THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEOBAND MADRASA NETWORK AND U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT MILITANT IDEOLOGY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
The School of Continuing Studies
and of
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Liberal Studies

By

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Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
October 21, 2009
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ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes recommendations on how to implement aid to Pakistan in order to mitigate the detrimental effects the militarization of the Deoband madrasas are having on U.S. efforts in the region. With the U.S. on the brink of unprecedented commitments of development aid earmarked for western Pakistan, an opportunity exists for a monumental shaping effort to the execution of U.S. policy along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and compliment to ongoing security operations intended to quell the strengthening insurgency in Afghanistan.

The thesis traces the history of the Deoband madrasa network from its origins in India as an answer to the occupation of Britain in the 1860s. It highlights the expansion of the Deoband sect into Pakistan after its establishment in 1947, and describes how it was continually politicized by multiple organizations over time, peaking in the late 1970s at the beginning of the Zia ul-Haq regime. It then discusses the Deoband madrasa tipping point to militarization in the 1980s. It demonstrates how the U.S. played a key role in turning the madrasas into more militarized institutions through curriculum and weapons in order to bolster the Mujahedin ranks which were battling the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
From there, the thesis addresses the imbalance of development and security aid to Pakistan, and how this, combined with the militarization in the 1980s, significantly contributes to the problems the U.S. is presently dealing with in the region. The bulk of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 1977 has focused on security, and has been spent by the Pakistani military primarily to bolster their ability to combat India.

Finally, the thesis discusses the Kerry/Lugar Bill in detail, and how applying funds from this, along with proper utilization of private sector organizations already involved in madrasa demilitarization is the key to a successful long term initiative. The thesis cautions that the U.S. must carefully manage perception with regard to these efforts as to not appear as violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, as well as threatening the identity of the Deobands who still cling to an anti-colonial spirit. The aim of spending money from the Kerry/Lugar Bill on the demilitarization of the madrasas would be an effective way to assist in quelling the insurgency in Afghanistan, and would prove an innovative soft power approach to enhancing U.S. national security.
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INTRODUCTION

A Lesson In Perception

May 3, 2005 started as a typical day for a newly arrived unit in Afghanistan. Intelligence and operational updates, a review of enemy engagements in the past 24 hours, and a look ahead at what was expected in the next 48 hours was our standard start to the daily routine. As the battalion intelligence officer for an airborne infantry outfit in southern Afghanistan, I was slowly getting used to delivering stark news at these meetings. We were approaching 5 weeks into a yearlong deployment. A five weeks that had woken us up to the fact that the enemy we were facing was not a rogue Taliban contingent clawing onto a fading attempt at regaining a foothold in southern Afghanistan. It was quite the opposite. What we had on our hands was a resurgent force, benefiting from the regrouping effort that had taken place over the course of the past 3 years just over the border in Baluchistan Province, more specifically the Quetta region or western Pakistan. Our battalion had already battled the enemy in large scale engagements on numerous occasions in these initial weeks, and what we were about to discover was that today was set to be another chapter in what was to turn out to be a challenging year.

Shortly after the morning updates, I was chatting over a map with the battalion operations officer when a frantic call came in over the radio. Troops in contact, an alert that had become all too familiar to us was shouted throughout the battalion tactical operations center. A small contingent of our battalion scouts had been attacked while on patrol by what was reported at the time as a 60 man Taliban element. The report
indicated that this 10 man scout element was pinned down in the Arghandab River Valley, in the village of Bulac Kalay. This region of northwest Zabul province was located at a crossroads where the provinces of Zabul, Ghazni and Oruzgan all converged; an area which was a hotbed of Taliban transience and activity.

The operations officer and I were charged with updating the battalion commander of the situation at hand, and advising on courses of action. With little hesitance, the commander indicated that he wanted to launch the quick reaction force (QRF) to assist the pinned down scouts, with battalion leadership to oversee the operation. We knew exactly what this meant. Within an hour, we were on the helicopter landing zone reviewing the updated situation with the QRF leadership. Shortly after that, the QRF strike package helicopters were visible over the horizon; inbound to pick up the QRF and battalion leadership element and transfer us into the fight.

It was about a 20 minute flight from our battalion headquarters to the Arghandab Valley where this small contingent of scouts was hanging on for dear life. The flight seemed to drag on as we wondered what awaited us on the other end. After receiving the cue from the pilots that we were within a minute of our objective, we rose to our feet in anticipation of exiting the aircraft as efficiently as possible. As I peered out the side window of the Chinook helicopter, I saw the evidence that led me to believe we were entering a challenging set of circumstances. The slow landing helicopter blanketed in dust a U.S. vehicle that was engulfed in flames from enemy attack. As the helicopter set down, we scurried out the back to the sounds of crackling machine gun fire as we moved
to a defensive position behind a collection of oversized boulders. As we observed the helicopters departing the area, hoping they could clear the next valley without taking a pounding from enemy fire, we heard the wisp of rocket propelled grenades make their way over our hasty position. Feeling exposed, we set our sights on a compound approximately ½ kilometer in the distance. We maneuvered our way to this structure, which is where we managed the next 12 hours of intense fighting throughout the valley.

Fighting escalated throughout the afternoon, and with that escalation came continued close proximity engagements. Casualties on both sides continued to mount, and with that, enemy prisoners were being captured by the handful and transported across the battlefield to our location at the makeshift mud hut headquarters. In processing these enemy fighters who were moments ago engaging us in combat, I intended to extrapolate information from willing combatants that would assist in identifying enemy intentions in the valley, numbers and locations of fighters and weapons.

I turned to my interpreter, Nasir, a product of the streets of Kandahar with a personal passion of distaste for the Taliban. I asked him to assist me in identifying personnel that would be willing to have a discussion about the intentions of the enemy. Minutes later, Nasir approached me with a young Taliban fighter, no more than 17 years old, hands shaking with terror and a confused look in his eyes. Through Nasir, I asked the young man if he would be willing to assist us, and he agreed. We moved to a position on the roof of the compound that offered us a better vantage point of the ongoing engagement. Between bursts of machine gun fire, the young Taliban fighter
assisted Nasir and myself in sketching out enemy positions, which enabled the infantry forces to close within the enemy and greatly mitigating the imminent threat.

Throughout the rest of the afternoon and into the evening, this young man informed us that several cells of Taliban fighters had convened under a single commander in this region only 3 days prior. The plan was not to engage U.S. forces this day; however they decided to leap at what they perceived as a target of opportunity. As late afternoon faded into evening, and the engagement continued to subside, our conversation moved more toward what provided the motivations of the Taliban fighters, what his personal story was and, what led him to this moment of uncertainty.

The young man discussed the fact that he was sad that he had been away from his family for so long. He was from southern Afghanistan, and approximately 6 months prior to this event had been recruited, or in interpreting his description of the events, intimidated into leaving his village to attend religious training in western Pakistan. The young man attended a madrasa which he described as being near the city of Quetta, and they received religious instruction, short lessons on how to operate an AK-47, how to throw a grenade and basic navigation. I asked Nasir to have him elaborate on the lessons he learned in the madrasa about the war, and what had convinced him to fight. The gist of his explanation indicated that he had been enlightened in the madrasa, by mullahs that convinced him that the Americans were here to “steal” their religion. The U.S. is the enemy of Islam, and he was fighting to ensure that the Islamic faith would not be replaced in Afghanistan by the colonizing Americans.
Perplexed, I turned to Nasir seeking greater explanation. Certainly they know that we do not have a problem with Islam itself, and that our presence here is due to the fact that the U.S. was attacked by al Qaeda, who had been given sanctuary by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In relaying between the young Taliban fighter and me, it continued to become abundantly clear. This young man had never heard of “9/11”, was not aware of what al Qaeda had accomplished throughout the world and saw only the end effects of what a U.S. presence in his country meant. This experience repeated itself numerous times throughout two combat rotations in Afghanistan. Some villages we visited simply believed we were an extension of the Soviet occupation with no ability to distinguish between the two.

The propaganda mechanisms, combined with the remoteness of a majority of the rural regions the U.S. is invested in are one of the greatest challenges faced in U.S. efforts to quell the strengthening insurgency in Afghanistan. The madrasa network in western Pakistan, specifically those of the Deoband sect, continues to be a major contributor of the propaganda facilitator we must address in order to combat the harsh ideology that continues to threaten regional stability.
CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND AND CREATION OF THE DEOBAND MADRASAS

The history of the Deoband branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam, and the teachings of Darul Uloom are critical to understanding the existence of the madrasa network in western Pakistan today. From its inception in the 1860s, the ideals of the Deobandis were shaped by the objectives and principles established by pioneering personalities which subsequently drove its curriculum and philosophies. These set the movement on a path as a protector of Muslims in Southwest Asia. This chapter will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the objectives and principles demonstrating that the Deobandi leadership set forth with good intentions, but fell victim to outside influence and politization of the movement along the way. This outside influence was coupled with the Deobandis straying off the course set forth by the objectives and principles of the founders. As the madrasa network continued to grow, it became increasingly vulnerable to this combination which led to an aggressive politization of the Deoband movement by the Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI). This would set the stage for what would come next with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a critical turning point in the militarization of the Deoband madrasa network.

The Islamic Madrasa

The concept of the Islamic madrasa and its role in the Muslim world is something which is varied given the country, context and sect. The understanding of the word “madrasa” differs with the numerous languages spoken throughout the Islamic world. In countries like Egypt and Lebanon, it refers to any educational institution –
state sponsored, private, secular, or religious. In south Asian countries, especially Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, it generally refers to the Islamic religious schools that provide both free education and sometimes free boarding and lodging for their students.¹ The concept of the madrasa as a separate institution of learning also carries a varied history as well. Many Islamic scholars, especially those affiliated with madrasas, suggest that the first madrasa was the Darul Arqam, established by the Prophet Mohammed in Mecca. However, the Jamiat al Qarawayyn, located in a mosque in the city of Fez, Morocco, is considered by many to be the oldest degree-winning madrasa in the Muslim World.² The Deoband madrasas in western Pakistan are institutions which carry a unique evolution grounded in these basic concepts. With ideas of protecting Islam from its perpetrators, providing free religious education along with boarding and lodging, and formalizing the identity of the movement, the Deoband brand was launched. The Deoband chapter in the history of Islamic madrasas will be examined further through discussion of its history and motivations, curriculum, objectives and principles and politization all which led to a critical turning point for the movement.

Deoband History and Motivations

The origins of Deoband Islamic teachings are commonly traced back to 1867, to the city of Deoband, India and a school founded by Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad


Qasim. These men, and additional noteworthy pioneers of the school, held fresh memories of a bitter defeat at the hands of the occupying British forces in an uprising that took place only ten years prior. Many of the ulama revered by the founders of the Deoband School participated in the war of freedom in 1857. This inspiration and an ever increasing desire to react to a continued loss of Muslim influence in British India launched the Deoband branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam as an anti-colonial inspired movement. Deoband is commonly referenced in conjunction with the Dar-ul-Uloom (house of learning) which aimed to academically match the British occupiers.

Mumtaz Ahmad discusses this pivotal point in time noting that the Indian National Congress and the Muslim league were both vehemently struggling for support from Indian Muslims. The Deoband Ulama almost unanimously supported the Indian National Congress because of their anti-colonial policies, even initially fearing the establishment of Pakistan as a British ploy to “divide and conquer.” The developing of an Islamic theology curriculum was first and foremost a reaction to the ongoing British occupation with a less overtly advertised agenda of changing the political landscape and the plight of Indian Muslims of this era. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Deobandis began setting up madrasas throughout northern India, which would alert the founders to the need for formalization of the objectives which defined the Darul Uloom concepts.

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5 Ibid., 10.
The Aims and Objectives of Darul Uloom Deoband

As the Darul Uloom Deoband continued to emerge and carve out its intentions, it became increasingly evident that the foundations being laid for this movement were bent on the protection of Islam, as well as shaping students with the basics of arts and sciences. However, the Darul Uloom Deoband was not aimed at providing degrees to graduated or educated people. It was established to produce such scholars who can have thorough knowledge of the Quran, Hadith and all the sciences they contain. This new movement intended to consolidate Ulama as protectors of Islam, and guide students to attain a true spirit to reform society, and even be willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Allah. The original aims and objectives of the Darul Uloom Deoband movement can be defined as follows:

1. To teach the holy Quran and Hadith with all the sciences and arts which they contain.

2. To produce such Ulama who can have thorough knowledge of Islamic Sharia. They could have a true spirit to serve Islam whole-heartedly. The service can be through learning and teaching, through Dawah and implementing Islamic Sharia in the society, as the time requires.

3. To remove Bid’at (teachings out of synch with the Quran) and to defend Islam through presenting the true concept of Islam before people. To counter those who are propagating against Islam and Muslims of the world.

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6 Muhammad Sajid Qasmi, *Madrasa Education Framework*, (Mumbai: Markazul Ma’arif Education and Research Center, 2005), 42.
4. To Present Islam in the best way to every individual and group whether it is of a higher class or of a lower, by emphasizing that Islam is the everlasting religion which will last up to the day of judgment. It is the final message of Allah sent through the last prophet to all human beings. It has the solution for every time and place. Human beings are in need of it as they need water, air and food.

5. To teach all Islamic sciences and arts in Arabic language because it is the official language of Islam. It is the main source of Quran and Hadith. Quran was revealed in this very language. Islamic Sharia can only be comprehended if we have a good command over the Arabic language.\(^7\)

In observing the points listed above, there are two themes which resonate. The first is that it is recognizable that the protection of Islam was the priority of the Ulama that were at the forefront of the Darul Uloom Deoband movement. The second is that although there was an emphasis on the arts and sciences, limitations are instituted in the fact that as demonstrated in points one and five, all arts and sciences should be taught in Arabic, with the Quran as its main source. This directive severely impedes Deoband educators from evolving with the times as the minimal advances in this realm would be lent to changes in interpretations of the Quran, which are few and far between. These points also spur a debate as to why the modern day Deoband madrasa network struggles to adapt with educational advances. The Deoband network today possesses a sense of threat from modernity, secularization and any curriculum that strays far from what the

\(^7\) Ibid., 43.
Quran authorizes. This, in conjunction with cultural and language limitations emplaced with the stress of the use of Arabic in this instruction where Urdu, Dari and Pashtu are the dominant dialects present additional challenges.

*The Deoband Curriculum*

In observing the militant ideological curriculum that is taught in the Deoband madrasas of western Pakistan today, it is important to trace the origins and analyze how this evolution took place. Evidence suggests that the origins of the philosophy of the Deoband School and its madrasas’ curriculum included varying ingredients, and that it cannot be concluded that the institutions were founded with a sole religious intention in mind. In other words, there was a mixture of inspiring elements in addition to the anti-colonial reaction that fueled the Deoband leaders. The early instruction of the Deoband School included subjects in addition to religious studies, although there were always differing opinions amongst the Ulama as to what needed to be included in the curriculum. Barbara Metcalf discusses some of the early instruction of calligraphy and tibb (the system of medicine derived primarily from the theories of the classical Greeks) which existed in the 1870s, despite the fact that Rashid Ahmad viewed it as a distraction.8 Mumtaz Ahmad notes that the curriculum adopted by the Deoband leadership in the 1860s and 1870s did not focus solely on religion over the rational sciences, and that the subject areas included grammar, rhetoric, prosody, logic, philosophy, Arabic literature, dialectical theology, mathematics and Islamic law. He

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adds that of among the original twenty subjects taught in the madrasas, only six could be associated with religious studies.\(^9\)

Although the Deoband madrasas initially introduced varying “secular” subjects in their curriculum, the institutions were subject to numerous factors that demonstrate a continued struggle to maintain its objectives. Over time, Muslim leaders who patronized the schools also influenced the madrasa curriculum for political ends. Such rulers used the madrasas as instruments for propagating the state ideology and as tools of social control.\(^10\) This had an effect on the evolution of the madrasa curriculum over the years because of constant changes enforced on them due to geography and the political climate of the times. As this evolution continued to play itself out, Muslim leaders had a tendency to utilize the Deoband madrasas as a means to control the population, specifically the underprivileged. This usually meant an adjustment to the curriculum away from the rational sciences with more of a focus on religion.

The Dars-e-Nizami curriculum was devised in the 18\(^{th}\) century and focused on rote memorization of the Quran which was the highest scholastic achievement under this syllabus. It was essentially the first standardized madrasa curriculum, and was designed by what is known as the ulema of Farangi Mahall which is a residential area of

\(^9\) Mumtaz Ahmad, “Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh”, (Virginia: Hampton University), 103.

Lucknow, India.\textsuperscript{11} “This system also recognized the importance of the rational sciences calling for stressed reason and understanding in areas such as logic and philosophy. The syllabus drew heavily on Persian and Central Asian scholarship from the previous 600 years.”\textsuperscript{12} Some of the Persian texts that have traditionally been used in the Deoband madrasas include \textit{Pand Nama}, \textit{Nam-e-Haq} and \textit{Karima}. These books are didactic and are in Persian rhymed couplets. “The Ulema consider the books “safe” because they focus on a morality which is strictly medieval and patriarchal approving of hospitality and condemn miserliness. They also enforce that silence is a virtue and, that women are inferior, untrustworthy and alluring and belong in a male world confident in its superiority.”\textsuperscript{13} Despite the traditional Deoband conflicts along sectarian lines, these texts have fallen into place with some of the more hard line teaching tactics used and has survived the tests of time.

After countless fluctuations in the teachings at Deoband madrasas, today’s institutions in western Pakistan generally focus on the Dars-e-Nizami curriculum with some modifications. As observed while conducting a Madrasa Reform Project, the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) has seen that most of the Deoband madrasas emphasize a perceived superiority of their own sect over others, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Douglas Johnston, Anzar Hussain, Rebecca Cataldi, \textit{Madrasa Enhancement and Global Security: A Model For Faith-Based Engagement}, (International Center For Religion and Diplomacy),December, 2008, 38.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas With Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices”, (Cairo: Al-Azhar University, Draft Report, 2003), 10.
\end{itemize}
that they are taught to refute western ideologies and other “heretical” beliefs in lessons on combating heresy and the dangers to Muslim thought and identity. The ICRD discusses that students in these madrasas typically receive one of two types of courses. The first is the Hafiz-e-Quran course which concentrates on memorization of the Quran without concentrating on meaning and context. Students on this track work toward the title of “Hafiz”, which means they are a student that has memorized the entire Quran. The second track is the Alim course, which aims at producing a more learned Islamic scholar. This curriculum usually includes the Arabic language “tafseer” (Quranic Interpretation), “Sharia” (Divine/Islamic Law), “hadith” (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed), “fiqh” (Jurisprudence), “mantaq” (Logic), and Islamic history.¹⁴

The Dars-e-Nizami texts that are used date back to the 1500s, are studied in both Arabic and Persian. As in the case of the Persian texts mentioned previously, the Arabic texts are also treatises on grammar in rhymed couplets. One of the best known among them, Kafia ibn-e-Malik is so obscure that it is always taught through a commentary called the Sharah Ibne-Aqil.¹⁵ Neither Arabic nor Persian are taught as living languages; they are simply a mechanism for systematic memorization. At times certain passages are articulated in Urdu or Pashtu which are the common languages amongst most of the students, but that is assuming that the instructors have a fundamental grasp on the meanings.

¹⁴ ICRD, 43.

¹⁵ Anzar, Islamic Education, 6.
Despite the fact that the Dars-e-Nizami syllabus is grounded in the practice of teaching a broad range of subjects, it can be seen that over time the Deoband madrasas have drifted away from an expanded program. This has been particularly evident in the western regions of modern day Pakistan in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balouchistan. Numerous factors to include madrasa expansion throughout the region and outside influences are the most evident reasons for this shift.

Expansion and Continued Politization of Deobandi Islam and Its Madrasas

Throughout the 1870s the number of Deoband madrasas in northern India continued to grow. By roughly 1880 there were between 12 to 15 schools that identified themselves as Deobandi and by the end of the century there were at least three times as many. The influence of the Deobandi brand of Islam was reaching as distant as Chittagong to the east, Madras to the south and Peshawar to the west.\(^\text{16}\) Although the Deobandi madrasas had reached into modern day Pakistan, the numbers remained low and would continue that way for some time.

*The Eight Principles of Darul Uloom*

As the Deoband madrasa system was seeing its initial expansion, another of the founding leaders, Maulana Nanautavi, identified the necessity to formalize a set of guidelines for maintaining the integrity of the Darul Uloom approach to educating. Highlighting the potential for “rogue” instructors, interpretation that swayed from the Darul Uloom principles, infighting amongst instructors regarding interpretation and

government interference, Nanautavi formalized eight principles for issuance to the madrasa networks’ leadership. The principles are summarized as follows:

1. Madrasa leaders should always pursue ways to increase donation, and encourage those around them to do the same.

2. Madrasa leaders should always try to carry on giving food to students to increase their numbers.

3. Madrasa leaders should put the needs of the madrasa before their own personal needs. Opinions which are outside of the issued guidance should be limited, however leaders should be willing to hear each other out on issues.

   Madrasa leaders should not make any important decisions without consulting the Muhtamim (rector / vice chancellor). Failure to carry out these directives will make the madrasa weak.

4. Instructors in the madrasas should carry out similar views to that of the Darul Uloom objectives. Instructors should not be egotistical, should not pursue individual agendas and should not be jealous of their fellow instructors.

   Allah forbidding, if this persists, the madrasa will fail.

5. Teaching materials which are proposed for the given year should be prepared before hand otherwise the madrasa will not flourish. If the madrasa has a large student body and a poorly proposed agenda, the madrasa will ultimately fail.

6. The madrasa should attempt to remain self-sufficient with regard to funding.

   If this is not possible, the madrasa can remain open to donations, but must be
very selective with regard to whom they are taken from. If donations are received from corrupt sources, Allah will look down upon these men. If Allah looks down on the leaders, quarreling will result.

7. The share of government and the rich also seems dangerous.

8. The donations from those who do not wish name and fame are blissful.

Good intention of the donor is a cause of establishment for the madrasa.  

These principles laid out by Maulana Nanautavi are worth further discussion regarding the early intent of the Deoband movement and how it evolved. When analyzing the points addressed, those that pertain to placing the madrasa above oneself, respecting the opinions of one’s peers and utilization of a formal hierarchy demonstrate Nanautavi’s foresight, especially when considering the political influence that the movement later fell victim to. With the spreading of the Deoband ideals of Darul Uloom, he identified the potential for geography and personalities of the individual instructors as having the potential to sway the madrasa network from its core values. This guidance has maintained relevance and provided a baseline for the integrity of the movement for over a century. However some of the ideas embedded in the principles, like select points garnered from the objectives discussed above, offer explanation to some of the phenomenon witnessed in the Deoband madrasa network today in western Pakistan. First is the guidance that the madrasas should always try to carry on giving food to the students to increase their numbers. This is an early indicator that the

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Deoband madrasa network was focused on catering to the underprivileged, a cause with great intentions which was later exploited via politicization and a ready pool of potential militants. The next theme which suffered similar results with the evolution of the network was the guidance to distance the network from the input of the government. Although the original intentions of this were likely pure in that Nanautavi wanted to keep this brand of education independent from this potential disruption, it could also create a separation between the network and a constructive existence within the boarders of today’s Pakistan. It could also be argued that the guidance Nanautavi provided with regard to being selective as to whom they received donations from was also politicized later in the network’s existence. These points will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Continued Expansion

In the 1930s and 1940s, divisions remained within the Deobandi leadership on the issue of the ongoing British occupation. The divisions focused along the lines of whether or not to support a push for the establishment of an independent Muslim state and gamble with the prospect of simply a shift in British rule. This division eventually led to an alliance of three individuals who disassociated themselves with the Indian National Congress and anti-colonial stance in India; Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani. “In 1945 they formed their own political group, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and campaigned vigorously for the
establishment of Pakistan”. After the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the JUI remained focused on the intent to shape Pakistan into an Islamic state. With the Deoband background and history formed in an anti-colonialism stance, JUI maintained these efforts at their forefront throughout the next decade. With the doors now open to Pakistan for Indian Muslims, an influx took place and thus an expansion of the Deoband madrasa network. Noteworthy schools such as the Dar-ul-Uloom Karachi, Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia in Binori Town, Khair-ul-Madaris in Multan, Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania between Peshawar and Islamabad and Jamia Ashrafia in Lahore were established soon after the partition of India by Deobandi scholars who migrated to Pakistan. Madrasas of varying sects continued to expand throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the new state of Pakistan continued to take shape. New business opportunities offered greater contributions to the emerging madrasas throughout Pakistan.

In 1962 in the NWFP of Pakistan, JUI’s leader Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi facilitated a split of the party into several factions, one of which was the Pashtun faction headed by Maulana Mufti Mehmood. Mehmood’s efforts were focused on deterring from military rule in Pakistan and had some influence on the elections in 1970. This contributed to the continued madrasa expansion which maintained its western migration into the NWFP. Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania (Akora Khatak between Islamabad and Peshawar) and Dar-ul-Uloom Sarhad (Peshawar) emerged as major centers of Deoband

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19 Ibid., 10.
pedagogy in the region both attracting large numbers of students from across the border in Afghanistan as well as from the tribal regions.\textsuperscript{20}

Deobandi madrasas throughout NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan were on a significant rise throughout the 1970’s. It was also at this time that the JUI truly started developing into an extremely active Deobandi political wing within Pakistan. This growing influence could easily be measured by the increasing number of sponsored madrasas in this region of Pakistan. In 1950 there were an estimated 210 madrasas in Pakistan. By 1970 this number was up to 908, and in 1979 it rose to around 1,745. With the JUI most actively facilitating the expansion of this system, it can be inferred that the majority of these institutions were of Deobandi philosophy.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, there were an estimated 9,000 total Deobandi madrasas spread throughout South Asia by the early 1970’s.

This timeframe also saw JUI gain momentum in the political forum when Maulana Mufti Mehmood was elected as the Chief Minister of the NWFP in 1973. Mehmood fostered a positive working relationship with other political parties representing varying stances which led to what some consider an ability of JUI to work alongside other parties in alliances. Others argue this is simply JUI showing its true intentions of a political organization focused primarily on politics and not the will of the people or shaping Pakistan into an Islamic state. An example of this action came in 1977 when JUI combined efforts with Jamiat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Muntaz Ahmad, “Madressa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh”, 105.
Pakistan (JUP) to launch the Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement (NAM) under the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in an attempt to overthrow Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from power and form an Islamic state.

The Deobandis had certainly demonstrated that they had found their political footing in Pakistan. Throughout the 1970s, this politization continued to play itself out. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's politically-expedient appeasement of the religious community paved the way for a madrasa population explosion during the rule of General Zia ul-Haq.\textsuperscript{22} General ul-Haq would become the most important political figure in the growth of Pakistan's madrasa community. In 1979 he established a "National Committee for Deeni Madaris" with a charter to transform the madrasas into a legitimate branch of the Pakistani education system. The committee conducted a report with recommendations for improving the economic conditions of madrasas and introducing modernization programs while preserving their autonomy. Ironically, these reforms were rejected by the clergy who had been empowered by General ul-Haq's "Islamization" policy.\textsuperscript{23} This instance could also be viewed as the madrasa clergy holding true to Nanautavi's principle encouraging them to maintain distance from government entities which may not hold the best interests of the madrasas. Momentum for the expansion of the Deoband sect of Islam within Pakistan, and a continued increase in the number of madrasas was ever increasing, and a tipping point of sorts was just over the horizon.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, and the state of the existence of

\textsuperscript{22} ICG, 8.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 10.
the Deoband madrasa network in western Pakistan would see an almost immeasurable explosion in numbers, and a pivotal transition in its curriculum.

Summary

Matching the British occupiers and establishing a mechanism for protecting the Muslims of India was the driving intent of the formation of the Deoband movement. This introduction to the history of the Deobands and the Darul Uloom teachings discusses the original intent providing a basis for how the madrasa network in western Pakistan evolved to the point in which it functions today. In this evolutionary process, one can trace the strengths and weaknesses of the movement, and how these assisted in shaping what is seen in the madrasas of today.

From its inception, the Deobandis were strengthened by their motivation to organize consistency with its teachings and instructors as the movement grew. The Deobandis extended a hand to the underprivileged by providing students a place to live, a religious education and a path to a more promising future. They included the arts and sciences in their curriculum noting the importance of a well rounded individual. It was with these practices that the Deobandis truly set forth to become the protectors of the Muslim faith at this point in time and in this geographical region of Southwest Asia.

However, the Deoband movement did contain some inherent flaws which evolved over time and are seen within the existence of the network today. Self imposed limitations on how far the instruction could stray from the Quran on the topics of the arts and sciences greatly limited progress. Additionally, strict adherence to the Arabic and Persian texts placed additional restraints on the ability of the instructors to fully
appreciate the meaning of what they were teaching, and inhibited their ability to pass these lessons on to the students. This could be identified as a reason for a natural straying from instruction which was more challenging to communicate. Principles which pushed for a distancing from the government have created a division and suspicion in today's Deoband madrasas in western Pakistan, and have created challenges in integrating them into the culture. Perhaps the most notable flaw identified in the evolution of the Deoband madrasa network is the extreme politization that came with its expansion. It seems that this area was where the Deoband leadership strayed most severely from Nanautavi's principles. By allowing the JUI to manipulate the Deoband brand and utilize the madrasa network in Pakistan for its political objectives, the Deoband leadership had been pushed off course.

Is it these weaknesses alone that have put the Deoband madrasa network in western Pakistan on the path to militancy? Was this enough to cause the explosive madrasa expansion in the 1980s, along with the militarization of the curriculum taught? Although the Deobandis have struggled with identity, curriculum and politization over the years, these blemishes were not enough alone to place them on the path to the ultimate dismissal of non religious education, and a harsh militaristic interpretation of the curriculum which had been taught in a more moderate fashion in the decades preceding the 1980s.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would subject the madrasas to unforeseen influence from the outside by states and organizations with an interest in the outcome of the occupation. Additionally, the Deobandi leadership in the madrasas of western
Pakistan would demonstrate further drifting from their principles specifically in the areas of who they allow to influence and donate. This critical juncture in the existence of the Deoband madrasa network in western Pakistan sets the stage for the challenges of today.
CHAPTER 2

A TIME OF TRANSITION AND A TURN TO MILITANCY

The late 1970s and early 1980s was a pivotal time of transition for the Deoband madrasas of western Pakistan. Several factors led the madrasas down the path to increased militancy, and much of the phenomenon that is witnessed today in the Deoband madrasas was shaped by these events. The Islamization of Zia ul-Haq that initiated in 1977 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 were key events in this region that started the Deoband madrasas down a militarized path. The most pivotal event which caused this drastic turn toward militancy was the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was during the subsequent occupation through the 1980s that saw skyrocketing numbers of madrasas throughout the regions of the NWFP, FATA and Balouchistan. The madrasa network in these regions, of which most were Deoband, provided a structure and a ready pool of potential recruits which was capitalized upon by both the U.S. who was interested in countering the threat of communist expansion in the region, as well as allies such as Saudi Arabia which identified a place for themselves in the conflict. This outside participation assisted in manipulating the curriculum as well as expanding the number of Deoband madrasas throughout Pakistan.

After the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the stage was set for continued militancy in the madrasas of western Pakistan. Post occupation Afghanistan was fragilely governed and this was recognized by the Mujahedins which relocated back into Pakistan, and utilized the madrasa network to reorganize before they pushed into Afghanistan in 1996, setting up a defacto government. Taliban rule in Afghanistan
fostered a strict adherence to Sharia law, and a hosting of key elements of al Qaeda, to include Osama Bin Laden. As this developed, bitterness and mistrust amongst the Soviet war veterans and leadership and the aftereffects of the altered madrasa curriculum began to show its lasting effects. The coming of age of the Taliban, and strengthening of al Qaeda culminated with the attacks of September 11, 2001. As discussed in Chapter 1, the path of the Deoband madrasa to militancy was somewhat preset by the politicization and straying form the original Deoband objectives and principles from within. This Chapter will demonstrate how these events built off the Deoband struggles, and tipped it to a point of extreme militancy

Islamization and Revolution: The Backdrop

In analyzing the rapid turn to militancy that took place in the madrasas of Pakistan, the context of the times and two critical facets which provide the backdrop; the Islamization of Pakistan under General Zia ul-Haq, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Islamization in Pakistan

As highlighted in Chapter 1, General Zia ul-Haq is one of the most important political figures to consider when analyzing the function of the Deoband madrasa network in western Pakistan. The Zia period, which ran from 1977 to 1988, served as a turning point for the madrasa system. In 1977, Zia suspended the constitution in Pakistan, and became the chief martial law administrator. In 1978, Zia pledged, and
then reneged on his promise to hold elections with a promise of Islamization and accountability of all politicians.¹

As the Zia years progressed, the process of Islamizing the state of Pakistan took place at two levels. First, changes were instituted in the legal system. The court system was changed to accommodate Sharia, and cases were tried under Islamic law. Additionally, legislation was devised to Islamize the economy by gradually eliminating interest-based banking, making it compulsory for the nationalized banks to deduct zakat (obligatory Islamic alms), from the deposits of Muslim account holders. This was the first time zakat was retrieved as a religious tax by any government and an elaborate system of provincial and district level zakat committees were formed.² Portions of the zakat collected by the government went into establishing additional Deoband madrasas in western Pakistan, with an alarming curriculum that focused on a sectarian divide.

Secondly, Islamization took place utilizing the print media, television, radio and mosques. New ordinances were issued to Islamize public morals, the civil service, armed forces, education system, research organizations and even science and technology. The religious view dominated public discourse, but provided a divide along sectarian lines.³

This initiative required the support of the religious seminaries for legitimacy. The military government promised additional entitlements for their allegiance,

¹ ICG, 9.
² Ibid., 10.
³ Ibid.
adherence and backing of these newly Islamized initiatives. Many of the Deoband leaders remained skeptical of this initiative suspecting it as a façade. They were concerned that Zia was simply politicizing Islam.

Despite this demographic of concerned mullahs, the Islamization policies of Zia were effective in altering the psyche of this critical region of Pakistan as a whole, and the sectarian divides between Sunni and Shias that were enhanced with Zia’s policies were about to get energized with a monumental regional event; the Islamic revolution in Iran.

*Revolution in Iran*

The events of 1979 in Iran enhanced the sectarian divide within Pakistan that had already been put in motion by the new Islamization policies by General ul-Haq. On February 1, 1979, Sayyid Ruhollah Mosawi Khomeini returned from exile to over five million people who lined the streets of Tehran to welcome his arrival. The Islamic revolution in Iran opened up the first wave of foreign funding for madrasas in Pakistan. Reactions throughout the Sunni Islamic world indicated a fear that growing Iranian influence and the spread of the revolution would offset Shia influence inside Pakistan. Nations such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and some other oil-rich Muslim countries started pumping money into hard-line Pakistani Sunni religious organizations willing to counter the supposed Shia threat.\(^4\) Millions of dollars were sent to Pakistan setting up madrasas across the country. Many of the madrasas set up at this time with this funding

were within Balouchistan province, which borders Iran in southwest Pakistan. These madrasas were subject to the Deoband influence as most of the institutions already in place in this region were of this sect.

Islamization and sectarian divisions both prior to and expanded by the Iranian revolution, propaganda, and outside financial influences were all themes which emerged in this region and specifically in western Pakistan at this critical juncture. These themes fostered a backdrop that initiated change in the Deoband madrasa network, which was set to be enhanced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

Refugees, External Influence and a Turn to Militancy

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan spurring a refugee situation that pushed hundreds of thousands of Afghans from the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan into the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan. The U.S. was anxious to assist in recognizing the threat in communist expansion throughout this already volatile region. Pakistan, already experiencing discomfort with a communist led Afghanistan prior to the invasion, had their fear heightened tenfold as the Soviets continued to settle into occupation mode throughout 1980. Knowing full well the interest the U.S. would have in countering these events, Zia intended to “make Pakistan as valuable as possible to the Americans.”

Zia knew that with the U.S. came vast

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2 Dr. Qumar Ul Huda Interview conducted 27 August 2009 at the United States Institute of Peace.
resources that could contribute to efforts in Afghanistan, while greatly serving Pakistan’s interests.

**Solidifying the New Relationship**

In July of 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter authorized a secret sanction to foster the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia to destabilize the Soviet Union.⁶ Zia saw this as an opportunity to engage the U.S. and initiate what he realized early as an essential relationship. However, this relationship did not start off at the level he desired. In January of 1980 Zia dismissed Carter’s offer of a $400 million aid package as “peanuts”.⁷ This relationship would soon improve after the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan and his new approach toward the problem of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia offered the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to act as a conduit for the arms and funds that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) wanted to supply the Afghan Mujahedin. For the next three years, the U.S. relationship with the ISI flourished, and it came to be that they were soon overseeing critical operations across the border in Afghanistan. Additionally, due to the relationship established between the ISI, the religious order through the JUI and Zia’s regime, increasing influence on the political processes within Pakistan.⁸ With this, the relationship was established for operations

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⁸ Ibid., 38.
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the threat of communism throughout
the region.

Politics in Pakistan

It did not take long for politics to assume its role within Pakistan in the wake of
these events. The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) saw this as an opportunity to gain a much greater
level of influence in Pakistani politics, and threw its weight behind the Afghan
resistance movement. As the U.S. continued to demonstrate that it was going to be a
key participant in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet occupation, JI made it clear that
they were interested in playing the role as facilitator to what the Americans would need
as they established their operations out of western Pakistan. JI’s stock continued to rise
with regard to what the U.S. needed to open up this covert front against the Soviets from
Pakistan, and JI continued to bask in the unprecedented political influence gained with
the military coup that Zia orchestrated in 1977.9

U.S. initiatives backed by the Saudis and the British were well supported by the
Pakistani ISI. Millions of dollars turned into billions of dollars quickly with participants
of this stature. The continued influx of refugees from Afghanistan, approximated at
nearly 3 million between 1980 and 1983 ensured a ready pool of easily influenced
young men that could be recruited to battle the Soviet occupation. Gulbadin Hekmatyar

9 Jalal, Partisans of Allah, 274.
was the leader if the Hizb-i-Islami in Afghanistan, and continued to work very closely with JI.\textsuperscript{10}

Despite this relationship, the political winds would soon change as a considerable portion of money flowing into Pakistan would be redirected toward the Deoband madrasas in the NWFP.\textsuperscript{11} The Pashtun culture shared between the Deobands of western Pakistan and the Afghan refugees, along with geographical convenience to corridors leading to and from Afghanistan, made this a more practical use of funds. With this, JUI led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and its subsidiary led by Maulana Samiul Haq, established itself as the primary facilitator of Jihad and the proxy military the U.S. and Saudis were seeking in this area.

\textit{Heightening the Rhetoric}

The U.S. continued to expand its financial investment throughout western Pakistan, and paralleled this effort by supporting the heightening of its political rhetoric. In the early 1980's, madrasas were not conducting military training, but there was a distinct transition in the ideology. These institutes were overtly encouraging students to join the 'holy war' against the infidel Soviet occupiers. The purpose of this was to ensure a continued supply of recruits for resistance across the border in Afghanistan. The message that was being taught in the madrasas was simple: all Muslims must

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 275.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
perform the duty of jihad in whatever capacity they could.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. worked in concert with the Pakistani military and ISI in facilitation of this effort. Focusing on the Deoband madrasas throughout the NWFP and FATA, the U.S ramped up its assistance in fueling the rhetoric that was perceived as necessary to counter the Soviet military machine in Afghanistan by promoting militancy, the culture of Jihad and support of the clergy in its war against communism.\textsuperscript{13}

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu by the University of Nebraska-Omaha and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with an aim to promote jihadist values and militant training. Millions of such books were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas where the students learnt the basics of math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles.\textsuperscript{14} The U.S. did not have to wait long on their return, and began to see the immediate effects of their investment in jihad. However, the tables soon turned in the mid 1980s, and are summarized accurately in an International Crisis Group (ICG) interview with Samiul Haq. In describing this period of time, Haq noted that as recruiting spiked throughout western Pakistan the importance of the Deoband madrasas also grew. Haq stated that “we did not need the ISI; the ISI and the CIA needed us.”\textsuperscript{15}

The swagger that was carried by the Deoband leadership was backed politically by the

\textsuperscript{12} Zahid Hussain, \textit{Frontline Pakistan}, 80.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 80.


\textsuperscript{15} ICG, 11.
JUI and exemplified how important the U.S., Pakistan and contributing nations saw the madrasa network for the mechanism that it provided the resistance in Afghanistan.

*The Madrasa Boom*

With the increased importance in the role that the madrasas were playing in the efforts against the occupying Soviets in Afghanistan, came increased numbers of institutions. The madrasa boom that had initiated in the late 1970s with Zia’s Islamization policy were experiencing yet another expansion with billions of foreign investment and facilitation by Pakistani mechanisms such as the military, ISI and political groups such as JI and JUI.

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, there were roughly 140 madrasas established. The numbers rose from 210 in 1950 to 563 in 1971. Although the reliability of figures on madrasa numbers are questionable, it is easily identifiable through the estimates to see that the early 1980s was a time of unrivaled growth. During the early 1980s 893 larger and smaller Pakistani madrasas were in existence, with a total of 3,186 teachers and 32,384 regular students. Most of these madrasas were showing up in the smaller towns and in the countryside than in the major cities.\(^{16}\) As billions of dollars continued to come in, enterprising mullahs rushed to fill the demand for recruits by offering their students for jihad. Madrasas were popping up everywhere as the religious leadership of varying sects saw this as an opportunity to partner with political parties to establish these institutions in areas where they saw the opportunity to expand

their influence. In 1980 there were 700 such institutions in the country. By 1986 there were approximately 7,000. Most were set up in the NWFP and the southern Punjab and served as facilitators of jihad. This existence of what became a business of jihad for some of the religious leadership made Pakistan a haven for foreign students excited about the prospect of attaining martyrdom by fighting the godless and satanic governments of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.  

The Deobands came out of this period well ahead of other sects and organizations with regard to the number of new madrasas. A percentage breakdown of the number of madrasas in Pakistan demonstrates that the Deobands are well ahead with over 71%. The next closest are the Barelvis with 16%, followed by the JI madrasas of which are 5%, Shia madrasas which have 4% and finally Ahle-Hadith also with 4%.  

Funding and Continued Foreign Influence

This period saw an influx of outside entities with interest in the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan and took an active role in utilizing the existing madrasa system to augment the Afghan Mujahedin. As the U.S. increased their presence in the region fixed on combating the Soviets through the Afghan resistance, influence was increased and JUI madrasas as described above were transformed into camps which began to include military training for individuals participating in operations in Afghanistan. Funding for these initiatives came from not only the U.S., but also international NGOs, sympathetic Arab gulf countries and the United Nations refugee

\[18\] ICRD, 47.
agencies. The international community was inadvertently creating an atmosphere of militant jihad throughout the Deoband madrasas in NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan.

It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that attracted potential students and leaders from across the Muslim world. Among this influx came Osama Bin Laden who headed to Peshawar in 1980. It was at this time that leadership of the Deobandi movement and JUI first interacted with what would be the pioneering elements of al Qaeda in this region of the NWFP. It was also during this time that JUI affiliated madrasas in the Peshawar area were critical in mobilizing, recruiting and logistically facilitating support for several Afghan Mujahedin groups. JUI also assisted in propagandizing popular support in the region for these efforts. It is in these circles that the relationship between JUI, which later had a hand in creating the Taliban, and al Qaeda leadership were formulated. The al Qaeda – Deoband alliance was solidified in 1989 after Osama bin Laden met with Taliban leader Mullah Omar at the Deobandi Banuri Mosque in Karachi.19

Madrasas at this time were now educating thousands of students with skills of little relevance other than militant jihad. With funding coming in from so many representatives, each with their own specific interest on that the purpose of the funding, made it very difficult to regulate the madrasa system. Madrasas, based on the fluctuation of incoming funds, opened and closed regularly creating an immense irregularity in the curriculum and thus made it much more susceptible to manipulation at the most tactical levels.

19 Jalal, Partisans of Allah, 278.
Soviet Defeat and the Inspiration of the Taliban Movement

Although the Mujahedin handily defeated the Soviets with the assistance of U.S. operatives and funding, the challenges which would present themselves to the U.S. were only beginning to emerge. With the confidence gained by the defeat of one of the world’s most formative superpowers, the Mujahedin intended to continue to carry out what they saw as the guarding of Islamic values in Pakistan. In the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Deoband madrasa network would give birth to the Taliban movement mostly out of what were the veterans of the war against the Soviet Union. The early 1990’s would prove to be a prosperous time where the leaders of this movement would gather forces and momentum strong enough to target the fragile government of Afghanistan. As the relationship evolved between the growing Taliban movement and the Deoband madrasa network, the Taliban continued to posture themselves for occupying Afghanistan, and students were increasingly used to logistically support the movement of personnel, supplies, equipment and propaganda across the border. In 1996, the Taliban invaded Afghanistan and established defacto rule with an extremely strict interpretation of Sharia law. The organization that was given life in the Deoband madrasas of western Pakistan was now on the international scene.

A Sense of Abandonment

Religious fervor and support from the super-powers resulted in the defeat of the Soviet Union. However, the perception by the former Mujahedin was that the CIA abandoned the madrasas in which they assisted in setting up thinking now that the
Soviet Union was gone that so were the lessons from the minds of the madrasa students that were trained to fight the Soviets. Additionally, the inability of the Pakistani government to adjust to the void left by the departure of the U.S. and its resources, insufficient means to educate the former madrasa students in state institutions, and the precarious political situation in Afghanistan all contributed to a recipe for disaster.

An unintended consequence of assistance by the U.S. and its allies to the Mujahedin was that the rhetoric they used against the Soviet Union would soon be turned in their direction. After the fall of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the focus of the militant rhetoric and hatred in the madrasas in Pakistan shifted from Russia to the west in general. The boundary of hatred that was earlier limited to Russia, the Godless enemy, expanded to include the west in general, and the U.S. in particular.\(^{20}\)

Five years after the Taliban successfully invaded and occupied Afghanistan, al Qaeda, who enjoyed immunity under the Taliban rule, orchestrated the devastating attacks of September 11\(^{th}\) 2001. Soon after, the U.S. found itself involved in a war against this militant ideology they contributed to fostering in the early 1980s.

*Bitteoriness and Mistrust*

The ICRD notes that among madrasa administrators and teachers today, one finds many who have previously fought against the Soviets and who are still willing to put their lives on the line to preserve the Islamic way of life. This time however, the perceived enemy of Muslim identity is not the former Soviet Union, but the United

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 19.
States. Keeping in mind the original auspices for the formation of the Deoband
madrasas in response to the colonization by the British in the 1800’s, it should serve as
no surprise that this concern continues to exist. Despite the fact that the U.S. assisted
the Mujahedhin against the Soviet Union, there was a major sense of betrayal and that
they were used to fight on behalf of the U.S., not alongside them. This belief caused
many of the madrassa leaders to remain angry with the U.S. and therefore prone to
encouraging hostility toward the U.S. presence. Of course, the fact that the U.S. came
into the region with the Taliban in its crosshairs fosters friction, but a feeling of a threat
to the Islamic way of life and a disbelief that the U.S. does not have an intent to
maintain a colonial stake likely outweigh the obvious.

Extended Effects of Hardened Rhetoric

As the Taliban continued to tighten its grip on Afghanistan by expanding its
power and influence in the late 1990s, it became increasingly evident that what was
being taught in the madrasas of Pakistan was having a profound effect on maintaining a
foothold in the tribal regions. The rhetoric the U.S. assisted in spreading during the
1980s had contributed in creating a new jihad phenomenon amongst the former
Mujahedhin. These former fighters and their leaders identified themselves as the
guardians of Islam in the region against colonization, modernization and any threat to
their identity. The underprivileged continued to fill the ranks of the madrasas
throughout Pakistan where they were taught that it was their spiritual duty to contribute
to combating the enemies of Islam.

\[^{21}\text{ICRD, 31.}\]
Spiritual Duty

Deoband madrasas today are exposed to a religious curriculum taught by a community of teachers which embrace the sense of victimization from decades of war, threats of colonization and modernization that could lead to a loss of Islamic identity. This “culture of victimhood”, has isolated the madrasa leaders from the outside world.  

This isolation and sense of victimization leads to a spiritual sense of duty in the madrassa leaders, their students and the population of this region of Pakistan. Jessica Stern describes this phenomenon in a Foreign Affairs article printed in late 2000, before the September 11th terrorist attacks holding just as much relevance today. Extremist madrasa leaders in Pakistan clinging to a misunderstood concept of “jihad” equated this form of struggle directly with guerilla warfare. Stern argues that madrasa leaders encouraged underprivileged citizens to fulfill their spiritual obligation by fighting against the enemies of Muslims. This hunger to fulfill one’s spiritual duty can lead to an addiction to Jihad, and a search for any enemy that can serve as a means to this end. Stern quotes a longtime Mujahid interviewed on this topic who stated that “a person addicted to heroin can get off it if he really tries, but a mujahid cannot leave the jihad. I am spiritually addicted to jihad.”

The desire to serve the religious cause is exploited by mullahs and Taliban leaders in western Pakistan. The Taliban effectively target the rural and poverty stricken

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22 Ibid., 30.

regions of the NWFP, FATA and Balouchistan with rhetoric that intends to play upon these individuals’ desire to serve their God. Being that there is little room for financial contributions from these individuals, the Taliban have created a culture that encourages families to give up their sons in the name if the Islamic cause. There arises almost a sense of pride when a son is lost in battle against the infidels, fulfilling their contribution. When a boy becomes a martyr, thousands of people attend his funeral. "Poor families become celebrities. Everyone treats them with more respect after they lose a son and when there is a martyr in the village, it encourages more children to join the jihad. It raises the spirit of the entire village, and in poor families with large numbers of children, a mother can assume that some of her children will die of disease if not in war."\textsuperscript{24} This form of ideology is difficult to combat. This use of victimization and spiritual duty is applied effectively by the Taliban.

\textit{Changes in Interpretation}

Hussain Haqqani, current Pakastani ambassador to the U.S., has discussed the dramatic change in Quranic interpretation comparing how the same passage he was taught as a madrasa student in the 1960s compares to the post September 11\textsuperscript{th} interpretation. Haqqani visited the Darul Uloom Haqqania which sits on the main highway between Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan. This madrassa at which Haqqani was a student, is closely associated with the emergence of the Taliban, and boasts that it is the madrassa which Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban was educated. This visit, which took place shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, keys

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 122.
in on a 9-year-old student named Mohammad Tahir. Haqqani describes how Tahir rocked back and forth reciting the same verse of the Quran that had been instilled into his memory at a similar age. The passage Haqqani keyed in on is paraphrased as such; “of all the communities raised among men you are the best, enjoying the good, forbidding the wrong, and believing in God.”25 The troubling thing that Haqqani found was how this verse was interpreted by the young boy. When asked what his thoughts were on the meaning of this reference, Tahir stated that “the Muslim community is the best in the eyes of God, and we must make it the same in the eyes of men by force. We must fight the unbelievers and that includes those who carry Muslim names but have adopted the ways of unbelievers. When I grow up, I intend to carry out Jihad in every possible way.”26 This troubling excerpt is indicative of the vast changes that have taken place over time in these religious institutions. The example of Tahir is a direct result of the militarization that has taken place in the Pakistani madrasas which started after the Soviet invasion, evolving into the defacto support network for the Taliban, a major contributor to the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and a disruptive influence to stability in Pakistan. The U.S. was spearheading an effort to rid the world of communist expansion, and in the context of the times sought to ensure regional and international stability through this campaign. However, in doing so are currently faced with the daunting task of stabilizing a region fraught with suspicion about its true ambition.


26 Ibid., 60.
Summary

The Deobands had been set on a path in the mid 1970s that led them away from the values set forth by their pioneers. Politization continued to pose the greatest challenge at the end of the 1970s, and the major changes that Zia’s Islamization policies drove caused great divisions between the Sunnis and Shias. The propaganda which the regime utilized, as well as the general changes in policies, altered the psyche of the Pakistani people. When the Iranian revolution took place, sectarian divisions grew, and the madrasas had been set on a path to militancy.

With the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan came new political relationships and jockeying, but the Deobands emerged as the greatest facilitator of jihad, almost appearing as warriors for hire to the U.S. and any outside entity that was paying. This attitude certainly demonstrated continued drifting away from the objectives and principles laid out be the Deoband leadership in the late 1800s, specifically regarding with whom donations were accepted from, and involvement with the government and politics.

The U.S.’s critical decision to ramp up efforts throughout Pakistan with weapons and rhetoric that encouraged violent jihad against the Soviets fostered a rapid increase in the number of Deoband madrasas opening up in western Pakistan. These tactics in fighting a proxy war against the Soviets would prove to lead to unintended consequences following the defeat of the Soviets.

With the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Mujahedin that stood by the side of the U.S. felt abandoned, and began to turn the rhetoric that was facilitated by
the U.S. against it and its allies in the west. The early 1990s saw a rapid shift in the perceived enemy of Islam in this region from the Soviets to the U.S. After the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 the new enemy was clear, and the arrival of U.S. forces in the region provided an enemy to focus efforts against. The battle cry of al Qaeda and the Taliban are driven by the same fears of a loss of Islamic identity, modernization, secularization and a general sense of threat, paralleled by a lack of trust in the Pakistani government.
CHAPTER 3
KEY MADRASAS

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October, 2001 successfully uprooted the Taliban hold on the country, and inhibited the existing al Qaeda sanctuaries along the Afghanistan / Pakistan boarder. The military operations of late 2001 and early 2002 by the U.S. were effective in disrupting the Taliban, placing them on the run, and pushing them into Pakistan; which was not unfamiliar territory. For many, it was not an escape but a return home – back to refugee camps in Pakistan where they had been brought up and where their families still lived; back to the madrasas where they had once studied; back to the hospitality of the mosques where they had once prayed.¹ Over the course of the next three years, the Taliban reestablished themselves throughout the NWFP, FATA and Balouchistan while reacting to the invasion and shuffling their hierarchy. ISI officials, standing with the Frontier Constabulary guards and customs officials at Chaman, the border crossing into Balouchistan between Kandahar and Quetta, waved them in. Pervez Musharraf was not about to discourage these Taliban fighters who had been nurtured for two decades by the Taliban.² With the inability of Musharraf and the Pakistani government to influence these ethnically Pashtun regions, the movement that was born in the 1980s as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had safely settled in and returned home.

¹ Ahmed Rashid, Decent Into Chaos, 240.
² Ibid., 241.
With this, the madrasas of Pakistan had once again become an entity that provided an established mechanism with which to consolidate refugees that were arriving from Afghanistan. More importantly it provided a forum for Taliban leaders and fighters that were pushed from Afghanistan in need of somewhere to settle, rcorganize, recruit and deliberate the intentions of the U.S. and NATO. Jessica Stern’s article in 2000 demonstrated that the post Soviet withdrawal madrasas of Pakistan were militarized prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, but with the enemy which had been built up over the course of the past decade in these institutions present in the region, it was not going to be challenging to discover a willing pool of participants in this generation’s jihad opportunity. Statistics have suggested for the past ten years that 10-15% of madrasas in Pakistan are militarized.\(^3\) As the U.S. and NATO are experiencing, that is enough to greatly contribute to the insurgency that is being led by the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Pakistan. On the surface, this common estimate appears logical given the great number of madrasas that ignored the allure of funding and jihad in the 1980s and 1990s.\(^4\) However, the madrasas that do exist to exert militarized ideology and contribute to the unrest in both Afghanistan and Pakistan trace their roots to several key madrasas. Three key madrasas stand out when analyzing institutions that have carried on the militarized rhetoric from the 1980s, and continue to play a role on the situation in Afghanistan, as well as domestically in Pakistan today. These madrasas

\(^3\) ICG, 2.

\(^4\) Dr. Qumar Ul Huda Interview conducted 27 August 2009 at the United States Institute of Peace.
include the Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khatai (between Pashawar and Islamabad), the Shaldara madrasa in the city of Quetta, Balouchistan province and finally the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia in Karachi.

_Jihad University_

Maulana Samiul Haq addressed a graduating class at the Darul Uloom Haqqania explaining to the students that “being watchmen of your religion, you are naturally the first target of your enemies.” The madrasa is situated on the Grand Trunk Road near Peshawar, and has been a prominent factory for producing students ready and willing to participate in a holy war against the enemies of Islam in Afghanistan. The madrasa was established in 1947 by Samiul Haq’s father Maulana Abdul Haq who was a well established scholar and highly respected Deoband. Darul Uloom Haqqania developed into a center for pan-Islamism at the beginning of the Afghan war against the Soviets in the early 1980s. Darul Uloom Haqqania expanded greatly with outside funding from varying governments and outside entities. By the mid 1980s over half the students in the madrasa were Afghans. It also attracted students from former Soviet republics such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In the mid 1990s, Darul Uloom Haqqania was a launching pad for the Taliban invasion of Afghanistan. A few months before the attacks of September 11th, the madrasa hosted a conference of Islamic parties and militant groups to express solidarity with Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban regime. An

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5 Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, 76.
6 Ibid., 80.
7 Ibid., 81.
agreement was reached that all would assist each other in launching a holy war against the U.S. and the west.

Zahid Hussain describes a post September 11th visit to Darul Uloom Haqqania in describing the banners on hand throughout the campus portraying weapons and tanks celebrating the might of the Taliban forces. Posters hung on the walls adorning Osama Bin Laden with slogans supporting holy war. In this speech that Samiul Haq was giving, he celebrated Osama Bin Laden as a hero of Islam, and ensured the students were left instilled with the idea that it was their duty to defend their faith before everything else. Hussain then describes the collection of graduating students breaking into frenzied chants of “jihad, jihad”, and “Allah is the greatest” as a message from Mullah Omar was read to them. The Haqqaniya madrassa was not only the primary recruiting ground for Taliban students, it was also a major producer of Taliban leadership. In 1999 at least eight Taliban cabinet ministers in Kabul were graduates of Haq’s Darul Uloom Haqqaniya and dozens more served as Taliban governors in the provinces, military commanders, judges and bureaucrats. The Haqqaniya madrassa is completely private and operates solely on public donations, and the demographics of this madrassa include a large percentage of students that come from Afghanistan to study. Geographically, this madrassa is situated in a strategic area with easy access to potential recruits throughout the NWFP, and into Afghanistan via Peshawar and into Jalalabad. To the east, is easy access via the Peshawar to Islamabad highway to the Pakistani

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capital. Utilization of recruits from this madrassa was more focused on the northeastern region of Afghanistan in the provinces of Nangarhar, Ghazni, Nuristan and Konar. Tribal, cultural and language attributes were among the most applicable characteristics which made the students in this region of Pakistan attractive for utilization in this region of Afghanistan.

*The Shaldara Madrasa*

The capital of Baluchistan, Quetta, serves as the home of the Shaldara madrasa which is this regions’ primary recruiting and training facility for Taliban students. The Shaldara madrassa distinguished itself in 1994 as the first to send its students into Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban, carrying messages back and forth between leadership. Maulana Nur Mohammad ran the madrassa in the mid 1990’s, and maintained it as a primary meeting place for Taliban leadership in this region of Pakistan. Geographically, Shaldara was located in Quetta which was a part of what is commonly referred to as Pashtunabad. Pashtunabad is a congested slum district that hosted numerous Taliban supporters that were open to the idea of the Taliban returning to where they were welcome. Pashtunabad had a striking resemblance to a typical Kandahar neighborhood under the former Taliban regime, and several Taliban leaders were believed to be enjoying refuge there.\(^9\) Shaldara also facilitated a sprawl of madrasas that speckled the map on the main highway from Quetta to Chaman, which is a central way point on the Afghan / Pakistan border en route to Kandahar. Chaman is a

dusty and transient border town that is a key facilitation and recruiting ground for the Taliban fighting against the U.S. and NATO troops. The madrasa sprawl between Quetta and Chaman was where a significant amount of the shaping of the Taliban movement took place, so it naturally became an attractive hiding place for fighters and leaders fleeing Afghanistan at the beginning of the U.S. invasion. Zahid Hussain recounts a conversation he had with Abdul Hadi in the summer of 2003 in Chaman where he stated that he had fled his home in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in order to wait out the initial wave of U.S. forces flowing into country. Hadi was among thousands of Taliban who “melted away into the Pakistani seminaries with intentions of returning to Afghanistan at some point in the future to battle the U.S. and reestablish Taliban control over Afghanistan.” Hussain noted the optimism of the Taliban he interacted with in this region between Quetta and Chaman in 2003 that the Taliban would emerge as victorious against the invading and occupying U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Basing themselves out of Quetta and the Shaldara madrasa, many provincial ministers and members of parliament belonging to the ruling alliance became actively involved in efforts against the U.S. and NATO, and openly supported the Afghan Taliban leadership using this region as a base. Maulana Abdul Qadir, who is the deputy at the madrasa has stated that they are “proud that the Taliban are made and

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10 Ibid., 87.

11 Ibid.
helped here and we do everything we can to facilitate them". 12 This madrassa and its students were more focused on the southern regions of Afghanistan. Again, as in the case of Haqqaniya, links of language, culture and tribal affiliation made the demographic of students in this area of Pakistan more transparent in Zabol, Kandahar and Helmand provinces of Afghanistan.

Karachi

In Karachi, the Jamia Uloom ul-Islamia madrasa has also established itself as a key Taliban recruiter and facilitator. Although most of the efforts of this madrasa prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 were focused on sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiias, it altered its purposes under the leadership of Maulana Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai. Shamzai was the author of several popular books on Jihad and was extremely outspoken against the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Mumtaz Ahmad maintains that this madrassa was a prominent ideological pillar of the Taliban movement which encouraged Muslims through sermons, publications and fatwas supporting the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The sprawl that was seen with the Darul Uloom Haqqania Madrasa up north, and the Shaldara Madrasa in Balouchistan seems to also be taking place in and around Karachi from the Jamia Uloom ul-Islamia.

12 Ahmed Rashid, Decent Into Chaos, 243.
The 9/11 Commission Report notes that the police commander of Karachi stated there are now over 859 madrasas teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{The Madrasa Cycle}

The Madrasas have settled into a cycle where they are not just harboring and aiding existing Taliban warriors, but are also creating them. More than 8,000 new pupils have enrolled in the seminaries in the border areas alone since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. There is a constant stream of them, and it is difficult to find accommodations for the newcomers said Hafiz Hameedullah, the head of one seminary that Zahid Hussain conducted research at.\textsuperscript{14}

Each of these madrasas came to utilize a similar cycle for the students and leadership. Although recruiting was always very active, it was prominent during the summer months to prepare for the winter class schedule. Summer was the time for transit in and out of Afghanistan in times when regional conflict was minimal, and served as the fighting season when the students were at war from the early 1980’s through today. Students spent winter months residing at the thousands of madrasas these examples represent, attending classes and preparing for the coming months of jihad against the prescribed enemy of the moment. This cycle proved effective during the Soviet occupation, the fostering of the Taliban between 1989 and 1996, the Taliban’s

\textsuperscript{13} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Philip Zelikow, Executive Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins; Counsel, Ernest R. May; Senior Advisor, \textit{The 9/11 Commission Report}, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004).

\textsuperscript{14} Zahid Hussain, \textit{Frontline Pakistan}, 88.
struggle to overthrow the communist government of Afghanistan, and continues today against NATO forces.

**Summary**

The U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as a reaction to the devastating attacks of September 11th, 2001 provided purpose to the already active madrasa network throughout western Pakistan. As discussed, the droves of Taliban fighters and leadership were in many cases welcomed back with open arms by family and supporters in this ethnically Pashtun region of Pakistan. The political dilemma that Pervez Musharraf found himself in at the time did nothing for subduing the sanctuary which was to be carved out by the Taliban leadership over the coming years. Once again, it was clear that the same Deoband madrasas that played such an important role in the Mujahedin struggle against the Soviet Union in the 1980s would now assume a role against the retaliating U.S. forces.

The word ‘Taliban’ literally translates to “students” in Arabic and is most commonly used to describe students that study in the Deoband madrasas of Pakistan. The word “Talib' carries the connotation of students that study religion not in a large public university, but an institution that is purely religious in nature, and does not even consider the contributions of the sciences. Thus, even the etymology of the word “Taliban” suggests the Taliban’s close ties to madrasas and its distance from other varieties of modern education.\(^\text{15}\) The Taliban were born and raised in these madrasas, located in regions which are ethnically different from the government in Islamabad, and

exist with a blanket of cover by elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. These relationships create a situation which makes it difficult to counter the rhetoric being taught in these institutions.

The three madrasas focused on here represent examples of how the madrasa role has evolved, and the part each plays now. Darul Uloom Haqqania and the Shaldara Madrasa stand as fixtures for developing students with rhetoric, and supplying the Taliban with fighters in both the Northeastern and Southern Afghanistan war fronts. Both were in existence before the U.S. invasion, but enjoyed an enhanced role once the new enemy had arrived just miles across the border. Both operate as overtly supportive of the Taliban in Pakistan, and demonstrate the inability of the central government to counter their ideology. Both clearly demonstrate the important role of the Deoband madrasa, how they have been politicized and drifted away from the principles and objectives laid out in the 1870s. The Jamia Uloom ul-Islamia reminds one that the Taliban do not just have influence in the rural regions of western Pakistan, but also in urban areas such as Karachi. Madrasas such as these are having a impact on U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan. With little ability to counter the messages being taught to thousands of students a year in these schools, the U.S. will see very little let up in the emergence of willing fighters bent on contributing as protectors of the Islamic identity against what they perceive as a colonizing force which threatens the existence of Islam, and does so against predominantly ethnic Pashtuns whom which they share an identity and culture.
The U.S. finds itself facing a new generation of jihadists in Afghanistan which are educated and groomed in Pakistan. The U.S. cannot counter this shaping entity to the insurgency in Afghanistan solely with military power; this simply would never subdue the threat and would likely contribute to fostering greater discontent. Instead, the U.S. must exhibit the whole of its national resources for this investment in its national security, and stabilization of the region. The U.S. has a tradition of contributing both military and non-military aid to Pakistan as a whole, and specifically to these threatening enclaves in western Pakistan. However, how can the U.S. specifically address the issue of the madrasas? Can the U.S. in some way counter the rhetoric they at one time had a hand in creating, and now face the unintended consequences? Madrasa and education reform is something that the Pakistani government has promised since prior to the attacks of 2001, heightened rhetoric for after the attacks, but has failed to influence through today. The U.S. will need to continue to spend money in this region to counter the threat to the Afghan efforts, regional stability and national security. The manner in which this money is spent, is something that needs careful attention.
CHAPTER 4

HISTORIC U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN AND A GATEWAY TO ADDRESSING THE MILITARIZED MADRASAS

Spending money and contributing resources to Pakistan is something that is not new to the U.S. government. However, when analyzing the manner in which money is spent, one is led to question whether the right balance has been struck with regard to allocation of funds for security and development. These facets are both critical when it comes to meeting the strategic objectives of the U.S. in this region.

This chapter will start by revisiting U.S. spending in Pakistan from 1977 to the present, revealing that it has not struck the right balance in the distribution of funding for security and development. From there, this chapter will turn to an in depth discussion of what may be the answer to this imbalance, a response in the form of unprecedented earmarking of non-military aid for western Pakistan proposed in Congress as the Kerry/Lugar Bill.

Finally, the summary will set the stage for discussion of how the U.S. can specifically address the problem of the militarized madrasas in western Pakistan under the auspices of the Kerry/Lugar Bill. Allocating the funding for an effort of this magnitude is only the beginning of the challenge when attempting to spend a sum of money in the billions in a hostile region like this. Debates continue with regard to whether or not this is a feasible initiative on the grand scale, and addressing the madrasa issue within this will also be a daunting task.
Recent History of U.S. Aid to Pakistan

The primary focus of aid initiatives has not centered on development, education or reform. An in depth study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2007 revealed that the U.S. had at that point given approximately $10.58 billion in aid to Pakistan since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The CSIS study notes that close to 60% of this money had gone to Coalition Support Funds (CSF) which are intended to reimburse partners for their assistance in the war on terrorism. CSF funds are given to 20 countries, but Pakistan is by far the single largest recipient.\(^1\) From there, approximately 15%, or close to $1.6 billion has been dedicated to security assistance, which the Pakistanis have spent mostly on the purchase of new major weapons systems intended for large scale wars, not counterinsurgency.\(^2\) The next 15% of aid from 2002 – 2007 has gone toward budget support, or direct cash transfers to the central government of Pakistan. These funds are meant to give Pakistan the freedom to allocate spending where they see it most necessary. The suspicion is that most of this has gone toward defense as well. Finally, roughly 10% has been used specifically for development and humanitarian assistance to include the U.S. response to the earthquake in Pakistan in October of 2005.\(^3\) These numbers and percentages do not include covert funds which CSIS estimates could parallel the $10.58 billion listed here.

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\(^2\) Ibid., Pg x.

\(^3\) Ibid.
This spending would suggest the U.S. approach to the involvement of Pakistan as a coalition partner after September 11, 2001 centered around a robust Pakistani military capability as essential to their contributions in combating al Qaeda and Taliban influence within Pakistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban’s projection and support for the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s overall ability to contribute to U.S. national security by stabilizing the region.

*Previous Trends in U.S. Aid to Pakistan Interpreted*

Further analysis of U.S. aid trends to Pakistan continue to demonstrate this trend. From 1977 through 1981, the U.S. contributed approximately $250 million in economic and development assistance to Pakistan. This number rose dramatically in 1982, and held steady at just over a half a billion in economic and development aid over the course of the next decade. In this same timeframe, security assistance funds provided by the U.S. remained consistent at just over a billion.

However, this trend did not continue through the 1990s. From 1992 through 2001, security assistance aid disappeared. Economic and development assistance dropped to well under a quarter of a billion annually. It wasn’t until after the attacks of September 11, 2001 that Pakistan saw a drastic increase in security assistance back to levels seen in the mid 1980s of approximately $1 billion, the introduction of the CSF, which started at a billion in 2002, budget support which initiated at just under a billion
in 2002, and a moderate increase in economic and development aid estimated at just over $250 million.⁴

There are several aspects to this spending trend that resonate. In the late 1970s, the U.S. was delivering only a moderate amount of aid within the realm of economic and development assistance, but once the Russians invaded Afghanistan U.S. aid increased drastically. This increase was seen mostly in the area of security, with a modest $250 million spike in economic and development money. This lasted throughout the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, and almost completely dried up in 1992 when it was clear that the threat of communism spreading in the region and world wide had been mitigated. The trend continued through the 1990s, a timeframe when U.S. interests were elsewhere, but while the future enemies of the U.S., the Taliban and al Qaeda, were gaining momentum in Pakistan and Afghanistan. U.S. aid numbers did not increase again until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when it was clear that the U.S. would once again look to Pakistan as a ally in battling its enemy in the region.

As we have seen, U.S. aid to Pakistan is directly related to when there is a vested interest in events in the region. As demonstrated by the dollar amounts spent in the areas of security during the Russian occupation and the U.S. war in Afghanistan. However, this should not be the take away from observing these numbers. A case could be made that this level of spending directly on security mechanisms in both scenarios was justified given the context of both situations. What should be noted is the fact that there was not a consistent balance between security and economic development. The

⁴ Ibid., 3.
gap in the 1990s in both areas hurt the U.S. by allowing the Mujahedin whom were once close allies in the struggle against the threat of regional communism, evolve into the Taliban with a feeling of betrayal, fueled partially by the rhetoric the U.S. helped to create. During this period, the madrasas of Pakistan were left to these former Mujahedin, along with illiterate mullahs that heightened this rhetoric while continually militarizing these institutions.

With the current balance still heavily tipped in the direction of security, it is necessary to point out the importance of leveling this effort in an attempt to shape the stability efforts the U.S. is engaged in. There needs to be a consistent contribution of non-military economic and development assistance in Pakistan. Within this, there must be ideas and initiatives intended to focus on reform of madrasas. The U.S. Senate has proposed unprecedented aid to western Pakistan in the form of the Kerry/Lugar Bill. It is important to understand this important proposal before analyzing how it could be applied to mitigate the role of the madrasas in the current unrest in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and their threat to U.S. national security.

Analysis of the Kerry/Lugar Bill

Setting the Context of the Kerry/Lugar Bill

As the United States approaches its eighth year of combat in Afghanistan, military leadership, government officials, the media and regional experts have all offered opinion on what the way ahead should look like in this complex problem set. Attacks have steadily risen against U.S. forces since 2005, which has resulted in mounting casualties, and a sense of a loss of control over the strengthening insurgency.
driven by the Taliban and al Qaeda. Shaping the war effort with the correct resources and manpower have highlighted the discussions as to how to move ahead, properly balancing security and development initiatives as a holistic approach. An important element in the undertaking in Afghanistan is the influence of Pakistan, specifically the regions of the NWFP and the FATA in western Pakistan. These are regions that continue to enjoy an autonomous existence far removed from the influence of Islamabad, and governed primarily by ethnic Pashtun figures whose ties to the Taliban run extremely deep.

Recognizing the need for a shift in approach to these efforts with more of a regional view, Senators Joe Biden (D-DE) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan” Bill (S 3263) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 2008. This bi-partisan initiative called for an unprecedented 7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan for fiscal years 2009-2013. Interestingly, the aid was specifically intended for the Taliban sanctuaries of the NWFP and FATA as a soft power approach to shaping this front which has so greatly hindered efforts in Afghanistan.

Within two months of the initial introduction of this bill, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated to the House Armed Services Committee after a trip to the region that “We are running out of time” and he was “not convinced
we’re winning in Afghanistan”.5 Mullen noted that a change in approach had to take place and that “we cannot kill our way to victory” in Afghanistan.

It could be seen that in the waning months of 2008, there was a clear consensus that our approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan had to be enhanced. The Biden/Lugar Bill gained momentum and unanimous support from the Foreign Relations Committee and appeared set to move ahead. However, the ongoing presidential campaigns and transition of power shelved the bill for the time being.

Transition

With the elections complete and the new administration settling into office, President Obama wasted no time in addressing the new directions that would be taken in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In February, 2009 President Obama announced that U.S. forces in Iraq totaling approximately 142,000 would be reduced to between 35,000 – 50,000 by August 2010.6 A month later, President Obama held a news conference where he discussed his administration’s plan for moving ahead in Afghanistan. In the March 27th speech, President Obama discussed the challenging times that lay ahead in our efforts in Afghanistan. After reminding constituents of the reasons the struggle in Afghanistan are worth the additional investment, President Obama announced plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan by 17,000 to 20,000 in the coming year essentially doubling the numbers of combat forces on the ground. He then discussed varying facets

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of this conflict, and the complexity which the Pakistan influence maintains on our moving forward. The President discussed what was originally introduced as the Biden/Lugar Bill, now being re-worked as the Kerry/Lugar Bill for Senator John Kerry (D-MA) the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, replacing the recently sworn in Vice President Joe Biden. President Obama stated that:

A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. Al Qaeda offers the people of Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for something different. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years - resources that will build schools, roads, and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistan's democracy.  

With this, the bill was resuscitated and America’s new President had issued his guidance on both the combat and development efforts geared toward a balanced approach to this region which spawned the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and has become our primary effort in battling terrorism. This Bill comes at a time when it may be a politically challenging initiative to undertake given the fiscal mood of the American people, but the President had a response to that concern. “I do not ask for this support lightly. These are challenging times, and resources are stretched, but the American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own future - because the security of our two countries is shared. Pakistan's government must be a stronger partner

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in destroying these safe-havens, and we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people\footnote{Ibid., 3.}.

**A Multi-Faceted Relationship**

Through the Kerry / Lugar Bill, the United States seeks to improve its image and create a multi-faceted relationship with the people of Pakistan. With the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and the ability of the Taliban and al Qaeda to propagandize to the citizens of the FATA and NWFP, the perception of the U.S. is seen only through the results of drone attacks and hearsay. The U.S. needs to improve this image, and combat the information campaign that the Taliban manages so well which expertly demonizes both the U.S. and the central government of Pakistan. Spending billions of dollars on projects to improve the lives of everyday people in these contentious regions is a critical way of extending the soft side of U.S. power in an effort to improve our image, and articulate our intentions for the region with something other than an offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda leadership.

People to people engagement will be a key factor in building this multi-faceted relationship. With the increase of funding will come an increase in U.S. representation in the region. This increase in U.S. representation will come from various organizations within the government, but should not be uniformed military personnel. This presence of U.S. workers outside the military with the intent to improve the situation for the citizens by seeing the money and projects through should assist in this portion of the initiative, and is a key factor in making it work. However, the practicality of sending aid
workers into one of the most dangerous areas of the world for westerners is an area of
great concern regarding this element of outreach. The reasons for the increase in U.S.
aid workers in the region must also be explained to Pakistanis, as the propensity of
residents in this area will be to see and interpret this action with suspicion.

Goals of the Kerry/Lugar Bill

Economic Development

Achieving economic independence in the NWFP and FATA is a key element to
advancing the quality of the existence for its citizens. Economic prosperity will lead to
less dependence on the leadership of the Taliban and al Qaeda which offer nothing along
the lines of progress. As President Obama noted in his policy address on Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the development of schools, hospitals and roads is essential to this
undertaking. The enhancement of education is particularly vital to the future of
economic development in this region of Pakistan. Isolation to the outside world is a
dominating inhibitor to the ability of the central government in Islamabad to reach out to
the citizens of these areas, and allows the Taliban to monitor everything that comes in
and out. This is true with the case of education, and leads to the problem seen with the
poor public education option in the region, and the manipulation of the madrassa system.
This gives the Taliban the ability to keep the people separated from any kind of
progress, and prevent competing ideals from having an opportunity to flourish. This
facet of the Kerry/Lugar Bill is an extremely challenging one given the extreme threat to
outsiders.
Military Coordination

With U.S. forces fighting a strengthening counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and Pakistan battling the Taliban and al Qaeda in the NWFP and FATA, continued military to military coordination is essential to success. Although the money proposed in this bill is specified as non-military aid, the security challenges both sides faces presents a situation where this coordination is vital. Within this lies some daunting challenges. The Pakistani military has traditionally been focused east, and the threat from India. Thus, the Pakistani military trained primarily on a conventional military engagement with a foreign Army, not the counterinsurgency skills necessary to diminishing the power of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Additionally, the element of the Pakistani military that is stationed in the FATA and NWFP is the Frontier Corps, which is ethnically similar in make up to the demographic in the region, and is under trained and equipped. The ethnic and age similarities, and the fact that in many cases, members of the Frontier Corps having family members involved in the insurgency on both sides of the border create a situation where it is very difficult for both the U.S. and Pakistani governments to trust this wing of the Pakistani military. A desired side effect from this investment for the U.S. is a better relationship between the Frontier Corps, the U.S. military and the Pakistani military. Cooperation has greatly improved between the two, and needs to continue down a path that leads to effective security enhancement, but with the image that the U.S. is not in Pakistan as an extention of the Afghan occupation. The partnership must remain in the background in order to manage this perception. The military effort, regardless of how critical it is to the overall effects desired in the region,
must not appear as such to the citizens of NWFP, FATA and Balouchistan. This is a very difficult, but not impossible feat to accomplish.

*Deny Enemy Sanctuary*

The Kerry/Lugar Bill intends to deny the sanctuary which the Taliban and al Qaeda have enjoyed since the U.S. invasion into Afghanistan in 2001. Building multifaceted relationships with the people of Pakistan, economic development in the NWFP and FATA and military coordination are all elements which are essential in strengthening the immature democracy in Pakistan. Without mitigating the power and influence of the Taliban in the NWFP and FATA, and offering the citizens a better solution than what exists, the bill will not accomplish its goals. It is essential that the bill works towards uprooting the Taliban and al Qaeda from this sanctuary, thus separating them from their power base.

The primary focus must remain on investing in the people of western Pakistan. A common phrase attached to any counterinsurgency effort is that the people are the center of gravity of the initiative. The Kerry/Lugar Bill intends to improve the quality of life for citizens of Pakistan in the NWFP and FATA by directing funds at issues which would be an investment in the future of this region.

*Inherent Risks of Executing Kerry/Lugar*

The reality of pumping 7.5 billion of non-military aid into the NWFP and FATA is the fact that at least some of these funds will end up in the hands of Taliban supporters, or at a minimum, passive facilitators. This prospect is an enormous gamble both in the realms of national security, and political survivability. The intent is
obviously to foster change in the region, but the risk is the U.S. acting as an enabler to
the very enemy we are fighting. The U.S. has undertaken very similar initiatives in
approaches inside Afghanistan with reconstruction projects aimed at road improvement,
construction of clinics, schools and infrastructure. These projects inside Afghanistan
enjoyed the inherent security presence of the U.S. military, something which will be
absent in the Pakistan version. Under Kerry/Lugar, the U.S. is banking on this very
change in approach to place a different type of face on the effort, and show the Pakistani
people that the U.S. is a friend, and not just a military partner. The unintended
consequence here is the strengthening of the enemy through these projects, leading to an
unimproved security stance for the U.S. and Pakistan, as well as a political conundrum
for the Obama administration.

The U.S. must also manage perceptions of the Pakistani people of
colonialization. The Taliban and al Qaeda are very creative with propaganda, and
possess a type of “home field advantage” when it comes to convincing the general
public what is in their best interests. It is much easier for the average citizen to identify
linguistically and culturally with the Taliban, despite the fact they may know that the
Taliban are an oppressive organization. Playing to ethnic and religious pride and
arguing that the U.S. is using this approach only to further its own initiatives is a likely
reaction by the Taliban to Kerry/Lugar implementation.
Continued Debate: Arguments For and Against the Kerry/Lugar Bill

When the bill was originally introduced in July of 2008 as Biden/Lugar, there was a sense within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of great support. Partisanship on the Bill did not present itself as an issue, either publicly or privately when originally introduced. However, since the original introduction of the bill, there have been select legislators and regional experts which have voiced concerns. Perhaps the most outspoken legislator, cautioning on the desire and ability of Pakistan to police from within against the Taliban, has been Senator Carl Levin (D-MI). "Mr. Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that so far Pakistan had demonstrated no willingness to confront the violent forces in its own government. He questioned the effectiveness of billions of dollars in proposed aid from the Obama administration."9 Senator Levin goes on to state that he would support the investment if he thought Pakistan would participate, and that stability would result. "If I thought we could buy stability, I would buy it," he said. "I have no reluctance in purchasing stability if it's effective."10 Senator Levin's concerns represent a common trend among some experts on the region. The unreliability of the Frontier Corps along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border raises concerns that the U.S. would be placing money into the hands of the Taliban and al Qaeda. It is a very careful line that must be walked, and the money must be monitored closely. Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation also addresses the

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10 Ibid., 2.
concern of following through on the money, ensuring Pakistan is holding up its end of the bargain despite a fragile democracy and encouraging close coordination amongst the varying branches of government and agencies tasked to carry out the application of the bill. “The inherent political instability in Pakistan and continued domination of the country's national security policies by the military will make it difficult to carry out the policies laid out in the Kerry-Lugar legislation. It will require close coordination and consultation between the executive and legislative branches in order to understand clearly and respond quickly to developments inside Pakistan.”

The U.S. is also fielding concerns from India who has a very direct interest into how the Kerry/Lugar Bill will be implemented. India’s concern in the wake of Mumbai, and a history of conflict with Pakistan which has resulted in numerous terrorist attacks on Indian soil is of great concern. Money falling into the wrong hands and used against India has the potential to complicate the situation on numerous fronts. It could lead to increased attacks in India upsetting an already fragile relationship between these two nuclear powers. Additionally, this would also undermine the U.S. goal to get Pakistan to give more attention to its western border with Afghanistan. If terrorist attacks are launched against India from Pakistan, this will most certainly not occur as India’s propensity will be to respond to the next attack militarily against Pakistan.

Proponents of the bill argue that the time is now to initiate a long-term investment into the future of Pakistan. In a paper written for the Atlantic Council,

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former Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and Senator John Kerry (D-MA) discuss opening the lines of communication with the Pakistani people, as well as fostering growth in a number of facets between the U.S. and Pakistani governments. “The U.S. also needs to urgently close the “Trust Deficit” between it and Pakistan, with greater exchanges of high-level visits, closer military, intelligence, and economic cooperation. It needs to pass the (Biden)-Kerry-Lugar bill as soon as possible to begin the flow of more resources to Pakistan.”

Although the proponents of the bill acknowledge the inherent challenges and likely setbacks, they are convinced that this is the only option, and it needs to be exhausted. Common themes trace back to the argument by proponents that the U.S. needs to place a softer hand on the management of the security threat which exists in the NWFP and FATA, and careful management of this initiative over time will assist in quelling the threat.

Concluding Thoughts on Kerry/Lugar

The worsening situation in Afghanistan, as shaped by the strengthening influence of the Taliban and al Qaeda in the NWFP and FATA is an extremely important national security issue for the U.S. Utilizing a balanced approach to the region, one which aims to shape the larger picture of the efforts in Afghanistan is necessary, and needs to take place immediately. The U.S. could continue to battle the same enemy they face in the mountains of Afghanistan for years to come, and not gain any ground toward quelling the terrorist threat, or enhancing national security. There must be a shaping effort that

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over time develops into the main effort in combating the ideological enemy the U.S. has in this region. Combat operations, even when executed with the best intentions, are subject to creating enemies via perception and unintended mistakes which alienate otherwise disinterested segments of the population. Over time, these sentiments begin to work against the occupying force as the citizens become weary of war, and question the intent of those promising to make their lives better.

The Kerry / Lugar Bill is the best answer to the situation as it exists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Greatly increasing the U.S.’s soft power approach to the region will set the conditions for strides to be made. The Kerry / Lugar Bill will be very difficult to implement, and will experience setbacks on several fronts to include inefficiency, money falling into the hands of enemy forces and corruption. Despite these challenges, the U.S. should remain resolute in its approach, which will take years to advance. The approach is the correct one given the spreading out of funds over the course of 5 years, and the stipulations set to ensure Pakistan is doing all it can to utilize these funds effectively.

**Summary**

The Kerry/Lugar Bill offers a new approach to shaping efforts in this volatile region which is critical to the national security of the U.S. Numerous development initiatives across varying facets of development will have an opportunity to emerge with these funds. It will be critical for the U.S. to utilize this opportunity to address the education system, and specifically that of the militarized madrasas throughout western Pakistan. However, as mentioned, the allocation of funding and resources is just the
beginning. With the madrasas, the U.S. must tread carefully in how efforts are made to move ahead. Just throwing money at the problem will not suffice. Just allocating additional aid representatives from the State Department and USAID will not solve the issue. The U.S. must be creative when implementing this monumental spending initiative. There must be the involvement of the Pakistani government, as well as Pakistani agencies that can partner with U.S. representatives focused on the madrasa issue. The U.S. must be ready to engage members of the Taliban regime, and other personalities which will be unreliable at best. Pushing through these uncertainties will be paramount to any success enjoyed. Staying the course with long term initiatives will be critical to the application of these funds, because a project of this nature, madrasas which were militarized over the course of the past 30 years, will not be solved overnight with a surge of funds and new text books.

In addition to the creativity needed to effectively implement the Kerry/Lugar funds to the madrasa issue, is the careful management of perception in Pakistan. For the U.S. to go into Pakistan and attempt to manipulate how Islamic religious education is implemented is a dangerous scenario. Striking the right balance in its approach to effectively achieve its desired results, and avoid falling victim to further Taliban and al Qaeda propaganda will be a challenge, but is certainly attainable.

As this chapter has demonstrated, for three decades the U.S. viewed security spending in Pakistan as the primary means of attaining national security objectives. The proper implementation of the Kerry/Lugar funds can assist in offsetting this. An effective approach to addressing the issue of militarized madrasas in western Pakistan
can play a key role to long term shifts in ideology, which would lead to stability and an enhanced security situation.
CONCLUSION

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

On October 5, 2009, an updated version of the Kerry/Lugar Bill, after having passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, was presented to President Obama for signature. The new version reads almost verbatim to the original proposal presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 2008, but has been updated to state that the appropriations will be allocated to Pakistan for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. This is an important gesture to demonstrate to the region given the growing suspicion that the U.S. is considering abandoning the mission to assist in stabilization in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With the passing of this Bill comes great responsibility with regard to properly allocating funds in an effective manner. Ensuring this financial commitment is not squandered inappropriately, risking missed opportunity for the people of western Pakistan, or a more serious scenario of placing funds into the hands of the enemy we are attempting to combat.

This section will discuss five points that need to be considered by policymakers when making decision on allocation of the funds appropriated in the Kerry/Lugar Bill. It is essential that the issue of the militarized madrasas be specifically targeted with funds and resources, and recognized as a long-term investment in the overall stability in the region; specifically quelling the insurgency in Afghanistan. A critical juncture has been reached in the growing insurgency in Afghanistan. All aspects of what contributes
to this region as a haven for the Taliban and al Qaeda, the means in which they project
the insurgency in Afghanistan and maintain a destabilizing effect on Pakistan, must be
addressed. The madrasa network in western Pakistan is a key contributor to this, and
has been for 30 years. Reversing this effect will not be easy or quick, but it is not
impossible. The U.S. must devote significant resources and effort to this issue, which
remains a major cause and contributor to the militant ideology that exists in the region.

Policy Considerations for Implementation of Kerry/Lugar Funds to
Demilitarize Madrasas

Define the Problem

In his March 27th strategy speech on Afghanistan, President Obama stated that
"the future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan."1
In describing how Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri use the mountainous
terrain on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the President summed up this point grimly
noting that "for the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous
place in the world."2

These words accurately describe the difficult situation at hand in Pakistan, and
demonstrate the need for timely efforts that are committed to long term initiatives. The
problem is that the madrasa network in western Pakistan has been, and will continue to
project ideology that assists the Taliban and al Qaeda. This issue must be met with a

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1 "President Obama’s Speech On Afghanistan and Pakistan," U.S. News and World Reports,

2 Ibid., 2.
shaping effort that supports the mission in Afghanistan. The writing is on the wall that the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is one that will continue for the long term, possibly as long as another decade. This must be accompanied by long term ideas and approaches in Pakistan, in this case to mitigate and de-legitimate the enemy’s ideology and propaganda from the madrasas.

Identify the Objectives

The passing of the Kerry/Lugar Bill demonstrates that the U.S. is headed in the right direction when it comes to correcting the security and development imbalance that has existed for the past 30 years. The objective, when it comes to addressing the issue of militarized madrasas which contribute to instability in the region, is to develop a program with the Pakistanis that places them in the lead, with funding specifically earmarked for the madrasa project. The end state which is sought is a madrasa system that is no longer hospitable to the ideology of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and can no longer be used as a tool to train insurgents for combat in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is a difficult end state to measure, and will not come easily or in a timely manner, but this does not lessen its importance. The madrasas reached their tipping point to militancy 30 years ago with the invasion of the Soviets into Afghanistan, and it may take that long to replace the militant ideology with more progressive ideas in these institutes. The transformation of the Deoband madrasas that continue to demonstrate the most anti-western sentiment in the region to a more moderate network of madrasas in Pakistan will take careful interaction between the U.S. and Pakistan, and the right agencies must be identified for carrying this important work out.
Identify Agencies and Roles Which Match the Objectives

The Department of State and USAID are the logical leads on a project that will attempt to partner with Pakistani organizations on the demilitarization of the madrasas. There are two fronts to manage when it comes to this endeavor which are application of the funds on the ground in Pakistan, and the important task of managing expectations at home, specifically with Congress which will continue to expect results given the level of investment.

Also needed is a strong role for the private sector in tackling this project. Those tasked to carry out a madrasa project with Kerry/Lugar funds will need to look to organizations that have already carved out a niche with regard to this type of work. The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP) are two places to start enhancing relationships with. Both have made strides in the area of partnering with madrasa leadership throughout the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. Segments of this pool of religious leaders in Pakistan have demonstrated an interest in this type of partnership, and this sentiment will be vital to progress. Neither the Department of State nor USAID have the personnel required to be able to reach out to the number of madrasas necessary to make progress on their own, and will benefit from the mechanisms that ICRD and USIP have in place for initiating these types of projects.

The Way Ahead

Solidifying the partnership between the private sector organizations which can greatly contribute to this initiative is an essential gateway to starting on the right foot.
This relationship can be an important step in gaining credibility in this initiative by increasing the number of Pakistani-Americans participating. Additionally, existing relationships between these organizations and mullahs which they have worked with will assist in heading the initiative in the right direction from the start.

Secondly, the U.S. must foster a working relationship with the government of Pakistan on this initiative. Despite the fact that the funds allocated in the Kerry/Lugar Bill are specifically intended for the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan, it is essential that the U.S. prevent the bureaucracy of the central government of Pakistan from interfering. This is a daunting proposal, but essential to placing the project in motion. The U.S., and its private sector agencies in which it is teamed up with need to maximize their relationships on the project with key leaders in the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. Involvement of Pakistani agencies such as the Ittihad Tanzeemat Madaris Deenia (ITMD), which is a private madrasa oversight board that represents a large number of Pakistan’s madrasas, will be essential. The ICRD has worked with the ITMD in the past, and has already suffered some of the hard lessons learned which could assist the State Department and USAID in properly initiating these relationships effectively.

Third, the U.S. and the agencies which it partners with must be selective about which madrasas it intends to initially attempt to work with. For example, the madrasas discussed in Chapter 3, the Darul Uloom Haqqania near Peshawar, the Shaldara madrasa in Quetta, and the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia in Karachi, would not be the places to start this initiative. However, as discussed, all three of these madrasas have experienced a sprawl effect of madrasas which are tied into their overall recruiting initiatives. The
U.S., through its American and Pakistani private sector partners, should begin the initiative in madrasas which are identified as more reasonably approachable. The project will not be able to target the most militant madrasas up front. The point with this approach would be to utilize this soft power approach to clog the recruiting networks which contribute to the central madrasas’ goals of supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. Relationships with Taliban supporters and facilitators will be essential to making progress, and the ICRD can already attest to strides made in working with militant mullahs in these regions, and enjoying breakthroughs through their approaches.

Capitalizing on the systems already in place when it comes to reaching out to the madrasas will be key to implementing the funds appropriately. Again, the ICRD has established mechanisms to maximize the usage of limited personnel, which the State Department and USAID should take a great interest in given the limitations they have with allocated resources and personnel in the region. For example, the ICRD uses a train the trainer model that enables mullahs that have been exposed to the outreach of their program, to communicate a more moderate approach to teaching to other religious instructors in a given region. If this approach were enhanced with additional resources that a partnership between the private sector and government entities such as the State Department and USAID, over time greater strides could be made.

Naturally, this type of approach does not come without its limitations. Security concerns throughout the region will present severe limitations for American personnel. However, this is what makes the partnerships with Pakistani organizations, and the relationships already formed through ICRD and USIP so valuable. Limitations will also
emerge when it comes to stipulations regarding U.S. government involvement with facilitating religious instruction. Important to this factor will be the inclusion of additional subjects, which were part of the original Deoband curriculum, to expand on the instruction and help shape a more rounded student. These limitations should not deter the initiative from taking shape, and can be addressed and adjusted along the way.

Managing Perceptions

In any initiative that the U.S. undertakes in this region, there will be the secondary struggle of managing how the efforts are perceived by the Pakistani people. In this case, the U.S. is up against a well-oiled propaganda machine managed by the Taliban and al Qaeda. "When the U.S. government urges military action in the tribal areas, or seeks to close madrasas, or calls for curriculum reform, the perception in Pakistan is that the United States has a problem with Islam." This accurately describes how any efforts the U.S. is involved in are manipulated by the Taliban and al Qaeda. Additionally, the U.S. is up against an extremely popular Pakistani suspicion that America's intentions to increase aid in the area are a threat to Pakistani sovereignty. A New York Times article from October 7, 2009, describes President Asif Ali Zardari as "coming under sharp criticisms from opposition parties and many Pakistanis who view America as a cavalier and condescending ally." U.S. efforts in any kind of madrasa demilitarization need to be accompanied with a robust counter propaganda initiative.

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3 Cohen, A Perilous Course, 9

That said, the best counter propaganda is maintaining the lowest profile possible, which is where the partnerships with the private sector come into play once again. Ensuring the effort of demilitarizing the madrasas has a “Pakistani face” will be essential to moving forward, and mitigating unwanted negative perceptions. It must not be forgotten that when the U.S. approaches this effort, they are stepping into the territory of the same Deoband madrasas that were founded in the spirit of anticolonialism against British occupation in the region over 140 years ago. Accompaniment by a perceived threat to the identity of Islam, and hesitancy toward modernization, creates a delicate set of circumstances surrounding the initiative.

Summary

This study has described and analyzed the roots of the Deoband movement in the 1860s, and how it carved out its influence throughout Pakistan over time through its ever expanding madrasa network. It describes the politicization that took place, which began in the late 1970s, reaching its tipping point in the early 1980s. It then describes the imbalance of security over developmental aid to Pakistan from 1977 through the present, and argues how this trend needs to change in order to assist overall regional efforts.

The U.S. played a key role in militarizing the madrasas of Pakistan in the 1980s, and has a chance to mitigate those effects as they continue to strive to quell a growing insurgency in Afghanistan, fed greatly by the militarized madrasas of western Pakistan. The role of the madrasas in this struggle is great, and the U.S. must not pass up this opportunity to address the issue. The U.S. must utilize funds allocated for aid in the

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Kerry/Lugar Bill toward demilitarizing the madrasas. Doing so is critical to our national security.


Talbani, Aziz. "Pedagogy, Power and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education." 