THE LANGUAGE OF TERRORISM
AL-JAZEERA AND THE FRAMING OF TERRORISM DISCOURSE

A Dissertation
submitted to the faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
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By

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### Transliteration System

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Chapter 1 - Al-Jazeera and the Discourse of Counter-Ideology

1.1 Why This Study?

There is general consensus among U.S. scholars and policy makers that anti-Americanism in the Arab world is at its highest point to date. However, there is disagreement about the root causes of this sentiment. The claim has been made that, ‘they [Arabs] hate our freedom’ or, ‘they hate our values,’ while others blame U.S. foreign policy for causing the anti-Americanism. A 2004 article in the *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* maintains that “scholars agree that the extreme anti-American sentiment is pervasive across the predominantly Muslim countries of the world, but disagree about the sources of these negative perceptions. Some researchers point to cultural, religious, and value divisions as primary factors shaping negative perceptions of the United States, while others emphasize internal Muslim state politics, comparatively low levels of economic and social development, and failure to establish civil society and democracy as the key contributors to Anti-American opinion. Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the second Gulf War, a number of U.S. policy makers and commentators have zeroed in on Al-Jazeera\(^1\), as an additional major contributor” (Nisbet et al: 2004). This

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\(^1\) The correct transliteration of Al-Jazeera is *al-jazīra*. However since it is now a brand name, I decided to use the way it is commonly written in the literature, namely Al-Jazeera. In chapter 6, I will address the development of Al-Jazeera in depth, including its name.
study will examine whether Al-Jazeera does in fact contribute to this extreme anti-American sentiment that is reputedly so pervasive across the Arab and Muslim world. Further, it will examine the way Western discourses on terrorism are framed and how Al-Jazeera plays the role of a counter-ideology to these discourses.

Language and discourse are the catalyst for building cultural images that define the way in which global terrorism is perceived, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This applies to how communities identify their enemies, how political the political elite and the average react, and how cultures collectively understand their relationship to terrorism. Which ideology is reflected in the Arab media’s news coverage? Based on Al-Jazeera’s mission-statement, it would be expected that Al-Jazeera’s news coverage would reflect a counter-ideology to Western discourse in the media.

With the Bakhtinian notion of heteroglossia and the dialogic construction of meaning as a backdrop, this dissertation examines the concept of ‘objectivity’ as an idealistic, abstract notion and as it applies to Al-Jazeera’s role in covering America’s “war on terror” and other major news events and conflicts inside and outside the Arab world. Further, it examines how Al-Jazeera attempts to produce a counter-ideology vis-à-vis Western media through its programming. It will explore the processes by which the terminology of Western discourse is framed, specifically regarding program moderators and guests on Al-Jazeera’s round table discussions, with a focus on the following questions:

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2 **Heteroglossia.** A term used by Mikhail Bakhtin to describe the many-voicedness of language. Although languages (e.g. English) present themselves as unified and homogeneous (monoglossic), Bakhtin shows that they are actually always fractured and stratified (heteroglossic). For example, they include traces of other national languages (English is made up of archaic Norman, German, Latin, contemporary French, American English, etc.). Language is also split along social, cultural, professional lines, as seen in Scouse or Estuary English, estate-agent-speak, academic English, military or police idioms, etc. No language or identity is as unified and homogeneous as it claims. See Bakhtin 1981 for more details.
1. Which discourses on terrorism do these program moderators and their guests use in these talk shows?

2. Are there differences in the range of opinions covered by the various segments dealing with issue of terrorism?

3. How are these different views reflected at the local/global levels of analysis?

4. And most importantly, what do these discussions on terrorism tell us about Al-Jazeera’s self-confessed editorial line (“opinion and counter-opinion”) concerning one of the most debated topics of our time.

Al-Jazeera, and, more specifically, its programs min wāshinṭūn (From Washington) and al-sharī‘a wa-l-ḥayāt (Islamic law and life), present an intersection of ideas, images, people, and voices that are constantly being negotiated and reshaped in the dialogic interchange between cultures of circulation: Western, Arab, Islamic, American, Arab Nationalist, Secularist, Qatari, and Israeli. Through an analysis of selected transcripts from the above-mentioned programs, I will demonstrate that Al-Jazeera not only informs its audience, but creates an information audience as well. Moreover, Al-Jazeera’s responds to, and is influenced by, not only the Arab cultural context of interactive exchange, but also Western frames, formats and structures of information dissemination. The end result of this environment is an ever-evolving form and flow of exchange creating a constant meta-discursive negotiation of the terms employed in discussions involving terrorism.

This study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze terrorism discourse on Al-Jazeera’s talk shows. Between 2002 and 2005, several segments treated terrorism, most of them
hosting prominent religious scholars such as Youssef Al-Qaradawi, U.S. government officials, and Arab media and political personalities. Drawing mostly on Fairclough’s critical analytical approach to the media, I examine, at the micro or local level, key linguistic strategies and rhetorical arguments deployed by the participants (mostly the hosts of the min wāshinṭūn (From Washington) program such as Hafez Al-Mirazi and the main guest of the program asharī’a wa-l-ḥayāt (Islamic law and life), Youssef Al-Qaradawi, to justify their positions on the nature of terrorism and discourse surrounding it. I will supplement this in-depth textual/local analysis with an analysis at the macro or global level, which will look at the overall structure of these episodes in order to determine the extent to which dominant positions taken by participants at the micro level are reinforced by the superstructure of the segments themselves. Throughout, I will use inter-textual analysis to study the political discourses which Al-Jazeera draws upon from the larger socio-cultural context in its discussions of terrorism. The purpose of this multi-level

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3 Sheikh Al-Qaradawi, according to an Arabic language website dedicated to him (www.qaradawi.net), was born in a small village in the Nile Delta in 1926. He studied Islamic theology at Al-Azhar university in Cairo, from which he graduated in 1953. Twenty years later he was awarded a PhD for his thesis on how Zakat (Islamic alms) can contribute to solving social problems. He has written extensively on Islam and is regarded as a respected scholar. His website describes him as the most prominent voice of moderation (wasatiyya) in Islam and a builder of bridges between traditionalists and modernizers. His involvement with the outlawed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood landed him in trouble. The brotherhood, founded in the 1920s, is one of the largest and most influential Islamist organizations in the region. It has a history of violence, but now says it is committed to peaceful means for creating an Islamic state. Sheikh Al-Qaradawi has been jailed several times in Egypt. Since 1963, he has lived and worked in the Gulf state of Qatar, where he now heads an Islamic research center. It is his views on suicide bombings in particular that has generated controversy, mainly in the West. He has distanced himself from suicide attacks in the West, though he has consistently defended Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis. He told Al-Jazeera that he was not alone in believing that suicide bombings in the Palestinian territories were a legitimate form of self-defense for people who have no aircraft or tanks. He said hundreds of other Islamic scholars are of the same opinion. In this respect, he is very much in tune with what the vast majority of people in the Arab world believe. Defending suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians, Sheikh Al-Qaradawi told the BBC programme Newsnight that an Israeli woman is not like women in our societies, because she is a soldier… I consider this type of martyrdom operation as evidence of God's justice? …Allah Almighty is just; through his infinite wisdom he has given the weak a weapon the strong do not have, and that is their ability to turn their bodies into bombs as Palestinians do.? Despite his popularity, Sheikh Al-Qaradawi is not without his critics in the Arab world. Some see his regular preaching on Al-Jazeera as an uncritical regurgitation of Islamic dogma out of touch with the modern world.
analysis is to answer the following key questions raised above. This study will also investigate the relationship between media and terrorism and how the Arab media, through its news coverage, analysis, and debates about U.S.-Arab relations, the situation in Iraq, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has portrayed terrorism or so-called terrorism.

1.2 A Brief Overview of Previous Works in Arabic Discourse Analysis

Middle Eastern society experienced sudden and profound change in the 19th century under the impact of European expansion and influence. But as Western ideas about politics, technology, and culture began to infiltrate Arab society, the old language proved to be an inadequate vehicle for transmitting these alien concepts from abroad. A number of studies analyze Arabic political discourse and its transformation. Yasir Suleiman examines the communicative and symbolic roles of language in articulating national identity. He identifies the links between language and nationalism while demonstrating how this has been articulated over the past two centuries. In another study, Suleiman examines national identity in relation to language, and how language could be manipulated to signal political, cultural or historical difference.

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4 Which discourses on terrorism do these talk shows use? Are there differences in the range of opinions on the same issue that the various segments cover? How are the various positions, when they exist, manifested at the local/global levels of analysis? Most importantly, what do these discussions on terrorism tell us about Al-Jazeera’s self-confessed editorial line (“the opinion and the counter-opinion”) concerning one of the most controversial topics of our time, namely terrorism?


According to Dunne, Arabic discourse analysis has been limited to the exploration of the relation between specific linguistic forms and political functions and between lexical choices and political trends. In her study about democracy in contemporary Egyptian political discourse, Dunne mentions a number of works dealing with Arabic discourse analysis, namely Ayalon (1994), Bengio (1998), Ismail (1995, 1998a, 1998b), and Marzani (1995, 1997). Ayalon, Bengio, and Ismail focused on the analysis of political lexicon while ignoring other linguistic features “as a way of understanding political culture (Ayalon, Bengio) or political economy (Ismail). Ayalon and Ismail use a deductive approach, starting with a hypothesis and seeking examples from various instances of political discourse. Bengio takes a more inductive approach, defining her corpus (selected excerpts from Iraqi Ba’th discourse 1968-98) and eliciting key words, phrases and trends.” (Dunne 2000: 34). In her study, “Functions of Arabic Political Discourse: the case of Saddam Hussein speeches,” Marzani’s goal was not to explore the political situation through a discourse analysis similar to that of the above-mentioned researchers. Rather, her goal was focus on a particular language aspect, namely code-switching, by exploring political discourse. Discussing her method, Dunne maintains that “it is clearly inductive, analyzing a few political speeches in detail… Marzani uses only data that were spoken, whereas Ayalon and Ismail focus on written data and Bengio uses both” (Dunne 2000: 34).

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Ayalon examines 19th-century linguistic change in the Eastern Arab world as a mirror of changing Arab perceptions and responses to the West as well as a guide to the emergence of modern Arabic concepts, institutions, and practices. Focusing on the realm of political discourse, he looks at a wide array of evidence—local chronicles, travel accounts, translations of European writings, Arab political treatises, newspapers and periodicals, and dictionaries—to show how shifts in the color, tone, and meaning of the Arab vocabulary reflected a new socio-political and cultural reality. As an example of his work, Dunne cites his comparison of the use of the word “/ra ‘āyya/ (‘subjects’) to refer to the populace of Arab countries under Ottoman rule during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to the increasing use of /sha‘b/ (‘people’) in the mid-nineteenth century. His data are primarily excerpts from newspaper reports and books” (2000:34).

While Ayalon examines Arabic discourse diachronically in selected historical and contemporary texts via what he calls “semantic archeology” (by searching many Arabic lexicons and glossaries from various periods), Mol uses a synchronic description of the use of complementary particles with reference to contemporary Standard Arabic grammar. He conducts an empirical investigation into horizontal regional variation in the Modern Standard Arabic of radio news bulletins. After first determining the position of Modern Standard Arabic within the Arabic language setting—which has been described, inter alia, as diglossia, triglossia, and quadriglossia—Mol analyzes the methodological implications of these descriptions. For this study, a corpus-linguistic approach was chosen, requiring the compilation of a text corpus of

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radio news bulletins from linguistically very different countries, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The completely transcribed corpus of approximately 320,000 words was tagged primarily on the word level, using the traditional, mixed grammar as a reference point. Various computer applications were then developed to explore the corpus. In general, the investigation attests to great uniformity among the three countries on the syntactic level. However, it also reveals that the function of certain particles has shifted significantly compared to the descriptions of the same particles in classical Arabic grammar.

Like Ayalon, Ofra Bengio\textsuperscript{11} looks for patterns in lexical choices and correlates them to political and historical developments. While Ayalon takes a longer term, broader look covering a number of Arab countries over several centuries, Bengio concentrates on a specific period of time in contemporary Iraqi history. She attempts to understand modern Iraq by closely examining the political discourse used by the Ba'ath regime and its leader, Saddam Hussein. By analyzing political terms, concepts, and idioms as disseminated through the official Iraqi mouthpieces, she sheds light on Iraq's political culture and the events that these expressions have both reflected and shaped. In doing so, she brings to the fore a universal truth, namely that political culture is built on public discourse under any regime. Dunne notes that Bengio observes how the Sunni Arab minority dominates political discourse, just as it dominates political action, and tries to neutralize discursively the other religious and ethnic groups, namely the Kurds and Shiites:

“People are disqualified in various ways, all of which is given expression in the political idiom. One means is to avoid the mention of words disqualified groups use to speak of themselves. ‘Shiite’ or ‘Kurdistan’ are sometimes ‘non-words.’ Such usage is meant to

wipe out the identity of those groups and to melt them down in the crucible of ‘Iraqness’ in a way characteristic of Baathi thought. A more active way is to label groups as ‘communal’ or ‘anti-Arab.’ These labels place them beyond the pale and rob them of their political weight.”12 (quoted in Dunne 2000: 36)

Salwa Ismail delves into particular contemporary political situations with reference to how they are manifested on the level of lexical choice in public discourse. For example,13 she focuses on the interdiscursivity in discourses on democracy between Islamist and secularist intellectuals in Egypt. In her article, “Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics and Conservative Islamism in Egypt” (1998a), Ismail explores the interdiscursivity between the discourse of secularist intellectual Farag Foda14 (also spelled Fawda) and the discourse of Islamist leaders. Dunne quotes Ismail’s observation that “both Islamist and secularist discourses on democracy tend to be framed in terms of reactions to the West”(Dunne 2000: 38):

12 (Bengio: 1998:14)


14 Ana Belen Soage wrote an article about Foda and his stand against Islamist totalitarianism. Published in the June 2007 issue of Middle East Review of International Affairs, the article exposes Foda's critique of the Islamist enterprise. In particular, Foda points out that it was the Islamists who are the true enemies of Islam, not secular intellectuals like himself: Soage writes, “However, the growth of Islamism was not just the result of hankering after a glorified past, and Fawda acknowledged the role played by other factors. They included the crushing 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel, which had been interpreted as a punishment from God; economic hardship, especially in some of Cairo's shantytowns, where people are in constant contact with more affluent areas through work or studies but struggle to meet their most basic needs; generous financing of books, magazines, and newspapers by the affluent Islamists; and the political ineffectiveness when not collusion alluded to above. Fawda also stressed the responsibility of liberal intellectuals and urged them to challenge the Islamists. He himself was not afraid of taking controversial stances, such as his denunciation of the fatwa against Rushdie, which, in his opinion, offered the world an image of Islam as a religion unable to confront its critics with anything other than the sword. He personally believed Islam to be a tolerant religion that encouraged rationality and inquiry and felt that he was defending it against those trying to distort its message for their own purposes. Furthermore, he did not think that Islam should be held responsible for the backwardness of the Muslim world any more than Japan's technological prowess should be attributed to Buddhism or Shinto.” Foda was killed by militant Islamists in 1992.
“In sum, the problematic of democracy is thought of in terms of the experiences of the “Other.” This is true of the intellectuals who use the West as a model to emulate as well as those who reject that model. While rejection is articulated in terms of difference and specificity, emulation is posited as an obligatory step for joining the march of humanity, catching up, and staying in history. Democracy in this sense becomes a historical imperative dictated by the necessity/desire to remain in history and to be historical agents.” (Ismail 1998b:96)\(^{15}\)

Among the most recent works on Arabic political discourse is Marzani’s book on aspects of language variation in Arabic political discourse,\(^{16}\) in which the author conducts a linguistic analysis of the discourses of Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Qadhafi. In a related article,\(^{17}\) Marzani takes a variationist approach and examines “the relationship of language forms to functions, primarily through the prism of code switching and code-mixing (using two or more codes within a single utterance or even a single word) among varieties of Modern standard Arabic (MSA) and Arabic dialects. She examines each speech for code-switching at the level of phonology, morphology, syntax and lexicon.” (2000:40). The key question, as Marzani expresses it, is “what is the aim of the speaker, what is he actually attempting to convey in his speech, and how would this affect the linguistic choices he makes?” (1997:86. Quoted in Dunne 2000: 41)

As far as her own study is concerned (2000), Dunne takes the issue of democracy in contemporary Egypt as the central problem and examines selected instances of public discourse.

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\(^{15}\) Quoted in Dunne 2000: 38


She uses both ethnographic and linguistic research methods “to discover who was involved in the production of the texts, which social and political functions (such as identity construction and negotiation of power relations) the texts performed for the producers, and how those functions were carried out via specific linguistic strategies and devices.” Her approach is “problem focused (looking at how democracy is discussed in contemporary Egyptian political discourse) rather form-focused (like Marzani) or culture-focused (like Ayalon, Bengio, or Ismail).” (Dunne 2000:43).

1.3 Why Critical Discourse Analysis?

The methodological approach I use in this study differs fundamentally from those of the aforementioned studies. It falls broadly under the theory of critical discourse analysis. This approach is simultaneously a technique for the analysis of specific texts (or speech acts) and a means to understand the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena. Discourses are groups of related ideas, expressed in different types of written and spoken texts that use a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, assumptions, narratives, and forms of social action. In particular, labels and narratives are critical to the analysis of political discourse. Labels are the linguistic terms employed to describe actors, acts, behavior, scenes, qualities or purposes within the general public vocabulary. Narratives are the stories that provide coherence and consistency to the scenes, characters and themes that guide the ethical conduct of a society and bring meaning to the lives of the linguistic community and its members. They play the role of identifying, interpreting, and reframing past events and to structure the

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19 See Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, Boston, Addison Wesley, 1995
relationships between different groups of labels. 20

Discourse functions ideologically by dictating: what is possible for people within a culture to say or not say about a particular topic; what is considered normal; what is common sense and what can be accepted as legitimate “knowledge.” This is does not mean that discourse is completely unified and coherent or that it always remains consistent. Speakers and texts are often inconsistent and contradict each other, and there are exceptions to rules within language. It is, however, important to emphasize that discourse is rarely neutral or objective. It is almost always an exercise in social power—the power to ascribe value concerning what is right and wrong, true or false, and to define what is reasonable and appropriate. It defines the parameters of debate and sets the limits for possible action. With regard to public policy, discourse sets the limits, possibilities, and interests for its development. Interests themselves exist primarily outside of public policy. They are discursively constructed and reflect other discourses and narratives of national security, threats, identities, values, relationships, and the like. It is important to understand this when considering the public policy outcomes of the particular discourse called “Islamic terrorism.”

It is equally important to note that discourse neither comes from a vacuum, nor does it work in one direction. Instead, it exists in concert with and builds upon other socio-cultural discourses and narratives, which shape it in definitive ways. In this sense, discourse has discernible histories and genealogies. It builds upon the discursive foundation laid down by previous texts and responds to pre-existing discursive opportunity structures. Over time, as layers of discourse and practice are laid down and compacted, “social lithification” can create

20 Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism, pp. 8-11.
deeply embedded, hard discursive structures which are resistant to change or challenge.\textsuperscript{21} In many ways, the “Islamic terrorism” discourse—laid down in countless academic, governmental, and media texts over many decades—is an example of an institutionally and culturally embedded discourse. The academic, official, journalistic, and popular literature on Islam, the Middle East and contemporary “Islamic terrorism” is extremely large and continuously expanding. The main units of analysis are written and spoken texts sampled from: (i) the speeches and statements of high level government officials (ii) articles and documentaries produced by media personalities, prominent intellectuals, and think-tanks; (iii) literature produced by international relations and terrorism studies journals; and (iv) transcripts of excerpts from Al-Jazeera’s talk show programs. Texts were analyzed for the labels, assumptions, symbols, rules and narratives they use; the kinds of existing cultural-political narratives they delve into, and the ways in which the language they use functions to structure the meanings, logic, and potential policy responses to the events they describe. This analysis also is an attempt to examine how this discourse functions politically in the wider political and cultural spheres.

1.4 Why Research Al-Jazeera?

Many researchers have shown that the media, especially in times of war, are not free of dominant ideologies (see e.g., Fairclough, 1995 and 2003; Thompson, 1995; Van Dijk, 1997; Watson, 1998). However, the myth of freedom of the press still lives on, not only among non-media experts, but also among communication scholars and news people (Shaul, 2003: 147). The idea of freedom of the press stems from a traditional liberal theory, by which the role of the

media in a democracy is to check the state.\textsuperscript{22} Nowadays, it is still often claimed that in democratic countries the media independently set the agenda of news in an objective presentation, free of ideology, and that they have autonomous power that is free from influences of governments and the elite (Shaul, 2003: 144). This claim is supported by well-known cases in which the media served society by investigating the abuse of authority by public officials, e.g., in the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, there are also numerous examples in which the media are guilty of biased news reporting, sometimes with serious consequences, like the U.S. news coverage of the issue of Iraq’s illegal possession of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{23} Contrary to the belief that the media strives for objectivity, there seems to be an steady increase in awareness that the coverage of mainstream media of major events is largely determined by dominant ideologies (see e.g., Thompson, 1995 and Watson, 1998) and market forces.

Two phenomena pertaining to dominant ideology in the media have been labeled as “Westernization” and “Americanization” (Hall, 1991: 21). Starting in the late sixties, “the cultural imperialism of the Western-dominated global village” has been discussed by many scholars and has been researched throughout the world. Herbert Schiller was probably the first who determined that the media were being dominated by the United States. He argues (1993) that, along with American aid programs, expansion of Western media and business corporations promoted capitalist and consumerist values, and it eroded local cultures. In the eighties and nineties, scholars demonstrated that the notions “Westernization” and “Americanization” were

\textsuperscript{22} The so-called watchdog role; see Curran, 2002.

based on the theory of one-way flow of communication. They argued that instead of going one way, global flows are “multi-directional” (Curran, 2002: 171). In addition, researchers found that the media-imperialism theory underestimates the critical responses to American hegemony. Thus, the radical version of cultural hegemony was rejected. However, Stuart Hall (1991: 33) argues that, despite the existence of global cultural diversity, it is structured by an underlying hegemonic dynamic. The dominant type of global popular culture “remains centered in the West ... and it always speaks English.”. So far, news coverage has also for a long time been dominated by the West, by big press agencies such as Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), and Reuters, and international news networks like CNN (International), BBC (World) and France 24. The assumption of cultural imperialism’s impact on the media dominated by the West, or America alone, is mainly the reason why the Arabic satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera started an English version in 2006, named Al Jazeera English. In its mission statement, Al Jazeera English states that it aims to provide both a regional voice and a global perspective to a potential world audience of over one billion English speakers, but without an Anglo-American worldview.  

According to many scholars, Al Jazeera is now successfully challenging the hegemony of the West. Seib states that the rise of Al Jazeera marked an end to the near monopoly in global news that American and other Western media had long enjoyed: “New voices emerged, competing for audiences throughout the world by offering news shaped by varied interests and perspectives” (2005: 601).

Al Jazeera started to oppose the media hegemony of the West out of the tiny state of Qatar, but nowadays it has 50 bureaus around the world. It is the first major network headquartered in the East. Senior editor Faisal Bodi (quoted in Seib 2005: 602) cites Al Jazeera

24 See the website: http://english.aljazeera.net/.
as “‘a corrective’ to the official line that the Western media embraced.”

Because Al-Jazeera wants to change a media world that is dominated by the West, one may expect that their news reporting differs from that of the Western news networks. To determine this, I use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), because this approach can detect the use of ideology\textsuperscript{25} in language. Al-Jazeera has a different ideology in its news coverage concerning the issue of terrorism. From this hypothesis, I have extracted the following research question:

Which ideology can be recognized in the news coverage at Al-Jazeera? What kind of lexicalization and predications can be seen in its news coverage? What kind of intertextuality and framing can be recognized in its talk shows?

My interest in this theme is mainly based on the potential of Al-Jazeera to break the hegemony of the Western networks in news coverage. I assume that Al-Jazeera will bring a complementary voice to the West with their network. In the words of the scholar Seib (2005: 601)\textsuperscript{26}: “American and other Western policymaking must be prepared to deal with the influence of broadly based news programming [like Al-Jazeera] that will lessen the influence of U.S. news organizations, which have been relatively supportive of U.S. policy during recent conflicts.” If such corrective influence on the Western media—which is known, for good reason, as the fourth branch of government—turns out to be consistent, I expect that Al-Jazeera could sooner or later help improve the relations between the East and the West.

\textsuperscript{25} The concept of “ideology” is often used in the media and social sciences, but it is notoriously vague. In this study, ideology is based on van Dijk’s ideas on ideology and may therefore be defined as “the mental representations that form the basis of social cognition, which is the shared knowledge and attitudes of a group” (1997: 29). Hence, deviating from the norm, ideology here is not seen as something negative.

\textsuperscript{26} Seib studied the influence of Al-Jazeera on the Western media.
Chapter 2 – Overview of Research in Interactional Discourse and Media Discourse Analysis

2.1 Introduction

Field investigations of discourse in real-life settings have shed considerable light on language use. While no unified theory of discourse analysis has yet been formulated, scholars have shown that continued focus on the hypothetical context-free sentence can neither illuminate nor account for “how linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge interact in speech production and comprehension” (Radford 1988:2).

Of the many possible speech events that may be analyzed, it is the ordinary conversation that has claimed a central role in discourse analysis, at least in the United States. This type of speech event constitutes the “unmarked” case for language use and provides the criterion against which other speech events are analyzed (Goffman 1981; Greatbatch 1988). Much has been learned from the study of mundane conversation, both in terms of the structure and functions of utterances. Scrutiny by ethnomethodologists has achieved impressive results about the organizational structure of ordinary conversation as well as revealing how the local organization of utterances
contributes to their function.27 The pragmatists,28 despite relying on hypothetical utterances, have satisfactorily demonstrated how extra-linguistic principles operate in the interpretation of utterances. The contributions of speech act theorists29 have been successfully applied to mundane conversation to illustrate how the illocutionary forces of utterances are signalled and interpreted.30

Researchers working within such frameworks have made significant contributions to the current understanding of everyday conversation. However, the contributions of interactional sociolinguists31 have proven even more illuminating. Through the adoption of an eclectic approach coupled with a broad view of both context and meaning, these researchers have clarified many aspects of conversation: the negotiated and emergent nature of meaning, the multiplicity of interpretations, the social functions of utterances, and the real possibility of miscommunication. Scholars following such a paradigm were the first also to venture into the unexplored area of cross-cultural and intra-cultural communication.32 In doing so, they demonstrated how socio-cultural backgrounds and expectations play a vital role both in the signaling and interpretation of meaning. They were the first to introduce the notion of interactional style, a concept by which they showed how previously marginalized linguistic features are integral to the communication of meaning.33 And through empirical analyses of

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27 For more on the ethnomethodological results on the everyday conversation, see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1967.
28 Such a work is Grice 1975, to which the reader is directed.
29 (e.g., Austin [1955], 1962; Searle 1969)
30 (e.g., Schiffrin 1994a)
31 (e.g., Tannen 1984; Schiffrin 1984a)
32 (e.g., Gumperz 1982a, b)
33 (Saussure 1959)
instances of miscommunication, they highlighted the importance of differing interactional styles as a source of misunderstandings and subsequent negative attitudinal judgements.

2.2 The Problem

Language is the key means to accomplish numerous functions that go beyond the simple transmission of propositional content. However, language is also primarily used to engage in an interactive activity “that is directed to another person and has a potential for affecting that other person” (Schiffrin 1994a: 415; emphasis added). Therefore, it may be extrapolated that meaning is just as much a function of hearer response as it is of speaker intention. In fact, listener response is not solely the recovery of a speaker’s propositional intention, but also the effect of the listener’s feelings, beliefs, and actions. Differences in interactional styles create a possible source of miscommunication that is rarely noticed by interlocutors.34 Because people tend to signal and recover meaning in terms of their own internalized norms, any variation within these norms creates the possibility for misunderstanding or miscommunication.

This study goes beyond previous characterizations of interactional style in that it incorporates and integrates research from media discourse analysis to identify goals shown to affect positive listener evaluation. Cotter posits that:

“A primary objective of most media discourse analysis (from the linguistic to the sociological) is often the registering of the presence of bias or ideology in language, or the problematizing of power relations in society…The literature as a body tends to focus variously on the ideological implications of language in the media, and thus critiques of the approaches are organized around the validity of findings of bias, whether instigated

34 (e.g., Tannen 1984)
through linguistic or sociological means. The fundamental concerns are: to what extent is language evidence used to support the ideological frame or bias a researcher believes is there? To what extent does focus on ideology as a research goal obscure the potential contribution that a linguistic examination could bring to bear?” (2001: 421)

While discourse analysts, and more specifically interactional sociolinguists, have contributed a great deal to the understanding of language use, there remains at least one domain which has thus far remained virtually unexplored: the domain of those speech events such as media broadcasts, which include imagined ratified participants and unaddressed ratified participants as an essential component of their participation frameworks.35 As O’Keefe describes, “The traditional dyadic speaker-hearer model of communication cannot fully accommodate media interactions. The main reason for its inadequacy is its inability to account for the different types of hearers in a media encounter. On television or on radio, some participants (including the audience) can be hearers and addressees while others can be hearers…seeing media interactions as akin to overheard conversations does not fully describe the situation either since media audiences, unlike overhearing audiences, are ratified by the other participants in the interaction and their talk takes cognisance of this audience.” (O’keefe 2006:14).36

2.3 Communicative Success

The success and failure of participants to communicate depends on several factors: the interactive nature of language, the importance of socio-cultural assumptions and expectations in the signalling and interpretation of meaning, and the crucial role played by evaluative responses

35 (cf. Goffman 1981)
in the assignment of meaning. These different factors all contribute to a view of communication wherein communication between participants can succeed or fail to varying degrees. Thus, communicative success is not a dichotomous variable, but a continuous variable with degrees of success and failure. When scholars analyzing discourse label an interaction as an instance of successful—or more typically unsuccessful communication—37—they are in fact digressing from the reality of the interaction for the purposes of their analyses. The view of human communication utilized within this study predicts that there will rarely be a situation where participants understand or misunderstand each other completely. The criterion of communicative success, and therefore understanding, encompasses more than the assumed linguistic function and will always include the internalized norms of the participants.

The departure from the idea that meaning resides wholly within speaker intention allows the examination and consideration of hearer response. Thus, the discourse analyst’s main task becomes providing an account of meaning that allows for the determination of the degree of communicative success in a given interaction, i.e., the extent to which the speaker succeeds or fails in achieving his interactional goals. This requires clarifying the nature of the interactional goals by examining what the speaker is trying to achieve relative to what the hearer is expecting. Taking both parties into account is necessary, because a message is not communicative unless it is “directed to another person (Schiffrin 1994a: 415).” If the communication of meaning is always done with an audience in mind, the discourse analyst may provide a complete account of the meaning only by considering the audience a priori. Nowhere is the need for taking the hearer into account from the outset more evident than in the context of the political speech and interview. By giving consideration to the audience, the discourse analyst can create an analytical

37 (e.g., Gumperz 1982; 1992)
slot for listener response, a slot that is linguistically filled in other speech events but remains conspicuously empty in the televised interview.

2.4 Interactional Goals and Listener Response

Three major interactional goals have been shown to affect positive hearer evaluation:

1. Presenting a clear, comprehensible message.

2. Establishing interpersonal involvement or rapport38 (Tannen 1989; Gumperz 1982a).

3. Projecting a credible image, where credibility consists of both competence and trustworthiness.

Therefore, any account of meaning that includes interactional style must characterize the linguistic strategies a speaker uses to achieve his goals and the way in which these strategies are distributed.

This study focuses on the achievement of comprehensibility, interpersonal involvement, and optimal self-presentation. However, these are not the only goals of communication. Indeed, people, particularly politicians, often have communication goals that go beyond these three basic goals. Nonetheless, such additional objectives may be considered lower-order goals that can be accomplished only if the speaker succeeds in presenting a comprehensible message, projecting a credible image, and establishing interpersonal involvement with his audience. When analyzing a televised political interview, the task, therefore, is to identify the linguistic strategies that are aimed at achieving the three interactional goals and how these strategies are distributed.

38 I use the terms “interpersonal involvement” and “rapport” interchangeably.
As noted above, the characterization of interactional style offered here is expected to provide a solid account of the degree to which a speaker communicates successfully. The extent to which a speaker succeeds in achieving his interactional goals will depend on two key message factors:

1. Will the hearer positively evaluate the linguistic strategies used to serve these goals?

2. Are the linguistic strategies distributed in a combination that serves the goals which the hearer expects and will thus evaluate positively?

Depending on the physical and socio-cultural contexts, such goals are not expected to be of equal importance. For example, the relationship between participants may be such that interpersonal involvement takes precedence over clarity and credibility. Conversely, the situation may be such that clarity and credibility take precedence over interpersonal involvement. Although this does not vitiate the importance of all three goals, it does testify to the important role played by the distribution of strategies in hearer evaluation, hence a speaker’s communicative success.

2.4.1 Social Psychology

Social psychology research related to attitude change is directly relevant to this study. As argued above, communicative success is determined by the degree of (in)congruence between what the speaker may be trying to achieve and what the hearer receives. Many linguistic strategies depend on listener evaluation to be realized, and attitudinal judgements are crucial to the assignment of meaning. Thus research on attitude, or more specifically attitude change, is immediately pertinent to this study. Six distinct message factors have been demonstrated to cause attitude change: number of arguments, order of presentation, repetition, use of rhetorical questions, metaphorical conclusions, and indirect conclusions.
2.4.2 The McGuire Hypothesis (The Information-Processing Paradigm)

The factors affecting attitude change assume that the message is comprehensible. McGuire argues that attitude change occurs as a result of six information-processing steps: The subject must 1) be presented with the message, 2) pay attention to it, 3) understand it, 4) yield to it, 5) retain it, and, if the attitude change is to persist, 6) behave in accordance with the changed attitude (1968a; 1968b; as cited in Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 259).

Experiments investigating the empirical validity of McGuire’s hypothesis (the information-processing paradigm) have focused on how the second and third steps (attention and comprehension) yield attitude change. Due to the difficulty of operationalizing attention and comprehension, these steps were lumped together in “a single step of reception” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 261; italics retained from the original).

A cursory review of the social-psychological research points to the need to consider “specific characteristics of the communicator, the message, the medium, the recipient, and the communications environment” when studying attitude (Cergen and Gergen 1981: 177). A communicator who uses comprehensible and clear language while establishing his credibility and creating interpersonal involvement with his audience is more likely to effect a positive evaluation than one who does not. These findings point to three interactional goals which hearers evaluate positively. These goals can then be used to characterize a speaker’s interactional style. Anchoring the analysis in empirical findings, the task becomes one of isolating the linguistic strategies that contribute to the creation of such attitudinal judgements and showing how these strategies are distributed. Research on linguistics and linguistic interaction independently supports the pre-eminence of the three interactional goals identified in the review of the social psychology research: presenting a clear, comprehensible message, establishing interpersonal
involvement or rapport (Tannen 1989; Gumperz 1982a), and projecting a credible image, wherein credibility consists of both competence and trustworthiness.

Basing the analysis on a demonstration of how the speaker tries to achieve fundamental interactional goals provides for an account of meaning that truly reflects the interactive nature of meaning. It also frees the analyst from the pitfalls of trying to decipher what the speaker may be intending to achieve: The researcher’s task is not to hypothesize about a speaker’s perlocutionary intents, but to show how the speaker tries, consciously or subconsciously, to achieve the basic interactional goals.

In the context of political discourse, as in any human interaction, the speaker must achieve a balanced blend of clarity, interpersonal involvement, and optimal self-presentation. The strategies that the speaker uses in attempting to achieve these goals, and the distribution of these strategies, constitute the speaker’s interactional style.

The speaker’s communicative success depends on:

1. The extent to which the linguistic strategies the speaker uses are those which his interlocutors expect and will thus react to positively.

2. The extent to which the strategies the speaker uses to achieve his interactional goals are distributed in a combination that his interlocutors expect and will thus react to positively.

Therefore, a characterization of interactional style – one that pre-considers interactional goals that all interlocutors will react positively to – may be used to account for the relative success or failure of a given communication. This study will examine this characterization with a view toward incorporating a measure of communicative success, and, thus, a complete account of meaning.
2.5 Media Discourse Analysis

Speech events—including imagined ratified participants and unaddressed ratified participants as an essential component of the participation frameworks of speech events—are virtually unexplored by discourse analysts and provide fertile ground for research. As Goffman stated in his 1981 work, *Forms of Talk*:

“There are three kinds of listeners to talk: those who overhear whether or not their un-ratified participation is inadvertent and whether or not it has been encouraged; those…who are ratified participants but are not specifically addressed by the speaker; and those ratified participants who are addressed, that is, oriented to by the speaker in a manner to suggest that his words are particularly for them” (9-10).

A good example of such events is a television broadcast including the non-participating audience as the principal recipients. Whether or not the (imagined) audience is directly addressed, the fact remains that whatever occurs in the broadcast interaction is primarily intended for them; they are the primary ratified participants.

On the rare occasions when such speech events have been analyzed, the analyst either completely ignores the existence of the audience by supplying his or her own interpretation, or includes the audience merely to demonstrate how its existence affects the structural organization of the event in question. By ignoring the audience, or including it only in a marginalized form, analysts undermine the reliability and validity of their interpretations as well as indirectly

39 For an example of an analysis wherein the audience is wholly ignored, see Blum-Kulka 1983 and Jucker 1986. Regarding the incorporation of the audience to demonstrate its effect on the structural organization, see Heritage 1985.
espouse a narrow interpretation of meaning. If listener interpretation is an essential part of
utterance meaning, ignoring the audience can only provide an incomplete account of meaning.

Analysts have nonetheless recognized the importance of incorporating the audience in the
analysis. In an analysis of news interviews broadcast on BBC radio, Jucker acknowledges that,
“It would have been necessary to investigate the reaction of the audience to particular interviews
and the subsequent standing of the interviewees in the public opinion (1986:165).” In his
analysis of political interviews broadcast on American television, Al-Aridi also notes the
importance of the audience as “the best judges for the success or failure of an interviewee or
interviewer (1986:373).” Taking full analytical account of the audience is crucial to the
complete analysis of meaning. As mentioned above, such analysis views meaning as a matter of
both listener response and speaker intention. Bakhtin posits a number of conditions that affect
the meaning of any word uttered at a particular time: social, historical, and physiological
conditions (Bakhtin 1986:72-74, 84, 90; Holquist 1990:59-66; Morson and Emerson 123-30,
133-35, 136-39). He believed that, although participants use words based on previous use and
context, each new use causes a change in meaning: “All utterances are heteroglot in that they are
a function of a matrix of forces” (428). Only through the incorporation of evaluative responses
into the characterization of a speaker’s interactional style may a more complete account of
meaning be provided.

Dialogue and its processes are central to Bakhtin’s heteroglossia. The continuous dialogue
and interaction of meanings create a state of flux, a never-ending process of redefining that could
only be stopped by a powerful ‘undialogized participial modifier,’ which transforms the
dialogism into something authoritative and absolute. Holquist explains that “a word, discourse,

40 For more on this concept, see Schiffrin 1994a: chapter 4.
language or culture undergoes ‘dialogization’ when it becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same things” (Holquist 1981: 427). In this way, responsibility for the dialogic process of two central terms of the terrorism discourse, *al-jihād*[^41] and *al-irhāb*[^42], are shared between various groups: ordinary citizens, religious scholars, Islamic and Arab governments, Western nation-states, and other dialogical participants with an interest in or relationship to the two ideas. The dialogue concerning the Islamic concept of *al-jihād* has transcended Islamic societies and has become an integral part of the discourse of Western societies. Arab/Islamic and Western educational and political institutions along with media corporations have become central dialogical actors in the process of interpreting the concept of *al-jihād*.

As a basis for the symbolic narratives that aid individuals, groups, and institutions to comprehend and maintain the social order, language is integral to the construction of social realities. Thus, a media message that creates, attacks or supports a narrative “takes the raw events of our world and places them in a unifying context, a translation that renders them comprehensible and safe to readers or viewers” (Koch, 1990:23). Cotter also closely examines the media output. She states that “the discourse of the news media includes two main components: the news story (text) and the process involved in producing this text” (Cotter: 2001). Up to this point, the text or news story has remained the primary focus of media researchers, as the text is the location of the values and ideologies reflecting and affecting the

[^41]: The American Heritage dictionary gives two definitions for *al-jihād*: A Muslim holy war or spiritual struggle against infidels, and a crusade or struggle. “The war against smoking is turning into a jihad against people who smoke.” [Arabic jihād, from jahada – to strive]

[^42]: The American Heritage dictionary describes terrorism as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intent of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons. [Arabic irhāb, from rahaba – to fear, be in absolute awe]
larger world. However, the process, which includes the norms and routines of the news
purveyors “has been on the research agenda for the past several years, but to date no significant
work has been completed.” (Cotter: 2001)

Although the text may be examined from one of two vantage points (either that of discourse
structure or linguistic function, or according to its impact as ideology-bearing discourse), Cotter
argues that either view assumes an emergent, dynamic mechanism that results in the unique
display of media discourse over time, culture, and context: “Bakhtin’s notions of voicing
([1953]1986), Goffman’s concept of framing (1981), Bell’s work on narrative structure and style
(1991, 1994, 1998), and Tannen’s positioning of the media as agonists and instigators of
polarized public debate (1998) have led to valuable insights into discourse structure, function
and effect – and have characterized the very significant role the media play in the shaping of the
public as well as media, discourse.43” Cotter maintains that the second vantage point, which
consists of observing the news text according to its impact as ideology-bearing discourse “forms
the interdisciplinary framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and may be seen in a variety
of studies: Fairclough’s deployment of social theory and intertextuality in the illumination of
discourse practice (1992, 1995a, 1995b), Fowler’s critical scan of social practice and language in
the news (1991), and van Dijk’s work on the relation of societal structures and discourse
structures, particularly as this relation implicates racism (1991). This core of research, along with
Bell (1991, etc.) forms the foundation of media discourse studies to date”. (Cotter: 2001)

In his work on mediated discourse, Scollon (1998) makes two points of interest to this
study. The first is his rejection of the idea that during a news broadcast, direct communication is
occurring between the presenter/reporter and the viewer or consumer of news. Rather, there are

43 Cotter, 2001: 417; emphasis added.
two different communities of practice involved. The first is the community that produces the news. The relevant discourse is that which occurs between producers as they create news texts. It involves the communication that occurs between the anchors, reporters, producers, directors, and owners to produce texts that are then transmitted to consumers. There is, however, no meaningful or direct feedback from the second community, the consumers. Scollon’s second relevant point is that discourse between producers of the news, which viewers do not directly observe, is not substantially different from any other type of discourse between two or more individuals. He analyzes several business telephone calls, which he describes as intermediate between face-to-face social interactions and the writing and reading of news discourse, to elucidate the “Maxims of Stance” which are used to open and close any communication event and can be briefly described as follows (Scollon 1998:34):

1. Attend to the channel, that is, the social interaction and any mechanical characters.

2. Attend to the relationship among participants. Produce claims of identity as well as conventionally or culturally given relationships.

3. Attend to the introduction of the first topic.

Of particular importance to media discourse is Scollon’s claim that “the broadest domain in which power is exercised is the power to frame communicative events… Within this power is the power to position participants in relation to each other. This positioning is done by both rights to speak…and rights to topic” (Scollon 1995:37). In her book, *Framing in Discourse* (1993), Tannen discusses this topic of expectations and frames. She argues that “in order to function in the world, people can not treat each new person, object or event as unique and separate” (14). To deal with this reality, people are equipped with frames, which are essentially ways of looking at
the world around them. These frames provide not only expectations of how things should occur, but also shape perceptions in accordance with the frames that are held. In Tannen’s words, “Structures of expectations make interpretation possible, but in the process they also reflect back on perception of the world to justify interpretation” (21). Tannen maintains that these ideas are not new and have been presented in different forms in fields of learning. What she thus adds is an analysis of how these underlying expectations affect language production. She delineates several specific speech acts, or lack thereof, that give evidence to the existence of specific expectations and the frames which generate them. These include:

- omission, as one tends not to remark upon the occurrence of expected events;
- repetition, which indicates a key phrase or idea;
- backtracking, indicating the need for further explanation;
- hedging, when a speaker feels his statement may be misinterpreted by the expectations of others;
- negatives, which indicate events contrary to expectation;
- contrasting connectives, which anticipate and deny other expectations;
- modals, such as ‘much’ and ‘should’ indicating the speakers judgement and others.

Bakhtin’s dialogic emergence of meaning combined with Fairclough’s analytical framework for discourse analysis of a communicative event as a theoretical base provides useful concepts to explore how meaning is taken outside of the individual and emerges in the social interaction.
The role of the media is essential to the impact of these events upon the general public. Journalists function as facilitators in the sense that without the airwaves of Al-Jazeera or the front-page headlines in the *New York Times*, group and state terrorists would fail to achieve many of their goals.

Japerson and El-Kikhia (in Norris et al 2003) argue that Al-Jazeera was keen to distance itself from Osama bin Laden and the Taliban; that it tried to play the role of a neutral source of information in that area of the conflict: “Yet, the media outlet still applied a different cultural lens to the American military efforts in Afghanistan. Ten stories (almost 24 percent of coverage) focused on rallying Arab and Muslim masses and leadership to confront what was portrayed as the United States’ “arrogance” and “disproportional” response to September 11 terrorist attack. In a report on December 2nd, 2002, Al-Jazeera footage showed the impact of U.S. bombing on mosques in Afghanistan…” This footage depicted destroyed mosques and pictures of torn Qur’ans lying amidst the rubble. These images perhaps meant little to the average American viewer, who, unless told that they were images of mosques, would not realize that they were places of worship. However, an Arab or Muslim viewer would recognize the images without the need of commentary. Taysseer Allooni, the Al-Jazeera correspondent in Kabul at the time, on more than one occasion after viewing the destruction caused by U.S. bombing raids, asked, “Afghans are looking towards brothers of faith for support, but will they find support in the hurried attempts by the Arabs and Muslims to satisfy America’s arrogance (Al-Jazeera January 5th, 2002)?”

In a broadcast from Tora Bora in the White Mountains of Afghanistan, another Al-Jazeera correspondent echoed Allooni’s question when he asked: “Why doesn’t the Arab League or the Arab countries provide a third alternative to either surrender or death, and thus relieve
them of the charge of collaboration with the United States (Al-Jazeera March 12th, 2002)?” It was precisely this type of coverage that appeared to have angered the US government and military establishment and ultimately led to the “mistaken” bombing of Al-Jazeera offices in Kabul.

Japerson and El-Kikhia maintain that the meaning of these messages signified that Arab opposition to the war was, in large, not against America’s invasion of Afghanistan but rather against America’s invasion of the Middle East. This media framing reinforced the popular perception among Arabs that the war in Afghanistan was not against the Taliban per se but rather against Islam and Arabs. These reports were an attempt to rally the Arab populace against Arab regimes. In none of the ten segments did Al-Jazeera reporters mention a specific country, but merely referred to the “Arab League”, “Arabs”, or “Muslims”. However, as Taysseer Allooni’s reports indicate, Arabs were unable to confront the will of the “arrogant” United States in Afghanistan and Iraq just as they have been unable to confront it effectively elsewhere in the Middle East. This impotence has led to dire consequences for the region in general, and the for Palestinians in particular. This second message put many Arab regimes on the defensive, and some ordered the closing of Al-Jazeera’s offices in their countries.

Al-Jazeera prides itself on being one of the only Arab satellite news networks to have extensive international coverage, citing its 23 bureaus with seventy reporters located in the major Western capitals and Arab world. During 2004, the Washington Bureau consisted of six reporters headed by Hafez Al-Mirazi, and had two weekly programs, min wāshinṭūn (From Washington) and Race for the American Presidency, which focused on events, characters, and

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44 This is despite the fact that Afghanistan is not an Arab country.

45 Information cited by Waddah Knayfer, General Direction of Al-Jazeera in the 7/15/04 episode of min washingon.
discourses flowing from or forming around the United States. The format of these two programs is rather straightforward and the background austere when compared with other prominent Al-Jazeera talk shows. The program backdrop is a simple studio image in muted tones whose centerpiece is the U.S. Capital Building, rather than the bright lights of a vibrant urban center, or brilliant blues, greens, and industrial metals of the Doha digital studio. Unlike many of the other weekly talk shows, min wāshinṭūn does not have a call-in portion (although call-in participation is included on occasions). The moderator frames the discussion with opening and closing statements and directs the flow of discussion through specific questions to the invited guests, even determining the turn-taking of participants. All of Al-Jazeera’s program moderators have editorial independence with regard to their program content and direction—there is no oversight committee for the discussions.

The choice of program topics covered the relevant current events of the region including: President Bush’s State of the Union Address, the release of the September 11 Commission report, the Abu Ghraib scandal, and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. Guests on the programs were also selected with obvious constraints: consent to participate, availability in Washington or near an Al-Jazeera studio, and ability to speak Arabic - although simultaneous interpretation was usually available. Normally, the roundtable discussions were between three or four guests, some of whom knew Arabic and others for whom simultaneous interpretation was provided. During 2004, the guests were preponderantly Arab, many of whom were Egyptian⁴⁶, and Americans in high level positions⁴⁷.

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⁴⁶ The News Director in Washington DC and host of min wāshinṭūn, Hafiz Mirazi, is himself Egyptian. Thus, the proliferation of Egyptians on this programming is more a reflection of his social networks than any preference of Al-Jazeera toward Egyptian opinions.
The use of the Arabic language is an obstacle that challenges U.S. participants in their attempt to win the support of the Arab and Muslim viewers. The language barrier further complicates the intertextual nature of dialogue. The program moderator has the advantage of understanding both English and Arabic, following American debates surrounding current events, issues, and policies, while English-speaking guests have access to the dialogue only via an interpreter. On the one hand the interpretation slows the dialogic exchange, allowing interactants more time to formulate responses and standardizing turn-taking to a greater degree. However, language interpretation is still subject to the ‘interpretation’ of the interpreter, further introducing possibilities for misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

47 High level positions refers both to Governmental and non-governmental positions. Included on the show were government and staff officials from the current and previous administrations, Department of Defense and State representatives, as well as media personnel such as newspaper and television producers and editors.

48 Hatem hypothesizes that the simultaneous interpreter relies on textual signals only; “context is muted because the interpreter is not a ratified participant in the speech event and because the constraints of immediacy of response and the focus on short units deny the interpreter the opportunity for adequate top-down processing”. See Hatim, Basil and Mason, Ian. 1997. The Translator as Communicator. New York: Routledge.
Chapter 3: Ideology, Power and the Media

3.1 Ideology and Power

It goes without saying that the West and particularly the United States, dominates the international media. It is a known fact that big Western news agencies and media outlets, such as CNN, boast the widest news coverage in the world. Against this backdrop, in September 2006, the Qatar-based network station Al-Jazeera launched its sister-company, Al-Jazeera English which states its mission as “to provide both a regional voice and a global perspective to a potential world audience of over one billion English speakers, without an Anglo-American worldview”.\footnote{http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/DE03467F-C15A-4FF9-BAB0-1B0E6B59EC8F.htm} There are basic assumptions about power and ideology that underlie this mission: (1) the division of the media world into dominating and dominated groups (2) the predominance of the Anglo-American discourse and worldview at the expense of others’, and (3) Al-jazeera’s attempt to contest it posits that the Anglo-American worldview is neither immutable nor incontrovertible. These assumptions, among others, compel the examination of two overarching concepts: ideology and power.

3.1.1 Ideology

Al-Jazeera, as can be understood from its mission statement, wants to inform the world from a different perspective and to challenge the existing Anglo-American worldview. Herein
lies the importance of the concept of ideology. Van Dijk \(^{50}\) views ideologies as “the mental representations that form the basis of social cognition, which is the shared knowledge and attitudes of a group” (1997: 29). Ideologies, the trigonal interpenetration of cognition, society and discourse (van Dijk, 1998:5) form the foundation of the social representations and practices of group members, including their discourse. The first component, cognition, which refers to a system of ideas, places ideologies in the symbolic field of thought and belief. According to van Dijk (2001: 14), ideologies show a number of basic dimensions:

1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who are we?
2. Actions: What do we do?
3. Aims: Why do we do this?
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to other groups?
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?

These are some of the basic categories that define social cohesion and constitute the basic self-schema that organize ideologies. In addition to being social in so far as they are associated with group interests, conflict and struggle, ideologies may be deployed to legitimate or contest given distributions of power and dominance. Furthermore, ideology is associated with discourse in that ideologies are expressed and reproduced in society (van Dijk, 1998: 5). But while

\(^{50}\) I rely on van Dijk because his definition of ideology (and power) is founded on cognitive models, and he therefore views ideology in a relatively neutral way. He diverges from a more critical approach that sees ideology as a pure modality of power. Van Dijk (1997: 25) states that a critical view on ideology is not completely wrong, yet it is too superficial. In the first place, because at all times one needs to ask: how exactly does it work? Secondly, because most of the time it ignores the fact that dominated groups may develop their own ideologies of resistance. The second statement is, in particular, in the light of this research, a key reason for relying on van Dijk’s sociocognitive viewpoint on ideology and power.
discourse is not the only vehicle for an ideology it plays a specific role in its reproduction and validation. Finally, in the definition of ideology accepted in this research, it is stated that ideologies belong to groups; this does not imply that all group members at all times act according to the values of that specific ideology. Group members participate in different social groups, and they may exhibit conflicting group affiliations and alliances in their talk and text, depending on the context (Van Dijk, 1997: 37).

3.1.2 *Ingroup and Outgroup*

Van Dijk (2001: 13) states that different (discourse) research has shown that ideologies often appear in polarized thought, opinions, action, or discourse where prejudicial discourse is characterized by a positive representation of the self (the ingroup; “Us”) and by a simultaneous negative characterization of the other (the outgroup; “Them”). Crucial in this case are the representations of social position, of ingroups and outgroups, and of their association with what is defined as good and bad. One way to exhibit these ideological frames in discourse is to identify certain structures and strategies that contain a positive self (ingroup) presentation and a negative other (outgroup) presentation. These structures and strategies include the following (taken from van Dijk, 1995: 144):

Describing/attributing positive action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingroup</th>
<th>Outgroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis</td>
<td>De-emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Understatement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicalization</td>
<td>De-topicalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
-sentential (micro)

-textual (macro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High, prominent position</th>
<th>Low, non-prominent position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headlining, summarizing</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed description</td>
<td>Vague, overall description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution to personality</td>
<td>Attribution to context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative illustration</td>
<td>No storytelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative support</td>
<td>No argumentative support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impression management</td>
<td>No impression management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These specific semantic strategies are well-known in the social psychology of attribution and intergroup relations (van Dijk, 1995: 144) that realize positive ingroup-presentation and negative outgroup-presentation (foregrounding). The reverse is seen with the presentation of negative acts, which generally aims to de-emphasize negative ingroup qualities and emphasize negative outgroup descriptions and attributions (or backgrounding). Moreover, Linville and Jones (quoted in van Dijk, 2001) assume that less extensive knowledge about outgroups and emphasis on the ingroup will probably lead to more polarized structures. Thus, the formal structures of text and talk in general, and of news in particular, tend to favor the ingroup and they often derogate or problematize the outgroup.

3.1.3 *Power*

Al-Jazeera was launched to challenge established perceptions, in other words to recalibrate
the balance of power. Here, the key is on the word power which I shall, for the purpose of this study, treat as the ordering principle that locates groups in a matrix of positions that militates for their control, a concept van Dijk (1998: 162) defines as follows: “a group A has or exercises power over another group B when the members of A are usually able to control the members of B. This may typically involve the control of the actions of the other group and its members, in the sense that the others are not only not (or less) free to do what they want, but may be brought to act in accordance with the wishes or the interests of the more powerful group, and against their own best interests (and usually also against their will)”

Making others act in accordance with external stipulations requires resources. Thompson (1995: 14) distinguishes four main types of power resources: economic, political, coercive and symbolic or cultural power. Economic power stems from the possession of wealth, or the means by which wealth may be obtained. Political power refers to the decision making authority of individuals in elective or appointed positions. The third, coercive power, involves the use, or threat of use, of physical force to subdue or conquer an opponent.

Finally, there is symbolic power, which is an essential element to the framework of this research. Symbolic power is “the capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, through the means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms” (Thompson, 1995: 17). Here, control does not occur (primarily) through physical or political or economic coercion, but by more subtle and indirect control of the dominated, effectuated through commands, requests or suggestions. When at their most insidious, Van Dijk states that “the discourses of a powerful group may be such that others will form the intentions and accomplish the acts as if they were totally without constrains, and
consistent with their own wants and interests” (1997:19). With this type of discourse we are in
hegemonic power territory.

3.1.4 Hegemony

According to van Dijk (1997: 17), “hegemonic power makes people act as if it were
natural, normal, or simply a [factor of] consensus.” Thus, it seems, deceptively, to relate to
common sense. Antonio Gramsci, the Marxist scholar and the father of the concept of
hegemony defines it as “the ideological dominance of society, the position in which an ideology
favorable to the dominant class is agreed upon by the society as a whole, [in a process whereby]
the subordinate classes are persuaded to hold views and values which are consistent with the
continued economic and social dominance of the ruling class” (Downing et al, 1995: 485). Thus,
a diverse culture can be dominated by one group or class, as much by force as by popular
consensus. In this case, hegemony, rather than domination, means leadership since it appears to
drive people to internalize and embrace those ideologies that are in fact controlling and limiting
them. The crucial question here is: How is this power wielded? Any answer to this question
must involve the role of the media. The media represent one of the carriers through which
hegemonic power is applied, together with education, religion and the church (Thompson, 1995).
Hegemony is never exercised with absolute or permanent force, which can only bring about
“unstable equilibrium,” as Fairclough (1995: 76) argues. However, several studies show that
mind control is able to influence the attitudes of people. Van Dijk (1997) provides an example of
mind control by Western governments concerning immigration politics. Western governments,
by informing citizens about the dire economic and social consequences of immigration, may

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51 For more information on Antonio Gramsci, see the following website: www.internationalgramscisociety.org
influence popular attitudes about immigration. These attitudes may, in turn, influence the intention or motivation of people to act as the government or other elites prefer, e.g., by expressing resentment and staging protests against immigration, so that politicians may claim that there is no popular support for liberal immigration policies. Van Dijk comments that this may seem cynical, but that it is largely how discourse about immigration is managed in many Western countries.

3.1.5 Domination

There are many examples of legitimate and acceptable uses of power, such as can be seen in relationships between parents and their children or teachers and students. For the purpose of this study, however, I will focus on the illegitimate exercise of power, i.e., power abuse or domination. This type of power is exercised primarily in the interest of the powerful, and against the interest of the less powerful (van Dijk, 1997: 24). In a more traditional setting, domination can be seen in social conflict/struggle, or other kinds of clashes between groups over material or symbolic resources. Other examples of social conflict or struggle include that of feminists versus anti-feminists, mainstream cultures. Domination-based relations between groups and the ideologies that consecrate them on the ground lead, often, to inequality and repression which the dominated groups resist and struggle to overcome. As soon as members of dominated groups no longer accept such ideological grounds and have the material conditions to act, counter-ideologies will arise. An example of a counter-power is that of Amnesty International against governments that violate human rights (van Dijk, 1997: 30). In the same way that dominating groups have an ideological basis, intra-group solidarity and inter-group resistance have to be ideologically organized. Van Dijk states that “whereas it may be of interest for a dominant group
to conceal their power abuse and to hide the forms of equality that are its consequences, dissidents and opponents may be specifically interested in uncovering and exposing domination and inequality, and to manifest and legitimate as ‘just’ their own counter, ideologies” (1998: 168). It follows that ideologies are neither intrinsically dominant nor negative. They are productive or counterproductive according to the degree they can be instrumental in upholding social practices that comport with a predetermined “social order” objective.

3.2 The Mediatization of Power

Ideological institutions are needed to organize ideological practices. Hegemonic power is no exception in that it too uses the institutions of education, religion and the media to articulate, disseminate and uphold its ideology. With the diminishing importance of churches and schools in the life of contemporary Western societies (Watson, 1998: 15), the media may be poised to play an ever more crucial role in the circulation of ideologies. Marxist scholar Louis Althusser (1918 – 1990) was among the first to argue that the media are more often the voice of the powerful than of the average person. Althusser identified two sets of social sites or apparatuses that the capitalist mode of production has generated. The first set is the so-called Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs). RSAs include the police, army, prisons, etc. These are the more direct instruments of coercion and violence at the disposal of the ruling classes. In other words,

52 Louis Pierre Althusser was a Marxist philosopher. He was born in Algeria and studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he eventually became Professor of Philosophy. Althusser was a lifelong member and sometimes strong critic of the French Communist Party. His arguments and theses were set against the threats that he saw attacking the theoretical foundations of Marxism. These included both the influence of empiricism on Marxist theory and humanist and reformist socialist orientations which manifested as divisions in the European Communist Parties, as well as the problem of the cult of personality and of ideology itself. Althusser is commonly referred to as a Structural Marxist, although his relationship to other schools of French structuralism is not a simple affiliation and he is critical of many aspects of structuralism.
coercive power reveals itself through the RSAs. However, Althusser was particularly interested in the second set of social sites, namely the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). ISAs include such institutions as education, churches, family, media, trade unions, and the law. These fall partly outside state control, but still serve to transmit the values of the state. Therefore, they do not operate based on power and politics, but rather on ideology.

To further drive the point home, by mediating access to public discourse, only specific forms of knowledge and opinions may be expressed and widely circulated, and these may persuasively lead to mental models and social representations that are in the interest of the powerful. Van Dijk (1998: 20) observes three different ways in which the powerful groups can effectively control the media. The first, is media ownership which gives elite groups the power to tell the editors what (or what not) to publish or write about. The elite will always claim this is not the case, however research shows the contrary (Curran, 2002). The second control method involves the dominant group hiring journalists that share its ideology, so that mind control is not needed. The third form involves the elite dominating the public discourse by saturating it with topics that are of interest to the government or to other dominant groups such as lobby factions. In so doing the elite establishes the relevant issues and compels the journalists to address them to the detriment of other themes such as poverty or racism that can be harmful to the image of the dominant group(s). Thus, journalists are led to believe that they are free to write about whatever they want, the reality, however, is that they are (more or less) controlled by the dominant group. In other words, the elite group sets the climate of opinion. To return to the mission of Al-Jazeera, the news station implicitly claims that (certain groups within) the United States control public discourse, and that they circulate mental models and social representations that are based on an Anglo-American worldview. And finally, this Anglo-American worldview helps to implement
the policies of the powerful groups, or at least it helps maintain positive images of these groups.

3.3 Western Discourse and Al-Jazeera

Many scholars have shown that the media cannot be seen separately from state institutions or other powerful groups. The media are not immune to mind control by elite groups (Thompson, 1998). As different (elite) groups pressure the media the news stations become the mouthpiece of the most powerful among them. It is in view of this reality that Al-Jazeera launched an English-language version in an attempt to produce a counter-ideology to—for instance—CNN International. The question central to this study—whether Al-Jazeera is succeeding in this regard—still stands. The fact remains, however, that Al-Jazeera has come to be recognized worldwide as a factor of political interest. For example, the U.S. Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced the network for anti-U.S. propaganda, including reports that American troops in Fallujah were terrorizing civilians. "They are simply lying," he said (Halloran, 2006). Al-Jazeera journalists have also been expelled from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other countries (Miles, 2005: 323). A likely reason for these drastic solutions is that Al-Jazeera ventilated implicit or explicit criticism towards the concerned state (Miles, 2005: 45).
Chapter 4: Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool

This chapter reflects on the concept of discourse and the method of Critical Discourse Analysis with specific attention to Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for CDA consisting of text analysis, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice. It brings to the fore links between social practice, a concept described in this chapter, and text. After explaining my choice of CDA, I discuss views discourse and discourse analysis adopted in this study. Second, I deal with the critical aspect of CDA. Finally, the three-dimensional method of Fairclough is explained.

4.1 Why Critical Discourse Analysis?

Before explaining the concept of discourse and CDA, I wish to justify my choice of CDA as a method of analysis. A fundamental aspect of CDA is that it claims to take its starting point in social theory. According to Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 452), the most common theories in this respect are, among many others, are Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” and Althusser’s concepts of “ideological state apparatuses” and “interpellation.” In addition, CDA emphasizes language. Even though scholars, such as Kress and van Leeuwen, stress the importance of moving into broader multimodal conceptions of semiosis (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 450), CDA positions itself primarily in a linguistic milieu. Titscher et al. clearly explain the relationship between ideology and language:

“According to Antonio Gramsci the political structure of a society is dependent upon a
specific combination of political / institutional and civil society. To achieve the agreement of the majority to the pressure exerted by the political society, a collective will must be formed. This is achieved by means of ideologies. Ideologies achieve in discourse a real materiality in the linguistic sign.” (2002: 145)

This combination of language and social theory makes CDA particularly useful for examining my theoretical assumptions. I have chosen Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, because this model pays much attention to concrete textual features but also takes into account the discourse-as-discursive practice, i.e. discourse as something that is produced, circulated, distributed and consumed in society. The role of the receiver / reader has long been neglected, although nowadays many researchers underline the importance of this aspect of communication patterns. Finally, I wish to state that I share the same ambition as many scholars of CDA, in the sense that analyzing social concepts (such as “hegemony” and “ideology”) has a positive effect on society; i.e. by “empowering the powerless, giving voice to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 499). Thus, this investigation focuses on power and ideology on the one hand, and textual elements on the other hand. As stated above, CDA concerns itself with relations of power and inequality in language. In other words, CDA builds a bridge between social theory (in this case power and ideology) and language.

4.2 Discourse and Discourse Analysis

What is discourse? Fairclough states that the term discourse is “used in general sense for language (as well as, for instance, visual images) as an element of social life which is
dialectically related to other elements” (2003: 214). Thus, he distances himself from linguists who see discourse analysis as referring to text structure above the text. The term can also be used in a more specific way: “Different discourses are different ways of representing aspects of the world” (Fairclough, 2003: 4). Discourse analysis, in research, forges a link between linguistic analysis and social analysis. Fairclough sees discourse analysis as “analysis of how texts work within social practices” (Fairclough, 1995: 7).\(^5^3\) This approach emphasizes detailed linguistic analysis of texts, which is, for example, not the convention among scholars influenced by Foucault.\(^5^4\) Thus, discourse analysis looks at real and often extended instances of social interaction that take the form of language, completely or partially (Fairclough, 1995: 9). Ultimately, CDA involves an analysis of how discourse relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations, particularly unequal, hierarchical, and discriminatory power relations.

### 4.3 A Critical Analysis

Before moving on to a more detailed explanation of CDA (Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework), it may be useful to consider the term “critical.” The critical approach is distinctive

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\(^{5^3}\) When talking about social practices, “social events” and “social structures” must be defined. Fairclough states that social structures define what is possible, social events constitute what is actual, and the relationship between potential and actual is mediated by social practices. Language is an element of the social at each of these levels. (Fairclough, 2003: 223).

\(^{5^4}\) Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French historian and philosopher associated with the structuralist and post-structuralist movements. He has had wide influence not only in philosophy but also in a wide range of humanistic and social science disciplines. He explored: the history of ideas and beliefs, showing how they changed over time; shifting patterns of power within societies; and how everyday practices allow people to establish identities and systematize knowledge. For Foucault, discourse cannot be analyzed only in the present, because the power components and the historical components create such a tangled knot of shifting meanings, definitions, and interested parties over time.
in two ways. First, it is distinctive in its view of the relationship between language and society. Secondly, it is so in the relationship between analysis and the practices analyzed. CDA sees the relationship between language and society as interwoven. As stated above, discourse entails, following Fairclough, “a form of social practice.” Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) explain that discourse, as a form of social practice, implies “a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it.” The term dialectical takes on a significant role in discourse analysis. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship. So for instance, society and culture are dialectically related to discourse. This means that society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time they constitute discourse. Richardson (2007: 28) states, “every single instance of language use reproduces or transforms society and culture, including power relations.” I will further explain this relationship when I discuss the three-dimensional framework for CDA. Referring to the relationship between language and the practices analyzed, my approach may be considered critical in the sense that it aims to reveal power relations and ideology. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 260) state, “CDA sees itself not as dispassionate and objective social science, but as engaged and committed. It is a form of intervention in social practice and social relationships.” Thus, CDA does not claim to be less objective than other forms of research, but normally the political interests and uses of social scientific research are less explicit. It can be said that CDA is concerned with social problems as well as the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (see Richardson, 2007 and Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Nonetheless, CDA also distinguishes itself in that it aims to unearth “a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations” (Wodak, 1996, cited in Richardson, 2007: 27).
4.4 A Three-dimensional Framework for CDA

CDA emerged in the late 1980s as a programmatic development in European discourse studies spearheaded by Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, and others. Fairclough’s method can be distinguished from the social-psychological approach, the social-cognitive model, and the discourse-historic method. Fairclough sees discourse as the complex of three elements: text, discursive practice (text production, distribution and consumption), and social practice. In his view, analysis should also be carried out by considering these three elements, and he accordingly suggests a three-dimensional framework consisting of textual analysis, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practice. These levels and their interrelations must be studied when analyzing a specific discourse (Fairclough, 1995: 74).

4.5 Textual Analysis

Before describing textual analysis, it is important to discuss the view of textual content adopted in this study. Together with Richardson (2007), my assumption is that every aspect of textual content is the result of choices. One choice may be to use one way of describing a person, action, process over another way, or one sentence construction over another, or a particular fact, opinion, or argument over another. Hence, a text is never accidental, but is always the product of a writer’s choices.

Textual analysis is the first step in the three-way method. Fairclough (cited in Richardson, 2007: 38) proposes that “textual analysis involves the analysis of the way propositions are structured and the way propositions are combined and sequenced.”

Fairclough believes that texts should be analyzed at different levels. These levels pertain to analysis of vocabulary, grammar, semantics, etc., but more importantly that they “must not be
considered to be profound and of direct significance in themselves; rather it is the function that such elements serve in the moment of their use that is of interest” (Gerbner, cited in Richardson, 2007: 38). Hence, linguistic analysis must be examined in relation to its direct or indirect involvement in reproducing or resisting systems of ideology and social power.

4.5.1 Discursive Practices

The second step is the discursive practice. Fairclough (cited in Richardson, 2007: 39) states, “The discourse practice dimension of the communicative event involves various aspects of the processes of text production and text consumption. Some of these have a more institutional character whereas others are discourse processes in a narrower sense.” Referring to the more institutional character, Richardson provides the example of editorial procedures of The Independent compared to The Times. In a narrow sense, one can think of “decoding of texts by the reader / viewer” (Richardson, 2007: 39). Thus, in this phase, analysis becomes discourse analysis rather than textual analysis. Text is embedded within, and relates to, the social conditions.

Richardson (2007: 40) states, “At each point of the discursive mediation [...] the discursive practices are a two-way street.” Authors encode meaning in text (the producer makes his choices), but the text also acts on the producer (text-genre, similar to the journalist’s five wh-questions). Similarly, the text may shape the reader’s belief, but at the same time the reader decodes the text. Decoding is not a simple straightforward process; readers have perspectives, background knowledge, agendas, etc. These elements can (and mostly do) differ from the producer’s ideas and knowledge. Thus, “social setting” differs, which implies that discourses need to be conceptualized as socially situated (Richardson, 2007: 75). Richardson (2007: 41)
adds that readers also have their opinion about the producer, which also influences the decoding process. At the same time, within the production of the text, the producer envisions a target consumer that determines in part the encoding process.

4.5.2 Social Practices

On the third level, the insights from textual and discourse analysis are prolonged and seen in relation to the wider society. This can occur in different dimensions. The insights can be placed in “immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices or the wider frame of the society and the culture” (Richardson, 2007: 42). Thus, textual and discursive analysis must refer to social theory. Here, the so-called critical part also comes into view. Blommeart states (quoted in Richardson, 2007: 42) that “this [critical analysis] can only take place when texts and their (ideological) claims are analyzed against the facts – the reality of social practices and relations of power more specifically.”

As within the discursive practice, there is again a dialectical relation. As Richardson (2007: 43) states, “Each point of [the] discursive mediation – between society and discourse and between discourse and society – is characterized by a dialectical relation.” First, there is society and social structure – the historical, economical, political and ideological features of society – that provide a setting that both enables and orders the work of journalists. Richardson (2007: 43) emphasizes that this social formation is a “structure-in-process.” Thus, it does not stand on its own or outside of ourselves. For example, in the framework of ideology and consideration of the ideological state apparatuses, the state does not reflect the interest of classes in any direct way, apart from exceptions, but consolidates the context in which such an interest is achieved (Richardson, 2007: 44).
4.6 Conclusion

Before we can understand the meaning and implications of how terrorist events are framed in the mass media and before we can distinguish between “objective” indicators for monitoring terrorism incidents and its “subjective” perceptions, we need to deconstruct and clarify the basic concept of “terrorism.”

The etymological root of terrorism is the Latin word *terrere*, which means to frighten or to cause to tremble, from which are derived the terms *terrible*, *deter*, and *terrify* as well as *terror* (Weimann & Winn, 1994). A common definition of terrorism in the literature is that it is “the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians for political goals” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 6). Several elements are often emphasized by terrorists: their extensive reliance on both random and symbolic violence; their refusal to differentiate between civilians and non-civilians as legitimate targets; their use of civilians as surrogate victims for the state; and their exploitation of the media to publicize their cause (Miller, 1982).

This concept is essentially contested, value-based, and open to multiple meanings located within broader cultural frames, so that, to some extent, terrorism is in the eye of the beholder. The decision to label protagonists forms part of the political struggle over meaning. Groups can be regarded as “terrorists” or alternatively as “freedom fighters,” “radical activists,” “armed rebels,” “urban guerillas,” or “extremist dissidents,” just as nation states can be labeled “terrorists” or seen as “repressive regimes,” “authoritarian systems,” or “dictatorships.” Rather than being identified by their tactics, groups present labels centered on their grievances or cause, such as Hamas, the Animal Liberation Front, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (Tamil Tigers).
Since labeling certain actions or actors as “terrorist” carries strong normative overtones, the social construction of reality cannot avoid being an intensely ideological contest\textsuperscript{55}.

In the next chapter, I will critically examine the central characteristics terrorism discourse in the west. My goal is to describe and dissect its central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives, and genealogical roots and to reflect on the political and normative consequences of the dominant language and knowledge-production of “Islamic terrorism.” My central argument is that the language and discourse of “Islamic terrorism” in the West are precisely the raison d’être of the advent of Al-Jazeera as counter-ideology to this discourse.

\textsuperscript{55} Since conceptualization is intimately linked with theory, there can be no single “correct” definition. Terrorism is understood here as the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians for political goals. This concept identifies this phenomenon by its techniques, targets, and goals; and all these attributes are regarded as necessary and sufficient for an act to qualify as terrorism.
Chapter 5: The Emergence of Al-Jazeera

5.1 The Rise of the New Arab Media

The Arab media has sustained a political, regulatory, and technical shock. It has encountered a new geo-media map, as expressed by the *Arab Strategic Report*, which maintains that the Arab media has responded weakly to the globalization of the media. More than 140 Arab satellites have been launched into space, giving rise to new cultural and political concepts and circumstances. These new concepts and circumstances must be examined to find optimal ways to deal with them. The media is expanding and specializing. Specialized Arab news channels have emerged in striking numbers. Some consider them a natural development of the communications and information revolution that Arab societies must prepare to coexist with. Accordingly, some Arab intellectuals advocate designing political and cultural programs to cultivate the Arab and Islamic identity amid globalization and protect it from the dangers of assimilating into other cultures as the world moves toward cross-cultural communication based on the removal of barriers. In this regard, these intellectuals perhaps fear what Robertson has called “the reformation of the entire world as one place.” Media conglomerates driven by

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59 Ahmad Bin Rashid Sa’id, “The Borders of Hegemony: The Active Audience and Communications Technology” [in Arabic], paper presented to the 5th Annual Academic Conference on the Reality and Future of Communications, Cairo, Journalism Faculty, Cairo University, 1999, p. 186.
motives of profit rather than knowledge and culture have reinforced these fears, as such conglomerates do not serve cohesiveness and unity among peoples and do not create cultural exchange and international mutual understanding.60

Arab public and private sectors have responded quickly to catch up with the broad technological development occurring in the communication fields. The sky has become crowded with dozens of satellites. The large number of satellite channels is boosting acculturation,61 whereby one culture dominates another.62 This is particularly so, as those who possess the keys to knowledge in the world represent only 11 percent of the global population. This confirms the adage that “knowledge is a speeding train; if countries and their peoples do not keep up with this train, glory and sovereignty will pass them by.”

The launching of Arab satellite channels is the first step toward keeping pace with such technological developments. The launching of satellite channels is no longer limited to governments. Businessmen and private enterprises have surpassed governments in this field, establishing 27 private Arab satellite channels.63

Prominent Arab satellite stations are operated by a number of Arab governments, including but not limited to Egypt, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Tunisia, Morocco, and Kuwait. Satellite channels owned by individuals or corporations include Middle East Broadcasting, the Arab


Radio and Television Network, the Orbit network, Al-Mustaqbal channel, El-Mehawar satellite channel, and Dream satellite channel.

Following their initial expansion, Arab state and private satellite channels succeeded in attracting a broad audience with diverse interests. These channels are now moving to specialize in order to satisfy the many, diverse demands of their broad audience. Such specialization has emerged, despite its novelty in the Arab sphere, to keep pace with channels that evolved in the early 1980s, the most prominent being western satellite channels such as Star, Sky Channel, and MTV. The steady increase in the number of satellite channels and the diversity of their content and ownership have rattled the position of the national (domestic) media channels, leading to a review of the audience—with its diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural components—to meet the media needs of different age groups and people with different interests.

The Arab region did not initially keep pace with this evolutionary leap in the media, as specialized Arabic satellite channels began to appear only in the mid-1990s. The notion of specialized news channels became current only after a change in many prevalent media concepts.

The first specialized channels were the drama and song channels broadcast by the Orbit and Art networks. They were followed by the appearance of Arab news satellite stations, such as Al-Jazeera, ANN, and Nile News. These channels provoked a debate among media and academic circles, as they presented the news in the Arabic language in a way that differed from the manner to which viewers of the national media agencies (land and satellite) had become accustomed. This accords with a study that asserts that the peculiar situation of the international

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political news prompted the introduction of a new media structure in the Arab world that focuses on unleashing creative, innovative energies based on excellence in production and performance.66

As a result, the Arab satellite stations began to provide greater freedom of expression, permitting people to express their ideas, regardless of how extreme they are and to seek to convince viewers of their views.67 The situation was further complicated by the appearance of digital technology. This technology spawned an increase in the number of satellite stations, which offered viewers a great multiplicity of satellite channels and media content.68 The entire Arab region became an arena covered by many government and private television channels.69 Specialized satellite television channels took one of two forms70: specialized channels for a limited audience;71 or channels with specialized content, e.g., variety shows, songs, sports, drama, news, or content aimed at a defined sector of the public sharing common characteristics. These channels offer material that fulfills the needs and desires of their specific audiences. Programs are directed at children (e.g., Spacetoon and Arteens), at women and the family (e.g., the Family Channel), and at youth (e.g., Kuwaiti Youth and Sports or the Egyptian OTV). Some channels specialize in addressing certain ethnic or religious groups e.g.: SAT 7, Al-Ḥayāh [Life],

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69 Iyyad Shakir al-Kubra, op. cit. p. 82.


Mu ‘jizah [Miracle], and Al-Mahabbah [Love] for Christians; and Iqra’ [Read!], Al-Majd [Glory], Al-Fajr [Dawn], and Al-Risālah [Prophecy] for Muslims. These satellite stations represent a departure from the previous Arab media. Previously, the Arab media customarily produced a product featuring certain rites embracing a closed set of facts. These programs circled in closed circuits of thought in a monotonous investigative language. These programs denied “the other” and rejected the values of dialogue, contingent concepts, and anything that falls in the relative circumstantial, contextual framework.

Consequently, many satellite channels appeared. It became difficult to follow them. Visions defining the media activity and message of most channels became fragmented, as the plethora of channels differed in their content and services. Shabby programs devoid of content were introduced. An entire generation of media workers—e.g. female broadcasters on song channels—lack any professional or academic training. All of this had serious implications, as it is well known that the media exercises a significant effect on public opinion and on values, especially among young adults, adolescents, and children.

The appearance of these satellite channels has also put enormous pressure on the satellite stations of the Arab governments. The state-run stations now face challenges they cannot meet despite all their previous successes. These ramified, intermeshed challenges are posed by the freedom to innovate and the possibility of producing, marketing, and promoting commodities, ideas, concepts, terms, life styles, and cultural patterns in the framework of what has been called Americanization and commoditization.

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72 Firyal Mahna, (Communication Sciences and Digital Societies (in Arabic), 1st Ed, Damascus, Dar al-Fikr al-Mu’asir, 2002], p. 102
As a result, new concepts have been introduced to counter these trends and the raging globalization now underway. The new concepts are ideological, doctrinal, and perhaps ethnic. They provide the framework for an approach that seeks to restore the order of existence in the face of the global melting pot, which is giving rise to global humanitarian values that transcend sectarian, ethnic, ideological, doctrinal, economic, political, cultural, and scientific chauvinism. The melting pot of globalization threatens the national identities of certain peoples. These peoples have retreated into themselves; they cling to a given economic, political, or cultural path. Thus, one can expect that national identities unable to be open, to evolve, learn, interact, and renew will sentence themselves to isolation, marginalization, and exclusion from the new dynamic mechanism called globalization.

This Arab media’s role is compounded by its responsibility to build concepts, spread humanitarian values, and inoculate societies against deviant ideas and erroneous beliefs that exploit the chaos that may be entailed by freedom in all of its forms—social, religious, intellectual, and sectarian. It has thus become quite important to strengthen the values of responsible freedom, so that people will not swerve from their sound temperament and their society’s culture, doctrinal axioms, values, and ethics.

Arab satellite channels emerged simultaneously with globalism in the early 1990s. Since it first surfaced, globalism has spawned research and discussion in various branches of knowledge. Satellite channels in general and Arab satellite channels in particular evolved as a response to the new world order and to globalization (globalization is more grounded in economics and culture, whereas the new world order is more grounded in politics and the military sphere).

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The media, particularly the satellite channels, are important because they function to both promote and counter globalization. The Arab satellite channels in the 1990s evolved to exploit the climate of globalization and to offer a media message to counter the adverse effects of globalization on the Arab individual, family, and society.

The practices of the Arab satellite channels gave rise to an ideological, journalistic, and media debate over the Arab media’s relationship with globalization. It has become necessary to study this relationship at the theoretical and practical levels. The Arabic media plays a dual role in treating the culture of globalization. It transmits and promotes globalization but also criticizes and attacks it. However, more important is the question of the extent to which the Arab media can at least interact with the trend of globalization through a give and take. In other words, to what extent can it convey globalization while also presenting what is special and unique about its own heritage and broad audience?75

This dual role depends on the Arab media’s ability to cope with a number of challenges that impede its progress and adversely affect its content, particularly the content of the Arab satellite channels. The most salient of the many challenges facing the Arab satellite channels include the following:

5.1.1 Professional challenges:

- Inferior professional performance of the Arab media in general. The official media focuses on official news. It provides only partial treatment of events. It engages in traditional, ideological media discourse, which is not suited to the rapid flow of information.

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• Arab journalists are in crisis. They are subjected to various types of pressure, censorship, and harassment. Qualification and training programs cannot keep pace with rapid media developments. Journalists have insecure relationships with their information sources, because there are no guarantees in the practice of their profession.

• There is a crisis of credibility stemming from the Arab governments’ control of the media.76

• Prevailing media values are out of step with the times. They do not meet the needs of the public. This negatively impacts official Arab media discourse. The Arab media thus cannot be local in its affiliation, Arab in its scope, and human and global in its presence.

• The official view predominates in the media. This has divested the media of much of its vitality and attractiveness, limiting its reach and influence and raising the question: What type of awareness is it propagating?77

5.1.2 Technological challenges:

The key technical challenge is the emergence of the Internet as an international source of knowledge. This has posed many technical, professional, and cultural challenges, the most salient78 being the entrenchment of the media and information divide between those who possess this knowledge and those who do not.

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These challenges in the aggregate and the ongoing changes in the visual media, particularly in the 1990s, demonstrate the need to define and study the factors that influence the Arab media in general and the visual media in particular, especially the satellite news channels.

Based on the preceding, what are the variables that influence news coverage of the Arab issues presented on the specialized Arab news channel? The factors may include all elements of news activity, the work environment, the surrounding milieu, economic factors, the level of freedom granted to the satellite channels, and other variables, including but not limited to:

- The entity that runs the media.
- The editorial policy adopted by the media organization.
- The type of ownership or financial dependence of the media organization.
- The credibility enjoyed by the media with the various groups comprising the public.
- The attractive and exciting aspects of news coverage; the use of communications technologies, including email, video phone, fax, and satellite communications; and the creation of suitable forums for the public’s interaction with the media.

Variables concerning the internal and external work environment include:

- The various groups comprising the audience (elites and the general public).
- Competition among the various media due to conditions in the media and advertising markets.
- The domestic political conditions in the country of broadcast, which affect the margin of freedom granted to the media and those who run the media.
- External political conditions, which concern the relations of the country of broadcast with other countries.
These variables or factors interact in a woven, sometimes complex way. It is thus difficult to separate them from each other. However, in the aggregate, they affect—sometimes positively, sometimes negatively—the communication process and the news media product. In addition to the preceding, international political, economic and social variables have altered the international media in general and the Arab media in particular. I will therefore also examine how the Arab satellite channels give expression to their audiences, comprehend the needs of their audience, and correct the distorted, biased image of the Arab reality in all of its forms on the foreign satellite news channels. These aspects are particularly appropriate in the light of plans to discuss political, economic, and information reform in the Arab region, the expansion of freedoms, and action to prepare Arab societies for democracy based on dialogue, negotiation, and freedom of expression of opinions and beliefs.79

Researchers and professionals agree on the definition of a news program: It is a television production80 designed to introduce the viewer to things, persons, issues, or activities that increase his/her knowledge and enrich him/her culturally. Such programs assume numerous forms. They include the live talk shows or opinion shows,81 such as television debates, interviews with one or two guests, and special programs concerned with a single issue, person, political or event or with a specific scientific or intellectual event. The news program aims to achieve the media’s general purpose, which is to treat the news, regardless of the multiplicity of its forms and types. News of an event is usually broadcast as the event unfolds. Some programs,

80 Halah Muhammad Isma’il Baghdadi, “The Role of Egyptian Television in Arab News Exchange” [in Arabic], Master’s dissertation, Cairo, College of Media, Cairo University, 1994, p. 65.
81 Muhammad Muhammad Mihni, “Issues Treated by Opinion Programs on Egyptian Radio and Television” [in Arabic], PhD dissertation, Cairo, College of Media, Cairo University, 1994.
however, are historical, scientific, or cultural in nature and may not be actually connected to what is happening on the day they are broadcast.

Robert K. Hilliard\textsuperscript{82} divides these news programs into five types as follows:

a. Special events: The direct, real-time transmission of events on location.

b. Special feature programs: They are based on analysis and research. They delve into and interpret events in real-time or after the event occurs. They may be based on recorded material.

c. Documentary programs: They combine specific events, special programs, and drama. They present events according to how they are interpreted and predict the future.

d. Panel discussions: Different views are presented on an event, without the moderator injecting his personal view.

e. Reports by domestic and international newspapers: This involves journalistic treatment of current events and key opinions from the viewpoint of newspapers and journalists.

5.2 The Case of Al-Jazeera

In the aftermath of September 11th, Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based channel, emerged as a leading news source on the world media stage. With its controversial coverage of the United States’ war on terror, it quickly challenged major Western news outlets (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002). Although Al-Jazeera has drawn much criticism for airing the Osama Bin Laden video tapes, live reporting in Kabul during the 2001 U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan, and the footage of captured and slain American soliders in Iraq in 2003, the Arab network refuses to accept the Western portrayal of its coverage as propoganda. It continues to assert its claim of

\textsuperscript{82} Abd-al-Aziz Sharaf, \textit{The Art of Media Editing} [in Arabic], 1\textsuperscript{st} Ed., Cairo, The Egyptian General Book Organization, 1987, pp. 278-279.
objectivity within an Arab-Islamic view\textsuperscript{83} via discussions in its many round tables, interviews, and websites.

5.2.1 *Roots of Al-Jazeera*

Qatar, a former British colony and member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, is a monarchy whose economy, like many of its Gulf neighbors, relies on oil revenues and industry. In June 1995, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani peacefully deposed his father who was, at that time, in Geneva. Sheik Hamad, British-educated and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, was determined to introduce a liberal political system by adopting democratic institutions and emphasizing women’s freedom and right to education. In 1996 he announced the abolition of the Ministry of Information, an end of media censorship, and the establishment of the General Association for Qatari Radio and Television. This led to the establishment of Al-Jazeera, one of the most popular and controversial satellite TV stations in the Arab world (Parker 1999). Qatar’s Emir promised to subsidize the channel until 2001, at which point it would need to rely on advertising revenues. However, the advertising revenues have not materialized, despite the fact that Al-Jazeera has one of the largest audience shares in the Middle East (Schleifer 2003). Al-Jazeera has turned to alternative funding options, primarily the sale of exclusive footage and images to global/Western media outlets.

Many of the station personnel came from the BBC Television Arabic Satellite Channel, a joint Saudi-British venture that failed after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and BBC disagreed upon editorial principles. That core group, which consisted of journalists drawn from all over the Arab world, has expanded as Al-Jazeera opened a series of training workshops for broadcast journalism in Qatar. Al-Jazeera’s journalistic format combines voices and opinions of Israeli and

\textsuperscript{83} as embodied in its motto: *al-ra’i wa r-ra’i al-ākhar* (“Opinion and Counter Opinion")
Arab opposition leaders which had not been heard in the Arab media previously (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002). By re-routing the flow of information away from censored and foreign produced media, Al-Jazeera forced the Arab and Western, state- and privately-owned information structures to respond, thereby transforming the mechanisms for control of the public stage (Eickelman and Anderson 1999:5).

Much has been written and said about Al-Jazeera’s objectivity or lack thereof (Hudson, 2005). Regional and international politicians and analysts comment on and seek to engage Al-Jazeera directly – in program interviews – or indirectly – via other round tables or commentaries – on a regular basis. Some, like independent Palestinian journalist Rami Baroud, see Al-Jazeera as a champion of free speech leading to democracy in the Middle East.

And because Al-Jazeera displayed a shockingly balanced narration of the news and provided an equal platform to all, it was hated and loved; it was an Islamist, a socialist, a radical, a conservative, a reactionary, a progressive, a demagogue, a liberal, democratic, pro-Saddam, pro-Shite, pro-Kurds, anti-Israel, infiltrated by the Israeli Mossad, by the CIA, by Osama bin Laden, by everyone, by no one, all at once. In short, it was even-handed (Baroud, 2002).

Others find Al-Jazeera’s methods extremist, seeking to incite rather than inform. They have been accused of disloyalty to Arab unity and breaking the tacit regional agreement not to use state media to interfere in the affairs of neighbors (Ajami, 2000). This has resulted in diplomatic scandals and international pressure on both Al-Jazeera and its host, Qatar. After Al-Jazeera aired the bin Laden tapes in October, 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell protested to the Emir
of Qatar (Fine, 2003). Hafiz Al-Mirazi, the moderator of the round table program *min wāshinṭūn*, asked him about the US government policy toward ‘independent media in the Arab world’ citing Al-Jazeera specifically:

**Mirazi:** Mr. Secretary, let me just conclude with one question by asking is the U.S. still committed to support independent media in the Arab world and in the Middle East and refrain from penalizing any government if that government is supporting independent media, as in the case of the Government of Qatar and Al-Jazeera?

**Powell:** We believe in free and open and independent media. We believe that in order for a free, open and independent media to do its job -- and its job is to serve its viewers, serve its listeners, serve its readers -- then that presentation ought to be balanced and it ought to reflect all views. And it should not just be slanted to one particular point of view or the focus strictly on polemical actions, polemical activities. And so, free, open, independent, yes, but with those values comes the value of balance and perspective… (Department of State transcript, June 16, 2004).  

Still others view Al-Jazeera as a work in progress, attempting to train its personnel in appropriate means and methods: “There is no question in my mind that Al-Jazeera does not

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84 This transcript may be found online at, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/33631.htm, to which the reader is directed.
make up facts or deny them, and there is no question in my mind that many of Al-Jazeera's presenters indulge their emotional commitments, as Arab nationalists, to such a degree that at times the spin they put on the facts can be scandalous (Schleiffer, 2003).”

Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel was established on November 1, 1996. It was the only satellite station belonging to the state of Qatar at the time. Its motto is “The opinion and the other opinion.” It operates independently and neutrally. It is considered the first of its type. The Qatari government has undertaken to finance the infrastructure for this channel provided the private sector acquires and manages it in the future. The channel has an independent legal status. It is operated on purely commercial foundations, taking into account Arab and Islamic values, customs, and traditions.85

Al-Jazeera began by broadcasting for six hours a day, which was later increased to 12 hours and then to 24 hours a day. Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- The channel shies away from local and regional events but rather attempts to address Arab citizens in general and to serve as a media and cultural bridge to facilitate the transmission of news to Arab viewers, allowing them to constantly stay apprised of the latest developments in the world in politics, finance, and business and to view documentary programs.

- Al-Jazeera covers breaking news stories. It attempts to treat events with impartiality, neutrality, objectivity, and complete fairness, without favoring a particular party.

85 Emiri Decree Law No. 1 of 1996 to Establish a Qatari Public Satellite Channel Corporation, Appendix No.2.
5.2.2 *Al-Jazeera’s Name:*

The name “Al-Jazeera Channel” was chosen instead of “Qatar’s Satellite Channel” or “the Qatari Satellite Channel,” because the channel is a corporation that operates completely independently of Qatar’s government and its information institutions. A more general name helps remove the official veneer from the station. “Al-Jazeera” means “the island,” i.e., it sits alone in the middle of the sea, with no other land abutting it directly.\(^86\)

5.2.3 *Management and Financing:*

The government of Qatar provided a $500 million loan to finance the station over a five-year period provided the channel becomes capable of supporting itself through advertising and subscriptions. Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel is managed by a board of directors headed by a young, open journalist, Sheikh Hamad Bin Thamir Al Thani. The board of directors formulated a five-year plan for Al-Jazeera Channel when it was first launched in 1996. The plan, which covers up to 2001, provides for the capital and operating costs of the station. Al-Jazeera’s expenditures in 1998, for example, totaled 100 million riyals out of a total budget of 500 million riyals (i.e., an average annual expenditure of 100 million riyals).

There are encouraging indicators that the channel is covering its expenses through advertising and the sale of its variety programs, as advertisers are interested in advertising on the channel. In addition, numerous companies sponsor many programs for Al-Jazeera. The Satellite Channel has invested in the establishment of a huge studio with the most technologically advanced, digital equipment.

To increase its financial resources, Al-Jazeera began to sell its programs and media content on compact discs and in publications. The state of Qatar has made numerous decisions to strengthen Al-Jazeera and allocate resources for it, including a decision to reform Al-Jazeera’s board of directors and transform the network into a private, joint-stock company. To underscore this decision, the Qatari government announced its resolve on February 2, 2005 to privatize Al-Jazeera Channel after completing a draft study for major American companies involved in privatization.

5.2.4 Objectives of Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel:

Al-Jazeera is a unique, Arab, media enterprise. It represents a qualitative improvement in the Arab media. It has filled in the gaps of the restricted government media, which sometimes disregard the Arab viewer, denying him certain information on Arab and international events.

Al-Jazeera is an independent news channel that has broken the stagnation of the Arab media. It keeps pace with events and reports the news on location through its network of correspondents and offices located in many countries in the world and through directly-aired reporting via telephone. It has restored the bridges of communication with the Arab viewer, who had previously relied for his news and information on international news agencies and western and American satellite channels, which are known for their distortion and falsification of the facts and monopolization of information by virtue of their superior technologies and long expertise in international satellite broadcasting. Moreover, Al-Jazeera has become a pioneer in

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87 Emiri Decree of 2005 to Reform the Board of Directors of Al-Jazeera Channel and Convert Al-Jazeera Channel into a Private, Joint-Stock Company.

providing interactive services, such as Al-Jazeera.net, Al-Jazeera Mobile, and Al-Jazeera Direct or Live Streaming.

Al-Jazeera seeks to provide comprehensive news coverage of the issues of the hour and political and social affairs. It presents live talk shows and economic and sports broadcasts. It seeks to responsibly translate its declared motto, “opinion and the other opinion,” by furnishing the viewer with all points of view without bias. Since the day it was launched, it has been characterized by its independence and professional manner in collecting and broadcasting the news and in preparing diverse talk shows. Its programs seek to treat the primary, crucial issues of concern to Arab citizens, particularly sensitive issues, without censorship and with the free participation of viewers via telephone or fax. Other Arab channels would dare not address or disclose such issues, preferring to skirt them.

5.2.5 Media Gains Achieved by Al-Jazeera Channel:

Al-Jazeera seeks to support Arab causes, particularly the Palestinian cause. It is concerned with highlighting the Arab point of view. For example, it was able to provide unique coverage of the speech of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in which he expressed steadfastness and defiance in the face of the Anglo-American aggression in December 1990. In that case, Al-Jazeera provided direct coverage instead of following it through CNN as it customarily did. CNN purchased the coverage of Al-Jazeera’s correspondent in Baghdad, using it without referring to the work of its correspondent there. Due to the great popularity enjoyed by Al-Jazeera Channel, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami addressed the Arab and American peoples to state his country’s policy through an Arab satellite channel.

For the first time, Al-Jazeera broadcast a long interview with Usamah Bin Ladin, the Islamic activist, who was accused of being behind the explosions that targeted the US embassies in East Africa that claimed the lives of 224 persons, including 12 Americans. The Arab viewer was thus granted his first opportunity to listen to Bin Ladin as he spoke without restrictions. Despite being accused of promoting American ideas, Al-Jazeera came under pressure by U.S. diplomats to refrain from broadcasting the interview. The diplomats feared that Bin Ladin’s call for new attacks would further expose Americans to attacks in the Middle East. The western media, including the *Financial Times*, said the interview boosted the influence of Qatar, not only in the Arab region, but also in the western world, because of its bold, liberal policies—polices that have annoyed Arab governments and compelled them to send their ministers to Doha to ask Al-Jazeera to tone down its language. Politicians say that Al-Jazeera has created, in the western perception, a brilliant image of Qatar as a model small state that has taken a huge step in freeing the Arab media from its long subjection to autocratic, undemocratic regimes.

Because of its comprehensive presentation of the news and sensitive subjects, Al-Jazeera represents a breath of fresh air that contrasts with the atmosphere in which the Arab media normally discusses political, social, and religious issues.

Al-Jazeera’s programs deal with new, previously taboo subjects, e.g., torture in Arab prisons, the killing and concealment of political opponents, and even religious issues such as the right of a Muslim man to marry four women. Its programs have treated the most sacred religious teachings, placing Muslim clerics, conservatives, reformists, and advocates of women’s liberation across from traditionalists in confrontations that reveal startling differences concerning the Islamic religion in the Arab world. Some experts believe that the channel’s popularity indicates that Islamic extremism, which was felt to have been on the ascendant in the Arab
world, is facing a challenge from a new generation seeking to entrench greater democracy and
tolerance in society.

5.2.6 Official Criticism Against Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel

Al-Jazeera has drawn the attention of viewers through its many bold, controversial
discussions on its programs. Such programs and the channel’s unreserved manner have elicited
harsh, offensive reactions from some Arab regimes and Western officials. For example, Jordan
closed Al-Jazeera’s office in Amman for four months to express its dissatisfaction over a dispute
concerning the behavior of an Al-Jazeera’s broadcaster thought by some to have offended
Jordan’s king. Kuwait’s information minister was assigned to convey to Doha his country’s
official objection to the channel’s positions.90 In Saudi Arabia, the kingdom’s official spokesman
called Al-Jazeera a “dubious channel,” describing its programs as “poison.” In Algeria, Al-
Jazeera’s program on the dark corners of the civil war in the country was cut off suddenly when
the government cut off electrical power to a number of cities. Egypt launched a major media
campaign against, and boycotted, Al-Jazeera recently, prosecuting its correspondents and its
office chief a number of times.91

From its inception, Al-Jazeera has taken a distinguished, courageous media line. Al-
Jazeera was able to induce the leader of the Libyan revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi, to speak
with the public directly on the air and respond to their questions with spontaneity in an open
dialogue.

90 Mohammed El Nawawi and Adel Eskander, Al-Jazeera, op. cit., p. 91.
91 The director of the office in Cairo, Husayn Abd-al-Ghani, was prosecuted a number of times by the security
establishment and judiciary. Also, Howayda Taha, an Al-Jazeera reporter, was prosecuted because of her resolve
to prepare a report on torture in Egyptian police stations.
Chapter 6: Text Analysis

Al-Jazeera television, whose aim is balanced reporting has been praised by its admirers as a beacon for freedom of expression, and accused by its critics of sensationalism and biased reporting. These accusations have prompted this study to look into the concept of “objectivity” as an idealistic, abstract notion, and particularly as it applies to the role played by Al-Jazeera in covering America’s “war on terror” and other major news events and conflicts inside and outside the Arab world. The literature on the subject presents a variety of definitions of objectivity, and provides solid evidence to justify the main argument that it would be futile to expect Al-Jazeera, or any other network for that matter, to be absolutely objective. That is because broadcasting networks are products of the cultures from which they originate; “…journalistic methods and ideals are no guarantee of ‘truth,’ but vary according to the environment and media landscape. Journalists, decision-makers and audiences are confronted with a fundamental contradiction in journalism:..between impartiality and loyalty to audiences in this new culturally relativistic broadcasting landscape…” (Riegert, 2005).

To address the tension between a network’s impartiality and loyalty to its audiences, El-Nawawy92 introduced the term “contextual objectivity,” which describes Al-Jazeera’s attempt to

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cover all sides of any story, while trying to appeal to its Arab audiences. To provide the context necessary for assessing Al-Jazeera’s role and its approach to various news events, the structure, ownership and financing of Al-Jazeera, and the Arab political culture in which it is operating, have already been described in chapter 5. I will also shed some light on the issue of the “Al-Jazeera effect” by explaining Al-Jazeera’s role in political mobilization and the public sphere, and by addressing the question of whether Al-Jazeera is considered a mainstream or an alternative medium.

This study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to analyze terrorism discourse on Al-Jazeera’s talk shows. Between 2002 and 2005, several episodes dealt with the issue of terrorism, most of them hosting prominent scholars, US government officials and Arab media and political personalities. Drawing mostly on Fairclough’s critical analytical approach to the media, I will examine, at the micro- or local level, key linguistic strategies and rhetorical arguments deployed by the participants, and particularly, the hosts of the min wāšintaṭun program (which focuses on the events, characters, and discourses flowing from or forming around the United States), in order to justify their positions concerning the nature of terrorism and the discourse around it. This in-depth textual/local analysis will be supplemented with an analysis at the macro- or global level, which will look at the overall structure of these episodes in order to see the extent to which dominant positions taken by participants at the micro level are also reinforced by the superstructure of the episodes themselves. Throughout, an intertextual analysis will be used in order to study which political discourses from the larger socio-cultural context are drawn upon in Al-Jazeera’s discussions of terrorism. The purpose of this multi-leveled analysis is to answer the following key questions: Which discourses on terrorism are used by those talk shows? Are there differences in the range of opinions covered by the various episodes dealing
with same issue? How are the various positions, when they exist, manifested at the local/global levels of analysis? Most importantly, what do these discussions on terrorism tell us about Al-Jazeera’s self-confessed editorial line (“opinion and counter-opinion”) concerning one of today’s most controversial topics.

In order to answer all these questions, I will analyze excerpts from all those episodes of the \textit{mi\textit{n w\textit{\=a}sh\textit{\=i}ntun} (From Washington) program which dealt entirely or partially with the issue of terrorism and the discourse related to it. I chose the discourse on terrorism within the framework of America’s “war on terror”, to study Al-Jazeera’s adoption of contextual objectivity in its coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iraq war, and the US-Arab relations in general including the difference between Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Arab issues and Western coverage of the same issues.

6.1 Model of Analysis

The focus of this research is on the linguistic analysis of texts. Discourse analysis is a broadly used research tool, so it is not extraordinary that many scholars have developed different kinds of strategies in discourse analysis to analyze texts. Richardson states in his book \textit{Analyzing Newspapers} (2007: 47) that analysis should move from a micro level to a macro level\footnote{Richardson is certainly not the only scholar who takes this way of researching as a starting point. Also Fairclough works from a micro to macro level (see Fairclough, 1995). Yet, Richardson is more explicit about it.}. The chosen strategies are also based on earlier research. First of all, different studies have shown that lexicalization plays an important role in the discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Ackerman (2001) shows that the U.S. media have systematically avoided the use of the
word “occupation” in the reporting of the Al-Aqsa intifāḍa. In reference to the verbal processes and intertextuality, researchers have emphasized the importance of the implementation of different voices. In *Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War* (2005: 17), the authors show that, among other differences, Al-Jazeera, in contrast with the U.S. counterparts, devoted a great deal of coverage to voices of protests and diplomacy. Dimitrova and Strömback (2005: 413) claim that “the media [...] seems to ‘blind’ the audience to alternative interpretations of events and imply national consensus on issues by not offering opposing views.” With these theories in mind, the following elements were chosen to be analyzed: (1) topicalization (2) lexicalization and predications, (3) intertextuality and (4) framing of the voices. Below, these different strategies will be further explained.

6.1.1 Topicalization

Van Dijk (1998: 266) states that topics “embody what is most relevant or important for the participants” and “are crucial in the formation and accessibility of preferred ideological models, and, thus, indirectly in the formation or confirmation of ideologies.” Topics of discourse define the information in a discourse that speakers find relevant or important (Van Dijk, 1995b: 27). Medina (2003: 83) showed that CNN International focused much on the United States, a tendency also seen in the news coverage concerning terrorism. Analysis also shows that Al-Jazeera focuses on themes, such as the condition of the Palestinian inhabitants, and the Iraqis after the US invasion.

6.1.2 Lexicalization and Predicational Strategy

Richardson states that the analysis of words is the first stage of discourse analysis. He
argues (2007: 47) “Words convey the imprint of society and of value judgment in particular – they convey connoted as well as denoted meanings.” Allan (in Richardson, 2007: 48) analyzed the words used in the U.S. war against Iraq in 1991. He encountered words that were used that could have been used to refer to the persons, people or actions of both parties involved, but that they had not been used that way. For example, the U.S. had an army, navy and an air force, in contrast with Iraq, which had a “war machine”. The U.S. “suppressed” and Iraq “launched” sneak attacks. Richardson (2007: 48) states that the alternatives in each of these pairings could be exchanged, but “the ideological constraints (felt particularly at time of war) meant that they very rarely were.” Clark (qtd. in Page, 2003: 563) also relates the use of words with an ideology: “Naming is a powerful ideological tool... Different names for an object represent different ways of perceiving it.” Thus, words are commonly taken as neutral reflections of the real world. They may, however, be more accurately regarded as constructions of the real that reflect the interest of Dominant groups.

In the analysis, I will also take into account the predications that are attributed to certain groups. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 54) state that “predication is the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events actions and social phenomena. Through predication, persons, things events and practices are specified and characterized with respect to quality, quantity, space, time and so on.” Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 55) claim that predications are mostly realized through specific forms of reference (based on explicit denotation, as well as on more or less implicit connotation), by attributes (in the form of, for example, adjectives, appositions, and prepositional phrases), by predicates or predicative nouns / adjectives / pronouns, by collocations or by explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures. For example, in Al-Jazeera, the ‘suicide bomber’ is referred to with the
noun ‘martyr’, coalition forces in Iraq are referred to as ‘occupation forces’.

6.1.3 *Narrative: Intertextuality and Framing*

“News reduces complex series of events whose relationship may not be terribly clear to stories, imposing narrative order upon them”, declares Fairclough (2003: 84) when he writes about news and narrative. News is, thus, not an actual series of events written on paper or being told on television. News coverage involves constructing what Fairclough (2003: 84) calls “fragmentary and ill-defined happenings”. Fairclough (2003: 85) continues by stating that it includes certain happenings and it is excluding others, and it, subsequently, sets these events in a particular relation to each other. A part of making the story is the representation of voices and of speech. Yet again, the issue of selecting arises. The journalist is in control of the process of selecting and of framing the voices or speeches. As Fairclough (2003: 85) states, “Journalists are in the business of including some things which were said and excluding others (which often means excluding certain voices), selecting particular parts of what was said, and generally ordering what is often a cacophony of speech and writing into separate speech events.”

Fairclough (2003: 49) differentiates four ways of reporting:

- **Direct reporting**
  
  Quotation, purportedly the actual words used, in quotation marks, with a reporting clause (e.g. She said, “He’ll be there by now.”).

- **Indirect reporting**
  
  Summary, the content of what was said or written, not the actual words used, no quotation marks, with a reporting clause (e.g. She said he’d be there by then).

  Shifts in the tense (“he’ll” becomes “he’d”) and deixis (“now” becomes “then”) of direct
• Free indirect reporting

Intermediate between direct and indirect – it has some of the tense and deixis shifts typical of indirect speech, but without a reporting clause. It is mainly significant in literary language (e.g. Mary gazed out of the window. He would be there by now. She smiled to herself).

• Narrative report of speech act

Reports the sort of speech act without reporting its content (e.g. She made a prediction).

The first form of incorporating speech, direct reporting, is a very obvious inclusion of a voice; the other three ways summarize texts. One might wonder how a journalist decides between choosing direct or indirect speech. In the scope of framing, Fairclough (2003: 53) states, “When the voice of another is incorporated into a text, there are always choices about how to frame it, how to contextualize it, in terms of other parts of the text – about relations between report and authorial account.” One can think about the ordering of the voices in relation to each other. Moreover, if one examines the ordering of the voices, an antagonist-protagonist structure can sometimes be seen. Fairclough (2003) gives an example of a text concerning the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. He states that in the text the Western diplomats and politicians are the good guys, dominantly voiced in the final part of the text, and they are very critical about the Libyans, the bad guys. The latter is prominent in the first part of the text. Especially the contrast between the Libyan voices, which refer to what Libya is doing, and the Western voices which refer to what Libya appears to be doing, makes a distinction between antagonist and protagonist clear.

Hence, when different voices are included, it does not automatically mean that there is no
altering of attitudes towards a certain side. Framing voices can make a major difference and they can create an antagonist-protagonist structure. Turning back to narrative and its relation to state apparatus, I will quote some words of Allan (qtd. in Fairclough, 2003: 85): “If we see news as part of the apparatus of governance, this highlights the sense in which news stories are oriented to regulating and controlling events, and the way in which people respond to events.” Taking this into account, I expect that an analysis of intertextuality and the framing of voices will be a valuable contribution to exposing the dominant ideology of Al-Jazeera.

6.1.4 Data

The transcripts from Al-Jazeera are the data for this research. They include the following:

1. Min Wāshinṭun Program 1 – Message of the Directed Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>American Media Discourse</strong></th>
<th><strong>الخطاب الإعلامي الأمريكي</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong> Muhammad al-Alami</td>
<td><strong>مقدم الحلقة:</strong> محمد العلمي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong> Mouafac Harb, News Director, Radio Sawa and Alhurrah Television; Fadil al-Amin, Editor in Chief, Hi Magazine; Hani Salamah, film producer; Hassan Najmi, President of the Moroccan Union of Writers</td>
<td><strong>ضيف الحلقة:</strong> موقف حرب، مدير الأخبار في إذاعة سوا وتلفزيون الحرة؛ فضيل الأمين، مدير تحرير مجلة هاي؛ هاني سلامة، مخرج سينمائي؛ حسن نجми، رئيس اتحاد كتاب المغرب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of segment:</strong> July 8, 2004</td>
<td><strong>تاريخ الحلقة:</strong> 8 يوليو 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topics of the program:</strong></td>
<td><strong>مواضيع البرنامج:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Directed media message</td>
<td>o رسالة الإعلام الموجه</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o American consciousness has no notion of the Arab identity</td>
<td>o غياب الهوية العربية عن الأذهان الأميركية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Arabs have incomplete image of Americans</td>
<td>o الصورة المنقوصة لدى العرب عن الأميركان</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Youth are the hope for a meeting of civilizations</td>
<td>o الشباب هم أمل تلاقي الحضارات</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the entire articles and their corresponding English translations, see Appendix 1
2. *Min Wāshīṭun Program 2 - Reasons for the Issuance of a Code of Ethics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Codes of Ethics</th>
<th>مواثيق الشرف الإعلامية</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong> Haфиз al-Mirazi</td>
<td>مقدم الحلقة: حافظ المرازي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong> Waddah Khanfar, Director-General, Al-Jazeera Network; Eason Jordan, Chief News Executive, [CNN]; Norman Solomon, Director of the Institute for Public Accuracy</td>
<td>ضيف الحلقة: وضاح خنفر، المدير العام لقناة الجزيرة، إي سن جوردن، كبير مدير الأخبار بالشبكة، نورمان سولومان، مدير مؤسسة رقابة الدقة العامة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of segment:</strong> July 5, 2004</td>
<td>تاريخ الحلقة: 5 يوليو 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topics of the program:</strong></td>
<td>مواضيع البرنامج</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Reasons for the issuance of a code of ethics</td>
<td>أسباب إصدار ميثاق الشرف</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o American view of the media code of ethics</td>
<td>النظرية الأميركية لميثاق الشرف الإعلامي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Al-Jazeera and CNN</td>
<td>الجزيرة وقناة سي أن أن CNN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o US media’s harmonization with the US Government</td>
<td>تجاوب الإعلام الأميركى مع الحكومة الأميركية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Media ethics of Al-Jazeera channel</td>
<td>الأدبيات الإعلامية لقناة الجزيرة</td>
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</table>

3. *Min Wāshīṭun Program 3 – Washington’s Demand for Democracy in the Arab World, and the Struggle of Terrorism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Washington’s Quest to Democratize the Arab World and Fight Terrorism</th>
<th>مطالبة واشنطن بديمقراطة العالم العربي وكافحة الإرهاب</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong> Hafiz al-Mirazi</td>
<td>مقدم الحلقة: حافظ المرازي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong> Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi, Yemeni Foreign Minister; ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Sa’id, Chairman, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies; and Mamduh ‘Abd-al-Razzaq, Member, Egyptian People's Assembly.</td>
<td>ضيف الحلقة: أبو بكر القريبي، وزير الخارجية اليمني؛ عبد المنعم سعيد، رئيس مركز الدراسات السياسية والإستراتيجية بالأهرام؛ ممدوح عبد الرازق، عضو مجلس الشعب المصري</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of segment:</strong> February 5, 2004</td>
<td>تاريخ الحلقة: 5 فبراير 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topics of the program:</strong></td>
<td>مواضيع البرنامج</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Democracy of the Arab state in Bush's speech</td>
<td>ديمقراطية الدولة العربية في خطاب بوش</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o American-Yemeni relations</td>
<td>العلاقات الأميركية اليمنية الموقع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The Yemeni position on the arrest of al-Mu’ayyid and al-Bana</td>
<td>اليمني تجاه القبض على المؤيد والبنا</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Min Wāshinṭun Program 4 – The Middle East in Bush’s Rhetoric

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Middle East in Bush's Rhetoric</th>
<th>الشرق الأوسط في خطاب بوش</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong> Hafiz al-Mirazī</td>
<td><strong>مقعد الحلقة:</strong> حافظ المرازي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong> Mouafac Harb, journalist and News Director, Radio Sawa and Alhurrah Television; Laith Kubba [Senior Program] officer for the Middle East at the National Endowment for Democracy; Daniel Brumberg, Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University; Halah Mustafa, Editor in Chief, the quarterly Democracy Review</td>
<td><strong>ضيوف الحلقة:</strong> موقع حرب، صحفي ومدير مشروع تليفزيون الحركة الأمريكية؛ ليث كبة، مسؤول قسم الشرق الأوسط في الصندوق الأمريكي لدعم الديمقراطية؛ دانيل برومبرغ، أستاذ العلوم السياسية بجامعة جورج تاون؛ هالاة مصطفى، رئيسة تحرير مجلة الديمقراطية</td>
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<td><strong>Date of segment:</strong> January 22, 2004</td>
<td><strong>تاريخ الحلقة:</strong> 22 يناير 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Topics of the program:</strong></td>
<td><strong>مواضيع البرنامج:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Programs of the American National Endowment for Democracy</td>
<td>o المشاريع الصادقة الأمريكية للديمقراطية في المنطقة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Focus on the democracy, and disregard of primary issues</td>
<td>o التركيز على الديمقراطية وتجاهل القضايا الرئيسية</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Alhurrah’s message for the Arabs</td>
<td>o الرسالة التي تحملها قناة الحرة الأمريكية إلى العرب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Alhurrah’s policy on coverage of Arab issues</td>
<td>o سياسة القناة تجاه تغطية القضايا العربية</td>
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<th>9/11 Commission Report</th>
<th>تقرير لجنة 11 سبتمبر</th>
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<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong> Hafiz al-Mirazī</td>
<td><strong>مقعد الحلقة:</strong> حافظ المرازي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong> Amr Musa, Secretary-General of the Arab League; Michael Hirsh, Senior Editor of the American Newsweek Magazine; Shelby Telhami, Professor of Political Science</td>
<td><strong>ضيوف الحلقة:</strong> عمرو موسى، الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية؛ مايكل هيرش، كبير محرري مجلة نيوزويك الأمريكية؛ شيلي تلحمي، أستاذ العلوم السياسية بجامعة ولاية</td>
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6. *Al-shari‘a wa-l-ḥayāt* Program 6 – Terrorism and Violence

<table>
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<th><strong>Terrorism and Violence</strong></th>
<th><strong>الإرهاب والعنف</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presenter of segment:</strong></td>
<td>مقدم الحلقة: ماهر عبد الله</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahir Abdallah</td>
<td>ضيف الحلقة: الدكتور يوسف القرضاوي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guests on segment:</strong></td>
<td>باحث إسلامي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi</td>
<td>تاريخ الحلقة: 27 أكتوبر 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic scholar</td>
<td>مواضيع البرنامج</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Date of segment:</strong></td>
<td>اهتمام الإسلام بالأمن الاجتماعي</td>
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<td>October 27, 2002</td>
<td>ومحاربته الإرهاب</td>
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<td><strong>Topics of the Program:</strong></td>
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<td>المجتمع</td>
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<td></td>
<td>حقيقة أصبع الشرعية على أعمال</td>
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<td>الجماعات المتطرفة</td>
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<td>المشروعة</td>
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<td></td>
<td>فقه الموازات وفحة الم الآلات</td>
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<td></td>
<td>والحكم على الأحداث الأخيرة</td>
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<td>- Examination of the 9/11</td>
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<td>- Difficulty of defining</td>
<td>التهديش بين الجامعة العربية والأمم</td>
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<td>terrorism</td>
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<td>- Marginalization of the</td>
<td>الموافق العربي من الانتخابات</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab League and the United</td>
<td>الأميركية</td>
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<td>Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Arab position on</td>
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<td>American elections</td>
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6.2 Al-Jazeera and the “War on Terrorism”

There has been a great deal of research done on whether Al-Jazeera is biased or not. Rumors have developed in the West claiming mainly that the network sponsors terrorism and that it broadcasts in an anti-Semitic way. Nevertheless, most scholars reject the notion of Al-Jazeera being propaganda for the Arab world\textsuperscript{95}. Media specialists and communication researchers state that Al-Jazeera is not a propaganda network station. “It does have a point of view, and it reflects that point of view, just as the U.S. networks reflect their U.S. view,” says Dan Hallin, media and war specialist at the University of California, San Diego\textsuperscript{96}. For instance, Seib (2005: 602) notices a pro-Palestinian attitude. He states that Al-Jazeera reports on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with “a pro-Palestinian slant (suicide bombings were referred to as ‘commando operations’) and an emphasis on the mood on ‘the Arab street’”. Thus, it can be stated that Al-Jazeera has a bias like any other news station.

Contextual objectivity on Al-Jazeera is best explained in the framework of the network’s coverage of America’s “war on terror,” or as Al-Jazeera refers to it the “so-called war on terror.” It is worth mentioning here that Al-Jazeera has normally avoided using the term “terrorism” with either attributing it to a source or referring to it as “so-called terrorism.”

This war, which was launched by the U.S. administration in the aftermath of the September 11 events in 2001, has sparked major debates over the definition of terror, its social and political implications, and the extent of news media’s adherence to the journalistic principles of balance, truth and objectivity, especially during times of political strife.

\textsuperscript{95} See among others: Miles, 2005.
\textsuperscript{96} in A Failure to Launch (2006)
Norris, Kern and Just (2003) defined terrorism as “the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians for political goals” (p. 6). But the world’s media systems have not agreed upon a universal definition of terror. In fact, the concept of terrorism is “contested, value-laden and open to multiple meanings located within broader cultural frames, so that, to some extent, terrorism is in the eye of the beholder” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 6).

In the media coverage of any terrorist event, some facts may be neutral (e.g. the timing of the event); while others may be controversial (e.g. the motives and political repercussions of the event). Each media system may perceive a terrorist event differently. For some, it may be a suicide; for others it may be a martyrdom (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). That is why one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. The Arab media systems, in their portrayal of practitioners of violence as either “terrorists” or “freedom fighters,” reflect their political culture, value systems and ideological and commercial interests that tend to drive media anywhere.

“This raises the very question of whether and to what extent Al-Jazeera can be truly objective when reporting from the Arab world about issues that matter to Arabs the most.” Or yet another question: “Can an Arab channel reporting on Arab issues remove itself from its Arab perspective?” (Zayani, 2005a: 18). To such question, I would add: “Why should it?”

Addressing these questions in the context of America’s “war on terror” is especially important given the way U.S. President George W. Bush described the parties involved in this war as “either with us or against us.” In this context, Zaharna (2005) argued that Bush’s pronouncement has placed media outlets like Al-Jazeera in a cultural split of “us” and “them.” The implied cultural assumption for the American broadcast networks, which are products of American culture, was that they were the platform for the “us” in the war against “them.” However, Al-Jazeera, which is a product of Arab culture, found it difficult to join the “us” side
(i.e. the American side) when most of its viewers were obviously non-Americans who had some reservations about the way the war was conducted. That is why, whenever Al-Jazeera presented news from an Arab perspective in America’s “war against terror,” it was automatically perceived by U.S. officials as anti-American (Zaharna, 2005).

In this context, Al-Jazeera does not have an anti-American agenda, but it reflects Arab public opinion, which is overwhelmingly opposed to American policies in the Middle East.

### 6.3 American Media Discourse and Al-Jazeera

Numerous scholars have shown that the media cannot be seen separately from state institutions or other powerful groups. The media are not free of mind control by elite groups (Thompson, 1998). Different (elite) groups pressure the media, and with that the news stations become the mouthpiece of powerful groups. In this light, Al-Jazeera tries to produce a counter-ideology to, for instance, CNN International. The question central to this study is whether this is working. Evidently, Al-Jazeera is recognized worldwide as a factor of political interest. For example, the U.S. Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced the network for anti-U.S. propaganda, citing reports that American troops in Fallujah were terrorizing civilians. "They are simply lying," he said (Halloran, 2006). Al-Jazeera journalists have also been expelled from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other countries (Miles, 2005: 323). A likely reason for these drastic solutions is that Al-Jazeera ventilated implicit or explicit criticism towards the concerned state (Miles, 2005: 45).

The term “contextual objectivity” is the idea that the “medium should reflect all sides of any story while retaining the values, beliefs, and sentiments of the target audience (Iskandar and El-Nawawy 2002:26).” Iskandar and El-Nawawy argue that this apparent contradiction stems
from the dialogic space where, “Al-Jazeera determine[s] what [is] important for the public to know even as Al-Jazeera [is] itself influenced by its audience (2002:27).” In order to gain public awareness and attention, Al-Jazeera relies on and responds to local sensitivities while using *uslūb al-*ithāra aṣ-ṣaḥāfiyya [the style of emotional journalism] (Iskandar and El-Nawawy 2002:57). As it presents images and information of interest to Arab-Islamic audiences and draws on their emotions however, this reporting style leans away from reporting both sides of the story. When reporting on American operations in Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the intermittent bombing of Iraq, images were shown of Iraqi, Palestinian, and Afghani casualties rather than Israeli, American, or Kuwaiti losses. This was explicitly addressed in a *min Wāshintūn* program, where the invited guests included an editor from Hi Magazine⁹⁷, Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra producers—all U.S. government sponsored media directed toward the Middle East. But before analyzing the transcript, it is important to give a brief background on this U.S. sponsored media directed toward the Middle East.

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⁹⁷ According to the website http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Hi_Magazine: Hi Magazine was conceived by the U.S. Department of State in 2002. In order to "establish the strongest connection with the target audience," Hi was produced entirely in Arabic by an Arab-American staff hired by the magazine's publisher The Magazine Group and "working in-house with a global network of stringers." Intended as a lifestyle magazine, Hi was launched in July 2003, "featuring a story on the American college experience, profiles of actor Tony Shaloub and jazz singer Norah Jones, an exploration of public smoking laws and hot yoga trends in the U.S.A. and the Middle East," according to The Magazine Group. "Complementing the print publication, The Magazine Group launched himag.com in July 2003. In addition to viewing content from the magazine, the interactive site enables visitors to respond to polls, submit poetry in monthly contests and ask questions about America." On December 23, 2005, the *Toronto Star* reported in a story titled "US Shelves 'Propaganda Rag’" that "The U.S. State Department announced yesterday it was suspending publication of Hi Magazine, its glossy, monthly attempt to win the hearts and minds of young Arabs, part of a communications troika it established following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. ... The magazine had been derided by commentators in the Arab world as 'brainwashing' and one had dubbed it the CIA's official publication. The decision to suspend publication was made by Karen Hughes, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy ... The U.S. government had been spending $4.5 million (U.S.) annually since July 2003, trying to bring its own particular take on American life to a target Arab demographic aged 18-35. Along with Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa, Hi was a three-pronged $62 million (U.S.) annual effort to counter anti-Americanism in countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and others." Distribution had been approximately "55,000 copies in 18 countries, although 95 percent were given way for free, officials said, ... it had been selling only 2,500 copies a month."
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government launched a series of multi-million-dollar programs designed under a wide scale public diplomacy plan to improve America’s image in the Middle East and win the hearts and minds of the Arab people. Two such programs, Radio Sawa and Alhurra satellite television, were supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the Federal body responsible for all US international broadcasting. The target audience for Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra is the younger Arab generation, who will be tomorrow’s decision-makers. The main objective of Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra is to help explain various aspects of American foreign policy and ‘to provide information about basic characteristics of American society that are important for Arab and Muslim audiences to know and understand’ (Rugh, 2004: 154). This information is regarded as critical at a time there is increasing Arab dissatisfaction with the US presence in Iraq and its handling of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

6.3.1 *Min Wāshinṭūn Program 1 – Message of the Directed Media*

**Muhammad al-Alami:** We welcome our viewers to this week’s segment of the program “From Washington.” The problem of the Arabs’ relationship with America is becoming deeper and more entangled almost daily. America has now become an Arab neighbor, even though it has handed over sovereignty to the Iraqis. The issue of Iraq has become the deciding factor in the elections this year in America. Nonetheless, we do not understand America, and America does not understand us. We will attempt to ascertain some of the reasons for this love-hate relationship between the two civilizations, and whether the media is a part of the solution or a part of the problem.

A recent US Senate subcommittees hearing leads one to conclude that the US Government believes that its problems in the Arab world boil down to misunderstanding in the media, and that the achievements of Radio Sawa and Alhurrah to date

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*Arabic text*:

محمد العلمي: مشاهدينا أهلاً وسهلاً بكم في حلقة هذا الأسبوع من برنامج من وانطن، إشكالية علاقة العرب بأميركا تزداد عمقاً وتشابكاً بشكل يومي تقرباً، أميركا أصبحت الآن من دول الجوار العربي رغم تسيير السياسة إلى العراقيين وأصبحت قضية العراق الفيصل في انتخابات هذا العام هنا في أميركا ومع ذلك لا نفهم أميركا ولا تفهمنا أميركا، سنحاول معرفة بعض هذه الأسباب على الأقل حول حالات العشق والكراهية المتبادلة بين الحضارتين وما إذا كان الإعلام جزء من الحل أو جزء من المشكلة.

*Arabic translation*:

بُعثت من تصرفات الحكومة الأميركية أنها تختزل مشاكلها في العالم العربي في سوء التفاهم الإعلامي وأن ما حققه سوا والحرة حتى الآن يبعث على التشجيع كما كان واضحًا في جلسة استماع عقدت

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Muhammad al-Alami: In the US Congress, several American legislators are congratulating themselves and Radio Sawa and Alhurrah television officials on the US Government’s efforts to convey the news with objectivity to the Arab world and to lessen the enmity toward America in the Middle East.

Norman Pattiz, a member of the State Department’s Broadcasting Board of Governors: Our mission is to provide them with an example of a free press à la America. We have demonstrated, through Radio Sawa that they listen and are influenced. The study that we conducted shows that about two-thirds of Radio Sawa’s listeners have a positive view of America compared to non-listeners.

Muhammad al-Alami: The difficulty faced by those in charge of this enormous project was made clear in the Senate chamber. If the mission of persuading necessarily begins with capturing the attention of others, the way is still long and perhaps deep, as stated by the International Broadcasting Agency official.

Mouafac, according to what has been achieved so far in radio and television, has the American project began to bear fruit in your view?

Mouafac Harb, Alhurrah News Director: First of all, what is the American project? We are a television station and a radio station. We should not be so naïve as to think that a radio or television station can solve all the problems. However, there are urgent efforts at the diplomatic, bilateral, and media levels to do something in this regard. We are still only at the beginning of the path. However, we in the International Broadcasting Agency and in the US Congress, which is supervising and financing the project.
this project, believe that we are on a sound path, and that we can achieve something if other factors, in addition to the media project, come into play.

... 

Muhammad al-Alami: Hani Salamah in New York, you participated in producing the film “Control Room” about Aljazeera, which provided you with an opportunity to see how the world is covered from an Arab vantage. You have also had an opportunity to view the Arab world from America. Do you believe, as Fadil and Mouafac have said, that there is a favorable reaction in the Arab world, and that it is only a matter of time? 

Hani Salamah, film producer, New York: It could be that most Arabs have a negative view of a channel such as Alhurrah, because they think that the channel’s objective is to change the culture and medium of the Arab citizen. From my perspective, we need to establish media channels together, because there are always new events. The problem today is that “history is written by the victors,” which means... History is written by the victors, because new events constantly arise, and these events are covered without transparency.

Muhammad al-Alami: Mouafac, if you accept Hani’s statement that history is written by the victors, the Americans are the victors in the region. Some accuse Sawa and Alhurrah specifically of providing media coverage of a defeated region, coverage that is heartless and unfeeling or does not take into account the feelings of victims.

Mouafac Harb: This is inaccurate with all due respect to Hani Salamah, whom I believe is sitting in New York. [He said] ‘most of the Arabs.’ We should refrain from generalizing. We cannot know people’s opinion on all media matters. We understand the media message like any journalist.

98 [The phrase in quotations marks is in English.]
working in any news editing room. He presents reliable information. We deal with the news item objectively and truthfully. We distinguish between opinion and news. If I were to give you an opinion, I would tell you that it is my opinion. However, a news item comprises facts. Emotions are opinion.

There are programs and articles for expressing your feelings and emotions. There are many media through which you can express your views and feelings without transforming those media into party organs or tactical organizations for the public. I respect this. However, we must make a careful distinction, because citizens have a legitimate right to obtain reliable information so that they can form their own views and strengthen their views based on reliable information.

6.3.1.1 Analysis

In this program, contextual objectivity (being sensitive to the culture, feelings, and interests of the target audience) is being challenged, but not directly by Western media. The interlocutors are both from the Arab world, have had experience in Arab and Western media bureaus, and are familiar with the context of these debates. This is not seen as a personal exchange, despite the use of first and second person pronouns in this face-to-face interaction. Instead, the parties challenge the official platform and objectives of the “Other” metadiscursively via voices that index previous debates, iconic terms (such as “victims” and “objectivity”) that have been reframed and refitted for this particular dialogic moment.

Alhurra, whose legal name is ‘Middle East Broadcasting Network’, was launched on February 14, 2004 with a $62 million budget. It was designed to counteract the impact of popular news channels in the Arab world such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya (Seib, 2004). In the words of Norman Pattiz, who was featured in the recorded report segment of this program, and
who spearheaded the launching of the network, ‘Alhurra will present fresh perspectives for viewers in the Middle East that we believe will create more cultural understanding and respect’ (Broadcasting Board of Governors website).

Another guest in the program, Mouafac Harb, Alhurra news director then, testified before the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations in April 2004, highlighting exactly what he said in this segment. He said, ‘Alhurra has brought a new idea to journalism in the Middle East – telling the truth. We do our work the way it is supposed to be done. We play it straight and we behave like news professionals because that is what we are.’

Another guest on this program, Hani Salama, a co-producer of the film “Control Room” rejects that idea, saying ‘It could be that most Arabs have a negative view of a channel such as Alhurra, because they think that the channel’s objective is to change the culture and medium of the Arab citizen’. He joins several media experts who question Alhurra’s success in changing Arabs’ negative opinions towards US policy, especially in a highly competitive media environment where some Arab satellite channels, such as Al-Jazeera, have gained Arabs’ trust. Shibley Telhami, in his April 2004 testimony before the US Senate’s Committee on


100 A chronicle which provides a rare window into the international perception of the Iraq War, courtesy of Al-Jazeera. Roundly criticized by U.S. members and Pentagon officials for reporting with a pro-Iraqi bias, and strongly condemned for frequently airing civilian causalities as well as footage of American POWs.

101 Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he taught at several universities, including Cornell University, the Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Princeton University, Columbia University, Swarthmore College, and the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. Professor Telhami has also been active in the foreign policy arena. He has served as Advisor to the US Mission to the UN (1990-91), as advisor to former Congressman Lee Hamilton, and as a member of the US delegation to the Trilateral US-Israeli-Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee, which was mandated by the Wye River Agreements. He also served on the Iraq Study Group as a member of the Strategic Environment Working Group. He has contributed to The Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times and regularly appears on national and international radio and television. He has served on the US Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, which was
Foreign Relations, argued that Alhurra’s ‘detached objectivity’ may not appeal to Arab audiences, especially when it comes to covering highly sensitive issues like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{102} He said “Alhurra’s aim is to be precisely dispassionate while facing a passionate audience. To illustrate his point, Telhami referred to Alhurra’s coverage of Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin in March 2004. Despite overwhelming Arab concern about this incident, “Alhurra ran a short story as the news [about the assassination] broke, then went back to its normal programming, which focused on an episode in American history. This may be one reason why many Arab viewers would rather watch Al-Jazeera which reflects their convictions in a way Alhurra does not”.

Kim Elliot, a veteran audience researcher at the Voice of America\textsuperscript{103} (VOA), also expressed his doubts, in an interview with Sefsaf\textsuperscript{104}, that satellite networks with strong ties to the US government can gain mass appeal. He argued that Arabs will always look at Alhurra as a propaganda station that publicizes the ideas of the US government.

Several US policy makers argue a different position again, that channels such as Alhurra should be utilized to enhance foreign audiences’ understanding of the US position, but not necessarily in the expectation that it make them embrace it. In his testimony during the hearing


\textsuperscript{103} The Voice of America, which first went on the air in 1942, is a multimedia international broadcasting service funded by the U.S. Government through the Broadcasting Board of Governors. VOA broadcasts more than 1,250 hours of news, information, educational, and cultural programming every week to an estimated worldwide audience of 134 million people.

on Public Diplomacy and International Free Press, before the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations in February 2004, Senator Joseph Biden said, ‘…we tend to think of public diplomacy in terms of, we’re going to convince people that they have to, or should, adopt our views, our values, our system. And I think may be a bridge too far’.  

Regardless of what Alhurra’s proponents and opponents say about it, there is no question that more research needs to be conducted on how the Arab public perceives the credibility of Alhurra. Very few surveys have been carried out to that end. One was conducted in seven Arab countries in April 2004 (two months after Alhurra’s launching) to measure the channel’s popularity in the Arab world. The survey, which was administered by Ipsos-Sat, a Middle East research company hired by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), showed that an average of 29 percent of adults had watched Alhurra in the previous week (BBG website). Another survey that was conducted in 2005 using a sample of Egyptian viewers showed that the majority of the respondents did not report using Alhurra as a major source of news. 

Al-Jazeera, however, despite its claim of independence and objectivity, is constrained within the confines of general Arab public perceptions toward the West. In an interview with Middle East Insight in March 2002, Hafez Al-Mirazi, Al-Jazeera Washington Bureau Chief then, noted that the network covers, “the news from an Arab perspective, the same way that CNN covers the news from an American perspective.”

The attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the emerging American ideology toward terrorism altered both audience orientations and western attitudes toward Al-Jazeera’s

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“propagandistic” representations. Previously, the West had encouraged the controversies stirred by Al-Jazeera’s reporting on regional Arab issues and applauded its methods as key to introducing democratization and freedom of speech. CBS’s “60 Minutes”, the New York Times, Washington Post, and LA Times all ran positive features on Al-Jazeera’s efforts (Mahjoub 2001).

6.3.1.1.1 Schematic Overview of the Analysis:

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<th>Schematic Overview of the Analysis:</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Topicalization</strong></td>
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<td>Al-Jazeera focuses on background information that exposes critical views or a stance towards the United States: In this particular program, the credibility and/or the objectivity of the American media discourse. Nonetheless, we do not understand America, and America does not understand us. We will attempt to ascertain some of the reasons for this love-hate relationship between the two civilizations, and whether the media is a part of the solution or a part of the problem. Topics of discourse define the information in a discourse that speakers find most relevant or important. (Van Dijk, 1995b: 27). For instance, speakers or writers will emphasize information that is positive for the ingroup or it will emphasize negative information for the outgroup. Al-Jazeera topicalization shows a focus on the lack of credibility or objectivity of the American directed media.</td>
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<th><strong>Lexicalization and Predications</strong></th>
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<td>In its coverage of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera adopted what Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy (2005) describe as the “Victims Mode” of reporting, which applies to situations in which “the major event concerns one’s own victims” and when the civilian losses are especially severe. Hafez Al-Mirazi, the program host, notes that the American sponsored networks coverage of the war in the region as follows: Some accuse Sawa and Alhurrah specifically of providing media coverage of a defeated region, coverage that is heartless and unfeeling or does not take into account the feelings of victims.</td>
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107 Emphasis added
In the coverage of these events, the “weaker antagonists who have been victimized will [demonize the enemy] by talking about ‘massacres’ and ‘war crimes’” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awabdy, 2005). These were the circumstances in Afghanistan, where many ordinary Afghans lost their lives as a result of the U.S. intensive strikes. According to Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy, the “Victims Mode” also enhances the drama of the war by focusing on “collective mourning,” and by airing “frightening images and sounds emanating from the scene – examples include pictures of bodies or body bags, and the screams and sobbing of hysterical bystanders” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy, 2005).

The program participants challenge the official platform and objectives of the “Other” metadiscursively via voices that index previous debates, iconic terms (such as “reliable”, “objectively” and “truthfully”) that have been reframed and refitted for this particular dialogic moment:

This is inaccurate with all due respect to Hani Salamah, whom I believe is sitting in New York. [He said] ‘most of the Arabs.’ We should refrain from generalizing. We cannot know people’s opinion on all media matters. We understand the media message like any journalist working in any news editing room. He presents reliable information. We deal with the news item objectively and truthfully.

Framing of the Voices

Journalists include certain voices and they exclude others; they select who is heard and who is not. This incorporating of voices is very common in news coverage. Al-Jazeera gives voice to different parties; some parties are equally heard in certain programs, others are more often heard in other programs. Media researchers have stated that Al-Jazeera devotes more coverage - in contrast with U.S. counterparts - to voices of protest and diplomacy. This can be seen here in this program concerning the American Media discourse. While Al-Jazeera includes many voices of the US institutions of the directed media (Radio Sawa, Alhurrah Television, Hi Magazine, and the Broadcasting board of governors), it gives the other side (people who doubt the credibility of the American directed media) only one voice (Hani Salamah, film producer of Control Room; a documentary about Al-Jazeera) who states:

It could be that most Arabs have a negative view of a channel such as Alhurrah, because they think that the channel’s objective is to change the culture and medium of the Arab citizen. From my perspective, we need to establish media channels together, because there are always new events. The problem today is that “history is written by the victors,” which means…History is written by the victors, because new events constantly arise, and these events are covered without transparency.

هو منتهى لي معظم العرب يرون مثل قناة الحرة بسلبية لأنهم فكرى أن هذه القناة هي تغيير ثقافة وأداة المواطن العربي، من وجهة نظرى التي أحياناً محتملين نعمله أنه يجب أن نفتح القنوات

108 Aday, Livingston and Hebert: 2005
109 [The phrase in quotations marks is in English.]
6.4 Media Codes of Ethics

Al-Jazeera came to international prominence following the 9/11 attacks by increasing the number of programs airing from outside the Middle East, boosting the number of correspondents in non-Arab countries, capitalizing on its exclusive images for marketing to Western news outlets, and even providing an English language version of their website and, lately, of the satellite channel itself. It sees itself as competing with international media giants, such as CNN and BBC for audience and influence, in addition to local Arab news channels. In June 2004, Al-Jazeera issued a code of professional conduct, which stimulated a *min wāshinṭūn* program surrounding issues of journalistic integrity in international media:

6.4.1 *Min Wāshinṭūn* Program 2 - Reasons for the Issuance of a Code of Ethics

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: …Earlier this week, Aljazeera network held its first media roundtable entitled "The Media in a Changing World: Between Professional Standards and Cultural Plurality." On this occasion, Aljazeera also issued a professional code of ethics. We will focus our discussion today on this code and compare the Aljazeera standards with standards in the US media...

Before we shed light on the development of codes of ethics in the American media and the electronic media in particular, which, as we stated earlier, first appeared close to 60 years ago, I will ask Mr. Waddah Khanfar what may be the first question on the minds of Arab readers or viewers: Why issue a code of ethics now, close to eight years after...
Waddah Khanfar: Actually, this is nothing new in our professional activity. Aljazeera network and its employees have been complying with these principles since the network was established. This code is like a constitution that governs the relationship among all of us. Each one of us knows his professional boundaries and rights. The establishment of a code of ethics, I believe, is a very important step in the process of consolidating, framing, and creating ethics for what has come to be known as the ‘Arab media school.’

Hafiz al-Marazi: Norman Solomon, you are currently focusing on, or at least accusing, the American media of having take orders from the government. Don’t the media, whether in America or even in the Arab world, reflect the general atmosphere in the sense that the general atmosphere in the Arab world harmonizes with the Palestinian intifada? Thus, how can you go against the tide and against your own audience? The general atmosphere in America supports America’s soldiers in the battlefield, regardless of how the battle began. How can you challenge this general atmosphere and the public by saying, I will oppose the government in a time of war?

Norman Solomon: The work of a journalist is not like that of an employee, such as someone working in a restaurant who takes care of his customers. The work of a journalist is to seek the truth…

Waddah Khanfar: A key question here is: When we refrain from broadcasting ugly images of war, are we falsifying or glamorizing the ugly face of war? An American or Western station may not have the opportunity to broadcast many of these ugly images.-motion of images of war, are we falsifying or glamorizing the ugly face of war? An American or Western station may not have the opportunity to broadcast many of these ugly images.
images. But when a station is planted in the Middle East, in the Arab world, in a region of daily incidents of killing, displacement, destruction, and bombing, how can you report these facts to viewers without showing these images?

Hafiz al-Marazi: Norman Solomon, to what extent do you see the logic in the position of CNN and al-Jazeera of not showing images of hostages that are issued?

Norman Solomon: I believe it is good to observe good taste in everything. However, frankly, compared to one person who is decapitated, there are hundreds and thousands of people in the Iraq war whom the Americans have killed—much larger numbers of Iraqis. I believe that this is decisively important for our understanding of what CNN and other American networks are circulating about the war. Each minute of coverage of civilian suffering in the war led by the United States is matched by hours and hours of coverage of President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, the generals, the officers, and others, with statements and interviews vindicating the causing of that suffering. Coverage of the two cannot be compared. This is one way in which CNN lies, namely through its selection of what to show about the war.

Eason Jordan: Can I respond to that? First, arguing with labels is truly not good. I would not want to accuse CNN of lying. If we wanted to talk about memoranda from management from several years ago, I can tell you what the situation was regarding Afghanistan. For a long time, only one television network was permitted to broadcast images from Afghanistan. Literally, the only images that came out for days and days from Afghanistan were images of wounded civilians. Such images alone were shown because the Taliban authorities permitted only those images. However,
when the war ended, we found that the civilian injuries, regardless of how tragic they were, were much less than what some had been predicting. This does not mean that I diminish the loss of lives, which is horrible. However, the images coming out of the war were not just those of wounded civilians. There were other wounds of which not a single image was presented. We had an obligation in Afghanistan to be fair and to provide context. Otherwise, you would only hear about injuries among civilians. The story was much greater than that.

Norman Solomon: The truth is that American media coverage by CNN and other networks in the autumn of that year focused overwhelmingly on justifications by the American administration and senior officials. There was lower-than-average coverage of the persons who were releasing those bombs or the persons who were suffering from the bombs.

Hafiz al-Mazari: Eason Jordan, were any restrictions placed on CNN regarding coverage in Iraq or anywhere in the occupied Palestinian territories by the Israeli censor? Were texts read and censored before they were issued? Did they pass through a censor? Is our problem that we cannot broadcast the Iraqi casualties surrounding us at the Baghdad airport because we are prohibited from doing so?

Eason Jordan: I am not aware of any Israeli censorship of CNN reports broadcasted from Gaza. We provided coverage from Gaza a number of times, creating considerable tension and annoyance for the Israeli government. We do not seek to satisfy or anger any government, person, etc. We are there to tell the facts. If we face any kind of censorship, as happened on the day that Saddam Hussein appeared in court, we report that immediately, as we are required to do.

Hafiz al-Mizari: On this point, which we are at
least all discussing as humans and members of the same species, I end this discussion. There may be agreement regarding CNN’s practices as stated by Eason Jordan. Although, ultimately, no code of ethics or professional standards can take the place of the personal judgment of the journalist or media professional, provided they establish standards of credibility and objectivity. However, any media organization will certainly be judged by the extent of its long-term commitment and not—perhaps even in one case or another—al-Jazeera’s professional code of ethics and its position in the evolution of codes of ethics in the American media.

6.4.1.1 Analysis

The program moderator, Al-Mirazi, began this July 15, 2004 program by reading the code issued by Al-Jazeera at the conference that convened earlier in the week under the heading "The Vision and Mission." Al-Jazeera's code states that Al-Jazeera, an Arab media service, is Arab in its affiliation and global in its orientation. Its slogan is "Opinion and the Other Opinion." It is a pluralistic forum that seeks the truth and complies with professional principles within an institutional framework. The code, entitled “Professional Code of Ethics,” states that, being a globally oriented media service, Al-Jazeera shall adopt a professional code of ethics in

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The following is the Professional Code of Ethics adopted by Al-Jazeera:

1. Adhere to the journalistic values of honesty, courage, fairness, balance, independence, credibility and diversity; giving no priority to commercial or political considerations over professional ones.
2. Endeavor to get to the truth and declare it in our dispatches, programs and news bulletins unequivocally in a manner which leaves no doubt about its validity and accuracy.
3. Treat our audiences with due respect and address every issue or story with due attention to present a clear, factual and accurate picture while giving full consideration to the feelings of victims of crime, war, persecution and disaster, their relatives and our viewers, and to individual privacy and public decorum.
4. Welcome fair and honest media competition without allowing it to affect adversely our standards of performance, so that getting a "scoop" will not become an end in itself.
5. Present diverse points of view and opinions without bias or partiality.
6. Objectively treat diversity in human societies with all their ethnic groups and cultures.
7. Acknowledge a mistake when it occurs, promptly correct it and ensure it does not recur.
8. Observe transparency in dealing with news and news sources while adhering to internationally established practices concerning the rights of these sources.
9. Distinguish between news material, opinion and analysis to avoid the pitfalls of speculation and propaganda.
10. Stand by colleagues in the profession and offer them support when required, particularly in view of the acts of aggression and harassment to which journalists are subjected at times. Cooperate with Arab and international journalistic unions and associations to defend freedom of the press and media.

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pursuance of the vision and mission it has set for itself. Al-Mirazi then moves on to an extensive summary of the historical changes to the American media code of ethics, and an explicit comparison between CNN’s professional standards and those of Al-Jazeera. Fully one-half of the program was a comparison with CNN and clarification for the timing, content, implementation, and previous Al-Jazeera practices of journalistic ethics. The program, however, did not simply respond to international discourses on transparency in Al-Jazeera’s reporting policies. Instead, Al-Jazeera’s general manager stressed the importance of this code for educating and creating an informed audience—recognition that Al-Jazeera is at the intersection of engaging global and local dialogues and audiences.

On the first day of the U.S. military strikes on Afghanistan for example, Al-Jazeera aired the first video message from Osama Bin Laden. Following that message, Bin Laden released several videotapes that were aired on Al-Jazeera on different occasions. Bin Laden sought Al-Jazeera because he realized the importance of the war of ideas, and he wanted to get his message across to as many people as possible through the most popular news network in the Arab world. Al-Jazeera’s airing of Bin Laden’s tapes “changed the Western perception of [the network] from a ‘phenomenon of democracy’ to a ‘mouthpiece of Bin Laden’ – although Al-Jazeera perceives itself as nothing more than a delivery system in a competitive media environment” (Bessaiso, 2005, p. 153). Al-Jazeera also claimed that airing Bin Laden’s tapes allowed its audience the opportunity to be exposed to the other side of the story from the “most wanted man” in the world (Bessaiso, 2005).

Before the start of the Afghanistan war, Al-Jazeera was the only network with staff inside the Taliban-held territories in major Afghan cities, such as Kabul and Kandahar. This paved the
way for Al-Jazeera to have exclusive footage from the battlefield, at least during the initial stages of the war (Bessaiso, 2005).

In its coverage of the Afghanistan war, Al-Jazeera adopted what Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy (2005) describe as the “Victims Mode” of reporting, which applies to situations in which “the major event concerns one’s own victims” and when the civilian losses are especially severe. In the coverage of these events, the “weaker antagonists who have been victimized will [demonize the enemy] by talking about ‘massacres’ and ‘war crimes’” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awabdy, 2005). These were the circumstances in Afghanistan, where many ordinary Afghans lost their lives as a result of the U.S. intensive strikes. According to Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy, the “Victims Mode” also enhances the drama of the war by focusing on “collective mourning,” and by airing “frightening images and sounds emanating from the scene – examples include pictures of bodies or body bags,…and the screams and sobbing of hysterical bystanders” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy, 2005).

Al-Jazeera’s coverage was different from the CNN coverage in that it did not focus on the progress of the U.S. military on the ground or the technological advances of the weaponry. Al-Jazeera, in contrast, highlighted the “collateral damage” that was caused by the U.S. bombing of buildings, mosques, villages and infrastructure. While CNN presented a sanitized version of the war, Al-Jazeera contextualized the war by humanizing the personal suffering of the Afghan people. Al-Jazeera also showed gory images of severely wounded civilians and Afghani mothers wailing by their children’s bodies. It also presented “emotional testimonials” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awabdy 2005) of young children who explained how they lost all their family members (Jasperson & Kikhia, 2003).
Al-Jazeera presented Afghanistan as “the underdog” that had to go through a one-sided war with the world’s military superpower. Highlighting the sense of victimization was what granted Al-Jazeera its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its Arab viewers, most of whom were opposed to Bin Laden, but sympathetic to the loss of civilian lives in Afghanistan.

In his comment on the fact that Al-Jazeera’s perspective in the Afghanistan war differed from that of the Western networks, Hassan Ibrahim, a senior Al-Jazeera producer, was quoted in Bessaiso (2005) as saying: “We in the ‘Third World’ have our own cultural perspective in looking into issues. Whenever I ask myself the question, ‘what did we want to say?’ I always find that we wanted to prove to the world that the truth is not always in the hands of the CNN or…the Pentagon; we…have the right to look at the issues from our own cultural perspective” (Bessaiso, 2005, p. 163). It might have been this perspective that incensed the U.S. government, which accused Al-Jazeera of inciting antagonistic feelings against America by focusing on the human losses in Afghanistan.

Al-Jazeera’s humanitarian framing of the Afghanistan war, which challenged the official Western line regarding this war, did not prevent it from interviewing top political leaders from the Western world (Jasperson & Kikhia, 2003). The list of senior Western politicians who appeared on Al-Jazeera included figures such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the then U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Again, this is evidence that Al-Jazeera provides a platform for different sides of the story to express themselves.

6.4.1.1.1 Schematic Overview of the Analysis:
### Topicalization

One of the topics frequently covered in Al-Jazeera is the objectivity and the reliability of its reporting. This is a returning argument in the news reporting of Al-Jazeera as the guest here who happens to be the Director-General of Al-Jazeera Network emphasizes again as in the program that information is positive for the ingroup or it will emphasize negative information for the outgroup.

On this occasion, Aljazeera also issued a professional code of ethics. We will focus our discussion today on this code and compare the Aljazeera standards with standards in the US media...

This code is like a constitution that governs the relationship among all of us. Each one of us knows his professional boundaries and rights. The establishment of a code of ethics, I believe, is a very important step in the process of consolidating, framing, and creating ethics for what has come to be known as the ‘Arab media school.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicalization and Predications</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hafiz al-Mizari: Eason Jordan, were any restrictions placed on CNN regarding coverage in Iraq or anywhere in the occupied Palestinian territories by the Israeli censor? Were texts read and censored before they were issued? Did they pass through a censor? Is our problem that we cannot broadcast the Iraqi casualties surrounding us at the Baghdad airport because we are prohibited from doing so?</td>
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In the framing of the above question, Al-Mizari reveals what is implicit in his choice of the phrase ‘the occupied Palestinian territories’ over the phrase ‘disputed territory’, or the phrase ‘Israeli censor’. Absence is just as vital as presence, as Ackerman (2001) discusses in his study concerning the use of the term ‘occupation in the U.S. media. Ackerman argues that the U.S. media have systematically avoided the term ‘occupation’ in the reporting of Al-Aqsa intifada. Thus, the context of Palestinian uprising is missing and Palestinian violence is seen as revolt rather than resistance. The choice of particular words by Al-Mizari reflects the counter-ideology that Al-Jazeera produces.

### Intertextuality

Media researchers argue that Al-Jazeera devotes more coverage—in contrast with U.S counterparts—to voices of protest and diplomacy (Aday, Livingston and Herbert: 2005).

Hafiz al-Marazi: Norman Solomon, you are currently focusing on, or at least accusing, the American media of having take orders from the government. Don’t the media, whether in America or even in the Arab world, reflect the general atmosphere in the sense that the general atmosphere in the Arab world harmonizes with the Palestinian intifada? Thus, how can you go against the tide and against your own audience? The general atmosphere in America supports America’s soldiers in the battlefield, regardless of how the battle began. How
can you challenge this general atmosphere and the public by saying, I will oppose the government in a time of war?

Norman Solomon: The work of a journalist is not like that of an employee, such as someone working in a restaurant who takes care of his customers. The work of a journalist is to seek the truth...

Waddah Khanfar: A key question here is: When we refrain from broadcasting ugly images of war, are we falsifying or glamorizing the ugly face of war? An American or Western station may not have the opportunity to broadcast many of these images. But when a station is planted in the Middle East, in the Arab world, in a region of daily incidents of killing, displacement, destruction, and bombing, how can you report these facts to viewers without showing these images?

The included voices in this exchange protest the notion that Al-Jazeera is not balanced in its coverage of the war. In doing so, they give voice to their audience, particularly those who are affected by the war and the wider context that supports them. The predications used by Waddah Khanfar (‘daily incidents of killing, displacement, destruction, and bombing’) are not given through (in)direct reporting, but through the Director-General of Al-Jazeera himself (Waddah Khanfar) who directly assigns traits to his Arab audience. The predications used here highlight the occupation by and the violence of the Israelis against the Palestinians and the Americans against the Iraqis.

Framing of the Voices

Al-Jazeera here makes the point that it adheres to western media standards of objectivity but at the same time maintains the voices, the values and ideals of the Arab-Islamic world. This is compounded by the complexity of the target audience and production staff, which is composed of multiple nationalities, voices, interests and agendas: Waddah Khanfar, Director-General of Al-Jazeera Network puts this way:
This code is like a constitution that governs the relationship among all of us. Each one of us knows his professional boundaries and rights. The establishment of a code of ethics, I believe, is a very important step in the process of consolidating, framing, and creating ethics for what has come to be known as the ‘Arab media school.’ … This also educates viewers in how we conduct our news operations. Viewers can then communicate with us based on these principles.

6.5 Washington’s Quest to Democratize the Arab World and Fight Terrorism

Much of what Al-Jazeera’s recent programs report, debate, and respond to are the comments of President Bush, who has yet to appear on any of their programs. His words are appropriated and then debated by third party representatives or critics. The program min Wāshinṭūn, for example, regularly examines Bush’s views on the spread of democracy throughout the Arab world, and the program both begins and ends with video clips of Bush’s speeches. What follows is the transcript of a min Wāshinṭūn episode discussing this subject.

6.5.1 Min Wāshinṭūn Program 3 – Washington’s Demand for Democracy in the Arab World, and the Struggle of Terrorism

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Welcome to this segment of our program, “From Washington.” We will attempt in this segment to treat three topics concerning the capital Washington and its visitors from the Arab world. The first topic is President Bush, who has resumed speaking about the need to counter dictatorships in the Arab world and spread democracy, although he is also praising several countries.
**George Bush:** From Morocco to Jordan to Qatar.\(^{111}\)

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** In this segment, we will also speak with Yemen's Foreign Minister, who is visiting Washington. Many of his meetings are focusing on the countering of terrorism, particularly as Arab leaders have begun that to praise Washington's positions on terror after hesitating and dawdling in praising Washington for its fight against terror. The third topic concerns the visit of an Egyptian delegation comprising academicians, members of the People's Assembly, and businessmen to knock on doors, get close to Washington and decisionmaking centers, and affirm Egyptian-American relations. We previously discussed Saudi-American relations and similar visits. We will attempt to ascertain the nature of this visit and what distinguishes it.

On the occasion of the opening of an exhibition at the Library of Congress in Washington on Wednesday on the life of the British leader Winston Churchill, US President George Bush again linked the fight against terror to the spread of democracy in the Arab world. He said that America is pursuing a strategy to spread freedom in the region, which is confronting the enemies of reform and allies of terror as he called them. He stressed that America is now making unprecedented demands on its friends.

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\(^{111}\) From Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace London, England, released on November 19, 2003: “Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress… have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html).
been ignorant of the persecution of people and their loss of hope. This time has passed. We can regain our trust now. Freedom will vanquish persecution and oppression in the Middle East as it did in Germany, Japan, and Eastern Europe.

جارج بوش: لزم طويل جدا تجاهل السياسة الأميركية اضطهاد الناس وفقدان أملهم هذا الزمن قد وَّلنا وبإمكاننا أن نستعيد ثقتنا الآن ولعما حصل في ألمانيا والأيابان وأوروبا الشرقية فإن الحرية ستنتشر على الاضطهاد والقمع في الشرق الأوسط.

6.5.1.1 Analysis

Hutchby, in a study on power asymmetries in British call-in discussions, noted that program hosts attempt to gain control of an agenda by (re)formulating the gist of participants’ remarks and requiring them to justify or refute inserted assertions (Hutchby 1996:482). Power, however, is not unidirectional, and participants co-construct the dynamics of the exchange as the dialogue continues. This is evident in this min wāshinṭūn program introduction by the moderator, Al-Mirazi, as he “recontextualizes” American political discourse. He restates and reframes the comments of his guests throughout the dialogue, as well as those guests who are called upon to speak on behalf of other individuals and institutions.

In a heated debate over terminology with the News Bureau chief of Alhurra, Mouafac Harb, Al-Mirazi asked about the difference between American Government sponsored news and propaganda.

6.5.2 Min Wāshinṭūn Program 4 – The Middle East in Bush’s Rhetoric

هَفِيزَ اﻟْمِرَازِي: وَمَا نَاوِكِنَا إِبِرَاءً أُخْرَىٰ فِي الْخِاوْرَاءِ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِلسَّرِئِ ﻋَنْ ﻨِصِبِ الشَّرَقَ ﺍﻟْأَوْسُـ ﻟِس
Tuesday in a joint session of Congress. We have spoken about democracy and support for democracy in the region, especially through the increase in the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy and the projects in which these funds can be invested, even though they are very modest. President Bush also dealt in general in his State of the Union address with the Middle East, i.e., the Arab world, but said nothing to address concerns of importance to Arab viewers, particularly the peace process and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

George Bush [from the 2004 State of the Union address]: To cut through the barriers of hateful propaganda, the Voice of America and other broadcast services are expanding their programming in Arabic and Persian -- and soon, a new television service will begin providing reliable news and information across the region.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Indeed, there has been considerable talk about a new television station to broadcast the news to the Arab world. President Bush clearly stated that he supports a role for the Voice of America and for media beamed from Washington to the Arab world. Bush's speech on November 6, 2003 on support for democracy in the Arab world is reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's speech to the Eastern Bloc and the former Soviet Union in Britain in 1982. Reagan viewed the Voice of America and the directed media as a pickax for destroying the leadership and walls of the Eastern Bloc. It seems that George Bush will also use the pickax of the directed media in the form of Radio Sawa, which was established to replace the voice of America's Arabic service, and Alhurrah Television station. President Bush supports both of these projects of the Board of Broadcasting Governors. The board supervises radio Sawa and the new television station and certainly has the White House's political support. There is also talk of allocating an extremely large amount for Alhurrah Television. We are talking about more than $60 million in the first year. President Bush himself heralded the new television station for the Middle East region so much so that a famous Lebanese commentator said that although President Bush saluted Mr. Adnan Pachachi, the current President
of the Provisional Governing Council in Iraq, in his State of the Union address, the Arab personage on whom Bush will rely in the Middle East is not Adnan Pachachi, but rather another person, Mouafac Harb, the director of Alhurrah Television and our guest in the second segment of our program "From Washington." Welcome Mouafac.

Mouafac Harb: Hello.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: You have accomplished something with Radio Sawa regardless of the views on this subject. Let's begin not with Radio Sawa, but rather with the television station announced by President Bush. Some had been expecting movement on the roadmap and the establishment of a Palestinian state on such and such a date. However, it seems that you have been assigned, as stated in the Lebanese press, to be President Bush's point man for change. What did you have in your quiver to give us? Which direction is Alhurrah taking to stop the hatred and enmity toward America that is being broadcast by our detestable station Aljazeera?

Mouafac Harb: First, there are many exaggerations in your introduction. It is incorrect to say that Aljazeera is detestable. Many American politicians and journalists in the United States believe that Aljazeera's accomplishments deserve to be highlighted, because of their impact on the media and politics in the Arab world. Now, I shall return to the other exaggerations with which you begin. First, we reject the term 'directed media'. Now that the Cold War has ended, nobody believes that 'directed media'—an uncultivated socialist, communist term—can achieve anything.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Let us call it the external media.

Mouafac Harb: It is media like any other media. We have a mission. The mission of the Board of Broadcasting Governors, whom you know from your days at Voice of America, is to spread, advocate, and promote freedom and democracy.
As journalists, we—yourself included—believe
that if you want to serve freedom and democracy as
a journalist, the only way to do so is by providing
accurate information that helps viewers or citizens
consolidate or form their views in a sound manner.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: However, US law prohibits the
government from broadcasting government-
supported directed media inside the United States
to its citizens. British citizens may consume the
BBC. But the Voice of America, your television
station, may not broadcast inside America.

Mouafac Harb: You are correct. But the reality is
different in view—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): It seems that
anything I say will indeed differ from that in
view—

Mouafac Harb: One of the objectives of Alhurrah
and Sawa is to expose the exaggerations that may
be stated about them from time to time. First,
regarding the fact that we are not allowed to
broadcast inside the United States, it would be of
no use to broadcast in the United States, because
our station broadcasts in the Arabic language.
Second, the media in the United States is private.
The state may not participate in the media sector.
Regardless of whether the media is private or sate-
controlled, not only—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): Why are goods
that are rejected in America presented to the Arab
world and private-sector goods presented to the
Americans? We are also talking about English,
because the Voice of America has an English
language service. Is that service also prohibited in
American?

Mouafac Harb: The objective of the station and
the media services overseen by the Board of
Broadcasting Governors is to broadcast to viewers.
in the world, not in the United States, which is a totally different mission. Perhaps problems in the private American media compelled the US Congress to advocate funding for a US-supported project.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Far from the exaggerations, let us speak about the facts. Can you provide some information on Alhurrah Television for our viewers, who have perhaps become confused about what may be seen as propaganda as opposed to a well intentioned project originating with Americans who preach the facts or at least the numbers.

Mouafac Harb: Let me provide you with a quick introduction to the Alhurrah project. One of the primary features of democracy in any society is the free, rapid reporting of information. We have begun to see the free, rapid reporting of information in the Arab world. This heralds the advent of democracy. However, it is important to note that the information must also be accurate. I personally believe, as do many observers of media and political activity in the Arab world, that there is a problem with the accuracy of information. We hope that this project will help convey an accurate picture of global events for Arab viewers. We hope to launch Alhurrah in the coming weeks. It will broadcast to the Arab region via satellite. Anyone who has an analogue or digital receiver dish or Nilesat will be able to receive Alhurrah. The programming philosophy at Alhurrah flows from the station’s objective, which is to promote democracy and freedom by providing accurate, reliable information to Arab citizens. The station will provide its viewers with comprehensive news coverage. It will directly report the facts of events that concern Arab citizens. It will carry news from the Arab region as well as world news of interest and concern to Arab citizens. Our goal is to bring the Arab viewer or media consumer into the global debate on all levels—political, social, and artistic. Alhurrah viewers, and I believe there will be many viewers—
Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): We hope that this will be the case for you.

Mouafac Harb: Thank you, there will be—

Hafiz al-Mirazi: I believe that you selected [the name] Alhurrah ['the free one']. It was supposed to be 'Middle East Television.'

Mouafac Harb: ‘Middle East Television [Network]’ is the English name of the network.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Yes, the umbrella organization.

Mouafac Harb: But the station’s name is Alhurrah.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Yes, I read, I believe in The New York Times, a statement that you made saying that your slogan is ‘I am free, if you want to be free, join us.’

Mouafac Harb: No, this is the explanation of the station. If we called it, for example, the ‘Free Station,’ it could be [construed] that we were coming to the region to impose something. The station is free. Whoever wishes to contemplate freedom and desires a free media sphere, this station is for him.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is Aljazeera not free? Can you offer something different? We reported the challenge message of President Bush’s speech. We report most of President Bush’s speeches, to the point of boring our viewers with coverage of events in Washington—what Rumsfeld said, what Powell said. When President Bush says that Sharon is a man of peace, do you want us to modify his remarks for Arab consumption? What would you do when a politician or President Bush tells you that Sharon is a man of peace? Would you alter his comment in reporting it to Arab viewers?

Mouafac Harb: Certainly not.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Then, there is a change—
Mouafac Harb: First of all, we are not refuting Aljazeera.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: No, disregarding Aljazeera or others. I do not want to mention others, lest it be said we criticize others.

Mouafac Harb: First, by merely calling ourselves the free station, we challenge any citizen who might wonder about the name. However, there is a yardstick. Will we remain faithful to this name? We will leave that to the viewer. That is the challenge. We have made a promise. We do not want to break that promise. We want to fulfill it.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Will you interview leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine?

Mouafac Harb: Credibility is the key to success. We cannot enjoy credibility and the citizen’s respect if we are not reliable and transparent in our presentation of issues. Speaking as a journalist now, if an important news story arises, you must be thorough in obtaining the elements of the story if you claim to be comprehensive and claim to provide an accurate, professional report. If there arises a story with news value involving a person from Hamas—our goal as a news organization is to report credible information.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: I would like to clarify matters for the viewer. Is there any political problem with an Alhurrah correspondent directly interviewing someone from Hamas, Hizbullah, or the Islamic Jihad?

Mouafac Harb: I see no problem in that. I believe that if any topic has news value, Alhurrah promises to cover the topic with its background, context, and elements integrated in our coverage.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: If you interview leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, will you interview leaders of Alhurrah? Mouafac Harb: I see no problem in that. I believe our station has credibility and the citizen’s respect if we are not reliable and transparent in our presentation of issues. Speaking as a journalist now, if an important news story arises, you must be thorough in obtaining the elements of the story if you claim to be comprehensive and claim to provide an accurate, professional report. If there arises a story with news value involving a person from Alhurrah—our goal as a news organization is to report credible information.
Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is there a place called Palestine? Will your correspondent conclude his reports from there by saying ‘so and so reporting from Ramallah’?

Mouafac Harb: We do not invent things. Rather, we apply to each country terms that are recognized by respected media organizations.

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): Excuse me, does ‘respected’ mean non-Arab?

Mouafac Harb: I did not say that. Aljazeera is respected and enjoys credibility.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: The Arab stations, for example, say Palestine.

Mouafac Harb: I believe that—

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Will you use the word ‘Palestine’?

Mouafac Harb: I will answer you. First, President Bush was the first in the West to speak of the establishment of the state of Palestine—

Hafiz al-Mirazi: In the future, but I mean now. Will a correspondent in this region say Palestine when he concludes his report?

Mouafac Harb: He will say ‘from the territory of the Palestinian National Authority.’

Hafiz al-Mirazi: How is it that you deny the Palestinians something the United Nations grants them. There is a sign at the United Nations on which ‘Palestine’ is written.

Mouafac Harb: I will answer you directly.
Hafiz al-Mirazi: Please, go ahead.

Mouafac Harb: I believe that it is Palestine. Journalists believe that it is Palestine. The Arab world believes that it is Palestine. Media organizations do not grant recognition. We are journalists, not decisionmakers. If everyday I said Palestine—

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Who grants recognition, the US State Department or the United Nations?

Mouafac Harb: The Palestinian National Authority threatens daily to declare a state. Even the Palestinian National Authority has not yet declared a state. We are journalists. If I were to recognize a state, my opinion and media organization would be worthless.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: US forces in Iraq are another controversial topic. Some are wondering how Alhurrah will refer to these forces. Will they refer to them as ‘an occupation’?

Mouafac Harb: Their name is ‘the coalition forces.’

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Fine, but do not the Americans themselves use the term ‘occupation,’ as does Rand Rahim, Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations and the United States in Washington?

Mouafac Harb: There is a difference between the English and Arabic languages. Arabic ‘ḥtilāl’ is translated literally as ‘occupation.’ English ‘resistance’ is translated as Arabic ‘muqāwamah.’ However, the word ‘resistance’ in English does not connote the inflaming of feelings. By contrast, in the Arabic language, the word ‘muqāwamah’ is exalted and has other meanings besides ‘resistance.’ I do not believe, excuse me, I cannot believe—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): Are ‘resistance’ and ‘occupation’ not in the political lexicon?
Mouafac Harb: I do not believe that most of the Iraqi people today believe that an explosion targeting Iraqi civilians is resistance. If you respond with today's statistics to show me that the Iraqi people believe that the killing of civilians now occurring in Iraq is ‘resistance,’ I would say to you, let us call it ‘resistance.’

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Iraqi civilians are not talking in the way that you mentioned. However, are they saying, if you strike the Americans, it is understandable? Would you understand if they struck the Americans. Would you call them ‘resistance’?

Mouafac Harb: Who has claimed responsibility to date? Has someone claimed responsibility? Did the resistance claim responsibility?

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is the problem— The conversation has been cut off with Mouafac Harb in the interview which I have just been conducting with him. However, we are short on time and may not be able to complete the other interview segments. Is it an American political problem? Or is it that America's image is distorted by anti-American media in the Arab world? It is at least an open question, like the issue of democracy in the Arab world and Washington's intentions in this regard. Is it merely a change of subject? Or is it a real intention? These elements were covered in the President Bush's treatment of the Arab world and the Middle East in his state of the union address before Congress. In this address, President Bush avoided the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though there is a consensus that it is the pivotal issue in the Middle East. Rather, he spoke about democracy and the need to create a media to counter the antipathy of the media in the Middle East. This concludes this segment of our program 'From Washington.' I thank you and I thank the program staff in Doha and here in Washington.
7.5.2.1 **Analysis**

The program *min wāshinṭūn* makes clear, as Bakhtin claims, that we use the words of others, which implies the power of appropriation. Appropriation is a central part of Bakhtin’s dialogism, in that participants must be able to, “apprehend, internalize, and recreate the utterances of others (Bakhtin 1986:89)”, as opposed to reshaping it for, “absorption and subsequent conformity to the dominant discourse of a given community (89).” Rather, the text is re-contextualized by advancing the discourse of the self (89). While the debate is over terminology, the defense of Al-Jazeera and the Arab point of view is inherent, and it becomes explicit at the point where utterance is appropriated to further Al-Jazeera’s place and validity in the world media stage.

Before the start of the U.S. military strikes on Iraq in March 2003, Al-Jazeera, unlike most American networks, devoted much airtime to anti-war sentiments and the international rallies and marches that protested war efforts (Aday, Livingston & Hebert, 2005). This ran counter to the U.S. government’s attempts to build a coalition for the war.

The strong Arab opposition to a war that was deemed unjust from the very beginning dictated Al-Jazeera’s coverage, which also adopted the “Victims Mode” (Wolfsfeld, Frosh & Awabdy, 2005) in its approach to that war by focusing on the humanitarian aspects, the losses of Iraqi civilians’ lives and the wide-scale looting that took place in several Iraqi cities after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In the Iraq war, as was the case in the Afghanistan war, Al-Jazeera fed a strong desire in the Arab world to support Iraqi civilians, who represented the “underdog” in that war. It “played to the general feelings of Arabs who wanted to see an end to the Iraq civilians’ suffering…” (Iskandar & el-Nawawy, 2004).
There were major differences between Al-Jazeera and its British and American counterparts in their ideological slant on this war. “While the BBC, CNN and NBC showed soldiers rescuing POWs, taking Iraqi prisoners or moving through empty deserts [in what was described as a ‘war of liberation’],...Al-Jazeera [showed images of] blood, tears, fear and anxiety of the [Iraqi] civilians [in what was described as a ‘war of occupation’]” (Reigert, 2005).

Each side was showing a version or a perspective that was consistent with its culture and the general mood of its audiences. The differences between the two sides were so drastic that viewers on both sides thought they were watching two completely different wars. In this context, Zaharna (2005) argued that on the surface Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war was drastically different from that of the American networks. However, “below the surface, both the American networks and Al-Jazeera appear to share the same news philosophy and approach: cover the story from a local angle and the audience’s perspective” (p. 199).

Despite Al-Jazeera’s focus on the human losses in Iraq, the language it uses to describe the current and ongoing violent acts in Iraq is different from its language to describe violence in the Palestinian territories. Al-Jazeera reporters use the term “suicidal attacks” to describe any acts where suicide bombers kill either Iraqis or Americans. Al-Jazeera also describes unknown perpetrators of violence who kill Iraqi civilians or policemen as “unidentified armed men.” This difference in language use can be explained by the fact that Arab audiences, who are united in their perception of the just cause of the Palestinians’ struggle for independence, are highly divided, and somewhat confused, about violence in Iraq. There are several Iraqi factions that are fighting each other, and that makes it hard for any Arab network to express a particular slant. The only aspect that is agreed upon by the Arab audiences when it comes to Iraq is the desire to end the civilians’ suffering and the loss of human lives.
The fact that Al-Jazeera had approximately 20 reporters inside Iraq and one reporter who was embedded with the U.S. Marines at the beginning of the Iraq war helped present different angles to the war (Reigert, 2005). It is worth mentioning here that Al-Jazeera wanted to have more of its reporters embedded with the U.S. military, but the Pentagon allowed only one of its reporters to be embedded.

Al-Jazeera’s on-the-ground, non-embedded correspondents did create what was considered a system of “checks and balances” to the American official line that always claimed that the military campaign was going according to plan (Iskandar & el-Nawawy, 2004). Those roaming correspondents, who were reporting from places that were still inaccessible to Western correspondents, often interviewed average Iraqi citizens and thus provided a “street-level view” of the war’s impact on the Iraqi people in general (Iskandar & el-Nawawy, 2004).

But in addition to its interviews with the regular Iraqi citizens who were opposed to the war, Al-Jazeera aired interviews with members of the Iraqi opposition who lived overseas and who supported the war. Moreover, it aired interviews with the Iraqi officials in Baghdad and presented war updates from the U.S. Central Command in Doha, Qatar. The network also conducted a series of interviews with key American figures in Iraq, such as Paul Bremer, the then top American administrator in Baghdad, and it aired documentaries showing the brutality of Saddam’s regime. So, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war “displayed an invocation of both broader journalistic practices and a clear instance of contextual objectivity” (Iskandar & el-Nawawy, 2004, p. 323).

Still, Al-Jazeera was accused by U.S. officials of inflaming the “Arab street” and broadcasting anti-American remarks. Then in April 2003, an American missile hit Al-Jazeera’s Baghdad bureau, causing the death of one of its star reporters in an incident that was described
by the Pentagon as “unintentional.” This happened despite the fact that Al-Jazeera informed the Pentagon of its location in Baghdad three months before the war started (Iskandar & el-Nawawy, 2004).

6.5.2.1.1 Schematic Overview of the Analysis:

| Topicalization | A quick look at the questions and interventions of the program host Al-Mirazi in his exchange with Mouafac Harb, the news director of Alhurra, gives an indication of the main topics of Al-Jazeera: the Palestinian side. Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is there a place called Palestine? Will your correspondent conclude his reports from there by saying ‘so and so reporting from Ramallah’?

Hafiz al-Mirazi: I would like to clarify matters for the viewer. Is there any political problem with an Alhurrah correspondent directly interviewing someone from Hamas, Hizbullah, or the Islamic Jihad?

In the Iraq war, as was the case in the Afghanistan war, Al-Jazeera fed a strong desire in the Arab world to support Iraqi civilians, who represented the “underdog” in that war. It “played to the general feelings of Arabs who wanted to see an end to the Iraq civilians’. Again, asking a question to Mouafac Harb: Hafiz al-Mirazi: US forces in Iraq are another controversial topic. Some are wondering how Alhurrah will refer to these forces. Will they refer to them as ‘an occupation’?

Lexicalization and Predications | Words are not commonly neutral reflections of the real world; they are more productively regarded as constructions of the real that reflect the interest of specific groups. For instance, what remains implicit in a journalist’s choice for the term terrorist group other than resistance movement? Moreover, leaving certain words out or the use of euphemisms can elucidate ideologically informed choices. Absence is just as vital as presence, as Ackerman (2001) discusses in his study concerning the use of the term occupation in the U.S. media. Ackerman argues that the U.S. media have systematically avoided the term occupation in the reporting of the Al-Aqsa intifada. Ackerman investigated the use of the word occupation in the U.S. Media (including ABC World, NBC, CBS and CNN International). He concluded that 90 percent of the networks’ reporting has failed to report that the territories were occupied. Nevertheless, he also stated that the number on CNN is closer to 80 percent, possibly reflecting the network’s awareness of its international audience.

Both the program moderator and the guest question the efficacy of translation,
as well as the cultural meanings accrued to particular terms:

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: In the future, but I mean now. Will a correspondent in this region say Palestine when he concludes his report?

**Mouafac Harb**: He will say ‘from the territory of the Palestinian National Authority.’

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: US forces in Iraq are another controversial topic. Some are wondering how Alhurrah will refer to these forces. Will they refer to them as ‘an occupation’?

**Mouafac Harb**: Their name is ‘the coalition forces.’

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: Fine, but do not the Americans themselves use the term ‘occupation,’ as does Rand Rahim, Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations and the United States in Washington?

**Mouafac Harb**: I do not believe that most of the Iraqi people today believe that an explosion targeting Iraqi civilians is resistance. If you respond with today's statistics to...
show me that the Iraqi people believe that the killing of civilians now occurring in Iraq is 'resistance,' I would say to you, let us call it 'resistance.'

**Mouafac Harb**: Who has claimed responsibility to date? Has someone claimed responsibility? Did the resistance claim responsibility?

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: Reagan viewed the Voice of America and the directed media as a pickax for destroying the leadership and walls of the Eastern Bloc. It seems that George Bush will also use the pickax of the directed media in the form of Radio Sawa, which was established to replace the voice of America's Arabic service, and Alhurrah Television station.

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: How is it that you deny the Palestinians something the United Nations grants them. There is a sign at the United Nations on which 'Palestine' is written.

**Mouafac Harb**: I believe that it is Palestine. Journalists believe that it is Palestine. The Arab world believes that it is Palestine. Media organizations do not grant recognition. We are journalists, not decisionmakers. If everyday I said Palestine—

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intertextuality and Framing of the Voices</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mirazi uses a number of discourse strategies, such as framing, restating, topic and turn-taking management, and interjection, which have an impact on the larger meta-discourse surrounding media’s role and importance in defining terrorism terminology:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: Iraqi civilians are not talking in the way that you mentioned. However, are they saying, if you strike the Americans, it is understandable? Would you understand if they struck the Americans. Would you call them 'resistance'?

**Mouafac Harb**: Yes.

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: How is it that you deny the Palestinians something the United Nations grants them? There is a sign at the United Nations on which ‘Palestine’ is written. I believe that it is Palestine. Journalists believe that it is Palestine. The Arab world believes that it is Palestine. Media organizations do not grant recognition. We are journalists, not decisionmakers. If everyday I said Palestine—

**Mouafac Harb**: I will answer you directly.

**Hafiz al-Mirazi**: Please, go ahead.

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6.6 The Negotiation of Meaning

Al-Jazeera, and specifically the weekly program min wāshinṭūn, is an intersecting node of ideas, images, people, and voices that are constantly being negotiated and reshaped in the dialogic interchange between cultures of circulation: Western, Arab, Islamic, American, Arab Nationalist, Secularist, Qatari, Israeli, and others. For example, min wāshinṭūn does not use the term ‘war on terror’ harb ‘ala-l-irhāb as utilized by American discourses, but rather mukāfaḥat- al-irhāb, ‘Counterterrorism’. Al-Jazeera broadcasters use the term ‘martyr’ shahīd when identifying Palestinian ‘suicide bombers.’ This word indexes a religious and emotional framework with which an Arab audience already identifies. However, when Al-Jazeera broadcasters use the word ‘terrorism’, it qualifies its use with the phrase mā yusammā bi-l-irhāb ‘the so-called terrorism’. They distance themselves from the meaning this term has accrued in western contexts by visualizing it in quotes, while at the same time indicating their epistemic stance toward the truth-value of its usage by others.

Bakhtin’s dialogic emergence of meaning offers a useful concept from which to explore how meaning is taken outside of the individual and emerges in social interaction. From this viewpoint, dialogue is the way in which groups continuously produce, reproduce and revise
culture and meaning (Crpanzano 1990). Tedlock and Mannheim, however, have identified a type of dialogue that is more than a formal exchange of ideas. They see dialogue as a functional social field where multiple voices and cultural logics contend with each other and challenge the authority of the narrator (1995:5). Maranhão further emphasized the collective construction of meaning:

the speaker is successively enfeebled, first, by his lack of autonomy in the face of his addressees, who also participate in the production of meaning; second, by the dilution of his identity behind the characters, who start speaking for him and soon speak as independent voices; third, by the characters themselves having their roles attenuated by the polyphony...that is typical of ordinary life (1990:4).

Thus, words and ideas emerge in a particular social and historical context where participants appropriate and negotiate their meaning (1990:6).

Al-Jazeera represents a social space in which multiple audiences appropriate and negotiate the meaning of events. Therein, the authority of speakers is constantly challenged and transformed, as reporters, program moderators, and broadcasters frame successive discussions as responses to previous critiques, guests, and interlocutors re-contextualize utterances made at different times and in different places by individuals not present at the time of dialogue.

6.6.1 Min Wāshinṭūn Program 5 – 9/11 Commission Report

Hafiz al-Mirazi: The recommendations proposed by the 9/11 investigations include a dialogue with the Arab and Islamic world. A dialogue is also taking place in New York, not in Washington, between the United Nations and regional organizations, specifically the Arab League. Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara has followed this dialogue and provides us with details in the following report:

حافظ المرزازي: التوصيات التي طرحها في تحقيقات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر تشمل الحوار مع العالم العربي والإسلامي، هناك حوار يتم أيضاً في نيويورك وليس في وASHINGTON بين الأمم المتحدة وبين المنظمات الإقليمية وبالتحديد جامعة الدول العربية، الزميل عبد الرحيم فقراء تابع هذا الحوار ووفقاً
Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara: Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations has become extremely important as a new national order takes shape. This was stated by Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa in a Security Council session in the context of his remarks on the new circumstances being faced by these organizations.

Amr Musa: The new global and regional circumstances concern not only extraordinary political circumstances, but also deeply rooted economic and social problems that combine poverty, backwardness, disease, and terrorism.

Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara: While Israel accuses the Palestinians of engaging in terrorism, and the violence continues in Iraq, some entities, including the Arab League, are underscoring the need to distinguish between terrorism and resistance to occupation. Lakhdar Ibrahimi, the special envoy to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has expressed his support for such a distinction in the case of Iraq. However, other international entities have a different view on the same situation.

Khafyir Boubouria - the chairman of the Counterterrorism Committee at the United Nations: There is no uniform definition of terrorism in the United Nations yet. However, the importance of terrorism since September 11 will increase as a result of the American accusations that Iran took part in some way in 9/11 attacks, an accusation which Iran rejects.

Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara: There is no uniform definition of terrorism in the United Nations. However, concern with this terrorism since the events of 9/11 is growing, especially in view of recent American accusations that Iran is connected with the events of that day.
to the 9/11 events, although Iran denies these accusations. Many regional organizations, including the Arab league, point to their role in resisting the attempt to marginalize the United Nations and the multilateral world order in dealing with terrorism and other issues, as indicated by Amr Musa and his counterparts—to the extent that they came again to the Security Council to emphasize this role. Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara, Al-Jazeera, New York.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Before Amr Musa left New York and the United States, I spoke with him on Wednesday evening regarding these topics, which are brought up in any Western-Arab or international-Arab dialogue. I first asked him whether there is still a disagreement over the definition of terrorism. I asked him, when will we be able to remove terrorism from our lexicon? He answered:

[Tape Recording]

Hafiz al-Mirazi: [What is] the difference between terrorism and resistance?

Amr Musa: Our definition of terrorism is the agreed upon international definition. All countries and societies of the world take the same position on global terrorism, i.e., terrorism sows fear in societies, kills innocent people, and spreads chaos. This talk is not acceptable to all of us. The Arab countries agree with all other countries of the world. Israel's occupation of Palestine is one side of the coin. The other side is resistance and rejection of the occupation using all methods. People do not accept foreign occupation. If the occupation resorts to bloody methods, the response thereto is also bloody. This is not terrorism. At the same time, as I have said and reiterate because it is important, in all cases, civilians, innocent people, and ordinary people with no connection to the conflict and the practices of the occupation must be excluded from being targets for any military or violent operation. Therefore, we return to the

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definition. Everyone opposes terrorist operations that sow fear in societies. But this does not prejudice the right of one who is militarily occupied to resist, reject, and oppose the occupation and to call for what we have adopted and insisted on. The concern is to keep citizens away from the woes of wars.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: In other words, the blowing up of a bus by a Palestinian or non-Palestinian, and the killing of civilians or innocent persons in a residential building by an F-16 aircraft or a hand grenade are both terrorism. Is this agreed?

Amr Musa: Anything that harms or targets civilians is terrorism, regardless of whether it is carried out by a state or a group. Resistance is resisting the occupier's soldiers and tanks in the occupied land. This is the resistance of which I am speaking.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Does this apply to the settlers?

Amr Musa: The settlers are illegal, as made patently clear in a judgment issued by the International Court of Justice and a General Assembly resolution to accept and support that judgment. The settlers are usurpers of the land and aggressors. They are hurting the civilian population. The settlers have their own story. It is a dangerous story. It is based entirely on the violation of the law. They have seriously damaged and are seriously damaging all the assumptions of peace or hopes for peace.
6.6.1.1 Analysis

Frames, whether at the beginning or end of a program, are important in that they set the tenor and direction of dialogue, or condense the dialogue into sets of questions program moderators pose themselves (Norris, Kern and Just 2003). The larger Arab/Islamic-Western ideologies and contact between moderators and audiences impact what Al-Jazeera program anchors decide to, “select, to edit, to publish to provide the ‘appropriate’ context and the theoretical orientation (Crapanzano 1990:287)” for these settings. After questioning Musa about the meaning of the word *irhāb* (terrorism), he restated:

Hafiz al-Mirazi: In other words, the blowing up of a bus by a Palestinian or non-Palestinian, and the killing of civilians or innocent persons in a residential building by an F-16 aircraft or a hand grenade are both terrorism. Is this agreed?

Amr Musa: Anything that harms or targets civilians is terrorism, regardless of whether it is carried out by a state or a group. Resistance is resisting the occupier's soldiers and tanks in the occupied land. This is the resistance of which I am speaking.

In the interview with Musa, Al-Mirazi builds a rhetorical structure through parallelisms that is mirrored by Musa but expanded to include a hierarchical component. Collaboratively they move away from unequivocal designations to nuanced notions of “so-called terrorists”. Terrorism is anything that harms civilians, whether orchestrated by individuals or nation-states.

6.6.1.1.1 Schematic Overview of the Analysis:

| **Topicalization** | One of the topics frequently covered in Al-Jazeera English is human rights and international law. When rights or laws are being discussed, is the discussions are always very critical towards Israel. A returning topic is that of the terrorism and its definition. This is a returning argument in the news reporting of Al-Jazeera and it is used to criticize Israel for violating international law: |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Lexicalization and Predications</strong></th>
<th>There is little agreement over the definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Recognizing the worldwide debate on this term, Al-Mirazi, asks his guest, Amr Musa, the Secretary General of the Arab League:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hafiz al-Mirazi:</strong> [What is] the difference between terrorism and resistance?</td>
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<tr>
<td>حافظ المراني: التفرقة بين الإرهاب والمقاومة؟</td>
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<td>The message of all the predications in this exchange stress the Israeli violence against the Palestinians. He make Amr Musa move away from unequivocal designations to nuanced notions of “so-called terrorists”. Terrorism is anything that harms civilians, whether orchestrated by individuals or nation-states:</td>
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<td>عمو موسى: كل هذا اللي يضر بالدمئيين يستهدم المدنيين إرهاب يقوم به الدولة يقوم به جماعة دم..</td>
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<td><strong>Amr Musa:</strong> Anything that harms or targets civilians is terrorism, regardless of whether it is carried out by a state or a group.</td>
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| **Intertextuality** | Al-Jazeera avoids the term but refers to the concept by means of intertextuality: Al-Mirazi, in his exchange with Amr Musa, drew on the metadiscourse of the terrorism debate, seeking to broaden the definition or at least call into question how it is being utilized. His use of “so-called terrorism” in the introduction highlights and challenges previous instantiations of the term. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Framing of the Voices</strong></th>
<th>Al-Jazeera frames voices in such a way that the interpretation is more positive for the Palestinian side and more negative for the Israeli side. This does not mean that it always frame the voices that they are conducive to a specific group. Some voices are included in the programs and they do not appear favorable or unfavorable to any particular group. Such is the voice of Khafyir Boubouria - the chairman of the Counterterrorism Committee at the United Nations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no uniform definition of terrorism in the United Nations yet. However, the importance of terrorism since September 11 will increase as a result of the American accusations that Iran took part in some way in 9/11 attacks, an accusation which Iran rejects.</td>
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**Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara:** While Israel accuses the Palestinians of engaging in terrorism, and the violence continues in Iraq, some entities, including the Arab League, are underscoring the need to distinguish between terrorism and resistance to occupation. Lakhdar Ibrahimi, the special envoy to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has expressed his support for such a distinction in the case of Iraq. However, other international entities have a different view on the same situation. |
الذي تُؤَضِّبه إِیْران.
Chapter 7: Terrorism and Violence

Although constant dialogic interaction(s) of meanings condition each other, the process of redefining is endless unless a powerful ‘undialogized participial modifier’ is involved. At that point, dialogism becomes authoritative and absolute. Holquist explains that, “a word, discourse, language or culture undergoes ‘dialogization’ when it becomes relativized, de-privilged, [and] aware of competing definitions for the same things (Holquist 1981: 427).” The dialogical process of the religious term \textit{al-jihād} takes place between different individuals, ordinary citizens and religious scholars, sectors of Islamic and Arab societies, government and the people, Western nation states and other dialogical participants who are affected by \textit{al-jihād}’ and/or \textit{al-irhāb}.\footnote{Although Bakhtin would perhaps disagree in terms of viewing this conversational input as an objective neutral reporting throughout these dialogical interactions on \textit{jihād}/terrorism, the terms are between quotes to stand as they are described by the different voices that have been reinterpreting them. Hence, words related to \textit{jihād/terror} will be put between quotes. There are other nouns and noun phrases that can be defined as \textit{jihād} and/or \textit{terror} depending on the voice that utters them. Among these are \textit{al-‘unf al-islāmi}’ (Islamic violence), \textit{at-ta‘fīrāt al-irhābiyya} and \textit{al-‘amilāyyāt al-intihāriyya} (suicide bombings). One of the examples that continues to stir the debate on the use of these terms is how Arab media reports military actions towards Palestinians by Israelis. They are generally referred to as ‘assassination operations’ while Israeli media usually names the operations as “extrajudicial punishment,” “long-range hot pursuit,” and “selective targeting.”}

Dialogue concerning the concept of \textit{al-jihād} becomes not only internal to Islamic societies but also part and parcel of the daily conversations of Western societies. Arab-Islamic and Western educational and political institutions as well as media corporations have become central dialogical actors in the process of ‘relativizing’ or ‘de-privilging’ the concept of \textit{al-jihād}. Thus, the interpretations and redefinitions of \textit{jihād}, terrorism and violence have dialogically influenced Muslims’ modern conceptualizations of \textit{jihād}:

The Arabic word \textit{jihād} (verbal noun of the verb jāhada) means to strive, to exert oneself, to struggle. The word has a basic

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connotation of an endeavor towards a praiseworthy aim. In a religious context it may express a struggle against one’s evil inclination or an exertion for the sake of Islam and the umma, e.g. trying to convert unbelievers or working for the moral betterment of Islamic society (“jihad of the tongue” and “jihad of the pen”). In the books on Islamic law, the word means struggle against the unbelievers, which is also a common meaning in the Koran. Sometimes, the “jihad of the sword” is called “the smaller jihad,” in opposition to the peaceful forms named “the greater jihad.” Nowadays, it is often used without any religious connotation, more or less equivalent to the English word crusade (“A crusade against drugs”). If used in a religious context, the adjective “Islamic” or “holy” is currently added to it (al-jihād al-islāmī or al-jihād al-muqaddas) (Peters 1995: 1).

The forms of jihad113 (al-jihād) and fighting (al-qitāl) against the unbelievers are discussed in several Quranic verses, one of which is chapter 22, verse 39: “Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged - surely God is able to help them – who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say ‘our Lord is God’”.114 Peters maintains that this verse, “revealed not long after the Hijra115, is traditionally considered to be the first dealing with fighting unbelievers. Many verses exhort the believers to take part in the fighting ‘with their goods and lives’ (bi-amwālihim wa-anfusihim), promise reward to those who are killed in the jihad (K. 3:157-158, 169-172) and threaten those who do not fight with severe

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113 Ron Geaves states that “the term refers to duty imposed by thw Qura’an on every Muslim to struggle against evil whilst walking the path of Allah. It is both the inner stuggle against the manifestations of sin in oneself and the outer struggle to promote Islam and protect the faith against the enemies. In this latter context jihād has often been interpreted to be Holy war’ either against polytheists, or Christians and Jews that threaten the security of Islam. A genuine jihād has to be carefully defined by criteria laid down in the shari’a and led by an Imam or Muslim head of state. The main criterion is that it must be fought only to protect the faith and not be used for any lesser temporal motive. A famous saying of Muhammad states that after returning from fighting, he told his companions that ‘this was the lesser jihād, I will now show you the greater jihād’. It was explained that the latter jihād constituted the battle against carnal desire and the purification of the inner being. The emphasis on the inner jihād has been mostly followed by the Sufis. Some twentieth-century revivalist movements have declared jihād the sixth pillar of Islam. They are usually emphasizing the duty of Muslims to struggle to promote their faith amongst lapsed members of the community and the apparent threat to Islamic values from globalization of Western Values. (Geaves: 2006, 55).

115 The Hijra was the prophet Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina in 632.
punishments in the hereafter (K. 9:81-82, 48-16) (Peters 1995: 2). As a result, many Muslims have interpreted and legitimized ‘suicide attacks’ and ‘martyrdom operations’ towards Israel and citizens of some Western and Muslim nations. After the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada in 2000, some Palestinians resorted to suicide bombing as a legitimate warfare strategy against Israel. This came not only with the acceptance of the general public, but also from state and individual Islamic muftis and scholars. Indeed, a number of fatwas\textsuperscript{116} have been issued by Muslim clerics in favor of suicide bombings.

Al-Jazeera presented several live programs following the 9/11 attacks on the relationship that exists between Islam, violence and martyrdom. One of the more prominent of these programs is \textit{al-sharī’a wa-l-ḥayāt} (Islamic Law and Life). The program provided a live forum for discussion on topics such as terrorism and violence, and opened an important dialogue on such controversial topics as the legitimacy of ‘suicide bombings’. The Egyptian-born Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, is one of the most prominent proponents of suicide bombing as a tactical weapon of Palestinian resistance, and a regular participant on the \textit{al-sharī’a wa-l-ḥayāt} program. In one episode, he discussed these ‘martyr operations’ and ‘suicide bombings’ as part of the jihad in the path of God – \textit{jihād fī sabīl Allāh}.\textsuperscript{117}

Although many scholars like al-Qaradawi condemn the hostile acts of 9/11 as terrorism, they legitimate ‘martyrdom operations’ against Israel. In the wake of 9/11, there has been tremendous pressure on Arab governments to condemn ‘suicide bombings’. December of 2001 witnessed a wave of ‘suicide operations’ in Jerusalem and Haifa. These events pressured Saudi Arabia and Egypt to officially reconsider their position regarding terrorism and violence. Sheikh

\textsuperscript{116} In Arabic: \textit{fatāwā} - religious scholarly judgments or rulings on a certain issue.

\textsuperscript{117} What episode was this, and can it be placed in Appendix 2 – additional transcripts.
Muhammad Said al-Tantawi, Egypt’s al-Azhar mosque and university head, declared that *al-sharī’a* rejects, “all attempts on human life, and in the name of *al-sharī’a*, we condemn all attacks on civilians, whether communities or states are responsible for such an attack.” This position was also supported by Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Sabil, member of the Saudi council of senior ‘*ulama* (clerics) and Imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca: “Muslims must safeguard the lives, honor and property of Christians and Jews; attacking them contradicts the *sharī’a*.”

To counter such state-promoted fatwas, al-Qaradawi used an episode of *al-sharī’a wa-l-ḥayāt* to declare that he was astonished that some sheikhs delivered fatwas that betrayed the *mujāhidīn*, instead of supporting them: “It is unfortunate to hear that the grand imām [of Mecca] has said it was not permissible to kill civilians in any country or state, even in Israel.” He also directly questioned Sheikh Muhammad Said al-Tantawi’s ruling against the use of ‘suicide operations’: “Israeli society was completely military in its makeup and did not include any civilians. How can the head of al-Azhar incriminate al-mujāhidīn who fight against aggressors? How can he consider these aggressors as innocent civilians?” Despite his initial fatwa condemning suicide actions, growing public support for ‘suicide operations’ pressured al-Tantawi to change his fatwa. He explained that his first ruling on suicide bombings had been misinterpreted, and he clarified his position, saying:

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118 This quote may be found in the December 16th, 2001 edition of *Al-Akhbar* (Cairo), to which the reader is directed.

119 This quote was taken from the Saudi Press Agency, December 4 2001, to which the reader is directed.

120 What are the mujahidin? Explain the use of this term.

121 This quote is from al-Qaradawi in an interview with Agence France-Press, December 4 2001.

A man who blows himself up in the middle of enemy militants is a martyr, repeat, a martyr. What we do not condone is for someone to blow himself up in the middle of children and women. If he blows himself up in the middle of Israeli women enlisted in the army, then he is a martyr, since the women are fighters.\(^{123}\)

According to Peters, “the theory of jihad as *bellum justum* that developed in modern Islam, concentrates upon the causes of warfare waged by the Muslims. This cause must be ‘in the way of God’(fī sabīl Allāh), which excludes fighting for territorial expansion, for booty, for vengeance and for other worldly aims. Modern authors usually limit the causes for which war may be waged. These causes fall into two categories: those connected with the *propagation of Islam* and those connected with the idea of *defense*. The following are accepted as legitimate causes:

1. Repelling aggression on Muslim lives and property in case of an actual or expected attack by enemy forces. This is founded on [2:190]: “*And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not.*”

2. Preventing oppression and persecution of Muslims outside the Territory of Islam. This is closely linked up with the idea of protecting freedom of religion. It is based upon [4:75]: “How is it with you, that you do not fight in the way of God, and for the men, women, and children who, being abased, say, ‘*Our Lord, bring us forth from this city whose people are evildoers, and appoint to us a protector from Thee, and appoint us from Thee a helper.*’”

3. Retaliating a breach of pledge by the enemy. This is supported by [9:12]: “*But if they break their oaths after their covenant and thrust at your religion, then fight the

\(^{123}\) *ruz al-yusuf* (Cairo) January 5, 2002.
leaders of unbelief, they have no sacred oaths; haply they will give over.” (Peters 1995: 121)

On January 11-16, 2003, the Islamic Fiqh Council affiliated to the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) in its fourteenth session, issued another legal judgment and ruling regarding Palestinian ‘suicide bombing.’ The resolution text reads as follows:

4. Islam dignifies man as a human being, safeguards his rights and protects his honor. Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence is the first jurisprudence all over the world which really presents local and international legislative codes for human relations both in war and peace.

5. Terrorism equals illegal aggression, terror, threatening both in material and abstract forms which is practiced by states, groups or individuals against man, his religion, soul, honor, intellect or his property via all means, among which is the spread of corruption on earth.

6. The Islamic Fiqh Council asserts that jihad and martyr operations done to defend the Islamic creed, dignity, freedom and the sovereignty of states is not considered terrorism but a basic form of necessary defense for legitimate rights. Thus oppressed peoples who are subjected to occupation have the right to seek their freedom via all means possible.

7. The Islamic Fiqh Council stresses that martyr operations are a form of jihad, and carrying out those operations is a legitimate right that has nothing to do with terrorism or suicide. Those operations become obligatory when they become the
only way to stop the aggression of the enemy, defeat it, and grievously damage its power.

8. It is not allowed to use terms such as ‘jihad’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘violence’, which have become frequently used by today’s mass media as technical terms, to mean other connotations beyond their basic well known meanings. In light of the above, there is no change concerning the Islamic ruling regarding martyr operations as such operations are considered true jihad in the Cause of Allah.\(^{124}\)

7.1.1 \textit{Al-shari'ah wa-\textasciitilde{h}ayat Program 6– Terrorism and Violence}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mahir Abdallah:</th>
<th>Our topic for this segment is “terrorism and violence.” Why has terrorism and violence spread? \emph{Or why have terrorism and violence been attributed or are frequently attributed exclusively to Islam and the Islamic nation?}(^{125}) Recent events in Chechnya have again focused attention on the Islamic arena. To discuss this topic, I am pleased to have with me His Eminence, Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi. Welcome again to “Islamic Law and Life.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:</td>
<td>Before I respond to this question, I would like to say that Islam is currently waging many battles. It is waging a military battle, a political battle, an economic battle, a cultural battle, a religious battle, and a media battle. The media battle has its weapons. Terminology is one of the most effective, important, and dangerous of these weapons. We often fight this new war, the terminology war. They coin terms as they see please and impose them on us. They use enormous apparatuses to circulate these terms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{125}\) Emphasis added.
among the people... This is the imminent danger that we now see: The stronger wish to rule everything, even terminology.

Mahir Abdallah: There are two questions that I believe need to be clarified. This first concerns state terrorism. What you said about oppression in the Arab world is used by America, albeit in a slightly differently worded fashion, but the meaning is the same. Do you believe that such oppression justifies bringing about change in the Arab world to rid it of these regimes and to bring it around to a democratic opening that recognizes others? Is there any difference between what you want and what America wants in terms of eliminating state oppression and terrorism? Is there an overlap in this regard?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: No, there is a great difference. I maintain that the country most founded on terrorism, the most dangerous and notorious country founded on terrorism, is the Zionist entity. It was founded on terrorism. It was terroristic even before it was established, when it was merely gangs... This is true, terrorism against the Palestinians, the inculcation of fear in the hearts of poor villagers, women, and pregnant women... I consider Sharon the greatest terrorist in the world. Nonetheless, unfortunately, America regards him as defending his poor self, meaning he is presented as—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: A man of peace!

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Mahir Abdallah: A man of peace!
supports Sharon? America supports Sharon and accepts his rule.

**Mahir Abdallah:** What is happening in Chechnya is similar to what is happening in Palestine. There is supplanted colonialism. There are currently a number of Russians in the state or small autonomous republic of Chechnya. The Russians are clearly supplanting the Chechens. Is this justified? Is this comparable or similar to what is happening in Palestine?

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** It is generally justified to resist. However, in the event of a war, Islam is keen to minimize human casualties and spare lives as much as possible. Therefore, the principle in warfare in Islam is that only combatants may be killed. Women, children, the elderly, the blind, the crippled, monks in monasteries, one plowing his land, and the merchant in his store may not be killed. When our brothers in Palestine strike, they in fact select locations where soldiers are concentrated. They attempted to strike such locations. If a woman or child is killed, it is unintentional. However, Israeli society is militarized. Its men and women are soldiers in the army or reserves. It is also a society of invaders. They came from outside the homeland and occupied it. They displaced the population from its land. Israeli society therefore has a special nature. Thus, I maintain that the principle is to not kill civilians unless required by the exigencies of warfare. Therefore, the principle is that we do not fight civilians intentionally, although we may hit them as a consequence.

7.1.1.1 Analysis

Through a series of rhetorical questions, al-Qaradawi clearly reflects the concerns of the Arab viewers rather than of western politicians. The humanitarian fallout of the invasion raised
all kinds of issues: civil casualties, refugees, ethnic and sectarian civil strife, and the further marginalization of the Palestinians. The cleric rejects mixing legitimate terrorism with illegitimate terrorism as well as labeling the Palestinians as terrorists. Additionally, in his dialogical interpretation of the phrase ‘suicide bombing,’ al-Qaradawi rejects comparing ‘suicide’ to ‘martyrdom.’ It is distinct from ‘terrorism’ because it is an act of self-defense and thus a legitimate form of resistance (Malka 2003:22). Whereas suicide is prohibited in Islam, martyrdom is considered one of the highest forms of religiosity. As al-Qaradawi states on the program: “Suicide bombing is an unjust and misleading term because these are heroic commando martyrdom attacks and should not be called suicide operations or be attributed to suicide under any circumstances.” Moreover, he released a fatwa providing an historical link between ‘suicide bombing’ and the jihad. Drawing on both the Qur’an and the Sunna, he posits.

The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of jihad in the cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrifices himself, deeming his life of less value striving in the cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring land and preserving dignity. To such a valorous attitude applies the following Quranic verse: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath compassion on His bondmen.” (Qur’an 2:207) But a clear distinction has been made here between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and of finding no outlet except putting an end to one’s life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the cause of Allah, and that is why it is considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of jihad.

By defining the concept of ‘suicide bombings’ on the basis of traditional deontological ethics\textsuperscript{127}, al-Qaradawi is looking backward, as a modern revivalist scholar, for a justification for “killing oneself” which Islam and other religions prohibit because it debases human life. His attitude towards the problems of fighting Israeli soldiers by looking for an ideological justification draws from a fundamentalist Islamic reference to \textit{jihād} but is also modernist because it uses Hegelian or even utilitarian consequentialist ethics\textsuperscript{128}, which maintain that the end justifies the means. In his interpretation, ‘suicide bombing’ as a form of jihad is essentially an instrument of revival, employed for the purpose of extending or defending the frontiers of Islam and leading the faithful back to their roots.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has dominated the Arab “socio-political consciousness” over the past sixty years. In fact, no other political issue has been as successful in uniting Arabs, who have been following live news coverage about this conflict through their various satellite channels. Therefore, Al-Jazeera’s heavy coverage of the second Palestinian intifāḍa has contributed to its perception as a pan-Arab network (Zayani, 2005b). This intifāḍa, also called “Al-Aqsa intifada,” started in September 2000, following what was perceived by many observers

\textsuperscript{127} Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Definition: The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (\textit{deon}) and science (or study) of (\textit{logos}). In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to (aretaic [virtue] theories) that — fundamentally, at least — guide and assess what kind of person (in terms of character traits) we are and should be. And within that domain, deontologists — those who subscribe to deontological theories of morality — stand in opposition to consequentialists.

\textsuperscript{128} Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Definition: Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.
as a “provocative” visit by former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa mosque (Zayani, 2005b). Thanks to this intifada, Arabs have been exposed to a heavy dose of television images, reflecting suffering, death and destruction on a daily basis.

Since suicide is forbidden in Islam, the use of the term “suicide bombers” in that context would delegitimize what a large segment of the Arab population perceives as legitimate acts of resistance against the Israeli occupation. So, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera’s use of the term “martyr” in this context is a reflection of its appeal to Arab public sensibilities. And Al-Jazeera is not alone in its use of the term martyr in the Palestinian-Israeli context: most other Arab networks use the same term. Al-Jazeera’s description of Palestinian suicide bombers as martyrs is one reason why Arab viewers relate more to Al-Jazeera than to Western networks with regard to coverage of this conflict. In this context, CNN is often criticized in Arab circles for using the term “targeted killings” rather than “assassinations” to refer to the Israeli policy of assassinating Palestinian political activists (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003). So, in a way, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the second Palestinian intifāḍa “reflects a certain cultural tradition: but only in the same way that CNN approaches stories from a Western perspective” (Zayani, 2005b, p. 177).

Al-Jazeera’s slant in favor of the Palestinians in this conflict is further substantiated by having reporters who are almost always “on the spot,” where the events are taking place in the Palestinian territories, providing first-hand coverage of breaking news and talking to “ordinary” Palestinians on the street (Knudsen, 2004). This situation allows the Al-Jazeera reporters in the Palestinian territories to provide their audiences with an insight into the mentality of a Palestinian suicide bomber and the circumstances that might have led him/her to commit such an
act. This insight helps humanize the Palestinian cause, rather than minimize it to just numbers and figures.

In this context, Al-Jazeera reporters have an edge over their Western counterparts, who are not as familiar with the Arabic language and culture, with all its nuances and intricacies, and who often rely on mediators and translators to communicate with the ordinary Palestinian citizens. Thus, the Western reporters in the Palestinian territories do not often provide the context and the background that are needed to understand why a certain event happened. In fact, in many cases, several Western reporters are parachuted in to cover the breaking news events in the Palestinian territories and then sent back to their home base.

7.1.1.1.1 Schematic Overview of the Analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topicalization</th>
<th>A quick look at this transcript immediately gives an indication of one of the main topics in Al-Jazeera: the Palestinian suffering and portrayal of Israel as the aggressor. Al-Qaradawi here provides background information critical views towards Israel and focusing on the Palestinian suffering:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:</strong></td>
<td>No, there is a very great difference. I maintain that the country most founded on terrorism, the most dangerous and notorious country founded on terrorism, is the Zionist entity. It was founded on terrorism. It was terrorist even before it was established, when it was merely gangs… This is true terrorism, terrorism against the Palestinians, the inculcation of fear in the hearts of poor villagers, women, and pregnant women… I consider Sharon the greatest terrorist in the world.</td>
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</table>

Lexicalization and Predications

| Al-Jazeera has been subject to criticism particularly in western discourse for its use of the term shuhadā’ (“martyrs”) to describe Palestinian suicide-bombers who strike in Israel or who are killed by Israeli soldiers. The overwhelming Arab support for the Palestinians’ fight for independence from the Israelis and the deep-seated political judgments that are shared by the majority of Arab viewers against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories make it practically impossible for a network like Al-Jazeera to present a decontextualized, non-biased version of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 129 This reflected in the use of words and predications such as the following: |

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129 Walid Al-Omary, Al-Jazeera’s bureau chief in the West-bank town of Ramallah, describes the difficulty of emotional neutrality and the complexity of an Arab journalist’s position in the heart of action by saying: “To be objective in this area is not easy because we live here. We are part of the people here. And this situation belongs to us, and we have our opinions”. See El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003: 53.
The Zionist entity

- I consider Sharon the greatest terrorist in the world.

However, Israeli society is militarized. Its men and women are soldiers in the army or reserves. It is also a society of invaders. They came from outside the homeland and occupied it. They displaced the population from its land. Israeli society therefore has a special nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intertextuality</th>
<th>From this transcript, a categorization of an ingroup/outgroup can be seen: Al-Jazeera categorizes the Palestinians as an ingroup and Israel as an outgroup.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framing of the Voices</td>
<td>up and unfavorable for another”. From an analysis of the framing, it appears that Al-Jazeera has created an additional antagonist-protagonist structure. It frequently frames voices in favor of the Palestinian side. Journalists include certain voices and they exclude others; they select who is heard and who is not. This incorporating of voices is very common in news coverage. Al-Jazeera usually gives voice to different parties; some parties are equally heard in certain programs such as programs 1, 2, and 3. Others are more often heard in other programs such as this one (Al-shari’a wa-l-ḥayāt Program 6). Media researchers have stated that Al-Jazeera devotes more coverage - in contrast with U.S. counterparts - to voices of protest and diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mahir Abdallah: Recently, in the eminent [holy] month [of Ramadan], Israel's aggression and repression has intensified, going beyond the assassination of several Palestinian political leaders to the random bombing of many Palestinian neighborhoods, villages, and cities. The Palestinians generate debate each time they resort to their only available weapon for responding to Israeli aggression, martyrdom operations. Recent martyrdom operations have also prompted a new debate in Islamic jurisprudence, even if it has been limited to one symbol of the Islamic world today. |

| 130 | See Aday, Livingston and Hebert: 2005 |
| 131 | Al-shari’a wa-l-ḥayāt Program 7 - The Palestinian Intifadah and Fedayeen Operations |

It is necessary to mention that Al-Jazeera’s empathy toward the Palestinians does not deter it from presenting the Israeli side of the story. In fact, Al-Jazeera is the only Arab channel
that airs live interviews with top Israeli politicians, official spokespersons, journalists and political analysts. This is despite the argument that the Israeli media refrain from giving Palestinian figures the same platform to express their perspective to the Israeli public (Zayani, 2005b).

For that reason, Al-Jazeera has been accused, in some Arab circles, of advocating the normalization of relations between the Arabs and the Israelis. Some Arab critics have gone as far as accusing Al-Jazeera of being an agent for Israeli intelligence – the Mossad. Many Arab guests on Al-Jazeera talk shows express resentment at having Israelis participate in the same shows, but they are often told by Al-Jazeera hosts that they need to give the other side a chance to express their opinions. This reinforces the argument that Al-Jazeera adopts contextual objectivity in its coverage of events that are of great concern to the Arab public.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

It may be seen from the Al-Jazeera round table transcripts that Al-Jazeera is as much in the process of creating an information audience as it is informing its audience. The Al-Jazeera enterprise is not just about responding to the Arab cultural context of oral exchange, it is about doing so within Western frames and formats and structures of information circulation. The forms and flows of these exchanges are transformed and transform as they circulate. As a result, there is constant metadiscursive negotiation of the terms employed in terrorism designations.

Whatever the political and social environment, Al-Jazeera evokes a powerful response from whatever camp disapproves of its actions. It has become a symbol for controversy and fulfills the Arabic proverb, khālif tu ‘raf. Not only has the station gained visibility in the cafes, salons, and homes of the “Arab street”, it has emerged as an influential force in the American and Western imagination, diplomacy and discourses. From President Bush citing concerns of Al-Jazeera “propaganda” to President Bartlett of “The West Wing” worrying about Al-Jazeera’s exposing of covert US actions, Al-Jazeera’s image is being appropriated on international and regional levels. Al-Jazeera has also appropriated the Arabic political dominant discourse of the surrounding nation states, not absorbing it and subsequently conforming, but rather apprehending and reinterpreting it. In this manner, it exposes their inconsistencies and contributes to the transnational media’s influence on public debates. This form of appropriation is part of the synchronic intertextuality of Al-Jazeera in the discursive social imagination. The

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132 Disagree and you will be known.
133 Discussed in an episode during October, 2002.
dialogue is occurring on both the verbal and visual planes, both with and without the consent of Al-Jazeera.

The “global war on terror” that has been launched by the US administration in the aftermath of the September 11 events has sparked a major debate over the definition of terror, its social and political meanings, and the extent to which news coverage can meet journalistic standards of balance, truth, and objectivity, especially in cases of extreme political conflict. At the heart of this debate is the role played by the Arab media in covering “terrorism” or “so-called terrorism” inside and outside the Middle East. The concept of terrorism is disputable, value-laden, and open to various interpretations located within broader cultural and social frames. Therefore, the world media systems have not agreed on a universal definition of terror. Since terrorism is in the eye of the beholder, the Arab media, in its portrayal of practitioners of violence as either “terrorists” or “freedom fighters,” reflects its political culture, value system, and ideological and commercial interests that tend to drive media everywhere.

Modern-day terrorists usually try to seek publicity about their existence and purposes through the media. This may include issuing statements, giving interviews, claiming responsibility for terrorist actions, or sending tapes to television stations. This places an extra burden on the media to devise standards for dealing with the terrorists’ publicity tactics. For example, media executives “face painful decisions when provided by terrorists with videos of hostages they have executed or of their captives making apparently voluntary but probably coerced statements” (Paletz & Boiney, 1992, p.8). When Osama Bin Laden, the head of the Al-Qaeda network, decided to publicize his group’s ideologies, he selected the two most popular Arab satellite channels: Al-Jazeera and the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiyya. In that context, Salah Nigm, Al-Arabiya News Director, said: “They [Al-Qaeda leaders] go to who is most influential.
I don’t know if it’s their gut feeling or if someone’s advising them” (Smith, 2004). Airing the Bin Laden tapes made the US administration vilify Al-Jazeera and accuse it of serving as a mouthpiece for Bin Laden. In that context, Hafez Al-Mirazi, Al-Jazeera’s Washington, D.C. bureau chief, said: “They [the US administration] are confusing the message with the messenger…The tendency of ‘thugs’ like Bin Laden to seek out specific media should not necessarily undermine the station’s reputation for journalistic integrity” (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003, p.179).

In the media coverage of any terrorist event, some facts may be relatively neutral (e.g. the timing of the event); but many others may be highly controversial (e.g. the political grievances underlying these actions). This affects the language used by the news media to describe events (was it a suicide, a martyrdom, or an assassination?), the selection, depiction, and meaning of iconic images, and the choice of experts for commentary (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). Strong emotional reactions to extreme acts of political violence mean each media system may provide different interpretations of the same events, sharing almost nothing in common. For Al-Qaradwawi, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. He states in Program 7:

We reject mixing legitimate terrorism with illegitimate terrorism and regarding the Palestinians as practicing terrorism. America has categorized the Palestinians as terrorists. Hamas, [Islamic] Jihad, the al-Aqsa brigades, and Hezbollah are all considered terrorists. They have become terrorists. Who applies the label terrorist and says so and so is a terrorist? This is not the force of logic, buy rather the logic of force, which we reject.

Unlike the situation a decade ago when most Arab media systems were monopolized by governments and were abiding by the official line, today, the new Arab satellite channels are
trying to cater to the market needs. They have to think about reaching the widest possible audience, by extending their broadcast beyond their own national boundaries. “So the logic is no longer catering to the Egyptians or the Saudis…but to the Arab. In that sense, they [Arab media] are trying to find out what most Arabs want and what is the common denominator among most Arabs” (Telhami, 2002). To illustrate that argument, at a time when Arab official discourse is pressing for peace with Israel as a strategic option and opposing the Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, some Arab satellite channels insist, most of the time, on dubbing the Palestinian suicidal operations “martyr” operations134. In doing that, the Arab channels seem to voice the stand of their peoples, who are mostly supportive of the Palestinian operations as the only way to resist the Israeli occupation. Voicing their audiences’ stand has not, however, kept many of the new Arab satellite channels from presenting all sides to the story. Walking the fine line between providing audiences with a true representation of real events while still appealing to public sensibilities is an exercise in contextual objectivity. An example that illustrates that concept is that some Arab satellite channels, especially Al-Jazeera, provide news about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from an Arab perspective, i.e. they sympathize with the Palestinian resistance. However, that does not prevent these channels from providing the Israeli officials with a venue through which they can explain their position (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003). Moreover, Al-Jazeera airs Bin Laden tapes, but it also puts foreign officials like Tony Blair and Collin Powel on air to give the Western view.

The coverage of terrorism by Arab media, both private and state-owned, is far from monolithic. Some outlets are more balanced than others, providing factual reporting and breaking

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stories. An example that shows the differences among Arab media in their coverage of violent events is that unlike most outlets, which use loaded terms such as “martyrs” when referring to Palestinian suicide attackers, the London-based Saudi daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* and the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Ḥayāt*, also based in London, use the term “suicide attackers” in their news reporting though not on their editorial pages. Commenting on his newspaper’s approach, Abdel Rahman Al-Rashed, the former *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* editor in chief, said: “I know that adopting an impartial stand in the [Arab] media world is akin to suicide, because there are many who push the media into extremes and take nationalistic positions and maintain that whoever thinks differently is committing treason against the national cause” (WorldNetDaily.com, 2003). One possible reason for the different line taken by *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* and *Al-Ḥayāt* newspapers in their reference to the Palestinian suicide bombers maybe their adoption of an “out-in” offshore distribution model, with editorial offices in a foreign venue and markets in the Arab world (Mneimneh, 2003). This model might have helped make their reporting coincide with the Western framing of the Palestinian suicide bombings.

There is a more apparent monolithic approach in the Arab media coverage of Al-Qaeda acts. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, most elite Arab media outlets either printed or broadcast a *fatwa* by six prominent Islamic scholars condemning the terrorist attacks as contrary to Islam and calling for the apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators. However, in their reference to Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks that take place outside the Arab/Islamic world (e.g. the Madrid attacks on March 11, 2004), the Arab print and broadcast media do not use loaded terms like “terrorist.” They refer to terrorist acts committed by Al-Qaeda as either “so-called terrorism” or “what an official called terrorism.” As for the Al-Qaeda attacks that take place inside the Arab or Islamic world (e.g. attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco), the Arab
media tend to use more loaded terms, such as “suicide attacks” and “terrorism.” In the language used by Arab media to describe the violent acts in Iraq, they use the term “suicidal attacks” to describe any acts where suicide bombers kill either Iraqis or Americans. Arab media outlets also use loaded terms like “Iraqi resistance” when troops from the coalition forces are killed. However, when Iraqi civilians or Iraqi policemen are killed, the Arab media refer to the perpetrators as “unidentified armed men.” Moreover, the Arab media refer to the American troops as “occupying forces” or “invaders” rather than “coalition forces.”

The description of the American presence in Iraq as an occupation echoes the hated Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. “And just as most Arabs consider Palestinian violence against Israelis to be a legitimate response to occupation, so the attacks on U.S. and British forces in Iraq since the war’s end have been portrayed, and received, as both understandable and justified” (Lynch, 2003).

Writing in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahār, the Palestinian novelist Ziyad Khaddash published a short story titled: “As if I were in Basra, as if you were in Ramallah.” Emphasizing the “Palestinianization of Iraq,” in an imagined telephone conversation with a Basra-based Iraqi novelist, Khaddash finds it hard to distinguish between the sound of the Apache helicopters attacking the West Bank town of Ramallah and those attacking the Iraqi city of Basra (Machool, 2003).

A quote from an op-ed piece taken from the pro-government Saudi newspaper Al-Waṭan, dated November 20, 2003 commenting on the recent bombings in the Saudi capital Riyadh discusses the different approaches mentioned above:

The Arab world is facing a great quandary: the relationship between terrorism and resistance. There is no disputing the right of a people to resist foreign occupation with force, and this is indeed what is happening in Palestine and Iraq. Likewise, there is no
dispute over the idea that using armed violence to impose political viewpoints is completely rejected. Yet…it seems that the forces that rise up in resistance to foreign occupation are the same ones that instigate terrorism in our societies…No one wants to talk about this issue because it would seem to…deligitimize the right of resistance at a time when Israeli state terrorism has reached such severe levels (Arab terrorists, Arab victims, 2003).

In their live coverage of violence, Arab field reporters working for the new Arab satellite stations often show emotions in their reporting. They adopt what is called a “journalism of attachment” where the journalists’ emotional involvement is reflected in their reporting (Foerstel, 2001). In a report from Iraq, correspondent Ahmed Mansour’s features tightened and his eyebrows furrowed as he snapped at the anchor in the Al-Jazeera studio: “I am not going to tell you about the developments. I am going to tell you about the deteriorating situation here in Falloujah” (El-Deeb & Cooney, 2004).

The studio anchors, who are away from the scene with all its emotions, tend to be more poised and to show fewer emotions than the field anchors. For example, the Arab studio anchors use the term “killed” when an Iraqi dies as a result of a terrorist attack. However, some field reporters tend to be more emotional and occasionally use the term “martyrs” to refer to the Iraqi casualties. Another aspect of the field anchors’ emotionality is their use of absolutes and sometimes premature speculation in their assessment of the situation at hand. For example, the Al-Jazeera field anchor, Abdel Azeem Mohammed, in his report from the Iraqi city of Fallujah following the killing of four US contractors on April 1, 2004, said: “The Iraqi security forces and the American troops are absent from the scene, which maybe a sign that they are fed up with this wave of violence. This escalation that we’re witnessing today may be intentional to send a
message to the American troops that the armed resistance is the best way to get rid of the occupier.”

Walid Al-Omary, Al-Jazeera’s senior correspondent in the West Bank town of Ramallah, described the difficulty of emotional neutrality and the complexity of an Arab journalist’s position in the heart of action: “To be objective in this area is not easy because we live here. We are part of the people here. And this situation belongs to us, and we have our opinions” (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003, p.53).

In their coverage of terrorism, Arab journalists have an edge over their Western counterparts, who were “parachuted” in to cover events in remote areas that are totally foreign to them, and who are not as familiar with the Middle Eastern culture and language with all its nuances and intricacies. This has allowed the Arab reporters to provide their audiences with a thematic narrative to make sense of a range of diverse stories and individual incidents. Most terrorist incidents covered by Arab media are placed in context. Information about the perpetrators is balanced by information about the official response to them.

For example, in its coverage of a Bin Laden tape in which he warned the European countries to stay away from Iraq or face the consequences, Al-Jazeera satellite channel invited a panel of officials and experts, including a spokesman from the German Parliament, a Saudi media professor, an Arab researcher from Washington, and a Belgian political science professor. The panelists assessed the Bin Laden message, comparing it to previous messages and highlighting its implications.

On many occasions, Arab journalists try to approach political violence thematically by providing explanations for the actions of Palestinian suicide bombers. This thematic coverage includes shedding some light on the background of a suicide bomber and his reasons for
committing such acts. These journalists who are catering to their Arab audiences are often accused by Western media of contributing to the “legitimation of terrorists and encouraging them to engage in further acts of violence” (Irvin, 1992, p.65).

8.1 Is There a Clash of civilization on Arab talk shows?

The concept of “the Clash of Civilizations” first appeared in an article published by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs. In that article, Huntington argued that the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations (Huntington, 1993).

Many discussions by various panelists invited by Arab satellite networks’ political talk shows have revolved around the concept of the “clash of civilizations” and the war between Islam and the West. The active participants in what the US administration has called “the global war on terror” have presented their own definitions: “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” was the line in the sand drawn in the immediate aftermath of September 11 attacks by the US President George W. Bush. Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden soon provided his own version of the putative dichotomy: “These events have divided the world into two camps: the camp of the faithful, and that of the unfaithful.” It is a war on terrorism for the former, “an obligatory jihad against Crusaders and Jews for the latter” (Mneimneh, 2003).

President Bush’s zero-sum environment, and his characterization of the war as a “crusade” helped feed that notion of the clash of civilizations despite attempts on the part of many Arab news anchors to put that into the American perspective in saying that President Bush meant an all-out effort to fight terrorism, and he was not referring to the historical Crusades.
Announcements by President Bush that Iraq was part of the “Axis of Evil,” which also include Iran and North Korea, and that the invasion of Iraq was only phase one of what was meant to be a multi-phase military campaign have also nurtured the belief in the Arab world that the United States was launching a war against Islam. In this context, Hafez Al-Mirazi, the former Al-Jazeera Washington bureau chief, said: “When President Bush is asked about Iraq, he says, this is phase one. How about Somalia? Phase one. Philippines? Phase one? What do you mean? Are you going to use September 11th to continue for your next four or eight-year wars as phase two, phase three, etc.?” (Foreign correspondents’ perspectives, 2001).

In the “global war on terror” launched by the US administration to root out terrorist cells around the world, the Arab media outlets have been primarily interested in the impact of the war on the ordinary people as well as on the perceived passivity and inaction of Arab regimes in influencing events on the ground. The Afghan war was the first real war to be covered by any Arab network. Much of the Arab media coverage of that war focused on the destruction US bombing had on the Afghan people, cities, and infrastructure. Al-Jazeera, which was the only network in Afghanistan during the beginning stages of the US bombings, framed the war in terms of the human toll and the personal suffering of the Afghanis. Graphic video footage of death and damage to civilian sites, such as houses, mosques, and complete villages, had a profound effect on the Arab audiences. “This media framing reinforced the popular perception among Arabs that the war in Afghanistan was not against the Taliban per se but rather against Islam and Arabs” (Jasperson & Kikhia, 2003, p.126). Some of the most disturbing videos of the campaign were those that specifically showed the personal lives of Afghanis that lost loved ones. One such image was presented of an Afghani who had lost fifteen members of his family in a bombed building in the Afghan capital, Kabul. He did not need to elaborate on his emotional
pain with actions or words. Video footage showing the man searching for his relatives through the rubble was enough to make viewers sympathize with him. It was that kind of coverage that appeared to have angered the US government and military establishment and ultimately led to the “mistaken” bombing of the Al-Jazeera offices in Kabul. (Jasperson & Kikhia, 2003).

The Arab media outlets, especially Al-Jazeera, have proven to be strong contenders with the Western networks, such as CNN and BBC, in their coverage of what the United States calls “the war on terror.” Achieving journalistic scoops on the ground, interviewing key terrorist members, and covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the political violence involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict using their own correspondents and resources have gained Al-Jazeera regional as well as international legitimacy and credibility.

Al-Jazeera’s coverage of terrorist activities and political violence in the Middle East would not have been possible had it not been for the freedom of expression that the new Arab media outlets have struggled to achieve. Today, the young Arab journalists are faced with a set of challenging questions that they need to address in their coverage of future conflicts and terrorist activities: How to sort truth from propaganda in a world of conflicting accusations? How to continue to present all viewpoints in such a sensitive problem as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? What impact does anti-American sentiment in the region have on a journalist’s ability to report this complex story? Zayani (2005a) argues that what makes Al-Jazeera a unique phenomenon is its combination of two trends: On the one hand, it adopts Western journalistic practices, such as enjoying editorial independence outside the government realm, being the first on the scene, and broadcasting live, newsworthy and timely information and exclusive footage; on the other hand, it utilizes these practices to present an Arab perspective that may be contrary to the Western narrative. Zayani describes this situation as Al-Jazeera’s “hybridity” (p. 30).
The interesting aspect about Al-Jazeera viewers is that they perceive the network as credible for the very reason of presenting an Arab news perspective that corresponds with their cultural and social values. A survey of a purposive sample of Al-Jazeera viewers by Johnson and Fahmy (2005) found that overall, the respondents rated Al-Jazeera’s credibility higher than that of CNN, the BBC and local Arab media. In this survey, which was posted on Al-Jazeera’s Arabic website, the viewers noted that Al-Jazeera “promotes the belief that the Iraq war was unjust and increases support for the Palestinian cause, presumably perspectives they support” (Johnson & Fahmy, 2005). These perceptions of Al-Jazeera viewers indicate that when it comes to Al-Jazeera’s popularity, objectivity is not the issue; credibility is what matters, and Al-Jazeera has it. What enhances Al-Jazeera’s credibility is its keenness in presenting different sides to the story, even the sides that do not support the Arab perspective on issues. Al-Jazeera’s attempt to harness the advantages of both context and objectivity represents an experiment that redefines modern journalism. Its attempt at delivering news and commentary that juxtaposes multiple opinions and realities into a single mosaic is a testament to the network’s pursuit of contextual objectivity, especially in its coverage of critical conflicts. However, attempts to strike equilibrium between the tensions of context and objectivity have left Al-Jazeera celebrated by admirers and battered by critics (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002).

While most news networks engage in contextual objectivity, consciously or otherwise, in their day-to-day coverage, Al-Jazeera is perhaps the first network to articulate this approach as a network philosophy. The channel’s motto “The Opinion and the Other Opinion,” repeated frequently during program intermissions, is an indication that the channel aspires to cover all sides of a particular story, and that it has instituted a pluralistic media discourse. Al-Jazeera
believes that public discourse can only be equitable and effective if all possible opinions and views are expressed and demonstrated equally, whether they are Israeli, Palestinian, American or Turkish. Al-Jazeera’s philosophy suggests that “truth” is the culmination of multiple conglomerated subjectivities (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002).

But in the process of trying to live up to its motto, Al-Jazeera has also tried to appeal to the values and beliefs of its Arab audiences. This seemingly paradoxical dilemma is for some a form of contextual objectivity. Al-Jazeera has been telling the American side of the story in Iraq, even as it sympathizes with the plight of the Iraqi people for independence. Its sympathy with the Palestinian cause does not deter it from interviewing Israeli journalists and politicians (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002).

Although Al-Jazeera executives claim that they present their news in a fair, accurate and balanced manner, they do not deny that the station presents news from an Arab perspective to correct anti-Arab distortions and to counter dominant Western perspectives like CNN and the BBC. In this context, Mohammed Jasim Al-Ali, the former Al-Jazeera managing director, argued that “…they [Al-Jazeera staff] take the professional experience from the BBC, but their background as Arabs means we can adapt this experience and apply it to the Arab world. We know the mentality of the Arabs” (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003, p. 54). Along the same lines, Hafez Al-Mirazi, Al-Jazeera former Washington bureau chief, explains that “CNN has an American perspective. We have an Arab perspective. People call it bias. We call it perspective” (Scott, 2003).

The response of the U.S. administration to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to regard, frame, and represent them as acts of war and to declare a global “war on terrorism”. In his first statement about September 11, President Bush repeatedly portrayed the conflict as a war between
good and evil. He extensively used the “wild-west” metaphor, calling for bin Laden “dead or alive”, and he described the campaign as a “crusade” (Erjavec and Volcic, 2007). Aruti (2003) claims that since 9/11 the definition of terrorism has multiplied and that “the war on terrorism” has become “a war on evil”. Aruti states that the war on terrorism nowadays is also related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: “It is in this framework that Bush sees the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. Irrespective of the ideology, orientation, or methods of struggle, all variants of the Palestinian resistance are simplified and subsumed under the category of terrorism”. (Aruti, 2003: 198)

Terms such as terrorist, extremist and fanatic are, in the West, associated with Arab or Muslim fundamentalists, and they are used in particular in regard to people who use violence in their resistance against the West. (Aruri, 2003) Thus, when terrorism is spoken of in terms such as extremist(s) are used in relation to Israel, it appears that Al-Jazeera attempts to reposition the discourse of terrorism. That is, Al-Jazeera re-contextualizes the discourse on terrorism. The notion of re-contextualization is the incorporation of elements from one social practice/context into another. Re-contextualization involves “a movement of discourse(s) across practices, from one type of a practice (e.g. the Bush’s administration practice) or context (e.g. the situation in the USA after 9/11) to another” (Erjavec and Volcic, 2007: 127). The discourse on terrorism as used in the Bush’s administration practice, and which can also be seen in the news coverage of Western news outlets, is moved to practices concerning Israeli violence and their extreme political stance in the Middle East conflict. Al-Jazeera takes elements of the discourse on terrorism and relates these to the Israeli side. In recasting this discourse, Al-Jazeera relates terrorism to violence from Israelis and attributes to the Israelis characteristics that imply a radical political stance that endangers freedom.
This study has shown that absolute journalistic objectivity is a myth, and that media outlets cannot be devoid of a perspective that reflects the leanings of their public constituencies. A broadcast network is more likely to present news in a way that is consonant with its audience’s norms and values when the event it is covering has a direct impact on that audience. Cunningham (2003) argued that “journalists…must acknowledge, humbly and publicly, that what we do is far more subjective and far less detached than the aura of objectivity implies – and the public wants to believe. If we stop claiming to be mere objective observers, it will not end the charges of bias, but will allow us to defend what we do from a…less hypocritical position.” The onus falls on the audience members to be aware of the inherent biases in different media systems. In today’s open media environment, audiences have the option to follow news on various broadcast networks if they want to compare these networks’ coverage of the same event.

The broadcast networks, on their part, can aspire to achieve a more realistic standard, which is contextual objectivity, by presenting multiple sides of the story while emphasizing a certain degree of slant to appeal to their target audiences’ sensibilities. While covering major political and military conflicts, Al-Jazeera lives up to its motto “The Opinion and the Other Opinion.” Although Al-Jazeera broadcasts in the context of the Arab cultural and political environment, it has gained legitimacy, credibility and popularity – both regionally and internationally – by presenting divergent, and often opposing, opinions. It has also encouraged other networks in the Arab world to emulate its style and integrate its editorial policy in their programming.
Appendix 1: Arabic Transcripts and Corresponding English Translations
Min Wāshinṭin Program 1 – American Media Discourse

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<th>American Media Discourse</th>
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<td>• Presenter of segment: Muhammad al-Alami</td>
<td>• مقدم الحلقة: محمد العلمي</td>
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<td>• Guests on segment: Mouafac Harb, News Director, Radio Sawa and Alhurrah Television; Fadil al-Amin, Editor in Chief, Hi Magazine; Hani Salamah, film producer; Hassan Najmi, President of the Moroccan Union of Writers</td>
<td>• ضيف الحلقة: موافع حرب، مدير الأخبار في إذاعة سوا وتلفزيون الحرية؛ فضيل الأمين، مدير تحرير مجلة هاي؛ هاني سلامه، مخرج سينمائي؛ حسن نجمي، رئيس اتحاد كتاب المغرب</td>
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<td>• تاريخ الحلقة: 8 يوليو 2004</td>
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<td>• Topics of the program:</td>
<td>• مواضيع البرنامج</td>
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<td>o Directed media message</td>
<td>o رسالة الإعلام الموجه</td>
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<td>o American consciousness has no notion of the Arab identity</td>
<td>o غياب الهوية العربية عن الأذهان الأمريكية</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Arabs have incomplete image of Americans</td>
<td>o الصورة المنقوصة لدى العرب عن الأميركان</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Youth are the hope for a meeting of civilizations</td>
<td>o الشباب هم أمل تلاقي الحضارات</td>
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Muhammad al-Alami: We welcome our viewers to this week's segment of the program “From Washington.” The problem of the Arabs’ relationship with America is becoming deeper and more entangled almost daily. America has now become an Arab neighbor, even though it has handed over sovereignty to the Iraqis. The issue of Iraq has become the deciding factor in the elections this year in America. Nonetheless, we do not understand America, and America does not understand us. We will attempt to ascertain some of the reasons for this love-hate relationship between the two civilizations, and whether the media is a part of the solution or a part of the problem. To discuss these issues, I am pleased to host Mouafac Harb, News Director of Radio Sawa and Alhurrah Television; and Fadil al-Amin, Editor in Chief of Hi Magazine, which is published by the US State Department. From New York, we are joined by film producer Hani Salamah. From Rabat, we will be joined shortly by Hassan Najmi, the President of the Moroccan Union of Writers.

A recent US Senate subcommittees hearing leads...
one to conclude that the US Government believes that its problems in the Arab world boil down to misunderstanding in the media, and that the achievements of Radio Sawa and Alhurrah to date are encouraging.

[Recorded report]

Muhammad al-Alami: In the US Congress, several American legislators are congratulating themselves and Radio Sawa and Alhurrah television officials on the US Government’s efforts to convey the news with objectivity to the Arab world and to lessen the enmity toward America in the Middle East.

Norman Pattiz, a member of the State Department’s Broadcasting Board of Governors: Our mission is to provide them with an example of a free press à la America. We have demonstrated, through Radio Sawa that they listen and are influenced. The study that we conducted shows that about two-thirds of Radio Sawa’s listeners have a positive view of America compared to non-listeners.

Muhammad al-Alami: The difficulty faced by those in charge of this enormous project was made clear in the Senate chamber. If the mission of persuading necessarily begins with capturing the attention of others, the way is still long and perhaps deep, as stated by the International Broadcasting Agency official. Mouafac, according to what has been achieved so far in radio and television, has the American project begun to bear fruit in your view?

Mouafac Harb, Alhurrah News Director: First of all, what is the American project? We are a television station and a radio station. We should not be so naïve as to think that a radio or television station can solve all the problems. However, there are urgent efforts at the diplomatic, bilateral, and
Muhammad al-Alami: Hani Salamah in New York, you participated in producing the film “Control Room” about Aljazeera, which provided you with an opportunity to see how the world is covered from an Arab vantage. You have also had an opportunity to view the Arab world from America. Do you believe, as Fadil and Mouafac have said, that there is a favorable reaction in the Arab world, and that it is only a matter of time?

Hani Salamah, film producer, New York: It could be that most Arabs have a negative view of a channel such as Alhurrah, because they think that the channel’s objective is to change the culture and medium of the Arab citizen. From my perspective, we need to establish media channels together, because there are always new events. The problem today is that “history is written by the victors,” which means...History is written by the victors, because new events constantly arise, and these events are covered without transparency.

Muhammad al-Alami: Mouafac, if you accept Hani’s statement that history is written by the victors, the Americans are the victors in the region. Some accuse Sawa and Alhurrah specifically of providing media coverage of a defeated region, coverage that is heartless and unfeeling or does not take into account the feelings of victims.

Mouafac Harb: This is inaccurate with all due respect to Hani Salamah, whom I believe is sitting...
in New York. [He said] ‘most of the Arabs.’ We should refrain from generalizing. We cannot know people’s opinion on all media matters. We understand the media message like any journalist working in any news editing room. He presents reliable information. We deal with the news item objectively and truthfully. We distinguish between opinion and news. If I were to give you an opinion, I would tell you that it is my opinion. However, a news item comprises facts. Emotions are opinion. There are programs and articles for expressing your feelings and emotions. There are many media through which you can express your views and feelings without transforming those media into party organs or tactical organizations for the public. I respect this. However, we must make a careful distinction, because citizens have a legitimate right to obtain reliable information so that they can form their own views and strengthen their views based on reliable information.

Min Wāshinṭūn Program 2 – Media Codes of Ethics

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<td>مقدم الحلقة: حافظ المرازي</td>
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<td>Guests on segment: Waddah Khanfar, Director-General, Al-Jazeera Network; Eason Jordan, Chief News Executive, [CNN]; Norman Solomon, Director of</td>
<td>ضيف الحلقة: وضاح خنفر، المدير العام لقناة الجزيرة، إيسن جوردن، كبير مديري الأخبار بالشبكة، نورمان سولومان، مدير</td>
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<td>Reasons for the issuance of a code of ethics</td>
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<td>American view of the media code of ethics</td>
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<td>US media’s harmonization with the US Government</td>
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<td>Media ethics of Al-Jazeera channel</td>
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**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** …Earlier this week, Aljazeera network held its first media roundtable entitled "The Media in a Changing World: Between Professional Standards and Cultural Plurality." On this occasion, Aljazeera also issued a professional code of ethics. We will focus our discussion today on this code and compare the Aljazeera standards with standards in the US media…

Before we shed light on the development of codes of ethics in the American media and the electronic media in particular, which, as we stated earlier, first appeared close to 60 years ago, I will ask Mr. Waddah Khanfar what may be the first question on the minds of Arab readers or viewers: Why issue a code of ethics now, close to eight years after Aljazeera was founded?

**Waddah Khanfar:** Actually, this is nothing new in our professional activity. Aljazeera network and its employees have been complying with these principles since the network was established. Aljazeera’s employees come from well-established schools of journalism. Such principles have been in existence, albeit verbally and unwritten. Over the past several months, we have been able to sit down and talk with our colleagues in the newsroom and with our correspondents. We held a serious
dialogue in the network, which yielded these principles. Why specifically now? For a number of reasons. First, the network has expanded significantly. We now have 70 correspondents and 23 offices spread over five continents. It is not as easy to fully communicate with our people verbally as it was in the past. Now, we have this large number of correspondents and journalists who come and go. This code is like a constitution that governs the relationship among all of us. Each one of us knows his professional boundaries and rights. The establishment of a code of ethics, I believe, is a very important step in the process of consolidating, framing, and creating ethics for what has come to be known as the ‘Arab media school.’ I believe that the past eight years has seen an Arab television media school come into being. It is a very important step for us to say, not only to our colleagues in Aljazeera network, but to our Arab colleagues in journalism and our viewers, that we are presenting them with material for which we are accountable. They can then say, yes, you have complied here, but not there. This also educates viewers in how we conduct our news operations. Viewers can then communicate with us based on these principles.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Don’t you have a problem with airing footage of a female who has been taken hostage taken in Iraq or elsewhere or images of Usama Bin Ladin or al-Zawahiri?

Eason: We deal with these problems on a case-by-case basis. I do not believe there has ever been a time when a report or statement of Bin Ladin’s was not aired on CNN. However, we study it carefully before broadcasting it. We actually do not broadcast live or as soon as we receive [footage]. I believe that there should be editorial criticism of Bin Ladin. We should not permit ourselves to be a mere mouthpiece for al-Qaeda. Therefore, we exercise some editorial control. However, at the same time, we do not censor sensitive information, regardless of how much people dislike what Bin Ladin says. In some cases, they [al-Qaeda] make threats that can affect many people. Therefore, people should have a chance to hear what he says.
However, we do not allow them to exploit CNN whenever they wish to.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Norman Solomon, you are currently focusing on, or at least accusing, the American media of having take orders from the government. Don’t the media, whether in America or even in the Arab world, reflect the general atmosphere in the sense that the general atmosphere in the Arab world harmonizes with the Palestinian intifada? Thus, how can you go against the tide and against your own audience? The general atmosphere in America supports America’s soldiers in the battlefield, regardless of how the battle began. How can you challenge this general atmosphere and the public by saying, I will oppose the government in a time of war?

Norman Solomon: The work of a journalist is not like that of an employee, such as someone working in a restaurant who takes care of his customers. The work of a journalist is to seek the truth. The British author Orwell said, ‘Freedom is the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.’ This means that television journalism shows people what they don’t want to see. Because the United States entered a war, American television has refrained in many cases from showing the human suffering brought on by the Pentagon’s actions and the U.S. President’s orders.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Eason Jordan, perhaps you would like to comment on what Norman has said about the American media in particular I would like to avoid revisiting coverage of the war and the discussion surrounding it. Rather, let’s focus on adherence to professional ethics and standards.

Eason Jordan: I do not believe that the criticism is entirely fair, though some of it may be legitimate. We must remember that the American media comprises hundreds if not thousands of organizations. Some do their work better than others. Some begin in the United States and are...
excellent. Is there not one in the Arab world that
does excellent work? In Iraq, even today, we
report on civilians being killed and show images
when we obtain them. Perhaps we do not show
enough to satisfy everyone. But we do try to be
sufficiently tasteful. We show that people have
been killed. However, we do not show people who
have been decapitated. We may not show a
decapitation. We try hard to do things right. But
we do not try to place a curtain over the sorrows
and tragedies of war. We are not afraid of showing
something frightful.

Waddah Khanfar: A key question here is: When
we refrain from broadcasting ugly images of war,
are we falsifying or glamorizing the ugly face of
war? An American or Western station may not
have the opportunity to broadcast many of these
images. But when a station is planted in the
Middle East, in the Arab world, in a region of daily
incidents of killing, displacement, destruction, and
bombing, how can you report these facts to viewers
without showing these images? I agree with Mr.
Jordan that there are limits in this regard. We have
controls regarding the images that we show—the
torn-off limbs, lest we present an emotionally
disturbing picture. For example, we are not at all
showing the footage of the massacres that are now
occurring repeatedly. We tell viewers that the
incident occurred, and we are certain, because we
saw it, and we have the footage, but we do not want
[to show] it. We also have children and people
with feelings. We cannot broadcast everything.
However, unfortunately, a certain dose of such
incidents appears in the Arab media, because we
cannot ignore reality. I too have been accused of
glamorizing the face of the destructive war now
occurring in the region.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Eason, go ahead.
Eason Jordan: There is nothing nice in decapitation. It is inappropriate for us to show such images. I congratulate al-Jazeera. Some time ago, there was the beheading of the journalist, Dan Pearl. At that time, I believe, al-Jazeera made a mistake. What I believe is that al-Jazeera has realized it now—that it showed that tape, and CNN did not and would not show it and it would not do anything of the sort in the future. I don’t believe that this in any way is [close to] the horror that accompanied the incident. However, in al-Jazeera’s case, the decision was a mature decision, a mature, news judgment. I must congratulate al-Jazeera, because, during the past few months at least, it has served its viewers in the Arab world as best it can.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Norman Solomon, to what extent do you see the logic in the position of CNN and al-Jazeera of not showing images of hostages that are issued?

Norman Solomon: I believe it is good to observe good taste in everything. However, frankly, compared to one person who is decapitated, there are hundreds and thousands of people in the Iraq war whom the Americans have killed—much larger numbers of Iraqis. I believe that this is decisively important for our understanding of what CNN and other American networks are circulating about the war. Each minute of coverage of civilian suffering in the war led by the United States is matched by hours and hours of coverage of President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, the generals, the officers, and others, with statements and interviews vindicating the causing of that suffering. Coverage of the two cannot be compared. This is one way in which CNN lies, namely through its selection of what to show about the war. I have a question for Mr. Jordan. He works hard and is a professional. He has great

stature regarding a memorandum submitted by a senior CNN employee to CNN employees in the autumn of 2001, instructing them that whenever there is a sign or display of civil suffering in Afghanistan because of an American bombardment or the war, there is a need to remind the public of the suffering that was caused on September 11 by the terrorist attacks against the United States. This is an instruction by the CNN management sending the message that a propaganda message is needed on every such occasion, which is an attempt to justify a crime against humanity with other ideas against humanity. It is precisely this joint justification that is perpetuating the circle of violence—this violence and killing, which is appreciated and desired by criminals like Bush and Bin Laden.

Hafiz al-Marazi: Eason.

Eason Jordan: Can I respond to that? First, arguing with labels is truly not good. I would not want to accuse CNN of lying. If we wanted to talk about memoranda from management from several years ago, I can tell you what the situation was regarding Afghanistan. For a long time, only one television network was permitted to broadcast images from Afghanistan. Literally, the only images that came out for days and days from Afghanistan were images of wounded civilians. Such images alone were shown because the Taliban authorities permitted only those images. However, when the war ended, we found that the civilian injuries, regardless of how tragic they were, were much less than what some had been predicting. This does not mean that I diminish the loss of lives, which is horrible. However, the images coming out of the war were not just those of wounded civilians. There were other wounds of which not a single image was presented. We had an obligation in Afghanistan to be fair and to provide context. Otherwise, you would only hear about injuries among civilians. The story was much greater than that.

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Norman Solomon: The truth is that American media coverage by CNN and other networks in the autumn of that year focused overwhelmingly on justifications by the American administration and senior officials. There was lower-than-average coverage of the persons who were releasing those bombs or the persons who were suffering from the bombs.

Eason Jordan: With all due respect, I believe we should complain to the Taliban leadership, which permitted CNN to be present...

Norman Solomon: You were the one who compiled the montage.

Hafiz al-Mazari: Eason Jordan, were any restrictions placed on CNN regarding coverage in Iraq or anywhere in the occupied Palestinian territories by the Israeli censor? Were texts read and censored before they were issued? Did they pass through a censor? Is our problem that we cannot broadcast the Iraqi casualties surrounding us at the Baghdad airport because we are prohibited from doing so?

Eason Jordan: I am not aware of any Israeli censorship of CNN reports broadcasted from Gaza. We provided coverage from Gaza a number of times, creating considerable tension and annoyance for the Israeli government. We do not seek to satisfy or anger any government, person, etc. We are there to tell the facts. If we face any kind of censorship, as happened on the day that Saddam Hussein appeared in court, we report that immediately, as we are required to do.

Hafiz al-Mazari: Norman Solomon, you have the last word, in less than a minute if possible.

Norman Solomon: The entire matter ultimately concerns the adoption of the code of ethics. It is the applicable standard. However, we can say that...
outcomes are generally based on senior media officials’ decisions. Frequently, there is self-censorship, both intended and unintended. As stated by the speaker a short time ago, it is very important that we understand that our material is human, and that we intentionally or unintentionally value some living organisms more so than others. We are necessarily biased more toward some human than others, making us inhumane and more a part of the problem than the solution for what we face as humans on this planet.

Hafiz al-Mazari: On this point, which we are at least all discussing as humans and members of the same species, I end this discussion. There may be agreement regarding CNN’s practices as stated by Eason Jordan. Although, ultimately, no code of ethics or professional standards can take the place of the personal judgment of the journalist or media professional, provided they establish standards of credibility and objectivity. However, any media organization will certainly be judged by the extent of its long-term commitment and not—perhaps even in one case or another—al Jazeera’s professional code of ethics and its position in the evolution of codes of ethics in the American media.
**Min Wāshinţin Program 3 – Washington’s Demand for Democracy in the Arab World, and the Struggle of Terrorism**

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**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** Welcome to this segment of our program, “From Washington.” We will attempt in this segment to treat three topics concerning the capital Washington and its visitors from the Arab world. The first topic is President Bush, who has resumed speaking about the need to counter dictatorships in the Arab world and spread democracy, although he is also praising several countries.

[Recorded Report]

**حافظ المرازي:** مرحبا بكم معنا في هذه الحلقة من برنامج من واشنطن. سنحاول في هذه الحلقة أن نتناول ثلاث موضوعات تتعلق بالعاصمة واشنطن أو بزوارها من العالم العربي. الموضوع الأول الرئيس بوش يعود للحديث عن ضرورة مكافحة الدكتاتوريات في العالم العربي ونشر الديمقراطية لكنه يمتدح بعض الدول.

[تقرير مسجل]
George Bush: From Morocco to Jordan to Qatar. \(^{137}\)

Hafiz al-Mirazi: In this segment, we will also speak with Yemen's Foreign Minister, who is visiting Washington. Many of his meetings are focusing on the countering of terrorism, particularly as Arab leaders have begun to praise Washington's positions on terror after hesitating and dawdling in praising Washington for its fight against terror. The third topic concerns the visit of an Egyptian delegation comprising academicians, members of the People's Assembly, and businessmen to knock on doors, get close to Washington and decisionmaking centers, and affirm Egyptian-American relations. We previously discussed Saudi-American relations and similar visits. We will attempt to ascertain the nature of this visit and what distinguishes it.

On the occasion of the opening of an exhibition at the Library of Congress in Washington on Wednesday on the life of the British leader Winston Churchill, US President George Bush again linked the fight against terror to the spread of democracy in the Arab world. He said that America is pursuing a strategy to spread freedom in the region, which is confronting the enemies of reform and allies of terror as he called them. He stressed that America is now making unprecedented demands on its friends.

[Recorded report]

George Bush: For a very long time, US policy has been ignorant of the persecution of people and their

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\(^{137}\) From Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace London, England, released on November 19, 2003: "Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress… have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html).
loss of hope. This time has passed. We can regain our trust now. Freedom will vanquish persecution and oppression in the Middle East as it did in Germany, Japan, and Eastern Europe.

الأميركية اضطهاد الناس وفقدان أمهم هذا الزمن قد ولى وبإمكاننا أن نستعيد ثقتنا الآن وكما حصل في ألمانيا واليابان وأوروبا الشرقية فإن الحرية ستنتصر على الاضطهاد والقمع في الشرق الأوسط.
The Middle East in Bush's Rhetoric

- **Presenter of segment:** Hafiz al-Mirazi
- **Guests on segment:** Mouafac Harb, journalist and News Director, Radio Sawa and Alhurrah Television; Laith Kubba [Senior Program] officer for the Middle East at the National Endowment for Democracy; Daniel Brumberg, Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University; Halah Mustafa, Editor in Chief, the quarterly Democracy Review
- **Date of segment:** January 22, 2004
- **Topics of the program:**
  - Programs of the American National Endowment for Democracy
  - Focus on the democracy, and disregard of primary issues
  - Alhurrah’s message for the Arabs
  - Alhurrah’s policy on coverage of Arab issues

Hafiz al-Mirazi: We welcome you again to the second part of our program, "From Washington." This segment is devoted to the attention given to the Middle East and Arab world in President Bush's State of the Union address, which he delivered on Tuesday in a joint session of Congress. We have spoken about democracy and support for democracy in the region, especially through the increase in the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy and the projects in which these funds can be invested, even though they are very modest. President Bush also dealt in general in his State of the Union address with the Middle East, i.e., the Arab world, but said nothing to address concerns of importance to Arab viewers, particularly the peace process and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
George Bush [from the 2004 State of the Union address]: To cut through the barriers of hateful propaganda, the Voice of America and other broadcast services are expanding their programming in Arabic and Persian -- and soon, a new television service will begin providing reliable news and information across the region.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Indeed, there has been considerable talk about a new television station to broadcast the news to the Arab world. President Bush clearly stated that he supports a role for the Voice of America and for media beamed from Washington to the Arab world. Bush's speech on November 6, 2003 on support for democracy in the Arab is reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's speech to the Eastern Bloc and the former Soviet Union in Britain in 1982. Reagan viewed the Voice of America and the directed media as a pickax for destroying the leadership and walls of the Eastern Bloc. It seems that George Bush will also use the pickax of the directed media in the form of Radio Sawa, which was established to replace the voice of America's Arabic service, and Alhurrah Television station. President Bush supports both of these projects of the Board of Broadcasting Governors. The board supervises radio Sawa and the new television station and certainly has the White House's political support. There is also talk of allocating an extremely large amount for Alhurrah Television. We are talking about more than $60 million in the first year. President Bush himself heralded the new television station for the Middle East region so much so that a famous Lebanese commentator said that although President Bush saluted Mr. Adnan Pachachi, the current President of the Provisional Governing Council in Iraq, in his State of the Union address, the Arab personage on whom Bush will rely in the Middle East is not Adnan Pachachi, but rather another person, Mouafac Harb, the director of Alhurrah Television and our guest in the second segment of our program "From Washington." Welcome Mouafac.

Mouafac Harb: Hello.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: You have accomplished
something with Radio Sawa regardless of the views on this subject. Let's begin not with Radio Sawa, but rather with the television station announced by President Bush. Some had been expecting movement on the roadmap and the establishment of a Palestinian state on such and such a date. However, it seems that you have been assigned, as stated in the Lebanese press, to be President Bush’s point man for change. What did you have in your quiver to give us? Which direction is Alhurrah taking to stop the hatred and enmity toward America that is being broadcast by our detestable station Aljazeera?

Mouafac Harb: First, there are many exaggerations in your introduction. It is incorrect to say that Aljazeera is detestable. Many American politicians and journalists in the United States believe that Aljazeera's accomplishments deserve to be highlighted, because of their impact on the media and politics in the Arab world. Now, I shall return to the other exaggerations with which you begin. First, we reject the term ‘directed media'. Now that the Cold War has ended, nobody believes that ‘directed media'—an uncultivated socialist, communist term—can achieve anything.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Let us call it the external media.

Mouafac Harb: It is media like any other media. We have a mission. The mission of the Board of Broadcasting Governors, whom you know from your days at Voice of America, is to spread, advocate, and promote freedom and democracy. As journalists, we—yourself included—believe that if you want to serve freedom and democracy as a journalist, the only way to do so is by providing accurate information that helps viewers or citizens consolidate or form their views in a sound manner.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: However, US law prohibits the government from broadcasting government-supported directed media inside the United States to its citizens. British citizens may consume the
BBC. But the Voice of America, your television station, may not broadcast inside America.

Mouafac Harb: You are correct. But the reality is different in view—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): It seems that anything I say will indeed differ from that in view—

Mouafac Harb: One of the objectives of Alhurrah and Sawa is to expose the exaggerations that may be stated about them from time to time. First, regarding the fact that we are not allowed to broadcast inside the United States, it would be of no use to broadcast in the United States, because our station broadcasts in the Arabic language. Second, the media in the United States is private. The state may not participate in the media sector. Regardless of whether the media is private or state-controlled, not only—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): Why are goods that are rejected in America presented to the Arab world and private-sector goods presented to the Americans? We are also talking about English, because the Voice of America has an English language service. Is that service also prohibited in America?

Mouafac Harb: The objective of the station and the media services overseen by the Board of Broadcasting Governors is to broadcast to viewers in the world, not in the United States, which is a totally different mission. Perhaps problems in the private American media compelled the US Congress to advocate funding for a US-supported project.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Far from the exaggerations, let us speak about the facts. Can you provide some information on Alhurrah Television for our
viewers, who have perhaps become confused about what may be seen as propaganda as opposed to a well intentioned project originating with Americans who preach the facts or at least the numbers.

Mouafac Harb: Let me provide you with a quick introduction to the Alhurrah project. One of the primary features of democracy in any society is the free, rapid reporting of information. We have begun to see the free, rapid reporting of information in the Arab world. This heralds the advent of democracy. However, it is important to note that the information must also be accurate. I personally believe, as do many observers of media and political activity in the Arab world, that there is a problem with the accuracy of information. We hope that this project will help convey an accurate picture of global events for Arab viewers. We hope to launch Alhurrah in the coming weeks. It will broadcast to the Arab region via satellite. Anyone who has an analogue or digital receiver dish or Nilesat will be able to receive Alhurrah. The programming philosophy at Alhurrah flows from the station’s objective, which is to promote democracy and freedom by providing accurate, reliable information to Arab citizens. The station will provide its viewers with comprehensive news coverage. It will directly report the facts of events that concern Arab citizens. It will carry news from the Arab region as well as world news of interest and concern to Arab citizens. Our goal is to bring the Arab viewer or media consumer into the global debate on all levels—political, social, and artistic. Alhurrah viewers, and I believe there will be many viewers—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): We hope that this will be the case for you.

Mouafac Harb: Thank you, there will be—

Hafiz al-Mirazi: I believe that you selected [the name] Alhurrah [‘the free one’]. It was supposed to be ‘Middle East Television.’

Mouafac Harb: ‘Middle East Television
[Network]’ is the English name of the network.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Yes, the umbrella organization.

Mouafac Harb: But the station’s name is Alhurrah.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Yes, I read, I believe in The New York Times, a statement that you made saying that your slogan is ‘I am free, if you want to be free, join us.’

Mouafac Harb: No, this is the explanation of the station. If we called it, for example, the ‘Free Station,’ it could be [construed] that we were coming to the region to impose something. The station is free. Whoever wishes to contemplate freedom and desires a free media sphere, this station is for him.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is Aljazeera not free? Can you offer something different? We reported the challenge message of President Bush’s speech. We report most of President Bush’s speeches, to the point of boring our viewers with coverage of events in Washington—what Rumsfeld said, what Powell said. When President Bush says that Sharon is a man of peace, do you want us to modify his remarks for Arab consumption? What would you do when a politician or President Bush tells you that Sharon is a man of peace? Would you alter his comment in reporting it to Arab viewers?

Mouafac Harb: Certainly not.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Then, there is a change—

Mouafac Harb: First of all, we are not refuting Aljazeera.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: No, disregarding Aljazeera or others. I do not want to mention others, lest it be said we criticize others.

Mouafac Harb: First, by merely calling ourselves the free station, we challenge any citizen who might wonder about the name. However, there is a yardstick. Will we remain faithful to this name?
We will leave that to the viewer. That is the challenge. We have made a promise. We do not want to break that promise. We want to fulfill it.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Will you interview leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine?

Mouafac Harb: Credibility is the key to success. We cannot enjoy credibility and the citizen’s respect if we are not reliable and transparent in our presentation of issues. Speaking as a journalist now, if an important news story arises, you must be thorough in obtaining the elements of the story if you claim to be comprehensive and claim to provide an accurate, professional report. If there arises a story with news value involving a person from Hamas—our goal as a news organization is to report credible information.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: I would like to clarify matters for the viewer. Is there any political problem with an Alhurrah correspondent directly interviewing someone from Hamas, Hizbullah, or the Islamic Jihad?

Mouafac Harb: I see no problem in that. I believe that if any topic has news value, Alhurrah promises to cover the topic with its background, context, and elements integrated in our coverage.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is there a place called Palestine? Will your correspondent conclude his reports from there by saying ‘so and so reporting from Ramallah’?

Mouafac Harb: We do not invent things. Rather, we apply to each country terms that are recognized by respected media organizations.
**Hafiz al-Mirazi** (interrupting): Excuse me, does ‘respected’ mean non-Arab?

**Mouafac Harb:** I did not say that. Aljazeera is respected and enjoys creditability.

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** The Arab stations, for example, say Palestine.

**Mouafac Harb:** I believe that—

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** Will you use the word ‘Palestine’?

**Mouafac Harb:** I will answer you. First, President Bush was the first in the West to speak of the establishment of the state of Palestine—

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** In the future, but I mean now. Will a correspondent in this region say Palestine when he concludes his report?

**Mouafac Harb:** He will say ‘from the territory of the Palestinian National Authority.’

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** How is it that you deny the Palestinians something the United Nations grants them. There is a sign at the United Nations on which ‘Palestine’ is written.

**Mouafac Harb:** I will answer you directly.

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** Please, go ahead.

**Mouafac Harb:** I believe that it is Palestine. Journalists believe that it is Palestine. The Arab world believes that it is Palestine. Media organizations do not grant recognition. We are journalists, not decisionmakers. If everyday I said Palestine—

**Hafiz al-Mirazi:** Who grants recognition, the US
Mouafac Harb: The Palestinian National Authority threatens daily to declare a state. Even the Palestinian National Authority has not yet declared a state. We are journalists. Hafiz, if I were to recognize a state, my opinion and media organization would be worthless.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: US forces in Iraq are another controversial topic. Some are wondering how Alhurrah will refer to these forces. Will they refer to them as ‘an occupation’?

Mouafac Harb: Their name is ‘the coalition forces.’

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Fine, but do not the Americans themselves use the term ‘occupation,’ as does Rand Rahim, Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations and the United States in Washington?

Mouafac Harb: There is a difference between the English and Arabic languages. Arabic ‘iḥtilāl’ is translated literally as ‘occupation.’ English ‘resistance’ is translated as Arabic ‘muqāwamah.’ However, the word ‘resistance’ in English does not connote the inflaming of feelings. By contrast, in the Arabic language, the word ‘muqāwamah’ is exalted and has other meanings besides ‘resistance.’ I do not believe, excuse me, I cannot believe—

Hafiz al-Mirazi (interrupting): Are ‘resistance’ and ‘occupation’ not in the political lexicon?

Mouafac Harb: I do not believe that most of the Iraqi people today believe that an explosion targeting Iraqi civilians is resistance. If you respond with today's statistics to show me that the Iraqi people believe that the killing of civilians now occurring in Iraq is ‘resistance,’ I would say to you, let us call it ‘resistance.’

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Iraqi civilians are not talking in the way that you mentioned. However, are they saying, if you strike the Americans, it is understandable? Would you understand if they
struck the Americans. Would you call them ‘resistance’?

Mouafac Harb: Who has claimed responsibility to date? Has someone claimed responsibility? Did the resistance claim responsibility?

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Is the problem— The conversation has been cut off with Mouafac Harb in the interview which I have just been conducting with him. However, we are short on time and may not be able to complete the other interview segments. Is it an American political problem? Or is it that America’s image is distorted by anti-American media in the Arab world? It is at least an open question, like the issue of democracy in the Arab world and Washington’s intentions in this regard. Is it merely a change of subject? Or is it a real intention? These elements were covered in the President Bush’s treatment of the Arab world and the Middle East in his state of the union address before Congress. In this address, President Bush avoided the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though there is a consensus that it is the pivotal issue in the Middle East. Rather, he spoke about democracy and the need to create a media to counter the antipathy of the media in the Middle East. This concludes this segment of our program ‘From Washington.’ I thank you and I thank the program staff in Doha and here in Washington.

اليوم ونفترجني أن الشعب العراقي يعتقد أنه ما يحصل اليوم في العراق من قتل مدنيين عراقيين يسمى مقاومة، أنا أقولك نسبيها مقاومة.

حافظ المرازي: عظيم هم يقولون.. المدنيين العراقيين لا كما ذكرت ولكن يقولون إذا ضربوا الأميركيين هذا مفهوم؟ هل هذا مفهوم لديكم إذا ضربوا أميركيين ستسموها” مقاومة”؟

موفق حرب: مين يعلن مسؤوليته حتى اليوم؟ حد أعلن مسؤوليته؟ هل هي مقاومة؟

حافظ المرازي: هل المشكلة مواقف ه.. انقطع الحوار مرفع حرب في لقاء أجريته معه قبل قليل ولكن لضيق الوقت ربما لن نستطيع أن نستكمل باقي فقراته. هل هي مشكلة سياسية أميركية أو مشكلة صورة أميركية التي شوهدت الإعلام المضاد لها في العالم العربي؟ على الأقل هو سؤال مفتوح شأنه شأن مسألة الديمقراطية في العالم العربي ونوايا واسطوان بالنسبة لها، هل هي مجرد تغيير الموضوع أم هي نية حقيقية؟ على أي حال كانت هذه عنصر عن نصيب العالم العربي والشرق الأوسط في خطاب الرئيس بوش عن حالة الاتحاد الأميركي الذي ألقاه في الكونغرس وتجنب فيه قضية الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي التي هناك إجماع فيها على أنها القضية المحورية في الشرق الأوسط، لكنه تحدث عن موضوع الديمقراطية أيضا عن ضرورة إيجاد إعلام يواجه الإعلام الكراهي هناك، أختم بهذا هذا البرنامج أو هذه الحلقة من برنامجهنا من واسطنا، أشكركم وأشكر فريق البرنامج في الدوحة وهنا في العاصمة الأميركية مع تحياتهم وتحياتي حافظ المرازي.
### Min Wāshinṭūn Program 5 – 9/11 Commission Report

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### Hafiz al-Mirazi:  
The recommendations proposed by the 9/11 investigations include a dialogue with the Arab and Islamic world. A dialogue is also taking place in New York, not in Washington, between the United Nations and regional organizations, specifically the Arab League. Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara has followed this dialogue and provides us with details in the following report:

[Recorded Report]

### Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara:  
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations has become extremely important as a new national order takes shape. This was stated by Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa in a Security Council session in the context of his remarks on the new circumstances being faced by these organizations.

[تقرير مسجل]

عبد الرحمان فقراء: التعاون بين الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الإقليمية أصبح يكتسي أهمية قصوى في الوقت الذي يجري فيه رسم نظام دولي جديد هكذا صرح الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية عمرو موسى في جلسة لمجلس الأمن في سياق حديثه عن
Amr Musa: The new global and regional circumstances concern not only extraordinary political circumstances, but also deeply rooted economic and social problems that combine poverty, backwardness, disease, and terrorism.

Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara: While Israel accuses the Palestinians of engaging in terrorism, and the violence continues in Iraq, some entities, including the Arab League, are underscoring the need to distinguish between terrorism and resistance to occupation. Lakhdar Brahimi, the special envoy to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has expressed his support for such a distinction in the case of Iraq. However, other international entities have a different view on the same situation.

Khafyir Boubouria - the chairman of the Counterterrorism Committee at the United Nations: There is no uniform definition of terrorism in the United Nations yet. However, the importance of terrorism since September 11 will increase as a result of the American accusations that Iran took part in some way in 9/11 attacks, an accusation which Iran rejects.

Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara: There is no uniform definition of terrorism in the United Nations. However, concern with this terrorism since the events of 9/11 is growing, especially in view of recent American accusations that Iran is connected to the 9/11 events, although Iran denies these accusations. Many regional organizations, including the Arab league, point to their role in resisting the attempt to marginalize the United Nations and the multilateral world order in dealing with terrorism and other issues, as indicated by Amr Musa and his counterparts—to the extent that they came again to the Security Council to emphasize this role. Abd-al-Rahim Fuqara, Al-Jazeera, New York.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Before Amr Musa left New York and the United States, I spoke with him on Wednesday evening regarding these topics, which

الظروف الجديدة التي تواجهها تلك المنظمات.

عمرو موسى: الظروف العالمية والإقليمية الجديدة والمتجادة التي لا تتقبل فقط بظروف سياسية طارئة وإنما بشمائل اقتصادية واجتماعية تراجعة يجمعها الفقر والخطر والعجز والإرهاب.

عبد الرحيم فقارة: وفي الوقت الذي تتهيم فيه إسرائيل الفلسطينيين بممارسة الإرهاب وتجاهلهم في وتيرة أعمال العنف في العراق توجد بعض الجهات ومن بينها جامعة الدول العربية على ضرورة التمييز بين الإرهاب ومقاومة الاحتلال وبالرغم من أن الأخضر الإيراني المستشار الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة كوفي عنان كان قد أعرب عن دعمه لذلك التمييز في الحالة العراقية إلا أن جهات دولية أخرى لها وجهة نظر مختلفة في الحالة حينها.

خافير بوبوريا - رئيس دائرة مكافحة الإرهاب في الأمم المتحدة: لا يوجد تعريف موحد للإرهاب في الأمم المتحدة بعد لكن أهمية الموضوع منذ الحادي عشر من سبتمبر سوف تزداد في أعقاب الاتهامات الأمريكية لإيران بأنها كانت ضالعة بشكل ما في تلك الهجمات وهو الاتهام الذي ترفضه إيران.

عبد الرحيم فقارة: ليس هناك تعريف موحد للإرهاب في الأمم المتحدة غير أن الاهتمام بهذا الملف منذ أحداث الحادي عشر من أيلول سبتمبر يزداد خاصة في ظل الاتهامات الأمريكية الأخيرة إلى إيران بأنها ذات صلة بتلك الأحداث بالرغم من أن إيران تنفي تلك الاتهامات، العديد من المنظمات الإقليمية بما فيها جامعة الدول العربية تشير إلى دورها في صد ما تسميه بالتعاونية التمييزية للأمم المتحدة والنظام العالمي. معهد الاطراف في التعامل مع الإرهاب وغيره من القضايا كما يشير عمرو موسى ونظرائه إلى أن أنهم قد جاؤوا إلى مجلس الأمن للتأكيد مرة أخرى على ذلك الدور، عبد الرحيم فقارة الجزيرة نيويورك.

حافظ المرازي: وقبل أن يترك نيويورك والولايات
Hafiz al-Mirazi: In other words, the blowing up of a bus by a Palestinian or non-Palestinian, and the killing of civilians or innocent persons in a residential building by an F-16 aircraft or a hand bomb are brought up in any Western-Arab or international-Arab dialogue. I first asked him whether there is still a disagreement over the definition of terrorism. I asked him, when will we be able to remove terrorism from our lexicon? He answered:

[Tape Recording]

Hafiz al-Mirazi: [What is] the difference between terrorism and resistance?

Amr Musa: Our definition of terrorism is the agreed upon international definition. All countries and societies of the world take the same position on global terrorism, i.e., terrorism sows fear in societies, kills innocent people, and spreads chaos. This talk is not acceptable to all of us. The Arab countries agree with all other countries of the world. Israel's occupation of Palestine is one side of the coin. The other side is resistance and rejection of the occupation using all methods. People do not accept foreign occupation. If the occupation resorts to bloody methods, the response thereto is also bloody. This is not terrorism. At the same time, as I have said and reiterate because it is important, in all cases, civilians, innocent people, and ordinary people with no connection to the conflict and the practices of the occupation must be excluded from being targets for any military or violent operation. Therefore, we return to the definition. Everyone opposes terrorist operations that sow fear in societies. But this does not prejudice the right of one who is militarily occupied to resist, reject, and oppose the occupation and to call for what we have adopted and insisted on. The concern is to keep citizens away from the woes of wars.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: In other words, the blowing up of a bus by a Palestinian or non-Palestinian, and the killing of civilians or innocent persons in a residential building by an F-16 aircraft or a hand bomb is unacceptable to us.
Amr Musa: Anything that harms or targets civilians is terrorism, regardless of whether it is carried out by a state or a group. Resistance is resisting the occupier's soldiers and tanks in the occupied land. This is the resistance of which I am speaking.

Hafiz al-Mirazi: Does this apply to the settlers?

Amr Musa: The settlers are illegal, as made patently clear in a judgment issued by the International Court of Justice and a General Assembly resolution to accept and support that judgment. The settlers are usurpers of the land and aggressors. They are hurting the civilian population. They have their own story. It is a dangerous story. It is based entirely on the violation of the law. They have seriously damaged and are seriously damaging all the assumptions of peace or hopes for peace.

حافظ المرازي: ينطبق هذا على المستوطنين؟
عمرو موسى: المستوطنين زي الآن وضح تماماً من حكم محكمة العدل الدولية ومن قرار الجمعية العامة بقبول هذا الحكم ودعمه هؤلاء جميعاً وجودهم غير قانوني ومعتصمين للأرض بالإضافة إلى أنهم هم المعتدون وهم اللي بيوثوا السكان المدنيين، المستوطنين دول لهم قصة لوحدها قصة خطيرة في حد ذاتها وكلها تقوم على خرق القانون ولذلك دورهم سبب ضرراً بالغاً وسبب ضرراً بالغاً لكل افتراضات السلام أو أمال السلام.

Al-shari‘a wa-l-ḥayāt Program 6 – Terrorism and Violence

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Mahir Abdallah: Our topic for this segment is “terrorism and violence.” Why has terrorism and violence spread? Or why have terrorism and violence been attributed or are frequently attributed exclusively to Islam and the Islamic nation?

Recent events in Chechnya have again focused attention on the Islamic arena. To discuss this topic, I am pleased to have with me His Eminence, Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi. Welcome again to “Islamic Law and Life.”

…It is frequently asked: Who has given so many groups that resort to violence, extremism, and what is called terrorism—and we will agree later on whether it is terrorism or not—the right to speak on behalf of the nation or on behalf of the issues they bring up?

Islam’s Concern with Social Security and the Combating of Terrorism

ضيف الحلقة: الدكتور يوسف القرضاوي، باحث إسلامي
تاريخ الحلقة: 27 أكتوبر 2002
مواضيع البرنامج:
- اهتمام الإسلام بالأمن الاجتماعي
- ومحاربة الإرهاب
- أنواع الإرهاب وأخطرها على المجتمع
- حقيقة أسباب الشرعية على أعمال الجماعات المتطرفة
- الفرق بين الإرهاب والمقاومة المشروعة
- فقه الموازنة وفقه المآلات والحكم على الأحداث الأخيرة

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Islam’s Concern with Social Security and the Combating of Terrorism
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Before I respond to this question, I would like to say that Islam is currently waging many battles. It is waging a military battle, a political battle, an economic battle, a cultural battle, a religious battle, and a media battle. The media battle has its weapons. Terminology is one of the most effective, important, and dangerous of these weapons. We often fight this new war, the terminology war. They coin terms as they see please and impose them on us. They use enormous apparatuses to circulate these terms among the people. Our audio, visual, and print media accept these terms and take them for granted, broadcasting them among the people as facts, when they are not facts. At one time, it was disseminated that Islamic movements and missionary work were ‘fossils,’ a term intended to turn us back 14 centuries. After this term became worn out, new terms appeared, such as ‘extremism.’ They have continued talking about extremism. First they said beware of extremism, beware of extremists. They found them saying, furthermore, beware of moderate Islam. Moderate Islam is more dangerous than extremist [Islam]. The extremist is short lived, but the moderate is more long lived and more firmly rooted. Then, they say, Islam cannot be moderate. It started out as moderate. Then it became extremist. In other words, they block your path. Then, they abandoned extremism and began to talk about fundamentalism and the war against fundamentalism, which is extending along our flanks everywhere, its arms everywhere. Then, they abandoned this term. Now we have so-called terrorism. The war is now against terrorism. In disseminating these terms and launching them like missiles, they sometimes define them. At other times, each party calls them out vaguely, amorphously, and impulsively with no defined explanation or specific concept to explain them. Each party does as it pleases to serve its objectives and achieve its interests. For example, the concept of terrorism: They said,
come, let us fight terrorism. They wanted to mobilize the entire world. They wanted to bring the entire world into their orbit. They wanted the entire world to be subservient to them for the sake of fighting terrorism. They unleashed their slogan: Whoever is not with us is a supporter of terrorism. In other words, they left no option for one to be neutral, i.e., neither with nor against them. No, you do not have this right. They did not say, whoever is not with us is against us. No, they said, whoever is not with us is with terrorism, i.e., one must fight, because one who is not with is a terrorist and must be fought just like the terrorists whom we fight.

This is the imminent danger that we now see: The stronger wish to rule everything, even terminology.

Let us take up the topic of terrorism. What is terrorism? The word terrorism and its various derivatives stem from “fear” or “terror.” Terrorism means to cause fear, alarm, and terror to enter the hearts of others. Islam speaks of ‘causing fear’ in the following hadith: ‘A Muslim may not terrorize another Muslim.’ The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said this when one of the Companions accompanying him nodded off for a short nap. A quiver of arrows lay beneath his head. Someone stole up to him. What did he take from him?

Mahir Abdallah: An arrow?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: He took an arrow from his quiver as a joke. The man awoke and became alarmed. When the Prophet saw this, he said, ‘It is not permissible for a Muslim to terrorize another Muslim.’ In other words,

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138 [narrative relating the deeds and utterances of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions]
even such mild intimidation that is motivated by fun and jesting is impermissible. Thus, we say that one of Islam’s greatest objectives is to spread security in the life of the people—psychological security, material security, individual security, and social security, as it is said in the following hadith: ‘One among you who has become secure in his heart, sound of body, and has his daily sustenance is if he had the whole world in his hands.’ ‘Secure in his heart’ refers to his community. ‘Sound of body’ refers to his health. ‘Daily sustenance’ refers to his livelihood that comes to him each day. This is a possession, as if the entire world were in his hands. Security has primacy. Islam is very keen on achieving security in the life of the people. Every Muslim has memorized the following brief chapter from the Koran, called Surat Quraysh: In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate, “For the covenants (of security and safeguard enjoyed) by the Quraysh, their covenants (covering) journeys by winter and summer—let them adore the Lord of this House, Who provides them with food against hunger and with security against fear (of danger) [Koran, 106:1-4].

ترجمة: فمن أجل هذا نقول: إن الإسلام من أهداف الكبيرة جدا إشاعة الأمن في حياة الناس، الأمن النفسي والأمن المادي، الأمن الفردي والأمن الجماعي، حتى جاء في الحديث “من أصبح منكم أمناً في سريه، معافاً في بدن، عده قوت يومه فكان أماً حيزة له الدنيا بحافرها” أول شيء أن يكون أمناً في سريه، في جماعته ومعافاً في بدن، في صحته، وعنده قوت يومه يعني بيجي له يعني يوماً بيوم الأؤمن، الإسلام حريص جداً على أن يحقق الأمن في حياة الناس وكل. كل المسلمون يحفظون هذه السورة القصيرة اسمها سورة قريش، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم (1) إبلاغهم رحلة الشتاء والصيف (2) فليغدون رب هذا البيت (3) الذي أطعمهم من جوع وأمنهم من خوف الله يستحق العبادة من الناس لأنه حقق لهم الشبع والرخاء كفاية والأمن. الأمن من الخوف والعذاب من السوء، وذلك شر ما يصبه به المجتمع أن يفقد هاتين العنصرين، الأمن والرخاء، والقرآن الكريم يقول: (وضرب الله مثلًا قرية كانت أمنة مطمئنة يأتينها رزقها رعداً من كل مكان فكفرت بأنعم الله فأذقه الله ليس الجوع والخوف بما كانوا يصنعون) شر ما يبتلي به المجتمع الجوع والخوف، وخیر ما ينعم به على مجتمع.. الكفاية والأمن، فمن أجل هذا: الأمن يعتبر في نظر الإسلام نعمة عظيمة، حينما ذهب أخوة يوفس أده وأخوه إلى مصر استقبلهم بهذه الكلمة قال: (انحلوا مصنًا إن شاء الله أمين) الأمن يعبده يعني وامتن على الجماعة قال (وقرنوا فيها) (سيروا فيها ليالي وآياما أمينين) أهل مكة قال (أو لم يروا أنا جعلًا خرجًا أمنًا ويبخطط الناس من حولهم) فالأمن نعمة عظيمة.

sufficiency and security. Thus, in Islam's view, security is a great blessing. When Joseph's father and brothers went down to Egypt, they were greeted as follows: 'Enter ye Egypt (all) in safety if it please Allah' [Koran, 12:90]. Security is entrusted to the community. God said, 'We had placed Cities in prominent positions, and between them We had appointed stages of journey in due proportion. Travel therein, secure, by night and by day' [Koran, 34:18]. The people of Mecca said, 'Do they not then see that We have made a sanctuary secure, and that men are being snatched away from all around them?' [Koran, 29:67]. Security is a great blessing.

Thus, Islam forbade and criminalized any act that threatens the security of the people. Capital offenses in Islam include theft and brigandage [haraabah, see below in this paragraph]. Islam did not legislate a legal punishment for the wrongful seizure of property. If someone plunders the people's property, there is no punishment for it. The perpetrator is excused because of his straits. However, one who steals is punished. Why?

In the case of wrongful seizure of property by people, the point in question is that security and comfort are security from fear and satiety from hunger. Thus, Islam forbade and criminalized any act that threatens the security of the people. Capital offenses in Islam include theft and brigandage [haraabah]. Because of his straits, the perpetrator is excused. However, one who steals is punished. Why? In the case of theft, the thief steals security and threatens security. Security is more important than property. Therefore, in this latter case, a punishment has been established as a deterrent [as stated in the Koran 5:38].

God is deserving of worship by people, because He provides for their satiety, comfort, sufficiency, and security—security from fear and satiety from hunger. Therefore, it is bad for society to be deprived of these two blessings, security and comfort. The noble Koran says, 'Allah sets forth a Parable: a city enjoying security and quiet, abundantly supplied with sustenance from every place. Yet was it ungrateful for the favors of Allah. So Allah made it taste of hunger and terror (in extremes) (closing in on it) like a garment (from every side), because of the (evil) which (its people) wrought' [Koran, 16:112].

The good with which society is blessed is the absence of hunger and fear.
criminal gangs in the streets or elsewhere threaten people's security through the use of power, weapons, and force. The Koran provides the harshest penalty for such persons, namely ‘the punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger.’ It considers their action warfare against God and His Messenger. ‘The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter’ [Koran, 5:30 3]. This is the incipient terrorism which Islam opposes strongly to protect the security of the community and the security of the people.

[Commercial break]

Mahir Abdallah: Regarding such issues as social security and Islam’s desire for security, many say that you persist in presenting the ideal situation desired by Islam. This is nice talk, because this is our religion and the call to Islam. However, the world does not see the ideal in Islam. What we see from Islam is not the ideal that should be.

Types of Terrorism and the Most Dangerous Type of Terrorism for Society

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: As long as we are talking about terrorism, I would like to clarify the types of terrorism. I mentioned civil terrorism. Islam strongly opposes such terrorism, because it infringes on the security of innocent people. There are other forms of indisputable terrorism, such as colonialist terrorism. Throughout its long history, the world has known colonialist terrorism. When colonialism enters a country and wishes to control its population, the people of that country must resist it. This is instinctive. I

علي أمنان الجماعة وأمان الناس

Mahir Abdallah: سيدى، الأمن الاجتماعي وحصب الإسلام عليه، على الأمن، كثيرين يقولون: الدكتور يوسف القرضاوي في، في مثل هذه المشاكل يصر على توضيحوضع المثالي كما أراده الإسلام، وهذا كلام جميل لأنه هذا هو الدين وهو الدعوة إليه، ولكن ليس ما يراه العالم من الإسلام هو هذا الوضع المثالي، إن نرى، يعني ما نراه مناس غير الإسلام الذي يجب أن يكون.

أنواع الإرهاب وأخطرها على المجتمع

ديوسوف القرضاوي: دعني في الحقيقة أشرح ما دمتا نتحدث عن الإرهاب أريد أن أوضح أنواع الإرهاب، أنا ذكرت الإرهاب المدنى هذا، ودا يعني كما قلت، الإسلام بقاومه بشدة وبقوة لأنه يعتقد على أن الناس الذين لا ذنب لهم يعني أن نازع فيها مثل الإرهاب الاستعماري، هناك عرف العالم في تاريخه الطويل أنواع من إرهاب الاستعمار، الاستعمار حينما يدخل بلدًا ويدير أن يسيطر على أهلها، وأن يتحكم فيهم لابد أن يقوم أهله هذا البلد، هذا أمر فطري إن أي إنسان
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Occasionally, the violence assumes the character of an extermination. Colonialism may sometimes involve only settlement activity, such as French colonialism in Algeria, which was not intended to expel and supplant the Algerians. Rather, the French wished to share Algeria with the Algerians. However, there is another type of colonialism, namely supplanting, which involves exterminating the original population. Unfortunately, this is what happened when the Europeans went to America. They wished to exterminate the American Indians. America was established based on two great crimes, the enslavement of Africans, as we see in the film "Roots." They enslaved these free, sovereign people from their country, which is a crime. The other crime is the attempt to exterminate the American Indians. They killed many of them. A similar attempt was made in Australia with respect to the aborigines, and the Zionists did this when they came to—

Mahir Abdallah: Palestine.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Their famous slogan was ‘a people without a land for a land without a people.’ How can there be a land without a people? Where is the population of Palestine? Of course, the Europeans sent them [the Zionists] and helped them, and there was the Balfour Declaration, etc. By means of this supplantive colonialism, they wished to expel the Palestinians from their country and scatter them on the horizon. Where are these five million refugees from? They were not
expelled from their country as refugees. This is also colonialist terrorism, and we must condemn and reject it before talking about terrorism with weapons.

There is also a state terrorism. Sometimes, the state itself uses terrorism against some or all of its population. This occurs in countries that are based on autocracies, dictatorships, and control of the people. They rulers regard their people as if they were a herd of sheep. In other words, the people have no rights. Nothing is inviolable for them. They have no freedoms. The state treats them in this way, to say nothing of punishing them. Sometimes the state exploits a group of people that has an opinion or ideology which the state opposes or is of another race, as in ethnic cleansing. The Koran provides us with an example of this: ‘Truly, Pharaoh exalted himself in the land and broke up its people into sections, depressing a small group among them. He slew their sons but kept alive their females, for he was indeed a maker of mischief’ [Koran, 28:4].

[News summary]

Mahir Abdallah: I have not forgotten the question with which we began. The introduction that you provided was very useful, and we will continue with it shortly. There are two questions that I believe need to be clarified. This first concerns state terrorism. What you said about oppression in the Arab world is used by America, albeit in a slightly differently worded fashion, but the meaning is the same. Do you believe that such oppression justifies bringing about change in the Arab world to rid it of these regimes and to bring it around to a democratic opening that recognizes others? Is there any difference between what you want and what America wants in terms of eliminating state oppression and terrorism? Is there an overlap in this regard?
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: No, there is a very great difference. I maintain that the country most founded on terrorism, the most dangerous and notorious country founded on terrorism, is the Zionist entity. It was founded on terrorism. It was terroristic even before it was established, when it was merely gangs. These gangs committed criminal acts and imposed themselves with violence, blood, steel, and fire. They killed many people in Egypt and in other countries. When they wished to establish the state, they committed enormous human massacres to instill fear. This is true terrorism, terrorism against the Palestinians, the inculcation of fear in the hearts of poor villagers, women, and pregnant women, ripping open wombs, and even—

Mahir Abdallah: Correct.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: (Menahem Begin) was proud of [the massacre of] Deir Yassin, saying, had it not been for Deir Yassin, Israel would not have been established. This state was built on terrorism and still engages in terrorism to this day. I consider Sharon the greatest terrorist in the world. Nonetheless, unfortunately, America regards him as defending his poor self, meaning he is presented as—

Mahir Abdallah: A man of peace!

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: A man of peace, while these Palestinians are wild beasts who possess only stones and light objects in the face of these tanks, aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and tracked vehicles—these wild beasts. And he [Sharon] is a miserable victim in the face of this enormous, ruthless force!

The terms are being falsified. Who is the terrorist? The Palestinians or Sharon? Who supports Sharon? America supports Sharon.
and accepts his rule. The Koran [60:9] says, ‘Allah forbids you only those who warred against you on account of religion and have driven you out from your homes and helped to drive you out.’ The Americans helped drive out the Palestinians and helped to oppress the Palestinians. This is terrorism. Does America wish to liberate the Arab countries from oppressive, tyrannical regimes that impose themselves with steel and fire on the people and prevent the people from even praying? Prayer is considered a crime. It is considered a crime for a woman to wear a veil. People are not given religious freedom or personal freedom. The springs of religion are drying up—there is a policy of drying up these springs. Why is America not fighting them? Why is it fighting only Iraq?

We reject mixing legitimate terrorism with illegitimate terrorism and regarding the Palestinians as practicing terrorism. America has categorized the Palestinians as terrorists. Hamas, [Islamic] Jihad, the al-Aqsa brigades, and Hezbollah are all considered terrorists. They have become terrorists. Who applies the label terrorist and says so and so is a terrorist? This is not the force of logic, but rather the logic of force, which we reject.

We oppose unrightful terrorism. You were at the conference held here in Qatar. I condemned violence. I condemned terrorism forcefully and openly. I said that violence is the use of physical force with transgressors when it is possible to use arguments, missionary work, and persuasion. You do not abandon these means and use a bomb. That is violence. If you can use the force of logic, there is a need to use the logic of what?

Mahir Abdallah: Force.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Terrorism is the use of force and violence against a person with...
whom you have no problem in order to terrorize others. This is the definition of terrorism in my view. Terrorism is the use of violence against someone unrelated to you. You may not have known him previously. This has happened on various occasions, such as the battle with the tourists in Egypt, the Luxor massacre, or with the tourists in Bali recently. There was nothing between them and these tourists. Rather, they wanted to pressure a specific government. Thus, the Abu-Sayyaf group takes and detains hostages and makes specific demands. The hostages are unrelated, meaning there is no problem between Abu-Sayyaf and these hostages. He did not know them previously.

Mahir Abdallah (interrupting): However—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: The hijacking of planes is the same thing. This is what I call terrorism. The seizure of innocent people is not permitted in Islam. The Koran [52:21] states, ‘(Yet) is each individual in pledge for his deeds,’ ‘Every soul draws the fitting reward of its acts on none but itself: no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another [Koran, 6:1 64], and ‘man can have nothing but what he strives for’ [Koran 53:39]. Individual responsibility is fundamental. Seizure of people because of others’ sins is equivalent to taking an innocent person because of an evildoer’s offense or taking the righteous for the sin of the villainous.

Mahir Abdallah: You permitted this in Palestine, because it entails resistance, and in southern Lebanon when it was occupied. Some foreign journalists say that when you permitted this in Palestine, others generalized from this experience and began to kill tourists and civilians outside Palestine. Is this connected with your religious rulings regarding the resistance in Palestine?
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: First, those who are killing tourists are from countries that have not adopted my religious rulings. They have no connection. They had not read my books. They have begun to read my books now and are reconsidering the whole matter, such as the Islamic Jama’ah. Four books have now come out in Egypt, and two books are still at the printing press, which is called Muraja’at. They are attempting to correct concepts. Before that, they refused to read my books. Now, they quote dozens of pages from my books. When our Lord began to guide them toward middle-of-the-road, moderate thinking, they began to read my books. When they conducted operations, they had not adopted my books. They were not reading them. Therefore, it is not my books that inspired them to killed tourists. On the contrary. Last year, after the events of 9/11, many American journalists came here. They wanted to construe my religious rulings allowing Palestinians to conduct martyrdom operations as allowing the 9/11 operations. I told them, there is a difference. I even said this to Thomas Friedman, who interviewed me when he was here. I told him, there is a big difference between the two. The difference lies in the objective and means. The objective is to defend one’s occupied homeland and resist the usurper occupiers. This is a legitimate objective. The means is to blow up oneself. I possess my soul. I place it in the palm of my hand. In other words, I sacrifice myself to resist my enemy. I do not use someone else. This is the objective and means, in contrast to the objective of me going to another country where I strike towers or something else. I do not use myself. I use the passengers on a civil aircraft. You, I, or anybody could be a passenger on the plane. None of the passengers has anything to do with policy or American decisionmaking. They were used as tools. The objective and means are thus not the same.
The Truth About the Legitimization of Extremist Groups

Mahir Abdallah: Let us return to the first questions with which we began this segment. You drew distinction among what is happening in Palestine, the hijackers of the planes, and what is happening in Chechnya. There is the question of legitimacy. Who legitimized these people? Who determines the benefit of this or that act in this nation?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: After the 9/11 events, I said, and I reemphasize, that the Islamic nation does not bear responsibility for what occurred on September 11. It is not yet known conclusively who performed this act. True, there are suspicions, words, and things. But no final judgment has been issued, such that we would now who the author of this act is, which we should know. Even America said that Usamah Bin Ladin is the main suspect in this case. He is a suspect in it. We therefore do not know who precisely was behind it. We do not want to enter into the great deceit wherein the French writer entered. Many matters surround this issue. Could the young men said to have carried out this act been able to carry it out alone with all its complexities? Or were there parties that assisted them? Or were they victims of others? Or—no, I do not want to get into this.

Another thing, even if it is assumed that this was done by these young men, Usamah Bin Ladin, his Al Qaeda, and his organization, what is the sin of the Islamic nation? The Islamic nation did not authorize Usamah Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda to carry out these acts. These acts are carried out by individuals and groups in all countries, even in America itself, for example Oklahoma City. There are young people who carry out violence in the schools.
and so on, because of the education and information which they have received, violent movies, and violent television series. All of this can lead to and influence such actions. Every country has violence and terrorism, including America, England, India, Israel, Japan, and various other countries. No nation is condemned because of the actions of a group within it.

Therefore, we should not condemn the Islamic nation and accuse it of being the author of this deed. Saudi Arabia is talked about, attacked, and condemned. Saudi Arabia denaturalized bin Laden and his family, even if his family was cleared of any connection with him. What is the offense of Saudi Arabia? Such talk is groundless.

Regarding what is going on now in Chechnya, these people [Chechen rebels] did not claim to represent the Islamic nation. Perhaps bin Laden did so. He declared in the messages that were broadcast by Aljazeera that he was delegated by the Islamic nation to fight these crusaders and Zionists. These people [the Chechen rebels] are defending their homeland and are entitled to independence in their homeland. They have been fighting the Russians for 400 years. They are demanding independence. East Timor in Indonesia was given the right to independence and to separate from the mother country, Indonesia, even though East Timor and Indonesia share the same language, nationality, and territory. The Chechens do not share a religion, language, nationality, homeland, or anything with the Russians. They believe they have a right, and they are demanding it. I am not justifying. I do not want to justify. I do not know whether their killing of the hostages was proper or is a type of threat, because it was the Russians who hastened to strike the people with poisonous gases, whose source and facts are unknown to us. In any case, they [the Chechen rebels] did
not claim to be agents of the Islamic nation. They are their own agents who are defending their homeland.

Mahir Abdallah: Let us just hear from Salman Mamduh, who has been on the telephone for a long time. Go ahead, Salman.

Salman Mamduh: There was a big reaction to the terrorist operations in the entire world, especially in the expatriate community where we live here in Sweden. As soon as you tell them that you are a Muslim, they shower you with questions regarding these terrorist operations. We have become embarrassed. We do not know how to respond. Were these operations legitimate or illegitimate? There are many responses. It would be nice if there could be only one, unified response, so that we could have a defined position. Are these terrorist operations the result of the pressure and dictatorships that rule the region? Thank you very much.

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you, Salman. I have Muhammad Balqis from Syria.

Muhammad Balqis: I have this request of you, may God be pleased with you, namely to meet with the Pope and the Sheikh of al-Azhar to give a lecture to explain Islam. We are not terrorists. I am a Syrian Arab citizen. However, my ethnicity is Circassian. I am proud of Islam. Islam came to us because we hearkened to it, not through war. Today, Chechens and Circassians are being called terrorists because they continue to defend their homeland. America was established on the blood of the American Indians. Israel was established on the blood of the Muslim Palestinians. My sheikh, may God be pleased with you, is there any possibility that you, the Pope, and the Sheikh of al-Azhar could invoke a blessing and give a lecture on Islam, Muslims, and our master Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation. May
God grant you good health.

The Difference between Terrorism and Legitimate Resistance

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you Muhammad. Following up on Muhammad’s question, what is happening in Chechnya is similar to what is happening in Palestine. There is supplantive colonialism. There are currently a number of Russians in the state or small autonomous republic of Chechnya. The Russians are clearly supplanting the Chechens. Is this justified? Is this comparable or similar to what is happening in Palestine?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: It is generally justified to resist. However, in the event of a war, Islam is keen to minimize human casualties and spare lives as much as possible. Therefore, the principle in warfare in Islam is that only combatants may be killed. Women, children, the elderly, the blind, the crippled, monks in monasteries, one plowing his land, and the merchant in his store may not be killed. Only combatants may killed. When the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, saw that a woman had been killed, he became critical and angry. He said, she was not a combatant. In other words, why was she killed? The rule is that we may kill combatants. If we kill civilians, it is an unintended consequence. When our brothers in Palestine strike, they in fact select locations where soldiers are concentrated. They attempted to strike such locations. If a woman or child is killed, it is unintentional. However, Israeli society is militarized. Its men and women are soldiers in the army or reserves. It is also a society of invaders. They came from outside the homeland and occupied it. They displaced the population from its land. Israeli society therefore has a special nature. Thus, I maintain that the principle is to not kill civilians unless required by the exigencies of warfare. This is similar to the Prophet’s siege of Ta’if. He used
a catapult. In that case, it was possible for a noncombatant to be struck, albeit unintentionally. Therefore, the principle is that we do not fight civilians intentionally, although we may hit them as a consequence.

Mahir Abdallah: We will ask you about the Pope later after the current calls. Muhammad al-Shamari from Saudi Arabia, please go ahead.

Muhammad Shamari: I would like to say to the sheikh that it is correct that there is a difference between the operations in Palestine and the operations in America. The difference is between one who bears the concerns of the state and one who bears the concerns of the entire Islamic nation. Could the sheikh please clarify this, namely whether America is a dhimmi140 state or a hostile state. Thank you.

Mahir Abdallah: Than you very much Muhammad. I have here Ahmad al-Da’is from Yemen. Go ahead Ahmad.

Ahmad Da’is: The Arab issue is very difficult, especially regarding America and the Arab countries that side with America. There is no benefit for our people. Our people, talk, our people chit-chat, our people everything. Enemies and agents from the Arab nation are among us. They commit the greatest crimes in the Arab homeland. It is useless. Our life is threatened with danger. We are finished. We have no honor in the end. Why are we lying to ourselves? Sitting, outdoing ourselves with talk, talk, talk, talk. What is the solution? The solution is that if there is no vigilance with respect to the leaders of the Arabs— They feel no shame about our right. They have no honor. It is ultimately useless.

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you very much for your emotions at least, even though the way in

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which you expressed them regarding the Arab leaders ultimately compels us—we who pay the price—to apologize for all these remarks. We share the brothers' enthusiasm, and we appreciate their desire. However, I believe that a bit of calm and wisdom would also benefit us.

I believe that Muhammad al-Shamari’s question is intelligent. He agrees with you that there is a difference between what is happening in Palestine and what occurred in America. However, he believes, if I understood his remarks correctly, that what is happening in America is more serious and more important, as he is speaking about the concerns of the entire nation. He wants to find a way out for the entire nation, in contrast to what is happening in Palestine, which would be a partial solution for a part of this nation. What do you say to Muhammad al-Shamari?

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** The concerns of the entire nation should be borne by a group of wise people of the nation. These concerns should not be left to one, two, ten, or twenty individuals. Influential people, intellectuals, smart people, and experts who are the wise of the nation should gather to hold discussions, because these are very important matters. In Islamic jurisprudence, we call these matters ‘the doctrine of balances.’ This concerns balancing the various pros and cons and assigning priorities according to ‘the doctrine of priorities,’ which involves prioritization, [as it is stated in a hadith:] ‘Faith has over 70 branches. The most excellent is to say there is no God but Allah. The lowest is to remove from the path that which is harmful.’ There are many branches between the highest and lowest branches. You do not allow branch number one to be branch number seventy, or branch number seventy to be branch number one.

There is also the doctrine of consequences. This involves examining the outcomes of an
action. An action may appear beneficial, although it may result in very dangerous outcomes. Therefore, one must examine. The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was advised to kill Abdallah bin Abi bin Salul, the chief hypocrite he, the Prophet, learned of the many things that were harming the Muslims. Kill him O Prophet of God, and give us rest from his evil. What did he say to them? He said, 'I am afraid that the people will talk about Muhammad killing his companions.' In other words, be afraid of any media campaign that will distort the Prophet Muhammad's life, path, and treatment of his companions. If they say so and so is killing his companions, no one sits and thinks and says, 'I am afraid that the people will talk about Muhammad killing his companions.' The Koran mentions in the chapter of al-Khaf [The Cave] the story of our master Moses and a righteous servant named al-Khidr. The story is primarily an examination of the consequences of putting a hole in a boat: 'So they both proceeded until, when they were in the boat, he scuttled it. Said Moses, 'Hast thou scuttled it in order to drown those in it? Truly a strange thing hast thou done!' [Koran, 18:71]. He scuttled a sound boat. Al-Khidr said to him, you do no know why I did this. This is an examination of consequences. A king sees beautiful boats and orders that they be made part of the royal fleet. They wanted to cause a defect, so that other boats would be saved. In other words, he scuttled some of them to save all of them. He examined the consequences. Therefore, in the doctrine of the unseen, we do not look at the [immediate] consequences. When I went at the head of a delegation of clerics to our brothers in the Taliban, some of them said, you are going, going to—

Mahir Abdallah: To mediate in the matter of the idols.
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: The Buddha statues. I am not going to the Buddha statues. I am going to save our brothers. I say to them, there is no need to incite the East and West against you. The Buddha is worshiped in Japan, China, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. You need these countries’ support. Why are you inciting them against you? These statues have existed for thousands of years. Leave them alone. I tell them to examine the doctrine of consequences, which is not apparent to many young people. Therefore, the concerns of the nation must be examined in the light of a new doctrine, the doctrine of intents and balancing between pros and cons. We must examine matters based on the doctrine of priorities and the doctrine of consequences and decide what must be done accordingly.

Mahir Abdallah: I have a question about the doctrine of balances and the doctrine of consequences. But permit me to ask this question after we hear from Ahmad Karim of Algeria. Ahmad, go ahead. Ok, let us hear from Ahmad Majdi of America.

Ahmad Majdi: I would like for His Eminence the Sheikh to provide me an answer for a question that one of my non-Muslim friends asked me and I could not find an answer for him: If we look at the world—from the Far East, the Philippines, and Indonesia to Palestine, Kosovo, Russia, Chechnya, and America—wherever Islam is present, there is instability, fighting, and blood. I do not know how to answer this question. The second question: According to my information, my readings in the Koran, and Islamic history, the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and the companions Abu-Bakr and Umar Bin al-Khattab, may God be pleased with them, ordered the armies of the Muslims not to kill civilians, women, the elderly, and children. What is the opinion of His Eminence the Sheikh on the blowing up of civilians.
happening now throughout the entire world, especially in Palestine against the Jews, in Indonesia against civilians, in Kosovo, and in Russia, where 110 died because of a current—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: You are apparently not with us my brother. You did not watch the segment. Did you not hear what I was saying?

Mahir Abdallah: Fine, let us hear from Muhammad Sa’id from Nigeria. Muhammad, go ahead.

Muhammad Sa’id: I am Senegalese and live here in Nigeria. My name is Muhammad Sa’id. I would like to ask: Has not the time come for the clerics of Islam to issue a fatwa [formal religious ruling] calling on the armies of the Arab and Islamic world, especially the Saudi and Kuwaiti armies, to rebel against the regimes and join the jihadist believers? I say to every Muslim in the world, membership in Al-Qaeda is an honor and a source of pride. I say to the rulers of the Gulf, Islam is coming. There is no escape from it. We also salute our fighters in Bali in Indonesia, on Filka [Island] in Kuwait, and in the Moscow theater in Russia. We hope for more. Finally we call for the praising of God, Master of the universe.

The Doctrine of Balances, the Doctrine of Consequences, and Judging Recent Events

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you Muhammad. Muhammad Sa’id’s question takes me back to what I wanted to ask regarding the doctrine of balances, the doctrine of consequences, and the judgment on what is happening in America, which may result in us quickly becoming losers. Some say, wait until you see the actual consequences, not one or two years but perhaps ten years. In the doctrine of balances, you see and hear the feelings of the people, whether on this program or on other programs.
Muhammad Sa‘id’s remarks, in their substance, are not far from the remarks of Ahmad al-Da‘is. In the doctrine of balances, if a faithful Muslim man sees what is happening to this nation, he is not content. The brother wants the clerics to issue a fatwa to the armies to rebel. The brother from Syria believes that a session with the Pope may be useful. There is intense mental or emotional pain. No armies are moving. No leaders are taking stands. No clerics are preparing to establish the council of wise men that you prefer. But the doctrine of balances requires a man to see in himself the ability to cause a shock. Should he cause such a shock?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: No, such a shock may satisfy his emotions or his ravenous appetite, but it might damage the entire nation. An individual may not act contrary to the interests of the nation. He may not make himself the representative of the entire nation and commit acts which might put the nation back decades. You could say Saddam Husayn did when this he invaded Kuwait. He saw that it would perhaps be better to create a single power, a single country, by annexing Kuwait. Unifications had been imposed by force in the past. For example, Saladin annexed Egypt to Syria by force. Such a justification may drive events. Many of our brothers speak emotionally without logic or proof to satisfy their emotions. Does the brother believe that meeting with the pope and giving a lecture will solve the problem? The matter is more complex than that. The pope is not ignorant of Islam. He does not need a lecture from me or from the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. Another brother says that a fatwa should be issued to the armies. Armies do not take action based on a fatwa. These armies are not like the tribes of the old days. These armies comprise officers, including the army chief of staff, minister of defense, or general commander. These officers are government employees. They have no power. Such emotional talk does not sate or
relieve one’s hunger. The nation needs to think rationally and with discipline according to religious law. In this way, it can see the future based on the light of the present and inspiration of the past to thereby determine what action to take. The problem is that everyone is claiming to be able to represent the nation. This is not in the nation’s interest.

Mahir Abdallah: I have a follow-up question, but first permit me to take the last call in this segment. Isam Ghannam from Britain, please go ahead.

Isam Ghannam: I completely support what you have just been saying. The Koran [5:8] says, ‘Let not the hatred of others make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just. That is next to piety.’ Our problem concerns us as Muslims. It does not concern the governments in Islamic and Arab countries or even in Britain and America. Muslims must immediately oppose any person who swerves from justice and commits crimes and kills innocent people, as the Palestinians unfortunately did in Europe initially and as has occurred in many countries. As a result, the Europeans and Americans think that the Muslims are aggressors and that they make no distinction between innocent people and criminals. Muslims must change the trend of random aggression against non-Muslims. This must change, God willing, so that people will view Muslims as being just and committed to justice, regardless of whether the West is with or against them.

Mahir Abdallah: Isam’s point is worthy of comment. But let us first hear from Ahmad al-Subay’i from Qatar.

Ahmad Subay’i: Sheikh al-Qardawi, why should we distinguish between civilians and soldiers in Israel? Can we tell the civilians to move to one side and the soldiers to move to the other side, because we are fighting you?
Does Israel distinguish between civilians and soldiers among the Palestinians?

**Mahir Abdallah:** Your question is clear. God willing, you will hear the sheikh comment on it, although the sheikh’s remarks on Israel, which have caused him much difficulty in many circles, are clear. But give us time, and we will ask him again.

Let us return to the question posed by Ahmad Majdi from America. It is frequently stated in the Western media that the entire realm of Islam is marred by instability, considerable bloodshed, and frequent resort to violence. Dr. al-Qardawi has long spoken about balances, priorities, and consequences. However, don't you agree that Sheikh al-Qardawi’s doctrine continues to be held by only a minority among clerics with influence in some jurisdictions? The prevailing trend in our school textbooks and university courses is the study of traditional jurisprudence. No one speaks about the doctrine of consequences in the sense of what we have heard today. One cites several Koranic verses and hadiths. The doctrine of consequences and balances has not been adequately presented to Muslims. Thus, some Westerners may be somewhat mistaken in maintaining that our culture will always produce violence due to the absence of these new doctrinal details.

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** My response to this comment consists of two points. It is questionable to say that instability, disturbances, and violence exist wherever Islam exists. This is not actually the fault of Muslims. It is the fault of the West itself. It is the West that has sown the causes of these problems. It has sown governments friendly to it and hostile—
Mahir Abdallah: To their peoples.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: To their peoples. The West is responsible for everything that has been happening in Kosovo, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Palestine, southern Sudan, and Algeria. Take Algeria for example. The West rejected the Algerian election results and supported the military rule that nullified the elections. The West maintains that it supports democracy, but not if democracy brings Islamists to power. The truth is that the Muslims are the ones being attacked. They are being mistreated everywhere. Islamic blood has become the cheapest blood on earth—blood that has no value or price. The Muslims are being slaughtered and displaced. They are being unjustly tortured. Islam is not permitted to have its say in its own countries among its people. True Muslims are banned from acting. Why is no one saying this? Solve the problems of Muslims and see. Islam is the one being oppressed now.

What you say about the doctrines of intents, balances, priorities, consequences, difference, etc. perhaps means that this doctrine is not held among many Muslims or most Muslims. However, what is our mission? Our mission is to educate Muslims, create awareness, and illuminate the path and perceptions of Muslims. Our mission is to bring the Muslims out from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge, discernment, and proper governance. We want to take the people out from the demagoguery and emotionalism to rationalism and secularism. We want to take them out from oppression and alienation to freedom from difficulty and good tidings. We want to bring them out from lowliness and transgression to justice and moderation. This is our mission. Our mission on this program is to illuminate the path for viewers to enable them to know their rights and obligations and to see the objective and path.
Mahir Abdallah: Most of the callers indicate that the Islamic concepts learned by Muslims determine their behavior. Islam requires Muslims to defend their creed, land, honor, and resources from the vicious colonialist attack being led by America, Zionism, and the infidel West. Islam defines the results of this defense as the glory of this life and the reward of the afterlife. When a Muslim kills an American soldier in Kuwait, he knows that this is the road to heaven. When a Chechen Muslim kills an infidel, heretical Russian, he knows that he is pushing disbelief out of the Islamic land in Chechnya. The Muslim who destroys the trade tower knows that the Satan of the age, America, must become extinct.

There are many questions with this slant. Abdallah Muhammad al-Khalid asks on the Internet: Whom do you follow in the current dissension? Should we follow appointed clerics, or does each person issue fatwas as he pleases? Some simple people have been observed to say the truth, whereas some clerics flatter the rulers for temporal interests. In other words, there is a crisis of authority. Many people trust Sheikh al-Qardawi. But many others have no access or way to communicate with or listen to Sheikh al-Qardawi. Despite the reach of Aljazeera, Islam Online, and your published fatwas, there is a crisis of authority. To whom should the people listen?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I sympathize with these people. We have now gotten into a state of utter confusion. The nation lacks a unified leadership. The nation used to have a caliphate. The caliphate issued instructions and was obeyed. It spoke and was heard. If it said help your brothers in Palestine or Chechnya, the nation would help. The nation no longer has a political or even a religious leadership. The Christians do not have a

An نتحدث عن وعي وتنير الطريق وتنير بصائر المسلمين، أن نخرج المسلمين من الظلمات إلى النور، ون liebe رئة غابة، وأن نخرج من الرغبة. وتوزي الميلمين ونادب الحكم الصحيح وذلنا عايزين نخرج الناس من الفوغة والطمعية إلى النقانية والمعلمة، نريد أن نخرجهم من التفسير والتنوير إلى التبيير والتشريع، نريد أن نخرجهم من الوكس والشطب إلى الاعتدال والوسط، هذا مهمتنا نحن مهماكنا في هذا البرنامج أن نوضيء السبيل أمام الإخوة المساندين يحتى يعرفوا مالهم وما عليهم، ويضيروا الغاية ويضيروا الطريق.

معنى أسبوع الله الأخ سعود. يعني مجموع المشاركات بتسير باتجاه يعني إنه مهمله بقول الأخ، إنه المماليك التي تعاملها المسلم من أفكار الإسلام هي التي تحديد سلكها، فالإسلام يطالب المسلمين بالدفاع عن عقيدتهم وأرضهم وعرضهم وخيراتهم إزاء الهجمة الاستعمارية المرسة التي يقومها أمريكا والصهيونية والغرب الكافر، والتي حدد الإسلام نتانيها عز الدنيا وثواب الآخرة، فالإسلام في الكويت حينما يقول الجندي الأمريكي يعلم أن هذا طريق إلى الجنة والسلم الشيشاني حينما يقول الكافر المحدود الروسي يعلم أنه يدفع الكفر عن بلاد الإسلام في الشيشان، والسلم الذي دمر برج التجارة يعلم أنه لابد من من زوال طاغوت العصر أميرا.
leadership similar to our caliphate. They have a religious leadership. They have a pope. He speaks and they listen to him. The Islamic leadership has lapsed. We do not have a religious leadership. I jokingly told several brothers that the Christians have a pope [literally ‘father’] while we have neither a father nor a mother.

**Mahir Abdallah:** Neither a father nor a mother.

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** We have neither. We do not have a great scholar, a sheikh of Islam, an authority whom people may consult. The nation is now confused in its thinking. Its ways are disrupted. This makes our mission more difficult than at any other time in the past. But we should not throw down our weapons in despair. The nation is a blessing.

The late Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib promoted two slogans in the magazines *al-Fath* and *al-Zahra’*.

The first slogan says, Muslims are a blessing, but there is weakness in the leadership. The Muslims lack leadership.

The second slogan says you are manning one of the breaches of Islam. You did not create the breach. You are standing in the breach, keeping the enemy from infiltrating. This is the type of direction and education the Islamic nation needs now.

We call upon our brothers and sons not to despair and to trust that the Islamic nation and religion will own the future God willing. God the Sublime says, ‘They want to extinguish Allah's light with their mouths, but Allah will not allow but that His light should be perfected, even though the Unbelievers may...’

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**مراجعية، ممن يسمع الناس؟**

ديوسف القرضاوي: هو يعني أنا أغرر هؤلاء الناس، نحن الآن اختطف الحاجل بالنابل، نحن في وقت الأمة فقدت فيه القيادة الواحدة، الأمّة كان لها خليفة بأمر فيطاع، ويقول فيسمع، يقول هؤلاء إنها نجدة. إنها خوانكم في فلسطين أو في الشيشان أو في كذا، فتغلب الأمّة، الأمّة لا عاد لها قيادة سياسية ولا حتى قيادة دينية، يعني... يعني المسيحيون ما عندهم قيادة مثلنا خليفة، إنما عندهم قيادة دينية، عندنا بابا يعني يقول فيسمعون له، إجنة سقطت القيادة الإسلامية. وليس عندنا قيادة دينية، يعني أنا بأضحك مع بعض الأخوة بأقول المسيحيين عندهم بابا، وإجنة لا عندنا لا بابا ولا ماما.

ماهر عبد الله: ولا بابا ولا ماما.

ديوسف القرضاوي: عندنا ما عندنا، حتى كان زمان فيه حاجة اسمها شيخ الإسلام، يعني عالم كبير الناس تقوم عليه شيخ الإسلام فيرجع الناس إليه، الآن حتى ما ما.. ما يوجد هذا شيخ الإسلام الذي يمكن نقول.. عنه يعني شيخ الإسلام، فأمّة في هذه المرحلة مبهمة الفكر، مضطربة المسالك، وهذا يصعب علينا المهمة أكثر من أي وقت مضى، ولكن لا ينبغي أن نلفي السلاح، ولا ينبغي أن نأس، لأن الأمّة إلى خير، كان الأستاذ محمّد الدين الخطيب – رحمه الله - في مجلة “الفتح” ومجلة “الزهراء” يرفع شعاعّين:...
detest (it). It is He Who hath sent His Messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth, to proclaim it over all religion, even though the Pagans may detest (it)’ [Koran, 9:32-33].
**Al-shari‘a wa-l-ḥayāt Program 7 - The Palestinian Intifadah and Fedayeen**

### The Palestinian Intifadah and Fedayeen Operations

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**Mahir Abdallah:** welcome viewers to a new segment of the program ‘Islamic Law and Life.’

It has been a year and several months since the second Palestinian intifadah was launched. Recently, in the eminent [holy] month [of Ramadan], Israel's aggression and repression has intensified, going beyond the assassination of several Palestinian political leaders to the random bombing of many Palestinian neighborhoods, villages, and cities. The Palestinians generate debate each time they resort to their only available weapon for responding to Israeli aggression, martyrdom operations. Recent martyrdom operations have also prompted a new debate in Islamic jurisprudence, even if it has been limited to one symbol of the Islamic world today.
To discuss the intifadah, Muslims’ duty with respect to it, and Islamic law's position—which we believe is legitimate and correct—on the martyrdom operations, which some insist on calling suicide operations, I am pleased to have with me again his Eminence, Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi. Dr. al-Qardawi, welcome once again.

[Commercial break]

Muslim Reaction to the American Double Standard regarding the Palestinian Issue

Mahir Abdallah: This crisis has revealed painful realities for the Islamic world. After the Israeli bombardment intensified in recent days, the American administration commented that Israel has the right to defend itself as it deems appropriate. Sharon reportedly received the green light directly from President Bush to bomb the Palestinians and perhaps to attempt to assassinate their political leadership. Just several weeks ago, we were defending America's right to defend itself, and many Islamic countries stood by America's side. How should we respond to this American position?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Unfortunately, America and the Western world generally use a double standard in dealing with Arab and Islamic issues. Justice should be uniform with both friend and foe alike and with one who is near and one who is far, as the Koran teaches us: ‘O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin’ [Koran, 4:135]. One should be just with one whom he likes and dislikes. ‘O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just. That is next to piety. And fear Allah’ [Koran, 5:8]. Hatred involves intense anger directed by or against you. It should not prevent you from speaking justly and...
ruling justly. This is the Islamic logic. However, Western logic, unfortunately, revolves around interests. Interests change. Westerners say, we have neither permanent animosities nor permanent friendships. We have permanent interests. Their interests determine what is right and what the verdict is. Unfortunately, when America was struck on September 11, we stood with them. We issued statements. I was among the first to issue a statement condemning the explosions in New York and Washington. I condemned the perpetrators regardless of their religion, position, homeland, and nationality, because we support what is right. However, unfortunately, America uses double standards. Now, when we are in the right regarding the Palestinian cause, America does not support us. This is nothing new. America and the entire West has long held this position. Moreover, America in particular firmly supports the Zionist entity strategically. America's position is fixed, permanent, unchanging, and immutable. I said long ago that were it not for America's absolute support, money, weapons, and veto, Israel would not have been able to do what it is doing, which is to assault, roam freely, pick quarrels, kill, and destroy with no accountability. This is unfortunate.

The Arab world and the Islamic world are hastening to join with America in the war against terror, even though we have not defined the terrorism that America is fighting. The terrorism that America is fighting is not the terrorism that we have in mind. America regards as terrorists those who defend their homelands and holy and sacrosanct places. It views as terrorists Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian resistance groups, the Kashmiri mujahid movement, and many charitable associations, the most recent being the Holy Land Foundation in the United States. The United States decided officially to make this foundation a state-supported agency. Due to pressure exerted by the Zionist lobby in the United States, it has now become a terrorist organization. Thirty-five terrorist associations have been placed on the list. Many are on deck. We do not know who might be a terrorist. Perhaps I am a terrorist. We do not know. We are defending the Palestinians' right to defend themselves and their honor. America and its supporters view us as terrorists. This is unfortunate.

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Muslims Jurists’ Position on Martyrdom Operations

Mahir Abdallah: This brings us to the heart of the issue on which we wish to focus this evening, which is obvious to many Islamic leaders: How is it that a major figure such as the Sheikh of al-Azhar applies in practice the same term [terrorist] to those carrying out the martyrdom operations in Palestine?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I did not read exactly what the Sheikh of al-Azhar wrote. However, I heard his statements from the news agencies, Aljazeera, and several newspapers. I was astonished by this position. I would like to sit and talk with him face-to-face, as we are old friends. However, I believe that this jurisprudence is marred by a misunderstanding of what I call the ‘jurisprudence of reality.’ The error of many Islamic legal scholars who have erred in this regard does not lie in their understanding of texts or proofs. Rather, the basic error is that they do not understand the reality. If they understood and were thoroughly acquainted with the reality from all standpoints, they would change their religious rulings. This is an extraordinary case. Palestinian society has been attacked. Its land has been usurped. It has been displaced from its home. Its blood has been shed. Machinations have been engineered against it. In the early 20th century, there was no appreciable Jewish presence in the land of Palestine. This is a well known. They [the Jews] made attempts with Sultan Abd-al-Hamid to gain a foothold for themselves, but he refused and lost his reign as a result. The British mandate was introduced to Palestine after 1917. Preparations began for mass migrations of Jews from Europe, America, and the world to form the nucleus of a Jewish state through terrorist groups, including the Hagana, Irgun, and other such groups and through
massacres to frighten the people and compel them to abandon their homes. This state, this usurper entity called Israel, was established. No, the Palestinians are resisting these invaders. I am sitting in my land. It is my land, my property. It has been Muslim for 1400 years and Arab for thousands of years, from the time of the Jebusites, Canaanites, and others. The Jews passed through it. They were called Hebrews, which comes from the root meaning ‘to pass through.’ They passed through the land. They entered it, and it was not empty. It was populated. They left it. They did not leave it empty. Its population is still there. This population is the population of Palestine. What does one do when his land is invaded and he is displaced? Colonialism is a well-known evil in history. There are different grades, hues, and levels of colonialism. However, the most evil type is supplantive, settler colonialism. In settler colonialism, the people of the land are not expelled. An example is the French colonization of Algeria. The French settled in Algeria and considered it a homeland. However, the original population was allowed to remain. The French did not expel them. The Jews entered Palestine and did not allow its population to remain there. They displaced millions of Palestinians to the four corners of the earth. The Palestinians’ land and houses remain intact. Some of the Palestinians still possess the keys to their homes in the hopes of returning to them some day. We must conceptualize the issue: The Palestinians are resisting invaders of their land and homes who expelled them unrightfully, spilled their blood, and displaced them. One is entitled to use all possible means to defend his land, house, homeland, people, blood, and religion.

Mahir Abdallah: Adil Ali Filban of Saudi Arabia has some doubts about martyrdom operations. He says that, according to a genuine hadith, ‘The Prophet of God has forbidden us from killing by assassination.’ Do martyrdom operations include such treacherous killing?
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: He does not understand the subject. In an assassination, one person is killed. In a war, there is no assassination. War is deception. In war, one must employ everything possible. ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies’ [Koran, 8:60]. There is no need for assassination. I go and blow myself up at a bus stop where soldiers returning from Sabbath leave have congregated as happened today. He blows himself up. This is not assassination. We are in a state of war. In a state of war, there is no assassination. It is erroneous to call this suicide. It is not suicide. A person commits suicide kills to escape his personal concerns, e.g., a person who loses his business, fails in love, fails a test, etc. Such a person wishes to relieve himself. He is self-centered. A martyr does not attempt to escape a personal issue. His issue concerns the nation, religion, and the homeland. A person who commits suicide is usually a coward. He is too cowardly to face himself and society. He escapes by committing suicide. He flees from dealing with himself and society. The martyr is among the most brave and sacrificing of the people, because he sacrifices what is most precious, as the Arab poet says, ‘giving generously of oneself is the ultimate goal of generosity.’ The coward is stingy about giving of his self. Giving generously of oneself is the ultimate goal of generosity. One gives generously of himself for the sake of his religion, homeland, and nation. This is unprecedented in our heritage. There have been no situations in which a person puts on a belt of explosives and blows himself up in the enemy’s midst. This has not been known before. Therefore, the religious scholars who did not realize the depths of these issues may differ. However, our Islamic jurisprudence and books of interpretation and hadiths do touch on something similar to this phenomenon.

[News summary]

Mahir Abdallah: You were about to speak about historical evidence. You said that such operations are unprecedented, but there is historical evidence.
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Before I mention the historical evidence, let me say to the brother who says that assassination is not permitted: If they are constantly assassinating our people, the most recent being Hamas leader Abu-Hanud, and they also assassinated Abu-Ali Mustafa. They have assassinated members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah. They even wanted to assassinate Arafat.

Mahir Abdallah: They are declaring this openly.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: How can we permit them to assassinate while we stand by and say assassination is prohibited. One who attacks you should be attacked in kind.

Regarding one who makes himself into a human bomb and then explodes this bomb among his enemies, our forefathers had no knowledge of, nor did they use, explosives. However, religious scholars have referred to something called ‘throwing oneself into the enemy.’ Such a person inserts himself in the enemy. He throws himself, taking a risk knowing that he will certainly or most likely die. This was done as early as the time of the Prophet's companions. The tribe of Bani Hanifah, which is the tribe of a false prophet Musaylimah, had fortified itself. The Muslims besieged them for a period in the War of Apostasy. One of the companions, al-Bara’ bin Malik, said throw me over the wall and I will open the door for you. He absolutely risked his life. There were guards inside. He fought them and was able to open the door. This involved risk.

found that the horses of the Arabs were frightened and alarmed by the elephants employed by the Persians, as the Arabs had no experience with elephants. An elephant was like a tank for them or something more imposing. The Muslim considered...
what could be done. He formed an elephant of mud. He brought his horse to this elephant, so that the horse could become accustomed to it and would not fear it. The horse actually became accustomed to the elephant. He then said, I will kill the elephant. He was told that the elephant would kill him. He said that he had no objection to being killed if the result is victory for the Muslims. This is a long-standing notion among Muslims. Imam Muhammad Bin al-Hasan al-Shibani, a companion of Abu Hanifah [the founder of a legal school in Islam], is considered the founder of international law. He stated: 
‘There is no objection to a man attacking 1000 men and being killed if he expects to escape, or to harm or terrify the enemy, or to embolden his fellow Muslims against the enemy.’
In other words, if he expects to escape, or harm the enemy, even if this harm is to terrify or frighten the enemy, or to embolden the Muslims against the enemy—all of this is permitted. He said, if this were not the case, I would find it repugnant, because he would harm himself to no avail for the Muslims. Muhammad Bin al-Hasan al-Shibani said that he would find this repugnant, but he did not forbid it. This case involves terrorizing others and emboldening Muslims. This is an extremely important case, because Jewish society, Israeli society as it is called, has no roots in this region. It is recent. It has no attachment to this region. Therefore, when the earth is shaken beneath it, when fear is instilled in the hearts of the members of this society, they will flee. This has happened. Several brothers have told me that they heard several months ago on German television, a general in the German army being asked, why have you returned? You were a general in the army. He said to them, ‘we left our country and came to this country seeking security and stability. However, we have not found security and stability. We said, after 10, 20, 30, and 40 years, it is becoming worse.’ Even his son says, ‘whenever I ride on a bus, I am afraid that the bus will explode with me! This means that these operations are shaking these people and putting fear into their hearts. These are very important operations, because they are making them flee and leave this homeland. It is not their primary homeland. The clerics say, as long as you are able to do this, it is not considered ‘contributing to your own destruction.’ In this regard, Imam Ahmad and Abu Dawud related a hadith in the
name of Abu-Ayyub al-Ansari: When the Muslims were besieging Constantinople in the face of the Roman army, a Muslim threw himself into the midst of the Roman army. The people cried, ‘he is contributing to his own destruction.’ Abu-Ayyub al-Ansari said, ‘No, this was revealed to us, the assembly of the companions, when God made Islam victorious and granted victory to His religion. We said, let us return to our property to exploit and repair it. God revealed the following verse: ‘And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make not your own hands contribute to (your) destruction; but do good’ [Koran, 2:195].

Regarding contributing to one's own destruction, he said, you are abandoning the jihad and occupying yourselves exclusively with your property. The verse should not be understood as they understood it. They said to our master Umar, ‘We and another person were besieging a fortress. The person cast himself by his own hand into destruction. Umar said, you are to be refuted, for did not God the Sublime say, ‘And there is the type of man who gives his life to earn the pleasure of Allah. And Allah is full of kindness to (His) devotees’ [Koran, 2:207]. There is a great deal of evidence that one who sells himself and casts himself in the service of God, as long as his objective is to elevate the word of God— Imam Ibn-Taymiyyah draws conclusions from a key hadith in this regard. It is the hadith of the lad in the story of the companions of al-Akhdud [the Ditch], which was related by Imam Muslim in his collection of hadiths. This story is well known: The lad believed in God and disbelieved in the king whom the people worshipped. When the king learned of the lad, he wanted to kill him. He threw him from atop a mountain. But the lad did not die. He threw him into the sea, but he did not drown. He was unable to kill him. He had exhausted all his means. The lad said to him, I will show you one means by which you may kill me. The king asked, what is it? The lad said, gather together the people in a plain. Take this arrow and shoot me with it. Say, in the name of this lad’s God, and shoot this arrow. This arrow will kill me. The king did not realize the stratagem of this young boy. He assembled thousands of people. They watched the young lad whom the king had been unable to kill. They waited to see how the king would kill him. The people waited. The king stood up. He said, in the
name of this lad’s God. He then shot the arrow at him. The lad died. The king killed the lad. The people said, we believe in the God of the lad. This lad had given instructions on a guaranteed method for killing him. But he did so for a cause, namely to spread monotheism and belief in God the Almighty and Exalted. There are many proofs indicating that there is no objection to throwing oneself at one's enemies, even if the enemy is numerous, and even if it is certain or probable that one will be killed thereby. During a military expedition, the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was asked: What makes God ridicule his servants O Prophet of God? He said, ‘when they throw themselves at the enemy without helmet or code of mail and are killed in the service of God. This is not suicide in any case. I find fault with the use of the expression ‘suicide attacks’ by the Arab and Islamic media and the satellite stations, even Aljazeera at times. This is not permitted. This expression is misguided and misleading. These are not suicide attacks. They are heroic, fedayeen, martyrdom attacks. They may not be called suicide attacks. They cannot be attributed to suicide in any case.

Mahir Abdallah: How does this evidence respond to the other doubt raised by Adil, namely every Muslim is required to protect his body and soul?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: The mujahid protects his soul. He must give over his soul. He must place his soul in the palm of his hand to serve God. ‘Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise)’ [Koran, 9:111]. How can you ask a mujahid to protect his soul? I give my soul to God. I do not lose it. I may destroy it with alcohol and drugs. I may damage it with what is impermissible. Giving my soul to God is the utmost in protecting it, because doing so purchases eternity in the service of God. ‘Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead’ [Koran, 3:169].
Mahir Abdallah: Before continuing, I have had two brothers who have been waiting on the line for some time. Nidal Abu-Nuwas from Saudi Arabia, please go ahead.

Nidal Abu-Nuwas: The religious scholars of the Islamic nation have differed over whether martyrdom or suicide operations are legitimate. I will present a viewpoint. If it is correct, praise be to God. If I am mistaken, please excuse me—

Mahir Abdallah (interrupting): Just a moment please while we turn up the volume in the studio. Go ahead.

Nidal Abu-Nuwas: Regarding the Islamic movements, the intifadah, and all these things, God the Almighty said, ‘Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a caliph on earth [Koran, 2:30]. How do you create a caliph on earth who is corrupt, sheds blood, and who knows what else? He [the Lord] said: I know what ye know not [Koran, 2:30]. The world has order. This world is preserved through the preservation of man, the master of this world. The improvement of man’s resources is the foundation of this world. To achieve this, God must judge us favorably regarding several points:

1. We must preserve life, be it mineral, man, plant, or animal. In this regard, the Prophet ordered that trees not be cut down in war. He also enjoined sensitivity to the feelings of animals destined for slaughter and—as stated in a hadith—that such animals be spared distress.

2. Happiness is the use and embellishment of all good things of the world according to rules (‘goods things were permitted to you’).

3. Basic happiness is political self-determination.

4. Political power. It is extremely important for one to be vigilant in maintaining the order of whatever he has authority over in this world. One must observe Islam according to the strict letter, because power, as my master Yusuf knows, is serving God for the
purpose of establishing righteousness. However, what happens is that the government moves away from observance of the Koran and Sunna. The people come to view Islam not as a religion or creed, but as a social entity, i.e., like a sect, tribe, etc. One’s attachment becomes partisan, resulting in the appearance of groups, movements, and martyrdom operations. Palestine occurred. Tomorrow, violence. Martyrdom violence, if one may use this expression, is one of the causes of sovereignty. Man has become tyrannical or aggressive, which, our [Sufi] master al-Ghazzali said, is the nature of man, who possesses both divine and devilish inclinations. Violence among Muslims has even resulted.

Finally, jihad is the most onerous duty of Muslims, even for devoted Muslims, as ‘it is hateful to you’ [Koran, 2:216]. The problem lies not in Palestine or martyrdom operations. The problem is that the succession of multiple defeats over the years has only increased the Palestinians’ aggressive tendencies. These tendencies stem from self-defense requirements and resentment toward other Arabs. I would like to know, how may we renounce this concept? How may we renounce our Arab regimes? How may we renounce ourselves before we issue a religious ruling on whether to permit martyrdom operations? Thank you my master Yusuf for your magnanimity.

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you Nidal. With us is Samih Abdallah from Germany.

Samih Abdallah: I would like to tell listeners and Nidal Abu-Nuwas, the previous speaker, that the calamity of the Islamic nation is not only its rulers, but also its clerics. Praise God who gave us a sheikh such as Sheikh al-Qardawi. He has ruled that it is permitted to carry out martyrdom operations. He refutes those who say that growing

141 [Sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad later established as legally binding precedents]
a long beard down to one's chest and shortening one’s trousers\textsuperscript{142} are glorified Sunna. Those whom he refutes say that making a pilgrimage to al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] is a prophetic tradition. They are stubbornly strict on several issues that are very much disputed but at the same time very lenient in permitting peace with the Jews and in saying that making a pilgrimage to Al-Aqsa Mosque is a prophetic tradition.

We would like to know whether Sheikh al-Qardawi believes that Nidal Abu-Nuwas, from Saudi Arabia is indicative of the superficiality of thinking of the Islamic as a whole, when we hear brother Nidal saying that the Palestinians have come to violence because of their circumstances. This psychological analysis has nothing to do with Islamic law. Our view is based on canonical law, not one’s personal insight. What Sheikh al-Qardawi said is based on Islamic law. What Nidal said is based on his insight. We reject Nidal’s opinion and adopt the opinion based on Islamic law.

Regarding the Islamic nation’s clerics, Nidal said that the calamity of the Islamic nation does not lie solely with its rulers. There is a problem when a ruler comes to a cleric, and the cleric issues a formal religious ruling that satisfies the ruler. The ruler says, this cleric has issued such and such a ruling, and he is more knowledgeable than me. If I undertake such and such, he rules in my favor. The calamity of the nation lies not just in its rulers, but also its clerics, who order the people to grow their beards long and shorten their trousers.

Mahir Abdallah: Samih, your idea is clear. Than you very much for this contribution. Sheikh al-Qardawi, before I pass this question to you, you reminded me of an oddity when you were talking about the story of the elephant and al-Bara’ bin Malik. Had he lived in our time, would he have been prohibited from making an idolatrous image!? Let us begin with Samih’s question after we finish discussing the first subject.

\textsuperscript{142} [In Islam, men should keep their trousers a little bit above the ankles, but trousers may be lengthened to the ankles. However, below the ankles is forbidden if it implies showing off.]
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I did not hear Nidal’s remarks well.

Mahir Abdallah: I will tell you.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: But I did hear strange words from him.

Mahir Abdallah: I will tell you what he said.

Samih asked whether you believe these religious rulings are being exploited politically? At the beginning of the intifadah, even the Sheikh of al-Azhar ruled on the permissibility of these martyrdom operations. He said that Palestinians may use all means to defend themselves. However, putting aside the Sheikh of al-Azhar, Samih asked, with respect to several other religious rulings, whether the problem lies also with the nation’s clerics, not just its rulers? Do you perceive that several fatwas are being exploited politically?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I cannot claim to know whether the Sheikh of al-Azhar or the Saudi clerics responsible for issuing fatwas were asked for a specific fatwa on this subject. Individual fatwas appear. The mufti is a member of the government, unlike the Sheikh of al-Azhar. The newspapers published the opinion of the mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Dr. Farid Nasr Wasil. The latter's opinion is at odds with the opinion held by the Sheikh of al-Azhar on this issue. If the government wishes to exploit a matter, i.e., to inspire all the religious authorities to adopt a single line— However, I think these are the opinions of the Sheikh of al-Azhar and several Saudi clerics. As I stated, this stems from their lack of understanding of the jurisprudence of reality. They are not aware. Israel possesses extensive resources. What can the Palestinian do in the face of tanks on the ground, ships at sea, helicopters in the air, and the nuclear arsenal that backs them? The Palestinian’s only option is to blow himself up among Jews?! Do we wish to deny the Palestinians even this means which our Lord gave to them to enable them to...
resist the tyranny of the haughty on earth?! Do we wish to deny them even this means?!

We understand this grave reality in which a person sacrifices himself for the sake of— What is wrong with that!?

Mahir Abdallah: It seems that the fact that we live in an atmosphere of war is lost on many and certainly on Nidal. Events in Palestine are not an academic discussion among university students. What is happening is happening within—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Could you please summarize for me what he said.

Mahir Abdallah: He said that that jihad is generally an onerous duty. This world is protected by protecting its master, man. Man protects life by guaranteeing political happiness and political power.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: According to these remarks, it is as if we started the war and the fighting. We have been attacked in our own house. Our houses have been occupied. Our land has been usurped. Our population has been displaced. Our blood has been shed. Our mosque, al-Aqsa Mosque, has been occupied. People are prevented from praying in it. Our leaders have been assassinated. We did not begin this. We are defending. Would he prohibit us from defending?!

Such talk has no place. Samih says that he speaks with the logic of Islamic law, and that the brother [Nidal] speaks with the logic of insight. This is neither the logic of Islamic law nor the logic of insight. Insight does not say this. Insight says that every person may defend himself, as the Arab poet of old said:

If a people invades me, I shall invade them.
Am I therefore, O House of Hamdan, an oppressor?

When you impose harshness, arrogance, and wrath on the pure heart, you shall find no refuge.

Mahir Abdallah: More significantly, in his final remark, Nidal said—if I understand him correctly, and if not I beg his pardon—that the Palestinian people’s ongoing suffering has made them aggressive, and this tendency must be tempered.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: The oppression of the Palestinian people is real. On the contrary, we maintain that, during these years, this people has formed a jihadist, self-sacrificing, heroic tendency that has enabled it to resist, despite its paltry capabilities, this mighty, arrogant force which is supported by the great powers, chiefly America. Without this heroism, self-sacrifice, and toughness, the Palestinian people would not have been able to bring about revolution after revolution and intifadah after intifadah, i.e., Fatah’s revolution, then the first intifadah, which is called the ‘revolution of the mosques,’ and then this second intifadah, which has been going on for a year and several months. The Palestinian people offers up martyrs daily. Is this what the brother calls an aggressive tendency? Or is it a heroic tendency, a self-sacrifice tendency, a martyrdom tendency, a toughness tendency, and standing like a lofty mountain?! We must bless this tendency. I censure Samih for saying that the brother [Nidal] speaks with the logic of insight. This is neither the logic of insight nor the logic of science. His analysis is unacceptable. It is not based on either the logic of Islamic law or the logic of science.

Mahir Abdallah: But the brothers appreciate the atmosphere in which the people are living. Talal al-Hajj is a Palestinian from America. He says, I am now afraid to send financial aid to my needy brother living in Lebanon. He is a religious Palestinian refugee. Perhaps he supports Hamas and is a terrorist according to Bush’s classification. His children cannot go to school. If he is not a terrorist now, perhaps he will be one in 10 years.
The Palestinian people is living in this climate. Talal al-Hajj is even afraid of transferring money to his needy brother lest he be accused of being—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: This is the climate in which the people are living. I tell you frankly, in our village, there is a mosque. It is a large mosque. It is the first in which I prayed, delivered a sermon, and studied. It is now on the verge of collapse. There are people in my village seeking assistance. My wife and children say, no, do not send money to them. It will be construed as terrorism! This is the prevailing environment. It is now feared that any charitable act will be construed as terrorism. This is a major problem.

Mahir Abdallah: The final specious argument—and excuse me for pressing this subject, over which there is a great deal of confusion—concerns the case where at least one Muslim is among those who are attacked [in a martyrdom operation]. As stated in the hadith collection of Muslim, according to brother Adil, ‘if the people of the land assemble to kill a single Muslim unrightfully, God overturns them in hell.’

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: That applies if they intended to kill a Muslim. But if the intent is to kill Jews where they congregate, and it happens that a Muslim among them is killed in error, he is rewarded regarding his intent and is among the martyrs in the service of God. Some hadiths state the following: ‘They are resurrected based on their intents.’ Such a person is not deemed to have killed a Muslim intentionally. The legists have said: If disbelievers shield several Muslims, and the disbelievers must be fought, it is permitted to kill a Muslim, even intentionally if allowing the disbelievers to live in dangers the Islamic community. This is not intentional killing. Rather, it happens as it happens. In this case, no wrongdoing is committed, as we will discuss in the next segment, God willing.
Mahir Abdallah: Muhammad Sa’id from Saudi Arabia asks: ‘What is your Eminence's opinion on allowing violation of the agreements concluded by Egypt and Jordan with the Jews and the return of Gaza to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan, after America violated its agreements with the Arabs before the fall of the Taliban? What would the Islamic peoples lose if they came to have no hostilities or wars with non-Muslims?’ The first part of the question is, what is in your position on the violation of agreements concluded between several Arab countries and Israel, particularly given that the sponsor of these agreements, America, violated all of its agreements with the Muslims?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: We hope that the ministerial Islamic Conference being held in Doha tomorrow God willing will discuss these issues, which concern the Islamic nation and the Islamic world. This is necessary, because the Islamic Conference is the supreme political organization representing Muslims. We hope that this topic will be discussed based on legitimate, realistic givens and the nation's resources. The nation possesses considerable resources. However, unfortunately, it does not consolidate these resources into a jumping-off point.

Mahir Abdallah: Hamdallah Muhammad, a businessman from Palestine, differs with you fundamentally. He says: ‘The Islamic meeting will be held on Monday. However, are these really Islamic countries if they support Israel and adopt warm relations with it? No, by God, this nation deserves to live, because it— Or, why was Jerusalem stolen?’ This appears to be a negative reaction to the conference even before it is held. People are not expecting anything from it.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: People are entitled to view these matters pessimistically and to look at them through dark glasses, because the precedents are not encouraging. However, we maintain a flicker of hope that people will start acting after
being quiescent, that they will wake up after sleeping, and that they will unify after being divided and insist on obtaining their due. We at least hope that a step forward will be taken.

Mahir Abdallah: We have with us several sisters from Cairo, including—I believe her name is—A’ishah Abu-Khadir. They insist that several of these fatwas are supported politically and were sought by the government. Hani Sayyid Khattab is an employee on the Internet. He is an administrative employee in Egypt. He asks: ‘How do you respond to one who says that the Palestinian fedayeen operations target civilian women and children contrary to what has been enjoined regarding wars by the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation?’

Martyrdom Operations and Islam’s Position on the Targeting of Civilians

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: This is the second point we wish to address, namely that some people condemn these operations because they target civilians. I disagree. These operations do not target civilians. Israeli society is a military society. The Israelis have militarized their society. This is well known. All of Israeli society, both men and women, had been recruited either as regular army soldiers or reserve soldiers who may be called up at any time. All workers and employees are soldiers in the army. In the Qatari newspaper, al-Watan, Raja al-Naqqash says today that Israel is an army in a society or a society in an army. This is the reality. When a brother blows himself up today at a bus station where there are soldiers returning from [leave], he does not intend to kill a child. Rather, he is attempting to kill people who are regular soldiers or reserve soldiers. A child may be killed. This is an exigency of war. Such exigencies have their rules. As long as it is unintended, it is permitted. In the military campaign against the Bani al-Nadir, the Muslims burned down date palm trees. The Jews said: O Muhammad, you have prohibited us from corruption and have denounced it. Why is this happening now? The Koran sent down a revelation to the Prophet supporting the Muslims’ act: ‘Whether ye cut down (O ye Muslim!) The tender
palm-trees, or ye left them standing on their roots, it was by leave of Allah, and in order that He might cover with shame the rebellious transgressers’ [Koran, 59:5]. Sometimes, things that are prohibited are permitted due to the exigencies of war. We are facing a tyrannical society that is committing machinations against us. As we watch these acts being committed daily, do we want to say to them [the Israelis], be careful, you might get hit! That is out of the question. These are the exigencies of war. We must resist and defend with everything that we can.

Mahir Abdallah: Hundreds of Afghans have been killed in the American bombardment. America explained that this was a necessity of war. In order to reach our objectives, they must be killed.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: However, America is not defending its homeland like the Palestinians are defending theirs. Thousands of miles separate Afghanistan from America. America went to Afghanistan to defend America in Afghanistan. American is defending itself by killing civilians and peaceful people, destroying all vital installations and infrastructure, and killing people. Therefore, what is wrong with someone who fights in his land to defend his homeland and what is sacred for him?

Mahir Abdallah: Ahmad Mahir, a student from Palestine says: ‘I am a Palestinian. I know how things are going in Palestine. The reality is different from what people see on television. The only path is martyrdom operations. Volunteers carry out these operations based on their own choice. Let us hear—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi (interrupting): These martyrdom operations are the greatest type of jihad in our era. We salute those who give up their lives in the service of God. This is a type of heroism. The problem is, how do we face the Jews with their nuclear arsenal? They are extremely covetous of life. We are extremely sacrificing of life. Their concern for life is our path to victory and mastery, God willing.
Mahir Abdallah: We have with us Muhammad Khidr from Mauritania. Muhammad, we apologize for the delay. Please go ahead. Excuse me, Muhammad Hafiz from Mauritania. Muhammad, are you with us? Fine, Dr. Ali al-Qaradагhi from Doha is with us.

Dr. Ali al-Qaradагhi: Greetings. I salute our Eminent Sheikh in this blessed segment, particularly in the times through which our nation is passing. Some desire that our nation be completely despairing and frustrated. Colonialism's policy is to cause us to despair. We truly require such people as His Eminence Sheikh al-Qardawi and those who perform the jihad with words and deeds. I would like to join my voice to the voice of Sheikh al-Qardawi regarding the Islamic law provisions that he has reviewed. These provisions clearly indicate that martyrdom operations are permitted and even given priority. I would like to make several minor additions. When Islamic law provisions speak about performing the jihad with your selves, they do not specify a specific method. [The Koran states:] ‘Struggle in God's way with your possessions and your selves’ [9:41], ‘they struggle with their possessions and their selves’ [9:44], and ‘O ye who believe, shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty? - That ye believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that ye strive (your utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your property and your persons’ [61:10-11]. God, the sublime and exalted, did not specify a single method for performing the jihad. Such methods include fighting in a war and these methods. The purpose of jihad is to make the truth prevail and to fill the enemy with fear--' to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemy, of Allah and your enemies' [Koran, 8:60]. This terrorism, if this expression is proper, involves terrorizing the enemy, not peaceful people. How is this terrorism currently carried out? These Zionist enemies are in their armored cars, F-16 and F-18 aircraft, Apache helicopters, etc. How can our unarmed brothers [resist them]? They have no weapons to employ in such a fight. What does one do in the face of a tank? In my opinion, the only method by which our brothers can fight at present is this method [i.e., martyrdom operations]. How
can we stop them [the Zionists]? The noble Koran enjoins us to strive using our selves with all means. Then, there is the story of the lad [see above]. All agree that this story is authentic. This lad wanted to serve Islam, and the Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, mentions and praises this story. The noble Koran includes the following revelation: ‘By the sky, (displaying) the Zodiacal Signs; By the promised Day (of Judgment) [Koran, 85:1-2]. This lad showed the king how he could kill him. He instructed the king to come to him, take an arrow from his quiver, and say, in the name of the Lord of this lad. Why? To make Islam victorious. All of the specious arguments that have been raised fail to distinguish between what we call in Islamic jurisprudence the ‘jihad of repulsion’ and the ‘commanded jihad.’ The jihad in Palestine is the jihad of repulsion, as it involves repulsion of an assaulting enemy. Even if a believer comes to you and wishes to take your property and honor or attack you on your land, you may fight him, kill him, and repel him. Internal self-abandon is an instinct, not only in humans, but in all animals. Moreover, all of creation is based on this impulse. A human being repels a stranger. The human body repels anything foreign to it.

This is what our brothers are mostly doing today. It comes under the heading of healthy instinct. It is the instinct to repel that which is foreign. These gangs are occupying our land. The Muslims helped the Jews and embraced them. The peerless Ottoman Empire permitted the Jews to live among them in places other than Palestine. They Jews came and occupied our land. Now, we say to them, just as his Eminence the Sheikh said: We cannot compare what happened in America and what is happening in Palestine. All of us and all Muslim clerics condemned what happened in America and several Western countries. In that case, some Muslims—through ignorance, misunderstanding, or extremism—behaved improperly. From the standpoint of Islamic law, the issue is completely

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143 [an individual obligation to repel disbelievers who invade a Muslim land]
144 [The fighting of disbelievers in their own lands under the command of the leader of the nation.]
different when enemies occupy our land. In this case, jihad to repel the enemy becomes a duty. We have agreements and pacts [with the Americans]. We must preserve these agreements and pacts. We are not permitted to harm men, even soldiers. We are not harming them inside America. We cannot go in there, because we have treaties, for it says in the Koran, ‘But if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance’ [8:72].

In Palestine, they [the Muslims] basically have no treaty. Experience as shown that the treaties that have been concluded are useless. They have achieved nothing and are not enforced. [Israeli] society is a military society as the sheikh said. Consequently, these specious arguments should not be raised, and we should not block this path [of martyrdom operations].

Mahir Abdallah (interrupting): Thank you very much Dr. Ali for this contribution. The consensus is clear. I do not know whether the sheikh wishes to comment on several aspects.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: No, we agreed. May God bless and thank him.


The Political Exploitation of the Muslim Clerics’ Fatwas, and Its Effect on the Credibility of Fatwas

Adam Ashur: Fatwas are issued by the greatest historical institution in the Islamic world. All clerics in official positions and those sitting at home are accountable for the fatwas that appear from time to time in the Islamic world. His Eminence Sheikh Tantawi (the Sheikh of al-Azhar) must be told that this is a mistake. This is required of all religious scholars of the nation, whether in official positions or retired. The word of truth must be said without fear and flattery. Otherwise, what shall we demand of our religious scholars? Are we...
less strong in our belief if we say: Your Eminence, these remarks are somewhat mistaken. We do not say, no, you are our eminent one. However, there is some error here. What does the junior cleric say when you issue such fatwas? Politics is interfering with our fatwas.

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you. I would like to ask you a question relating to Abu-Nawwaf’s topic. You would consider this a frank, offensive question. He says: I would like your Excellency Dr. al-Qardawi to clarify your view from the standpoint of Islamic law, with your well-known candidness. If you were in the Sheikh of al-Azhar’s position, would you insist on your view of martyrdom operations and subject yourself to accountability? I have no reproach for the Sheikh of al-Azhar. He ruled as was dictated to him to preserve his position.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: First, I do not believe that he was dictated to. However, if I were in his position, I would insist on my view, regardless of what happens, because this is an issue of a principle in which I believe and on which I will not compromise, even at the cost of my life, let alone losing a position. It is not open to debate.

Mahir Abdallah: Khaulah from the Netherlands says providing monetary support to Muslims has now become terrorism. It has been announced that financial transfers will be monitored. She asks: ‘What can we in the West do to help our Muslim brothers in Palestine and throughout the world?’

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: We must take measures. We must resist. We must not surrender. Otherwise, we will have abandoned our brothers to die of hunger. We will have abandoned Islamic causes and separated Muslims from each other.
contrary to what Islam desires. Islam says, ‘There must not be among us one who has become rich while his neighbor is hungry.’ Believers make up a cohesive structure. They are a single body. If one part complains, the entire body complains. God helps the servant as long as the servant helps his brothers. The Koran and the hadith require us to help each other with charity and piety. We should not fear. These things should not make us afraid and distance us from performing our duty. We must perform our duty, regardless of what may come upon us. We will not lose anything. God cherishes us for it. The proverb says, ‘Life is but one and God is but one.’ Neither our lives nor our livelihoods will be diminished. We must perform this duty and rely upon God the Almighty.

Mahir Abdallah: Muhammad Ibrahim Umar, who does not mention where he is from, asks: Why are we betting on those who oppose martyrdom operations to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and establish a sovereign state?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I did not know why.

Suicide operations are the means of the weak. Our Lord strengthens us with this means. Do you wish to deny our brothers this means? I am dismayed by this type of thinking. God did not prohibit this in the Koran or prophetic tradition. Should we oppose these great martyr fighters who are shaking the ground under Israel? Israel has held conferences and taken action, because, if this continues, many will immigrate. Many have immigrated recently, since the start of the second intifadah. Thousands have immigrated from Israel. People are seeking to immigrate daily. We must be patient in this jihad. It will bear its fruit and achieve its objectives, God willing.

The Adverse Effect of Martyrdom Operations on Palestinians

Mahir Abdallah: Dr. Muhammad from Germany asks: Do not the martyrdom operations also have an adverse effect? Do they not provide the Zionist

D. Yusuf al-Qardawi: and Allah, by the way, has prohibited this, and has prohibited any means of war against us. How are we doing this, how are we doing this? Our Lord says, ‘There must not be among us one who has become rich while his neighbor is hungry.’ Believers make up a cohesive structure. They are a single body. If one part complains, the entire body complains. God helps the servant as long as the servant helps his brothers. The Koran and the hadith require us to help each other with charity and piety. We should not fear. These things should not make us afraid and distance us from performing our duty. We must perform our duty, regardless of what may come upon us. We will not lose anything. God cherishes us for it. The proverb says, ‘Life is but one and God is but one.’ Neither our lives nor our livelihoods will be diminished. We must perform this duty and rely upon God the Almighty.

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Mahir Abdallah: Dr. Muhammad from Germany asks: Do not the martyrdom operations also have an adverse effect? Do they not provide the Zionist...
gang ruling in occupied Palestine with justification to attack and pursue their aggressive policy more violently? Moreover, after each martyrdom operation against civilians, public opinion becomes more sympathetic to the Zionist entity.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: All martyrdom operations are in response to Israel’s aggression. The Palestinians usually respond to hostile actions. The Israelis conduct an operation in the Mosque of Abraham in Hebron. The Palestinians attempt to respond to it in the tunnel. They killed them in the tunnel, in Qana. All of these operations are responses. The recent operations are a response to the killing of Hamas leader Abu-Hanud. The Israeli minister [Rehavam Zeevi] was killed in response to the killing of Abu-Ali Mustafa. These operations fulfill the following Koranic verses: ‘Whoever acts aggressively against you, inflict injury on him according to the injury he has inflicted on you’ [2:194] ‘and there is life for you in (the law of) retaliation’ [2:179].

Mahir Abdallah: Weju from Saudi Arabia, a computer technician, says: May God bless you for discussing this topic. All of the examples mentioned by the sheikh concern martyrdom operations in which a martyr dies at the hand of enemies, not by his own hand. There is no debate regarding someone who is assaulted by a machine gun. However, I did not know if this would also be the case regarding one who kills himself. Is there a difference between one who is killed by an enemy bullet in battle in which he was required to participate and one who assaults himself?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: There is no difference. He assaults himself to kill. His only objective is to harm and undermine the enemy. He is a victim. He sacrifices himself to serve. There are in effect judged to be the same.

Mahir Abdallah: Ahmad Mustafa al-Alwan from
Mi’arrat al-Ni’man in Syria asks: Is not the hadith concerning the story of al-Ghamidyah, who submitted herself to punishment, suitable additional evidence to justify martyrdom operations? Have you found any better example of one who sacrificed herself to God?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: It may be helpful. She sacrificed herself to God the Almighty.

Mahir Abdallah: I have with me Fadil Murad from Qatar.

Fadil Murad: I would like to make several points on this subject. All Islamic legal provisions on jihad in the service of God and self-sacrifice indicate that martyrdom operations are permitted. Anyone who disagrees must produce clear, unobjectionable evidence. As for the specious argument of killing oneself, why has jihad been legislated if not for that purpose, or to bear witness in the service of God, or to elevate God’s word. The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said that the children of combatants are ‘from them’ with respect to their plotting. Regarding the assassination of combatants, the Prophet ordered the assassination of Jews, including Abu Rafi’ and Salam Abu al-Haqiq, only because they vilified Muslims, put them in a bad light, and flirted with their women. The Prophet instructed that a Muslim man going to the idolaters, to the Jewish tribes, would expose himself to being killed. The legists also mention in Bada’ i’ al-Sana’i’ that a mujahid may attack idolaters, even if he is certain he will be killed, in order to harm and terrorize the enemy’s of God. This is clear in many books of jurisprudence. There appears to be no disagreement among jurists on this issue if legal intent exists. Another question: America has classified Islamic resistance operations as terrorist. Could you elucidate for Muslims your analysis from an Islamic law perspective ‘to make clear what God has revealed to them' so that they

145 [Al-Ghamidiyah committed adultery but afterwards repented and wanted to be purified. When she found herself pregnant she went to the Prophet knowing she would be stoned and asked him to purify her, but he told her to have the baby first. The Prophet gave her many opportunities not to return to him. He finally purified her before she accepted her punishment.]
Mahir Abdallah: Do you want an Islamic justification for the American position?

Fadl Abdallah Murad: What is the justification under Islamic law for America declaring Islamic resistance operations terrorism?

Mahir Abdallah: America does not resort to Islamic law for legal decisions. It is not concerned about the justification for terrorism.

Fadl Abdallah Murad: What I mean is, how does Islamic law frame the issue?

Mahir Abdallah: What issue?

Fadl Abdallah Murad: To make it clear to the people.

Mahir Abdallah: To make clear the position on America's classification of several movements?

Fadl Abdallah Murad: Yes, is this war?

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you very much Fadil.

[Commercial break]

Mahir Abdallah: Before responding to the Muhammad Abdallah Fadl’s comment, permit me [to read] a message from Dr. Ibtihal Muhammad ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, who identifies herself as the granddaughter of Sheikh ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam.146

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146 [“Born in Ladhiqiyah, Syria; Muslim preacher, religious teacher and social reformer with residence in Haifa; Muslim Brotherhood member; preached Jihad (holy war) and revolution against both the British and the Zionists; organizer and leader of the first Palestinian guerilla group, acting against British security forces while preaching..."
‘From the depths of my heart, I bless our nation, the nation of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation. [We are blessed] with people like yourself who speak boldly and take genuine stands. You are the true leader of millions of Muslims whose blood boils with love for the jihad and yearning for martyrdom. Whenever the fire of frustration and despair blazes for young mujahids, your positions renew their determination. Our nation will never die. It is the nation of the eternal Koran. What are we waiting for our enemies to say about us? Therefore, I take this opportunity to bless Palestine’s pious martyrs who line up under the illumination of Sheikh al-Qassam. The march of al-Qassam shall God willing remain eternal and everlasting as the minarets and domes of our noble Jerusalem. My master, the enemies of Islam do not dissuade us from resorting to any method by which they fight Islam and its men. You, my master, are now the thundering Islamic voice that defends the causes of Muslims. Be careful. I pray to God Almighty, the Lord of the great throne, to protect you. God hearkens and responds.’ Could you please comment on the message of the doctor and of Ali?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I have no comment. I salute this noble sister Dr. Ibtihal. It is no surprise that such comments should come from her, as ‘the apple does not fall far from the tree.’ As God the sublime said, ‘Offspring, one of the other [Koran, 3:34]. A granddaughter of Sheikh ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam is very likely to make such remarks. We pray that God forgive her grandfather and accept him among the righteous. The members of Hamas recognize their debt to the sheikh and have paid it by naming their brigades after him. We pray that God multiply the likes of the children of Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and the spirit of Izz-al-Din al-Qassam.

Mahir Abdallah: Muhammad Abdallah shares an earlier contributor’s view that Arab and Islamic conferences are useless, because they are subordinate to America’s agenda.
Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I believe that it is better for the Arabs and Muslims to meet than not to meet. We know that America has long attempted through various means and methods to prevent the convening of any Arab summit. Therefore, we encourage the convening of any Arab or Islamic summit or ministerial conference. We believe that holding discussions on these matters is perhaps good. Strong, committed voices will continue. Such conferences allow our nation to move ahead. They shake us from our laziness, wake us up, and get us moving. I hope that good will come of them. In any case meeting is better than not meeting.

Mahir Abdallah: Regarding the question posed by Fadl Murad, which is a strange turn if it is correct or accurate, namely that all the Koranic verses on jihad permit all means of jihad, and that anyone who thinks otherwise must be backed up his objection with proof, because the verses indicate that everything—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: This remark is reasonable. It is the principle, the jihad. This underscores what was said by our brother, the august Muslim scholar, Sheikh Dr. Ali al-Qarah Daghi. He said that Our Lord said, ‘Struggle in God's way.’ However, he did not specify the method for jihad. This is one of the methods of jihad. The people have invented a method that had not been known. The mujahid kills himself or exposes himself to being killed and kills others with him. This is the required jihad, namely that you kill. God the sublime said, ‘Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His cause, and slay and are slain’ [Koran, 9:111]. He kills and is killed. I agree with him in this regard. I also agree with Fadl Murad’s remark that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, used assassination at one time against several Jewish leaders who had adopted adverse positions, such as Abu al-Haqiq, Ka’b Bin al-Ashraf, and others. The Prophet wanted to eliminate them without...
provoking a major war. America has given itself the right to assassinate personages as it wishes if it believes they endanger American national security, without stating the reasons for its actions. Why should we be denied this means? They assassinate us in the morning, and, in the evening, we say, no, no, Islam forbids assassination?

**Mahir Abdallah:** Dr. Hisham Nasif Makki, who does not state from where he hails, says that he is retired. He states: Others have placed us in the courtroom dock. Our sole concern has become defending ourselves and justifying our behavior. This is what they want. Would it not be better for us to indict them and place them in the dock?

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** People from among us have compelled us to take this position. I used to think that this matter would become clear, that the relevant facts would become manifest, that the cover would be taken off it, and that these operations would become legitimate and recognized. The truth is that hundreds of Muslim scholars throughout the Arab and Islamic world all approve of these operations. However, voices are heard from time to time roiling this process, and we are compelled to adopt a defensive position, which we do not like to do.

**Mahir Abdallah:** Mahmud Freihat from Jordan says: ‘Regarding those who question the effect of martyrdom operations on world opinion, I believe that the West needs no justification to make clear its loyalty and bias in favor of the Jews.’

**Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:** The West respects strength. They have respected the Jews when the latter have imposed themselves forcefully and killed. When we find ourselves weak and cannot stand up to them, we are disregarded. We are not a consideration, because the West respects power. Were we the strong ones, the West would respect us.

**Mahir Abdallah:** Sister Afra Abd-al-Karim Untha, an administrative employees in Saudi Arabia, says:
‘We fear for Sheikh al-Qardawi because of the Israelis. May God protect him and surround him with His care. We pray to God night and day. Please convey to the sheikh our greetings over the air.’ And so we have.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: I thank her and return her greeting two-fold. The time of one's death is in the hands of God Almighty. ‘But to no soul will Allah grant respite when the time appointed (for it) has come’ [Koran, 63:11]. ‘When their term is reached, not an hour can they cause delay, nor (an hour) can they advance (it in anticipation)’ [Koran, 7:30 4]. ‘But Allah is the best to take care (of him), and He is the Most Merciful of those who show mercy!’ [Koran, 12:64].

Mahir Abdallah: Umar Muhammad al-Qadiri from Syria, a student: ‘Those who betrayed the Muslims in the Battle of the Trench were Jews. Everyone who had reached puberty was to be sentenced to death. Who is more deserving of being killed, the Jews at the Battle of the Trench or the Jews of today?’

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Sa’d bin Mu’adh ruled that combatants must be shown to have reached puberty in order for them to be killed. These [Jews of today] are equal to the Jews of the tribe of Bani Qurayzah, because they have entered the Muslims’ domain and displaced and expelled its population unrightfully. According to our Lord, they are oppressive, arrogant, unrightful usurpers. They must be resisted. Resistance is necessary. Resistance must continue as long as there is a way to resist.

Mahir Abdallah: Abdallah as a businessman. He does not mention where he is from. He would like you to compile, after a long life, these fatwas in a single book, because, in time, all of us will become terrorists according to the American classification. Sheikhs of the Jews have appeared. They have permitted usury and banned martyrdom operations. They have done all this to satisfy the Jews. It is feared that they will become the sheikhs of the
future and will set examples that we would not set. It is hoped that you will record these fatwas, before everyone enters into—

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: It is in my book entitled *Fatawi Mu’asirah* [Contemporary Fatwas], which is in three volumes. The fourth volume is forthcoming God willing. Everything is written and recorded on the Aljazeera program ‘Islamic law and life.’

Mahir Abdallah: Abd-al-Hadi Abd-al-Ghani asks or comments: The nation is set back by these conflicting fatwas. The most dangerous are the fatwas that weaken the resolve of Muslims and distance them from jihad in the service of God. May God bless al-Qardawi for his sound religious fatwas. We are reminded that a council of religious scholars must be established to unify fatwas.

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: We hope that an international federation of Muslim scholars will be established as you have advocated. I have received approbations, encouragement, and urging from all parts of the world. We pray that God prepare for us a headquarters so that such a federation can engage in its activity and determine its positions, God willing.

Mahir Abdallah: His question relates to authority. He says: There is obedience to God and obedience to the ruler. I have not found any site on the Internet that responds to my inquiry. Any military action requires obedience to the ruler. The president of the Palestinian Authority is requesting that the people not carry out these operations. Where is the obedience to the ruler in this case?

Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi: Does he mean that the president of the Palestinian Authority is free and may choose to issue such orders or is being pressured? The questioner refers to the first part of a Koranic verse [4:59], which is, ‘O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority.’ The last part of the verse is as follows: ‘If ye differ in anything among
yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger.” If
the Palestinians differ with the president of the
Authority, they must refer the matter to God and
the Prophet, i.e., the Koran and the Sunna. If we
refer the matter to the Koran and the Sunna, we
find a requirement to resist according to the
religious obligation of jihad. This is the jihad of
repulsion, as Dr. al-Qarah Daghi said. Muslim
scholars maintained that this is an individual duty. It
is an individual duty of every Palestinian to resist
and defend his country and holy places. The
Muslim scholars even said that this obligation may
be fulfilled by a woman without her husband's
permission, a son without his father's permission, a
servant without his master's permission, and a
subordinate without his superior's permission,
because it is a general right that supersedes [other]
rights. Everyone must resist. Not even the
president expects— No, everyone must, for this is
the jihad of repulsion, or jihad of necessity, or jihad
of resistance. It has been imposed on everyone.
No one may stop or dispute it.

Mahir Abdallah: Thank you for participating and
staying with us. Until next week—may God's
peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you
Iraq's Image in the Arab Media

- Presenter of segment: Abd-al-Azim Muhammad
- Guests on segment: Muhammad al-Musaffar, Professor of Political Science, University of Qatar; Muhammad Al-Sayyid Sa’id, Deputy Chairman, Al-Ahram Center [for Political and Strategic] Studies; and Haydar Sa’id, Researcher and Journalist
- Date of segment: September 12, 2004
- Topics of the program:
  - Media Coverage of the Iraqi Scene
  - Journalistic Code of Ethics

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Welcome to this special segment of the Iraqi scene, which we present to you directly from Doha. In this segment, we will discuss the image of Iraq in the Arab media or Arab media coverage of the Iraqi scene. On the occasion of this discussion on the Arab media, we would first like to express our deep condolences to the news channel, which has experienced a sad day following the death of its correspondent in Baghdad, our colleague, Mazin al-Tamizi. It is also a sad day for us here at Aljazeera due to the great loss of our colleague Mahir Abdallah. May God protect them with his ample grace and inspire their families with patience and consolation. The provisional Iraqi government, represented by the higher media authority has issued a code of journalistic ethics which the media operating in Iraq must observe. It has done so in an apparent attempt to end a long series of misunderstandings which began with the establishment of the Iraqi
in the Iraqi government. The Iraqi provisional government, since beginning its term, has accused the media, including the Arab media in particular, of providing a bleak picture of the situation in Iraq and providing a platform for persons whom the government describes as terrorists while disregarding the achievements.

To discuss this topic, I have with me in the studio doctor Muhammad Al-Musaffar, Professor of Political Science, University of Qatar. Also with me from Baghdad is journalist Haydar Sa’id. From Cairo, we are joined by journalist and researcher, Dr. Muhamad al-Sayyid Sa’id. Welcome to you all. We will be discussing the situation of media coverage in Iraq and the code of ethics issued by the provisional government. We will start this segment by shedding light on journalistic work in Iraq in a report by Imad al-Atrash.

**Media Coverage of the Iraqi Scene**

[Recorded report]

Imad al-Atrash: With the development of communications and the growing number of satellite stations, the television screen has become a true window that transports you to the site of the events. If the right to cover the war in Iraq were to be granted exclusively, the competition would rival the World Cup. Image and words are the backbone of the visual medium. Of course, images and words originating in Iraq do not have the same meaning for everyone. Iraq’s demographic weave is complex. Events happening there are difficult to convey faithfully through the eyes, minds, pens, and lenses of correspondents. The Iraq that has been reported in the Arab media for the past year or more is not monolithic. Reverberating, successive changes have struck Iraq since the fall of Baghdad. The political process paralleling what is happening on the ground has produced different reactions.
at all levels.

The media has thus had to cover a broad spectrum of differences. The US military presence in Iraq is unequivocally an occupation. This occupation is recognized by United Nations and the majority of the Iraqi parties. It has nonetheless become the object of debate and contention at the first key turning point in America’s vision for a solution to the crisis in Iraq, i.e., directly after the signing of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. The adoption of this law has clearly divided the political powers operating in the Iraqi arena. The media echoes the events it reports. The media has thus entered the center of the debate over whether America’s military presence in Iraq is an occupation or merely part of the multinational force, with its mutual attractions and repulsions, depending on whether one is a coalition member or opposes the coalition. The picture has become increasingly complicated on the ground and in the media amid the succession of key turning points on the US-paved road to a political decision, the continuation of momentous events, the increase in abductions, the circulation of the names of groups, the rise of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the consolidation of a [coalition] solution [to secure] the city of Falluja.

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: We will begin from Baghdad with Professor Haydar Sa’id. Professor Haydar, how do you view the coverage of Iraq by the international media and the Arab media in particular?

Haydar al-Sa’id: Thank you very much. The Arab media's coverage of events in Iraq has several dimensions, including the professional and cultural dimensions. The Arab media...
comprises Palestinians, Jordanians, North Africans, and Syrians. They are a part of Arab public opinion. Coverage of Iraq forms Arab public opinion's position on Iraq. Arab culture and Arab public opinion are inseparable from Arab media coverage of Iraq. The Arab media is also inseparable from Arab public opinion. Arab public opinion is formed at the core of Arab culture, which is essentially hostile and inimical toward the West. Arab culture views the West as colonialist and hostile toward its aspirations and cultural enterprise. After a strange historical turn, the West has returned to Iraq to herald the elimination of dictatorship. Arab public opinion and the Arabic media thus inevitably adopted a position that is hostile to what has been happening in Iraq. This hostility is not apparent in the reporting of the news, as the professionalism of the Arab media is beyond doubt. Rather, it occurs in the general orientation taken by these channels in—

**Abd al-Azim Muhammad:** What is the meaning of ‘hostile to what has been happening in Iraq’? What are you getting at?

**Haydar Sa’id:** We must study the Arab media's behavior regarding the Iraqi war. The Arab media has hopes of creating aspirations and great hopes on account of the Iraqi issue. We remember the resistance at Umm Qasr [where US and British forces met significant resistance in March 2003]. There is no doubt that there was resistance. However, it was spun and exaggerated in the Arab media. The reason is that Umm al-Qasr presents a victory for the Arab ego, which has experienced a long history of defeat. The focus on several
incidents in Iraq—and I underscore that this concerns opinion, not the professionalism of news reporting—is an attempt by the media to find what it is hoping for in Iraq. The media wants to see America defeated in Iraq. It wants to see in Iraq the failure of the American enterprise, i.e., "democratic liberalism."

Abd al-Azim Muhammad: I would like to direct this question to Dr. Muhammad al-Musaffar. As Haydar Sa’id said, the Arab media is accused of promoting what the Arab world and Arab public opinion want to occur in Iraq rather than [presenting] the actual situation in Iraq. It promotes opposition to the American occupation or promotes the so-called Iraqi resistance.

Dr. Muhammad al-Musaffar: First, let me also express my deepest condolences to the Aljazeera family and to all the noble members of the Arab media throughout the Arab world and abroad over our loss of Mahir Abdallah, may God have mercy on him, protect him, and cause him to dwell in heaven. Haydar Sa’id's remarks seem to flatten reality. He wants to isolate the Arab individual from his reality. He wants to isolate him from his thoughts and ambitions to see his nation free, independent, sovereign, and not under foreign hegemony. Like any culture, the Arab culture rejects occupation. The Vietnamese rejected the occupation of the French and Japanese. South Korea continues to reject occupation. Japan continues to reject the presence of American bases in Japan. Thus, our brothers in Iraq reject our tendency to depict what America wants us to depict regarding the situation in Iraq. We believe that this force that came to Iraq is an aggressive, unjust, occupier. The second point—
Haydar Sa’id: If we could please focus specifically on the media.

Muhammad al-Musaffar: Ok, I will answer you. It has been said that the resistance at Umm Qasr was true resistance. The media conveyed the glory of this resistance, which continued for more than two weeks. How do you want the Arab media to depict it from its perspective? The correspondents who entered this region with US forces might depict it differently from other Arabs or members of other media, including the foreign media, especially the media of forces not participating in the war to occupy Iraq. If you want, I will say that there is a very strong shortcoming, but it is not a turning point. I want to reflect my thoughts on the situation in Iraq. Let me give you an example to keep the matter in perspective. When a group of Pakistanis or two Pakistanis were kidnapped, the media emphasized that they were poor, weak, and unfortunate folks who had come in search of a livelihood to support their large families. The media then segued into a report on the suffering of their families in Pakistan. This is not an accurate picture of this situation. The media did not report that these two abducted Pakistani men were seen in a photograph showing them behaving in a friendly affectionate way with an American general, Kret [phonetic], in Baghdad. They did not show us the image of these two men wearing military uniforms as they entered the country or wearing them elsewhere. Therefore, the only media image that we received was that they were unfortunate, persecuted, innocent abductees, that this was an act of terrorism which they opposed, etc. Moreover, there were no reports that these individuals had
information and that they provided confessions. No Arab media broadcasted the tape in which they confess to what they did in Iraq. Regarding the brother from Egypt who was killed, I greatly sympathize with these people and am extremely pained by the execution, murder, or slaughter of any person. However, the Egyptian brother who was abducted and executed by the brothers confessed voluntarily that he served the American presence in the region. He confessed on a videotape in his own voice without any suffering.

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Doctor—

Muhammad al-Musaffar: Please allow me a minute. He distributed more than 25 reflecting disks to allow American aircraft to strike positions in Falluja.

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Doctor, it was reported that these confessions were given under duress. Many have said that they are unreliable. Let me direct a question to Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa’id from Cairo. Doctor, from a professional perspective, how do you evaluate the performance of the Arab media in terms of conveying the situation in Iraq?

Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa’id: First, there has been a major development in the international media in the Arab region. Arabs have emerged in the international media as significant players with unquestionable professional distinction. Nonetheless, I believe that there are legitimate questions or doubts concerning the credibility, quality, and coverage of the Arab satellite stations, including Aljazeera. The Americans, Arabs, and many Arab intellectuals are raising such
questions, which must be discussed. I congratulate Aljazeera's discussion of this issue with such great transparency and clarity. Some maintain that Aljazeera has come under substantial American pressure, and that this pressure has succeeded somewhat in causing Aljazeera to make specific changes or to adapt to the pressure. There is also a major American theory or lie, which has greatly impacted contemporary media culture. According to this lie, the major political struggles are over image, narrative, and spin. These struggles parallel the struggle over major fundamentals in the world and region. The Americans assert that they must be without rival in as large an area or space as possible in order to present their narratives without adjusting their policy, which draws the region's animosity. In this false media message or lie, which they have repeated a number of times, they say that they want to influence Arab public opinion without changing US policies on the Arab region. This largely explains the pressures on Aljazeera, even tough the American media is itself moving increasingly toward homogeneity, indecency, and vulgarity, as we see on the Fox stations for example. However, from an Arab viewpoint, there is another extremely important factor, which we must bring up [for the sake of] political and historical integrity, which is that the Arab media is government-controlled. Does this situation, which always raises questions, pose a cognitive dissonance problem for Aljazeera? In other words, the policies of the Qatari government, which finances Aljazeera, are friendly toward the Americans. However, the political discourse or the basic image or narrative appearing in Aljazeera’s coverage of the Iraqi crisis or other issues is largely a nationalistic narrative. This causes great confusion. Perhaps many do not understand it. Another point: Coverage of Iraq should provide a great opportunity to improve professional performance in terms of depth of coverage and diversity in particular.
Diversity was largely absent, especially before the invasion and war. Perhaps we see more diversity now, but not the diversity that we as Arabs or intellectuals and professionals want. Rather, it is the diversity that the Americans want. This is a flattened diversity. It does not enable us to really see Iraqi pluralism at work or ideological or political differences. Hence, we cannot understand many events. We cannot, for example, understand the positions of the Shiite religious authority or the Shiite religious seminary authorities vis-à-vis the young Shiite leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. Suddenly, after he is defeated, we hear that he has his own prisons, courts, etc.

Abd al-Azim Muhammad: Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa‘id, excuse me, we will take up Aljazeera’s situation in Iraq and the pressure on Aljazeera that you mentioned, but after a short break.

[Commercial break]

Journalistic Code of Ethics

Abd al-Azim Muhammad: We welcome viewers to the "Iraqi Scene Program." In this portion of the program, we will try to present several paragraphs of the code of ethics issued by the provisional Iraqi government and sent to Aljazeera. This is the first time the code is being publicized. Paragraph 1 of the National Code of Ethics calls upon the media to be truthful and objective in reporting the news. It also calls upon the media to avoid: inciting violence and sectarian and ethnic strife in Iraqi society; spreading hatred; using the media to pillory individuals; showing support for kidnappings, bombings, and the killing of
civilians; and promoting terrorist threats and demands. Dr. Haydar Sa’id from Baghdad, these are some of the points mentioned in the code of ethics which the media, including Aljazeera, is being asked to sign as a code of ethics for journalistic activity in Iraq. What is your opinion on this code? Which agency renders legal judgments regarding these paragraphs, which are said to be more nebulous than defined?

Haydar Sa’id: Thank you very much. I did not hear the last part of the question very well, but I believe that I have understood the content of the question. I am opposed to governmental imposition of a list of requirements on the media. From the beginning, I have strongly opposed the decision to close Aljazeera’s office in Baghdad. I am not saying this just because I am now speaking on Aljazeera. I have made these remarks to other media outlets. This is an extremely dangerous decision. I am concerned for the future of the Iraqi media. I fear the establishment of a centralized state that will again order the media around. I am afraid that the freedom of the media which has been granted in Iraq will be lost after two, three, or four years in the face of the centralized state that is now in the process of forming. The decision to punish Aljazeera was a political decision. There are three dimensions that I would quickly like to lay out.

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Quickly, because not much time remains.

Haydar Sa’id: The decision to close Aljazeera’s office enjoys popular, emotional support in Iraq. I believe that the Iraqi government exploited the Iraqi public’s emotions vis-à-vis Aljazeera. The Iraqi
government wanted to punish Arab public opinion in general, not Aljazeera specifically. The decision to close Aljazeera's office is also a way of deporting Iraqi problems to abroad. When Aljazeera's office was closed, the Iraqi government placed responsibility on foreign parties for what is happening in Iraq. The government cast blame on Iran, Syria, and Aljazeera. Some [foreign] parties have actually played a significant role inside Iraq. However, the government has tended to cast this problem abroad. The third and final dimension—

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Professor Haydar Sa’id, you said that the decision enjoyed popular, Iraqi support. However, we have received many statements condemning the decision. Almost all Iraqi organizations and associations, including the Union of Iraqi Journalists, condemned the decision and have stood with us in solidarity. Professor al-Musaffar described this code of ethics as being rather general and open to whatever interpretation the government deems necessary.

Haydar Sa’id: If I may make one more comment.

Muhammad al-Musaffar: These eight points [in the code of ethics] are worded in a way that allows anyone who reads them to come up with his own justifications and interpretations. When you read the actual text, you find nothing objectionable in it. However, what is the intent? What is the criterion? Who determines who [is in violation] when, for example, the media shows an image of an action being carried out by what we are now calling the national resistance in Iraq? You said that this national resistance in Iraq

عبد العظيم محمد: أستاذ حيدر سعيد يعني أنت قلت أن القرار حظي بتقييد شعبي عراقي ونحن استقبلنا الكثير من بيانات التنديد تكاد تكون جميع الهيئات والجمعيات العراقية بما فيها نقابة الصحفيين العراقيين أدان هذا القرار ووفقنا في وقفة تضامنية، أستاذ المسفر وصف هذه الميثاق الشرف بأنه عاموميا وأنه يمكن تفسيره بالطريقة التي تراها الحكومة.

حيدر سعيد: نعم بس إذا تسمح لي أستاذ عبد العظيم عبارة أخيرة.

محمد المسفر: هذه الثمان نقاط التي جاعت هي صياغة تeczyت تبريرات وتغذي تفسيرات لكل من يقرأها عندما نقرأها ننتقص النص الحقيقي ليست عندك مانع ولا اعتراض على كل ما جاء فيها لكن ما هو المقصود وما هو المعيار ومن الذي يحدد من ومع
opposes the occupation. Then, you are told that showing the image is incitement. Then, you say, for example, that the Organization of Muslim Scholars or al-Mahdi Army conducted an operation and you show a picture of one of the persons involved. You are then told that this act is threatening, inciting, sectarian, etc. A person sitting in a closed room formulated the code of ethics. He is not familiar with the dimensions of what he is talking about or reading. However, he is able to summarize the situation. He says, all Arab media are prohibited from entering Iraq, and we will eliminate this problem using the stratagem we have here in our hands. I maintain that such a stratagem is indicative of deception and murkiness that are leading Iraq into darkness, where there is no difference between the current regime and the former regime.

**Abd-al-Azim Muhammad**: Let us ask Dr. Sa’id in Cairo how he views this code and whether it can be applied without bias.

**Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa’id**: I am completely opposed to such talk and constraints. The code does not use legal language. It uses extremely elastic language. Clearly, it aims to subjugate primarily the Iraqi media and then the Arab or international media. However, I also support the idea of Aljazeera taking the initiative to establish the necessary criteria and values for its own editorial policy. The audio, visual, news, or opinion media have true power over the minds of viewers and listeners. This power must generally be balanced by democracy, which says that there must be not only pluralism and diversity, but also checks and balances. Checks and balances may result automatically if Aljazeera says, for example, that it adheres to the principal of privacy and refrains from pillorying individuals or harming dignity, and that it puts forth its opinions based on certain criteria. I believe that acceptable criteria in this case can be found in international

من عندما يظهر مثلًا أن ظهرت صورة
لحركة الآن نسمى مقاومة الوطنية في العراق
وقلت أن هذه مقاومة وطنية في العراق ضد الاحتلال
ثم قال بأن هذا أيضًا تحريض ثم تأتي وقول مثلا أنه
هيئة علماء المسلمين أو جيش المهدى قام بعملية
بالشكل ده وأبرزت صورة لأحد الأشخاص ثم قال
بأنه هذا أيضًا عمل تحريضي وتحريضي وطائفي إلى
آخره من هذا العمل هذه البنود صاغها إنسان جالس
في غرفة مغلقة لا يعرف أعد أن يقول ولا يعرف
أعد ما يقرأ إلا هو كان بإمكانه أن يختار الموقف
هذا يقول جميع وسائل الإعلام العربية متعدد دخولها
في العراق وانتهينا من هذا الشكل أما بالطريقة
الاحتكالية هذه الصياغة التي مطورة بين دينا فأننا
أقول أنها توحى إلى الضلالة إلى النظام وأنها تقود
العراق إلى ظلام دائم وليس فرق بين النظام الحالي
والنظام السابق الذي قضى نحبه.

عبد العظيم محمد: إذا ما سألنا دكتور سعيد في
القاهرة دكتور كيف تنظر إلى هذا الميثاق وهل يمكن
تطبيقه بشكل حيادي؟

محمد السيد سعيد: لا أنا أعارض تماما مثل هذا
الحديث أو مثل هذا التقييد فهو من الواضح أنه لا
يستخدم لغة قانونية وإنما يستخدم لغة مططمة شديدة
ومن الواضح أنه يرمى بالعن إلى إخصاع وسائل
الإعلام العراقية قبل العربية أو قبل العالمية لكن أنا
أيضًا مع فكرة أن تقوم الجزيرة بمبادرة ذاتية لطرح
فيه تلتزم به لسياستها التحريرية من معايير وقيم
فمن الواضح أن الإعلام سلطة سواء الصوت أو
الصورة أو الخبر أو الرأي هذه سلطة حقيقية على
عقل المشاهد وعلى عقل المستمع ولايد أن تؤثرها
سلطة والنموذج الديمقراطية في التفكير عموما لا
يقول فقط بالتحديد والنتيجة وإنما يقول أيضًا أنه
ينبغى أن تكون هناك عملية مكافحة أو (checks and
comparative law. Regarding rights and freedoms of expression, we have different laws in the world and studies, for example, the Article 19 organization.\(^{147}\) We have dozens of codes of ethics. It is a purely professional action for any large media organization to say that its editorial policy is such and such, and that it adheres in its coverage to certain values. If Aljazeera takes such an initiative, it may largely avoid the criticism of the governmental and nongovernmental parties leading the discussion.

Abd-al-Azim Muhammad: Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa’id, we are sorry, but we do not have much remaining time. We are also sorry for not being able to give Haydar Sa’id more time at the end of this segment. I thank my guests, Muhammad al-Musaffar, Professor of Political Science, University of Qatar; Dr. Muhammad Al-Sayyid Sa’id, researcher and Deputy Chairman at Al-Ahram Center [for Political and Strategic] Studies; and Haydar Sa’id, researcher and journalist. May God be with you until we meet again next week in a new segment of "The Iraqi Scene."

147 [Article 19 is a nongovernmental organization dedicated to elimination of censorship. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.]
Appendix 2: Law on the Establishment of Al-Jazeera

Law on the Establishment of the Qatari Public Satellite Channel Corporation (al-Jazeera Channel)

We—Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar, after examining: the amended provisional Constitution, particularly Articles 23, 24, 51 thereof; Law No. 13 of 1987 on the establishment of a Qatari Public Corporation for Wire and Wireless Communications; and the draft law submitted by the Council of Ministers; and after obtaining the opinion of the Consultative Council—have decreed the following law:

Section 1 – Establishment of the Corporation and the Corporation’s Goals

Article 1

An independent public Corporation designated the “Qatari Public Satellite Channel Corporation” shall be established as a legal entity with a separate budget and with headquarters in the city of Doha. The Corporation may establish branches or offices or hire correspondents in Qatar or abroad. It shall be run on commercial foundations.

Article 2
The Corporation alone shall operate and transmit the Qatari Satellite Television Channel, and it shall do so according to the law. The provisions of Law No. 13 of 1987 mentioned above notwithstanding, it may undertake activities conducive to achieving its goals. In particular, it may:

1. Acquire all moveable and immoveable property needed to establish and operate the channel.

2. Prepare studies and plans concerning the establishment, operation, and development of the channel.

3. Handle the general daily supervision of the channel’s programs and performance.

4. Establish, acquire, or participate in companies by itself or with others.

5. Cooperate and enter into contracts with other Arab and foreign entities that operate in the same field to produce, market, and exchange programs and expertise.

6. Manage, invest, and use the revenues realized by the Corporation consistent with the purpose for which the Corporation was established.

7. Conclude contracts concerning financing and borrowing from domestic and foreign sources to finance and operate the satellite channel and the Corporation’s investment projects.

Section 2 – Management of the Corporation

Article 3

A board of directors shall manage the Corporation. The board shall comprise a chairman, deputy chairman, and a number of members. The members shall be appointed, and their membership tenures and remuneration shall be set, by decree of the Emir.

Article 4
The board of directors shall be responsible for setting, and supervising the implementation of, the Corporation’s general policy. The board shall be responsible for its action to the Council of Ministers.

**Article 5**

The board of directors shall have all the authorities needed to manage the affairs of the Corporation and to take actions required for the Corporation’s good conduct of its activity. The board may make the decisions that it deems necessary to achieve the Corporation’s goals. The board’s decisions shall enter into force on the date they are issued, excluding decisions concerning the following matters, which shall enter into force only after being approved by the Council of Ministers:

1. The Corporation’s obtainment of any domestic or foreign loans.
2. The Corporation’s establishment, acquisition, or participation in companies by itself or with others.

**Article 6**

The board of directors shall establish the financial, administrative, and technical bylaws needed to manage the Corporation without having to adhere to the rules and regulations in effect in the government.

**Article 7**

The board of directors shall submit, the Council of Ministers, an annual report covering all aspects of the Corporation’s activities, attaching to the report its recommendations and opinions. The Council of Ministers may at any time request that the board of directors submit to it reports on the Corporation’s technical, financial, or management situation, or any aspect of its activity, or any information pertaining thereto.
Article 8

The Council of Ministers may issue general directives to the board of directors regarding matters to which the board must adhere regarding the Corporation’s general policy. The board of directors must comply with these directives.

Article 9

The chairman of the board of directors shall represent the Corporation before the judiciary and in the Corporation’s relations with others.

Article 10

The board of directors shall meet at least once monthly upon the invitation of its chairman or deputy chairman in the chairman’s absence. The board shall also meet whenever so requested by at least three of its members. A meeting of the board shall be valid only if a majority of the board members are present, including the chairman or deputy chairman. The board shall have a secretary selected by the board. The board shall specify the secretary’s authorities.

Article 11

The sessions of the board of directors shall be secret. Proxies may not be appointed to attend or vote at board meetings. The board shall issue its decisions by a majority of the votes of the members present. In the event of a tie, the chairman’s vote shall be decisive.

Article 12

The minutes of the board’s sessions and the board’s decisions shall be recorded in a special record with numbered pages that is signed by the chairman and secretary of the board.

Article 13
The board may invite Corporation employees—excluding other experts—to its meetings as it deems appropriate to request from them information and clarifications. Such employees may participate in the board’s discussions, but may not vote on decisions.

**Article 14**

The board may form standing or temporary committees from among its members to assist it in studying subjects presented to it. The board may add members to such committees who are from inside or outside the Corporation.

**Article 15**

The Corporation shall have a general manager appointed by decision of the board of directors. The appointment decision shall specify the general manager’s emoluments. The bylaws shall specify the general manager’s authorities and duties. The general manager shall be responsible to the board of directors for the good operation of the Corporation according to the Corporation’s regulations and bylaws and the decisions and directives issued by the board.

**Article 16**

The chairman of the board of directors, or the deputy chairman in the chairman’s absence, shall be entitled to sign for the Corporation. The board shall be entitled to delegate to the general manager or another employee in the Corporation the right to sign for the Corporation—separately or together—in matters specified by the board and in accordance with the bylaws.

**Article 17**

In order for the Corporation’s to be valid on its documents, the stamp must be connected to the signature of the chairman or deputy chairman of the board of directors or an authorized signatory.
Article 18

The chairman of the board, any board member, and any employee in the Corporation may not have a direct or indirect personal interest in contracts concluded by or for the Corporation, in any project undertaken by the Corporation, or in any of the Corporation’s areas of activity.

Section 3 - Capital, Profits, and Reserves

Article 19

The Corporation’s authorized capital shall be 500 million riyals and shall be wholly state-owned. The Corporation’s capital may be increased or decreased by decree of the Council of Ministers issued based on a recommendation of the board of directors.

Article 20

The net profits for each fiscal year shall be determined after all expenditures and expenses required to perform the Corporation’s activity, particularly sums needed for any purposes approved by the Corporation, are subtracted from revenues realized.

Article 21

1. The Corporation shall have a general reserve fund, for which 10 percent of net profits shall be deducted annually until the balance of the fund equals capital.

2. The reserve stipulated in this article may be increased by the amount and percentage decided by the Corporation and approved by the Council of Ministers.

3. Other reserves needed to achieve the Corporation’s goals may be formed by decree of the Councils of Ministers based on the board of directors’ recommendation.
4. The general reserve and other reserves may be disposed of only by decree of the Council of Ministers based on the board of directors’ recommendation.

5. Profits remaining thereafter shall be transferred annually to the State.

**Article 22**

The Corporation’s funding sources shall consist of the following:

1. The funds and appropriations allocated to the Corporation by the State.

2. The proceeds of the revenues realized by the Corporation from its engagement in its activities.

3. The return on the Corporation’s share in the capital of the companies, establishments, and utilities that it establishes, acquires, or participates in, or which are transferred to the Corporation through purchase or appropriation.

4. Net profits transferred to the Corporation in the form of reserves and provisions.

5. The loans that the Corporation contracts.


**Section 4 - The Corporation’s Budget and Accounts**

**Article 23**

The Corporation shall have an annual budget approved by decree of the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be prepared as a commercial budget. The fiscal year shall start on January 1 and end on December 31 of each year. The first fiscal year shall include the period from the date of this law’s entry into force until December 31 of the following year.

**Article 24**
The board of directors shall prepare, for each fiscal year, within six months of the end of the fiscal year, the Corporation’s next balance sheet and profit and loss account. It shall also prepare a report on the Corporation’s activity during the fiscal year and a report on its financial position for the same year.

Article 25

Subject to the provisions of Law No. 4 of 1995 on the Accounting Chamber, the Corporation may have one or more auditors who are certified public accountants. The auditors shall be appointed, and their annual remunerations set, by decision of the board of directors.

Article 26

The auditor shall be entitled to at any time to examine all books, records, and documents of the Corporation and to request the data which he deems necessary to perform his duty properly. He may also verify the assets and liabilities of the Corporation. If the auditor is unable to exercise its rights, he shall submit a report to this effect to the board of directors.

Article 27

The auditor shall submit his annual report to the board of directors and shall submit a copy thereof to the Accounting Chamber.

Section 5 – General Provisions

Article 28

The Corporation’s immoveable and movable state-owned property shall be considered private property and subject to the provisions thereon. That notwithstanding, such property may not be attached to pay a debt, nor may ownership be acquired through seizure or prescription regardless of the duration thereof.
Article 29

The established laws on taxes and duties shall apply to the Corporation and its subsidiary companies. Subject to the established provisions on exemptions contained in the special laws, the Corporation and companies of which it is the sole owner may be exempt from all or a portion of taxes and duties by decree of the Council of Ministers based on the request of the Minister of Finance, Economy, and Trade.

Article 30

The Council of Ministers shall issue the necessary decrees to implement the provisions of this law based on the recommendation of the Corporation’s board of directors.

Article 31

The board of directors shall issue the necessary decrees for the management of the Corporation’s business so as not to conflict with the provisions of the law until the necessary financial, administrative, and technical bylaws are issued.

Article 32

All competent agencies, each within its purview, must implement this law, which shall enter into force on the date on which it is issued in the Official Gazette.

Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar
ملحق رقم 2
قانون إنشاء المؤسسة القطرية للقناة الفضائية (قناة الجزيرة)

قانون إنشاء المؤسسة العالمية القطرية للقناة الفضائية رقم 1 لسنة 1996

نحن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر، بعد الاطلاع على النظام الأساسي المؤقت المعدل، وبخاصة على المواد 23، 34، 51 منه، وعلى القانون رقم 13 لسنة 1987 بإنشاء المؤسسة العامة القطرية للاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية، وعلى مشروع القانون المقدم من مجلس الوزراء، بعد أخذ رأي مجلس الشورى، قررنا القانون الآتي:

الفصل الأول

إنشاء المؤسسة وأغراضها

المادة 1

تنشأ مؤسسة عامة مستقلة، ذات شخصية معنية تسمى: "المؤسسة العامة القطرية للقناة الفضائية"، تكون لها موانع مستقلة، ويكون مركزها الرئيس في مدينة الدوحة، ويجوز لها أن تنشى فروعها أو مكاتب، أو تعيين مراسلين لها في قطر أو في الخارج، وتدار المؤسسة على أسس تجارية.

المادة 2

تولى المؤسسة، وحدها دون غيرها، التشغيل والبث للقناة التلفزيونية الفضائية القطرية، وفقاً لأحكام هذا القانون، واستثناء من أحكام القانون رقم 13 لسنة 1987 المشار إليه، ولا في سبيل تحقيق أغراضها أن تقوم الأعمال التي تؤدي إلى ذلك، وبوصف ما يلي:

1- تملك جميع الأموال الثابتة والمنقولة اللازمة لإنشاء وتشغيل القناة.
2- إعداد الدراسات والمخطط المتعلقة بإنشاء القناة وتشغيلها وتطويرها.
3- تولى الرقابة العامة واليومية لبرامج وآراء القناة.
4- تأسس شركات بصرفها أو مع غيرها، وتمتلك شركات قائمة، أو المساهمة فيها.
5- التعاون والتعاقد مع الجهات الأخرى، العربية والأجنبية التي تعمل في المجال نفسه، لإنتاج وتسويق وتبادل البرامج والخدمات.
6- إدارة واستثمار وتوقيع ما يحققه المؤسسة من إيرادات، بما يحقق الهدف من إنشائها.
7- إبرام عقود التمويل، أو الإقراض من المصادر المحلية والأجنبية اللازمة لتمويل وتشغيل القناة الفضائية، والمشاريع المؤسسة الاستثمارية.

الفصل الثاني

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إدارة المؤسسة

المادة 3

يتولى إدارة المؤسسة مجلس إدارة يشكل من رئيس ونائب للرئيس، وعدد من الأعضاء يصدر بتعيينهم وتحديد مدة عضويتهم ومكافأتهم، قرار من الأمير.

المادة 4

يتولى مجلس الإدارة رسم السياسة العامة للمؤسسة والإشراف على تنفيذها، ويكون مسؤولا عن أعماله أمام مجلس الوزراء.

المادة 5

يكون لمجلس الإدارة كل السلطات اللازمة لإدارة شؤون المسئول، وباشرة التصرفات التي يقضيها حسن قيامها بعملها، وله أن يتخذ من القرارات ما يراه ضروريا لتحقيق أغراضها. ويتولى قرارات المجلس نافذة من تاريخ صدورها، ويستثنى من ذلك القرارات المتعلقة بالأمور التالية، والتي لا تكون نافذة إلى بعد موافقة مجلس الوزراء عليها:

1 - حصول المؤسسة على أية قروض داخلية كانت أو خارجية.
2 - تأسيس شركات بمفردها أو مع الغير، وتملك شركات قائمة، أو المساهمة فيها.

المادة 6

يضع مجلس الإدارة - دون التقيد بالنظام والقاعد المعمول بها في الحكومة - اللوائح الداخلية والمالية والإدارية والفنية اللازمة لإدارة المؤسسة.

المادة 7

يرفع مجلس الإدارة إلى مجلس الوزراء تقرير سنوياً شاملاً عن أنشطة المؤسسة من جميع الوجهين، متنوعاً بالتغوان والبيان، ولمجلس الوزراء، في أي وقت، أن يطلب من مجلس الإدارة أن يقدم إليه تقارير عن وضع المؤسسة الفنية أو المالي أو الإداري، أو أي وجه من وجه نشاطها، أو أي معلومات تتعلق بها.

المادة 8

لمجلس الوزراء أن يصدر توجيهات عامة إلى مجلس الإدارة بشأن ما يجب عليه إتباعه في الأمور المتعلقة بالسياسة العامة للمؤسسة، وعلى مجلس الإدارة التقيد بهذه التوجيهات.

المادة 9
يتمثل رئيس مجلس الإدارة، المؤسسة أمام القضاء، وفي علاقتها مع الغير.

المادة 10

مجتمع مجلس الإدارة مرة كل شهر على الأقل، بدعوة من رئيسه، أو نائبه في حالة غياب الرئيس، كما يجتمع المجلس كلما طلب ذلك ثلاثة من أعضائه على الأقل. لا يكون اجتماع المجلس صحيحا إلا إذا حضره أغلبية أعضائه، على أن يكون من بينهم الرئيس أو نائبه. ويكون للمجلس أمين سر يختاره المجلس، ويدرس اختصاصاته.

المادة 11

تكون جلسات مجلس الإدارة سري، ولا تجوز الإفلاس في الحضور أو التصويت، وتصدر القرارات بأغلبية أصوات الأعضاء الحاضرين، وعد التصويت يرجع الجانب الذي منه الرئيس.

المادة 12

تدون محاضر جلسات المجلس وقراراته في مجل خاص مرقم الصفحات، ويوقعها رئيس المجلس وأمين السر.

المادة 13

للمجلس أن يدعو لحضور إجتماعاته من يرى الاستعانة بهم، من العاملين بالمؤسسة، دون غيرهم من ذوي الخبرة، لتقديم ما يطلب منه ببيانات أو إيضاحات، وله ولاء الاشتراك في المناقشة دون أن يكون لهم صوت محدود عند اتخاذ القرارات.

المادة 14

للمجلس أن يشكل لجانا دائمة أو مؤقتة من بينه أعضائه لمعاونته في دراسة ما يقدم له من موضوعات، وله أن يضم إلى تلك اللجان أعضاء من داخل المؤسسة أو خارجها.

المادة 15

يكون للمؤسسة مدير عام، يعين بقرار من مجلس الإدارة، ويدرس القرار مختصاته، وتحدد اللوائح الداخلية اختصاصات المدير العام، وواجباته، ويكون مسؤولا أمام مجلس الإدارة عن حسن سير العمل بالمؤسسة وفقاً للوائح المؤسسة والقرارات والتوجيهات التي يصدرها المجلس.

المادة 16

يملك حق التوقع عن المؤسسة رئيس المجلس، أو نائبه في حالة غياب الرئيس، وللجلس الحق في أن يختر المدير العام أو غيره من العاملين بالمؤسسة، حق التوقع منفردين أو مجموعين، ذلك في الشؤون التي يحددها المجلس، وفقاً لأحكام اللوائح الداخلية.
المادة 17

لا يعد بخاتم المؤسسة على أوراقها إلا إذا اقترن بتوقيع رئيس مجلس الإدارة، أو نائب الرئيس، الشخص المفوض بالتوقيع.

المادة 18

لا يجوز أن يكون لرئيس مجلس، أو لأي عضو من أعضائه، أو لأحد العاملين بالمؤسسة، صلاحيات شخصية، مباشرة، أو غير مباشرة، في العقود التي تبرم مع المؤسسة أو لحسابها، أو في المشاريع التي تقوم بها، أو في مجالات نشاطها.

الفصل الثالث

رأس المال والأرباح والاحتياطات

المادة 19

رأس مال المؤسسة المصرف به هو (000-000-000-000). خمسة ملايين ريال مملوك كامل للدولة، ويجوز زيادة رأس مال المؤسسة أو تخفيضه بقرار من مجلس الوزراء، يصدر بناءً على اقتراح مجلس الإدارة.

المادة 20

تتحدد الأرباح الصافية لكل سنة مالية، بعد خصم جميع المصاريف، والزيادات اللازمة لمباشرة نشاط المؤسسة، من الإيرادات المحصلة، وعلى الأخص المبالغ اللازمة لأغراض تعمدها المؤسسة.

المادة 21

- يكون للمؤسسة صندوق الاحتياطي العام يقدر له سنويا 10% من مصاف الأرباح إلى أن يصبح الرصيد مساوياً لرأس المال.
- يجوز زيادة الاحتياطي المخصص عليه في هذه المادة بالقدر، وبالنسبة الذين تقررهم المؤسسة ويوافق عليها مجلس الوزراء.
- يجوز بقرار من مجلس الوزراء بناءً على اقتراح مجلس الإدارة، تكوين الاحتياطيات الأخرى اللازمة لتحقيق أغراض المؤسسة.
- لا يجوز التصرف في الاحتياطي العام، أو الاحتياطيات الأخرى، إلا بقرار من مجلس الوزراء، بناءً على اقتراح مجلس الإدارة.
- تؤول سنويا الأرباح المتبقية بعد ذلك إلى الدورة.

المادة 22

تتكون المصادر التمويلية للمؤسسة مما يلي:

- الأموال والاعتمادات التي تخصصها لها الدولة.
- حصيلة الإيرادات التي تحققها المؤسسة من ممارسة أنشطتها.
الفصل الرابع
 موازنة وحسابات المؤسسة

 المادة 23
 يكون للمؤسسة موازنة تقديرية سنويًة، يتم اعتمادها بقرار من مجلس الوزراء، وتعتمد على نظم الموازنات التجارية. وتبدأ السنة المالية من أول يناير ونتهي في 31 ديسمبر من كل سنة، على أن تشمل السنة المالية الأولى المدة من تاريخ نفاد هذا القانون حتى 31 ديسمبر من السنة التالية.

 المادة 24
 على مجلس الإدارة أن يعد، عن كل سنة مالية، وفي موعده لا يتجاوز سنة أشهر من تاريخ انتهاءها، ميزانية المؤسسة المدققة، وحساب الأرباح والخسائر. كما يعد قراراً عن نشاط المؤسسة خلال السنة المالية، وعن مركزها المالي للسنة ذاتها.

 المادة 25
 مع مراعاة أحكام القانون رقم 4 لسنة 1195 بشأن ديوان المحاسبة، يجوز أن يكون للمؤسسة مراقاب حسابات أو أكثر من المحاسبين القانونيين، يتم تعينها وتحديد مكافحتها السنوية بقرار من مجلس الإدارة.

 المادة 26
 لمراقب الحسابات، في كل وقت، الحق في الاطلاع على جميع دفاتر المؤسسة وسجلاتها ومستنداتها، في طلب البيانات التي يرى ضرورة الحصول عليها لأداء واجبه على الوجه الصحيح. ولن يجوز أن يحق مواقف المؤسسة والالتزامات. وفي حالة عدم تمكنه من ممارسة هذه الحقوق، يرفع المراقب تقريراً بذلك إلى مجلس الإدارة.

 المادة 27
 يرفع مراقب الحسابات تقريره السنوي إلى مجلس الإدارة، ويتم نسخة منه إلى ديوان المحاسبة.

الفصل الخامس
 أحكام عامة
المادة 28

تعتبر أموال المؤسسة، الثابتة والمنقولة، من الأموال المملوكة للدولة ملكية خاصة وتضمن لأحكامها. واستثناء من ذلك، لا يجوز عليها استيفاء أي دين، كما لا يجوز اكتساب ملكية بالاستيلاء أو التقدم بهما طالب مدته.

المادة 29

تسري على المؤسسة والشركات التابعة لها قوانين الضرائب والرسوم المقررة، ومع مراعاة التوصيات المقررة والإعدادات الواردة في القوانين الخاصة، يجوز بقرار من مجلس الوزراء، بناء على عرض وزير المالية والاقتصاد والتجارة، إعداد المؤسسة والشركات المملوكة بمفردها من كل الضرائب أو الرسوم أو جزء منها.

المادة 30

ينص مجلس الوزراء القرارات اللازمة لتنفيذ أحكام هذا القانون، بناء على اقتراح مجلس إدارة المؤسسة.

المادة 31

ينص مجلس الإدارة القرارات اللازمة لتسهيل أعمال المؤسسة، بما لا يتعارض مع أحكام القانون، وذلك إلى أن تصدر اللوائح الداخلية المالية والإدارية والفنية اللازمة.

المادة 32

على جميع الجهات المختصة، كل فيما يختص، تنفيذ هذا القانون. ويعمل به من تاريخ صدوره في الجريدة الرسمية.

حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر
Appendix 3: The Nature of Al-Jazeera’s Programming

Al-Jazeera is primarily a news channel that attempts to cover and analyze events based on five pivots.

Global and International News

Al-Jazeera provides comprehensive coverage and analysis of events as they unfold through a broad network of correspondents deployed where events occur in Arab and foreign capitals. These correspondents report the news directly, discussing all aspects and crucial points about an event while monitoring international news agencies to ensure their reporting remains current.

Debates and Discussions

Al-Jazeera hosts experts in various specialties to discuss the political, economic, religious, scientific, and artistic issues of the hour. The various views presented on its programs are debated and discussed.

Financial and Business News

From London, Al-Jazeera reports the latest news on the prices of currencies and financial instruments in world stock markets, providing economic analysis on currency prices and stock exchanges in the world.
Sports News

Al-Jazeera broadcasts sports events directly, presenting the most up-to-date international sports news.

Educational and Documentary Programs

Al-Jazeera provides educational and documentary programs and films on the natural and other sciences, technology, and the biographies of famous pioneering scientists and innovators in all fields of life. It receives $66.2 million in government support annually. The channel’s management has allocated $1.3 billion to develop the channel over the next five years.

Since being launched, Al-Jazeera has provoked and continues to provoke controversy in Arab circles in all fields. Moreover, it has become a world-class, independent channel described as having a presence among such international channels as the BBC, CNN, and others. Not only does it have a presence, it has also cast a new viewpoint into the international media arena, which had long been dominated by the American media.\(^\text{148}\)

\textit{Al-Jazeera’s Programs}

Al-Jazeera has distinguished itself as the first Arab news channel to pursue an independent, free, unbiased path in all the discussions and programs it presents. The channel operates according to the highest standards of journalistic professionalism, which has won it great respect and a wide reputation among viewers. Al-Jazeera attaches particular importance in its programs to news broadcasts and the issues of the hour, which are presented in talk shows and political and news analyses throughout the week. It also broadcasts numerous economic

broadcasts, sports programs, documentaries, and scientific and entertainment programs, which attract various audience segments.

**Al-Jazeera’s Telephone and Internet Services**

1. **Al-Jazeera’s Telephone Service:**

   On 1 October 2004, Al-Jazeera began making it possible for the public to obtain quick news summaries through a mobile service, which permits the subscriber to obtain information and news through a short message service. A subscriber can obtain this service in Arabic and English. The subscriber may, based on his interests, select from general news summaries, political news, sports news, and economic news.

2. **The Mobile Newspaper Project:**

   This includes a short message service for photographs and a web-based live video broadcast service. This service is offered to subscribers who pay a monthly subscription fee through the Qatari Communications Company. The subscriber receives a political, economic, or sports news brief according to his/her desire.

   Much is hoped to be achieved through the new Arab formula for Al-Jazeera Net, which was launched in mid-September 2004. The innovative design is a step toward building an integrated network for Al-Jazeera sites on the Internet. The site has been designed to be a network of sites offered to visitors. There are four sources of information:

   **I. Al-Jazeera Internet Service** ([www.aljazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net)):

   This site was inaugurated in January 2001 as the first primary site for news in the Arabic language on the Internet. It quickly became the premier Arabic site, entering the competition for the most visited international site. It offers the following links from its home page:
- **News**: This link is the main Arabic site for news. It provides comprehensive coverage of events as they unfold throughout the hour.

- **Information**: This site offers more in-depth opinions on the factors behind the news through analysis, research, and extensive studies.

- **Satellite**: This site presents Al-Jazeera Channel broadcasts. It retains full records of the huge database generated by the channel, which is made available to visitors.

- **Business**: This site is Al-Jazeera’s e-marketing tool through which news services and the channel’s products are promoted in general.

An American site specialized in political affairs on the Internet selected aljazeera.net as one of the top 15 sites in the world that exercise an effective political influence. This choice was made based on an opinion poll conducted by the “Politics Online” site on the political influence of individuals and organizations on the Internet. The poll involved a sample of about 30,000 persons who visit and subscribe to the site and are concerned with political affairs. Participants were asked to determine 25 sites that have caused change in the world of the Internet and politics. The results were announced through the annual quadripartite e-democracy forum. Phil Noble, the director of the “Politics Online” site said the poll results point to the role played by such sites in strengthening the Internet’s political influence. The report on the poll results praised Al-Jazeera and its Internet site, which were placed first in alphabetical order. Noble added that Al-Jazeera Channel is currently considered a rostrum for free expression in the Middle East. He emphasized that its news site, aljazeera.net, is the first news site in the Arab world that enjoys uncensored freedom. The opinion survey also pointed to the acts of piracy to which the aljazeera.net was subjected in the initial days of the Iraq War and how officials at the channel overcame these difficulties to continue providing news service. The report also refers to
a number of accusations typically leveled at Al-Jazeera Channel and its website regarding news coverage of the Middle East—coverage that does not always please the United States and Israel. These four sites are linked to a home page that presents the most recent, key items published on each of the sites.

**Function**

www.aljazeera.net rounds out the pioneering role played by al-Jazeera Channel in developing the Arab visual and print media message to enable the Arab public to interactively and continuously monitor news, programs, and analyses on the Internet, and to boost the number of persons who follow the al-Jazeera Channel through its Internet site and television audience.

**Vision**

The vision of www.aljazeera.net is to provide balanced media and information treatment that is accurate, objective, impartial, respectful, and compatible with the cultural, social, and civilizational components of its Arab audience.

**Editorial Policies**

- The channel’s constant motto is “Opinion and the Other Opinion.” [al-ra’y wa-al-ra’y al-ākhar]

- Objectivity and impartiality.

- Scooping and confirmation.

- Accuracy and documentation.

- Spreading of discourse.
Target Audience

The Arab audience is ideologically, culturally, religiously, and politically diverse. It includes decision makers, diplomats and intellectuals, media professionals and researchers, and students and youth.

Sources of Information of the Site

- Reports of aljareeza.net correspondents and Al-Jazeera Channel.
- Arab and international news agencies.
- General and specialized references and encyclopedias.
- Authors and researchers.

Al-Jazeera Sports Channel

Trial broadcasting began in early November 2003, and official broadcasting began on 6 November 2003 for six hours daily, increasing gradually. Al-Jazeera Sports is included in a bundle of Al-Jazeera channels that includes Al-Jazeera Documentary and Al-Jazeera’s Children Channel, which were subsequently inaugurated.

Al-Jazeera Sports is broadcasted unencrypted from ARABSAT 2 and the Egyptian satellite NILESAT within a frequency band dedicated solely to Al-Jazeera channels. Al-Jazeera Sports 2 channel has also been launched. It is an encrypted station. Subscribers must pay a monthly fee to receive it through the NILESAT and ARABSAT satellites.

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Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel\textsuperscript{150}

Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel was launched on 9 September 2005 in the Qatari capital Doha as a partnership between the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development and Al-Jazeera Satellite Network. Its goal is to provide entertaining educational programs designed—in cooperation with a French consulting firm—to be compatible with the situation and aspirations of Arab children. The channel, which broadcasts 18.5 hours daily. Based on its unique concept and on the entertaining educational programs that it produces and purchases, it seeks to strengthen the mental faculties of Arab children and develop their skills, encouraging them to learn, explore, and seek out knowledge.

Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel offers a series of Arabic programs that present diverse interactive educational and entertainment subjects in a mold that attracts children between the ages of 3 and 15. The programs are designed to meet the children’s needs and harmonize with their interests. The channel produces close to 40 percent of the programs it broadcasts. It shows only a small percentage of films and cartoons. Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel presents the first Arabic talk show on which Arab children discuss and express themselves and their opinions. The channel also produces the first Arabic educational magazine to cover topics relating to science, health, sports, culture, and information technology. The channel also airs game shows that present information in an easy-to-understand, interactive way. It seeks to use studios and facilities equipped with the latest equipment and technology to ensure high-quality television production. The channel is committed to presenting new programs during six of the 18 hours it broadcasts daily during the work week and during seven of the 19 hours it broadcasts daily during the weekend. It is an open (unencrypted) channel that broadcasts its program via the

\textsuperscript{150} Abdallah Scheifer, “Al-Jazeera : Once More into the Fray,” TBS, 14, Spring, 2005.
ARABSAT and NILESAT satellites and the European satellite “Hot Bird.” The channel’s programs can thus be viewed in all parts of the Arab world and Europe. It has five regional offices (in Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Rabat, and Paris) in addition to its main headquarters in Doha.

Al-Jazeera Direct

In a recent development, Al-Jazeera Corporation announced, on 18 April 2005, the launching of a new satellite service called “Al-Jazeera Direct” or “Al-Jazeera Live.” This is a specialized channel offering direct transmission of all hot, key events in real time without any editorial or journalistic intervention or commentary. The launching of this channel coincided with the launch of Al-Jazeera Festival for Television Production in the same year. The festival was covered live through this channel.151

Al-Jazeera International152

Despite many challenges, particularly western opposition to its orientation,153 Al-Jazeera International in English was launched in November 2006, placing Al-Jazeera on the international horizon of English-speaking countries. This channel focuses on broadcasting in English from four world capitals—Doha, London, New York, and Kuala Lumpur. It is the first Arab news network to broadcast in English, giving Al-Jazeera a new stake after its electronic site was rated the fifth-most popular destination for web users seeking information after Apple, Google, Wikia, and Star Box.154 According to Steve Clark, the news director at Al-Jazeera International, the

154 www.aljazeera.net.
channel will adhere to objectivity, impartiality, and a high level of quality in its performance. It will not adopt any position on the extreme right or left, rather, it will be moderate. The deputy general manager of Al-Jazeera International is Salah Najm, a well-known Egyptian journalist. Working with him is Ibrahim Hilal, the former editor-in-chief of Al-Jazeera News.

The inauguration of Al-Jazeera International was accompanied by Qatar’s filling of the Asia chair in the UN Security Council for the Asian continent.

Al-Jazeera Documentary

On 1 January 2007, Al-Jazeera Documentary was launched. This channel aims to play a leading role in spreading the documentary culture in the Arab milieu and in the southern hemisphere in general. It broadcasts programs covering social, political, cultural, artistic, scientific, historical, and environmental dimensions of human activity in interaction with its environment. The channel adopts Al-Jazeera Channel’s approach of illuminating the human story, wherever it exists, plumbing the depths to provide viewers enjoyable, useful documentaries that extend bridges of mutual familiarity among peoples, understanding among nations, and cross-cultural communication [according to] a statement issued by Al-Jazeera Network on the launching of the Documentary Channel.

Al-Jazeera Documentary Channel seeks to provide rich, in-depth material conducive to strengthening freedom of expression, dialogue, and openness to others and spreading awareness and the documentary culture to its audience. In this framework, the channel has started to broadcast documentary films that attempt to answer difficult questions and address controversial

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155 [http://www.archipress.org/content/view](http://www.archipress.org/content/view)
issues, many of which are taboo in the Arab world and thus left untreated. Consistent with this orientation, the channel broadcast, in its first week, a “Behind the Facts” program on AIDS. This program sheds light on a dangerous disease. It is taboo to merely discuss AIDS in the region, where there is only limited awareness of the causes of the disease, which has yet to receive adequate treatment and attention.


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