REFINING IDEAS: NORM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE JUBILEE 2000 CAMPAIGN

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Communication, Culture and Technology

By

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Washington, DC
April 21, 2006
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Abstract

Under what conditions do states change their behaviors to conform to international norms? While states often agree with international norms in principle and rhetoric, whether or not the state changes its behaviors to conform to the norm is much less predictable and occurs much less often. This thesis seeks to provide an answer to this research question by investigating the empirical puzzle of why the United Kingdom and Japan relieved their international debt holdings as a result of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Where previous campaigns to enact debt relief were largely unsuccessful, Jubilee 2000 was able to engender favorable outcomes by utilizing mass media and framing strategies to set state expectations of behavior. The campaign achieved this by refining the nebulous concept of international finance as a social idea. Through mass media and framing, Jubilee 2000 was able to institutionalize a refined notion of international debt, setting expectations of state behavior. Ultimately this thesis contributes to the growing body of literature that explores international norms, institutions, mass media and framing processes in an attempt to explain international polity outcomes.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review

International relations scholars in recent years have returned to understanding the role of normative and ideational concerns in the international polity. This turn in scholarship exists largely because of the political realities of the late 20th Century. In the post-Cold War world, collective actors in the transnational space have mobilized around a number of normative issues. Many of these issues, focused on the effects of globalization, center on social issues of human rights, corporate responsibility, and the nature of standards of conduct. A compelling and perhaps universal feature of these transnational social actors is that they face tremendous power asymmetries with respect to engendering outcomes. Often pitted against large corporations or state governments, these non-state actors face an uphill battle in attempts to persuade and effect change. Yet, transnational non-state social actors are often able to exact favorable outcomes, persuading states and corporations to change their respective positions on social issues. In the most successful of initiatives, these changes of practice lead to the eventual creation of a set of international standards that effectively change operating procedures for states and firms.

Most commonly associated with the constructivist approach to international relations theory, scholars have undertaken the process of understanding the many puzzles that develop from shared ideas and normative concerns. How are such ideas created? Why do international actors often respond to normative concerns and other times do not? This thesis is concerned with explaining these puzzles of a particular type
of shared idea: norms. Norms, defined as a set of international standards of behavior that actors align themselves with, represent a powerful collective shared moral idea of what is right and wrong that compels actors to change behaviors. Norms thus precede traditional political science analytics such as principles, rules and decision-making procedures. In nearly all cases these shared ideas that have the potential for changing behavior are proffered from social actors that face power asymmetries compared to the actors whose behavior they are attempting to change. Yet, in many cases these social actors are able to engender favorable outcomes, creating a norm that changes behavior across a broad scale. Social actor groups and networks routinely change state behavior through this process. Yet, not all norms that are lobbied for result in behavior change. Moral ideas are constantly being created and lobbied for by social movements and other actors for change, but we lack a sufficient theory to explain and predict how and why certain norms become part of the structure of the international system and acted upon, while others do not. This thesis suggests that norms are actionable when they become institutionalized into the political and social structure. We can define institutionalization as the process of refining an idea into an actionable unit, incorporating the idea into the set of international rules that states oblige by. Ideas are only acted upon if they are refined in such a way that political actors are compelled to change behaviors. To accomplish this, norm entrepreneurs and social movements must use an existing institution, mass media, to aid in the compelling process. Social movements that are successful in negotiating and forging partnerships with mass media outlets and refining a
message that resonates with both domestic and international constituents, are ultimately the ones that are successful in having their norm institutionalized into the larger political and social structure. What accounts for this refinement and why does some refinement result in favorable outcomes while other initiatives fail?

**The Argument**

This thesis argues that in order to explain this puzzle of norm institutionalization, an often overlooked component of the norm-creation process, communication of the norm itself, must be analyzed. Ultimately it is through a communication strategy that utilizes framing and mass media effect that norms are successfully refined such that they represent an actionable idea. Through framing and mass media the norm becomes more than a shared moral idea of what *should* be done; the norm is transformed into the *rules and changed political behaviors*. Mass media serves as the institution that combined with a framing strategy, institutionalizes the norm into the system, and often results in action in the international arena.¹ Institutionalization serves as a crucial step between norm emergence and action.² The use of mass media as an institutionalizing force, while tremendously powerful in its ability to reach a broad audience and convince large numbers of the legitimacy and moral imperative of a norm, is not a strategy without

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¹ Mass media here and throughout the thesis is used in the singular to suggest media as a singular institution. There are many types of media that constitute mass media, including television, newspapers, radio and Internet.

² It is important to note that norm institutionalization does not necessarily mean decisive action by political elite. Rather, action can not occur before institutionalization occurs, making it a necessary condition for action.
challenges. Attracting mass media outlets is an inherently contested endeavor, with many social movements and advocacy groups vying for the media’s attention. In addition, as the framing scholarship has illustrated, not all issue framing initiatives are created equally and success in crafting an actionable message is not guaranteed. In the end, communication of norms matters and it is the process of achieving mass media communication, the structure of the negotiations and partnership creation that can be used to analyze and predict norm institutionalization outcomes.

<table>
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<th>Dependent Variable</th>
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| Norm Institutionalization | Idea Refinement Process | 1) How the issue is framed  
2) How local media attention is attracted  
3) How political elite is targeted |

Scholars of social movements and the strategies of transnational social advocacy networks have long understood the importance of communication in a general sense. By using media, these social actors are able to communicate their message to a broader audience, extending the reach of their ideas internationally. The contribution of this thesis is to build upon this general understanding to illustrate how specific strategies of issue framing and media partnership forging lead to success eliciting political change. Recent study of mass media theory that incorporates an interdisciplinary approach, combining fields such as the social sciences with semiotics and linguistics, has elicited
both a more comprehensive understanding of how broader reach occurs, as well as a new understanding of precisely how mass media effect changes opinions of the audience.

Scholars of mass media suggest that beyond achieving a broader audience scope, which is crucial to any successful norm creation process, mass media also has the power to reflect and create new social reality by institutionalizing selected ideas. It does this through a number of distinct processes including: inundation of visual imagery that links ideas to recognizable visuals that dominate the audience’s consciousness; linking of issues with celebrities and leaders held in high-esteem to convey the relative importance of the issue; aligning the issue with political and media elite to suggest that powerful actors believe in the issue as well; providing legitimacy to an issue by covering it; framing the issue in a way that evokes and emotional and shared response, and finally, mobilizing the issue across a broad international audience. Through these processes, mass media has the ability to effectively change prevailing wisdom on issues. For the scholar of international norm creation, this is particularly important because norms are precisely exercises in social construction and changing prevailing action.

What is missing from this theoretical understanding of the role of communication is an analysis of how general ideas are refined into actionable units. Scholars have illustrated how mass media has the potential for creating new reality, but they have not uncovered the process by which it occurs. How does a norm move from a general assessment of what is right and wrong to an actionable step by states? The goal of a norm is to persuade a set of actors to change their behavior based on a shared moral idea
about what is right and wrong behavior. In a sense, this persuasion is about changing reality into something new, something morally better. How this persuasion occurs is through institutionalizing the idea into the system such that action results. We can define this new reality creation or action as normative institutionalization: the ability of norm entrepreneurs to move a norm from idea to action. Institutionalization, at its center, is about turning an idea into reality. Just as norm creation is about the attempt to change behavior, institutionalization is the process by which the behavior is instituted into the social and political structure. The puzzle that develops is why are some norm entrepreneurs successful at institutionalizing their normative stance and others fail? Among a universe of moral ideas, why are some made so compelling that states take action and others do not? What role does media play in the institutionalization process? What are the conditions under which some norm entrepreneurial groups effectively use mass media to “step in” in their efforts to institutionalize the norm? How precisely do norm entrepreneurs attract the attention of mass media outlets and distinguish themselves from other social movement competition?

This thesis is concerned with both a theoretical and empirical understanding of norm institutionalization. First, it seeks to illustrate why and how refining ideas such that they are institutionalized into actionable units is central to the norm life-cycle. Second, it will validate the theoretical claims made of issue framing and mass media effect on norm institutionalization and delineate the conditions under which norm entrepreneurs are able to gain the attention of the media and use it to their advantage, through empirical case
studies. By examining how norm entrepreneurs are able to forge and negotiate partnerships with mass media outlets, we can test the theoretical hypotheses scholars have proffered about the role of media for social movements as well as delineate conditions under which we expect norm institutionalization to occur. This thesis contributes to the growing scholarship on norm emergence and social movement strategies by providing both a theoretical argument for the importance of idea refinement, issue framing and mass media in the norm life-cycle and eventual institutionalization into the international political structure and an empirical account of how this relationship between norm entrepreneurs and mass media outlets develops and is utilized. Variation in how these processes are undertaken results in varied levels of success by norm entrepreneurs.

The international norm chosen for analysis is that of international debt relief. As Josh Busby (2001) notes, “International finance is a rather arcane topic for grassroots advocacy” (p. 4). Yet, it is surprisingly one that gained a great deal of visibility in the latter part of the 20th century when the Jubilee 2000 campaign, focused on developing world debt relief, became one of the more popular and visible social movements in recent history. The case of Jubilee 2000 is suited particularly well for examining the theoretical argument outlined in this chapter precisely because of its within-case variation of the independent variable. Jubilee 2000 represents not one attempt at persuading a state to adopt a policy of debt relief, but a number of attempts at persuading numerous states to adopt debt relief policies. Each persuasion endeavor, while tied to the
overall Jubilee 2000 goals, exhibited its own mass media tactics and outcomes. Within the G-7, for example, states such as Britain and Canada were early adopters of the debt relief norm, while France and Japan lagged behind (Busby, 2000). These differences in outcomes can be explained partly through the independent variable analyzed: the strategies and methods used by norm entrepreneurs to refine their ideas and extend their message to broad audiences. The methodology for conducting the Jubilee 2000 case study is set up a structured focused comparison between two of the countries involved in the persuasion efforts in order to delineate the conditions under which beneficial mass media partnerships and strategies lead to norm institutionalization. The intent here is to examine the structure of tactics used by norm entrepreneurs to create mass media partnerships in order to determine the explanatory sub-factors that lead to success.

Scholars of international norms have provided much of the theoretical and empirical foundation of explaining norm creation and adoption, but lack a sufficient theory to explain why variation in how a norm is communicated results in whether or not a norm is institutionalized. By applying theories from mass media, linguistics, political science and semiotics scholars, we can explain the new terrain of norm creation through established theory of mass media effect and mass media partnership strategies.

The thesis will proceed as follows. First, it will review the political science literature on the norm creation, adoption and institutionalization process. Having determined at what stage(s) of the norm life-cycle communication elements are most relevant to institutionalization of the norm, the thesis will turn to theories of social
movement communication in order to understand precisely why communication matters, including the use of mass media and spotlight effect, and framing processes. Having established *why* communication and mass media effect matters in the institutionalization of norms, the thesis will turn to explaining *how* mass media can be used by social movements and norm creators to help them overcome power asymmetries and engender favorable outcomes. It will highlight the various strategies and tactics that are employed by norm entrepreneurs to take advantage of mass media effect by forging partnerships with mass media outlets and gaining their attention. Unveiling each of these strategies, we will be able to create a matrix of necessary and sufficient conditions and explanatory sub-factors that comprise the independent variable and will be used in the empirical section to determine success or failure in of the norm institutionalization initiatives in the case studies. Next, the thesis will test the argument proffered, that explanation of norm institutionalization can only be done by analyzing how entrepreneurs strategically approach mass media outlets to cover their story, through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 relief campaign. Finally, having conducted an in-depth analysis of the case, conclusions can be drawn that speak to how mass media effect can predict norm adoption, which strategies are most effective in taking advantage of and using mass

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3 It is important to note that there are various other arguments that could be offered to explain the Jubilee 2000 case. These arguments include utilitarian, rational-choice and realism-based explanations. These counter-arguments will be dealt with in the Conclusions chapter of the thesis, once the empirical evidence for the institutionalization argument has been presented.
media effect and how the interpretive case study can be generalizable for other instances of norm institutionalization initiatives.

Norms as Shared Ideas

International relations scholars have recently turned to understanding the strategies transnational social actors use to achieve favorable outcomes in the face of these power asymmetries. One of the strategies these actors employ is norm creation. The literature illustrates how social movements and transnational advocacy networks are particularly adept at bringing visibility and salience to issues by highlighting what Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink term the issue’s “oughtness,” or normative judgment (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). By bringing attention to a given issue and delineating the normative stance of what is right and what is wrong, firms and states are often compelled to change policy direction, creating a positive outcome for the actors that are attempting to elicit such change. The success of norm-creation strategies thus creates a puzzle: how and why are norm-creation processes able to overcome power asymmetries? Under what conditions can we expect the new norms to be effective in determining political outcomes? Why are some norms successful and others not?

Constructivist scholars in the field of international relations have begun to tackle this puzzle by asserting that shared social ideas and knowledge are critical to the understanding of political outcomes. John Ruggie (1998) notes that it is precisely these shared concepts that are the “building blocks of international reality” (p. 33). Alexander
Wendt (1999) extends this concept to suggest that these building blocks comprised of social knowledge create a structure of social purpose that can be defined as the “international distribution of ideas.” The distribution of ideas often creates mini “worlds” in which inhabitants share normative conceptions of right and wrong, affecting how they approach politics (Rosenau, 2003). This view that social ideas can serve as part of the structure of international politics finds itself in sharp contrast to the realist notion that it is the power of the nation state that should be analyzed in explaining outcomes, but nevertheless helps to elicit the logic behind the power of ideas. The constructivist approach is particularly useful in explaining cases where relatively weak non-state actors such as transnational activist groups are able to engender favorable outcomes against powerful state actors or international organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002). The approach helps to elicit precisely why ideas are important in international political economy and the consequences of shared idea adoption among states. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) relate, for example, how pressure from non-government organizations (NGOs) led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ch. 3). It was ultimately a shared idea - human rights standards are critical in a global society - that led to salient changes in the international polity structure.

The existence of a shared idea, however, is not the sole catalyst for political outcomes. The shared idea must be strategically developed, communicated and socialized among the actors and policymakers themselves in order to evoke change. This strategy of attempting to create a shared idea that will effect political change is at the
heart of norm construction. International norms, defined as a set of standards of behavior for actors within a given context or identity, have been long studied and their salience understood; scholars have more recently turned to understanding the process behind how norms are constructed and how the study of norms can be used in making causal claims (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The standard of behavior that creates the structure, or backbone of norms, is based on what is considered to be the shared moral idea; the behavior that passes the “right or wrong” test. Thus, central to strategies of creating an agreed upon standard of behavior is finding, and invoking, the shared moral idea within the greater “international distribution of ideas.”

Once the shared moral idea has been invoked, states and other actors have compelling reasons to conform their behavior to the shared idea. It is often the case that nation states follow international norms because they are beneficial to the state in terms of coordination and “stability of expectations” (Khagram et al., 2002). For example, states provide a host of welfare services to their citizens in order to create stability among the population. In other cases the state’s identity within the larger construct of the international community may compel it to adopt norms that states adopt. States typically are not served by being perceived as outliers with respect to agreed upon behaviors. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink note that from a macro-level perspective, norms also hope to create stability within the international system. They note that “norms channel and regularize behavior; they often limit the range of choice and constrain actions” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 894). Thus from a citizen’s and international
polity structure perspective, norms are beneficial in helping to ensure that shared moral ideas are implemented and followed, by limiting and constraining behavior of states and other actors.

Yet, there are a number of international norms that are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the nation-state, or in other cases, the goals of private firms. In many instances the acceptance of an international norm requires the state to change its operating procedure, often for monetary or political loss. The question becomes why any authority would accept and adopt international norms that limit its function (Khagram et al., 2002)? Goertz and Diehl (1992) have posited that variation in why some norms are adopted, particularly when they are against a nation’s utilitarian interest can be partially explained by understanding the *norm type*. They identify different norm types, based on the norms relationship with the state’s self-interest. Thus, four different variables are investigated in order to determine what type of norm is being identified: behavioral regularity in conforming to the norm, the norms direct relationship to self-interest, potential sanctions involved with norm compliance, and the norms relationship to morality. Variation of these variables leads to three distinct types of norms: cooperative norms, hegemonic norms, and decentralized norms. International debt relief, the case to be examined here, is an instance of cooperative norms, where rich nations cooperate together to aid developing nations. As such, the norm in question is of a *humanitarian* nature, characterized by high levels of cooperation. According to the Goertz and Diehl
framework, cooperative norms show little by way sanctions with compliance, they are based more on a nation’s desire to cooperate in the international system.

For the purposes of this thesis, the norm type that will be examined is of a cooperative nature and exists because of largely humanitarian concerns. This is an important distinction to make precisely because whether or not a state institutionalizes a given norm can depend on the type of norm in question. A norm that carries high levels of sanctions for non-compliance will have a different affect on the state than a cooperative norm with low sanctions, for example. Purveyors of cooperative and humanitarian norms theoretically have the deck stacked against them in attempting to convince states to adopt the norm precisely because the threat of sanctions and other detrimental effects are not present. Humanitarian norms thus represent relatively weak norms with respect to the state’s initial response; there is typically not a pressing reason for the state to adopt the cooperative norm. This point is important for campaigners who are attempting to convince a state to change its behavior, as they must institutionalize some salient reason for the state to cooperate.

Finally, norms are not one-time events; a norm does not suddenly appear and states are compelled to either adopt or reject the shared idea. Rather, norms are created through an often lengthy and complicated life-cycle that includes the original creation of the shared idea and salient socialization and institutionalization processes among actors that lead to its adoption.
The Norm Life-Cycle

The purpose of this section is to review the norm literature proffered to date and make an argument for where the norm institutionalization process occurs within the norm life-cycle. The process of norms influencing behavior, the movement from shared moral assessment into actor action, occurs through a three-stage process. Scholars of norms generally agree on the aims and effects of these stages: the first stage is norm \textit{creation} or “emergence”; the second stage is broad norm \textit{acceptance}; and the third stage is \textit{internalization} as the norm becomes deeply entwined with the domestic and international consciousness (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This three-step model is important because it suggests that the goals and priorities of each stage will be different, that each stage depends on the success of the previous stage(s) and that the actors and institutions involved in each stage of the process may be different.\textsuperscript{4} Norm institutionalization, as a process, is concerned with all three stages of the norm life-cycle. It is through institutionalization that states and other actors accept and act upon norms, thus it is inherently linked to how a norm is created and the efforts conducted to have it accepted, adopted and internalized. It is important to note that the institutionalization process is not necessarily linear. That is, institutionalization is not a discrete step that \textit{necessarily follows} norm adoption. Rather, it is a parallel and

\textsuperscript{4} It is important to note that while scholars have generally agreed on the concept of norm life-cycles, this should not necessarily connote a beginning and an end to a norm. A successful norm’s final resting place is within the “international distribution of ideas,” the most successful of which will prescribe and constrain behavior. In this sense a norm never dies, unless it is superseded by another norm.
simultaneous process that brings norms to action. For instance, a norm could be created and accepted by a group of actors as a morally good thing, but it is only when the norm is institutionalized that behavior change occurs.\(^5\) Thus, this thesis departs from the existing norms literature to suggest that “norm adoption,” as a process, is not necessarily about action. Adopted norms and acted-upon norms are two different entities and the processes by which each is achieved are different. To understand how institutionalization occurs, it is worth reviewing the various steps of the norm creation and adoption process delineated by norms scholars.

The most salient component of the first stage of the norm life-cycle is that the norm’s creation is attributed predominantly to the efforts of individuals, organizations, or institutions that serve to convince large numbers of states or other actors to adopt a new set of standards for behavior. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) refer to these persuaders as “norm entrepreneurs” (p. 895). As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest, “Norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” (p. 896). Numerous examples of successful norm creation exist that trace the process to one particular group, or often one individual, that successfully built what would become an international norm. James Martin (1984) relates how Raphael Lemkin single-handedly

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\(^5\) Many examples of this exist, one of which will be dealt with in the Jubilee 2000 case of international debt relief. Debt relief as a concept or shared moral idea existed well before the Jubilee 2000 campaign, but it was only through institutionalization through framing and the media that action occurred. Other salient examples include responses to genocide.
redefined and reinterpreted the issue of ethnic mass violence, coining the concept of “genocide,” that was eventually adopted by 55 states at the UN General Assembly in 1948. The “Genocide Treaty” reflected the efforts of Lemkin, the norm entrepreneur, and the salience of shared moral ideas in the world political order. His efforts, often enacted alone, persuaded states to adopt genocide measures, effectively changing the operating procedure for dealing with mass violence against ethnic groups. Thus, norm creation and emergence are characterized not necessarily by the strength in numbers of those attempting to bring about the set of international standards, but rather the strategies employed and tenacity of the norm entrepreneurs involved in the process itself. This is important to the scholar of norm creation because it suggests that resources and power are not necessarily the defining characteristics of a successful norm enterprise; there is something else within the norm creation process that leads to its success or failure.

The strategies employed by norm entrepreneurs in the first stage of the creation process are particularly important because norms do not exist, or develop, in vacuums. Rather, potential shared moral ideas must compete with a number of interests (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) illustrate, for example, how norm entrepreneurs at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights were able to reflect women’s rights as an issue of human rights, supplementing the previous understanding of women’s rights as largely a discrimination issue (pp. 183-184). This successful strategy led to the creation of a women’s rights norm that suggests women’s rights are human rights. Yet, the process of achieving this norm emergence was not without its
contestation. Prevailing wisdom and alternate views about the role of women were firmly implanted in the international political arena previous to the norm entrepreneurs taking up the issue of women’s rights as human rights. Put another way, the norm entrepreneurs were forced to deal with a previously held shared idea in order to create a new shared idea. What results is norm contestation where norms are often pitted against each other, leaving the entrepreneurs and their respective strategies to be the predictor of outcomes. This norm competition leads to two peculiar aspects of the norm-creation stage that are related and will be discussed in depth: inappropriate behavior wins (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) and communication matters.

Precisely because existing norms set standards for behavior, they can be seen as arbiters of appropriate behavior. Put another way, norms in some sense determine what type of behavior is, and is not, appropriate. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note that it is precisely because of this structure that the first stage of norm creation is often characterized by its inappropriateness. Norm entrepreneurs, in contesting and challenging the existing structure, “may need to be explicitly ‘inappropriate’” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 896). For example, norm entrepreneurs will routinely chain themselves to fences or trees (such as protestors at the World Trade Organization meetings in Cancún in 2003), destroy government property, attack government officials or any number of other inappropriate acts. This type of inappropriate behavior is ultimately about communicating the salience of an issue through exercising of voice and agency. Victor Turner’s (1982) anthropological work on the effectiveness of groups,
what he terms *communitas*, provides a theoretical backbone to the inappropriate behavior: “Communitas is made evident or accessible… only through its juxtaposition [to] aspects of social structure” (p. 44). Ultimately by striking out in inappropriate ways, norm entrepreneurs are able to signal to a larger audience that the old norm must be destroyed and something new installed in its place. This exercising of agency is important for understanding the norm creation process because it suggests that one of the most substantial predictors of a norm’s ability to emerge is how the idea is voiced.

Before the new norm is installed and the end of the first stage of norm creation completed, norm entrepreneurs must persuade a critical mass of states to adopt the norm. This critical threshold, what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) term the “tipping point” is what signifies the movement from norm emergence to norm adoption (p. 901). While scholars have studied the events that occur in the process of reaching, and causal effects of, the tipping point, there exists a gap in the literature that explains precisely how the events in the tipping process are triggered themselves. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note, “although scholars have provided convincing quantitative empirical support for the idea of a norm tipping point and norm cascades, they have not yet provided a theoretical account for why norm tipping occurs, nor criteria for specifying *a priori* where, when, and how we would expect it (p. 901). Finnemore and Sikkink proceed to provide partial answers to the puzzle by providing arguments for two hypotheses: the tipping point rarely occurs before one-third of the total states in a given system adopt the norm and *which states* adopt matter. These insights are particularly beneficial to the scholars of
norms creation because they provide an empirical basis for analyzing the tipping point processes; by bringing quantitative analyses into the model a clearer picture of when we can expect norm adoption to occur is created. Yet, additional questions remain: what is the process behind convincing one-third of states to adopt a norm? What exactly does adoption entail and how is it different from institutionalization? What tools and strategies do norm entrepreneurs use to convince states to take on their normative stance? Further, why would any state act as a “first-mover” in norm adoption?

An additional problem with the norm adoption step is the conceptual difference between adoption and action; it is this gap that the institutionalization concept seeks to resolve. Adoption suggests that states and other actors are conditioned into accepting the moral idea being presented to them. They have come to agree with the position of the norm entrepreneurs and have agreed upon a structure for behavior. This does not necessarily result in the state changing its behavior, however. States routinely accept and adopt a moral position without changing behaviors. Prominent examples of this can be seen in responses to genocide and other acts of mass violence. Nearly all developed nations have adopted the normative stance that genocide is wrong and that nations should come together to prevent it. Yet, in recent cases where genocide has occurred, such as Rwanda and the Sudan, action is not always guaranteed. Thus, there is a subtle difference between the adoption of a norm in rhetoric and principle and institutionalization of the norm into changed rules and behaviors (see Figures 2 and 3 below). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) do note that institutionalization into legal
frameworks and organizations are important in changing behaviors. This thesis takes institutionalization as a process further, suggesting that action only will occur once the norm has been institutionalized into the social and political structure. Institutionalization thus becomes a parallel process within the norm life-cycle that will determine whether or not a norm becomes actionable. Why are some norms adopted (such as genocide) and institutionalized (such as international debt relief) and others not? In attempting to solve this puzzle, we must look at the process behind how a norm is communicated and refined. Ultimately, differences in norm communication will affect not only which norms are able to convince states to adopt, but which norms are institutionalized into action as well.

Figure 2. Norm Life Cycle. Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896.

Figure 3. Revised Norm Life Cycle: Norm Institutionalization.
Once a critical mass of states has adopted the norm and the tipping point reached, additional states adopt the norm, often in large waves of action. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) refer to this dynamic as “norm cascades.” “At this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or ‘contagion’ occurs in which international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Put another way, international socialization, or “peer pressure,” effects begin to develop as states quickly work to adopt norms that other states are implementing. As mentioned earlier, there are often economic and political incentives for quickly adopting norms. As economists have pointed out, there are costs associated with being a “rogue state” in the international political economy that governments are not always willing to bear despite disagreements on normative bases. States might, for example, disagree about norms regarding cultural legacies such as foot-binding, female genital mutilation or other human rights abuses, yet they are compelled to adopt the norm for economic reasons such as sanctions or marginalization within the international political economy structure itself. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out, there is also a two-level game occurring with norm adoption in that domestic legitimacy, or the notion that citizens look to the international arena in order to make sense of, and judge, their own government, is important because “it promotes compliance with government rules and laws” (p. 903). Put another way, citizens take cues from other nations with respect to their opinions of how their own state’s government should act. This serves as a particularly potent method of
socialization; states fear being outside of the fray for domestic as well as international political economy reasons. It also serves as a strategy for norm entrepreneurs who are able to institutionalize the notion that other highly-regarded and powerful states have taken action on the norm.

Finally, once a norm has been sufficiently socialized amongst nation-state peers, they may become widely accepted or internalized by the actors. This can be thought of as “status quo” or “taken-for-granted” quality (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The result is that the norm is viewed no longer in terms of being a new norm, but it has sufficiently replaced the standard operating procedure to a degree that the norm’s moral imperative is now natural. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) rightly point out, these norms are particularly difficult for political scientists to study precisely because of the embeddedness of the norm in culture, or everyday life. Without a degree of separation, or distinction between no norm and new norm, successfully studying the internalized norm is a tall order. On the other hand, internalized norms are extremely powerful in that they effectively change culture itself. If we define culture as the everyday lives of humans in a given context, be it community, nation, firm, etc., the ability for a norm to change the way individuals live is extremely powerful. In a sense, every day reality has been changed through the internalization of the new norm.

Thus, through the three-stage model of norm creation and socialization, scholars have been able to identify the important characteristics of norms, the agents that construct them, and the decision-making processes by which they are adopted by states.
What is missing however is a more nuanced theoretical construct that accounts for precisely *how* these processes work and *why* some norms turn into action and initiatives and others do not. Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Margaret Keck and others have provided a strong foundation for further theoretical work in describing the backbones of norm creation. We can now take this research further by uncovering the institutionalization process that moves norms into action. Put another way, having identified the larger structure, we can now begin to dig deeper into the process to reveal the important underpinnings that make them work; specifically, we can turn to the strategies of norm communication to develop a theoretical framework that explains, and predicts, the conditions under which norms will be successful in changing operating procedures.

**Communicating the Norm: Framing**

The three-stage model of norm creation and adoption is useful in tracing the process and causal mechanics of norms, but it is not complete. Specifically, while we know generally that a “tipping point” occurs that signifies a critical mass of states adopting the norm such that cascades of adoption among other states can occur, we know less about precisely how that point is achieved. What are the strategies and processes utilized by norm entrepreneurs in reaching the tipping point? In particular, in any given campaign, how is the tipping point of the state reached? The norms literature has taken a close look at the tipping point as it occurs state-to-state, but further investigation is
needed to determine what accounts for a change in behavior in any given state or campaign. This thesis argues that communication of the shared moral idea, what will eventually become the norm, to states and firms is critical to the success of reaching the tipping point. Communication here is defined as the process by which the shared moral idea is conveyed to international actors in an attempt to engender change in behavior by firms or states. These actors are comprised of two main stakeholder groups: policymakers and a broader general audience that exerts pressure on the former group. This communication to both stakeholder groups occurs through two distinct processes: framing the issue and utilizing mass media effects to make the frame more “real.”

Framing processes or the strategic attempt to package ideas together is essentially an attempt to produce attention to a given cause. This framing process meets two goals: it “render[s] events or occurrences meaningful,” and “function[s] to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, 464; Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing, in its most simplistic form, is a process of rendering a particular idea or situation in such a way as to make it both easily understood and powerful. Linguists and cognitive scientists have provided the theoretical underpinnings of the process. A frame is the conceptual framework behind language; words are linked to particular conceptual and cultural metaphors (Johnson & Lakoff, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). These metaphors are highly salient, as they are what make words meaningful – we relate the words to a concept in our minds that evoke emotions. Rodger Payne (2001) notes, for example, that with respect to environmental discourse leading to
the Kyoto Treaty, “environmental crisis” as a frame was far less successful than “environmental security.” The reason is that the conceptual metaphor of an environmental crisis did not provoke the more tangible danger of an environmental security concern which could theoretically lead to scarcity of resources and subsequently economic costs (Busby, 2002). It is important to note, however, that frames are not just strategies for translating visceral or normative causes (such as environment degradation) into something more tangible (such as economic costs). Rather, frames also represent the process of creating meaning; they are “the strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, 1996, p. 6). Put another way, frames are not merely the repackaging of ideas, but the process of refining ideas as well. Some scholars have related this process to the synthetic nature of music; musicians borrow themes or ideas from previous music and synthesize them to create something new (Busby, 2002). Returning to the notion of a collective shared moral idea, framing represents the process by which the idea is refined into an idea that is effective because of the emotions attached to it and easily communicated to a greater audience. Framing thus represents not only the process of packaging, but the synthesizing of collective ideas and the creation of something new. This is precisely how ideas, and norms, are refined.

The connection between framing and norms is the evolution of the shared moral idea into a strategic and powerful linguistic package. As Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston (2000) note, this powerful linguistic device works precisely because it is linked
to an underlying ideology already present in the audience of the frame. Ideologies are “any system of meaning that couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with value and norms relevant to promoting or resisting change” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 7). In addition, “an ideology links a theory about society with a cluster of values about what is right and wrong as well as norms about what to do” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 9). Thus, ideologies are normative in nature; they help decide what is right and wrong by linking disparate concepts to a particular unifying idea or core value. Oliver and Johnston (2000) illustrate this concept in the socialist ideology, showing how diverse and “competing” social theories were united by a core opposition to capitalism (p. 7).

Ideologies can be thought of as the structure of thinking: they help to connect seemingly disparate ideas around a common core, usually normative in nature. Because ideologies are linked to a common normative core, they often result in networks of like-minded individuals sharing the core. In anthropological terms this might be thought of in terms of culture: a network of individuals that all maintain autonomous thought and their own ideas, but nonetheless share a particular core value. Networks of norm entrepreneurs fit this theoretical abstraction quite nicely; they share a moral idea, or core value, and work together to package the idea for political change. Precisely because the repackaged idea speaks to an ideology that is shared among a larger group, or ideological network, the idea becomes particularly powerful to the greater audience. In political science terms, ideological networks are best exemplified in epistemic communities and social movements.
Peter Haas’ work in illustrating that “epistemic communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country” is indicative of the power of ideology: its power is derived from networking individuals together around a common idea (Haas, 1992, p. 27). Whereas epistemic communities represent use of ideology that is often less normative in nature, often forming around salient scientific issues for example, social movements represent the best example of networked mobilization around normative issues. Social movement organizations concerned with human rights, for instance, have been successful only when they create a “human rights culture” (Mertus, 2004). The diction choice of “culture” is not inconsequential. Mertus argues that rallying a social movement around persuasion, either of governments or firms, is not nearly effective as culture building. “A human rights culture is the vehicle through which a particular set of shared beliefs and understandings—human rights norms—take root in and influence a population” (Mertus, 2004). The implication of a human rights culture as strategy for social movements is that culture itself, through building a shared ideology, is able to effect change. These examples of networks where ideology plays a unifying role are important because they illustrate the central nature ideology plays in international outcomes. Haas demonstrates for example that epistemic communities are able to influence states and compel them to action, particularly in instances of information asymmetry where the community can fill in the knowledge gap. Human rights social movements have played large roles in changing international organizations to internalize human rights frameworks (Power &
Allison, 2000; Mertus, 2004). Ideology, then, is not just an abstract concept used to group individuals into easily definable buckets. Rather, dissecting ideology illuminates two unique and salient properties: it links disparate concepts to core normative ideas in the thinking process, and it allows for networking of individuals to that core idea, creating the possibility for effecting change.

Given the nature of ideology in linking an idea to a central core concept, it is easy to see the link between ideology and frames. Both are mechanisms that are connected to the life-cycle of ideas and normative issues. Importantly, however, ideologies and frames are not synonymous. Frames are the cognitive devices or heuristics that help individuals relate concepts to each other in the thinking process. Oliver and Johnston suggest that frames specify how we think about things, the process behind our thoughts, while ideology speaks to why it matters. Myra Ferree and David Merrill (2004) suggest why this delineation is significant. The fact that gender can be framed as a biological sex difference or a social role does not speak to whether or not this framing is used to support feminist or anti-feminist ideology (pp. 249-250). In other words, the frame is separate from the ideology; it has helped in the thinking process in linking gender to sex difference and/or social role, but it does not help to create the link to a particular normative position. Put another way, a frame without an ideology is only an outline or shadow of its full potential. As Oliver and Johnston (2000) suggest, “as a substitute for ideology, frames are woefully incomplete: they offer too shallow a conception of what is involved in developing ideologies and an one dimensional view of how others [adopt]
them” (p. 9). The real power of frames is realized when the frame is linked to a particular ideology.

The successful framing process is a continual cognitive activity that links the frame to an ideology; it is what puts everything together. A frame alone does not imply normative good or bad about a given concept, it merely invokes a cognitive structure that if implemented the right way, powerfully links the structure to ideology. As Ferree and Merrill (2004) suggest, “framing [is] both strategic and social,” in this regard; it is a strategy of linking a concept to a socially salient normative concept (p. 297). The implication of this strategy is that if one can create a frame that is linked to an emotional ideology, it becomes powerful. From the perspective of norms and the entrepreneurs that attempt to socialize states and firms to adopt them, framing strategies represent a powerful way of packaging what they are trying to promote. This helps to somewhat solve the puzzle of why some norm entrepreneurial activities are successful and others are not. In large part the success of norm creation and reaching the tipping point rests on how the shared moral idea is framed, or packaged. Is the frame linked to a salient cultural metaphor that elicits emotional and psychological response from actors? Is the ideology being tapped into one that resonates with a broader audience? These questions help to elicit the differences between successful framing of norms versus unsuccessful initiatives. Yet, it does not help us achieve a broader understanding of norm creation because a crucial link is missing: how the frame is communicated to stakeholders. Put simply, a powerful frame linked to salient cultural metaphor or pertinent ideology is only
as successful as the way it is communicated to its audience. In order to evoke change through framing and reach action in norms, the powerful frame must be combined with mass media communication to become real.

A central component to the norm model is how the frame and ideology of the shared moral idea are communicated. Using mass media effect theory the thesis will build upon the framing model suggested above and norm model delineated by scholars to suggest that norms are acted upon when they are institutionalized into the prevailing political and social structure. This institutionalization is essentially about taking a nebulous and arcane concept, such as international debt relief, and distilling it into a digestible concept that is powerful to political elite and more importantly, constituencies. By linking a normative concept to an ideology that the state cares about, norms are institutionalized into the psyche of social structure. Precisely because the normative idea is crafted in a way that resonates and is ingrained in the social structure, it creates new truth: that the normative idea should reflect reality and the state should change its position to act upon the new idea. Ultimately this ability to create new truth is what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) terms “social construction power.” This power ultimately allows actors to construct a new social reality through the institutionalization of norms.

Recalling the discussion above, frames function by linking a given word, or words, to a concept. Semiotic theory provides a number of ways of investigating the notion of concept. One method defines concepts as bearers of meaning and seeks to understand how the meaning itself is created, by delineating a concept into its
constitutive parts. This allows for analysis to be conducted at a level beyond the abstract concept to include signs, signifiers, and signified meaning; the emphasis is on understanding how the components of a concept work together to create meaning (Saussure, 1922). While this method of understanding concept provides a robust manner of dissecting language into how the underlying meaning is created, it lacks a basis for understanding why some concepts resonate in individuals and others do not. This problem also sheds light on predicting which frames, in an environment of competing frames, will win.

If meaning and ideology help to predict which frames will win, how do we analyze a nebulous concept such as meaning? Concepts may be the bearers of meaning, but why is it that not all meaning is created equal? Semiotic theory attempts to shed light on this perplexing issue through an analysis of tropes. Tropes include a large number of linguistic devices, or figures of speech, that all use shared understanding as the ultimate bearer of meaning. Tropes include devices such as metonymy, irony, synecdoche, and metaphor. All of these devices work in largely the same manner by relying on shared understanding for communicative function. For our purposes in dissecting the framing process, metaphor is the most common method of generating meaning through shared understanding. Metaphor is essentially the borrowing of an understanding in one

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6 Metonymy is used to refer to a figure of speech that consists of the name of one thing for that of another of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated. Irony refers to the use of words to express meaning other than the literal meaning; it refers to an incongruity between what is expected and the actual result. Synecdoche is a figure of speech by which a part for the whole or the whole for a part. Metaphor refers to a figure of speech where a word or phrase denoting one type of object or idea is used to refer to another object or idea.
conceptual or meaning domain, to create understanding in another domain (Lakoff & Johnston, 1980). George Lakoff notes that humans rely on the borrowing of concepts from various domains to both think and speak (Lakoff & Johnston, 1980). More importantly, however, these metaphors are often cultural in nature. That is, the understanding that is borrowed from one domain must be a shared understanding if meaning is to be transmitted effectively. Lakoff proffers the notion of “war” as a cultural metaphor that permeates our thinking and speech on a daily basis: “He shot down all my arguments” and “He won the argument” are both instances of communication relying on cultural metaphor to evoke shared meaning (Lakoff & Johnston, 1980). The only reason the two sentences mean anything to a listener is that the listener understands war. To “shoot down” is “to best,” for example. These are metaphors because they rely on the domain of war to make sense and they are cultural because only one with the notion of war is able to understand the underlying meaning. Cultural metaphor then is a trope that helps to illustrate why not all concepts or meanings are created equal. Effective conceptual devices invoke a cultural metaphor that is shared and thus are able to elicit stronger response.

Shared understanding is not enough, however. In addition to evoking a shared understanding, cultural metaphors must be salient. Salient here can be defined in a reflexive manner: a salient cultural metaphor is one that evokes a personal response. Merely having a frame that evokes shared understanding only guarantees that the audience hearing the frame understands what is being said. Crucial to the communication
process is that the shared understanding evokes something that is personally important. Recalling the lead-up to the Kyoto Treaty discussed above that witnessed a change in tactic from framing the environmental situation as one of crisis to one of a security issue, “crisis” as a salient cultural metaphor was weak; the reflexive personal importance was not strong. Crisis is a broad term that can be applied to many fora: the Asian Financial Crisis, the Hong-Kong WTO Ministerial Talks Crisis, etc.; it does not evoke a personal response because the link between crisis and the personal is not clear. “Security,” however, is a much stronger salient cultural metaphor. While security can be applied to a variety of fora as well, it is easier to witness the reflexive aspects of the term. The notion of personal security, that an environmental problem might have an eventual effect on the well-being of the individual, maintains a strong reflexive component that makes it salient. Thus, from a communications perspective, the conceptual element of the frame is particularly important. All meaning is not created equal and it is through a combination of shared understanding and evoking personal response that some frames are able to convey more powerful meaning than others.7 Having uncovered how the actual frames

7 Cultural studies and semiotics scholarship has provided a wealth of knowledge and theoretical explanations for why frames are successful at creating meaning. More specifically, cultural studies scholars are interested in explaining how successful frames end up as de facto truths. Roland Barthes, in Mythologies, writes of the discovery of ideas that are provided and circulated through society, effectively constructing the world around us (2001). Barthes notes that these ideas are essentially myths, or constructed ideas. The term “myth” should not connote falseness or untruth, but rather an idea that is constructed; a myth is a myth precisely because it has what Barthes terms a “motivated” construction. To the scholar of international relations theory this resonates with debates regarding constructivism, that the world around us is constructed by ideas; what Barthes is introducing is the notion that these ideas are often intentionally created and represent motivated action. This has tremendous implications for framing because it suggests that by redoubling efforts to propagate a message, groups can essentially create myths that encode meaning and this encoded meaning eventually can become a constructed reality.
can be more or less powerful depending on the conceptual metaphor utilized, it is important to understand how the frame is communicated to a larger group and how these frames affect behavior.

**Reaching Normative Action through Mass Media: Institutionalization**

Mass media effect influences state behavior in two ways. First, mass media serves as an institution that “sets the rules” and structures the political and social debate amongst its audience set. Second, mass media pressures political elite to change state behavior through its influence on domestic constituency groups. Turning to the first effect first, institutions occupy a unique role in the international political structure in that they are able to effectively structure the discourse and debate about particular behavior. March and Olsen (1998) note that institutions serve as “relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations” (pp. 943-969). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note that while this definition of institutions may sound quite similar to that of a norm, there is an important difference: aggregation. While norms delineate single standards of behavior, institutions emphasize the “way in which behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). The similarity is an important one to note, however. Institutions structure the debate and provide the “rules” of behavior; norms seek to make changes to that structure and re-write the rules. In this sense norms and institutions are inherently
linked as norms rely on institutions for implementation, or more concretely, institutionalization.

Given that institutions possess tremendous power in their ability to dictate policy discussions and set rules for the debate, it is critical to specify under what conditions mass media can be considered an institution. Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez’s (1975) definition of institution per the *Handbook of Political Science* suggests that: “Politics – that is, deciding who gets what, when and how for a society – often, but not always, takes place through formal organizations and procedures. To the extent that these organizations and procedures become stable, recurring, and valued patterns of behavior, they become political institutions.” More specifically, institutions serve as the “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1988, p. 383). Given that mass media serves as stable entities (major mass media outlets in much of the world have flourished in the late 20th century and continue to grow), recurring in that they are ever-building through accretion (movement from newspapers to television; addition of the Internet as mass media outlet), and valued patterns of behavior (such as nightly newscasts, political advertisements during election cycles, airing of political debates, serving as agenda-setters, etc.), it qualifies as a political institution, capable of deciding “who gets what.”

Further, if institutions are taken to serve as the rules of the game or the structure of expectations, mass media fits that framework quite nicely. The “Frankfurt School” of
scholars, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, concerned with the role of media and propagation, rising out of the wake of World War II, provides much of the conceptual foundation scholars use today to understand the media’s ability to both create new social reality and control thought (Baudrillard, 1988; Chomsky 1988). The Frankfurt School’s analysis of mass media was essentially centered on the ability for media to form both social and political consciousness. Adorno notes in *The Jargon of Authenticity* that “mass media can create an aura which makes the spectator seem to experience a non-existent actuality” (Adorno, 1973). These cognitive changes, experiencing that which does not exist, sensual orientation reflecting outside stimuli as opposed to internal thought processes, that Marshall McLuhan noted in his conception of the global village in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, are effects of mass media itself (McLuhan, 1962). What is significant here is that mass media is capable of defining the rules of the game: it can create “non-existent actualities,” projecting these rules on its audience, setting their expectations and controlling their perceptions. Thus, mass media fits both social science and cognitive definitions of institutions.

As an institution, mass media can be *controlled* and utilized just as it can be *controlling*. Put another way, as Timothy Cook (1998) notes in his treatment of mass media as a major political institution in the United States, “Newsmaking and its place in the political system is best conceived not as a linear, unidirectional process but as interactive and interdependent, the result of what I have elsewhere termed the *negotiation of newsworthiness*” (p. 12). Political actors, journalists, social movement
leaders and norm entrepreneurs thus interact through a series of negotiations, within the institution, in order to determine outcomes. In a very real way mass media serves as institutional scaffolding, the structure in place that determines who is in the debate and how the debate will be run. Without that institution, deciding “who gets what,” becomes a more complex endeavor. Thus mass media, by serving as an institution, provides norm entrepreneurs with a mechanism for helping to determining “who gets what,” or put another way, what norms are institutionalized by mass media such that they become reality in the media’s discourse. By working with mass media, norm entrepreneurs are able to distill complex ideas into actionable concepts that are accepted into discursive debates. This is a critical step in the norm adoption process as it enhances socialization by institutionalizing the norm into major discourse debates.

Institutions, like international organizations, are also subject to bureaucratic and organizational pressures and dynamics (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). In this way they do not serve as “black boxes,” where inputs simply pass through and become outputs, but rather there are processes that occur within the institution that are important to the output itself. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004) note, institutions, as organizations, are bureaucratic and subject to their own interests and “logic of action.” This view is consistent with the view of institutions in this thesis: mass media acts in its own interest and chooses stories that it feels will resonate with its audience. Further, the precise bureaucratic processes and decision-making that occurs in international organizations is present in mass media as well. As Gitlin (2003) notes, understanding the nuances of a
particular mass media’s bureaucracy is crucial to success. The lesson for norm entrepreneurs is that in order to be successful in institutionalizing norms, the interests of mass media must be understood and combined with the processes within the institution.

Once the norm has been institutionalized into the social and political structure through mass media, its institutionalization has another salient effect: pressure on political elite from below. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) note that within the norm creation and adoption process, the ability for norm entrepreneurs to “speak” to domestic audiences is of particular importance as it increases domestic legitimacy: “Domestic legitimacy is the belief that existing political institutions are better than other alternatives and therefore deserve obedience” (p. 903). For the norm entrepreneur this is an important concept because it suggests that through reaching domestic constituencies about alternatives, what other nations are doing in a given space, norm entrepreneurs can convince constituencies that their norm is preferable. “Increasingly, citizens make judgment about whether their government is better than alternatives by looking at those alternatives (in the international and regional arena) and by seeing what other people and countries say about their country” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). This is incredibly important because it suggests that there is a “two-level game” that occurs in the norm institutionalization process. Norm entrepreneurs must work internationally to institute their norm in the political and social debate structure, but they must also work with domestic constituencies to convince them that the institutionalized norm is the way to go. This is best achieved through mass media. As noted earlier, mass media is
powerful precisely because it institutionalizes ideas and sets the structure for the debate. By playing the two-level game with mass media, norm entrepreneurs are able to set the structure for the international debate and then work with domestic constituencies to follow the norm. Norm institutionalization then fills in the gap in the theoretical norm life cycle of how domestic audiences are convinced to adopt a given a norm. Two-level games have illustrated the importance of domestic constituencies in effecting outcomes derived from the political elite (Putnam, 1988). Norm institutionalization then is the process by which domestic audiences are socialized into accepting the norm that will be enacted through political actions of the elite. In effect, norm entrepreneurs use media to step into the discourse, providing legitimacy and to the norm and including it in its sphere of consideration. A puzzle thus develops: how precisely do norm entrepreneurs convince mass media outlets to “step in”?

Using Mass Media to “Step In”

One of the more common metaphors used by journalists in the 20th century to describe the news reporting process is that of “holding a mirror up to reality” to reflect what is occurring in the world back to the audience. Scholars of mass media in the late 20th century, spurred by controversies of the media’s role in the Vietnam War and student protests, began to see mass media not only as reflectors of reality, but creators of the reality as well. As Todd Gitlin (2003) notes in his seminal study of the role of mass media in the social movement Students for Democratic Society, “[Journalism] was at
least in part composing reality, and the composition was entering in our own
deliberations – and more, our understandings of who we are and what we were about” (p.
xiv). Which stories and events are “reflected back” to society and how they are reflected
very much determines the perceived reality of the situation. As Gitlin (2003) notes, this
has tremendous consequences for political and social movements:

Political movements feel called upon to rely on large-scale communications in order to matter, to say who they are and what they intend to publics they want to sway; but in the process they become ‘newsworthy’ only by submitting to the implicit rules of newsmaking, by conforming to journalistic notions (themselves embedded in history) of what a ‘story’ is, what an ‘event’ is, what a ‘protest’ is. The processed images then tends to become ‘the movement’ for wider publics and institutions who have few alternative sources of information, or none at all, about it; that image has its impact on public policy, and when the movement is

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8 Cultural studies scholars are provided a theoretical backbone for how this reality composition occurs. Jean Baudrillard notes that the propagation of ideas and objects through mass media serves to create new “hyper”-reality (1988). Through the overloading of information in mass media societies, individuals are able only to synthesize a relatively small number of ideas from the universe of ideas presented. The ideas that become more easily synthesized into truths are the ones that are duplicated and repurposed in multiple forms. As Baudrillard (1988) suggests, it is precisely through media devices that this propagation and replication occurs:

Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. (pp. 144-145)

What Baudrillard is suggesting is that through a reproductive medium, ideas or constructed myths, not only become “real,” but they become more real than the reality they are replacing. This “hyper-reality” is created through mass communication when what is being reproduced begins to feel more real than reality itself. As media studies scholars have shown, this theoretical construct is particularly salient in newsmaking precisely because the story or event that is reported on does not occur through chance, but rather is the product of a complex process of interplay between the media and movement attempting to create the story
being opposed, what is being opposed is in large part a set of mass-mediated images (p. 3).

This section turns to uncovering the precise strategies norm entrepreneurs use to communicate their norm to other political actors and the greater public. Having established that through mass media effects, institutionalization of the norm into the social structure occurs, we must turn to the process behind that selection. How do norm entrepreneurs convince mass media outlets to cover their story? What are the implicit rules that entrepreneurs must obey in order to have the media serve as a beneficial force for their cause? By examining the process behind news-making, we can derive a structure of strategic action that serves as the basis for communicating the norm to enough actors to reach the norm tipping point of acceptance.

Norm entrepreneurs are typically more dependant on mass media outlets than mass media outlets are on norm entrepreneurs. At stake for the entrepreneurs is the institution that will help them to redefine their normative issue and ingrain it into the underlying political and social structure. At stake for the mass media outlet is a utilitarian function of market share. Where the norm entrepreneurs need mass media to accomplish their task, mass media outlets need interesting and compelling stories to drive audience numbers. More specifically, mass media outlets are crucial to norm entrepreneurs for three distinct purposes: mobilization, validation and “scope
enlargement” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Mobilization refers to the need for norm entrepreneurs to distribute their shared moral idea to a larger audience through public discourse. As discussed earlier, in order to achieve the tipping point in norm creation, a critical mass of actors must adopt the given idea. Mass media outlets allow norm entrepreneurs to spread or mobilize the norm efficiently to a large audience.

In addition to mobilizing and spreading the shared idea through a large public audience, mass media outlets also provide a level of validation to the norm entrepreneurs’ initiative. Media spotlight is a method of illustrating the importance or salience of a group’s message. As William Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993) point out, “When demonstrators chant, ‘The whole world is watching,’ it means that they matter, that they are making history. The media spotlight validates the fact that the movement is an important player” (p. 116). From a norm entrepreneur’s perspective, this is a critical step because it provides legitimacy to both the work of the entrepreneur, but more importantly, the shared moral idea itself. By having the idea discussed through mass media channels, policy-makers and the international actors that norm entrepreneurs are trying to attract are notified that the idea has gained substantial standing within the “international distribution of ideas.” As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) poignantly suggest, “A demonstration with no media coverage at all is a nonevent, unlikely to have any positive influence either on mobilizing followers or influencing the target. No news

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9 Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) in “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems” do not refer specifically to “norm entrepreneurs” as their focus is on movements more generally. I am extrapolating the strategies they delineate for movements more generally for norm entrepreneurs.
“is bad news” (p. 116). Validation thus serves to illustrate to the actors norm entrepreneurs are attempting to reach that the shared moral idea is relevant, powerful and legitimate.

Finally, mass media outlets also provide norm entrepreneurs with an ability to redefine the scope of the issue. For instance, if norm entrepreneurs are attempting to create a norm relating to labor standards in a developing nation, publicity through mass media allows the entrepreneur to focus narrowly but build support broadly. Norm entrepreneurs might bring in additional actors to help to help fuel the initiative. E. E. Schattschneider (1960) notes, “If a fight starts, watch the crowd” (p. 3). The idea here is that a changing audience, or the altering of actors and players on the side of a movement, can help to change power dynamics. Gitlin (2003) notes in his survey of social movements using media to achieve outcomes that the use of celebrities is precisely the type of strategy that aids in changing power dynamics. Thus, while the scope of the norm creator might initially be quite narrow, in an attempt to change a specific behavior, mass media allows the entrepreneur to broaden its base of support quite broadly. This broadened base is beneficially precisely because the broader support an initiative has, the more likely the support will resonate with an audience. The emphasis becomes not only the shared moral idea or initiative itself, but the sympathy and support it has generated among notable actors, such as celebrities.

While the media presents tremendous possibilities for the norm entrepreneur in its ability to mobilize, validate and broaden scope, it also presents unique challenges in
building partnerships between entrepreneurs and media outlets. Media-entrepreneur partnerships do not grow organically and without considerable effort on the side of the norm entrepreneur. The partnership is based on convincing the media that the story is one that is worth telling. As Gitlin (2003) notes, mass media outlets are inherently about selecting from a large pool – they choose what to report on, thereby creating a prevailing definition of what is news. This prevailing definition, or “dominant frame,” thus becomes the de facto structure, or what Gitlin (2003) terms “ideological hegemony” (p. 9). As he notes, “Mass media are, to say the least, a significant social force in the forming and delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes, and moods – of ideology, in short” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 9). The ideology Gitlin speaks of is really the creation of reality. Through reproduction of assumptions, attitudes and moods, the news effectively creates an ideology that its viewers are inculcated to. This has significance consequences for norm entrepreneurs because it suggests that in order to convince a media outlet to cover a story, perhaps one of human rights abuses or corporate governance malfeasance, the story must fit within the ideology that the mass media outlet has created and perpetuates. Precisely because of this characteristic of mass media, norm entrepreneurs must frame their issues in ways that resonate not only with the broader audience, but often with the ideology of the media itself. If not, the story will likely not be covered.

In order to resonate with these two-fold interests, audience and ideology, norm entrepreneurs must ensure that their framing strategies are closely aligned with both. This poses particular difficulties for norm entrepreneurs that are attempting to spread a
share moral idea that does not resonate with the particular ideology of the mass media outlet. Finnemore and Sikkink refer to this problem at the level of contesting norms: norms compete with each other for resonance and salience among the greater public. The contestation also occurs, however, before the norm is created, at the level of frame contestation. As Gitlin (2003) notes, from a mass media perspective, the frames social movements choose are incredibly important as they are what link an idea to an audience (ch. 11). Frames must be dramatic, speaking directly to an audience about something they care about emotionally. However, precisely because a number of groups are incessantly attempting to partner with mass media outlets, simply having a resonating framing strategy is not enough. Alice Cooper (2002) in her work on framing and mass media strategies notes that it is this congruence between ideological framing and mass media framing that helps to explain which movements are successful in their initiatives. Gitlin (2003) notes that successful framing strategies, as it relates to attracting mass media attention, must also align closely with the interests of political and mass media elites (pp. 283-287). Given the contestation involved with competing frames, the ones that align close to the ideology of the mass media outlet win. This is of particular importance to norm entrepreneurs precisely because norms, by definition, represent a change in operating procedure. Norm entrepreneurs are attempting to change the way actors, be they corporate or state, conduct business. If norm entrepreneurs are to be successful in cultivating and spreading a normative position that requires international actors to change behavior, they must be savvy in relating their position through media so
as not to alienate political and media elites; there is always another frame and issue to be publicized.

**Strategies for Media-Entrepreneur Partnerships**

While the media-entrepreneur relationship is a complicated one, there are a number of strategies that can be employed to help norm entrepreneurs mitigate the process of forming a media partnership and ensuring that its initiative is not rejected for failing to fit in with the ideology of media outlet. Mass media scholars have proposed a number of hypotheses that speak to a movement’s ability to create stronger partnerships with mass media outlets, thereby securing a channel for broader dissemination of their message. By testing these hypotheses with empirical case studies, a more concrete structure that can be used to predict outcomes for norm entrepreneurial groups can be created.

First, the success of norm entrepreneurs is dependent largely on the characteristics of its organization. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), “The greater the resources, organization, professionalism, coordination, and strategic planning of a movement, the greater its media standing and the more prominent its preferred frame will be in media coverage of relevant events and issues” (p. 121). Media outlets, like most businesses or corporations, respond favorably to organizations that are professional, well-run and organized. This characteristic is a marker of “seriousness” and suggests to the media outlet that the norm entrepreneur group is not a fringe element, but
rather a “serious player” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 121). The fact that media outlets respond favorably to such characteristics returns us to Gitlin’s notion of the mirror that reflects reality, but the reality is one that is selected. From the media’s perspective, there is an interest in choosing to promote movements that appear organized and professional. “The burden of proof is on the movement to show that it is a potential force. Here journalists act as self-appointed surrogates for political elites, assuming, perhaps unconsciously, that if a movement seems sloppy and disorganized in dealing with them, the authorities it is challenging will be unlikely to take it seriously” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 121). The crucial point here is that if Gitlin is correct in asserting that movements must cater to the political and media elite in order to have one’s message distributed, then at least appearing to be professional and organized is a strategy that can be used to meet that criterion.

Second, while appearing professional and organized is often a prerequisite for gaining the confidence of media outlets, the appearance of being an upstart or fringe movement is a hurdle that must be overcome for the norm entrepreneur’s message to be taken seriously. Scholars note that movements that approach the media face an uphill battle from the very start, for many of the reasons discussed above. Once they have reached the top of the hill and have convinced the media outlet to carry their message, the message must be relayed such that it gains legitimacy among viewers. If the message is communicated from a group that appears to be too extremist or pushing only one ideological perspective, it is likely to fail to obtain this legitimacy among viewers. One
strategy for circumventing the problem of appearing too extremist is what Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) refer to as the “division of labor” strategy (p. 122). In this tactic the main actors involved in a movement do not necessarily become to communicators of the movement’s message through the media. Rather, the main actors will defer to other partners, or *celebrities*, to relay the message to the public. This has the benefit of removing the “baggage of deviance” from the movement’s message (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 122). Further, movements also benefit from the covering of multiple viewpoints of a controversial issue. If a movement appears to be proposing only one extremist viewpoint, it is difficult to gain legitimacy among a broad audience; providing multiple viewpoints, even if skewed towards the position of the movement, allows for legitimacy building and the message is received more as news than opinion. Finally, as Gitlin (2003) notes in his study of the creation of the American New Left movement in the 1960s, using a division of labor strategy that includes celebrities allows for the media to capitalize on the celebrities’ performance capabilities. In a sense, the celebrity or spokesperson becomes as much about entertainment as it is about communicating a norm.

Third, narrow issues areas are often preferable to broader issue areas. As discussed earlier, narrowing an issue area is one benefit of using mass media outlets to communicate a message – it forces the movement to be specific and attract a broad audience around a tangible, focused issue. From a strategic perspective, norm entrepreneurs must constantly walk a thin line between asking for too much and asking
for too little. If the movement attempts to change fundamental cultural institutions, for example, it risks “being denied standing altogether or being branded as dangerous threats” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 123). However, if the norm entrepreneurs seek too little, they risk “being forced to settle for a few symbolic gestures that change little or nothing” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 123). Unfortunately for norm entrepreneurs there is no concrete rule for how large an issue area should be. Yet, by at least starting with narrow issue areas, entrepreneurs can be assured of not being written off completely. The obtaining of “symbolic gestures” is more advantageous to a movement than being branded as a “dangerous threat.” Further, the strategy taken by the norm entrepreneur might depend on the audience of the particular media outlet being utilized. For example, as Gamson and Wolfsfeld note, movements are often unwilling to “water down” their message in an attempt to reach as large of an audience as possible without alienating a considerable piece of the group. However, if the media outlet offers a national or global audience, it is advantageous for the entrepreneur to both narrow and soften the message, making it more palatable to a larger, more generalized audience. Thus, by focusing in on a particular narrow issue and softening the language, examples used, etc., norm entrepreneurs can achieve greater visibility through alienating less of the audience core.

Finally, evidence suggests that movements that utilize visual material in disseminating their message via mass media are more effective than those using purely print media. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) note, “The more the media actor emphasizes visual material in its news production, the more likely it is to produce action
strategies that emphasize spectacle, drama and confrontation” (p. 124). Images work well for norm creation for a variety of reasons. First, as Finnemore and Sikkink note, and as discussed earlier, the norm creation process often leads to inappropriate behavior. This inappropriate behavior, be it chaining oneself to a building, setting fire to resources, etc., is more communicable in images than it is in print. Put another way, “fire in the belly is fine, but fire on the ground photographs better” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 125). In addition, as noted above, celebrities and other noteworthy individuals also play a crucial role in a movement’s communication strategy with respect to mass media. Images provide instant, powerful recognition of the celebrity and association of celebrity with cause. Finally, the strategy of using images returns us to Baudrillard notion of hyper-reality and the creation of reality through reduplication and repetition. The mirror that the mass media holds up reflects and creates reality at once. Images serve to provide an enhanced reflection, and thus represent a beneficial strategy for norm entrepreneurs attempting to create new reality.

**Bringing it Together: The Cases**

In the end, the way a norm is communicated is crucial to predicting its success of creating eventual action by states and other international actors. Norms seek to create a new international reality by changing behaviors such that they conform to an appropriate moral standard. We can define this process as norm institutionalization. The moral shared idea is instituted into the existing political and social structure, providing
compelling reasons for states to conform to the new structure. By both reflecting and creating reality, mass media represents the institution that is a source of tremendous power for norm entrepreneurs, who traditionally face an uphill battle in attempting to have more powerful actors change their behaviors. Mass media, as a political and social institution, is precisely the instrument of choice for norm entrepreneurs who wish to institutionalize their idea amongst a greater public. While the theory is simple, its execution is quite complex. Ultimately norm entrepreneurs must compete with a number of contesting claims, moral ideas, groups, institutions and organizations that all seek mass media attention. Unfortunately for norm entrepreneurs, gaining the attention of mass media outlets and convincing them to “step into” the discourse on the topic can be the most difficult, and critical, stage of the norm life-cycle. Accordingly, entrepreneurs must utilize a number of strategies that are designed to garner the attention of mass media outlets by providing them with something tangible and beneficial. These strategies include framing of issues in an effective manner by linking the norm to shared cultural metaphors that elicit strong, emotional response from a board audience, framing the issue in such a way that it is strategically aligned with the perceived interests of media and political elite, forging partnerships with media outlets such that standing is created for the issue and use of effective media ploys and tools such as celebrities, visual imagery and other entertainment devices. Through these strategies norm entrepreneurs, while facing an uphill battle, can successfully attract media attention and have their
issues disseminated to a broad audience and the shared moral idea replace current reality with a new reality.

Methodology

Given the claims made by this thesis about norm institutionalization and the role of idea refinement through mass media partnership forging and communication strategies, it is worth reviewing the criteria by which the case studies where chosen to validate the paper’s hypotheses. The universe of cases to choose from is instances where a norm has been created and norm entrepreneurs seek to have the norm made into an actionable idea such that it is institutionalized into the political and social structure. There are many cases in which norms exist but the institutionalization lags behind. Cases of genocide, referring back to earlier in the chapter, fit this set of cases quite well. Nearly all countries have adopted the norm that genocide is bad, but it has not been sufficiently institutionalized as actionable. This is evidenced by the failure of nations to respond to the Rwandan genocide, for example. Thus in the absence of refinement that institutionalizes the norm into action, the norm becomes merely that: a norm with no action.

For our purposes, a case that exhibits variation in the manner with which norm entrepreneurs attempt to refine the norm into an actionable unit will serve as a beneficial case to choose within the universe of cases. This will allow us to illustrate how variation within refinement strategy leads to different outcomes at the norm institutionalization
level. This is important because if cases were chosen based on the other end of the equation, looking at dependent variable variation, it would be difficult to determine causal linkages. Further, cases that exhibit the ability to control for, and contrast strategies, within the case is extremely helpful as it allows the researcher to be more confident that the claims being made are true. The Jubilee 2000 case fits this criteria nicely.

First, the case is an example within a universe of successful norm institutionalization cases. Jubilee 2000 was successful in that the end result of their strategies and initiatives was the forgiveness of international debt (at the Cologne Summit – see end of chapter for discussion of events since then). Second, the outcome (dependent variable) occurred because of the strategies used by the norm entrepreneurs (the independent variable). These strategies vary considerably within the Jubilee 2000 case, when viewed at the country level. The case therefore provides for the ability to trace changes in strategy and outcomes through the timeline of the initiative. By process tracing the efforts in Japan, for example, the thesis will show how original refinement strategies did not work in securing a desirable outcome, but later strategies that took into account the learning that occurred were successful in refining the idea into an actionable unit. Thus, the Jubilee 2000 case provides a nice single-case analysis that can be broken down into a variety of cross-country analyses, allowing for illustration of how variation of refinement strategy leads to variation in outcomes.
It must be noted that this study benefits tremendously from the work done by Joshua Busby, whose 2004 Georgetown doctoral dissertation examined the role of discourse in creating international norms. Busby used the Jubilee 2000 campaign as a case study and thus provides much of the background discussed in this thesis. Further, much of the evidence provided in this thesis is based on the groundwork conducted by Busby and the author is indebted to Busby’s fine research. Without Busby’s fieldwork and interviews, the process-tracing and thick description methods used in this thesis would not have been possible. Importantly, however, this thesis differs significantly from Busby’s work by both extending and refining the argument he makes. Busby argues that the international debt relief case can be explained by looking at how norm entrepreneurs used “strategic framing” to focus on specific “domestic veto players” in each of the countries analyzed, and argues that this micro-approach to framing, the focusing on key individuals, helps to explain the outcomes.

This thesis agrees with Busby’s conceptualization of the importance of strategic framing, but suggests that the individual level of analysis is not the only level that framing need be concerned with, nor is strategic framing as a process the only process that explains normative action. Successful framing must speak to both political elite and the greater population, in order to be successful. As will be established in the empirical chapters, policy-makers often look to domestic support on humanitarian concerns. Further, this thesis suggests an argument of what it means to “speak to” political elite and the greater population. Institutionalization is what accounts for whether or not a
normative concept has been inculcated into the formal and informal rules of society. The way institutionalization occurs is by refining and distilling larger arcane concepts into digestible units. Complex ideas such as international debt and monetary policy become transformed into humanitarian issues in the refinement process. Whereas Busby ends with strategic framing, this thesis begins by arguing that the frame is only one part of the refinement process. Utilizing mass media to communicate the strategic frame is as important as the frame itself, and success in attracting media attention is not guaranteed. Efforts to create a strategic frame must be coupled with efforts to have the frame communicated. The conditions under which this can occur successfully are one of the main contributions of this thesis.

Most importantly, Busby’s emphasis is on explaining normative action. This thesis is concerned with explaining what is conceptualized to be a precondition to normative action: normative institutionalization. The strategic framing and mass media partnerships that are examined in this thesis are taken to be part of a process that is a necessary precursor to action. Normative ideas must be systemized into the formal and informal rules of a state before they will be acted upon. Thus, this thesis is less concerned with explaining the outcome of normative action, as it is concerned with explaining how the institutionalization step that has been identified in the norms literature is reached.

One final note on case selection methodology is warranted. Because a variety of exogenous conditions exist that might affect whether or not a country accepts
international debt relief, it is important to choose cases from the universe of cases that reflect diversity in underlying conditions. For this reason the United Kingdom and Japan represent useful cases because exhibit substantial differences in latent conditions that might affect debt relief. As will be described in the coming chapters, the United Kingdom can be summarized largely as a “most-likely” candidate for instituting debt relief, while Japan can be characterized largely as a “least-likely” candidate for debt relief measures. Ultimately this aids in support of the thesis’ argument as norm entrepreneurs were able to overcome the exogenous conditions in the case of Japan through a successful refinement strategy. In summation, while we might expect international debt relief to occur in the United Kingdom, we would likewise expect it to fail in Japan, creating a compelling empirical puzzle to be solved.

Operationalizing Mass Media Strategies and Tactics

This chapter presented a number of mass media partnership forging and communication strategies that norm entrepreneurs can use to engender favorable outcomes from actors that maintain asymmetric power relationships. The argument suggests that norm entrepreneurs will be successful if they can refine their normative ideas into resonating and actionable concepts. In understanding how norm entrepreneurs undertake such initiatives, we must analyze the strategies and tactics they use in the refinement process. The aim of this section is to delineate those strategies into testable units, or operationalized components of the main independent variables: efforts to
reframe norm into a *refined actionable concept*, efforts to attract local media attention towards conveying their refined idea and targeting political elite as audience for the actionable concept. These testable units will then serve as the main characteristics investigated during the case study process tracing to occurs later in the chapter. We can refer to these refinement tactics and strategies as the *structure of idea refinement*. This structure is presented below, with specific questions designed to operationalize each strategy such that making decisions as to whether or not a strategy was followed, and to what degree, is straight-forward.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Operationalizing Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MASS MEDIA PARTNERSHIP FORGING</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue frame as presented to mass media outlet</td>
<td>Does the issue frame resonate with the goals of the mass media outlet? What does the media outlet achieve by disseminating the norm entrepreneur’s message? Is the frame polarizing in one direction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of professionalism</td>
<td>How are negotiations with the mass media outlet conducted? Does the negotiating party represent a “fringe” element or are they incorporated into the mainstream professional discourse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of 3rd party spokesmen</td>
<td>Who is the conduit that is presenting the norm entrepreneur’s message? What characteristics does the conduit possess that differentiate it from the norm entrepreneurs themselves?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow/broad issue</td>
<td>What is the focus of the message that is to be disseminated? Is it a narrow issue with only one focal point or is it a broader issue with many goals and focal points?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue frame as presented to mass media audience</td>
<td>Does the issue frame resonate with the sensibilities of the mass audience? Does the frame fit the audience in terms of culture, goals, expectations and politics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue frame as presented to political elite</td>
<td>Is the frame threatening to political elite? Is the issue frame aligned with their goals and political leanings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural metaphor utilized</td>
<td>What is the underlying metaphor that the issue frame invokes? Does that metaphor speak to the audience as it is intended? Does the culture match the metaphor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying ideology invoked</td>
<td>What is the underlying ideology that the issue frame is invoking? Does the audience share the ideology? Is the ideology culturally based?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of celebrity</td>
<td>To what extent are recognizable celebrities used in disseminating the normative message to a larger audience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of entertainment devices</td>
<td>To what extent are entertainment devices (e.g. concerts, sporting events, etc.), used to bring salience and visibility of the norm?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Use of visual imagery
Is visual imagery used in the communication strategy (e.g. human constructed lasting imagery such as being chained to a fence, well-populated rallies, etc.)?

### EXOGENOUS CONDITIONS

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other states that</td>
<td>Which states have already adopted the norm? Are any states crucial to reaching the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopted previous to</td>
<td>tipping point?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states that</td>
<td>How many states have already adopted the norm? Has a critical 2/3rds threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopted previous to</td>
<td>been reached?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of international</td>
<td>What is the country’s share of international debt to be relieved? How does this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debt to be relieved</td>
<td>share relate to other countries that are expected to relieve international debt as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>well?</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Given the theoretical argument presented earlier about idea refinement utilizing mass media negotiations tactics leading to success in eventual norm institutionalization, we would expect that in instances where the mass media tactics were followed and utilized that norm entrepreneurs would ultimately be successful in engendering favorable outcomes from states in adopting their normative idea. To that end, we can further refine the structure of idea refinement to be predictive in nature and note that each strategy has an affect on the ultimate outcome of norm institutionalization. By operationalizing the concepts that constitute the independent variable, we have concrete, testable questions that can be asked in each of the Jubilee 2000 country cases to determine whether or not mass media tactics and negotiations were followed and if they were, whether or not they are correlated with norm institutionalization outcomes.
Chapter 2: Jubilee 2000 UK

Chapter Goals

The aim of this chapter is to test the theoretical argument raised by this thesis. In Chapter 1, the thesis argued that social normative action can be partly explained by institutionalization of the norm by mass media and framing efforts. Norm institutionalization represents the crucial link between concept and action; in order for states to act upon normative ideas, the idea itself must be made part of the social and political rules and standards of behavior. Norm entrepreneurs accomplish this by refining the concept into actionable and digestible units and inculcating that refined idea into the social and political structure. Efforts by norm entrepreneurs to utilize mass media and framing to achieve this represents the independent variable, with the specific strategies and tactics utilized representing explanatory sub-factors that lead to either success or failure of the initiative. Ultimately norm institutionalization occurs by refining a usually complex and nebulous moral idea, such as genocide is a tragedy that should be avoided and international debt relief is a good thing for developing countries, into an understandable, actionable idea that resonates with their own beliefs and culture. This chapter will systematically trace the efforts of norm entrepreneurs during the Jubilee 2000 campaign to determine which of the strategies identified in the theoretical argument correlate to success at the norm institutionalization level. To conduct this analysis the chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will review provide context to the
larger international debt relief concept and establish why a need existed to refine the larger idea into a distilled, actionable unit. Having established that refinement was necessary, the chapter will turn to an exploration of the tactics within the Jubilee 2000 campaign that were used to refine debt relief. This chapter will focus on process-tracing and thick description of the United Kingdom and the next chapter will turn to the same type of analysis for Japan. These two countries represent instances of considerable variation in the strategies used to refine international debt relief as an actionable and powerful concept, and thus constitute a beneficial test of the causal hypothesis presented. Through process-tracing and thick description techniques, the empirical chapters of this thesis will present how each country’s Jubilee 2000 campaign led to eventual success in norm institutionalization yet the tactics and strategies used to get there were quite different.

Context and Background

The aim of this section is to provide context and background to the various international debt relief initiatives, in order to inform the discussion of the following UK case and the Japanese case to be presented in the next chapter. International debt relief, generally defined as partial or complete forgiveness of debt holdings by one state to another (but can often take the form of debt owed by firms as well), typically concerns developing nations which often become indebted to developed nations during times of crisis. The Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s, known as the “lost decade” for
the area, is an example of how developing nation indebtedness can occur within a fairly short period of time.\footnote{In brief, during the 1960s and 1970s Latin American countries, most notably Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, underwent large growth and industrialization. In an effort to increase modernization and industrialize further, these nations borrowed large amounts of money from international creditors. Because of the high growth rates at the time, it was believed the Latin American nations would be able to repay the loans in a timely fashion, creating a situation where developed nations and banks had little hesitation in providing large loans. When an economic recession occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America was unable to repay the debts they had accrued during the period of growth.}

The developed world, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in coordination with international banks and development agencies, sought a system in the 1990s that could help developing nations retrieve from the burden of their extreme debt. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is a program that resulted from those deliberations and was initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, in 1996. The program works through a “carrot and stick” approach. Countries in debt are able to have portions of it relieved, but that relief is tied to efforts by the nation to reduce poverty. This has led to criticism by NGOs that suggest efforts to reduce poverty by indebted countries typically fail making the nations worse off than they were previously to pursuing the HIPC program. Further, because of the inclusion criteria required for HIPC, many of the poorest nations in the world are not included in the program.

The Jubilee 2000 campaign, an idea originated by activists Martin Dent and Bill Peters, arose out of the perceived failings of HIPC. Precisely because HIPC did not include all indebted countries and focused on the nation’s ability to address poverty
issues as well as the financing of debt, Dent and Peters sought a system that would transcend these shortcomings. The concept of Jubilee centered around the Biblical notions of the year of Jubilee where in the book of Leviticus the Jubilee year was one of freeing those enslaved by debt and restoring community: "That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you; you shall not sow, or reap the aftergrowth, or harvest the unpruned vines. For it is a jubilee; it shall be holy to you; you shall eat only what the field itself produces" (Leviticus, 25:11-12). In contrast to HIPC, Jubilee 2000 sought all “unpayable debt relief” to be forgiven. Inclusion criteria, carrots, sticks and other structural characteristics of HIPC were not included, making Jubilee 2000 a campaign for blanket debt relief.

This thesis is particularly concerned with the Jubilee 2000 campaign, leading to commitments in 1999 and 2000 for debt relief measures. International debt relief did not end in 2000, however. As discussed at the end of this and the following chapters, in relation to the United Kingdom and Japan in particular, Jubilee 2000 rekindled the international debt relief debate and initiatives that have continued into the present. Further, precisely because in the international system commitments and compliance are often two separate processes, the thesis provides discussion of what happened after the year 2000 in each case. While the argument in the thesis is centered on commitments, the two empirical chapters provide context on compliance as well.
The following table highlights the key moments of the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign which will be referenced throughout the following chapters\textsuperscript{11}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Debt Relief and Jubilee 2000 Campaign Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>October, 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>December, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{11} The table is adapted from Jubilee Research (2000b) and Teunissen and Akkermans, 2004.
that is watched by a billion people worldwide annually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June, 1999</td>
<td>“Break the Chain” events occur in Edinburgh, London. A human chain is formed at the Cologne G8 Summit with news coverage sending photographs of the visual imagery around the globe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1999</td>
<td>Pope meets Jubilee 2000 campaign and proclaims the Church’s backing of the initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1999</td>
<td>Gordon Brown announces 100% bilateral debt cancellation for 26 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2000</td>
<td>Demonstrations at Japanese embassies around the world begin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2000</td>
<td>Human “Break the Chain” is formed around the Finance Ministry in Tokyo. Coverage of event is circulated throughout Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2000</td>
<td>Jubilee 2000 campaigners focus on Japanese Prime Minister Mori and protest each stop of his G7 tour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2000</td>
<td>End of official Jubilee 2000 campaign with rallies to mark its end.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having provided context for the work of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the thesis will now turn trace the strategies and tactics used by the Jubilee 2000 UK and Japanese campaigns to achieve their goals of having states adopt international debt relief by canceling their debts held by developing nations.
The United Kingdom

Early Work

As documented in the preceding chapter, the United Kingdom represents a case of leadership in instituting the international debt relief norm. Serving as the home base for the Jubilee 2000 campaign, it is perhaps fitting that the UK served as a leader and first-mover in institutionalizing the norm. This section will trace the process by which the UK gained that position. The argument made by this thesis is that a series of factors help to explain whether or not idea refinement is successful as a process. These factors were identified in the Introduction and will be systematically evaluated in this chapter with respect to the UK Jubilee case. This chapter will establish that indeed each of the factors identified helped to refine the larger international debt relief concept into an institutionalized idea that debt relief is not only a good thing, but an action is imperative. Norm entrepreneurs essentially changed the rules of the game, inculcating debt relief into the operating procedure of the state.

The UK case is one where decision-makers are represented by relative few. Debt relief responsibilities in the UK rest primarily with the UK Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer\(^\text{12}\) (HM Treasury, Undated). The Prime Minister, as First Lord of the Treasury and head of international state affairs also plays a significant role, particularly in communicating the work of others in government, including the Chancellor, to other

\(^{12}\) For the purposes of this thesis, the British spelling of Exchequer will be used as that is how the position is referred to in official state and Jubilee 2000 campaign documents.
states. Unlike the United States, the Chancellor is able to set taxation rates and financial spending matters with Parliamentary approval. This creates a situation where the Chancellor, and Prime Minister by extension in ability to help persuade other states, are critical to the UK’s policy on debt relief.

Similar to the United States, the UK has a healthy advocacy sector that seeks to advise the Chancellor and Prime Minister on development issues. Social movement and advocacy networks such as Oxfam, Christian Aid and Action Aid have a long history of working with UK officials to set development goals. Particularly because the number of decision-makers in the UK system are relatively few, civil service groups, social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) yield considerable influence in their ability to persuade government officials to tackle certain issues. Martin Dent and Bill Peters, the founders of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, recognized the integral role NGOs play not only in affecting government policy, but providing a professional and ever-growing backbone of support, and used the NGO platform to gain legitimacy and reach for their movement. As Dent notes, “We realized that the individual members of the Jubilee 2000 campaign could not by themselves bring in the great change for which we sought. It was urgently necessary to enlist the help of organizations bigger than ourselves” (Dent and Peters, 1999, p. 32).

In addition to soliciting the help of both secular and religious NGOs, the coalition also gained the backing of a professional financial fund, the Isabel Carter of Tear Fund (Dent and Peters, 1999, p. 31). This professional organization not only provided
financial backing for the early campaign efforts, but it also provided the campaign with a legitimate charitable trust backbone of talent. Included in the creation process of the campaign company was Ann Pettifor, previously coordinator of the Debt Crisis Network, a structure of civil service groups with aims of reducing international debt abroad. Pettifor, not only an experienced lobbyist, also brought significant debt-relief policy experience that coupled with Dent and Peters academic understanding and sensibilities. The addition of Pettifor was crucial because it provided both an intellectual and policy credibility and legitimacy to the campaign. The partnership with aid agencies and NGOs, coupled with the addition of personnel that were familiar with the policy territory and landscape, meant that Jubilee 2000, from the very beginning of their campaign, was respected by government (Busby, 2004, p. 137). It also meant that the campaign was able to communicate its message through less-radical intermediaries when necessary. While an advocacy group might be labeled as radical, professional organizations and intellectuals could communicate the same message without being stigmatized with the radical characteristic.

Thus, the initial work in the UK campaign was focused largely on creating an advocacy structure that would work well given the political realities of the UK system. By partnering early with NGOs, building a professional and financial trust backbone, and bringing on board experienced lobbyists and policy experts, the UK campaign was able to successfully create a structure that would allow it to strategically target the Treasury, Chancellor and Prime Minister, the main debt policy decision-makers. The
benefit of such a structure was that Jubilee 2000 had intermediary bodies to serve as message communicators. While the message and intent would be congruent, the campaign recognized early that importance of third-parties in refining messages in a less radical and more professional manner. Having set up the structure in a strategic fashion, the campaigners turned towards crafting a message that would speak to the UK’s cultural base.

Framing and Refining Debt

Martin Dent, credited with initially creating the Jubilee 2000 name, was acutely aware of the effect of words and symbols on popular emotional response. He was also aware of the need to separate his group’s efforts from other social movements that were attempting debt relief policy changes, generally as a part of a broader agenda; “in order not to be a pale copy of major aid charities, we needed to have a special emphasis” (Dent and Peters, 1999, p. 27). The dominant frame previous to Dent’s work, particularly within the HIPC initiative was that of “debt forgiveness.” Forgiveness had become the adopted norm, but from Dent’s perspective lacked a crucial actionable and cultural component. Dent notes that in creating a way to communicate the problem of international debt to the public, he needed something powerful to convey both the unfortunate circumstances of debt in the international polity as well as the moral grounds for relieving it:
I reached the idea of Jubilee through reason. I was, of course, aware of the rich Biblical tradition of Jubilee, but I used the concept as a kind of shorthand for the necessary remission of past, inert debt which alone could clear the ground for a new beginning. If there had not been a resonant doctrine of Jubilee already in the Biblical text, we should have had to invent one (Dent, 1999, p. 17).

Dent’s use of religious metaphor and symbolism is not accidental. The success of the political campaign to relieve debt would rely on their ability to mobilize popular and political support; tapping into religious values is a potent strategy, particularly for the UK where according to the World Value Survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, 79.3% of UK citizens believe in God in 1991 and 57.4% considered themselves to be religious. Among the Christian religions represented in the UK, Roman Catholicism is the denomination with the highest number of members, followed closely by the Church of England (British Census, 2001). In addition, Jubilee 2000 also tapped into the millennial celebrations that would be occurring in a short period of time. The “cleaning of the slate” for 2000 idea was firmly established by the campaign’s name.

Using religious symbolism and the approaching millennium as a backbone for the Jubilee 2000 name, the campaigners eventually settled on a single dominant frame of “unpayable debt relief” to be the communication frame for the campaign. It is important to note that this is the strategic frame used by the entrepreneurs. The Jubilee name itself, while connoting notions of rebirth and social justice served as an overarching label for the initiative, but it is “unpayable debt relief” that was chosen to serve as the main frame.
This frame was chosen, and ultimately proved beneficial to the campaign, for a number of reasons. First, continuing with the religious symbolism, Dent felt that “unpayable debt” focused largely on Judeo-Christian notions of justice (Peters and Dent, 1999, ch. 3). The frame would speak to moral and normative judgments about what is just, what is right and what is wrong. Second, the message alone was quite simple. Creating a clean slate for the year 2000 was a message that could be understood by anyone and did not require intimate knowledge of an arcane international political economy topic; it was a frame that popular support could mobilize behind. It spoke to a particular ideology, that removal of debt for the millennium represented a fresh start. Third, the frame invoked a salient cultural metaphor. Returning to the discussion in the Introduction about powerful frames, the “unpayable debt relief” spoke to a common understanding of what it means to have relief from an ill. As George Lakoff notes about the concept of tax relief, but apropos for our uses as well, relief is powerful because it invokes both an affliicter and a reliever. “For there to be relief, there has to be an affliction, an afflicted party, somebody who administers the relief, and an act in which you are relieved of the affliction. The reliever is the hero, and anybody who tries to stop them is the bad guy intent on keeping the affliction going” (Lakoff, 2003b). The “unpayable debt relief” frame thus invoked a number of a salient thought processes and did so in a simplistic manner, all attributes of a successful frame.

This shift from debt as one of “forgiveness” to one of “unpayable debt relief” is crucial because it marks the first in a long series of tactics that seeks to refine the
international debt relief norm into something more powerful. Forgiveness as a frame suggests that the indebted country has done something wrong – the richer nations are taking a loftier position by forgiving the nations of their misdeeds. The refinement of the exact same idea into unpayable debt relief brings in a moral and social justice component. The concept has changed to be one of creating justice, rather than forgiving nations for the position they have created for themselves. If Dent’s idea refinement through reframing was successful, and the notion of social justice over forgiveness more powerful, we would expect the refined idea to resonate more strongly with the population.

What evidence exists to illustrate that the issue frame had an affect on a large number of UK citizens? One of the strategies employed by the campaign was conducting a petition for international governments to adopt the debt relief norm. This effort was coordinated both through non-secular means such as Churches and secular involvement from the media. By the time the campaign had ended, the petition drive had solicited more than 2.96 million signatures from the UK, representing slightly more than 5% of the total population (Peters and Dent, 1999, p. 140; Busby, 2004, p. 134). This large number of petitions speaks to the effect of the frame on the local UK population: the frame resonated and called individuals to mobilize for action.

While the simple religious frame spoke to a large segment of the UK population, it also spoke to the relevant few salient policy-makers that make decisions on debt relief. The Jubilee 2000 campaign in the UK benefited in 1997 by the appointment of Gordon
Brown to Chancellor of the Exchequer. Brown’s father had been a minister and the impression given to others in the Treasury was that debt relief was as much of a moral issue as it was an economic issue for Brown (Busby, 2004, p. 133). This meant that the Chancellor was not only sympathetic to the issue frame Jubilee 2000 UK was trying to communicate, but also to the efforts of the group to lobby the government. The tactic of reframing and refining the norm such that it speaks to political elite was serendipitous with respect to Gordon Brown: his religious upbringing and family values predisposed him to the refined idea. This gave the campaign an important edge in competing with other social movements vying for the government’s agenda. It also allowed the campaign to broaden its efforts from convincing the UK to relieve debt to convincing the UK to convince other governments to relieve their debt as well.

Put another way, crafting a frame that spoke to the political elite gave the campaign a leg-up in securing the UK’s position such that it could also focus on having the UK pressure other nations as well. As Busby notes from an interview with John Garrett, a researcher for Jubilee 2000, “The Labour government, realizing that progress on debt reduction required other countries to move, indicated that other countries such as Germany, France, Japan and the United States remained to be persuaded, and signaled that the campaign was wise to mobilize campaigners there” (Busby, 2004, p. 136). Thus, the salient frame not only spoke to a mass audience and the political elite, but it had the additional benefit of allowing the UK campaign to broaden its focus to include having the UK government lobby other governments for debt relief.
Communicating the Refined Frame

Once the salient and simple refined frame of “unpayable debt relief” had been chosen, how was the frame communicated such that it gained substantial media attention? One of the early strategies employed by Martin Dent and Bill Peters during the UK campaign was the involvement of Churches and religious non-governmental groups. One of the benefits of utilizing a religion-laden name for the initiative as well as a religious frame is that it resonates very well with groups pining for social justice on religious grounds. Consequently, Dent and Peters were able to engender support from Christian Churches, most notably the Catholic Church, to help mobilize local parishioners to action. One of the early major successes of the campaign was getting on the Catholic Church’s agenda and having the Church frame the upcoming millennial celebrations as one about debt relief. In a letter to Catholics entitled *Tertio Millennio Adveniente* (The Coming Third Millennium), written in January 1999, Pope John Paul II suggested that the millennium be a time for Christians to:

> Raise their voice on behalf of all the poor of the world proposing the Jubilee as an appropriate time to give thought, among other things, to reducing substantially if not cancelling outright, the international debt which seriously threatens the future of many nations (Dent and Peters, 1999, p. 33).

The effect of having the Catholic Church behind the Jubilee 2000 efforts cannot be understated. In addition to reaching a healthy contingent of Christians worldwide, the Vatican is continually monitored and reported on by mass media outlets. Once the
campaign gained the support of the Pope for their initiatives, press and mass media coverage followed. The Pope served as a distinguishable, high-profile figure for the media to focus on and provided an excellent source for on-going stories and coverage about the Jubilee 20000 campaign.

The Catholic Church’s support also served to refine and distill the debt relief norm further into a customized version for the UK Catholic populace. Through communication directly from the Pope, the debt relief norm became something of doctrine; it was consistent with Catholic teaching to go out and support debt relief. This is important because it marks the new refined idea as something that is actionable. The Pope’s plea to “Raise [voice] on behalf of all the poor” is essentially a call to action. It is a call for citizens to petition and lobby their governments to create social justice by serving as the relievers of international injustice. Thus the Pope’s involvement is not merely a token celebrity communicating a message, but rather a distinct distilment of the international debt relief norm into an actionable unit of social justice.

In addition to the Pope, Jubilee 2000’s simple frame also communicated very well to another media-friendly figure: Bono, front-man of the British rock band U2. Bono’s involvement in social and activist causes is well documented (Byrne, undated), but it is his activism with respect to the Jubilee 2000 UK campaign that was particularly

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13 Joshua Busby notes a significant “attention spike” occurring in 1999, at the pinnacle of the campaign’s influence as well as the Pope’s announcement of endorsing the Jubilee 2000 campaign (Busby, 2004, p. 108). This spike was validated by the author of this thesis by conducting a LexisNexis search for “pope” and “debt relief” coverage in UK newspapers between 1997 and 2000.
overt and newsworthy. What was the catalyst for Bono’s extreme effort in Jubilee 2000?
In many respects it was the same framing catalyst of the overall initiative: utilizing the
millennium for a time to wipe the slate clean. In an editorial written for the Guardian
entitled “World Debt Angers Me,” Bono (1999) writes:

The millennium is a key moment in time. We have to grasp that
moment. It is not a time for factions, for narrow sects or
ideological crusades. Jubilee 2000 is none of those things. Jubilee
2000 is bipartisan. It is broad, inclusive and international. It is
emerging as a fresh convergence of differing groups. Including
conservative elements, recognising the rule of money-lenders has
gone too far… The eve of ’99 will provide a unique set of
circumstances. And we have a unique set of players, who I believe
are ready to face the implications of their own script. Tony Blair is
one such performer. So is Gordon Brown. Grand gesture is the
performer's twitch. A sense of occasion is everything.

The importance of Bono’s involvement is critical for a number of reasons. First, by
providing a simple frame and bringing Bono onboard to the initiative, Jubilee 2000 UK
gained a secular celebrity figure to complement its non-secular figurehead of the Pope.
This unique structure served to unite the religious as well as the secular, many of whom
are quite young and energetic U2 fans, around a single issue. This allowed the celebrity
factor to extend to many different segments of the population. In addition, as evidenced
by the editorial space reserved for Bono at the Guardian, Bono’s involvement attracted
extreme levels of press coverage. UK papers ran interviews and editorials by Bono and
worldwide high-circulation magazines such as Time ran stories about Bono’s
involvement in the initiative (Elliott, 2000). Through this media coverage Bono became the *ad-hoc* spokesman for Jubilee 2000 for a younger generation. This complemented the Pope’s efforts to mobilize the Christian base quite nicely. Further, just as the Pope had refined international debt relief to speak to his followers, Bono was able to refine the norm to speak to *his* followers: a younger generation of UK citizens. By weaving the message of debt relief into entertainment such as concerts and rallies, Bono was able to distill a complex international political economy subject into something digestible, and interesting, by and to the younger mass population. The arcane and complicated nature of international finance was replaced with a notion of occasion and popularity. Bono was able to take a complex subject and make it real for his fans, distilling the most important concept, creating action, into a simple message. Bono’s involvement was ultimately key in creating a norm that was made simple and actionable, all through entertainment.

The celebrity factor was not the only result of a simple, communicable frame. One of the primary focal points of the UK campaign had been a coordinated effort to influence the G-8 Summit in Birmingham, English in May 1998. The Birmingham summit was seen as a key, and vital opportunity for making the world’s largest and richest countries aware of the Jubilee 2000 campaign and the need for international debt relief to accompany the upcoming millennium. With Tony Blair serving as Chairman of the G-8 Summit, the UK campaign felt that their ultimate success would be largely dependent on their ability to create a marked demonstration at the meeting to show support for debt relief and start to convince other nations of the moral imperative of
international debt relief. This was particularly true since the feeling within the campaign was that the deck was stacked against debt-relief-friendly nations heading into the Summit. As Martin Dent relates, “Up to 16 May 1998, the prospects, realistically were perhaps not too favourable. The G-8, then meeting in Birmingham, seemed to be heavily balanced towards those, led by Germany and Japan, who saw no reason for speeding up the HIPC initiative” (Peters and Dent, 1999, p. 186). As discussed above, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were very much in favor of debt relief and the UK campaign had their support. By conducting a demonstration at the Summit itself, the campaign would show the G-8 nations, particularly those that were against debt relief, that popular support was behind the initiative as well.

The result of efforts to mobilize around the G-8 Summit was extraordinary. Through a pamphlet campaign largely conducted through the Churches (evidence again of the effect of the Pope’s involvement), 70,000 demonstrators took to the streets at Birmingham to welcome the G-8 heads of state. The activists created a human-chain, by holding hands, and surrounded the G-8 Summit building. With signs and pickets that proclaimed, “Break the Chain of Debt,” (see Photographs 1 and 2) the activists were able to create a visual image of a chain that conveyed both the binding force of debt as well as the binding force of the activists. Perhaps more than anything else, the Birmingham event served to gain the attention of mass media outlets from around the world, who were covering the Summit. As Jessica Woodroffe, one of the lead UK campaigners noted, the use of imaginative tactics such as that of celebrities and the human chain
around the Birmingham Summit was critical to the increase and jump in media coverage that the campaign enjoyed (Busby, 2004, p. 138). Further, the visual imagery of the “break the chain” event would remain with the campaign and its message, becoming part of the refined norm. The notion of international debt relief was no longer just associated with central banks and government lenders, but with 70,000 activists holding hands. Recalling Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s comment, “When demonstrators chant, ‘The whole world is watching,’ it means that they matter, that they are making history” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 116). The campaign would learn from this experience and focus on high-profile events that garnered additional media attention. Concerts, sporting events, and campaign rallies were all staged in order to generate as much as media coverage and press as possible (Jubilee, 2000++), all efforts to further distill international debt relief into something digestible and actionable.

Thus, the effects of a simple, convincing frame were quite beneficial to the UK campaign, as it was able to generate mass media attention by using the frame itself. By communicating the frame to the Pope and other celebrities such as Bono of U2, the campaign was able to engender considerable attention from the press, widening the scope of the campaign’s audience to an international level. Further, by coalescing around salient events such as the G8 Summit in 1998, the campaign was able to create a media-friendly visual representation of debt and popular support for its relief, providing the media with something it could mobilize around. The result of these tactics by the UK
campaign occurred on December 17, 1999 when Gordon Brown announced a program of 100% bilateral debt cancellation for 26 of the world’s poorest nations.

Explaining UK Success

The argument proffered by this thesis is that by examining the strategies and tactics used by norm entrepreneurs to refine norms into distilled actionable ideas, we can better understand the variation in why some efforts succeed and some fail to institutionalize norms. As discussed in the previous chapter, the UK case represents a most-likely fit to this argument precisely because of the individuals in power that were sympathetic to debt relief initiatives, the UK’s history of collaborating with HIPC initiatives and the relatively low share of debt that the UK held relative to the other G-7 countries. Ultimately the strategic, methodical and determined tactics of Martin Dent, Bill Peters and other UK campaigners to 1) reframe the international debt relief norm into a refined actionable concept, 2) attract local media attention towards conveying their refined idea and 3) targeting political elite as audience for the actionable concept was crucial to the success of the initiative. These three categories represent key umbrella categories of factors under which the rest of the explanatory sub-factors developed in the previous chapter (and identified within the UK context below). Ultimately success in implementing the strategies and tactics of framing, mass media effect and targeting of political elite help to explain why the UK case was successful.
However, a reasonable argument could be made that the UK’s campaign success rested largely on exogenous conditions that were present without influence from the campaign. It is worth examining these conditions because they not only help to invalidate competing arguments as well as strengthen the argument presented in this thesis. The first among these conditions might be the existence of debt-relief-friendly politicians in the UK autonomous from the campaign. Put another way, Gordon Brown, son of a minister and sympathetic to the plight of developing countries, could have just as easily supported debt relief without the campaign’s use of mass media tactics and negotiations. The same exact outcome might have occurred regardless of the independent variable in question. This argument gains support from the fact that Gordon Brown did see debt relief as a moral issue and likely would have supported debt relief issues regardless of media pressure. However, this argument does not explain the widespread popular support for debt relief in the UK, nor does it explain Gordon Brown’s use of the millennial date argument in dealing with other politicians within the UK government (Busby 2004). Gordon Brown did not just take up debt relief, he took up Jubilee 2000’s refined version of debt relief and incorporated it into his own discourse. If nothing else, the media strategies and tactics of the UK campaign influenced Gordon Brown to adopt their framing device and mobilized tremendous popular support through the use of celebrity, entertainment devices, visual imagery and other tactics. While Gordon Brown’s personal views on debt relief do serve as an exogenous condition, the condition itself can not explain the mobilizing of such popular support. As Barbara
Crowther notes, “What made government sit up and take notice was that grannies and women’s institute types were demonstrating on the streets and they hadn’t seen that before” (Busby, 2004, p. 138).

A second exogenous condition worth investigation is the level of debt the UK was owed at the time of its cancellation. This utilitarian argument essentially suggests that states will act in their self-interest and we would only expect a state to adopt debt relief if there was something to be gained from doing so. In the UK case, the debt owed to the government is relatively low compared to that of other G-8 countries, in some cases as low as a quarter of other nations’ debt. This would suggest that the UK had relatively little to lose by cancelling its debt and could be viewed a first-mover in the international system by supporting a debt relief policy. This argument partially explains why the UK might adopt a debt relief policy, but it does not explain the timing of adoption, why Gordon Brown adopted the rhetoric of the millennium/moral justice, and only provides a weak argument for why a state might adopt debt relief. While the relative costs of cancelling debt are few, there are still costs involved by not being able to collect on the debt. This cost must be weighed with the benefits of being a first-mover in debt relief, in order to satisfy the utilitarian argument. There is little convincing evidence to suggest that the UK would benefit from being a first-mover without taking into account the popular support that was created through the use of media. Thus the utilitarian argument does have a place in explaining the outcome, but it does not explain
everything as there were few compelling reasons for the UK to adopt debt relief from a pure self-interest perspective.

Given that a utilitarian explanation only partly satisfies the puzzle of debt relief adoption, what else explains why the UK case was successful? Earlier in this thesis it was argued that norm institutionalization can be partly explained by looking at the structure of mass media negotiations and communication strategies that norm entrepreneurs use in order to convince a large population to accept their moral position. It was argued that the process of that convincing can be labeled as norm refinement. In this chapter, those refining strategies and tactics were delineated into specific characteristics and questions that can be asked of a movement’s campaign in order to understand how the campaign engendered a favorable outcome. In analyzing why the UK campaign was successful, it is worth reviewing each of the tactics, how it contributed to the norm’s refinement, and the ultimate outcome of each of the tactics. Ultimately, the UK campaign’s success can be attributed to specific negotiations and communication strategies employed by the campaign to get on the agenda of mass media and political elite and mobilizing both political and popular support for their initiatives through actionable ideas:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Norm Refinement</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MASS MEDIA PARTNERSHIP FORGING</strong></td>
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</table>
| **Issue frame as presented to mass media outlet** | ▪ Overall “Jubilee” naming frame with religious/millennial overtones spoke to religious UK populace  
▪ “Unpayable debt relief” constituted simple frame that spoke to wide audience  
▪ “Relief” as a concept spoke to ability to act | High level of mass interest, media outlets willing to carry simple message that resonated with a large group of citizens. |
| **Level of professionalism**                | ▪ Utilized aid agencies and trust fund backbone to provide intellectual/professional legitimacy and appearance  
▪ Refined norm became less radical as it was not constituted directly from activists | Public face for the media was separated from intellectual legitimacy provided by aid agencies. |
| **Use of 3rd party spokesmen**              | ▪ Used aid agencies including World Bank to speak on behalf of the campaign when necessary  
▪ Use of Pope, Bono and other spokesmen to speak to respective population segments and mobilize their respective constituencies | Media rallied behind both aid agencies and spokesmen that guaranteed high viewership. Bono serves as strong media figurehead. Pope is able to make debt relief a call to action. Churches play critical role in mobilizing mass support. |
<p>| <strong>Narrow/broad issue</strong>                      | ▪ Campaign focuses initially on small issue: relieving LDC debt. This serves as simple, refined | Initial use of a narrow issue meant that the media could relay a |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy: Initial issue focus was narrow, became more broad with UK success</th>
<th>idea of “relief” that is removed from complex international finance discourse – easily digestible</th>
<th>simple message. By not asking for too much, the campaign did not suffer from trying to solve all problems at once.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Expands issue to include convincing UK government to petition other governments to follow similar debt-relief measures</td>
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**COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Issue frame as presented to mass media audience</th>
<th>Simple message spoke to a large number of people. The religious overtones worked well for a country that is predominantly religious.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Issue framed in simple manner</td>
<td>Overall “Jubilee” frame with religious/millennial overtones spoke to religious UK populace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “Unpayable debt relief” constituted simple frame that spoke to wide audience</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Issue frame as presented to political elite</th>
<th>Gordon Brown’s moral imperatives and world viewpoint are congruent with the frame. Brown uses rhetoric of the campaign in his own speech and privileges the millennial concept. This proved invaluable during the campaign.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Align frame with political elite sensibilities</td>
<td>Overall religious frame presented to Gordon Brown, son of a minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unpayable debt spoke to notions of Christian justice and the ability for government to act as reliever</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cultural metaphor utilized</th>
<th>Frame resonated with large segment of population and mobilized them for action in Birmingham at G8 Summit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Invoke a cultural metaphor that speaks to a large segment of the UK population</td>
<td>Utilized a social justice and “reliever” metaphor frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Refined norm into something that spoke to cultural nuances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Underlying ideology invoked | Overall “Jubilee” frame with religious/millennial overtones spoke to religious UK populace.  
“Unpayable debt relief” constituted simple frame that spoke to wide audience. | Ideology was germane to a large segment of the population, media outlets were assured of a far-reaching message and story. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Use of celebrity | Campaign was able to reach the Pope through religious framing, served as celebrity figure for the campaign and initiative  
Secured Bono as entertainment-based spokesman  
Both figures rallied and mobilized support in terms of call to action, helped to distill complex subject into a more simple concept | The Pope and Bono were able to elicit tremendous media support with outlets from around the globe tracking the Jubilee 2000 story. |
| Use of entertainment devices | Use of concerts, rallies and soccer matches were utilized to generate media coverage | Entertainment devices reached large numbers in the population and attracted greater mass media attention at the events. |
| Use of visual imagery | Visual image of a chain of hands served as a metaphor for chain of debt that developing countries were faced with.  
Mass media outlets used the visual imagery in reproducing the story, drawing attention to the campaign. | --- |
Ultimately the UK Jubilee 2000 campaign was successful because it was able to take a rather arcane and complex topic of international political economy that existed as a norm and institutionalize it into the mainstream political and social structure by distilling the concept into something simple, salient, and actionable. The campaign achieved this by pursuing a framing and communication strategy that allowed them to create a simple message and then attract mass media attention in disseminating that message to the populace and political elite. The effect of this mass media attention was striking. The campaign put international debt relief into the public discourse, where it had not previously been, and effectively made it an important political and social issue. More importantly, the campaign’s efforts institutionalized the norm by making it actionable. Until the Jubilee 2000 campaign, efforts for international debt relief adoption, such as those of the HIPC were successful insofar as countries agreed with the moral position: debt relief, as a concept, was a good and morally correct idea. Jubilee 2000 made debt relief real by refining and distilling the norm into action. The “unpayable debt relief” frame proved to be the crucial catalyst for this action as political elite, media elite and the populace rallied around the notion of serving as active relievers of debt.

After 2000

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While the Jubilee 2000 UK campaign was successful in having political commitments made with respect to relieving international debt, and serves as the main case study for this thesis, it is worth examining what occurred after the 2000 campaign with respect to debt relief. Bill Peters and Martin Dent’s vision for unpayable debt relief took a large step in the right direction with the commitments made on December 17, 1999 when Gordon Brown announced the cancellation of 100% bilateral debt for 26 of the world’s poorest nations. This was a large improvement from the commitments made under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, founded at roughly the same time as the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Thus, from a UK perspective, the Jubilee 2000 campaign had met its goals: a critical mass had culminated in Birmingham at the G-8 Summit leading to debt relief promises in 1999.

According to Dent and Peters, it was intended that the Jubilee 2000 UK campaign would cease at the end of 2000, marking the end of millennial movement, the initial frame for the campaign’s activities (Dent and Peters, 1999). After commitments were made by Gordon Brown in 1999, the campaign’s activities did officially cease, yet the aims and goals of continual debt relief persevered through offshoot organizations of the campaign. For instance, the Jubilee Research, part of the New Economics Foundation (NEF) took over the Jubilee 2000 goals and mission in 2001. The organization serves to continue the trajectory started by the initial campaign with particular emphasis on using third party academics, think-tanks and professional organizations to continue the persuasion activities. As part of the overarching organization, the Jubilee Debt Campaign
was created as a successor the UK’s Jubilee 2000 campaign. Much of the original membership, including Ann Pettifor’s involvement, has remained the same and concept of eventual 100% unpayable debt relief among poor nations remains the goal.

With respect to the UK, the promises that were made in 1999 have largely been kept. The promise made by Gordon Brown in 1999 to cancel debt directly owed to them (this is of the bilateral debt variety) breaks down into three groups of countries. For countries that have completed the HIPC initiative, the UK has cancelled all debt. This amounts to 18 of the 26 countries promised by Gordon Brown. The UK’s approach to the second group, those that are still in the first stage of the HIPC initiative, has been to stop receiving debt payments. This will lead to eventual debt cancellation once the countries work through the HIPC initiative. In this group 10 countries currently exist. Finally, the third group is for countries that are eligible for HIPC but have not qualified yet. The UK’s approach to this group is to place their payments in a trust-fund that will be returned at a later date (Jubilee, 2005a). While the Jubilee Debt Campaign is content with progress that has been made in the first and second groups, they note caution with respect to the last group (Jubilee, 2005a).

As the Jubilee Debt Campaign advocates note, the HIPC has turned out to be an inadequate mechanism for moving countries out of poverty precisely because of the restrictions placed on the program by the measures countries are forced to adopt to pass through each stage (Jubilee, 2005a). As the campaigners note, “At the beginning of 2005, low income countries still owe more than $500 billion… Around $30 billion has
so far been cancelled through HIPC since it started in 1996” (Jubilee, 2005a). Comparisons with other debt relief initiatives help to provide context for these numbers. The campaigners point out that while $30 billion of debt has been cancelled over the decade between 1996 and 2005 by HIPC, debt cancellation to Iraq by the “Paris Club” of countries was valued at $31 billion, and it occurred on one day in November, 2004 (Jubilee, 2005b). The Debt Relief Campaign improved this situation somewhat at the 2005 G8 meeting in Gleneagles, which increased promises by the UK and other governments to increase debt relief by $40 billion by the end of 2006.

Perhaps the most important legacy of the original Jubilee 2000 campaign has been its influence on campaigners to broaden their focus to include international organizations as well as sovereign nations. The Jubilee Debt Campaign activists note that one of the bigger breakthroughs in recent history was movement on multilateral debt. Where the original Jubilee 2000 campaign focused bilaterally, the new campaign has broadened to the multilateral level. The UK campaigners are credited with lobbying organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Fund to cancel 100% of their debt to the poorest nations. The campaigners note that so far this agreement is only extended to HIPC-complete countries, an outcome they view as somewhat favorable but not ideal. Nevertheless, the cancellation of multilateral debt sets a promising precedent for debt relief activities to come (Jubilee, 2005a).

Thus, while the original Jubilee 2000 campaign was successful in moving rhetoric to action by institutionalizing the norm, the effects of this institutionalization
extended well beyond 2000. The overarching campaign is quick to point out, however, that further work needs to be done, particularly in convincing the UK to lobby other governments to reform HIPC to be more focused on debt relief and removing restrictions for country involvement in the initiative. This, perhaps, is the most striking example of the UK campaign’s success. Having convinced the UK to relieve its debts, the campaign has been able to broaden its scope to focus on broader reforms, including multilateral debt relief, and the use of the UK government in instituting further relief reforms.

Conclusion

Having examined the success of the UK’s Jubilee 2000 campaign to negotiate with mass media outlets and construct an effective communications strategy that represented a “most-likely” fit to the theory, the paper will now turn to an investigation of the norm refinement tactics and strategies used by Japan’s campaign. Japan represents somewhat of a least-likely case to fit the theory: high levels of debt owed to Japan, a culture of anti-debt-relief, etc.; yet, norm entrepreneurs were able to eventually distill and refine the debt relief norm to both political elite and the greater population. What originally started as a complete failure for the Jubilee 2000 Japan campaign ended in success. The following section turns to dissecting this puzzle. In doing so, we will uncover how the strategies of refining and distilling ultimately did work once a suitable cultural frame and communication strategy was discovered.
Photographs

(Photograph 1, Birmingham, UK, Peter Marshall).

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14 Photographs used with permission from the photographer, Peter Marshall of the United Kingdom. Photographs such as the ones included here were printed in UK and European newspapers, highlighting the “break the chain” message. Activists chained themselves together by holding hands and surrounding the actual building the Birmingham G-8 Summit took place in.
(Photograph 2, Birmingham, UK, Peter Marshall)

(Photograph 3, Bono at the Birmingham event, Photographer unknown)
(Logo 1, Jubilee 2000’s logo, utilizing the “break the chain of debt” visual imagery)
Chapter 3: Jubilee 2000 Japan

Chapter Goals

Having conducted a process-tracing and thick description exercise with respect to the United Kingdom’s Jubilee 2000 campaign in order to determine what worked in institutionalizing the international debt relief norm as an actionable unit, the thesis will now turn to conducting a similar exercise with respect to the Japanese campaign. Recalling the argument presented in Chapter 1, norm institutionalization, or the distilling of normative ideas into actionable units, can be explained partly by investigating the way the normative idea is framed and communicated to both political elite and the domestic population. The goal of this chapter is to examine the methods used to frame and communicate by 1) understanding what strategies and tactics the Japanese campaign used to distill debt relief into a concept that resonated with the Japanese population and political elite and 2) delineating how the concept was mediated to political and media elite as well as the greater population. Ultimately by conducting the same type of analysis with Japan that was used in examining the UK case, the differences will help to illuminate under what conditions we can expect norm institutionalization and norm distilling to be successful. Wherein the UK case framing was based on religious notions of social justice, using a metaphor of “unpayable debt relief,” the Japanese case is an instance of using framing of a different metaphor type: world standing. Japanese campaigners realized early in their endeavors that a frame of international standing
would be more well received than Christian notions of social justice, and thus chose the most-likely path to success. It was this salient frame of international cooperation that garnered the attention of media and subsequently brought the concept of international debt relief into a distilled notion of Japan’s place in the world.

As with the previous chapter, the Japanese case will be analyzed in a structured format. First, an overview of the Japanese position will be provided through an analysis of background and early work of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Next, the chapter will turn to analyzing the efforts to frame international debt in a culturally relevant and salient way. The chapter will then turn to the strategies used in communicating the newly framed message, with particular emphasis on mass media partnership forging and communication strategies. Finally, having synthesized the various approaches and strategies used by the Japanese campaign, an explanation will be provided to explain the shift from failure to success. Ultimately the original strategies used by the Japanese campaign were unsuccessful, while later strategies reframed and re-communicated the issue led to success in norm institutionalization.

Japan

Early Work

Japan presented a number of challenges to the Jubilee 2000 campaign. With Jubilee headquarters based in London, coordinating activist activities in Asia proved more difficult than those in the UK and continental Europe. Further, cultural and
religious differences between Asia and the Europe meant that what resonated in other campaigns, such as that of the UK or Germany, did not resonate with Japan. Most importantly however, the Jubilee 2000 campaign faced difficulty in convincing Japan of its core message and changing a pattern of behavior that had previously looked skeptically upon debt relief efforts. While the UK population and political elite can be labeled largely as looking upon debt relief favorably, the opposite was true in the Japanese case. Not only did the Japanese traditionally look at debt relief with a skeptical eye, there is evidence to suggest that Japanese culture itself found debt relief to be dubious from a moral perspective. Finance officials in Japan spoke of the problem of moral hazard, the notion that debt relief runs counter to its aims in that it allows developing nations to “pursue irresponsible policies and would lead eventually to a new round of overborrowing” (Kenen, 1999, p. 15; Busby, 2004, fn. 173). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s policy papers on debt relief specifically refers to consideration of the “moral hazard” problem, and that it must be taken into account in any debt relief measure discussions (MFAJ, 1999). The view of the Japanese towards debt relief should not suggest that the Japanese do not believe in charity or that their culture is somehow bereft of social justice; what it does suggest, however, is that the particular mechanism that Jubilee 2000 was advocating for, a wiping of the debt slate clean, would be a difficult argument to make to the Japanese who disagreed with the particular mechanism. Further, scholars have pointed out that Japan’s monetary culture is one based on savings. A study conducted during the period in question suggests that
while Japan’s savings rate has fallen over the latter half of the 20th century, it still maintains a higher rate than other industrialized nations such as the United States (Kitamura, Takayama, and Arita, 2001; The Economist, 2003). This suggests that culturally, Japan was a nation of savings and would be less inclined to abandon its principles of the value of savings for a debt relief initiative that was believed to be the wrong approach to relieving developing world poverty. While Japan wanted to relieve poverty, it was not convinced that wiping the slate clean was the appropriate method for achieving the goal. This would pose considerable unease among Jubilee 2000 campaigners as the success of their endeavor rested largely on convincing a broad population that international debt relief was, in fact, not only a viable and correct international finance move, but the morally correct position as well. These challenges would mean a substantial rethinking of strategy for the Jubilee 2000 campaign. What worked in the United Kingdom would not work in Japan. The strategies and tactics would need to be modified in order to convince Japan to accept debt relief not on religious or moral grounds, but on issues of international standing and cooperation.

Leadership of the Jubilee 2000 Japan team started with Yoko Kitazawa, a seasoned and media savvy activist. Kitazawa immediately saw the need for NGO support development as well as the building of coalitions and partnerships with mass media outlets. As Kitazawa notes, the media component was of particular importance early on in the process particularly because of the parochial nature of Japanese interests vis-à-vis the external world: “The problem is that a Japanese person can live and die in this island
nation without even once thinking about problems in developing countries, such as in Africa. While many Japanese travel abroad, they do so in a way that gives them little insight into the outside world” (Corliss, 2001). According to Kitazawa, this leads to a paucity of media coverage about the outside world, particularly damaging to a campaign that rests its hopes on sympathy for developing nations. One of Kitazawa’s first strategies was to spread the international debt relief idea through local newspaper editorials\textsuperscript{15}.

In addition to using newspapers to begin socializing the Japanese public to the notion of debt relief, Kitazawa utilized NGOs to provide a third-party spokesman and Western legitimacy to the debt relief initiative. In a strategy memo written for the Jubilee campaign, Kitazawa notes that NGOs serve three purposes with respect to international action. First, they “empower the poor as well as to implement sustainable development programmes.” Second, they make policy proposals to “central and local governments, the United Nations,” etc. Third, and most importantly to Jubilee 2000, they provide for “local, national, regional and international networking” (Kitazawa, Undated). This backbone of international NGOs was viewed as critical to the solvency and legitimacy of the endeavor, precisely because it gave Jubilee 2000 Japan a critical mass of advocacy groups working on its behalf. Unlike the UK’s implementation of Jubilee 2000 with headquarters in the UK, Japan’s campaign was much smaller and thus needed the power

of networking with established NGOs to put it on higher standing. Kitazawa worked to get the NGOs on board with the campaign from the initial stages. Thus, similar to the UK campaign, the Japanese foundation was one based on strong leadership by a seasoned activist, strong NGO support and initial penetration of the debt relief idea through local media channels. While the structure of the campaigns resembled each other, the strategies they used would have to take a different tact, however, given the structure of Japanese politics.

Unlike financial policy-formation in the United Kingdom, Japan’s oversight of international financial matters is relatively decentralized. The result of this decentralization of activities and responsibility is that there is no central body, or individual, to lobby for international debt relief measures. Prior to 2001, loans and debt financing was controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)16, the Ministry of Finance, and the Economic Planning Agency in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office (Busby, 2004: 169). As Busby points out, while the aforementioned agencies traditionally retained control over international finances, another nineteen ministries and agencies were also involved in some form, usually in the administration of the loans and the providing of technical assistance (Busby, 2004, pp. 169-170). Further, as Takehiko Nakao, Director of the Coordination Division in the Ministry off Finance’s International Bureau, points out, the coordination between ministries and agencies adds an additional layer of complexity.

16 MITI is now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
when it comes to overcoming a “no” vote. If one ministry says no to international debt relief, it would be difficult to overcome that blow (Busby, 2004, pp. 171-172). This bureaucratic decentralization and dependency on previous ministry decisions created a situation in which success depended on early wins – if the campaign was not successful in convincing one ministry or individual to carry the debt relief platform, ultimate success would be doubtful as overcoming precedent is difficult.

Despite the decentralized nature of international finance decision-making, much coordinated loan activity did occur in the later half of the 20th century. In 1977 at the Bonn Summit, Japan agreed to a doubling of its previous overseas development assistance (ODA) loans. As analysts have pointed out, the move was seen largely as one to demonstrate Japan’s role within the international system. ODA doubling was viewed as a way of illustrating to the world that Japan is a legitimate great power, ally and player among the great powers (Busby, 2004). Islam (1991) notes that increasing foreign aid is a way for Japan to maintain standing within the “international club of rich countries” (Busby, 2004, p. 173). As Dennis Yasutomo has argued, “ODA is considered a key to Japan’s status and survival as an accepted member of the world community” (Yasutomo, 1995, pp. 3-6). This point is important because it suggests a precursor to what will become an important concept to the Jubilee 2000 campaign: Japan’s status in the international system is an important cultural phenomenon of the political elite.

Joseph Nye (2004) has written on the concept of soft power, the idea that international outcomes can be affected by a nation’s culture and ability to persuade states
into certain actions by means other than brute force and traditional notions of power. Garingalao (2006) has taken this concept a step further to illustrate how in the case of Japan in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it was precisely soft power through strategic use of culture, and specifically branding, that helped Japan fulfill its national interest of becoming a world player on the international stage. Japan’s history of international foreign aid is consistent with that thesis. Just as Japan was able to control its image and standing in the world through one source of soft power, corporate branding, so too was it able to do the same through international aid efforts. Japan’s level of aid in the 1990s was the largest in terms of US dollars (Shah, 2006). It can be argued that one of the reasons for Japan’s high level of aid is precisely to cultivate its soft power and establish Japan as one of the richest and most powerful nations in the world.

The support for international loans and foreign aid by the Japanese government was just not present in government ministries, however. One study suggests that among the Japanese public, support for international foreign aid was always quite high (McDonnell, Lecomte et al, 2003, pp. 34-35). In 1995 the study notes that public support was 78.7\% and it stayed between 70-80\% throughout the late 1990s. Put into perspective, this level of support is comparable to what was found in the United Kingdom (81\% in 1995) and the United States (80\% in 1995). Thus, international foreign aid was supported both at the political elite and population level. This is important because as Schoppa (1993) points out, political support in Japan often stems from outside of government offices and ministries. Japanese officials look to the
domestic base when making policy decisions. If Jubilee 2000 was to convince Japanese officials to accept debt relief, it would need a strategy that spoke not only to the officials themselves, but the domestic base as well.

As a corollary to using international loans and development programs to maintain international standing, Japan also was relatively unenthusiastic about relieving such loans for countries that were having trouble paying them back. Japan was often viewed as a thorn in the side of debt relief activist organizations precisely for this reason (Jubilee+, 2001). Japanese policy-makers suggest that Japan’s spoiling of debt relief initiatives relates to a cultural notion of moral hazard. As Tamaki Tsukada of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out, “Just giving money like a handout isn’t good for the country in the long run” (Busby, 2004, fn. 173). Put another way, whereas debt relief was viewed as a morally righteous move in the UK, the opposite was true in Japan. To relieve debts was to put the borrowing nation in a tumultuous situation that was ultimately not helpful as it would rely on borrowed funds without changing the policies that led to the need for funds in the first place. This represented a complication to the Japanese campaign that had planned on pursuing Japanese governmental officials to accept debt relief through notions of social justice.

This relationship to debt relief that is essentially the reverse of the UK position stems from the cultural and religious makeup of the nation. According to the World Value Survey, the Japanese report low levels of religiosity (27.71% answered yes to the question of “Are you religious” in 1981 and 23.78% in 1995-1997). This is
approximately half the percentage of religious citizens in the UK and less than a third of the percentage of religious citizens in the United States. However, when asked whether or not they believe in God, the percentages are much higher (62% in 1981 and 57.3% in 1995-1997). This suggests that while the Japanese believe in a deity, the religious manifested around the deity is not all that prevalent. Further, the religious make-up of the country is largely Shintoism and Buddhist. A very small minority profess to Christianity. This population segmentation was critical to the Jubilee 2000 campaign name that relied on Christian-Judeo notions of “Jubilee” for its salience and may not have resonated with non-Christian individuals. Consequently, there is some indication that the millennial celebrations did not maintain as much salience in Japan as it did in the West. Given that the Jubilee name itself was a strategy to tap into the powerful timing of the millennium, any issue to frame Jubilee as a Christian and social justice enterprise would be difficult.

Finally, recalling the discussion above about the salience of “unpayable debt relief,” one of the cultural metaphors that the frame tapped into was based on Christian-Judeo notions of social justice. Given the lack of a Christian-Judeo religious paradigm in Japan, it is questionable whether or not the frame would gain the same salience amongst Japanese. This is not to suggest that social justice is not a component of Buddhist or Shintoist thinking, but the rhetorical device and underlying metaphor is not the same as
in the West\textsuperscript{17}. As Edward Lincoln notes, the Japanese “society is not based on a Judeo-Christian ethic that includes charity towards strangers” (Lincoln, 1993, p. 260). This cultural and religious foundation is important because it suggests that while international loans can be made, in order to gain higher standing within the international community, the loans can not be \textit{forgiven}, for they would create a moral hazard that deviates from the cultural foundation of the country.

The result of this complication in applying a largely Christian frame to debt relief was that the Japanese campaign opted for a strategy of framing debt relief as an issue of international standing as opposed to social justice. While there is much evidence to suggest that Japanese culture \textit{is} charitable and Shintoist and Buddhist teachings profess notions of justice, the campaign realized that pursuing a strategy whose foundation and frame were overtly Christian would be more difficult than pursuing one based on international politics and soft power. The campaign thus pursued a framing strategy that was most-likely to succeed: convince Japan that debt relief, similar to international aid in the 1990s, is a source of soft power and higher international standing.

\textsuperscript{17} A recent program conducted at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs (http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/7315.html) has synthesized the various approaches religions take to major questions such as justice/injustice, health, wealth and peace. The project notes that Buddhist conceptions of justice do sometimes include notions of redistribution of wealth. Thus, while there is evidence to suggest that the frame of the millennium and social charity \textit{because} of the millennium timing was not as powerful in Buddhist society, there are nevertheless notions of social justice and redistribution within the Buddhist doctrine itself.
Framing and Refining Debt

Given the history of international debt relief initiatives, the lack of a compelling frame that spoke to political elite and the population, combined and the lack of a centralized body to lobby, what explains why the norm of debt relief was eventually institutionalized and debt relief measures were taken between the Cologne and Okinawa Summits? Part of the explanation relates to the shift in framing strategy Jubilee 2000 adopted for the Japanese campaign. Given that the frames crafted for the UK campaign were not likely to gain the same resonance in Japan, and initial indications of support were not high, Jubilee campaigners adopted a different strategy after initially testing the waters with the Jubilee “unpayable debt relief” message (Busby, 2004). Rather than using a frame of social justice, the campaigners adopted a framing strategy that spoke to Japan’s place in the world.

Scholars of the Japanese political process note that when an international issue relates to demands by foreign governments, demand must exist outside the government ministries; it must have a foundation among the public in order for policy-makers to take notice. Leonard Schoppa (1993) notes for example that external political pressure from international actors is successful when “latent support for foreign demands exists outside the privileged elite” (Schoppa, 1993, p. 385). This point is important for the Jubilee 2000 Japanese campaign because it suggests that to rally political elite support, the campaign would have to rally the domestic base first. Kitazawa notes that this fact became increasingly clear as the campaign started and attempts were made to lobby the
government officials, including the Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi. In meeting privately with Mr. Obuchi, Kitazawa notes that Obuchi relied on lack of domestic support as a crutch for not clearing debt: “Japan is undergoing a severe economic recession, and the public have not been supporting the cancellation. I would not cancel unless the public and parliament demand it” (Kitazawa, 2000a). Recalling the UK case, much of the campaigning started initially with Gordon Brown and other ministry-level individuals before the campaign started on the domestic base. The Japanese case called for an inverse of this strategy: work on the domestic base first in hopes of creating latent support that ministry officials would respond to.

The campaign settled on a message that spoke to the domestic base while reflecting the cultural desire to be a part of the larger international community: “Let’s cancel the debt together!” Compared to the UK’s approach of “unpayable debt relief,” the Japanese version is notable for its lack of a Christian-Judeo frame and its emphasis on community. Jubilee 2000 campaigners made an active decision to change the Christian-Judeo frame that was working in the UK to a frame that elicited response on the international level. Consequently, the campaign strategically replaced the Christian-Judeo frame with one of (secular) community action because it represented the most-likely path to success.

The metaphor of community and collective action invoked is one of partnership and coming together to solve a problem of debt relief. Similar to the aims of the UK’s strategic frame, the Japanese version is powerful in its ability to harness a cultural
phenomenon; where in the UK version it was religion and social justice, in the Japanese case it is cooperation among the international elite, of which Japan is part of the “in” group. The metaphor speaks to notions of solidarity within the community and subtly refers to cooperation within the international system, thus working on two levels. The cooperation and “togetherness” can be viewed as Japanese citizens coming together to help put an end to debt and also the G-7, Japan teaming up with other powerful nations, to end debt. This was particularly powerful and timely in light of the upcoming 2000 G-7 Summit in Okinawa that would be chaired by the Japanese prime minister. The lead-up to the Summit garnered significant newspaper coverage18 and the strategic frame was well-suited to take advantage of pre-Summit press and media coverage.

The strategic frame alone however was only one part of the strategy. Kitazawa, recognizing the need to mobilize support for the message and following the UK’s lead of utilizing NGOs and high-profile events to disseminate their message, crafted a communications strategy that centered on the issue of international cooperation and Japan’s place within the international political structure.

Communicating the Refined Frame

Campaigners utilized a two-pronged approach to communicate the strategic frame of the debt issue as one of international cooperation, international community,

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18 A LexisNexis search of the Japanese English-language newspaper, Japan Times, generates 13 editorials mentioning “Okinawa Summit” between 1999 and 2000. This does not include other Summit stories carried on news wires such as Reuters.
maintaining international stature and soft power. The first involved using Western
campaigns and NGOs to lobby the Japanese government in a visible and media-friendly
manner that would trickle-down to the domestic base. Prior to the 2000 G-7 meeting in
Okinawa, Western NGOs coordinated a postcard campaign to the Japanese embassy in
London and citizens in Japan. These postcards touted the benefits of debt relief and
called upon the Japanese government to free the developing world from debt. According
to reports over 100,000 postcards were distributed throughout Japan and 2700 sent
directly to Japanese embassies (Jubilee 2000, undated). In addition, the campaigns
organized weekly rallies and demonstrations that occurred outside of the Japanese UK
embassy gates. As Busby notes, interviews with high-level finance ministers suggests
that Japan took these events seriously; the embassy counted the number of demonstrators
and communicated the count back to Japan (180). These events made public the
campaign’s disapproval of Japan’s lagging behind other powerful countries in relieving
debt.

Kitazawa was also successful in achieving smaller scale high-profile events in
Japan, similar to those staged in the UK. Similar to the “break the chain” campaign that
surrounded Birmingham, Kitazawa and her team were able to organize a human chain
around the Ministry of Finance in Tokyo. Kitazawa attracted the Public Workers Union
to join in the demonstration and used “paper chains, colorful banners and placards,
trumpets, [and] Buddhist drums” to make the demonstration visually significant (Jubilee
2000, undated). While of a much smaller scale than the chain in Birmingham, the Tokyo
demonstration did garner media attention, including Reuters coverage of the event that went out over the newswire to news outlets worldwide (Lies, 2000). Further, the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, with a circulation of 8 million, carried a color photo of the event and *Mainichi Shimbun*, another Japanese paper carried a color photo on the front page (Kitazawa, 2000b).

The second strategy that contributed to communicating international debt as a stature and cooperation issue was to partner with NGOs in an attempt to shame Japan into submission at the political elite level\(^{19}\). The NGOs were particularly effective at making it clear to Japan that what they were pursuing with respect to the moral hazard argument was hurting its position in the international polity. The NGOs criticized Japan’s efforts with respect to the heavy debt burden LDCs faced and noted that Japan was in the position to do something beneficial to the international system and solidify itself among the great powers. In addition, the NGOs were successful at attracting Western academic celebrities, such as Jeffrey Sachs, to travel to Japan and provide analysis on the debt relief issue and what Japan’s response should be, as a member of the international community. Jubilee 2000 and the NGOs benefited from the fact that Japan had previously doubled its ODA offering, as noted above, precisely because it was evidence that Japan was interested in maintaining high status among its peer nations.

\(^{19}\) The use of the word “shame” here is not incidental. Based on reports written by Kitazawa, meetings between the NGOs, Jubilee 2000 and Japanese officials often became quite emotional and accusatory as NGOs suggested Japan was not a helpful member of the international system when it came to developing world support.
(Busby, 2004). The height of NGO pressure on Japan came in the spring of 2000, towards the end of the campaign, as Japan was preparing for meetings with both the IMF and World Bank and feared being labeled as a laggard with respect to debt relief issues (Jubilee Research, 2000; JACSES, 2000).

Unlike the UK campaign, Japan lacked the ability to use a number of the tactics to attract media attention outlined in the introduction. As a non-Christian country, having the Pope’s backing for the initiative was less compelling in Japan than it was in the United Kingdom. While newspapers carried the Pope’s sympathetic stance towards debt relief, it is difficult to make an argument that the act resonated as well in Japan as it did in the United Kingdom. Bono, the front-man for U2 was well-known, but lacked the immense appeal that he enjoyed in Europe, having hailed from Ireland. Because the overarching Jubilee 2000 campaign was headquartered in London, rallies, demonstrations, human chains and other types of visual representations of poverty and debt relief were difficult to organize and efforts were limited to what could be conducted through the mail (such as post cards). There was some limited success in creating demonstrations at Japanese embassies throughout Europe, as noted above, although the extent to which the Japanese and media outlets paid attention to the efforts is not as clear.

Instead, what the Japanese campaign relied on was the ability of their partner NGOs and professional aid agencies to make the case for them. Given that the UK strategies did not work in the Japanese context, the Jubilee 2000 campaign was flexible
in its ability to reform its tactics and strategies to fit the need. The result was professional
NGOs attempting to convince Japan to engender a positive act, not because of the social
and ethical obligations of debt relief (which would not resonate due to the culture of
supporting the moral hazard argument), but because it would lead to Japan’s stance in
the world order to be solidified. Scholars such as Busby have pointed out that in dealing
with Japan, this is often a tactic that states utilize. The term *gaiatsu* refers to the concept
of foreign pressure. As Busby points out, *gaiatsu* traditionally refers to Japan being
bullied with some sort of coercion (Busby, 2004, p. 182). In this case the coercion is not
one of military consequence (it would be unlikely for any nation to take military action
on Japan for not adopting debt relief), nor economic consequence (other states would be
equally unlikely to impose trade or financial sanctions on Japan for not adopting the
norm); rather, the coercion here is one of culture: Jubilee 2000 is tapping into Japanese
desire to be a great player in the world and it is offering the carrot and stick of debt relief
to entice an outcome (a carrot of world prestige, a stick of shaming if the norm is not
adopted).

Thus, the frame utilized by Jubilee 2000 in the UK campaign had little chance of
succeeding, and indeed early efforts to frame the issue as one of social justice and of
Christian-Judeo importance yielded little by way of results (Busby, 2004, ch. 3 (Part
IV)). The Japanese campaign had to reconfigure its frame to resonate with Japanese
culture, political elite and populace. Once it found a frame that worked, international
derbt relief linked to Japan’s status in the world, Jubilee 2000 was able to work with
professional agencies and NGOs to communicate the frame to officials. This proved critical as the professionalism and standing of the Western NGOs was great enough to show Japan that debt relief was an important issue to the West. When the debate was reframed as a way of having Japan contribute to the international system and not serve as an outlier, Japan listened to the activists.

The Shift: Moving from Cologne to Okinawa

The Jubilee 2000 Japan activists were aided tremendously by the success of the UK campaign in Cologne, where the UK, United States and Canada all agreed to cancel their debts. While Japan did not sign on to the same agreement, the agreement nevertheless provided the pressure that made the communicated frame of cooperation and international stature all the more potent. Initially the Japan campaign faced similar resistance to debt relief and rationalizations for why it is not done in Japan. These rationalizations ranged from the economic recession (although as Busby and others have pointed out, the country’s reticence towards debt relief began long before their economic troubles began) to the size of the country’s debt holding to domestic legislation banning debt cancellation (Busby, 2004). Yet, as the Okinawa Summit neared, the frame of cooperation and international stature became more relevant and visible on the nation’s agenda. As Marc Castellano of the Japanese Economic Institute noted, Japan’s position in the world as a leader was in peril leading into G-8 Summit in Okinawa as it could not
agree with the other leading nations on the debt relief issue. “The country’s reputation as a global leader also is on the line” (Busby, 2004).

Japan announced in April 2000 that it would cancel 100% of its bilateral non-ODA debt. While this was a success in terms of the Jubilee 2000 campaign’s mission to relieve international debt, it was greeted with disdain by Kitazawa who termed the announcement an attempt to “overshadow our action by this meager new measure” (Kitazawa, 2000b). While the agreement only applied to non-ODA debt (the smaller component of Japan’s credits) and applied only to HIPC countries, it was a start and Japan Jubilee 2000’s campaign had ultimately helped to start the debt cancellations.

Explaining Japan Failure and Eventual Success

This thesis argues that variation in the way norm entrepreneurs frame and refine their issues and communicate those issues to media, political elite and the populace will have an effect on whether or not a norm is institutionalized and thereby acted on. Japan is a case where objective observation before the Jubilee 2000 campaign stated would have suggested that debt relief institutionalization would be an uphill battle and changing the minds of a country historically against debt relief near impossible. Yet, while Japan represents a “least likely” to succeed norm institutionalization case, eventually the debt relief norm was institutionalized and Japan made commitments (albeit relatively small) to support the debt relief initiative.
The evidence described above illustrates that the issue frame was of tremendous importance to the eventual success of the campaign. When the frame was crafted in a way that spoke to Christian-Judeo notions of social justice and the millennial celebrations, the same frame that worked in the UK case, it was not believed to be promising in the Japanese case. Campaigners had to shift their strategy and find a frame that spoke to Japanese sensibilities. Mass media coverage of the Jubilee 2000 campaign was relatively non-existent and support for the message was small before this change in strategy. Jubilee 2000 existed in Japan previously, but it was not until the new strategy of selling debt relief as a form of international cooperation that media coverage and attention blossomed. When Jubilee 2000 Japan adopted a different strategic frame, this time focusing on notions of international cooperation and Japan’s place in the world, combined with a strategy of using Western NGOs and agencies to communicate the message, the campaign’s fortunes began to change. This variation in issue framing helps to explain the early laggardness of Japan, followed by institutionalization of the norm later. Japan only became a success story for Jubilee 2000 when it found the appropriate frame.

Given the early failure of the strategic frame, the mass media component of the early campaign was less emphasized, yet the shift in mass media attention levels indicates that media attention and framing are a combined strategy. Coordination difficulties, the lack of an initial salient cultural metaphor to tap into and the lack of Asian or Eastern celebrity all contributed to the inability of the Jubilee 2000 campaign to
attract significant media attention (compared to that of the UK campaign). This served as a contributing factor to Japan’s laggard response to the international debt relief norm. Without mass media outlets on their side, Jubilee 2000 was left without strategic use of a mass media partnership and method for communicating their issue frames to a large segment of the population. This only changed once the strategic frame had changed and the Japanese campaign was able to utilize visual imagery to define their initiative. While the “break the chain” events in Tokyo were much smaller than those in Birmingham, they served a similar purpose: they put the campaign, and more importantly, debt relief, on the popular agenda. Front page color photographs of Japanese protests in Tokyo, with individuals holding hands in cooperation, were visual representations that served to provide the media with something the could reproduce. International debt relief was no longer an arcane financial topic, it was a real and distilled social issue.

More important than the mass media attention garnered in Japan through the use of visual imagery and attention-grabbing initiatives, attracting media through the use of NGOs, academics and professional aid agencies was key. Given the cultural heritage of Japan, as elucidated in the literature discussed above, notions of international inclusion and foreign-based bullying (gaiatsu) are quite real. Kitazawa, recognizing that shaming through Western organizations is a useful strategy, organized numerous meetings with top-level officials that were attended by NGOs, Western high-profile academics such as Jeffrey Sachs and aid agencies. These meetings were not perfunctory; rather, they served to instill a sense of international pressure on Japan. This pressure intensified particularly
after Cologne and the build-up to the Okinawa Summit. In addition, the visits from NGOs and aid agencies also made their way to newspaper editorials and coverage, as discussed above. This served to create two-level pressure: from the top and from the bottom. Evidence that this pressure mattered can be viewed in Japan’s own development reports that cite the growing international debate of the 2000 millennial goals and a growing domestic support for debt relief as reasons for Japan’s revisiting of its debt relief policies (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). Given the importance of developing pressure from the domestic base in Japan, this was a critical step in distilling a sense of international pressure and onus on the domestic constituency.

In the end, Japan institutionalized the international debt relief norm because it did not want to be labeled as an outsider in the international political system. Achieving this point can be attributed to Jubilee 2000’s strategic use of framing debt relief as a Japanese international *cooperation* and *contribution*. This is not to say that the campaign did not try other strategies first. In the initial stages of negotiations Japan lagged behind other G-8 nations in acting upon the norm as the campaign tried to fit a communications strategy that worked for the UK on the Japanese. Low use of mass media attention grabbing strategies and the use of an issue frame that did not tap into a culturally relevant and salient metaphor led to a negative outcome. Once the issue was reframed in a way relevant to Japanese culture, mass media elements began to pay more attention, and a positive outcome was engendered. The Japan campaign’s initial failure and ultimate success can be attributed to specific changes in negotiations and communication
strategies employed by the campaign, allowing us to synthesize under what conditions we can expect particular framing and communication strategies to be successful in engendering favorable outcomes:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASS MEDIA PARTNERSHIP FORGING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Issue frame as presented to mass media outlet** | - Initially used same frame as UK campaign: social justice/Christian-Judeo roots  
- Reframed issue to tap into issues more relevant to Japanese sensibilities: stature in the world political system | The Jubilee 2000 campaign was able to refocus the debate on Japan’s place and standing in the world, a politically and socially salient issue for the nation. |
| **Level of professionalism** | - Jubilee 2000 Japanese campaign relied on Western trust and professional organization  
- Utilized NGOs to provide professional, Western-based shaming | Re-framed issue as one about Japan’s stature in the world. This strategy effectively worked around the lack of a Christian-Judeo ethic. Message was conveyed not only through activist groups but through professional agencies. |
| **Use of 3rd party spokesmen** | - Utilized NGOs to act as voice for Jubilee 2000, provided legitimacy and gaiatsu effect | Professional organizations were able to convince Japan to adopt international debt relief because of international polity standing issues. |
| **Narrow/broad issue** | - Initially focused issue on the merits of international debt relief. Broadened issue to include Japan’s stature in | By broadening the issue to be more about Japan and less about debt relief, the |
Strategy: Focus debate on narrow issue so as to accomplish goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue frame as presented to mass media audience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Use frame that speaks to broad audience that mass media will be attracted to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mass media rallied behind cooperation message and covered the campaign’s events.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue frame as presented to political elite</th>
<th>Reframed issue to reflect Japan’s desire to be among leaders in international political structure</th>
<th>New frame spoke to Japan’s political elite’s desire to be recognized as a stable world leader.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Align frame with political elite sensibilities</td>
<td>Refocused frame away from “unpayable debt relief” to Japan as major player and ally – cooperation and contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural metaphor utilized</td>
<td>Issue was framed in terms of Japan’s ability to rise in standing</td>
<td>The new cultural metaphor was a powerful one. Since World War II Japan has sought status amongst the most powerful nations in the world. The new frame tapped into that desire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Invoke a cultural metaphor that speaks to a large segment of the Japanese population</td>
<td>Cultural metaphor based on community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying ideology invoked</td>
<td>Successful issue frame tapped into ideology of nationalism and Japan’s place in the world</td>
<td>Use of Japanese nationalism and desire to be recognized in the international system provided a strong basis for Japan to adopt debt relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Invoke a shared ideology that would not eliminate large segments of the population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of celebrity</td>
<td>While Western celebrities such as Bono had limited influence, Western academics and notable personalities such as Jeffrey Sachs provided legitimacy and a prestigious name to the campaign</td>
<td>Celebrity factor helped to both attract media attention to events as well as to convince political elite of the urgency of Japan’s decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy: Use celebrities to pique media interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of entertainment devices</td>
<td>Limited use of entertainment devices in the Japanese campaign. Campaign walks and gatherings helped to garner media attention</td>
<td>Media coverage of entertainment devices helped to increase visibility of overall campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy: Utilize entertaining events when possible to attract media attention</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Use of visual imagery

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strategy: Provide a recognizable image for the media to use and reproduce</th>
<th>Attempted to recreate the Birmingham Summit’s “Break the Chain” campaign in Tokyo by surrounding the Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>Newspaper coverage of the event was widespread. Front page, color photographs helped to strengthen visual metaphor of cooperation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

EXOGENOUS CONDITIONS

| Other states that adopted previous to case | Japan was the last G-8 nations to adopt international debt relief. | |
| Number of states that adopted previous to case | Among the G-8, 7 countries adopted before Japan. | |
| Share of international debt to be relieved | 2nd highest among G-8 countries | |

After 2000

Given Japan’s staunch record of opposing international debt relief measures for concerns of moral hazard, it is noteworthy that any promises to relieve debts were made at all at the Okinawa Summit. Japan’s promise in April of 2000 to eliminate all non-ODA bilateral debt was met with skepticism as the program Japan created to relieve the debts was based on the use of Japanese grants: developing countries could have their debts relieved and replaced with grants that would allow them to purchase Japanese-made goods (Busby, 2004). Critics rightly noted that the debt relief measures were structured in such a way that they helped Japanese exports and did not reflect a true
cancelling of “debt,” per se. Japan would still benefit from the position of developing countries, and arguably, would be repaid their debts through growth in trade.

Japan finally gave in to pressure to reform the program and announced in December 2002 that it would cancel all ODA debts (of eligible HIPC countries) (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). As noted above, the reasons provided in the official report cite growing concerns over security after September 11th, 2001, enhanced international focus on debt relief as a major policy area for the international community to respond to, and growing domestic support for debt relief in the developing world (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). This build-up of support, which started with Jubilee 2000’s initial campaign, continued well past the year 2000 goal. The Jubilee 2000 campaign officially networked with the Debt and Poverty Network, headquartered in Tokyo, where Yoko Kitazawa continued to spearhead campaigning activities. Campaigning activities have continued to the present day in Japan, with coordination activities occurring between the UK and United States Jubilee initiatives.

The networked initiative found additional success, at least in principle, in 2005 at the G-8 Gleneagles Summit. Finance ministers from the G8 agreed to cancel $55 billion by 2006, with Japan committing a share of 13.17% of the total debt. This agreement was met with initial optimism by Stephen Rand, current head of the Jubilee Debt Campaign, but quickly deteriorated into disappointment as member nations soon attempted to change the terms of the agreed-upon deal. In a memo written by IMF representative Willy Kierkens (and leaked by the Jubilee Debt Campaign), it was learned that member
nations were attempting to return to the initial Japanese version of debt relief: relief through grants. “Rather than giving full, irrevocable and unconditional debt relief… countries would receive grants” (BBC, 2005). The result of these backroom negotiations has meant that it is unclear as to how much of the G-8 deal will be implemented, and in what form. As Stephen Rand notes, “There has been progress but there's a need for continued pressure and scrutiny to make sure commitments are kept” (BBC, 2006).
Photographs

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The aims of this chapter are threefold. First, it will summarize the argument and evidence presented in the thesis. Next, it will address potential criticisms of the argument and other potential explanations of norm institutionalization. Finally, the chapter will turn to a discussion of the generalizability of the claims made in the thesis, how the model presented might be applied to other cases of norm-making, what policy-makers can learn from this study and what further work needs to be accomplished.

Contributions

Before turning to the criticisms and rejoinders of the argument presented, it is worth reviewing the argument and the contribution made by this thesis. This thesis has argued that in order to explain the puzzle of why some norms are acted upon and others are not, an often overlooked component of the norm-creation process, communication of the norm itself, must be analyzed. Ultimately it is through a communication strategy that utilizes issue framing and mass media effect that norms are successfully refined such that they represent an actionable idea. Through framing and mass media the norm becomes more than a shared moral idea of what should be done; the norm is transformed into rules and changed political behaviors. Mass media serves as the institution that, combined with a framing strategy, institutionalizes the norm into the system, and often results in action in the international arena. Institutionalization thus serves as a crucial
step between norm emergence and action. The use of mass media as an institutionalizing force, while tremendously powerful in its ability to reach a broad audience and convince large numbers of the legitimacy and moral imperative of a norm, is not a strategy without challenges.

Communication, mass media attraction and use is often taken *a priori*, or as a given by those seeking to explain the success of social movements, activist campaigns and norm entrepreneurs. This thesis has shown that mass media coverage is not guaranteed and that norm entrepreneurs that use effective strategies for forging partnerships with mass media outlets and communicating their message benefit from those strategies. Unless the norm entrepreneurs present a story to media elite that is beneficial to them, a story that the media feels will speak to the mass population and prove exciting and newsworthy, it likely will not be covered. Thus, norm entrepreneurs in attempting to institutionalize their moral idea into the political fabric of rules, preferences, actions, and expected state behaviors, must utilize a number of different strategies to get on the media’s agenda.

In the end, this thesis has proposed both a theoretical argument and empirical contribution to the growing body of literature on the norm life-cycle and, in particular, the process of norm institutionalization. From the theoretical perspective, this thesis adds the role of mass media as an influencer in the norm institutionalization process. While scholars have generally agreed that mass media plays a role in creating international political and economic outcomes, the precise *mechanism* by which it affects outcomes is
less understood. By problematizing mass media’s involvement in norms, this thesis has undertaken the task of discovering that mechanism. In the end, mass media serves to refine and distill complex ideas into digestible chunks and disseminate those ideas to a wide population base, helping to generate support for normative ideas.

On the empirical end, this thesis has contributed to the growing body of literature of political and social dynamics in the United Kingdom and Japan. International relations scholars have argued that in the post Cold War world, regionalism is an important concept and paradigm in understanding political outcomes; the world is no longer governed by two large superpowers, but rather politics at the regional level are shaping outcomes in the world system (Katzenstein, 2005). Thus, understanding the political dynamics in a comparativist perspective between the United Kingdom and Japan is beneficial to the scholar of international relations. Further, beyond political dynamics, this thesis has illustrated that social dynamics matter as well. These dynamics include issues of identity, meaning, moral positions, psychology and religion. As has been shown by this thesis, states do not operate as a black box. Rather, internal political and social dynamics often result in different outcomes. The differences in progression and outcomes between the United Kingdom and Japan help to elucidate the conditions and strategies that both help and hinder norm institutionalization movements in both countries, thus contributing to knowledge on region-based outcome analysis.
Generalizability: Other Cases

A solid test of any theory is whether or not it is generalizable. That is, do the arguments presented in this thesis apply only to the cases chosen, international debt relief, or will they apply to other cases as well? While future research and empirical studies need to be conducted, there is initial evidence to suggest that the theoretical argument made could be applied to other cases as well. Cases to choose from would be instances where norms became acted upon only after substantial media attention as ideas are cultivated and distilled by norm entrepreneurs. In particular, the norm investigated in this thesis is characterized as a weak, cooperative humanitarian norm. It is expected that the theory proposed in this thesis would apply particularly well to other norms of a weak, cooperative nature.

International standards of labor that have been adopted by many states and firms through the United Nation’s *Global Compact* program fit these conditions nicely. In particular, the case of Guatemalan Coca-Cola workers and international norm entrepreneurs using media to distill a complex notion of labor standards into a digestible concept of human rights and workers rights fits this thesis nicely (Holmes, 2006). It was only after norm entrepreneurs found a frame of workers rights and partnered with mass media outlets to carry its message, that the concept of labor standards was institutionalized in Guatemala, forcing Coca-Cola to change its operating procedures and the Guatemalan government to change its informal and formal workers rights rules and expectations.
Other humanitarian weak social norms that more explicitly involve institutionalizing ideas through mass media, creating state expectations of action, include landmines and climate change. The International Campaign to Band Landmines NGO has focused its efforts on attracting mass media coverage to the “Stolen Lives, Limbs and Livelihoods” frame. This frame is successful because it taps into a cultural metaphor of personal security and well-being. The campaign has been successful in using this frame to attract media attention and put landmines on state agendas (ICBL, 2006). A similar endeavor is underway by activists in the climate change space that seek to change state expectations on appropriate response to global warming. Spearheaded by Al Gore, the Stop Global Warming NGO has recently utilized a frame of “Planetary Emergency” to connote the dire situation of planet warming (Gore, 2006). This marks a significant departure from the earlier dominate frame of “Global Warming” and constitute a much stronger and emotional frame. The metaphor of emergency speaks to individual security and connotes a much greater problem facing the planet than the metaphor of warming. Further, Al Gore’s celebrity status has also allowed for significant media attention and coverage of the new frame. The climate change case is a case where issue reframing must be combined with significant media attention in order to change state expectations. Norm institutionalization success will depend on whether or not domestic bases and mass media outlets respond to the impending “planetary emergency.”

Finally, it should be noted that the theoretical and empirical claims and validation proffered in this thesis also contribute to policy-making knowledge. While this thesis is
not overtly policy-driven, it can be used as an instructional guide for social movement and norm entrepreneurs that hope to enact policy changes. By understanding the role of issue framing and mass media attention, groups that are attempting policy changes will be better prepared in enacting strategies that work. Clearly not all of the explanatory sub-factors and strategies outlined in this thesis will be applicable to each movement’s initiative, nor does the thesis provide a blueprint for changing governmental behavior. Yet, by examining instances where framing and mass media were useful in engendering favorable outcomes, social movements can learn how to incorporate those strategies into their own paradigms and issue areas. In this way the thesis speaks not only to entrepreneurs of international debt relief norms, but all social movements that seek political change.

**Counter-explanations, Potential Criticisms and Rejoinders**

Having reviewed the theoretical argument and empirical evidence proffered in the thesis, it is worth reviewing potential criticisms of the argument and empirical evidence, in order to understand both ramifications for the argument itself and future research opportunities these criticisms might elucidate. The criticisms addressed in this section will proceed by looking at the critique itself, providing evidence that supports the critique and finally a rejoinder that addresses the issue.

One criticism of the argument presented in this thesis is that it privileges mass media communication while minimizing the effect of direct negotiations with policy-
makers and other less public aspects of norm creation, adoption and institutionalization. That is, while mass media portrayed the international debt relief issue in a certain frame, the events that occurred “behind closed doors” were equally, if not more, important than the media’s involvement. This criticism speaks to general issues of argumentation associated with using one set of explanatory sub-factors to address a wide set of outcomes. In this respect, the criticism is justified. Any attempt to explain norm institutionalization by only referencing one tool, such as mass media, would be missing other potential sources of variation. This thesis does not quarrel with that view. It argues that variation in norm institutionalization outcomes can be partly explained by investigating the role of mass media and framing on the process. This does not minimize the effect of closed door negotiations, but it does suggest that mass media might have an effect on the negotiations themselves. Recalling the explanatory sub-factors outlined above, part of the influence of mass media is precisely on political elite themselves. Thus, to a certain extent, any “behind the scenes” negotiations will be affected by mass media involvement.

Further, while negotiations certainly play a role in changing behavior of individual actors, they have a more difficult time explaining the cascade effect of norm adoption that is witnessed when new norms are created. More specifically, the causal link between one state changing their practices and other firms and states following suite can not be explained through negotiations alone. In some instances alternate explanations might explain why states respond to another firm or state changing
behavior. Firms might change behavior in order to prevent regulatory involvement, for instance. States might anticipate international organizational involvement and preempt such action by acting voluntarily. At a broader level however, negotiations alone between social movements and international actors does not sufficiently explain why third-party actors who are not involved in the direct negotiations would change behaviors unless a new social reality had been constructed through mass media effect.

A corollary criticism of privileging mass media effect in the norm institutionalization process is that it is obvious. Clearly norm entrepreneurs want to attract as much publicity as possible in order to disseminate their message(s) across as broad of an audience base as possible. This fact about gaining the attention of mass media outlets is undoubtedly true and somewhat obvious. What is not obvious, however, is why some groups are able to successfully accomplish this and others are not. While it is clear that groups seek to attract media attention, a sufficient theory to explain and predict when they will be successful is lacking. This is particularly true in the complex international arena where norm entrepreneurs must play the “two-level” game, focusing on domestic as well as international constituencies (Putnam, 1988). Thus, while it is clear that norm entrepreneurs will want to attract mass media attention, it is considerably less clear how they are able to do so. This thesis has attempted to fill this gap by examining the explanatory sub-factors that compose media partnership success or failure. By investigating these factors, what seems obvious at first, that it is important to generate mass media attention, quickly becomes a complex endeavor that requires
straddling social-level and political elite-level interests and preferences. The most
successful of norm entrepreneurs will be able to negotiate that complex arrangement by
finding an issue frame that speaks to both political elite and social-level sensibilities.

Finally, given that this thesis has taken an institutionalization approach to
explaining an international outcome, it is worth addressing an alternate conceptualization
of the role of institutions in international debt relief. Specifically, one could argue that
institutions in international norms serve to organize and systematize a realist view of the
world: states will institutionalize measures that are beneficial to the state. For instance, in
the case of international debt relief, an argument could be made that the norm was
institutionalized and adopted from the top-down due to utilitarian considerations. This
argument would suggest that the reason Japan lagged behind the United Kingdom in
relieving debt was simply because Japan had more of it. In short, Japan lost more than
the United Kingdom did because Japan was owed more debt at the time it was to be
relieved. The state, in other words, will institutionalize a norm or other set of rules if it
will benefit it in the long-term. This argument is a strong one and speaks to the difficulty
of any single argument explaining all of a given outcome. The response to the utilitarian
argument rests on three distinct pieces of evidence: interviews with high-level officials
suggest it is not true; the timing of debt relief suggests the Jubilee campaign had some
effect; and, the utilitarian argument itself in many ways speaks to the power of framing
and mass media communication.
The main evidence that suggests a utilitarian view was not the only consideration in both the UK and Japanese cases is that top policy official interviews indicate otherwise. In the UK case, Gordon Brown’s philosophical opinion of international debt relief was cited as one of the strongest reasons for pursuing the initiative (Busby, 2005). Further, while the UK had relatively low debt holdings (2nd lowest in the G-7), they did hold substantial claims (over $3 billion between 1998 and 1999). To relieve the claims would not necessarily follow a strict utilitarian argument that the UK would only pursue the course of action that benefited the country the most. In the Japanese case, Japan held a high number of claims (roughly $11 billion between 1998 and 1999) and thus has much more to lose, with respect to remittances. Thus, a utilitarian explanation would expect Japan not to institutionalize the international debt relief norm; it was not in their utilitarian interest to do so. Further, evidence from interviews with Japanese officials suggest that policy-makers were paying attention to what was going on in the campaign, from newspaper coverage to the “break the chain” demonstrations in Tokyo (Busby, 2005). This suggests that while Japan might be maintaining utilitarian interests, those interests were not the only parts of the decision-making equation.

If the utilitarian explanation does not explain Japan’s eventual acceptance of international debt relief, might it help to explain the lag between the UK’s acceptance and Japan’s acceptance? Recalling the two empirical chapters, the UK cancels its debt in December 1999, shortly after the Cologne summit and it is not until the middle of 2000 that Japan first agreed to bilateral debt relief in April and then made further
commitments at the Okinawa Summit in July. A utilitarian explanation would suggest that Japan had the most to lose and thus held off from making commitments for as long as possible. This argument is persuasive, but it does not address the timing of Japan’s commitments. The Okinawa Summit was the largest initiative for the entire Jubilee Japan campaign, culminating their incessant work in incorporating debt relief into the social and political structure. Thus, it was not surprising that Japan’s commitments came at the pinnacle of the campaign. While the campaign provides an explanation for the timing, the utilitarian argument does not. The lag might have been based on utilitarian functions of interest, but the decision to accept debt relief and timing to announce it can only be explained by looking at the efforts of the debt relief campaign, and their initiatives, itself.

The utilitarian argument speaks in many ways to the power of framing and mass media communication. Jubilee campaigners were able to convince Japan and the United Kingdom, to a lesser extent, to accept international debt relief, even though it was against their interests. Both countries had remittances to lose and thus gave up on potential revenue from loans in order to help developing nations. In this sense, framing and mass media partnership strategies were able to overcome strong and compelling reasons to not relieve debt. The Japanese case, in particular, illustrates the power of framing nicely. While it could be argued that Japan’s stature in the international political system is ultimately about utilitarian interests, it is also about identity interests. Japan’s reversal of position on debt relief signals that utilitarian desire does not necessarily
trump moral persuasion, particularly when issues of identity and world standing are at stake. Thus, if nothing else, the Jubilee campaign and its framing strategies were able to link debt relief and identity, creating a compelling interest for Japan to forget about revenue and think about image.

Finally, addressing a potential criticism about the methodology of using framing analysis is worthwhile. One of the critiques about analyzing frames and framing strategies is that the analysis is typically done post-hoc in cases where framing was successful. Put another way, it is a relatively simple exercise to look at an outcome and suggest that the outcome was reached based on framing. The researcher making the claim benefits from the difficulty of illustrating and predicting good frames from bad frames. As Rodger Payne (2001) notes, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling. It would be virtually impossible to know in advance if an apparently compelling frame in one situation would also prove persuasive when applied to an analogous case” (p. 44). Thus, any attempt to argue that an outcome was derived from successful framing will be subject to this critique: is it the frame that was successful or something else? The response to this critique is two-fold. First, while a comprehensive framing theory and predictive framework for understanding successful from unsuccessful frames has yet to be developed, that does not mean investigating frames is without value. Researchers might not be able to predict which frames will be successful, but the method of reaching that point is by understanding under what conditions certain frames are successful. This
thesis is an exercise in that approach. Payne’s critique that it is impossible to predict future success of frames is correct, but it is still useful to look at how frames contribute to outcomes in order to determine under what conditions prediction might be possible. Second, as it relates to this thesis, falsifying the framing argument is a relatively straightforward procedure. If policy-makers had acknowledged that the issue frames presented by Jubilee 2000 were not compelling and did little to change their minds, we would have an instance where framing was unsuccessful. Thus, framing analyses inherently have the problem of predictability, and to a certain extent, falsifiability, but each can be overcome by investigating the empirics closely to determine the conditions under which a particular frame did work and what evidence would need to be provided to be convinced that framing was of no consequence.

**Limits and Future Research Questions**

One of the limits of this study has been the type of norm investigated. International debt relief is largely a social and humanitarian issue, as presented here, and thus represents a social norm. The argument presented is tailored particularly well to social norms, but it is less clear that the argument works for other norms as well. For instance, legal and institutional norms, such as nuclear arms norms, might be less affected by mass media representation than those of a social focus. Additionally, this thesis has focused on a norm that is normatively “good” in nature; would the same argument apply to those that are “bad” in nature as well? It is important to note that not
all norms are good norms, limits and changes to behavior can be positive as well as negative in an international polity.

An additional limit to this research has been the level of analysis utilized. This thesis has investigated state-level norm institutionalization precisely because international debt relief is largely controlled at the state level. However, norms do not affect only states. Firms, in particular, are under continual pressure to conform to normative concepts of right and wrong. Issues of labor standards, workers rights, etc., are all ultimately normative concepts that are either adopted and acted upon, or ignored. As mentioned above, the argument made in this thesis could apply to firms and their ability to institutionalize norm as well. A research project that applied the concepts of norm institutionalization and mass media on state decision-making could also be applied to the decision-making process of the firm. This would be particularly interesting in cases where corporate social responsibility (CSR) visibility is at stake.

Finally, future empirical work on cases where framing and mass media effect were unsuccessful in institutionalizing a social norm is warranted. This study has utilized two instances where ultimately the strategies by norm entrepreneurs were eventually successful. It is in the initial failure of the strategies in the Japanese case where many of the most salient conclusions of the study can be drawn. Thus, future work that

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20 Institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc., certainly promote debt relief in a variety of capacities, but it is ultimately the state that has final discretion as to whether or not they agree to relieve the debt.

21 Initial evidence suggests that media portrayal is extremely important to firm decision-making. The Nike “sweat shop” and Coca-Cola Guatemalan worker cases illustrate two labor standards cases where mass media seemed to be influential in the institutionalization of a fair labor norm.
investigates failed attempts at norm institutionalization will help norm scholarship by creating a more comprehensive list of conditions that help and hinder norm institutionalization. As Thomas Kuhn notes, “all theories are born wrong.” In this spirit, it is important to determine not only when a theory might work, as is the case in this study, but also when a theory fails to provide a compelling explanation of an outcome.
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