“America Should Take Her Share”

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and U.S. Imperial Ambitions, 1915–1929

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Acknowledgments

I could not have completed my thesis without the advice and resources of dozens of people since I undertook it in March 2022. This was during my spring break, when I had the sudden epiphany to synthesize two developments I first experienced as a freshman: 1.) the critical methodology of Georgetown University’s slavery, memory, and reconciliation campaign since 2015, and 2.) an invisible specter of the past haunting the centennial celebration of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 2019. I have since put multiple hundreds of hours into this thesis. Admittedly, about a quarter of that time was spent attempting to develop a heavily theoretically basis for my paper. Over the summer, I studied classic liberal and Marxist theories of imperialism, dependency theory, unequal exchange, world-systems theory, postcolonial studies, the decolonial school, the black radical tradition, revisionist histories of U.S. diplomacy and white masculine culture, critical indigenous studies, and critical university studies, only to rely on a far more standard and accessible narrative-based account once I viewed my archival sources.¹

Lesson learned! In writing history, examine your primary sources first! Much of my research was seeing if any of the name in the archives had any results in Google Scholar or JSTOR. Almost all my key findings on Willard L. Beaulac, the first graduate of the School of Foreign Service, appeared in the last two weeks of my research! When writing about early twentieth-century imperialism, classic texts from Hobson, Lenin, Du Bois, and others can be intellectually invigorating, but make note that they are more than a century out of date!²

I am foremostly thankful for the support of my advisor, Professor Toshihio Huguchi, whose outstanding patience and consistent recommendations backed my efforts across the thesis process. Professor Higuchi also suggested that I present its preliminary version at the American Historical Association Conference in Philadelphia, which was a spectacular experience. I’m also deeply thankful for Professor Osama Abi-Mershed, who led my HIST 408 and 409 seminars with superb diligence. Without Professor Higuchi’s and Abi-Mershed’s support and confidence in my abilities, even when I strongly considered dropping my thesis in February, this project would have been a dramatically more challenging task.


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Morales Herrera. I must also indirectly thank Brett Guesford, who digitized many of the 289 Hoya articles I downloaded and reviewed for my archival research.

I also wish to credit the advice of academics who either had no relation to Georgetown University, or who retired or transferred from the university. Tamson Pietsch, Emily Rosenberg, Jamie Martin, Charisse Burden-Stelly, and Andrés Pertierra, each gave me useful advice, mostly in the form of book recommendations. When I reach out Patrick McNamara and Robert Emmett Curran, who both wrote about the early School of Foreign Service, they provided key primary source suggestions that helpfully narrowed down my archival search to the Booth Center. However, who knows! There might be an undiscovered wealth of documents relevant to the early School of Foreign Service at the Library of Congress, National Archives, or another location. I must also thank Benjamin Schafer—a fellow Buffalonian—for sharing his 2019 senior thesis, “Empire of Good Neighbors: Diplomatic, Commercial, and Racial Empire-Building at the Pan-American Exposition, Buffalo, 1901,” with me four years ago. Schafer’s superb analysis was one of many inspirations for me to interrogate the materializations of American empire on familiar turf. I could easily imagine him being the foremost historian on Buffalo’s past. Although I never personally communicated with him, Matthew Quallen’s editorials in The Hoya on Georgetown’s slaveholding past were also a significant inspiration for my historical investigation into the early School of Foreign Service. I likewise plan to write briefer summaries of my findings in another student publication, The Caravel, to expand the accessibility of my thesis research.

Last, I offer my utmost appreciation for the workers at the Fairfax, Virginia Micro Center and Uber drivers who took me to and from it. My laptop’s battery burned out only two weeks before the submission deadline for this thesis, but the Micro Center’s staff transferred all its data into a new device, rescuing dozens of hours of work and incidentally reminding me to save important documents on a flash drive more frequently. I highly recommend their services.

I give permission to Lauinger Library to make this thesis available to the public. I hope that readers, especially fellow Georgetown students, find this thesis enticing and even entertaining enough to prompt their own research projects in a similar spirit.
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Abbreviations

B29FR—Box 29 Financial Records

BFCSC—Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia

CMP—Constantine E. McGuire Papers

EWP—Edmund A. Walsh Papers

GCJ—Georgetown College Journal

MPA—Maryland Province Archives, Roland Park, Baltimore, Maryland

NCBNY—National City Bank of New York

SFSB1—School of Foreign Service Box 1 (1919–1929)

SFS—School of Foreign Service

SJ—Society of Jesuits

UFCO—United Fruit Company Organization

WASP—White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
Prologue

In *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, Michel-Rolph Trouillot uses the metaphor of a gun silencer as a meditation on how history “works” rather than what history “is.” The historian, in choosing to privilege and reproduce some narratives about the past over others, inevitably writes history as an active, constructed, and selective process: “one ‘silences’ a fact or an individual as a silencer silences a gun.” This understanding of history is at the heart of “‘America Should Take Her Share’: Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and U.S. Imperial Ambitions, 1915–1929.” My narration of the School of Foreign Service’s (SFS) first decade of existence consists of its own unique silences and amplifications, as would anyone else’s, a decision exemplified by the title, “America Should Take Her Share.” The quotation originates from the first document I intensively studied during my research at Georgetown University’s archives, one that was effectively “silenced” via its omission from earlier histories of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service.

This document was a letter sent to Roy S. MacElwee, dean of the School of Foreign Service, by the U.S. embassy in Constantinople on May 13, 1922. The school was less than three years old at the time, yet the letter’s contents and historical context reveal its already considerable impression on the United States’ overseas capabilities. Written by the embassy’s third secretary, the letter shared U.S. Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol’s gratitude for the school’s dedication toward American interests in the “Near East.” As a vocational college

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5 Third Secretary of Embassy, Assistant to the High Commissioner to Roy S. MacElwee, May 13, 1922, SFS 1922 File, School of Foreign Service Box 1 (1919–1929), Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia.
6 “Near East” in this context referred to Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions. At the time of the letter, Bristol was both the American High Commissioner to Turkey and the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the
predominantly concerned with instructing undergraduates for foreign trade careers, rather than the all-encompassing approach to international relations it is known for today, the School of Foreign Service valuably trained competent young men who would fill the ranks of overseas government offices and business postings responsible for managing America international commerce.\textsuperscript{7}

In 1919, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Rear Admiral William S. Sims, entrusted Bristol to safeguard U.S. economic expansion through beneficial relations with Turkey, a disgraced empire undergoing intense political uncertainty after its defeat as a member of the Central Powers during World War I.\textsuperscript{8} The United States never declared war on Turkey when it joined the Allies in 1917 and did not participate in the postwar treaties led by France and Great Britain that split up its territory.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, eager to take advantage of Great Britain’s poor reputation in Turkey, Sims and Bristol together saw an opportunity for the United States to replace its seafaring rival as the leading commercial power in the Eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{10} To fulfill his orders, Bristol took the image of Americans in front of Turkish nationals into careful consideration. He supplied aid resources and personnel to Turkey with utmost sincerity, but the cunning admiral also understood that the soft humanitarian power of the American missionary, school teacher, and relief worker were the perfect ancillaries to his core intention of exposing Turkish markets to the American businessman.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, Bristol felt that the growth of U.S. commercial relations with Turkey would simultaneously compel it to adopt the “benefits of modern civilization,” specifically good governance, religious liberty, universal education, and—

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\textsuperscript{7} Third Secretary to MacElwee, May 13, SFS 1922, 1922 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{8} Bryson, "Mark L. Bristol," 454.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 455–456.
“at some future time”—self-determination. The historian Thomas A. Bryson sums up Bristol’s diplomatic performance as one that “aggressively employ[ed] the Open-Door principle in the traditional manner to defend and extend American economic enterprise,” albeit one much less intrusive than the competing Allied imperial powers.

Bristol’s intentions in Turkey sharply mirrored those disseminated at the School of Foreign Service five thousand miles away. Given the brevity of his correspondence with MacElwee, Bristol’s liaison did not delve into the granular details of how the School of Foreign Service would benefit their mission in the Near East, but he reported that the admiral gladly awaited the future performances of its graduates. Bristol’s objectives on U.S. commercial interests and racial interactions in the region reverberated across the letter. The secretary foremostly noted “how important it is that America should take her share in the development of the great natural resources” and grumbled that the men currently representing American interests abroad lacked the training of “how to deal with other races.” Administrators of the School of Foreign Service in downtown Washington, DC—only blocks away from the nexuses of American international power at the Departments of Commerce and State—shared the secretary’s attitudes. They eagerly saw the world shaken by World War I as a global market ripe for commercial opportunity, a world that also required great tact to handle the “racial prejudices and antipathies” of foreign peoples. Across the 1920s, the School of Foreign Service would continue to loyally facilitate the needs of American commerce and business in the world’s

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12 Bristol to Lewis Heck, 25 Feb. 1920, box 37, Bristol papers, quoted in Ibid., 458.
13 Ibid., 466. Several American policymakers and businessmen viewed the Open Door Policy as an alternative to traditional territorial colonialism. Based upon principles of free trade and anti-protectionism, the Open Door Policy expected that tearing down trade barriers to the United States would permit the country’s massive economic resources and potential to dominate the world’s peripheral regions. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York City, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009/1962): 53.
14 Third Secretary to MacElwee, 1922.
15 Ibid.
16 Thomas I. Gasson, “Congratulations from the Sick Room,” 1922, SFS 1922 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
peripheral regions, foremostly Latin America, but also Russia, East Asia, and others. Silences on this intricate interwar entanglement between American global ascendency and higher education at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service—such as the 1922 Bristol–MacElwee correspondence—are where this thesis intervenes.
Introduction

Founded in 1919 as the first permanent American school to specialize in international affairs, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service (SFS) uniquely anticipated trends that the United States’ post-World War I geopolitical standing would require the training of young men to manage its overseas prowess. Across the next ten years, through the funding and guidance of various American institutions such as the U.S. Steel Corporation and the Department of Commerce, the School of Foreign Service emerged as a platform to project U.S. imperial ambitions abroad. Administrators, faculty, and student each facilitated the labor and ideology to imagine and facilitate a global market advantageous for the rising nation. This inquiry primarily examines the relationship between the school’s pedagogical mission and the United States’ response to a transforming world during the first decade of the interwar period. This research on the School of Foreign Service’s origins hopes to encourage more scrutiny on the school’s impact on the global arena and generally assist broader historical scholarship in situating the American university within the global political economy.

My decision to take on this project was a very abrupt decision intimately built into my experiences as an SFS undergraduate. Heavily inspired by the multidisciplinary field of critical university studies, my reflections on Georgetown University’s global influence compelled me to investigate a topic close to home, a deconstructive history that would invert the gaze of academia onto the foundational institutions and ideologies of the School of Foreign Service.\footnote{For a survey of critical university studies, see Chatterjee and Maira, The Imperial University; Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America's Universities (London, UK: Bloomsbury Press, 2013); La paperson, A Third University Is Possible (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017) Davarian L. Baldwin, In the Shadow of the Ivory Tower: How Universities Are Plundering Our Cities (New York, NY: Bold Type Books, 2021); Roderick A. Ferguson, The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London, UK: 1999); and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (New York, NY: Autonomedia, 2013).} Two
personal experiences most provoked this decision. The first was Georgetown University’s reckoning with its slaveholding past, particularly the 1838 sale of 272 slaves by Maryland Province Jesuits that financially rescued the university.\(^\text{18}\) Although descendants of these slaves always recalled this history, and Georgetown University Jesuits and historians chronicled it since 1983, it remained virtually unknown to the wider public for nearly two centuries.\(^\text{19}\) It was not until 2015, when articles written by SFS student Matthew Quallen in The Hoya undergraduate newspaper reframed these events as a present problem, that Georgetown University officials decided to address its slaveholding past in a more formal and open manner.\(^\text{20}\) This controversy quickly became a focal point in ongoing debates on the historical memorialization and reconciliation of slavery in the United States. It particularly continues to see vocal advocacy from descendants of those slaves and students demanding material reparations from the university.\(^\text{21}\)

The second experience was the centennial celebration of the School of Foreign Service during my freshman year in 2019, a momentous celebration reflecting on “100 Years of Service” since the school’s foundation in 1919.\(^\text{22}\) The centennial’s impressive catalogue of lecture series and social events, featuring high-profile figures in international affairs such as former President Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and World Bank Group President

\(^{18}\) See the recently published collection of relevant documents to Georgetown’s slaveholding past and contemporary reconciliation, Adam Rothman and Elsa Barraza Mendoza, Facing Georgetown’s History: A Reader on Slavery, Memory, and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021).


\(^{22}\) For more information on the SFS Centennial, see “Centennial Celebrations,” Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, https://sfs.georgetown.edu/mission/legacy/sfs-100/.
David Malpass among others, furnished an aura of elite excellence aiming toward the cultivation of international community and cooperation. The book *SFS 100: A Century of Service* was one of many commemorative outcomes of the centennial. When I contrasted these experiences that marked Georgetown’s past in two jarringly different fashions, an exciting question became immediately clear to me: what would a more critical historical account of the School of Foreign Service look like? One comparative to recent accounts of Georgetown University and its past with slavery?

**Literature Review**

To my surprise, and despite the substantive—occasionally nationwide—attention held to Georgetown’s past for almost a decade, this question about the School of Foreign Service was left almost entirely untouched in both academic literature and public discourse. However, this thesis is not the first work on the origins of the School of Foreign Service. My literature review come across seven secondary source texts on Georgetown University, the School of Foreign Service, or Edmund A. Walsh—probably the singularly most important figure in SFS history—across the relevant timeframe of 1915 to 1929, beginning with the original idea of a foreign service school and ending with the school’s tenth anniversary commemoration. W. Coleman Nevils’ *Miniatures of Georgetown, 1634–1934: Tercentennial Causeries* and Joseph T. Durkin’s *Georgetown University: First in the Nation’s Capital* were the earliest published texts on the School of Foreign Service’s beginnings. Both authors agree that the school’s financial supporters and Jesuit planners desired to train students for international trade on American ideals of

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23 Clinton is an SFS Class of 1968 alumni and Albright was a distinguished practice in diplomacy professor at the School of Foreign Service at the time of the centennial.
liberalism and commercialism.\textsuperscript{24} Despite the three-decade difference in publication dates, the only noteworthy difference between these two books is Nevils’ additional focus on early School of Foreign Service connections with Latin America via the Pan-American Union, the precursor to the Organization of American States and an organization founded in 1890 to stir greater cooperation between the hemisphere’s republics.\textsuperscript{25}

In contrast to these earlier works that focused on the School of Foreign Service peripherally, Seth P. Tillman’s \textit{Georgetown's School of Foreign Service: The First 75 Years} offers the first book-length view of the school’s history. Tillman contextualizes the School of Foreign Service’s roots as the United States grew into a global powerhouse, culminating with President Woodrow Wilson’s pronouncements of constructing a “new world order” based upon ambitious new international organizations such as the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{26} Tillman importantly distinguishes the School of Foreign Service from Wilson’s global ambitions by noting that it was also established as the U.S. Senate rejected the League of Nations, fundamentally restricting the United States’ global political engagement.\textsuperscript{27} The policies first advanced by a Republican-led Congress (1919–1931) largely hostile to Wilsonian ambitions, and further executed by fellow Republicans Warren G. Harding (president, 1919–1923), Calvin Coolidge (president, 1923–1929), and Herbert Hoover (secretary of commerce, 1921–1929, and president, 1929–1933), instead stressed stronger business ties and trade with foreign countries, a prioritization of an economic over than political maintenance of international order.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} Nevils, SJ \textit{Miniatures of Georgetown}, 427.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, 9.
The next book of note is the second volume to Robert Emmett Curran’s three-part History of Georgetown University series, The Quest for Excellence, 1889–1964. Compared to Tillman, Curran places a heavier emphasis on Walsh’s dualism between preparing men for war and for peace, the former role he took up as troop instructor during World War I, and the latter as the dean (1919–1921) and regent (1920–1956) of the School of Foreign Service.\(^{29}\) Walsh desired an elite replication of the military training he oversaw during wartime for a new generation of foreign service corps at Georgetown.\(^{30}\) He affirmed at the School of Foreign Service’s opening commemoration on November 25, 1919 that “unprepared as we were for war, we have highly resolved that we shall not be unprepared for peace.”\(^{31}\) Curran further supplements his chronology of the early School of Foreign Service with a substantial listing of prominent graduates and faculty members.\(^{32}\)

Two other texts specifically pertain to the interwar School of Foreign Service: Emily Solis-Cohen in “Father Walsh and the Founding of the School of Foreign Service” and SFS 100: A Century of Service, both of which shed more light onto the original financial backing behind the university.\(^{33}\) Solis-Cohen approaches her inquiry through an intensive interpretation of a 1918 letter that stressed finding wealthy, anti-socialist funders, while the centennial book shares the story of U.S. Steel President James A. Farrell’s tight ties to the school’s original endowment.\(^{34}\) The last two relevant books focus on Edmund A. Walsh. Louis J. Gallagher’s

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., 91.


\(^{32}\) Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 92.


\(^{34}\) Solis-Cohen, “Father Walsh,” 65; School of Foreign Service, SFS 100, 14-17. The only thesis on the School of Foreign Service covered the leadership theories and practices from SFS deans during the late twentieth century.
Edmund A. Walsh, S.J.: A Biography is a rather hagiographical text written by one of Walsh’s close friends, but Patrick J. McNamara’s A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics of American Catholic Anticommunism is by far the most analytically rich book on the School of Foreign Service’s origins despite only covering it for a chapter. McNamara takes up a uniquely critical approach on the School of Foreign Service among secondary sources: he identifies Walsh’s moral celebration of American constitutionalism and Christendom—an ideological formation he stamped onto the early School of Foreign Service—as the nascent form of the radical anticommunist views he developed over the next thirty years.

To my surprise, there is a broad literature gap on histories of American higher education’s ties to U.S. foreign relations during the interwar period. Except for the two world wars, nearly every scholarly contribution on this topic focuses on the Cold War, a period when national defense and security funding flooded almost every department in the humanities and sciences. Australian historian Tamson Pietsch documented transcontinental scholarly networks

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Clare Ogden, “Inside the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service: How Its Contemporary Deans Shaped the School,” Masters Thesis, the School of Continuing Studies and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University, 2018. There was also a Georgetown Voice article published in 2018 on the beginnings of the School of Foreign Service, but it only takes a cursory look that uncovers no new information beyond the previously mentioned books. Ari Shapiro, “Solidarity Shouts: School of Foreign ‘Service’?” The Georgetown Voice, March 2, 2018, https://georgetownvoice.com/2018/03/02/solidarity-shouts-school-of-foreign-service/.


36 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 89, 134–135.

across the British Empire from 1850–1939, but no equivalent comprehensive book-length study exists of how American universities interacted with the world or even its colonies before 1945.  

Coincidentally, Pietsch released another book partly addressing this gap only weeks before the thesis’s completion, *The Floating University: Experience, Empire, and the Politics of Knowledge*, which narrates an unsuccessful attempt in 1926 to tour five hundred American college students on a worldwide ship voyage. The “Floating University” intended to prepare these students for cosmopolitan leadership in the aftermath of World War I amidst a rising United States, albeit far less successfully than the School of Foreign Service’s more grounded efforts in Washington, DC. Pietsch’s review of existing historical literature on U.S. universities highly resembled my own, observing that while voluminous scholarship existed on the Cold War, inquiries of U.S. imperial power and knowledge during the interwar period remain heavily underexamined. The few pieces that actually touch upon this era are brief, selective, and almost entirely focus on student study abroad programs. Only two historical works acted as contextual pieces for these questions regarding the 1920s: Ido Oden’s chronological outline of the earliest schools of international affairs in the United States, and Ricardo Salvatore’s research on the “disciplinary conquest” of Latin America by early twentieth century U.S. scholars. This

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 4–5.
surprising lack of relevant secondary sources made the thesis process daunting, but it also presented an exciting opportunity to tread upon a relatively untouched past.

My thesis research was overwhelmingly based upon the archival primary sources at the Booth Family Center for Special Collections inside Georgetown University’s Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library and the center’s additional storage at the Maryland Province Archives. Containing a file or two for each year, Box 1 (1919–1929) of the School of Foreign Service records was by far the most useful archival resource, but the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Catalogues, 1919–30, Constantine E. McGuire Papers, John B. Creeden Papers, Box 29 Financial Records, and records of the student publications The Georgetown College Journal and The Hoya were other core contributions. The sole singular physical archival materials I collected from outside the Booth Center were the William Franklin Sands Papers at the Philadelphia Archdiocesan Historical Research Center, which an archive employee emailed to me. Coincidentally, over the course of writing this thesis, the location of this collection was later transferred from Philadelphia to the Booth Center, where I viewed them again alongside the William F. Beaulac Papers, Commencement Files, and photo archives on the early School of Foreign Service.

**Theoretical Background**

I originally planned to back up the thesis with a substantially theoretical basis, but I later choose to adopt a far more narrative approach that overwhelmingly relied on the empirical description and analysis of my archival primary sources. The past’s particularity and complexity tend to disrupt any grand historical theories. There were a few texts, however, that offered useful interpretations of the “imperial” or “imperialism” that were both academically rigorous and suitably applicable to the early School of Foreign Service. These works generally interpreted
imperialism as the reproduction of hierarchical relationships between hegemonic core countries holding considerable political or economic sway over less powerful peripheral countries. However, they also understood that imperialism as social relation was not necessarily territorial, totalizing, or even deliberate. The first relevant work is Paul A. Kramer’s essential 2011 article, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World.” Kramer is pragmatically concerned with what the “imperial” implies for studies of United States in the world rather than a completely consistent transhistorical definition. Nonetheless, he does provide the following general description of what he means by imperial; while vague, it was still a useful analytical heuristic for my research:

Here the imperial refers to a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.

There are five key components of this definition: 1.) orders of scale, whether based around military, economic, politic, or cultural power; 2.) the re-organization of space, whether expressed through changes in physical territory, institutions, networks, or ideological discourses; 3.) the exceptionalization of difference, usually through hierarchical gradations such as class, race, and gender; 4.) an emphasis on consequences, regardless of any deliberate intention to enact imperialism; and 5.) an view of the imperial as a category of analysis rather than purely as an entity, the definition’s most overarching aspect. Whether securing territorial conquest or more informal political and economic dominance, both of which the United States participated

45 Ibid., 1348.
46 Ibid., 1348–1349.
47 Ibid.
in, Kramer’s broad imperial framework is core to this thesis. His observation that the actions of empires often lack or deny consciously “imperialist” motivations is especially useful. Officials at Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service never explicitly advocated for an “American empire” between 1915 and 1929, but the global repercussions and affiliations of the School of Foreign Service certainly fit within the parameters of the above-mentioned “imperial.” Institutions such as the School of Foreign Service foremostly took advantage of the United States’ postwar ascendancy into an “informal” imperialism of economic domination.

The school’s ideological frameworks that backed this imperial mission brings me to the second relevant work on imperialism: the previously mentioned 2016 book by Ricardo Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900–1945. Latin America was by far the most important region to the early School of Foreign Service’s interests, so Salvatore’s research on the “imperiality” of knowledge gathered by five early Latin Americanists is especially helpful. In fact, one of these five scholars, the political scientist Leo Stanton Rowe, was a lecturer at the School of Foreign Service and is a key figure for the thesis’ arguments. Salvatore’s approach to the “imperial” is more epistemological; in the context of early Latin American studies, he understands it as the accumulation of local information across the peripheral Latin American countries into a more comprehensible and practical knowledge for

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48 Since 1898, the United States had territorially annexed the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, America Samoa, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and various Pacific and Caribbean islands. Across the early twentieth century, it had also conducted military interventions or occupations in Cuba, Panama, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and the Honduras while these countries officially maintained their sovereign independence. The China Relief Expedition arranged to put down the 1899–1901 Boxer Rebellion is the notable major exception of a U.S. military intervention outside of Latin American without aims of colonization, unlike the 1899–1902 Philippine–American War. See Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire A History of the Greater United States (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishers, 2019); Alan McPherson, A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons); and Aaron Simon Daggett, America in the China Relief Expedition (London, UK: Forgotten Books, 2013/1903).

49 Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest.
U.S. scholars, diplomats, politicians, and businessmen in the core. More specifically, “the sense of hegemony, exemplarity, and purported cultural and technological superiority” among scholars from major American research universities facilitated the knowledge production of early Latin American studies. This accumulated research was a precondition to making authoritative institutional assessments of Latin America, and deepened U.S. government and business involvement in the region. In my own studies, I have found that knowledge production at the early School of Foreign Service, which heavily interpreted the world as a potential marketplace that SFS graduates would unfurl to the winds of American free market commerce, relied upon an adjacent imperial project.

**Summary of Chapters**

Chapter One begins with World War I, which sparked the conditions that made the School of Foreign Service possible. Support for American war efforts in Europe encouraged Georgetown’s leadership to reconsider its relationship with the country’s growing interests and responsibilities overseas. It specifically explains how Edmund A. Walsh first segued this wartime reconsideration into a far deeper partnership between the state and Georgetown University following the conflict’s end. To further contextualize the intentions of the new institution headed by Walsh, I step back and introduce Constantine E. McGuire, an international trade bureaucrat who originally had the idea of a foreign service school in the nation’s capital in 1915. Georgetown University President John B. Creeden approved of McGuire’s plan in June 1918 and assigned Edmund A. Walsh to oversee and promote the project’s execution in November 1918, a role Walsh resolutely fulfilled across the next three decades. Patrick

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50 Ibid., 8, 14.  
51 Ibid., 13.  
52 Ibid., 5.
McNamara aptly sums up the trio’s contributions to the School of Foreign Service’s beginning: “McGuire was the expert, Walsh the activist, and Creeden the educator.” From the first sessions of its preliminary single semester in February 1919 to its formal inaugural welcoming ceremony on November 25, 1919, the School of Foreign Service immediately established itself as an ideological apparatus for advancing the United States’ foreign commercial interests.

Chapter Two elaborates how this chiefly vocational, undergraduate-focused mission of the early School of Foreign Service strayed massively from McGuire’s original proposal. He intended for a far more ambitious plan, an advanced studies institute that would attract academics and policymakers across the Americas. A disappointed McGuire eventually severed his formal ties with the School of Foreign Service, but his continual—at many points amusing—interactions with Georgetown leadership, reveal how he maintained ambitions for a leading international institute. Beyond this individual focus, this chapter more importantly emphasizes the driving imperialist characteristic of the School of Foreign Service: its staunch promotion of interpreting the world as a market. Most SFS graduates entered foreign government and business offices at low-ranking positions, but this commercialist conviction threads throughout the school’s connections to the most coercive U.S. behavior abroad, foremostly its occupations of countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

Chapter Three records the School of Foreign Service as it enthusiastically approached its tenth anniversary in 1929. The chapter particularly focuses on two of the school’s explicit interactions with U.S. foreign policy as the special occasion approached. The first—advocacy for a national shipping fleet—made little impact on government decisions, but the second—support for the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact—was a successful alignment with U.S. ambitions for an anti-

war, rules-based global order. The SFS Tenth Anniversary Commencement, a spectacular honorary event starring invitations across Washington, DC’s diplomatic scene, exemplified this strategy. The special guest speaker for the occasion was U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, one of the pact’s namesakes, and the most prominent American advocate for international peace since Woodrow Wilson. This focus on Kellogg also counterbalances the more materialist emphasis from previous chapters to show the importance of liberal internationalist ideals to the early School of Foreign Service.

Unlike its predecessors, Chapter Four takes on a predominantly thematic approach to the School of Foreign Service, focusing on how affiliates of School of Foreign Service approached questions of imperialism and anti-imperialism, from formal territorial colonialism in the Philippines to informal empire in Cuba and Nicaragua. It ends with a contrast of anti-imperialist SFS professor John Halladay Latané’s presence at the Fourth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War to Kellogg’s address to the School of Foreign Service. I last formally conclude my thesis with a comparison of the international history of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service to William Appleman William’s class work, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, and a plea for future scholars to take up similar critical histories of the university’s institutions in the future.
Chapter One: An “Alliance of Knowledge and Power”: the Idea and Foundation of the School of Foreign Service, 1915-1919

World War I and Peacetime Reconstruction

Prior to any serious consideration of a foreign service school, Georgetown’s leadership had a far more existential concern related to the United States’ foreign affairs. When the United States entered World War in 1917, Georgetown officials feared that lackluster support for the war, combined with the university’s Jesuit management, would harm the national reputation of the Society of Jesuits.\(^\text{54}\) American higher education was largely ambivalent to the conflict upon its outbreak in 1914, but by Congress’s declaration of war three years later, it resolutely backed the Allied powers in a moral struggle against the evils of autocracy and militarism.\(^\text{55}\) In November 1917, Georgetown President Alphonsus J. Donlon warned Father Provincial Anthony J. Maas, his superior as the head of the Society of Jesuit’s Maryland Province, that if they did not make a stronger showing of support for the war effort, the society would lose credibility and public influence within the United States.\(^\text{56}\) Donlon further feared that other Americans would whisper doubts over their loyalty to the nation’s cause: “there is no doubt people are talking and their criticism is growing and before long may take an unfriendly coloring.”\(^\text{57}\) Donlon suggested that Mass make a few bureaucratic rearrangements within the society as well as supply the U.S. military with more Jesuit chaplains, especially as government officials made “an earnest effort to stamp out vice in the vicinity of the camps.”\(^\text{58}\) In his return message, Maas agreed with Donlon’s concerns that to avoid public mistrust amidst these exceptional times, “one must give external

\(^{54}\) Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 78.

\(^{55}\) Gruber, *Mars and Minerva*, 78–82.

\(^{56}\) Alphonsus J. Donlon, SJ to Anthony J. Maas, SJ, November 27, 1917, 1, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1917–1918), Box 29 Financial Records, Maryland Province Archive.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 1–2.
manifestation of his patriotism.” Fortunately a year later, the next university president, John B. Creeden, reported to Maas that a total of 1,498 Georgetown alumni, including three generals, had so far entered the U.S. Army, Navy, or Marines. Creeden confirmed that “we have fared well for a non-military college.” By the November 11, 1918 armistice that concluded the war, over 2,600 alumni had served and fifty-six had died fighting in U.S. military forces.

Beyond the war’s immediate human costs was a tremendous institutional transformation at Georgetown University, one faced by American higher education in general. The sheer organizational requirements of tracking massive inventories of men, equipment, and funding for of the U.S. military prompted a nationwide standardization of university bureaucracies. Furthermore, although Georgetown University always felt a close symbolic attachment to the U.S. government due to its proximity to the nation’s capital and establishment in 1789, the same year as the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, World War I marked an unprecedented development in the university’s growing alignment with the government’s overseas directives. Even during the American Civil War, Georgetown administrators did not take up the nation’s cause with nearly as much vigor, fearing an anti-Catholic backlash if they took a staunch position on a matter as divisive as succession. Half a century later, united against a foreign enemy and seeing the opportunity to prove its patriotism, Georgetown zealously rallied behind the American

59 Maas, SJ to Donlon, SJ, November 1917, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1917–1918), B29FR, MPA.
60 John B. Creeden, SJ to Maas, SJ, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1917–1918), B29FR, MPA, 1–2.
61 Ibid.
62 Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 80–81.
65 Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 78.
war machine. This campaign permanently expanded the degree to which Georgetown attached itself to the national government’s overseas interests.

These nationalistic trends reveal themselves within a 1918 correspondence between W. Coleman Nevils, the dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and President Creeden. Nevils writes the letter as essentially an ode to the intimate connection between the United States and Georgetown since the foundation of both entities in 1789: “We Americans love to trace the history of our country’s growth; we feel a thrill of exultation at every new increase in her powerfulness.” He marks each major war of the growing nation with a corresponding expansion of the university: the War of 1812 (1812–1815) and Georgetown’s charter (1815), the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) and the establishment of the School of Medicine (1851) and the Graduate School (1855), the Civil War (1861–1865) and the School of Law (1870), and the Spanish-American War (1898) and Georgetown Hospital (1898) and the School of Dentistry (1901). Consistent with this tradition of American military prowess and Georgetown expansion, he anticipated the advent next year of the School of Foreign Service as a celebratory outcome of a world battered by the war that needs a United States to help push it toward liberty and peace.

The last war mentioned by Nevils—the war with Spain—also marks a geographic narrative departure from continental growth to overseas affairs: World War I exposed the United States to novel global realities and responsibilities. Now, the United States must unroll her commercial prestige to distant lands and maintain exemplary standards for conducting consular and trade services. Nevils eagerly felt that the newly inaugurated School of Foreign Service was up to the task of fulfilling America’s new expectations as a major player in the world.

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66 William Coleman Nevils to Creeden, 1918, SFS 1918 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
arena. He concluded with the exuberant statement, “As our country has expanded so have we. America, thou hast no more loyal institution than Georgetown.” Nevil’s excitement corresponds well with Mark R. Nemec’s observations that university administrators were eager and zealous entrepreneurs who took initiative and pushed forward nationalist interests; they were not merely compliant attendants to the educational policies of the state. McNamara further noted that Georgetown’s initiative on the School of Foreign Service was a rare occurrence where a Catholic college anticipated rather than acted upon broader trends among American universities. Despite the United States’ rapid commercial and territorial expansion since the latter-half of the nineteenth-century, the U.S. government had no official foreign service until 1924 with the passage of the Rogers Act. Attaining diplomatic positions before World War I relied more on political connections rather than training in a formal educational environment taught at a university. U.S. diplomats’ positions required far more expertise and training after the war as international trade necessitated more government supervision and assistance to American businessmen, such as the cementing of contracts with foreign governments and attuning businesses to local customs and traditions.

Edmund A. Walsh, a thirty-two year old Jesuit who obtained his priesthood in 1916 and joined Georgetown’s faculty in May 1918, embodied the transition of this collaboration into peacetime conditions. As a Student Army Training Corps regional inspector, Walsh was

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
76bid., 2.
responsible for training student cadets into officers during the war.\textsuperscript{77} Walsh’s experience convinced him of the need for an professional cohort specializing in global commerce that would rally for peace instead of war. He would later call this, “the West Point for Foreign Service and a national clearinghouse of foreign trade information.”\textsuperscript{78} Walsh’s dramatic personality and theatrical aura—often wearing a flowing black cape on campus or posing for photographs against world maps and globes—made him the perfect mouthpiece for Georgetown’s latest addition.\textsuperscript{79} Creeden hired Walsh knowing that the enthusiastic priest had the elite know-how and activist fervor to find and encourage prominent scholars, businessmen, and government officials to join the School of Foreign Service either as faculty members or financial contributors.\textsuperscript{80} Following Creeden’s orders, Walsh quickly secured political and financial backing from the U.S. Shipping Board and the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce at the Department of Commerce.\textsuperscript{81} Within half a year, Walsh attained the $500,000 recommended by the prospective school’s endowment board, an amount almost quadruple that of Georgetown University’s endowment.\textsuperscript{82}

Walsh’s remarkable ability to scrap together the necessary talents and resources for the surfacing school would lead his friend and later biographer Louis J. Gallagher to write, “There can be no doubt as to who did the plow work, the irrigation, the harvesting, and the marketing of this new field of education, once the university decided to take it over. Father Walsh was Georgetown.”\textsuperscript{83} The historical consensus and public record rightfully credit Walsh as the

\textsuperscript{77} Curran, \textit{The Quest for Excellence}, 82.
\textsuperscript{78} Edmund A. Walsh, SJ, “Systematic Training for Foreign Service,” Address Delivered at Annual Convention American Manufacturers Export Association, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, October 17, 1919, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1919), B29FR, MPA, 1–12.
\textsuperscript{79} McNamara, \textit{A Catholic Cold War}, 15–16
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, 18.
\textsuperscript{81} Creeden to Rockwell, Washington, January 25, 1919, H-1, MPARP; \textit{Woodstock Letters} 48, no. 1 (1919): 114
\textsuperscript{82} Curran, \textit{The Quest for Excellence}, 91.
individual most responsible for the successful implementation of the School of Foreign Service, but to better understand the imperial character of the school’s foundation, it is also necessary to introduce Constantine E. McGuire and his original vision for the school.

**Constantine E. McGuire, the Initiator of the School of Foreign Service**

Born in Boston on April 4, 1890, Constantine McGuire quickly grew into elite circles as a young man, earning his bachelors, masters, and doctorate degrees from Harvard University. During a 1913–1914 traveling fellowship that funded his studies across Europe, McGuire encountered France’s National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations, an impressive global-orientated university that was his initial inspiration for an equivalent institution in the United States. Upon receiving his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1915, McGuire solemnly discovered that the university’s religious prejudices barred any Catholic from teaching medieval history at Harvard, dashing his dreams of becoming a professor. Later that year, he joined the Inter-American High Commission in Washington, DC as a research assistant, and within a few months, McGuire became the commission’s assistant secretary general. McGuire’s main role was presiding over the commission’s jurists and financers; men who helped stabilized exchange rates and disposed of regulatory obstacles to business relations between the twenty republics of the Western Hemisphere. It was in this prestigious position that McGuire cultivated several of the connections that soon prompted his foreign service school proposal.

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85 Quigley, “‘Constantine McGuire,’” Ibid.
86 Ibid., 13.
87 Ibid.
88 “Memorandum concerning the qualification of C.E. E. McGuire to be certified to take the examination for admission to the Bar in the District of Columbia,” 1920, 1–2, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.
McGuire was very well-connected, barring friendships across the world with Vatican cardinals, U.S. Naval College generals and admirals, and Swedish billionaire Axel Wenner-Gren, among other notably powerful individuals and organizations. His friends rumored that behind the scenes, McGuire was among the most influential Catholic layman in the United States, acting as a financial counsel to the papacy and supposedly convincing the Vatican to move its gold security holdings from the United States the summer before the 1929 Wall Street Crash.

McGuire was also passionately opinionated. After he passed away in 1965, C. S. Tenley—McGuire’s close friend and stenographer at the Inter-American High Commission (and a 1924 SFS graduate)—recalled that McGuire “had given a complete dressing down” to political and legal figures as prominent as a Supreme Court justice, a White House Cabinet secretary, and a Latin American president. Knowing that McGuire hated the small talk and gossip among the “magpies” at Georgetown, Tenley joked that if McGuire were able to read his obituary by

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89 C. S. Tenley to Joseph M. Jeffs, March 22, 1979, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.  
90 Quigley, “Constantine McGuire,” 12; This last rumor reputedly inspired the British writer W. Somerset Maugham to base a character off McGuire for his 1944 novel The Razor’s Edge. The character, Elliott Templeton, is a charismatic and snobbish American expatriate simultaneously infatuated with the gregarious social life of Paris and the hierarchical order of the Catholic Church. Elliot heavily profited from the 1929 crash by selling short the summer before, and even on his death bed glowing professed that “I have always moved in the best society in Europe and I have no doubt that I shall move in the best society in heaven” (274). Below is another amusing passage regarding Elliott’s socialite proclivities:  
“Elliott was too clever not to see that many of the persons who accepted his invitations did so only to get a free meal and that of these some were stupid and some worthless. The glamour of their resounding titles blinded him to their faults. I can only guess that to be on terms of intimate familiarity with these gentlemen of ancient lineage, to be the faithful retainer of their ladies, gave him a sensation of triumph that never palled; and I think that at the back of it all was a passionate romanticism that led him to see in the weedy little French duke the crusader who had gone to the Holy Land with Saint Louis and in the blustering, fox-hunting English earl the ancestor who had attended Henry the Eighth to the Field of the Cloth of Gold. In the company of such as these he felt that he lived in a spacious and gallant past. I think when he turned the pages of the Almanach de Gotha his heart beat warmly as one name after another brought back to him recollections of old wars, historic sieges and celebrated duels, diplomatic intrigues and the love affairs of kings” (16–17).  
Georgetown Professor Carrol Quigley, who suspensefully titled it, “Constantine McGuire: Man of Mystery,” he would have had Quigley “stretched” in the woods behind the campus grounds.  

Despite his fondness for everything high status, McGuire hated dragging attention to himself. Outside of their affiliations with the powerful, his personality was the complete opposite of the bombastic Walsh, whose showmanship was one of the reasons why McGuire accepted Walsh’s execution of the school plan. He was so determined to stay outside of the public spotlight that few of McGuire’s obituaries mentioned his ties to the School of Foreign Service except for Quigley’s article, which sought to correct this record. In a letter to the Georgetown archivist, Tenley clarified that contrary to the enticing subtitle, “Man of Mystery,” McGuire made no effort to cultivate an aura of mystery surrounding his contributions to the School of Foreign Service, but “only a desire to work without interruption, publicity, or fanfare.” Never referring to himself as the “founder of the SFS,” McGuire always duly credited Walsh as the paramount genius behind the school, who remained a close lifelong friend of his even after McGuire’s later falling out with the school. Even when Georgetown officials offered to award McGuire with an honorary degree in 1953 and name a student loan fund after him in 1958 for his SFS services, he declined the distinctions on principle.

91 Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, 1–3.
92 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 13–16.
94 Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, 1.
95 Ibid. Walsh and his friend and post-mortem biographer Louis J. Gallagher would later hold that—not too dissimilar to McGuire—his education at foreign universities in pre-war Europe inspired him for a foreign service school in the United States. However, McNamara believe this claim was possibly historical revisionism on Walsh’s part: his diaries from the time period only made minor statistical references to European universities. Gallagher, Edmund A. Walsh, 11; McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 181.
96 Ibid., 3; McGuire to George S. Roper, June 26, 1958, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BUSC, 1–3; For the latter honor, McGuire suggested that Creedon, Tierney, Nevils, or Farrell would be more suitable candidates.
McGuire thoroughly explains the background of the School of Foreign Service’s creation in an April 19, 1953 letter he sent to William F. Maloney, the newly selected father provincial of the Maryland Province. McGuire first drew up the school’s plan in 1916–1917 and shared it with Thomas I. Gasson, graduate dean of sociology, and President John B. Creeden of Georgetown University. Nothing materialized from this meeting, however, because Creeden told McGuire that Georgetown would be unable to take on such a sizeable project. McGuire then suggested the “Consular and Diplomatic School” to Catholic University President Thomas J. Shahan in 1918. Outraged that anti-clerical movements across Latin America diminished the Church’s power in the region and that American Catholics were a rare presence across the nation’s diplomatic and consular corps, McGuire’s proposal for Catholic University took on a more passionately denominational character than at Georgetown. Nonetheless, he received a similar rejection from Shahan.

A few months later on May 16, 1918, Constantine McGuire enclosed a memorandum disclosing more details of the school to Farther Richard H. Tierney, the editor of leading Catholic magazine America and a personal acquaintance of Creeden, and asked him to pass on the proposal to Creeden if he found it worthwhile. McGuire again shared his deliberate desire for a Catholic institution to host the school, finding the lack of Catholics in U.S. diplomatic and consular services to be a sign of constant negligence in advancing transnational Catholic cooperation: “It is essential to the unity of Catholics of this hemisphere that a layer proportion—

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97 McGuire to William F. Maloney, SJ, April 19, 1953, Constantine McGuire Folder, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2–4; In the 1953 letter, McGuire additionally disclosed that other than Walsh, he assumed that Portuguese Professor Joaquim de Siqueira Coutinho was the only remaining Georgetown faculty who had any knowledge of his contributions to the school’s foundation. *Ibid.*, 4.
99 Constantine E. McGuire to Thomas J. Shanan, “The Consular and Diplomatic School of the Catholic University of America,” 1918, 1–3, SFS 1918 (?) Memo on Origins of SFS File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.
100 *Ibid.*
at least half!—of our representatives (diplomatic and consular) in Latin America should be Catholic.\textsuperscript{102} With a graduate-level institution in mind, McGuire believed that Georgetown would attract Catholics across Canada and Latin America to the foreign service school.\textsuperscript{103} This prestigious facility would eventually become a source of diplomats for the U.S. Department of State, supplanting the elite WASP stronghold held over the profession.\textsuperscript{104}

McGuire was sure that wealthy American Catholics interested in foreign trade would contribute to the school’s endowment. McGuire’s list of proposed funders featured some of the United States’ most powerful and affluent businesspersons across a number of industries, including James A. Farrell, president of the U.S. Steel Corporation; Charles M. Schwab, president of Bethlehem Steel; Edward L. Doheny, founder of the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company; and Frederic C. Penfield, a former U.S. diplomat married to Anne Weightman, one of the world’s wealthiest women.\textsuperscript{105} When Tierney got back to McGuire, he informed him that Creeden would like to meet him and recount the project once more. During this second offer, Creeden and McGuire confirmed the plan for foreign service school and awaited the war’s armistice to officially place it into effective action.\textsuperscript{106} The day after, Creeden appointed Walsh for the task, having returned from his work with the Student Army Training

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 1–2.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{104} Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 3; Among this list, Edward L. Doheny is the most immortalized through fictionalized depictions. He was the loose real-life inspiration for the oil tycoon characters James Arnold Ross in Upton Sinclair’s 1926–1927 novel Oil! and Daniel Plainview in the 2007 film directed by Paul Thomas Anderson, There Will Blood, the latter of which filmed its climatic ending at the basement of Doheny’s Beverly Hills mansion. Jason Sperb, “I Have a Competition in Me: Political Allegory, Artistic Collaboration, and Narrative of Perfection in There Will Be Blood,” Blossoms and Blood: Postmodern Media Culture and the Films of Paul Thomas Anderson (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013): 195, 229.
\textsuperscript{106} McGuire to Muloney, SJ, April 19, 1953, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.
Corps. McGuire highly respected Walsh’s commitment to the school, commenting that, “Whatever the School is, he has made it.”

McGuire had little responsibility for framing the policy of the early School of Foreign Service beyond a few key tasks in its first years. He helped select many of its first faculty members, such as three refugees from the Russian Revolution—Michael I. Rostovtseff, Michael Karpovich, and Baron Korff—as well as two general secretaries of the Inter-American High Commission, Guillermo A. Sherwell and Leo Stanton Rowe. He also originally induced James A. Farrell—the president of the United States Steel Corporation, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, and a prominent anti-union industrialist—into dedicating $20,000 to the school’s endowment. Farrell would be among the school’s most dedicated supporters until his death in 1948. However, McGuire’s other career commitments—first as an economist for the Brookings Institute and then for various Latin American governments—as well as the caretaking of his dependent elderly relatives, partly explain why he decrease his involvement with the school. But even more importantly, the school’s undergraduate focus heavily dissuaded him from any much deeper association. Very unlike the graduate level institutions that impressed McGuire in Europe, the SFS program prioritized the vocational knowledge of trade before any general study of foreign affairs. The early School of Foreign Service did offer Masters and

107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 McGuire to Maloney, April 19, 1953, 3.
112 “Preliminary Statement” in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), SFS 1918–1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 19.
Doctorate degrees in Foreign Service, but this was a minor component of what was in essence a pre-professional international commerce school.\footnote{The Committee on Graduate Studies, “Rules for Graduate Work in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University,” 1919, SFS 1918–1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.}

McGuire did not anticipate that the school he originally envisioned would overwhelmingly specialize in training students for employment within trade activities such as accounting and shipping. He felt that those more rudimentary subjects were far more suitable for the “great commercial centers for foreign trade” such as New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and New Orleans, not Washington, DC.\footnote{Ibid.} McGuire expected the School of Foreign Service to intensively address the most pressing and complex issues of international affairs.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, McGuire formally severed his direct ties with the School of Foreign Service on May 4, 1921, when he informed President Creeden of his member resignation from the SFS Advisory Committee.\footnote{McGuire to Creeden, May 4, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.} While reluctant given McGuire’s essential services to the school during its first two years, Creeden accepted his request.\footnote{Creeden to McGuire, May 7, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC.} Walsh found McGuire’s decision understandable, but it also sincerely upset him, and he hoped that his friend would someday permit Georgetown to feature his name as one of the School of Foreign Service’s founders.\footnote{Walsh to McGuire, July 25, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC.}

**The School of Foreign Service’s First Year**

By January 25, 1919, Creeden confirmed that the prospective School of Foreign Service attained substantive investment from the U.S. government; the national shipping board was...
especially enthusiastic and wished to establish Georgetown as “the Shipping School for the Nation.” The board even sent forty batches of four-month shipping courses to Georgetown and offered to pay for the tuitions of students trained at the school.\textsuperscript{119} In another letter with the father provincial, Creeden remarked on the fortuitous geographic location of Georgetown University: no city could equal Washington, DC for its access to U.S. government officials and representatives from foreign countries that the school could hire as experts to teach the student body.\textsuperscript{120} In touch with his predecessor’s concerns during World War I, Creeden also assumed that the School of Foreign Service would be a more ambitious step toward preserving the institutional security and professional connections of the Jesuits with powerful American groups: “The school would be in the nature of a continued service to our country and it would bring the Society into contact with the prominent men in finance and in government.”\textsuperscript{121} Although the United States was no longer in the “abnormal times” of a declared state of war, and suspicions of an unpatriotic Catholic leadership no longer topped the concerns leadership at Georgetown and the Maryland Provincial, President Creeden’s letters demonstrated a sustained eagerness to attach his university to the aims of the national government.\textsuperscript{122}

From February to May 1919, Walsh led a preliminary semester for seventy registered students as an experiment before the School of Foreign Service’s official inauguration in the fall.\textsuperscript{123} Class registrations and the semester respectively began on February 3 and 17, and tuition for the single semester was $60.\textsuperscript{124} Registrations for the first full 1919–1920 academic year

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Creeden to Donlon, January 25, 1919, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1919), B29FR, MPA.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item “Preliminary Statement” in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), SFS 1918–1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 4.
\end{enumerate}
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began on September 17, 1919 with a total annual tuition cost of $110. While no university dormitories were available for SFS students, Georgetown had a listing of approved boarding housing nearby the downtown Law School campus. Depending on the day, courses were taught between 6:30 and 9:45 p.m., so that students could find day-time employment at a government or business office. The school’s location at the Law School building on 506 E Street, NW—while partly disconnected from most undergraduate life at the main campus—also placed it immediate vicinity of the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Pan-American Union, Library of Congress, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ideal for anyone wishing to study and engage with U.S. diplomatic and consular services.

This preliminary semester also consisted of twenty-six faculty members who taught a combined total of thirty classes. The school split these courses into four divisions: 1.) the Economic and Commercial Group, 2.) the Law and Political Science Group, 3.) the Shipping Group, and 4.) the Language Group, the last of which initially included English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese. While this assortment contained subjects in the humanities and social science, the list of classes “deemed basic and essential” by the school showcased an overwhelming priority of materialist commercial interests. As an example, the June 1919 final examination for “Latin American Financial and Commercial Problems,” asked students to

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. The average cost for room and board, laundry, and textbooks and notebooks were $300, $25, and $25, respectively.
127 Ibid., 15.
128 Ibid., 4.
130 Students were expected to have a speaking and written working knowledge in a non-English language to graduate, which was evaluated through an oral examination. “Preliminary Statement: Conspectus of Studies,” in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), BFCSC, 5–6; “Expenditures 1919–1920,” Georgetown University, Washington DC Estimates, 1919–1922, SFS Academic Exercises Commemorating the Founding of the SFS 1917–1919, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.
131 Ibid.
identify the regional locations of petroleum, cacao, copper, bananas, coal, and sugar to describe how the characteristics of Latin American racial distributions and populations affected commerce. \(^{132}\) This initial SFS curriculum thus placed a far higher emphasis on the vocational training of students rather than an education on the high-minded philosophical and legal problems surrounding international liberalism. Highly impressed by Walsh’s conviction and performance during this spring test run, President Creeden sent a correspondence to the father provincial in July 1919 requesting approval for Walsh to devote his efforts almost exclusively to the Foreign Service School across the next year. \(^{133}\) Creeden noted Walsh’s key contributions to marketing the plan for the school among prominent government officials and financial men. \(^{134}\) Through Walsh’s restless eagerness to complete his SFS tasks; Creeden believed that by the end of the year, the school would acquire an impressive endowment to “exert a wide and important influence.” \(^{135}\)

Across the first year of the School of Foreign Service’s existence, and despite the differing opinions of its initial leading backers, there was explicit support for U.S. efforts to attain wealth and prosperity abroad. For instance, McGuire delivered a lecture in 1919 for first-year students titled “Some Financial Problems of Latin America,” where he advertised the region’s vast and largely pristine economic opportunities: “like all new parts of the world read for exploitation and development, the Latin American republics are greedy absorbers of capital and generous promisors of re-payment.” \(^{136}\) McGuire observed that the extensive quantities of


\(^{133}\) Creeden to Maas, July 28, 1919.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.

agricultural and mineral resources of Latin America were not easily accessible to their host countries due to labor scarcity and the considerable financial costs of extraction, transformation, and transportation of the products into exportable goods.\textsuperscript{137} Issuing loans and capital investment for the Latin American republics in order to supply them with mining machinery, port infrastructure, and railroad systems—as European nations had for around fifty years—would be a highly lucrative in-road for the United States.\textsuperscript{138}

In an August 20, 1919 invitation sent out to Massachusetts Senator David I. Walsh, McGuire stated that Georgetown University and School of Foreign Service authorities hoped that President Woodrow Wilson could also attend the inaugural ceremony on November 25, 1919, for he had not attended any prior university events.\textsuperscript{139} He noted that the school’s inauguration, with its symbolic strength as a representation of the United States’ expansion and its new responsibilities in the postwar world, would be an opportune moment for Wilson to distinguish the ceremony.\textsuperscript{140} Wilson never attended the opening ceremony, but each dean of a Georgetown University school eagerly welcomed the School of Foreign Service as the university’s latest newcomer and as a grandiose historical achievement in its own right.\textsuperscript{141} Distinguished speakers at the School of Foreign Service Commencement also included Adolph C. Miller, member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Edwin F. Sweet, acting Secretary of Commerce; and William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{142} \textit{The Philadelphia Public Ledger} hailed the School of Foreign Service’s emergence and endowment backing by James A. Farrell, and

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 4–5.
\textsuperscript{139} McGuire to David I. Walsh, August 20, 1919, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{141} Nevils, Gasson, George M. Kober, George E. Hamilton, and Bruce L. Taylor, “Addresses,” Academic Exercises in Gaston Hall, Part I, November 25, 1919, 18–26 in \textit{Yearbook, February 1919–February 1920}.
expected that the school would have little trouble securing future finances, considering the
National Foreign Trade Commission’s insistence for a commercial education department
“directed specifically to our friendly conquest of Latin America.”

Dozens of students initially enrolled at the School of Foreign Service: advertisements for
employment in foreign trade attracted veterans and other young men eager to advance into
middle class careers. The school’s establishment in the immediate aftermath of World War I
was also particularly fortuitous: wartime trainings—based upon the fast-paced attainment of
multiple vocation skills—resembled the SFS curriculum far more than a standard college
educations associated with the liberal arts and humanities. While making no direct reference to
Georgetown, Clyde W Barrow in *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism
and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928*, noted the irony of this
institutional rearrangement, “While the university had pledged itself to make the world safe for
democracy, it institutionalized the competing imagery of a militarized wartime production
unit.”

One of Walsh’s highest profile appearances shortly after the SFS commencement
highlighted this unprecedented collaborative step. In his speech, “Systematic Training for
Foreign Service,” at the American Manufacturers Export Association Convention at the Waldorf-
Astoria of New York City, Walsh explicitly declared that his active participation and
representation of Georgetown at the conference, packed with American commerce leaders set on
buttressing the growth U.S. foreign trade, was in fact a formal “alliance of Knowledge and
Power.”

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144 Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State*, 32
145 Ibid., 151.
146 Ibid., 151.
148 Ibid., 1.
Chapter Two: Making the World a Market, 1920–1927

Sponsored by National Geographic

This chapter begins with a jump ahead to the fall semester of 1924, the fifth year of the School of Foreign Service. On November 21, 1921, Edmund A. Walsh recognized this special occasion with yet another familiarly grandiose speech. At the SFS Fifth Anniversary Commemoration, Walsh delivered a striking ode the school’s foundational motivations born the hour after the World War and “sealed by the blood of the flower of American youth.” 149 He proclaimed that the school valorously engrained traits of true citizenship, pure patriotism, and intelligent service to the world among the SFS student body. 150 As this speech indicates, and as McNamara correctly noted, Walsh never adhered to a total obsession toward capitalist growth and commerce: he clearly advocated for the School of Foreign Service in visceral moral terms committed to internationalism. 151 On the other hand, upon closer study of early SFS educational materials and lectures circulated to students, the paramount concern with expanding U.S. foreign trade won out over all other motivations.

For example, in the same speech, Walsh listed the various postwar political transformations that made the world a rapidly unfamiliar place. This dynamic was especially dangerous, because to become “the candidate for commercial conquest,” the United States must know the world: “he who would bring back the wealth of the Indies must take the wealth of the Indies with him.” 152 Luckily for Walsh, the School of Foreign Service partly would answer this call during the same semester as his address. This came in the form of a new Applied Geography

149 Walsh, “Address,” Delivered at Exercises in Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the School of Foreign Service, November 21, 1924, SFS 1924 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 2–3.
150 Ibid.
151 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 78.
course officially backed by the National Geographic Society headquartered in Washington, DC and taught by staff members of its publication, *National Geographic Magazine*. The first lecturer of this course and the senior assistant editor of the magazine, Ralph A. Graves, held views on American commercialism consistent with that of the School of Foreign Service. In 1918, he wrote and published an article advocating for the expansion of the U.S. merchant marine, a consistent SFS talking point that would reach the point of obsession by the end of the 1920s. The ideologies he promoted in his Applied Geography class also followed a widespread postwar optimism and faith in American commerce at the time. Many American businessmen believe that consumer products and technological innovations generated by the country’s entrepreneurship could simultaneously supply the world’s consumption demands while making the United States more prosperous than ever.

On October 1, 1924, Graves introduced students to the contents of his proposed Applied Geography course in a pamphlet for the 1924–1925 academic year. This document is one of the single most fascinating revelations into the ideological training of SFS undergraduates. At its core are two audacious proclamations: first, that “The world is the American businessman’s market today”; and second, that applied geography, particularly concerning the study of mutual relations between land, natural life, human beings, and technology, “is as essential to selling manufactured goods as chemistry or mechanical engineering is in making them.” Applied geography was not only practical to strengthening American commerce; it had universal utility. According to Graves, an action as minor and insignificant as a boy ascertaining on whether his

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155 Graves, “Department of Applied Geography, Fall and Spring Semesters, 1924–1925, Tuesdays, 6:50 to 8:15 p.m.,” October 1, 1924, SFS 1924 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 3–4.
neighborhoods use their yards for a vegetable garden or a tennis court, and one as complex and multinational as foreign automobile producers competitively pitching their vehicle sales to the Moroccan government and its newly built road system, are alike dependent on the geographic interpretation of geographic information.\textsuperscript{156}

Disregarding applied geography could be very costly. Graves recalled one anecdote where an American manufacturer delivered a shipment of horse plows to Venezuela, only to learn upon arrival that they were entirely useless in a region reliant upon oxen, costing them $2,600.\textsuperscript{157} Conversely, the innovative use of applied geography could overcome cultural obstacles and reap in massive profits from undiscovered markets, such as one hardware salesman in old Latin American cities who discovered that the ancient cumbersome model for door keys used by locals could be supplemented with a modern American product.\textsuperscript{158} A shrewd businessman must know local conditions and customs to not only determine what to sell, but how to sell it as well. When an American shoes salesman on a tight time schedule declined a potential Cuban buyer’s invitation to a dinner and opera, he offended his host’s sensibilities so much that it took the shoe company three years to rewin the buyer’s favor.\textsuperscript{159} In another instance, a German firm once reclaimed an alarm clock market lost by the British in central Africa by discovering that their consumers did not want precise time-telling devices, but machines that made loud clicking sounds!\textsuperscript{160}

One of the benefits to the National Geographic Society sponsoring the course was that Graves had access to its massive repertoire of photographs from around the world. The eleven

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 4–5.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 6.
photographs he scattered through the pamphlet viscerally demonstrated how the School of Foreign Service encouraged students to imagine the world as a market from which to buy raw materials and sell manufactured goods.¹⁶¹ At first glance, the photographs could not be more unlike; it appears that Graves selected them at random from every corner of the world at random.¹⁶² The captions, on the other hand, questioned readers whether any hidden markets exist or why they do not within their above photograph. Under one image of a man riding a goat-driven cart in the Philippines, Graves comments that “the speedometer salesman would starve to death,” and in another of a traditional Cambodian dancing performance, he notes that the “girls are not pining for ballet slippers and tulle skirts.”¹⁶³ As for a photograph of two barefoot African schoolboys disciplined by standing on one leg, Graves snidely remarked, “it would take a long time to develop a market for shoes” for the region.¹⁶⁴ The caption of every photograph from the pamphlet pushes a market-based interpretation. Similarly, the actual syllabus for the course also centered questions of commercial utility about the world. Every weekly topic of the fall semester’s second half concerned the geography of raw resources such as fabrics, grains, meats, minerals, and other precious materials, and the sole required textbook was *The Business Man’s Geography: A Compendium of General and Post-War Conditions in Respect of Overseas Produce and Overseas Markets*.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² The image’s locations included China, Japan, the East Indies, the Middle East, southeast Africa, Java, the Philippines, Wales, Cambodia, and Mongolia. See the “Selected Images” section for all eleven images and captions.
Graves was unable to resume his Applied Geography class for the fall of 1925, but fellow National Geographic Magazine editor Jessie Richardson Hildebrand would pick it up over the next three years. One of Hildebrand’s National Geographic contributions before his SFS hiring were “The Geography of Games,” a sixty-one-illustration collection on how national sports shaped various peoples around the world. Another highlight was “The Sources of Washington’s Charm,” which featured the humorous application of his geographic sensibilities to Georgetown itself as a “pre-Capitaline civilization,” in reference to its past as a legally separate entity from Washington. As the main lecturer, Hildebrand invited exciting guest speakers from the National Geographic Society to speak at his Applied Geography courses, such as Maynard Owen Williams who recently returned from his Arctic expedition to describe its harsh environment and indigenous inhabitants adaptations.

Despite each of these indications that Hildebrand was a more idiosyncratic figure than Graves—he once proudly declared that geography was the most “romantic” within the curriculum of an university—he reliably continued his predecessor’s focus of interpreting the various climates, cultures, and races of the world through a filter of commercial opportunity. Out of any characteristic of the SFS curriculum, the Applied Geography course was to always make itself “as practical and as valuable as possible.” Hildebrand’s midterm examination questions prove an unyielding dedication toward making the world a market for SFS students:

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166 “J.R. Hildebrand Added to Teaching Staff,” The Hoya 7, no. 5 (October 15, 1925): 7.
168 Hildebrand, “The Sources of Washington’s Charm,” The National Geographic Magazine 48, no. 6 (June 1923): 665.
169 “Explorer Makes Graphic Lecture: Member of the MacMillan Arctic Expedition Lectures Before Georgetown University School of Foreign Service—Class in Applied Geography is Great Success,” The Hoya 7, no. 7 (November 6, 1925): 7.
170 “J.R. Hildebrand Added to Teaching Staff,” The Hoya 7, no. 5 (October 15, 1925): 7.
171 Ibid.
questions asked them to name elements that secured the successful sale of goods in a foreign country, geographic factors that made Africa a “backward continent” unfavorable to business investment, and the political status and principle products of the Hawaiian Islands.  

No matter its precise circumstances, the firm conviction among most SFS administrators, faculty, and students that “the world is the American businessman’s market today” sits at the center of every other topic covered in the chapter: Willard L. Beaulac’s complicity in U.S. military occupations, Edmund A. Walsh’s shifting views on Russia and the “Slavic world,” affiliations with bank responsible for coercive politics in the Caribbean, and Constantine E. McGuire’s efforts to extract favors from Georgetown after he severed his formal ties.

**A Tale of Four Countries: The School of the Foreign Service’s First Graduate and U.S. Interventions in Latin America**

By the School of Foreign Service first graduation ceremony on June 14, 1921 (after completing the school’s two-year curriculum), thirty-two out of the school’s sixty-four graduating senior class had accepted employment opportunities at trade companies in the United States or foreign countries, six entered the U.S. diplomatic and consular services, and fifteen became trade commissioners for the Department of Commerce.  

The graduation speaker of the university’s general assembly, Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, eagerly called upon students to assist America’s reaching out to the world’s markets in a fair and honorable manner.  

He shamefully admitted that large U.S. corporations who “cheat” foreign countries conjured

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173 “School of Foreign Service,” *GCJ* 49, no. 9 (June 1921): 488.
sensations abroad by selling subpar products, but the School of Foreign Service could ferment an honest reputation and greater trust between the United States and its trade partners.\footnote{Ibid.}

Denby anticipated that the graduates before him would replicate his anecdote of “a very great market being conquered” by a single man deeply knowledgeable of a foreign consumer base.\footnote{Ibid., 464. Most of the information of this story come from U.S. Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, who recounted a more detailed version than Denby’s account in 1919. “Editorial: A National of Foreign Trade,” The New York Evening Mail, August 23, 1919, 79–80 in Yearbook February 1919–February 1920, 80.} A few years ago in a South American country, American and British businessmen struggled to sell brightly-colored fabrics to a large indigenous population.\footnote{Ibid., 464; “Editorial: A National School of Foreign Trade,” 80.} A German firm seeking to enter the potential market sent an archaeologist to the region, where he learned that the indigenous peoples considered the colors of the American and British goods unlucky.\footnote{Ibid.} The German firm then removed those colors from their products and immediately secured the indigenous peoples’ clothing consumption.\footnote{Ibid., 80.} Similar to the lessons of Professor Graves’ and Hildebrand’s Applied Geography course a few years later, this story instructed SFS graduates to intimately study foreign lands, so that their denizens and cultures would become commensurable—and therefore profitable—to the commercial world.

Denby declared that future commercial conquests would rely on whether Americans advancing their nation’s commercial interests come across to foreign countries as “good, clean, honest business men” or “cheap swindlers.”\footnote{Ibid., 463.} Ironically, one of the audience members would occasionally embody far more coercive business practices than those endorsed in Denby’s

\footnote{Ibid., 463. Ironically, only a month before this address, Denby initiated the first steps into what would eventually become the Teapot Dome Scandal when he signed off oil reserves controlled by the Department of the Navy to the Department of the Interior. Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall than leased these reserves to friends heading private oil companies with bribes totaling $300,000. The news outbreak of this deal scandalized the Harding Administration and although Denby was cleared of criminal charges, Congress forcibly resigned him from his position as secretary. J. Leonard Bates, “The Teapot Dome Scandal and the Election of 1924,” The American Historical Review 60, no. 2 (January 1955): 303–322.}
message—showing a disconnect between a benevolent value that the School of Foreign Service rhetorically promoted among its students, and the more underhanded reality of U.S. behavior overseas in spite of earnest intentions. Willard L. Beaulac was the first student to receive the School of Foreign Service’s Bachelor of Foreign Service degree, an honor he attained because his name was the listed first alphabetically among his twenty-one-person graduating class.\textsuperscript{181} Subsequently, he was first in line to receive his degree.\textsuperscript{182} Despite its mundane rationale, this distinction granted him considerable recognition at Georgetown: photographs of Beaulac’s degree were placed inside the school’s successive catalogues and Walsh even hung a copy in his office.\textsuperscript{183} The U.S. consular service immediately employed Beaulac and stationed him as the assistant vice-consul of the Tampico oil fields in Mexico.\textsuperscript{184} The rugged frontier town preoccupied the young man with “plenty of excitement and plenty of fun” as his tasks reputedly ranged from uncovering a white slave trafficking ring to accompanying a Mexican military detachment as it battled bandits raiding American petroleum companies.\textsuperscript{185} Beaulac amusingly declared that, “If Hollywood were to portray faithfully some of the incidents and circumstances that were well known in Tampico, it would undoubtedly be charged with exaggeration.”\textsuperscript{186} Across the next four decades, Beaulac would also become the first SFS alumni to make a name for himself in U.S. foreign service circles, eventually serving as the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay.

\textsuperscript{182} Willard L. Beaulac, \textit{Career Ambassador} (New York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1951): 4; “Graduation Exercises: Class of 1921, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,” June 14, 1921, Commencement 1921 File, Commencement Files Box 4, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{183} Beaulac, \textit{Career Ambassador}, 4.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 35–39.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 85.
(1944–1947), Colombia (1947–1951), Cuba (1951–1953), Chile (1953–1956), and Argentina (1956–1960).\textsuperscript{187}

Before these ambassadorships, Beaulac contributed significantly to a series of U.S. military interventions across Latin America. The first was as the counsel general of Puerto Castilla, a recently constructed United Fruit Company Organization (UFCO) port nearby Trujillo, Honduras. Stationed in a “banana republic” politically and economically dependent on the UFCO and other foreign businesses, the raison d'être of the Honduras’ newest U.S. consulate was the smooth exportation of bananas and ensuring that Honduran politics did not disrupt said exports.\textsuperscript{188} Only twenty-four years old, Beaulac was reputedly the youngest consul of the United States; a flattering newspaper profile from his hometown in Pawtucket, Rhode Island later dubbed him as the “Boy Consul.”\textsuperscript{189} With the exception of his Catholic faith in a WASP-dominated field, Beaulac personified the American “banana cowboy” archetype associated with the UFCO in the Honduras: a college-educated, khaki-wearing, white-collar management type with authority over nonwhite agricultural laborers, typically wielding a pistol on his belt and a Stemson hat atop his head.\textsuperscript{190} The U.S. Department of State flew Beaulac down to the Honduras


\textsuperscript{188} Beaulac, \textit{Career Ambassador}, 40, 43.

\textsuperscript{189} “Willard Beaulac Consul in Haiti for Four Months: Pawtucket Man, Youngest Member of Service, Reveals Appointment,” \textit{The Times}, 1927, Folder 17, Box 1, Willard Leon Beaulac Papers, BFCSC.

in 1924 as it anticipated the country’s liberal and conservative political factions to fight a civil war.\textsuperscript{191} Beaulac was to officially open and manage the consulate in case any outbreaks of violence imperiled American interests.\textsuperscript{192} Beaulac had blanket authority to request the presence of a U.S. naval warship and even deploy marines in defense of American lives and their property at Puerto Castilla or Trujillo.\textsuperscript{193} While Beaulac never ordered the landing of marines, he did request naval vessels on multiple occasions to safeguard American belongings when war did break out.\textsuperscript{194} In his 1951 biography \textit{Career Ambassador}, published when flagrant foreign interventions were far more frowned up, Beaulac reflected with bewilderment that the State Department left a man of his age—only three years out of college—with the discretion to initiate military action against a sovereign nation.\textsuperscript{195} In one notable instance, Beaulac’s request for a U.S. warship helped ensure both the peaceful transfer of Trujillo’s control from government to revolutionary forces, and the guaranteed presence of the UFCO at the negotiating table alongside the two sides and foreign nations’ representatives.\textsuperscript{196}

One of Beaulac’s next jobs with the Department of State was as the third secretary at the Haitian embassy during its military occupation by the U.S. Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{197} Beaulac developed warm and complimentary—albeit paternalistic—feelings for Haiti, “I know no other country that so quickly charms the visitor and foreign resident as Haiti does. It’s tragic history, the courage and courtesy of its people, their simplicity and kindness, which are capable, on occasions, of

\textsuperscript{191} Beaulac, \textit{Career Ambassador}, 46.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 75–79.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 81–84.
turning into primitive savagery.”\textsuperscript{198} While he opposed U.S. interventions in her “sister republics” on principle, he fundamentally concluded that the U.S. occupation of Haiti since 1915 was justified: first on the basis to prevent a German sphere of influence over the island, and second to stabilize the country’s tumultuous political environment.\textsuperscript{199} Beaulac sang high praises for progress in economic, educational, and public health development, but the occupation’s publicly unaccountable political system heavily concerned him.\textsuperscript{200} One of the most striking experiences were the weekly meetings he attended at the Haitian cabinet where American treaty officials would run “a kind of laboratory in government.”\textsuperscript{201} The below passage best summarizes Beaulac’s uneasiness with his complicity with this undemocratic system:

“Neither did we require that congressional elections, provided for in the new constitution, be held. The president was assisted in governing the country by a council of state which he himself appointed and which in turn elected the president. We upheld and participated in a dictatorship which, while benevolent, was as arbitrary as many another dictatorship which has existed in the republics to the south of us.”\textsuperscript{202}

Beaulac’s ambiguous positions on military force resurfaced during his deployment as second secretary in Managua, Nicaragua, which stationed U.S. marines since 1912.\textsuperscript{203} Arriving during a period of sharpening militarization in the country, Beaulac and other U.S. officials feared that the well-equipped Sandinista army opposing the Nicaraguan government and U.S. occupation could adopt a “revolutionary character” and throw the entire country into turmoil.\textsuperscript{204} Beaulac repeatedly described himself as anti-interventionalist in his biography, feeling that the

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\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 100. 
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 102. 
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 102–103. 
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 16, 242–243.
Nicaragua occupation was unjustified and that the country would stabilize quicker without it. Nonetheless, Beaulac “enjoyed the excitement of it all,” and diligently carried out his post’s orders to facilitate the intervention toward its end. In reflective comments on Haiti and Nicaragua, Beaulac later admitted that both interventions unintentionally contributed to violence by provoking armed anti-occupation resistance—the Cacos in Haiti and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua—even though the interventions framed themselves as nonpolitical, stabilization missions.

At certain points, Beaulac’s reflections on the interventions resemble a confessional, occasionally bemoaning his assistance in establishing a dictatorship over the Haitian people. He was less despondent over the political regime in Nicaragua, but still vividly frustrated over U.S. officials’ naïve belief that the Marine Guard’s supervision of elections would stimulate democratization. In contradiction with the occupations’ lofty pretensions of governance and infrastructural uplift, Beaulac concluded that they were unscientific violations of sovereignty undertaken with an inadequate state machinery. Direction of the interventions were delegated to State Department bureaucrats who—while intelligent and competent according to Beaulac—were not and could not be experts in the countries they oversaw; in fact, no one in the State Department would be capable of the massive administrative needs and expertise of an

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205 Beaulac, Career Ambassador, 115.
206 Ibid., 118.
207 Ibid., 115.
208 Ibid., 120.
209 Ibid., 121.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid., 121–122.
intervention. The department could direct the U.S. Navy and Marines toward minimalist military assistance, but anything more would entangle it into a foreign quagmire.\footnote{Ibid., 122.}

Even though Beaulac disapproved of the more authoritarian nature of the Haiti intervention, he surmised that the Nicaragua intervention was far more counterproductive for both Americans’ and Nicaraguans’ best interests.\footnote{Ibid.} While the intervention ended an ongoing civil war in the country, more foreign lives and property perished following the Marine Guard’s arrival. Nicaraguans also continued to die during the subsequent anti-American insurgency led by the revolutionary Augusto C. Sandino.\footnote{Ibid., 123.} Beaulac begrudgingly admitted that his negative assessment vindicated Sandino, whose actions included the targeted destruction of a precious American mine and the kidnapping of its manager.\footnote{Ibid.} Beaulac presumed that Sandino’s audacious assault was an ultimatum to the United States, one that showed the intervention’s stated aims—to defend American property and personnel—were in fact provoked attacks, rendering the occupation meaningless and unjustifiable.\footnote{Ibid., 114–115.} Only weeks after the marines finally left Nicaragua in 1933, Sandino laid down his arms and ended his rebellion; Beaulac personally witnessed Sandino’s reception as a national hero in Managua.\footnote{Ibid., 123.} The fruitless eighteen-year venture also damaged wider U.S. relations with Central America; to Nicaragua’s neighbors, the occupation was yet another arbitrary abuse of power by the “Colossus of the North.”\footnote{Ibid., 124.}

In the last chapter of \textit{Career Ambassador}, Beaulac gauges the United States’ constant military interventions to its south as an “honest effort” to resolve the political issues in the
Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, and other nations, “whose populations are politically immature, where poverty and ignorance retard democratic evolution.” Beaulac uncharitably viewed foreign opposition to U.S. interventionalism as a living contradiction: those who relied upon the U.S. military as their only dependable form of protection against the region’s myriad revolutions, coup d’états, and civil wars were aghast at the actual implementation of protection. “Our well-intentioned interventions” possibly even improved the material wellbeing of the countries’ inhabitants, but by boosting anti-American fears and suspicions across Latin America, Beaulac concluded they were counterproductive to advancing U.S. interests. Beaulac was glad to see that in the decades following his departure from Managua, the United States promoted Pan American treaties based upon the principle of non-interventionalism and finally progressed toward a continental unity that fractured in the 1920s. However, in touch with the Cold War paranoia at the time, Beaulac warned of the existential threat posed to this unity through “international Communism in the service of Russian imperialism.” Ironically, this crusade against communism would rapidly restore a new round of U.S. interventionalism in Latin America: covert U.S.-backed operations such as the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz (1954), the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba (1961), and the assassination of former U.S. ally and Dominican Republic President Rafael Trujillo (1961) all occurred within a decade after Career Ambassador’s publication.

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220 “Toward a Better World,” 257–262 in Ibid., 258.
221 Ibid., 259.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
There was no program and course at the School of Foreign Service that directly trained or prepared Beaulac for his participation in U.S. military occupations after his graduation in 1921. In my research, I came across no internal documents or public speeches from Walsh, McGuire, MacElwee, and other leading SFS figures that explicitly backed the protection of overseas economic interests with armed force. Regardless, a continuous preoccupation with safeguarding U.S. commercial desires coursed throughout the School of Foreign Service’s curriculum and mission as well as Beaulac’s interventionalist actions. This is a constant pattern across the first decade of the School of Foreign Service’s existence: a predominant concern with educating young American men for the advancement of U.S. commercial interests alongside more tangential connections with the most blatant manifestations of overseas U.S. imperialism. These connections typically consisted of the actions practiced by SFS students, faculty members, or the guest speaker invited for lectures. For example, a few early SFS graduates entered employment for companies notorious for their substantial power over countries reliant upon the export of raw materials. Shortly after Beaulac arrived at Puerto Castilla, a second SFS graduate named Connie R. Herron joined him as a private employee for the UFCO. The UFCO stationed Herron in Guatemala from 1925 to 1926, but little documentation exists of his actual actions there. It is unlikely Herron had as dramatic of an impact as Beaulac despite the UFCO’s extensive influence over Guatemala’s government because he arrived during a rare democratic interlude for Guatemala: an independent legislature, a nationalistic journalism environment, and a politically active labor force each pressured the UFCO’s Guatemala branch into conceding several

225 “Connie R. Herron Given Assignment,” The Hoya 6, no.11 (December 18, 1924): 1–2.
226 “Mr. Herron to Go to Guatemala,” The Hoya 7, no. 8 (November 13, 1925): 10; “Delta Sigma Pi Frat Holds Spring Dinner,” The Hoya 7, no. 28 (May 21, 1926): 10.
privileges attained from the prior dictatorships, such as exemptions from taxes and government regulations.227

In 1928, William H. Cross, a masters SFS graduate, received a position from the Firestone Rubber Company based in Akron, Ohio.228 Like Herron, there are few details about Cross’s appointment, but Firebrand had a similar level of notoriety regarding its dominance in Liberia as the UFCO did throughout Central America in the 1920s. A few years before hiring Cross, Firestone secured a ninety-nine-year lease with the government of Liberia to grow rubber across one million acres of the country’s territory.229 This was the first step to developing what historian Gregg Mitman called Firestone’s massive “plantation world” to reduce the United States’ rubber dependence on British and Dutch colonies.230 To meet high expected quotas of coagulum rubber, the average Liberian tappers often needed to perform exhausting physical labor over eight hours a day; to meet the maximum wage rate, they could be working as long as eleven-hours per day for over twenty-six days of the month.231 While Firestone coordinated this subordination of labor and the destruction of homes to secure its Liberian land holdings, ensuring a productive cultivation of rubber exports, the company decorated its intentions with claims of developing the country through access to American technology and capital, not a dissimilar line from Beaulac on Haiti.232

Attention to the Slavic World

230 Ibid., xii–xiii.
231 Ibid., 195.
232 Ibid., 140.
After Latin America, the region of the world to receive the most attention from SFS documents during the 1920s was Eastern Europe, often referred to as the so-called “Slavic world.” In a 1920 interior SFS document serving to “clarify our ideas of the economic importance of the Slavic people” Walsh explained the materialist rationale behind this focus.233 While most of the document surveys Eastern Europe using demographic, anthropological, and economic studies of its ethnic make-up, population distributions, and industrialization, it explicitly endorses the School of Foreign Service to direct its attention toward advancing “Slavic studies” so that the United States could benefit from the region’s massive populace and landmass.234 Walsh took an excerpt from a speaker at the American Manufacturers Export Association Convention he attended last year to stress Russia’s potential importance to U.S. economic interests.235 Being a “metropolitan county,” the United States could no longer satisfy its economic needs and growth by only selling products within its domestic market, rather “she must investigate all existing colonial countries in order to determine how and where she may best throw her export power.”236 Disappointingly, few would be available for free export competition: the colonies of Africa and South Asia were “certainly reserved” for Britain, France, and Italy, leaving only South America, China, and Russia largely open for the United States.237 The speaker believed that out of these three regions, Russia would pose the fewest challenges to promoting future U.S. exporting dominance. Although the World War sharply reduced Germany’s influence in Latin America—the region’s third most important trading partner in the pre-war era after the United States and Great Britain—the speaker foresaw that Germany would

234 Ibid.
235 Ibid., 3.
236 Underline in original document. Ibid.
237 Ibid.
desperately seek to reestablish her presence there. Meanwhile, entrenched British and Japanese commercial interests in East Asia would unquestionably “meet the competition of America” with ample forces, experience, and established relations. The speaker concluded that the United States would encounter a less vicious export rivalry in Russia. While Walsh did not argue that the United States should embark on its own colonization projects in competition with Britain, France, Italy, or Japan, he certainly shared the viewpoint that the United States ought to seek out weaker regions where it could establish economic pre-eminence.

Walsh reiterated this degree of seriousness regarding “the Slavic problem” for U.S. trade relations at the Smithsonian Institute’s National Museum auditorium (now the National Museum of Natural History) in Washington, DC the next year. Speaking in front of the entire student body at an event inaugurating the establishment of an SFS Institute of Slavic Studies, Walsh reminded them that the School of Foreign Service was created two years ago to train men as successful foreign representatives in government, business, or financial institutions. This required a firm education in the “languages of commerce,” not only the most common languages used in international trade, but also relatively rare languages that “did not seem to invite our active penetration” until recent years. More specifically, the School of Foreign Service had the obligation to intensively study “distinct racial groups and geographic units” relevant to

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239 “Insert 1.,” 3.
240 Ibid.
242 Ibid., 1–2.
243 Ibid., 2.
conducting trade: first, as a matter of proximity to the United States, and second, as circumstances permitted. Latin America represented the first category: Walsh boasted of the School’s thorough provision of courses on the “American Republics” and Spanish and Portuguese language training, while being regrettably unable to support research into surviving indigenous languages of the region so far. The “great nation of the Far East,” for whom Walsh stated the School of Foreign Service laid foundations of intensive study, also demanded the United States’ attention; the “endless resources” at the command of nations in Central, Eastern, and Southern Asia and Australasia made the potential for future advanced study almost limitless.

Yet Walsh reminded the students that despite the School of Foreign Service’s international scope and influence, its culture, business practices, and economic structure—as with all attributes of North American civilization—were essentially an extension of Western European civilization, albeit refracted through its particular circumstances of geography, race, and institutions. Walsh remarked that after a century and a quarter of concentrating on the dramatic internal growth and development of the United States, the last few years sparked a rejuvenation in America’s recognition of its roots and ties across the Atlantic to the affairs of Europe. Boosting the economic health of the nation was core to this realization: American manufacturers acknowledged that foreign trade profoundly impacted the health of domestic trade, and financiers found that a healthy and stable credit system for the world was a pre-requisite to a sound credit system at home. The “inexorable course of trade requirements” thus

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244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., 2–3.
246 Ibid., 3.
247 Ibid., 3–4.
248 Ibid., 4.
249 Ibid.
brought the United States into near proximity to Europe, obliging the training of American men who are devoted to U.S. institutions and idealism and familiar with the aspirations, languages, natural resources, and trade potentials of the nations and racial groups of Europe.\textsuperscript{250}

Accordingly, Walsh declared that the School of Foreign Service must establish the intensive study of these European groups, foremostly the Slavic world, followed by “Italy and the Italian races,” and then the countries of Central Europe, France, England, and Spain.\textsuperscript{251} Walsh admitted to his students that this ordering is seemingly arranged opposite to relative importance to U.S. trade.\textsuperscript{252} However, rather than flatly dismiss Eastern Europe because Americans currently know little about it and have difficulty accessing the region, Walsh was confident of the possibilities it could offer the United States once trained SFS graduates opened it for American businessmen.\textsuperscript{253} He paid high compliments to the Slavic world, especially the Russians, who hosted vast pockets of subterranean wealth and advanced the intellectual development of politics, economics, and literature.\textsuperscript{254} Pitching the unrecognized possibilities of the Slavs to the students, Walsh vaunted that on account of “the character of their national genius,” the Poles, Bohemians, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians each deserved the fullest attention and knowledge from U.S. commercial experts and practitioners.\textsuperscript{255} Given that the warfare of the past five years had discouraged other foreign powers from prioritizing the Slavic world in their commercial ties, Walsh saw a unique opening for U.S. economic penetration in the region.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 7–8.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 8.
At his 1920 National Museum speech, Walsh was dismissive of turmoil across Russia and Eastern Europe since World War I and the Russian Civil War, guaranteeing that the Slavic nations will rise to their rightful prominence in the world within a few years, eager to establish the United States as a key trade partner.257 Beyond the continuation of elementary and advanced language training in Russian, the School of Foreign Service would plan to teach courses on the Polish, Czech, and Slovakian languages, the histories of Russia’s territorial expansion into Asia and foreign policy, and its importance to U.S. political and commercial concerns in the upcoming years.258 However, as the head of the Vatican’s Famie Relief Mission to Russia from 1922 to 1924, Walsh’s position rapidly transformed from one stressing economic opportunity to warning of an existential threat against the moral values and national security of the United States.259

Walsh’s exhausting efforts in Russia to free Archbishop Jan Baptist Cieplak and twenty-two Catholic priests from imprisonment under the revolutionary government led him to adopt extremely negative views of the Soviet Union.260 One incident that especially offended Walsh’s sensibilities was a public exhibition in Moscow of Polish religious treasures taken by Soviet soldiers from Poland. These treasures were seized after Polish forces routed the Soviet Union during its failed attempt to spread communist revolution to Germany two years prior. Included among this sacrilegious “ridicule of holy things” were relics blessed by the seventeenth century Jesuit missionary and martyr Andrew Bobola.261 Although Walsh successfully negotiated for

257 Ibid., 8.
258 Ibid., 9; McGuire to Walsh, SJ, “Memorandum for Fr. Walsh,” June 1, 1920, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.
259 An accessible study of Walsh’s time spent in Russia is the chapter, “‘What Think Ye of Russia?’: Walsh and Catholic Anticommunism in the 1920s,” 23–61 in McNamara, A Catholic Cold War. According to McNamara, the most comprehensive account is Henry Hull, “The Holy See and Soviet Russia, 1918–1930: A Study in Full-Circle Diplomacy,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970.
260 Walsh, SJ to Creeden, SJ, “Extracts from a letter from Father Walsh,” Fall, 1922, 1, B29FR MPA.
261 Ibid.
their transportation to the Vatican as long as the treasures did not cross Polish territory, he attested that “the Bolsheviks are the lowest type of humanity I can imagine” and remarked that orders from the Holy See to uphold usual diplomatic decorum with the Soviet leadership was “like casting the proverbial pearls before swine.”

From 1924 onward after his return to the United States, Walsh became a significant U.S. Catholic anticomunist intellectual, with the unique status of having foreign affairs expertise by actually visiting revolutionary Russia. When Walsh spoke on Russia to student bodies, he no longer described it as a land of pristine commercial potential, but as country where catastrophe won over civilization. His first major public contribution to this cause was the following year during his “Russia in Revolution” twelve-part lecture series. He again hosted these talks at the National Museum Auditorium on the causes, progress, and consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution as well as the passionate debate over whether the Soviet Union should “be admitted into the family of civilized nations on the basis of absolute equality.” Walsh’s post-mission commentary was now far more skeptical of the Russia’s economic opportunity for U.S. commercial interests, instead describing the domestic affairs of the Soviet government as a total tyranny over the individual, property, and family, and its foreign affairs as an danger to America’s democratic and constitutional principles. Walsh’s Russia lectures attracted massive crowds that featured many high-profile Washington, DC politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals. Even U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was among these

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262 Ibid.
263 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 53.
265 Walsh, “Russia in Revolution—Lecture Series, February 13, 1925–May 15, 1925” Pamphlet, January 26, 1920, Folder 281 (Series: Manuscripts/Addresses), Box 4, EWP 2, BFCSC.
266 “Fr. Walsh Concludes Lectures on Russia,” The Hoya 8, no. 28 (May 21, 1926): 10.
prominent attendees, heartedly complimented Walsh in a personal letter on his presentation about the fall of the Romanovs.268

**Bankers at the School of Foreign Service**

One SFS memorandum describes a 1920–1921 winter lecture series, “Fifteen Public Lectures Upon International Finance,” for Dr. Guillermo A. Sherwell’s Latin America course. Within the enclosed listing of lecturers is more evidence that the School of Foreign Service eagerly hosted those who participated in American domination over Latin America countries during the early twentieth century.269 The speaker assigned for January 26, 1921 was the John H. Allen, president of the American Foreign Banking Corporation.270 Allen’s previous position was as vice president of the National City Bank of New York (NCBNY), a company key to the School of Foreign Service’s initial steps as a vocational institution. In the same month that Creeden formally enacted the plan for the School of Foreign, Roy S. MacElwee—then the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and future dean of the School of Foreign Service—released a bulletin advocating for what a Washington, DC-based commercial school should look like.271 MacElwee held up programs for college students at the NCBNY as an exemplar for any university seeking to establish a foreign trade and shipping college.272 Upon its creation, the School of Foreign Service quickly furnished vocational ties with the NCBNY.

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268 Herbert C. Hoover to Walsh, SJ, March 5, 1925, Folder 17 (Correspondence/Individual Herbert Hoover), Box 2, EWP 1, BFCSC.
269 The lecture series listing included William A. Reid of the Pan-American Union (December 1, 1920); a lecturer furnished by the First National Bank of Boston (December 8, 1920); Donnel F. Hewett of the United States Geological Survey (December 15, 1920); Charles M. Pepper, author of *Guatemala: The Country of the Future* (1906) (December 22, 1920); and John H. Allen, President of the American Foreign Banking Corporation (January 26, 1921). In Constantine McGuire,” Memorandum for Father Walsh,” November 30, 1920, 1–2, Constantine McGuire Papers, BFCSC.
270 Ibid., 2.
272 Ibid., 232.
Working scholarships with the bank were one of the first prizes offered to students by the School of Foreign Service.Over the summer, winners would move to New York City, where they would receive trainings on the theory and practice of international banking. After three years of summer training and corresponding university coursework, the SFS graduates would then accept employment into the NCBNY and their first assignments to a foreign post. By 1929, the School of Foreign Service had supplied the bank with at least fifteen graduates, posted at offices around the world from Brazil to Hong Kong.

During his vice-presidency, Allen also took up a more infamous position as the manager of the National Bank of Haiti, shortly before the country’s occupation of the United States. In his role, Allen knew that perceptions of Latin America as a land strewn with anarchic violence and foreign savagery practices harmed U.S. efforts to open the region for profitable trade. As of result, he attempted to disabuse U.S. bankers of the most extreme rumors about Haiti in a 1920 article published by the NCBNY’s foreign trade journal *The Americas*: “the stories occasionally heard of recent-year cannibalism and of infant sacrifices are not founded on fact, nor are the stories of attacks upon foreigners.” Despite his refutation of the most vicious myths about Haiti, Allen heavily relied upon stereotypical perceptions of Black American as childish and indolent to justify the U.S. Marine occupation of Haiti since 1915, “Humorous incidents were of almost daily occurrences, and showed the naivete and also the restricted mentality of the people,

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273 “Students to Compete for Trip Abroad: Money Prizes and Scholarships to be Awarded by School of Foreign Service,” *The Hoya* 1, no. 5 (November 12, 1920): 2.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
which latter was plainly noticeable even among the more highly education.” Allen firmly believed that Haiti had no better option but to accept some semblance of white rule.

Allen’s lecture, “Public and Private Credit in Latin America”—as with all others from the series—was hosted at the familiar National Museum Auditorium venue. While Allen’s speech did not touch upon Haiti, the Latin American republic that he had a more familiarity intimacy with than any other, nor any other occupation for that matter, it still orientating perfectly within ideological frameworks of marketization at the School of Foreign Service. Allen backed the growth of a national merchant marine to transport goods between the United States and Latin America and left an overall positive assessment of region’s credit conditions. While Latin America was already a substantial U.S. trade partner, Allen felt there was massive potential to boost this economic relationship even more. The School of Foreign Service was so impressed by Allen’s address that it decided to redistribute it for DC intelligentsia consumption, eventually attaining publication in the Pan-American Union’s February 1921 Bulletin.

**McGuire’s Curious Concerns**

Despite his formal separation from the School of Foreign Service in 1921, McGuire would continue to provide names for potential donors to the endowment of the School of Foreign Service, including Andrew James Peters, the mayor of Boston; Condé M. Nast, founder of the eponymous mass media company Condé Nast; and Lewis Ong, a representative of the UFCO.

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281 “School of Foreign Service,” *GCJ* 49, no. 5 (February 1921): 252.
282 Allen, “Public and Private Credit in Latin America,” 254–263.
284 Constantine McGuire, “List of Persons to be considered in Connection with the raising of the Endowment of the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University,” 1920, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1–7. Another individual on McGuire’s list, a mining engineer named Spruille Braden, would become a significant U.S.
The last person he listed, William Madison Wood, was notorious for the poor treatment of immigrant workers as owner of the textile giant, the American Woolen Company. Increased productivity pressures for workers combined with a wage cut prompted the 1912 Textile Strike of Lawrence, Massachusetts, organized by the Industrial Workers of the World. Violence inflicted onto laborers by anti-strike militias agitated the public against Wood, and tensions became even more heated when Wood faced charges of conspiracy for hiring an undertaker to plant dynamite across Lawrence. A jury ultimately acquitted Wood by an eight-to-four decision, but these controversies further plummeted his reputation.

The most eccentric figure recommended by McGuire was John Hays Hammond, an American mining engineer who profited lucratively from his employment under the South African diamond and gold mines ran by Cecil Rhodes during the 1890s. Consistent with racist attitudes among Europeans in colonial southern Africa and fearing that “the safety of the whites
may sooner or later necessitate the disruption of the native tribal organization,” Hammond advocated taxing the native population in order to coerce them into wage labor in the mines.\textsuperscript{289}

However, Hammond’s most notorious action was his role as one of the leading conspirators behind the 1895 Jameson Raid, a failed covert operation by American and British capitalists to stage an insurrection in favor of foreign capital against the Boer-led South African Republic.\textsuperscript{290}

The following year, Hammond was sentenced to death for high treason, but a U.S. campaign with ties to prominent political figures such as Richard Olney—the secretary of state—and John Tyler Morgan—Alabama senator and Ku Klux Klan grand dragon—secured his freedom and return to the United States.\textsuperscript{291} Although Hammond’s audacious raid to overthrow a white “sister republic” haunted his reputation back home, he gradually reformed his public image into advocacy for international liberalism by the 1920s, making him a plausible donor in McGuire’s eyes.\textsuperscript{292}

Given that Georgetown’s archives rarely contain documents naming the actual donors to the early School of Foreign Service, it is unknown whether anyone McGuire suggested in his list financially contributed to the school’s endowment, but Hammond would maintain a sizable amount of involvement with school activities. In 1921, he pitched a special lecture for the School of Foreign Service titled, "Russia as a Field for American Foreign Trade," at the same National Mall event where Walsh delivered his “Slavic world” speech.\textsuperscript{293} Hammond exercised even more

\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Ibid.}, 29.
\textsuperscript{292} \textit{Ibid.}, 29, 32.
\textsuperscript{293} “Soviet Rule Sure to Fail Says Speaker: John Hay Hammond, Noted Engineer, See Collapse Coming,” \textit{The Washington Post}, January 17, 1921, SFS 1921 File, SFSB1, BFCSC. Hammond was an admirer of Tsarist empire and had personal experience with Russia before its revolution, visiting in 1898 and 1910 as an informal ‘special industrial advisor’ to evaluate the country’s investment potential. See van Onselen, \textit{The Cowboy Capitalist}, 536.
confidence than Walsh on Russia’s future commercial potential. He assured that a total disintegration of Bolshevik rule in Russia would come within two years, a situation that—once it happened—would open up the country to American businessmen anxious to access the its rich natural resources. Hammond ambitiously proclaimed that a commercial “dollar diplomacy” would be the most optimal outcome for Russia, despite the commonplace contempt this doctrine previously arose from peripheral nations that associated it with foreign financial manipulation. He found that peace settlements based upon racial or geographic self-determination were to blame for the violence across the postwar Slavic world, so nationality-neutral economic arrangements via trade with the United States would be far more conducive toward peace. The third speaker at the event, U.S. Assistant Secretary to the Navy Oscar Terry Crosby, assumed that transformative change would come far more gradually, but—based on the trends from the American South’s development after the Civil War—he still proclaimed that within twenty years, the Russia would be the safest country for Americans to invest their finances. A year later, one of the three SFS fraternity branches at the time, Kappa Alpha Phi, invited Hammond as a guest of honor to its banquet hall, but far less information was recorded on this event.

Despite his displeasure with the School of Foreign Service’s divergence from his initial vision, McGuire expressed tinges of indignation whenever he felt the reputation of the school...
was downplayed or slighted. In a February 2, 1923 letter to the now-retired Creeden, McGuire expressed his astonishment that the Chamber of Commerce President Julius H. Barnes wrote an article entitled, “Foreign Affairs Neglected Study,” that made no reference to the School of Foreign Service’s contributions to the field.\(^\text{300}\) He suggested that the dean of the School of Foreign Service could tactfully impress the school’s character and pioneering scholarship onto Barnes, who in the future ought to “make more extensive reference to Georgetown than he has done.”\(^\text{301}\) John Hopkins University’s 1924 announcement of a million dollar fund for a new Graduate Department of International Relations—twice the size of the School of Foreign Services—threw McGuire into an even greater panic.\(^\text{302}\) He wrote a memorandum for Dr. Sherwell, and urged him to inform President Notz and Regent Walsh that if Georgetown did not initiate McGuire’s original plan for the School of Foreign Service submitted in June 1918, it would be relegated “to the second or third rank” of schools specializing in international affairs.\(^\text{303}\)

Four years after his departure, McGuire was still upset that few developments arose toward the hemispherical Catholic unity he hoped for six years ago.\(^\text{304}\) On March 17, 1925, he wrote a letter to Georgetown President Charles W. Lyons—Creeden’s successor—sharing his embarrassment that out of the twenty-two U.S. embassies, legations, or high commissionerships in Latin American, not one was held by a Catholic.\(^\text{305}\) “Is it any wonder that Latin Americans smile incredulously when we of our 20 million Catholics and out 110 Archbishops and Bishops?

\(^{300}\) McGuire to Creeden, SJ, February 2, 1923, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.; The article McGuire discusses is Julius H. Barnes, “Foreign Affairs Neglected Study,” The New York Times, January 21, 1923, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

\(^{301}\) Ibid.

\(^{302}\) McGuire to Sherwell, “Memorandum for Sherwell,” April 22, 1924, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

\(^{303}\) Ibid.

\(^{304}\) McGuire to Charles W. Lyons, SJ, March 17, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

\(^{305}\) Ibid.
Why would they credit such strength when they never see a Catholic Minister or Consul General?”

The continual absence of a Catholic presence in U.S. foreign service likely compounded McGuire’s disappointment that the School of Foreign Service was an undergraduate school; amidst rising standards in professionalism, SFS graduates would enter the diplomatic and consular services in less prestigious positions than those with the credentials of an advanced graduate level degree. This was a frequent trait of McGuire’s correspondences with important Georgetown University and School of Foreign Service figures; five years earlier, he wrote to Walsh that Leo Stanton Rowe, a Latin American affairs professor at Georgetown and the Director General of Pan-American Union, wished to teach an advanced graduate level course intended for a masters or doctorate degree granting institution. Unfortunately for McGuire, his ambitions for graduate studies in international affairs would remain mostly unfulfilled until after World War II when Hunter Guthrie, dean of Georgetown University’s Graduate School, made that level of coursework a permanent fixture of Georgetown.

McGuire contacted Lyons for another reason relevant to his general complaints on the standing of Catholics in U.S. diplomacy. Touting the skills and experience of Guillermo A. Sherwell—McGuire’s friend, a fellow Catholic, the head of the School of Foreign Service’s Spanish Department, and McGuire’s successor as Director General of the Inter-American High Commission—McGuire thanked the president for connecting Sherwell with the New York attorney Martin Conboy, an alumni of Georgetown Law School. McGuire intended Conboy to strongly bring up Sherwell’s name to Senator James Wadsworth of New York, who would then...

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310 McGuire to Lyons, March 17, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.
officially recommend Sherwell to the vacant ministerial posting in Asunción, Paraguay.\textsuperscript{311} McGuire wished Lyon to remind Conboy that “if there is any one country in the wide world which should appeal to the Society of Jesus, it is Paraguay, with whose history the Society in inseparably associated,” a reference to seventeenth century Santísima Trinidad del Paraná Mission, the largest Jesuit mission during the Spanish colonization of the Americas.\textsuperscript{312} Even if a Paraguay appointment could not follow through, McGuire believed that the ministerial position to Venezuela would also be suitable for his friend; the other Latin American vacancy in Uruguay would be too expensive for Sherwell’s aspirations.\textsuperscript{313} McGuire suggested that the current U.S. minister to Venezuela, Willis C. Cook, “could be transferred—promoted, in fact,—to Montevideo, and Sherwell appointed in his place.”\textsuperscript{314} Sherwell never ended up in any of the three positions, passing away only sixteen months later, but McGuire’s correspondence with Lyon reveals an early and audacious, albeit failed, attempt to take advantage of the recent foreign service networks forged through Georgetown University.\textsuperscript{315}

Nor was this the first time McGuire attempted to boost Catholic association across the Americas via his connections to Georgetown. A short time after McGuire first met Lyons at a dinner hosted by U.S. Navy Admiral William S. Benson, and two weeks before his letter on Sherwell, McGuire informed him on the unfortunate circumstances befalling the Jesuit Archbishop Luis Muñoz y Capurón of Guatemala.\textsuperscript{316} In 1922, Guatemalan President Jose Maria Orellana—who gained power in a 1921 UFCO-backed coup d’état—exiled the newly appointed

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{313} McGuire to Lyons, March 17, 1925, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{316} Constantine McGuire to Charles W. Lyons, SJ, March 5, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.
Archbishop Muñoz based off of accusations of a clerical anti-government conspiracy.\textsuperscript{317} Church relations only worsened since, with the Guatemalan government banning nearly all religious orders in 1924.\textsuperscript{318} McGuire expressed total disgust toward both Muñoz’s treatment and Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes’ recognition of the military government, even taking a bewildered conspiratorial tone on how “the nest of grafting murderers who have ruled the country since the Grand Master of the Masons was able to secure recognition from the Secretary of State of the United States” in contradiction of Hughes’ professed piety on the inviolability of foreign constitutional governments.\textsuperscript{319}

McGuire wished to ensure that the injustices faced by Muñoz, “a zealous worker for the two million illiterates who comprise the bulk of the Indo-Latin population of Guatemala,” did not go unrecognized, so he suggested to Michel Curley, head of the Baltimore Archdiocese that oversaw the diocese of Washington, DC, that Muñoz y Capurón be invited to deliver the address at the next Pan American Mass on Thanksgiving Day.\textsuperscript{320} McGuire wished “that all necessary measures be taken to secure the utmost publicity for this discourse,” including a dispatch by mail to every Latin American capital for the publication of Muñoz’s speech. McGuire asked Lyons if Muñoz could reside at Georgetown College for this event several months in advance, or, if Curley declines the invitation, at a bare minimum support Muñoz’s living arrangements.\textsuperscript{321} He assured the president that the archbishop, currently living in El Paso, Texas, could better manage his problems with Guatemala in Washington, DC, “the center of control of northern Latin American affairs.”\textsuperscript{322} Cognizant of the scale of this favor, McGuire appealed to Lyons through

\textsuperscript{318} 260.
\textsuperscript{319} McGuire to Lyons, March 5, 1925, 1–2.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
his personal acquaintance with Tierney, Archbishop Curley, and National Catholic Welfare Council officers who could testify his dedication to serving the Catholic hierarchy.323

In his message, McGuire omitted Muñoz’s less flattering characteristics, most of all that Muñoz held a far more oppositional and combative stance against anticlerical legislation than his two Guatemalan archbishop predecessors.324 In exile, Muñoz even proclaimed the existence of a state-sponsored conspiracy to destroy the Church in Guatemala.325 Narratives from the Vatican’s representatives to Guatemala aligned far more with the accounts of the Guatemalan government than with Muñoz.326 Angered by his antagonistic behavior, Vatican officials blamed him and other belligerent clerics for violating the distinctions of the political and religious spheres.327 Their constant transgressions against secularist laws bought the harsh penalties upon themselves, which ironically accelerated the deterioration of the Church’s standing in Guatemala.328 It is very likely that Lyons did not wish to confront Vatican orthodoxy by hosting such a polarizing figure to an ceremony representative of Pan American cooperation. That relations between the United States and Guatemala only recently normalized, heavily motivated by Secretary Hughes’ cautious plan to reform Guatemala’s currency and standardize its finances, were another probable influence on Lyon’s decision.329 If Muñoz were to issue a moral diatribe implicating the Vatican and the United States in Guatemala’s military rule, he could heavily risk Georgetown’s standing with authorities of both institutions. When Lyons returned a message to McGuire on March 11, he confessed a deep concern with the crisis in Guatemala and Archbishop Muñoz’s

323 Ibid., 1.
325 Ibid., 30.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
misfortunes, but ultimately felt that inviting the archbishop to Georgetown just now would not be “wise or prudent.\textsuperscript{330} He promised to explain his reasoning to McGuire at a later meeting, and while the exact contents of this proposed conversation are unknown, Lyons very likely feared that hosting Muñoz could harm Georgetown’s reputation in Pan American circles.\textsuperscript{331} News clippings of the Pan American Mass eight months report a rather mundane celebration, hardly the bombast promised by McGuire.\textsuperscript{332}

If any effort by the School of Foreign Service mirror McGuire’s squandered efforts to influence Georgetown policy, it would be support for an increased national merchant marine, which climaxed alongside the school’s most important event since its inauguration: the 1929 Tenth Anniversary Commemoration.

\textsuperscript{330} Lyons to McGuire, March 11, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{332} “Pan-American Mass On Thanksgiving Day,” \textit{The Sun [The Baltimore Sun]}, November 22, 1925, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
Chapter Three: The School of Foreign Service Approaching Ten Years, 1927–1929

As the tenth anniversary of the School of Foreign Service’s foundation neared, administrators at Georgetown University felt confident in its youngest department’s diplomatic services to the United States. In his 1927 and 1928 annual reports to Georgetown University’s Board of Regents, SFS Assistant Dean Thomas H. Healy detailed that the School of Foreign Service had made such a positive impression on international circles in Washington, DC, that many officials eagerly engaged the school, with ambassadors, ministers, and admirals delivering special lectures and diplomatic corps members enrolling in courses.  

The School of Foreign Service also proudly embraced the most recent innovations in pedagogical technology, utilizing novel tools such as motion pictures, projection slides, and exhibits. Healy was most proud of the prestige that the School of Foreign Service attained abroad. He mentioned that the school left an especially commendable impression on Chilean Ambassador Miguel Cruchaga, who now sought to arrange the erection of a similar institution for his home country modeled on the School of Foreign Service. At his May 1927 address to Georgetown, Cruchaga guaranteed that internationally engaged higher education would extend Pan American goodwill through intellectual collaboration. More specifically he supported SFS faculty trips across the hemisphere as government advisors on economic, financial, and public health affairs, while

334 Ibid., 5.
335 Ibid., 6.
336 Miguel Cruchaga, “Address: By His Excellency Miguel Cruchaga, Ambassador from Chile,” GCJ 55 no. 8 (May 1927): 454–466.
American and Chilean students receive awards for the best papers on relations between the United States and Latin America.\textsuperscript{337}

That same year, the total cash assets and savings account of the School of Foreign Service numbered approximately $100,000, almost four and five times that of Georgetown College ($26,166) and the Law School ($20,491) that year.\textsuperscript{338} Georgetown University’s Medical School at $178,557 was the only department to receive more funding.\textsuperscript{339} The School of Foreign Service had attained enough prominence that its position at Georgetown University began to threaten some non-Catholic foreign service circles. An October 1928 profile from the Masonic magazine \textit{The Crescent} warned that the school trained a larger proportion of Catholics than Protestants for foreign service.\textsuperscript{340} To prevent Georgetown from inundating the foreign service with recruits loyal to the Roman papacy, \textit{The Crescent} urged that Masonic societies fund foreign service schools of their own to boost the diplomatic and commercial training of Protestant youth.\textsuperscript{341} Yet despite its hostility to the School of Foreign Service, even \textit{The Crescent} ultimately applauded the school’s merit and aptitude, admitting that “It is childish to attempt to minimize that which is good because you don’t like it!”\textsuperscript{342}

Another impressive aspect was active student participation in social activities despite the School of Foreign Service’s physical distance from the main campus. One of the most notable student-led initiatives to correspond with the SFS mission arose only months after the school’s 1919 commencement. On February 21, 1920, the alpha branch of the foreign service fraternity Delta Phi Epsilon was inducted at an initiatory banquet, a social event graciously received by

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{337} \textit{Ibid.}, 466.
\textsuperscript{338} Walsh, SJ to Lyons, SJ, April 26, 1927, SFS 1927 File, SFSB1, BFCSC; Financial Records, June 1, 1927, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Financial (2 of 2) (1926–1939), B29FR, MPA.
\textsuperscript{339} Financial Records, June 1, 1927.
\textsuperscript{340} “A Catholic School,” \textit{The Crescent} 17, no. 1 (October 1928), SFS 1928 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 20.
\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{flushright}
Roy S. MacElwee, Edmund A Walsh, and multiple foreign trade officials. By May 1929, Delta Phi Epsilon could list thirty-three Department of Commerce employees and thirty-three more men stationed overseas with private companies across its alumni network. The fraternity even expanded nationwide, adding new branches at other higher education trade centers: New York University (Beta Chapter, 1920), Boston University (Gamma Chapter, 1922), the University of Southern California (Epsilon Chapter, 1923), the University of Detroit (Zeta Chapter, 1924), and George Washington University (Eta Chapter, 1929).

This chapter showcases two different efforts from SFS officials to situate the school within the perceived needs and goals of U.S. foreign policy: the need for an adequate merchant marine and the promotion of international peace through the legal banishment of war. The former cause—despite advocacy from several top SFS figures—never made a strong impression on U.S. commercial policy. However, the latter—expressed through Secretary of State Frank B. Frank’s invitation as the keynote speaker of the School of Foreign Service Tenth Anniversary Commemoration—formed a much stronger alignment between the university and the state due to basing itself on the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, a U.S. treaty that reflected pre-existing state interests, rather than advocating against a predominant trend in U.S. foreign policy.

The Revival of Shipping and the U.S. Merchant Marine as an Expression of American Power

The revival of shipping was one of the core attributes of the United States’ postwar prominence, essential enough for School of Foreign Service administrators to designate the

343 Ibid.
shipping industry as one of the four divided sections of the school’s curriculum.\textsuperscript{345} As a field that received numerous SFS graduates during the interwar period, major school officials frequently recognized the significance of the merchant marine, the commercial fleet consisting of all waterborne trading vessels, to the economic growth of the United States. In an October 1929 \textit{Washington Post} editorial, Alfred H. Haag, director of the Department of International Shipping at the School of Foreign Service, boasted of the importance of this attribute in a lengthy quantitative assessment of the increase in U.S. ship quantity and tonnage since 1914.\textsuperscript{346} An assortment of 5,100 vessels transported an estimated 1.75 million passengers and 100 million tons of cargo valued at $8 billion in cargo value the past year.\textsuperscript{347} In Haag’s mind, the management of this sizeable transportation task required heavy domestic recruitment to construct and operate the vessels for international shipping.\textsuperscript{348} This was a point of frequent concern for Haag: at a Georgetown address in 1926, he warned that Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan each outbuilt and outweighed U.S.-owned shipping, forcing an insultingly inferior national commercial service onto Americans.\textsuperscript{349} Still distressed by this outlier among an otherwise outstanding American economic performance almost three years later, Haag assumed that the United States ought to control its commerce with its own ships rather than rely on foreign flag ships.\textsuperscript{350} While the United States exerted considerable economic prowess regardless

\textsuperscript{345} \textit{Yearbook February 1919–February 1920}, 12.
\textsuperscript{346} Alfred H. Haag, “Revival of Shipping,” \textit{The Washington Post}, October 28, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{347} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{348} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Ibid}.
of a subpar merchant marine, Haag still believed that his country should match its rivals’
capacities and secure a permanent placement in international carrying trade.351

The growth and preservation of an American-operated merchant marine became a notable
concern among School of Foreign Service officials as the school approached its tenth
anniversary. Thomas H. Healy was also utterly dumbfounded that the richest nation in the world
depended seventy percent of its annual $10 billion trade to transportation on foreign ships.352
Despite the United States’ advantageous position as the major World War belligerent least
impacted by the conflict’s economic devastation, Healy deplored United States for falling behind
the merchant marine development of other great powers across the 1920s.353 The American fleet
was both too small and its vessels technologically obsolete in size and speed to transport the
majority of trades overseas.354 To his further dismay, the majority of the $12 billion in private
American loans funding the construction of merchant navies went to foreign countries instead of
the United States.355 Haag and Healy alike viewed the U.S. merchant marine deficiencies as an
unbecoming disgrace for a nation with such an opulent status, yet they also envisioned an
opportunity for the School of Foreign Service within this deficiency. Healy anticipated that if
Department of Commerce changed its policy to expanding the U.S. merchant marine, the School
of Foreign Service—now with ten years of experience preparing young men to take up careers in
the shipping industry—would readily supply outstanding leadership for the service.356

Unfortunately, Healy’s hope that a growing merchant marine fleet could plentifully employ SFS

351 Jackson D. Haag, “New Ships, or Loss of Trade: Building and Operating Program Vital to U.S. Says Trade
Delegate,” Detroit News, May 26, 1927, SFS 1927 Newsclippings, SFSB1, BFCSC.
352 “Build Ships or Lose Trade, Say Experts,” Detroit Free Press, May 26, 1927, SFS 1927 Newsclippings, SFSB1,
BFCSC.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
Folder, SFSB1, BFCSC.
graduates remained unfilled until the United States’ preparation and entrance into World War II (in fact, the percentage of foreign vessels shipping American products increased and the U.S. merchant marine deadweight tonnage halved in the decade after the publication of Healy’s article). However, the promotional insert of the school demonstrated a continual effort to brand the School of Foreign Service as a core contributory party to university administrators’ perceived foreign needs of the United States.

Even Walsh, now the vice-president of Georgetown University and regent of the School of Foreign Service, raised special attention to the maintenance and security of strong U.S. shipping transportation through a U.S.-supplied commercial fleet, delivering the address, “The Need for a Strong Merchant Marine Demonstrated from History and Right Reason,” to the Second National Conference of the Merchant Marine on January 23, 1929. Walsh began his address at the conference with a humorous anecdote of him and his friends studying abroad in Central Europe upon the outbreak of the World War, forcing them into a frantic search from Hamburg to Naples for an American ship back home. Disappointingly, they only came across transportation under foreign flags; resorting to spending $2,000 on tiny cramped boarding on a ship stationed at Genoa. Shocked by the “disgraceful condition” of the U.S. shipping industry on the eve of the war, Walsh affirmed to his audience that his conundrum in Europe taught him the United States paid a considerable “tribute” to those foresighted foreign nations equipped with

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357 The U.S. merchant marine reported that U.S. vessels carried only twenty-two percent of U.S. foreign trade in 1939 and held deadweight tonnages of 13,700,000 in 1930 and 6,830,000 at the beginning of 1942. Respective figures provided in “Armed Forces Talk 209,” AGO 1–1072–A, Department of the Army, July 1, 1947, 1929 File, SFSB1, GUAM, 3; Ibid., 8; “Victory and Liberty Ships at California Shipbuilding Corporation’s yard at Wilmington, California, United States, 14–26 Apr 1944,” United States War Shipping Agency, https://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=7081.
359 Ibid., 1.
360 Ibid.
a suitable merchant marine for their citizenry.\textsuperscript{361} Walsh did not pull back from his disapproval of how a deficient merchant marine damaged the United States’ prosperity and dignity; most shamefully, he reminded those before him that “the bodies of American citizens who had been killed on the Lusitania were shipped back by a friendly government at current cargo rates, so much per corpse,—deadweight.”\textsuperscript{362}

Shaken by these personal and national embarrassments, Walsh was adamant to the conference that the School of Foreign Service instructed its students how an adequate American-owned merchant marine fits into the preservation of American sea power, national security, and national prosperity.\textsuperscript{363} As seen previously during the School of Foreign Service’s development in its first few years, Walsh consistently emphasized building up a peacetime equivalent to U.S. resources for warfare. He explicitly built off of the well-received argument from U.S. Naval Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 1890 history book, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783}, that the United States ought to pursue a strong naval policy in order to become the foremost sea power in the world.\textsuperscript{364} Adjacent to military strength was the guidance of a prestigious corps of peacetime professionals to handle overseas mechanisms of trade, which Walsh felt that the School of Foreign Service could exceptionally provision.\textsuperscript{365} To Walsh, the United States must simultaneously be a first-class military and economic power. An adequate supply of shipping vessels flying under the American flag would ensure that the mines, fields, and factories of the United State produced bountiful goods exported abroad, that its financial institutions host the world’s foremost gold reserve, and even “let the wealth of the Indies be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{361} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{362} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{363} \textit{Ibid.}, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{364} Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783} (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company 1890) in \textit{Ibid.}, 2–3.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Schulzinger, \textit{The Making of the Diplomatic Mind}, 33.
\end{itemize}
Walsh firmly believed that the United States’ marine merchant deficiencies were an insult to its national destiny toward economic preeminence. However, Walsh felt that if the United States were to become lax in its commercial conduct, it would go the way of previous seafaring powers such as the Phoenicians, the Genoese, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the French, and the Dutch: at best a second-rate claim to international prestige and power. The Spanish Empire particularly received a vitriolic reception from Walsh’s historical survey. Despite the massive inflows of wealth generated from American silver imported to Spain during the sixteenth century, the ascendent empire completely squandered its swift global ascendency and affluence. Preferring to “buy service than to create it,” the Spanish Empire lazily purchased foreign goods and relied upon foreign ships for transportation even though it could afford the more entrepreneurial route of producing these amenities through its own capital and labor. As silver mines dried up, Spain’s failure to build up its national productivity during the height of its wealth forced the mighty empire’s retreat from the leading position it ungratefully enjoyed for centuries.

Walsh was paranoid that the United States could enter a similar downfall if it did not learn from what he called “one of the most expensive lessons in our national history” by failing to create, control, and operate an efficient merchant marine. For Walsh, the shipping industry’s inadequacies during the World War were a sharp warning of a possible future commercial demise. Across those four years, the United States paid approximately $3 billion to foreign vessels for the transportation of U.S. cargo and passengers in the absence of available

367 Ibid., 3.
368 Italics in original document. Ibid.
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid., 4.
U.S. merchant marine ships.\textsuperscript{371} Even a decade later, the number of vessels and gross tonnage of each merchant marine fleet of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan dwarfed that of the United States.\textsuperscript{372} While the United States made active moves toward constructing a prominent navy in the decades since Mahan’s book, Walsh harped on the conference that it is in fact “the combined strength of these two [naval and merchant vessels] which constituted the real sea power of a nation.”\textsuperscript{373}

Throughout his address Walsh explained further reasons to the conference on the necessity of maintaining commercial strength through these two intertwined attributes. He warned that the sorry state of the merchant marine was indicative of a broader trend of falling behind innovation in Europe: while Americans invented the airplane, the machine gun, and the telegraph, Walsh felt that Europeans made far greater strides in their development of each respective invention during the World War.\textsuperscript{374} The lackluster merchant marine fleet was one more sign that the United States was falling behind its rivals across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{375} Most of all, Walsh feared the repercussions that an unreliable merchant marine could have on the United States’ domestic stability. Making note of the enormous productive output of U.S. industrial machinery—supplying 120 per cent of the nation’s consuming capacity—Walsh stated that an inadequate merchant marine would fail to effectively market this exportable surplus overseas.\textsuperscript{376} He then presumed that this inefficiency would raise unemployment levels as an idle industry, agriculture, and commerce failed to resolve the overproduction crisis.\textsuperscript{377} With the various recent Communist revolutions across Europe fresh on his mind—most of all the Bolshevik takeover of

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 4–5.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
Russia—Walsh warned the conference that opportunistic radical agitators would sow the seeds of communism, socialism, and class warfare in an America characterized by mass-unemployment.”378 This was the lesson Walsh sternly reminded himself since his famine relief mission to the Soviet Union, “Men are most easily educated to discontent and whipped to fury when the mind is tormented and the body famished.”379 In order to ensure national prosperity and prevent class consciousness from becoming the herald of revolution, he urged that the United States must maintain optimal employment through the merchant marine’s transportation of exportable surplus goods.380

Despite his sordid assessments of the merchant marine’s condition for much of his address, Walsh concluded on a much more auspicious note. Confident in the potential of American manpower, Walsh received applause from the men before him as he encouraged them to defy the foreign naysayers who doubted that American businessmen cannot and need not oversee a proper merchant marine fleet.381 Although the School of Foreign Service was not the core component of his address, Walsh concluded gloating that the school trains students for the leadership required for missions such as the development of the merchant marine.382 One consistent impression that the school laid upon its students was the key distinction between a politician and a statesman: the former keeps his eye on the next election but the latter prioritizes the next generation.383 In Walsh’s mind, it was obvious that any proper embodiment of statesmanship must secure the United States’ simultaneous placement as a first class military and commercial power.

378 Ibid., 8.
379 Walsh, “The Message,” Truce of God 2, no. 76 (1926): 6, Box 2, EWP 2, BFCSC.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
As mentioned earlier in the analyses of Haag and Healy, Walsh’s pleas ultimately had little immediate policy impact on the expansion of the U.S. merchant marine fleet. Nonetheless, the Georgetown officials’ focus on preserving American construction and manpower over shipping vessels again exemplified Nemec’s observation that American universities intentionally attempted to facilitate and capitalize on their own visions of state-university collaborations.³⁸⁴ Haag, Healy, and Walsh’s fixations with upkeeping the U.S. merchant marine fleet was an early unsuccessful effort to deliberately establish priorities for the United States’ foreign policy, but the School of Foreign Service more successfully fostered an alignment with U.S. diplomacy a month after Walsh’s merchant marine diatribe.

**The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the School of Foreign Service’s Tenth Anniversary**

**Commemoration**

The case that most epitomizes the atmosphere of ideological optimism between the interests of the U.S. government and the School of the Foreign Service at the end of the decade was an invitation extended to U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg at the school’s tenth anniversary commemoration held at Gaston Hall on February 19, 1929. Georgetown offered this invitation during Kellogg’s spearheading of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which sought to renounce war as a tool of foreign policy among state signatories.³⁸⁵ By the time of Kellogg’s address, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had nearly attained the height of its prospective success; nearly all independent countries and all of the world’s great powers were signatories or adherents to the treaty.³⁸⁶ It was still long before the October Wall Street Crash of 1929 disrupted prospects of

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economic prosperity, the Smoot–Hawley Act of 1930 disrupted international economic cooperation through the raising of U.S. tariffs on foreign imports, and the 1931 Japanese undeclared invasion of Manchuria shattered hopes of abolishing war.\textsuperscript{387}

The School of Foreign Service Tenth Anniversary Commemoration was one of the highest profile events for the school since its inaugural ceremony on November 25, 1919. Still the most recent department of Georgetown University at the time, the School of Foreign Service enrolled the largest number of students out of any facility other than Georgetown College, featuring more than five hundred students a year, one hundred different courses taught by sixty distinguished specialists and experts, and graduates in over fifty-five countries outside the United States.\textsuperscript{388} One \textit{Washington Post} articles claimed that in the midst of a generally conservative and lethargic system of America higher education at the time, the School of Foreign Service’s rapid expansion and international success stood out.\textsuperscript{389} Nearly every government department in Washington, DC sent a representative to the commemoration, including Assistant Secretaries William R. Castle, Jr. and Nelson T. Johnson of the Department of State, Attorney General John Garibaldi Sargent of the Department of Justice, Secretary of Interior Roy O. West, Commissioners Jefferson Myers and Samuel S. Sandberg of the U.S. Shipping Board, and Commissioners Frank Clark and E.B. Brossard of the U.S. Tariff Commission.\textsuperscript{390} A prominent selection of international organization and foreign country representatives also attended the event, including the ambassadors of France, Italy, Mexico, and Chile; the ministers of Persia, Siam, Venezuela, Poland, and Colombia; and staff members from the legations and embassies of

\textsuperscript{388} Rothwell Brown, “Kellogg to Speak at Georgetown: Special Exercises to Be Held Tonight Commemorating Foreign Service School,” \textit{The Washington Star}, February 18, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{389} Rothwell Brown, “G.U. Will Award Honorary Degrees: Secretary Kellogg and Dr. W.F. Notz Will Be Paid Tribute Tomorrow,” \textit{The Washington Post}, February 19, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
\textsuperscript{390} \textit{Ibid.}
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Romania, Austria, Hungary, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Norway, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Lithuania, and others located in Washington, DC. 391 Leading figures of prominent Washington, DC universities and institutions, such as George Washington University, Catholic University, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Catholic National Welfare Council, additionally appeared at the commemoration in anticipation of Frank Kellogg’s speech on his soaring diplomatic accomplishment. 392

Promotion of the commemoration underlined the School of Foreign Service’s emergence at a critical juncture in history for the United States. The school’s advocates sought to brand itself as a pioneer in meeting the new diplomatic and commercial obligations that the United States attained as a member on victorious side of the World War and as the wealthiest country on the planet. 393 Because the various branches in the foreign service—foreign trade, international shipping, diplomatic, consular, and trade commissioner work—became professionally trained work in the United States recently compared to the Europe, the School of Foreign Service would provide novel solutions to the challenges of overseas competition and professional foreign service management in the postwar order. 394 The fact that the School of Foreign Service’s speaker of honor was the secretary of state at the height of his proudest diplomatic achievement retrenched the school’s exceptional educational status for assisting the United States’ goals abroad. Wishing to activate student involvement with the commemoration and its wider political significance, the School of Foreign Service also offered a $100 prize from an anonymous donor to whichever student presented the best paper on the international possibilities of the Kellogg-

391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
The School of Foreign Service was eager to pin its reputation to Kellogg. The pact’s ambition for a world dignified enough to rise above interstate war well complemented the school’s call for a “restatement of the common principles which should guide nations in their conduct towards one another” in its initial announcement for the tenth anniversary commemoration.

During his speech at Gaston Hall, Kellogg repudiated unimpressed critics who scorned the pact as a “mere gesture” without any possibility of enforcement. Rather, he eagerly proclaimed the pact as a necessary “rallying point for the mobilization of world opinion” and the greatest step in history toward ensuring nonbelligerent resolutions of international disputes. Kellogg’s sternly claimed that legal arbitration and diplomatic dialogue—not the maintenance of armies and navies—must become the normative principles of international exchange, leading newspapers to regard Kellogg’s Georgetown address as one of the most forceful defenses of his practices as secretary of states. Kellogg extolled Georgetown University’s growth and development alongside the United States since their corresponding inceptions 140 years ago. He explicitly acclaimed the School of Foreign Service for being the first educational institution of its kind and for establishing a new standard for U.S. diplomacy, as only recently did trained professionals—rather than just political patrons—become frequent appointees to postings at foreign embassies and consul generals. He recounted that twenty-five years ago the State

396 “Announcement,” School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, May 15, 1928, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFSC.
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
400 “Georgetown Honors Secretary of State: It Bestows Doctorate Of Laws Degree on Honorable Frank B. Kellogg,” The Baltimore Catholic Review, March 1, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFSC.
401 Ibid.
Department first attempted to train consuls, vice consuls, and secretaries in the hundreds of treaties, commerce and trade branches, and international law principles relevant to American foreign service, although within a mere thirty day timespan.\textsuperscript{402} Now, however, the School of Foreign Service granted far more time, breadth of information, and preparation for trainees before their country sent them abroad to represent national interests.\textsuperscript{403} Protective against the public reputation of career diplomats, Kellogg also viewed the School of Foreign Service’s reputation and professionalism as a defense against “unjust and uninformed criticism” that U.S. diplomats cared more for lively and expensive social events than important matters in political and economic foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{404} At the conclusion of his address, Edmund A. Walsh—now vice president of Georgetown University and regent of the School of Foreign Service—presented an honorary doctor of laws degree for the secretary.\textsuperscript{405} Dr. William F. Notz, the dean of the School of Foreign Service and MacElwee’s successor, also received an honorary doctor of laws degree, for his key leadership since 1923 in guiding the educational model Kellogg praised.\textsuperscript{406}

Historians and statespersons have since frequently maligned Kellogg-Briand Pact as an exercise in naïve international liberal legalism a decade before the world descended again into war, but Kellogg’s efforts encountered a far more laudatory reception at Georgetown.\textsuperscript{407} The enthusiastic professor of international law James Brown Scott foresaw that history would remember Kellogg as one of the nation’s greatest secretaries of state, and Georgetown University President W. Coleman Nevils invoked the School of Foreign Service’s motto of “international peace through international understanding” as a corresponding ideological sentiment in spirit

\textsuperscript{402} “Kellogg Opposes Penalty for Pact,” The New York Times, February 18, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.  
\textsuperscript{403} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{404} “Pact No ‘Gesture,’” BFCSC.  
\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{406} Rothwell Brown, “G.U. Will Award Honorary Degree,” BFCSC.  
with Kellogg’s pact, asserting that the conduct of nations “must learn to love one another better, to know one another better.” The School of Foreign Service’s tenth anniversary commemoration witnessed a close alignment between the goals of international peace and diplomatic expertise from a major figure of U.S. government international affairs—Frank Kellogg—and those of School of Foreign Service administrators and faculty to train U.S. professionals for new commitments within a morally guided world order.

408 Ibid.
Chapter Four: Contesting Visions of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism

This chapter delves into a far less recognized element of the early School of Foreign Service in pre-existing historical scholarship. Dissenting affiliates with Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service are recognized within published histories of the campus, but only comparably recent movements such as the student-organized protests against the Vietnam War and South African apartheid.\textsuperscript{409} Progressing through Georgetown’s interactions with territorial empire in the Philippines and informal empire in Cuba and Nicaragua, this chapter ends with a novel look at the anti-imperialist SFS history professor John H. Latané as an early predecessor to later university reflections on how the United States ought to engage with the world. Unlike the Vietnam and apartheid protesters of decades later, Latané did not openly address any direct or indirect role that the School of Foreign Service or Georgetown University played in rationalizing shrewd materialist relations with weaker nations, but his example still demonstrates that public opinion at the early School of Foreign Service was far from monolithic.

Territorial Empire: The Philippines

Amidst the United States’ ascendency to global power came numerous accusations of “imperialism,” a term that many U.S. foreign policymakers regarded with special offense given their efforts to differentiate themselves from the empires of Europe.\textsuperscript{410} The faculty and administrators at the School of Foreign Service were likewise aversive against labeling the United States as an imperialist nation. The first question for a 1926 “Commercial Policies and Treaties” midterm examination asked students why the traditions and experiences of the United States make its people anti-imperialist—likely in reference to the United States’ antagonisms


toward European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere.\footnote{“Commercial Politics and Treaties: Midyear Examination,” January 26, 1926, 4 in Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations, February 1926, School of Foreign Service, SFS 1926 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.} Internationalist liberals at the School of Foreign Service saw little inconsistency between criticism of European territorial conquests and advocacy for American economic domination, but this variant of American anti-imperialism often exceptionalized even the most blatant U.S. territorial expansion.\footnote{Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest, 225; Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, “Introduction,” 1–20 in Tyrell and Sexton, eds., Empire’s Twin U.S. Anti-imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015): 2.} The course midterm of “Far East as an Export Field” covered the United States’ largest overseas colony, the Philippines, but asked students to describe how its aims and policies in the Philippines were distinctive from those of European nations in their colonies.\footnote{Frank R. Eldridge, “Far East as Export Field,” in Questions, 25.} Pedagogy at the School of Foreign Service pondered little over the deep interconnections between the growing empires of the Old and New Worlds. In reality, American policymakers repeatedly looked to Great Britain as an example of governing foreign peoples at the turn of the century; the British poet Rudyard Kipling’s infamous hymn “The White Man’s Burden” explicitly celebrated the United States for taking up the Anglo-Saxon mantel of civilizing inferior races.\footnote{Kramer, The Blood of Empire: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006): 10–12.} Within the same “Far East as an Export Field” midterm, even the brutal counterinsurgency that the United States waged against Filipino guerrillas from 1899 to 1902 in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War—killing approximately 250,000 Filipino from violence, disease, or starvation—is euphemistically described as “the pacification of the Philippines.”\footnote{Ibid., 157.}

Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service yielded more attention toward the Philippines than any other overseas colonial possession of the United States. The case for or against the Philippines’ independence was an incredibly popular topic at Georgetown’s debate
club, appearing a total of six times between January 1920 and May 1929, more than any other subject during that time period. The first of these in December 1920, “Resolved, That the Philippine Islands should be granted independence within one year” was selected by the Philodemic Society—a undergraduate-level debate club—for the Merrick Debate, the university’s most prestigious debate competition. However, the Philippines were not only the subject of abstract debate. Filipino students, most of whom either attended the School of Foreign Service or the Law School, were among the most prominent and numerable nonwhite presences on campus grounds. A few exemplary SFS Filipino students attained high academic recognition. The University of the Philippines appointed SFS graduate Mariano C. Lopez as a rural economics professor at the beginning of 1925, and the Netherland’s Academy of International Law selected the still-matriculating SFS student Alfonso Donesa as the first student to represent the Philippines at an international student council centered on international peace at the Hague and Geneva. In 1923, Filipino students formally organized themselves into the “Philippine Georgetownians” society. First presided by Donesa, the Philippine Georgetownians took up a “conspicuous part in the activities of the University” by hosting annual luncheons and other social events. High ranking SFS and Philippine officials often attended these occasions, with the 1925 annual luncheon featuring Edmund A. Walsh as the guest of honor, as well as Thomas

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418 “Filipino Students Elect Officers,” The Hoya 7 no. 6 (October 22, 1925): 10.

419 Ibid.
H. Healy, a judge with personal ties to the Philippines, and the Philippine Press Bureau Director Vicente Bunnan as additional guest speakers.\footnote{\textit{Philippine Students Have Annual Luncheon: Third Annual Luncheon of Filipino Georgetownians a Brilliant Success – Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S. J., was Guest of Honor}, \textit{The Hoya} 7 no. 10 (December 4, 1925): 10.}

Even more noteworthy was the presence of Teodoro M. Kalaw, the executive secretary of the Philippine Commission of Independence, as the luncheon’s fourth invited speaker. A former officeholder in the Philippine Assembly and Cabinet, Kalaw attained a controversial reputation among American colonial authorities as an outspoken Filipino nationalist.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} In 1910, Dean C. Worcester, a staunch imperialist and the head of the Philippines’ Interior Department, used colonial anti-libel laws to shut down Kalaw’s pro-independence political magazine with a costly lawsuit.\footnote{Kramer, \textit{The Blood of Empire}, 342.} Worcester even sentenced Kalaw to prison in a decision legally backed by the U.S. Supreme Court.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Regardless, Kalaw still pushed for Filipino self-determination in his home nation and the United States. The same year of the Philippine Georgetownians banquet, where Kalaw “urged his compatriots to give their utmost for the Philippines,” he published a sympathetic historical account of Filipino armed resistance to American colonization.\footnote{\textit{Philippine Students Have Annual Luncheon}, \textit{The Hoya}, 10; Teodoro M. Kalaw, \textit{The Philippines Revolution} (Manila, Philippines: Manila Book Company, 1925).}

Kalaw’s depiction of the Philippine–American War in \textit{The Philippines Revolution} was far less euphemistic than the beforementioned SFS midterm examination packet, making special note of atrocities committed by American troops against Filipino civilians. For instance, Kalaw reported that following the near-total annihilation of U.S. troops at Balangiga, U.S. Army officer Jacob H. Smith invaded with the retaliatory order to “kill and burn” anyone capable of bearing arms—even children over the age of ten—and eviscerate the region into a “howling
While historians have long disputed whether Smith was successful at actually executing his indiscriminate order, anti-imperialists rallied around the “Balingiga massacre” as yet another vicious abuse of American power overseas.  

Due to this fascinating array of differing viewpoints on the Philippines at Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service, it is difficult to ascertain whether top administrators favored Philippine independence in the immediate future. The far more mainstream position in the United States on the islands was the gradual but indefinite policy of “eventual independence,” ensured under the Jones Act passed by Congressional Democrats and President Woodrow Wilson in 1916. On the other hand, Baltimore Archbishop James Gibbons and other members of the American Catholic Church’s upper hierarchy were among the strongest supporters for the maintenance of American control. Concern for Catholic missions in the Philippines, especially amidst fears of a potential invasion and anti-Christian persecution by Japan, was one of the Church’s core justifications for colonial retention. Similar to my research on Georgetown’s ties with interwar U.S. occupations in Latin America, there were no official statements or memorandums that directly address the Philippines, but once again, campus speakers indirectly reveal foreign policy positions that administrators of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service at the very least condoned or promoted.

A minor example of this was Richard B. Schmitt’s 1929 address at Gaston Hall. A Jesuit from Loyola College in Baltimore, Schmitt described the hardships of converting the Islamic Moro population on the Philippine island of Mindanao to provoke financial contributions

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428 Ibid., 358–359.  
429 Ibid., 358.
to the Jesuit missionary schools.\textsuperscript{430} The Schmitt invitation suggests some sympathy toward standard ecclesiastical defenses of U.S. colonialism, but an earlier SFS guest lecture by Manuel Roxas, the Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives and an ardent supporter of independence, presents a far more nuanced position.\textsuperscript{431} The January 24, 1924 event began with Roxas sharing how the Philippines fared so far under American supervision: its literacy rate had risen to nearly ninety percent and the legal system synthesized the best elements from Roman civil law, British common law, and Islamic Sharia.\textsuperscript{432} He ended with an emotional appeal to professed American principles that if the United States were to grant independence for his home nation, it would “rest the opinion of the world as to our real belief in democracy.”\textsuperscript{433} Georgetown President Creeden, the chair of the event, then introduced the events’ other speakers. First was Alfonso Donesa, who as president of the Philippine Georgetownians and representative of the university’s Filipino students, explained the society’s organization and aims to the rest of the student body.\textsuperscript{434} Next was Leo Stanton Rowe, who took special care to warn the audience against analogizing the Philippine cause for independence to the nineteenth century fight against slavery.\textsuperscript{435} In a rather glaring contrast to Roxas’ concluding message, he assured that the

\textsuperscript{430} “Non-Resident Sodality to Hear Fr. Schmitt: Will Speak on Philippine Islands - Receiving to Take Place During Second Week in May,” \textit{The Hoya} 10, no. 25 (April 25, 1929): 13.


\textsuperscript{432} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{433} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{434} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{435} \textit{Ibid.}
colonization of the Philippines was not a moral stain on the United States; in fact, Rowe confided that “the United States has never held other people in subjection.” Advocacy for Philippine independence was a common political opinion at the School of Foreign Service, yet as Rowe’s comments’ and school coursework demonstrate, the dual advocacy for independence and apologia for empire were by no means incompatible positions at interwar Georgetown.

**Informal Empire: Cuba and Nicaragua**

This seemingly contradictory understanding of U.S. territorial empire resembles how the School of Foreign Service approached American empire that did not require the direct annexation or governance of foreign lands. Returning to the 1926 midterm examinations, the pamphlet included questions on the more informal elements of preserving U.S. economic interests: for instance, students in “Export Sales” were asked to name four features that made Cuba an attractive market for American manufacturers. This coursework corresponded with special events also centering commercial concerns, such as an lecture on Cuban business conditions by the Cuban consul to the United States in the class, “Latin America as an Export Field.” Here the School of Foreign Service again neglects the historical context that explains the United States’ hegemonic influence over peripheral partners such as Cuba during the early twentieth century. Over the course of the 1920s, the United States dominated Cuba’s production of sugar, the country’s most profitable commodity, with American businesses owning more than sixty percent of the sugar industry and ninety-five percent of its exports entering the United States. Cuba avoided the annexations experienced by fellow ex-Spanish colonies Puerto Rico

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437 Daniel E. Casey, “Export Sales Practice Supplemental Examination,” March 1926, 15 in *Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations*, BFCSC.
and the Philippines, but the island nation entered independence as a U.S. protectorate under several controlling impositions decreed by its northern neighbor. Under the 1901 Platt Amendment, the United State could unilaterally intervene in Cuba using several justifications, including barring Cuba from going into debt or from making similar treaties with other nations. Cuban dissidents such as Fernando Ortiz Fernández long accused this deeply unequal relationship represented by the sugar industry and Platt Amendment of fomenting a foreign plutocracy over Cuba’s potential for democratic governance and economic sovereignty:

“Cuba will never be really independent until it can free itself from the coils of the serpent of colonial economy that fattens on its soil but strangles its inhabitants and winds itself about the palm tree of our republican coat of arms, converting it into the sign of the Yankee dollar.”

A defense of the Platt Amendment was a core argument from one of the earliest dissertations completed at the School of Foreign Service. Porfirio A. Bonet, the Cuban consul general in Canada, became the first diplomat to attain a Doctorate in Foreign Service from the School of Foreign Service in 1925. Before his posting in Canada, Bonet was the Cuban commercial attaché to the United States—the diplomatic position that oversees economic affairs between the two countries—and a Cuba representative to the Pan-American Commercial and Financial Conferences. He also previously received a Masters of Foreign Service from Georgetown in 1923. Completed across two years of research, Bonet’s dissertation fundamentally interpreted the Platt Amendment as a mutually beneficial security pact between

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444 Ibid.
the United States and Cuba in which “the United States government guarantees to protect against all comers the independence and sovereignty of Cuba,” downplaying how this relationship directly curtailed Cuba’s sovereignty in the first place with the threat of military force.\footnote{445} \textit{The Hoya}’s profile of Bonet’s accomplishment also reminded readers of Cuba’s key importance to U.S. economic concerns, being among its most significant trade partners and “one of the wealthiest strips of territory in the world.”\footnote{446} Apologists for these relations with weaker Latin American countries under coercive conditions were not a rarity at the School of Foreign Service.

Dana G. Munro, the first professor on Latin American affairs hired for the School of Foreign Service’s faculty in 1919, was possibly the university’s most ardent early proponent for U.S. foreign interventions.\footnote{447} The year before his employment, he published \textit{The Five Republics of Central America: Their Political and Economic Development and their Relations with the United States}, the culmination of four years of research funded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with the intention of fostering stronger U.S.-Latin American ties.\footnote{448} Munro felt that despite prevalent American understandings of Central American as a dysfunctional land inherently unfit for self-governance, the region held much promise for the United States.\footnote{449} However, this was also under the condition “the preservation of internal and international peace in the Isthmus has been powerfully aided by the influence of the United States.”\footnote{450} He also stated

that a lack of enforced religious conventions bred a low standard of societal morality prone to sexual infidelity.\footnote{Ibid., 12–13.}

Present at the Nicaragua intervention before Willard L. Beaulac, Munro was more explicitly defensive of its occupation in practical terms. He found anti-imperialist charges that the U.S. government intervened to exploit the Nicaraguan people for American businessmen as “simply ridiculous.”\footnote{Ibid., 262.} Munro did note that the foreign collection of Nicaraguan public revenues and the sale of its most valuable national properties under occupation—while absolutely necessary for economic stabilization—humiliated the “patriotic Nicaraguan citizen.”\footnote{Ibid., 263.} The Nicaraguan party officials who most cooperated with American-led banking and currency reform disproportionately profited from these changes, rather than the country as a whole.\footnote{Ibid.} He was further disappointed that the Americans appointed within the various reform commissions received far higher remunerations than their Nicaraguan equivalents.\footnote{Ibid., 264.} Munro was confident that these outrages were insignificant to the various long-run financial benefits of adjusting Nicaragua’s foreign debt, improving its railroad transportation and customs systems, and establishing a stable currency system.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, he declared that U.S. financial and military support was entirely responsible for maintaining order in Nicaragua, ensuring that “the vast majority of people have been inestimably better off” who would otherwise be locked in “bloody party strife and the wars with Central American neighbors.”\footnote{Ibid.}
Despite this myriad list of benefits, and like Beaulac’s later conclusions, Munro believed that there was a fundamental moral wrong at the heart of the U.S. occupation, and that it could not remain as a permanent and sustainable trait of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.\textsuperscript{458} The United States’ support for a minority-led government and financial policies unpopular with much of the population in Nicaragua prompted fervent antagonisms across Latin America.\textsuperscript{459} Although Munro believed that the crisis worsened wider relations with Latin America, he was frustrated that Nicaraguans and its neighboring countries could not sympathize with the United States for having to forcibly put down a threat to its property and people.\textsuperscript{460}

Comments resembling critics as vehement as Ortiz’s rarely entered the classrooms of Georgetown University, but let it not be mistaken that all persons affiliated with Georgetown University or the School of Foreign Service backed U.S. actions abroad as eagerly as Munro. U.S. interventions in neighboring countries in the Caribbean and Latin America were one of the most contentious debate topics on the role of the United States in the world. As mentioned earlier, Beaulac and Munro doubted their basis even as they participated in them. Out of any of the midterms from the beforesaided 1926 examination packet, the “Inter-American Problems” course taught by Leo Stanton Rowe, one of Munro’s successors, assigned the most open-ended questions on the United States’ behavior with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{461} Rowe’s prior employment in Puerto Rico’s colonial administration and his defense for the American treatment of the Philippines presumably indicate an interventionist attitude toward Latin America that would resemble that of Munro.\textsuperscript{462} However, his appointment

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{460} Manning, “Book Review,” 443.
\textsuperscript{461} Leo Stanton Rowe, “Inter-American Problems: Midyear Examination,” January 26, 1926, 21 in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{462} Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest, 48.
as director general of the Pan-American Union in 1920 would actually herald a less aggressive expression of U.S.–Latin America relations.⁴⁶³ Heavily involved in the resolutions of the U.S. occupation in Haiti and disputes with Mexico following its revolution, Rowe was at the forefront of reconciliating Latin American hostilities toward the “Colossus of the North.”⁴⁶⁴ Argentinian historian Ricardo Salvatore recognizes Rowe’s softer endorsement of inter-American cultural and intellectual connections as a precedent for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration’s reproachment strategy a decade later under the Good Neighbor Policy.⁴⁶⁵ Rowes’ background thus prompted the development a far more multidimensional picture of U.S.-Latin American relations beyond how American commerce could benefit from the region’s industry and trade, topics overwhelmingly prioritized in other classes such as “Export Sales,” “Latin America as an Export Field,” and “Staple Commodities of World Trade.”⁴⁶⁶

Unlike the previous midterm examples on the Philippines and Cuba, Rowe’s course did not omit negative attitudes toward the U.S. presence in Latin America, but neither did he unequivocally denounce it as an imperialist violation of foreign countries’ sovereignties.⁴⁶⁷ He expected students to explain how Latin Americans evolved their own attitudes toward the United States’ involvement in the region: Latin America was not simply a bounty of raw resources and trade opportunity to make Americans rich.⁴⁶⁸ Rowe left deliberately ambiguous questions for SFS undergraduates in his examination; students had to present and justify their own views on

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 49.
⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.
⁴⁶⁷ Rowe, “Inter-American Problems,” 25 in Ibid.
⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.
foreign policies as controversial as the military occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.\footnote{Ibid.}

While self-described “anti-imperialists” in the United States originally adopted an ant-interventionalist position in response to U.S. annexations of overseas territories during the turn of the century, most notably during the debates over the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone, anti-imperialists discourses rallied more around the economic rather than territorial attributes of U.S. power extended overseas by the 1920s.\footnote{E. Berkley Thomas, \textit{Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920} (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Rosenberg, 123.} The anti-imperialist movement was ideologically diverse, including socialists opposed to U.S. hegemony in Latin America, Black newspapers lambasting unfair investment deals in Haiti and Liberia, and more moderate commentators who supported the growth of U.S. commerce but criticized its more militant attributes.\footnote{Rosenberg, \textit{Financial Missionaries to the World}, 123–135.}

As with most subjects of political controversy, the question of the United States’ role in the world entered open discussion at Georgetown. The university’s rich array of debate societies frequently took on arguments over the recognition of the Soviet Union, the expansion of merchant marine and naval fleets, the League of Nations, and the Kellogg–Briand Pact.\footnote{“Soviet Recognition Is Yale–G.U. Question,” \textit{The Hoya} 3, no. 19 (March 9, 1922): 7; “White,” \textit{The Hoya} 5, no. 21 (March 13, 1924): 2; “D.J. McCune wins Hamilton Medal,” \textit{The Hoya} 5, no. 30 (May 22, 1924): 1; “White Prepares for Loyola Debate,” \textit{The Hoya} 10, no. 20 (March 7, 1929): 1; “With the Debaters: Philodemic,” \textit{The Hoya} 4, no. 10 (December 7, 1922): 5; “Cavanaugh Again Heads Philodemic,” \textit{The Hoya} 10, no. 16 (February 7, 1929): 1; With the Debaters: Philodemic,” \textit{The Hoya} 4, no. 10 (December 7, 1922): 5; “Cavanaugh Again Heads Philodemic,” \textit{The Hoya} 10, no. 16 (February 7, 1929): 1; “New York University Debaters Are Defeated by Georgetown,” \textit{The Hoya} 9, no. 20 (March 8, 1928): 1.} One repeated topic was the U.S. military protection of American investments abroad, such as a Georgetown Law School debate in May 1929 on whether the United States should continue its
occupation of Nicaragua.\footnote{Nicaragua Made Debate Subject: Representatives of Four Law Clubs Will Meet at Georgetown Wednesday,\n\textit{Washington Post}, May 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.} Previously, the Philodemic Society—the university’s most prestigious undergraduate debate club—also selected, “Resolved, That the United States Government Should Withdraw the Troops from Nicaragua,” with the affirmative winning the debate.\footnote{Philodemic Debates Nicaraguan Question: Seven New Members Admitted—Debate on Central American Invasion,\textit{The Hoya} 10, no. 6 (October 27, 1928): 17.}

One of the most outspoken critics of U.S. foreign policy associated with the School of Foreign Service was John Holladay Latané, a professor of American diplomatic history who also chaired John Hopkin University’s history department.\footnote{\textit{Curran, The Quest for Excellence}, 92} A prolific writer on subjects ranging across colonial America, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and contemporary foreign affairs, Latané agreed with most SFS affiliates that the end of World War I bore unforeseen global opportunities for the United States, writing in the preface to his book, \textit{From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign Policy}, that “sooner or later we must recognize and assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.”\footnote{John H. Latané, \textit{From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign Policy} (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922): i.} Latané proudly attributed the Monroe Doctrine—a centuries-long U.S. foreign policy opposed to European intervention in the Western Hemisphere—with preventing the recolonization of the Americas while most of Africa and southern Asia fell under colonial rule.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 3.} However, he also acknowledged that many Latin American understandably did not share these positive sentiments.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
A month before the SFS commemoration, Latané was invited as a guest speaker to the Fourth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War hosted in Washington, DC. Condemning the incongruity between the cooperative anti-war ambitions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the predatory behavior of the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America, Latané declared that the Senate’s consideration of a naval cruiser construction bill was a nullification of its earlier ratification of the pact. Articulating a materialist interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy, Latané told the conference that only the size of U.S. overseas investments, not promises from peace treaties or agreements, determined the scale of its naval construction.

Latané’s views directly contradicted Kellogg’s more optimistic assumptions made at Georgetown a month later that his treaty indicated a substantial nonbelligerent change in how nations conducted themselves with one another. In contrast, Latané maintained that the “economic imperialism” of the U.S. dollar diplomacy, specifically the creation of protectorates in the West Indies and coercive relations with Latin American republics favorable to U.S. interests, undermined pretensions toward international peace: “We have presented to the world a treaty renouncing war as an instrument of policy, but navies are instruments of imperialism and they are used to safeguard investment.” A Washington Post article reporting on the conference summarizes Latané’s attitude with the pithy statement, “The Constitution may not follow the flag, but the State Department follows the dollar.” To Latané, the “big Navy advocates” regarded the Kellogg pact with mockery as a “harmless and meaningless declaration against war,” ultimately irrelevant to the provision of cruisers guaranteed to safeguard their foreign investments.

479 “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference: Dr. Latane Assails Cruiser Consideration With Passage of Kellogg Pact,” Washington Post, January 17, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
480 Ibid.
482 “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.
483 Ibid.
investments.\textsuperscript{484} Latané’s denouncement of the paradoxical political entanglement between the U.S. renouncement of war and growth of its navy demonstrates an counterhegemonic SFS viewpoint on how the U.S. impact on foreign countries, one far incredulous than the sentiment at School of Foreign Service’s Tenth Anniversary Commemoration and official proclamations of high ranking Georgetown administrators.\textsuperscript{485}

For example, Latané stated massive figures on U.S. overseas economic activity at the conference: a twenty-five-year increase in Latin American investments from $300 million to over $5 billion, an observation that marked similar trends as Assistant Dean Healy’s articles published nationwide later that year.\textsuperscript{486} The latter boasted of the school’s mission to fulfill America’s new expectations as a major global player in public newspapers. In one June 2, 1929 \textit{Washington Post} contribution, Healy urged that “our vast economic, financial, and political interests abroad, running into stupendous proportions” needed a field of men satisfactorily trained in export and import trade, international shipping, international banking, international law and foreign relations, diplomacy, consular service, or trade commissioner service.\textsuperscript{487} Recounting that the United States obtained by that point an import-export trade of almost $10 billion, abroad private investments of $13 billion, and government obligations of $11 billion, Healy was deeply aware that no few countries had ever attained the level of economic and financial strength that the United States accumulated over the past multiple decades, nor had as much potential to secure even more future prosperity from its advantageous position.\textsuperscript{488}

\textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{488} Ibid.
However, the moral and political interpretations of these two SFS affiliates were diametrically opposed. For Healy, the postwar commercial and investment growth advanced opportunity and responsibility for the United States abroad, a towering new role in which the School of Foreign Service eagerly supplied the manpower for its nation to wield and advance.\textsuperscript{489} The spirit of civic nationalism courses throughout Healy’s promotion of the School of Foreign Service’s attributes and feats as an auxiliary institution to the United States’ foreign interests. In comparison, Latané exhibits the darker, hierarchical underbelly of this historical development. Latané began his analysis with the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, and rather than celebrate the conflict as a harbinger of the United States’ global emergence (as Nevils did in his correspondence with Creeden) or even as an anti-imperialist victory against an archaic and brutish Spanish empire, Latané scrutinizes the annexation of the former Spanish colony Puerto Rico into its territory. Latané then noted that while the United States has not annexed any independent states and was unlikely to enact such a method of direct control in the future, he asserts that economic imperialism does not need to rely on “crude” measures such as annexation in order to maintain dominance.\textsuperscript{490} Rather, the State Department propped up “puppets” as leadership in select countries such as Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{491}

To counteract the State Department’s abusive relations with its southern neighbors, Latané declared that the U.S. government needed to rein in the behavior of American investors: all contracts between American citizens and foreign governments must contain an arbitration clause to settle disputes between the two parties. Presumably, this would avoid American investors’ repeated demands that the United States should militarily intervene if foreign business

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\textsuperscript{489} Healy, “Service in Foreign Countries Urged,” June 2, 1929; Healy, “Training for the Foreign Service Profession,” June 12, 1929.
\textsuperscript{490} “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.
\textsuperscript{491} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
deals go awry, as was historically the case in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{492} While unrepentant in his cynicism toward U.S. imperialism, Latané foresaw some potential for better relations toward Latin America with the signing of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration on January 5, 1929.\textsuperscript{493} He hoped that president-elect Herbert Hoover’s visit to South America was another sign of less confrontational diplomatic attitudes; a move toward commerce that cultivates good will with smaller nations rather than the business frictions that led the intervention of U.S. marines in Caribbean and Central American states.\textsuperscript{494}

While Latané did not directly comment at the conference on what role—if at all—the School of Foreign Service or his employment at the school played within the economic imperialism he deplored, his speech unveiled an oppositional worldview of U.S. foreign policy largely neglected on Georgetown’s campus. The significant ruptures between the political beliefs of Kellogg, Healy, and Latané invite a contrast to Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad’s thesis on U.S. and Soviet foreign policymakers during the Cold War. According to Westad, each group was often sincere in their universalist competing beliefs: free markets and relative skepticism against a powerful state for the United States, centralized production and transition to socialism for the Soviet Union, and technological progress for both.\textsuperscript{495} Westad contests the assertion that these ideologies were purely cynical justifications of geopolitical power plays; in fact, policymakers’ passionate ideological attachments partly explained why interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reached their levels of violent brutality.\textsuperscript{496} In a similar fashion, the self-interested motivations during the early formation of the School of Foreign Service do not

\textsuperscript{492} Hudson, \textit{Bankers and Empire}, 101, 115, 157–158.
\textsuperscript{493} “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.
\textsuperscript{494} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{495} Odd Arne Westad, \textit{The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 5, 9, 39, 72.
\textsuperscript{496} \textit{Ibid}., 5.
simply expose Walsh, Healy, and others’ principles as ideological veneers. Their trust in liberal internationalism or peace through international commerce was genuine although SFS officials either downplayed or ignored the negative effects of U.S. hegemonic emergence onto foreign countries.
Conclusion: The Tragedy of the School of Foreign Service and Where to Go from Here

Since my first conceptualization of this thesis in March 2022, I intended for it to instigate future scholarly contributions. My call is not that unlike Hugh Gusterson’s presidential address at the 2017 American Ethnological Society where—inspired by Cold War era interrogations of collaboration between state, military, and university apparatuses—he urged anthropologists to self-reflectively study the more recent restructuring of the university into a neoliberal entrepreneurial model. In particular, hope that this thesis inspires two paths of future historical scholarship. The first is orientated to a national or university-specific scale. Comparatively little literature exists on ties between U.S. higher education and U.S. foreign policy before the Cold War, other than World War I and World War II. As mentioned in the introduction, while the School of Foreign Service was the first college entirely devoted to the study of international affairs, it was not the first university department to look overseas. What role did U.S. higher education have with the beginning steps of the colonization of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, or other annexed territories at the turn of the century? Did universities other than Georgetown embrace or contest Wilsonian liberal internationalism in the aftermath of World War I? The concurrent publication of Pietsch's *The Floating University* indicates that literature of this type may already be on its way.

498 Pietsch, *The Floating University*. Examples of other potential institutes and schools to study include the School of Political Science (1880) at Columbia University, the School of Comparative Jurisprudence and Diplomacy (1898–1907) at Columbia University (later renamed George Washington University in 1904), the political science departments at the University of Wisconsin (1901) and University of California, Berkley (1903), the School of International Relations (1924) at the University of Southern California, the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations (1930) at John Hopkins University, the School of Public and International Affairs (1930) at Princeton University, the Parker Institute (1931) at Columbia University, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1933) at Tufts University. Oden, “Schools of International Affairs,” 10–13.
The second path encourages students or faculty to apply this thesis’s approach to other aspects of Georgetown University’s international history.\footnote{499} I originally intended to cover the entire interwar period, but ultimately decided to leave the 1930s entirely untouched given the economic disruptions and military conflicts between 1929 and 1941 that discredited the previous decade’s ambitions of commercialist peace.\footnote{500} The internationalist optimism projected at the 1929 SFS Tenth Anniversary Commemoration rapidly collapsed across the next tumultuous decade of increased U.S. isolationism and interstate warfare; a suitable study of the SFS during the 1930s alone deserves a thesis on its own right.\footnote{501} Although I repeatedly touched upon the Philippine–American War and the subsequent colonization of the islands, Georgetown’s contributions to this most prominent example of U.S. territorial imperialism deserves a far greater focus on the period between the Spanish–American War’s outbreak in 1898 and the School of Foreign Service’s foundation in 1919.\footnote{502} One particular Georgetown graduate—Malin Craig—fought in almost every major U.S. overseas operation at the turn of the century: Cuba during the Spanish–American War, China to put down the anti-foreigner Boxer Rebellion, and

\footnote{499} The footnotes listed in this paragraph provide potential useful archival and secondary sources for any scholarship that decides to take up this approach. While each of the archival collections I will list should be available at the Booth Center Special Collections on the fifth floor of Georgetown University’s Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, any that document Georgetown records after 1970 would require departmental approval to access. Broadly speaking, SFS 100: A Century of Service, Curran’s three volume A History of Georgetown, Seth P. Tillman’s Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service: The First 75 Years, and historical publications such as The Washington Post, The Hoya (available at the Lauinger’s online archive) and The Georgetown College Journal (Booth Center) would be suitable sources for most of the following topics.\footnote{500} Eckes and Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century, 59–79.\footnote{501} Herring comprehensively summarizes these changes across the chapters "A New Age": Wilson, the Great War, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1913–1921,” 378–435, “Involvement Without Commitment, 1921–1931, 436–483, and “The Great Transformation: Depression, Isolation, and War, 1931–1941,” 484–537 in From Colony to Superpower.\footnote{502} For archival sources on the School of Foreign Service during the 1930s, see SFS Box 2 (1930–1949), BFCSC; and Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Catalogues (1942–1951), BFCSC.\footnote{502} For a superb monograph on the U.S. colonization of the Philippines, see Kramer, The Blood of Government. Kramer also lists a massive collection of books and dissertations published on the topic in the bibliographic appendix of “How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire,” Diplomatic History 42, no. 5 (2018): 924–929.
the Philippines at part of the American counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{503} Multiple other Georgetown alumni also combatted Filipino guerrillas or later filled important colonial administrative positions, such as Richard Campbell, assistant to the Philippines attorney general; Amasa S. Crossfield, a territorial administration judge; and James J. Tracey, a justice of the Philippines Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{504}

The Cold War could potentially host the most plentiful and case-specific scholarship. The superpower archrivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union witnessed Georgetown’s restructuring into the leading international relations university it is known for today.\textsuperscript{505} This first occurred through the development of an unprecedented level of state–military collaboration, and second with massive reforms in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s initiated by SFS Dean Krogh transformative enough to deem him the school’s “second founder” after Edmund A. Walsh.\textsuperscript{506} Georgetown’s graduate departments especially experienced unprecedented levels of financial and government support for defense-related research and training.\textsuperscript{507} The most fantastical example of this development was Georgetown’s inauguration in 1951 as the 352\textsuperscript{nd} Military Government Area Reserve Unit, the only type-A military headquarters status granted to a university in the country.\textsuperscript{508} Under this role, Georgetown would train officers to lead military-

\textsuperscript{503} “Chief of Cavalry Elevated in Rank: Former Georgetown Student Recommended for Rank of Maior-General—Was Chief of Staff, First Army Corps, in France Saw Service in Cuba, Boxer Rebellion and Philippines,” \textit{The Hoya} 7, no. 17 (February 19, 1926): 1. Craig would eventually become the U.S. chief of staff of the U.S. Army and a four-star general from 1935–1939.

\textsuperscript{504} For Georgetown’s military and colonial ties to Philippines, see Curran, \textit{The Quest for Excellence}, 41–42.

\textsuperscript{505} See Westad, \textit{The Global Cold War} for a nuanced study of the forty–five-year standoff. See footnote 21 for notable scholarship on Cold War universities as well as Gusterson, “Homework,” 437–439.


\textsuperscript{507} Curran, \textit{The Quest for Excellence}, 288.

\textsuperscript{508} \textit{Ibid.}, 380.
occupied governments in the Eastern Bloc foreseeing “M-day,” a full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union.  

Georgetown also hired faculty members notorious for their foreign policy influence on the White House or State Department. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a full government professor at Georgetown in the 1970s and 1980s, became notorious as the Reagan administration’s foremost advocate for the Salvadoran military government, which was responsible for eighty percent of all civilian deaths in its civil war against left wing revolutionaries. In 1977, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took up a teaching position at the School of Foreign Service. This was after student protests over the Nixon administration’s role in bombing Cambodia pressured Columbia University into rescinding their offer to Kissinger. When a New York Times reporter later asked Kissinger if he encountered similar dissent among Georgetown students, he remarked, “The criticism I get from students is that I was too soft, not that I was too tough.”

Psychological warfare programs during the Korean War, butting heads between officials and students over the Vietnam War, and divestment campaigns against apartheid South Africa are only a small selection of the innumerable topics that each deserve greater study around this time period.

There are also two other theses by other Georgetown students I recommend that could also act as an inspiration for future “critical histories” of the university. In 2017, Peter Gage

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509 Ibid.
512 Ibid.
513 School of Foreign Service, SFS 100, 121
514 Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 238; Curran, The Rise to Prominence, 261–262; Georgetown University, SFS 100, 121.
showed that Edmund A. Walsh manipulated facts at the Nuremberg Trials to falsely accuse Karl Haushofer, the founder of geopolitics, of being the intellectual mastermind behind Adolph Hitler’s military expansionism.515 Two years later, Marcus Lustig’s focus of blackface minstrelsy at Georgetown University from the 1860s to the 1950s was far more domestic, but its rich social analysis of the young Georgetown men who performed plays in black face makes it one of the best contextualized and most nuanced works on Georgetown’s history.516 I also agree with Lustig on one of the major limitations of this type of scholarship: despite his thesis’ focus on blackface minstrelsy, there is a complete absence of Black Americans viewpoints at Georgetown on these performances due to a lack of archival documentation.517 I demonstrated how early SFS administrators, faculty, and students made the world legible for American businessmen and firms, but archival availability restricted my understanding of how the peoples of foreign regions interacted with the results of this pedagogy. This is by no means a discouragement from future scholarly endeavors; any foreseeable critical histories of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service would likewise need to work around or reckon with this limitation. Returning to the prologue, the “silencing” of Trouillot’s focus did not only refer to how historians selectively decide which aspects of the past are retold or omitted, but also how archives act as additional limitation beyond the historian’s control.518

It is important to note that the School of Foreign Service’s founders were not shrewd materialists who advanced U.S. economic growth at the cost of any concerns from foreign countries. They held up earnest assumptions that commercial expansion developed world peace

517 Ibid., 102.
518 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 48?
while also—depending on the individual—rationalizing or challenging the more forceful policies directed toward this goal. Furthermore, while deep archival searches at the Booth Center occupied the bulk of my research, publicly available secondary sources published by Georgetown University itself, such as Curran’s three volume history and the books released at the SFS’s seventy-fifth and one-hundredth anniversaries, directed me toward those archives in the first place. Nonetheless, the overseas experiences of the very first SFS graduate alone poses an outstanding irony to the School of Foreign Service’s public image. The preface of *SFS 100: A Century of Service* states that the “SFS was established to send its graduates overseas to make the world a better, safer, more prosperous place,” a sentiment dispersed across SFS Centennial events.519 Yet Beaulac’s story directly contradicts this message: he admitted that U.S. overseas interventions often contributed to the exact opposite. I thus call upon more scrutiny on the School of Foreign Service as an historical institution; I believe that “imperialist” would be an apt descriptor of the School of Foreign Service in the 1920s due to its association with U.S. foreign policy that sought to economically dominate peripheral regions of the world.

In this sense, the School of Foreign Service shares much in common with William Appleman Williams’ thesis in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, arguably the most well-known diplomatic history scholarship. The “tragedy” in William’s title refers to how the assumptions of U.S. policymakers ideologically entrapped themselves.520 Through rigid frameworks such as commercial expansionism or anticommunism, policymakers backed decisions grossly disconnected from professed aims of international peace and stability, often resulting in military or economic coercion against weaker nations that further damaged relations

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519 School of Foreign Service, *SFS 100*, 17; and “Centennial Celebrations.” Beaulac is mentioned in the commemorative book, but it only touches upon his contributions to interventions in Honduras. His more negative reflections on Haiti or Nicaragua are omitted.

with the United States.\textsuperscript{521} Edmund A. Walsh, who the School of Foreign Service honorably named itself after in 1958, exemplified this tendency in its most extreme variant through his vehement anti-communism. In the early 1950s, Walsh feared that the Soviet Union posed an existential threat to the United States, an ontological evil that relentlessly plotted the revolutionary overthrow of Western civilization, Christianity, and capitalism.\textsuperscript{522}

Alongside taking the preliminary steps toward establishing Georgetown University as a military government reserve unit, and supporting President Harry S. Truman’s 1945 proposal that all eighteen-year-old American males undergo peacetime military training, Walsh’s most notorious action during the Cold War was his argument in favor of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{523} First proposed in various interviews, lectures, and articles, and then expanded upon in the chapter “Atom Bombs and the Christian Conscience” of his 1951 book \textit{Total Empire: The Roots and Progress of World Communism}, Walsh argued that America leaders were morally obligated to a commit a first strike on the Soviet Union if war appeared imminent, being “a power with no moral inhibitions.”\textsuperscript{524} What makes Walsh a “tragic” figure (both in how Williams uses the term and in a more dramatic Shakespearean flair) is that his ideological, even theological, belief in the Soviet Union’s inherent immorality led him rationalize any civilian deaths as little more than a “regrettable effect” negligible to the “cosmic

\textsuperscript{521} Williams, \textit{The Tragedy of American Diplomacy}, 31–64.
\textsuperscript{522} McNamara, \textit{A Catholic Cold War}, 134.
\textsuperscript{523} \textit{Ibid.}, 141–148; and Curran, \textit{The Quest for Excellence}, 380. Truman placed Walsh as the sole Catholic representative on the supposedly nonpartisan nine-member advisory commission for the Universal Military Training proposal, an especially controversial decision given that Walsh was one of the only Catholics of political significance to back Truman’s plan. McNamara, \textit{A Catholic Cold War}, 142–147. Walsh was also reputedly responsible for inspiring Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy to commence his infamous red-baiting campaign, but unlike the other three examples, historical consensus suggests this is a factually flimsy and unlikely rumor. \textit{Ibid.}, 157–160.
poker game for the highest stakes in history.” Three decades earlier, Walsh’s famine relief efforts possibly saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russians from starvation, only for him to justify the hypothetical annihilation of tens of millions in a nuclear apocalypse as a necessity to halt the inexorable march of World Communism. Given that his mission operated out of Moscow, many of those very same survivors would have perished in the assault Walsh proposed.

While the character of Walsh’s anticommunism was far more hotblooded than any suitable comparison at the contemporary Georgetown University or the School of Foreign Service, their continual direct associations with U.S. interventionalism from the Cold War to the War on Terror invite us to cast rigorous inquiry onto Georgetown’s affiliations with most powerful engines of U.S. foreign policy. For example, what are the implications for women’s rights and feminism when they are bounded to the apparatus of the security state, as the name of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security implies? Do arguments from Georgetown’s faculty that “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China” repeat the tragedy of American diplomacy in real time? These questions are beyond the bounds of thesis, both by time period and discipline, but are even more urgent given their more immediate relevancy. Therefore, this intervention does not only hope to open the floodgates on international histories of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service, but also inspect their contemporary impacts.

525 Walsh, Total Empire, 252, 258.
526 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War, 146, 152.
**Glossary**

**Alfred H. Haag**—Director of the Department of International Shipping at the School of Foreign Service. Major advocate of increasing the size of the U.S. Merchant Marine.

**Alphonsus J. Donlon, SJ (1867–1923)**—Georgetown University President (1912–1918). Oversaw the university’s response to World War I.

**Augusto C. Sandino (1895–1934)**—Nicaraguan revolutionary who waged a guerrilla war against the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933.


**Constantine E. McGuire (1890–1965)**—Originally proposed the idea of the School of Foreign Service to Georgetown University President John B. Creeden in 1918. Assistant Secretary General to the Inter-American High Commission of the United States Treasury Department. Formally severed his ties with the School of Foreign Service in 1921 due to his disappointment of its vocational aims but would still maintain contact with important SFS officials.

**Edmund A. Walsh, SJ (1885–1956)**—School of Foreign Service Dean (1919–1921) and School of Foreign Service Regent (1920–1956). The singular most important figure behind the direction of the School of Foreign Service for the first three decades of its existence. After his leadership behind the Vatican’s famine relief mission in the Soviet Union from 1922–1924, he became a notable Catholic anticommunist, also over the next three decades.

**Edwin Denby (1870–1929)**—U.S. Secretary of the Navy (1921–1924). Speaker at the general graduation ceremony of Georgetown University in 1921, the first attended by SFS graduates.

**Dana G. Munro (1892–1990)**—Taught Latin American Trade Problems at the School of Foreign Service. Researched the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua before his SFS appointment and afterward joined the Department of State at various posts.

**Delta Phi Epsilon Foreign Service Fraternity**—First fraternity established by SFS students in 1920. Expanded to five branches in other universities by the end of the decade.

**Firestone Tire and Rubber Company**—American tire company based in Akron, Ohio founded in 1900. Historically well-known for establishing rubber plantations across Liberia.

**Guillermo A. Sherwell (1878–1926)**—Secretary General of the Inter-American High Commission, Professor of Spanish in the College of Georgetown University, and Head of the Spanish Department in the School of Foreign Service.

**James A. Farrell (1871–1948)**—President of the United States Steel Corporation (1911–1932), Chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, and a prominent anti-union industrialist.
Significant financial backer of the School of Foreign Service across his lifespan and the speaker at the first SFS graduation ceremony in 1921.

**James Brown Scott** (1886–1943)—Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and prominent scholar of international law who was a member of the U.S. delegation to the 1907 Hague Conference.

**Jesse Richardson Hildebrand** (1888–1951)—Lecturer of Applied Geography at the School of Foreign Service (1925–1928) and Assistant Editor of National Geographic Magazine (1930–1951).

**John B. Creeden, SJ** (1871–1948)—Georgetown University President (1918–1924). President who approved of the enactment of the School of Foreign Service.

**John H. Allen** (1872–1958)—President of the American Foreign Banking Corporation. Previously vice president of the National City Bank of New York, in which he managed the National Bank of Haiti shortly before the U.S. occupation of Haiti.


**John Holladay Latané** (1869–1932)—School of Foreign Service history professor of American diplomacy. Critical of “economic imperialist” policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Taught History and Principles of American Diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service.


**Georgetown University**—Jesuit Catholic university established in 1789.

**Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928**—International treaty that sought to legally outlaw the use of war to mediate disputes between states.

**Leo Stanton Rowe** (1871–1946)—Taught subjects on Latin America at the School of Foreign Service. United States Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (1917–1919) and Director General of the Pan-American Union (1920–1946).


**Mark Lambert Bristol** (1868–1939)—Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, United States High Commissioner in Turkey (1919–1927), and Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.
**U.S. Merchant Marine**—The commercial ships of the United States, whether owned by private citizens or the U.S. government. The expansion of the merchant marine was a substantial concern among early SFS officials.

**National City Bank of New York (NCBNY)**—New York City-based bank founded in 1812 with close ties to the School of Foreign Service. Played a significant role in the management of the National Bank of Haiti during the U.S. occupation of Haiti. Would later become Citibank.

**Ralph A. Graves (1882–1932)**—Professor of Applied Geography at the School of Foreign Service (1925–1928) and Senior Assistant Editor of *National Geographic Magazine* (1916–1932)

**Roy S. MacElwee (1883–1944)**—School of Foreign Service Dean (1921–1923). Previously, backed the creation of vocation trade colleges as Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

**School of Foreign Service**—Established in 1919 at Georgetown University for the purpose of training young men to become members of diplomatic, consular, and foremostly foreign trade services of the United States or businesses performing similar functions overseas. Would eventually become one of the most prominent American schools of international affairs.

**School of Foreign Service Tenth Anniversary Commemoration (1929)**—Most prominent event hosted at the School of Foreign Service since than its inauguration ceremony during the 1920s. Starred Frank B. Kellogg as the speaker of honor, who propounded support for the Kellogg-Briand Pact at the commemoration.

**Teodoro M. Kalaw (1884–1940)**—Executive Secretary of the Philippine Commission of Independence. A Filipino nationalist, he was previously a member of the Philippine Assembly (1909–1912) and the Philippine Secretary of the Interior (1920–1922).

**Thomas H. Healy**—School of Foreign Service Dean (1935–1943), previously Assistant Dean of the School of Foreign Service during the late 1920s.

**United Fruit Company Organization (UFCO)**—American fruit company found in 1899. Responsible for the maintenance of fruit cultivation and exports across multiple Latin American countries, often deeply entangling itself within the countries’ politics. Would later become Chiquita.

**W. Coleman Nevils (1878–1955)**—Georgetown University President (1928–1935). President during the School of Foreign Service Tenth Anniversary Commemoration.

**William F. Notz**— School of Foreign Service Dean (1923–1935). Dean during the School of Foreign Service Tenth Anniversary Commemoration.

**Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924)**— United States President (1913–1921). Espoused a liberal internationalist view of international affairs through his support for the League of Nations during and after World War I.
Selected Images

Georgetown College from the Virginia Hills. Potomac River in Foreground; c. 1919, Photograph by National Geographic Society, *Yearbook February 1919–February 1920*.

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529 These photographs are sortable by likely chronological order. According to the Booth Center, Georgetown University did not have a photographer until the 1950s, leading to less collectable photographs at the archive than I expected to be relevant to my thesis.
Constantine E. McGuire Memorandum Sent to Richard H. Tierney, May 16, 1918, Constantine McGuire File, CMP, BFCSC.

“The Opening Class in the School of Foreign Service,” in *The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin* no. 6 (April 1919): 13, SFS 1918–1919 File.
(1) John B. Creeden, Georgetown University President; (2) W. Coleman Nevils, College of Arts and Sciences Dean; (3) William Philips, United States Assistant Secretary of State; (4) Edmund A. Walsh, School of Foreign Service Regent; and (5) Edwin F. Sweet, United States Acting Secretary of Commerce, c. 1919 in *Yearbook, February 1919–February 1920*. 

Opening Lecture, 1919, School of Foreign Service, October 2, 1919, *Yearbook February 1919–February 1920.*
“A Group of Ex–Service Men Training for Foreign Service on Scholarships Awarded by the Committee on War Activities of the Knights of Columbus (47 such Scholarships Were Allocated to the School of Foreign Service),” c. 1919–1920, *Yearbook February 1919–February 1920.*

The first Initiatory Banquet of Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Fraternity, held at the New Ebbitt Hotel in Washington, DC, on February 11, 1920, Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Fraternity Website, [http://www.deltaphiepsilon.net/History.html](http://www.deltaphiepsilon.net/History.html).
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“Georgetown University Commencement, June 14, 1921—at which the Degree of Foreign Service was conferred for the first time in the United States,” in “Georgetown University and Latin America,” February 1923, SFS 1923 B File. John B. Creeden, W. Coleman Nevils, and James A. Farrell can be seen seated above the “o,” “n,” and to the right of the decorative “Georgetown” sign, respectively.

“Scene at Georgetown University Commencement Exercises When 400 Students Received Diplomas,” The Washington Star, June 15, 1921, Commencement 1921 File, Commencement Files Box 4, BFCSC. The man standing at the center front of the podium is likely Georgetown University President John B. Creeden.
First Degree Awarded in School of Foreign Service, Awarded to Willard L. Beaulac, June 18, 1921, in *February 1921–February 1922 Yearbook*.

Photograph of Willard L. Beaulac, “Hunting for Bandits in Mexico,” c. 1921–1923, Tampico, Mexico (standing at the center in a white suit and black tie). Folder 17, Box 1, Willard L. Beaulac Papers, BFCSC.
According to its descriptive caption, every Sunday, an anti-American demonstration group held protests across the street from the American consulate at Tampico. While Beaulac initially feared their intentions, he came to appreciate their musical performances and “imaginative and noisy speeches.” Determining it was largely a cordial social ritual, Beaulac began to openly intermingle with the friendly protesters, as the photograph demonstrates.
May 13, 1922.

Dr. R. S. MacElwee, Dean,
School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University,
Washington.

Dear Sirs:

I am directed by Admiral Bristol to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 29, 1922, enclosing publications of the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.

The Admiral considers that the work that you are doing is of great value not only for the men who may enter the government service, but in building up a body of American young men fitted to occupy business posts abroad. Here in the Near East particularly we feel how important it is that America should take her share in the development of the great natural resources, and we see every day the lack of trained men with an understanding of how to deal with other races.

Admiral Bristol will be glad to receive such other publications as you may care to send him from time to time.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Third Secretary of Embassy,
Assistant to the High Commissioner.
School of Foreign Service Building (located at the downtown Georgetown Law School location on 506 E Street, NW, Washington, DC), 1922, Archives Photo File: Foreign Service School 1922, BFCSC.

Left to Right: SFS Dean Roy S. MacElwee, Georgetown Regent W. Coleman Nevils, and SFS Assistant Dean Thomas H. Healy, “Georgetown University and Poland,” May 1923, 205, 1923 B File, SFSB1, BFCSC.
“Why is the making of hairnets confined to China, a country in which not a single hairnet is worn?—A problem in Applied Geography,” photograph by Margaret Sanger, in Jessie Richardson Hildebrand, “Department of Applied Geography, Fall and Spring Semesters, 1924–1925, Tuesdays, 6:50 to 8:15 p.m.,” October 1, 1924, Pamphlet, SFS 1924 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.
“No one versed in Applied Geography would try to sell this type of farm machinery in Vermont: but there is a vast market for it in Australia and Argentina. Why?” in Ibid., 2.

“Hieroglyphics to many, but to those who know, this picture means that the Japanese are tremendously interested in motion pictures—a market for American manufacturers and film producers. On the other hand, Japan has rigorous laws against the importation of any picture in which a youth is shown kissing a maid,” photograph by Willard Price in Ibid., 3.

“A Hart-Schaffner-Marx catalogue would have no appeal for this Middle-European dandy: cotton and linen goods would,” in *Ibid.*, 5.
“‘Go Foot,’ a novel method of punishing Kaffir school boys in southeast Africa: it would take a long time to develop a market for shoes in this corner of the world,” in *Ibid.*, 6.

“No labor-saving devices are wanted in Java: human labor is cheaper than any form of mechanical device that could be introduced,” in *Ibid.*
“The speedometer salesman would starve to death in that part of the Philippines where the goatomobile is widely used,” in *Ibid.*, 7.

“And the man with the outrigger motor would find it hard going in this section of Wales,” in *Ibid.*
“Cambodian dancing girls are not pining for ballet slippers and tulle skirts,” photograph by Theodore Macklin in *Ibid.,* 7.

“The conveniences and comforts of civilization are spreading to the far places of the earth, however. Not long ago the "Living God" -spiritual and temporal ruler of Mongolia- ordered an American motor car. It had to be driven and hauled from Peking across the Gobi Desert to Urga,” in *Ibid.*
SFS delegation at the 1926 National Foreign Trade Convention in Charleston, South Carolina. James A. Farrell stands at the photo’s center, with Charleston Mayor Thomas Stoney to the left and SFS Assistant Dean Thomas H. Healy to his right.


Photograph of Willard L. Beaulac, c. 1926, Arica, Chile Folder 16, Box 1, Willard L. Beaulac Papers, BFCSC. Beaulac was U.S. Consul at Arica Chile between his stations at the Honduras and Haiti.
1929 Profiles of Significant Administrators, Faculty, and Supporters of the School of Foreign Service.

Center: SFS Regent Edmund A. Walsh. Clockwise From Upper Left: SFS Dean William F. Notz, U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Steel Corporation President James A. Farrell, SFS Assistant Dean Thomas H. Healy; Georgetown President W. Coleman Nevils, Portuguese Professor Joaquín de Sequeira Coutinho, Latin American Studies Professor Leo Stanton Rowe, and International Law Professor James Brown Scott.


Portrait of Constantine McGuire, c. 1940, donated by Joaquin de Sequeira Coutinho, Archives Photo Files: Constantine McGuire, BFCSC.
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