THE BURDEN OF THE BARBED WIRE:
THE ROLE OF ICONIC IMAGERY ON TURKISH CYPRiot POSTMEMORY

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By

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ABSTRACT  

Cyprus has been divided by a border since 1974. The failure to recognize, acknowledge and understand the psychosocial aspect of the conflict during the reunification talks has been nothing but an obstruction on the way to end the division, as the conflict weighs heavily on the Turkish and Greek Cypriot conscience. In order to understand the psychosocial and emotional aspects of the conflict and division better, this work explores the transmission of traumatic experiences of Turkish Cypriots during the intercommunal violence in Cyprus between 1963 and 1974 to the second generation Turkish Cypriots. Through semiotic analysis of six widely-disseminated images that depict pain, suffering, and violence the Turkish Cypriot community experienced, I found that iconic photographs have enabled the materializing and restructuring of collective memory and postmemory over time. Furthermore, these memories, the national myths they sustain, and their contribution to the construction of insecurity towards the “other” have been crucial in maintaining the mental and physical separation of the two communities in Cyprus.
This thesis process has been such an incredible journey. There were times when I hit a wall and thought my scars were too deep to get up again. But I did it. I learned a lot through it all and have become a much stronger person, and that would not have been possible if I was not blessed with such an amazing family and the best friends anyone could ask for.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Kimberly Meltzer, and my second reader, Dr. Martin Irvine, for being so kind and wonderful; it was an honor working with such a great thesis committee.

The research and writing of this thesis is dedicated to my parents, Aynur Yolga and Candas Yolga, and all my friends. I cannot thank you enough for all you have done for me.

With peace and love,

HAZAL YOLGA
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Introduction

While growing up on the Turkish side of the Cypriot border in Nicosia, I remember playing next to the barbed wires wondering what would happen if my ball escaped to the other side; waking up to church bells every Sunday morning; seeing Turkish soldiers guarding the army base next to the buffer zone, holding their guns every time I rode my little green bicycle; having nightmares that there was a war again, and not making sense of the border that was indeed very close to home. As I grew up, I kept finding myself going back to what I was thinking back then: What is this all about and why does it matter so much? Why was I scared of the “other side” before I even crossed the border? Why do my teachers tell me “Greeks” are the enemy? Why do they show me pictures of dead Turkish people and tell me to never forget what they did to us? Are they teaching me a one-sided history? Why do I have vivid memories of the atrocities that happened before I was even born? Will there ever be peace in Cyprus?

Bloody struggles are all behind now; the wounds seem to have been slowly healed, yet the border is still intact as well as the political conflict and the status quo -division that is. After years of observation, activism since high school years, and now looking at the big picture from the outside, one thing has become obvious to me. During the negotiation process of the last eight years, which has become relatively stagnant in the last few years, the failure to recognize, acknowledge and understand the psychosocial aspect of the conflict has been nothing but an obstruction on the way to an effective solution for a reunified Cyprus, as the conflict weighs heavily on the Turkish and Greek Cypriot conscience. Shedding some light on the psychosocial and emotional aspects of division and conflict, as well as attempting to come one step closer to answering some of the
questions that haunted my childhood in a conflict-ridden setting have been the main motivators of this research.

I argue that the iconic photographs that depict the pain and suffering Turkish Cypriots went through during the intercommunal violence have been crucial in transmitting the first generation's memories of trauma to the second generation. Furthermore, I argue that these transgenerational memories of trauma have been instrumental in maintaining the mental division of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, which ultimately has contributed to the physical division in Cyprus.

In this thesis, I analyze six photographs, familiar to practically all Turkish Cypriots, that depict the pain and suffering Turkish Cypriots went through between 1963 and 1974. These photographs have become national symbols and are a big part of the Turkish Cypriot national identity. I carefully examine the theoretical framework of nationalism and national identity, assess how national symbols effect the construction of national identity in Cyprus, and interpret the aforementioned photographs to understand how memories of pain are produced and reproduced through the imagery of pain and suffering, and how they reframe collective memory and post-memory.

I start Chapter 1 with a brief overview of history of Cyprus focusing on the modern period since the British rule on the island, and the conflict between the two communities and their co-existence on the island as well as the security dilemma. Further on, I explore a concept of borders and then specifically the case of Nicosia and other divided cities, looking at various border conflicts and divided cities.
In Chapter 2, I lay the theoretical groundwork on which I base my cases and arguments and review the literature on borders, inter-communal violence, nationalism and national identity, national myths and symbols, collective memory and memories of pain—all fundamental and interlinked concepts that need to be visited under the umbrella of this work.

I introduce my data and methodology of analysis in Chapter 3, discuss photographs of suffering, and why these particular photographs are relevant to my analysis. I also discuss the qualitative research method I employed to analyze my data; more specifically, I briefly talk about how semiotic deconstruction of photographs is carried out.

I carry out the data analysis in Chapter 4. The semiotic analysis interprets what the photographs really mean and examines the effects of the photographs on collective and reconstructed memory of Turkish Cypriots by highlighting the patterns of fear, pain and despair among the photographs.

Finally, in the conclusion I discuss the ties between fear and nationalism, how pain and fear are manifested in the photographs, their effects on collective and reconstructed memory in the Turkish Cypriot Community, as well as how they influence the current situation in Cyprus. Furthermore, I draw broader conclusions from the arguments and the case discussed, which can be useful in other conflicts and conceptualize lessons beyond Cyprus. Lastly, I make suggestions for further research on this issue in Northern Cyprus and in general.
CHAPTER 1: Cyprus Conflict, Division and Security Dilemma

Historical Overview

In this chapter, I provide a brief history of Cyprus focusing on the modern period and exploring the causes, progression, and results of the violent conflict. I also discuss the security dilemma between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, the border, and the divided capital Nicosia. This chapter is intended to provide the essential context for the other chapters and this thesis in general.

Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot coexistence and conflict in Cyprus. Cyprus has been influenced by the various conquerors in different historical periods who all left their marks on the local landscape. The Greek language, religion and culture were introduced with the arrival and settlement of the Mycenaeans/Achaeans from the mainland Greece in the second millennium B.C; and both Hellenism and Greek Orthodoxy formed the cultural configuration of the Greek Cypriots (Hadjipavlou, 2006, p. 5). Hadjipavlou (2006) asserts that “to this day the Greek Cypriots, especially the nationalists, refer to this period to highlight the Hellenic heritage and its continuity to the present” (p. 5).

Also according to Hadjipavlou (2006), “The Turkish Cypriot nationalists, on the other hand, place emphasis on the three centuries of the Ottoman presence in Cyprus (1571-1878) that determined the inter-ethnic character of the island and thus claim the island is Turkish” (p. 5). Lindley (2007), drawing from Markides, Keefe and Solsten, notes several important developments
that the Ottoman/Turkish rule led to, such as bringing Turks to the island in larger numbers and creating ethnic heterogeneity, Greek Cypriots turning to their church as a source of continuity and security during occupation, contributing to the strength of Greek Cypriot nationalism as a result of Turks’ confiscatory and discriminatory colonial policies and fostering dreams of unification with Greece -which is also known as Enosis (p. 228).

According to Kizilyurek and Gautier-Kizilyürek, during the Ottoman rule in Cyprus, “the population of the Ottoman province of Cyprus lived and worked together under similar conditions. Despite religious differences, the vast majority of the population shared the same fate, and the same exploitation and poverty” (2004, p. 39). After almost three centuries of Ottoman rule, the United Kingdom took over the government of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire/Turkey in 1878. Substantiating Kizilyurek’s statement, Lindley writes that “inter-communal tensions were not high when the British took over administration of the island”. In fact, Lindley (2007) argues that Greek Cypriots who are against division often tell the story that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had a friendly relationship, and adds that “the motivation for this view of history is to promote a Cyprus solution by addressing the concern of skeptics that the two groups cannot live peacefully together” (p. 228) which is discussed further in Chapter 2. However, Joseph argued that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities stayed as “separate and distinct ethnic groups” even though they had coexisted on the island for a long time, and highlighted the “absence of intermarriage, and . . . limited participation in joint social and cultural events” (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 228).

Having said that, Lindley also emphasizes the role of other institutions and factors such as the church, colonial British rule and schools in elevation of tension between two communities as the
differences between the two communities were highlighted. This as a result, as Meleagrou and Yesilada noted, encouraged the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities “to view themselves as extensions of their respective motherlands”, and this way, “the development of two distinct nationalities with antagonistic loyalties was ensured” (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 229).

Between 1930 and 1955, Greek Cypriot desire to unite Cyprus with Greece was manifested in many ways. According to *Chronology of Cyprus Conflict*, “in 1931, Greek Cypriots burned down the British Governor’s house in riots in favor of Enosis” (1978, p. 5). Consequently, the British sent the Greek Cypriot leaders to exile in Greece, and restricted all national expressions of the two communities until the end of the World War II. When Enosis leaders returned from exile in 1945, they started their campaigns for Enosis again. Turkish Cypriot leaders, naturally, reacted to this campaign. In 1950, Archbishop Makarios was elected archbishop and he committed to achieve Enosis (*Chronology of Cyprus Conflict*, 1978, p. 5). Kizilyurek and Gauntier-Kizilyurek noted that Turkish Cypriot nationalism and spread of nationalist feeling within the community emerged as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalism, and “it gained momentum in 1950s, when the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece reached its culmination” and it is when Turkish Cypriot desire for Taksim (partition of the island) which was a “counterideology to Enosis” became more pronounced (2004, p. 45).

Formulation and attempts for execution of these two opposing ideologies are key in Cyprus Conflict. According to Lindley (2007), the foundation for inter-communal conflict in Cyprus was set-out in two main ways:
The first is the emergence of different and wholly incompatible views for the future of Cyprus: Enosis (union with Greece) and Taksim (partition). The second is the merging of church, schools/education, and politics in divisive and nationalistic ways. This is true on both sides, but is particularly virulent on the Greek Cypriot side. (p. 229)

In 1955, a newly-founded underground organization EOKA -Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (Greek for “National Organization of Cypriot Fighters”) formed by Greek Cypriots, revolted against the British rule, and “the British responded to this in part by forming Turkish Cypriots into a police force to help fight EOKA” indirectly bringing two communities against each other. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, formed an underground resistance organization in 1956 called Volkan which then became TMT -Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish for “Turkish Resistance Organization) in 1958 to fight against EOKA. According to some unofficial sources, between 1956 and 1958, 6000 Turkish Cypriots fled from 33 villages (Chronology of Cyprus Conflict, 1978, p. 6). These seemingly small numbers show the real importance of the casualties when compared to the small population of the island which was comprised of 80 percent Greek Cypriot and 18 percent Turkish Cypriot populations with the total population of around 600,000 (Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 2).

On August 16, 1960, Cyprus gained independence after an agreement in London and Zurich between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; and Republic of Cyprus was established. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance were also signed to protect the newly established Republic of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee carried the most significance as it designated Greece, Turkey and Britain as guarantor states who would ensure nei-
ther Taksim nor Enosis would happen in Cyprus, and reserved the right to intervene to reinstate the status quo should there be any threats.

The 1960 constitution contained a variety of clauses and provisions which provided Turkish Cypriots with important safeguards in the state affairs, such as the vice-president position and 30% of the parliament seats being allocated to Turkish Cypriots, and veto rights (Chronology of Cyprus Conflict, 1978, p. 6). These provisions were found problematic by Greek Cypriot leaders and as a result, they “heightened tensions; and as tensions increased, the veto powers led to government gridlock” (Lindley, 2007, p. 230). On that account, “President Makarios proposed 13 points on November 30, 1963, which would have reduced or eliminated the Turkish Cypriot veto and quotas leading to firstly destabilize the republic, and to revoke the treaties” (Lindley, 2007, p. 230). This plan was called The Akritas plan which was created with the aim of weakening the Turkish Cypriot wing of the Cypriot government and ultimately achieving Enosis (TRNC Public Information Office, n.d.). As short as a few days after the proposals were rejected by Turkey on December 16, violence broke out between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Starting in Nicosia on the night of December 20th, private Greek Cypriot armies attacked Turkish Cypriots throughout the island as Makarios wanted final victory in 24 hours [which would be known as double Christmas]. Journalists Rene Maccoll and Daniel Mc Geachie reported 28 December 1963 for UK’s Daily Express:

We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We are the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print and horrors so extreme that
people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to a hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears. (as cited in TRNC Public Information Office, 2001)

Turkish Cypriots fled from 103 villages and 30,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees when their houses were completely destroyed (*Chronology of Cyprus Conflict*, 1978, p. 8). This series of attacks targeted the whole population ranging from babies who were born three days prior, to the elderly, leaving hundreds of people orphaned or widowed. For this reason, this short but extremely violent period of time is engraved in the Turkish Cypriot collective memory, and has always served as the biggest example and reminder of ferocious and cruel acts of Greek Cypriots. Violence continued intensely until 1967; and according to Patrick, Purcell, and Volkan, “during this period, Turkish Cypriots, the weaker party, bore most of the costs in terms of casualties; around one-fifth of their people gradually were displaced in refugee camps” (as cited in Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 2). Papadakis et al. (2006) also state that “fearful of Greek Cypriots and urged by their partitionist leadership, they set up enclaves scattered throughout the island” (p. 2).

In March 1964, United Nations sent peace keeping forces, and as a result, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed in Cyprus. However, this did not help the violence that was taking over the island. After mainland Greek troops illegally entered Cyprus and attacked Turkish villages, Turkey launched air attacks against the Greek troops which intensified the tension between Turkey and Greece. Ultimately, a cease-fire was signed, however the offenses continued until 1974.

On 20 July 1974, following an attempted Greece-inspired coup d’etat against Greek President Makarios on July 15, 1974, Turkey intervened to save Turkish Cypriots from the violence they
had been facing since the 1960s. This intervention is also known as “Turkish invasion” or “Turkish occupation” since Turkey seized the northern portion of the island. Even though Turkey’s invasion was initially legal under the Treaty of Guarantee, it soon became illegal as it failed to restore the status quo, therefore causing the Northern portion of Cyprus to be addressed as “occupied zone” in the international arena.

The partition is marked by the UN Buffer Zone or "Green Line" which is also referred to as “the border”, “the boundary”, “buffer zone”, “dead zone” and “the wall” running east to west across the island. The Turkish intervention led to the displacement of around 200,000 Cypriots (keeping in mind that different sources cite different numbers, total number of refugees was comprised of around 50,000 Turkish Cypriots and somewhere between 160,000 and 180,000 Greek Cypriots) and the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which is not recognized in the international arena and deals with embargoes (Hadjipavlou, 2006).

Anastasiou (2002) examines the impact of the division and the ethno-national conflict on the communication process in Cyprus, arguing that they

marked the communication process between the major stake-holders in the conflict, but most of all, and in a profound way, between the two Cypriot communities [..] The so-called Green Line, which ethnically divides the capital city of Nicosia, is not so much in itself an obstacle to communication as it is a symbol of a communication problem that goes far deeper than the physical barriers of sandbags and barbed wire. (p. 581)
However, the communication process and the conflict itself has been continuously changing since the opening of the borders and the beginning of the negotiations for reunification in the early 2000s.

**Security Dilemma.** Security Dilemma usually refers to a situation when uncertainty, change (arming), and mistrust can combine to create conflict; it occurs when increasing one state’s security or actions reduces or hurts the security of the other and brings along greater instability (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 226). Indisputably the crucial part of the debate on division in Cyprus revolves around the security dilemma since-as often is the case for all ethnic conflicts-, it is less challenging to attack one’s neighbors (Lindley, 2007, p. 226). According to Lindley (2007), this is because

> “in contrast to states with borders and armies, inter-mixed populations have few defined borders, and few external distinguishing characteristics. This porosity makes violence easy to perpetrate. Hence, when relations begin to slide downwards between intermixed adversaries, each side has much to fear, and it is relatively hard to put the breaks on”. (p. 226)

There are various opinions on the role of security dilemma in the emergence of ethnic conflicts as well as the application of security dilemma to ethnic conflict, specifically in the case of partition. Kaufman, for example, “argues that it takes a combination of the security dilemma, hostile masses, and hostile leaders to spiral into ethnic conflict” (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 226). According to Lindley and Kaufmann, following from this argument, it is reasonable, then, to argue
that “partition may offer some promise of saving lives and bringing about peace since it is harder
to incite conflict across more established borders, and easier to identify and confront aggressive
adversaries” (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 227). However, Kaufmann suggests that “the only time
partition will promote peace is when the separation of peoples is so complete as to eliminate the
possibility that any lingering minority population could possibly threaten the minority, thereby
eliminating the security dilemma” (as cited in Lindley, 2007, p. 227).

Taking both arguments into consideration, it is fair to argue that partition had both of the afore-
mentioned effects on security dilemma and the general progression of the conflict in Cyprus. As
explained in the previous section, Enosis, and Taksim are “at the root of the Cyprus conflict” and
the security dilemma encircling it; as they each posed a substantial threat to the other group
(Lindley, 2007, p. 228). As Lindley (2007) puts it, “the closer one group gets to or pushes for
unification with their motherlands or partition, the more it threatens the other group” and men-
tions that another “form of near perpetual insecurity on Cyprus” is incurred by the “story of the
Greece-inspired coup leading to threat of Enosis and triggering the Turkish invasion” (p. 233).
Given the incidents happened not long ago, the security dilemma is multi-faceted; it goes beyond
the political realm and extends into the mental and emotional sphere which I argue and demon-
strate, it is as important as the political side of it, if not more. For example, Danielidou and Hor-
vath, -also drawing from Bobo, Levine and Campbell- discuss Sherif’s Realistic group conflict
theory which proposes that “negative attitudes and prejudices toward out-groups result from per-
ceived threats to the in-group’s existence, beliefs, or way of life” and suggest that such “threats
could result from negative contacts and conflicts with the out-group members” (2006, p. 406).
Borders

Border as a concept. Diez, Albert, and Stetter (2008) explained that new approaches in Political Geography and International Relations, which agree that borders are not just physical lines, “have instead proposed to study borders as socially constructed institutions” and argued that various scholars have highlighted that “borders need to be seen as social structures that are constantly communicatively reproduced” (Diez, Albert, & Stetter, 2008, p. 21). On the other hand, “geographically represented border conflicts are a particularly stable form of conflict because they provide a clear cut physical distinction between two easily identifiable sides” (p. 21) as is the case in Cyprus. Furthermore, Diez et al. (2008) stated that

In such conflicts, borders have a ‘double function’ in that they provide a means of both territorial inclusion and exclusion, but in parallel also for ‘functional’ inclusion or exclusion, as there are reinforcing tendencies between borders, identities and particular social orders. (Diez et al. 2008, p. 21)

In the section below, I explain the current condition of the border in Cyprus as well as discuss its evolution and effects.

The Cyprus Border. Papadakis argues that what lead to violence and the erection of a barbed wire division of parts of the city was the British exploiting interethnic differences on the island (Papadakis, 2006). The border in Cyprus was called the Green Line from 1963 to 1974,
and it “expanded to include a cordon sanitaire” (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 123). Kaufmann explains this phase of partition:

Since the Greek Cypriot community was far stronger than the ethnic Turkish community [...] , even taking into account open and covert aid that both received from their respective mainlands, the result was that Turkish Cypriot control was compressed into a number of isolated enclaves amounting to about 5% of the island. Afterward the government of Cyprus was entirely controlled by the Greek community, while the Turkish enclaves developed a parallel administration. (2007, p. 206).

Yet, he notes that this partition was not stable: “The Turkish Cypriot enclaves could not defend themselves against determined attack, while many Greek Cypriots saw the autonomous enclaves as potential bases for expansion of Turkish control over even more of Cyprus” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 206). During this period, pedestrian and vehicular traffic was generally allowed through checkpoints, however, the “Green line entered an important and long phase, during which it became heavily fortified within Nicosia, constantly monitored by UN Peacekeepers in the Buffer Zone” with Turkish military intervention of 1974 (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 123). As of now, Green Line -also known as “the border”, “the boundary”, “the buffer zone”, “dead zone”, “Atilla Line” and “Mason-Dixon Line”- is “a de facto international boundary between the portion of Cyprus that is officially recognized as a sovereign state and the self-proclaimed but unrecognized TRNC” (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 122).

As Calame and Charlesworth (2009) wrote, consisting of “sand bags, oil barrels, concrete, corrugated iron, brick, barbed wire and remnant architecture” (p. 123), the 187-mile-long border “in-
interrupts some of the most dense and historic parts of the city along with several traditionally mixed suburbs” (p. 122).

Not only does the border have adverse effects on the economic, political, social and geographical landscapes, but also has major impacts on communication. In relation to this, Anastasiou (2002) wrote: “Observers of the Cyprus phenomenon have noted that while the separation of people by natural barriers, such as rivers, seas, and mountains, is understandable, the separation that occurs along artificial lines of hostility is horrifying” (p. 582).

In April 2003, TRNC eased restrictions on border crossings which enabled millions of Cypriots and tourists to travel across the island after years of a ban. In March 2008, “Lokmaci Barikati”, a wall that was seen as a very powerful symbol of division in Cyprus, was demolished ("Symbolic Cyprus crossing,", 2008). This step was seen as positive by many Cypriots and gave hope for ending the partition of the land and the peoples of Cyprus after a long time.

Divided Capital

A Look at Divided Capitals. In their extensive study on Divided Cities -namely Beirut, Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar and Nicosia-, Calame and Charlesworth (2009) wrote that all these five cities “exhibited similar combinations of stress and insecurity prior to division” (p. 206). I explore the common causes and impacts of partition further below. However, I see great importance in mentioning the most crucial and in most cases the overarching factor: fear. As Ervine noted, once a community starts feeling insecure and fears the other community, they will most
likely react to this fear and naturally feel the urge to be safe. If living among the other is not safe, they would want to live somewhere else, distance themselves from the other community (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 206). This is the most basic instinct and the core of partition, at least in the initial stages.

According to Calame and Charlesworth (2009), “merging of political and ethnic identity on a mass scale” (p. 206) is often very significant in leading to partition insofar as “ethnicity becomes the dominant determinant of political affiliation” (p. 207). They discuss another major prerequisite to partition, which is “clustering”: “when members of a threatened community seek out smaller more ethnically homogenous clusters” (p. 208). On that account, they observe that “strained relations between minority and majority ethnic communities are routinely complicated by a lack of consensus regarding relative group status”, and find Benvenisti’s “double minority syndrome” (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 208) to be a common character in all of the five cities they examined. In the case of Nicosia, Papadakis argues that “Greek Cypriots see themselves as a minority, given Turkey, while the Turkish Cypriots see themselves as a minority on the island” (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 209).

**Nicosia.** Calame and Charlesworth (2009) suggest that “lines become walls and walls govern behavior…. Walls are both a panacea and poison for societies where intergroup conflict is common, but over time it is their toxicity that tends to prevail in social relations” (p. 8). In this section, I explore the imprints of the two different viewpoints of the past in the divided capital of Cyprus, Nicosia.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the role of Britain, Greece, and Turkey cannot be overlooked in the partition of Cyprus, proving Calame and Charlesworth’s (2009) notion that division is “typically a product of external forces acting on a city with the intent to protect it, save it, claim it, demoralize it, or enlist it in a larger struggle from which it cannot benefit” (p. 8). Together with this, the times of physical violence between the two communities—when bloodshed, pain, fear, and hatred overcame political agenda in an ordinary citizen’s mind—reminding and forgetting the past, constructions of the past and new national myths and symbols have shaped the concepts of division and the border on both sides of Cyprus.

According to Calame and Charlesworth (2009), the partition is most pronounced in the capital, Nicosia, and the reason for this is twofold: “its physically disruptive impact on the fabric of the city led directly to inefficiency and demoralization for urban residents” as the border “transformed the center of the historic city, its most vibrant and cooperative sector into a no man’s land” (p. 141), and as the urban divided city it is where the landscape has been inscribed with symbols, buildings, and monuments relating to the past. As Papadakis (2006) wrote, after independence from the British rule, the two ethnic groups did not share the same hopes for the future, in that the Greek Cypriots followed a more integrationist policy, while the Turkish Cypriots pursued a more separatist one (p. 2). He continues: “These factors have led to significant divergences in the two sides’ constructions of the past, ones which were subsequently inscribed in the landscape of the divided capital itself: its symbols and physical structures (such as monuments and museums) along with related erasures” (Papadakis, 2006, p. 2). Similarly, Bruce and Creighton (2006) argue that:
In any historic town, community identities are often closely related to extant physical remains; town walls represent not only physical monuments but also ideas—evocative mental constructs integral to the multi-layered self-images of communities. Yet, while these distinctively civic monuments outwardly symbolize a shared corporate identity, they inevitably represent far more contested, indeed divisive, elements of heritage. (p. 2)

In his examination of the monuments of Nicosia, Papadakis points out that Nicosia “has been gradually evolving from a multi-cultural site towards a culturally homogeneous Greek and Turkish side (in line with the changing demographics towards two ethnically homogeneous sides)” (2006, p. 6). He mentions Canefe’s argument that “representations of the past in the Turkish Cypriot side of Nicosia take two forms”, one of them relating to the “grandeur of the Ottoman Empire,” and the other to “Turkish Cypriot suffering under Greek Cypriots as a defining aspect of Turkish Cypriot identity” (p. 6). On the other hand, he claims that “the notion of living in a divided capital” is more prominent among Greek Cypriots: “they experience Nicosia as ‘divided Lefkosia’. For Turkish Cypriots, Nicosia is officially Lefkosha, their capital […] For Turkish Cypriots, another capital of another state lies beyond the divide” (Papadakis, 2006, p. 3). This sentiment has been changing since the reunification has been a possibility. Yet, depending on the government that is in power, the separatist approach is highlighted or shifted towards a more integrationist one.

Another important examination Papadakis (2006) brings to the table regarding the divided capital is that of the two different museums of national struggle. He notes that they “are located on either side of the Green Line, within the walls of the Old City” (aforementioned Venetian Walls), they are both called the Museum of National Struggle, one in Turkish (Milli Mucadele Muzesi),
the other in Greek (Mouseio Ethnikou Agona) (Papadakis, 2006, p. 8). He observed that “both museums share a strongly ethnocentric and selective representation of the past” (p. 9), which is not uncommon for countries/cities in conflict but nonetheless notable considering their physical proximity.

According to Papadakis (2006), the Turkish Cypriot Museum which was built in 1978, focuses on the Turkish Cypriot suffering caused by Greek Cypriots during the interethnic/intercommunal conflict, as well as citing history starting with the Ottoman conquest, thus implying that both Turkish Cypriots and the island of Cyprus are of Turkish heritage (p. 8). In the Greek Cypriot Museum of National Struggle that was built in the 1960s, on the other hand, Turkish Cypriots are portrayed as the enemy and aides to the British, with more emphasis put on the clash between Greek Cypriots and the British (Papadakis, 2006, p. 8).

The Green Line in Nicosia has evidently changed the structure and texture of the city as mentioned above. As also seen in Papadakis’ examination of the national struggle museums, Nicosia is a haven for everything that is inscribed with different national ideologies and the concept of the past which is constructed and remembered differently on each side; yet, it also is the city where it all intersects and transcends.

**Conclusion**

The intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots took many lives, devastating the whole population. The total number of casualties between 1955 and 1974 is said
to be approximately 3000 (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 140; Kaufmann, 2007). Papadakis and Calame and Charlesworth (2009) have voiced fears regarding the potential complications that are likely to arise in the event of a political settlement due to both sides failing to acknowledge the pain of the other and seeing themselves as victims, and trauma accumulating over the years as well as segregation becoming more pronounced after years of separation (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, pp. 134-141). While these are all valid concerns, only reaching an actual political settlement will clarify where the Cypriot communities are standing and how well they can accept each other again. In the next chapter, where I review a body of theories that informed my research, the complexity of the Cyprus Conflict and its impacts on the society become more evident.
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Background and Literature Review

In this chapter, I review literature that informed my research on the concepts of border, nationalism, national identity, national myths and symbols, role of fear in national identity construction, memories of pain, and finally, role of photographs in memory.

The Border

The restrictions on the border were eased by Turkish Republic of Cyprus in April 2003, and Cypriots have been able to cross the border by showing their documents ever since. Thus, as Dikomitis argues, between 2003 and the present, “the dividing line in Cyprus was transformed from an impenetrable boundary into a border which is still physically present, but can be crossed, negotiated and manipulated” (2005, p.7). Diez, Albert and Stetter (2008) look at borders and border conflicts from a different perspective: “Traditionally borders have been seen as physical lines, and border conflicts were, therefore, conflicts of subordination where rules were to be extended beyond the existing geographical borderline” (p. 21). Even though this can be assumed to be true for many border conflicts, Diez et al. (2008) find this notion problematic as it does not address the border “as a symbol of and means towards demarcation” (p.21). In accordance with their criticism and suggestion, the border in Cyprus as a symbol of demarcation is seen not only as an obstruction to reunification and peace but also as an essential tool for maintaining security as concurrently the national myths and symbols are conveying messages that create insecurity towards “the other”. The mistrust constructed toward Greek Cypriots through the national myths, historical narratives and national symbols relate to the psychological aspect of the security di-
lemma which generally revolves around uncertainty in international relations; the other aspect usually relates to weapons. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008) argue that the security dilemma perpetuates “the pervasiveness of fear, underlies the problems of cooperation, and checks the problem of trust” (p. 1).

Considering the frequent changes in the political situation and the progression of the negotiation process in the past eight years, the meaning and perception of the border has been continuously changing for various groups of Cypriots; for some, the border that was drawn to “shield” Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriot terror is now the foremost obstacle on the road to reunification and, generally, the advancement of the Turkish Cypriot community. For others, it practically marks the end of Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot co-existence on the island and is a constant reminder of the violence that ensued in the country. It is also important to mention that border refers to several physical and social constructs in Cyprus. The first border is comprised of the boundaries of the island: where the land ends and the sea begins. The other border is the Green Line administered by the UN which leaves Turkish Cypriots in the North and Greek Cypriots in the South. The first “border” signifies Cyprus as a separate land or territory in that it is not attached to Greece or Turkey, which has implications in terms of nationalism, sense of location and belonging, politics, and international relations. The other border, i.e. the Green Line, symbolizes a partitioned land, disconnected places and people, limit, barrier, the other, pain, conflict, relief, security, insecurity, unrest, status quo, and transcendence. On the physical level, it is a barrier and a divider of the territory which used to be “one Cyprus”.

According to Gumpert and Drucker, “borders are not just geographic barriers, but that they are the enemy of talk, of interaction, of the flow of ideas, in short, they are the opponents of commu-
nication” (as cited in Anastasiou, 2006, p. 152). Other scholars have also noted that “borders typically function as barriers to human interaction in one form or another” (Webster and Timothy, 2006, p. 163). This is not untrue in the case of Cyprus; the Green Line in Nicosia, as Harbottle notes, is an “unremitting obstacle to progress toward normalization between the two communities” (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p.133). While these are all valid arguments, it is important to remember that borders and partition can be practical, instrumental, or rather necessary in terms of maintaining safety and peace, as well as defining a nation and developing necessary policies relating to its peoples and territory.

Taking a more positive and deconstructionist approach towards the concept of border, Bhabha (1994) places it into a completely different context where border is not seen as a divider, but rather a liminal space of intersection and transcendence contrasting the other views mentioned above. Bhabha (1994) talks about beyond the border in a philosophical, postmodern sense:

The 'beyond' is neither a new horizon, nor a leaving behind of the past... Beginnings and endings may be the sustaining myths of the middle years; but in the fin de siècle, we find ourselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion. [...] 'Beyond' signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary - the very act of going beyond - are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the 'present' which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced. (pp. 5-6)
Bhabha’s approach speaks to the transcendence of two sides of the border, as well as past and future, and emergence of a new reality in between these sides and times, which can be considered as meta-reality. The border in Cyprus can be said to provide an avenue for this new reality at times as the peace movement gained momentum after the gates were open.

**Theories of Nationalism and National Identity**

In this section, I explore the use and role of national symbols, myths, and the construction of national identity in the Turkish Cypriot community, and how the mistrust towards “the other” and security dilemma is constructed and framed through these processes.

Nationalism parallels an intrinsic sense of belonging; as Butz (2009) noted, “humans’ attachment to higher-order groups, including their attachment to states and nations, is one of the most significant forces of nature and a powerful component of human motivation according to psychologists” (p. 779), substantiating the importance and the universality of this concept.

Nation is metaphorically imagined as an extension to family, and this notion plays an instrumental role when it is considered in relation to other nations, especially if they pose a threat to our nation, hence our family (Lakoff, 1995). The “other” in Northern Cyprus, often means Greek Cypriots as they are the immediate neighbors and concurrently, threatening enemies. Thus, for the context of this thesis, the term xenophobia can be applied to the fear of Greek Cypriots. Delanty and O'Mahony (2002), suggest that:
Xenophobia is shaped by the logic of exclusion – the separation of the ‘we’ from the ‘they’ - and the construction of adversarial frames, requiring a negative identification by which the ‘they’ becomes an enemy. However the shift from exclusion to adversity is a very subtle one. Most groups are based on a sense of the ‘we’ as distinct from a ‘them’. The potentiality for other-creating mechanisms to become adversarial is always present.

(p. 166)

Delanty and O'Mahony (2002) also give an example of this shift, which particularly relates to how Turkish Cypriots see Greek Cypriots; they note that “a sense of grievance or an injustice can transform the self identity of the we into an exclusive preoccupation with the other who is made responsible for the fate of the we” (p. 166).

**National myths and construction of national identity.** In this section, I examine the relationship between national myths, collective memory, and construction of national identity, in general and in the Turkish Cypriot community specifically. After discussing the emergence and aftermath of the Cyprus conflict in Chapter 1, it is important to now put the theories and approaches of nationalism, national symbols, political “mythmaking”, and collective memory into the context of Northern Cyprus. This chapter contains a discussion of the ways in which history and myth differ and why that distinction is important; how and why national myths are created and communicated in Northern Cyprus as well as their role in construction of national identity, the ways in which “collective remembering and collective forgetting” took place in the Cypriot
communities while constructing their historical narratives, and the relation of memories of pain and grieving to nationalism.

National symbols and national myths are paramount in construction of national identity, in that they reinforce national consciousness and a sense of collective identity, also giving the nation vitality and truth (Kluver, 1997). Similarly, Smith (1991) argues that “national myth typically relies on a certain amount of factual history co-mingled with dramatic interpretation. These historical narratives reflect and articulate the collective understanding of the ‘essence’ of the nation” (1991).

**History vs. myth.** History is generally defined as the prose narrative or a record of past events, and differs from myth since “a myth is a story of concrete events involving concrete persons; but it lacks any precise indication as to the time and place the events happened” and myths “differ from historical accounts, in that they are often vague in their specifications of time and space” (Munz, 1956, p. 2). Anastasiou (2002) offers an explanation on how the national histories and myths are formulated. Anastasiou argues that “nationalist frameworks resist the natural process of communicative interaction by which communicating parties create increasingly an emergent, shared domain of meaning” (Anastasiou, 2002, p. 582). He explains:

The reason for this is not because the frameworks of rival nationalist groups are different, but, paradoxically, because they tend to be identical in their fundamental nature […] It conceptualizes society in terms of a single, homogeneous ethnic identity, thus rendering
the existence of other ethnic groups in the body social a “national anomaly” and, in times of conflict, a “national blemish” that needs to be cleansed. (Anastasiou, 2002, p. 582)

Papadakis (2006) gives an insight on the significant divergences in the two Cypriot communities’ constructions of the past specifically. He claims that

Turkish Cypriots, who officially aimed for separation, constructed a historical narrative placing emphasis on events of conflict and animosity between the two sides, one focusing on Greek Cypriot aggression against them, especially during the 1960s, but often projected deeper into the past. This, clearly, is also a view of the past emphasizing boundaries and separation between the two communities, which helps the legitimization of future separation through the argument that ‘the past proves that the two peoples cannot live together’. (Papadakis, 2006, p. 3)

Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, who aim for reunification -often in the sense that they would like to be able to get their homes back and live in the North again- “have placed emphasis on past events of cooperation, constructing a historical narrative whereby the two ethnic groups are said to have ‘peacefully coexisted’. This legitimates their aim of reunification by asserting that ‘the past proves that the two communities can live together’” (Papadakis, 2006, p. 3). These substantial differences in two communities’ historical narratives and national myths that Papadakis (2006) noted, “foster disagreement between former enemy countries over what happened during their past conflict” (He, 2007, p. 45).
National myths and construction of national identity in Northern Cyprus. As pointed out in *Remembering and Forgetting the War* by He (2007), “national myths which are fanciful stories about the origins, identity and purposes of a nation, constitute a vital part of the ideological foundation for national identity and nationalism” (p. 44). Doubtlessly, the construction and constant communication of national myths to the public has played an instrumental role in mobilizing people (He, 2007, p. 45) as well as building national consciousness and construction of national identity in Northern Cyprus.

He (2007) claims that “myths offer a picture of the shared past that can evoke the deepest emotional resonance from the populace,” (p. 44) and identifies three types of myths created by elites which are used to “justify national security policy or address domestic political concerns”: (1) “self-glorifying myths, which explicitly incorporate inflated or false claims of national virtue and competence; these include myths of victimization that form a ‘cult of national martyrdom,’ endowing a nation with moral superiority”; (2) “self-whitewashing myths, which deny or rationalize a nation’s past wrongdoing against others;” and (3) “other-maligning myths, which denigrate other nations as inferior, evil or culpable” (He, 2007, p. 45).

Thus, mythmaking undeniably becomes instrumental for governments. The reason why governments communicate national myths to the masses is because “the national myth performs several vital psychological roles that help account for its power in political discourse. First, it provides a sense of cultural or national identity, which in turn leads to a unified political will” (Smith, 1989; 1991). Also on the mobilizing power of myths and history, Berger (2009) discusses Bizeul’s point:
Myths were often perceived by nation-builders as being far more powerful in mobilizing people than history, so that the combination of myths and history became an even more attractive amalgam to make sense of the world, to provide a master key to explain the present and predict the future, to integrate diverse social and political groups, to legitimate political regimes and also to work towards the emancipation of groups suffering discrimination and persecution (as cited in p. 494).

The photographs that I will introduce in Chapter 3 constitute a significant part of Turkish Cypriot national symbols, and in cooperation with national myths, contribute to Turkish Cypriot national identity construction. Moreover, their ability to greatly influence the Turkish Cypriot community stems from the fact that they both fed off and are fed off by Turkish Cypriot national myths.

Nevertheless, there are often social groups that do not subscribe to this belief no matter how strong the national narrative is. Granted national myths -particularly the ones discussed in this study- are essentially communicated with the agency of the government and media in Northern Cyprus, these myths are not deliberately manufactured by the leaders; as such, these myths have become prevalent through their repetitive dissemination by these institutions.

National symbols. According to Butz (2009), nations develop attachment through symbols of national group membership “given the potentially positive effects of strong national identification for personal well-being and the cohesiveness of societies” (pp. 779-780). According to Firth, national symbols such as “flags, anthems, emblems”, as well as other group symbols, represent group membership on a conceptual level, as well as “condensing the knowledge, values,
history, and memories associated with one’s nation” (as cited in Butz, 2009, p. 780). Correspondingly, Cerulo (1993) argued that national symbols construct national identity, as well as “the image of the nation projected by national leaders both to their constituents and to the world at large” (p. 243). Considering the prevalence of national symbols, discussing the different effects they may have on the members is necessary. Michael Billig argues that residents are “repeatedly reminded of their nationhood in everyday life” primarily through national symbols; however, according to Butz (2009) and Billig, effects of national symbols may become rather automatic in the case of “well-established and stable” nations (as cited in Butz, 2009, p. 781). Yet, there are cases when the effects may not become automatic. In line with this, Butz discusses Billig’s work:

Residents of nations in which there is disruption due to internal or external threats (i.e., separatist or extremist movements, threat of attack from other nations) or in which there are concerted efforts to infuse nationalistic sentiment (e.g., when nations are newly established or observing patriotic holidays) are likely to experience intense displays of nationalistic ‘flag-waving.’ Exposure to national symbols in these environments may elicit powerful explicit psychological reactions stemming from the intense memories and emotions associated with the nation. (Butz, 2009, p. 781-782)

The case of Cyprus has been ever-changing and thus disruption has always been present. After 1974, i.e. the border, there has not been any physical violence between the two communities. However national identity construction has never stopped on either side. Considering the relatively short history of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, “infusing nationalistic sentiments” has been a task each government has took on. Depending on their stands and positions on certain
issues, each leading political party chose to communicate certain national myths and symbols to the community to shape people’s convictions about Greek Cypriots and/or the Cyprus Problem and eventually justifying their policies. National myths and symbols are conveyed through photographs, songs, poems, posters, flags, the national anthem (Turkish National Anthem), and intense use of “guiding metaphors” such as “motherland”, “yavru vatan” (child nation), and others (Baruh & Popescu, 2008). As Feshbach and Sakano argue symbols of a nation such as flags, emblems, anthems, and in the context of this thesis, iconic imagery, may increase people’s sense of psychological identification with and sense of attachment to their nation (Butz, 2009). Granted these myths spread faster within such a small community, their influence on the construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity is unequivocally immense.

**Education.** History Education has always provided an effective avenue for governments in efforts to reaffirm and reconstruct a nation’s past, and diffuse nationalistic values and national myths widely, as education is “connected with instilling values of patriotism, of loyalty, and national identity” (Howard & Gill, 2001). As Karahasan and Latif have argued, “History education is seen as a significant tool for creating national identity. In this regard, history education in Cyprus can be seen as an instrument that legitimizes official discourse” (2010, p. 18).

The use of history textbooks imported from their respective motherlands since the British Rule has resulted in further separation of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, cultivation of Greek and Turkish nationalisms, construction of different national narratives infused with myths demonizing and marginalizing “the other”, and ultimately upholding ethnonationalism in
Cyprus (Karahasan & Latif, 2010, pp. 15-16). The history textbooks used in Cyprus between 1971 and 2004, which is mostly reflective of the time period studied in this thesis, were written by Vehbi Zeki Serter, who was “an active member of TMT and subsequently member of the nationalist right-wing party UBP (National Unity Party)” (Papadakis, 2008, p. 12). The biased approach used in these textbooks was “a simple reflection of nationalistic policies, which are based on an ethnocentric perception of history” (Karahasan & Latif, 2010, p. 20). Also discussing this undeniable trend and logic, Papadakis (2008) noted “The books were produced at periods when the Right monopolized power on the Turkish Cypriot side with the explicit aim of preserving the de facto partition of Cyprus. These books present the history of Cyprus as nothing but part of Turkish history” (pp. 12-13).

In 2004, the history textbooks were revised and focused more on “mutual tolerance and understanding”, and “common experiences of Turkish and Greek Cypriots”. However, in 2009, they have reverted to including the “notion of a homogenous and single ‘other’” and “bringing the emphasis back to the history of Turks and the struggles of Turkish Cypriots” (Evripidou, 2010). Regardless of the changes and revisions on these texts in the recent years, the ill-advised way history was taught in Cyprus until 2004, had a substantial impact on how the younger generations grew up subscribing to the constructed national narratives and national myths.

**Fear and national identity.** Another vital concept in nationalism and construction of national identity is fear of “the other”, which is critical in the scope of this study. Gellner (2006)
offers a basic explanation on how groups are formed -which helps us understand the fundamentals of nationalism- and the significance of fear and insecurity in that context:

Mankind has always been organized in groups, of all kinds of shapes and sizes, sometimes sharply defined and sometimes loose, sometimes neatly nested and sometimes overlapping or intertwined. The variety of these possibilities, and of the principles on which the groups were recruited and maintained, is endless. But two generic agents or catalysts of group formation and maintenance are obviously crucial; will, voluntary adherence and identification, loyalty, solidarity, on the one hand; and fear, coercion, compulsion, on the other. (p. 52)

Complementing Gellner’s argument, Davis (1999) discusses Mack’s argument which formulates the creation of “us” vs. “them” through group participation as it meets the need for “personal survival, security, and safety” (p. 28). Davis (1999) further explains:

Individuals, as a result of early socialization, recognize their membership in various collectives and begin to draw distinctions between those within the group ("us") and those outside ("them"). Whether rational or not, individuals develop anxiety and latent fears about the of "outsiders," leading them to embrace the collective (i.e., the racial, ethnic, or national group) as a protector from perceived threats. (p. 28)

Neumann (1999) also talks about the difference between “us” and “them”, drawing from Hogg and Abrams:
A differentiation arises between oneself, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. (p. 223)

The other is what is different from us as a group, and in time it becomes the unknown—which can be mysterious and intimidating. What sets fear and insecurity apart from all the other factors that are part of nationalism, is its intrinsic nature. Fear, as an emotion, is not learned; it is truly natural as well as the reaction to fear. Similarly, feeling insecure and the desire to feel safe and secure are all innate. Petersen (2002) argues that emotion helps explain the “essentialization of identities that underlies ethnic conflict” (p. 3). Petersen then goes on to state that “while identities are multiple and malleable, identities can crystallize when one is in the grasp of a powerful emotion as emotion can coordinate motivations and effectively point a legion of individuals in one particular direction” (2002, p. 3). Finally, Petersen (2002) suggests that

Fear is instrumental because it produces actions that directly meet a pressing concern in the form of a threat…fear prepares the individual to satisfy safety concerns; hatred prepares the individual to act on historical grievance resentment prepares the individual to address status/self-esteem discrepancies. (p. 19)

Given the explanations and arguments above, it is not difficult to see how nationalism centers on the basic instincts of fear and reaction to fear, as well as how they contribute largely in the construction of national identity. These concepts are in turn very instrumental when ethnic conflict, violence and partition are in question. Benvenisti argues that “chronic insecurity creates an at-

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mosphere in which discrimination and fear flourish” (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 208), and further explores the groupings and cluster formations -hence division and maintenance of division- as a result:

The defense mechanism of clustering around your own kind was a natural reaction, but it was also rooted in [each group’s] fundamental perception of . . . Itsel as a besieged and threatened group, and of the other side as cruel, ruthless, and demonic. (as cited in Calame & Charlesworth, 2009, p. 208)

**Memory and National Identity**

In this section, I examine how collective remembering and collective forgetting fits into the current situation in Cyprus as well as collective memory’s link to nationalism. In addition to the inter-connectedness of myth and history, memory comes into the equation when considering a nation’s past and how the members of the nation remember it. According to Berger (2009), “memory is different from history as it necessitates presence in, and experience of, an event; which he says is at least true for individual memory” (p. 492). Collective memory, according to Zelizer (1992), “reflects a group’s codified knowledge over time about what is important, preferred, and appropriate” (p. 3). To contrast with individual memory, Berger (2009) states that collective memory “includes many elements or events which individuals did not directly experience; yet, they have internalized a memory which is presented to them through a mixture of public and private narratives as a collective memory with the assumption that individuals should par-
take in it” (p. 492), Hirsch (2001) calls this internalized memory “postmemory” which is discussed in detail in the next section.

James E. Young explains in his book that “different ethnic groups, nations, religions, generations, tend to remember the same past in complex and conflicting ways” (Meyer, 1994). Naturally, such disparities become crucial matters in conflicts and when the reconciliation processes are in progress. What should come as no surprise are the issues related to memory, remembering and forgetting that arise when discussing the conflict in Cyprus, as well as considering prospects of reunification as these concepts have been appropriated/used as political mobilization tools for many years. While examining the social memory in Divided Cyprus, Papadakis et al. (2006) observe multiple significant aspects of “political construction of memory in Cyprus” (Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 12). They note that the two ethnic groups that previously lived together “have come to remember and forget the past in markedly different ways”, “turning memory into a means of legitimating their political claims.” (p.12)

“Regarding the links between place, history and memory”, Papadakis et al. (2006) draw from De Certeau, Klein, and Bahloul’s work, and assert that “it is difficult to draw a distinction between private and public or collective stories” given “the case of Cyprus” (p. 14). They argue that “even if the kinds of erasures of memory in the context of capitalism - entailing the erasure of others’ memories” (by changing place names, destroying statues, etc.) -are “present in Cyprus, the political demands emerging from the lack of consolidated states makes the need to infuse the landscape with (ethnic) memories and memorials as a way to provide linkages to the land paramount” (Papadakis et. al, 2006, p. 14). Papadakis et al. also examine Nora’s “groundbreaking discussion of the links between memory, history, and space in modernity”, where Nora argues
that “memory is embodied in landscapes and familiar social settings, while history comes to be associated with monuments and heritage sites” (p. 14). “Milieux de mémoire”, the term Nora uses, ”refers to social spaces and landscapes that embody memory as lived experience”, whereas “history is associated with lieux de mémoire, officially monumentalized sites” (p. 15). Following from these definitions, “these exist precisely because there are no longer any settings in which memory is a real part of everyday experience— milieux de mémoire— and for this reason the past has to be embodied in sites (monuments, museums, street names, etc.)” (p. 15). In the case of Cyprus, Papadakis et al. (2006) suggest that Cyprus’ social spaces lie “somewhere between milieux mémoire and lieux de mémoire, for many people do have living memories of the recent events which led to the current situation” (p. 15). As Sant Cassia observed, “the widespread use of the trope of witnessing indicates that history is regarded more as part of the present than as something past, done and over with, a closed issue” (as cited in Papadakis et al., 2006, p. 15). This view and conclusion demonstrates the existence of collective memory and postmemory in Cyprus and suggests that memories of Cypriots are predisposed to resurfacing often.

Memories of pain. National, collective memory and memories of pain and remembering the dead are essential concepts in this context; as Smith argues, “[O]ne might almost say: no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation’ which explains why it is important that ‘nationalists must rediscover and appropriate shared memories of the past” (as cited in Bell, 2003, p. 70). National memory, as Rachel Harris (2009) explains, “is the result of constructed common denominators that have, on the symbolic level, overcome real social and political differences in order to create an imagined, idealized community” (p. 202). Maurice Halbwachs, who coined the term
“collective memory”, argued that “it is not a given but rather a socially constructed notion. Nor is it some mystical group mind” (as cited in Coser, 1992, p. 22). In addition, Halbwachs wrote "while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember" (as cited in Coser, 1992, p. 22). In a similar manner, Bell explains Smith’s take on memory:

Smith places great weight on the role of memory, noting the vital relationship of shared memories to collective cultural identities: memory, almost by definition is integral to cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities. (as cited in Bell, 2003, p. 70)

Memory, myth and history are all closely linked concepts, and are of great importance in this study. Johann Gustav Droysen states that memory and myth are heavily associated (as cited in Berger, 2009, p. 492). Harris (2009) talks about framing narratives and turning them into myths: “Events are selected in the process of framing narratives to create a shared image of self and community articulated for the nation” (p. 202). Harris offers Zerubavel’s view on this as well: “Collective memory creates a particular periodization and evaluation of the past, and turns certain events into political myths” (as cited in Harris, 2009, p. 202). In turn, Harris continues, “these myths become motivating forces. Through active remembrance of the dead, particularly those who have died in a way that can support national political myths, a link is created between the sacrifice of the individual and the nation” (p. 202). Benedict Anderson (2006) also wrote about the sacrifice and death and their link to nationalism:
These deaths bring us abruptly face to face with the central problem posed by nationalism: what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely more than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices? I believe that the beginnings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism. (p. 7)

According to Zerubavel, commemoration “establishes invisible ties between the communities of the living and the dead” (as cited in Harris, 2009, pp. 202-203). Harris (2009) quotes Ashplant, Dawson and Roper to stress the importance of commemoration in a broader scope: “The political use of war commemoration is ‘a practice bound up with rituals of national identification, and a key element in the symbolic repertoire available to the nation-state for binding its citizens into a collective national identity’” (as cited in Harris, 2009, p. 203). This wholly explains the influence that shared memories of pain have on Turkish Cypriots’ national identity and the psychological aspect of security dilemma which I argue have been capable of contributing largely to the border’s firmness on the psychosocial level rather than the physical border that is currently negotiated on political terms.

**Postmemory and iconic imagery.** Hirsch (2001) refers to the “response of the second generation to the trauma of the first generation” as “postmemory” (p. 218). She claims that “postmemory” describes “the relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narratives and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” (Hirsch, 2001, p. 219). The first generation, people who have
directly experienced the collective trauma, have vivid memories of reality and considering the selectivity of memory, they only remember what is salient. Consequently, the representation of the incidents and the reinterpretation of the first generation memories are what is transmitted to the second generation. As a result, the second generation has a memory, but it is not of reality, rather it is the memory of a memory, and representation of the reality. Hirsch (2001) explains that the term “postmemory” is meant to convey “its temporal and qualitative difference from survivor memory, its secondary, or second generation memory quality, its basis in displacement, its vicariousness and belatedness” (p. 220). “Postmemory”, she adds,

is a powerful form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through representation, projection, and creation—often based on silence rather than speech, on the invisible rather than the visible” (Hirsch, 2001, p. 220).

In Northern Cyprus, the second generation’s memory, i.e. Postmemory, envelops the violent incidents and loss of life; and sustained pain has been mediated through iconic imagery, such as photographs of pain and suffering, the text in the history books, newspapers, TV programs and personal narratives. As these have all been frequently used as nation and national identity building tools, it is important to consider them not only as a part of the education or information pool that one has, but also as a part of second generation Turkish Cypriot’s identity and correspondingly, their reconstructed memory of the past. In accordance with this, Sontag (2003) argues that Collective memory is not a remembering but a stipulating: that THIS is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures that lock the story in our minds.
Ideologies create substantiating archives of images, representative images, which encapsulate common ideas of significance and trigger predictable thoughts, feelings. (p. 86)

demonstrating that “postmemory” is in fact reconstructed.

Photographs are crucial in relation to memory as Hirsch (2008) noted “presence of embodied experience in the process of transmission is […] best mediated by photographic images. Memory signals an affective link to the past, a sense precisely of an embodied ‘living connection’” (pp. 8-9). Also on photographs’ importance, Sontag (2003) writes:

In an era of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something and a compact form for memorizing it. The photograph is like a quotation, or a maxim or proverb. Each of us mentally stocks hundreds of photographs, subject to instant recall. (p. 22)

As strong visual stimulants and continuous messages as Barthes defines, photographs are capable of communicating, solidifying, reminding the concepts and ideologies defined in this chapter (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977). On the act of photographing and looking at photography Brothers (1997) noted:

Implicit in the act of photographing is a recognition of the passage of time, of transience and the inevitability of change. To look at photographs of people is to engage in a king of mourning for past innocence, their poignancy sharpened in the knowledge of what was to come. (p. XI)
According to Barthes (1981), photographs are never distinguished from what they represent, or their referents, “at least not immediately or generally” and they are capable of signifying something other than the actual image they present, however in order to “perceive this photographic signifier, a secondary action of knowledge or of reflection is required” (p. 5). The photograph as a sign, and what the signifier represents is not enough to understand “workings of a society” as Debray argues “codes' transmission has no autonomous or pure existence” in his book Transmitting Culture, where he talks about “mediology” and tries to understand “how explicit symbolic systems are perpetuated” (2004, pp. 8-9). Debray points out the difference between communication and transmission, and argues that the former “transports through space” while the latter “takes its course through time” (2004, p.3). Understanding transmission is what is also crucial for this thesis and the concept of postmemory, since the national myths and other views and notions that ultimately become national assets not only form the “symbolic systems” that have been perpetuated over time, but also help make sense of the codes. The method and approaches to the photographs in order to explore what they signify and represent are described and explained in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3: Data and Methodology

As detailed in Chapter 1, the violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots reached its peak from 1963 through 1967 and again in 1974. The intensity of the assaults and their aftermath are conceivably reflected best in the visual documentation of the violent conflict between the Cypriot communities. Among hundreds of such images, a small array of them have been repeatedly circulated in North Cyprus. While there is no concrete information available as to why certain photographs were chosen to be displayed over others, it is sensible to argue that numerous factors contributed to this process such as proper composition and lightning of the shots, their ability to tell a tragic story and potential to cause distress to the viewer. The data set chosen for this thesis contains six of the widely disseminated photographs. While choosing the sample size and the data, I drew from my own experiences as a Turkish Cypriot postmemorial viewer in terms of most frequently encountered photographs, as well as selecting photographs that exhibit at least one of dominant themes found in the aforementioned extensive pool of imagery such as dead bodies of men, women and children, mass graves, blood, and grief.
Photograph 1 (McCullin, 1964). Taken by Donald McCullin in Gaziveren, Cyprus in April 1964 for The Observer, the world’s oldest Sunday newspaper and sister paper of The Guardian (P. Arıkan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011). McCullin won the World Press Photo Award with this photograph which not only enabled the communication of this image to masses, but also stimulated foreign media coverage of the intercommunal violence in Cyprus.
Photograph 2. Taken on December 24, 1963 during the Christmas massacres showing a woman named Nahide Oden and others fleeing Omorphita, Cyprus. There is no information available on who took the photograph (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011) . It has been one of the most widespread images of the Cyprus intercommunal violence as well as being featured on the cover of *The Genocide Files* by British journalist Harry Scott Gibbons (Gibbons, 1997).
Photograph 3. Taken by Omer Sami Cosar inside the bathroom of a house in Nicosia, which was later converted to the Museum of Barbarism, on December, 23 1963 with Rene MacColl and Daniell McGearchie from Daily Express with him present at the moment who were the first western journalists on site (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011).
Photograph 4. Taken on August 14, 1974 in Maratha, Cyprus during the excavations of mass graves after the Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda Massacre; the man’s name is Mehmet Tavukcu (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011). It was published with the caption “a man weeps over grisly remains” in various local and foreign newspapers although no information was available on specific dates of publication or names of the outlets. Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda Massacre was reported by foreign journalists working for The Sun (covered by John Akass), The Guardian, The Times, United Press International and BBC (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011).
Photograph 5. Taken by Bozkurt Ergun who worked for a photo press agency called Foto Rekor and published on the front page of Turkish Cypriot newspapers Bozkurt and Halkin Sesi on 25th April, 1964 (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011; “K. Kaymaklida”, 1964; “Baf’ta Rumlarin”, 1964). The victim’s name is Arabaci Hasan Ibrahim, he was 55 years old when he was shot from behind at 7:15pm on April 24, 1964 during Paphos Massacres (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011).
Photograph 6. Taken by Foto Rekor during the Paphos Massacre and published in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers in March 1964 with the caption “Bodies of our 4 brothers who were killed in Paphos by Greek Cypriots” (P. Arikan, TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 14 March, 2011).
Dissemination

The photographs I chose to analyze have been reproduced and circulated in different formats on different occasions. As mentioned above, these photographs not only formed the content of tabloids of various newspapers in Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and foreign press (including Bozkurt on 12 March 1964, 8 April 1964 and 25 April 1964, Zaman on 2 September 1974, Halkin Sesi on 12 March 1964 and 12 April 1964, and The Guardian in August, 1974, and possibly earlier, though no specific information was provided by the TRNC Public Information Office as assaults were taking place, but also have become visual bookmarks for the violent chapter in Cyprus history through their repetition.

Furthermore, in the events organized every year in commemoration of the attacks, these photographs are featured in the brochures, posters, booklets and documentaries used both for propaganda through various outlets - TV, newspapers, magazines, websites and social media platforms, distributed as hard copy- and as the contents of the events, contributing largely to the dissemination to a wider population and solidifying their iconic value.

Moreover, the commemoration events are rituals in all schools in Northern Cyprus, starting from elementary school all through the end of high school; these traditional commemoration events often include poetry reading/writing, essay contests, school choir performances including anthems and songs written about the attacks, speeches, film/documentary screenings, and decoration contests of the boards in every classroom which stay on for a few weeks. Needless to say, these photographs are featured as main contents of the commemoration board contests and pivotal parts of all the other commemoration events that mark December 21st and July 20th.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the history textbooks used in North Cyprus for elementary, secondary and high school education -written by Vehbi Zeki Serter, from 1971 until 2004, with revised editions coming out periodically- had been the major sources of dissemination of these images regarding the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots to the younger generations. Taking a biased approach toward the history of Cyprus, these textbooks featured the photographs in question throughout the years until they were revised recently. Conceivably, the repetition of tragic narratives and the continuous re-use of the visual material have played an important role not only in construction of the “other” as the enemy for the younger generation and perpetuation of ethno-nationalism -and division- on the island, but also helped form the second generation’s post-memory.

One of the first targets of the attacks in December 1963 was a single family home in the heart of Nicosia, shown in Photograph 3. The bathroom, where a mother and her three sons were shot to death while they were hiding in the bathtub, was preserved, and the house was converted to the Museum of Barbarism in 1974, featuring all the photographs analyzed in this thesis. As a pillar of the nation-building and national identity construction process in the Turkish Cypriot community, which centralized on the victimization of Turkish Cypriots and “othering” of Greek Cypriots, this museum always played an instrumental role: Elementary school and middle school students were taken on field trips to the museum almost every year repeatedly. Coupled with this, it became a popular tourist -mostly of Turkish descent- destination. According to the statistics by the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, 49,663 people visited the museum in 2008 (Museum Visits in Nicosia in 2008), with the numbers slightly changing to 46,056 in 2009 (TRNC Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, Personal Communication, 5 March 51
2010) which shows the number of people exposed to these photographs in two years through this outlet alone. As evident in its name, Museum of Barbarism provides a haven for anti-Greek Cypriot propaganda. The blood stains on the walls coupled with the photographs citing examples of other atrocities make for a distressing museum visit, as well as constructing negative presuppositions about Greek Cypriots in a negative way. The Museum of National Struggle in Northern Cyprus, which is also a popular school trip and tourist location, is another important domain in terms of dissemination of the photographs under examination, provided some 9900 people visited it in 2008 (Museum Visits in Nicosia in 2008).

Methodology

The methodological aim of this thesis is to understand the underlying conventions, relations and connotations employed in the photographs chosen as data and the message these visual elements communicate. Chandler (2005) defines Semiotics as the study of signs, and asserts that “semiotics can be applied to anything which can be seen as signifying something - in other words, to everything which has meaning within a culture” (Introduction, para. 1).

As put forward by Ferdinand de Saussure, founder of semiotics, a sign is comprised of a signifier, which is “the form which the sign takes”, and signified, “the concept it represents” (as cited in Chandler, 2009, Signs, para. 3). As Chandler (2008) notes, the terms “denotation” and “connotation” are used to describe the relationship between the signifier and the signified, and that denotation is usually "described as the definitional, ‘literal’, ‘obvious’ or ‘commonsense’ meaning of a sign” (Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 2). Chandler (2008) then writes that the
term “connotation”, on the other hand, “is used to refer to the socio-cultural and ‘personal’ associations (ideological, emotional etc.) of the sign which typically depend on the interpreter's class, age, gender, ethnicity and so on” (Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 2).

Roland Barthes defines “three levels of meaning” in a photograph, which is one of the key approaches I use while interpreting the photographs in Chapter 4 (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 52). First one is the “Informational level”: which gathers together everything that can be learned “from the setting, the costumes, the characters, their relations,” and so on. Barthes sees this level as that of “communication” (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 52).

The “second level of meaning”, according to Barthes, is “symbolic level” which is that of signification and symbolism (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 52). He claims that its mode of analysis would be “a semiotics more highly developed than the first, a second or neo-semiotics” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 53). More specifically, this level of connotation “uses the denotative sign (signifier and signified) as its signifier and attaches to it an additional signified, and reflects ‘expressive’ values which are attached to a sign. Therefore, connotation is a sign which derives from the signifier of a denotative sign” (Chandler, 2008, Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 7). Barthes argues that the symbolic meaning is intentional i.e.

it is what the author wanted to say and it is taken from a kind of common, general lexicon of symbols; it is a meaning which seeks me out, me, the recipient of the message, the subject of the reading, a meaning which starts with SME and which goes on ahead of me; evident certainly (so too is the other), but closed in its evidence, held in a complete system of destination. (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 54)
Barthes calls this complete sign the “obvious meaning; obvious means which comes ahead and this is exactly the case with this meaning” (Barthes & Heath, 1977 p. 54).

Barthes’ “third meaning”, on the other hand, which is the key meaning, is “the supplement that my intellection cannot succeed in absorbing, at once persistent and fleeting, smooth and elusive” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 54). Barthes and Heath (1977) call this the obtuse meaning, which as a word means supplementary meaning; it "opens the field of meaning totally” (p. 54). This level is also referred to as mythological or ideological level, and it is at this level that “the sign reflects major culturally-variable concepts underpinning a particular world view” (Chandler, 2008, Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 17). Barthes elaborates on this concept of myth: “Myth has in fact a double function: it points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something and it imposes it on us…” (as cited in Chandler, 2008, Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 12).

Chandler (2008) writes “signs and codes are generated by myths and in turn serve to maintain them. Like metaphors, myths help us to make sense of our experiences within a culture” (Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 16). According to Barthes, “myths serve the ideological function of naturalization”; in other words, they make “dominant cultural and historical values, attitudes and beliefs seem entirely ‘natural’, ‘normal’, self-evident, timeless, obvious ‘commonsense’ - and thus ‘true’ reflections of ‘the way things are’” (as cited in Chandler, 2008, Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 16). Chandler (2008) also argues that “myths can function to hide the ideological function of signs and codes in the sense that the power of such myths is that they ‘go without saying’ and thus appear not to need to be deciphered, interpreted or demystified” (Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 16).
The photographs discussed in this chapter are all, as mostly clearly manifested, photographs of pain and suffering. Does everyone “read” them the same, then? Keeping with Barthes, certainly not. When the postmemorial viewers see these pictures, they are already familiar with the dominant myths and historical narratives. Consequently, when denotation and connotation are combined to form a signifier for the third level, the signified is mostly based on their interpretation which depends on the contextual information Turkish Cypriots share. In turn, these myths that are used to interpret the sign on the third level, are maintained by that sign (Chandler, 2008, Denotation, Connotation and Myth, para. 16).

In the analysis of photographs introduced in this chapter, I explore the denotations and connotations, as well as exploring the three levels of meaning. More specifically, I examine the “informational level” of the photographs and explore the “symbolic level of meaning” in them so as to see what the elements featured in the photographs stand for. I then discuss the “third meaning”, or “obtuse meaning” which is almost entirely based upon the viewer’s interpretation and possibly presupposition in cooperation with national myths -which can be assumed to provide a dominant framework for Turkish Cypriots, making the third meanings of the iconic images almost uniform among the community at a given time period. In doing so, I examine the connotations of these photographs in the context discussed in Chapter 1, what kind of emotions they are capable of eliciting in those who have been exposed to them frequently, and what they mean with respect to the body of theories provided in Chapter 2, and to the Turkish Cypriot mindset and collective memory.

As a Turkish Cypriot born in the 1980s, I am a postmemorial viewer of the analyzed photographs myself. While my familiarity with the photographs and experiences growing up in North Cyprus
have provided me with insight in producing this work by means of applying fresh knowledge to a framework I am familiar with, I tried to be self-reflexive in my approach to the analysis; however, I acknowledge the possible presence of different perspectives on the sensitive issues examined here (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 236).
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS

According to Sontag (2002), “iconography of suffering has a long pedigree. The suffering most often deemed worthy of representation is that which is understood to be the wrath, divine or human.” (p. 7) I employ semiotic analysis and Barthes’ approach for analyzing the iconic photographs of suffering; I start by briefly describing what these six images show, giving contextual information if available. Then, I attempt to decode the third meaning of the photographs in light of the dominant myths surrounding the interethnic war.

Theories of photography laid in Susan Sontag’s books *On Photography* and *Regarding the pain of Others*, and Marianne Hirsch’s work on transmission of memory have been the most influential in analyzing and interpreting the impact of the photographic images in structuring and shaping postmemory.

“What is the content of the photographic message? What does the photograph transmit?” asks Barthes (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 16). He, then, explains that the content of the photographic message and what is being transmitted is “the scene itself, the literal reality” (p.17). He discusses how reality transforms to photograph:

“In order to move from the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to divide up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs, substantially different from the object they communicate; there is no necessity to set up a relay, that is to say a code, between the object and its image. Certainly the image is not the reality but at least it is its perfect analogon and it is exactly this analogical perfection which, to common sense, defines the photograph.” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 17)
From this, Barthes concludes that photographic image is a message without a code; “from which proposition an important corollary must immediately be drawn; the photographic message is a continuous message” (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 17).

According to Woolf (as cited in Sontag, 2003, p. 26), photographs are not an argument; “they are simply a crude statement of fact addressed to the eye” and they are not simply anything. Woolf writes that eye is connected with the brain and the brain is connected with the nervous system; “that system sends its messages in a flash through every past memory and present feeling” (as cited in Sontag, 2003, p. 26). Sontag asserts that “photographs of an atrocity may give rise to opposing responses. A call for peace. A cry for revenge. Or simply the bemused awareness, continually restocked by photographic information, that terrible things happen” (2003, p. 13). In a similar vein, Hirsch attributes the importance of photographic images shaping “our conception of the event and its transmission” and gaining symbolic status to them being both indexical and iconic in Peirce’s definition of the sign (2008, p.12).

As mentioned above, this chapter explores “the privileged status of photography as a medium of postmemory” (Hirsch, 2001, p. 223) within the framework Hirsch provided in her essay, Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory. Hirsch explains that photographs “that survive massive devastation and outlive their subjects and owners function as ghostly revenants from an irretrievably lost past world. They enable us, in the present, not only to see and to touch that past but also to try to reanimate it by undoing the finality of the photographic ‘take.’”(2008, p. 12)
Photograph 1

Photograph 1 depicts a crying woman who has short curly hair and wrinkles around her eyes. Winter of 1964 must have been cold, she is wearing a warm coat. Her hands are clasped together over her chest. Her upwards curved eyebrows and facial expression are emphasizing the intense pain, horror and sadness in her eyes. She is the main figure in the frame being taller and darker haired than people next to her. This photograph was taken on what it seems like a narrow residential street or perhaps the main square of a village, when bad news were received. All of the ten people visible in this photograph are telling a different yet similar story with their facial expressions. There is an older woman wearing a head scarf next to the crying dark-haired woman; she has on a light color patterned dress/jacket. She is grabbing the crying woman by the arm, almost hugging her from the side. Her crestfallen, gloomy eyes are looking at another direction. There is a blonde woman on the left side of the subject towards the right side of the picture. She has curly hair, a light colored wool coat and a pearl necklace on. She is hugging the subject above her waist as she is looking behind. She seems to be dressed very properly as if she is going to or coming from somewhere nice, which makes one think she does not belong in the scene. Another striking figure in the photograph is the little boy, crying and reaching out to the main subject’s hands. Another woman in the background is holding her child who is holding her mother around her neck and looking behind. The mother is crying. Crying in a way that resembles a child’s; that genuine and unsheltered. The little boy behind her is holding on to the railing, wearing a white shirt and a tie. Dressed nicely, he also does not seem like a part of the tragedy that is portrayed, and is, one can assume, related to the woman with the pearl necklace. He is looking directly at the camera, his head is tilted. There is something unsettling about his gaze,
and his calmness. Two young men in the distance look quite indifferent to what is going on in front of them; one of them is leaning on the wall, with his hands in his bell hoops, the other one is looking directly at the camera.

What is so stimulating about photograph 1 is witnessing the pain, mourning and grieving of two mothers, the hopeless cry of a child, grief and support of friends, neighbors and perhaps family members. Though it is unclear what really happened, or what exactly they are looking at, the photograph and the scene captured are still distressing. The viewer is witnessing the eyes and the faces that witnessed the incidents, similar to Alfredo Jaar’s well-known work, The Eyes of Gutete Emerita (as cited in Reinhardt, Edwards & Dugganne, 2007). The faces the viewer is looking at are traces of what they saw, what they felt (Reinhardt, Edwards & Dugganne, 2007).

Even though the focus is on the tall woman in the middle as the subject of this image, the number of people in the shot is worth noting. This mirrors the chaotic atmosphere surrounding those days. Pain is visible on every face in the frame suggesting that they were all experiencing similar piercing emotions; possibly sadness, sorrow, fear and anger. These shared feelings and experiences illustrate collectivity, feeling of being in this together, suffering as a community regardless of their class and age differences encapsulated in their dress, hairstyle etc.

The viewer also witnesses the unity and solidarity among the subjects of the photograph, sharing and feeling each other’s pain. This solidarity also symbolizes the revitalization of a Turkish Cypriot nation. The little boy is reaching out to the woman, holding her hands and crying at the same time, showing the viewer there is no age for such scarring pain, and that it is universal which makes it all the more unsettling for us to witness. It also makes one think and understand how the
younger generation of that time will remember this pain all through their lives since they experi-
enced them in their early ages, and how these experiences will leave them wounded forever.

The little boy in the background and two young men look calm, considering the scene they are
witnessing. They are just watching quietly. At the mythic level, this unresponsiveness mirrors the
silence people had to maintain during the distressing times, as well as perhaps the nature of the
incident granted the frequency of slaughters during those years. Yet, their calmness is painfully
disconcerting.

**Photograph 2**

Photograph 2 (TRNC Public Information Office, personal communication, 10 February 2010)
was taken during the day, on a street. It shows three middle aged women running towards the
camera. The woman in the middle is middle aged, wearing black knee-high socks or boots, pat-
terned skirt, and a black sweater. She is holding a child in her arms, as such his waist and legs on
her side. Light is shining behind her flowy hair in the wind, her mouth is open and her nice ear-
rings are visible. Child’s clothes are about to come off.

The woman on the left is middle aged, yet older than others. She is wearing a headscarf, urgency
on her face is striking. She is holding something that is rather obscure.

The woman on the right is not wearing a coat, which leads me to believe she left suddenly. She is
carrying something with the help of her daughter who is also running. She is looking in the direc-
tion of her daughter.
Composition of photograph 2 is very powerful in terms of contrasting colors, lighting and the positioning of the subjects. The viewer immediately sees three women, one in each vertical section; emphasized more according to Rule of thirds, a rule of dividing an image into thirds -both horizontally and vertically- and placing the points of interest in the intersections or along the lines, thus enabling the viewer of the image to interact with it more naturally -as studies have shown that when viewing images that people’s eyes usually go to one of the intersection points most naturally rather than the center of the shot ("Photography tips," 2010).

Aesthetically speaking, it is a beautiful photograph in terms of composition, the usage of the entire frame, and how well it transforms the reality of the scene. Contrasting colors of the women’s outfits mirror the difference between their personalities, and lives; these are three different women, who have their own lives, thoughts and experiences. The harmony and the pattern in these three vertical sections, however, highlight an important message on the connotative level. All three of these women are running, escaping from something. They are all carrying their children -they are saving others from a tragedy, or taking their belongings with them to remind them of their past as if they knew nothing would be the same again.

Taking all these cues into consideration, the meaning of this photograph as a whole is agonizing. Each woman has their own fears and concerns. The woman in the middle grabbed her son, held him and left. The woman on the left, on the other hand, is collaborating with her daughter to save something important from her home. Yet, they do have another important thing in common. They all ran away. They all escaped from something horrible, something undeserved: Death.
Brothers (1997) explains the conditions surrounding war photography that are similar in what they depict to photograph 3, in her book *War and Photography*:

Danger hovers at the edges of all such images; the passions they record are always the most extreme. The possibility of dying that is their subtext, for their subjects as much as the photographer, means they make urgent claims on our attention, allowing us both to feel a sense of our own mortality and to hold that sense at bay. (p. XI)

To the postmemorial viewer, the message and the third order of significance of this photographic image is clear; mothers and grandmothers telling stories of how they ran away when Greek Cypriots started attacking, scared for their lives and by the thought of their husbands, sons, daughters, and siblings being already killed somewhere. They were all frightened and they all wanted to be somewhere safe. This is a universal as well as a basic instinct; they followed that instinct. They were there on their own, guarding their own lives and their dear children’s or belongings, but they were still in it together; experiencing the same sheer panic and fear.

**Photograph 3**

Photograph 3 brings us face to face with a horrible reality: a family killed inside the bath tub which is now covered in blood stains. At first, three children can be seen lying there, dead. One of the little boys has blood running from his temple. Another boy has messy hair and striped pajamas. One side of his face is visible, he is holding the side of the tub with his hand and there are blood stains on his pajamas. Another boy is lying on top of his mother, wearing the same striped
pajamas as his brother. He is in fetal position, yet he looks peaceful. Behind him is their mother, her body is covered with dead bodies of her three children. Her exposed arm is wrapped around the smallest child in front.

Photograph 3 has a story that accompanies it which all Turkish Cypriots are familiar with. In *Image, Music, Text*, Barthes talks about texts accompanying press photographs, which is also applicable in the case of Photograph 3 and its story; he claims that “the text constitutes a parasitic message designed to connote the image, and to ‘quicken’ it with one or more second-order signifieds” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 25). He explains further:

> In other words, and this is an important historical reversal, the image no longer illustrates the words; it is now the word which, structurally, are parasitic on the image. The reversal is at a cost: in the traditional modes of illustration the image functioned as an episodic return to denotation from a principal message (the text) which was experienced as connoted since, precisely, it needed an illustration in the relationship that now holds, it is not the image which comes to elucidate or ‘realize’ the text, but the latter which comes to sublimate, patheticize or rationalize the image... (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 25)

The story is as follows:

It was year 1963, the night before Christmas. EOKA members started attacking Turkish Cypriots in the Kumsal neighborhood of Nicosia. When they entered the Irfanbey Street with automatic rifles, Muruvvet Ilhan, wife of Major Dr. Nihat Ilhan, was getting her three sons ready for bed. When she heard voices speaking in Greek, she immediately took her sons and hid in the bath tub
with them. The door broke down, and the shooting started… Soon, the bathtub was filled with the blood of three innocent little kids and their mother.

The neighborhood was under heavy attack; when press and authorities could finally enter the house a few days later, they were horrified with what they saw. A bathroom with the lights on, blood and pieces of human flesh on the ceiling… A woman, lying dead in a bathtub with two little boys lying on her chest, and one on her knees… All of them in their pajamas, which were now covered in blood..

This story as a myth helps the Turkish Cypriot postmemorial viewers grasp the third level meaning of this shot as Barthes explains that “today, the text loads the image, burdening it with a culture, a moral, an imagination […] The connotation is now experienced only as the natural resonance of the fundamental denotation constituted by the photographic analogy and we are thus confronted with a typical process of naturalization of the cultural” (as cited in Barthes & Heath, 1977, p.26).

The affect this photograph produces in the viewer is amplified with the powerful story accompanying it, and confronting the image and the horror of its reality becomes all the more disturbing.

Visibly innocent expressions on children’s faces symbolize the purity and naivety of childhood. In relation to this, the fact that they are wearing their pajamas shows they were asleep moments before the attack, and that they were unprepared and defenseless. Such merciless violence documented with a photograph makes it that much more powerful as it also inflicts emotions of pity as a response to the image.
The dead bodies are lying in a bath tub, analogous to lying in a hole or a ditch which symbolize depression or a tragic situation that is impossible to get out of. The viewer can also see that the mother is facing the wall, which means she could not stand to watch as she knew the end was approaching. Such incidences are not unheard of; nonetheless heartbreaking.

Another striking element of Photograph 3, is the vast amount of blood that can be seen in the entire shot which symbolizes violence as well as being a very strong visual stimulant which is further discussed later in this chapter.

**Photograph 4**

Photograph 4 shows military and civilians exhuming the mass graves in a village called Maratha where between 80 and 90 Turkish Cypriots had been buried alive a few days earlier (“Murataga ve Sandallar”, 1974). We can see body parts lying on the ground, UN vehicles and other military trucks in the background as well as piles of soil and body parts. Villagers are covering their mouths and noses, and watching in horror, while military personnel are supervising and digging bodies out. Two people, one military and one civilian, are reaching down and touching some body parts. The main subject is a man on the right side of the photograph. He is on his knees, holding pieces of clothing in each hand.

Upper thirds of the picture consists of a crowd of young men, looking at the dead bodies and body parts which were dug out from the mass grave. Some of them are covering their mouths
and noses, some of them trying to help the UN soldiers, some of them are just watching the massacre unravel.

In photograph 4, the viewer’s attention shifts to the subject, the man who is crying and praying towards the right side of the frame. In the closer crowd, some people are disgusted, some are scared, some are trying to help. Crowd in this photograph in its entirety symbolizes chaos, curiosity, and solidarity all at the same time. The indifferent expression on some people’s faces is portraying the fact that incidents like this, even though horrible, may have become mundane during those years and that people still tried to maintain their composure and operate effectively.

Wrinkles on his face are emphasizing and symbolizing the flow of emotions he might have experienced at the moment: sadness, stress, despair... The very moment the photograph was taken, he seems calm and rather hopeless. One can tell he does not know what to do. Then my attention, as a Turkish Cypriot who knows the story behind this photograph, goes to the pieces of clothing he is holding in each hand, right above his knees. This confirms my initial observation. In such moment of unprecedented agony, he does not know what to do. He is sure his family is in the grave; he identified them, found their clothes, traces... And fell into that big black emptiness of sorrow, anger, and disappointment. The angle this photograph was taken also carries significance as Kress and van Leeuwen argue that “a high angle depicts a relationship in which the producer of the image and the viewer have symbolic power over the person or thing represented” (as cited in Chandler, 2000, Angle of view, para. 6). This points to the subject’s apparent misery and pity felt towards him by the photographer/viewers.
What makes this photograph so powerful is an element that was missing from the previous photographs. In this shot, the viewer is not only looking at what happened but also its aftermath. This brings to mind the opening image at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. Regarding that image, Hirsch (2001) asserts that it “places the viewer in the position of the unbelieving onlooker or retrospective witness, who confronts the contemporary witnesses and sees both them in the act of looking and what they saw”. Photograph 4 does exactly the same, it confronts the viewer.

Knowledge of historical context is also a rather crucial part of reading this particular photograph as mentioned above. The viewer sees a pile of dead bodies and remains on the ground. *Why are they there? What happened exactly? What lead to this incident?* Hundreds of innocent people were thrown into massive holes and buried alive one night, and the few survivors who happened to be away from their villages that day came back to find their whole family buried under tons of soil, in mass graves. This previous knowledge of the postmemorial viewers regarding the Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda Massacre of 1974 answers these questions and, together with the image, contributes to the “process of naturalization of the cultural” (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 26).

**Photograph 5**

Photograph 5 is simply of a dead body from the waist up. Sontag (2002) asserts that “because an image produced with a camera is, literally, a trace of something brought before the lens, photographs had an advantage over any painting as a memento of the vanished past and the dear departed” (p. 6). The dead body portrayed belongs to a young to middle aged man, naked, lying on
a pile of what looks like his clothes. There is blood coming out of his nose. This explicit image
gets more disturbing as the viewer focuses on the subject’s neck; the photograph is in grayscale
like the others, but the concentration of black tones where his neck meets his chest looks like he
had been shot from there, and there are blood stains all over his chest. The subject’s head is tilted
to the left, so is the camera’s angle.

Barthes (1981) identifies two important concepts/elements in photographs: *studium* and *punctum*.
He describes *studium* as his general interest in a photograph and “of the order of liking”: “The
*studium* is that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interest, of inconsequential
taste” (p. 27). *Punctum*, on the other hand, is what disturbs the *studium*: “it is this element which
rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (Barthes, 1981, p. 26)

I can see his torso and head, he is naked; and lying on his clothes. This tells me he was tortured
before he was killed. His eyes are still open - this is what pricks and upsets me, this is the *punc-
tum*. It symbolizes that he still had things to do in life, maybe a family to go back to and his life
was taken away from him suddenly (Barthes, 1981, p. 27).

**Photograph 6**

In Photograph 6, four dead men are lying on the ground. The first man from the left is seen in
more detail as the photographer used a diagonal-angle for this shot. The fourth man is barely
visible. The open skulls, and blood are defining elements of the photograph. The first man is
wearing a grey blazer and a white shirt. His left arm is bent over his chest. He looks like as if he
is about to say something. And even smiling a little bit. The second man looks very young. The big scar on his head is daunting. The third man has his right arm up, and there is a stream of blood coming from his mouth.

There is a lot of texture in this shot. We see, blood, the stains on the floor and the dirt on the men’s clothes, suggesting that they have been either hiding somewhere or maybe beat down and thrown on the floor, implying that it was not an easy death, if there is ever such a thing as easy death. Zelizer (2001) argued that atrocity photos from the Holocaust “displayed a marked preference for group or collective shots over pictures of the individual” (p. 252), along with photos 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is also the case in this photograph enabling the generalization of a number of incidents to a broader scope to depict the violence Turkish Cypriots were subject to.

**Patterns**

A strong pattern that can be observed in photographs 3, 4, 5, and 6 is that they portray sheer terror. They all present hard, concrete evidence of the atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriots and the toll these incidents have taken on Turkish Cypriots. These images make it much more harder to disregard the violence and the hostilities that transpired between the two communities, as Barthes would say, they have "evidential force" (1981, p. 36).

The aforementioned photographs bring Goya’s images that Sontag discussed to mind. The series from the early 19th century, titled Los Desastres de la Guerra (2003, p. 44), “depict the atrocities perpetrated by Napoleon’s soldiers who invaded Spain in 1808 to stop the insurrection against
French rule move the viewer close to the horror” (p. 44). These print series do not feature the “trappings of the spectacular” in that the landscape is “an atmosphere”, not detailed, not emphasized; and the series is “not a narrative: each image captioned with a brief phrase lamenting the wickedness of the invaders and the monstrousness of the suffering they inflicted, stands independently of the others” (p. 44). Sontag finds the combined effect to be heartbreaking, yet mentions that this is the effect photographs which are depicting the cruelties and in the disasters of war and conflict are supposed to have; they “are meant to awaken, shock, wound the viewer” (p. 45). Sontag also believes that Goya’s print series take this to another level and introduce a new standard for responsiveness to suffering where “the account of war’s cruelties is fashioned as an assault on the sensibility of the viewer” (p. 45). The photographs communicate with us as if they are (or the artist is) asking “Can you bear to look at this?” (p. 45). Without a doubt, photographs 3, 4, 5, 6 bring out the same kind of response, they invite us to be “either spectators or cowards unable to look” (p. 42). Sontag discusses this further:

Those with the stomach to look are playing a role authorized by many glorious depictions of suffering. Torment, a canonical subject in art, is often represented in painting as a spectacle, something being watched (or ignored) by other people. The implication is: no, it cannot be stopped -and the mingling of inattentive with attentive onlookers underscores this. (2003, p. 42)

Not only do these photographs of real horror and death cause disturbance and shock, they also cause shame. Sontag (2003) suggests that “perhaps the only people with the right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order are those who could do something to alleviate it, or those who could learn from it” (p. 42).
Such emotions and responses are unarguably strong in that they overwhelm the postmemorial viewer. For Turkish Cypriots who experienced the interethnic war, they not only trigger such emotions but also awaken, and help create the memories regarding these very incidents or incidents alike, as well as reaffirming the roots of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Photographs 5 and 6 were featured in multiple newspapers -both local and international-, a few days apart as well as being included in the history textbooks, posters and flyers, like the rest of the photographs discussed. Together with photograph 3, what makes them different from the rest of the series is the fact that there is no intended composition, symbolic meaning or a message. They are all simply photographs of Turkish Cypriots who were killed by Greek Cypriots. Yet, they do carry significance, in that they serve as sobering reminders of the violence that happened, and the mercilessness of the “enemy”. The fact that dead bodies of Turkish Cypriots were exposed in the newspapers during the turmoil -and in various outlets over the years- inflicted anxiety among Turkish Cypriots through the uneasy thought of “this could be me, or someone from my family”.

The simplistic compositions of these two photographs, no attention to aesthetics or surrounding, makes the focus solely the dead bodies. The viewer is taken out of context; he does not have any information about what happened because we are not able to see the attacker, the setting. What is visible, however, is the results of violent ethnic conflict. The toll it is taking on innocent people is portrayed in its most naked form; dead bodies of young Turkish Cypriot men, leaving us faced with this horrible reality. The lack of artistic styling, attention to lighting and composition, and the fact that there is nothing aesthetically pleasing about these photographs, in fact help their validation and authenticity, according to Sontag (2003, p. 27). She wrote that “for the photogra-
phy of atrocity, people want the weight of witnessing without the taint of artistry, which is equate
with insincerity or mere contrivance” (p. 27). Such pictures of “hellish events”, Sontag explains,
-the ones that are not “‘properly’ lighted and composed, because the photographer either is an
amateur or-just as serviceable- are thought to be less manipulative-all widely distributed images
of suffering now stand under that suspicion and less likely to arouse facile compassion or identi-

corpse inflicting abjection: “The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost
of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject.” (p. 4). Photos 3, 4, 5 and 6 all feature dead bodies:
corpses. According to Kristeva (1982), when confronted with images of dead bodies, the border
between life and death are blurred for the viewer as they are faced with the possibility of their
own death:

A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not *signify*
death. In the presence of signified death—a flat encephalograph, for instance—I
would understand, react, or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or masks, re-
fuse and corpses *show me* what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body
fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the
part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. (p. 3)

Another pattern we see is blood which is explicitly visible in photographs 3, 5 and 6. Blood is
disturbing, it draws attention and locks us in. It lingers, it haunts. It leaves a mark on our memo-
ries. It evokes feelings of shock, horror, nausea, and uneasiness. Sontag (2003) mentions that
now we can witness these sights of horror in our own homes, and adds, “information about what is happening elsewhere, i.e. ‘news’, features conflict and violence” (p. 18). This has been true for the atrocities in Cyprus, the press has never been shy about exhibiting such photographs. Sontag argues that “‘if it bleeds, it leads’ runs the venerable guideline of tabloids and twenty-four-hour headline news shows -to which the response is compassion, or indignation, or titillation, or approval, as each misery heaves into view” (p.18). In line with Sontag’s point, photographs like 3, 5, 6 that exhibit horror and terror in their simplest and most disturbing ways, -with blood and dead bodies- have been successful in getting people’s attention and causing strong response.

A pattern that is obvious in photographs 1, 2 and 4 is that they all inflict pain in the viewer. Again, we are not the ones going through the same things, or suffering ourselves, yet we do witness the pain and suffering of others. We are drawn into affect by the act of bearing witness (Zelizer, 2001). We, as the viewer, become a part of the tragedy, we are no longer outsiders to the emotional scene that is portrayed.

In photograph 1, the viewers are looking at women and children who are crying and hugging each other. Maybe they had just found out their husbands, fathers or brothers were killed in a far away village, maybe they were killed in front of their eyes, maybe the dead bodies were piled up in the town center, and they were looking at their dead bodies as the moment was captured. Yet, one thing we know for sure is that they are going through intense pain. Similarly, in photograph 4, the pain and suffering of a father that survived the mass murder but lost his whole family to it is visible, and so are the remains of the family. This is, in every respect, devastating.
Also worth discussing is the portrayal of women in the photographs. There are considerable parallels between the images of atrocities analyzed here and photos from the Holocaust both in their impacts on the postmemorial viewers and the ways in which they are used as a “representational strategy” (Zelizer, 2001, p. 256). While discussing “woman as symbols of atrocity story,” Zelizer (2001) observed that “the need to universalize the depictions of those same photos and use them as broad symbols of atrocity made particular sense when it came to women, whose supposed fragility made the atrocious seem that much more so” (p. 254). This strategy is also visible in the photos and stories of interethnic atrocities that took place in Cyprus: “they even attacked to women and children” is a line often used while talking about the war. In photographs 1, 2 and 3 the stereotypes of women as vulnerable, nurturing and domesticated are maintained in the same way as Zelizer describes the “overgendering of women in the atrocity photos” from the Holocaust (2001, p. 256).

Grieving and crying over the lost ones are the heartbreaking main occurrences in both Photographs 1 and 4. In relation to this, stages of mourning are discussed by Anastasiou (2006) also drawing from Bowlby and Parkers:

When encountering traumatic pain resulting from loss, there are three stages of mourning. The first stage is denial, “the unwillingness to face the fact that a loved one has died. The second stage is anger, derived from the yearning of the bereaved to retrieve the dead. And the third stage is acceptance, entailing the growth and psychological reconstitution of the bereaved person through which the image of the deceased is no longer an unrealistic preoccupation”. (as cited in Anastasiou, 2006, p. 135)
In both photographs, Turkish Cypriot viewers can witness the first and second stages where they are having difficulty facing the horrible truth, but at the same time anger is visible. Both photographs leave the viewer thinking what happened after the photograph was taken and perhaps how they transitioned to stage three.

There are parallels between photographs 1, 2, and 4 and the picture of the chief of the south Vietnamese National Police, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, shooting a vietcong suspect in a street in Saigon, taken by Eddie Adams in February 1968 (Sontag, 2003, p. 59). This iconic photograph shows the precise moment the bullet has been fired; “the dead man, grimacing, has not started to fall. As for the viewer, this viewer, even many years after the picture was taken . . . Well, one can gaze at these faces for a long time and not come to the end of the mystery, and the indecency, of such co-spectatorship” (Sontag, 2003, p. 60). Likewise, in photographs 1, 2, and 4, we, the viewers, are puzzled by the frontal gaze of the subjects.

The pattern of showing dead bodies, identified photographs 3, 4, 5 and 6, symbolizes in justice in that those deceased people were all civilians who had been murdered violently when they were not able to defend themselves. In relation to this, Delanty and O'Mahony (2002) make an important point that “a sense of grievance or an injustice can transform the self identity of the ‘we’ into an exclusive preoccupation with the other who is made responsible for the fate of the ‘we’” (p. 166). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, historical narratives were constructed differently in Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and the rather new-found Turkish Cypriot nationalism centered on the fear of other; other being Greek Cypriots, the enemy. In this regard, patterns of fear, pain and despair observed in the imagery Turkish Cypriots are subject to, completely comply with the Turkish Cypriot “history” in that they depict Turkish Cypriots as victims, and document
the violence committed against them and the clash of two communities in the island. Now, it is important to remember that this argument had been used to justify the partition and arguably feeds the propaganda for the continuance of division on the island. In addition, as Sontag (2002) argued, the constant exposure to footage/images about conflict is crucial in positioning “conflict in the consciousness of the viewers”, thereby such photographs carry significance in shaping the idea of war in the minds of those who did not experience war, i.e. postmemorial viewers (p.6).

Keeping in mind that the memories of Turkish Cypriots, whether they be first generation or second generation- are already energized with cues reminding them not to trust Greek Cypriots and to hold on to their “Turkish” Cypriot identities, are once again refueled with such photographs insofar as they highlight the unjust attacks, loss of life, violence, brutality thus inflicting fear and possibly crystallizing the argument that Greek Cypriots are untrustworthy.

Pain, as another significant overarching theme and message of the photographs analyzed, also ties into the construction of national identity in the Turkish Cypriot community. Such emotions Turkish Cypriot viewers experience are definitely not equivalent to what just any viewer might experience. Anastasiou (2008) discusses this issue in his book *The Broken Olive Branch*:

> In a nationalist culture, the individual who has suffered from the violence of ethnнационаl conflict is indirectly involved not to deal with his or her pain as a uniquely human and personal affair, but rather to treat it through the polarized stereotypes of collective narcissism. In this sense, nationalism implies that the pain resulting from ethnic conflict belongs not primarily to the real suffering individuals but to the nation. (p. 136)
This is in parallel to how individual memories take on a different meaning when put located within a group and become constituents of collective memory. On this, Halbwachs argued that

We cannot properly understand their relative strength and the ways in which they combine within individual thought unless we connect the individual to the various groups of which he is simultaneously a member. (As cited in Coser, 1992, p. 53)

Anastasiou (2008) emphasizes a clear point that “the nationalist mind needs to deal with pain one way or another during and after unavoidable prevalence of adversity at a time of inter-communal, violent conflict” (p. 136). But, Anastasiou continues, “it only does so in ways that are fundamentally self-serving, as nationalism transforms the pain from the distinctively human dimension of a tragedy to an extraordinary and powerful national asset” (p.136). Thus, pain of a citizen regarding loss of loved ones as a result of the violent conflict is regarded as a nation’s collective suffering and is used as a tool for construction of national identity and imposing nationalistic ideologies.

Effects of the Photographs on Collective Memory and Postmemory

Photographs are powerful in communicating traumatic experiences and messages across generations. Explaining such notable abject of war photographs, Brothers (1997) wrote: “The forcefulness of their messages makes them unlike any other genre of image, the power of their desire to communicate impelling them towards representations that touch us more deeply and more directly” (p. XI). Much like the photographs from Holocaust, details in the atrocity photos from
Cyprus interethnic/intercommunal violence were “generalized so as to accommodate a broader atrocity story. In a wide range of practices, both compositional and presentational, the photos were turned into iconic representations of atrocity” (Zelizer, 2001, p. 254).

According to Bennett (1988), photographs “can communicate an emotional or bodily experience by evoking the viewer’s own emotional and bodily memories. They produce affect in the viewer, speaking from the body’s sensations, rather than speaking of, or representing the past.” (as cited in Hirsch, 2001, p. 225). Thus, as Hirsch (2001) argues, “this connection between photography and bodily or sense memory can perhaps account for the power of photographs to connect first- and second- generation subjects in an unsettling mutuality that crosses the gap of genocidal destruction” (p. 225).

According to Sontag (2003), “the familiarity of certain photographs builds our sense of the present and immediate past; they lay down routes of reference, and serve as totems of causes: sentiment is more likely to crystallize around a photograph than around a verbal slogan” (p. 85). And in relation to what Hirsch calls postmemory, Sontag argues that “photographs help construct -and revise- our sense of a more distant past with the posthumous shocks engineered by the circulation of hitherto unknown photographs” (2003, p. 85). Sontag also wrote that: “Photographs that everyone recognizes are now a constituent part of what a society chooses to think about” (ibid.) which points to the reframing and materialization of collective/cultural memory and postmemory.

Hirsch (2001) asserts that inconsistent responses occur simultaneously when confronted with the atrocity photos repeatedly: “a warding away of traumatic significance and an opening out to it, a
defending against traumatic affect and a producing of it” (p. 238). In her book *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Sontag (2003) offers an interesting insight on the repetitions of photographs denying the traumatic affect:

> “Photographs shock insofar as they show something novel… Once one has seen such images, one has started down the road of seeing more-and more. Images transfix. Images anesthetize… At the time of the first photographs of the Nazi camps, there was nothing banal about these images. After these years, a saturation point may have been reached” (p. 21).

Sontag (2003) emphasizes this point yet again. She asks “does shock have limits?” and argues that shock can become familiar; “shock can wear off. Even if it doesn’t, one cannot look. People have means to defend themselves against what is upsetting. As one can become habituated to horror in real life, one can become habituated to the horror of certain images” (p. 82). She gives the example of representations of crucifixion as to how it does not become banal to believers, if they really are believers (p. 82). In the case of Cyprus, where the usage of the same few images repeatedly and iconically to signal the incidents that took place between 1963 and 1974 is still definitely remarkable, repetition of these upsetting photographs may become banal depending on the context, however they never lose their value due to the large amount of emotions, narratives, and attitudes loaded into them, and the memories of Turkish Cypriots -both first and second generation. “Pathos” touches Turkish Cypriots, for it was not so long ago and for it was so close to home. Specifically on photographs of suffering that are repeated, Sontag herself wrote “…..on the contrary. They weep, in part because they have seen it many times. People want to weep. Pathos, in the form of narrative, does not wear out” (p. 83).
The underlying messages in these photographs not only substantiate the argument and narratives justifying division, but also put the blame on Greek Cypriots solely. According to Volkan, “in establishing the image of the enemy as the sole cause of all pain and suffering, nationalism consolidates protective psychological boundaries of group identity and cohesion, offering solace to the vulnerable individual” (as cited in Anastasiou, 2006, p. 134). This, unarguably, lightens the burden of pain that is resting on the shoulders of Turkish Cypriots, yet leaving them untrusting of Greek Cypriots.

In conclusion, the powerful images analyzed in this chapter have the ability to wound, hurt, shock, disturb, anger, and distress the viewer. Especially when the mythological level of meaning is grasped, which is possible by the previous knowledge, memories, and myths, the feelings and emotions that these photographs communicate haunt the postmemorial viewer, thus constituting memories pertaining to this trauma in their own right.

According to Hirsch (2001), “even as the images repeat the trauma of looking, they disable, in themselves, any restorative attempts. It is only when they are redeployed, in new texts and new contexts, that they regain a capacity to enable a postmemorial working through” (p. 238). Although this remark is irrevocably accurate, it is also dependent on time and various circumstances. As a result of the education practices and wide circulation of these images as a part of the nationalist agenda, postmemorial viewers were exposed to these atrocity photos and accompanying myths and narratives from a considerably early age -elementary school. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the trauma was transmitted and even restored in the young postmemorial viewers. The possibility of reunification and border re-openings in the early 2000s, however, transformed the political climate and the public opinion about Greek Cypriots shifted towards a
more amiable attitude. Together with this, the circulation of the images decreased (yet never stopped) as government policies were adjusted for a more pro-peace approach towards the Cyprus Conflict and Greek Cypriots. As the isolation from the South practically ended, new friendships formed and old friendships restored between communities, second generation became desensitized to such photographs. In light of this more positive and optimistic new national consciousness forming through this time period, dissemination of the photographs were often perceived as propaganda and, presumably, the postmemorial viewers are gradually becoming desensitized to a certain extent. The implications of this effect are discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion

As I have argued, the iconic photographs that have become powerful and instrumental Turkish Cypriot national symbols have played a critical role in transmission of the first generation's memories of trauma to the second generation. Fear, pain, despair, violence, injustice and suffering describe the period of violent conflict in Cyprus. Within the Turkish Cypriot community, these emotions and concepts are usually associated with the time period between 1963 and 1974 when many Turkish Cypriots were massacred. Notions of collective memory and “postmemory” derive from the remembrance and transmission of cultural trauma or traumatic memories across generations (Hirsch, 2001), and as I have argued, these memories, the national myths they sustain, and their contribution to the construction of insecurity towards the “other” have been crucial in maintaining the mental and physical separation of the two communities in Cyprus.

Photographs 3, 4, 5, and 6 all depict terror and serve as evidence to the violence committed by the Greek Cypriots and its results, making it almost impossible to disregard the hostilities between the two communities in Cyprus. With the exception of photograph 4, these photographs also display blood which is unquestionably disturbing, shocking and nauseating. Granted these photographs do not have any particularly artistically appealing visual elements such as composition, landscape, lighting, etc., they portray horror and terror in their simplest ways which has been a powerful tool for getting people’s attention and causing strong response as well as awakening, shocking, and wounding the viewer (Sontag, 2003, p. 45).

Photographs 1, 2 and 4 inflict pain in the viewer in the sense that even though the viewer is not the one going through the same things, or suffering herself, she becomes a part of the tragedy by witnessing the pain and suffering of others. By looking at these photographs, the viewers trans-
form from just viewers into witnesses and insiders, thus conceivably going under the emotional burden that is carried within those roles. The painful themes and messages of these photographs trigger the memories of traumatic past that is already a big part of collective memory and “post-memory” in the Turkish Cypriot community.

The photographs that feature dead bodies of civilians, who had been murdered violently when they were not able to defend themselves, or women and children crying or running away in fear symbolize injustice and cruelty, have the ability to create feelings of pain, anger, grievance, and sorrow in the viewer. The dichotomy of us and them in the Turkish Cypriot community, specifically the constructions of the other as the enemy and the ones to be blamed for our misery, is in the heart of nationalist ideology in Northern Cyprus. The demonstrated patterns of fear, pain and despair in the imagery that Turkish Cypriots are repetitiously exposed to, go along with the Turkish Cypriot constructed historical narrative, in which Turkish Cypriots are portrayed as victims, and violence committed against them and the clash of two communities in the island are focused on. This argument has been used to justify the partition and still contributes the propaganda for the continuance of division on the island; moreover, they go completely against the Greek Cypriot “history” and narrative of “peaceful coexistence”.

Through photographs or other cultural productions, the memories of Turkish Cypriots, whether they are first generation or second generation- which are already noticeably energized with cues possibly reminding them not to trust Greek Cypriots and to hold on to their “Turkish” Cypriot identities, are once again refueled insofar as the photographs highlight the unjust attacks, loss of life, violence, brutality. As I have claimed, this, in return, has had the possibility to lead to the crystallization of the notion that Greek Cypriots are untrustworthy.
In other words, the denotations of the signs, in this case photographs, are often the same for all viewers whereas connotation varies depending on factors such as ethnicity, age, etc. Granted the third level meaning is a combination of the first two levels of meaning, i.e. denotation and connotation, not everyone will grasp this level of meaning in the same way, and the myths or ideologies produced at the end will not be the same (Chandler, 2008). These photographs whose third level meanings and third level significances are unraveled with the help of Turkish Cypriot national myths and collective memory, also serve to sustain these myths which focus on the atrocities.

North Cyprus national myths have also been based on fear of the other -the Greek Cypriots- depicting “them” as bloodthirsty barbars and “us” as the victims, as well as on division conveying the message that it is only safe and secure to live apart. Thus, the perpetuation of these myths through exposure to photographs analyzed in this thesis and those that are similarly powerful and prevalent, contributes to the construction and solidification of insecurity toward Greek Cypriot community and the emphasis on the security dilemma.

Consequently, the division was sustained. As Calame and Charlesworth (2009) argue:

The typical divided city remains divided as long as the insecurities that led to intergroup violence remain. Though physical partitions generate new problems and intensify interethnic rivalries in their own right, their removal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation of more favorable and equitable social conditions in the urban framework. (p. 226)
As I have argued, negative convictions and insecurity towards Greek Cypriots, constructed with the help of memories of suffering and pain, have been an important part of the physically and mentally separated communities on the island. The Cyprus conflict rooted from two opposing ideologies and movements, Enosis and Taksim, as well as the security dilemma that they brought along. The violence is over and the border has been maintained by the UNFCYP since 1964, leaving Republic of Cyprus on the south and the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north with almost completely homogenous populations. The role security dilemma has played ever since the 1950s as a sustainer of the conflict has been undeniably substantial.

According to Lindley (2007),

in cases like Cyprus, where security dilemma plays an important role in the ethnic conflict, one of its biggest implications is the changes in ethnic demography. If there is an insecurity towards the other community, and attacking is easier in inter-mixed communities, then it is reasonable to expect those who are most vulnerable to try to get away from their adversaries, to concentrate themselves, and to reduce the amount of intermixing. (p. 231)

According to the statistics presented by Lindley (2007), the number of mixed villages was substantial at 43% when the British arrived; however, the number of mixed villages shrank over time, while the Greek Cypriot villages grew. Lindley (2007) suggests that “these trends accelerated as hostilities increased, especially during the interval from 1960 to 1970, and the Turkish Cypriots become more concentrated” (p. 231). Hence, it can be deduced from these statistics that
living within their own ethnic community was deemed safer than living in intermixed villages with a constant threat from the “out-group”.

“Another form of near perpetual insecurity in Cyprus stems from the story of the coup leading to threat of Enosis and triggering the Turkish invasion” (Lindley, 2007); in that the “Turkish Cypriot minority fears the Greek Cypriot majority, while the Greek Cypriots fear nearby Turkey” (p. 233) and the large number of Turkish troops deployed in Northern Cyprus. Thus, considering all the factors discussed above, the insecurity towards Greek Cypriots and the security dilemma suggest that division could be a safer choice or that the border could be a necessary tool for safety and protection of Turkish Cypriots.

Since understanding the meaning behind these photographs also serve to reshape postmemory and to perpetuate and create myths, the national myths -which are instrumental in decoding the photographs- help construct or strengthen the insecurity towards Greek Cypriots as they are based on atrocities, fear and division. Furthermore, since the security dilemma is already a fundamental issue within the scope of Cyprus Conflict as discussed previously, constant reiterations of national myths or national symbols, that support or bring out the arguments that essentialize the border, has had the ability to contribute to the firmness of the psychological border.

I have found through my analysis that the “othering” process is still prevalent in Cyprus and it has more important and practical implications than often considered. Furthermore, my findings suggest that through repetition, these photographs which have become iconic imagery for Turkish Cypriots, had a retraumatizing effect when national identity construction and nation-building were at their prime between late 20th century and early 21st century. Through repetition of these
photographs, along with other national myths and symbols, trauma of the first generation were transmitted to the second generation, guiding the structure of postmemory, therefore maintaining the physical and mental border between the communities.

The frequent use of traumatic and provocative imagery which are capable of influencing people’s attitudes -through resurfacing of memories -toward the other community poses indirect boundaries between the two communities and hamper the reunification talks. These findings can be useful in other conflict countries, since the same practices are adopted. In a broader sense, this thesis suggests that the conflict and the status quo have shaped collective memory and Turkish Cypriot consciousness. It also suggests that disturbing iconic images have a huge impact on child/youth education; and that “maligning” or “victimizing national myths” can be immensely powerful, and certainly have the ability to create a lens through which an individual and consequently the collective are perceiving, interpreting, remembering, forgetting and reframing things.

It is worthwhile to mention that the perceptions of the border and division are ever-changing as is the political situation. As Dikomitis (2005) wrote, the border has now become something that can be negotiated and manipulated. The reason for this is the recent changes in the status quo: The UN made a big effort to get both sides to agree a peace settlement, consisting of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, before Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004. In this referendum (on 24 April 2004), the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor, the Greek Cypriots voted against it. After a two-year hiatus, the peace talk process resumed and have been going on since. The Presidential Elections in Northern Cyprus, which were held on 19 April 2010, has the possibility to affect the process negatively as the new president is not in favor of a reunited, federation of Cyprus. The opening of the border in April, 2003 has led to 19 million border crossings until the
end of 2008, and has certainly influenced the perceptions of the “other”, the border and the possibility of reunification within both communities (Ernur, 2009).

The border crossings gave a face to the other especially for the younger generations who have always lived in separate communities until the gates opened. In addition, they significantly intensified and strengthened the bicomunal peacebuilding efforts which aim to inform and empower the Cypriot youth as well as advancing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot coexistence, trust and understanding between the communities. As people started visiting their old villages and houses and reunited with some of their friends from the other community, their memories of friendly interactions and relationships which were, for the most part, overshadowed with memories and myths of atrocities, appear to have resurfaced to some extent and influenced their opinions and feelings toward more positive which can only be observed and studied in the future.

Because of the political gains, international recognition and numerable other rights and authorities that would come with European Union membership, majority of Turkish Cypriots approached the idea of reunification positively, which explains why Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of Annan Plan in the referendum that took place in April 2004. In sum, with the possibility of reunification, border has gained another meaning which is strictly political and economical, and it would benefit Northern Cyprus largely if the conflict was resolved.

In addition, Turkey’s current Government has been imposing spending cuts along with other policies that deem unacceptable in the Turkish Cypriot community therefore causing a backlash against Turkey in Northern Cyprus. The reactions to the “austerity packages” were reflected in government worker strikes and later, large demonstrations and protests (on January 29th, March
2nd, and April 7th 2011) organized by unions, opposition parties and attended by thousands of Turkish Cypriots. With these demonstrations, strikes and events organized around this issue, coupled with the recent Turkish Cypriot as well as bicomunal anti-militarist demonstrations and concerts demanding a demilitarized Nicosia i.e Turkish Army to get out of Cyprus, a strong movement against Turkish political currents and in favor of self-governance has emerged.

This backlash not only indicates the shift in public opinion but also adds fuel to it. An agreement still has not been reached in the negotiations for reunification, causing disappointment and frustration in the politicians, and losing hope for the future of Cyprus. More importantly, Turkish Cypriots who became/were encouraged to be economically dependent on Turkey are no longer silent: built up frustration against the status quo, i.e. remaining unrecognized citizens of an unrecognized republic, and pressure from Turkey on various matters is becoming more and more apparent. This new uprising against what is widely perceived as attempts to eliminate the will of Turkish Cypriots and practically assimilate them into the people of Turkey, is proving to be reaffirming the Turkish Cypriots’ commitment to Cyprus and presumably to the idea of reunification.

These sentiments appear to be reflecting back onto the narratives and visual images of atrocities in a different light, in that they illustrate the pain and suffering that was endured to protect their integrity, therefore reminding Turkish Cypriots to keep fighting for their rights (in this context, against Turkey).

As new political and social circumstances emerge, the usage of photographic images and the intensity of their distribution are also likely to change. Undeniably, new meanings and interpretations, and consequently different impact on postmemory as well as the society in general will
come forth within different contexts. Since this work encompasses the time period between the set up of the border and the re-opening of it, the changes in the political climate and the photographs’ implications on collective/cultural memory and postmemory of the younger generations after 2003 deserve attention for future research. The main motivation for pursuing this study was the lack of research on the psychosocial aspects of the Cyprus Conflict which are as important as the political aspect. More specifically, the studies that in fact address these issues usually focus on one of the communities, thus not enabling comparisons or a broader sense of the situation on the island. In that regard, it would be useful to look extensively into how the border is perceived by both communities and the effects of the pain and terror depicted on photographs in the Greek Cypriot community. In addition, since diaspora nationalism varies from the mainland nationalism, looking into the impacts of iconic imagery, as well as, other cultural/ethnic artifacts on the collective memory and postmemory of Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the UK, Australia, and Turkey would provide a good insight on constructions of negative convictions of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot nationalism that perpetuates the divided state of the island. Furthermore, this study could be expanded to include the notions of gender that were reinforced with iconic imagery and narratives of war and the gendered construction of nationalism and division could be explored. While this thesis could be applicable to other conflict regions in understanding the constructions of nationalism in younger generations, future research can be done to produce a comparative study of different communities in conflict.
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