Nationalism is a social construct built upon the intersection of modern media, capitalism and bureaucratized state. Increased extension of the state and capitalism beg for standardized subjects. Nationalism brings that standardization while providing affective support for the citizens to undergo the painful transition into capitalist economy. Turkish nationalism embodies traits of both postcolonial and European models of nationalisms. Although never had been a colony, Turkish intelligentsia preserves culture as a site of authenticity like the postcolonial nation. It is a project of incessant modernization and therefore Westernization, which reached to its climax with Kemalism. Beginning in 1960s, new variants also emerge that re-introduce a glorified image of a Turk with an emphasis on Islam. Like in its counterparts, in Turkish nationalism, in building and maintaining the national subjects media play an integral part. They create self-images with reference to what they are not- the ‘Other’ nation. In this vein, a Greek is the anti-image of a Turk, with his religion, culture and intemperate desire to expand against Turkey. Media create and sustain these self and Other images. However, the Internet might be challenging the national self. The disentanglement of the body and the self makes it possible to teleport the self to interact with other selves.
What happens to Turkish nationalism when these ideas are transported to the online space? Since the Internet may make new subjectivities possible, does this mean that a new Turkish national identity can be formulated on the online space in reference to Greek Others? Will hostility be the norm on the Internet? This research aims to uncover these questions. Nevertheless, this research also brings Turks’ first hand articulations about the Greeks. Since previously it was harder to have access to these ideas, the Internet brings a great wealth of material for the researchers of nationalism.
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In the process of writing this thesis, my grandmother passed away. She was one of the only two living Crete-born Turks in my father’s hometown, Tarsus. Her and my grandfather came to Turkey on separate boats that crossed the Aegean from Crete to Anatolia with the population exchange between Turkey and Greece. I grew up hearing stories about their lives in Crete and a longing to go back and visit their birthplaces. My grandparents both had the opportunity to go back before they passed away.

Learning from personal experience how the Turkish and Greek nations are intertwined in their history and culture, I always had hard time to position myself within the hostile attitude against the neighboring people. The two nations share centuries of co-existence that is undermined in the current conjuncture. I hope this research serves a purpose to understand the ways in which the hostility breeds in the Internet age.

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To all those who crossed the Sea on both sides of the Aegean…
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Every Turkish student from the early ages learns one of Ataturk’s, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, most known quotations through mural engravings in many schoolyards: “How glad to be a Turk.” 1 English translation does not capture an important element in this quotation: the literal translation is “How glad to say for someone that s/he is a Turk.”  “Being able to say” and “being” refer to two distinct states of self-consciousness. Because many different peoples make up the Turkish nation, Ataturk does not tie the condition of being a Turk to an ethnic or racial definition, but rather opens up an inclusive category. Nevertheless, as one moves from the schoolyard to the classroom, the history reading in the school textbooks undermine that multiplicity.

Turkey’s Turks came from distant lands of Central Asia and settled in the Anatolian peninsula. The history textbooks elaborate this feature via maps with colored arrows showing the migratory routes of Central Asian Turks. One of those arrows settles in what is now Turkey. The same books discuss the peoples of pre-Turkish Anatolia with a tone that describes those civilizations to be vanished from the history scene with all their people – the civilizations passé. Ancient Greek civilization, for instance, is one of those who lived on these geographies and no longer exists. In these books, they would have no relation to the makeup of the current Turkish nation (ethnically, culturally, religiously) whatsoever.

This history reading has a relation to Turkish nationalism in the ways in which it formulates images for the self and also the anti-self, the Greeks. The boldly outlined

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1 Ne mutlu Turkum diyene
contours between the two nations rest upon their respective nationalisms. Both nationalisms will insert history into a form of narrative that constructs images of ‘Other’ for the other nation. This research studies the ways in which Turkish nationalism formulates such images for the Greek nation on the online space.

This study is a piece in the practice of historicizing Turkish nationalism in relation to the media. The research findings show that Turkish nationalism in its hostile attitude of the Greeks is present on the online space. The Internet is a relatively safer place since it does not involve physical presence. However, this feature does not enable the appearance of unconventional views about the Greeks. In this sense, Internet users extremely underutilize the medium. On contrary, Turkish nationalism in its hostile attitude of the Greeks deepens. Online space makes imagining the Turkish nation more real.

The hostility is not only present on the Turkish side. It is a fact for both nations. However, a similar analysis for the Greeks asks for a culturally competent researcher to take on the challenge. This research is a building block for future nationalism researchers. A similar examination would reveal how much the two nations retain hostility of each other. Furthermore, nationalism is already in relation to other factors, like other nationalisms concerning the Turkish nation. Within this vein, Western media’s depiction of Turkey is also an important aspect in the study of Turkish nationalism. In this context, the media depict Turkey as an Other with aggressive nationalism. However, this depiction informs this aggression, which in turn portrays a non-nationalist, ‘civil’ West. As Billig (1995) illustrates, ‘we’ forget ‘our’ nationalism through naming it as
others’ (p. 49). Evidently, this interconnection also articulates on the nationalisms in the West. Within the limits of this study, it will not be fair to address the Greek hostility against the Turks and other nationalisms’ look onto Turkey. These two important aspects are two distinct research questions.

This research examines blogs, online commenting to e-newspaper articles and forum discussions for the Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece show. Frustration is a common theme in all of these platforms. Western media’s depiction of Turkey and their favored attitude for the Greeks frustrate Turkish Internet users. In cases of showing positive inclination for the Greeks, users use an apologetic tone to make their articulations. In these discussions, nation is the norm and universal across space and time.

Chapter 1 studies blogs about the Greek nation. The study used blogcu.com, the biggest blogging service provider for the Turkish speakers. It covers the blog articles pertaining to the Greek nation and the mutual history. Blogs are media of personal journalism for patriotic duties. It is the national responsibility of a Turkish blogger to get the truth out about the Greek nation. Thus, they can educate blog readers about the real face of the Greeks. In this sense, blogs have the function of perpetuating the hostility against the Greek nation. In the blog entries in this research, historical memory is in active use to sustain myths about the Greek nation. The bloggers use elaborate technologies, such as YouTube, to make their point. At the end, they persistently blog other news articles. The patriotic duty of a blogger is blogging about the Greek nation without the need of validating the information. In this process, circular citationality does not bring the true event to the blog universe but its representation. Only reference
pervades on the Internet. Therefore, the bloggers perpetuate the mythic Greek image on the cyberspace.

Chapter 2 deals with the online comments posted to the news articles. News media build and maintain the national construction. In their capacity to tie geographically apart individuals together via relating them to nationally important events, news media are sine qua non of nationalism. They provide material for the coffee house conversations of close acquaintances, making it possible to imagine each other belonging to the same national unit. This chapter studies these effects on the online space. However, online news reading experience is different from reading physical newspapers. On the cyberspace, news readership is a collaborative act with online commenting. It also turns the coffee house experience into an online one, where the newsreader does not necessarily converse within close social circles but also with distant fellow nationals. Online commenting inserts personal hostility into the news media, turning imagined communities into real ones.

Chapter 3 examines the forum discussions for *Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece* game show. Media circulate representations in order to maintain the national construction. This chapter studies the show in order to illustrate the ways in which the Greek image flows in the popular culture. Current TV shows are distinct from their previous examples because they bring a new TV watching experience via attaching the viewers to each other on the online space. The forum discussions with the show’s mediation introduce the Greek images into the popular culture. This show is also an illustration for new levels in consumption. National sentiments can have entertainment value on the online space.
National ideas about the Greeks are discussed not in relation to the politics any more but real, ordinary people. It is the final stage in hostility when it gets detached from history and politics and attaches to average citizens in people’s articulations.

The Internet promises freer expression. Unheard voices can make their way to an international audience if they find the right route. However, as far as this research goes, the Internet users underutilize the online space. The offline myths about the Greek nation are also present on the online world. Turkish nationalism on the Internet deepens along the lines of hostility of the Others.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

Turkish nationalism is the product of successive stages of modernization and Westernization in the Ottoman society that culminated with the formation of the Turkish nation. It was at its final stage that the Turkish nation was born. In this process, images for a Turk and its inverse ‘Other’ adjusted with the changes in modernization. Since nationalism is an on-going process, these images also change with its new variants. In its contemporary version of a glorified Turkish identity with an emphasis on Islam, Turkish nationalism preserves the image of Greeks as the ‘Other’ nation. Since nationalism is a social construct that depends on media, as a medium of interaction the Internet can have the power to change these constructions. This literature review attempts to capture nationalism’s relation to media and the Internet’s role in this process.

The survey of literature present in this review is an attempt to deconstruct the ways in which the spread of nationalism throughout Europe, which finally entered the Ottoman lands triggered the standard history. In this attempt, this presentation also tries to relate postcolonial nationalism and Orientalism to the Turkish nationalism’s formation processes.

Turkish nationalism is the culmination of successive phases of modernization. Starting with the Tanzimat movement, this modernization first attempted to bring a new Ottoman identity that equalized all the subjects of the Empire. Noticing the frustrations that this caused among the Muslim populations as they lost their prior privileges, Sultan Abdulhamid formulated his ideology with an Islamic appeal in order to counteract the modernization that restricts his sovereignty. Nevertheless, his Pan-Islamist attempt was a
failure with increased European intervention into Ottoman affairs and the rising of a new
tide of ideology, Pan-Turanism. This time the Central-Asian Turkish émigrés from
Russia influenced the Ottoman intelligentsia with their versions of nationalism to unite all
the peoples of the Turan. Its failure signaled a new stage in national consciousness with
the appearance of Turkism. Finally, Turkish-speaking-Muslim populations of Anatolia
became Turks in the new nation: the Turkish Republic.

Nationalism is a project of the modern era. The intersection of shifts in media
production, administration and economy determines this social construct. In this process,
the ruling elite and intellectuals will study the needs of their constituents and incorporate
them into their intents. Nevertheless, this new form of consciousness is a Western
paradigm. Thus, for the postcolonial nation, it is an act of internalizing the order of the
invader, and therefore culture must be preserved as a site of authenticity. Although
Turkey had never been a colony, its nationalism views the culture in postcolonial terms.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman intelligentsia, unlike postcolonial one, did not experience the
psychological burden of appropriating the order of the invading power; Westernization
was a self-initiated effort. The Westernized intellectual elites will use the peasant culture
of the bottom as a coating to broadcast their new worldview to the rest of the population.

Nationalism requires images of Other to sustain the national group identity. The
media have an integral role in maintaining theses constructions and therefore
perpetuating hostility between the Greek and the Turkish nations. For instance, the
media circus formed around the Imia/Kardak islet crisis in 1996 almost brought the
countries to war. As a form of individualized medium, the Internet reconfigures national
identities. Since body and space are no longer together on the cyberspace, individuals can teleport their selves to interact with other selves. Thus, according to some scholars, the Internet has the potential to create a new subjectivity. Can the Internet be a medium where these mythic articulations about the Greek Others are challenged? What happens when the mythic Others are now electronic Others? What will their position be in relation to the Turkish nationalism on the cyberspace? Starting with this literature review, this research tries to answer these questions.

**Turkish Nationalism**

Beginning with 19th century, multinational empires faced the challenge of nationalism. The nation as a modern way of imagining self in a group threatened the integrity of such empires. Especially in Eastern Europe, multinational empires such as the Ottoman Empire started to crumble into different nation-states. Religious communities in the Empire, such as the Greeks, became a nation rather than a religious group. With the increased national consciousness among these groups, communities built discursive borders to set themselves apart from the others based on religion, language and culture. The identity of the Turkish nation emerged within such border building practices. Facing this challenge, the Ottoman Empire launched into the task of modernization to prevent the Empire from falling apart.

Turkish nationalism is a series of ideological efforts to hold the Ottoman Empire intact, which culminated with its form in the Turkish Republic. In this sense, Turkish nationalism developed differently from its counterparts in Europe. Nationalism was not so much of a challenge for those who established nation-states, except multinational
empires (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 43). In such empires, ethnicity is very complicated especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 63-4). Within this multinational context, although never colonized, the Western states treated countries like Turkey as one entity for cultural and economical purposes. There was a desire to reform local population and link independent and reformed state to a sense of national identity (Breuilly, 1982, p. 195). Nevertheless, Turkey was not part of the colonized world and her experience with modernization differed from her postcolonial counterparts. It was a self-motivated effort.

Nationalism in a non-colonial, non-European world such as Turkey was about modernization distinct from the postcolonial experience. Despite the fact that Turkey was a part of a non-European, non-colonial group of nations, she was under constant threat of colonization. The modernist nationalism is a term that accommodates for this type of non-colonized and non-European society (Akman, 1999, p. 33). Thus, Turkish modernist nationalism was about building a commonality for the nationals of Turkey to adapt to the Western cultural mode in the form of ‘civilizational conversion’ (Akman, 1999, p. 24). In other words, it entailed instrumentally, pragmatically and ideologically internalizing the ‘West’ (Akman, 1999, p. 26). The way Turkish nationalism differs from postcolonialism is that the Turkish elite were spared direct dilemma of colonization, making the enactment of a modernist national identity possible (Akman, 1999, p. 39). Thus, Turkish nationalism was the modernization of its subjects to counteract the rising European threat and other nationalisms growing among religious communities of the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman administration used religious affiliation as a way to group ethnic communities in Ottoman society. The beginning of the 19th century brought nationalist challenges to such administrative structuring of the multinational empires of the Eastern Europe. Multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic empires such as the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires were turned into multi-national empires, and those groups demanded recognition as different nations (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 143). These empires were ‘turned into’ multinational ones in that the emerging national consciousness started to divide these heterogenous administrative communities into smaller national units. This process was related to national-consciousness formation of various ethnic/religious/lingual groups within the empires to imagine themselves as distinct from other groups.

Ethnic groups in the Empire belonged to their respective religious communities, rather than the national one. The Ottoman administration used the “millet” system to divide Ottoman society along the lines of Muslims vs. non-Muslims (Gocek, 2002, p. 18). Since the mid-15th century, the administration designated four millets: Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish and Muslim, whose clergy were responsible for tax collection and other duties (Gocek, 2002, p. 18-9; Hanioglu, 2002, p. 85). Turks had their place under the Muslims category as their journey from Central Asia was erased from the collective memory (Georgeon, 1986, p. 13-4). Consequently, Greeks’ location as non-Muslims within the Ottoman society preconditioned the ways in which both theirs and Turkish nationalism’s formulations.
Under threat of separatist nationalisms among the non-Muslim populations of the Empire, the ruling elite faced a discomforting challenge. Various ethnic communities demanded a break from the heterogeneous religious organization. In the beginning of the 19th century, ideas about nation infiltrated into the Ottoman lands. Noticing the uneasiness among these groups, the Ottoman administration started the modernization process, known as Tanzimat, which promised equality to all subjects of Ottoman society. This process was not able to create loyalty to non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities, and eventually culminated in Turkish nationalism.

Tanzimat, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and the Young Turks

Ottoman modernization was a self-consciousness one. Facing constant threats of falling prey to Europe’s systematic colonization and nationalist separatisms among ethnic groups, Ottoman society underwent processes of modernization. Religion and ethnicity were no longer the basis in determining subjects’ taxes and education. All subjects were turned into equals. In this way, the administration hoped to keep the loyalty to the Empire intact.

The ideological experimentations failed to reinstitute that loyalty and nations separated from the Ottoman state. Finally, after losing its various populations, the Ottoman population narrowed down to a very refined one, in which Turkish-speaking-Muslims of Anatolia were left alone. The experimentation started with Ottomanism, which promised equality for all subjects. However, this loss of advantageous position within the administrative system created anxiety among the Muslims of the Empire. Observing this discomfort, Sultan Abdulhamid saw it as a chance to regain his
sovereignty that he shared starting with the modernization processes. His ideology of Pan-Islamism with its religious coating appealed to the Muslims living in the Empire. Yet, the increased European intervention into the non-Turkish Muslim lands brought its downfall. While it faded in power, with increased presence of Russian Turkish émigrés in the Ottoman intellectual circles, Pan-Turanism rose as an alternative communicating the idea of a union for all the peoples of Turan. This experiment shared the destiny of the others and had no other choice with the Bolshevik Revolution taking over in Asia. Turks were left alone in the picture.

The modernization efforts of the Ottoman elite against rising nationalisms within the empire laid the foundations for a proto-Turkish national identity. The Tanzimat reforms entailed the modernization of the state apparatus and the union in the millet system. Coupled with the anxiety for the expansion of European colonization into the Ottoman lands, as a survival method, the state occupied itself with ‘self-inflicted processes of defensive modernism’ (Akman, 1999, p. 44). The ideas propagated by the French Revolution fed into these separatist nationalisms. Members of various millets defined themselves not only through the millet-religious identity designated by the center, but also through their own ethnic traditions (i.e. Bulgarian, instead of Greek Orthodox). To counteract these efforts, the Ottomanism ideology of the Tanzimat elite worked for the union of all subjects irrespective of religion or ethnicity (Hanioglu, 2002, p. 85-6). As non-Muslims gained more rights and became equal with the Muslims of the empire, this situation created a discomfort for the Muslims.
The rise of Pan-Islamism under Sultan Abdulhamid signaled the switch to a more refined Islamic and Turkish identity, rather than the historic, cosmopolitan Ottoman one. Abdulhamid’s rhetoric designed his rhetoric to gain the support of the wider Muslim public (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 249). Pan-Islamism emphasized the Sultan as the protector of Muslims. It intended to counteract the increasing Western presence in the Ottoman domestic affairs. Since different groups in the Empire were turning to West for support rather than official Ottoman structures, the Sultan hoped Pan-Islamism to appeal to the Muslims of the population and therefore put a halt on a potential separatism among the Muslims (Poulton, 1997, p. 59). Meanwhile, with the diffusion of Turanist ideologies from Central Asia into the Empire, a Turkish component of Ottoman society was more pronounced.

Pan-Turanism, a movement of Russian Turks in the Ottoman Empire, further emphasized the Turkish component of the society. The Central-Asian Turkish influence, mainly from the Tatars, shifted the focus from Pan-Islamism to Pan-Turkism (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 256-7). Turanism, led by émigrés from Russia, was the first ethnic movement, emphasizing one country from Balkans to China, called Turan (Poulton, 1997, p. 82). Yusuf Akcura became a prominent figure in Turkish nationalism. He brought Russian Turkish nationalist ideas stressing race to the Ottoman intelligentsia through his publications. However, he called for a narrower national definition than Turan. In *Three Types of Politics*², Akcura argued the consequences of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in the Ottoman Empire and claims that these ideologies

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² Uc Tarz-i Siyaset
cannot address the fall of the Ottoman Empire; thus, Turkish nationalism is necessary (Georgeon, 1986, p. 8, 35). Nevertheless, Akcura was influential in introducing Turkist characters into the intelligentsia. With World War I and the Russian Revolution, the defeats of the Ottoman armies brought the fading of Turanism (Poulton, 1997, p. 83). Despite this defeat, Pan-Turanism, with the curiosity it created for Turks of Central Asia, led to the emergence of Turkism. Turkism was the form of Turkish nationalism that was built on the political experiences and influences coming from Europe and Central Asia. The Central-Asian Turkish exiles coming from Tsarist Russia brought with them their notions of nations, formulated during their fight for national autonomy and European ideas that they acquired during their stays in the Western nations (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 257). In this sense, Turkish nationalism shows traits of modularity in its flexible to be transplanted at geographies away from its origins (Anderson, 1983, p. 4). Consequently, Turkism, within the old Empire’s territories, developed into the rhetoric of the ruling elite.

As the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations of the Empire separated away, the ruling military elite of the Young Turks broadcast their Turkist national ideology through print media. Young Turk movement emphasized a new brand of Ottoman administration elite with an anti-religious and pro-Turkish stand (Gocek, 2002, p. 35). The highly organized Committee of Union and Progress was an intellectual endeavor that became influential in defining nationalism for the Young Turks. Their journals advocated a separate Turkish nationalism and were outraged for European Great Powers’ intervention into Ottoman affairs. For instance, the article “Conversation with a Greek in
Boulogne Forest”\textsuperscript{3} presents the Turkish emphasis in nationalism. The article claims that Ottoman citizenship cannot extend to Christians because they either think of joining with their new nation (such as Greeks and Bulgarians) or forming their own nation (such as Armenians). Thus, the Turk should be the focus of the Ottoman state (Hanioglu, 2002, p. 91). With the loss of Christian population of the Empire, the connection between ‘Turk’ and ‘Muslim’ increased (Poulton, 1997, p. 67). Thus, after the Muslim/Turkish population was left with the dissolving of non-Muslim territories, the political conjuncture was ready for the envisioning of Turkism (Behar, 1992, p. 64). The Young Turk movement further concentrated the national efforts around Turkist elements.

Westernization was a recurring theme among the intellectuals of the Young Turk movement. Ziya Gokalp emerged as an important figure in Turkish nationalism. Gokalp argued for a German type of nationalism, with strong separation between civilization and culture. Under this schema, civilization can be acquired, but not culture. Nationality is therefore based not on ethnicity, or blood, but on culture (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 63). Similarly, Gokalp called for acquiring Western civilization while retaining Turkish culture. According to him, culture consists of essential values (language, literature, art) and those should not be changed. On the other hand, civilization can transform into the new order of system (technology, administration), which will support the development of cultural values (Gungor, 1995, p. 11-2). Therefore a synthesis of Turkish culture and Western civilization must replace the Ottoman system (Gokalp, 1968, p. 32-3). Consequently, Gokalp favored the concept of Westernized Muslim Turks, with one

\textsuperscript{3} Boulogne Ormaninda bir Rum ile Muhavere
language and one culture (Gocek, 2002, p. 38; Gokalp, 1968, p. 17). Thus, Islam, Turkishness and Westernism figured to be the main three pillars of Turkish nationalism.

The Young Turks movement signaled a distinct stage in nationalist thought by emphasizing Muslim-Turkish-Speakers of Anatolia as the nation. They equated the homeland with Anatolia (Poulton, 1997, p. 64). Thus, the Turkism promoted by the Young Turk intellectuals between 1902 and 1907 laid the grounds for Turkish nationalism after 1908 (Hanioglu, 2002, p. 95). Young Turks provided the milieu in which Ataturk erected the Turkish Republic.

Building upon the legacy of various unsuccessful modernization efforts on the Ottoman elite’s part, the Muslim Turks of Anatolia were left as the main constituents for the Young Turks. Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism could not answer the challenges that the Empire was facing. Nationalist separatism was ripping the Ottoman land into distinct nation-states. Along the process, it shifted the focus of Ottoman administration finally on the Muslim Turkish speakers of Anatolia. As their movement was based on intellectual efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress, Westernization emerged as an important theme in their ideology. With the emphasis of culture among the intellects of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Young Turk movement was a blend of tradition and progress. The Kemalist nationalism of the army commander Mustafa Kemal Ataturk erected upon this legacy.

**Kemalism and the New Variants of Turkish Nationalism**

Kemalism, the nationalist ideology of Kemal Ataturk, built upon the foundation laid by the Young Turk movement. The ideology aimed at changing the society into a
civil and Western one. Thus, with its strong Westernization, Islam was taken out of the
civic discourse and contained to the personal lives of Turkish citizens. However,
although influential among the educated, urban segments of the population, Kemalism
could not penetrate into the rural lower classes. Therefore, new variants of nationalism in
the forms of revived Pan-Turanism and a new appeal to Islam emerged within Turkish
nationalism.

Kemalism was an extension of the reformism of the Young Turks that culminated
with modernization into a nation-state. Kemalists showed continuity with the Ottoman
‘reformist tradition’ (Akman, 1999, p. 59). Statism in Turkey imposed an image of a
‘civilized, Western’ society (Akman, 1999, p. 50). For Kemalists, ‘nation-building,
modernization and Westernization were synonymous’ (Akman, 1999, p. 74). “[T]he
establishment of a republic can be seen as a logical result of political developments since
1908; the Independence War and the ensuing spread of Turkish nationalism forced the
pace of change but did not alter its path” (Poulton, 1997, p. 91). Thus, Kemalism became
the modern form of Turkish nationalism.

Since nationalism also entails re-reading of history in line with new nation-state
building processes, Kemalism erased the legacy of Ottoman cosmopolitanism, where
Greeks and Turks figured as separate national entities. The Kemalist vein of Turkish
nationalism de-emphasized the country’s Ottoman past, while promoting the idea of
prehistoric Turkish civilizations. The Turkish state emerged in fundamental opposition to
Ottoman cosmopolitanism (Robins, 1996, p. 69). As European historiography viewed
Ottoman/Turkish identity as a second-class one, official historiography of the Turkish
Republic counteracted with this view by making references to prehistoric Turks. Supposedly Mesopotamia, Egypt and Aegean civilizations were of Turkish stock and the new historiography used this concept to galvanize Turkish nationalism (Behar, 1992, p. 12). The Turkish History Thesis builds upon this historiography to claim that with climate changes in Central Asia, Turks migrated to Anatolia and founded the Hittite, Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations. The goals with this formulation were to portray Anatolian Turks as not invaders, and showing that Turks come from advanced civilizations (Gungor, 1995, p. 84-5). It eventually created historical myths linking prehistoric Turks of Asia Minor and Central Asia (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 259). The nationalist historiography ignored the Ottoman past and linked the Turkish past to distant civilizations.

Kemalism was a limited ideology in the sense that it did not penetrate every segment of the society, leading to formulation of various other ideologies. The Kemalist Revolution did not penetrate into all of society and was limited mainly for the urban areas. In this way, the unaffected population carried out their own self-identification, while remaining to the village unit. This situation stayed the same until the mass mobility of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, the rural population adopted various competing ideologies, not just Kemalist nationalism, but ultra-nationalism and Islam (Poulton, 1997, p. 129). New forms of nationalism entailed the emphasis on Turkish race and the Islamic religion, which are potentially hostile to its opposite, the Greeks.

Beginning in 1960s, Pan-Turanism re-emerged to re-stress the Turkish components from Central Asia. Although they sided with Ataturk in the War of
Independence, they did not give up their Turanist dreams. The Kemalists tried to co-opt Turanists into their dominant rule. Nevertheless, the new system included pan-Turkist symbols like Grey Wolf in stamps and currencies. This symbol still preserves its place for the revived Pan-Turanist ideology (Poulton, 1997, p. 132). Pan-Turanism gained further strength when it incorporated Islam into its discourse.

Islam and Turkism defined the character of the ultranationalist ideology. Since 1960s, Alparslan Turkes’ persona was synonymous with this form. Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) - Nationalist Action Party monopolized the Pan-Turkist ideology, under the leadership of Alparslan Turkes. A radical development was its adoption of Islam to appeal to the Islamic sensibilities of the masses. MHP integrated Islamism into its political agenda in 1969. Yet, more rivals were on the way with the Islamic parties (Poulton, 1997, p. 140, 156, 166-7). Thus, Islam and Turkishness figured as two important features of Turkish nationalism.

Contemporary Turkish nationalism combines Kemalism, pan-Turkism and Islam into one appeal. With the breakdown of society in the 70s, became of the conflict between Marxist and fascist groups, the military, the bastion of Kemalism was endowed with the preservation of the nation, and religion became instrumental in state control (Poulton, 1997, p. 204; Robins, 1996, p. 71). The combination of Turkish nationalism and Islam, known as the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ was apparent in extreme nationalists like Alparslan Turkes. Islamic sympathizers made their way into the central government, especially the Education Ministry. This hybrid of Kemalist nationalism and Sunni Islam was popular among the rural population and segments of urban population migrated from
rural areas, to the extent that the electoral success depended on the religious appeal (Poulton, 1997, p. 204-5). It found mass appeal in the squatter establishments of urban centers, among the migrants from the countryside, whose lives had been disrupted by modernization. By similar reasons, it also found appeal among small businessmen. They were taking advantage of the more liberal climate of 1980s and 1990s (Poulton, 1997, p. 205). Within this environment, the Islamic intellectuals published and broadcasted their ideologies (Poulton, 1997, p. 205). Thus, the Islam that the Kemalist nationalist tradition so strongly opposed was introduced into Turkish nationalism.

Kemalism continued Young Turk movements in its efforts to modernize and Westernize Turkish society. However, it had a limited appeal and reached to urban and educated classes of the country. New variants of Turkish nationalism emerged to fill the lack in the rural and uneducated classes of the nation. A revived Pan-Turanism appeared as it also radically incorporated Islam into its discourse. Yet, new rivals were on the way since Islamic parties were also racing to fill that lack. A hybrid of Turkism and Islamism defined the new version of Turkish nationalism in modern Turkey.

**Nationalism and the Modern Order**

Nationalism is a project of the modern era. Its emergence is related to modern forms of administration, economic activity and mass media to create subjects different from those of the religious order. In this new order, because the nation and the state become synonymous, nationals become responsible for their state’s present and past actions. The hyphenation of the nation and the state creates this affective affiliation to the state. Furthermore, processes of democratization also make the two synonymous
since nationals assume the state represents them through their votes. Such associations are instrumental in creating hostility among nations. In this way, Turks and Greeks can accuse each other because of the other state’s actions.

Defining nationalism is a difficult task as it is so dependent on local contexts. Nevertheless, nationalism is the product of modern media, administration and economy. There is no scientific definition for nationalism (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 5). Scholars cannot agree on specific criteria because the nations are new comers to history and products of certain historical and regional conjuncture of political, media-related technological, administrative and economic conditions (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 5, 10). Thus, according to Hobsbawm (1990), the nation is a posteriori condition of nationalism (p. 9). Nations emerge as a result of nationalist ideologies that connect the people to the state.

Although nation and state may have separate meanings, their hyphenation points to the operations of nationalism. Nations are social entities belonging to a particular historical period of ‘modern territorial state’: the nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10). Hobsbawm points to three preconditions of being a nation-state: historic association with a state, a cultural elite possessing to advocating a national vernacular, and proven capacity for conquest that creates a consciousness for collective existence among previously separate groups (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 37-8). At the same time, nation and state may also refer to distinct concepts. According to Seton-Watson, nations and states come in various forms. For instance, some nations can be one state or can be included
with other nations in a state (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 1). Nevertheless, the term nation-state shows their interchangeability as democracy equated them.

Nationalism equates the nation and the state through processes of democratization. As it is evident in the term nation-state, the people of a nation become equated to the state (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 18). Nationalism holds the political and national units congruent (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Thus, the collective sovereignty of a body of citizens creates a political expression – the state. The sovereign people of a nation, living in a defined territory, are equal to the state (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 19). To this end, democratization can create state patriotism. States and regimes can use symbols and sentiments of imagined communities to reinforce it (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 91). Therefore, nationalism acts on nation and state to combine the two with the promise of self-determination. Within this vein, Turk’s and Greek’s self-association with their current and ancient respective states create hostility against the Other.

This process of creating Greeks and Turks as Others requires constant enactment of nationalism. For nationalism to perpetuate, it needs reproduction in a ‘banally mundane way,’ so that the world of nations is an everyday phenomenon. It is a part of everyday life. On contrary, it is an endemic condition (Billig, 1995, p. 6). Therefore, Turks should be reminded of past and present Greek violence in an incessant fashion.

Nation-states appear at the conjunction of media productions, changes in administrative systems and shifting to capitalist economy. Such reconfigurations make secular imaginings possible. In the process, nation and state become synonymous through processes of democratization. The political and the national units are
compatible. This makes the projection of hostility against the Greeks possible as they are a nation and have direct relation to the Greek state. Changes in people’s relation to media, their position in the economy and their relation to the state make such associations possible.

**Emergence**

The switch to capitalist economy signal shifts in the daily lives of people into a more modern order. In this process, state structures the society rigidly. Nationalism emerges as an affective solution to ease that transformation processes into capitalist economy. It provides secular motivations to go through such changes in life. Media and vernacular language also serve as tools of secularization with the new subjectivities they introduce. For instance, novels insert the readers in a universe of simultaneously unfolding events and tie the actors together. States intervene in the course of modernization with nationalism to ease the nations’ shift into modern economy.

Many theorists on nationalism argue that nationalism emerges under conditions of modernization. It is a product of a larger cultural system. Nationalism often appears with the fall of religious modes of thinking (Anderson, 1983, p. 11-2). It is the consequence of the emerging tensions created by the modernizing world, in which nation-states provided solutions to these problems (Billig, 1995, p. 22). Billig gives a synthesis of ideas from other nationalism scholars, those who reflect on its emergence: For Gellner, nation-state’s centralized control dealt with the demand for standardized skills, created by industrialization. As for Anderson, with the rise of the capitalist print industry, vernacular languages spread to bring new consciousnesses. Mann claims that
the state support was necessary for the continuing success of the industrial revolutions in the Western Europe. Nairn and Hroch reflect on capitalism, where for Nairn the state could spread this economic model even to the periphery. According to Hroch, central direction in the form of education and commercial policy was essential for capitalism (Billig, 1995, p. 22). In this vein, Turkish modernization dating back to Tanzimat also pushes for a standard education and administrative systems that would produce equal subjects. All these conditions of industrialization, print industry and capitalism point to the processes of modernization.

States, through nationalism, provide incentive to undergo the changes that capitalism pushes. As the societies move from pre-agrarian to agrarian and finally to industrial, they require complex standardization of production. For enormously large societies, members get accustomed to a complex division of labor and co-operation in the form of standardization (Gellner, 1983, p. 5). Thus nationalism becomes a sine qua non of industrialization, as it provides secular motivation to undergo the painful shift from the traditional society to the modern. National strength and prestige becomes the main motivation, which is achieved through industrialization (Smith, 1983, p. 43-4). In this vein, Turkish nationalism re-emerges in its new variants to bring an ease to the rural low class Turkish nationals since they cannot co-opt into the urban, modern and capitalist order. Therefore, nationalism becomes an ideology to sustain capitalist industrialization.

The move towards modern forms of living preconditioned nationalism. The nexus of relationships between nationalism and modernization are fundamental in the emergence of nation-states (Smith, 1983, p. 6). Modernization as a process drives its
meaning from application of rational, efficient and innovative change (Smith, 1983, p. 99). Such a progression, where traditional societies move into modern ones, requires shift in daily transactions from small, face-to-face, solid and diffused role of communities to specialized men, who have ephemeral interactions (Kedourie, 1993, p. 42). For Anderson, new forms of media, like newspapers, help create this shift to modernism. This move is fundamental in order to sustain capitalism.

Along with the changes in economic activities, the media are essential in making national imaginings possible. According to Anderson (1983), newspapers and novels were two important tools secularizing time. Simultaneity, marked by ‘temporal coincidence’ and ‘clock and calendar’ in novels and newspapers, enabled the new imaging of nations (p. 24-5). Novels place readers in a nationalist position, as they bring the sense that with its simultaneous unfolding of plot in different places by different actors invested the audience with God-like features of omnipresent seeing (Anderson, 1983, p. 26). Likewise, newspapers portray the calendarical coincidence of events, moving alongside other events, united by national importance (Anderson, 1983, p. 33). Books were the first modern mass-produced industrial commodity, where newspapers were the extreme form of book with ephemeral popularity. Their consumption was a morning ritual that others simultaneously replicate, who have the slightest notion of each other. It is an incessantly re-enacted event throughout the calendar. Others’ consumption of newspaper also becomes a visual reassurance of the reader’s world (Anderson, 1983, p. 34-6). The association with others that media provide is strengthened by vernacular languages.
Print-languages, those vernaculars that were able to be printed, assembled various idiolects fewer in number to create national consciousness. Through these languages, communities can imagine (Anderson, 1983, p. 43-45, 134). Following Anderson, Hobsbawm claims that if these intercommunicating elite coincide with a vernacular zone, then it can be a model to move to a larger community, a nation (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 59-60). Thus, printed dialects create a national consciousness.

Switch from agrarian to capitalist economy create burden on the society. The citizens need to move away from face-to-face interactions into rigidly defined modern order. Nationalism eases this discomfort while moving capitalism further in the society to the periphery. Media and vernacular language make new forms of subjectivities possible. These new national identities require state’s intervention for their perpetuation. State uses education and language to create standardized national identities.

**Dissemination**

With the advent of the centralized administrative apparatus and the educational system, the states relayed national identities that would enhance capitalist modernization efforts. The national subject as the product of this new system is a standardized one. It is a unitary identity for all the nationals, which forbids any form of education below the national level. This union also involves discursive boundary making operations. Nations define themselves based on blood, kinship, language, culture and history. They imagine themselves to be unique as a nation but same across the nation. They build boundaries over which other nations lie. In these operations to create standardized subjects, Greek and Turkish national identities emerged in inverse relation to each other.
Nation-states create standardized national identities through education and language. In extending the reach of the official nationalism ideology, imperial elites use mass media, education and administrative regulations to create their imaginings (Anderson, 1983, p. 113-4)\(^4\). Therefore, the purpose of education is not to transmit knowledge but ‘to bend the will of the young to the will of the nation’ (Kedourie, 1993, p. 78). In this process, men are produced outside of their social groups, where a connection between state and culture is formed (Gellner, 1983, p. 38). Like most of its European counterparts, Turkish nationalism sponsors the diffusion of a unified identity. The elite used education and media vehicles to broadcast the national identity over the population. Tanzimat was the first attempt to unify the education system for all, while Young Turks made use of media to support their ideas. The educational system eroded sub-national identities through standardization, like national language (Breuilly, 1982, p. 31). Language is a means to homogenize and modernize inhabitants, especially against counter-nationalisms (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 93). Furthermore, with the growth of central governments, the machine of administration required standard written and spoken languages (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 81-2). Moreover, language is ‘the external and visible badge’ for nations to differentiate themselves from one another; the criteria by which nations have the right to exist and create a state (Kedourie, 1993, p. 58). Like language, other features of a nation play roles to create discursive boundaries among each other.

\(^4\) To perpetuate the dynasts’ rule over vast regions of the empires, the emperors deployed nationalism to unite their subjects. In Anderson’s (1983) words, the official nationalism of these dynasties was ‘stretching the short tight skin of nation over the gigantic body of empire.’ (p. 86)
As Turkish national identity inversely references Greeks, a nation’s identity depends on other nations. National identity is relational. It can only exist with reference to what it is not (Ignatieff, 1999, p. 93). In that sense, blood and kinship are important factors to create these boundaries. Nationalism was not entirely invented, but was building on other notions of community, like ‘ethnies’-people with ‘unique history, culture and loyalties’ (Billig, 1995, p. 26). Likewise, kinship and blood are important categories to bond certain people together, while excluding outsiders (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 63). To this end, racial stereotypes create Others (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 66). Thus, a nation ‘is an imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). It is imagined because no fellow member can meet with the others, but they imagine their communions. (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). They are limited since beyond their defined limits, other nations lie. Nations are sovereign as it was a concept born in the Enlightenment and Revolution, breaking free from divinely dynastic order and finally a community of a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1983, p. 7). A nation imagines itself to be what the Other is not.

States sponsor national identities to ease their nation-state building course. Through education and administrative machineries, nationals acquire certain characteristics. The nation further elaborates on these standardized identities by ways of setting borders around their nationhood. They also learn to mark themselves apart from other nations based on their characteristics. The union of a nation is discursive boundary making exercise. In this vein, Greek and Turkish nations build their boundaries to strictly
oppose each other. Although nationalism claims a nation to be unique and promises self-determination, is it really that the nations self-govern?

From Above or Below? Postcolonialism and Orientalism

Is nationalism a process that unfolds only from above or can there be cases where it is generated from below? It is a process of both. It is both a process of modernization from above and the analysis of people’s needs, desires, longings and interests by the modern elites. The folk culture of a nation is incorporated into the discourse of the ruling elite to join them into the nation-state building process. Yet, the frameworks within which these popular notions are substantiated are European and require the re-thinking of nationalism outside of the West. Although Turkey was not a postcolonial nation, its categorization as Oriental calls for this exercise.

Nationalism is the appropriation of popular low culture into the elite’s intents, where the ruling class sustains its imperative through mobilizing these cultural belongings. It emerges from a struggle, where it can be the peasants who develop that struggle. Subalterns can also participate in nation-state formation, as in the cases of Peru and Mexico, although they are usually destined to be buried in the state history (Mallon, 1995, p. 2, 3, 7). Yet, hegemony includes both coercion and consent with a combination of elite and popular notions (Mallon, 1995, p. 6). According to Hobsbawm, this combination explains why nation-states were pervasive since states and national movements can mobilize certain belongings – or popular notions in Mallon’s terms – those were already there and could fit into modern states and nations (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 46). Similarly, Turkish nationalism portrays the combination of high and low.
Turkish nationalism is top-down nationalism, with bottom-up traits. Firstly, it is the project of a select, educated, Westernized elite who claims to act on behalf of the masses. The elite broadcast a European form of consciousness to convert a traditional society into a modern one. Within this context, the low culture of the peasant provides the material for the high culture of the intellectual and military elite. The latter group uses folk culture of the Turkish peasants to appropriate it into their high culture. Yet, it is not any folk culture, but the one of the Turkish speaking Muslim population. As Akcura and Gokalp emphasize, the intellectuals must go towards the public to bring them modernization and in return the public should give them their culture. Thus, the Turkish public comes to national consciousness through its formulation of a modernization with cultural elements that is propagated from above, similar to other examples from outside of Europe.

In non-European nationalisms, the West was both the framework and a source of hatred. For the postcolonial states development and modernization are disciplining concepts, where postcolonial independence has been a major motivation for nationalism (Chatterjee, 1993, p.3; Beiner, 1999, p. 5). This situation of being independent through modernization creates an ambivalent situation towards Europe.

To be able to cope with the discomfort that modernization created in the postcolonial world, nationalism in such cases build upon the dichotomy of tradition and modernity. Nationalism, in functional terms, is the break down of the former’s values to establish the latter, or turning community into society (Breuilly, 1982, p. 31). In its cultural interpretation, it is a response to Western values, which are incompatible with
many traditional religions. Nationalism substitutes religious values and appropriates Western values while embodying them into colonial-nation-value system (Breuilly, 1982, p. 136). Thus, anti-colonial nationalism divides the society into the material West and the spiritual East (Chatterjee, 1993, p.6). The East claims ownership on the spirituality, making sure that the domain of authority should be ordered on the nation’s terms, not on the conquerors (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 49). Eastern nationalism involves a transformation into the Western civilization, which calls for the equipment of its culture to reach to Western standards. Therefore, Eastern nationalism is about re-equipping and transforming the culture. Yet, postcolonial nation tries to remain culturally distinctive in the process (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 2). Underdeveloped nations should strive to attain those values, which becomes discomforting for the nation as they are alien. Thus, autonomy remains the only mark of dignity, making nationalism inevitable (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 6). Eastern nationalism is both hostile and imitative to the model it imitates (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 2). To retain its dignity, nationalism promises self-autonomy. To accomplish this task, nationalism uses some pre-existing cultures and transforms them. Postcolonial nationalism is the imposition of an alien high culture, involving school-mediated bureaucratic and technological communication to establish an impersonal society (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 6). Nationalism claims to be an authentic product for non-European cases. Yet, it is an export of Europe on the rest of the world (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 7). Thus, nationalism in the postcolonial world assumes to be self-determinative with the preservation of its spirituality and incorporation of Europe’s materiality.
Modernity guarantees a fake autonomy for the postcolonial nation. There is no alternative but to appropriate modernity for the non-European cases, over which they have no control (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 10). Chatterjee elaborates on modernity in postcolonial nationalism with the ‘moment of departure’. It is the awareness that there is a difference between East and West and modern Europe is culturally equipped for power and progress, while traditional attributes lack those attributes. Yet, a pre-modern nation can transform by acting collectively, adopting modern attributes of European culture. Still, this will obliterate its characteristics distinct from the European culture. The answer is West is materially superior, while East is spiritually, so non-European nationalisms can make the ultimate combination (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 50). At this point, Turkish nationalism diverges from the postcolonial one.

Although the separation of Eastern spirituality and Western materialism is present in Turkish nationalism, as discussed by Ziya Gokalp, its motivation escapes the Turkish nationalism from being postcolonial one. Gokalp stressed a similar distinction between East and West. However, the intellects at the time did not go through the discomforting mental exercise of internalizing the imperial power. As not being a colony, Turkey was not modernizing against the West, but rather to be part of it. It was made possible with the distinction created between culture and civilization, where the former is unique for a nation and cannot be transplanted, while the latter can be appropriated. Thus, Turkish nationalism, as described by Akman, is a self-inflicted modernism, which escapes the political/cultural dichotomy of the postcolonial nationalism and makes it a political act. The only imperial past that it avoids is the Ottoman rule, as in Kemalism. Despite this
divergence from postcolonial nationalism, Turkish nationalism still parallels postcolonialism in its construction of national history.

Response to the West triggered re-reading of the history and secular imaginations. Turkish nationalism tries to embody an alien framework, which was not invented in its intellectual circles, but rather was an import through elites living in places like Paris and Russian Turkish émigrés. This European influence brings with it a European history reading of classicism. In this vein, Turkish nationalism reacts to European perceptions of Turkey, as being Oriental, and invents a history to counter that argument. Seeing herself within the Western civilization, Turkish nationalism, specifically the Kemalist vein, puts conscious efforts to escape from the Oriental discourses generated on Turkey. Similar endeavors are also apparent in postcolonial nationalisms. As Chatterjee (1993) notes for India, the nation attributed its roots to ancient India of the classical age, where the period between classical era and the nation was medieval and dark (p. 98). Similarly, Turkish nationalism glorifies a Central Asian root, as it also claimed the ancient Anatolian civilizations to be of Turkish stock (Gocek, 2002, p. 32; Gokalp, 1968, p. 4). This history rejected Ottoman Empire and portrayed it as the dark ages of the Turks, which ended with the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Behar, 1992, p. 158). Both histories resemble the European historiography. Both, Turkish and postcolonial nationalisms are subjugated within European frameworks, which formulates oriental imagery over Turkey.

Orientalist projects created the opposing images for Turks and Islam, and the Occident. Turk is the antithesis of the Europe in Enlightenment. This image is created within modern Orientalism to inform the European perception of the Orient (Soykut,
Likewise, Islam possessed militant hostility compared to European Christianity. Orientalist efforts of studying the Orient created these discursive boundaries in order to judge and rule the modern Orient. The scholars used these projects to invade and possess the geography, through scholarly re-creation of the Orient (Said, 1994, p. 91-2). Thus, Orientalism is a project manifested in various forms to make the Orient visible to the Western eye.

Nationalism westernized Turkey, a part of the Orient but not a postcolonial nation, against the threat of European superiority. Adaptation of Western institutions of nationalism and the nation-state promoted a transformation into Western civilization (Robins, 1996, p. 67). In this transformation, nationalists, as an elite group, represent modernism for the local population that has not been modernized yet (Gungor, 1995, p. 52). The intellects guide the public to modern knowledge and administration modes (Gungor, 1995, p. 57-8). Turkish nationalism was a way to break through Turkey’s discursive colonization in Orientalism.

Turkish nationalism combines the postcolonial and European models of nationalisms. The Turkish elite use popular culture of the Turkish speaking Muslim Anatolians to build their rhetoric for the nationalism. Turkish nationalism combines a top-down outlook with bottom-up traits. Nevertheless, its ways of propagation is a European framework. While postcolonial nation lived the anxiety of appropriating the order of the invading culture, Turkish nationalism, on contrary, embraced European civilization as the Turkish intellect did not need to sort the dilemma of being invaded. Nevertheless, it still carries traits of postcolonial nation. Culture is an important element
of authenticity that needs to be preserved while internalizing the West pragmatically. However, because Turkey is part of the Orient through the West’s lens, the nation re-reads her history to position herself within the Occident. Westernization comes through nationalism.

The identity constructions in nationalism create opposite images for the Greeks and the Turks. The hostility against the Other is an integral part of their nationalisms. It is already present in their discourses and ready to explode with some agitation. Greeks and Turks serve mirror images for each other. The media perpetuate these images as the hostility between the two is an economically desirable state.

**Greek-Turkish Relations**

Hostility is the norm between the two nations. Historical memory is an important tool in shaping this hatred. However, there is no unbiased and objective way of reading the mutual history. One’s nationalist affiliation determines the type of reading. Therefore, Turks and Greeks will present the history in relation to their stances and at the end hostility will be inevitable. Because nationalism ties the contemporary citizens to their ancestors, they will feel frustration about the past atrocities of the Other. The history readings present an idea of ‘us vs. them,’ where being a member of ‘us’ require enmity against ‘them.’

The history of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire shapes Greek nationalism. Greeks in the Ottoman Empire belonged to the Orthodox millet category. Yet, their identity changed as the Greek community switched to a national mode of identification. The Ottoman Empire was not a nation but a state that was able to maintain cohesion and
attract loyalties for centuries, as few current states have been able to (Kedourie, 1993, p. 73). Today’s Greece was under Ottoman rule, like other Balkan regions of Serbia and Macedonia. Yet, no other country maintained such hatred as Greece towards Turkey (Borowiec, 1983, p. 19). Hostility depends on the opposite image relationship that both nations have against the other.

Greeks and Turks are mirror opposites of each others in their respective nationalisms. Images of us and the others construct national consciousness through discursive operations, like language and perception of differences. According to Triandofyllidou (1998), nationalism requires the other, which is constantly reconstructed for current interests, responding to affective needs of its members (p. 608). The Other is an essential part for the formation of national consciousness. Nationalism depends on the constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These constructs are products of complex patterns of discourse, which is part of a wider historical process (Billig, 1995, p. 18). ‘We’, the first person plural emphasizes connection to associations; such as ‘language, kinship, religion and occupation, through which people become conscious of the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Scruton, 1999, p. 281). We of membership affirms membership to an ancestry and bare the obligations and responsibility between the living and the dead, ‘asking us to bear the burden of our ancestors’ misdeeds, and to recognize moral bonds for which we never contracted, toward victims who were no victims of ours’ (Scruton, 1999, p. 291). In the era of nationalist scare, ‘Other’ in both Turkish and Greek contexts was almost identical but as mirror images: enemy, source of political problems, different from us, having negative characters. The binary of ‘we’ and the ‘Other’ is found in both
Greek and Turkish nationalistic discourses, within which bilateral relations are carried on (Millas, 2004, p. 141-2). Likewise, members of Turkish and Greek nations are responsible for the actions of their ancestors, creating hostility for each other. Thus, each member of the nation assumes other members to have hostility towards the Other to be included in the ‘we’ of the group.

Although both of the nations blame each other for different historical reasons, they both share occupation as the basis of their hatred. The political and economical conjuncturc of a time motivates the presentation of the Other. Therefore, Other images of Turks and Greeks in their respective contexts have not always been negative. However, one thing is common: both share ill feelings for foreign occupation (Millas, 2004, p. 144). Thus, occupation, whether in the form of ‘Ottoman invasion of Greece’, ‘Turkish invasion of Cyprus’ or ‘Greek aggression in the Aegean’, both nations blame each other for their expansionist policies at the expense of the other.

Perceived expansion is the underlying theme in the historical memory. Greeks and Turks use history in ways that serve their nationalist stance. In this process, they define their national groups in inverse relation to the other national group. Turkey and Greece serve as the mirror opposites for each other in shaping their respective national group identity. Thus, enmity is an inevitable component of history readings available in both nationalisms.

**Other Greeks and Other Turks**

Nationalisms on both sides of the Aegean Sea used history to justify their antagonism. In this vein, the two nations use Ottoman rule over Greece and Greek
invasion of Western Turkey as sites of legitimization. Thus, the Other Turk and the Other Greek gain substantiation within historical animosity. Expansion of the Other is a critical historical fact to be remembered as in the cases of Aegean islets, continental shelf and most importantly Cyprus. Still, both nations had experienced very brief rapprochement. Despite these brief experimentations with rapprochement, hostility is the norm.

Greek nationalism uses history to legitimize the presentation of the Turks as the Other. With its advent, Ottoman Empire emerged as the Other and the enemy and continued into the twenty-first century, as evident in textbooks (Kitroeff, 2004, p. 126). Ottoman occupation, the bloody struggle for independence and religion are the legitimizing grounds for Greek hostility. Greek nationalism was also based on religion. In addition to fighting for freedom, they were also fighting for Christian faith. It was regarded as a holy war against Islam (Borowiec, 1983, p. 19, 22). Thus, the Greek nation perceives Ottomans to be Muslim oppressors, while Greeks are civilized inheritors of Classical Greek heritage (Kitroeff, 2004, p. 128). Fear of a bigger neighbor with a history of conquest shapes the Greek paranoia against Turkey (Borowiec, 1983, p. 19). Similar operations are at place on the other side of the Aegean.

Greek Other images depended on the state of Turkish nationalism. For instance, in the Turkish novels, before national identity became a problem in Ottoman society, they do not make an issue of the Greeks. With the appearance of Young Turks, however, nationalism expanded from being an ideology into rhetoric to legitimize all military and
political actions against the ‘Other’ (Millas, 2004, p. 141-2). Thus, Greek images in Turkish nationalism depended on the political conjuncture of the time.

Although, there have been instances of positive changes in their relations, hostility is inevitable. Greece and Turkey are facing a radical re-thinking of their nation-state configurations. National interest is not predetermined but dynamically changing with the current views. This change in view had culminated at the end of the 20th century. After earthquakes in both countries, a policy of rapprochement was initiated (Keridis & Perry, 2001, p. xvi-xvii). Furthermore, European Union has sometimes inhibited this change, while also enabling it. For instance, with the acknowledgement of Turkey’s candidacy for full membership to EU in December 1999 in Helsinki, for the first time in a long time, Greece showed a pro-Turkey political move (Kollias & Gunluk-Senesen, 2003, p. 1). Nevertheless, rapprochement is mostly temporary.

Despite the rapprochement on both sides, Greco-Turkish relations have been mainly marked by hostility revolving around certain issues. Even though Greece and Turkey are the two major players in the Balkan region, their bilateral relations are marred by issues like Cyprus (Kollias & Gunluk-Senesen, 2003, p. 1). Accordingly, when then Greek Minister of Defense, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, was asked in an interview on CNN in September 1999 if Greece no longer saw Turkey as an ‘enemy’, he said ‘Turks and Greeks can no longer be treated as enemies but they still have some antagonism without doubt’ (Sonmezoglu & Ayman, 2003, p.37). As long as the Turkish threat, either real or perceived, is present, Turkophobia, Greek defensiveness and siege mentality remain (Keridis, 2001, p.14-5). ‘Hostility is there, often under the surface but ready to explode
at the slightest opportunity’ (Borowiec, 1983, p. 31). The expansionist political move of the Other often triggers the hostility.

Perceived expansion of both countries at the expense of the other tarnishes the bilateral relations. Greeks maintain that Turkey is an expansionist state, while Turks attributes to Greece’s Megali Idea, which is supposed to put Istanbul under Greek rule (Borowiec, 1983, p. 23). Along with these, other subjects related to expansion are continental shelf and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, airspace and its control, fortification of islands and sovereignty over uninhibited islets (McDonald, 2001, p.135). These policies taint the contemporary bilateral relations. Yet, the most disagreeable subject between the two countries is the question of Cyprus.

Cyprus has been the sourest site for tension. “Cyprus as an integrated, bicomunal, independent state effectively has never existed. It has been a field of Greek-Turkish rivalry, and the powers in the Mediterranean…” (McDonald, 2001, p.116). Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Greece sought to consolidate the Greater Greece with territories in the Balkans, Asia Minor, the Aegean and Greek Cypriots (McDonald, 2001, p.117). Cyprus has been a medium of great conflict with ethnic clashes and Greek military coup, resulting in a Turkish military intervention. Greeks see this as an aggression on the Turkish side, while for Turks the Megalo Idea is not dead and Greece seeks any opportunity to expand its borders (Sonmezoglu & Ayman, 2003, p.38). In 1959, UK drew back from the island to a new Republic of Cyprus, where UK, Turkey and Greece became guarantors to be responsible for sustaining the constitutional order. After growing tensions between two sides, Turkey intervened into
the island in 1974 as a guarantor state, which later divided the island into two ethnically homogenous communities, creating a buffer between the Helens of Cyprus and Turkey. UN talks did not help to settle the disputes. In 1983 TRNC was declared to be an independent state, pursuing a reunited confederated island, which is now solely recognized by Turkey (McDonald, 2001, p.117-22). Therefore, the recent past in Cyprus always becomes a material for antagonism, with faint attempts of cooperation.

Rapprochement has been nevertheless apparent in the political relations, for instance over subsequent natural disasters in both countries. The earthquakes of 1999 have provided a platform for the two countries to get closer. As it was termed, the ‘Seismic Diplomacy’ started rapprochements (Sonmezoglu & Ayman, 2003, p.41). Empathy after the disasters shows how preexisting images did not fit into reality. As Greeks saw Turks as sufferers, they treated Turks as friends. Greeks were friends helping in bad times (Sonmezoglu & Ayman, 2003, p.45). For the first time in more than a quarter-century Greek navels came to Turkish ports. Turks observed the anniversary of their 1922 triumph over Greece with restraint, which normally used to be filled with ‘Turkish triumphalism and symbolic humiliation of the enemy’ (Sonmezoglu & Ayman, 2003, p.41). Whether creating hostility or rapprochement, the media have an essential role in perpetuating national stereotypes for the Others.

In creating images of Other, history is in constant use to define the hostility. Although, these images can also change depending on the political atmosphere, seeing Greeks as the Other is the norm within Turkish nationalism. Instances of rapprochement during times of earthquakes in two countries were very brief. Despite these efforts,
perceived expansion of the Other determines the bilateral politics. Aegean continental shelf dispute, islet crisis and many other conflicts based on expansion are materials to keep the hostility constant. In this environment, Cyprus is the biggest site of tension. The nation requires reminders that hostility is part of the national character, and the media assume this role to maintain negative images for the Other.

**Media’s Role in Perpetuating Hostility**

The media are important institutions to consider in understanding the enmity between the two nations. For the most part, the nationals of the two countries do not interact with each other directly; they substitute that lack of contact with the information from mass media as portraying what the Other ought to be. Having revenue concerns, mass media galvanize nationalist sentiment by exaggerating the risks or downplaying the enemy.

As the two sides have vague direct experience of each other, the information from various institutions fills the lack of acquaintance. Prejudices fill the knowledge and institutions, like schools, families, and mass media mediate these social constructs. Thus, negative stereotypes are prevalent between the two. For instance, while 73% of Greeks feel Turks not to be trusted, 70% of them have actually met a Turk. Similarly, 95% of Turks feel Greeks should not be trusted, as only 7% have actually met a Greek (Terzis, 2004, p.170). Thus, mass media are responsible for the maintaining of these stereotypes.

The media, driven by rating concerns, pump a form of nationalism that creates an Other through overstressing siege mentality and using hate language. Reproduction of oppositional metaphors and hate speech can be found at every stage of media production.
(Terzis, 2004, p.181). Moreover, editors and media owners in Greece are interested in high ratings, and few trained Greek journalists in international relations and Turkish-Greek relations hinder the bilateral relationships (Keridis, 2001, p.16). Tsagarroussianou’s work illustrate how Greek mass media play a role in reproducing and reinforcing ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, painting the Greek nation as being under threat from its neighbors (Terzis, 2004, p.170-1). For instance, portraying the country as ‘Brotherless, friendless Greek nation’ leads to exaggeration of risks and make Greeks defensive and oversensitive. Populist politics and media feed from sensational stories, and reinforce Greek defensiveness (Keridis, 2001, p.12). For example, in Imia/Kardak Aegean islet crisis of 1996, media in both countries launched a giant ‘media circus’ of escalating threats that brought the two to naval confrontation, while legitimizing nationalist positions of both countries (Terzis, 2004, p.171). Mass media in their coverage of bilateral relations perpetuate the hostility among the two.

In the maintaining of animosity, language is another important component of this process. Greek media constantly underline ‘Us’ with the great old civilization vs. ‘Them’ with their historical backwardness” for Greece and Turkey (Terzis, 2004, p.174). Similarly, the media frame nationalism as being benevolent in the country, while militant in the enemy (Terzis, 2004, p.172-3). States use parallel methods on the Internet as well. Both governments on Cyprus on their official Web sites represent the other side as the Other (Barkay, 2004, p. 199). Media perpetuate these stereotypes.

Triggered by profit, media owners and journalists choose to relay a distorted image of the Other in order to stimulate the local audience by creating hatred towards the
enemy. They use language in ways to frame their messages that would trigger hostility. In this vein, as most people do not come into contact with the Other, the media become essential sources of information. Consequently, populations continue to live with hatred against each other.

Mass media are important components of constructing and perpetuating nationalism. News media, for instance, builds a one way information flow between the news outlet and the audience. There is very limited interaction. The Internet, on the other hand, is a medium that has great potential for interactivity. With the current technologies available, the Internet turns the media into an individuated space, which might be challenging the nationalist myths. Since it is more a medium of personal expression, there are more opportunities to break these myths. Does the Internet challenge nationalism?

Cyberculture and Nationalism

Nationalism is a formation of a specific historical moment. Part of its emergence relates to the modern forms of media technologies that enable secular ways of imaginings. Thus, the media are sine qua non of nationalism. As modern media create subjects who can imagine themselves as a nation, the New Media, or the Internet, also acts on nationalism in formulating new forms of subjectivities. Thus, these new subjects can imagine their identities in such ways to change modern nationalism. Therefore, cyberspace can bring a new discourse for the identity. Nevertheless, these identities will still be pre-informed by those from the real-life. Therefore, the Internet users can also carry national hostility to the cyberspace.
The definition of the term cyberspace is varied one. Cyberspace scholars term it as virtual reality, electronic storage or information transmission, Computer-Mediated-Communication (CMC), or with communication over networks. It is seen as an individual conceptual space and a product of social interaction (Strate, Jacobson & Gibson, 1996, p.4). Nonetheless, cyberspace is a construct, an imaginary product (Lyon, 2002, p.22). It is about a space that is believed to be behind the screen; a place you can’t see but know is there. It is a “nonspace”, “a hyperdimensional realm that we enter through technology” (Barnes, 1996, p.231). With the increased presence of cyberspace in daily conduct, computer-mediated communications increasingly inform the offline life (Ignacio, 2006, p.190). In the future, information from the virtual world may rival the information from actual face-to-face interactions (Barnes, 1996, p.241). Thus, cyberspace is a medium of ambiguities, paradoxes and contradictions (Lyon, 2002, p.24). Cyberspace with its new imaginings can enable new subjectivities.

As nationalism entails modern subjects created through secular imaginings of modern media, with the challenges that Internet poses to the traditional media, it is possible to formulate new selves. Media technologies are means of representation and self-representation. They present ourselves to us and to others (Bolter, 1996, p.130). The Web is an ephemeral environment as its content can be expected to last for a brief time, and the content needs to be reproduced by the producers’ intentions, unlike traditional media, like print, where once experienced, it can be experienced infinite times (Foot, 2006, p.90). These features of the Internet also have effects on the self. In traditional physical environments, face-to-face interactions with other people and objects develop a
concept of self, while in cyberspace, such interactions occur in media-generated spaces. The individual’s interaction takes place in media environments of “written language, images, videos, sounds, three-dimensional computer-generated objects, virtual people, and artificial life” (Barnes, 1996, p.230). Thus, the Internet threatens modern perceptions of identity.

With the decompounding of the space and the body, the cyberspace can make new community imaginings possible with telepresence. Cyberspace challenges traditional self theories as they emphasize the importance of the body and therefore physical space in the development of subject. On the Internet, people can develop relationships with others without ever meeting face-to-face, where electronic spaces create symbolic or virtual communities. How will people develop a self-identity when they communicate through electronic spaces, rather than face-to-face engagements? (Barnes, 1996, p.247) As self formation depends on social behavior, media will effect the development of self (Barnes, 1996, p.248). Cyberspace is a move away from discursive communication to graphic electronic environments, which will eventually affect the cultural definition of self (Bolter, 1996, p.124). With electronically enabled flows, temporal and physical distinctions erode. Through the computer interfacing, spatial distinctions become meaningless (Lyon, 2002, p.25). Termed as Telepresence, it refers to the “mediated perception of an environment” (Barnes, 1996, p. 244) in media spaces of the audio-video, computer and telephone technologies (computer mediated collaboration) (Barnes, 1996, p.245). Telepresence is about the “the transmission of the user’s ‘presence’ to another location, allowing user’s to act from a distance” (Strate, Jacobson & Gibson, 1996, p.10).
As modern media brought imagining of national communities through the consumption of novels and newspapers, similarly, the Internet may present new group associations.

New communities, away from national imaginings can be possible with the Internet. The Internet turns person’s physical self into a digital representation, which can be distributed throughout networks to interact with other digital selves. Thus, according to Barnes (1996), “[t]o enter cyberspace, people create digital persona” (p. 230). Electronic discourse makes the play with digital personas possible (Barnes, 1996, p. 248). The identity that was largely received by family, class, religion, community and nation in the past, is today, replaced by postmodern one, which is about choosing one’s identity (Webster, 2002, p.37). The cyberspace poses challenges for the nation-state.

Nationalism can change its meaning for those having access to the Internet. People online can radically change the ideas about nations, race and ethnicity in transnational communities (Ignacio, 2006, p.186). Forming communities in newsgroups enable more meaningful discussions as these are groups committed to one main activity (Ignacio, 2006, p.186). As a result, these forces will alter processes of creating national Others. “[W]hat happens when the generalized other becomes the ‘electronic other’?” (Barnes, 1996, p.247) Nevertheless, certain components of nationalism may stay intact. New forms of communication are already embedded in exclusionary practices as it works for different groups differently. Rising speed of communication disconnects certain groups while connecting others. It produces non-homogenous global village (Lyon, 2002, p.25). The Internet can also preserve the characters from the offline life.
Greeks can continue to figure as the Other in Turkish nationalism as the Internet users feed the space with previous notions. Previous modes of communication precondition cyberspace and the identities of this new medium. It is impossible to disconnect cyberworld from real-world settings, as the former is modeled after the latter (Fung, 2006, p.138). Although the appearance of Internet surfers may be not public, race, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. still play into the way we use the Internet (Silver & Massanari, 2006, p.8). Virtual identities are closely intertwined with real-life identities. Daily life constitutes the cyberculture (Fung, 2006, p.130). Thus, Turkish hostility against the Greeks can remain as the Internet users are informed by their real-life experiences.

Nationalism, for the most part, is a media-related phenomenon. Modern forms of communication, mainly in print media, like novels and newspapers, create the imagined communities, where people are turned into modern secular national subjects. Yet, new communication technologies alter those subjectivities. Starting with television and radio, subjects are claimed to acquire a new form of self. The Internet culminates this phenomenon. What happens when the new communication technologies enable alternative discourses in the form of anonymity, flexibility in creating a self, alternative discussion sites? Will nationals stay to be nationalist? Will Greek stay to be the ‘Other’ as being informed by the dominant version of Turkish nationalism, or would alternative discussions be created around the Greek nation? Will the direction of the formulation of the discourse about the Greeks be reversed from top-down to bottom-up? In other words,
can the Internet really invest the individual with the freedom to escape the hegemony, or will it still be informed by the pre-existing power structures?

This research project attempts to examine the myth creations about the Greeks on the cyberspace. With its individuated form, the Internet carries the potential to bring alternative views about the Greek nation. Greeks, traditionally defined as the anti-self for the Turks, may or may not find an unconventional articulation on the online space. The Internet can be a site on which the contours boldly painted between the nations can melt and re-emerge in more inclusive ways. However, since the offline world predetermines the online life, there is also the possibility that the same Greek images will keep pervading on the new medium. Nevertheless, historicizing Turkish nationalism shows that it did not carry these images until the beginning of the 20th century. In its historicity, in relation to the Internet, Turkish nationalism may also go through configurations vis-à-vis the Greek nation.

Turkish nationalism is the end result of various ideological experiments in the Ottoman Empire, facing the challenges of separatist nationalisms and threat of European colonization. Moving from Ottomanism to finally Turkish nationalism, this survey of literature presented the Ottoman administration’s look on the population. Coming from a cosmopolitan perspective of Ottomanism, this look changed with successive ideological attempts of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and Turkism, which finally ended with the birth of the Turkish Republic. In this process, modernization and westernization are two indispensable components. However, it does not share the same fate with the postcolonial world since the Ottoman and then Turkish intelligentsia fully embraced the
order of the West without going through the discomfort of appropriating the invader’s rule.

Since the media determine nationalism, the same holds true for the broadcasting of Greek images in Turkish nationalism. The media represent the Greeks under certain light with historical references. In this depiction, the media create us vs. them images to define the lines between the two nations. In its radical nature to individuate the space, the Internet offers ways to challenge these perceptions. The following chapters examine blogs, online commenting to e-newspaper articles and forum discussions on Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece in an attempt to see how much of this hypothesis holds up.
Chapter 3. Blogging Greek ‘Others’

In their capacity to extend personal expression, blogs are an important part of this analysis. Although some scholars describe blogs as the online version of a diary, blogs are distinct from traditional journals. While paper journal writers address their thoughts to themselves, bloggers have a broader audience since virtually anyone can access their Web sites. At this point in the history of relations between Turkey and Greece, bloggers are able to show the frustrations, emotions and ideas of the Turks towards the Greeks within the context of Turkish nationalism.

Blogcu.com is the biggest Turkish blog provider in terms of number of blogs posted and the number of users. My research analyzes blogs containing subject matter on Greek and Turkish relations that appear with this service provider. In order to access the blogs related to the scope of this study, I used a tag search for Yunan (Greek in Turkish) and only focused on the ones written about mutual history and contemporary issues. It is beyond the scope of this research to exhaust the complete list of such blogs as I went over a list of 200 search results in reverse chronological order and the list was still expanding. This study covers blogs published between May 8, 2006 and January 16, 2007.

Among the relevant blog articles, four groups appeared. There are 11 articles on ‘Greek atrocities in history’, 9 blog publications on ‘Contemporary issues’, 3 ‘Jokes about Greeks’ and 5 blog postings on ‘General personal opinions about the Greeks’. The following analysis chooses two from each category, with the exception of ‘Jokes about Greeks’ and makes an in-depth review of them. Only two of the blogs present Greeks in a positive light. One of these two, the blog by Warchild is studied in further depth below.
Blogs, as spaces for personal expressions, invest their users with the power to extend their ideas to others. Turkish bloggers’ frustration with the Western media and their depiction of Turks as the grandchildren of genocidal killers motivates them to disseminate the ‘truth’. Blogs are a medium to engage in such citizenry duties at a personal level. However, blogging creates a biased representation in that bloggers rarely acknowledge possible Turkish wrongdoing. They portray Greeks as villains, while Turks are victims.

Blogs perpetuate Turkish nationalism with the virtual communities they create and the connection they establish between Greek and Turkish national histories. Hostility is already present and Turkish bloggers tap it in their representation of Greeks. In this way, they use hostility to create cohesion, especially during times of perceived attack. The Greek nation bears the brunt of hate-filled speech in their relation to Turkish national history. Since national history building is a process of creating an outside group in order to from more perfect in-group cohesion, every citizen is responsible for his/her past as well as his/her ancestors’ faults. In the blog universe, the contemporary Greek nation carries the atrocities their ancestors committed against the Turkish nation, and thus deserve the accusations.

Although some cyberculture scholars argue that the Internet de-centers modern subjectivities (Ignacio, 2006, Webster, 2002), blogging actually deepens Turkish national identity. Nationalism requires constant re-enactment in order to perpetuate its order; blogs facilitate this process with opportunity they create for individual expression. Along with state institutions and media, Turkish nationals have the capacity to circulate the truth
about the Greeks. Instead, blogging concretizes nationalism. In its daily enactments, nationalism is not only a subject for conversation among close acquaintances, but now also among the Internet users. With the decompounding of body and space on the Internet, Turkish nationals do not only imagine other nationals also hating the Greeks, but also see them and interact with them in a way that deepens the hatred.

In their patriotic duty to blog about Greek Others, Turkish bloggers use material provided by the mass news media and circulate it among themselves. They cite media sources and each other, creating a biased representation about the Greek nation that blurs the line between reality and myth in its circuitry. Citing is not the prerogative of the scholar any more, but also that of the citizen. In this case study, Turkish bloggers assume the journalist’s function to create myths about the Greek nation that deepen divisions along national lines.

**Greek Atrocities in History**

Western media and governments accuse previous Turkish administrations in the Ottoman Empire of committing genocide against some non-Turkish ethnic groups. Yet, they rarely debate the history of the suffering of Turks. Such a biased reading of history creates frustration on the Turkish side. Therefore, blogs appear to be medium to gain a voice. The bloggers in this category cite scholarly articles, newspaper clips on Greek violence against the Turks in history. They feel it to be their patriotic duty to report on these commentaries in order to show the real face of the Greeks and to educate Turkish blog readers. The bloggers hardly ever mention violence inflicted by the Turkish side.
Greek Violence in Turkey

The posting called “Turkiye’dede Yunan Vahseti” (Greek Violence in Turkey) particularly deserves attention to illustrate the ways in which non-online publications get re-circulated into the blog universe. Mass media provide material for the bloggers to pick up and perpetuate the myth about the Greek villains and the Turkish victims. Furthermore, it elaborates on the issue of genocides, which is an important debate in Turkish foreign affairs as it relates to acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, the Pontus Greek Genocide and the Assyrian Genocide. This article reverses the accusations against the Turks and claims Greeks to be responsible for the genocides of Turks. This blog entry also has a comment posted by another blogger.

The blogger Ahmetdursun374 gives an account of the Greek violence against the Turks by referencing a news article in Cumhuriyet newspaper that was published on October 14, 2006, which references the book called Greek Violence in Turkey\(^5\). The documentary book illustrates segments of history from Western Anatolia under Greek invasion during the War of Independence (Mudafaa-i, n.d.). It is a compilation of the Greek Army’s documented massacres in the region. The blog entry was posted one day later on October 15, 2006, which shows the blogger’s enthusiasm for the issue and his efforts to spread the word about the Greeks. The article that the blog cites encourages its audience to read this new book.

The columnist from Cumhuriyet, Ali Sirmen starts his article with his visit to Keramet village in Bursa’s Orhangazi province as a way of setting the stage for the Greek

\(^5\) Turkiye’dede Yunan Vahseti
atrocities in that time: “Keramet, which is 1 km. away from where I am, used to be two thirds Armenian. Now it is completely Muslim”\(^6\) (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). The use of tense, *imiş* (used to be), is important as it is a form of reporter speech in Turkish that refers to a past time for an event that the reporter did not experience personally but heard it through someone else. This choice emphasizes the absence of the Armenian population who used to live in this village; Greek atrocities completely erased them from the village’s history due to Greek atrocities. He continues to say, “But at the beginning of the past century, people lived through violence and that is why the Armenians left the village”\(^7\) (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). He shows the departure of the Armenians to be the result of Greek armed forces’ violence.

Sirmen documents the hostility in the village with agitating language by reporting on the book *Turkiye’de Yunan Vahseti*. “I read the people’s experience with great disgust from the book called ‘Turkiye’de Yunan Vahseti’”\(^8\) (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Sirmen stresses the degree of violence perpetrated by the Greeks in their invasion. He reports the events to be formidable. Yet, he does not give historical examples; instead, he quotes from other sources. His language is an important vehicle to get a rise out of the audience. *Ahmetdursun374* assumes Sirmen’s duty to incite his audience when he cites the article from *Cumhuriyet*, extending the article’s effect to blog readers.

As a way of strengthening his statement, he argues that the book is based mostly on foreign sources. “What is interesting about this book is … it is based on British,
French, Italian Occupation Forces and Red Cross Investigation Commission … documents”9 (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Sirmen strengthens the supported accuracy of this book, and therefore the accuracy of accounts of Greek violence, since he references mostly Western occupation forces, which were in Turkey with the Greeks and would possibly have pro-Greek and anti-Turkish sentiments. The Greek violence must have been so intense that in spite of the Westerners’ biases, these incidents were hard to miss.

The columnist talks about the book as a way to reverse the genocide claims against the Turks. “This book reports on incidents of wounding, murder, attack, theft and rape … that came to the level of genocide”10 (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). In this incident, Sirmen elaborates on the violence with detailed descriptions to the extent that it was genocide. Since the Greek government is one of the heaviest accusers of Turkey for committing genocide against the Armenians and the Pontus Greeks, Sirmen counteracts such claims with a maneuver that accuses the Greek nation this time. He further develops the details of violence with quotations by the Red Cross Commission from the book: “The Greek invasion force … has been trying to annihilate the Muslims on the peninsula …”11 (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Likewise, the following quotation from the report by American, British, French and Italian army officers paints a similar picture: “…The Greek invasion turned into a form of Crusade… Although there were no reasons to

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9 Kitabın ilginç yanı, bu belgelerin yalnızca yerli kaynaklara dayanmaması, daha çok İngiliz, Fransız, İtalyan İşgal Kuvvetleri ve Kızılhaç Şurası Komisyonları’nın tanıklık ve belgelerine dayandırılması
10 Söz konusu kitapta, Orhangazi, Gemlik, Yalova ve cıvar köylerde yapılan ve soykırımı düzeye varan, 1921 yılında meydana gelen, sivil halka yönelik, yaralama, öldürme, saldırdı, yağma ve irza tecavüz olayları anlatılıyor
11 Yunan işgal güçü iki yıldan beri yarımada kadar Müslüman halkı bütünüyle yok etme çabasına girmiştir... Kendi gözlerimizle görüdüğümüz ya da izlerine rastladığımız vahşilikler, silahlı sivillerden oluşan çetelerin ve düzenli ordu birliklerinin işidiler... Her şey hepsinin de olduklarını yerde ölüurdüklerini gösteriyordu. Kimilerinin kolları bacakları kopmuştu..
agitate, they massacred defenseless civil Turks”\textsuperscript{12} (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Mentioning of the violence as Crusades and portraying Turks as defenseless becomes the means to vilify the Greek nation, while turning Turks into the prey.

The columnist contextualizes the book at a point in time when Turkey faces ongoing accusations for committing genocides: “…It has not even been a week since the European Parliament’s Foreign Relations Commission resolved for Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian, the Assyrian and the Pontus Genocides”\textsuperscript{13} (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Sirmen again tries to reverse the accusations by counter-accusing the Greeks and also the Armenians of committing genocide against the Turks.

“This book, based on foreign sources, reports on the continued genocide of the Turks, … that took place during Greeks’ invasion of Anatolia and with the cooperation of the Armenians” (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). He not only accuses Greeks of being genocidal killers but also puts Armenians under the same light. In this section, he again uses very elaborate explanations of the violence to vilify the Greeks and the Armenians. “These acts took place … in the form of rapes, cutting of limbs, disemboweling of children and mass burning of people in houses”\textsuperscript{14} (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). By citing the reversal of the genocide accusations against Turkey, the blogger \textit{Ahmetdursun374} does his part for

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{12} ...Yunanların uyguladıkları işgal eylemi, haç seferi görünümü almıştır... Ortada hiçbir kıskırtıcı neden yokken, savunmasız durumdaki sivil Türklerle tam bir katliam uyguladılar...
\item \textsuperscript{13} Avrupa Parlamentosu Dış İlişkiler Komisyonu’nun Türkiye’nin Ermeni, Suryani ve Pontus Soykırımı’nı kabul etmesini isteyen kararının üstünden daha bir hafta bile geçmiş
\item \textsuperscript{14} 19. yüzyıldan başlayarak, önce Rumeli’de, sonra başka bölgelerde sürekli soykırıma uğratılan Türklerle, Yunanların Anadolu’yu işgalleri sırasında Ermenilerin de katlımlarıyla yaptıkları anlatan bu kitap, şu anda üzerinde bulunduğu topraklarda 85 yıl önce yapılan mezalımı, yabancı kaynaklara dayanarak anlatıyor. Orada İzmit’te, Gemlik’te, Orhangazi’de, Yalova’da ve köylerinde meydana gelen irza tecavüz, kolacak kesme, çocukların karlarını değişme, insanları toplu halde bir eve kapatıp yakma gibi eylemler yer alıyor
\end{enumerate}
Turkish nationalism by defending its history, and educating the blog’s audience about the “truth”.

Sirmen finally advises the *Cumhuriyet* readers to read the book as an act to counter the arguments directed against Turkey. “We all must read this book… because … it is the time to respond to the attacks against us with a high voice”\(^{15}\) (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). Sirmen uses ‘we’ discourse as a way to unite the readers to act together in response to these attacks by Westerners. He also creates a siege mentality making Turkey out to be the victim of foreign threat and thus asks for Turkish unification. This is illustrated by his reference to the European Parliament’s resolution.

To justify his argument, Sirmen claims to have benevolent intentions. “Dear Readers, I do not intend to sew seeds of enmity among nations and peoples but to bring the truth out ...”\(^{16}\) (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). He pretends to be naïve in the sense that this is a duty for humanity. He wants peace and not to start a conflict between nations. Through such sentimental language, Sirmen legitimizes his argument and the reasons to read this book.

Sirmen also cites another source to illustrate Greek violence. The following quotation is from an interview by a woman born in Orhangazi village in 1916 and is about her memories of the Greeks:

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\(^{15}\) Hepimiz bu kitabı okumalıyz… Bu kitabı okuyalım. Çünkü artık Türkiye’nin, bu saldırıları karşı kendini savunması aşaması geçmiş, bize karşı yapılan saldırıları konusunda yüksek sesle hesap sorma vakti gelmiştir

\(^{16}\) Sevgili okurlar, amaçım uluslar ve insanlar arasında düşmanlık tohumları ekmek değil, gerçekleri dile getirmek. Şu anda bulunduğu topraklar üzerinde 85 yıl önce meydana gelen vahşeti anlatırken, başka bir kitabın aktardığı bir gerçeği de, gözüm yaşararak, insanlık namına göğsüm kabararak aktarmayı görev biliyorum
...I was very little. I used to be very scared, but they also had good ones among them (referring to the Greeks). For instance, when they were going to burn Orhangazi, a Greek soldier came and knocked on the window and warned the people as ‘Today, this place will be burned, go away’. People fled...17

(Ahmetdursun374, 2006)

Sirmen utilizes journalist spin to show how even the most benevolent Greek acts are borne of violence.

The response of a commenter to the blog posting also illustrates the animosity of Turkish nationalists towards Greeks and Armenians. Vatansever (A Patriot in English) says that: “Greeks and Armenians, if they find a chance would do the same thing. I have no doubt about it. That’s why we should all be united against internal and external enemies”18 (Ahmetdursun374, 2006). The ‘under siege mentality’ becomes a motivation for unification.

This blog and similar blogs reference other newspaper articles and scholarly works. It becomes a process of circular citation, where the validity or the accuracy of the information is no longer of concern. It is circular in the sense that representations circulating on the blogs reference the media messages, which shape these online representations at the first place. Citation is no longer the tool of legitimization of the knowledge producing institutions, such as universities and media, but also the blogging average citizen. Like Edward Said (1994) claims for Orientalism, what circulates is not

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17 ...Ben çok küçüktüm. Çok korkardım. Ama içlerinde iyileri de vardı (Yunanları kastediyorum). İyilere örnek mesela Orhangazi’yi yakacakları zaman bir Yunan askeri gelmiş, camı tiklatıp, ‘Bu gece burası yanacak, gidin’ diyerek halkı uyarıyor. Halk kaçıyor...

18 Yunanlılar, rumlar, ermeniler fırsat bulursalar yine aynı şeyi yaparlar, bundan hiç kuşkum yok. Onun için de iç ve dış düşmanlara karşı her zaman birlik içinde ve güçlü olmak zorundayız
the truth, but a representation that is assumed to be true (p. 22). On the blogs, unvalidated citations reach larger audiences through the Internet.

In the infinite form of its circular citation, blogging becomes an act of dissolving the line between myth and reality about the Turkish hostility against the Greeks. Ahmetdursun374 inserts the material provided by Cumhuriyet article into the blog universe propelling the hostility forward. Whether Greek violence against the Turks happened or not, the myth about Greek Others has taken over the Turkish blog universe. Thus, Greek nation is only reported in negative contexts; there is no mention of possible Turkish violence. It is a uniform universe, where only a certain idea about the Greeks prevails.

**Historical Confessions from the Greeks**

The posting titled “Historical Confessions from the Greeks”\(^{19}\) references a newspaper article that was compiled from news coverage on TGRT, a TV channel. Furthermore, this coverage is based on a Greek newspaper called To Vima. In this respect, this blog serves as an example of the process of constant citations on the cyberspace. It is as if there is no news left beyond the reference. As I have stated before, bloggers incessantly refer to other sources and each other, which creates a unitary universe of representation, where the Greek nation must bear every burden of being antagonistic and the Turkish nation needs to mourn their victimhood. The article shows a high motivation to refute claims that have been made against the Turks and rescue the nation from humiliation. Since every nation bears the faults of their ancestors, Turks

\(^{19}\) Yunanlilardan Tarihi Itiraf
need to save their face by disproving the claims against the Ottomans. This necessitates a re-reading of national histories.

The title of the blog illustrates the ways in which the Greeks are generally lumped into a single category. Although the article is about a Greek journalist disproving the Greek myths against the Turks, the coverage presents it to be a confession of the entire Greek nation. Furthermore, it also presents the confession to be very important to the extent that it is historically accurate.

The blog lists ‘10 biggest Greek lies’ as the follows: 1. Ottomans did not force Greeks to convert to Islam; 2. Families made their children janissaries on their will; 3. Greek language was not prohibited; 4. Church’s real enemy was the Catholics; 5. Independence did not come with uprising; 6. Greeks did not attain independence by themselves; 7. Serbians also had an uprising; 8. Other states helped for their benefits; 9. Turks also lost territory; 10. The Greeks who came back with the population exchange were those who have been to Anatolia (Caganturker, 2006).

The article has a nationalist spin in that it tries to rescue the Turkish nation from the biased history reading prevalent among the European nations. Greece in this representation is the prime example, where the nation of Greece highlights heroic stories against the Ottomans in its history books: “Every Balkan country, furthermore every European country … like Greece [has heroic] stories … where uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1821 … is the most important part of history books”20 (Caganturker, 2006).

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20 Her Balkan ülkesinde -hatta Avrupa ülkesinde- okutulan tarih kitaplarında olduğu gibi, Yunanistan’ın da tarih kitaplarında kahramanlık öyküleri ve mit’leri yer alıyor. Yunanistan’ın 1821’de bağımsızlığını kazanmak amacıyla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı ayaklanması, tarih kitaplarının en önemli bölümü oluşturmuyor
The article presents hatred in history books to be a European trait, and even more specifically a Greek characteristic. This biased representation rescues the Turkish history books from the possibility of containing similar stories and myths and paints a one-sided image against the Greeks, in favor of the Turks. Furthermore, as this article illustrates these Greek myths are created at the expense of the Ottomans.

These errors in Greek history reading (lies as the article calls them) are represented in an effective fashion that makes it easy for the readers to digest and for the author to refute. In its explanation of the lies, the blog lists them in bullet points as Lie 1, Lie 2 and so on and then refutes them later.

In an attempt to save historical face, the article refutes these lies and creates a benevolent image of the Ottomans. For instance, the 4th lie says that “The Greek Church fought a tough battle against the Ottoman Empire” (Caganturker, 2006). The counterargument paints a softer picture of the Empire. “Ottomans did not force anyone in Greece for the conversion into Islam. Countries like Bosnia and Albania … chose to convert into Islam at their will” (Caganturker, 2006). It portrays a very humanist Ottoman persona, where the Greeks had the option to choose their religion: it is a lie that they were subject to any kind of religious oppression. This depiction views Ottoman history as not a national attribute that should be rejected, but rather embraced fully.

This attempt to save the reputation of the nation by saving the history also involves undermining Greece’s heroic reading of its own history. Since the Greek nation

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21 Yunan kilisesi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı sert bir mücadele verdi.
22 Osmanlılar İslamiyet’i kabul etmeleri için Yunanistan’da kimseyi zorlamadı. Bosna ve Arnavutluk gibi ülkelerde fazla vergi ödemenek ya da Osmanlı’da memur olarak çalışabilme için kendi istekleriyle İslamiyet’i kabul edenler oldu.
takes pride in attaining its independence from the Ottomans, the bloggers must deflate their heroism. Greece’s dependence on European powers explains its independence. As Lie 5 states “Greek nation won its independence in 1821 with uprisings against the Ottomans”\(^{23}\) (Caganturker, 2006). The blogger subsequently disproves this claim by illustrating that Greek independence was dependent on European intervention. “The uprising was suppressed right away. In 1827, France, Britain and Russia intervened with the idea that an independent Greece would be to their benefit, so Greece became independent”\(^{24}\) (Caganturker, 2006). The usage of *da* (so) shows the Greek independence to be merely a twist of fortune. Furthermore, the author reinforced the Ottoman military might with the word choice of *anında* (right away), indicating that the Greeks could not even stand for a short time. The language of the article undermines Greek national gains while emphasizing Ottoman prowess. This form of reporting saves Ottoman history from humiliation.

In a similar effort to vilify the Greek nation in order to save the Ottoman history, the article also claims to show that Philhellenism was based on benefits from other states, which explains the Ottoman loss of certain wars. Lie 8 says “Foreign states helped because they loved the Greeks”\(^{25}\) (Caganturker, 2006). Again, in an effort to undermine Greek independence claims, the posting argues that “Because they were assured of the fact that an independent Greece would benefit them, they intervened” (Caganturker, 2006). The author tries to justify Ottoman losses against the Greeks, by insinuating that

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\(^{23}\) Yunan ulusu 1821’de Osmanlı’ya karşı ayaklanıp bağımsızlığını kazandı.

\(^{24}\) Ayaklanma anında bastırıldı. 1827’de Fransa, İngiltere ve Rusya bağımsız Yunan devletinin çıkarlarına hizmet edeceğini düşünerek savaşa müdahale etti. Yunanlılar da bağımsız oldu

\(^{25}\) Yabancı devletler Yunanlıları’ı çok sevgi için destek oldu.
Greeks gained independence based on unfair grounds. To support this insinuation, the posting continues to claims that Greece acquired Salonika, although it was not a Greek city to start with, and thus their independence always involved unfair gains. “That is why Greece acquired Salonika, although its population is 40% Jewish, 25% Turkish and only 20% Greek” (Caganturker, 2006). Salonika was only 20% Greek, but also it was only 25% Turkish. This blog posting discredits the Greek national independence.

Nationalism personalizes history in the sense that the people of a nation are required to effectively connect themselves to the past. In this type of history reading, Ottoman past becomes a legacy to be defended, while Greek past is a history of coincidental victories. In this sense, “Historical Confessions from the Greeks” serves this particular nationalistic duty of being a Turkish citizen proclaiming his/her interpretation of his/her own and the enemy’s histories.

The article’s insertion into the blogsphere also signals a different twist in history reading, in which the blogger and the audience lose their connection to the distinction between myth and reality. Before being presented on the blog, the article passes through the stages of being edited by a Greek newspaper, a Turkish TV Channel and finally the blogger. With the current Internet technologies available, it is easy to blog off of this entry into other ones and further the myth about the Greek villains and the Turkish victims. Since blogs invest the citizens with the power of citation, there is no way to

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26 Bağımsız bir Yunan devletinin kendi çıkarpın hizmet edeceğine dair aldıkları güvencelerden sonra savaşa müdahale ettiler. Yunanistan bu nedenle 1910-1920 arasındaki Balkan Savaşı’nda yapılan paylaşmalardan karlı çıkmış, ahalisinin yüzde 40’ı Yahudi, yüzde 25’i Türk ve sadece yüzde 20’şi Yunanlı olması rağmen Selanik kentini Yunan topraklarına katılmıştır.
check references used in blogs. This creates the dissolution of the line between myth and reality.

**On the Greek Nation**

The blogsphere presents a singular universe for the Greek and the Turkish national identities, where they are pitted against each other as opposites. Nevertheless, there are blogs that try to represent the two nations in a different light. However, because nationalism runs so deep among the bloggers, the article poster for “How do We View the Greek Nation?” \(^{27}\) needs to use apologetic language. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the blogger for “Oh Brother, Are We under Siege?” \(^{28}\) presents a view, where it is easy to see the history that best agrees with nationalism. He clearly illustrates that there are multiple ways to read history. Nevertheless, according to him, being a Turkish citizen requires advocating the Turkish case against Greek claims. In both cases, the bloggers voice frustrations: one of a blogger seeing Greek-Turkish hostility as endemic between two nations, and the other frustrated with the Turks who are not nationalistic enough to defend their history. The preponderance of nationalism creates a norm in terms of the personal opinions of these bloggers.

**How do We View the Greek Nation?**

The blogger *Warchild* comments on the Greeks as being a superior race compared to the Turks on his blog entry titled “How do We View the Greek Nation?” *Warchild* claims to show the real image of the Greeks with his writing. His language is unique in the sense that he portrays Greeks and Turks in a completely different light from the

\(^{27}\) Yunan Ulusuna Nasil Bakiyoruz?
\(^{28}\) Isgal Altinda miyiz Kardesim?
bloggers. However, at the same time, he substantiates national identities as his posting illustrates such identities as being constant throughout history.

In contrast to views presented in the previous section, the blogger *Warchild* does not undermine the strength of the Greek nation but rather bolsters it. *Warchild* speaks to a nationalist audience and presents an alternative view of the Greek nation. “We have a lot to learn from a nation that has longer history than us. From their experiences, stories, fights … uncountable traits”29 (Warchild, 2006). He plays with hyperbole by claiming the Greeks’ positive traits to be uncountable. Yet, he shows these traits with an ellipsis. Greeks are a nation that the Turks must look up to. He makes use of similar other language tricks to illustrate the glorious traits of the Greek nation.

The blogger emphasizes the significance of the Greeks, while giving deference to his nationalistic readers. “The Greek nation’s history dates back to 2000-3000 BC and even further past. The Greek geography is a small region” (Warchild, 2006). *Warchild* uses phrases like ‘even further past’ to emphasize the longevity of the Greek civilization without giving a concrete definition. However, being aware of the deviant nature of his assertion, he puts a disclaimer of apology for his argument. “Now I can hear my dear nationalist friends to say noooo, in fact Turks founded the Ottoman and ruled the entire world. Of course you are right my friends” (Warchild, 2006). *Warchild* must acknowledge the nationalist history reading to win the audience and later refute its claim. He paints a completely different image of the Greeks and the Turks in his blog, where the Turks forced other nations to join in their culture, while the Greeks (also known as

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29 Tarihi bizden eski olan ve bu kadar köklü bir ulustan öğrenecek çok şeyimiz var. Onların tecrübelerinden, hikayelerinden, mücadeelerinden … saymakla bitmez.
Helens) took the world over with their culture. “Yet, the Turks forcefully engaged other nations into our culture … However; the Helens spread their wisdom and culture all over the place …”30 (Warchild, 2006). Warchild argues that the Ottoman rule was based on warship, while Greek’s was on wisdom. He claims the Turks to be at fault by forcing their culture on other nations. Furthermore, his choice of the word Helen, instead of Yunan is telling, as the former connotes a more of a glorious representation.

Although scholars argue that cyberspace can be a medium that shakes modern subjectivity, the blogs further reinforce national identity, because of the relationship between the subjects and the history. In Warchild’s posting, the national identity is not only preserved for the current order, but anachronistically extended to other eras. S/he freezes Turkish and Greek identities, in this blog entry, and makes his argument as if they have always been the same, since the classical era. According to Gellner (1983), this is an endemic feature of nationalism: it presents itself to predate the era of nationalism (p. 49). Warchild furthers these notions with his argument.

Warchild’s comments also illustrate the endemic condition of hostility between the two nations. His posting shows a one-sided view, where s/he does not acknowledge possible Greek hostility against the Turkish nation. He observes an unreasonable rage among his Turkish friends. “All my Turkish friends I tried to talked to have hatred

towards the Helen nation that they cannot also know the reasons for …”\textsuperscript{31} \textbf{(Warchild, 2006).} Hatred is there, though it has lost all its reasons to be there.

Although it is a different depiction of the two nations, \textit{Warchild}’s blog entry is important to show the prevalent features of Turkish nationalism: its relation to history and hostility against the Greeks. For the first time, Greeks are victims with glorious traits. However, the article runs into an anachronism in the sense that it assumes the peoples living under the Ottoman rule also had nationalistic consciousnesses. His relation to history is nationalist in the sense that he treats identities as being constant throughout history. His posting also shows the prevalence of hostility between the two nations. Hatred of ‘Other’ is necessary to be a Turk, and in order to qualify for membership, one needs to present it. The following blog analysis of \textit{Karadenizliyum}, in this sense, shows a complete reversal but the standard depiction of the Greek-Turkish history reading. Presenting hostility against the Greeks is the way to be a good Turk.

\textbf{Oh Brother, Are We under Siege?}

The blogger \textit{Karadenizliyum} addresses the blog readers about the proper ways of reading history. He makes heavy use of street slang as he presents the correct history reading about the Greeks. Although he alludes to an important feature of nationalism, when he thinks of history as a construction through the lens of a nation, he persists on a history reading that qualifies hatred against the Greeks as one of the elements of being a Turk.

\textsuperscript{31} Bu konuda konuşmaya çalıştım her Türk arkadaşım kendisinin de anlamını bilmediği bir hınç, bir kin besliyör Helen ulusuna karşı. Ancak bu gayet yanlış birşey. Biz Türkler ve Yunanlılar savaşsakta tarih boyunca yoğun bir kültür alış-verişi yaşamış iki ülkeyiz. Bu sebeple biz Türkler Yunanlılara nefetle bakmamalı, onların efsanelerle, bilgelikle, insanlık tarihiyle dolu geçmişlerini araştırmalıyız diye düşünüyorum...
Karadenizliyum illustrates the ways in which nationalism assigns a particular history reading that creates Others. This blogger makes an important point about the ways in which different nations read histories differently. “It might have pieces that you would not like, but it is totally yours … If you are from Helen race, Romen Diogen is your hero, if you are Turkish, it is Alparslan” (Karadenizliyum, 2007). National order assumes its subjects to wholeheartedly embrace its version of history. The blogger illustrates how history can be read in different ways according to the national motivation. He speaks from a Turkish nationalist point of view, in which we, the Turks, must read history through the lens of Turkish nationalism. Like most of the other bloggers he uses ‘we’ language to distinguish the Turks from the Greeks. The Turks consider Alparslan as their hero, while his enemy Romen Diogen is the Greek hero. Greek heroes are Turks’ enemies: and the Greek nation is Turks’ enemy.

Karadenizliyum highlights the prevalent component of hostility against the Greeks in Turkish nationalism. According to him, Greeks can never be “our” friends as it is an impossible effort for a Turkish national. “Acknowledging the Greek as a friend … can only be accepted by the minds who … say ‘we are now friends. Let’s not have symbolic Greek humiliation in the celebrations on September 9’” (Karadenizliyum, 2007). Karadenizliyum sees enmity against the Greeks as part of being Turkish. In his

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33 Yunanlı’yi ‘AB uyum yasaları çerçevesinde’ dost kabul etmek; 30 Ağustos’ta İzmir’de Sezen Aksu konseri dinleyen kafaya uyar. 9 Eylül’de ‘Artık dostuz. Törenlerde deniz dökülen temsili Yunan kuvvetleri olmasın” diyen kafaya uyar.
opinion, thinking of Greeks as friends is unacceptable for a Turk. Furthermore, he accuses certain Turks of not being patriotic enough as they would prefer to take negative representations of Greeks out of the celebration of Izmir’s liberation day (September 9) from the Greeks. He shows similar anti-Turkish representations on the Greek side to be the justification for his distaste for those Turks who would want to consider Greeks as friends. “That mind ignores the fact that … the Greeks burn a galley decorated to be Turkish … He will burn the Turkish galley … but I won’t dump the Greek into the sea in Izmir”34 (Karadenizliyum, 2007). Anti-Turkish sentiment on the Greek side is fair grounds for anti-Greek sentiment on the Turkish side.

The frustration caused by the ‘invading Turk’ image motivates the blogger to stress a history reading that would rescue the Turkish nation from being invaders, while projecting the same role onto the Greek nation. Since nationalism personalizes history, every citizen is supposed to embrace it as if it is his/her own history. This motivates the blogger to save the Turkish history from humiliation. In his entry, he ‘corrects’ certain assumptions of those are against the Turks and in favor of the Greeks: “The local-autochthonous people of the Black Sea are Turan people. Helens came later … The real ‘invaders’ are the Helens … In this vein, 1461 is not the Turkish conquest of Trabzon, the last Greek point in the Black Sea, but its first liberation”35 (Karadenizliyum, 2007). Karadenizliyum reverses the debate about Turkish invasion of Anatolia into the Greek

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34 O kafa hemen hemen aynı tarihlerde Sisam Adası’nda limanda Yunanlıkların “kurtuluş günü şerefine” Türk kadırgası süsü verdikleri bir gemiyi her sene şolenle yakıtları göz ardı eder. Sisam’da o Türk kadırgası yakacak ama İzmir’de ben Yunanlıyı denize dökmeyeceğim…

invasion. His discussion of Black Sea people as being from Turan stock of people comes from the Turkish History Thesis, which claims the Anatolian peoples to be of Turkish origin. The authors of the thesis claimed that the Turks were not invaders, but as autochthons of the region (Behar, 1992, p. 12). In a similar line of thought, Karadenizliyum pushes a history reading that reverses the accusations against the Turks as being invaders and this time presents Greeks as such. This motivation reveals two basic component of Turkish nationalism: affective history reading, and unconditional hatred of the Greeks.

The two examples of bloggers’ personal opinions on the Greek nation show that the national order is far from dead. The bloggers assume its discourse to be the norm and extrapolate national identities to the study of non-national eras. They also showcase how much the hostility against the Greeks is prevalent in the Turkish nationalism. Warchild must put a disclaimer before bragging about the Greek nation; Karadenizliyum must present hatred against the Greeks in order to qualify as being a true Turk. The nationalist history reading ties the hostility to its rhetoric. As Karadenizliyum makes clear, there is no single way of reading history; but every nation reads from its own perspective. In that sense, Turkish citizens must save Turkish history from illegitimate claims of invasion by demonizing the Greeks as invaders.

**Contemporary Issues**

Past disputes haunt the current Turkish-Greek relations. Old hostilities feed into new ones, and the Internet expands them with further audiovisual elaborations. The Aegean coastal dispute is one of the biggest items of conflict between the two nations.
Conflict comes in the form of army planes agitating each other over the Aegean Sea or claiming disputed territories, such as the Imnia/Kardak islet, as one country’s national territory. The Internet witnesses the resurrection of these issues with a unique use of mass media. The impassible barrier between the two nations appears in an incessant manner, but this time with audiovisual features. Bloggers dispute old hostility on the new media.

**Imnia/Kardak Once Again**

Imnia/Kardak islet is a decade old dispute that the mass media like to revisit from time to time. The blog article by Armagonorki, titled “Imnia/Kardak Once Again”\(^{36}\) is an example of a reference to a news article that depicts Greeks in a certain light. Since Kardak islet crisis in 1997 became a symbol of antagonism between the two countries, which brought the two to the brink of war, this posting deserves special attention. As the symbol of the antagonism on the Aegean Sea, the islet is a subject on which the two nations spew their hatred through the media.

This blog posting preserves the traditional way of representing Greeks in the blogsphere. No matter what, the Greeks are the trouble makers and the Turks are the victims of their hidden designs. “The fishermen, who caused a crisis … the day before, joined with other fishermen … and fished all together at 7:00 AM”\(^{37}\) (Armagonorki, n.d.). According to this section, Greeks do not stop causing trouble; they move from one islet to another to test the boundaries between the two countries with the hope of creating

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\(^{36}\) Yeniden Kardak

\(^{37}\) Yunanistan’ın Kilimli Adası’ndan önceki sabah satlerinde Kardak Kayalıkları’na gelerek krize yol açan balıkçılar, dün de Leros Adası’ndan gelen balıkçılarla buluşup sabah 07.00 aralarında toplu halde gelip ağ attı
a crisis. Moreover, the author’s choice of presenting the event as a collective is an allusion to the Greek nation, such that their action can be extrapolated to a greater Greek nation.

The storytelling aspect of the article shows how the act of a few can be an act of a greater whole (the Greek nation). “A high level official from the Coastal Security Command stated that ‘the Greeks try to agitate the Turkish side by sending their fishermen all together to Kardak islet … Yet, we won’t be agitated’”38 (Armagonorki, n.d.). The article presents the crisis as the agitation of the Greeks. In this sense, the fishermen do not come merely of their own will but are sent by the Greeks to agitate the Turkish side; it is not an act of just a few Greek fishermen, but of all the Greeks.

As Greeks are the trouble makers in this representation, the Turks are the victims of their plans. This posting, similar to the others, depicts the Turks as victims of Greek wrongdoing. “Turkish Coastal Security team warned the Greek fishermen by saying ‘Leave this region’. Yet, the Greek fishermen and soldiers did not leave. On the Turkish side, Coastal Force did not let the [Turkish] fishermen leave …”39 (Armagonorki, n.d.). Unlike the Greek fishermen and soldiers who further perpetuate the crisis through their presence, the Turkish Coastal Forces try to prevent it. The author of the article paints a benevolent image of the Turkish authorities, while demonizing the Greeks. Furthermore, the Turkish fishermen, due to the Turkish Forces’ responsible actions and the Greeks’

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38 Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı’ndan üst düzey bir yetkili “Yunanlar, balıkçlarını toplu halde Kardak Kayalıkları’na göndererek gerginlik yaratıp Türk tarafını tahrik etmeye çalışıyor. 14 balıkçının yan yana, küçükük kaya parçacıkları etrafında avlanması ilginç. Ancak tahlıklere kapılmayız” diye konuştu.
unfair actions, cannot take advantage of fishery resources. “The Greek is fishing, we are watching … [T]he captain of the boat called Menekse … stated that ‘…The past few days, the Greek fishermen take advantage of the fish and we just watch them from the coast’”\(^{40}\) (Armagonorki, n.d.). The caricature of a gullible Turk is a recurring one from the offline world. Turks lose only because they are too benevolent while the enemy has ulterior designs. A Greek is someone, either a fisherman or a state official, who deceives the Turks for his/her gain, while a Turk is prey to these plans since s/he is too innocent to act that way.

As media spectators, it is not possible to know whether these events have unfolded as explained in this article because the facts are always presented in mediation. It is not possible for the Turkish blog audience to know whether the Greek fishermen really agitated the Turkish forces or not. However, the over-saturation of blogs sites with this and similar postings creates narrowed and biased images of the Greeks that maintains the hostility between the two nations. The bloggers carry the traditional conflict over the Aegean coastal dispute to the online world.

**Dog Fight**

Along with Imnia/Kardak islet, another symbol of dispute over the Aegean is the dogfight between the two army’s airplanes. The posting “Dogfight with Cursing on the
Internet”⁴¹ by Kabuslarim is another example of the negative representation of the Greeks on blogs through the Turkish news media. Yet, what is interesting about this posting is that it includes the news article from Radikal newspaper, with its video illustration. As this posting is on a video about the ‘dogfight’ of Greek and Turkish army airplanes agitating each other, the blogger brings the video to his blog through YouTube.

The posting cites a newspaper article, while at the same time remedying for its lack of audiovisual illustration with the insertion of the video. The article, without questioning the accuracy of the video on YouTube, guides the readers to a hostile environment. It exaggerates the reactions that this video had created. “The video of dogfight of Turkish and Greek F-16 on YouTube, showing the Greek pilots cursing at the Turkish one, receives a lot of reaction. Here is the Greek rudeness”⁴² (Kabuslarim, 2006). The article presents the story as if most people are aware of this video and a lot of them show their reaction. This way, the publication is able to unite all the readers against the video. Furthermore, although it is the act of two Greek pilots, it is presented as typical Greek rudeness. The acts reflect on the entire Greek nation, as if it is their nature.

In order to justify hostility against the Greeks, the posting explains the video to be accurate. However, its usage of passive voice conceals the source of the video and guides the readers to an assumption about its accuracy. “The video that is claimed to be filmed over the Aegean Sea in 1997 and real shows a Greek war plane getting locked to a

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⁴¹ Internet’tede Kufurlu İt Dalası
⁴² YouTube’da Türk ve Yunan F-16’ları arasındaki it dalışı gösterdiği kaydedilen bir görüntüde Yunan pilotun Türk pilota küfür etmesine tepki yağıyor. İşte Yunanlı terbiyesizliği
Turkish F-16\textsuperscript{43} (Kabuslarım, 2006). The passive voice hides the sources of the video such that the possibility of inaccuracy is minimized.

Although the video is as old as ten years old, it comes out into the media at a time when a service like YouTube starts operating, which enables easy dissemination of audiovisual materials. As these services become available, they can also be integrated into blogs and further their spread.

The news article’s remarks on the comments made about this video on YouTube preserve the traditional representation of Greeks as being villains on the blogsphere. It only mentions certain comments that would not challenge the arguments made within the article. “While the Turkish users write that the Greek pilots ‘can only be successful in such games and fail in real instances like Cyprus operation’, the Greek users state that Greek pilots can beat Turks in any circumstance, and Turkish planes fall all the time”\textsuperscript{44} (Kabuslarım, 2006). The choice of comments victimizes the Turks with the Greek comment while glorifying their military victories with the Turkish comment. But, there are other comments on YouTube that could invalidate the video. However, since the media gain economically from maintaining hostility between the two nations, such comments would not find a place on the article.

Bloggers carry old disputes to the new media. The symbol of hostility between the two nations, the dogfight, is presented to the audience at a time when video streaming

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\textsuperscript{43} 1997 yılında Ege Denizi üzerinde çekildiği ve gerçek olduğu öne sürülen görüntüde, bir Yunan savaş uçağının bir Türk savaş uçağına kilitlenmesi gösteriliyor. Görüntüde Yunan pilotun Türk savaş uçağına kilitlendiği anda Türk pilota küfür etmesi ise tepki çekiyor
\textsuperscript{44} Türk internet kullanıcıları, Yunan pilotların “sadece bu tür oyunlarda başarılı olabileceğini, Kıbrıs harekatı gibi gerçek olaylarda ise kaçığını” yazarken, Yunan internet kullanıcıları ise Yunan pilotların Türkleri her ortamda yenebileceğini, zaten Türk uçaklarının sürekli düştüğünü söylüyor
\end{flushright}
and blogging technologies become available to the Internet users. The users can finally place an old video like this in a context to sustain the national myths on the online media. The digital online video also elaborates on nationalism since it is now in a form that is easy to disseminate to illustrate the Greek atrocity, and thus establish cohesion among the Turks. Without further contemplation of its correctness, the article asserts on the accurateness of the video and assumes the readers to accept it. The fact that Kabuslarim blogged it off of a newspaper article also illustrates the ways in which the Internet user embraces the hostility and takes it to other fronts on the personal level. Only the reference to the hostility pervades the blogsphere since its accuracy is never a question. As long as it portrays a hostile attitude towards the Greeks, it has a place on the online media.

With the spread of blogs, the audience of traditional journals switches. It is no longer a monologue, but a medium to express oneself to others. In this process, as the bloggers copy and paste news articles and scholarly writings from other sources, the audience of these publications also switches. As the bloggers insert these sources into the blog universe, they become manifestations for their personal opinions. Along the way, it becomes a process of endless citation where the original source of the article fades in importance and the blog extends the original audience of the publication to blog readers. What is left on the blogs is no more the news or the information but the reference. As bloggers and their audience do not stop to think about the validity of the original source, the reference to circulate on the Internet. This feature dissolves the distinctions between myth and reality, where myth becomes the perceived real.
As far as this case study goes, the bloggers assume themselves to be invested by the duty of counteracting those forces, which try to undermine Turkey’s strengths. Blogs become a way for individuals, who previously did not have the means to make their views heard, to communicate the ‘truth’ about the real face of the Greeks by making references to other sources on the Internet. It is the personal battle of the bloggers to educate their audience about what did not happen – Turkish violence against the Greeks – and what really happened – Greek massacres of the Turks. As the Western media have bias in favor of the Turkish massacres of the others, and not so much the other way around, blogs become an outlet for those unheard views to be expressed. As truth is the production of certain power holders, blogs are ways to challenge that power. Thus, it is their patriotic duty to report on and guide the blog audience against the Greeks. Nevertheless, the modern conceptions of national identity invade the Internet.

All the views within the reach of this study, even those having contradictory expressions to the conventional Greek image, like that of Warchild, cannot escape national constructions. The blogger evaluates the past as if the nation-state and its order are universal and their members imagined themselves to be nationals. The blogs portray Greeks and Turks to be different nations, to have different countries from the beginning and have always to have thought of themselves in modern ways. Although the Internet might be de-centering the individual and creating new ways of thinking, these examples show that the hype on the Internet is not totally valid.

Even though the Internet has a global reach and thus can be challenging to the notions of nation-states, the blogs have an assumed audience. Bloggers present the Greek
violence to their audiences in ways to rouse and therefore maintain the hostility that is already there. Thus, the bloggers assume the audience to be a nationalist one, previously possessing negative affiliations to the Greeks. Even pro-Hellenist entries, like “How do We View the Greek Nation?” make their points with an apologist disclaimer. Such bloggers need to make sure that they win the anti-Greek audience first in order to communicate their ideas.

Although the Internet opens various avenues for communicating different ideas to different people, its usage undermines its character of multiplicity. On the Internet, services like blogs and YouTube can be merged to express opinions; bloggers mostly use them to communicate the dominant ideology in the group. Whether the video presented with “Dogfight with Cursing on the Internet” is real or not, its authenticity is not a question. As long as it portrays hostility against the Greeks, it qualifies as material to be broadcasted to blog readers. A uniform universe of hatred against the Greeks dominates the blog universe. Opposite views, like the one expressed by Warchild, are only outliers, whose numbers are minute compared to the articles with the language of hatred. Thus, as a medium of free expression, blogs tilt towards a dominating articulation designating Greeks as ‘Others’.

What happens when the real Others turned into electronic Others? Although both of them are fictive representation of the national Other, electronization of ‘Others’ shifts the maintenance of these ideas to a different level. While the non-interactivity of the traditional media, like TV, radio or the print, disseminate the images of the ‘Others’ from top to bottom, the bloggers, pre-informed about these ideas, bring their perpetuation to a
personal level, where the dissemination of the ideas flow from top to bottom and then among the bottom. Thus, these Internet technologies modify the route of nationalism’s perpetuation, making it even more pervasive. Bloggers can easily disseminate ideas about electronic Others through technologies at their disposal, such as video streaming and blogging.

Blogging nationalism both preserves its offline features and raises nationalistic fervor to a greater pitch. Blog entries present the readers with ways to embrace a nationalist reading of history, which is stimulated to challenge claims against that reading. In this history reading, Greeks take the role that the Turks have been accused for, that of invaders, genocidal killers and demons. The blogs guide their audience to accept their history reading, and to further it.

Since blogging brings the personal expressions of distant nationals to the individual computer screens, the imagined community is not so much imagined any more, but real. With the decompounding of body and space on the Internet, and the shrinkage of distant geographies, the Internet users reach different national consciousness, where the citizens no longer have to imagine their community; they see it unfold on their computer screen. In this vein, they meet fellow citizens who think similarly on Greeks Others, and no longer need to imagine that other citizens share their opinions of the Greeks. Electronization of the Greeks increases the scale and the scope of Turkish nationalism in relation to Greeks as being the national Others.
Chapter 4. Discussing Greek ‘Others’ on the Online News Media

News media are the sine qua non of nationalism. With their capacity to relate individuals to one another, news media make national imaginations possible. They also facilitate discussions in social circles, which further elaborate on this secular imagining. Newspaper readership is still an important component for the conception of nations. However, with its transportation into the online space, readership moved away from being an individual act to a collaborative one, hence reconfiguring the national imagination.

News media and the social spheres around them formed national subjectivities. Expansion of the print industry brought newspapers into the households of Europe, which in turn created a new form of consciousness (Anderson, 1983, p. 24-5). Print media construct national subjects since a sense of cohesion arises among readers located in different geographies, but united by a common language and a common consideration of news. Furthermore, news in its edited format provides a framework upon which the disparate stories of a nation are woven together. Tightly knit individual stories present newspaper readers with something shared, but secular (Anderson, 1983, p. 34-6). News articles are also materials for coffee house conversations. The reading class used the news media materials in their daily debates. Coffee houses were social circles for media-stimulated critical discussions (Habermas, 1989, p. 41-2, 70). The conversations in these spaces integrated the individual imagination into a communal one, which elaborates on national identity. While the individual’s close environ, or the urban space, is the real community, the nation becomes the imagined community.
Newspaper reading has moved away from being a solitary morning ritual. With the Internet, people can discuss topics without being physically together (Bulut, 2006, p. 39). With interactive components added to online news articles, such as online commenting, news reading has become a collaborative act. Readers not only read news and contemplate it in their own personal spaces, but they have been invested with the tools to make their opinions heard by other readers. News transmission on the Internet is not necessarily a one-way process anymore; the audience not only receives media content but also responds back. A comment-posting feature for a news article turns readership into a forum discussion: readers can express their opinions relating (and sometimes not relating) to the news at hand.

This commenting feature of the electronic newspaper carries the coffee house experience to the Internet, which then intensifies the national imaginings in the sense that news is no longer only a subject of discussion among close acquaintances but among disparate readers as well. The imagining of other readers becomes a lived experience. Online commenting further extends nationalism with its capacity to turn expressions into discussions. Online newspaper readers respond to other readers that they do not physically interact with. This feature strengthens free expression, as it is easier to disentangle one’s body from the space of opinion formation. The space for comments is not real space. Thus, one expects unconventional views to be voiced. But, it only becomes unconventional in its stretch of hostility against the Greeks to more passionate levels. Alternative views on the Greeks are only outliers on the online news media, as in the world of blogs. Commentators try to refute hostile readings of the relations between
Turkey and Greece in their limited capacity. Overall though, national imaginings on the online space deepens along the lines of hatred.

Villainous Greek images prevail in these discussions; its characterization is exacerbated by news media depictions. The news carriers set the subject and the tone of postings through their choice and presentations of certain topics. Thus, the news media mediate the online comments. Hostility is a powerful way to attract audience in the attention economy. Since, a newspaper’s advertising revenue depends on the scope of its reach; the news-providing outlet can increase its access to the audience through hostility. Mass news media agitate readers via the illustration of an antagonistic Greek identity. Furthermore, news sources retain some form of surveillance, where comments do not appear automatically on the Web site, but need to go through an authorization phase. Online postings differ from blogs in the sense that they do not create broad personal spaces, but allow for specific opinions expressed on particular subjects.

The recurring theme of Turkish nationalism in these comments is frustration over the Cyprus issue. The Cyprus question is one of the thorniest problems between the two nation-states. Cyprus almost always emerges as a point of tension between the two, leading to hostility. As the United Kingdom (UK) drew back from the island in 1959, Greece, Turkey and UK became the guarantor states to uphold the constitutional order on the island. Following Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, the island divided into two ethnically homogenous societies, an action necessitated by ethnic tension between the Greek and Turkish communities. In the Northern part of the island, the 1974 intervention created a buffer between Greek Cypriots and Turkey. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared itself to be an independent state, which is now solely recognized by Turkey (McDonald, 2001, p. 117-22). Turkey and TRNC assert the legality of direct flights and trade to the northern side of the island. Current news media cover Papadopoulos’ (Greek Cypriot Prime Minister), Erdogan’s (Turkish Prime Minister) and Talat’s (Prime Minister of TRNC) remarks and policies regarding these issues of flights and trading. Many online comments posted about these articles refer to these three people and their political actions.

A politico-historical reading the Cyprus issue that is skewed in favor of the Greeks creates the frustrations expressed in the online comments. Since there is no objective single history reading, interpreting the Cyprus question depends on one’s national affiliations. One example of the different perspectives is the word choice used to describe Turkish army’s intervention on the Island versus its invasion. The comments in response to news articles depict frustration with the biased view of the issue as an invasion. This frustration motivates the readers to paint the traditional Greek Other images. Unlike blogs, online commenting moves the Greek representations from personal spaces to online debate, from a staged soliloquy to a communal discussion. Online commenting extrapolates coffee house talks to the new media that intensifies the imagined community. It propagates nationalism more powerfully since the ideas are substantiated in a world of unfolding events. While blogs are frozen expressions, with limited anchors to the simultaneity of real life, online commenting is temporarily linked to the concurrently evolving offline world.
All of the news coverage pertaining to this study relates to the EU-Cyprus-Turkey triangle at a time coincidental with two important developments: Greek Cyprus’ attempts to license firms from Egypt and Lebanon to excavate oil in the Mediterranean, and the EU’s suspension of an integration negotiation with Turkey as a result of Turkey’s closure of its ports and airports to trade from Cyprus. The articles cover a time span between December 15, 2006 and February 6, 2007 from two online news sources, Hurriyet and NTVMSNBC. The sources of the articles are designated in the footnotes in parenthesis after the article name in Turkish, as H for Hurriyet and N for NTVMSNBC. Online commenting to news article on the Internet brings multiple views into the discussion of Greek identity. The representation of Greeks in online news discourse shapes many of the comments. Thus, speech of hatred dominates discussions about the Greeks and solidifies Turkish national identity.

Voicing Frustration

Comments voice frustration with the current state of affairs with Greece and Cyprus. Nationalism motivates this articulation since the citizens are affectively tied to their states. With the democratization of state apparatus, nationals assume the state to represent their actions. Therefore, Turkish Internet users defend their national will via supporting their state’s past and present action and its history. In this manner, affectionate citizens patriotically defend the national cause on an individual level. In this defense, online commenting intensifies national imaginings of Greek Others. Hostility comes in concrete ways as it relates to a world of simultaneously unfolding events.
The comments posted about news articles in this section mostly voice some form of frustration with the current state of affairs regarding the Cyprus issue. They portray nostalgia for the old glorious days of the Ottoman Empire and most of the time present Turkey as being a victim of Greek designs. In this vein, ‘Greece as the spoiled kid of Europe’ is a recurring theme. Some comments also exhibit extreme hostility, where the comment posters voice regret over policies in the mid-70s. In these postings, the writers think that Turkey’s military interventions on the island should have been brought to a completion: the whole island should have been completely eradicated off the Greeks.

Nostalgia for the lost power is a point where this frustration intensifies. According to the comment posters, since Greek power used to be minimal, it is extremely humiliating for the country to lose against the Greeks in the political arena. The commenter Dogukan Isik, in his posting to the article called “Greeks won’t give up”45; best illustrates frustration with current Turkish affairs. He comments that “even the Greeks are now able to pose a challenge; such a pity…”46 (Isik, 2007). His use of the word bile (even) is telling in the sense that Greeks did not used to be a mighty nation, especially since they were one of the millets, religious groups making up the Ottoman society, under the Ottoman rule. Current politics regarding Cyprus undermines Turkish glory. The posters mostly justify these comments by victimizing the Turks and vilifying the Greeks, especially in the latter’s ability to bring EU in opposition against Turkey.

Turkey is prey to Greek plots; the mass media’s framing of messages creates this myth. Victim Turks-Villain Greeks discourse is most apparent in the comments posted

45 Rumlar Vaz Gecmiyor (N)
46 Artik Rumlalr bile kafa tutar oldu yazik gercekten cok yazik…
for news articles dealing with Greek Cyprus’ intervention in EU-Turkey negotiation with their anti-Turkey sentiments. “Archbishop the Main Actor”\textsuperscript{47} article addresses the new Archbishop’s efforts to introduce Greek Orthodoxy into a resolution of the Cyprus question. The article reports that he will be active until Turkish troops leave the island. It also notes that the Archbishop is known for his opposition to the Annan plan (which was a UN formula for the unification of the island, accepted on the Turkish side and rejected on the Greek side) and Turkish presence on the island. In a way, the article sets the stage to agitate its readers; hence, the comments logically flow. A comment poster \textit{Serhat Serhat} thinks that Greeks are lucky since Turks are merciful. “…You are alive only because we did not make you suffer like you made our nation suffer. It is again our fault!”\textsuperscript{48} (Serhat Serhat, 2007). This world view rescues the Turkish policies from blame for the conflict since Turkey has always been benevolent.

According to comments, Greeks will never be approachable because they are always the source of trouble. Comments for “TRNC Survey: No to One State”\textsuperscript{49} illustrate similar tendencies among Turkish Cypriots. The article reports on a survey of Turkish Cypriots: their attitudes towards reunification have changed significantly, and now 65% favor two separate states (“KKTC’d”, 2007). Some worry that Turks will be victims again, no matter what: “ONE state together with Greeks would be a

\textsuperscript{47} Assolist Baspiskopos (H)

\textsuperscript{48} Turk devleti savasarak geri kazandigi topragini,insanini tarihin hangi bolumunde siyasi oyunlarla birakip kacmistir Hiristostomos..Zamaninda milletimize cektirdiginiz eziyetin aynisini size yapmadik diye hayattasiniz yaa,suc yine bize!

\textsuperscript{49} KKTC’de Anket: Tek Devlete Hayir (H)
HISTORICAL mistake and as always Turks would pay for that mistake”\(^{50}\) (Korkmaz, 2007). There is also a masochistic empowerment, where Turkish Cypriots enduring sufferings are finally realizing the truth. Thus, the change in their attitudes is an illustration. “Difficulty brings power. Pain is a perfect teacher. To be able to overcome the pain, one needs to experience it first. Cypriot Turk started to realize the truth”\(^{51}\) (Tunabeyi, 2007). Similarly, some comments blame Greeks for the division of the island. “Chance comes only once and the Greeks declined it”\(^{52}\) (Keles, 2007). According to this posting, as Greeks did not favor the Annan plan, they lost their chance, so Greeks are at fault, not the Turks.

Hostility against the Greeks is so taken for granted that any form of compromise from the Turkish side can be treacherous. The comment by Gokhan Guney to the article “New Year’s Message from Talat to Papadopoulos”\(^{53}\), reporting on a Turkish Leader’s message for a united Cyprus in 2007, is illustrative. The posting sentimentalizes its message in the sense that the commenter’s anger is tied to martyrs. “Shame on you. You are only making our martyrs roll over in their graves.”\(^{54}\) (Guney, 2006) The frustration with an intention to compromise is evident in the emotional intensity of the comment.

Frustration brings offline metaphors like ‘the spoiled kid of Europe’ to online news media as a means to channel the hostility. According to this image, Greece possesses certain characteristics. He is sometimes a tool for Europe to use against the

\(^{50}\) Rumlarla aynı çatı altında TEK devlet TARİHİ hata olur ve hatanın bedelini herzaman olduğu gibi Türk tarafı öder.
\(^{52}\) fırsat bir sefer olur rumlar o fırsatı tepdiler
\(^{53}\) Talat’tan Papadopoulos’a Yeni Yıl Mesajı
\(^{54}\) yazılar olsun. Şehitlerimizin kemiklerini sizlatıyorlar sadece.
Turks, and sometimes has mischievous designs that would use the EU against Turkey. Some of the postings illustrate frustration among the Turks because of these ‘spoiled’ acts of the Greeks. The comments portray Greek claims to be so aggressive and grasping that they can never be fulfilled. Commentators even make vulgar remarks to show the spoiled character of the Greeks. A comment by HG SS is an example in point, which responds to the article “Warning from Turkey to Eastern Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{55}: the article reports on the Greek side’s attempts to license Lebanese and Egyptian oil excavation companies. The comment says that “The spoiled kid of Europe is even getting more spoiled. It is apparent that he won’t stop until he gets slapped”\textsuperscript{56} (HG SS, 2007). The hostility in this quotation with the use of the ‘spoiled kid’ description is obvious. The journalistic language lends legitimacy to the metaphor in the eyes of its readers.

The article titled “Let’s See if they can Fly”\textsuperscript{57} report on Papadopoulos’ comment on UK Prime Minister Blair’s remarks on direct flights to Northern Cyprus. According to him, British Prime Minister Blair’s comment on starting direct flights to the Northern side if there are no legal obstacles is not necessarily a positive development for Turkey. Rather, since it is legally impossible, Blair closes the way to direct flights. What is interesting about this article is the fact that although Papadopoulos never remarks like “Let’s see if they can fly”, the article is titled with these words. Hurriyet mediates the future discussions of the commentators, as people are expected to rise the occasion proffered by this article. Thus, the comments respond accordingly.

\textsuperscript{55} Turkiye’den Dogu Akdeniz’e Nota (H)
\textsuperscript{56} Avrupanın şmarık evladi şmardıkça şmarıyor. Belli ki tokat yemeden oturmayacak yerine.
\textsuperscript{57} Ucsunlar da gorelim (H)
The anger in the postings is clear. Saban Korkmaz (2006) exclaims “Let’s see if you can stop”. Similarly, other comments undermine Greek claims with an angry tone. “What would you do if they fly?” (Keles, 2006) and another comment saying, “...I want to see what they would do if planes land on TRNC. Will they shoot them down? We are very afraid, aren’t we friends?” (Cihan, 2006) The comments belittle Greek policies. Some go to extremes to play on the notion of the ‘spoiled kid’ in a way to humiliate the Greek Cypriot Leader. These postings portray the Greek leader as a toy in the hands of Europe, in reference to the metaphor. “This badly morphed midget has invested himself a role like the court jester of the king in EU. Whatever he says no one is offended nor gets angry...UK must start the direct flights; such that the court jester will know his role as one.” Similarly, Yilmaz Ors expresses his rage with the following quotation: “If Papadopoulos, or molos (a derogatory word that rhymes with the name, meaning rubble in English), or whatever his name is, if and only if, England or EU do not cuff your Midas ears, there will be a lot of people who would do so” (Ors, 2006). The spoiled kid must be punished. If this midget court jester or (rubble) does not stop, Turks will devise a punishment.

The news carriers mediate the comment postings in the way they frame the message. In this vein, the media may choose to present the EU’s resolutions that hinder the accession process with a reference to Greece. Merely the appearance of the reference

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58 Allah askina acaba ne yapacaklar görmek isterim KKTC’ye uçak inse. Düsürecekler mi yoksa, çok korktuğum diş arkadaşlar...
59 Bu şekilsiz cüce,AB içinde kral soytarı gibi bir görev üstlenmiş olduğundan,ne söylese söylesin kimse alınmıyor ve kizmiyor. İngiltere Başıkanı cücenin bu sözlerinden sonra Ankara’da söylediğini gerçekleştirdi ve Türk havaalanına İngiltere’den uçak seferlerine başlamalı ki,soytarı da soytayı bilmeli.
60 Eğer papadapulos, molos yada her neye eğer, eğer varsa eğer senin o midas kulaklarını ingiltere veya ab çekemezse bu memlekte çekken çok olur.
is enough: the bait works and the comments respond accordingly. In their responses, the Turks accept the connection presented by the news media and draw upon it.

Small references may cause big uprisings. Articles covering EU-Turkey relations regarding the Cyprus issue receive postings that hypothesize anti-Turkey resolutions in the EU as part of Greek plans. Thus, the comments hold Greece responsible for creating enmity against the Turks in the EU. Nevertheless, some postings disentangle the EU and Greek Cyprus and reflect on the general EU attitude towards Turkey. In this case, comments for “Negotiations Under One Title” are illustrative. The article reports on the hold-up of integration talks between the EU and Turkey, yet it frames the news in a way that perpetuates hostility towards the Greeks. The article finds Greek Cyprus to be responsible for the hold-up: “It was resolved that the negotiations would start not on four subjects, as Turkey expected, but on one subject, as Cyprus Greek Administration wanted” (“Tek Baslikta”, 2006). Although the news piece does not mention how influential Greek Cyprus was in this EU decision, it makes a note of their attitude, just to create agitation among the readers. Thus, some readers respond to the article as an attack on Greece, not the EU.

The comment posters respond to the bait set by the media. The poster Hikmet Akalan (2006) comments, “It is not obvious whether this is the European Union or a Greek fan club.” Similarly, another comment poster, Songul Bickin (2006a) states,

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61 Tek Baslikta Muzakere (H)
62 Türkiye’nin beklentisi doğrultusunda dört değil Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi’nin istediği gibi bir başlıkta açılımı konusunda uzlaşıya varıldı
63 Bu da Avrupa birliği mi Yunan fan klübü mü belli değil.
“This not the European Union, but has become the Greek Union”\(^{64}\). In the same vein, Puan IsteMlyorum (2006) posts his comment, “Of course it would be the way the Greeks said. Did anyone of you, my friends, think otherwise?”\(^{65}\) Some comments express frustration with Greek designs and the weakening in Turkish power. Adnan Tezel is disturbed by how a tiny nation like Cyprus can make a fool of a large country like Turkey: “Turkey with a population of 70 million became a toy in the hands of the Greeks with 700 thousand in their population”\(^{66}\) (Tezel, 2006). Another commenter reflects on the ways in which Turkish power has declined against Greek Cyprus. “Look at what happened to the Turk that the whole world feared. Southern Cyprus really is making fool of you”\(^{67}\) (Otlu, 2006). Again, the spoiled kid metaphor comes up in the postings. “The spoiled kid that Europe raised, challenges us at every chance”\(^{68}\) (Alpagut, 2006).

However, the article plays a trick on the reader in the ways in which it presents the news. If it were reported to be an EU resolution, rather than a resolution that the Greeks sided with, the comments would have been aimed at the EU instead. Nevertheless, some comments make the distinction.

Although very few in number, some postings reflect on the EU instead of the Greeks. For instance, one posting sees the resolution as an EU maneuver, not necessarily a Greek one. “Because of the Greeks or not, EU will not take Turkey as a Member. Is it

\(^{64}\) bunlar avrupa birliği değil rum birliği oldu.  
\(^{65}\) Tabi ki Rumların dediği olacaktır. Aksini düşünün var mıydı arkadaşlar?  
\(^{66}\) 70 MILYONLUK TÜRKİYE, 700 BİNLİK RUMUN ELİNDE OYUNCAK OLDU…  
\(^{67}\) “. ….Dunyanın tırtılgı Turke bak ne oldu .Güney Kibris hakikaten sızla kafa yapıyor…  
\(^{68}\) AVRUPANIN KUCAĞINDA BÜYÜTTÜĞÜ BU ŞİMARİK ÇOCUK HER FIRSATTA BİZİ ENGELLİYOR.
that hard to understand?” (Cevik, 2006). Similarly, another poster Hakan Dogrucu (2006) thinks of problems with Greeks as an excuse. “Greeks are an excuse. They don’t want us and would not take a country with this big of a Muslim population.” The numeric comparison between these two categories of comments vis-à-vis their take on the resolution as either an EU-triggered or a Greek-motivated event, shows the success of the bait.

Hostility can reach the level of desiring the annihilation of the Other. Insertion of news into a discussion on the Greeks connects abstract notions that enrage Turks to real events. In the process, the hostility solidifies. Discussions of the Cyprus issue is illustrative in this sense since it is possibly the most problematic subject between the two nations. Accordingly, the hostility generated by this issue can appear in extreme ways. Hatred against the Greeks is an endemic condition. It mostly appears in the form of regret for Turkish past policies.

Postings showing disappointment with Turkey’s military intervention on the island in 1974 and 1975 clearly illustrate the extreme version of hostility present in the space of online commenting. According to these comments, the military operations should have been fully realized by completely annihilating Greeks on the island. If this had happened, there would be no Cyprus question. For the “Let’s See if they can Fly” article discussed above, some comments call for another military operation. The comment by Murat Sicak (2006) offers an example: “How would it be if we unite north

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69 RUM LAR OLSADA OLMASA DA AB TÜRKİYEYİ ÜYE OLARAK ALMAYACAQ BUNU ANLAMAK ZORMU?  
70 RUM BAHANE BİZİ İSTEMİYORLAR VE BU KADAR MÜSLÜMAN NÜFUSU OLAN ÜLKEYİ ALMAZLAR...”
and south with an operation like in 74. :D" Likewise, another comment poster Songul Bickin (2006b) elaborates on Turkish military might by claiming how easy it would be to take the island. “They want us to take the whole island ... We would do that for our Greek friends... We would take it in a day... Then the problem will be resolved. Happiness to them in Greece.” Comments also show disappointment with the past Turkish authorities in their incapacity to bring the operation to completion.

Some comments wed disapproval of Turkish policy with scorn for Greek leadership: “If Cyprus was taken completely in 1974, now the EU-spoiled Papadopoulos would not be arrogant like this…” (Tari, 2006). Comment poster Ali Akin joins the discussion by victimizing Turkey. “We are at fault. We should have taken the whole island by then...” (Akin, 2006). Article “Oil Discussion is Getting Bigger” has a comment that accuses the political leaders of the time for negligence in failing to take over the island completely. “We live the same problems today due to Bulent Ecevit’s (then the Prime Minister) ineptitude. It would have been much better if we eradicated the island of all of Greeks” (Ozgur, 2007). A comment for “Talat’s Call for Dialogue” even goes further and asks for an attack on the Greeks: “Can’t we bomb the Greeks by

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71 74'deki gibi bir opresyonla günayle kuzeyi birleştirsek nasıl olur :D
72 adanın tamamını almamızı istiyorlar. fazla söze gerek yok bir günde alırız. rum kardeşlerimiz için bunu da yaparız. kimse bizimle uğraşmaz. böylece rumların İlin havaalanı sorunu da çözülmüş olur. kendilerine yanımında mutluluklarrr.
74 Suç bize. Zamanında tamamını alacaktık Kıbrıs’ın şimdi böyle konuşmayaacaktır.
75 Petrol Tartışması Buyuyor (N)
76 İşte bölgenin ecevitin beceriksizliği yüzden bügende aynı sorunu yaşıyoruz ne vardı ki adanın hepsinden rumları silseydik
77 Talat’tan Diyalog Cagrısı (N)
plane by mistake? I mean without aiming for it. The best defense is attack.”78 (Fidanci, 2007). Hostility reach excessive levels when nationals view the past with regret.

News articles make use of Greece in order to agitate national sentiments in the readers. Some article titles sound provocative, while some articles uses the Greeks as a way to make a connection between Greek hatred and anti-Turkey EU policies. In a way, the newspaper sets out bait to get the readers’ reactions. Posting becomes a platform for the declaration of personal manifests on the Cyprus question. Related to the articles or not, readers may find this as a chance to express their opinions and make themselves heard. In this process, they are not passive receivers of the news content, but active participants in discussions. It is their chance to show patriotism.

Online comments become a means to manifest this patriotism. They help to defend Turkish state’s actions on the personal level. With the democratization of states apparatus, the nation and the state become synonymous. Thus, the word nation-state equates the two (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 18). Nation-states through dissemination methods like education and media brings a national subjectivity that creates loyalty towards the state actions. Hence, Turkish nationals build affective connections with the state’s functioning. Posting their views to online newspaper articles is a way to defend and demonstrate their loyalties for their state.

Patriotism, in this particular case, comes in the form of voicing frustration with the current state of affairs on the Cyprus issue. It is the citizenry duty of every Turkish national to perpetuate the counter-claims against the Greeks and make a convincing case.

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78 РУМЛАРА АРАСИРА ЯНЉIЉIКЛА BOMBА ATAMIYОРIМUЗUЗ УÇAKLA....ISTEMEDEN ЯNILI EN IYI SOVUNMA SALDIRMAKTIR...
Making such a case entails forming images of Greeks that echo those in the blog universe. However, comments inspired by the media are different from those views on blogs in their power to intensify the hostility. Mass media connect the abstract hostility that is already there to real life events. This feature injects intensified hostility that can reach extreme levels. Therefore, with the online comments, Turkish nationalism expands in its relation to hatred against the Greeks.

**Different Voices**

The Internet technologies do not naturally intensify the hostility. Its amplification depends on its use in that unconventional voices can also find a place within this online space. Studying these views is important to show the potential in the medium. Hostility grows unchecked in online commenting only because the space is underused to challenge the myths surrounding the Greek-Turkish relations. Just like blogs, different opinions that do challenge assumptions are only outliers. Nevertheless, if these opinions find room on the cyberspace within the nationalistic discussions, they have the power to undo the myth of the villain Greeks and victim Turks.

Online commenting, when used to express alternative views can move the coffee house conversations on the Internet away from the national imaginings of Us versus the Other to a point where the discourse breaks through the myths. Unlike the face-to-face conversations at the coffee house with close acquaintances, cyberspace conversing does not always include likeminded individuals. These exchanges may also include individuals who show the flip side of the question. As the dissolution of the body on the Internet frees people to express hostility, it also does the same for the myth-busting
discourse. Furthermore, in comparison to blogs, it is easier to express views in the online discussion circles since they do not immediately become locked-in personal endorsements. Once the news article goes offline, the comments get lost in the archives of the newspaper. Moreover, the comment posters do not insert these views in the personal space of blogs, where every expression has a relation to national identity. Thus, it does not threaten the comment poster with its loss. These features facilitate the expression of alternative inspections of the Cyprus question. The ephemeral and impersonal qualities of online commenting explain the relatively more variable character of the online commenting compared to the blogs. However, as with blogs, the challengers are extremely few in number.

The different voices that sound off on the Cyprus issue can be rated on a scale of four that runs between substantiating a Greek Other image in relation to politics (not necessarily the myth), to shattering that image. Along the way the impact of these comments diminish in number. At the first level, the views resemble the nationalist myth since they still lay blame with the Greeks as far as Cyprus issue goes. However, these thinkers are able to take the issue out of a mythical context and substantiate claims with political relevance, rather than threatening the spoiled kid of Europe with slaps. At the second level, a Greek can turn into a hero, but only when he is loyal to his country and shows nationalist affection. The views at the third level use the rhetoric of the first phase, but equate Greeks with Turks. At this stage, Turkey can be as faulty as the Greek Cypriots or might even receive all the accusations. The discussion shifts away from the myth-making practices, and instead relates to politics. Finally, at the fourth level, the
expression breaks out of the myth and deconstructs the hostility as one based on a social construct: nationalism. Though this level of thought shows that there is hope for using the online space to eradicate the hostility, it is minute in number: only one person truly achieves the fourth level. Moving along this scale is an act of engaging in different forms of history reading.

Comments that rely on political events as substantiation have the potential to move the Greek Other image away from mythical constructions. While these views express frustration with the Greek Cyprus’s attitude, they, nonetheless, argue it in a political context. *Firat Ay*’s posting to the article “Dialogue Call from Talat”79 puts a different spin on the discussion by giving reasons for Greek Cyprus’ faults. Although it is not necessarily different from other comments in the above section ‘Voicing the Frustration’ in the sense that it accuses Greek Cyprus for the mess, it does ground its case with political reasoning. *Firat Ay* claims that Greeks also have military presence on the island and accusing only the Turkish Army is not necessarily fair. “…Today, as Greek side … claims Turkish Army to be an ‘invasion army’ on Cyprus … Turkey is a ‘GUARANTOR’ country and this requires defending the interest of our brothers…”80 (Ay, 2007). Cyprus’ accusations, according to this view, are groundless because the Turkish army’s presence has legal justifications.

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79 Talat’tan Diyalog Cagrısı (N)
Greeks, on rare occasions, may also appear as heroes or model people, as long as they show nationalism for their country. Some discussions portray Papadopoulos as a great leader, the kind of leader that Turkey needs, since he patriotically defends his country’s rights on all fronts. As nationalism establishes a connection between the subjects and their nation-state, loyalty to one’s country is the preeminent characteristic of a national subject. Discussions around the “Let’s See if they can Fly” article revealed the views of those who glorify Papadopoulos’ patriotism, alongside those who demonize his persona. For instance, a posting says that “I think Papadopoulos is more honest than Erdogan. At least, he is telling the truth…”81 (Deli Gadir, 2006). Similarly, another comment confirms the validity of the Greek leader’s argument. “The man is saying right…Let’s first have the direct flights, then they can talk…”82 (Deli Gadir, 2006). Another one reflects on the subjective reading of history. Hence, Mehmet Kalayoglu (2006) claims “Unfortunately Papadopoulos is right. We interpret the way we want to hear.”83 The national affection requires a particular form of reading. Cemalettin Demir’s comment is right at the point in its veneration for Papadopoulos’ leadership. “If we had a leader like Papadopoulos, we were already in EU… He defends his country and their pride. An ideal leader is like him”84 (Demir, 2006). Such depictions acknowledge Greek leader’s capacity; he is not necessarily a molos (rubble).

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81 bence Papadopoulos erdoğan'dan daha dürüst en azında dobra dobra doğruları söylemiş milleti uutumaya çalışmuş yada Blair gibi kelime oyunları yapmışı.
82 adam doğru diyo işte lafla peynir gemisi yürümeye önce direkt seferleri başlatsınlar sonra çıkıp konuşunlar. Türkiye ye karşı kim adil davranmış ki ingiltere davranının
83 Maalesef Papadopoulos doğru söylemiş bu sefer. Biz duymak istedigimiz çekilde yorumluyoruz.
84 PAPADOPOLOS GİBİ BİR LİDERİMİZ OLSA IDI, ŞİMDİ ÇOKTAN AB ÜYESİ OLMUŞTU. ADAM YAĞMASA DA GÜRLÜYOR, HAKLI-HAKSIZ, MEMLEKETİNİ VE GÜRURLARINI NASIL DA SAVUNUYOR. LİDER DEDİĞİN BOYLE OLUR.
The freeing effect of online discussions can push the Cyprus question into “restricted” areas, where Turkey also shares the fault for the conflict. One posting on “Greeks’ Maras Must”\(^85\) also blames Turkey for preventing peace on the island. “Turkish Republic is also one of those countries preventing peace in Cyprus. The reason for the change in Turkish policy is Turkey’s efforts to join the EU... The borders in Cyprus will one day disappear and Cyprus will reunite in peace...”\(^86\) (Osman, 2007) It is interesting to see that a call for peace only comes from a posting that reverses the direction of the accusations. Another posting to the same article, although not directly related to the content, uses the space as a chance for the commenter to make himself/herself audible about his/her unconventional ideas. H Guney (Kibris) sees Greek Cyprus’ actions as a sign that the country is trying to retain its national solidarity. “After the events of 1963... Turkey violated certain agreements and most importantly ‘human rights’... The method was also used against the Turkish Cypriots by the Greeks... Yet, today the northern part of Cyprus is ‘invaded’ because Cyprus Republic is a legal entity...”\(^87\) (H

\(^85\) Rumlardan Maras Sarti (N)


Demonizing Turkey with the same accusation leveled against the Greeks is a present practice, but happens rarely. The posting to the article “TRNC’s Oil Reaction” by Hasan (Kibris) argues that oil is the reason why Turkey has been reacting to the Cyprus issue so adamantly. “It is now easy to see why Turkey has been insisting on Northern Cyprus that much. OIL, STRATEGIC BENEFIT... If there is anything legal, that is Cyprus Republic” (Hasan (Kibris), 2007). The comment illustrates how Turkey has ulterior motives about the Cyprus issue. It is a very rare practice to use the traditional deflating remarks reversed for Greek Cyprus in describing Turkey’s position towards Cyprus.

Only one posting de-centers nationalist myths about the Greeks and Cyprus in that the commenter reflects on nationalism as constructing these myths. The comment for “Archbishop the Main Actor” asks to put a stop to such myth-making. “Of course there is nothing that either the Greek or the Turkish soldiers can do. Let’s stop this blind nationalism because it causes a lot of trouble. We are preparing an army of murderers.”

istiyorum; diyelim ki Turkiyede yasayan Kurt ler belli nedenleden dolayi dogu da cumhuriyet kurmak ister. Nasil ki Turkiye Cumhuriyeti buna kesinlikle sert tepki verirse, Kibris Cum. de buna ayni tepkiyi veriyor. Bu arada Kibris adasinda yasayan nufusun % 38 i K.turk geriye kalan % 62 K.rum...Bazi politik durumlara daha objektif bakmayi basar isek hem o ulkede yasayan halklar hem de komsularimiz mutlu olur....Ulkeler ve de en onemlisi "demokrasinin" amaci da insanlari mutlu etmek degil midir? Sevgiler

88 KKTC’nin Petrol Tepkisi (N)
89 Turkiyeenin de neden israrla kibrisin kuzeeyinden vazgecmemesinin nedeni yavas yavas belli olmaya basladi...PETROL, STRATEJIK CIKAR...Turkiye varligini adanin kuzeeyinde korumak ve butun stratejilerden faydalanmak istiyor, arac olarak da Kbrisli Turkleri kullaniyor. Yasal olan tek bir sey varsa o da Kibris Cumhuriyeti dir...
90 tabii ya, kibrista ne türk askerinin nede yunan askerinin yapabilecegi bir sey yok.. artik burakin bu kör milliyetciligi, bakin basimiza ne belalar acmakta.. katiller ordusu hazirlamaktayiz.. yarin vurabilecekleri
Nationalism creates hostility and an army of murderers. Such analysis of nationalism number very few in comparison to vast majority of comments.

Media serve as an important disseminator of nationalism by creating social cohesion among fellow nationals. TV, radio and print journalism function as one-way dissemination processes where a cohesive Turkish identity (an identity defined by being opposed to the Greeks) is created. However, with the introduction of interactive components like comment posting for readers, what was once a one-way process becomes a multi-directional exchange. Comments present a more fragmented picture than the traditional media discourse in their inclusion of views, and do not necessarily demonize the Greeks. Nonetheless, the less accusatory postings are very limited in scale. Online comments do, however, show more diverse perspectives than blogs.

The ephemeral quality of online comments enables more varied discussions. Once the news is outdated, the comments no longer exist in the cyberspace. They exist only as long as the news is current. Furthermore, they take their place amongst many other views, and have a tendency to be lost in the mix. Because the online comments are more ephemeral, they present less of challenge to the national group identity, making it easier to voice unconventional views. On the other hand, blogs are personal spaces where the bloggers personally endorse their online articulations. The personalization of ideas presented on blog entries makes it more of a challenge to post comments that threaten the national views against the Greeks. Online comments are thus the medium that provides more space for the de-centering of Turkish national identity.

kimse kalmadiginda sira bize gelecektir.. asker cekilsin, rum ve kuzey kibrisli türkiye halki baris zemini olustursun.
This process of de-centering takes the shape of four types of articulations. These expressions move on a spectrum of ‘providing political reasoning to perceived Greek wrongdoing’ on the one hand, to ‘thinking of hostility as a nationalist construct’ on the other. Some people still view the Greek side to be the sole source of trouble. Interestingly, there are other online commentators who respect the Greek leader Papadopoulos for his patriotism. Some even dare to claim that Turkey is the sole wrongdoer, which reverses the idea from the first category, while preserving its political framework. Finally, there is only one person who concludes that Turkish hostility against the Greeks is a nationalist construct. Although the Internet holds the potential to challenge the traditional way of perceiving the Greek nation, its underutilization in this sense is what perpetuates myth-making on the cyberspace.

**Interactivity**

The online comments do not exist in a vacuum; they appear with other comments, in dialogue to each other. Some comment posters interact mostly to disprove each other’s points. From this perspective, the comments are in an interaction with each other and become a medium of discussion, rather than a compilation of different comments. Although they resemble the views expressed in the previous section in this chapter, in their ability to de-center Turkish nationalism, they merit a unique analysis. In their articulations, the comments in interaction represent the two poles of an unconventional set of opinions. They are either substantiation of Greek fault with historical references, rather than myth-making or they are a deconstruction of national hostility against the Greeks. What happens when these comments are matched against each other?
The dissolution of space and body on the Internet creates an interaction where the comments can function to remove hostile myth-making from the discussions. It is not like a face-to-face interaction in the sense that on cyberspace, the commenter can easily ignore the response and may not even visit the article page again. There is very little evidence of writing back and forth between comment posters. In this sense, a response does not only try to refute (or back) a previous comment: it also guides future readers in a ‘truer’ reading. In its ephemeral way, before going offline, the responding comment leads the readers away from the myth-making expressions. Furthermore, since the online coffee house situations diversifies the clientele of cyber newspapers and accommodates opposing interactivity appears as a feature to respond back to those views. Frustration is not with the Turkish policies or the Greek attitude regarding the Cyprus question any more: it is more with the readers’ way of thinking. It is also valid to argue that the users can use interactivity to back each other’s comments. Yet, as far as this research goes, this is not the case. Comments drawing upon other comments are extremely few in number.

With the motivation to debunk the claims against Turkey’s interest in Cyprus, one comment reverses the argument while materializing his stance with historical illustrations. Mahmut Ozbek responds to the comment by Hasan (Kibris) about Turkey’s strategic benefits from the oil in Cyprus:

“Dear Mr. Hasan, I am asking you as a Cypriot. When Turkey intervened in 1974 (33 years ago) was there any oil? If we had no intervention…do you think those Greeks would leave any of the Turks on the island alive? ... Greeks were killing Turks when there was even no oil … Dear Mr. Hasan, I follow your comments
and the clouds of love and tolerance present when you talk about Greeks turn into
dark ones when it is time to talk about Turkey … If we are suffering, we suffer 70
million + 200 thousand. Is that a lie? (Ozbek, 2006)

In this example, two Turkish Cypriots (as they claim themselves to be) discuss differing
points on the same issue over this feature to the articles. Yet, the discussion is ephemeral
in nature as there is no guaranteed response since it is not a face-to-face environment. In
any case, Mehmet Ozbek’s comment will guide the future readers into a ‘proper’ history
reading.

Interactivity also challenges the hostility present in nationalistic discussions. The
article “Approval for Direct Trade to TRNC” receives two sets of responses. A poster
Erol indirectly uses this article to create a hostile situation. “Hello dear readers, we
slowly lose what we have, we have a flag and a country. There are spies among us…
They will pay for this and there are examples. Regards” (Erol, 2007). Yavuz Toklu
responds to Erol’s comment and highlights the hostile sentiments in his posting. “Brother
Erol, your provocations work on some people. Look, a patriot shot Hrant Dink (An
Armenian Turkish journalist)… When people like you guide others to the conclusion that

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91 Sayin Hasan Bey, Bir Kibrisli olarak soruyorum. Turkiye 1974’te (33 yil once) adaya mudahale ettiginde
Kibris’ta petrol mu vardi? Bu mudahaleyi yapmasaydi bu gun o her turlu zenginliklerini sizinle paylasmaya
hazir Rumlar ada uzerinde tek Turku sag birakir miydi? … Turkiye olmasa ada uzerinde 200 000 nufusun
400 milyar dolara ortak olmasina hangi ulke musade eder. O cok seviginiz adamlar bu miktarin cok daha
azi icin Afrika da kac insani katletti haberiniz var mi? Rumlar daha ortada petrol yokken Turkleri
olduruyordu, bedavidan sade ada ada icin, simdii ucunda 400 milyar dolar da var… Sayin Hasan Bey,
Yazilarinizi surekli takip ediyorum ve Rumlardan bahsederen sozlerinizde beliren sevgi ve hosgoru
bulutlari, sira Turkiyeye donunce renk degistiriyor yerini kara bulutlara birakiyor anlamis degilim
…Suruuyorsak 70 milyon + 200 bin olarak suruuyoruz yalan mi?
92 KKTC’ye Dogrudan Ticarete Onay (N)
93 selam,sayin okucular,, yavas yavas herseyimizi kaybediyoruz bir bayrak birde vatanimiz var,,öyle veya
boyle icimizdeki casuslar bizi satiyorlar,,bu ise bir dur diyen de cikmicagina gore gelecek,te cikarsa eger
hesabi sorulur örnekleri vardir,saygilarimla.
the country is sold, others will also be killed. Stop such ‘the country is sold’ rhetoric…” (Toklu, 2007). The interaction shows opposing views in relation to each other, which also emphasizes the processes of hostility in the making. A similar dialogue is present between the comment posters Atakan Turk and Martin Bruker. Turk, commenting on the same article, asserts that Greeks want to claim the territory they lost without fighting for it. “These Greeks are very funny. They want to take back the territories they lost in war by chatting. Let’s see if they can with arms” (Turk, 2007). Bruker (2007), getting furious about the hostile tone of Turk’s comment, responds back by saying “Dear Turk, please don’t be funny…If things worked with heroism and hostility, then I would have no worries about the future of this country. Regards, MB.”

The source of frustration behind these comments is not only the Turkish-Greek affairs, but users’ disagreement with one another. Although the interaction between these comments illustrates the ways in which hostility is created, they are tremendously limited in number.

Online comments to newspaper articles exist in a dialogue to each other. The interactivity of the discussion on the online articles puts opposing views in relation to each other. However, the dialogue is ephemeral since it is not an on-going face-to-face discussion, while at the same time the comments go offline once the article is outdated.

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95 çok komik bu Rumlar, savas da kaybedilen topraklari konusarak geri almak istiyorlar. Silhala denesinerde bakilim...
96 Sayin Türk, Lütfen komik olmayınız. Kerkük, Musul, 12 Adalar savas ile kazanildi da sonradan nasil kaybedildi? Ayni baglama fakat aksi istikamette, Hatay nasil ana yurda ilhak oldu? Hamasi ve fasizan söylemlerle bu isler yurusedi keşke, juste o zaman tülkenin geleceği hususunda zerre endişem olmadı. Saygilar MB
As online commenting moves coffee house conversations to online spaces, the users interact to debunk each other’s claims. Through putting these opposing views in relation to each other, the comment posters challenge dichotomized perspectives of demon/victim Greeks/Turks with debates that have political and historical reasoning. However, they are limited in scale and hostility stays to be the norm.

Turkish nationalism depends on the media for its articulation. On the Internet, the news media also inflate the hostility between the two nations of Greece and Turkey. With titling and framing techniques, the news media agitate the readers to get a rise out of them. Electronic newspapers can crystallize the national imagining in relation to hostility against the Greeks. Since it becomes a safer environment to make comments, compared to the offline world, it allows for the broadcast of unconventional views. However, it is often unconventional in its amplification of hostility against the Greeks. As comment postings tie free-floating signifiers of hatred to real-time unfolding events, its tone intensifies. Furthermore, although present, the views that undermine the hostility are very limited in number.

Comment posters can interact among each others to largely refute a national hostility maintained by myth-making. Yet, the interaction to undermine hostility is limited and the discussions are dominated by nationalism-informed enmity against the Greeks. Accordingly, the national imagining against the Greeks solidifies among online newsreaders as they witness opinions similar to theirs find a place in online postings. Electronic news media, while enabling the expression of unconventional views, crystallize Turkish national identity in an inverse relation to the Greeks.
Chapter 5. Surviving Panama: Media Wars Between the Nations on Survivor

Media have an indispensable place in perpetuating nationalism. As illustrated in the previous section, media outlets like newspapers serve to create national imaginings. As newspapers transitioned from a paper form to an electronic one, TV also changed in its engagement with the online world. At the same time, nationalism’s niche on TV also morphed to include an element of entertainment. The Turkish postmodern society now consumes the media spectacle surrounding nationalism in its novel TV formats.

Media consumption defines the current stage of capitalism in much of postmodernist literature and theory. With the increasing commodification of every aspect of life, image consumption figures as the rising star of global economics. In their mediation of images, media are outlets those allow for consumption of ideas, lifestyles, emotions and virtually any aspect of life in their visual forms. Thus, nationalism and nationalist sentiments can also become commodities marketed on prime time TV. Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece (Survivor) is a contemporary illustration of this phenomenon.

The partnership of the Greek Mega Channel TV station and Turkish Show TV channel turns national identities into vehicles for creating advertising revenue. The rivalry between the two nations is transformed into a game show where teams of Greek and Turkish nationals race against each other on various challenges in Panama to become the solo-winners of 250,000 Euros. This rivalry becomes even more interesting when a romance starts between Selim, a Turkish male participant, and Nadia, who is from the
Greek side. Moreover, as declared on the online forum for the game show, Turkish female viewers’ attraction to Amfikratis, a Greek competitor, creates a dispute where the forum discussions debate the nationalist sentiments of the Turkish viewers with references to gender dynamics. To some viewers, supporting Turkey means unconditionally hating the Greek team. The discussions amongst Turkish viewers on the online forum of the game show illustrate the ways in which Internet users transport nationalism into the cyberspace.

The game show *Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece* maintains the original US setup of the show in ways that make it an entertainment medium for nationalist sentiments. The original *Survivor*, first created for the UK viewers in 1992, had failed to grab the audience’s attentions. Then the Swedish Strix TV channel bought it and renamed it *Expedition: Robinson*, which became a major Swedish TV hit in 1997 (“Expedition: Robinson”, 2007). The US TV channel CBS introduced the show with its original name *Survivor*, and launched a new phase in reality TV and game show genres. In the US version, the producers group the participants into 2-4 equally sized teams. Team members work together to build shelter, gather food and basically live at a subsistence level, away from the modern world of commodities. The game unfolds with competition of tribes on various challenges. At the end of each episode, the losing team gathers what is called the ‘Tribal council’ and votes one person off their team. As the game proceeds and number of participants is reduced to two (in some cases three), the eliminated participants reconvene to form the ‘Jury’. The Jury asks the finalists why they deserve to win the game, and finally vote for the winner. Although the tribes at first were
heterogeneous across the teams, in terms of age and gender, in later editions, the producers formed the tribes based on gender, age and finally race (Survivor). The Turkish-Greek version of the show mainly preserves the American design, but elaborates on the later versions’ formats to create competition between the two nations.

The format for Survivor in the Turkish media followed its US counterpart by revising the tribes’ compositions, as they went from being heterogeneous groups of people to being determined by nationality. Its first appearance on the Kanal D TV station mirrored the Survivor US version with tribes and a jury. After the airing of one season, Show TV took over and brought in its Greek counterpart, Mega Channel. This second version of Survivor in Turkey, which was the first one on the Show TV Channel, pitted the Turkish and the Greek nations against each other, just as later US editions had done. Since there is no racial category in Turkey as prevalent as in the USA, the national hostility between Greece and Turkey serves to bring an additional element of suspense to the show. After ending their original version of the show, Show TV still preserves the concept of pitting homogenous groups against each other: **Survivor: Aslanlar Kanaryalar** is a show where the producers match the tribes against one another based on soccer team fanaticism (Acun Ilicali, n.d.). Hostility is an attractive way to grab viewers’ attention.

Online forum discussions on the show’s Turkish Web site further intensify the hostility that I have already shown to be apparent in online commenting about e-newspaper articles. Blogs present hostility in the online space in a frozen form. Since the hostility of bloggers does not directly relate to simultaneous events in the offline world, it has a relatively limited intensity compared to newspaper commenting and forum
discussions. With its capacity to link hostility to immediate events, online commenting intensifies hatred of the Greeks. The forum discussion about *Survivor* actually takes the hostility to its final phase in intensification; these discussions remove online commenting from the political sphere and place the commentary in a non-political, people-centered context. As the media elaborate on nationalism as entertainment value that becomes a commodity, hostility reaches alarming levels.

Postmodern media-consuming society loses its relation to the first-hand-experiences of reality; instead, people perceive the media’s depiction of reality as the truth. Therefore, the media have power to simulate images that have no relation to reality, other than the reality of their own imagining. The media present their version of reality as real. Baudrillard, a postmodern media theorist, explains the current state of media representations using the Watergate scandal as an example. According to him, the event was scandalous only because the Washington Post journalists staged it as such. It is only meaningful in their representation of the real. The media simulation has no relation to any reality whatsoever except itself- the hyperreal (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 177-180). Similarly, *Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece* moves nationalism into the domain of hyperreal.

Electronic images of the Greek Other move from the frozen space of blogs to the pseudo-events of the hyperreal, which are perceived as actual reality. The forum discussions prove this point that the comment posters view the staged media reality as actual reality. The posters imagine the show’s participants as national soldiers fighting a war, forgetting the fact that it is only a game show with a grand prize of 250,000 Euros.
This delusion reflects Turkish nationalism’s gender dynamics, unconditional support for Turkey and natural hatred for the Greeks.

*Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece* is more than a game show. The forum is ripe with examples of how the show becomes a new way of battling for the media society. The war metaphors are a commonly used feature in the discussions, while opposing views are also voiced. The Turkish team members are the media soldiers, while the viewers become cyber supporters, creating a stadium experience with their computer desktops. In this vein, Internet technologies, like online forums, are important vehicles for attracting viewers to the program. YouTube and similar video-sharing sites are other Internet tools used to elaborate on the Turkish-Greek rivalry from the show in the online space. The capability to post videos from the game and add comments to the video make YouTube an important arena for online warfare. While Turkish viewers train themselves within the Turkish-speaking online forums, they battle with the Greek viewers on YouTube in English with the comments they append to the video. The online forum prepares the audience by modulating nationalist discourse and using a Greek ‘Other’ identity to construct a Turkish identity. The hyperlinks to YouTube on the forum transport the viewers to the video-sharing site to comment on the videos from the game show and this time battle in English with other Greek viewers.

Online media show features of nationalism. Nationalist identity is still a persistent character in defining selfhood, although globalization is thought to challenge the nation-states. Support for one’s country is an unconditional property of the viewers. The Greek team members are the grandchildren of the traitors and they act like their
ancestors; therefore, Greeks will always be the national enemy. However, these conventions are male-defined ones. Women’s relation to nationalism, as the reproducers of culture, shows up as an underlying theme in the discussions. As women reproduce the nation symbolically, and culturally, Turkish males cultivate a need to protect Turkish women from becoming sexual preys of the enemy males. Therefore, Turkish female viewers’ attraction to Amfikratis, and romance between Selim and Nadia are important sites of illustrating the gender dynamics involved in Turkish nationalism in relation to the Greek Others. Nevertheless, online forums may also become an empowerment tool for the Turkish women in their accession to the nationalist discourse. Online forums and YouTube comments become an arena to contest past and contemporary disputes with the Greek nation and win the war at an alternative space. In this process, nationalism professes itself with viewers’ references to past and its gender codifications. These online media become sites to debate history, love for the Other and silencing alternative views, with their illustrations of nationalism’s unconditional support for the country and gender dynamics.

**Unconditional Love**

Love for the country is natural just like the love for a person of the other sex. Nevertheless, the media construct the *naturalness* for this patriotic love for the country. For instance, explaining this process for Latin America, Doris Sommer (1991) explores nationalist novels as love stories. Romantic novels and patriotic history go hand in hand. Desires for domestic happiness in the form of marriage intersect with the dreams of national prosperity because families are building blocks for the nation (p. 7). In this vein,
there can be nothing more natural than one’s love for his/her country, just like his/her desire to build a family in a conjugal arrangement with a person from the opposite sexual group.

The love for the country can also come in the form of dying for the motherland, which becomes an instructive rhetoric in explaining the ways in which online forum discussions are a new breed of warfare. Benedict Anderson (1983) notes, “[N]ations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (p. 141). This point illustrates the emotional intensity involved in nationalism. The self-sacrifice that Anderson refers to is national soldier’s willingness to die for his country. Yet, this view needs to be adjusted for the contemporary media society. The online technologies teleport nationals into an imaginary, therefore safer, battleground. However, it makes such warfare particularly dangerous as it involves ordinary citizens and especially youngsters. Online forum for the game show is the preparation for the battle, while YouTube video comments are the battlefield with other Greek viewers of the show. In its preparation stage, online forum discussions illustrate an unconditional support for Turkey and hatred against the Greeks, in which one can gain a Turkish identity by his/her hatred. Therefore, naturally Turks and Greeks cannot be friends and this game show is more than a competition. It is postmodern warfare between the two nations, where nationality is the most immediate character that defines a person.

Showing unconditional love for the Turkish team is an indispensable attribute. In this space, being nationalistic is a natural character for the viewer. Turkish forum users discuss how in order to win the game, the team and the audience must be nationalist.
right comments on how the Greek channel is better than the Turkish one in presenting the show because they are nationalists. Claiming that while Turkish TV station is busy with showing the paparazzi side of the competition, Greek one shows the solidarity of the Greek team. *Mr. right* reports that the Greeks were acting in solidarity against the Turks. “...The Greek [TV] shows how Amfı and Platonas (Greek participants) acted together against Derya (Turkish finalist) with ‘eye of the tiger’ music on the background, how they practiced … and how they were one body against the Turks...” (Mr. Right, n.d.) For him, this is a better representation for the audience because it feeds nationalist feelings. “...In summary, it was in a format to pump nationalist sentiments...”97 (Mr. Right, n.d.). In cases where these feelings are questioned, there are forum users to give the answer. The user *murat87* (n.d.) warns another for being ultranationalist. Yet, *ozlem sener* thinks it is very natural to be so because anything involving Turks and Greeks is by default nationalist. “...Its name is clear, Turkey-Greece. How come I should not be extreme nationalist?”98 (Sener, n.d.). The discussions show that being nationalist and supporting your country is normal. However, this normalcy also contains the hatred for the Greeks.

Being a Turk involves *unconditionally* supporting Turkish team and hating the Greek participants. Survivor is not about supporting a person that you like but supporting

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97 Arkadaşlar cuvaldız’ı biraz kendimize batıralım. Biraz önce amfikratıs’ın finalist seçildiği yan an programını izledim format olarak bizim derya’nın seçildiği programla arasında dağlar kadar fark vardı. Biz tele voleyyle beyni yıkanmış bir toplum olarak hangi yarışmacı hangi vinil ile fingirdi, kimin eli kimin cebindeyi tarzi magazinle ugraşırken yunanlar finalist amfı ve platonas nasıl tahlil ettiğini “eye of the tiger” şarkılarıyla deryaya karşı nasıl bilelyendiğini nasıl antrenman yaptıklarını, nicin seçimleri gerektiğini gösterdiler ve Türklerle karşı nasıl tek yumruk olduklarını gösterdiler. Ada süt dökümü kedi olan platonas bile pontı’sa kadar köklerinin olduğunu Türklerle nasıl bilelyendiğini falan anlatılar. Özetle milliyetçi duygularımı pomplayan bir formattayırdı. 1 Türk (Teymuralp) Dünyaya Bedel ama malsef 10 Türk hiç bir işe yaramıyor çünkü organizasyon yeteneğimizle takım ruhumuz yok.
98 adı üstünde türk yunan neden aşırı milliyetçi bakmıyorum?...
the nationality of the person. Therefore, nationality has a primacy over the individual.  

*The_Gangsta_Boyz* (n.d.) says “a Turk must win the game, then we can acknowledge Greeks’ presence.”99 Similarly, *Duru* (n.d.) thinks “a Turk must win.”100 By the same token, it is forbidden to support the loss of a Turk. Writing back to *amfrikratis_fan*, *Karargah* is raged about his opposition to Selim. “…are you aware of what you are saying[?] … I cannot believe that you are this happy for Selim’s elimination. *Nevertheless*, he is a Turkish participant…”101 (my emphasis) (Karargah, n.d.). This comment illustrates how Selim’s nationality is more prior than his other attributes. He is, nevertheless, a Turk, therefore must be supported at all fronts. A similar discussion between *Rivaldo* and *mls_teymur_amfiklatis* shows how users back each other on their support for the Turkish team. Being frustrated with comments in favor of the Greek team, Rivaldo (n.d.) exclaims “… I cannot really understand. Whoever he is, Derya (the Turkish finalist) will represent Turkey at the end of the day.” *Mls_teymur_amfiklatis* backs up this point in a way that resonates with *Karargah*’s comment. “Although I hate Derya, because he is a Turk, I support him” (Mls_teymur_amfiklatis, n.d.). Just like a Turk should never back away his/her support from Selim, similarly, one should also extend it to other team members, even though they hate them. Nationality shows primacy over a team member’s other characteristics in thinking about a viewer’s support.

The case of showing positive feelings towards a Greek, not necessarily supporting him/her, requires an apology in advance. Even showing positive inclinations for a Greek

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99 Valla yarışmayı bi türk kazansında biz ondan sonra tanırız bütün yunanları
100 illaki bir Turk kazanmalı
101 amfrikratis_fan sen ne dediğinni farkındasın.selim evet bazı hataları oldu ama ama son iki hadtasında çok başarılıydı ve ayrıca selim son yarışmasında elenmesine bu kadar sevindiğine inanamıyorum her ne olursa olsun o bi türk yarışmacasıydı bence ne yazacağıım önceden tarat sonra yaz
involves the risk of losing national membership. Ciginix, in his posting for showing respect to Amfikraktis, must make sure that he wants Turkey to win. “Even he wins or not, I will have a deep respect for Amfikratis because he respects the Turkish people. Now some might think that I support him. I want Derya, therefore Turkey, to win…”\textsuperscript{102} (Ciginix, n.d.). The user’s respect also has a nationalist source. Amfikratis deserves his respect because he respects the Turkish people. Nevertheless, he gives the disclaimer that he is in no way in support of his victory. Amfikratis’ Greek nationality takes primacy over his decent character.

The self-sacrificing love of the nation involves enmity against the Other; there is no room for friendship with the Other. Although Survivor is claimed to be designed as a medium to feed friendship between two nations, the forum comments show high dominance of hate speech and refutation of opposing views. Semi (n.d.) says “Greeks and Turks are not friends and cannot be, stop dreaming.” Similarly, on a more alarming tone \textit{lk1302} thinks Survivor to be a war. “Whether you like it or not, this game show is Turkish-Greek war… The participants and the producers want it to be like that and act like that! Especially Greek participants…” (Lk1302, n.d.). Although he makes an important point on how the media feed this hostility, he nevertheless accuses the Greeks more for this hatred. War metaphor dominates the online forum discussions.

The online discussions illustrate the features of unconditional love for the country and hatred against the Greeks. Participants’ nationality gains more priority over their

\textsuperscript{102} Yensedeyenilsede Amfikratis’e saygımız sonsuz olucak Çünkü oda TÜRK HALKINA saygı duuyor Arkadaşlar yanlış anlamayın. Şimdi bazı sıvri zekalar bu yazına Amfikratis’i tutuyor diye cevap verecekleri için şunu demek istiyorum… Arkadaşlar bende DERYA’nın ve TÜRKİYE’NİN kazanmasını istiyorum fakat YUNANLI YARIŞMACIYADA SAYGIM SONSUZ
other characteristics. In that respect, love of a person for another must factor nationality into the passion. Since the domestic happiness is also the national happiness, a love affair with the enemy is non-national and therefore sanctioned. The discussions around Selim and Nadia affair evolve in this respect. Furthermore, their affair also poses a danger to the nation since *Survivor* is not a mere game show, but is the new battlefield for the two nations. While Turkish forum users elaborate on their hostility on the online forum, they transport it to video sharing sites, like YouTube, to battle with the Greeks.

**It is a War!**

Loving one’s country is like desiring to marry another person with the opposite sex. Family is the building block of a nation. Happy families guarantee the happiness of the nation. Therefore, domestic happiness parallels the national goals. This requires state’s intervention into the domestic sphere to guarantee the making of nationally happy families. Foucault (1990) substantiates this argument in a politico-economic context where he says with the rise of the modern nation-state, the family emerged as an economically desirable unit that required state’s intervention into the domestic life to guarantee national prosperity (p. 25). In this vein, Selim and Nadia love affair is a nationally non-aligned one because their domestic happiness involves one with the Other woman, which might signal the undoing of the Turkish nation.

For forum users, *Survivor* is more than a game show to win the prize. In line with the views illustrated above, unconditional support for the country requires giving support to the Turkish nationals. Yet, it is elaborated in a metaphor of war. As lk1302’s comment show, *Survivor* is a Turkish-Greek war and in this war, it is natural to support
your country. Forum users describe Selim’s (a Turkish male participant) romance with Nadia (a female Greek participant) in relation to a battle between the two nations, in which Selim jeopardizes his national identity for a Greek woman. Selim’s pursuit for happiness in his domestic space does not overlap with the nationally desirable romance. Therefore, his love does not serve the nation, and therefore must be sanctioned. Hostility against the couple emerges as a reflex of national defense.

Although there is a money prize of 250.000 Euros involved, it cannot be more important than one’s country, neither can love. Therefore, it becomes problematic for the audience that Selim is in a romantic relationship with Nadia. The forum discussions usually accuse him for abandoning his team, therefore his country for his love, which jeopardizes his Turkish nationality. User burcu kumas, responding to another user puts Selim’s nationality into question. “…He said he would never eliminate Nadia, even though she is very powerful… What kind of a Turk is he? I only support him because he is in the Turkish team…” (Burcu Kumas, n.d.). Since this is more than a competition and a war between the two nations, Selim should never betray his country for ‘anOther’ woman. His romance puts his nationality into question.

The participants do not only compete for themselves but the entire nation’s stakes are involved. Non-patriotism is a fault against every Turkish national. Again, Selim’s romance is a problem against Turkey. Top_cu (n.d.) says “…yes, what is important is TURKEY’s victory. Selim already sold his friends and I am afraid that he will soon..."
forget his Turkishness and will sell all of us, which means the Turks, for a Greek girl…” In line with the ‘unconditional support for Turkey’ feature of the discussions, Selim is being disloyal to the entire Turkish nation for a Greek woman. Since this a war between Turkey and Greece, the nation’s honor is at stake. Being Turkish involves being patriotic for the nation. The Greek woman’s influence is an important aspect in this process and will be further analyzed in the following section. Nevertheless, the moderator of the forum, Inca (n.d.), feels necessary to comment on the postings and invite the users to use a less hostile language:

We are not questioning people’s nationalism here… There is not a Turkish-Greek war. There are only Turkish and Greek participants… We are of course here to support the Turkish team, but we should be calmer on our comments to the participants… This is what is expected of a Turk. Let’s not forget that when they laid down a Greek flag in front of Ataturk in front of his house in Izmir, he did not step on it and ordered the flag to be removed… Thank you for your understanding…

Knowing that s/he is appealing to a nationalist audience, the moderator’s comment supports the idea of naturalness in backing your country as s/he draws his references from Ataturk and glorifies being a Turk. Despite Inca’s comment, the other postings still try to justify the hostility with historical references.
The use of history is a common place on online media to justify the hate speech. Like in blogs and online comments to newspaper articles, users of the online forum make use of history to create the theme of villain Greeks and victim Turks. *Semi*, responding to the moderator’s comment, creates this image. “On the other hand the Greek king stepped on the Turkish flag. We only lose because we think that everyone is like us.”\(^\text{106}\) (Semi, n.d.). Even though the Turks are respectful of the Greek nation, the Greeks are not. Online media portray a heavy use of this method.

On a different note, forum users also employ historical references to describe the Turkish losses in history as the results of women’s hidden plans. *Seaventer* both vilifies the women as the cause of losses and victimizes Turks as being the target of their plans. “Dear friends, Turks have never failed in a battle. Look at history to understand … Yet, when there is women’s involvement, we become silly … Nadia is a Trojan horse … The phrase ‘History consists of repetitions’ fits in here perfectly …”\(^\text{107}\) (Seavanter, n.d.). Seavanter references the Russian Queen Katharina’s involvement in Ottoman affairs as a way to show Nadia’s hidden agenda of breaking the Turkish team apart. She is a Trojan horse, meaning she is part of a larger Greek plan and is on mission to conquer from inside. Nonetheless, there is a reaction against *seavanter*’s comment. *Canimat* (n.d.) thinks Survivor to be just a game and his/her comment is illogical. Although, there is

\(^{106}\) öteki taraflı yunan kral türk bayrağını çignemiştir biz hep bundan kaybediyoruz herkezi kendimiz gibi görüyoruz

challenge against such views, the use of gender, especially the image of the traitor enemy woman is a frequently used one, which makes comments like canimat’s minority voices in the forum discussions. Similar dynamics are present when these views are transported into the YouTube commenting section to battle with the Greeks.

Discussions on YouTube comments both diverge from and mirror the forum discussions. They are different because it is an un-moderated medium. There is no moderator to watch over the comments and disqualify users who use profane and humiliating language. Therefore, this medium is ‘freer’ as it has less surveillance. It also mirrors the forum discussions because it resonates with the themes of unconditional support for Turkey and hate against Greeks. It is the only site where this research tries to capture the interaction between Turkish and Greek comment posters and also references to Greek counterparts. It is also a glimpse to the Greek side. However, a total analysis of that universe needs another research. On these comments, the Turkish comment posters justify their hostility based on an a priori Greek one and when there is interaction between posters from both sides, it has a great depth of historical memory. The interaction injects history into the vulgar language.

According to these postings, Turkish comments carry hostility only because Greeks are already hostile. Such comments justify hatred against the Greeks based on their prior hatred. In other words, Greeks are responsible for the hostility at the first place and should bare the burden. Thus, Turkish hate is natural because it is self defense against an attacker. In her comment afrodit1964 illustrates her disappointment with the use of vulgar language in serkankarabag’s (n.d.) comment “The spoiled kid of Europe,
ignoble offspring of the Greeks. Here is an Ottoman slap for you.”¹⁰⁸ She says that Greeks do not use such language as she knows it because she reads Greek forum comments (Afrodit1964, n.d.). In an attempt to undo her comment and justify serkankarabag’s use of profane language, canarkadas interrupts the discussions and claims the Greeks to do the same: “Write Cyprus or Armenia into the search box. Unfortunately, there is a lot of profanity by our Greek neighbors”¹⁰⁹ (Canarkadas, n.d.). Although the discussion continues with the introduction of other comments, it illustrates how Turkish hostility is based on a Greek one. The profane language is apparent in the interaction among users from both countries.

Turkish posters use historical memory to undo the Greek hostility. They reference to events going back six centuries to diminish Greeks’ self-bragging and humiliating language. Superalexos (n.d.) comments that Amfikratis will win because “Greeks are stronger and smarter…”¹¹⁰ To counteract that move, pirahinulayn brings up the fact that Turkish army disposed Greeks to the Aegean Sea when they could not succeed in overtaking Izmir: “They sure are the best swimmers of the Aegean sea, we’ve ever seen so far…”¹¹¹ (Pirahinulayn, n.d.). The commenter reverses the strong Greek image via showing them as strong only when they need to run away from the Turks.

The comments also carry expressions unrelated to the neither show nor YouTube video since they are only means to demonstrate that hostility. Kotzas1978 jokes about Turks by telling a fictive story where a stranger interacts with a Turk who is walking his

¹⁰⁸ avrupanın şımarık çocuğu şerefsiz yunan dölleri. alıș size osmanlı tokadı
¹⁰⁹ Search a Cyprus, armenia yaz bak ne kufurler var yunan li komsularımızdan,maalesef
¹¹⁰ greeks are stronger and smarter... Winner is AMFIKRATHS.
¹¹¹ hey sure are the best swimmers of the Aegean sea, we've ever seen so far. They swam from Izmir to Athens in 2 hours some say:}
camel in a desert. According to the joke, the stranger asks ‘where are you going with this donkey?’ and the Turk replies that he is blind and it is a camel and not a donkey, and then the stranger replies that he is talking to the donkey not to him\(^{112}\) (Kotzas1978, n.d.). This joke is a way for the Greek commenter to present the Turk as an Oriental with his depiction of the character in the desert and with the camel. The commenter pirahinulayn (n.d.) frustrated with kotzas1978’s depiction, speaks through the donkey and says “well that donkey f.cked you real hard in 1453, 1923 and 1974 that's why the best thing you can do is sharing your pain with fictional animals.”\(^{113}\) Pirahinulayn refers to the conquest of Constantinople, foundation of Turkish Republic after the expulsion of the Greek army and Cyprus Operation consecutively with his dates. The historical memory is in an active use to undo the Greek hatred to build a Turkish hatred. Kotzas1978’s response back is also instructive in depicting the naturalness of the hostility when he says pirahinulayn is referring to events that happened years ago and they will see what will happen with the upcoming Greece vs. Turkey soccer game (Kotzas1978, n.d.). Whether it is a soccer game, a game show or history, it is always in a mode of war when it comes to the Turkish-Greek relations.

When the interaction is not substantiated in a historical reading, they still preserve the profane language. As part of the comments for the video on the final episode of the show, Shallkurd (n.d.) referring to the Turkish flag that Derya (Turkish finalist) is carrying after winning the game, comments “fuck that flag”. He cannot get away with

\(^{112}\) One day a Turk and his camel were walking in a desert when they meet a stranger. Stranger asks: Where are you going with this donkey? Turk replies: Are you blind to see this is not a donkey? Stranger quickly replies: I am not talking to you, I am talking to camel.

\(^{113}\) And the camel replies back to the greek ; "well that donkey f.cked you real hard in 1453, 1923 and 1974 that's why the best thing you can do is sharing your pain with fictional animals.
that and extrastrange (n.d.) responds, “I FUCK YOUR FLAG YOU RUDE PERSON.” Some comments are out of context and portray a general hostility unconnected to the video posting. For instance, vhx57 (n.d.) posts “fuck [A]llah[,] That doesn’t need translation” and in return, taytay1984 (n.d.) says “are you from [G]reece[?] [I]f it is true I fuck your all gods and stupid m[y]th[o]logy” (Taytay1984). Again the same responding reflex is present in this interaction.

Turkish hostility against the Greeks is a form of national defense. It is a natural response in the face of Greek plans. Selim and Nadia’s affair also falls into this category, where Turkish nation is under attack by the Greeks since Nadia is not sincere, but rather she is a Trojan horse for a greater Greek plan. Therefore, their romance contains the potential for the loosening of the Turkish nation, as domestic happiness must guarantee national prosperity. Facing this challenge, Selim’s nationality is under question as he flirts with an Other woman. In order to show the ways in which this affair can be a Greek setup, comment posters put history into use to back their hostility. History serves the hatred, in which Turks have always won against the Greeks and Survivor will be just another illustration for the repetition of history. Yet, for this game show, undoing the Greek nation passes through sexually desiring Greek women, as preventing the Turkish nation passes through avoiding the Turkish women from being preys of Greek men.

**Protecting Our Women, Desiring Other Women**

Nation is already a gendered construct speaking from a male experience. National order appropriates men and women’s roles within its discourse. It institutionalizes gender definitions in modern terms. Thus, nationalism assigns sexual
roles for men and women, where women reproduce the nation and men protect it. In this vein, Turkish nationalism has sexual implications for Turkish wo/men, and also for their relations with Greek wo/men. *Survivor*, with the love affair between Selim and Nadia and Turkish female forum users’ attraction to Amfikratis, provides material for the demonstration of sexual dynamics embedded in Turkish nationalism. The forum discussions elaborate on the hostility against the Greeks in gender terms in relation to nationalist constructs of masculinity and femininity.

In the nation, women inversely define the men. Women serve the mirror image for the masculine subject (Mosse, 1988, p. 10). Although the inverse relation between the two genders is not necessarily a nationalist construction, their institutionalization is one. Genders relation to labor and compartmentalized spaces serves a national purpose. Constructions for masculinity and femininity within a nationalist discourse create a division of labor, in which women reproduce the nation both symbolically and physically, while men have the duty to protect it (Drezgic, 1985, p. 9). The compartmentalization of public and private spaces as men and women’s domain respectively further delimits this division in labor. The ideal image of a woman is one who preserves the traditional values in the domestic sphere and does not trespass into the men’s world since the active world of the public space corrupts the men (Mosse, 1988, p. 97). Therefore, men protect the feminine private space of motherland via protecting women. Undoing of the nation in *Survivor*, therefore comes through having sexual intercourse with the nation’s women.

For this case study, such a dichotomized view in relation to national gender roles is instructive to explain the love/attraction for the Other. Women’s role in symbolic
reproduction of culture (Pettman, 1996, p. 62) as a concept can help in understanding Selim and Nadia’s romance. Similarly, this notion becomes heuristic in understanding the discussions around some Turkish forum users’ attraction to Amfikratis, a Greek male participant. These discussions reveal the Turkish nationalism’s sexual configurations in loving anOther wom/man. As illustrated in the forum discussions, having feelings towards a national Other, is problematic both for male and female Turkish nationals. However, being attracted and desiring sex with that Other has different implications on Turkish men and women. While men have the luxury of desiring sexual intercourse with Other women, Turkish women do not have the same privilege since the nation sees women as preservers of national culture. On contrary, through their ability to use men’s desire to have sex with the women (in order to show their manliness) for their advantage, Other women have the sexual capacity to deceive naïve Turkish men. Nevertheless, Turkish women on the online discussions also enjoy a level of empowerment in their accession to nationalist discourse, which at the same time weakens them since it has to resonate with masculine articulations for nationalism.

Forum discussions on attraction to a Greek man become a site over which Turkish men preserve their superiority over Greek males and where women are sanctioned from such engagements. Helen’s, a forum user, declaration of her attraction to Amfikratis, like many other users, is enough to raise hatred on supposedly male users. Kurkur’s response to Helen illustrates the Turkish male users’ view on such attractions as being irrational. “…There are a lot of Turkish men, why the Greeks…”114 (Kurkur, n.d.). At the same

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114 ...gidin allah aşkına o kadar türk erkeği var kala kala Yunanılara mız kädimiz yapmayın boşverin…
time this comment also portrays the fact that it is unbearable for the Turkish male not to be liked for a Greek man. It is not only the males but also female users who try to maintain this order, in which Turkish women are kept away from the Greek men. Kibrisli_Kiz (n.d.) says “…the people of my land are not satisfied with Turkish men. I can do nothing but pity…” These examples show that the target of attraction is not the person, but his nationality. National character, like in above examples for unconditional love and hatred, has always more primacy than any other. Therefore, it is not about liking Amfikratis, even though he can present friendly behavior to the Turks, it is being attracted to a person with Greek nationality that becomes problematic.

Amfikratis’s Greek nationality is the central question. The_Gangsta_Boyz thinks it is only legitimate for the Turkish girls to like him, only if he was Turkish. “If Amfi were a Turk, then all the girls would have been crazy for him” (The_Gangsta_Boyz, n.d.). However, he can never reach that level of legitimacy since his Greekness is unavoidable. Take the discussion on some users’ metaphor of Amfikratis being Turkish delight. When a user fantasizes about him as Turkish delight, s/he is immediately warned about the incommensurability of the sweet and his nationality. Spring-24 and Volkan_28’s discussion on the metaphor ends with a consensus to think of Amfikratis not in terms of Turkish delight but ouzo, a Greek drink. “I would say nothing for Ouzo, but if he is a Turkish delight, he must be Turkish” , says Volkan_28 (n.d.), reflecting on the highly delineated borders between the two nations.

115 …yurdumun insanlar türk erkekleriyle yetinemesi acımak düşünden başka kişi gelmiyo…
116 Amfi türk olsa tamam artıık. herhalde bütün kızlar tutuşardu heralde imgokpa
117 BAK UZOYA BİRŞEY DİYEMEM FAKAT EYER LOKUM VARSA AMFI TÜRK OLMASI GEREK BU ARADA ADAMDA TÜRKİYED BAYA MEŞUR OLDU YANİL KİZLARRRRR
A method of legitimizing the attraction to a Greek guy can be through apologizing for it in advance with a reference to Turkish nationalism. *Mls_teymur_amfiklatis* starts his/her comment with a love towards Amfikratis. Nevertheless, s/he feels obligated to state “…Don’t get me wrong, of course I want a Turk to win…” (Mls_teymur_amfiklatis, n.d.). Yet, it is not enough and s/he receives criticism. *Zehir_87* (n.d.) wants her to acknowledge that it would be not so nationalistic if a Turk wants a Greek to win. In response to this comment, *mls_teymur_amfiklatis* agrees with him/her and says that s/he only loves Amfikratis a lot and wants a Turk to win (Mls_teymur_amfiklatis, n.d.). It is highly traumatic to have any kind of positive inclination for a Greek. *Zehir_87*’s stress on the audience being Turks and Amfikratis being a Greek illustrates the impossibility of any relationship but hatred.

As discussions on Amfikratis illustrate the ways in which hatred towards the Greek can emerge under the conditions of saving Turkish women from Greek men, discussions on Nadia, in relation to his romance with Selim, show how Turkish men’s affection to Greek women can be troubling for the Turkish women. Turkish men must refrain from Greek women in order to save the Turkish women from humiliation. The concept of ‘women as the reproducers of national culture’ helps us in explaining the discussion here. Along these lines, Turkish men’s desire for Greek women over Turkish ones is degrading for the Turkish nation since women represent the national culture. *SSOS* (n.d.) says “I don’t know what people find in Nadia…” and continues “…our girls

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118 Bi insan bu kadar mı tatlı olur yaa bitanesin sen ya yunanlılardan tek sevdiğini \(:)\) Yanlış anlamayın tabi ki TÜRK kazansın..her ne kadar deryadan nefret etsemde kazanmasını istiyorum Türkiye için... Ama eğer ikisi de aynı ülkeden olsaydı kesinlikle amfikratis derdim \(:)\) Çünkü mükemmel biri \(:)\) hele derya ile kıyaslanırsa...
… are ten thousand times better than these Greek girls.” Likewise, angora comments in a similar fashion where s/he thinks there are so many more beautiful girls than Nadia in Turkey. At the same time, s/he thinks Selim is trivializing Turkish women since he acts as if there are no beautiful women in Turkey. Thus, he is not representing the Turkish team, “…Selim’s actions do not become on the Turkish team” (Angora, n.d.). As these echo the male perspectives on saving the face of the Turkish women, female users also illustrate a similar outlook.

Female forum users portray an extremely hostile attitude when Turkish male users show signs of attraction to Nadia. Swarthy’s later realization that Nadia can be as good as Turkish girls, receives attack messages from kardelen85. “How can you say that you thought she was not like Turkish women? Turkish girls are worth sacrificing yourself for. It is even a mistake that you compare her and us…” (Kardelen85, n.d.). The intensity in her language is evident to show the fact that it is unbearable to be even compared with a Greek woman. Female users also present ecstasy for Nadia’s elimination in relation to her inferiority since she is not a Turkish woman. DAMLA? thinks that Nadia stayed in the game more than she deserved and DAMLA? danced when she was watching the eliminations. When ending her comment, she accuses Turkish men to like her since Turkish women are way better (DAMLA?, n.d.). Her friend ela responds to her in backing up her comment on Turkish women (Ela, n.d.). Same

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119 …bizim kızlarımız kıskançtır, kaprislidir fahan ilan alan yine de bu yunan kızlarını arka ceplerinden 10000 kere çıkarır.
120 …Selim davranışlarıyla Türk takımına yakışmıyor.
121 ne demek türk kızları ayarında değil. sen türk kızlarına kurban ol be.onunla bizleri kıyaslanan bile hata.ama tabi sana türk kızı sana bir beden büyük gelir.
dynamic that goes between Amfikratis and male users is also present for women users and Nadia.

Gender, sex and love interact in ways to define hatred against the Greeks. As illustrated above both genders are sanctioned from having romantic affairs with the Other wo/man. In this vein, Selim’s love for Nadia becomes problematic. Nevertheless, desiring to have sex with the Other wo/man has certain legitimacy for the men while it is strictly forbidden for women in their relation to national culture. Since women represent the culture, Other men having sex with them is the breaking of the nation. Along the same lines, desiring Other woman is sexually accosting the Greek nation.

Having romance with an Other woman is synonymous with betraying one’s country. Selim’s love for Nadia illustrates the impassible barrier between the two nations. Forum discussions show how Selim sold Turkey. Kurkur (n.d.) comments “…he sold us for the girl…it is very bad that he got all the Turkish team against him.”

Selim’s romance as an act of selling the country is a vocal concern. He is expected to love his country more than Nadia and when the two loves are contested, it becomes a traumatizing experience for the audience. Hate speech against Selim is also present in discussions. Seda83 refers to Selim as sell-him, again stressing his fault. She even goes on to say “…I hate sell-him. He is a traitor in my eye. I do not know how he will walk around in the country”123 (Seda83, n.d.). The user takes him to the level of being a traitor to the country with his love affair. Nevertheless, he wins back his national membership...
with showing his patriotism at the end of the game. Selim appears on TV with a Turkish flag at the end to show his happiness for Derya’s victory. According to forum users, since this is the way to be for a Turk, Selim wins his nationality and even is let to be with Nadia. Selminn’s words are illustrative: “Although I was angry at you because you divided the group with your romance with Nadia, when you hugged Derya, I said to myself, at the end he is a Turk, too, like he should be. At that moment, I cried and wanted to hug you and kiss you. Selim, happiness with Nadia”\(^\text{124}\) (Selminn, n.d.). Selim’s act of unconditional love for his country, which is a way to be for a Turk, qualifies him for national membership. On the same token, halukbilgehan, acknowledges Selim’s romance with Nadia since he has shown his patriotism. “…when are Selim and Nadia getting married? Anybody knows?”\(^\text{125}\) (Halukbilgehan, n.d.). He not only qualifies for his nationality but also has the acknowledgment for his romance. Selim finally passed his test of nationalism under a lot of suspicion and earned his right to be with the Other woman.

Although both genders are forbidden to have an affair with the Other wo/man, in having sex, men have a privileged position. Because women are the preservers of national culture, Other men’s fornication with them is dangerous for the nation. Along the same line, it is legitimate for men to desire the Other women as this entails breaking the Other nation apart. As illustrated above, Turkish women who show attraction to a Greek male, Amfikratis, are silenced both by males and females. Yet, the forum

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\(^\text{124}\) Sana yarışma sırasında Nadya yla olan ilişki ile grubu biraz baltaladığın için haif sinir olsamda finalde Derya yla sarılışına işte dedim sonuçta oda bir türk, olmasi gerektiği gibi. O anda ağladım sana sarılıp öpesim geldi. Selim Nadya yla mutluluklar, gerçekten, e simdi selim nadya ne zaman evlenio bilen varmi acaba:}

\(^\text{125}\) e simdi selim nadya ne zaman evlenio bilen varmi acaba:}
discussions show the opposite way of relationship in Turkish men’s sexual desires for Nadia. SSOS’s comment is at point. Referring to Selim-Nadia affair, he comments “…we should think about it from the man’s perspective. At least a Turk is having sexual fun with a Greek. Enjoy Selim…”126 (SSOS, n.d.). Since the woman is from the Other side, it is legitimate and also desirable for Turkish men to engage in sexual fantasies about Greek women. Similarly, mrsic in his fantasy says “…Nadia’s mine, I will make her a Turk”127 (Mrsic, n.d.) Making Nadia a Turk involves having sex with her.

Greek women’s subordination is not only limited to their sexual objectification. Traitor Greek woman with hidden agendas is a recurring theme over and over throughout the discussions. In Selim-Nadia affair, since Nadia is a Greek woman, the forum discussions portray her as the enemy with possible intentions. In this case, she is a traitor sent by the Greek team to conquer the Turkish team from inside. She is a tool in Greek designs. Since Turkish men supposedly are inclined to sexually desire Greek women in order to threaten the Greek nation, Greek women should also be carefully monitored as she possesses sexual power to misguide the Turkish men into breaking his nation. The common theme of perceived expansion of the Other in bi-national politics spills over to Survivor. Because Greeks are naturally inclined to have hidden plans to expand against the Turkish nation, Greek women can be tools in this process. Selim and Nadia’s romance can be understood within this vein, where Nadia is a Trojan horse and Selim a misguided fool.

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126 …olayı biraz da erkek mantığında görürsek en azından bir Türk bir yunanlaı görürüyör, keyfine bak selim eminim takımını çıkarlarını kendi içinden de olsa hesaba kattıysorsundur…
127 hopppp durum bakım nadya benim ben onu türk yapcam
Greek women are spies to divide the Turkish nation. Nadia, therefore, does not necessarily like Selim but uses him to bring chaos to the Turkish team. It is a highly circulated concept in the discussions. “Nadia is really very beautiful but she has evilness inside. She brought chaos to the Turkish team”\textsuperscript{128} says lovefromnadya (n.d.). Similarly, Heatmans (n.d.) thinks along the same lines, “She is very smart… She brought chaos to the Turkish team through Selim.”\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, Nadia is a smart woman who uses her physical appeal to lure Selim and divide the Turkish team. ReflectioN (n.d.) comments “Nadia is very beautiful and she is using her beauty against the Turkish team…”\textsuperscript{130} Thus, Nadia’s love is not real; it is part of a Greek plan, in which Nadia is only a tool. Eftalia (n.d.) says “Nadia previously had moves on for Onur, now she is flirting with Selim…They conquer us from inside…”\textsuperscript{131} As this comment illustrates Nadia is a means for a wider Greek design, as they conquer the Turkish team with Nadia. Furthermore, forum users back their claims against Nadia through making use of historical references. Nadia sometimes does her Byzantine games\textsuperscript{132}, and sometimes she is a Trojan horse\textsuperscript{133}. This conscious use of metaphors portrays Nadia to be the granddaughter of Byzantines and earlier classical Greeks. Byzantine metaphor is particularly important since the rise of the Ottoman Empire triggered its fall. Subconsciously the commenter is suggesting that Nadia’s games will not be successful since she is a grandchild of the Byzantine.

\textsuperscript{128} nadya gerçekten çok güzel ve zeki bir kız.Ama içinde şeytanlık yok değil. Türk takımı birbirine kattı.
\textsuperscript{129} Çok akıllı bu kız yaa .. Selim'i ayrarak Türk takımını birbirine düşürdü ..
\textsuperscript{130} Nadya çok güzel bir kız ve bu güzellikini Türk takımını aleyhine kullanı...
\textsuperscript{131} nadya dünyanın onura göz süzüyordu bugün selim'le flört ediyor yarin selim elense Türk takımından başka biriyle yakılmışacak. bizi içeren tüketiyolar...
\textsuperscript{132} kardelen 85:..anlamak zor değil kardeşim.birçok köşe yazımımızda bahsettiği gibi kuz bizans oyunu çevirdi ve başarında bizim karaböcük selimin aklına girip selimde diğer kişilerin aklına girip teymuralp yolladı... (Kardelen85).
\textsuperscript{133} armagedon_batiyaka: Türk takımını tek başına darma duman ettin. Yunanlı erkeklerden de daha iyi yarıştı. Ama Türk takım için bir truba atıydı... (Armagedon_batiyaka)
Greek women also provide a medium over which past Turkish losses are dealt with. In this process, misogyny for the Other woman is a common theme to justify those losses. Nadia resembles those deceitful women as she might potentially deceive Selim into her plans and cause loss of the Turkish team. Msinanbayram thinks Nadia is on a similar project like Russian Queen Katharina in her use of sexual power to mislead the Turkish man. “…One of the Ottoman sultans had been through a lot because of Russian Queen Katharina and Nadia took Katharina’s role in this game. Selim needs to realize that it is a national fight and … represents 70 million people (a metaphor for Turkish people)…”\textsuperscript{134} (Msinanbayram, n.d.). Selim represents the Turkish nation, as the Ottoman sultan represents the Empire and like in latter’s fate, Selim may be dragged down the same path because of Nadia. She provides an outlet to voice frustrations for the past losses while vilifying the Other women. Emregurbuz2 voices her comment in an extremely hostile tone: “…don’t you (Selim) ever come back from that island you sexomaniac. It is always women who brought our fall in the Turkish history and this did not change here [in the game]. Get that in your head”\textsuperscript{135} (Emregurbuz2, n.d.). Survivor is more than a game; it is where history is debated and past issues are dealt with. Since nation is a male project, it figures practical to accuse women for its fall.

\textsuperscript{134} evet arkadasınız çok güzel şekilde noktayı koymuş ilave olarak osmanlı padişahlarından birinde rus kraliçesi katerina yuzunden ne hale geldiğini unutmayalım nadya da katerininin rolunu bu yarışmanda ustlenmiştir selim arkadasımızın işin bilincine varıp bunun bir ulusal dava haline geldiğini orada 70 milyon insanı temsil ettiği benimle evlenirsiniz yarışmasında olmadığını hatırlaması lazımdır en son su dokme yarışmasında smark laubali hareketleri yuzunden nerdeyse kaybediyorduk,surf nadyaya hava atmak için trubune oynamayı bırakıp bir an önce iyi bir şekilde TÜRK milletini temsil eder insallah yoksa onurla aynı kaderi paylaşacak sanırım

\textsuperscript{135} seni knamak sana kizmak yetimior ex kankana kurban olsn yunan oyuncaga oldukça Türkler senden utanı o nadya sana kadum o zaman görece seni........o adadan sakın dönme üçkür düşkünü dönme seni Türk tarihinde hep karlar yedi bizi burdada değişmedi.. kafına sok..
Alternative voices for the Greek women are also present. Yet, the discussions silence and swallow them within the language of hatred. For instance, responding to another comment poster, *thunderksk* is annoyed by the Byzantine metaphor and also sees *Survivor* as a game, not a Turkish-Greek war. “What does it got to do with the Byzantine? She is smart and there is 250.000 Euros at the end … and I don’t like it when you present this game in the light of Turkish-Greek war…”136 (Thunderksk, n.d.). However, other users attack similar views to silence the alternative perspective. In an attempt to illustrate the absurdity of vilifying Nadia, *(b)ru* (n.d.) comments that Nadia is honored among the Greek nation, but Selim is demonized in Turkey. Yet, s/he receives attacks from two other comment posters who claim that the logical way of seeing her is as being smart and misleading Selim. As these comments exemplify portraying the Greeks as Others on the online media can be an empowering act for the Turkish women.

Women’s relation to nationalism is limited in its articulation. However, in the cyberspace, since they can disguise their bodies and be at the same level with other forum participants, their voice can be heard. However, in order to access the nationalist discourse, they need to follow a nationalist course, which at the same time make their feminine identity masculine. In their attempt to claim their Turkishness, Turkish women vilify the Greek women, silence the alternative views for her and also have an apologetic tone for their attraction for the Greek men. They become masculine in their accession to

136 bizansla ne alakası var hatun akıllı netecide rtada 250.000 avro var sen ben almaycaz o parayı biri gotureck deilmİ ayrıca su olayı türk yunan savaşına sokma modunu hec sevmiyom hepmiz insaniz barış istiyor arttik ben yetir yav dünya bi huzur olsun!!!!!!!!!!!
nationalist discourse. On the online space, one should either act like a man, or silenced like a woman.

Nationalism in gender terms come in myriad ways in the online space. While both Turkish men and women’s romantic relation to Greek Others is sanctioned, men are privileged in their flexibility to desire Greek women. Since sexually desiring Other women involves threatening the Other nation, Nadia is a platform over which Turkish men voice their desire to intimidate Greeks through having sex with Nadia. While sexually subjugated, Greek women are also empowered in their capacity to use their bodies to misguide the gullible Turkish men. Nevertheless, this brings them to a traitor position. Greek women are also vilified to deal with past Turkish losses in history. Thus, misogyny runs in the discussions. Nevertheless, the audience’s illusion of Survivor as a ‘real’ war signal some features of the contemporary society.

Forum discussions on the Turkish Web site for the Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece show signal the final phase of national hostility on the online media. Relative to the other online media, forum discussion intensifies hostility. As blogs present the Greek Other images in a frozen space, which has no immediate relation to the offline world, online commenting for e-newspapers makes up for that lack. Commenting on this medium ties the hostility to unfolding real events. Thus, the substantiation of hostility in a more real world intensifies hostility. With the forum discussions that connection to political events breaks apart and rather bond with non-political pseudo-events of media spectacle. Hostility against the Greeks loses its connection to any reality but the hyperreal.
Media represent its version of real as the real. The audience perceives the staged reality of the *Survivor* show to be the real. *Survivor* is the war between the two nations. Turkish team becomes the Turkish army and the spectators are citizens under their protection, who extend their support to the Turkish team. Therefore, forum discussions show unconditional love for the nation with unconditional hatred against the Greek nation.

Forum discussions present a homogenous universe of hatred where historical memory is in heavy use. Atrocities of the Other in history come back to haunt the users’ expressions. In this vein, Greeks are traitors and never to be trusted. Nadia, as a Greek woman, is therefore a toy, a hoax, a Trojan horse, serving a wider Greek plan. Similarly, Selim and Nadia affair faces challenges since it is a non-national romance. Selim’s domestic desire has the potential of crumbling the nation, as a romance with the Other woman does not serve the nation. Thus, the comment postings put Selim’s nationality into question.

Forum discussions fine-tune a nationalist discourse: using the hyperlinks posted on the comments, the users are teleported to YouTube where they are expected to use these sentiments to battle with the Greeks. Historical memory is still in the background and feeds the vulgar Turkish comments in response to profane Greek language. In the process, the posters desire to daunt the Other nation.

Abating the Greek nation comes in the form of sexually desiring the Other women. Nationalism in gender terms institutionalizes the traditional dichotomy between men and women through compartmentalizing their spaces. Woman, kept in the domestic
space, has the duty to preserve the traditional values that may be absent in the public arena. Because man lives in the corrupted world of the public, women are expected to assume this role. Nevertheless, it is the man who needs to protect the feminine private space of the motherland, and he does this through protecting the women. Thus, romance with the Other is nationally undesirable. Neither Turkish men nor women should engage in a love affair with a person from the Other nation. However, in their sexual desire of the Other, men have more privileges. If they can fornicate with the Greek women, it also means sexually accosting the Greek nation. By the same token, Turkish women need to avoid sexual relations with Greek men. Thus, their desire for attractive Greek men is alarming.

Although nationalism is primarily a male construct, Internet technologies empower the female, but at the end this perpetuates the male’s domain. Because the Internet has no physical space, users can hide their body behind a non-gendered identity, allowing them to be at the same level with other users. In this vein, Turkish women gain access to the nationalist discourse as their bodies are not present in the discussions. Nevertheless, to be able to have that access, they take on a masculine voice, where women self-sanction relations with Greek men, vilify the Greek women and at the same time apologize in advance for being attracted to Greek men.

The discussions around the Greeks and the Greek nation are epistemic of the current media society. The audience often misses the fact that this show is a game and a money prize is involved. For instance, Survivor is a war, and Selim is treated as a national soldier, while Nadia is a traitor woman of the enemy. They represent the two
nations and the audience thinks of the game in terms of having literal consequences for the two nations. In its hyperreality, the viewers equate the media experience for the experience of war. Thus, insertion of nationalism into a TV format like this, which resonates with national sports competitions, or in this case a war, serves as a substitute for actual physical battle between the two nations. Media wars replace real wars and the audience is welcomed to join in this experience through the Internet, which extends the national sentiments to other nationals. In this way the Turkish audience is vested in electronically imagining their nation hating the Greeks.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

On the online space, the Internet users elaborate on Turkish nationalism in its antagonism to the Greek nation. All three case studies show that nationalism deepens along the lines of hatred to the Greeks. Moving from the blogs to online commenting and finally to the forum discussions, intensity in hatred increases and comes to alarming levels. In this movement, the hatred moves from being a frozen one having no relation to offline events to one where it is projected to ordinary people. In these respects, the imagined community of the Turkish nation moves from an imagination to a reality. With the departure of the self from the body, on the Internet, users can interact with other fellow nationals from distant geographies. The local coffee house experience metamorphoses into an online one, where hating the Greeks is a nationally experienced phenomenon.

The Internet has the capacity to de-center the modern subjectivity. National subjects can imagine themselves in new ways. However, at least for the time being, they do not and on contrary, deepen that subjectivity. In the future, if they do, this research will stay as a piece in Turkish nationalism’s historicity in relation to media.

The media are an integral part of nationalism. They make the hatred against the Greeks to be a national feature. Mass media present the events in ways that the audience has no alternative to respond. However, with the Internet, the media become a platform of interaction between other fellow citizens. Seeing, hearing and interacting with these other people at remote parts of the national geography, or even in different parts of the world, make nationalism more real than imagined.
Blogs are media for personal journalism. They switch the audience of newspapers to blog readers. As part of their patriotic duty, bloggers incessantly cite other newspaper articles to get the ‘truth’ out about the Greeks. Frustrated with the current state of international affairs and Western media’s biased position against the Turks, bloggers try to educate the Internet users about the real face of the Greeks. Bloggers constantly cite other sources where they lose their connection to the validity of the source. As long as these sources portray hostility against the Greeks, they qualify to be blogged. In the process, only the reference circulates on the blogsphere, furthering the myth about the Greek Others.

Online commenting to news articles takes the blogging experience to another level. These comments do not exist in a soliloquy but are inserted in discussions. They take the coffee house experience to the online media. Conversations at the local coffee house widen with the Internet. It is no longer a local experience but a national one. Talking about national events pertaining to the Greeks involve distant nationals rather than close acquaintances. Since the self and body are no longer together on the Internet, selves can be telepresent.

Online commenting intensifies the hatred against the Greeks. It inserts the blog experience to an offline world reality. Blogs stay as frozen articulations without having any relation to a world of simultaneously unfolding real events. On contrary, online commenting relates those articulations to real events. Hostility against the Greeks
appears in relation to news media. Commenting to e-newspapers further concretizes the national imagining via taking the coffee house experience to the online media.

Forum discussions for *Survivor: Turkey vs. Greece* are last stage in hostility against the Greeks on the Internet. The forum users extrapolate the hatred that had some political validity to ordinary people. *Survivor* is the new mode of warring between the two media nations. The forum users fine-tune their hostility in the discussions and hyperlink the users to YouTube video sharing portal. The new mode of war involves ordinary citizens, who use profane language against the other nation to win the battle.

On the forum discussions, Greeks preserve their traditional images. They are traitors and always have ulterior designs. In this vein, Greek women are only tools of a bigger hidden agenda. Thus, romance between nationals of the two nations is impossible because the Greek woman is there to deceive the Turkish man. Since domestic happiness is the happiness of the entire nation, a romance between the two is impossible. Greek women can only be objects of sexual desire for these men. On contrary, Turkish women cannot desire the Greek men. Woman reproduces the national culture and man protects the woman to protect that culture. Therefore, Turkish men also need to protect Turkish women in order to avoid the destruction of the Turkish nation. Forum discussions present such a national perception over the game player.

Nationalism is a male project. Women’s access to this project is limited. Nevertheless, the Internet provides ways to have that access. Since on the forum discussions, the body is no longer available, women can disguise their feminine physique and have that admission to the nationalist discourse. However, they can only stay to be
national through voicing masculine ideas. They need to stop Turkish women from desiring Greek men and make sure the Greek woman is not their equivalent.

Turkish nationalism in its articulations for Greeks as the Other crystallizes on the online space. Nationalism is no longer an elitist project. Ordinary citizens are welcomed to join media articulations through the Internet technologies. However, their access comes in the form of perpetuating it. The Internet users can also use these technologies in reverse ways. They can be media to voice unheard expressions, but they are underutilized in that sense. Nationalist hatred against the Greeks intensifies on the online community. This is a fact on both sides of the Aegean. Thus, this research can be complete when a similar analysis is conducted for the Greek Internet users. Furthermore, this research does not include a survey for the offline community. The online and offline communities may evolve differently in their relation to the Greeks. Nevertheless, for the time this research captures, Turkish nationalism in the form of hatred against the Greeks becomes more real.
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