ARMED ACTORS IN CIVIL RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

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ABSTRACT

The consensus in the civil resistance literature is that the use of violence undermines nonviolent campaigns’ ability to achieve their stated goals. But given the diversity of armed actors that could have an impact on nonviolent movements, there is reason to believe that they do not have a uniform effect on campaign outcome. The primary aim of this paper is to make the theoretical and conceptual advancements necessary to study of the impact of contemporaneous violent elements on the outcome of maximalist nonviolent campaigns. I outline six causal mechanisms that link nonviolent action to success and argue that the impact on campaign outcome is contingent upon the type of violent actor. Three factors that define the nature of violent actors, namely their goals (whether they are maximalist or reformist), tactics (whether they are indiscriminate or not) and affiliation to the nonviolent campaign, emerge as particularly important in leveraging our understanding of violence and nonviolent campaign outcome. I develop and test this typology of violent actors in five cases of maximalist nonviolent campaigns: East Germany 1989, Kosovo 1989-1999, Belarus 1989, Yugoslavia 2000 and Belarus 2006.
For my husband Luis Felipe and parents Patricia and José, with all my love. To Autumn Amat Elliott, in the hopes that she will see a world with less violence and more peace.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In their seminal work on major nonviolent and violent social movements, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan found that maximalist nonviolent campaigns are more than twice as effective as violent ones in achieving their stated goals.\(^1\) To explain their findings, the authors argue that civil resistance is more effective\(^2\) than violent insurgencies because the former attracts mass civilian participation from different sectors of society, makes it more difficult for the regime to justify repression against protesters, and is much more likely to make crackdowns backfire against the target regime. Nonviolent action\(^3\) often leads to defections of government armed forces, the police and civilian officials, international sympathy for the cause and international sanctions against the target regime, and ultimately, to the weakening of the target state. These mechanisms hinge on the ability of the movement to remain nonviolent.

It is also the case that most maximalist nonviolent campaigns do not maintain absolute nonviolent discipline. Thus, how can nonviolent campaigns prevail for the reasons outlined above despite the prevalence of the use of violence? In order to answer this question—which has

\(^1\) In their paper, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” Chenoweth and Stephan (2008a) define maximalist campaigns (also called major campaigns) as “a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective ... [and with a] discernible leadership.” They are also 1) “primarily nonviolent” or “primarily violent,” which is “based on the primacy of the methods employed,” and 2) have maximalist goals, such as regime change, secession or independence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008a, 16; 2008b). The Nonviolent And Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset (2008c) is a compilation of aggregate data on all the major nonviolent campaigns as defined above from 1900 to 2006. There are 105 such campaigns in the dataset. I will be using this definition of nonviolent campaign and their dataset to do case selection.

\(^2\) Success and effectiveness are defined by the attainment of the campaign’s stated goals. For more on the definition of the dependent variable (outcome), see section II. Methodology.

\(^3\) Nonviolent action is a “general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence. Such actions may be conducted by (a) acts of omission—that is, the participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; (b) acts of commission—that is, the participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both.” The methods fall in three general categories: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. (Sharp 2006, 547)
not been submitted to systematic empirical scrutiny thus far— it is first necessary to characterize the phenomenon of violence in nonviolent campaigns, as well as to specify the relationship between the violent actor(s) and the nonviolent movement. The primary aim of this paper is to do just that: to make the theoretical and conceptual advancements necessary to study the impact of the use of contemporaneous violence on maximalist nonviolent campaigns. I outline six causal mechanisms that link nonviolent action to success and pose the question of how different violent actors could impact those links. The six mechanisms are: (1) the ability to generate mass mobilizations of people; (2) the ability to appeal and garner active support from different sectors of society; (3) the diversity of tactics in the nonviolent repertoire and the difficulty of undermining them through the traditional means of the state; (4) the possibility of making crackdowns less severe by posing no physical threat to the target state’s security forces; (5) the backfiring of repression; and (6) the building of parallel and decentralized institutions that make non-cooperation with the target regime less costly for participants and repression less damaging for the movement. Three factors that define the nature of violent actors, namely their goals (whether they are maximalist or reformist), tactics (whether they are indiscriminate or not) and affiliation to the nonviolent campaign, emerge as particularly important in leveraging our understanding of violence and nonviolent campaign outcome.

The affiliation variable, however, is not a structural constraint as are the goals and tactics of the violent actors: the nonviolent movement can control its level of association to the violent

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4 Erica Chenoweth and Kurt Schock are currently conducting the only systematic, empirical study on this issue of which I am aware. Schock presented this work on violent flanks and their preliminary findings in an International Center on Nonviolent Conflict/ United States Institute of Peace seminar in 2010 (Schock 2010).

5 The use of violence prior to or after the nonviolent campaign is important, but outside the scope of this paper. See Sharp 1974, 528 for a good discussion about the impact of past violent actors on nonviolent campaigns.
element, or aggressively distance itself from the armed actor if falsely accused of collaboration by the opponent. This disassociation can be easier or more difficult depending on various factors, such as the sharing of goals and the state’s ability to control all communication systems. The purpose of these definitions is to develop a typology of violent actors in nonviolent campaigns that one could ultimately use to predict their effect on campaign outcome.

While the main contribution of this paper is the conceptual understanding of violent elements in the context of nonviolent campaigns, the second major part of the essay tests these concepts in five case studies. Although it is not possible to draw generalizations from these cases, the conclusions of this paper are reflections on the empirical examination of the concepts and the iterative process between theory and cases.

What follows is a broad sketch of the civil resistance literature’s arguments for what makes nonviolent campaigns successful and what accounts for their ability to achieve their goals more often than violent campaigns. Then, a discussion about the ways in which violent actors can reverse or undermine the mechanisms that link nonviolent action and success shed light on the need to characterize the types of violent actors. An introduction to these types precedes the paper’s methodology (part III), which provides an in-depth specification to the key variables.

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II. Theory

2.1 Mechanisms that Make Nonviolent Campaigns Successful

There are six major causal mechanisms that link nonviolent action to success, and as will become apparent, they are intertwined in very complex ways. Given my focus on campaigns with maximalist goals, I assume that the state is very resistant to this change, prepared to fight, and unwilling to convert or accommodate demands.\(^7\) The first is \textit{(l) the ability to generate mass mobilizations of people} and to involve up to millions in the struggle against the state. Nonviolent action, in contrast to violent insurrections, can attract the participation of large segments of society because of the relatively low ethical and physical barriers to joining the movement.\(^8\) In comparing the two types of campaigns—the violent and nonviolent—and assuming that they have maximalist goals, taking part in civil resistance generally presents a less difficult moral problem for people than becoming part of an armed movement. In terms of more material impediments, there is a reason why the typical member of an armed insurrection is a young male. Women, children, seniors, professionals and other groups are less likely to join a violent movement for physical and psychological restraints, but they are able to participate in a peaceful movement in various capacities. Despite the fact that there are many high-risk tactics in the nonviolent repertoire—such as defying martial law in a demonstration with a low turnout or exposing oneself as a leader of a movement—there are also low-cost tactics, such as boycotting, for those who fear reprisals, are physically impaired or would otherwise not contribute to the

\(^7\) Sharp’s four mechanisms of producing change through nonviolent action are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (1973). Given the polarizing nature of maximalist demands, I outline the micro-processes that primarily occur in the last two mechanisms (nonviolent coercion and disintegration).

\(^8\) Chenoweth and Stephan (2008a) explicitly make this argument, and Chenoweth elaborated on it further in a class presentation she gave to the “Nonviolence and Civil Resistance” class at Georgetown University, via Skype, in March 2011. It is further developed in Chenoweth and Stephan 2010.
cause. In addition, armed struggles “must depend on participants who have high levels of both commitment and risk tolerance” because of the more burdensome screening, training process, among other reasons.\(^9\)

Unity and cooperation at this scale brings with it legitimacy and sympathy nationally and internationally: a cause that is courageously and nonviolently defended by hundreds of thousands of people obtains a kind of legitimacy that is difficult to attain, and especially to maintain, by armed actors. As British military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart points out, armed resistance’s “...heaviest handicap of all, and the most lasting one, [is] of a moral kind. The armed resistance movement attracted many ‘bad hats.’ It gave them license to indulge their vices and work off their grudges under the cloak of patriotism—thus giving fresh point to Dr. Johnson’s historic remark that ‘patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.’”\(^10\) Legitimacy and sympathy can translate into power when those affiliated with the target regime start questioning their allegiance due to fear of ending on the “wrong side of history” and without jobs—or worse yet, prosecuted for crimes—if and when the regime collapses. Public employees, who run the bureaucracy, as well as average citizens, can also partake in non-cooperation that ends the normal functioning of government. As Hardy Merriman conveys, “[l]egitimacy is ... a function of the degree to which people believe that an individual or an organization has the right and capability to rule,” and it is “one of the most important sources of power for a ruler or a nonviolent movement because it is often the least costly way to influence people’s obedience patterns.”\(^11\) The idea is that obedience is essentially voluntary and that consent can be withdrawn.\(^12\) Also at the national and local levels, mass participation renders nonviolent action’s methods effective: numbers make slow-

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9 Chenoweth and Stephan 2010, 256-257.
10 Hart 1968, 203.
11 Merriman 2009, 18.
downs, civil disobedience of a law, boycotts, strikes and demonstrations expensive and embarrassing for the target regime, and they lay bare the government’s inability to impose its will on the people.

Another way that discrediting the target regime can translate into power is through external pressure: the international community might decide to invest resources to protect and/or boost the civil resistance movement; impose economic and political sanctions against the target government or withdraw support in the form of revoking foreign aid, arms transfers or special trade agreements; intervene militarily; among others. The tools that foreign actors have at their disposal are varied and some of their possible effects are discussed later in this section.

The second mechanism that links nonviolent action to success is related but distinct from the first. Successful nonviolent campaigns rely not only on large, but also diverse coalitions. (2) Being able to appeal and garner active support from different sectors of society is paramount for the success of a nonviolent campaign. (3) Bringing together different groups under the same cause furthers the campaign’s legitimacy and makes it very clear that the movement is not on the fringes of society. This facilitates outreach to government insiders—through large networks, those resisting might be closely connected and have relationships with policemen, members of the armed forces, political figures, and others who they can appeal for support or at least for humane treatment. Having partners in the business community is also extremely beneficial because it opens up the options for increasing the economic costs to the target government. The other benefits that come with legitimacy outlined above apply here as well. Also, given the moral, physical and psychological burdens of violent insurrection described in the first mechanism, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to have a diverse backing than violent

13 This argument is put forth by Sharp 1973, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2008a; Stephan 2009; and others.
campaigns: “Nonviolent challenges have the potential to allow the maximum degree of active participation in the struggle by the highest proportion of the population.”\textsuperscript{14} The agents of social change in this case are not from one part of society and can include even exploited groups that are seldom part of struggles against oppression.\textsuperscript{15}

The third mechanism that explains nonviolent action’s ability to attain its goals has to do with (3) the creativity, diversity of tactics and unexpected quality of the methods, as well as the difficulty of controlling people’s actions at all times and in all places. Government security forces are trained to deal with violence and have a difficult time adapting to a very different kind of challenge. If thousands of people refuse to pay their taxes, how can a bureaucracy enforce collection without incurring unsustainable costs? How can public officials make sure that workers do not participate in slow-downs and strikes? Even demonstrations, which are easier to suppress than other methods, can overwhelm security forces if they are sufficiently large and widespread. The idea is to put a strain on the opponent’s relatively weaker points, such as its organizational handicaps, limited resources and inability to enforce cooperation. This mechanism, as are the other two, is self-reinforcing in that when the government’s weaknesses become apparent, more people join in these acts of defiance. Numbers dilute the risks of participation, even more people take part, and the government becomes less capable of imposing its will.

Rebel groups, unless they couple their activities with contentious politics,\textsuperscript{16} do not have this diversity of tactics at their disposal. In order to partake in contentious politics effectively, they would need legitimacy and the backing of the masses, which as I describe in the first

\textsuperscript{14} Schock 2005, 40.
\textsuperscript{15} Schock (2005) expressing Galtung’s ideas (Galtung 1980, 396-398).
\textsuperscript{16} Contentious collective action is “[t]he irreducible act that lies at the base of all social movements, protests, rebellions, riots, strike waves, and revolutions...” (Tarrow 2011, 7)
mechanism, is far more difficult to maintain in violent struggles. In addition, rebels challenge the state through armed struggle, a much more familiar front to most regimes. Government armed forces and police are usually better equipped and trained than rebels to fight, although guerrilla warfare is notorious for focusing on the weak side of armies and for being apt at debilitating a well-armed opponent.

The fourth causal mechanism has to do with (4) nonviolent action’s ability to make crackdowns less severe by posing no physical threat to security forces. It seems reasonable to expect that soldiers and police are more likely to use harsher measures against a violent crowd—either out of contempt, vengeance for the death or injury of a peer, or fear for their own lives—than against a non-threatening one. While nonviolent actionists often face extreme crackdowns, the thinking goes that security forces will be less concerned for self-defense and have more mercy with a nonviolent protest than they would otherwise. In cases when security forces are not receiving direct orders to fire at peaceful protesters, they may also be constrained by the inability to make self-defense or rioting justifications for using force against peaceful protesters. Given that violent repression poses great challenges for the survival of the nonviolent action campaign, reducing its intensity can help maintain morale, determination and participation levels high.

Gene Sharp refers to the fifth mechanism as political jiu-jitsu, and it is (5) a way in which

17 This could also work the other way around: state security forces may fear reprisals from armed actors and not from peaceful protesters, thus making them less likely to repress the violent elements.
18 This is of course a counterfactual and is thus very difficult to prove or disprove. In addition, there are arguments to be made for the opposite effect: soldiers may view peaceful protesters as weak and scorn their willingness to die unarmed, thus leading to worse treatment.
19 Political jiu-jitsu is one of the special processes by which nonviolent action deals with violent repression. By combining nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in the struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponent’s repression to be exposed in the worst possible light. This, in turn, may lead to shifts in opinion and then to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent group.” (Sharp 1973, 657)
a nonviolent campaign can withstand repression by making it backfire against the target government. Even if then use of nonviolent action leads to less callousness from security forces, as suggested by mechanism four, crackdowns are almost expected in these high stakes struggles. Therefore, the ability to cope with and manage violence is of utmost importance if the movement is to prevail. In response to unjustified violence against unarmed civilians, public opinion can turn against the opponent and in favor of the nonviolent campaign. The target government can lose its legitimacy in the eyes of “uncommitted parties,” “the opponent’s usual supporters,” and “the general grievance group.” As far as the first group is concerned, winning over uncommitted parties domestically and internationally is important to boost legitimacy, gain a wider audience and diversity of support, and ultimately to make nonviolent action methods more effective (see the first and second mechanisms). Public outrage is often a consequence of disproportionate uses of force, especially against peaceful activists. However, the target regime may or may not care too much about domestic or international opinion: indeed, “[h]ostile opinion may cause the opponent to try to justify his policies and measures, or to deprecate those of the nonviolent group. But world opinion on the side of the nonviolent group will by itself rarely produce a change in the opponent’s policies.” A shift in power relationships is the link between public opinion and policy changes, and that occurs when resources back a loss of legitimacy or disapproval. The international community can help change the power balance by taking some of the concrete actions outlined in the other mechanisms above, such as sanctioning or withdrawing support from the target regime, intervening with a peacekeeping, peace

21 Sharp 1973, 662.
enforcement or military operation, and/or propping up the civilian-based movement.\footnote{This is just to outline the various actions that the international community can take; however, some of these may prove detrimental to the nonviolent campaign, even if they are well intentioned and constructed to do the opposite. For example, direct international support to the movement can put local ownership into question and diminish commitment from nationals, either because locals might think that the campaign is another artifact of imperial control, or that their help is no longer needed since they have secured international resources.}{22} The second group, formed by government supporters and enablers, is at the center of power shifts.

The ultimate goal is to change the opinion and behavior of the regime’s supporters. “...[E]xtreme repression against nonviolent resisters is more likely to create opposition from within the opponents’ own group [than repression against violent resistance]. Harsh repression against nonviolent resisters may be perceived as unreasonable, distasteful, inhumane, or harmful to the opponents’ own society,” and those affiliated with the government may start questioning the repression and the cause.\footnote{Sharp 2005, 408.}{23} A change in the power dynamics occurs when public officials or members of the security forces change allegiance and defect. When the government issues orders but receives no compliance, it has lost control. The third “general grievance” group is also essential because it is from where most of the active members of the campaign will come. Having the most to gain from the campaign, they are likely to bring the most committed and passionate participants, and they are likely to become more emboldened as they see their fellow citizens sacrificing their lives for the cause. Repression can embolden and not necessarily deter the grievance group.

When it comes to shifts in international and domestic public opinion from uncommitted parties and government supporters, and eventually to changes in behavior (i.e. defections), nonviolent action is far more effective than armed resistance.\footnote{Sharp 1973, 658.}{24} To achieve their maximalist goals, rebels have to either militarily defeat the target government or provoke a stalemate where...
negotiations can take place. For it to be considered a success, however, the armed movement has to attain all its stated goals, and it is unclear whether the rebels would be able to avoid making significant concessions in a stalemate situation. In other words, stalemates and negotiations could lead to limited success much more often than to success.25

The sixth and last major mechanism linking nonviolent action to success is (6) the building sets of parallel and decentralized institutions that can run affairs for the grievance group, make non-cooperation with the target regime less costly for participants, and repression less damaging to the movement. “Partly autonomous and contextually rooted local organizations that are linked by ... leaders and followers,” which permit “coordination and aggregation and ... movements to persist without hierarchical organizations.”26 A campaign that is decentralized is more likely to be resilient in the face of repression given that there will always be groups mobilizing despite some members being in prison or killed. In addition, the creation of parallel institutions and markets can sustain campaigns during strikes, shutdowns, and particularly in cases when the oppressed group is a minority that is seeking to maintain its livelihood. Whether it is home schooling to preserve a native language or setting up sustainable economic systems of local production, parallel institutions are a creative source of civil resistance that can operate clandestinely and in an inconspicuous manner.

In essence, the six mechanisms outlined above show how nonviolent action campaigns undermine the sources of state power while weathering repression and fatigue. As Kurt Schock puts it: “...[T]he key variable for the success of an unarmed insurrection is not the amount of

25 The same could be said of nonviolent campaigns: if leaders of the civil resistance movement go to the negotiating table with their opponents without having shifted the power dynamic significantly, they are unlikely to achieve all their demands.

violence that accompanies it, but rather the *ability to remain resilient in a repressive context and to increase its leverage relative to the state*, either by directly severing the state’s sources of support or by mobilizing the crucial support of third parties that have leverage against the target state.”

But these sequences that lead to success can be perturbed by many factors, one of which is violence not coming from the target state but from a third party or within the nonviolent movement. The theories and causal mechanisms outlined above place a heavy emphasis on dealing with the most obvious and direct perpetrator of violence: the target state. But, what if there are other types of violent actors simultaneously pursuing their agenda? How do nonviolent campaigns manage these challenges and what are their effects on the ability of civil resisters to achieve their goals? These questions are spectacularly complex and they are just beginning to be studied. Below I outline some of the possible effects that violent actors could have on the course of these six mechanisms. This discussion is by no means exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to point out that there is good reason to believe that the effect on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns would be different depending on the type of violent actor that we are talking about.

### 2.2 Possible Effects of Violence in Nonviolent Campaigns

While there are myriad structural and semi-structural factors that could impact the trajectory of a civil resistance campaign through the six mechanisms, violent actors are particularly important and understudied: Most of the processes that make state repression backfire, movements resilient and that lead to success hinge on nonviolent discipline. But nonviolent campaigns are seldom completely nonviolent: as the police moves forward to put

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27 Schock 2005, 161. (Emphasis mine)
28 “Structural factors” are those over which the nonviolent resistance campaign does not have any control, such as terrain or the fact that the movement is occurring in the post-cold war period. I purport that violent actors are semi-structural factors in that nonviolent actionists do not directly control them, but they have some ability to influence them.
down a demonstration some participants may decide to throw rocks or use a Molotov cocktail bomb against the security forces, thereby breaking their pledge do no physical harm to the opponent. The leadership of the movement may or may not condemn this action, and perhaps even justify it given the circumstances. Beyond isolated events of misconduct, there could be a more organized armed group that is formally and publicly associated with the nonviolent campaign. In this case, the two groups share the same goals and if they do not have the same leadership they have at least made public statements of joint revolution. These two kinds of violent actors—the spontaneous, less threatening one and the more organized, armed one—are internal to the nonviolent campaign.

There could also be armed actors external to the campaign, which means that the nonviolent campaign and the violent element have distinct leadership and followers, that there are either public statements confirming the disassociation or no statements joining them. The two groups may or may not share the same goals vis-à-vis the state. Within this broad category of external armed actors, there is a variety of possibilities: they may be an armed insurrection or rebellion pursuing maximalist goals against the state; they may be revolutionary terrorists or terrorist organizations with reformist goals; or they may be organized armed groups with reformist goals.

Another external violent actor that is distinct from the third parties described above are agents provocateurs of the state, which are often planted in peaceful protests to sabotage and/ or justify quelling down dissent. Even though they are extensions of the state, this fact may not necessarily be known at the time or accepted by all audiences. Depending on a nonviolent campaign’s ability to identify those agents, prevent other participants from descending into violence, and effectively distance themselves from the violent elements, the provocation may
prove useful for the state.

In a similar vein, there are problems even for those campaigns that maintain nonviolent discipline or that come very close to it. If the state does not send their own *agents provocateurs* they can still fabricate associations between the nonviolent campaign and violent actors in order to discredit the former. Sharp elaborates on this point: “Because of the special difficulties of repressing a nonviolent resistance movement, the opponent may seek to ease them by attributing violence to the nonviolent actionists.” In order to couple violent and nonviolent actors, the target regime may issue false reports, and “plant incriminating evidence ‘proving’ violent intentions and unsavory political associations within the nonviolent group.”  

Finally, as I specify in the methods section, tacit or secret collaboration between the nonviolent campaign and violent actors are outside the scope of this study given the complexity that it adds and the difficulty of gathering reliable data.

The presence of one or more of these violent actors contemporaneously with a nonviolent campaign is theoretically possible. I contend that three factors that define these violent actors, and their relationship to the nonviolent movement and the state, can do the work of explaining the effect of the violent element on the nonviolent campaign’s outcome. The factors are: (1) the affiliation of the violent actor with the nonviolent campaign and the ability of the latter to disassociate itself from the former; (2) the goal of the violent actor vis-à-vis the state; and (3) whether or not the violent actor uses *indiscriminate force* (e.g. killing civilians in suicide bombings, for instance) or if it discriminates.

(1) Affiliation captures the distinction between internal and external armed actors plus the campaign’s ability to disassociate itself from the violence, and it is perhaps the most important

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30 Goals can be maximalist or reformist.
factor. Given that peaceful resistance against oppression gave the movement legitimacy, widespread support, cross-sectional partnerships, and international appeal, an associations with a violent actor and/or the use of violence—whether it is objectively true or perceived to be true—will most likely reverse these benefits. “Even more threatening [than state repression] may be the temptation to abandon one’s nonviolent strategy and to lash out with a violence that is cathartic and vengeful yet void of strategic purpose. In the context of nonviolent conflict, violent retaliation is not likely to improve one’s position and may elicit even harsher reprisals.”31 If the wider public, international community, government supporters and even participants of the nonviolent campaign believe these accusations to be true, then the nonviolent campaign will not only be repressed but it will also have a much more difficult time making the crackdown backfire against the state. When it comes to a failure to maintain nonviolent discipline, even if it brings with it more repression from the state, the backlash in terms of loss of legitimacy and sympathy may be not be as great if the leadership of the nonviolent campaign condemns the rogue elements. The fact is that “[e]ven minor breaks in discipline and very limited violence may be the occasion for quite disproportionate response by the agents of repression...”32 Leaders may be able to counter some misconduct by sending a strong message of disapproval and calls for more nonviolent discipline.

This kind of disassociation would not occur against an internal armed wing of a movement: in these cases the nonviolent campaign is either a partner of the violent wing, or is considered the same organization. One would expect repression in this case in addition to more loss of legitimacy and sympathy. Speaking about the nonviolent resistance in Europe during World War II, Hart says that “[i]t was a relief to [the Nazi Germans] when resistance became violent, 

31 Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, 38.
and when non-violent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic suppressive action against both at the same time.”

In short, it is reasonable to assume that depending on the affiliation between the nonviolent campaign and the violent actor, as well as on the ability of the nonviolent campaign to distance itself from aberrant participants, the effect of violence on campaign outcome can differ.

(2) The goal of the violent actor vis-à-vis the state is also an important factor influencing nonviolent campaign outcome for two reasons: First, maximalist goals pose a greater challenge to the authority of the state than reformist ones; therefore, the response of the state may be less harsh, and the ability to justify extreme repression may be diminished, if the violent actor does not have maximalist goals. Second, if the goals of the nonviolent and violent actors converge, and they are therefore both maximalist, it may be easier for the state to equate them and justify oppression.

Violent elements that have similar goals, and thus are maximalist in nature, pose a much more serious threat to the state than actors with more reformist demands. Given the high stakes involved in the outcome of these struggles, the state is likely to use all the resources that it has at its disposal to suppress them, which may lead the country to an all-out civil war. A nonviolent movement in these circumstances would be much more difficult to conduct for many reasons. It may become much more difficult for the nonviolent campaign to separate itself from the violent group given the shared goals, making it easier for the state to not lose legitimacy by quelling both forms of dissent. Mass mobilizations of people and other overt actions would become less widespread—if not impossible—given the high risk of being killed by the various warring parties. Parallel institutions may be the most viable strategy to maintain civil resistance and

33 Hart 1968, 205 (Emphasis mine).
survive in this kind of environment. In an environment of violence it would be ever more
onerous to build diverse coalitions given that some sectors of the population may support armed
struggle and others not. In essence, divisiveness and suspicion can run high, especially if the
armed group takes up guerrilla warfare and the state a heavy-handed counterinsurgency
campaign where civilians are likely to suffer.

If the violent actor seeks concessions from the state rather than the ousting of the regime, it
may be easier for the nonviolent campaign to continue its activities and succeed in distancing
itself from the violent group. The state might still try to equate the two groups together, but it is
implausible that a war would take place. If security forces believe in the state’s propaganda and
the nonviolent group is unable to shift their opinion, repression may come in a higher degree
given fear and claims to self-defense. Under these circumstances, however, it may still be
possible to conduct a strong nonviolent campaign, to reach across diverse communities, mobilize
the masses, build legitimacy, and make repression backfire even if it does not bring defections
from the police or armed forces.

(3) The third factor has to do with the violent actor’s tactics, and specifically with whether
or not it uses indiscriminate force. The reason for taking into account the use of this tactic is that
it is particularly divisive—thus affecting the ability to mobilize and appeal to diverse groups—
and that the target state is not likely to incur significant political costs from repression. Either
internal or external violent actors can use arbitrary force. Internal elements that commit violence
haphazardly would most likely alienate many sectors of society, and undermine the nonviolent
movement in the eyes of the local and international communities. Indeed, “terrorism has an
abysmal track record in promoting change unless it is combined with forms of mass political
contention. ... In fact, a major difference between “people’s war” and “people power,” on the one
hand, and terrorism, on the other, is that the former depend on mass collective action and support, while the latter does not.\textsuperscript{34} Legitimacy and sympathy from the various audiences is likely to vanish, as is any restraint from the security forces. This makes the backfiring of repression and defections very unlikely. The same negative consequences could occur against the nonviolent campaign if the indiscriminate violent actor is external, and the nonviolent group is not able to disassociate itself strongly enough.

Revolutionary terrorism,\textsuperscript{35} which employs tactics that create physical victims of terror and victims of the psychological effects of wanton violence, is a unique subgroup in that it pursues maximalist goals. This actor may or may not be associated with the nonviolent campaign. For similar reasons to those outlined above, this actor would have a difficult time building legitimacy and winning sympathy. In addition, given the sharing of maximalist goals with the nonviolent campaign it may be easier for the target regime to lump the two groups together and justify unrestrained violence. The state is likely to respond with utter ruthlessness because it will be able to justify its actions in light of the opponent’s terror tactics and the high-stakes demands. Repressing a fringe element is far less politically costly than doing so to a more centrist, and certainly a more peaceful, one.

In conclusion, it may not be enough to ask what the impact of violent actors is on the nonviolent campaign. Specifying the types of violent actors, their affiliation to the nonviolent campaign, goals and tactics is likely to give us more leverage in answering that question. From the discussion above it seems reasonable to think that different violent actors will have different effects on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. Once we have these types and the cases are

\textsuperscript{34} Schock 2005, 23.
\textsuperscript{35} Revolutionary terrorism is defined as “...planned violence intended to have psychological influence on politically relevant behavior ... used by revolutionaries aiming to overthrow that system.” (Price 1977, 52)
coded, we can further refine the six causal mechanisms linking nonviolent action to success.

2.3 Alternative Explanations

Even though the most important processes linking civil resistance to successful outcomes hinge on nonviolent discipline, there are compelling challenges to the idea that violence necessarily undermines nonviolent action. One alternative explanation to this line of reasoning derives from the work of Herbert Haines on radical flanks in social movements. Haines makes the distinction between positive and negative radical flank effects (RFEs). A positive RFE occurs when extremists\textsuperscript{36} enhance the campaign’s ability to achieve its stated goals, and the opposite is the case for negative RFEs. In his 1988 book \textit{Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970}, Haines’ central contention is that nonviolent social movements are more likely to attain their goals in the presence of radical flanks, and that the case of Black Power during the American Civil Rights Movement proves this: “...black radicalization had the \textit{net effect} of enhancing the bargaining position of mainstream civil rights groups and hastening the attainment of many of their goals.”\textsuperscript{37} Other scholars\textsuperscript{38} and major figures such as Malcolm X\textsuperscript{39} tend to side with Haines in contending that radical flanks have generally had positive effects on movements. Haines’ definition of radical flanks does not distinguish between tactics and goals, which means that groups that have relatively more radical goals (e.g. regime change versus political reform) are put in the same category as those who use more extreme means to attain their goals (e.g. terrorist attacks versus protest). Further, it goes without saying that the concept of radical flanks

\textsuperscript{36} By extremists or radicals Haines means contemporaneous elements that employ more extreme means than their nonviolent counterparts (such as violence) and/or that seek more sweeping goals.

\textsuperscript{37} Haines 1988, 2. (Emphasis mine)

\textsuperscript{38} Isaac, McDonald, Lukasik 2006; Boyd 2002.

\textsuperscript{39} In 1965 Malcolm X said: “I want Dr. King to know that I didn’t come to Selma to make his job difficult. I really did come thinking that I could make it easier. If white people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they’ll be more willing to hear Dr. King.”
is by definition relative: that which is considered radical in one setting can be labeled moderate in another.

This paper’s focus on maximalist nonviolent campaigns and their relationship to violent actors make it so I am concerned with a type of radical flank: the one that uses primarily violent means to achieve its goals. In addition, given the broad definition of goals that I am using as either maximalist or reformist, the violent actor can either be as “radical” as the nonviolent movement, by seeking maximalist aims, or less radical than the nonviolent counterpart, by having reformist goals. For Haines the two groups—the nonviolent and the radical sect—would have to share the general grievances because the state is looking to appease the more radical group by reaching out and making concessions to the nonviolent one. If the grievances were different the government would not be able to “deal” with both by engaging with one.

With those caveats in mind, about the parameters of the radical flank effect theory and the framing of this study, there are important implications of Haines’ arguments on the conventional wisdom in civil resistance. The presence of a violent actor with similar grievances may in fact make the state more likely to negotiate with the nonviolent campaign, thus potentially leading to concessions. As a result, it is possible that nonviolent campaigns that would have failed without this bargaining process could achieve some of their objectives and be coded as a limited success.\(^40\) On the other hand, had the state remained impervious to popular demands and not reached out, the nonviolent campaign could have achieved full success by capitalizing on an ever-more enraged population. Negotiations could help a movement achieve goals that it would otherwise not have been able to achieve, but it could also co-opt it before it reaches its full potential.

\(^{40}\) Of course this is a counterfactual and it is very difficult to prove or disprove. However, it is a theoretically possible effect of violent actors on nonviolent campaigns.
One other bit of complexity is worth pointing out: Haines based his study on the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, which was a reformist, primarily nonviolent campaign, and perhaps the positive flank effect can only occur in those circumstances. Confronted with a maximalist nonviolent campaign, which often has goals incompatible with the survival of the state, the government will be very reluctant to reach out regardless of the presence of violent actors. Therefore, no matter how much the violent fringe makes the nonviolent movement appear moderate (in terms of their tactics, not goals), the government is going to be unwilling to signal any level of capitulation. Instead, given that both the nonviolent movement and violent flank threaten the basic power arrangement—leaving little room to negotiate—the state is more likely to resort to repression. As this discussion suggests, there is a dearth of empirical research untangling these questions and the debate remains wide open.

A very recent and ongoing study by Erica Chenoweth and Kurt Schock is beginning to fill these gaps: through quantitative analysis, complemented by case studies, they are investigating the effects of violent flanks on the outcomes of major nonviolent campaigns. Schock presented their preliminary findings in 2010\textsuperscript{41} and conveyed that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to be successful when a simultaneous violent campaign is absent. However, their findings are not statistically significant. After disaggregating the violent campaigns to account for whether they were “an intra-movement campaign or an inter-movement campaign,” their results were similar—with no support for a positive flank effect, but no statistically significant result supporting a negative flank effect. They were able to find a robust indirect effect through one of the key variables linking nonviolent action to success: mass mobilization. The presence of a simultaneous violent campaign decreases the nonviolent action campaign’s mass support and

\footnote{Schock 2010.}
therefore its ability to attain success. This finding not only bolsters the civil resistance literature and the six mechanisms outlined above, but it also enhances the importance of untangling the impact of violent actors on nonviolent campaigns and further understanding the responses that nonviolent campaigns could take to disassociate themselves from violent actors.

A second alternative to the argument that violent actors harm civil resistance campaigns is that the latter could in fact neutralize the former. By presenting themselves as a viable way to achieve social change, the nonviolent campaign may undermine and weaken the violent actor. Although it is speculation at this point, the most obvious example that we have today is Al Qaeda’s appeal perhaps diminishing due to successful popular insurrections in Egypt and Tunisia. Writing in 2006, Merriman and DuVall contend that “as [nonviolent resistance] models a new, more effective way of representing grievances [...], the perceived need for and legitimacy of terrorists as liberators will be marginalized. When civilian-based, nonviolent forces are able to come to the fore and produce decisive change in society, the demand for terrorism as a form of struggle will subside.”\textsuperscript{42} Stephan also makes the argument along the same lines.\textsuperscript{43} But there seems to be no reason to limit this argument to terrorist organizations: nonviolent campaigns, by drawing on their own smaller victories and backed by the success of past movements, could also emasculate the appeal of armed insurrections. A backlash against an armed actor, however, would perhaps be less likely if the civil resistance campaign were affiliated—or perceived to be associated—with the violent group. Constituting a distinct alternative to violent methods may be a fundamental requirement for Merriman and DuVall’s theory to hold. Therefore, examining affiliation and the mechanisms of disassociation at the disposal of nonviolent campaigns may prove crucial in understanding the armed and nonviolent actor dynamic. These propositions are

\textsuperscript{42} Merriman and DuVall 2007, 221.
\textsuperscript{43} Stephan 2009.
fascinating and compelling, but remain largely untested against the empirical record.

As a third alternative explanation, it is just as plausible that the presence of some violent actors will not have an important, observable effect on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. In this case affiliation also becomes important: Perhaps the armed actor is completely and obviously separate from the nonviolent campaign—or even hostile to it—and it is widely known that the two do not collaborate. In instances when it is not that clear, the nonviolent campaign may prove capable of aggressively distancing itself from the armed elements and not lose its support and legitimacy.

The overview of causal mechanisms linking nonviolent action to success, and of the ways that violent actors could impact the nonviolent campaign’s outcome, is not as refined as one would need it to be to test hypotheses. Regardless, it became clear that violent actors—depending on their level of affiliation to the nonviolent campaign, goals and tactics, as well as the nonviolent campaign’s ability to disassociate itself from violence and to condemn it when it happens internally—may have different effects on nonviolent movements. In the end, the idea would be to identify the conditions under which some violent actors boost or undermine nonviolent campaigns, when the impact is minor, and when the nonviolent campaign undercuts the violent actor. The following part is the methodology of this paper, which is where I disaggregate and specify the key independent variable—violent actors.
III. Methodology

In the methodology section, I first disaggregate and specify my key causal variable, “violent elements,” as well as provide the definition of the dependent variable, “outcome” of nonviolent campaigns and other independent variables. Then, I lay out the criteria for case selection and the steps of the research process.

3.1 Variable Specification

3.1.1 Key Causal Variable: Violent Element

A diagram depicting the aggregate components of the main independent variable is helpful prior to delving into each individual piece. As mentioned in the introduction, my goal is to account for all the possible types of contemporaneous violent elements in a nonviolent movement except for those officially representing the state. The theoretically relevant groups are those either inciting nonviolent activists to resort to violence, or facilitating the “lumping together” of the nonviolent and violent groups to justify/legitimize repression. Based on this criterion, I came up with five types of violent actors and they are each essentially a causal variable (henceforth, “causal variable” refers to one of these five types of violent elements. Their aggregate is the “Causal Variable” with capital letters). They are all defined below.

Figure 1: The Causal Variables
The first distinction that I make to disaggregate the main causal variable is between internal and external violent elements. Internal violent elements share both the same leadership and have common goals.\textsuperscript{44} There are two types of internal violent elements: the first is simply made up of active participants of the nonviolent campaign who do not maintain nonviolent discipline and perpetrate acts of violence. These participants could be part of the leadership or followers, and they may or may not be sanctioned by the leadership. The following is the operationalization of the two internal causal variables:

**IA. Level of Nonviolent Discipline:** to measure the level of nonviolent discipline of a movement we can evaluate the behavior of its constitutive actors and divide them in two broad groups: the \\

\textsuperscript{44} Goals are broadly defined as the overall stated objectives of a campaign. Therefore, having the same goals implies targeting the same state.
leadership and followers. Indexing the two sub-variables (leadership and followers) would give us the value for the causal variable “nonviolent discipline,” which will come to assume a number from 0 to 2.

IAA. **Leadership**: the leadership is broadly defined as the group of people who define the objectives and tactics of the campaign, as well as those who manage the day-to-day activities. This variable can take on two values: two (2) is assigned to a movement’s leadership that sees a place for violence in some instances of the campaign. One (1) is assigned to a movement’s leadership that does not encourage followers to use violence or nonviolence\textsuperscript{45} and/or that does not discourage followers from using violence against the opponent. Zero (0) is assigned to a movement’s leadership that rejects the use of violence for the purposes of the campaign, explicitly petitions followers to remain nonviolent for principled or strategic reasons, and does not perpetrate violence.

IAB. **Followers**: followers are broadly defined as any and all participants in a given campaign who view themselves as part of the movement. This variable can take on three values: Two (2) is assigned to a movement’s followers if they use violence and their acts are sanctioned or encouraged by the leadership. One (1) is assigned to the movement’s followers if they use violence and these acts are neither praised nor condemned by the leadership. Zero (0) is assigned to a movement’s followers if they do not perpetrate any violence against the opponent during the campaign. If there are sporadic uses of violence—such as rock throwing—but the leadership condemns these acts, then the followers are still coded as 2. The acts of violence in this variable

\textsuperscript{45} As Sharp points out, “[i]n some cases, participants in nonviolent action may intuitively, or by common accord, adhere to nonviolent discipline without formal efforts to promote it.” (Sharp 2005, 392)
are sporadic (without intent, not premeditated, in the language of the Minorities at Risk Project\textsuperscript{46} in nature and are commonly referred to as rioting.

**IB. Violent Flank:** the definition of violent flank that I will be using in this project derives from the social movements literature and specifically from the work of Herbert H. Haines on radical flanks.\textsuperscript{47} It is defined as an organized group affiliated with the nonviolent campaign that wages armed struggle against the same target regime. By “affiliated” I mean that the violent flank and the nonviolent campaign share the same leadership and goals. In some cases, if there is not a complete overlap of leadership between the violent and nonviolent groups, such as when the political leadership is responsible for the nonviolent campaign and the armed leadership for the violent wing, the violent group can still be labeled as a violent flank as long as there is a formal recognition, mandate or statements from both sides indicating that the groups belong to the same campaign.

If members of the armed forces defect and make formal statements with the leaders of the nonviolent campaign about their now joint efforts, and they in turn use arms against the regime—or make credible threats to use their military capability against the state—this group also considered a violent flank. In short, the perpetrators of a bloodless or bloody coup d’état\textsuperscript{48} could be considered a violent flank if they were formally aligned with the leadership of the nonviolent campaign.

The causal variable “violent flank” can take on two values: zero (0) for nonviolent campaigns that do not have violent flanks as defined above, and a one (1) for nonviolent

\textsuperscript{46} Marshall and Gurr 2003.
\textsuperscript{47} Haines 1984; 1988.
\textsuperscript{48} A coup d’état is “seizure by action of a small group of physical and political control of the State machinery. Coups d’état initially target the prime governmental centers of command, decision, and administration, and later the whole State apparatus. The seizure of the State is seen as the key step to gaining control of the whole country.” (Sharp 2005, 544)
campaigns that have a violent flank. In the presence of a violent flank, more details about the armed group will be provided for each case, such as the names of the leaders, size (total members at height of campaign), and time in operation.

**E.A. Armed Insurrection**: The Minorities at Risk Project (MAR, 2007 coding) from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland, College Park, has a very helpful seven-point measure called the “Rebellion Index” (REB), which I will be using to define this external causal variable. MAR “defines an armed self-determination movement as one whose leaders or organization publicly state that they want greater political autonomy, association with kin neighboring states, and/or independence,” resembling what Chenoweth and Stephan call maximalist goals. For MAR to classify it as an armed campaign, Walter explains, “a movement had to pursue at least a minimum level of violence as opposed to convention politics or protest while seeking self-determination.”

Cases that correspond to the definitions of the Rebellion Index’s values 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and that are discrete (i.e. tacit/secret or no affiliation) from the nonviolent campaign are coded as an armed insurrection in this study. Local rebellions (REB=3) are armed attempts to seize power in a locale; small-scale guerrilla activity (REB=4) is characterized by (1) fewer than 1,000 armed fighters, (2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year), and (3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales; intermediate guerrilla activity (REB=5) has one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity (see description of value 6 for details); large-scale guerrilla activity (REB=6) characterized by (1) more than 1,000 armed fighters; (2) frequent

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49 This summary of MAR’s definition is from Walter 2006, 113.
50 *Ibid.* More details about what constitutes “a minimum level of violence” are contained in the Rebellion Index explained below.
armed attacks (more than 6 per year), and 3) attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group; and lastly, protracted civil war (REB=7) fought by rebel military units with base areas.\textsuperscript{51} The values 1, 2 and 3 are not coded as armed insurrection in this study.\textsuperscript{52}

To qualify as an external armed insurrection, the group has to have different leadership and possess no formal mandates or declarations indicating joint work with the nonviolent campaign. Especially useful to make this distinction will be statements by the nonviolent campaign explicitly distancing itself from the armed insurrection. If there is an observable tacit or secret support between the nonviolent campaign and the armed insurrection, the group is still coded as an external armed insurrection given reliability concerns and the difficulty in making these judgments in most cases.

The external causal variable “armed insurrection” can take two possible values: zero (0) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns during which there were no armed insurrections as defined by the Rebellion Index (values 3 to 7). One (1) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns during which there was an armed insurrection (or more than one). In the presence of an armed insurrection, more details about the group will be provided for each case, such as the names of the leaders, group size, time in operation, and main objective.

**EB. Other Armed Actors:** Values 1 and 2 from MAR’s Rebellion Index (2007 Codebook) defines this external causal variable. Political banditry and sporadic terrorism is coded REB=1 and campaigns of terrorism are REB=2 in Rebellion Index. “Other armed actors” are essentially smaller and less well-organized groups that may have a number of different political goals,

\textsuperscript{51} These definitions are taken directly from the MAR Codebook 2007 version, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{52} Political banditry and sporadic terrorism is coded REB=1 and campaigns of terrorism are REB=2 in Rebellion Index (MAR Codebook 2007, 22).
ranging from reformist to maximalist. Violent activity without clear political objectives, such as is the case for organized crime, is outside the scope of this paper.

In terms of affiliation, the same criteria used for violent insurrections apply: to qualify as “other violent actors,” the group has to have different leadership and possess no formal mandates or declarations indicating joint work with the nonviolent campaign. If there is tacit or secret support between the nonviolent campaign and the violent actor, it is still coded as an external “other violent actor” given the constraints mentioned above.

The external causal variable “other armed actors” can take two possible values: zero (0) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns during which there were no other armed actors as defined by the Rebellion Index’s values 1 and 2. One (1) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns during which there was one external armed actor, two (2) for two external armed actors, and three (3) for three or more armed actors. In the presence of other armed actors, more details about the group will be provided for each case, such as the names of the leaders, group size, time in operation, and main objective.

**EC. Agents Provocateurs:** As Robert Helvey defines them, *agents provocateurs* “...attempt to provoke violence, promote dissension within the movement, and divert the movement away from government vulnerabilities.” Informants and agents of the state who infiltrate the nonviolent movement to gather intelligence are also considered provocateurs in the literature; however, this paper is solely concerned with actors who, feigning to be part of the nonviolent campaign, perpetrate acts of violence to create the appearance that the movement is using force. Most commonly, *agents provocateurs* are hired, ordered and/ or encouraged by the target state, but they may also emerge from other sectors of society. The goal behind these

53 Helvey 2004, 123.
violent interlopers is to weaken the movement by encouraging internal fractures and alienating other nonviolent activists;\textsuperscript{54} helping legitimize a violent crackdown by the state; inciting fear in security forces, thus leading to harsher treatment toward the activists; and/ or provoking actual participants of the nonviolent movement to turn violent.

By definition, \textit{agents provocateurs} are not affiliated to the nonviolent campaign, but it is usually very difficult to make a judgment one way or the other for the simple fact that the agents are pretending to be part of the movement. With the benefit of retrospection and careful analysis by historians, it is possible to determine the existence of \textit{agents provocateurs}. In addition to these secondary sources, public statements by the nonviolent campaign’s leadership calling out these agents of the state constitute useful evidence.

The external causal variable “agents provocateurs” can take on two possible values: zero (0) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns that did not have this problem. One (1) is assigned to nonviolent campaigns that had a presence of these agents. In the presence of \textit{agents provocateurs}, more details about the group will be provided for each case, such as whether or not the nonviolent campaign made a strong effort to differentiate itself from the violent actor.

It is worth mentioning that \textit{agents provocateurs} in nonviolent campaigns are essentially the same type of actor as “spoilers” in the context of peace negotiations. Stephen Stedman defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Agents provocateurs} have an interest in weakening and ending mass nonviolent movement and they use violence in pursuit of this objective. Spoilers can be inside or outside of

\textsuperscript{54} The use of violence leads to less participation from the population and thus to attrition in movements. (Sharp 2005; Helvey 2004)

\textsuperscript{55} Stedman 1997, 5.
a negotiated settlement; vary in size as a group; have varying strategic objectives such as destroying settlement or getting more concessions; and be part of the leadership or followers of various warring factions.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite the equivalence between agents provocateurs and spoilers, there are some important distinctions, which explain why I purport that the terms are not interchangeable. The literature on spoilers is very theoretically sophisticated and it has been refined to capture the complexities of negotiated settlements. Spoilers use violence to bargain and leverage better deals for their factions in civil wars, for example. They can also come from parties that are not part of the negotiation and wish to either destroy the talks altogether, or pressure for a seat the table. Thus, contrary to agents provocateurs, spoilers often carry out overt actions to gain more visibility as a group, and they can benefit from being identified by negotiators. In short, the objective of spoilers and their loci in society can be very different from agents provocateurs in nonviolent movements.

3.1.2 Other Independent Variables

Throughout the paper, and especially in describing the case studies, there are a few other variables that I will be referring to. They are specified below.

Defections: identifies “breakdowns on the execution of orders from the target regime”\textsuperscript{57} and it refers to both members of the armed forces civilian political figures who cease to cooperate with the government. Those who defect may or may not join the nonviolent struggle.

Cold War: One of the control variables in the Chenoweth and Stephan 2008 study is whether the nonviolent campaign took place before (1900-1948), during (1949-1991) or after the Cold War period (1992-2006). Unique dynamics in the international system that characterized these

\textsuperscript{56} Stedman 1997, 8.
\textsuperscript{57} Chenoweth and Stephan 2008b, 8.
periods, such as multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity,\textsuperscript{58} are important to consider in explaining the outcome of maximalist nonviolent campaigns. It becomes especially important in this study given the 1989 domino effect of nonviolent insurrections that occurred in many former communist states.

**Group size:** number of active participants in nonviolent campaigns, and in violent groups, during the height of their respective operations. Data are available for some groups and not others—I will provide it whenever possible.

**Duration:** duration, in days, of the nonviolent campaign and of the armed actors’ operations. NAVCO dataset offers the start and end years of the nonviolent campaigns. I will procure the same information for the violent actors.

**Temporal Convergence:** given that the violent elements that could undermine a nonviolent campaign the most are those that are easily equated with the peaceful activists, it is reasonable to only count armed actors that are contemporaneous to the nonviolent campaign. More specifically, I will count a violent element as long as there is a reasonable amount of temporal convergence with the nonviolent campaign.\textsuperscript{59}

**Geographic Convergence:** given that the most threatening violent elements for the nonviolent campaign are those that can be equated with the movement, it is important to take into consideration whether or not the armed actors operated from—and carried out operations in—the same space where the nonviolent campaign. For the purposes of this project, I am counting


\textsuperscript{59} Contemporaneity with the nonviolent campaign is also part of the definition of violent flanks that Kurt Schock and Erica Chenoweth are using in their forthcoming study (Schock 2010).
violent elements that operated in the same country where the nonviolent campaign took place. There is no further refinement in terms of within-country regions and the rural/urban divide.

3.1.3 The Dependent Variable: Nonviolent Campaign Outcome

Chenoweth and Stephan (2008c) define outcome based on a campaign’s attainment of its stated goals. A nonviolent campaign is considered a “success” when it achieves one hundred percent of its stated goals “within a year of the peak of activities.” A campaign that achieves some of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities is labeled as “limited” in the outcome variable. Specifically, “[w]hen a regime makes concessions to the campaign or reforms short of complete campaign success, such reforms are counted as limited success.” A failed campaign achieves none of its stated goals. Suppressed campaigns are thus labeled failures.

This concrete ordinal-level variable enables a very preliminary correlation assessment between the presence of a contemporaneous type of violent actor and the outcome of the nonviolent campaign. Further studies could make this assessment for all nonviolent campaigns, and/or disaggregate the outcome variable to account for a campaign’s long-term effects, such as democratization, as well as effects not comprised in the stated objectives, such as the number and strength of civil society organizations.

3.1.4 A Quantitative Variable

We can aggregate the information above to create a quantitative variable. Figure 2 shows how indexing the five types of violent elements yields an ordinal-level variable that could be employed in statistical analysis. The index’s components—with the exception of “IA.

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60 In their dataset, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008c) provide the location of the nonviolent campaigns.
Nonviolent Discipline”—are dichotomous variables that can either take the value of zero or one. “IA. Nonviolent Discipline” is itself an index of the sub-variables Leadership and Followers.\(^\text{61}\)

**Figure 2: Quantitative Variable “Contemporaneous Violent Actors in Nonviolent Campaigns”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>IA. Nonviolent Discipline</th>
<th>IB. Violent Flank</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors</th>
<th>EC. Spoilers</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Actors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign X</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign with no violent actors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign with highest possible number of violent actors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.2 Case Selection**

Ideally, all of the 105 nonviolent campaigns in the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset would be a part of this study. Given time constraints, I am reducing the number of cases considerably—down to five—and narrowing them to one region (East-Central European countries, Former Communist States and Russia). Even though the sample size is certainly too small for statistical inferential analysis, and to draw any conclusions about the impact of contemporaneous violent actors on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns, the study will serve as an exploration of the disaggregated key causal variable, as well as to determine the

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\(^{61}\) As illustrated in Figure 1 on page 5, Leadership: 0, 1, 2 and Followers 0, 1, 2. An additive index of these two variables divided by 4 makes the Nonviolent Discipline an interval-level with values from 0 to 1.
focus and feasibility of a larger study. Bearing these constraints in mind, the following are the steps I took to select the cases.

First, I decided to narrow it down by selecting one region of the world in order to compare cases that are most similar in terms of control variables such as geographic location, general culture and common history. I chose East-Central European Countries, the Former Communist States and Russia given the number of campaigns that have taken place in the region, as well as due to the variation in start and end dates of these campaigns. This restriction brings the number of cases from 105 to 29. These 29 cases are what I call the “subset.”

Figure 3: The Subset (29 Cases of Nonviolent Campaigns in Central-East European Countries, the Former Communist States and Russia from 1900 to 2006. (The thicker horizontal line at the bottom indicates the end of the Cold War.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>campaign</th>
<th>location</th>
<th>icode</th>
<th>target</th>
<th>tcode</th>
<th>byear</th>
<th>eyear</th>
<th>nonviol</th>
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<td>Soviet occupation</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>Communist regime</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Velvet Revolution</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>315</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Against Violence</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>Czech communist government</td>
<td>315</td>
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<td>368</td>
<td>Lithuanian regime</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>366</td>
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<td>367</td>
<td>Communist regime</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>Communist regime</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-dem movement</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>Anti-coup</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>pro-dem movement</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>semi-presidential system</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Milosevic regime</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Orange Revolution</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>Kuchma regime</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>pro-dem movement</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>Shevardnadze regime</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-dem movement</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>Belarus government</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secondly, given the importance of the end of the Cold War in igniting many of the region’s nonviolent campaigns, I made sure to include two nonviolent campaigns that occurred in the same country but during different periods: one during the Cold War and the transition period (Belarus in 1989) and the other after the end of the Cold War (Belarus in 2006). Third, in order to give as much variation as possible to the dependent variable (outcome), I am including two cases that were failures (Kosovo 1989-1999 and Belarus 2006), one that achieved some concessions and was thus coded as limited (Belarus 1989), and two successes (East Germany 1989 and Yugoslavia 2000).

Fourth, in order to give variation to NAVCO’s defections variable, which identifies large and systematic breakdowns of authority in the armed forces, I made sure that defections occurred in two of the nonviolent campaigns that I will be examining (East Germany 1989 and Yugoslavia 2000) and not in the other ones (Kosovo 1989-1999, Belarus 1989 and Belarus 2006). Defections and success are highly correlated, but there is one case that I will be studying where there were no defections and limited success was achieved (Belarus 2006). Finally, the fifth criterion is campaign duration in days as coded in NAVCO: Kosovo lasted 3,650 days and is the longest campaign in my pool, both of the Belorussian campaigns and Yugoslavia were between 300 and 360 days, and the shortest was East Germany, which lasted 60 days. It is worth pointing out that all the target regimes in my cases had similarly low democracy scores (polity) ranging from -9 (in the case of East Germany) to -6 (for Kosovo and Yugoslavia). The only nonviolent campaign in this group that was not coded as having suffered significant regime repression was East Germany.

62 Thirteen out of twenty-nine nonviolent campaigns from 1900-2006 in this region occurred in 1989 and 1990.
3.3 Research Process

The first part of this project consisted of reviewing the literature on civil resistance, social movements, revolutions, non-state armed actors, rebellion and spoilers in order to disaggregate the independent variable, as well as to put forth the five types of violent elements that are most likely to undermine a nonviolent campaign’s ability to make state repression backfire against the target state. The development of this variable required an iterative process between the theory and the case studies, and this should remain an important part of the process when coding the rest of the cases: in case studies we may find different violent actors that are unaccounted for in the five types, which may merit the re-assessment of the existing categories and even the creation of a new one.

The second part of the research involved assigning values to the causal variables for each nonviolent campaign, as well as developing short case studies to provide details on the violent actor(s) present and their affiliation to the nonviolent movement. Prior to delving into each case study in detail, I went through ten datasets to make the first rough assessment of the presence—or lack thereof—of contemporaneous armed actors in the nonviolent campaigns that I am analyzing. These datasets include:

1. Correlates of War Project’s Intra-State Wars Dataset

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63 I compiled the results of this assessment in an excel spreadsheet named “Presence of Violent Actors-Datasets.xls.” Available upon request.
2. Correlates of War Project’s Non-State Wars Dataset
3. Minorities at Risk Dataset (versions 2003 and 2009)
4. Freedom House’s How Freedom is Won Dataset 2005
5. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute of Olso (PRIO) Armed Conflicts Dataset
6. UCDP/ PRIO Non-State Conflicts Dataset
7. UCDP/ PRIO One-Sided Violence Dataset
8. Expanded Non-State Actor Dataset by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009
9. Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism’s Suicide Attack Database
10. START Dataset from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland

Following the dataset evaluation and in order to make the detailed case studies (third part), I consulted the main sources that Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan used to make their NAVCO dataset, as well as other peer-reviewed journal articles and books. Two major bibliographical compilations on nonviolent movements were particularly useful: People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action by April Carter, Howard Clark and Michael Randle (Housmans, New York: 2006) and Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide by Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp (Garland, New York: 1997). The Cases section (III), which follows the methodology, comes closest to a structured, focused comparison where I will ask each nonviolent campaign whether there were contemporaneous violent elements and what types. The specification of the violent actor(s) in each campaign will be accompanied by a short description of the campaign, and end with a preliminary and rough correlation analysis between the various violent actors and the dependent variable, outcome. In the conclusion of this paper I summarize the main arguments, bring together the evidence from the cases, and offer directions for future research.

64 Bennett and George 2005, 67.
IV. CASES

4.1 Pro-Democracy Movement in East Germany (Target: Communist Regime) 1989

4.1.1 Background

East Germany, formally known as the German Democratic Republic or GDR, became an independent state in 1949 as a consequence of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Decades of repression brought East Germans to mobilize on a large scale in 1989, in a remarkably nonviolent campaign that lasted 60 days and brought an end to the communist regime and the reunification of Germany. Regular—but not massive—popular resistance began in response to the fraudulent “communal elections” in the spring of 1989, and it took the form of organized protests and the boycott of the elections. Grassroots opposition movements began organizing mainly in Leipzig, but also in East Berlin and it spread to other cities, and this coupled with a mass flight of the population over the border to West Germany was the beginning of the end for the communist regime. The exodus that reached a rate of about 10,000 per day—with more than 130,000 people fleeing in November 1989—presented a severe hindrance to the functioning of the state, and mounting popular pressure led to the resignation of a significant part of the leadership in the Politburo. The internal breakdown of the government explains why NAVCO codes this case as having had defections.

The biggest demonstration, which is essentially a proxy of the number of participants at the height of the campaign, was of approximately a million people. On November 9, 1989 the

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65 Bleiker 1993, 6.
66 NAVCO Dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008c). Even though there were protests before, September is coded as the beginning of the campaign, as it is when the mass exodus and mobilization occurred.
67 Bleiker 1993, 8.
68 Three major opposition groups were New Forum, Democratic Awakening and Democracy Now.
69 Hirschman 1993, 188.
70 In East Berlin on November 4, 1989 (From a detailed chronology of the revolution in Bleiker 1993, 40).
Berlin Wall effectively came down, as East Germans were declared free to travel abroad for the first time in forty years. The government soon disintegrated and “[e]very single demand that the people had taken to the streets in the fall of 1989 was thus met by the spring 1990.” Needless to say, the East Germany campaign is coded as a success in NAVCO.

Even though the regime was “one of the most repressive” in Eastern and Central Europe, and there is evidence of violent crackdowns—although not major ones—during protests in 1989, NAVCO does not code this case as having had regime violence. The events leading up to the defeat of SED, the Communist Party, occurred in a “window of opportunity” when “external and domestic circumstances came together,” such as the weakening and reforms of the Soviet Union (Mikhail Gorbachev had already introduced some of his “new thinking”) and the classic problems that made Marxist-Leninist regimes in the region implode. In addition to the favorable environment, Bleiker attributes the institutionalization of safe spaces in churches, and the ability of East Germans to dissent and organize there, as one of the most important “preconditions for the emergence and successful employment of nonviolent resistance against SED rule.” The peace prayers and Monday demonstrations became important centers of popular pressure intensified by the mass flight of the population to West Germany.

72 “The Stasi was more than twice as big as the Gestapo, controlling a population less than one fifth as large as Nazi Germany’s. Thus, the Stasi was able to put even the tiniest organized opposition groups under surveillance and often infiltrated agents into their leadership.” (Thompson 1996, 273) (Quote in text from Bleiker 1993, 8)
73 For example, “[o]n October 2, 25,000 [people] were violently dispersed by the police.” (Bleiker 1993, 8) Also, see Thompson 1996, 272 on “violent dispersal” on October 7 and 8.
74 This information comes from the “regviol” variable and it is defined as “target uses violence to retaliate against the campaign.” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008c) Other sources do point out that there was very little violence from the part of the regime during the uprising and called it “remarkably bloodless.” (Kuran 1991, 12)
75 Bleiker 1993, 19-22.
76 Ibid., 26-27.
4.1.2 Presence of Violent Actor(s)

Internal – Nonviolent Discipline: Overall, East Germans were very disciplined in their use of strategic nonviolent action and gave “no pretext for violent repression.”\textsuperscript{78} I found very little evidence suggesting a few protests that turned violent, but the leadership of the main opposition organizations was adamant about their rejection of violence and had clear messages\textsuperscript{79} urging participants to remain nonviolent. The sources I consulted confirmed this over and over: “An overwhelming number of the demonstrations occurred nonviolently. Nonviolent discipline was so strictly maintained that burning candles, initially only a declaration of adherence to nonviolent principles, became the overall symbol for resistance against the regime.”\textsuperscript{80} Slogans during popular protests were “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people) and “Keine Gewalt” (no violence), others “expressing the hope for avoidance of violence” (Widerrede ist nicht Widerstand).\textsuperscript{81} In addition to strong messages from the leadership, protesters took measures to prevent violence from activists and to not provoke the Stasi secret police, such as “prematurely breaking off events [and] creating human chains to protect MfS\textsuperscript{82} property.”\textsuperscript{83}

The most significant evidence countering claims of nonviolent discipline came from Ekiert and Kubik’s meticulous study of individual protest events in East Germany from 1989 to 1993. They report that on average from those four years, 13.2% of protest acts in East Germany were violent.\textsuperscript{84} Unfortunately, I was unable to discern from their article—and their data is not

\textsuperscript{78} Roberts 1991, 19-21. There are a variety of reasons why the armed forces failed to crackdown more violently, especially on the dramatic day of the fall of the Berlin Wall. See Thompson 1996, 290. See Fulbrook 1995, 239 and 247 for more on nonviolent discipline.
\textsuperscript{79} Bleiker 1993, 46.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{81} Hirschman 1993, 192-193.
\textsuperscript{82} Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), the formal name of the Stasi.
\textsuperscript{83} Fulbrook 1995, 255.
\textsuperscript{84} Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 557.
publicly available—the percentage of violent acts that occurred in 1989. While taking the four-year average as the percentage of violent protests for 1989 may make East Germany not a purely nonviolent movement, it is important to note that the year with most protest events was 1993 and not 1989. Further, given that the opposition organizations adamantly rejected the use of force, called on protesters to remain nonviolent, and took concrete measures to prevent outbreaks during protests, East Germany should be coded as purely nonviolent.

Internal – Violent Flank/Wing: I found no evidence of an internal armed wing in all the sources in the bibliography for East Germany.

External – Other Armed Actor and Agents Provocateurs: There were two external, politically motivated armed actors operating in East Germany at the time. The first were Neo Nazi groups notorious for intimidating and harassing churchgoers. Fulbrook explains one incident: “Young people leaving the church after a concert service on October 17 were attacked by a groups of neo-Nazis.” Even though the “Egon Krenz’s [security chief] office collated an extensive file on the issue, dissidents were somewhat disconcerted by the lack of any visible police intervention or control of these ‘rowdies.’” Given that churches became one of the epicenters of dissent, organization and protests against the SED, there is reason to suspect that the Nazi assailants were in fact agents provocateurs or “at least [acting] with the implicit or even explicit approval of the Stasi.” Whether or not they were in fact agents of the state, acting at their behest or with their tacit approval, it is clear that the Nazi group was not only distinct but hostile to the nonviolent campaigners. In that sense it was obvious to all parties that there was no collaboration—or

86 Fulbrook 1995, 237.
87 Ibid., 237-238.
affiliation—between the Nazi groups and the campaign against the communist regime. These Nazis were essentially political bandits (Rebellion Index=1) or 

agents provocateurs.

The second violent actor is the Red Army Faction, formerly the terrorist organization Baader-Meinhof Group, and it may be categorized as “other violent actor” and specifically as a small (estimated 10 to 20 people) terrorist group with maximalist aims (their objective was to create more socialist states in Europe). Even though they had maximalist goals, the Red Army Faction was not against the target state of the nonviolent movement. Essentially, the nonviolent movement and terrorist group did not share the same “grievances.” Quite the opposite, in fact: the government of East Germany “provided logistical support, training, and safe haven to the Red Army Faction.” They operated in East and West Germany from 1978 until 1992, and despite their small size they were able to carry out several deadly terrorist attacks. The group targeted U.S. military facilities, as well as German business and some political leaders, which makes sense given their “loosely” Communist ideology.

4.1.3 Coding Variables

Figure 5: Values of Five Causal Variables – East Germany Case

START Dataset.
**Figure 6: Aggregate of Five Causal Variables – East Germany Case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>IA. Nonviolent Discipline</th>
<th>IB. Violent Flank</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors</th>
<th>EC. Agents P.</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>East Germany 1989</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (out of 7)</td>
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</table>

### 4.1.4 Preliminary Evaluation of Impact

Even though it was not the only contributing factor, many of the analyses I read attributed the use of nonviolence as one of the reasons for the restraint of the Stasi during the large demonstrations in mid September, October and early November. As Fulbrook notes: “The very non-violence of the demonstrators *served to defuse the possibility of violent repression* by the authorities; while at the same time the loss of the external cordon of force, the Iron Curtain, made the issue of internal force all the more central.”[^89] There were also no internal armed wings to speak of. As far as nonviolent discipline and the absence of armed wings are concerned, this case bolsters the civil resistance causal mechanisms in that nonviolent purity is correlated with the campaign’s success.

The two contemporaneous external armed groups were aligned with the state more than anything—they presented no threat to the target regime of the nonviolent campaign (the SED). Insofar as the Nazi groups harassed and intimidated the peace prayers and church groups, the violent group had a negative impact, albeit a minor one. From the sources I consulted it does not appear that the Nazi groups had any important effect on the protesters—the threat of state repression, which mainly came from the Stasi, during demonstrations was much more significant.[^90] Indeed, many academics attribute the lack of subversion in years prior due to the

[^89]: Fulbrook 1995, 247. (Emphasis mine)
[^90]: Joppke 1995, 140. One month after the fraudulent elections in the spring of 1989 opposition groups failed to mobilize more than 250 protesters to the street. 1,000 Stasi agents showed up to the protest.
strength and viciousness of the security forces.\textsuperscript{91} I also contend that the Red Army faction did not have an effect on the nonviolent movement. The terrorist group was far too small and it was not mentioned once in the sources I read—only in the START dataset. In conclusion, the East Germany case does not challenge the conventional arguments in the civil resistance literature: nonviolent discipline was maintained, defections occurred, and the armed groups that were present during the campaign were small, clearly unaligned with the nonviolent movement, and did not threaten the state.

\textbf{4.2 Kosovo Albanian Revolution in Yugoslavia (Target: Serbia) 1989-1999}

\textbf{4.2.1 Background}

An autonomous province of Serbia since 1974, albeit with equal representation to Serbia on the federal presidency, Kosovo had a population of approximately 2 million people in 1989. 90% were ethnic Albanian and the majority of those were Muslim, although there were 55,000 Catholics.\textsuperscript{92} Even though the majority of the population was rural, Kosovo’s mining, electrical plants and chemical factories were important to Yugoslavia’s economy, and the territory had strategic military value as a “buffer” zone to the south. For Serbs in particular, Kosovo also has symbolic value: “Serbs regard it as ‘the cradle of Serbian civilization’” and the Serbian Orthodox Church is based there. Ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs (a minority in Kosovo) had coexisted for centuries in Kosovo, but “[t]he manipulation of these symbols has been at the root of [the province’s] recent misfortunes.” Serbian authorities view Albanians as immigrants and “twice in the twentieth century they have sought to ‘repatriate’ Albanians to Turkey,” and the Serbian

\textsuperscript{91} Joppke 1995, Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{92} Clark 2000, xix.
population generally holds them in no better concept. In fact, “as a consequence of [deep-seated] ignorance, miseducation, and unexamined bigotry, even Serbian political opposition and pro-democracy supporters largely hold militant anti-Albanian positions.” These sentiments translated into particularly drastic political actions in the mid and late 1980s.

In 1989, Serbia started stripping away Kosovo’s autonomy and rights under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 and favored the “re-Serbianization” of the province. Kosovars responded by resisting these encroachments nonviolently and demanding independence from Serbia until 1999. One of their first actions was a miners’ strike that galvanized the vast majority of the ethnic Albanian population: students, doctors, teachers, and others joined the miners and brought the area to a standstill. Later that year, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) were created, and became the loci of the nonviolent movement. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, a steadfast proponent of “passive resistance” and head of the LDK, Kosovars initially tried methods such as demonstrations, labor strikes and hunger strikes. Not only did the Serbs ignore their demands and responded with brutality, but they pushed further with their project: the Serbian government banned the Kosovar police, closed Albanian-language schools and imposed a uniform curriculum, prohibited Kosovo’s doctors and nurses from continuing their practice, and shut down Pristina’s radio and TV stations.

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93 Clark 2000, xx.
94 Reitan 2000, 79.
95 Reitan 2000, 81.
96 Kosovars were at first seeking to reclaim their constitutional rights, but then made maximalist goals: “As repression escalated and no resolution was forthcoming, their demands intensified to complete independence.” (Reitan 2000, 73)
97 “…[T]raditionally Communist workers of the Stari Trg mines [in the Trepča valley] marched to Pristina to demonstrate their opposition to any constitutional change and were soon joined by thousands from all sectors of Albanian society.” (Reitan 2000, 74)
Kosovo boycotted Serbia’s elections in 1990, young men emigrated to avoid conscription into the Yugoslav army, and established a complete parallel system of government, which by 1992 included “...an independent, democratically elected government and a separate school system, health care system, and mechanism for collecting taxes...”\textsuperscript{98} In 1991 Kosovo parliamentarians declared independence, the Republic of Kosova formed a government-in-exile, ethnic Albanians again boycotted the 1992 Serbian elections, continued to operate through their parallel institutions largely funded by remittances from refugees abroad, and made significant appeals to the international community. No country other than Albania recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence.\textsuperscript{99}

By 1994 the LDK showed signs of strain and internal splits given their inability to produce results, the youth started radicalizing, and factions became convinced that armed resistance was the only way forward. Irredentist warfare became a reality in 1996 and it ended in 1999 with NATO’s bombing campaign. While the nonviolent movement persevered, intensified their actions and defied the Serbian government with their parallel institutions, “...armed resistance surged and Serbs reciprocated with indiscriminate violence against the Albanian population...”\textsuperscript{100} The United States and Europeans failed to give the Kosovars a seat at the table in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which the Kosovo parliament perceived as the ultimate humiliation and neglect from the international community. The Dayton Agreements did not touch the issue of Kosovo and Rugova lost more support at home.\textsuperscript{101} The armed insurrection had been organizing since 1992 and in April 1996, the UÇK or KLA (Kosova Liberation Army), claimed their first attacks. International outrage and condemnation for Serbian massacres in

\textsuperscript{98} Reitan 2000, 74.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{101} Waller et al. 2001, 21-22.
Kosovo increased and led to the Rambouillet talks in France in February 1999. The parties could come to no agreement\(^\text{102}\) and given the continued assaults on the Kosovar population, NATO began bombing Serbian forces in Kosovo and civil infrastructure throughout Serbia on March 24, 1999. Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo in June of the same year. Kosovo remained part of Yugoslavia, but it became a UN Protectorate and NAVCO codes the nonviolent movement as having ended in 1999.

4.2.2 Presence of Violent Actor(s)

**Internal – Nonviolent Discipline:** Even though the movement was mainly nonviolent, there were several incidents of violence, particularly against the Serbian minority in Kosovo. For example, following the alleged poisoning of Albanian schoolchildren\(^\text{103}\) in 1990 there were reports of “at least 50 personal attacks on Kosovo Serbs.”\(^\text{104}\) But given that Rugova and the LDK adamantly rejected the use of force, called on protesters to remain nonviolent, and condemned acts of violence, Kosovo should to be coded as predominantly nonviolent.

**Internal – Violent Flank:** By 1996 the more radical youth elements broke off from the nonviolent movement and joined a Macedonian-grown armed insurrection called the KLA, but they did not technically constitute an internal armed flank of the nonviolent movement. The KLA rejected the LDK’s leadership and approach, and the nonviolent movement condemned the KLA’s activities. Both actors shared similar goals of an independent Kosovo, but their leaderships were distinct.

\(^{102}\) The Kosovo Albanians did sign an agreement but Milosevic failed to do so: “...[U]nder intense pressure from the United States, the Albanian delegation signed up for the peace plan in March.” (LeBor 2006, 277)

\(^{103}\) The case has never been fully resolved, but thousands of children were poisoned and the ethnic Albanian blamed the Serbs. “...[I]nternational experts trusted by the Kosovo Albanians never found conclusively that poisoning did not occur. Serbian and federal authorities worked to block local investigations and to hinder treatment of the children. As a result, competing Truths created by the “poisoning case” have never been settled...” (Mertus 1999, 197)

\(^{104}\) Clark 2000, 58.
and, as far as I could tell from the literature I consulted, they did not collaborate. Indeed, “[t]he pacifist leader Ibrahim Rugova refused to support the KLA’s armed struggle.”

External – Armed Insurrection: There were two external armed insurrections in Kosovo during the period from 1989 to 1999: the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKÇK). The Kosovo Liberation Army was formed in Macedonia in 1992 with the purpose of creating a “Greater Albania” with ethnic Albanians from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. Under the political leadership of Hashim Thaçi and the command of General Sulejman Selimi, KLA’s foot soldiers wore uniforms and the organization had some hierarchy, but they operated in “dispersed cells” and carried out terrorist attacks. Dissatisfaction with Rugova’s approach led many ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to join their movement and to redirect funds from parallel institutions to the purchase of Kalashnikovs. “The KLA’s support came from young radicals released from prison, and former soldiers and police officers who had weapons training.” Membership swelled from 500 in the early ‘90s to 20,000 strong in 1999, while the KLA attacked Serbian citizens in Kosovo, and Serbian police and armed forces. The nonviolent movement, through their leader Ibrahim Rugova, distanced themselves from the armed movement, but Slobodan Milosevic’s relentless terror campaign in Kosovo did not differentiate between the KLA and other guerrilla groups, the nonviolent campaign, or innocent civilians.

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105 LeBor 2006, 287.
106 The KLA broke off from the Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK), a small radical group that formed in 1982 with the belief that Kosovo’s liberation had to come through armed struggle.
107 In the spring of 1997, Albania’s government collapsed, the army dissolved and the police fled. As a consequence, “...state armories were thrown open, releasing a million Kalashnikovs on to the market...The significance of this was not lost to the Kosovars.” (Waller et al. 2001, 22) The lack of arms, which was restraining KLA activity, was suddenly not an issue.
108 LeBor 2006, 278.
109 Reitan 2000, 93; START Dataset.
The second rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKÇK), also emerged out of the same small radical group from where the KLA came: the Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK) of 1982. LPK, a much smaller group than the KLA, broadly believed that armed struggle was the only way to achieve liberation for Kosovo and the LKÇK shared the same view, but with a strong Marxist-Leninist leaning. As a left-wing guerrilla group, they perpetrated attacks against civilians, and the Serbian police and armed forces. Composed of a “mostly youthful membership,” “virtually all served with the [KLA], though they regard themselves as a distinct organization.\textsuperscript{110}

**External – Other Armed Actors:** There were two actors that can be classified as “other”: Macedonia Dawn and Serbian irregulars. Macedonia Dawn was small and short-lived terrorist organization based in the Republic of Macedonia that claimed responsibility for an explosion near the headquarters of Kosovo peacekeeping forces in Skopje in 1999. Macedonian police arrested ten ethnic Serbs who were involved in the bombing and the terrorist group was never heard of again. Some doubt if it ever existed as an organization of more than ten people and to do something beyond the Skopje bombing.\textsuperscript{111}

The second were Serb paramilitaries or “Serbian irregulars”\textsuperscript{112} funded by the Milosevic regime and who performed the “dirty work” for the Yugoslav army. Among those groups were the Tigers who, “under the direction of the indicted war criminal “Arkan” Zeljko Raznjatovic, ominously walked the streets of Pristina and Podujeva.”\textsuperscript{113} As Serbian nationalist hardliners and

\textsuperscript{110} ICG 1999, 7.
\textsuperscript{111} START Dataset.
\textsuperscript{112} The Expanded Non-State Actor Dataset (1945-2001) by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009 call these actors “Serbian Irregulars.”
\textsuperscript{113} Reitan 2000, 88.
loosely following orders from the Serbian government, they were ruthless and did not distinguish between civilians, nonviolent activists, or rebels.

External – Agents Provocateurs: I found no information about agents provocateurs acting at the behest of the Serbian government, infiltrating and perpetrating violence in nonviolent protests. Instead, the Serbian government sent its paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army to directly subdue the activists.

4.2.3 Coding Variables

Figure 7: Values of Five Causal Variables – Kosovo Case

Figure 8: Aggregate of Five Causal Variables – Kosovo Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>IA. Nonviolent Discipline</th>
<th>IB. Violent Flank</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors</th>
<th>EC. Agents Provocateurs</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo 1989-1999</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3 (out of 7)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4.2.4 Preliminary Evaluation of Impact

Given that the Kosovar nonviolent movement was coded as a failure in NAVCO, it would be tempting to simplify and attribute the shortcomings to the parallel external armed insurrection
and the presence of other violent actors. However, there are many reasons why Kosovars were unable to attain independence and why it was a rebel movement that received the most international attention in the form of a NATO bombing.\(^\text{114}\) The following is an attempt to put the role of the various armed actors in perspective and summarize the ways in which they affected the nonviolent campaign. Internally, the nonviolent campaign remained steadfast in its rejection of violence despite the major blows from the Serbian security forces, and Rugova condemned violence perpetrated by ethnic Albanians against Serb civilians. Coupled with this discipline, the success that Kosovars had in creating a parallel system of government to preserve their language, culture and their children’s education, was remarkable and aligns with what makes campaigns more likely to succeed in theory. One could argue that repression would have been worse had they used violence—because it was worse when the KLA launched its armed insurrection—yet the Serbian police and irregulars steadily increased their callousness during the nonviolent campaign: “...Serbia’s aggressive acts against Albanians, terrorist interference in Albanians’ daily lives increased throughout the nonviolent period.”\(^\text{115}\) Despite the failure to earn generalized support from Serbs, “[t]he Kosovo crackdown [in 1998] and the international outcry ... began to trigger splits within the Milosevic regime.”\(^\text{116}\)

The major problems were the insurmountable disdain that the majority of the Serbian population—even those against Milosevic—have against Kosovars and the lack of action by the international community when the nonviolent movement pleaded for recognition of an independent state. Under these circumstances, it seems almost impossible to “win over” the Serbian population so that they would have mounted pressure against Milosevic, let alone the

\(^{114}\) For an in-depth discussion of why the campaign failed, see Reitan 2000.
\(^{115}\) Reitan 2000, 87.
\(^{116}\) LeBor 2006, 278.
armed forces and police so that they defected. The LDK did make tangible improvements in people’s lives, especially through parallel institutions, but it ultimately failed in attaining independence and even in getting back the autonomy lost in 1989. The armed insurrection that slowly gained more clout, recruits in Kosovo and the military backing of NATO, overshadowed the nonviolent movement. The KLA, which had been named a terrorist organization by the United States in the early and mid 1990s, became NATO’s most important strategic partner in the 1999 bombing and ending Milosevic’s operation in Kosovo. In fact, scholars argue that “...NATO would not have intervened in Yugoslavia without the emergence of the KLA.”117 The Rambouillet agreement, the NATO intervention with the KLA, and the UN mission secured more autonomy for Kosovo.

As far as external actors go, the armed insurrection “eclipsed” the nonviolent movement even though peaceful activists tried to maintain their institutions and continue challenging Serbian control.118 The LDK lost monetary support as the KLA fundraised for weapons: remittances suddenly started going to Kalashnikovs instead of schools. This is evidence of a negative flank effect and presents a challenge to Haines’ argument regarding fundraising in the American Civil Rights Movement.119 The youth joined the armed struggle in more numbers than the demonstrations. The armed insurrection did not delegitimize the nonviolent movement in the sense that people failed to feel sympathy or support the Kosovar cause because they had resorted to arms. The differences between the LDK and the KLA were clear in the eyes of international community, ethnic Albanians and even Serbs; therefore, the nonviolent movement did not have

118 Reitan 2000, 72.
119 Haines (1984) argues that the more moderate wing of the American Civil Rights Movement, led by Martin Luther King, received more funding due to the radicalization of some parts of the movement. The idea is that people were more willing to put their money behind a group that they believed could appease the extremists, and that would be more reasonable in their demands and tactics.
disassociation concerns. The problem was the opposite: Rugova’s nonviolent attempt had failed in the eyes of the population and now they chose armed struggle, but they knew the peaceful activists would not follow. The international community unfortunately sent the unintended message that it would intervene aggressively in response to an armed struggle and not a nonviolent one.\textsuperscript{120}

The Serb irregulars had the same effect on the nonviolent movement as the Serbian police and other state security forces: they killed, intimidated, raped, and oppressed civilians and nonviolent activists. In that sense they certainly had a negative effect on the nonviolent campaign, as they exacerbated the sense of helplessness of the people and doubts about the ability of nonviolent action to prevail. The Macedonian Dawn had no effect on the nonviolent movement, as its sole attack was against the UN in 1999. There is no evidence of a positive flank effect from any of the armed actors because even the KLA, which had similar goals and attained some of them, did not boost the nonviolent campaign’s ability to achieve its goals. I assume that it is for those reasons that Chenoweth and Stephan code the KLA as a separate, violent campaign that ended in “limited success” and the nonviolent campaign has having failed.\textsuperscript{121} It would be interesting to explore how the nonviolent campaign might have legitimized, especially in the eyes of the West, the armed insurrection that came as a result of failed peaceful attempts.

\textsuperscript{120} To the credit of the international community, repression during the armed resistance period was far crueler and indiscriminate than during the nonviolent campaign. In addition, the scale of repression in Kosovo during the height of the nonviolent campaign was dwarfed by the genocidal atrocities and full-scale war in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{121} Chenoweth and Stephan 2008c.
4.3 Belarus (Target: Communist Regime) 1989

4.3.1 Background

Prior to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster of April 26 1986, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) did not have visible aspirations for independence from the Soviet Union except in artistic and intellectual circles. A group of twenty-eight intellectuals sent a letter to Mikhail S. Gorbachev in 1985, for instance, pleading “...to prevent the ‘spiritual extinction’ of the Belorussian nation and laid out measures for the introduction of Belorussian as a working language in party, state, and local government bodies and at all levels of education, publishing, mass media, and other fields.”¹²² Not much came from these efforts. But Moscow’s failure to announce the accident in a timely manner, evacuate people, start the clean up, and give compensations was a source of great anger for the Belorussian people.

Soon thereafter, in 1988, archeologist Zyanon Paznyak made a discovery that alienated the population from the Soviet Union and sparked “political nationalism”: a mass grave of up to 300,000 of Stalin’s victims in Kurapaty. The demand for truth and accountability brought approximately ten thousand people to the streets, but riot police met them and the protest ended in deadly clashes. Later that year, those most eager for reform organized under the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF).¹²³ Paznyak, now involved in politics, became the voice of the movement as BPF’s chairman. Another opposition organization, the Organizational Committee of the Confederation of Belorussian Youth Associations, was calling for ‘radical restructuring of

¹²² Fedor 1995; Zaprudnik 1993, 126.
¹²³ The constituent congress took place in June 1989 and out of a “total 280 delegates, 243 had college or higher degrees, 201 were younger than forty years, 118 delegates were students, educators, scientists, scholars, writers or artists, while another 100 were engineers and civil servants.” They were largely “unconnected with the vast majority of Belarusians, unable to coopt a single member of the ruling elite.” (Savchenko 2009, 154)
Belorussians’ lack of nationalism, political apathy, and their inability to stage protests in Belarus—they were only permitted to gather in Vilnius, Lithuania.  

Public opinion did not reflect a desire to separate from the Soviet Union and this understanding was confirmed by a referendum in 1991, which “showed that 83 percent of Belorussians wanted to preserve the Soviet Union.” Belarus was one of the most developed and prosperous of the Soviet republics; therefore, they entered the period of perestroika with domestic tranquility and confidence, unlike other neighboring republics. As the “Soviet civilization” started to crumble the transformation was “protracted and painful.” Alyaksandr Lukashenka was elected in 1994 partly due to his policy of close ties to Russia—which included unification—and his emphasis on anti-corruption. The BSSR became the Republic of Belarus two weeks after Russia declared independence, following a coup and the parting away of Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine. In addition to these messages, political participation in these elections was extremely low.

125 Savchenko 2009, 154.
126 Fedor 1995; Savchenko 2009. Since the mass migration from rural to urban areas in the 1960s, people gained access to such conveniences as “indoor plumbing and hot water, central heating, stores with a selection of processed foodstuffs, and modern health care facilities.” Given that urban Belarus was more Russian speaking and oriented toward the Soviet Union, people started embracing the cultural shift and associating the Belarusian language and and rural society with backwardness. In fact, by the 1970s no school in Minsk used Belarusian as the “language of instruction” and these changes took place without much upheaval from the population. (Savchenko 2009, 141-142)
127 Savchenko 2009, 144.
128 A concrete example of political apathy and attachment to the Soviet Union: “Of the 360 seats in the legislature, fifteen were unfilled (at least eleven remained so more than a year later); of those elected, 86 percent belonged to the Communist Party of Belorussia (CPB). ... A majority of the republic’s population, 83 percent, also voted conservatively in the March 17 all-union referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, even though the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic on June 27, 1990.” (Fedor 1995) Only 27 seats of
NAVCO codes this yearlong campaign as having had limited success because the popular front gained seats in parliament in 1990 and was able to extract some concessions to protect the language, namely a law making Belarusian the official language of the state.\textsuperscript{129} No large-scale defections occurred, although they did gain some supporters from the Byelorussian Communist Party (BCP), and it was not until 1991 that Minsk declared independence: “Following the August 1991 coup d'état in Moscow and declarations of independence by Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet in Minsk declared the independence of Belarus on August 25, 1991, by giving its Declaration of State Sovereignty the status of a constitutional document and renaming the country the Republic of Belarus.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{4.3.2 Presence of Violent Actor(s)}

\textit{Internal – Nonviolent Discipline:} As far I was able to gather from the sources, the Byelorussian Popular Front (BPF) and affiliated participants maintained virtually perfect nonviolent discipline. There was one-sided repression and harassment from the state in the form of beatings, arrests, use of tear gas and water cannons, unleashing of aggressive dogs, and libel in the press. Since their inception, they tried to provide no justification for onslaught: “Leaders of the ... Belarusian Popular Front gained experience addressing potential constituencies, creating grass-roots networks, mobilizing supporters and, perhaps most importantly, keeping the scale of the protest within limits that would not provoke the authorities to a comprehensive crackdown, which would endanger the future of the movement.”\textsuperscript{131} The elected president of the BPF, Paznyak, in his

\makebox[1\textwidth][c]{\textsuperscript{129} Zaprudnik 1993, 121.}\textsuperscript{130} Fedor 1995.\textsuperscript{131} Savchenko 2009, 153.
speeches and statements emphasized order, assured Soviet authorities that they would not cause chaos, and even urged people to respect the rule of law.

Given their nonviolent discipline on the one hand, but their limited success on the other, one wonders what was missing from the movement. Authors seem to agree that the most important shortcoming of the campaign was the lack of widespread popular interest in the group’s nationalistic and “anti-Russification” objectives. Once the few BPF members were elected into parliament in 1990, the language law passed, and the Republic of Belarus was born in 1991, the movement became more of an institutionalized opposition against more traditional and Soviet-minded politicians. I would go as far as to say that the limited success would have been impossible had the BPF resorted to violence, mainly because of the difficulty they faced getting people behind their cause. Their grievances about language and culture, and Byelorussia’s suffering under Stalin, became more legitimate as time went on in part thanks to their good-natured humor and inspiring discourse.\footnote{See the collection of political cartoons and leadership statements in Zaprudnik 1993.}

Internal – Violent Flank: I found no evidence of an internal armed wing in all the sources in the bibliography for Belarus during 1989.

External – Other Armed Actors and Agents Provocateurs: I found no evidence of other armed actors and agents provocateurs in all the sources in the bibliography for Belarus during 1989.

4.3.3 Coding Variables

Figure 9: Values of Five Causal Variables – Belarus 1989 Case
Figure 10: Aggregate of Five Causal Variables – Belarus 1989 Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>IA. Nonviolent Discipline</th>
<th>IB. Violent Flank</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors</th>
<th>EC. Agents Provocateurs</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.3.4 Preliminary Evaluation of Impact

Given the absence of violent actors there is no impact to speak of.

4.4 YUGOSLAVIA (TARGET: MILOSEVIC REGIME) 2000

4.4.1 Background

In the mid and late 1990s Slobodan Milosevic started losing popularity in Serbia, although overt demonstrations were relatively irregular and concentrated in and around the University of Belgrade. The wider public in the cities joined the students later, but repression against dissent was severe at that time. It was not the wars against Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, but rather the abysmal economic conditions and cronyism that pushed Serbs to vote for the opposition during the 1996 municipal elections. For Milosevic’s most ardent supporters, who have traditionally been “workers in the provinces, pensioners and peasants, it was falling wages,
rising prices and crime statistics, empty store shelves, energy shortages, and too much corruption by officials high and low that triggered their revolt at the polls.”

Dissent during the ‘90s is not coded as part of the civil resistance movement in NAVCO because the groups initially had reformist goals. For instance, following the municipal elections where the opposition won the most important urban areas, including Belgrade, the Serbian government initially failed to recognize the results. By late 1999 and 2000, however, the objective became ousting Milosevic and the opposition grew to include many sectors of society, including the Serbian Orthodox Church, miners, peasants, workers, and the usual strongholds in the urban areas.

With mounting pressure, and optimistic that he would win, Milosevic announced federal elections before his term was set to expire in 2001, and a mere two months prior to the vote. Otpor (Resistance), a decentralized and youth-run movement that had been organizing for many years and enjoyed more popularity than political parties at this point, played a major role in these elections. Their offices across the country—including in rural areas—and membership base in the thousands allowed them “...essentially to shame 18 opposition parties into forming a coalition known as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), and promised them they would deliver at least 500,000 votes if the coalition launched a common candidate for federal president.”

Otpor also had a broad network of contacts, some within the government, and knew about the presidential elections two weeks prior to Milosevic’s announcement. DOS’s candidate for the

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133 Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001, 104.
134 “Police in full battle gear confronted the protesters daily, but in the end, the regime, yielding to the combined pressure of the protesters, the international community, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, recognized the results of the election. [Zoran] Djindjic became the first democratically elected mayor of Belgrade in more than 50 years.” (Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001, 98-99)
135 Misosevic made the announcement on July 27, 2000 and elections were set for September 24.
137 Ibid., 325.
presidency was Vojislav Kostunica, a moderate nationalist intellectual, and he became the president of Yugoslavia on October 6.

But Milosevic did not leave without a last fight: he announced outright victory the day after the elections even though the opposition had counted that Kostunica won by more than 50% of the vote. DOS and Otpor called for a countrywide general strike to culminate in a massive demonstration in the center of Belgrade. The miners and electric plant workers, joined by hundreds of thousands of people, were on the verge of bringing the economy to a standstill and making the country go without electricity.\textsuperscript{138} The march toward Belgrade marked the end for Milosevic as his security forces refused to follow orders to stop the crowd’s entrance to government buildings. The plan was to take over the parliament and the television station. Some demonstrators had sticks, baseball bats and metal bars as they “stormed in the government buildings,” and proceeded to set it on fire with Molotov cocktails.\textsuperscript{139} They did the same while taking over the television station, but clashes were worse here: the director of the station, Dragoljub Milanovic, was severely beaten, as were other male journalists, and “women were abused and spat on.”\textsuperscript{140} In the end, Milosevic conceded Kostunica’s victory that day and many of his government members resigned.

4.4.2 Presence of Violent Actor(s)

Internal – Nonviolent Discipline: The two major actors involved in the nonviolent campaign that brought Milosevic’s regime to an end were Otpor and DOS. Otpor was committed to nonviolence and rejected the use of violence. At their founding, Otpor “…members firmly

\textsuperscript{138} Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001, 105.
\textsuperscript{139} Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001, 106; LeBor 2004, 310; Paulson 2005, 336.
\textsuperscript{140} LeBor 2004, 311; Paulson 2005, 336.
committed the organization to the use of only nonviolent forms of resistance."\textsuperscript{141} In the sources I consulted I did not find any instances of Otpor leaders encouraging or using violence against their opponents—not only in 2000 but also during the 1990s. The 18-party coalition of DOS, however, is more dubious on its pledge to remain nonviolent and reject violence. Kostunica, who as the presidential candidate was the leader of the coalition, made statements rejecting violence and maintained his position even after the elections. Responding to the elections commission about their proposal to repeat the elections, he said: “This is an offer that must be rejected. The victory is obvious, and we will defend it \textit{by all nonviolent means}.”\textsuperscript{142} The DOS coalition and certainly Otpor maintained nonviolent discipline during the pre-elections coalition-building, the get-out-the-vote campaign, and other activities related to the race. However, DOS as a whole was clearly not committed to nonviolence on the march to Belgrade following the strike: “In the southern city of Cacak, an opposition stronghold ruled by fiery mayor Vladimir Ilic, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was building its own private militia of shock troops. Disgruntled army officers, policemen, karate champions, body builders and criminals trained for the final showdown.”\textsuperscript{143} Chanting “Revolution or Death!,” Ilic led ten thousand people out of Cacak in a “convoy of 230 trucks, 52 buses and hundreds of cars” carrying “Kalashnikovs, pistols, rocket-propelled grenades and even mortars.”\textsuperscript{144} They were preparing in case Milosevic’s feared praetorian guard or security service’s Special Operations Unit (JSO), would in the end not defect and attack the protesters. In the end the JSO did not shoot at protesters despite attacks at the television station and the parliament building.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{141} Paulson 2005, 318.  
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 327. (Emphasis mine)  
\textsuperscript{143} LeBor 2004, 301.  
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 309.  
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 311-312.
Even though Otpor and DOS worked closely together, especially during the race, elections and subsequent strike, the two organizations are clearly distinct and they had their differences. Indeed, “[c]onservative, law-abiding Kostunica did not like Otpor, and the feeling was mutual. But everyone focused on the primary objective: Gotov je (He is finished).”\textsuperscript{146} Given that part of the leadership of the movement—namely some elements in DOS—saw a place for violence in some instances of the campaign, such as during the taking over of government buildings, the leadership is coded with a 2. Also, since some followers used violence on that day and they were not, as far as I could tell from the sources, condemned by the leadership, they also get a 2.

Internal – Violent Flank: I found no evidence of an internal armed wing in all the sources in the bibliography for Yugoslavia in 2000. I decided not to code DOS’s deviation from strict nonviolence as an armed wing because their methods were primarily nonviolent and because the arming came only at the very end of the campaign.

External – Other Armed Actors and Agents Provocateurs: I found no evidence of external armed actors or agents provocateurs in all the sources in the bibliography for Yugoslavia in 2000. The government did, however, launch a libel campaign to delegitimize the movement by accusing them of violence. For instance, “[o]n May 16, the government accused Otpor of planting bombs at the offices of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Left, the political party run by Milosevic’s wife. Otpor was also accused of attempting to murder the prominent Milosevic ally, and of assassinating Bosko Perosevic, the Socialist Party governor of the Vojvodina province.”\textsuperscript{147} In addition, the government also banned Otpor and labeled it a “violent

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 307.  
\textsuperscript{147} Paulson 2005, 323-324.
terrorist organization.” These actions signal possible agents provocateurs, but I was unable to find any evidence of this.

4.4.3 Coding Variables

**Figure 11:** Values of Five Causal Variables – Yugoslavia Case

![Diagram showing values of five causal variables for the Yugoslavia case.]

**Figure 12:** Aggregate of Five Causal Variables – Yugoslavia Case

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Campaigns</th>
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<th>IB. Violent Flank: No</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection: No</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors: No</th>
<th>EC. Agents Provocateurs: No</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1 (out of 7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.4 Preliminary Evaluation of Impact

Otpor activists who have been interviewed since their success contend that nonviolent discipline and the repression with which security forces met them only helped to gain more support. In effect, state repression backfired by increasing their membership base and delegitimitizing the government: “When the repression against the movement began in earnest

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shortly after the Otpor founding congress, it was welcomed by the group, as they found there was a direct correlation between arrests of Otpor members and membership spurts.” Also in line with the civil resistance literature, Otpor and DOS’s broad base of support, which included some of Milosevic’s traditional centers of support in the rural areas, enabled them to reach inside the government, get crucial information and persuade officials to defect. These contacts also decreased repression, especially during the last few days of the strike. Even though a few elements planned for armed counterattacks, and clashes against the opponent occurred, the lack of nonviolent discipline took place at a very late stage in the campaign. They used violence after most of the security forces had agreed to side with protesters and leave Milosevic. Although a counterfactual, if one follows Otpor’s logic about the positive impact of their nonviolent discipline, one could argue that had the opposition used violence prior to securing defections, the outcome could have gone awry. Other than some in the DOS coalition, there were no other violent elements during the campaign of 2000.

4.5 Belarus (Belorussian Government) 2006

4.5.1 Background

The Belorussian people went to the polls on March 19 2006 for presidential elections. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who had been the country for twelve years, took measures to ensure a landslide victory and to quell down quickly any post-elections protest. But the president did not expect an important backlash from tampering with the results. Indeed, he was popular:

149 Paulson 2005, 323.
150 The police failed to crackdown on miners who ceased to work although they had been ordered to do so.
“Belarus’s economy had been improving, and the country’s largest independent polling agency estimated that he had won 63 percent of the vote.” 152

“While the Belarusian opposition lost the election and still lacks a clear vision of how democratic change can be brought about, it matured organizationally, extended its influence beyond the traditional core of activists, and discovered new ways of sustaining civil resistance and democratic activism in the face of worsening repression.” 153 Preparing a year in advance of the elections, the opposition managed to put their weight behind one candidate. The Congress of Democratic Forces (CDF) chose Alyaksandr Milinkevich, “a veteran civil society organizer with strong roots in the NGO sector,” who was also backed by the “right-of-center and nationalist Belarusian Popular Front.” 154 Two other opposition candidates also joined the race, including Alyaksandr Kazulin who was “badly beat” with clubs by policemen after mounting “scathing verbal attacks” about Lukashenka’s personal life and finances during his radio slot.

“While the opposition rallied its own base fairly well, it made no dent in Lukashenka’s. Even the best efforts at grassroots organizing could not overcome the informational and administrative barriers that the regime had put up. The opposition stressed political issues such as the importance of democracy and human rights, an emphasis that proved to have limited appeal.” 155 The government also slandered the opposition by accusing them of trying to set off bombs and attacking the authorities. “In trying to associate regime critics with violence, the government was preparing public opinion to accept whatever measures the security forces might

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152 Ibid., 138.
153 Ibid., 138-139.
154 Ibid., 141.
155 Silitski 2006, 143.
They eventually succeeded after a demonization campaign following the announcement of electoral results.

Thousands went to the streets as the fraudulent results were announced and riot police were immediately deployed. A media propaganda campaign culminated in hostile public opinion against the protesters. Having never reached massive numbers participation dwindled as the state did not show signs of buckling. “Not only had there been no exit polling or parallel vote count allowed, but more importantly everyone—including opposition leaders and activists—knew that Lukashenka had actually received more valid votes than his challengers.”

Without a clear objective for the post-elections protests the unrest subsided.

4.5.2 Presence of Violent Actor(s)

Internal – Nonviolent Discipline: As was the 1989 uprising, the opposition operated within the legal framework of Belarus—even though it is a very oppressive one—and rejected the use of force. I did not find any evidence suggesting violent action from the part of political candidates, civil society leaders and post-elections protesters. Repression was again solely one-sided coming from the state. The campaign experienced similar shortcomings as in 1989 concerning their ability to spark a strong desire for democracy of a critical mass of people. This time around it was not only apathy and a lack of nationalism, but a carefully orchestrated plan to make sure that the opposition could not win. Government tactics included: changing the date of the elections to make campaigning difficult during the cold winter and less intense due to the holiday season, shortening the duration of the race, intimidating and harassing the opposition, controlling the media and allotting a small amount of air time to the candidates, and preparing an efficient and

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156 Ibid., 144.
157 Ibid., 146.
unrelenting response to quell post-elections protests, among others. The opposition did not resort to violence, but they were unsuccessful. The campaign is coded as a failure in NAVCO.

**Internal – Violent Flank:** I found no evidence of violent flanks or *agents provocateurs* in all the sources in the bibliography for Belarus during 2006.

**External – Other Armed Actors and Agents Provocateurs:** I found no evidence of other armed actors and agents provocateurs in all the sources in the bibliography for Belarus during 2006.

### 4.5.3 Coding Variables

**Figure 13:** Values of Five Causal Variables – Belarus 2006 Case

![Diagram showing values of five causal variables for Belarus 2006 case.]

**Figure 14:** Aggregate of Five Causal Variables – Belarus 2006 Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns</th>
<th>IA. Nonviolent Discipline</th>
<th>IB. Violent Flank</th>
<th>EA. Armed Insurrection</th>
<th>EB. Other Armed Actors</th>
<th>EC. Agents Provocateurs</th>
<th>Presence of Violent Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus 2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (out of 7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.5.4 Preliminary Evaluation of Impact

Given the absence of violent actors there is no impact to speak of.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This paper is an attempt to further the much-needed debate between the study of armed conflict and nonviolent social movements. The prevailing view in the civil resistance literature is that “[j]ust as [small amounts of] water can contaminate the fuel used in our cars ... nonviolent movements can also have contaminants that make them inefficient or even destroy them.”158 The fact that there are many successful nonviolent campaigns with small and large amounts of violent elements presents a fascinating puzzle—that which sparked this research. Given the varying types of violent actors and their relationships to the nonviolent movement, there is good reason to suspect that their impact on campaign outcome will not be uniform. I contend that the violent actor’s goals, tactics and affiliation to the nonviolent campaign matter and can help us determine the effect on campaign outcome. If the violent group has maximalist goals against the state—as does the nonviolent movement—the flank effect is more likely to be negative because the state, threatened by two groups, will lump them together and justify massive repression. In some cases, however, this “lumping together” or justification process is not needed, as was the case in Kosovo: Milosevic ordered indiscriminate repression against the KLA, the nonviolent movement and civilians without incurring many domestic political costs. At the international level, though, he did suffer a heavy cost imposed by NATO’s military intervention. Despite this cost for Milosevic, the nonviolent movement was eclipsed by the armed insurrection and even more so when NATO troops partnered with the KLA. In the other cases there were either no violent actors (such as the two Belarus cases) or the armed actors did not have maximalist goals against the state as in East Germany. In East Germany the violent groups were acting at the behest or tacit approval of the target state, and they were relatively minor players. In the case of 158 Helvey 2004, 117.
Yugoslavia, where we could have seen a negative or positive flank effect, the internal lack of nonviolent discipline came at the very end of the campaign when Otpor and DOS had secured defections and a critical mass of support.

Positive violent flank effects are more likely to occur when a movement is perceived as distinct from the violent actor. That way the nonviolent movement may still be able to make state repression backfire, gain more support by presenting itself as a viable—and more superior—alternative to achieving social change, and perhaps even undercut the violent actor’s methods and base of support. Yet this remains speculative, as there were no instances of positive flank effects in the five cases I analyzed here. With regards to tactics, the KLA was the only armed actor parallel to a nonviolent campaign that used terrorism as part of its tactics. The argument I make about these methods leading to far more repression stands: Milosevic launched a “scorch the earth” campaign against the KLA and civilians alike. This indiscriminate violence undermined the Rugova’s argument for nonviolent discipline and diverted resources away from the parallel institutions. The two armed groups in East Germany—the Nazis and the Red Army faction—used terror as well, but they were far smaller and did not pose any threat to the state.

Although these cases do not provide conclusive evidence either way, it is clear that violent elements do not have uniform effects on campaign outcomes. In addition, it is also abundantly apparent that the absence of violent actors is not sufficient for success (Belarus 1989 and 2006), and that the presence of violent actors, and even internal violence, do not necessarily lead to the failure of nonviolent campaigns (East Germany and Yugoslavia). Although, it is worth mentioning that the case of East Germany, because of the relatively minor role of the Nazi groups, and the case of Yugoslavia, because the opposition only used violence at the very end of the campaign, do not rule out the possibility that more prominent violent actors would lead to the
failure of nonviolent campaigns. The iterative process between the theory and cases shed light on the fact that it may be insufficient to record number of violent actors without accounting for their size and impact. East Germany should have probably not received a score of 2/7 while Kosovo, a campaign that had a much more prominent violent actor—obtained a 3/7. Perhaps weighing the score of violent actor presence with the size of the actor would take care of this problem. Also, it is important to further develop the role of actors like the Serb irregulars—groups that do the “dirty work” for the target state, but are not strictly agents provocateurs. The nonviolent campaign may have a particularly difficult time undermining these groups because they may not suffer the same political costs from lack of legitimacy as the establishment.

As far as future research goes, the coding of all cases of nonviolent action in order to do correlation analysis and other statistical analysis would be the most obvious next step. That way one could systematically investigate the differing effects of violent actors on campaign outcome, and draw more generalizable conclusions. Another approach would be using this data to further test and refine the six mechanisms linking nonviolent action to success. The testable hypotheses that Chenoweth and Stephan propose in their recent publication are very useful for this purpose.\textsuperscript{159} Beyond these extensions I would propose more research on the emerging role of competitive authoritarian regimes—like Belarus in 2006—which may prove very resilient, especially if coupled by favorable factors like economic prosperity. The measures that these regimes could take, such as “putting on the show” of democratic elections, may coopt a majority and leave the core of activists without much base of support. Authoritarians have learned that repression backfires and that fixed elections are likely to appease discontent just enough to continue in power—although indiscriminate and conspicuous violence remains in their arsenal, it

\footnote{159 Chenoweth and Stephan 2010, 274.}
will probably be used more as a last resort. On the other hand, when dictators call elections they may be setting the stage for their own overthrow, as was the case for Milosevic. Fraudulent elections can be a major turning point for a protracted nonviolent movement as a critical mass of people feels the sting of blatant censorship and corruption.

A second area is to study this emerging and interesting idea of nonviolent campaigns undermining violent campaigns. Given that strategic nonviolent resistance is designed to exert pressure and undercut the pillars of power of an establishment (the state or an institution), it is not very clear how people power could leverage a non-state actor. Perhaps the mere presence of successful nonviolent campaigns present the biggest threat to non-state armed actors seeking political objectives. Lastly, a third area for research is whether conflicts that have strong ethnic or national identity dimensions are more difficult for nonviolent campaigns. In the case of Kosovo, for example, ethnic Albanians were unsuccessful in winning over Serbs’ sympathy despite their nonviolent discipline. Sharp ethnic divisions can cause a level of dehumanization not easily reversed, which reduces the ability of the nonviolent campaign to gain support from the target regime and encourage defections. Given the salient out-group/ in-group dynamic, it may also be easier for the target regime to repress the nonviolent campaign without losing constituent support.


http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/research-and-data/ (2008b) NAVCO Codebook;

(2008c) NAVCO Dataset;

(2008d) Précis for Book.


California Press, Berkeley.
http://www.youtube.com/user/NonviolentConflict#p/c/871D7871736DCB99/12/O5bcwtij08

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DATASETS

1. Correlates of War Project’s Intra-State Wars Dataset
2. Correlates of War Project’s Non-State Wars Dataset
3. Minorities at Risk Dataset (versions 2003 and 2009)
4. Freedom House’s How Freedom is Won Dataset 2005
5. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
6. UCDP/PRIO Non-State Conflict
7. UCDP/PRIO One-Sided Violence
8. Expanded Non-State Actor Dataset 2009

9. Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism’s Suicide Attack Database
http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php

10. START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland; Global Terrorism Database (GTD): http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

CASES

East Germany 1989


Kosovo 1989-1999


Yugoslavia 2000


Belarus 1989 and 2006


