FROM KABUL TO ISLAMABAD: HOW TO WIN THE LONG-TERM BATTLE AGAINST ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, Pakistan has seen a spike in Islamic militarism that has threatened to topple its democratic and even nuclear stability. The political vacuum left by a violent war with the Soviets and the subsequent collapse of a stable government, has allowed a generation of Islamic extremists to become hardened and nurtured by the Taliban’s distinct form of Islam. The result has been a region which has helped foster a climate of Islamic extremism that has seeped through Afghanistan’s porous borders into Pakistan’s already fragile democracy. Today, a new generation of extremists inspired by the Taliban, are fighting to overthrow the Pakistani government with the hope of ultimately establishing an Islamic style government based on the teaching and principles prescribed by the Taliban.

While many ideas have been put forward to tackle extremism in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan, they too often rely on short term solutions rather than dealing with the roots of the problem. This paper will attempt to define the conditions which helped spawn Islamic extremism in the region by synthesizing otherwise disparate bodies of knowledge –including the rise of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan’s democratic and socioeconomic conditions which provided the fertile land needed for Islamic extremism to grow. In the end, I hope to develop practical solutions that will help stem the increase of Islamic extremism in the region as well as lead to a more stable and secure Pakistan.
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GLOSSARY

DEFINITION OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM:

It is important to distinguish Islamic extremists or fundamentalist from the vast majority of moderate Muslims who do not adhere to extremism of behavior and live peacefully throughout the world. The University of Chicago, backed by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences defined fundamentalism as "approach, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group . . . by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past."\(^1\) In short, Islamic extremists are Muslims who prescribe to ideologies that foster, justify or condone terrorism in order to achieve a desired end.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Originally, the general thought in Washington was that ultra conservative interpretations of Islam, although rigorous, were not a threat to the U.S. In fact, they could even serve U.S. interests by defeating communisms as we saw with our support for the Afghans in their fights against the Soviets. However, all that changed on Sept 11, 2001. Today words such as *sharia* or *jihad* conjure up images of misogynist brutality and suicide bombers. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan have plunged American into a religious and political discourse that is constantly discussed but never really examined.

This study explores the roots of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan with a particular focus on the FATA. It begins by examining the interplay of several factors that set the stage for the emergence of indigenous Islamic fundamentalism. These factors include the Soviet-Afghan invasion and the subsequent rise of religious extremism. Finally, it offers recommendations on how to stem the growing reach of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan by offering recommendations that go beyond merely providing economic aid or shouting ‘democracy’. It is important to understand the driving force behind extremism if the U.S. wants to win the hearts and minds of the locals in the wars on terrorism.

Pakistan is quickly becoming an extremely dangerous unstable country, and a major component source of instability in the Middle East. As we saw with the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the continued assaults on local government institutions, Pakistan has become a
sanctuary for terrorists who operate with “complete impunity” throughout Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the entire western border, as well as in the 1500-mile border with Kashmir.¹ In 2009, the government’s agreements with the tribal leaders in the NWFP to allow for law based entirely on the Quran and the teachings of the Muslims Prophet Muhammad in return for a ceasefire, demonstrates the weakness of the government to deal with growing terrorist threats.² Pakistan has been further rocked by the global financial crisis which has hit the country particularly hard. Standard and Poor’s released its rating last year showing that Pakistani creditworthiness was ranked the second-worst among nations, forcing Pakistan’s President, Asif Ali Zardari to go on television to assure the public that “Pakistan is not going bankrupt.”³ Combined with a long history of military coups d’état and an arsenal of roughly 60 nuclear warheads, Pakistan is now considered the mostly likely location for a Taliban or al-Qaeda style government taking power.⁴

For Washington, preventing the collapse of Pakistan is paramount to the stability of the Middle East. However, the exact remedy remains unclear. U.S. policy toward Pakistan has oscillated between entrenchment and chastisement. Today, the Pakistanis


see the U.S. as a fickle ally, helpful to fight against communism in Afghanistan during the Cold War, or extremism today, but easily discarded when American interests differ. To fully understand the rise in extremism today in Pakistan and its border region, we must look at the Cold War and the struggle between American and Soviet influence in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER 2
THE SOVIET AFGHAN WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTOLERANCE

The Cold War which led to the nuclear arms race dominated the international arena for over four decades and shaped the political landscape of the world. In a time when countries were gaining their independence from colonial powers, the Cold War served essentially as an election between America and the former Soviet Union, each claiming to offer the superior political ideology that would provide its citizens with a better way of life. And as in many elections, policies that once distinguished one candidate from another were pushed aside towards the finish line. The U.S., the beacon of democracy, supported regional dictators while the iron fist of the Soviet Union crushed the political dissent of the very people it had fought a revolution to free.

Afghanistan and Pakistan like many developing countries were ensnarled in the machinations of the Cold War. Afghanistan with its instability, location, and changing regimes had become a prime target for both U.S. and Soviet influence. The U.S., hoping to roll back communist influence, sought the assistance of Pakistan, a small country surrounded by Soviet-backed India and Afghanistan, which was in a desperate need of a strong power to defend its sovereignty.1 When the cloud of the Cold War dissipated, and the American and the Soviet forces withdrew, Afghanistan was left with over a million dead and an infrastructure in shambles to endure a civil war that allowed the most

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extreme elements to gain control and from where they eventually infiltrated the Pakistan borders.

Afghanistan borders China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse. Pushtuns, with 42% of the population, make up the largest ethnic group. Tajiks follow second with 27%, while Hazaras come in third at 9%; Turkmens, Baloch, Uzbek, Aimak, and others comprise the rest. Afghanistan is predominantly Sunni Muslim with a small population of Shia Muslims making up 19% of the overall population and 1% comprising the rest. Its rich linguistic and tribal structure add to its already diverse ethnic and religious mixture, which further complicates not only Afghanistan’s political status, but its relationship with neighboring countries.

A similar number of Pushtuns to those who live in Afghanistan also inhabit the land in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP). After the British simultaneously recognized India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, many Pushtuns, who have a distinct culture and dialect, felt they should have their own independence as well within NWFP. They would call this new country “Pushturistan.” Mohammad Daoud, prime minister of Afghanistan from 1973-1978, supported Pushtuns independence as it was thought that if the Pushtuns were allowed to form their own state, they would ally themselves with the Pushtuns majority in Afghanistan. The leaders of Pakistan did everything they could to quell any hope of the Pushtuni independence

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3 Ibid.
movement which continued to raise its head where it eventually caught the attention of both the U.S and Russia during the height of the Cold War.⁴

Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud was assassinated in 1978 by the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).⁵ As the new government tried to implement reforms, fighting quickly broke out between religious leaders supported by Pakistan and the Soviet-backed PDPA.⁶ When infighting between fractions within the PDPA, threatened the Soviet interests, Moscow finally moved to secure Afghanistan on Christmas day of 1979.⁷

**The Cold War Prism**

In his book, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, current U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, writes that Jimmy Carter began to facilitate “propaganda and other psychological operations” to support the Afghan insurgents six months before the Russian Invasion.⁸ The U.S. feared a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan would allow the Soviets to increase not only their influence in Southeast Asia but also in Iran. The idea of a country with an immense reserve of oil, succumbing to Soviet control was thought to be unacceptable.⁹

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⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.


⁹ Ibid.
Before Christmas day of 1979, the Soviets were not directly engaged in Afghanistan, choosing to keep their actions funneled covertly through the communist regime struggling to remain in power. The United States, although unsure of how far the Soviets would go to protect their interests in Afghanistan, believed Moscow could not maintain a strictly covert presence if opposition forces were properly funded. At that point, the Soviets would have two options: either allow opposition forces to take Afghanistan, or commit its troops. For the U.S. either outcome was beneficial. If U.S. covert action failed and the Soviet troops maintained their interests in the region, they would still have to intervene much more forcefully than before, inevitably creating Muslim resentment throughout the Middle East not to mention the economic costs. On the other hand, if the opposition forces could maintain pressure on the Soviets troops for an extended period, the situation could potentially lead to “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnam-like quagmire.”

There were, nevertheless, potential pit falls for the U.S. as it feared that any direct confrontation with the Soviets could spark a wider nuclear war. To avoid a potential catastrophe, the U.S. did not directly support local groups who opposed the Soviet invasion. Instead, America, along with Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and several other countries, subcontracted to the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan the task of

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 146.
13 Ibid.
distributing funds to anti-Russian forces within Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14} Pakistan, fearing they could be the next government to be overrun by Moscow, was only too happy to oblige.\textsuperscript{15} The mujahedeen, who were anti-Soviet paramilitaries, did not represent a single military force but instead many small “strongmen” each vying for power. Pakistan chose mujahedeen leaders who were not only anti-communist but also most welcoming of Pakistani influence and vehemently opposed to the creation of a Pushtunistan state.\textsuperscript{16} Pakistan became increasingly worried that Moscow’s military advantage might also put in jeopardy the Durand Line, the 19th century British imposed India - Afghan boundary, allowing Afghanistan to finally annex the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, which harbors a large Pushtun population.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1979, under the Carter administration, U.S. aid to Afghanistan started off slowly with $30 million annually.\textsuperscript{18} The Regan’s doctrine, established by former president Ronald Regan, in 1980, however, emphasized the support of anti-communist regimes and/or insurgents.\textsuperscript{19} In his 1985 State of the Union address, President Ronald Regan, who had previously called the Soviets Union an “Evil Empire” stated, “We must


\textsuperscript{15} Hilali, \textit{The U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan}, 114.


\textsuperscript{17} Hilali, \textit{The U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan}, 114.


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.”\textsuperscript{20} To Ronald Regan, after the failed policies of the Carter administration, “rolling-back” Russian influence was a priority.

As president, Ronald Regan continued to pour huge amounts of resources into the Afghan war, and by 1986, the mujahedeen were receiving roughly $100 million a month.\textsuperscript{21} By 1989, combined with another 600 million pledged by the Saudis, the mujahedeen received $1.3 billion annually to fight Russian aggression.\textsuperscript{22} This included an estimated $65 million for surface-to-air Stinger missiles which arguably helped turn the tide in favor of the mujahedeen.\textsuperscript{23} At this time, the Stinger missiles were not provided to NATO allies.\textsuperscript{24} On the other side, the Soviets poured an estimated $5 billion a year to fight the mujahedeen for a total of $45 billion by the end of 1989.\textsuperscript{25} In the end, most of the foreign aid came in the form of lethal military weaponry given to a population made up of mostly farmers.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Hilali, \textit{The U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan}, 169.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
The Soviet Union finally withdrew its forces in 1989 and the U.S. followed suit. What was left was a country with over one million dead, a devastated economy and an infrastructure in shambles. Without the security and funding from the super powers, a political and military vacuum formed and was quickly filled by a new generation of violent fundamentalist.

**The Rise of Islamic Extremism in Afghanistan**

Historically Afghanistan has been immensely tolerant of other Muslims sects and culture differences. And although Afghans are 90 percent Sunni, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews as well as Hazaras Tajiks who are Shia all played and contributed an important part to the Afghan economy through its popular bazaars. Sectarianism only became an issue after 1992 when the bloody civil war turned neighbor against neighbor. Once the Taliban arrived, they used the unifying factors of Sunni Islam and the notion of jihad or holy war against foreigners and infidels, to justify killing fellow Muslims who opposed their agenda.

The Taliban, who originally espoused peace, justice, and an end to the civil war which had gripped the Afghan people, made no mention of their desire to control

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28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
Afghanistan. At first, the Taliban were quite popular with a war-weary Pushtun population but as they became increasingly vicious with the local population, their popularity quickly waned.\textsuperscript{33} When the U.N. was given a rare opportunity to renovate a bombed out football stadium in Kandahar, instead of football christening the field, the Taliban used it to execute those accused of breaking Sharia law.\textsuperscript{34} The Taliban, after taking Kabul, as a sign of what was to come, hung the former communist president, Mohammad Nujibullah in the public square. They banned education and employment for females, music, dancing, kite flying, and television, and enforced a strict dress code both males and females.\textsuperscript{35}

The Taliban’s extremist interpretation of Islam is based on Deobandism-a branch of Sunni Islam that was created to inspire the colonized Muslim population in British-controlled India.\textsuperscript{36} The ideas behind Deobandism was that one could harmonize classical Islamic text to modern day event. However, this form of Islam was largely ignored in neighboring Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{37}

The war with the Soviets, and the subsequent civil war, pushed many Afghans into refugee camps in the Pushtun belt of Pakistan where hundreds of madrassas, Islamic

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{33} Rashid, \textit{Taliban: Islam, Oil and the Great Game in Central Asia}, 118.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Theology Schools, welcomed them with open arms.\textsuperscript{38} The schools which offered free education, shelter, food, and military training, took advantage of their situation to indoctrinate young Muslims.\textsuperscript{39} The madrassas were run by barely literate mullahs, unclear of Deobandi's original intentions and funded by Saudi monies bringing Deobandi closer to the ultraconservative, Wahhabism.\textsuperscript{40} Thanks to oil revenues, the Saudi government was able to spread this version of Islam to all parts of the globe.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1971 there were about 900 madrassas in Pakistan. By 1980, that number had ballooned to 50,000 with only 4,000 officially registered by the Pakistan government.\textsuperscript{42} Moreover, the areas with the highest amount of madrassas tended to have the lowest levels of literacy and employment.\textsuperscript{43}

The Afghan-Soviet war also helped to fulfill Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Washington, which was opposed to a nuclear armed Pakistan, had enacted the Symington Amendment in 1979 barring economic assistance to Pakistan when it attempted to enrich uranium.\textsuperscript{44} However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Congress waived the

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism."

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{42} Hilali, The U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 229.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 191.
Symington Amendment citing national security interests. Pakistan took advantage of this window of opportunity and in 1986-87, produced its first nuclear weapon.

During the Afghan war, both the U.S. and Pakistan used religion as a weapon to defeat the Soviet Union, spending millions on Islamic literature and religious institutions. Saudi Arabia alone spent 140 million publishing religious books and supporting religious school, in hopes of containing Shia influence from spreading beyond Iran. At the same time, Pakistan, partly to gain credibility at home, played the “Islamic card” to portray the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan as a clash between Islam and Godless communism. A.Z. Hilali, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Peshawar, feels this could help explain why sectarianism became so deadly. When the Soviets and Americans pulled out of Afghanistan, the once poster child that had been strategically important to both countries was now abandoned to the radical elements which allowed the Taliban and later al-Qaeda to flourish.

During the Afghan-Soviet conflict thousands of Arabs came from neighboring countries to fight alongside the local Afghan population to resist colonial rule. One of those individuals was Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi businessman. Osama

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 213.
48 Ibid., 229.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
bin Laden used the Afghan War to embed his extremist ideology to a desperate and highly illiterate population. By 1988, he had enough support to establish al-Qaeda.\(^51\) Built on the backs of the mujahdeen, bound by a common purpose and trained in guerilla-type asymmetric warfare, al-Qaeda vowed to continue the fight to remove “false” and “corrupt” Muslim regimes in power and worked to replace them with Islamic states.\(^52\) Moreover, the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan gave al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists the confidence that guerilla warfare could be used to successfully defeat a superpower.\(^53\) The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought al-Qaeda’s militant dogma of Islam into the homes of every American, creating a backwards and misunderstood depiction of the second largest religion in the world.

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2002, the Taliban was ill prepared to fight the U.S. military and either fled to the Pakistan tribal belt or blended in with the local Afghan people. Washington soon focused its eyes on Saddam Hussein and Iraq. As U.S and collation forces were relocated to Iraq, the Taliban began to creep back into Afghanistan. However, many Taliban and al-Qaeda militants also began to look to Pakistan which had nuclear weapons and a large anti-American Muslim population.

As Jeri Laber of Human Rights Watch wrote in the New York Review of Books on the origins of the Taliban in refugee camps, recalling an article he’d written in 1986,


Hundreds of thousands of youths, who knew nothing of life but the bombings that destroyed their homes and drove them to seek refuge over the border, were being raised to hate and to fight, "in the spirit of Jihad," a "holy war" that would restore Afghanistan to its people. "New kinds of Afghans are being born in the struggle," I reported. "Caught in the midst of a grownups' war, the young Afghans are under intense political pressure from one side or another, almost from birth." [...] The children that I interviewed and wrote about in 1986 are now young adults. Many are now with the Taliban.54

**Pakistan’s Tribal Belt**

Former Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, stated in April of 2008 during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, when then Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) asked him which was a bigger threat to U.S. interests, Iraq or the Afghan-Pakistan border, Crocker answered al-Qaeda on the border area.55

Bin Laden is thought to be living somewhere in this vast and unforgiving landscape which is not often traversed by American or Pakistan troops and where many in Washington believe that next 9/11 type attack will be planned.56 The Cold War helped to breed this cocktail of extremism, and today, the world is unable to keep it contained. This mountainous region that once was a recruiting and training ground for terrorists groups to threaten the Afghanistan government is now seen as a launching pad to attack

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NATO forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistan government. The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland claims that “Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland” and goes on to report that al-Qaeda enjoys a safe haven in the FATA for its lieutenants, and top leadership.

The Pakistan government is largely unable to exercise any sort of military control in the tribal regions, and often seems to be more concerned with a threat coming from India than from its own hinterland. At the same time, the lack of legitimacy of the Pakistan government- which I will discuss in later chapters- and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, has pushed some Pakistanis to embrace extremist ideologies in hopes of finding justice.

The U.S. has at this point been unable to convince the Pakistan population that it has more to offer than military threats, sanctions and its support for undemocratic regimes. The result is a region that has become closed off from the Western World making it extremely difficult to enact polices that would otherwise persuade the local population from bowing to extremist ideologies.

The debate in Washington and in Islamabad tends to focus on threat from fundamentalist or “jihadists” in Pakistan. While combating the direct threat of jihadist is

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intrinsic in fostering a stable Pakistan, there are other underlying factors that contribute to
the spread of fundamentalism. These injustices create a climate that allows
fundamentalism to penetrate the society. The Cold War shaped the landscape of the
Middle East and helped to cultivate a climate of Islamic extremism that we see today in
Pakistan. To create a more equitable system, however, Islamabad first needs to make hard
decisions regarding its socioeconomic structure. The next chapter will discuss the roots of
instability and how to address pressing problems relating to education, democracy, and
land reform.
CHAPTER 3

THE ROOTS OF INSTABILITY

Understanding Sharia Law

Before putting forth recommendations to defeat Islamic militants like the Taliban in the FATA, we must first understand the complexities of the driving forces influencing their beliefs and actions such as Sharia Law. Islamic scholar, Tariq Ramadan, in his book *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, describes how the West perceives Sharia law:

In the West, the idea of Shariah calls up all the darkest images of Islam: repression of women, physical punishments, stoning and all other such things. It has reached the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all of their work by the mere mention of the word.¹

However, a recent polls conducted by the New America Foundation demonstrated that Muslims support for Sharia law is on the rise, even though it has a hugely negative connotation in the west.² How is it that most westerners view Sharia law as disdainful and backward, while many Muslim see it as vibrant aspect of Islam?

Perhaps the difference in the Western and Muslim perception of Sharia lies in its meaning. For the West, Sharia or Sharia law brings up stark image of brutality against women and of suicide bombers; a backward concept built on suppression rather than progress. However, for Muslims, Sharia law means something quite different. Although in English, it is common to use Sharia and Islamic law interchangeably, it does not nearly encapsulate the depth and significance of its meaning.


The word “Sharia” simply means “the path” or “the path to water” and is mostly a literal interpretation of early Muslim traditions and tribal customs.\(^3\) The Guardian newspaper in the UK describes Sharia as “... a religious code for living, in the same way that the Bible offers a moral system for Christians.”\(^4\) Sharia represents both a set of laws and a moral and almost metaphysical way in which to live your life.\(^5\) Sharia is derived from the Quran, the Muslim holy book, and the Sunna, which is referred to as “Islamic Custom or practice; particularly that associated with the exemplary life of the Prophet Muhammad, comprising his deeds and utterances as recorded in the hadith.”\(^6\) The hadith literally means “report” or “narrative.”\(^7\)

However, at its core, Sharia law represents the belief that all people are bequeathed by God to receive justice under the law.\(^8\) It’s the job of the state or religious community to reward and punish, with the goal of guiding the community on the basis of justice. In traditional Islamic governments, the religious jurist or scholars acted as a counter balance to the Caliphate or king, who usually had a large army and ran the administrations such as collecting taxes from the people. The jurists would interpret


\(^7\) Ibid.

Sharia to insure the Imam was providing justice to the people, and consequently checking
the power of the king. The scholars on the other hand, did not control an army and had to
act in accordance with Islam as well as stay in the relative graces of the king in order to
maintain their position. Thus a system of relative checks and balances allowed these early
Muslims communities to have continual rule with minimal social and political upheavals.

How exactly this system of checks and balances broke down is complex, but it
can be largely summed up with the codifying of Sharia. In the early 19th century, the
Ottoman Empire in an attempt to overcome a loss of political and military power, made
internal reforms to its system. One of these reforms was to codify Sharia law.
Consequently, a system that once could be transformed and rediscovered was carved into
an incorrigible doctrine bound in a book. Moreover, the religious scholars who
previously interpreted Sharia were no longer relevant. Now the King is both the religious
authority, and tax collector bound together with no internal opposition to check his
power. Rather than rebellion being a political act, it became a sin; a violation of religious
duties. Therefore, obeying rulers became sacred, essential equating their rule with God.

The rise of support for Sharia law in countries with corrupt governments does not
represent a call for savage punishment or sexism, but rather a call for political justice,
accountability and the rule of the law.

This concept of political and religious justice in Sharia is different than what the
Fundamentalists such as the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban preach. The Taliban claims to
represent the purist form of Islam, yet their violent actions have found them marginalized
by the Islamic community. The 55-member Organization of Islamic Conference refused
to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s official government and the ultraconservative organization Muslim Brotherhood denounced the Taliban’s decrees. This is precisely why the support for the Taliban in Pakistan can be down while the support for Sharia law is up. The Taliban, regardless of their claim, do not practice Sharia as seen by the vast majority of Muslims; such as providing justice and a better way of life to the people. However, the growing support of Sharia Law in Pakistan also means that the Pakistani people do not believe their government is accountable and providing the necessary structure to achieve justice, which I will discuss later in this paper.

Defeating extremism means weakening rogue elements like the Taliban, while allowing a structured democratic system to prevail in Pakistan. At the same time we cannot afford to merely view the Islamic militants like the Taliban as anomalies, created by bad polices in Afghanistan as we rush to monitor elections or provide economic aid. It is important to understand the driving force behind Islamic fundamentalists who are few but make up an alarming segment of the Muslim population.

Let’s begin with the 13th Century and the invasion of the Mongols. After the collapse of the central caliphate to the Mongol invasion from the East in the 13th Century, the Mongols instituted their form of political justice, while removing the Islamic political structure. Social upheaval swept through the Muslim world resulting in lawless regions with no political accountability. Furthermore, some Muslims under Mongol rule began to

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abandoned Islamic law such as the probation of alcohol, as well as participated in activities that were seen by many Muslims as un-Islamic.

In response, Ibn Taymiyya, a Muslim theologian and jurist championed political accountability through violence while stressing a doctrine of conservative Islamic reformism. Ibn Taymiyya believed like many fundamentalist today, the current system had failed them and the only way to return to the Golden Age of Islam was to return to the fundamental teaching of Mohammed. He sought to carry out violence against the infidels and religious purification in Islam. The end result was to establish what he thought was a proper Islamic state.

There are similarities in the current political landscape to the time of Ibn Taymiyya. The Mongols had just captured Baghdad and a large part of Muslim land was either occupied by the Mongols or the Crusaders. Furthermore, many Muslims fractions such as the Shias and Sunnis vied for political control, while the prominent Islamic ruling elites were not seen accountable to the people and stiffened rather than promoted intellectual creativity.

Today, Iraq has been defeated by a western military. Egypt, once the center of Muslim intellectualism, and Saudi Arabia, home to the holiest site on Islam, Masjid al-Harā, the Sacred Mosque, are now seen by many Muslims as corrupt and unaccountable to its people. Iran, which is predominately Shia Muslims, is vying for religious and political credibility, while sectarian violence often plagues the Middle East. Afghanistan is currently engaged in a deadly war with U.S. and coalition forces while Pakistan, especially under Musharaff, is largely seen as fraternizing with the West.
For extremists who view the U.S. as “abyssmally primitive in the world of the senses, feelings, and behavior”\(^\text{11}\) and their own culture vastly superior, the only way the West could have conquered the Middle East is if Islam and Muslims had become corrupted. Otherwise God would never have allowed it; hence the call to return to the fundamentals of Islam as well as need for absolute purification. Ibn Taymiya made a similar argument.

Christian Fundamentalist, Pat Robertson, claimed that the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, was in response to God lifting the curtain of protection for America and giving us what we deserved since “the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays” had pushed God out.\(^\text{12}\) These beliefs that we “deserve” to be punished are because events such as 9/11, or the invasion of the Mongols and the collapse of the caliphate, are simply impossible events to imagine and thus require a great deal of clever and innovative thinking in order to both explain what happened and provide people a way out. However, this “way out” is never a smooth development. For the Taliban, it requires violence and intimidation to remove the infidels and to re-educate an adulterated and often unwilling people.

We saw similar situations in communist China and Russia which attempted to reorient their people towards communism through militant brutality. In the end, as the utopian world never materialized, the people revolted and demanded justice.

The weak spot of fundamentalism, regardless of ideology, is that it is centered on accusing its people that they are not pious and must be constantly purified and corrected.


Further rebellion against their rule is not only a crime, but a sin against God. They have forged their laws into religious laws, their rule to religious duties.

Washington must demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the U.S. war in Afghanistan and Iraq is not to spread American ideals or cultural characteristics but rather to enforce justice for Americans as well as the local Muslim population. Economic support is important, but more so is the belief that the U.S. is providing a better way of life than the extremist can offer. Furthermore, the Pakistani government must provide justice to its people or else there will not be political stability. Areas that are more sympathetic to the Taliban are also areas that are not politically represented in Pakistan.

Genuine Democratic Reform

Pakistan’s is a Federal Parliamentary System of government with a President who is head of the State and a Prime Minister who is appointed by the President from among the members of the National Assembly.\(^\text{13}\) Pakistan has a bicameral Federal Legislature composed of the National Assembly and Senate.\(^\text{14}\) From the outside, the government structure of Pakistan models many Western style democratic governments; however, the cracks in democracy have been with Pakistan since its inception in 1947.

Pakistan was forged when the majority Muslim populations of the eastern and western regions of British India, demanded independence. What emerged was a state of

\(^{13}\) Government of Pakistan Ministry of IT & Telecom. http://202.83.164.26/wps/portal/ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hQN68AZ3dnIwN3C3M DAYOPYDNvXwMjQwNnI6B8pFm8n79RqJpGhh2zmr0YGRmYcJk0-Yp4G7izEB3eEg-_DrB8kb4ACOBvphHvm5qoFuREGWstOigDeD0uL/dl2/d1/L2dJQSEvUUU3QS9ZQnB3LzZfVUZKUENHQzIwT0gwODAySFMznZWMzEwMDE!/ (accessed January 5, 2010).

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
historical warring ethnic groups, still bound by a feudal system of land distribution, all wrapped in a constitution dominated by a Punjab majority that controlled the military and the political institutions. Over 60 years later, the over-centralization of state authorities and the lack of equal distribution of land in the provinces, still haunts Pakistan. With the attention of the international community's focused on the war in neighboring Afghanistan and the rise of Muslim extremism in Pakistan, Islamabad has been able to avoid making any crucial reforms that would provide genuine democracy to the people or increase provincial autonomy. Instead, the government has clamped down, squashing political dissent. With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto during the campaign preceding the 2008 election and the dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, resulting in the government imposing emergency rule, Pakistan has slipped further from democratic reform and closer toward destabilization.

In July of 2009, Dr. Larry P. Goodson, Director and Associate Professor of Middle East Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College, wrote a report titled *Pakistan - The Most Dangerous Place in the World*. In the article, Goodson lists the five major reasons why he believes Pakistan deserve such a reputation, stating nuclear weapons, Islamic extremism, poverty, ineffective government, and its location next to Afghanistan. It is not surprising that democratic reform, never made it to Goodson’s list since democracy in Pakistan is not seen as a

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priority. However, the lack of democracy in Pakistan is one of the biggest issues for many in Pakistan and is a major source of the country’s instability.

The U.S. must demonstrate that it supports the Pakistani people and not simply a government that bows to its influence as was the perception under former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and which continues for many under the current President Asif Ali Zardari. At the same time, the current Pakistani government must demonstrate that it is acting independently of U.S. pressure and carrying out policies that serve Pakistan’s interest. Both of these goals can begin to be accomplished by the U.S. supporting an independent judiciary in Pakistan which will strengthen the country’s democracy by equipping the local population with a voice. If democracy is to be established, the elected official and the military establishment must allow for judicial independence to protect the will of the people and the Pakistan constitution.\footnote{Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan,” The International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide 4, no. 160 (October 2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/160_reforming_the_judiciary_in_pakistan.pdf (assessed March 5, 2010).}

Former President Musharraf, who came under intense pressure to restore civilian rule, fired Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, and 60 judges when he believed they threatened his legitimacy.\footnote{Pakistan Needs Independent Judiciary,“ The Washington Times, August 27, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/27/pakistan-needs-independent-judiciary/ (accessed March 2, 2010).} Chaudhry was finally reinstated in March of 2009 but only after delays threatened to overthrow the new ruling coalition who gained popularity by impeaching Musharraf for failing to uphold constitutional law.\footnote{Ibid.} The new coalition still must deal with the judges appointed and removed under Musharraf which
has largely been viewed as unconstitutional. The U.S. should work with the Pakistani government, to reinstate public officials who were removed for speaking against the state, even if they are not necessarily pro-U.S. Although this may have short-term consequences such as restricted U.S. influence, in the long run the Pakistani people must exercise their grievances through the ballot box instead of turning towards local rebel groups.

As classical Islamic scholars one stated “A kingdom may last while there is irreligion, but it will not endure when there is oppression.” The best way to create stability in Pakistan is to promote democracy and oppose oppression.

The U.S. has provided billions of dollars to strengthen Pakistan’s rule, but without a government that is seen as legitimate, the insurgency will continue to garner support from the local population who largely feel left out of the democratic process. Pakistan’s Supreme Court Bar president, Aitzaz Ahsan, when referring to the importance of an independent judiciary in Pakistan, said “If the local population looks at you as a tyrant, you have given up your most effective weapons.” The local population must be equipped with the ability to influence change in a system they consider legitimate or else

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19 Ibid.


they will not invest in its success.22 “[I]f you deny a people an independent justice system, you actually contribute the people to the adversaries who promise a rough kind of justice,” Mr. Ahsan added.23 Ultimately, establishing a legitimate government will not be possible without serious attention to land reform.

**Feudal Rule and Land Reform**

After the collapse of the British Empire, Pakistan was cobbled together from a group of roughly 200 different tribes.24 Pakistan was governed by the Zamindari system, similar to the feudal system that existed in medieval Europe. The Zamindari system was first introduced in 1793, in the pre-colonial period to collect taxes from the people.25 Under this system feudal lords became property owners on the condition that they would give a portion of the taxes collected to the British.26 After Pakistan independence and its adoption of a constitution and a modern style democracy, feudal lords became politicians, bankers, and industry leader, while maintaining their large plots of land.

Today, little has changed. The Pakistani elite own vast estates, in which the landowner runs everything from the local town to even the occasional private prison. Locals who live on the land pay dues to the landowner, which are often much more than they are able to pay themselves while other are working to pay off debts that can last

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
generations. Some are even indentured. In Sindh Province, a local man who defaulted on this debt offered his two underage daughters as payment. The payment was accepted and the daughters now work the land with no pay and are essentially owned by the landowner. Although Article 11, of the Pakistani Constitutions states “. . .slavery and all forms of trafficking in human beings are prohibited. . .” in reality, modern day slavery still occurs in Pakistan. Moreover, police live under the auspices of the feudal lord who is able to influence their rule and essentially create his own laws. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) stated the “Feudal lords. . .continue to manage police affairs and have ultimate responsibility over which officer is good for their area and which is not. Hence, they control the efficiency and operations of the police force.”

Pakistan’s feudal system has also penetrated the political structure making democracy all but an illusion. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, founding member of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), who is the first cousin of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former prime minister and his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, claims tenets are free to vote for any candidate they choose. Some locals, on the other hand, living on feudal properties argue otherwise. Ghulam Abbas, a sharecroppers living on feudal land in Punjab province, describes the


28 Rodgers, “Pakistan: Reality’s Collision with Hope.”


31 Ibid.
conditions during an election. “The feudals have their own cronies on every street. They know who is favoring whom. If they lose in any polling station they can figure out through this system and take revenge.”\textsuperscript{32} Repercussions can come with police brutality, or higher prices at the mill owned by the feudal lord.\textsuperscript{33} When asked, Bhutto agreed that such incidents do happen but quickly added, “We don’t need to do that here, people vote for us already.”\textsuperscript{34}

Although during the elections, each political candidate states his or her commitment to land reform and human rights, when in power the government structure changes little. The problem is those in power benefit most from the current system. The interest of the industrial, military and landowning elites are all intertwined and rely on each other for support. A genuine democracy and land reform have never been accomplished in Pakistan because in part, the landowning elite are the base of the political system.

Without the ability to influence change through the ballot box, the rural poor are left with few option. Pakistan’s system thus creates a climate where ordinary citizens have no real access to justice or a way to increase their standard of living without turning to other means. The result is a local population who is very receptive to Islamic extremists who argue for the rise of Sharia law and the return of political justice and accountability.


\textsuperscript{33} Baker and Bhutto, “Landowner Power in Pakistan Election.”

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
Although India shared a similar beginning to Pakistan, India has a much smaller percentage of rural poor and is politically more stable. In part, the answer to India’s success can be found in India’s ability to demolish the feudal system and initiate land reform after its independence in 1947. These developments helped pave the way for a larger middle class and greater political participation which are both critical to having a sound democracy. The current conditions would suggest that Pakistan is in a revolutionary, if not prerevolutionary state. However, in a country with over 50 nuclear war heads as well as launch capabilities, a revolution could easily have dire consequences for the region and the war in Afghanistan.

There are policies the U.S. can embrace to help create a more stable climate. Education reform and an impartial judicial system could improve current conditions and help stem the influence of fundamentalists. However, to vastly improve Pakistan’s political stability, real attention should also be focused on land reform.

Dwight Perkins, a Harvard economist, argued that land reform in China created factors that contributed to a more productive and equal society. He concludes that “the institutional structure in China’s countryside, . . . solidified support for the new regime, increased the income of those who needed it most, laid the basis for egalitarian, socialist economic development, and channeled a portion of the agriculture surplus into increase national saving and investment.”\textsuperscript{35} Understandably, land reform would be a difficult policy for the Obama administration to propose; nonetheless, the feudal system is

fostering a climate of extremism as well as hinders economic growth. Nevertheless, there may be a strategy which makes land reform more politically viable for the Obama administration that would also be accepted by the political elite in Pakistan. Lands that are captured by the Taliban could be divided up by the locals. In return, the landowner could keep his family mansion and a few acres as well the guarantee of protection from the locals.

In 2009, the Taliban captured the Swat Valley and quickly instituted Sharia law. Although the Pakistan military was eventually able to regain control of the area, after pressure from the U.S., the landowners did not return in fear of the Taliban continued threats. The absents of the landowning elites has allowed the Taliban to continue to shape policy in the region and extend its reach. The Taliban have responded by rewarding the peasants with profits and crops from the landlords to gain support. Vali Nasr, a senior adviser to Richard Holbrooke stated, “If the large landowners are kept out by the Taliban, the result will in effect be property redistribution.” He added “That will create a vested community of support for the Taliban that will see benefit in the absence of landlords.” However, if the landowning elites were willing to strike a deal with the locals that would allow them to keep a portion of their land in return for protection, the locals would have no incentive to maintain Taliban rule. This would not only curb extremism but would also create more a democratic system as those who were previously

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37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.
under feudal rule could vote without the fear of reprisal. This would be far from a popular plan and should only be considered if the Taliban continue to gain support and the government is unable to retaliate while protecting the citizens. However, if Pakistan only addresses the threat from “jihadists” but fails to address the socio-economical issue such as bonded labor and its archaic form of land distribution, “Jihadists” will have no problem maintaining their ranks as the disenchanted rural poor will look to other avenues to influence change such as the Taliban.

Pakistan does have a prospering middle class but for the great majority of poor, life remains difficult at best with little access to a decent education, human rights, and justice. Genuine democracy will only be realized if politicians, preferably from non-feudal backgrounds, are able to deliver a more equitable system that benefits more than just the wealthy elite. Until then, if the Pakistan people only have a choice between large, land-owning politicians and/or the military elite, the rise of fundamentalism will continue until a revolution forces change. According to political scientist Ayesha Siddiqa, “both the military and the political parties have all failed to create an environment where the poor can get what they need from the state. So the poor have begun to look to alternatives for justice. In the long term, flaws in the system will create more room for the fundamentalists.”

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Professor and political scientist, Hamza Alavi, once noted that Pakistan at best will continue to function in a “constant state of crisis.”\textsuperscript{40} Given the current situation, let’s hope it does. However, without bottom-up reform, it is hard to imagine Hamza Alavi’s best case scenario will continue.

**Pakistan’s State Education System**

Pakistan’s educational system has become an international problem and should be of major concern to the U.S. and coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan. Pakistan has made reforms to the national curriculum and built many more schools thanks to western aid; however, there remains a real threat that the state run schools are helping to foster a climate of terrorism. Currently the Pakistan public school system is plagued by dilapidated classrooms, underpaid teaches and a curriculum based on an outdated agenda that continues to preach fear and hatred.

In a poor village in Punjab province, students sit on a dirt ground near open sewerage that goes untreated. The school has no roof, walls or even running water. The only chair is saved for the teacher who shares a chalkboard with the rest of the student body.\textsuperscript{41} The elementary school which caters to over 300 Pakistani youth is unfortunately not an anomaly.\textsuperscript{42} There are roughly 20 thousand shelterless schools in Pakistan. Out of


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
the schools which have walls and a roof, only 40 percent have electricity while a mere 60 percent have running water.\textsuperscript{43}

One of the biggest factors contributing to Pakistan's poorly developed schools is the government's low level of commitment to education. Between 1999 and 2002, the total education budget as a percentage of GDP declined from 2.4 to 2.0 percent.\textsuperscript{44} Today Pakistan spends only 1.8 of its GDP on education, which is one of the lowest in the world.\textsuperscript{45} There are only 12 countries that spend less than 2 percent of GDP on education; Pakistan ranks 5\textsuperscript{th} from the bottom.\textsuperscript{46} UNESCO recommends that a minimum of 4 percent of GDP should be spent on education while some international organization purpose upwards of 8 percent.\textsuperscript{47} With less than half of the suggested bare minimum allocated by Pakistan to its public school system, it is no wonder the system is seriously lacking.

The state's low priority placed on education likely contributes to its extremely high dropout rate. Only 22 percent of girls and 47 percent of boys complete any form of primary schooling.\textsuperscript{48} More than 51 percent of Pakistan youth drop out of school before

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.


the 5th grade while a mere 19 percent attend upper secondary schools.\textsuperscript{49} In a country with a population of roughly a 170 million, not preparing Pakistan youth for any field other than manual labor and no prospect for a better future is a ticking time bomb.

One way to demonstrate the states interests in fostering education is the amount of money paid to teachers. In Pakistan, primary schools teachers are often paid between 1,400 and 2,860 rupees ($32 to $65) which translates to less than the average income of a cook, gardener or chauffeur.\textsuperscript{50} The result is those who have the necessary skills to teach, choose careers that offer a pay that can meet their basic needs.

However, there is a non-pecuniary reason for the poor turnout of adequate teachers. In an interview of Pakistan teachers conducted by local scholars, they also pointed to lack of career progression and poor self-esteem attributed to being a teacher.\textsuperscript{51} In fact, the status of teachers has become so low, that the educated unemployed only become teachers as a last resort and leave as soon as they find another job.\textsuperscript{52}

Those who do stay on the job and teach often do not even bother to show up for work and when they do, it is only to pick up their paycheck. For the state run schools, this has resulted in the phenomenon called “ghost schools” or “ghost teachers.” In the most recent survey conducted by the Pakistan education department, there were roughly 700

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
primary and secondary ghost schools in just Punjab Province alone, with 18,000 ‘ghost teachers on the pay roll.’

There are, on the other hand, brand new schools being built in Pakistan with plenty of room for students, and where the teachers do show up for work. The schools even offer a hot meal and free tuition. These schools are called madrassas, religious school that lecture on nothing but Islam. John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, stated when referring to the madrassas “It is why they offer free education to impoverished Pakistani children, where they can recruit and indoctrinate the next generation.”

Although, Islamic religious schools often get the most press in the West, they are not Pakistan’s biggest threats carried out in the name of education. Currently, the number of madrassas in Pakistan compared to the state and private education system hovers around one percent of overall enrollment. Even in the areas that border Afghanistan where matriculation in the madrassas is the highest in the country, enrollment is still less than 7.5 percent.

Islamic extremists groups continue to replenish their ranks by recruiting from the madrassa schools; however, the state run educational system touches many more students and is a much larger problem than the madrassas. Rabina Saigel, an academic who has

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53 Ibid.


56 Ibid.
studied public school textbooks for years, stated “I feel that a great deal of the ideology that we think madrassas are producing is in fact being produced in state schools,” she says. “And I say that it’s the biggest madrassa because it has the widest outreach. It reaches every town, village, and small hamlet. It reaches every nook and cranny of the country.”

In a Pakistan school textbook written in 1995, titled Introduction to Pakistan Studies, reads “The Hindus always desired to crush the Muslims as a nation. Several attempts were made by the Hindus to erase the Muslim culture and civilization. Hindi-Urdu controversy, shudhi and sanghtan movements are the most glaring examples of the ignoble Hindu mentality.” The Ministry of Education has made attempts lately to rewrite the curriculum to a less militaristic message; however, passages such as this still remain: “For the past three centuries the Europeans have been working to subjugate the countries of the Muslim world” and “The Christians and Europeans were not happy to see the Muslims flourishing in life. They were always looking for opportunities to take possession of territories under the Muslims.” The state school curriculum still teachers that countries like India, Britain and the U.S. are still their enemy and the country is in a battle for survival. In a recent Frontline interview, on the state schools system, a little girl named Fatima declared “The teachers tell us that India and the British are our

57 “The Lost Generation.” Frontline.


enemies.” They are killing Muslims. They are behind the bomb blasts. I do not know much about America, but generally people do not like America, and they can never be our friends.”

The government-mandated curriculum should be of major concern to Western countries and neighboring allies such as India. In a 2003 report by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), an Islamabad-based independent group, found that for over twenty years, the official curriculum written by the government in every major subject, “have contained material that is directly contrary to the goals and values of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan.”

It goes on to say the textbooks include “Incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of Jihad” and that it “encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens, especially women and religious minorities, and towards other nations.”

Reforming Pakistan’s curriculum to a less militaristic message will take time and strong support by the government. However, it will also require substantial funds which currently are not be committed by the state.

Recently the World Bank has announced the approval of the Sindh and Punjab Education Sector Projects, what will spend over $650M to help reform education. However, aid to Pakistan is nothing new. The problem is how to distribute the aid

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60 Ibid.


62 Ibid.

63 “Education in Pakistan.” *The World Bank.*
without losing it to local bureaucrats or having it absorbed into the already broken schools system where it will continue to be used to fund “ghost schools” and a curriculum filled with fear. Isobel Coleman, CFR’s senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, claims that when it comes to dispersing aid, Islamabad is “largely dysfunctional” and fears that the government will be unable to stand as an effective partner which is essential for the longevity of any aid program.64

The public education system cannot wait until the dysfunctional Pakistani government is able to disperse aid. The problems are simply too severe. Moreover, there is reason to believe the government and ruling elite do not want to necessarily improve the current system since they may worry that an educated public will not be willing to accept the status quo. Thus, the World Bank should consider dispersing aid and bypassing the Pakistani government by using techniques similar to micro lending.

Traditionally, micro lending has been used to help spur entrepreneurship and development from the ground up in emerging countries. The money is often given in very small loans to individual who lack collateral or even steady employment. The World Bank could disperse the money to local communities in the form of very small loans to be paid back by the government, to build a school and pay the teacher. This would solve the problem of giving the money to the government to be allocated where it will likely disappear in paperwork and into the pockets of administrators and bureaucrats. Not only

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would this maximize the effectiveness of the loan, it would also give the community a chance to build a school that fits its needs.

The money, however, would be borrowed from the Pakistani government and thus the school’s curriculum would be controlled by the government. To help ensure the local schools do not continue to preach a message of hate and fear, the World Bank should consider making the loan contingent on the basis that the government incorporates real reforms to their school curriculum. The government would obviously be apprehensive about agreeing to such a deal and need to be reminded that their real threat does not come from India but from within their own borders. On the other hand, if the World Bank gives the loan directly to the Pakistan government with the stipulation that the funds be used for education, based on previous occurrences, it is unlikely the much of the money will ever find its ways to the actual classroom.

The alarmingly high dropout rate clearly indicates the schools’ inability to retain students. However, a big deciding factor that often tilts the parents to remove their child from school is the stark reality that a child earning a living can often mean the difference between malnutrition and the family having enough to eat. This produces major social problem for Pakistan, and for the U.S. since militant groups often indoctrinates the children when they become young adults and discover they have no job skills. To overcome this growing problem, the U.S. should consider small stipends that are given directly to the parents in exchange for sending their children to school. Since the children only earn on average 16 cents a day, these small stipends given only to the poor would not cost the taxpayer an unreasonable amount and could be argued to the American
people to help curb terrorism. Moreover, how safe will the U.S. be in the next five to ten years as thousands and even hundreds of thousands of children become adults and realize they have no skills or real future. The current education system in Pakistan breeds hatred and exposes U.S. soldiers to attacks as well as helps fuel the international al-Qaeda network that threatens regional stability.

The public school curriculum must be improved as well as the quality of teachers and schools augmented. The U.S should not suggest removing Islam from the education system since it will only give extremists a place in the debate to claim victimization and will ensure the government and local parents that their identity is not being comprised. However, the U.S. and World Bank should make their loans contingent on reforming the national curriculum to resemble more mainstream thought. In the end, the government will likely have to take a stance towards the most radical elements of society who will oppose any changes to the current school system. However, as long as the debate is about quality of education and not removing Islam, the militants will be marginalized.

In the end, dollars alone cannot solve the problem. The choice to have a functioning school system must be made by the Pakistan people. Given the low approval rating of the U.S. in Pakistan, any project funding or even supported by the U.S. risks being interpreted by the local population as simply U.S. control or manipulation of Pakistan’s resources.

Pakistan is learning the hard way that religious extremism is destroying the country and presenting a false picture of the Pakistani people as well Islam to the rest of the world. Some in Pakistan are taking matters into their own hands to quell the distorted
religious ideals that extremists use to brainwash many youth in Pakistan. The new Islamic Alliance, comprised of over 22 Islam groups, is hoping through education to try and present a more moderate interpretation of Islam to the poor and downtrodden youth who are often recruited by extremists. The schools teach a message of non-violence and respect for other faiths and traditions. One of the members, an Islamic college in Lahore, teaches students from economically deprived communities in Punjab and NWFP that the Taliban is a “stigma on Islam.” Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi, a Sunni cleric who heads the madrassa, preaches “That is why we will support our Government and our army and their right to destroy the Taliban” ending with “We will save Pakistan.” The group has two main goals: educate the youth of a more moderate form of Islam and oppose the Taliban. The group has even gone so far as to hold conferences and planned anti-Taliban Protests.

In a country where there often seems to be more preventing cooperation than inspiring it’s cause, rebuilding Pakistan’s school system with a government that is largely divided by class and plagued by corruption and mistrust, will not be easy. Nevertheless, the situation is reaching a critical juncture in Pakistan with dire consequences.

In the following chapter, I will put forth recommendations that will offer practical, long-term solutions. In the end, the situation calls for a multifaceted strategy


66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
by the international community and a genuine commitment by the Pakistani government and the local population. However, there is much the U.S. can and should do to help foster a more conducive climate that could lead to real and lasting stability.
CHAPTER 4
RECOMMENDATIONS

In the Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual published in December of 2006, co-author by then Gen. David Petraeus, they argued that in order to fight an effective counterinsurgency (COIN), one needs a “minimum troop density,” of roughly 20-25 troops for every 1000 insurgents.¹

The CIA estimates Afghanistan’s population at around 33.5 million. Following Petraeus’ suggested troop to population ratio of 1:50, it would require an approximate 672,000 troops to meet the minimum troop density in Afghanistan. Currently, the number of troops in Afghanistan is not even 5 percent of the total number recommend. Even with the components of better intelligence and technological advances, adding additional troops would not provide sufficient number of boots on the ground to conduct an effective COIN operation. Moreover, in Pakistan, the U.S. military is not allowed to officially have any U.S. troops conducting COIN operations without the acquiescence of the Pakistan government leaving the troop density essentially to that of the Pakistan military.

However, it might be interesting to note that the British lost the guerrilla war waged by Greek Cypriots, which relied on military might alone, with a troop density of 110 to 1 in their favor. On another note, around the same time, Indonesia pushed back Dar’ul Islam fighters with a troop density of 3 to 1 by developing a community watch

program run by local villagers and working with the local population. What Indonesia did differently than the Greek Cypriotes was incorporate a successful diplomatic solution coupled with a military agenda. In the following sections, this paper incorporates many different recommendations in order to achieve peace in the region. Some of the recommendations are more critical than others; however, if the U.S. wants to win in Afghanistan and maintain a stable Pakistan, Washington must learn from the mistakes of the Greek Cypriots and follow the example of Indonesia and put forth a sophisticated diplomatic strategy that will reduce the effectiveness of Islamic extremism that is fueling the insurgency.

**Enhancing Economic Cooperation**

Militancy and terrorism are hindering Pakistan and contributing to a downward spiral of a crippled economy which is further exacerbated by militants’ ability to recruit youth disenfranchised by lacking economic opportunities. The solution lies in developing underdeveloped areas through the promotion of free and fair trade which will provide a much needed economic uplift.

The U.S. should seriously consider a full-scale Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Pakistan. The U.S and the international community have contributed billions of dollars to Pakistan aid\(^2\) which has not always been seen to trickle down to the local level or have

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benefited America’s image in the country. ³ Although aid is an important part of creating stability in Pakistan, the U.S. should being to negotiate a U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which would help foster a stable and secure investment climate that would help to attract foreign direct investment. ⁴ A direct trade agreement with Pakistan would also help to better U.S. Pakistan relations that often seem to favor India. Pakistan has already requested increased access to U.S. markets for leather and textiles. ⁵ The poorest parts of Pakistan, namely the tribal regions, would benefit by increased employment that would be reliant on a positive U.S. Pakistan relationship. ⁶ Understandable, many U.S. investors would be uncomfortable investing in Pakistan, and that discomfort would have to be addressed. Moreover, it is possible that rebel groups could set up front companies and raise money for terrorist acts with American money. However, in the long run, a FTA with Pakistan would decrease Pakistan’s direct dependence on economic aid and allow its local industries to grow while the U.S. benefits from cheap imports.

Washington should also consider reducing its tariffs on Pakistan. The textiles industry account for about 60% of Pakistan’s export earnings, while American tariffs on

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⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
Pakistan textiles are about four times the average rate on imports.\(^7\) The current global recession combined with a poor international image, has greatly hindered Pakistani exports and contributed to a shrinking job market and employment opportunities. The U.S. should seriously consider removing exports tariffs or at least reducing the amount to the average import rate which would allow Pakistan to compete fairly. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and U.S.-Pakistan Business Council issued a report stating “Although the United States stresses the importance of economic growth in Pakistan, American trade policy fails to provide increased market access for Pakistani products in the United States.”\(^8\) Additionally, a more equitable economic relationship with Pakistan would help both countries geopolitical goal of market stability for Pakistan.

On top of reducing tariffs, the U.S. should also consider backing a bill by Senator Maria Cantwell and Congressman Chris Van Hollen which would grant duty-free treatment to goods produced in Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ). The proposal will create ROZ in many of the poorest areas of Pakistan which are the most susceptible to embracing Islamic extremism. These areas include but are not limited to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North West Frontier Province and other provinces near the Pakistan-Afghan border.\(^9\) The success of the bill can lead to better investment


\(^8\) Ibid.

opportunities, greater cooperation between U.S. and Pakistan, provide legal long term employment opportunities, and increase economic growth in an otherwise jobless region.

Duty free access to U.S. markets has historically proven to help industries that would otherwise be uncompetitive. Egypt, Jordan and Israel which have already established Reconstruction Opportunity Zones with the U.S. have seen a substantial benefit to their textile industry.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, in a White Paper of the U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel, claims that there is no indication that ROZ have hurt U.S. producers.\textsuperscript{11} Ambassador Richard Holbrooke claimed “One of the most important and potentially effective cooperative tools the United States can offer Pakistan and Afghanistan at this fragile moment are Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs).” There is no reason to provide Pakistan with less of an opportunity to export cheap textiles to the U.S. By not passing the bill, Washington will send the message to Islamabad and the local Pakistan population that U.S. is not really ready to foster economic development in the country and could undermine U.S. goals in the region.

The U.S. and Pakistan share a commitment to improving security and stability. Ensuring that bilateral, economic cooperation between the two countries continues to be a central tenant of U.S. foreign policy, should be a top priority for the Obama administration and for winning the war on terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking

The booming drugs trade in Afghanistan is both a symptom and a source of instability and corruption in the region. In 2005, Afghanistan was responsible for the production of 85% of the world’s opium. Currently that number hovers around 90%. Afghanistan is also only second to Morocco in cannabis cultivation. Much of that was smuggled out of Afghanistan through the porous border of Pakistan. Funding for Taliban and other Islamic militants groups to train and carry out their acts, is largely provided by either private donations by sympathizers or by the sale of drugs produced and smuggled out of Afghanistan. Although policies have been put in place to quell opium poppy production in Afghanistan, they have largely been ineffective. Instead, many of the policies have even succeeded in strengthening the bond between the Taliban and the farms by alienating the few farms who adopt the policies as well as the Afghan government. Consequently, this made the job of gaining intelligence to combat terrorism for the central government more difficult as those farmers who stopped growing poppies were usually the same farmers who previously shared information with the

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13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

government. As a result, U.S. and collation forces chose to look the other way when discovering poppy fields with the hope of gaining the trust of the local population to help fight terrorism.

However, ignoring the sale of drugs will not win the war on terrorism. There cannot be a priority given to counterterrorism over counternarcotics as stability will not be achieved in Pakistan and Afghanistan as long as the sale of heroin continues to provide a central source of funding for terrorists in these parts. The situation is further complicated by the shared cultural and tribal linkages which transcend national affinity. Coupled by a population that is extremely poor and lacks the necessary infrastructure to provide a way out for the growing youth population, rooting out and arresting drug smugglers is proving exceedingly difficult. Terrorist groups who seek shelter from government authorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan exploit this scenario. In exchange for the great wealth acquired by the highly profitable sale of poppy cultivation, terrorist groups are able to influence the impoverished population in this border region.

There is cause to be hopeful. In a report produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), claimed that Afghan poppy yields have decreased since Afghan and NATO forces have remained diligent in rooting out drugs. The government has, after some silence, effectively increased the risk of drug trafficking, deterring many would be traffickers in the future. The UN report claimed farmers have become

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17 Ibid.
increasingly wary of arrest and have begun to move away from growing or smuggling narcotics as the risk vs. reward of growing poppies is beginning to shift.\(^{18}\)

A combination of poverty, increasing radicalism, and corruption will ensure the drug trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan will remain an extremely serious security challenge for Collation forces and the Afghan Government.

**Ensuring Nuclear Stability**

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are uniquely at risk since they are geographically close to al-Qaeda’s central leadership, which has a declared many times its intention to obtain a nuclear weapon. Combined with Pakistan’s political instability, and current offensive against internal extremist forces, worries many in Washington that Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal could fall into the hand of rogue elements. The Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated in a 2008 speech, regarding Pakistan:

> To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven’t changed. That said, they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I’ve spoken with on both the military and civilian side understands that.\(^{19}\)

In a 2009 Senate Armed Services Committee Statement speech, General David H. Petraeus stated “Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and


\(^{19}\) Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues.”
other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.\textsuperscript{20}

In George Tenet’s memoirs, \textit{At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA}, he writes that the infamous A.Q. Khan, who is credited for giving Pakistan the nuclear bomb, was approached several times by Osama bin Laden for nuclear know-how.\textsuperscript{21} Tenant claims that even A.Q. Khan was not prepared to offer a terrorist such as bin Laden the nuclear capabilities to create Armageddon in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{22}

Although A.Q. Khan did not provide bin Laden with nuclear expertise, a group known as the Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) may have. Founded by two retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) officials, Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, created UTN for relief efforts in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{23} However, they were detained along with five other members by Pakistan soon after 9/11 when coalition forces in Afghanistan found documents demonstrating UTN’s interest in Nuclear Weapon.\textsuperscript{24}

George Tenet does suggest in his book that a UTN alliance with terrorist organizations inside of Afghanistan were likely supported by elements inside of


\textsuperscript{21} George Tenets, \textit{At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA} (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 261.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus. He notes that despite multiple warnings by
the CIA, Pakistan did not take action against the UTN. It was not until Tenant was
dispatched to the Middle East, did Pakistan begin to pay attention which eventually led to
the arrest of seven UTN members.25

In the end, it is unlikely that a terrorist organization will steal a nuclear weapon.
According to a report prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Islamabad’s
nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form. Pakistan probably could
assemble the weapons fairly quickly and has aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles
available for delivery.”26 This suggests that Pakistan has taken serious measures to keep
terrorists or any group of people from breaching security and taking control of Pakistan’s
nuclear stock pile. However, one way a terrorist organization could get access to the
country’s nuclear arsenal, is through the ballot box. This scenario is not as far off as one
may think. The government currently is not supported by much of the general population.
Further instability fostered by terrorist activities, could push the Pakistan military, which
has long been firmly in control of the country’s nuclear weapons, past its breaking point.

For example, in 2007, when former Pakistani President Musharraf arrested thousands
of people in a crackdown to strengthen his own grip on power, many in Washington and
around the world, feared that Pakistan’s political volatility could lead to a situation where

25 Tenets, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, 262-268.

26 “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January, 20 2001,
its nuclear facilities were compromised. In response to a question by CNN reporter Wolf Blitzer regarding Pakistan ability to maintain control of its nuclear arsenal, Benazir Bhutto at the time stated:

General Musharaff says that he is in firm control of the nuclear arsenal and the army is a very disciplined army. But we have been facing chaos, growing chaos for some time. Our armed forces are heavily engaged in the tribal areas. We keep reading about casualties that they are suffering and the bomb blast incidences are spreading throughout the country so this is straining the social fabric of the country. The armed sources are part of the public and this will have an impact on them, too. We need to maintain Pakistan’s stability. If there is no stability, then I’m afraid the controls could weaken.

Soon after the assignation of Benazir Bhutto, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Dr. Mohammad Al Baradei, speaking on the stability of Pakistan concluded that he “worried that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of an extremist groups in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.”

The U.S. should continue to work with Pakistan to ensure that its nuclear arsenal is secure. Washington has already spent millions of dollars to help fortify Pakistan’s security. However, Washington should consider offering special training for those protecting the weapons as well as screening personnel so incidents such as UTN don’t happen again.

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28 Ibid.

The likelihood of a terrorist organization stealing a nuclear weapon is slim giving Pakistan’s multi layered control structure. Additionally, Islamabad with U.S. support has instituted launch codes that require two to three people to authenticate. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an interview in 2007 stated that “we spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanism to guard the security of those.” Even India’s National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, believes that it would be “extremely difficult” to steal a nuclear weapons from Pakistan claiming they are “pretty safely guarded.”

What is more likely, however, is through political instability and economic depression, the Pakistan people elect a pro-Taliban government that would then put Pakistan’s nuclear know-how into the hands of terrorist organizations. The current government’s ability to hold on to power will depend heavily on its response to the economic crisis and its own war on terrorism. Pakistan’s recent negotiations with terrorist groups in order to maintain peace demonstrated to many locals and to those around the world that Islamabad is losing its grip on Pakistan.

In the end, the best way to ensure security and stability in Pakistan is through the strengthening of democracy. Currently, Pakistan lacks the democratic credentials to enforce its rule throughout the country. In the short term, the U.S. should continue to

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30 Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues.”
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
provide funds and training to the Pakistan military to help secure its military prowess. However, in the long run, the U.S. should push for democratic control.

**Improving Pakistan-Indian Relations**

Washington has already adopted many important short term strategies to help Pakistan defeat its growing insurgency; for example, President Obama’s decision to provide General McKiernan with 17,000 extra troops in Afghanistan to patrol the south and along the Afghan/Pakistan border near the FATA. These regions are extremely rugged and cannot simply be patrolled by wheeled vehicle such as humvees or even helicopters. Washington has also outlined a plan to provide the appropriate tools and training to Pakistan’s military to root out terrorist cell in their home country especially in the FATA. Both of these initiatives will do much to create a stable platform in which the Pakistan government can root out extremist groups.

However, as long as Pakistan continues to view India as it primary threat, providing more U.S. troops in the tribal regions or better trained Pakistan military will not be enough to fully oust al-Qaeda in the FATA. The primary reason is because as new troops are trained to fight extremists, they are often moved to the border of India, allowing the Eastern border to continue to be undermanned.

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34 Ibid.


It would seem that given the Taliban’s and al-Qaeda’s recent successes in Burner and surrounding areas, the Pakistani government would realize the significance of the current situation and would begin to move troops from Kashmir to fight battles closer to the capital. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee this will occur. As we saw in NWFP, the Pakistan government continues to offer concessions to militants in exchange for a ceasefire, effectively abandoning the local population living in the region.\textsuperscript{37} In April of 2009, U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, highlighted these points when she charged Pakistan’s government of “abdicating to the Taliban” when it agreed to Sharia law under pressure from the Taliban.\textsuperscript{38}

For the last 61 years, Pakistan has held the view that nuclear armed India provides the greatest security challenge for Pakistan. Reshaping these generational beliefs will take more than just providing U.S. troops or training the Pakistani military.\textsuperscript{39} The U.S. must recast Pakistan/Indian relations so that they both view terrorism as their greatest challenge for peace and security and not each other.\textsuperscript{40} The attacks in Mumbai and the subsequent political posturing taken by both countries demonstrates the deep distrusts as well as unease both countries still harbor for one another. The attacks also drew

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
Pakistan’s already overstretched army from the western tribal regions of FATA, to the country’s eastern border near India.\textsuperscript{41}

The U.S. should work to forge a consensus between the two countries that terrorism is their great threat to their national security. Not only will this serve to isolate local terrorists, but it will serve to lessen the possibility that nuclear armed India and Pakistan would ever go to war, which would be catastrophic for the region and threaten to destabilize recent U.S. gains in Iraq.

Washington should also push India to be supportive of Pakistan’s effort to deal with Islamic extremism in its own borders.\textsuperscript{42} India could contribute by lessening its often critical propaganda campaign against Pakistan which will allow Pakistan to focus its efforts on rooting out Islamic extremists instead of maintaining its strong troop presence on its border with India. Former Senator from the Pakistan Muslim League-Q party, Ishaq Khan Khakwani, who is sympathetic to America’s position in the region, summed up Pakistan’s general sentiment when he stated: “The United States has to get India to back off in Afghanistan. Then Pakistan will see Indian interference is diminished and that will give confidence to Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{43}

**Creating Instability though Drone Attacks**

Many locals in Pakistan believe the drone attacks carried out by the MQ-1 Predators are causing too many civilian deaths. Without the consent of the Pakistan


\textsuperscript{43} Perlez, “Time Is Short as U.S. Presses a Reluctant Pakistan.”
government, these efforts are fostering more terrorism than they are curbing. The U.S. should refrain from using the MQ-1 Predator in the tribal regions. The Predator attacks have killed top al-Qaeda operatives, and given the difficult terrain and inhospitable environment, the system’s surface-to-air Hellfire missiles has been an effective weapon in the past.\textsuperscript{44} However, it has not come without a cost. Civilian casualties have been extremely high and are serving to anger the locals, pushing them closer to embracing extremist groups. On CNN’s Faried Zakaria GPS, Imran Khan, former cricket player, turn politician and founder of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, argues that “this insane aerial bombing -- these drone attacks, killing innocent people -- all it’s doing is, it’s inflaming the whole area. And this insurgency is turning into a sort of freedom struggle now.”\textsuperscript{45}

To understand the backlash that is created by the death of civilian population the U.S must understand the Pashtun people and their culture. The Pashtun belt that Pakistan and Afghanistan share and which covers the FATA is governed by tribal codes. One code referred to as “Pashtunwali” relates to the concepts such as hospitality and revenge.\textsuperscript{46} Pashtunwali was originally adopted by the local tribes to mediate disputes and protect the weakest in their society.\textsuperscript{47} Under the rules of Pashtunwali, if a person creates war or kills


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
a member of the tribe or a guest, the remaining tribal members are bound by honor to revenge their death. The drone attacks in the FATA by the U.S. has resulted in hundreds of civilians casualties. As a consequence many locals have taken up arms against American forces, and turned their back on political negotiations with the U.S. or the Pakistan government. The result is a radicalized Pashtun belt with less patience for any moderate voice to be heard. To root out terrorism in the tribal areas, the local population must also view as terrorists those who the U.S. and Pakistan view as terrorists. Once local insurgents groups become “freedom” fighters or “heroes”, the region will succumb to extremists and the battle will be lost.

The predator attacks are also undermining the Pakistan government which is often viewed as an American stooge. California Senator Diane Feinstein’s statement in March that unmanned CIA Predator aircraft operating in Pakistan were actually taking off from an airbase in Pakistan, led to outcry by the Pakistan population, creating political havoc for a government that is already politically weak. Pakistan has traditionally referred to the drone attacks in the tribal areas as “violation of its sovereignty.” To many in

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48 Ibid.

49 Khan, “How to Save Pakistan.”

50 Ibid.


Pakistan, the Senator’s statement only reinforced the belief that the Pakistan government is deeply entrenched with the U.S. in a war that benefits the U.S. and not Pakistan.53

In April of 2009, Islamabad was put on high alert prompting the closing of schools and embassies to caution their staff that Taliban members threaten to storm the capital after U.S. drone attacks hit suspected terrorists on the Pakistan border.54 Following growing local pressure on the Pakistan government to do something about the drone attacks in the tribal belt, on September 12, 2008 after repeated drone attacks, Pakistan blocked any NATO and U.S. supplies from passing through the Khyber Pass hampering a global effort to fight the war in Afghanistan.55 Pakistan needs U.S. support to win the battle in the tribal regions, but if the central government is seen as weak and unable to protect its local citizens, locals will look to different means of protecting their families and influencing change.56

I recommend that the U.S. stop using drone attacks to kill al-Qaeda members which is inflaming anti-Americanism and turning moderate Muslims towards extremism as well as undermining the Pakistani government. Drone attacks are a successful killing tool, especially in the mountain regions of the FATA where manned vehicles are unable to maneuver.57 Stopping drone attacks would allow militants to operate more freely;

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Nawaz, “FATA The most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” 25.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
however, the collateral damage of innocent civilians, women and children is simply too high and militants are quick to use every attack as a propaganda campaign to rally locals against the West.\textsuperscript{58}

Until the Pakistani people believe that the militant extremism will not be overcome without the support of the U.S., any attacks precipitated by the U.S. will appear to be an infringement on the sovereignty of Pakistan.

**Incorporating the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)**

Currently the Pakistan government enjoys millions in U.S. aid but is slow to send in Pakistani troops to secure the tribal belt even when it threatens U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan is falling to see the big picture. The war in Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to Pakistan to accomplish what the country has not been able to do since its inception: incorporate the tribal region and finally unite the country.

The FATA is still governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), an ancient plan of colonial rule promulgated by the British Raj to serve indigenous autocratic authority and not a modern style government.\textsuperscript{59} The effect is a system of governance that lacks accountability and the protection of basic human rights for its people.\textsuperscript{60} The extremely rough mountainous terrain has not made providing electricity, healthcare, and

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 4.
education any easier to the local population.\textsuperscript{61} As a result, the FATA is the poorest and most undeveloped section of Pakistan, with a literacy rate of 17 percent, half the national average of 40%, and a per capita income of $250, compared to the national average of $500.\textsuperscript{62}

The FATA is also home to many al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters that come to the mountainous regions from many parts of the world for training and further militant indoctrination.\textsuperscript{63} Once adequately prepared, rebel groups and al-Qaeda operatives occasionally return to their home country to create terrorist cells.\textsuperscript{64} However, most cross the FATA border into Afghanistan to join the insurgency in the fight against the Afghanistan government of Hamad Karzai, and/or NATO collation forces.\textsuperscript{65} The border is also crossed by many Afghan insurgents who seek refuge in FATA in order to replenish their weaponry before returning to fight in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{66}

For the U.S. it has become increasingly clear that unless the situation changes in the tribal regions of Pakistan, the War in Afghanistan will never really be won. Even in the best case scenario, the U.S. is able to install a stable Afghan government and push the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the situation will remain extremely fragile. The Afghan Taliban can easily retreat to the border of Pakistan to seek sanctuary before it launches

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Armitage, “The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan.”
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Nawaz, “FATA The most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” 25.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
another counterattack in Afghanistan. For the U.S. to win the long war in Afghanistan, it will require that the FATA regions no longer provide a safe-haven for the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The only way to accomplish this is if the Pakistan government is finally able to secure the tribal regions and institute Pakistan law which is has so far failed to do.

The Tribal region, as discussed earlier is a vast arid land, governed by tribal loyalties rather than the national government. However, Islamabad realizes in order for it to become a modern member of the international community, it must complete its independence and finally become unified. Once the U.S. pulls out of Afghanistan, Pakistan will likely never again have the support of the world’s only super power to help it regain the FATA. Washington should remind Islamabad of this rare opportunity and push Pakistan towards making real reforms in the FATA that will lead to cooperation and eventually integration.

There has been some progress in recent months. Last year on August 14th Pakistan’s Independence Day, President Zardari’s announced political, judicial and administrative reforms for the country’s tribal areas. The reforms included the ability for lifting the ban on political parties and freedom of speech as granted for the rest of the Pakistani citizens in the Constitution. However, since Pakistani government is not able to legislate in the FATA, any elected members are unable to actually represent their

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constituents in this region. In the end, the reform appears to not offer ostensible changes to the current situation.69

Fierce battles continue to range in the FATA as insurgent attacks being to hit the capital. With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the country’s democratic system has been directly threatened. A better trained military is perhaps needed, but insurgencies are never defeated by military might alone. Islamabad should demonstrate its willingness to respond to the growing discontent in the tribal regions by leading a serious effort to root out terrorism, while working with local tribal elders to extend the rule of law and by ending culture impunity. Pakistan needs a real, long-term effort to build an effective government that extends into the tribal region.

Avoiding hard decision in the FATA is what allowed the present and increasingly dangerous situation to form. Islamabad should be upfront with its citizens and recognize that an armed conflict in the FATA will likely last many years but also reassure the public that there is a clear goal of establishing an inclusive state. Fighting terrorists that threaten national security should be taken seriously, but priority must be given to the rule of law with special priority given to reforming the judicial system. Short term measures of relying on ill-trained military forces to carry out harsh ad hoc tactics to broker peace will only undermine the long-term goal of building a sound democratic system. Moreover, making deals with the Taliban to establish footholds in exchange for a ceasefire is foolhardy and shortsighted. The key to integrating the FATA into wider

69 Ibid.
Pakistan is to meet the legitimate grievances of the population who are growing steadily disenfranchised with Islamic extremism.

The unification of Pakistan is essential to Pakistan’s stability and its hopefully eventual progression into a modern state. Divided countries have always wrestled with stability and the rule of law. Until China’s unification and reunification, it fought many bloody wars within its current border. Italy was divided into multiple regions and run by different monarchs all holding unique loyalties and culture identities. War between the regions was a continuous part of life until Italy finally unified in 1861. Incorporating the FATA into the Pakistan Law and establishing democratic rule is critically important for both Pakistan and U.S. security interests. The current situation as it stands now allows terrorist cells to take advantage of the lack of accountability and social services to exploit the people and use their homes as safe houses.

However, without the support of the Pakistani people, any policy openly proposed by Washington will appear to Pakistanis as another attempt by a foreign power to interfere in domestic affairs without any genuine concern for the future of Pakistan or its local population. Washington must ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Pakistani people and demonstrate that U.S. interests lie in supporting the long term growth and prosperity of Pakistan and creating real stability in the region.
CHAPTER 5

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS

In a speech on January 7 of this year at the Brookings Institution, Richard C. Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan stated that roughly 60 to 70 percent of Afghans fighting with Taliban or al-Qaeda are not necessarily supporters of their ideals.\textsuperscript{70} Holbrooke believes these individuals fight for various reasons such a personal grievance, injustice or are simply driven by propaganda fostered by militant Islamic schools.\textsuperscript{71} He states that these individuals must be given the opportunity to leave their militant activities and rejoin the political process, which has historically not necessarily been the case.\textsuperscript{72} Holbrooke’s recommendations have actually worked in Iraq and could possibly be used in Pakistan. As we saw in Anbar province, the Sunni Awakening helped turn the tide of extremism.

Anbar province is a vast Sunni region located west of Baghdad. It contains the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, borders the porous borders of Syria and was formerly seen as a Saddam stronghold.\textsuperscript{73} In 2007, a leaked classified Marine Corps intelligence report

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
called Anbar province lost, claiming it would not be long before a caliphate would be established there by the Islamic militants.\textsuperscript{74}

Today, however, Anbar has a much different story. Attacks in the city of Ramadi have dropped from 25 per day in 2006 to 4 per day in 2007.\textsuperscript{75} Iraqis signing up to work with Americans went up from 1,000 a month in 2006 to 12,000 a month the following year.\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, in March 2008, the Department of Defense claimed there had been a “nearly 90 percent” reduction in the ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq since June 2007 and a 70 percent reduction in deaths of coalition forces.\textsuperscript{77}

The former Sunni stronghold is now described as a success and was even referred to in 2007 by President George Bush as “one of the safest places in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{78} In a Department of Defense News Briefing, David Petraeus, attributed the drop in violence in large part to the “brave” and “courageous” Sunni tribal leaders working with the American forces in the fight against al-Qaeda known as the Awakening.\textsuperscript{79} It is critical that those who want to leave militant groups have a way out.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{76} O’Hanlon and Campbell, “Iraq Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.”


In a speech to the Brookings Institute, Richard Holbrook, stated that allowing Taliban members to renounce their ties to terrorism is “critically important.” He pointed out that, “there are currently many members of the political society in Kabul today who are former Taliban. They’re in the National Assembly. They’re in the government. They are outspoken. One of them wrote a bestselling book about his experiences with the Taliban.”

If members of the Pakistan Taliban, who have become disenchanted with the militancy of the Taliban have a way to rejoin the political system, the Pakistan military could gain from both their intimate knowledge of the Taliban as well a smaller insurgency. There is data to suggest that support for the Islamic extremism is weakening.

According to the Pew Research Center, 69 percent of the Pakistanis fear extremist will take control of their country. In 2008, just 33 percent held a negative view of the Taliban; today, 70 percent rate it unfavorably. Likewise, the percentage of Pakistanis with an unfavorable opinion of al-Qaeda has plummeted from 61 percent to 34 percent in the last year.

Rukhshehnda Naz, former resident director of Aurat Foundation, a national organization advocating women’s rights in Pakistan recounts that when the Taliban was overwhelmed in Afghanistan by collation forces in 2001 and forced to flee to the FATA

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80 Holbrooke, “The Obama Administration’s Challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

region of Pakistan, many locals welcomed them with open arms.\(^\text{82}\) Naz claims that at the
time, people saw the Taliban as defenders of Islam against the United States.\(^\text{83}\) Today,
that is no longer the case. According to Naz, many locals are now anti-Taliban and are no
longer happy to share their homes as they were before. Instead of heroes, the people have
grown disgusted with the Taliban’s violent acts which have often target innocent people.
Naz states, “First they operated in the garb of Taliban. Now, they are referred to as
militants, extortionists.”\(^\text{84}\)

Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA case officer who studied
fundamentalist terrorist movements, argued that terrorist support in Iraq eroded as it has
in previous conflicts since militants pushed the envelope to the point where their original
goals or ideologies become associated with atrocities, eventually becoming
unattractive.\(^\text{85}\) Author Peter Bergen, known for conducting the first television interview
with Osama bin Laden, asserts that al-Qaeda’s brutal tactics will eventually prove “self-
defeating” since killing Muslims and civilians is forbidden in the Koran.\(^\text{86}\)

In 2008, a reporter from the New York Times spent two months interviewing
forty young Iraqis from five different Iraqi cities, eventually publishing an article titled

\(^{82}\) Ashfaq Yusufzai, “Pakistan: Vestiges of War, Hopes for Peace,” Ani-War.com, January 12,
January 3, 2010).

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) Ibid.

\(^{85}\) Philip H. Gordon, “Can the War on Terror Be Won?” Council on Foreign Relations
(November/December 2007), http://www.adesse.jp/apprendre/Can%20the%20War%20on%20Terror%20Be%20Won.PDF (accessed
January 5, 2010).

\(^{86}\) Ibid.
Violence Leaves Young Iraqis Doubting Clerics. The reporter described a growing skepticism among Iraqis from both poor and middle classes, towards religion and religious figures in Iraq.\textsuperscript{87} Abu Mahmoud, a moderate Sunni cleric in Baghdad was quoted saying, “When they behead someone, they say ‘Allahu Akbar,’ they read Koranic verse, using the phrase for God is great. The young people, they think that is Islam... So Islam is a failure, not only in the students’ minds, but also in the community.”\textsuperscript{88} A Baghdad University School of Law professor, who only identified herself as Bushra, said speaking of her students, “They have changed their views about religion. They started to hate religious men. They make jokes about them because they feel disgusted by them.”\textsuperscript{89} Like with any movement, if extremist fail to offer better solutions to people’s everyday problems, fervent speeches or quotes from a holy book will not convince the people to continue to live against their own self-interests. In the end, people will look to others that can.

U.S. Freedom Agenda

Washington should be careful of how it chooses to promote “freedecom” when fighting the war in Afghanistan or trying to create stabiltiy in Pakistan. Freedom in countries like Pakistan or regions like the FATA, has a very different meaning than to Americans. The U.S. hopes that “promoting freedom” will win the hearts and minds of the locals as well as sounding good to many Amerians back home. However, promoting


\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
our concept of freedom abroad can be a dangerous tactic and can even be counterproductive to a successful strategy of creating stability in the Middle East.

Even in the U.S. the understanding of freedom often depends on what side of the political spectrum you are on and can range from gun rights to abortion and access to free healthcare. When the U.S. speaks of freedom in the Middle East, we are usually speaking of religious and or political freedom as well our culture values such as women’s rights.

For many in the Muslim world who promote the concept of Sharia, freedom connotes the submission to God. In the U.S. this may seems contradictory, but in the Middle East the concept of choice and submission can exist in harmony. For example, a women wearing the head scarf can represent both a choice and a sign of acquiescence to God. For Muslims who believe that God has created mankind, giving or submitting yourself to God is in line with human nature and free will. As well-known Islamic fundamentalist Sayyid Qutb stated, “He Who has created the universe...has also prescribed a Shari’ah for [man’s] voluntary action. If man follows this law, then his life is in harmony with his own nature... only through obedience to Allah does man’s personality, internal and external, become integrated.”

Therefore it is believed that by devoting and submitting yourself to God, you are fulfilling your true nature and are thus free.

Therefore, when the U.S. espouses reforms that are believed to be out of line with Sharia law and Islamic customs such to the head scarf or even to women’s rights, the U.S. is not seen as promoting freedom but instead promoting its own values and agenda.

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90 Loboda, “The Thought of Sayyid Qutb: Radical Islam’s Philosophical Foundations.”
Moreover, Pakistan is going to be naturally very suspicious of the U.S. promising to bring freedom through military means, a lesson we learned in Iraq. As Maximilien Robespierre stated in 1792, “No one likes armed missionaries; and the first advice given by nature and prudence is to repel them as enemies.”91 The U.S. should not attempt to demand that Pakistan or Afghanistan adheres to its moral laws even if they seem counter intuitive to America’s understanding of human rights. Instead, when the U.S. refers to freedom in the Middle East, it should be very careful to reiterate their support for political freedoms such as freedom to vote judicial prudence; concepts that are supported in the Koran that will lead to a more democratic system.

Perhaps, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous statement, “man is born free; and everywhere is in chains” sums up American’s understanding of Islamic freedom. However, we are not in the situation to define freedom in the Middle East. Moreover, pushing our concepts of political freedom will only serve to support the Islamic radicals who claim the U.S. is trying to destroy their identity.

Washington should understand that the concepts of Sharia law are not only important to Islam, but also has historically offered the only counter balance to stem corruption since both the political elite and the peasants must all adhere to Sharia. If Pakistan is able to establish a genuine democracy that contains the necessary checks and balances, Sharia law will not be relied upon as the only means to stem corruption since the democratic process will naturally weed out those who are not seen as legitimate by

the people. At that time, Sharia law can move to the background and moral issues such as women’s rights, can be more freely debated with the West.

For now, Washington must also allow Afghanistan and Pakistan to develop their own distinct identity while guiding the country towards a democratic system. This can be done most efficiently be ignoring culture questions of human rights, and focusing instead on reforming Pakistan’s political landscape to reflect a more just system of governance and rule of law.

**Not the Crusades**

During a press conference five days after the attacks on the World Trade Center, President George Bush stated, in a response to a question regarding new restrictions on homeland security that “this is a new kind of -- a new kind of evil,” he said. “And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.”

This statement instantly had reverberating consequences on the perception of U.S. foreign policy for the Muslim population in America and around the world. Using terms such as “crusades” and “evil” come with historical baggage. The Crusades were a bloody conflict between the Christians and Muslims that lasted centuries and crossed continents. The Crusades shaped politics and countries, and left an indelible mark on Islamic and Christian History that endures to this day. When President Bush uttered the word “crusade” many Muslims who already believed U.S. foreign policy was centered on destroying Islam and claiming their land,

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believed they finally had their proof. Moreover, this statement provided the Islamic extremists with a platform to preach violent jihad and to further convince a population that was already skeptical of U.S. interests, to join or protect extremists who were bent on destroying U.S. policies.

In a war that calls for winning the ‘hearts and minds’, President Obama should make it abundantly clear the war in Afghanistan and creating a stable Pakistan is not about the continuation of the Crusades but about promoting justice and the rule of law, concepts that are endemic to Sharia law and Islamic principles. Today in Pakistan, the educational system continues to prescribe to an international system based on hatred and fear. The U.S. must work to overcome these misperceptions and outdates ideologies, not serve to strengthen them.

In order to demonstrate U.S. interests are strategic and not religious, the U.S. should continue to put public pressure on Israel to stop building settlements in disputed areas and work on a Palestine and Israel two state solution. There is arguably no issue more contentious and divisive for the Muslim community than the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Islamic militant groups and rouge fractions hoping to gain sympathy and legitimacy from the Islamic community, often exploit this issue. The best way to demonstrate the war in Afghanistan and reform in Pakistan is not about fulfilling ancient prophecy but rather about providing stability and a better way of life for the Muslim population is visibly improve Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Winning the Hearts and Minds of the American Public

The current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to kill and capture the Taliban but also to protect the local Afghans in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. However, what Washington should also focus on is winning the hearts and minds of the American people.

The U.S. population, like all countries, prefers short wars. When conflicts drag on and the situations turns from being perceived as a patriotic responsibility to a waste of treasure and lives, the war is lost. If Americans loses the will to stay in Afghanistan and the Taliban regains control of the country, Islamabad, which is already struggling to maintain in control of its country, could tip towards revolution; this will have far greater consequences in the long run and could eventually even destabilize the entire region. Winning the War in Afghanistan and stabilizing Pakistan is fundamental to U.S. foreign policy interests. However, unless these efforts are supported by the American population, a growing chorus of people will begin to demand the U.S. brings its troops home.

In a speech that President Obama gave at West Point last year, when referring to the war in Afghanistan he stated: “...it’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people.”

Since the Obama administration has taken office, when referring to the war in Afghanistan, he has attempted to drum up support by reminding Americans the attacks of September 11th, were premeditated in Afghanistan. This strategy worked well in the
Beginning of the Afghan war and even in part helped to shore up support for the invasion of Iraq. However, as support for the War in Afghanistan is at an all time low, Washington should rethink its strategy.

After the Nigerian Muslims attempt to blow up an airliner late last year, a new Rasmussen poll suggests that 79% of U.S citizens believe that another terrorist attack within a year is likely. The U.S. should reinforce that winning the War in Afghanistan is a fundamental aspect to keeping our country safe from terrorists. Moreover, the Obama administration should remind the country that Afghanistan is nestled next to not only Iran and Pakistan but also India and China two of our biggest trading partners that are vital to our economy.

Perhaps most importantly the U.S. should emphasize that allowing Afghanistan to its own devices could lead to Islamic extremists from getting hold of nuclear weapons in Pakistan which could spill over to nuclear conflict in the region. If Pakistan extremists are able to secure nuclear weapons in Pakistan there is no reason to think they would not use them on India especially since India and Pakistan have already come very close to nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. In short, the U.S. should emphasize that winning the War in Afghanistan is about preventing nuclear conflict in South Asia and to keep our country safe. For these reasons and for America’s place in the international system, it is important that Washington reminds Americans of its political and military commitment to Afghanistan.

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In the end, any counterinsurgency operation in Pakistan must be coupled with support for enhanced socioeconomic policies, such as land, educational and political reform in order to effectively counter Islamic extremist's propaganda. Otherwise, Islamic militants will continue to gain support and any long term goal of stability will not be realized.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

When the Berlin Wall was torn down, the future costs of the Cold War and the support for the mujahedeen and Islamic fanatics to fight “godless communism” was not fully calculated. In an interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, confirms Secretary Gates’s statement that the U.S. began funding the Mujahedeen before the Russian invasion chiefly to entice a potential Russian invasion into Afghanistan.¹ When asked if he had any regrets Brzezinski says:

Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war.²

With the rise of Muslim fundamentalism as a result of the mujahedeen support, Brzezinski claims “What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?”³

Former Director of Central Intelligence, James R. Woolsey agrees with Brzezinski. In an interview with the Brooking Institute, he stated that although there were consequences of U.S. support for the mujahedeen during the Cold War, it was the right


² Ibid.

³ Ibid.
decision as it essentially helped to break the back of the Soviets.\footnote{Patrick L. Clawson and John Parachini, “Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Brookings Institution Press, April 21, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2001/0425terrorism.aspx (accessed March 3, 2010).} However, he does admit, leaving the Afghanistan to the devices of the mujahdeen and their unstable extremist ideologies in the end was a mistake.\footnote{Ibid.}

The U.S. Pakistan relationship during the Cold War is an excellent example of two nations taking advantage of an opportunistic partnership to serve their immediate needs. As we support the Sunni Awakening in Iraq or an “acceptable dictator” in Afghanistan, for good or bad, it is important to remember sound principles should not be replaced with quick fixes. Our democracy is designed to tackle policy issues within a 2-6 year cycle, forcing elected officials to substitute quick results to often long-term predicaments. Unfortunately, on the way to the podium, this can mean effective governance is sometime replaced with shortsighted statecraft.

A military campaign against extremism in the FATA and Pakistan at large will not work with bombs alone. Nor will it work with only short term fixes such as financial assistance or training for Pakistan’s military. To defeat extremism in the Pakistan’s FATA, the local population must have a stake in the peace process and see Islamic extremism as a threat to a better way of life for them and their children.

Time is running out. The constant attacks by extremist groups on the Pakistan government coupled with a global economic recession is putting severe pressure on the Pakistan government and local population pushing the country closer to collapse. As President Asif Ali Zardari said in December, “We [the United States, Pakistan, NATO
and the world at large] are losing the battle to keep Pakistan stable, at peace and prosperous."6 Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan already has the necessary infrastructure to win the battle on extremism.7 What Pakistan requires now is a resolute and concentrated U.S. response that will greatly reduce the odds of a nuclear armed al-Qaeda style government from gaining power.

Pakistan has been unsuccessful in ridding its own borders of extremism let alone assisted the U.S. and Afghan government in its fight against extremism in Afghanistan. However, without the support of Pakistan, Afghanistan will never be stable as key Taliban leaders have fled into the mountainous regions of the FATA. Once coalition forces leave Afghanistan, the Taliban will simply return to Afghanistan to establish their own government.

The U.S. must acts decisively in order to keep terrorist groups from taking control of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. To overcome the complex set of realities, it will require the full commitment of Washington to use both military as well as soft-power. Although the ultimate responsibility rests with the Pakistani government, it is critical that the U.S. works with Pakistan to lessen the trust deficient between Pakistan and the U.S. before the country is lost to Islamic extremism.

Much of the current U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan is focused on security issues and terrorism. For example, in a 2008 interviews of Bruce Riedel, who has been tapped by the Obama administration to chair an interagency review of policy toward

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7 Ibid.
Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed strategies to win in Pakistan. In his interview, he rarely strayed from counter insurgency operations instead of discussing socio-economic problem in Pakistan.\(^8\) U.S. based Think Tanks also follow a similar pattern. However, it is hard to overlook the fact that Islamic fundamentalists both garner their support and replenish their ranks from Pakistan’s rural poor.

The U.S. with the support of the international community should develop a better rounded framework to deal with terrorism in Pakistan. I encourage the U.S. to address many of the socio-economical issue more effectively and eventually develop a foreign policy agenda along the lines that I have outlined here that will truly transform Pakistan to a functioning member of the international community.

Regardless of the path chosen, there will be dangers and setbacks. However, the consequences of failing to act soon will be far greater to the interests of the U.S. and the world at-large.

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