ADOMIZEN: A FOUCAULTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY OF HOMELESSNESS
IN WASHINGTON, D.C.’S MONUMENTAL CORE

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ABSTRACT

Washington D.C.'s monumental core is a unique space in which discourses circulate like taxi cabs and individuals are hailed as U.S. citizens. The city, itself, is a body of knowledge: the monuments, the museums, and the parks were designed with a didactic dimension meant to inspire and instruct individuals on the ways of citizenship. Homelessness has existed side by side to D.C.’s monumental core throughout the city's history of D.C – but it is not included in the discourses that circulate in the monumental core; rather, it exists in the silence behind the discourses - it exists in the spaces between the discourses.

In this thesis I use Michel Foucault's concept of Archaeology in order to posit an alternative history of Washington, one marked by exclusion rather than inclusion. I engage in three case studies: The 1932 Bonus March; the 1984 Supreme Court Case Clark versus The Community for Creative Non-Violence; and the 2007 Help the Homeless Walkathon. I disengage the events from normative modes of linear or causal history in order to suggest a relationship between citizenship and
homelessness that is not immediately visible. While on the surface, the discourse of citizenship and that of homelessness appear to be mutually exclusive, I argue that they are in fact co-constituted. Thus, I use the term Adomizen to suggest an inextricable link between citizenship and homeownership - suggesting further that if one lacks a home one also lacks citizenship.
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Introduction

There was a time when archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, inert traces, objects without context, and things left by the past, aspired to the condition of history, and attained meaning only through the restitution of a historical discourse; it might be said, to play on words a little, that in our time history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument.

- Michel Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge

In July of 2005, Washington, D.C. Government Officials made plans to lease Franklin School, a historic building in downtown Washington, to developer Herbert S. Miller. Miller planned to renovate the building into a high-end hotel. The building, however, was not entirely unoccupied. At the time, Franklin School was being used as an emergency shelter that provided two-hundred and forty beds for the homeless. While Franklin School is run-down and dilapidated, it is also an integral part of a diminishing shelter system in the downtown area that provides spaces for approximately three thousand people a night.

Many advocates and consumer advocates have derided the conditions of the shelter system in Washington, D.C. and have called for more permanent solutions to homelessness; nevertheless, many of these advocates have argued that shelters like Franklin School remain a necessity. Emergency Shelters serve two primary needs: 1) they provide a necessary safety-net that keep people off the street in the case of an
emergency; and 2) they offer an alternative to the street for many people who are currently waiting for transitional housing or vouchers for permanent housing. In reaction to the District’s plan to develop Franklin School, a group of advocates started The Committee to Save Franklin Shelter. They wrote letters, appealed to politicians, and in September of 2006, they marched on City Hall to protest the deteriorating conditions of poverty in the District and to demand the right to shelter. The actions of the Committee were successful: That October, D.C. Council severed the lease agreement with Miller, and the development plans were scrapped. The success, however, was tenuous. As of April 2008, two years later, Franklin Shelter, like the recently closed Gales and Randall Shelters, is scheduled to close as well.

The act of marching or public protest is in no way a unique experience in the city of Washington. The National Park Service estimates that they receive an average of three thousand permit requests per year from groups who wish to demonstrate (Ruane 2008). For the homeless, however, the act of protest is uniquely significant: For a long time, the homeless have attempted to engage in the public sphere in Washington and have been excluded from such by various means. The act of gathering in public spaces is a symbolic activity: it allows for people “to, literally, see themselves by coming together in the same place, and thereby constituting themselves as part of ‘a public’” (Mitchell 1995). In their exclusion from public spaces, the homeless have
been excluded from the public. The action of The Committee to Save Franklin Shelter marks a common struggle for the homeless: to enter the public sphere, not as inhabitants but as ‘people’, or what T.H. Marshall calls “social citizens.”

Discourses of citizenship are articulated in the physical space of Washington’s monumental core. The National Mall was designed with a didactic dimension to train individuals to be citizens. The space is instructive in both what is present, but also what is absent. Thus, the ideal of citizenship is constituted as much by the patriotism one might experience by reading Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address engraved in marble on the inner wall of the Lincoln memorial as it is in the conspicuous absence of homeless people in the Mall itself.

This thesis takes up the question of homelessness and citizenship in the monumental core of Washington, D.C. I use Michel Foucault’s model of Archaeology in order to suggest an alternative history of Washington marked by exclusion rather than inclusion. I dig into the discursive ground upon which the city is built and examine the ways in which homelessness is constituted in the different strata of textual earth. I engage in three case studies: The 1932 Bonus March; the 1984 Supreme Court Case Clark v. The Community for Creative Non-Violence; and the 2007 Fannie Mae Foundation Help the Homeless Walkathon. In each case study, I explore the relationship between the discourse of homelessness and that of citizenship within the
monumental core. My method is to disengage these events from the linear or causal history in order to redraw the lines of history and suggest alternative groupings.

Chapter 1 is a literature review. I ground the three case studies that compose the body of the thesis in a specific context and outline the methodology I employ. Section I provides a general history of the National Mall and a theory of didactic spaces. Section II moves from the physical space to the subject and examines theories of citizenship, with an emphasis on Marshall’s theory of social citizenship. I then provide an overview of literature on homelessness. Section III reviews two methodological frameworks that guide my analysis: 1) Michel Foucault’s historical method of Archaeological; and 2) semiotic textual analysis.

Chapter 2 examines the Bonus March of 1932, specifically looking at the difference and rupture implicit in the discourse at the moment of its utterance. I focus on three specific acts within the discourse: appellation, treatment and reception. I argue that the discursive struggles over framing and naming the event marks a ‘will to power’ and a ‘will to truth’ which is expressed by both the marchers and the Government. Section I provides an introduction and a historical overview of the Bonus March. Section II examines the different names the marchers were called and the acts of naming by various groups. Section III examines the public reaction to the event
which was largely divided between those who viewed the expulsion as a success and those who saw it as a tragic failure.

Chapter 3 examines the Supreme Court Case Clark v. CCNV and the way in which the homeless have been excluded through judicial means. I take up Michel Foucault’s and Giorgio Agamben’s model of Biopolitics and Biopower in order to discuss the way in which the homeless body is legislated. Section I is an introduction and provides a historical overview of the court case and the decision. Section II examines the underlying discourse of preservation in the Court’s majority opinion, and in particular, the relationship between preservation and exclusion. Section III dissects the biopolitical act of policing and legislating sleep.

Chapter 4 turns to the recent example of the Fannie Mae Help the Homeless walkathon and engages a semiotic analysis of a 30 second promotional advertisement designed to recruit walkers for the event. Section I is an introduction that provides a brief ethnographical account of the Walkathon. Section II examines the denotative and connotative messages in the advertisement. Section III looks at the various ways in which the homeless are in fact excluded from the text of the advertisement. Section IV examines the interpellative features of the text and argues that the discourse of homelessness functions as an interpellative device that hails citizens.
In Chapter 5, my final conclusions, I look back over my case studies, specifically examining three reoccurring themes: terminology, treatment, and public space. In Section I, I ask: how are these themes articulated within and across the three case studies? More specifically, what are the differences and similarities? And, what might this history of homelessness in the monumental core reveal about the discourse of citizenship and that of homelessness? In Section II, I turn back to contemporary social policy, particularly former D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams’ proposal *Homeless No More*. I briefly examine the discourse of ending homelessness. Finally, Section III purposes the possibility for future theoretical and policy analysis.
Chapter 1. Homelessness and Citizenship: Context, Literature and Methodology

‘Could we,’ I said, ‘somehow contrive one of those lies that come into being in case of need, of which we were just speaking, some one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city?’

- Plato, The Republic

I. Didactic Spaces: A Historical Overview of the National Mall

Washington, D.C. was first conceived as a dream, a fantasy, a vision: It was a speculative project, both financially and politically (Luria 2006). It was not designed to accommodate the current needs of the newly anointed United States, but rather, to rival the capital cities of the great European nations; to provide a model of greatness into which, the founding fathers hoped, the country would grow (Scott 1991, 39). It was designed with a didactic dimension: the physical space itself, the monuments, the parks, the museums, were intended to impart upon the populous the ideals of citizenship. In this way, the city itself was conceived first as a noble lie: It was not premised on what existed, but on what the founding fathers hoped to bring into existence.
While the scope of Washington, and particularly the monumental core has changed significantly over time, and continues to change, the landscape remains dominated by two visions: Pierre L’Enfant’s original design commissioned by George Washington in 1791; and The McMillan plan enacted by the Senate’s park commission in 1902 (Reps 1967).

**L’Enfant’s Legacy**

L’Enfant’s original design for the city of Washington aimed to unite the philosophical ideals of freedom and liberty, republicanism and federalism, in the physical form of the city. As Sara Luria writes “[L’Enfant’s], artful merging of grid plan and radiating avenues suggests the structural compatibility of republican and federalist design” (Luria 2006, 29). James Sterling Young goes even further arguing that L’Enfant’s design was “renderings, in a different language, of the constitutional prescriptions for the structure and function of the national government” (Young 1966, 8). In Washington, it was hoped that the architecture, the roads, and the public spaces, would work together as a physical manifestation of the new government. The planners envisioned that the simple act of walking in the city would provide a visceral experience of the abstract concepts that formed the basis of the Constitution and that of the new Nation (Evenson 1991).
The “Publick walk,” as L’Enfant called it, was one of the defining features of his design. “The center of L’Enfant’s federal city was an immense, T-shaped public park…drawing together the public life of the city” (Scott 1991, 40). The plan included a network of public spaces in which citizens could engage in social and democratic activities, thus satisfying the democratic ideals expressed in the constitution. Michael Bednar writes, “The Mall in particular is considered American’s premier public place, its main square or park, its front lawn. There citizens are free to exercise their constitutional rights, to freely congregate, to peaceably protest, to celebrate their citizenship” (Bednar 2006, 2). Thomas Jefferson imagined that citizens would “tread and retread the capital city’s paths of regular government and so, like the plow, dig their way into the groove of the nation’s politics” (Luria 2006, 28). The lofty vision of the planners, however, does not necessarily translate into practice. Michel de Certeau suggests that there is a disconnection between city planner’s vision of the city and that of the inhabitants or, the “walkers.” He writes “The panorama city is a ‘theoretical’ (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices” (Certeau 1999, 128).

The hope of L’Enfant, alongside politicians and other city planners, was to produce a space in which citizens could see past their parochial identifications as members of townships or states and see themselves as citizens under one nation (Luria
C.M. Harris argues that George Washington “put his hopes in the physical world of architecture, monuments and institutions, believing they offered the best means to regulate the popular will and induce a national character” (Harris 1999). Benedict Anderson argues that a nation is always already an “imagined community.” He writes, “it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). Cities, particularly, function as nodal points where each individual can more easily imagine their communion with the nation as a whole. Washington is unique in that it is not subordinated to anyone State; rather, it belongs to the Nation as a whole. Thus the city of Washington is a fantastic space that produces within it a strong national identity.

**City Beautiful**

L’Enfant’s vision was never fully enacted, but its spirit has lingered and it was later revived in the City Beautiful movement: a city planning movement that flourished around the nation, including Washington, in the late 19th and early 20th century (Streatfield 1991, 117). During this period, American cities were in the midst of enormous transition: there was a rapid increase in development, industry, and immigration. George Templeton Strong described the city streets as “absolutely
swarming, alive and crawling with unwashed Democracy” (Levine 1988, 32). City planners, such as Fredric Law Olmstead Sr., believed that they could “instruct” immigrants and lower class individuals to be proper citizens by filling the city with moral or didactic spaces (Weyeneth 1984); (Jackson 1972, 213). Irving Fisher writes, “[Olmstead] envisioned art as a means to reform society, and he created scenes of idealized natural beauty to educate and refine the tastes and habits of those who visited his parks” (Fisher 1986, 93). Olmstead’s work helped to usher in, what would eventual become, an enormous shift in the urban planning movement: a shift from unplanned city development to comprehensive city planning (Streatfield 1991, 127); (Fisher 1986).

It was George Kriehn, however, who captured the spirit of the era in a seminal essay titled “City Beautiful.” He wrote “Why should not the American people be taught patriotism, to a far greater extent than at present?... Nothing would be a more effective agent in making good citizens of our foreign population than such monuments… Many of them cannot read English books, but they can read monuments which appeal to the eyes” (Kriehn December 1899, 600). In 1902, the Senate Park Commissions, heavily influenced by the City Beautiful movement, put forth a plan for central D.C. that “sought to inspire good citizenship through the creation of monumental buildings” (Gillette 1995, 118). The Senate asked four landscape
architects to prepare a plan for the city, most notably, Daniel Burnham and Fredric Law Olmstead, Jr. In the following 35 years, Olmstead Jr. remained the unofficial guardian of the monumental core serving on numerous commissions (Streatfield 1991). In this period, the National Mall began to take shape according to the McMillan plan, and began to resemble the iconic space that many are familiar with today (Streatfield 1991, 130). Jon Peterson argues that the McMillan plan was the most “comprehensive” plan ever put forth for a city and suggests that it was this plan, more than any other factor, inspired the National City planning movement that followed (Peterson 1991). Howard Gillette, Jr. argues that the development of Washington D.C. has always been caught between beautification and social welfare. Pointing to the McMillan commission as one example, he argues politicians have historically focused on beautification projects while neglecting social welfare issues (Gillette 2006).

The McMillan commission insisted that their plans for the city were not new, but merely, a “restoration and continuation of the original plan of the city” (Commision 1918, 48). Nevertheless, the McMillan plan diverged from L’Enfant plan in a few significant ways (Reps 1967); (Evenson 1991). For example, L’Enfant originally envisioned a giant avenue running straight out from the Capitol and proceeding into the city. The commission instead voted to create a grassy park between the museums (Reps 1967). The commission’s decision changed the
monumental core from being an open space, as in Paris, where the Champs de Elysées is integrated in the fabric of the city; to a closed space separate from the city (Evenson 1991). In doing so, it is as if they created two distinct cities. As Evenson argues, “The Mall functions in some ways like a monumental theme park, enabling the visitor to “do” Washington without extensive exposure to the rest of the city” (Evenson 1991, 33).

Finally, there is a body of scholarship that focuses on the close relationship between urban space and social or cultural phenomena (Davis 1990); (Berlant 1997); (Luria 2006). Sara Luria writes, “By lifting texts out of their physical context we miss the important ways in which texts are site specific – how they engage the political, cultural, and economic landscapes from which they emerge” (2006, xxix). Lauren Berlant takes up this task in her book The Queen of America goes to Washington City. Berlant examines the changing ideas of citizenship specifically in relationship to feminism, reproduction, and sex with in the physical context of D.C. She argues that politics has increasingly focused on governing personal and private issues and that citizenship itself has been privatized (Berlant 1997). Following this tradition, the following thesis examines the relationship between homelessness and citizenship within the specific context of the monumental core.
I. Homelessness and Citizenship

Social Citizenship

In America, you can become a citizen through birth, parents’ citizenship, or naturalization. While the requirements to obtain such identity appear to be cut and dry, the label ‘citizen’, as well as the rights that accompany it, have been heavily contested throughout the history of America (R. M. Smith 1997). Throughout this history, the discourse of citizenship has been dominated by issues of inclusion and exclusion. In Civic Ideals, Rogers Smith examines the politics of citizenship laws that have resulted in “intellectually puzzling, legally confused, and politically charged and contested status” (R. M. Smith 1997, 14).

Citizenship, however, is more than simply a legal or political right; rather, it encompasses a whole series of social rights that are granted or withheld depending on a variety of circumstances and factors. T.H. Marshall divides citizenship into three categories: civil, political, and social. Civil citizenship, he describes, is the right to individual freedom, to certain ‘inalienable rights;’ political citizenship, the right to participate in politics, whether by voting or running for public office; and finally social citizenship, “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security…the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the
standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1964, 8). It is precisely this third category of citizenship, which seems to be withheld from homeless individuals. Accordingly, in America social citizenship has been relegated to the private sector (Kessler-Harris 2001). “When the federal government linked wage work to tangible, publically provided rewards, employment emerged as a boundary line demarcating different kinds of citizenship” (Kessler-Harris 2001, 5). Michael Katz argues, “It is true that men and women do not lose formal citizenship because they lack work or do not pay taxes, but a definition of citizenship that rests on obligation and contribution marginalizes those who do not work at regular jobs and creates second class citizens” (2001, 344). Similarly, Judith Shklar describes two qualities of citizenship: the right to vote and the opportunity to earn. (1991) Robert Dahl suggests that inequality of resources among citizens results in inequality of power to influence government (1961). Thus, citizenship is not only an issue of agency, but it is also an issue of social standing (Shklar 1991).

Conversely, the discourse of “good citizenship” is premised on duty and responsibility: “The duties of citizenship are carried out in context of associational life, not just through participation in politics” (Eberly 1995, xi). Similarly, Ricci writes “Americans understand not only that government officials should work properly but also that citizens must help assure the quality of public life” (2004, 3). Or as Michael
Joyce writes, good citizenship is marked by “active participation in that vast realm of human affairs known as civil society” (1995, 4). Citizenship extends beyond the act of voting to all aspects of social life: from working to volunteering; from school to church; from the family to the neighborhood; etc. These associational activities, however, are premised on exclusion. Institutions such as the service based voluntary organizations; churches, etc. are based on the server/served binary. Other associational relationships, such as family, school, neighborhood, are premised to some extent on domestic life and ultimately the home. In both situations, homeless become excluded from the category, ‘good citizen.’

A handful of scholars have specifically addressed the issue of homelessness and citizenship. Todd Depastino’s book, Citizen Hobo, traces the cultural history of homelessness focusing on how homeless have been excluded from social citizenship (2003). Leonard Feldman examines legal and policy discourse in which homelessness is constructed, specifically focusing on the anti-homeless sentiments that are expressed. Feldman examines laws that ban sleeping in public places or pan handling. He describes such laws as “a sovereign ban on bare life.” He argues that by withholding the right for homeless people to live in encampments, it in turn consigns them to criminal status and withholds the rights of citizenship (Feldman 2004).
Homelessness in the Mall

Homelessness has existed side by side within the Monumental Core throughout the history of Washington: In alley dwellings on Capitol Hill; the infamous Bonus March in 1932; the 2500 people who currently seek shelter nightly at 2nd and D; or in the annual Help the Homeless Walkathon. Despite the seeming omnipresence of homelessness in Washington, D.C., it is not included in the discourses that circulate in the monumental core. Rather, it exists in the silence behind the discourses: it exists in the spaces between the discourses.

Homelessness is not a static concept; rather, its meaning is historically contingent. The terms used to signify this category have changed over time as well as the signification: homeless have been called ‘tramps,’ ‘vagrants,’ ‘bums,’ ‘paupers,’ ‘hobos,’ and more recently ‘homeless,’ a term that signifies both “those who regularly lack shelter,”\(^1\) and a state of abject poverty (Morse 1992).

As the concept of homelessness has changed, the practices employed to “treat” such people have changed as well (Wagner 2005). Michael B. Katz provides a history of 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century institutions in which the poor dwelled such as prisons, prisons,

\(^1\) The Stewart B. Mckinney Homeless Assistance Act, Codified in Usca 42.
mental hospitals, and poorhouse. He examines ‘poor laws’ that often criminalized or excluded certain people classified as ‘unworthy poor’ such as ‘tramps’ (Katz 1983). Similarly, David Wagner engages in an in depth study of the poorhouse and the communities that were forged in the institution. Wagner argues, despite the negative connotation that the poorhouse retains today, inhabitants felt connected to a community and enjoyed their time spent there (Wagner 2005). Kim Hopper argues that, with the distinction between worthy and unworthy poor, social services operate between the function of sanctuary and discipline (Hopper 1987, 163).

Mary Anderson Cooper shifts focus from institutions that “treat” homelessness to the individuals, groups and organizations that run the institutions. The four primary groups that she discusses are faith based organizations, non-profit organizations, volunteer groups and the government. She compares and contrasts how different groups have approached the issue in varying ways across time (Cooper 1987). Other researchers have examined more closely singular groups. For example, June Q. Koch focuses specifically the role of the federal government in providing poverty relief. She examines Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and their role in providing shelter and food for those in need (1987). Cynthia J. Bogard argues that homelessness is not a condition; rather, it is a social construction. Bogard specifically focuses on four agents who are active in the
construction of this social category: the media, activists, the government, and experts (2003). According to Bogard, the institutions as well as those that operate the institutions are complicit in the construction of homeless identity and the condition of homelessness.

Contemporary social policy and comprehensive service models are premised on the idea that homelessness is not a singular problem; rather, it is a complex network of material and individual problems embodied in a single term (Morse 1992); (Robertson and Greenblatt 1992). In his book *Tell Them Who I Am*, Elliot Liebow chronicles the lives of several homeless women in Washington D.C. in order to describe many of the issues and challenges that homeless people face. He argues that the solution to homelessness resides in providing housing for homeless people as well as other services to help individuals reintegrate into society (Liebow 1993). Similarly, Christopher Jencks argues that the homeless crisis in the 1980’s grew out of a conglomeration of social and economic conditions, including: deinstitutionalization of mental institutions, joblessness, lack of shelter, etc. (1994).

Conversely, a series of scholars have argued that homelessness is a result of structural or institutional factors, not individual factors. Charles Hoch and Robert Slayton examine the narratives of “new homeless” during the 1980’s. They argue that the proliferation of human interest stories and a new focus on the individual mask the
causes of homelessness. They write, “The problem with these stories is that they focus public attention on individual vulnerabilities rather than the institutional roots of homelessness” (Hoch and Slayton 1989, 7). Hoch and Slayton draw a historical comparison between skid row bums and “new homeless” arguing that the condition has not changed; rather, urban development policies have destroyed skid row communities and have prevented the development of low-income housing (Hoch and Slayton 1989). Similarly, Kay McChesney argues that homelessness results from factors that are beyond the control of homeless individuals; McChesney places the responsibility on “aggregate market characteristics” that effect employment and housing supply (McChesny 1992). David Hilfiker argues that poverty persists as a result of historical structures not individual behavior. Hilfiker focuses on African Americans living in poverty, specifically in D.C., and suggests that the culture of poverty is a lingering effect of centuries of enslavement and American apartheid via Jim Crow laws (Hilfker 2002).

During the 1980’s, there was an increase in attention to the homelessness and consequently, a proliferation in studies conducted on homelessness and social policy. Joanne Neale argues, however, that current theories of homelessness do not adequately describe the condition of homelessness. She suggests that if we wish to create good policy, we must first have good theory. She takes up feminist arguments as well as
postmodern and post-structural arguments in order to rethink concepts of housing policy, housing design, and homelessness (Neale 1997). Similarly, April Veness argues that it is not enough to examine the individual or material conditions that are often placed at the root of homelessness, but one must examine the concept of home itself (Veness 1992, 464). Following Foucault theory of power, Neale argues that focus should shift from macro-power struggles formed in binary relations such as of server and served or home owner and homeless and focus instead on micro-power struggles (Neale 1997).

In his book, *Homo Sacer* Giorgio Agamben examines models of power as they exist between juridico-institutional and the biopolitical. His aim is to illuminate or add to Foucault’s theory of power: the idea that power is not limited to overarching hierarchical structures and reduced to simple binaries of powerful/powerless; rather, as Foucault argues, power exists in every relationship and within every subject (Agamben 1998). Other theorists have attempted to place the concept of home within another dialectic, arguing in part that homelessness is constructed through identifiable difference. As Samira Kawash writes, “this ‘war on homeless’ must also be seen as a mechanism for constituting and securing a public, establishing the boundaries of inclusion, and producing an abject body against which the proper, public body of the citizen can stand” (Kawash 1998, 325). Similarly, Don Mitchell argues that “the
“public” is a category constituted by private citizens, one which homeless people disrupt. As a result, the presence of homelessness alters the way in which public spaces are created, maintained and utilized (Mitchell 1995).

Following in the trajectory of these arguments, I ask: What is the relationship between citizenship and homelessness? And, more specifically, how is this relationship articulated in Washington, D.C.’s monumental core? In the following thesis, I argue that homeless individuals would more accurately be described as partial citizens, as opposed to 2nd class or noncitizens, as Katz or Shakler suggest. It is not that they are necessarily subordinated to homeowning citizens, but that they are incomplete citizens. Thus, I use the term adomizen to describe individuals who may legally or politically be citizens, but not socially. The word ‘citizen’ comes from the Anglo-Norman citesein. The prefix Cite comes from Old French meaning city and the alternative ending zein, as the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) suggest, is probably after deinzein – or as it is now spelled denizen. This etymology reveals a relationship between dwelling or inhabiting (denizen) and the duties and rights that accompany citizenship. Denizen is defined in the OED as “an inhabitant, an occupant, a citizen (of a place).” Playing off the meaning of denizen, particularly the later meaning (the connection between citizenship and place) I changed the word to domizen. Dom comes from the Latin domus – meaning home - as found domicile, domestic, or in the German dom or dome
meaning a cathedral. The ending -izen signifies a connection between citizenship and place – in this case, specifically the home. Finally, I take the prefix a- from the Greek meaning without or lacking. I invent this neologism in order to suggest an inextricable link between citizenship and homeownership that is suggested in the discourse of the mall yet has remained unarticulated. The term suggests that when one lacks a home, one also lacks citizenship. I argue that, while the discourse of homelessness and that of citizenship appear to be mutually exclusive, they are, in fact, co-constituted. In situating the two in a dialectical relationship, I open up a series of questions: How might an individual form their own identity as a social citizen through their identifiable difference from that of a homeless person? Is there a structural necessity for homelessness? What might this relationship tell us about the larger social order? What does it mean to be adomizen? How is this figure constructed in D.C.’s monumental core?

II. Methodology

Archaeology

Michel Foucault’s historical projects mark a distinct break from traditional history (Major-Poetzl 1983). Foucault’s archaeology stresses discontinuity and rough
incongruous events rather than linearity or historical unity. In doing so, he disrupts the dominant notions of History (with a capital “H”) or the concept of doxa or common sense. Foucault rejects concepts such as “influence, crisis, sudden realization,” which he says, “seem rather magical to me” (Foucault 1998, 282). Foucault instead focused on description. As Pamela Major-Poetzl writes, “Archeaology…describes artifacts as they appear and as they are found in relation to other artifacts in the same archaeological layer. It does not attempt to erase uniqueness of the artifact nor to blur the borders separating different archaeological layers. It seeks, rather, to make differences visible” (Major-Poetzl 1983, 12). Consequently, Foucault abandons questions of “what” and “why” which, he suggests, imply a deeper meaning, and instead, focuses on questions of “how” (Andersen 2003). Foucault writes, “I made an effort to describe statements, entire groups of statements, while bringing out the relations of implications, opposition, exclusion that might connect them” (Foucault 1998, 283). Anderson writes, “Foucault wants to show how any discourse involves excluding procedures, which not only exclude themes, arguments and speech positions from discourse, but also produce outsiders, denounce groups of people as sick, abnormal or irrational…” (Andersen 2003, 3). Furthermore, Foucault’s historical projects specifically address the question of how subjects are constituted within a series of discursive practices and more particularly “discursive assumptions”
(Andersen 2003, 3). Thus, he poses a shift in historical practices from a focus on moments or events to a focus of enunciation, or how these events are articulated in a specific moment of discourse (Major-Poetzl 1983).

Foucault’s stress on noncausal, nonlinear history, as well as his claim that the subject is a “vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals…” (Foucault 1972, 93), have been intensely controversial. They have led to two major critiques: 1) that Foucault’s work is antihistorical (Major-Poetzl 1983); and 2) that he is an antihumanist (Stoianovich 1976). Nevertheless, Foucaults approach to history provides a unique method to explore dynamics of exclusion and rupture in historical narratives. Foucault writes, “the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and validity” (Foucault 1972). Foucault’s model of history seeks to problematize history rather than refine it.

In The Archeaology of Knowledge, Foucault explicitly states that his aim is not to produce a discipline of archaeology (Foucault 1972, 15). Foucault set out to establish a methodological prescription for “doing history;” rather, he turns back to his earlier work to describe his unique and often controversial process of archeaology (Andersen 2003). Foucault himself suggests that the theory is incomplete (Foucault 1972). Nevertheless, he outlines the beginning of a three part methodology, which

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functions as a starting point: 1) Surface of emergence: how are differences accorded status within a discourse? Where do these differences emerge? 2) Authorities of delimitation: Who has the authority to classify, divide, etc. What rules do they operate by? 3) Grid of specification: The system, in which concepts are grouped, regrouped, divided, classified, etc. (Foucault 1972, 41-42). Andersen, has gone further, attempting to develop a more systematic approach to Foucaultian discourse analysis and particularly archaeology. Andersen locates three essential building blocks to Foucault’s archaeology: Statement: the “smallest unit” of a discourse; Discourse: the “demarcated body of the formulated statements”; and Discursive Formation: “a system (and regularity) of dispersion of statements” (Andersen 2003, 8). Keeping in mind the scope of this thesis, it would not be possible for me to follow in detail Foucault’s rigorous historical analysis; however, his methodology provides a unique starting point from which to approach the topic of homelessness and citizenship in the monumental core. Rather than claiming to an ostensibly complete archive, I examine specific artifacts or instances of discourse. For example, in Chapter 2, I examine the relationship between appellation and power, or in Chapter 4, I examine one promotional ad for the Help the Homeless Walkathon. Finally, I employ Foucault’s methodology in order to ask how are homeless people constructed within the discourse of monumental core and, specifically, the discourse of citizenship? How might they be excluded? I will
also engage both discourse analysis and semiotic textual analysis in order to examine individual artifacts or instances of discourse.

**Semiotics**

Semiotics is the study of signs (Chandler 2002). It “comprises all forms of formation and exchange of meaning on the basis of phenomena which have been coded as signs” (Johansen and Larsen 2002, 3). Consequently, semiotics has changed the way in which we think about language and mediation: particularly, the way in which meaning is communicated and received. Semioticians take as their starting place Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept of the linguistic sign. According to Saussure, the sign is composed of two parts: 1) a signifier which represents a sound image; and 2) a signified which represents a concept (Saussure 1986). Saussure argues that the relationship between the two is arbitrary, but still, the two taken together point to the same referent. For example there is no relationship between the sound image tree and the concept of a tree, the sound image could easily be exchanged for arbor, or a different arrangement of letters, regardless, the sign points to a referent, in this case, a tree (Saussure 1986). Saussure goes on to argue, “Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (Saussure 1986, 650). Thus language is
constituted in an infinite chain of signification in which meaning is produced through
difference. This quality of language is visible in the way in which language is
organized in a dictionary: the meaning a word is described by different words and so
on, ad infinitum. Jacques Derrida plays off of the concept of difference arguing that
meaning both differs and defers: it is constituted through difference (hot is hot because
it is not cold) and meaning is never complete (Derrida 1998). Roland Barthes takes up
a similar position in his essay “The Death of the Author.” Barthes writes, “We know
now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the
‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of
writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (Barthes 1977, 146). Julia Kristeva
calls this “multi-dimensional space” intertextuality. Based on Maikhail Bakhtin’s
theories of Dialogism and Heteroglossia, Kirsteva describes intertextuality as the
interrelationship of three dimensions of the text, the “writing subject, addressee and
exterior texts” (Kristeva 1986, 36). Kristeva argues that meaning arises through a
dialogue between the reader and the writer as well as between the text and “an anterior
or synchronic literary corpus” (Kristeva 1986, 37). The semiotic definition of the sign
is extended even further by Post-Structuralists, who have stretched Saussure’s notion
of the arbitrary nature of the sign, and argue that not only is the relationship between
the signifier and signified arbitrary, but the relationship between the sign and the
referent is as well, resulting in what is commonly called “the free play of signifiers.” In semiotics, the notion of the linguistic sign has been applied to extralinguistic structures. Thus, semiotic analysis is not only a fruitful way to examine linguistic texts but also as a way to examine photographs, film, architecture, etc. as texts (Deely 1990).

Consequently, semiotics triggers a new way of reading which privileges the reader over the author. It eliminates the notion of a singular and authoritative meaning and encourages multiple and variant readings. Semiotics introduces a whole series of techniques in which to analyze a text, such as: intertextuality, connotative/denotative, mode of address, syntagmatic/paradigmatic, etc. Taken together, these modes of analysis open up new ways for the reader to contribute to the production of meaning, by asking, who is the preferred reader/audience? What is the text’s relationship to other texts? What are the inferred or applied meanings? What is the relationship between the parts that compose the text to the whole (what is included, what is excluded)?

There are a handful of critiques facing semiotics. Chandler writes “Some semioticians seem to choose examples which illustrate the points they wish to make rather than applying semiotic analysis to an extensive random sample” (Chandler 2002); (Leiss, Kline and Sut 1990, 214). Social Scientists often contend that semiotics is subjective; preferring instead, quantitative modes of textual analysis such content analysis. The two forms of analysis, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive;
rather the two have the ability to complement each other (Chandler 2002). While the former suggests overarching trends that can be quantified, the latter suggests the way in which a text communicates. Other critics argue that, in reducing everything to a system of sign, semiotics is a form of linguistic determinism (Johnson 1996). Nevertheless semiotics provides an indispensable toolkit with which to engage qualitative textual analysis. It helps to render visible the multiplicity of meanings made possible by a text and the different ways a text communicates meaning (Eco 1979).

The semiotic definition of the sign complicates language in that it posits language as one sign system among many which communicate meaning. The following thesis engages semiotic analysis in order to examine specific visual and textual documents, focusing, specifically, on modes of exclusion within the text.
Chapter 2. The Bonus March: a Will to Power; a Will to Citizenship

*War service should be performed as the highest duty of citizenship and is a sacrifice that can never be measured in terms of money*
- Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, July 2, 1921

I. Introduction

In a funeral oration in honor of the soldiers who had died during the war of Athens, Pericles says, “When the power of the city seems great to you, consider then that it was purchased by valiant men who knew their duty and kept their honor in battle…” (Thucydides 1993, 44). Pericles suggests that citizens are willing to die for their city because it is great: The city is great because citizens are willing to die for it. In this way, he links the concept of citizenship together with the concept of the city. Similarly, in the city of Washington, these two concepts are bound together in cement, stone and masonry: In both L’Enfant’s plan of 1791 and the McMillan commission’s plan of 1902 for the city of Washington, the two concepts are inextricably linked and seek their expression in the landscape and the architecture of the National Mall. While military service is often considered “the highest duty of citizenship” soldiers and veterans are not always afforded the social rights that, Marshall suggests, make up
social citizenship. Following this train of thought, I ask: What constitutes a citizen? Who is included in this category? Who is excluded? And, to what ends?

**The Story of the Bonus March**

In the spring of 1932, Walter W. Waters led a small group of unemployed veterans, later referred to as the “Bonus Army,” as they traveled cross-country, hopping freight trains from Portland, Oregon to Washington, D.C. Their aim was to demand the immediate payment of their Adjusted Service Certificate: a “bonus” for their service in World War I which the American Legion had petitioned Congress for and won in 1926 (Lisio 1994). The bonus, as stipulated in the bill, was to be placed in an endowment and paid in full in 1945. But after the collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the ensuing depression, the veterans saw the bonus as their only hope for poverty relief. As the Bonus Army approached Washington, the press began to carry the story; as the word spread of the march, veterans from around the country began to follow step. In the following weeks they descended upon the Nation’s Capital en masse, numbering approximately twenty-five thousand in all (Hennessy 1957); (Daniels, The Bonus March 1971); (Lisio 1994).

Pelham Glassford, the Chief of Police, as well as other city officials, tried to dissuade the veterans from coming to Washington. Glassford contacted the American
Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in order to request the veterans turn back, but had little success. Glassford, however, was generally accommodating when the veterans finally arrived in the city. He wished to avoid trouble and worked hard in order to provide a place for the veterans to camp and other resources such as food (Bartlett 1937); (Dickson and Allen 2004). Glassford worked closely with the veterans, particularly Waters, throughout the summer in order to maintain order and civility.

Shortly after arriving, the veterans set up camp on the Anacostia flats and began to build a micro-city. The camp quickly came to resemble one of the many shanty towns or “Hoovervilles” that were springing up all across the nation (Dickson and Allen 2004). They rummaged for supplies from a nearby junk pile and fashioned makeshift shelters: “One lucky junk-picker found a chicken coop that he carried off for his new home. A man from Ohio lived in an oil drum, another in a barrel filled with grass, another in a burial vault set on trestles, another in a piano box…” (Dickson and Allen 2004, 108). For the next two months the Bonus Army lived a meager existence, often on the brink of starvation and pandemic, as they petitioned Congress for relief. During this time, a few “bonus” bills were brought to vote before Congress, but were ultimately defeated in the Senate. Instead, Congress passed a bill which offered provisions for the veterans to “return home.” Few of the veterans took up the offer,
vowing instead, to stay in Washington, D.C. until 1945 when their bonuses were to be paid in full (Dickson and Allen 2004).

As the summer progressed, city and government officials became increasingly irritated by the presence of the veterans. Glassford complained that they were, “seriously affecting local relief,” and that, “No political advantage [could] be gained by remaining in [the] city” (Dickson and Allen 2004, 144). President Hoover too became increasingly concerned with removing the veterans from the District. Hoover was convinced that the Bonus Army had been infiltrated by the communists and that their aim was nothing short of revolution (Hoover 1952); (Lisio 1994). When the Congress failed to encourage the veterans to return home, Hoover turned to the use of force. On the morning of July 28, 1932, the police were dispatched to evict a group of veterans who had been living in partially demolished and abandoned buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue. When the police arrived, they encountered thousands of marchers who resisted the eviction and began throwing bricks. The police requested additional support, and Hoover, as he had previously threatened, responded by deploying American soldiers. That afternoon, General Douglas MacArthur, Hoover’s chief of staff, led a brigade of soldiers, armed with rifles and bayonets, accompanied with tanks and cavalry, down Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenue to evict the veterans. The army drove the veterans out of the city at saber point, but did not fire a
shot (Dickson and Allen 2004). That night, the soldiers traveled down to the Anacostia flats, where, in the shadow of the capitol dome, they evicted an additional twenty thousand men, first bombarding the camp with tear gas and then torching the makeshift shelters.

The bonus march has been the subject of a handful of comprehensive historical studies which have placed it within a variety of grand narratives: the Great Depression (Hennessy 1957) (Daniels, The Bonus March 1971); veteran rights (Dickson and Allen 2004); the Hoover presidency (Lisio 1994); hobo culture (Depastino 2003). The following analysis seeks to dislocate the bonus march from these historical narratives and, instead, examine the event as a function of discourse: focusing on discontinuity, rupture and exclusion implicit within the language of the event itself in order to problematize the concept of citizenship as well as the relationship between homelessness and citizenship within the monumental core. As Foucault writes, “We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed…Discourse must not be referred to distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs” (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 1972, 25). Accordingly, I specifically examine the official and unofficial discourse in which the bonus army was constructed between May and
August of 1932. I ask: How was the bonus army named? How were they treated? How was this treatment received? Finally, I examine the ways in which these acts of naming and acts of “treatment” differ and conflict with one another.

II. The Namable: Appellation, Power, and Contested Identity

The identity of the bonus army was highly contested from the moment the march began to when the veterans were finally evicted from the city. Throughout their stay in Washington, the names the veterans were called differed drastically among different constituencies – they were called ‘ex-service men,’ ‘tramps,’ ‘bums,’ ‘communists,’ ‘a mob,’ ‘rioters,’ ‘fascists,’ etc. The debate and conflict that ensued was first and foremost a debate over framing, a conflict over naming. Hoover writes, “Probably the greatest coup of all was the distortion of the story of the Bonus March…” (Hoover 1952, 225). The emphasis here is not on the event itself, but the “story” of the event. Hence, the language in which the story is framed, and more particularly, the act of naming or the power to name, both precedes and takes precedence over the action. Foucault suggests that “the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its power and its dangers…” (Foucault 1986, 149).
In the moment in which discourse is formed, however, the struggle over acts of naming suggests ‘a will to power’ and a ‘will to truth.’ In the case of the Bonus Army competing constituencies attempt to define the terms of the discourse by naming the Bonus Army in order to assert their power and to lay claim to ‘truth.’

“The Khaki Shirts”

Shortly before leaving Oregon, Walter Waters asked the marchers “to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to swear unswerving allegiance to its flag” (Waters 1933, 16). He also asked that they refrain from acting like a mob or engaging in unlawful activities (Waters 1933). To ensure order, Waters organized the veterans organized in the fashion of a military unit: they dressed in military fatigues; followed a hierarchical structure of command; and even preformed military drills (Hennessy 1957). Soon, the group began to call themselves the Bonus Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.), a play on American Expeditionary Force, the name for troops who were sent to France in World War I (Dickson and Allen 2004).

The name and corresponding actions suggest a ‘will to power.’ The veterans were concerned with both their appearance and their identity: they saw themselves as soldiers and as citizens, not hobos and tramps, nor as revolutionaries. While the veterans were poor, many without jobs or homes, they saw the power to influence the
government in their identity as soldiers. The name suggests that their claim to the bonus was not based on need or charity but rather on a right that they had earned as soldiers. Fredric Nietzsche writes on this topic: “Where I found living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of those who serve I found the will to be master” (Nietzsche 1954, 114). The veterans tie themselves to their identity as soldiers in order to assert their power and demand early disbursement of their bonus. Although the veterans are relatively powerless, their name suggests ‘a will to power.’

The military model of command began as a means to maintain order, but it quickly developed into an overarching political system at the Anacostia camp. On June of 1932, Waters was reelected leader of the B.E.F. for the third time. Waters said, “I accept the leadership only if I will be leader in every sense of the word” (Waters is Acclaimed as Leader of B.E.F. 1932). He then stated that he required “unlimited power” if he were to take command (Bonus Army Drills Under New Discipline 1932). The New York Times reported that “the bonus army was under a virtual dictatorship…” Similarly, after the eviction, The Washington Post called Waters “the one time dictator” of the Bonus Army (Waters Says Bonus Men Will Carry On 1932). Waters’ style of leadership lent itself to such descriptions: Once taking command, Waters told the press, “I’m going to be hard-boiled with the B.E.F… If any man refuses to carry out my orders, he will be dragged out of Washington by the military police. To hell
with civil law and General Glassford” (Waters Acts to Drill Vets into Mobile Shock Troops 1932). As the summer passed and it appeared less and less likely that the march would succeed in persuading Congress for an early disbursement of the bonus, the B.E.F. grew more extreme in its operation and the name began to evolve from the language of the military to the language of fascism.

After the eviction, Waters did not resign himself to Oregon; rather, he set out to frame the B.E.F. as a legitimate national movement. He developed a plan to “elect candidates who will give the government back to the common people, remove special privilege from wealth and in the future prevent men like Andy Melon and Herbert Hoover…from getting the reins of Government in their hands” (Bonus Army Boos Hoover at Capitol 1932). Waters called this new group “the Khaki Shirts” drawing an analogy to the “black shirts” in Fascist Italy or the “brown shirts” in Nazi Germany (Dickson and Allen 2004). Waters wrote, “For five years Hitler was lampooned and derided, but today he controls Germany. Mussolini, before the war was a tramp printer driven from Italy because of his political views” (Khaki Shirts - W.W. Waters Imagines One Million - Waters Outlines Road Ahead for New Organization 1932). *The New York Times* reported that the bonus army was “trying to turn the veterans’ crusade into a sort of fascist movement,” which welcomed “American citizens, loyal to the ideals of the constitution” to join (Daniell 1932).
The veterans turned to the “Khaki Shirts” in an attempt to link themselves with the historical narratives of power implicit in the fascist movement. After having failed to assert their power as the B.E.F. and as soldiers, the veterans ‘will to power’ led them to the “Khaki Shirts” movement. Furthermore, the moment in which the Government is able to assert their will over the veterans and expel them from the Mall is the same moment in which the veterans turn to the most extreme image of power: fascism. As the veterans become increasingly powerless, they seek out more extreme ways in order to assert their ‘will to power.’ The name B.E.F. or Khaki Shirts suggests that the veterans sought to gain power, influence and legitimacy through appellation, other constituencies, such as the Government, demonstrates a ‘will to power’ and a ‘will to truth’ that sought to strip the veterans of legitimacy and their rights as social citizens. The veterans ‘will to power’ may well be related to the administrations ‘will to truth:’ as the government began to define the terms of discourse, and particularly the way in which the veterans were named, the veterans reacted by seeking out a more extreme image of power.

“The so-called bonus marchers”

The veterans had the benefit of naming themselves before their group became known to the public, but still, their name and identity were only begrudgingly accepted
by many in the government. In a press statement on July 28, 1932, Hoover describes
the group of veterans as “so-called bonus marchers” [emphasis mine] (Hoover 1934).
In a letter to President Hoover, L.H. Reichelderfer, the President of the Board of
Commissioners in Washington, D.C., warns of “unlawful acts of large numbers of so-
called ‘bonus marchers’” (Hoover 1952, 227). When preparing troops to confront the
veterans in the streets of Washington, General P.L. Miles framed the conflict by
saying, “Gentleman, the so-called Bonus Marchers are occupying certain Government
properties in Washington…” (War Department, Office of the Secretary 1932, 2).
Similarly, H.N. Cootes, Colonel, 3d Cavalry, commanding, wrote in an official report:
“On July 28, 1932, the large majority of a mob of some 7000 persons, comprising the
so-called “Bonus Expeditionary Force” inaugurated such an extensive riot in the city of
Washington…” (War Department, Office of the Secretary 1932).

In the way in which the Hoover Administrations names the bonus marchers, the
act of naming shifts from a ‘will to power’ to a ‘will to truth.’ The two, however, are
closely linked together: Nietzsche writes, “verily, my will to power walks also on the
heels of your will to truth” (Nietzsche 1954, 115). The administration asserts its power
over the bonus marchers by drawing into question the truth status of their identity. In
Government and military correspondences, the name often shifts from that of the
“Bonus Army,” which signifies soldiers, veterans, etc., to “the bonus march” a term
commonly used by the press and one that signifies the event of marching or protest. Furthermore, the modifying tag “so-called,” a common trope, especially in communication between government and military officials, draws into question the status of the veterans’ identity. It suggests that the veterans are not what they seem. In doing so, the administration begins to open up a space in which to reframe the marchers’ identity.

General MacArthur writes, “if there was one man in ten in that group today who is a veteran it would surprise me” (Hoover 1952, 229). In a statement to the press on July 28, 1932, Hoover insisted that many of the marchers were not veterans, but “communists and persons with criminal records” (Hoover 1934). MacArthur wrote, “I call them ‘insurrectionists’” (Hoover 1952, 229). Other members of the military called them “rioters” or a “Mob” (War Department, Office of the Secretary 1932).

There is a process of exclusion that is enacted in naming, in the administration’s will to truth, in that it renders the identity of the Bonus Army false. Foucault writes, “this will to truth, like other systems of exclusion, relies on institutional support: it is both reinforced and accompanied by a whole strata of practices …” (Foucault 1986, 151). The truth discourse of the press, official reports, etc. set into action a discourse that excludes the bonus army from their identity as veterans and ultimately their rights as social citizens. Furthermore, truth and power are
closely related: Foucault argues that knowledge is power and representational violence; thus, in redefining the terms of the debate, in defining the knowledge fields in which the bonus army operates, the administration shifts the discourse from poverty relief to civil disobedience. It makes possible the administration’s decision to deploy troops: In a statement to the press on July 28, 1932, Hoover says, “In order to put an end to this rioting and defiance of civil authority, I have asked the army…to restore order” (Hoover 1934). While Hoover’s response is a wholly inadequate policy solution to the problem of homelessness or unemployment, it is a common consequence to rioting and revolutionaries. Thus, the name the administration calls the veterans produces as well as justifies the corresponding action.

“Another kind of tramp”

The terms ‘tramp,’ ‘hobo,’ and ‘bum’ were generally absent from the official discourse on the bonus march, but they were frequently used in private and civilian discourse. While the veterans name sought to establish themselves as soldiers, the use of the term ‘tramp’ suggests that many civilians viewed the veterans instead, as charity cases. The term ‘tramp’ entered the popular lexicon in America during the post-civil war economic depression. Mass unemployment gave rise to hoards of poor men, referred to as tramps, who traveled back and forth across the country in search of wage
labor (Despastino 2003); (Katz 1983). At the time, anti-vagrancy laws and social conventions prevented tramps from settling in towns or seeking public support (Wagner 2005). By 1932, the term tramp commonly signified ‘unworthy poor.’ The use of the term to name the veterans suggests a mode of classification between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy poor.’

This act of naming became an argument over whether or not the veterans were worthy of public support. Since arriving in Washington, the veterans were wholly dependent on the charity of the American people to supply them with material goods. Glassford warned them early on from overstaying their welcome and suggested that the veterans refrain from begging because it would “tax the kindness of the people of the district” (Waters is Acclaimed as Leader of B.E.F. 1932). Regardless of such warnings, the bonus army regularly asked the public for food and material support “so that [their] sorely tried and true comrades may not suffer the pangs of hunger” (Waters is Acclaimed as Leader of B.E.F. 1932). While the veterans actively resisted the tramp label, their actions and status were often similar to those that are associated with tramps. For examples activities such as: hopping freight trains; begging for food; being unemployed; etc. lent themselves to the image of the tramp. Civilians reacted to this image in two ways: 1) they denounced the veterans as tramps; or 2) they sought support for the impoverished veterans.
Upon arriving at the Anacostia camp, one observer noted that it appeared as “an immense hobo jungle” (Depastino 2003, 197). The Kansas Star compared the bonus marchers to Mark Twain’s “Tramp Abroad” (Pro and Con 1932). Press Secretary Joslin wrote in his diary, “The marchers have rapidly turned from bonus seekers to communists or bums” (Joslin 1932). In a letter to the editor an unaffiliated veteran writes, “The bonus army, so-called, has become an army of bums and roustabouts and should be scattered to the four corners of the Nation at bayonet point” (A.E.H. 1932). The assistant secretary of war described the group in a speech as “a polyglot mob of tramps and hoodlums, plus a generous, sprinkling of Communist agitators…” (Davison B.E.F. Rap Hissed by Veterans 1932). Politicians like Senator J. Hamilton Lewis questioned whether the “soldiers served for patriotism or merely for pay.” David Hinshaw described the veterans as “professional money hunters” (Hinshaw 1950).

Other people defended the veterans. John Bartlett argued that “They were not a ‘mob of bums,’ as some liked to call them…They were just what a cross section of ten thousand of us would be if we had faced unemployment and poverty as they had faced it” (Bartlett 1937, 56). Bartlett and others viewed the veterans as worthy of support framed the march in terms of charity. In a letter to Pelham Glassford on July 28, 1932, John Bartlett offered his 30 acre estate to the veterans for temporary use. He wrote, “I will gladly cooperate to help these unfortunate people” (Bartlett 1937, 22). Later
Bartlett wrote, “All that I did personally was through Superintendent Glassford, and I did it, of course, as a matter of charity toward human beings” (Bartlett 1937, 23).

The way in which the veterans were named corresponds with the way in which the veterans are to be treated. The veterans were either tramps and thus unworthy of support, or they were poor and worthy of charity. The term ‘tramp’ was used by critics of the bonus army to discredit the veterans claim to the bonus and restrict their right to redress. The term relegated the veterans to the discourse of ‘unworthy poor’ and, as a result, excluded them from the rights social citizenship. The actions of the Government and the military on the Mall suggest that social citizenship is not an inalienable right; rather, some individuals qualify while others do not. Civilians are able to reaffirm their own social citizenship through opposition to the veterans. For example, Charles T. Green, an eighth-grader, recalled in an interview watching the different veterans at their camp: “You had another set of bonus marchers who didn’t want to be identified with those people who camped out there on the flats. They tried to impersonate just normal citizens” (Dickson and Allen 2004, 113). Green’s observation suggests that the veterans were identifiably different from “normal citizens.” Furthermore, by designating the veterans as tramps and seeking to exclude them from the monumental core, civilians reaffirm a code of proper behavior/action for social citizenship that in turn strengthens their own identity as citizens.
Citizens who seek to support the bonus marchers through charity come to fulfill, in part, their obligation as a social citizen by caring for the indigent and the needy. In doing so, they reaffirm their own identity as social citizens. Thus, whether citizens seek to exclude the veterans from the rights of social citizenship by labeling them as tramps or support them through charity, the image and names become a visible way for civilians to distinguish themselves as citizens. Nevertheless, civilians such as Bartlett who rejected the name “tramp” open the possibility a space for an all encompassing category of social citizenship: one where everyone has “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security” (Marshall 1964). The moment in which this space is closed off, however, is the moment in which the bonus marchers begin to resemble adomizen.

III. The Public Reaction: Between Tragedy and Success

The response to Hoover’s eviction varied from those who considered it a great success; to those who saw it as an immense failure. The public and private reactions correspond, to some extent, with the names by which the veterans were called. People who were likely to refer to the veterans as ‘tramps’ or ‘bums’ were likely to support the eviction, while others who supported the bonus legislation were more likely to
disagree with the actions of the administration. Nevertheless, the riots that preceded the eviction led many people, who may at one point have supported the bonus seekers, to defend the government’s action. The reaction is particularly significant because it marks an ostensible terminus to the conflict that has taken place over naming. The actions of the government and corresponding response help to define the identity of the bonus marchers as rioters and revolutionaries as true and other identities as false.

“A Great Success”

The Hoover administration and the military, particularly, viewed the eviction as an “unfortunate necessity” and yet also a great success. In a letter to Brigadier General P.L. Miles, Commanding Sixteenth Brigade, Anton Stephan, Major General, Commanding wrote: “I congratulate you and the officers and men under your command for the splendid manner in which the disagreeable duty of last week was performed.” Similarly, General MacArthur wrote in a letter to General Miles: “I wish to commend the highly efficient manner in which the operations of your command were conducted during the civil disorders in the District of Columbia July 28 – 30, 1932.” MacArthur noted that nothing is more difficult than the “necessity of composing civilian riots,” or “handling disorderly civilians” both of which, he said, are

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2 Letter: August 4th 1932 To Brigadier General P.L. Miles, Commanding Sixteenth Brigade from Anton Stephan, Major General, Commanding
a “disagreeable duty” but nevertheless, a necessity (War Department, Office of the Secretary 1932).

The military framed the event as if Washington had been under attack. MacArthur compared the situation to a country that had been occupied by foreign troops. He described their presences as “a reign of terror.” He wrote, “At least a dozen people told me…a regular system of tribute was being levied on them by this insurrectionist group” (Hoover 1952). Furthermore, MacArthur wrote “[the bonus army] had come to the conclusion…that they were about to take over in some arbitrary way either the direct control of the Government or else to control it by indirect methods” (Hoover 1952, 229). MacArthur’s comments on the rout reassert the necessity of action.

Following the administration’s reaction to the rout, the conservative and moderate press were quick to praise Hoover’s action (Liebovich 1994). The Philadelphia News defended Hoover’s decision as “acts of self defense on part of the government” (editorial 1932). The Chicago Daily News wrote that the BEF camps were “nurseries of sedition” (editorial 1932). The Wall Street Journal wrote, “‘Bonus Army’ Besieges Congress” (1932). The New York Times commented that “Editorial opinion was practically unanimous in expressing the belief that President Hoover was justified in his course” (New York Times 1932). Similarly, The Washington Post found
support for the “evacuation” in a survey of editorial comments across the nation (Nation's Editorials Indorse Evacuation 1932). In Letter to the editor, one person wrote, “No clear-thinking citizen, Democrat or Republican, can fail to disapprove the attempt that is being made to discredit the administration for maintaining public order in the District of Columbia” (W.T.T. 1932). Similarly, Walter Trohan of The Chicago Tribune noted, “I think most people despised the marchers” (Liebovich 1994, 173). The Washington Post wrote “President Hoover was fully justified in calling out the troops to put down this uprising against the United States…No government can tolerate defiance and disorder on the part of its citizens” (Coercion, Riots, Bloodshed 1932).

The reaction to the eviction and the treatment of the bonus marchers by the press, the administration, the military, as well as some civilians, begins to concretize the frame that the administration placed on the marchers, it begins to solidify their identity as unworthy poor, criminals, or communists. This reaction marks the moment the administrations ‘will to truth’ shifts to a record of historical fact thus satisfying ‘the will to truth.’ But just as there were many different and contradictory names by which the veterans were called, the reactions to the event differed significantly. Are the different truths articulated by the different reactions incompatible? Or, is it possible that they co-exist?
“A Great Tragedy”

Veteran groups, the liberal press, and other sympathizers expressed utter dismay towards Hoover’s reaction to the bonus seeking veterans (Liebovich 1994). Floyd Gibbons of the New York Journal wrote “I swear I could not believe it…The victims are American citizens, veteran soldiers, some of them disabled men who fought to sustain this Government” (Gibbons 1932, 2). After witnessing the rout first hand, John Bartlett wrote “The Cavalry and Infantry were ‘Booed’ by onlookers at every turn” (Bartlett 1937, 46). The New York Times reported similar indignation and jeers directed at the soldiers from the crowds lining Pennsylvania Avenue (Hoover Orders Eviction 1932). The New Republic described the event as “unforgivably stupid and cruel” (Bullets for the B.E.F.: Hoover Relief, New Style 1932). Veterans made formal protest to the War Department: “We believe that certain atrocities were perpetuated by soldiers against innocent and defenseless men, women, and children and against the flag of our nation…” (Mahoning Valley Post Resolution to President Hoover 1932). Furthermore, Bartlett defended the actions of the bonus marchers during the rout itself, arguing “Have not all of us an instinct to defend what we call our ‘homes’” (Bartlett 1937, 32).

The indignation expressed by the public suggests alternative “truths” that correspond with the marchers’ identity as the “Bonus Army” or as impoverished non-
citizens. Consequently, the military action, in this frame, appears to be a wholly inhumane and despicable reaction. The administrations nod to the “unfortunate” nature of the event suggests that they sought to subsume the negative press by preemptively conceding to this fact. Those who viewed the reaction as a travesty, however, did not explicitly express the right for the bonus seekers to remain in Washington – they merely disagreed with the means of expulsion. Thus, while the two reactions appear to be on opposite ends of the spectrum, the two are not necessarily contradictory. Again, this suggests the that the action taken by the government not only expelled the veterans from the Mall, but also served to solidify the identity of the bonus marchers. The two reactions do not point to a multiplicity of identity, rather, they suggest two different ways to deal with the same problem: adomizen.

IV. Conclusion

The Bonus Army operated within multiple and often conflicting narratives – they were ‘veterans,’ they were ‘tramps,’ they were ‘fascists,’ they were ‘communists.’ The ‘will to truth’ is comprised in the act of naming and functions as an act of exclusion. The name by which the Hoover administration calls the veterans excludes them in two ways: first from the discourse of social citizenship; and second, from the
physical space of the Mall itself. In doing so, the Hoover administration’s ‘will to
truth’ and corresponding action, reduce the veterans to that of adomizen. The name
locates the veterans within a discourse of truth defines them as unworthy of support
and consequently excludes them from the rights of social citizenship.

Here, on the National Mall, in the camps on the Anacostia flats, on the wide
avenues of Washington, the concept of home and citizenship are bound together.

Hoover writes, “Congress made provision for the return home of the so-called bonus
marchers who have for many weeks been given every opportunity of free assembly,
free speech and free petition to the Congress” (Hoover 1952, 228). Hoover suggests
that the veterans were given the opportunity to exercise their rights as citizens, but
ultimately they abused these rights. In a letter to the editor, one individual questions:
“Where does “peaceably assemble” end and revolution begin?” (Anding 1932) The
letter suggests that if the veterans were truly patriotic and disciplined they would know
better than to act the way they have acted. Similar to Hoover, the letter suggests that
the bonus marchers failed to act like citizens and thus were evacuated. How did the
veterans fail to act like citizens? The crisis was not that they sought redress for their
condition, but the manner in which they did it: a large group of men, women and
children, many without homes, had made homes in public spaces. John Bartlett writes,
“They were hungry. They were urged to go home. But they replied, “How can folks go
home who have no homes?” (Bartlett 1937). Adomizen is a subject who embodies a position of dual lack: it signifies one who lacks a home, resources, etc. and simultaneously lacks citizenship. Thus, the veterans were excluded from social citizens and expelled from the Capital because they lacked homes; and conversely, they lacked homes because they were not guaranteed the rights to social citizenship. In this way, adomizen is an irresolvable contradiction – the lack for which they sought reprieve is that which denies them the right to do so.

The story of the bonus march and the subject adomizen suggests that the status of citizenship is fluid: one can fulfill the “highest duty of citizen” and then later, be excluded from the rights of social citizenship. Social citizenship can be earned and lost. In this way, adomizen is a foil to social citizenship: it violates social citizenship through the disintegration of public and private space and permits social citizens to reaffirm their own identity through identifiable difference to that of adomizen.
Chapter 3. Clark v. CCNV: Biopolitics and the Discourse of Preservation

Lafayette Park and others like it are for all the people and their rights are not to be trespassed even by those who have some ‘statement’ to make
- Chief Justice Burger, June 29, 1984

I. Introduction

The network of parks and memorials that compose Washington’s monumental core serve multiple functions: They are cultural, meditative, didactic, political, and even recreational spaces. The National Mall is as much a location of Sunday soccer games as it is “a fitting and powerful forum for political expression and political protest” (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 1985, Justice Marshall). Thus, the space is not reserved for a single purpose, but for a multiplicity of activities. The National Mall is “America’s premier public place, its main square or park, its front lawn” (Bednar 2006, 2). At the same time, however, the National Mall is a highly regulated and refined space. While the discourse of the Mall is often rooted in democracy and multiplicity of use, there is a clear, yet often unspoken, distinction between the proper use and the improper use of the space. This distinction is exemplified in Paul Bator’s opening statement on behalf of the National Park Service before the Supreme Court in Clark versus CCNV, Bator says, “You can speak. You
can leaflet. You can parade and demonstrate, and you can take any activity to the park short of moving in and living.” The question of living, and more specifically of sleeping, is precisely the issue at hand in the case of homelessness. While the discourse of multiplicity seeks to conceal the discourse of improper use, it is made explicit the moment in which proper use is violated. The discourse of proper use not only suggests the disciplined nature of the space, but also that of the bodies that operate within this space. I ask: What is the relationship between the physical space and the biological body? More specifically: How is the body citizen constituted in the discourse of proper use? What about *adomizen*?

**Clark v. CCNV**

On the first day of winter, in 1982, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) arranged a demonstration to protest the Reagan Administration’s budget cuts and the exacerbating conditions of homelessness in Washington, D.C. and in America. They acquired a permit to set up 20 tents in Lafayette Square, the park adjacent to the White House, which they called “Reaganville USA” and an additional 40 tents on the National Mall which they called “Congressional Village.” The tent cities were created in the image of “Hoovervilles” and suggested a historical analogy between the Great Depression and the economic downturn of the early 1980’s. CCNV’s intention was to
have homeless people sleep in the tents throughout the winter months in order to raise awareness of the plight of the poor. In a statement to the press, Mitch Snyder, the director of CCNV, said “We as a society, as a nation, have made invisible and abstract what is, in fact, most concrete and real; the pain of the very poor” (Rader 1986, 149). CCNV hoped to duplicate the success of previous demonstrations: The year before, CCNV had attracted some media attention with a similar, yet smaller, demonstration. By repeating the demonstration in a larger capacity, they hoped to capture the Nation’s attention and in doing so, help bring an end to abject poverty. CCNV succeeded in gaining attention, but perhaps not in the way they intended.

In the intermittent period between the two demonstrations the National Park Service banned camping from non-designated parks which included the monumental core. They described camping activities as “the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities…storing personal belongings, or making fire or using any tents…” (36 CFR 50.27(a)(1983)). Following the new law, the Park Service permitted CCNV to set up the tents as a symbolic demonstration, but would not allow homeless people to sleep in them. CCNV responded by filing an action against the Park Service in the Federal District Court. CCNV argued that the act of sleep, especially in the case of the homeless, was an expressive act and that the prohibition of sleep was a violation of their First Amendment right. The Federal
District Court ruled in favor of the Park Service; CCNV appealed and the ruling was overturned in a six to five decision in Watt v. CCNV. The Appeals Court noted that homeless people “can express with their bodies the poignancy of their plight. They can physically demonstrate the neglect from which they suffer with an articulateness even Dickens could not match” (CCNV v. Watt). The decision was appealed again and taken before the Supreme Court in Clark v. CCNV; the Supreme Court reversed the appeal and sided in favor of the Park Service citing that “the regulation forbidding sleep meets the requirements for a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction of expression, whether oral, written or symbolized by conduct.” (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 1984). Furthermore, the Court specified that the regulation set forth by the Park Service to ban camping was solely in the interest of preserving the National Mall. Thus, it was content-neutral and “not applied because of a disagreement with the message presented” (Clark v. CCNV).

The case of Clark v. CCNV does not merely seek to negotiate the proper use of the monumental core, but also, the proper use and biological function of the body within the monumental core. The court case can be read as an extension of biopolitics, what Griogio Agamben calls “the growing inclusion of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power” (Agambe 1998, 119). In this chapter, I seek to examine the legal arguments and opinions of Clark v. CCNV in order to explore the
relationship between the body of the citizen and the monumental core. More specifically, I focus on the discourse of preservation by asking: What is it that is preserved? What is the consequence of preservation? In addition, I examine the ways in which the legal discourse seeks to legislate the body by asking: How does the discourse of this space help to produce the body of the citizen? What are the consequences of this production?

II. Preserving the National Mall; Preserving the Body Citizen

Paul Bator’s argument on behalf of the National Park Service is rooted in the concept of preservation. Bator says, “This case is about places that are very, very special, places that mean something to every American and that really do belong to every American.” At stake in the Case, Bator claims, is the quality and the condition of the park land itself. Bator argues, “The finding of the park service…is that the threat to the parks comes from a regime in which people are generally told that they can stay for a long time and sleep there.” He argues that banning sleep is essential to the preservation of the park. On the surface, the discourse of preservation appears to be neutral and is put forth by Bator, and confirmed by the majority opinion of the Court, as a service preformed on behalf of the common good. This discourse, however, is not necessarily neutral: The discourse of preservation conceals a disciplinary function that
instructs people how to be social citizens and, at the same time, excludes others from
the very same category of citizenship. How does the discourse of preservation
function as a means of discipline? More specifically, how does it train people as social
citizens?

**Preservation and education**

The concept of preservation casts its gaze on an ideal state or a prior condition
that must be maintained. It takes as its starting place “a secret origin” which Foucault
describes as “an ever-receding point that is never itself present in any history;” that “is
merely its own void” (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 1972, 25). It is from
this point of a secret origin that Justice White begins in the majority opinion of the
court. Justice White describes, at great length, the location, size, and features of the
park. He writes, “Lafayette Park is a roughly 7-acre square located across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House…It is a ‘garden park with a…formal
landscaping of flowers and trees, with fountains, walks and benches.’” Accordingly,
Justice White locates his description in a discourse of objectivity, in a discourse of
indexicality, as if he sought to deliver a photographic or cartographic representation of
the space. Furthermore, he specifically notes: “Both the Park and the Mall were
included in Major Pierre L’Enfant’s original plan for the Capital.” Justice White
stresses the significance of the space by referencing its origin. He incorporates the history of the Mall into an authoritative narrative that provides a distinct thread tying the original design of the Mall to the current manifestation of the space. In this way, Justice White establishes precedence for preservation.

The discourse of preservation and that of objectivity are unique in that they position Justice’s White’s argument as ‘always already.’ The two discourses conceal the constructedness of the argument: The discourse of preservation is not about preservation at all, but rather, about the construction or invention of a mythical space that must be preserved. In this way, the discourse of preservation precedes and justifies the act of preservation. Furthermore, preservation enters into the narrative in a way that suggests a didactic undercurrent to instruct the body in how to operate in public spaces as a social body. It implicates social citizens in the discourse so much as it assumes that social citizens’ hold both a common image of the Mall as well as a common purpose to preserve it – producing in the social citizen a model of proper action.

Justice White writes that the regulation on camping “narrowly focuses on the Government’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of the Capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them” (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 1984). The
absence of such regulation, he writes, “would be totally inimical to these purposes…” It is this act of regulating or disciplining the space that simultaneously disciplines the body of the citizen: it lays down a code of proper use that instructs people in how to enjoy the space and, more specifically, how to act.

The act of preservation presupposes a responsibility on behalf of the user that they knowingly or unknowingly take up when they participate in the discourse of proper use. The Mall functions as didactic space that conditions the body to function as a social citizen; the simple act of walking on paved or designated walkways, obeying signs that prohibit alcoholic beverages or unleashed pets, etc. conditions the individual as a social citizen. The relationship between physical spaces and discipline is not necessarily new: Foucault notes that one of the features of western democracies is the increasing development of “architecture as a function of the aims and techniques of the government of societies” (Foucault 1994, 349). The Mall itself contains within it structural features that help to govern the space and facilitate activities within this space. Justice White writes, “All those who would resort to the parks must abide by otherwise valid rules for their use, just as they must observe the traffic laws, sanitation regulations, and laws to preserve the public peace” (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 1984). The system of formal and informal rules governing the National Mall provides a precedence of how to act as a social citizen that extends beyond the
Mall itself. Furthermore, the formal and informal rules function as a searchlight that shines upon those who violate the code of proper use, and distinguishes between social citizens and adomizen – it distinguishes between those who preserve and those who degrade. Here, we see that exclusion arises as a natural consequence of preservation.

**Preservation and exclusion**

From the very beginning of the argument in Clark v. CCNV, it is clear that in order to preserve the monumental core certain behaviors must be prohibited and certain people must be excluded. The act of exclusion is not separate from the didactic function of the Mall; rather, the two go hand in hand like lovers to the altar. The act of exclusion is disciplinary in that it punishes those for improper action and, conversely, instructs people on proper action. It is important to ask: How is exclusion enacted in the discourse of preservation? Furthermore, how might one’s identity as social citizen be posited or reaffirmed in opposition to those who are excluded?

The discourse of preservation in the monumental core assumes a proper function as well as a proper limit to the space. While the discourse governing the Mall is rooted in the principles of democracy and pluralism, the debate that takes place before the Supreme Court focuses very much on who has a right to this space and who does not. In an interchange between Burt Neuborne, on behalf of CCNV, and Justice
Rehnquist, the issue of rights and that of exclusion is made explicit. Rehnquist poses a hypothetical question about whether or not it would be permissible for the Government to ask the demonstrators to leave after seven days. Neuborne replies by saying, it would be troubling, and the following exchange ensues:

**Mr. Neuborne:** I would rely on the general notions of the First Amendment that where expressive activity is at stake the Government ought to demonstrate some need before it cuts it off.

**Question:** I don’t think that’s necessarily true when the Government’s dealing with its own property, is it?

**Mr. Neuborne:** The property of the Government – the suggestion that the parks are the property of the Government is an extraordinary statement. The parks are the property of the people, Justice Rehnquist.

**Question:** Well, who do you think the title to the parks is in, Mr. Neuborne?

**Mr. Neuborne:** Title to the parks from time immemorial, as this Court said in Haig Versus CIO, rests in the people.

**Question:** I don’t think it said –

**Mr. Neuborne:** Who engage in First Amendment activity.

**Question:** I don’t think the Court said that the title rested in the people.

Burt Neuborne, and later Justice Marshall, both cite the Case of Haig versus Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), in order to justify CCNV’s right to demonstrate on the Mall, and more particularly, the right for homeless people to protest their condition by sleeping on the Mall. The case states:
The streets and parks...have immemorially been held in trust for the uses of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens ((1939), 515).

Accordingly, Neuborne and Marshall identify homeless people as citizens who are imbued with certain rights, among those, the right to assemble on the National Mall. As Marshall writes “They are citizens raising issues of profound public importance…” Rehnquist’s argument, on the other hand, reverses this position, and in doing so, strips the rights of citizenship from the homeless. His argument suggests that homeless people do not qualify as “people” or, more specifically, social citizens.

The moment in which the issue of preservation and improper use appears, the discourse of public spaces shifts to a discourse of private space. Justice Rehnquist seeks to assert authority over the space, and ultimately a right to regulate the space, by turning away from the rights of the users to the rights of the owner. He distinguishes between the rhetoric in Haig v. CIO and the legality of ownership. In this way, he suggests that the parks belong to the people, only when the people are able to act as social citizens; the moment in which they fail to adhere to the formal and informal
rules that govern this space they no longer have a right to that space. In his counter-
argument to Haig v CIO, Justice Rehnquist asserts the Government’s power to exclude
people whom it deems to be “threatening” or “disturbing” to the quality of the space.
The ultimate effect of this logic is that the preservation of this space justifies exclusion.

Bator, along with the majority opinion of the Court, however, argues that no
one is being excluded or expelled. Bator says, “The Park Service granted the
Respondents a wide-ranging permit to demonstrate. Nobody tried to prevent the
Respondents from exercising their right to speak, to assemble, to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances…The Respondents were told…they could
speak in every normal sense of that term as freely as they wished.” Yet, at the same
time, both Bator and the Justices acknowledge, as CCNV argues, that the homeless
demonstrators would not come out to the demonstration if not for the promise of food
and a place to sleep. Accordingly, Justice Stevens argues that the camping serves as a
“functional need” rather than an expressive act. Stevens says “you’re assuming
everybody’s out there pretending they’re asleep when we know it’s not true; they are
not going to be there unless they can sleep.” In denying the possibility that sleep can
be a communicative act, the court simultaneously acknowledges that they are severely
restricting CCNV’s ability to demonstrate. In this way, the discourse of preservation
conceals the act of exclusion while simultaneously enacting it.
For the homeless, sleep is both a functional as well as an expressive act. In Clark v. CCNV, it is clear that in the act of denying the homeless the right to sleep, the Court, in turn, denies them the right to protest: the homeless are being punished for not having a home to return to. The very factor they wish to protest is that which justifies their exclusion. Furthermore, the lack of a home presupposes a lack of social citizenship and, reveals again, the subject *adomizen*. This is particularly evident in Rehnquist’s argument in which he reasserts a distinction between public and private spaces: One’s body must first dwell in the private sphere in order to then have access to the public sphere. Public spaces then operate on their binary relationship with private spaces. The public parks can only be enjoyed in opposition to private spaces thus preserving their use for homeowning citizens. While citizenship seeks its expression in the public sphere, the rights of citizenship are in fact closely linked to the private sphere. This relationship is rendered visible in *adomizen* where the distinction between public and private that collapses. In this way, *adomizen* threatens the existence of the public sphere and consequently must be excluded.

Present within the discourse of preservation is both the concept of public space, but also the social body. In so much as the function of the space presupposes the function of the body. In preserving the National Mall, the Supreme Court is also
preserving the concept of social citizenship. How do the formal and informal rules
governing this space function to govern the body citizen?

III. Regulating Sleep: The Deployment of Biopower

The disciplinary function of the discourse of preservation renders visible the
deployment of biopower and of biopolitics. In Clark v. CCNV, the explicit question
debated before the court is whether or not the sleeping body can function as a mode of
symbolic expression – but really, the question they are dealing with is: what is the
proper function of the body? While the Court explicitly debates the proper use of the
National Mall, and whether or not sleeping degrades the space, they are simultaneously
debating what biological functions, particularly sleep, should be permissible in the
public sphere. Consequently, their decision not only affects the rules governing the
mall, but also that of the body. From the very beginning, what is at stake in the case of
Clark v. CCNV is biological life, which is brought forward as the object of legislation.
Foucault writes, “What was demanded and what was served as an objective was life,
understood as the basic needs, man’s concrete essence, the realization of his potential,
a plentitude of the possible” (Foucault 1990, 137). While the biopolitical problems are
concealed behind the concerns of freedom of expression, the presence of biology and
of biopower in the Case pose a series of difficult questions. Thinking in terms of Foucault’s idea of biopower, I consider: What is the difference between the right to sleep and the right to speak? How is it that the state can grant the right to free expression, but restrict one’s right to base functions? Why is one constitutionally protected and the other regulated? And finally, what is the relationship between citizenship and the body? Building from these questions, I examine the way in which sleep is constituted in the argument before the court, in two ways: First, as an expressive act; and then second, as a criminal act.

**Sleep as an expressive act**

Sleep, Laurie Magid writes, “is inherently ambiguous since it is usually performed as a non-expressive everyday function, yet it may also be performed for communicative reasons” (Magid March, 1984). The challenge for Burt Nueborne and CCNV is to clarify the ambiguity between function and expression. Nueborne’s argument is premised on the fact that the only way for the homeless to communicate their message is through sleep. Snyder adds, “To speak is to communicate. For some, and under certain conditions, words, either spoken or written will suffice. But for others, communication must find different forms. It is with their bodies and their very existence that the homeless must speak, if they are to have any hope at all of changing
their fate or their lives” (Rader 1986, 150). If sleep is to be heard as the voice of the homeless: how does sleep communicate? And what, precisely, is the message?

Sleep, as a biological function, is generally relegated to the private sphere, and more particularly, a singular space: the bedroom. The body, in this space, may have the potential to intentionally or unintentionally communicate with whom one shares their bedroom. For example, if your partner fell asleep in bed while you are talking about your day, this act may potentially be read as communicating indifference or malaise. This message, however, would most likely be highly idiosyncratic and interpretive if received as a message at all. Accordingly, common sense or doxa suggests that sleep in the bedroom is not to be considered a location of speech or expression. Thus we take the function of the sleep to be given, or obvious. But it is the concept of doxa itself, which should make us look twice. While doxa suggests an ‘always already’ status of sleep as a biological function, it simultaneously masks the possibility of alternative functions. The moment, however, in which sleep moves from the private sphere into the public sphere the function of sleep changes. Take for example Andy Warhol’s film Sleep: a five hour film that challenges the conventions of narrative and cinema, but also that of sleep. The subject of the film is a sleeping man. Rather than traditional methods of communication such as conversation, soliloquies, dance, music, etc., it is the act of sleep itself that communicates to the audience. While
the message communicated in the film is neither clear cut nor singular, it suggests that sleep becomes a communicative act when it is displayed to the public. Regardless of the fact that sleep is performing a biological function, sleep has the potential to communicate.

For the Homeless, the message of sleep is drastically different from that of Warhol’s film, but nevertheless, it has the potential to act as a message: to be a communicative act. The act of sleep shifts from simply a biological function to a communicative function when it takes place on the streets. Here, sleep is performed, as if on a stage, for all to see. Again, it is the presence of spectators that makes possible an exchange of information. Nueborne says, “What will take place…in the dead of winter is homeless people sleeping in tents…to express in a way that no verbal communication can, and that indeed these homeless people are incapable of expressing any other way a plea for help and a plea for human compassion.” In this way, sleep makes concrete, what would otherwise be abstracted by symbolic tents or signs. It is easy to ignore verbal discourse, but difficult to ignore physical suffering. Furthermore, it is the context of the situation itself that shapes the message. Nueborne argues that the Mall is essential to “attain some expressive conduct, a political dimension to their desperation.” The Mall is a premiere stage; it is, as we know, a unique symbolic space that models the ideals of citizenship. Homelessness acts in conjunction with this
symbolic space to convey a particular message: it displays a sharp binary between power and powerless; between extraordinary wealth and extraordinary poverty. In this space, the homeless body articulates its own subject position: *adomizen*. The homeless body is a site of micro-power which is expressed in transforming biological function into powerful communicative measures. The Court’s decision can be read in reaction to this expressed power. The fact that the homeless pose a threat to the Mall suggests that sleep is a potential location of power for the homeless.

While Justice Marshall asserts in his dissenting opinion that “Sleeping in a highly public place, outside, in the winter for the purpose of protesting homelessness – is a symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment,” the Court disagrees. Kathleen Olson writes “Because the Supreme Court refused in Clark to determine whether sleeping actually was protected as a form of symbolic speech, the case was not a breakthrough for free expression rights. Instead it marked another instance of the Courts willingness to accept the government’s word as to the need for regulation of some forms of expressive conduct…” ( Olson 2004). The Supreme Court Justices were less interested in the debate over freedom of expression than they were in regulating the biological function of sleep.
Sleep as a criminal act

As previously stated, Sleep is an activity that has specifically been relegated to the private sphere; just as urination has been relegated to the bathroom, sleep belongs, almost exclusively, to the bedroom. The problem that Adomizen poses is, again, the disintegration of public and private space – the threat of which does not damage the land itself, but rather, the discourse of citizenship that circulates through the Mall. In other words, the problem of sleep does not degrade the physical space, but the symbolic space. This threat is evident in the way the National Park Service, as well as the Supreme Court, deals with sleep as a criminal issue.

In his argument before the court, Bator is very careful to draw a distinction between proper and improper use of the Mall. At times, however, the distinction becomes very hazy, particularly, the distinction between all night vigils and camping. In the following exchange, one of the Justices challenges Bator’s argument, seeking a categorical explanation of why one should be banned while the other permitted. The following exchange is reproduced at length in order to highlight not only the significance of the argument, but the significance of the exchange itself.

**Question:** Why do you draw a distinction between sleeping all night and demonstrating all night?

**Mr. Bator:** The composition of the Park Service regulations on that is to maintain a bright line between the round-the-clock vigil and the camping, sleeping activity, and I think that that is responsive to the notion that the round-the-clock vigil is –
Question: You mean that there’s a bright line between sleeping and not sleeping?
Mr. Bator: The bright line is between the round-the-clock –
Question: How do you tell when somebody’s sleeping and when they’re not sleeping? I know people that sleep with their eyes wide open.
Mr. Bator: your Honor, the –
Question: I mean, I was worried about that bright line.
Mr. Bator: The bright line is between two sorts of activities. I think, Your Honor, if you were told – if I were told that I’m allowed to go into that park and maintain a round-the-clock vigil, but I’m not allowed to use the park as sleeping quarters overnight, I think I would understand that rule. It is really directed at two different sorts of activities.
Questions: But precisely how do they carry on the round-the-clock vigil between midnight and so on?
Mr. Bator: How?
Question: How do they do it?
Mr. Bator: People do maintain round-the-clock vigils in these parks.
Question: How? What do they do?
Mr. Bator: They stand, they sing, they carry candles. There are many – the round-the-clock vigils, as the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has indicated, is a fairly well recognized and understandable and important sort of symbolic activity.
Question: Well, you could also sit in a chair or lie down, as long as you’re not sleeping, is that it?
Mr. Bator: Yes, sir.
Question: So you can enter a tent and lie down and lie there all night –
Mr. Bator: Yes, sir.
Question: --as long as you don’t sleep?
Mr. Bator: Yes, sir.
Question: And you’re all right
Mr. Bator: Yes, sir. Now, I’d like to say why that line is in fact a very important line. The problem of the park service is not – that is, once a given demonstrator is already there and he’s
allowed to go into the tent and lie down, you say, what
difference does it make if he’s actually allowed to go to sleep?
But that does not mean, Your Honor, that it makes no difference
to the parks whether the rule is that you can sleep there
overnight as part of camping activity on the one hand or whether
you’re allowed to stand a round-the-clock vigil and if you want
in connection with that to pretend that you are asleep.

While Bator is invested in talking about two distinct activities: an all night vigil
and camping; the Justices’ challenge makes clear that these two activities have blurred
in the CCNV demonstration. The terms of debate shift from freedom of speech to the
issue of sleep itself – particularly, the difference between sleeping and feigning to
sleep. Why is it that two, nearly identical acts, are treated so differently?

There is no indication, as the Justice suggests, that sleeping damages the land
while feigning to sleep does not. Rather, both activities require bodies to occupy the
same amount of space and apply the same amount of stress to the land. The difference
between the two, then, is that one is a means of sustaining life and unlimited in
duration, while the other is solely communicative and thus limited. In banning sleep,
the Park Service is able to assert a natural limitation on certain demonstrations and
certain populations. Bator says, “there is substantial Government interest, unrelated to
the suppression of expression, in conserving park property that is served by the
Sleep threatens the space by facilitating and sustaining life in the space even when the
aim of said life is intended to be communicative. Accordingly, the Court turns to the body as a site of legislation.

The Court draws a distinction between function and expression that ultimately restricts the rights of the homeless. It not only restricts the right to speak, but also the right to live. Clark v. CCNV reveals that “the concept of the ‘body’ too is always already caught in a deployment of power” (Agamben 1998, 187). The decision of the Court to uphold the National Park Service’s ban on sleeping is a case of legislating biological life and thus an extension of biopolitics. The Court, however, does not legislate the body directly; rather, they do so indirectly by regulating the space.

IV. Conclusion

There is a useful analogy between the Mall and Foucault’s description of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon: the function of discipline is embodied and exercised in the physical space of the Mall, just as it is in the architecture of the Panopticon. As Foucault writes: “[The Panopticon] arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the function it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact” (Foucault 1979, 206). In this way, the regulations imposed by the Government on the monumental core are filtered through the discourse
of preservation as a means to disperse power throughout the space, depositing the mode of regulation within social citizens themselves. The space is largely self-regulating – like a system of traffic laws, people have internalized the rules and reproduce them in their action. Social citizens are provided the opportunity to exercise power by participating in the discourse of preservation and that of exclusion. In doing so, they reaffirm their own identities as social citizens while simultaneously positing adomizen as other. The discourse of preservation becomes a more effective means of control and of exclusion than military or police force; it is the necessity of preservation that justifies the expulsion of adomizen.

For adomizen, the city and the house are indistinguishable – collapsing together the biological and political. Adomizen challenges the concept of the public sphere and that of the city, the very premise upon which citizenship is constructed. This subject suggests that citizenship is in fact rooted in the private sphere not the public sphere as it has been previously conceived. While the possibility for micro-power is present for adomizen and is embodied in the physical body itself, the case Clark v. CCNV suggests that these power positions are repeatedly contested and diminished. Adomizen is posited as an object upon which the will of the social citizen is imposed – distinguishing social citizens as sovereign beings and reducing adomizen to bare life (Agamben 1998).
Chapter 4. The Help the Homeless Walkathon: The Interpellative Function of Homelessness

Someone once said, ‘To solve a problem, walk around,’ which is exactly what 150 Fannie Mae employees did 20 years ago to help solve the problem of homelessness in our area.
- Daniel H. Mudd, Chairman of the Board, Fannie Mae Foundation

I. Introduction

Washington D.C.’s monumental core is a unique space in which discourses circulate like taxi cabs and individuals are hailed as U.S. citizens. The city, itself, contains within it a material ideological framework: the monuments, the museums, and the parks were designed with the specific intention to inspire and instruct individuals on the ways of citizenship. Louis Althusser writes, “What is represented in ideology is…not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (Althusser 1971, 165). What is represented in the ideological framework of the monumental core is not the real relation between people or between people and the Government, but rather an imaginary relationship between a Nation and its citizens. In this way, the monumental core helps to cultivate what Benedict Anderson calls, an “imagined community” (2006). The discourse of the monumental core and that of
citizenship, however, are not wholly inclusive; rather, as we have seen, the homeless have repeatedly been excluded and marginalized at the expense of those who claim the rights of social citizenship. While in the past, the homeless have been confronted with physical or legal barriers barring them from this “community,” in the beginning of the 21st century, the homeless seem to have disappeared entirely from this space. There is no longer a presence, but merely, a presence of absence. In this way, the homeless return to the Mall, not as a threat that must be expelled by military force, but rather, as a specter and as a spectacle.

Once a year, during the Help the Homeless Walkathon, their image returns as a siren which sounds out across the mall, calling citizens to duty. How does the discourse of homelessness help to interpellate, or hail, individuals as citizens?

**The Help the Homeless Walkathon**

On Saturday, November 17, 2007, the Fannie Mae Foundation hosted their 20th annual Help the Homeless Walkathon to support non-profit agencies that serve low-income and homeless families and individuals living in Washington, D.C. I work for a non-profit organization that participates in the event and this was the second year in which I had helped to organize our participation in the fundraiser.
When I arrived at the National Mall on the morning of the 17th, it was filled with “walkers” clad in the white long sleeve “help the homeless” t-shirts and touting signs branded with the name or logo of different non-profit organizations. A series of large white tents were set up on the grassy lawn between 7th and 14th streets NW where participants could register to walk – fifteen dollars for youth or twenty-five dollars for adults; at other tents, participants were being handed free bottles of water and Power Bars. Beyond the tents, there was a large stage where the announcers bantered back and forth on the PA and, at times, if you stopped paying attention, the conversation could be mistaken for a Sunday night baseball game on the radio. When the walk began, the crowd of people slowly coalesced into a mob and shuffled towards the starting line. The announcers welcomed the beneficiary organizations – listing off the names to the sound of muffled yelps and cheers from the crowd. As the event progressed, it became clear to me that there was something missing from the walk: the homeless themselves.

The Walkathon is, in the Freudian sense, an uncanny event. There is a sense of the familiar to the Walkathon in that it resembles so closely the other Walkathons that take place annually in this space – the walk for breast cancer, the walk for AIDS, etc. Yet, simultaneously, there is something missing – something that is not immediately identifiable, yet leaves you feeling uneasy. The walk also resembles the many historic
protests that have taken place within the monumental core; yet, at the same time, the walkers make no demands nor is there anything directly at stake for the participants. The significance of the event does not reside in the message that is conveyed by the walkers, but rather in the partially concealed absence that produces this uncanny experience. It is here, during the walk, that one feels the presence of a ghost. It is here that the specter of homelessness reveals itself as uniquely linked to the discourse of social citizenship.

In order to examine the relationship between citizenship and homelessness, the following chapter examines the promotional material produced and distributed for the Fannie Mae Help the Homeless Walkathon. Specifically, I engage in a semiotic analysis of a thirty second television advertisement produced by Fannie Mae that aired in the weeks leading up to the event on November 17, 2007. I break the advertisement down into its constituent parts and examine the denotative and connotative meanings; the paradigmatic and syntagmatic features; and finally, the mode of address. I ask: How is this relationship articulated in the advertisement for the Help the Homeless Walkathon? Furthermore, I examine the discourse of exclusion that is enacted through the promotional material – I ask: In what ways are the homeless excluded from this representation of the Walkathon? What are the consequences of this symbolic exclusion?
II. Advertising Citizenship: Denotative and Connotative Messages

The advertising image is, as Roland Barthes notes, “[U]ndoubtedly intentional” (1977, 33). The aim is first and foremost to sell or to promote; Fannie Mae’s advertisement is no different. Nevertheless, the message is not necessarily singular nor is it restricted to its “intentions.” As Barthes writes, “[A]ll these ‘imitative’ arts comprise two messages: a denoted message, which is the analogon itself, and a connoted message, which is the manner in which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it” (1977, 6). The denotative meaning can be read as Fannie Mae’s intention as communicated in the advertisement, or the direct message, while the connotative meaning suggests the possibilities of viewers’ responses to the commercial within different viewing contexts.

Denotative Messages

The commercial begins with a young college-aged man dressed in a blue polo walking a dog in front of a metro station. The mise-en-scene is framed by a green letterbox. In the lower right hand corner is a call to action that reads www.helpthehomelessdc.org. The commercial then cuts to a mother and child on a park bench; then to a businessman in a suit and tie; then to a middle-aged married
couple, all within the green letterbox. Each character talks directly to the camera, hinting at why the Walkathon appeals to them, but never mentioning it by name. For example, the middle-aged couple says, “We just want to make more of a difference.” Midway through the commercial a dark turquoise intertitle is superimposed on an image of mother and child as they walk towards the camera. A voiceover narration reiterates the text that is simultaneously imprinted across the screen and invites the viewer to join in the Help the Homeless Walkathon. The second half of the commercial consists of four additional shots that revisit each of the four characters in reverse order: the couple, the businessman, the mother and child, and lastly, the student. This time, it is only the couple that speaks, and then a voiceover narration comes up over the last three characters.

The denotative message of the advertisement is twofold: the aim is 1) to promote the Walkathon; and 2) to promote Fannie Mae. While the commercial begins with a series of vague scripted statements, the denotative message becomes anchored in the text of the intertitle. Barthes writes, “The text directs the reader through the signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid some and receive others” (1977, 9). The text immediately shapes the viewers’ experiences: it functions as an adhesive that binds together all of the scenes and images up to this point as well as the images to follow. Both denotative messages are encapsulated in a single line: “Join honorary
chair…for the Fannie Mae Help the Homeless Walkathon.” The first message tells the viewer: participate in the Walkathon; the second tells the viewer: Fannie Mae helps homeless people. The commercial promotes the walk, while simultaneously promoting Fannie Mae. Furthermore, the syntagmatic arrangement of the text on the screen suggests that one meaning is privileged over the other. When the text rolls across the intertitle, three statements are triangulated on the screen: Centered on the top reads “Honorary Chair Michael McDonald;” the lower left hand side, reads “Fannie Mae” and directly below, in larger letters, “Foundation;” on the lower right hand side, there is a logo for the Walkathon - a silhouette of a family within the shape of a two dimensional house, and the phrase, “Help the Homeless,” printed in a semi-circle around the roof. Beneath the logo, in larger text, is a tagline that reads “20 years of commitment.” The viewer reads the text top down, from left to right, prioritizing the text as such: the text on the left hand side is privileged over the text on the right. Furthermore, the way the text is situated on the screen produces the reading, “Fannie Mae Foundations 20 years of commitment.” While the advertisement is created under the auspices of the Walkathon, the arrangement of the text suggests that Fannie Mae is in fact the primary subject of the message, not the Walk.

If the primary intention of the commercial is to publicize Fannie Mae, to whom is the company targeting? What is the ad’s mode of address? Fannie Mae is one of the
nation’s leading providers of home mortgages; the logical target for its’ commercials are homeowners and potential homeowners. Consequently, the two denotative messages immediately enter into tension with each other. In one sense the commercial locates itself within the discourse of homelessness, yet, simultaneously it excludes the homeless in structuring a message that specifically addresses homeowners. Thus, the commercial produces a discourse of homelessness that excludes the homeless. The tension between the two denotative messages increases when one considers the different connotative messages made possible by the advertisement as well.

**Connotative Messages**

While the denotative messages suggest the scripted intention of the advertisement, there remains a series of connotative messages that flow like magma beneath the surface of the text. The producer, in this case Fannie Mae, does not simply dictate a message which is then received by the consumer; rather, each informs the other. Furthermore, Barthes writes, “[t]he more technology develops the diffusion of information (and notably of images), the more it provides the means of masking the constructed meaning under the appearance of the given meaning” (197, 40). Barthes suggests that it is the connotative messages, and not the denotative messages, that the viewer first experiences. These messages, however, are then concealed by the
“obviousness” of the denotative meaning. What is it that the denotative ad consciously or unconsciously conceals from the viewer?

The commercial begins, as noted above, with four shots of four different people. Each person communicates a unique message, which, when taken together, forms a particular image in the viewer’s mind. While these messages are later subordinated by the denotative message, they continue to linger, and work to create a positive image of Fannie Mae as a site of corporate responsibility and ‘corporate citizenship.’ In addition, these images produce a particular image of an ideal viewer, which extends beyond the concept of the viewer as a mere homeowner, and elevates them to the status of social citizen – in this way, the commercial links social citizenship to homeownership.

The commercial opens with a long shot of a young man spreading out his arms, “This is my community,” he says, looking to his right, the camera cuts to a mid-shot and the man looks straight into the lens, locking eyes with the viewer, “I want to help take care of it.” There are at least two presuppositions that accompany this statement: 1) the community needs to be taken care of; and 2) there are a particular group of people who are best suited to take care of it. The problem at hand, however, is amorphous – the immediate appeal is not directed to a niche population, but to the community as a whole, and more particularly, citizens who participate in the social.
The next scene is a mid-shot of a woman sitting on a bench, “I want to teach my kids, to help others.” As she speaks, her son stands behind her, disinterestedly fidgeting with the back of a park bench. The syntagmatic arrangement of the mise-en-scene speaks to the mother’s dilemma: her son isn’t sitting with her on the bench as she addresses the viewer; rather he is behind the bench and thus outside of the discourse. Consequently, it is her responsibility to draw him into the discourse, to “teach” him to help others; to point out how he is an integral part of a larger community. Furthermore, this scene suggests that social citizenship is not a natural or common identity: it is not granted at birth like the status of legal or political citizenship; but rather, it is an identity that must be acquired, that must be learned, and consequently, must be taught. The third scene is a low-angle mid-shot of a businessman, “I wish I could say I volunteered more.” He says, looking off to the right, and then shrugging his shoulders. The shot positions the spectator in a way that they are looking up at the businessman. The camera angle suggests, perhaps literally, that this is a man who is looked up to in the community. The man’s intonation and body language, however, suggests that he knows that it is his responsibility to help, but also, perhaps, that he has not lived up to that expectation.

The issue at hand in each of these messages is not homelessness but the act of helping, of teaching, of volunteering – acts which compose the associational relationships that are essential to social citizenship (Eberly 1995). Each scene speaks to
an obligation and each character takes up this obligation in a different way. While the young man is enthusiastic, the businessman is reluctant or guilty. Furthermore, there is a lack present in each statement: the characters want to, or feel obliged to help, but they are not acting upon that desire in the scenes. Fannie Mae presents the Walkathon not as a means to help homeless people, but rather, as a means for people to partake in associational activities associated with social citizenship such as volunteerism and philanthropy. Perhaps more importantly, Fannie Mae provides a venue in which participants can be seen engaging in these activities. Through this engagement, participants enter the public sphere and assert their identity as social citizens. In sponsoring a walk for the homeless, Fannie Mae is simultaneously sponsoring the production of social citizenship.

The image of the social citizen occupies the focus of the commercial, but it does so by continually marginalizing homelessness, the very crisis that Fannie Mae sets out to “end.” Consequently, adomizen and the social citizen are intimately bound together. The individual can only “live the life of a civilized being according to the standards in the society” (Marshall 1964). if he/she can simultaneously point their finger at an individual who lives below these standards. Adomizen produces the possibility to volunteer; the possibility to help the community; the possibility to “help others.” Adomizen arises as a foil against whom the individual can distinguish
him/herself as a social citizen. It is through difference that the social citizen defines his/her social position. It is through difference that he/she takes up their privileged position.

III. Adomizen: Excluded from the Text; Excluded from the Space

The discourse of exclusion is a central feature in the promotion of the Help the Homeless Walkathon. Not only is the discourse present in the narratives that flow through the advertisement, but also within the individual parts that compose the narratives. The paradigmatic parts of the advertisement such as shots, cuts, characters, setting, etc. are essential to its denotative and connotative messages. The message is partially formed through the choice of setting, characters, shots, etc. but this choice, also marks an act of exclusion so much as “the choice of one excludes the choice of another” (Silverman & Torode 1980, 255). For example, the long shot in the opening scene could easily be replaced with a close up or a point of view shot, etc. But how would a different shot alter the message that is communicated? I explore these questions specifically as they relate to two key paradigmatic components of the text: setting and characters.
Public spaces

The choice of setting in the commercial plays an integral role in the construction of the message. Every shot is constituted within a public space. While the setting corresponds with the characters identity, for example the businessman is located in the business district, or, the mother and child in a park, etc. in each scene there is marked distinction between public spaces and private spaces such as the home. How is the message shaped by the use of setting? What does the exclusion of private spaces reveal about the advertisement’s message?

Ideally, public spaces are designed as a location in which citizens engage in public discourse; a location to see and to be seen. There is a tension, however, in this space because it is also the location where adomizen dwells. Public spaces are a location in which the rights and duties of citizenship find expression. There are both locations of citizenship, but also, the lack of citizenship. This lack is exemplified in the conspicuous absence of homelessness within the setting of each scene. Take for example the mother and the child in the park: the act of exclusion is particularly evident in this scene, considering that it is rare to encounter a park in Washington, D.C. free from all signs of homelessness. What then does the setting tell us about adomizen? On the one hand the setting provides a space in which people are more likely to think of their role as social citizens and of their role as community members.
For example, a young man throwing out his arms and saying “this is my community” inside his own home conveys a very different meaning, than if he is outside on the street. On the other hand, the setting suggests that while the social citizen is posited in opposition to adomizen, the social citizen simultaneously denies adomizen’s existence. The advertisement rids itself of all images or vestiges of adomizen, creating a subject position that exists purely in absence.

While the setting is a secondary feature within the mise-en-scene, it is, nevertheless, essential to the messages in the commercial. The significance is further suggested in the way in which each shot frames the setting. The majority of shots in the commercial are mid-shots with a low depth of field. Consequently, the background is often blurry and truncated. While it is clear that each shot takes place outside within the space of the city, it is generally unclear the specific location of each shot or, supplementary or peripheral actions that are taking place around the characters. Thus, the setting is continually marginalized in place of the character. While space is important, the focus remains on the people themselves. Different shots would come to change the significance of the setting and the messages. For example, a series of close up shots would entirely remove the setting from the discourse; while the setting is not the focus of the discourse it provides a necessary context from which to move forward; a common ground from which to discuss community issues. Alternatively, a series a
long shots would emphasize the location over the individual; consequently, it would shift the discourse from citizenship and the role of the individual in the community to the community as a whole, and, perhaps more specifically, the crisis of homelessness in Washington, D.C.

The absence of the Mall from the physical setting also bears some significance. The location of the National Mall is essential to the discourse of the Walkathon, and to that of the commercial, but it is essential precisely as an absence. The characters do not speak from a position on the Mall, but rather the Mall is posited as the end location. The Mall is essential to the commercials’ message, not because it is a location of homelessness, or a convenient location to walk, but precisely because it is a location where individuals’ identity as citizens is articulated. In this way, the transition from city space from which the characters speak, to monumental space where the characters are to walk, signifies for the characters (and the viewer), the transition from an individual to that of a social citizen.

**Characters**

The role of individual characters in the advertisement helps to shape the message, and more particularly, the mode of address. As alluded to previously, the characters in the commercial are characters with whom some viewers can identify and thus function as place holders in the narrative for the viewers themselves. What kinds
of people are included as characters? Who is excluded? While the characters
demonstrate a diversity of age, race, and gender, they are uniform in one feature: class.
Every character in the commercial is well dressed, clean cut, and visibly middle class.
The characters match the qualities of the ideal recipient of the message: a homeowner,
or potential homeowner. What is the significance of class in the advertisement? How
does the choice of characters help to shape the message?

The uniformity of class signifies an exclusive narrative which is premised on a
distinct binary between homeowners and the homeless. The term “Help the Homeless”
-presupposes an individual who is helpless and thus cannot help themselves. Perhaps,
the commercial takes it upon itself to only address middle class individuals because it
is operating on the assumption that only middle class individuals are capable of
helping. As a consequence of this discourse, adomizen is relegated to the image of the
infantilized child or of the victim. But unlike the child who is presented in the
commercial, adomizen is not provided with the opportunity to “learn” to be a social
citizen. Rather, adomizen is justified only in that it makes possible the subject position
of social citizen.

The advertisement for the Help the Homeless Walkathon is unique in its
exclusion of homeless people. While other walks such as the AIDS Walk or the Breast
Cancer Walk take up the position of those afflicted with the illness as well as survivors
in their advertisements and in the walks themselves, the homeless appear to be wholly absent from the official discourse of the walk. Furthermore, the discourse is premised on absence. If *adomizen* were included as a character, the message would shift drastically. His/her presence would extend the discourse from that of volunteerism and helping others to the act of empowerment and helping oneself. In this way, the discourse would shift from that of exclusion to inclusion; from victimization to healing. At the same time, the very reason that *adomizen* may be excluded from the advertisement is that his/her presence may in turn exclude homeowners and consequently disassociate viewers/walkers/borrowers. Since the primary denotative message is to promote Fannie Mae, then clearly, the advertisement will be constructed in a manner that best promotes Fannie Mae to the ideal consumer. Finally, the denotative and connotative messages in the advertisement suggest that there is in fact a structural necessity for homelessness: It is the discourse to end homelessness, which, produces in it, a narrative that interpellates individuals as social citizens.

IV. Making Social Citizens: The Interpellative Function of Homelessness

Fannie Mae’s advertisement marks a function of ideology that “hails” the viewer and transforms them into social citizens. As Althusser writes “All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the
category of the subject.” (1971, 172). In this way, the commercial calls to the viewers, as if by name, and identifies them as social citizens. The commercial performs the function of interpellation in two ways: 1) in the function of the gaze; and 2) in language through the pronominal use of “we.”

**The interpellative function of the gaze**

The syntagmatic arrangement of shots in the advertisement comes together to form a supplementary narrative that strengthens many of the connotative messages and also functions to interpellate the viewer. Through a progressive series of shots that move from long shots, mid shots, to close ups, the commercial creates an inclusive movement that draws the viewer into the mise-en-scene and more particularly into the ideology of the commercial. As the camera moves incrementally closer to the characters, it leads the spectator to identify with the characters: to see themselves as one of the characters on the screen, or, as a part of a greater social community.

Furthermore, the way in which the actors’ gaze is constituted, particularly in the last three shots, creates a powerful effect that addresses the viewer as a member of a larger unnamed group. The last three shots of the commercial are composed like moving portraiture: The businessman lifts up his head and, looking directly at the camera, he smiles faintly, as if now, he can look the viewer in the eye without being embarrassed. The next shot is of the mother who is sitting on the park bench with her
child. The boy has moved from his peripheral position behind the bench to a privileged position on his mother’s lap. They are looking at each other and smiling.

Finally, the commercial ends with a close up shot of the young man, looking directly at the camera, and smiling. The shot fades out as the man continually moves closer to the viewer. The characters’ engage the spectator by looking them directly in the eye. The characters’ gaze simulates an act of recognition – it seems to call out to the spectator through the screen and says “you’re like me!” It calls on the spectator to take up the position of the character in the commercial; more specifically, to take up their responsibility as a social citizen.

The last sequence of images marks the completion of a transformation for Walkathon participants from individual to social citizen that occurs within the commercial. While in the first four scenes, the characters’ expressed desire to “help” signifies a lack, Fannie Mae’s Help the Homeless Walkathon resolves that lack. The resolution is demonstrated in the last three scenes as the viewer revisits each of the characters one last time. Finally, it is the promise of fulfillment within this narrative that hails the viewer as as social citizen.
The Pronominal use of “We”

In addition to the gaze, language itself hails the viewer as a subject within society. As Emile Benveniste writes, “it is in and through language alone that man constitutes himself as subject” (1971, 729). In the advertisement, the pronominal use of “we” calls forth the viewer as a collective member in a specific group.

After the first four scenes, the commercial cuts to the intertitle and the narrator speaks up for the first time, “We’ve all talked the talk, now let’s walk the walk.” The pronominal use of we in the slogan immediately groups the spectator with the characters on the screen. While “I” is an exclusive pronoun which is used to distinguish oneself from others, “we” is inclusive and is often used to refer to the speaker plus at least one other. Furthermore, “we” is often strategically deployed in order to invent and to coalesce a group identity. John Wilson writes that “we” is used “to encourage solidarity; to designate and identify those who are supporters (with us) as well as those who are enemies (against us)” (Wilson 1990). Who is included in this “we”? And, who is excluded?

The pronominal use of “we” assumes that the viewer is like the characters. In the sense of the advertisement for the Walkathon, “we” can be characterized by a variety of middle class individuals who have a strong underlying sense of civic responsibility and either feel obligated to participate in the community or have a sincere
desire to help out. The group may not agree on their reasons for wanting to help, or to be involved, but are bound together by the obligation to do so. Thus, the “we” denotes a group of people who are bound by their identity as social citizens.

The group, of course, is not all inclusive. In fact, the group may more accurately be described by what it is not: adomizen. It is adomizen who is excluded from “we.” He/she is posited as other, not only through his/her absence in the images, and characters, but also within the language itself. It is this difference that makes possible a group identity, so much as, a social citizen is a social citizen because they are not adomizen. The pronominal use of “we” is significant in that it defines a specific yet amorphous group of social citizens and simultaneously functions to interpellate the viewer as a member of that group.

V. Conclusion

The implicit and explicit discourse of exclusion in the 30 second promotional ad for the Help the Homeless Walkathon suggests that the absence of the homeless from the walk is not accidental, but rather intentional: homeless people are excluded from the Walkathon because they do not belong in this monumental space; they are excluded from participating in the social as citizens because they are adomizen. Thus, the promotion for the Walkathon, and the walk itself, suggest that social citizenship
and homeownership are uniquely connected; conversely, the absence of a home and the absence of social citizenship too are connected. The discourse of homelessness is intimately bound to that of social citizenship, so much so, that each appears to produce the other. It is here, in the discourse of the Walkathon, that the discourse of homelessness is subsumed by the discourse of citizenship: homelessness is appropriated as a tool to interpellate social citizens.

The exclusion that takes place in the Walkathon carries with it repercussions that extend throughout the non-profit sector; the discourse of philanthropy; and in the design and implementation of social policy aimed to alleviate abject poverty. The exclusion suggests, that perhaps, these tools are not designed, as they claim, to “end homelessness,” but rather as an effective way to mitigate and control this population. Furthermore, these tools function as a means, not to engage homelessness in the social, but to produce social citizens.
Chapter 5. Conclusion

Every attempt to rethink political space in the west must begin with a clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between...private life and political existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house and man’s political existence in the city.
- Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*

I. *Adomizen* and the National Mall: Redrawing the Lines of History

*Adomizen* has a unique relationship to Washington’s monumental core: unlike home dwellers for whom the Mall is a location in which to engage in civic activities, it is a location in which *adomizen* dwells. While the public sphere is most often defined in opposition to the private sphere, these two concepts are blurred beyond recognition in the body of *adomizen*. In this way, he/she poses a threat to the concept of public spaces and that of the Mall. Consequently, *adomizen* has been excluded from the Mall throughout its history and simultaneously from the discourse of social citizenship. Conversely, *adomizen* poses a challenge to the old distinctions of the public and the private and consequently puts into question what it means to be a citizen. As such, concepts of citizenship and homeownership, are more intimately tied than they initially appear.
Within this thesis, each case study is examined as separate event, as it is articulated at the moment of discourse. At this point, I turn back over the three case studies in order posit possible connections that were not previously apparent. As Foucault writes, “I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether other groupings should be made…” (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 1972, 26). The relationship between the discourse of citizenship and that of homelessness suggests an alternative history of the Mall. In order to examine the groupings that give way to this history, I specifically look at three themes: terminology; treatment; and physical space. In some cases the application of these themes differs drastically, while in other instances, they resemble each other, as if twins.

**Terminology**

Terminology is not ahistorical; rather, the meaning of terms, even the same term, is contingent upon the context in which it appears. The terms *adomizen* and social citizenship are employed for the sake of analysis in all three case studies, but do they signify the same thing in each historical stratum?

The contemporary notion of “homelessness” has existed since the late 1860’s, but the term homeless itself, did not appear in common usage until the late 1970’s.
The term “homeless” does not signify a condition of poverty as much as it signifies a contemporary way of thinking about and categorizing this condition. Accordingly, it is anachronistic to take this term up across the different strata that I examine. While the Bonus Army is often described in historical accounts as poor and without homes, they are not described as “homeless.” While it also could be said that the term “adomizen” belongs specifically to the contemporary moment, the term denotes a specific relationship between homeownership and citizenship that is observable across historical strata. In addition, this word that I have coined is not articulated within the discourse of the case studies and thus lacks the connotations that the terms such as ‘tramp’ or ‘homeless’ bear. Here, adomizen is purely a theoretical term and operates well on a transhistorical level.

Nevertheless, the relationship that adomizen denotes is articulated in different ways in different strata. For example, the relationship between homeownership and citizenship is much more explicit in the story of the Bonus March than it is in the Help the Homeless Walkathon. During the Bonus March, those who lack homes are stripped of their rights as social citizens by military force. The rights to assemble, seek redress, as well as to gain a modicum of economic welfare are physically barred from the marchers. On the other hand, during the Help the Homeless Walkathon there were no police barricades or armed soldiers preventing the homeless from participating in
the event; rather, the homeless are excluded through a means of discursive erasure. For example, they are excluded through prohibitive registration fees, or, as I describe in detail in Chapter Four, in the textual representation in promotional material. In the example of Clark v. CCNV, the homeless are encouraged to use their own voice to express their plight and to locate micro-power positions from which to challenge economic and social policies in the early 1980’s. In this example, the body of adomizen is presented as a threat that is accordingly silenced by the Supreme Court. The potential for micro-power that is demonstrated in Chapter Three seems to have disappeared in the case of the Walkathon. Here, adomizen exists purely as an absence and lack of the ability to engage in micro-power struggles. While the term is applicable to each case study, the subject position and what this subject is capable of, changes across time.

The second term that is used throughout the analysis that requires additional attention is social citizenship. I contend that this term is transhistorical as well, in that it is measured by the standards of society. For example, a livable wage in 1980 is different from that of 1932, yet, in both cases, there is a certain standard which one requires to live. While these standards that define social citizenship have changed over time, the concept of social citizenship is still applicable. Social citizenship is measured by one’s ability to participate in the public sphere. Furthermore, adomizen reveals that
in order to participate in the public sphere as a social citizen, one must first be properly grounded in the private sphere. In other words, citizenship finds its expression in the public sphere, but is rooted in the private sphere and more particularly, the home.

**Treatment**

The concept of exclusion figures prominently in each of the stratum, yet, it is enacted in different ways. In the Bonus March, *adomizen* is expelled by force; in Clark v. CCNV he/she is excluded by law; in the discourse of the Walkathon he/she is excluded via discursive erasure. This movement from explicit to implicit exclusion suggests an increased sophistication in excluding and consequently in controlling *adomizen*. The different treatments of *adomizen* in different stratum are not arbitrary, but rather linked together in a sequential fashion. The forms of treatment are increasingly refined to enhance their power to exclude. In this way, the events of the Bonus March give way to the Help the Homeless Walkathon. The very crisis that Hoover is confronted with during the Bonus March, namely, what to do with the veterans, is eliminated in the Walkathon. One could argue that the option to deploy military force against a civilian population on U.S. soil is no longer an option, but more probably: it is no longer a necessity. What once had to be removed by force is now removed by discursive erasure. It is not that military force is not an option, but rather, that society has developed more effective means to exclude and to expel this
population. In this way, the act of erasure may be viewed as more violent than physical violence itself; it is a form of murder that kills without killing. One might call this process of erasure *excivicution*: a process of ridding *adomizen* from both physical and symbolic civic spaces.

**Physical Space**

Finally, the three case studies suggest a correlation between the discipline of the physical space and that of the body which operates within the space. Moreover, it is the history of *adomizen* that renders visible this relationship. Similar to the forms of treatment enacted upon *adomizen* in the Mall, there is a loosely linear development: as the space becomes increasingly disciplined, so too does the body. This development is particularly evident in the issue of camping on the Mall. During the Bonus March camping was wholly facilitated by the government – Police Chief Glassford helped to arrange a location for the marchers to stay and was relatively hospitable to the veterans. In Clark v. CCNV, camping was banned by judicial statute, not only as a physical activity, but also as a symbolic activity that may be used to communicate the plight of the homeless. The issue of camping returns in a strange way to the discourse of the Walkathon – the presence of the event tents and food resemble, in some ways, the same tents that were subject to controversy in Clark v. CCNV. These are some of the very activities that are cited in Clark v. CCNV as being destructive to the Mall and
thus subject to regulation. During the Walkathon, the image of the tent returns, but it is no longer threatening: it has been stripped of its significance, its voice silenced. The interrelationship of these events reveals again the presence of adomizen.

The management of physical space helps to define the different forms of dissent that are possible. As the Mall has become an increasingly disciplined space, the forms of dissent has become correspondingly limited. The dissent that was demonstrated in 1932 was not possible in 1982; and similarly, the dissent expressed in 1982 was not possible in 2007. In current debates over the use of the National Mall, there is a discussion among the National Park Service to move forward on a series of new developments, including the remodeling Union Square, the area in front of the Capitol, in order to add, among other things, a designated area for protests. The National Park Service cites the necessity to contain protests in order to preserve the park for all users. Opponents criticize the proposal claiming that it restricts First Amendment rights. (Ruane 2008) Here, the discourse of preservation returns again as a means to further discipline the space and the bodies that operate within this space.
II. Homeless No More

Contemporary social policy has placed renewed emphasis on “ending” homelessness. At the same time, however, the crisis of homelessness persists, and by many estimates has increased over the past five years. In 2004, Anthony Williams, the Mayor of Washington D.C., proposed a comprehensive plan to end homeless in 10 years. In a letter to stakeholders, Williams writes “Ending the social and economic scourge of homelessness – rather than just continuing to manage it – will benefit not only those who suffer the problem personally, but will also improve the quality of our neighborhoods and the experience of all residents and visitors” (Williams 2005). The major feature of Williams’ plan is a shift in focus from emergency services to a Housing First model. This model would place homeless people in permanent or transitional housing first and then address the issues that may have caused them to become homeless such as financial management, drug addiction, mental health, unemployment, chronic illness, etc. According to critics, what is missing from the plan is the creation of adequate affordable housing (Hickey 2006). The city has been eliminating emergency services (most recently shutting down DC Village) but they are not installing adequate alternatives to emergency resources. As a result, the homeless are being pushed onto the street or out of the city. The discourse of ending
homelessness is also present in the promotional material for the Help the Homeless Walkathon, Daniel Mudd, the Chairman of the Board of Fannie Mae Foundation writes, “Someone once said, ‘To solve a problem, walk around,’ which is exactly what 150 Fannie Mae employees did 20 years ago to help solve the problem of homelessness in our area” (Foundation 2007). Here, the crisis of homelessness is discussed as if it had been solved. Accordingly, homelessness is framed in a manner in which it is perpetually being ended just as in *Homeless No More* or perpetually being solved.

### III. Moving Forward

On December 17, 2007 a group of advocates set up a tent city for the homeless on the banks of the Seine in Paris. The group was protesting the government who had defaulted on a promise to add twenty-seven thousand new affordable-housing units for low-income families and individuals. The police ended the protest by launching tear gas into the encampment and then systematically breaking down the tents. In moving forward from this project, it would be a valuable task to look at the issue of homelessness beyond the condition in Washington, D.C.’s monumental core and to ask whether or not the term *adomizen* accurately describes the condition of homelessness
in other American cities or even international cities such as the current issues that are
taking place in Paris.

Finally, it would be a valuable task for future research to reassess contemporary
social policy and social services in light of *adomizen* and to ask: How are these
measures complicit in the production of *adomizen*? How might they be redesigned to
eliminate or reorient this subject?
Works Cited

Introduction


Chapter 1


**Chapter 2**


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**Chapter 3**


**Chapter 4**


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Chapter 5


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