‘LIBERTÉ, EgalitÉ, FraternitÉ’
AND THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN
UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS

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By

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ABSTRACT

In what follows, I will compare the democracy promotion strategies of Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. I will try to answer why these countries promote democracy in the way they do. My hypothesis is that the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden promote democracy in different ways, and that their different democracy promotion strategies arise from different concepts of democracy. I will end my thesis by considering what these different concepts of democracy might mean for democracy promotion more generally.

The data that I have used in researching this thesis comes from three primary sources: the Foreign Ministry of Lithuania, the United States’ Department of State, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. I have looked at these three agencies’ definitions of democracy and their descriptions of what they are promoting in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. After describing their official democracy promotion strategies, I look at some of their specific projects and at the amounts of money that they have allocated for them in relation to other projects that they support under the umbrella of ‘democracy promotion’. This has enabled me to better understand what these agencies mean when they say that they promote certain aspects of democracy, such as civil society.
or human rights or good governance, and to draw conclusions about both the emphasis that these countries place on these aspects and the concepts of democracy that underlie their democracy promotion efforts.
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INTRODUCTION

2.1. My problem, my hypothesis, and why it matters

In what follows, I will compare the democracy promotion strategies of the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova respectively. I think that the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden promote democracy in different ways, and I want to answer the question why they promote it in the ways they do. My hypothesis is that these three countries promote democracy in different ways because they actually have different concepts of democracy. I will first show how their democracy promotion strategies differ. I will then try to describe their different concepts of democracy. And I will then consider what these different concepts of democracy might mean for democracy promotion more generally.

But why does it matter whether the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden promote democracy in the same way, or whether they have different concepts of democracy? I think that matters for several different reasons.

First, and from a purely scholastic or academic perspective, getting clear about how these three countries promote democracy will allow us to better understand some of the different democracy promotion strategies employed in Eastern European countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Second, the recognition and comparison of these different democracy promotion strategies will allow us to learn the possible ways in which the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden, or other countries for that matter, might coordinate their efforts to promote
democracy—which may, in turn, lead us to revise and improve our current democracy promotion strategies.

Third, the number of countries that promote democracy is on the rise. Several of the new European Union member states, for example, have embarked upon more active democracy promotion efforts since joining the European Union. It may thus be useful for them to have several different models of democracy promotion strategies to consider as they develop their own.

Fourth, democratic Asian countries that want to promote democracy abroad, such as Japan and South Korea, could also benefit from having several different models and a list of strategies from which to choose.

Fifth, different countries may have different reasons for promoting democracy abroad. Understanding the differences in these three countries’ democracy promotion strategies may help us to understand differences in their motivations for promoting democracy in other countries. And this, in turn, may help us to see how these countries understand democracy itself, and whether or to what extent they understand it in the same way.

Finally, but most important, I think that understanding that, and how, and why the democracy promotion strategies of these three countries differ matters because it may show that the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden are actually promoting very different things when they promote democracy.
2.2. A brief history of the theory and practice of democracy promotion

The United States has promoted democracy in foreign countries through much of the 20th century. But democracy promotion has been a significant part of the United States’ foreign policy only since the 1970’s. It is thus a relatively new phenomenon, and it has taken various shapes and forms even during this short period of time. Thomas Carothers\(^1\) describes the rise of democracy promotion in the following way. Democracy promotion began with the United States’ promotion of human rights in the late 70’s under President Carter. President Ronald Reagan not only started to use democracy promotion rhetoric in the 80’s, he also started to institutionalize it through various programs in foreign aid bureaucracy and the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). This began a gradual institutionalization of the United States’ democracy promotion efforts. President George H. W. Bush redefined the course to include not only the promotion but also the consolidation of democracy. He also expanded the United States’ efforts from Central and Eastern Europe to Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Democratic aid, moreover, became one of the four main goals of USAID. President Clinton made a broad-gauged rhetorical commitment to democracy promotion in the 90’s, and he incorporated it into policy effecting countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America. But George W. Bush tied democracy promotion to the war against terrorism after September 11th 2001, and his efforts have thus been characterized by military interventions and by a unique regional focus on the

Middle East. Due to these policies, democracy promotion has lost much of its legitimacy with many people around the world.

2.3. How my thesis fits into the literature about democracy promotion

Despite its short history, democracy promotion has already gone, or at least should have gone, though a paradigm shift, as eloquently described by Carothers in his book *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Carothers criticizes democracy promoters for clinging to a false template about democracy promotion that is specific to the United States. He calls upon them to shrug off this false paradigm, to be more sensitive to local context, and to correct their idea that democratization follows a natural progression toward consolidation.

Carothers has since argued\(^2\) that there has been a diversification of strategies in recent democracy promotion efforts and that this has led to two distinct models of democracy promotion, which he calls the ‘political’ and ‘developmental’ approaches. My master’s thesis will test Carothers’ claims with several case studies. It will also discuss several problems that are found in the literature on democracy, democratization, and democratic nation-building—including the existence of different concepts of democracy—that may influence democracy promotion today.

There is a rich literature distinguishing between different kinds of democracy. n that there are over five hundred, fifty different adjectives that have been used to describe

democracy in the literature. Some social scientists have argued that these five hundred, fifty adjectives all fall under the rubric of five broad categories. But until now, social scientists who have distinguished among different kinds of democracy have generally focused their attention upon non-liberal democratic regimes.

My hypothesis, by contrast, is that different democracy promotion strategies may reveal different concepts of liberal democracy. I thus hope to make a contribution to the literature on democracy and democratization by drawing distinctions among these different concepts.

I have already said that my thesis will test Carothers’ claims with several case studies, and that my hypothesis may reveal several different concepts of liberal democracy. But I also think that my master’s thesis could contribute to the literature in several other ways.

First, my thesis could contribute to the nation-building literature, especially since a series of books by James Dobbins et al. illustrate that democracy promotion is an integral part of nation-building efforts around the world.

Second, Laurynas Jonavicius has done a comparative study of democracy promotion efforts among Eastern European countries, and there is a growing number of articles analyzing Western European democracy promotion efforts. My thesis could contribute to this literature by giving a comparative analysis of democracy promotion efforts in Eastern and Western European states.

Third, one of the newest developments in the democracy promotion literature is the so-called ‘broader democracy project’. The idea behind this strategy is to involve non-
western societies in democracy promotion—or, in other words, to de-link democracy and its promotion from being merely Western European and American projects. My master’s thesis will compare several different western democracy promotion strategies. And I think that it could later be developed to broaden the democracy project by studying the effectiveness of these democracy promotion strategies and their transferability to various Asian countries.

Finally, Larry Diamond and others have recently written about the current recession of democracy that is occurring in many countries around the world, including some of the Eastern European countries that I intend to study. My thesis may provide some insights regarding the causes of this recession, especially if the recession can be traced to democracy promotion strategies.

2.4. Explanation of research techniques and procedures

In this part I will describe the cases that I have selected for my study. I will explain why I have selected the three donor states and the three recipient counties that I have selected. I will also explain the techniques and procedures that I have used to collect data for the thesis.

2.4.1. Case selection

In this study will I present case studies of the United States, Lithuania, Sweden as democracy promotion donor states, and of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as democracy promotion recipient states. By ‘a case’ I mean the democracy promotion strategy of a
specific donor state in a specific recipient state. The case of ‘the United States and Ukraine’, for example, refers to the democracy promotion strategies that the United States uses in Ukraine.

This study is thus based upon nine separate cases, namely, the United States and Ukraine, the United States and Moldova, the United States and Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, Lithuania and Moldova, Lithuania and Belarus, Sweden and Ukraine, Sweden and Moldova, and Sweden and Belarus. I may, however, reduce the number of cases that I present when a specific donor state uses the same democracy promotion strategy in more than one recipient state.

I have chosen to study the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden as donor states for the following reasons. First, I chose to study the United States partly because it is the largest and the most active donor state in Eastern Europe, partly because it has been promoting democracy for the longest time in the region, and partly because democracy promotion was part of the official foreign policy of the United States during the Bush administration. Second, I chose to study Lithuania partly because it has gone through a successful transition from communism to liberal democracy, partly because it just recently started its democracy promotion efforts, and partly because it is active in the three recipient countries that I have chosen to study despite its rather limited budgets and ‘small economic capacity’. Finally, I chose to study Sweden partly because it budgets more money to democracy promotion as part of its overall foreign assistance than any other European Union member state, partly because it is active in all three of the recipient
states that I have chosen to study, and partly because it was my personal experience with the Swedish approach to democracy promotion at donor conferences in Eastern Europe that first led me to think that Sweden, Lithuania, and the United States place different emphases upon different aspects of democracy and are thus promoting somewhat different things when they promote democracy. It seemed to me that Sweden’s approach to democracy promotion placed much greater emphasis on human rights and gender equality than the approach that we were taking in Lithuania. And this made me think more generally about how our approach to democracy promotion differed from that of the United States as well. One of the main purposes of this thesis is to systematically study whether and to what extent these three donor countries actually do place different emphases on different aspects of democracy in their democracy promotion efforts.

I chose to study the neighboring countries of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as recipient states partly because they are most-similar cases. Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus have very similar histories and levels of socio-economic development. But they are—despite their very different levels of liberalization and democratic development—also the only countries in Eastern Europe in which liberal democracy has not taken root since the collapse of the Soviet Union. I also chose to study these three countries because each of the three donor states that I have chosen to study is pursuing democratization efforts in them.
2.4.2. Data Collection

In researching this thesis, I have collected information from the Foreign Ministry of Lithuania, the United States’ Department of State, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—and from conferences on the subject that I have attended at think tanks in Washington DC. These are my primary sources. But I have also collected information from relevant books, journals, magazines, and news reports—both in hard copy and online via the internet. My descriptions of democracy in the recipient countries in my case studies rely heavily upon Freedom House, the CIA World Fact Book, and Transparency International.³ While I am generally concerned with democracy promotion strategies in the twenty-first century, the case selections that I have made for this study have influenced the data that is available. For example, I have focused upon Lithuania only since 2004 because Lithuania began to systematically promote democracy as a part of its foreign policy only after it joined the European Union and NATO in 2004.

The United States, on the other hand, has a long history of promoting democracy that stretches back to at least two World Wars. But the eight years that I have chosen to focus upon coincides with the Bush administration policies toward promoting democracy—which arguably took a rather different form when compared to democracy promotion efforts by the United States more generally.

I should point out that some of the observations, insights, and analyses that I offer in this thesis come directly from personal experiences that I have had while working in the democracy promotion field in Lithuania with countries that were recipients of its aid—including Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus—and that others come from the numerous conversations that I have had about democracy promotion with Lithuanians, Americans, Germans, and Swedes working in the field.

Finally, I will in what follows, describe some of the democracy promotion projects that each of the donor countries is pursuing in each of the recipient countries. Here, it is obvious that the United States sponsors many more democracy promotion projects in each of the three recipient states than Sweden and Lithuania combined, and an exhaustive description of its projects would require a separate thesis twice the length of this one. The Lithuanian democracy promotion projects that I will describe, on the other hand, are Lithuania’s only democracy promotion projects. My purpose in describing these projects, however, is not to give an exhaustive account of what each country is doing, but to focus the spotlight upon the aspects of democracy that they emphasize. My descriptions of the donor countries’ democracy promotion projects are thus intended to illustrate the main emphases behind their democracy promotion efforts.

Here, someone might say that I am using different units of measurement in this study. But the point to be made is that I am not so much comparing units of measurement, as I am proportions of emphasis. I am looking at the emphasis that the democracy promotion

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4 See Appendices 1-3 for a more complete description of the United States’ 2007 democracy promotion projects in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus respectively.
projects of each of the donor countries places on a certain aspect of democracy in relation to other possible aspects of democracy.

Let me illustrate this point. If we were to find, for example, that most of Sweden’s democracy promotion projects emphasize equality, and that few, if any, emphasize good governance, then I would conclude that Sweden associates democracy primarily, if not exclusively, with equality. If, on the other hand, I were to find that the United States emphasizes good governance in most of its democracy promotion projects, and equality in only a few of them, then I would conclude that the United States associates democracy primarily with good governance—even if it actually runs more projects that focus upon equality than Sweden. The claim would not be that Sweden emphasizes equality in its democracy promotion projects and the United States does not, but that the United States places a much greater emphasis upon good governance than upon equality in its own democracy promotion projects, and that Sweden places a much greater emphasis upon equality than upon good governance.

I have, insofar as this is concerned, tried to track the money that each of the donor countries allocates for its democracy promotion projects. This seems like a reasonable way to assess the priority that a donor country places on its projects. But I also recognize that the fact that a country spends more money on a given project does not always mean that it is a higher priority. For it is possible that some more important projects are simply less expensive.
3. RESEARCH FINDINGS

In this section I present my research findings. First I briefly describe the current state of democracy in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 then respectively describe and analyze the United States’, Lithuania’s, and Sweden’s democracy promotion strategies in these countries.

3.1. The Current State of Democracy in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus

3.1.1. Democracy in Ukraine

Ukraine gained its independence and started its transition to democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But its governance was marred by corruption, unreformed state institutions, and scandals regarding privatization until 2004, when the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’\(^5\) brought a pro-Western government to power. This consolidated Ukraine’s long-term foreign policy goal to seek closer ties with the West. But despite high hopes at home and abroad, democracy has not taken hold in Ukraine.\(^6\) And the work of the Ukrainian government has been paralyzed by governmental stalemate for the past several years. First there was political squabbling between President Viktor Yushchenko\(^7\) and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. But Yushchenko and the new Prime Minister, 

\(^5\) Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections were marred by electoral fraud. Freedom House writes that: “Despite the falsification of several million ballots in the first two rounds of the 2004 presidential election, massive citizen protests doomed the attempt at voter fraud and ensured that a democratically elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, would emerge from the process in the third round, which was mandated by Ukraine’s Supreme Court”.

\(^6\) The CSIS report *A Net Assessment of 16 Years of Independence* states that Ukrainians “have developed democratic institutions.” But I disagree because those institutions are excessively corrupt and neither transparent nor accountable.

\(^7\) “Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc led the party-list portion of the March 2002 parliamentary elections, marking the first electoral success for the democratic opposition since independence.” Freedom House.
Yulia Tymoshenko, cannot put aside their personal animosities and political differences long enough to get the government working.

Here, the problem is that the Ukrainian constitution does not clearly stipulate the division of power between the Ukrainian President and the Ukrainian Prime Minister. There are no judicial precedents or guidelines for resolving such disputes. And the result is that Ukraine currently has a fragile coalition government in its executive branch that has been even more weakened, especially in these times of economic crisis, by the recent resignations of its foreign minister and finance minister.\footnote{8 For more see “Ukraine Foreign Minister Sacked.” \textit{New York Times}, March 3, 2009.}

The parliament is not in much better shape. Ukrainians elect four hundred, fifty delegates to the Verkhovna Rada (or Supreme Council) for four-year terms. This is a unicameral parliament. The seats are distributed on the basis of party-list proportional representation by parties that gain at least three percent of the vote. The most recent parliamentary elections in September 2007 were free and fair with the exception of a few minor polling-place violations. So were the previous elections in March 2006. The greater problem, aside from President Yushchenko’s dissolution of the parliament, is that the delegates that are elected to it are neither accountable to the people nor intent upon representing their interests.

This political turmoil in the executive and legislative branches is ultimately due to a very weak rule of law in the country. Corruption is found not only at the highest political levels, it has permeated the entire Ukrainian society. Ukraine was ranked 134 out of 180
countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index\textsuperscript{9}. And a recent CSIS report\textsuperscript{10} suggests that judicial reform is badly needed if Ukrainians are to rely upon the judicial system to make fair decisions.

The weakness of the rule of law in Ukraine has hindered its democratic development. In its “Freedom in the World Report-Ukraine (2008)” Freedom House says that “when the interests of oligarchic clans are involved, cronyism and the protection of insider interests prevail,” and that “factory owners are still able to pressure their workers to vote according to the owners’ preferences.” The weakness of its rule of law has also hindered foreign investment in Ukraine—which, in turn, has hindered its democratic development, since foreign investment usually opens closed societies to new ideas. But foreign investment in Ukraine has also been hindered by the political uncertainties posed by Russia’s attempt to slow Ukraine’s democratic development, especially by manipulating its energy sector, which has resulted in recurring disputes over gas prices and deliveries.

The authors of the CSIS report, among others, argue that there is clearly a need for more transparency and accountability at all levels of the Ukrainian government. But despite these problems, the 2006-2008 Freedom House assessments rated Ukraine as ‘free’. In its report, Freedom House says that “Freedom of Conscience and Religion define religious rights in Ukraine, and these are generally well respected.” It also says that the Ukrainian government “generally respects personal autonomy and privacy, and

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{10}] A Net Assessment of 16 Years of Independence by J. Bugajski, S. Pifer, K. Smith, and C. Wallander.
\end{itemize}
the constitution guarantees individuals the right to own property, to work, and to engage in entrepreneurial activity.” Indeed, Freedom House says that “Ukraine has one of the most vibrant civil societies in the region,” that its “citizens are increasingly taking issues into their own hands, protesting against unwanted construction, and exposing corruption,” that “trade unions function, but strikes and worker protests are infrequent,” and that one of the most positive developments since 2004 has been the growth of increasingly pluralistic media.

The growth of a pluralistic media in Ukraine is a positive development because a pluralistic media has usually been both a sign of democracy and a vehicle for increasing transparency and democratic accountability. But the troubling side of this development is that most of the media in Ukraine is owned by wealthy oligarchs who are intent upon exerting their political influence—and this, of course, all too often translates into biased reporting. It is thus not too surprising that polls show that the Ukrainian people are disappointed with their government and want it to resign.

3.1.2. Democracy in Moldova

Moldova gained its independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It held free and fair elections in 1994. But the Communist Party of Moldova came to power at

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11 Freedom House writes: “Opaque economic control over the press remains in place, which means that media coverage frequently follows the will of a wealthy owner who might at the same time be an influential political figure….. Local governments often control the local media, and journalists who investigate wrongdoing at the local level still face physical intimidation. Local police and prosecutors do not energetically pursue such cases. Journalists frequently lack professionalism and print politically biased information rather than independently checking all the facts.” For more see “Freedom in the World Report-Ukraine (2008).”
the head of a majority coalition in 1998, and then won a landslide victory in 2001 after campaigning to return to Soviet-era living standards. Moldova’s one hundred and one seat unicameral Parliament is elected by proportional representation for four-year terms. The Parliament, and not the public, has elected Moldova’s President to a four-year term since 2000, and his choice for Prime Minister must also be approved by the Parliament. The presidency has nonetheless taken on significant power under Vladimir Voronin. Freedom House says that Moldova’s electoral code is generally sound, despite the fact that certain regulations favor incumbents. But the fact that certain regulations favors incumbents may be part of the reason why the communist party has dominated Moldovan politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union—which is unique in Eastern Europe.

As in Ukraine, corruption is a major problem at all levels of Moldova’s government. Moldova was ranked 109 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index.\textsuperscript{12} Laws that are designed to promote governmental transparency are in place. But the public’s access to information is limited, and this means that the government’s accountability is limited as well. Moldova’s corruption also extends to its courts and judiciary. These are supposed to be independent according to Moldova’s constitution. But Freedom House writes in its “Freedom in the World Report-Moldova (2008)” that “there is evidence of bribery and political influence among judicial and law enforcement officials,” and that “some courts are inefficient and unprofessional, and many rulings are never carried out.” Moldova’s government has initiated a number of

anti-corruption efforts. But even these efforts were corrupt, since they were typically used by sitting Moldovan government officials against their political opponents.\(^{13}\)

The situation with the media is somewhat better. Freedom House reports that the print media present a range of opinions—though it also says that it is not really available in rural areas, despite the fact that only about forty-seven percent of the population live in towns or cities, and that “only the public service broadcasters have national reach.”\(^{14}\) Moldovan journalists still often practice self-censorship because they want to avoid crippling fines, despite the fact that prison sentences for libel were abolished in 2004.\(^{15}\)

The Moldovan government does not restrict internet access, and Moldovan citizens can view websites around the world—provided, of course, that they can access the internet.

With regard to civil society, Moldovan authorities do not restrict academic freedom—though there is widespread bribery in the education system, as there is in Ukraine.

Moldovan citizens, with the possible exception of the Romany community,\(^ {16}\) can also participate freely in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Finally, it is important to say something about the Transnistria, which, as a separatist region, is the most problematic part of Moldova. The very existence of the Transnistria

\(^{13}\) Freedom House writes that: “corruption is a major concern in Moldova, and officials have used anticorruption efforts against political opponents” (“Freedom in the World Report-Moldova (2008)”).


\(^{15}\) Freedom House writes that “prison sentences for libel were abolished in 2004, but journalists often practice self-censorship to avoid crippling fines” (Freedom in the World Report-Moldova (2008)).

\(^{16}\) The Romany community is the most harassed minority group in Moldova, especially when it comes to housing and employment.
threatens Moldova’s territorial unity, impedes its governance, and allows Russia to interfere in its political and economic affairs—especially due to the fact that the region hosts several very important Moldovan industries, such as electricity and steel factories. The high level of criminal activity in Transnistria is also problematic to Ukraine, which borders it.

But despite these problems, or perhaps because of them, Freedom House has been ranking Moldova as ‘partly-free’ at least since 2002.

3.1.3. Democracy in Belarus

Belarus is a republic in name, and a full-fledged dictatorship in reality. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus is rated ‘not free’ by Freedom House, and it is commonly referred to as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’. Its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, has now held office for nearly fifteen years since his election on July 20, 1994. He is known for suppressing all forms of opposition, including NGOs, education establishments, and independent media outlets.

None of Belarus’ recent elections, or the political processes that have led up to them, have been regarded as ‘free and fair’. This typically means that the state-controlled media coverage of political opposition to the government is either biased or altogether absent. But the problem in Belarus goes far beyond media coverage.

Lukashenko extended his presidential term in 2004 through a referendum. The 2006 elections, which he won with eighty-three percent of the vote, were then marred by
electoral fraud, and the OSCE declared that they did not meet basic democratic standards. The Belarusian government, according to Freedom House, “took harsh repressive measures against the opposition, detaining and beating many campaign workers, including Alyaksandr Kazulin, one of the opposition candidates.” But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Lukashenko, according to his own former security service officers, won reelection in 2001 by using death squads to silence his opponents.

It is no surprise that Freedom House gave Belarus low scores of 7 and 6 for political rights and civil liberties respectively.

Belarus has a constitution and a National Assembly. But the 2004 National Assembly elections were engineered so that not a single opposition candidate was elected to office. The OSCE said that these elections fell ‘significantly short’ of Belarus’ commitments. The National Assembly thus serves as a rubber-stamp for the president. Political parties in Belarus are generally undeveloped, and opposition parties are not represented at all.

The rule of law does not exist in Belarus. The constitution explicitly states that presidential decrees take precedence over the laws. This gives the president the power to control the entire government, including the courts and legislative process. Transparency

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17 People in Lithuania tell the following joke: After the presidential elections in Belarus, the head of electoral commission comes to Lukashenko and says: ‘President, I have good news and bad news. Which would you like to hear first?’ Lukashenko says: ‘The good news first’. The head of the electoral commission says ‘The good news is that you have won the election. Congratulations Mr. President! The bad news is that this time nobody voted for you.’


International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index\(^{20}\) ranked Belarus 151 out of the 180 countries it surveyed due to the government’s overall lack of transparency. There is also a systematic suppression of the press in Belarus. The state media follows the president, while independent media are harassed and censored to the point of extinction. Libel is both a civil and a criminal offense. There are no national opposition papers.\(^{21}\) Activities on the internet are both monitored and censured. Free assembly is not allowed. The police disrupt public demonstrations. Their participants are arrested. And political dissidents are persecuted.\(^{22}\)

Academic freedom and freedom of movement are also severely restricted in Belarus. “Official regulations stipulate the immediate dismissal and revocation of degrees for students and professors who join opposition protests;”\(^{23}\) and The European Humanities University\(^{24}\) was forced to relocate with its professors and students to Vilnius. It is true that Lukashenko has eliminated the need for citizens to obtain travel permits in order to leave the country. But he is also reputed to have a list of nearly one hundred thousand people who cannot travel abroad.

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\(^{21}\) “The Committee to Protect Journalists listed Belarus as one of the 10 most censored countries in the world in May 2006” (Freedom House).

\(^{22}\) “The authorities have filed criminal cases against bloggers and online media sites for alleged defamation and slander. On August 1, 2007, opposition politician Andrey Klimau was sentenced to two years in prison at a closed trial for publishing criticisms of the government on the internet” (Freedom House).


\(^{24}\) For more information see European Humanities University website < http://en.ehu.lt/about/>. 
These are just some of the reasons why people regard Belarus as the last dictatorship in Europe. But they are not the only reasons why it is difficult to move forward towards democratic change in Belarus. Indeed, the real problem is that the opposition to Belarus’ government is simply too divided to do anything significant. It thus failed to support Alyaksandr Milinkevich as its leader at the Congress of Democratic Forces, and instead replaced him with four co-chairs.25

There cannot be any overt democracy promotion projects in Belarus due to the dictatorial nature of its political regime. Any foreign aid that comes to Belarus needs to be approved by Belarus’ Ministry of the Economy, and projects that are concerned with democracy promotion are simply not approved. Democracy promotion projects in Belarus thus typically take the form of cooperation between a donor state’s NGOs and Belarusian NGOs.

3.2. Democracy promotion efforts of new European Union Member States

Lithuania, like most other new European Union member states (or NMS) after regaining their independence in early 1990’s, focused its foreign policy upon preparing and joining international organizations—especially the European Union and NATO. After achieving this goal, several NMS shifted their democracy promotion focus toward the East, and especially toward Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the South Caucasus.

Laurynas Jonavicius argues that all new European Union member states have similar measures and instruments for promoting democracy. Jonavicius says that democracy promotion “policy is mainly political and knowledge-based” rather than economic in nature, and that democracy promotion itself is based upon the transfer of knowledge and political structures. Here, the transfer of knowledge means the transfer of ‘know-how’ and state-building experiences from the NMS’ own transitions to democracy, such as the know-how required to strengthen administrative capacity and support reforms towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

The NMS’ financial capacity to promote democracy should not be overlooked. All of the NMS’ democracy promotion budgets are small, especially in comparison to those of the United States and their wealthier western neighbors. This influences the number, and very often the quality, of the projects that they support. The NMS thus find it desirable, and often unavoidable, to cooperate with other donor organizations (especially from the United States) in their democracy promotion efforts. This cooperation often comes in the

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form of financial support to strengthen their capacity. And this, of course, is another incentive for them to promote democracy in the East.

In addition to their unilateral efforts to promote democracy, the NMS are also active in the European Union’s multilateral democracy promotion efforts. Indeed, Jonavicius says that the NMS seek “to keep the democratization question as high as possible on the general EU agenda,” and that their efforts include “activities in the development of the European Neighborhood Policy” and the “creation of regional initatives, such as Community for Democratic Choice”27 (Jonavicius 14). He says that “NMS sucessfully adapt to the complexities of EU by transforming development cooperation commitments of the European Union to democracy promotion possibilities,” and that the European Neighbourhood Partnership28 financial instrument “provides the biggest (quasi-) external spur to strengthening NMS democracy promotion policies” (Jonavicius 14). The NMS also assumed new responsibilities for development and cooperation when they joined the European Union. ‘The European Consensus on Development Cooperation’ thus states that “member states which joined the EU after 2002 will strive to increase by 2015 their ODA/GNI to 0.33%.”29

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27 The Community of Democratic Choice was established in December, 2005 by the nine members from Baltic, Balkan, and Black Sea Region to promote democracy and human rights in the former Soviet Union countries. For more information see: [http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063461.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063461.html).


Specific ways in which Lithuania promotes democracy

Arturas Paulauskas says that Lithuania changed its foreign policy focus after joining the European Union and NATO in 2004 to become “the regional leader through its quality of membership in the EU and NATO and through proactively developed neighbouring relations.”

Lithuania’s policy provisions for Development Cooperation for 2006-2010 state that its objective is “to contribute to security and stability in the region.” Its priority partner countries for doing this are Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Lithuania’s foreign ministry has established a ‘Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Department’. The department’s website says that “Lithuania’s promotion of development and democracy is based mainly on…creating the rule of law, enhancement of democracy, protection of human rights, transition to the market economy and Euro-Atlantic integration, strengthening of administrative capacities and building civil society.”

One of the ways in which Lithuania has tried to achieve its priority cooperation goals was by becoming “the regional centre for conferences and seminars on democratisation in Eastern Europe” (Jonavicius 7). These conferences include the Vilnius Conference where

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former U.S. vice-president Dick Cheney accused Russia of blackmail. Lithuania also decided to host The European Humanities University, which had been expelled from Belarus, and Belarusian opposition forces in Vilnius. But Jonavicius writes that “the main instruments of democratisation being employed by Lithuania are the same as those of the other Baltic States: training, technical assistance and the experience of transition and Euro-Atlantic integration” (Jonavicius 7).

The scope for development cooperation is rather wide. But according to its Foreign Ministry’s website, Lithuania’s sectoral priorities for development cooperation are: (1) good governance; (2) economic reform process and transport; (3) the development of democratic and civil society; and (4) education, culture, social development, health, and environmental protection.

Figure #1: Lithuanian Development Cooperation Projects by priority areas and partner countries

Luke Harding writes: “Russia has a choice to make,” Mr Cheney told Baltic leaders during a summit in Vilnius. “No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolise transportation.” May 5, 2006.


Here, it is interesting to note that Lithuania clusters ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ under the same roof, and places ‘good governance and the rule of law’ under a different one. This suggests that Lithuania regards democracy promotion as more closely linked to human rights than to good governance and the rule of law. I will return to this point later in my analysis.

I have already said that the democracy promotion efforts of NGOs is comparatively weak in Lithuania, as it is in Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania follows a more ‘top-down’ democracy promotion model. This, in practice, means that the Lithuanian government, or the Foreign Ministry to be exact, decides the priorities, the instruments, and the regions for democracy promotion.

Information regarding the specific amounts of money allocated to priority areas and projects is not publicly available. But it is important to note that ‘good governance and rule of law’ accounts for twenty-eight percent of total expenditures, while ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ is second with twenty-three percent. This may be due to the fact that the top two recipients of Lithuanian aid—Afghanistan (47%) and Belarus (23%)—are both non-democratic countries. Afghanistan is a Lithuanian priority because of Lithuania’s NATO commitments. Belarus is another priority because Lithuania has its longest border with this ‘last dictatorship in Europe.’

Lithuania’s democracy promotion efforts—and, indeed, democracy promotion efforts around the world—are likely to be scaled down due to the current global economic crisis. This may not occur in 2009, since Lithuania’s foreign ministry operates on pre-approved
budgets. But it will likely occur after that. Be this as it may, Lithuania has laid solid foundations for its democracy promotion efforts, such as its European Integration Studies Centre, an institution with a long-term commitment for training governmental officials in democratic practices.

3.2.1. The Lithuanian democracy promotion strategies in Ukraine

In this section I analyze Lithuania’s democracy promotion strategies from the years 2006-2007. I have chosen to analyze these years partly because they are when Lithuania started to deliberately and systematically promote democracy in Ukraine, and partly because data from 2008 is not yet available. Lithuania did not group its democracy promotions projects in Ukraine under descriptive categories in 2006. But it did group its projects under such categories in 2007. In what follows, I will suggest a descriptive category for Lithuania’s 2006. But I will not base my conclusions on it.

In 2006, all of the Lithuanian government’s development cooperation projects (see Figure #2 below), with one exception, could fall under a category ‘sharing knowledge and technical assistance’, since these projects were all designed to share Lithuania’s knowledge about regulations, control systems, and communications and to give technical assistance in these areas. The one exception was an attempt to institutionalize Lithuania’s activities in Ukraine by establishing European Integration Centers in Kharkov and Lvov. This attempt, to my knowledge, was unsuccessful.
Lithuania tried to be active in development efforts in Ukraine in 2007. But cooperation occurred in only two areas:

- Good governance, strengthening of administrative capacities; and
- Strengthening of cultural ties; protecting cultural heritage.

We have already seen that the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry considers ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ as a separate category from ‘good governance and the rule of law’. According to the Lithuanian Development Cooperation Policy 2007, Lithuania’s ‘good governance and the rule of law’ projects in Ukraine were “oriented towards
providing assistance to Ukrainian institutions (e.g. public procurement office, veterinary service, and customs) in introducing reforms and creating a legal base.”

It seems to follow that Lithuania, according to its Foreign Ministry’s classifications, had no democracy promotion projects in Ukraine in 2007.

If we compare Lithuania’s 2006 foreign assistance to Ukraine with its 2007 foreign assistance to Ukraine, we can see both conceptual development and a clarification of the areas in which Lithuania offers foreign assistance, as well as a conceptual development and clarification of its strategies and techniques. But the aid we see is primarily for sharing knowledge and information, and not for promoting democracy, according to the Foreign Ministry’s formal classifications.

3.2.2. The Lithuanian democracy promotion strategies in Moldova 2006-2007

As in Ukraine, Lithuania’s foreign assistance projects to Moldova in 2006 were tied to knowledge sharing and capacity building. Lithuania’s specific development cooperation projects in Moldova in 2006 (see Figure #3 below) thus included a veterinary control system, custom services, aid in the fight against economic crimes and corruption, training civil servants, and an attempt to establish an European Integration Institute in Chișinău. This attempt, to my knowledge, was no more successful in Moldova than it was in Ukraine.

Lithuania increased its cooperation development assistance to Moldova substantially in 2007. In addition to seven projects for ‘good governance, strengthening of administrative capacities’, it had eight projects for ‘democracy promotion and human rights’. But the projects listed under ‘democracy and human rights’ are diverse and include projects aimed at strengthening Moldova’s administrative capacity; developing its media and its capacity for investigative journalism; explaining the EU and NATO to Moldovans; and preparing them for European integration, and for the establishment of an European Integration Study Centre in Moldova. For specific projects see Table B below.

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B. Lithuanian Projects in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation areas</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>The main implementing party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Study Visit to Lithuanian Institutions Conducting Corruption Proofing of Draft Regulatory Acts, as part of a British supported Project &quot;Raising Awareness of the Scourge of Corruption in the Public Sector&quot;</td>
<td>Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania (SIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strengthening of Food Safety and Veterinary Control System in Moldova</td>
<td>State Food and Veterinary Service under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (MVU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Development of Curriculum of study programme for Moldovan public servants at the Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences</td>
<td>Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences (ISPMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lithuanian Moldovan Foundation “European Integration Study Centre”: Information campaign about Lithuania and the EU</td>
<td>European Integration Study Center (EISC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The assistance for the Moldovan Customs Service in the customs audit area</td>
<td>Lithuanian Customs under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to Moldovan Customs Officials in the Area of Customs Evaluation</td>
<td>Lithuanian Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Visit of Moldovan Officials to UK Storage Sites (OSCE co-finance)</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Strengthening of administrative capacity of public servants in Moldova</td>
<td>Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration (LIADIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Preparation of concept for European Integration Study Center in Moldova</td>
<td>Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences (ISPMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Investigative Journalism seminar for Lithuanian and Moldovan Media Representatives</td>
<td>Lithuanian Journalist Center (LJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Role of the Public Media in the Democratic Process</td>
<td>Lithuanian Journalist Center (LJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Development of Gagauzia’s Mass Media – Democratic Values in Action</td>
<td>Independent Gagauzia’s newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Publication of Electoral Lessons at the School of Democracy</td>
<td>Independent News Agency “Infotim”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>European Integration – Step by Step</td>
<td>Monthly journal “Timpu”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Information campaign about the EU and NATO</td>
<td>Independent Journalists association of Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>Gagauzia Autonomous Territorial Unit Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Support for International business forum in Gagauzia Autonomous Territorial Unit</td>
<td>Documentary “Moldovans in Lithuania”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of cultural heritage protection of cultural heritage</td>
<td>Film festival “The big house of relatives”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the projects in Lithuania’s democracy and human rights category seem to aim at sharing Lithuania’s knowledge of how to integrate into the European Union and NATO. Indeed, Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry’s website says that “the Lithuanian customs service has taken a long-term commitment to share its reform experience with its Moldovan counterparts” (Lithuanian Development Cooperation Policy 2007).37 It thus seems that much of Lithuanian democracy promotion is about the ‘brotherly’ sharing of information about the ‘Step by Step’ integration process.

3.2.3. The Lithuanian democracy promotion strategies in Belarus

Of the three aid recipient countries discussed here, Lithuania focussed most of its foreign assistance projects on Belarus. This is understandable given the fact that Belarus is not a democracy, and given the fact that Lithuania shares its longest border with Belarus. Jonavicius writes that in certain cases “democracy promotion is understood in very pragmatic terms and is treated as the action which is necessary to protect one’s own security, stability and prosperity” (3). He also says that “countries that have experienced more complicated relations with Russia, and which see their own security and prosperity being possible only when Russia is ‘pushed back’ as far as possible from their borders, implement more active and hardline democratisation policies on their eastern borders (Poland, Baltic States)” (Jonavicius 3). Both of these comments about the pragmatic motives for democracy promotion apply to Lithuania. But Jonavicius acknowledges that Lithuania, like many of the NMS, has “notably idealistic attitudes towards the normative importance of democracy promotion” (1).

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry did not differentiate between cooperation areas, or types of projects, in 2006. And it unfortunately did not offer descriptions of them either. But I would suggest two possible categories as I look at the project titles on its website. The first type of project might fall under the rubric of ‘preserving brotherhood’. This is clearly reflected in the “‘Our Past and Future’ project to protect the historical heritage of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania,” which was implemented in both Ukraine and Belarus. This project aimed at protecting the common cultural ties that bind Lithuanians,
Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Hence, the idea of preserving brotherhood. The second type of project might fall under the rubric of ‘democracy promotion’. This is clearly reflected in its “Project ‘Promotion of Democratization’.” I was unable to find a description of this project, but I think it is highly probable that it is connected with the presidential election that took place in Belarus in 2006. Finally, I should note that several projects focus upon Belarusian Youth. For a list of the specific projects, see Figure #4, Table A below.

Figure #4: Lithuania’s Projects in Belarus 2006-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Lithuanian Assistance Projects in 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus/Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lithuanian government was more conceptually clear about its efforts in 2007. It listed three cooperation areas with Belarus:

- Democracy and human rights;
- Strengthening cultural ties; protection of cultural heritage; and
- Sustainable development.

Of these three areas, Lithuania was most active in ‘democracy promotion and human rights’. It implemented ten projects that fell under this category. And just as in 2006, its emphasis was on projects related to civic education of the Belarusian youth. Lithuania thus provided support for the European Humanities University, for several other educational institutions, and for summer camps. There were also two projects to support

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independent media in Belarus, and one to empower grassroots organizations in Belarus.

For a list of the specific projects, see Table B below.

### B. Lithuanian Projects in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Cooperation areas</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>The main implementing party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Empowering Grassroots Organizations in Belarus</td>
<td>Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuanian Language and culture studies for students, professors and other staff at the BLU</td>
<td>European Humanities University (EHU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for EFL</td>
<td>European Humanities University (EHU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Civil Forum</td>
<td>Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for independent media</td>
<td>Balshansk Institute (BI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>TV BELSAT* - an independent channel for Belarus</td>
<td>Association Polish Information Center in Limerick (consider)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Summer camp for Belarus students in exile</td>
<td>Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Right to Democracy in Belarus - Presentation of the movie “The Square” for international community</td>
<td>D3 “Spouses Nudity”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>The EU ideas for EHU students</td>
<td>European Humanities University (EHU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Winter School in Varso</td>
<td>Balshansk J. Kolar’s Lyceum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Our past and present</td>
<td>Academy of Memory and History (AMH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>The workshop Lithuanian-Belarussian-French poets and artists</td>
<td>Writers’ Union Fund (RUP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign policy documents of Grand Duchy of Lithuania: early Lithuanian metrics, legal codes and relations with Russia</td>
<td>Lithuanian History Institute (LI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Publishing and presentation of the short children story by Bruch Jonashko</td>
<td>Writers’ Union Fund (RUP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>The chronicle of the exposition “Big Nemunas”</td>
<td>Lithuanian Literature Fund (LiL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Christian exhibition</td>
<td>Bernadette monastery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Airs and Blindens</td>
<td>Lithuania’s Ministry of Culture and Sport Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Parliament in the governing structure of Grand Duchy of Lithuania in XV–XVII centuries, situation of the research and prospects</td>
<td>Lithuanian History Institute (LI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>Ineffective use of foreign resources</td>
<td>Engineering College of Forestry and Environment (ECA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shaping “a screen” for cultural campaigns</td>
<td>NGO Information Center (NCIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation treatment for children of Chechernsk</td>
<td>Secondary School of Chechernsk No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Developing the life situation-ecology conditions for children of Chechernsk</td>
<td>Institute of Radiation Safety “SHELDT”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency of Social Services</td>
<td>National Development Institute (NDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation treatment for children of Chechernsk – 2</td>
<td>Secondary School of Chechernsk No. 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the [Lithuanian Development Cooperation Policy 2007](http://www.urm.lt/index.php?1226860993), ‘Support for the Belarusian University in Exile’ “provides education in liberal arts and social sciences according to the best Belarusian and European academic standards to more than 1200 students from Belarus”; ‘Belarus in Europe Historical Heritage’ highlights

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the European origins of Belarus and their shared historical and cultural heritage, in addition to supporting Belarusian artists; ‘Civil Education of Youth’ enhances the capacities of youth organizations to raise awareness of Belarusian history and culture; and ‘Music Opens Borders’, through its August 2007 international music festival ‘Be2gether’, opened the borders between Belarus and Lithuania.
3.3 The United States’ Democracy Promotion Efforts 2000-2008

The United States has a global span in its democracy promotion efforts. President George W. Bush launched his second term by saying in his inaugural address that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Bush also linked the spread of democracy with United States national security. He said that liberty at home depends on liberty abroad, and that without freedom abroad we cannot ascertain freedom at home. And in his February 2003 speech at the American Enterprise Institute in the run-up to the war in Iraq, Bush declared that “the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” (Carothers 3).

Bush’s adoption of democracy promotion as official foreign policy translated into “increased funding for reform-oriented organizations such as the International Republic Institute, and National Endowment for Democracy”. Bush also created the Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which committed more than three billion dollars in grants to approximately twenty-two countries to promote economic growth. Thomas Carothers writes that “the MCC seeks to make a positive effect on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the developing and former communist worlds by giving out funds on the basis of countries meeting a set of social, economic, and political

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41 For more see Millennium Challenge Corporation’s website: www.mcc.gov/
performance indicators, thus creating positive incentives for better performance in all these areas” (Carothers 11).

It is difficult, however, to know whether and to what extent Bush’s rhetoric was accompanied by an increase in allocations for democracy promotion. Robert McMahon writes that Bush “continued to set aside billions of dollars in economic aid for countries committed to reforms aimed at improving governance.” But while Thomas Carothers acknowledges that the overall amount of U.S. democracy aid may have increased under Bush, he says that “such comparisons are difficult due to governmental changes in what gets counted as democracy aid, with the Bush administration adopting a more inclusive definition over time” (Carothers 11).

This much, however, seems clear. If the United States increased its funding for democracy promotion programs during the Bush years, then the beneficiaries of those increases were almost entirely in the Middle East. The United States’ democracy promotion allocations for other regions either decreased or remained the same. More specifically, as the graphs in Figures 5, 6, and 7 below indicate, U.S. funding for democracy promotion programs (FREEDOM Support Act) in Ukraine and Moldova reached their peaks with just over $200 million for Ukraine and just under $50 million for Moldova under the Clinton administration. With a few minor exceptions—such as the increased funding in the period leading up to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution—funds for democracy promotion in these countries declined both dramatically and steadily during

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43 For more see Carothers’ U.S. Democracy promotion during and after Bush.
the Bush years. Funding for democracy promotion in Belarus, by contrast, may actually have increased slightly under Bush. But it generally remained more or less flat at about $15 million dollars a year.
3.3.1 The U.S. democracy promotion strategies in Ukraine

The United States’ government assistance goal for Ukraine, as described on the State Department website, is to “promote the transformation of Ukraine into a free-market, democratic society.” The State Department goes on to say that “U.S. Government (USG) assistance encourages the reforms needed for Ukraine to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions.”

**Figure #5: USG Total Assistance to Ukraine 1992-2008**

For the State Department’s detailed explanations of the graphs see footnote 45.

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44 For more see Department of State website: [http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/109722.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/109722.htm)

45 **Graph Explanations** ([http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/109722.htm#graphs](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/109722.htm#graphs))

Pie Chart: For estimated Fiscal Year 2008 forty percent of U.S. assistance to Ukraine went to the objective of Peace and Security (PS), twenty-six percent to Peace Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD), nineteen percent to Economic Growth (EG), thirteen percent to Investing in People (IIP) and two percent to Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

The Line Graph covers U.S. assistance to Ukraine from 1992-2007:
- In Fiscal Year 1992 23.70 Million dollars in Freedom Support Act (FSA) assistance was given to Ukraine and total United States Government (USG) 59.91 Million dollars; Total USG: 117.84 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1993: FSA: 59.91 Million dollars; Total USG: 117.84 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1994: FSA: 210.71 Million dollars; Total USG: 458.22 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1995: FSA: 189.34 Million dollars; Total USG: 297.94 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1996: FSA: 219.76 Million dollars; Total USG: 333.12 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1997: FSA: 224.91 Million dollars; Total USG: 295.53 Million dollars
- Fiscal Year 1998: FSA: 223.43 Million dollars; Total USG: 360.24 Million dollars
It is important to point out the financial assistance that the United States allocated to Ukraine during 2007 and 2008. In the fiscal year 2007 the United States’ assistance was $96.51 million ($80M FSA, $16.51M Other). In 2008 it was estimated to be $83.41 million ($72.41M FSA, $11.00M Other). Out of that, $22.57 million and an estimated $19.64 million, respectively, were allocated for ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ (or GJD). The State Department says that the objectives of the GJD programs in Ukraine were to “promote fair elections administration and develop strong political parties, legislature, civil society, and independent media.”

It goes on to say that “strengthening and sustaining rule of law reforms in the Ukraine is dependent on making public officials more accountable, combating corruption, reforming the courts and law enforcement structures, and strengthen the rule of law in ways needed to sustain Ukraine’s reforms.”

I have included the State Department’s descriptions of its specific projects for 2007 in Appendix 1 to this study, and I will refer to it in the analysis that follows. For now, suffice it to say that the money for these programs was allocated to “encourage the development of sustainable independent media outlets”; “increase effectiveness and inclusiveness of Ukraine’s legislature and parties”; and “support NGOs’ ability to

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Fiscal Year 1999: FSA: 208.66 Million dollars; Total USG: 288.54 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2000: FSA: 174.75 Million dollars; Total USG: 213.39 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2001: FSA: 96.55 Million dollars; Total USG: 252.24 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2002: FSA: 156.54 Million dollars; Total USG: 201.96 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2003: FSA: 139.93 Million dollars; Total USG: 178.16 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2004: FSA: 96.55 Million dollars; Total USG: 144.82 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2005: FSA: 136.61 Million dollars; Total USG: 198.06 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2006: FSA: 81.88 Million dollars; Total USG: 154.43 Million dollars
Fiscal Year 2007: FSA: 80.00 Million dollars; Total USG: 155.36 Million dollars

increase civic participation, advocate for public interests, and perform oversight of
government activities.\textsuperscript{47} 

The United States’ Department of State has described its recent (i.e., 2007) successes in democracy promotion in Ukraine as follows:

- Helped Ukraine to reduce trade barriers and harmonize with international economic standards, allowing Ukraine to join the WTO on May 16, 2008.
- Upgraded facilities in hospitals and orphanages in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine to reach out to the most vulnerable populations.
- Attracted more than $200,000 from local sources, created 117 new businesses, provided 352 new jobs and four agricultural cooperatives through a public-private partnership program.
- Trained over 1,430 journalists and nearly 1100 civil society organizations to increase the voice of civil society in a democratic Ukraine.
- Through public education initiatives and a March 2007 government anti-TIP program, 78\% of Ukrainians now understand the dangers of TIP.\textsuperscript{48}

The ‘Rose’ and ‘Orange’ electoral revolutions, in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) respectively, have sometimes been branded ‘made-in-the-USA’. They are, consequently, sometimes seen as much more successful examples of the Bush administration’s ‘regime change’ efforts than Iraq or Afghanistan. But Thomas Carothers argues that “the increase in pro-democratic diplomatic and assistance efforts in the lead-up to the 2003 Georgian


elections and the 2004 Ukrainian elections was an amplification of a long-standing approach, not a new Bush policy” (Carothers 14). Carothers argues that even in such cases “the U.S. role was at most a facilitating rather than determinative factor” (Carothers 14). And the United States’ State Department says that the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act has been “a cornerstone for the continuing U.S. partnership with Ukraine and the other NIS.”

More specifically, the State Department says that “Ukraine has been a primary recipient of FSA assistance,” that “total U.S. assistance since independence has been more than $3 billion,” that “U.S. assistance to Ukraine is targeted to promote political, security, and economic reform and to address urgent health and humanitarian needs,” and that “The U.S. has consistently encouraged Ukraine’s transition to a democratic society with a prosperous market-based economy.”

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3.3.2. The United States’ democracy promotion strategies & techniques in Moldova\textsuperscript{50}

The United States’ government assistance goals, as described on the United States’ Department of State website, are to “help Moldova become fully democratic and prosperous, secure within its recognized borders and free to become a full partner in the Euro-Atlantic community.” The United States’ assistance, according to the website, “supports Moldova’s transition to a modern, more transparent and participatory state, underpinned by the rule of law and a functioning market economy.”

**Figure #6: USG Total Assistance to Moldova 1992-2007**

For the website’s detailed explanation of the graph, see footnote 51.


\textsuperscript{51} Graph Explanations

Pie Chart: In Fiscal Year 2008 fifty-one percent of U.S. assistance went to the objective of Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD), thirty-one percent went to Economic Growth (EG), sixteen percent went to Peace and Security (PS), and two percent went to Humanitarian Assistance.
While it is not represented in the graph, it is important to point out the financial assistance that the United States allocated to Moldova for 2007 and 2008. In the fiscal year 2007 the United States’ assistance was $17.77 million ($16M FSA, $1.77M Other). And the estimate for the United States’ assistance in the fiscal year 2008 was $15.23 million ($14.18M FSA, $1.04M Other). $8.31 million and an estimated $7.8 million, respectively, were allocated for ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ (or GJD). The objectives of the GJD programs were “to strengthen democratic institutions, enhance the role of civil society, and promote rule of law.” These programs were “built on the momentum of Moldova’s movement toward adherence to EU norms and promoted a more decentralized, participatory, and transparent political environment.” The U.S. Department of State. [Link](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm) They included specific programs in the categories ‘Rule of Law and Human Rights’, ‘Political Competition and Consensus Building’, and ‘Civil Society’. The U.S. Department of State. [Link](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm)

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The Line Graph covers U.S. assistance to Moldova from 1992-2007:

- In Fiscal Year 1992 $1.11 Million dollars in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds was given in assistance to Moldova and total United States Government (USG) assistance was 12.16 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 1993: FSA: 11.69 Million dollars; Total USG: 61.43 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 1996: FSA: 23.50 Million dollars; Total USG: 58.07 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 1997: FSA: 27.57 Million dollars; Total USG: 30.14 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 1998: FSA: 34.20 Million dollars; Total USG: 44.89 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 1999: FSA: 47.31 Million dollars; Total USG: 63.10 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2000: FSA: 50.09 Million dollars; Total USG: 63.20 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2001: FSA: 22.54 Million dollars; Total USG: 68.95 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2002: FSA: 36.02 Million dollars; Total USG: 47.91 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2003: FSA: 30.10 Million dollars; Total USG: 51.27 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2004: FSA: 22.54 Million dollars; Total USG: 41.30 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2005: FSA: 17.51 Million dollars; Total USG: 30.55 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2006: FSA: 17.82 Million dollars; Total USG: 26.74 Million dollars;
- Fiscal Year 2007: FSA: 16 Million dollars; Total USG: 22 Million.

52 The U.S. Department of State. [Link](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm)
53 The U.S. Department of State. [Link](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm)
Department’s descriptions of its specific projects for 2007 in an appendix to this study, and I will refer to it in the analysis that follows. For now, suffice it to say that the money for these programs was allocated to: “develop democratic institutions and ensure free and fair elections”; “strengthen civil society and support independent media to monitor government reforms and curb corruption”; “improve citizens’ access to justice by increasing public education, competent legal services, judicial effectiveness and assist Moldova’s legal system to operate transparently, efficiently and independently”; “develop more effective local political leadership and increase citizen participation in decision-making.”

The United States’ Department of State has described its recent (i.e., 2007) successes in democracy promotion in Moldova as follows:

- The Government of Moldova (GOM) has remained committed to the Moldova-EU Action Plan it signed in 2005—a “road map” of reforms to strengthen democratic institutions, increase transparency and improve the investment climate;
- The USG assisted the GOM to establish a witness protection unit at the Center for Combating Trafficking in Persons (TIP), which aids in prosecuting TIP cases;
- Strengthened a new law which clarifies that domestic violence is a criminal offense; 35 judges and prosecutors were trained regarding the new law and a legal representation program was established for victims;
- Technical assistance and training in the apparel sector led to better management of workflow and performance targets, resulting in a 20% increase in productivity;
- With USG assistance, the Ministry of Health de-centralized

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health care with the creation of 40 new independent primary care centers.\textsuperscript{55}

3.3.3. The U.S. democracy promotion strategies in Belarus

Thomas Carothers sums up the Bush administration’s attitude towards Belarus, and dictatorial regimes in general, as “tough.” The Bush administration criticized Belarus publicly, organized multilateral diplomatic actions against it, and funded programs that bolstered pro-democratic dissent.\(^{56}\) The United States’ assistance goal towards Belarus, as described on the State Department website, is “robust democracy promotion with the goal of empowering the Belarusian people so that they may determine their own future.” The State Department goes on to say that most of the United States’ assistance to Belarus “is targeted to support Belarus’s transformation to a democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law by building democratic institutions and strengthening civil society,” and that “U.S. social and humanitarian programs work to improve standards of living, demonstrating U.S. support for the Belarusian people.”\(^{57}\)

Figure #7 below depicts the United States’ assistance to Belarus since 1992. In the fiscal year 2007 the United States’ assistance was $11.34 million ($11.19M FSA, $0.15M Other). In 2008 it was estimated to be $10.19 million ($10.19M FSA). $8.95 million was allocated for GJD programs in 2007, and an estimated 9.16 million was allocated for GJD programs in 2009. The objectives of these GJD programs were to “build the capacity of civil society organizations to act as agents for reform, strengthen the pro-democratic political process, and develop the institutional capacity and sustainability of the

\(^{56}\) For more see Carothers’ U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush. Especially p. 10.

independent media.**58

**Figure #7: USG Assistance to Belarus 1992-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FSA</th>
<th>Total USG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Graph Explanations:**

Pie Chart: For estimated Fiscal Year 2008 to Belarus ninety percent of U.S. assistance went to the objective of Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD), seven percent to Investing in People (IIP), and three percent to Humanitarian Assistance (HA).

The Line Graph covers U.S. assistance to Belarus from 1992-2007:

- In Fiscal Year 1992, 2.23 Million dollars in Freedom Support Act (FSA) assistance was given to Belarus and total United States Government (USG) assistance was 41.44 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1993: FSA: 4.44 Million dollars; Total USG: 129.87 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1994: FSA: 15.63 Million dollars; Total USG: 58.31 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1995: FSA: 8.31 Million dollars; Total USG: 59.0 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1996: FSA: 5.07 Million dollars; Total USG: 27.94 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1997: FSA: 5.24 Million dollars; Total USG: 1.79 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1998: FSA: 7.84 Million dollars; Total USG: 1.02 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 1999: FSA: 12.40 Million dollars; Total USG: 0.91 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2000: FSA: 8.69 Million dollars; Total USG: 1.00 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2001: FSA: 8.04 Million dollars; Total USG: 4.82 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2002: FSA: 10.91 Million dollars; Total USG: 1.26 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2004: FSA: 8.40 Million dollars; Total USG: 3.80 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2005: FSA: 12.15 Million dollars; Total USG: 4.49 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2006: FSA: 11.55 Million dollars; Total USG: 3.80 Million dollars.
- Fiscal Year 2007: FSA: 11.34 Million dollars; Total USG: 0.15 Million dollars.
I have included the State Department’s descriptions of its specific GJD projects for 2007 in Appendix 2 to this study, and I will refer to them in the analysis that follows. For now, suffice it to say that the money for these programs was allocated to “build the capacity of NGOs in Belarus to increase public participation and act as agents for change; strengthen independent media outlets and journalists inside and outside of Belarus to increase access to independent information; build the capacity of democratic parties to unify, strategize, organize and connect with constituents.”

The United States’ Department of State has described its recent (i.e., 2007) successes in democracy promotion in Belarus as follows:

- With USG support, 900 Belarusian youths seeking an alternative to state-sponsored higher education received free tuition for an EHU distance-learning program.
- A USG-supported external radio project improved its program content and increased its audience to over 16,000 hits per month, a four-fold increase from the end of 2006.
- Nearly 600 people received USG-assisted political party training in FY 2007.
- More than 300 political activists whose human rights were violated received humanitarian and legal services through USG supported NGOs.

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3.4 Swedish democracy promotion strategies & techniques

Sweden put its greatest emphasis in the period 2000-2006 on promoting international law, with a priority on women’s rights. Since 2006, however, Sweden has officially shifted its emphasis to democracy promotion.

The United Kingdom allocates the most financial aid for democracy promotion among the European Union Member States, followed by the Netherlands and Germany. Sweden is fourth on the list. But insofar as its overall development aid is concerned, Sweden was by far the greatest financial contributor among the European Union Member States to democracy and human rights issues in the years 2006-2007, as Figure #8 illustrates.

**Figure #8: Member states’ aid allocations with shares of total development aid**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Aid Category</th>
<th>Amount (£ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of ODA</th>
<th>Year*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Good governance, human rights and peace-building</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Democracy, civil society and public administration</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Democratic governance and human rights</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Human rights and Democratisation</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Government and civil society</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>European initiative for democracy and human rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Democracy, civil society</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 “Sweden has consolidated its position as the most generous relative democracy supporter. Swedish assistance for ‘democratic governance and human rights’ increased in absolute terms by nearly 23% between 2005 and 2006 and will increase another 18% in 2007, rising to €401 million, 24% of total ODA” (Youngs).

63 I share Youngs’ concern: “A belief still prevails in the EU that low scale and low key democracy projects can shift political reform in a liberalising direction, without engendering too much geopolitical tension with autocratic regimes. But if these regimes have learned how to deflect the impact of democracy assistance, as analysts now suggest, the scale of EU efforts outlined here must be seen as woefully inadequate.” (10)

Sweden, like Lithuania, is active in promoting democracy through international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations. Youngs et al. writes that the “distinctive Swedish input in this regard” can be seen in Sweden’s support of the European Union’s creation of civilian rapid reaction units, its support for including human rights experts in these units, its push for strengthening the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and its attempt to coordinate actions within the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Youngs et al. writes that this forum gives Sweden “both increased weight and a way of benefiting from the influence of nearby, recently democratized states as international advocates of political reform,” that “Democracy promotion came to occupy a formal part of CBSS ministerial meetings,” and that “Sweden was democratized as having been the most enthusiastic supporter of the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).”

3.4.1 Swedish democracy promotion strategies & techniques in Ukraine

Sweden allocated almost 4 million euros for democracy and human rights work in 2004. This was almost two-thirds of its total foreign aid. Sweden was also one of the few European Union states to fund exit polls in the contested second round of the Ukrainian 2004 elections. Sweden both strengthened its bilateral political dialogue with Ukraine and doubled its direct aid to Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Figure #9 below gives a

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breakdown of the Sweden’s ‘Democratic Governance’ assistance to Ukraine in the
twenty-first century.

Figure #9 Sweden’s ‘Democratic Governance’ assistance to Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year and Amount Allocated or Spent (SEK= Swedish Krona)</th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>Total USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Support to Ukraine’s EU integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/2006-12/2008 spent 2 040 000</td>
<td>250,104</td>
<td>526,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/2006-12/2008 spent 1 254 000</td>
<td>153,740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/2007-5/2008 spent 1 000 000</td>
<td>122,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public Administrative reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/2007-10/2008 spent 3 150 000</td>
<td>386,190</td>
<td>528,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/2003-12/2010 allocated 1 164 295</td>
<td>142,742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Public Administrative reform (Environment)</td>
<td></td>
<td>674,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/2005-12/2008 spent 500 000</td>
<td>61,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/2006-01/2008 spent 5 000 000</td>
<td>613,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>607,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/2005-6/2008 spent 4 058 000</td>
<td>497,510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Election Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>545,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/2007-5/2010 spent 4 000 000</td>
<td>490,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/2007-8/2008 spent 450 000</td>
<td>55,170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,226,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/2006-2/2010 spent 10 000 000</td>
<td>1,226,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,467,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/2005-6/2009 allocated 6 000 000</td>
<td>735,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/2006-9/2009 allocated 15 000 000</td>
<td>1,839,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006-2008 regional program spent 855000</td>
<td>1,048,230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 3/2006-1/2010 allocated 15 049 000</td>
<td>1,845,007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,287,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007-2010 spent 10 500 000</td>
<td>1,287,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>545,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Ukraine ran 29 projects in cooperation with Swedish organizations and committed 4 448 634</td>
<td>545,402</td>
<td>545,402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table may not give the most useful breakdown of Sweden’s Democratic Governance assistance to Ukraine because of the different time-lengths (from 1 to 7 years) and scopes (from Ukraine specific to a Roma project for the whole of Eastern Europe) of the projects that it tracks. It does, however, show that Sweden has allocated most of its democracy

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66 For specific projects see Appendix 5.
promotion funds in the twenty-first century to human rights, media, gender, and public administrative reform with an emphasis upon environment. And it is clear from Figure #10 below that Sweden allocated most of its money for Development Cooperation with Ukraine to its Human Rights and Democratic Governance Projects.

**Figure #10  Development Cooperation with Ukraine in 2007**

Sweden spent 48,492,000 Swedish Krona—or 5,945,119 United States’ dollars—on human rights and democratic governance in Ukraine in 2007. Sweden officially calls its democracy promotion programs ‘democratic intensification’. The goals of its democratic intensification are to “strengthen institutions and to promote active civic participation and a democratic culture, including respect for human rights.” The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) thus financed “electoral polls, the training of election officers, media coverage, the education of first-time voters and the creation of

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67 Sida. “Cooperation in Figures”

political lobby groups for women” before Ukraine’s 2006 parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{68} It also supports KIMTU, a society working for the protection of journalists’ rights, together with “several projects designed to increase equality in the country.”\textsuperscript{69} Its website says that “Sweden will double its aid to Ukraine and will target development cooperation primarily towards the reduction of poverty and democratization with the EU” in coming years.\textsuperscript{70}

3.4.2. Swedish democracy promotion strategies & techniques in Moldova

Sweden began its democratic assistance to Moldova in 1996 under a project arranged by the UNDP. This initial project was later expanded, and today Moldova is the largest of Sida’s partner countries among the developing nations of the southern Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which are the former Soviet republics excluding the Baltic States.\textsuperscript{71}

Sida’s website says that “the overall goal of Sweden’s development cooperation with Moldova is to help poor people improve their living conditions,” and that Sida tries to do this “through contributions to poverty-reduction programmes and, as of this year, to the country’s efforts to gain accession to the EU.”\textsuperscript{72} So Sweden’s commitment to equality, and especially to economic and social equality, is much more obvious in the case of


Moldova than in the case of Ukraine.

Sweden has adopted a new strategy for 2007-2010,\textsuperscript{73} according to which its bilateral support for programs in Moldova amounts to 100 million SEK (about $12,260,000) per year in total. This new strategy includes a special allocation of 5–7 million SEK (or $613,000-$858,200) per year to NGOs. This bilateral support is in addition to the money that Sweden contributes to the internationally supported regional programs that affect Moldova. Sweden lists its areas of assistance to Moldova as: a) Good Governance; b) Energy Sector; c) Rural Development; d) Social Assistance/Employment; e) Emergency Assistance; f) NGO Programs.

Here, ‘Human Rights/Democracy’ is a sub-category under ‘Good Governance’ that includes the following seven projects:

1) Promoting Gender Equality in National Development Policies and Programmes;  
2) Gender Perspective in Education and Labour Market;  
4) Combating Trafficking in Human Beings;  
5) Strengthening Civil Society in Moldova;  
6) Citizen Oversight Initiative; and  
7) Juvenile Justice Reform Moldova.

It would seem from this list that Sweden’s democracy promotion programs in Moldova are aimed primarily at enhancing human rights and gender equality in Moldovan society. This aim is clearly reflected in at least the first four of the projects listed above, namely, Promoting Gender Equality in National Development Policies and Programmes, Gender

<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/96/44/2303d476.pdf>.  
Perspective in Education and Labour Market, Moldova: Human Rights 2004–2006, and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. It may be reflected in the other three projects as well. But Sweden’s tendency to associate democracy with human rights is clear from the very title of the sub-category ‘Human Rights/Democracy’.

3.4.3. The Swedish democracy promotion strategies & techniques in Belarus

Sweden’s democracy promotion projects in Belarus take the form of cooperation between Swedish and Belarusian NGOs. Sida says that “the overall goal of Swedish incentives in Belarus is to improve the living conditions for vulnerable groups in society.” In order to achieve this goal, Sida runs projects in Belarus on democracy, civil society, human rights, media and information; culture, education and research; environment; private sector; social services and health care. Several of Sweden’s political parties also have extensive contacts with Belarusian opposition parties and organizations.

Sida’s website says that Sweden’s cooperation with Belarus “is designed to transfer know-how in fields where Swedish skills and experience are able to support ongoing reforms.” In its Strategy for development cooperation with Belarus January 2007-December 2010 Sweden states that “the primary aim of Swedish development cooperation should … be to strengthen people’s awareness of their rights and their ability to invoke them, thus creating conditions conducive to future democratic development and

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a modern society based on the rule of law.” This is an interesting and important emphasis in Sweden’s democracy promotion efforts, and I will return to it later in my analysis.

Sweden’s strategy towards Belarus is very similar to its strategies in Moldova and Ukraine. Its main cooperation initiatives are “deeper democratization, involved support to civil society, the mass media, local self-government, gender equality and exchanges on a limited scale in the administrative sphere.” Sida, however, stresses that “priority should be given to democratic political forces, students and academics, administrative officials, actors in the business sector, people active in cultural affairs and the media, and non-governmental organizations.” It says that “young people form an especially important group, one which can be expected to drive social development and bring about change in the future,” and that “a restrictive approach should be taken to direct cooperation with Belarusian authorities.” So Sweden, like Lithuania, aims its democratization projects at the Belarusian youth.

Sweden has given both Belarus bilateral and multilateral assistance. It is difficult to know exactly how much of its multilateral support goes to Belarus, because it is typically contributed to international organizations such as the United Nations. But its bilateral aid to Belarus for 2002–2005 totaled SEK 138 million ($16,918,800). In 2003 it allocated 5

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
million euros to democracy projects related to Belarus.\textsuperscript{81} And its investment in bilateral cooperation projects in 2006 totaled SEK 40 million (or $4,904,000).\textsuperscript{82} It is obvious from Figure # 11 below that ‘Human rights & democratic governance’ has received the most funding, almost 22 mln SEK ($2,697,200). The next closest is ‘Health’ with almost 16 mln SEK (or $1,961,600).

**Figure #11. Sweden’s development cooperation with Belarus in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>SEK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>15 596 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>498 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights &amp; democratic governance</td>
<td>21 853 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, peace &amp; security</td>
<td>410 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>1 944 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, business &amp; fin. system</td>
<td>7 265 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources and environment</td>
<td>6 153 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget support poverty red.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53 744 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information about Sweden’s democracy promotion projects in Belarus is not publicly available, unlike information about its projects in Ukraine and Moldova. This is

\textsuperscript{81} Youngs et al. Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006. FRIDE.
understandable given the hazardous position in which that information would put the Belarusian receivers of such aid. But this lack of public information made it difficult for me to compare how the implementation of Sweden’s democracy promotion projects in Belarus matches its official strategy.
4. Analysis

In this section I will test my hypothesis that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden promote democracy in different ways and that their different democracy promotion strategies arise from different concepts of democracy against the facts that I presented above. First, I will compare the democracy promotion strategies and techniques of Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden. I will analyze how they are similar, how they differ, and what is problematic about such comparisons. Then I will consider why Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden use the democracy promotion strategies that they use. In so doing, I will argue that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden use different strategies to promote democracy because their goals (or ends) in promoting democracy, and indeed their very concepts of democracy, differ. Finally, I will end this section by considering alternative explanations to my hypothesis.

My argument will refer heavily to Figure #12 below, which gives a concise summary of the material that I have presented above regarding the democracy promotion strategies and techniques that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden use in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. This table makes it easier to compare, contrast, and analyze the emphases that these countries place on certain aspects of democracy in their democracy promotion efforts. In constructing this table, I refer selectively to both broad categories (in the case of the United States) and specific projects (in the cases of Lithuania and Sweden) to show the emphasis that they place upon a certain aspect of democracy promotion. I have done this partly because the United States’ efforts dwarf both Lithuania’s and Sweden’s both
in terms of the quantity of its projects and the money it allocates for them—but primarily because it reflects their different emphases.

### 4.1. Comparison of democracy promotion strategies & techniques

Figure #12: Democracy Promotion as Stated by the Governments of the United States, Lithuania and Sweden in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
<td><strong>‘Governing Justly and Democratically’</strong></td>
<td>‘Democracy Promotion and Human Rights’</td>
<td>See below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU integration</td>
<td>None; only ‘good governance and strengthening of administrative capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop independent media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reform courts and law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop legislature:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) combating corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) making public officials more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accountable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop strong political parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote fair elections administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to EU integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public administration reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public administration reform (environment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Human rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Justice and home affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See the next page.
4.1.1 Similarities in the donor countries’ democracy promotion strategies & techniques

One of the main similarities among the three donor states’ strategies is that democracy promotion makes up a substantial part of their overall aid to the recipient country. Lithuania, however, seems to distinguish ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ from ‘good governance and the rule of law’. ‘Good governance and the rule of law’ thus accounts for twenty-eight percent of...
its total expenditures according to the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry’s website, while ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ is second with twenty-three percent. The fact that ‘democracy promotion and human rights’ is second may be due to the fact that the top two recipients of Lithuanian foreign aid, Afghanistan (47%) and Belarus (23%), are both non-democratic countries—which might make the promotion of democracy and human rights more controversial in these countries than the promotion of good governance and the rule of law. This is also true of the United States and Sweden. In 2008 the United States’ (est.) Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) programs in Moldova and Belarus received 51 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of the funds that the United States allocated to these countries (see Figure #13 below). These programs in Ukraine, by contrast, received 24 percent of the United States’ aid to Ukraine. This is the second highest percentage after ‘Peace and Security’, which received 42 percent, though this may be due to the geopolitical and military importance of Ukraine. Finally, Sweden’s ‘democratic governance and human rights’ projects received 24 percent of Sweden’s overall development aid (see Figure #14 below)—which, as mentioned above, is the highest among the European Union Member States.

Figure #13: The difference between US assistance to Ukraine and Belarus, and Moldova
A second similarity is that all three donor states support the development of independent media, the strengthening of civil society, and the enhancement of the administrative capacities in the recipient countries as part of their democracy promotion efforts.

The greatest similarities in the democracy promotion strategies and techniques of the United States, Lithuania, and Sweden appear to be in Belarus. Here, many of the projects of all three donor states target the Belarusian youth. There are two main reasons for this. First, the donors do not foresee political change coming to Belarus in the foreseeable future. Second, they believe that if and when change does come, it is likely to come from the young.

Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden also support independent media projects in Belarus that aim at the dissemination of alternative information from the information that is broadcast by state controlled television and radio stations. Their emphasis has shifted to electronic media in recent years, since it has become increasingly difficult to circulate printed press in Belarus.

But we must always bear in mind that Belarus is a closed society with a dictatorial governmental regime. This leaves very little room for democracy promotion projects or cooperation at any level. And this may be the reason why the democracy promotion
programs that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden conduct there all seem to be similar.

### 4.1.2 Differences in the donor countries’ democracy promotion strategies & techniques

The democracy promotion strategies and techniques of Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden seem to differ in certain respects. Let me consider each of the cases that I have presented in turn.

Lithuania, in the case of Belarus, seems to place a greater emphasis on targeting its democracy promotion efforts toward the youth than the United States and Sweden. This is admittedly a difference in degree rather than in kind, since the United States and Sweden also target the young. But Lithuania seems to do it much more. In the case of Moldova, Lithuania’s resources have been exhausted by the three common democracy promotion areas that I have identified above, namely, the development of independent media, the strengthening of civil society, and the enhancement of administrative capacities. And in the case of Ukraine, Lithuania, according to the categories that were developed and used by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not promote democracy at all. Lithuania promoted ‘good governance and strengthening administrative capacity’ in Ukraine instead.

The United States’ democracy promotion strategies and techniques are clearly more aggressive, more political, more intrusive, and potentially more transformational than either Sweden’s or Lithuania’s.
I say this, because the United States has been engaged in changing internal political processes in all three recipient countries. In the case of Ukraine, it has, for example, implemented programs designed to develop Ukraine’s legislature and political parties. These programs have focused upon combating corruption, making public officials more accountable, and promoting fair elections administration. In the case of Moldova, it has focused on strengthening political competition and consensus building, as well as the rule of law and human rights. And in the case of Belarus, it has attempted to build the capacity of democratic parties to unify, strategize, organize, and to connect with their constituents.

Finally, Sweden’s democracy promotion efforts have focused more upon equality, human rights, and the environment. In the case of Ukraine, Sweden’s democracy promotion programs placed a special emphasis on gender equality, human rights, and the environment. In the case of Moldova, Sweden focused upon gender equality and the rule of law. And its emphasis, in the case of Belarus, has been on youth, education, and the environment.

One more similarity became very clear in describing the foci of the donor states’ democracy promotion efforts above. The democracy promotion efforts of each of the three donor states focus upon the development of independent media, the strengthening of civil society, and the enhancement of the administrative capacities in their recipient countries. But each of the three donor states have foci that are unique to them as well.
And the unique foci of each of the donor states seem to be the same in each of their recipient countries.

Thus, the unique foci of the United States’ democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine, as I have described them above, are very similar to the unique foci of its efforts in Moldova and Belarus. Indeed, they seem so similar that I think we can now simplify our analysis by collapsing them all into one case, namely, ‘the United States’ democracy promotion strategy.’ But the same is also true of the unique foci of the strategies and techniques that Lithuania and Sweden use to promote democracy in their recipient countries. So I think that we can also collapse these cases and speak simply of ‘Lithuania’s democracy promotion strategy’ and ‘Sweden’s democracy promotion strategy’ as well.

This similarity, however, suggests a more interesting difference between the three democracy promotion strategies of the three donor states, namely, a difference in their very concepts of democracy.

Lithuania and Sweden both tend to link democracy and human rights in the categories that they use for describing their democracy promotion efforts. This suggests that they both tend to think about democracy as having a strong emphasis on human rights. The United States, on the other hand, categorizes its democracy promotion efforts as ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’—and it does not even have an explicit category for human rights under its description of its foreign aid to Ukraine and Belarus. This suggests that the United States thinks about democracy more as a process of governing—
the process of governing justly and democratically—than as something associated with human rights.

Please do not misunderstand. I am not saying that Lithuania and Sweden are not concerned with the governing process.

I am saying that they do not conceive of it as the primary focus of democracy, which they seem to conceive of as being more concerned with human rights.

If we look back at the way in which these countries categorize their democracy promotion efforts (see Figure #12 above), we find that Lithuania conceives of ‘good governance and rule of law’ as an entirely separate category from democracy, and that Sweden’s conceives of ‘justice and home affairs’ as a sub-category under the rubric of ‘democratic governance’. I am saying that these different categorizations indicate that the Lithuanian and Sweden have different concepts of democracy and democracy promotion from the United States, and slightly different concept of democracy and democracy promotion from each other.

Earlier I noted Thomas Carothers’ view that there has been a diversification of strategies in recent democracy promotion efforts and that this has led to two distinct models of democracy promotion. Carothers has called these two different models the ‘political’ and ‘developmental’ approaches to democracy promotion, and he has characterized the political approach as ‘American’ and the developmental approach as ‘European’. I have argued above that the United States places a greater emphasis on the political process in its democracy promotion efforts than Sweden and Lithuania. I have
also argued that Sweden’s and Lithuania’s democracy promotion efforts are similar to each other in the emphasis that they place on human rights—especially when juxtaposed with the emphasis that the United States places upon the governing process. But when I look at Lithuania’s and Sweden’s democracy promotion strategies—as I have described them above—I do not quite see why we should regard the European approach, and not the American approach, as ‘developmental’.

4.1.3. How my analysis of the strategies and techniques might be problematic

My analysis of the strategies and techniques that the three donor countries use depends upon my description of those strategies and techniques, which in turn depends upon the information that the donor and recipient countries make public about them. Here, the major potential problem with my description and analysis of the democracy promotion strategies and techniques that the three donor countries that I have studied use is a lack of information at all levels. In most cases the information that is publicly available is incomplete. But in some cases it is very vague and sketchy. And in still other cases, it is not publicly available at all.

Thus, my description and analysis of the democracy promotion strategies and techniques that the three donor countries use in Belarus might be more problematic than my description and analysis of the other cases, since information about specific projects for promotion democracy in Belarus is simply not publicly available. I was thus very conscious of the fact that I was unable to make as thorough an analysis in the cases of
Another potential problem area is my description and analysis of the donor countries’ most recent democracy promotion efforts, since the relevant data for 2008 is not yet publicly available. The problem in Sweden’s case is mitigated by the fact that its democracy promotion projects usually last for several years. And the problem may also be mitigated in the case of the United States, since projected budgets for its democracy promotion efforts in 2008 are available.

A third potential problem is that only the United States describes its recent democracy promotion successes—which allows us to know that its projects were implemented—while in Lithuania’s case it is not even clear if the projects described were implemented. Lithuania’s failure to classify or categorize its foreign assistance projects in 2006 also made my case studies weaker than they might have been. I created my own categories to describe Lithuania’s projects—but I did not use them in my subsequent analysis, since they were, after all, my categories and not Lithuania’s. Lithuania, moreover, only listed its projects by name and did not even provide descriptions of them. This makes it difficult to know what ideas and actions were behind the titles, or whether and to what extent its projects matched its titles.

Finally, my argument would obviously be stronger if I had more case studies that showed the same or similar results. Here, additional cases could be drawn from Eastern Europe and other former Soviet Union countries. But they could also be drawn from the
donor countries’ democracy promotion strategies in other parts of the world, such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America—and I think that finding the same or similar results in these countries would especially bolster my claims.
4.2. Why the donor countries use the strategies that they use

I mentioned earlier in my analysis that all three donor countries promote democracy by developing the independent media, strengthening civil society, and enhancing the administrative capacities of their recipient countries. I also pointed out differences in their democracy promotion efforts that I think reveal differences in their concepts of democracy. My hypothesis is that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden promote democracy in different ways, and that their different democracy promotion strategies arise from their different concepts of democracy—or, at least, from the different emphases that they place upon the values that are often associated with democracy. Simply put, Lithuania emphasizes fraternity (or a shared sense of community) in its democracy promotion efforts; the United States emphasizes liberty; and Sweden emphasizes equality. I think that this means that Lithuania values fraternity more than it values liberty or equality; that the United States values liberty more than it values equality or fraternity; and that Sweden values equality more than liberty or fraternity. In what follows I will explain how these different values translate into different concepts of democracy.

I have already suggested that Lithuania’s reasons for promoting democracy in Ukraine and Belarus arise from its sense of a shared common history and cultural heritage with these countries that date back to the 13th century. I think that this sense of shared history and culture forms a bond of community—or a sense of fraternity—that
justifies Lithuania’s assistance to Ukraine and Belarus to Lithuanians. I am not alone in this analysis.

Jonavicius writes that “history and bilateral, cultural and ethnic relations among nations result in different countries trying to assist those states that are seen as the most similar and closest in terms of historical experience” (14). And he argues that Lithuania is more interested “in Ukraine and Belarus (with which they share the common history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Republic of Two Nations)” (14). But if this is true, then Lithuania’s democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine and Belarus both arise from and are justified by the Lithuanians’ sense of fraternity—or ‘brotherhood’—with Ukrainians and Belarusians (and even Moldovans).

But here, what is interesting is that when Lithuania promotes ‘democracy’ it is generally sharing its technical knowledge about strengthening ties to the European community. This can be seen in the democracy promotion projects that Lithuania implements in Moldova and Belarus (see Figure #12 above).

Lithuania has thus focused its democracy promotion efforts in Moldova upon preparing Moldovans for integration into the European Union and upon explaining NATO to them. And in Belarus, it has focused upon empowering grass-roots organizations, creating summer programs and summer camps for Belarusian youth, and sharing information about the European Union with Belarusian students in exile via the European Humanitarian University. These programs strike me as clear attempts to create
and enhance a sense of community and, more specifically, of belonging to the European Community.

Lithuania is clearly promoting fraternity—or a sense of European brotherhood—through these programs.

The United States’ democracy promotion efforts, by contrast, put their emphasis upon enhancing the rule of law, reforming courts, and enforcing law and human rights in their recipient countries, especially in Ukraine and Moldova. The United States also places a great emphasis upon developing political parties and fair election administrations. What does this mean about the United States’ concept of democracy? Having a strong rule of law in a country enhances the ability of its citizens to act with a knowledge of the likely legal consequences of their actions. Having effective political parties in a country helps to ensure that the political interests of its citizens will be represented in the political process. And having free and fair elections allows individual citizens to have a voice in the choice of their leaders. My sense is that these programs promote democracy by enhancing the individual’s ability to choose his or her political representatives and legislatures—and that the United States is thus promoting something like individual freedom, or liberty, when it promotes democracy.

Finally, Sweden’s democracy promotion efforts aim at increasing human rights—and socio-economic, gender, and political equality along with it. Sweden also lists concerns about the environment under its category ‘human rights/democracy.’ Here, Lithuanians

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83 In case of Belarus, the United States cannot promote democracy in Belarusian governmental institutions; thus the foci are slightly different as they are described above.
and Americans might wonder what environmental protection has to do with democracy and human rights. But I think that this simply reveals that Sweden has a different notion of democracy. I think that Sweden sees environmental protection as a human right, and the protection of human rights as what democracy is all about. This is quite different from developing community or ensuring freedom. And it is, perhaps, the reason why Sweden’s democracy promotion projects emphasize equality.

I am aware that Sweden has tried to shake off the image that it promotes socialist programs, the so-called ‘Swedish social model’. But after analyzing Sweden’s recent democracy promotion projects, I do not see that it has significantly changed its strategy. It is clear, however, that the specific Swedish democracy promotion projects that I have analyzed above aim at enhancing equality.

It may be tempting to attribute these differences to minimalist and maximalist concepts of democracy—as described by Joseph A. Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl respectively—but I think that this would be a mistake. The differences that I am pointing out cut across the minimalist-maximalist distinction. They are not differences about how much we build into democracy—whether we include only elections or campaign finance laws as well—but differences in what we build into it and in the emphasis that we place upon it. Liberal democracy has paid homage to liberty, equality, and fraternity at least

84 “Swedish policy-makers strongly rejected the standard suggestion that Swedish democracy promotion in this period emphasised the state as part of a strategy of replicating the Swedish social model. They insisted that this approach was ‘history’, with Sweden now seeking to find ‘good partners’ to work on the issues those organisations considered to be of primary importance. Those involved in twinning programmes stressed recognition of the impropriety of seeking to replicate Swedish models, although recognised that they instinctively saw problems from ‘a Swedish perspective’” (Youngs et al. 109) in Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006.
since the French Revolution. But it is obvious that these ideals can often be at odds with each other. And what I have been arguing here is that Lithuania’s version of democracy emphasizes community, the United States’ version emphasizes liberty, and Sweden’s version emphasizes equality.

4.3 Alternative explanations to my hypothesis

I understand that my hypothesis about why Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden use the democracy promotion strategies that they use may be false, and that there may be other reasons why they promote different things under rubric of promoting democracy. So let me present a few possible alternative explanations.

First, donor states may decide to divide their labor and to use their expertise where they have special knowledge. Under this hypothesis, the three donor states would promote only the things that they are especially good at promoting. So Lithuania would promote community because it is especially good at promoting community. The United States would promote liberty because it is especially good at promoting liberty. Sweden would promote equality because it is especially good at promoting equality. And they would divide their labor in this way even if they value other aspects of democracy more.

Second, smaller donor countries, such as Lithuania and Sweden, may have only a limited capacity of local NGO’s to implement their democracy promotion projects—and those NGO’s may have limited capacities of their own. A donor country might, for example, be limited in the funds that it can spend upon democracy promotion. And an NGO may propose only certain kinds of democracy promotion projects because of its
capacity—or it may be able to implement only certain kinds of democracy promotion projects regardless of what might be proposed.

A third possible explanation is that the three different donor countries simply have different perceptions of what the recipient countries need to develop into strong liberal democracies.

These are all possibilities, and to reject them completely I would need to make another study and to write another thesis. But thus said, none of the three alternative explanations strike me as particularly plausible—or as getting to the real heart of the matter.

I have studied the democracy promotion strategies of Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden in some depth, and I have not come across any mention of an agreement among these states to divide their labor in the way suggested. On the contrary, they each have democracy promotion projects in the three common areas that I have identified above. But even if there were such an agreement, we would still have to ask the questions ‘Why is Lithuania good at promoting community?’, ‘Why is the United States good at promoting liberty?’, and ‘Why is Sweden good at promoting equality?’ And I think that the plausible answer might be that these are the things that these three countries value most about democracy.

The second alternative explanation also strikes me as implausible. It is true that Sweden is more limited in the funds that it can allocate to democracy promotion than the United States, and that Lithuania is more limited still. So it is clearly the case that these
countries cannot afford all of projects that the United States is able to afford. But thus said, I know of no reason to think that Sweden and Lithuania would be unable to afford projects that promote liberty.

Finally, the third alternative explanation seems to beg the very question at issue. For why do these three donor states have different perceptions about what their recipient states need, if not for the fact that their perceptions correspond to what they associate most with democracy?
5. CONCLUSION – effects on democracy promotion more generally

In this section I will consider the possible consequences that my findings might have for democracy promotion in the future.

I have found in this study that three donor states, Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden, have used different strategies to promote democracy in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Their different democracy promotion strategies can be aligned with the well-known ideals of the French revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. I have thus argued that when Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden promote democracy in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, they are actually promoting fraternity, liberty, and equality respectively.

According to my hypothesis, the different democracy promotion strategies of the three donor countries arise from their different, and in fact competing, concepts of ‘liberal democracy’. I understand that there may be many reasons why donor countries might want to promote democracy in other countries, and that there are many reasons why people in recipient countries might accept democracy. I think that the various different justifications for democracy and democracy promotion may ultimately arise from different and competing world views and values. I think that the different concepts of democracy that I have described, and the different justifications for promoting it, ultimately arise from the different values that Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden place upon liberty, equality, and fraternity.
But what difference does it make for the field of democracy promotion whether what I am saying is true?

From a purely academic perspective, getting clear about how Lithuania, the United States, and Sweden promote democracy in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus allows us to better understand some of the different democracy promotion strategies that are being employed in the Eastern European countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century. My study, furthermore, shows significant differences between the democracy promotion strategies of Sweden and Lithuania—and, hence, at least some of the Western European and Eastern European European Union member states. Recognition of these specific similarities and differences between them is—to my knowledge—a unique contribution to that comparative literature.

But there are other, and for some much more interesting, reasons why my findings might be significant for the future of democracy promotion.

For one thing, they might mean that democracy promoters in different countries may come to recognize that they may actually be promoting very different things when they promote democracy.

For another, they might mean that democracy promoters in different countries might be less inclined to cooperate with each other in their democracy promotion efforts when they do, or that they might be inclined to cooperate only to the extent to which it advances their own concept of democracy.
For a third, the recognition of differences in their democracy promotion strategies and techniques might open up new opportunities for the possible ways in which the United States, Lithuania, Sweden, and other countries might coordinate their efforts to promote democracy—which may, in turn, lead us to revise and improve our current democracy promotion strategies.

In the three common areas of democracy promotion that I have studied—the development of civil society, independent media, and administrative capacity in the recipient countries—my findings could lead to greater cooperation and a more effective division of labor among donor countries.

A fourth possible answer to the question—‘What might these findings mean for the future of democracy promotion?’—is that countries that are new to democracy promotion might, as a result of my findings, be better able to craft and design their own models for democracy promotion in a more self-conscious way. My findings might, in other words, help countries that are new to democracy promotion to recognize that they do not have to follow one pre-established model of promoting democracy, or accept one pre-established concept of democracy. And this, in turn, might mean that Japan and South Korea, for example, could either evaluate which model for democracy promotion and which concept of democracy fits them best—or even create their own democracy promotion strategies and techniques and their own unique concept of democracy that might be better suited for Asian or African contexts.
I think that my findings also contribute to the nation-building literature, especially since democracy promotion is now an integral part of nation-building efforts around the world. Afghanistan is an on-going nation-building project. Each of the donor countries that I have studied has been involved there—Lithuania in Ghor province, Sweden in Mazar-e-Sharif, and the United States throughout Afghanistan—and each of them have Provincial Reconstruction Teams (or PRTs). It may be a very useful to take a closer look at the possibly different emphases of their democracy, peace, and stability strategies and techniques in an effort to coordinate them.

Last, but not least, I think that my findings may raise questions about what some of the standard evaluations of our democracy promotion efforts actually mean. I mentioned above that Larry Diamond and others have recently written about a current ‘recession’ of democracy that is occurring in many countries, including Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. This assessment, however, is based upon the yearly evaluations that are made by various predominately American organization—such as Freedom House, which, as its name might suggest, puts a high value on freedom or liberty. But even if it is true that liberty has been decreasing in recent years, this may not mean that community and equality have been decreasing as well. Ukraine, for example, has one of the most vibrant civil societies in Eastern Europe. If nothing else, my findings show that democracy may mean different things for different people, and that we should be cautious about saying that democracy is increasing or decreasing around the world—or at least be very clear about what we mean when we say it.
Specific USG ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ programs for Ukraine in 2007, as listed on the U.S. State Department’s website, included:85

**Rule of Law** - Ukraine’s aspiration to join the Euro-Atlantic community requires it to ensure that its justice system comports with European norms and standards. However, 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine still has not replaced its Soviet-era Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). The lack of a unified Ukrainian Bar Association, in contrast to the European norm, impedes the development of a system of continued legal education and inhibits the establishment of uniform procedures to enforce professional ethics, discipline, and anti-corruption initiatives for defense attorneys. The over-use of pre-trial detention and the poor availability of alternatives to incarcerating accused persons awaiting trial are factors highlighted as not meeting minimum European norms.

USG assistance projects are designed to help Ukraine address these challenges. One core project supported the GOU’s drafting of a Council of Europe (CoE)-compliant CPC. This draft CPC was undergoing final revisions at the end of 2007 and is to be introduced into parliament by early 2008. The new CPC will be the most important mechanism for ensuring the implementation of the Concept for Justice Reform, developed with assistance from the USG. Once approved by the National Security and Defense Council, the Concept will legally require the GOU to amend laws pertaining to the law enforcement community, the judiciary, and defense attorneys, bringing them into compliance with European standards and norms.

One recommendation of the CoE is to put in place a single Draft Law on the Bar. In FY 2007 the USG began to assess the three competing Draft Laws on the Bar using European standards. When completed, the assessment will allow parliament by early 2008 to consolidate the legislative-drafting process, so as to create a recognized organization of advocates authorized to govern and control the defense practice of law, to create an effective mechanism for the establishment of a continued legal education system, and to introduce necessary anti-corruption safeguards into the overall system of the Defense Bar.

The U.S. supported a network of 27 consultation centers and clinics that provided more than 8,000 legal consultations, filed nearly 1,800 administrative actions, and represented clients in nearly 1,400 lawsuits in FY 2007. The direct support provided through pro bono legal consultations, advocacy services and public awareness campaigns to disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, in conjunction with training programs for pro

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85U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115983.htm>
bono lawyers on substantive and procedural law issues, ensured Ukrainians have increasing access to high quality, competent legal services and information. Assistance programs also included workshops for law professors on human rights, EU law, and legal research. To increase justice sector efficiency and accountability, the U.S. trained 600 staff, improved judicial selection and disciplinary procedures, and fostered consensus-building dialogue around judicial reform for 165 key policy makers. Programs promoted the creation of a comprehensive legislative framework for judicial reform by providing legal advice and expertise for draft legislation, thereby aligning Ukrainian reform initiatives with international standards.

As a result of USG activities, half of the recommended changes to the key draft Law on the Judiciary were approved by the president and forwarded to parliament. An important change is transferring authority for the appointment and removal of chief judges from the executive branch to the Council of Judges. USG assistance programs also supported six public hearings on legal reforms, civic monitoring in 49 courts, and expert analysis, publication, and distribution of court decisions. With USG support, the High Administrative Court has started publishing its decisions on the Internet since September 2007. To date, 225 decisions have been published on the Internet and 261 more decisions are pending. The number of people using the official registry of the court decisions on the web site has increased, and the feedback is very positive. The results of this pilot reform will be used to develop recommendations for the State Court Administration on improving case management.

**Good Governance** - Despite a large intake of new Members of Parliament (MPs) and a political crisis that essentially froze legislative activity for six months, the national legislature (Verkhovna Rada, or VR) improved its committee oversight capacity as a result of U.S. training programs for MPs and their staff in the legislative and budget processes, committee operations, and citizen access. The U.S. helped to professionalize the VR’s operation by developing, publishing, and distributing six comprehensive guides on the legislative process. The USG-funded parliamentary internship program complemented this effort by exposing promising young graduates to the legislature’s work, engaging them in the parliamentary process, and further opening the VR’s operations to the public. However, the VR assumed less financial and administrative responsibility for the internship administration than originally planned because the political crisis prevented the secretariat from focusing on long-term planning issues. The U.S. provided reference resources covering all major aspects of parliamentary practice, and which complement VR institutional staff development and training. With U.S. support, VR gender outreach expanded as a result of regular gender focus group meetings and professional workshops on gender issues.

USG assistance contributed to increased VR transparency in FY 2007. The parliament took steps to improve working conditions for journalists to complete the strategic
communication plan developed in close cooperation with USG experts. Other programs helped to improve cooperation between the VR, Ukrainian NGOs, and foreign donors through an information fair in the VR, as well as field committee hearings that attracted hundreds of citizens and local NGO representatives. To further promote transparency, the USG funded two small grants to indigenous NGOs to provide Ukrainian voters with timely, accurate information about the activities of their MPs and to analyze various proposals for constitutional reform. As a result, the political parties that won pre term parliamentary elections and finally formed majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada declared their intentions to amend the Ukrainian Constitution to balance the powers of various branches of government.

Even after the VR was officially dissolved in mid-summer 2007, USG assistance supported the conduct of small group sessions to improve working relations between majority and opposition representatives. In order to build linkages and improve communications within the executive branch, the USG brokered discussions with political appointees in the Cabinet of Ministers and Presidential Secretariat oriented toward helping the political actors work effectively after elections.

The USG facilitated the decentralization and strengthening of local government capacity in FY 2007. With this support, local authorities developed performance-based budgets in 85 cities, attracted $70 million in foreign direct investment, trained nearly 17,500 elected and appointed city officials, and drafted 20 laws, regulations, and policies. USG efforts increased state budget transparency, efficiency, and accountability by helping to implement performance program budgeting at five national ministries, three regional oblasts, and at the local level. As a result, three national working groups formed on macroeconomic forecasting and budgeting, enabling strategic planning for long-term budget implementation. Twenty-four cities implemented strategic economic plans, resulting in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) growth, work force development, increased foreign direct investment, communal service improvement, increased communal land utilization, and heightened private sector competitiveness.

The USG worked with the central government to promote greater fiscal and policy decentralization, helping to draft legal acts on local self-government, submit related draft laws in Ukraine’s parliament, strengthen the economic autonomy for local self-governance, and train local government officials in 16 separate self-government disciplines. Although the GOU was supportive of several regulatory initiatives, GOU personnel and policy changes following the September election could jeopardize these initiatives. Hopefully, working relations were sufficiently institutionalized to increase understanding of the need for greater decentralization. To build upon the reforms mandated by the passage of new equal opportunities legislation, over 52% of the individuals that received USG training to facilitate decentralization and strengthen local governance were female.
Political Competition and Consensus Building - With the introduction of a fully proportional electoral system, political parties became the sole formal participants in the electoral process and the critical vehicles for Ukrainian governance. While parties still need to improve their governance and policy-making capacity and their ability to build lasting governing coalitions and establish effective links between legislative and executive branches, they have become more critical for Ukraine’s democratic consolidation than at any point since independence.

USG assistance to political parties strengthened their coalition-building capacity, particularly at the local level. After the announcement of snap elections following the spring 2007 political crisis, political party training largely focused on campaigning and coalition-building. Additionally, USG assistance worked to build the capacity of young political leaders and local elected officials. USG assistance also helped Ukrainian youth engage more effectively in the political process by providing practical skills in basic party organization and mobilization. These activities were complemented by an annual opinion survey gauging citizens’ views on political and social developments in Ukraine, which provided key insights into public views on the democratic transition.

With the support of USG assistance, the elections law was amended to include provisions requiring that printed articles commissioned by parties be appropriately marked and that parties use budget funds for paid political advertising only on national TV channels. This effectively halved public expenditures for pre-election campaigning in media. The USG also supported small grants to indigenous NGOs to support activities such as exit polling, voter education, get-out-the-vote efforts, poll monitoring, media monitoring, and youth participation for the September election. This support helped contribute to the third election in Ukraine’s history designated as meeting OSCE and international standards.

Civil Society - This year’s political crisis and parliamentary dissolution stalled national-level NGO legislative initiatives, including a major new draft law on associations designed to bring Ukraine’s NGO-enabling environment in line with European standards. However, future prospects for passage of this major law remain good because it is included in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. Despite political instability, the USG contributed to a number of positive changes in the legal environment for NGOs. New value-added tax (VAT) exemptions on charitable assistance came into effect; NGO membership fees were exempted from income tax; the minimum threshold for deductible donations was removed; and the maximum threshold of 5% was recognized by the tax authorities as a result of a court decision. USG assistance helped the Ministry of Justice improve regulations on NGO registration, reducing paperwork and reconciling previous jurisdictional disputes between public registrars.

The USG worked to strengthen Ukrainian civil society by providing assistance to approximately 1,100 NGOs to improve their organizational capacity, increase
professional standards, strengthen internal governance, and build advocacy skills. USG support enabled NGOs to engage citizens in key issue areas including community development, anti-corruption, youth leadership, NGO law reform, and NGO ethics. This helped improve the financial viability of NGOs by promoting community philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and social entrepreneurship initiatives which supported vulnerable populations, created new jobs, and generated revenue to support core NGO mandates.

In FY 2007 USG grants continued to support networks that promote civic participation in areas key to Ukraine’s democratic development. For example, the USG funded 18 organizations to promote equal opportunities for women and men. Network participants monitored the implementation of Equal Opportunities legislation on the national and regional levels and conducted training for media on how to cover gender issues. Monitoring results will be distributed nation-wide and recommendations for changes to the Equal Opportunities legislation will be submitted to parliament for review and consideration in spring 2008. USG funding was used to establish a national system of patients’ rights protection, which will bring together 15 leaders to promote patients’ rights, raise public awareness of violations in the medical sphere, and encourage public involvement and influence to make changes in the system. USG assistance supported the organization of 24 human rights discussion clubs across Ukraine in order to promote discussion of human rights issues to raise public awareness and encourage participants to become advocates for human rights. USG assistance also supported a network of 14 organizations to set up a system of student leadership in Ukraine’s universities. Student councils created in each region advocated for quality education and combat corruption. USG-sponsored small grants also supported the core activities of indigenous organizations. These programs included support for research, seminars, publications, websites, and press monitoring on issues such as legislative reform, civic participation, NGO development, Crimean affairs, defense policy, and military reform. USG-funded projects targeted eco-corruption, corruption in public procurement, and government transparency.

A special focus of USG assistance to strengthen civil society was support to key legacy organizations capable of serving the NGO sector in a number of areas, including the development of progressive NGO legislation, providing intermediary training, financial and other support resources, conducting policy analysis, and performing watchdog and public oversight functions. USG programs also contributed to incremental improvement in public perceptions of NGO activities by organizing regional press tours on a variety of civil society and advocacy issues. Training for journalists on reporting on the NGO sector also increased media awareness of NGO contributions. Overall, information regarding the achievements of local grantees appeared in more than 200 national and regional publications, 95 reports in electronic media, and on 40 television channels throughout the country.
The USG provided 16 grants to allow U.S. exchange program alumni to use the skills and experience they acquired in the U.S. to become agents of democratic change in Ukraine by undertaking projects in democracy building, economic reform, and community service in their hometowns. Through training seminars, workshops, conferences, and the development of Internet resources and manuals, alumni disseminated information related to topics such as peer mediation, women as leaders, youth leadership, tolerance, education reform, a code of ethics for higher education, volunteerism, corporate social responsibility, European integration, globalization, and critical thinking. Activities primarily targeted youth, high school teachers, university professors, educational administrators, community leaders, and representatives of NGOs. The USG also brought three U.S. experts to Ukraine to speak on topics including student government, promotion of tolerance, and the responsibilities of regional government press offices.

In the area of media in FY 2007, USG assistance worked to increase access to independent information, particularly in the regions, through intensive media monitoring and training to strengthen basic reporting skills, civic journalism, journalistic ethics, election coverage, and investigative reporting. USG funded supported training for more than 1,430 Ukrainian journalists. In addition, the USG provided technical assistance to approximately 200 non-state regional news outlets on media business development. USG efforts strengthened the organizational capacity of eight key media partners and expanded their role in facilitating public discussions on media issues. The 2006 /2007 MSI (Media Sustainability Index) score showed the most significant increase for the “business management” objective (2.83 compared with 2.26 in 2005). The overall 2006 /2007 MSI score for Ukraine is 2.37. USG efforts strengthened the organizational capacity of eight key media NGO partners. As a result, media broadcast and print publishers associations have become strong advocates of industry interests, provide effective assistance, and protect the rights of member outlets. Media watchdog NGOs widely publicized media monitoring results and increased public debate on key media issues.

To improve professional standards, USG assistance helped develop a model editorial statute for television and radio companies that guarantees editorial independence. The statute was adopted by a number of television and radio companies, including the National Television Company of Ukraine. The USG contributed to efforts to reform the legal and operational environment for the media sector, including new legislative bills on television and radio, and on state and municipal print editorial freedom. These bills were under consideration by parliament when it was dissolved. The USG also worked to improve media independence by providing privatization training to representatives of municipal and state-owned media. As a result of USG-funded consultations and technical assistance, 16 state-owned media outlets decided to begin privatizing without waiting for a government initiative.
In FY 2007 the USG awarded 78 grants to independent Ukrainian media organizations in 14 oblasts to support projects on information distribution, local governance and accountability, citizen rights, media advocacy, and pre-term parliamentary elections coverage. Several USG-funded grants were targeted to support Internet-based outlets and projects, particularly in the regions. For example, the U.S. awarded small grants to local entities such as the Donetsk-based Internet newspaper Ostriv. Such assistance increased access to independent information in Eastern Ukraine, where much of the population still receives its news from official Russian sources just across the border. With USG support, Ostriv’s website began arranging interviews and live Internet chats with national political figures and their regional representatives and provided local journalists and political analysts the opportunity to produce online diaries. Ostriv received around 9,000 visitors each day, and its stories were cited by the regional media more often than any other local news source. Its articles and analytical essays were reprinted in large-circulation media outlets. FY 2007 the U.S. also helped to open 16 new Internet centers in previously under-served cities, including areas with minority population, bringing the total of USG-funded centers nationwide to 131. Library directors at the new Internet centers received training on access to electronic information as an important function of a public library in a democratic society.

The U.S. promoted the development of a sustainable free and independent press in Ukraine by establishing long-term partnerships between Ukrainian and U.S. media outlets, as well as U.S. outlets and Ukrainian students. One project sponsored internships in the U.S. for Ukrainian media professionals, and also financed visits to Ukraine for their American counterparts. The USG also continued to support visits of Ukrainian broadcasters to the U.S. to produce documentaries jointly with counterpart U.S. media outlets. In FY 2007 the Ukrainian television station Tonis, one of the leading stations in the country, participated in a program on alternative energy. The USG also awarded travel grants to media practitioners to increase their understanding of international standards of journalism, NATO/ EU integration, and ethnic tolerance. USG assistance also supported internships at leading media outlets for 400 students on such topics as news reporting, journalism investigation, photo journalism, and editing. Additionally, many participants attended seminars, workshops, and conferences in Europe and the U.S. The experience significantly contributed to promoting competitive and viable regional media. Journalists’ exposure to modern methods of communication and methods of preparing and delivering information improved the quality of print and broadcast materials on both national and regional levels.
APPENDIX 2

Specific USG ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ programs for Belarus in 2007, as listed on the U.S. State Department’s website, included:

| Political Competition and Consensus Building | In the run-up to the January 2007 local elections, the USG directed its assistance in support of democratic processes toward capacity building among regional branches of democratic parties and the equipping of political and civic activists with the skills and knowledge to monitor election campaigns. USG funds also supported regional and local non-partisan get-out-the-vote efforts. Local polls failed to meet even the most basic preconditions to be considered free or fair. Following the rigged local election, USG assistance focused on fostering the cohesion of the democratic movement in a non-electoral period. In April 2007 a breakthrough strategic dialogue session brought the Political Council of the United Democratic Forces together with more than 50 activists. In May 2007 the United Democratic Forces held its second national congress in Minsk, with 568 delegates in attendance. The group agreed on a collective leadership with five co-chairs as well as a united plan of action to present a positive alternative to the Lukashenko regime that engages society in a dialogue on the future of Belarus. |
| Civil Society | With independent NGOs under constant GOB scrutiny, USG efforts helped sustain local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), independent trade unions, associations of small entrepreneurs, and legal assistance providers. The USG supported training to over 60 Belarusian NGOs and their leaders in organizational development, advocacy, rights education, and protection. Over 50 grants were awarded to local NGOs to support their initiatives. USG assistance supported five regional resource centers, which in turn were able to conduct 30 training workshops, publish more than 50 bulletins, and make 150 small grants to local civic initiatives. As part of an effort to increase the capacity of Belarusian civil society organizations, in particular media, the USG funded 45 projects with small grants. With this support, four regional and eight district human rights centers were able to expand their services, including providing free legal aid to victims of human rights violations and conducting awareness-raising events for the general public. USG resources were also used to fund four grants to NGOs to provide humanitarian and legal support to activists, whose rights were violated, benefiting more than 300 persons. USG assistance to ten university-based legal clinics supported the provision of legal services to the most vulnerable citizens, including prisoners and their families. This program strove to engage young legal professionals. In FY 2007 activities included opportunities for student clinic representatives to meet and plan future activities such as training workshops, professional meetings, the launch of an Internet resource on legal clinics, and the production of a textbook for clinical education in Belarus (with a |

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corresponding course syllabus). Six clinic leaders participated in a study tour to Russia to the St. Petersburg Center for Legal Clinical Education. Over 50 students from three Minsk-based and seven regional clinics took part in workshops and clinic activities.

In order to increase access to independent information in the face of GOB restrictions, USG assistance continued to support independent print and Internet-based domestic publications. USG funding supported regional publishers to produce 75 independent newspapers and bulletins, two key independent websites, and Belarus' only e-mail daily newspaper. Trainings for journalists and media managers helped sustain the local media’s capacity to publish and distribute. In addition, eight registered independent newspapers received funding from the USG, as did two new unregistered regional bi-monthly publications with circulations of 50,000 each. Although projects had not been completed at year end, interim reports indicated that USG assistance enabled many of these newspapers to increase their readership by an average of 10-16%. Support to upgrade these publications increased volume, allowing space for regional, analytical, and interactive reporting, thereby attracting more professional journalists. In some cases, the addition of color copy enhanced the quality of the publications, making them more competitive. Successful distribution, given the lack of commercial and legal means, varied from region to region, and utilized a variety of methods to maximize readership. While distribution of independent newspapers was a challenge, there was some evidence of improvement. One representative of the independent press established a regional network to distribute periodicals at 156 new sites.

The United States, EU, and other bilateral donors provided funding for European Radio for Belarus (ERB), based in Warsaw, which provides independent news via the internet and radio. ERB began broadcasting in 2006 and has moved steadily to increase its listeners both on the radio and the Internet. During 2007 ERB steadily increased its audience and programming. The results of independent polls showed significant growth of the radio audience, reaching 1.9% nationally and 12% in the Brest region. A web counter has confirmed over 16,000 hits per month, a four-fold increase from the end of 2006. ERB’s development into a truly multi-media platform was a major achievement of the year.

The USG also hosted American experts on elections processes, library management, business education, intellectual property rights protection, and women’s entrepreneurship. Speakers visiting Belarus participated in roundtable events conducted at the U.S. Embassy as well as speaking events at universities, schools, professional organizations, and the USG-created American Corners, with one speaking engagement in a regional city. In several cases in FY 2007 the speaker program built on relationships between the speaker and the inviting host institution. For example, one speaker provided a mini-course for university students on business practices. Speakers met with independent and state media outlets, resulting in articles or television coverage that
reached thousands of Belarusians. Since it is a relatively rare opportunity in Belarus for a scholar, student, or professional to be able to communicate directly with an American expert in their field, these programs contributed significantly to broader USG goals – such as improving business education or awareness of intellectual property rights – as well as longer term aims of enhancing the general image of Americans among a growing number of Belarusians.

In order to build upon past efforts, the USG supported networking and other activities for the alumni of its programs. Activities ranged from discussions about child abuse, rehabilitation for disabilities, agro-tourism, human rights education, digital information reference, and violence among youth. Additionally, alumni organized or participated in a variety of events, including an art exhibition, sports activities, conferences, nationwide competitions, publications, workshops, and training of trainers. These activities strengthened relationships between the USG and alumni, many of whom are leaders in Belarus capable of influencing its future development.
Specific USG ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ programs for Moldova in 2007, as listed on the U.S. State Department’s website, included:87

**Rule of Law and Human Rights** - USG assistance efforts in FY 2007 focused on improving citizens’ access to justice by increasing public education, competent legal services, and judicial effectiveness, and assisting Moldova’s legal system to operate transparently, efficiently, and independently. Training programs and workshops were provided to develop the capacity of defense lawyers. The USG also provided technical assistance to the Moldovan Bar Association on the effective implementation of the national anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies. Seven USG-sponsored traveling lawyers provided legal aid to over 4,400 socially disadvantaged individuals living in rural areas. With the support of USG assistance, four legal clinics and a legal aid component of a domestic violence shelter collectively provided services to nearly 1,200 clients. USG-backed written analyses and comments were submitted to the GOM on draft laws related to the criminal-law system. Twenty-five members of parliament were trained to recognize lobbying as a potential source of corruption. USG grantees also produced several public information documents, including the Second Annual Judicial Reform Index and a report that measured the degree to which Moldovan laws promoted and protected the human rights of women. USG assistance also supported the selection of four pilot courts envisioned in the TCP. The pilot courts will be studied for workflow and case flow analysis. Based upon this analysis, the administration, systems, software, and training for courts will be developed in the pilot courts and then rolled out throughout the court system. Longer term impacts of these activities are not yet evident.

During FY 2007 USG-sponsored recommendations helped the GOM improve draft laws affecting criminal justice. The Moldovan Supreme Council of Magistrates passed on first reading a code of ethics that the GOM developed with extensive comment and assistance from the USG. Also with USG assistance, the Chairperson of the Criminal Collegium of the Supreme Court of Justice established a working group to develop sentencing guidelines for criminal cases. The proposed sentencing guidelines will increase the uniform application of criminal law provisions when imposing sentences. Sentences that are more well-founded and well-reasoned will also increase the credibility of the justice system in Moldova.

In July 2007 the USG sponsored a roundtable discussion for the Procuracy, law enforcement, civil society, and the judiciary on investigating corrupt investigators. Also in July 2007 a MCC TCP program began to reform the organization and operation of Moldova’s anti-corruption agency, the Center for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (CCECC). In September 2007 CCECC leadership agreed to several significant changes that will streamline the organization to decrease opportunities for internal corruption and also improve CCECC enforcement efforts. These reforms include

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87 U.S. Department of State. [http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115979.htm)
improved personnel management procedures, an improved financial disclosure regime and the creation of a corruption prevention unit. Work on the creation of a Civilian Oversight Board also began.

Political Competition and Consensus Building - Observers declared that Moldova’s June 2007 local elections mostly met international standards. However, concerns remained, including misuse of power by the ruling Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM) to support its candidates and the lack of unfettered access to media for opposition candidates. The PCRM suffered a serious defeat as the party’s share of the vote fell from 46% in 2003 to 34% in the 2007 elections for mayors and district councils. The PCRM’s control over local districts fell drastically, from 30 districts to only 10. In Chisinau, an opposition candidate for mayor was elected with 61% of the vote in a run-off election against the PCRM candidate. In FY 2007 the USG provided technical assistance to campaign managers, staff, and candidates from the major political parties in the run-up to the 2007 local elections. Over 6,000 individuals received USG-assisted training in campaign management, voter mobilization techniques, door-to-door campaigning, message development, communications, and fundraising. These efforts played a key role in increasing political competition. Political parties at the grassroots level improved campaign management; many of those trained successfully used their new skills during the campaign period. The 2007 local elections also saw considerable electoral gains by previously less well-organized opposition parties.

Civil Society - In FY 2007 seventy-eight community initiative groups led their communities in identifying and prioritizing community problems and in developing appropriate solutions. Over 100 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations were awarded grants to advocate for social issues such as voter education, human trafficking, and youth leadership. Three Transnistrian NGOs received grants to advocate for counter-trafficking measures and to train 50 young journalists from Transnistria. The USG also provided grants to promote and enhance public engagement and oversight of the pressing issues of poverty reduction, democratic elections, European integration, and fighting corruption. For example, several grants were provided to local independent media outlets for election debates. The USG also provided support to a broad coalition of NGOs and media partners to monitor corruption at the national and local levels. One vehicle for these activities was a coalition of NGOs dedicated to exposing and eradicating corruption. In May, the USG hosted a roundtable discussion for members of the coalition entitled, “GOM Reform Process, Anti-Corruption Activities, and the Role of Civil Society.” The coalition group held four quarterly meetings with the Prime Minister to discuss the national anti-corruption strategy and other anti-corruption initiatives. Further, the GOM included three members of the coalition in the TCP Development Working Group and in the official GOM TCP Monitoring and Implementation Working Group. These are key achievements, as NGOs are now becoming more effective monitors of GOM reform polices.
role in the implementation of the MCC TCP and with USG assistance, the GOM drafted and distributed for public comment a “TCP Information and Communications Strategy” and a draft “Concept on Cooperation of Public Institutions and Civil Society in the TCP.” Broad elements of Moldovan civil society participated, making extensive comments and suggestions for each draft. The USG also completed both a NGO capacity and needs assessment and a media assessment to establish baseline data as required under the MCC Threshold Country Program.

Under the aegis of the MCC TCP, the USG launched a major effort in September to monitor media reporting on corruption. The project will publicly report results on a monthly basis. A Moldovan association of legal clinics also received a USG grant to provide legal assistance to victims of corruption, as envisioned in the TCP.

Moldovan citizens are now making greater demands on the GOM to respect their rights, as illustrated by the growing number of complaints filed by Moldovan citizens against the GOM at the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR). The complaints filed by Moldovans before the ECHR totaled over 1,700 at the end of 2007. Community initiative groups have been successful in developing grassroots organizational structures to advocate for critical community needs, such as the repair of government schools, roads, and other infrastructure. Due in part to USG efforts, the GOM is now more accepting of the efforts of Moldovan civil society, as grantees successfully created fora for cooperation between civil society and government that led to more inclusive policymaking and to better representation of civic groups’ interests in the government and parliament.
APPENDIX 4


Table 1. Member states’ aid allocations with shares of total development aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Aid Category</th>
<th>Amount (€ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of ODA</th>
<th>Year*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Good governance, human rights and peace-building</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Democracy, civil society and public administration</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Democratic governance and human rights</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Human rights and Democratisation</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Government and civil society</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>European initiative for democracy and human rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Democracy, civil society</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The most recent year of available data.
APPENDIX 5


DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Support to Ukraine's EU integration

Tripartite Cooperation on EU Integration in Diplomatic Training in Ukraine

Project period: March 2006 – December 2008
Implementing agency: SIPU International
Local counterpart: Diplomatic Academy; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Sida contribution: 2 040 000 SEK

Project brief: The project aims at strengthening Ukrainian foreign relations with the EU both in the long and the short term. In the long term, the project will support the DAU in its efforts to establish a modern faculty for European Studies, giving the DAU access to teaching methodology and educational management practices from its partner countries. In the short term, the project will include ad hoc courses on key topics for the MFA staff. The objective is to contribute to Ukraine's capability to manage an EU integration process.

Support to Building EU Skills in the Diplomatic Academy in Ukraine: ESD Scholarship Programme

Project period: June 2006 – December 2008
Implementing agency: Estonian School of Diplomacy
Local counterpart: Diplomatic Academy; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Sida contribution (total): 1 254 000 SEK

Project brief: The ESD (the Estonian School of Diplomacy) scholarship programme supplements the on-going Tripartite Cooperation between Sweden, Ukraine and Estonia on EU Integration in Diplomatic Training. The objective of the programme is to offer an “International Relations and European Integration” training programme in Tallinn, giving two groups of Ukrainian students first-hand experience of Estonia’s EU integration and
transition policies (the academic years of 2006/07 and 2007/08). The training is provided in cooperation with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Prospects, Benefits and Challenges for Ukraine to Participate in Regional Trade Associations

**Project period:** May 2007 – May 2008 (13 months)

**Implementing agency:** Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Razumkov Centre)

**Sida contribution (total):** 1 000 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The aim of the project is to improve capacity and increase knowledge of decision makers at central and regional levels in order to enhance internal dialogue as to the conditions Ukraine will face on the world market and the need to understand and differentiate the role between the WTO and SES, emphasising the role of WTO and European integration. The project will comprise three components such as analysis of the global trade environment and Ukraine’s place in global economic relations, identification of the prospects of Ukraine’s separate regions (preliminary Kharkiv, Lviv, Kherson and Poltava) in the era of globalisation and a study tour to Sweden.

EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement: Analytical, Methodological and Informational Support to Negotiations

**Project period:** September 2007 – September 2008

**Implementing agency:** International Centre for Policy Studies, Ministry of Economy

**Sida contribution:** 1 000 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The goal of this project is to enhance the process of Ukraine’s economic and trade integration with the European Union by providing analytical, methodological and information support to the Ukrainian central and local government, business community and the mass media. The project main components are econometric modeling and training for ministerial staff, feasibility, cost-benefit analysis and possible consequences of Ukraine’s participation in Community agencies/programmes and public consultations in the region.

Public Administrative Reform

**Ukraine Public Dialogue, Phase 2**
Project brief: The project is a response to the request of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for the continuation of the first phase of the project Ukraine Public Dialogue implemented in 2006. The development objective of the project is to strengthen the reform process for democracy by improving public communications and the dialogue between the state and the public. The project includes three main components that are closely interrelated; they are planning and structuring public communications, capacity development for the primary target group and special catalytic actions.

Oversight Panel – Swedish Expert Assistance (State Tax Administration Modernisation Project)

Project brief: The contribution is linked to the World Bank's and State Tax Administration's Modernisation Project. Sweden will finance participation of a Swedish expert in the oversight panel, which has the task to conduct periodic reviews of the State Tax Administration's accomplishments in becoming a professional, transparent, equitable, efficient and accountable public institution.

Public Administrative Reform (Environment)

The Swedish Radiation Protection Agency: Feasibility Study Regarding Future Cooperation with Ukraine

Swedish counterpart: The Swedish Radiation Protection Agency (SSI)
Sida contribution: 500 000 SEK
Project brief: The Swedish Radiation Protection Agency performed a feasibility study to initiate bilateral cooperation projects with Ukrainian authorities, industry, medical institutions and universities in the area of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. After a successful feasibility study a cooperation commenced in November 2006. Ukrainian partners include the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the Ministry of Health and Ukrainian Scientific Research on Hydro Meteorological Institute in cooperation with the State Department of Hydrometeorology. Key partner is the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee.

The Swedish Radiation Protection Agency Co-operation with Ukraine on Civil Radiation Protection

Project period: November 2006 – December 2008
Swedish counterpart: The Swedish Radiation Protection Agency (SSI)
Sida contribution: 5 000 000 SEK

Project brief: The long-term development goal of the cooperation is an improved civil radiation protection in Ukraine in accordance with the modern international standards and reduced collective radiation dose to the Ukrainian population in the regions concerned. Specific objectives are to improve managerial, scientific and technical capabilities of Ukrainian authorities (key partner is the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee) and other Ukrainian organisations involved.

Justice and Home Affairs

Strengthening the Restorative Approach in Juvenile Justice in Ukraine

Project period: June 2007 – May 2008 (12 months)
Implementing agency: UNICEF Mission in Ukraine
Local counterparts: Ukrainian Inter-agency Working Group for Juvenile Justice (IAWG)
Sida contribution: 900 000 SEK

Project brief: This project is a part of a larger programme and includes the preparation of the upcoming juvenile justice reform. It also aims at creating a platform for a dialogue between different actors, thereby contributing to the development of a national policy with regard to restorative juvenile justice system and its further implementation. The objective of the larger programme is to establish a separate juvenile justice system in conformity with international standards. The main activities of the Sida funded project
will be centred around three main components: partnership building, situation assessment and regulatory development.

**Probation Reform Ukraine**

**Project period:** April 2005 – June 2008  
**Implementing agency:** National Swedish Prison and Probation Administration  
**Local counterparts:** State Department for Execution of Punishment of Ukraine  
**Sida contribution:** 4 058 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The project aims to work with politicians and headquarter staff to reconsider the purpose and use of imprisonment on the scale it has been used and continue the introduction and development of alternative measures to imprisonment that the first phase of the project started; to train the personnel on all levels to create a set of common values and behavioural rules in conformity with the recommendations of the Council of Europe; to continue developing non-custodial sentences as an alternative to incarceration in Ukraine.

**Election Reform**

**Election Reform 2007-2010, Ukraine**

**Project period:** June 2007 – May 2010  
**Implementing agency:** OSCE Mission in Ukraine  
**Sida contribution:** 4 000 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The project is a continuation of the OSCE PCU activities aimed at compiling electronic voters lists in Ukraine for the parliamentary elections in 2006 (case 2005-004273). The OSCE PCU intends to improve the existing voter lists as well as undertake necessary capacity building measures and legislative support, within a more comprehensive 3 years project. This project aims at assisting the Government of Ukraine, upon their request, to further democratise electoral practices, procedures and standards in Ukraine. The project consists of two main components of which the first has a more long-term approach and the second provides assistance in conducting the pre-term parliamentary elections.

**Election 2007 – Public Opinion Information and Exit Poll Campaign**
**Project period:** September 2007 – August 2008  
**Implementing agency:** Democratic Initiative Foundation  
**Sida contribution:** 450 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The overall goal of the project is to ensure democracy building in the long run through diminishing the reoccurrences of fraud during the election processes in Ukraine by conducting exit polls and public information and opinion campaigns. The project comprises the following activities: nationwide non-partisan exit poll on September 30, 2007, exit poll methodology and management, review of programme documents and election slogans of political parties, public opinion information (POI) dissemination and discussion, special bulletin, weeklong election information tour for pollsters (and others).

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**Gender**

**UNDP Supporting Equitable Access to Opportunities, Phase 2: Ukraine – En Route to Equality**

**Project period:** August 2006 – February 2010  
**Implementing agency:** UNDP Ukraine  
**Sida contribution:** 10 000 000 SEK

**Project brief:** "Ukraine – En Route to Equality" is the second phase of the UNDP Equal Opportunities Programme. The first phase, also funded by Sida, was implemented in 2003-2005. The programme will cover all regions of Ukraine and is aimed to improve the knowledge base and capacity building, required to institutionalize already adopted gender policies among ministries, parliamentary committees and regional state administrations.

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**Human Rights**

**Staff Secondment to the UN Office/UNICEF in Kiev, Ukraine**

**Project period:** 2005-12-01 to 2009-06-30  
**Implementing agency:**  
**Sida contribution:** 6 000 000 SEK

**Project brief:** The International Human Rights Advisor will be responsible for assessing the human rights needs in the country and advising the UN country team as a whole regarding human rights based programme strategy and implementation.

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**Ukraine: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, ‘Phase out’**
Project period: October 2006 – September 2009
Implementing Agency: International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
Cooperating partner: IOM Mission in Ukraine
Local counterparts: State Committee for Nationalities and Migration
Estimated contribution: 15 000 000 SEK

Project brief: The project aims at eradication of the trafficking in human beings in Ukraine through advancement of the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities and civil society in addressing the three interrelated aspects of this phenomenon: protection and reintegration, prosecution and criminalization, and advocacy and prevention. The project is a logical continuation of all the previous Sida-funded projects focused on combating trafficking in women in Ukraine.

Core Support to European Roma Rights Centre 2006-2008 (regional)

Countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Belarus, Turkey, Ukraine
Project period: February 2006 – 30 August 2009
Implementing agency: European Roma Rights Centre, ERRC
Sida contribution: 8 550 000 SEK (for the region)

Project brief: ERRC is an international public interest law organisation, founded and based in Hungary. ERRC is working with Roma rights issues in the whole Europe. Specific programmes are planned in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine. The aim of the project is to provide a core support to ERRC for their Roma human rights activities.

“The Söderköping Process (phase 2)” Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

Countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova
Project period: March 2006 – January 2010
Implementing agency: Swedish Migration Board (SMB)
Sida contribution: 1 626 895 SEK
Planned expenditure 2007: 1 017 630 SEK
Planned expenditure 2008: 560 375 SEK
Planned expenditure 2009: 48 890 SEK
Total project expenditure: 15 049 000 SEK
**Project brief:** The project builds upon the positive results of the previous cooperation between and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine’s migration authorities. The project is focused on transferring experience of the newly acceded EU member states to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in aligning their migration and asylum related legislation, policies and practices with EU acquis standards and promote further networking among participants, in view to creating an effective and sustainable regional network an asylum-and migration-related issues.

### Media

**Ukrainian Independent Media Project 2007-2010**

- **Project period:** 48 months, until May 2011, start May 2007
- **Implementing agency:** Media Development Loan Fund
- **Sida contribution:** 8 000 000 SEK
- **Planned expenditure 2007:** 2 000 000 SEK
- **Planned expenditure 2008:** 2 000 000 SEK
- **Planned expenditure 2009:** 4 000 000 SEK
- **Sida contribution phase 1**
  - (36 months, decision # 436/03, dated 2003-08-18): 2 500 000 SEK
- **Sida contribution (total amount):** 10 500 000 SEK

**Project brief:** Ukrainian Independent Media Project 2007-2011 is the second phase of a project supporting the Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF) in its support to democracy through the establishment of independent media channels in Ukraine. The goal of this phase is to develop at least three independent media companies in Ukraine and provide them as well as the MDLF’s four existing Ukrainian clients with technical assistance, training and consulting in order to improve client’s editorial independence, efficiency and journalistic skills.

### Civil Society

**Funding Channelled via Organisations Associated with Swedish Political Parties.**

Centre Party International Foundation (CPIF) established cooperation with Reform and Orders Party, Public Order Party, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and European party (conference in Kyiv); Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC) cooperates with the liberal party Pariya Narodnyi Poryadok (Donetsk region), Swedish Social Democratic Party (Oskarshamn regional unit) with Socialist Party of Ukraine and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Zhytomyr and Nizhyn), Olof Palme International Centre with
Socialist Party of Ukraine and Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (central level); LO-trade union Arvika-Eda with the Socialist Party of Ukraine (in Odessa region); Olof Palme International Centre with the Socialist Party of Ukraine and its youth organizations, Swedish Social Democratic Party (Blekinge regional unit) with the Socialist Party of Ukraine (Donetsk), CEE Network for Gender Issues with East-European women's organizations, connected with social or social democratic parties; Jarl Hjalmarson Stiftelsen with Our Ukraine.

**NGO COOPERATION**

The support to NGOs cooperation is channelled through Swedish framework organizations. 29 projects are run in Ukraine in cooperation with the Swedish organizations (4 448 634 SEK committed contribution) within such sectors as democracy development, education, environment. Please visit www.sida.se/ngodatabase for further information.
WORKS CITED


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