New world disorder? U.S. in search of a role

In the post-cold-war world, America's vital interests are likely to remain the stability of Europe, the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and the economic and military security of North America. These interests must be tied to the larger interest of promoting global growth and equity.

by James Chace

It would be an irony of fate if my Administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs—so said Woodrow Wilson in 1913 as he left Princeton, N.J., for his first inauguration in Washington, D.C. President William Jefferson Clinton might well have echoed these words as he boarded the plane from Little Rock, Arkansas, to the White House in January 1993. Bedevilled by an endless war in the former Yugoslavia, a humanitarian mission gone sour in Somalia, seemingly intractable authoritarianism in Haiti and the threatened erosion of the international trading system, the President and his aides spent much of their first year in office struggling to define U.S. goals.

The cold war, after all, had provided two superpowers with the means to control vast areas of the globe. It was a bipolar world that enforced stability within respective spheres of influence. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, however, the simmering conflicts that had never been resolved after the breakdown of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires boiled over. With the further retreat of Russian power, newly emancipated countries on the periphery of the former Soviet Union came into conflict with one another. In Georgia, in Armenia, in Central Asia, ethnic and religious conflict is likely to be quelled only if Russia asserts a neo-imperial role, and as 1993 drew to a close that was precisely what was happening.

Haiti: setback for democracy

For the U.S., turmoil was also raging within its own sphere of influence. In Haiti, the unwillingness of the military to step down and restore the freely elected, populist president, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, posed a dangerous problem for an American government that had always preferred stability in the Caribbean-Central American region. Even if the Clinton Administration had wanted to leave Haiti to the Haitians, that was not advisable because of the likelihood that continued political and economic repression would lead to new boatloads of refugees streaming to Floridian shores. In addition, there was a significant Haitian minority in New York City and Miami, Florida, that would continue to press Washington to reinstate Aristide, by force if necessary.

To this end, the Clinton Administration believed it had an agreement, signed July 3, 1993, with the Haitian military that...
would allow Aristide to return to power; but when an American troopship appeared off Port-au-Prince carrying more than 200 American "combat engineers and technical advisers" who were to train and "professionalize" the Haitian military, it was greeted by scores of civilians shouting anti-Aristide slogans and brandishing automatic weapons. In response, the Administration had the ship turn back and found itself once again hoping that increased economic pressure would bring the military to heel.

Finally, in Somalia, the ostensibly humanitarian mission of feeding a starving population—which the departing President George Bush had will ed as a dubious legacy to his successor—had turned into a political and military nightmare. Clinton's people had initially endorsed the policy of United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had decided that Somali clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, should be pursued and punished for killing on June 5, 1993, 24 Pakistani soldiers who were in Mogadishu as part of the UN peacekeeping force. By the fall, Washington was rethinking this policy but had apparently not communicated this to the U.S. commander there, who had final approval over the use of U.S. troops as part of the UN mission. On October 3–4, U.S. Army Rangers found themselves surrounded by about 400 of Aidid's men. Within hours, television screens were displaying pictures of corpses of American soldiers being dragged through the streets.

Somalia: U.S. to pull out

For the Clinton Administration, enough was enough. On October 7, the President announced that 15,000 reinforcements would be sent to Somalia to protect our soldiers, but also that U.S. military personnel would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. Our motives, he explained, were pure and our hands were clean. But with no discernible national interest involved, Clinton was finally prepared to seek a political solution to what had always been a political problem. The tragedy of Somalia resulted from warring military and political factions; the suffering of the Somalia people did not result from a natural disaster like a famine but rather from a political disaster. Once Somalia had ceased to be even remotely important as a staging ground for cold-war rivalries in East Africa and the U.S. and the Soviet Union had stopped giving aid to its dictator, it disintegrated. But the U.S. had never admitted that what brought us into Somalia probably required nothing less than a neocolonial UN trusteeship.

Nafta victory

While the U.S. may prefer to forsake the use of force in Somalia, Haiti and the remnants of the Communist empire, Washington nonetheless has no intention of withdrawing from the world. Clinton's successful campaign to gain congressional endorsement for an open-trading system through passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) testified to his internationalist commitment. But at the end of the first year of a new Administration, it was also apparent that the President had signally failed to define America's mission—unless it be to contain chaos and to make the world safe for democracy, following once again in the footsteps of President Wilson—or, as national security adviser Anthony Lake put it when asked to define what comes to mind when Clinton's foreign policy is mentioned, "pragmatic neo-Wilsonian."

Attitudes, not policies

On another occasion, Lake spoke of the Administration's strategy as the "enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." Such a policy, however, is likely to prove quixotic: there are market economies, especially in Asia, that are not by America's definition democratic, just as there are democracies that are committed to a very large measure of centralized control, as in India. Other than Lake's high-minded neo-Wilsonianism, there was nothing said that would clearly delineate the central contours of American foreign policy. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 4, 1993, he offered familiar nostrums of the "overarching priorities" of American foreign policy: "the security of our nation," "the prosperity of our people," and the advancement of "our democratic values."

But these are attitudes not policies. Without even a rough roadmap to lead us safely into a new internationalism that avoids either a latter-day Pax Americana or an illusionary isolationism, the signal absence of an articulated foreign policy can only contribute to disorder abroad and confusion at home.

National interests

What are America's national interests? Are they so difficult to define for a broad public? To what extent are they long-standing and to what extent have they changed in a world where the linkages between domestic and foreign policies, as President Clinton himself has pointed out, have become indivisible?

As most Americans now recognize, the U.S. emerged from the cold war geopolitically dominant but economically impaired. With the 12-nation European Community (EC) politically divided and Japan still in the shadow of its wartime atrocities, neither has been able to assume global responsibilities
commensurate with its economic strength; yet with the disappearance of the Soviet threat both have been increasingly unwilling to follow Washington's every command. Without economic strength to match its military might, any American claim to be anything but a military superpower is a hollow one.

American foreign policy in the 1990s will therefore have to choose its goals and targets much more carefully. In newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann's definition, it will have to bring into balance, with a fair surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's capabilities. The U.S. may be the only truly global power at the end of the 20th century—but neither the American people nor their political leaders are likely to regard this as an unmixed blessing.

In little more than a decade the U.S. has gone from being a creditor nation to a debtor nation that owes the world almost half a trillion dollars. To finance our standard of living we printed money from 1967 to 1979; from 1980 to the present, we borrowed money, both from abroad, and now increasingly from ourselves. This money has not and does not go into investment and savings. It finances consumer buying, our VCRs and our walking shoes. In 1985 we deliberately drove down the value of the dollar in order to get rid of our trade deficit, but we have not succeeded. What we have to learn is that you cannot repair an economy with a weak currency.

So in considering any new foreign policy agenda in defense of our national interests, we have to keep in mind that the U.S. must first and foremost restore its economy to solvency. America's fiscal deficit—$290.3 billion for fiscal year 1992—has to be reduced not merely in the short term but also over the long haul. This the President understands, although his program to do so is modest enough by any standard. Solvency, however, is not only about a balanced budget. It is about means and ends. It is about strengthening the fabric of American society in order to allow the nation to meet its obligations.

Three priorities

Absent the Soviet threat, America's primary national interests are and are likely to remain (1) the stability of Europe; (2) the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific; and (3) the security—economic and military—of North America.

In the defense of these interests, we can reassure the Europeans, both politically and militarily, that we will not permit any one nation so to dominate the Continent as to endanger the general peace; we can continue to play a central role as a holder of the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific; and we can attempt to extend a free-trading zone throughout the Western Hemisphere.

To the extent that the West depends on Middle Eastern-Persian Gulf oil, we are also concerned that the free flow of oil be available at reasonable prices to the outside world; for that reason we should be prepared to play a role in ensuring the stability of the Persian Gulf. And for both moral and strategic reasons we remain committed to the security of Israel, a functioning democracy that shares our basic values.

Our commitment to democratic values compels us to do what we can to promote democracy abroad, recognizing that our ability to create democratic regimes is highly circumscribed. No American foreign policy can be successful over the long term without such a moral component. But our democratic mission today is not so much a Wilsonian export of democracy as the effort to create the broad conditions under which democracy can take hold.

These interests and these strategies, in turn, are tied to a larger goal of global economic growth and equity. To this end, the U.S. can strive to prevent the world from falling into hostile trading blocs and to ensure that the rules of international trade and investment will help support the existence of social democracy and social peace.

Germany, dominant power in Europe

In sketching out the contours of the new Europe, which will now require the integration of the newly emancipated nations of what was once Soviet-controlled Europe, the economic and political weight of Germany inevitably dominates the landscape. As the great British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote of Germany in 1914: "Round Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany, the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended....The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly." The German question is not who will dominate Central Europe, for surely Germany will do so, but whether the new Europe can accommodate a unified Germany.
The emergence of Germany as the dominant power in Europe, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet empire — while this is something to be grateful for will force the U.S. to rethink its view of the direction of Europe. We had expected that the EC would deepen, and that the political unity of Europe would follow hard upon the single market that was to come into being on January 1, 1993. We anticipated a European central bank and a European currency, and eventually a European defense mechanism.

Nationalism and political fragmentation

Instead, what we see are two parallel movements — on the one hand, increasing economic integration, not only in such institutions as the European single market, but globally, with Nafta and newly emerging Asian groupings, and, on the other hand, growing fragmentation. But in Europe and the former Soviet Union the forces of fragmentation are now — and are likely to be for some time to come — in the ascendancy. The political fragmentation in Europe inhibits further political unity; the shift toward market economies by the East European countries and the former Soviet Union puts a further strain on any movement to deepen the EC and thus to move it forward as the West European leaders had hoped to do in the late 1980s.

Political fragmentation has followed in the wake of ethnic, cultural, religious and nationalist movements. On the one hand, how can the EC accommodate countries that are in danger of splitting apart? On the other hand, how can Europe exclude countries that aim to become like the West, for example Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia? Moreover, if you exclude countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, not to mention the Balkans, is there not a greater danger in having these countries outside a European polity than within one?

Economic integration stalls

The shape of things to come is therefore very different from what anyone might have imagined a few years ago. The expectation that “Europe” — the EC — would emerge as a political entity, able to act in concert with the U.S. and Canada on political and economic issues, is increasingly remote. Even though almost all the European states have approved the 1992 Maastricht treaty establishing a single market, the likelihood is that Europe will not make much headway toward creating a common currency, a common central bank, or a common foreign policy. The German Central Bank’s insistence on raising interest rates to attract foreign capital in order to rebuild eastern Germany put pressure on the other members of the European Monetary System (EMS), established in 1979, to shore up their own currencies. Recession and unemployment followed, and speculators forced the weakest of them to expend their foreign reserves to support currencies against the all-powerful deutsche mark. Finally, the EMS cracked: London decided it couldn’t afford to tie the British pound to the German mark, Rome followed suit, and they abandoned the system in the wake of their devalued currencies. A few months later, even France was forced to expend so much of its reserves that the EMS had to be radically modified so that to all intents and purposes it no longer fulfilled the function for which it was designed. German national purpose and power took precedence over the political construction of Europe.

NATO: expensive fiction?

As for the Western alliance, its behavior in the light of the Yugoslav war has demonstrated its irrelevance. It seems likely that history will record the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to respond to the Bosnian conflict with military force as evidence of the demise of an alliance that lasted for almost half a century. Founded to deter the expansion of the Soviet Union and to shore up the Western economic and political system, the Atlantic alliance was one of the signal achievements of that extraordinarily creative period in American history that brought forth the 1944 Bretton Woods, N.H., conference, which created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and later the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

With the collapse of communism, the task of containing the
Soviet Union no longer existed. The new mission, many of us believed, would be to transform NATO into a broader organization that might eventually include the former members of the Soviet military alliance, known as the Warsaw Pact. In this respect, a transformed NATO would permit American and Russian troops to remain in Europe, not as occupiers but as guarantors of the European order.

The primary purpose of the new security organization would be to preserve the territorial status quo, except where changes are mutually agreed upon by both parties. Borders are not carved in stone, but the greatest danger that faces post-cold-war Europe is rectification of borders by force rather than by negotiation. Aggression by any country against its neighbor could then be met with a united response from the organization as a whole.

Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The expansion of Serbia to include large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a state whose sovereignty was recognized by all the members of NATO—would seem to fulfill the requirements of military intervention in the post-cold-war world. It did not happen. On the other hand, if NATO's mission is not to contain military conflict across borders, then what role does NATO have to play?

The U.S. therefore finds itself in a dilemma. Had it taken unilateral military action in Bosnia, it would have undermined NATO, for it soon became clear that the other members of NATO were unwilling to intervene militarily to enforce a settlement. Even had the Clinton Administration shown more resolve in its policy toward Serbia, rather than merely threatening to bomb Serbian positions and arm the Bosnians, it would not have moved without at least some allied support. But that support would not have had to entail a NATO action. It could have been a traditional coalition, similar to the one President Bush assembled to wage the Persian Gulf war.

Thus, the crisis in Bosnia revealed that NATO is little more than an expensive fiction. By failing to push our allies into taking concerted NATO action and by refusing to act unilaterally outside NATO, Clinton may have "saved" NATO while at the same time demonstrating its irrelevance.

In the light of all this, what is the likely role of the U.S. in Europe?

The most self-defeating posture for the Clinton Administration would be to cling to the status quo. With NATO moribund, security concerns are likely to be met by coalitions that will vary crisis by crisis. Moreover, if the U.S. remains concerned with European stability, as it should, it will have to keep some bases and troops in Europe for an indefinite period.

In addition, Washington will have to seek allies willing to use arms to preserve borders from being changed by force rather than negotiation. This could mean, for example, that the U.S., France and Russia would intervene in a Hungarian-Romanian conflict over the lost Hungarian lands now part of Romanian Transylvania. Even if done under a UN umbrella, it would be a very traditional way of preserving the peace.

In this respect, the end of the 20th century might come to resemble the end of the 19th, and America's connection to Europe increasingly threatened by authoritarian nationalism would be frayed and tenuous, endangering European stability and America's role in the world.

APEC summit

The Administration believes the Asia-Pacific region to be the most "lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs," as Secretary Christopher put it on the eve of Clinton's meeting in Seattle, Washington, with the leaders of the 15-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within APEC are gathered together all of America's and Japan's major Asian trading partners, including even China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, representing more than half the world's total gross national product (GNP). In 1992, even without formal ties, U.S. exports to the Pacific area totaled $120 billion, and accounted for 2.4 million American jobs.

It is an encouraging sign that the U.S. is committed to playing a central role in preserving the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific among the four great powers—China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. In that part of the world, there are no supranational organizations that can help stabilize the region—no NATO, no EC. The countries are too big and remain in a state of dynamic tension.

While APEC may be useful in encouraging the Asia-Pacific region to open its markets, the organization is as yet little more than a forum aimed at fostering market-driven growth and liberalizing trade. But the problems that Asian economies pose for the U.S., and, indeed, for other highly industrialized economies, is the unwillingness of Asians to spend their money. Excessively high savings act as a brake on the growth of the global economy, and it is no accident that America undergoes continuing and rising trade deficits with both China and Japan.
Chinese and human rights

With a phenomenal growth rate, China is trying to manage a transition to a market-driven economy while at the same time keeping the political lid on. This policy is the conclusion the aging Chinese gerontocracy came to after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Punishing China for human-rights violations—if it is done unilaterally by the U.S.—is unlikely to have a great effect on the Chinese political scene, especially when other countries, particularly Japan, are seeking access to the Chinese market. On the other hand, China very much needs the American market, as it continues to enjoy a sizable trade surplus with the U.S. At the same time, China is also increasing its defense budget, which causes profound uneasiness in Japan and Russia. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, China is likely to be the dominant power in Asia.

Relations with Japan

Japan, in its turn, has extended its “yen-bloc” to Southeast Asia and Thailand—which is reminiscent of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan tried to construct during World War II. At the same time, American fears of Japan’s trade surplus of $49 billion a year contribute to anti-Japanese feelings in the U.S. In fact, on a per capita basis, according to political economist Masuru Tamamoto, Japan now imports more from America than the U.S. imports from Japan—about $400 a year as compared with about $370 a year. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan results in part from the fact that the population of the U.S. is twice that of Japan. Moreover, the Japanese consumer saves more than does the American, and Americans buy Japanese manufactured goods that are no longer made in the U.S.—fax machines, camcorders, industrial robots and high-quality luxury cars. In addition, trade imbalances with Japan and other countries are aggravated by U.S. factories moving abroad. What we are now seeing is a relatively new phenomenon: global manufacturing allows high-tech goods to be produced by low-wage countries—Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines. In any case, it is unlikely that such trade balances can be righted by import quotas, local-content requirements or demands for a set percentage of the market. But the Clinton Administration’s obsession with the trade deficit has led it to continue making Japan a scapegoat for America’s economic malaise.

Russia, fearful of losing face in the region, refuses to compose its differences with Japan over the islands it seized at the end of World War II. But there is some reason to believe that President Boris Yeltsin will try to do so, if he can without aggravating nationalist critics. China, in turn, is wary of Russia’s turmoil as Russia tries to convert to a market-driven economy.

Rx for Pax Pacifica

Although North Korea is not a major power, it nonetheless poses the most immediate threat to Asian security by refusing to halt its nuclear program. This threatens not only South Korea and the other nations of the region, but it could also spark Japanese rearmament, which would in itself upset the balance of power dramatically.

For the U.S., the closing of its bases in the Philippines, as well as its need to reduce the defense budget, requires it to rethink its military posture in the Pacific, even if it does not radically scale down its military and naval deployments in the region. In short, Washington cannot impose a Pax Pacifica, even if it wants to.

What probably ought to be done, at the very least, is for the U.S. to propose broad arms reductions—including nuclear weapons—among all the powers of the region. Washington need not encourage Japan to arm, as it has done in the past, but to disarm. America should engage China, Russia and the Koreas in this same effort. This means that the U.S. Navy must also be prepared to reduce the number of aircraft carrier battle groups and that the U.S. Army further cut down on the number of troops in South Korea and the garrisons in Japan. All this, however, must be part of an overall Asian initiative. But the United States cannot—and should not—withdraw from the region or the fragile balance of power will be destroyed.

North American concerns

Who would deny that the region that should stand at the very apex of U.S. interests—at any time—is North America. Relations with Canada, whatever the tensions in the past, have never resulted in open warfare in this century. But the depth of Canadian nationalism is often underestimated or ignored in Washington, and the likelihood that Quebec will achieve independence by the end of the century cannot be discounted.

The U.S. role in the Caribbean/Central American/Mexican region has, of course, had a very different history. This has been a traditional U.S. sphere of influence since the 1820s, and while our behavior toward the nations of this region has been far from exemplary, the alternative is not withdrawal but wiser policies.

In Central America, at least, U.S. involvement is winding down. In the future, Central America’s economic problems can only be resolved by sensible economic and fiscal policies of the government involved, coupled with a willingness on our part to lower our trade barriers to its goods. The recourse to Marxist economics is probably dead—but the return to authoritarianism is likely, should the economies fail to deliver.

Nafta’s impact

As a result of the passage of Nafta, trade barriers between the U.S. and Mexico will fall. U.S. exports are also likely to increase, and more exports will mean more jobs. According to one study, from a base year of 1990, the agreement should, over five years, “create approximately 320,000 new jobs in the U.S. and displace about 150,000 workers, resulting in about 170,000 net new jobs.” The long-term goal, to improve the Mexican economy so that its workers begin to earn wages comparable with those of American and Canadian workers, which in turn should slow illegal emigration and offer an even greater market for Canadian and U.S. goods, can only take place over time. It is a long-term goal, however, and perhaps the strongest argument made in favor of Nafta was the fact that a good deal of manufacturing from the north had already moved south, and in a global economy there was
probably no effective way to prevent it. Nafta is also likely to lock in Mexico's market reforms, its new openness to foreign investment and foreign imports. Finally, insofar as Nafta may lead to a more prosperous, stable, and ultimately more democratic, Mexico, the overall goals of North American security will be fulfilled, and the way will be open to extend the free-trading zone throughout the hemisphere.

Trading blocs and trade wars

Perhaps the greatest danger the world faces is not small wars and unsolvable conflicts, but rather its division into three great trading blocs: Europe, East Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

Even before the unification of Germany, the EC's GNP was two-and-one-half times larger than Japan's. A new European bloc would account for one fourth of the world product. Should Europe close its gates, the risks to the U.S. are huge, for America sells one fourth of its products to Europe and has recently enjoyed a trade surplus with the EC. In a well-intentioned effort to stabilize Eastern Europe, as political analyst Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, "Western Europe, led by Germany, could establish something like Napoleon's projected continental system. Eastern Europe and North Africa would supply the raw materials, certain agricultural products, and low-wage industrial labor. Western Europe would provide capital and host the high-value-added and high-tech industries.... A Europe of this kind would inevitably put most of its capital into its own backyard, and it would close its markets to competitors from the rest of the world. It would produce VCRs in Poland, not China; it would buy its wheat from Ukraine, rather than the Dakotas."

As for Japan, by the year 2000, Japan, with less than half the population of the U.S., will likely have a GNP only 15% smaller. In this respect, danger would result from an American determination to shut out—as much as possible—Japanese goods from a North American market.

New challenges, new institutions

To avoid trade wars and ensure global prosperity, new international institutions and arrangements are needed to replace or augment the existing international economic and financial system that was set up after World War II at Bretton Woods under U.S. leadership. For example, we might consider reviving the idea of an international trade organization—suggested originally by Keynes. It would do more than focus on lower tariffs as the U.S. preferred instrument, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), does. GATT never has been able to resolve questions of how to harmonize differences among economic policies or provide rules of the road. A new trade organization would be similar to America's interstate commerce commission. It would work to set up common rules for antidumping, subsidies, antitrust mechanisms and intellectual property.

Also needed is a more powerful coordination of international monetary policies. The Bretton Woods institutions were set up when the dollar was world currency. But now America no longer sets the pace of the world economy, which is subject to sudden shifts that threaten international economic stability. The IMF alone is clearly inadequate to meet needs of a global economy.

In search of new directions

Despite the EC's problems in establishing its own central bank, we should nonetheless proceed to investigate the feasibility of a world central bank to help stabilize currency shifts and thus help promote free trade. To deal with a global recession, for example, no international agency is now capable of strategic planning and rapid action, and individual nation-states may not be able to take action on a grand scale. In this respect, the relationship between nation-states and the global economy is comparable to that between firms and the nation-state.

There may be no single blueprint for the future, but the inability of President Clinton and his secretary of state to articulate a comprehensible hierarchy of U.S. interests may well lead to a directionless America, increasingly embittered as U.S. purpose and power erode. There was a time, let us not forget, when the international order had to be rebuilt. Dean Acheson and General George Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, Ernest Bevin, Lester Pearson, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and later Konrad Adenauer, were determined to remake the system. They were all, in Acheson's memorable phrase, present at the creation. It would be a tragedy of world proportions if a new generation were found to be present at the destruction.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Should the U.S. urge NATO to incorporate Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic? How would this affect NATO’s mission? What do you think Moscow’s reaction would be?

2. Do you think that the emergence of Germany as the dominant power in Europe is likely to be a threat to peace? How will that affect America’s role in Europe?

3. If Europe does not make much progress for the rest of the century toward unification, how would this phenomenon affect America’s role in Europe?

4. Do you think a unilateral reduction in our naval and military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific will seriously inhibit our role as the holder of the balance of power in that region?

5. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in 1993 that “Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world” and that Washington has to get over its Eurocentric view of diplomacy. Do you agree?

6. Do you believe the Clinton Administration should campaign for human rights in China? How is this likely to affect America’s relationship with this great power?

7. If Japan loses confidence in the U.S. as the guarantor of its security, what are likely to be the consequences for Japanese policy?

8. The bipolar world of the cold war, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the only two superpowers, was a relatively stable one. Does it seem in retrospect a more desirable world than the one in which we are now living?

SUGGESTED READINGS


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Rizopoulos, Nicholas X., “A Third Balkan War?” World Policy Journal, Summer 1993, pp. 1–6. The director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations pulls no punches in criticizing the Clinton Administration zigzags in its policy toward the Yugoslav war.