BEING DEAR TO GOD:
DUE MEASURE AND MODERATION IN LATE PLATO

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents an analysis of due measure and moderation in Plato’s later dialogues. An examination of the Statesman, Philebus, and Laws, indicates that there is a substantially different, but complementary, emphasis in Plato’s political and moral thought from that encountered in the rest of the Platonic corpus. Rather than grounding politics and ethics in rationalism and persuasion or in the apprehension of the supersensible, the dialogues treated in the dissertation have their positions grounded in due measure and moderation. The appeal to due measure is first encountered in the Statesman. It is the task of the statesman to find the middle ground between extreme states so that individuals and the political community live well. In the Philebus, Plato's conception of the best life as one which mixes true pleasures and knowledge relies upon weighing the various pleasures and kinds of knowledge against the standard of due measure. Due measure and moderation converge in the Laws. There is a reciprocal relationship between due measure and moderation: what is in due measure is what the moderate person would choose to do, and a person is moderate because he chooses to do what is in due measure. Both due measure and moderation are central to what constitutes the best type of regime, the manner in which a law-giver legislates, and the education which the citizens receive in respect to the political community; they are essential to ensure that the citizens live as politically responsible citizens and morally responsible agents. Although Plato never disregards the fundamental notion that in order to live politically and morally responsible lives we must always attend to the condition of our souls, the manner by which we can accomplish this becomes reconfigured in the
late dialogues. By living in accordance with due measure and moderation, a person emulates the
divine order of the cosmos. As a consequence of Plato's views in his late-period dialogues, there
is an increased potential for a greater number of human beings to live morally virtuous lives.
The moderate person among us is dear to god,  
For he is alike, whereas the immoderate person is unlike  
And different, as is the unjust person

Plato, *Laws*, 716d1-3
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A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATIONS

All the translations in this study are my own. It is always difficult to decide whether or not a translation should loosely convey the spirit or closely duplicate the vocabulary and syntax of the original language. In my English translations I have attempted to render the Greek as literally as possible, even at the expense of sacrificing a certain degree of literary elegance for the sake of accuracy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Many commentators, whose interpretations will discussed throughout this study, have recognized that the dialogues composed during the latter part of Plato's life exhibit marked differences from the works which preceded them. Plato scholars note that there are differences encountered in all aspects of Plato's late-period philosophy, including his philosophical positions concerning questions of epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, ethics, and politics. In addition, there is a difference in the philosophical method employed by Plato in the dialogues of the late period. Rather than the use of the Socratic method of question and answer, or the method of hypothesis, the dominant philosophical method of the late period is the method of division and collection and the employment of dialectical inquiry.

This study is directed specifically at Plato's late-period political and moral philosophy, as well as at his philosophical method, although issues pertaining to his views on epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics also will be addressed. An examination of the late dialogues suggests that Plato presented substantially different arguments in support of his conception of the manner in which human beings ought to live both as individuals and as members of a political community. It is important to stress, however, that Plato does not entirely abandon the positions held in his early- and middle-period dialogues; there is both continuity and difference with these works in the late-period writings. There is continuity in the sense that many, if not all, of the fundamental concerns which are examined in the early- and middle-period dialogues continue to be investigated in the later works. There is difference in the sense that the solutions offered in the late-period dialogues are significantly unlike those presented in the earlier works, so that one may reasonably consider the philosophy of the late period to be distinctly altered in relation to the rest
of the corpus. Moreover, in order to account for the continuity and difference in Plato's late-period moral and political thought, an interpretation of more than simply his arguments and views is required. It also is necessary to analyze his philosophy in relation to the philosophical methods in which his views are grounded. Briefly stated, the use of a particular philosophical method – the elenchus, for example – results in the positing of certain views that are themselves the product of the sort of method utilized for the matter under examination. Thus, it may be claimed that, since there is a close relationship between Plato's philosophical methods and the positions that are generated from the use of a particular method, an analysis of his methods will lead to a better understanding of his philosophy.

The problem, then, which I shall examine involves three fundamental questions. First, in what manner are we able account for the continuity and difference in Plato's moral and political thought, as well as the solutions presented in respect to these considerations, among the three chronological periods? Second, how do Plato's philosophical methods affect his philosophical positions? Third, is there some particular feature, or idea, encountered in the late-period dialogues which would permit us to understand why Plato's positions take the form that they do in this period? It is hoped, that by analyzing and offering some answers to these three questions, a better understanding of the relationship among the political and moral philosophy and philosophical method of the early-, middle-, and late-period dialogues may be achieved.

Since this entire study will attempt to provide detailed answers to these questions, I shall only offer some very brief remarks concerning them at this time. In response to the first question, it is my view that the sense of continuity and difference which we find in Plato's works may be treated in terms of two concepts: complementarity and practicability. In regard to the concept of complementarity, the solutions presented in the dialogues of the late period do not so much develop the solutions presented elsewhere in the corpus as they present solutions that are equally
legitimate. It does not appear correct to argue that Plato's philosophy develops in the sense that the positions given in the late-period works revise, replace, or reject prior views. Rather, it seems more reasonable to suggest that the arguments and solutions in works such as the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and the *Laws*, complement the arguments and solutions found in the rest of the corpus. These three particular works offer sets of solutions concerning the manner in which one may best live which are as equally legitimate as those offered in an early-period dialogue such as the *Gorgias*, or in a work from the middle period such as the *Republic*. The arguments of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* are not superseded by the positions set down in the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, or the *Laws*. Each work presents its own unique solution which complements the solutions given in the other dialogues. While there is, of course, some sort of development in Plato's philosophy, it is the sort of development that one would expect to occur as one's philosophical understanding and technique grew over time. The development of Plato's thought should not be regarded in the sense that the late-period dialogues represent his final views on a given topic.

In regard to the concept of practicability, it is arguable that Plato's late-period political and moral thought is more practicable, or feasible, than that of the earlier periods. The solutions offered in the *Republic*, while in themselves elegant and intellectually powerful, do not appear to be realizable in practice, except, perhaps, under the most extraordinary circumstances. These solutions, in effect, constitute a theoretical ideal. In contrast, the solutions laid down in the *Laws* appear to have some possibility of being brought about. These solutions are, in effect, practicable. It will be made apparent in later chapters that there are sufficient reasons for believing that in the latter part of his life Plato came to the realization that the solutions he presented in the *Republic*, for example, could not be put into practice, and thus a different approach was needed if there were to be any chance of his views actually being realized. This
was accomplished, I believe, to a certain extent in the *Statesman*, and to a much greater extent in the *Laws*. The arguments in both of these dialogues, along with those in the *Philebus*, were made in the belief that there is some possibility that they could be applied in practice, instead of merely serving as theoretical ideals.

The second question may be briefly answered as follows. There is a correspondence between Plato's philosophical method and arguments in the sense that the manner in which Plato analyses a problem is directly connected to the sort of method he employs. This appears to be especially the case in the late period where the use the method of division and collection gives Plato a powerful analytic tool for articulating some of his philosophical positions. While, in general, it is reasonable to say that there are three basic methods encountered in the corpus – the elenchus, the method of hypothesis, and the method of division and collection – it is the last of these three methods which is the one most frequently utilized in the late-period works. The principal advantage to an examination of the philosophical methods that underlie Plato's arguments is that we are given a further means for understanding the continuities and differences in Plato's philosophy, in addition to the understanding we attain from an analysis of a dialogue's philosophical content. An examination of Plato's philosophical method will strengthen the interpretation of the text itself by illustrating how his philosophical views do not radically differ in the late works, but that his later positions concerning what is the best manner in which we ought to live are to some extent entailed by the sort of method he employs. Or, to put it another way, it is the use of a particular methodological framework which allows Plato to reach certain conclusions.

The response to the third question is complex and requires a somewhat longer answer. It is my hypothesis, and the central focus of this study, that there is a discernable shift in Plato's late-period thought in the sense that there is no longer a need to apprehend the supersensible realm of
the Forms in order for an individual to possess a well-harmonized soul and live virtuously. Rather, Plato appears to be making a claim that that a life lived in accordance with what is in due measure (τὸ μέτρον) is perhaps the best that can be attained. A life that is lived in accordance with what is in due measure is a life that is orderly and moderate; a life which in some manner emulates and reflects the order of the cosmos. It is also the sort of life that can be realized by a significantly larger number of individuals than the type of morally virtuous life that depends on the apprehension of a supersensible realm. In the late works Plato directs his attention to argue in favor of a type of moral and political philosophy that is not grounded in the intellection of the Forms, but to a practical philosophy that appeals to what is in due measure and to what is moderate. The change to the appeal to what is in due measure as the ground for Plato's later political and moral philosophy is first encountered in the Statesman, further articulated in the Philebus, and finally is applied on a broad scale in the Laws. It is on the appeal to what is in due measure in these three dialogues that I shall concentrate the most attention.

In order to comprehend the shift in emphasis in the late-period works, it will be necessary first to examine the principal characteristics of Plato's early- and middle-period moral and political philosophy. But since there is a diverse amount of material contained in the dialogues of these two periods, my analysis is restricted to an investigation of the manner in which Plato treats the virtue of sōphrosunē, the role of education, and the rule of law in the Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, and Republic in relation to his general views concerning what is required to live as a morally responsible individual and as a politically responsible citizen. These particular topics have been selected because they have a special significance for Plato's late-period thought, for without sōphrosunē, proper education, and the rule of law neither can the individual be morally virtuous nor can the political community be stable, secure, and flourish.
Moreover, in order to demonstrate the greater practicability of the late-period's moral and political thought, the early- and middle-period philosophy must be examined in terms of its potential to be realized in practice. Arguably, the moral and political philosophy of the early and middle periods is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The reasons why this is the case will be presented in subsequent chapters. For the present, however, it may be said that one of the chief difficulties in putting the philosophy of these periods into practice is that Plato is lacking some sort of standard that might be readily grasped and appealed to by a large number of individuals; a standard which will function as guide for determining correct moral and political choices and actions.

The first step in making his political and moral philosophy practicable occurs in the Statesman. In this dialogue, in a passage which we may term the "digression on due measure", Plato establishes that contrary qualities can be measured against some standard, with the result that a mean between two extremes can be attained; a mean in which elements of both extremes participate in the sense that the extremes are blended, or reconciled, with each other. In other words, qualitative measurement leads to the determination of a middle position; a position which, in effect, is an appeal to what is in due measure. This appeal to what is in due measure is something which can be grasped by a large number of individuals, provided they receive the proper education and guidance. Unlike the grounding of the Republic's political and moral philosophy in the apprehension of the Forms, the use of due measure only requires that it be demonstrated in the sensible sphere without the need to apprehend a supersensible realm. In this respect, the sort of education that an individual requires to understand what is in due measure does not need to comprise the sort of training in philosophy and dialectics that was needed in order to grasp a supersensible realm.
Once the idea of qualitative measurement and its relation to what is in due measure are set down in the Statesman, Plato then proceeds to apply them to this dialogue's political philosophy. The expert in the art of statesmanship will be able to intertwine the disparate elements of the materials he has at his disposal. That is to say, by the use of qualitative measurement and an appeal to what is in due measure, the statesman will be able to blend the contrary character traits of the citizens into a harmonious mixture for the sake of both the individual and the polis. It is the task of the statesman to find the middle between certain extreme states of the soul so that individuals may become moderate. The goal at which the expert in the art of statesmanship aims is to make the political community moderate. A polity whose citizens are moderate is one that will be virtuous and live well.

When we turn to the Philebus, we find that due measure underpins this work's moral philosophy. The best sort of life, that is, the mixed life which blends true pleasures and knowledge, is one that is measured and well-proportioned. The appeal to what is in due measure enables Plato to argue that both knowledge and pleasure, which may be regarded as contrary, or opposing, qualities, can in fact be blended and reconciled. The best sort of life, then, is the one that is a mean between the good as knowledge and the good as pleasure. It appears to be the case that without an appeal to what is in due measure, it would be difficult, when confronted with the choice between a life of pleasure and a life of knowledge, to determine whether or not one or the other of these two sorts of lives, or some combination of both, would be best.

In the Laws, the political structure, legal code, educational program, and theology of Magnesia are grounded in to metrion. Knowledge of what is in due measure is essential to ensure the proper establishment of a polis and its continued existence, the laws by which it is governed, the education which the citizens receive, and the manner in which the relationship between the human and the divine is conceived. A political community's constitutional organization, its legal
code, the education of its citizens, and its theological beliefs function together to assist individuals to live as morally virtuous agents, otherwise the polis is in danger of destruction and its members risk living morally vicious lives. The individual who lives in accordance with what is in due measure is one who lives moderately. Indeed, it is my view that sōphrosunē and to metrion are treated by Plato as being functionally equivalent in his final work. Being moderate implies knowing what is in due measure, and acting in accordance with what is in due measure implies that one is moderate.

If my interpretation of the significance of what is in due measure as the ground from which Plato argues in the Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws is correct, then the political and moral philosophy articulated in these late-period dialogues may be understood in a somewhat different manner than they have previously been interpreted by Plato scholars. Rather than viewing these works as displaying marked differences with the rest of the Platonic corpus, they may best be regarded as offering a set of complementary and practicable solutions to the problems of how we may live, while simultaneously taking into account the same sorts of concerns that occupied Plato throughout his life. The employment of to metrion allows alternate solutions for Plato's political and moral philosophy to be posited; solutions which do not replace those set down in other dialogues, but which should be considered as complementing the other solutions.

I have organized this study in the following manner. In Chapter 2, I discuss the hermeneutical and methodological approach I employ for my interpretation. After examining the literary and analytic methodological approaches to the Platonic corpus, I set down and offer a defense of my position. Briefly stated, I focus my attention more on the philosophical content of the dialogues than on their dramatic form and structure. Furthermore, I argue that we can posit a chronological ordering to Plato's works, but we should not regard those works that were written later in his life
to be a development of his earlier views. While I do think that there is some development in a restricted sense of the word, it is better to treat the solutions offered throughout the corpus in terms of the idea of complementarity.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine certain aspects of Plato's political and moral philosophy in order to prepare for the discussion of his late-period dialogues. Chapter 3 analyzes Plato's views on sôphrosunê in a work from the early period, the Charmides, and a middle-period dialogue, the Republic, to show the manner in which Plato's position regarding this fundamental concept display both a sense of continuity and difference across the corpus. At the end of this chapter, I suggest that in the Republic we are given the first glimpse that there is a connection between the way Plato conceptualizes sôphrosunê and to metrion. In Chapter 4, I investigate Plato's early- and middle-period political philosophy. This investigation is confined to three aspects: (1) the broad outlines of the political philosophy of these two chronological periods; (2) the role of education; (3) the rule of law. The principal concern of this examination is to establish the point that the metaphysical grounding of Plato's middle-period political philosophy is impracticable in the sense that there is little possibility of its being realized in practice in precisely the form it is set down in the Republic.

Chapters 5 and 6 may be regarded as a closely related pair of chapters which focus on two core issues in Plato's late-period philosophy. Chapter 5 offers a detailed analysis of the digression on due measure in the Statesman. This digression is of the greatest importance in that it establishes the idea of qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure. I also attempt to show that qualitative measurement and due measure were not something that Plato just happened to chance upon in the Statesman. Rather, it is better to consider qualitative measurement as Plato's response to the need for an art of measurement which was first mentioned in the Protagoras. In the second half of the chapter, I discuss the implications of due measure for
Plato's philosophy, especially in the sense that the employment of an appeal to what is in due measure opens the space for the greater practicability of Plato's late-period thought. Chapter 6 is addressed toward what I consider to be Plato's first application of *to metrion*. Before Plato utilizes what is in due measure as the ground for his political and moral philosophy, he first applies it to his philosophical method. After reviewing the use of the elenchus and the method of hypothesis, I examine the manner in which *to metrion* is incorporated into the method of division and collection so that a variant form of *diairesis* is established, the method of division and blending. The method of division and blending is used in the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and to a lesser extent in the *Laws* as the basic philosophical method of these three works. Its employment allows Plato to demonstrate how contraries may be blended and reconciled in terms of method, but also by the use of this same method he is able to generate philosophical positions in respect to what is in due measure.

In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I treat the political and moral philosophy of the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and the *Laws*, respectively. Chapter 7 examines how the political philosophy discussed in the last part of the *Statesman* is indebted to due measure. While there are other influences at work in this dialogue, it is important to recognize that the expert in the art of statesmanship relies on *to metrion* to moderate the polis in the sense that by blending the disparate character traits of the citizens he produces citizens who possess an suitable mixture of these traits with the result that both the citizens and the political community live moderately. In Chapter 8, I analyze the role of due measure in the *Philebus* in respect to the arguments given in this work regarding the best life. Since the best life is the one which blends true pleasures with knowledge, there is a necessity for some standard against which pleasures and knowledge may be weighed and judged. It is my position that *to metrion* is what allows one to determine how one should weigh not only pleasures against pains so that only true pleasures are chosen, but also that the proportion of
pleasure and knowledge in one's life needs to be determined in accordance with what is in due measure as well. Finally, the focus of Chapter 9 is on the manner in which *to metrion* underlies the political thought, the legal code, the system of education, and the theology of the *Laws*.

Perhaps, even more importantly, I argue that in this last work of Plato there is the sense that *to metrion* and *sōphrosunē* converge. Unless individuals and their polities consistently employ a standard to determine what is in due measure they will neither be moderate nor live well. Both *to metrion* and the virtue of *sōphrosunē* are necessary to accomplish this task.
CHAPTER 2

HERMENEUTICAL STRATEGIES AND
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Hermeneutical Strategies

It would be helpful to begin this study of τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν with an examination of the two dominant methodological approaches – the analytical and the literary – for interpreting Plato, in order to situate my methodological framework in relation to them. The methodology with which we approach the Platonic corpus is crucial for the way in which the dialogues are interpreted and understood. In the following pages I shall begin by presenting a brief review of the principal hermeneutical strategies currently employed by Plato scholars, after which I shall discuss the methodological approach which underlies my examination of the dialogues.

In general, there is a bipartite, and what appears to be a mutually exclusive, division to the methodologies used to read a work of Plato. In spite of attempts to bring both sides into a dialogue with each other, these two opposing methodologies seem neither willing nor able to reconcile their respective positions.¹ On the one hand, the analytical approach, which may regarded as the traditional, or orthodox, approach to the interpretation of Plato's dialogues, generally concentrates on the philosophical content of the works. An analysis of the dialogues' content permits an interpreter who utilizes this approach to argue that we are more or less able to know the chronological order in which the dialogues were composed. Furthermore, it follows that if we have an established chronology we can then trace the changes, or development, in

¹ Griswold, for example, has tried to get both positions to engage in a conversation on the questions of why Plato wrote dialogues and in what manner they should be read. After reading the papers published in response to Griswold's attempt, one is unfortunately left with the distinct impression that both sides are talking past one another. See, Charles L. Griswold, ed., Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002).
Plato's thought. It is well to remember that the establishment of a plausible chronology and the tracing out of Plato's philosophical development are distinct and independent issues. For example, one can accept a chronological ordering of the dialogues, but reject any notion of development, a view which is held by those who espouse a strict unitarian view of the corpus. The contrary would be improbable, namely, that one could think in terms of development without accepting even a loosely structured chronology.\(^2\) On the other hand, there is the methodological approach that insists that we are unable to discover a reliable chronology for Plato's works, and subsequently, we should not read them in terms of development. Rather, adherents of this methodology privilege the literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues in order to arrive at their interpretation and understanding of what Plato was attempting to say.

The orthodox chronological approach has been developed and refined over the past century and a half, beginning with the linguistic analysis of Campbell.\(^3\) There are four principal techniques by which the chronological ordering of the dialogues has been derived: (1) stylometric and linguistic tests; (2) analysis of the manner in which Plato's use of language develops; (3) external evidence and cross-references within the dialogues themselves; (4) examination of Plato's philosophical development. The second technique generally does not lead to reliable

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\(^2\) Howland, in a highly influential article criticizing the ability to know the chronology of the dialogues, appears to admit that there was a certain sort of development to Plato's philosophy over time: "no doubt Plato's thought did evolve over the course of his life, but the crucial question concerns his practice as a writer." Howland, however, seems to think that he has avoided arguing in developmentalist terms, or involving himself in a contradiction, by emphasizing that Plato was in the habit of revising his own works throughout his career as a philosopher, the consequence of which is that it is impossible to speak in terms of development in the same manner as in the standard approach. Howland's main evidence for this claim is a remark by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the treatise Περὶ συλλέξεως ἰδεικτῶν, written well over three-hundred years after the death of Plato. It would seem rather implausible that in the absence of evidence nearer to the time of Plato we should take Dionysius' claim too seriously, much less argue, as does Howland, that it was Plato's literary practice to revise continually his own compositions. One should also keep in mind the practical difficulties of revising a manuscript written on papyrus scrolls. Although I am not aware of any scholarly study concerning the revision of works written on papyrus, it would seem to be the case that the revision of any lengthy piece of writing, for example, the Republic or the Laws, would present formidable challenges for both the author and transcriber of the manuscript. Additionally, there are a number of internal inconsistencies, as well as poorly reasoned arguments, in the dialogues which even more strongly suggest that Plato did not very admirably succeed in revising his own works. See, Jacob Howland, "Re-reading Plato: The Problem of Platonic Chronology," *Phoenix* 45, no. 3 (1991), 200-202.

conclusions since the interpretation of an author's literary style is for the most part a subjective interpretive exercise. Although the analysis of certain linguistic characteristics – the avoidance of hiatus, for example – can be used to assign individual works to particular groups, it cannot convincingly demonstrate the chronological ordering of the groups. The fourth technique can only lead to reasonable results after a chronology is established, otherwise to employ the notion of development to establish a chronological framework, which in turn lends support to the notion of development, entails circular reasoning. The remaining two methods have resulted in the positing of a broad chronology, dividing the Platonic corpus into three chronological groups, early, middle, and late. Although the results of stylometric analysis have led to certain inconsistencies among the arrangement of the dialogues, the placement of the Parmenides and Theaetetus presenting perhaps the greatest chronological difficulties, it has nevertheless proven to be a reasonably sound method for determining the general chronology of Plato's dialogues. The various attempts at dating the works has been summarized well by Brandwood, and despite the fact that certain works do not neatly fit into the three-period classification, his review of stylometric analysis indicates a greater degree of general consistency than of inconsistency, especially in regard to positing a late group of writings.

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5 A widely accepted chronological ordering is that given by Vlastos. See, Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 46-47. Perhaps the most unfortunate attempt to order the dialogues, and the one which opponents of this method most frequently use to criticize the entire endeavor, is that employed by Lutoslawski. His belief that the arrangement of the dialogues could be known with mathematical precision was misguided at best. Wincenty Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, with an Account of Plato's Style and of the Chronology of His Writings (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905).

6 Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and "Styloometry and Chronology," in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). It also should be noted that while the computer analysis undertaken by Ledger appears to be in broad agreement with the results of stylometric analysis, he does make known that there is a presupposition on the part of stylometricists that is flawed, namely, "the assumption of linearity, the belief, usually unstated, that a shift in value of the linguistic feature measured is a direct representation of an exactly proportionate shift in the date of composition."
With the establishment of a plausible chronology, numerous scholars have turned their attentions to examining the development of Plato's thought. The analysis of Plato's philosophical development, if pursued with a rigorous methodology, can lend support to the chronological arrangement of the dialogues. There are two basic versions of the developmentalist position. One view argues that by the term "development" we simply mean that Plato's philosophy developed during his lifetime, without attempting to demonstrate from what, to what, or why it changed. The other, perhaps more common, developmentalist position argues we indeed are able to trace the manner in which Plato's philosophy developed. Works composed at a later period reflect an alteration, possibly even a radical rethinking, of Plato's earlier philosophy. It follows from this view that the philosophy of the late-period dialogues represents Plato's final thoughts on a particular problem, and that his later philosophy supercedes his earlier. There are several arguments made in favor of the view that there is development in Plato's late-period philosophy reflecting a reconfiguration of his thoughts in regard to certain philosophical questions. First, there is the argument that Plato revised certain of his positions in light of self-criticism, or possibly a dissatisfaction with his earlier works. Perhaps the best example, Plato's self-criticism of the theory of Forms in the Parmenides, permits a developmentalist to argue that this work was composed later than a dialogue such as the Republic, where we encounter the fully worked-out theory as the necessary grounding for the latter work's philosophy, and to which the former dialogue supposedly critically responds. It would be implausible, if not logically


Schofield, in his recent book on Plato's political philosophy acknowledges that Plato's thought evolved over time, but does not himself present his analysis in developmentalist terms. Malcolm Schofield, Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.

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impossible, for Plato to have written a critique of a particular philosophical concept before actually articulating the concept. One cannot raise as a criticism that $x$ is -$F$ before the claim has been made that $x$ is $F$. Second, Plato's philosophy may have developed under the influence of external criticism. Although it cannot be maintained with certainty, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Aristotle's association with the Academy during the final twenty years of Plato's life did not have some effect on his mentor's philosophy. Third, a shift in Plato's thought may be attributed to practical experience. For example, Plato's disastrous attempts to educate Dionysius and involve himself in the political affairs of Sicily may have led him to alter his political thought. Rather than rule by a philosopher-king, Plato may have developed the idea of a person possessing expert knowledge in statesmanship as the best ruler of a political community. Fourth, members of the Academy were called upon and engaged in the task of legislating for other poleis, a fact which suggests that their practical experience may have caused Plato to modify, if not abandon, the metaphysical grounding of the political philosophy of the Republic, substituting for it the role of education and the rule of law we find in the Laws. Taken together, then, these four factors provide the developmentalist with analytic tools to interpret Plato's thought as changing from one particular set of views to another.

A common criticism of those who hold a chronological and developmental position is that there are significant untested presuppositions in their approach. The establishment of a reliable chronology tends to assume a certain sort of development in Plato's writings, thereby allowing a chronology to be posited that is entailed by what appears developmentally to be a later work.

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9 Even if we are unable to know the date of the composition of the Politics, it seems reasonable to argue that the criticisms of Plato's political philosophy in Book II of Aristotle's work reflect to some extent the objections he might have raised while he was a member of the Academy. Additionally, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Aristotle's harsh criticism of the Forms in the Metaphysics and Peri ideōn may have originated during the time that Aristotle was under Plato's tutelage. For a recent examination of Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic, see, Robert Mayhew, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997).

10 These issues will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4.

11 This sort of criticism is best expressed in Howland's essay, "Re-Reading Plato."
Similarly, a developmentalist view may presuppose a certain chronological ordering; if a work is regarded as belonging to Plato's late period, then there is the risk that the placement of this work in the late period presupposes that it displays a development over the early-and middle-period dialogues. While there is some truth in this criticism, it can be countered by a constant and careful testing of assumptions, along with the willingness to reject chronological or developmental claims in light of a better reading of the text. It is perhaps unreasonable and unfair to jettison the scholarship that has been accomplished within the analytical methodological framework because some interpretations of Plato have improperly utilized the methodology.

Rather, the conclusions based on this sort of scholarship should be carefully evaluated in order to determine if the methodological framework was utilized correctly, avoiding the sorts of presuppositions that could possibly invalidate the results. Undoubtedly, the same sort of criticism regarding untested presuppositions (or false assumptions) could be leveled against those who work within any methodological framework.  

Alongside of the developmentalist position is a view held by some scholars of the analytical approach who argue that Plato's thought displays a unity, substantially formulated in his mind before he began to compose his works. Rather than positing a development to his thought, defenders of this view maintain that, even though there is a chronology for the dialogues, Plato's philosophy underwent little or no change over time. The best known unitarian argument was  

Howland himself, I believe, is guilty of this charge. He argues, for example, that Aristotle's remark at Politics 1264b26, that Plato wrote the Laws "later" (ὡτʰερῇ) than the Republic is used to establish the basic starting-point for the development of a chronology; a reading of Aristotle that presupposes that Aristotle's assessment of the ordering of these two dialogues is correct. Howland goes on to suggest that we cannot "rule out the possibility that Republic was revised in light of the Laws." Even though Howland attempts to adduce further evidence for Plato's practice of revising his works, the evidence he presents is arguably tenuous. It appears to me that Howland, who is working within the framework of a literary and dramatic reading of Plato, has presupposed that Plato, like other strictly literary authors, engaged in the practice of revision. The ancient evidence for this practice is, frankly, weaker than Aristotle's evidence. It would seem to be a better hermeneutical strategy to accept at face value Aristotle's ordering of the Republic and Laws – not to mention the remark made by Diogenes Laertius that the latter work, which was left in the wax (ἐν κηρώ), that is, not completed and transferred to papyrus, was transcribed (μετέγραφε) by Phillip of Opus (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, III.37) – rather than problematize it by assuming that Plato was accustomed to revising his works. Howland, "Re-Reading Plato," 200-201.
made over a century ago by Shorey. A more subtle approach is that employed by Kahn, whose study of the early and middle dialogues attempts to show that Plato wrote proleptic works, that is to say, the arguments and positions found in the works of the early period anticipated, or foreshadowed, those made in the middle-period works. While both the strict unitarian and proleptic approaches are subject to rather severe criticism, not the least of which is on the grounds of plausibility, Kahn's reading is to some extent enlightening in that he pays due regard to the question of Plato's use of the dialogue form, in addition to his literary style. Rather than arguing that the different literary styles used by Plato underlay a development of his thought, Kahn chooses instead to regard the differences in style as reflecting a change in the manner in which Plato presents his philosophy, a philosophy which nevertheless remains consistent regardless of the style in which it is expressed. Finally, Rowe argues in defense of a unified Socratic Plato. Rather than following the orthodox developmentalist view that in the early dialogues we primarily are presented with the views of Socrates, whereas Plato's own philosophical positions become more pronounced in the middle- and late-period works, Rowe's thesis is that "Plato stayed a Socratic till the end." In effect, Rowe, while presenting a sort of unitarian perspective, offers one which may be termed a reverse-unitarian position. That is to say, a unitarian typically works backwards from what is assumed to be a Platonic Plato in the middle and late works to the Socratic Plato of the early dialogues. In contrast, Rowe begins with this Socratic Plato and traces out the way in which Plato remains Socratic throughout the corpus. In any case, both Kahn and Rowe do provide nuanced and stimulating unitarian interpretations which mark a hermeneutical advance over Shorey.

14 Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*. It would be of great interest to see if Kahn is able to extend his reading to encompass the dialogues that are considered as belonging to Plato's late period. This is a task which Kahn has not yet attempted in publication.
15 Christopher Rowe, *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
16 Ibid., viii.
In contrast to the analytic approach of those who hold either developmentalist or unitarian views, there is a methodology that fundamentally differs in its approach to the philosophical content of the dialogues. Scholars who adhere to this opposite methodology begin from the premise we can never know what Plato thought or intended, and thus they concentrate on the literary or dramatic aspects of the dialogues in order to illuminate the content of the works.17 These commentators hold that, since the dialogues are akin to dramas and their authorial voice is suppressed, we are unable to recover the intent of the author, similar to the manner in which we cannot know the authorial intentions of, say, Sophocles or Shakespeare. We can, however, interpret and explicate the content of these texts, but not in a manner that privileges the philosophical content of the dialogues as the analytical approach does.

The fundamental argument of this position is given by Strauss: "in none of his dialogues does Plato ever say anything. Hence we cannot know from them what Plato thought."18 In one obvious and limited sense Strauss is correct; Plato never speaks in his own voice. Yet, one wonders whether it necessarily follows that a close reading of the Platonic corpus, as well as the historical context in which the dialogues were composed, cannot supply us with a plausible means of distinguishing Plato's voice and intent from that of Socrates or any other character encountered in the works. In other words, it is reasonable to argue that an examination of both the arguments and underlying philosophical methods of the dialogues can provide the interpreter with the keys for unlocking Plato's own philosophy, distinguishing to a greater or lesser extent his intentions from those of the dialogues' dramatis personae.

17 A representative list of scholars who work within this methodological framework would include Seth Benardete, Alan Bloom, Charles Griswold, Jacob Howland, Gerald Mara, Thomas Pangle, Stanley Rosen, Leo Strauss, Roslyn Weiss, and Catherine Zuckert. While it might be somewhat otiose to group such a diverse group of scholars under one heading, nevertheless, their rejection of an analytical methodological approach in preference to an emphasis on the literary qualities of Plato's writings does suggest a certain degree of commonality. Kahn presents a singular case. While it is fair to say that he primarily is concerned with the philosophical analysis of Plato's works, he also places an emphasis on their literary qualities and on their formal structure as dialogues.

This approach also owes a great debt to Strauss' notion of the contrast between exoteric and esoteric writing.\textsuperscript{19} Strauss argued that philosophers, especially those writing political philosophy, often were required to disguise their true intentions in order to avoid persecution for ideas that a ruling elite may have considered subversive.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, Strauss distinguishes between a public (exoteric) and private (esoteric) textual content. He writes: "An exoteric book contains two teachings: a popular teaching of an edifying character which is in the foreground; and a philosophic teaching concerning the most important subject, which is indicated only between the lines."\textsuperscript{21} Scholars who follow this idea of Strauss have sought to "read between the lines" of a Platonic dialogue in the attempt to recover the true content esoterically embedded in the text.\textsuperscript{22}

Based on the considerations discussed in the previous paragraph, the revealing of the esoteric content of a Platonic text does not imply that Plato's own intentions have been brought to light. Rather, it is the meaning of the text, articulated by means of the arguments and dramatic characteristics of the dialogues, that is made known and interpreted, regardless of the actual

\textsuperscript{19} I leave aside the arguments of the Tübingen School who hold the idea that Plato's dialogues do not contain the whole of his teachings; there are unwritten doctrines which only can be recovered by careful philosophical and philological examination of later sources. See, Giovanni Reale, \textit{Toward a New Interpretation of Plato} (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1997), for a detailed exposition of this view.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{22} It should be pointed out that individual attempts to interpret the esoteric content of a text frequently lead to readings that are fundamentally incompatible with one another. In all fairness, Strauss himself was aware of the problem. "It must, then, be considered possible that reading between the lines will not lead to complete agreement among all scholars. If this is an objection to reading between the lines as such, there is the counter-objection that neither have the methods generally used at present led to universal or even wide agreement in regard to very important points." This argument strikes one as being rather weak. Would not a better method of reaching a consensus in regard to the meaning of text be to test and refine constantly one's methodology rather than permit an even greater degree of subjectivity by attempting to uncover hidden meanings where none may in fact exist? Part of the difficulty with Strauss's approach is that he links the esoteric content of a text to his position that works of philosophy, particularly those of Plato, are to be read as literary compositions. Strauss argues that the literary qualities and problems of a text "will, I believe, compel students sooner or later to take into account the phenomenon of persecution." In the case of an author such as Plato, if one were to keep separate the literary form from the philosophical content of the dialogues, rather than reading Plato's works as literary creations containing both exoteric and esoteric meanings, and to pay strict attention to one's methodological framework, then it is possible to obtain a greater degree of consensus in respect to the meaning of the text, rather than reading between the lines to reveal the deeper meaning. The interpretive subjectivism entailed by Strauss's approach most likely results in an even lesser degree of "universal or even wide agreement" in regard to the content of a text. See, "Persecution and the Art of Writing," 30-31.
originator of these thoughts. While it is possible to recover the hidden meaning in a Platonic
dialogue, it does not follow that we have revealed Plato's own thoughts. Furthermore, I do not
mean to suggest that both hermeneutical strategies are always employed in tandem. Either of
them can be used on their own depending on whether or not one believes that we can or cannot
recognize Plato's authorial voice, or whether or not the dialogues do indeed present examples of
esoteric writing.

There are two passages in the Platonic corpus which appear to lend support to the Straussian
notion that Plato intentionally disguised the actual content of the texts' political philosophy. First,
in the *Seventh Letter* Plato comments: "There are no writings of mine concerning these things,
nor will there ever be; for it cannot be stated in any way like other studies" (οὐκὸν ἐμὸν γε περὶ
αὐτῶν ἦστιν σώγραμμα οὐδὲ μὴποτε γένηται· ἢττον γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἦστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα).
Second, in the *Phaedrus* the character of Socrates argues that writing is an inadequate form for
expressing ideas. The greatest objection to writing is that it cannot speak; it is silent and fixed,
just like a painting. Should one want to question the writings further, they are unable to give a
reply, "what they signify always remains the same" (ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἄει).
Finally, perhaps an even more serious objection is that writing is equally accessible to those who
understand it and to those who do not; the written word itself does not know to whom it should be
addressed. Although both of these passages suggest that Strauss was correct in his views, I do
think that they may be interpreted in a way that is in opposition to the notion of esoteric writing.

Rather than signaling a suggestion that Plato did write esoterically, both the comments in the
*Seventh Letter* and the argument in the *Phaedrus* may be plausibly read as saying that philosophy
may be best engaged in as a ongoing dialectical conversation between a master and his pupils.

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23 *Epistles*, 341c4-6.
24 *Phaedrus*, 275d9. The entire argument against the written word is found at *Phaedrus*, 274b3-278b4.
Some subjects simply cannot be learned from books; similarly, some subjects cannot be fully explained in writing without the active participation of the learner. Indeed, the passage from the *Seventh Letter* continues by stating that knowledge of these subjects "arises from much conversation about this very same subject-matter and from living together" (ἀλλ’ ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγαντιαίης περὶ τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζήν).\(^{25}\) We should also keep in mind two major points regarding the context of these comments. First, Plato's disavowal of writing and the weakness of the written word forms an introduction to a brief summary of his metaphysical and ontological positions; subjects which were regarded by Plato as being impossible to understand without personal interaction and dialectical examination between teacher and student.\(^{26}\) Second, Plato was annoyed by the fact that Dionysius claimed to be the author of a treatise setting forth ideas that were purportedly Dionysius' own, when in fact they were misrepresentations of Plato's own thoughts. The anecdote concerning Dionysius supplies Plato with an excellent example of the danger that written treatises, not to mention second-hand verbal reports, can entail by distorting another person's ideas. In light of the context in which these remarks were made, it is reasonable to conclude that Plato's distaste for the writing of treatises alone does not suggest that he held some esoteric doctrines more than it supports the idea that there are some subject areas, or philosophical doctrines, which cannot be properly apprehended solely by means of books.\(^{27}\)

There must be a personal interaction between discussants if a full understanding of the subject under examination is to be attained

\(^{25}\) *Epistles*, 341c6-7.

\(^{26}\) This educative give-and-take is found at *Epistles*, 344c1-d2, a passage in which once again Plato criticizes the written word, especially in the sense that writing does not contain the best thought of an author. In order for a subject to be truly illuminated and understood, "names, arguments, appearances, and perceptions" (ἀόνυμα καὶ λόγῳ ὦνθες τε καὶ \(αἰσθήσεις\)) must be tested among each other by questions and answers between a teacher and pupil. In other words, the written word alone cannot lead the student toward knowledge. *Epistles*, 344b4-5.

\(^{27}\) Although the point is perhaps obvious, nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that for nearly twenty-four hundred years many of Plato's doctrines have been, and continue to be, the object of much contentious scholarly dispute. Plato's arguments about the inadequacy of writing is proven by the fact that we still are unable to agree entirely about what certain aspects of Plato's philosophy actually mean.
The argument given in the *Phaedrus* not only supports my interpretation of the *Seventh Letter*, but also provides us with a clue for understanding why Plato chose to write dialogues. In addition to the points just mentioned, namely, that writing is fixed, silent and open to misinterpretation, there is the important idea that in comparison to spoken discourse, the written dialogue is but an image (ἐἰδωλικὸν). As a sensible farmer would not plant seeds at the inappropriate time, except perhaps for his own amusement, neither would the serious philosopher plant the seeds of his ideas in writing, except to amuse and remind himself of them in his old age. Rather, the person who wishes to practice philosophy, especially in regard to the most important questions of what is just, noble, and good, must engage in dialectics with partners in whom the seeds of ideas may take root and flourish; the written word runs the risk of being sown in barren soil. While as an image of real discourse the written dialogue may have some usefulness as a reminder of what was discussed, it cannot substitute as a replacement for "living and breathing" (ζωντα καὶ ἐμφών) discourse. It would appear, then, that the *Phaedrus* passage does not suggest that there are some disguised doctrines that cannot be put into writing. On the contrary, there are topics for which only actual discourse and the practice of dialectics will lead to their fully being apprehended by a pupil.

This methodological approach, principally for the two reasons I have just discussed, tends to privilege the literary and dramatic aspects of Plato's works. The scholars working within this interpretive framework regard the dramatic form itself as highly significant, and in many cases attempt to understand the content of a dialogue through its literary structure. To state this another

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29 The analogy is made at, *Phaedrus*, 276b1-276e3.
30 In addition to the passages I have just discussed in the *Seventh Letter* and the *Phaedrus*, there is a passage in the *Laws* where the Athenian remarks that the best pattern of instruction for the young would be for the lawgiver to use the discussion between Clinias, Megillus, and himself, or similar types of discourse, as the best model for education, in terms of both content and literary form. It is hard to understand why this would be the case if the *Laws* contained any esoteric content. See, *Laws*, 811b6-812a3.
way, the dramatic form is examined in order to reveal a dialogue's philosophical content.

Additionally, scholars who employ this approach argue that the dramatic structure and choice of characters may influence the philosophical positions and arguments that are articulated in the text. Plato's choice of interlocutors – Callicles or Critias, for example – may be deliberate for the purposes of positing particular counter-arguments in relation of the arguments made by particular characters.

This view is in contrast to one which believes that Plato's arguments are given as essentially the same, regardless of the character to whom they are being addressed. An interpretation which suggests that Plato to some degree tailored his arguments according to the dramatic requirements of a given dialogue and its characters offers intriguing possibilities for the manner in which we understand Platonic philosophy, yet it also presents us with an interpretive difficulty. If Plato's arguments are specifically tailored for particular dramatic requirements, then it may not be possible to claim that there is a Platonic philosophy which is consistent and coherent throughout the entire corpus. Rather, the view which argues that Plato's arguments were directed toward a specific dramatic context entails the conclusion that each dialogue should be read independently of the others, and that it would be exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to regard the Platonic corpus as espousing a unified philosophy. It is arguable that a methodological approach which privileges the dramatic qualities of the dialogues runs the risk misrepresenting, or under-valuing, the philosophical content while over-emphasizing a work's dramatic presentation. While it is obviously not the case that this sort of difficulty is encountered in all literary interpretations, it is nevertheless well worth noting that the possibility exists that certain readings of this sort may

31 It could, of course, be the case that despite the shaping of an argument to meet the requirements of a specific character or dramatic situation, there is an underlying philosophy that is consistent and unifying. This is essentially the view held by Kahn. This position is plausible only if the interpreter holds to a strict analysis of the work's content and recognizes the importance of consistency of philosophical positions across the corpus. A difficulty arises, as I point out above, when interpreters who employ the literary approach prefer to treat each dialogue as an independent treatise whose philosophical consistency with other dialogues is of little consequence.
suggest that a dialogue's literary aspects could be more significant than its philosophical content, or that in some sense the form of a work entails its content, rather than that the content is expressed through a certain type of form. It should also be noted that there potentially is a similar, but opposite, danger in readings which concentrate on a dialogue's philosophical content at the expense of its literary qualities. In certain analytical interpretations, it is possible to focus too extensively on a work's philosophical content while ignoring its literary aspects, as well as neglecting the applicability of the content. Ultimately, the way in which an interpreter chooses to regard the importance of Plato's literary and dramatic abilities and their effects on the philosophical content of the dialogues rests on one's position in respect to the relation between Plato the philosopher and Plato the dramatist. I prefer to concentrate primarily on Plato's philosophy, and only secondarily on his qualities as a dramatist. It is my belief that the analysis of the philosophical content of Plato's works should be studied for the sake of determining which of his philosophical positions still possess any degree of relevance and applicability.

The question arises as to why Plato chose to write in the dialogue form. The passages in both the *Seventh Letter* and the *Phaedrus* may provide an interpretive key to understanding Plato's reason for composing dialogues. Arguably, Plato chose this particular form as a written analogue that approximates philosophical discourse.\(^{32}\) His intense dislike of a monologic treatise is quite understandable; as it is made clear in the *Phaedrus*, this type of work is closed off to the possibility of questioning, the very core of what philosophical investigation should be. A dialogue, even though it, too, is a fixed piece of writing, at least allows its author to set out questions and answers in a manner which resembles spoken practice. It permits a degree of

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\(^{32}\) It is well worth keeping in mind that by the time that Plato began to write there existed a literary genre termed by Aristotle, Socratic *logoi*. These "discourses" were written by several authors in dialogue form to record and preserve Socrates' conversations. The best surviving examples are the Socratic works of Xenophon; there also are fragments from four other authors, Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, and Eucleides. See, Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1447b11. For a full discussion of the Socratic *logoi*, see, Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 1-35.
dialogic interchange which a monologic treatise cannot possess. A dialogue has a functional value as an image of discourse, but it should never be mistaken for the real thing. The reason why Plato's works were composed as dialogues may not so much be the product of his highly skilled literary and dramatic abilities, rather they are more likely a response to his criticisms of employing a written text to express the most important and profound philosophical examinations.

There is also a literary interpretation of Plato that does not owe its methodological approach to the concepts of Strauss. In general, this methodology attempts to relate the literary form, especially in terms of the use of rhetoric, to the literary genres that either potentially influenced Plato or were practiced during the time when the Platonic corpus was written. Ober, for example, has attempted to analyze Plato's political philosophy in the context of fifth- and fourth-century intellectual history and political rhetoric, thereby situating Plato's political works within their cultural milieu as expressions of political dissent. Nightingale has demonstrated that Plato's literary qualities and philosophy were developed under the influences of the literary genres that were available to Plato, including those of poetry, drama, and rhetoric. This sort of approach, not entailed by Strauss's premises, is able to offer insightful readings of those Platonic dialogues in which we encounter a substantial degree of rhetorical content. The Menexenus, for example, is a work that lends itself quite well to a reading that emphasizes the connection between rhetoric and philosophy. When dealing with this dialogue, even scholars who generally adhere to the traditional methodological framework are compelled to consider the Menexenus' literary form.

34 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Unfortunately, Nightingale's analysis is flawed in that she completely neglects the influence of the pre-Socratics on Plato's development as a philosopher. Surely, Plato's thought was formed at least as much under the influence of early attempts at philosophical writing as it was through literary genres.
35 For example, Dodds is well aware of the work's rhetorical devices, comparing the Menexenus' relation to the Gorgias as analogous to the relation between a satyr-play and a tragedy. See, E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 23-24.
In conclusion, the literary methodological approach to Plato's works has frequently offered revealing interpretations, illuminating aspects of the Platonic corpus that might otherwise have gone unnoticed by adherents of the traditional methodology. Yet, given the fact that Plato was considered both by his contemporaries and by philosophers and scholars for over two millennia since his death to be a philosopher, it is difficult to accept a methodological position which occasionally ranks the philosophical content of his works below that of their literary form. If Plato's successors in the Academy and Aristotle – regardless of how they interpreted and developed Plato's thought – considered him to be expounding serious philosophical doctrines, then Plato's thought may be best interpreted by emphasizing his philosophy first, and relegating to second place his qualities as an author. Perhaps we can employ the comments of Diogenes Laertius as a guide for our interpretation of Plato: "It is not unknown to us that some claim to divide the dialogues otherwise – for they call some of these dramatic, others narrative, and others a mixture – but the difference they name among the dialogues belongs more to tragedy than to philosophy" (Οὐδὲν οὐκ ἦν μαντικώς ὅτι πάντες ἄλλως διαφέρειν τῶν διαλόγων φασίν – λέγουσι γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν μὲν δραματικῶς, τῶν δὲ διηγηματικῶς, τῶν δὲ μεικτῶς – ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τραγικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφως τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν διαλόγων προσωπόμασαν).36

**Methodological Considerations**

In general, I follow a chronological and developmental approach in my interpretation of Plato's dialogues. In regard to the chronology of the works, I believe that we are able to arrange the Platonic corpus into a plausible tripartite ordering of early, middle and late periods. However, with the possible exception of the dialogues assigned to the late period, we cannot with any degree of reasonable certainty establish a chronology within a particular period. In respect to the

notion of development, I do, however, take a more cautious approach. While I do not disagree that some sort of development may be traced diachronically in the dialogues, I am far more skeptical in advancing claims about Plato's philosophical positions in developmental terms. Rather than viewing works of the late period as representing a development over the works of the early or middle periods, I prefer to employ the notion of complementarity in my interpretation. That is to say, a work composed in the latter part of Plato's life may present us with a complementary approach to a problem that was treated differently in either an early- or middle-period dialogue. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall discuss in greater detail a manner in which the methodological and philosophical characteristics of the dialogues may be used to confirm their chronological arrangement. Additionally, I shall address the issue of development and its relation to the concept of complementarity as a means by which we might determine the relation between the philosophical positions encountered in works from different periods.

I wish to argue that support can be given for the establishment of a chronology for the Platonic corpus through the analysis of certain defining characteristics. These characteristics can be broadly divided into three fundamental areas: (1) the type of philosophical method underlying Plato's arguments; (2) the traits that define arguments and philosophical positions held by Plato, and the literary and dramatic means by which his philosophy is expressed; (3) the practicable or impracticable consequences entailed by the characteristics. The arrangement of the dialogues is divided into three periods on the basis of a particular trait's predominance in a given dialogue. It should be noted, however, that the appearance of a particular characteristic and its classification within a particular period does not imply that this particular characteristic is not found in other periods as well. The assignment of a particular characteristic to the early, middle, or late periods simply means that the characteristic is encountered more frequently in those dialogues which
belong to a particular period, rather than suggesting that it is represented only in works assigned to a period.\textsuperscript{37}

Before proceeding to a discussion of this classificatory scheme, a brief comment on the idea of authorial voice is in order. Do the texts express Plato's own views, or through the voices of the other main protagonists, such as Socrates, the Elean Visitor in the \textit{Statesman}, or the Athenian in the \textit{Laws} are we hearing an authorial voice other than that of Plato?\textsuperscript{38} In opposition to Plato commentators such as Strauss, I think that a close reading of the entire Platonic corpus entails the reasonable conclusion that the authorial voice is either that of Socrates in the case of the dialogues I have assigned to the early period, or that of Plato himself in those dialogues classified in the middle and late periods.\textsuperscript{39} The argument that we are unable to know Plato's own thoughts because he never speaks in the first person, rests, I believe, on two premises which may not be valid: (1) the dialogues are primarily literary compositions which may be treated analogously to tragedies; (2) their deeper meaning is purposely disguised. Since I have previously offered some arguments in criticism of both premises, I shall merely repeat the point that I treat Plato primarily as a philosopher, and that it appears implausible to argue that any thinker would not express in his works his own philosophy, much less purposely disguise his principal doctrines, especially in light of the Plato's own critique concerning the manner in which the written word is subject to

\textsuperscript{37} It should be mentioned that several of the dialogues exhibit characteristics that could allow them to be placed in more than one chronological period. My classification assigns these works to the period in which these characteristics predominate, while recognizing that there are traits that overlap with works assigned to other periods.

\textsuperscript{38} I shall examine these two characters more fully in Appendices 4 and 5. There is reasonably convincing evidence that the central character of the \textit{Statesman}, for example, does not represent the views of the Elean school of philosophy. His position resembles more closely the philosophy of the Academy, if not that of Plato himself. A similar case can be for the Athenian Stranger in the \textit{Laws}.

\textsuperscript{39} As previously noted, Rowe has recently attempted to establish the idea of a Socratic Plato, that is, a Plato whose philosophy remains essentially Socratic throughout the corpus. According to Rowe, Plato's Platonism is grounded in the Socratic notion that each individual is capable of determining his own life; a notion which Plato never rejects, but employs at the center of all his thought. See, Rowe, \textit{Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing}. Rowe's views, although well-argued and intriguing, perhaps do not give enough credit to Plato's own immense philosophical abilities. While it is undoubtedly true to say that Socrates exerted a profound influence on Plato, it is quite another matter to claim that this influence was the basis for all of Plato's thought. In all fairness to Rowe, he does recognize that his argument is "inevitably, still a work in progress." Ibid., viii.
misunderstanding. The position I adopt in regard to the question of authorial voice is summarized well by Sedley: "In general I favor the more conservative view, the one which nearly all interpreters of Platonic texts since antiquity have reflected in their actual hermeneutic practice, that by and large the main speaker in a dialogue can be assumed to be voicing Plato's own beliefs and arguments."40

The table on pages thirty-three and thirty-four sets out my classification of distinguishing methodological, philosophical, and literary characteristics, as well as the assignment of the dialogues into early, middle, or late chronological periods. In order for a dialogue to be assigned to a particular period, there must be a correspondence among the dominant philosophical method employed in the work, the manner in which a defining philosophical and literary trait is argued, and the consequences which are entailed by the arguments, but not, of course, any results that are related solely to a work's literary characteristics.

There are also two points in respect to the table that must be noted. First, The dialogues enclosed in brackets are works which do not conveniently fit into a single chronological period. They may perhaps best be regarded as dialogues sharing in the principal characteristics of more than one chronological period. By way of example, I shall briefly mention three such works, one from each period. The philosophical method of the *Charmides* employs both the elenchus and the method of hypothesis; the former being the usual method of the early-period dialogues, the latter being that primarily of the works of the middle period. On balance, however, the *Charmides* exhibits more traits that allow it to be placed among the early-period dialogues than among those of the other two periods. The *Menexenus* presents a special case in that its function as an *epitaphios* presupposes that it owes more to the form and content of a funeral oration than to one of Plato's philosophical works. Yet, a close reading of this enigmatic dialogue suggests a relation

to the *Gorgias*, as an example of the sort of rhetoric condemned in this work, and a resemblance to the rhetoric of Socrates' first speech in the *Phaedrus*.

Since the period in which the *Gorgias* should be assigned is itself not without problems, it seems, then, that counting the *Menexenus* among the middle-period works is the least problematic solution. Although the defining characteristics and stylometric evidence of the *Theaetetus* appear to situate this dialogue among the late-period works, Socrates' professions of his own ignorance and his role as the midwife of the ideas of others rather than his role as the expositor of his own (or Plato's) philosophy, as well the inconclusive ending of the work, suggests that the *Theaetetus*’ inclusion among the late compositions is more a matter of convention and convenience than that it actually belongs to this period. There is a uniqueness about the *Theaetetus* which resists classification.

Second, there are dialogues which I do not assign to any chronological period since I consider them not to have been written by Plato. Even though several of these works were considered at one time or another to be authentic, contemporary scholars have not reached a consensus for admitting them to the Platonic corpus. An examination of their contents, arguments, philosophical methods, and linguistic and stylistic qualities, taken either individually or in combination, suggests that these dialogues quite probably are spurious. Thus, I omit from the list the following dialogues: *Alcibiades I, Hippias Major, Clitophon*. In addition to these works of doubtful authenticity, there are several dialogues that are generally agreed to be inauthentic Platonic works, which, of course, do not have a place in the table. They are: *Alcibiades II, Hipparchus, Rival Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis, Definitions, On Justice, On Virtue, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Halecyon, Eryxias, Axiochus*. Finally, in regard to the *Epigrams* and *Epistles* I believe it is arguable that some of them, at least, are authentic. Of this last group of works, the one that is the most important for the study of Plato is the *Seventh Letter*. Good, but

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not compelling, arguments have been made both for and against the acceptance or rejection of the *Seventh Letter* as Plato's work. Even though the *Seventh Letter*'s exceptional length appears to be somewhat odd, stylometric considerations, along with the concordance of Plato's arguments with those given in dialogues whose authenticity is beyond question, suggest than the letter may have been composed by Plato. For the purposes of this project, I accept the letter's authenticity.

I should like to make some brief comments on Sections A, B, and C of the table. The first point to discuss are the types of philosophical method employed by Plato. I begin with the question of method because it is the ground upon which Plato constructs his arguments. Section A of the table indicates that the basic methods used by Plato to examine questions of philosophy can be divided into three types: dialogues in which the elenchus is the principal method; works that employ what has been termed the method of hypothesis; and, finally, a group of writings in which the method of division and collection, or *diairesis*, is predominant. I do not mean to imply, of course, that any given dialogue restricts itself to the use of any single method; there are numerous instances where more than one method is employed in accordance with the

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42 Perhaps the most satisfactory analysis of the letter is given by Hackforth. He concludes the *Seventh Letter* is authentic. Reginald Hackforth, *The Authorship of the Platonic Epistles*, reprint ed. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1985), 84-131. Sayre, too, accepts the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter*. In particular, he argues that Plato's disavowal of the written word does not imply that Plato never wrote on philosophical subjects. "What he is disavowing, rather, is ever having attempted to put into writing an understanding of philosophy, to which Dionysius and others falsely laid claim." Sayre further argues that this mental state of understanding is consistent with Plato's views in other dialogues, especially the *Theaetetus* and the *Phaedrus*. Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato's Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Same Press, 1995), 11-12, and 10-21. Guthrie gives a good summary of some of the positions taken by scholars concerning the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter*. W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*. Volume V of *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 399-417.

43 The *Seventh Letter* occupies thirty Stephanus pages. By way of comparison, the *Crito* takes up twelve pages, the *Euthyphro* fifteen, the *Charmides* twenty four, and the *Apology* twenty six. The *Meno*, at thirty one pages, is the dialogue closest in length to the *Seventh Letter*. Although Plato's brief summary of his metaphysics and method may appear somewhat out of place, arguably it is necessary for understanding his overall position. *Epistles*, 342a3-344c1. Hackforth argues that "the philosophical digression is not, properly speaking, irrelevant to the design of the letter." Hackforth, *The Authorship of the Platonic Epistles*, 102.

Chronology of Plato's Dialogues Arranged by Defining Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early Dialogues</th>
<th>Middle Dialogues</th>
<th>Late Dialogues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Philosophical</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Elenchus</td>
<td>Method of Hypothesis</td>
<td>Method of Division and Collection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aporia and lack of a positive philosophy</td>
<td>Arguments designed to reach positive conclusions</td>
<td>Arguments designed to reach positive conclusions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Defining</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical and Literary Traits</strong></td>
<td>Reason and persuasion</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Socratic intellectualism</td>
<td>Attention given to the role of bad desires</td>
<td>Attempt to blend good and bad desires</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unity of the virtues</td>
<td>Four separate principal virtues</td>
<td>Emphasis on to metrion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The good soul cares for all the virtues equally</td>
<td>The soul is balanced in harmony</td>
<td>The soul knowing what is in due measure</td>
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<td>Simple model of the soul</td>
<td>Tripartite soul</td>
<td>Multi-part soul</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Philosophy directed toward the sensible sphere</td>
<td>Two-world metaphysics, emphasizing the supersensible sphere</td>
<td>Two-world metaphysics, emphasizing the sensible sphere</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No theory of Forms</td>
<td>Fully developed theory of Forms</td>
<td>Forms present, but not extensively relied upon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minimal use of myth</td>
<td>Extensive use of myth</td>
<td>Selective use of myth</td>
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<td>No concern with natural science</td>
<td>Concern with mathematics</td>
<td>Concern with mathematics and natural theology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No developed political philosophy</td>
<td>Fully articulated and critiqued political philosophy</td>
<td>Attempt to work out a political philosophy applicable to actual political practice</td>
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<td>No worked-out educational system</td>
<td>Development of an educational system favoring the elite</td>
<td>Education designed for a broader range of citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Consequences</td>
<td>D. Chronological Classification of the dialogues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Little practicability in terms of social and political institutions</td>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>Phaedo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crito</td>
<td>Republic</td>
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<td>Laches</td>
<td>Symposium</td>
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<td>Euthyphro</td>
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<td>Hippias Minor</td>
<td>Cratylus</td>
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<td>Protagoras</td>
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<td>Ion</td>
<td>[Parmenides]</td>
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<td>[Menexenus]</td>
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<td>[Lysis]</td>
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<td>[Gorgias]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[Meno]</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Impracticability for social and political institutions and for most individuals</td>
<td>[Theaetetus]</td>
<td>Sophist</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Statesman</td>
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<td>Timaeus</td>
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<td>Critias</td>
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<td>Philebus</td>
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<td>Laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attempt at a greater practicability for social and political institutions and for individuals</td>
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Table 1

requirements of the argument. In addition to the two methods that are employed in the

Charmides, there are two additional examples that should be mentioned. Book I of the Republic
is quite dependent on the elenchus to counter the arguments of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and
Thrasyilmachus, while in the remaining nine books the method of hypothesis is extensively utilized for the purpose of developing Plato's positions. Similarly, while the method of hypothesis is the principal method in the *Phaedrus*, the method of division and collection is referred to near the end of the work as one of the methods for discovering what is true.\textsuperscript{45}

The employment of these three philosophical methods leads to two principal results. The dialogues in which the elenchus is the dominant method end in *aporiai*, and no positive philosophical outcomes are possible since the fundamental need to possess a definition remains unmet.\textsuperscript{46} The works utilizing both the method of hypothesis and the method of division and collection are able to reach positive conclusions because the former method establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a particular proposition, while the latter method furnishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what a thing is. The sort of knowledge which results from the use of the methods of hypothesis and division and collection permits Plato to set down positively constructed arguments. Rather than claiming that one method is superior to another, or that one in some sense is a development of another, we should regard each individual method as the representative philosophical method which corresponds to the philosophical characteristics of the chronological period to which they are assigned.

We can now turn to a discussion of Section B of the table. In this section I have laid out a set of basic philosophical and literary traits that are representative of the types of concerns one encounters in the Platonic corpus. This set of characteristics should not in any sense be taken to be exhaustive, rather it is simply a selection of what should be regarded as several of the more distinguishing features of Plato's thought. The basic concept of arranging these philosophical

\textsuperscript{45} *Phaedrus*, 277b7-8.

\textsuperscript{46} The *Gorgias* presents an exception. Even though this dialogue concludes with a positively articulated philosophy, the elenchus is extensively utilized throughout in the construction of the philosophical arguments, especially in Socrates' encounters with Polus and Callicles. The tension between the use of the elenchus and the *Gorgias' positive conclusion is one of the reasons why the assignment of this dialogue to the early-period works is problematic.
characteristics is indebted to and extends Vlastos' analysis of "the differences between the philosophy Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates $_E$ upon the one hand, from the philosophy he expounds through Socrates$_M$, upon the other."$^{47}$ Vlastos attempts to distinguish the philosophy of Socrates from that of Plato by setting down ten theses designed to illustrate the differences between them. There are, however, two significant differences between my table and the ten theses posited by Vlastos. First, unlike Vlastos it is not my intent to attempt to distinguish the philosophy of Socrates from that of Plato.$^{48}$ A reading both of the Platonic corpus, as well as other classical writings about Socrates, suggests that the focus of this study, τὸ μέτριον, cannot in any sense be attributed to Plato's teacher, and that one is on secure ground in assigning this to Plato alone. The differences he finds between S$_E$ and S$_M$ allow Vlastos to propose a chronological arrangement of the dialogues and to point out the perceived development of Plato's thought, at least as it is found in the early- and middle-period works. The second, and perhaps more important difference between Vlastos' analysis and my table of characteristics, is that Vlastos restricts his set of differences only to a portion of the complete corpus, namely, the dialogues that he believes were written during the early and middle parts of Plato's career as a philosopher, whereas my treatment of the defining methodological and philosophical characteristics takes into consideration the entire Platonic corpus. It is crucial, I believe, to examine these characteristics in respect to all the dialogues since many of these traits show three distinct instantiations which can only be articulated adequately by analyzing them in relation to all of Plato's works.$^{49}$

$^{47}$ Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 47-49. Socrates$_E$ and Socrates$_M$ refer, of course, to the Socrates of the early- and middle-period dialogues respectively.

$^{48}$ Although I think that Vlastos' analysis of the distinctions between these two philosophers is in general terms correct, I nevertheless remain unconvinced, in spite of Aristotle's testimony, that we can ever know with a sufficient degree of certainty where Socrates' philosophy leaves off and Plato's begins.

$^{49}$ It is well to consider that the fundamental starting point of an analysis of any philosopher ought to take account of that thinker's complete *oeuvre*. If one is to examine the content of a particular text it is methodologically sound first to regard it in light of an author's other works in order to see the manner in which the arguments in a particular work relate to the arguments in other works. There is an unfortunate tendency on the part of those who treat Plato's dialogues primarily as literary compositions to interpret a particular dialogue without paying due attention both to similar and
Although the arrangement of the table is straightforward and should require little explanation, I would, by way of example, like to comment on two of the defining characteristics in order to indicate the manner in which I conceive their chronological classification: the notion of political philosophy, and the dramatic setting of the dialogues. It is worth pointing out once again that the location of an individual characteristic in a particular period does not in any way suggest a degree of exclusivity with that period. The distinctions that I have made should be regarded as analytic, that is, they are merely a way in which a general sense of order can be imposed on the varied sorts of philosophical questions, as well as their literary expressions, that engaged Plato throughout his life. It is principally due to the fact that Plato wrote multiple works on the same topic, although frequently emphasizing different aspects or proposing different solutions at different times in his philosophical career, that there is a certain overlapping of characteristics across the three chronological periods. It is not possible to argue that, for instance, trait $x$ only may be assigned to early period, while in the middle and late periods we find traits $y$ and $z$ but no trace of trait $x$.

First, turning to the topic of political philosophy, we find that the dialogues which belong to the early period contain very little in the way of fully articulated arguments setting out a program of political thought. To be sure, there is a sense in these Socratic logoi that Socrates strongly disapproves of contemporary Athenian political practice, but he never attempts to develop a political theory which is designed to correct and replace the faults of Athenian politics. We need only to recall Socrates' statements in the *Apology* suggesting that the philosopher should not take especially dissimilar arguments in the rest of the corpus. While this sort of methodology may be suitable and lead to convincing readings of, say, an individual drama of a playwright, to apply this method in the case of a philosopher runs the risk of distorting the overall meaning and purpose of the philosopher's thoughts by mistaking the particular for the universal.

I mean by the expression "program of political thought" the sort of theorizing about politics that takes into account the individual citizen, the political community, and the kind of institutions that permit both the individual and the political community to act in association with each other for the good of the citizen and the good of the polis. Plato's middle- and late-period political philosophy meets this requirement; the Socratic dialogues of the early period do not.
part in politics. In general, there is an emphasis in this group of dialogues on the individual and on the manner in which the individual should care for his or her own soul. Only in the loosest sense can we say that a well-cared-for soul is the foundation of a well-constituted polity. There is too great a stress on the use of persuasion and reason in respect to the individual in these works that would enable their arguments to be extended to the political institutions and practices of an entire political community. Perhaps the closest Socrates comes to stating any sort of normative political philosophy is his argument in the Crito that the laws of the polis must be obeyed if there is to be any political and social stability in the state. Yet, even this very basic requirement for a well-organized political community is far removed from the detailed political programs set out in some of the middle- and late-period dialogues.

In contrast to the dialogues of early period, the middle-period Republic, and both the Statesman and the Laws in the late period, present us with a comprehensive treatment political philosophy. In the Republic there is a very detailed political philosophy argued in terms of the relation between the parts of the soul and the parts of the polis, the need for the polis to be ruled by individuals trained in philosophy, a hierarchy of political regime-types, and the requirement that the whole system be grounded in a two-world metaphysics in order for it to function well. The Statesman and the Laws present arguments in favor of a political philosophy that I have termed practicable. That is to say, it is a political philosophy that may be more appropriate to the way individuals really are and to the manner in which politics is actually practiced. There is an emphasis on expert statesmanship, the rule of law, the role of education, and a lack of the need to

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51 Apology, 31c3-32a3. In this passage Socrates claims that it was his daimonion who held him back from participating in politics: "it is necessary for the person who is going to fight on behalf of what is just, if he is to be kept safe even for a little time, that he be a private person and not be in public service" (ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι τὸν τῷ ἄνθρωπῷ ἔσται ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, καί ἐν μέλλει διὰ τοῦ ἁπλοῦ σωθῆσθαι, Ἰδιωτικὸν δὲ μὴ δημοσίως). There are resonances of this view both in the Republic (496a11-e3) and in the Seventh Letter (325c5-326b4).

52 Among the topics covered in this group of works are, andreia (Laches), sōphrosunē (Charmides), piety (Euthyphro), and the teaching of virtue (Protagoras).
ground the entire project in metaphysics. In sum, then, there are distinctly different emphases among the three chronological periods in respect to the articulation of a political philosophy.

Second, there is a marked difference in the way the dramatic settings of the dialogues are presented. In the early-period works, Plato, for the most part, indicates where the conversation takes place: the law-court in which Socrates was tried (Apology); Socrates' prison cell (Crito); a palaestra (Charmides and Lysis); the stoa of the king-archon (Euthyphro); the recollection of a conversation at the house of Callias (Protagoras); probably the house of Anytus (Meno); an unspecified public place, possibly a gymnasium (Gorgias). The Laches, Hippias Minor, and the Ion have no specified dramatic locations. But in addition to the settings of the works, there are numerous small dramatic touches that help bring the conversations to life; for example, the personification of the Laws in the Crito, the very real sense that Socrates is actually addressing the jurors in the Apology, and perhaps most dramatically in all these works, the sense of excitement and anticipation of the audience that runs throughout the Protagoras.

The middle-period dialogues provides us with an even greater sense of dramatic setting and characterization. The settings of these dialogues are memorable, not the least of which are: the opening of the Republic, located in the Piraeus at the house of Cephalus; the setting of the Symposium in the house of the tragic poet Agathon; the idyllic outdoor location on the banks of the Ilisus in the Phaedrus; and the double setting of the Phaedo, the narration by Phaedo to Echecrates, presumably in Phlius, of what took place in Socrates' prison cell in Athens on the last day of his life. The dramatic touches in these works are even more pronounced than in the early-period dialogues. For example, the frightening roaring of Thrasyvoulos as he breaks into the conversation in Republic I; the details of the conduct of the drinking-party, along with the

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53 This description of the political philosophy of the middle and late periods necessarily is brief; since one of the purposes of this study is to analyze the political thought of the late-period dialogues in relation to those from the middle period, there is little need to discuss in detail their respective characteristics at this time.
interruption of the drunken Alcibiades in the *Symposium*; the depiction of the cicadas singing in trees in the *Phaedrus*; and perhaps the most moving of all the scenes in the Platonic corpus, the depiction of Socrates' death in the *Phaedo*.

The dramaturgy of the late-period dialogues is closer to that of the early period than that of the middle period, but arguably is distinct from either of these groups. There is a sense that in this group of works both the dramatic setting and dramatic characterizations of the principal characters was of less interest to Plato than was the articulation of the philosophical content of the dialogues. Although the conversation reported in the *Theaetetus* takes place in Athens, the dialogue itself occurs in Megara, where it is a written narrative, read by a slave to Euclides and Terpison, recounting a discussion among Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus at the time of Socrates' indictment. Because the conversation is twice-removed from its actual occurrence, there is a subdued sense of dramatic impact. Both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* continue on subsequent days the conversation begun in the *Theaetetus*, although we are not given the information if these two dialogues are read by the slave to Euclides and Terpison as well.

The dramatic settings of the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and the *Philebus* are unspecified. It is only in the *Laws* that we have a dramatic setting, the island of Crete, that echoes the sort of dramaturgy of the early- and middle-period works. It is also in the *Laws* that we still find a trace of the sort of dramatization encountered in the other two periods, in reference to the few details given to us about the Cretan landscape on the walk from Cnossus to the cave of Zeus on Mount Ida. The few dramatic touches of the *Laws* notwithstanding, it is reasonable to argue that the late-period

54 To make the conversation seem more immediate it is reported in direct speech, rather than recalling the remarks of each speaker with an introductory "he said" or "Socrates said". It is worth noting, too, that this is the only one of Plato's dialogues which is a written narrative report read out loud.

55 There would seem, however, to be nothing standing in the way of regarding both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* as being written narratives continuing the one begun in the *Theaetetus*. That is to say, it is possible that both of these works also are being read out loud by the slave to Terpison and Euclides, or they may simply be the sort of written narrative that we encounter in the rest of Plato's dialogues.
dialogues show a marked lack of concern with dramatic setting and dramatic characterization. This lesser sense of drama can, in the main, be attributed to two principal causes. First, there is a greater degree of monologic exposition of the topic under consideration, and a heightened sense that the espousal of the philosophy is of more importance than the manner in which it is literally conveyed.\textsuperscript{56} Second, the choice of protagonists other than Socrates – the Elean Visitor, Critias, Timaeus, and the Athenian Stranger – to articulate the works' philosophical content tends to diminish the need for the sort of dramatic characterization that Plato composed in the cases of both Socrates and the interlocutors who directly confront him.\textsuperscript{57} The focus on content rather than on form in these dialogues, then, provides an additional distinguishing characteristic for placing them among the late-period works.

The treatment of political philosophy and dramatic setting which I have just discussed illustrates the type of analysis I have employed to separate defining philosophical and literary traits into three chronological periods. As in the case of Plato's philosophical method, I am not claiming that the dramaturgy found in any one period is in some sense superior to that in another, or that the philosophy of any one period necessarily represents a development over the thoughts articulated in the others. Rather, I think that it is preferable to regard the differences in philosophy and dramaturgy as expressions of distinct, and in some sense complementary, approaches to particular problems.

The penultimate part of the table, Section C, sets out what I consider to be the principal consequences entailed by Plato's arguments. The dialogues assigned to the early period would

\textsuperscript{56} To give but one example, with the exception of the last line, the whole of Book V of the \textit{Laws}, some twenty-one Stephanus pages, is a monologue delivered by the Athenian. Similarly, large stretches of other books in this work are spoken solely by this character, without the usual opportunity for regular questioning that we find in the rest of the corpus.

\textsuperscript{57} It could be argued, however, that there was nothing preventing Plato from depicting any of these non-Socratic protagonists with the same degree of literary detail that was applied to the characters in the dialogues of the early and middle periods. In response to this, it appears plausible to suggest that Plato's concern in this group of works was directed to a greater extent on philosophical content, and to a lesser degree on literary form and dramatic characterization.
appear to lead to results that have little practicability, at least in terms of a wide range of individuals. The emphasis placed on the use of reason and persuasion, along with the problematic notion of Socratic intellectualism, suggest that the proper care of the soul could never come to be realized by most people. The moral psychology in which the arguments are grounded appears too simplistic, entirely neglecting the complex influences of emotions, passions, and interests as motivating forces on many human beings. While reason and persuasion may lead some to change previously held beliefs, it is not plausible to think that this could be effected on a scale necessary to ensure the proper means of existence for the entire community. Additionally, the near lack of any substantial political philosophy indicates that in these dialogues there was little concern with the good of the polis as a whole, except only in the sense that if an individual could be persuaded to care for his or her soul, then it could be assumed that the political and moral good of the community would be taken care of as well. Finally, the fact that the works end in *aporiae*, the *Gorgias* excepted, without establishing the definitions required to construct a positive philosophy, also strongly suggests that this group of works has very little practicability.

In the philosophy of the middle-period dialogues far greater attention is paid to working out in detail a type of political and moral philosophy that takes into account many of the aspects that were neglected in the early works, as well as considering the application of this philosophy not only in terms of the individual but, more importantly, in terms of the whole political community. Yet, it is arguable that the philosophy of this group entails a degree of impracticability. Stated briefly, there are three fundamental problems which suggest that Plato's political philosophy in the *Republic* would not be able to be brought about with any reasonable degree of success. First, his two-world metaphysics is deeply problematic, both in terms of the theory of Forms and in

58 Since the philosophy of this group of works will be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4, I shall not make any extensive comments concerning it at this point.
terms of the manner in which individuals are able to turn themselves toward the Good. Second, the role of education appears to be highly elitist, offering little means to those assigned to the producer class, and possibly to the auxiliary class as well, to enable them to apprehend the Good, and thus live their lives with a well-harmonized soul. Third, the rule by philosopher-kings is at best impracticable, and at worst very risky. Both Plato's own attempts to influence political affairs in Sicily, and his arguments in Republic VIII and IX on the degeneration of soul- and regime-types indicate that both on practical and on theoretical levels rule by a philosopher-king is quite difficult to attain and highly undesirable. In general, the grounding of practical philosophy in first philosophy, while offering a conceptually beautiful and elegant solution for the problems of how we may best live well as individuals and as members of the political community, entails impracticability.

Finally, in the works of late period we encounter a philosophy which attempts to arrive at a greater degree of practicability. Plato no longer grounds his practical philosophy in metaphysics, education is not as restricted or elitist, and the need for the philosopher-king is no longer retained. Instead, the works comprising this group argue in terms that have an appeal and applicability to a far wider range of individuals, as well as taking under consideration social and political life as it occurs in actual practice. The greatest and most significant emphases in these dialogues are on education, the rule of law, and what is in due measure. An appropriate understanding and application of these three important ideas will enable individuals and communities to live not perhaps the theoretically best existence, but an existence which will permit them reasonably to care for their souls, individually and collectively. The arguments and philosophy expounded in the late-period dialogues would appear, then, to entail far more practicability than encountered in the works of early and middle periods.
I have indicated throughout the previous discussion that I am skeptical in regard to the notion of development in Plato's dialogues. In relation to the Platonic corpus, there are two senses – a stronger and a weaker – in which one is able to understand the term development. First, the term development can mean that position \( A \) changes to position \( B \), where \( B \) replaces \( A \) or where \( A \) is rejected in favor of \( B \). One also could infer that position \( B \) is an improvement over position \( A \). For example, it could be argued that the political philosophy of the Republic is rejected and replaced by the political philosophy of the Statesman and the Laws; that the philosophy of the latter two dialogues is an improvement over that in the former work. I think that to regard the development of Plato's thought in this stronger sense is incorrect. There is no adequately convincing way to demonstrate that Plato regarded his late-period political thought as a replacement for, or a rejection of, or an improvement over of the political philosophy of his early and middle periods.\(^59\) Second, the term development can have the sense that position \( A \) is altered in position \( B \), where \( B \) enhances, or deepens, the views held at \( A \). This weaker sense of development may be considered as analogous to the term evolution in that \( B \) has evolved from \( A \) without either replacing or improving upon the latter. Another way to put this is that \( B \) is a recognizable evolution, or development, of \( A \); \( A \) functions as the foundation of \( B \). It may be regarded as the natural deepening of one's thoughts about something in light of increased knowledge and greater experience. In the case of Plato, it would appear that his conception of, say, sōphrosunē is developed, or evolved, in this manner. The positions he holds in the Charmides, the Republic, and the Laws concerning sōphrosunē are related to each other, but they also reflect a deepening consideration of the nature and function of this moral virtue, while neither rejecting nor necessarily improving upon any previous version. In a sense, Plato's views

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\(^59\) I will argue in Chapter 4 that Bobonich's interpretation of Plato's late-period political philosophy is compromised by adopting this sort of notion of development.
of sōphrosunē are linked both to his growth as a philosopher and the requirements of the problem he is addressing. In general, I do not wish to argue that some sort of strong development takes place across any of the chronological periods, although I do accept and employ the idea that Plato's thought developed in the second, weaker sense of the term development. That is to say, that there is a development, or evolution, to his thought that corresponds to an increase in the depth of his philosophy.

In addition to this view of development, I think that Plato's various views on subjects which are treated at different chronological times and in different dialogues should be considered in light of the concept of complementarity. Plato's different approaches to particular problems in different periods may be said to complement each other. The concepts and arguments used to examine a problem in a dialogue from one period may be altered in respect to the requirements of a work belonging to a different period in accordance with the manner in which the problem ought to be considered. This idea may be made clearer if we examine one particular case; Plato's models of the soul. There appear to be three distinct views articulated about the composition of the soul. In some dialogues we encounter a simple model of a unified soul, in others, the soul is regarded as being tripartite, and in others, in turn, the soul appears to be divided into two parts. Does this changing view of the parts of the soul suggest development or complementarity on Plato's part of the manner in which he conceived the human soul, or do the various soul-types indicate that a unified, two-part, tripartite, or even multi-part soul was posited in order to address a particular problem? The strong developmentalist position would argue that Plato's conception of the soul altered diachronically from the unified soul encountered in the Socratic dialogues of the early period, to the tripartite soul of the middle-period works, to either a bipartite or tripartite one in the late writings. In contrast, the weaker developmentalist position that I am employing would suggest that Plato could have utilized any of these three models of the soul at any time in
his philosophical career based on the needs of the philosophical problem at hand. The requirements of Plato's moral psychology in the *Republic* would seem to need a model of at least a tripartite soul, while in a dialogue that approaches a moral problem in terms of Socratic intellectualism, the model of a unified soul is appropriate. Rather than objecting that Plato's views on the soul are inconsistent and *ad hoc*, the complexities and differences we find in these views may perhaps be better understood if the various models of the soul are treated as being in some sense complementary, reflecting the particular philosophical requirements of the problem he was engaged in examining. In other words, Plato held a core belief about the soul as both a cognitive principle and a life-force, but the manner in which he articulated his views are dependent upon the context in which they are presented.\(^6^0\)

There is also a way in which the weak version of development and the concept of complementarity are able to work in tandem. As I shall argue in my analysis of Plato's late-period political philosophy in subsequent chapters, we find that certain aspects of his thought are altered in accordance with the weak version of development, but also that the political program set out in the later dialogues complements that of the middle period. In general, it is implausible

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\(^6^0\) In the early Socratic dialogues the fundamental view of the soul is that it is a cognitive principle and a principle of moral behavior. In the middle-period works, especially in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, Plato begins to view the soul in terms of a life-force and noetic principle by which our actions are directed. In the *Timaeus, Phaedrus, Philebus, and Laws* the notion of a sort of cosmic, or world, soul is developed; a soul that is itself eternally in motion and the source of all motion in the cosmos. Yet, the notion of an individual soul remains. As the cosmic soul is the source of motion for the universe, the individual soul, sharing in and contingent upon the cosmic soul, is the source of motion in the body. Despite the various manifestations and development of Plato's views of the soul, we find in the *Laws* a sense that the soul is still being viewed as some sort of cognitive principle. The soul has two aspects; a "stronger and better one which acts as a master, and a weaker and inferior one that acts as a slave" (τα μέν οὖν κρείττων καὶ ἀμείνω διηστότα, τά δέ ἦττα καὶ χείρω δοῦλα). The individual must learn to respect and honor the master part of the soul which one should infer to be similar to the earlier dialogues' reasoning part (*logistikos*) of the soul. Thus, it is arguable, that the notion of the soul as some sort of cognitive principle is the core of Plato's conception of the soul, while the other depictions of the soul develop, in the weaker sense of the term, and complement this fundamental conception. *Laws*, 726a4-5. Robinson concurs. He argues that the human soul in the *Laws* (with the exception of the view of the soul in Book X) may be regarded as a noetic principle. "The view of the soul [as a noetic, or cognitive, principle] just outlined can, for all its inadequacies and internal inconsistencies, be roughly described as that single general view running through the *Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Republic*, and (in part) *Phaedrus*: the (noetic) soul is in some way divine, precious, worthy of respect, superior to and natural master of the body." T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 146.
to suggest that Plato's philosophy did not undergo a deepening in his old age. Similarly, it is not reasonable to argue that the political thought of the Republic is replaced by that of the Statesman and the Laws. It appears that we can make the most sense of all these works if we regard them in relation to two principal considerations. First, the growth of Plato as a philosopher entailed a deepening of the manner in which he approached philosophical problems. We should not expect that he held the same views in regard to philosophical methods and characteristics throughout his entire life. These views developed, or evolved, as his career progressed. Second, in view of the complexities of the questions Plato addressed, we should not assume that he posited any one definitive answer to these questions. Rather, it is arguable that at different times in his life he attempted to respond to the fundamental questions concerning how we may best live in different ways and with different solutions that are complementary.

In conclusion, the methodological framework I am advocating offers a way in which the Platonic corpus may be interpreted in a more flexible manner, allowing, perhaps, a greater understanding of Plato's complex treatments of particular subjects as they are articulated diachronically. There are two advantages to organizing the corpus in terms of philosophical method, philosophical and literary traits, and the consequences entailed by the arguments. First, this sort of arrangement lends support to the argument that we are able to posit a reasonable chronology for the dialogues by supplementing the stylometric and other techniques that have been previously employed for this purpose. Second, it permits us to view the principal characteristics of Plato's philosophy in their entirety, thus enabling us to apprehend the manner in which particulars relate to the whole. Additionally, by interpreting the dialogues in terms of weak development and complementarity, we avoid the risk sometimes encountered in the methodological approach that claims there to be a development of Plato's thought in the strong sense of the term, and which thereby potentially misinterprets the relations among the dialogues,
and misunderstands the intent of the arguments. Even though I do not employ a literary methodological framework for my reading of Plato, there is much in these contemporary readings of the dialogues that have illuminated many aspects of Plato's works which may otherwise have gone unnoticed. My approach utilizes a methodological framework which differs from both the strong developmentalist and literary methodologies, but nevertheless attempt to maintain a respectful appreciation of their interpretive accomplishments. Ultimately, of course, it should be the goal of any interpreter of Plato, regardless of the methodology employed, not only to attain some understanding of what Plato is attempting to teach us, but more importantly, I believe, to find what is still relevant in his philosophy and apply it to our current needs.
CHAPTER 3

KNOWLEDGE AND ORDER:
SÔPHROSUNÊ IN THE CHARMIDES AND REPUBLIC

In this chapter I would like to examine the central features of Plato's views in regard to the virtue of sôphrosunê as presented in two representative dialogues from the early and middle periods – the Charmides and the Republic.¹ I wish to argue that there is a connection between sôphrosunê and to metrion. It is a connection which suggests that by the time Plato came to compose his late-period dialogues, moderation and due measure were regarded as virtually synonymous. Although the principal aim of this study is to investigate the role played by to metrion in the political and moral thought of Plato's late works, it would be valuable to consider Plato's notion of sôphrosunê in dialogues from other chronological periods.² By doing so, the similarities and differences between Plato's positions on due measure ought to be made apparent. To put this in terms of the methodological framework I am utilizing, we should be able to determine the complementary manner in which Plato conceived of sôphrosunê in selected early and middle dialogues, before turning in subsequent chapters to a detailed analysis of τό μέτρον and its importance for the philosophical method and moral and political thought of the Statesman, Philebus, and Laws.

¹ It hardly needs mentioning that the term sôphrosunê is virtually untranslatable. LSJ, for example, defines the term as follows: soundness of mind, prudence, discretion, moderation in sensual desires, self-control, temperance, and in a political sense, a moderate form of government. Schofield translates it as "measured judgement," which may perhaps be somewhat misleading if "judgement" is construed as a process of reasoning. It appears that Plato regarded sôphrosunê more as the possession of a type of knowledge that results in a particular disposition of character, rather than as the result of an active reasoning process which Schofield's phrase suggests. See, Schofield, Plato, 147. For the most part, I prefer to leave sôphrosunê untranslated, although upon occasion I shall simply use the English word "moderation". For an excellent treatment of the concept of sôphrosunê in antiquity, see Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966.
² The most salient features of Plato's early- and middle-period political philosophy will be examined in the next chapter.
I have organized the chapter into two principal sections. In the first part I analyze Plato's treatment of the concept of sōphrosunē in the Charmides. In this dialogue Plato posits an important argument for regarding the epistemological aspect of sōphrosunē, the possession of which allows the individual to know what she knows and of what she is ignorant. It is arguable that, even though Plato does not decisively conclude that sōphrosunē is a sort of knowledge of knowledge, the epistemic function of sōphrosunē supplies a fundamental underlying element for the manner in which Plato conceived what is in due measure and the concept of sōphrosunē in the late dialogues. In the second section I examine Plato's conception of sōphrosunē in the Republic. There appear to be two principal senses in which Plato regards this term. First, it is one of the moral virtues which along with wisdom justice, and courage, is necessary to possess if one is to live well. In this sense sōphrosunē is regarded as a sort of order to the soul; the moderate person is one who has the soul's parts in balance. The second sense of sōphrosunē, although it appears to be different than the first sense, is not unrelated to it. Plato seems to view sōphrosunē as a position between extremes of excess and deficiency, a blending of disparate elements into a combination that shares in both extremes. To give but one example, this usage of sōphrosunē is made clear when we consider that the best form of polis is a mixture of elements both of the "city of pigs" (ὐόν πόλιν) and the "city in fever" (φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν). Kallipolis is theoretically founded by blending the austerity of the "city of pigs" with an amelioration of the excess luxuries in the "city in fever". If it is established in this way, a polis will be moderate and "moderately managed" (οἰκή σωφρόνως).³ The Republic's conception of sōphrosunē, in both of these aspects, contains fundamental elements that are again encountered in the Statesman, Philebus, and the Laws.

³ See, Republic, 423a5-6 for the conclusion of this argument.
A Knowledge of Knowledge: Sôphrosunê in the Charmides

The Charmides presents the reader with a sustained discussion concerning the concept of sôphrosunê. In this so-called Socratic dialogue Socrates and his two interlocutors, Charmides and Critias, attempt to define this concept. While Socrates, as usual in this type of dialogue,

4 Hyland offers a rather unorthodox interpretation of this virtue. He begins by hypothesizing that there are three "stances" represented by the Charmides' characters. (1) Critias and Charmides represent the "stance of mastery", a position which claims that reason can master the world. (2) Chaerephon represents the "stance of submission", a position that denies the rationality of values and favors the submission of oneself to one's own culture. (3) Socrates represents the "stance of interrogation or wonder", a view which concerns the questioning of the world. Hyland further contends that the "stance of interrogation" is Plato's metaphor for philosophy. Rather than treating sôphrosunê as a virtue, Hyland remarks that "we shall discover, as we work through the various 'definitions' of sôphrosunê, that this virtue becomes not merely an aid to the stance's [that is, the stance of interrogation] preservation, but identical with the stance itself. The Charmides, ... is Plato's representation of his conception of philosophy." Drew Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981), 3-17. After analyzing the dialogue in terms of the integration of its dramatic aspects and philosophical arguments, Hyland believes that he has demonstrated the identity of philosophy with sôphrosunê. "Philosophy, the effort to preserve and develop ourselves as best we can be by taking that stance toward the world and toward our fellow humans that keeps us responsive to things as they are, with an integrity founded in an understanding of what we are and what we ought to be — that is sôphrosunê." Ibid., 148. Although Hyland's claim is bold and intriguing, it seems to be more of a reflection of the author's Heideggerian Weltschauung than it is of Socrates' and Plato's views on sôphrosunê and virtue in general. Perhaps the most serious drawback to Hyland's analysis is that he examines the Charmides and its arguments about sôphrosunê apart from the manner in which this virtue is treated in the rest of the corpus. Plato's arguments about sôphrosunê (and to metrion) in works written after the Charmides strongly suggest that sôphrosunê is not a metaphor for philosophy as the "stance of interrogation". Rather, sôphrosunê ought to be regarded as the fundamental virtue in which are grounded all of an agent's choices and actions.

5 The dramatic date of the dialogue is sometime either during or shortly after 432; Socrates has recently returned from the military campaign at Potidaea. The dramatic setting of the work is a palaestra in Athens. Plato's selection of characters is interesting; Charmides was a brother of Plato's mother; Critias was a first cousin both to Charmides and to Plato's mother. Both men were members of the Thirty Tyrants, Critias, of course, being the leader of this aristocratic and anti-democratic group. Kahn interestingly comments: "the choice of these interlocutors permits Plato to elaborate on the fame and distinction of his own family and its connection by marriage. ... [T]he presence of Critias and Charmides serves as a kind of personal signature, superimposed upon the anonymity of the Socratic dialogue form, just as the presence of his two brothers as principal interlocutors imprints Plato's signature on the Republic." One could infer from Kahn's remark -- as Kahn himself does -- that the dialogues in which members of Plato's family make an appearance are those in which Plato himself was especially concerned. One could argue that perhaps in these dialogues we have the means of hearing to some extent Plato's voice, or at the very least, have the opportunity to eavesdrop on the sort of conversation that might have occurred between Plato and several of his distinguished relatives. It is also worth commenting on the relation between Plato's choice of characters and the subject matter of the dialogue. One suspects that the figures of Charmides and Critias were deliberately employed by Plato to demonstrate the necessity of sôphrosunê for political leaders; the necessity of this virtue is placed in high relief by the subsequent immoderate political acts of the dialogue's interlocutors. In other words, the lack of moderation displayed by the historical Charmides and Critias may serve as a reminder of the manner in which politics is incorrectly practiced when political leaders do not ground their actions in sôphrosunê. If I am correct in my belief that sôphrosunê was an important virtue for Plato throughout his career, then the combination of Kahn's idea of the relation between the choice of characters and the importance of the subject matter and the notion that the immoderate political behavior of Charmides and Critias was harmful to the polis provides reasonably convincing evidence in support of my position. Plato, by making himself heard through the characters of Charmides and Critias, as well as by means of an awareness of the harm done to the Athenian regime by the actions of these two family members, perhaps is able to present his arguments concerning the importance of sôphrosunê more forcefully than if the Charmides' interlocutors were individuals of less personal and historical significance. See, Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 187.
professes that he does not know what sōphrosunē is, both Charmides and Critias believe that it is a virtue. Sōphrosunē is chosen for examination after Socrates argues that since the body cannot be cured apart from the soul, because the soul is the source of both health and disease for the body, it is necessary first to cure the soul by means of charms (ἐπιθεῖσαι), the result of which is the possession by the soul of sōphrosunē.6 Critias remarks to Socrates: "Charmides is thought to surpass not only those of his own age in appearance, but also ... [in what Socrates has called] moderation" (Χαρμίδης τῶν ἠλεκτρῶν ὡς μόνον τῇ ἴδει δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ... σοφροσύνης).7 Furthermore, Critias claims that Charmides has the reputation for being the most moderate (σοφρονέστατος) young man of his age-group. Socrates replies that, given his lineage, it is quite appropriate for Charmides to possess this virtue in the degree that he does. Socrates is led to inquire of Charmides if he "already sufficiently shares in moderation or is lacking it" (ἰκανὸς ἦδη σοφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδείξει εἶναι).8 In light of Critias' praise and Socrates' questioning, Charmides is at first somewhat embarrassed, for he correctly reasons that if he denies possessing sōphrosunē he would be pointing out that Critias was lying (ψεύδη ἐπιθείσω); but if he affirms what Critias had said, he would be guilty of "praising himself, and perhaps it will appear to be offensive" (ἐμαυτῶν ἐπαινῶ, ἵσως ἐπιχεῖσθε φανεῖται).9 Charmides' response pleases Socrates, and the latter is stimulated to pursue the discussion of sōphrosunē in depth.

Charmides offers three definitions of the term: (1) to act in an orderly (κοσμίως) way and be at rest (ἡπικχῇ), that is, to live according to a certain kind of quietness as one goes about one's daily affairs;10 (2) the capacity to make people feel shame (ἀἰσχώμεσθαι) and be bashful (ἀἰσχωμένου),

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6 The argument is found at 156d1-157c6 of the Charmides.
7 Charmides, 157d1-3.
8 Charmides, 158c3-4.
9 Charmides, 158d3-4.
10 I do not think that this definition of sōphrosunē suggests a conscious desire to disengage from civic and political affairs. Rather, I believe all that Charmides is suggesting is that we conduct ourselves in a manner which does not give
in other words, sōphrosunē is modesty (aiδος); (3) doing one's own business (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), that is, minding one's own affairs. The first two definitions are apparently Charmides' own. The third definition is one that he has heard mentioned by someone else, who turns out to be Critias. Using the elenchus, Socrates quickly rejects the first two definitions. It appears that the first definition is rejected because the behavior one exhibits in public is an insufficient ground for sōphrosunē; the second definition is lacking because the capacity to feel shame varies from individual to individual, and thus the virtue of sōphrosunē would not be grounded universally. Moreover, modesty is not always the best quality for all people in all situations. The third definition, however, presents some kind of enigma (αινίγματι) since Socrates is quite at a loss to know what "doing one's own business" really means. Socrates' puzzlement is curious given that in the Republic justice is defined as "doing one's own business" (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The best way to explain Socrates' unwillingness to pursue this point further is to note that in the remainder of the Charmides the focus of the examination is not so much on finding a definition of sōphrosunē per se, as it is on the question of the relation between sōphrosunē and knowledge.

offense to others. The point is more subtly developed at 307a1-d5 in the Statesman. In this passage the Visitor argues that frequently the class of what is gentle (τὸ ήγεμαίας) is praised, saying that these things are quiet and moderate (ήγεμαία ... καὶ σωφροσύνη), and we apply to all these things not the name courage (αἰερία) but orderliness (κοσμολόγιος). The opposite qualities are censured. In other words, according to the views of the Eleean Visitor, sōphrosunē and quietness do not suggest any sort of civic disengagement more than that they suggest the qualities needed by citizens to ensure the health of the polis. In contrast, Schofield perhaps presses the point too far when he argues that "The 'quiet life' had its own political resonances – of aristocratic restraint and decorum. … Plato in the Charmides suggests that Critias and Charmides gave it a central place in their ideology if not in their political behavior." See, Schofield, Plato, 24, and on the notion of political engagement in general, 19-30. While it is possible to regard Charmides definition as suggesting a certain decorum in one's interactions with others, it is hard to see the actions of the Thirty Tyrants as containing "resonances of aristocratic restraint". Perhaps the best analysis of ή ήγεμαία is, L. B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

11 The definitions are stated respectively at, Charmides, 159b3, 160e3-4, and 161b6.

12 Part of my analysis of the Charmides owes a debt to Kahn who, in general, gives a fine interpretation of this dialogue. See, Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 183-209.

13 Republic, 43a8, and 441d7-8. This raises two intriguing speculative questions. Is Socrates feigning his puzzlement for the sake of the dialogues' subsequent arguments? Can Socrates' unawareness in the Charmides of the meaning of the phrase "doing one's own business" suggest that this dialogue was in fact composed before the Republic? It does not seem to be the case that there is sufficient evidence to answer either of these questions satisfactorily.
Charmides, rather slyly and provocatively, next suggests that perhaps the person who said this—Critias—also did not know what it meant. This remark has its intended effect; Critias takes over the role of interlocutor from Charmides. Critias emends Charmides' third definition, stating that \textit{sōphrosunē} is "the doing of good things" (τὴν γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν πράξειν). Socrates dismisses Critias' revised definition by demonstrating that a person could be ignorant in respect to acting moderately; one could act in this manner but not know that one in fact possesses \textit{sōphrosunē}. From this point forward, the argument examines the question of knowledge. Critias responds by asserting that "to know oneself and to be moderate are the same" (τὸ γὰρ Ιγνόθη σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ Σωφρόνει ἔστιν μὲν ἑαυτὸν). Critias, of course, is linking his definition of \textit{sōphrosunē} to the admonition of the Delphic oracle which he regards, along with the other Delphic maxims—"nothing in excess" and "ruin comes from pledges" (τὸ τε Μηδὲν ἀγαν καὶ τὸ Ἐγγύη πάρα δ’ ἂτη)—as useful warnings in regard to the manner in which one ought to live. At this point in the dialogue, Critias is only making the claim that \textit{sōphrosunē} is self-knowledge, but not that it aims at the goal of living well. Tuckey, referring not only to the Delphic injunction, but also to sentiments expressed by Pindar, Aeschylus, Thales, and the Pythagoreans, argues that in general Greek thinkers acknowledged "the attainment of self-knowledge was in some sense the crowning

14 Hyland seems to think that the turning over of the conversation to Critias indicates a change from a discussion of the "examined life" to a "professional dispute". "No wonder, then, that Socrates reacts to the definition with an epithet hardly appropriate in polite company and with friends: ὁ [ὁ] \textit{μιαρέ}, ('vile pollutor')." Hyland, \textit{The Virtue of Philosophy}, 75-76. The word in question is found at \textit{Charmides}, 161b8. Hyland is simply incorrect with this translation. There is an idiomatic reading of the term \textit{μιαρέ} that means "rogue", "rascal", and the like. A parallel usage is encountered at \textit{Phaedrus}, 236e4. This is an excellent example of how in a literary reading the interpreter can select a particular meaning of a term to support a presupposition about the way in which one of the dialogue's characters should be interpreted. Hyland presupposes a rather negative view of both Charmides and Critias, and his presupposition is bolstered by the manner in which he translates \textit{μιαρέ} in the most negative possible way. If he translated the term in the sense of "rascal" it would tend to suggest a reading that shows Socrates giving Charmides a playful, perhaps somewhat affectionate, rebuke. It is also difficult to imagine that Charmides and Critias would have allowed themselves to be insulted in the manner Hyland indicates, much less continue the conversation with Socrates.

15 \textit{Charmides}, 163e10.

16 \textit{Charmides}, 164e5-165a1.

17 We should also note that Critias is connecting his definition not only to the Delphic injunction, but also to Socrates' own belief and teaching. Guthrie remarks: "Thus Critias has presented Socrates with his own doctrine that virtue (or a virtue) is knowledge, and even more precisely that \textit{sophrosynē} is self-knowledge, the doctrine of the first \textit{Alcibiades}.” Guthrie, \textit{Plato: The Man and His Dialogues}, 169.
achievement of the moral life."^{18} It does seem, however, that the connection Critias makes with the injunctions of the Delphic oracle (as well as Socrates' own teaching) prepares the way for the discussion near the end of the *Charmides* whether the possession of *sōphrosunē* would entail living a good and happy life. But before this thread of the argument can be considered, Socrates first examines what sort of self-knowledge *sōphrosunē* is.

Since *sōphrosunē* is a kind of knowledge "it would be some kind of knowledge and about some kind of thing" (ἐπιστήμη τίς ἄν ἔιη καὶ τινός); it would be knowledge of oneself.\(^{19}\) It is a knowledge of knowledge, including a knowledge of ignorance: "To be moderate, moderation and knowing oneself are to know what one does know and what one does not know" (τὸ σοφρονεῖν τε καὶ σοφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἐαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἃ τε οἴδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἴδεν).\(^{20}\) It is a knowledge of itself and a knowledge of the absence of knowledge. There is a further link with the Delphic injunction "Know Yourself" in the sense that the admonition should be interpreted as saying that one ought to know that one's knowledge has a limit; being a human being, one cannot have unlimited knowledge. Kahn points out, correctly I believe, that this "epistemic reading is more specifically Socratic; it corresponds exactly to the interpretation given by Socrates in the *Apology* of the oracle that declared no one wiser than he."\(^{21}\) So, at this point in the *Charmides*, it would appear that Plato is attempting to tie together epistemological and practical considerations, in the sense that *sōphrosunē* is treated both as a kind of knowledge and as one of the moral virtues, along with traditional Hellenic moral strictures and Socratic teaching. Further discussion of *sōphrosunē* as a virtue becomes over-shadowed by the emphasis on epistemological concerns in the remainder of the dialogue.

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\(^{19}\) *Charmides*, 165c5-7.

\(^{20}\) *Charmides*, 167a6-7.

\(^{21}\) Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 191. Kahn makes the further important observation that at 72a5-7 in the *Timaeus* "it was well-stated long ago that it belongs only to the moderate person to know himself and to do his own business" (αλλ' εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνῶσει τὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἑαυτὸν σοφρονὶ μόνη προσήκειν).
Because Socrates claims that he himself does not know whether this definition is correct or not, he directs the conversation toward the examination of two further questions: (1) can one know what one knows and does not know, that is, is such knowledge even possible; (2) what is the benefit of such knowledge. The discussion is carried out in terms of whether a thing’s faculty can have itself as its object by employing analogical examples such as largeness, sound, and vision. There are two steps to the argument. The first is to state a hypothesis, in reference to which, Socrates asks: "Is this knowledge a knowledge of something, and does it possess some such faculty so that it is of something?" (ἐστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τουαύτην δύναμιν ὡσεὶ τινὸς εἶναι). The second is to examine several examples to test the validity of the hypothesis, one of which being the example of largeness: "If we find something larger that is larger than larger things and than itself …" (Εἴ ὁν τι εὑρομεν μείζον, ὁ τῶν μείζων ἐστὶν μείζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ …). Similar examples, drawn from the faculties of hearing and sight, follow. The immediate point of this argument is to attempt to establish the theory that "whatever exercises its function in relation to itself will have the character of that to which its function is related." If this hypothesis is valid, then knowledge would be a knowledge of knowledge; knowledge directed toward knowing what one knows and what one does not know would assume the character of a reflexive relation to itself, that is to say, it would be self-knowledge. More generally, the argument is of great importance in trying to explore the relations between relative terms, whether some refer back to themselves (reflexive relation) or whether some do not refer to themselves (non-reflexive relation). The argument relies on the manner in which Plato treats the objective and comparative uses of the genitive case. He appears to

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22 Charmides, 168b2-3.
23 Charmides, 168b10-11.
24 Guthrie, Plato: the Man and His Dialogues, 161.
25 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see, Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 194-196.
26 See, Guthrie, Plato: the Man and His Dialogues, 161.
regard both uses of the genitive as interchangeable. Thus, "knowledge of something" (objective genitive) is not clearly differentiated from "larger than large things" (genitive of comparison). This lack of differentiation entails inconclusive, if not incompatible, results. By treating the objective and comparative genitives as the essentially the same, two results follow. On the one hand, Plato is able to suggest that knowledge perhaps is self-knowledge; knowledge is reflexive. In general, therefore, there are some reflexive relations. On the other hand, the examples of largeness, sound, and vision, lead to the conclusion that not all faculties are reflexively related; some relations are non-reflexive.

Even though Socrates, not to mention Critias, is quite perplexed at the consequences of this argument, and is unable to continue the examination of the problem, this section of the *Charmides* is, I believe, highly important philosophically in two respects. First, it is an innovative attempt by Plato to establish the beginnings of a theory of relations. Second, it leaves open the possibility that there can be a knowledge of knowledge, and if knowledge is reflexive, then there is the additional possibility that this self-knowledge may be able to be applied to benefit us in our practical affairs. Indeed, since Socrates cannot examine this question further, he turns to a new investigation – what is the benefit of possessing a knowledge of knowledge.

Socrates begins the next part of the discussion by conceding that self-knowledge is possible. If a knowledge of knowledge is possible, "is it any more possible to know what one knows and what one does not?" (τι μᾶλλον οἶδον τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἃ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ μη;). In other words, Socrates remains perplexed. Is knowing what one does and does not know the same as

27 Kahn argues: "We have here the beginnings of technical terminology for the theory of relations, a sample of professional philosophy even more advanced than the treatment of extensional relations in the Euthyphro and Meno, and a hint, perhaps, as in the Parmenides, of the kind of questions that specialists might be studying in the Academy." Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 196. For his analysis of extensional relations in the Euthyphro and Meno, see, Ibid., 172-174.

28 *Charmides*, 169d6-7.
self-knowledge? The concession that a knowledge of knowledge is possible is employed by Socrates as a presupposition for the next stage of the discussion. It is worth pointing out that Socrates appears to adopt the method of hypothesis at this point in the dialogue. He is going to assume a hypothesis that seems to agree with the way things are in order to examine what follows from the hypothesis. As Kahn puts it: "So we take for granted, for the moment, that it is possible to have reflexive knowledge, including knowledge of self, in order to explore the implications of such an assumption." The immediate and principal implication of this presupposition is that sōphrosunē only entails that one knows, not what one knows: "he will know that he possesses some knowledge, but of what, moderation will not make him know" (γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινά ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δὲ γε, ἢ σωφροσύνη οἳ ποιήσει αὐτῶν γνώσκειν). Furthermore, one will not be able to distinguish an expert from a non-expert who pretends to be an expert. Using the example of a physician, Socrates argues that if sōphrosunē does not allow one to know what he both knows and does not know, how would he ever be able to distinguish between a real and false physician. Grounded in the idea that the knowledge of a particular science (ἡ ἐπιστήμη) is the object of that particular science – for example, medicine is the knowledge of health and illness – it would seem that one could not know the object of a science of which one does not possess knowledge. Thus, even if one possessed sōphrosunē, but not the science of medicine, one could never distinguish the medical knowledge of a person claiming to be a physician. Conversely, a physician possessing knowledge of medicine, but one who does not possess sōphrosunē, would be unable to distinguish anyone except another who practices the same craft (ὁ ὀμότεχνος).

29 The use of the method of hypothesis in the Charmides is but one example of a trait that should make the interpreter cautious in assigning this work to the early-period dialogues. Although the Charmides exhibits many of the characteristics of a typical Socratic logos, the methodological and philosophical sophistication underlying this section of the work suggests it has much in common with the middle-period works.
30 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 196.
31 Charmides, 170d7-9.
32 The argument is found at Charmides, 170a6-171c10.
Kahn, along with other scholars, has pointed out that this argument presents a very serious difficulty for Socratic philosophy. If one cannot distinguish between, say, the true and false physician, how is it possible for Socrates to go about examining the knowledge of others? Kahn comments: "So in general if temperance is knowledge-of-knowledge alone, it will not equip someone to distinguish experts from false pretenders in any field, unless the temperate person happens also to be an expert in that field himself." The main point of Kahn's argument is that in the Charmides Plato is engaging in a critique of Socrates' profession of ignorance. There surely would be little reason for Socrates to examine others continually in respect to their knowledge if, at bottom, Socrates was incapable of distinguishing, at least to some degree, whether or not the responses of his interlocutors were true or false in relation to the knowledge or lack of knowledge possessed by Socrates in respect the object of knowledge possessed by the person he was questioning. To put it simply: "Can one judge competence in a technē that one does not possess?" The argument in the Charmides, then, casts grave doubt on the Socratic τι ἔστι question in terms of both practical and moral expertise. Yet, even though Socrates professes ignorance, his masterly use of the elenchus in demonstrating the weaknesses of his interlocutors' arguments suggests that Socratic ignorance may not appear to be as simple and complete as Socrates leads his interlocutors to believe. At the very least, of course, Socrates knows that he

34 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 197.
35 The principal issue is the tension between Socrates' claims at 21b–22e of the Apology that he went about examining those who thought themselves to be wise and the potential impossibility of knowing what one knows in the Charmides. In addition to Kahn's interpretation, Vlastos appears to reject the Charmides' arguments; Socrates examines Critias' claim that sōphrosunē is a knowledge of knowledge "only because it was proposed as (an unacceptable) definiens of sōphrosunē." Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, n. 12, 47-48. Carone recognizes the difficulty of the tension between the Apology and the Charmides, but argues that the arguments of the latter dialogue "do not have to be seen as decisive, and are susceptible of resolution within the Socratic framework." Carone, "Socrates' Human Wisdom," 276. Finally, Benson concludes his analysis with the statement that "the Charmides' arguments concerning self-knowledge do not repudiate the Socratic mission of uncovering his and others' ignorance, at least insofar as we understand that mission as requiring only the ability to recognize ignorance."
36 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 200
does not know. Kahn's analysis suggests that Socrates did possess at the very least knowledge of
good and evil. Tuckey regards the purpose of this section of the dialogue as articulating the
logical problems entailed by the notion of a knowledge of knowledge. "Once certain logical
difficulties have been discerned, and the ground has been cleared to some extent … Plato brings
the moral aspect of the problem to the front."

Not surprisingly, then, the remainder of the
Charmides examines sōphrosunē in relation to moral philosophy.

Setting aside the definition that sōphrosunē is a knowledge of knowledge, Socrates questions
Critias: "What would be the benefit for us from moderation if it were of this sort?" (Τίς ... ὡφελία
ήμιν ἔτι ἔν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὕσης). Would the possession of sōphrosunē
lead to well-managed households and well-governed poleis, with individuals performing the
functions for which they had knowledge and handing over those tasks for which they did not
possess knowledge to those who do? After once again granting that they should assume the
proposition that it is possible to know what one knows and does not know, and after framing his
argument as if it had been given to him in a dream, Socrates concludes that such a specialized
system of the division of labor would not be beneficial. They have not yet learned whether "by
acting knowledgeably we would fare well and live happily" (ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστημόνος ἄν πράττωτες

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37 Much of Kahn's analysis involves the relation between first-order knowledge (the knowledge one possesses in
respect to a particular science) and second-order knowledge (a knowledge of knowledge). He argues that 170a-171c of
the Charmides implies that, despite his protestations to the contrary, Socrates did indeed possess the necessary first-
order knowledge, especially in regard to virtue and knowing how to live well. Furthermore, Kahn appears to regard
Plato's critique of Socratic ignorance as a necessary step toward the establishment of Platonic epistemology and
metaphysics. By questioning Socratic self-knowledge in the sense of knowing what one knows and does not know,
Plato must surely have expected an answer. "The answer is not, of course, intended to imply that Socrates historically
possessed such knowledge. Rather, Plato's own theory can be seen as his attempt to provide for the world, and for
himself, a coherent account of what kind of knowledge would be required for full competence in the search for moral
wisdom that Socrates had begun." Ibid., 202-203.

38 Tuckey, Plato's Charmides, 73.

39 Charmides, 171d1-2.

40 It is instructive to note the similarity to the Republic's division of labor according to functional specialization. But
unlike the Republic, the Charmides rejects the notion of the specialized division of labor, in part because of the
inconclusive argument attempting to define sōphrosunē as knowledge of knowledge, and in part because it is doubtful
that such specialization would do any good for humanity (Charmides, 173a1). This second reason clearly is at odds
with Plato's theory of justice in the Republic, where each part of the polis and each part of the soul is assigned its
special function. Also see, Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 203-205.
While there may be some material benefits, such as having better health because the physician would be acting in accordance with the expert knowledge of medicine, or having better material goods made by expert craftsmen, and since we would be dealing with knowledgeable persons we could never be deceived, there would still remain a lack of what is perhaps the most important knowledge of all, a lack of the kind of knowledge that brings us happiness.

Although Critias thinks that knowledge is necessary for happiness, it is not any sort of specialized, or expert, knowledge directed toward a material object. Eventually, Socrates deduces from Critias' responses that: "It was not living knowledgeable that makes us fare well and live happily, nor possessing the rest of the kinds of knowledge altogether, but only the possession of this one [kind of knowledge], the one that is concerned with good and evil" (οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν τε καὶ εἰδαμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμμαθῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἄλλα μᾶς οὖσας ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ κακόν). So, in order to live well it is necessary that we possess the sort of moral knowledge that enables us to distinguish good from evil. Ἁρμονία, defined as a knowledge of knowledge, would not in this sense be beneficial. Socrates, although apparently misled by Critias' definition, concludes: "It seems, at least, that this [knowledge] is not moderation, rather it is one whose function is to benefit us. For it is not a knowledge of knowledge or of the lack of knowledge, but [it is a knowledge] of good and evil."

(Ὅπει εὖ τῇ δὲ γε, ως ἐοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρμονία, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀρμονία εὐγενος ἐστιν το ὀφελεῖν ἠμᾶς. Οὐ

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41 Charmides, 173d3-5.  
42 Charmides, 174b12-c3. It should be pointed out how quickly Plato directs the argument from the epistemological domain to the political domain, before turning to considerations of moral philosophy. While it may appear that on the surface Plato seems undecided whether or not ἁρμονία is an epistemological or practical quality, the examination of ἁρμονία in relation to epistemology, politics, and ethics rather more reflects the idea that moderation is a complex quality, or virtue, grounded in self-knowledge as the foundation for knowing what is both the correct and incorrect ways in which the individual is able to live as a morally responsible agent and the polis is able to be governed well. The results of these practical applications of ἁρμονία are that both the individual and the political community live well and happily.
Socrates is quite disconcerted by the conclusion that sōphrosunē is not beneficial, believing that "moderation is some great good, and if you possess it, you are blessed (ἐπεί τίν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἄγαθον εἶναι, καὶ εἰπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, μακάριον εἶναι σε)." Even after conceding the possibility of a knowledge of knowledge that could know the objects of the other kinds of knowledge, so that the person possessing sōphrosunē would know what he knows and does not know, the discussion concludes with a profound and disturbing paradox: there is no practical value to sōphrosunē since it is not the knowledge of good and evil. The Charmides ends with all three characters – Socrates, Charmides, and Critias – in a state of puzzlement. The conclusion of the dialogue implies that Charmides does not possess sōphrosunē, since in order to be a sōphrōn one must know that one possesses sōphrosunē. Yet, Charmides, even though he himself does not possess sōphrosunē and both Socrates and Critias are unable to define sōphrosunē, readily agrees to submit himself to being further charmed and instructed by Socrates.

In view of the fact that the Charmides treats questions of epistemology, political, and moral philosophy, and attempts to discover the definition of the term sōphrosunē, while appearing to

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43 Charmides, 174d3-6.
44 Charmides, 175e5-176a1.
45 See, Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides, 90.
46 The suggestion that Socrates is "to charm" (ἐπιθέων) Charmides refers back to the beginning of the dialogue to the passage (156d3-6) in which Socrates relates that he learned from a Thracian physician of a charm for treating both a part and the whole together. This Thracian charm is also referred to at the end of the work (175e2-5) when Socrates mentions that he would be very troubled if after taking the time to learn this charm it should end up being worthless. It is also interesting to note that Critias and Charmides plot to enlist Socrates' further assistance, warning him that he had better take counsel how he will respond to their demand, because, if necessary, they will use force against him. Socrates replies that taking counsel is useless because no one can oppose them when they use force. These remarks are somewhat disturbing, and there appears to be two ways in which they might be explained. On the one hand, given Charmides' and Critias' roles as members of the Thirty Tyrants, one cannot help but wonder if Plato is indulging himself in a subtle, but pointed, criticism of his two relatives. On the other hand, perhaps the reference to using force may be more benignly interpreted in the sense that the force of Critias' and Charmides' aristocratic natures would prevent anyone from being able to offer them opposition. The latter reading is preferable, I think, in light of the manner in which Plato portrays both Critias' and Charmides' characters in this dialogue. There is an echo of the idea of using force in order to persuade Socrates to engage in, or continue, a discussion in the Republic. It is found in the passage at the beginning of this dialogue where Polemarchus suggests that unless Socrates proves to be stronger (ὡς ἐπεί διηνίσκεται), Polemarchus has enough companions with him to be able to make Socrates remain in the Piraeus. See, Republic, 327c7-9.
follow the course of a typical Socratic *logos*, but while simultaneously seeking to critique certain Socratic notions and introduce non-Socratic concepts, we must ask the following: What, then, is the purpose of the *Charmides*? Taylor concludes: "The purpose of the dialogue is to show that serious examination of the implications of the current conceptions of *sophrosyne* conducts us straight to the two famous Socratic 'paradoxes' of the unity of virtue and its identity with *knowledge* of good." Guthrie argues that Plato is beginning the process of questioning and exploring the philosophical implications of Socratic philosophy in light of his own growth as an independent thinker, especially in respect to epistemological problems. "We see the first stirrings of the intellectual curiosity which led him later on, in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, to look for the essence of knowledge itself, its relation to sensation and opinion, the possibility of error and related questions. He will found the study of epistemology, but not here." Both of these scholars, I think, are only partially correct.

There is no doubt that in the *Charmides* Plato is in some manner questioning the epistemological foundation of Socratic philosophy, as well as the consequences entailed by this foundation. There must be a defensible epistemological basis if one is to attempt to construct any sort of normative practical philosophy. To put this another way, any practical philosophy that hopes to be taken seriously needs to be grounded in a theory of knowledge; Socratic epistemology, if indeed there be any such theory of knowledge evidenced in the Socratic *logoi*, is quite deficient as the ground for political and moral philosophy. Yet, despite the correctness of Taylor's and Guthrie's conclusions, there appears to be even more taking place in the *Charmides* than merely epistemological considerations.

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49 This is an point that was not lost on philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant. Aristotle's epistemology is the foundation for his moral philosophy which, in turn, is the necessary basis for his political thought. Similarly, Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* is unworkable without his first *Critique.*
Penner has given a complex analysis demonstrating that the arguments in the *Charmides*, when taken together with the examination of courage (ἡ ἀνδρεία) in the *Laches*, suggest that the purpose of these two dialogues is to offer arguments in favor of the unity of the virtues. The knowledge of good and evil forms the foundation of the moral knowledge necessary for Plato's political philosophy. Penner's examination concludes: "... this knowledge is, in germ, the political art of the *Euthydemus* and *Republic*." Penner is correct in viewing the *Charmides* as containing more than simply epistemological investigations. There is a sense, encountered elsewhere in Plato, that even if a discussion does not appear immediately relevant to the fundamental question of how we may best live, we run the risk of under-reading Plato if we neglect the fact that his philosophy has practicability as its goal.

More strongly than Penner, Kahn and Schofield emphasize that there is a political dimension to the *Charmides*. Schofield argues that knowledge which is beneficial is knowledge directed toward knowing what is good and evil. "The extent and complexity of Plato's treatment of this notion of an architectonic knowledge can hardly be explained except as evidence of his own absorption in its possibilities, including in due course its political possibilities." In Kahn's view the conclusion of the *Charmides* is entailed by three premises: (1) knowledge must have a non-

50 Terry Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," in *Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Penner's formulation, slightly rearranged for the sake of this footnote, runs: "Temperance = the science of good and evil; temperance = the science which makes all other sciences beneficial; temperance = the science of making oneself and others happy; temperance = the science of ruling a city or household." For the quotation above and the formula, see, Ibid., 102.

51 Another example, which I shall discuss at length in a subsequent chapter, is the relation between philosophical method and its practicable application in the *Statesman*. While it is possible to read this work as the exposition of the method of division and collection, it seems clear that Plato has more in mind in this work by including a discussion of the role of the expert statesman. Method is examined in order to prepare the ground for practicable considerations. In other words, like in the *Charmides*, theory is examined first, then it is applied to questions of politics and ethics.

52 Schofield, *Plato*, 149. By the term "architectonic", Schofield appears to suggest the sort of knowledge that is directing or controlling. He sums up his analysis of the *Charmides*, stating: "Plato signals his attraction to the idea of an architectonic form of knowledge as the basis for good government that will produce general happiness." Ibid., 154. Although Schofield does not explicitly say so, it seems that he has in mind a connection between the epistemological arguments of the *Charmides* and the definition of the expert statesman in the *Statesman*. There is, I believe, a fundamental and complementary association between the knowledge of knowledge in the *Charmides* and the sort of knowledge required not only by the expert in the *Statesman*, but also between the *Charmides*’ concept of sōphrosunē and that encountered in the *Laws*. 

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reflexive object; (2) the most beneficial knowledge will have as its object good and evil; (3) the knowledge of good and evil will allow for individual and communal happiness. "In short, if such knowledge is to be fully beneficial, it must exercise political power." Notomi attempts to argue that there was a very specific purpose to the *Charmides*, namely, to overcome Critias' political ideology and to refute the sort of politics practiced by the Thirty Tyrants. After setting out the political ideology of the Thirty Tyrants, he analyzes the philosophical dimensions of what is termed the "evil" of Critias, concluding his argument with the following observation: "In this way, the collapse of Critias' political project, and the inadequacy of his political beliefs, became the starting points of Plato's philosophy of politics." Notomi, I believe, while offering a interesting analysis of the *Charmides* which properly recognizes that this dialogue is more than an exercise in epistemological theory, overstates his case. In addition to the remarks I made earlier concerning Critias, the fact that it is Critias himself who introduces the definition of *sōphrosunē* as a sort of moral knowledge, suggests that Plato was not attempting to overcome Critias in this dialogue. If anything, it is perhaps more plausible to suggest that Plato was trying to display Critias in a better light than his role as the leader of the Thirty Tyrants warranted.

Another interpretation of the *Charmides* that attempts to regard Socrates' interlocutors in a negative manner is made by Mara, who, arguing in the context of the collapse of "political sōphrosynē", views both Charmides and Critias as exemplifying a corrupt form of *sōphrosunē*. He argues that Charmides readily accepts Socrates' refutation of the first two definitions of *sōphrosunē* because Charmides "has so little real regard for quietness or modesty." In regard to the third definition, Charmides hands over its defense to Critias because Charmides apparently

lacks the ability to defend it himself. Mara concludes his analysis by commenting: "Charmides thus lacks the sōphrosynē which would make his soul healthy. His propensity for being led suggests the need for guidance. However, his current guardian is Critias, someone who is eventually shown to be even more deficient in sōphrosynē." Mara's reading is plausible, but only, I think, within the context of a political reading of the dialogue. His interpretation appears correct only if one accepts two premises on which his reading is constructed. First, Mara presupposes that the natures of both Charmides and Critias as depicted in the Charmides are similar, if not identical, with the actions of these two men as members of the Thirty Tyrants. Second, there is the assumption that the Republic's portrayal of the tyrannical soul "is virtually defined by the absence of political sōphrosynē." It is not entirely clear, however, that these premises are correct. In regard to the first premise, we have no reliable way of determining whether Plato's depiction of Charmides and Critias is accurate, or whether their natures remained unchanged between the dramatic date of the dialogue and their rule as members of the Thirty Tyrants. In regard to the second premise, it is arguable that far more than simply "the absence of political sōphrosynē" goes into the formation of the tyrant's soul. Nor can we state with any degree of certainty that Plato had his two relatives in mind when he depicted the nature of the tyrannical soul in the Republic. Indeed, given that the tyrannical soul develops out of the democratic soul, one wonders how one can connect Charmides and Critias, both of whose natures were surely aristocratic, with the formation of the tyrannical soul-type in the Republic. Finally, by restricting his analysis primarily to the political implications of the Charmides, Mara neglects important epistemological aspects of the dialogue, especially in the manner in which a certain

56 Ibid., 97.
57 In all fairness, Mara does comment on this issue, but concludes: "In general, I am more inclined than Carter to see a continuity between the behavior of Charmides and Critias in the dialogue and their later careers." Unfortunately, Mara does not sufficiently establish why he believes this is the case. See, Ibid., n. 55, 280.
58 Ibid., 95.
type of knowledge is necessary prior to making practicable moral and political claims. In other words, while Mara's exegesis does reveal a provocative political dimension to the dialogue, it does not do full justice to the equally important philosophical aspects of the *Charmides*.

In conclusion, the concept of *sōphrosunē* in the *Charmides* suggests both theoretical and practicable dimensions. In respect to theoretical considerations there are important notions for the study of epistemology, especially in regard to reflexive and non-reflexive knowledge. More importantly, perhaps, is the idea that moral knowledge must be directed toward the object of living well, without which neither the individual nor the political community can flourish. Additionally, we encounter in this dialogue an attempt to ground practical philosophy in a theory of knowledge. To state this in a somewhat different way, there is a need for theoretical philosophy to support the claims of practical philosophy. We cannot make normative claims about the manner in which we ought to live unless there is a defensible epistemological basis for our claims. Despite the fact that the *Charmides* ends in an *aporia*, we can nevertheless reasonably conclude that, for Plato, the possession of *sōphrosunē* was epistemologically and practicable related to the ability determine standards of correct and incorrect behavior if we wish to live as morally responsible agents and good citizens. A related view is reached by North, who concludes her analysis of the *Charmides* by arguing that Plato "has brought sophrosyne [sic] within the orbit of the two concepts most important for the Socratic approach to virtue: epistêmê and *technê*."\(^{59}\) The concern with *sōphrosunē* regarded in this twofold way lies not only at the core of the *Charmides*, but continually reappears in Plato's political philosophy as the virtue which is necessary for living well.

\(^{59}\) North, *Sophrosyne*, 158. North also correctly notes that in the *Charmides* Plato does not attempt to link *sōphrosunē* with the "control of the appetites and passions", a position that Plato adopts in the middle- and late-period dialogues. She writes: "In later dialogues, as Plato moves away from the Socratic position, he becomes increasingly interested in sophrosyne as the means of controlling the irrational in man, and in the last of his works, the *Laws*, this conception of sophrosyne is completely victorious."

Ibid., 158.
A Kind of Order: Sōphrosunē in the Republic

I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that sōphrosunē is manifested in two forms in the Republic: (1) as one of the four principal moral virtues whose possession is necessary if one is to hold the soul in a harmonious balance for the sake of living well; (2) as some sort of capacity of the soul which enables one to determine an end (be it a state of the soul, a material object, or the outcome of a process) that appears to blend together opposite elements into a mixture which partakes in both opposites. It is to the Republic's conceptions of sōphrosunē that I now turn my attention.

The initial discussion of sōphrosunē commences in Book III of the Republic, although there is a passing reference made in respect to it by Adeimantus in Book II, where he comments that in contrast to licentiousness (ἀκολασία) and injustice (ἀδικία) “both moderation and justice are fine things, yet they are difficult and laborious” (καλὸν μὲν ἡ σοφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπῶν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον).⁶⁰ I cannot agree with Rosen who claims that the concept of sōphrosunē is to be found in the speech of Cephalus. Even though Rosen does concede the fact that the term sōphrosunē is not used in this speech, he asserts that "we can take this speech to be an endorsement of temperance."⁶¹ Cephalus' speech is concerned primarily with a conventional view of justice, not sōphrosunē. It is an opinion in respect to justice that must first be stated and refuted before Socrates can embark on a more philosophically grounded discussion of justice; a discussion which eventually links dikaiosunē with sōphrosunē. In fact, Cephalus seems more concerned in old age with his not having committed many injustices, which is far different than saying he acted throughout his life with justice and moderation. Rosen himself appears to undermine his argument when he sums up Cephalus' character as being "a moderate hedonist who

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⁶⁰ Republic, 364a2-3.
spends within his means." Unless one is willing to argue that Plato's conception of sōphrosunē, as it is developed in the Republic, is connected with some sort of hedonistic moral philosophy, then it is incorrect to agree with Rosen's conclusion that Cephalus is an advocate for the conception of sōphrosunē articulated in this dialogue, or for that matter in the entire Platonic corpus.

When we turn to examine sōphrosunē as a moral virtue we find that Plato has given us two distinct, but related, views. First, it is regarded in the Republic as the virtue whose most important aspect is to enable most people "to be obedient to the rulers, and ruling themselves in regard to the pleasure of drink, sex, and food" (ἀρχόντων μέν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀρχόντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδας ἱδονῶν). Sōphrosunē is employed in this passage as a virtue reflecting the popular conception of moderation as something that holds one back from doing something. In other words, it is related to the Delphi maxim "nothing in excess". Three literary examples, drawn from the Iliad, are used by Socrates to illustrate the sort of words spoken by the many which are either in accord with or in opposition to the proper relations between rulers and ruled. Anna notes that this view of "moderation is connected with the avoidance of excess and vulgarity, and with polite and deferential behaviour." Additionally, Adam is correct in interpreting Plato's use of sōphrosunē in this passage as

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62 Ibid., 29.
63 Of course, there could be a weaker reading of Cephalus' supposed endorsement of sōphrosunē. If the speech of Cephalus implies moderation, then it could only be the sort of moderation held in the popular imagination. A view of sōphrosunē that regards it simply as not doing anything in excess is an opinion about moderation which Plato addresses in Book III. The standard account of a hedonist Platonic moral philosophy is, Terrence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
64 Republic, 389e1-2.
65 Dover has argued that, in general, there is a tendency in Greek popular morality "to distinguish between 'negative' virtue, which restrains one from doing wrong, and the 'positive' virtue shown in achievement." K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 67.
66 Even though Plato is generally opposed to poetic imitation, he does allow for imitation when good individuals are depicted in literary narrative. "… when a moderate man (μέτριος ἀνὴρ) comes upon some speech or action in the narrative of a good man, he will wish to report them as if he himself was that man (ὡς μέτριος ἐσχῆτο) …" Republic, 396c6-8.
"warning us not to regard his account of σοφροσύνη here as scientifically accurate and complete. It is the most obvious and conspicuous aspects of self-control which poets should chiefly impress upon the multitude, and to these Plato confines his attention." This discussion of σοφροσύνη, which certainly is not Plato's complete view of the matter, should perhaps be considered apart from Plato's treatment of this virtue in Book IV of the Republic, although it provides the foundation for what is to come later in the work. It is common practice for Plato to examine popularly held opinions before proceeding to argue in favor of his own conceptions.

The second conception of σοφροσύνη as a moral virtue in the Republic, and the one that, I believe, expresses Plato's own view, is the idea of σοφροσύνη linked to a form of self-knowledge. It is by knowing what is good and evil that we are able to determine the appropriate course of action. Again, in the words of Annas: "moderation … is thought of as knowing one's place, having a correct idea of who you are and what is due to and appropriate for your position." The notion of "knowing one's place" is fundamentally important for the way in which Plato sets up his argument in respect to the relations between the classes in the polis and the parts of the soul in the individual. It is the possession of σοφροσύνη that allows the agreement of the citizens in respect to whom their rulers ought to be, as well as entailing the self-knowledge on the part of the citizens that those who do not rule are not fit to rule. Adam, too, argues in favor of this reading: "our citizens are in accord with one another as to who shall rule and who shall be ruled, so that Temperance is present in both ruled and rulers, pervading the whole city through and through and rendering it accordant with itself. We may define Temperance as accord

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68 James Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), 138. While not specifically referring to Plato, Dover, too, notes that there was a fluid conception in regard to the meaning of σοφροσύνη in the popular imagination. Indeed, it is arguable that Plato's purpose in treating this virtue at such length in several dialogues was to establish a precise definition of the term. See, Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 68.

69 Annas, Introduction, 115.
between the naturally better and the naturally worse, on the question which of them should rule." As we have seen in the previous section, Plato argued in the *Charmides* that in some sense σωφροσύνη is the knowledge of good and evil. In the *Republic*, this conception is further developed by Plato to encompass both the harmony of the individual soul and the concord of the political community. The connection between the epistemological and practicable aspects of σωφροσύνη which was left unresolved in the *Charmides*, appear more plausibly related in the *Republic*. And in addition, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the notion of "knowing of what is due to and appropriate for your position" becomes associated with τὸ μέτρον and its more widely practicable applications in the *Statesman*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*.

The fullest expression of σωφροσύνη as a moral virtue is encountered in Book IV of the *Republic*. After the tripartite structure of the city has been established, Socrates next turns his attention to the individual. If the city "is wise, courageous, moderate, and just" (σοφή ὁ ἐστί καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαια), then we ought to be able to find these same four qualities in the individual.71 *Sōphrosunē* is the third of the virtues Socrates discusses. This virtue "resembles some kind of concord and harmony more than the previous ones" (συμφωνία τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονία προσέκκεν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρῶτον); "Indeed, moderation is some kind of order, <having> the mastery over certain kinds of pleasures and desires" (Κόσμος ποιύ τις, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν καὶ ἠδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμών ἐκράτεια)."72 The expression "having mastery over" (κρείττω) is somewhat problematic, since it implies that if the soul is a unity both what has mastery, or control, is the same as what is mastered, or comes under control. The solution to this problem is to suggest that perhaps "in respect to the soul, there is one better part and one inferior part, and when the part that is better by nature has mastery over the inferior part, this person is

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70 Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 232
72 *Republic*, 430e1-5.
said to have mastery over himself" (peri τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἐνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φῶςει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατές ἦ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττω αὐτοῖ).73 Conversely, should the better (and smaller) part of the soul be mastered by the inferior part "he is called weaker than himself, and the person who is in this condition is licentious" (καλεῖν ἤττῳ ἐαυτῷ, καὶ ἀκώλαστον τῶν οὕτως διακείμενον).74

This argument foreshadows the argument that follows in Book IV concerning the relation between the parts of the soul and the parts of the city. In order to see how sōphrosunē functions in relation to the individual and the political community, it would be helpful to analyze Plato’s arguments for the parts of the soul. Briefly stated, it must first be determined whether the soul can be divided into parts. Socrates begins by stating a principle that "the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in <the aspect of the> the thing itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time" (ὅτι ταύτων τάναντια ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταύτων γε καὶ πρὸς ταύτων οὐκ ἔθελησεν ἀμα).75 It appears that in the Republic Socrates is attempting to posit a principle which states that a thing cannot be both itself and something other than itself; a principle in which his arguments for the tripartite soul are grounded. Indeed, Plato follows the statement of this principle with the example of a spinning top. Spinning tops can be said to be both at rest and in motion; that is, they are at rest in respect to their axis, and they are in motion in respect to their circumference.76 Yet, Socrates argues that this view is incorrect. Tops are not at rest and in motion in respect to the same aspect of themselves (οὐ κατὰ ταύτα ἐαυτῶν); the axis about which tops revolve and the circumference which does revolve are different aspects of tops. One aspect – the axis – is at rest; the other aspect – the circumference – is in motion. Thus, since there are

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73 Republic, 431a4-6.
74 Republic, 431b1-2.
75 Republic, 436b9-10.
76 See, Republic, 436d5-e5.
two different aspects, it cannot be said that tops are both at rest and in motion. A similar, but unexpressed, principle underlies the Socrates' second hedonist argument in the *Gorgias*. In response to Callicles' claim that "the pleasant and the good are the same" (ἡδὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι), Socrates argues and concludes that "the pleasant turns out to be different than the good" (ἐπερεπόν γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). In other words, the pleasant and the good cannot be the same property.

How are we to understand the principle set out in the *Republic*? Adam, for example, writes: "[This] is the earliest explicit statement in Greek literature of the maxim of Contradiction." Bloom, closely following Adam's view, states that this passage in the *Republic* articulates "The earliest-known explicit statement of the principle of contradiction." Guthrie, too, considers the *Republic* passage to be a statement of a principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Silverman writes: "Plato uses the law of non-contradiction in the critical argument to establish the tripartite soul." In contrast, Irwin argues that: "In *Republic* 4 Plato formulates a principle somewhat similar to the Principle of Non-Contradiction; … [h]e does not suggest that if something is *F* in one respect and not-*F* in a different respect, it is self-contradictory. All his remarks suggest that he takes the opposite properties of sensible equals, and so on, to be perfectly compatible." Irwin's reading does not seem applicable to Plato's argument at *Republic* 436b. Rather, Irwin's interpretation seems more applicable in relation to an argument in Book V where Plato argues in favor of the existence of an intermediate state between being and nonbeing; in this particular case, opinion is the intermediate state between knowledge and ignorance, and it participates in both.

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77 *Gorgias*, 495d2-497a5.
"If some such thing could be shown to be and not be at the same time, such a thing would be laid down between what purely is and what in every way is not" (εἴ τι φανεῖ οὖν ἀμα ὑν τε καὶ μὴ ὑν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι τοῦ εἰλεκρινῶς ὑντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὑντος). 83 Plato is at pains to show in this passage, as well in dialogues such as the Parmenides, that there is a state between what is $F$ and $-F$. Opposite things do not logically have to be in contradiction; there is a way in which a third thing can be set over them, a thing in which both opposites participate. Indeed, this third ontological category might very well be the ground for τὸ μέτριον in the sense that what is in due measure is a blending of opposite qualities into a third sort of quality in which the opposites share.

It is arguable that the just-mentioned readings are incorrect. Plato is positing neither the principle of non-contradiction, nor is he articulating a principle of the compatibility of opposite properties of sensible equals. Rather, it appears to be the case that Plato is formulating a principle of non-identity. 84 He is attempting to establish a proof of non-identity by reference to properties. An analysis of the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of non-identity supports this interpretation. The principle of non-contradiction simply states that a property cannot both belong and not belong to a thing at the same time and in the same respect. 85 In contrast, the principle of non-identity states that for any $F$, if $x$ is $F$ and $y$ is $-F$, then $x$ is non-identical to $y$. 86

That the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of non-identity differ may be illustrated by examples drawn respectively from the Phaedo and the Republic. In the Phaedo...

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83 Republic, 478d5-7
84 The distinction between the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of non-identity was brought to my attention by Alfonso Gómez-Lobo.
85 The locus classicus for the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (ἀντιφασεις) is found in Book Γ of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1005b19-20: "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect" (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἁμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ); that is, $x$ cannot be both $F$ and $-F$ simultaneously.
86 It is instructive to compare Plato's statement of the principle of non-identity to Leibniz's Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Leibniz's principle states that for any property $F$, subject $x$ has $F$ if and only if subject $y$ has $F$, then $x$ is identical to $y$. 

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Socrates claims: "The opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that which is in us nor that which is in nature" (ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον ὑπὲρ ἀν ποτὲ γένοιτο, οὐτε τὸ ἐν ἣμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει). The principle is more succinctly asserted at bit later in the Phaedo: "An opposite will never be opposite to itself" (μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεθαι). In both of these passages, it is clear that Plato is formulating the principle of non-contradiction. He is clearly stating that any property cannot simultaneously be both $F$ and $–F$. In contrast, the example of the spinning top in the Republic attempts to demonstrate that two opposite properties cannot simultaneously inhere in the same aspect of a thing. Being at rest and being in motion are two opposite properties of the top, yet they cannot be considered as inhering simultaneously as contrary properties, except in the sense that they can inhere simultaneously in different aspects of the top. Understood in this way, then, Plato is able to claim that a plurality of contrary properties can inhere in a thing, as long as they do not inhere simultaneously in the same aspect of a thing. In other words, rather than articulating the principle of non-contradiction, the example of the top illustrates the principle of non-identity in respect to the substrata of contrary properties.

After formulating this principle of non-identity, Plato relies upon it to establish that what prevents one from satisfying a thirst cannot be the same as that which desires to satisfy a thirst. Thus, if the principle of non-identity is to hold, there must be at least two parts to the soul, one part that desires to drink, and another part that acts to refrain one from drinking. One part is associated with calculation, the other with appetitive desire. The calculating part of the soul is the "rational" (λογιστικὸν) and the other is the "irrational and appetitive" (ἄλογον τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν).

87 Phaedo, 103b4-5.  
88 Phaedo, 103c7-8.  
89 Republic, 439b3-d8.
Socrates next abruptly commences to investigate the part of the soul with which we display spiritedness, or anger (θυμός). It appears to be a rather startling move first to name what the third part of the soul may be. It seems perhaps that a more appropriate method would be to examine whether all aspects of the soul were sufficiently treated by the two parts just posited; if not, then an investigation of what an additional part, or parts, might consist of would be in order. Instead, we immediately begin with the claim that a defined quality, namely spirit, is what we are to examine. The underlying presupposition, of course, is that spiritedness is a distinct component of the soul which is not to be found either in the rational or appetitive parts. Plato employs a somewhat lurid anecdote concerning the appetitive desire to look at some corpses to demonstrate that anger, not reason, can be set in opposition to the appetites. If reason cannot rein in the appetites, then one sometimes becomes angry with oneself for giving in to desire. Thumos does not ally itself with the appetites in opposition to what reason dictates. Since the spirited element is not the same as the appetites, Socrates next must show that it is not identical to reason as well. The same basic principle that allowed the separation of the rational and appetitive parts of the soul is utilized for separating out a third part as well. Socrates uses two examples to show that the thumotic part is indeed distinct. He first shows that children are spirited even before they begin, if ever, to calculate rationally. Then, employing a line spoken by Odysseus from Book xx of the Odyssey "He struck his chest and spoke to his heart" (στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίνην ἔριπα πεμμε μυθό), he argues that this quotation illustrates that thumos and reason are different. Since the spirited element is not the same as the appetitive, and also is not identical to reason, it must constitute a third part of the soul.

90 Republic, 439e1-441c6.
91 Republic, 441b5. The verse from Homer is found at, Odyssey, xx.17. It may strike the reader of the Republic as rather odd that Plato makes use of this quotation from Homer to support his view that the thumotic part of the soul differs from the reasoning and appetitive parts. One would prefer that Plato constructed an argument rather than rely on a literary reference to establish his point.
Finally, once it is established that the soul is tripartite, Plato has Socrates conclude that there are three parts to the soul corresponding to the three parts of the polis. These correspondences may be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polis</th>
<th>Soul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian / Deliberative</td>
<td>Rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Thumotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer / Money-making</td>
<td>Appetitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that a one-to-one correspondence between the individual and the city has been established, Plato neglects to pursue the investigation any further, being satisfied that both the city and the individual are comprised of three parts.  

Socrates further claims that it necessarily follows that the four virtues found in the polis—wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice—will be found in the same part and in the same way in the individual. He recalls that the polis was just "because each of the three classes in it was doing its own business" (ὅτε ἐκείνη γε τῷ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἐκαστῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὅντων γεγονός). This is, of course, identical to one of the definitions of σοφροσύνη in the Charmides. In a manner similar to the rule of the guardians over the polis, reason will rule the soul, while the thumotic part will obey and assist reason, just as the auxiliaries aid the guardians. Together they will govern the appetitive part—which like the producer-class is the largest part of the soul—in order that the appetitive part of the soul and the producer-class in the polis do not dominate the other two parts.

92 Even though the soul-type in the Republic is tripartite, Plato does leave open the possibility that there could be more than just three parts to the soul. Plato writes: "there may happen to be some other <parts of the soul> in between" (καὶ εἴ ἄλλα ἄττα μεσαζών τιςχάνει ὄντα). Unfortunately, Plato does not follow up this suggestion either in the Republic or in any other dialogue. See, Plato, Republic, 443d7. The question, then, remains open whether Plato has conclusively proved the existence of a tripartite soul, along with the corresponding three divisions of the polis. There is a sense that by attempting to prove a tripartite soul after proving that three classes comprise the city, Plato is liable to the accusation of proving simply what he set out to prove. One could suggest, however, that the different types of soul-structures encountered in the dialogues do not imply that in the case of the Republic's conception of the soul there is any circular reasoning on Plato's part. Rather, the unified, bipartite, tripartite, or possibly multi-part soul-types suggest that Plato's view of the structure of the soul was necessitated by the requirements of the problem under examination.

93 Republic, 441c8-442b3.

94 See, Charmides, 159b3, 160e3-4, and 161b6. Also see my comments in the previous section of this chapter.
To conclude the argument, Socrates relates the functions of the virtues to the soul. Courage is connected to the spirited part, preserving what reason asserts to be or not to be feared. Wisdom is linked to reason in the sense that it is what enables an individual to know what is best and relay this knowledge to the other parts. Sōphrosunē is the object of a harmonious balance of the parts, one possesses sōphrosunē when one has acknowledged that reason ought to rule and does not attempt to rebel against reason's controlling influence. Finally, justice in the individual, as in the polis, is the doing of one's own internally. One who is just does not permit any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the parts within him to meddle with each other. Likewise, injustice is a civil war (στάσις) within the person taking place among the parts. It is a "meddlesomeness and an involving oneself in the work of another" (πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνη), a rebellion which upsets the balance of the soul.95

In the Republic sōphrosunē has both an epistemic and moral function. In terms of its epistemic function, the possession of sōphrosunē is related to a knowledge of ends. That is to say, it is non-reflexive knowledge directed toward the proper inner harmony of an individual, as well as knowing one's place within the polis. The arguments in the Republic provide a more plausible and comprehensive response to one of the aporiai of the Charmides. Knowledge is required if one is to live well and happily, yet in the latter dialogue it remained unresolved as to what sort of knowledge it might be. Sōphrosunē conceived as the knowledge of what is our proper end in relation to ourselves and the political community in which we live appears to supply the answer. It is the recognition that both we and the regime must be guided by reason. Guthrie has rightly drawn attention to Socrates' first speech in the Phaedrus which echoes this conception: "We must realize that in each of us there are two principles ruling and guiding us … one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other is the acquired judgment directing us toward what

95 Republic, 442b10-444b8.
is best … So, when judgment rules and guides us by reason toward what is best, this power has
the name moderation” (δεί αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἢμιῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δίῳ τινε ἐστον ἱδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ
ἄγοντε ... ἦ μὲν ἐμφύτους αὕτα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφεμένη τοῦ ἄριστον
... δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγοῦσης καὶ κρατοῦσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα).96

As in the Republic, sōphrosunē exercises an epistemic function as a non-reflexive knowledge
oriented toward a proper goal.

In terms of its role as one of the four cardinal moral virtues, sōphrosunē enables both the state
and the individual to maintain their disparate elements in a harmonious balance. It is an essential
component in the psychology of the whole (the polis) and its parts (the citizens), allied to and
entailed by the ruling and reasoning part. The possession of sōphrosunē in the polis "consists in a
harmony of will between all classes as to which is to be in control;" in the individual sōphrosunē
"consists in willing agreement that reason should be in control and keep the appetites within
bounds beyond which they are no longer doing their proper work and spoil a man's whole life."97

The parallel between the polis and the individual, between the whole and the part, is striking. As
the guardians are educated to be the most fit rulers of the state, so, too, should individual reason
be educated to rule over the citizens.98 Both in the polis and in the individual sōphrosunē is the
psychological quality and moral virtue required in order that either each class in the polis or each
part of the soul knows what is the proper task it must perform so that both may live well. The
moral psychology of Plato's Republic requires the possession of sōphrosunē by the individual and
the political community if both are to practice justice by knowing the correct manner in which the
parts of the soul and the parts of the polis are "to do their own business."

96 Phaedrus, 237d6-e3. Also see, Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 400.
97 Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 472 and 475.
98 In the next chapter, I shall argue that the manner in which Plato conceives education in the Republic does not lend
itself very well to ensuring the rule of reason in those of the producer and auxiliary classes who have not received the
sort of training given to the members of the class of guardians.
Before concluding this chapter, I wish to examine a conception of the term sōphrosunē as it is employed by Plato in respect to the methodological process by which one derives a moderate position from the consideration of extremes. I had noted at the beginning of this section that there are suggestions in the Republic that this concept appears to have a connotation resembling Plato's use of the term sōphrosunē as an equivalent for the term τὸ μέτριον, especially in the sense of its usage in the Statesman, Philebus, and the Laws.99 That is to say, there is a suggestion that the possession of sōphrosunē permits one to know how to blend opposite things into mixture that contains elements of both opposites.100 It is arguable, in fact, that sōphrosunē regarded in this sense is already present to some degree in its role as a moral virtue. Knowing that one should permit reason to control the thumotic and appetitive parts of the soul is in a way knowing how to blend our passions and appetites in such a manner as to enable us to live with the soul correctly balanced.101 The passions and appetites that not only oppose each other but that also are opposed to reason itself, are directed by reason into an alternate way of living in which these opposite psychological components are channeled correctly but not entirely eliminated or suppressed. Yet, besides the blending, or balancing, of both the soul and the polis, there is a sense that sōphrosunē is the basis of at least two arguments in the Republic concerned with the construction of the best type of regime and the best sort of education given to the guardians.

99 It should be pointed out that the word τὸ μέτριον occurs only twice in Republic, at 460d3 and 470d8. In both instances its meaning does not imply knowing what is in due measure. The meaning of τὸ μέτριον at 460d3 is best rendered in English as "reasonable", and at 470d8 "suitable" or "appropriate" would be a fitting translation. I have mentioned this because it is not precisely identical to the connection between τὸ μέτριον and sōphrosunē as we find it in the late-period dialogues, although there is a connection between the meaning of sōphrosunē in the Republic and its meaning in the latter works. To put this another way, while the use of sōphrosunē in the Republic does suggest finding a middle between extremes, as it does in the Statesman, Philebus, and Laws, the meaning of τὸ μέτριον, in its two occurrences in the Republic, does not suggest a similar connotation with this term's meaning in the Statesman, Philebus, and Laws. The word μέτρος is used three times, at 396c5, 460e1, and 466b6, and never means due measure.

100 In addition to sōphrosunē, it is remarked that justice, too, is regarded by some individuals as a position between opposites. At the beginning of their discussion, Plato has Glaucón remark in reference to the origin and essence (γένεσιν τε καί ούσιαν) of justice that it is "between what is the best … and what is the worst" (μεταξὺ οὗτοι τοῦ μὲν ἀριστοῦν ... τοῦ δὲ κακότατον). Republic, 359a5-7.

101 It is well to keep in mind that Plato never denies the importance of our passions and desires, and the need for them to be expressed. He simply requires that we know how to distinguish good and bad ones, and under the guidance of reason pursue and satisfy our passions and appetites in an appropriate and moderate manner.
Socrates attempts to derive the best sort of polis by a method that seemingly contrasts two very different types of cities. In order to see where justice may be found in the individual, Socrates suggests that they look for it in the polis. He attempts to accomplish this not by looking at an established political community, rather he thinks that, "if we observe the generation of a city in theory, we might also see the generation of justice and injustice in it" (*ei γνωμόνην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγω, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἐδοµένην ἀν γνωμόνην καὶ τὴν ἁδικίαν*). He begins by founding a polis in which each person produces the goods that he is naturally suited to produce; the city is founded on the idea of craft specialization with each citizen producing just enough for his and the community’s needs. It would seem that the simple life in this sort of city is designed to make it healthy and self-sufficient by avoiding any of the extremes that could lead to hardships. The austerity of this city causes Glaucon to remark that it is a city "without delicacies" (*ἀνευ ὁφον*). Socrates responds by adding certain non-essential foods in order that the citizens might "pass their lives in peace and with health" (*διάγωντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ἱγνείας*). Even these additional delicacies appear insufficient for Glaucon who refers to this first city as a "city for pigs" (*ὕδων πόλιν*), by which he means that it is devoid of the common luxuries and delicacies that people presently possess.

Glaucon’s objection is understood by Socrates; the former would like to see how "a city of luxuries" (*τριφώσαν πόλιν*) comes to be. Rather than examine a healthy city, Socrates agrees that perhaps it would be best to study a "fevered city" (*φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν*), even though he believes that "the true city is the one we just examined" (*ἀληθινὴ πόλις ... εἶναι ήν διεληλύθαμεν*). The fevered city is filled with things that exceed what is necessary for a city. In

102 *Republic*, 369a6-8.
103 The description of this city is found at, *Republic*, 369c9-372d4. Since I am examining the method used to establish the city, I am leaving out of account any discussion concerning the manner in which justice is related to the city.
104 This city is discussed beginning at, *Republic*, 372d8.
addition to non-essential luxuries, in respect both to goods and occupations, their need causes the growth of the city which, in turn, requires an army to guard the material interests of the city and its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{105} Even in the fevered city, Plato does not eliminate the need for the specialization of function; those who are to comprise the city's army, functioning as its guardians, must be experts in their profession. A non-expert, or a person lacking a natural aptitude for military matters is to be prevented from being a guardian of the city, just like a shoemaker was prevented from trying to practice a different craft. Annas seems to see something sinister in this notion: "This is the first mention of compulsion in the state, and Plato offers \textit{no defence} [sic] of it whatever."\textsuperscript{106}

It is interesting to observe that Socrates appears to favor the austerity of the healthy city. The principal reason for this, I believe, is that the specialization of labor in the healthy city will be reflected both in the division of classes in \textit{kallipolis} and in the division of the soul, with each individual component "doing its own business" so that there is a harmony for the whole. In light of the connection between the city and soul, the doubts voiced in the \textit{Charmides} concerning the specialization of functions appear resolved in the \textit{Republic}. By linking the parts of the soul to the classes of the city, Plato is able to demonstrate in the \textit{Republic}, in a manner in which he was unable to do in the \textit{Charmides}, that both the city and the individual have distinct opposing

\textsuperscript{105} The need for an army sets off a long discussion on the nature and education of those who are to guard the city, as well as the extended examination of the effects of poetry and poetic imitation, before \textit{kallipolis} is finally established in Book IV, 427d1. While it is not my intention to analyze these topics per se, I would like to note that in a very broad sense they contribute to the founding of the best city by removing some of the luxuries encountered in the luxurious city.

\textsuperscript{106} Annas does concede that although this passage does not suggest "authoritarian measures within the state ... there is unmistakably a reference to compulsion." Given the fact that the argument for the specialization of labor is theoretical, and that it is closely connected to the specialized functions of the parts of the soul, Annas's objection may be overstated. Additionally, she questions whether or not Plato recognized some form of human rights; in this case, the right not to be forced to do something one does not wish to do. I think that this is the wrong way to approach this problem. The link between the parts of the soul and the parts of the city "doing their own business" is not so much a question of rights as it is a philosophically theoretical argument directed toward what is the best way that an individual and political community are able to live well and justly. If we must frame this in terms of rights, then it would appear that for Plato the rights of the individual are subordinate to the good of the whole, although I am skeptical whether Plato, or any fourth-century Greek for that matter, conceived of rights in the manner Annas suggests. Annas, \textit{Introduction}, 79. Also see, \textit{Republic}, 374b6-e6.
elements that must be maintained separately under the supervision of the best of the individual components, namely, reason in the individual and the guardians in the polis. It is arguable that if Plato held to his objection concerning the specialization of function, the city/soul analogy of the Republic and all that is entailed by it would be unworkable.

With the basic parameters of the fevered city established, we can now examine how certain of its features are modified, or eliminated, by Plato with respect to the healthy city in order to arrive at the founding of kallipolis. The examination treating the nature of the guardians and the type of education they receive in musikē and gymnastikē, along with the extended discussion concerning the appropriate content and form of poetry and music, is designed, in part, to ameliorate some of the worst practices and their effects in the luxurious city. I am not claiming, however, that this is the sole purpose for which these topics are discussed. Rather, I am suggesting that the arguments employed to demonstrate the sort of character which a guardian ought to possess and the sort of education they receive, especially in respect to a love of learning, will enable them to rule successfully, moderating the worst tendencies of the fevered city. Additionally, the correct employment of poetry and music will assist in checking some of the excesses found in the luxurious city. The consequences of proper rule, education, and art is to moderate the fevered city, bringing it more in line with the austere city of pigs. It seems, then, that a city is able to be healthy by means of exercising appropriate control those aspects of it, which left unchecked would lead to its ruin. At the same time, there is the implication that if the city of pigs were left to itself, life, both for the individual and for the community, would stagnate. The solution, of course, is kallipolis, a city whose health derives from a blending of elements of both the austere and luxurious cities.

107 This poses an intriguing question: Is politics even possible in the city of pigs? It would appear that something more is needed if a community is to be a true polis with active citizen engagement in its affairs. While the fevered city may lead to a dangerous sort of politics, kallipolis provides a setting for a suitable kind of politics; suitable, at least, in terms of the sort of politics and political philosophy Plato envisages in the Republic.
The key text in support of this interpretation is found in the middle of Socrates' discussion concerning the proper musical modes, instruments, and meter. Socrates remarks: "We have not noticed that we have been cleansing the city which we just now said was luxurious" (λελήθημέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ὑν ἄρτι τροφᾶν ἐφαμεν πόλειν). Glaucon responds to this remark, saying: "Yes, since we are acting moderately" (Σωφρονοῦντές γε ἕμεῖς, ἦ δ' ὡς).108 It would seem to be the case that both Socrates and Glaucon are aware that they are engaging in a process which first sets up two extremes, before discovering an alternative that does not entirely reject elements drawn from both. Being moderate suggests that one knows how to derive this alternative from the extremes. In other words, acting moderately suggests that one knows how to discover a middle position between extremes, a middle-ground in which the extremes participate. It in this sense that sōphrosunē appears connected with knowing what is in due measure as it is presented in the later dialogues.

There are three further examples in this section of the Republic which suggest that opposite qualities can be blended together into a mixture in which elements of the opposites can partake. First, by demonstrating the manner in which the guardians' nature is molded by mixing the opposing dispositions of gentleness (πράος) and high-mindedness (μεγαλόθυμος), "for a gentle nature is opposite to a spirited one" (ἐναντία γὰρ ποι θυμοεἰδεί πραεία φύσις), Plato strongly suggests that the correct disposition for a guardian is one in which these opposite qualities are blended.109 While there is no explicit mention of the term sōphrosunē in this passage, the mixing of opposite qualities both parallels the establishment of kallipolis out of contrary city-types and reflects the method employed in the late-period dialogues in respect to the functioning of τὸ

108 Republic, 399e4-6.
109 Republic, 375c6-8. Adam argues that "Plato regarded this as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend ἰθυμοεἰδεῖς and πράον harmoniously together." Adam, The Republic of Plato, 107.
μέτρον in the *Statesman* and the analogous use of it in respect to the term *sōphrosunē* in the *Laws*. The possession of *sōphrosunē* permits one to know that the best disposition for a guardian to possess is one that blends gentleness and spiritedness. That is to say, *sōphrosunē* entails knowing how to combine these contrary qualities in accordance an appropriate measure of each of them.

Second, the education one receives in *musikē* and *gumnastikē* is to be a harmonious mixture of these two things in order to produce an individual whose soul is moderate and courageous. Education in both of these areas "was established especially for the sake of the soul" (τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέκα τὸ μέγιστον καθιστάναι). Since the use of the simple kind of *musikē* produces moderation (*σοφροσύνην ἐντίκειν*), it follows that the correct kind of physical training also produces an individual who is moderate. Furthermore, the argument connects the results of education to the sort of soul one will possess; too much physical training will make the thumotic part of the soul too savage, too much education in *musikē* will make one who has a philosophic nature (ἡ φιλόσοφος φύσις) more soft (μαλακώτερον) than he ought to be, with the result that the reasoning part of the soul will be improperly educated. The person whose soul is receptive to *musikē* will be softened, but if he pursues *musikē* excessively his spiritedness will be completely dissolved. Similarly, if a person whose nature is spirited shuns *musikē*, because he is a hater of reason (μυστικός) and is against music (ἄμοιβος), his disposition will become savage, and he will

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110 One is reminded of the *Statesman*’s argument that the task of the expert in statesmanship in to blend the opposite qualities of citizens into a harmonious mixture containing the correct amounts of moderation and courage. See, *Statesman*, 306a1-311c7.

111 *Republic*, 410c5-6.

112 The argument is given at, *Republic*, 410a7-411a1.

113 Guthrie sees a reflection of Pericles' Funeral Oration in Plato's argument. He writes: "Guardians must be brave without ferocity, philosophic without softness, these contrary qualities being harmonized to produce a nature truly civilized – a remarkable echo (whether intended or not) of Pericles' idealization of the Athenian character: 'love of beauty without extravagance, of culture (philosophia) without softness' (Thuc. 2.40.1)." Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 455. Perhaps; but it would seem to be the case that Plato's argument is directed at the formation of a proper moral psychology, as opposed to Pericles' praise of Athenian character. The differences between these two aims are, I think, significant.
live "in ignorance and awkwardness" (ἐν ἀμαθείᾳ καὶ σκαλιστητῃ). The proper amount of musicē and physical training will prevent the soul from moving toward either dispositional extreme. The person will exhibit courage and moderation in a soul that is balanced with a suitable share of each quality. It would seem that, once again, it is not only the possession of sōphrosunē that allows this to occur, but also the manner in which Plato discusses this middle position between extremes of excess on the soul's dispositions reflects the way in which knowing what is in due measure is related to being a moderate individual.

Third, the argument concerning the blending of musicē and gymnastikē concludes with the following observation: "the person who has best mixed physical training with music and applies it to the soul in the most measured way, this is the person we would most correctly say is complete and most harmonious in the arts of the Muses" (Τὸν κάλλιστον ἀρά μουσικῆ γυμναστικῆν κεφαλαίαν καὶ μετριότατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρθότατον ἄν φαίμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικότατον καὶ εὐφροσυνότατον). The use of the superlative degree of the adjective μέτριος, suggests that, even in the Republic, Plato is employing τὸ μέτριον as the way in which an individual is able to discover the mean between extremes. The person who properly pursues the studies of musicē and gymnastics not only is moderate and courageous in the appropriate manner, but also the mixture of these two qualities is in relation to what is in due measure.

I have tried to demonstrate in the preceding paragraphs that in the Republic Plato regards sōphrosunē both as a moral virtue and as a capacity of the soul that entails knowing how to blend opposite elements into a mixture in which both elements participate. The epistemology in which sōphrosunē is grounded enables one to know that one must "do one's own business" if a person is

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114 Republic, 411a5-412a2.
115 Republic, 412a4-6. Unfortunately, the requirements of English do not lend themselves to conveying the full sense of the word μετριότατα. In order to avoid undue clumsiness, I have translated this word as "in the most measured way", but we should keep in mind that all three degrees of this adjective connote the sense of "moderation" and "what is in due measure".
to know what is to be done in respect to oneself and in respect to one's place in the polis. The moderate person is moderate precisely because he knows that the parts of the soul are to be kept in a harmonious balance. He is moderate in respect to the regime because he recognizes that there are those who are fit to rule and those who are fit to be ruled. It is through this knowledge that he is able to live happily and the political community is able to flourish. But in addition to the moral virtue of sōphrosunē, it appears to be the case that Plato regards sōphrosunē as connected to τὸ μέτριον. There is a correspondence between being moderate and understanding what is in due measure which, as I shall argue in subsequent chapters, forms the basis of Plato's political and moral philosophy in the late-period dialogues. In the Republic, the establishment of kallipolis, the formation of the guardians' character, and an education which properly blends training in musikē and gymnastikē, are suggestive of the manner in which the person who possesses sōphrosunē is able to discover what is in due measure. Understanding what is in due measure requires sōphrosunē, and being moderate entails knowing what is in due measure. While the relationship between to metrion and sōphrosunē is not explicitly articulated in the Republic, nevertheless, there appears to be some evidence in support of it in the passages I have examined. When we turn to the Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws, it will become apparent that the close link between sōphrosunē and to metrion becomes central for Plato's late-period philosophical method, as well as for his political and moral philosophy.
CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF PLATO'S EARLY AND MIDDLE PERIODS

In order to establish a point of comparison against which Plato's late-period political philosophy can be measured, it is necessary first to examine the political thought of his early- and middle-period dialogues. Any analysis of the works of these periods reveals distinct differences in the way in which Plato argued in respect to how we may best live as individuals and citizens. Since there is a very large range of issues addressed by Plato in the works of the early and middle periods, my examination must be restricted to those aspects which are the most salient for the later-period dialogues that I intend to investigate in subsequent chapters. These aspects are: (1) the general character of Plato's political philosophy; (2) the role of education in respect to the individual's place in political life; (3) the concept of the rule of law.

The first section of this chapter discusses Plato's political thought in the early-period dialogues. Although there is not a fully articulated political philosophy, these works present us with more than an ample amount of evidence to suggest that politics was a central concern in the so-called Socratic dialogues. In the second section I shall examine Plato's middle-period political thought and the emphasis in the Republic that politics needs to be grounded in metaphysics if the political community is to live well and happily. Finally, the third section of this chapter will consider some criticisms – historical and philosophical – in regard to the restricted practicability of the Republic's political program. There are difficulties in this work (as well as in other early- and middle-period dialogues) that may have led Plato to re-examine, or argue from an alternate perspective, his political philosophy in order to offer different solutions in the works of the late period; solutions that complement but do not necessarily reject the positions articulated in other
dialogues. In other words, the political philosophy of the Statesman and the Laws, dialogues which essentially offer proposals concerning how we may best live, is neither a development (in the strong sense of the term) nor a rejection of the Republic's political thought, rather it represents a different way of viewing, for different circumstances, the manner in which we ought to live as members of a political community.

The Privileging of Individual Reason: The Early-Period Dialogues

The purpose of this section is to sketch in broad outline the most important features of Socratic political philosophy in the dialogues of the early period. When we examine these works, it is clear that they do not exhibit any fully developed and comprehensive political theory. While many of the concerns of these dialogues, especially the Gorgias, tangentially deal with questions concerning political practice and how we may best live as members of a political community, they nevertheless do not constitute any sort comprehensive set of proposals that may be recognized as a systematic theory of political philosophy. What they do display, however, is a focus on the use of persuasion and individual reason to discover how one ought to conduct oneself as a morally responsible agent. It apparently follows that if one is able to live a morally correct life in accordance with virtue, then the political community itself will be well-governed, since the polis is regarded as a collection of individuals. In other words, the polis will be virtuous because its citizens are virtuous; the whole will possess the same nature as its parts. Before turning to an examination of individual reason, it would be helpful to discuss the general

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1 Indeed, a part of my argument is directed against Bobonich's position in Plato's Utopia Recast, that the works of Plato's late period constitute a radical break from his middle-period dialogues. While there is much to admire in Bobonich's highly important book, I think that he overstates his case in regard to the development of Plato's thought. Despite Bobonich's developmentalist position, there is no compelling reason not to consider the political philosophy of Plato's later works as complementary to his other, earlier arguments, rather than regarding the later works as presenting a significant re-thinking by Plato of his views on political and moral philosophy. In addition to discussing the strong developmentalist position in the final section of this chapter, I shall examine in depth this important and contentious issue in Chapters 7 and 9.
characteristics of this period's political philosophy, to the extent that we may abstract them from the early-period dialogues.

Perhaps the most extensive reference to politics in the early period is encountered in the *Gorgias.* The examination of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* presents us with arguments designed to demonstrate the type of political rhetoric that would be most efficacious for the political good of the polis and the good of the individual soul, but Socrates' conversation with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles does not attempt to establish a fully developed political philosophy. Rather, the arguments are directed toward the justification of the fundamental thesis of Socratic ethics: it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice. This principal claim, of course, has a direct application to political philosophy, yet by itself it is insufficient as a theory of politics. It is arguable that before Plato can attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of political philosophy he must first attempt to prove certain claims. In the case of the *Gorgias,* there are two such claims: (1) there is a type of rhetoric that aims at what is good for the individual and the polis; (2)

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2 The placement of this work within the chronology of the Platonic corpus is not without problems; it may be situated either as one of the last dialogues of the early period, or as one of the first works belonging to the middle period. There are features in the *Gorgias* that would seem to indicate a date of composition later than that generally assigned to the early-period works. Among these features, we should mention the following: (1) the length of the dialogue; (2) the importance of the afterlife; (3) the influence of Pythagorean doctrines. Kahn argues that the *Gorgias* is possibly a work of the first part of Plato's early period, written around the time of "Plato's dramatic break with Athenian politics marked by his departure for Sicily at 'about the age of forty' (Ep. VII, 324A)." Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue,* 127. In a more detailed argument, Kahn argues that the *Gorgias,* along with the *Apology,* *Crito,* *Ion,* *Hippias Minor,* and *Menexenus* should be placed in what he terms "Group I" of the early dialogues; that is, works composed between 399-386. Kahn, "On the Relative Date of the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras,∗" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 69-70. The three features I have just mentioned would appear to cast some degree of doubt on Kahn's relatively early dating of the dialogue. For the purposes of this discussion, I am generally in agreement with Dodds and Guthrie, both of whom place the *Gorgias* in the latter part of the early period. See, Dodds, *Plato's Gorgias,* 18-30, and Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues,* 284-285.

3 The thesis is formulated in the *Gorgias* as follows: "To commit any injustice whatsoever against me and my possessions is more wicked and more shameful for the person who commits injustice than for me, the person who has suffered injustice" (οὔτοι φέρετε καὶ έμε καὶ τά έμα τά άδικοντε καὶ κάτω καί άνθρωπον εύναι ἡ έμοι τό άδικουμένον). *Gorgias,* 508e4-6. For an analysis of Socratic ethics which thoroughly examines the principles and premises in which they are grounded see, Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, *The Foundations of Socratic Ethics* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994). Chapters 4 and 5 deal specifically with the *Gorgias.* After identifying a total of eighteen principles, Gómez-Lobo concludes: "Socratic ethics rests upon two and only two foundations. … Those principles, as we say, are: (P1) A choice is rational if and only if it is a choice of what is best for the agent, and (P13) Something is good for an agent if and only if it is morally right." Ibid., 116. P1 and P13 entail the conclusion that if committing injustice is morally vicious, then suffering injustice is morally virtuous; a conclusion which is opposite Polus' claim that it is better to commit injustice than to suffer injustice.

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there is a certain principle of justice which is the foundation for all actions, both private and public. Even though Socrates does not appear to practice politics in a conventional manner, his claim that he is "one of the few Athenians at present to work at the political art as truly as possible and to practice politics" (μετ’ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ... ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν), suggests that before there can be a comprehensive political philosophy, there first must be set in place some underlying principles in which political thought is grounded. The historical evidence notwithstanding, Socrates appears to believe that without the proper sort of political speech and without a principle of justice there can be no politics. The myth that closes the Gorgias suggests that there are both political and trans-political consequences entailed by the arguments. "Let us use the account that has now been disclosed to us as a guide, that indicates to us that this is the best way of life, to practice justice and the rest of virtue, both while living and after death" (ὅσπερ οὖν ἤγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησάμεθα τῷ νῦν παρασκευαστὶ, ὡς ἦμέν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἀρετοῦ τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦσας καὶ ζῆν καὶ πεθάναι). The principle of justice which Plato establishes in the Gorgias – an action is just if and only if it does not wrong both the agent and the object of the action – furnishes the basis for the further examination of this virtue.

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4 Gorgias, 521d6-8.
5 While this is not the place to enter into a discussion concerning Plato's use of myth, suffice it to say that as a general rule Plato turns to the telling of myth as a means of getting his point across when reasoned discourse fails. It also should be noted that the three great eschatological myths which conclude the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic permit Plato to make fundamentally important claims about the need to be virtuous in this life for the sake of the afterlife; claims that arguably would not be as effective if made by means of dialectical examination alone. Mara argues: "Socrates likewise follows both myths [that is, the myths of the Gorgias and the Republic] with the observation that their lessons could be offered in nonmythical language." This reading is only partially correct. In both dialogues the arguments are indeed presented through reasoned discourse, yet this sort of discourse is not able to make the sort of claims about the afterlife that can be made by the use of a carefully formulated myth. Plato's myths serve to add another dimension over and beyond the one which can be argued by means of logos alone. It is well to remember that in fourth-century Greece myths still retained a degree of reality which is lacking in contemporary sensibilities. Mara, Socrates' Discursive Democracy, 38. For an interesting examination of the relation between myth and philosophy, and the transmission of mythology by philosophers, see, Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
6 Gorgias, 527e1-5.
in the Republic, as well as it being the necessary virtue underlying this dialogue's political philosophy.\footnote{While this principle is not explicitly stated in the Gorgias, it may, nevertheless, be derived from the arguments advanced by Socrates. If the principal thesis of Socratic ethics is that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice, then committing injustice wrongs the agent. Conversely, acting justly benefits the agent by entailing the agent's happiness. Thus, acting justly does not wrong an agent, whereas acting unjustly does wrong an agent. A key passage from which the principle is derived is Gorgias, 507c7-e1. A person must avoid acting without discipline (δικαιοσύνη) and submit to punishment (κολαστεύω) should he do so if he is to be happy (ευδαιμονία). This is the target (σκοπος) which both the individual and the city should direct themselves at in all their actions or affairs (και πάντα εἰς τὸτού τὰ αὑτῶν συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως), "so that justice and moderation will be present for the person who intends to be blessed" (ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σοφροσύνη τῷ μακρῷ μέλλοντι ἕσσεσθαι).}

Similarly, the early works contain arguments in respect to views on education and the rule of law, but in no sense can these dialogues be regarded as espousing theories of education or of law. In terms of education, both the Laches and the Protagoras have this subject at the heart of their arguments. While the Laches is principally concerned with discovering the definition of courage, the examination of this virtue, nevertheless, is framed in terms of what is the best way in which to bring up a young person so that he may be able to possess courage.\footnote{I do not propose to offer an analysis of the Laches' arguments. Rather, I refer to this dialogue as an example of the manner in which education is treated in the early works.} Kahn, in the context of discussing the unusual length of the Laches' prologue, rightly concludes: "The direct result of the prologue is to motivate the search for a definition as the basis for a decision on educational policy."\footnote{Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 152.} Yet, the direction which the argument takes, as well as the work's aporetic ending, does not allow any sort of system of instruction to be established.

The importance of the proper sort of education is established in the first thirteen Stephanus pages of the Laches. Lysimachus remarks near the beginning of the dialogue in reference to the young men who are present: "We are considering this question, what sort of thing would they learn or practice that would make them become the best" (ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τὸ τούτο σκοπούμεν, τί ἄν οὕτως μαθόντες ἥπετηθεοῦσαντες ὑπὶ ἀριστον γένοιμον).\footnote{Laches, 179d6-7.} The initial response is framed in terms that instruction in fighting in armor (ἐν διπλοῖς μάχεσθαι) must be learned in order to instill
courage. The exchange between Laches and Nicias that follows is important for establishing two interrelated concepts: (1) the benefit of learning this particular subject; (2) the possibility that such a subject could be taught.\textsuperscript{11} When Socrates enters the discussion, he generalizes these two notions: "whenever someone considers something for the sake of something else, it happens that his counsel concerns that for the sake of which he was considering, but not in regard to that which he was considering for the sake of something else" (ὅταν τίς τι ἑνεκὰ τοῦ σκοπῆ, περί ἐκείνου ἢ βουλή τυγχάνει αὕτα ὧν ἑνεκα ἐσκόπει, ἀλλ' ὧν περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἐέκα ἄλλῳ ἔξετελ).\textsuperscript{12} In other words, Socrates directs the conversation to consider virtue in general the goal of education. Instruction in fighting in armor is but one example of the way in which a young man can be taught one of the virtues. Since, however, Socrates holds that there is a unity of virtue, it appears that he must generalize the example given by Lysimachus to encompass both virtue as a whole and the sort of education that would allow one to become as good as possible. The question they are really discussing is "in what manner might virtue come to the souls of their sons that they might be made better" (τίν' ἄν τρόπον τοῖς ἕσσον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνοις ποιήσει).\textsuperscript{13} The person who is able to effect this is the expert (technikos) in the care of the soul.\textsuperscript{14}

Once again, as in so many of Plato's dialogues, the notion of the expert and expert knowledge is brought into play. In the Gorgias, for example, an expert in the proper sort of politics (and proper sort of political rhetoric) is required if the polis is to be well-governed and its citizens are to live well.\textsuperscript{15} Both education and politics cannot attain the appropriate goal unless they are guided by someone who possesses the correct expertise in these fields. Unfortunately, the idea of

\textsuperscript{11} The exchange between these two characters is given at, Laches, 180a6-184c8.

\textsuperscript{12} Laches, 185d4-6.

\textsuperscript{13} Laches, 190b4-5.

\textsuperscript{14} See, Laches, 185c3.

\textsuperscript{15} See, Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 152.
the expert who cares for the soul is not pursued further in the Laches. Rather, before we can know how the expert can instruct the young in courage, it is necessary first to define this virtue. Since fighting in armor is believed to lead to courage, it is necessary "to state what courage is" (ei\(\upsilon\)e\(\iota\)n, \(\alpha\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \tau\iota\ \pi\omicron\eta\tau\iota\ \varepsilon\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\nu\)).\(^\text{16}\) The remainder of the dialogue is involved with an unsuccessful attempt to define this virtue.

Even though the Laches does not articulate an educational program of the sort set out in the Republic or the Laws, this dialogue, nevertheless, establishes two fundamental points in regard to education. First, we encounter the idea that there is an appropriate sort of education aimed at a particular goal, namely, the establishment of virtue in the individual. Second, Plato claims that there exists an expert, and expert knowledge, to direct the care and education of the young, without whose expertise the training of the soul cannot be accomplished well. Both of these points are returned to and expanded on in the later dialogues as essential elements to education in Plato's philosophy.

The role and aim of education even more strongly underpins the arguments of the Protagoras than they do in the Laches. Yet, education is not considered in isolation in this dialogue; there is also an inextricable connection between the sort of education one receives in respect to virtue and the practice of politics. Without the nurturing of virtue, political virtue is absent, and without political virtue there would be no poleis.\(^\text{17}\) It seems, then, that although a system of education is not worked out in the Protagoras, education in virtue for the sake of a well-governed polis is of foremost concern for Socrates and his interlocutor, Protagoras. Since the sophists were regarded primarily as educators, both by themselves and by general public, it is hardly surprising that education is a principal subtext in this brilliant literary depiction of a conversation between

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\(^\text{16}\) Laches, 190d8.
\(^\text{17}\) See, Protagoras, 322e2-323a3.
Socrates and Protagoras. In the course of Socrates' discussion with the sophist near the beginning of the dialogue, Protagoras explicitly admits that he "is both a sophist and teaches human beings" (τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους). Furthermore, he prides himself on his openness in respect to the craft he practices, refusing to disguise himself, as other well-known sophists have done, out of fear of being treated with ill will on account of his profession.

Given the low esteem in which the sophists were regarded, one can admire Protagoras' candidness, unless, of course, as Plato seems to suggest, he is merely showing off for the assembled company. In any case, we can infer from these remarks a general thesis, namely, that there is both a correct method for educating students and an appropriate subject matter with which they are to be instructed. These educational concerns become more clear as the dialogue progresses.

The dialogue opens with Socrates, in response to the eager promptings of Hippocrates, allowing himself to be dragged off to a gathering of sophists at the house of Callias. Socrates and

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18 I leave aside the question whether we should regard Protagoras as being a philosopher of sorts. While he appears to employ philosophical argumentation and espouses philosophical doctrines, such as the relativity of individual perspectives and values which itself is derived from Heraclitus' concept of ceaselessly changing motion, Protagoras does not in any sense appear to practice philosophy in the way in which Plato regards philosophy as the seeking after the truth. See, Republic, 474b3-475e4, for Plato's definition of the philosopher as one who desires the whole of wisdom and loves the sight of truth. It is hard to square this definition with the actual practice of sophists such as Protagoras. It could be said that rather than a love of truth, the sophist has a love of making imitations of what is true. This definition of the sophist as one who substitutes appearances for reality is given at the conclusion of the Sophist, 268c8-d4. For an excellent, and more sympathetic, account of the sophists, see, Jacqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). In brief, it is de Romilly's view that due to the lack of primary source material written by the sophists themselves, and in the face of abundant criticism by authors such as Plato and Aristophanes, posterity has been handed down a too negative assessment of these men. For the surviving texts, see, Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Zürich: Weidmann, 2004).

19 Protagoras, 317b4-5. It is well to keep in mind that Protagoras and the other sophists regarded themselves as possessing expertise in teaching. I fully agree with Mara's comment: "Protagoras' role as a teaching expert is to do professionally what others do amateurishly." Mara, Socrates' Discursive Democracy, 43. But whether or not they possess expert knowledge in the Socratic sense of what they teach is a different issue; an issue which is at the heart of Plato's frequent criticisms of the sophists.

20 As in the example of the Laches, it is not my intention to examine the arguments of the Protagoras. The difficulties found in this dialogue have been well analyzed by numerous scholars. For example, see: James Adam and A. M. Adam, Platonis Protagoras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921); Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 213-235; R. E. Allen, "Comment [on the Protagoras]." in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 3 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 89-168; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 210-257.
Hippocrates are assured that if the latter becomes Protagoras' pupil he will return home "having become better" (βελτίων γεγονότι). Indeed, Hippocrates will become better and better each day he studies with Protagoras. Socrates asks the obvious question: Better at what? He concludes from Protagoras' answer that Hippocrates will learn how to become a good citizen, that is, he will study the art of citizenship (τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην). "Making men to become good citizens" (ὑποσχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας) is equated with teaching them to become virtuous. Socrates is skeptical that this subject is capable of being taught, for he has observed that although the Athenian Assembly will listen only to the advice of experts on technical matters, they will give a hearing to anyone, regardless of his expertise, on matters of governance. Even Pericles could not impart political wisdom to his own sons. It follows, in Socrates' view, that the sort of expert knowledge Protagoras claims to teach is, in fact, not teachable. To put this another way, in order to learn the art of citizenship, or political virtue, it must be taught by one who is an expert in this subject, but since, based on empirical observation, there is no one who possesses this sort of expert knowledge, it cannot be taught.

Virtue can be taught if and only if it is a craft (technē) similar to the other crafts for which there is expert knowledge and experts who can teach the craft to others. Yet, there is no attempt made to define virtue until near the end of the Protagoras. Is virtue knowledge or is it not

21 Protagoras, 318a8.
22 See, Protagoras, 319a4-5.
23 It should be noted that although Socrates is initially skeptical about the teaching of virtue, the dialogue ends with him apparently agreeing that virtue is teachable. The change in Socrates' position turns on the idea that if virtue is knowledge, then it is teachable. See, Protagoras 361a3-c2. Even though Socrates is for the moment forced to agree, he nevertheless wishes to continue his discussion with Protagoras by first examining what virtue is before they can determine whether it is teachable. Protagoras demurs. One is left with the distinct impression that Socrates still strongly holds the view that virtue cannot be taught. See, Protagoras, 361c2-d6.
24 One is reminded of Socrates' claim in the Gorgias that he is one of the few to practice truly the art of citizenship. While the argument in the Gorgias is in respect to the use of correct political rhetoric aimed at what is best for the polis, the inference that can be drawn from the Protagoras suggests that Socrates possesses the sort of expert knowledge that enables someone to instruct human beings in respect to virtue. The possession of virtue is, of course, necessary if there is to be any chance that the political community is to be well governed. See, Gorgias, 521d7.
25 See, Protagoras, 360e8 and 361c5.
knowledge? The inability of Socrates and Protagoras to answer this fundamental question contributes to the dialogue's aporetic conclusion, and the reversal of their respective views. If virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught, but if it is not knowledge it would not be teachable. Thus, although the dialogue appears to be "an irritating patchwork of niggling argument, irrelevant digressions, false starts and downright fallacy," nevertheless, we can discern an underlying theme. Kahn comments: "The thematic unity of the Protagoras is provided by this persistent concern with the nature of aretē and, to a secondary extent, with the problem of its teachability." For the purposes of this study, the important lesson we can learn from this dialogue is that there must be a correct manner in which the young are instructed in respect to virtue in order that they may possess the political wisdom to administer the polis well. It will be left to other works to argue how this education may be accomplished and applied.

In contrast to the middle- and late-period dialogues, the works of the early period, with the exception of the Crito, display little concern with law or legal theory. The Crito's principal contribution to legal theory is the concept of legal obligation. The relation between the citizen and the polis is a closely woven one, built on two premises. First, by agreeing, either explicitly or tacitly, to live as a citizen and enjoy the benefit's of the political community, one is agreeing to be brought under the authority of the law. Second, if one disobeys the law, then one injures the law and the polis. Legal obligation rests on the moral obligation, and fundamental principle of Socratic ethics, that one should never commit injustice. Disobedience to the law is not simply an act against the binding legal force of the law, but, more importantly, it is a morally vicious act.

26 See, Protagoras, 361a5-c2.
27 Guthrie, Plato the Man and His Works, 235.
28 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 212.
29 An excellent analysis of the Crito's notion of legal obligation is, R. E. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), especially 100-113. Allen's fundamental point is the legal obligation ultimately is grounded in moral obligation. It is the strong connection between these two obligations that prohibits Socrates' escape from prison.
The concept of legal obligation is articulated in the *Crito* in the speech addressed to Socrates and Crito by the personified Laws.\(^\text{30}\)

The personified Laws are introduced to argue their position in response to Socrates' question: "If we leave here by not obeying the city, are we doing something bad to those whom we ought least do this, or not? And are we abiding by those things that we agreed are just, or not?"

\(\text{(άπλόντες ἐνθέντε ἴμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἠκαία δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίος οὐσιν ἢ οὐ;.)}\(^\text{31}\) The Laws begin by stating, in the form of a rhetorical question, that a polis can be overturned and cease to exist "should judgments have no force but come to be without authority and are destroyed by private persons" (ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαιαι μηδὲν ισχύσωσιν ἄλλα ὑπὸ ἴδιοτῶν ἄκιρον τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρωται).\(^\text{32}\) In other words, the Laws appear to provide a minor premise to an argument based on the major premise that "one must not do harm" (κακοῦργεῖν δεῖ).\(^\text{33}\) While the major premise is fundamentally important for Socratic ethics, the minor premise is essential for any legal system: legal verdicts have a binding force upon those to whom they are rendered.\(^\text{34}\) They add to this argument the notion that a citizen has an agreement with the polis to abide by the requirements which the polis sets for its citizens.\(^\text{35}\)

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\(^\text{30}\) In order to keep my discussion within a reasonable length, I shall focus solely on the speech of the Laws, rather than on the entire dialogue. It is well to keep in mind, however, that in addition to setting out the concept of legal obligation, the *Crito* devotes much attention to Socrates' moral philosophy. Indeed, it is arguable that the premises of the personified Laws' arguments are themselves grounded in the fundamental principles of Socratic ethics. Gómez-Lobo presents a convincing analysis of the relation between the principle of not doing harm and the principle of honoring just agreements. "Socrates' conclusion, then, is that he ought to stay and die. He derives this conclusion from the reply given to the question: 'Is it just or unjust to escape?' The two branches of the argument, viz. one that rejects harm to others and one that rejects violations of fair agreements, lead to the same conclusion: it would indeed be unjust to escape." See, Gómez-Lobo, *The Foundations of Socratic Ethics*, 45-70. For the quotation, see, Ibid., 67.


\(^\text{32}\) *Crito*, 50b2-5.

\(^\text{33}\) *Crito*, 49c2.

\(^\text{34}\) Allen, *Socrates and Legal Obligation*, 84-85 argues precisely this point.

\(^\text{35}\) See, *Crito*, 50c5-7.
The Laws then proceed to argue what is generally referred to as the parent/child and master/slave analogy for the purpose of demonstrating that there is an inequality between the laws of a polis and its citizens. Just as there is no equality of right between a parent and child or a master and slave (ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἀρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἔξ ἔσον ἢν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς δεσπότην) there is no equality between the laws and the citizen.\(^{36}\) Similarly, since it is wrong to strike back at a parent or master, it is just as wrong to strike back at one’s polis. Finally, the Laws argue that "if we attempt to destroy you, thinking that it is just, you also will attempt, as far as possible, to destroy us laws and your country, and you will say that by doing this you are doing what is just, you who care for the truth of virtue" (ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἠμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡρῴμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἠμᾶς τὸς νόμον καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ’ ὡςαν δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταύτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελούμενος).\(^{37}\) The idea that one might destroy his country by requiting a wrong with a wrong essentially restates the fundamental thesis of Socratic ethics that it is better to suffer wrong than to commit wrong.\(^{38}\) Socrates’ position in Athens and well-known views regarding what he believed to be correct moral behavior were such that if someone such as he could disregard the force of legal obligation, then by his act of disobedience license could be granted to those of lesser moral stature to act in a similar manner, or perhaps even commit acts that were more

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\(^{36}\) See, *Crito*, 50c5-8. This passage seems to suggest an authoritarian force to the laws. I do not think that this is the case. Both the doctrine of "persuade or obey", as well as the suggestion that a citizen who did not care for the laws and institutions of Athens was perfectly free to emigrate elsewhere (*Crito*, 51d6-8), appear to mitigate against an absolutely authoritarian interpretation of this passage. Kraut, too, argues that it is a "false impression that the *Crito* advocates an authoritarian philosophy of law." Kraut, *Socrates and the State*, 108.

\(^{37}\) *Crito*, 51a3-7

\(^{38}\) The following question should be considered concerning the destruction of the laws and the polis: Can the retaliatory action of any single citizen against the polis possibly lead to the destruction of the polis? In response, it is fair to say that, in general, the actions of an individual citizen against the polis ought not have the destructive consequences which the Laws suggest will occur should a citizen purposely undertake to harm the polis, although the cumulative effect of many citizens disobeying the laws could lead to the demise of the polis. It should also be noted that by the time Plato came to write the *Laws*, the notion of disobedience to one’s legal obligation remains a fundamental concern. Anyone who is found guilty of obstructing the verdict of a court "is to be punished with death as being a person who is destroying the whole polis and the laws (ὡς δὴν τὴν πόλιν καὶ νόμους φθέινων)." *Laws*, 958c5-6.
morally vicious. Legal obligation is perhaps best considered as a corollary derived from at least three staring points: the obligation not to harm; the obligation to fulfill a fair contract; the obligation of children to their parents and slaves to their masters.

Next, the Laws introduce the means by which justifiable exceptions may be granted to their authority; the doctrine of "persuade or obey". The fact that the doctrine is stated three times in close order, suggests that it held a position of some significance in the *Crito*'s arguments. It is first stated simply: "to persuade or to do that which was ordered" (ἠ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἀ ἀν κελεύη). At its second occurrence it reads: "but in war, in the law-court, and all other places, what must be done is that which the polis and the country have ordered, or persuade it where the just is brought forth" (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαιστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἀ ἀν

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39 We should also keep in mind that Plato (who is, after all, the author of the *Crito*) held the view that human beings were essentially mimetic creatures. Thus, if the actions of individuals are at least to a certain degree imitative, and if the figure of Socrates possessed any degree of moral authority, then Socrates’ flagrant violation of the law would set an undesirable example which others must be prevented from emulating. For if the laws were indeed set aside at will by a substantial number of individuals, then the Laws’ concern for their own destruction could possibly take place.

40 Although there this is not the place to examine it at length, the doctrine of "persuade or obey" has been interpreted in various ways, embracing an entire spectrum of scholarly opinion. On one end of the spectrum is Grote’s view that "persuade or obey" required “absolute submission” to the polis. (Quoted in, Kraut, *Socrates and the State*, 55). On the other end are the conclusions reached by some scholars (Woozley and Colaiaco, for example) that the doctrine permits civil disobedience for those citizens who disagree with the laws or commands of the polis. See, A. D. Woozley, *Law and Disobedience: The Argument of Plato’s Crito* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979; A. D. Woozley, "Socrates on Disobeying the Law," in *The Philosophy of Socrates*, Gregory Vlastos, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980); James A. Colaiaco, *Socrates Against Athens: Philosophy on Trial*, (New York: Routledge, 2001). Brickhouse and Smith (among others) regard the whole issue of civil disobedience as inapplicable to the *Crito*. See, Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *The Trial and Execution of Socrates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 236. Finally, for a reading that privileges the literary aspects of the text as a whole, and presents a rather capricious reading of the Greek text of the doctrine of "persuade or obey", see, Roslyn Weiss, *Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially, 106. It seems to me that "persuade or obey" taken in a literal and simple sense cannot be interpreted as allowing the citizen any degree of civil disobedience. The doctrine implies nothing further than the idea that if a citizen is unable to persuade the court otherwise, he must obey the judgment rendered by the court. The doctrine is, after all, stated in the context of a legal philosophy. Additionally, by the fact that the doctrine is articulated by the Laws, one ought to conclude that it applies only to the citizens’ interaction with the legal system and should not be extended to cover executive commands or debate in the Assembly, as Grote argued. Allen, I believe, has interpreted the doctrine correctly: “The application of law requires application through lawful agency, and it is the foundation of a legal system that judgments judicially rendered, unless set aside by legal means, are authoritative.” In other words, without a mechanism to enforce lawful judicial verdicts the very existence of law is threatened. The agent through which the law was applied was the courts (δικαστήρια) whose verdicts, in turn, were upheld by the fundamental legal principle that they be obeyed. Thus, to deny the authority of the law would be indeed equivalent to destroying them. Allen, *Socrates and Legal Obligation*, 84.

41 *Crito*, 51b4.
κελεύῃ ἡ πόλες καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε).\(^{42}\) The third time it is formulated as: "but we permit one of two things, to persuade us or to do [that which we order]"

(ἄλλα ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν).\(^{43}\) The Laws provide a means by which a dissatisfied citizen may leave if he chooses not to accept living under the laws. This provision is stated immediately after the second iteration of the doctrine of "persuade or obey": "any Athenian who wishes, when he has tested and observed the affairs in the polis and us laws, and is dissatisfied with us, is permitted, after taking up his possessions, to depart to wherever he wishes"

(Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτὸν ἀπείναι ὡς ἂν βούληται).\(^{44}\) Those who do remain, and in so doing, accept their legal obligation "have agreed with us to do those things that we have ordered" (ὁμολογήκενα ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ὃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύσαμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα).\(^{45}\) In other words, once a citizen has chosen to stay in Athens, he is obligated to submit himself to the legal system, including adherence to the doctrine of "persuade or obey". It appears that the Laws are setting forth a sensible and reasonable demand. If a citizen decides to remain in Athens, then he has certain obligations to abide by the laws which govern the polis in exchange for the advantages and benefits which living under the direction of a legal system entails. If this basic requirement is untenable, then he is at liberty to move elsewhere without incurring any penalty. In addition, for those who tacitly entered into the agreement to retain their citizenship and be subject to the laws, the option given by the Laws in the doctrine of "persuade or obey" was always available.\(^{46}\)

\(^{42}\) Crito, 51b9-c1.

\(^{43}\) Crito, 52a2-3.

\(^{44}\) Crito, 51d2-5.

\(^{45}\) Crito, 51e4-5.

\(^{46}\) The final part of the Laws' speech is addressed specifically to Socrates, and although this section of the speech is important for establishing further connections between Socrates' moral philosophy and his obligations to the laws of Athens, it is not necessary to examine this section of the speech. Suffice it to say, however, that the remainder of the
Although the early-period dialogues do not set down either a fully developed and comprehensive legal philosophy, or the sort of code of laws which we encounter in the Laws, the concept of legal obligation articulated in the Crito is of great importance for two principal reasons. First, it is an attempt on the part of Plato to establish a basic principle of legal obligation, without which it would be exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to ensure the compliance of citizens with laws of the polis. In turn, by adhering to the obligation to obey the law, the citizens are ensured that the authority of the law may offer assistance in order that life in the polis may be lived well. Second, by grounding the concept of legal obligation in ethics Plato tries to convince his audience that far more is at stake than simply disobedience to legal authority. If one chooses to disobey the law, then one is making a morally incorrect choice and harming oneself. Obedience to the law is both a legal obligation and a moral and prudential duty. Thus, in this early-period dialogue we find the first association between considerations of politics

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47 One could object that Plato is not positing a principle of legal obligation, rather his argument is simply an ad hoc attempt to justify Socrates' decision. I think that this objection does not hold. The principle of legal obligation rests on the moral obligation that one should not do wrong. The case of Socrates is the particular which illustrates the universal. Socrates was bound by the moral obligation not to do wrong, of which the moral obligation to uphold a just contract is but a part. In terms of Socratic ethics, any citizen is obligated not to do wrong and to abide by just contracts. Without a principle of legal obligation it is difficult to see how Socrates, or Plato, could justify the universality of Socratic moral obligation in relation to the obligation of a citizen to the polis. Allen argues: "The Crito maintains that legal obligation rests essentially neither on force nor on a set of rules fixed in the nature of things or the mind of God. It maintains that fidelity to the legal order is a moral obligation, and of such weight as to require Socrates to abide by an unjust sentence of death." If Socratic moral obligation is capable of being universalized, then so, too, is the principle of legal obligation. While the Crito's arguments may appear to be directed solely at Socrates' situation, they do, in fact, apply universally. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation, 111.

48 I do not think that Plato is arguing in terms of contractualism, at least as the term came to be defined by the seventeenth century. There is a fundamental difference between the sort of Hobbesian and Lockean contractualism in which men agree to leave a state of nature and form a political community and the Crito's contractualism in which an agreement is entered into between an established polity and its citizens. Plato's arguments are not so much designed to demonstrate an agreement between the citizen and the political community in the sense that by entering into an agreement with the polity, the individual cedes certain rights to the authority of the polity. Rather, Plato's arguments appear to extend only to the fundamental requirement that duly enacted laws are to be obeyed lest the contract be violated and the polis descend into anarchy. After all, laws are enacted by the Athenian Assembly, they are not arbitrarily imposed by some authority to whom the citizens have ceded their rights.
and ethics; an association which becomes more closely bound together in Plato's works of the middle and late periods.

The final topic which I wish to examine in this section is the lack of a comprehensive political philosophy in Plato's early-period dialogues. I think this lack is primarily attributable to the fact the early-period dialogues represent Plato's attempt to depict the sort of conversations that Socrates held with various interlocutors in the course of the his philosophical activities. As in the case of Xenophon's Socratic writings, Plato's Socratic *logoi* exhibit characteristics that are substantially distinct from those found in the middle- and late-period dialogues to suggest plausibly that in the works of the early period we are hearing the voice of Socrates more than that of Plato. If this view is correct, then we should not wonder why a comprehensive political philosophy is not found in the early-period dialogues. It is quite apparent that Socrates did not attempt to formulate such a philosophy; his concern was focused far more on questions of ethics than on the establishment of a systematic political philosophy. It is Aristotle who offers strong

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49 Although this issue is quite contentious among Plato scholars, I nevertheless do agree with Vlastos's analysis of the differences between Plato's depiction of the early and middle Socrates. One of the strengths of Vlastos's reading is that he is careful enough to avoid relying upon Plato alone; he employs the works of both Xenophon and Aristotle as sources outside the Platonic corpus as controls. The evidence presented by these two authors does appear to lend reasonably strong support to Vlastos's argument. While I do not believe that it is possible to distinguish completely the philosophy of Socrates from that of his pupil, the distinctions in Plato's texts, along with the results of contemporary philosophical analysis lead to the conclusion that Plato's early-period dialogues are for the most part representations of Socratic philosophy. See, Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, especially 45-106. The works of Xenophon that bear the most on this question are: the *Memorabilia*, the *Oeconomicus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Apology*. Aristotle's remarks on Socrates are found chiefly in the *Sophistical Refutations*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Magna Moralia*, *Eudemian Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Rhetoric*.

50 I am not, of course, suggesting that Socrates' concentration on ethics precludes political implications, nor that Socrates did not hold particular views on Athenian politics. As I have hoped to make clear in the preceding pages, both the grounding of legal obligation in moral obligation and the need for the correct sort of education in respect to virtue are fundamentally important for the practice of politics. Moreover, Socrates' repeated criticisms of Athenian democracy and his choice not to engage in political activities himself because of the way in which politics was practiced indicates a deep concern with questions of politics. These views are made most forcefully in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*, yet they do not suggest a total rejection of democracy more than they suggest an intense distrust of the sort of unbounded democracy engaged in by his fellow Athenians. I cannot fully agree with Samaras' belief that "What emerges from these passages [Crito, 44d and 48a, Memo, 93a-94d, Gorgias, 515e, Laches, 184e-185a, Apology, 24d-25b and 31c-32a] is Socrates' profound disrespect for all aspects of democracy, its theory, its practice and its leaders." Thanassis Samaras, *Plato on Democracy* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 13. To be sure, Socrates is highly critical, yet I believe he leaves open the possibility that there could be a better sort of democracy if individual moral concerns were addressed first. In contrast to the completely anti-democratic Socrates, many contemporary Plato scholars, such as
evidence for Socrates' concern with moral philosophy: "Socrates busied himself about ethical concerns and not about the whole of nature, but in seeking what is universal in these matters, and for the first time setting his thought on definitions" (Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀλίγης φόβους οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήμην πρῶτον τὴν διάνοιαν). In light of Aristotle's assessment and the evidence presented in Plato's Socratic dialogues that Socrates was searching after definitions in ethical matters, it is not difficult to see that, given the failure on the part of Socrates to reach definitions of the things he examined, he could hardly have posited a comprehensive political philosophy (or, for that matter, any systematic philosophy) in the absence of definitions of the concepts upon which a system of political thought must be constructed.

In addition to the foregoing consideration, there is another primary characteristic of Plato's depiction of Socrates in the early-period dialogues which limits the possibility of a comprehensive political philosophy, namely, Socrates' use of the elenctic method and his belief in individual reason. An examination of the early-period Socratic dialogues reveals that Socrates' discussions relied extensively on his interlocutors' abilities to employ their reason to persuade themselves that the opinions they held were incorrect and needed to be revised in light of Socrates' questioning. In effect, we find that Socrates privileged a particular type of rational discourse in order to assist in bringing about a change of opinion on the part of his interlocutors about virtue. Even though we could regard the Socratic method as a sort of political activity, as is

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Mara and Monoson, have attempted with varying degrees of success to demonstrate that there is some degree of sympathy with democratic practices on the parts of Plato and Socrates. See, Mara, Socrates' Discursive Democracy and S. Sarah Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

51 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b1-4. In regard to the accuracy of Aristotle's comment, Ross remarks: "The statements of the Platonic Socrates might be regarded as instances of his 'irony', and Xenophon's statements may be to some extent discounted as being in the direct line of his apologetic; but Aristotle is hardly likely to have been mistaken on the point. And Plato's account in the Phaedo (96 A) represents Socrates as having abandoned physical science as quite a young man." W. D. Ross, Aristotle: Metaphysics, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 1, 159.
apparent from the depiction of Socrates in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*,\(^{52}\) nevertheless, it does not seem reasonable to argue that this practice is sufficient as the basis of a comprehensive political philosophy.\(^{53}\) Since Socrates was principally engaged in the examination of the moral and political opinions held by individuals, any sort of political activity was in relation to the individual, not in relation to the whole polis. It is the individual citizen, subjected to Socrates' relentless questioning by means of the elenctic method, who will become better. It is only by extension that individuals, after they have come to recognize virtue, will then be morally capable of working collectively for the good of the political community. To put this another way, if individuals can be made virtuous through questioning and persuasion, then politics, too, could be improved.

Socrates' use of rational discourse by means of the elenchus and persuasion as a sort of political activity is not without a serious difficulty. If individual virtue depends on knowledge, then politics must also depend on the knowledge held by individuals. Yet, given Socrates' failure to persuade his interlocutors to regard virtue in the Socratic sense, much less convince them actually to practice it, it is not at all difficult to see that knowledge could not form the basis for political practice.\(^{54}\) Barker puts the point well: "… the proper conduct of political affairs was shown to depend on knowledge – a knowledge which neither the democratic assembly itself, nor the officials whom it appointed by the chance of the lot, could be said to possess."\(^{55}\) If individuals do not have this knowledge, then neither can the political community as a whole. In

\(^{52}\) See *Apology*, 31c3-32a3, and, *Gorgias*, 521d6-e1. In both examples, Socrates' refusal to engage in traditional political activities does not suggest that his one-on-one approach with individual citizens does not entail implications for politics. For Socrates, the examination of his interlocutors in private on moral and political matters was perhaps the best way in which he could influence political practice.

\(^{53}\) Klosko argues: "Socrates' political practice amounts to a new kind of politics. … In keeping with the traditional Greek view that a chief responsibility of the *polis* is to see to the moral betterment of its citizens, Socrates' goal must be judged 'political'. But Socrates' pursuit of this end is distinctive in that he sought to attain it without recourse to political means." Klosko, *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*, 54.

\(^{54}\) The difficulty is further compounded by Socrates' frequent claims that he could not define what virtue is.

short, the failure of Socrates' mission implies a limit to the type of rational discourse practiced by Socrates.

In order for a comprehensive political philosophy to be posited, the limits of reason and persuasion must be considered. Since this was apparently beyond the ability, or perhaps interest, of Socrates, it was left to Plato and subsequent political thinkers to attempt to find a means other than the use of the elenchus and persuasion on individuals in respect to moral knowledge. What was required was a method of examination that could lead to the sort of political philosophy which is concerned with the good of the entire polis. It is arguable that the principal reason for Socrates' failure is the notion of Socratic intellectualism. Socrates' view of the human rationality is too simplistic; a model of the psyche which fundamentally claims that all desires are desires for what is good. The neglect on Socrates' part to consider the overwhelming influence in most human beings of their emotions and desires is, I believe, the proximate cause both of his failure to persuade individuals through the use of reason to live well, and to develop any sort of political philosophy. In other words, if the demos itself is incapable of knowing and acting upon what is best for itself, principally because its members possess a more complex moral psychology than Socrates admitted, then a solution is required in which the political community is to be guided by someone who does possess the knowledge of what is best for the polis and its citizens that goes beyond reasoned argument alone, taking into account all the diverse and opposing aspects of the psyche.

If this reading of the early-period Socratic dialogues is correct, and if it was Plato's intention to establish a political philosophy which takes into account both individual and the polis, then he

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56 By the phrase Socratic intellectualism, I mean: (1) the identification of virtue with knowledge; (2) the idea that the virtues are in some sense unified; (3) one does not voluntarily act badly, one acts badly solely on account of ignorance; (4) the denial of akrasia. Kahn succinctly describes Socratic intellectualism as "a purely cognitive moral psychology that ignores or denies the role of emotion as an explanatory cause of human action." Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 73.
must first reject the notion of Socratic intellectualism and substitute a moral psychology that reflects the way human beings actually are before attempting to argue what is the best manner in which the political community ought to live.\(^{57}\) While there are concerns expressed in the Socratic works, such as the role of proper education, the necessity for law, and above all the need for virtue both in the individual and in the polis, which Plato carries through into the middle and late dialogues, these concerns must be treated in a manner far differently than they had been by Socrates. Klosko comments in regard to the early-period dialogues: "The political theory of the Republic grows directly out of the rejection of the view of Socrates."\(^{58}\) It is to the Republic's arguments on these topics that I now turn my attention.

**A Pattern in the Heaven: Plato's Metaphysical Political Philosophy**

Ostensibly the primary focus of the Republic is a search for the definition of justice, yet during the course of the argument Plato manages to construct a broadly encompassing political philosophy within which justice functions.\(^{59}\) The concept of justice provides the basis for Plato's middle-period political theory which, in turn, is itself dependent on individuals and the polis acting in a just manner. Justice and politics may be regarded as having a reciprocal relationship. In other words, there cannot be good political practice without justice, nor can there be justice

\(^{57}\) It is well worth noting that Aristotle, too, near the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* reaches a similar conclusion in respect to rational discourse as the sole means of moral and political persuasion. "So, if arguments were sufficient in themselves for producing suitable persons, they would justly bring many great rewards, as Theognis said, and such rewards ought to have been provided; but at present, they appear to have the power to encourage and stimulate liberal young men, and to make a well-born character and one that is truly a lover of what is noble capable of being possessed by virtue, but they are unable to encourage the many toward being noble and good" (εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν αἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκειαι πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἑπισκεῖσιν, πολλοὺς ἄν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δεκαίος ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ἔδει ἄν τούτους πορίσασθαι: νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παραμένει τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἱσχύειν, ἢ δὲ τ’ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαιλον ποιῆσαι ἀν κατωκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τούς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι). Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1179b4-10. Aristotle argues in the Ethics that virtues are nurtured in the young by habituation, arguments alone are insufficient for achieving this purpose.

\(^{58}\) Klosko, *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*, 59. Klosko does not apparently mean that Plato entirely rejected Socrates' teaching, rather he no longer employs those aspects of Socratic thought that cannot be universalized.

\(^{59}\) It is well to keep in mind that the sense of the term justice, as it is employed in the Republic, connotes the whole of virtue. Although Plato treats the four principal virtues separately, the truly just person is one who practices all the virtues together.
without a well-governed political community. But unlike the political thought of the early-period Socratic dialogues which is based upon the examination of individual citizens in respect to virtue, the political philosophy of the *Republic* requires a grounding in something beyond the practice of individual virtue. It requires the apprehension of a metaphysical dimension, the Forms, in order for the entire system to succeed. The Socratic intellectualism and individualism of the early works gives way to a complex moral psychology and universalization which, at the time the *Republic* was composed, Plato considered to be the best solution to the question of how we may best live.

Although certain Socratic views are no longer held to be tenable by Plato, the political philosophy of the *Republic*, nevertheless, retains and expands upon many aspects of thought encountered in the early-period dialogues. To the extent that the philosophy of Plato's middle period displays a deeper consideration of the problems first articulated in the Socratic *logoi*, can it be said to develop. Many, if not all, of the topics dealt with in the early-period works appear in the dialogues of the middle period, not the least of which is the concern with the attainment and practice of virtue in order to live well. What alters in the middle-period works, or perhaps complements the Socratic dialogues, is the recognition that Socrates' was unable to arrive at solutions. While retaining Socrates' fundamental concerns, it is arguable that Plato's middle-period philosophy reflects not only an awareness with the limitations of his teacher's ideas and method, but also the growth of his own philosophical thought. If the Socratic dialogues do indeed represent, to some degree or another, the philosophy of Socrates, then the works of the middle period may be regarded as Plato's own efforts to answer the questions posed by Socrates, but

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60 Guthrie, I believe, is wrong to conclude: "Essentially however the *Republic* is not a piece of political theory but an allegory of the individual human spirit, the *psyche.*" The *Republic* is a work of political philosophy precisely because the political community is comprised of individuals whose correctly harmonized psyches are necessary for there to be a well-governed polity. The correct attention and care of the individual soul entails the correct practice of politics. To put this another way, the whole can only be as good as its parts. In this sense, the *Republic* is a profoundly political work. Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 561.
without quite rejecting some of Socrates' fundamental notions. With this point in mind, I shall examine in the following pages the role of education, the concept of law, and finally, the metaphysical grounding of the Republic's political thought.

We have seen in the previous section that education in respect to virtue was an important Socratic consideration, but any program, whether through education or through other means, concerning how this might be accomplished was not worked out. The Republic, by contrast, presents us with a detailed educational system which should be interpreted as Plato's response and working-out of the need for individuals to be educated in respect to virtue if there is to be a chance for the political community to be just and thus prosper. For Plato, education is a necessary prerequisite if one is to live justly. This view rests on two premises: (1) being just is a good; (2) being just is a condition of the soul, it is not a set of laws imposed externally. Thus, in order to nurture the growth of virtue in the individual, there must be an educational program by which all may learn to be virtuous, and once virtue is acquired, to practice justice for the sake of both one's own good and the good of the polis.

After briefly outlining the qualities needed by those who are to become the guardians of the polis, the discussion about their education begins with a question: "In what way are we to rear and educate them" (θρέφονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὕτω καὶ παιδεύονται τίνα τρόπον)? The answer is that they are to be trained in μουσική and γυμναστική, but as I had mentioned in Chapter 3,
education in these two subjects is to be brought about by blending both in an appropriate mixture to ensure a soul that is moderate in its nature. The correct sort of instruction in musikē, especially in respect to poetry that depicts the gods, demi-gods, and heroes as they truly are, and in physical training is essential for those who eventually are to rule the polity. Their education will permit them to know what is best for the polis, "for if they were educated well, they will become moderate men" (ἐὰν γὰρ εἴσαι παιδευόμενοι μέτροι ἄνδρες γίγνονται), and those who are moderate are the sorts of individuals who are just, that is, they have their souls harmoniously balanced. Yet, it can be questioned whether the type of education discussed up to this point is sufficient for the guardians. I think it is reasonable to suppose that Plato does not have in mind only the education in respect to musikē and physical training which he has just finished discussing in Books II and III, rather it appears that he is considering the education of the philosopher, set down in Books VI and VII, as well.

It is problematic, of course, that Plato's treatment of education appears restricted only to those children who are believed to possess the qualities that, under proper nurturing, would result in their becoming members of the guardian class. While Plato does not directly address the education of the producer and auxiliary classes, it is not the case that he entirely ignores their education. Klosko is correct to remark: "Even if the majority of people can never become

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65 It is well to remember that both male and females are to receive the same training. See, Republic, 451e4-5. For two contemporary assessments of Plato's treatment of women, see, Julia Annas, "Plato's Republic and Feminism," in Plato 2, and Gregory Vlastos, "Was Plato a Feminist?," in Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

66 Republic, 423e5-6.

67 Adam, too, holds this view. "[I]n the later books Plato expressly declares that the training necessary for the Rulers was inadequately discussed before: see VI 497 C ff., 502D. For these reasons we must, I think, suppose that Plato when he wrote these words was thinking of the education still to be provided." Adam, The Republic of Plato, 214. Perhaps another way of understanding the difference between the education of the producer and auxiliary classes and the guardian class is to compare their respective educations to the analogy of the Line. Those who are given education in musikē and gymnastikē may attain knowledge of the lower portion of the Line, the visible sphere of imagination (eikasia) and belief (pistis). The guardians who receive training in philosophy will attain knowledge of the upper segment of the Line, the intelligible sphere of thought (dianoia) and understanding (noēsis), as well. Clearly, in Plato's view, those who only possess knowledge of the visible sphere are not capable of ruling, they only are capable of being ruled.
philosophers, they are capable of living balanced, moderate, well-ordered lives."⁶⁸ Ultimately, it is the guardians who, after they have completed their training and take their places as the rulers of the polis, will be responsible for the education of the rest of the citizens, presumably educating them in accordance with the same type of instruction that they themselves had received.⁶⁹ "To speak briefly, those have charge of the polis must cling to this [education] in such as manner as it does not escape their notice that it has been corrupted, but guard it against everything, and especially, as far as possible, keep guard that innovations are not made in regard to gymnastikē and musikē contrary to order" (’Ο οὐκὸν διὰ βαραγέων εἶπεν, τούτου ἀνθεκτέων τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὡς ἂν αὐτοὺς μὴ λάβῃ διαφθαρέν ἀλλὰ παρά πάντα αὐτὸ φυλαττο, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικῆν τε καὶ μουσικῆν παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ὅσ’ οἷς οἷον τε μᾶλλον φυλάττειν).⁷⁰ Although it is neither explicitly stated nor implied that the members of the producer and auxiliary classes will obtain any training in philosophy, it nevertheless does appear to be the case that the instruction these citizens do receive in musikē and gymnastikē will be sufficient to ensure a specific purpose.⁷¹ “This is meant to make clear that the rest of the citizens must be brought to this single task for which is natural for them, so that by the one practice that belongs to each one himself he might not become many but one, and thus the polis altogether will grow as one, and not as many” (τούτῳ δ’ ἐβούλετο δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολέτων, πρὸς ἐς τις

⁶⁸ Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Theory, 115.
⁶⁹ Guthrie comments: "Plato could not have viewed with indifference the prospect of the children of artisans and businessmen being stuffed with false and harmful notions about gods and heroes, and in fact it is guardians who will oversee the education of all the rest." Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Works, 456.
⁷⁰ Republic, 424b2-6. After the pains taken by Plato to demonstrate that there are proper types of musikē and gymnastikē, it would indeed be odd if the two remaining classes were not given the same sort of education in respect to these subjects. Instruction which is not similar would be dangerous to the well-being of the polis. Adam rightly comments: "We must forbid all innovations in music and gymnastics because they are productive of political change." Adam, the Republic of Plato, 213.
⁷¹ Reeve, who seems to think that education is reserved only for the guardians, argues: "… there is reason to think that Plato intends future producers to receive a traditional apprenticeship training in the single polis craft for which they have as high a natural aptitude as for any other." This may be the case, however, it is arguable that all three classes must receive training in musikē and gymnastics before they may be educated in respect to a specific craft or discipline. C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 190.
By receiving this sort of education, the citizens will be able "to do their own business" both in respect to themselves and in respect to their place in the community.

For those individuals, however, who have been marked out as potential guardians, Plato establishes a rigorous program in philosophical training. He sets out in detail the subjects that are to studied. First, as a propaedeutic to the study of dialectic comes instruction in mathematics, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics. The discussion regarding the subjects to be studied concludes with the observation: "Dialectic has been laid down by us above the other subjects like a coping-stone and no other subject could correctly be placed above it"

Second, Plato supplies a schedule for the ages when these subjects ought to be studied, culminating in a fifteen-year period of public service, after which, at the age of fifty, the individual is fully equipped to govern the polis. It is only at the completion of these studies and public service that one will have acquired the requisite skills to be able to apprehend the Good, administer the polis, and train others who will rule in turn.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of Plato's educational theory is that he regards education not so much as the filling of pupils' minds with knowledge as he considers it to be a process of "turning around" (τῆς περιστεράς) the pupils' souls from darkness to light. Despite Irwin's

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72 Republic, 423d2-6.
73 See, Republic, 522b7-534a1. For the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to examine these subjects in detail.
74 Republic, 534e2-4. It is well worth remembering that the philosopher-king "is to labor in politics and rule for the sake of the polis, not as if he were doing something noble, but as if he were doing something necessary" (πρὸς πολιτικῶς ἐπεταλαπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκκιστῶς τῆς πόλεως ἐνεκα, οὐχ οἷς καλὰν τι ἄλλα οἷς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας). Republic, 540b3-5.
75 See, Republic, 537b1-540c2.
76 See, Republic, 518b7-d7.
interpretation, it does not appear to be the case that the Republic's view of education is a reference to Plato's doctrine of anamnēsis. Indeed, recollection is never mentioned in the Republic. The fact that the notion of "turning around" comes shortly after the Analogy of the Cave suggests that Plato has in mind the capacity for the mind to be directed toward at least some apprehension of the Good, not the recollection of what one had learned in a previous state of being. It is well to keep in mind that in the Republic, Plato explicitly comments that those souls who return to a mortal existence on earth do not return with any memories of what they had seen in the afterlife. "Since it was becoming evening, they then encamped beside the River of Oblivion, whose water no vessel can contain. It was necessary for all to drink a certain measure of water, … and the person who drinks always forgets everything" (ακηράσθαι οὖν σφάς ἡδη ἐσπέρας γεγυμένης παρὰ τὸν 'Αμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὑδωρ ἀγγείον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τοῦ τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαίον ἐναι πείν ... τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πῶντα πάντων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι). It is difficult to see how this passage from the Myth of Er can be reconciled with the notion of "turning around" that is encountered in the Republic. Since a very large part of the Republic is concerned with moral psychology, to apprehend the Good is to know that one must keep one's psyche in balance in order to live in accordance with justice. Given the absence the doctrine of anamnēsis in this dialogue, it would appear that to accomplish the "turning around" of the soul some sort of education is required. Reeve remarks: "Platonic education is aimed primarily not at the transmission of information or at the inculcation of intellectual skills, but rather at the removal or moderation of as many of a person's unnecessary desires as his nature permits." It is plausible

77 See, Terrence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 140 and 218. For an opposing view, Reeve, too, thinks that Plato is not referring to the doctrine of recollection. See, Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, n. 6, 286
78 Republic, 621a4-b1.
79 In reference to the psyche Reeve comments: "But it does not acquire knowledge of forms while disembodied, nor recollect it when on earth. The virtuous are rewarded in heaven, not educated." Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 108.
80 Ibid., 50.
to conclude, then, that this sense of the term education is the basis for education in respect to one's soul, and it functions in tandem with the sort of training that is appropriate for the acquisition of a craft, which itself is directed toward what is best for oneself and the polis.

Thus, rather than leaving an individual's education solely dependent upon the Socratic notions of elenctic examination and persuasion as the means to nurture virtue, the Republic's program explicitly articulates an educational system designed to address in a similar manner the entire body of citizens, administered by those who themselves have been educated in the same system. While this program of education undoubtedly fosters a certain degree of homogeneity among the citizens, particularly among those who are not given the opportunity, or who do not possess the ability, for training in philosophy, it would appear that Plato regarded this solution as better than there being none at all. Socrates' method of examining individual citizens about virtue does not readily lead to a stable polis, a political community in which justice prevails and the citizens, both as individuals and as members of a specific class, "do their own business". Plato's solution to this problem, although not without its own difficulties, seems likely to have offered a better opportunity to establish a longer-lasting political community whose members worked toward a common good.

In the Republic the concept of law is made conspicuous by its near absence. Even though Socrates refers both to Glaucon and Adeimantus as the polis' lawgiver (ὁ νομοθέτης), there is a marked lack of developed argument concerning legal codes and institutions. It would appear that, while Plato does not reject the need for law, the manner in which he organizes kallipolis and the moral education of its citizens precludes the necessity for a protracted examination of law and the formalization of a legal code. Annas argues: "Plato does not, in the Republic, give enough attention to the importance of law in setting up and regulating the institutions of a state,

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81 See, Republic, 458c6 and 497d1.
regardless of the roles of capable people." Yet, it is arguable that given the nature of the guardians and the citizens over whom they rule, Plato believed that "it is better for all to be ruled by divine wisdom, especially that which is his own in himself, but if not, by that imposed from outside … and it is clear that law means such a thing, since it is the ally of everyone in the city" (ὡς ἄμεινον ὁν παντὶ, ύπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξοθεν ἐφεστῶτος ... Δηλοὶ δὲ γε ... ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιούτων βαίλεται, πάσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὃν). Plato is arguing that divine wisdom, or reason, is what ought to rule us, whether in the sense that reason rules the souls of individuals or the wisdom of the guardians is suited to rule those who are less wise. In the most fundamental sense, then, the rule of reason is the law under which all must live. Law, viewed in this way as a general concept, favors no single class in the polis, rather it is the ally of every citizen, representing, according to each one's capacities, what is the highest quality in both the individual and in the political community. Given a polis whose rulers and citizens possess the ability to direct themselves and the political community in accordance with the dictates of reason, there would be no need for the sorts of legal regulations that Annas finds lacking in the Republic. Reason itself is sufficient as the fundamental law on which a polis is founded and which regulates its institutions.

82 Annas, Introduction, 105. Annas rightly sees Plato replacing a legal code with the guardians, but she is highly critical of this arrangement. The guardians "are not constrained by a constitution or laws, and the other classes have no part in decision-making or even administration; they simply are not consulted. …The Guardians think of others as inferiors who have less knowledge of their own real interests than they themselves have." Ibid., 106-107. Annas, I think, over-interprets Plato's intent. She tends to read the Republic through the lens of contemporary liberalism, thereby privileging individual freedom and choice, while criticizing anything in Plato that may suggest paternalism. If the guardians have indeed attained apprehension of the Good, and if the members of the producer and auxiliary classes have some apprehension, then the problem as stated by Annas would not exist. The guardians would in fact have a superior knowledge of their charges' interests, and by the fact that they possess knowledge of the Good, they could not do anything that would harm or not be of benefit to the whole community.

83 Republic, 590d3-c2.

84 Adam comments on this passage: "Plato means that the purpose, intention or meaning of Law is that the better should rule the worse, and we may fairly appeal to the witness of Law on such a subject, for Law does not, as Thrasymachus argued (I 343 C), hold a brief for ὁ σπειτων, but is the ally of every class and individual in the city without exception." Adam, The Republic of Plato, 367.

85 This position foreshadows the Statesman's argument that the best rule would be one without law; laws should not prevail, rather the man who rules as a king with wisdom, but without laws, would be the best solution. Because law
Plato argues that there is no need for laws to regulate education in respect to matters of lawful
convention: "It is silly to legislate these matters; for verbal or written legislation neither will make
them come to be nor make them last" (Nomotheitein δ᾽ αὐτά, ... eýhthes' oúte γάρ ποι γίγνεται
oúτ᾽ ἀν μείνειεν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν νομοθετήθηντα). The type of education in respect to
musikē and gymnastikē that is set down by the guardians will ensure the proper nurture and
growth of the children. Because the guardians have established education in accordance with
divine reason, the result will turn out well, since a person's education will determine what sort of
individual he or she will become. Similarly, there is no need for laws regulating market
transactions, private contracts, legal procedures, and the like. It is unnecessary to dictate such
laws because the educational system will produce citizens who are "fine and good" (καλοίς
καγαθοῖς), who themselves will discover what sort of legislation is required.

There is a potential drawback in that if the god-granted law of divine reason does not establish
the sort educational system intended by Plato, then there is a risk that the citizens will pass their
time trying to compensate for a bad education by passing and amending all sorts of laws, "not
knowing that they are really cutting off the heads of a Hydra" (ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὀσπέρ
"Ὥραν τέμνουσιν"). Laws concerning institutions and procedures should be set down only in
those cases in which the citizens do not possess the wisdom to do so for themselves. Otherwise,
there will be a continual altering of the laws according to the desires of those who gain the
confidence of the polis through flattery, and thereby badly govern the polis.

must be applied to a wide variety of cases, it can never take into consideration individual variants. The lawgiver, when
setting down a legal code, uses the principle of what best suits the majority. In contrast, the ruler who possesses expert
knowledge is able to do away a legal code precisely because he has the knowledge to judge individual cases on their
own merits without the restrictions of fixed laws. See, Statesman, 294a2-295b5.

Republic, 425b7-8.
87 See, Republic, 425c10-e2.
88 Republic, 425e3-426c7.
89 The theme of rhetorical flattery for the sake of indulging the desires of the citizens is the central topic of the Gorgias.
It is perhaps obvious to note that it is also a concern in the Republic. The politician who resorts to flattery cannot be
(τὸν ἀληθῶν νομοθέτη) should not busy himself about such legal regulations. In a badly-governed polis they will make no difference; in a polis established in accordance with the *Republic*’s criteria, either the citizens, by employing their reason, will discover the appropriate laws, or the what the laws ought to be will follow of their own accord from the way in which the polis was established.90 In contrast, there are some laws concerning sacred rites, festivals, and burials for which laws must be enacted. But these are not the sort of laws for which human beings have knowledge; they must by prescribed by the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.91

Even though law is not treated in the specific manner in which the *Crito* dealt with the concept of legal obligation, the sense of law as the use of reason to regulate both the actions of the individual and the affairs of the polis is quite pronounced in the *Republic*. The grounding of the concept of law in human reason which, in turn, is itself a divinely given capacity, entailed by one’s knowledge of the Good, suggests that Plato saw no need to posit a legal code. With the exception of the laws pertaining to the gods, the citizens of *kallipolis* will have their legal system set down by the guardians, and accepted by themselves, in accordance with the principles of justice and just behavior that is the consequence of their souls being harmoniously balanced. If it is indeed the case that the citizens are able to attain this balance, then any extended discussion of law and legal procedure would be unnecessary and redundant. The best sort of law is within ourselves, provided we are able to access it and realize it in practice.

In general terms, the political philosophy of the *Republic* is distinctly different from that encountered in the early-period dialogues. We have seen that the works of this group privilege

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the use of elenctic examination to persuade individuals to live well for the good of the community. In the middle-period dialogues political, as well as moral, philosophy is grounded in a metaphysical conception of the Good. Whether it be in terms of education, law, or the manner in which citizens rule or are ruled, it is made clear in the Republic that rational discourse among individuals no longer is sufficient to ensure the good of the polis. What is required is the apprehension of something that transcends what one encounters in this world. Since human beings are essentially fallible, with the propensity to be guided by their passions, the recognition that there is a divine element in us – the reasoning part of the psyche – is needed so that we may order our souls and thus furnish order to the political communities in which we live. Yet, in Plato's view, reason itself is a divine gift, whose full use by human beings requires the apprehension of the Forms as the ground from which we can then attempt the management of our practical concerns. Both politics and ethics must be directed by reason when it has intellected the Forms. Thus, one of the principal features which distinguishes the dialogues of the middle period from the early-period works is Plato's two-world metaphysics; a sensible realm in which the everyday interactions of moral agents and political concerns take place, and the supersensible realm of the Forms whose apprehension is necessary in order to live as morally responsible agents and good citizens in the sensible world.

When we examine the middle-period dialogues, the most striking characteristic is precisely the doctrine of separately existing Forms. Additionally, there is a close link between this doctrine and the concept of a soul capable of existing apart from the body, a soul that is eternal and subject to reincarnation. Unlike the unified soul of the early works, the Republic's soul is tripartite.92

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92 Even though I have discussed Plato's arguments for the tripartite soul in the previous chapter, I would like to offer the following observation as well. The structure of the soul is itself problematic in the middle dialogues, for in the Phaedo, unquestionably considered as a middle-period work, the soul's structure is unitary, whereas in the Republic, we encounter the fully developed idea of a tripartite soul. The shift from a unified soul to a multi-part one is at the root of Plato's rejection – or development – of Socratic intellectualism. That is, a change from the view that all desires are
Both the Forms and the tripartite soul are respectively necessary metaphysical and psychological conceptions for the political and moral philosophy of the Republic. In order to live well we must be able to apprehend the Forms which, in turn, provide paradigms of the highest ideals to which we may aspire. Ultimately, both the soul of each individual and the theoretical polis, kallipolis, depend on Plato's particular two-world metaphysics. As Socrates remarks in reference to the city they have founded, it is "perhaps a pattern laid up in heaven for the person who wishes to look at it, and when he has looked at it, to establish it in himself" (ἐν οὐρανῷ ίσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀράν καὶ ὥρωτι ἐαυτὸν κατοικίζειν). 93

Problems and Possibilities:

The Impracticability of the Republic's Political Philosophy

By grounding the Republic's political and moral philosophy in metaphysics, Plato posits a philosophical structure of great power and beauty, but one from which practical and theoretical problems arise. Leaving aside the metaphysical and epistemological difficulties of the Forms which were harshly, and perhaps tendentiously, criticized by Aristotle in the Metaphysics and Peri ideön, 94 and which Plato himself subjected to rigorous self-criticism in the Parmenides and reconsidered in the Theaetetus, there are serious objections to the manner in which the middle-directed toward the Good; some desires, of course, may not be oriented in this way. Socratic intellectualism seems to require a unified soul. By dividing the soul, Plato is able to demonstrate that the objects of our desires – good and bad – stem from the reasoning, thumotic, and appetitive portions of the soul respectively. The problem persists by the time of the Laws. Plato appears to reject the tripartite structure, positing instead either a bipartite soul or a unified soul. For a discussion of Plato's conception of the structure of the soul, see, Robinson, Plato's Psychology and Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, esp., 216-373.

93 Republic, 592b1-2. Adam comments: "ἐαυτὸν κατοικίζειν is a pregnant and powerful phrase, which involves not only the idea of the πόλεις κατοικεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν (cf. 590 E, 591E, X 605 B, 608 B), but also perhaps a hint that the παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ is as it were the μητρόπολις from which our souls should be colonized. Jowett and Campbell understand ἐκεῖ after ἐαυτὸν κατοικίζειν, while Richards thinks Plato may have written ἐαυτὸν οι κατοικίζειν: but the word παράδειγμα, as well as τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀράν καὶ ὥρωτι, shews that the heavenly city is regarded as a model for the soul rather than as the place in which the soul should be planted." Adam, The Republic of Plato, 370.

94 For an analysis of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's metaphysics, see, Harold F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1944).
period works conceive political and moral philosophy. To state it bluntly, there is fundamentally an elitist and exclusionary nature to this philosophy that would hinder, if not preclude, the establishment of a well-constituted polis that seeks the good of all its citizens. To be certain, a polity may be ruled by a Platonic philosopher-king and attain a certain measure of flourishing under his guidance and authority, and the citizens may be educated in respect to virtue so that they may to some degree act in a morally responsible manner, but unless instruction in the apprehension of the Good is made available to everyone, then two consequences follow. First, there is a consequence that affects the individual. Even though the members of the producer and auxiliary classes receive a degree of education that would permit them to act as morally responsible agents, it does appear to be the case that they would be excluded from the full realization of their potentials as both individuals and citizens. Without the sort of education available to the guardians, the manner in which the rest of the citizens are supposed to apprehend the Forms, and thereby learn how to place their souls and polis in a harmonious balance is problematic. Given the great significance in the Myth of Er on being able to choose one's next temporal life correctly, it is difficult to see how these individuals would be equipped with the requisite knowledge to do so successfully. Second, there is a consequence for the political community. The sort of polis in which only few individuals have attained a high degree of knowledge and understanding is one that would be unstable. Despite Plato's claims that the education in musikē and gymnastikē given to the members of the producer and auxiliary classes would be sufficient for them "to do their own business", that is, perform the task for which one is most suited, it is doubtful that over a long period of time whether one's moral psychology could

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95 For Aristotle's arguments contra Plato's political philosophy, see Politics, Book II. As I noted in Chapter 2, Mayhew offers a recent examination of Aristotle's critique of the political philosophy of the Republic. See, Mayhew, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic. In general, see, Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast for fundamental arguments regarding these concerns.

96 See, Republic, 617d2-620d5. Plato specifically states at 619e1-5 that the person who "pursues philosophy soundly" (ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφῶν) will have the easiest journey in his life on earth and in the afterlife.
sustain this specialization of function. As Plato's depiction of the decline of regime- and soul-types in Books VIII and IX makes clear, it appears to be inevitable that all political communities and individuals must undergo a process of degeneration. The results for the political community are potentially devastating if only a select group of individuals, the guardians, have knowledge of the highest ideals, and thus the possibility of there being a well-harmonized polis that is able to endure over a substantial period of time is greatly lessened. The city founded in Republic may be a fine theoretical construct, but since politics and moral responsibilities necessarily occur not in a metaphysical, non-sensible realm, but in the visible, practical sphere, the worlds of the Republic – both sensible and supersensible – would entail no, or very little, practicability. Plato's concerns for moral responsibility and political flourishing would not extend beyond the theoretical founding of kallipolis.

I wish to argue that Plato became aware of certain difficulties concerning the applicability of his middle-period political philosophy. In effect, the political philosophy of the Republic entailed a limited practicability. Plato's recognition of the problem of applicability, or possibility, arguably led him to approach the problem of how we may best live from a different perspective in his later dialogues. Before doing so, however, I would like to address the question whether Plato himself regarded the Republic's program as possible, or did he simply consider it be to a theoretical examination of what the best sort of polity could be, with there being no intention whatsoever to attempt to establish it in actuality.

Plato's ideal polis is referred to several times as being founded in theory or in speech. One could easily infer from these references that kallipolis is indeed just a "city in speech", and that Plato did not regard its coming to be as possible. Yet, offsetting the fact that the city is only a

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97 Burnyeat helpfully provides a list of these occurrences: Logôi, 472d-e; lexêôs, 473a; en logos, 592a; cf. 369a-c, 371b, 374a, 379a, 394d, 422e, 428c, 433a, 434e, 450a-b, 451c, 452a, 456d, 458c, 473e, 477e, 530e, 534d, 546b, 557d, 558b, 595a. Miles Burnyeat, "Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability of Plato's Ideally Just City," in Plato 2, 297, n. 1.
theoretical construct, it is stated twenty-two times in the Republic that a city of such a sort is possible or practicable. What, then are we to make of these conflicting claims? Is the instantiation of kallipolis actually possible or practicable? Appendix I lists the passages in which the idea of possibility is raised. An analysis of these passages suggests that in a limited sense practice can follow theory. It appears to be the case that the concept of possibility is akin to the idea of approximation. In other words, the individual or political community that attends to Plato's theoretical "city in speech" may be able to approximate it in practice. While there may be only the slightest possibility that kallipolis could actually come into existence, those who adhere to its ideals as a paradigm have the possibility to live well as individuals and citizens.

There have been several ways in which the possibility of the "city in speech" coming into being has been interpreted. First, there are scholars who argue that Plato intended kallipolis to be a theoretical model; it is not blueprint for a political community that could be realized. Guthrie, for example, states: "the whole scheme is a purely theoretical exercise." A somewhat different view was expressed by Strauss, who argued that the Republic presents us with the proof that such a city is impossible. Kallipolis is not a theoretical model of what the best city ought to be, rather we should interpret the Republic as meaning the opposite of what it appears to say, namely, kallipolis is not the sort of polis that we ought to desire.

Rosen argues that the purpose of the Republic is to demonstrate the inherent instability of politics, and it may be inferred from Rosen's analysis that Plato's social and political programs could not be enacted in practice.

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98 See, Republic, 375c-e, 415c-d, 423d-424a, 425d-e, 450d, 452e-453c, 456c, 457a, 457c, 457d-e, 458a, 458b, 466d, 471c-e, 472b-473b, 473c-e, 485a, 499c-500e, 502a-c, 520e-521a, 540d, 592a. Ibid., 301, n. 11.
99 Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 457, n. 1. Also see pages 483-486 for an extended discussion on the practicability of Plato's ideal city.
100 Strauss comments: "We arrive at the conclusion that the city is not possible because of the philosopher's unwillingness to rule." Strauss, The City and Man, 124. Bloom even more forcefully, perhaps, follows Strauss' reading. See, Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay."
101 See, Rosen, Plato's Republic. While Rosen explicitly claims that he is offering a refutation of the Straussian reading, he nevertheless appears to arrive at the same conclusion; the Republic demonstrates the impossibility of Plato's ideal city.
Contrary readings are given by many interpreters. Cornford argues that the Republic's ideal city was intended to be taken seriously and implemented as a remedy for the harmful practices and institutions of fourth-century Greek politics. Cornford does note, however, that Plato's ideal city does recognize human weakness, trying to mold it as best as possible. Reeve attempts to demonstrate the possibility and coherence of the Republic's arguments by analyzing four broad topical areas: epistemology and metaphysics; psychology; politics; ethics. Reeve concludes his examination by claiming: "Plato's overall theory … is defensible, at least to some degree, … and in all sorts of ways it points us in promising directions – by shaking our confidence in accepted dogma …" For Reeve, the possibility of the Republic appears to lie not so much in the possibility of the coming into being of kallipolis as it does in demonstrating to its readers the possibility of questioning and revising firmly entrenched views. Laks, in article examining the relationship between the Republic and the Laws, employs the concept of "projection". That is to say, the laws of the Laws are a projection of the Republic's theoretical arguments; the possibility of the Republic is fulfilled in the Laws. Laks claims: "… the Politeia puts forward an explicit theory of possibility that is just the one we need in order to account for the Laws in terms of a 'projection'." Finally, Burnyeat has presented an interesting interpretation that is based on the notion of fantasy. There is an element of the fantastical found both in the Republic and in Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae that suggests a subversion of the audiences' expectations, a sort of liberation from one's common perspectives. The sharp juxtaposition of our mundane reality and Plato's fantasy indicates that the fantastical Aristophanic elements of the Republic are designed

103 See, Reeve, Philosopher-Kings.
104 Ibid., 273.
105 André Laks, "Legislation and Demiurgy: On the Relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws," Classical Antiquity 9, no. 2 (1990), 214. Laks further notes that there is a specific Platonic conception of possibility which defines the possible in terms of "the greatest proximity." Ibid., 216.
106 Burnyeat, "Utopia and Fantasy."
"to free our imaginations from the conventional assumptions that hold us back from seeing that we could and should take his proposal seriously."\textsuperscript{107} Of course, the sort of comic fantasy employed to make the Republic acceptable is precisely the type that Plato wishes banned in his ideal polis. While this might appear to be a contradiction, or a paradox, Burnyeat argues that it is not. We need to enter into this world of comic fantasy because "it is the partial, parochial perspectives of everyday existence which make it hard for us to accept that the Republic is right."\textsuperscript{108} In other words, the practicability of the "city in speech" depends on us taking its fantasy seriously, and if taken in this way, then there is a possibility that we could be persuaded that the Republic's political program is practicable.

All of the above interpretations present good and ingenious, but not compelling, arguments. Their variety suggests that it may not be possible to reach a consensus on the question of the practicability of Plato's ideal city. Indeed, the tension between the "city in speech" and the notion of possibility in the text perhaps indicates that Plato himself was not entirely persuaded in respect to the practicability of kallipolis per se. It is arguable that while Plato may not indeed have intended his ideal city to be established in the precise manner in which it is set out in the Republic, nevertheless it is not implausible to suggest that he believed such an ideal was necessary as a paradigm toward which human beings ought to aim. Barker, who analyzes the dialogue in terms of its practicability, concludes: "that there should ever be a state according to this manner, Plato hardly expects; it must be an ideal to which men may approximate as closely as they can, but not a copy of what must imitated line for line."\textsuperscript{109} To put this another way, Plato's political goals in the Republic were very likely not intended to be realized in practice as

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 305.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 308.
\textsuperscript{109} Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1959), 160. Guthrie, too, reaches a similar conclusion: "But it is still a paradeigma or model of the order which, given men's need for communal life and their diversity of character, would be 'completely good' for them (427e), and towards which political thinkers should strive." Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 486.
much as they served to illustrate and illuminate the best way of life that is possible; a way of life that could approximate his ideal.

Yet, even an ideal, even though it may be necessary, may also be impracticable. Given human nature being what it is, I wish to suggest that Plato came to regard the political philosophy of the *Republic* as entailing little or no practicability both in respect to its actually coming into existence and in respect to its usefulness as a model to be approximated. There are four principal reasons, mentioned in Chapter 2, which may have led Plato to seek a different, more practicable, solution to the problem.\(^\text{110}\) While there can be no complete certainty that any of these reasons, either alone or in combination, were the cause of the later-period's political and moral philosophy, it is not unreasonable to suspect that they lay behind the shift in Plato's thought from the metaphysical grounding of the middle-period dialogues to the more practicably applicable philosophy of the *Statesman, Philebus, and Laws*.

First, Plato's two-world metaphysics was subject to severe criticism, not the least of which was written by Plato himself.\(^\text{111}\) Although the Forms do not entirely disappear in the late works, they no longer are the centerpiece and linchpin of Plato's philosophy.\(^\text{112}\) In the *Republic* it is essential that the guardians apprehend the Forms in order to rule well, but in the *Laws* it is the law itself,

\(^{110}\) There is a fifth, more speculative reason for the change. Starting in about 367, Aristotle became a member of Plato's Academy. While there is no certain means of ascertaining the influence of Aristotle on Plato, the more reasonable and practical nature of the former philosopher's own surviving works on ethics and politics suggest a regard for ethics and politics as found in practice, rather than regarding these subjects as the objects of theoretical and metaphysical considerations. It is not entirely implausible to suggest, then, that discussions carried out with Aristotle in the Academy itself may have contributed to the redirection of Plato's later philosophy.

\(^{111}\) As noted previously, the *Parmenides* should be read as Plato's self-response to potential difficulties with the manner in which he conceived the doctrine of the Forms. Whether or not the arguments in the *Parmenides* were stimulated by discussion within the Academy, perhaps with Aristotle, may only be guessed at. The fact remains, however, that regardless of the stimulus for Plato's reconsideration of the Forms, he did undertake to address this issue. It is not implausible to think that if his central metaphysical views could be re-evaluated, then so too could be the practical philosophy which was grounded in Plato's metaphysics.

\(^{112}\) I am not convinced by Saunders's claim that the *Laws* is "wholly devoid of the theory of Forms." For example, in his discussion of music in Book II, the Athenian argues that music should not be judged by the criterion of pleasure, rather it should be judged by its resemblance to its model, beauty (668a9-b2). Trevor J. Saunders, "Plato's Later Political Thought," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 465.
along with the correct nurture and education of the citizens, that ensures good government. Yet, the rule by law is only a second-best choice; this second-best polity is one which looks to the model of the best, or ideal, polis and which should resemble it as far as possible. In this sense, the notion of an ideal type, or Form, continues to provide a paradigm against which all else is evaluated. While this model may not quite be the Form of the Good in the Republic, the general philosophical conception that there is some standard, not posited by human beings, underpins the arguments of the Laws.

Second, it is difficult to imagine that external criticisms of Plato's philosophy did not occur. We do know, for example, that there was continual interaction between Plato and his pupils in the Academy, including communal meals and sacred feasts. Guthrie comments: "Much of the instruction would be by Plato's favoured [sic] dialectical method, but he also gave continuous lectures, some of which were open to a wider audience." Surely, given the intellectual acumen and philosophical ability of associates such as Aristotle, Speusippus, and Eudoxos, it is reasonable to assume that Plato's ideas underwent some sort of reconsideration as the result of his daily interaction with the Academy's members. If, as Plato himself asserts in the Republic, the goal of philosophy is to discover the truth, then the practice of dialectics would permit both Plato

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113 *Laws*, 739b8-e7.
114 In the Republic, Socrates defines the good as: "this thing that grants the truth to the things that are known and gives power to the knower is, you must say, the form of the good" (*Toûto tōn toû tēn álētheiaν parēx̣hν tō̂̂ς gennoskouṃēnais kai tō̂̂ gennoskounti tēn dū̂̂̂μαι̂̂̂ν ἀποδιδον tēn tō̂̂ ἀγαθον ἰδεαν ψαθι εἴ̔̂ ταν*). Republic, 508d10-e2. In the *Laws*, the Athenian explicitly claims at 716c4-5 that "in our view, the god is most of all the measure of all things" (*ὁ δῆ θεὸς ημῖν πάσων χρήματος μέτρον ἄν εἰ̔̂ η μάλιστα*). While the accounts of Socrates and the Athenian are not precisely identical, the notion that there is some higher power that functions as a paradigm for human affairs is common to Plato's middle- and late-period thought. On a related point, Schofield makes the interesting argument that the political program of the *Laws* is grounded in religion. "Religious observance inculcating a sense of divine power and divine justice turns out to be a priority for the legislator's agenda." Schofield sees Magnesia as a sort of theocracy. Even though it is arguable that Schofield goes too far in arguing that Magnesia is a theocracy, there is the sense that even in what appears to be a work of practicable political theory, there is the need ultimately to base the work's political philosophy on metaphysical grounds. While the divine aspect of the *Laws* is not quite the same as the Forms, it nevertheless functions as a transcendent power upon which actions in the sensible realm depend. Schofield, *Plato*, 311-325.
115 Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 21. For a general account of Plato's philosophical activities in the Academy and in Sicily, see, Ibid., 17-32.
himself and the members of the Academy to attempt to attain this goal.\textsuperscript{116} If through the act of philosophizing a previously held position was found to be untenable, or impracticable, then, according to Plato's own claim, it ought to be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{117}

Third, the turn to the practicable application of his moral and political thought may have been caused by Plato's disastrous attempts to educate Dionysius and involve himself in the political affairs of Sicily. Plato's second and third trips to Sicily occurred in 367-65 and 361 respectively, corresponding to the traditional dating for the early years of his late period. It is not unreasonable to argue that his experiences at the court of Dionysius would lead Plato to reject the practicability of a philosopher-king ever coming to rule in actuality. The \textit{Seventh Letter} contains ample evidence of Plato's disillusion with his attempt to put his metaphysical political philosophy into action. Near the conclusion of this letter, in the context of recounting his attempt to educate Dionysius, Plato remarks: "I said these things having felt hatred in regard to the Sicilian wandering and its misfortune" (ταῦτα εἶπον μεμισθικῶς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν).\textsuperscript{118} These are the words of one who has suffered a bitter experience, perhaps of the sort that would lead to finding a different means of addressing the questions of politics. Guthrie suggests that Plato was essentially a theoretician, lacking the abilities to translate theory into practice.\textsuperscript{119} Perhaps this reading is correct. Yet, the fact that Plato, after his disastrous trips to Sicily, still managed to philosophize about politics from a more practicable standpoint, suggests that his experience did not so much defeat him as it offered the opportunity to attempt to work out a new type of political theory.

\textsuperscript{116} See, \textit{Republic}, 475b8-e4.
\textsuperscript{117} I am not, of course, claiming that any reconsideration of a view entails a rejection of that view and the substitution of a new one in its place. It is perfectly feasible that a successive position could complement a prior one, with both being held in respect to the manner in which a particular problem is addressed.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Epistles}, 350d4-5.
Fourth, members of the Academy were called upon and engaged in the task of legislating for other *poleis*. Plato himself apparently had a deep knowledge and interest in the political arrangements of other *poleis*. Morrow comments: "However Plato's knowledge of Greek laws and political institutions was acquired, the *Laws* shows clearly that his knowledge was accurate and extensive." Judging by the fact that some members of the Academy were known to have engaged in practical political matters, it may be suggested Plato intended that "many of his pupils should leave the Academy for politics, not as power-seekers themselves but to legislate or advise those in power …" Arguably, there was a reciprocal relation between the teaching of the Academy and the experience of its members in the actual practice of politics. The experience gained in politics would affect the theorizing in the Academy, and the political philosophy of the Academy would function to guide political practice in accordance with Plato's conception of politics. It would also appear rather likely that the practical activities of the Academy are reflected in its written works, both in the sense that the political philosophy of Plato was affected by requirements for legislating, and in the sense that the written philosophy of Plato could be used as a guideline by other *poleis*.

Taken either individually or together, then, these four considerations suggest that there was sufficient reason to compel Plato to seek after alternatives in his political philosophy. Neither the

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120 Plato's *Sixth Letter* is perhaps the most reliable evidence for this claim. Two of its three addressees, Erastus and Coriscus, were members of the Academy who later returned to their native city, Scepsis, as political advisors. The *Eleventh Letter*, if genuine, sets out Plato's reasons why neither he nor (the younger) Socrates are able to travel in order to fulfill the request of Laodamas to provide advice concerning a colony that was being planned. Among later authors, Plutarch, suggests that "Plato [who] left behind in his writings many fine arguments concerning laws and constitutions … sent out his pupils" (Πλάτων δὲ καλοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι λόγως περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ἀπέλευ … δὲ τῶν ἐναιρῶν ἐξεσάρτειλεν) for the purpose of engaging in political practice. Plutarch lists several members of the Academy who functioned as political advisors to other *poleis*. Plutarch, *Adversus Coloten*, 1126b10-c10. For a fuller treatment of this question, see, Anton-Hermann Chroust, "Plato's Academy: The First Organized School of Political Science in Antiquity," *The Review of Politics* 29, no. 1 (1967). Schofield offers a more cautious analysis of this question. Malcolm Schofield, "Plato and Practical Politics," in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also see, Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 23-24, and Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960) 8-10.


122 Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 23. Guthrie lists several former members who engaged in politics, either as advisors or as legislators. Both Aristotle and Eudoxos, for example, legislated for their native *poleis*. 128
reliance on the elenctic method of the early-period Socratic dialogues, nor the metaphysical grounding of the middle period's political and moral philosophy was practicable. Stated most simply, neither of these two ways of treating the problems of how we may best live could be brought about in practice. They must give way to a type of political and moral thought that, while not rejecting outright the philosophy of the early- and middle-period dialogues, nevertheless offers different solutions that could have the chance of succeeding in practice. Solutions that both build upon and complement those articulated in the previous works.

There is one final consideration to examine in this chapter before turning to an analysis in the chapters that follow of to metrion as the basis for Plato's late-period political and moral philosophy. Since I have argued that Plato's late thought is a development, in the weak sense of the term, of his prior philosophy, it is necessary to discuss the position set out by some scholars that his late-period philosophy is more or less a rejection of his earlier positions. In order to keep the discussion to a manageable length, I shall briefly examine only two recent readings, those of Klosko and Bobonich.

Klosko's interpretation of the development of Plato's political theory rests on the idea that "There is a marked drop in his estimation of human nature and human potential … Though he had little faith in existing political institutions, Plato came to rely on those that could be erected in a properly run state." It can be inferred from this statement that Plato's later political thought in some way rejects the ground of his middle-period political philosophy, namely, the rule by a philosopher-king, substituting the authority of institutions in place of virtuous rulers who have apprehension of the Good. There are two points worth noting in Klosko's remarks. First, is it really the case that in his later years Plato came to hold a less positive view of human nature? Surely, there is sufficient evidence throughout the corpus that Plato regarded most human beings

123 Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 13.
in a negative light. One only needs to recall the *Republic's* arguments about the need to educate and fashion the soul so that it is held in a harmonious balance to realize that human nature is not so highly regarded by Plato as Klosko would like us to believe.\(^{124}\) Second, it is doubtful whether the *Laws* is concerned solely with institutions as the best solution for politics. The theological discussion in Book X and the virtue of those who are members of the Nocturnal Council are but two examples of fundamental requirements in the *Laws* for a stable political arrangement that are not institutional.

Additionally, Klosko argues that throughout the *Laws* "Plato's procedure is to take what exists and to work out its flaws. This is strikingly different from his procedure in the *Republic*, where the ideal state is more or less deduced from the requirements of virtue." This interpretation, I believe, is incorrect. The need for virtue and virtuous citizens is at the core of all of Plato's political philosophy. The political community cannot work for the good of its citizens unless they possess virtue. The analogy between the virtue of the individual and the virtue of the polis is not made to demonstrate that virtue in the former entails virtue in the latter. Rather, virtue is necessary in both the citizen and the polis if both are to live well and with justice. Throughout the *Laws* Plato recognizes that virtue as a whole, and in particular the virtue of moderation, is necessary if Magnesia is to have any chance for long-lasting stability and success. What differs in the *Laws* from the *Republic* is that virtue is not developed by coming to apprehend the Good, rather it comes about by means of education, the understanding of law, and correct religious beliefs and practices. While the legal and political institutions of the *Laws* may indeed be derived and reconfigured from Plato's knowledge of other Greek *poleis*, it is not the case that this

\(^{124}\) It is perhaps too obvious to mention Plato's depiction of the degeneration of soul-types in Books VIII and IX of the *Republic* as suggesting a very low esteem for our moral psychology. Furthermore, the *Gorgias'* description of the Assembly being swayed by false rhetoric suggests an equally negative view of human nature in a dialogue assigned to the early period.
dialogue simply works out their flaws for the sake of Magnesia's political community. Whatever reconfiguration of existing practices that occurs in the *Laws* is done in conjunction with their affect on the inculcation of virtue for the citizens. Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* have essentially the same concerns; the former articulates an ideal, the latter a greater sense of practicability.

Like Klosko, Bobonich, too, sees a remarkable difference between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, but unlike Klosko, Bobonich regards Plato's last work as offering a degree of optimism. In his recent and important study, Bobonich argues that there was a radical change in Plato's later philosophy, a development of one's ethical capacities related to Plato's deepening views in respect to epistemology and psychology. But in manner similar to Klosko, there is the implication in Bobonich's analysis that we should somehow regard Plato's later philosophy as being representative of his final views, superceding those which came previously. In other words, Bobonich's work adheres to the strong sense of the term development, and thus carries the implication that Plato no longer held to his earlier views.

Briefly stated, it is Bobonich's contention that Plato changed his perception about the capacities of those who are not trained in philosophy. The fundamental argument made by Bobonich is that in the *Laws* Plato accepts the following four theses which he did not accept in the middle-period dialogues:

1. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing virtue for its own sake, that is, are capable of believing that virtue is good for its own sake and of desiring virtue for its own sake.
2. At least some non-philosophers are capable of being genuinely virtuous.
3. At least some non-philosophers are capable of living happy lives.
4. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing for its own sake the genuine well-being or happiness of others; in particular, they are capable

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125 For an excellent analysis of the sources for the political and legal institutions of Magnesia, see, Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City*.  
126 See, Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast*.  

of valuing for its own sake in other people the most important constituent of happiness, i.e., virtue.\textsuperscript{127}

If these four theses are laid down correctly, then it follows that in Plato's late-period dialogues non-philosophers are capable of acting as morally responsible agents for the sake of both their own good and the good of the political community. In contrast to the Republic's notion that only a philosopher is able to live well because he is able to apprehend the Forms, in the Laws some non-philosophers will have this capacity as well. "What Magnesia offers to its citizens is the possibility that non-philosophers – even while remaining non-philosophers – can lead virtuous lives and can make the sort of progress that entitles them to the opportunity of increased happiness."\textsuperscript{128}

Given the depth and complexity of Bobonich's arguments, it is not my intention to offer of critique of the propositions that form the ground of his analysis. While there is much to admire in his book, which, I believe, establishes the foundation for further discussion, I would like to focus my comments on Bobonich's developmentalist presuppositions. Substantial critiques of Bobonich's assumptions concerning Plato's moral psychology, epistemology, social, and political thought have recently been made by Kahn and Brisson.\textsuperscript{129} Despite his four theses, there is in

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 89-93.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 479.
\textsuperscript{129} Kahn, who is primarily critiquing Bobonich's assumptions regarding Plato's psychology and epistemology, states: "B.'s interpretation of Plato pays little or no attention to the dialogue form. There is no discussion of the literary context of an argument, the relation of speaker to interlocutors, or the problem of platonic anonymity." The lack of sensitivity to the Laws literary aspects has led Bobonich into certain anachronisms in respect to the concept of virtue, the distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers, and the relation of virtue to each of these two groups. Furthermore, Kahn argues that Bobonich's treatment of the soul is problematic, tracing a line of development from the Republic's tripartite soul to the unitary moral psychology of the Laws, without sufficiently taking into account the structure of the soul in the works that supposedly fall between these two. Kahn concludes that the foregoing difficulties do not permit Bobonich to establish his central developmentalist thesis, namely, that there was a radical shift in Plato's views between the Republic and the Laws. Charles Kahn, "From Republic to Laws," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 337-362. For the quotation, see, 343. Brisson, too, challenges the claim that there is a distinct break in Plato's thought. "There is no break in Plato's work, either on the level of psychology and epistemology (as has been shown by Charles Kahn in his excellent discussion of Bobonich's book) or on the level of social structure and politics ..." Brisson frames his criticism around four concepts: economical autonomy; social autonomy; political autonomy; moral autonomy. An analysis of all four concepts reveals that there is not the sort of break between the Republic and the Laws that Bobonich presupposes. Bobonich's conclusion only
general a sense that they are not unique to Plato's late thought. While undoubtedly it is the philosopher who is able to attain the greatest apprehension of the Good, and thereby live virtuously, there appear to be many indications that Plato believed that many human beings had at least some capacity to live well. Regardless of the failure of the elenctic method, the privileging of individual reason in the Socratic dialogues suggests a conviction that non-philosophers who examine their beliefs are capable of revising them in light of a better understanding of what they entail. It is hard to imagine that Socrates would have spent such a considerable amount of time questioning a diverse group of individuals if he did not assume that they could be directed toward living well. In the Republic, regardless of the difficulties of Plato's two-world metaphysics as the grounding for his practical philosophy, there is a definite sense that under the guidance of philosophers, non-philosophers can be educated in respect to the Good. If they were not, then no amount of rule by philosopher-kings would be possible in the long term; the very core of the polis would be unstable. Thus, it is arguable that throughout the Platonic corpus there is the belief that at least some individuals are able to act as morally responsible agents and good citizens. Bobonich is incorrect to argue that the possibility for some non-philosophers to be virtuous is a feature of Plato's philosophy found only in the late-period dialogues.

The fact that Klosko and Bobonich hold quite contrary views concerning Plato's view of human nature in his late works points out one of the difficulties to interpreting Plato from the strong developmental perspective. It appears to be the case that in order to posit the idea that the late works reflect a rejection of the philosophy of the earlier periods, an interpreter is compelled to adopt certain assumptions that are not necessarily borne out by the texts. Both Klosko and Bobonich build their respective analyses on two premises: (1) that the late dialogues exhibit a

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appears to be valid if we assume that there is a opposition between the Republic and the Laws. Luc Brisson, "Ethics and Politics in Plato's Laws," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 93-121. For the quotation, see, 95-96.
demonstrable break with the philosophy of the early and middle periods; (2) that Plato's view of human nature changed. But since both scholars accept the strong developmentalist position, and each has radically different views on what Plato's views were and changed to, their arguments and conclusions dramatically differ. Without doubt, there are difficulties in the way Plato attempts to offer solutions to moral and political problems in the early-and middle-period dialogues, but it is not correct to argue these solutions are replaced in their entirety in works such as the Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws. A better way to regard the late works in relation to the rest of the corpus is to understand that there is a significant degree of continuity among the dialogues. It is my contention that if we read the late works in terms of complementarity, then we are afforded a greater opportunity to demonstrate that these dialogues do not present a rejection and reconfiguration of Plato's thought. Rather, they are complementary treatments of certain fundamental philosophical questions that extend diachronically across all of Plato's works.
CHAPTER 5

THE DIGRESSION ON DUE MEASURE: STATESMAN, 283C3-285C3

Plato's views on τὸ μέτριον are fundamentally important for my interpretation of his later political and moral philosophy. It is necessary, therefore, to examine at length the manner in which Plato conceives due measure, before analyzing in subsequent chapters its function in Plato's philosophical method, as well as its role in the philosophy of the Statesman, Philebus and Laws. Since a significant portion of Plato's late-period thought appears to be grounded in what is in due measure, I wish to argue that τὸ μέτριον should be regarded as the result that follows from the measurement of opposite qualities. If this interpretation of the function of due measure is correct, then there are implications for both Plato's practical and theoretical philosophy. In other words, it is arguable that what is in due measure, treated as the result of qualitative measurement, entails consequences not only for the manner in which Plato conceived political and moral philosophy in the dialogues of the late period, but also that his metaphysics, ontology, and philosophical method were affected by to metrion. Although the central focus of this study is on the political and moral thought of Plato, some discussion of his theoretical philosophy will also be required in order to understand the significance of due measure for Plato's philosophy.

Evidence in support of my position that to metrion is fundamentally important for Plato's thought also is provided by the examination of other passages in the Platonic corpus. Connections are found among dialogues from all three chronological periods that suggest a need on Plato's part to develop a philosophical position which attempts to tie together epistemological considerations with some sort of standard by which one is able to determine how to act in a morally virtuous manner. While this problem is tentatively explored in works from the early and middle periods, its principal discussion occurs in the Statesman in what may be termed the

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digression on due measure.¹ It is in this passage that Plato first sets down the need for some sort of qualitative measurement which in a sense completes the unfinished arguments of earlier dialogues. The Protagoras and the Charmides are the two works from the earlier part of the corpus whose aporetic conclusions have the most immediate bearing for the digression on due measure in the Statesman. It is plausible to argue, then, that the inconclusive discussion concerning sōphrosunē in the Charmides and the incompletely argued need for an art of measurement in the Protagoras lead to the digression on due measure in the Statesman.

There are references in the Protagoras for the need of an art of measurement (ἡ μετρητική) as the sort of knowledge on which the preservation of life depends.² Yet, what this art may be and in what this knowledge may consist is not articulated in the dialogue; Socrates leaves it to be explored for some future time. I wish to suggest that the digression on due measure in the Statesman fulfills that task. The examination of qualitative measurement in the Statesman results in setting down a type of measurement that appears to be precisely of the sort mentioned and required in the Protagoras. The art of measurement is the measurement of opposite qualities against some standard so that a mean is attained in which both opposites share. Furthermore, it is arguable that there is a relation between sōphrosunē conceived of as a kind of knowledge in the Charmides and what is in due measure in the Statesman. Knowing what is in due measure entails the possession of a certain sort of knowledge necessary for an individual to choose correctly a middle, praiseworthy, state lying between two extremes. Thus, qualitative measurement is an art of measurement in the sense that it is an art (ἡ τέχνη) requiring the kind of expert knowledge needed to accomplish the aim of that art, and to metrion is equivalent to sōphrosunē in the sense

¹ See, Statesman, 283c3-285c3. It should be noted that by the term "digression" I do not wish to imply any negative connotation. It is not a digression in the sense that it needlessly or randomly steers the discussion (and the reader) away from the dialogue's central argument. Rather, it is a digression in the sense that this passage, although it temporarily turns aside from the main argument, nevertheless is integrally related to, and indeed is necessary for, a complete understanding of the Statesman's argument.

² See, Protagoras, 357a1-b5.
that the *sōphrōn*, or moderate individual, is one who possesses knowledge of what is in due measure. The *Charmides* ἡ *sōphrosūnē*, the *Protagoras* ἡ μετρητική and the *Statesman*’s τὸ μέτριον are conceptually and philosophically connected in Plato’s thought. To know what is in due measure requires the possession of a type of knowledge and the employment of an art of qualitative measurement that enables one to choose and act correctly. If, then, one accepts that both the *Charmides* and the *Protagoras* were composed before the *Statesman*, which itself antedates the *Philebus* and *Laws*, then it is arguable that not only is there a concern on the part of Plato, extending diachronically across the corpus, with the relations between measurement and due measure and between the concept of measurement (ἡ *μέτρητική*) in general and knowledge, but also in the later dialogues, τὸ μέτριον is the philosophical notion which Plato posits as a solution to the unresolved problems of the earlier works.

This chapter is organized in three main sections. In the first, I summarize the argument of the digression on due measure. The second part discusses interpretations of the passage which directly influence my reading of the text. This is necessary, I believe, in order to situate my interpretation of what is in due measure in relation to the views of other commentators. Finally, in the third section I analyze the respective passages in the *Charmides*, the *Protagoras* and the *Statesman* which refer to the art of measurement, measurement, and due measure so that the relation among them may be articulated. Once this connection is made clear, then the significance of *to metrion* for Plato’s later philosophical method and philosophy may be examined in the following four chapters.

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3 It is well worth pointing out that by the time Plato came to write the *Laws*, the terms τὸ μέτριον and ἡ *sōphrosūnē* are essentially employed as functional equivalents. I shall examine this more fully in Chapter 9.

4 I mean by the phrase “measurement in general” the idea of Measurement, under which both the art of measurement and what is in due measure are subsumed. This usage appears to be sanctioned by the text of the *Statesman*. All three terms, the adjective τὸ μέτριον, and the nouns ἡ μετρητική and ἡ μέτρητικη, are employed by Plato at *Statesman* 284e6-285a3. While these three terms are not precisely synonymous, they do seem to be interchangeable in this passage in the sense that all of them refer to what is measured.
The Argument of Statesman 283c-285c

The digression on due measure occurs immediately after the long *diairesis* concerning weaving. After the completion of the Elean Visitor's examination of weaving, Young Socrates objects that it appeared to him that a division of such great length served no purpose; the definition of weaving could have been reached in a less complicated manner. The Visitor responds by remarking that he is not surprised by the Young Socrates' comment, but in cases such as this, that is, in cases in which one must determine the length or brevity of a discussion, there is a way to determine what the appropriate length ought to be. Rather than merely confining his argument to what ought to be the suitable length for a discussion, the Visitor immediately proceeds to examine the broad concepts of excess and deficiency in general (*πάσαν τὴν τε ὑπερβολήν καὶ τὴν έλλειψιν*). The argument is about length and shortness (*Μήκους τε πέρι καὶ βραχύτητας*) and excess and deficiency in general since the art of measurement (*ἡ μετρητική*) is concerned with all these things. That is to say, the art of measurement is concerned on a general level with the concepts of excess and deficiency, of which length and shortness are instances.

The Visitor begins by dividing the art of measurement into two parts: one part is concerned with the association with each other of greatness and smallness (*μεγέθους καὶ αμικρότητας*): the other part is concerned with the being that is necessary for coming-into-being (*τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαῖαν οὐσίαν*). Understandably, Young Socrates is puzzled by what the Visitor has just said.

Straightway, the Visitor explains the first part of the division; what is larger is larger than what is smaller, and what is smaller is smaller than what is larger. In other words, one part of

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5 I intend this section to be a straight-forward narrative and summary of the discussion between the Elean Visitor and Young Socrates. Philosophical analysis of the passage will be given in the final section of this chapter. To facilitate a full understanding of the passage, I give a translation of the digression on due measure, along with the Greek text, in Appendix 2. I have also included in this appendix the text and translation of the passage from the *Protagoras* which I shall discuss later in this chapter.

6 It is worth noting that this passage is not the only one in which Plato articulates a concern for the suitable length of a discussion. At *Republic* 376d2-3, Socrates remarks that while they want their discussion to be sufficient for its purpose, they do not want it to be any longer than required.
measurement is concerned with relative quantities measured against each other. But in addition to measurement of this sort, there is a different type of measurement in which opposing quantities are measured against a standard of due measure; there really something that exceeds due measure, or is exceeded by it (τῷ τῷ μετρίου ... ὑπερβάλλον καὶ ὑπερβαλλόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς).

Therefore, besides there being two kinds of great and small, there are also two ways of distinguishing between them; the first is in their relation to each other, the second is the way each is in relation to due measure. The Visitor closes this part of the argument by asking Young Socrates if they would like to know why this is so.

The Visitor explains that if the greater was not in relation to anything except the smaller, it would never be in relation to due measure. There would be great negative consequences if this indeed were the case. In general, the arts (τὰς τέχνας) and what is produced by them would be destroyed, and in particular, the subject which they are currently examining, the art of statesmanship (τὴν πολιτικήν), would not be able to be determined. All such kinds of expertise guard against (παραφολαίττουσι) exceeding or falling short of what is in due measure. Due measure is necessary for expert knowledge in that it provides a standard of sorts against which the more and the less (πλέον καὶ ἐλάττων) may be measured. By preserving due measure all good and fine things (πάντα ἄγαθά καὶ καλά) are produced. Thus, without due measure the art of statesmanship will be hidden from view, and it will be difficult for them to proceed with their inquiry about the knowledge of kingship (τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης).

Next, the Visitor argues that, just as in the case of the sophist, where they compelled non-being to exist, so, too, must they now compel the more and the less to become measurable, not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to the coming-into-being of what is in due measure (πρὸς τῷ μετρίου γένεσιν). If they cannot agree that there is a measurement against
what is in due measure, then it will be impossible for either the statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of practical matters ($\tau\alpha$ $\pi\rho\alpha\varepsilon\epsilon\iota\sigma$) to come into being in a way that is indisputable ($\alpha\nu\alpha\mu\phi\epsilon\sigma\beta\gamma\eta\tau\iota\pi\omicron\sigma\varsigma$). The Visitor claims that this task will be even greater ($\pi\lambda\epsilon\omicron$) than the one in case of non-being, but it is very right ($\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha$ $\delta\dot{i}k\lambda\iota\omicron$) that they attempt to lay down the following hypothesis.

The Visitor begins the next part of the argument by stating that what he had just mentioned will be needed at some time "for the demonstration concerning the precise itself" ($\pi\rho\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{i}n$ $\pi\acute{e}r\acute{i}$ $\alpha\nu\tau\acute{o}$ $\tau\acute{a}kr\acute{e}b\acute{e}z$ $\dot{a}p\acute{o}d\varepsilon\epsilon\iota\xi\nu$). In any case, their present argument appears to aid them magnificently ($\mu\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\rho\nu\pi\acute{e}r\acute{e}t\omicron\sigma\varsigma$), namely, that similarly all the arts exist, and that the larger and the smaller are to be measured both in relation to each other and in relation to the coming-into-being of what is in due measure ($\pi\rho\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{i}n$ $t\acute{o}$ $\omicron$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{r}\acute{i}\omicron$ $\gamma\acute{e}n\epsilon\acute{e}a$). The point that the Visitor is making is that the larger and the smaller are measured both in respect to quantitative measurement and in respect to qualitative measurement, but in order for there to be judgment in the arts, qualitative measurement is required. While it is possible for there to be quantitative measurement alone, this sort of measurement is insufficient for measuring excess and deficiency in the arts.

Young Socrates agrees and asks what comes next, and the Visitor responds by saying that they should next divide the art of measurement ($\tau\acute{i}n$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\tau\iota\kappa\iota\acute{n}$). One part will comprise all the arts that measure the number, lengths, depths, breadths, and speeds ($t\acute{o}$ $\alpha$ $\rho\acute{e}b\acute{m}$ $\varsigma$ $\kai$ $\mu\acute{h}k\acute{e}$ $\kai$ $b\acute{a}$ $\acute{h}t\acute{e}$ $k\acute{a}$ $\pi$$l$$\acute{a}$ $t\acute{e}$ $kai$ $t$$a$$x$$h$$n$$t$$i$$t$$a$) in relation to what is opposite to them, that is, quantitative measurement: the other part measures what is in relation to due measure, what is fitting, what is

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Footnote 7: The subject of what was just mentioned is ambiguous. It could be either the argument for the existence of due measure, or the argument that they must compel due measure into being. Given the textual proximity of the latter argument, it would appear that the Visitor is referring to it. Additionally, it should be noted that the phrase $\pi\rho\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{i}n$ $\pi\acute{e}r\acute{i}$ $\alpha\nu\tau\acute{o}$ $\tau\acute{a}kr\acute{e}b\acute{e}z$ $\dot{a}p\acute{o}d\varepsilon\epsilon\iota\xi\nu$ is difficult to understand clearly. It could suggest a reference to a Form, or it could simply be a reference to some future account of their argument that is to be given with a greater degree of accuracy. For further comments on this passage, see, Christopher J. Rowe, *Plato: Statesman* (Oxford: Aris and Phillips, 1995), 208. Sayre offers a possible solution to this problem which I shall mention later in the chapter.
appropriately timely, what is requisite, and all such things that are removed from the extremes to
the middle (πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ’ ὀπόσα εἰς τὸ
μέσον ἀπομίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων), that is, qualitative measurement.

Young Socrates notes that each of the divided sections (τμῆμα) is large and different from each
other. His remark leads the Visitor to argue in the final part of the passage in terms of the proper
way to distinguish and divide classes of things. There are many clever, or sophisticated, people
(πολλοὶ τῶν κοµψῶν) who, although they correctly say that the art of measurement concerns
everything that comes into being, since in a certain way everything that is within the province of
art partakes in measurement (μετρήσεως μὲν γὰρ τινα τρόπον πάνθ’ ὀπόσα ἐντεχνα μετείληψεν),
nevertheless, incorrectly divide things according to classes (κατ’ εἶδη) because they are not
accustomed to thinking in terms of classes. 8 They either place into the same class dissimilar
things, or they do not properly divide things according to parts (κατά µέρη). The correct way in
which one should make a division is first to consider the dissimilarities (τὰς ἄνοµοιςτητὰς) in
things, then, when the similarities in things have been recognized, they should be subsumed
within one likeness (ἐντὸς µᾶς ὁµοίωτητος), making them a particular ontological (οὐσία) class of
things. In other words, the process that the Visitor recommends is one that begins by perceiving
the resemblances among particulars before gathering them together within the universal. The
Visitor then briefly concludes that enough has been said about excess and deficiency and the two
kinds of the art of measurement (δύο γένη τῆς µετρητικῆς), and he gets Young Socrates to
promise that he will remember the distinction between the two and their features.9

8 The identity of the πολλοὶ τῶν κοµψῶν is problematic. They generally are taken to be the Pythagoreans, but other
candidates include the Sophists, the natural philosophers mentioned in the Phaedo, or even members of the Academy
who were especially concerned with mathematizing the universe. Rowe is probably correct when he points out that by
using the term "many", Plato had no particular group, or school, in mind. See, Ibid., 209.

9 It should be pointed out that immediately following the digression on due measure, the Visitor launches into a
discussion of the purpose of their examination. Is their inquiry regarding the statesman "for the sake of that very thing,
Interpreting the Digression on Due Measure

The digression on due measure in the Statesman has received varying degrees of attention from Plato scholars. An examination of the relevant literature in regard to this passage reveals a range of treatment extending from brief remarks of relatively little hermeneutical value to book-length studies of deep insight and significance. There is also a large and diverse spectrum of opinion in regard to the manner in which the passage ought to be interpreted, as well as to its significance in respect to Plato's philosophy. In order to facilitate a manageable arrangement of these interpretations, I have divided them into four principal types. First, there are readings which either are dismissive or critical of the arguments employed by the Elean Visitor, and thus suggest that the Statesman, either in whole or in part, is an unsuccessful dialogue. One of these interpretations – Annas – is part of a commentary on the Statesman, while the remaining two – Miller and Scodel – in more broadly conceived studies, rely extensively on a dramatic approach to the dialogues. The second group – Campbell, Skemp, and Rowe – is comprised of

or for the sake of becoming better dialecticians in regard to all things (ένεκα αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ... μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικοτέρους γίγνεσθαι). Young Socrates responds that their inquiry was for the sake of becoming better dialecticians in regard to all things (Καὶ τοῦτο δήλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα). Statesman, 285d5-8. In other words, the discussion comes round to the point at which it started, namely, why the division of weaving was done at such length. It was done for the sake of illustrating the method by which dialectics should be correctly practiced. Framing the digression on due measure with a question and its answer regarding the importance of the method of division and collection for the sake of the correct practice of dialectics, suggests that to metrion and the art of measurement, especially in respect to the final part of the Visitor's argument, is fundamentally significant for the way in which Plato conceived diairesis in his later dialogues. This point will be examined further in the next chapter.

10 In contrast, the passage on the art of measurement in the Protagoras has received scant attention. I shall comment further on the lack of scholarly interpretations later in this chapter.

11 See, Julia Annas, ed., Robin Waterfield, trans., Plato, Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Mitchell Miller, The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman, reprint ed. (Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing, 2004); Harvey Ronald Scodel, Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1987). Each commentator, to a greater or lesser degree, bases his or her reading on the presupposition that there are problematic aspects to the Statesman that arguably affect the manner in which the digression is interpreted. Annas simply dismisses the digression as irrelevant. Miller, although he does acknowledge the positive qualities of the Statesman, nevertheless begins his analysis from the premise that the work is, on the surface at least, a dramatic failure. It is worth noting that Miller believes the dialogues to have a performative aspect. That is to say, Plato's dialogues were actually performed by students in the Academy for the purpose of instruction. For another, but less nuanced, argument in favor of the performance view, see, Gilbert Ryle, Plato's Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), Chapter 11. Sayre challenges the position that Plato intended the dialogues to be employed for educational purposes, much less that they ever were performed. Rather, the dialogues are written representations of dialectical conversations. Sayre, Plato's Literary Garden, 9-10. While the Statesman as a whole may not be Plato's greatest dramatic success, Miller does argue
interpreters who regard the passage more positively, recognizing its philosophical significance, but who do not always analyze it in sufficient depth, leaving many of its implications not fully examined. All three of these readings of the digression are part of extended critical commentaries on the entire dialogue. In the third group I have placed the work of three scholars – Benardete, Rosen, and Lane – whose analyses have attempted to explore at length the deeper significance of the digression. Benardete's interpretation is part of a commentary on the Statesman, whose

that there is a positive implication to the digression. He ties his reading of the digression to a very practical aim: to become a better dialectician. This is a plausible reading of the passage, yet it is one which leaves many implications of the digression unexplored. Scodel offers a harshly critical reading of the digression that reaches a negative conclusion. It is Scodel's view that the digression is used by Plato as one of many passages in the Statesman employed to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Visitor's arguments. A major difficulty with Scodel's interpretation is that he offers translations of the Greek that are quite at odds with the readings of other translators. My own translation of the texts suggests that Scodel's readings simply are incorrect. It seems to be the case that in order to support his interpretation of the dialogue as a whole, Scodel relies on readings of the text which a close examination of the Greek does not support. In general, it is rather difficult to critique Scodel's analysis on account of his reading of the Greek, his habit of drawing unwarranted inferences, and a lack of references to other scholarship.

12 See, Campbell, The Sophistes and Politics of Plato; J. B. Skemp, trans., Plato: The Statesman, 2nd ed. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1987); Rowe, Plato: Statesman. All three scholars offer positive contributions to the understanding of Plato's thought, although none of these readings fully reveals the implications of the digression. In brief, Campbell views the digression as an attempt to disengage Platonic metaphysics from it reliance on the Forms. Plato, through the voice of the Elean Visitor, is signaling his rejection of the transcendentalist Forms as the paradigms by which things are measured in the sensible sphere, replacing them with a scientific method that is found and employed solely in the sensible world. In contrast, Skemp admits the existence of the Forms in his reading of the Statesman. For an opposing view which directly addresses Skemp's interpretation, see, G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on the Undeceptible," in Logic, Science, and Dialectic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). Additionally, Skemp recognizes that the digression prefigures Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. While it cannot be established unquestionably that Aristotle's doctrine was influenced by Plato's conception of due measure, it is reasonable to suggest that this was indeed the case. Yet, there is a significant difference between Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions. The principal characteristic that distinguishes Aristotle's doctrine of the mean from Plato's conception of due measure is that in Aristotle the mean is relative to the individual, whereas in Plato the mean appears to be fixed for all individuals. It is worth pointing out, however, that in addition to the difference between Plato's mean and Aristotle's relative mean, there is another important distinguishing characteristic. In a summary of his arguments, Aristotle writes: "That moral virtue is a mean, then, and how it is, and that it is a mean between two vices, one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because it is an aiming at what is the middle in passions and actions, has been sufficiently stated" ("Ὅτι μὲν ὁπόθν ἐστιν ἡ ἄρετή ἢ ἡθική μεσότης, καὶ πόσο, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ καθ’ ἐλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστι διὰ τὸ στοιχεῖον τούτου μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκανόν εἰρηταί). Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a20-24. The crucial point to note is that for Aristotle the mean lies between two opposed vices, whereas for Plato what is in due measure does not necessarily have to be a mean between vices; it could be a mean between what on one extreme is virtuous and what on another extreme is vicious. As Plato makes clear in the Philebus, the middle may be a position between a positive state (a life of knowledge) and a negative state (a life of pleasure). Rowe, somewhat surprisingly in light of the very useful and detailed remarks in his commentary on the Statesman, does not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the digression on due measure. He does, like Campbell and Skemp, address the question of whether or not the Forms are present in this dialogue. But Rowe neither sees Plato rejecting the Forms, nor does he believe that transcendentally existing Forms are present. Rather, Rowe appears to adopt a middle approach, one which permits the Forms to be acknowledged as possibly underlying the classes of things that the Visitor divides. The manner in which the method of diateresis divides classes permits us to infer that there could be an ontological status to the classes that is related to the ontological status of Platonic Forms.
analysis of the digression concentrates on its ontological implications. The book-length examinations of Rosen and Lane focus on the political dimensions of Plato's arguments. The fourth and final group – Guthrie and Sayre – offer readings of the digression which focus on its implication for Plato's theoretical philosophy. Both readings are fundamentally important for my interpretation of what is in due measure, as will become apparent in the following pages.

Guthrie recognizes the importance of the digression for Plato's metaphysics and ontology. But, in contrast to Campbell, he does not regard the passage as signaling Plato's rejection of the theory

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13 See, Seth Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Stanley Rosen, Plato's Statesman: The Web of Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); M. S. Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Benardete's interpretation represents a special case. He presents a reading of the dialogue that is written in an obscure style, seems mistaken on many points of textual interpretation, introduces what appears to be conceptual anachronisms, and thus is of questionable value as an accurate reading of the text. The opaque nature of Benardete's prose makes it difficult to understand precisely the points he is attempting to make. Rosen, who finds some of Benardete's earlier work "enormously valuable", is highly critical of his prose style which Rosen thinks has descended in The Being of the Beautiful into willful obscurity and mannerism. [Benardete's study] is instead too often a string of assertions not grounded in an accurate representation of the text. (Rosen, Plato's Statesman, 192-193.) In general, Benardete argues that Plato regarded the two types of measurement – quantitative and qualitative measurement – as corresponding to the ontological categories of the being of nonbeing and nonbeing. Perhaps the best one can say is that Benardete seems to hold some sort of Heideggerian conception of being which misrepresents Plato's ontology, and very likely would be unrecognizable to Plato. Both Rosen and Lane principally regard the Statesman as a work of political philosophy. Rosen views the dialogue as an examination of the relation between knowledge and production; expertise in the art of governing is entailed by phronēsis (translated by Rosen as "sound judgment") and technē ("technical construction" in Rosen's usage). He appears to privilege politics over method. Yet, if this view is correct, then there are serious difficulties in accounting for the extended discussion of method in the Statesman, not the least of which is Young Socrates' response that the digression on due measure was for the sake of improving their skills at dialectics. Lane argues in the Statesman that Plato explores and articulates the close connection between philosophy and politics. There are two principal points to consider in respect to Lane's reading of the passage. First, she argues that there is a normative aspect to due measure. This normative aspect, however, is not found in the notion of relative measure. The comparison of quantities according to relative measure is descriptive, not evaluative, whereas the act of comparing a thing against a standard is an evaluative judgment. It would seem, then, that what is in due measure is necessary for making the correct judgments about political matters. Second, because Lane places great weight on the notion of ho kairos in her interpretation of the political philosophy of the Statesman, "the appropriately timely" (τὸν καιρὸν) mentioned in the digression is thus accorded a high degree of significance. She regards the things which measure "in respect to due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite" (πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον), as being each a specification of mean-measurement. Yet, Lane focuses exclusively on ho kairos; knowing the right moment for action is of great importance for the exercise of political authority (Lane, Method and Politics, 131). I think that Lane is incorrect to emphasize one particular aspect of qualitative measurement at the expense of the other three. As I shall discuss later in this chapter, it appears to be the case that the four terms mark out interchangeable domains to which qualitative measurement applies. It seems inappropriate to concentrate solely on ho kairos without considering whether the art of statesmanship also requires to metrion, to prepon and to deon.

of Forms.\textsuperscript{15} Rather, Guthrie argues that Plato is somehow attempting to make the idea of an absolute standard against which things are judged more accessible. Even though the Forms remain an ideal, "Plato's increasing use of the method of diairesis made an obvious contribution by bringing down the Forms as nearly as possible, within the necessary limits of knowledge, to the individual level."\textsuperscript{16} Another way to put this would be to claim that knowledge of the Forms is without benefit unless this knowledge can in some manner be put into practice. We have seen in the previous chapter that in Plato's middle-period philosophy it was only those who had received training in philosophy who were able to apprehend the Good, leaving the bulk of the citizens to depend on the philosopher-king to establish the parameters by which they might be able to live well. In the \textit{Statesman}, although the expert in the art of statesmanship is the person who will be best equipped to organize and administer the affairs of the polis, it does seem reasonable to suggest that this individual does not quite need to apprehend the Forms in the sense in which the \textit{Republic}'s philosopher-king did. Rather, the statesman, by knowing how to divide classes of things correctly in respect to qualitative measurement, will be able to provide practicable solutions to the problems of politics by possessing the knowledge of a mean between extremes. The Forms can still function as a best-case ideal, but they no longer are the necessary paradigm for a well-administered polis; due measure can act as a practicable alternative.

Guthrie's analysis is given textual support in that what is in due measure is linked to the notions of "what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, what is requisite, and all such things that are removed from the extremes to the middle" (τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὀπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποφείκησθη τῶν ἐσχάτων).\textsuperscript{17} It would appear on Guthrie's interpretation of the passage that the notions of what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Ibid., 172-173.
\item[17] \textit{Statesman}, 284e6-8.
\end{footnotes}
precisely the sort of considerations that a ruler must know in order to apply his knowledge of expertise in statesmanship to the actual practice of politics. Without this sort of knowledge the ruler would not be able to employ the standard of due measure; there would only remain for him the absolute ideal of the Forms.

Finally, Guthrie links his interpretation of the digression on due measure to Aristotle. He comments: "Conversely Plato is coming closer to the Aristotelian position that for practical purposes knowledge of the highest Good is insufficient unless one knows what means to it … are immediately applicable." Guthrie illustrates his point by referring to the passage on health in *Metaphysics Z*. In general, Aristotle argues that health is brought about by having the form, \( (\epsilon\iota\deltaos) \) of health in one's mind. By the term "form" Aristotle means "the essence of each thing and its primary substance" (\( \tau\omicron \\tau\iota \hat{\eta} \nu \epsilon\iota\nu\epsilon\iota \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \hat{\eta} \nu \pi\rho\omega\tau\eta\nu \omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota\nu \}). The form of health, or if we generalize this argument, the form of any thing that is produced, must first be apprehended before its practical application can be accomplished. Therefore, in a way health (as a physical condition) is brought about by health (as an idea in the mind). In terms of Plato's argument, then, the Forms, or ideals, can still be held in the mind, but the practicable means by which they are instantiated in actual practice are to proceed according to due measure along with the knowledge of what is fitting, appropriately timely, and requisite. I had suggested in Chapters 2 and 4 that perhaps Aristotle's involvement in the Academy had some sort of mitigating effect on Plato's thought, especially in respect to his grounding of practical philosophy in metaphysics. If Guthrie's reading of this passage is correct, then it is not implausible to regard the practicable consequences of the digression as being influenced in part by Plato's most illustrious pupil.

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18 Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*, 172. Guthrie, of course, is not the only commentator to discern a connection between the digression on due measure and Aristotle. I have already briefly discussed Skemp's view that there is a resemblance between Plato's *to metrion* and Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.
Among all the interpretations of the digression on due measure, Sayre's is the one which places the most significance on this passage. Succinctly stated, Sayre argues that the Visitor's discussion of the two kinds of measurement is crucial for understanding Plato's late-period metaphysics, ontology, and the method employed to become better dialecticians, as well as for making sense of Aristotle's arguments in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* concerning Plato's metaphysics. Since Sayre is primarily concerned with the philosophical content and its implications for Plato's views on metaphysics, ontology, and method, there is no examination of the consequences and application of *to metrion* for Plato's political and moral philosophy.

Although Sayre explicitly acknowledges that "Readers accustomed to approaching the *Statesman* as a political treatise will find relatively little in this book that responds to their interests," there is nothing in his interpretation that would preclude an examination of the digression in terms of Plato's practical philosophy. Yet, it is arguable that by concentrating on the significance of the digression for Plato's theoretical philosophy Sayre supplies the foundation which enables one to examine the importance of τὸ μέτρον for Plato's practical philosophy as well. That is to say, by analyzing what is in due measure in respect to Plato's political and moral philosophy (as this study is attempting to accomplish) in conjunction with Sayre's arguments for due measure's importance for Plato's metaphysics, ontology, and philosophical method, it becomes possible to

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21 The ambitious scope of Sayre's project hardly requires mentioning, and my brief comments cannot but fail to do full justice to his analysis. It should be pointed out that Sayre's *Metaphysics and Method* is simply his most recent study concerning Plato's late-period works. Sayre's involvement with late Plato extends over nearly four decades, starting with his attempt to explicate Plato's philosophical method in *Plato's Analytic Method*, first published in 1969.

22 Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 6. Given the focus of Sayre's study, namely, an examination of Plato's philosophical method across several dialogues, I think that he is correct to exclude the political implications of the *Statesman*’s arguments. Since Sayre principally regards the dialogue as a work concerned with philosophical method and not as a "political treatise", it is reasonable that he leaves discussion of the dialogue's political aspects to other commentators. In contrast, Lane, in a not especially enthusiastic review, takes Sayre to task for not attempting to integrate method with politics, and thereby not presenting an overall interpretation of the dialogue. Moreover, Lane appears to believe that a study that traces common philosophical positions across several dialogues, rather than presenting a fully integrated interpretation of an individual work, is somehow less valuable and more open to criticism than a reading that concentrates on a complete interpretation of a single text. This sort of criticism is beside the point; there is ample space in the area of Platonic studies for different interpretive strategies and methodological approaches. See, Melissa Lane, "Review of Kenneth M. Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman*," *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2/7/2007). Available: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=8864.
regard to metrion as something that entails consequences for nearly all aspects of Plato's late-period philosophy, both theoretical and practical.

As the title of Sayre's book suggests, there are two general areas in which he frames his examination: metaphysics and method. By first establishing the method by which Plato believed that correct dialectical inquiry could occur, it then becomes less difficult to demonstrate the connection between method and metaphysics. The starting point for Sayre's analysis is the statement of the Visitor that the purpose of their discussion is to make them better dialecticians.\(^{23}\)

It is this passage that gives Sayre the warrant for exclusively focusing on method, rather than political philosophy, as the subject of the Statesman. Indeed, for Sayre, the digression presents an argument for the correct way one should make a division, and thus become a better dialectician. Prior to the digression on due measure, both the Visitor's divisions and choice of paradigms are flawed in one way or another, whereas after the discussion on due measure both the use of paradigms and the remaining divisions in the dialogue are applied correctly.\(^{24}\)

The paradigm of weaving is of particular importance "as a paradigm for the use of paradigms in dialectical inquiry generally."\(^{25}\) In Sayre's view a paradigm is the correct starting point for a division by providing the necessary conditions under which the division (whose function is to arrive at the sufficient conditions) may then take place. It is well to remember that the purpose of diairesis is to derive a definition, and that both the necessary and sufficient conditions must be established in order to define a thing as being a thing of a particular kind. On the one hand, in terms of the practicability of method, the definition of weaving supplies the paradigm for the task of the statesman. On the other hand, in terms of philosophical method, "the formal definition provides the structure into

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\(^{23}\) See, Statesman, 285d5-8.

\(^{24}\) In respect to the selection of a paradigm, the paradigm of the herdsman on which the first group of divisions is based is incorrect. It is also worth noting that Sayre devotes two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, to an examination of the method of division and collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist, in order to establish a point of comparison with the divisions that take place in the Statesman.

\(^{25}\) Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 5, and 100-109.
which the dialectician interweaves descriptive details that bring clarity to the final product of his or her inquiry.\textsuperscript{26}

Having established his position on the relation between method and definition, Sayre next examines the digression on due measure in respect to its importance for Plato's late-period metaphysics. Sayre regards the digression as "an extended interlude on metaphysical matters."\textsuperscript{27}

He argues that the digression supplies the ground for articulating the link between Plato's philosophical method, metaphysics, and ontology. Sayre begins this part of his analysis by discussing the significance of the phrase "excess and deficiency" with which the digression itself commences, and which the Visitor announces is to be the principal topic of their investigation.\textsuperscript{28}

His analysis of the significance of the expression \textit{μετρήσις καὶ ἐλλειψις} is sophisticated and lengthy, not only in respect to its significance for the digression and Plato's metaphysics in general, but also in respect to Sayre's attempt to reconcile the use of the expressions Aristotle used in his criticisms of Plato's metaphysics. Sayre argues that in the digression there are six formulations concerning the difference between the two kinds of measurement.\textsuperscript{29} Although a close reading of each of the formulations reveals distinctions among them, it nevertheless is possible to subsume them all under a single principle: "[they] are all included under Excess and Deficiency as a general principle of contrariety."\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{28} Sayre notes that the phrase \textit{μετρήσις καὶ ἐλλειψις} is found only one other time in the Platonic corpus at \textit{Protagoras} 356a2-3. An equivalent phrase, \textit{μέτρησις καὶ ἐλλειψις}, occurs at \textit{Statesman} 283c11-d1. As Sayre appears to suggest, the relative infrequency with which Plato uses a particular word or expression may imply a relative degree of significance for his philosophy. See, Ibid., 140. It is not implausible to argue that a term or phrase used rarely by Plato at critical junctions in his arguments may indeed indicate that Plato himself attributed some special significance to both the term or phrase and to the concept which it denotes. Another example, which I shall discuss in Chapter 7 and Appendix 3, is the expression \textit{δεύτερους πλοίους} (literally, second sailing or voyage); a phrase which occurs only three times in the corpus, and on each of its appearances marks out an important change of direction in the discussion. It is also worth noting that although the phrase in the \textit{Protagoras} does not refer directly to measurement, it does occur immediately prior to, and in a way helps to introduce, the passage on measurement in this dialogue.

\textsuperscript{29} The formulations occur at: \textit{Statesman}, 283d7-8; 283e3-4; 283e8-9; 284b8-c1; 284d4-6; 284e2-8.

\textsuperscript{30} Sayre, \textit{Metaphysics and Method}, 147. Unfortunately, Sayre does not offer a clear formulation of this principle.
If Sayre is correct in claiming that both quantitative and qualitative measurement are subsumed under "Excess and Deficiency as a general principle of contrariety", then the question arises: How does the expression "excess and deficiency" relate to a general principle of contrariety? It appears to be the case that the terms "excess" and "deficiency" are evaluative predicates that require a principle to be applied; taken in themselves, they are not a formulation of a principle. Briefly stated, Sayre argues that the expression "excess and deficiency" is an alternate expression for the principle of "the Great and the Small". Drawing upon both Aristotle and other ancient commentators, Sayre demonstrates that these two expressions are equivalent in Plato. "Excess and deficiency" and "the Great and the Small" are equivalent expressions for a principle of contraries. Sayre, in fact, argues that there are a total of six equivalent expressions to denote this general principle of contrariety, and of the five which are employed by Plato, two are found in the Statesman and three in the Philebus. Therefore, in order to illuminate more fully the principle of "excess and deficiency" in the digression on due measure, Sayre devotes an entire chapter to analyzing the use of the equivalent expressions in the Philebus. For the purpose of this study,

31 Sayre does not take in account the fact that at Statesman, 283c3-4, the terms ἐπερβάλλον and ἐπερβαλλόμενον are evaluative because they are used in reference to τοῦ μετρίου.
32 Sayre helpfully tabulates the six different expressions employed by Aristotle and ancient commentators on Aristotle as equivalents for the Great (τὸ μέγα) and the Small (τὸ χλικόν). They are: The Indefinite Dyad (ἡ ἀξιότερος δύος), The Unlimited (τὸ ἄπειρον); The Unequal (τὸ ἄνω); the More and the Less (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔτοιμον); The Nature of the Unlimited (ἡ ἀπειροῦ φύσις); Excess and Defect (ἐπερχῆ καὶ ἐλλειψε). These phrases are regarded as synonymous with the measurement of greatness and smallness (μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος). The five expressions found in Plato are: ἐπερχῆ καὶ ἐλλείφει and τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν in the Statesman; τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔτοιμον, and ἡ ἀπειροῦ φύσις in the Philebus. Sayre notes that although contemporary commentators have been unable to identify in Plato's texts the views attributed to him by Aristotle in Metaphysics A, an analysis of the evidence in terms of the equivalence of "excess and deficiency" and "the great and the small" resolves the difficulties in trying to understand in what way Aristotle's criticisms actually pertain to Plato's philosophy. See, Ibid., Appendix, 241-243 and 149-153. Sayre first examined Plato's views about the Great and the Small and its equivalent expressions in Plato's Late Ontology. In this earlier book Sayre argued that they are principally encountered in the Philebus. In Metaphysics and Method, Sayre argues that they are also encountered in the Statesman. He believes that he is able to demonstrate a consistency in Plato's ontological principles as articulated in the late-period dialogues. See, Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology, especially, Chapters 2 and 3.
33 Ibid., Chapter 8, 154-170. This brief summary of Sayre's complex argument must necessarily omit a significant portion of his analysis of the Philebus and its relation to the Statesman. I am able only to review what I regard as the most significant points of Sayre's discussion. Thus, I leave out his examinations of the principles of Mixture and Cause, as well as his analysis of the expression, "unlimited in multitude" (ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος), used by Plato in the Philebus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides. The analysis of both expressions contributes to his overall interpretation.
the most important of Sayre's analyses concerns the Philebus' ontological principles of the Limit (τὸ πέρας) and the Unlimited (τὸ ἀπειρον). In the Philebus the Unlimited is characterized as the class which admits "all things which appear to us as becoming more or less (Ὁπόσ᾽ ἀν ἵμιν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤττον γνώμενα), and the Limit is the class which does not admit the more or the less, rather it admits "all the things that are opposed to them (τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα διεχόμενα)." The examples used by Socrates, such as "the hotter and colder" (θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχρότερου), cannot be regarded as exhibiting limit, whereas "everything which is a number or measure in relation to number or measure" (πᾶν διπερ ἀν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἦ μέτρον ἦ πρὸς μέτρον) would belong to the class of limit. The class of the Unlimited is composed of contrary pairs that can only be compared against each other, that is to say, only in terms of more or less. What is hotter is only hotter in relation to being more or less hot; what is colder is only colder in relation to being more or less cold. The same holds for the other examples of contrary pairs enumerated by Socrates. According to Sayre's argument, then, the connection between the Limit and the Unlimited and the more and the less may be interpreted as equivalents, in addition to being related to, of the principle of "excess and deficiency" in the Statesman as a principle of contrariety. The principle of excess and deficiency in the Statesman, "[a]s Plato's general principle of contrariety, it is equivalent to the class of opposites that are characterized in the Philebus as comparable only in terms of More and Less." Thus, underlying the digression on due measure are the ontological principles that are crucial for understanding Plato's late-period philosophy.

Additionally, the ontological principles of the Limit and the Unlimited are of great importance for understanding a particularly difficult passage in the digression: the expression "the being that

34 Philebus, 24c7-25a1 and 25a6-b2.
35 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 175-176.
is necessary for generation" (τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν γενέσεως ἀναγκαῖαν οὐσίαν). Sayre is correct, I believe, to argue that what comes to be "as a result of mixing Limit with the Unlimited should remind us of the being said to be necessary for generation at Statesman 283d8-9." Thus, he equates "the being [that is] necessary for coming-into-being" with the Philebus' ontological principle of the Limit. Furthermore, since due measure is associated with the Limit in the Philebus, Sayre argues that due measure is one of the ways in which the principle of the Limit is expressed in the Statesman. In other words, "what these considerations indicate is that the being said to be necessary for generation at Statesman 283D8-9 is Limit is the sense of the Philebus." If we understand that what "comes-into-being" as what is produced, or generated, by the arts, then due measure functions as the principle of the Limit on which both the arts and their products, that is to say, "all the good and fine things that are produced' (πάντα ἄγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργαίζονται), necessarily depend. Otherwise, without due measure as a principle of the Limit guarding the arts against excess and deficiency (used synonymously for the more and the less), the arts and their products would be destroyed. Sayre's analysis, then, is of great value for demonstrating the influence of Plato's ontological views in respect to the manner in which he conceived to metrion.

The final point which I would like to discuss concerning Sayre's reading of the digression is his view on the metaphysics underlying the passage. Sayre argues that the Forms are present in Plato's late-period works. The method of division is carried out according to Forms. In general,

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36 Ibid., 159. To indicate the difficulty translators and commentators have with this expression, Sayre quite usefully lists several different translations, not all of which appear to be in agreement concerning what Plato is trying to say. My translation differs from Sayre's only in that I render the term γενέσεως as "coming-into-being" rather than as "generation". The sense of both translations, however, is the same. See, Ibid., 176-177.

37 See, Philebus, 24c8. In this passage Socrates argues that if due measure and the concept of quantity were allowed to appear in the realm of the more and the less, then those things, such as the hotter or colder, would no longer always be coming into being, they would be stationary and at rest due to the imposition of due measure or quantity. The Unlimitedness of the hotter or the colder would no longer be the case by means of the mixing of the Limit with the Unlimited.

38 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 178-179. Although I cannot discuss them, Sayre also correctly notes, based on the six different formulations of the two kinds of measurement, that there are various forms of the Limit in relation to relative measurement and measurement in accordance with what is in due measure. See, Ibid., 179-188.
Sayre analyzes the different meanings of the terms γένος, μέγες, and εἶδος in respect to the context in which Plato employs these words, and in respect to the manner in which kinds relate to classes and to parts. Sayre notes that Plato tended "to vacillate between the sense of Form and the sense of class in his use of the term εἶδος." Yet, the method of division which the Visitor employs in the Statesman suggests to Sayre that "division according to Forms is division of class into subclasses of individuals, such that all members of a given subclass are instances of the same general Form." While in general terms Sayre's conclusion appears to make sense, a difficulty arises if we attempt to apply his analysis to some of the specific divisions made by the Visitor. In the divisions of weaving or of the angler in the Sophist, are we to accept that Plato believed in the existence of the Form of weaving or in the Form of an angler? I mention this not in order to resolve this difficulty, but simply to point out that Sayre's reading is not without its potential problems. In terms of the digression, it is Sayre's view that due measure is to be regarded as a Form, one which supplies a standard "by which these other things [that is, actions and the products of the arts] are measured. Without such standards, human affairs would be awash in Excess and Deficiency … Platonic Forms mark off a middle ground between extremes of the Unlimited." This view is problematic. The enumeration of what is due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite suggests particular instances, or domains, to which qualitative measurement may be applied. It does not seem reasonable to claim that to metrion is a Form without also claiming that what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and

39 Ibid., 214. This reading is, I think, correct. The ambiguity of Plato's usage affects the way in which the metaphysics of the Statesman is interpreted. Hence, on the one hand, we find commentators such as Campbell arguing against the existence of the Forms, while, on the other hand, Skemp contends that they are in fact present. Of all the commentators who have taken either a pro or contra stance on this question in relation to the Statesman, Sayre appears to be the only one who has actually analyzed the question in depth. While his argument on division according to the Forms may be unacceptable to some scholars, the thoroughness of his examination does present a substantial amount of convincing evidence in favor of the presence of the Forms.

40 Ibid., 114. Sayre further argues: "[A] kind is a class all members of which participate in the Form that determines the class's identity, but whose membership remains indeterminate with respect to other properties." Ibid., 236.

41 Ibid., 239.
what is requisite are Forms as well. Since Sayre does not appear willing to regard these three other instances as Forms, it may be objected that what is in due measure also should not be regarded as a Form. Sayre is incorrect, I believe, to argue that to know that when we divide in respect to due measure as the Limit of excess and deficiency, is to know that we are dividing according to one of the Forms, and it is this knowledge that will lead to our becoming better dialecticians. Because due measure should not be taken as a Form, we do not divide in respect to the Form of due measure. Rather, we employ qualitative measurement to determine what is in due measure, or what is fitting, or what is appropriately timely, or what is requisite.

It ought to be apparent that the preceding discussion has shown the significance of the digression on due measure for not only the arguments of the Statesman, but also in respect to Plato's later philosophy. If any one aspect of this discussion signals the importance of the digression, it would be the fact that the digression has received such varying and at times incommensurable interpretations. It is truly remarkable that such a relatively short passage could elicit readings that on one end of the scale perfunctorily dismiss it as irrelevant, to an analysis on the other end that finds reflected in it the core of Plato's late-period philosophical method, ontology, and metaphysics. With few exceptions, these commentators have revealed illuminating aspects of the digression that ultimately assist us in understanding Plato's thought. For those who regard the Statesman primarily as a work of political philosophy, the readings of Rosen and Lane present valuable insights into the relation of the passage to Plato's political thought. For those who believe that the literary and dramatic structure of a Platonic dialogue must be considered as the framework in which his ideas are conveyed, Miller's interpretation in very useful. Finally, for those who desire a better understanding of Plato's metaphysics and ontology, the examinations of Guthrie and Sayre offer excellently argued analyses. In the next, and concluding section of this chapter, I shall present my interpretation of the digression; an interpretation which acknowledges
the contributions of the commentators I have just discussed, but which primarily considers the manner in which qualitative measurement and to metrion entail significant consequences for the practicability of Plato's late-period political and moral philosophy.

The Philosophical and Practicable Importance of To Metrion

I would like to argue that the digression on due measure need not be viewed as being restricted either to Plato's political philosophy or to his metaphysics, ontology, and method, although, as the readings of several of the scholars I have just discussed suggest, convincing interpretations can be made even when one limits the scope of one's analysis. Rather, it is my intent to show that the digression on due measure could be regarded in a wider sense with consequences not only for Plato's theoretical philosophy, but also with consequences what I have characterized as the greater degree of practicability of his late-period practical philosophy.42 A more broadly construed interpretation of to metrion can serve to illuminate several aspects of Plato's late philosophy which cannot be accomplished if one's reading of the digression is confined to certain relatively limited parameters. The appeal to what is in due measure, then, entails consequences both in respect to Plato's political and moral philosophy and in respect to his philosophical method, metaphysics, and ontology.43 Additionally, I would like to argue that there is a relation

42 As I noted earlier, Guthrie considered the digression as pointing the way toward a more practicable alternative to metaphysics of Plato's middle-period dialogues. It is knowing what is in due measure, rather than the apprehension of the Forms, that becomes the basis for Plato's late-period philosophy. It is well to keep in mind, however, that the Forms still exist in late Plato, and that they may be regarded as a best-case ideal. Due measure, then, may be considered as a second-best alternative, but an alternative which may be more successful than the apprehension of the Forms when applied in actual practice.

43 This is not say, however, that I regard Sayre's analysis to be incorrect. My view is quite the contrary, in fact. Sayre's reading is extremely valuable in demonstrating the continuity between Plato's middle- and late-period method, metaphysics, and ontology. Whereas Sayre chooses to emphasize the continued existence of unaltered, or only slightly altered, middle-period concepts in the late works, I prefer to concentrate on the more practicable aspects of these concepts. There is space, I believe, for both Sayre's and my interpretation to exist simultaneously, with each reading revealing complementary dimensions of Plato's philosophy. A careful examination of the late dialogues suggests that Plato never renounced, or replaced, his middle-period views; they are still present in the texts. What has changed, however, is that in the late works there is a greater concern with applying his ideas in practice; changes which require a
between *to metrion* in the *Statesman*, the epistemological aspect of *sōphrosunē* which Plato first attempted to articulate in the *Charmides*, and the need for an art of measurement which was mentioned in the *Protagoras*. To state it succinctly, the employment of qualitative measurement to determine what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite is the fundamental means by which one knows how to consider correctly what one ought to do in respect to all human choices and actions. It is Plato's response to the unanswered requirement in the *Protagoras* for an art of measurement as the sort of knowledge on which the preservation of life depends. It is akin to *sōphrosunē* as a kind of knowledge which was discussed in the *Charmides*.

Although the *Charmides* was discussed in Chapter 3, its relation to the digression on due measure needs to be examined. One of the more notable features of the dialogue was Critias' suggested definition of *sōphrosunē* as "knowing what one does know and what one does not know" (*τὸ εἰδέναι ἃ τε οἴδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἴδεν*); that is, *sōphrosunē* is a knowledge of knowledge.\(^4^4\) We should recall that Socrates avoided a direct examination of this definition, choosing instead to discuss whether or not it is possible to know what one knows and what one does not know, and the question of whether or not this sort of knowledge would be beneficial. The definition of Critias is left unexplored. The fact that Plato does not have Socrates pursue an examination of this definition per se ought to prompt further reflection. Even though Socrates does pursue the questions of possibility and benefit, each of these investigations ends in an *aporia*.\(^4^5\) When taken together, the non-examination of Critias' definition and the *aporiai* which result from the questions Socrates does examine, suggest that at this point in time Plato himself

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\(^4^4\) *Charmides*, 167a6-7.

\(^4^5\) See, *Charmides*, 167a9-169d8 and 171d1-176a1.
was unsure of the answers to the questions posed in the *Charmides*. Yet, I do not believe that it is reasonable to assume that these questions remained unanswered in the rest of the corpus; Plato does provide answers in other dialogues.

The connection between sōphrosunē and knowledge is resumed and in part resolved in the digression on due measure in the *Statesman*. Throughout the *Statesman*, the Visitor advances the claim that the expert is the person who possesses knowledge of the art or craft that he practices. For example, in regard to the different sorts of expertise at ruling, whether it be kingship (βασιλική), statesmanship (πολιτική), or household management (οἰκονομική), "it is apparent that there is a single type of knowledge that concerns all these things" (φανερῶν ὃς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα). More specifically, in the digression, Plato refers to the expert in statecraft as one who "has knowledge of practical matters" (τὰς πρᾶξεις ἐπιστήμων). But in order for the expert in statesmanship to possess knowledge of the art of ruling, he must know how to measure not only relative quantities, but also know how to measure in accordance with what is in due measure. Due measure itself, since it measures what is in the middle between two extremes, can plausibly be regarded as a sort of moderation. Although the term sōphrosunē does not appear in the *Statesman*, it is possible to infer that the expression "what is in due measure" is analogous to what is moderate, being moderate, or acting in a moderate manner. To know what is in due measure is akin to possessing sōphrosunē in the *Charmides*’ sense that it is a type of knowledge.

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46 I do not wish to suggest that the digression fully answers the questions left unanswered in the *Charmides*. One must turn to other dialogues, especially to the *Theaetetus*, for a complete exposition of Plato's epistemological views.
47 *Statesman*, 259c1-3.
48 *Statesman*, 284c2-3.
49 We can recall, for example, that in the *Republic*, the cleansing of the extreme elements in the luxurious city in order to establish kallipolis was regarded by Glaucon as "acting moderately" (Σωφροσύνης). See, *Republic*, 399c4-6.
50 The task of blending together overly courageous and overly moderate natures by the statesman into a nature that comprises a proper mixture of both, may be considered as an illustration of this point. That is to say, the statesman's expert knowledge, grounded in what is in due measure, allows him to fashion the characters of his citizens into
There is an additional consideration of a more theoretical nature that helps to demonstrate the manner in which the *Statesman* may resolve some of the difficulties encountered in the *Charmides*, thereby strengthening the connection between the two dialogues. This consideration is in respect to the absence of an ontological state between being and not-being in the *Charmides*. The idea that either one knows what one knows or does not know what one knows is a rather simplistic epistemological position which reflects the tendency among all early Greek philosophers for dichotomous thinking. Parmenides' ontological view that something either is or is not was especially influential. That is to say, a thing either is or is not, with no state of coming-into-being between the two. This sort of dichotomous way of considering the world led to significant philosophical difficulties, particularly in the manner in which one dealt with the concept of what is not. It was not until Plato wrote the *Sophist* that the difficulty was addressed and the ontological position of Parmenides was refuted. Given the fact, then, that the *Charmides* was written before the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, it is plausible to argue that at the time of the composition of the *Charmides* Plato had not yet developed the concept there could exist a state of being that lies between the extremes being and not-being. There was as yet no state of coming-into-being that could reconcile the dichotomy between being and not-being. Thus, in terms of the problem of the relation between knowledge and ignorance in the *Charmides*, there is no middle position between these two epistemological states, even though Critias' definition of *sōphrosunē* appears to be a tentative step toward resolving this epistemological dilemma. In the *Statesman*, individuals whose natures are moderately bold and moderately gentle. The statesman, in effect, hits upon a moderate course of action which itself produces individuals whose characters are truly moderate.

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51. The Sophists, of course, were notorious for entrapping their opponents on the Parmenidian dichotomy of what is and what is not.

52. The positing of an ontological state between being and not-being is of critical value for what is in due measure in the *Statesman*.

53. It is well worth pointing out that the argument which immediately follows the definition of *sōphrosunē* as a knowledge of knowledge employs examples of relative quantities – for example, the attempt to discover if there exists "something larger that is larger than large things and than itself" (*οὐ τῶν μὲν μεῖζων ἐκ τίνι μεῖζον καὶ ἵνα τοι") – that at
however, once the view had been established in the *Sophist* that there is an ontological state of coming-into-being, the difficulties encountered in the *Charmides* may be overcome by the use of qualitative measurement and the appeal to due measure, because the result of measuring opposites against some standard results in a middle state that could be regarded as analogous to the middle ontological state of coming-into-being.

At the core of both the *Charmides*' failed investigation and the *Statesman*'s successful examination remains the notion that *sōphrosunē* and due measure are inextricably connected with an epistemological claim. One can neither be moderate nor act in accordance with due measure unless one possesses a certain sort of knowledge. In the *Charmides* it is a knowledge of knowledge, in the *Statesman* it is a knowledge directed toward the application of the art of which one possesses the requisite knowledge. In the former dialogue the *sōphrōn* possesses self-knowledge; in the latter work the person who knows how to measure in accordance with due measure is the person who knows how to choose and act with *sōphrosunē*.

When turning to examine the *Protagoras*, one is struck by the fact the Socrates mentions the need for an art of measurement (*ἡ μετρητική* which is both an art and a kind of knowledge (*τέχνη καὶ ἑπιστήμη*) necessary to render the power of appearance (*ἡ τοῦ φανομένου δύναμις*) powerless (*ἀκρον*). Socrates, however, postpones a discussion of the art of measurement, remarking: "But what this art and knowledge is we shall consider later" (*Ἡτίς μὲν τοῖς τέχνη καὶ ἑπιστήμη ἐστίν αὕτη, εἰς αὐθεὶς σκεφώμεθα*). This discussion, I believe, is resumed in the *Statesman*'s digression on due measure, even though neither the *Protagoras* nor the *Statesman* make any specific references to each other. Surprisingly, few commentators have drawn attention

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55 *Protagoras*, 357b5-6.

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to the connection between the passage in the *Protagoras* and the digression.\(^{56}\) Campbell, for example, notes: "The first mention of \(\mu\varepsilon\tau\rho\varepsilon\tau\iota\kappa\iota\acute{\eta}\) is in the *Protagoras* [sic] …"\(^{57}\) Allen, who does explicate the passage at some length, only comments in a footnote that "An art of this sort is discussed by the Eleatic Stranger at *Politicus* 283 ff. …"\(^{58}\) Given the relative lack of discussion concerning the connection between the *Protagoras* and the *Statesman*, it would be helpful to examine briefly the passage.

The portion of the text which refers to the need for an art of measurement occurs during an imagined discussion between Socrates and "the many" (\(\tau\iota\omega\nu\ \pi\omicron\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\)), the purpose of which is to examine their opinions in respect to the relation of good and bad pleasures and pains.\(^{59}\) Socrates' argument is framed in terms of the manner in which what is called "the pleasant" (\(\tau\iota\ \acute{\iota}\rho\acute{o}\iota\)) and "the painful" (\(\acute{\alpha}v\nu\lambda\alpha\rho\omicron\dot{\omicron}\)) may be regarded as outweighing each other; one can only outweigh the

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\(^{56}\) Adam, although he does not state whether it is his opinion as well, remarks: "Siebeck, who asserts (Zur Chronologie der Platonischen Dialogen, pp. 121 ff.) that this and similar formulas were intended by Plato to be a distinct promise of future dialogues (if not a reference to a later part of the same dialogue), finds here a reference to *Politicus* 283D ff., where the ‘measuring art’ is discussed and described as the \(\beta\omicron\alpha\omicron\lambda\iota\kappa\eta\ \tau\acute{e}\chi\nu\)." Adam, *Platonis Protagoras*, 203. A similar comment is made by the Visitor in the digression on due measure itself, where he remarks "that at some time we shall need what I mentioned just now for the demonstration of preciseness itself" (\(\acute{\iota}\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu\pi\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\omicron\acute{\eta}\acute{\iota}\ \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\acute{k}\omicron\alpha\rho\omicron\beta\omicron\acute{e}\acute{s} \acute{\alpha}p\omicron\omicron\omicron\acute{e}v\)). *Statesman* 284d1-2. The demonstration concerning "preciseness itself" is not carried out in the *Statesman*. Sayre makes the rather intriguing suggestion that this demonstration occurs at *Philebus* 55d5-59d5, where Socrates discusses with Protarchus the notion of accuracy among the arts. See, Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 191-193.

\(^{57}\) Campbell, *The Sophist and Politics of Plato*, 100, n. 6.

\(^{58}\) Allen, "Comment," in *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. 3, 145, n. 74. Allen goes on to make the rather odd assertion concerning the Eleatic Visitor that "he speaks as an Eleatic and not as a Platonist," without providing any arguments to support his claim. Finally, it should be mentioned that Kahn finds a connection between the art of measurement in the *Protagoras* and the notion of *phronēsis* in the *Phaedo*: "The conception of wisdom as a *metrētikē technē*, an art of measurement in the *Protagoras* is thus a partial but deliberate foreshadowing of the stronger, metaphysically grounded notion of *phronēsis* we find in the *Phaedo*." Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 251. Kahn apparently is referring to *Phaedo* 69a6-b5 where pleasures are not to be exchanged for pleasures, pains exchanged for pains, or fears for fears, but that the only thing for which they should be exchanged is wisdom (\(\phi\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\kappa\omicron\sigma\iota\acute{\omicron}\omicron\alpha\omicron\nu\)). Guthrie makes a similar reference to this passage. See, Guthrie, *Plato: The Man and His Dialogues*, 234.

\(^{59}\) *Protagoras*, 353a1-357e8. This imaginary conversation has been taken by some scholars, Irwin, for example, as a textual crux allowing them to argue in favor of Socratic hedonism. See, Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 85-92. This view, I believe, is incorrect. The passage clearly is designed to demonstrate the hedonist opinions of the many which Socrates attempts to refute. Socrates uses popular opinion as a foil to his own arguments in respect to the relation between pleasures and pains and the good and knowledge. Both Taylor and Kahn, for example, concur with this interpretation. The former writes: "Neither Protagoras nor Socrates is represented as adopting the Hedonist equation of good with pleasure. The thesis which Socrates is committed to is simply that of the identity of goodness and knowledge." Taylor, *Plato*, 260. The latter argues that Plato is not committed the hedonist thesis, rather it is used as a device for demonstrating "the necessary consequences of certain popular assumptions about human motivation." Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 242.
other except in relation to the "excess and deficiency" (ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐλλειψις) of one against the other. If one weighed pleasures and pains against each other in any combination either the most pleasant or the least painful course must be chosen. But this presents an agent with only a relative choice of pleasures and pains; it does not help an agent to determine whether or not the choice is correct in respect to some sort of standard. Just as things of equal size appear larger when near or smaller when seen at a distance, pleasures and pains have the appearance of seeming more or less intense when weighed relative to each other; and just as we would say a thing of equal size that is nearer is larger, so, too, would we choose the pleasure that is the largest or the pain that is the least. What is measured relatively cannot result in a correct choice, for the choice would be in terms of relative appearances; appearances that "often make us wander back and forth, to participate in and repent of the same things in actions and in choices of large and small things" (ἡμῶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἔποιει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταύτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν). It is to avoid judging by appearances alone that Socrates introduces the need for an art of measurement that would enable one to choose correctly by weighing pleasures and pains qualitatively.

Since the choice of relative pleasures and pains is harmful, only furnishing appearances but not the truth, Socrates asks the question: "What would save our life?" (τί ἄν ἔσοφεν ἡμῖν τὸν

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60 See, Protagoras, 355e4-356a3. I have already mentioned that Sayre has pointed out that the expression ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐλλειψις is used by Plato only in this passage and in the digression on due measure in the Statesman. In the Protagoras it appears that the phrase is being employed in the sense of the incommensurability of relative terms in relation to each other, whereas in the Statesman, excess and deficiency is regarded more in the sense of a principle of contrariety. In both occurrences, however, there is the notion that opposites, whether they be pleasures and pains or whether they be generalized contraries, cannot be measured in relation to each other. What is needed is some standard against which they can be weighed.

61 On this view, the relative choice of pleasures and pains would appear to imply that choiceworthiness is solely a matter of quantity. Whatever choice that would bring about the most amount of pleasure or the least amount of pain is the choice that an agent should select. The notion that the choiceworthiness of a thing or action regarded as a matter of quantity is, for Socrates, incorrect. Throughout the dialogues - for example, in the Gorgias, Protagoras, Republic, and Philebus - we encounter arguments which attempt to illustrate the harm of choosing in respect to quantity. In order for something to be choiceworthy it must be choiceworthy in relation to some measurable standard. A choice is choiceworthy only if it is in relation to the quality of what is to be chosen.

62 Protagoras, 356d5-5.
He responds by arguing that in order to overcome the power of appearance an art of measurement is needed. The manner in which we choose pleasures and pains depends upon "an art of measurement, an examination of excess and deficiency and equality in respect to one another" (μετρητική ... ύπερβολής τε και ἐνδείας οὕτα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἄλληλας σκέψεως). Furthermore, Socrates makes the important point that "since it belongs to measurement, surely, it necessarily is an art and knowledge" (Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκη δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη).

After establishing the need for an art of measurement, Socrates puts off a discussion of this need. For the present purposes it is enough for Socrates to posit that the art of measurement is some kind of knowledge. While it may appear odd that Socrates does not attempt to examine fully what this art is and how it is regarded as a sort of knowledge, it is arguable that the context of the discussion does not require a fuller development of this notion. Since they had previously agreed that "wisdom and knowledge are the strongest things of all human activities" (σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ... πάντων κράτιστων ... τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων), it requires no additional argument to claim that knowledge "always, whenever it is present, governs pleasure and everything else" (ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἄν ἐνή, καὶ ἡθονής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῶν). Knowledge, in the sense that there is a kind of knowledge of how one ought to measure relative things against some sort of standard, is sufficient for Socrates' argument in the Protagoras. Pleasure cannot rule over a person who has knowledge, particularly the sort of knowledge which allows one to measure pleasures and pains in terms of an art of measurement; the sort of art of measurement that weighs qualities, not quantities. Furthermore, since the opposite of knowledge is, of course,
ignorance, it is this lack of knowledge, along with the absence of an art of measurement, that permits one to make incorrect choices is respect to pleasures and pains.  

In sum, then, the passage in the *Protagoras* argues that many people simply relatively weigh pleasures against pains, choosing what is most pleasant or least painful without paying any regard to the goodness of their choices, although those who do this assume, incorrectly in Socrates' view, that goodness resides in pleasure. In order to overcome this error an art of measurement is needed by which these relative relations may be measured in respect to something other than themselves. The art of measurement is a kind of knowledge, the opposite of which is ignorance. Therefore, if one allows oneself to be overcome by pleasure, it is because one has not carefully measured pleasures and pains. Thus, one is choosing and acting, or ruling oneself, not from knowledge, but out of ignorance. Although this argument still reflects the Socratic view that virtue, or acting virtuously, is knowledge, it is reasonable to suggest that the introduction of the notion of an art of measurement is a step toward a deeper understanding of how an individual may make the best choice when confronted with conflicting desires. The art of measurement is functionally equivalent to *sōphrosunē* in the sense that one is required not to measure extremes against each other, but to measure them against some sort of standard, as will be argued in the *Statesman*. The possession of such a standard, or the knowledge of measurement, is in a sense knowing how to choose and act moderately.  

In the *Charmides* *sōphrosunē* was regarded as self-knowledge, but ultimately this argument was found to be insufficient, principally on account of Plato's dichotomous epistemological and ontological views. In the *Protagoras*, even though there still remains the basic dichotomy between knowledge and ignorance, there is a sense that there is some form of knowledge,

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68 Allen makes the point that "Such an art, if it is not temperance or justice, would be an image of it, for it asks us to forgo the satisfaction of some desires in favor of others, and thereby ranks them." Allen, "Comment," in *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. 3, 146.
considered as an art of measurement, that is needed for individuals to make correct choices. When we examine the digression on due measure, it appears that qualitative measurement resulting in an appeal to *to metrion* fulfills this need. Thus, it is not implausible to interpret both qualitative measurement and *to metrion* in the *Statesman* as yet a different attempt by Plato to treat the problem of how we are able to choose correctly when presented with opposing options; an attempt which has significant implications for the practicability of Plato's ideas.

My reading of the digression on due measure suggests that it should be treated as stating a type of measurement by means of which contraries may be reconciled. By "reconciled" I mean that contraries may be brought into harmony, or concord, with each other when measured against some standard. Unlike Guthrie or Sayre who limit their analyses of the digression to its implications for Plato's metaphysics, ontology, and method, and unlike Lane who views the digression solely in terms of its applicability for politics, it is not unreasonable to argue that *to metrion* may be extended to cover both theoretical and practical concerns.\(^6^9\) Due measure, when treated in a broad manner, provides us with a fundamental tool for understanding the philosophy of Plato's late-period dialogues. Since many aspects of the digression have been previously discussed in this chapter, I now wish to argue how the appeal to what is in due measure is the result of qualitative measurement.

At the very beginning of the digression Plato introduces the ideas of excess and deficiency in general (πᾶσαν τὴν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν). Sayre has argued that these dual notions state a principle of contrariety. Contraries may refer to many sorts of things. To name but several, there may be contrary quantities, qualities, conditions, states, or dispositions. Some may

\(^{69}\) By "theoretical", I mean such areas of philosophical inquiry as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and method; by "practical", I mean principally moral and political philosophy. Both terms, however, should be taken as analytic distinctions only. The close interconnectedness of the theoretical and practical in Plato's thought cannot be overstated. It is precisely on account of the interrelations among the branches of philosophy in Plato's thought that *to metrion* should be regarded as broadly as the text will permit.
be more applicable in terms of theoretical philosophy, others may be more applicable for practical philosophy. In both cases, however, it is necessary to discover some way in which contraries can be measured. After positing the notion of an art of measurement (ἡ μετρητική), the Visitor makes a division of this art of measurement into two kinds, measurement of things that are "according to the association of greatness and smallness in relation to each other" (κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλληλα μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος κοινωνίαν) and of things that are "according what is the being necessary for coming-into-being" (κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οἰσίαν). The first kind of measurement is of contrary quantities in relation to each other; for example, what is larger is larger only in relation to what is smaller, and what is smaller is smaller only in relation to what is larger. The second kind of measurement is of contrary qualities that must be measured "in relation to due measure" (πρὸς τὸ μέτρον). Of the two kinds of measurement, the second carries much more weight for Plato's late philosophy. Quantitative measurement only permits the measurement of contraries against each other, with there being no standard against which they can be measured or evaluated. In a sense, quantitative measurement returns us to the problem encountered in the Charmides; a dichotomous epistemology is analogous to relative measurement. To put it in ontological terms, there is no category of coming-to-be that would permit us to reconcile the dichotomous distinction between being and not-being. It is obvious that quantitative measurement entails difficulties affecting both theoretical and practical philosophy precisely on account of the fact that there is no standard, or ontological category, with which one may measure contrary things due to the fact that they are purely quantitative ones. In sharp contrast, the second kind of measurement, qualitative

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70 Statesman, 283d7-9.
71 Statesman, 283e11.
72 Although it may be reasonable to argue that it is necessary to refer to the Forms to determine which instance of a set of things represents what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite, the
measurement, resolves the difficulty of there being no standard because due measure itself functions as the standard for measurement. As a sort of standard, due measure is not necessarily limited to practical philosophy, although perhaps its most immediate appeal is to considerations of politics and ethics. Rather, as Guthrie has argued, there is also a profound implication for Plato's metaphysics; due measure can function as a practicable second-best alternative to the apprehension of the Forms. While it is possible to retain the middle-period metaphysics of the Forms, apprehension of the Forms is no longer the necessary and sufficient condition for living well. Finally, as Sayre has attempted to demonstrate, what is in due measure may be regarded solely in terms of Plato's late-period theoretical philosophy. Taken together, then, these considerations suggest that τὸ μέτριον functions on multiple levels: (1) in respect to Plato's practical philosophy; (2) as a sort of bridge between the metaphysical grounding and application of Plato's middle- and late-period thought: (3) solely in terms of due measure's consequences for the theoretical philosophy of the late-period dialogues. Thus, it is plausible to treat the due measure as the standard necessary for weighing and reconciling contraries.

An analysis of the rest of the digression should be able to confirm this view. There are terms and expressions employed in the digression that may be interpreted in reference both to theoretical and practical philosophy. It will be necessary to show that these terms and expressions do in fact refer either to Plato's theoretical or practical philosophy, or to both, if due measure is to be regarded as the standard for weighing opposite qualities.

When the Visitor begins his division of the art of measurement, he uses the expression "the being necessary for coming-to-be" as the first statement concerning what is in due measure. Initially, the expression seems rather vague, if not ambiguous. If due measure is "the being
necessary for coming-to-be", then the question must be asked: What is this "being"? Sayre, has given one answer: it is Plato's ontological principle of the Limit. This response is, I believe, correct, yet it is arguable that in addition to its relation to and usefulness for Plato's late-period ontology, and its implication for his theoretical philosophy, there is a very important consideration in respect to his practical philosophy. To put this another way, while what is in due measure is necessary as a standard for theoretical considerations, it is equally useful as a standard of measurement for practical matters. The Visitor is quite explicit in cautioning Young Socrates that without due measure two consequences would follow: (1) if there is only relative measure, "would we not destroy the arts themselves and all their products" (Οὖκ οὖν τὰς τέχνας τε αὐτὰς καὶ τὰργα αὐτῶν σύμπαντα διολογίμεν); (2) by acting as guard against "what is more and less than what is in due measure" (τὸ τοῦ μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον), measure functions as the means by which "all the good and fine things that are produced" (πάντα ἁγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται) are preserved. Clearly, these are not the products of theoretical philosophizing, for example, the ideas resulting from metaphysical speculations. Rather, these products are the things produced by human beings, whether they be the product of a particular craft, such as house-building or ship-building, or whether they be what results for a political community from the art of statesmanship. The choices and actions of human beings, as well as the results of their choosing and acting, will be far more difficult to bring about successfully without due measure as the standard by which these matters are weighed and compared. Although due measure may have consequences for theoretical philosophy, its most immediate and practicably beneficial dimension is in respect to what we try to do as individuals and members of a political community. Viewed

73 Statesman, 284a5-b2.
74 It is well to remember, too, that even the impracticalities of a certain sort of theoretical philosophy may be tempered and rendered more practicable by means of due measure. The practicable consequences of due measure are not restricted solely to the products of the arts. In respect to this point, I believe that Guthrie's analysis is correct; due measure provides a means by which the very limited practicability of Plato's middle-period metaphysics may be made more widely available.
in this manner, "the being necessary for coming-to-be", or due measure, is required for both theoretical and practical concerns. It is both an ontological concept as well as a practicable standard.

A further and related argument advanced by the Visitor is that without due measure coming-into-being, "it is not possible for either the statesman or anyone else of those who have knowledge of practical matters to come into being indisputably" (οὐ γὰρ δὴ δυνατὸν γε οὐτέ πολετικῶν οὐτέ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐπιστήμων ἀναμφισβητήτως γεγονέναι τοῦτον μὴ συνομολογηθέντος). In other words, unless there is some sort of objective standard, or standards, for politics and for action in general, there would not be those who possess expert knowledge of politics or of practical matters. Interestingly, the Visitor compares the coming-to-be of due measure to the positing of the idea of becoming in the Sophist as a distinct ontological category. In the Sophist the concept of becoming is an ontological middle ground between being and nonbeing; in the Statesman due measure is a middle position between the opposite extremes of excess and deficiency. Although what is in due measure may appear to be analogous to the ontological category of becoming, it nevertheless is functions quite differently in that due measure entails fundamental practical consequences for the argument. Even the possibility that there may be someone who possesses expert knowledge of statesmanship is called into question if there is no standard of due measure. It seems reasonable, then, to view this part of the digression in a similar manner to those consideration I have just discussed in the previous paragraph. There is an ontological necessity for qualitative measurement in order for there to exist a certain type of statesman, that is, a statesman who possesses the epistemic capacity to choose and act for the good of the political community in accordance with a standard against which possible choices and actions are measured. Due measure, then, has a relation both to epistemology – which should be

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75 Statesman, 284c1-4.
regarded as a part of theoretical philosophy – and to the actual and practicable concerns of
statesmanship.

The link with epistemological considerations is strengthened, and in effect made practicable,
in the passage in which the Visitor restates the twofold division of the art of measurement. One
type of measurement measures relative quantities, the other type is "all those things that measure
in respect of due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, what is requisite, and all
such things that are removed from the extremes to the middle" (μετροῦσιν ... ὑπόσαι πρός τὸ
πρέπον καὶ τὸν καμάρων καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὑπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκισθη τῶν ἔσχατων).76
Guthrie, I believe, is correct to notice a connection between the knowledge needed by an expert in
the art of statesmanship and what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely,
and what is requisite. To metrion, to prepon, ho kairos, and to deon are what form the basis of
the statesman's knowledge in order to govern a polis correctly. As in the case of to metrion
itself, Plato moves from an argument related to epistemology to an argument that uses the results
of theoretical reasoning for the sake of their applicability in practice. It should be noted that this
turn to the applicability of the epistemic requirements of the statesman should not suggest that
there is a lessening in the importance for the way in which knowledge of what is in due measure
is equally important in respect to epistemology as a branch of theoretical philosophy.

One additional, but crucial, point regarding qualitative measurement and its relationship to
what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite requires
discussion. The employment of qualitative measurement results in an appeal either to what is in
due measure, or what is fitting, or what is appropriately timely, or what is requisite.77 How, then,

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76 Statesman, 284e6-8.
77 I should like to point out that this second type of measurement may be regarded as stating a principle of qualitative
measurement. Even though the Visitor does not set down his views on qualitative measurement in terms of a principle
of a particular form of measurement, nevertheless, it is possible that such a principle of qualitative measurement can be
formulated. For any qualities F and G, where F is not the same as G, there is some standard S, against which F and G
are we to understand the distinctions (if any) among the four terms to which qualitative measurement appeals? Are to metrion, to prepon, ho kairos, and to deon in some sense related to one another, or are they distinct terms that have no relationship among themselves? To put this another way, can something that is the result of qualitative measurement be to metrion, but not to prepon, ho kairos, or to deon? It seems to be the case that the four terms are best understood as being partly synonymous. An examination of Plato's use of these four terms in the corpus suggests that frequently there is a common connotation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite. In general, we may consider that all four terms connote something that is the moderate, proper, and necessary sort of thing to do. Clearly, to metrion and to prepon connote that which is moderate and proper, while to deon connotes that the requisite thing to do is the moderate and proper thing to do. At first glance, it appears that ho kairos is not quite synonymous with the other three terms. However, one of the meanings of ho kairos is "due measure, proportion, fitness"; an alternate English rendering is "what is appropriate". There are several passages in the corpus in which Plato uses the term ho kairos in its meaning of due measure, or what is appropriate. There are a total of fourteen instances where ho kairos is used in this sense; four of these passages are found in the Statesman, and the

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78 Although it is not possible to analyze every single occurrence of to metrion, to prepon, and to deon in the corpus, the following enumeration of representative passages will serve to illustrate Plato's usage of these three terms. For to metrion in the sense of moderate or proper, see: Phaedo, 117b9; Cratylus, 414e2; Theaetetus, 181b2; Philebus; 66a7; Protagoras, 338b1; Timaeus, 59d1; Laws, 691e1. For to prepon in a similar sense, see: Gorgias, 503e8; Ion, 530b7; Menexenus, 239c7; Republic, 399a5; Timaeus, 33b1; Laws, 670d6. For to deon in the sense of what is moderate and proper, see: Phaedo, 99c5; Cratylus, 419a3; Symposium, 189e8; Protagoras, 355d2; Republic, 336d1; Timaeus, 42d7; Laws, 793e5. It is interesting to note that the connotations of these three terms in respect to what is moderate, or appropriate, are encountered in dialogues from all three chronological periods.

79 See, LSJ, s.v. kairos, ὁ.

80 Indeed, LSJ specifically refers to Statesman 307b9 and 310e2 as instances where ho kairos means "due measure, proportion, fitness", or what is appropriate. Throughout this study I have translated ho kairos as "appropriately timely", in the belief that this expression best conveys the meaning of the Greek.
remaining ten occur in the Republic, the Timaeus, the Laws, and the Seventh Letter.\textsuperscript{81} It seems to be the case, then, that there is sufficient evidence for regarding \textit{ho kairos} as connoting due
measure, proportion, fitness, and what is appropriate.\textsuperscript{82} Taken together, then, there are instances in the corpus where what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite should be understood as being synonymous.

By concentrating on \textit{ho kairos}, Lane appears to be suggesting that each of these four terms should be considered as distinctly separate, or separable, qualities which do not have the same meaning.\textsuperscript{83} I believe that her view is incorrect because, as I have just discussed, the four terms are to some extent synonymous in Plato's usage. It is more plausible to claim that the four terms refer to the domains to which qualitative measurement appeals. Each term marks out an instance of what is appropriate in its respective domain. They are not terms that should be taken separately in respect to qualitative measurement. Rather, the standards of what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are those which would be appropriate or fitting.

\textsuperscript{81} See, Statesman, 277a6-b1, 284c2-8, 307b9, and 310c2; Republic, 370b8 and 370c4; Timaeus, 85d1; Laws, 630c7, 708e2, 916d8, 916e2, and 938b2; Epistles, 324b7 and 339d1.

\textsuperscript{82} If, however, \textit{ho kairos} is taken in its temporal sense it is possible to see how the sense of timeliness, or opportuneness, may be synonymous with what is in due measure, what is fitting, and what is requisite. A passage in the Republic illustrates this point well: "in relation to what each person is naturally suited for and for what, working at it throughout his life while having the leisure for other pursuits, he would not let slip the opportune, or timely, moments for doing the work well" (πρὸς ὅ ἐπεφίκει ἐκαστὸς καὶ ἐφ’ ὃ ἐμπέλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτῷ ἐφαγαζόμενον οὐ παρεῖσι τοῖς καιροῖς καλῶς ἀπεργήσατο). Republic, 374b1-c4. These opportune, or timely, moments are those which would be appropriate or fitting.

\textsuperscript{83} Sayre treats the four qualities as coordinate, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are not subordinate to, or a subclass of, due measure. Sayre bases his claim on the fact that the division of the art of measurement is first divided into a class of measurement according to contraries and a class of measurement according to fixed measure. The class according to contraries is then divided into number, length, width, breadth, and speed, while the class according to fixed measure is divided into due measure, the fitting, the appropriately timely, the requisite, and for the sake of symmetry, Sayre posits a fifth class not mentioned by the Visitor. The reason Sayre apparently posits this sort of symmetrical division is to demonstrate that division is a "dialectical procedure", which in the case of the division of the art of measurement pursues division "in both left and right directions," and is an example of "nondichotomous division." Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 187-188. The problem with Sayre's interpretation is that the text really does not support his symmetrical arrangement. The initial division into two classes immediately divides the art of measurement into a class of measurement of relative quantities (or, in Sayre's terminology, contraries) and into a class that is according to due measure. Due measure is not subsumed under Sayre's class of fixed measure. Rather, due measure is the class of fixed measure. Additionally, there is no suggestion of an unmentioned class of fixed measure that corresponds to the final class of contrary measure, speed, unless Sayre thinks that the expression \textit{πάνθ’ ὑπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκλίθη τῶν ἐργάτων} is this fifth, unmentioned class. Unfortunately, he does not argue that this phrase should be understood in this manner. It does not seem likely that it should be, for the divisions of the class of measurement according to contraries is divided into five distinctly definite sorts of quantities, whereas the expression "all such things that are removed from the middle to the extremes" is far too indefinite to consider it in parallel with the corresponding term, speed, in the division of things that are divided according to contraries.
what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are interchangeable in the sense that they have synonymous connotations. If this interpretation is correct, then it is arguable that *to metrion, to prepon, ho kairos, and to deon*, when understood as interchangeable standards connoting the same thing, refer, in fact, to the concept of *sōphrosunē*. If one is to be moderate, or act moderately, then one must have knowledge of what is in due measure, or what is fitting, or what is appropriately timely, or what is requisite. To state this another way: the results of the use of qualitative measurement appeal to the standards of *to metrion, to prepon, ho kairos, and to deon*, any one of which connotes something that is moderate, proper, appropriate, and necessary. If, for example, there is an appeal to something that is *to metrion*, then it is implied that the appeal is to something that is moderate, proper, appropriate, and necessary; it is not simply an appeal to what is in due measure. The same would be true in the other three cases as well.

To sum up. The digression on due measure begins with a reference to excess and deficiency. If, as Sayre argues, excess and deficiency may be regarded as a principle of contrariety, then qualitative measurement may be considered as a form of measurement which weighs contrary qualities against a standard that results in a mean in which the contraries share, or are reconciled in the sense that the contraries are brought into some sort of concord with each other. In turn, the result of qualitative measurement appeals to the interchangeable standards of what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite, or, in effect, with what is moderate. The result of this appeal allows one to know and choose what is in accordance with *sōphrosunē*. When one has chosen in accordance with what is in due measure, or what is fitting, or what is appropriately timely, or what is requisite, or in accordance with *sōphrosunē*, then this choice is able to applied in practice, either in terms of an individual conducting his or her own life, or in terms of anyone who correctly practices a *technē*. 
Finally, in general terms, the digression on due measure is a textual crux delineating the distinctions between the metaphysical grounding of Plato's middle-period dialogues and the more practically directed philosophy encountered in his late-period works. This interpretation should not suggest, however, that Plato's late philosophy rejects and replaces that of his middle period. Plato's later-period thought should be treated as complementary, owing in large part to knowing what is in due measure as the means by which a greater degree of practicability could be granted to his thought without needing to dismiss any of his middle-period positions. Furthermore, a connection may be established between the Socratic dialogues of the early period and due measure. It is arguable that some of the *aporiai* encountered in Plato's early-period works may be resolved when considered in terms of due measure. The attempted definition of *sôphrosunê* in the *Charmides* as knowledge of knowledge might not have resulted in a difficulty if Plato had employed some sort of qualitative measurement against which the opposing states of knowledge and ignorance could be compared. Even though the weighing of relative pleasures and pains in the *Protagoras* recognizes that they could properly be compared by an art of measurement, the lack of a fully articulated qualitative measurement hinders a complete resolution of the problem, and contributes to the confusion in which this dialogue ends.

The concern with how we may best live is encountered diachronically throughout the Platonic corpus. Although Plato provides various solutions to this concern, there appears to be some sense of commonality among those he does present. One such commonality is the need for *sôphrosunê* in the sense that one who is moderate and acts moderately knows how best to live, whether as a private individual or as the ruler of a political community. There is a close connection between the need for a type of knowledge and the need for an agent who acts virtuously. In the early-period works, this connection cannot be sufficiently established on account of the lack of an ontological category of becoming, although by the time of the composition of the *Protagoras*, this
link is beginning to be articulated. In the dialogues of middle period, knowledge and virtuous action are grounded in a metaphysical claim concerning one's ability to apprehend the Forms. Yet, there are practicable difficulties encountered in the attempt to instantiate the philosophy of the middle period in actual practice. Finally, in the late-period works, Plato posits both qualitative measurement and τὸ μέτρον as the means by which the connection between knowledge and virtuous action may become more practicable and may be made more accessible to a greater number of individuals. If this view of the trajectory of Plato's thought is correct, then the importance of the digression on due measure in the Statesman should not be underestimated.
CHAPTER 6

DIAIRESIS AND TO METRION

In the previous chapter, I argued that the employment of qualitative measurement results in an appeal to what is in due measure. I also noted that, along with implications for Plato's political and moral philosophy, *to metrion* entails consequences for his philosophical method. In this chapter, I shall examine how qualitative measurement and due measure are related to Plato's use of the method of division and collection, particularly in respect to the way in which *diairesis* is carried out after the Elean Visitor discusses the importance of due measure for dialectical examination.  

It is my contention that once the appeal to what is in due measure has been established, its connection with division brings about a variant method of *diairesis*. The philosophical method used by Plato is fundamental for the arguments and views that result from the method in which they are grounded. In order to understand his positions, it is first necessary to grasp the underlying methodological structures from which they arise. Thus, by first demonstrating the relationship between due measure and method, the analysis in subsequent chapters concerning Plato's political and moral philosophy and their relationships to due measure ought to be made clearer.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I shall discuss the different versions of Plato's methods in order to indicate their respective differences, similarities, and relations. Second, the role of paradigms for the method of division and collection will be examined. Third, the weaving paradigm will be analyzed, as a paradigmatic representation for statesmanship which begins to make use of what is in due measure. Fourth, because it has significant bearing on the interpretation of the *Statesman*, the question concerning the purpose of the dialogue needs to be

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1 See, *Statesman*, 284e11-285c2, for the relation between due measure and dialectic.
investigated. Fifth, I shall examine the final division of the statesman. The definition of the
statesman succeeds as a consequence of the digressions on the use of paradigms, weaving, due
measure, and the purpose of dialectics. Sixth, and finally, three examples – one from the
Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws – of the manner in which diairesis carried out in
accordance with to metrion affects Plato's arguments will be analyzed.

Plato's Philosophical Methods

We may begin by asking the following question: Why is method important? The simple
answer is that method provides the logical structure in which arguments are located. More
specifically, in the case of Plato, method is necessary in order to arrive at an adequate definition
of a thing which sets down the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of
such a sort. By knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a
sort, we are able to state a definition of a thing. Without an adequate definition of a thing, there
can be no knowledge of it, and thus no true account or judgment can be given in respect to it.² It
follows, then, that without a true account of a thing, any discussion concerning it becomes a
matter of speculation and opinion. Indeed, one of the more serious criticisms that can be directed
against those commentators who privilege literary interpretations of the dialogues is that by
neglecting the underlying logical structure of Plato's arguments the analysis of his views runs the
risk of being incomplete, and possibly even incorrect.³ Both the aporiai in which the early-period

² “When someone gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul has the truth about it, but he does
not know it; for if he is unable to give and receive an account of it he is without knowledge; but when he also has
gotten an account, all this becomes possible and he is complete in respect to knowledge” (ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου
τὴν ἀλήθη λόγων τινὸς τις λάβῃ, ἀληθείοις μὲν αὐτῷ τὴν ἄσχερ περὶ αὐτό, γεγονόσκει τὸ ὦν γὰρ μὴ δοκίμων
δοκῶν τε καὶ δεξιοθείς λόγων ἀναπαράστασις εἶναι περὶ ταύτων προσλαβόμενα δὲ λόγων δυνατόν τε ταύτα πάντα
γεγονέας καὶ τελείος πρὸς ἐπιποτήμην ἐχειν). Theaetetus, 202b8-c5
³ Sayre comments: "And it is undeniable as well that Plato has had few peers as dramatist and as stylist of language.
Those commentators who dwell upon these features of his dialogues to the exclusion of their logical structure,
however, see only a minor part of Plato's philosophic genius." Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 238.
dialogues end and the definitions used as the basis for philosophical examination in the works of
the middle and late periods are directly dependent on the type of philosophical method employed
in a particular dialogue.

In Chapter 2, I briefly mentioned the three philosophical methods found in the Platonic corpus:
the elenctic method; the method of hypothesis; the method of division and collection. As also
previously noted, I do not wish to suggest that only a single method is found in a given work;
there are many instances where more than one method is utilized. It does, however, appear to be
the case that there is a correlation between the success or failure of the principal arguments and
the dominant philosophical method in a given dialogue.4 Certain difficulties arise that cannot be
adequately dealt with by a particular method if the resulting arguments are to be valid. When this
occurs, either a new or a revised method needs to be established that will take into account and
attempt to resolve whatever difficulties were encountered in the use of the previous method.
While it seems reasonable to argue that the elenctic method of the Socratic dialogues is replaced
by the new method of hypothesis, the method of division and collection may be best understood
in the sense that the method of division and collection is an evolution of the method of
hypothesis. Since both methods are designed to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a thing, Sayre correctly argues that there are similarities between them: "Not only are the
methods alike in fundamental respects, but moreover they are connected by a line of transition

4 The inconclusive ending of the Theaetetus supplies an excellent example of this point. Theaetetus' third definition of
knowledge – knowledge is true judgment with an account (Theaetetus, 202e8-9) – can neither be confirmed nor denied
for two reasons: (1) the possibility of false judgment is not adequately resolved; (2) the term "account" (λόγος) has not
been adequately defined. Both of these difficulties result from the fact that in the Theaetetus, Plato primarily employs
the method of hypothesis as the logical structure for the discussion. In the Sophist, however, these difficulties are
resolved principally because by means of the method of division and collection an adequate definition of the term
"account" can be given. In Sayre's view, "Plato's intention in writing the Sophist, it is plausible to conjecture, was at
least in part to provide answers to the problem of false judgment and of λόγος which will answer the central problem of
the Theaetetus as well." Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 139. While the method of hypothesis may prove to be
adequate for articulating certain necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a particular proposition, the
example drawn from the Theaetetus clearly indicates that this method is inadequate for the task of supplying the
necessary and sufficient conditions to give an adequate account of a thing; the method of division and collection is
more suitable for this task.
which suggests that it is no less arbitrary to speak of two methods than to speak of one method in two states of development."⁵ It cannot be maintained, however, that either the method of hypothesis or the method of division and collection developed from the elenctic method.

The elenctic method is found primarily in the early-period Socratic dialogues which are examples of the type of dialogue that falls under the heading "Socratic logoi".⁶ Vlastos has provided a good description of the elenchus: "Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer's own belief, who is regarded as refuted if and only if the negation of his thesis is deduced from his own beliefs."⁷ Furthermore, Vlastos is correct to caution that although the Greek noun, ἐλεγχος, may mean refutation, it should be taken more in the sense of "search".⁸ That is to say, it is a search, or test, of the truth of one's propositions. In the case of Socrates' use of the elenchus, it is the search for the truth in respect to questions of ethics. If we take elenchus solely in the sense of refutation,

⁵ Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method*, 223. It is not fair to characterize Sayre's analysis of the method of hypothesis and the method of division and collection in terms of strong development. Rather, it appears to be the case that the method of division and collection evolves out of the method of hypothesis when the latter method proves to be inadequate. The insufficiency of the method of hypothesis becomes especially apparent in the *Theaetetus* when Theaetetus' third attempted definition of knowledge – "Knowledge is true judgment with an account" (δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι) – cannot be tested by this method. *Theaetetus*, 202c8-9. Although there are significant procedural differences between them, the logical structure of both methods is similar, and both methods are directed toward the same end, the establishment of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing. Sayre comments: "… collection and division may be aptly conceived as means of achieving the same goals as those of the earlier hypothetical method, with the difference primarily that these procedures are considerably more specific and effective than any analytic procedures emerging from the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. … The appearance of a 'brand new' method in *Phaedrus* 265E-266B, and in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* generally, is in large part illusory." Although Sayre concedes that there are differences, "These difference, however, are differences of technique rather than differences of analytic purpose." *Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method*, 231 and 237.

⁶ Developmentalists have argued that this group of dialogues should be placed in the category of early works, principally on account of their similarity to the Socratic logoi, and also because the elenchus is a less sophisticated and useful method than either the method of hypothesis or the method of division and collection if one is to construct positive arguments. While I agree with this view, it would be fair to mention that the arrangement of these dialogues could be differently considered. Hypothetically speaking, it is not implausible to suggest that in principle there is no reason why Plato could not have composed this type of dialogue at any time in his career. In other words, even if Plato's own mature method and philosophy were substantially different than that of his teacher, Socrates, it cannot be maintained with complete certainty that there is anything that might have prevented Plato from writing in the style of a Socratic dialogue long after the death of Socrates at a time when Plato was engaged in articulating his own philosophy, grounded in a very different sort of philosophical method.


⁸ Ibid., 39. My entire discussion of the elenchus is greatly indebted to Vlastos' analysis. For his detailed examination, see, Ibid., 46-61.
then Socratic dialectics can easily descend into mere eristics, rather than an examination of the truth. Yet, this is not to say that the elenchus cannot be employed to refute an interlocutor's views. Although there are variations, the elenchus may be outlined as consisting of four steps. (1) Socrates begins by asking a question in the form of "What is $F$?", where $F$ is generally some virtue, for example, piety. In attempting to reply to Socrates' question, his interlocutor responds with a definitional claim $P$ that Socrates believes to be false, which is then tested by use of the elenchus in order to determine whether or not the interlocutor's statement is true, and whether or not the statement is to be refuted. (2) As part of testing the claim, Socrates gets the interlocutor to state additional premises, say $q$ and $r$, in support of the initial claim. These further premises, rather than providing the requested definition are an instance, or set of instances, of what piety is, but which do not in fact define the piety. (3) Arguing from $q$ and $r$, Socrates demonstrates, with the eventual agreement of the interlocutor, that $q$ and $r$ entail $\neg P$. (4) Socrates is then able to claim that $P$ is false and $\neg P$ is true. The principal effect of the elenchus, then, is to demonstrate logically that a person holds inconsistent beliefs for reasons that do not entail that position.\footnote{Perhaps one of the primary reasons why Republic I should be regarded as integral to the whole work, and not as some other dialogue that Plato continues in the rest of the Republic, is that in this book the elenchus is used to demonstrate that conventional views of justice are false. The rest of the work, based on the method of hypothesis, is then able to consider justice in a way that enables Plato to construct positive philosophical arguments concerning it.}

Since a positive argument cannot result from the use of the elenchus, and both the protagonist and the interlocutor are left without a definition of the topic under examination, a different method must be employed.

Clearly, the use of the elenchus in the Socratic dialogues has limited applicability for the sort of dialectical philosophizing Plato utilized in the middle- and late-period dialogues. Even if we accept Vlastos' notion that we should take the term $\delta\varepsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega\upsilon$ more is the sense of "search" rather than in the sense of "refutation", it is difficult to see how this sort of Socratic search could lead to the definitions Plato requires in order for one to possess knowledge. Leaving aside the
hypothesised case in which P is in fact true, there appears to be no instance in the Platonic corpus where use of the elenctic method does not result in an *aporia*. In all those cases that result in an *aporia*, it is demonstrated to a person claiming that P is true that P is false and –P is true. The logical structure of the elenctic method suggests that what is needed to provide adequate definitions cannot be determined by use of the elenchus; the elenchus merely proves that a person holds inconsistent beliefs. If, then, we wish to give an account of a thing, an entirely different method is required.

This different method is the method of hypothesis, and it is initially encountered in the *Meno* and further examined in the *Phaedo*. The hypothetical method described in the *Meno* is that used by geometricians. A particular proposition is hypothesized so that the hypothesis may be employed to demonstrate whether or not the proposition holds in respect to the hypothesis. In the *Phaedo*, the remarks about method occur in the middle of a discussion concerning "the Forms as "causes" [aιτίας] of characteristics in particular things." After dismissing the explanations of the natural scientists and Anaxagoras' views on Mind (νοῦς) as the cause of all things, Socrates remarks: "Since I was deprived of this and was unable either to discover it myself or learn it from another, do you wish, Cebes, I said, that I give you an explanation of how, as a second sailing or second-best way, I busied myself with a search for the cause" (ἐπειδή δὲ ταύτης ἑστερήθην καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐφεξέν ὀστὲ παρ᾽ ἄλλῳ μαθεῖν οἶνος τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησαν ἥ τε πραγματέυμα βούλει σοι, ἐφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὥς Κέβης;). Sayre argues that this passage introduces as the second-best way, the method of hypothesis, a methodological approach employed by Plato for the discovering of causes. "This alternative

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10 See, *Meno*, 86e1-87b2 and *Phaedo*, 99c4-101e3.
11 Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method*, 3. Sayre cautions that "cause" is perhaps "a misleading translation of aιτία in this context." "Reason" or "condition" might be more suitable English renderings.
12 *Phaedo*, 99c8-d2. The notion of δεύτερος πλοῦς is further examined in Appendix 3.
The method of hypothesis essentially functions by deducing conclusions from hypotheses. As an illustration of the method Socrates states that he assumes (ὑποθέμενος) that Forms exist. Furthermore, the Forms are the causes of the characteristics in particular things. A thing is beautiful because it shares in Beauty; "it is through Beauty that beautiful things come to be beautiful" (ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ). The thesis that the Forms are causes appears in itself obscure, but as an illustration of the method of hypothesis it seems reasonably clear. The thesis that the Forms are causes is accounted for "by positing as an hypothesis the theory that the Forms exist, and by showing how this thesis alone agrees with what has been posited." Two key passages from Socrates' description of his new method in the Phaedo are helpful for understanding how Socrates' conceives of the method of hypothesis. First, Socrates states: "in each case I assume the proposition which I judge to be the most compelling and set down as true that which seems to me to agree with this concerning both causes and all other things, and that which does not as false" (καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἔρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἂ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὥς ἀληθῆ ἄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ἂ δ’ ἂν μὴ, ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ). Second, he comments: "When you are required to give an account of it [that is, one's hypothesis] you should give it in the same way, by assuming another hypothesis, the one which appears the best of the higher ones, until you reach one that is

13 Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 4-5. It should be noted that the expression "verbal formulations" is Sayre's way of rendering the Greek term logos.
14 See, Phaedo, 100b5-c7.
15 Phaedo, 100d3-9.
16 Phaedo, 100e2-3. Socrates notes that this is the safest (ἀσφαλέστατον) answer he can give. The answer is safe because it is a tautology. It is interesting to note that the Greeks regarded δεύτερος πλοῦς, or using oars instead of sails, as a safer way of seafaring.
17 Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 12.
18 Phaedo, 100a3-7.
The hypothesis that the Forms exist would appear to be for Socrates, and presumably for all those present in the dialogue, the "best of the higher" hypotheses that could be hypothesized from the initial thesis that the Forms are causes. Conversely, it appears to be the case that the thesis that the Forms are causes is the only thesis which agrees with the hypothesis that the Forms exist. In other words, the thesis that the Forms are causes is an example of Socrates' first statement concerning setting down the proposition which is "most compelling"; the hypothesis that the Forms exists illustrates his second statement that the "best of the higher" hypotheses is deduced from the initial thesis.

In the Republic, a somewhat refined version of the method of hypothesis makes its appearance. The development of the method may be seen in the Analogy of the Line, where dialectic proceeds on an upward path to a non-hypothetical first principle. The principal difference between the method used in the Phaedo and that encountered in the Republic, is that in the latter dialogue the connection between Plato's method of dialectic and the mathematical method of analysis becomes severed. In the Phaedo, the method of hypothesis, like the mathematical method of analysis, functions only to justify hypotheses deduced from hypotheses, whereas in the Republic's method of hypothesis dialectic proceeds upwards to a non-hypothetical first principle without attempting to justify hypotheses deduced from hypotheses. "The dialectical method alone proceeds in this way, doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the

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19 Phaedo, 101d6-8.

20 For a more detailed analysis of these passages, see, Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 4-15. Sayre also presents a well-argued analysis of the connection between the methodological passages in the Phaedo and the methodological practice of Greek mathematics. There was a analytic technique known as the method of analysis whereby a proposition could be proved by a deductive process until a proposition that is independently known to be true is reached. See, Ibid., 15-28. Guthrie, too, notes: "Plato's emphasis on deduction may … be connected with his interest in geometry and the extension of its methods beyond the mathematical sphere." Guthrie, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues, 355. In the Republic, however, Plato appears to move away from the connection between dialectic and mathematical method.
first principle itself, in order to be secure" (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη παρείπτω, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναλογία, ἐπὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται).21 There are two serious difficulties in the Republic's version of the method of hypothesis which should be mentioned. First, it may be argued that even if dialectic is able to proceed "upwards" to a non-hypothetical first principle, "it is by no means clear what such a starting point would be found to be like once it had been achieved."22 It is not entirely certain if Plato intends this non-hypothetical first principle to be understood as the Good or as something else. From the way Plato constructs his argument it could indeed be inferred that this first principle should be understood as referring collectively to all the Forms themselves, not merely to the Form of the Good.23 Second, Plato does not appear to demonstrate the dialectical procedure for moving upwards from hypotheses to a non-hypothetical first principle, except perhaps in a sense similar to that used in the Phaedo's method of hypothesis in which "the best of the higher" hypotheses are justified by their agreement with the hypotheses from which they are deduced.24 In any case, the procedure remains vague and cannot be satisfactorily explicated by the texts.25

The principal purpose for the use of the method of hypothesis is to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a particular proposition; a proposition which itself is not a hypothesis. The method of hypothesis can be applied to particular things as well. When the method is applied to a particular thing, it is directed toward establishing the causes, or

21 Republic, 533c8-d1.
22 Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 45.
23 Textual evidence in support of this idea is given at Republic 534b3-4 and 534b8. "Do you call dialectical person who has taken hold of an account of the being of each thing?" (Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τὴν αὐτίας;). A few lines later Socrates asks: "Then is it not also similar in regard to the good? (Οἷκαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἧμισυδο ὑπονόμος;). Clearly, the being of each thing and the Good are different.
24 I agree with Sayre's view that in regard to the "upward way" perhaps the best we can say is that at this point of his career, "Plato himself was not clear about what was involved in this phase of the dialectician's procedure." Ibid., 54.
25 Many theories have been advanced about this procedure, none of which appear compelling. Robinson offers an examination of several of the more plausible ones. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 160-179.
characteristics, of the thing.\(^{26}\) The necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a particular proposition may be extended to "establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of an hypothesis about the existence of a specific type of thing."\(^{27}\) In general, however, the method of hypothesis functions by testing the consistency of, or justifying the validity of, claims derived from hypotheses.

Yet, even with the refinements added to the method in the *Republic*, it nevertheless appears to be inadequate for Plato's task of finding defensible definitions that entail knowledge of the *definiendum*. Although the method of hypothesis is adequate for establishing the necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a particular proposition, as well for establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions in respect to the causes of particulars, it does not establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort.\(^{28}\) In short, the method of hypothesis cannot be employed to answer the Socratic "What is F?" question; the method does not furnish a definition of the *definiendum*. The difficulties encountered in the *Republic*'s use of this method, coupled with the failure in the *Theaetetus* to justify or refute adequately Theaetetus' third definition of knowledge, suggest that a new logical structure was required by Plato. But unlike the rather radical break between the elenctic method and the method of hypothesis, Plato's new method, the method of division and collection, is closely related to, and evolves out of, the older method.

\(^{26}\) By the term "causes", I mean the cause, or reason, why a particular thing is of a certain sort. For example, The cause of a particular thing's beauty is that it participates in Beauty. By the term "characteristics", I mean the qualities that that particular thing possesses.

\(^{27}\) Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method*, 225.

\(^{28}\) This is not to suggest, however, that Plato achieved little or nothing by the use of this method. Quite the contrary, in fact. Sayre lists five significant methodological achievements in the middle-period dialogues: (1) the justification or refutation of propositions in respect to their relationships with one another; (2) a hypotheses cannot admit any inconsistencies in its consequences; (3) hypotheses can be justified by deduction from hypotheses which themselves have been demonstrated to be consistent; (4) higher propositions are entailed by the one from they are deduced, but the ones from which they are deduced are not entailed by higher propositions; (5) in the *Republic*, the chain of deductions reaches a non-hypothetical first principle. See, Ibid., 55-56.
Plato first mentions the method of division and collection in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates describes a method in which there are two steps. First, things that are scattered about everywhere (τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα) are seen together (συνορωμένα) and brought (ἀγείν) into a single form (Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν). Second, this single form, or genus, is cut through, or divided, (διατέμνειν) by its natural joints, or by its species, (κατ’ ἀρθρα ἤ πέφυκεν). At this stage of its development, *diairesis* consists of collecting together particulars that can be subsumed under a general class which then can be divided into the species that naturally comprise the class. It at first appears that the method is employed for the sake of rhetoric: "So, the person who intends to associate with the art of rhetoric first must divide these things in this way, and grasp the characteristic of each class" (Οἱκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικήν μετίεναι πρῶτον μὲν δεὶ ταῦτα ὅδον διηρήσαθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτήρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους). Yet, at the conclusion of his discussion concerning collection and division, Socrates remarks: "I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able to speak and to think" (Τούτων δὴ ἐγὼ ἀυτὸς τε ἐραστής, ὁ Φαίδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα ὁ λόγος τε ὁ λέγειν τε καὶ φρόνειν). Socrates goes on to call those who practice this method "dialecticians" (διαλεκτικοὺς). It would appear that Socrates is suggesting that the method of division and collection is needed in order to have knowledge about what one is discussing, although he does not explicitly state

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30 The example used in the *Phaedrus* is madness (μναία), or irrationality. The genus madness is divided into two species, one brought about by "human illnesses" (νοσημάτων ἄνθρωπίνων), the other brought about by "divine release from usual customs" (θείας ἐξιλαλαγής τῶν εἰσβότων νομίμων). The divine species of madness is further divided into four parts which are connected with four gods: the madness of divine inspiration associated with Apollo; a sort of mystical madness associated with Dionysius; the poetical madness of the Muses; the erotic madness of Aphrodite and Eros. See, *Phaedrus*, 265a6-b5.
31 *Phaedrus*, 263b6-8.
32 *Phaedrus*, 266b3-5.
33 *Phaedrus*, 266c1. A similar idea is conveyed in the *Sophist*. "shall we not say that it is knowledge of dialectics that divides according to classes, and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different one is the same" (τὸ κατὰ γένε τοιοῦτον ἐνδιακόμηθαι καὶ μήτε ταῦτα ἐνδιακόμηθαι καὶ μήτε ἐνδιακόμηθαι μήτε ἐνδιακόμηθαι ἐνδιακόμηθαι μήτε ταῦτα ἐνδιακόμηθαι ὁ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι). *Sophist*, 253dl-3.
that the method is to be employed for the sake of determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort. It is, nevertheless, a method that is necessary for a philosopher, but it also is useful for a rhetorician, especially if we keep in mind Socrates' views in the Gorgias that rhetoric should be directed toward the good or the care of the listeners' souls.\(^{34}\)

In the Sophist, Plato has the Elean Visitor fully explain and illustrate the method of division and collection, and once the Visitor accomplishes this task the method is extensively employed throughout the remainder of this dialogue. Diairesis is utilized as the logical structure by which a definition may be reached in order to have knowledge about the definiendum by attempting to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions of the definiendum. Before attempting to define the sophist, who is, of course, the central focus of this dialogue, the Elean Visitor suggests that both he and Theaetetus work through a practice definition so that they may observe how the method functions. The example chosen, the angler (ὁ ἄσπαλικεντής), is used so that they might attempt a definition of something inferior (περὶ τῶν τῶν φαίλων), or less important, as a paradigm (παράδειγμα) of the method of division and collection before they try to define something more important (τοῦ μείζονος), namely, the sophist.\(^{35}\) The type of division is dichotomous. That is to say, the division of each level results in two, and only two, successive characteristics, only one of which is necessary for the definiendum. The division proceeds by further dividing the right-hand side and discarding the left-hand one. Figure 1 illustrates the division of the angler.

\(^{34}\) Ferrari comments: "For if we take the procedure, praised by Socrates, of distinguishing types within a delimited domain (which is, of course, the method of 'Collection and Division' prominent in later dialogues such as the Sophist and Politicus), and consider it purely as a formal technique, it does not seem so very different from the skill of assimilation and dissimilation at which, as we saw Socrates determine, the orator must excel." G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 61 and 66.

\(^{35}\) See, Sophist, 218c7-219a2.
Division of the Angler

Non-Expert     Expert

Production  Acquisition

Exchange  Taking Possession

Combat  Hunting

Lifeless Things  Living Things (Animal Hunting)

Land Animals  Water Animals

Winged (Birds)  Underwater (Fish)

Enclosing  Striking

Torch-Hunting (by night)  Hooking (by day)

Spearing  Drawing Upwards

Figure 1

The definition is obtained by collecting the right-hand terms. Thus, an angler is someone who has expert knowledge for acquiring by taking possession through the hunting of living things which are water animals living underwater by means of striking with a hook to draw them upwards. On each level, the characteristic is necessary to angling. The angler must have these characteristics if he is to be an angler. The characteristics also supply descriptions of the
sufficient conditions of the angler. "Given this as a true description, no further information is needed to assure the correct application of the name 'angler' to the person so described." Thus, the definition of the angler provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for an angler to be angler. The *diairesis* of the angler functions not only as a paradigm, but also, since it does indeed define the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an angler, demonstrates "the features of a successful definition in contrast with the several faulty definitions [of the sophist] which follow."37

Once the paradigm for the method of division and collection has been posited, the Visitor states: "Come, then, let us try to discover in accordance with this paradigm what a sophist is" (Φέρε δή, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστήν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν ὧτι ποτ' ἐστιν).38 There are a total of seven attempts made to define the sophist, the first six of which fail. The first five divisions are defective in that, although they do describe the sufficient conditions for being a sophist, none of them demonstrate that each of the posited characteristics furnish the necessary conditions. Since all five divisions are defective, the sophist has not yet been defined, and further attempts are required.

The sixth division appears to reach an adequate definition, yet it could be argued the this definition of the sophist is not the sort of definition which Plato was seeking. The sixth division is not connected with either the first five or with the seventh. In contrast to the other divisions, the sixth begins with a collection of terms relating to the practices of combining and separating; the *diairesis* proceeds by dividing the latter classification, that is, the separative arts, whereas all the other attempts to define the sophist proceed from an initial division into production and

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36 Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method*, 143.
37 Ibid., 141.
38 *Sophist*, 221c6-7.
acquisition with the latter characteristic being the one to be divided further.\textsuperscript{39} The sixth division leads to a definition of the "sophist of noble lineage" (ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική).\textsuperscript{40} This definition seems far more applicable to Socrates and his use of the elenctic method than it does to the sort of sophists depicted, and criticized, by Plato in other dialogues. The close resemblance of the definition of the "sophist of noble lineage" with the character of Socrates has not gone unnoticed by commentators.\textsuperscript{41} The sixth division does, however, supply a definition of sorts; a definition of a "sophist of noble lineage", that is, it defines someone who appears to resemble Socrates, but it does not define what one imagines Plato regarded as the true sophist, and the sort of sophist whom one suspects Plato was looking to define.\textsuperscript{42} In regard to the first six divisions, Cornford writes: "The definitions in which they terminate are not definitions of 'the Sophist', but analytical descriptions of easily recognisable [sic] classes to whom the name had been attached."\textsuperscript{43}

The seventh and final diairesis, the one in which the necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of the true sophist is given, is carried out at the very end of the \textit{Sophist}. But before Plato is able to offer an adequate definition of the sophist which conforms to the logical requirements of the method of division and collection, it is first necessary for him to work through a series of difficult and highly important arguments: (1) the refutation of Parmenides;

\textsuperscript{39} The sixth division is carried out at \textit{Sophist}, 226b2-231b8.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Sophist}, 231b8.
\textsuperscript{41} See, for example, Taylor, \textit{Plato: The Man and His Work}, 380-381. One way to view the rather uncomfortably close connection between the type of philosophy engaged in by Socrates and the practice of the sophists is to suggest that perhaps Plato is demonstrating how Socrates' use of the elenchus could be misconstrued as a sophistical device by those who were unaware of Socrates' true intentions. It is not at all difficult to mistake the genuine and sincere desire to question beliefs for the sake of knowledge with the eristics of the sophists. Cornford comments: "As Socrates remarked at the outset (216D), the genuine philosopher sometimes seems to wear the guise of the Sophist. Here, moreover, Plato has been careful to analyse [sic] only the negative side of Socrates' practice – the side on which the resemblance lies." Francis M. Cornford, \textit{Plato's Theory of Knowledge} (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003), 182.
\textsuperscript{43} Cornford, \textit{Plato's Theory of Knowledge}, 187.
(2) giving an account of that which is \((\tau \omicron \ \omicron)\); (3) the combination of Forms; (4) false judgment.\(^{44}\)

It is not until Plato establishes clearly articulated views on these matters can we discover the character of the true sophist. Once Plato is able to demonstrate that the Parmenidean dichotomy of being and not-being is incorrect, that there is indeed an ontological category of coming-to-be in order that one might be able to speak about that which is not, then one may claim that false judgment is possible in the sense that one can think and speak about that which is not. Grounded in these views, the seventh definition of the sophist reveals his true nature. The successful seventh division in the *Sophist*, not only illustrates the proper use of the method of division and collection to attain knowledge of a thing, but it also lends support to the dialogue's other arguments.

When we turn to examine the *Statesman*, we see that the method of division and collection is once again extensively utilized. As in the case of the *Sophist*, we are given examples of both unsuccessful and successful attempts at defining the statesman, as well as a paradigmatic division. The first *diairesis* of the statesman fails. This division is complex and it is set out in seven different sections of the text in order to allow the Visitor to demonstrate to Young Socrates how they might correct and refine the errors that have been made.\(^{45}\) Yet, even with these corrections, the *diairesis* does not succeed. Figure 2, adapted from Sayre, shows the compete first division of the statesman.\(^{46}\)

\(^{44}\) The sections in which these arguments respectively occur are, *Sophist*, 236d9-245e5, 245e6-250e2, 250c3-260a5, and 260a5-264e14. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze these arguments, not only are they necessary for the definition of the sophist, but in addition, they are of fundamental importance for Plato's late period philosophy.

\(^{45}\) The first division occurs between *Statesman*, 258b4-261e8, 264d5-e5, 265b8-266b3 (the longer route), and 266e4-7 (the shorter route). The *differentiae* are collected at 267a8-c3. There are two further refinements of the division at 276d6 and 276e8 which should be added to the definition. It should be noted that the longer and shorter routes refer to two ways of dividing: the longer route as much as possible makes its cuts in the middle (\(\mu \epsilon \nu \nu \sigma \varphi \omicron \mu \epsilon \omicron \epsilon\)); the shorter route proceeds by dividing a small part off against a large part (\(\pi \rho \omicron \ \omicron \ \epsilon \gamma \alpha \ \nu \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \delta \iota \omicron \iota \omicron \omicron \omicron \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \alpha \kappa \omicron \omicron \nu\)). See, *Statesman*, 265a1-5, for the Visitor's description of these two ways of division.

\(^{46}\) Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 27. The figure incorporates the longer route discussed at *Statesman*, 265b8-266b3.
First Division of the Statesman

Knowledge (258b4)
  Practical
  Theoretical ((258e5)
    Critical
    Directive (260b4)
      (Unnamed)
      Self-directive (260e5)
    Inanimate Objects
    Living Subjects (261c1)
      Individuals
      Groups (Herd-rearing) (261e8)
    Aquatic
    Dry-land (264d7-8)
      Winged
      Footed (264e6)
        Horned
        Hornless (265b11)
      Interbreeding
      Non-interbreeding (265e8)
    Four-footed
    Two-footed (266b3)
      Divine herdsman
      Human carer (276d6)
    Enforced
    Voluntary (276e8)

Figure 2

Sayre identifies three false steps: (1) the Visitor assumes that the statesman possesses knowledge; (2) that this knowledge is theoretical rather than practical; (3) that the statesman, like
the slave-master, utilizes a similar sort of directive knowledge. Miller notices two principal flaws: (1) that only dichotomous division is employed; (2) that the statesman as a herdsman or shepherd is a false metaphor; the metaphor is a reflection of common opinion.

It is difficult to believe that this division fails unintentionally. Rather, it may be plausibly argued that there are two primary purposes for the Visitor to offer a *diairesis* that he surely must have known would be unsuccessful. First, I believe, the failed division serves a pedagogical function. The Visitor is demonstrating to the dialectically inexperienced Young Socrates how easy it is to posit and divide inappropriate classes of things. The example which immediately follows concerning how to divide the human race makes this clear. It is procedurally incorrect to begin by dividing the class of human beings into Greeks and barbarians. The correct method is to begin by dividing the human race by male and female. The point that the Visitor is trying to impress upon Young Socrates is that class and part must not be confused with each other. "That when there is a class of something, necessarily it is also a part whatever thing of which it is said to be a class; but it is in no way necessary that a part is a class" (ἐὰν ἐῖδος ἢ ὡς ἢ ῃ του, καὶ μέρος σ.AppendLine(ἄναγκαῖον ἐκαὶ τῷ πράγματος ὅτου μέρος ἑκά τῷ ἑῖδος λέγηται· μέρος δὲ ἑῖδος οὐδὲμία ἄναγκη). Sayre, who believes that division in the *Statesman* is carried out in accordance with the Forms, argues: "Dividing human beings between male and female … sets apart two classes that can be characterized without reference to each other." If Sayre is indeed correct about division according to Forms, then it is reasonable to infer that division is carried out according to contraries, rather than by classes that are defined relative to each other. If "two classes can be

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48 See, Miller, *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, 16 and 34. Lane, too, notes that the statesman/shepherd relation is incorrect; the notion of a king as a shepherd was common in popular Greek belief, and may be traced back to the *Iliad*. See, Lane, *Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman*, 45.
49 The discussion is at, *Statesman*, 262b1-263b11. Division is to be carried out by species, not by cultural differences. *Statesman*, 263b8-10.
50 Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 219. This is a class whose characteristics are independent of another class.
defined only relative to each other," then this relation "precludes their corresponding to eternally fixed Forms." The two classes, male and female, meet Sayre's criterion; they can in fact be characterized without reference to each other. Sayre uses the expression "descriptive independence" to characterize these classes. Dividing in accordance with these independent classes is important for dialectics in that it ensures that the necessary conditions for the definiendum are established.

Second, the presumably intentional failure of the first division provides for Plato an opportunity to examine several aspects concerning the method of division and collection and dialectics in general. The results of these examinations are then taken into account in order to make a second attempt to define the statesman. Before reaching a definition of the statesman that satisfies the requirement of defining the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a statesman, the Visitor first turns to the following topics: (1) the use of paradigms; (2) the paradigmatic diairesis of weaving; (3) the digression on due measure; (4) the question regarding the purpose of this exercise. Following the example of the Visitor, I shall turn first to an examination of these topics before resuming the analysis of the use method in the Statesman.

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52 Ibid., 219. I shall argue later in this chapter that diairesis according to contraries is indeed what takes place after the Visitor examines to metrion. I do not, however, think that it is necessary to follow Sayre's view that the contrary classes represent Forms. We can imagine these classes of contraries simply as contraries without having to claim that they are representations of Forms.

53 Ibid., 220.

54 These four discussions are carried out at Statesman, 277d1-278e11, 279a7-283a8, 283c3-285c3, and 285c8-286c4, respectively. The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos, at Statesman, 269c4-274e3, may be considered as a fifth digression in this dialogue. The myth seems to serve two principal functions. First, it posits an incorrect correspondence between the statesman and a divine ruler that needs correction if the definition of the mortal ruler is to succeed. In this sense it acts as a paradigm of sorts; a paradigm which demonstrates that even though the conclusion reached in the myth concerning the function of a particular type of ruler is correct, nevertheless, it is an incorrect definition of a ruler for the purpose of the Visitor's investigation. Second, it functions as an illustration of what the Visitor means by excessive length in his comments on excess and deficiency in the digression on due measure. The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos serves to illustrate a paradigm that is excessively lengthy in relation to its results. I shall briefly discuss this second function of the myth in the section on the use of paradigms.

55 Since qualitative measurement and what is in due measure was the subject of the previous chapter, there is no need to discuss it at this time. I shall, however, examine the role that what is in due measure plays in Plato's method later in this chapter.
The Use of Paradigms

The discussion concerning the use of paradigms occurs immediately after the unsuccessful attempt to define the statesman. The Visitor remarks: "It is difficult, my friend, to demonstrate sufficiently any of the more important matters without using paradigms" (Χαλεπόν, ὁ δαίμονε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἰκανὸς ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων). Furthermore, in order to convey the idea of a paradigm, a paradigm itself is required. There appear to be two requirements for a paradigm to function as a model of models. The first requirement is a sense of familiarity. The Visitor employs the analogy of learning letters and syllables as a paradigm to illustrate the use of paradigms. By using letters and syllables that the student already knows, the student, when he comes upon the same letters in syllables that he not yet acquainted with, will be able to identify those that he does know. The importance of a paradigm becomes clear. The student will not only have true judgment about familiar letters and syllables, but also he will have true judgment (ἀληθὴ δόξα) about those that were previously unfamiliar. Sayre comments: "Prior ability to judge correctly in the paradigmatic case has been extended to a case in which it was previously lacking."

A paradigm is also required to exhibit similar characteristics to the thing of which it a paradigm. In other words, a letter or syllable that is unknown must share a likeness with the letter or syllable that is known. This resemblance does not mean that the letter or syllable be written or

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56 Statesman, 277d1-2.
57 I prefer to translate τὸ παράδειγμα as paradigm, rather than as model or example. The context of the Visitor's argument suggest that he views the Greek term in the specific sense of a model of models; hence, it should be construed as a true paradigm. Rosen provides a helpful analysis of the distinction between the terms paradigm, model, and example. "We require not merely an example of a paradigm but a paradigmatic example. Not all examples of models fulfill this function." Rosen, Plato's Statesman, 81-88.
58 A similar case is found at Theaetetus 207d8-208a10. It should be noted that, although one will have "true judgment with an account" (μετὰ λόγου ἀρρή βούλα), one will not yet have knowledge. It would appear to be the case, then, that a paradigm itself does not lead to knowledge. Rather, it is what results from the correct use of a suitable paradigm that leads to knowledge.
59 See, Statesman, 278c3-6.
60 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 79.
inscribed in precisely the same way in both cases. That is to say, neither a written or inscribed letter must be by the same hand and in the same style. Rather, it means that the unknown letter or syllable must be a representation of a letter or syllable that is known. Borrowing the example from the *Theaetetus*, the syllable THE (ΘΕ) is a paradigm for all other instances, both known and unknown, of precisely the same syllable, or combination of letters. It can never be a paradigmatic representation of the syllable TE (ΤΕ). Sayre makes the point that this second requirement for a paradigm, "is that a suitable paradigm share with the thing being learned salient features that are essential to the latter's nature." In sum, then, both familiarity and similar characteristics are needed if something is to be considered as a paradigm.

The importance of the use of paradigms in education prepares the ground for its importance for dialectics. In order for a dialectical examination utilizing the method of division and collection to proceed correctly toward its desired goal it should make use, if needed, of the proper sort of paradigm. It is well to remember that just before the Visitor discusses the use of paradigms he remarks: "it is more fitting for those who are able to follow to make manifest all living things by means of speech and discourse than by painting and all the manual crafts" (γραφής δὲ καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας λέξει καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζωὸν μᾶλλον πρέπει τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐπεσθαί). One can infer from the location of this passage just prior to the discussion of paradigms that dialectical discourse, if it is to be successful, should also make use of paradigms.

Plato presents us with two such dialectical paradigms. The paradigm of weaving fulfills this task in the *Statesman*. In the *Sophist*, the diairesis of the angler functions as the dialogue's

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61 Ibid., 80.
62 *Statesman*, 277c3-5. Even though I have translated ζωὸν with its standard meaning of living thing, Sayre makes the interesting observation that in this context it may perhaps be better to render the term as "subject of depiction". Plato appears to be suggesting that the term implies figures or images in general. See, Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 81, n. 4.
dialectical paradigm. Yet, does the angler paradigm fulfill the requirements set out in the
Statesman for a proper paradigm? It is arguable that it does not function as a paradigm in the
Statesman's sense. Although the division of the angler does indeed serve to demonstrate how to
posit and divide classes so that the necessary and sufficient conditions of the definiendum are
established, it does not well serve as a paradigm for the sophist. Unlike the weaving paradigm
which appears closely connected to the task of the statesman, the angler paradigm does not
exhibit a similar relation to the sophist. It would be stretching the connotation of the Greek too
far to suggest that the "hooking" the angler employs to catch his underwater prey is analogous to
the sophist's method of "hooking" his human quarry by utilizing dubious discursive tactics. Even
though we can say in English that a person angles to obtain something by doubtful or devious
means,\(^63\) it does not seem to be the case that an equivalent connotation, or idiomatic expression,
was known to the Greeks.\(^64\) If this is in fact the case, then the paradigm used by the Visitor is
faulty, and the idea and use of paradigms would require a revision.

There are two possible explanations to consider in respect to paradigms. First, it is arguable
that Plato recognized at the time of writing the Sophist the lack of connection between the
dialogue's dialectical paradigm and the subject about which the dialogue's divisions are directed,
but did not see the need to relate a specific paradigm-type to a specific subject. He may have
simply regarded the angler paradigm as a paradigm of the method of division and collection.
Alternately, it could be argued that it was not until Plato began to work through certain problems
related to the correct practice of dialectic in the Statesman that the requirements set down by the
Visitor regarding paradigms came to light, namely, that a paradigm needs to exhibit similarities to

\(^{63}\) For example, we can say a person was angling to get a promotion at work. This would be considered as an idiomatic
expression suggesting the person was perhaps plotting in some way to get ahead rather than relying on more acceptable
means to receive a promotion.

\(^{64}\) There are no definitions in LSJ for ἄσπολείοςεμε, and its related noun and adjective, other than those related to
angling as a type of fishing. In contrast, one of the definitions of the English verb angle in the OED is to "use artful,
indirect, or wily means to obtain something."
the subjects for which it is a paradigm. Either explanation accounts for the need in the *Statesman* for Plato to present another paradigmatic division.

The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos may also be considered in part as an instance of a faulty paradigm. I am not suggesting, however, that the myth does not serve other useful functions. As a paradigm, the myth fails in two specific respects, and perhaps one general respect as well. First, even though the Visitor and Young Socrates appear to believe that the myth has corrected a mistake in the first *diairesis*, namely, that the statesman is concerned with the rearing not of herds of animals but with the rearing of human beings, the paradigm derived from the myth of the statesman as a shepherd is equally faulty. The discovery of this mistake will eventually lead to the setting down of the more appropriate paradigm of weaving. The second respect in which the myth fails is that it is too long. The Visitor himself recognizes this failing: "we took up an astonishing mass of myth, and were compelled to use a greater part of it than we ought to have" (καμαστὸν ὄγκον ἀράμενον τοῦ μύθου, μεῖζον τοῦ δέοντος ἣναγκάσθημεν αὐτὸν μέρει προσχρήσασθαι). The result of this overly long myth is the digression on due measure. Sayre notes: "Ostensibly to adjudicate questions of this sort, he [that is, the Visitor] then launches into a

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65 The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos functions on many levels and has received diverse interpretations. Campbell suggests that the myth is used by Plato "to recall the mind from resting in a merely abstract ideal." That is to say, the myth paints a picture of how things ostensibly stand in the actual world, in contrast to the theoretical world of dialectic. For Rosen, the myth is "a kind of Hegelian synthesis of two opposites, Cronos and Zeus." Miller attempts to demonstrate that the myth serves a twofold purpose: (1) it functions as a sort of antidote to what Miller seems to believe were anti-traditionalist tendencies in fourth-century Greek thought; (2) Plato calls to attention the "thought-forms" that correspond to their underlying mythic symbols. Scodel believes that the myth is employed to reject divine guidance, by replacing it with the rule of human beings. Ferrari argues that the myth furnishes the basis for Plato's conservative politics. Lane argues that the tale told by the Visitor is crucial for connecting method and politics. Finally, Sayre, who devotes little attention to the myth, appears to regard it as a device for demonstrating the incorrectness of the shepherd paradigm and as an example of discussing something for longer than required. Campbell, *The Sophist and Politicus of Plato*, xxviii; Stanley Rosen, "Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," *Review of Metaphysics* 33 (1979), 74; Miller, *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, 36-37; Scodel, *Diairesis and Myth*, 89; G. R. F. Ferrari, "Myth and Conservatism in Plato's Statesman," in *Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum*, ed. Christopher J. Rowe (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995), 389-397; Lane, *Method and Politics*, 101; Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 12-14.

66 *Statesman*, 277b4-6. It should also be noted that the lengthy *diairesis* of weaving also is a factor contributing to the need for the digression on due measure. See, *Statesman*, 283b1-c1. The myth may be considered as an illustration of something said too excessively in relation to its contribution, while the length of the division of weaving is appropriate for its function of providing a representative paradigm.
surprisingly abstract discourse on 'Excess and Deficiency in general'\textsuperscript{67}. Although the myth fails as a paradigm in these two specific respects, it nevertheless is useful for constructing a more suitable paradigm for the statesman, as well as for providing an opening into the discussion concerning due measure. Finally, the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos may be regarded as a demonstration of the failure of myth to function as a paradigm in general. In the case of the \textit{Statesman}, the myth is inadequate as a paradigm both for method and for the sort of statesman and political practice envisioned by Plato. In dialogues composed prior to the \textit{Statesman}, Plato frequently resorted to the use of myth to reinforce his arguments about politics and ethics, in a sense using the stories related by the myths as paradigms. If the interlocutors could not be persuaded by argument, then the telling of a story might be a way to convince them. In the dialogues which chronologically follow the \textit{Statesman}, myth is no longer employed. There is a sense that the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos was written by Plato to illustrate the futility of storytelling as a substitute, or adjunct, to rational discourse. Rather than attempting to convince individuals by affecting their emotions through the use of a myth, the type of philosophical method and argumentation that emerges in the \textit{Statesman} becomes the sole means of persuasion. In other words, in general terms, the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos is the final instance in the corpus in which Plato attempts to use myth as a paradigm, rather than rational discourse and dialectical examination for the sake of persuading his audience to accept his philosophical positions.

In sum, the discussion of the use of paradigms fulfills an important role. It sets out the manner in which a successful paradigm needs to be an appropriate representation of the thing for which it serves as a paradigm. The faulty paradigm of the first \textit{diairesis} of the statesman prepares the way for the establishment of a paradigm which correctly represents the statesman, the weaving

\textsuperscript{67} Sayre, \textit{Metaphysics and Method}, 14.
paradigm. The failure of the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos as a paradigm, not only contributes to finding the correct terms for defining the statesman, but it also serves to suggest the inappropriateness of myth for dialectical analysis.

The Weaving Paradigm

The Elean Visitor begins the division of weaving by asking Young Socrates, "What paradigm, having the same activity as statesmanship, by being compared to it on a very small scale, could satisfactorily discover what we are seeking?" (Τί δήτα παράδειγμα πς ἂν, ἐχον αὐτὴν πολιτικὴ πραγματείαν, σμικρότατον παραθέμενος ἰκανῶς ἂν εὑρεῖ τὸ ξητοῦμενον.) 68 The Visitor will make use of expertise in weaving (ὑφαντικός) as the paradigm for expertise in statesmanship. The diairesis of weaving is the direct result of the Visitor's discussion about the need for paradigms. Once expertise in weaving has been defined successfully in respect to the requirements for paradigms, then both the logical structure of its divisions and the definition of weaving taken from the collection of the divided terms will establish the paradigm for this sort of dialectical investigation. While the division of weaving does establish an appropriate paradigm, it also is the case that the definition of expertise in weaving meets the criteria for establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort. The diairesis of weaving leads to knowledge of the art of weaving, as well as demonstrating its appropriateness as a paradigm for use in examining other things, especially the art of statesmanship. The division of weaving is performed in three distinct parts. 69 For the purposes of this discussion, only the first and final parts of the division are shown. Figure 3 illustrates the first division.

68 Statesman, 279a7-b1.
69 The diairesis of the art of weaving is carried out between, Statesman, 279c7-283a8. In comparison to the length of the first attempt to define the statesman, the division of weaving is relatively brief.
First Division of Weaving

Produced or Acquired Things
  
For Doing  For Preventing
  
Charms  Defenses
  
Armaments  Protections
  
Screens  Weather Protections
  
Shelters  Coverings
  
Spread Under  Placed Around
  
Single Piece  Compound
    
Stitched  Unstitched
    
Made from Fiber  Made from Hair
    
Felted  Bound with Hair (Clothes)
      
(Part of the art of weaving)

Figure 3

In the first part, a series of ten divisions of protective devices reaches a definition not of the art of weaving, but of clothes-making.\textsuperscript{70} The Visitor at first somewhat oddly claims that weaving is

\textsuperscript{70} See, \textit{Statesman}, 279c7-280a1.
the largest part of clothes-making (δον ἐπὶ τῆ ὁματίων ἑργασία μέγιστον ἡν μόριον), and he attempts to get Young Socrates to agree that a definition has been reached. It turns out that this definition is incomplete.

In the second part of the *diairesis*, the Visitor proceeds in two steps. He begins by separating those arts that are akin to and share features with the art of weaving. The arts that are separated are the arts of fabricating blankets, of fabricating garments from vegetable fibers, of felting, of cobbling, of working with skins, of building shelters, of making protective products (that is, the art of joinery), of producing arms for defense, and of protective charms. Sayre remarks that all but one of these arts, the art of cobbling (σκυτοσομική), use terms to designate them which appear to be coined by Plato. These neologisms seem to satisfy "[t]he need for precise identification beyond general description" in order that "all kindred arts be specifically distinguished from weaving." In the second step the Visitor enumerates those arts that are related to clothes-making but are not part of the art of weaving. These arts are the art of breaking apart fibers, the art of carding, the art of manufacturing warp and woof, the art of fulling, the art of clothes-mending, and the arts responsible for making the tools used in weaving, namely, all the products that are contributory causes (συναλτιώς) of all things that are woven. Once again, three of the descriptive terms, διαλυτική (the art of breaking apart), ξαντική (fulling), and κναφευτική (the art of clothes-mending) are Platonic neologisms. The procedure that Plato utilizes of separating kindred arts is necessary in order to eliminate "the rival arts which will soon appear to challenge weaving."

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71 Statesman, 280a3-4 and 280e6.
72 These arts are separated at, Statesman, 280a8-e4.
73 See, Sayre, *Metaphysics and Method*, 105-106. It is also interesting to note that Plato's seems to display a considerable knowledge of the art of weaving.
74 Ibid., 112.
75 These arts are separated at Statesman, 281a5-c5.
76 Lane, *Method and Politics*, 49.
The third part yields the final definition of weaving. This *diairesis* separates particular arts in relation to their function. Figure 4 represents the final division.

**Final Division of Weaving**

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Expertise in Doing

Contributory Causes       Direct Causes

Art of the Fuller          Art of Wool-working

Washing Mending Looking After

Art of Separating          Art of Combining

Carding Art of the Shuttle

Art of Twisting            Art of Intertwining

Art of Warp Spinning       Art of Woof Spinning
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**Figure 4**

At first glance, the *diairesis* of weaving appears to be an example of right-hand division.

Indeed, the first part of the division at 279c7-283a8 follows the pattern initially set down in the *Sophist* of dichotomous division, that is, by "dividing in two the class that was posited" (σχίζοντες διαίρεις τὸ προτεθέν γένος). The left-hand terms are discarded while division of the right-hand terms proceeds toward the definition. In the second and third parts of the weaving division,

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77 The final division is at, *Statesman*, 281d8-283a8.
78 *Sophist*, 264d12-13.
however, a new procedure emerges; both left-hand and right-hand divisions are pursued. In these parts of the division of weaving we have the first examples of non-dichotomous division, a type of *diairesis* which will provide the paradigm for the division of the statesman later in the dialogue. This new method of dividing is essentially eliminative. "Weaving in effect is defined by *eliminating* other arts with which it shares relevant characteristics."[^79]

There is an apparent advantage to employing this eliminative approach. It is well to recall that the method of division and collection reaches a successful definition of a thing by furnishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort. The sufficient conditions are derived from the terms to be divided, while the necessary conditions are given by the collection of the right-hand terms which had been divided. Thus, both division and collection are required for a successful definition of the *definiendum*. The *diairesis* of weaving supplies an alternate method of attaining a successful definition. The task of discovering the necessary conditions for a thing to be such a thing no longer relies on the collection of divided terms. Rather, the necessary conditions depend on a paradigm which not only divides classes of things along the right-hand side, but also separates out on the left-hand side those terms that may be akin to, or share some characteristics with, the right-hand terms. In the former method of division and collection, the collection of terms on the right-hand side of the division appears to result in an increasing specification of terms for determining the necessary conditions for the *definiendum*. The terms used in the method of division and collection provide a general description of the *definiendum*. In contrast, the method of division and elimination provides a far greater degree of precision in the terms used in the *diairesis* by removing terms that could be mistaken for those that actually belong to the *definiendum*. This new method results in a more precise, and ultimately

successful, definition, but only to the extent that kindred terms have been correctly identified and separated.  

The final topic I wish to address in regard to the weaving paradigm concerns its relevance as a paradigm for the division of the statesman. There are two questions to consider. (1) What does weaving accomplish? (2) How does weaving apply to statesmanship?

In response to the first question, the Visitor declares that "the art of weaving is the intertwining of woof and warp" (πλεκτικήν εἶναι κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ὑφαντικήν). It is a skill of blending separate threads into whole cloth. It brings about a unified product from disparate elements by a process of blending the warp and woof into a single fabric. The expertise in weaving presents us with an interesting set of correspondences. The art of dialectic, too, may be viewed as a sort of weaving together of elements. In the Sophist, the Visitor remarks that "discourse comes to be through the weaving together of Forms with one another" (διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἴδων συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν). While it is apparent that this comment is directed toward discourse in general, it is not difficult to infer that it equally applies to dialectic which is but one specialized form of discourse. Sayre points out that that verb συμπλέκω is used at the very end of the Sophist in the passage where the Visitor asks Theaetetus whether they should "weave together" the various characteristics of the sophist in order to define him. Clearly, there is a connection in Plato's mind between the practice of dialectic and the art of weaving in the sense that both blend disparate elements into some single thing, whether it be a definition or a piece of cloth, through some sort of process of intertwining. In addition to the correspondence between weaving and dialectic, a second correspondence will be encountered

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80 Sayre notes that Plato's concern with employing precise terminology may account for the neologisms found in the division of weaving. See, Ibid., 112.
81 Statesman, 283b2.
82 Sophist, 259c5-6.
83 "[S]hall we weave together his name from start to finish?" (τοῦσμα συμπλέκαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀρχήν;). Sophist, 268c6. See, Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 94.
when we examine the definition and function of the statesman. The expert in statesmanship, like
the weaver, and like the dialectician, will know how to blend the different parts of the city into a
harmonious whole.

The art of weaving regarded as an expertise in blending together disparate things into a whole
appears to function quite well as a paradigm for Plato's philosophical method, including for the
diairesis of the statesman. But a question that must be asked is this: Does the art of weaving also
function well as a paradigm for the art of statesmanship and the role of the statesman? The
second question concerning the application of weaving to statesmanship may be given, I believe,
an affirmative answer. The art of weaving appears to be a suitable paradigm for the art of
statesmanship. Unlike the paradigm of the angler, which was determined not to be a
paradigmatic representation of the sophist, weaving does seem to be an analogous representation
of the function of a statesman; or, at least, the function of a statesman as it came to be regarded by
Plato in the late-period dialogues. While it is possible to argue that representing the task of the
statesman as analogous to the task of weaving is a misconception of political rule, it is not the
case that Plato has committed any sort of error in logic by making use of the paradigm of
weaving to illustrate the function of the statesman. Since Plato's view of the function of the
statesman was rooted in the idea that in order for there to be harmony in the political community
the disparate elements in a polis needed to be mixed together, it was necessary for him to employ
an appropriate representative paradigm. Sayre also holds this view: "[w]hen Plato was looking
around for a paradigm to illustrate the kind of blending skill involved in genuine statesmanship,
the art of weaving was close at hand."

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84 Political philosophers can certainly imagine many others ways in which a statesman can carry out the task of
governing besides that of weaving together the fabric of the political community. It is not my intention to enumerate
these different conception of the function of a statesman. It is enough to note that Plato's conception in not the only one
available.
85 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 94.
There is another response to these two questions; a response which accounts for the use of the weaving paradigm both in terms of it being a methodological paradigm and in terms of its relation as a paradigmatic representation of the function of the statesman. I would like to suggest that the appeal to what is in due measure is the connecting link between Plato's philosophical method and the Statesman's political philosophy. By linking the weaving paradigm and the function of expertise in statesmanship with *metrion*, the connection between the art of weaving and the art of statesmanship is established. Both the weaver paradigm and the statesman have a close relationship to the digression on due measure in the sense that both the art of weaving and the art of statesmanship are concerned with blending disparate elements together. As the art of weaving blends the warp and woof into a whole fabric in which both threads are combined, so, too, does the art of statesmanship blend the elements of the polis together into a single political fabric.

What is in due measure, in turn, may then be regarded as the common element to which the weaver paradigm and the statesman are related.

As I argued in the previous chapter, qualitative measurement functions to blend contraries by weighing them against a standard so that a mean results in which both contraries participate. This resulting mean, in turn, is an appeal to the interchangeable standards of what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite. In the art of weaving, in contrast, appears to be an example of something that is not excessive. Even though the *diairesis* of weaving is fairly lengthy (although not as long as other divisions, for example, the first division of the statesman), the value of its contribution to Plato's method justifies its length.

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86 Although he does not recognize the link between due measure and Plato's political philosophy, Hoffmann argues that due measure functions as a structural principle for *diairesis*. Building upon Miller's idea that Young Socrates represents one of the younger members of the Academy who display a certain haste in their investigations, Hoffmann argues that we "… gain an order in the dialogue in which 'the realization of the due-measure' as the structural principle of the art of leading a discussion is expressed. It is to be hoped that through the practicing of defining concepts not only the younger Socrates, but we too have become better dialecticians." Michael Hoffmann, "The 'Realization of the Due-Measure' as Structural Principle in Plato's Statesman," *Polis* 12 (1993), 94. Also see, Miller, *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, 5-8.

87 It is worth recalling that the digression on due measure begins with remarks about "excess and deficiency in general". As I mentioned previously, the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos is an example of something said at excessive length in relation to its contribution, although the Visitor does acknowledge that there was a reason for this length. See, *Statesman*, 286b8. The weaver paradigm, in contrast, appears to be an example of something that is not excessive. Even though the *diairesis* of weaving is fairly lengthy (although not as long as other divisions, for example, the first division of the statesman), the value of its contribution to Plato's method justifies its length.
weaving, the weaver sets about intertwining the separate strands of the warp and woof into a single piece of cloth. In effect, the weaver blends contrary things into something in which these two contrary elements are combined. As I have just noted, the statesman, too, weaves contrary elements in the polis in order to bring about a mixture which is an appropriate blending of these contraries. To put this another way, the appeal to what is in due measure applies both to the results of the weaving \textit{diairesis} and to the function of the statesman.\footnote{It is worth mentioning that the appeal to what is in due measure applies to all the arts, not simply the art of weaving or the art of statesmanship. Plato is not claiming that there is an absolute standard of due measure in itself. Rather, he is claiming that each individual art would have its own standard of \textit{to metrion} in respect to the particular requirement of that art.} Rather than viewing the art of weaving as a paradigmatic representation of the art of statesmanship, or, conversely, that the art of statesmanship is related to the paradigm of weaving as a paradigmatic representation, it may be best to regard \textit{both} the art of weaving and the art of statesmanship as related to what is in due measure. The function of the statesman does not follow directly from the function of the weaver. Rather, both the paradigm of weaving and the definition of the statesman are determined by what is in due measure. Due measure acts as a sort of bridge between weaving and statesmanship in the sense that both depend on the skill of blending disparate, or contrary, things.

\textbf{Becoming Better Dialecticians}

Immediately after the digression on due measure, the Visitor directs the discussion toward the topic of dialectics. He questions Young Socrates about what he thinks is the purpose of their examination. The Visitor first asks if a student learns his letters "more for the sake of answering a single question set before them" (\textit{\'e\nu\nu\kappa\alpha \mu\alpha \lambda\lambda\omicron \tau\omicron \\pi\rho\omicron\beta\lambda\iota\vartheta\epsilon\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\sigma\omicron}), or for the sake of "being able to answer all questions relating to letters" (\textit{\ita \tau\omicron \\pi\epsilon\omicron \\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha \tau\iota \\pi\rho\omicron\beta\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\epsilon\nu\nu}).\footnote{\textit{Statesman}, 285d1-3.} Young Socrates responds that learning one's letters is "Clearly for
the sake of his being able to answer all" (Δῆλον δὲ τοῦ περὶ ἀπαντα). The Visitor then inquires if the discussion is "for the sake of that very thing [that is, the statesman], or for the sake of becoming better dialecticians in regard to all things" (ἐνεκα αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ... μᾶλλον ὅ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικώτερος γίγνεσθαι). Once again, Young Socrates replies: "This, too, is clear, it is for the sake of being able in relation to all things" (Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον δὲ τοῦ περὶ πάντα). In other words, the Visitor is asking whether the purpose of their conversation is for learning to practice dialectics correctly, or for articulating a certain view of political philosophy. Is the dialogue an exercise with an abstract theoretical purpose, or should it be regarded as having some practicable purpose for philosophy?

The manner in which the Visitor asks his questions is somewhat ambiguous. The questions appear to be posed in the form of "is it for the sake of A, rather than for the sake of B," suggesting that the Visitor anticipates a reply from Young Socrates that chooses either A or B, but not both A and B. Yet, Young Socrates' responses to both questions indicate that he understands the questions in the sense that he is not required to choose either A or B, rather his answers strongly suggest (by use the terms ἀπαντα and πάντα) that both A and B are meant. Another possible way in which to regard the Visitor's questions, is to say that A implies B. Learning specific combinations of letters to answer a single question about them implies that the student is able to answer all questions about letters. Similarly, becoming a better dialectician implies being able to use one's knowledge of dialectical procedure to examine all instances for which the practice of dialectics prepares one; in this particular case, the statesman. Rowe comments: "In any case, however, no one would deny that finding the statesman is at least part of the purpose of the conversation in Plt. (and if the purpose were to make E. S. and Y. S. better able to discuss every

91 Statesman, 285d6-7.
92 Statesman, 285d8.
subject dialectically, it would also make them better able to discuss the statesman.)" 93 It does not, then, appear to be the case that the dialogue's is either a discussion of method or a treatise on political philosophy. 94 It is both in the sense that before one can turn to studying questions such as the statesman and the art of statesmanship, one must first acquire a suitable understanding of the method which will lead to knowledge of what is being examined. Once method is grasped, then examination will proceed correctly.

The Visitor then tells Young Socrates why dialectic is necessary. "No one having sense would wish to hunt down the definition of weaving for its own sake" ("Η ποι τῶν τῆς ύφαντικῆς γε λόγων αὐτῆς ταύτης ἔνεκα θηρεύειν οὐδείς ὃ ἐθελήσει οὐν ἐχος). 95 Rather, although for some things there are "certain perceptible likenesses" (αἰσθητάς τινες ὁμοιότητες) that aid one in being able to give and account of them, there is "no image of the things that are the most important and most valuable" (τοῖς δ᾽ αὐτ ἰέγέντως οὖσι καὶ τιμωστάτως οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνδόν οὐδέν). 96 One must work at "being able to give and receive an account of each thing" (λόγον ἐκάστων δυνατον εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι). 97 The greatest things can only be demonstrated by verbal (λόγος) means; perceptible likeness, or pictorial accounts, do not demonstrate the greatest matters. "Everything that is being said at present is for the sake of these things" (τούτων δὲ ἔνεκα

94 The fact that the dialogue is concerned with both method and political philosophy has not prevented scholars from choosing to emphasize one aspect over the other depending on what aspect they wish to highlight in their interpretations. Sayre, for example, concentrates on Plato’s method, while commentators such as Rosen and Lane focus their attention of the political dimensions of the Statesman. Both approaches are valid, provided that the interpreter acknowledges that the dialogue is concerned with more than either method or politics.
95 Statesman, 285d9-10.
96 Statesman, 285e4-286a1. Owen argues that what is fundamental in this passage is the distinction between what is depictable and what is undepictable. See, Owen, "Plato on the Undepictable," 138-147. Lane, too, interprets this passage in light of Owen's views. She argues that weaving is depictable, but that for giving an account of the greater things a logos, rather than "a picture of weaving was justified." Lane, Method and Politics, 74. In other words, the type of examination undertaken will necessitate the need for an account based upon either what is depictable or undepictable. In contrast, Scodel, appears to read the passage as somehow rejecting the weaving paradigm. "The digression on weaving is similarly dismissed." This view is, I think, incorrect. The passage does not reject weaving as a paradigm in the manner suggested by Scodel, since, after all, weaving is used as the paradigm for the statesman later in the dialogue. Scodel, Diatresis and Myth, 137.
97 Statesman, 286a5.
The Visitor remarks that it is better to practice on small things, that is, weaving, than on greater things, presumably, the art of statesmanship. The length of the discussion about weaving, the Myth of the Reversed Cosmos, and even the examination in the *Sophist* concerning the being of non-being was appropriate in view of their importance. Although the Visitor feared lest their discussions be superfluous (περιέργα), nevertheless they were of the proper length in relation the matters and purpose for which they were conducted. It was necessary to speak of these things at length for the sake of future investigations.

We should conclude then, along with the Visitor, that the digressions on the use of paradigms, the weaving paradigm, due measure, and the purpose of dialectics which interrupted the division of the statesman were necessary. Before a successful division of the statesman could be carried out certain theoretical concerns needed to be addressed and examined. It is arguable that theory must be analyzed before it can be applied. In the case of the *Statesman*, one must first confirm that the method employed is one that will lead to the correct definition of the *definiendum*. The statesman and the art of statesmanship cannot be properly determined until the method is shown to be sound. Young Socrates gave the correct answers. By becoming better dialecticians, skill in dialectical method leads to becoming better philosophers in general.

The Statesman Defined

The Visitor prefaces the final *diatresis* of the statesman with some brief comments about brevity and length in respect to whatever topic is under discussion. The length or brevity of something should not be judged in terms of relative measure, "but in accordance with the part of the art of measurement which we said before we must remember, in relation to what is fitting"

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98 *Statesman*, 286a7-8.
100 The passage is at, *Statesman*, 286c6-287b2.
(ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος ὃ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνήσθαι, πρὸς τὸ πρέπον), that is, in accordance with qualitative measurement. Since the second and final attempt to define the statesman is quite long, it is indeed fitting that the Visitor remind Young Socrates, as well as the readers of the dialogue, about their discussion of due measure. Yet, given the argument concerning excess and deficiency in general, the second division of the statesman should not be charged with being excessively long. Since the diairesis does result in a definition of the statesman, a definition that does set out the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a statesman, such a lengthy definition was required if it were actually to result in a correct definition of the definiendum. Its length is fitting when measured against the importance of its results. In the case of the statesman, one must not argue that the division was excessively lengthy in relation to less lengthy things. Rather the division is of a fitting length in accordance with a standard of measurement, since when the division is complete an account is able to be given of the statesman. Hence, we can then know what a statesman is and what functions he performs. As the Visitor states: "and in fact, should an account, even if it has been spoken at great length, makes the hearer more able to make discoveries, we should take this one seriously and feel no irritation at its length" (καὶ δὴ καὶ λόγον, ἄντε παμμῆκης λεχθεῖς τὸν ἀκούσαντα εὐρετικότερον ἀπεργάζηται, τοῦτον σπουδάζειν καὶ τῷ μῆκει μηδὲν ἀγανακτεῖν). The Visitor begins the second attempt to define the statesman by noting that the king (ὁ βασιλεὺς), that is, the statesman, has been separated from many other such sorts of things, especially from those concerned with herds. This sort of division of types of rulers is analogous with the separation of preventative arts in the weaving paradigm. In fact, the diairesis will follow the paradigm of weaving, not by making dichotomous divisions, but by dividing "limb by limb"
One of the purposes for which the weaving paradigm was introduced was to demonstrate non-dichotomous division. Just prior to the exposition of the paradigm, the Visitor noted that there are countless people (μυρίου) who dispute the role of the king "in regard to the care of cities" (περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐπιμελείας) who must be separated from the king. During the course of the diairesis, the Visitor identifies and separates four classes of things that compete with the statesman in the care of a polis. The first class to be identified and separated are a general class of things which the Visitor refers to as "contributory causes" (τῶν ... συνωμολόγων). These are the causes of things produced in the polis, and which are necessary for life in the polis, but are not the direct causes (τῶν αἰτίων) of the products of the art of statesmanship. Servants, or more correctly "those who are subordinate to the greatest extent" (Τῶν ... μεγάλου ὑπηρέτας), are the second class which needs to be separated. This is a class of individuals which can take part in public affairs, but which cannot be considered as exercising expertise in statesmanship.

The identification and separation of the third class is the most complex and lengthiest of the four separations of classes, taking up thirteen Stephanus pages. This class is comprised of regime-types and the rulers who govern them. They are essentially imitators of the sort of statesman which the Visitor is attempting to define; both the rulers and the regime over which they rule imitate the true statesman and the true art of statesmanship. They are described as a "very large mob" (πάμπολον ὁχλον), some of whom resemble various animals, both real and mythical. Among this group is to be found "the greatest sorcerer of all the sophists" (Τῶν

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104 Statesman, 287c3. It should be noted that this type of non-dichotomous division by limbs, or joints, is first encountered at Phaedrus, 265e1-2.
105 Statesman, 279a2-3.
106 Statesman, 287b6-7.
107 The contributory causes are separated at, Statesman, 287c1-289c2.
108 This class is separated at, Statesman, 289c4-290e8.
109 Statesman, 291a2-3 and 291a7-b2.
πάντων τῶν σοφιστῶν μέγεστον γόητα), the one who is "the most experienced in this skill" (παύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπεριστάτων), who although it is very difficult, must be separated "from those who truly are statesmen" (ἀπὸ τῶν δυντῶν δυντῶν πολεμικῶν). These individuals, along with the regimes they govern, must be separated from the regime-type and statesman "based on knowledge" (τῆς ἐπιστήμου) for they are not statesmen, but "experts in faction" (στασιαστικῶς), and "being the greatest imitators and sorcerers they turn out to be the greatest sophists among sophists" (ὅντας μιμητάς καὶ γόητας μεγίστως γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς). The reference to knowledge as the basis of statesmanship is the criterion for distinguishing true statesmanship from the kinds of imitative statesmanship. Sayre comments: "The defining difference between genuine statesmanship and its imitations is that the former, and the former only, practices a skill of just government in the interests of the populace at large. This skill is born of knowledge and as such is stronger than institutionalized law." The fourth class is one which consists of arts that are related to statesmanship, but which are not themselves part of the art of statesmanship. Each of these arts, oratorical skill, generalship, and judgship, has its own particular knowledge, or expertise, and each is subordinate (ὑπηρετική) to the statesman. The art of statesmanship controls (ἀρχουσαν) the other arts. "For what is truly kingship must not itself act, but must control those who have the capacity to act" (τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ὁσάν βασιλείαν οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ ἀρχεῖν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν) … and because the true statesman knows the opportune time for action, he instructs his

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110 Statesman, 291c3-5.
111 Statesman, 303c1-4. Presumably, the Visitor is referring not only to the sophist mentioned at Statesman, 291c3-5, but also to the sophist defined at Sophist, 268c1-d4, as an imitator who is incorrectly considered as having a name drawn from the name (παρωνύμου) of the person who is imitated.
112 The notion of statesmanship as a form of knowledge is found throughout the Statesman, beginning at 258b3-5. I shall take up further the connection between the art of statesmanship and knowledge in the next chapter.
113 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 118.
114 See, Statesman, 305a8-9.
subordinates, and "the others must do what has been prescribed" (τὰς δ’ ἀλλὰς τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾶν).\textsuperscript{115}

Table 2 illustrates the four classes and their members that are separated on the left-hand side of the final, non-dichotomous \textit{diairesis} of the statesman.

\textbf{Left-hand Divisions}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributory Causes</th>
<th>Subordinates</th>
<th>Imitative Politics</th>
<th>Governing Subordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>287c11-289c2</td>
<td>289c4-290e8</td>
<td>291a1-303d2</td>
<td>303e7-305d10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Slaves</td>
<td>Kingly Monarchy</td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>Tyrannical Monarchy</td>
<td>Generalship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Heralds, public servants</td>
<td>Aristocracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defenses</td>
<td>Diviners, priests</td>
<td>Oligarchy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lawful Democracy</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nourishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 2}

The complete final division of the statesman may now be briefly discussed. Although it is not specifically stated, the second division situates the art of statesmanship under the class of practical knowledge. The unsuccessful first division began by dividing knowledge into practical and theoretical, and then proceeding to attempt to define the statesman by placing him under the class of theoretical knowledge. Rather than performing a division of practical knowledge, the Visitor immediately posits a subclass of expertise in governing a polis. The \textit{diairesis} is carried out with a combination of dichotomous and non-dichotomous divisions. The subclasses on the right-hand side are divided in two, while the left-hand subclasses, following the pattern set down in the weaver paradigm, are non-dichotomously separated. It would seem that non-dichotomous

\textsuperscript{115} Statesman, 305d1-5.
division is necessary, as it was in the weaver paradigm, to eliminate functions that could be considered as part of the art of statesmanship. Yet, the right-hand divisions are carried out in accordance with the standard method of cutting two classes "through the middle" (διὰ μέσων) so that it will be more likely that the dialectician will encounter true classes.\footnote{See, \textit{Statesman}, 262b6-9.} Figure 5, which should be viewed in conjunction with Table 2, shows the final division of the statesman.

Final Division of the Statesman

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}
\centering
\scalebox{0.7}{
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node {Expertise in the polis} [level distance=1.5cm, level 1 distance=2cm]
  child {node {Contributory Causes (\textit{συναίτιες}) Direct Causes (\textit{αἴτια})}
    child {node {Subordinates}
      child {node {1 2 3 4}}
    }
    child {node {Governors}
      child {node {In Imitative Politics}}
      child {node {In Genuine Politics}}
    }
  }

  \end{tikzpicture}
}
\end{minipage}
The use of both dichotomous and non-dichotomous division serves two purposes. First, the right-hand divisions divide according to classes, or on Sayre's reading Forms, in order to discover what the sufficient conditions are for being a statesman. Second, the left-hand divisions, although they do not define the sufficient conditions, are necessary to eliminate any causes, practices, or skills that could mistakenly be identified with those of the true statesman. In effect, the left-hand division provides a degree of clarity in respect to the right-hand divisions. They assist in defining the *definiendum*, but are not themselves part of the definition, since they are not any of the sufficient causes of the *definiendum*. Sayre comments that the left-hand divisions provide "a scaffolding for the descriptive coloration needed to bring the picture of the statesman to life."¹¹⁷ In other words, while the right-hand divisions will still furnish the sufficient conditions for a successful definition, the definition is made clearer by eliminating on the left-hand side whatever may potentially blur the definition.

In accordance with the usual practice of the method of division and collection, the Visitor next collects the terms in order to set out the necessary conditions for the statesman. At long last, it appears that the statesman is defined. The statesman is the person who "controls all of these [that is, generalship, judgeship, and rhetoric], and the laws, and cares for everything in the city, weaving all things together in the most correct manner, by embracing its power with the name belonging to the whole, we would most correctly, it seems, call it statesmanship" (*Τὴν δὲ πασῶν τε τούτων ἀρχουσαν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελομένην καὶ πάντα συνυφαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα, τοῦ καὶ κόσμου τῇ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς προσαγορεύομεν δικαιότατ' ἀν, ὡς ἐοικε, πολιτικήν*).¹¹⁸ But it does not yet seem to be the case that the Visitor is finished with setting down a full exposition of the art of statesmanship.

¹¹⁸ *Statesman*, 305e2-6.
After the necessary and sufficient conditions have been established, the Visitor further clarifies the statesman's function in the polis in terms "fabricating the web of state."\(^{119}\) We should take note that in the definition, one of the statesman's roles is to weave together everything in the polis. In order to illustrate how this weaving, or intertwining (συμπλοκή) operates, the Visitor examines in the remainder of the dialogue the manner in which the statesman weaves together, or mixes, contrary characteristics of the citizens into a mixture that shares in both of them.\(^{120}\) The significant point to note in relation to this chapter's examination is that the task of political weaving is carried out in accordance with what is in due measure. The citizens' contrary natures are woven together into a complete fabric as the product of the art of statesmanship, which, in turn, brings about the happiness of the polis. It is arguable that simply positing a definition of the statesman according to the method of division and collection is insufficient for a complete understanding of the art of statesmanship. The Visitor must also show by example how the statesman must practice the art of statesmanship. In other words, defining the necessary and sufficient conditions of the definiendum is not enough. In order to possess full knowledge of a thing, it must also be shown how a thing functions.

It is obvious that the notion of weaving as a metaphor for the art of statesmanship is adopted from the weaving paradigm. The statesman-as-weaver adds a further significance to the weaving paradigm. Not only does the diairesis of weaving furnish a paradigm for the correct manner in which dialectical inquiry should be carried out, but weaving and the weaver supply a paradigmatic representation of statesmanship and the statesman. Like the weaver, the statesman possess expertise in blending disparate elements into a unified whole. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, due measure, which is closely related to the art of weaving in the sense that the


\(^{120}\) See, *Statesman*, 306a1-311c7. The passage will be fully explored in the next chapter.
weaver intertwines the warp and woof into a whole cloth, is also extended to the task of governing. If it is correct to suggest that an illustration of how a thing functions is required to complete the definition of a thing, and if, as in the paradigmatic case of weaving and in the particular case of the statesman, an appeal to what is in due measure is the basis for seeing how a thing functions, then it follows that to metrion has some sort of connection with method. The final diairesis and discussion of the function of the statesman suggest that in the last part of the Statesman, Plato is positing a variant form of the method of division and collection. It is a variant method that requires that the full definition be not merely the demonstration of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be such a thing, but that its function also be identified in accordance with to metrion, if the definiendum requires it.121

The significance of the definition of the statesman should not be underestimated. It makes use of and illustrates the significance of all the digressions in the Statesman. It illustrates the proper employment of paradigms in order to arrive at an appropriate definition. It utilizes the paradigm of weaving both as a correct paradigmatic representation for the art of statesmanship and for the sort of task that both the weaver and the statesman undertake. It relates, by means of the weaving paradigm and the functions of the statesman, to metrion to method and function. And finally, the entire process of diairesis and discussion of function demonstrates how the examination of theory and practice are both required for those who desire to become better dialecticians.

**Due Measure and Division**

The final diairesis of the statesman furnishes Plato's final use of the method of division and collection in the corpus; the method does appear in the works composed after the time of the

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121 It is not the case that all definienda require their function to be identified in accordance with to metrion. While the function of the statesman does require it, it does not appear to be the case that that the angler, for example, does. The criterion for determining whether or not the function of a thing is required to be in accordance with what is in due measure is left unspecified in the Statesman.
Sayre is correct to point out that "we have no way of knowing whether the procedures followed here represent the author's final thoughts on the use of paradigms in dialectic." Even though there is the opportunity in the works written after the Statesman, especially in the Philebus, for Plato to employ the method of division and collection, there appears to be no sound textual support for attempting to show why he did not continue to employ this method. There is, however, a somewhat different method encountered in the final works that may be regarded as a variant of the method of division and collection. This method, too, is directed toward positing a definition of the definiendum, but in a way that blends the discarded terms of a division in order to set down the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to of such a sort. Rather than simply collecting the divided right-hand terms, it operates by first dividing a class either into contrary characteristics, or at least into separate elements, and then blends the separated elements, according to a standard of measurement, into something in which the elements share. This method may be termed the method of division and blending. It is a variant of the method of division and collection, applied to the sort of subject matter – weaving or statesmanship, for example – that requires a normative appeal to due measure in order for an acceptable definition to result. The method we find in the final pages of the Statesman, is the basis of the philosophical method underlying the Philebus and the Laws. It is a logical structure for analyzing contraries in accordance with to metrion that issues in a definition. To illustrate this method, I shall discuss three examples, one each from the Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws.

I have commented in the previous section that one of the tasks of the statesman is to know the manner in which opposing characteristics can be intertwined so that something new is brought

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122 On a chronological reading of the dialogues, it is plausible to claim that, with the possible exceptions of the Timaeus and the Critias, only the Philebus and the Laws were composed after the Statesman.

123 Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 135.

124 One could, of course, argue that the method is not Plato's, but is that of the Elean Visitor. But leaving aside the question of the Visitor's identity, which I shall take up in Appendix 4, the fact the method is employed in the Phaedrus would seem to indicate that division and collection was a Platonic method.
about in which the opposing characteristics share. The statesman, like those who possess expert knowledge, voluntarily combines both the good and bad elements in what they produce, rejecting as much as possible what is bad, and taking what is suitable and useful from them, elements that are both alike and unlike, he collects all of them into one, crafting some single capacity and form" (τὰ μὲν μοχθηρὰ εἰς δύναμιν ἀποβάλλει, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια καὶ χρηστὰ ἔλαβεν, ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ ὑμοίων καὶ ἀνυμοίων ὄντων, πάντα εἰς ἐν αὐτὰ συνάγονσα, μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ). In the Statesman, the Visitor argues that "moderation is something distinct from courage" (σωφροσύνην γε ἄνδρείας μὲν ἕτερον), and "in some way, they are very much enemies to each other" (κατὰ δὴ τίνα τρόπον, εὐ μάλα πρὸς ἄλληλας ἔχθρα). Some citizens are too moderate and are liable to act too cowardly for their own good and the good of the community. Others possess an excessive amount of courage which may lead to rash actions that can harm both themselves and the polis. The statesman's task is to blend individuals who possess an excess these opposing traits into citizens who possess a balance of the two, just like a weaver intertwines the warp and woof. He accomplishes this by finding a mean, or a standard of measurement, against which these opposing tendencies can be weighed and blended.

In terms of method, what the Visitor does is to divide a class of character traits, or virtues, into two, moderation and courage. Each of these subclasses is further divided into two contrary parts, one that represents a fine example of moderation or courage, another that represents a bad example. Moderation, then, is divided into orderliness and cowardice, while courage is divided into keenness or what may be termed manic excessiveness (ὕβριστικὰ καὶ μανικὰ). Once these contraries have been identified and divided, it falls to the statesman to find the way to blend them.

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125 Statesman, 308c4-7.
126 Statesman, 306b2-10.
127 See, Statesman, 309b2-7.
so that a person ends up possessing these traits in the correct proportion, and thus becomes a well-blended individual. Figure 6 is a diagrammatic representation of the process.

The Blending of Moderation and Courage

![Diagram of Moderation and Courage]

Figure 6

A similar sort of division and blending is encountered throughout the *Philebus*. Indeed, it would not be stretching the point too far to suggest that the notion of dividing and measuring what has been divided according to a standard of measurement in order to arrive at some middle position is fundamentally important for this dialogue. Among the major instances of the use of this method is the initial discussion between Socrates and Protarchus about the life of pleasure, the life of intellect, and the life that is a mixture of the two in some correct proportion; the division of "all the things that are at present in the cosmos" (*Πάντα τὰ νῦν ἄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ*), the

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129 In this section, I am only concerned with the method underlying the *Philebus'* arguments. A more complete discussion of the arguments will be given in Chapter 8.

130 I am not suggesting that the purpose of the *Philebus* is to illustrate the method of division and blending in relation to a standard of measurement, or due measure. Rather, the arguments advanced in the dialogue, as well as the conclusions reached, are closely connected with the methodological employment of *diairesis* and due measure.
unlimted (ἀπερῶν), limit (περᾶς), the being that is mixed and generated from these two (ἐκ τούτων ... μελκτήν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν), and that which is the cause and generation of the mixture (τὴν δὲ τῆς μείζεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως); and near the dialogue's conclusion, the determination and ranking of the types of lives. Additionally, there are minor instances in which a single concept, ignorance for example, is divided into subclasses in order to show that there is more than one way in which a person can be said not to know himself.

By way of illustration, let us consider how the method of division and blending is carried out in the case the best sort of life. In the Philebus, two types of life are posited as the best. Socrates summarizes that Philebus believes a life of pleasure is the best, whereas Socrates maintains the life of knowledge is the best. A lengthy and complex discussion ensues in which pleasure is examined in great detail. It eventually turns out that there some pleasures that are mixed with pains, and some that are unmixed. Of the pleasures that are mixed, some are mixed badly, others are mixed well in respect to knowledge. Socrates and Protarchus then examine understanding and knowledge (νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης). It would appear that a life of pure knowledge would be the best. Yet, Socrates asks whether anyone would really desire a life of knowledge unmixed with pleasure. As in the case of pleasure, knowledge can be divided into mixed and unmixed; the mixed type can be further divided into a type that is mixed badly or mixed well. The upshot of this discussion is that the good should be sought in a life that blends

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131 See, Philebus, 21a8-22b2, 23c4-27c1, 66a4-d2.
132 See, Philebus, 48d8-e10. One can be ignorant of oneself in respect to believing that he is more wealthy than he is, that he possesses greater physical advantages than he does, and most importantly, that he is superior in virtue when in fact he is not.
133 This account greatly simplifies a series of complex arguments for the sake of demonstrating the general outline of the manner in which the method of division and blending is employed.
134 See, Philebus, 11b4-c3.
135 See, Philebus, 50b1-4 and 52c8.
136 See, Philebus, 55b1-c1. It would be absurd for unmixed pleasure to be good, Pleasure must be mixed with knowledge in accordance with a standard of measure in order for it to be good. In other words, the blending of pleasure and knowledge implies that the combination of the two is mixed well.
137 This investigation takes place between, Philebus, 55c4-59d2.
138 See, Philebus, 60d3-e5.
well-mixed pleasures with knowledge that is well-blended in respect to pleasure. Figure 7 represents the way in which these concepts are divided and blended.

**The Blending of the Best Life**

![Diagram of the Blending of the Best Life]

The method of division and blending in encountered in the *Laws*, although not to the extent that it is employed in the *Philebus*. This is not to say that the notion of finding a middle position between extremes that is a mixture of the extremes that weighs them against a standard of measure is not of great importance in the *Laws*. I am simply claiming that the method is not employed with the frequency of use found in the *Philebus*. We do find, however, that the method is utilized at a crucial point in the text, in the discussion in Book III of regime types.

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139 See, *Philebus*, 63d1-64a5 and 66a4-8.
140 As will be made clear in Chapter 9, *to metrion* is at the core of the *Laws*’ arguments.
141 It is arguable that it was not necessary to work through the sorts of divisions and blendings that were required in the *Philebus*. There is a sense that the concepts utilized by the Athenian were already familiar, and that there was no need to define them again by the frequent use of Plato’s preferred philosophical method. Additionally, it is plausible to suggest that the practicable nature of the *Laws* did not require the sort of methodological underpinning that a more hypothetical, or theoretical, examination would seem to need.
142 The fact that the method is obviously employed in this section of the text lends some support to what was mentioned the previous footnote, namely, that the method is required more in a theoretical context than in a context that is setting
There are two mother-constitutions (ἐίσιν πολιτείαν οἴον μητέρες δύο τινές) from which all the other constitutions are derived. These two forms of constitutional arrangement are monarchy and democracy, and it appears to be the case that the other forms of regime are derived from them. The Athenian argues that the correct constitution must share in the forms of monarchy and democracy, and without so doing it can never be governed well. He then demonstrates by means of a historical narrative that the Persian monarchy and the Athenian democracy, when taken by themselves, are incorrect constitutional forms because they have tended to an excess of their constitutional forms.143 The Persian monarchy fails as a model of the best form of constitution because it is excessively authoritarian. The Athenian democracy exhibits a contrary failure, it permits an excessive degree of freedom to its citizens. Both constitutions are unjust in that both are excessive in their practices. It is only by blending the two types that a regime may enjoy "freedom and friendship along with wisdom" (ἐλευθερία τ' ἕσται καὶ θλία μετὰ φρονήσεως).144 In other words, the Persian monarchy and the Athenian democracy represent the two extremes of incorrectly organized regimes, neither of which possess freedom, friendship, and wisdom. It is by blending these two constitutional forms into a third type that falls in between the two that the correct constitution can be established. As in the previous two examples, the best constitution is found by blending contraries against a standard of measure. More specifically, the extremes are weighed and reconciled in accordance with what is in due measure. Figure 8 shows how the method divides and blends constitutional forms.145

143 See, Laws, 694a3-698a7 for the account of the Persian monarchy, and 698a9-701d3 for that of the Athenian democracy.
144 Laws, 693d2-e3.
145 Although the Athenian does not discuss it, we can infer that there are opposite forms of excessive monarchy and democracy, neither of which would suitable in themselves as the best form of regime. Hypothetically, the opposite of an excessive monarchy would be one in which the ruler was weak and did not exercise a sufficient degree of authority over the citizens. In the case of democracy, the opposite of the type which granted too much freedom to its citizens would be one in which the freedom of its citizens would be in some manner restricted.
The Best Constitution

Constitutional Forms

Monarchy

(Deficient Monarchy) Excessive Monarchy (Persia)

Democracy

Excessive Democracy (Athens) (Deficient Democracy)

Best Constitutional Form

Figure 8

These three example illustrate the manner in which *diairesis* and due measure function as a variant of the method of division and collection. In all these cases, the need to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort is accomplished by the method of division and blending. Contraries are weighed and blended, or reconciled, with each other in order to bring about a third thing – whether it be the well-ordered individual, the best sort of life, or the best constitutional form – that shares in the characteristics of the two contraries. The contrary characteristics are reconciled by weighing them against a standard of measurement, that is, they are weighed in accordance with *to metrion*. The philosophical method I have termed the method division and blending furnishes the means by which a dialectician is able to set down the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort in those instances in which contraries are required to be blended in respect to a standard of measurement for the sake of furnishing a definition.

This analysis of the philosophical methods found in Plato's dialogues has attempted to reveal the basic functioning of the logical structure underlying Plato's arguments. There does, in fact,
appear to be a development to his use of method in the sense that method is formulated to meet the requirements of a particular manner of conducting philosophical inquiry. In broad outline, we can summarize the trajectory of this development as follows. In the Socratic dialogues, the elenchus was employed in the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to find the definition of things, and thereby have knowledge of the thing under examination. In the middle-period works, the method of hypothesis was directed primarily toward determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a given proposition. In the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, the method of division and collection was directed toward a different end, the discovery of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort, that is, to furnish a definition of a thing. In all these cases, the ultimate goal of the use of a particular method was to employ method as the foundation for knowledge.

The method of division and blending, although it is a variant of the method of division and collection, aims at the same goal. It defines a thing by attempting to reveal how contrary things relate to one another. It accomplishes this by weighing contraries against a standard of measurement in order to blend the contraries together. The method of division and blending not only develops out of the method of division and collection, but also that at the center of this method lies *to metrion*. Without having *to metrion* as a standard against which contraries are weighed, the method of division and blending would be unsuccessful, if not outright useless. Unless we are aware that there is such a thing as what is in due measure, there is virtually no way in which we could be able to blend contraries. That fact that Plato uses the method of division and blending extensively in the *Statesman*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*, suggests that *to metrion* is of great significance for his late-period philosophical method.
CHAPTER 7
MODERATING THE POLIS:
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATESMAN

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the political philosophy of the Statesman in relation to *metrion*. While the primary focus of this analysis is on due measure and Plato's political thought, it is necessary to interpret the dialogue's political philosophy in a general sense as well. It is not so much the case that the political thought of the Statesman is entirely influenced by due measure, rather, due measure should be regarded as a primary influence on Plato's late-period political philosophy in general. There are several other concerns – for example, education, the rule of law, the role of knowledge, and the relationship between political expertise and the practice of politics – which are examined throughout the corpus and which are integral in particular to the Statesman's political philosophy and in general to the political thought of Plato's late-period works. One task of this chapter's discussion is to determine the manner in which these fundamental concerns fit in the context of the political thought of the Statesman. Although it is plausible to claim that due measure exerts a strong influence on some aspects of Plato's late-period thought, due measure should not be considered as the sole major influence on it; there are other influences at work as well. Therefore, an interpretation of the Statesman's political philosophy in general is required.

The analysis in the previous chapter attempted to demonstrate that the role of the statesman and expertise in statesmanship are related to and result from the Visitor's discussion of philosophical method. Most notable is the connection which the Visitor makes between the weaver and the statesman; the former weaves the contrary elements of the warp and woof into a piece of whole cloth, the latter blends opposing character traits of individuals into a harmonious
While it does appear to be the case that there is a direct connection between the weaver and the statesman, it cannot be maintained that the expertise in weaving is identical to art of statesmanship. It seems more reasonable to regard them as analogous. Both are related to and derived from due measure in the sense that both the weaver and the statesman require expertise in blending contrary, or opposing, elements. By knowing what is in due measure both the weaver and the statesman will then attain the knowledge necessary either to weave a piece of whole cloth or blend together the fabric of the polis.

The primary thesis of my interpretation of the *Statesman's* political philosophy is as follows. The art of statesmanship consists in understanding the best manner in which a political community can be arranged, and how politics can be practiced, in accordance with moderation. It requires that the statesman possess the *politikē epistēmē* to weigh and blend the disparate elements of a polis against a standard which is itself a mean between extremes. If we consider this mean to be a position functionally equivalent to the virtue of moderation, then, in effect, politics is knowing why, when, and in what way to act moderately. This suggests that the political philosophy of the *Statesman*, because it is derived from knowing what is in due measure rather than from the apprehension of the Forms, is more practicable than the political thought of Plato's middle-period dialogues.

The connection between Plato's philosophical method and the discussion of the statesman suggests a relationship between theory and practice. In the previous chapter I tried to show that the *Statesman* is neither a theoretical work concerned with dialectics, nor is it a work of political philosophy which just so happens to include a long, perhaps even tedious, discussion of method.  

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1 It is well to keep in mind that weaving functioned as the paradigm for *dai̱eresis*. Without the establishment of a proper paradigm, neither could the division of the statesman be carried out successfully, nor could the statesman's function be identified by analogy to the weaver.

2 Taylor expresses the opinion that the first attempt to define the statesman "involves a rather tedious exercise in division (dai̱eresis) . . ." Q. P. Taylor, "Political Science or Political Sophistry? A Critique of Plato's *Statesman," Polis
The method of correct dialectical inquiry supplies the logical structure in which philosophical examination may be carried out. In the Statesman, the methodological discussions may be viewed as the theoretical basis for the practical investigation of the statesman and the art of statesmanship. To put this another way, theory may be put into practice in the sense that the theoretical can have practical effects. Yet, Plato does not appear to regard the relationship between theory and practice in the Kantian sense that theory entails general rules that may be applied in particular circumstances.\textsuperscript{3} Márquez draws a distinction between theoretical general rules that may be applied in practice and the more narrowly construed theoretical knowledge that one must possess in order to practice one's technē correctly. "Indeed, the Stranger explicitly claims that the πολιτική of the statesman must be the knowledge that applies to each particular circumstance in political life, not simply a knowledge of general laws, and indeed not even a knowledge that can be fully expressed in general laws."\textsuperscript{4} The statesman requires a specialized knowledge of the art of governing a polis that results from a theoretical examination, not of general considerations, but of the specific theoretical conditions that apply to the art of statesmanship. That is to say, the theoretical conditions of statesmanship are those that are specifically applicable to the art of statesmanship; they are not the sort of general conditions under which the art of statesmanship may be subsumed. For Plato, the relation between theory and practice is one that must utilize a particular theoretical framework in relation to a specific practice. It would appear, then, that in the Statesman, there is a restricted sense in which we should regard the relation between theory and practice; the specific theoretical considerations of the Visitor's discussion of method leads to the practice of the art of statesmanship.

\textsuperscript{17} (2000), 93. Guthrie comments: "The Politicus has been called a 'weary' dialogue." Unfortunately he does not cite any specific references to the commentators who regarded the Statesman as being weary. Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 164.


Not only do we find a connection between theory and practice in this dialogue, but there is also a relationship between practice and practicability. I believe that it is plausible to maintain that Plato intended the results of the Visitor's examination of the statesman and the art of statesmanship to be applied in actual political practice. It is a mistake to regard the Statesman as simply a theoretical treatise on dialectical theory and practice, but one that lacks any practicability. My interpretation of the dialogue suggests that the definition of the statesman and his function were meant to be regarded by Plato's audience as furnishing a template and guide for a political ruler and for the manner in which politics ought to be practiced. The dialogue does not explore solely the relationship between theory and practice, rather in addition to this relationship, it suggests that there is a further relationship between theory, practice, and practicability. Once theory provides the logical structure for examining practice, then the results of this combined analysis may be taken up and applied in actual practice. If this reading is correct, then any interpretation of the Statesman needs to consider not only the dialogue's philosophical content, but also the practicable implications of Plato's arguments.

Another fundamental concern is that if there is a practicable dimension to the Statesman's arguments, in what way does it differ or remain similar to the types of solutions posited by Plato in respect to the political philosophy of other dialogues. In Chapter 2, I discussed the notion of complementarity. I argued that it is reasonable to consider Plato's various solutions to certain problems as complementing one another. Rather than taking a strong developmentalist position and arguing that Plato's late-period dialogues reflect an improvement over the philosophy in the works that preceded them, it is perhaps best to regard the late works as offering arguments and solutions that complement those given in the dialogues of the early and middle periods. What changes, as I have previously discussed, is the way in which Plato's political solutions may be best put into practice. There is a greater sense that the Statesman supplies a more practicable
solution than the one offered in the Republic. It would appear to be the case that political rule by an individual who possesses expert knowledge of statesmanship is less difficult to bring about than a political community ruled by philosopher-kings. In the Statesman, it is arguable that the expert in the art of statesmanship is a more practicable version of the philosopher-king. Cooper comments: "The king is assimilated to the statesman, not the other way about." Yet, we should not claim that the statesman replaces the philosopher-king in Plato's political thought; the statesman is a complementary solution to the philosopher-king in respect to what manner political rule is best exercised.

The interpretation of the Statesman which follows in the remainder of this chapter is based on four presuppositions: (1) to metrion plays a role of fundamental importance for Plato's late-period philosophy; (2) there are aspects to Plato's overall position that do not necessarily depend in themselves on due measure, but which must be considered alongside it in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Statesman's political thought; (3) the political philosophy of this dialogue has a greater degree of practicability than the political works from the early and middle periods; (4) the solutions presented in the work complement those given in other works.

The chapter is arranged into three main sections. In the first, I examine general issues related to the Statesman taken as a whole. There are three primary aspects to investigate. First, we should consider whether or not the Statesman presents a political philosophy that could be successful if put into practice. Second, the structure and form of dialectical inquiry should be examined to determine if it is carried out correctly by the Visitor and Young Socrates. Third, the identity and the function of the Visitor himself needs to be addressed. The second part of the chapter will discuss four aspects of the Statesman's political philosophy: (1) the limited

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discussion concerning education; (2) the rule of law; (3) the Visitor's categorization of regime-types; (4) the concept of expert knowledge, or politikē epistēmē. The central focus of my interpretation of the dialogue – the relation between what is in due measure and the dialogue's political philosophy – will be analyzed in the third and final section. The main point I wish to emphasize is that at the conclusion of the work the statesman employs his expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship to moderate the disparate elements of the soul and the polis into a suitable mixture for the sake of both the individual and the community. The statesman puts into practice the theoretical discussion concerning due measure to arrange things so that they are "removed from the extremes to the middle" (eis to méson ἀποκισθη τῶν ἐσχάτων). In short, the task of the statesman is to discover the appropriate degree of moderation in order to ensure the well-being of the citizen and the polis. By so doing, both the souls of the citizens will be made moderate and politics will be practiced with moderation.

General Considerations Concerning the Statesman

1. The Statesman's Political Philosophy

Regardless of whether or not one chooses to concentrate on the theoretical aspects of the Statesman or on the work's political thought, there is a fundamental question which arises and needs to be addressed concerning the statesman and the art of statesmanship: Do the conclusions reached at the end of the dialogue furnish the basis for good politics and political practice? It is arguable that the Statesman displays both successful and unsuccessful aspects in terms of articulating a political philosophy which can be put into practice. The dialogue's political

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6 Statesman, 284e7-8.
7 One could, of course, argue that by linking the art of statesmanship with the art of weaving, Plato is limiting his views on the practice of politics to one that expresses a particular conception of politics. As I noted in the previous chapter, it seems to be the case that in the late-period dialogues, Plato strongly held the position that politics should be treated as the art of blending, or reconciling, contrary elements for the sake of the good of the political community. It also is
philosophy succeeds in the sense that by defining the statesman, the political philosophy of the
*Statesman* demonstrates the type and function of the sort of individual who is most suited for
governing a political community. The statesman is the sort of person who employs expertise in
the art of statesmanship (*politikē epistēmē*), in accordance with what is in due measure, to bring
about the best conditions for the polis and its citizens. It falls short in that it does not furnish a
comprehensive political philosophy because several aspects of the statesman's role are left under-
determined. Certain essential components of politics and political philosophy are not thoroughly
examined. Among the topics requiring more extensive analysis are the education of the citizen,
the education and nurture of the statesman, the rule of law, and the role of political knowledge.
All of these topics will be examined in detail during the course of this chapter.

Overall, there is a sense of ambiguity in the dialogue's political thought. Schofield remarks:
"... the dialogue does not reflect as widely as it might have done on the framework of politics and
the role political knowledge might play within it." Klosko also finds the *Statesman's* political
philosophy to be incompletely developed. "Plato's outlook in the work is ambivalent." Yet, the
under-determination of the dialogue's political thought does not imply that somehow the work is
completely unsuccessful. This sense of ambiguity, or ambivalence, has led certain scholars to

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8 By the term ambiguity I simply mean that certain basic questions regarding political practice are left under-
determined. Roochnik argues that Plato's dialogues are ambiguous in a general sense. "... because they are
underdetermined, the Platonic dialogues are residually ambiguous, i.e., capable of sustaining two or more distinct
meanings." In reference to the *Statesman*, Roochnik presses this notion even further: "Platonic ambiguity is residual
and cannot be eliminated, because the teaching of the dialogue – its content, what it takes to be the truth – is itself
ambiguous." I think that Roochnik overstates his case. Undoubtedly, many texts can be said to be ambiguous since
they are subject to more than one interpretation. In the case of Plato, a careful reading of the entire corpus suggests that
his principal philosophical positions may be determined. Furthermore, the philosophy of the *Statesman* is not
ambiguous in Roochnik's sense; it seems reasonably clear what is the work's philosophical content. What is
ambiguous, however, is the full determination of certain aspects of the dialogue's political theory. David Roochnik,
www.nd.edu/~plato/plato5issue/contents5.htm.
argue that the *Statesman* fails as a work of political theory. The interpretations of Benardete and Taylor are among the more negative readings of the *Statesman*’s political thought. Benardete, in the context of discussing the dialogue's digressions, asserts: "The movement of the *Statesman* is perverse. It is one long descent into the cave."\(^{11}\) Apparently, the work's content does not serve to enlighten the reader about method and politics, rather, Plato's arguments act to return us to the realm of shadowy opinions exemplified by the cave.\(^{12}\) Q. P. Taylor, writing under the influence of Popper's totalitarian reading of Plato's political philosophy, concludes: "As such, the *Statesman* (in both its method and prescriptions) is grossly deficient as a work of political theory."\(^{13}\) In particular, Taylor objects to the notions of absolute rule and the eugenics program which the Visitor outlines in the work.\(^{14}\) Both readings, I think, miss the more fundamental concerns that Plato attempted to address in this dialogue, namely, that before politics should be engaged in it is necessary to define the person and the art of the person who is to govern, and that political rule requires a particular sort of politikē epistēmē if it is to have any possibility of success. Despite the ambiguities of the *Statesman*’s political philosophy, these are significant accomplishments in themselves, and the dialogue should not be considered either as a "descent into the cave" or as "grossly deficient".

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\(^{11}\) Benardete, *Being of the Beautiful*, III, 105.

\(^{12}\) Although it is not certain, Benardete might be suggesting that the *Statesman*’s political thought fails because, in contrast to the metaphysical grounding of the *Republic*’s political philosophy, it is oriented more practicably. Rather than turning to the intellection of the Forms as the foundation for knowledge of political practice, the turn in the *Statesman* to political knowledge derived from the understanding of non-metaphysical concerns, such as what is in due measure, implies that politics is grounded in what can be known from consideration of things in the sensible world. In this sense, then, it can be said that we have returned to the cave.

\(^{13}\) Taylor, "Political Science or Political Sophistry?", 109.

\(^{14}\) By situating himself in the Popperian tradition, Taylor focuses excessively on those aspects of Plato's political philosophy that appear repugnant to an anti-totalitarian perspective. While it is understandable how Popper could have formulated his views in light of the damage inflicted by mid-twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, it is a hermeneutical error to interpret a Platonic dialogue within the sort of anti-totalitarian framework employed by Popper and his followers. Undoubtedly, there are aspects of Plato's philosophy that are at odds with contemporary sensibilities, but it is surely the case that Plato overriding concern was with articulating the conditions for human well-being, even if some of his proposals might strike a contemporary interpreter as too harsh. The fact that many contemporary Plato scholars (whether correctly or not) look to the dialogues for arguments that are relevant to liberal democratic political theory suggests that viewing Plato as some sort of totalitarian thinker is perhaps at best too restricted, and at worst misguided.
I believe that perhaps the best manner in which to regard the political philosophy of the *Statesman* is to argue that it is a transitional dialogue between the *Republic* and the *Laws*. It functions as a hinge, or bridge, between the metaphysically grounded political thought of the middle-period works and the far more practicably oriented thought of Plato's final work. Klosko comments: "The *Statesman* stands midway between the worlds of Plato's two major political dialogues." 15 While the *Statesman's* political philosophy displays certain ambiguities, it is arguable that they become fully worked out in the *Laws*. It also is arguable that it was not Plato's intention to articulate a comprehensive political theory in the *Statesman*. It is well to remember that this dialogue treats both theory and practice, and that the work's treatment of politics is in a sense subordinate to the discussion of philosophical method. This is not to suggest, however, that the Visitor's discussion of the art of statesmanship is in any way inferior to his examination of method. Rather, it appears to be the case that the somewhat shorter treatment of politics was of a suitable length to illustrate correct dialectical procedure in the far longer part of the dialogue. To put this another way, if the primary purpose of the *Statesman* is to instruct us in how we may best know a thing through the proper use of dialectical examination, then obviously some sort of example needs to be utilized to demonstrate the method. The statesman and the art of statesmanship were chosen for this task. Yet, it would be wrong to regard the statesman as merely an example to be used for the sake of illustrating the manner in which method should operate. Simultaneously with its use as a subject for dialectical inquiry, the examination of the statesman presents us with Plato's initial late-period views on political philosophy. We should not expect a comprehensive political theory without any ambiguities remaining. Rather, we should consider the political thought of the *Statesman* as an example of the type of practical philosophy that flows from the work's method, and which furnishes the basis for further

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discussion in the dialogues that chronologically follow. On a general level, we should regard the relationship between the *Statesman's* method and political philosophy as one which demonstrates how theory may be put into practice.

On the one hand, due to the ambiguities and incompleteness of the *Statesman's* political thought, it cannot be said that this dialogue provides a firm enough foundation for good politics. As I have indicated, there are more aspects to Plato's views on politics that require further theorizing before we can claim that his views will lead to the sort of political practice which will ensure the good of the polis. On the other hand, the conclusions reached about the statesman and the art of statesmanship do supply a reasonable and viable starting-point for good politics. There are three aspects of this dialogue's political thought that may be viewed as the basis for good political rule. First, rule by a statesman possessing *politikē epistēmē* appears to be a plausible complementary solution to the *Republic's* rule by philosopher-kings. Next, the notion of the rule of law as a second-best alternative to rule without law by an expert appears to be a more practicable approach to governing a political community. Finally, the application of an appeal to due measure in the context of political philosophy indicates the connection between the theoretical and the practical. In sum, then, I believe we can claim that, although there are certain deficiencies in the political philosophy of the *Statesman*, there are, nevertheless, several valuable contributions made in this dialogue which lead to good politics.

2. **Dialectical Inquiry in the Statesman**

The second general consideration concerns the structure and form of dialectical inquiry in the *Statesman*. The principal question to consider in respect to the use of dialectics in this dialogue is

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16 It should be noted that this second-best alternative prepares the ground for the extensive discussion of the formulation and application of law in the *Laws*; a discussion which could not have possibly been carried out adequately in the *Statesman*.

17 The due measure not only has a significant effect on Plato's political philosophy, but it also, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, has a distinct influence on the moral philosophy of the *Philebus.*
this: Does the discussion between the Elean Visitor and Young Socrates adhere to the correct manner in which dialectical inquiry ought to be conducted? It appears to be the case that the search for the statesman is to be conducted as a joint exercise between the Visitor and Young Socrates. Just prior to the first attempt to define the statesman, the Visitor remarks to Young Socrates: "It seems to me that we two must search for the statesman" (ἀναγκαίον, ὅς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα διαζητεῖν νῦν). Indeed, throughout the remainder of the dialogue the Visitor continually asks his conversation partner whether or not he agrees with him, providing Young Socrates with the opportunity to make substantive contributions to the discussion.

Yet, with one or two possible exceptions, Young Socrates either simply assents to the Visitor's statements, or asks questions of the most basic nature. At times, Young Socrates even agrees with the Visitor when, clearly, the latter is merely testing the possibility of certain positions. Miller, too, comments on this point: "Most striking, however, he shows this impulsive energy less by taking up positions of his own than, quite the contrary, by repeated, overhasty agreements. At crucial points he accepts the stranger's teachings while the stranger himself does not!" An excellent example is encountered when Young Socrates quite readily agrees that the collection of the differentiae in the first attempt to define the statesman does, in fact, adequately define him. The Visitor responds by asking Young Socrates: "Is it the case, Socrates, that we really have done what you just now said?" (Ἀρά γ’, ὥΣώκρατες, ἀληθῶς ἦμαν τοῦτο καθάπερ σὺ νῦν εἴρηκας

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18 Statesman, 258b2-3. Another clear example that dialectical inquiry should be a joint venture is found at 297d3: "This is the sort of thing we must inquiry about" (Τοιοῦτο τι δεῖ γε ζητεῖν).
19 Perhaps the most notable contribution of Young Socrates comes in the discussion concerning how law-governed regimes function, particularly in the passage in which he infers that if the laws prohibited inquiry, "all kinds of expertise would be completely destroyed" (πᾶσαι τε αἱ τέχναι παρεδόθη ἢν ἀπόλοιπον). See, Statesman, 299e6-10. Additionally his rather hurried and overconfident attempt to divide collective rearing into the rearing of human beings and the rearing of animals, while incorrect, does permit the Visitor to embark on the important discussion concerning the right way of distinguishing a class and its parts. See, Statesman, 263a3-b11.
20 Miller, The Philosopher in Plato’s Statesman, 7.
It is the Visitor who bears the greatest responsibility for conducting the investigation.

On the surface, at least, it appears the structure and form of dialectical inquiry in the *Statesman* is more monologic than a true dialogue between two conversation partners. Even though the examination of the statesman is supposed to consist of a shared dialectical search, the inquiry in the *Statesman* appears one-sided. Furthermore, if one of the purposes of this dialogue is to demonstrate the correct use of the dialectical method, then it is somewhat difficult to understand, in view of the fact that Young Socrates offers very little in the way of contributions, how this process is supposed to work. Should not the structure and form of dialectical inquiry be such as to accommodate substantial contributions from two or more partners, or is it sufficient for just a single person to assume a role as leader of the inquiry? The latter consideration would seem to be the case in the *Statesman*. It seems reasonable to suggest that, given the concern with method in this dialogue, it is more appropriate for the Visitor to carry the weight of the discussion. The contributions of Young Socrates, especially those that give assent to positions which the Visitor ultimately believes are inadequate, are designed as a structural device to enable the investigation of philosophical method to proceed successfully. In other words, if it is Plato’s intention in the *Statesman* to set out his late-period views on method by employing a type of dialectical inquiry which leads to knowledge of the *definiendum*, and to articulate the relationship between theory and practice by demonstrating how the sort of statesman and art of statesmanship defined in theory may be realized in practice, then these tasks should fall to the more philosophically experienced conversation partner, the Elean Visitor, rather than to the

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21 *Statesman*, 267c4-6.
22 Although I would not wish to press the point too far, a parallel could be drawn between the sort of one-sided dialectical examination carried out by the Visitor and Young Socrates and the function of the expert in the art of statesmanship. Both the Visitor and the statesman possess the requisite expert knowledge that permits them to dominate in their respective areas of expertise.
philosophically inexperienced Young Socrates. The form of the *Statesman*, then, resembles a didactic treatise; a discussion between a master and pupil. Miller, I believe, is correct to note: "... by presenting Young Socrates as immersed in mathematics and not yet introduced to philosophy, he [that is, Plato] seems to address his students at just the point in their education where they must turn from one to the other."²³

Support for this reading is given in a previously mentioned passage from the *Seventh Letter*. The knowledge of certain kinds of things can only be learned through the interaction of a teacher and his pupil. It "arises from much intercourse about this very same subject-matter and from living together" (ἀλλ’ ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γεγονόμενης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν συζήν).²⁴ While it cannot be maintained that the conversation between the Visitor and Young Socrates resembles a dialectical inquiry between philosophical equals, it can be claimed that that there is much conversation of a certain sort between them. The types of responses given by Young Socrates allows the Visitor to advance his arguments, with the result that by the end of the dialogue Young Socrates should have knowledge of how dialectical inquiry functions, as well as an understanding of the art of statesmanship.

Rowe evaluates the structure and form of the *Statesman* in light of the positions, both explicit and implied, taken in the final section of the *Phaedrus*. We have seen that the arguments in the *Phaedrus* opposing the written word may be interpreted as implying that philosophy should be a dialectical interchange between a teacher and his student. Despite the nature of Young Socrates' elenctic contributions, Rowe argues: "[T]he *Politicus* is indeed written with something like the Phaedran model of dialectic in mind, and that the most persuasive explanations of YS's (relative) inactivity is that the author, Plato, has priorities other than the realistic portrayal of a live

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²⁴ *Epistles*, 341c6-7.
philosophical conversation."²⁵ Rowe's central claim is that, although the Statesman does not completely follow the form of a Platonic conversation, its special nature as a didactic work on dialectic explains why it does not precisely follow the model of dialectic implied in the Phaedrus. In a general sense, "[t]he Socrates of the Phaedrus portrays dialectic in terms of a master-pupil relationship, in which the main gain is to the younger partner."²⁶ Surely, this is also the case in the Statesman. In the Phaedrus, and also in the Seventh Letter, we encounter the notion that philosophy is a conversation between partners, one of whom has the experience to act as guide, or teacher, for the other conversation partner, even if there is an unexpressed expectation that the less experienced partner may be able to make a significant conversation to the dialectical inquiry. In the Statesman, the same process is at work, the only differences being the rather specialized discussion of philosophical method and the philosophically inexperienced Young Socrates. When these differences are taken into account, it seems reasonable to suggest that the structure and form of dialectical inquiry in the Statesman follows the pattern for such inquiry set down in the Phaedrus and Seventh Letter.

Finally, Gill argues that in the late dialogues dialectical inquiry is directed more toward making philosophical progress. Although there are resemblances to the sort of dialectical interchange of the early-period works, the dialogues of the middle and late periods do not end in aporiai. Rather than concentrating on the refutation or validation of individuals' views by means of the elenctic method, there is a greater propensity for shared inquiry between discussants whose philosophical skills are reasonably well matched. Gill contends that there is a tendency in Plato's late-period works "to engage in sustained 'dialogue' with other philosophical, or conventional, positions, a process which is sometimes (though not always) expressed through the dramatized

²⁵ Christopher Rowe, "The Politicus: Structure and Form," in Form and Argument in Late Plato, ed. Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 154.
²⁶ Ibid., 176.
interchange between personae in the dialogue."  

While Gill's position may hold for many of the middle- and late-period dialogues, I do not think that it applies to the Statesman. The philosophical skills of the Visitor and Young Socrates are significantly different. Gill attempts to meet this objection by arguing that in the section of the Statesman dealing with the statesman and the art of statesmanship, the Visitor is presenting an "examination and critique of a more conventional 'constitutionalist' position." This position is held by Young Socrates who the Visitor tries to refute. It appears to be stretching the point to claim that Young Socrates held any sort of views on matters of political theory. Rowe, too, is skeptical of Gill's argument that Young Socrates held views that the Visitor was required to refute: "... the contributions made by YS in these cases remains extremely small."  

It is more plausible to regard the structure and form of dialectical inquiry in the Statesman as an example of the type of philosophical conversation that should be engaged in between an experienced master and his inexperienced pupil. This sort of philosophical discussion is didactic in nature, with the master seeking to guide his pupil to an understanding of the matter under discussion. It is carried out in order for the student to become more adept at the practice of philosophy. The particular type of inquiry in this dialogue requires that the Visitor makes himself responsible for articulating nearly the entire argument. The minimal contributions of Young Socrates are designed to assist the Visitor's exposition. Although the Statesman does not follow an ideal pattern of dialectical inquiry between partners who have experience in philosophizing, it

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28 Among the late works, the Philebus, in contrast, does give the appearance of a true dialogic exchange between Socrates and Protarchus. The latter's contributions to the discussion, reflecting his more advanced philosophical skills, are far more substantive than those of Young Socrates. Arguably, since the Philebus is concerned with an examination of complex philosophical issues, rather than with a discussion which is in large measure concerned with philosophical method, it is more appropriate that its structure and form be representative of a conversation between two partners, both of whom are capable of making substantial contributions to the inquiry. Interestingly, Philebus, whose position Socrates attempts to refute, hardly speaks.
30 Rowe, "The Politicus: Structure and Form," 158.
does adhere in a general sense to the structure and form of dialectics, with the result that Young Socrates and the work's readers will become better dialecticians.

3. The Identity of the Elean Visitor

The appearance of the Elean Visitor in the Statesman, as well as in the Sophist, presents a difficult interpretive challenge. The principal question is: Who does the Elean Visitor represent? There are three possible answers to this inquiry: (1) we may simply take him to be Plato's spokesman; (2) we may treat him as espousing non-platonic philosophy in the context of works composed by Plato; (3) we may infer that he is representative of Plato's thought without assuming a strict correspondence between his views and those of Plato. The answer to this question carries profound implications for the manner in which we interpret Plato's late-period thought. If we assume a direct correspondence between the Visitor and Plato, then we should be able to find convincing evidence in the dialogues to confirm this assumption. Similarly, if we wish to claim that he is not Plato, then this position, too, requires confirmation. In respect to the third possible answer, we would need to justify the correspondence between the Visitor and Plato. Q. P. Taylor argues: "If the inference is unjustified, then we should politely drop the convention of speaking of Plato's 'political thought' or Plato's 'philosophy'."31 Regardless of which view is adopted, some justification for holding that view is needed.

Before setting out my position on this question, it would be helpful to note very briefly how this question has been treated by several interpreters of Plato. An evaluation of the scholarly literature on the question of the Visitor's identity reveals three general interpretive positions. At one extreme are those scholars who simply assert that the Visitor is in fact Plato. Campbell, after noting that Socrates in no longer the chief character in the late dialogues (with the exception of

31 Taylor, "Political Science or Political Sophistry?", 93. It does not appear that Taylor's statement is restricted to the Statesman. Presumably, he means that unless we can justify the inference we cannot in any circumstance refer to Plato's philosophy since Plato never speaks in his own person. It should be noted that Taylor accepts the third possibility.
the Philebus), claims: "… the spirit of Socrates is still working under the Eleatic mask."32 Skemp, who unquestioningly equates the Visitor with Plato, comments: "This Eleatic Stranger is, of course, used by Plato as a mouthpiece for his own views."33 Echoing Skemp's language, Klosko avers: "The main spokesman, obviously Plato's mouthpiece in the work, is an unnamed Eleatic Stranger."34 Both Skemp's and Klosko's remarks are simply assertions; neither commentator makes any attempt through a close examination of the text to establish their claims. As the final representative of this view, Guthrie, although not as assertive as Skemp or Klosko, conjectures that the Visitor is Plato who must first set out and then refute the Eleatics before being able to clear the way for "a positive restatement of Plato's own conception of knowledge."35

At the other extreme are interpretations designed to demonstrate that the Elean Visitor is employed by Plato to repudiate Socrates and the type of philosophy practiced by him. Howland, for example, appears to discern in the figure of the Visitor an attempt to condemn Socrates and Socratic philosophy for failing to accord "with the standard of due measure itself."36 Solana Dueso, following a similar line of attack, argues that the Statesman was intended to demonstrate that "If the activity of Socrates is seen by Plato as the initiation of his political doctrines, in the eyes of the democracy it has to be seen as a doctrine intended to encourage tyranny."37 In other words, positions such as these attempt to argue that Plato, by the time he came to write the Statesman, also came to repudiate Socrates' political philosophy, if not Socrates himself. A more subtle argument is developed by Zuckert who argues that not only does Plato employ the Visitor

32 Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, xix.
34 Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 201.
35 Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 123-124. Lane, too, identifies the Visitor's views with those of Plato. "I take the liberty of identifying the Eleatic Stranger's arguments with Plato's, in the spirit of identifying what the arguments are on their own terms rather than seeking clues that they are to be disregarded or minimized [sic]." Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, 8.
to criticize Socrates, but also by drawing a contrast between the two philosophers certain deficiencies in the Visitor's position are made evident. The problem with readings of this sort is that they focus on passages isolated from the broader context of the dialogue in which they appear, they neglect to consider the arguments within the context of the Platonic corpus, and generally they ground their attacks on presuppositions of political theory that are themselves not necessarily applicable to politics as understood in antiquity. There is also a presupposition that in some way Plato's political thought favors democratic theory and practice, whereas Socrates' does not.

In the middle of these extremes are several diverse interpretations which suggest that there are a number of differences between the arguments employed by Socrates and those given by the Visitor, yet which do not attribute these differences to any sort of change in Plato's thought. Rather, they suggest that the Visitor functions either to critique aspects of Socrates' philosophy, or to use the latter's thought to point up the deficiencies in the arguments of the former. These readings may be divided into three categories. (1) Those which articulate differences between the Visitor and Socrates, but which at some level ultimately are able to find the differences reconcilable and compatible. Miller, for example, suggests that the Visitor "is somehow to be judge and mediator both for the explicit conflict between Socrates and Athens and for the implicit conflict between Socrates and Theodorus' circle." Rosen notes differences between the Visitor and Socrates, particularly in terms of Eros and pedagogical style, yet seems to think that the

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39 For a well-argued counter-argument against the view that Socrates is somehow being punished for his political teachings, see, Christopher Rowe, "Killing Socrates: Plato's Later Thoughts on Democracy," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 121 (2001). 63-76.
40 At the risk of over-simplification, I am suggesting this classification solely to place these diverse readings of the Statesman in some degree of order.
41 Representative of this approach are: Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful III; Miller, The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman; Rosen, Plato's Statesman: The Web of Politics.
42 Miller, The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman, 12.
function of the Visitor – an invention of Plato "for the sake of indicating his own refutation or punishment of his former teacher" – is the ground from which the two can be united.\(^\text{43}\) (2) Readings which not only find differences between the Visitor and Socrates, but which also, after analysis, tend to prefer the views of Socrates over those of the Visitor.\(^\text{44}\) (3) An interpretation which claims that the introduction of the Visitor and his arguments are designed to show up the inadequacies of the Visitor's position; the *Statesman* is a dialogue that thus becomes "a parody of the Stranger in which the silent Socrates is ultimately vindicated."\(^\text{45}\) We are confronted with interpretations of the Visitor's identity and role in the *Statesman* which are widely at variance and which cannot be reconciled among themselves. I wish to argue that there is a way in which the identity of the Visitor might be revealed. An examination of text of the *Statesman* in relation to the Platonic corpus may allow us to see any continuities, or similarities, between this work and the rest of the dialogues.\(^\text{46}\) If it can be established that the views espoused by the Elean Visitor are consistent with, or are related to, the views expressed in other works, then it is plausible to conclude that the Visitor is intended by Plato to represent his

\(^{43}\) Rosen, *The Web of Politics*, 7. I shall pass over Rosen's notion that the Visitor metes out some sort of discursive or dialectical punishment upon Socrates. At best, it may be said that the Visitor provides a critique of certain aspects of Socratic thought which is far removed from the idea that Socrates is being punished. Benardete, too, subscribes to the idea that the Visitor, in the *Sophist* at least, is introduced by Plato to punish Socrates. See, Benardete, *The Being of the Beautiful*, III, 71.

\(^{44}\) For example, Mara regards Socrates' classification of regime types as superior to those of the Visitor because the Visitor "Seems to deny the possibility of a compatibility between common and private human capacities". Gerald M. Mara, "Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy in Plato's *Statesman* and *Republic*," *Polity* 13 (Spring, 1981), 376. Weiss sees a move on the part of the Visitor to incorporate more of Socrates in his argument in the second half of the dialogue, that is, after the myth. She also argues that the *Statesman* represents an extension and refinement of the political philosophy of the *Republic*. See, Roslyn Weiss, "Statesman as ɛνεργήματ: Caretaker, Physician, and Weaver," in *Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum*, ed. Christopher J. Rowe (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995), 213-217.

\(^{45}\) Scodel, *Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman*, 167. Although Zuckert in some sense builds upon Scodel's work, the latter's book-length analysis is *sui generis*. As intriguing as Scodel's argument is, and despite the occasional illumination it offers concerning the text, the question must be asked if it is at all plausible, not to mention necessary, for Plato to have written a work extending over eighty-five Stephanus pages for the purpose of parodying the arguments of the Visitor without offering counter-arguments against his position?

\(^{46}\) Although there is a risk that dissimilarities might be under-emphasized, an analysis which focuses on similarities is perhaps a better approach for bringing a degree of coherence to this issue. To put this another way, if there are in fact significant similarities between the *Statesman* and Plato's other dialogues, then it is possible to analyze any variances in terms of their similarities to the extent that these differ from the rest of the corpus, instead of attempting to problematize the coherence of Plato's philosophy by emphasizing any particular dissimilarities.
own views. Surprisingly, no such analysis has been attempted in any adequate degree of detail by other commentators.

An examination of the corpus leads to the plausible conclusion that the Visitor does represent Plato's positions. Although for reasons of space I cannot offer a full defense of my position in this chapter, I do set out my analysis in greater detail in Appendix 4. The plausibility of my conclusion is given support by the examination of five general areas. First, as we have seen in the previous chapter, there is a logical coherence to Plato's philosophical methods. The method of division and collection in the Statesman, as well as in the Sophist, is logically related to the method of hypothesis. While it cannot be maintained that the elenctic method is related to either of these two other philosophical methods, it can be maintained that all three function as means by which we can attain knowledge of a thing. Second, there is a correspondence between sōphrosunē and to metrion introduced by the Visitor in the Statesman. The idea that sōphrosunē is a kind of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides, the Republic's notion of acting moderately, the introduction of due measure in the Statesman, and the use of due measure and moderation as fundamentally important concepts in the Philebus and the Laws, when taken together, suggests a close connection among these concepts which can be observed diachronically across the corpus. Rather than regarding the Visitor's discussion of to metrion as something unique to himself, it is reasonable to argue that due measure is the chronologically latest attempt by Plato to posit a standard by which the individual and political community may best live. Third, an examination of Eleatic philosophy suggests that the Visitor was not a member of this philosophical school. There is no evidence to indicate that the Visitor was in some way

47 It is also possible that the Visitor does not directly represent Plato. Rather, it may be the case that he is someone who is intimately acquainted with Platonic concepts, and who employs these concepts for the sake of articulating the Academy's philosophy. If this is the case, then the Visitor may be regarded as a sympathetic representative of the Academy whose role is to advance its philosophical views. In order for this view to hold, however, we must be willing to accept the rather unlikely position that Plato was more concerned with setting out the views of the Academy rather than his own views in a work composed by and from a character created by Plato.
attempting to defend Eleatic views against those held by Plato and the Academy. While it could be argued that in the dialogues written after the *Sophist* and *Statesman* Plato's views were influenced by the Visitor's Eleatic philosophy, the fact that the Visitor's positions show a degree of continuity and correspondence with the philosophy of the early- and middle-period dialogues indicates otherwise. Fourth, there are topics encountered in the *Statesman* that are familiar to us from other works. Among them is the idea of expert knowledge, the use of the craft analogy, the categorization of *poleis* into an arrangement of regime types, the employment of myth, the role of paradigms, the employment of letters and syllables for the sake of learning, and the need for some sort of eugenics program. 48 Fifth and finally, there are unusual words and expressions spoken by the Visitor which appear only with great rarity in the rest of corpus. The term *μετεωρολόγος* (one who talks of heavenly bodies) is used only three times in the Platonic corpus; twice in the *Cratylus* and once in the *Statesman*. 49 The expression *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, as previously pointed out, appears just three times in Plato's works; once each in the *Phaedo*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*. 50 The rarity and contexts in which these words and phrases are found suggests a usage unique to Plato.

When these five general areas are considered together, it does indeed appear to be the case that the identity of the Visitor can be established. The substantial degree of continuity and similarity between the Visitor's philosophical method and positions and those encountered elsewhere in the dialogues helps to illustrate the overall coherence of the Platonic corpus. The lack of any recognizable Eleatic philosophy, the employment of familiar concepts, and the use of language indicates that there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the views of the Visitor

48 There are other topics as well that are beyond the scope of this study to evaluate, such as the notion of imitation and the role of the virtues. These additional topics, if extensively analyzed, would, I believe, reveal further correspondences between the arguments made by the Visitor and those found elsewhere in the corpus.
49 See, *Cratylus*, 396c2 and 401b8; *Statesman*, 299b7.
50 See, *Phaedo*, 99d1; *Statesman*, 300c2; *Philebus*, 19c2-3.
and those of Plato. It surely does not seem to be the case that the Visitor simply is a character introduced by Plato to condemn Socrates, nor was he designed expressly to show up the flaws in Socrates' thought. While we should leave open the possibility that the Visitor may be Plato's portrait of a representative of the Academy, the evidence is such that we may plausibly accept the Elean Visitor as representing Plato himself.

**Education, Law, Regime-types, and Politikē Epistēmē**

In this section I shall examine several aspects of the *Statesman* that are directly related to the dialogue's political philosophy. Although not all of these aspects are fully discussed by the Visitor and Young Socrates, nevertheless, they play a significant role in Plato's late-period political thought in general. Since I regard the *Statesman* as the pivotal work between Plato's early- and middle-period political thought, an analysis of the way in which certain concepts and themes are treated in the *Statesman* should be able to show not only how they function in this work, but an analysis also should attempt to reveal the relationships of these aspects to both the earlier dialogues and to those written afterward.

1. **Education**

   The *Statesman* is nearly silent on the subject of education. We can in a certain sense regard the entire dialogue as the education of Young Socrates, as well as its readers, in the correct practice of dialectical reasoning. This is not, however, what I mean by the claim that there is a lack of discussion concerning education. What I do mean is that there is no mention in the *Statesman* as to the manner in which both the expert in the art of statesmanship and the citizens under his authority are to educated. We have seen in Chapter 4 that in early-period works such as

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51 Or, if we accept Miller's interpretation that there is a performative dimension to the *Statesman*, we can view the work as a pedagogical demonstration by some members of the Academy for the sake of instructing their fellow students.
the Laches and the Protagoras, Plato was greatly concerned with the role of education, even if no comprehensive educational plan was worked out. It was also shown that in the Republic a full course of education was developed as the prerequisite for being able to live well. Given the importance attached by Plato to education in these works, it is surprising that it is not taken up in the Statesman.

The Visitor does, however, briefly mention the function of "educators and tutors" (παιδευταῖς καὶ τροφεῦσιν). The art of kingship (ἡ βασιλική) will not allow the educators, who are subject to law (κατὰ νόμον), to do anything contrary to their role of trying to bring about the appropriate mixture in the characters of their pupils; "they are exhorted to teach only these things" (ταῦτα δὲ μόνα παρακλείεσθαι παιδεύειν). While education in respect to courage and sōphrosunē appears to be the central task of educators and the primary goal of education, there is no substantial examination of how this molding of character is to be accomplished.

Klosko comments: "Plato's discussion is not only brief but it is also dominated by the metaphor of weaving, so it is not entirely clear how this programme [sic] of education is to work." In view of Plato's other discussions of education, the one in the Statesman is relatively inadequate.

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52 Statesman, 308e5.
53 Statesman, 308e4-9.
54 The passage does set down remedies for those whose natures are incapable of being made moderate. The polis deals with the worst cases "by death, or sending them into exile, or by punishing them with the severest punishments" (θινάτοις τε ἐκβάλλει καὶ φεγγαῖς καὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις κολάζουσιν ἀτιμίας). Those who are not incorrigible but who nevertheless "wallow in ignorance and baseness are brought under the yoke into the class of slaves" (Τῶν δὲ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τε αὐτοῖς ταπεινότητι πολλῆς καλλιδομένως εἰς τὸ δομικὸν ὑποτείγειν γένος). Statesman, 309a2-6.
55 Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 208. Klosko goes on to note that the sort of education envisaged in the Statesman is one in which "the statesman will attempt to instill correct moral convictions."
56 Cooper appears to think that Visitor's brief comments on education are sufficient. By linking together the notion of weaving with education, Cooper argues that education should be regarded as the blending of excessive or deficient character traits into a moderate disposition which "is the result of the educator's expertise, exercised under the control and direction of the expert statesman, who of course oversees all the 'weaving' that goes on in his city by establishing each sort of weaving's particular objects in relation to the overall project." This reading does accord with the meaning of the text, but it does not seem to recognize what the text does not mention, namely, how this process of education is to be accomplished. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the both the statesman and the educator are identical to the weaver; weaving is perhaps better regarded as an analogy for the types of tasks undertaken by the statesman and educator. All three functions, weaving, statesmanship, and education, do indeed blend together disparate things, but they also require expert knowledge of their particular function. The Visitor does not address this point in respect to
I would like to suggest one way in which the lack of a discussion of education, broadly construed, in the *Statesman* may be understood. If we regard this dialogue as occupying an intermediate position between the early- and middle-period works and the *Laws*, then there is a plausible explanation for why Plato chose not to offer a full discussion about education in the *Statesman*. There is a sense that at the time the *Statesman* was composed Plato may still have been tied to the idea of a philosopher-king. This idea is reflected both in the function of the statesman and in the language used to describe his art.

The Visitor refers to the statesman as practicing either the "art of statesmanship" (πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη) or the "kingly art" (βασιλικὴ) without any apparent distinction between these two expressions. The expert in the art of statesmanship may, after all, be seen as a more modest and practicable version of the philosopher-king. While education in the limited sense of being made moderate is indeed part of the Visitor's argument, a central component of the *Statesman*’s political thought is on the need for an expert in the art of statesmanship. That is to say, both individuals and political communities are best governed by one who possesses *politikē epistēmē*. It is not until we reach the *Laws* that we encounter the notion that a combination of law and properly educated citizens, both male and female, is sufficient to ensure good government. Since the *Statesman* still adheres to the notion that expert knowledge is required for good political rule, perhaps it is not odd that the Visitor does not present a comprehensive educational plan. The basic idea that the Visitor is attempting to convey is that as long as the citizens are educated in respect to being moderate, and as long as there is someone with the requisite *politikē epistēmē* to rule over them, then the polis will be governed well and its citizens will live sufficiently good lives. By the time Plato came to educators. It is insufficient to claim, as Cooper does, that under the directive knowledge of the statesman, educators weave together opposing character traits in individuals. What is missing in Cooper's analysis is a determination of the nature of an educator's expert knowledge, how he obtains it, and in what manner does he go about instructing his pupils. Cooper, "Plato's *Statesman* and Politics," 183.

That the "kingly art" and the "art of the statesman" are identical may suggest a close connection between the philosopher-king and the statesman. I translate βασιλική as the "kingly art" throughout this study.
compose the *Laws*, it appears to be the case that a far more comprehensive treatment of education is required because Plato no longer holds the view that a single ruler possessing *politikē epistēmē* is a fundamental prerequisite for good political practice. In effect, the educational program set out in the *Laws* embraces the possibility that through education and the rule of law a greater number individuals will be able to live politically and morally responsible lives without the need to be directed by an expert in the art of statesmanship.

2. The rule of law

We have previously examined the role of law in the early and middle dialogues. With the exception of the *Crito*’s concept of legal obligation and the few mentions of law in the *Republic*, Plato does not offer any discussion of law and its place in the polis. The discussion of political rule with or in the absence of law in the *Statesman* is Plato’s first attempt to analyze the relation of law in general to the requirements of politics. The examination of law is framed by the Visitor’s analysis of regimes-types and what ought to be considered as the best form of political arrangement. The result of the first part of the inquiry concerning regime-types is that the best regime-type is "the one in which a person would find that the rulers truly possess knowledge, and not one in which they merely seem to do so, whether they rule without laws or without laws" (ἐν ἡ τις ἄν εὐρίσκοι τοῦς ἀρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, ἐάντε κατὰ νόμους ἐάντε ἄνευ νόμων ἀρχοσι). The conclusion reached by the Visitor concerning the best type of constitutional organization allows him to introduce the subsequent discussion about the rule of law.

The Visitor begins by examining the possibility of there being political rule without law. Since legislation is a function of the king, that is, of the person who possesses *politikē epistēmē* to

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58 I shall discuss the importance of education in the *Laws* in Chapter 9.
59 *Statesman*, 293c6-9.
govern correctly, "the best thing is not that the laws, but that the man who is kingly and endowed with wisdom be powerful" (τὸ δ᾽ ἀριστον οὐ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν). 60 In other words, law is unnecessary when the polis is governed by a ruler who possesses expert knowledge. The argument is similar to the one made in the Republic, where Socrates maintains that legislation is not required for education which is conducted in accordance with lawful convention, nor is there a need to establish laws to regulate certain activities such as market transactions. 61

After the Visitor has claimed that the ruler who possesses politikē epistēmē should rule without laws but by means of his wisdom (φρονήσεως), he continues the discussion by pointing out the limitations of law. 62 The Visitor argues that laws are too generalized to be applied to individual cases. The continually changing differences in human beings, their circumstances, and their actions "does not allow any expertise whatsoever to declare a simple judgment in anything that is concerned with all cases and will last for all time" (οὐδὲν ἐσον ἀπλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ᾽ ἴντινον). 63 Law is like a person who gives orders that must be carried out as prescribed and who cannot be questioned, even if what he has commanded brings about a result contrary to what was intended.

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60 Statesman, 294a7-8.
61 See, Republic, 425b7-e2. Klosko claims that the Visitor's argument is different from the one given in the Republic: "In the Republic, Plato argues that laws are useless: in a good state they are unnecessary." I think that this claim is incorrect. In the Republic, the term employed by Plato in respect to legislating about such things is ἐποιηκεῖξ, which means silly, simple-minded, or foolish; it does not mean "useless". Although it is possible to infer that something silly may be useless, there is a distinction between something that is useless and something that is silly. The former term means that something serves no purpose, or that it cannot produce good results; the latter term means absurd, ridiculous, fatuous, or lacking in good judgment. Something that serves no purpose is best considered as something that is unnecessary rather than as something that is useless. Given the fact that in the Republic it is reason that enables us to understand how to conduct these matters correctly, and in the Statesman it is the knowledge of ruling that permits the expert in the art of statesmanship to dispense with the need for written laws, it is plausible to conclude that in both cases laws are unnecessary. The two arguments are similar because it is either the use of reason or expert knowledge that makes laws unnecessary. The difference between them which Klosko claims cannot be maintained. Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 204.
62 See, Statesman, 294a10-295b5.
63 Statesman 294b4-6.
Since there are limitations to what law is able to accomplish, the Visitor and Young Socrates need to examine "Why, then, it is ever necessary to make laws" (τί δή ποτ’ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον νομοθετεῖν). There are two principal points which the Visitor discusses. The first concerns the impossibility of legislating for particular cases. Arguing from the analogy of expert trainers (τῶν τέχνῃς γυμναζόντων), the Visitor concludes that, just as it is impossible for one possessing expertise in gymnastics to arrange physical training on an individual basis, it is also impossible to prescribe appropriate laws accurately for individuals. Instead, the statesman will enact laws according to a standard of what best suits the majority of people and for the majority of cases, "legislating by means of ancestral custom" (πατρίκες δὲ ἔθεσε νομοθετῶν). No statesman would be capable of attending to each person throughout his entire life for the sake of prescribing what is appropriate.

The second point concerns the question of whether or not laws, both written and unwritten, just like medical prescriptions or the needs of physical training, should be changed as circumstances require. It would be impossible for a legislator to anticipate all possible future contingencies. The Visitor argues that if a physician or trainer, who was intending to be absent for a period of time and who had left instructions before his departure, returned unexpectedly to discover that his prescriptions were no longer effective, he would change them to something more suitable for the new circumstances. It should also be the case, then, that laws should be changed "if someone recognizes that there are better laws contrary to those that had been established previously" (εἶ τις γνῶσκει παρὰ τῶν τῶν ἐμπροσθεν βελτίως νόμους). This change is to be effected by persuading the people to adopt the better laws. There is, however, the case in which

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64 Statesman, 294c10.
65 See, Statesman, 294d4-295a3.
66 Statesman 295a5-9.
67 This somewhat lengthy discussion is carried out at Statesman, 295b10-301a4.
68 Statesman, 296a8-9.
coercion rather than persuasion is employed to bring about change. Yet, since coercion is contrary to persuasion and the expertise of the statesman, it is "shameful, bad, and unjust" (τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδικον). Something that is forced on the citizens is not to their benefit; that which is in the interests of the governed "is the truest criterion of correct administration of a polis" (τὸν ὄρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινῶτατον ὁρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως); it is the criterion by which the wise statesman will govern. By holding the benefit, or interest, of the governed as the prime consideration, "a regime would be correct if it resulted from those who are able to rule in this way, that is, by providing the strength of their expertise as more powerful than the laws" (παρεὶ τῶν οὐτῶς ἄρχειν δυναμένων ὁρθὴ γίγνοιτ’ ἀν πολετεία, τήν τῆς τέχνης βόμην τῶν νόμων παρεχομένων κρείττο). To state this another way, expert knowledge is more beneficial to the polis and its members than written or unwritten laws, as long as it is directed toward the interests of the governed. If this sort of situation can be instantiated, then the best type of constitutional arrangement would be established; a regime which was governed not by law, but by someone possessing politikē epistēmē.

The Visitor next discusses under what circumstances are laws necessary. He argues that the mass of people (πλῆθος) can never have the expertise to govern themselves well; it is only in the correct regime-type that this can be accomplished. The Visitor refers to the standard underlying this regime as his "first" (πρῶτον). Yet, since there are poleis in which the people do govern themselves, laws are necessary for this sort of regime. The standard behind this regime-type is the second (δεύτερον). This second standard states: "No one in the polis should dare to do

69 Statesman, 296e6-7.
70 Statesman, 296e2-4.
71 Statesman, 297a3-5.
72 See, Statesman, 297d5-e6. Although the word standard is not explicitly used in the text, it seems reasonable to infer from his remarks that the governing by means of expert knowledge without written or unwritten laws is the standard in which the best regime is grounded. A regime in which the citizens are subject to the rule of law is the standard for the second-best form of government.
anything contrary to the laws, and the person who dares to do so is to be punished with death and every extreme punishment" (Το παρα των νόμων μηδὲν μηδένα τολμάν ποιεῖν τὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸν τολμῶντα δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις.)

Employing the analogies of pilots and physicians, the Visitor demonstrates the manner in which a law-governed regime functions. Hypothetically, what would result if the noble (γενεάων) pilot or physician were thought to be doing the most terrible things (δεινότατα), rather than those things which preserve us? In other words, what if the people on account of their ignorance came to believe that the sometimes painful courses of action which a pilot or physician must resort to in order to save a ship or a patient were wrongly considered to cause harm rather than good? The people would replace them, substituting their own ignorance in place of expert knowledge. Non-experts would establish written rules governing the practice of these and all other arts. In a reductio ad absurdum, the Visitor argues that there will be laws against inquiring or speculating on these arts, and if anyone demonstrates some expertise about them he will be regarded, not as an expert, but as a "stargazer, some kind of babbling sophist" (μετεωρολόγον ἀδόλεσχην τινα σοφιστήν).

Finally, if anyone is found to being doing this, he may be indicted for "corrupting those who are younger than himself" (διαφθείροντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους), and if he is found guilty of persuading anyone contrary to the law, "he is to be punished with the extreme penalty" (κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις.

Since everything is written down in the law, there is no possibility that anyone can be mistaken about what the laws stipulate.

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73 Statesman, 297e1-3.  
74 See, Statesman, 298a1-299e10. The tone of the argument strikes a rather discordant note. There is a sense of maliciousness and parody in the Visitor's comments. Yet, given Plato's harsh and negative views on what results when ignorance poses as knowledge, the severity of the Visitor's tone should perhaps come as no surprise.  
75 Statesman, 299b7-8. The rarity of the word μετεωρολόγον is discussed in Appendix 4.  
76 Statesman, 299c2-5. The allusion to Apology, 24b9 is unmistakable. While it could be argued that this reference to Socrates and Socratic inquiry suggests a criticism of Socratic practice, it is more plausible, I think, given the tone of the argument, that any implied criticism is directed at the social customs and political institutions which put Socrates to death. In a sense, Socrates supplies the model for the Visitor's argument.
The laws were initially set down by those who lacked knowledge in relation to particular subjects. Those who attempt to change them because they do possess knowledge must not be listened to and punished. In effect, laws established in this manner perpetuate ignorance and lead to a badly-governed polis since they prohibit change if someone with expert knowledge is able to demonstrate that the laws are inadequate. Young Socrates recognizes the problem that if the arts were practiced in accordance with these written rules and not on the basis of expert knowledge "all the arts would be completely destroyed" (πᾶσαι τε ἂν τέχναι παντελῶς ἄν ἀπόλοιπτο). 77

Furthermore, because of the law prohibiting inquiry, the arts could never be restored, with the result that "life would come to be unlivable" (ἄβιώτος γίγνοντ’ ἄν τὸ παράπαν). 78

The situation could be even worse. The Visitor mentions the case in which written rules are ignored by those in office who themselves lack expert knowledge. 79 It would be a greater evil if an ignorant ruler, acting for his personal advantage, ruled contrary to established law. The Visitor concludes that if someone such as this were to act "contrary to the laws that were laid down on the basis of much experience, with some advisors having given advice on each subject with good intention, and with the majority having been persuaded to establish them" (Παρὰ ... τῶν νόμων τῶν ἐκ πείρας πολλῆς κειμένως, καὶ τινῶν συμβούλων ἐκαστά χαριέντως συμβουλευόμενων καὶ πεισάντων θέσαλ τὸ πλῆθος), then, even more so than in the case in which laws set down by non-experts and which cannot be inquired into and changed destroy the arts, rule by a non-expert who ignores the laws would be an even "greater evil" (μεῖζον κακόν). 80 It is important to recognize that in this passage, the Visitor has significantly altered two premises of the argument. The first premise is that legislation is to be set down by those who do not possess expert knowledge about

77 Statesman, 299e6-7. As previously noted, this remark is one of the few insightful comments made by Young Socrates in the course of the dialogue.
78 Statesman, 299e6-10. It appears that Young Socrates' comment refers to Socrates' belief, stated at Apology, 38a5-6, that "the unexamined life is not worth living" (δὲ ἄνεξεταίροι βίος οὐ βιωτός).
79 See, Statesman, 300a1-b6.
80 Statesman, 300b1-6.
the subject for which they are legislating. Yet, the conclusion of the argument is not entailed by this premise. Instead, the Visitor concludes that at least some of the laws are established by those who have much experience concerning the subject.\textsuperscript{81} That is to say, legislation is to be presented for consideration on the basis of some sort of knowledge or experience; it is not to be proposed by those who are lacking expertise. The second premise is that force, rather than persuasion, will be employed to get the majority to pass the legislation.\textsuperscript{82} But, once again, the conclusion does not follow from this premise; the laws are adopted by the majority on the basis of persuasion, not force.

The reason for changing these two premises is clear. The conclusion of the argument leads the Visitor to posit the second-best (δεύτερος πλοῦς) way of governing. The best way is rule without written or unwritten law by the expert in the art of statesmanship. The second-best way is rule by law, but this second-best way is not without problems. The Visitor asks: "Would not what was written by those who know as far as possible be imitations of the truth of each thing?" (Οὐκοῦν μιμήματα μὲν ἃν ἐκάστων παῦτα ἐιῇ τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι γεγραμμένα.)\textsuperscript{83} It is necessary that "for those who set down laws and written rules about anything whatsoever is never to permit either the individual or the majority to do anything anything

\textsuperscript{81} See, Statesman, 298b7-d5 and 300b1-6.
\textsuperscript{82} While this is not explicitly stated, in light of the Visitor's discussion of the difference between persuasion and force which introduces the argument, we can reasonably infer that the laws in the main body of the argument are not passed on the basis of persuasion, rather, they are adopted under compulsion. See, Statesman, 296b1-d5.
\textsuperscript{83} Statesman, 300c5-7. The Visitor's claim that laws established by those who know something about what the subjects for which they are legislating are imitations raises an interesting question. What is the relationship this sort of imitative law and the second-best way of governing? It appears that the Visitor continues to maintain that only the knowledge possessed by the expert in the art of statesmanship is able to govern in respect to what is true. Rowe has made an intriguing argument that attempts to demonstrate that the Visitor's question is not "an endorsement of laws per se, ... but rather a reference to an ideal set of laws." It is Rowe's view that "what these 'imitations' of the truth' will be are laws that are as good as any laws could possibly be, not just any laws." In other words, Rowe argues that although it is difficult to acquire knowledge, knowledge is the only means by which the correct, or ideal, form of political organization is possible. Good "imitations of the truth", however, "allows for the possibility, and the validity, of our attempting to approximate to the truth – of 'imitating' it." This sense of approximating the truth is what Rowe believes that Visitor is aiming at in this passage; it allows for non-ideal regime-types to have the chance of being governed well. Rowe also thinks that what the Visitor argues in respect to the imitation of the truth "is what permits the writing of the Laws," Christopher Rowe, "The Treatment of Non-Ideal Constitutions in the Politicus: Further Considerations," Journal of the International Plato Society, 5 (2005). Available: www.nd.edu/~plato/plato/5issue/contents5.htm.
contrary to these laws" (τοῖς περὶ ὅτους νόμους καὶ συγγράμματα τιθεμένους ... τὸ παρὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἕνα μήτε πλῆθος μηδὲν μηδέποτε ἕαν ὁ δράν μηδὲν ὁπλοῦν). If the Visitor did not change the premises regarding who should legislate and in what manner laws should be passed, then the second-best method, as given by the Visitor, would not follow from the conclusion in the form that it does. Rather, if the second-best method was entailed by the original premises, then the conclusion would result in a situation in which the rule of law was one in which legislation was proposed by non-experts by means of force or compulsion. This would hardly be an acceptable second-best way of governing, and undoubtedly this sort of rule of law would lead to a very incorrect form of government.

At the end of the Visitor's examination of law, we are left with two possibilities for good government. The first possibility, or best way, describes the situation in which the political community is governed without written or unwritten laws by the person who possesses politikē epistēmē. The second possibility, or second-best way, is the type of political rule in which laws, initially established by those who possess at least some degree of expertise in the subjects for which they are legislating and which cannot be changed by the people, rule the polis. Those who legislate for this type of regime imitate the laws of the expert in the art of statesmanship. They appear to be able to approximate the truth possessed by the true statesman. These regime-types have a possibility of succeeding. In contrast, if legislation is established by those who do not possess any sort of knowledge, then the regimes for which they legislate are incorrect constitutional forms. Rowe comments: "the non-constitutions simply fail to do what

84 Statesman, 300c1-3.
85 Klosko distinguishes four possibilities: (1) rule without law by those who possesses expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship; (2) rule by law that is laid down by those who possess knowledge of the subjects for which they are legislating; (3) rule by law that has been established by those who do not possess any expertise; (4) rule in which the laws are disregarded by a ruler who himself lacks knowledge of statesmanship. While Klosko's distinction is correct, only possibilities (1) and (2) are the basis on which good government may be practiced. See, Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 212.
constitutions, *qua* constitutions, are supposed to do … look after the true interests of the citizens as a whole. … [the reason they fail is that they] *are based on ignorance.*

The discussion in the *Statesman* concerning law is an advance on Plato's treatment of this topic in the early- and middle-period dialogues. The limited treatments of law in the *Crito* and the *Republic* are being replaced by a wider consideration of the relation between law in general and political rule. While the possibility of rule without law is important for the *Statesman's* political theory, it is arguable that the second-best way is even more significant for Plato's late-period political philosophy. The notion of the rule of law will become the foundation for the political thought of the *Laws*.

3. Regime-types

The Visitor's discussion of law is bracketed by an examination of regime-types. For the purpose of this study, the most salient point of the Visitor's investigation is the relation between regime-type and knowledge. The fundamental idea which the Visitor is attempting to convey is that there is a correspondence between the form of political organization and knowledge. He begins by mentioning three recognized regime-types: monarchy (*μοναρχία*); rule by a few (*τίνων ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείαν*); rule by the many, which is called democracy (*δημοκρατία*).

Based
on the notions of force and consent, poverty and wealth, and law and lawlessness, the first two
forms of regime can be further divided; monarchy, or sole rule, into tyrannical and kingly forms;
rule by the few into aristocracy and oligarchy. Even though there are two forms of democracy as
well, one in which law and consent governs, another in which force and lawlessness prevails, they
are generally referred to by the same name.\(^9^9\) The result of this \textit{diairesis} of regime-types is that
there are six forms of political organization, although only five have their own names. The
organization of regime-types articulated by the Visitor can be tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lawful Regimes</th>
<th>Lawless Regimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule by one person</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule by a few persons</td>
<td>Aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule by many</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 3}

Since the criterion for good government is knowledge of the art of statesmanship, the question
the Visitor and Young Socrates must consider is: "in which of these does knowledge concerning
the rule of human beings happen to occur" (ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι
περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς).\(^9^0\) Straightaway, democracy is eliminated; it is not possible for the many,
even a relatively small number such as fifty, to possess expert knowledge of statesmanship.
Apparently for the same reason, both aristocracy and oligarchy are ruled out. The Visitor never

\(^9^0\) \textit{Statesman}, 292d2-4. It is well to recall that the discussion of regime-types is important for the \textit{diairesis} of the statesman. The Visitor must separate out those who pretend to practice statesmanship but who do not possess the \textit{politikē epistēmē} to be regarded as true statesmen.
quite discusses these two regime-types, rather he concludes that "we must seek the correct rule in respect to some one, two, or at most a few persons, when it is correct" (τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν περὶ ἕνα τινὰ καὶ δύο καὶ παντάπασιν ἀλλόγους δεῖ ζητεῖν, ὡταν ὀρθὴ γίγνηται). Regardless of whether the rulers govern with law or without, or over willing or unwilling subjects, or whether they are poor or wealthy, the only correct regime-type is "the one in which someone might find rulers who truly possess knowledge, and not one in which they merely seem to do so" (ἐν ἔνειρίσκου τὸν ἀρχοντα ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον). All the remaining regime-types are "not genuine" (οὐ γνησίας), rather they are "imitations of this one" (μεμιμημένας ταυτην). Even the law-abiding regime-types are imitations; there is only one correct form of constitutional organization – rule without law by the person who possesses expert knowledge.

When Young Socrates remarks that this sort of rule would be very difficult to accept, the Visitor enters into his discussion of law, and after law has been examined, the conversation returns to the topic of expert knowledge in relation to regime-types. The discussion about law was necessary to establish the concept that the best regime is the one in which the statesman rules. The Visitor reiterates the point that the expert in the art of statesmanship would govern in accordance with his expert knowledge, acting contrary to even those laws set down by him "whenever it seems better to him" (ὅπως ἄλλῳ αὐτῷ βέλτιω δόξῃ). Yet, there is the possibility that an individual or a group of individuals who do not possess politikē epistēmē may do the same thing, that is, they may act contrary to the law "because it is better otherwise" (ὁς βέλτιον ἐτέρον ὅν). In this case, the Visitor argues that those who attempt to act contrary to the laws without expert knowledge "would be attempting to imitate what is true, but would imitate it

91 Statesman, 293a3-4.
92 Statesman, 293c6-8.
93 Statesman, 293c3-4.
94 Statesman, 300c11-d1.
95 Statesman, 300d6.
altogether badly" (μμείσθαι μὲν ἂν ἐπιχειροῖεν τὸ ἀληθὲς, μμοντὶ ἂν μέντοι παγκάκως).

The Visitor asks what about the case in which they were able to act contrary to the laws on the basis of expert knowledge, would "this no longer be imitation but that very same thing that is most true?" (τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερ μύμημα ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐκεῖνο;). Young Socrates agrees.

By considering this last case, the Visitor appears to have placed himself in a difficult position. He attempts to resolve this difficulty by arguing that it previously was agreed that "no large group of people is able to acquire to any expertise whatsoever" (μηδὲν πλήθος μη δὴ ἴντταν ἁπλαῖαν δυνατον εἴναι τέχνην). There are two main reasons why the Visitor's response is flawed. First, the Visitor alters the number of people connoted by the word πλήθος. In the passage at 292e where he and Young Socrates had agreed that the πλήθος could never possess expert knowledge, it is clear that πλήθος refers to the majority, or the masses, in a democracy. In the passage at 300e, πλήθος surely does not refer to a majority, rather it strongly suggests a relatively limited number of individuals. Additionally, there is no indication that in this latter passage the Visitor is making reference to any particular sort of regime-type. He is making a general claim. These distinctions are significant in that the Visitor's response to the case in which there may be some experts who could change the laws makes use of an argument, taken from a completely different context, which does not apply to the terms of his claim. Second, the Visitor's reply is faulty in that he never considers the possibility that a limited number of citizens could, in fact, possess the expert knowledge needed to amend the laws. Rowe comments: "...on the face of it, large-ish numbers of people can acquire some kinds of expertise (farming, weaving, and so on)."

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96 Statesman, 300d10-e1.
97 Statesman, 300e1-2.
98 Statesman, 300e5. The agreement on this point was reached at Statesman, 292e1-293a1.
99 Rowe, Plato: Statesman, 231.
it is undoubtedly correct to suppose that politikē epistēmē is very difficult to acquire, it does not seem to be the case that expertise in a more modest technē is comparably hard to attain.100 Throughout the dialogues, Plato has repeatedly connected the knowledge of particular technai with the ability to carry out the functions of these technai. For example, one could not be a physician if one did not possess expertise in the art of medicine. It is not implausible to suggest, then, that in any polis there would be present those who possess expert knowledge of their particular technai, and these individuals, if called upon, would be able to offer ideas for changing the laws that were related to their particular technē. By ignoring this possibility, the Visitor believes that he is more securely establishing his claim that the second-best form of government is the one in which there is rule by laws which cannot be altered. It is arguable that if he had seriously considered the possibility that the second-best regime-type is one in which there is rule by laws which can be changed by those possessing particular sorts of expertise, rather than responding to this possibility with a flawed argument, then the appearance of this second-best regime-type would look considerably different. Although in the Statesman this possibility is never considered, it does seem to be the case that in the Laws we encounter a form of government which more closely resembles the second-best regime-type which the Visitor neglects to consider in the Statesman.

The Visitor concludes this portion of the discussion by reasserting that "neither the group of those who are wealthy nor the people altogether" (τὸ τῶν πλουσίων πλήθος καὶ ὁ σύμπας δῆμος) are able to possess the expert knowledge of statesmanship.101 At best, the regime-type that is

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100 Rowe also notes that the principal point on which the Visitor and Young Socrates had agreed was that "statesmanship was a peculiarly difficult form of expertise to acquire (292d-e) – though there are evidently other lesser forms which are also difficult (like pettia)." Ibid., 231-232.
101 Statesman, 300e7-9. Note how the Visitor abruptly introduces the term "wealthy" into the discussion. Nothing in the passage we have just examined suggests that the expression μηθεύει πλήθος includes a reference to the wealthy. Once again, the Visitor is guilty of changing the terms of his argument while in the middle of it. In this case, it appears that he qualifies πλήθος for the sake of his claim that when the wealthy imitate the best regime-type it is called an
second-best will be as far as possible (\(\varepsilon i\zeta \delta i\nu\alpha\mu\nu\)) a good imitation of "that true regime-type of the one person ruling with expertise" (\(\acute{\epsilon}k\acute{e}i\nu\eta\nu \tau\eta\nu \tau\eta\nu\ \varepsilon\nu\omicron\upsilon \\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha \tau\acute{e}x\nu\eta\zeta \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\upsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\sigma \pi\omicron\lambda\tau\epsilon\ivardaron\)).\(^{102}\) The result of this discussion is that all five regime-types are reducible to one in the sense that all lack expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship.\(^{103}\) The tyrant and the king, as well as oligarchy, aristocracy, and both types of democracy come to be because the people cannot accept the idea that there can be the sort of statesman who "is willing and able to rule with virtue and knowledge, correctly dispensing to all what is just and right" (\(\acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{e}\ell\epsilon\iota\nu \kappa\acute{a}i \\delta\nu\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\nu \ \varepsilon\iota\nu\omicron \ \mu\epsilon\tau\iota\).\(^{104}\) So, unless there comes to be a ruler who possesses politikê epistêmê, rule by law is indeed the best alternative.

Although it is surprising that these second-best regime-types can survive without being governed by an expert, the correct question to ask is this: "Which, then, of these incorrect regime-types is the least difficult to live with … and which is the heaviest to bear?" (\(T\acute{\iota}\varsigma \ \omicron\nu\nu \ \delta\acute{\iota} \ \tau\omicron\nu\nu \ \omega\omicron\kappa \ \alpha\acute{\rho}\theta\omicron\acute{\nu}\nu \ \pi\alpha\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\nu \ \acute{\eta}\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\acute{a} \ \chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\acute{\nu}\ \sigma\upsilon\zeta\acute{\omicron} \ ... \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \ \beta\alpha\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\nu\).\(^{105}\) The Visitor once again divides forms of constitutional organization into seven types; the six that are arranged in Table 3, and a seventh – the correct one. The Visitor arranges the regime-types in descending order from the best to the worst in order to indicate clearly that they are not to be confused with the regime-type governed by the expert in the art of statesmanship.\(^{106}\) If we are to know who the true

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\(^{102}\) *Statesman*, 301a5-8. 
\(^{103}\) *Statesman*, 301a1-2. 
\(^{104}\) *Statesman*, 301b5-8. 
\(^{105}\) *Statesman*, 301c1-d2. 
\(^{106}\) *Statesman*, 302b5-7. 
\(^{106}\) *Statesman*, 302c8-303c5. In descending order the regime-types are: monarchy, aristocracy, lawful democracy, lawless democracy, oligarchy, tyranny. Democracy occupies an interesting position. The Visitor considers it to be the worst of the lawful regimes, but the best of those which are lawless. This has led some scholars, such as Roochnik, to argue that lawful democracy may prove to be the best regime-type that is possible in practice. While it is possible to make this inference, this sort of view seems to miss the larger point that the Visitor is attempting to make, namely, that none of these regime-types, lawful democracy included, is a correct form of constitutional organization.
statesman is and over what sort of regime-type he governs, then it is necessary to separate out those regime-types that might be erroneously taken for the one in which the expert in the art of statesmanship actually belongs. This second *diairesis* of regime-types concludes this part of the discussion. The Visitor resumes the inquiry concerning the statesman.\(^\text{107}\)

4. *Politikē Epistēmē*

Both the discussion of law and the examination of regime-types are necessary for establishing the claim that the true statesman needs expert knowledge, or *politikē epistēmē*, in order to govern. A regime-type, in its lawful form, that lacks the true statesman at its helm is one that can only imitate the correct regime-type. In other words, in order for there to be a correct form of constitutional organization there must also be a ruler who possesses *politikē epistēmē*.\(^\text{108}\) The purpose of this section is to examine what sort of expert knowledge this is and to what it is related, before turning in the final part of this chapter to discuss how it is applied by the statesman in practice.

Through the employment of the method of division, the Visitor determines what constitutes expert knowledge in regard to statesmanship. In the previous chapter I had discussed that in the final *diairesis* of the statesman, the Visitor removed certain *technai* that are associated with statesmanship, but which are not a part of statesmanship in its pure form: generalship (*στρατηγία*), the art of judging (*δικαστική*), and the art of rhetoric (*ῥητορεία*).\(^\text{109}\) These three *technai*, although they do exercise some sort of ruling function, are subordinate to the art of statesmanship. Arguing from the analogy of the learning of music and other similar things, the

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\(^\text{107}\) The search for the statesman was interrupted at 291c7.

\(^\text{108}\) We may ask if there is an implicit criticism of Pericles and the Periclean style of political leadership underlying the Visitor’s requirement for *politikē epistēmē*. Based on Plato’s negative view of Pericles, it is reasonable to believe that Pericles did not possess the sort of *politikē epistēmē* needed to govern in accordance with the views set down in the *Statesman*. For one of the stronger anti-Periclean views expressed in the dialogues, see, *Gorgias*, 515d6-516d5.

\(^\text{109}\) See, *Statesman*, 303e10-304a1. It should be noted that the art of rhetoric which is associated with statesmanship is of a particular kind: it is the sort of rhetoric which ”persuades people about what is just” (*πειθούσα το δίκαιον*). It is the type of rhetoric advocated by Socrates in the *Gorgias*. 265
Visitor gets Young Socrates to agree that there is a type of knowledge that "controls all the other [kinds of knowledge] together" (ἀρχεῖν συμπασών τῶν ἄλλων).\textsuperscript{110} In the case of learning, the knowledge that decides whether or not one should learn a particular subject controls the specific sorts of knowledge related to the learning of each subject. In the case of the statesman, politikē epistēmē is the knowledge that controls those technai that are subordinate and akin to statesmanship and which have their own specific sorts of knowledge. As music is a particular sort of learning, so, too, the functions of the general, the judge, and the orator are particular sorts of practical tasks. In both cases, there is a controlling knowledge: "For what is really the kingly art [that is, statesmanship] must not itself perform practical tasks, rather it must control those who are able to perform them" (τὴν γὰρ ὁντως οὗσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δὲι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ ἀρχεῖν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν).\textsuperscript{111} The expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship is a directive knowledge. It is the knowledge that "controls all these functions, as well as the laws, and cares for everything altogether in the city" (Τὴν δὲ πασῶν τε τούτων ἀρχουσαν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλεως ἐπιμελουμένην).\textsuperscript{112}

It would appear from the Visitor's discussion that the possession of politikē epistēmē is the sole criterion by which the statesman is defined. It also appears to be the sole criterion by which his authority over the polis is legitimized. Cooper comments: "...knowledge in the relevant area, and the personal virtues that go along with that knowledge, are the sole valid criterion for legitimate access to political power at any level. It is because, and only because, the expert statesman is expert at what it takes to make a human community happy that he is entitled to rule."\textsuperscript{113} In the absence of the statesman who possess politikē epistēmē, no political community

\textsuperscript{110} Statesman, 304c2.
\textsuperscript{111} Statesman, 305d1-2.
\textsuperscript{112} Statesman, 305e2-3.
\textsuperscript{113} Cooper, "Plato's Statesman and Politics," 186.
could be regarded as possessing a correct form of constitutional organization. It would merely be one, in its lawful form, that imitates by the rule of law the type which is governed by the true statesman.

Given the fundamental importance of politikē epistēmē, it is something of a surprise that the Visitor does not examine how one comes to possess this knowledge. Although the Visitor does recognize that this sort of directive knowledge is "nearly the most difficult and the greatest to acquire" (σχεδόν τῆς χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης κτήσις), he simply assumes that such knowledge and such a person is possible. We unfortunately are given no hint about how this may come to be. There is nothing in the text of the Statesman from which we can even infer how the true statesman is to be educated. It does not seem reasonable to view the passage near the end of the dialogue which notes that a person who has the proper mixture of courage and moderation may be placed in charge of "a single office should there happen to be a need" (ἀν ἐνὸς ἀρχὸντος χρεία συμβαίνη) as referring to the true statesman. The person who has been educated in courage and sōphrosunē cannot be considered as identical to the statesman. The correct amount of courage and moderation might be adequate for holding an office in the polis, but as the qualities required for the exercise of politikē epistēmē they appear to be insufficient. The true statesman surely requires an education in many more areas than these. Saunders is incorrect to argue: "The ideal ruler would in that case be one with politikē epistēmē somehow based on a knowledge of relevant Forms."  

114 Statesman, 292d4-5.  
115 Statesman, 311a4-5.  
116 Saunders, "Plato's Later Political Thought," 466. One could, of course, speculate that since the statesman seems to be related to the Republic's philosopher-kings, the educational program designed for the philosopher-kings would be similar to the one that is required for the statesman. A potential major obstacle to accepting this interpretation is, in my view, the lack of any obvious reference to the Forms in the Statesman. Despite Sayre's argument, in Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman, that the classes divided by the Visitor are Forms, a position which is plausible but not compelling, there is no hint whatsoever that the statesman's directive knowledge is entailed by the apprehension of the Form of the Good as it is in the case of the Republic's philosopher-kings. The problem of the education of the statesman is perhaps the sort of problem for which a solution may not be possible.
Although we are not able to demonstrate the manner in which the statesman acquires \textit{politikē \ epistēmē}, we are able to determine to some extent what his knowledge comprises. Clearly, the knowledge of the statesman is directive, aimed not only at controlling the practical actions of those who are subordinate to him, but also at bringing about the conditions under which both individuals and the polis may live in harmony. Yet, what must the statesman know in order to accomplish the tasks articulated in the \textit{Statesman}'s arguments? I wish to suggest that it is necessary for the statesman to know what is in due measure. Without knowledge of due measure, it would not be possible for the statesman to direct the actions of the general, judge, and orator, as well as to blend together the excessive or deficient character traits of the citizens. To state this point another way: \textit{politikē \ epistēmē} consists in part of knowing, and knowing how to achieve, \textit{to metrion}.

Moreover, I believe that in a general sense the statesman's knowledge is knowing how and when to act in accordance with \textit{sōphrosunē}. I had argued in Chapter 3 that there is a connection between the \textit{Charmides}' conception of \textit{sōphrosunē} as the knowledge of knowledge and the sort of knowledge needed by the statesman. \textit{Sōphrosunē} was regarded as the ability to arrive at correct behavior when measured against some standard. This standard, \textit{to metrion}, is set down in the \textit{Statesman}, thereby linking \textit{sōphrosunē} with \textit{to metrion}. In Chapter 4, I had argued that in the \textit{Republic} the idea of "acting moderately" indicates that a person knows how to find a middle position between extremes. "Acting moderately" is functionally equivalent to acting in accordance with due measure. When these arguments are taken together, it seems reasonable to conclude that \textit{politikē \ epistēmē} is in part comprised of the epistemological aspect of \textit{sōphrosunē}, along with the practical aspect of acting with moderation, with the result that the statesman's knowledge is, in effect, knowing the interchangeable standards of what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite, all of which are governed by
Without the knowledge of what is in due measure to guide him, the statesman will lack a fundamental component of the politikē epistēmē needed to direct the affairs and citizens of a political community. Regardless of whatever other elements that make up the statesman’s expert knowledge, it appears to be the case that understanding what is in due measure is perhaps the most important. It remains to determine the manner in which the person who possesses politikē epistēmē utilizes due measure in his role as an expert in the art of statesmanship.

Due Measure and the Politics of the Statesman

Before examining the relationship between due measure and the Statesman’s political thought, it would be helpful to address the issue of the statesman’s goal. Simply stated, the statesman requires expert knowledge to make individuals and the political community good by directly involving himself in the affairs of the polis. Rowe draws a useful contrast with the Euthydemus. In this dialogue, Socrates makes the distinction between acquiring knowledge and using knowledge. "There does not seem to be any benefit in any other kind of knowledge … which knows how to make things, unless [it knows how] to use what it makes" (Oὐδὲ γε, ὡς ἐξοικε, τής ἅλλης ἐπιστήμης ὠφελός γίνεται οὐδέν ... ἤτις πολεῖν τι ἐπιστάται, χρήσθαι δὲ μὴ

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117 It is important, I believe, to emphasize that what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are interchangeable standards. Politikē epistēmē is knowing how all these standards are related to one another. It does not seem to be the case that one of them ought to be given greater significance that the others. Lane is only partially correct by concentrating on what is timely (καιρός), a term which she treats in its temporal sense only. Her basic claim is that the political theory of the Statesman is a political ideal, "but one shaped by a crucial innovation: the perspective of time as the dynamic medium within which political conflict occurs." For the statesman, ho kairos is a "claim of objective knowledge"; it is the knowledge of recognizing the opportune moment for action. This is true to a certain extent. The objective of knowledge of knowing when to act leaves unanswered the following question: In what manner, for what purpose, and in relation to what does the statesman act? This question can be answered more satisfactorily by regarding the statesman’s knowledge as comprising what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite, rather than by treating his knowledge solely in terms of ho kairos. Melissa S. Lane, “A New Angle on Utopia: The Political Theory of the Statesman,” in Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum, ed. Christopher J. Rowe (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995), 276.

118 See, Christopher Rowe, “The Politicus and other Dialogues,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield, 251-253.
These two different kinds of knowledge need to be combined into a single type of knowledge that both knows how to make and how to use what it makes. Furthermore, Socrates notes that it was believed that "the art of the statesman and the kingly art were the same" (ἡ πολιτική καὶ ἡ βασιλική τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι). The art of statesmanship knows how to make use of what is under its control. Socrates then asks a fundamental question: "What about the kingly art? When it governs everything that it controls, what does it produce?" (Τί δὲ ἡ βασιλικὴ πάντων ἀρχουσα ὃν ἀρχειν; τι ἀπεργαζεται;). It appears that the product of the expertise is something good, but what sort of good this is must be determined. This determination presents a difficulty in that both Clinias and Socrates are in agreement that there is nothing good except some sort of knowledge. The king, or statesman, does not benefit the citizens in the sense that their material goods increase, because the argument has established that these are not goods in themselves. It seems to be the case, then, that the kingly art would have to benefit human beings by making them "wise and good" (σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς). Socrates realizes the difficulty that they have gotten themselves into and breaks off further consideration of this topic.

Does politikē epistēmē in the Statesman impart knowledge? An analysis of this question suggests that it does not, at least not on any deep level. In the Euthydemus, the argument seems to lead to the conclusion that the kingly art imparts knowledge in the sense that this art instructs individuals in how to be good. Any relation between being good and the practice and goals of politics is unexamined. In the Statesman, politikē epistēmē aims at something more than merely imparting a certain type of knowledge; it aims a specific political ends as well. First, since politikē epistēmē is directive knowledge it directs the arts which are subordinate to it – a

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119 Euthydemus, 289a4-7.
120 Euthydemus, 291c4-5.
121 The parallel with the statesman directing the general, judge, and orator in the Statesman should be obvious.
122 Euthydemus, 292a4-5.
123 See, Euthydemus, 292a7-293a1.
distinctly political task. Second, by blending excessive and deficient degrees of courage and moderation in the polis' citizens, the statesman concerns himself with the life of the political community. Rowe comments: "In both these roles, he seems to acquire a direct involvement in practical politics of the sort that is denied to the ideal king of the *Euthydemos.*" While the kingly art of the *Euthydemos* is directed toward a good, this good may be characterized as somewhat abstract. In contrast, the good aimed at by the *Statesman's* expert in the art of statesmanship is a practical, concrete good – the harmony and preservation of the political community.

Moreover, it may be argued that the differences between the goods aimed at in the *Euthydemos* and *Statesman* reflect the more pronounced practicability of the *Statesman's* political thought. Unlike the *Euthydemos*, the *Statesman* contains no reference to the Socratic notion that virtue is knowledge. Knowledge is not treated in this work as the philosophical understanding of knowing how to be virtuous for the sake of one's soul. Rather, *politikē epistēmē* has a different aim; its possession allows the statesman to direct the political practices of a community so its citizens live well. It is arguable that Socrates ended the discussion in the *Euthydemos* about the kingly art because he was unable to determine how the kingly art could ever impart knowledge to the relatively large number of people who are disinclined to practice philosophy. It would seem to be the case that unless substantial numbers of citizens possessed the knowledge to practice virtue, then there would be little chance of a political community living well. By restricting the goal of *politikē epistēmē* in the *Statesman*, it appears that Plato is arguing in favor of a politics that is more practicable than the one encountered in the *Euthydemos*. The statesman is not attempting to impart philosophical understanding to his subjects, rather his principal purpose is to make them good by making them moderate.

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In order to help Young Socrates understand the manner in which the statesman performs his function, the Visitor refers "to the paradigm of the art of weaving" (κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς παράδειγμα).\(^{125}\) By employing the art of weaving as a paradigm for the art of statesmanship, in the sense that both arts are concerned with the idea of intertwining (συμπλοκήν), the Visitor attempts to determine "what sort of thing it is and in what way" (ποία τέ ἐστι, καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ) intertwining relates to statesmanship.\(^{126}\) While both the art of weaving and the art of statesmanship require knowledge of what is in due measure in order to accomplish their respective tasks, knowledge of weaving and politikē epistēmē are not the same. Since they are directed toward two different objects, the relationship between weaving and statesmanship is at best analogous. Perhaps the greatest difference between the expert knowledge of the weaver and the statesman is that the latter must possess directive knowledge, whereas the former possesses knowledge "concerning all the things that are done" (περὶ πάντα τὰ δρώμενα), that is, the weaver possesses productive knowledge.\(^{127}\)

The Visitor begins his discussion of the statesman's political art with a bold assertion: The virtues of courage and moderation "are in some way extremely hostile to each other and hold an opposite position in many things" (κατὰ δὴ τινα τρόπων, ἐν μάλα πρῶς ἀλλήλας ἐχθρὰ καὶ στάσιν ἔναντίαν ἔχετον ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων).\(^{128}\) The Visitor continues by demonstrating to Young Socrates that we often speak of courage and moderation in relation to other fine (καλὰ)

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125 Statesman, 305e8.
126 Statesman, 306a1-3.
127 Statesman, 281d8-9. There is an interesting point of similarity between some of the things that are produced and one of the functions of good political leadership. In the first division of weaving, the Visitor notes that some things are produced for the sake of defense or protection. These are things that provide security. Likewise, the statesman, by exercising control over the art of generalship may be seen as possessing the expert knowledge to provide security for the polis. It seems to be the case that the true statesman will know when and in what manner the polis is to be preserved. See, Statesman, 279d1-3 and 305d2-5.
128 Statesman, 306b9-11. The Visitor's claim immediately raises the question of whether or not the parts of virtue are different than virtue as a whole. Recognizing this part to whole relationship, the Visitor argues that courage and moderation are hostile to each other in the a specific sense discussed above.
qualities; for example, "sharpness and speed" (δεότητα καὶ ταχύς) in reference to courage, and "slow and soft" (βραδέα καὶ μαλακά) in reference to moderation. When these respective qualities occur at the right time (ἐν καιρῷ) they in effect describe the virtues they represent, and accordingly are praised. But when they occur at the wrong time (ἀκαιρε), the virtues represented by these descriptive qualities are censured, and the virtues are given opposite names, that is, they are regarded as vices. When these qualities "occur more sharply than is timely" (Ὀξύτερα μὲν αὐτὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς καιροῖς) a person is called "overbearing and manic" (ὑπερστικὰ καὶ μανικά), when they are untimely slow or soft we say that a person is "cowardly and lethargic" (δειλὰ καὶ βλακκικά). Thus, when courage or moderation are either too sharp or too slow in respect to what is appropriately timely, they are "not mixed with each other" (οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλαις μεσγυμένας), and are opposed to each other.

Mishima argues that courage and moderation are separate virtues which describe separate individuals; they are not separate virtues in the same person. He argues that there is both "essential disunity" and "extensional disunity". There is "essential disunity" because courage and moderation "belong to 'opposite species' (306 c 7-8)." There is "extensional disunity" because "the two virtues are said not to appear within the same individuals." Mishima finds this theory of virtue unsatisfactory, and he attempts to explain it by arguing that Plato's objective in writing the Statesman "is not to pursue theoretical rigour [sic] for its own sake, but to give practical advice on how to make a harmonious and happy society from existing, and in many aspects

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129 See, Statesman 306d1-307b3.
130 See, Statesman, 307b5-d4.
131 Teruo Mishima, "Courage and Moderation in the Statesman," in Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum, ed. Christopher J. Rowe (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995). I should point out that throughout this section I use the terms "moderation" and its associated forms to render both κομίκους and σωφροσύνη and the words related to them. Since the Visitor employs both terms interchangeably, it seems best to use a single English word to translate them.
132 Ibid., 307. Mishima's evidence for his claim of extensional disunity is the part of the passage I just discussed, Statesman, 307c2-d7.
imperfect, resources." While I agree, in part, with Mishima's conclusion, his understanding of the way in which courage and moderation are treated in the *Statesman* seems incorrect.

In terms of "essential disunity", it does not seem to be the case that the Visitor is making the claim that a courageous individual and a moderate individual are members of "opposite species". Rather, the Visitor states that "we should place all the things that we call fine into two classes that are opposed to each other" (δοσα καλα μεν λέγομεν, εἰς δύο δέ αὐτά τίθεμεν ἐναντία ἄλληλων εἰδη). It is the qualities that are opposed to each that are to be placed in opposite classes, not the individuals who display these qualities. The Visitor nowhere either explicitly or implicitly affirms that there are separate classes of individuals who possess one and only one virtue. It is implausible to suggest that an individual could be courageous but not moderate, or moderate but not courageous. Perhaps a better way to regard this is to claim that a person can be described by her dominant character trait. Someone who possesses both courage and moderation can be characterized in four ways in respect to what one's courage or moderation inclines: (1) as manic if courage inclines more toward sharpness and quickness than it ought; (2) as cowardly if courage inclines more toward slowness and softness than it ought; (3) as overbearing if moderation inclines more toward sharpness and quickness than it ought; (4) as lethargic if moderation inclines more toward slowness and softness than it ought. In terms of "extensional disunity", the passage Mishima employs in support of this notion should not be taken as referring to individuals who exhibit one or another of these virtues but not both. The Visitor is simply making an

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133 Ibid., 311.
134 *Statesman*, 306c7-8.
135 The passages at Statesman, 309a8-309b7 and 311a4-5, suggest that a person can have both courage and moderation. In the first of these passages it is suggested that some may incline more toward one or the other of these virtues, but not that they possess one or the other exclusively. The second passage clearly refers to "the person who has both qualities" (ἀμφότερα ἄξοντα). Skemp, too, does not think that courage and moderation are "irreconcilable opposites". Skemp, *Plato*, 229.
136 Bobonich discusses this issue in terms of a Reciprocity Thesis of the Virtues and an Incompatibility Thesis. The former states: A person has one virtue if and only if he has all the virtues. The latter claims: There are psychic qualities F and G, such that F is a virtue and G is a virtue and a person can have either F or G but not both. Bobonich correctly
analytic distinction to show what sort of character is entailed by an excess or deficiency of courage and moderation. It is the task of the statesman to blend both courage and moderation in the same person, not in separate individuals who implausibly exhibit only one or another of these virtues.

The Visitor argues that as a consequence of the opposition of courage and moderation there will be a negative effect manifested in the life of the polis in respect to how individuals are inclined in terms of moderation and courage. Those whose dispositions are too moderate, on account of their passion for order and quiet, are "more untimely that they ought to be" (ἀκαλρότερον ὄντα ἦ ἄρη). They are inclined to be peaceable and avoid engaging in warfare. Since they are "unwarlike" (ἀπολέλοις) and are concerned with preserving peace, "they are continually imposed upon [by others]" (ὅντες τε ἃεὶ τῶν ἐπιτεθεμένων), with the result that without even noticing it, they, their children, and the whole polis "often become slaves instead of free men" (ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων πολλάκις ... γενόμενοι δαολοκ). In contrast, those who tend to incline more toward courage always draw their poleis into some sort of war "because their desire for such a life is more impetuous than it ought to be" (διὰ τὴν τοῦ τολούτου βίου σφοδρότεραν τοῦ δέοντος ἐπιθυμίαν), and by making enemies of those who are powerful, "either completely destroy their own countries, or else make them slaves and subjects of their enemies" (ὑ πάμπαν

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argues: "If Incompatibility is true and at least one person has either F or G, then Reciprocity is false, but the denial of Reciprocity does not entail Incompatibility." The question, then, is does Plato actually reject Reciprocity and accept Incompatibility? There does not seem to be enough evidence in the Statesman to determine whether or not Plato is committed to either thesis. In other words, the lack of a fully worked out theory of the virtues in this dialogue suggests a certain degree of ambiguity on this question. Yet, in view of the blending function of the statesman at the end of the work, it is difficult to argue in favor of the Incompatibility Thesis. Bobonich, whose analysis adopts a cautious approach to the this issue, and whose arguments are grounded in the view that Plato alters his views about the capacities of non-philosophers in the late-period works, remarks: "The ambiguity we are left with at the end of the Statesman may well reflect a genuine tension in Plato's views [about these capacities] ... Nevertheless, the Statesman's closing section does suggest that important changes in Plato's ethical theory and ethical psychology are taking place in the late dialogues." Christopher Bobonich, "The Virtues of Ordinary People in Plato's Statesman," in Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum, ed. Christopher J. Rowe (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995), 313-314 and 329.

137 Statesman, 307e1-308a2.
Both characteristically moderate and courageous persons can bring about the same negative consequences for their political community; its enslavement or destruction. The Visitor notes that similar results can be entailed by different causes. This fact supports his initial claim "that the parts of virtue are in no small way naturally at odds with each other" (ὁτι μόρια ἄρετής οὐ συμκρά ἀλλήλως διαφέρεσθον φύσει). Based on the Visitor's analysis, it appears to be the case that in certain circumstances the virtues, rather than working together for the sake of living well, can conflict with one another with the result that the individual does not live well, potentially harming both herself and the political community in which she lives. This occurs when courage and moderation do not mix with each other but pull in opposite directions.

In the final part of the argument, the Visitor determines the role of the statesman. There appears to be two courses open to anyone who possesses expert knowledge. Either expert knowledge voluntarily puts together whatever it produces from good and bad elements by combining the good and bad, or it rejects as far as possible the bad and makes use of "what is suitable and good" (τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια καὶ χρηστά), bringing both like and unlike good elements together, with the result that the expert is "crafting some single kind of thing and some single capacity" (μίαν ποιηθὰν καὶ ιδέαν δημιουργεῖ). The art of statesmanship (ἡ πολιτεία) will never voluntarily attempt to construct a political community from good and bad human beings. Rather, it will first test children in play, and when they have been tested it will entrust them to educators who have the capacity for this particular end. The art of statesmanship will direct the educators in their task of educating the young for the sake of the polis, just like the art of weaving (ἡ ψαντεική) entrusts its materials to those who are responsible for preparing them for

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138 Statesman, 308a4-9.
139 Statesman, 308b7-8.
140 Statesman, 308c1-7.
the weaver.\textsuperscript{141} In other words, in accordance with the directive knowledge possessed by the statesman, his subordinates will carry out the actual task of educating the young, while he prescribes how the educators are to accomplish their duties. It was noted previously that the art of statesmanship will not permit the educators and tutors to do anything contrary to the law: "they are to produce some suitable disposition [in their pupils] that is not contrary to its own task of mixing together (ὅτι μὴ τις πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς σύγκρασιν ἀπεργαζόμενος ἤθος τι πρέπον ἀποτελεῖ).\textsuperscript{142}

After the incorrigible and ignorant have been separated out, those who remain are persons whose natures, when educated, are "sufficiently noble" (ἐπὶ τὸ γέναῖον ἰκαναὶ). It is they whom the art of statesmanship attempts to weave together. Continuing the weaving metaphor, the Visitor states that the individuals who strain more toward courage, since their dispositions are firm are like the warp; the individuals who incline toward the orderly (ἐπὶ τὸ κόσμιον), or moderate, since they are soft resemble the woof. The art of statesmanship blends together those who have more courageous dispositions with those whose dispositions tend toward the opposite, that is, toward moderation, just as the art of weaving intertwines the warp and woof, with the result that an individual possessing a well-blended disposition is produced.\textsuperscript{143}

The Visitor then describes the manner in which this blending is carried out. He first mentions that there are two bonds which unite the aspects of the soul; a divine bond which has a kinship with the divine elements in the soul, and a mortal bond which ties together the mortal aspects of the soul. The divine bond is what enables human beings to have "right belief about what is fine, just, and good, as well as about the things that are their opposites" (Τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαιῶν

\textsuperscript{141} See, Statesman, 308d1-e2.
\textsuperscript{142} Statesman, 308e6-8. There are some who do not have the capacity to be educated in respect to courage and moderation. Unfortunately, why this is and what causes it to occur is not discussed by the Visitor. As mentioned earlier, the incorrigible and ignorant are removed from the polis.
\textsuperscript{143} See, Statesman, 309a8-b7.
πέρι καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτων ἐναντίων ὄντως οὐδεν ἄληθῆ δόξαν. 144 Only the statesman and the good lawgiver are able to forge this divine bond by means of the "muse that belongs to the art of kingship" (τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μουσῆ). 145 The courageous soul, when it has grasped true opinion, will become more moderate, and the moderate soul, rather than being soft and timid, will be made "truly moderate and wise" (ἄντως σωφρόν καὶ φρόνιμον). 146 This divine bonding together is especially successful in the case of those who dispositions are naturally noble and who have been nurtured in accordance with their nature. It would appear that this last remark is the justification for eliminating the incorrigible and ignorant from the polis; their souls are such that the divine bond uniting the parts of virtue that are unlike and opposed to each other could never be established. 147

In relation to the difficulty faced by the statesman in blending the soul's divine bonds, the human bonds are relatively easy to understand and establish. The forging of human bonds is effected through a eugenics program. 148 Based on the principle that "like attracts like", the Visitor argues that those who are disposed toward moderation seek out and marry those who are similar; those who incline toward courage do the same. The result of this inter-marriage between like types is that in the case of those whose characters are predominantly courageous procreation over the course of many generations will produce in the end a disposition that "erupts completely in madness" (ἐξελθεῖν παντάπασι μανίαις); in the case of the excessively moderate, the result is a soul which is "unmixed with daring courage" (ἄκέραστος τόλμης ἀνθρείας), and in the end

144 Statesman, 309c5-6.
145 Statesman, 309d2-3. Plato's choice of the word μουσα is interesting. He appears to be suggesting that there is some sort of divine inspiration behind statesmanship and law-giving. Skemp comments: "the word μουσα does not seem to be used in quite the same sense elsewhere in Plato, but the closest parallels are probably Republic, VI, 499d, and Laws, IV, 722d, particularly the latter, for though the actual word μουσα there refers to musical 'nomes' there is the deliberate play on musical 'nomes' and political 'nomes' or laws to which the lawgiver must compose a prelude." Skemp, Plato, 230.
146 Statesman, 309e6.
147 See, Statesman, 310a1-5.
148 See, Statesman, 310b2-e3.
becomes "completely crippled" (παντάπασιν ἀνατηροῦσθαι).\footnote{Statesman, 310d6-e3.} Once the divine bonds have been established so that both dispositional types possess a single opinion about what is fine and good, it is not a difficult task for the statesman to blend the moderate with the courageous. "For this is the single and complete task of kingly weaving-together, never to allow moderate dispositions to stand away from the courageous" (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν καὶ ὅλον ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς συνυφάνσεως ἔργον, μηθέποτε ἐὰν ἀφίστασθαι σώφρονα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων ἡθη).\footnote{Statesman, 310e7-9.} When a "well-woven fabric" (εὐχρήστω εὐφασμα) has been made out of the moderate and the courageous character-types, then political offices may be entrusted to both types in common. Those who are inclined to moderation, when they hold office, supply the polis with a sense of caution, justice, and preservation, while those who are disposed toward courage, but who are inferior in respect to justice and caution, provide a keenness when action is required. "Unless both of these are present, it is impossible in cities for anything that concerns both public and private matters to be done well" (πάντα δὲ καλῶς γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἰδία καὶ δημοσία τούτων μὴ παραγενομένων ἀμφοίν ἄδινατον).\footnote{Statesman, 311b3-5.}

The discussion of the statesman and the art of statesmanship has reached its conclusion. The statesman, weaving together the dispositions of courageous and moderate citizens, employs his expert knowledge "to complete the best and most magnificent of all fabrics" (πάντων μεγαλοπρεπέστατων ὑφασμάτων καὶ ἁριστῶν ἀποτελέσασα) – a political community whose citizens to live together in "concord and friendship" (όμονοία καὶ φιλία).\footnote{Statesman, 311b9-c3.}

While it is clear that the statesman requires politikē epistēmē to direct the affairs of the polis, and that he performs his task by blending together the opposing virtues in the dispositions of his
subjects, the Visitor does not explicitly address the issue concerning the standard by which the statesman measures courage and moderation. In relation to what standard does the statesman know how to blend courage and moderation in the citizens? It seems insufficient simply to claim that the statesman blends, or interweaves, opposing elements into something whole in which both partake without attempting to say what these opposites are weighed against. It is my position that the answer to this question is implicit in the text of the *Statesman*. It is in accordance with to *metrion* that the statesman carries out his task. The standards of what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, and what is requisite are reflected in the blending operation that the statesman performs on the souls of his subjects. Due measure is framed in terms of weighing the extremes of excess and deficiency against a mean in which both may share; it is a way of knowing how to measure and reconcile contraries. Without knowing how to weigh and reconcile courage and moderation, the statesman would not be able to blend the dispositions of his citizens in the manner suggested by the Visitor. The statesman's *politikē epistēmē* comprises two principal components: (1) it knows how to direct the actions of those who are subordinate to the ruler; (2) it knows how to apply due measure to bring about the good for individuals and the political community.

Earlier in this chapter I had argued that the political philosophy of the *Statesman* was incomplete. Yet, despite this sense of incompleteness, the dialogue does offer a new way of conceiving politics; a way which complements the treatment of politics in the *Republic* and other early- and middle-period dialogues. The political thought in the *Statesman* is directed toward what may be termed a politics of moderation. By understanding and applying due measure, the expert in the art of statesmanship is able to blend the excessive and deficient dispositions of the citizens so that one particular virtue, or character trait, does not dominate the others in respect to both the souls of individuals and the political community as a whole. Without the application to
politics of due measure, there is a significant chance that ultimately the political community may
tear itself apart from within or be destroyed from without. In effect, politics and political
leadership becomes an exercise in acting moderately to ensure the preservation and flourishing of
the polis. While the solution presented in the Statesman is very likely immensely difficult to
bring about successfully in practice, it appears, nevertheless, that it may be a more practicable
solution for politics than the one offered in the Republic. The statesman who possesses politikē
epistēmē and rules in accordance with what is in due measure may be considered as an interim
step between the philosopher-kings of the Republic and the expert law-giver and rule of law set
down in the Laws. In this sense, the Statesman looks backward and forward while
simultaneously presenting its own, albeit incomplete, political philosophy. There is, however, a
common thread running through all of Plato's political writings – at the core of all human and
political action there is the need for moderation or knowing what is in due measure.
CHAPTER 8
MODERATING THE INDIVIDUAL:
DUE MEASURE IN THE PHILEBUS

As is the case in Plato's late-period political philosophy, to metrion plays a significant role in this period's moral philosophy as well. In this chapter I would like to analyze the manner in which to metrion is employed throughout the Philebus for the sake of determining what is the best sort of life for human beings. Due measure is the standard against which pleasures, pains, and different types of knowledge are weighed in this dialogue. Yet, before Plato is able to conclude that the best sort of life is one that mixes true pleasures and knowledge, he first sets down a complex series of metaphysical and ontological arguments which function as the ground for his views concerning the best sort of life at the dialogue's conclusion. These metaphysical and ontological arguments, in turn, make extensive use of the method of division and blending, a philosophical method which itself relies on due measure in order to mix together contraries. Moreover, the method of division and blending is utilized for the diairesis of the types of lives. In short, then, to metrion underlies both the method and the philosophy of the Philebus. Arguably, many of the complex arguments and positions taken in this dialogue may best be illuminated in terms of what is in due measure.

The principal discussion of the Philebus concentrates on the question of what sort of life brings about the greatest good for a human being: Would this be a life of pleasure, a life of knowledge, or a life which combines elements of both? Although the focus of the work seems to be centered on individual moral choice and conduct, the Philebus deals with far more than merely an agent's moral choice of the best type of life. Closely interconnected with the dialogue's principal topic are investigations of matters concerning ontology, metaphysics, and philosophical
method, all of which should be regarded as being integral to understanding the whole work, and supporting its conclusions. It does not seem to be the case that Plato intended these investigations to be taken as digressions, or subordinate to the main discussion. Rather, they are incorporated into the *Philebus* to serve four primary functions.

First, the discussions of ontology and metaphysics allow Plato to argue that an individual's choice of life is not simply an action performed by a human moral agent, but that the best sort of life chosen by an individual is inextricably linked with the manner in which Plato views the cosmos. Since the individual human soul is a part of the cosmic soul, both sharing in the same properties, the sort of life chosen by a human agent will be a reflection of the order of the universe. That is to say, the best sort of life is one which replicates on the level of the human "the measure and the nature of due proportion" (μέτρον καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως) found on the level of the cosmos.¹ Second, the metaphysical and ontological examinations in the *Philebus* function to connect this work with other dialogues. In respect to Plato's metaphysics, the *Philebus* articulates one of his fundamental premises: the cosmos is rationally ordered by a divine mind. The premise that a divine mind is the organizing force of the universe is found throughout the middle- and late-period works, from the *Phaedo* to the *Laws*, and its inclusion in the *Philebus* serves to demonstrate the continuity between the former and latter dialogues. In respect to Plato's ontology, the four ontological categories posited in the *Philebus* should be read as a development of the ideas set down in the *Sophist* concerning being, becoming, and not-being. Third, the philosophical method employed in the *Philebus* continues the use of the *Statesman's* method of division and blending. Arguably, the view expressed by Socrates that the best life is the one that is a mixture of the life of pleasure with the life of knowledge is directly influenced by Plato's treatment of method in the *Statesman*. Fourth, *to metrion* plays a significant role in the *Philebus*.

¹ *Philebus*, 64d9.
Since the dialogue concludes that the best life is the mixed life of true pleasure and knowledge, and since pleasure and knowledge are two contrary qualities, there must be some sort of standard against which these contraries may be measured, both individually as pleasure and as knowledge, and collectively as a combination of the two. Without the Statesman's appeal to what is in due measure as the standard by which pleasure, knowledge, and the type of life are weighed and judged, Plato's conclusion that the life which mixes true pleasure and knowledge is the greatest good for human beings could not be satisfactorily reached.

In sum, then, the Philebus is a complex text whose many considerations work together to attempt to demonstrate that the best sort of life is not simply one which an agent chooses for the sake of living in the sensible world. Rather, the connection between the human and divine in this dialogue seeks to point out the relationship between the individual and the cosmos: As the universe is a rationally ordered whole, so, too, should the individual live a rationally ordered life, a human existence which mirrors the order, measure, and proportion of the cosmos.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine to metrion, along with the philosophical method of division and blending, in respect to the Philebus' arguments for the best life. This chapter should not be regarded as offering a comprehensive treatment of particular problems concerning Plato's moral philosophy, ontology, or metaphysics, nor should it be viewed as presenting an overall interpretation of the dialogue.\(^2\) Rather, for the most part, I limit my examination to the method of division and blending and to metrion in order to show how the Philebus' arguments rely upon these two important features of Plato's late-period philosophy. The chapter is organized into four main sections. In the first section, I discuss briefly several interpretive views on the Philebus for the sake of situating my reading in respect to current scholarship. The second section addresses

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\(^2\) In view of this chapter's place in this study, it is not possible, except to the extent required by my interpretation, to examine the dialogue's moral philosophy, ontology, and metaphysics in themselves. Any in depth treatment of these topics would go well beyond the scope of this study.
two important issues concerning the *Philebus*: the dialogue's chronological location in the Platonic corpus, and the relationship between the work's dramatic form and its *dramatis personae*. The third section examines the manner in which *diairesis* is carried out in the dialogue. In the fourth and final section, I analyze the use of due measure in the *Philebus*, especially in respect to the necessity for having some sort of standard against which pleasures and knowledge should be measured.

**Reading the Philebus**

In general, the *Philebus* is regarded as a work of moral philosophy which examines what sort of life would bring about the greatest good for human beings. This view of the dialogue's main topic is emphasized by nearly all scholars who examine the *Philebus*.³ Taylor, for example, comments: "In the *Philebus* we are once more dealing with 'practice' and more specifically with 'individual' morality. The dialogue is a straightforward discussion of the question of whether the 'good for man' can be identified either with pleasure or the life of thought."⁴ Similarly, Dorothea Frede regards the main subject of the work as an examination of "the rivalry between pleasure and knowledge as candidates for the dignity of the highest good in human life."⁵ Guthrie, however, holds a dissenting view. He argues that the principal topic of the *Philebus* is not exactly what Taylor claims it to be. On Guthrie's reading, the discussion about whether the life of pleasure or the life of knowledge is the "good for man" has been concluded "(evidently to a

³ There are, of course, notable exceptions. Sayre, for example, analyzes the work's ontological views far more extensively than its moral philosophy. See, Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology*, esp., 118-186, and *Metaphysics and Method*, passim. It appears that for Benardete, the *Philebus* is far more than simply a work that treats ethics, metaphysics, and ontology. It is a dialogue – along with the *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* – in which Plato set down his views regarding the relationship between the beautiful, the just, and the good, for the sake of articulating the contrast between philosophy and poetry. Plato "has philosophy invade the territory of poetry and claim for itself what seems to be the indisputable domain of poetry. Philosophy, he either argues or boasts, can do better what poetry seems to best," Seth Benardete, *The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato's Philebus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ix.


stalemate) before the dialogue began."⁶ He argues that Socrates almost immediately directs the conversation to a consideration that perhaps neither a life of pleasure nor a life of knowledge is best; a third alternative is possible, a life that is better than either.⁷ A careful reading of the text seems to bear out Guthrie's position. Since the dialogue begins *mediis in rebus*, starting with a quick recapitulation by Socrates of his and Philebus' views on the life of pleasure versus the life of knowledge, is it reasonable to take Taylor's and Frede's comments as being not quite accurate. It is more correct to say that the principal topic of the *Philebus* is the "relative importance" of the two types of lives in respect to each other and in respect to a third, alternate sort of life.⁸ The distinction made by Guthrie is not insignificant in that the impasse reached by Socrates and Philebus before the dialogue actually commences prepares the ground for the more detailed and philosophically sophisticated discussion concerning pleasure which follows. Guthrie comments: "By this dramatic device of a dialogue before a dialogue Plato shows plainly that he has no intention of treating us to yet another refutation of the naïve hedonistic equation of pleasure with good which he already dealt with amply in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*."⁹

Furthermore, Guthrie is correct to recognize that the *Philebus*’ philosophy should be considered in its entirety. The moral philosophy of this work cannot be adequately understood without grasping the relationship between Plato's ethics, ontology, and metaphysics. Guthrie is in agreement with my previous remarks about the need to treat the dialogue as a whole.¹⁰ It is necessary to consider the connection between the human and the divine, the worldly and the cosmic, if one hopes to gain a full apprehension of the *Philebus*. There is an order to the cosmos

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⁷ See, *Philebus*, 11d11-12a1.
⁸ See, Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*, 202
⁹ Ibid., 202.
¹⁰ Although Guthrie does regard the *Philebus* in terms of the relationship of its metaphysics, ontology, and moral philosophy, he does not consider the dialogue's underlying philosophical method, or the importance of what is in due measure for its arguments and positions. It is my intention to attempt to fill this lacuna in this chapter.
that is reflected both in the individual and in the polis; a view of the universe and a view of human beings which seem to be a hallmark of Plato's late-period philosophy. Neither the individual nor the political community appear to be regarded by Plato as isolated parts of the cosmos. Rather, the individual and the polis are closely bound to the universe in which they partake. Even though Plato examines, or perhaps emphasizes, separate components of this whole in individual dialogues, it is well to keep in mind that the idea of a cosmic order is at the core of Plato's late philosophy. Guthrie remarks: "The Philebus treats of it in the individual, the Politicus in the state, and the Timaeus in the universe at large, but all alike are at pains to put mankind in his setting as an integral part of the cosmic order.\footnote{Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 203.} It is arguable that even the Laws, a dialogue generally regarded as a work of practical political philosophy, shares in Plato's attempt to link together the human and the divine. One only has to recall that in this work Plato argues that the moderate person (δ ἁσθενεῖ) is dear to the god because they are similar (ὁμοιοί) to each other.\footnote{See, Laws, 716d1-3.} In other words, Plato is making the claim that both the human and the divine share in the quality of moderation, or being moderate; in a sense, it is the principal defining characteristic both of men and of the gods.\footnote{This point will be examined further in the next chapter. Moreover, the theological discussion in Book X of the Laws could be read as Plato's attempt to set the task of legislation within a divine, cosmic framework. As I noted in Chapter 4, Schofield does regard the political thought of the Laws as a sort of theocracy. The ordering of Magnesia by means of positive law may reflect, or depend upon, the ordering of the universe by divine law. In any case, the type of political community discussed in the Laws should be regarded in the same sense that we regard the relationship between the worldly and the cosmic in Plato's late-period thought. See, Schofield, Plato, 311-325.}

An understanding of the Philebus is complicated by the fact that, in comparison to Plato's other dialogues, there is a relative lack of full-scale, book-length analyses and interpretations of this dialogue. The number of essay-length articles far surpasses the number of books written about this work. In general, these examinations are directed toward particular problems encountered in the dialogue, rather than at a comprehensive interpretation of the entire dialogue.
Commentators typically focus on either the ontological and metaphysical portions of the work, or on the dialogue's moral philosophy. Similarly, there is a relative scarcity of commentaries on the work as a whole. Although the scholarly literature concerning the Philebus is enormous, it is reasonable to say that, in general, the Philebus has been treated by scholars in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, either by concentrating on a specific aspect of the dialogue, or by incorporating a rather generalized interpretation of the work into a larger study concerned with Greek views on pleasure.

Further complicating the picture is a belief by some interpreters that the arguments and meaning of the Philebus are obscure. Grote, for example, writes: "It is neither clear nor orderly … Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philebus [sic]." A more contemporary scholar, Waterfield, also regards the Philebus in a negative light. The dialogue contains "wild ideas and bad arguments." In addition to his criticism of the its arguments, Waterfield is also critical of the work's dramatic structure: the Philebus is a "bad example of the earlier dialogue form." Waterfield's disparaging comment

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19 Ibid., 271.
may be regarded as tendentious in view of his belief that the *Philebus* is not a late-period dialogue, rather it belongs to that a group of works composed by Plato before a period of self-critical re-evaluation of his philosophy.\(^{20}\)

Frede attempts to explain why the *Philebus* has not received the sort of treatment given to the majority of Plato's other writings. The work is essentially divided into two major sections. In the first part, Plato is primarily concerned with questions of dialectic and metaphysics; in the second, he concentrates on questions of ethics. Frede grants that that first part of the dialogue, its discussion of dialectics and metaphysics, is difficult, although she does not go quite so far as Grote in claiming that this section of the work is obscure. The issues in this part of the *Philebus* appeal to specialized scholarly interests. The second section's treatment of ethics is of interest to either moral philosophers or general readers. According to Frede, the specialist is not particularly concerned with Plato's examination of pleasure and pain, while the general reader is somewhat put off by the more difficult discussion of dialectics and metaphysics. She concludes: "Our situation with respect to the dialogue is therefore rather paradoxical: The 'general' reader cannot and the specialist will not deal with it as a whole. As a consequence, the *Philebus* has remained largely excluded from the discussion of Plato's philosophy …"\(^{21}\) Frede's explanation appears to be reasonable, if one believes that there are distinct and separable arguments taking place in this dialogue. If, however, one views the complete work in the sense that I, and others, have suggested, then perhaps the *Philebus* need not be considered and interpreted as having an appeal for two different sets of readers. Both the "general" and the "specialist" readers should attempt to understand the text of this dialogue in its entirety, in order to see how Plato's ontology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and dialectics function together to articulate a view of the highest

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\(^{20}\) Waterfield's views will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter. He seems to be the only Plato scholar who does not believe that the *Philebus* is a work of Plato's late period.

\(^{21}\) Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration," 426.
human good, a view entailed by Plato's position on the relationship between the human and the

divine.\textsuperscript{22}

There are two books written about the \textit{Philebus} which are worth briefly mentioning. Among
older book-length studies is Gadamer's interpretation of the dialogue.\textsuperscript{23} While this book presents
a fascinating exercise in hermeneutics, it may perhaps best be regarded as a meditation by one
great philosopher on the work of another; an evaluation of Plato through Gadamer's
phenomenological perspective.\textsuperscript{24} Gadamer's analysis goes well beyond the usual interpretations
given by scholars in respect to the \textit{Philebus}. He employs Plato's use of dialectics to demonstrate
the way in which we reach a shared understanding through dialogical interaction; a notion which
itself is fundamental to Gadamer's own philosophy. At the very outset of his book, Gadamer
writes: "The process of reaching a shared understanding of the matter in question through
conversation (\textit{Sachliche Verständigung im Gespräch}) is aimed at knowledge."\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore,
Gadamer examines Plato's practice of dialectics in conjunction with Aristotle's view that
knowledge is arrived at through demonstration, in order to show that "dialectic is not a uniform
phenomenon but can appear in diverse forms."\textsuperscript{26} The point that Gadamer is attempting to
establish is that shared understanding can only be attained by means of some process of
conversation. The discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors in the \textit{Philebus} is but one
way in which a shared understanding, or knowledge, of a particular question can be reached.

\textsuperscript{22} I am not, of course, suggesting that all studies of the \textit{Philebus} should focus on the dialogue as a whole. I am merely
suggesting that a full understanding of the \textit{Philebus}' positions must take into account the inter-relationships among all
of the work's aspects.

Robert W. Wallace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). It is well to remember that this was Gadamer's

\textsuperscript{24} I do not mean to imply any criticism of Gadamer's interpretation of Plato. I do wish to suggest, however, that
Gadamer offers a reading that considers Plato through a unique interpretive point of view; a point of view which
possibly reveals more about Gadamer's relation to Plato than about Plato himself.

\textsuperscript{25} Gadamer, \textit{Plato's Dialectical Ethics}, 17. The translator's rendering of \textit{Sachliche} as "shared" is somewhat inaccurate.
It would be better to translate the term as "objective".

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 18.
A more recent study of the *Philebus* is that of Hampton. The great merit of Hampton's analysis is her attempt to connect the human good to the universal, cosmic good in which the human good shares. We are only able to realize our human good by acknowledging the relationship between the human good and the universal, or cosmic, good under which the human good is subsumed. Not only does Hampton offer a comprehensive interpretation of the *Philebus* itself, but she also demonstrates the sense of continuity with Plato's other writings on the question of pleasure, as well as with his moral philosophy in general.

Although the *Philebus* has not received the sort of comprehensive examination that many other of the dialogues have received, the interpretations of this work have been successful in revealing particular aspects of its sometimes difficult, but not obscure, arguments. In particular, the studies by Sayre, Frede, Hampton, and Gosling, have assisted in enriching our understanding of the *Philebus*. Yet, even in view of these scholarly contributions, it is arguable that there is still a substantial amount of work remaining to be done on this dialogue before we are able to claim that its arguments have been fully explained and its riches fully revealed.

**The Chronology, Dramatic Form, and Characters of the Philebus**

Before turning to an analysis of Plato's use of *diairesis* and the role of what is in due measure, I first wish to address two issues regarding the *Philebus* that are of some importance for understanding the dialogue, as well as for the manner in which I interpret the work.

**1. The Philebus' chronological position in the Platonic corpus**

The *Philebus* is almost universally regarded as belonging to Plato's late-period dialogues. As I previously mentioned, Waterfield appears to be alone in viewing the *Philebus* not as a work

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belonging to Plato's late period, but as a dialogue written in during his middle period. Waterfield exhaustively analyzes four major areas – literary criticism, external evidence, stylometry, and doctrinal considerations – to reach the conclusion that Plato went through what Waterfield calls a "critical period", that is, a period in which Plato subjected his philosophy to a probing self-critical examination. Waterfield does not find that the arguments given in the *Philebus* are of the sort that Plato employed after this period of self-examination. The arguments, as well as the form, of this dialogue seem to him to belong to an earlier time in Plato's career as a philosopher. In his conclusion, Waterfield remarks: "I have argued that it cannot simply be taken for granted that the *Philebus* is a post-critical dialogue. An assumption I have made throughout is that there is a critical period to Plato's work, and that these critical arguments are, or Plato took them to be, decisive against certain elements of his earlier metaphysics." Waterfield's argument is interesting but by no means compelling. Perhaps the most serious objection to his position is that it is not entirely certain that we can ascribe to Plato a "critical period". Undoubtedly, a work such as the *Parmenides* is self-critical of Plato's middle-period theory of Forms, but there does not seem to be a group of works that can be regarded as offering a critical re-evaluation of Plato's earlier thought. It seems more reasonable to argue that, with the exception of the *Parmenides*, any self-criticisms encountered in Plato's works should be considered as part of his evolution, or development, as a philosopher. Waterfield's distinction between Platonic critical and post-critical periods seems rather artificial. A second objection is that Waterfield's analysis is unable to account satisfactorily for the similarities between the *Philebus* and other late-period dialogues, especially in respect Plato's philosophical method and *to metrion*. The fact that *diairesis* is carried out in the *Philebus* in accordance with the method of division and blending which was established in the *Statesman* as a variant form of the method of division and collection set down

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28 Waterfield, "The Place of the *Philebus* in Plato's Dialogues," 299.
in the *Sophist* and in the first part of the *Statesman*, suggests that at least in terms of method the *Philebus* exhibits characteristics that resemble those employed in other late-period works which are not found in any dialogues written prior to them. In addition, the use of due measure in the *Philebus* indicates that this work belongs to that group of dialogues – the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and the *Laws* – in which the appeal to what is in due measure plays a prominent role in determining a fundamental aspect of a dialogue's philosophical views.

Even though the *Philebus* should be regarded as a work of Plato's late period, it does strike the reader as somewhat odd that its dramatic form is reminiscent of the early-period, Socratic dialogues, particularly in respect to its opening *mediis in rebus* and the manner in which Socrates and Protarchus carry on the conversation.29 It is arguable that this resemblance between the *Philebus* and the Socratic dialogues is superficial. Frede notes that the similarity between the *Philebus* and the early-period works is a bit misleading. Because the *Philebus* begins just when there is a change of conversation partners, the work "has no introduction at all, for its beginning is not a real beginning."30 Unlike works which begin with an introduction of a sort, namely, a topic for discussion is proposed, and then is examined initially with one conversation partner before any change of partners takes place, the *Philebus* begins after a preliminary discussion with Philebus has occurred which simply is recapitulated by Socrates when Protarchus takes over as Socrates' main interlocutor.31

The difference between the opening of this dialogue and other Socratic dialogues is striking. Although the *Gorgias*, for example, does not have a dramatic opening in the sense of the kind encountered in the *Republic*, it does have a beginning that both briefly sets the scene and sets out

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29 Unlike the relatively detailed dramatic beginnings of works such as the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Parmenides*, the dramatically unprepared opening of the *Philebus* reminds one of the openings of the *Meno* or the *Gorgias*, but even these two dialogues do not start *mediis in rebus*.
the topic for examination before the conversation with Socrates passes successively from
Gorgias, to Polus, and finally to Callicles. Typically, a switch in conversation partner indicates
that some sort of change is taking place in the direction of the examination after the views of an
interlocutor have been stated and rejected. This is not the case in the Philebus. We are made
aware of the different views held by Socrates and Philebus concerning the best sort of life, but we
are not privy to how these conversation partners reached their respective positions before
Protarchus agrees to take over the argument from Philebus at the beginning of the work. Nor are
we given any reason as to why Philebus chose to break off his conversation with Socrates. Frede
notes: "We are given to understand that Philebus wishes to drop out, but it is left unclear whether
he does so from sheer indolence or from ennui with Socrates and with the drift of the previous
discussion in general."33

In view of the fact that the Philebus resembles the form of an early-period Socratic dialogue,
while simultaneously employing the method and philosophical positions encountered in the
works of Plato's late period, a serious interpretive question arises: Why did Plato choose to write
this obviously late-period dialogue in the dramatic form of an early-period work?34 It is perhaps
best to defer an answer to this question until the Philebus' dramatis personae have been
discussed.

32 A similar sort of dramatic structure is encountered in the Meno, the Laches, and the Charmides. In the Meno, the
question concerning the teachability of virtue is clearly stated before Socrates examines this topic with Meno and
Anytus. In the Laches, the subject of manly courage is first brought up before Socrates examines it with Laches and
then with Nicias. Finally, sôphrosunê is the chosen subject for Socrates' conversation with Charmides in the first part
of the Charmides, and with Critias in the work's latter portion. In all these dialogues, and in others as well, there is no
sense that the work commences in the middle of a conversation. The opening of the Philebus is even more striking
when it is compared to dialogues of the middle period such as the Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Republic. In these latter
works Plato gives to his reader a detailed depiction of the dialogues' dramatic settings before the philosophical
discussion commences. While the opening of these works have great literary beauty, strictly speaking, they are not
philosophically necessary for the ensuing conversations.
33 Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," 218. In other works, the Gorgias, for example, Plato makes it quite clear why
one conversation partner decides to disengage from further discussion with Socrates.
34 It is well to remember that the Theaetetus, too, exhibits the characteristics of an aporetic dialogue although its
philosophical content seems more closely related to Plato's late-period works than to the early-period Socratic
dialogues.
2. The dramatis personae of the Philebus

The unusual opening of the Philebus also raises several questions concerning the characters in this dialogue. Who is Philebus, and why does he withdraw from the conversation with only a summary of his position given to us? Who is Protarchus, and what function does he serve in the work? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, why does Plato employ the character of Socrates as the protagonist in the Philebus?

There is no historical record of Philebus.\(^{35}\) It would appear to be the case that he was invented by Plato as a representative of a certain view: "Philebus claims that the good for all living creatures is to have enjoyment, to have pleasure and delight, and all such things of this sort that go together with them" (Φιλήβως μὲν τοῖνοι ἄγαθον εἶναι φοβεῖ τὸ χαῖρεν πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἱδρονήν καὶ τέρφιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἑστὶ τούτῳ σύμφωνα).\(^{36}\) In reference to Philebus, Guthrie remarks: "He is simply the embodiment of a dogmatic hedonism."\(^{37}\) Although the dialogue is named after him, his contribution to the discussion in minimal and insignificant. It is reasonable to argue that there is no need for Philebus to present his views on the best life in an extended examination with Socrates. If we regard Philebus as a sort of less politically ambitious version of Callicles, then it is hardly necessary to have him set out in detail a defense of the hedonist position which was previously argued by Callicles in the Gorgias.\(^{38}\) Since the hedonist position was fully articulated and rejected by Socrates in the Gorgias, it would serve little purpose to set out, go over, and reject the same sort of position yet again in the Philebus. It is sufficient for Plato simply to make use of the character of Philebus as a representative of

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\(^{35}\) See, Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), s. v. Philebus. It should be noted that the name, Philebus, literally means "loving youth" or a "lover of youth". It is not necessarily correct to regard the name as connoting sexual love; it may be best to consider the name as suggesting the sort of love of all sorts of pleasure usually associated with young persons.

\(^{36}\) Philebus, 1184-6.


\(^{38}\) Frede holds a similar view. See, Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," 219-220.
hedonism, who undoubtedly could not be convinced that his views were untenable, before
moving on to a discussion with a more pliant and cooperative conversation partner. ⁴⁹
Additionally, the ensuing examination of the best sort of life is far different and more
philosophically sophisticated than Plato's other treatments of pleasure in the Protagoras, Gorgias,
and the Republic. ⁴⁰ In order for this different argument for choosing the best life to succeed, a
different interlocutor is required.

Protarchus is referred to as "the son of Callias" (ὁ παῖς Καλλίου) and as the "son of that man"
(ὁ παῖς ἱκείνου πάνδρος). ⁴¹ Scholars have assumed that this Callias is identical to the wealthy
Callias who participates in the Protagoras and who was reputed to be an admirer of the
Sophists. ⁴² This identification, however, is not securely established. Nails argues that Protarchus
could not be the son of the Callias he has been assumed to be. She notes that there were other
men of this period with the name Protarchus, and that the name Callias was common, so that it is
possible that the Protarchus of the Philebus was the son of a different Callias. ⁴³ Regardless of his
actual identity, Protarchus may be seen as a conversation partner who is open to persuasion.
Unlike the dogmatic hedonist, Philebus, Protarchus is reformable. His hedonist views can be
changed. Frede bases part of her interpretation of the Philebus on the idea of the conversion of
Protarchus. ⁴⁴ Since Protarchus appears to have received some sort of education at the hands of
the Sophists, he is a worthy conversation partner for Socrates. But neither does he exhibit the

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⁴⁹ Frede notes: "Here, the unreformable hedonist is simply passed over as not capable of dialogue; Socrates no longer cares for mere tactical victories in this renewed treatment of hedonism … He works on a more promising partner." Ibid., 220.
⁴⁰ Frede presents a good summary account of Plato's arguments on pleasure in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, and Republic, especially in respect to the manner in which they differ from the account given in the Philebus. In a sense, the arguments in the Philebus complete, or tie up the loose ends, of Plato's earlier attempts to discuss pleasure, while at the same time make an advance on his previous treatments of the issue. See, Frede, "Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures," 349-354.
⁴¹ Philebus, 19b5 and 36d6-7, respectively.
⁴² See, for example, Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 198, and Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," 221.
⁴³ Nails, The People of Plato, s. v. Callias III and Protarchus.
⁴⁴ See, Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," passim.
dogmatism of characters such as Callicles or Thrasy machus, nor does he simply respond with yes or no answers in the manner that some of Socrates’ philosophically untrained interlocutors do. In a sense, Protarchus is an ideal conversation partner, holding his own views and exhibiting a willingness to cooperate and be persuaded. Frede comments: "Even the intelligent reader well versed with Plato's philosophy would often not do better than Protarchus … Nor does Socrates treat him as an ignoramus, for he praised him more than once for a smart answer (24b-c, 31d1)."\textsuperscript{45}

There is another way in which we may consider Protarchus and the manner in which he carries out the discussion with Socrates. We can view Protarchus as an example of the sort of student of philosophy which both the Elean Visitor in the \textit{Statesman} and Plato in the \textit{Seventh Letter} recommended as being well-suited for the practice of dialectics. Unlike the philosophically unsophisticated Young Socrates, Protarchus is, for the most part, able to engage Socrates on the level of a talented pupil dialectically pursuing philosophy with his teacher. While Protarchus may represent a moderate hedonist position and a willingness to alter his views, it would be difficult for him to change his position if he did not possess the capacity to engage in dialectical inquiry correctly. Protarchus' contributions to the discussion, in addition to his receptiveness to the views expressed by Socrates, conform to Plato's model of dialectical inquiry between master and pupil, with the result that at the end of the \textit{Philebus}, Protarchus is able to claim: "We now all agree, Socrates, that what was said by you is most true" (\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ἀληθέστατα, ὃ Σῶκρατες, εἰρήθαι σοι νῦν ἂν ὑπὸ φαμέν ἄπαντες}).

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 222. In a different essay, Frede notes: "Protarchus, Socrates' main interlocutor, is not at all reduced to the ayes and nays of the respondents in the second part of the \textit{Parmenides}, the \textit{Sophist}, and the \textit{Statesman}; he plays an active role to the very end of the discussion. There is true antagonism, wit – including sexual innuendoes – and a gradual conversion." Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration," 432. It should be pointed out, however, that Protarchus does, at times, agree too readily. For example, he agrees without question to Plato's fundamental thesis that the universe is governed by a divine intelligence; a thesis that is surely of such importance as to warrant some debate. See, \textit{Philebus}, 28d5-e6.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Philebus}, 67b8-9. It is left unclear whether or not we should include Philebus among those who agree. It seems more reasonable to suppose that only Protarchus and perhaps some others of those who are present have come around
The appearance of Socrates in the *Philebus* is perhaps more problematic. It is the only dialogue of Plato's late period in which Socrates is given the role of protagonist. In the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Critias*, and *Timaeus* Socrates merely functions in a minor capacity while the arguments are given to the Elean Visitor, Critias, and Timaeus, respectively. In the *Laws*, of course, Socrates does appear at all.\textsuperscript{47} Scholars have accounted for the presence of Socrates in various ways. Guthrie, for example, writes: "Socrates again leads the debate, probably because the subject is pleasure, about which he has so often expressed strong views in earlier dialogues, but his manner is more like that of the Eleatic visitor than of the ironic Socrates we know."\textsuperscript{48} Wood, in an essay analyzing Plato's criticism of comedy in the *Philebus*, argues: "… Plato is not simply criticizing comedy and laughter in the *Philebus*. He instead uses a very specific conception of comedy as malicious ridicule to oppose to the philosophical life of Socrates."\textsuperscript{49} Frede offers a well-considered argument for Socrates' presence. She argues that the Socrates of the *Philebus* is not the Socrates familiar to us from the early-period Socratic dialogues, rather he is the Socrates described in the *Sophist* as the "'sophist of noble lineage' … which seems to represent something like Plato's last word on Socrates."\textsuperscript{50} This noble Sophist, the sixth whom the Visitor attempts to define through *diairesis*, is the one who cleanses the soul of empty beliefs.

\textsuperscript{47} I leave aside the case of the *Theaetetus*, a work in which Socrates does indeed play the principal role, but a work whose chronological location in the corpus is uncertain.

\textsuperscript{48} Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*, 197.

\textsuperscript{49} James Lewis Wood, Comedy, Malice, and Philosophy in Plato's *Philebus*,” *Ancient Philosophy* 27 (2007), 77.

\textsuperscript{50} Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," 223. Yet, it may be questioned whether the noble Sophist represents Plato's final view concerning Socrates. It could be the case that the division leading to the noble Sophist presents a definition of the Sophist that comes dangerously close to defining Socrates and the Socratic practice of philosophy, but does not imply that late in his life Plato came to regard Socrates as akin to a Sophist. The definition of the noble Sophist may have been undertaken to show just how easy it could be to mistake Socrates for a Sophist, without implying that Socrates was a Sophist of any sort, not even one of "noble lineage".
preparing it for knowledge. In light of Frede's interpretation that the moderate hedonist, Protarchus, is converted by Socrates, then her argument linking the Socrates of the *Philebus* with noble Sophist of the *Sophist* seems plausible. Yet, Frede's position on the presence of Socrates holds only if Protarchus is purged of, or converted from, his previously held beliefs in the sense that Frede advocates in respect to his conversion to Socrates' position regarding the best sort of life.

I would like to argue that Socrates' presence and function may be considered in a manner similar to that in which I view the presence and function of Protarchus. As Protarchus serves as an example of the sort of philosophically trained student who is willing to engage in the practice of dialectics, so, too, is the figure of Socrates an example of the sort of patient teacher of philosophy who attempts to discover the truth through a discussion with a talented pupil. In other words, we are presented in the *Philebus* with a dialogue fashioned in the form of an exemplary philosophical conversation which employs the method of dialectics to examine a problem. The Socrates depicted in this dialogue is not the Socrates who must refute someone like Callicles or Thrasymachus; it is a portrayal of Socrates as a teacher and philosophical guide for a talented and eager pupil. Frede is incorrect, I believe, to identify this Socrates as the "sophist of noble lineage", much less argue that this was Plato's final view of Socrates. The *Philebus* offered to Plato one final opportunity to depict his friend and mentor in the guise of the sort of teacher of philosophy that Plato advocated in the *Statesman* and *Seventh Letter*.

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52 As I noted previously, this is the main reason why Philebus does not participate in the discussion; his dogmatically held views would not be amenable to Plato's depiction of Socrates as a model for dialectical examination. Any attempt to examine the best sort of life with Philebus would most likely lead to the same sort of result as in Socrates' discussion with Callicles; Philebus would withdraw in anger, and the discussion would either be taken over by another interlocutor, by Socrates himself, or perhaps even end in an *aporia*.
53 Frede also, I think, overstates her case in respect to the conversion of Protarchus. In order for Protarchus to become converted to Socrates' views, it would be necessary for Socrates to have a firmly held position on the best sort of life. My reading of the *Philebus* suggests that both Protarchus and Socrates are searching for the truth. Socrates does not enter the conversation fully armed with an answer to the question they are examining. Rather he, along with Protarchus, arrives at an answer by means of dialectical inquiry into the problem.
If this interpretation is correct, then Guthrie's position that Socrates is present because the topic of discussion is pleasure is given support. Since the dialogue is primarily concerned with a subject treated several times previously by Socrates in the corpus, it is reasonable to suppose that his appearance in Plato's chronologically final treatment of this subject is quite intentional. Even though the arguments in the *Philebus* are far removed from what is generally considered to be Socratic philosophy, and employ a much different method than that encountered in the Socratic dialogues, the fact that the dialogue is an examination concerning the question of what is the best sort of life for a human being, it is plausible for Socrates to appear discussing a subject about which he spent a great portion of his life investigating.

The question I earlier deferred from answering – Why did Plato choose to write this obviously late-period dialogue in the dramatic form of an early-period work? – can now be given an answer. In light of my analysis of the *Philebus' dramatis personae*, it does not seem to be the case that Plato wrote this dialogue in the dramatic form of an early-period work. Any resemblance between the dramatic form of the *Philebus* and the Socratic dialogues is superficial. What the *Philebus* does resemble is the sort of dialectical inquiry between a master and a philosophically educated pupil which Plato set out in the *Statesman* and in the *Seventh Letter*. The manner in which Socrates and Protarchus examine the question of the best life is reminiscent of the type of dialectical inquiry conducted by the Elean Visitor and Young Socrates, with the significant exception that Protarchus, even though he is guided along by Socrates, has sufficient training in philosophy to function as a reasonably adequate conversation partner. Furthermore, it cannot be maintained that there is any resemblance between the *Philebus’* ontological and metaphysical positions and the early-period Socratic works. Plato's late-period views on these topics has nothing in common with the early-period dialogues. Finally, the philosophical method utilized in
the *Philebus* is of the same sort employed by the Visitor in the *Statesman*; it is not the elenctic method utilized so frequently by Socrates in Plato's early writings.⁵⁴

In sum, then, the *Philebus* is not written in the form of an early-period Socratic dialogue. The *Philebus* is a late-period work composed to demonstrate the manner in which dialectical inquiry should be carried out between the sort of master and pupil who exemplify correct philosophical practice. Although the presence of Socrates appears out of place in this late work, it is in some sense fitting that Plato chose to employ the character of Socrates to articulate his final views on the question of how we may best live; a question which was at the core of both Socrates' and Plato's philosophizing.

**Diairesis in the Philebus**

*Diairesis* is carried out somewhat differently in the *Philebus* than it was in either the *Sophist* or the *Statesman*. It appears to be the case that rather than proceeding by dividing a class into a number of subclasses for the principal purpose of obtaining a definition of a thing, the method of division and blending, although it still may furnish a definition of a *definiendum*, is employed in the *Philebus* primarily for the sake of identifying the members of a class, so that each member may be examined in relation to the class itself and in relation to every other member. Plato is not so much concerned with finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort; he is more concerned with distinguishing the individual elements that comprise a class.⁵⁵ There is one notable exception: the division and blending of the class of lives to

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⁵⁴ Despite Frede's attempts to demonstrate that the elenchus is used throughout the first part of the *Philebus*, it seems more reasonable to argue that the dominant method of this dialogue is the method of division and blending. See, Frede, "The Hedonist's Conversion," 239-247.

⁵⁵ Perhaps the best analogue to the method of division on the *Philebus* is the one found in the final division of the *Statesman*, where the Visitor distinguishes four classes of things – contributory causes, subordinates, imitative politics, and governing subordinates – for the sake of demonstrating the parts that make up each of these classes. See, *Statesman*, 287c11-305d10.
determine the best life. In this particular *diairesis*, the definition of the best life is obtained through the use of the method of division and blending.

No attempt is made in this dialogue to define any of its principal terms, such as pleasure or knowledge, by means of *diairesis*. Moreover, even though Protarchus suggests that a division of the kinds of pleasures and kinds of knowledge might be required, unless Socrates is willing to pursue their discussion in some other way, their division is not carried out. Protarchus tells Socrates: "In respect to these matters, then, consider whether you yourself must divide the kinds of pleasure and knowledge or must let it alone, if somehow you are able and willing to make clear in some other way the matters presently being disputed among us" (*Bouleovou δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἴδινης εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐκτέον, εἰ δὴ καθ’ ἕτερον τινα τρόπον οὗς τ’ εἰ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι πῶς ἄλλως τα νῦν ἄμφισβητούμενα παρ’ ἡμῖν*). Frede seems thankful that these divisions are not performed: "The student of the divisions (*dihairesis*) [sic] in the *Sophist* … and in the *Statesman* … will probably regard this shortcut in the *Philebus* with unmitigated relief, in view of those long and still far-from-complete (!) exercises devoted to the divisions of all the arts. But it is not just the shudder provoked by the thought of the ordeal of a complete division of all pleasures and all kinds of knowledge that justifies our gratitude for Socrates' parsimony in the *Philebus*. There are good reasons to doubt that a completion of dialectical divisions … would be of any real use."¹⁵⁷

It should be pointed out that Frede does not appear to be criticizing the method of division in general, only its use in this particular case. Frede does, however, touch upon one good point. It would seem to be the case that a series of divisions of all types of pleasures and kinds of knowledge would be unnecessary, since Socrates recalls that neither pleasure nor knowledge in

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¹⁵⁶ *Philebus*, 20a5-9.
themselves is the good, "rather, there is some other third thing, different than these and better than both" (ἀλλά ἄλλο τι τρέτον, ἐτέρων μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἄμφοτερον).⁵⁸ It is well to remember the Visitor's remarks in the digression on due measure regarding length and brevity in discussions. Arguably, a lengthy division of pleasure and knowledge would be excessive in respect to what it might accomplish in the context of the Philebus' discussion.⁵⁹

In effect, the use of the method of division in the Philebus attempts to address the fundamental and difficult problem of the relation between the one and the many, the relation between unity and plurality.⁶⁰ Sayre frames the one and the many problem in terms of the Forms: How can an unchanging Form "become involved with many changing particulars without losing its unity?"⁶¹ We should recall that it is Sayre's position that the use of method in the late dialogues in concerned with solving difficulties about the ontology of the Forms.⁶² In the case of diairesis in the Philebus, the procedure followed by Socrates is to find a single Form from among the things being examined, and then to divide this Form further, either dichotomously or into even more than two subdivisions, to the extent that any further divisions are necessary, in order to determine of what the thing under examination is a particular example.⁶³ The result of these divisions "is to see the original Form as neither simple nor indefinitely numerous, but rather as containing a

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⁵⁸ Philebus, 20b8-9.
⁵⁹ See, Statesman, 283c3-6.
⁶⁰ The one and the many problem is examined at, Philebus, 14c7-18d2. An especially important passage is, Philebus, 15b1-8. The problem has received much attention from scholars. Delcomminette provides a helpful bibliography of the more significant analyses. See, Delcomminette, "The One-and-Many Problems at Philebus 15 B," 21, n. 1.
⁶¹ Sayre: Plato's Late Ontology, 119.
⁶² I have previously expressed some reservations regarding Sayre's view that division is carried out in respect to Forms in Chapter 5.
⁶³ This is Sayre's interpretation of a difficult passage at Philebus, 16d1-ε2. In reference to this passage, Gosling remarks: "[the] whole passage has proven extremely recalcitrant to interpretation." Gosling, Plato: Philebus, 154. Sayre attempts to explain the passage by comparing the use of the method of division and collection in the Philebus to the manner in which it is employed in the Sophist and the Statesman. Yet, Plato's use of the word "unlimited" (ἄπειρον) in the Philebus passage presents a serious challenge if the comparison is to hold: the word is not encountered in the description of the method of division in the Sophist and the Statesman. Otherwise, it is Sayre's view that the method would "appear essentially the same" in all three dialogues. Even though it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss and evaluate Sayre's argument, it should be noted that he does attempt to account for the difficulty that arises from the presence of the word "unlimited".
definite number of specifically identified Forms."  According to Sayre, then, participation in a Form fulfills both necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort. It seems to be the case that, rather than defining a particular thing in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort, a thing's participation in a Form defines the thing. It is unclear whether or not Sayre's analysis convincingly shows that there is an actual distinction between defining a thing in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions and its participation in a Form. It is arguable that a thing's participation in a Form does, in fact, supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a thing, thereby making Sayre's distinction unnecessary.

Returning to the examination of the Philebus, the one and the many problem arises early in the discussion when it is noted that there are many different kinds of pleasures and kinds of knowledge that are not alike: "there can be many dissimilar pleasures, and many different kinds of knowledge" (πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνώμοιοι γεγυνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστήμαι καὶ διάφοροι). If we wish to say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good, and if the good is a single thing, or unity, and if there are many different kinds of pleasures and knowledge, that is, a

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64 Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology, 123.
65 This interpretation would seem to lead to a serious problem for Plato's ontology: Does a Form consist of other Forms that participate in it? An affirmative answer seems to be required if we accept Sayre's view that division is carried out in respect to Forms. As I shall soon discuss, it is possible that diatresis does not solve the one and the many problem, rather the problem is generated by the application of the method of division in the Philebus. Additionally, Sayre's claim that participation in a Form provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a thing may also be problematic. The method of division and collection leads to a definition of thing first by dividing a class into the elements that make up the class, and then after collecting the divided terms, a definition is given. In the Philebus, it is not the case that the divided terms are collected. Without the crucial step of collection, it is hard to see how the necessary and sufficient conditions are established for the definiendum. It seems more reasonable to view diatresis in the Philebus as simply a procedure for isolating the various members of a class in order to determine the composition of a class and the relationship of the individual members both among themselves in respect to the class to which they belong. This certainly seems to be the procedure followed in the division of "all the things that are now in the universe" (Πάντα τὰ νῦν ἄλοι ἔν τῷ παγκόσμῳ) at Philebus, 23e4. Although Socrates does state: "let us try collecting each one into a unity again" (πειρῶμεθα ... εἰς ἐν πάλιν ἑκάστερον συναγάγοντες), the ontological categories that are revealed by division are not gathered together to establish the necessary and sufficient condition to define "all the things that are in the universe". They are collected in order "to understand in what way each of them is one and many" (οὐχ οὖν ἡ παντὸς ἀριστοκρατία καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάστερον), Philebus, 23e4-6.
66 Philebus, 14a8-9.
plurality of pleasures and knowledge, then how are we able to regard this plurality of either pleasure or knowledge as a unity? How do we demonstrate the relation between the many, the different kinds of pleasures and knowledge, and the one, the good. Socrates himself is quite well aware of the difficulty confronting him: "It is these problems concerning the one and the many ... that are the causes of all kinds of difficulties if they are not well agreed upon, but would not be if they are well solved" (ταῦτ᾽ ἠστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν καὶ πολλά ... ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αὕτα μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας αὖ καλῶς). Socrates attempts to solve the problem by using the method of division, but not in the sense that diairesis will lead to knowledge by furnishing a definition of the terms of the matter under consideration. Rather, the employment of the method of division will lead to recognizing the relationships among the things that are being investigated.

Yet, it is arguable that the method itself, or the sort of dialectical inquiry practiced in the Philebus, does not satisfactorily solve the problem. The chief difficulty arises in how one interprets Plato's use of diairesis to address the question of the one and the many. Does the method of division introduced at Philebus 16c5, actually solve the problem of the relation between the one and the many, or does the method give rise to the problem? According to Delcomminette: "... these problems [that is, the problems associated with the use of division to articulate the relation of the one to the many] do not appear before the practice of dialectic: they are rather the consequences of such a practice." In other words, diairesis may not be the means by which the one and the many problem is solved; the employment of the method of division to examine it may, in fact, may be the cause of the problem in the first place. Delcomminette argues

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67 *Philebus*, 15b8-c3.
68 It is not my intention to attempt to offer a solution to the problem in this study. I am merely indicating that the use of the method of division to address the one and the many problem may not be sufficient for dealing with this difficulty; or at the very least it is insufficient in respect to the way in which it is employed in the *Philebus*.
69 There is a third alternative. *Diairesis may reveal, rather than solve or give rise to, the one and the many problem. In other words, the relationship between genus and species may be made apparent when a genus is divided in the manner in which Plato's method of division functions.*
that if this is the case, then "... we should not look for a solution to these problems in Socrates' description of this method, or, in fact, in the Philebus itself." This does not mean that the problem is insoluble; it simply means that the solution is not given in the Philebus, nor does it appear that the solution is achievable by the method of division.

The attempt to distinguish the relation between the one and the many is the first principal use of *diairesis* in the Philebus. One will become "wise" (σοφός) when one has apprehended how pluralities can be a unity; similarly, in reverse, if one has grasped certain pluralities, it is necessary "to grasp some number that determines each plurality" (ἀριθμῶν αὖ τινα πληθος ἐκαστὸν ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν), before proceeding from these pluralities "to unity" (εἰς ἐν). The point of this dialectical exercise is to demonstrate each thing is both one and many, and how each thing is not altogether unlimited, but is limited by some number. In the Philebus, knowledge, then, is not a matter of defining a thing by discovering the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be a thing of such a sort; knowledge is determining the relation between the one and the many, how pluralities are subsumed under a unity, and how pluralities are not completely without limit but do possess some numerical limit. It would appear that the method of division is not the correct analytic tool for this task. We have seen that the method of division was directed toward obtaining the definition of a thing, and if the *definiendum* is defined, then there is knowledge of the thing. In contrast, it appears that in the Philebus knowledge is something different than being able to give a definition; knowledge is being able to apprehend a complex set of relations between pluralities and a unity. This is not to say that knowledge is no longer being able to give an

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71 Ibid., 42.
72 Delcomminette suggests that the solution to how the one and the many problem in relation to *diairesis* is to be sought elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, principally in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. See, Ibid., 42.
73 See, Philebus, 17d7-18b3.
74 See, Philebus, 18e8-19a2.
75 Whether or not the one and the many problem is generated by the use of *diairesis*, as Delcomminette believes, is a somewhat different concern. My position is that, since Plato appears to be arguing that knowledge is entailed by discovering the relation between the one and the many, *diairesis* is not the means by which this can be accomplished.
account of a thing. Rather, for the specific purposes of the Philebus' arguments, it appears to be the case that Plato is claiming that there is a sort of knowledge that arises from the apprehension of relationships, in addition to the sort of knowledge that comes about from being able to furnish a definition of a thing. If this is indeed the case, then, even though diairesis is employed at various points in the dialogue for a variety of purposes, it is possible that it is not the appropriate means by which the relationship between the one and the many may be determined.

Diairesis can, however, successfully separate out the elements that comprise a class. This is precisely what Socrates attempts to accomplish when he divides "all the things that are now in the universe" (Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ πάντι). He begins by reminding Protarchus that "it is a gift of the gods to men" (Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις) that human beings have learned that "of the things that are ever said to be come from one and many, having inborn in them limit and unlimitedness" (ὅσες ἔξω μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἐκλεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρείαν ἐν αὐτοῖς σύμφωνον ἓχοντων). Thus, there are two categories of thing, limit and the unlimited, into which the things in the universe are divided. A third category can be discovered which results from, or is generated by, the "mixing together" (συμμετοχή) of limit with the unlimited. Clearly, this third ontological category is not derived from the method of division as set out in the Sophist, rather it should be regarded as a case of the variant form of division and blending which was employed by the Elean Visitor in the latter part of the Statesman. Neither limit nor the unlimited are divided to reveal the category "the mixed" (ἡ μικτή). The category "the mixed" is generated when limit and the unlimited are blended together. Since "the mixed"

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76 Philebus, 23c4.  
77 Philebus, 16c9-10.  
78 Philebus, 23d1.  
79 The category of the mixed is not merely something brought about by the uncontrolled mixing of limit with the unlimited. Rather, the mixed is regarded as a unity in itself; it is a "coming-into-being from the measures created with limit" (γένεσις εἰς ὀλίγον ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ περίστος ἀπειρομένων μέτρων). Philebus, 26d8-9. The category of the mixed may provide the ontological ground for to metrion.
results from the blending of limit with the unlimited, there must be something that brings about
the mixed. A fourth category is required: "Look at the cause of the mixing together of these two
with each other, and set it down as my fourth category in addition to those three" (Τῆς συμμειξέως
tούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὃρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισίν ἐκεῖνος τέταρτον τοῦτο).80
Since everything that comes into being must be produced by some producer, or maker, it follows
that there is a cause for all things; what comes into being and what produces something that
comes into being are different.81 What comes into being must not be mistaken for what causes
the thing to come into being. Protarchus then asks if a fifth category, one that "has some capacity
for their separation" (διάκρισιν τινὸς δυναμένον), is required.82 Socrates replies that he does not,
at least at the moment, think that this fifth category is necessary.83

Thus, four ontological categories are established – limit, the unlimited, the mixed, and the
cause – for the purpose of determining which type of life corresponds to which ontological
category. Cooper argues that Plato's fourfold ontology is set down for the sake of his moral
philosophy: "Though this passage [that is, the passage establishing the four ontological
categories] has often been interpreted as an isolated 'digression,' it is presented in the text as
making an essential contribution to the predominantly ethical dispute …"84 By this point in the
dialogue, three types of lives have been distinguished: one of pleasure, one of knowledge, and
one which shares in both. Socrates begins with the mixed type of life; a life that is comprised of
all that is unlimited, bound by limit" (συμπάτων τῶν ἀπείρων ύπο τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων).85 The
mixed type of life corresponds to the category of the mixture. Since pleasure or pain have no

80 Philebus, 23d7-8.
81 See, Philebus, 26e1-27b2.
82 Philebus, 23d9-10.
83 It could be suggested that this fifth category, separation, is not required because the object of their examination is not
to see how things are brought apart from each other, but rather to investigate the manner in which things are related to
each other.
84 Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Good in the Philebus," 150.
85 Philebus, 27d9.
limit, the life of pleasure corresponds to the category of the unlimited. Assigning the life of knowledge to the proper ontological category is a bit more difficult. In order to demonstrate that the life of knowledge actually corresponds to the category of cause, Socrates must first show that reason (νοῦς) belongs to that category which is the cause of all things. He argues that since the universe has a soul which is directed by cosmic reason, it is cosmic reason that is the cause of all things in the universe. Similarly, since the human soul and intellect are patterned after the relation between the cosmic soul and cosmic reason and share in the cosmic soul and reason, it follows that human reason is the cause of all things for human beings. In imitation of the divine, the human soul is directed by human reason. Whereas pleasure belongs to the category of the unlimited, "reason is akin to cause and is surely of that category" (νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενῆς καὶ τούτων σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους). Socrates is able to conclude that the life of knowledge corresponds to the category of cause.

The division carried out in these passages appears to be undertaken not to show how the problem of the one and the many may be solved. Rather, the division of "all the things that are now in the universe" appears to be directed at distinguishing the sort of categories that are employed to apprehend the structure of the cosmos. By understanding the relations among the ontological categories of limit, the unlimited, mixture, and cause, we are able to have some degree of understanding about the universe. But since the Philebus is concerned with more than simply ontological and metaphysical matters, we are also provided with the means for being able

86 See, Philebus, 27e1-28a4. Interestingly, Socrates discusses the correspondence between the life of pleasure and the unlimited with Philebus, not Protarchus who, when Philebus starts becoming somewhat annoyed with Socrates, tells Philebus: "Socrates is speaking correctly ... we must obey him" (Ὀρθῶς ταύτα λέγει ... καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον). It seems that Protarchus is well on the way to being persuaded by Socrates. Philebus, 28b4-5.

87 It would appear to be the case that, since human reason is the cause all human things, human reason also directs all human choices. A person would choose a particular sort of life because human reason enables one to do so. The type of choice that one makes, whether praiseworthy or blameworthy, would depend on one's use of reason. A choice that is praiseworthy would be one in which human reason is used correctly to direct human choices in imitation of the divine reason which chooses correctly in respect to the manner in which it orders the cosmos.

88 Philebus, 31a7-8.
to understand the manner in which human concerns are related to the cosmos. The correspondence between the types of lives available to us and the organization of the universe is able to furnish reasons why the choice of one sort of life is preferable to another. Although the *diairesis* in this part of the *Philebus* can be interpreted and applied to a variety of philosophical concerns, perhaps its greatest significance lies in its use as a guide for determining the most choiceworthy type of life.

There are two divisions carried out in the *Philebus* which are designed to demonstrate that both pleasure and knowledge may be mixed. The first division concerns the ways in which it possible for one not to know oneself; the second division, the division of the arts, distinguishes between pure and mixed knowledge. In the first of these two divisions, Plato has Socrates argue that one can hold a false opinion of oneself in respect to three things: (1) we can falsely believe that we are more wealthy than we are; (2) we can think that we have greater physical advantages than we do; (3) we can be mistaken about how much virtue we possess, especially the virtue of wisdom (*sophia*). False self-opinion, when combined with weakness and an inability to take revenge when laughed at, leads one to being viewed by others as a ridiculous person. When false self-opinion is combined with strength or power, then that person is regarded as malicious and harmful. Frede remarks: "We enjoy the spectacle of our neighbor making a fool of himself, so long as he is weak (because he cannot revenge himself on us), while such a display of ignorance

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89 The method of division is also employed on a smaller scale to distinguish linguistic and musical sounds. Plato utilizes linguistic and musical sounds as examples drawn from the sensible world to illustrate the relation between unity and plurality. See, *Philebus*, 17a8–e6. For the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to examine these two divisions at length. The discussion of the Plato's ontological division sufficiently demonstrates his attempt to show the relationship between the one and the many. Ionescu views the division of sensible linguistic and musical sounds as the first stage in apprehending these classes of sound in the intelligible sphere. She argues that division of grammar and sound can be carried out on the level of either the sensible or the intelligible for the sake of their classification: "Whether they [that is, linguistic and musical sounds] are regarded under their sensible or intelligible aspect is a reflection of the extent to which the method is pursued." It is her view that if a *diairesis* is carried through far enough on sensible things, then the intelligible Forms in which they participate will be revealed. Ionescu, "The Unity of the *Philebus*," 57-59.

90 See, *Philebus*, 48d8-49e5 and 56c4-57c4, respectively.
in a powerful neighbor causes fear in us, because she is capable of taking revenge."\(^{91}\) The division of ignorance is undertaken for the purpose of demonstrating a certain ambiguity in our emotional makeup, an ambiguity which indicates that neither pleasure nor pain is pure, rather they are mixed, or impure. "For we had agreed all along that resentment is a pain of the soul, and laughing is a pleasure, and that both of these occur at the same time on those occasions" (τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὁμολογήθαι λόγων ψυχῆς ἤμιν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἀμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τὰς χρόνοις).\(^{92}\) Thus, by means of diairesis, Plato is able to establish the point that pleasure and pain may be mixed; a point which will be crucial for the determination later in the dialogue that the best sort of life is one that is mixed.\(^{93}\)

Similarly, the division of the arts attempts to show how the different arts are relatively pure or mixed in relation to each other and with respect to the truth, "by considering whether one kind of knowledge is any purer than another, just as one kind of pleasure is purer than another" (σκοπῶν ἀρα ἐστὶ τὶς ἐτέρας ἀλλή καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονής ἡδονή).\(^{94}\) The division begins by dividing "the so-called arts" (τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας) into those having "less precision" (ἐλάστωσιν ἀκραβείας) and those with "greater" (πλεῖόνας) precision in their practices.\(^{95}\) Although mathematics – that is, arithmetic, geometry, the "art of calculating" (λογιστική), and the "art of measuring" (μετρητική) – is counted among the precise arts, it, too, may be further divided into two kinds, the kind of mathematics employed by the many and the kind utilized by philosophers. While both kinds of mathematics go by the same name, their objects and their

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\(^{91}\) Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration," 451.

\(^{92}\) Philebus, 50a7-9.

\(^{93}\) It should be noted that the division of ignorance does not establish the necessary and sufficient conditions to define ignorance. Rather, this division does show how false opinion, combined with certain dispositions of character, lead to the demonstration that there is a mixing, or blending, of pleasures and pains. The object of this diairesis, then, is directed toward the aim of determining the manner in which contraries, that is, pleasure and pain, can be blended together.

\(^{94}\) Philebus, 57a1-1b2.

\(^{95}\) See, Philebus, 56c4-6. We should recall that this is the passage which Sayre believes takes up the discussion of the notion of preciseness mentioned at Statesman, 284d1-2. See, Sayre, Metaphysics and Method, 191-193.
relative degrees of certainty differ. Arts that are referred to by a single name should actually be regarded as two, depending on their "degree of certainty and purity" (τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν), and whether or not these are practiced with "more precision" (ἀκριβέστερον) by philosophers or by non-philosophers.96 The arts practiced by philosophers are indeed superior to those with the same names engaged in by non-philosophers because "they are superior in precision and truth in respect to their use of measure and number" (ἀκριβεῖα καὶ ἀληθεῖα περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν διαφέρουσιν).97 Even though these arts are very precise when used by philosophers, there is an art that is supreme, the art of dialectics. Dialectics, because it is concerned with being, what is truly real, and what is eternal "is the truest of all the kinds of knowledge" (ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνώσιν).98 The art of dialectics alone leads to "a purity of mind and reason" (τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως). All the other arts, because they deal with what comes to be, that is, what is merely opinion, are not pure and can never lead to certainty.99 The upshot of this diairesis, then, is the proof that there are different degrees of knowledge in relation to the degree of purity of knowledge. The degree of purity of knowledge differs in relation to the object of knowledge and the purpose for which knowledge is employed in a particular art. At one extreme, the philosopher's art of dialectics is the purest type of knowledge, at the other extreme would be those arts practiced by non-philosophers in which there is more opinion than knowledge, that is, an impure sort of knowledge. In any case, however, just as Plato used diairesis to demonstrate that all pleasures cannot be regarded as being either the same or unmixed, so, too, does the method of division assist in showing that not all knowledge is the same and that nearly all knowledge is mixed with opinion.

96 See, Philebus, 57c1-3.
97 See, Philebus, 57c9-d2.
98 See, Philebus, 58a4-5.
99 See, Philebus, 58d6-59b5.
The divisions of ignorance and the arts supply an important conceptual foundation for the final arguments in the *Philebus*. *Diairesis* has established the point that things that are usually understood as being called by a single name and are considered as simple, unmixed things are, in fact, different and compound. What we refer to as pleasure is not a single, simple thing. Rather, there are different types and degrees of pleasure, most of which have some degree of pain mixed in with them. Similarly, knowledge is not something which is single and simple. Like pleasure, there are different kinds of knowledge and different degrees of knowledge, most of which are mixed with some amount of opinion.

It is reasonable to claim, then, that the method of division plays a significant role in the *Philebus*. *Diairesis* was employed to establish, by dividing a class that may be termed the class of types of lives, that there is a life of pleasure, a life on intellect, and a life in which both pleasure and knowledge are mixed. The method of division is also used to demonstrate the correspondence between the types of lives and Plato's ontological categories, especially in respect to the view that there is a link between the way in which the universe is structured and the way in which human lives should be lived. In other words, *diairesis* reveals a connection between the sensible and supersensible realms. In effect, it articulates the connection between Plato's moral philosophy and metaphysics, in the sense that *diairesis* demonstrates the grounding of Plato's ethics in his metaphysical and ontological views.\(^\text{100}\) Additionally, by using the method of division to prove that pleasure and knowledge can be mixed, Plato has prepared the ground to argue that a mixture of the appropriate sorts pleasure and knowledge is what would constitute the best sort of life. Since it has been set down that most pleasure is not pure, rather pleasure is mixed in varying degrees with pain, and that nearly all sorts of knowledge are mixed with

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\(^{100}\) Ionescu, who regards the *Philebus* as offering a unified set of arguments, acknowledges that the unity of this dialogue is indebted to the method of division, especially in the sense that *diairesis* can reveal the connection between the sensible and the metaphysical. See, Ionescu, "The Unity of the *Philebus*," passim.
differing degrees of opinion, perhaps it would be plausible to extend this idea to the manner in which human beings ought to live. The task that remains for Plato in the final part of the *Philebus* is to demonstrate how, or by means of what standard, the best type of mixed life is to be achieved.

*To Metrion and the Philebus*

I wish to argue that *to metrion* plays a fundamentally important role in determining the *Philebus’* best sort of life. In Chapter 5, I attempted to demonstrate that qualitative measurement is the means by which contraries may be weighed and reconciled, or blended, against some standard by an appeal to what is in due measure, what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, or what is requisite. Two extremes are measured against this standard so that a middle ground, or mean between the extremes, might be attained; a mean in which both extremes share. In the *Philebus* it seems clear that the best life is one in which contrary, or opposing, types of lives are blended together. The life of pleasure and the life of knowledge are contrary, or opposing, types of lives, neither of which would be the best by itself. The mixed, or best, life is one in which these contrary lives have been reconciled, or blended together, in order that the person who chooses to live the best life shares in both pleasure and knowledge. Furthermore, Plato argues that both pleasure and knowledge may be either unmixed (pure) or mixed (impure), and that mixed pleasure and knowledge may by mixed well or mixed badly.\(^{101}\) The best life, then, is the one in which well-mixed, or correctly blended, pleasure and well-mixed knowledge is blended in accordance with an appeal to the interchangeable standards of *to metrion, to prepon, ho kairos,* or *to deon.*

\(^{101}\) I refer the reader to Chapter 6, figure 7 for an illustration of the manner in which these notions are divided and mixed.
Plato's examination of pleasure in the Philebus is the subject of much scholarly debate.\textsuperscript{102} Pleasures are divided into those that are true and those that are false. "Shall we say that these pleasures and pains are true or false" (Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν;).\textsuperscript{103} Both Penner and Frede maintain that pleasures are true or false in a propositional sense. A pleasure is true in the propositional sense "if it not only accompanies a belief but is taken in that belief, that is, one is pleased about the things believed.\textsuperscript{104} Pleasures, like beliefs, cannot be morally evaluated unless they are true or false in a propositional sense: "…only 'propositional' pleasures can be analysed [sic] and judged in the same way as opinions and beliefs are."\textsuperscript{105} In contrast, Hampton argues that pleasures are neither true nor false in respect to true or false belief, rather their truth or falsity depends on the way in which one orders his or her life. It is her view that both Penner and Frede regard the propositional sense of true and false pleasures in a manner foreign to Plato's way of thinking. Hampton argues that for Plato human beings not only wish to know the truth intellectually, but also wish to experience it in our existence as human beings. That is to say, human beings do not merely wish to apprehend the truth as some sort of abstract intellectual concept, rather human beings wish to have an actual experience of the truth, both physically and emotionally, in their day-to-day affairs. A human being must actually experience truth as something that provides a sense of physical and emotional satisfaction. Hampton concludes: "Thus, in the Philebus Plato makes it clear that only those

\textsuperscript{102} The interpretations of Gosling, Kenny, Penner, Hampton, and Frede, cited earlier in this chapter, are among the more significant contributions to the debate. It is not my wish to offer an interpretation of Plato's views on pleasure in this dialogue. I am merely attempting to indicate that the pleasures that are well-mixed, or true, are those that are beneficial for the mixed life. The discussion takes place at, Philebus, 36a3-41a6.

\textsuperscript{103} Philebus, 36c6-7.

\textsuperscript{104} Hampton, "Plato's Later Analysis of Pleasure," 41. Penner and Frede do differ in respect to the manner in which they respectively interpret the word "belief" (ἡ ἤδω). There is a certain ambiguity in the word ἤδω, depending on whether one construes it in its active or passive senses. Penner argues that "belief" should be taken in its active sense, that is, the process of believing; Frede claims that it should be taken in its passive sense, that is, the result of the process, or the thing that one believes in. See, Penner, "False Anticipatory Pleasures," 171-176; Frede, "Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures," 362-364.

\textsuperscript{105} Frede, "Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures," 372.
pleasures that do not impede reason's commitment to the truth may be considered a part of the
good life (62E-64B), for it is truth alone which is our proper goal." 106 In other words, one cannot
properly order one's life until one has had a complete experience of the truth.

Hampton's interpretation appears to be more plausible and textually sound than those of
Penner and Frede. The text of the Philebus lends strong support to Hampton's position. Socrates
clearly expresses the need for truth in the mixture of pleasure and knowledge; truth, in effect,
functions as the standard against which true and false pleasures are measured. 107 When measured
against the truth, certain pleasures will be shown to be false, and must not be allowed into the
mixture. The most intense and false pleasures will act as an impediment, "even preventing us
from developing at all (καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ ἐδώκα)." 108 Only true pleasures will be
permitted into the mixture, pleasures which will forge a kinship with reason in order that the
mixture be stable. This is especially the case if one wants to understand "what is the good in a
human being and in the universe, and what idea one must divine of the nature of the good itself"
(τί ποτε ἐν τ’ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἄγαθον καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε
μαντευτέον). 109

Yet, if true and false pleasures are determined in respect to the truth, a further question arises:
What enables us to determine the relationship of pleasure to truth? Or, to put the question
somewhat differently: What determines whether or not a pleasure is to be judged true? The
answer appears to be that reason determines the manner in which truth is measured. Reason will
insist that only true pleasures be included in the mixture of pleasure and knowledge; reason will
reject any pleasure that is false. Reason insists upon this because it is the ordering principle in the

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106 Hampton, "Plato's Later Analysis of Pleasure," 47.
107 See, Philebus, 64b2-3.
108 Philebus, 63d6-e1.
109 Philebus, 64a1-3.
soul and most valuable element in a human being. Protarchus does not hesitate in responding to Socrates' question "whether reason or pleasure is more akin to truth (πότερον ἡδονήν συγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθεία). There is no doubt in Protarchus' mind that reason is more closely related to truth than pleasure is related to truth. Furthermore, since human reason is the ordering principle of the human soul, and divine reason is the ordering principle of the cosmos, a connection is established between the human and the divine. Arguing from the position that there is a unity to the arguments of the Philebus, Carpenter comments: "... we thus get a picture of what it means for human beings to be part of the universe as a whole, and for reason ... to be part of that same whole."  

In respect to pleasure, to metrion is employed for two purposes: (1) to show that there are certain sorts of pleasures that need to be admitted into the best life; (2) to demonstrate the relationship between these types of pleasures and knowledge. Plato's argument proceeds in two steps. First, pleasures are shown to be either true of false when measured against the truth. A true pleasure is one in which truth is mixed in with pleasure; a false pleasure is one in which no amount of truth is mixed. Moreover, since it appears to be the case that a thing that is pure (τὸ καθαρὸν) is closer to the truth, a true pleasure is a pleasure that is true to the degree that it is pure. Clearly, true and false pleasures are contrary, or opposite, pleasures. Without measuring pleasure by means of an appeal to what is in due measure, it would be difficult for Plato to argue that there are in fact different types of pleasures. Rather than rejecting pleasure in its entirety as an important component of the best life, the use of due measure allows Plato to demonstrate that

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110 See, Philebus, 64b5-c9.  
111 Philebus, 65c2-3. In this context, the word νοῦς is best rendered as "reason", rather than as "understanding" or "mind". It seems that Plato in attempting to convey the idea of an active cognitive process which determines whether or not something – in this case a pleasure – is true or false. The word "understanding" connotes a sense of the product of the cognitive process, while "mind" suggests the thing that carries out this process.  
113 A pleasure is pure to the extent that it shares in pain. The less the amount pain that is mixed in with a pleasure, the purer the pleasure. See, Philebus, 52d6-53c2.
contrary pleasures can be measured against a standard, the truth, and, in effect, reconcile different pleasures in respect to their relationship with truth. True pleasures are admitted into the best life; false pleasures are rejected. Second, once Plato has determined that true pleasures should be part of the best life, then it is necessary to weigh true pleasure against knowledge. If we regard pleasure as the contrary of knowledge, then in accordance with what is in due measure there will need to be a standard against which they are measured.\(^{114}\) Reason is the standard for measuring true pleasure and knowledge in this second application of *to metrion*. As truth functioned as the standard for analyzing the relationship between the different sorts of pleasures, so, too, does reason function as the standard for measuring true pleasure against knowledge, in order to determine the relative value of each in respect to their participation in the best life. Since reason is more akin to truth than true pleasure is akin to truth, it is reason that is the more valuable component in the life that mixes true pleasure with knowledge. In sum, then, the appeal to what is in due measure provides the analytic tool which enables Plato first to measure pleasure in general so that he may determine the difference between true and false pleasure, and second, to measure true pleasure and knowledge in order to determine the relative value of each of these fundamental elements of the best life.

As with the distinction between true and false pleasures, Plato also attempts to distinguish two types of knowledge. "One kind [of knowledge] treats what comes to be and perishes, while the other treats what does not come to be or perishes, but what the same in itself and eternal" (ἐπὶ τὰ γεγονόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γεγονόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταύτα δὲ καὶ ὀσπαύτως ὀντα ἀεί).\(^{115}\) The former kind of knowledge is "uncertain and

\(^{114}\) Pleasure is contrary to knowledge in the sense that pleasure does not require knowledge in order for it to be experienced and knowledge does not depend on the presence or absence of pleasure. Moreover, following Plato's line of reasoning in the *Philebus*, he clearly sets up the life of pleasure as the contrary of the life of knowledge, thereby suggesting an opposing dichotomy between pleasure and knowledge.

\(^{115}\) *Philebus*, 61d10-e3.
Knowledge of what comes to be and perishes is an inferior and impure kind of knowledge, which in the Republic is treated as \( \delta\xi\alpha \), or opinion, while knowledge of what always is and remains the same is a type of superior and pure knowledge; it is the type of knowledge associated with philosophy. Although knowledge is divided into two kinds, Plato does not eliminate one of them, as he does in the case of false pleasure. Both kinds of knowledge are to admitted into the mixture. A distinction is made between false pleasure and inferior knowledge: the admission of false pleasure would be harmful for the soul, whereas the admission of inferior knowledge would not do any damage. Protarchus supplies the reason why both kinds of knowledge should be allowed in the mixture: "In my view, it appears to be necessary if our life is to be at least some sort of life" (\( \'\text{Αναγκαίον φαίνεται ἐμοίγε, ἐπερ γε ἡμῶν ὃ βίος ἐσται καὶ ὑπωσόν ποτε βίος} \). As long as the pure sort of knowledge is included in the mixture, the addition of the impure kind should do no harm. Presumably, reason will be able to distinguish between the two types and their appropriate usages. Socrates agrees with Protarchus and adds both kinds of knowledge to the mixture. Once it has been determined that the mixed life will consist in a mixture of true pleasure and all kinds of knowledge, it remains for Socrates and Protarchus to discover what other element, or elements, are necessary and the most valuable for the best life. It turns out that there are three elements necessary for the good: "beauty, proportion, and truth" (\( \kappaάλλει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ \).

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116 See, Philebus, 62a2-b7.
117 It is not the case, however, the inferior kind of knowledge is false and the superior kind is true. The notion of false knowledge would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, it is best to view the two kinds of knowledge in respect to their relative degrees of purity. Music provides an example of the inferior kind of knowledge, for the knowledge associated with music may be "full of guessing and imitation and is lacking in purity" (\( \text{στοχάσεως τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστήν οὔσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖ} \). Philebus, 62c1-2.
118 Philebus, 62c3-4.
119 Without wishing to push the point too far, it could be suggested that an appeal to what is in due measure would be an excellent tool for measuring pure and impure knowledge against each other on the occasions when either of the two types are required, or when both types are in conflict.
120 It should be pointed out that reason insists that in order for the mixture to be stable only true pleasures will be allowed to be included. See, Philebus, 63d1-64a5.
These three things are closely related in the sense that the good cannot be captured in a single idea; beauty, proportion, and truth are necessary if the good is to be described correctly. Beauty, proportion, and truth should be treated as a single thing, and they are held responsible (ἀληθεία), in the view of Socrates and Protarchus, for what is in the mixture. Beauty, proportion, and truth are in themselves goods, and they make the mixture itself good. I have already discussed the importance of truth for the best life; reason is more akin to truth than to pleasure in the sense that truth is present in reason. Similarly, proportion is possessed by intelligence (φρονήμα) rather than by pleasure. Finally, it is set down that, beauty is more akin to reason and is present in reason, so that "reason is more beautiful than pleasure" (есть καλλίων νοὸν ήδονή). Neither truth nor proportion nor beauty are akin to pleasure, nor are they present in pleasure; in themselves they are goods, whereas in itself pleasure is not a good since pleasure does not possess truth, proportion, or beauty.

It seems, however, that in this argument the notion of true pleasure, or the sorts of pleasures related to health and virtue are ignored; only the "most intense" (τῶς μεγίστας) pleasures are being compared to the goods of truth, beauty, and proportion. Guthrie notes this small but significant change in determining what is good in the mixture: "What about those pleasures which are no less in it? Protarchus's [sic] by now enthusiastic cooperation makes it clear that in deciding the issue between pleasure and thought only the 'false', most vehement pleasures are being taken into account." One can only conjecture as to why this shift in emphasis has

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121 Philebus, 65a2.
122 "So, if we are unable to capture the good in a single idea, we should take hold of it with three things: beauty, proportion, and truth" (ὅτι όμως δ’ αμφοτέρας τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρεῖν, συν τρεῖς λαβοῦντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ ἀληθεία). Philebus, 65a1-2.
123 Philebus, 65e3.
124 See, Philebus, 65e9-66a3. In the context of this passage, the best English rendering of τῶς μεγίστας is "most intense" rather than "the greatest". Clearly, Socrates is referring to the strength of certain pleasures, not to the quantities of pleasures.
125 Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 234-235.
occurred. One possible way in which to regard this change is to suggest that Plato, who appears anxious to get to the end of the discussion, is unwilling to admit that there are certain true and necessary pleasures, such as the pleasures related to health or virtue or even learning, that are valuable. It is perhaps enough for him to concede that true pleasures are indeed necessary for the best life, without wishing to argue that some of these pleasures may in fact be nearly as valuable for a human life as are truth, proportion, and beauty. Given the fact that the relationship between reason and truth, proportion, and beauty are central concepts in Plato's metaphysics and moral philosophy, it is reasonably understandable that Plato may have been reluctant to argue in favor of including true pleasure among the things that are valuable for a human life.

The third good, proportion, is the most important for this analysis. "That any kind of mixture that does not in some way possess measure and the nature of due proportion will necessarily destroy its components and first of all itself" ("Οὐ μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχόοισα ἦπιοσών καὶ ὑπωσών σύγκρασις πάσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυε τά τε κεραυνύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν"). In the absence of measure and proportion there would be no blending in the mixture, each component would be independent and unconnected, essentially free to function at will. "Measure and proportion come to be identified everywhere with beauty and virtue" (μετρώτης γάρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήποι καὶ ἀρετή πανταχόθεν συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι). It would appear that measure and proportion are essential for determining the relationships among

126 The dialogue straightaway proceeds to the ordering of the types of lives and its conclusion after the relatively brief examination of truth, proportion, and beauty. In addition, at the very end of the Philebus there is the sense that it is Socrates who is in a hurry to finish the conversation. After Socrates asks if he can leave, Protarchus reminds him that "there is still a bit more remaining" (Σμικρὸν ἐπὶ τὸ λοιπόν), which unfortunately is not taken up further when the dialogue somewhat abruptly ends. Philebus, 67b10-11.

127 Russell, who fails to notice this shift in the discussion from true to false pleasures, argues that Plato does believe that "pleasure is necessary for happiness since pleasure is a part of the self to be transformed and rationally incorporated into the life of virtue." This does seem to be Plato's position prior to the examination of pleasure in relation to truth, proportion, and beauty. The text is ambiguous whether this view still holds after the relative value of truth, proportion, and beauty in respect to pleasure is determined. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, 203.

128 Philebus, 64d9-11.

129 Philebus, 64e6-7.
all the elements in the mixture. Not only is the relationship of pleasure to the goods weighed in respect to the measure and proportion, but it also seems to be the case that the relationships between reason, truth, and beauty depend to some degree on measure and proportion. Ultimately, the good itself is entailed by the relationships of measure and proportion with all the elements in the mixture. Guthrie remarks: "Everyone knows that the goodness in any mixture depends on correct measure or proportion. This at once unites goodness with beauty, for that is a matter of measure and proportion like any kind of excellence (aretē)."\(^{130}\)

Although Plato does not explicitly mention it, it is plausible to regard the appeal to what is in due measure as furnishing the conceptual framework underlying the notion of measure and proportion in the *Philebus*.\(^{131}\) We have seen that Plato, from his early-period dialogues onward, made several attempts to set down some sort of standard of measure. I argued in Chapter 5 that qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure posited in the *Statesman* was Plato's solution to the problem concerning the weighing of contraries. In the *Philebus* there is a clear necessity for measure and proportion as one of the goods that enable one to live well. Since we are not given any other arguments in Platonic corpus, except for the one made in the *Statesman*'s digression on due measure, that attempt to establish the need for measure and proportion, it is likely that the comments in the *Philebus* regarding measure and proportion refer to *to metrion*. The manner in which qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure function to reconcile, or blend, contraries seems well suited to the sort of measure and proportion required to determine the appropriate mixture of reason, truth, beauty, and true pleasure in respect to their relationships in the *Philebus*. Unless one wishes to argue that Plato means something entirely different when he states that measure and proportion are necessary to

\(^{130}\) Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*, 234. Guthrie also notes that this necessity for proportion in respect to the body, soul, and beauty is discussed in similar terms in the *Timaeus*. See, *Timaeus*, 87c1-88c1.

\(^{131}\) There is some textual evidence in support of my interpretation at, *Philebus*, 66a6-7, which I shall very shortly discuss.
properly weigh and blend all the elements that comprise the best life, then it can be claimed that

to metrion is in fact the standard of measure and proportion to which he refers.

Immediately after Socrates' and Protarchus' discussion of truth, measure, and beauty, Socrates
sets down the arrangement of lives, and thus brings the dialogue to a close. There are five lives,
ranked in descending order from the best to the least desirable. Socrates introduces the
ordering by saying "pleasure is not a possession of the first rank" (ἥδωνή κτῆμα οὐκ ἐστὶ πρῶτον);
nor is it a possession of the second, third, or fourth ranks; a life that partakes of true pleasures is
the fifth and final one in this ordering of lives. The fourth-best life is the one that is led in
accordance with "correct beliefs" (δόξας ὡρθὰς), the third-best is given over to "reason and
wisdom" (νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν), and the second-best life is the one "concerned with the
commensurable, the beautiful, the perfect, the sufficient, and all such things that belong to that
class" (περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὀπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶν).

The prize for the best life is awarded to the life that is "in some way concerned with measure,
what is in due measure, the appropriately timely, and all such things that should be considered
such as these" (πὴ περὶ μέτρων καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ καίρων καὶ πάντα ὀπόσα χρῆ τοιαύτα νομίζειν). It is not unreasonable to regard this best life as one closely connected with to

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132 It should be pointed out that the five lives are yet another example of non-dichotomous division designed to illustrate the manner in which a class may be divided, blended, and compared in accordance with the variant method of division set down in the latter part of the Statesman.

133 Philebus, 66a5-6 and 66c4-6. It may strike the reader as somewhat odd, perhaps, that Socrates refers to pleasure as a possession. Does one actually possess pleasure in the same sense that one possesses, say, knowledge? It would seem that pleasure is more of a psychological state that comes into being after one undergoes some sort of pleasant experience. In regard to the word κτῆμα, Guthrie writes: "To conclude, Socrates divides what he calls 'possessions' into five." Guthrie is incorrect, I believe, to interpret the word "possession" as referring to the five lives which Socrates will shortly enumerate. The word clearly refers to pleasure and not the five lives. Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 235.

134 Philebus, 66a6-8. It should be noted that this sentence ends with the expression τὴν αἰέναν ἐγερθαί [φόνην], a phrase which is meaningless in this context. Clearly, the manuscript tradition is corrupt, and several emendations have been offered to make the Greek seem plausible. The bracketed word, φόνη, is found only in manuscript T. See,
metrion. The choice of words used to describe the best life reflects those employed in the
Statesman. The expressions τὸ μέτρον and καὶρον are precisely those found in the passage from
the Statesman in which the appeal to what is in due measure is made. It does not seem to be
the case that the parallels between the Statesman and Philebus passages are accidental. Rather, it
is arguable that Plato was consciously making use of what is in due measure as an essential
notion underlying the best sort of life. The person who apprehends what is in due measure will
know the standard for weighing contraries against each other so that he or she may live as well as
possible.

Rather than making a simple choice between a life of pleasure or a life of knowledge, the
arguments presented in the Philebus lead to the conclusion that the best life is a mixed sort of life;
a life in which knowledge and true pleasures are blended and which is governed in accordance
with to metrion. Without an understanding of due measure, it would be quite difficult for an
individual to order appropriately the elements that go into comprising the best life. Furthermore,
although it is not explicitly stated in this dialogue, it nevertheless can be inferred that the best life
is a life that is moderate. It appears to have been one of Plato's goals, both in his political and
moral philosophy, to find a way in which the individual and the political community could live
moderately. The tentative steps taken in early works such as the Protagoras and Charmides
toward this goal were significantly advanced when the appeal to what is in due measure is made.
In the Statesman due measure is used to moderate the polis; in the Philebus it is employed to
moderate the individual. When we turn to examine the Laws in the next chapter, it will become
apparent that due measure and moderation are necessary both for the moral education of the

"Sigla" in Burnett's Oxford Classical Text edition of the Philebus, as well as the textual variants listed for this passage. In any case, this expression is unimportant for the notion that a life of due measure is the best attainable.

The fact that the expressions τὸ μέτρον and τὸ δέκω are not used in the Philebus passage does not alter the reference to the passage in the Statesman. These two phrases can be understood as being included in the phrase "all such things that should be considered such as these". See, Statesman 284e6-8.
citizens of Magnesia and for its political and legal institutions. By knowing what is in due measure, individuals are able to live as morally responsible agents and politically responsible citizens in accordance with to metrion and sōphrosunē.
CHAPTER 9

THE CONVERGENCE OF

SŌPHROSUNĒ AND TO METRION IN THE LAWS

In the previous two chapters I analyzed how to metrion was important for understanding the political philosophy of the Statesman and the moral philosophy of the Philebus. Both dialogues rely on the use of to metrion to set down a certain degree of moderation in their respective subjects. In the Statesman, the person who possesses expert knowledge in the art of statesmanship makes the polis moderate by blending, the contrary, or opposing, character traits in the souls of its citizens according what is in due measure in order to ensure the harmony of the political community. In the Philebus, the best sort of life is the one in which true pleasure and knowledge are combined with measure and proportion so that an agent may live a morally correct life which, under the guidance of due measure, is a life that reflects on the human level the order of the cosmos.

When we turn to the Laws, it is my position that Plato is attempting to synthesize the Statesman's best type of political organization with the Philebus' best sort of life to establish a polity that is moderate in respect to both the projected character of its citizens and its political organization and institutions. The citizens of Magnesia are moderate because they are to be educated in the virtue of sōphrosunē. It is a moderate polis because its constitutional form is a mixture that combines the best features of monarchical and democratic regime-types, and because its political institutions are grounded in the rule of law. The political community described in the Laws is one which depends to a great extent on due measure for its success. To metrion and sōphrosunē are central to what constitutes the best type of regime, the manner in which a lawgiver legislates, and the education which Magnesia's citizens receive relative to the political
community. If due measure is absent from the intentions and program of its legislator, it appears to be less likely that Magnesia and its citizens could succeed in becoming moderate. In other words, to metrion is essential to ensure the proper establishment of a polis, its continued existence, the laws by which it is governed, and the manner in which its citizens live as morally responsible agents and politically responsible citizens. Without a firm grounding in what is in due measure, the political community risks destruction and its individual members risk living morally vicious lives.

There is one additional point to consider in respect to the importance of due measure in the Laws, namely, the feasibility of its political program ever actually being put into practice. I have suggested throughout this study that one of the distinguishing characteristics of Plato's late-period political philosophy is its practicability, that is, the possibility that it could come into being. If it is indeed the case that it is less difficult for a larger number of individuals to understand to metrion than it is for them to apprehend the Forms as the standard by which one judges and chooses the best course of action, then it is reasonable to claim that the sort of moral and political life set down in the Laws is more practicable, or possible, than the solutions offered by Plato in those other works which deal with matters of political and moral philosophy. Since virtuous action, both by an individual and by a political community as a whole, depends on knowledge, the link between knowledge and virtuous action established by the appeal to what is in due measure may furnish a more practicable way of bringing about the conditions under which individuals may determine how to live well. Due measure grants to individuals a means by which they might know and act upon what is best for themselves and the political community in which they participate without needing to possess the training in philosophy necessary for the

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1 As I shall argue later in the chapter, there is a sense that by the time he composed the Laws, due measure and sôphrosunē are functionally equivalent in Plato's thought.
apprehension of a supersensible realm.\textsuperscript{2} The difficulties encountered in Plato's middle-period political thought are significantly minimized if understanding what is in due measure is substituted for the apprehension of the Forms. In effect, the practicability of the \textit{Laws}' program is brought about by \textit{to metrion}. A greater number of citizens will practice moderation and the polis will engage in a politics of moderation precisely on account of the fact that by understanding \textit{to metrion}, rather than by having to grasp an abstract metaphysical concept, a space is opened up to permit the political program of the \textit{Laws} to be feasible.

In order to keep this chapter to a manageable length, and in order to keep it in conformity with the topics which were examined in regard to Plato's early- and middle-period political philosophy in previous chapters, the discussion is organized as follows.\textsuperscript{3} In the first section I address two issues of general consideration: (1) the purpose of the \textit{Laws} compared to Plato's other works of political philosophy; (2) the relation of the \textit{Laws} to the rest of the Platonic corpus. The point of this analysis is to demonstrate, in a broad sense, the similarities and discontinuities of this work with some of Plato's other writings. The second section examines the role of education in the \textit{Laws}, specifically in respect to the manner in which education relative to the regime is aimed at producing citizens of a certain sort. The use of drinking parties and education in \textit{musikē} and \textit{gumnastikē} are all designed to foster a sense of \textit{sōphrosunē} in the young by showing them how to choose and hold to a middle course. I turn to the matter of legislation in the third section, concentrating primarily on the relationship between the preambles to the laws and the laws themselves, and the task of the legislator. Plato specifically states that a legislator must perceive

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\textsuperscript{2} I am not suggesting that there is not a metaphysical dimension to the \textit{Laws}. In this work Plato is still very much concerned with notions of the divine and its relation to the human sphere. What I am suggesting, however, is that the political philosophy of the \textit{Laws} does not directly depend on metaphysical considerations, in the sense that it did in a work such as the \textit{Republic}, in order for it to be possible to be put into practice. I shall examine briefly the role of metaphysics and theology in the \textit{Laws} in a later section this chapter.
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\textsuperscript{3} Due to the large amount of material covered by Plato in the \textit{Laws}, it is necessary to omit discussion of several subjects which, although important for Plato's presentation, are not strictly relevant to this study. The most significant topics which are not discussed include the arrangement of Magnesia's political institutions and offices and the specific laws set down in its legal code.
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what is in accordance with due measure and set down the law accordingly. While it is the function of the preambles to persuade individuals to obey the laws to which they are attached, there is a sense in which the combination of a persuasive preamble with a positive law assists in moderating the severity of the law. In the fourth section, I examine the remarks made in Book III by the Athenian Stranger concerning regime-types. The principal focus of this examination is on the idea of the mixed regime; a regime-type which is a mixture blended from two contrary regime-types. This mixed regime is regarded as the second-best type of constitutional arrangement and is the one for which the Athenian legislates in the Laws. The fifth section investigates the role of metaphysics and theology in the Laws to show that considerations of the divine still play an important role in Plato's late-period political philosophy, particularly in the sense that there is a relationship between the human and the divine. Finally, in the sixth section, I discuss the relationship between to metrion and sōphrosunē. It appears to be the case that in the Laws knowledge of to metrion and sōphrosunē converge in the sense that there is a reciprocal relationship between them; one cannot be moderate without knowing what is in due measure, and one who knows what is in due measure is moderate.

The Purpose of the Laws and Its Relation to the Platonic Corpus

Before turning to investigate the main topic of this section, there are two general issues that I would like to examine briefly concerning the Laws. The first issue that requires consideration,

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4 Unlike my translation of Ἐλείαττος Σέλως as Elean Visitor, I believe it is more appropriate to render the Laws' Ἀθεράμοιος Σέλως as Athenian Stranger, or simply as the Athenian. In view of the fact that the Athenian is unknown to Clinias and Megillus, as opposed to Theodorus who does know the Elean Visitor and between whom there apparently is some relation of reciprocal hospitality, it is more accurate to refer to the Athenian as a stranger rather than as a visitor. I should point out that I regard the Athenian Stranger as representing Plato's own views. My reasons for doing so are set out in Appendix 5.

5 It is worth noting that the discussion of regime-types is the only part of the Laws in which Plato clearly makes use of the method of division and blending. In general, Plato does not employ in the Laws the sorts of philosophical methods which are so prominent in other dialogues. Perhaps because of the subject matter, length of exposition, and the near-monologic character of the Athenian's arguments, Plato's usual reliance on a particular type of method is not required.
but which is infrequently discussed by commentators, is whether or not the text of the *Laws* accurately transmits to us what Plato wrote, or intended to write. Since this work was left in an incomplete state by Plato at the time of his death and was transcribed by Philip of Opus, at least according to the account of Diogenes Laertius, we are justified in questioning whether the text that has been handed down from the hand of Philip is faithful to Plato.\(^6\) Nails and Thesleff offer an excellent analysis of this potential problem. In addition to providing a historical account of the interpretation of the text of the *Laws*, they argue that the *Laws* in the form we have it does not accurately depict Plato's thoughts; the *Laws* is an example of what they term "Academic accumulation", that is, it is an accretion by numerous hands of arguments that were not necessarily those of Plato. Although they concede that their interpretation is impossible to prove, they do provide evidence that there are sufficient inconsistencies in the text which reasonably suggest that Philip (or perhaps someone else) "... edited a diverse school accumulation that had been composed by more than one person, and represented layers of revision. It is our misfortune that Philip was not philosophically competent for the task he undertook."\(^7\) In view of the fact that it is not possible to prove that the *Laws* in the form we have it is not fully the work of Plato, I accept, for the purposes of this study, the arguments of the *Laws* as given in the text, while recognizing that there is also the possibility that not all of them may precisely represent what Plato had intended to argue.

The second issue needing some discussion concerns the manner in which the *Laws* ought to be read. The fundamental question is: Given the literary form of the work, how are we to interpret it? Are we to interpret the *Laws* as merely a political treatise of a certain sort, or is it a work of political philosophy? One criterion for distinguishing between a political treatise and a work of

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political philosophy is whether or not a work leads to further reflection and debate about its subject matter. Adoménas, who approaches the *Laws* from the perspective of contemporary literary criticism, argues that the *Laws* is "self-referential". Adoménas argues: "Plato's protagonists identify their conversation (and, by implication, Plato's dialogue, which presents itself as the 'script' of the conversation) with the lawcode of the state which is to be established. Thus it is not only a conversation about the laws, but also a presentation of the laws."

On Adoménas' reading, the *Laws* is written in such a manner that it is able to transcend considerations of place and time, "to enact" itself by persuading us in respect to "the goodness and necessity of implementing the political project which it outlines." Because of the self-referentiality of the text we are drawn into a dialogue with it implying that the *Laws* is a work of political philosophy precisely because it compels us to engage in an ongoing intellectual debate, "by issuing a challenge which cannot be ignored, only overcome by further and better argument."

The *Laws*' standing as a work of political philosophy has been challenged by Schofield. His challenge is directed mainly at the lack of real dialogical interchange among the Athenian, Clinias, and Megillus. Since philosophy, according to Plato, proceeds by dialectical inquiry, the absence of any substantial amount of such inquiry in the *Laws* suggests that it is not a philosophical work. Schofield argues that the *Laws*’ intended audience is the "practiced Platonic reader" but not necessarily a reader who is a philosopher. Especially in reference to contemporary liberal sensibilities, the monologic character of the *Laws* discourages free philosophical inquiry. The *Laws* points out for us "the consequences of constructing a political settlement conceived in terms of a controlling gerontocratic religious rhetoric … There is here a

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9 Ibid., 56-57.
10 Ibid., 59.
message for our times – but warning, not beckoning us.” In opposition to Schofield, Bobonich argues that although the *Laws* is principally monologic for the sake of positing stable views concerning legislation in general and Magnesia's legal code, dialogical exchange does occur, especially in matters concerning ethical reflection. Despite the fact that the weight of the arguments is shouldered solely by the Athenian, Bobonich argues: "In the *Laws*, Plato tries to live with the tension between fostering true beliefs supported by good reasons and avoiding the undermining effects associated with exposure to false opinion, and we see this tension reflected in his literary techniques and the use of the dialogue form.” Finally, Gill addresses the issue of the use of dialogue in the *Laws* in relation to Plato's use of the dialogue form in the corpus as a whole. In brief, it is Gill's view that because "[t]he ideas of the *Laws* are, to an exceptional degree, couched in ordinary, conventional language," the type of dialectical inquiry encountered in Plato's other writings is not required. The *Laws* is a real dialogue in the sense that the amount of dialogical exchange among its participants is appropriate to the manner in which the work's ideas are expressed.

Schofield perhaps goes too far in claiming that the *Laws* is not a philosophical work. Even if one were to concede that more than one-hundred laws set down by the Athenian are not what is usually considered as philosophy, there are many other topics examined in the *Laws* that surely are of a philosophical nature, that are discussed by all three characters, and that are suitable subjects for further philosophical discussion. Moreover, the use of contemporary liberalism as the framework Schofield employs to critique the *Laws*, does not furnish an adequate reason for denying that this dialogue is a philosophical work. At best, the liberal perspective of free inquiry

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12 Christopher Bobonich, "Reading the *Laws*,” in *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, ed. Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 281.
advocated by Schofield may be used to argue against, or disagree with, Plato's views on what constitutes political practice in relation to the positions commonly held by contemporary commentators. If we define a philosophical work as one with which there is some sort of continuing dialogue, then the fact that we are still engaging with the text of the Laws, regardless from which perspective we choose to do so, indicates that this dialogue is indeed a philosophical work.

Both Bobonich and Gill are correct in regarding the Laws as a dialogue. While it is certainly the case that the Laws contains large stretches of monological exposition, these lengthy passages are mostly those in which the Athenian is describing Magnesia's social and political institutions and setting down its legal code. When the discussion turns to examine matters of education, regime-type, the preambles to the laws, ethics, and theology, both Clinias and Megillus do engage in a dialogue with the Athenian. Although it cannot be maintained that either of these characters makes significant contributions to the work's political and moral philosophy, they are depicted no less differently in terms of their role in the Laws than many other characters in Plato's late-period works. As conversation partners, neither Clinias nor Megillus are the equal of the Athenian, but they do participate in the discussion to the extent that, by assisting the Athenian in advancing the philosophy of the Laws, it is not difficult to regard this work as conforming to the dramatic style of Plato's late-period dialogues.

In view of the fact that the Laws should be considered as a philosophical work written in the form of a dialogue, the principal topic of this section may now be examined. One way in which to view the purpose of the Laws and its relation to Plato's other writings on political philosophy is

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14 Books V – IX and XI – XII, the books in which the Athenian sets down Magnesia's laws, have the lengthiest monological sections, but with the exception of Book V, opportunities are provided to Clinias and Megillus to question or comment on the Athenian's views.

15 It is well to keep in mind that in Plato's later dialogues the concern is not so much to refute the views held by another, but to expound his own positions. Clinias and Megillus are not opponents whom the Athenian must refute, rather, like Theatetus or Young Socrates, they are employed to help clarify the issues discussed by the Athenian.
to follow the interpretation given by Cicero in *De legibus*. Cicero appears to have regarded the *Laws* as a sort of sequel to the *Republic*: "But I think that I must do as Plato, the most learned man and most serious of all philosophers, did, who wrote first about the republic, and then separately about its laws" (*Sed ut vir doctissimus fecit Plato atque idem gravissimus philosophorum omnium, qui princeps de republica conscrisit, idemque separativ de legibus eius, id mihi credo esse faciendum*). Cicero's view is mistaken; the *Laws* is not a sequel to the *Republic*. Plato did not set down in the *Laws* legislation for the ideal regime described in the *Republic*. Rather, it is clear that in the *Laws*, the Athenian is setting down a legal code for what he considers to be the second-best polity; a fact which Cicero somehow manages to overlook.

Another way in which to regard the purpose of the *Laws* is to argue that is it Plato's practical solution to the question of how we may best organize and live in a political community. Unlike the *Republic*, which established the theoretical possibilities for the best regime, the *Laws* offers a set of practical possibilities. Laks, for example, interprets the *Laws* in terms of three models: (1) a model of completion – the *Laws* brings to a conclusion the political program of the *Republic* and the *Statesman*; (2) a model of revision – the *Laws* revises the type of regime set down in the other two dialogues; (3) a model of implementation – the *Laws* describes the practical realization of a type of political design. Although Laks' interpretation is to some extent a valid reading of

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16 I leave aside Aristotle's somewhat tendentious reading of the *Laws*. In general, it is arguable that Aristotle's far too brief critique of the *Laws* leaves its most significant aspects unexamined, thereby rendering Aristotle's interpretation not as useful as it might have been. Even more troublesome is the fact that Aristotle regards the perceived difficulties in the arguments of the *Republic* as "being very similar to those in the *Laws* as well, [a work which] was written later" (Σχεδόν δὲ παραπληρώς καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν Νόμων ἐξει τῶν ὑστερον γραφετας). Aristotle, *Politics*, 1264b26-1266a30. There are large enough differences and difficulties encountered between these works that do not warrant them being treated in so similar a manner as they are by Aristotle. This fact, however, does not prevent one contemporary scholar, Simpson, from claiming: "The *Laws* is the same as the *Republic*, as Aristotle said." Peter Simpson, "Plato's *Laws* in the Hands of Aristotle," in *Plato's Laws: Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum*, ed. Samuel Scolnicov and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2003), 303.

17 Cicero, *De legibus*, II.14.

18 That the *Laws* is a practical work has long been recognized by scholars. Taylor writes: "... the purpose of the whole is severely practical ..." Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work*, 463.

the text, it is arguable that it is not quite accurate to claim that the Laws completes, revises, and implements the political thought of the Republic and the Statesman.

I should like to present a brief criticism of each of Laks' three principal points. First, the nature of the political philosophy of the Republic and the Statesman is sufficiently different, in terms of both their theoretical aspects and the solutions presented for political practice, that it does not seem to be the case that the political thought of these two works is somehow completed in the Laws. All three dialogues can stand on their own as presenting unique solutions to the question of how we may best be governed. Second, despite that fact that certain topics are examined in the Laws that had been treated in the Republic and the Statesman, there is no significant reason for thinking that their appearance in the Laws is a revision of the manner in which they were dealt with in the other works. Moreover, Laks regards these revisions as a "retreat" by Plato from previously held positions. For example, Plato retreats from the Republic's view that a philosopher-king is the only person suited to govern and the Statesman's position that the expert in the art of statesmanship is most fitted for political rule to advance the idea of the rule of law in the Laws. While it is possible, but unlikely, to regard this change as a retreat, it seems more reasonable to consider it as a different sort of solution which is the result of the context in which it is being offered. It is also important to remember that there is a distinct

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20 Laks views the Republic and the Statesman as "little more than outlines of political philosophy." For Laks, neither the Republic nor the Statesman are authentic treatises on politics; the Laws, however, "can be considered the first work of genuine political philosophy." Apparently, in order for a work of political philosophy to be regarded as "genuine", Laks requires that it combine an analysis of the problem under consideration with arguments designed to demonstrate how the problem might be solved. This is accomplished by Plato in the Laws through the examination of law and legislation coupled with the positing of an actual legal code. Is it truly the case that this sort of political philosophy is not accomplished in the Republic and the Statesman? Arguably, in these two dialogues Plato both analyzes problems and offers solutions, perhaps not in as much detail as he does in the Laws, but certainly to a great enough extent that qualify the Republic and the Statesman as works of political philosophy. Laks, "The Laws," 258 and 267.

21 Several of these topics are examined in Appendix 5 in the context of showing a certain continuity between the Athenian Stranger and Plato. In none of the cases is there the sense that a topic initially encountered in the Republic or the Statesman undergoes a revision in the Laws in the sense that Laks suggests.

22 See, Laks, "The Laws," 269-270. Laks is also of the opinion that there is a critique of the Republic and the Statesman contained in the Laws. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate precisely what the Laws is supposedly criticizing in the other dialogues. Ibid., 273.
difference between the ideal polis ruled by philosopher-kings in the *Republic*, and the second-best polis under the rule of law in the *Laws*. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that Plato's views the *Laws* as a retreat from the positions he offered in the *Republic*, rather his views in the latter work result from an entirely different manner of contextualizing politics. Third, Laks argues that the implementation of the *Laws* does not refer to so much as the realization in practice of the actual political program outlined by the Athenian, as it does to the possibility of implementing this program as a theoretical model. That is to say, it is Laks' view that Plato does not expect Magnesia itself to be established, rather, Plato expects that the *Laws* be regarded as a theoretical model for a certain type of political practice. But if this is the case, then one might ask in what sense is the *Laws* any less theoretical than the *Republic*? Laks is aware of this objection, but his response seems rather ambiguous. He frames his answer by arguing that even though both the *Republic* and the *Laws* are theoretical models, there is a significant change in respect to the level on which each dialogue theorizes; from the level of the divine in the *Republic* to the level of the human in the *Laws*.\(^{23}\) As a consequence of this change in levels, Laks concludes: "By so resolutely taking into account the human factor, the *Laws*, in its specific and still very Platonic way, opens the path to Aristotle."\(^{24}\) While it is arguably the case that the *Laws*' political program is grounded more in the realm of the human than in the supersensible realm, there still remains a substantial element of the divine in the *Laws*, especially in terms of the relation between the divine and the human.\(^{25}\) Moreover, the idea that a "path to Aristotle" is opened up in this work strikes one as being superficial at best. It does not seem to be the case that the political program of the *Laws* resembles, or significantly influences, Aristotle's political philosophy, except to the

\(^{23}\) See, Ibid., 272-75.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 275.

\(^{25}\) While there is certainly a divine element at the core of the *Laws*' political philosophy, one does not have to go so far as Schofield and claim that the Plato, in the guise of the Athenian, is legislating for a theocracy. See, Schofield, *Plato*, 309-325.
extent that both the *Laws* and the *Politics* do not depend on the apprehension of a supersensible dimension in order for their respective political programs to function. Yet, even though Laks regards the *Laws* in terms of its emphasis on the human, he appears to contradict this position when he writes: "Most striking in the *Laws*, however, in comparison with the rest of the corpus, is the new emphasis placed on 'god' in the conduct of human affairs, and more generally on piety." Surely, the relationship being the human and the divine is a fundamental concern that is encountered throughout Plato's dialogues, and is not something that becomes particularly emphasized in his last work.

In any case, Laks' view that the *Laws* is Plato's practical solution to politics appears to uncover only one dimension of this complex work. Besides containing a practical aspect, there is a more than sufficient amount of theorizing about the best way to live to argue that the *Laws* is also a theoretical work. The dialogue is theoretical in the sense that throughout the exposition of its views it offers grounds for reflecting on what it means to live well. While these theoretical reflections are set within the context of a political community ruled by law, it is necessary to remember that the polis for which the Athenian is legislating is not the ideal one, rather it is the second-best one. Space is left open by Plato for further reflection, or theorizing. Indeed, one may say that the political program set down for Magnesia is only one possible solution in respect to a larger number of possible solutions that result from the theoretical dimension of the text. The *Laws* is also theoretical in the sense Plato continues to wrestle with, as he did throughout all his whole career as a philosopher, metaphysical questions, especially those concerning the relation between the human and the divine. These are the sorts of questions for which only theoretical answers can be given. Even if an interpreter chooses to focus on either the practical or theoretical

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26 This is not to suggest that Aristotle was not influenced by Plato. Rather, it does not seem to be the case that the social, political, and legal arrangements of the *Laws* were a significant influence on Aristotle's view of politics.

aspects of the *Laws*, it is necessary to keep in mind that this dialogue is one in which both aspects are present. Saunders sums up this position well when he writes: "The *Laws* has a good claim to be the most ambitious of all Plato's writings: it supplies a program of combined practical work and theoretical inquiry for the years after his death."28

In addition to the interpretations I have just discussed, I would like to suggest that there is one further way in which the *Laws* may be considered in respect to its purpose and in its relation to the rest of the Platonic corpus. It is arguable Plato conceived the *Laws* as a more practicable and complementary solution for politics and ethics than those offered elsewhere in the corpus. This is not to say, however, that the model presented in the *Laws* is in any sense easy to realize in practice; there are numerous difficulties that would have to be resolved first. Perhaps the greatest difficulty to overcome is persuading the citizens to accept Plato's fundamental premise that the unjust life is bad and painful, the just life is good and pleasant. Despite the attempts to educate individuals to be just, it is not at all certain that everyone would choose to live a just life.29 Rather, what is offered in this dialogue is a model which in comparison to the one set down in *Republic* has a better chance of being implemented successfully.

In terms of the work's practicability, I do not mean that the *Laws* articulates merely a more practical type of political philosophy than, say, the *Republic*. Although the *Laws* is both practical and theoretical in the ways I have just discussed, it is also practicable in the sense that its political program is feasible. In general, the political philosophy of the early- and especially the middle-period dialogues does not appear to possess much practicability because it is not feasible to bring about. Since the political philosophy of the early- and middle-period works was examined at

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28 Saunders, "Plato's Later Political Thought," 484.
29 See, *Laws*, 660d1-663c5. The notion that it is task of the law-giver to convince the citizens that to live justly is to live well appears necessary in order for the whole program to work. Other difficulties include finding a legislator of the type described by Plato, ensuring the continued stability of a polis organized in accordance with the *Laws*’ model, and finding a balance between the sacred and the secular aspects of the polis so that it does not become a theocracy.
length in Chapter 4, there is no need to reconsider it here except to make one broad observation in respect to the political philosophy of each of these periods. A principal problem with instantiating the political philosophy discussed in the early-period works is that Plato did not elaborate in any great detail the sort of institutional arrangements needed for its realization. A different, but equally serious, problem is encountered in the political philosophy of Plato's middle period. The grounding of political philosophy in metaphysics leads to the sort of political practice that depends on the apprehension of a supersensible realm which may be accessed only by those who have been trained in dialectical inquiry. The understanding of correct political practice is limited to only a very small number of individuals; it is an elite type of political practice that excludes most of the citizens from fully participating in the political community.  

In both cases, whether it be on account of the lack of an institutional framework or because of an elitist politics of exclusion, the consequences are nearly the same – the political philosophy of both the early- and middle-period dialogues is impracticable in the sense that the difficulties encountered in them are not possible to realize in practice. In the *Laws*, however, a well-developed set of institutional arrangements and the relinquishment of the need to apprehend a supersensible realm suggests that there is a greater possibility that the political program can be realized in practice. In other words, we are given in the *Laws* a practicable political philosophy.

In terms of the dialogue's relationship to the rest of the corpus, the *Laws* should not be regarded as a revision, development, or rejection of Plato's earlier attempts at political philosophy. Rather, the political thought of the *Laws* offers an alternate, complementary

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30 Despite my criticisms of Bobonich's developmentalist reading of the *Laws*, he is correct, I believe, to argue that in this dialogue there is a greater opportunity given for a substantially larger number of individuals to live well and virtuously. See, Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast*, passim.

31 It is well to remember that the ideal polis examined in the *Republic* was viewed as a paradigm. Any actual realization of it would most likely be an approximation; it is the ideal polis that is impracticable. In contrast, the polis for which the Athenian legislates in the *Laws* is considered to be the second-best polity. Because it is not the ideal polis, it is arguable that it is practicable.
approach to politics. Although the *Laws* displays many continuities with Plato's other writings and develops, in the weak sense of development, the views set down elsewhere, it should be considered as a distinct and to some degree independent work. It is independent not in the sense that it should be read apart from the context of the Plato's philosophy as a whole; it is independent in the sense that it is not the culmination, or final development, of Plato's views on politics. It is a work that furnishes its own solutions in response to the question how we may best live in a political community.

In respect to the relationship between the *Laws* and the *Republic*, the *Laws* does not supercede the *Republic*'s political philosophy; both dialogues should be read alongside each other, with each work offering its own, but not mutually exclusive, views. Where the *Republic* primarily addresses political philosophy from the perspective of the ideal political community, the *Laws* is principally a work which is directed toward the second-best polis. Where the solutions in the *Republic* may be regarded as infeasible, those in the *Laws* may be said to be possible to be put into practice. One solution is not necessarily better, or more efficacious, than the other; both dialogues posit equally valid arguments about politics. It is merely a matter of individual perspective, and perhaps personal inclination on the part of their readers, whether either the *Republic* or the *Laws*, or perhaps even both in their different ways, provides the more satisfactory solution. For example, a person who believes that politics ought to include some sort of metaphysical dimension might be inclined to prefer the solutions offered in the *Republic* over those given in the *Laws*. In contrast, someone who thinks that metaphysical considerations have little or no place in politics might choose to focus on the *Laws*’ grounding in the rule of law.

The *Laws* and the *Statesman* should also be viewed as complementary dialogues, but the relationship between the *Laws* and the *Statesman* is somewhat more complex than the relationship between the *Laws* and the *Republic*. Although the *Laws* and the *Statesman* do treat
politics in different ways, the former work is dependent on two very significant concepts set out in the *Statesman*: the appeal to what is in due measure and the notion of the second-best.\(^{32}\) The reliance on these two concepts in the *Laws* may seem to make the *Laws* and the *Statesman* less distinct, but a careful examination of the political philosophy contained in each dialogue strongly suggests otherwise.\(^{33}\) Even though the *Statesman* relies extensively on the appeal to what is in due measure and the notion of the second-best, its political philosophy is grounded in the idea of a ruler who possesses expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship. In contrast, the *Laws*’ political philosophy is based on the rule of law, administered by citizens who have been educated to govern the polis well. Unlike the sole rule of the expert in the art of statesmanship, the opportunity to govern Magnesia is open to a large number of qualified citizens. While there are other substantial differences between the political philosophy of the *Statesman* and the *Laws*, for example, the lack of an examination of education in the former dialogue contrasted with the detailed treatment of education in the latter work, the difference in terms of who is best fitted to govern the polis is great enough in itself to demonstrate that each dialogue's political thought is fundamentally different. Despite the continuities between the *Laws* and the *Statesman*, these two works, just as in the case of the *Republic*, complement each other in respect to the political philosophy set down in each one.

In sum, then, it is plausible to argue that Plato composed the *Laws* for the purpose of positing a practicable solution to the problem of how we may best be governed. This solution is one which may be considered as being more feasible than the solutions he presented in other

\(^{32}\) The relatively close proximity in time of composition between these two works, in contrast to the greater amount of time that had passed between the writing of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, as well as the experiences Plato underwent in Sicily during the interval between the middle- and late-period dialogues, may contribute to the appearance that there is closer relationship between the *Laws* and the *Statesman* than between the *Laws* and the *Republic*.

\(^{33}\) The two dialogues also seem to be less distinct owing to the fact that the *Statesman*, the *Laws*, and the *Philebus* as well, are arguably more concerned with the actual realization of their respective philosophical positions than those works which may be considered to be more theoretical in character.
dialogues concerned with political philosophy. Because positions set down in the Laws are aimed at a type of political arrangement grounded in the rule of law and administered by the citizens themselves, rather than by a philosopher-king or an expert in the art of statesmanship, because it is directed toward a non-ideal polity, and because it is not elitist and exclusionary, the political philosophy espoused in the Laws is such that it could perhaps be realized in practice.

The relationship of the Laws to the rest of the Platonic corpus is one of complementarity. Yet, in addition to being complementary, this dialogue also exhibits a continuity with the corpus; a continuity that reveals itself in the manner in which certain concerns that Plato had grappled with throughout his works appear to find a resolution, or completion, in his final work, the Laws. This sense of continuity and completion may be analyzed in terms of sōphrosunē and to metrion. In order for there to be the sort of social and political conditions that are able bring about the good of the individual and the political community of which one is a member, some sort of standard is required against which things are weighed and evaluated.

In one of the early-period dialogues which was examined, the Charmides, we have seen that sōphrosunē, regarded as a kind of knowledge of knowledge, was considered as a possible means for determining what is morally virtuous or vicious. In a middle-period dialogue, the Republic, the Forms were posited as the standard. But in both cases, however, difficulties arise, leading to the result that the employment of either the Charmides' sense of sōphrosunē or the Republic's two-world metaphysics would be impracticable, if not impossible, to realize in practice. When we turn to the Statesman, we find that Plato establishes to metrion as a non-metaphysical standard, accessible to a relatively large number of human beings, which may be used to reconcile and blend contrary, or opposing, things so that one may be able to choose a middle position which incorporates elements of the extremes it measures, and thereby producing a degree of moderation. Finally, in the previous chapter dealing with the Philebus, I have argued that what
is in due measure was fundamentally important for determining the best sort of life. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I shall examine the manner and sense in which to metrion and sôphrosunê converge in the Laws, with the result that both the individual and the polis become moderate.

**Educating the Citizen to Become Moderate**

According to the Athenian, the purpose of education is to prepare the citizens to become virtuous: "[education is] education from childhood in virtue, and produces the desire and love to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice" (eînai παιδείαν ... τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετήν ἢκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἔραστήν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχομαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης).34 Education, then, is a lengthy process of habituating human beings to become good citizens.35 Yet, it is arguable that Plato is well aware that habituation through education is not successful in all cases. The fact that a lengthy legal code is necessary suggests that more than simply habituating the citizens to act virtuously is required. If education alone were sufficient to secure virtuous behavior, then there would be no need for Magnesia's institutional framework to supplement its educational program. Moreover, the need for the Nocturnal Council, whose members must possess virtue in the highest degree, implies that not all the citizens are capable of being habituated to virtue to the same extent.36

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34 Laws, 643e3-6.
35 This point did not escape Aristotle's attention. The notion of habituation is fundamentally important for his arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics; the idea of knowing how to rule and how to be ruled is central to Aristotle's views on citizenship in the Politics. For example, see Aristotle's remarks at, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b3-4, and Politics, 1333a2-3.
36 Although Plato does rely on the notion of habituation, he quite correctly, I believe, recognizes that there are certain limitations to using habituation through education to ensure the virtuous behavior of all the citizens. More is required, whether it be in terms of institutional arrangements or the virtuous individuals who comprise the Nocturnal Council, to ensure that the entire polis lives in a morally correct manner. Plato's doubts about the effectiveness of habituation are quite apparent in the Myth of Er where at least one soul who "had participated in virtue by habit but without philosophy" (ἐθέκα ἀνεύ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετελειφθέω) choose "the greatest tyranny" (τῆς μεγίστης τυραννίδα). Republic, 619b7-d1.
Morrow believes that Plato was influenced by Lacedaemonian educational practices: "The value of such habituation Plato could see in the products of the Spartan discipline." Yet, for Plato, habituation is not for the sake of disciplining the body to endure the sort of physical hardships which were expected of a Lacedaemonian citizen. Rather, habituation is regarded as a process by which one is made virtuous. It is more important to educate the soul than to train the body, although physical training, especially instruction in dancing and wrestling, does have its place in preparing the citizens to have the necessary physical skills to honor the gods at festivals and to defend themselves in times of war.

This education in the habituation of virtue is directed primarily at learning to balance the pleasures and pains with which one is confronted. "Educating children consists in correctly disciplining pleasures and pains" (τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν παιδείων οὐσῶν). When these conflicting emotions are in the proper relationship among one another, then a person may be regarded as being virtuous. Virtue is, in effect, "the concord" (ἡ συμφωνία) between reason and emotion, so that "one hates what one ought to hate from first to last, and loves what one ought to love" (μισεῖν μὲν ἂμ αὐτῇ μισεῖν εὖθες ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἂμ αὐτῇ στέργειν). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to agree with Plato's view that virtue is a state in which pleasure and pain are held in balance by reason: "It is

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38 Xenophon presents an excellent depiction of the Spartan education system established by Lycurgus. Unlike Plato, however, Xenophon appears to suggest that the severe discipline of Spartan youths is directed at more than merely fostering the ability to endure physical hardships. The training of the body leads to a certain disciplining of the soul as well. See, Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaimonians, 2.1-6.5.
39 The process of habituating one to become virtuous presupposes that virtue can, in fact, be taught. The long-standing question in Plato's mind about the teachability of virtue appears to be resolved in the affirmative in the Laws, in the sense that one can be habituated to virtue. Morrow comments: "Plato's answer is that virtue can be taught, but not primarily by admonition, nor by the explanation and proof of principles, as one would teach a science." Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, 300.
40 See, Laws, 795d6-796d5.
41 Laws, 653c7-8.
42 Laws, 653c1-2.
for this reason that somehow we must straightaway from youth be led, as Plato says, so that we both take delight in and feel pained by what we ought; for this is correct education" (διό δεῖ ἵχθαι πως ευθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαῖρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ὃς δεῖ· ἢ γὰρ ὀρθῇ παιδείᾳ αὐτῇ ἐστίν). 43

The sort of virtue that Plato has in mind is, I believe, the virtue of ἕσοφροσύνη. In the Laws, there is a sense that by the term ἕσοφροσύνη, Plato does not simply mean that moderation is one of the four cardinal virtues which can be treated apart from the other three. Rather, it is arguable that wisdom, justice, and courage are all integral parts of, or are derived from, the virtue of ἕσοφροσύνη. 44 The person who possesses ἕσοφροσύνη and who acts in accordance with moderation also is courageous, just, and wise, and this person will live well. Yet, in addition to ἕσοφροσύνη, Plato recognizes that pleasure is required for the good life as well. Although the Athenian does not explicitly state it, the pleasures to which he refers should be understood as the sorts of pleasures which were considered to be true pleasures in the Philebus; that is, those pleasures that are blended into the best life. It is by balancing, under the guidance of reason, one's emotional states in respect to pleasure and pain that a person becomes moderate. And if one is moderate in this manner, then one will live correctly and happily. If it is the case, then, that both ἕσοφροσύνη and pleasure are needed to live well, then there are two distinct claims being made by Plato: (1) ἕσοφροσύνη is necessary in order to live a happy life; (2) pleasure, too, is necessary to live this sort of life. Either virtue or pleasure alone is insufficient for living well. Ἔσοφροσύνη and pleasure together furnish both the necessary and sufficient conditions for living well and happily. Carone, who analyzes the role of pleasure in the Laws, concludes: "Thus, the

43 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b11-13.
44 A similar view is expressed in the Gorgias. "The moderate man, as we just discussed, since he just, courageous, and pious, is a completely good man" (τὸν σώφρονα, ὡσπερ δήμηθραν, δικαίου ἀντα καὶ ἁθρηκτον καὶ ὁσον ἠγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελείως). Gorgias, 507c1-3.
appeal to virtue and the appeal to pleasure can be seen to fulfill two distinct informative roles on the context of the Laws: while the former highlights the intrinsic value of virtue as a state of inner harmony, the latter focuses on our innate feelings of pleasure and pain as a heuristic mark of the happy life."\(^{45}\)

It seems that these two claims depend on the position advocated at the end of the Philebus: the best life is the one in which true pleasures are mixed with knowledge, a life that is "in some way concerned with measure, what is in due measure, the timely, and all such things that should be considered such as these" (πη περὶ μέτρων καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ καίρων καὶ πάντα ὡσα χρή τοιαῦτα νομίζειν).\(^{46}\) The arguments given in the Philebus are important for the treatment of pleasure and virtue in the Laws. By demonstrating that there are some pleasures which are necessary to live a complete life, Plato has made it possible to argue that virtue alone does not lead to living well and happily. Virtue mixed with the correct sorts of pleasures, that is, the true pleasures, will suffice for this purpose. One of the difficulties encountered in the early- and middle-period dialogues was that the acquisition of virtue and a life lived strictly in accordance with virtue alone was impossible for most people to attain. Arguably, only those who have the capacity to be educated in philosophy, that is, by being trained in dialectics in order to apprehend the Forms, would be able to live completely virtuous lives. By allowing true pleasure to be mixed with knowledge in accordance with a standard of measure, more individuals have the opportunity to possess virtue in the sense that they become moderate, and thus can live well and happily. Rather than the intellection of a supersensible realm by a relatively small number of individuals, a far greater number of individuals have the opportunity for doing so if they receive the correct education and habituation in respect to being moderate and enjoying true pleasure.


\(^{46}\) Philebus, 66a6-8.
This latter alternative is possible only if it is the case that many human beings have some capacity for being moderate. It is unclear whether Plato actually came to hold this view by the time he composed the *Philebus* and the *Laws*. Bobonich takes the position that many people do have this capacity and that Plato did indeed hold this view near the end of his life. While Bobonich is correct, I believe, to argue that the sort of education in respect to virtue in the *Laws* is designed to make non-philosophers virtuous, he perhaps extends himself too far when he claims: "Insofar as many citizens, both men and women, can come to make such progress, Plato is far more optimistic than Aristotle about the capacity of human beings to attain a good and flourishing state of soul."\(^{47}\) It is debatable whether or not Plato can be characterized as being "optimistic".

The number and severity of the laws set down by the Athenian suggests otherwise.\(^ {48}\)

If the educational system outlined in the *Laws* was sufficient to guarantee that the citizens of Magnesia would live virtuously as a consequence of the training they receive from childhood, then, why, we may wonder, was such a detailed legislative program necessary to ensure their compliance with living in a certain manner. Surely, the extensive legal code of the *Laws* would not be necessary if by means of education alone the citizens were able to become virtuous and live happily. It appears more plausible to argue that both education and the rule of law are required if individuals and a political community are to live well. Education is employed as the first step which attempts to direct individuals toward virtue, but by acknowledging that this may not always come about, the laws are required to supplement education in those cases in which training and habituation either fall short or fail entirely. Rather than claiming that Plato was in any sense optimistic about the capacity of human beings for becoming virtuous, it is perhaps more reasonable to regard him as being aware that some sort of solution was needed which would

\(^{47}\) Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast*, 479.

\(^{48}\) As previously noted, the end of the *Republic* offers evidence that suggests that not all individuals are capable of learning to act virtuously during the course of one bodily existence, so that they end up choosing unwisely for their next physical life.
enable a larger number of individuals to be made moderate. The attempt to habituate the citizens to practice virtue through education and, when necessary, to enforce morally virtuous conduct by means of the laws was a solution that not only permitted a wider range of individuals to live well, but also supplied a solution which was more able to be realized in practice than the solutions offered elsewhere in the Platonic corpus.

The educational program articulated by the Athenian has two principal components: (1) the education received by means of drinking parties, especially in respect to the formation of correct social practices and the proper use of musikē; (2) a more formal educational program concentrating on the sort of general cultural and physical education necessary to become good citizens. In both cases, however, the primary goal of education is to foster a sense of moderation in the citizens from childhood onward. The examination of education is divided among four books. Books I and II deal primarily with drinking parties, while the more formal and academic sort of education is discussed in Books VI and VII. Guthrie takes a somewhat negative view about the manner in which education is presented in the Laws: "In spite of its supreme importance for Plato, the subject of education is treated is a more rambling way, and with more irrelevant digressions, than any other major topic." ⁴⁹ While it is true to say that the Athenian often digresses, for example, when in the middle of a discussion concerning the composition of music in Book II, he launches into an examination of the just and unjust lives, it is not the case that these digressions are without purpose for the main topic. ⁵⁰ This digression is important in that Plato must make the distinction between the just and unjust life so that the children may be persuaded when they are receiving instruction in musikē that the just life is superior to the unjust life. ⁵¹

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⁴⁹ Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 345-346.
⁵⁰ See, Laws, 660d11-664b2.
⁵¹ See, Laws, 664b3-c2.
In respect to spreading the discussion concerning education between Books I and II and Books VI and VII, the context in which these two discussions take place demonstrates why the examination of this fundamental topic was presented in this manner. The discussion about drinking parties in Books I and II follows quite naturally from the conversation regarding the Lacedaemonian and Cretan social and cultural institutions with which the Laws begins. The Athenian is trying to establish the point that certain social institutions are vitally important for educating the citizens to live in a certain manner. Moreover, since musikē is closely tied up with the sort of practices that take place at drinking parties, it is easy to understand the reasons for including a discussion of musikē within the context of an examination of drinking parties, and the way in which they are to be properly carried out. The digressions which Guthrie views as being "irrelevant" are integral for understanding the Athenian's purpose. The Athenian clearly indicates that the drinking of wine will have an effect on the manner in which one experiences pleasure, pain, and other emotional states; a person has the least amount of "self-control" (ἐγκρατεία), and has an emotional state similar to that of a child.52 Because the Athenian is treating such matters as pleasures, pains, and other emotional states, it is necessary for him to examine these things in order to be able to relate them to drinking parties, as well as to the purpose served by drinking parties. Ultimately, the drinking party will assist in fostering a good character: "This would be one of the most useful things, knowing the nature and disposition of people's souls" (Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρ’ ἄν τῶν χρησιμωστάτων ἐν εἴη, τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἐξεις τῶν ψυχῶν).53 By the end of Book II, the Athenian has established the point that the correct conduct of drinking parties is a beneficial social institution, and the polis must take the proper attitude toward drinking. The

52 See, Laws, 645d1-e8.
53 Laws, 650b6-7.
Athenian is quite clear about this point when he states: "making use of this exercise is for the sake of becoming moderate" (ὁς τοῦ σοφρονεῖν ἑνεκα μελέτης χρωμένη).54

The fact that any discussion concerning education is suspended for more than three books until it is resumed in Books VI and VII seems reasonable in view of the context in which this second discussion about education occurs. Unlike the examination of the educative value of drinking parties which took place in the context of considering what sort of social institution would be beneficial for the citizens, the treatment of education in the latter part of the Laws is related to the specific educational needs and goals of the polity for which the Athenian is legislating. Before the Athenian can begin examining the particulars of Magnesia's education program, it was first necessary to establish Magnesia and begin addressing the arrangement of its administrative offices and their functions.55 The Athenian reiterates the idea that education is necessary for the formation of good character.56 Indeed, the caretaker of education (ὁ τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελητὴς) holds "by far the most important of the highest offices in the polis" (τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀκροτάτων ἀρχῶν πολῶ μεγίστην).57 Since education is not a matter of secondary importance, the law-giver must ensure that the person appointed to this office is the best of the citizens, chosen by and from among those who are the "Guardians of the Laws" (νομοφιλάκων).58

The formation of a child's character, both in respect to the care he or she is given at home before formal schooling commences and the educational program set down by the Athenian for older pupils, is treated comprehensively by the Athenian. The development of a child's character

54 Laws, 673e5.
55 Similarly, the lengthy discussion in Book III about the origin of political systems and the types of regimes was required before proceeding to found and legislate for Magnesia. The same view should be held in regard to the examination in Book V concerning the care of the soul. Since the principal task of the legislator and the polity for which he legislates is to care for the souls of the citizens, it was necessary to engage in a preliminary discussion about the care of the soul prior to demonstrating how a polis' legal code, institutions, and social practices should be arranged for the sake of this fundamentally important purpose.
56 See, Laws, 765c3-766a4.
57 Laws, 765d4-c2.
58 See, Laws, 766b1-c1.
begins soon after conception. A child, both in the embryonic stage and during the first three years of its life, should be kept in motion because the Athenian perceives that there is a mental and physical advantage for the child if its mother and its nurses follow this practice. Keeping a child in constant motion cures it of its restlessness, producing a calm in the child’s soul and instilling a sense of courage.\textsuperscript{59} Children between the ages of four and seven will have their characters formed by engaging in play, but at the age of six the boys and girls should be kept apart from each other and educated separately.\textsuperscript{60} After this time, children begin their formal lessons. There is a twofold division for the subjects the children will formally study: physical training and cultural education. The former for the sake of perfecting the body, the latter for the sake of perfecting the character.\textsuperscript{61} Both males and females will be given the same instruction in \textit{musikē} and \textit{gumnastikē}. The former study will allow them to receive a general level of education in literature, arithmetic, and lyre-playing, as well as to attain the knowledge required to manage the affairs of their households sufficiently; the latter study will enable them to participate appropriately in the sorts of physical movements and dancing which are parts of religious festivals, while at the same time learning the necessary skills needed for warfare.\textsuperscript{62}

When asked by Clinias what would be the best model for teaching literature, the Athenian responds: "I should not be able, I imagine, to commend a better paradigm to the person who is both a Guardian of the Laws and an educator than this one" (τῷ δὴ νομοφώλακι τε καὶ παιδευτῇ)

\textsuperscript{60} See, \textit{Laws}, 793e3-794d3. Presumably, play is not only used for the formation of a child’s character, but it also is directed toward the learning the skills needed for the occupation which one will pursue as an adult. Playtime is to be employed “to lead the soul to the greatest love of that occupation of which, when he becomes a man, he will need to have complete excellence” (τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μᾶλλον ἄξιον τοῦτον ὅ δ’ ἔθεισε γενόμενον ἄνδρ’ αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πραγμάτως ἁρετῆς). \textit{Laws}, 643d1-3. It is also important to note that, based on the idea that the sort of play we engage in as children affects the way in which we act as adults, the Athenian argues that innovations should not be introduced into play. There is a need for constancy and continuity for the sake of setting a standard. Novelty must be avoided since it makes human beings despise custom, or the traditional ways of doing things. If novelty is introduced into the games of children, then the adults will turn out quite differently from those of previous generations. See, \textit{Laws}, 797a7-798d5.
\textsuperscript{61} See, \textit{Laws}, 795d6-8.
\textsuperscript{62} See, \textit{Laws}, 795d6-817e3.
It is Plato’s *Laws* itself which will serve as the paradigm for teaching the proper sort of literature. It appears to be the case that, since the *Laws* presents an examination of the sorts of considerations and measures necessary to bring about moderate individuals and political communities, then the use of this work as the basic educational text would admirably suit this purpose. Rather than relying on texts drawn from the canon of Greek literature — Homer or the tragedians — which most likely would contain some material that is unsuitable for the purposes Plato has in mind, the use of the *Laws* would prevent the pupils from being exposed to any such inappropriate material.

In addition to the basic level of moral and practical instruction, there is a more advanced type of education available to those who possess the aptitude for it. "For the freeborn, there still remain three areas of study: one concerns calculation and the study of number; the second concerns the art of measuring lines, surfaces, and solids; the third concerns the course of the stars and how they travel naturally in relation to each other" (*Ετι δὴ τοίνυν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐστὶν τρία μαθήματα, λογισμοὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀρμοδίων ἐν μαθημα, μετρητικὴ δὲ μῆκους καὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ βάθους ὅς ἐν αὐ δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τῆς τῶν ἁστρόν περιοδοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς πέφικεν παρεῖσθαι*). Some knowledge of these subjects is essential for human beings, just as it is for any "god, spirit, or hero who is seriously capable of being made the caretaker of human beings" (θεὸς οὐδὲ δαίμον οὐδὲ ἤρως οἷς δυνατὸς ἁνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν σὺν σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι). These higher subjects are not suitable for everyone to learn, but apparently they are to be learned only by those who will involve themselves in the administration of the polis. These

63 *Laws*, 811d5-6.
64 One only needs to recall the sorts depictions of the gods in Greek literature that Plato argued against in the *Republic* to understand his reasons for thinking that the *Laws* would be a better choice of texts for the moral education of the young.
65 *Laws*, 817e5-818a1.
66 *Laws*, 818c1-3.
are subjects which must be appropriately taught, since it is more dangerous, or harmful, to know something in detail that has been improperly taught than it is not to know it at all.67

Taken together, then, education is directed toward making human beings virtuous by providing them with the proper type and level of instruction for which they suited are so that they might live well both as individuals and as citizens. In the Laws, education is not of the exclusive sort advocated in the Republic; it is not the kind of education in philosophy that enables a only a small number of individuals to apprehend a supersensible realm and employ their understanding of this realm to rule over those who do not grasp, or who are not even given the opportunity to grasp it. Rather, the sort of educational program set down in the Laws is of the type that will attempt to make a larger number of individuals virtuous by educating them in respect to a set of shared social and cultural practices which themselves are designed to enable the citizens to live well. "Because, in general, those who have been educated correctly become good … [and] because those who are able to rule over themselves are good, but those who do not are bad" (ός αἱ γε ὁρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθῶς γίγνονται ... ὃς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὀντῶν τῶν δυναμένων ἀρχεῖν αὐτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μη.68 In effect, those who have been educated in this manner become moderate and carry out their private affairs and public duties by practicing sōphrosunē.

Finally, it is arguable that educating human beings to practice sōphrosunē by instructing them how to balance their pleasures and pains requires some sort of standard against which these conflicting emotional states may be measured.69 Although the Athenian does not explicitly refer to to metrion in his examination of education, it is not implausible to suggest that due measure is employed as the standard of measurement from which correct human behavior is determined.

67 See, Laws, 819a1-6.
68 Laws, 644a7-b7.
69 It is well to remember, as noted earlier in this section, that there is a connection between the examination of pleasures and pains in the Laws and the examination of the relationship between true pleasure and knowledge in the Philebus. In both cases, contraries are being measured against each other in accordance with some standard of measurement so that a middle position is determined in which elements of both contraries partake.
The Athenian does, however, argue that, in general, a law-giver must not neglect "what is in due measure" (τὸ μέτριον), for without perceiving what is in due measure, the greatest disease, folly, comes to be and corrupts everything with which it comes into contact: "Therefore, to guard against this [danger], by recognizing what is in due measure, is the task of the greatest law-givers" (τοῦτ’ ὁ δὲν εἰλαβήθηναι γνώντας τὸ μέτριον μεγάλων νομοθετῶν). If the law-giver is required to legislate in accordance with what is in due measure, and if it is one of the functions of the law-giver to set down the laws which regulate all aspects of education so that human beings learn to become moderate, then it follows that it is due measure which underlies the educational program of Magnesia. As a law-giver must recognize to metrion in order to legislate well, so, too, must human beings learn to perceive to metrion if they are to practice sōphrosūnē and live well. The connection between to metrion and sōphrosūnē is even more pronounced when we examine the topic of legislation in the Laws.

**Legislating Sōphrosūnē in the Polis**

In contrast to the rule of the philosopher-king in the Republic and the rule of the expert in the art of statesmanship in the Statesman, the polis for which the Athenian legislates in the Laws is governed by law. The personal authority of the philosopher-king or expert in the art of statesmanship gives way to the rule of law. The Athenian states: "For where the law is subservient and without authority, I see that in such a <polity> destruction is at hand; but where the law is master over those who rule and the rulers are the servants of the law, I observe its preservation and all those good things that the gods grant to cities" (ἐν ἐκὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀρχόμενος ἦ καὶ ἄκυρος νόμος, φθορᾶν ὅρω τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐτοιμίνος οὕσαν ἐν ἐκὲν δὲ ἂν δεσπότης τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ ἀρχόντες δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου, σωτηρίαν καὶ πάντα ὥσα θεοὶ πόλειν ἔδοσαν ἄγαθα γεγομένα

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70 Laws, 691c1-d5.
Klosko argues that since the proper exercise of personal authority by means of "philosophical intelligence" is not possible, Magnesia must be governed by law: "Human beings cannot be entrusted with unaccountable power, and so must be placed under laws." The rule of laws functions "as the only safeguard against the abuse of power in the world of fallible human beings." Although it may appear that the Nocturnal Council wields unlimited power, it, too, is subject to the law. Hall, who argues that in the Laws the ruler governs within the limits imposed by the law, comments: "Even the Nocturnal Council does not enjoy 'unfettered authority' no matter how its role is conceived in the practical state of the Laws … the Nocturnal Council is contained within the state's organizational structure." Although the function of the Council is restricted by Magnesia's institutional framework, its composition and operation is of the highest importance for securing Magnesia's stability and flourishing. It functions as "a sort of anchor for the whole polis" (οἶνον ἀγκυραν πάσης τῆς πόλεως) to preserve everything in it.

Arguably, the rule of law is possible because the citizens of Magnesia have been educated to act as autonomous moral agents, and the unlimited authority of the philosopher-king or statesman is unnecessary. Under the authority of a carefully worked-out legal code, the polis will be able to govern itself. Since it appears that the philosophy of Plato's late period provides the opportunity for a larger number of individuals to learn how to act in a morally responsible and virtuous

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71 Laws, 715d3-6.
72 Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 246. Klosko's reading seems somewhat misleading. It does not appear to be the case that rule by a philosopher-king is impossible, rather, it may be more correct to claim that such a rule is very unlikely, or impracticable, to realize in practice.
73 Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 382.
74 Robert W. Hall, "Platonic Rule: Fiat or Law," Polis 18 (2001), 112. It is worth pointing out that there is a degree of continuity in terms of the way in which Plato regards the Republic's philosopher-kings, the Statesman's expert in the art of statesmanship, and the Laws' Nocturnal Council, in the sense that all three have attained some measure of philosophical knowledge which enables them to rule. The members of the Nocturnal Council appear to possess some of the intellectual qualities of the philosopher-king and the expert in the art of statesmanship, without possessing the unlimited authority held by the philosopher-king and the statesman.
75 Laws, 961c4-6. In a sense, the Council functions to protect politics from philosophy and philosophy from politics, in addition to preventing theological considerations from turning Magnesia into a theocracy. The Council members' knowledge of virtue ensures the safety of Magnesia so that philosophy, politics, and religion are kept in balance.
manner, they will not need to be placed under the political power of any sort of authoritarian personal rule that attempts to ensure their compliance with what this authority deems to be the correct way in which they ought to live. Rather, the legal code itself, and especially the preambles that the Athenian believes ought to be affixed to the laws, is a sufficient source of authority for the polis. By submitting to the authority of the legal code, and by being open to the persuasive power of the laws' preambles, the citizens of Magnesia ought to be able to live well.

Moreover, there is a connection between the type of education that the citizens have received, Magnesia's legal code, and the use of rational persuasion. Magnesia's educational program is designed to prepare the citizens to attain some degree of moral knowledge, in part by means of persuasion. The Athenian admits that it is difficult to persuade men in respect to what is true, and that sometimes it might be necessary for a law-giver to employ useful falsehoods to convey the truth. Tales, or fables, are useful for persuading the young, since it shows a law-giver that "if he tries, he can persuade the souls of the young of anything" (ἄν ἐπιχείρησε δείξῃς ἀλήθειαν τῷ τῶν νέων ψυχῶν ὑπερήφανος).

The preambles to Magnesia's laws are designed to persuade the citizens to obey the laws. The Athenian wishes that the citizens "be as easy to persuade as possible in respect to virtue, and clearly this is what the law-giver will try to do in all his legislation" (ὁ δὲ εὐπειθευστάτους πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πειράσεται τούτῳ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐν ἀπάση ποιεῖν τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ). Persuasion, then, is fundamentally important for both education and the legal code, in the sense that its use will assist in instructing the citizens to live well.

Viewed in this light, the use of rational persuasion conveys a benefit on the citizens. Bobonich argues that that this type of persuasion furnishes the citizens with the sort of knowledge needed to practice virtue: "Thus if rational persuasion fails to produce ethical knowledge, it will

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76 Laws, 664a1.
77 Laws, 718c8-10.
fail to produce any benefit for the citizens." It is Bobonich's position that Plato believed that rational persuasion was beneficial for the citizens because they are free persons: "A free person is benefited by such exercise of his rational powers and by reaching a rational understanding of the bases of his actions." In effect, virtuous behavior depends on the use of a free person's rational capacities, and it is for this reason that both Magnesia's educational program and legal code rely on the use of persuasion. The capacity for individuals to be persuaded in respect to their moral behavior implies that individuals are capable of self-rule, and do not require the unlimited power of a philosopher-king or expert in the art of statesmanship to govern them. Mayhew argues that Bobonich is incorrect; the political philosophy of the Laws makes rational persuasion impossible. By examining several passages from Book X of the Laws, Mayhew attempts to demonstrate that Plato did not depend to as great an extent on rational persuasion as he did on the fostering of correct theological beliefs. It is Mayhew's contention that the theological discussion in Book X shows that Plato "cannot support rational persuasion or freedom in any genuine sense." Rather than disproving Bobonich's position, Mayhew, I believe, is wrong to apply the arguments given in Book X, which, after all, do have a specific theological context, to the whole of the Laws. The lack of the use of rational persuasion in Book X, in the sense that it is utilized in respect to education and the law in the rest of the Laws, is perhaps better regarded in terms of the manner in which Plato generally treated the apprehension of metaphysical concepts. Rational persuasion alone is insufficient to direct an individual toward the intellection of the divine; any such intellection is the result of an inward (or perhaps even some sort of outwardly assisted) turn.

79 Ibid., 402.
81 Ibid., 108. While it may be the case that Plato held certain theological views that may be termed dogmatic, it is not the case that this theological dogmatism is carried over into the Laws' political philosophy.
toward the apprehension of the supersensible realm.\textsuperscript{82} Rational persuasion, however, is possible when it is employed to attempt to convince individuals that they ought to live in a certain manner. Even though I have given only a small number of examples, there are numerous instances throughout the \textit{Laws} where the notion of rational persuasion is at the core of the \textit{Laws'} political thought. It does not seem reasonable, as Mayhew attempts to do, to take the context-specific arguments of Book X, apply them to the entire dialogue, and then claim that free persons do not have the capacity to be persuaded to act in a morally virtuous manner. Rather, it appears to be more plausible to accept Bobonich's view that rational persuasion is a core concept for the treatment of education and law in the \textit{Laws}.

The Athenian clearly indicates that Magnesia's laws serve a twofold purpose: to persuade and/or to compel the citizens to be virtuous. "The method of the laws will be partly by persuasion and partly, when there are characters who defy persuasion, by compulsion and just punishment" (τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκοντα πειθαὶ τῶν ἔθιων βίᾳ καὶ δίκαι̣ς κολάζουσα).\textsuperscript{83} Those who are not convinced by rational persuasion and act contrary to the law will receive punishments that are appropriate to their crimes.\textsuperscript{84} The purpose of the laws' preambles is to attempt to persuade and explain to the citizens the reasons why they should obey a particular law, while the penalties for the various crimes are stipulated in the laws themselves. The use of explanatory preambles was a significant contribution by Plato to legal theory. The

\textsuperscript{82} This notion of an inward turning is most clearly brought out in \textit{Republic} VII. Something, or someone, whether internally or externally, compels a dweller in the cave to turn from the shadowy sensible sphere to the supersensible sphere illuminated by the Good. See, \textit{Republic}, 515e4-516c2. For an excellent contemporary interpretation of implications of Plato's argument in the \textit{Republic}, see Joshua Mitchell, \textit{Plato's Fable: On the Mortal Condition in Shadowy Times} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), passim.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Laws}, 718b2-3.

\textsuperscript{84} Although many of the punishments may strike the modern reader as overly severe, if not downright barbaric, they were not necessarily too harsh in the context of fourth-century Greek penal practices. One also has to wonder, given the educational system of Magnesia, how often the most severe punishments would need to be handed out in actual practice. If a citizen cannot be persuaded to live a virtuous life, then the escalating severity of punishments for one who is incorrigible might, in fact, be suitable. After all, the whole purpose of Magnesia's educational program and legal code was to ensure that the individual and the political community live in a certain harmonious balance. The polis could not risk several, or even one citizen, significantly upsetting the order and balance of the whole community.
Athenian is somewhat surprised that legislators have neglected to prefix their laws with preambles, since preambles will help make the citizens more cooperative with the laws.\textsuperscript{85} Through use of preambles the citizens will display a greater sense of readiness to learn and abide by the legal code.

In addition to the introduction of preambles to the laws, there is a second notable and innovative feature to Magnesia's legal code: punishment is for the sake of chastising and reforming one who breaks the law; it is not for the sake of retribution or vengeance. Saunders is quite correct to argue that for Plato punishment looked to the future, and was not looking back toward the past. The purpose of punishment "is not to inflict suffering on an offender in return for the suffering he has inflicted, but the reformatory effect it should have on him henceforth."\textsuperscript{86} The view that punishment is not retributive is stated in the \textit{Protagoras} as well. Protagoras argues that punishment is not for exacting vengeance for a past wrong, rather punishment acts as a deterrent: "for one cannot undo what has been done – but it is done for the sake of the future" (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ γε ἀρχήν ἁγένητον θείη – ἄλλα τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν).\textsuperscript{87} If punishment does act as a deterrent against future transgressions, then it appears that it also is for the sake of instructing the individual in how to act properly in the future. In other words, if acting properly means acting virtuously, then Protagoras appears to be implying that virtue can be taught, at least to the extent that one will act with enough virtue in order to avoid committing the same offense and receive a similar, or even more severe, punishment. Even though the \textit{Protagoras} ends with Protagoras apparently denying the teachability of virtue and Socrates seeming to think that it can be taught, the view that virtue can be taught is a central idea in the \textit{Laws}, and it is accomplished through

\textsuperscript{85} See, \textit{Laws} 722b4-723b6.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Protagoras}, 324b3-4.
Magnesia's educational program, through the preambles to its laws, and by means of the sort of reformative punishments handed out to those who do break the law. Education and law work together to teach human beings to live moderately.

The combination of preambles which are designed to persuade a citizen to obey the laws and laws which lay down the types of reformative punishments that a citizen will suffer if he or she breaks the law may be regarded as the blending of two contraries, persuasion and compulsion. By combining persuasion and compulsion, the Athenian establishes a legal code in which these two contrary elements function in tandem to produce a unified system of law which requires both elements in order for it to be effective. Persuasion and compulsion are mixed together so that both contraries have a share in the overall structure of Magnesia's legal code. Rather than viewing persuasion or compulsion as mutually exclusive, or distinctly separate opposites, they are in a sense reconciled when they are brought together in the legal system set down by the Athenian. The code of law is not considered merely as either a set of descriptive explanations posited for the sake of persuading the citizens to act in a certain manner, or as a set of prescriptive legal remedies established for the sake of compelling the citizens to obey the laws. The legal code depends on the reconciliation of persuasion and compulsion in order for it to function successfully. Neither persuasion nor compulsion is sufficient by itself, both must be mixed and reconciled if the legal code is to assist in educating the citizens to live virtuously.

Although I do not wish to press the point too far, it is arguable that the blending and reconciliation of persuasion and compulsion as the basis for Magnesia's system of laws is brought about by the application of due measure. Since qualitative measurement shows how contraries may be blended and reconciled so that a middle position is reached in which both contraries, or extremes, partake, and since Magnesia's legal code blends and reconciles the contraries of persuasion and compulsion into a unified legal system which relies on both, it appears plausible
to argue that the manner in which the Athenian organizes the legal code makes use of qualitative measurement with its appeal to what is in due measure to establish the overall structure of Magnesia's legal system. To put this another way, qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure establishes a pattern for the blending and reconciling of opposites, and it is this pattern which the Athenian follows as he sets down Magnesia's legal code. In light of the innovative character of Magnesia's legal code, it is somewhat difficult to imagine that the manner in which it combines persuasion and compulsion would be possible without there having been previously established the sort of qualitative measurement available for demonstrating how contraries can be blended together. It would seem, then, that the structure of Magnesia's legal code utilizes qualitative measurement, and without the use of this kind of qualitative measurement the Athenian would not be able to blend persuasion and compulsion as he does in this legal code.

In the previous section I discussed the notion that a law-giver must be cognizant of "what is in due measure" (τὸ μέτριον) if he is to legislate well for the good of the political community. By knowing what is in due measure, the law-giver guards against folly and its destructive potential for the polis. A principal task of the legislator is that "he must try to instill as much good sense as possible in cities, and to the greatest extent eradicate folly" (πειρατέων ταῖς πόλεσιν φρόνησιν μέν δὴν δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀνοιαν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξαιρεῖν). He accomplishes this task by trying to make the citizens moderate, and he is able to make them moderate because he knows how to measure things in accordance with what is in due measure.

While the exact manner in which the law-giver goes about making the citizens moderate by applying the appeal to what is in of due measure to his legislation is not explicitly addressed in the Laws, we can make use of the example of burial expenses to demonstrate, at least to some

88 Laws, 688e6-8.
extent, how making the citizens moderate functions. In Book IV, just prior to the discussion concerning the need for preambles, the Athenian makes the point that a legislator, unlike a poet, must be precise in what he means. He notes that the expenditure on a funeral can be "excessive, deficient, or moderate" (τῆς μὲν ὑπερβεβλημένης, τῆς δὲ ἐλλειποῦσης, τῆς δὲ μετρίας), and the one which is prescribed and praised is "the moderate one" (τὴν μέσην). Yet, even though the moderate burial is the one which is recommended, the Athenian makes the very significant point that before the legislator can establish this sort of moderate burial as the lawful form of burial, it is first necessary to define what one means by the term "moderate": "one must state what moderate is and how large it is" (τί τὸ μέτρεον καὶ ὅποσον ῥητεόν). In other words, it is necessary for a legislator to be precise in respect to the terms he employs, for the term "moderate" may mean something quite different in relation to one's resources. For a wealthy individual, moderate may seem deficient, for a poor person it may be excessive, while for a person of moderate means, moderate may be appropriate. Thus, the permissible expenditures on a burial are relative to an individual's property.

The Athenian does not define what a moderate burial should be nor does he set down the regulations for a moderate funeral relative to the amount of one's property until the final book of the Laws; not until he has established the point that the soul is far superior to the body. It is the soul, not the body, which should be the object of care and attention during the course of a person's life, and a person who lives moderately is one who properly cares for the soul. Because the soul has departed from the body, the body should be considered "as a soulless altar to the gods of the underworld" (ὁς εἰς ἄφυλχον χθανίων βομών), and only "what is moderate should be spent"

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89 See, Laws, 719d4-7. Note that the Athenian describes these three types of burial expenses in terms of what is excessive, deficient, and moderate, or what is in the middle. The fact that the language found in this passage echoes the language used in the digression on due measure in the Statesman suggests that the appeal to what is in due measure underlies the way in which the Athenian derives his idea of what is moderate.

90 See, Laws, 719e3-5.
The notion that only a moderate amount should be spent on burials is mentioned in the address the Athenian makes Book IV to a group of colonists concerning an individual's duties and responsibilities: "When one's parents have died, the most moderate burial is best" (τελευτησάντων δὲ γονέων ταφή μὲν ἡ σωφρονεστάτη καλίστη)\(^92\). Because only the legislator will have the correct idea of what is moderate, it is his task to legislate the maximum expenditure for burials. The Athenian sets down the appropriate amounts in terms of one's property-class.\(^93\) It appears, then, that because one's attention should be directed toward the care of the soul, one should not concern oneself with things that may turn one aside from this aim. To the extent that the burial of one's body be moderate, one should live moderately for the sake of one's soul. As neither excessive nor deficient amounts should be spent on the burial of one's mortal remains, neither should one live excessively or deficiently. In all circumstances one should try to live moderately.

The Athenian is very well aware of the fact that most human beings do not have the capacity to live moderately without some outside assistance. "Only a small class of human beings, few by nature and nurtured with the highest training, who, when they fall into various needs and desires, are able to persevere in respect to what is in due measure" (σμικρῶν γένος ἄνθρωπων καὶ φύσει ἀλλοιωμένου, ὅταν εἰς χρείας τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινῶν ἐμπίπτῃ, καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ μέτρουν δυνατὸν ἔστιν).\(^94\) It is for this reason that a legislator who does know what is in due measure and is able to apply this knowledge when he establishes a polis' legal code is

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\(^{91}\) See, Laws, 959d1.

\(^{92}\) Laws, 717d7-8. The significance of this speech will be examined further in the penultimate section of this chapter.

\(^{93}\) He considers moderate amounts to be as follows: five minae for persons of the highest property-class, three minae for those of the second class, two minae for those of the third, and one mina for those of the fourth, and lowest, property-class. Although the Athenian considers these sums to be moderate, they nevertheless are substantial. One mina is equal to one-hundred drachmae, and in the fifth and fourth centuries, one drachmae was more or less the daily wage of a skilled workman. So, for a person of the highest property-class, the allowable "moderate" amount that one could spend on a funeral was roughly equivalent to the wages earned by a skilled workman in five-hundred working days, or, approximately, in one and one-half years of labor.

\(^{94}\) Laws, 918c9-d2
required. Without such a law-giver and the sort of legal code that he is able to establish, there is little chance that the citizens could find on their own the correct way to live.

Similar to the manner in which the educational program of Magnesia is directed toward habituating the citizens to act virtuously, the combination of preambles and legislation assists the citizens by persuading and, when necessary, compelling them to live virtuously. Guthrie correctly remarks: "Law is in fact a form of education." By grounding the legal code in what is in due measure, the legislator is able to instruct the citizens of Magnesia that by avoiding the extremes of excess and deficiency their lives will be directed toward living moderately, or living in accordance with what is in due measure.

**The Moderate, Mixed Regime**

In addition to its importance for the *Laws*’ educational program and legal code, *to metrion* and the idea of *sōphrosunē* are central to the Athenian's discussion of political philosophy in Book III. After recounting the origins of political systems and relating a destruction myth concerning the earliest political communities, the Athenian goes on to demonstrate how their present-day social, cultural, and political practices developed gradually out of the practices of the past. This process of development was carried in out in four stages: (1) single families living under autocratic rule; (2) collections of families under aristocratic rule, or kingship; (3) *poleis* situated on the plains whose political arrangements took various forms; (4) leagues of *poleis*. The general purpose of this exposition is to show that as life became more sophisticated and complex, there was a proportionate increase in the need for formally organized political systems, technical skills, and laws, along with an increase in the potential for morally virtuous or morally

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vicious behavior. All these attempts to arrange political systems, even the Lacedaemonian one for which the Athenian displays some degree of admiration, or sympathy, ultimately failed. These systems failed primarily on account of their own ignorance and folly in respect to the target at which correct social and political practice must aim. More specifically, they failed because of a conflict of authority in the political system. The Athenian outlines seven different ways in which authority can be exercised, or claimed, in respect to ruling and being ruled (ἀξιώματα δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι), and how they conflict with one another. The result of these conflicts is that "disharmony", or discord (ἡ διαφωνία) takes hold of a polis and ruins it.°

There are, however, two remedies which can be employed for the sake of preserving political communities: (1) legislating in respect to what is in due measure; (2) organizing the polis so that its constitutional form is one which shares in the features of more than one regime-type. The first remedy requires that a law-giver must not neglect "what is in due measure" (τὸ μέτρον) when legislating for a polis. As was discussed previously, legislation which makes use of the appeal to what is due measure will prevent poleis from being destroyed through their own folly because they will be guided by the laws, and by whatever social institutions are established by the law-giver, to act moderately (μετρίως). Additionally, a legislator must ensure that the citizens receive a good education in order to learn how to become virtuous. This especially is the case in respect to the virtue of sōphrosunē. It appears that, for the Athenian, sōphrosunē is the best of the virtues: "In the absence of moderation, justice will not spring up" (Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε δίκαιον ὁ δὲ φύσεται χαρίς τοῦ σοφρονείν). Sōphrosunē is "what benefits us the most (πλείων ἡμῶν ωφελείν), and when it is added to whatever good qualities a person may possess "it would most

° The seven ways of ruling or being ruled are: (1) parents over their offspring; (2) the noble-born over the base-born; (3) the older over the younger; (4) masters over slaves; (5) the stronger over the weaker; (6) the wise over the ignorant; (7) a person who has the good fortune and who is favored by the gods (θεοφιλής) to be successful when rulers are chosen by lot. See, Laws, 690a1-691a8.
°° Laws, 696c5-6.
correctly deserve to be held in the highest honor" (μάλιστ’ ἂν τιμῶμεν οὐθότατα τιμῶ).\textsuperscript{99} It is important that honor and disapprobation be distributed properly if a polis is to survive. The highest honor is to be accorded to the goods of the soul, "if it possesses moderation" (σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αἰτῆ), the second-highest honors are to be given to the goods of the body, and third and last are the honors paid to property and wealth.\textsuperscript{100} Clearly, then, by legislating with a view toward what is in due measure, the citizens are given the opportunity to become moderate, and if the most highly-esteemed virtue of sōphrosunē is present, then the polis stands a good chance of being preserved and "being as happy as humankind may possibly be" (εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν ἀθροπίνην).\textsuperscript{101}

The second remedy requires that a polis have a mixed-type political structure. The Athenian begins his examination of this remedy by claiming that there are "two mother-forms of constitution" (εἰσὶν πολετείων ὁδὸν μητέρες δύο τινές), monarchy and democracy; all the other regime-types are derived from them.\textsuperscript{102} He then argues that the correct regime-type must be one which shares in both of these constitutional forms. It is only by blending monarchy and democracy that a polity may enjoy "freedom and friendship along with wisdom" (ἐλευθερία τ’ ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονίμως).\textsuperscript{103} The combination of the two will result in a constitutional arrangement that does not tend to be extreme. Rather, it appears to be the case that by the mixing of monarchy and democracy into a third regime-type a moderate sort of regime-type will come about.

The Athenian employs the examples of the Persian monarchy and the Athenian democracy to illustrate how each of these regime-types, when taken by themselves, are incorrect constitutional

\textsuperscript{99} Laws, 696d11-e4.
\textsuperscript{100} See, Laws, 697a10-c3.
\textsuperscript{101} Laws, 697b1.
\textsuperscript{102} Laws, 693d2-3.
\textsuperscript{103} Laws, 693d8-e1.
arrangements which eventually develop into an extreme form of either type. Even though it began well, the Persian monarchy developed into a absolute kingship whose corruption increased over time so that its citizens were deprived of their liberty. The Persian monarchy "destroyed friendship and community in the state" (τὸ φίλον ἀπόλεσαν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει).\textsuperscript{104} The Athenian dismisses the Persian monarchy as "being badly administered at present on account of excessive slavery and despotism" (ὁς ὀφθαλμός τὰ νῦν διοικεῖται διὰ τὴν σφόδρα δουλείαν τε καὶ δεσποτείαν).\textsuperscript{105} The current Athenian democracy is harshly criticized, but for the opposite reason, for possessing an excessive and degenerate kind of freedom. Like the Persian monarchy, the Athenian democracy began well with a spirit of community and a respect and fear of the laws. Eventually, Athens' citizens grew tired of the restraint imposed by the law on their liberty, and as more and more of citizens came to believe that they had "wisdom on all matters" (εἰς πάντα σοφίας), they began to disregard the laws, disobey the authorities, and exhibit a complete and degenerate sort of freedom.\textsuperscript{106} The point that the Athenian is attempting to convey is that an unmixed form of constitutional organization will ultimately decay from being a moderate sort of regime-type to one that is extreme. Despite the fact that both the Persian monarchy and the Athenian democracy began as moderate representatives of their respective regime-types, "each declined when it became an extreme representative of its type."\textsuperscript{107} The Persian monarchy became a regime-type displaying the greatest degree of authoritarianism; the Athenian democracy carried liberty to the extreme.

Since the Persian monarchy and the Athenian democracy represent two extremes of incorrectly organized regimes, neither of which possess freedom, friendship, or wisdom to the

\textsuperscript{104} Laws, 697c9-d1.
\textsuperscript{105} Laws, 698a5-6.
\textsuperscript{106} See, Laws, 701a5-c4.
\textsuperscript{107} Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 239.
proper degree, the correct form of constitutional organization will mix elements from both. That
such a mixed regime-type is possible is due, I believe, to the appeal to what is in due measure.
The blending of the extremes of monarchy and democracy into a third, middle-type, mixed form
in which elements of both extremes participate precisely follows the manner in which the appeal
to what is in due measure operates. Although he makes no attempt to connect the Laws' mixed
regime-type with due measure, Klosko is correct to remark: "Thus, Plato attempts to find a mean
between extremes of arbitrary rulers and an unbridled, tyrannical mob."108 The mixed regime-
type will restrain and balance the extremes of unmixed monarchy and democracy so that the
political community will be governed well, and it will be preserved because it will be stable.
Klosko also rightly points out that the Athenian "never explicitly describes how the two forms are
embodied in Magnesia."109 It appears that we must infer this from the way in which Magnesia's
political institutions are arranged.110 The tendency to absolute authority in a monarchy is
tempered by the idea that there should be popular authority over some aspects of the government,
while excessive democratic liberty is held in check by the higher magistrates whose long terms of
office ensure a certain distancing from and stability against popular expression of will. The
combination of some degree of popular authority with the superior abilities of the higher
magistrates whose use of power is constrained by the law will lead to a political system in which
arbitrary power cannot be wielded by either the masses or their rulers. Each party will act as a
check against potential excesses and abuses by the other.111

108 Ibid., 239.
109 Ibid., 239.
110 The Athenian does, however, comment in respect to the procedures for selecting officials that "The selection made
in this way will be a mean between a monarchic and democratic constitution, which is to keep to the mean that a
constitution always must" (Ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γεγυμένη μέσαι ἐν ἐχθι χωρικής καὶ δημοκρατικής πολιτείας, ἦς
111 It is well to remember that despite its many shortcomings, the Athenian does praise Lacedaemonia's mixed form of
government. The combination of kings, the gerousia, and the ephors "because it was mixed together from what it ought
to be and because is possessed what is in due measure, preserved itself and was the reason for the preservation of
I noted near the beginning of this chapter that the discussion of the mixed regime-type is the only place in the *Laws* where we can clearly see the method of division and blending in operation. Moreover, I examined in Chapter 6 the manner in which division carried out in terms of a standard of measure allows the extremes of monarchy and democracy to be reconciled into what should be considered as the best constitutional arrangement. While there is no need to go over my previous comments, it is worth reiterating, however, that without the appeal to what is in due measure, it would be very difficult for Plato to argue that the best regime-type is one which blends elements from contrary regime-types into a form of constitutional organization in which both contrary types participate. In a sense, this middle, mixed regime-type may be regarded as a moderate sort of regime. It is moderate because it is a mixture of the more moderate qualities of monarchy and democracy which function to keep in balance the tendencies of either individual regime-type to become extreme. By employing the method of division and blending first to separate the types of regimes from one another and then to weigh them against the standard of what a well-governed, moderate regime ought to be, Plato is able to determine that this best regime-type is the one in which the moderate form of monarchy and the moderate form of democracy are mixed together.

The mixed regime-type which the Athenian advocates in Book III of the *Laws* is a constitutional form that is moderate. Unmixed regime-types will fail because, on account of the folly and ignorance present in them, they will over time exhibit extreme degrees of either authoritarianism or freedom. The task of the good law-giver is to ensure that the sort of disease inherent in an unmixed regime-type will not be able to increase so that the political system and its citizens become corrupted or even destroyed. He accomplishes this task by "recognizing what is

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everything else" (ἀναγνωρίζειν τὰ διάφορα). *Laws*, 692a7-b1.

112 See, Chapter 6, figure 8.
in due measure" (γνώντας τὸ μέτρον).

Just as Magnesia's educational program and its legal code depended on the appeal to what is in due measure in order for its citizens to live virtuously, so, too, does the constitutional organization of a polis rely on the same appeal. If the regime-type in which people live, along with the regime's social, cultural, and political institutions, is established in accordance with what is in due measure, then the regime, as well as its citizens, will possess sōphrosunē and live well and happily. The political community and its members will be stable and will be preserved because the sort of folly, or ignorance, that arises in polities which are established and conduct their private and public affairs with the benefit of to metrion will not be present.

The Relationship between Metaphysics and Sōphrosunē in the Laws

Although one can view the Laws principally as a work of practical political philosophy, it is not the case that this dialogue restricts itself solely to matters concerning how one may organize and legislate for a political community. Indeed, Plato continues to display a great concern with metaphysics and theology in the Laws, but not in the sense that the apprehension of a supersensible realm is necessary in order for the individual and the political community to live in a morally virtuous manner. Rather, it appears to be Plato's view that it is sufficient for a human being to be like, or to model oneself after, the divine if one is going to be virtuous. This view represents a significant shift in the manner which he conceives the relationship between metaphysics and moral and political philosophy. Yet, it is a shift which displays a high degree of continuity with Plato's earlier positions on the need for human affairs to be grounded in metaphysical and theological considerations.

113 Laws, 691d4.
Throughout the corpus, Plato holds a fundamental and unshakeable belief that human beings should not be left to themselves to determine their own standard of conduct. It is necessary for human beings to look toward something beyond themselves which provides the standard for the way they ought to live, otherwise, in the absence of this standard, there is the great risk individuals will turn toward his or her own human standard as the ground for regulating their conduct. Human beings must not adhere to the Protagorean doctrine that "of all things man is the measure" (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστίν ἰνθρωπός). For Plato, the measure of all things is god. The sort of relativism entailed by Protagoras' doctrine arguably is something that Plato opposed throughout his philosophical career, and is taken up by Plato for the last time in the Laws.

The alteration in Plato's emphasis from the need to apprehend the supersensible to the emulation of the divine as the as the basis for living virtuously arguably owes its origin to the view that order and harmony in the individual is a reflection of the order and harmony of the cosmos. In the previous chapter, I noted that the idea of a cosmic order was central to Plato's late-period thought. The notion that there is an order to the universe which is shared in by human beings is encountered in the Timaeus, the Statesman, and the Philebus, and it should not be surprising that it is found in the Laws as well. While it is possible to interpret this shift in Plato's late philosophy in several ways, for the purpose of this discussion I would like to regard this change primarily in terms of its possibility of being realized in practice. In accordance with Bobonich's view that in the late works Plato is concerned with demonstrating that large numbers of non-philosophers are capable of living virtuous lives, it seems reasonable to argue that one of the ways in which this could be accomplished is to educate the citizens to recognize that there is a

115 It may not be pressing the point too far to suggest that one of Plato's principal targets in the corpus was Protagorean relativity.
relationship between the human and the divine.\textsuperscript{116} An understanding of the divine and human relationship will enable the citizens to become moderate.

The difficulties in attempting to educate a large number of individuals to apprehend a supersensible realm are daunting, to say the least. As I have discussed previously, it is impracticable that enough individuals will be able to acquire the necessary philosophical skills to do so. Since large numbers of people are incapable of accomplishing this, rulers who are trained in philosophy, or who possesses the expert knowledge of the art of statesmanship, are needed to direct the political and moral lives of those they govern. But the rule by a philosopher-king, or an expert in the art of statesmanship, is also impracticable, since there is very little possibility of this sort of rule ever being brought about in actual practice. It appears, then, that a more reasonable and practicable way in which to arrange a political community so that it and its citizens may live in a morally virtuous manner would be to employ some metaphysical concept that a larger number of individuals would be capable of understanding and putting into practice. This, I believe, is precisely what Plato is attempting to do in the \textit{Laws} where the need to apprehend the supersensible is given less importance than the need to recognize that there is a close relationship between the human and the divine. By being made aware that the human shares in the divine, or that the order of the cosmos is reflected in the human order, and by emulating the divine in one's own life, then it becomes feasible for one to be morally virtuous. In other words, the metaphysical grounding of Plato's middle-period political and moral philosophy which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to bring about in practice, is altered in the late period to take into consideration the possibility that more individuals, not just those who rule over them, must be able to apprehend the ideas upon which their behavior is grounded.

\textsuperscript{116} I should point out that, although I accept the broad implications of Bobonich's position, there are numerous matters of detail in his interpretation with which I disagree, perhaps the most significant being his strong developmentalist view.
Yet, even the grounding of political and moral philosophy in Plato's late-period metaphysics is not easy to realize, and it is for this reason that a political community's social, cultural, political institutions and practices must be arranged in such a manner as to nurture the moral behavior of its citizens. In the *Laws*, it is the task of the knowledgeable legislator to ensure that this arrangement is successfully carried out. We have already examined how Magnesia's educational program and legal code are designed to foster a sense of due measure and *sōphrosunē* in its citizens. It is primarily by means of the virtue of *sōphrosunē* and the appeal to *to metrion* that the Athenian is able to demonstrate the relationship between the human and the divine, as well as the importance of this relationship for human moral conduct, and without which both the citizens and the political community as a whole could become moderate. The principal discussion concerning the relationship between human and divine *sōphrosunē* occurs in Book IV. But before turning to an examination of that passage, it would be helpful to consider briefly the lengthy theological arguments in Book X which deal with the existence of the gods.

The arguments in Book X have been regarded as proof that it was Plato's intention to construct a theocracy. I have already criticized Schofield's view that the "political framework" in which the *Laws*’ political discourse operates is a theocracy.\footnote{Schofield, *Plato*, 311. Although Mayhew does not attempt to argue to the extent that Schofield does in claiming that Plato is attempting to establish a theocracy, he does try to show that Plato's theological proofs are an unsuccessful means by which the citizens can be persuaded to obey the laws. See, Mayhew, "Persuasion and Compulsion in Plato's *Laws*, passim.} It is not the case that Plato is attempting to establish a theocratic form of regime; what he is attempting to establish is a proof that a divine realm does exist, and it would be well for human beings to acknowledge the gods' existence for the sake of their own souls.\footnote{It should be noted that theological arguments precede the laws against impiety. In a sense, these theological proofs function as a preamble, albeit a very lengthy one, to these laws, in that this preamble, just like all the other preambles in Magnesia's legal code, attempts to persuade the citizens as to why they should obey the laws concerning impiety.} Taylor comments: "He [that is, Plato] is convinced that there are certain truths about God which can be strictly demonstrated, and that the denial of these leads}
Specifically, Plato attempts to refute three pernicious views: (1) the gods do not exist; (2) if they do exist, they do not care about human affairs; (3) if they do exist, they can be bought off by gifts. Very briefly stated, the arguments are as follows. The proof of the existence of the gods requires that there be some sort of prime mover, or first principle, which for Plato is the cosmic soul. The proof that this cosmic soul exists allows Plato to prove that the gods exist. Once the gods are proven to exist, then Plato further proves, by making use of the analogy of the craftsman, that the gods do concern themselves with human affairs: as a good craftsman does not neglect any part of his product, so, too, do the gods not neglect human affairs which is one of the products that fall under the gods' domain. The proof that the gods cannot be bought off depends on another analogy: one of the functions of the gods is to be a guardian, and as a good human guardian cannot be bribed, so, too, can the gods not be bribed. Even though, "Plato's arguments throughout this section are weak and beg various questions at issue," they appear to suffice for his purposes.

In Plato's view, these proofs are sufficient to establish three propositions: (1) the cosmos is a rationally organized structure, guided by a cosmic soul which itself is prior to matter; (2) the heavenly bodies, whose motions are not random but rational, are gods; (3) the gods do care for human beings and reward those who are morally virtuous and punish those who are morally vicious, and because the gods themselves are virtuous, they cannot be bought off by sacrifices or prayers. In sum, the theological examination in Book X is designed to demonstrate the connection between the human and the divine. If we can be persuaded that both the universe and

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120 The three arguments are found at, *Laws*, 886e6-899-d3, 899d4-905d1, and 905d1-907b7, respectively.
121 Guthrie notes that the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* is not present in the *Laws*. It is Guthrie's view that the idea of a cosmic soul is adequate for Plato's purposes, since the Book X arguments are not a creation of the cosmos narrative. "For Plato's present argument the primacy and overlordship of a good and intelligent soul are enough." Guthrie, *The Later Plato and the Academy*, 366.
ourselves possess an immortal soul, that the gods exist, that they care for us, that they themselves are good, and that they reward the virtuous and punish the wicked, then there is every reason why we should attempt to live our lives in emulation of the divine pattern. Saunders puts the point thus: "Hence he [that is, Plato] presses theology and religion into the service of the moral, legal, and constitutional orthodoxies of Magnesia. Book X is in fact his most sustained attempt to mold the minds of the Magnesians into the shape he requires."¹²³

In Book IV the Athenian pretends to address a group of newly-arrived colonists in order to persuade them to live in accordance with "divine law" (τοῦ θείου νόμου).¹²⁴ Those who live in this way will be happy, whereas those who turn aside from divine law will be punished and will bring themselves, their households and their polis to ruin. How, then, must one live so that he, his household, and the political community to which he belongs lives well and happily? Clinias provides a part of the answer: "Every man must resolve to keep close company with those who follow the god" (ὁς τῶν συνακολουθησάντων ἐσάμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα).¹²⁵ While it is true to say that a person will live a morally virtuous life if he or she associates with like-minded people, this does not appear to be quite sufficient for Plato's purposes. One will require more than the company of human beings who are alike; one will need to turn to something beyond the merely human. Arguing from the proposition that "like is dear to like when it is in due measure, while what is not in due measure is dear neither to one another or to moderate things" (ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τῷ ὁμοίου ἄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἀμέτρα οὐτε ἀλλήλοις οὐτε τοῖς ἐμμέτρως), the Athenian attempts to link what is in due measure, or what is moderate, with the god.¹²⁶ "In our view, the god above all is the measure of all things" (ὁ δὲ θεὸς

¹²³ Saunders, Plato's Later Political Thought," 479-480.
¹²⁴ See, Laws, 715c7-719e5.
¹²⁵ Laws, 716b8-9.
¹²⁶ Laws, 716c2-4.
It hardly requires comment that this view is the opposite of Protagoras’ doctrine. Yet, it is important to be aware that for Plato it is the divine, not the human, that is the standard against which we measure our conduct.

After the Athenian claims that god is the measure of all things, he makes what I regard to be possibly the most important statement in the *Laws*; a statement which indicates the sort of relationship between the human and the divine that Plato had in mind when composing this dialogue, and which provides a key for understanding the importance of *to metrion* and *sōphrosunē* in the late-period works. Since like is dear to like, then if a person intends to live a morally virtuous life, it is necessary for that person to keep company with the god in order to live this sort of life. "The moderate person among us is dear to god, for he is alike, whereas the immoderate person is unlike and different, as is the unjust person" (ὁ μὲν σόφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ἡμῶς γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σόφρων ἀνόμοιος τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ <ὁ> ἄδικος). The Athenian notes that he believes this to be "the finest and most true of all accounts" (ἀπάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἀληθέστατον ... λόγων). The claim which the Athenian establishes is that the god, who is the measure of all things, is moderate. If, then, the god is both the measure of all things and moderate, it follows that being moderate is in some way connected with being the standard of measure. Arguably, it is plausible to regard this standard of measure as *to metrion*. Since the appeal to what is in due measure demonstrates the manner in which contraries can be weighed and reconciled so that a mean, or middle position, is found in which elements of the contraries participate, then what results from the application of *to metrion* is a mean that is moderate. In

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127 *Laws*, 716c4-5.
128 It is worth reiterating the point that it is arguably less difficult for one to learn to understand this metaphysical concept than it is to apprehend the Forms, particularly in light of the manner in which the educational and political systems of Magnesia are arranged.
129 Arguably, this statement also furnishes a key for understanding the principal aim toward which the *Laws* as a whole is directed: to make human beings moderate so that they may live well and happily.
130 *Laws*, 716d1-3.
131 *Laws*, 716d5-6.
order to know what is moderate, one must also know what is in due measure. The god is the measure of all things because the god knows how to determine the mean between extremes, and therefore the god is moderate.

Thus, if a person is to live virtuously, that is, live in accordance with sōphrosunē and to metrion, then that individual must pattern his or her life on that of the god who is the paradigm of sōphrosunē and to metrion. The consequences of trying to model oneself after the god are great. The morally virtuous individual who lives by keeping close company with the god and acts in accordance with sōphrosunē and to metrion will be happy, whereas as the morally vicious person will have the opposite sort of life. Living a moderate and pious life by honoring the gods, both those of Olympus and those of Hades, as well the gods of the polis and one's ancestral gods, and honoring one's parents are the ways in which one may ensure a blessed, virtuous, and happy life.132

**Equating Sōphrosunē with To Metrion**

In this final section, I should like to examine briefly the idea that in the *Laws* sōphrosunē and to metrion converge in the sense that Plato appears to treat them as functionally equivalent. Sōphrosunē is no longer regarded as an independent virtue that one should possess along with the virtues of wisdom, justice, and courage in order to live well. To metrion is no longer merely the standard against which contraries can be judged and reconciled. Both sōphrosunē and to metrion function in tandem; there is a reciprocal relationship between them. What is in due measure is what the moderate person would choose to do, and a person is moderate because she chooses to do what is in due measure. In other words, a moderate individual cannot choose something lying at the extremes, and what is not in due measure would be something chosen be an immoderate

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person. Some understanding of what is in due measure is necessary in order for a person to be moderate, and a person cannot be moderate without possessing some understanding of what is in due measure.

We have seen that from at least the time of the *Charmides* Plato struggled to define adequately what σοφροσύνη is. The most promising definition offered in this dialogue is that σοφροσύνη is a kind of knowledge of knowledge; a kind of self-knowledge that would enable one to determine correct and incorrect standards of behavior. Although Plato was unable to demonstrate conclusively that this is what σοφροσύνη actually is, because he was unable to determine precisely what this kind of self-knowledge consists in, he did, however, establish that there is an important epistemic component to σοφροσύνη, in that there is a connection between knowledge and virtuous action. In the Republic, σοφροσύνη is treated in a somewhat different manner, but expands on the views expressed in the *Charmides*. In this middle-period dialogue, σοφροσύνη is considered primarily as something which controls the appetites and establishes a sort of order in the soul and in the polis. An individual and a political community will live well if it is kept in a harmonious balance because the possession of σοφροσύνη guides the individual and the polis to the recognition of what is our proper end. Σοφροσύνη will assist reason in directing us toward what is best. The epistemic component of σοφροσύνη will enable one to know that one must "do one's own business" if a person is to be moderate. What is lacking, however, is a standard which would enable a large number of individuals to judge the moral correctness of their choices and actions. To be sure, the Forms, and particularly the Form of the Good, is the standard by which all conduct should be determined, but the full apprehension of this standard is restricted only to those whose have received the proper philosophical training. Arguably, a standard is needed which could be grasped by many individuals, rather than by a select few.

133 See, Chapter 3, for a full discussion concerning the *Charmides* and the *Republic*’s views on σοφροσύνη.
It appears to be the case that this standard is supplied by the appeal to *to metrion*. Although there are hints in the *Republic* that the possession of *sōphrosunē* is somewhat similar to understanding what is in due measure, it is not until the appeal to what is in due measure is established in the *Statesman* that Plato can begin linking *sōphrosunē* and *to metrion*, and thereby opening up the possibility that a greater number of individuals have the opportunity to understand how it is that they ought to live virtuously.\(^\text{134}\) At first, due measure is treated as something that permits the measurement and reconciliation of contraries in respect to some standard. The use of the appeal to what is in due measure is initially demonstrated by Plato in respect to his philosophical method.\(^\text{135}\) The method of division and collection is given a variant form in what I have termed the method of division and blending. Once due measure has been incorporated into his method, Plato then is able to apply it to his practical philosophy, that is, to questions concerning politics and ethics. This application of what is in due measure to politics is clearly shown in the *Statesman* in regard to the manner in which the expert in the art of statesmanship intertwines the disparate character traits of his subjects to form a character who is both moderate and courageous, and in the *Philebus* due measure is applied to ethics in the sense that the appeal to due measure provides a conceptual framework for the determination that the best sort of life is one that is measured and in correct proportion.\(^\text{136}\)

Having established a position on *sōphrosunē*, and having set down the appeal to what is in due measure, it seems reasonable to suggest that at some point Plato would attempt to combine the two for the sake of furnishing the means to a large number of people to be able to know and judge what sort of choices and actions are morally correct. I believe that this is precisely what he does in the *Laws*. Since an understanding of what is in due measure does not require the apprehension

\(^\text{134}\) See, Chapter 5, for my analysis of *to metrion*.
\(^\text{135}\) The use of what is in due measure for *diasēsis* is examined in Chapter 6.
\(^\text{136}\) For an examination of the use of *to metrion* in the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*, see, Chapters 7 and 8, respectively,
of a supersensible realm, and since sōphrosunē can be regarded as the product of knowing what is in due measure, it appears to be the case that the views expressed in the Laws are aimed at the goal of teaching a large number of individuals to know how to act moderately in accordance with what is in due measure. We have seen that in this dialogue the regime-type for which the law-giver legislates, the task of the legislator, Magnesia's educational program, social, cultural, and political institutions, its legal code, and its discussions concerning metaphysics and theology are all designed with this particular end in view: to habituate the citizens to become moderate. Like the god who a morally virtuous person must emulate, the moderate citizen will be moderate precisely on account of the fact that he or she has been educated and habituated to act in accordance with what is in due measure, and understanding how what is in due measure permits one to weigh and determine the contrary things, such as conflicting pleasures and pains, with which one is frequently confronted will enable one to live virtuously and moderately. It is in this sense, then, that in Plato's final work we see a convergence, or functional equivalence, of two of the more important aspects of his philosophy: sōphrosunē and to metrion.
I have attempted to show throughout this study that τὸ μέτρον is fundamentally important for Plato's late-period philosophy. We may best comprehend his late-period views on politics and ethics by considering them in light of what is in due measure. An understanding of due measure permits us to account for the perceived continuity and difference between the dialogues composed in the last twenty or so years of Plato's life and those written during the early and middle periods. Rather than arguing that the late-period works display marked differences in relation to the rest of the corpus, or that these dialogues present Plato's final thoughts on political and moral philosophy, it is more reasonable to regard them as continuing and complementing one another in the search for answers that preoccupied Plato throughout his career as a philosopher concerning the way in which one ought to live.

The manner in which Plato treats the virtue of σοφροσύνη offers an illustration of the sense of continuity which is encountered across the entire corpus. From the Charmides' failed examination of this virtue to the arguments set down in the Laws, the need to live moderately is viewed by Plato as being necessary if one were to live well. The Charmides ends in an aporia because there is an absence of a standard against which we may determine what is correct or incorrect behavior. In the Republic, Plato argues that we could only become morally virtuous if we are able to apprehend the Form of the Good. But this solution is not without its own set of difficulties, especially in the sense that any apprehension of a supersensible realm is confined to those who are trained in philosophy, thereby excluding a large majority of the citizens from being able to live virtuously on their own unless they are given guidance by the Guardians. Once, however, the idea of qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure is posited...
in the Statesman, (and it is well to remember that the establishment of qualitative measurement fulfills the need for an art of measurement first mentioned in the Protagoras), then a standard is set down for determining the type of conduct that would enable individuals to live virtuously without the need to apprehend the Forms. The appeal to due measure then allows Plato to argue in the Philebus that the best sort of life, the life which mixes true pleasure and knowledge, is one that is measured and well-proportioned, or, in other words, it is a life that is moderate. Finally, in the Laws there is a convergence of sōphrosunē and to metrion in the sense that in order to possess sōphrosunē one must recognize what is in due measure, and if one understands what is in due measure then one possesses sōphrosunē. In sum, then, even though we are presented with different views concerning the relationship between sōphrosunē and living well, the fact that Plato kept examining the role which this virtue plays in one's life provides us with the opportunity to observe the manner in which the corpus may be regarded as displaying a sense of continuity.

The sense of difference that we find among Plato's dialogues is demonstrable in respect to the manner in which a work's solutions are either practicable or impracticable. I have argued that the political and moral philosophy of the late-period dialogues is practicable in relation to the impracticability of a middle-period work such as the Republic. While the arguments and solutions given in the Republic are certainly one possible way of addressing the issue of how we may best live, they are impracticable in the sense that they are extremely difficult, if not impossible to realize in practice. In contrast, the arguments and solutions offered in the Statesman, the Philebus, and the Laws, while not altogether easy to bring about, do appear to be practicable, or feasible; there is a greater chance to bring them about. They are practicable because they are grounded in the more readily grasped idea of qualitative measurement and the appeal to what is in due measure, rather than depending on the apprehension of a supersensible realm. Furthermore, we may also see the way in which Plato's solutions differ if we regard them
in terms of who can actually benefit from these solutions. In the case of the Republic's ideal polis, it is arguable that only those of the Guardian-class would be able to understand and receive the full benefit of Plato's views, whereas in both the Philebus and the Laws, the opportunity is given to a larger number of individuals to understand and apply to their own lives the solutions presented by Plato for living well. We need only to recall that the Athenian recommended that the text of the Laws itself should be used as the principal textbook in Magnesia's educational system. Again, it is the understanding of what is in due measure, rather than the apprehension of the Forms, that opens up the possibility that more individuals can learn how to be virtuous. The practicability of his late-period political and moral philosophy and the wider audience for whom Plato intended these works is made possible by grounding his arguments in to metrion.

While the dialogues of Plato present many arguments and solutions, some practicable and some impracticable, concerning the manner in which human beings ought to live for the sake of their immortal souls, it is arguable that among these diverse arguments and solutions the possession and exercise of the virtue of sōphrosunē held a central position in Plato's philosophy. This especially appears to be the case when Plato attempts to demonstrate the connection between the divine order of the cosmos and the order of the human soul. The relationship between sōphrosunē, cosmic order, and human order is perhaps best articulated in the Laws. This relationship indicates that in some manner the universe and the human beings who participate in and mirror the cosmic order are both bound together by sōphrosunē, measure, and proportion. It is the god, the measure of all things, who is moderate. The god is moderate precisely because the god apprehends the manner in which contrary, or opposing, things must be weighed and determined. In effect, it is the god's fundamental quality of sōphrosunē that is the standard against which all things must be measured.
If human beings wish to be moderate and live virtuous lives caring for their souls, then, they, too, must understand how to weigh and determine their choices and actions against some standard of measure. It is, I believe, to metrion that furnishes this standard for human beings. As the god is the standard of moderation, measure, and proportion for the cosmos, what is in due measure is the standard of moderation, measure, and proportion for human beings. If human beings choose to employ due measure to determine the manner in which they may best live, then they emulate the god. And if human beings emulate the god, they will live and act moderately. As the Athenian states in the Laws: "The moderate person is dear to god, for he is alike." This expression, given in Plato's final dialogue, is an apt sentiment with which to conclude a lifetime's search for an answer to the question of how we may best live. Ultimately, the best that we human beings can do in order to live virtuously and well, is to attempt to live our lives in imitation of the divine cosmic order. By living in this manner, we will live moderately and in accordance with what is in due measure, so that not only will we be happy in our earthly existence, but also, and more importantly, our souls will experience their due rewards in the afterlife.

Although I did not discuss the implications of to metrion and sōphrosunē for political and moral philosophy in general, it is perhaps fitting to conclude this study with a few brief remarks concerning their influence and relevance.

The most obvious influence of Plato's views regarding to metrion is on Aristotle. It is arguable that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, set down in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, stems directly from Plato's later philosophy. The doctrine is designed to show what the appropriate virtues and their corresponding vices are, and the manner in which these virtues should be practiced. As such, the doctrine is a key concept in Aristotle's system of ethics. By attaining a

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1 See, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a26-1108b18.
mean (τὸ μέσον) in relation to two extremes in living a virtuous life, an individual is best able to fulfill the function of a human being.² In an argument that echoes Plato's arguments in the Statesman and Philebus, Aristotle defines a mean by demonstrating that of everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take a larger, smaller, or equal part in respect to the whole. The mean will be the point at which the whole is divided into two equal parts. From this basic definition of the mean Aristotle then develops the notion of a relative mean (μέσον ... τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς).³ This relative mean is the central characteristic of the doctrine of the mean, and is Aristotle's most important development of to metrion in Plato. The relative mean is not the same for everyone and cannot be determined as an arithmetical proportion, as in the case of number. The relative mean will be that point which corresponds to an individual's dispositions while avoiding the extremes of excess and deficiency, functioning as a safeguard, or standard, against the extremes which tend to destroy success in any undertaking. It takes into account that each individual is different, having different tendencies and dispositions in his or her emotions and actions, and precisely because of these differences the mean between the extremes regarding emotions and actions will not be the same for each individual.

One additional point must be noted. Aristotle twice states in Book II that virtuous behavior is not simply a matter of attaining a relative mean; rather, the practice of virtue should be directed toward "the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right manner" (τὸ δὴ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὕς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ).⁴ It is by attaining and following a relative mean and employing the mean in the appropriately correct manner that virtue is achieved. Thus, Aristotelian moral practice is a comprehensive plan through which

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² It should be noted that Aristotle generally employs the term τὸ μέσον rather than either τὸ μέτρον or τὸ μέτριον as preferred by Plato.
³ See, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b7.
⁴ Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b21. Very similar language is employed at 1109a28.
persons properly live, directing their lives toward the goal of individual and communal flourishing.

Aristotle's political philosophy also appears to rely on the concept of a mean in the sense that a regime-type should be mixed. This is similar to the sense of due measure as a mixture which was encountered in Plato's positions that the best life was a mixture of true pleasure and knowledge in the *Philebus*, and that the best regime-type was the one that blended elements of monarchy and democracy in the *Laws*. In his discussion of the type of regime organization called polity (πολιτεία), Aristotle remarks that it is a mixing (μιξίς) of oligarchy and democracy, or perhaps more correctly, a mixing of the best elements of each of these regime-types so that a middling constitutional arrangement is produced.\(^5\) He goes on to argue that polity exists in most states in the limited sense that there is an attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich. But in addition to freedom and wealth, there is a third element, namely, excellence or virtue (ἀρετή) which may be mixed in some combination with the other two.\(^6\) A mixture of the poor and rich is a *politeia*, whereas a blend of all three elements constitutes an aristocracy. It would appear, then, that in this passage Aristotle is suggesting that even the manner in which we regard the arrangement of regime-types there is a sense that they owe their arrangement to the way in which they are blended. A regime-type whose mixing pays heed to what is in due measure is one that offers perhaps the best chance for living well in a political community.

The development of Plato's views on what is in due measure in Aristotle's moral and political philosophy represents, I believe, an important step in making more widely accessible a type of philosophy grounded in the practice of virtue for the sake of both individual and collective flourishing, even beyond the steps taken by Plato himself in the *Philebus* and the *Laws*. The

\(^5\) *Politics*, 1293b34.  
\(^6\) *Politics*, 1294a20.
space initially opened up by Plato in his last works is appreciably expanded by Aristotle in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*.

Finally, I would like to conclude with the suggestion that, although there is much to be gained by analyzing the philosophical content of a particular philosopher for the sake of attaining a better understanding of his or her thoughts, it is perhaps even more important and gratifying to be able to determine if any of the ideas contained in the works of older thinkers may still be relevant for contemporary problems. If my overall interpretation is correct, namely, that Plato's late-period thought is grounded in an appeal to what is in due measure and the need for moderation, then we are provided with the possibility that at least this portion of Plato's political and moral philosophy may still be relevant and beneficial for us today. The idea that an appeal to what is in due measure, along with the need for moderation, can in some sense form the core of contemporary political and moral thought may perhaps be valuable. After all, there has been a long tradition, from Plato to Burke, which holds the idea of moderation as its central doctrine. Contemporary philosophers and political theorists could do much worse than to turn toward Plato's views on due measure and moderation. They should engage themselves in discourse with his late-period political and moral philosophy; Plato is a conversation partner from whom we may still have much to learn.
APPENDIX 1

The Notion of "Possibility" in the Republic

In this appendix I list the twenty-two passages which Burnyeat has identified as containing references to the notion of possibility in respect to the political and social programs discussed in the Republic.\(^1\) As I have discussed in the main text, these passages suggest that in some sense Plato did regard his proposals as possible.\(^2\) While there is no doubt that it would be extremely challenging to put these ideas into actual practice, Plato's remarks in regard to their possibility indicate that his proposals were more than merely theoretical constructs; he also appears to have thought that his ideas could be realized. The texts, especially the passage at 472b7-473b9, reveal that Plato did not expect a polis to be established exactly in accordance with his political and social programs. Rather, a good polis could be founded if it approximated the ideals set out in the Republic. Thus, it appears to be the case that Plato considered it possible for practice to follow theory, and some version of kallipolis could be founded.

There are three features to note concerning these passages: (1) their distribution in the Republic; (2) the language used to express the notion of possibility; (3) the topics to which the concept refers. I have set out these characteristics in a summary manner.

I. Distribution of passages containing the notion of possibility according to book:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book I</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book III</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book IV</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book V</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book VI</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^1\) Burnyeat, "Utopia and Fantasy," 301, n. 11. Burnyeat has listed these passages by Stephanus-page section. In more than one case, however, there are multiple mentions of the notion of possibility within the same section. In order to be consistent with Burnyeat's list, and because when the concept of possibility does occur more than once in the same passage it is always in reference to the same topic, I have chosen to regard multiple occurrences in the same passage as one mention of the notion of possibility.

\(^2\) See, Chapter 4.
II. Language used to express the notion of possibility:

δυνατὸν used in 15 passages
οὐκ ἄδυνατον used in 2 passages
no specific word used in 5 passages

III. Principal topics to which the notion of possibility refers:

Nature of a guardian 1 occurrence
Persuasion and education 3 occurrences
for the sake of future generations
Women – their education, holding them and children in common, their suitability to be guardians 9 occurrences
Philosopher-Kings 6 occurrences
Possibility of kallipolis 3 occurrences

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375c6-e6  Context: It seems impossible (ἄδυνατὸν) to discover someone whose nature is a blend of gentleness and spiritedness. Yet, such dispositions may be found in creatures who are likened to the guardian. Therefore, such a disposition is possible and not contrary to nature.

"This, then, I said, is possible"

Τότε μὲν ἄρα, ἑν δὲ ἐγώ, δυνατὸν (375c5)

415c3-d5  Context: Passage in the Myth of the Metals arguing that the sons whose souls are infused with silver of gold, and who are born to those who have bronze or iron in their souls, are to be honored by allowing them the opportunity to become guardians because the state will be overthrown if those who have bronze souls are its guardians. Glaucon cannot see how the immediate generation of
citizens can be persuaded of this tale, but future generations might be able to accept this it. In other words, it is possible to get the people of later generations to believe the myth for their own good and the good of the political community.

"There is no way, he said, that they themselves could; but, nevertheless, their sons and successors and the rest of human beings who will come later"

Ωδαμώς, ἐφη, ὅπως γ’ ἀν αὐτοὶ οὖν ὁμοῖοι τοῖς μένταν οῖς τούτοις ὑεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ’ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὑστέροιν (415c9-d1)

423d2-424b1 Context: In addition to each performing his proper task, education and nurture will make it possible for the polis to become a unity. Furthermore, once a polity starts well, as long as education and nurture are correctly practiced, then even better people will be produced for it in the future. Thus, Socrates assures Adeimantus that if these practices are followed it is possible for the polis to flourish in the long run, becoming better with each succeeding generation.

"The polity, once it starts, if it is set in motion well, will increase as if in a circle; for good nurture and education, when preserved, will produce good natures, and, in turn, useful natures, when they have received this sort of education, grow even better than their ancestors"

πολιτεία ἑάνπερ ἀμαξά ὀρμήσῃ εὖ, ἐρχεται ὑσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη· τροφῇ γὰρ καὶ παιδειας χρηστῇ σφοδροιν θύσεις ἀγαθίας ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ αὖ θύσεις χρηστας τοὑτης παιδείας ἀντιλημβανόμεναι ἐτι βελτίωσ τῶν προτέρων φύσιν (424a5-9)

425d5-e7 Context: Socrates argues that it would not be right to legislate about business transactions and the like. For those who are properly educated will find out these regulations for themselves, provided that the god grants them the preservation of the principal laws. The possibility that the polis can be preserved rests on the citizens' adherence to fundamental legal principles; but if these are neglected the citizens will act like those who are sick, always looking for some remedy that will restore their health. Therefore, the notion of possibility rests on the appropriate education directed toward knowing one's place and task in the political community. There is also the sense that some divine power is required for this to be possible.

"Yes, my friend, I said, if the god grants to them the preservation
of the laws that we discussed previously."

Naí, ὁ φίλε, εἶπον, ἕάν γε θεὸς αὐτῶς διδῷ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων ὁ ἐμπροσθὸς δεῖχλθημεν. (425c3-4)

450c8-e3 Context: In respect to the idea of holding women and children in common, Socrates remarks that it is not easy to explain this because people may not believe that it is possible. Yet, if he could feel certain that he was speaking with knowledge, he would be able to speak securely and confidently. It seems, then, that Socrates' proposal is impossible only for those who do not realize that it is the best way of organizing familial relations.

"For they would not believe that what was said is possible, and even if it could especially come about, that this would be best. … that our argument would not seem to be a mere wish."

Καὶ γὰρ ὁ δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστῶτ' ἂν, καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένετο, ὡς ἀριστ' ἂν εἰ η ταῦτα ... μὴ εὐχῆ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος (450c8-9; 450d1)

452e2-453c7 Context: In regard to the idea that females might be able to share in the same tasks as males, Socrates asks whether or not they should consider these proposals to be possible. Yet, to claim that women can perform the same functions as men appears to contradict the previous claim that each must perform the task that is suited to his or her nature.

"Must we not first agree, then, if these <proposals> are possible or not"

'Αρ' οὔν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἦ οὔ (452e3-4)

456c1-11 Context: In respect to the previous comments, it is asked whether it is possible and best that women become guardians. It is concluded that it is possible since it is in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν). It remains to determine whether this is best as well.

"So, was not our inquiry asking if this was possible and best? It was. And that it was agreed that it is possible? Yes."

Όδοκον ἦ ἐπίσκεψας ἡμῖν ὣν εἰ δυνατὰ τε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγομεν; Ἡν γάρ. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολογήται; Ναί. (456c5-9)
457a-4

Context: It is also concluded that the foregoing arrangement is also best for the polis.

"The law we established for the state not only is possible, but also it is the best."

Ὀὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ ἄριστον πόλει νόμιμον ἐτίθημεν. (457a3-4)

457b-2

Context: The first wave, that is, the notion that women can be educated to become guardians, has been successfully defended. It is both possible and beneficial for the polis that this be so.

"And this argument is in agreement with itself because it claims that <these proposals> are both possible and beneficial?"

ἀλλὰ πη τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὀμολογήσας ὁς δυνατά τε καὶ ὀφέλιμα λέγεις; (457c1-2)

457d-04

Context: Socrates introduces the second wave, the idea that women and children are to be held in common. They must examine whether such an arrangement would be beneficial and possible.

"But I think that there would arise the most dispute about whether it was possible or not."

ἀλλ’ οίμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι (457d8-9)

458a-1

Context: Socrates suggests that they should delay the question of possibility assuming that what is desirable exists, and proceed first to an examination of the arrangements.

"in order not be tired when they deliberate about what is possible or not"

ἴνα μὴ κάμνωσι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή (458a4-5)

458b-7

Context: Again, Socrates suggests that they put off the question of possibility until later, but assume that it is possible.

"I desire to delay and consider later if it is possible, but at present assume that it is possible"
Context: Glaucon agrees with Socrates that women and men should associate with one another in all pursuits. The question still remains whether it is possible to bring this about.

"Does it not remain to determine if this is even possible for human beings, just as it is among other living creatures, that this association can come to be, and in what way it is possible?"

Context: Glaucon reminds Socrates that he was to consider whether such a polity was possible. The things that have been mentioned would be good for their model polis if it came into being in this way. But they must try to be persuaded that it is, in fact, possible.

"That it is possible that this polity can come about, and in what way it is possible. … but now let us try to persuade ourselves that it is possible and in what way it is possible"

Context: This is perhaps the most critical passage in the Republic in respect to the possibility of kallipolis ever coming to be. Socrates reminds Glaucon that they were searching for justice and what sort of person the just individual would be in order to determine if it is possible for them to come into being.

Furthermore, Socrates notes that they were making a theoretical model of a good city, but it would still be worthwhile to examine this model even if it could not come to be. There are, however, conditions under which this sort of polis may be established, but not exactly as constructed in theory. Rather, a polis can come into being that closely resembles their theoretical city. There may one or, at most, a few changes that can be made to existing poleis that would enable them to approximate kallipolis.

"But it is not for the sake of this [i.e., justice], but it is in order to
demonstrate that it is possible for these things to come to be."

"Did we not say that we were making a model in theory of a good city?"

"Do you think that we would be speaking less well for the sake of this if we were unable to demonstrate that it is possible to found a city in the way that was mentioned?"

"To please you, I must be willing to demonstrate especially how and in accordance with what it would be most possible [to establish this polis]."

"Is anything able to be practiced as it has been stated"

"Let us say that what you have ordered has been discovered, namely, that this is possible to come to be."

Context: In order to make this polis possible, Socrates introduces the third and greatest wave, the rule of philosopher-kings. Unless they come to rule, the theoretical city will never come into existence to the fullest extent possible.

"There is one change that seems to me able to be pointed out that would make this change, yet it is neither small nor easy, but it is possible."
"Unless either philosophers rule as kings in the cities, or those who are at present called kings also are able to philosophize genuinely and adequately ... this regime which we have now been describing in theory will never be born to what is possible and or see the light of the sun."

'Εὰν μὴ ... ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἴκανος ... αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία μὴ ποτὲ πρῶτον φύε τε εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ὑδή, ἢν νῦν λόγῳ διελεύθημεν (473c11-d2; 473d6-e1)

485a1-2

Context: The best sort of ruler is the person who possesses the ability to guard the polis and who is keen-sighted, that is, those who have knowledge of what is true. It is necessary for Socrates to discuss the philosophic nature.

"Should we not discuss this, in what way would it be possible that they possess the former and the latter <qualities>?"

Ὁδικαὶ τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τ’ ἐσονται οἱ αὐτοί κάκεινα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; (485a1-2)

499c7-500e3

Context: Socrates is discussing the difficulty of persuading the majority that a philosopher should rule in the city. This task will be difficult, but not impossible. Since a philosopher is concerned with what is divine, he, too, will be as divine as it is possible for a human being to become. The majority will come to realize that what Socrates has been saying is true, and thus they will accept the rule of philosophers.

"For it is not impossible that this comes to be, nor are we speaking about impossibilities."

οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἦμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν (499d4-5)

502a4-c7

Context: If a ruler established the sorts of laws that Socrates has described, it should not prove to be impossible for them to be carried out by the citizens. Yet, the arrangements he has made are best, only if they are possible. Based on all that he has argued, Socrates concludes that although it will be difficult to bring all of this about, nevertheless, it is possible.

"If a ruler established the laws and practices that we have
described, surely it would not be impossible that the citizens would be willing to do them."

"Ἀρχόντως γὰρ ποὺ ... τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἑπτήδευματα ἀπελπισθήμεν, οὐ δὴ ποὺ ἀδύνατον ἐβέλεεν πολεῖν τοὺς πολίτας (502b6-8)

"Now, then, as seems likely, in regard to this legislation we can conclude that what we stated is best, if it comes about, but while it is difficult for it to come to be, it is not, at least, impossible."

"Νῦν δὴ, ὥσε ἔοκεν, συμβαίνει ὡμῶν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἀριστα μὲν εἶναι ἄ λεγωμεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. (502c5-7)

520e1-521a8 Context: Socrates is examining how it will be possible to convince philosophers to accept the burden of ruling. A philosopher who despises the idea of ruling actually is the person best suited to rule, if a well-governed polis is to be possible. He will not refuse this responsibility on account of the education he has received. Glaucon remarks that it is not possible for him to refuse.

"If you can find a way of life that is better than ruling for those who are intending to rule, a polis that is well-governed will become possible for you … but if beggars who hunger after private goods go into public service … [a well-governed polis] is not possible."

εἰ μὲν βίον ἔξευρήσεις ἀμείνο τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς μὲλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἐστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εἰ ποικιλή ... εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πείνωντες ἀγαθῶν ἰδίων ἐτί τὰ δημόσια ἰασιν ... οὐκ ἔστι (520c4-521a6)

540d1-3 Context: Socrates asks Glaucon if the proposals he has made regarding the rule of philosophers are possible.

"Do you agree that what we said regarding the city and regime is not entirely a mere wish, but although it is difficult, it is somehow possible …?"

συγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ πολιτείας μή παντάπωσιν ἡμᾶς εὐχός εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πη (540d1-3)

592a5-592b4 Context: Glaucon is concerned that the person whose soul is well-
balanced will not be willing to take part in politics. Socrates argues that he would be willing in the sort of city they have been founding. This city does not exist on the earth, but only in theory. Thus, Plato appears to deny the possibility of kallipolis ever coming to be. Yet, Socrates immediately remarks that if one desires to follow the pattern laid up in heaven of such a city, regardless of whether it currently exists or will exist, he or she will follow this divine pattern. In other words, the individual will take part in the divine pattern for the sake of both his or her soul and the political community in which he or she lives. It is the practice of justice by the individual that will make possible some sort of approximation of the ideal city in theory.

"But perhaps, I said, there is a pattern laid up in heaven for the person who wishes to look at it, and when he has looked at it, to establish it in himself. And it makes no difference whether it exists or will exist; for he would manage the affairs of this city alone, and no other."

'Αλλ', ἢν δ' ἔγιν, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἰσος παράδειγμα ἀνέκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ἁρᾶν καὶ ἀρώντι έαυτόν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστων εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξει, ἀλλης δὲ οὐδεμᾶς. (592b1-4)
APPENDIX 2

Passages on Measurement in the Statesman and Protagoras

A. Statesman 283c-285c

283c3 Visitor: First, then, let us look at excess and deficiency in general, in order that we may praise or blame in accordance with reason what is said on each occasion at greater length than it ought, as well as the opposite in regard to such sorts of discourses.
Young Socrates: Thus it must be done.
Visitor: If our discussion is about these very things, then I think that we would be doing it correctly.
Young Socrates: What things?
Visitor: About length and shortness, and excess and deficiency in general; for I suppose that the art of measurement is concerned with all these things.
Young Socrates: Yes.
Visitor: Then let us divide it in to two parts; since it is necessary, then, in respect to what we are now striving after.
Young Socrates: Please say in what way to make the division.
Visitor: In this way; one part is according to the association of greatness and smallness in relation to each other, the other part is according to what is the being [that is] necessary for coming-into-being.
Young Socrates: What do you mean?
Visitor: Does it not seem to you that according to nature the larger must be said [to be] larger than nothing other than the smaller, and the smaller, in turn, smaller than nothing other than the larger?
Young Socrates: It seems so to me.
Visitor: What about this? Shall we not also say that there really is a natural excess of what is in due measure, or is exceeded by it, either in words or in deeds, and in which both evils and goods differ most of all among us as well?
Young Socrates: It appears so.
Visitor: It must be laid down that these are two kinds of the great and the small, and there are two ways of distinguishing between them, but not, as we said before, that they must be only in relation to each other, but rather, as we have just now said, that in one way they must be said to be in relation to each other, and in the other way they must be in relation to what is in due measure. Should we wish to learn why?
Young Socrates: Of course.

284a Visitor: If someone will allow that by nature the greater is not in relation to anything other than in relation to the smaller, it will never be in relation to what is in due measure. Or not?
Young Socrates: It would be in this way.
Visitor: Then, with this account would we not destroy the arts themselves and all their products, and moreover, would we not hide from view the art of statesmanship we are now seeking, and the just mentioned art of weaving? For I suppose all such <kinds of expertise> guard against what is more and less than what is in due measure,
not as something that is not, but as something that is difficult in regard to their
practices, and it is in this way, then, by preserving measure, that all good and fine
things are produced.
Young Socrates: What then?
Visitor: So, should we make hidden the art of statesmanship, our inquiry for the
knowledge of kingship will be hard to discover.
Young Socrates: Yes, very much so.
Visitor: So, just as in the case of the sophist we forced there to be that which is not,
since it was in accordance with this that the argument escaped us, so, too, we must
now in turn force the more and less to become measurable not only in relation to each
other, but also in relation to the coming-into-being of what is in due measure. For if
this has not been agreed, then, it is not possible for either the statesman or anyone else
of those who have knowledge of practical matters to come into being indisputably.
Young Socrates: So, we must now above all also do this same thing.
Visitor: This task, Socrates, is even greater than the former one—and yet we
remember how lengthy that one was—but it is also very right to propose something
such as this about these things.
Young Socrates: What?
Visitor: That at some time we shall need what I mentioned just now for the
demonstration of preciseness itself. But in respect to what is presently being shown
well and sufficiently, it seems to me that this argument aids us magnificently, namely,
that we must consider that all the arts similarly exist, and at the same time that larger
and smaller are to be measured not only in relation to each other but also in relation to
the coming-into-being of what is in due measure. For if the latter is the case, then the
former also is the case, and if the former exists, then the latter too exists, but if neither
of them is not the case, then neither of these ever will exist.
Young Socrates: You say this correctly; but what, then, is next?
Visitor: It is clear that we should divide the art of measurement, as we just said, by
cutting it in two in this way, laying down as one part of it all those arts that measure
the number, lengths, depths, breadths, and speeds in relation to what is opposite, and
as the other <part>, all those things that measure in relation to what is in due measure,
what is fitting, what is appropriately timely, what is requisite, and all such things that
are removed from the extremes to the middle.
Young Socrates: Each of the sections you mentioned is also a large one, and they
differ very much from one another.
Visitor: Yes, Socrates, for sometimes many of those who are clever, supposing that
they are declaring something wise, say that the art of measurement concerns
everything that comes into being, which happens to be the very same thing we just
now said. For in a certain way everything that is within the province of art partakes in
measurement; but because people have not been accustomed to consider these things,
by dividing them according to classes, and believing that different sorts of things are
similar, they immediately throw them together into the same <class>; or, in turn, they
do the opposite of this by not dividing other things according to parts, as is proper, but
when someone first perceives an association of pluralities, he should not give up until
he sees in it all the differences, as many as are situated in the classes. And, in turn, the
dissimilarities of every kind, when they are seen in a great number of things, one
should not be able to stop in shame until one has encompassed all related things
within one likeness, having made them a certain class by means of their being. So, let this be enough said about these things and about what is deficient and excessive; and let us keep guard that two kinds of art of measurement have been discovered concerning these things, and let us remember what we say they are.

Young Socrates: We shall remember.

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ΞΕ. Πρῶτον τοίνυν ἰδομεν πᾶσαν τὴν τε ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλαίπην, ἵνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπαινῶμεν καὶ ψέγωμεν τὰ μικρότερα τοῦ δέντος ἐκάστοτε λεγόμενα καὶ τάναντια περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διατριβάς.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὅυκοῦν χρῆ.
ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ τοῦτον αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἢμῖν οἶμαι γιγνόμενος ὀρθῶς ἢν γῆνοιτο.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνον;
ΞΕ. Μήκος τε πέρι καὶ βραχύτητος καὶ πάσης ύπεροχῆς τε καὶ ἐλλείψεως; ἢ γὰρ που μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ ταύτα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Διέλαμβαν τοίνυν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη· δὲὶ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς ὅ νῦν σπειδομεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγοις ἢν τὴν διαφρεσκόν ὅπη.
ΞΕ. Τῇδε· τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλα μεγέθους καὶ συμπέρασμα κοινώνιαν, τὸ δὲ [τὸ] κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαι οὐσίαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;
ΞΕ. Ἀρ᾽ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μεῖζον μηδενὸς ἐτέρου δὲῖ μεῖζον λέγειν ἢ τοῦ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τούτου τοῦ μεῖζονος ἐλαττον, ἄλλου δὲ μηδενός;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦγε.
ΞΕ. Τί δὲ· τὸ τὴν τοῦ μετρίου φύσιν ύπερβάλλον καὶ ύπερβαλλόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτής ἐν λόγοις εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἑργοῖς ἀρ᾽ οὐκ αὖ λέξιμοι ὡς ὑπὸς γιγνόμενον, ἐν ὑ καὶ διαφέρουσι μάλιστα ἢμῶν οἱ τε κακοὶ καὶ [οὶ] ἅγαθοί;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται.
ΞΕ. Διπτάς ἁρὰ ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον, ἄλλ᾽ οὕς ὡς ἐφαμεν ἄρτι πρὸς ἀλληλα μόνον δεῖν, ἄλλ᾽ ὡσπερ νῦν εἰρῆται μᾶλλον τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἀλληλα λεκτέον, τὴν δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον· οὐ δὲ ἔνοικα, μαθεῖν ἀρ᾽ ἄν βουλούμεθα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μή;

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ΞΕ. Εἰ πρὸς μηδὲν ἐτερον τὴν τοῦ μεῖζονος ἐάσσει τις φύσιν ἢ πρὸς τούλαττον, οὐκ ἔσται ποτὲ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον· ἢ γὰρ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὕτως.
ΞΕ. Οὔκοῦν τὰς τέχνας τε αὐτὰς καὶ τάργα αὐτῶν συμπαντα διολογοῦμεν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐπιτυμωμένην νῦν πολιτικὴν καὶ τὴν ῥηθεισον ὑφαντικὴν ἀφανιούμεν;
άπασαι γάρ αἱ τοιαύται ποὺ τὸ τοῦ μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἐλαττὸν οὐχ ὃς ὄκ ὁν ἀλλʼ ὃς ὑπὸ χαλεπὸν περὶ τὰς πράξεις παραφιλάττουσι, καὶ τούτω δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ μέτρον σέξουσαι πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται.

Ν. Σ. Ο. Τι μήν;
Ξ. Ε. Οὐκοῦν ἂν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀφανίσωμεν, ἀποροσ ἡμῖν ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο ἢσται ζήτησις τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης;
Ν. Σ. Ο. Καὶ μάλα.
Ξ. Ε. Πότερον οὖν, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ συστήσῃ προσηναγκάσεμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δὲν, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοῦτο διέφυγον ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, οὕτω καὶ νὰ τὸ πλέον αὐτικ ἐλαττὸν μετρήτα προσηναγκαστέον γίγνεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλημα μοῦν ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν; οὔ γὰρ ὅ δυνατὸν γε οὕτω πολιτικὸν οὗτʼ ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐπιστήμονα ἀναμφιβοθῆτος γεγονόναι τοῦτον μὴ συνυφολογθέντος.
Ν. Σ. Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νὰ ὅτι μάλιστα χρῆ ταῦτὸν ποιεῖν.
Ξ. Ε. Πλέον, ὡΣῷκρατες, ἔτι τότε τὸ ἐργον ἢ ἱεῖν—καίτοι κάκεινον γε μεμήνεθα τὸ μήκος ὄς ἂν—ἀλλʼ ὑποτίθεσθαι μὲν τὸ τοιῶνδε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μάλα δίκαιον.
Ν. Σ. Ο. Τὸ ποιον;
Ξ. Ε. Ὡς ποτε δεῖσε τοῦ νὰ λεχθέντος πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τάκτηρες ἀπόδειξιν. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ νὰ καλὼς καὶ ἰκανῶς δείκνυται, δοκεὶ μοι βοηθεῖν μεγαλοπρεπὸς ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἂρα ἐγχιστέοι ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι, μεῖζον τὰ ἀπὸ καὶ ἐλαττὸν μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλημα μοῦν ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν. τοῦτον τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἐκεῖνα ἔστι, κάκεινον οὐσῶν ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο, μὴ δὲ οὕτως ποτέρον τοῦτον οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἢσται ποτε
Ν. Σ. Ο. Τοῦτο μὲν ὅρθως ἄλλα τὶ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;
Ξ. Ε. Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῦμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικήν, καθάπερ ἐρήθη, ταῦτα δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχυτίτας πρὸς τοῦνατιον μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρὸς καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπωρκίσθη τῶν ἐγχάτων.
Ν. Σ. Ο. Καὶ μέγα γε ἐκάτερον τμῆμα εἶπες, καὶ πολὺ διαφέρον ἄλληλον.
Ξ. Ε. Ὁ γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ὡΣῷκρατες, οἰόμενοι δὴ τὶ σοφὸν φράζειν πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν, ὡς ἂρα μετρητικῆ περὶ πάντ᾽ ἢστι τὰ γιγνόμενα, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ νὰ λεκέθη ὅν τυχανί. μετρήσεως μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὴν τρόπον πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα ἔντεχνα μετείληφεν δίὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐνὶ συνειθίσθαι σκοπεῖν διαιρομένους ταύτα τὸ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα συμβάλλουσιν εὐθὺς εἰς ταῦτὸν ὅμως νομίζαντες, καὶ τοῦνατιον αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ὁρῶν ἑτερα ὡς κατὰ μέρη διαιροῦντες, δέον, ὅταν
... but just like the person who is good at weighing, you place together the pleasures and the pains, both the near and the far, weighing them on the balance scale, and say which of the two is more. For if you weigh pleasures against pleasures, the greater and the more must always be taken; and if pains against pains, the fewer and the smaller; and if pleasures against pains, and if the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the near by the far or the far by the near, you must do that action in which the pleasant is present; but if the pleasures are exceeded by the painful, it must not be done. I should not say that somehow this is otherwise, my friends. For I know that we should not speak otherwise. This was agreed to by Protagoras as well.

Since this is so, I shall say, answer me this. Do things of the same size appear in your sight larger when near, and smaller when far; or do they not?

They will say that they do.

And likewise for what is thick and what is many? And equal sounds are louder when near, but quieter when far away?

They would say yes.

If, then, our faring well depended on this, doing and taking hold of large things, but avoiding and not doing small ones, what would appear as the salvation of our life? The art of measurement or the power of appearance? Does the latter not often make us wander back and forth, to participate in and repent of the same things in actions and in choices of large and small things, whereas the art of measurement would make this appearance powerless, and by making clear the truth, would it make the soul be at rest, abiding in the truth and save our lives? Could people agree in respect to this that it is not any other art than the art of measurement that saves us?

He agreed that it is the art of measurement.

What if the salvation of our life depended on the choice of odd and even, whenever it was necessary to choose correctly the greater and the lesser, either the same kind against itself or one kind against the other, whether it be near or far? What would save our life? Would it not be knowledge? And would it not be some sort of art of measurement, since this is the art of excess and deficiency? And since it is of odd and even, would it be anything other than the art of arithmetic? Would these people agree with us, or not?
It seemed to Protagoras that they would agree.

Well then, my friends; since the salvation of our life appeared to us to depend on the correct choice of pleasure and pain, be they more or fewer, larger or smaller, or farther or nearer, does it not first of all appear to be an art of measurement, an examination of excess and deficiency and equality in relation to one another?

Necessarily.

But since it is measurement, surely, it necessarily is an art and knowledge.

They will agree.

But what this art and knowledge are we shall consider later; but that it is knowledge of some sort suffices for the proof which Protagoras and I must demonstrate in regard to what you had asked us. You asked about it, if you remember, when we agreed with each other that nothing is stronger than knowledge, and that it always, whenever it is present, governs pleasure and everything else; but you then said that pleasure often rules over the person who knows, and since we did not agree with you, you next asked us this: "Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure, what is it, and what do you say it is? Tell us."

If, then, we immediately said that it is ignorance, you would have laughed at us; but if you now laugh at us, you would be laughing at yourselves as well. For you have indeed agreed that those who err in regard to the choice of pleasures and pains, err by the lack of knowledge – that is, both goods and evils – and not only by the lack of knowledge, but also by the lack of that which you previously further agreed is the art of measurement; and surely you yourselves also know that a mistaken act done without knowledge is done in ignorance. So it is this, namely the greatest ignorance, that is being overcome by pleasure, of which Protagoras here claims to be a physician, as well as Prodicus and Hippias; but you, on account of thinking it to be something other than ignorance, neither go yourselves nor send your children to the teachers of these things, these sophists, because it cannot be taught, but since they are troubled about money and do not give it to them, they fare badly in private and in public.

This would be our answer to the many; but I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, along with Protagoras (for let this discussion be common) whether I seem to you to be speaking the truth or whether I am speaking falsely.

It seemed to all of them that what was said was extraordinarily true.

So do you agree, I said, that the pleasant is good and the painful bad. I beg to be excused from Prodicus’ division of names; for whether you say pleasant or delightful or enjoyable, or from whatever way or in whatever manner you take pleasure in naming such things, my dear Prodicus, answer me in respect to what I wish.

Laughing, Prodicus, as well as the others, agreed.

What about this, then, gentlemen, I said. Are not all actions towards living painlessly and pleasantly fine [and beneficial]? And is the fine activity both good and beneficial?

He agreed.

If, then, I said, the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or thinks that other things are better than what he is doing, and possible, will do them, if it is possible to do the better things; being overcome by oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and ruling oneself is nothing other than wisdom.

All agreed.

358a
356b1 ἀγαθὸς ἵσταναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθείς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθείς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἔγγος καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείον ἐστὶν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰστῆς, τὰ μείζον ἢ καὶ πλείον ληπτέᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρά πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἑλάττω καὶ σιμιρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται υπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐὰντε τὰ ἔγγος υπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω υπὸ τῶν ἔγγος, ταύτην τὴν πράξεων πρακτέον ἐν ἢ ἂν ταύτ' ἐνή· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα υπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μὴ πη ἄλλην ἔχει, φαὶνην ἂν, ταῦτα, ὃ ἁνθρωποι; οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουν ἄλλως λέγειν. — Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνοι.

'Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ύμῖν τῇ ὃ ύψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὐ; — Φήσουσιν. — Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτους; καὶ αἱ φωναί <ai> ἵσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζως, πόρρωθεν δὲ σιμιρότερας; — Φαίνει ἄν. — Εἰ οὐν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἢν τὸ εὐ πρᾶττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πρᾶττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σιμιρά καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πρᾶττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἢ ρα γν ὑπερηφανίκη τέχνη ἢ ἦ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἀνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσειν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σιμιρῶν, ἢ δὲ μεταφυσική ἄκυρων μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθῆς ἤσοχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἕχειν τὴν νοσην ὶνουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεὶ καὶ ἔσοειν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἂρ᾽ ἂν ὁμολογοῦντι οἱ ἁνθρωποι πρὸς ταύτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μεταφυσικήν σώζειν ἄν τέχνην ή ἄλλην; — Τὴν μεταφυσικήν, ὁμολογεῖ. — Τὶ δ᾽ εἰ ἐν τῇ τῷ περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτοιι αἱρέσεις ἡμῖν ἂν ἴ (5) σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὅποτε τὸ πλέον ὅρθως ἔδει ἐλέσαται καὶ ὅποτε τὸ ἐλαττον, ἢ ἄυτο πρὸς ἐαυτῷ ἢ τὸ ἐτέρων πρὸς τὸ ἐτέρων, εἰτ᾽ ἔγγος εἰτὲ πόρρω ἐπὶ; τὶ ἂν ἔσωξαν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἂρ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ; καὶ ἂρ᾽ ἂν οὐ μεταφυσική της, ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἀ γνή; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἄρτοιο, ἢρα ἄλλη της ἢ ἀριθμητική; Ὀμολογοῦν τὸν ἡμῖν οἱ ἁνθρωποι ἂν οὐ; — Ἐδοκοῦν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρῳ ὁμολογεῖν. — Εἷν, ὃ ἁνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὥρῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἢ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὐσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζους καὶ σιμιρότερου καὶ πορροτέρου καὶ ἐγγυτέρου, ἢρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μεταφυσική φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὐσα καὶ ἵστητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; — Ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκη. — Ἐπεὶ δὲ μεταφυσική, ἀνάγκη δῆπον τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. — Συμφήσουσιν. — Ἡτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὐτή, εἰς αὕτης σκευόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἁπάντειαν ἢν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν.
κρέττω τλέγεις (διδασκάλους κατεγελκοινωὴ ἐπιστήμης ἔνδεια ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας—ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἁγάθα τε καὶ κακὰ—καὶ ὃν κόσμον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἢς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτὶ ὀμολογήσετε ὅτι μετηκς; ἢ ἐτὶ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πράξεις ἂνεν ἐπιστήμης ἢς που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὧτι ἀμαθία πράπτεται. ὡστε τοὺτ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἦττο εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστῃ, ἢς Πρωταγόρας ἢς φησίν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὧμες δὲ δία τὸ οἰέθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὐτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παιδᾶς παρὰ τοὺς τούτον διάσκαλους τοῦδε τοὺς σωφίστας πέμπετε, ὡς οὔ διδα διάδοκαίνες τοῦδε τοὺς σωφίστας πέμπετε, ὡς οὔ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμοινο τοῦ ἀργυροῦ καὶ οὔ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράπτετε καὶ ἕδικα καὶ δημοσία.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἡμὲν· ὧμας δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, <ὅ> Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε (κοινός γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶν ὧμην ὃς λόγος) πότερον δοκῶ ὧμην ἁλῆθη λέγειν ἢ γεύδεσθαι. — Ὅπερφυῶς εὐδόκει ἄπασιν ἁληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρήμενα. — Ὁ μολογείτε ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν ἢδον ἁγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀναρον κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παρατίθεμαι: εἶτε γὰρ ἢδον εἶτε θερπὸν λέγεις εἶτε χαρτόν, εἶτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὧπος χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομαζὺν, ὃ δὲ λέγετε Πρόδικε, τοῦτο μοι πρὸς ὧθοιμαι ἀπόκριναι. — Γελάσας οὖν ὃς Προδίκος συνειδολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. — Τί δὲ δή, ὃς ἄνδρες, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, τὸ τοιοῦτο; αἱ ἐπὶ τοῦτον πράξεῖς ἄπασιν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλλοῦς ζῆν καὶ ἢδος, ἢρ’ οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὀφέλμοι]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐφιν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ ὀφέλμον; — Συνεδόκει. — Εἰ ἄρα, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, τὸ ἢδον ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν, οὐδὲς οὕτε εἰδῶς οὕτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ ἡ ποιητής, καὶ δυνατά, ἐπειτε ποιητή ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω· οὐδὲ τὸ ἢδον εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἁμαθία, οὐδὲ κρεῖττο ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. — Συνεδόκει πᾶσιν.
APPENDIX 3
Plato's Concept of the Second Sailing

I wish to examine in this appendix Plato's use of the term δευτερος πλος, literally, "second sailing" or "second-best". Plato is the first author in extant Greek literature to use the phrase "second sailing". The expression is employed only three times in the corpus, on each occasion at junctures where it appears that the course of the problem under examination is proving to be fruitless and a new direction is required. It marks a change from one method of inquiry to another which at first seems to be "second-best", but which as the discussion unfolds actually becomes the best way of proceeding.

Chronologically, the first occurrence of the expression is found in the Phaedo. In this passage Socrates tells his listeners that he decided to give up the pursuit of natural philosophy, the investigation of things by means of material elements, to follow a course of examination of the causes of things by means of λογοι. Dissatisfied with Anaxagoras' claim that Mind (νοης) is the cause of all things, but of which he makes no use, Socrates determined it best to introduce a method of his own in his search for causes.

It is arguable that in a general sense the notion of the second sailing is the point from which Plato's two-world metaphysics is launched. Rather than turning to the material explanations of the natural philosophers, the δευτερος πλος marks Plato's turn to an approach consisting in the hypothetical positing of entities located in a supersensible realm. Other, interpretations are possible, both on a general level and in more specific terms. Benardete, for example, argues that the second sailing is a metaphor for Socratic philosophizing. "When the winds fails, the sailor turns to oars. He relies no longer on any help outside himself. Socratic philosophy, as we know

1 Phaedo, 99d1.
it from Plato, is the practice of this so-called second sailing.” Sayre takes a more restricted view of the phrase, arguing that δευτέρος πλοῦς refers to "the hypothetical method itself, which leads to explanation by formal causes.” Kanayama, who also takes the expression as referring to the examination of causes, notes that "second-sailing" proverbially referred to the use of oars rather than sails as a safer way of sea-faring, but not in the sense that rowing is inferior to wind-driven sailing. "Thus, for Socrates the second voyage is never inferior to the first. It is certainly laborious, but the labour [sic] is the price to be paid for safety and steadiness.” In any case, it is clear that the expression connotes some sort of significant change of direction.

The phrase δευτέρος πλοῦς next occurs in the Statesman, where the Elean Visitor argues that the second-best course for those who set down laws is to prohibit anyone from doing anything contrary to the law. According to the Visitor, the first-best way of governing would be expert rule by the statesman without written law, since the statesman, as the Visitor conceives him, possesses the requisite knowledge to govern in the best interests of the governed. But because the best way is impracticable, if not impossible, the second-best method is to establish laws that must be upheld. This argument is reflected in the Laws, which in a sense becomes a justification of the meaning of δευτέρος πλοῦς first articulated in the Statesman. In Book V of the former dialogue,

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2 Seth Benardete, Socrates' Second Sailing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 2. While it is often difficult to understand what Benardete is attempting to convey, it is arguable that the philosophy of the middle-period dialogues is not Socratic in the manner suggested by Benardete's interpretation.

3 Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method, 4, n. 3. Sayre also notes that the use of the phrase "second-best" for the method of hypothesis is ironic in relation to the method of Anaxagoras.

4 While Kanayama is correct to note the origin of the expression "second-sailing", it is well to remember the context in which Socrates uses the phrase in the Phaedo. Socrates makes use of the example of contemplating an eclipse to make a comparison between the first-best way and the second-best, but safer, way. Rather than observing an eclipse directly, which could result in severe damage to the eyes, the second-best and safer way to observe an eclipse is "to contemplate an image of the sun in water or in some such thing" (ἐὰν μὴ ἐν οὐδατὶ ἢ τινι τακούτῳ σκοπῶσι τὴν ἐκλογὰ αὐτοῦ). But Socrates also notes that this analogy perhaps is inadequate; his new method is not a second-best in the sense that it is not like contemplating images instead of contemplating things in themselves. Phaedo, 99d4-100a3.

5 Yahei Kanayama, "The Methodology of the Second Voyage and the Proof of the Soul's Indestructibility in Plato's Phaedo," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 95. Kanayama's suggestion that the way might be more laborious is supported by the "longer way" in the Statesman. See, Statesman, 265a1-5. For the statesman, ruling by law would be more laborious than ruling without law.

6 Statesman, 300c2.
after first articulating what would constitute the ideal or best constitutional form, the Athenian turns to examine "the one that is second" (ἡ μία δευτέρος), but which resembles the ideal. The ensuing discussion reveals that this second-best regime-type – the one for which the Athenian legislates – is, in effect, the best constitution that is practicable; others are either an unattainable ideal or incorrect constitutional forms.

The third appearance of this crucial phrase is found in the *Philebus*, in the context of Protarchus' remark to Socrates that although it is a fine thing (καλὸν) for a wise man to know everything, the second-best alternative is that "he not be ignorant of himself" (μὴ λανθάνειν αὑτὸν αὑτόν). Knowing oneself entails that one is able to judge things correctly in order to live a complete, well-rounded existence. By the conclusion of this dialogue, Socrates and Protarchus agree that a life which blends true pleasure and knowledge against the standard of what is in due measure turns out, after all, to be the most desirable sort of life. As in the *Phaedo* and the *Statesman*, the δευτέρος πλοῦς of the *Philebus* actually turns out to be the first-best way, a way which is more firmly connected to the practical realities encountered in the sensible sphere than to the realities of the supersensible sphere.

It is perfectly reasonable to argue that in the *Phaedo* the expression δευτέρος πλοῦς generally demarcates the point of departure for Plato's two-world metaphysics, or in respect to Plato's philosophical method introduces the method of hypothesis as the best way to test the validity of propositions. But if we consider this phrase in view of its two other occurrences, it is possible to regard the expression in a somewhat different light. Since it is my position that Plato became aware that certain difficulties arose by attempting to ground his middle-period political and moral

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7 *Laws*, 739e1-7.
8 *Philebus*, 19c2-3.
9 It is arguable that the in the *Statesman*, the idea that the second-best way actually is the first-best way has not been demonstrated as clearly as it was in the *Phaedo* and the *Philebus*. The description of the task of the expert in the art of statesmanship in the dialogue's closing pages suggests that he governs without law.
philosophy in his two-world metaphysics, it is arguable that the δεύτερος πλοῦς of the *Statesman* and the *Philebus* marks the inception of a philosophy more concerned with practicability. The ideal rule without law in the *Statesman* and the ideal regime of the *Laws* are, for all intents and purposes, nearly impossible to put into practice. In their arguments both the Elean Visitor and the Athenian Stranger use the expression "second-best", or simply "second", precisely at the point where their arguments shift from considerations of the ideal to a discussion of the practicable.

Although the turn to arguments based on what is practicable may appear to be second-best, that fact that these arguments deal with what is possible suggests that, at least in terms of how we actually live and practice politics, they are in fact our first-best options.

In all three instances where the phrase δεύτερος πλοῦς is used, it is vital to understand that it indicates a change in direction for a discussion that has reached an impasse to a discussion that opens up new avenues for philosophizing. The fact that the phrase is employed in three different dialogues (the *Phaedo*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*), on three different subjects (the best method with which to examine the causes of things, the character of the best sort of rule by law, and the nature of the best sort of life), and by three different characters (Socrates, and the Elean Visitor, and Protarchus) suggests that the use of the phrase is not restricted to a particular context or a particular character. Rather, it is a signal in Plato's philosophical method which is employed regardless of the subject matter or of the character who expresses it. If this analysis is correct, then the expression "second sailing" or "second-best" may be considered as an important concept in Plato's philosophy. In other words, if certain philosophical positions no longer appear tenable, then perhaps a philosopher should set out on a new, second voyage, reconfiguring, where possible, those positions when they are confronted with criticism. It is arguable that this is what Plato is attempting to accomplish in the turn from the middle-period conception of the Good and its relation to moral and political philosophy to the appeal to *to metrion* in the dialogues of the
late period. In the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*, at least, the expression δεύτερος πλοῦς signals a change to a type of political and moral philosophy that, in relation to the political and moral philosophy of the middle-period works, is more possible to realize in practice.
APPENDIX 4

The Identity of the Elean Visitor

In this appendix, I take up the five areas mentioned in Chapter 7, the analysis of which aids in determining that the Elean Visitor is a character created by Plato to advance Plato's own philosophical positions.¹ Contrary to the views of some contemporary Plato scholars, whose interpretations were discussed in Chapter 7, the Visitor should not be regarded as a historical figure whose presence in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* is intended by Plato either to expound some sort of non-Platonic philosophy, or to attempt to refute the philosophy of Socrates.²

1. **Plato's philosophical methods**

Because the philosophical methods underlying Plato's arguments were extensively discussed in Chapter 6, there is little need to repeat what was said there, except perhaps to reiterate that even though the Visitor introduces the method of division and collection in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, this method should not be regarded as being expressed by Plato uniquely through the Visitor. There are three points to consider. First, since there is a logical relation between the method of division and collection and the method of hypothesis, the former method is best viewed as a refinement, or methodological development, of the latter. Second, both methods are utilized by Plato to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for giving an account of a thing. Third, the fact that a variant of the method of division and collection is used in the

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¹ The usual translation of "Eleáð' xévos as Elean (or Eleatic) Stranger is inadequate. Literally, a xenos is a guest-friend, that is, one who is in a relation of reciprocal hospitality with another, and which frequently requires the exchange of gifts. Since the translation "Elean Guest-friend" is awkward in English, I have throughout this study rendered the expression as "Elean Visitor". The word "Visitor" at least conveys an impression of some relation between the characters in these dialogues; a relation which is excluded by use of the term "Stranger".

² I think that it is rather implausible that Plato could have invented two Elean Visitors. The brief comments exchanged by Socrates, Theodorus, and the Visitor at the beginning of the *Statesman* strongly suggest that the *Sophist's* Visitor is the same character that continues the discussion in the *Statesman*. It is well to keep in mind that the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are only the first two parts of what was supposed to be a trilogy of dialogues respectively examining the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. A work on the philosopher does not, of course, exist. See, *Statesman*, 257a1-c9.

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Philebus and the Laws, dialogues almost certainly composed after the Sophist and the Statesman, strongly suggests Plato's on-going effort to employ a logical framework that most effectively aids the dialogue's characters in the search for knowledge. The fundamental agreement between and development of Plato's philosophical methods indicates that there is a logical coherence and very little real distinction between the philosophical methods employed in the middle- and late-period dialogues.

2. To metrion

Again, since to metrion, its relation to the manner in which Plato conceptualized sōphrosunē, and its significance for both Plato's method and political and moral philosophy are the central focus of this study, it is only necessary to note in this appendix the significance of to metrion and cognate conceptions for Plato's thought throughout all three chronological periods. The discussion of due measure which Plato puts into the mouth of the Visitor is similar to his exposition of the method of division and collection. In both cases, the Visitor is not introducing into the Statesman something that is uniquely his own. Rather, the Visitor posits due measure as something that appears to clarify ideas about knowledge and political and moral actions which Plato had been wrestling with from at least the time when the Charmides was composed. What is in due measure is arguably the culmination of Plato's search for a standard in which to ground his arguments concerning method, political theory, and moral philosophy. In view of the fact that there is a sense of continuity extending backward from the Statesman's discussion and use of due measure to the Charmides' and Republic's examinations of sōphrosunē, as well as to the need for an art of measurement mentioned in the Protagoras, and forward to the Philebus' and the Laws' investigations into the best of sort life and the best sort of political community, it is not plausible to maintain that due measure is an innovation of the Visitor. Rather, it is far more the case that the Visitor is setting down in the Statesman a Platonic idea. In other words, the relation between
due measure and cognate concepts strongly suggests that the Visitor is in fact Plato and not a representative of Eleatic philosophy.

3. **Eleatic philosophy**

Perhaps the best way to begin this investigation is to inquire whether the Visitor is indeed portrayed by Plato a follower of the Eleatic school of thought. He is introduced by Theodorus to Socrates as a companion of those who associate with Parmenides and Zeno. Additionally, he is not someone who engages in refutation solely for the sake of winning an argument.³ What, then, makes the Visitor an Eleatic philosopher?

Traditionally, but controversially, the Eleatic school was founded by Xenophanes, who possibly was the major philosophical influence on Parmenides, although it has been plausibly argued that the influence was the other way round. Parmenides, in turn, was the teacher of Zeno.⁴ The central doctrine of Parmenides, and the Eleatics in general, was an ontological monism; essentially there is either a "that-which-is" or a "that-which-is-not"; they could neither simultaneously be, nor could there be a middle position – that is, a coming-into-being from one to another – between "that-which-is" and "that-which-is-not". Zeno supported the position of Parmenides "by the device, not of arguing directly in its favor, but of showing up its contrary as absurd."⁵ His rigid logic and seemingly irresolvable paradoxes presented a serious challenge to Plato, who in the final thirty or so pages of the *Parmenides* attempted to give counter-arguments against them. Zeno's apparently forceful method of argumentation has led commentators such as Miller to regard him as practicing eristics and to assert that the Visitor is the "true heir of

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³ See, *Sophist*, 216a1-4 and 216b5-8.
⁵ Guthrie, *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, 80.
I think Miller overstates his case; a person who practices eristics is solely interested in winning an argument for its own sake, whereas Zeno should be regarded as defending a particular philosophical position in the face of a potentially devastating set of counter-arguments. Zeno, Parmenides, and Plato's Elean Visitor are true philosophers, not eristics.

We should also mention that there is no suggestion in any of the surviving fragments of Eleatic philosophy that it had any concern with political philosophy or the practice of politics. The closest we come to having any knowledge of an Eleatic interest in politics is a remark in Diogenes Laertius, who quoting Speusippus, comments that Parmenides was considered by some to have given Elea some of its laws.\(^7\) There is an additional remark by Plutarch in *Adversus Coloten* that "each of the citizens annually swore to abide by the laws of Parmenides" (ἐκαστὸν ἑνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοῖς πολίταις ἐμμενεῖν τοῖς Παρμενίδου νόμοις).\(^8\) This evidence is too slight and removed in time to be considered as proof of some sort of Eleatic political philosophy. While is always is a hazardous task to offer a conclusion based on an *argumentum e silentio*, it is, however, plausible to argue that if the Eleatic school did hold some sort of views on politics, then we should expect Plato to make known the Elean positions on political philosophy in the *Statesman*.

In light of the principal doctrine of the Eleatic school, is the Visitor depicted by Plato truly one of its members? I think it is difficult to make a convincing case that he is. There are three primary reasons why we should not regard the Visitor as an Eleatic. First, in the *Sophist*, the Visitor sets about refuting "father Parmenides" (πατρὸς Παρμενίδου) fundamental doctrine.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Λέγεται δὲ καὶ νόμους θείναι τοῖς πολίταις, ὧς φησὶ Σπεύδαππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ φιλοσόφων. Diogenes Laertius, IX.23. Also see, Guthrie, *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, 2.

\(^8\) Plutarch, *Adversus Coloten*, 1126a1-1b2.

\(^9\) The refutation of Parmenides begins at, *Sophist*, 241d5.

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Indeed, the Visitor's demonstration that a thing can both "be" and "not-be" is undoubtedly the most important philosophical contribution made in this dialogue. It is hard to imagine why a member of the Eleatic school would refute the central doctrine of his own school while engaging in a discussion with the circle of intellectuals around Socrates and Plato. This is especially the case in view of the need for Plato to show that Parmenides' unity of being was invalid. It was fundamentally necessary for Plato to establish a third ontological category between "that-which-is" and "that-which-is-not" in order to account for the mental state of opinion or belief, a state which is between knowledge and ignorance.10 Second, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Eleatics formulated or engaged in the method of division and collection, or in diairesis of any sort. While this is in itself not a fatal objection to categorizing the Visitor as an Eleatic, the fact that this method is logically related to the philosophical methods used in other dialogues strongly supports the argument that the Visitor was created by Plato to espouse the views of the Academy rather than those of the Eleatic school. Third, as was just mentioned, although a significant portion of the Statesman is concerned with questions of politics, the sources indicate that the Eleatics disregarded this branch of philosophy. The refutation of Parmenides, the use of the method of division and collection, and the lack of any Eleatic political philosophy raise serious doubts about the degree to which the Visitor actually was an Eleatic philosopher, much less Miller's "true heir of Parmenides".

But if the Elean Visitor is not an Eleatic philosopher, we are confronted with the question why did Plato choose to represent him as such? The above examination suggests that the Visitor is more Platonic than Eleatic. Why, then, should Plato not have made these arguments in his own voice, or at least in the voice of someone known to be closely associated with him? Ultimately, I believe that any answers to these questions can only be speculative, but nevertheless, I shall

10 See, Republic, 479d6-8, and Guthrie, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus, 74-75.
attempt to suggest an answer that may strike the reader as containing some measure of plausibility. There are two parts to my response. First, it is necessary to make some remarks on the role of Socrates in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Since Plato chose not to speak in his own voice, the arguments advanced in the dialogues are always entrusted to other characters, particularly Socrates. We also know that in the works of the late period, with the exception of the *Philebus*, the figure of Socrates recedes into the background. One way to account for this change is to note that the late-period dialogues articulate a philosophy which can no longer be considered as Socratic, although Socratic elements are present in them.\(^{11}\) It would seem unlikely that the methodological and ontological arguments of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* could effectively be seen as representing the views of Socrates. His presence, but lack of participation, in these two works could be regarded as indicating a respective silence while listening to arguments which go beyond his own philosophy, but which are not fundamentally discordant with his views. While Miller's suggestion that Plato is putting members of "the Academy on stage before itself" is intriguing, there is a different way to interpret Socrates' lack of participation.\(^{12}\) Given that the dramatic date of the these two works is just before Socrates' trial in 399, we do not need to resort to the suggestion that it is members of the Academy on stage in front of Socrates, rather, it is perhaps just one member – Plato – who is demonstrating, at the last possible moment before the execution of his mentor and friend, the manner in which he developed the teachings of Socrates.\(^{13}\) The lack of participation on the part of Socrates may be read as his silent approval of his student's exposition.

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\(^{11}\) The distinction between what is Socratic and what is Platonic in the dialogues is notoriously difficult to disentangle, and I shall not attempt to do so. It is however, fairly safe to say that in the late works the metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological arguments are at a remove from what is known of the historical Socrates.


\(^{13}\) I am not claiming that the philosophy of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* represents Plato's thoughts in 399, rather I am suggesting that Plato has projected his more mature philosophy roughly thirty-five years back in time to the last opportunity he could have had to speak with Socrates himself.
Second, because Plato refuses to speak in the first person, it follows that his arguments need to be expressed by some other voice or school, as well as in a voice which has some relation to the arguments being made. Besides the Eleatics, what other choices would have been available to Plato? Certainly not Anaxagoras; Socrates had previously repudiated his teachings in the Phaedo.\textsuperscript{14} Not the Pythagoreans; even though Plato was influenced by Pythagorean mysticism and mathematics, the subject matter of the Sophist and the Statesman have nothing to do with this school. Even less a possibility would be Heraclitus, since it is arguable that one of the central concerns of Platonic philosophy was to argue against the Heraclitean notion of ceaseless change. The same is true of Protagoras; much of Plato's thought was directed at Protagorean relativism. The doctrines of the Atomists, such as those of Democritus and Leucippus, are irrelevant for the two dialogues we are considering, not to mention that Plato himself was influenced by this school as is apparent in the Timaeus. What remains is the school of Parmenides whose philosophy Plato respected (as allusions in the Republic and Timaeus would suggest), and which needed to be refuted by Plato if his own philosophy were to have any validity.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, the refutation of the Eleatics would appear to possess a greater force if it was delivered by a member of their own school in the person of the Elean Visitor, rather than from a position outside of it. The Visitor, then, is dramatically and philosophically employed by Plato to articulate the latter's own thought while simultaneously refuting an ontological view which was potentially devastating to Plato's philosophy.

In sum, then, the Elean Visitor does not appear to be depicted as a representative of Eleatic philosophy. His arguments, as far as can be determined, do not espouse Eleatic views. His refutation of Parmenides' ontology suggests that he serves the requirements of Plato far more than

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[14]{See, Phaedo, 97b8-99d2.}
\footnotetext[15]{See, for example, the Parmenidean language and thought at Republic, 477b4-9 and 508d3-9, and at Timaeus, 27d5-28a7.}
\end{footnotesize}
those of the school to which he ostensibly belongs. He functions more as a representative of Plato by setting out what should be regarded as Plato's mature thought.

4. Familiar concepts

In this section, I should like to discuss five concepts that are employed by the Visitor which are familiar from other dialogues: expert knowledge; craft analogies; regime types; myth; paradigms.

A. Expert knowledge. The Visitor begins his discussion with Young Socrates by asking whether they must posit (θετέον) that the statesman (τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν) is one who possesses expert knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The craft, or art, (τέχνη) of kingly rule (βασιλική) will be one which is grounded in such expert knowledge. The notion of ἐπιστήμη is retained throughout the divisions of the Statesman; it is a fundamental notion underlying the attempt to define the statesman. Moreover, the concept of expert knowledge as the basis for the correct practice of any craft is encountered throughout the dialogues. A person cannot be said to practice a craft correctly without possessing expert knowledge of the craft. A τέχνη is only such if its practitioner has the requisite ἐπιστήμη of that craft. This is made plain in the attempt to define the angler in the Sophist. The craft of angling is defined in terms of the expertise needed by the angler to practice his craft correctly. The possession of expert knowledge implies a degree of exclusivity; there are far fewer individuals who possess the expert knowledge of a given craft than those who do not. In the Statesman, for example, it is argued that a multitude (πληθος) in a polis does not possess expert knowledge to the degree which the expert in kingly rule must possess it.

Similarly, we encounter in other dialogues the notion that expert knowledge is necessary for a craft. A physician cannot correctly practice medicine without expert knowledge of the art of

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16 See, Statesman, 258b3-5.
17 See, Sophist, 218e2-221c3.
18 See, Statesman, 292e6-293a1.
medicine; the builder cannot construct a proper dwelling without the knowledge appropriate to building; a pilot could not captain a ship well unless he had the correct knowledge of the craft of piloting. Additionally, expert knowledge as applicable to the art of politics is a concept found in Plato's other political works. In the *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates argues that craftsmen, guided by their knowledge, set things in a certain organization, compelling one thing to be suited for another and to fit together with it until the entire object is arranged in a certain organization (τάξις) and order (κόσμος). One who does not have this knowledge cannot know what is suitable or fitting to be done; the product of non-expert knowledge cannot be a good one, rather it would be disorganized.¹⁹

There are serious consequences for politics and for the care of the soul. Just as experts in construction and ship-building are called upon by the assembly to give guidance for public projects, so, too, are experts in the care of the soul needed to make the citizens better.²⁰ In the *Republic*, expert knowledge is of fundamental importance for ruling the polis; only the philosopher-kings, because of the expertise they possess, should be entrusted with political rule.

Rowe comments that, "The *Politicus* argues as single-mindedly for the rule of the expert as did the *Republic.*"²¹ In the same vein, Lane argues that, "After all, that politics is an art (τέχνη) requiring knowledge is as fundamental to the *Republic* as to the *Statesman.*"²² There appears, then, to be a strong conceptual link concerning the need for ἐπιστήμη across a number of dialogues and for a number of core philosophical issues. The Visitor's employment of the concept is not unique; Plato simply has him make use of a concept which is central in Plato's thought.

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¹⁹ See, *Gorgias*, 503e4-504b5. The form of the argument is this: Any $x$ will be good if and only if it is organized and has the order proper to itself. See, Gómez-Lobo, *The Foundations of Socratic Ethics*, 105.
²¹ Rowe, "The *Politicus*: Structure and Form," 158.
B. Craft analogies. It is a commonplace to say that the craft analogy appears throughout the
dialogues from the early Socratic works to those of the late period. The Visitor, no less than
Socrates, relies on the analogy with a craft for the purpose of inducting from a set of particular
cases or examples (most often three) to a generalization. The favored analogies used by the
Visitor are those of the builder (τεκτωνικός), the physician (ἰατρός), the gymnastic trainer
(γυμναστής), and the pilot (κυβερνήτης). The Visitor uses these analogies not only as an aid for
determining the proper place at which to make a division; they also figure prominently as the
basis of his discussion for the rule of law.23 Perhaps, most importantly, is the division and
analysis of the craft of the weaver (ὑφαντικός), a paradigmatic analogy for the role and function
of the statesman.24 As the craft of kingly rule weaves together the diverse characters of the
citizens, so, too, does the craft of weaving blend the warp and woof of a fabric; a well-woven
garment is analogous to a well-woven polis.25 The use of craft analogies in the Statesman which
accord with their utilization throughout the Plato's writings suggests a continuity and
 correspondence with a particular mode of thinking and arguing which is central in Plato's
philosophy. To put it differently, given Plato's unquestioned literary skill, one should think that if
the Visitor was intended to represent a position different than that of Plato's, or a point of view
from outside the circle of the Academy, then either different types or analogies could have been
employed, or, better still, the analogical method could have been dispensed with altogether.
C. Regime types. There is a consistency in the Visitor's discussion of regime-types with those
encountered in the Republic and the Laws. In all three dialogues political constitutions are
arranged in a similar taxonomy. There are five (or seven, if we count expert kingly rule and a

23 For example, crafts are mentioned at the start of the first division at Statesman, 258d8; the reference to physician and
the gymnastic trainer in the discussion of the rule of law is found at 295c1.
24 See, Statesman, 299b2-e5.
25 See, Statesman, 310c7-311a2.
form of degenerate democracy as independent types) regime-types posited by the Visitor, based on either a correct understanding or a debasement of the type – monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and democracy.\textsuperscript{26} This same classification is found in the \textit{Republic} and in the \textit{Laws}. Gill notes the "points of similarity between these three works" in terms of their basic level of political theorizing.\textsuperscript{27} There are also, of course, many differences related to the particular focus of the discussion: the \textit{Republic}'s examination of regime types is related to Plato's conception of human psychology; the examination in the \textit{Statesman} is linked to the need for expert rule; and in the \textit{Laws} as part of the discussion of how to bring about the best practicable regime that blends elements from more than one regime-type. It is important, however, to recognize that, as far as is known, Plato was the first thinker to employ this classification. As I indicated earlier, there is no concern with questions of political thought among the Eleatics, and we would be hard pressed to find any consideration of this branch of philosophy among any of the surviving works of the Presocratics. It would be reasonable to suggest, then, that, given the lack of precedent in Greek thought before Plato, the Visitor's employment of the five regime-types in his argument reflects the political thought of Plato rather than another source. Likewise, the correspondence between the philosopher-king and the expert statesman as a solution to the problem of who is most fitting to govern, seems to indicate a further connection between the \textit{Republic} and the \textit{Statesman}.

D. The use of myth. The Myth of Cosmic Reversal in the \textit{Statesman} occurs at a structurally crucial point in the dialogue.\textsuperscript{28} After reaching an inadequate definition of the statesman as one who cares as a shepherd over a herd, the Visitor suggests that he recount a story (\textit{μυθος}) to see if it will aid them in better defining the expert ruler. The telling of this myth allows the Visitor to put

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Statesman}, 291d1-292a3.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Statesman}, 268e4-274e3.
the division of the statesman back on track. This use of myth corresponds to the manner in which Plato utilizes myth at critical junctures in other dialogues. The three great eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, the myth in Book X of the *Laws*, and the myth told by Protagoras in the *Protagoras* concerning the gifts of the gods to human beings all occur at structurally critical places in their respective dialogues, even if their content differs. The point is that Plato rather frequently in his wrings relied upon the telling of a story as an adjunct and extension to philosophical argument.

The content and analysis of the Myth of Cosmic Reversal is beyond the scope of this appendix, but suffice it to say that commentators have pointed out similarities between it and other myths in the Platonic corpus. Naddaf, for example, has pointed out a degree of uncertainty in Plato's position toward whether or not the universe had or did not have a temporal beginning; an "ambivalent position" that is consistent in the myths of the *Statesman*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*.\(^{29}\) Ferrari has noted that, "In its overall pattern, the cosmic cycle of the *Statesman* is similarly as compromise between reason and necessity," as is the "order of the cosmos and its inhabitants" in the *Timaeus*.\(^{30}\) Finally, Guthrie has demonstrated at least seven correspondences between the *Statesman*'s myth and the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, and *Sophist*.\(^{31}\) More importantly, perhaps, is the underlying Pythagorean influence in the Myth of Cosmic Reversal in the very notion of a cyclic recurrence of historical events. It has been long recognized that one of the major influences on Plato's thought was that of Pythagorean philosophy.\(^{32}\) The appearance of this influence in the myth of the *Statesman* should then come as no surprise if we are willing to allow that the Visitor is, in fact, articulating Plato's own philosophical positions.

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\(^{32}\) Scholars as diverse as Guthrie, Cornford, Brisson, Ferrari, among others have traced both the Pythagorean and Orphic influences on Plato, influences which most typically manifest themselves in the underlying presuppositions of the myths.
E. The role of paradigm. The Visitor remarks to Young Socrates that it is difficult to set out any of the greater things (τι τῶν μεθέξόνων) sufficiently except by using paradigms (μὴ παραδείγμασθαι χρώμενον). Thus, he begins a discussion of the necessity for using paradigms for the apprehension of unknown things. In this sense, a paradigm is an epistemological aid for obtaining knowledge and knowing that we have obtained it. A paradigm can also function as an equivalent for an analogy; the art of weaving is both an analogy for the role of the statesman weaving together the fabric of society and a paradigm of a pattern to be followed. A paradigm in the sense of a pattern to be followed is best seen in the example of the "city in speech" which ends Book IX of the Republic: "perhaps a paradigm is laid up in heaven for the person who wishes to look at it" (ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀρᾶν). Similarly, the definition of the angler in the Sophist functions as a paradigm for the correct manner of carrying out a diairesis. Kato writes: "… in the method of paradeigma we can see the most characteristic thinking of Plato." Both the epistemological and exemplar senses of the term paradigm play a significant role in the philosophy of the middle- and late-period dialogues. In this respect, there is nothing unique to Visitor's use of this concept, rather Plato has the Visitor quite naturally employ this notion as the analysis of the statesman is developed, thereby lending additional support to the hypothesis that the Visitor's positions are not distinct from those of his literary creator, the author of the Statesman.

F. Letters and syllables as epistemological aids. The Visitor makes use of the manner in which children learn their letters to support his position on the use of paradigms. The epistemological type of paradigm in the Statesman – the learning by example through the use of letters and

33 See, Statesman, 277d1-2.
34 Republic, 592b1-2.
36 See, Statesman, 27736-278c1.
syllables – is paralleled in a passage from the *Theaetetus*.\(^{37}\) In both dialogues the use of letters and syllables illustrates the epistemological problem of relating parts to wholes. In the case of the *Theaetetus*, letters must be learned before the syllables that are composed of individual letters can be learned. In order to learn a whole, that is, a syllable, its parts, that is, the individual letters, must first be learned. In the case of the *Statesman*, there is a similar relationship between the learning of individual letters and syllables. By learning how individual letters combine to form certain syllables, the pupil will come to know that a particular syllable stands as a paradigm for all other instances of that syllable. Once the student is able to recognize a particular instance of how parts relate to whole, then the student will be able to see the manner in which a known whole relates to wholes that are unknown. In view of the fact that both Socrates in the *Theaetetus* and the Visitor in the *Statesman* make use of letters and syllables to illustrate the relationship between parts and wholes, as well as the importance of this relationship for knowledge, it is somewhat hard to imagine that it is not Plato's views that are being advanced by both characters.

G. Eugenics. In the *Statesman*, the Visitor institutes what is in effect a eugenics program for the sake of harmony of the polis. The marriage of those who possess excessive courage with those who are too moderate will result in offspring whose dispositions share in both qualities.\(^{38}\) The idea of a eugenics program for the sake of the good of the political community is encountered in the *Republic* as well. Marriages (γάμους) are to be made as sacred as possible (ἰεροίς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μᾶλστα), and these sacred marriages are those that are most beneficial (ὀφελμόστατοι) for the political community. As in the case of the breeding of hunting dogs and fighting birds, the social organization of *kallipolis* is to be arranged so that the best men mate as often as possible with the best women in order to produce the best offspring. The opposite is the case for men and women

\(^{37}\) See, *Theaetetus*, 202e3-203e5. The relationship between letters and syllables is a particular example of the general problem of the relationship between parts and wholes.

\(^{38}\) See, *Statesman*, 310c9-311a2.
of an inferior nature. Although the eugenics programs of the Republic and the Statesman differ somewhat in the manner in which the citizens ought to be married or mated, both dialogues, nevertheless, advocate the view that only citizens of a certain type of disposition should be married or mated with each other in order to ensure the establishment of a certain concord and stability for the political community. As is the case in the other familiar concepts I have discussed, the need for some sort of eugenics program is not a concept unique to the Visitor in the Statesmen. Rather, this concept appears to be central component in Plato’s views on how a polis can attain harmony and thereby preserve itself.

5. Unusual words and phrases

A. μετεωρολόγος, μετεωροστόπος. In the Statesman, the Visitor employs the word μετεωρολόγος (one who talks of heavenly bodies) in reference to those who disobey the laws by attempting to investigate matters concerning the crafts (τέχνα) contrary to the prohibition set down by the laws. Those who are clever in speculating (σοφιζόμενος) about crafts such as navigation and medicine are not to considered as possessing the appropriate skills, rather they are to be called a μετεωρολόγος, or a stargazer, "some sort of sophistic babbler" (ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν). One who talks about or gazes upon the stars is considered to resemble a person who chatters about things which are of no concern to the community. In other words, by violating the law prohibiting inquiry, the offender makes himself useless to his fellow citizens. The Visitor goes on to argue that should someone continue in this practice, he will be brought to trial for corrupting the young (διαφθειρόντα ἄλλους νεοτέρους) by encouraging them to inquiry into the crafts in opposition to the laws.

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39 See, Republic, 458e3–459e4. Also see Plato's discussion about the relationship between geometrical number and the conceiving of children at, Republic, 546a1–547a6. The breeding of inferior offspring will lead to civil war.
40 See, Statesman, 299b7
41 See, Statesman, 299b8-9.
Besides the obvious reference to one of the charges brought against Socrates in the *Apology*, the use of the word *μετεωρολόγος* is of some significance. The word is quite rare in Plato, being used only three times; once in the *Statesman* and twice in the *Cratylus*. The first use of the word in the *Cratylus* concerns what the astronomers (*μετεωρολόγοι*) say in respect to the acquisition of a pure mind (*τῶν καθαρῶν νοῶν*) which results from looking at the things in the heavens. The second instance is found in a passage where Socrates tells Hermogenes that those who first gave names to the gods were not inferior persons (*φαίλοι*), but were *μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές*, certain individuals who talked about things in the heavens and who talked at length. It appears, from these three uses of the word *μετεωρολόγος*, that Plato intended to refer to a type of person whose gaze was fixed on things beyond the mundane. From Plato's philosophical perspective, a *μετεωρολόγος* is one who gazes upon what is true and real, whereas from the opposite, non-philosophical perspective, that is, the perspective of the common people, one who talks about the heavens is viewed as engaging in a useless task and babbling.

This interpretation is corroborated by the Parable of the Pilot in Book VI of the *Republic*. In this passage, Plato uses a cognate word, *μετεωροσκόπος* – a stargazer, as well as the term ἀδολέσχης, to denote the person who is the true pilot (*ἄληθῶς κυβερνητικόν*), even though the many consider him to be a stargazer and babbler in the same negative sense he is regarded in the *Statesman*. We should also point out that the word *μετεωροσκόπος* not only is unique to Plato, but also that this is its sole use in the entire Platonic corpus. This suggests that Plato attaches a rather high degree of significance to the word and the concept which it connotes. Given the

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42 Indeed, it has often been remarked that the passage from 299b2-e5 echoes the charges and trial against Socrates. Even the response of Young Socrates that if expert knowledge were completely destroyed, "life, which is now difficult, would at that time become altogether unlivable" (*ὁ βίος, ἤν καὶ νῦν χαλεπόν, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκέεινον ἄβλιτος γέγονεν* ἂν τὸ παρέκακον), resonates with traces of Socrates' claim at *Apology*, 38a5-6, that the unexamined life is not a life worth living. *Statesman*, 299e9-10.
43 See, *Cratylus*, 396c2.
44 See, *Cratylus*, 401b8.
linguistic connection between \( \mu \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \rho \omicron \omicron \sigma \kappa \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and \( \mu \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \lambda \omicron \omicron \omicron \), the rarity of their use, and the fact that it is Socrates who uses the words in the *Republic* and the *Cratylus*, it should give us pause to wonder why Plato would put the word \( \mu \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \lambda \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and the concept it conveys in the mouth of the Visitor.

B. \( \delta \varepsilon \omicron \tau \varepsilon \rho \omicron \varsigma \plou\varsigma \). The notion of the "second sailing" or "second-best" was examined in Appendix 3, and does not require further analysis. We should recall, however, that Plato was the first author, at least in the body of Greek literature that has come down to us, to use this expression which occurs only three times in the corpus.\(^{46}\) Each time it is employed, it is at critical junctures in the dialogues, in relation to three different subjects, and it is spoken by three different characters.

\(^{46}\) The phrase \( \delta \varepsilon \omicron \tau \varepsilon \rho \omicron \varsigma \plou\varsigma \) is found at *Phaedo*, 99d1, *Statesman*, 300c2, and *Philebus* 19c2-3.
APPENDIX 5

The Athenian Stranger

The Athenian Stranger is generally considered by commentators to be a character created by Plato to set out Plato's own positions. Morrow, who believes that the Athenian is Plato's mouthpiece, writes: "In no other dialogue do we feel less of a dramatic screen between ourselves and Plato."¹ Taylor points out that the Athenian is depicted as possessing some of the experiences that Plato himself had: "... of the Athenian we learn that he has astronomical and mathematical knowledge, is regarded by the others as a highly suitable person to give advice on matters of jurisprudence and political science, and that he has had personal experience of association with a 'tyrant' (711a)."²

It has also been suggested – most recently by Pangle and Benardete – that the Athenian might represent Socrates. Pangle asserts: "In the Laws we learn what Socrates would have said and done if his quest for self-knowledge, and his friendships, had ever allowed him the leisure to engage in giving advice to political reformers – and if he had ever found himself in the appropriate circumstances."³ Pangle's claim appears to be quite in error. Even if we were to grant that Socrates displayed any interest whatsoever in articulating a comprehensive political philosophy (which I do not believe is supported by both the textual and historical evidence), the views that Plato has the Athenian set down in the Laws are far enough removed from the sort of

¹ Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, 74. Morrow also is of the opinion that Plato chose to represent the protagonist of the Laws as an Athenian in order to contrast the Athenian way of life to that of the dialogue's two Dorian characters, Clinias and Meilus. Guthrie, too, holds this view: "[both Clinias and Meilus] are completely overshadowed by the Athenian, Plato's own mouthpiece." Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 324.
² Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 465. Taylor may not be correct in claiming that the Athenian had experience with a tyrant. The text seems ambiguous on this point. "But perhaps you have not observed a city-state governed by a tyrant" (ὁμοιοὶ δὲ πόλεων ἀδικεῖ θεών τηγανωκέμενην πόλιν). While one can infer that the Athenian had direct experience of such a regime, the text does not state specifically that he, in fact, had such experience. Laws, 711b6.
philosophical positions espoused by Socrates in the Socratic dialogues to conclude that the Athenian could not possibly represent Socrates or Socratic political philosophy. As I have attempted to show throughout this study, the political philosophy presented in the Laws is more closely related to that of Plato than to that of Socrates. Pangle's claim that the Athenian presents "what Socrates would have said" is simply not plausible.

Benardete, whose position is more subtly presented than Pangle's, bases his argument on two principal points: (1) on the similarity of a response given by Socrates in the Minos to one given by the Athenian in reference to the relation between Homer and the Cretan tradition; (2) on what appears to be Aristotle's view in Book II of the Politics that Socrates is the main speaker in the Laws. In view of modern scholarship, there appears to be little justification for this claim. Even though the Minos contains similarities to Platonic thought, these similarities seem to be more like imitations of Plato, rather than an authentic work, and consequently, the Minos ought to be regarded as a spurious dialogue. To argue that Aristotle identifies the Athenian with Socrates is simply wrong. While it is true that in the Politics Aristotle abruptly shifts from an examination of Socrates' role in the Republic to a discussion of the Laws, there is no sense that Aristotle is suggesting that Socrates is the speaker in the latter dialogue. Furthermore, the remark made by Aristotle, immediately following this passage, should not be regarded as implying that Socrates is present in the Laws. Aristotle comments: "All the discourses of Socrates are not, then, commonplace" (τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐχων τὰ πάντες οί τῶν Σωκράτους λόγοι). This remark appears to be directed toward all the dialogues in which Socrates appears, not the entire Platonic corpus, and it should not be construed as suggesting that Aristotle believed that Socrates was the

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4 In all fairness, Benardete does not extensively press this claim: "We may take the coincidence [that is, between Socrates in the Minos and the Athenian in the Laws] as a sign of either the spuriousness of the Minos or the casual Aristotelian identification of the Athenian Stranger with Socrates." Seth Benardete, Plato’s Laws: The Discovery of Being (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 5.
5 See, Aristotle, Politics, 1264b28-1265a10.
6 Aristotle, Politics, 1265a11.
principal speaker in the Laws.\textsuperscript{7} In either case, there is no solid ground for claiming that the Athenian might be Socrates.

Rather than merely asserting that the Athenian represents Plato's own positions, a better strategy would be to examine whether there are any similarities between the views expressed by the Athenian and positions encountered elsewhere in the corpus. With this in mind, I should like to discuss briefly eleven topics, examined by the Athenian, that reflect, or parallel, similar examinations in other dialogues.\textsuperscript{8} By so doing, we should be able to confirm, at least to some extent, that the Athenian is, in fact, expressing the views of Plato.

Before examining these particular topics, however, I should like to mention one analysis of the Laws that regards this dialogue as depending on and re-visiting certain positions previously treated by Plato in the Republic. According to Shorey, if we view the Laws as a whole, many ideas recur in the Laws that were initially articulated in the Republic.\textsuperscript{9} It is well to keep in mind that Shorey's arguments about the relation of the Laws to the Republic are made within the context of establishing a sense of unity and coherence in respect to both the Laws itself and to this work's relation to the Platonic corpus. Shorey enumerates nine broadly construed topics for which he sees correspondences between these two dialogues. Among them he includes: "The dependence of all reform on education, and the conception of moral education as the development and inculcation of instinctive right habit and true opinion in relation to pleasure and pain"; "the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[7] For a brief discussion of this passage, see, Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, 323, n. 2.
\item[8] It should be noted that the topics under consideration do not exhaust the list of possible correspondences between the Laws and the rest of the corpus. It also is well worth pointing out that there is a danger in focusing on the similarities, or correspondences, among the positions expressed throughout the corpus, in the sense that in attempting to show any similarities both philosophical and contextual differences tend to be minimized. Since the purpose of this appendix is to examine briefly certain broad topics in which it appears that the Athenian is expressing views that are similar to those made in other dialogues, and is not for the purpose of presenting a detailed analysis of the similarities and differences in regard to these views, I do not believe that the potential risk is too great. Despite the possibility that the distinctions between the expressions of similar positions may be minimized, nevertheless, it is arguable that there is a certain value in attempting to set out broadly some evidence that might allow us to determine with some degree of plausibility the extent to which Plato has the Athenian Stranger speak on Plato's behalf.
\end{footnotes}
determination of morals by mores”; "the anticipation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, and its application to the theory of mixed government."\textsuperscript{10} Although Shorey’s list is valuable, he unfortunately offers very little by way of analysis of these specific cases to support his view that there is a general correspondence between the Republic and the Laws. In fact, it is arguable that Shorey's failure to show adequately the connections between the Republic and the Laws, except on a very superficial level, may be taken as evidence in support of the view that his unitarian position in regard to the corpus is not convincing.

While I am not claiming to prove beyond doubt that the Athenian Stranger is Plato's spokesman, the evidence presented in this appendix should suggest that there are plausible textual reasons for identifying the Athenian as the representative of Plato himself. With the exception the topic of due measure and moderation, I have chosen to discuss the views expressed by the Athenian that reflect those found elsewhere in the corpus in the order in which they are presented in the text of the Laws.

1. Pleasure and pain

Near the beginning of Book II the Athenian states: "educating children consists in correctly disciplining pleasures and pains" (τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν παιδείῶν οὐσῖαν).\textsuperscript{11} From their earliest years children are to be educated to love what ought to be loved and to hate what ought to be hated in respect to pleasure and pain. The concern with the correct relationship between pleasure and pain, and the connection between reason, one's psychological state, and virtue, is a subject frequently discussed in the dialogues, perhaps most notably in the Book IX of the Republic and in the Philebus.\textsuperscript{12} For the Athenian, virtue is "the concord" (ἡ συμφωνία) between reason and our emotional states; for Socrates, in the Philebus, the

\textsuperscript{10} Shorey, “Plato’s Laws and the Unity of Plato’s Thought I,” 359-360.
\textsuperscript{11} Laws, 653c7-8.
\textsuperscript{12} See, Republic, 580d2-588a9 and Philebus, passim.
best life, or the virtuous life, is one in which pleasure, governed by reason, is mixed with
knowledge. In both dialogues the point that is stressed is that it is necessary to find, under the
guidance of reason, a correct proportion between the various sorts of pleasures and pains with
which one is confronted, if one intends to live virtuously and well. The position held by the
Athenian is generally in accord with the views expressed in the *Philebus* on the relationship
between pleasure and pain.

2. Legislation

   In Book IV of the *Laws*, the Athenian discusses the conditions under which a law-giver
establishes laws. Perhaps the greatest difficulty that a legislator faces is that he cannot
universally set down laws; circumstances change according to "chance and opportunity" (τύχη
καὶ καιρός). The Elean Visitor, while discussing the rule of law, makes a similar point: "nothing
in human affairs, as it were, is ever brought to rest" (τὸ μηδὲν ὢς ἔτειν ἐπεὶν ἦπερχίαν
ἄγειν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων), so that it is impossible to legislate for all future cases. The view of the
Athenian appears to mirror clearly that of the Elean Visitor. It would be odd if the views
expressed by two Platonic characters in two different dialogues do not articulate Plato's own
position concerning the view that, since life is unstable and subject to chance, universal, or
comprehensive, legislation is not possible.

3. Expertise

   Directly linked to the above consideration is the notion that to supplement the workings of
chance some person is needed who, by means of his expertise, understands how to carry out his
task correctly. In the case of the *Laws*’ legislator, it is "the art" (ἡ τέχνη) of the law-giver

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13 See, *Laws*, 653a5-c3 and *Philebus*, 63d1-64a5.
14 See, *Laws*, 709a1-d3.
16 Statesman, 294b3-4.
which, by understanding the circumstances for which he is legislating, allows him to set down laws in order for the polis "to live happily" (ἐξοικήςειν). In other words, expertise, or expert knowledge, is required if a law-giver is to legislate well. Similarly, in the Statesman, it is the person who possesses expertise in the art of statesmanship who will know to govern in accordance with his expert knowledge. In both cases, the idea of expertise underlies the task of the legislator and the statesman. Moreover, it hardly requires mentioning that the idea that expert knowledge is necessary for any craft to be practiced well is encountered throughout the Platonic corpus.

4. Persuasion

Persuasion is fundamental to the manner in which the laws function. In Book V the Athenian argues: "The method of these laws will be partly persuasion and partly … by compulsion and chastisement" (τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ ... βία καὶ δίκη κολάζουσα). The law-giver should attempt to bring it about that the citizens "are as easy to persuade as possible toward virtue" (ὁς εὐπειθεστάτους πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι). The idea of persuasion is very frequently encountered in Plato's writings. Throughout the early-period Socratic dialogues, Socrates attempts to persuade, or in turn to be persuaded by, his interlocutors. In the middle period, both the opening and closing of the Republic are concerned with the notion of persuasion. As persuasion seems central to Plato's understanding of how philosophy is correctly practiced, so, too, is persuasion at the core of the Athenian's view of law. Neither the practice of philosophy nor the rule of law can be carried out well in the absence of persuasion: neither dogmatic assertions nor bare laws are sufficient for getting people either to adopt certain

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17 See, Laws, 709c5-d3.
18 See, Statesman, 300c9-d2.
19 See, Laws, 718a5-b5.
21 See, Republic, 327c10-11 and 621c1, respectively.
points of views or to obey the authority of a legal code. It seems to be the case that for Plato, as well as for the character he created, the Athenian, the best way in which one might change one's views or obey the laws is by persuasion, rather than through compulsion.

5. Types of lives

In Book V, the Athenian once again discusses pleasures and pains, but this time in reference to the sort of life that would be best for a human being. An individual should choose the sort of life that will enable him or her "to live as blessedly as possible for a human being" (ζην ὡς οἰῶν τῆς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον μακαριώτατα). The Athenian lists four types of lives that he regards as good: the moderate (σωφρονα), the wise (φρονιμον), the courageous (τὸν ἀνδρείον), the healthy (τὸν ἰγνευνὸν). These good lives are contrasted with four sorts of lives that the Athenian regards as bad: the foolish (ἀφρονα), the cowardly (δειλόν), the licentious (ἀκόλαστον), the diseased (νοσώδη). In the moderate life the pleasures are controlled and outweigh the pains; in the licentious life, the pains exceed the pleasures and are uncontrolled. It appears to be the case that both the idea of dividing lives into types, as well as the notion that the best life is the one which is moderate, reflect the arguments given in the Philebus. That a person should attempt to choose the best type of life in order to live well and virtuously is not a position expressed solely by the Athenian, rather it is an idea that is fundamental to Plato's thought.

6. Purging the polis

Immediately following his discussion concerning the types of lives, the Athenian examines the idea that sometimes a polis, like a herd of animals, must be purged of its ill-bred (ἀγεννή) members, for the sake of ensuring that the political community does not come to any harm from

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22 See, Laws, 732e4-734e2.
23 Laws, 733e2-3.
24 See, Laws, 733e4-6.
25 See, Philebus, 66a4-c6.
those who are unable to live in accordance with the harmony of the polis.\textsuperscript{26} There are two forms of purging the polis; a mild form (ῥάονος) and a harsher form (χαλεπώτερος).\textsuperscript{27} In the mild form of purging, citizens who are inferior are to be moved to a colony in as friendly a manner as possible, while in the harsher form, citizens who are inferior will first be punished, and if this method is unsuccessful, then the incorrigible will either be exiled or put to death. The problems of dealing with society's ill-bred members is one that occupied Plato in both the Republic and the Statesman.\textsuperscript{28} Purging the polis of the incorrigible, by exile or death, is a solution not unique to the Athenian. This is the course of action recommended in the Statesman as well. It seems to have been Plato's belief, in the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws, that a political community could not be secure, stable, and prosperous unless some drastic measures were taken, when necessary, against its most troublesome citizens.

7. Weaving

In this same passage from Book V, the Athenian refers to weaving as an analogy for the relationship between the rulers and their citizens.\textsuperscript{29} Just as the warp must be a superior and stronger material than the woof which is softer and more pliable, so, too, must the polis be woven of a stronger material, the rulers, and a more workable material, the citizens. As the warp and woof are intertwined to produce a complete piece of cloth, so, too, are the stronger and more pliable elements of the polis woven together to produce a well-woven political community. The analogy of weaving was, of course, employed extensively by Plato throughout the Statesman, both as a paradigm for his philosophical method and as an analogy for the task of the statesman. The use of weaving as a paradigm for political practice in both of these dialogues strongly supports the view that it is Plato who is represented by the Athenian Stranger.

\textsuperscript{26} See, Laws, 735a6-736c4.
\textsuperscript{27} See, Laws, 735d3.
\textsuperscript{28} See, Republic, 459e3-7 and Statesman, 309a1-3.
\textsuperscript{29} See, Laws, 734e6-735a6.
8. The types of political communities

The Athenian notes, also in Book V, that they must consider the task of legislation not only in respect to an ideal polis, but also in respect to the "second- and third-best" (δευτέραν και τρίτην) types of political communities as well.\(^{30}\) A polis will almost always fall short of the ideal, so the law-giver needs to consider other less-than-ideal situations. In fact, the polis for which the Athenian does legislate in the Laws is the second-best political community. The distinction between the ideal and what is second-best is frequently made by Plato.\(^{31}\) Plato appears to be well aware that the ideal, or first-best, option is not always possible, and thus tends to direct his examinations toward what is more likely to be the case. In terms of his political philosophy, the notion of the importance of the second-best is made very apparent in the Statesman.\(^{32}\) While the political philosophy of the Republic may be regarded as Plato's ideal case, the fact that both the Statesman and the Laws are primarily concerned with the second-best alternative, suggests that in these two late works Plato is moving toward a political philosophy that is more possible to realize in actual practice. The fact that the Athenian legislates for this second-best polity is evidence that his views are not contrary to those of Plato in terms of the idea of the second-best.

9. Mathematics

Although this topic is not over-emphasized in the Laws, the Athenian does occasionally rely upon mathematical notions to underpin some of his positions. For example, in Book V he insists that the ideal number of households should be precisely 5040; he refers to this number as "suitable" (προσίκοντος).\(^{33}\) While the Athenian does not explicitly state it, there is a sense that he attaches a certain significance to this number, perhaps because it admits the largest number of

\(^{30}\) See, Laws, 739a1-b7.
\(^{31}\) See, for example, the discussion of the notion of the second sailing in Appendix 3.
\(^{32}\) See, Statesman, 300c1-3.
\(^{33}\) See, Laws, 737e1-2.
divisors, fifty-nine, a number which he thinks is suitable for purposes of war and peace, and contributions and distributions. This use of number recalls passages in the Republic where Plato attempts to prove by means of mathematical calculations the number that represents the human cycle of generation, and the relative pleasure of a king and a tyrant. In all three cases, there is an underlying notion that somehow the use of mathematics lends a certain justification when applied to practical matters. Additionally, in Book VII, the Athenian recommends the study of mathematics for those who have the capacity for this sort of higher study. Indeed, the subjects the Athenian recommends for advanced study, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, closely follow the course of education set down for philosophers in Book VII of the Republic. It is not implausible to argue that the emphasis on mathematics in these two dialogues reflects the importance of mathematics as one of the fundamental areas of study in the Academy. Because Plato apparently held the view that a knowledge of pure science was essential for the practice of philosophy, the study of "pure mathematics – the one department of sheer hard thinking which had attained any serious development in the fourth century B.C. – formed the backbone of the curriculum [in the Academy]." If the study of mathematics in the Academy was as important as appears to have been, then it is not difficult to understand why Plato would desire its inclusion in the educational programs of the Republic and the Laws, whether this subject is advocated by Socrates or by the Athenian Stranger.

10. Common education

As Socrates argues in the Republic, the Athenian argues in Book VII of the Laws that males and females are to be given the same education. It is absolutely necessary that the legislator

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34 See, Laws, 738a4-9.
35 See, Republic, 546a1-547a6 and 587d12-e4, respectively.
36 See, Laws, 817e5-818d1.
37 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 5-6.
38 See, Republic, 540c5-9 and Laws 804d6-805b2, respectively.
make certain that both men and women are educated in the same manner in order to ensure that they have a common purpose. A polis in which this does not occur is only "half a polis instead of a whole one" (ἡμίσεως πόλις ἀντὶ δύπλασίας). A law-giver who does not take the common education of males and females into account is guilty of making an "amazing error" (θαυμαστὸν ἀμάρτημα). The fact that the need for education in common is expressed by both Socrates and the Athenian suggests that this topic, too, is one in which two different characters are employed to advance Plato's views.

11. To metrion and sōphrosunē

Since to metrion and sōphrosunē have been investigated extensively throughout this study, and their importance for the Laws was examined in depth in Chapter 9, there is no need to discuss them in this appendix, except to note that in one form or another they appear throughout the entire Platonic corpus. The employment to metrion and sōphrosunē by the Athenian in the Laws should be taken, not as something unique to the Athenian's positions, but as a pair of fundamental ideas running through the whole of Plato's philosophy.

39 Laws, 805a7-8.
40 Laws, 805b1.
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