CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION: THE LONG-TERM CHALLENGES
Case Studies of Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina
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INTRODUCTION

Actions intended to avert refugee flows when conflict threatens to accelerate and those intended to enable war-uprooted people to reintegrate when the fighting ends are, in effect, the bookends of international refugee policies. On the one end, societies lacking basic conditions for citizen security, rule of law, responsive and effective governance, an active civil society, and basic trust among national groups are vulnerable to civil conflict and consequent refugee outflows. On the other end, these conditions may wholly or partially persist even after peace agreements are made and refugees return. Over the last decade, political instabilities, lingering hostilities, and social and economic dislocations have impeded peace from taking firm root in a number of countries long plagued by conflict. Measures designed to contribute to conflict prevention and programs to assist war-to-peace transitions are intended to help national leaders address the root causes that give rise to conflicts and motivate refugee flight.

The mandate of the refugee agency, UNHCR, does not officially encompass either of the two bookends. However, since resolving refugee-returnee issues merges with the revitalization of the society as a whole, UNHCR, along with several international agencies and institutions, has channeled its efforts and resources to broad-based initiatives in a number of war-torn societies.

That UNHCR has a significant role to play in conflict prevention and reconstruction is a fairly new phenomenon. UNHCR involvement in reintegrating returnees expanded during the 1990s, and was recognized to be essential to future peace and progress. At the time, there was growing interest within the organization in conflict prevention as well. Since the late 1990s, UNHCR, however, has been curtailing responsibilities beyond core refugee protection and assistance and, overall, the contributions of international actors to prevention and reconstruction remain inadequate. Despite prominent in institutional rhetoric and needs assessments, international commitments to long-term revitalization and reintegration take a back seat to the short-term mobilization of human and material resources for emergency response to humanitarian crises.

Donors and operational agencies maintain they can and should establish the foundations of good governance, security, civil society organizations and economic development as quickly as possible, i.e. during the emergency phase and even during actual conflict. In practice, unsurprisingly, the “massive intervention-quick fix” approaches typical of humanitarian emergency actions rarely yield durable results. Scholars, practitioners and evaluators continue to document the disappointing performance of international assistance during emergencies, underscoring the prevalent lack of coordination,
duplication of efforts, fragmented programs, and expenditures too large for local absorption that so often characterize these situations.¹

This chapter will discuss international interventions in two countries, Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), both of which have refugee issues at their core. In Haiti, the intervention was mounted to restore the former President and establish levels of stability and security sufficient to stem the continuing refugee flows, primarily to the United States. In BiH, the central goal of a massive internationally supported post-conflict rebuilding program was to make possible the return of refugees to a multi-ethnic society that had been destroyed by ethnic cleansing, war, and nationalist repression. In Haiti UNHCR has been minimally involved, while in BiH it has been one of the most essential players. The intention here is to illustrate how in two very different countries, international actors invested major resources during the early phase of their involvement, but impeded achieving the very results they sought by failing to plan comprehensively and reducing resources too quickly. Haiti and in Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from the least successful examples of international humanitarian interventions. Yet, they illustrate a limited understanding of, or preparation for, the challenges of long-term transition periods. Features common to both, and to many other cases include:

1. Donors and agencies have proposed to lay the foundations for political, social and economic objectives that require a decade or more to achieve under favorable conditions, but to do so on the basis of planning, funding and mandates that change from year to year.
2. Even where there are indications that international interventions are producing favorable results, the supporting agencies have found themselves unable to capitalize on success due to arbitrarily determined phase out projections.
3. Continued funding for fundamental changes is still programmed according to unrealistic indicators that are supposed to establish year-to-year progress, although in nearly all cases improvements in one area are accompanied by—or cause—regressions in another.
4. Donor fatigue sets in when it is perceived that an emergency has been managed, but well before the desired durable changes can reasonably be expected.

These constraints affect outcomes when projects are undertaken by development as well as relief agencies insofar as both are bound by time-limited project cycles and changing donor priorities. Conflict prevention and mitigation and post-conflict reconstruction are almost always unevenly and/or poorly funded. Nevertheless, as will be shown, a smooth transition process from war-to-peace is not solely a function of the amount of funding, but also of how and at what pace the funding is targeted to the multiple problems of difficult war-to-peace transitions.

RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI


Precipitating Events

From the outset, following the slave-led war of independence against France in the late 18th century, dysfunctional and dictatorial government, extreme inequalities, and internal conflict have plagued Haitian history. The overwhelming poverty of the majority of Haiti’s people has generated economic migration, while widespread political repression has generated refugees. Haitians fleeing repression, poverty, and often both, have been arriving on US shores in substantial numbers for the past forty years. The Haitians who found refuge in New York from the first Duvalier regime (1957-71) included many intellectuals and professionals. These early arrivals were relatively easily absorbed. When Haitians who were neither professionals nor intellectuals began arriving on the shores of Florida in much larger numbers in the 1970s, however, U.S. authorities sought to turn them back. Turning them back proved difficult: First, large numbers of Haitians saw migration as the only option for their survival, and were willing to take substantial risks. Second, increasing numbers of arriving Haitians claimed and were able to establish grounds for political asylum.

Through much of the period between the 1970s and 1990, with the acquiescence of the Haitian government, the U.S. Coast Guard tried to keep Haitian boats from reaching their intended destinations by pursuing them on the high seas and returning them. Although genuine refugees were to be exempt from arbitrary return, the requests for political asylum heard from passengers on intercepted boats were treated in a cursory fashion. Individual success in gaining asylum in the United States remained low.

Migration significantly declined for a brief period following the Haitian elections of 1990 that brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular former priest, to the presidency. However, after little more than a year, he was forced from office by a military coup in September 1991. The military imposed a dictatorship under General Raoul Cedras. With the increased repression following the 1991 military coup, there was even more human displacement than had occurred during the former decades. In addition to approximately 100,000 estimated to have fled the country, another 300,000 became internally displaced. The number of Haitian boats overwhelmed US interdiction capacities and many found their way to Florida. Haitian asylum seekers increasingly gained U.S. allies and advocates, who called attention to Haiti's pattern of systematic human rights violations. The members of the “Black Caucus” in the U.S. Congress took a special interest in Haiti, accusing policy makers of indifference and racism, citing the striking differences between prior handling of Haitians’ claims, as opposed to those of Cubans landing their boats on the same shores. Local resentment in Florida about the burdens caused by the influx of Haitians also carried political weight, somewhat in the other direction. During these clearly difficult times, and in view of US government opposition to the Cedras government, Haitian claims for political asylum took on considerable credibility.

General Cedras faced strong, but ineffective external condemnation and internal opposition. The international community employed various measures to push Cedras to...
restore the legitimate president to office. Soon after the coup, the OAS imposed economic sanctions, and two years later the United Nations Security Council authorized an arms and fuel embargo against Haiti. The sanctions neither unseated the government nor slowed the flight of Haitians. Although easily circumvented by wealthy Haitians, the sanctions were devastating to Haiti’s poor, depriving the country of basic needs, tools, agricultural and manufacturing inputs, closing off export trade, and severely limiting international humanitarian programs. As the Haitian population sought to escape their growing misery and repression through migration, the US government cast about for the means to acknowledge the political forces behind the migration yet prevent Haitian would-be refugees from entering the United States.

The US, UN and OAS exerted pressure to bring about the resignation of General Cedras and re-instatement of President Aristide. A short lived agreement to this effect in 1993 brought the lifting of sanctions, the promise of substantial financial assistance and plans for a UN/OAS peace keeping mission. The failure of General Cedras to comply, however, convinced the US government in 1994 to resolve the Haitian crisis and its consequent refugee outflow with force.

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**Intervention**

United Nations Security Resolution #940 of July 31, 1994 cited a “further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti” and the desperate situation of Haitian refugees. On these grounds it authorized the creation of a multinational force (MNF) under Chapter VII of the Charter. The United States was the leading advocate and executor in this initiative, and its troops constituted the majority in the force. The Resolution authorized the MNF to “use all means” to restore the legitimate authorities to Haiti, to maintain a “secure and stable environment,” and to permit implementation of the 1933 agreement Haiti thereby became the first case in which a multinational force under the UN was prompted by a refugee flow. It was deployed on humanitarian and democratic grounds, i.e. to take control of a sovereign country, not formally at war, in order to replace a predatory authoritarian government with a democratically elected regime. The action in Haiti also was one of the few examples of joint action between the UN and a regional organization, the OAS. As in the case of Bosnia, which will be considered in the following section, helping Haiti by creating a “secure and stable environment” was in the interest of Haiti’s refugee-receiving neighbors as well as of Haiti itself.

U.S. forces landed in Haiti on September 19, 1994. By October 15, President Aristide was back in Haiti and General Cedras had resigned and departed. While the U.S. Congress had called for aggressive action to restore Aristide to full powers, some Washington political leaders considered sending US troops to Haiti to be politically risky. They were still smarting from the recent death of 18 US soldiers in Somalia where they had similarly embarked on a humanitarian mission. Despite the fact that Haitians welcomed the US troops joyfully, policy makers and military leaders drew lessons from Somalia where the opposite had been the case. They concurred that US forces would
have to establish goals that could be achieved in a clearly defined and short timeframe, and to avoid becoming bogged down in a difficult transition process.\(^6\)

The U.S. led Haitian intervention achieved the mission it assigned for itself and exited on schedule. Within the eighteen-month period that the Multinational Force (MNF) remained in Haiti, it removed the military dictatorship, restored Jean Bertrand Aristide to the Presidency, re-established civic order and prepared the ground for the United Nations Mission for Haiti (UNMIH), which took over on March 31, 1995. For the UN, both the action itself and the hand over demonstrated the relevance of multilateral actions even in a sphere of super-power interests. For the Haitian people, the MNF presence meant removal of the dictatorship, the restoration of Aristide and, for the first time in many years, hope for a better future. Migration significantly declined.

UNMIH remained in Haiti until February 1996; its core mission was to:
1. Professionalize the armed forces,
2. Establish a new police force, and
3. Prepare for elections, (UNMIH with MICIVIH)

Neither the MNF nor UNMIH disarmed the Haitian paramilitary groups. Nor did either mission directly seek to prosecute war criminals, reform the judicial system, or embark on an economic revitalization program, though these items were priorities for the new Haitian government, the Haitian people, the US and the UN. While he applauded the work of the MNF/UNMIH, the UN Secretary General’s report of January 17, 1995 underscored the fragility of what had been achieved in the first year. He called attention to the extremely poor condition of the new and untested security forces, the dire need for more forceful judicial and prison reform, and the likelihood of continuing political tensions. The return of President Aristide, he concluded, combined with promises of important international assistance, “have raised very high expectations of jobs, education and a better life for all.” These very high expectations, he implied, could well be disappointed by the limited terms of engagement built into the UN mandate, and thereby undermine what had been achieved.

Following the end of UNMIH’s mandate on May 31 1996, UN operations were no longer under Chapter VII “peace keeping,” and subsequent missions depended on donor voluntary contributions. Each succeeding UN and OAS missions was smaller in size and resources.

- MIPONUH. UN Police Mission in Haiti, November 30, 1997 – March 2000
- MICAH. UN Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, March 2000 - \(^8\)

Each was a new entity, with its own mission plan and new staff members. The initiatives undertaken by one mission were not necessarily completed by the next, although the general themes of electoral support, police training and penal reform were common to all. Most UN efforts were devoted to the creation of the new Haitian police force. Other
international actors implemented a broader range of economic and institutional projects, including important judicial reform projects. The US, especially, invested significant resources for judicial reform. For the most part, the bilateral donor initiatives—like those of the UN missions—were designed for circumscribed purposes and quick implementation.

At the outset, the international community raised hopes of support for a political and economic transformation of Haiti. In 1995, donors pledged some $1.2 billion. This was an unprecedented sum of money for a country of that size and absorptive capacity. They then pledged a larger amount, $2.8 billion at the Paris Club meeting of 1995. The International Financial Institutions cleared Haiti’s debt so that rapid disbursement would not be impeded. The government agreed to an Emergency Economic Recovery Program that included privatization, trade liberalization, decentralization and general economic stabilization, in keeping with the structural adjustment program recommendations of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Despite generous pledges, slightly less than half of the promised $2.8 billion had been disbursed at the end of fiscal year 1996. Much of the funding was delayed on grounds of Haiti’s inadequate compliance with aspects of the economic reform. Privatizing state enterprises was unpopular in Haiti, and the Haitian parliament resisted its passage. Some donors criticized Aristide for equivocating on his commitments to overall economic reform, and withheld committed funds. This, in turn, jeopardized major programs the government and donors were executing in other areas, including the all-important effort to firmly establish the new police force.

The Agenda: Achievements and Disappointments

While UN missions and other internationally funded projects were usually of short-term duration, achieving even the limited UN and OAS agendas in Haiti implied institutional and economic transformations that were anything but clear-cut or short-term:

The Armed Forces and the Security Gap: The Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) had served as an organ of internal repression for Haiti’s authoritarian governments. In April 1995, Aristide disbanded the last of the FAdH. For the first time in Haiti’s history, the armed forces would not be a determinant factor in Haitian politics. A few former military troops were incorporated into the National Police. A USAID/OTI program, implemented by the International Organization for Migration, IOM, offered vocational training and counseling, and about 5,500 former FAdH took advantage of the offer. Of those who had accepted the training, only 304 found employment. Without case or employment, the demobilized soldiers, and particularly those who had been trained in specific employment skills that were not marketable, were intensely dissatisfied. Many turned to crime.

An IOM official insightfully questioned outcomes of the training for demobilized soldiers that his organization had undertaken. The program was typical in scope and time frames to many others: while the IOM had successfully fulfilled its training mission, he noted, the project was too narrowly conceived to address any of the prevailing conditions.
affecting the lives of most of the Haitian beneficiaries. He believed that what was needed at that time, instead of a militarily defined operation performed quickly, was a multi year, multi layered planning process for the country overall.14

The more immediate challenge to peace and progress resulted from the fact that the disappearance of the army created a security vaccuum. As UN military peacekeepers were withdrawn, and with the new police force at the early stages of its formation, security threats in Haiti increased. During 1995 The FRAPH and paramilitaries--still armed and not faced with prosecution--committed serious and frequent acts of violence. Crime increased sharply in 1995 as the drug trade took greater advantage of the easy access to Haitian territory and the willing collaboration of many Haitians.

Nevertheless, the UN Security Council continued to scale back the UN peacekeeping forces of UNMIH and its successor UNSMIH. By 1996, the UNSMIH troops were solely concentrated in Port-au-Prince, and no longer could help resolve security problems in the countryside. By September 15, 1996 international troop strength was at 600, plus an additional 672 persons funded on a voluntary basis, down from over 4,000 troops deployed in 25 locations.

The Haitian National Police, HNP: The international policy makers determined that Haitian security would best be served with a reliable and professional police force rather than by a military establishment. Therefore the MNF was charged to create what would become the Haitian National Police Force (HNP). The police force was to be the centerpiece of international action.

All the UN missions to Haiti have made it their priority to recruit, train, equip, and generally improve of the HNP. So too have the major bilateral donors. The U.S. alone contributed more than $70 million to the HNP.15 Canada, France, and the international agencies have contributed funds as well as personnel. With the appointment of a number of capable and committed officers to leadership positions, early assessments of performance were optimistic.16 Within about 18 months, there were HNP officers throughout the country. Haiti thereby acquired the first credible police force in its entire history. The U.S. took the position that a credible police reform program and an effective and democratic security force justified the withdrawal of the international troops.17

By 1998, the HNP reached its peak of some 6,500 officers. Thereafter, performance patterns were worrisome. The police worked for long hours, for little remuneration, few opportunities to advance and with inadequate technical or logistical support--significant donor contributions notwithstanding. The low salaries, the possibility of easy drug money, and the lack of effective oversight opened the way to rampant corruption. These and other factors caused the number of police to decline. Political opponents alleged that the HNP had come to serve the aims of the Aristide government, as former police forces had served previous Haitian rulers. International criticism of the HNP mounted between 1998 and 2000.18 Arguing against further support, a GAO Report of 2000 characterized the police as a “largely ineffective law enforcement body.”19 Congressional opponents of Haiti’s government voiced considerably more strident criticism.20 A mid-term Canadian
evaluation, more sympathetically, concluded that the despite the efforts expended to strengthen the HNP, its institutional capacity remained weak and the training had produced minimal results.\(^{21}\) That evaluation perceptively advised that the Canadian government deepen its involvement, accompany HNP progress more closely over a longer period, and lower expectations of immediate results.

**Electoral Assistance:** Another fundamental goal of the international efforts in Haiti was to replace the pattern of repressive dictatorship with democratic government. UNMIH oversaw two elections, in June and December 1995 for members of Parliament and for President, respectively. Despite serious irregularities, they represented major improvements over prior elections in Haiti. When Rene Preval replaced Jean Bertrand Aristide, the international community hailed the electoral transition of one civilian to another.\(^{22}\) To their disappointment, electoral procedures and practices in subsequent elections further deteriorated rather than improved.

First, there was the Parliamentary crisis that began in 1997 when the ruling Lavalas coalition fractured and then split. President Preval dissolved the sitting Parliament in 1999 and ruled for a year without a legislature. Absent the legislature, his own appointments and policies could not be ratified. Haiti paid an extremely high price for this political dispute as international programs were suspended, investors withdrew, and already approved funding was not disbursed. Donors concluded that the country lacked a functioning government to assume responsibility for funding it received. Haiti lost $500 million in loans and aid from the international financial institutions because there was no parliament to ratify the conditions of the funding. Opposition increased to the ruling government among the better-educated urban population.

New local and parliamentary elections were finally held in May 2000. Far from resolving the problems of political paralysis, the manner in which electoral victories were tabulated further undermined confidence in the democratic intentions of Haiti’s leadership. Political rivals accused Aristide of engineering a political monopoly that would result in his becoming President for life like his infamous predecessors. The U.S. Congress used the electoral manipulation to ban U.S. public assistance to the Haitian government. Haiti’s other major donors also have held back promised assistance although, as prior to the 1994, the economic punishment aimed at Haiti’s leadership falls on Haiti’s poor.

**Judicial system:** The judicial sector in Haiti has been inefficient, corrupt, and distrusted by all--outside of the wealthiest segments of the population whose interests it has served. Observers across the board have referred to it as “dysfunctional.” While judicial reform was not an official activity of the UN missions, the UN and all the donors recognized that without a substantially improved judiciary, there could be no credible criminal prosecutions even if Haiti had an effective police force. Nor would it be possible to adjudicate land and other disputes among citizens. The U.S. government and UNDP in particular supported a wide diversity of judicial reform projects, with little apparent success. Considering the numerous explanations of why the efforts produced few results, the most persuasive seems to be that the proposed changes were grafted on existing
structures and staff. Contrary to the aggressive approach taken in creating a new security sector, resources went into the pre-existing, hopelessly flawed institution.

Another obvious need in Haiti was, and still is, prison reform. Outside funding has brought material improvements to Haiti’s prisons, but they remain sub-standard both in terms of conditions and ability to manage the prison population. It is up the government to take the initiatives toward an overall penal reform.

*Economic Progress:* As noted, the generous donor investment for reconstruction early on, combined with the positive impacts of security and political reform, were supposed to lead to lasting economic improvement. At the outset, several projects were hastily put in place for repairing damaged infrastructure, including erosion control, potable water, health and educational structures. These projects were socially useful and provided desperately needed jobs for unskilled and low-skilled workers, but the positive impacts were not sustainable. In order to be ready for immediate execution the projects were inadequately prepared. Neither local authorities nor already existing local enterprises were taken very much into account, and there was little or no planning for future maintenance. As for the private sector, international investors could not help but notice that the Haitian elite continued to invest its own money outside of the country, indicating its lack of political and economic confidence.

At the outset, the Aristide government acceded in large part to IFI insistence on monetary control and, as a result, was able to clear its arrears with the international banks, as well as to reduce inflation from 30 percent to 10 percent between 1994-1998. By late 1999, according to the World Bank, both inflation and the fiscal deficit had again increased, and the Haitian *gourde* was depreciating rapidly. This was blamed on the related phenomenon of declining external contributions and neglect of the reform package. Haiti still receives more outside financial support than many similarly poor countries, especially in Africa. Nevertheless, the support is significantly less than was foreseen at the time of the 1994 intervention. Disbursements from international grants and loans from bilateral and multilateral sources have declined by 4.8% each year from 1995. As of 1998, international support accounted for about 10 percent of the GNP. Even this small percent, however, has been extremely important for the Haitian people, representing 85 percent of government expenditures.

Haiti’s economic profile is little different from that of 1994 when the intervention was launched to save the country from authoritarian rule and deepening misery. According to the UNDP, 91 percent of Haitian households are considered poor with 81 percent considered extremely poor. The rural population living in absolute poverty migrates in ever accelerating numbers to the capital city—where conditions of life are scarcely better. Income inequalities also remain extreme: The top four percent of the population possesses 66 percent of the wealth, while 70 percent of the population has but 20 percent of national wealth, and the very bottom 10 percent is too poor to count.

*Expectations and Results*
The donor assumption that creating a more secure environment and democratic government in Haiti would be sufficient to attract private investment, which, in turn, would generate jobs, did not come to pass. Investors have been discouraged by the failure of the government to privatize and to follow the reform package to which it had agreed. The donors that have been supporting rebuilding, democratization, and institutional strengthening point to political instability, poor management, politicized development policies, and the uncooperative behavior of the Haitian government as reasons for the multiple failures. There are ample reasons to blame Haiti’s government for much of what has gone wrong. It has neither lived up to its commitments to sustain democratic structures, nor provided adequate material and political support to maintain independent and responsive institutions. If the specific charges are accurate, however, the international diagnosis contains little self-criticism related to the donors’ own programs or expectations:

**Mutually Dependent Goals:** The UN/OAS mission mandates centered on security, electoral performance, and human rights. In reality significant improvements in the sectors targeted by these missions required complementary improvements in other related sectors: Human rights and an effective civilian police force required comprehensive judicial reform and improvement in the penal system. The productive incorporation of the FAdH required economic opportunities, of which there were few in Haiti. Donor contributions to all sectors were contingent on confidence in government commitments, beginning respect for the rule of law and electoral transparency. The international community, however, sought immediate results, but opted against a comprehensive program needed to encompass all these areas.

**Broad Expectations-Narrow commitment:** The international intervention and subsequent UN peacekeeping missions were charged to set Haiti on the road to democracy and establish the foundations for economic stability. Yet, as we have seen, the missions’ activities narrowly defined, and each mission was in place for a brief period. The MNF remained only 18 months. The UN peacekeepers were progressively withdrawn despite clear indications that Haitian security remained fragile, that violence was rising, and that the newly created national police was insufficiently prepared to meet the challenges placed before it. These problems were entirely predictable and, indeed, had been predicted.

**Reprisals:** By the turn of the century, only six years after the strong national and international optimism that greeted the restoration of the Aristide government, donors seemed to have decided that too little had changed for the better to justify continued engagement. Since 2000, U.S. assistance cannot be channeled to the Haitian government, and now goes only through NGOs and community groups. Other donors are more likely now to channel their assistance through UN projects rather than bilaterally.

The Inter-American Development Bank, which has long maintained a strong presence in Haiti, and especially in social sectors, has had projects worth approximately $200 million that were signed before the end of 1998, pending Parliamentary approval. Although a new Parliament was inaugurated in 2001, its legitimacy is in question, hence the IDB
projects cannot yet be executed. “We have lots of cash,” the Resident Representative commented in 2000, “but no way to provide it.”

Haitians’ Prospects

Although disillusionment regarding economic and political progress, and access to justice is very broadly shared, Haitians acknowledge that political expression is more open. Human rights violations, though widespread, are no longer official policy; and locally elected officials, at least in some parts of the country, are more responsive to citizens. Perhaps most significant, the government is no longer sustained by the armed forces. The HNP is a flawed institution, and will continue to be so while the judicial sector remains unreformed. Yet, the HNP is still an improvement over the terror wrought by the FAdH and Tonton Macoutes. Despite undemocratic practices on the part of the national government, Haiti today is a politically diverse country, with opposition voices that are heard and attended. Opposition candidates have gained local offices in a number of communities. The media remains varied and often critical. In short, since the international intervention, significant political changes have taken place, which affect the general population.

The economic situation is not encouraging. While internationally financed, mainly privately supported, micro-projects help people to survive in some communities, the projects depend entirely on international support. Haiti’s economy provides very little relief from the misery in which the majority still lives, and economic indicators remain stagnant. Agriculture, the traditional activity of most Haitians, is proving less and less viable for sustenance, causing record numbers to settle in vastly overcrowded capital, Port au Prince. Unfortunately, Haiti has not recovered from the loss of manufacturing and other economic enterprises that operated during the 1980s. Rural and urban Haitians are ready, as always, to leave for almost any destination that can offer greater economic opportunity.

Haitians fleeing to neighboring Dominican Republic and other Caribbean destinations encounter increasingly heavily policed borders. Migration to the Bahamas has grown from a total of 3,000 during all of 2000 to 5,000 for the first 8 months of 2001. All evidence indicates increasing efforts to leave, which UNHCR has attributed to violence, persecution and instability. As of this writing there is no massive Haitian entry into the U.S. but numbers of interdictions and asylum applications rose in 1999 and in 2000. First instance approval rates increased from 7.6 % to 22% between 1999 and 2000.

The UN system operating in Haiti is trying to rectify the former pattern of fragmented short-term projects. Haiti is one of the sites for the coordination mechanisms being put in place in selected countries following the Secretary General’s 1997 reform plan. Through the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), launched in September 2000, the UN agencies in Haiti have laid the groundwork for a multi-faceted and coordinated strategy over the long term. The agencies involved have pledged to engage in comprehensive planning for medium and
long-term outcomes, with maximum national execution. Sadly, as the United Nations system finally prepares its member agencies to participate in this strategy, the funding needed to give the initiative greater impact is unlikely to be forthcoming.

If the political future of Haiti is not hopeful, neither is it doomed to repeat the pattern of the Duvalier past. Yet, if the donors turn their backs both on current problems and the deeper political and economic roots of these problems, and if Haitian political leaders, including both government and opposition, fail to look beyond their own political interests, life in Haiti will become truly unbearable and likely more explosive.

MINORITY RETURNS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Today, nearly five years after Dayton, I am pleased to report that minority returns are finally a reality…

After years in limbo, the refugees and displaced people are tired of waiting.”
Sadako Ogata, Statement September 11, 2000.34

In fact, there are few refugee returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), to minority areas or elsewhere (about 13,000 in 2000). However, a number of Bosnians who were ethnically cleansed from minority areas now seek return to their places of origin after years living in majority areas. This movement more than quadrupled between the first quarter of 1999 and the same period of 2000.35 By the end of 2000, minority returns numbered over 67,000, or almost 40% over the 1999 return level.36 The welcome news, if it becomes a trend, would vindicate international humanitarian support for rebuilding and reconciliation. There are, however, still over 800,000 internally displaced persons in Bosnia.

Without question, the years of international programs, pressures and incentives in BiH were fundamental to improving conditions for minority returns. Nevertheless, a review of the international efforts to achieve these ends also demonstrates lack of clarity among donors and agencies about the linkages among their programs, as well as unrealistic expectations about the feasibility of early refugee returns. Moreover, while it is encouraging that significant numbers of people now are willing and able to move back to areas that were ethnically cleansed, the challenges of integration still lie ahead. Whether adequate international assistance and protection will be available to facilitate that integration is very much in doubt.

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Between 1992-1995, internal conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)37 and Croatia, formerly part of Yugoslavia, produced approximately 1.7 million refugees, at least the same number or more internally displaced persons and 200,000 deaths, from an initial population of about 4.4 million.38 The population fell by half between 1991 and 1995
and, of those remaining, more than half of the people were displaced from their original areas. Serbian aggression was intended to achieve ethnic uniformity by forcibly displacing the non-Serb population, consisting primarily of Muslims and Croats. By the time the war was brought to a close in December 1995, Bosnian cities, towns and rural communities were sharply segregated along ethnic lines. Additionally, what had been a moderately prosperous Bosnia was physically in ruins. Close to two thirds of the housing had been wholly or partially destroyed; factories, schools, mosques, medical facilities and communications networks were in ruins. The GDP in Bosnia declined some 75% between 1991 and 1995.39

The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), commonly known as the Dayton peace agreement, recognized the de facto creation of two separate ethnically defined entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats shared the former, and the population in the latter was almost exclusively Serb. At the same time, the measures comprising the Dayton agreements were aimed specifically at undoing the ethnic separation caused by the war, and which had been the motor force of the conflict. Annex 7 of the Dayton accord states the parties’ agreement to respect the right of refugees and internally displaced persons, and to permit them to return to the places in which they had lived prior to the war without “harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief or political opinion.” (Article 1 (2))

The accords established a structure that gives ample space for international interventions in every sphere. At this writing, the Office of the High Representative, OHR, oversees the civilian aspects of international programs—political, economic and humanitarian, monitors compliance of the Bosnian parties,40 and coordinates strategies and programs with the other agencies. UNHCR was given the leading role in refugee repatriations and promoting the right of return for internally displaced persons. The OHR, with UNHCR, assumed responsibility for accommodating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and nearly all donors designed their aid packages to facilitate the return process.

In January 1997, the OHR and UNHCR created the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) to serve as an inter-agency forum to coordinate reconstruction work for returnees.41 The RRTF established chapters at the local level and divided its international staff between the secretariat and field. The UNHCR and OHR, directly or through the RRTF, and often with the Stabilization Force, SFOR, participation, have brokered returns by directly assisting persons wishing to go back to their areas of origin and negotiating with the communities that should receive them. The International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization also have initiated refugee return programs. The goals of restoring a multi-ethic character in BiH and establishing peace and development coincided with national interests: It was expected that creating adequate conditions for return and demonstrating international generosity would bring about the repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees who had gone Europe and North America.

To address both physical damage and peace building activities, donors pledged over US$5 billion, which was to be disbursed during the four years following Dayton. While
this aid was not always timely, effective or efficiently disbursed, it established a pattern of tying support for reconstruction to incentives for peace building and reintegration. The mandates of almost all the agencies in Bosnia have directly or indirectly affected the course of refugee return. A Peace Implementation Council, PIC, has met regularly to set broad policies. The NATO International Implementation Force, IFOR, later renamed Stabilization Force, SFOR, is responsible for military and security issues, with authority to intercede at the local level when needed. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has monitored disarmament and human rights, and organized elections. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIBH cooperates with the OHR in judicial reform projects and in implementing election results. The UN mission has been responsible for organizing the international Police Task Force, IPTF—charged with the training, reforming and restructuring the Bosnian police. The World Bank and the European Union (EU) became lead agencies in the reconstruction effort. They coordinated the wide array of multilateral and bilateral assistance and the NGOs that implemented the activities. USAID and the European Commission have been the largest donors, but virtually all the major donors have given priority attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Minority Returns: Expectations and Obstacles

Despite having signed the Dayton accords, the nationalists steadfastly opposed the efforts of minorities to return and sought to restrict freedom of movement. In addition to the extensive destruction of homes and infrastructure and the scarcity of employment, ethnic minority refugees and internally displaced persons faced local hostility and locally imposed legal obstacles to reclaiming property and rights. While conditions governing returns differed in each municipality, municipal authorities in neither Entity were accommodating to minorities. To the contrary, the leaders frequently used their executive powers to the fullest negative potential, and rarely punished elements in the local population who threatened the lives of former residents from minority families trying to reclaim homes and property. Until nearly the end of the decade, minorities seeking to return were typically subjected to practices ranging from a levy of so-called war taxes, a requirement of special visas, discriminatory distribution of public assistance and onerous registration requirements. In some places discriminatory practices are still enforced.

Early actions to repair physical damage and revitalize the economy in the Federation communities facilitated the return of elderly persons and families whose reintegration was not complicated either by ethnic factors or major war damage to homes during 1996. The vast majority of the refugees chose, where possible, to remain outside the country. Refugee host countries in Western Europe and in the former Yugoslavia suspended temporary protection for Bosnian refugees between 1996-98, and over 150,000 Bosnians returned to BiH during this period. The vast majority were Bosniaks and Croats who had been ethnically cleansed. These returnees would not and could not recover their homes in minority areas and instead went to communities in the Federation, which became increasingly crowded. They remained there, living as internally displaced persons entirely dependent on international assistance. This trend not only strengthened the ethnic divide in the formerly multi-ethnic society, but seriously aggravated the problem of
displacement as well. It is this population that began to explore the possibilities of return to the Republika Srpska (RS) and to the areas of the Federation under Croat control during 2000.

The donors laid the groundwork, or so they believed, for refugee and IDP return during 1977 and 1998. Their strategy was to use resources as incentives. Cash advances were made available for returning families from Europe, and Bosnian municipalities and communities willing to collaborate were rewarded. Meanwhile, OHR, UNHCR and other agencies sought to remove physical and economic obstacles to return for those contemplating such action. Major initiatives included:

1. The Reconstruction and Return Task Force, RRTF, selected “Cluster areas” for return-related reconstruction projects, costing approximately US$179 million. The areas were chosen on the basis of their capacity to absorb and house returnees, the openness of local government to accommodating returnees, their potential economic development possibilities, and their importance as examples of inter-ethnic reconciliation. It was hoped that up to a third of the 590,000 believed to have fled would return by the end of 1998. The investment produced disappointingly modest results.

2. The UNHCR increased its investment for the housing reconstruction and rehabilitation programs underway since 1996. The construction activity helped spark local economies, but the program was costly and the results did not seem to justify the expense. As of the end of 1998, only 30% of the repaired houses were occupied.

3. The “Open Cities” Programs operated separately but along similar principles. UNHCR and the US Bureau for Population and Refugees and Migration aimed to reward those cities and areas that cooperated with minority return policies. The localities participating in the program could have access to security forces and/or human rights monitors. Donors would invest in basic infrastructure and income generation projects. UNHCR predicted that the Open Cities initiative, combined with other improvements that facilitated returns, would yield some 50,000 minority returns by early 1998. Instead, the minority return rates in the selected communities taken as a whole appeared to be no different from those outside of the programs. UNHCR estimated that only 10,000 returned to minority areas, of whom 4,000 registered with UNHCR.

Notwithstanding strengthened international determination to promote minority returns, far fewer than expected took advantage of incentives and expanded opportunities to go home. The pattern of majority as opposed to minority returns persisted. In March 1998, the OHR reported that more than 400,000 persons had returned in the first year of Dayton, but acknowledged that 1997 returns were down 40% from 1996.

Return Linked to Security
Without exception, official and unofficial analyses between 1996-1999 underscored inadequate security and human rights protections as the primary reasons for the low rate of minority returns. Funding for rebuilding and reconciliation succeeded only in those few municipalities where incentives and security were linked; i.e. where international protection was strong and visible enough to allay fears. Those who were contemplating return had been the victims of ethnic cleansing, had experienced hostility and brutally, and were not easily lured into situations where they and their families would be at risk. The risks were augmented by the poorly functioning judicial system, criminal corruption on the part of many political leaders, and overall institutional weakness throughout BiH.

Prior to 1998, proponents of minority returns looked in vain to the international forces of NATO to take more forceful measures against Dayton’s opponents. During the first three years of their occupation, the peacekeepers of the Implementation Forces IFOR/SFOR rarely used their powers to force compliance with Dayton with regard to the illegal obstacles to return or other issues. Nor did NATO forces arrest persons indicted for war crimes or pursue indicted criminals. As late as 1998, the SFOR had arrested only two major figures among the list of accused war criminals in the RS, and some thirty low-level officials. The elections of 1996—predictably—had confirmed the power of the intransigent, anti-democratic, and generally corrupt nationalists who had made the war, and used their official positions to preserve ethnic homogeneity and ethnicity-based control. The Republika Srpska was more restrictive than the Federation, but minority returns remained rare and difficult in both areas.

Imposing Dayton

Beginning in December 1998, the SFOR departed from its previous pattern of ignoring war criminals and arrested major figures among the wanted criminals. A number of actions in favor of economic transparency, judicial reform, control of borders, anti-corruption, human rights and electoral reform were initiated in rapid succession, all aimed at further unifying the territory and diminishing the power of the extreme nationalists.

- The High Representative, in late 1997, introduced a common license plate for the vehicles from all areas. The effect of this seemingly modest gesture was dramatic in terms of opening the way to freedom of movement throughout the entire area. The common plates, importantly, allowed potential returnees to return to their places of origin and assess living conditions.

- In order to restructure and regulate the broadcast media, the OHR with SFOR support, created an Independent Media Commission, and in 1999 he established the legal framework to govern public radio and television throughout the territory. In 1999 SFOR seized the transmission facilities of the nationalist controlled media and, with that action, silenced the regular broadcasts of nationalist propaganda.
• Acting directly on the political front, the HR used his power to dismiss 22 elected officials, from all ethnic groups, on grounds that they failed to comply with their obligations under Dayton—usually related to recovery of property—or were involved in criminal operations.

The Dayton Agreement received a further boost, and the ultra-nationalists in BiH suffered an unanticipated setback, with the changes of government in both Croatia and the former Yugoslavia during 2000.

In addition to the power of the nationalist leadership, the other major impediment to minority return has been the inability of property owners and renters to reclaim their homes or to evict those illegally inhabiting these homes. The flats and houses abandoned by the Bosnian Muslims in the RS were likely still to be occupied by minority Serbs and Croats who also fled during the war from the areas later encompassed within the Federation and Croatia. On October 27, 1999, the High Representative finally issued decisions that brought together all property legislation in force in both Entities, harmonized RS property legislation with that of the Federation in accordance with Annex 7, and established a coherent strategy for property law implementation. Until then, post-war legislation in both entities had permitted property not claimed by the owners within a specified time to be declared abandoned and allocated to new inhabitants. The Property Law Reform package (PLIP) was the result of close collaboration among the OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, UNMIBH, and the Commission for Real Property Claims, CRPC. The new laws, implemented in 2000, called on all 140 municipalities in the country to process claims for restitution of property and to end illegal occupancy through evictions. They also specified the rights returnees could demand of local officials.

While this property reform legislation is fundamental to opening the way for minority returns, however, its implementation is still problematic for the majority of urban dwellings occupied for years by squatters. In all, only about 20 percent of property claims raised had been decided as of March 2001. In the RS especially, municipal capacity remains weak, while resistance to evicting illegal occupants is still strong. The rightful owners frequently find themselves spending months or even years trying to establish their legal rights, while living in inadequate temporary dwellings. Most are discouraged.

Therefore, the present upswing in minority returns is directed primarily at rural not urban areas. There are no legal obstacles to returning to the ethnically homogeneous Bosniac villages that were destroyed by the Serbs during the war. Minority families now feel sufficiently secure to return to their villages or, better said, the places where villages once stood—providing their homes can be rebuilt, and other needs attended. Therein lies a problem. The once generous international funding for exactly these purposes was already rapidly disappearing in 2000, just as interest in returning grew.

**Paying the Price of Return and Integration**

A UNHCR monitoring and evaluation mission sent in early 2000 to observe recent minority returns found relative physical security, but an economically fragile
population. Returnees sought help with housing construction, employment, in some cases landmine removal, and other needs. Although building homes prior to return had not brought people back, shelter became the first and most urgent need for families who made the decision to do so. The shortage of housing stock throughout the country has been further exacerbated by the fact that families returning to their places of origin have tried to maintain two homes in case the return proves untenable. As for means of livelihood, only 5.5% of the interviewees or spouses were employed and these almost exclusively in the Federation. Children attended school in the Federation as virtually no appropriate schooling was—or is—available in the RS.

The RS population overall is in difficult circumstances. The donor policies of conditioning assistance to compliance with Dayton principles and acceptance of minority returns resulted in a disproportionate amount of assistance flowing to the more cooperative Federation and far less to the more intransigent RS. This left the latter not only poorer and less able to accommodate returnees, but it also reinforced the isolation—and corruption—of the leadership. By late 1998, the poverty and isolation, combined with SFOR’s more vigorous pursuit of war criminals, finally led voters to begin to reject some intransigent nationalist candidates. Slowly, moderate leadership replaced nationalist wartime leadership, at least in the western municipalities. These municipalities were then able to benefit from the various programs already underway in the Federation. Nevertheless, the economic situation to date remains quite dismal in most of the area. The residents of all ethnic groups lack pensions and health coverage, electricity; education, public transportation, agricultural machinery, etc. There is virtually no private investment in the RS and, for that matter, very little in BiH overall.

The absence of adequate jobs for the returnees and the rest of the population inevitably sharpens tensions and resentments between and among them. Although local police are now more helpful and the general population is more open, security remains problematic. Violence against minority returnees continues in parts of the RS and Croat controlled areas of Bosnia. As more people return to areas that are difficult to access and likely to be unfriendly to minorities, they will need security that—in the short run at least—only the international forces and police can furnish.

In order to reintegrate and restore the once ethnically diverse society in Bosnia, donors have remained involved over a longer time span than had been anticipated or is usually sustained in peace-building programs. It appears to be not long enough. The OHR, UNHCR, and other operational agencies repeatedly express their concern that funding is diminishing just as their policies are finally beginning to bear fruit. Indeed, the present opportunities notwithstanding, there is a clear trend among donors to reduce their contributions to BiH operations, and to the Balkans generally.

By 2000, donors had already adjusted most of their projects from humanitarian to development focused assistance, emphasizing legislative and administrative matters over more immediate forms of assistance. The well-justified commitment to institutional change, however, was accompanied by smaller total contributions. The Bosnia donors’ conference of May 1999 yielded pledges that covered only 30% of the estimated cost of
implementing the reforms planned and requested by the OHR. Over the next two years the total Consolidated Appeal process (CAP) submitted progressively lower requests for UN agency projects, but donor responses declined more precipitously than the amount of the requests. The CAP request for 2001, reduced by $200 million from 2001, was US$429 million—with 70% of the total still targeted for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia FYR—although this time funding requirements for Kosovo were considerably reduced. By all accounts, total funding will fall further in 2002/3, with a smaller allocation for what are considered relief items, including housing construction and direct assistance to returnees.

UNHCR’s requirements for humanitarian assistance have been rising due to a modestly increasing caseload of refugee returns and a faster growing caseload of minority non-refugee returns. The World Bank supports some infrastructure repair for returnee areas, but not individual housing or for other important UNHCR programs that furnish legal advice and information, and short-term income generation.

The region-wide Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe has become the major vehicle for securing funding and coordinating donors’ contributions in the Balkans, including BiH. The Pact was initiated on July 30, 1999 by the European Union, under the umbrella of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. The EU and World Bank jointly coordinate Stability Pact activities. The Pact brings together the foreign ministers of European and North American donor countries and of the Southeast European countries. Its aim is to strengthen regional cooperation, political and economic reform, stability and national institutions throughout the Southeast European region, toward the eventual incorporation of these countries within the European-Atlantic framework. The Stability Pact mobilizes funding for activities encompassing urgent needs, (e.g. quick start package projects in rural villages), institutional strengthening, governance, education, media and human rights.

Preventing forced displacement and ensuring safe return are among the explicitly stated objectives of the Stability Pact. Aspects of the return scenario emerge in virtually all discussions and, thus far, minority returns have been privileged in terms of attention within the Stability Group framework. For example, in 1999 the European Commission began implementation of an Integrated Return Program that included housing, infrastructure, social projects, legal aid, and landmine clearance.

Yet, it would seem the Stability Pact, like the OCHA CAP, is meeting the same reticence among donors to invest further resources in BiH. Funding conferences for projects covering the Balkan region have yielded disappointing results. Support for returnee housing is still seriously lacking. This was confirmed by a UNHCR-commissioned management study in December 2000 which concluded that housing units remained far beneath demand in returnee areas.

The US is a case in point: The US been a major donor in the entire array of Bosnia reconstruction needs, as well as a steadfast and dependable partner of UNHCR’s programs. Overall, through USAID and the State Department Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration PRM, it has contributed nearly US$1 billion to support the Dayton accords. PRM has been the channel for UNHCR and NGO humanitarian activities in support of reconstruction for refugees and the internally displaced. This assistance has continued. However, by March 2000 PRM guidelines for NGOs working in Bosnia and Croatia warned of forthcoming funding reductions, and proposed giving priority in 2000 to projects that could be completed in 12 months so that the NGOs could phase out.

The UNMBIH will terminate its mission at the end of 2002. The Secretary General has urged international donors to “provide necessary financial resources to enable UNMBIH to complete its work.” The remainder of his message enumerated a number of challenges that remained, and probably would remain, after the mission’s departure.

**Prospects**

The improvement in security in much of the Bosnian territory since 2000 has strengthened what may represent an enduring change of attitude among Bosnian citizens toward greater tolerance. It is not yet time to phase out the international vigilance over the Dayton process. Moreover, the very successes in obliging compliance potentially create further tensions. Minority returns, civil society groups protesting demanding their rights, pressures to end discriminatory practices, and the many actions that bring reconciliation closer to reality will inevitably be challenged by still determined opponents. Clearly SFOR still has an essential role to play until reconstruction, reconciliation and reintegration take root.

The process by which the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina will phase out requires the utmost care, collaboration and planning. Decisions should be guided by realities on the ground and should allow realistic timeframes for the still essential activities that require international resources and/or presence. Economic progress is now visible in most of Bosnia, but jobs are still scarce. Unemployment in 2000 was about 41% in the Federation, and assumed to be much higher in RS. Of fundamental concern to the donors contemplating the medium and long term, however, is the fact that economic growth is still primarily a function of donor transfers. Economic and especially banking reforms remain as continuing challenges. Nevertheless, assuming a gradual evolution toward political stability, security and improved governance, Bosnia and the other countries of the region—collectively and individually--should attract reasonable levels of international investment in the not too distant future.

There is virtual unanimity among analysts and field workers that Bosnia now needs long-term programs that strengthen institutions and provide economic bases for reconciliation, rather than short-term projects. It is especially important that international support continues for local capacity building, as national actors take over their rightful responsibilities. With regard to minority returns, reintegration assistance for basic needs is still critical. The case for continued support for at least the next few years to construction and reconstruction of housing and for income generation could hardly be more compelling. Families returning for the first time since the war to their places of
origin need emergency assistance and security support as well as investment in longer
term development. In other words, continued attention to urgent needs should accompany
efforts directed at regional development, institutional and structural changes, until such
time as the government can mobilize adequate resources to take on the reconstruction
itself.

CONCLUSION

There were strong justifications for the international interventions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Haiti. The Balkan conflict had been spreading and it was feared that
it would affect other Balkan nations, e.g. Kosovo, bringing added tensions to neighboring
European countries. Moreover, the human rights violations, brutal ethnic cleansing, the
widespread displacement and, not least, the massive refugee arrivals throughout Europe
demanded forceful responses. In the case of Haiti, the combined effects of serious human
rights violations during the dictatorship, extreme poverty affecting the majority of
citizens, and the counter-productive results of international sanctions had produced a
volatile domestic situation and a refugee emergency. The rapidly growing Haitian refugee
population in the United States was an important factor motivating international action.

Following the armed interventions, the major powers committed their resources to
rebuilding the countries, reconciling and re-integrating mutually hostile and uprooted
citizens, and strengthening national institutional capacities in political, economic and
social spheres. These remain the challenges. This chapter has explored these challenges
from a refugee perspective, meaning that it has examined the impacts of post-conflict
international efforts on the potential for continued flight and/or the conditions for durable
return. The two quite different case studies illustrate a number of common strengths and
weaknesses. In both cases, refugee and returnee integration and stability were threatened
by continuing conditions of fragile security, internal political conflicts, and limited
prospects for a viable, long-term economic futures.

In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Haiti, the countries of Europe and North America
and Japan have invested significant resources for post-conflict rebuilding. The findings
indicate that international resources could have been used to greater effect in addressing
these problems: In BiH, establishing citizen security should have been among the first
objectives. Despite the fact that humanitarian assistance was plentiful at first, the
international community could not induce refugees and displaced minority populations to
attempt to reclaim their homes in areas hostile to their ethnic group. Once the
peacekeepers and political leaders were prepared to enforce the Dayton accords more
forcefully, a gradual but significant movement to the former minority areas began to take
place. But, by that time the humanitarian assistance was no longer plentiful. While
current evidence indicates that BiH is moving in a more positive direction in political
and--more tenuously--in economic terms, international presence and support remain
essentials during the next few years.
In Haiti, it was clear that reinforcing political legitimacy and human rights was a *sine qua non* for creating options other than flight for the citizens of the country. And, when internationally induced agreements failed to achieve these objectives, armed international intervention was determined to be the only effective means for doing so. The primary goals of the armed intervention and the subsequent UN missions were to establish a system of security and reliable electoral mechanisms. These ultimately proved too narrow to sustain the transition that Haiti required—and still requires.

With both countries still in the midst of war-to-peace transitions, it is not clear that there will be sufficient support to sustain present achievements, much less to spur further progress. International agencies have been cutting back operations and donors reducing support, despite the fact the specific needs for which international assistance was initially mobilized are still high, and before national institutions and capacities to meet these needs have been established. In the case of BiH, a stronger commitment to “staying the course” would almost certainly produce long-sought goals of greater ethnic diversity. In Haiti, which is a more problematic case, withdrawal of support risks leading to the return of conditions resembling those that brought about the refugee emergency and intervention in the first place.

The conflicts of the past two decades on every continent—Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, the countries of the Great Lakes, West Africa; Central America and the Balkans—are all characterized by terrible destruction and massive human displacement. Authoritarian and repressive governments, weak institutions, and poverty have further complicated recovery in these countries. The major reason for declining international resources and commitments seems to be that donor governments neither anticipate nor plan for long-term involvement. Yet, logic as well as history indicates that following protracted periods of violence, destruction, economic and social disruption and massive displacement, all war-to-peace transitions are bound to be long and troubled. It is well understood that international funding alone will not be sufficient to produce meaningful political, economic and social reform. Nevertheless, inadequate commitments of time and funding, combined with an approach based on fragmented and uneven projects, obviously impede significant improvements.

The observations contained in this report are not intended to convince donors that staying longer is always better than leaving, or that more involvement is necessarily better than less. There is abundant contrary evidence that international actors sometimes overwhelm and stifle local initiatives. This has occurred in relations to some programs in Bosnia. The underlying question is how donors and international agencies, working with local actors, determine the impacts of their involvement on a continuing basis; i.e. on what bases are decisions taken that support should be modified, reduced, augmented or eliminated. These issues warrant greater attention from donors and international agencies. In assessing needs, it is essential to take into account how war-uprooted groups are being reabsorbed into political, economic and social structures. Efforts that have not failed should not be brought to a close due to impatience or funding gaps, but rather with informed and deliberative decisions aimed at achieving the best results by means of combined local and international efforts.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that although peace building and reintegration are long-term propositions, post-conflict international interventions need not be open ended in the vast majority of cases. Exit strategies can strengthen rather than weaken national capacities to take on remaining problems. However, they must be developed on the basis of comprehensive planning, funding levels targeted to priority tasks, and a willingness to accompany development and institutional assistance with continued attention to countering the legacies of war, displacement and violence,
ENDNOTES


8 MICAH consolidated the functions of both MIPONUH and MICIVIH. Although scheduled to begin in March, the Mission was not in the field until May,2000.


10 Maguire, op.cit.,74; Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Beyond the Mountains, More Mountains: Demobilizing the Haitian Army” in Tommie Sue Montgomery, ed Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Western Hemisphere, North South Center/Lynn Reinner, 2000, 67-89.

11 Malone, op.cit., 122

12 The broader U.S. operation was called Operation restore Democracy. The soldiers who, for a brief time, formed part of the interim police, eventually had access to training as well. (Mendelson: 2000.)

13 Smillie, p. 10 noted that many of the former soldiers were trained for skills already over-supplied in Haiti.

14 Interview, October 18, 2000.

15 US/GAO, “Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of U.S. Aid to Justice System,” September 18, 2000, p.2. In the US, the program was operated by the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program.


17 Mendelson, op.cit., 82)


19 Ibid.

21 Canada, CIDA, Projet d’appui institutionnel a la Police Nationale d’Haiti, Mid term evaluation, January 26, 2000, 57. (translation by author)

22 Kumar, op.cit; Human Rights Watch, June 25 1995


26 1998 figures from UNDP


28 These figures are recorded in the 2000 Annual Reports of ECOSOC and the World Bank.

29 Email exchange with Gerard Johnson, December 14, 2000.

30 UNHCR figures presented on September 13, 2001


32 Ibid. from 3,000 new applicants in 1999 to 4,700 in 2000.

33 UNDP, op.cit.17-22


36 Figures from U.S. Committee for Refugees and UNHCR, as cited in a report of the Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, March 28 2001, Report of Working Table 1

37 The terms Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH and Bosnia are used interchangeably.


40 The OHR, under the auspices of the UN Security Council, is governed by the Peace Implementation Council, consisting of the G-8 countries, the President of the European Union, the European Commission and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

41 The task force has consisted of bilateral donors, international organizations and NGOs, with SFOR participation, for programs aimed at coordinating international support and facilitating return and integration. Funding for the RRTF came from the US, the European Commission, and the World Bank.


43 The actions of local officials to obstruct minority return was a key factor. In 1996, the Mayor of one community, Travnik, cooperated with international authorities so that both refugees and displaced persons returned there, bringing benefits to both town and returnees. Human Rights Watch, June 1996, 14


45 As of November 2000, the estimated number of refugees who returned to the country, to both majority and minority areas was about 190,000 out of the 1.7 million estimated to have left. Of these, most of the approximately 800,000 who went to Serbia and Croatia have probably relocated permanently. Some 70,000 to 90,000 are living in Germany with temporary status, but are likely to be regularized. Thus far 179,000 have returned from Germany, mainly in 1977 and 1978. Only a few thousand have returned in 2000. (figures obtained from the International Organization for Migration, 1996-2000.) US Committee for Refugees estimates that about 250,000 still live abroad and lack durable solutions (web site, 2002)

46 Total refugee returns from all countries during 1977 were 60,257 and during 1998 90,503, according to IOM figures. Those from Germany represented by far the largest group.

47 OHR/RRTF, Report, December 1997, 3

48 ibid, ORH/RTF, Outlook for 1998. p. 4
50 The DAC study offers some possible explanations including inadequate selection mechanisms and follow-up, initiation of rewards on the basis of promised cooperation which failed to materialize, and the fact that donors overall did not necessarily invest more strongly in the open cities than in other places.

51 UNHCR, Bosnia: June 17, 1997. Unregistered returns are those unassisted by UNHCR


53 US Institute of Peace, “Balkan Returns: An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority Repatriation,” Special Report. Washington DC, Dec. 21 1999 6. Central Bosnia was among the few areas where the SFOR peacekeepers were actively present and obliged compliance with Dayton, returnee projects. This USIP Report, cites a study by the International Crisis Group showing small numbers of Croats and Bosniacs returning respectively to the towns of Bugojno and Prozor-Rama largely due to effective RRTF presence in those particular places, p. 7


56 Interview with Werner Blatter, UNHCR Representative in BiH, Oslobodjenje 2001

57 Many of those occupying homes illegally are Serbs forced out of the Croat Krajina area.

58 UNHCR, “Returnee Monitoring Study: Minority Returns to the Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” based on interviews 5 January-3 March 2000

59 Ibid.

60 Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative for two through end July 1999, “Lessons from Bosnia,” The Wall Street Journal, July 29 1999

61 The OCHA Consolidated Appeal for Southeastern Europe, Nov 8,2000 covers the five countries of the Southeastern region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and 16 UN agencies working there. In the 1999 submission for 2000, the initial request was for US$660 million, which was later reduced to US$627 million when UNHCR reduced its request. The total was 1/3 less than it had been in 1999. The donor response was disappointing, with less than 50% of the requested amount in place by the end of October 2000


64 Stability Pact, March 28, 2001

65 UN Department of Public Information, 5 December 2000.


67 The Center on International Cooperation at New York University has been exploring options to facilitate effective humanitarian assistance and overcome fragmented and piecemeal funding patterns. www.nyu.edu/pages/cic. See also Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, CIC, Boulder, Lynne Reinner, 2000.