THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY ON CIVIL SOCIETY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LANGUAGE VARIATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the strength of civil society in the developing world as it relates to linguistic diversity and social stratification. One of the nearly indelible assumptions about civil society is that cultural diversity is the prime cause of the deterioration of civil society. Therefore, we should expect culturally homogeneous countries to have strong civil societies. Surprisingly, however, this is not always the case. The central hypothesis of this research maintains that the strength civil society is not always dependent upon a macro understanding of the cultural composition of a country (i.e. homogeneous or heterogeneous); but instead upon a more micro understanding which looks at how various groups within a social system coalesce and negotiate their roles in society.

This argument is explored by employing an interdisciplinary methodology that begins with a quantitative study followed by a qualitative analysis. The purpose of the dual methods is crucial to the process of understanding both how and why cultural diversity affects the strength of civil society. Regressions based on survey data in 119 developing countries derived from the 2006 Bertelsmann Transformation Index reveal
the expected negative correlation between the amount of cultural diversity (measured by language variation) in a country and the strength of its civil society, but with low explanatory power. The data indicates that vibrant civil society can exist in both culturally homogeneous and heterogeneous societies. Four case studies conducted in India, Nigeria, Bolivia, and Chile show that developing countries with vibrant civil societies owe their success to the absence of deeply embedded social stratifications and the presence of upward social mobility among minorities. As a consequence, weak civil society tends to be fairly persistent in countries where the opportunity for social mobility is low. This research concludes: (1) linguistic diversity weakens the strength of civil society (but with low explanatory power), and (2) there is an inverse correlation between the embeddedness of social stratifications and the strength of civil society in the developing world.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Civil society is commonly understood to be weak or inadequate in the developing world. Daniel P. Moynihan’s assertion that “it is culture not politics, that determines the success of a society…” reflects the fundamental perspective that countries steeped in a milieu of cultural diversity are unsuited to develop vibrant civil societies (cited in Harrison & Huntington, 2000, p.xiv). Accordingly, much of the discussion on the role of culture to the process of developing a vibrant civil society has to a large extent been focused on understanding culture as an archaic trap, a mysterious power, or a perpetual source of self-defeating norms, behaviors and beliefs (Rao & Walton, 2004, p.3). Therefore, it is not unforeseen that one of the nearly indelible assumptions about civil society is that cultural diversity is the prime cause of the deterioration of civil society in developing countries (Collier, Honohan, & Moene, 2001, p.55).

In an article titled Africa’s Growth Tragedy, Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that the increasing complexity of culture in societies generates conflict, instability, atomization and a weakened capacity for communication. Ultimately, Easterly and Levine (1997) attribute the amount of diversity in Africa for the weakness and instability of civil society that distresses many African countries. The civil unrest in Sudan provides a ready example of this phenomenon.

Fueled by examples like Sudan, many scholars argue that less culturally diverse countries should generally be associated with stronger, more developed civil societies
(Collier et al., 2001). Culturally diverse societies are therefore seen as vulnerable to weak civil societies, while culturally homogeneous countries are seen as conducive to vibrant civil societies (Collier et al., 2001). From this vantage point, an abundant stock of homogeneity is presumably what produces a vibrant civil society.

There's certainly some validity to this argument. We can observe, for instance, that culturally homogenous countries such as South Korea and Japan have stable, vibrant civil societies, while culturally heterogeneous countries like Sudan endure weak civil societies. In spite of these examples, the argument does not hold true in all cases. South India, for example, features a high degree of cultural diversity and yet it boasts a strong civil society; similarly, Bolivia, well known for the weakness of its civil society is comprised of a relatively homogeneous population. Intriguingly, South India and Bolivia are not alone in providing the many counterexamples to the alleged theory that the strength of civil society is reflected by the degree of cultural diversity in a country. Therefore this begs the question how cultural diversity influences civil society in the developing world? What is different among the social relations of states with weak and strong civil societies?

This thesis will address the impact of cultural diversity on civil society. The theoretical framework for this argument stems from a cross-disciplinary analysis that draws primarily from the works of Robert Putnam, Douglas North, and Mark Granovetter. Building upon Robert D. Putnam’s analysis in *Making Democracy Work*, I will argue that a more plausible explanation for the strength of civil society looks at how various groups
within a social system coalesce and negotiate their roles in the social structure. More specifically, the central hypothesis of this thesis maintains that the strength of civil society is dependent upon the extent to which social stratifications\textsuperscript{1} are not embedded [illustrated in Figure 1.1 below]. It is predicted that when social stratifications are weakly embedded, civil society is strong; similarly, where social stratifications are deeply embedded, civil society is weak\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} In sociology, social stratification is the hierarchical arrangement of social classes, castes, and strata within a society, often according to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, linguistic identity, etc. Social stratification is never a random process, but a product of social relations that ascribe people to specific positions within a structured social hierarchy. \textit{Crystal Reference Encyclopedia}. Retrieved April 24, 2007, from Reference.com website: http://www.reference.com/browse/crystal/29521.

\textsuperscript{2} The term “embeddedness” as used herein refers to the extent to which social stratifications control an individual’s capacity for upward social mobility in a given social structure. The degree to which social stratifications are deeply embedded is measured according to the opportunity for upward social mobility among minority and marginalized populations. If the opportunity for social mobility is low due to one’s ascribed position in the social hierarchy, then social stratifications are interpreted to be deeply embedded. If the opportunity for upward social mobility is high, then social stratifications are not interpreted to be deeply embedded.
Leading scholars such as Francis Fukuyama and Douglas North suggest that culture influences society because it is intricately rooted in human exchange, whether political, social or economic (Fukuyama, 1995; North, 1990). “Culture” in the Fukuyama-North framework is an abstraction which encompasses the factors that dictate patterns of social relations, interaction, communication and human association. For example, North (1990) associates the notion of culture with institutions. Institutions, according to North (1990) are “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p.3).
Consistent with North’s interpretation, culture is concerned here with “identity, aspirations, symbolic exchange, coordination, and structures and practices that serve relational ends” (Rao & Walton, 2004, p.4). In this thesis I would like to begin thinking about culture with this definition in mind. In assessing the influence of cultural diversity on civil society, as my first point of entry, this thesis will quantify cultural diversity by measuring the amount of linguistic variation in a society.

Language is advocated to be a reliable measure of cultural diversity because it is commonly held that there is a strong association between the language of a society and the culture of its people (Duranti, 1997). Sociolinguist Peter Trudgill (1983) advocates that linguistic characteristics are the most defining features for cultural identity (p.53). Franz Boas, one of the founders of American anthropology, insists that it is necessary to study the language of a society in order to comprehend the complexity of the culture, social structure and value systems (cited in Duranti, 1997, p.52). Moreover, there is a holistic relationship between language and culture because language serves as both a marker of communication and as an indicator of values that are specific not only to countries but also to regions, dialects, socioeconomic status, gender, race, ethnicity, class, and caste (Crystal, 1997, p.10). Therefore, methodologically, this view of the intimate connection between language and culture means that linguistic systems can be studied as guides to cultural structures.
Then, as the second point of entry, this research will take a deeper understanding into the issue of how cultural diversity affects a society by analyzing the extent to which social stratifications are embedded in the social structure. An investigation into the context of social stratifications will reveal information about the patterns of human interaction, association and communication in the society, so as to provide a more nuanced understanding of cultural diversity.

Social stratifications are intimately connected with the diversity of society (Blau, 1977, p.79). As the complexity of culture in the society increases, the established patterns of social relations and social positions in the social structure become more complex as well. Blau (1977) asserts that the greater the degree of heterogeneity, the more pervasive is the social stratification (p.79). One would therefore expect increasing heterogeneity to increase social stratifications. The study of the extent to which social stratifications are embedded in society then becomes essential in determining the level of heterogeneity as well as the patterns of social interaction, and the complexity of the social structure.

The purpose of the dual methodology is first, to explore statistically the correlation between cultural diversity and civil society, and second, to then qualitatively assess why the correlation exists or does not exist. It is advocated here, that only through this more nuanced understanding of culture can we begin to account for the irony of cases like South India and Bolivia, as well as explain the most obvious cases like Sudan, South Korea, and Japan.
The statistical evidence presented in the first part of this research finds the expected negative correlation between cultural diversity—measured according to the amount of linguistic diversity per country and civil society; however the regressions reveal a correlation with low explanatory power in a sample of 119 developing countries. Civil society is measured on a scale of 1 to 6 for three proxy variables—rule of law, political participation, and political and social integration as reported by the 2006 Bertelsmann Transformation Index. The data reveals that vibrant civil society can exist in both culturally homogenous and heterogeneous societies. Moreover, this research also shows that countries with similar amounts of cultural diversity can be found to experience unequal levels of civil society.

In view of the fact that the empirical analyses of cultural diversity as measured by languages finds the projected inverse correlation (albeit with low explanatory power) between cultural diversity and civil society, the qualitative analyses take a deeper investigation into cultural diversity so as to find reasons to account for paradoxical cases like Bolivia and India. The qualitative analysis assesses the embeddedness of social stratifications according to indicators of social mobility for four case studies conducted in India, Nigeria, Bolivia, and Chile. The evidence established in the four case studies finds a plausible explanation of the apparent contrary cases. Although the evidence supports the main hypothesis and reveals that where the embeddedness of social stratifications is weak,

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3 A more detailed description of the methodology is found in chapter three of this work.
4 A score of 1, indicating the weakest possible value for the strength of civil society, and a score of 6, indicating the strongest possible value.
civil society is strong, and where social stratifications are deeply embedded, civil society is weak, the explanatory power of the conclusions in the case studies are limited because it is drawn from only four case studies.

The remainder of this thesis will proceed as follows: chapter two will provide an overview of the literature and establish a theoretical context for the argument and the methods. To address the argument, chapter two will: (1) conceptualize the characteristics of a developed civil society, (2) identify the relationship between culture and civil society, (3) identify how cultural diversity affects civil society, and finally, (4) investigate the various measures of cultural diversity and the problem associated with each.

Chapter three will outline the methodology and provide full details of the data, sources, and variables. More specifically, the methods section will identify the operational definitions for each variable and explain how each variable is measured, coded and interpreted. The methods section also serves to describe the criteria and motivation for choosing the specific case studies in the qualitative analyses.

Chapter four will then empirically investigate the macro relationship between cultural diversity and civil society. Chapter four will illustrate the relationship of linguistic diversity to civil society using statistical regression analyses. The statistical analyses support the central hypothesis of this thesis, and provide a contribution to the study of how cultural diversity influences civil society by showing that cultural diversity as measured by
linguistic diversity is not always a precondition for weak civil society. The findings of chapter four establish the criteria for the case studies conducted in chapter five.

Chapter five provides a greater context for understanding the variation of civil society in the developing world, because it looks at a more nuanced micro understanding of cultural diversity measured by the embeddedness of social stratifications. Chapter five will compare and contrast four different case studies (India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Chile) through a qualitative analysis that assesses the relationship of linguistic diversity, the strength of civil society, and the embeddedness of social stratifications. The embeddedness of social stratifications will be determined by assessing the degree of social mobility within each society in terms of educational indicators and rates of rural-urban migration. Ultimately, the data presented in this chapter serves to support the main hypothesis that the strength of civil society is dependent upon the degree to which social stratifications are deeply embedded.

Finally, chapter six will summarize the arguments and findings, discuss project limitations, and the consequent suggestions for future research
Chapter 2. Review of the Literature

There has been a renewed intellectual interest on the subject of civil society over the past thirty years. For a major portion of the 20th century, civil society was hardly utilized as a vigorous component in academic or popular treatises generated within Europe and North America (Adekson, 2004, p.4). It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s during the era of the Washington Consensus led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain and President Ronald Reagan of the United States, that Western theorists and practitioners alike supposedly ‘rediscovered’ the idea (Adekson, 2004; p.4).

The marked shift in renewed interest on civil society is characterized by a transfer of analyses wholly rooted in state-centered theories to those informed by society-driven explanations (Adekson, 2004, p.4). As a result, societies laden with cultural diversity are seen as vulnerable to the development of civil society because cultural diversity is perceived to be a source of disintegration, which stimulates the fragmentation of sub-national identities (Easterly & Levine, 1997). If fragmentation is the antithesis of civil society, then culturally diverse countries should not have vibrant civil societies because culturally diversity is understood to be a conducive environment for fragmentation (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Homogeneity is therefore considered to be a more advantageous environment for developed civil societies (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Easterly, 2001).
If cultural homogeneity is the most conducive environment for a strong civil society, it is puzzling to find evidence in the developing world that refutes this relationship. In support of the central hypothesis of this thesis, the empirical evidence found in the chapters to follow, report that strong civil societies can exist in the midst of cultural diversity, while weak civil societies are often found to exist in homogeneous environments. This thesis argues that the strength of civil society is dependent upon a deeper understanding of culture which looks at patterns of human interaction, systems of coordination, and how various groups within a social system coalesce, communicate, perceive one another and negotiate their roles in the social structure.

It is to this end that this review aims to establish the conceptual significance of civil society with respect to cultural factors. Culture has historically been understood to mar the development of civil society; however, the changing world demographic, economic, political, and social reality has called for an urgent reconsideration of the elements that both undermine and promote civil society (Arjomand & Tiryakian, 2004, p.50). There is a need to continue developing a more nuanced understanding of culture if we are to use culture as a reliable variable to explain the differences in civil society across countries. This thesis is an effort to contribute to the process of developing such a conceptual and methodological framework.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, it broadly discusses the characteristics of a developed civil society. In this section, we consider what a developed civil society
means and the elements it comprises. Second, the chapter explains the relationship of civil society to culture. In this section, we consider how the relationship of social relations, social structure, institutions, dyadic ties, and the patterns of human interaction influence society. Third, the chapter characterizes how scholars have linked the concept of cultural diversity to the weakness of civil society. Fourth, this review will broadly define the notion of cultural diversity and consider the various ways in which it can be measured, and the drawbacks for each method. Ultimately, this chapter will provide the theoretical support for the central hypothesis and methodology of this thesis.

2.1. Characteristics of a Vibrant Civil Society

In attempt to describe the characteristic of what defines a vibrant civil society, the point of departure for this review is first to provide a definition for civil society, and second to deconstruct the existing conversation about the importance of associational membership, social capital and trust to the development and civil society. Though scholarly interest in the concept of civil society has existed for many centuries, study of this phenomenon has certainly come of age in recent years (Ehrenberg, 1999). The demise of the communist epoch in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as the correspondingly important progression of democratization on the African Continent and more recently in Latin America has placed a renewed intellectual interest in the subject (Adekson, 2004, p.3). Relatedly and perhaps more importantly, the policies of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also undeniably contributed to a renewed emphasis on the merits of civil society and its bearing on the process of social development.

Despite the renewed interest on the topic, the notion of civil society yet remains to find a commonly accepted definition. As of the present date, a sufficiently complex theory of civil society that allows us to adequately understand the contemporary conditions of states does not exist (Arato & Cohen, 1992). Social scientists, policy-makers and practitioners alike are yet to find a conceptual and methodological framework that is adequate for understanding and discussing civil society in similar fashions as they would discuss the state of an economy, or the performance of governments (Anheier, 2004, p.10). This thesis is an effort to contribute to the process of developing such a conceptual and methodological framework.

Before we can begin to discuss the notion of civil society, it is important to first establish a common understanding of what is meant by the term “civil society” in this thesis. Various definitions of civil society can be found throughout the literature; however, much overlap exists among core conceptual components of each definition (Anheier, 2004, p. 20). The central concepts of civil society across definitions primarily include the role of the state and the market relative to that of citizens and the society they constitute (Anheier, 2004, p. 20). Given these presumptions, the concept of civil society is understood here according to the definition provided by Anheier (2004), “Civil society is the sphere of
institutions, organizations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market” (p.22).

Anheier’s (2004) definition does not define all aspects of civil society; but it does however list elements and components that most interpretations of civil society would define as essential and important for measurement (p.22). Accordingly, a thriving civil society is understood herein as one in which there is a credible rule of law, extensive political participation, and pervasive political and social integration. Conversely, the opposite is true for weak civil societies.

Now that a common understanding for civil society has been established, let us now deconstruct the role of social interaction and associations to the process of developing a vibrant civil society. Robert D. Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* has propelled a more in depth understanding of the relationship between associational membership and civil society to the front stage of social and political science. In his study of northern and southern Italy, Putnam asks a central question in the field of civics: what makes civil society stable and effective? The following will illustrate how Putnam’s conclusions serve to further develop the notion that patterns of human interaction and the way in which people coalesce determines are important in determining the strength of civil society.

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5 A discussion of how this conceptual definition relates to the measurement of the variables can be found in chapter 3 of this work.
According to Putnam (1993; 2000), there is a positive correlation between the strength of civil society and the levels of associational membership among the polity. While Putnam (1993) is most commonly associated with initiating these ideas, the theory regarding the importance of associativeness to the development of civil society originated from Alexis de Tocqueville. Reflecting on the social conditions that sustained Democracy in America, Tocqueville attributed great importance to the propensity of Americans to join formal and informal groups, and become members of various secondary associations (i.e. country clubs, sports teams, choral societies, bird-watching clubs etc.) in society (as cited in Ehrenberg, 1999, p.103). The degree of associativeness by Americans was seen by Tocqueville as the key ingredient to the strong stable civil society he witnessed in the United States (as cited in Ehrenberg, 1999, p.103). As a result of Tocqueville’s study, membership in secondary associations is perceived as a virtuous characteristic of civil society because it is believed to be a source of cohesion and a common point of interaction for both individuals and various social groups (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Due to the influence of Tocqueville’s seminal work, Putnam (1993; 2000) ultimately suggests that the differential degree of civic associativeness between societies is the cause for the variation of strong and weak civil societies throughout the world.

Associational membership is understood by scholars to contribute to the effectiveness and stability of a civil society “because of their ‘internal’ effects on individuals and ‘external’ effects on the wider polity” (Howell & Pearce, 2002, p.100).
Internally, associations create a sense of social solidarity, unity, integration, and cooperation among members of a social system (Putnam, 1993, p.89). Externally, associations indoctrinate skills of cooperation and the aggregation of interests across a community, as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective activities (Putnam, 1993, p.89). In short, the literature suggests that high levels of associational membership lead to stronger civil societies because they reduce fragmentation, and create a sense of social cohesion and a medium to integrate various social groups within society (Howell & Pearce, 2002; Putnam 1993).

The development of social capital is an example of both an internal and external effect of associational membership in society (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Social capital is conceptualized by Putnam (2000) as:

Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to the connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital. (p.19)

Given the definition provided by Putnam, social capital is a source of relationships and connections among individuals. The amount of social capital within a society speaks to the dyadic patterns of human interaction and communication between individuals.
(Fukuyama, 1995). The dyadic interactions between individuals are important because of their aggregate effects of trust and cohesion on society as a whole.

Therefore, the final step in understanding how patterns of human interaction influence civil society is to choose a rather limited aspect of human interaction—interpersonal interaction (dyadic ties)—to show how the use of a network analysis can relate this aspect to varied macro phenomena as communication across various social groups, social cohesion, and social capital and trust. Dyadic ties are understood by Granovetter (1973) as the interpersonal relation or connection between person A and person B. These ties may be strong or weak. A weak tie is an acquaintance, while a strong tie is a close friend or family member (Granovetter, 1983). The nature of the relationship of ties to the social interaction and patterns of communication in society will help explain how cultures that are characterized by little or no social capital become atomized.

An analysis of dyadic ties provides a correlation between micro-level interactions in a civil society and the macro-level patterns of communication within a social system. Many analyses of civil society have been restrained by an analysis of the macro-level patterns of cultural diversity or homogeneity. While macro-level analyses are important for purposes of generalization, they have failed to recognize that communication patterns are not fixed and that social networks exist across cultures. An emphasis on the strength of dyadic ties, lends itself into a discussion of the micro-level relations between groups, and

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6 The strength of a tie “(probably linear) is a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services” which characterize an interpersonal relationship (Granovetter 1973.p.1361).
an analysis of segments of social structures, networks and relations that are not easily identified in terms of macro-level observations (Granovetter, 1973).

Let us consider the theory of dyadic tie analysis more closely. Granovetter (1973) presents the theory in the following way: consider any two arbitrarily selected individuals—call them A and B—and the set, $S = C, D, E, \ldots$, of all persons with ties to either or both of them. Each tie is somewhat independent of the other, but in total, the set $S$ is highly intra-correlated. Granovetter (1973, p.83) argues that we can relate dyadic ties to the larger structure of a social system because the stronger the tie between A and B, the larger the proportion of individuals in set $S$ to whom they will both be tied or connected by a weak or strong tie. “This overlap in their friendship circles is predicted to be least when their tie is absent, most when it is strong, and intermediate when it is weak” (Granovetter 1973, p.1362). The overlap between individuals based on dyadic ties is what allows us to understand patterns of human interaction and communication for an entire society (Granovetter, 1983).

Given the possibilities for overlap we can then consider that societies are made up of numerous triads based on strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Imagine that A and B are strongly tied, and A has a strong tie to some person C, but the tie between C and B is absent. Granovetter (1973) argues that this triad never occurs because the tie between B and C is always present, whether weak or strong, because of the existing dyadic ties between A and B, and A and C. The presumption that B and C will always have a tie,
results from Granovetter’s hypothesis that weak dyadic ties allow us to relate indirectly to other individuals in a social system because of strong ties. In order to understand communication, cohesion and interaction in civil society and larger social structures as a whole, we need a deeper understanding of how these triads function.

Many studies have been historically and presently been conducted to suggest that our acquaintances (weak ties) are less likely to be socially involved with one another than our close friends (strong ties) (Gibson, 2001). We can thus assume that any group of people made up of any individual’s acquaintances will comprise a low-density network\(^7\); whereas the set of people consisting of the same individual’s close friends will be a densely\(^8\) knit network (Granovetter, 1973).

Every person in the triad has his or her set of strong and weak ties which links to other triads and then other triads and so on and so forth. The overall structure of social networking theory implies that any individual will have a set of both strong ties and weak ties (Granovetter, 1983). Each of the weak ties is likely to have a set of their own strong ties. Therefore, and most importantly the weak ties between any two individuals become a crucial bridge between two densely knit groups of strong ties (Granovetter, 1973).

Building on an institutional analysis of weak ties we can begin to understand what aspects of a social structure facilitate or block organization and communication. As crucial bridges between two densely knit groups, weak ties facilitate communication across

\(^7\) One in which many possible relational lines are absent
\(^8\) One in which many possible relational lines are present
various social groups and strata within a social system. Weak ties increase the number of channels through which communication and information can be distributed and received. Therefore, a society with an abundant stock of weak ties will have more possible channels of communication and less degrees of atomization. Social systems that are lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and the flow of communication will be slow or prevented because there will be a fewer number of channels through which communication can be disseminated (Granovetter, 1983).

These ideas suggest that the dissemination of social cohesion, trust, and communication throughout a society is the product of network capacity. The development of social capital is understood to be a product of the development of trust in a society because of dyadic ties and the network affects of linkages to trust-building on the society as a whole (Beem, 1999, p.20). For example, trust between individuals becomes trust between strangers, which then eventually relates to trust of a broad fabric of social institutions; and ultimately, “the sum of the whole is larger than its parts” as a network effect of trust becomes a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole (Beem, 1999, p.20).

Thus, in order to assess the extent to which individuals in a society share a set of values, virtues and expectations, it then becomes essential to measure the degree of social capital within the polity (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is conventionally measured using a survey methodology which asks respondents about levels of interpersonal trust and
membership in secondary associations (Foley & Edwards, 1998). We should then expect to find this relationship empirically. While providing details later, chapter 5 will measure the strength of social capital through a survey distributed by both the World Values Survey and Latinobarómetro to four case studies (Bolivia, India, Nigeria, and Chile).

Putnam argues that secondary associations are critical environments for the development of trust in society (1993; 2000). The concept of social capital contends that building or rebuilding community and trust requires face-to-face encounters, to allow the dyadic ties to form, which Putnam argues can most easily be made in secondary associations (Beem, 1999, p. 20). Without interaction in secondary associations, the formation of trust is hindered, cohesion is disrupted and society is more likely to be atomized (Gibson, 2001). Decay or lack of trust can manifest itself into serious social problems, involving civil unrest, conflict, and war (Beem, 1999). According to the Putnam et al. theory, a logical procession can then assume that countries with low degrees of social capital or trust are also more likely to have weak civil societies.

Embedded in this argument, is also an understanding of a specific culture of social interaction in societies that are predominated by primary associations and lacking in social capital and trust. The culture is one of exclusivity, known as amoral familism (Putnam, 1983; Putnam, 2000). A culture of amoral familism refers to a social system in which individuals base all contact and importance on the exclusive defense of the interests of the nuclear family, and they assume that all other individuals will do the same. Cultures of
amoral familism are common in many developing countries, and by definition they are also highly problematic for the development of civil society because they do not promote social cohesion and interaction across various social groups (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Putnam, 1993).

The concept of amoral familism was first used by American sociologist Edward Banfield. In his book *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, originally published in 1958, Banfield used the notion of amoral familism to explain the economic backwardness of the village of Chiaromonte (referred to as “Montegrano” in his book) in the southern Italian region of Basilicata (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p.103). From his field research in this village, Banfield concluded that its ethos of amoral familism was the cause of the organizational and political incapacity of its inhabitants (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p.105). This ethos, summarized in the formula “Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise” produced, according to Banfield, a culture of mutual distrust that inhibited the cooperation of the citizens of Chiaromonte (as cited in Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p.105). In so much as each individual and family assumes that every other family will assume the same amoral familism, the degree of association beyond the family is minimal in societies characterized by a culture of amoral familism (as cited in Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p.105). As a result the sense of social cohesion, social capital and trust is limited because people are not interacting beyond one primary social group. Scholars would argue that only when people develop
membership and social coordination beyond the primary associations (such as family, religious groups, and language communities), by bonding in secondary associations such as sports clubs, bird-watching groups, community choirs and the like, will civil society grow (Howell & Pearce, 2002; Putnam, 1993). Membership in associations is meant to foster a medium for the network effects of social capital and trust to spillover to the larger society as a whole.

Granovetter’s pioneering ideas on the capacity of individual relationships for the communication in the broader society as a whole are important to understanding patterns of interaction and how people communicate. Granovetter has made us aware that people interact, while Putnam et al. have made us aware of the benefits and outcome of those interactions, but both scholars have failed to provide a theory which guides the patterns of human interaction. I suggest that culture defines the patterns of communication, social relations, and patterns of human interaction in society. Most specifically, the following section will look at two aspects of culture that perform this function. Beginning first with language, and then followed by social stratifications. There is a need to look further into the social relations of states with weak and strong civil societies. This can be accomplished by looking at culture. Recognizing that patterns of social relations are subject to culture, the following section considers how culture relates to civil society. In particular, it looks at how culture as an institution guides patterns of social relations and human interaction.
2.2. Cultural Diversity and Civil Society

Leading scholars such as Francis Fukuyama and Douglas North suggest that culture influences society because it is intricately embedded in human exchange, whether political, social or economic (Fukuyama, 1995; North, 1990). Prior to Fukuyama and North, Blau (1977) previously advocated that “the fundamental fact of society is precisely that it is social—that human beings do not live in isolation but associate with other human beings” (p.1). This section thus maintains that the strength of civil society is heavily influenced by culture.

Culture is an abstraction which encompasses the factors that dictate patterns of social relations, interaction, communication and human association. Relating the importance of culture to society, anthropologist, Clifford Geertz refers to culture “as an entire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols, institutions, and human relationships” (as cited in Harrison & Huntington, 2000, p.xv). Building on Geertz’s definition, Rao and Walton (2004) suggest:

*Culture is concerned with identity, aspiration, symbolic exchange, coordination, and structures and practices that serve relational ends, such as ethnicity, ritual, heritage, norms, meanings, and beliefs…a set of contested attributes, constantly in flux, both shaping and being shaped by social and economic aspects of human interaction (p.4).*

Both Rao & Walton and Geertz conceive of ‘culture’ as something that influences how social interaction is received and communication is achieved.
Culture is an institution (North, 1990). Institutions determine the structure of communication and human interaction within a social system (North, 1994). North (1990) recognizes institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p.3). In short, institutions are the rules of the game that define the *striae* of social space (Hardt 1995, p.34). By providing structure to everyday life, institutions embed the criteria for how social groups and individuals behave with respect to one another. “In the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North, 1990, p. 4).

Thus far this review has explained how culture determines the patterns of interaction in society. As an institution, culture is the rules of game in a society that shape communication and human interaction. Culture can be measured on a macro level using variables like language, ethnicity or religion, but culture can also be measured on a micro level focusing specifically on the dimensions of communication and human interaction in society.

Recognizing that culture influences patterns of social interaction, communication and the way that the social structure is conceived, we can therefore begin to conceptualize how culture affects civil society. The increasing complexity of culture is thus assumed to hinder the process of social interaction and communication (Crystal, 1997, p.10). As social interaction and communication becomes sparse, the society becomes more atomized and fragmented. The literature therefore validates the claim that cultural diversity is seen as a
cause for atomization; and more importantly, if atomization is the antithesis of civil society, it now becomes apparent why so many scholars believe that cultural diversity weakens the capacity for a developed civil society (Posner, 2004).

Culturally complex societies—(cultural diversity) are characterized here as the coexistence of different ethnic, racial, religious, socioeconomic, and linguistic groups within one social unit. Whatever the conditions that produce diversity among societies, these conditions have paradoxical consequences for inter-group relations and the degree of cohesion in society (Blau, 1977, p. 79). The following will therefore examine how language and social stratifications are two cultural factors that influence social interaction and communication within a social structure. Moreover, language is a macro lens through which we can begin to understand the cultural composition and framework of a country, while social stratifications provide a micro analysis into the systems and structure of social relations in society.

2.2.1. Language is a Reliable Measure of Culture

The amount of linguistic variation in a country is used in this research to measure the concept of cultural diversity because of the strong correlation that exists between language and culture. Multilingualism is a reliable measure of culture because language is closely related to the social structure and value systems of society (Trudgill, 1983, p. 19). Franz Boas, one of the founders of American anthropology, argues that one could not really understand any culture without having direct access to its language (Duranti, 1997,
Boas insists on the need to study language in order to comprehend the complexity of culture because of the intimate connection between culture and language (Duranti, 1997, p.52). This research maintains Boas’ view that language and culture are locked in a relationship which may be characterized as holistically interrelated.

Language serves as an important instrument for understanding the customs and beliefs of people (Duranti, 1997, p. 52). We can deduce a great deal of information about a person’s cultural identity from their native language or mother tongue. Language carries culturally specific connotations, tradition, and history. For example, idiomatic expressions are great sources for ethnographic and sociolinguistic studies of culture and values. Language transcends the role of communication, and serves as a point of reference for conveying culture, and identifying values and social realities (Chriost, 2003, p. 13).

Language and culture are further viewed as interrelated concepts by anthropologists and sociolinguists because each represents an identity and greater group membership (McCormack, 1979, p. 1). Due to the inherent relationship between ethnicity and culture, we can draw conclusions from sociolinguistic ethnic studies; Trudgill (1983) affirms that in many cases language is an important association of ethnic group membership. Therefore one way to measure the degree of cultural heterogeneity within a polity is to use language as a proxy for ethnicity and cultural identity. Linguistic characteristics are seen by Trudgill (1983) as the most defining criteria for cultural identity (Trudgill, 1983, p. 53). The percentage of a population whose historic language is Welsh,
Catalan or Luo thus allows for a more subjective accounting of the percentage of Welsh, Catalans or Luos in Britain, Spain or Kenya (Laitin, 2000, p. 142). Evidence for these assertions is readily found in many other countries as well. For example, the three major ethnic groups in Mozambique are distinguished mainly by language. While they also have different religions, different histories, and traditions, the most important defining characteristic between them, is whether they are native speakers of Emakhuwa, Xichangana, or Portuguese (Baldauf, 2004, p. 152). Methodologically this view of the role of language and culture means that linguistic systems can be studied as guides to cultural systems (Duranti, 1997, p. 53).

Although a strong association does exist between cultural identity and language, there are some limitations to using language data as a proxy measure for cultural diversity or ethnic heterogeneity. In many instances, the word for an ethnic group is either identical to or has the same root as the word for the language, for example Welsh, Catalan, Luo, French, German, and Japanese. However, many examples come to mind where an ethnic group’s language name is different from the group name, for example, Tagalog in the Philippines, and also instances in which there is a common tongue shared by different ethnic groups, for example, Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique, Brazil, Portugal, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Macau, East Timor, and São Tome e Príncipe (Lieberson, 1981, p. 4). Lieberson (1981) offers a solution to this limitation:

*While ethnic differences are sometimes not accompanied by linguistic differences, it is rare to find two or more mutually intelligible languages*
used in a society without speakers belonging to different ethnic groups. (p.4)

Although important, Lieberson’s (1981) solution is not exhaustive. A second problem with using language data as a proxy for cultural diversity is that it assumes people map one-to-one onto ethnic or linguistic groups (Laitin, 2000, p. 143). People have multiple ethnic heritages, and many people throughout the world have a complex language repertoire that allows them to communicate effectively across cultures, this is particularly true in multilingual societies. A third problem is that culture is in itself a very abstract concept to measure. There are many definitions and interpretations of culture across disciplines. While any quantitative analysis by proxy is not entirely sufficient to encompass the totality and uniqueness of a single culture most interpretations of culture would find language as an essential and important defining characteristic. Therefore, methodologically, this view of the intimate connection between language and culture means that linguistic systems can be studied as guides to cultural structures.

2.2.2. Social Stratifications

What is missing from the Putnam et al. arguments is the implicit notion that society in and of itself is a socially constructed community (Anderson, 1983). As a source of identity, and as a cause of the innate human desire to feel as part of a larger whole, individuals imagine themselves as part of different groups in society, in what Anderson (1983) defines as *imagined communities* (p.7). Examples of imagined communities include
kin groups, religious sects, linguistic communities, nuclear families; and also broader categories of social stratifications like gender, race, ethnicity, class, and caste (Anderson, 1983, p.67).

Anderson (1983) notes that in culturally complex societies, imagined communities manifested in the systems of social stratifications play a dominant role in guiding human interaction, communication and relationships. As a type of imagined community, social stratifications dictate the patterns of interactions that exist within the social structure of a society (Blau, 1977). Granovetter (1973; 1983) has made us aware of how people interact and the network effects of individual interactions. The study of social stratifications illustrates the extent to which people associate with one another because they can create restrictions on interaction and associations (Blau, 1977, p.1). While language is an important channel for communication, it is not always about what languages a society speaks, but how people within the society communicate with one another within a broader framework of social norms, behaviors and beliefs. The study of social stratifications allows for an understanding of the broader framework that dictates the conditions under which individuals in a society communicate and interact.

The study of social stratifications, as conceived in this thesis, centers attention on the distribution of people among different positions of the hierarchal structure of society, their geographic location within the state, and the embeddedness of their ascribed social status. The following will focus predominantly on cultural factors of social stratification.
People are understood here to occupy different positions in the hierarchy of society because they are members of a particular race, ethnicity, caste, class, religion, gender, or linguistic community.

If we are to ever reach any understanding of what comprises a developed civil society, it is essential to consider the micro factors that dictate the patterns of social interaction (Blau, 1977, p.5) Social stratifications are one such factor. It is to this end that this thesis is concerned with the embeddedness of social stratifications—or the degree to which the different social positions in the hierarchy of society are entrenched, fixed, or deeply rooted to a particular race, caste, class, gender, ethnicity, etc. (Blau, 1977, p.5).

The greater the amount of heterogeneity in a society, the more pervasive are group barriers to social relations (Blau, 1977, p.79). The increasing complexity of cultural diversity in society creates more systems of social stratifications. As stratifications become more embedded, the degree of atomization in society increases (Blau, 1977, p.70). According to Gibson (2001), atomization is the antithesis of civil society (p.52). Atomization is defined by Gibson (2001) as “the condition in which each citizen is disassociated from every other citizen” (p.52). A logical procession can then assume that deeply embedded social stratifications are antithetic to the development of civil society. The central hypothesis of this thesis therefore maintains that the strength of civil society is dependent upon the extent to which social stratifications are embedded. It is predicted that when social stratifications are weakly embedded, civil society is strong; similarly, where
social stratifications are deeply embedded, civil society is weak. Chapter 5 will explore this relationship further in four case studies. Let us turn to the methods in which the embeddedness of social stratifications can be assessed. It is argued below that if there are indicators of upward social mobility among minority and marginalized populations, social stratifications must not be deeply embedded because individuals have the opportunity to escape or rise out of their ascribed status and social positions in the social structure.

2.2.3. Social Mobility

Processes of social mobility are an essential element in the most forms of structural change (Blau, 1977, p.5). Social mobility is defined broadly to encompass all movements of persons between social positions (from one stratum or group to another), including not only occupational mobility and migration but also rising income, unemployment, marriage, and changes in political affiliation (Blau, 1977). Because people are moving from one stratum or group to another, social mobility promotes inter-group relations (Blau, 1977, p.38). The following will discuss the implications of two methods of social mobility: education and rural-urban migration.

Beginning first with education, it is well known that education is one of the most important factors for social mobility. The increasing amounts of human capital, knowledge and skills allows individuals to be more competitive in the work force, and compete for better paying jobs. Two recent studies have theoretically analyzed the relationship between education and social mobility (Andersen, 2001; Revollo, 2006). They both arrive at the
conclusion that high social mobility is associated with higher levels of educational attainment.

Revollo (2006) focuses on the growing awareness that the expansion of formal schooling strongly influence improvements in standards of living. Revollo (2006) suggests that the role of formal education is not limited to imparting the knowledge and skills that allows individuals to function as economic change agents in their societies. Formal education also imparts ideas, values, attitudes, aspirations (Revollo, 2006, p.7). In her study, Revollo (2006) finds a positive correlation with the number of years of schooling and the increasing level of income in Bolivia. She concludes that education is a fundamental factor in promoting the development of the economy and social mobility in rural and marginalized peoples.

Despite the benefits of education, statistics on education can be misleading. Statistics on education tell us the proportion of school age children and teenagers enrolled in primary, secondary, and higher educational institutions at a single point in time (Todaro, 1989, p.334). They do not tell us how many of these students remain in school for the duration of the required time and if they go to school everyday. Andersen (2001) aims to overcome the shortfall in reported education statistics by measuring the average schooling gap in children. Andersen (2001) measures the average schooling according to the following formula: schooling gap is defined as the disparity between the years of education that teenager or young adult would have completed had she/he entered at a normal school-
starting age and advanced one grade each year on one hand, and the actual years of education on the other hand (p.8). For example, an 18 year old teenager who has completed 9 years of schooling will register on Andersen’s schooling gap of \((18-9-6) = 3\) years. Andersen’s methodology is a fruitful measurement for assessing the impact of education on rural people’s capacity for social mobility.

Andersen (2001) new measure of social mobility based on schooling gap regressions also determines the importance of social stratifications (family background in this case) in explaining schooling gaps among children in Latin America. Andersen (2001) finds that social mobility is highest in countries (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru) where children have significantly smaller schooling gaps. The schooling gap regressions also reveal that social mobility is generally higher in highly urbanized countries. Based on Andersen’s findings, this research builds on the relationship between higher social mobility and urbanization in developing countries. The following section investigates what factors of rural-urban migration and urbanization could contribute to processes of upward social mobility.

Rural-urban migration is a dynamic complex process that is both positive and negative. Urbanization implies intensification of human activities and opportunities for employment, besides the concentration of the more dynamic part of the population (Gaur, Bakshi, & Agrawal, 2004). There are direct as well as indirect links for urbanization and development schemes. In fact higher levels of urbanization are regarded as one of the
indicators of development (Gaur et al., 2004). Large cities are full of capacity for individual opportunity and national economic development. Numerous surveys and secondary data analyses document that large cities offer migrants the greatest options for social mobility (Parnell et al., 1993). One reason for this is because urban areas offer the luxury of proximity to public goods and resources that are otherwise often not available to rural regions in the developing world. For example, medical facilities, cheaper transportation, education, communication systems, infrastructure, social welfare program, access to political capital, voting booths, government officials, and judiciary bodies (Parnell et al., 1993).

Large cities serve as highly efficient centers of specialized products, labor, and as primary contributors to the national economy (Parnell et al., 1993). Various analyses reveal that many of the developing world’s largest cities are important global hubs of finance, manufacturing, trade, services, and administration (Parnell et al., 1993). Cities contribute exponentially to the economy because they provide individuals with opportunity for mobility and social transformation by providing economies of scale. The economies of scale found in cities allow industry and commerce to flourish with access to markets and create the needed jobs for many of the impoverished people in the rural regions (Parnell et al., 1993).

Urbanization can bring numerous beneficial factors for the migrant worker and the individual in search of opportunity in the urban area; however, accompanying urbanization
with the explosive growth of cities is a plethora of problems of sometimes seemingly unmanageable proportions (Parnell et al., 1993). The supply push-demand pull factors of urbanization can often strain the infrastructure of the city. Examples of these include, among others, high rates of unemployment and underemployment as urban labor markets are unable to absorb the expanding number of job seekers, soaring urban poverty, squalor and shanty-towns (insufficient shelter), inadequate sanitation, inadequate or contaminated water supplies, serious air pollution and other forms of environmental degradation, congested streets, overloaded public transportation systems, and municipal budget crises (Parnell et al., 1993). Among the most pressing issues of urbanization is the developing world is environmental degradation (Parnell et al., 1993, p.xv). Inadequate sewage and potable water supplies and severe air pollution create serious health risks for the millions of people living in overcrowded urban area (Parnell et al., 1993, p.xv).

Development or upward social mobility does not occur automatically with rural-urban migration; however, one cannot deny the prospect for opportunity that cities and urban areas represent. There is ample evidence that children living in urban areas have better access to education, and given the established positive correlation between education and upward social mobility, rural-urban migration is often the key to gaining access to education (Parnell et al., 1993). Given these presumptions, chapter 5 will build on the theoretical framework established here and investigate the benefits of rural-urban
migration in creating the capacity for upward social mobility in Bolivia, India, Nigeria, and Chile.

2.3. Summary

This review has established the conceptual framework for how cultural diversity relates to civil society. The literature has served as a point of reference to establish a foundation for the argument that the strength of civil society is dependent upon a system of social relations and patterns of human interaction and communication in society. The arguments outlined by Tocqueville and Putnam et al. served as a starting point to establish where the idea of a relational component to civil society is first found.

Moving then to understanding how social relations are the product of culture, this review outlines how North (1990) and Granovetter (1973) conceive of how culture affects the aggregate of society by affecting patterns of human interaction and communication. Given the importance of culture to society, it was then established that a complexity in culture can hinder the very characteristics that are central to the development of civil society (Gibson, 2001). From this vantage point, cultural diversity is viewed as inimical to the development of civil society because it is seen as a cause for atomization and the lack of social cohesion in society (Posner, 2004). The central question the literature poses is thus: if cultural diversity is understood as a source which mars the development of civil society, it is puzzling to find evidence of vibrant civil societies in culturally diverse
countries, and weak civil societies in culturally homogeneous cultures. I have argued here that the strength of civil society is not dependent upon macro generalizations of cultural diversity, but instead upon a more nuanced understanding of cultural diversity which accounts for the established patterns of association, human interaction and communication. Most particularly, I have argued that civil society is dependent upon the embeddedness of social stratifications in society.

That civil society is dependent upon the embeddedness of social stratifications is an explanation which holds to account for the variance of cases in civil society throughout the developing world. For example, if given cultural homogeneity and low civil society (i.e. Bolivia), then the explanation for the weakness of civil society is not a macro understanding of the cultural composition of the country, but the presence of deeply embedded social stratifications. The same reasoning holds true for cases that are most predictable (i.e. low diversity, strong civil society; and high diversity, weak civil society). I believe this argument explains not only the irony of countries like Bolivia, but it also explains the most obvious cases like Sudan, Nigeria, and the United States.
Chapter 3. Methodology

To illustrate the influence of cultural diversity on civil society, this thesis will employ an interdisciplinary methodology. The empirical evidence will involve a series of statistical regressions conducted for a sample of 119 developing countries, followed by a qualitative investigation of four case studies in India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Chile. The statistical regressions aim to show the strength of the correlation between civil society and cultural diversity, while the purpose of the qualitative analyses is to explain why the correlation exists or does not exist.

Civil society is measured according to three proxy variables: rule of law, political participation and political and social integration. The measurements for the proxy variables are derived from a robust index known as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). Cultural diversity will be measured with two different proxy variables. The first empirical analysis will measure the independent variable—cultural diversity according to the amount of linguistic variation per country, while the second empirical analysis will measure cultural diversity in terms of the embeddedness of cultural stratifications. The methods for these measurements are explored below. The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: the first section will describe the methodology for the dependent variable; second, I will outline the two different ways the independent variable is measured; third, explain

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how the values for social capital are retrieved and evaluated; and finally, describe the statistical and analytical procedures.

3.1. Measuring the Dependent Variable

The purpose of this research is to measure the validity of the claim that cultural diversity inevitably mars the development of civil society. Provided that as of the present date, a global civil society index does not exist, the concept of civil society will be measured here according to three proxy variables borrowed from the 2006 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). BTI is made up of two indices: a management index and a status index. The management index is the world’s only index on the quality of political leadership based on self-collected data. The following four variables are included in the measurement of the management index: steering capability, resource efficiency, consensus building, and international cooperation. The status index reports the progress of countries as they develop democratic market economies. The status index is the result of two miniature indices, which include democracy and market economy. The democracy index is

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10 BTI is a global index published every two years. BTI aims to analyze and evaluate the development and transformation process of developing countries towards a stable market based democratic regime. BTI is made up of two indices: a status index and a management index. The values for each index are based on qualitative expert assessments and a stringent review process. Relying on 58 separate questions, experts on the country in question, for all 119 countries, examine in detail to what extent the total 19 criteria (12 for the status index and 7 for market management index) have been met. Each score is viewed a second time by an independent second assessor who is also an expert on the country in question. Following the second assessment, a third review of the data is conducted by two regional experts to ensure an agreement on the reported scores, values and rankings. The BTI board then conducts a final review of the data, compiles the rankings and coordinates them within a global comparison. For further information, log onto BTI 2006 Brochure, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1
comprised of five variables: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of
democratic institutions, and political and social integration. The market economy index is
the combination of scores from seven variables: level of socioeconomic development,
organization of the market and competition, currency and price stability, private property,
welfare regime, economic performance, and sustainability. This research is primarily
concerned with BTI’s sub-index for democracy because the variables included in its
measurement soundly symbolize the components of civil society according to the
operational definition of civil society used in this thesis as outlined by Anheier (2004):

Civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals
located between the family, the state and the market (p.22).

The operational definition of civil society provided by Anheier (2004) reports that
civil society is made up of the interrelationships between institutions, organizations, and
individuals (p.22). Given this definition, the researcher has chosen to use three measures
from BTI’s status of democracy index as proxies to quantify the strength or weakness of
civil society in the sample population. The three proxy variables used to create the civil
society index in this research are: rule of law, political participation, and political and
social integration. The variables chosen properly represent the three basic components of
Anheier’s definition for civil society. For example, the rule of law is an adequate
representation for the strength of institutions in a society. Similarly, political participation,
is a satisfactory indication of individual values. And finally, the degree of political and
social integration serves as a reliable representation of the organizational component because it is a comprehensive measurement for assessing the extent to which people associate and organize. Taken in sum, the variables comprise an index which strongly characterizes the raw underlying concept of civil society. Table 1.1 below illustrates how the variables were defined and measured by BTI.

**Table 3.1. Definition of Proxy Variables Used to Create the Civil Society Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables:</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Political &amp; Social Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives:</strong></td>
<td>State powers ensure civil liberties and maintain a system of checks and balances</td>
<td>The population determines who governs, and has other political freedoms</td>
<td>Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state; there is a consolidated civic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Questions:</strong></td>
<td>1. Does the separation of powers (checks and balances) work?</td>
<td>1. To what extent are political leaders determined by general, free, and fair elections?</td>
<td>1. To what extent is there a stable, moderate and socially rooted party system to articulate and aggregate social interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Does an independent judiciary exist?</td>
<td>2. Do democratically elected political officials have the effective power to govern, or are there veto powers or political enclaves?</td>
<td>2. To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Are their legal or political penalties for office holders who abuse their position?</td>
<td>3. To what extent can independent, and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?</td>
<td>3. How strong is the citizens’ support for democratic norms and procedures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. To what extent are civil liberties guaranteed, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?</td>
<td>4. To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?</td>
<td>4. To what extent have social self organization and the construction of social capital advanced?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three proxy variables will be used to ultimately create a composite civil society index score for each of the 119 countries in the sample population. In BTI, the variables are measured on a scale of 1 to 10, with a value of 1 indicating the lowest possible assessment score and 10 indicating the highest. The scores of the three variables for each country will then be averaged and placed on a new civil society scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6\(^{11}\). By creating a scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6, we are able to create an index that assigns a qualitative value to the strength of civil society for each country in the sample population: 1= not at all strong, 2=not very strong, 3= somewhat strong, 4= rather strong, 5= very strong, and 6= extremely strong. Given this scale, countries with a score of 3 or less are interpreted to have weak civil societies; similarly, countries with a score of 4, 5, or 6 are understood to have strong civil societies.

3.2. Measuring the Independent Variable

The concept of cultural diversity and the degree to which a country is culturally homogeneous or heterogeneous is first measured according to the amount of linguistic diversity per country. The data for linguistic diversity will be derived from the 2006

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\(^{11}\)The total possible points for the three scores is 30, therefore the highest possible average score is 10. Countries with an average score of 1, 2, or 3 were coded as 1; countries with an average score of 4 or 5 were coded as 2; countries with an average score of 6 were coded as 3; countries with an average score of 7 were coded as 4; countries with an average score of 8 were coded as 5; and finally countries with an average score of 9 or 10 were coded as 6.
Ethnologue Report\textsuperscript{12}. Ethnologue reports yearly the total number of linguistic varieties in a country, including the number of minority languages, or indigenous linguistic varieties used a first language in a given country. The value for \( n \) languages ranges from \( n=1 \) to \( n=820 \) in the sample population. The degree of cultural diversity in a society is interpreted as a product of the amount of linguistic variation in the country; thus, as the level of linguistic diversity per country increases, the amount of cultural diversity is interpreted to increase as well.

3.3. Measuring Social Capital

In order to test for the strength of social capital in each case study, the researcher uses data provided by the World Values survey and the Latinobarómetro\textsuperscript{13}. Both surveys ask the same question\textsuperscript{14}: \textit{Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?} Survey respondents were


\textsuperscript{13} Latinobarómetro is a public opinion survey carried out annually in 18 Latin American countries since 1995. Latinobarómetro interviews approximately 1,000 people in each country each year. The sampling method varies slightly from country to country, as implementation is contracted out to national polling firms. Selection procedures ensure some quotas to secure representation across gender, socioeconomic status and age. The survey is restricted to urban populations, and the emphasis is on political perceptions and attitudes. Latinobarómetro Report Data Bank 2006. Online version: \url{http://www.latinobarometro.org/uploads/media/LatinobarMetro_Report_2006.pdf}. Accessed 17 March 2007.

\textsuperscript{14} The WVS was used for Chile, India and Nigeria. Due to lack of reported data for Bolivia in the WVS, the Latinobarómetro was consulted for the data in Bolivia. \url{www.worldvaluessurvey.org} and \url{www.latinobarometro.org}
given two choices: (1) one can trust most people, or (2) can’t be too careful. After gathering data from the surveys, levels of trust were determined as high or low as a result of comparison in the sample population.

3.4. Statistical & Analytical Procedures

OLS regressions will be conducted between the independent variable—language diversity, and the dependent variable—new civil society index. The R squared values and significance levels will then be assessed, followed by a close analysis of the data by individual country so as to find any cases of linguistically homogenous countries with low civil society scores, and linguistically diverse countries with high civil society scores\(^{15}\).

The case studies in chapter five will be selected according to the data presented in the statistical analyses of chapter four. It is the objective of the research to select a sample of cases studies which reflects all possible outcomes regarding the relationship of linguistic diversity to civil society. As illustrated in the matrix below, four cases were selected.

\(^{15}\) For a full illustration of this data, refer to Appendix 2.
Further criteria which influenced the selection of cases to be analyzed, involved the availability of data which described the social structure of each society with respect to social stratifications and the availability of indicators for social mobility. In order to test for the validity of the central hypothesis of this research, anthropological and ethnographic texts will be consulted to provide a description of the social stratifications that exist in each of these societies, and how the social stratifications are delineated across the different social groups.
After assessing the hierarchical structure of each society, the embeddedness of social stratifications is measured according to the opportunity for upward social mobility presented across marginalized social groups. Two primary indicators of social mobility will be examined: education and rural-urban migration. The analysis of social mobility indicators will focus primarily on the variables of race, ethnicity, caste, class, and geographical location.

Final conclusions and analyses of the case studies are determined based upon the following reasoning provided by Blau (1977): If upward social mobility is found to be high, social stratifications are not considered deeply embedded, similarly, if upward social mobility is found to be low, social stratifications are considered to be deeply embedded (p.4).
Chapter 4. The Influence of Linguistic Diversity on Civil Society

This thesis contends that the concept of culture is an abstraction which encompasses the factors that dictate patterns of human interaction in a social structure. Moreover, culture is an institution that influences how social interaction is received and communication is achieved. Language is an important cultural factor which governs the patterns of social interaction and communication within a social structure (Blau, 1977; Duranti, 1997). The strength of civil society is understood to be influenced by institutions which control the patterns of human interaction in a social structure (Fukuyama, 1995; Gibson, 2001). This chapter will therefore examine empirically how the institution of language affects the strength of civil society in the developing world.

When patterns of human interaction are discernibly absent or sparse, the society is atomized. Gibson (2001) asserts that atomization is the antithesis of civil society. If language is an institution which influences patterns of human interaction and communication, and atomization is the antithesis of a developed civil society then linguistic diversity could be a cause for atomization in society. Evidence exists to support this claim (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Posner 2004). Therefore, if linguistic diversity is in fact a barrier to the development of civil society in the developing world, we should not expect to find cases of less developed civil societies in linguistically homogenous states, and developed civil societies in heterogeneous states. The empirical analysis in this chapter
will illustrate that numerous contradictions like these do in fact exist. Ultimately, the data reported in this chapter will reveal that cultural diversity—as measured by language is not the most reliable indicator for describing the strength of civil society in the developing world. Therefore, the principle hypothesis of this thesis maintains that the strength of civil society is better explained by the embeddedness of social stratifications in a society rather than the degree of linguistic diversity among the population.

To address this argument, the chapter will first explain why a civil society index had to be constructed for the dependent variable. Second, explain the problems associated with measuring language. Third, report the statistical results; and, finally, discuss the implications of the findings.

4.1. Civil Society Index

To date, a global civil society index that provides a composite score of civil society cross-nationally for the world as a whole does not exist. The measures of civil society in the form of an index that do exist focus primarily on developed countries. The absence of a civil society index that is akin to the Human Development Index (HDI) or other quantitative indices is due primarily in part to the fact that there is no sufficiently complex theory of civil society that allows us to adequately understand the contemporary conditions of states (Arato & Cohen, 1992, p. 10). Anheier (2004) admits that social scientists, policy-

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These include the Global Civil Society Index (GCSI) produced by the London School of Economics, and the CIVICUS index produced by the World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
makers and practitioners alike have not yet found the conceptual and methodological framework that is adequate for understanding and discussing civil society in similar fashions as the state of an economy, or the performance of governments (p.10). Numerous definitions of civil society have been proposed, and many are culture-bound and inherently normative (Anheier, 2004, p.11). While many different definitions of civil society can be found, much overlap exists among core conceptual components (Anheier, 2004, p. 20). The core concepts of civil society primarily include the role of the state and the market relative to that of citizens and the society they constitute (Anheier, 2004, p. 20). As outlined in chapter one of this thesis, the following operational definition of Anheier (2004) is assumed:

Civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market (p.22)

Anheier (2004) asserts that the definition provided above does not attempt to define all aspects of civil society; however, it does list elements and components that most interpretations of civil society would define as essential and important for measurement (p.22). The operational definition is measured by using three proxy measures of civil society derived from the 2006 Bertelsmann Transformation Index: rule of law, political and social integration, and political participation. Together these three variables speak to the three components of institutions, organizations, and individuals that Anheier outlines in his definition. A composite index was created from the values each country received for
each variable as recorded in BTI 2006. The civil society index constructed here ranges in value from 1 (indicating a weak civil society) to 6 (indicating a strong civil society).

4.2. Measuring Language Diversity

There are many theoretical and methodological problems associated with the measurement of the independent variable, language. As explained in chapter two, language is considered to be a reliable measure of the concept of cultural diversity. The data for the independent variable (linguistic diversity) was derived from the 2006 Ethnologue Report. The operational definition for linguistic diversity is the total number of linguistic varieties in a country, including the number of minority languages, or indigenous linguistic varieties used a first language in a given country. The value for \( n \) languages ranges from \( n=1 \) to \( n=820 \) for the sample population. As the total number of linguistic varieties increases, the degree of linguistic diversity (and therefore cultural diversity) is interpreted to increase.

Language has the advantage that it can be measured independently of the dependent variables that concern this research. Additionally, language can be coded to allow for useful statistical tests and quantitative analyses. But while there is compelling evidence to use linguistic variation as a measurement for cultural diversity, there is some ambiguity in terms of how to collect linguistic data, and exactly what is meant by the phrase \textit{a language}.
There is a lack of consensus by linguistics, anthropologists, and other social-scientists alike on how to measure the degree of linguistic diversity in a society primarily due to the following five reasons: the first reason being, we don’t know enough about many of the languages spoken throughout the world because there are many languages which lack a systematic orthography, and many indigenous peoples are remote and unreachable (Duranti, 1997, p.50).

Secondly, linguistic surveys in many parts of the world are incomplete due to political rationale, social capital imbalances and power structures (Duranti, 1997, p.50). Some languages have yet to be discovered and many languages have not been adequately described (Duranti, 1997, p.50). This is the case with many of the languages in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas.

Thirdly, there is no clear-cut distinction between the phrase a language and the term dialect\(^\text{17}\) (Duranti, 1997, p.50). Fourth, and related to the latter point, criteria of national identity and mutual intelligibility may not coincide (Trudgill, 1974, p.51). In some cases, political criteria outweigh linguistic criteria and dialects are given the status of a

\(^{17}\) The difference between a language versus a dialect is an ongoing debate within the field of linguistics. Linguists usually rely on a criterion called mutual intelligibility to decide the difference between the two concepts. In scientific terms: if persons A and B speak different language systems, but can understand each other when each is speaking their characteristic language system, they are speaking dialects of the same language. Other criteria must also be met in order for the two languages to be considered dialects of the same language: the two language systems must be similar in their pronunciation, grammar, and word stock. If speakers A and B cannot understand one another, they are scientifically understood to be speaking different languages. But social stigma and political borders have created confusion regarding the differences between the two concepts, these implications are further explained above. Source: (Duranti, 1997, p.70).
standard language. For instance, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian are mutually intelligible (linguistic criteria), scientifically they are considered dialects of the same language, but since they are spoken in different countries and therefore separated by political borders (political criteria), they are considered to be three separate languages (Trudgill, 1974, p.51). On the other hand, many dialects of Chinese are mutually unintelligible, but are considered to be dialects of the same language because they are spoken in the same country and they share the same writing system (Trudgill, 1974, p.51).

And finally, the vast majority of nation-states have many different cultures which comprise their population, and accordingly, they also have more than one language spoken indigenously within their borders (Lieberson, 1981; Trudgill, 1983). In some cases, such as Cameroon, Papua New Guinea or Indonesia, the number of languages may rise into the hundreds (Trudgill, 1983, p.141). As a result, it is hard to determine how accurate the amount of linguistic diversity in the country is in terms of adequately describing the degree of cultural diversity. For example, in Brazil there are approximately 200 different languages spoken. A majority of these languages are found in the Amazon, and Portuguese is the official language spoken throughout the country. As a result the amount of linguistic diversity reported for Brazil gives a misleading impression in terms of the cultural diversity in the country.

Additionally, the degree of multilingualism throughout the world is so vast, that difficulty arises when one attempts to locate a country that is genuinely monolingual. We
are accustomed to thinking the United States and many countries in Europe are monolingual nations; however, there is more than one viable language spoken in many European countries and the United States. For example, using measures from *Ethnologue*\(^1\)\(^8\), the United States has 311 different languages spoken among its polity, while countries like France, Germany, and Sweden have 86, 69, and 32 different languages spoken within their respective frontiers. The number of different languages is just as high, and sometimes higher in many countries throughout the developing world. This evidence suggests that the theory of civil society concerning cultural homogeneity needs to be better defined, because it seems as though most societies are somewhat heterogeneous. The terms *cultural homogeneity* and *cultural diversity* as used in this study refer to the level of multilingualism in a society.

### 4.3. Results

Despite the limitations in the availability of data for each of the variables in this study, the research was still able to achieve statistically significant results\(^1\)\(^9\). Before conducting the regression analyses, the three proxy variables—rule of law, political participation, and political and social integration were first tested for correlation so as to determine if the proxy variables are strongly correlated with each other so as to see if they

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\(^1\)\(^9\) All results reported are statistically significant at the p<.01 level.
represent a good measure of the raw underlying concept of civil society. All three variables were solidly correlated at the .01 significance level with a very strong Cronbach’s alpha value of .957\(^{20}\). The values presented in table 4.1 below, grant statistical support to the strength of the relationships and speak to the reliability of the proxies as valid measures for the core principal concept of civil society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>Political &amp; Social Integration = .906(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law = .915(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political &amp; Social Integration</td>
<td>Political Participation = .906(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law = .921(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Political Participation = .915 (**).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political &amp; Social Integration = .921(**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Following the correlation analyses, an OLS regression was first conducted between the language variable and each of the three proxy variables. While statistically significant at the p<.05 levels, the R Square value for each regression was low, ranging from .033 to .052 to .054. From these values, we can interpret that 3.3%, 5.2% and 5.4% of the variance can be explained by the dependent variables in the sample population. We can therefore also interpret that approximately 95% of the variance is left unexplained when each of these variables is measured individually against the independent variable. In each case, the unstandardized coefficient B is twice the value of the standard error, which provides additional support for the strength and significance of the relationships between the variables. Moreover, the standardized coefficient Beta provides evidence that there exists an inverse relationship between linguistic diversity and each dependent variable in the data. Table 4.2 further illustrates these results.
Given that independently, each dependent variable provides a statistically significant relationship, the variables were then tested as one unit of analysis against the independent language variable used above. The new civil society composite score of all three variables tested at once against the independent variable yields an R Squared value of .076, and is significant at the p<.01 level. The unstandardized coefficient B (-1.64) is twice the value of the standard error (.682), which reinforces the statistical analyses conducted.
above, as well as the theoretical arguments of Putnam et al., which attest to the strength of the inverse relationship between civil society and cultural diversity. The composite score reveals that approximately eight percent of the variance in civil society can be explained by the independent variable. Under this regression, approximately, 3% of the cases were high civil society, high linguistic diversity; 27% were high civil society, low linguistic diversity; 52% were low civil society, low linguistic diversity; 18% were low civil society, high linguistic diversity.

The evidence provided in these statistical analyses contradict the theory that cultural diversity inevitably mars the development of civil society. The data reveals that there are cases in the sample population where the correlation between the variables of homogeneity and strong civil society says should not exist. The countries with the lowest civil society scores (i.e. composite index score of 1, 2, or 3) display a wide range in linguistic diversity, where \( n = 1 \) to \( n = 820 \). Similarly, the scope of the range in linguistic diversity does not hold true for countries with developed civil societies (i.e. composite score of 4, 5, or 6). Out of seven countries in the sample population that received a composite score of 6, no country had more than 27 linguistic varieties.

For further illustration of the point, consider the top five most linguistically diverse countries in the sample population: Papua New Guinea (820), Indonesia (742), Nigeria (516), India (427), and Mexico (297). Each country received a composite civil society score of 3, 3, 2, 4, and 4 respectively. Given that they are the most linguistically diverse
countries, we should expect that the civil society scores also be the lowest. But interestingly none of the countries received a composite score of 1. The same is true for the most linguistically homogeneous countries. The top five linguistically homogeneous countries in the sample population are: North Korea (1), Haiti (2), Cuba (4), South Korea (4), and Burundi (4). If homogeneity is predicted to be a precondition for a developed civil society, we should expect composite civil society scores of 6 or 5 for these countries, but all of the countries received the lowest possible composite civil society score (i.e.1), except for South Korea, which received a 5. Interestingly, the research also reveals examples of cases with the same number of languages spoken and different civil society scores. For example, Macedonia, Morocco, and Slovenia each have 10 linguistic varieties, and the civil society scores are 4, 2 and 6 respectively\(^{21}\).

4.4. Discussion

We can begin to see that language does not always provide a comprehensive explanation for the range of civil society in the developing world. While the inverse relationship between linguistic diversity and civil society was found to be a statistically significant, the data reveals that linguistic diversity is an inconsistent indicator of cultural diversity for this sample population. Moreover, this implies that a more nuanced understanding of cultural diversity needs to be employed if we are ever to fully comprehend the impact of cultural diversity on civil society.

\(^{21}\) A full illustration of the data is illustrated in Appendix 2
Ultimately, the statistical values reported here suggest that linguistic diversity explains approximately eight percent of the variance of civil society throughout the developing world in this sample population. The paradoxical cases outlined in the results above, beg us to ask further what is different between the social relations of states with weak and strong civil societies.

Given that linguistic diversity could only provide an indication that the correlation between civil society and linguistic diversity is found to be inconsistent, the analyses to follow will aim to explain why. The statistics reveal the necessity to examine how various groups within a social system coalesce and negotiate their roles in society. While cultural diversity, measured in terms of language variation does not fully defend the variance of civil society in the sample population, the following chapter will measure cultural diversity more qualitatively (albeit with a small sample population of four case studies) on a micro level. In attempt to continue building the scholarship of civil society and cultural diversity, the next chapter will measure cultural diversity according to the degree to which social stratifications are deeply embedded in the society.

The data reported in these regressions supports the central hypothesis of this thesis. The principle hypothesis of this thesis thus maintains that the strength of civil society is dependent upon the embeddedness of social stratifications. Chapter 5 will test for the strength of this hypothesis in four case studies: India, Bolivia, Nigeria and Chile.
Cultural diversity is therefore understood in the following empirical analyses through the lens of a sociological framework, which looks at the patterns of social relations, human interaction, and communication across various social groups. It is through this more nuanced understanding of culture that we can begin to move away from the macro generalizations of cultural diversity (i.e. homogeneous vs. heterogeneous), and embark on an understanding of the paradoxical cases the data above cannot begin to explain.
Chapter 5. Researching the Matrix: An Analysis of Four Case Studies

This chapter will focus on what is different among the social relations of states with weak and strong civil societies. In Chapter 4, several regression analyses documented the weak correlation between linguistic diversity and the strength of civil society in the developing world. While the negative relationship between cultural heterogeneity and civil society was found to be statistically significant, the independent variable (measured in terms of linguistic diversity) only explained approximately eight percent of the variance among the sample population. Ultimately, there were two types of cases the independent variable could not begin to justify: 1) a country with high linguistic diversity and strong civil society; and 2) a country with low linguistic diversity and weak civil society. The central premise of this thesis maintains that these anomalies in the data can be explained by embracing a more nuanced understanding of cultural diversity that investigates the social structure and how people coalesce and negotiate their roles in society.

The primary tool of analyses for the strength of civil society has historically been through the lenses of politics and economics. But Putnam (1993), North (1990) and Granovetter (1973) have exposed the opinion that culture matters as much as economics and politics. North (1990) has expressed the belief that culture is intricately embedded in human exchange, whether political, social or economic (p.3). If we are ever to understand what constitutes a thriving civil society we are obliged to study the patterns of human
interaction, communication, and the relationship of various social groups in systems of hierarchy within the social structure of a society (Blau, 1977, p.6)

The present chapter is designed to suggest that where linguistic diversity does not explain the variation of civil society, a useful tool of analysis may be found in a theory of group behavior at a sub-national level. At its core, such a theory systematically makes allowances for variation in the relation among subgroups which make up the larger entity. The variation in relations among subgroups is characterized here as a specific set of social stratifications among a defined set of persons or groups. The characteristics of social stratifications as a unit of analysis may be used to interpret the social relations and degree of atomization in the social structure, as well as the patterns of human interaction, communication, and the social behavior of an entire society (Blau, 1977, p.43). This chapter argues that there is an integral link between the embeddedness of social stratifications and the strength of civil society. The results of this chapter show that where social stratifications are deeply embedded, civil society is weak; similarly, where social stratifications are not deeply embedded, civil society is found to be well developed.

The method to follow will provide a qualitative analysis of the social structure of four case studies: (India) a country with high linguistic diversity and strong civil society; (Bolivia) a country with low linguistic diversity and weak civil society; (Nigeria) a country with high linguistic diversity and weak civil society; and finally (Chile) a country with low
linguistic diversity and strong civil society\textsuperscript{22}. An analysis of each country’s system of social stratifications will be conducted by consulting anthropological and ethnographic texts, and investigating the opportunity for upward social mobility among various social groups. Rates of education and rural-urban migration will be used as indicators of social mobility. It follows that if the indicators of social mobility are weak, social stratifications are assumed to be deeply embedded, and the society is presumed to be highly atomized. If atomization is the antithesis of civil society, a logical procession then concludes that deeply embedded social stratifications lead to weak civil societies. Table 5.1 presents a definition of the variables along with an illustration of the case studies to be analyzed, differentiating the types of civil societies according to the indicators used to test the hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{22} India = 427 languages, and a civil society score of 4; Bolivia = 39 languages and a civil society score of 3; Nigeria = 516 languages and a civil society score of 2; Chile = 12 languages a civil society score of 5.
Much scholarly work has been done on the topics of civil society and social structure, but few systematic attempts have been made to connect the two. The conclusions of the statistical analyses provided in the previous chapter of this research suggest that the links between civil society and social structure are in need of further investigations. The analyses provided here will therefore seek to answer the following questions: what is the relationship between social stratifications and the strength of civil society? What is the
relationship between linguistic diversity and social stratifications? These questions are of particular relevance to the developing world. Given the variation of civil society in developing countries, and the fact that linguistic diversity marks the social composition of many developing countries, the following may have great practical meaning for the improvement of civil society in the developing world.

5.2. Chapter Plan

The case studies have been selected based on statistics from the previous chapter. The first two countries presented here are two case studies that the analyses in Chapter 4 could not begin to justify: (Bolivia) a country with low linguistic diversity and weak civil society; and (India) a country with high linguistic diversity and strong civil society. Then the analyses will be applied to the most predictable cases to see if the relationship holds true across the matrix. (Nigeria) a country with high linguistic diversity and weak civil society; and (Chile) a country with low linguistic diversity and strong civil society.

In chapter 4, countries with high civil society were defined as those which received an average score in the composite civil society scale created here of 4, 5 or 6 from the Bertelsmann’s Transformation Index (BTI) proxy measures. Expert rankings measured on a scale of 1 to 10, (1 indicating a weak score, and 10 being the highest) for each country for the proxy measures of the rule of law, political and social integration, and political

\footnote{Please refer to Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the matrix: all possible outcomes regarding the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.}
participation were used to gauge the strength of civil society in 119 developing countries. Accordingly, countries with low civil society received an average score of 1, 2 or 3 in the BTI rankings. Linguistic diversity was measured in terms of the 2006 *Ethnologue* report’s linguistic diversity index [see chapter 2 for descriptions of the variables]. As the number of languages increase linguistic diversity increases, and the amount of cultural diversity is interpreted to increase accordingly.

Having outlined the case studies, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Each case study begins with an introduction to the ethnographic scope of the society, and outlines the social stratifications that exist in the country. The next section looks at the indicators of social mobility (rates of education and rural-urban migration\(^{24}\)) and assesses if the opportunity for upward social mobility exists across the various social groups. The third section measures levels of trust in the society using data from the World Values Survey and the 2006 Latinobarómetro. The results in the third section provide an indication of how people perceive one another, which ultimately attests to the embeddedness of social stratifications, atomization, and the strength of civil society. The last section summarizes the main results for the country and gives an analysis if the hypothesis holds true. A final discussion which compares and contrasts the results of all the case studies is provided at the end of the chapter.

\(^{24}\) The researcher is aware of the debates surrounding the impact of urbanization in cities, particularly in India. The limitations of this proxy measure for social mobility are discussed at length in chapter 2 of this thesis.
5.3. Bolivia

The literature on civil society and ethnic diversity predicts that less heterogeneous countries are more likely to possess vibrant civil societies. In comparison to other countries in this case study analysis, Bolivia is not as heterogeneous as India or Nigeria. There are approximately thirty-nine different linguistic varieties spoken throughout the country and three official languages which cater to the major ethnic groups: Quechua (30% of population), Aymara (25% of population) and Spanish (CIA World Factbook, 2006). Given its low linguistic diversity we should then expect that Bolivia ought to have a strong civil society. Evidence found in Chapter 4 provides counterintuitive data. According to the proxy measures of civil society established in Chapter 4, Bolivia, on a scale of 1 to 10, received a score of 6.0 for rule of law, 5.3 for political and social integration, and 8.0 for political participation [see chapter 2 for descriptions of measures]. Additionally, when the three variables are averaged and ranked on a scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6, where a value of 1 indicates a weak civil society and a value of 6 indicates a developed civil society [see chapter 2 for description of scale and values] Bolivia received a score of 3.

The discussion that follows will argue that the weakness of civil society in Bolivia is due to the presence of deeply rooted social stratifications. To address this argument, this section will first outline a background of Bolivian social structure and social stratifications, and then provide an analysis of the opportunities for social mobility; the third section will present data which measures levels of trust in the society, and finally draw some
conclusions in terms of the relationship between the characteristics of social stratifications and the strength of civil society.

5.3.1. Bolivian Social Structure & Social Stratifications

Cultural and ethnic diversity in Bolivia is reflected in the presence of the large indigenous population. Approximately half of Bolivians are of indigenous descent—predominantly Quechua and Aymara. There are four major ethnic groups in Bolivia: Quechua (30%) and Aymara (25%) indigenous peoples, whites or people of European descent (15%), and mestizos, a mix between whites and Amerindian ancestry (30%) (Andersen, 2001a, p. 4).

Bolivia can be divided into three distinct regions: the highlands, the valley region and the lowlands. From pre-Colombian times till now, most Aymara have lived in the highlands. Other highland groups include the Uru located in the Lake Poopo region in Oruro; the Chipaya of Oruro; and the Callahuaya, an Aymaran subgroup from northern La Paz (Andersen, 2001a, p.4). The Quechua live in the valley region, most notably in Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, Chuquisaca, and Tarija (Andersen, 2001a, p.4). A large population of European descendants lives in the lowlands. Each region has an urban center, El Alto and La Paz in the highlands, Cochabamba in the valley, and Santa Cruz in the lowlands, and each urban center attracts rural migrants from the predominant ethnic group of the region, and cross regional migration is low (Andersen, 2001a, p.4).
Beyond skin color, geographic region and language, social stratification and social identity is tied to way of life. Ethnicity is also identified by occupation, class, clothing, and consumption patterns (Queiser Morales, 1992). Ethnicity is practiced by style of dress. Indians of mixed blood or those who have adopted the way of life of the dominant class are called "cholos," a rough parallel to the "mestizo" identity of other Latin American societies. The lowest in social status are the rural indigenous people, also called “campesinos” (persons of the countryside). The rural indigenous are highly discriminated against because they are not assimilated into the dominant lifestyle, because they often do not speak Spanish, and they are the poorest class.

Indigenous people tend to be poor in absolute terms and in relation to the rest of the population. According to the 2006 Latinobarómetro survey, indigenous people face the most discrimination out of any other ethnic group in the country\(^2\). Many indigenous people have limited access and control over their own land and resources, which in turn place important limitations upon their economic opportunities and way of life. A recent (2006) report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) provides an account of the impoverished population of Bolivia. According to the IADB report, indigenous people in Bolivia represent a majority of the poor. Approximately 62% of the total Bolivian

\(^2\) Latinobarómetro is a public opinion survey carried out annually in 18 Latin American countries since 1995. Latinobarómetro interviews approximately 1,000 people in each country each year. The sampling method varies slightly from country to country, as implementation is contracted out to national polling firms. Selection procedures ensure some quotas to secure representation across gender, socioeconomic status and age. The survey is restricted to urban populations, and the emphasis is on political perceptions and attitudes. Latinobarómetro Report Data Bank 2006. Online version: [http://www.latinobarometro.org/uploads/media/Latinobar_meter_Report_2006.pdf](http://www.latinobarometro.org/uploads/media/Latinobar_meter_Report_2006.pdf). Accessed 17 March 2007.
population lives on less than $2 a day, and 81% of the indigenous population lives on less than $2 a day (IADB 2006). The discrepancy in the proportion of indigenous in the absolute poor provides a valid indicator that social stratification is an exclusionary mechanism which deeply affects income and occupational opportunities.

A high persistent correlation between ethnicity and socioeconomic status is most often considered a sign of discrimination and social segregation or exclusion. It is thus worthwhile to consider evidence of this association in the Bolivian labor market in order to illustrate the degree of social exclusion and the embeddedness of social stratifications in the country. The Latinobarómetro reports data collected from household surveys carried out in Bolivia in 1997. The data reports that indigenous people’s monthly mean earnings were substantially lower than non-indigenous earnings. Average monthly indigenous earnings were reported to be 650.14 in 1997, and for whites and non-indigenous the amount was twice that of indigenous wage earners, 1,308.6326 (Zoninsein, 2004, p.45). The social stratification of ethnicity is thus a precondition for economic status.

While ethnicity affects wages and socioeconomic status, it does not affect unemployment rates. Unemployment rates are not disproportional when unemployment is measured based on ethnicity. The number of unemployed indigenous Bolivians is relatively low (1.5% in 1999), in comparison to (2.9%) for non-indigenous people (Duryea & Genoni, 2004, p.251).

Despite low unemployment rates, the wages earned by indigenous are low because more than 80% of indigenous work in small firms and informal sectors (Zoninsein, 2004, p. 45). Small firm and informal sector employment is traditionally associated with lower wages, lower skills and laborers of lower socioeconomic status. Given that 80% of indigenous work in the small firm and informal sectors, indigenous have higher levels of informality in their jobs than their non-indigenous and white counterparts. Eighty percent of indigenous men and 86% of indigenous women, ages 15-60 earn less than $1 per hour in a primary job (Duryea & Genoni, 2004, p. 253). This is compared to 50% and 55% for non-indigenous men and women (Duryea & Genoni, 2004, p. 253).

Differences in wages and earnings are related to discrepancies in skills and average years of education between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Social stratification and discrimination against indigenous people is therefore also materialized in the educational system. Although Quechua and Aymara are officially recognized languages, they are rarely taught in the school systems. Since the 1990s, more efforts have been taken to incorporate Quechua and Aymara in primary education, but the numbers of schools that have taken steps towards intercultural and bilingual education are minimal (Andersen, 2001a). The lack of linguistic accommodation in schools for indigenous children causes lower rates of enrollment and fewer years of schooling among the indigenous population. In the 1990s, the average years of schooling for indigenous people in Bolivia was 5.07 years compared to 9.11 years for whites (Andersen, 2001b, p. 28). The number has
recently declined for the overall population as a whole (3.7 years and 9.4 years for indigenous and non-indigenous respectively), which further depress opportunities for social mobility among indigenous people (Duryea & Genoni, 2004, p.255). The discrimination extends not only to jobs opportunities, wages, and education; it also results in lower quality education, lack of property rights, unfair treatment in the judicial system, and reserved access to utilities and public resources (Sojo & Buvinic, 2003, p.150).

5.3.2. Indicators of Social Mobility

There are several factors that affect the level of social mobility in a country. The most important one is the educational system, which ultimately determines how equal the opportunities are across different social groups. If opportunities are relatively equal, then social mobility will be observed, and visa versa if opportunities are very unequal. The second indicator social mobility observed in this section is rural-urban migration, and the third indicator provides an analysis of social mobility according to income distribution and ethnicity.

In Bolivia, the normal school entrance age is six years old (Andersen, 2001b, p.7). A child’s schooling gap is defined as age minus six minus actual years of schooling. Thus, if a 15 year old child, has 5 years of education, the schooling gap is 15-6-5=4 years. The average schooling gap for children in Bolivia is 2.33 years (Andersen, 2001b, p.8). This figure is much higher in rural areas (3.76 years) when compared to urban areas (1.58 years) (Andersen, 2001b, p.8). Furthermore, the gap is much higher for poor families than
those from richer families, and given that indigenous people overwhelmingly represent a majority of the poor population, we can infer that the average schooling gap is greater among indigenous children than for non-indigenous children (Andersen, 2001b).

Education allows an opportunity for urban women to experience social mobility. The schooling gap in urban centers is not gender biased. Andersen (2001b) reports that female children are generally better educated than male children in urban areas. In rural areas, females tend to have a half year higher schooling gap than their corresponding male counterparts (Andersen, 2001b, p.9). These findings based on gender imply that cultural stratifications in terms of gender are not entrenched in urban centers but still existent in rural areas.

The above analyses for education among gender, rural-urban population, and indigenous and non-indigenous assume that the quality of education is equal in all areas and that the only problem is enrollment and retention rates. The quality of education in Bolivia varies based upon rural-urban divide and public-private systems. The quality of schools in the rural areas where most poor, indigenous reside is substantially inferior to the quality of education in urban centers or expensive private schools. This means that the real, quality-adjusted schooling gap differences are much larger between rich and poor, indigenous and non-indigenous, and rural-urban, than the analyses above suggest. It also means that the level of social mobility is likely to be overestimated, and that the
opportunity to escape deeply entrenched social stratifications is actually much lower than the figures suggest.

The second most important factor in determining social mobility is residence (rural vs. urban). In 1900, the urban population was approximately 14% of the population; by 2001 it increased to 60% in four major cities: La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba (Revollo, 2006, p.4). In 1999, indigenous people accounted for 16.8% of the urban population. (Duryea & Genoni, 2004, p. 248). Despite increased migration to urban centers, an overwhelming majority of indigenous peoples still live in rural areas and account for a majority of the rural poor (IADB 2006). Rapid urbanization in Bolivia has resulted in residential segregation by income, ethnicity and other social and cultural identifiers (Gray-Molina &., 2003, p.25). Urbanization has not resulted in a higher standard of living or higher levels of development for rural Bolivians or indigenous people; instead, it has served to reproduce and accentuate economic, social, cultural, and political inequalities (Revollo, 2006).

The Gini coefficient is a commonly used cross-national measure of inequality. The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Measured on a scale of 0 to 100, zero indicating perfect income equality, and one hundred indicating perfect income inequality, Bolivia’s Gini coefficient score is 45 (Earthtrends.org). Initially, the Gini coefficient provides an indication that cultural stratifications are deeply entrenched in
Bolivia because the opportunity for social mobility is low due to the disparate rates of inequality suggested by the Gini coefficient. A further analysis into the income distribution across income deciles and cultural groups will allow for a deeper understanding of the implications of the low Gini coefficient score.

The third factor used in determining social mobility in Bolivia is income distribution across ethnic groups. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the distribution of income by income deciles and ethnicity. In the higher income deciles (9th and 10th deciles) non-indigenous make up 48% and 60% of the sample population. This is in stark contrast to the 1st and 2nd deciles where the total percentage of non-indigenous is 15.4% and 26.8% respectively.
The presence of a larger indigenous population in the lower income deciles, coupled with the absence of a large number of indigenous in the higher income deciles, indicates that the opportunity for social mobility among indigenous people is low. The concentration of each ethnic group at opposite ends of the income distribution allows us to infer that there is not a large combination of different ethnic groups in various occupations and labor sectors. Indigenous people tend to make up the lower paying labor sector, which places a larger percentage of the population in the lower income deciles, while the non-
indigenous make up a larger proportion of the better paying jobs and higher income deciles.

Social stratifications are multi-layered in Bolivia. Beyond the indigenous vs. non-indigenous stratification, there is evidence of stratification within the indigenous community. Fifty-eight percent and 40.4% of the lowest income deciles is made up of Quechua, compared to 24.8% and 28.6% of Aymara. The larger proportion of Quechua in the lowest income deciles suggests that among the indigenous people, Quechua make up a larger proportion of the poor indigenous population. In general, Aymara make up a smaller percentage in the lower income deciles and a larger percentage in the higher income deciles (with the exception of the 10th deciles). Social mobility for Quechua is lower when compared to Aymara. These statistics serve to imply that there is further segregation, exclusion and cultural stratification within the indigenous population.

The segregation of income by ethnicity and within ethnicities further indicates that the possibility for social mobility among indigenous is low and that cultural stratifications are deeply rigid and heavily ingrained in society. Interaction and communication among different ethnic groups is low because society is heavily segregated based on income according to ethnicity. Moreover, the income division between indigenous and non-indigenous creates isolated residential communities based on ethnicity. The spatial distance generates a reduced sense of social cohesion within the community because people are divided along ethnic lines. Linguistic differences already create a formidable
barrier to communication and a declined sense of unity within the society, but low probability for social mobility further embeds social stratifications in society and creates inimical environment for civil society.

5.3.3. Social Capital and Levels of Trust

The Latinobarómetro surveys provide an analysis of levels of trust in Latin America. The main indicator used in the survey is modeled after the central question asked in the World Values Survey that is used to measure the level of trust within societies. The question used in the World Values Survey asks whether or not most people can be trusted, or can never be too careful.

In general, open interpersonal trust towards unknown third parties is rare and unusual in Latin American societies (Latinobarómetro Report). The kinship structure in these societies urges the development of strong family ties to maintain importance of family relationships over non-familial relationships. The trust that is measured in the Latinobarómetro survey somewhat varies from the World Values Survey, while it uses the same question, due to cultural differences, the Latinobarómetro survey measures trust built on networks and sets of ties that are derived from family, the workplace, and among people who interact physically or virtually.

According to the survey, 22% of Latin Americans trust an unknown third party. Figure 3.3 below illustrates the levels of trust among 18 Latin American countries. The data reports the percentage of people that feel an unknown third party can be trusted. The
average level of trust in Bolivian society is slightly higher than the average for Latin America. Twenty-three percent of Bolivians feel they can trust an unknown third party. Guatemala and Uruguay display the highest levels of trust at 32% for each country. While the 23% trust level in Bolivia is above average for Latin American standards, when compared to India the level of trust in Bolivia is low. A comparison between Bolivia and the case studies to follow will become important because it will additionally provide an explanation for the differences of strength in their civil societies.

Figure 5.2. Cross-National Differences in Interpersonal Trust
The direct relationship between social capital and the amount of social cohesion attests to the strength of a given social system. As the amount of social capital (measured by the degree of interpersonal trust within a society) increases the amount of social cohesion within the society is said to increase as well. The degree of trust is Bolivia low, therefore social capital is low, given the relationship between social capital and civil society that was conceptualized in chapter 2, we can assume that this is one reason which further explains the weakness of civil society in Bolivia.

5.3.4. Analysis

Societies which offer channels to escape cultural stratification will be less atomized, more cohesive, and thus comprise a strong social system and developed civil society. The analyses above suggest that such channels for social mobility are minimal in Bolivia. Consequently, poverty tends to be fairly persistent and based across ethnic lines, and many indigenous families remain poor generation after generation. Social stratifications are deeply ingrained in this society. The lack of opportunity to escape the predisposition of ethnicity entrenches ethnic divisions across income and class. Indigenous people are not only denied high quality education and education in their mother tongue; they are also consequently denied better paying jobs and the opportunity for subsequent generations to improve their social status.

A combination of factors serves to explain the weakness of civil society in Bolivia. Beyond language barriers, educational discrimination, low enrollment rates and higher
average years of schooling gaps among indigenous people weaken the opportunity for mobility in the labor sectors. As a result indigenous groups are excluded from primary wage sectors, ethnic divisions are pronounced among income deciles, rural areas are dominated by indigenous tribes, and the society is heavily atomized. Furthermore, social stratification exists within the indigenous community because discrepancies in wages and social mobility are evident in the income distribution between Aymara and Quechua peoples. The overall degree of social cohesion suffers as a result, and the evidence presented for the low levels of social capital further attest to the weakness of social cohesion in Bolivia.

The Bolivian case study is vital to the central hypothesis of this thesis because it illustrates that cultural homogeneity is not an absolute precondition for the strength of civil society. While no culture is totally homogenous, it is argued here, that in comparison to the other case studies, Bolivia is less heterogeneous. Given that there are 39 languages spoken in Bolivia compared to 427 in India and 516 in Nigeria, Bolivia qualifies as a less heterogeneous state. We should then expect that civil society is stronger in Bolivia when compared to India or Nigeria. The relationship does not hold true. This analysis has explained this paradox as a result of the embeddedness of social stratifications in Bolivia. This conclusion stems from the analysis that there is an important interdependent relationship between the embeddedness of social stratifications, the opportunity for upward social mobility, the degree of social capital, and ultimately the strength of civil society.
I have argued here, that because the opportunity for upward social mobility is weak, social stratifications are deeply ingrained; patterns of human interaction among different social groups and are hindered, society is atomized and civil society is weak.

If atomization is the antithesis of civil society, those societies with less atomization will have vibrant civil societies; this relationship holds true both for Bolivia. Atomization is the basis of the Bolivian social structure. The analyses to follow will seek to determine if the patterns and relationships found in Bolivia continue to hold true in the other three case study investigations.

5.4. India

That India is a heterogeneous society where cultural diversity is dense, is unsurprising given that there are twenty-four official languages\(^{27}\) and approximately four hundred twenty-seven linguistic varieties spoken as a first language among the population\(^{28}\). What is surprising however, is the strength of civil society in this multilingual culturally diverse country. According to the proxy measures of civil society established Chapter 4, India, on a scale of 1 to 10, received a score of 7.5 for rule of law.


6.8 for political and social integration, and 8.8 for political participation [see Chapter 3 for descriptions of measures]. Additionally, when the three variables are averaged and ranked on a scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6 [see Chapter 3 for description of scale and values] India ranks among the top percentage of countries in the sample population with a score of 4. In relationship to the 119 developing countries in the statistical analyses conducted in Chapter 3, as well as the other three countries (Nigeria, Bolivia, and Chile) analyzed in this chapter, civil society in India is strong. The question now becomes why?

Given that India displays similar characteristics of other countries in the sample population with regard to the degree of cultural diversity, the following analysis will explore how India has been able to overcome the barriers of multilingualism and ethnic diversity to reach the current level of development for its civil society. To address this argument, this section will first outline a background of the Indian social structure and social stratifications, then provide an analysis of the opportunities for social mobility, measure levels of trust, and finally draw some conclusions in terms of the relationship between the embeddedness of social stratifications and the strength of civil society.

5.4.1. Indian Social Structure & Stratification

In a complex society such as India, the number of enduring groups is very large and social stratification is multidimensional. In attempt to understand how Indian society is structured, this section begins with an outline of the ethnic composition in the country, followed by a brief description of the caste system. Together, this data will provide an
analysis of the social structure in Indian society through the lens of social stratifications that exist between different castes and gender.

There are six main ethnic groups in India. Each ethnic group is predominantly located in a specific region of the country: Negrito (found in sparse areas throughout the southern part of India), Proto - Australoids or Austrics (mainly found in central and eastern parts of India), Mongoloids (north eastern part of India), Dravidian (South India), Western Brachycephals, and Nordic Aryans (northern and central parts of India) (Sharma, 1997, p. 179). The Nordic Aryans make up about 72% of the population, Dravidians comprise 25%, and the remaining four ethnic groups together make up the outstanding 3% of the population (CIA World Factbook, 2006).

The states of India are divided along linguistic lines. Shortly after gaining independence, the Indian government created states based on linguistic boundaries (Sharma, 1997, p.44). Generally, each state has a majority language which takes precedence over the many others which also exist in the region (Sharma, 1997, p.44). This allows for local education in local languages and dialects. The average Indian citizen has a multilingual repertoire. It is common for one person to speak at least three linguistic varieties in India: the local dialect or language in the village, the state language or dialect, and either Hindi, English or both (Milroy, 1980, p. 115).

While there are 427 different linguistic varieties spoken throughout Indian society, language is not the only dividing institution in Indian social structure: caste, class, religion,
gender, occupation, and geographical region are some of the other important cleavages in Indian society. The institution of caste cuts across diverse religious groups and the other dividing factors of society and gives them all a common social idiom (Sharma, 1997, p.85).

Caste is the primary social stratification in India. There are five different mutually exclusive and occupation specific *jatis* or castes in Indian society. In order of precedence and rank, the *jatis* of Indian society are: *Brahmins* (priests or teachers), *kshatriyas* (warriors and loyalty), *varsyas* (moneylenders and traders), *sudras* (menial jobs), and *ati sudras* or untouchables (perform the lowest of the menial jobs) (Deshpande, 2000, p.322). Over a wide region or entire linguistic area a number of any given *jati* can be found in most villages; thus, while differences of ethnicity, language, and religion are geographically segregated, *jatis* invariably coexist in each region throughout the country (Blair, 1972, p.109).

The caste system has historically served to ascribe status and occupation in Indian society. Caste is the basis for the division of labor and the allocation of positions of power in both rural and urban areas (Deshpande, 2000, p.322). The social structure of Indian society relies heavily on the caste system to allocate the different divisions of labor that are necessary in both villages and urban centers. Each caste stands for a way of life that is to some extent distinctive, but at the same time the castes of a region form part of a single
social framework (Srinivas, 1980, p.1). People of lower castes have customarily been associated with lower degrees of economic prosperity and low quality jobs\textsuperscript{29}.

Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes in India are among the lowest ranking social groups and as a result are subject to the most stringent social stratifications in Indian culture and society. According to Mitra and Singh (2004), the Scheduled Tribe population represents one of the most economically and marginalized groups in India (p.2). The India Census 2001 declares that although Scheduled Tribes are a minority in India, they comprise approximately 8\% of the population. Mitra and Singh (2004) assert that although both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are discriminated against, they are not discriminated against in the same way (p.2). Scheduled tribes have generally been socially isolated and atomized from a majority of the Hindu population (Mitra & Singh, 2004, p.4).

The geographical isolation of Scheduled Tribes from mainstream society has numerous ramifications for their social status, opportunity for upward mobility, and access to public goods (Mitra & Singh, 2004). As a result, a majority of the Scheduled Tribes live in the most significantly underdeveloped areas of the country (Mitra & Singh, 2004, p.4). The rates of literacy and education among Scheduled Tribes are lower than not only the general population, but the Scheduled Castes as well (Sandhu, 2003, p.30).

\textsuperscript{29} In 1947 the government of India sought to rectify the correlation between caste and income distribution with the implementation of a constitutional amendment to equalize the opportunity of caste across class (Deshpande, 2000, p.322). All states of present day India have quotas for Scheduled Castes (which include 16-17\% of the population) and Scheduled Tribes (tribes that are socially and economically marginalized, approximately 7-8\% of the population) that imply reserving 22.5\% of the seats in the legislature, government sponsored education institutions and public sector jobs (Deshpande, 2000: 322).
The gap in educational and literacy rates is even more pronounced among women in Scheduled Tribes (Mitra & Singh, 2004, p.4). As Mitra & Singh (2004) point out, educational disparities among the Scheduled Tribes in India in relation to the rest of the population serve to perpetuate inequality, but it is most important to note that gaps are also a product of caste, class and gender (Blau, 1977). These three institutions are the most stringent social stratifications in India (Mitra & Singh, 2004). Across the society, caste and class determine the opportunity for social mobility and social development, but within caste and class, gender is a further dividing and exclusionary factor.

The caste system is unlike any other mode of social stratification. It is deep and historically rooted in hundreds of years of Indian culture, tradition and society. It provides both a sense of identity and way of life. This is another reason that makes the Indian case study so significant and critical to this research. The following will explore the degree to which these stratifications are embedded by looking first at rates of education, then urbanization.

**5.4.2. Indicators of Social Mobility**

This section investigates social mobility in India. There are several factors that affect the level of social mobility in a country. The most important one is the educational system, which determines how equal opportunities are across different social groups. If opportunities are relatively equal, high social mobility will be observed and visa versa if
opportunities are very unequal (Andersen et al., 2001, p.7). Most economists would probably argue that it is the human resources of a nation, not its capital or its material resources, that ultimately determine the character and pace of social development (Todaro, 1989, p.330). A second factor that seems to affect the degree of social mobility is the level of urbanization (Andersen et al., 2001, p.7). Andersen et al. (2001) reports that some developing countries that are more urbanized also seem to have higher levels of social mobility (p.7). This section will investigate if these relationships hold true in India.

The 2001 India Census and the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) survey conducted in 1999-2000 reveals that literacy rates and educational enrollment in India are stratified by gender and geographical location (Report No.473). Rural women have lower literacy rates when compared to rural men; the same is true in urban centers. The data reveals that 57% of rural women are illiterate, while 32% of rural men are illiterate. Moreover, the data also reveals that urban residents in general tend to have higher literacy rates than rural residents (80% vs. 56%). The implications of these findings are important because they serve to further suggest the differences in social mobility and social stratification in northern and southern India. Given that literacy rates are lower among women and among rural residents, particularly in the north, we can infer that social stratifications are more entrenched in the North than the South. Literacy rates are higher in the South, therefore it is presumed that the opportunity for social mobility is more pronounced and social stratifications are not as embedded in this region.
The same patterns can be discerned in enrollment rates and educational attainment between rural and urban centers. There are twice as many urban residents qualified with secondary education in the survey. The difference continues to widen as the level of education increases in urban areas; however in the lower sphere, the percentages of rural and urban residents with primary level schooling are similar (14% & 15% respectively). This indicates that the lack of opportunity for primary education in rural areas is not disparate from urban centers. The difference in enrollment rates between rural and urban centers is most pronounced in higher education. Merely two percent of the rural population has completed more schooling beyond secondary education, compared to ten percent of the urban population. Even though the number of rural residents with who have graduated above secondary education is low, the percentage is still remarkable given their conditions. The presence of rural residents beyond secondary education provides a weak indicator for social mobility in Northern India. Given that a larger percentage of urban residents achieve higher education, this serves to further suggest that the opportunity for social mobility is stronger in Southern India. The differences in enrollment rates for the various levels of education between rural and urban residents are provided in Table 3.2 below.
The NSSO survey also divides the sample population into four social groups: scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, other backward castes, and others. The findings for education based on these social divisions are significant because they speak directly to the entrenchment of social stratification in India based on caste and the opportunity for social mobility among these various social groups. The literacy rates for each of the social groups are higher in urban centers when compared to rural areas. Again, this suggests that cultural stratifications are not as embedded or deep rooted in Southern India as they may be in the North. People are given more opportunity in the South and social mobility is higher. From
these data, we can then infer that Southern India is less atomized because social mobility is high, and the various groups of society are exposed to interaction at all levels of education and occupations.

Rates of rural-urban migration are advocated here to be a proxy measure for social mobility due to opportunities for better employment and higher quality jobs in urban areas. If rural-urban migration is high, we can assume that there are some mechanisms in the Indian social structure which allow citizens to escape social stratifications. The following will aim to qualify the patterns of social mobility by region and gender in various Indian states using rural-urban migration data from the 2001 India Census and the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO).

The equalization of occupational opportunity and social mobility is most pronounced in the southern region, which generally has the highest rates of rural-urban migration (Indian Census 2001). The estimated number of migrants is represented in Table 3.1. It is seen from the table that more than 245 million people in India were migrants. The National Sample Survey (NSS) of India for 1999-2000 results also show, that among the states, the highest number of migrants were in Uttar Pradesh—about 45.6 million. Other states showing relatively high amounts of migration were Maharashtra (31.5 million), Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal (each about 19.2 million) and Madhya Pradesh (19.1 million). The lowest rates of migration are found in the northern states of Assam (1.8 million), Haryana (6.5 million), and Punjab (6.8 million).
The data in Table 3.1 also provide indicators of social mobility in terms of gender stratifications. Of the total migrant population, a majority were in the category of ‘rural females’. The highest rates of rural migration by females is found in Uttar Pradesh—31.2 million, followed by Maharashtra (13.8 million) Madhya Pradesh (12.7 million) and West Bengal (11.5 million). The lowest rates of migration by rural females are found in Assam (1.2 million), Haryana (3.5 million) and Punjab (3.6 million). Low rates of migration are signifiers of weak opportunities for social mobility—both in terms of gender and class.

### Table 5.3. Sample & Estimated Number of Migrants in Major Indian States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>major states</th>
<th>estimated migrants(00)</th>
<th>sample migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rural</td>
<td>urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>25815</td>
<td>92034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>2963</td>
<td>12026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
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<td>108308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>14951</td>
<td>75988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>4266</td>
<td>85700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>14601</td>
<td>75117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>19904</td>
<td>45341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>15390</td>
<td>126544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>35559</td>
<td>137011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>9668</td>
<td>57332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5716</td>
<td>36155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>12319</td>
<td>90339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>21581</td>
<td>75406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>31279</td>
<td>312133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>18485</td>
<td>115301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| all - India           | 246541 | 1424548 | 314248 | 465474 | 2450811 | 19212 | 99767 | 36891 | 58169 |

*Source: NSS Report No. 479: Migration in India 1999-2000, pg. 22*
5.4.3. Social Capital and Levels of Trust

As chapter 2 showed conceptually, social capital is intimately associated with levels of social cohesion and the strength of civil society (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000). The following will explore if these relationships hold true in India by measuring the degree of social capital in Indian society based on measures of trust and group membership in the 2001 World Values Survey.

How trustful are Indians? The conventional measure of interpersonal trust asks whether “most people can be trusted” or whether one “can’t be too cautious when dealing with people.” The 2001 World Values Survey reports that 41.0% of Indians in the sample population feel that most people can be trusted. Alternatively, 59.0% of Indians in the sample population feel they cannot be too careful. These figures at first glance seem to be relatively low, but in comparison to other countries in the World Values Survey, Indians are not particularly distrustful. The percentage of Indians responding that one cannot be too cautious is lower, for instance, than the percentage in Pakistan, Peru, Czech Republic, Morocco and Nigeria. Appendix 1 reports the average total responses of Indians in relation to a variety of other countries compiled as part of the World Values Survey in the 1990s and 2001.

5.4.4. Analysis

India is a unique and an important case study with varying results. It has been the objective of this section to measure the embeddedness of social stratifications in Indians
society by analyzing the opportunities for upward social mobility, and the level of social capital within the society. The major findings of this case study report that the embeddedness of social stratifications in India varies based upon state and geographical region—in general, social stratifications are more deeply embedded in the north than in the south, with the exception of Uttar Pradesh. The conclusions are based upon statistics for social mobility and measures of social capital derived from the 2001 Indian Census, NSSO and the World Values Survey. These findings are in line with the civil society proxy measures from chapter 2, which report a civil society score of 4 on a scale of 1 to 6 for India. A score of 4, indicates that civil society is strong but also that it could be stronger. The regional evidence for the varying strength of the social system in India supports this data.

The analysis in this section has shown that the opportunity for social mobility in India is dependent upon the region. The prospect for escaping cultural stratifications is generally weaker in the north when compared to the south. Cultural stratifications override social mobility in the northern states of Rajasthan and Bihar, but in Uttar Pradesh and the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, there are more opportunities for people to improve their ascribed cultural status in society. In Rajasthan, gender is a cleavage that supersedes any possibility of upward mobility, and in Bihar, the institution of caste works in the same fashion. In Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra, cultural stratifications are much more flexible. In theory, the caste system and its
restrictions do exist in these states, but it is not as entrenched or deeply rooted as in some states like Bihar, Assam or Rajasthan. To take up only one caste as an example, the Brahmins can be found today in almost all occupations in the most mobile states. Their ancient monopoly of priesthood and piety has eroded. There are more visible opportunities for lower castes in higher occupations. The resulting disintegration of cultural stratification indicates that different groups in these states are interacting on a more regular basis, which allows for less atomization, a greater sense of interaction amount disparate groups and ultimately a stronger social system and civil society.

The following two case studies (Nigeria and Chile) will seek to illustrate that the relationships established above hold true for all possible cases in the matrix. The analyses in the cases that follow are particularly important because they will serve to support the hypothesis that the strength of civil society is not predetermined by the degree of cultural diversity in a given country. Nigeria is a very diverse country with 516 different languages and a weak civil society, while Chile is less heterogeneous (total of 12 different languages spoken throughout the polity) and portrays a vibrant civil society. Despite the fact that these two cases are most prescriptive to the theory that civil society increases with homogeneity, the analyses that follow will seek to show that the predictable strength of civil society in these countries is not explained by the degree of cultural diversity, but rather the strength of the social systems.
5.5. Nigeria

As cultural diversity increases, civil society is predicted to decrease (Easterly & Levine, 1997). The choice to focus this section on Africa is important because it is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse regions in the world (Adekson, 2004: 15; Ethnologue Report). There are more languages spoken in Africa than elsewhere in the world and by implication more ethnic groups than almost all other continents (Adekson, 2004, p.15). Nigeria is an excellent case study for the investigation of cultural diversity and civil society for several reasons. With approximately 131 million people and more than 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is an example of one of the most typical cases which can be found with respect to the relationship between cultural diversity and the strength of civil society. According to the Ethnologue report, the variation of linguistic diversity in Nigeria is quite high. There are approximately 516 different languages spoken throughout Nigeria. English is the lingua franca. The proxy measures used to assess the strength of civil society throughout various countries in the previous chapter provide low measurements with respect to Nigerian civil society. According to the proxy measures established in the previous chapter, Nigeria, on a scale of 1 to 10, received a score of 5.3 for rule of law, 6.0 for political and social integration, and 6.3 for political participation [see chapter 2 for descriptions of measures]. Additionally, when the three variables are averaged on a scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6, Nigeria ranks among the lower percentile of countries in the sample population with a score of 2. Nigeria thus supports the hypotheses of
conventional wisdom, where the strength of civil society is inversely related to the level of cultural diversity within a polity.

As with the previous case studies, this section will argue that linguistic diversity is not the only dimension of culture that affects the strength of Nigerian civil society. Apart from linguistic diversity, the strength of civil society is also affected by the indigenous social structure of stratifications. To address this argument in the case of Nigeria, this section will first outline a background of Nigerian society with respect to cultural and social stratifications, then provide an analysis of the patterns of communication and the opportunities for social mobility, assess the strength of social capital, and finally draw some conclusions in terms of the relationship between the strength of the social structure and civil society.

5.5.1. Nigerian Social Structure & Ethnic Divisions

Like many countries in Africa, Nigeria is a nation-state whose geographical boundaries were created by the Europeans in the late nineteenth century. In this process various groups of people with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds were merged together to form the present geographical entity of Nigeria (Fabiyi, 2006; Adekson, 2004). There are approximately 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria (Adekson, 2004, p.47). Political scientists, economists, anthropologists, policy makers and scholars alike argue that the development of Nigeria has been stifled by the milieu of ethnicities living simultaneously
as one polity (Onokerhoraye, 1978). These statements serve to reaffirm the hypothesis of traditional theory that cultural diversity undermines the development of civil society.

No discussion of Nigerian social structure would be complete without due reference to the violence, ethnic conflict and civil war that burdens the nation. Inter and intra-ethnic conflicts have spontaneously erupted among many groups across the length and breadth of the country. “In the recent past, minority groups such as the Ijaw, Ogoni and Tiv communities have become especially vocal vis-à-vis the state and other ethnic nationalities” (Adekson, 2004, p.47). Civil war has taken the lives of thousands, and starting in the early 1980s, untold numbers of ethnic and religious strife has inundated this West African nation (Adekson, 2004).

Nigeria is the largest populated territory on the African continent (CIA World Factbook, 2006). It is also ranked as the ninth most populous country in world (CIA World Factbook, 2006). While there are approximately 250 disparate ethnic groups in the country, there are seven predominant ones: Hausa Fulani (29%), Yoruba (21%), Igbo (18%), Ijaw (10%), Kanuri (4.5%), Ibibio (3.5%) and Tiv (2.5%). Among these seven predominant ethnic groups, the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa Fulani populations are the most dominant.

Identity in Nigeria is heavily centered on geographical region. After independence from British colonial rule, major ethnic groups emerged in three geographic zones. The Yoruba emerged in the west, Igbo in the east, and Hausa in the north (Fabiyi, 2006, p.145).
The declaration of ethnicity to geographical region encouraged the ‘us’ (majority) versus ‘them’ (minority) dichotomy in the country. The most predominant differences are pronounced between the north and south. Northern Nigeria has embraced Islam since the eleventh century when the Arabs invaded West Africa (Fabiyi, 2006, p.145). Muslims are found mostly in the north and they are estimated to constitute about 50% of the total population (Obono, 2003, p.105; CIA World Factbook 2006). Christians are found mainly in the South (40% of the population), while tribal and indigenous religious systems are found throughout the country and they make up the remaining 10% of the population (Obono, 2003, p. 105; CIA World Factbook 2006). The diversity and division that exists between the north and the south attests to the fact that Nigeria can aptly be described as at least ‘two countries in one’ (Adekson, 2004, p. 25).

There is a spatial imbalance in the location of resources and major urban centers in Nigeria (Olubomehin, 2006, p.45). The geographical inequalities create tension and social unrest among the dominant ethnic groups in each of the regions. A large proportion of the country, especially the northwestern, northeastern and central areas do not have any major urban centers. Subsequently, 55% of the population lives in rural areas (45% urban) (Adekson, 2004, p. 237). In the north, the Hausa have built walls around their urban centers, to prevent any migrants from entering the city and capitalizing on the minimal resources that exist (Fabiyi, 2006, p.145). Further perpetuating the problem of isolation in the north is the poor infrastructure of transportation and communication throughout the
country. The present systems of transportation and communication do not adequately integrate the rural and urban areas of the country (Olubomehin, 2006, p.45). As a result this has left many parts of the country (mainly the north) marginally integrated into the national, social, and economic system (Olubomehin, 2006, p.45).

Even though a large percentage of the population lives in rural areas, the poverty gap between the rural and urban population showed some signs of reduction between 1992 and 1998 due to large scale rural-urban migration (Ali-Akpajiak & Pyke, 1998). In 1960, Smythe noted that urban-rural migration in Nigeria was beginning to generate a stabilized class structure in the society (168). Smythe (1960) notes that during the beginning of urbanization in Nigeria, “relationships are predominantly universalistic rather than particularistic, and all statuses except racial are achieved rather than prescribed” (p.168). Smythe’s (1960) statements are important because they speak to the capacity of social mobility to unveil cultural stratifications. More recently, large scale uncontrolled migration of unskilled, uneducated, rural migrants has resulted in the lack of capacity and opportunity for migrants and their offspring to escape the cycle of poverty (Adekson, 2004, p. 105).

There is a power struggle between the rural north and the south. Hausa Fulani are the main ethnic group of the north. Poverty is more pronounced among this ethnicity because the poorest states of Nigeria are concentrated in the North West, North East and North Central zones of the country (Adekson, 2004, p.105). The percentage of rural
people is lower in the south because there is a greater amount of urban centers in this region when compared to the north.

Beyond the rural-urban and north-south stratifications, discrimination against women is widespread and common throughout all areas of the country, although it its most concentrated in the North. Nigeria is a patriarchal society where male domination is most vivid in rural areas. Women tend to be particularly dependent upon men, especially in rural areas because women are less educated, often illiterate, and unskilled laborers (Hollos, 1991). Upon migration, they have the opportunity to escape male domination, but their lack of skills and illiteracy disadvantages the opportunity to change their social conditions. As a result of the unequal labor opportunities, some researchers have found that women work in the informal sectors as prostitutes, petty traders and illicit brewers (Hollos, 1991).

5.5.2. Indicators of Social Mobility

In order to analyze the degree of social mobility in Nigeria, this section will first outline the opportunities presented by education, then outline the progress (or lack thereof) with respect to rural-urban migration. The third part of this section will look at how education and rural-urban migration manifests itself in the labor sector by looking at income distribution according to geographical region.

Discrepancies of enrollment rates between rural and urban residents, and also between men and women reveal that social mobility in terms of education is low. The most recent statistics for literacy rates in Nigeria preliminarily expose the rural urban divide and
gender discrimination in the country. In 2006 the CIA World Factbook established that 68% of the population age 15 and over could read and write. Only sixty percent of the reported literate population is female. In terms of geographical region, sixty-seven percent of adults in urban areas are literate, while the number decreases significantly in rural areas to 42% (UNDP, 1998). In the North West, females have 21-22% literacy rates; their male counterparts report 40-42% literacy rates (UNDP, 1998). Literacy rates among women are twice as high in the southern region (55% for women, and 60% for men) (UNDP, 1998).

On average, men are reported to have three more years of schooling than women (UNDP, 1998). Nationwide, the average year of schooling for men is 4.7 and 1.7 for women (UNDP, 1998). For children between the ages of 6 and 11, 7.3% of girls are in primary school; compared to 84% of boys (UNDP, 1998). The percentages are similar when comparing enrollment rates in secondary education. The reasons for withdrawing girls from education vary depending on the region. In the North, girls are commonly taken out of school because of pregnancy or an arranged marriage (Atere, & Akinwale, 2006). In the South East states of Abia, Enugu, Imo and Anambra, families tend to withdraw females from school in favor of labor and employment (Atere, & Akinwale, 2006). Opportunity for social mobility in terms of literacy rates, average years of schooling and enrollment rates among men and women, and rural and urban residents suggest that there is more social mobility in the southern region when compared to the north. While the opportunity for social mobility is generally weak, it is more pronounced in the south.
The geographic distribution of the population in Nigeria is uneven (Adekson, 2004). Historically, there have been a larger percentage of people living in rural areas. The rate of rural-urban migration has been increasing steadily in recent years and the geographic distribution of the country is slowly changing as a result. According to a working paper (2003) by Oxfam International, the urban population in Nigeria rose from 20% in 1970 to 38% in 1993. Furthermore, the urban population is forecasted to grow at a rate of 7% and is expected to account for 70% of the country’s population by 2020 (Ali-Akpajiak & Pyke, 2003).

The south west region of Nigeria is reported to be most urbanized. The major ethnic groups in this region include the Yoruba. The South West is home to 40% of the nation’s 329 urban centers (Ali-Akpajiak & Pyke, 2003). A large percentage of rural immigrants venture to the south western urban centers in search of better opportunities. As a result, there has been large-scale migration of unskilled, uneducated, low-income earners to urban areas. The infrastructure of the urban centers does not have the capacity to accommodate the migrants, physically, socially or politically.

Until recently, migration by women to urban spheres was predominantly to join their husbands and families (Atere & Akinwale, 2006). Others came for a limited time to stay with relatives and achieve primary education. More recently, there has been an era of permanent migration by single women from rural areas in search of higher education. Upon completion of primary or secondary education, the availability and opportunity of
jobs for qualified women is scarce in rural areas due to discrimination (Hollos, 1991). Consequently, women migrate to urban centers where gender stratification is not as entrenched; however, women are still denied equal pay for the same jobs and qualifications as men. Even though gender stratifications are not as entrenched in the urban areas for educated women they still exist and as in many countries there is a glass ceiling for women.

The case of poverty in Nigeria is unlike any of the other cases already discussed here. Poverty does not discriminate based on ethnicity because repression, economic and social deprivation and discrimination occur to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity (Adekson, 2004, p. 18). According to data from the 2006 CIA World Factbook GDP per capita in Nigeria hovers around $1,400 (adjusted for purchasing power parity). Additionally, the Gini coefficient score of 51 reveals that a great proportion of the national income excludes the poor population (Earthtrends.org). Given the Gini coefficient, it is not surprising that a majority of the wealth in Nigeria is concentrated in the hands of 20% of the population (Ali-Akpajiak & Pyke, 2003). A working paper online produced by Oxfam international (2003), suggests that the highest-income earning status in Nigeria is enjoyed by 10% of the population, whom therefore control 31.4% of the total national income. The same document also reports twenty percent of the poorest portion of the population own 4% of the total national income. Discrimination occurs between the wealthy 10% of the population and the poorest 20%. The wealthy tend to live in the southern region because
that is where the oil reserves are located. The discrepancy of resources and wealth between
the north and south further infuriates the north-south divide, and the exclusion of the
Hausa from society. The concentration of wealth is a vicious cycle, because it perpetuates
poverty in the north generation after generation.

5.5.3. Social Capital and Levels of Trust

The level of social capital in Nigeria supports the data in the previous section
regarding the strength of civil society. According to the literature, societies with stronger
civil societies will have higher levels of social capital. The reverse is true for societies with
low social capital. As indicated by the World Values Survey (see appendix 1), in 1990,
1995 and 2000, the mean percentage of Nigerians who feel that most people can be trusted
is 21%. Most recently, the levels of trust in Nigeria have fallen. The year 2000 indicates
the lowest values of trust among the sample population for the 15 year time span. Only
17.7% of people felt that most people can be trusted in 2000 (82.3% said ‘can’t be too
careful’). The values for Nigeria in terms of social capital are the lowest out of the four
case studies analyzed here. Accordingly, the civil society score for Nigeria is also the
lowest among the four cases. Given that social mobility is low, social stratifications are
deeply entrenched, and therefore there exists a weak civil society, it is not surprising that
the level of trust among unknown third parties in Nigeria is so low.
5.5.4. Analysis

It has been the objective of this section to analyze the embeddedness of social stratifications in Nigeria. The major findings of this section report that there is low social mobility in the society and deeply entrenched social stratifications, particularly in the Northern rural zone among the Hausa peoples. As a result of the relationship between social mobility and social stratification the society is highly atomized, people are less connected, and less trustworthy of unknown third parties. Therefore, civil society is interpreted to be weak. I have argued that the weakness of civil society in Nigeria is explained by the embeddedness of social stratifications rather than by the degree of linguistic diversity.

While India and Nigeria display similar traits of cultural diversity, the difference between the strength of their civil societies is vast. Social mobility and social stratification can be overcome in southern India. There is great opportunity for scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and other backward castes to receive education and escape their ascribed status. Nigeria on the other hand, has high levels of inequality, low social mobility, meager opportunities for education, especially in the northern sphere, and social stratifications particularly with respect to gender are deeply embedded in the society. As a result, poverty perpetuates generation after generation, the society is highly atomized because people are both socially and physically segregated, and the strength of civil society suffers as a result. Interestingly, where these similarities hold true in northern India, civil society is also weak. Furthermore, if we control for cultural diversity and take
the case of Bolivia, these characteristics also hold true and civil society is also weak. The evidence presented between the comparisons of these countries is enough to show that an analysis into the embeddedness of social stratifications brings a fruitful understanding towards the development of its civil society. The section that follows will then seek to examine if this relationship continues to hold true in a common case characterized by low cultural diversity and high civil society.

5.6. Chile

Unlike many Latin American countries, the linguistic composition and distribution of ethnicity in Chile is low. According to the *Ethnologue* Report, the variation of linguistic diversity in Chile is rather low. There are approximately twelve different languages spoken throughout country, and Spanish is the lingua franca. According to Greenberg’s index, the degree to which two randomly selected people do not speak the same language in Chile is very low (.034,) (Ethnologue Report). This is a striking contrast to Nigeria and India, whose Greenberg Index measures are .870 and .930 respectively (Ethnologue Report).

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30 In 1956, Joseph Greenberg sought to develop the first quantitative measure differentiating regions of the world in which there was great linguistic diversity from those in which there was great linguistic uniformity. Greenberg went on to develop and improve his index with many versions, and the version used here is the most recent version used in the 2006 Ethnologue Report. The index is not meant to be interpreted literally because of inherent political and social methodological problems associated with the measurement of individual linguistic repertoires. Nevertheless, the index is used in the field of linguistics as a broad guideline to interpret the density of linguistic diversity in one country or region against another. See Latin, David. “What is a Language Community” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No.1. (Jan 2000), pp142-155.
Therefore, in comparison to the four case studies outlined in this chapter, the amount of linguistic diversity in Chile is the lowest.

Civil society is Chile is strong. The proxy measures used to assess the strength of civil society throughout various countries in the previous chapter provide high measurements for Chilean civil society. According to the proxy measures established in the previous chapter, Chile, on a scale of 1 to 10, received a score of 9.3 for rule of law, 8.0 for political and social integration, and 9.0 for political participation [see chapter 2 for descriptions of measures, and Appendix 2 for an illustrative table]. Additionally, when the three variables are averaged on a scale that ranges in value from 1 to 6, Chile ranks among the higher percentile of countries in the sample population with a score of 5. Only nineteen countries out of 119 received a score of five or better. Given the degree of linguistic diversity in Chile, and the high rankings of civil society, Chile conforms to the theory that the strength of civil society is inversely related to the level of cultural diversity within a polity. Despite this relationship, the following analysis will seek to illustrate that the strength of civil society in Chile is not the product of cultural homogeneity, but rather the result of feebly embedded social stratifications. To address this argument in the case of Chile, this section will first outline a background of Chilean society focusing particularly on social stratifications, then provide an analysis of the opportunities for social mobility, assess the strength of social capital, and finally draw some conclusions in terms of the relationship between the strength of the social structure and civil society.
5.6.1. Chilean Social Structure & Segregation

Chile is a relatively homogeneous country and most of its population is of predominantly Spanish origin, with varying degrees of native Amerindian. Many people are the product of racial mixture between colonial Spanish immigrants and native Amerindian tribes. The CIA World Factbook reports that the whites and white-Amerindian (mestizos) make up 95% of the population, while pure Amerindian are 3% of the population. The remaining two percent of the population are made up various indigenous groups, dominated by Mapuche tribes. The ethnic composition of Chileans is marked by a socio-genetic gradient where Amerindian admixture typically correlates to social levels. Amerindian contribution tends to be strongest in the lower echelons of society, and in the upper class and middle class, tend to register the lowest degree of Amerindian contribution.

Chile is one of the most urbanized countries in Latin America. In 1998, eighty-five percent of the population was reported to be living in urban centers (Fay, 2005). The rural-urban divide with respect to the incidence of poverty is not very pronounced in Chile because a majority of the population lives in urban areas. Seventy-six percent of the urban population is poor (Fay, 2005). As a result, discrimination works against the poor rather than a particular ethnic or racial minority. However, as noted above, as levels of Amerindian admixture increase in social identity there is a strong correlation with lower socioeconomic levels.
“The reality of social exclusion in Latin America has many faces and dimensions” (Behrman et al, 2003, p.3). The 2000 Latinobarómetro survey captures how social stratifications are perceived in Latin American countries. The survey asked respondents to name the groups most discriminated against in their countries. They could choose from three categories: Blacks, Indigenous, and the Poor. In Chile, the poor are the most discriminated social group (Behrman et al, 2003). Thirty-six percent of respondents reported that the poor are most discriminated against, compared to 1.2% of blacks, and 22.2% of indigenous (Behrman et al, 2003, p.3). Indigenous and blacks do not represent a large portion of the population in Chile because the racial makeup of the population is rather homogenous, therefore the poor are perceived as the being the most discriminated group.

5.6.2. Indicators of Upward Mobility

In order to assess the impact of cultural stratifications on the strength of the social system in the Chile, the following section will seek to determine the degree of social mobility in the country. Social mobility will be measured here using the average year schooling gap measured between rural and urban people as well as gender.

Chile is among one of the most socially mobile countries in Latin America (Andersen, 2001b, p.6). Paying particular attention to enrollment rates and education, Andersen (2001b) found that the mean schooling gap in Chile is 1.55 years. A child’s schooling gap is defined as age minus year they begin school minus actual years of
schooling. Thus, if a 15 year old child, has 5 years of education, and begins school at the age of 6, the schooling gap is 15-6-5=4 years (Andersen, 2001b). We can therefore infer that most children in Chile are attending primary and secondary education because the mean schooling gap is so low. The schooling gap is a simple indicator of future opportunities, but it is well suited for the purpose of this section because it provides a general guideline for the amount of education that the average Chilean child is receiving.

The average schooling gap between urban and rural zones in Chile does not illustrate a marked difference. As mentioned above, in the country as a whole the mean schooling gap is 1.55 years. In urban centers the gap is 1.42 years, while in rural areas it is 2.24 years (Andersen, 2001b, p.28). The deviation for each region from the mean value of the country is relatively small. What is also interesting about Chile is that the gender gap with respect to education is reversed. Females tend to have lower schooling gaps than males both in urban and rural zones (Andersen, 2001b). Accordingly, Andersen (2001b) reports that social mobility is higher in females than for males (p.29). We can infer from the data that females are granted the opportunity to escape the social stratification of gender because there is high mobility of women compared to men.

Using the 2001 Chilean Social Mobility Survey (SMS), this section undertakes a comparative analysis of rural-urban migration in Chile. During the past 60 years, Chile transformed from a rural agrarian society to an urban service-based one (Torche, 2003, p.7). The rate of urbanization in Chile is 83%.
In 1941, the rural population was approximately 50% of the population; by 2000 it decreased to 17% in three major cities: Santiago, Antofagasta, and Ancud (Torche, 2003, p.7). In 1999, the people with the highest levels of Amerindian mixture accounted for 16.8% of the urban population, compared to 18% in 1995 (Torche, 2003 p. 10). The increased migration to urban centers, have led Chile to become on the most urbanized countries in Latin America (Mecovi 2002). Rapid urbanization in Chile has resulted in improved capacity for migrants partly because of the economic changes the competitive base of the country (Torche, 2003, p.7). As a result, Torche (2003) argues that urbanization has resulted in a higher standard of living or higher levels of development for rural Chileans. Andersen (2001a) notes that the positive impact of widespread urbanization in Chile is unusual. Taking notice that large amounts of rural-urban migration as a response to the supply-push and demand-pull factors of modernization theory often create a burden to the social and physical infrastructure of cities, while it has had some difficulties, Chile has been able thus far to sustain its urbanization (Torche, 2003, p.8).

5.6.3. Social Capital and Levels of Trust

The most recent data from the World Values Survey which measures social capital in terms of the degree of trust within Chilean society was collected in 2000. The Latinobarómetro survey collected the same data from a different sample population in 2006. The following will report the values from each survey.
According to the World Values Survey (2000), 976 Chileans were asked if they felt ‘most people can be trusted’ or ‘can’t be too careful.’ Twenty-two percent of the respondents felt as though most people can be trusted, while 78.1% answered that they ‘can’t be too careful.’

The 2006 Latinobarómetro survey reports that the level of trust in Chile has lowered since the World Values Survey was taken in 2000. Referring back to Figure 3.3 on page 30, the Latinobarómetro reports that 13% of Chileans feel as though most people can be trusted. While Latin Americans tend to generally be distrustful of unknown third parties, the percentages for Chile are below average in 2006.

The findings for the degree of trust and the level of social capital in Chile are not consistent with the strength of its civil society. Further analysis on a larger sample population would have to be conducted to find out if Chile is an anomaly with respect to the level of social capital and civil society, or if the relationship is insignificant as a whole. Given that the degree of trust in Latin America generally tends to be lower than other regions in the world, the relationship between a strong civil society and high social capital may not always hold true in many Latin American countries.

5.6.4. Analysis

Latin American countries are generally known to have very unequal income distributions compared to most other countries in the world. Most often, this implies that many people live in poverty. However, unlike the Nigerian and Bolivian cases (high
inequality and low social mobility) Chile has high inequality combined with high social mobility. The high inequality-high mobility combination provides people with incentives to work hard, be innovative, and take risks because the expected returns are high. The presence of high social mobility is stimulating for the social system.

It has been the objective of this section to analyze the embeddedness of social stratification in the Chilean social system. The major findings report that social mobility is high; therefore it is assumed Chilean people are more interconnected because different networks and groups of people are interacting regularly in all levels of the labor sector. Both disadvantaged and advantaged children are given the opportunity to build skills and human capital through the multicultural bilingual education program. In the long term this allows for the networks of the poor and disadvantaged to be connected to the new networks of their offspring. In theory, these connections build bridges throughout society, and provide the linkages for communication and the diffusion of information to be passed throughout the disparate groups of social system.

The indication that social mobility is accessible and strong in Chile infers that social stratifications are not deeply ingrained because individuals may escape the ascribed preconditions of ethnicity, family and heritage through education and migration. The multicultural and bilingual education program established in 1993 throughout the country has served the Chilean social system most positively (Buvinic, 2004, p.12). As a result, indigenous children can receive education in both Spanish and their mother tongue, which
in the long term encourages smaller educational gaps and longer enrollment rates. Due to the bilingual and multicultural educational policy in Chile, individuals of different ethnicities are granted the opportunity to join all income deciles and labor sectors (provided they have the skills and human capital). As a result, different groups of society are engaged in interaction in the labor sector. Chilean society is less atomized than Nigeria and Bolivia. Communication and the diffusion of information are improved because generational social mobility links the networks of different classes and families. Moreover and regardless of the linguistic composition of the country, because social stratifications are not deeply embedded in Chile, I have argued here that civil society is well developed as a result.

5.7. Discussion

The strength of civil society in the developing world is unpredictable in terms of linguistic diversity. Traditional theory advocates that cultural homogeneity is a precondition for vibrant civil societies; therefore, cultural diversity is an adversary of civil society. Statistics in the previous chapter have shown that vibrant civil societies exist among linguistically diverse states, and also that weak civil societies exist in linguistically homogenous states. It was the goal of this chapter to further explore these paradoxes in four case studies: India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Chile. This chapter has suggested that the paradoxes can be explained by the strength of the social system in each of the societies.
The cases of India and Bolivia represent the two contradictions to traditional theory; India has a vibrant civil society in the environment of a complex, culturally diverse polity; while Bolivia has a weak civil society against the backdrop of a culturally homogenous state. Nigeria and Chile on the other hand are examples of the two most anticipated cases with respect to the relationship between cultural diversity and civil society. Nigeria is very diverse and has a weak civil society, while Chile has a well developed civil society and a great degree of cultural homogeneity. Given the cases of India and Bolivia, the central hypothesis of this thesis therefore maintains that the strength of civil society is better explained by a more nuanced understanding of culture, which understands culture as a social network characterized as a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a unit of analysis may be used to interpret the social behavior of an entire society and the subsequent strength of civil society.

Linguistic diversity is believed to weaken civil society because it increases the transaction costs for communication among the polity. Social networks are institutions which reduce the transaction costs of communication in society because they help diffuse information through various linkages and the disparate groups of a society. Social systems are understood here to be a type of social network. The strength of the social system in the four case studied above has been measured by means of analyzing the linguistic and social stratifications of each society. Subsequently, upon assessing the strength of each
social system, the evidence in this chapter supports the hypothesis that the strength or weakness of civil society in the developing world can be explained by the strength of the social systems.

The main findings of this chapter provide an explanation for the following questions: is the strength of civil society dependent upon the strength of the social network system within the society? Does linguistic diversity weaken the capacity for social networks to form? Do social networks allow for better communication among the various parts of a segregated society? What role do social networks play in linguistically diverse and socially segregated communities?

The strength of civil society is related to the strength of the social systems in each of the cases studies analyzed here. Furthermore, linguistic diversity does not weaken the capacity for social networks to form; however cultural stratifications do. The embeddedness of cultural stratifications determines the strength of the social system. If the opportunity for social mobility is low, cultural stratifications are understood to be deeply embedded because ascribed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, class, and gender inhibit individuals from improving their social status. In such a social system, people are therefore segregated and excluded from various spheres of society that lie outside their ascribed parameters, and the society by definition is highly atomized. The reverse is true if the opportunity for social mobility is high. In the case of India and Chile, strong social systems allow for better communication among the various parts of the society.
Despite the significant differences in cultural diversity, I have argued here that Chile and India have much in common with respect to the strength of their social systems. Similarly, putting cultural diversity aside, the social systems of Nigeria and Bolivia are comparable in many ways as well. The researcher advocates that the strength of civil society lies in the existence of social systems that are analogous to those explored in Chile and southern India. It is also predicted that states with weak civil societies will exemplify characteristics similar to those explored in the cases of Nigeria and Bolivia.

Civil society is prevented from development in Nigeria and Bolivia because social stratifications are deeply entrenched and the opportunity for social mobility is low. The opportunity for social mobility is low in each of these societies because poverty is a vicious cycle that repeats generation after generation among particular ethnic groups. As a result, each culturally stratified group subsists in pockets or regions of society with few opportunities to interact. The social systems of Nigeria and Bolivia are interpreted to be weak as a result of low social mobility, high atomization and segregation. Interestingly, where similar conditions hold true in northern India (i.e. Bihar, Rajasthan, and Assam), the social system is also weak.

If atomization is the antithesis of civil society, then those societies with low social mobility will have weak social systems and therefore weak civil societies. Although the domain of social networks cannot be observed directly, the results of these proxy analyses
lend support to the view that the development of civil society is dependent upon the strength of a society’s network structure.
Chapter 6. Conclusion: Implications of a Cultural Lens for Analyzing Civil Society

The endeavor in this research has been to understand the impact of cultural diversity on the strength of civil society in the developing world. I have attempted to explain that the development of civil society is dependent upon the embeddedness of social stratifications within the social structure. Strong civil societies have been identified as those in which social stratifications are not deeply entrenched and where the degree of fragmentation in society is low because indicators of upward social mobility are pervasive across minority and marginalized groups. Similarly, weak civil societies are characterized by deeply embedded social stratifications, a highly fragmented social structure, and weak indicators of upward social mobility across marginalized and minority groups.

The preceding research has argued that weakly embedded social stratifications are central to the strength of civil society because they reduce fragmentation across social groups and provide an impetus for social mobility, communal integration and social cohesion. If fragmentation across social groups is the antithesis of civil society, what is found to be different among the social relations of states with weak and strong civil societies is the degree of divisions between different strata distinguished by the presence or absence of deeply embedded social stratifications (Gibson, 2001). The case studies presented in this research served to support this claim.
6.1. Summary of Findings

Thriving civil societies are dependent upon the absence of a fragmented population and the presence of social cohesion within the polity (Gibson, 2001, p.52) Cultural diversity—most visibly in terms of linguistic variation is believed to create a highly atomized environment among various social groups and linguistic communities (Posner, 2004). Naturally then, it is assumed, that as the amount of diversity increases, the degree of fragmentation increases, and the strength of civil society therefore decreases (Collier et al., 2001). A logical procession can then assume that an abundant stock of cultural homogeneity is presumably what produces a strong civil society.

The inverse relationship between cultural homogeneity and the strength of civil society is not always found to hold true empirically. The explanatory power of language variation provides an important point of entry for assessing how cultural diversity affects the strength or weakness of civil society in the developing world. Statistical analyses conducted here have shown, that cultural diversity—measured first in terms of linguistic variation finds the expected negative correlation between cultural diversity and civil society; however, it is a weak relationship with an R Squared value of .076 in a sample population of 119 countries. The evidence also reveals that two countries with the same amount of linguistic diversity will not always have the same level of development for civil society. When cultural diversity is understood in terms of social stratifications, the research reveals a more plausible explanation for the weakness of civil society in homogeneous
countries and strong civil societies in heterogeneous countries, albeit the sample population was limited to four case studies. As a result we cannot generalize the results of these four case studies to the developing world as a whole, but it certainly serves as a point of departure to catalyze related future research.

This research has shown that not only do vibrant civil societies exist in both homogeneous and heterogeneous societies but also why. It was found that civil society thrives in the presence of weakly embedded social stratifications, regardless of linguistic diversity. Given the importance of fragmentation to the strength of civil society, it was found that social mobility is central to the level of fragmentation in society because it allows for the disparate social groups, most notably discriminated minorities, to integrate into the mainstream social structure through participation in both skilled and low skilled labor sectors (Grawe & Mulligan, 2002). As a result, the disparate social groups of society are more integrated, which then fosters a lower level of fragmentation and an increased capacity for social cohesion (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001, p. 80).

Qualitative case studies conducted in India, Nigeria, Bolivia and Chile have shown that this argument is valid. In Chile, the social stratifications were found to be weak because the opportunity for upward social mobility among minority groups is high. Chile also has a developed civil society. India however presents a dynamic case. The results for the India vary depending on the northern or southern region of the country. The research found results similar to Chile in South India, but not so in the North. The level of
fragmentation in Chile and Southern India was found to be low because the degree to which social stratifications are deeply embedded is low. Conversely, in Bolivia, Nigeria, and Northern India, social stratifications were found to be deeply embedded because the opportunity for upward social mobility among disparate social groups is low. Northern Indian, Nigerian and Bolivian societies were found to be highly divided based on social strata and characterized by weak civil societies. In sum, where civil society is strong, social stratifications are weak; similarly, where civil society is weak, social stratifications are strong.

6.2. Further Implications

The findings of this study are important contributions to the field of civics and cultural diversity because they stimulate two ongoing debates. First, how should cultural diversity be measured and what are the implications of this research for development? And second, what defines a strong civil society?

The first major contribution of this study has been to add to our understanding of how cultural diversity affects civil society. Ultimately, there is a long list of variables which can be identified as measurements for cultural diversity. This thesis was able to make three contributions to the science of measuring cultural diversity. The first has been to provide an index of cultural diversity measured by languages for a large sample population. Second, using linguistic diversity as a proxy for cultural diversity reveals the
expected negative correlation between cultural diversity and civil society, albeit with low explanatory power. And third, as another component of culture, social stratifications provide plausible explanations for the apparent contrary cases between cultural diversity and the strength of civil society. The results illustrate the need to continue exploring more interpretations of cultural diversity in future research so as to eventually acquire a robust holistic measure of cultural diversity.

The second major contribution of this thesis is the index of civil society used in chapter 4. The civil society index created out of three proxy variables contributes to the growing debate on civil society by adding to the scholarship which seeks to define and identify the notion of civil society in the developing world. This research is another step forward in identifying a commonly accepted framework and methodology for measuring civil society. Some critics might challenge the measurement of civil society taken here because it ignores the role of secondary associations, like labor unions, political parties and non-governmental organizations. The operational definition by Anheier (2004) used here, implicitly addresses secondary associations, labor unions, political parties and non-governmental organizations because the definition calls for the sphere of institutions, individuals and organizations in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests (p.22). Moreover, while not explicit, BTI considers associational membership as one of their criteria for defining and measuring the “political and social integration” variable.
Civil society scholars might additionally advocate that economic prosperity serves as a better indicator for the strength of civil society rather than the three proxy variables used here. Those who make the case for this argument, assume economic prosperity allows more time for leisurely activities, which then provides opportunity for individuals to participate in more secondary associations, which then creates social cohesion and ultimately a strong civil society (Howard, 2003). Given this theory, the presumption of uniform weak civil society throughout the developing world as opposed to developed countries could be justified; however, the main findings of this study show that both strong and weak civil societies can be found in developing countries, therefore questioning the validity of the claim that economics predicts the development of civil society.

Furthermore, the results of the case studies have implications for the scope of social development and widely held ideas regarding education in developing countries with respect to culture. According to the Organization Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank, “social development begins with the perspectives of the poor and marginalized people and works toward positive and sustainable changes to make societies more equitable, inclusive, and just” (Parker, 2005, p.3). The development of civil society and the process of social development speak to achieve the same relational ends. According to this definition, the development of civil society is inherent in the process of social development.
Like the development of civil society, social development is understood here as a process. This research speaks to the importance of social mobility to the process of social development. Most particularly, it speaks to the importance of education. Education is clearly one of the most fundamental opportunities for social mobility and economic growth in today’s knowledge economy (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001). Strong correlations have been found in numerous empirical studies between the development of human capital and economic growth (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001). Universal education has thus become a highly seasoned policy of international development institutions in developing countries. It is advocated that social development and education are hindered in culturally diverse societies because it is impractical to meet the demands of all the various ethnic and linguistic groups (Easterly & Levine, 1997). The case studies conducted in this research contradict this correlation. More specifically, the evidence presented in the case studies reveal that presence of linguistic homogeneity as a precondition for social development needs to be reconsidered. The Indian case study illustrates that cultural diversity—measured by language, is not always a formidable barrier for access to education; whereas the Bolivian case study demonstrates that linguistic homogeneity is not always a reliable channel for widespread access to education. Given the evidence and case studies presented here, this research has shown that providing education is not always predicated on whether there is linguistic homogeneity or heterogeneity present in the society’s social structure. It is to this end that this research provokes further attention to the relationship between the
concept of cultural diversity and social development. It is clear that all diverse societies cannot be treated in the same fashion, because diversity can be measured in a milieu of ways.

6.3. Limitations & Questions for Future Research

This research faced three major limitations. First, the availability of data for global civil society indices in the developing world is incomplete. Second, there are inherent methodological problems associated with measuring linguistic diversity and the total sum of individual language repertoires. And finally, the case study analyses were limited to four countries, and analyzed using secondary data rather than a participant observer approach.

6.3.1. Civil Society

Civil society is a very ambiguous concept for which uniform global data per country is scarcely available. Beginning first with an inconsistency in terms of definition and meaning, there is no formal universal definition of civil society that is accepted among scholars and policy makers alike. Unlike income, poverty and inequality which can be measured readily using standardized indices such as the GINI coefficient and the Human Development Index (HDI), indices that survey civil society cross-nationally do not exist. Given the restriction of limited data, it was necessary to create my own index of civil society using three proxy variables from secondary sources in order to quantify and
compare the strength of civil society across a large sample population. The civil society data derived from this methodology was constructed using a priori-additive approach. There are three limitations to this approach. First, the indicators are taken as given by a secondary source, second theoretical rather than mathematical knowledge is used to guide measurement assumptions, and third, each of the three indicators carry equal weight, which ultimately assumes that the indicators are equally important both theoretically and from a measurement perspective. Given these circumstances, future research would benefit from constructing a more mathematical approach for creating a civil society index.

6.3.2. Cultural Diversity

Cultural diversity as an abstract concept is a difficult variable to quantify. Critics would argue that there are many other ways to measure cultural diversity, and that linguistic diversity and social stratifications are not the most fruitful method to assess the extent of cultural diversity within a society (Marsden & Swingle, 1994).

While it cannot be disputed that language is one of many variables that serve to indicate the idiosyncrasies of different cultures and people; language carries culturally specific connotations, tradition, and history that other cultural variables do not (Duranti, 1997). For example, idiomatic expressions are the most excellent sources for culturally specific attitudes, preconceptions, and ingrained subconscious values. From this vantage point, language serves as both a marker of communication and as an indicator of values that are specific not only to countries, but also to regions, dialects, socio-economic status,
gender, race, class and caste (Duranti, 1997). As a result, language transcends the role of communication and relays a message beyond cultural diversity that variables like religion, clothing, cuisine, and artifacts cannot.

Others may ultimately contend that culture is not as important as economics or politics in assessing the strength or weakness of civil society because it is influenced by numerous factors, for example: geography, climate, politics and history. Culture clearly affects patterns of human interaction, communication and the social structure of society. The fundamental fact of society is precisely that it is social (Blau, 1977, p.50). Those who dismiss the interrelationship between culture and language, or culture and society, also miss the essence of what defines individuals and what motivates social behavior.

6.3.3. Language Diversity

Language has the advantage that it can be measured independently of the dependent variables that concern this research. Additionally, language can be coded to allow for useful statistical tests and quantitative analyses. But while there is compelling evidence to use linguistic variation as a measurement for cultural diversity, there is some ambiguity in terms of how to collect linguistic data, and exactly what is meant by the phrase a language.

There is a lack of consensus by linguistics, anthropologists, and other scientists alike on how to measure the degree of linguistic diversity in a society primarily due to the following four reasons: the first reason being, we do not know enough about many of the
languages spoken throughout the world because there are many languages that lack a systematic orthography, and many indigenous peoples are remote and unreachable. Secondly, linguistic surveys in many parts of the world are incomplete due to political rationale, social capital imbalances and power structures. Some languages have yet to be discovered and many languages have not been adequately described. This is the case with many of the languages in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas. Thirdly, there is no clear-cut distinction between the phrase *a language* and the term *dialect*. Finally, and related to the latter point, criteria of national identity and mutual intelligibility may not coincide. In some cases, political criteria outweigh linguistic criteria and dialects are given the status of a standard language. For instance, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian are mutually intelligible (linguistic criteria). Scientifically they are considered dialects of the same language, but since they are spoken in different countries and therefore separated by political borders (political criteria), they are considered to be three separate languages. On the other hand, many dialects of Chinese are mutually unintelligible, but are considered to

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31 The difference between *a language versus a dialect* is an ongoing debate within the field of linguistics. Linguists usually rely on a criterion called mutual intelligibility to decide the difference between the two concepts. In scientific terms: if persons A and B speak different language systems, but can understand each other when each is speaking their characteristic language system, they are speaking dialects of the same language. Other criteria must also be met in order for the two languages to be considered dialects of the same language: the two language systems must be similar in their pronunciation, grammar, and word stock. If speakers A and B cannot understand one another, they are scientifically understood to be speaking different languages. But social stigma and political borders have created confusion regarding the differences between the two concepts, these implications are further explained above. Source: (Duranti, 1997, p. 70).
be dialects of the same language because they are spoken in the same country and they share the same writing system.

6.3.4. Social Stratifications

The main basis for analyzing the embeddedness of social stratifications in this research involved the assumption that social mobility decreases the degree of fragmentation across social groups in a society. This methodology has two limitations. First, it assumes that an inverse relationship between fragmentation and social mobility exists, and second, it also expects that social mobility invariably generates dyadic ties across disparate social groups because of interaction in the labor force. These assumptions are based on personal and cultural biases. In the researcher’s country of origin, it is common to build dyadic ties through the workplace. Patterns of building dyadic ties through this particular type of social interaction may not be culturally universal.

Furthermore, the type of quantitative data needed for social network analysis was not available for each of the four case studies. The information about the strength of civil society had to be derived from making causal assumptions from information published in anthropological and ethnographic texts. A participant observer methodology would certainly prove to be more a fruitful approach for the qualitative analyses of this research. Future research would undoubtedly benefit from measuring weak ties and social networks in the case studies presented here in addition to other developing countries so as to test for
the validity of the relationship between civil society and social mobility, and social stratifications.

6.3.5. Future Research

As the most salient marker of different social groups, future examinations on the role of language in society are compulsory if we are ever to reach any deeper understanding of the affects of linguistic fractionalization on patterns of communication, human interaction and social cohesion. However, it is not enough to study the different ethnic groups according to the languages that they speak. One should also study the individuals and their individual linguistic repertoires. Multilingualism is a common feature of many citizens in linguistically heterogeneous societies. Future research might include a sociolinguistic analysis on the extent to which individuals in linguistically diverse countries use different registers in various environments to communicate across various social groups and generate interpersonal relationships.

Beyond language, it would be valuable to study other aspects of cultural diversity that affect the cohesion and patterns of communication in society. Other cultural variables worthy of study may include, inter and intra-ethnic marriage patterns, kinship ties, religious diversity, living arrangements, and the degree of secondary associational membership and activity per capita. Insights into these variables would also show patterns of interaction across disparate social groups and attest to the entrenchment of social stratifications and ascribed minority status.
Spatial distribution, infrastructure, laws, and geographical environment are other important variables that affect the degree of social cohesion and the patterns of communication in society. Most particularly, future research could consider the quality of transportation infrastructure by analyzing the number of roads (paved and unpaved), highways, railroads, and airports, as well as the spatial distribution of major urban zones with respect to urban design and city planning in developing countries. Infrastructure has a great impact on the extent to which geographical and physical environments are barriers to the diffusion of information and the flow of communication across disparate regions of a country. A closer look at the quality of roads and the number of roads would reveal a great deal of information in terms of the capacity for individuals to migrate, and participate or interact with other parts of society.

Under the guidance of urban design, one could study the ownership of space in cities, or the distribution of different social groups throughout the city, in addition to customary patterns of living. For example, in Middle Eastern societies, most specifically in Iran, it is common for families to live in the same neighborhood, on the same street and in heavily secluded living quarters (Clark & Costello, 2003). Each family lives together in the same region, street, and city area generation after generation (Clark & Costello, 2003). Non-family members are culturally discouraged from moving into these neighborhoods. As a result the society remains atomized due to architecture and cultural living norms. An analysis that further understands how architecture and city planning dictate patterns of
communication would further support the notion that culture is a principle variable in explaining social cohesion and the strength of civil society. More importantly, it would also show that various fields of study are important and essential analytical tools for development studies. Ultimately, what is needed is not the isolation of culture as an independent variable in development policy, but the integration of culture “as a common place malleable fact of life that matters as much as economics or politics to the process of development” (Rao & Walton, 2004, p. 3).

6.4. Final Remarks

By paying particular attention to the strength of social systems and the amount of linguistic diversity per country, this study has tried to illustrate how culture interacts with the development of civil society. The statistical analyses and case studies presented here achieved two objectives: first, they served to illustrate the influence of language on the strength of civil society, and second, they revealed that there are other cultural variables beyond language that dictate the patterns of communication and interaction in society. To this end, this research lends support to the importance of cross-disciplinary analyses in social development.

Furthermore, the ideas brought forth in this research reflect an increasing recognition of the centrality of cultural variables to the processes of globalization. Improvements in technology are increasing the speed and reducing the costs of global
communication and transportation. As a result, we are witnessing a widespread movement of people across borders. Cultures are becoming evermore hybrid and national populations are exponentially increasing with diversity. The amount of linguistic variety in nation states will continue to intensify accordingly; and moreover, the social problems associated with linguistic minorities and linguistic stratifications will deepen. This study speaks to the importance of language as a central variable in understanding the impact of cultural homogeneity or heterogeneity on how society is structured.

Finally, an analysis of civil society through a cultural lens has many implications for understanding the fundamental problems of inequality and empowerment in complex societies. Universally, cultural variables function as conventional tools to exercise power. The importance and influence of these variables on society cannot be dismissed. It implies that intervention needs to be shaped in ways that recognizes stratifications and power structures culturally. Ultimately, what emerges from this research is a deeper understanding of cultural stratifications in the role of social development and civil society.
### APPENDIX 1

**Cross National Differences in Interpersonal Trust**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cautious</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Civil Society Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>76.8</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>17.7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>82.1</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>59.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 Note: The source of the data is the World Values Survey, conducted in 1990-2001. The years vary because not every country reported data for every year. Bolivia was not reported in the World Values Survey, the data for Bolivia is derived from 2006 Latinobaròmetro.
## APPENDIX 2

Civil Society and Linguistic Diversity in Developing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Languages</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>PS Integration</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Final Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>51</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.0</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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33 R Squared = .076, p<.01
Civil Society and Linguistic Diversity in Developing Countries Cont’d

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