

EFFECTIVELY DIFFUSING TERRORISM: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE U.S.  
POLICIES BEEN IN COMBATING AND DETERRING AL-QAEDA POST-  
9/11?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will analyze the effectiveness of U.S. policies to combat and deter terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, and policies and procedures implemented following the terrorist attacks of that day (also referred to as "9-11"). The policies considered in this study were products from agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Terrorism Commission, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the White House (captured in Congressional Reports).

The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon provide the focal point for this thesis, as these attacks initiated fundamental changes to U.S. policy toward terrorism and terrorist organizations. In order to understand the effectiveness of the policy changes, it is important to understand the motivation behind terrorist acts and the evolution of terrorism. This study will assess whether policies pre and post 9/11 were effective in deterring or combating terrorism. The study will also identify how the U.S. policies pertaining to terrorism have evolved from an investigative policing

approach in the past (deterrence), to a militant approach (combative) in response to a heightened threat from terrorists organizations such as Al Qaeda.

In conclusion this thesis will take into account the information and case studies evaluated throughout the paper, and provide metrics that evaluate the total number of attacks, casualties that were killed and injured, and proximity of the attacks pre and post 9/11 to recommend that an approach to successfully combat and deter terrorist actions and threats must include a matrix of both deterrence and combative strategies.

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## CHAPTER 1

### THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM

There are several definitions on the Internet that are loosely used to describe terrorist, terrorism, and terrorist organizations/activities/actions, without much specificity in any definition. Initially, I felt it was imperative to identify a specific definition, but it soon became apparent that the reason there is so much ambiguity in the definition for terrorism may be directly correlated with the fact there are many known and unknown means to conduct terrorist activities, making it difficult to summarize or know how to react to it. For the purpose of this thesis, I will refer to terrorism in the context of *this* particular study, not necessarily terrorism in general terms.

With terrorist activity that cannot be classified as one form of action or activity, it is imperative to assign a definition that crystallizes and encompasses terrorist activities and groups as a whole; therefore, terrorism will be defined as "an act or action by an individual or group which are intended to cause fear or political unrest by unlawful force or a threat of an unlawful force." Though this definition seems open-ended, its ambiguity conveys that terrorism is not something that can be labeled. Terrorism and terrorist activity are unpredictable and unorthodox, and it is the combination of these two elements that make



the terrorist actions so devastating. To further probe how terrorism has evolved, contributing factors and motives of these organizations will be explored, along with primary and secondary motives used when partaking in terrorist activities.

Historically, terrorism has seen a paradigm shift in the last thirty years. Richardson explains:

In 1968, of the eleven known terrorist organizations, there were no religious affiliations with any of the group's motives or actions. By the mid-1990s, of the then fifty known groups, about a dozen had religious motivations linked to their actions. By 2004, seventy-seven terrorists groups designated by the U.S. Department of State had some mixture of political and religious motives. Of those groups, thirty seven were affiliated with Islamic extremists. (Richardson 2006, 61)

This raises the question: why are religious affiliations or religious motives driving the terrorist groups today, and what can be done to minimize and eliminate terrorism?

In most instances, terrorism is conceptualized as an ideology of an individual or groups of individuals on a quest to attain means that they feel cannot be accomplished in any other manner. Al-Qaeda is perhaps one of the best examples of an organized terrorist network that strikes with precision and immense impact upon its targets. This was not accomplished overnight, but has been evolving since the network's inception. The evolving ideology of Al-Qaeda and how it has managed to successfully continue with its terrorist acts deserves a brief

discussion though evaluation of its founding principles, views on democracy, and motivations behind the September 11 attacks.

Terrorist actions can also be measured by primary motives and secondary motives (Richardson 2006, xxii). Primary motives are those that are achieved by gaining independence from state or national rule and then replaced by religious law or groups. This type of motivation is distinct throughout organizations and not generally present. However, in the case of Al-Qaeda, it is clear that Al-Qaeda does not adhere to the laws of the nations it stems from nor the laws of the nations that provide it aid. It is this primary motive that has resulted in the violent attacks, such as September 11.

In several instances, terrorism was attributed to poverty, lack of education, and even a quest for world domination. Richardson states that terrorists' secondary motives are the 3 R's: "revenge, renown, and reaction" (Ibid, xxii). Richardson believes that terrorists' behavior can best be understood in terms of both long-term political motivations and more immediate motives. They want to exact revenge, to acquire glory, and force their adversary into a reaction (Ibid., xxii).

Richardson describes two types of terrorist organizations: temporal and transformational (Ibid., 12). Richardson believed that "temporal terrorist organizational goals could be met without overthrowing the existing political system" (Ibid., 13). Richardson

claims that terrorist organizations with temporal goals are open to negotiation, whereas organizations with transformational goals are not looking to negotiate but, instead, seeking to “satisfy demands by destroying the regional state system” (Ibid., 13). Sub-variables that often impact the success and growth of terrorist organizations, whether they are temporal or transformational, are often dependent on the organizations’ relationship to their community. Al-Qaeda has “conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mid-1990s using a series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and internet postings” (Blanchard 2007, 1). The support of the community that the terrorist organization is so-called “representing” not only furthers the organization’s cause, but transforms an ideology into a movement, with participants that are often willing to risk their lives in pursuit of accomplishing their means.

Richardson believes that “terrorism is the weapon of those who want to effect change, and to do so quickly, but lack the numbers either to prevail in a democratic system or to launch a viable military campaign” (Richardson 2006, 12). When taking into account the actions of Al-Qaeda, one must affirm with Richardson’s theory that the group is, in fact, an organization that seeks transformational change versus temporal change that can be accomplished without overthrowing the fundamental balance of power.

Since 9-11, there have been many claims for the necessity of policy change to respond to terrorism as quoted in *Wars on Terrorism and Iraq*: "Since September 11, 2001, it has become clear that responding to the demands of national and international security and those of human rights promotion requires significant rethinking of both policies and strategies" (Crahan, Goering, and Weiss 2004, 4). It is necessary to understand the history and formation of terrorist groups and how/why they form to make effective policy changes. To further understand and evaluate the relationship of U.S. policies and the threat and motivation behind terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda with Islamic origins, I will consider the beliefs of leaders such as Osama Bin Laden.

### **Al-Qaeda's Evolution and Osama Bin Laden**

"Al-Qaeda, meaning 'the base'," was created in 1989 as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Bin Laden and his colleagues began looking for new jihads" (BBC News Jul 20, 2004). Al-Qaeda is advanced, resourceful, and unconventional in its actions and structure. During its foundation, Al-Qaeda was comprised of mostly Afghan Arabs; now, it has cells that operate out of approximately 40-50 countries, which include areas of the Middle East, Asia, North America, and Europe. Cells that operate from cities such as London, Hamburg, Milan,

and Madrid are critical components of the terrorist network because they provide assistance in areas such as recruitment, fundraising, and planning operations.

Unlike the tightly-knit groups of the past, such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Abu Nidal group in the Middle East, Al-Qaeda is loosely knit. It operates across continents as a chain of interlocking networks. Individual groups or cells appear to have a high degree of autonomy, raising their own money, often through petty crime, and making contact with other groups only when necessary. (BBC News Jul 20, 2004)

This loose structure provides not only for elusive measures when looking to stop acts of terror from Al-Qaeda, but also adds a degree of difficulty when attempting to understand the motives of the organization explained Bevy:

Osama Bin Laden's beliefs are thought to have been formulated by his exposure to the teachings of conservative Islamist scholars in Saudi Arabia, as well as his work with Arab militants in Afghanistan who provided the ideological framework for his belief in the desirability of puritanical Salafist Islamic reform in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance in the face of the perceived aggression—a concept Al-Qaeda has since associated with a communally-binding Islamic principle known as 'defensive jihad.' (Bevy 2006, 16)

Bin Laden's opposition to foreign militaries was first noted in 1990 when he disapproved of military presence in Saudi Arabia after Iraq invaded Kuwait. As Blanchard notes, "Bin Laden used the Gulf War in 1991 as reasoning to renew defensive jihad and promote violence against Saudi Arabia and the U.S." (Blanchard 2007, 2). His public opposition of the royal Saudi family and their compliance with foreign

militaries led to his exile from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden did not approve of the Saudi government's cooperation in the matter because he felt Saudi Arabia, the birth place of Islam, was now working with an enemy, one he described as the "alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents" (Al Islah 1996, 2).

Though Bin Laden's direct interaction/opposition with the United States seemed to be based on the situation with Iraq and Kuwait, it was not the only ideological conflict he had with the United States and its dealings within Islamic regions. Bin Laden publically voiced his opinions of U.S. support for Israel and criticized the U.S. dealings with "massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina" (Ibid., 2).

Al-Qaeda's efforts to combat western oppression evolved from an ideology to a full-on attack. Listed below are some of the attacks linked to Al-Qaeda throughout the 1990s, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Each of the attacks listed were precise and had a deeper purpose beyond the obvious casualties. The attacks will be evaluated to track the devastation caused by Al-Qaeda leading up to September 11, 2001.

Table 1.1. Acts of Terrorism Linked to Al-Qaeda Pre-9/11 By Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Acts of Terrorism Linked to Al-Qaeda Pre-9/11</b>
1993	World trade center bombing in New York
1994	Bombing of Philippine airline
1995	Assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
1996	Attack on U.S. military housing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
1998	Bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
2000	Bombing attack on USS Cole

The Feb. 26, 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was carried out by Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Khaled Shaikh Mohammed, who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001 attacks. Prior to carrying out the attacks on the World Trade Center, Yousef did as follows:

. . . mailed letters to various New York newspapers, in which he claimed to belong to the Liberation Army, Fifth Battalion and demanded that the United States discontinue their aid in Israel, stop all diplomatic relations with Israel and vow not to interfere with any internal conflicts within Middle Eastern countries. (Coll 2004, 376)

Yousef's demands were not met and led to Yousef and his accomplices driving a Ryder truck filled with explosives and detonating it in the public parking garage, claiming the lives of 6 people and injuring 1,042.

The December 11, 1994 bombing of the Philippine airline was a test run for a plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II. The assassination of the pope would create the diversion Yousef was seeking, as a means to bomb United and Delta flights from Bangkok to the United States. Though the test run for Yousef's plan was effective in detonating a bomb on Philippine flight 434, killing the passenger sitting on the seat where Yousef had placed the bomb and injuring those in surrounding seats, the rest of the plan was not carried out due to a fire in Yousef's Manila apartment. Per Strasser, "Philippine National Police also uncovered plans of attacking CIA headquarters by flying planes into the Langley campus, which they turned over to the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]" (Strasser 2004, 443).

On June 25, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt while he was traveling to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for a summit of the Organization of African Unity. Mubarak's presidential motorcade was attacked, but he Mubarak ultimately escaped. The attack is believed to be linked to Al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Wright 2007, 242-244), and to be a



product of the inconsistent stance Mubarak has on the Palestine/Israel conflict. Mubarak supports Palestine, but has been noted for holding Hamas accountable for its actions during attacks when cease fires have been in effect. The weapons used during the attack were smuggled through Sudan, and both U.S. and Egyptian intelligence believe the Sudanese government was in compliance with the attack. The Sudanese government came into power after a coupe in 1989 denied the allegations of complying with the assassination plot.

Members of Hezbollah exploded a sewage truck adjacent to Building #131 on June 25, 1996 to inflict harm upon serviceman of the U.S. Air Force, as well as military personnel from other nationalities Risen and Perlez explained:

Osama Bin Laden was seen being congratulated on the day of the Khobar attack, and this raised the possibility that he may have helped the group, possibly by helping to obtain the explosives or the sophisticated timing device used to enable the escape of the perpetrators. According to classified evidence from the United States, it appears the government of Iran was the key sponsor of the incident, and several high ranking members of their military may have been involved. (Risen and Perlez June 23, 2001)

On August 2, 1998, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked with truck bombs that detonated within minutes of each other; the attacks were linked to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Bin Laden. This attack, similar to the prior attacks against the United

States, had a motive beyond casualties. As Lawrence Wright notes, "It is believed that the terrorist organizations were seeking to lure the United States into Afghanistan, which is known as the graveyard of empires" (Wright 2006, 272). By agitating and enticing the United States to pursue Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the underpowered extremists were seeking to use the landscape, climate, and regional awareness as an advantage to combat the superior military of the United States.

The attack on the USS Cole took place on October 12, 2000. This attack was achieved using a bomb that exploded on the ship's port side, leaving a hole measuring 40'x 40'. Al-Qaeda's advancement of bomb use now became a threat on land and at sea. A Congressional Report addressing the attack did not assign blame for the attack, but identified that the attack provides basis for implementing and improving anti-terrorist measures. It was later discovered that Al-Qaeda was responsible. An article by Enver Masud notes:

John Lehman, secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, in his op-ed article of October 15 in the Washington Post, wrote that the attack 'was a well-planned act of war by obviously brave and disciplined warriors.'

The values these 'warrior' and ordinary citizens in the Middle East, oppose is Western greed that robs them of their freedom, resources and opportunities—and the U.S. bias toward Israel that damages U.S. interests in the region.

U.S. forces, of which the USS Cole was a part, enforce crippling sanctions and the US/UK self-declared 'no-fly zones' against Iraq—which the UN says have resulted in the deaths of

at least one million citizens of Iraq, including at least 500,000 children under the age of 5. (Masud 2000)

By examining these attacks, a variety of patterns with Al-Qaeda and its evolution emerges, as it is apparent that the issue of Palestine and Israel is a major factor for why these Islamic extremists partake in terrorist activity. Another critical component to assess from probing into these attacks is how dynamic Al-Qaeda is as a network, often teaming with other terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Sudanese government, and the Iran government. Al-Qaeda's ability to reach such a wide array of Islamic extremists intensifies its ability to partake in attacks throughout the world.

Terrorism stemming from the Middle East dates back as early as the 1900s.

President [Woodrow] Wilson supported the Zionist movement of the Jewish population to transform Palestine into a Jewish state. . . . Wilson's approach to international affairs was rooted in his understanding that classic colonialism no longer represented the wave of the future. U.S. policy soon turned to rely instead on unofficial and unacknowledged influence to win and maintain control of dependent governments, compliant populations and accessible resources in the former colonies. (Bennis 2003, 24)

David Hunter Miller, Wilson's advisor at the time, said that "the rule of self-determination would prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine" (Bennis 2003, 24). This led to the American consultants King and Crane, also known as the King Crane Commission, to research and

determine whether they advocated or denounced the proposed Zionists movement. Bennis advises:

Much of the American team's work focused on assessing local opinions of the Balfour Declaration. The Commission found that, although they started their work 'predisposed' to favor the Zionist movement, the 'actual facts in Palestine' led them to oppose London's plan for allowing virtually unlimited immigration of European Jews into Palestine. Their report indicates that 'in the Commission's conferences with the Jewish representatives ... the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non Jewish inhabitants of Palestine.' (Bennis 2003, 24)

This issue has laid the foundation for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda providing historical background to the western oppression they fear most. An excerpt found from Bin Laden's fatwa (a religious opinion concerning Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) reads as follows:

For more than seven years, the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people, using the peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless....

These crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger and Muslims. And *ulema* [Muslim scholars] have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the *jihad* [Holy War] is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. On that basis,

and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following *fatwa* to all Muslims: The ruling is to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it, in order to liberate the Al Aqsa mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] .... This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God.

. . . We call on every Muslim who believes in God and wished to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

(September 11 News)

### **Al-Qaeda as a Global Threat**

Al-Qaeda has indubitably evolved into a global threat. The Department of State website contains a list that describes the interest of Al-Qaeda in certain regions, as well as the position the United States has on the current situation. Countries such as Tajakistan, Somolia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq all share commonalities of being impoverished regions with dominantly Muslim populations; they are also regions where Al-Qaeda can establish training camps with little or no detection, and where their geographic location can provide Al-Qaeda with means to move freely in and out of the regions. Listed below are the regions with the U.S. position on the regions, as well as reasoning for Bin Laden's interest in those areas. This will provide insight into why Bin Laden opposes the United States and its principles.

#### ***Tajikistan***

**U.S. Position on the Situation:** The Taliban-allied Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a U.S. government-declared terrorist organization formerly active in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, has also been greatly diminished as a threat to Tajikistan's domestic stability. Rampant illicit trafficking of Afghan opium and heroin through Tajikistan remains a serious long-term threat to Tajikistan's stability and development, fostering corruption, violent crime, HIV/AIDS, and economic distortions (U.S. Department of State, *Tajikistan*, 2009, under "Foreign Relations").

**Bin Laden's Reasoning for Opposition:** Bin Laden does not approve of U.S. interference with the ongoing issues of Tajikistan because of the country's dominant Muslim presence. Tajikistan is comprised of 95% Sunni Muslim, 3% Shi'a Muslim, and 2% other of other religions (U.S. Department of State, *Tajikistan* 2009, under "Foreign Relations").

### ***Somalia***

**U.S. Position on the Situation:** Although the United States never formally severed diplomatic relations with Somalia, the U.S. Embassy in Somalia has been closed since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. The United States maintains regular dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other key stakeholders in Somalia through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Consular coverage for Somalia is maintained by U.S. Embassy Nairobi, while

American Citizens Services in the self-declared Republic of Somaliand are provided by the U.S. Embassy in Djibouti (U.S. Department of State, *Somalia* 2010, under "U.S.-Somali Relations").

**Laden's Reasoning for Opposition:** The Muslim population of Somalia is a staggering 99.9%, which explains Bin Laden's feelings of obligation to include Somalia in his "defensive jihad." Bin Laden released an audio tape in 1998, notifying Islamic extremists in Somalia: "You are the first line of defense for the Islamic world in its southwestern part; and your patience and resolve supports your brothers in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Islamic Maghreb, Pakistan, and the rest of the fields of Jihad" (Kennedy *The Huffington Post March 19, 2009*). Bin Laden believes that Somalia is in danger because of attacks from United States' allies, such as Ethiopia, when they removed the Union because of suspected ties to Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden uses events such as these to build rhetoric and support the defensive jihad he has declared.

### ***Bosnia-Herezgovina***

**U.S. Position on the Situation:** The 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the crucial participation of the United States in brokering the 1995 Dayton Accords. After leading the diplomatic and military effort to secure the Dayton agreement, the United States has continued to lead the effort to ensure its implementation. The United

States maintains command of the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. It has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to help with reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and military reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The U.S. Agency for International Development has played a large role in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, including programs in economic development and reform, democratic reform (media, elections, etc.), infrastructure development, and training programs for Bosnian professionals, among others. There are also many non-governmental organizations that have likewise played significant roles in the reconstruction (U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2010, under "U.S.-Bosnian Relations").

**Bin Laden's Reasoning for Opposition:** Bin Laden's followers have made headlines on several instances with celebrations in Bosnia following successful attacks on the United States. However, unlike Somalia and Tajikistan, Bosnia is not a dominant Muslim nation. The U.S. State Department estimates that only 40% of the population is Muslim. Bosnia creates an opportunity for Bin Laden to expand his following due to the country's lack of government control. The TFG has been attempting to establish order but has limited resources and control measures in place.



## ***Iraq/Kuwait***

**U.S. Position on the Situation:** The focus of U.S. policy in Iraq remains helping the Iraqi people build a constitutional, representative government that respects the rights of all Iraqis and has security forces capable of maintaining order and preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists and foreign fighters. The ultimate goal is an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, secure, and an ally in the war against terrorism, with institutions capable of providing just governance and security for all Iraqis. U.S. forces remain in Iraq (under a UN Security Council mandate) as part of the Multi-National Force-Iraq to assist the government of Iraq in training and partnership to combat forces that seek to derail Iraq's progression toward full democracy. The U.S. government is carrying out a multibillion-dollar program to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq (U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2010, under "U.S.-Iraqi Relations").

**Bin Laden's Reasoning for Opposition:** Similar to most of the other regions, Bin Laden expresses interest in Iraq and Kuwait because of their dominant Muslim population. Iraq alone has a Muslim population of approximately 97% (U.S. Department of State, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2010, under "People").

Furthermore, it would be more than fair to presume that the actions of the United States dealing in matters with Iraq and Kuwait were driven by more than the U.S. humanitarian interest of preserving the lives of the Kuwaiti people. During the President Bill Clinton administration, the United States, in cooperation with the UN Security Council, established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

UNSCOM was set up to implement the non-nuclear provisions of the resolution and to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear areas [by demanding Iraq's full compliance with providing] on a regular basis, full, complete, correct and timely information on activities, sites, facilities, material or other items, both military and civilian, that might be used for purposes prohibited under resolutions 687 and 707. Furthermore, the Special Commission had the right to carry out inspections, at any time and without hindrance, of any site, facility, activity, material or other items in Iraq. It could conduct unannounced inspections and inspections at short notice. It may inspect on the ground or by aerial surveillance any number of declared or designated sites or facilities. (United Nations Special Commission)

UNSCOM, though successful in its mandate of locating and destroying weapons of mass destruction, had its share of controversy associated with its operations and intentions in Iraq, with reports of spying on Saddam Hussein and his guards, a clear violation of the UN resolution. Reports from both UNSCOM and IAEA, for the most part, affirmed the Iraqi cooperation in dealing with inspections of facilities when requested. As Bennis notes, "It turned out that UNSCOM inspectors had provided Washington and Tel Aviv with intelligence materials whose value lay not in helping to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons, but in overthrowing the Iraqi government" (Bennis 2003, 70).

It is controversial issues such as these that fuel terrorist organizations' quest to eliminate western influence and interaction within predominately Muslim areas. In each of the cases listed earlier

referencing the position of the United States and Bin Laden, it is apparent that Bin Laden uses predominately Muslim regions to unite his terrorist networks by proclaiming it is the will of god to defend the western interference that is detrimental to the furthering of Muslim nations.

In their quest to eliminate U.S. intervention of any kind in these regions, Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden launched numerous terrorist attacks. Bin Laden continues to attack U.S. targets in unorthodox manners, as evidenced by crashing passenger planes into civilian buildings on the September 11, 2001 attacks. Though most Islamic regions and governments have disapproved of Bin Laden's actions, it is apparent that his supporters are willing to stop at nothing to accomplish their mission. The attacks listed below are some of the activities that have been linked to Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden. The attacks were all well-planned and targeted with support from Islamic extremists:

- An Islamic extremist perpetrated the December 1992 attempted bombings against some 100 U.S. servicemen in Aden, Somalia, who were billeted there to support UN relief operations. The extremists claimed that Bin Laden financed their group (Central Intelligence Agency Report 1996, 7)
- A joint Egyptian-Saudi investigation revealed in May 1993 that Bin Laden's businesses interests helped funnel money to Egyptian extremists, who used the cash to buy unspecified equipment, printing presses, and weapons (Central Intelligence Agency 1996, 7)

- On August 7, 1998, two bombs exploded simultaneously at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, 213 people died and 11 were killed in Tanzania. According to *Newsweek*, U.S. intelligence intercepted a mobile phone conversation between two of Bin Laden's lieutenants that implicated them in the embassy bombings (*Cosmopolis Magazine* 2001, 49)
- On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four passenger planes, two from American Airlines and two from United Airlines. In an unprecedented act of terrorism, the hijackers crashed two of them into New York City's 110-story twin towers of the World Trade Center, killing over 5,000 civilians. One American Airlines plane crashed into the Pentagon, killing more than 100 people. The fourth plane crashed in a rural area in Pennsylvania; the passengers are believed to have hindered the hijackers who were planning to attack another building in Washington. Bin Laden is suspected to be the key financier and instigator of the terrorist attacks (*Cosmopolis Magazine* 2001, 49)

Though the attacks of September 11 were intended to build credibility for terrorist movements and follow Bin Laden's orders for Muslims to kill Americans, by no means did every Muslim follow such an order. There are currently 1.2 billion Muslims in the world and only a few thousand Islamic terrorists (Richardson 2006, 61). However, there was some degree of unexpected success from the September 11 attacks, namely a major increase in the education of the Muslim religion. Although the initial devastation took the lives of thousands, the interest the event caused in Islam impacted millions. Americans flocked to bookstores to buy copies of the Koran and books about Islam

(Ibid., 63); people read about Islam in an effort to become more educated on the religion of the perpetrators of the attacks.

### **Aero-terrorism**

It is not just an increase in terrorist organizations that leads us to believe that this is a trend continuing down the wrong path, but research on aero-terrorism provides similar results. Airplanes have long been used for terrorist actions dating back to 1931 when the first hijacking, or then-known "sky-jacking," occurred (U.S. House of Representatives 1996, 36). The significant impact of aero-terrorism was realized in the late 1960s when the number of hijackings began to rise at an astronomical rate. There were 88 more commercial hijackings in 1969 than in 1966. The hijackings were used as means to escape unwanted circumstances, instill terror, and extort money. The number of hijackings decreased significantly, however, in the following decade due to the increased security measures that had been implemented. In 1968, the FAA became involved in airplane security, along with its environmental and safety duties. All of these actions were aimed at providing safer travel for passengers.

The FAA's role has evolved since its inception, expanding to include the determent of terrorist activities. Many of the ways the United States deals with terrorists and terrorist activities have also

evolved to respond to the ever-changing demands of innovative terrorists. September 11, 2001 devastated the United States, who had created agencies and policies to deal with such a large-scale terrorist threat. This following section will discuss the U.S. policies that were in place prior to and post-September 11, 2001 and those implemented as a result of September 11. This analysis will require research into terrorist attacks both before and after September 11, as well as the U.S. response to those attacks, in an effort to measure the effectiveness of the United States in combating and/or deterring terrorism.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

Counterterrorism policies prior to September 11, 2001 were comprised of policies and procedures set forth to deter such actions from occurring; these policies were developed as more reactive to events rather than preemptive. This approach had been in effect dating back to the skyjackings of the 1960s when policy developed as “policing” of terrorist activity and threats. This policing approach intended on preventing acts of terrorism by implementing control measures that strengthened security through fostering and identifying agencies tasked to specific threat areas and responding when incidents occurred. The evolution of this practice correlates with the constant evolution of terrorist threats to respond and deter new threats as they became more imminent.

#### **June 21, 1995 Memo on Terrorism**

A memorandum from the White House to the Vice President; Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury; Secretary of Defense; Attorney General; Secretary of Health and Human Services; Secretary of Transportation; Secretary of Energy Administrator; Environmental Protection Agency; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Director, Central Intelligence; Director, U.S. Information

Agency; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency on June 21, 1995, stated that the U.S. policy on counterterrorism is a two-pronged approach: to reduce the vulnerabilities of terrorist attacks at home and abroad and to deter terrorist attacks and limit the support and capabilities of their sponsors. This memorandum identified the U.S. position on terrorism and stated that the United States would not comply with acts of terrorism or terrorist threats. It also stated that "the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks" (Presidential Decision Directive, *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*). In addition to presenting the U.S. counterterrorism policy, this document identified the agencies responsible for responding to situations in the United States and abroad. This memorandum is included below since it is used to evaluate the policies and procedures utilized in response to terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001:

It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or



assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.

We shall work closely with friendly governments in carrying out our counterterrorism policy and will support Allied and friendly governments in combating terrorist threats against them.

Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions. It is the policy of the United States not to make concessions to terrorists.

To ensure that the United States is prepared to combat domestic and international terrorism in all its forms, I direct the following steps be taken.

*1. Reducing our Vulnerabilities*

The United States shall reduce its vulnerabilities to terrorism, at home and abroad.

It shall be the responsibility of all Department and Agency heads to ensure that their personnel and facilities, and the people and facilities under their jurisdiction, are fully protected against terrorism. With regard to ensuring security:

The Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer, shall chair a Cabinet Committee to review the vulnerability to terrorism of government facilities in the United States and critical national infrastructure and make recommendations to me and the appropriate Cabinet member or Agency head;

The Director, FBI, as head of the investigative agency for terrorism, shall reduce vulnerabilities by an expanded program of counterterrorism;

The Secretary of State shall reduce vulnerabilities affecting the security of all personnel and facilities at non-military U.S. Government installations

abroad and affecting the general safety of American citizens abroad);

The Secretary of Defense shall reduce vulnerabilities affecting the security of all U.S. military personnel (except those assigned to diplomatic missions) and facilities);

The Secretary of Transportation shall reduce vulnerabilities affecting the security of all airports in the U.S. and all aircraft and passengers and all maritime shipping under U.S. flag or registration or operating within the territory of the United States and shall coordinate security measures for rail, highway, mass transit and pipeline facilities);

The Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in addition to the latter's overall responsibilities as the chief law enforcement official, shall use all legal means available to exclude from the United States persons who pose a terrorist threat and deport or otherwise remove from the United States any such aliens.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall reduce vulnerabilities by preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, by protecting the President and other officials against terrorist attack and through enforcement of laws controlling movement of assets, and export from or import into the United States of goods and services, subject to jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury;

The Director, Central Intelligence shall lead the efforts of the Intelligence Community to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through an aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12333.

## *2. Deterring Terrorism*

The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors. Our actions will reduce the capabilities and support available to terrorists.

Within the United States, we shall vigorously apply U.S. laws and seek new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States or using it as a base for recruitment, training, fund raising or other related activities.

*Return of Indicted Terrorists to the U.S. for Prosecution:* We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. When terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter of the highest priority and shall be a continuing central issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them. Where we do not have adequate arrangements, the Departments of State and Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where possible and appropriate, through negotiation and conclusion of new extradition treaties.

If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the procedures outlined in NSD-77, which shall remain in effect.

*State Support and Sponsorship:* Foreign governments assist terrorists in a variety of ways.

*3. Enhancing Counterterrorism Capabilities:* The Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Energy and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, FBI shall ensure that their organizations' counterterrorism capabilities within

their present areas of responsibility are well managed, funded and exercised.

#### *4. Responding to Terrorism*

We shall have the ability to respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism directed against us wherever it occurs, to protect Americans, arrest or defeat the perpetrators, respond with all appropriate instruments against the sponsoring organizations and governments and provide recovery relief to victims, as permitted by law.

*5. Lead Agency Responsibilities:* This directive validates and reaffirms existing lead agency responsibilities for all facets of the United States counterterrorism effort. Lead agencies are those that have the most direct role in and responsibility for implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, as set forth in this Directive. Lead agencies will normally be designated as follows:

The Department of State is the lead agency for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory, other than incidents on U.S. flag vessels in international waters. The State Department shall act through U.S. ambassadors as the on-scene coordinators for the U.S. Government. Once military force has been directed, however, the National Command Authority shall exercise control of the U.S. military force.

*6. Interagency Support:* To ensure that the full range of necessary expertise and capabilities are available to the on-scene coordinator, there shall be a rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST). The State Department shall be responsible for leading and managing the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) in foreign incidents. The FBI shall be responsible for the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) in domestic incidents. The DEST shall consist only of those agencies needed to respond to the specific requirements of the incident. Membership in the two teams shall include modules for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, biological or chemical threats. The Defense Department shall provide timely transportation for ESTs.

7. *Transportation - related terrorism*: The Federal Aviation Administration has exclusive responsibility in instances of air piracy for the coordination of any law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the UPS. as defined in public law. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, shall establish and maintain procedures, in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense, and Transportation, to ensure the efficient resolution of terrorist hijackings. These procedures shall be based on the principle of lead agency responsibility for command, control and rules of engagement.

8. *Consequence Management*: The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall ensure that the Federal Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism directed against large populations in the United States, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. FEMA shall ensure that States' response plans are adequate and their capabilities are tested. The State Department shall develop a plan with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and DOD to Provide assistance to foreign populations so victimized.

9. *Costs*: Agencies directed to participate in the resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations shall bear the costs of their participation, unless otherwise directed by me.

10. *Weapons of Mass Destruction*

The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S." (Presidential Decision Directive, *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*)

## **Examples of Terrorist Actions and U.S. Responses From 1998 – 2001**

This section will analyze a terrorist attack from Al-Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001 to explore how the United States responded to the attack. The CRS Congressional Reports will be evaluated to analyze whether the response was effective in combating or deterring terrorist. The afore-detailed codified document of the U.S. position on terrorism and the supporting agencies responsible for combating and deterring such actions will also be used. In addition, the September 11, 2001 attacks will also be analyzed to assess the changes in policy and procedures to determine whether they have impacted terrorist activity. At the conclusion of the two studies, it will be determined if the United States was successful in combating and deterring terrorist.

Table 2.1. Acts of Terror Linked to Al-Qaeda Pre-9/11 By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Case Studies of Acts of Terror Linked to Al-Qaeda</b>
1998	Bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
2001	Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon through hijacked planes

### **Bombings of U.S. Embassies Kenya and Tanzania**

On August 7, 1998, two bombs exploded almost simultaneously at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It is thought that these attacks were premeditated, dating back to 1993. The two 1998

bombings claimed the lives of more than 300 people and wounded more than 5,000, with the majority of the casualties being in Kenya. Around the times of the attacks, Bin Laden released a video tape to ABC claiming, "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa." This attack was the first of many that began to re-shape the thinking and policies used to respond to terrorist and acts of terrorism.

Prior to the attacks on the embassies, the U.S. role in combating terrorism was decisively more defensive than preemptive. However, because of the extensive planning and precision of these attacks, the United States began to evolve its policies to respond to such sophisticated terrorist threats. The CRS Report for Congress, updated September 1, 1998, identified the situation in Kenya and Tanzania along with some key changes being made to policies.

The same day as the missile strike, the President (Clinton) signed an executive order E.O. 13099, [63 Fed. Reg. 45167] which would freeze any assets owned by Bin Laden, specific associates, their self-proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and prohibiting U.S. individuals and firms from doing business with them. Bin Laden's network of affiliated organizations pledged retaliation; the State Department issued an overseas travel advisory warning for U.S. citizens, and security has been heightened, particularly at embassies, airports and domestic federal installations and facilities. (Congressional Research Service Report 1988, Perl 4)

This was the first time the United States had launched and acknowledged the following four characteristics identified in the Congressional Report:

- Launched and acknowledged a preemptive strike against a terrorist organization or network
- Launched such a strike within the territory of a state that presumably is not conclusively, actively, and directly to blame for the action triggering retaliation
- Launched military strikes at multiple terrorist targets within the territory of more than one foreign nation
- Attacked a target where the avowed goal was not to attack a single individual terrorist, but an organizational infrastructure instead. Moreover, in the case of the facility in Sudan, the target was characterized as one that poses a longer term danger rather than an immediate threat (Congressional Research Service Report 1988, Perl 5).

In addition to the new approach of responding to the terrorist attacks, the United States began evaluating the terrorist landscape as a global threat. This new thinking differed from the common diplomatic approach of economic and law enforcement agencies preserving national security and utilizing military strikes and covert operations as the appropriate means of deterrence or, as mentioned earlier, policing terrorist attacks. Combating terrorist cells, networks, and organizations required more involvement of intelligence agencies, as well DOD, transforming the response to a more militant “boots-on-the-ground” approach.



This new approach was to be used with or without compliance of other nations that may support or harbor terrorists. The United States would not stop at any means to pursue terrorists when national security was at stake. This train of thought required the United States to accept that as the nation is leading the anti-terrorism effort, it would need to take the financial and retaliatory burden that accompanies such militant actions.

In addition to this new way of thinking, President Clinton also launched Operation Infinite Reach in response to the terrorist bombings. The operation was a missile strike from the United States that targeted terrorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. A notable target of these missile strikes was the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which had been suspected of producing Iraqi nerve gas for Bin Laden. The U.S. strike was successful in destroying the factory, but the United States may have reacted too quickly. It was later found that there was no conclusive evidence of the factory being linked to terrorist networks or Bin Laden. This resulted in an outrage by the Sudanese government, who requested an apology from the Clinton administration, as well as the George W. Bush administration. No apology was issued. The factory was the main source of pharmaceuticals in Sudan, and the attacks were even more devastating because of the unavailability of medicine to the people of Sudan.

In the aftermath after the attacks, there was a great deal of controversy surrounding the United States. Several newspapers around the world discredited U.S. intelligence for destroying the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, including the *New York Times*, which wrote, "The chemical precursor of a nerve agent that Washington claimed was made at a Sudanese chemical factory it destroyed in missile attack last week could be used for commercial products" (Myers and Weiner 1998).

In addition to the lack of support from publications throughout the world, the United States was also scrutinized by public figures, academic leaders, and subject matter experts. The German Ambassador to Sudan claimed that the missile strikes from the United States would be responsible for thousands of deaths in Sudan, due to the unavailability of medicine. Most of the other claims from academia and experts questioned the soil sample used to justify the strikes. U.S. officials claimed the agents found could only be used for production of nerve gas, but there are several other compounds that have similar-make ups and can be used for agricultural purposes. Without definite insight into how the samples were obtained and examined, it remains questionable if the agents found in the soil sample were solely of EMPTA, the compound used to make nerve gas (Gabb 1998).

Similar to the controversy surrounding the missile strikes in Sudan, the 75 cruise missiles that were aimed at terrorist camps in Afghanistan were also questioned as to whether the targets were actually terrorist networks. The United States claimed the targets were terrorist training camps where Bin Laden was suspected of being a few hours prior to the strikes. The strikes were successful in destroying camps such as Al Badr controlled by Bin Laden and Harkat-ul-Majahideen controlled by Pakistan. Pakistani newspapers claimed that the camp controlled by Pakistan was not to fight Americans, but Indian troops in Kashmir.

President Clinton's intention in attacking the camps as an effort to pursue Bin Laden ultimately was ineffective in assassinating him. This led to the initiative later known as Operation Infinite Resolve, developed by the National Security Council's National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, who proposed there should be follow-on strikes to continue pursuing Bin Laden and his terrorist network.

Clarke prepared a paper for a political-military plan he called 'Delenda' from the Latin term 'to destroy.' Its military component envisioned an ongoing campaign of regular, small strikes, occurring from time to time whenever target information was ripe, in order to underscore the message of a concerted, systematic, and determined effort to dismantle the infrastructure of the Bin Laden terrorist network. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 3)

Though Clarke's plan was evaluated, it was not implemented. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Allen Holmes, also developed a very aggressive strategy to combat terrorism, which was also deemed too hostile. This strategy outlined an eight-part plan to respond to hostile terrorists attacks with militant actions.

The President and his advisors decided to continue pursuing Bin Laden with military force as needed, rather than continuing with ongoing strikes. There were several contributing factors, such as cost, time, and questionable intelligence that deterred them from conducting ongoing strikes.

This first case identifies the emphasis the United States places on acts of terrorism and terrorist networks, along with its willingness to explore various unconventional options of deterring and combating terrorist activities. It also identifies the global impact of actions taken by the United States, as evidenced by the measures taken in retaliation of the embassy bombings in Sudan and Tanzania.

### **Commercial Airliner Attacks of September 11, 2001**

September 11, 2001 marked a day in American history that stands as the biggest terrorist attack on the United States. This attack, unlike any other, used commercial airlines that had been hijacked as weapons. On the morning of September 11, 2001, two planes crashed

into the World Trade Center buildings in New York City. Within minutes, another crashed into the Pentagon building in Washington D.C., resulting in massive damage and claiming the lives of thousands. A fourth plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania and was thought to be headed toward Washington D.C. to strike another American landmark.

This attack was another targeted operation from Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The effects and vulnerabilities realized after the attacks resulted in the United States making numerous changes to the existing counterterrorism policies. The 9/11 Commission Report will be used as the primary documentation used to analyze the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the basis for our analysis of the U.S. government's response. The report is the first to talk about the attacks in detail, identifying the hijacking and tactics used by the terrorists to take over the planes, as well as the actions taken by the FAA and other government agencies in their efforts to diffuse and react to the situation.

The most significant of changes to U.S. policy was the U.S. Patriot Act, implemented to remove communication barriers between law enforcement and the intelligence community. The Patriot Act was approved shortly after September 11, 2001, without any House or Senate report, which is deemed normative to identify areas of concern within new legislation being implemented.

The Patriot Act made changes to several important statutes that pertain to areas such as the Wiretap Statute (Title III), Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute, Money Laundering Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, Money Laundering Control Act, Bank Secrecy Act, Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. These changes granted the government access to information such as incoming and outgoing calls, student records, and tracing internet activity on persons of interest. These new amendments to the Patriot Act enabled agencies to obtain information by simply stating it is part of an ongoing criminal investigation without having to present any probable cause. This section will explore cases from the Patriot Act to determine their effectiveness in deterring and combating terrorism. Cases that enabled authorities to prevent terrorist attacks will first be discussed, followed by cases that question the provisions of the Patriot Act and their effectiveness.

On September 20, 2009, Najibullah Zazi was arrested on charges of misleading investigators. Zazi, an airport shuttle driver from Denver, is believed to be part of a terror cell that operated out of Colorado in plots to attack the New York subway system. The FBI was able to prevent Zazi from taking violent action by utilizing the Patriot Act's

"roving wiretaps." The FBI began to monitor Zazi when he traveled to tribal areas of Pakistan where officials believe he received training from Al Qaeda. Probing Zazi's email revealed nine handwritten notes on how to make weapons of mass destruction originating from Pakistan. FBI officials discovered large quantities of hydrogen peroxide and acetone purchases from beauty stores and found residues of the substances while they followed Zazi from Colorado to New York in a rental car. It is suspected that Zazi was attempting to build a bomb using the ingredients purchased. When the arrest was made in New York, the FBI also found scales and batteries suspected to be part of the terror plot with Zazi's fingerprints (*Washington Examiner*, 2009).

Roving wiretaps enable law enforcement to continue monitoring a person of interest without having to obtain a warrant from a judge every time. This is critical when individuals know they are being watched and continuously change phones or email accounts. Under the traditional statute known as Title III wiretaps, law enforcement officials were required to have a warrant for each number or account they wished to monitor. By utilizing the roving wiretaps as approved in the Patriot Act, law enforcement no longer had to wait for another warrant to monitor the same individual suspected of being a terrorist. In Zazi's case, this proved to be imperative as FBI officials monitored Zazi's calls and internet activity. In one of the intercepted calls between Zazi and

Queens Imam Ahmed Wais Afzali, Afzali warned Zazi that he was being watched by the FBI. This prompted the FBI to arrest Zazi sooner than anticipated in fear of a terrorist attack in New York that could have had devastating casualties in the city's subways.

This case without a doubt signifies the benefits of provisions made proceeding September 11, 2001 to protect citizens on American soil. Without the ability to utilize roving wiretaps, FBI efforts would not be responsive enough to detect such a threat in time to stop the terrorist act.

When evaluating the U.S. position on terrorism, it is evident that it has evolved from an approach that was more reactive or policing in deterring and combating terrorist threats and actions to that of a militant approach seeking to eliminate terrorism. Assessing the cases discussed in this thesis prove that this transition has taken place to respond to a threat from an enemy who is also evolving and becoming more organized and precise with its attacks.

The retaliation from the United States for these terrorist attacks was successful in breaking up Al-Qaeda cells, closing down front companies, and freezing some of Al-Qaeda's assets. However, the terrorist threats linked to the group only seemed to increase in the 5 years after September 11, 2001.



Table 2.2. Acts of Terror Linked to Al-Qaeda Post-9/11 By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror Linked to Al-Qaeda</b>
2001	Attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight by Richard Reid (the "shoe bomber")
2002	Firebombing of synagogue in Bjerba, Tunisia
2002	Bombings at night club on island of Bali, Indonesia
2002	Bombing at Paradise hotel, Mombasa, Kenya
2003	Riyadh compound bombings Saudi Arabia
2003	Suicide attacks against French tanker MV Limburg
2003	Suicide bombing of Marriot Hotel, South Jakarta, Indonesia
2003	Bombing in Casablanca, Morocco
2003	Truck bombings of London underground and bus
2006	Transatlantic aircraft plot (liquid explosives) foiled

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **"COMBATING" AND "DETECTING" TERRORISM**

"Combating" and "deterring" terrorism are often terms used collectively to describe preemptive and retaliatory actions. However, they have distinct differences when examined closely. To combat terrorism means inherently emphasizing a military strike or action taken against groups that have committed terrorist acts against the United States, while deterring terrorism refers to the collection of intelligence and actions resulting in the deterrence of the terrorist act from occurring. This section will evaluate the cases examined earlier to determine whether the United States was successful in combating or deterring terrorism.

As noted in the earlier chapters, terrorism is not a new threat to the United States and combating terrorism has been a priority dating back to the aero-terrorism of the 1960s. The U.S. response to the hijacking of planes on September 11 was reactive in response to the epidemic of planes being hijacked at the time. Its position to assign responsibility to reduce terrorist threats in the air resulted in the FAA implementing policies and procedures that significantly reduced the number of planes being hijacked. A change such as locking cabin doors to prevent access to the pilots was one of the major implementations of this time and is still used in flight today.

The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, signed into law by President Richard Nixon, also implemented many important changes. The law states:

Under its provisions, the act:

- Authorized the President to suspend air transportation between the United States and nations that aided terrorist groups who used the illegal seizure of aircraft as an instrument of policy.
- Empowered the Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions against the carriers of nations that failed to maintain minimum security standards in the transportation of persons, property, and mail, as required by the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
- Required air carriers to refuse to carry persons unwilling to submit to personal search, and any article that a passenger did not allow to be inspected.
- Required FAA to continue in effect passenger and baggage screening procedures.
- Allowed FAA to use, for as long as needed, Federal personnel, including FAA personnel, to supplement state, local, and private law enforcement officers in airport security programs. (In anticipation of this responsibility, FAA had established a new unit, the Civil Aviation Security Service, out of what had been the anti-hijacking and cargo security section of the Office of Air Transportation Security. (Federal Aviation Administration Historical Chronology, under "1974")

The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974's "passenger screening program and other precautionary measures continued to be effective in combating the hijacking menace. For the second consecutive year, not one successful hijacking occurred on a scheduled U.S. air carrier aircraft" (Federal Aviation Administration Historical Chronology, under "1974").

In this instance, it is apparent that deterrence was the appropriate method of response. Since the FAA's involvement in air safety, the number of hijackings decreased significantly through changes in policy.

Next, the actions of Al-Qaeda pre- and post-September 11, 2001 will be examined. The U.S. response to these actions carries significant change in responding to terrorist actions as mentioned in Chapter 1; it has transformed the traditional thinking of deterring terrorist actions into combating terrorist actions and threats. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in military strikes against Al-Qaeda, along with sanctions on Bin Laden's funding to organizations believed to back the terrorist network.

After the military strikes that targeted controversial terrorist camps, Al-Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 with airplanes hijacked and aimed at hitting historical landmarks and

killing thousands of civilians. Again, the United States retaliated with military force and deployed troops to Afghanistan in search of Bin Laden and his agents. The United States has successfully captured several high-ranking Islamic extremists and continues to do so even now, eight years after the attack. On several instances, there have been plots against the United States that have been discovered prior to the events actually occurring, by using intelligence gathered through provisions utilized in the Patriot Act. Yet, the threat from Al-Qaeda is still present.

Examining these cases against whether they are combating or deterring terrorism enables us to question which method seems to be more effective when dealing with terrorist groups. Trager and Zagorcheva states:

Many scholars and policymakers argue that deterrence strategies have no significant role to play in counterterrorism. The case against deterrence rests on three pillars: terrorists are irrational; they value their political ends far above anything deterring states could hold at risk; and they are impossible to find. Each pillar is either incorrect or its implications for deterrence have been misunderstood. Under certain conditions, deterrence is preferable to the use of force. Analysis of the structure of terrorist networks and the processes that produce attacks, as well as the multiple objectives of terrorist organizations, suggests that some deterrence strategies are more effective than those of the past. In particular, many terrorist groups and elements of terrorist support networks can likely be deterred from cooperating with the most threatening terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. Although the use of force against multiple groups creates common interests among them, an appropriate

deterrence strategy could fracture global terrorist networks.  
(Winter 2005/06, 87-127)

### **MILF Policy**

The current U.S. policy toward the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) provides promise and understanding on potential approaches of building a relationship with terrorist groups, by understanding their infrastructure, processes, and reasoning behind attacks. The United States got involved with the MILF and ABU Sayyaf Group in an effort to provide assistance in the Philippines against a group that had known ties with Al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists. Upon its arrival in the Philippines, the United States successfully engaged the militant extremists and diffused the situation enough to began peace talks with the group.

The Bush Administration's initiative in offering 350 U.S. personnel to conduct civic action projects on Basilan reportedly proved popular with the people on the island and probably helped to neutralize public support for Abu Sayyaf on the island. The civic action projects (road building, medical care, and well-digging) may have influenced a less negative reaction of Filipino Muslims elsewhere to the U.S. military role, and the favorable Filipino media coverage appears to have helped President Arroyo contain the critics of the United States within the Manila political elite. (Congressional Service Report by Niksch for Congress 2007)

This type of diplomatic approach is critical in establishing peace and order with terrorist networks. Through the relationship with the Islamic extremist groups in the Philippines, the United States has also

gained intelligence against other terrorists organizations and created a venue for these groups to align themselves in a manner that creates stability and longevity for their beliefs and the people around them, instead of encouraging alliances with other terrorist cells, which would undoubtedly lead to an increased global threat.

### **A Matrix of Ideology**

Assessing the cases discussed in chapter 1, along with the effectiveness in the U.S. dealings with the MILF and ABU Sayyaf Group, provides evidence that combative and deterrence strategies alone are not effective in dealing with terrorist groups. Instead, there needs to be a matrix of the two ideologies to truly deter and combat terrorism. The evolution of terrorist polices has made a paradigm shift toward more militant actions and less diplomatic relations, which, in turn, has created support for terrorist groups from local communities as well as other terrorist organizations with similar views.

Terrorist networks often create a variety of messages to campaign their goals and missions to recruit support. In the case of Al-Qaeda, this is often done using videos that show captives' executions to demonstrate the organization's strengths, as well as public announcements identifying the need to unite in a front against western oppression. This relates the cause of the terrorist group to the aspirations of the local community.

The U.S.'s approach of providing humanitarian aid in the Philippines demonstrated that the United States is not looking to suppress a belief or culture, but to foster a different means of communication between the groups. The combative actions against the forces of the MILF and the ABU Sayyaf were to re-establish order, not to oppress the group. The reaction of the terrorist group regarding the negotiate peace talks to prevent being placed on the State Department's terrorist list proves that the goals of these groups may be met without acts of terror being committed. Most terrorist groups are not looking to create radical images of themselves; instead, they see themselves as freedom fighters. Their causes often began with just reasoning and, overtime, lose focus and evolve into radical tactics.

This new method of dealing with terrorism—using a matrix of the two ideologies—should be utilized more often because it creates an effective way approach to combating and deterring terrorism: not as a single shift toward military strikes, but toward a balance of establishing order and understanding of why these groups are formed, how they function, and, ultimately, what it is they seek. By establishing order and creating an opportunity for the groups to articulate what their primary motives are, the United States will be better equipped to discourage secondary motives of groups pertaining to the actions they take in achieving their mission.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **METRICS SUPPORTING THE USE OF DETERRENT AND COMBATIVE STRATEGIES**

Our analysis up to this point has been largely based on quantitative data that analyzes the actions and reactions of Al-Qaeda and the United States. This information has been presented by researching the attacks from Al-Qaeda and the changes in U.S. policies to determine whether the United States has been successful in diffusing terrorism post-9/11. To support the use of both deterrence and combative strategies, this section will utilize the running time line in the paper as a guide and provide metrics pertaining to the effects of the attacks, number of casualties, and whether the changes in policy or actions taken by the United States decreased the terrorist threat from Al-Qaeda.

In the beginning of each area covered, data will be presented with a table as listed in the example in table 4.1, accompanied by an analysis of each event being analyzed. At the conclusion of each event being evaluated, a conclusive table will be provided as seen in table 4.2. The information from that similar to table 4.2 will be used collectively to provide an all-encompassing statement addressing the effectiveness of U.S. policies combating and deterring terrorism.

Table 4.1. Data Table Example By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties
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Table 4.2. Conclusive Table Example By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties	Policy	Strategy
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Since our study is based on the policy changes as a result of September 11, 2001, a selected sample of cases that date back 7 years from September 11, 2001, as well as 7 years after, will be evaluated to determine the increase/decrease of activity, casualties, and overall strategies to deter and combat terrorism.

**U.S. Deterrence Strategy**

Table 4.3. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, Data By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties
1993	World trade center bombing in New York	Killed 6, Injured 1,042

This case is one of extreme importance because it identifies how the U.S. landscape was prior to September 11, 2001. The first bombing of the World Trade Center was viewed as an attack by a group of

radicals rather than a terrorist network with any links to a state.

Information pertaining to the attack was largely owned by the FBI, who prematurely established that it had captured a majority of the culprits within weeks of the attack. During this time period, no evidence of this being a terrorist attack from Al-Qaeda was apparent.

There was no intelligence investigation of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The CIA is, after all, prohibited from operating in America. Of course, a crack interagency team could have been established to examine the question of state sponsorship. But the Clinton administration officials set up no such team. (Mylroie, 1995/96)

The majority of officials investigating this World Trade Center bombing believed that the act of terror was committed by a group of radicals who somehow were supported by Iraq, but they found no conclusive evidence of such theory.

Since 1993, it is apparent that the attacks were not linked to Iraq but to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Some of the lessons learned by the United States from this attack and the manner in which the situation was handled, were the need to create a more open exchange of information through the Justice Department, FBI, and other federal agencies such as the CIA, National Security Agency, and State Department, to better prepare for situations such as these.

As detailed earlier, a memorandum from the White House to the Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury; Secretary of Defense;

Attorney General; Secretary of Health and Human Services; Secretary of Transportation; Secretary of Energy Administrator; Environmental Protection Agency; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Director, Central Intelligence; Director, U.S. Information Agency; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, FBI; and Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency on June 21, 1995, identified the role and responsibility of each agency to deter terrorists threat.

This approach was an effort to vamp up security measures at home and abroad to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel globally. The approach was similar to that of the police department at home, who implemented measures that created more safeguards against terrorist threats, but would not preemptively pursue terrorist organizations until an attack had occurred.

The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center created an awareness of terrorist activity and threats at home and abroad. Until then, most Americans were not aware of the vulnerabilities of terrorist attacks and how they would impact the lives of everyday Americans. In addition, it prompted the United States to evaluate security measures, roles and responsibilities of agencies, and how to improve deterrence strategies to prevent such events.

Table 4.4. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, Conclusions By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Strategy</b>
1993	World trade center bombing in New York	Killed 6, Injured 1,042	Policing Approach	Deterrence

The next case is the attack on U.S. military housing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996. This attack holds importance in its own right because it demonstrates the vulnerability Americans were now facing at home and abroad.

Table 4.5. 1993 Attack on Military Housing, Dharan, Data By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>
1993	Attack on Military housing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia	Killed 19, Injuring Hundreds

The attack was carried out using a gasoline transport truck that had been equipped with explosives and detonated outside of the

Khobar complex where U.S. and other government officials resided. Though the attack has been attributed to being the work of Hezbollah, its ties with Al-Qaeda are believed to be critical in successfully completing the attack. Intelligence reports suggest that explosives were smuggled through Lebanon and timing devices and other materials were obtained through the assistance of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

The attack itself is believed to be in retaliation for the execution of four Saudis who confessed to the attacking of an American-run military training center in Riyadh, months prior to the Khobar attack. U.S. policy at the time of the attack was still very much a policing approach; in this instance, there was some intelligence information that hinted toward the attack prior to it occurring, but no measures besides heightening the security precautions were taken. President Clinton did make statements such as, "The cowards who committed this murderous act must not go unpunished." He also sent the FBI out to Dhahran and stated "We're ready to work with them to make sure those responsible are brought to justice" (Shenon, *The New York Times* June 26, 1996).

Table 4.6. 1993 Attack on Military Housing, Dharan, Conclusions By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties	Policy	Strategy
1996	Attack on military Housing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia	Killed 18, Injured, hundreds	Policing Approach	Deterrence

The two terrorists attacks discussed prior to September 11, 2001 were chosen to highlight how the attacks took place, the method of terrorist attacks, and why the terrorist attacked the United States. In addition, these cases were under the U.S. policies prior to September 11, 2001, which as mentioned, were more of a policing role where the United States reacted only once terrorist attacks had occurred.

**U.S. Transformational Strategy**

Though the next two cases occurred prior to September 11, 2001, their impact on the U.S. counterterrorism policy is immeasurable because the thought from a policing/investigative approach began to evolve into more of a reactive/responsive approach.

Table 4.7. 1998 Bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,  
Data By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>
1998	Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania	Killed 223, Injuring 4,085

The catastrophic attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania not only increased the number of casualties from terrorist attacks, but also prompted the United States to take actions to further pursue terrorist agents responsible for these attacks. This is the first time that the thought behind responding to terrorism transformed from “law enforcement” to “militant/combative.”

In response to the attacks on the U.S. Embassies, the Clinton administration began to view terrorists as a global threat that required engaging troops to defend the sovereignty of our nation. In response to the embassy bombings, the United States launched Operation Infinite Reach whose mission was to search and destroy Bin Laden and terrorists cells responsible for the bombing. The missile strike resulted in the destruction of a pharmaceutical factory suspected of making nerve gas as well as some of the terrorist training camps. The camps were, however, primarily empty on the days of the attack because of knowledge that the strikes were coming.



Table 4.8. 1998 Bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Conclusions By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Strategy</b>
1998	Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania	Killed 223, Injuring 4,085	Reactive/ Combative	Transformational

The attack on the USS Cole is another example of the transformational strategy that was being utilized just before the attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. response to terrorism was somewhere in between a deterrence/combative approach when dealing with the terrorist attacks.

Table 4.9. 2000 Bombing of the USS Cole, Data By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>
2000	Bombing of the USS Cole	Killed 17, Injuring 39

The terrorists attacked the USS Cole by steering a small boat filled with explosives into the ship. This wasn't the first time terrorists attacked U.S. servicemen with explosives, but this was the first time that the attack took place on water. In the Congressional Report about this incident on January 30, 2001, there were three major issues

addressed: (1) procedures by U.S. forces to protect against terrorist attacks, (2) intelligence related to potential terrorist attacks, and (3) U.S. anti-terrorism policy and response.

It was clear from the CRS that the United States understood that the attacks from Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were now becoming more imminent at home, aboard, and at sea. The first section of the report discussed measures the United States could put in place to better protect serviceman at home and abroad. The biggest concern pertaining to the procedures to protect against terrorist attacks had to be the evaluation of current practices, on determining appropriate ports for ships to refuel and receive services while in the Middle East.

The dissemination of intelligence was also a major concern. It was believed that if there had been a more structured approach to communicate between the intelligence community and the USS Cole, the attack may have been averted. This required further probing on how to create such an interoperable exchange of information in the future.

In responding to the attack, the Congressional Report referred to the controversy surrounding the missile strikes in retaliation to the U.S. embassy bombings. The United States needed to ensure that in retaliation for this event, their intelligence was to be concrete and their targets valid. The key element from the report was to state that the

United States understood the importance in secrecy when planning such actions, but felt that the efforts to increase interagency communication would result in a more favorable outcome (Congressional Service Report for Congress by Perl 2001, 5).

Table 4.10. 2000 Bombing of the USS Cole, Conclusions By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Strategy</b>
2000	Attack on the USS Cole	Killed 17, Injuring 39	Reactive/ Combative	Transformational

Overall, the U.S. strategy prior to 9/11 had a relatively low degree of communication and processes designed to respond to terrorist threats and activity. The strategy was mostly deterrence, which transformed into combative strategies after the attacks against the U.S. embassies and the USS Cole. The table below demonstrates the number of U.S. casualties from 1993-2000. Along with an average of how many attacks occurred, it also includes how many Americans died or were injured through the course of 7 years because of terrorist attacks linked to Al-Qaeda.

Table 4.11. Number of U.S. Casualties, 1993-2000 By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>	
1993	World trade center bombing in New York	Killed 18	Injured 1,042
1996	Attack on military Housing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia	Killed 18	Injured (Est. 300)
1998	Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania	Killed 223	Injured 4,085

<b>Total (time in years prior to 9/11)</b>	<b>Total Acts of Terror</b>	<b>Total Casualties</b>	
7	4	Killed 264	Injured 5,466

According to the data analyzed, prior to September 11, 2001, an attack against the United States occurred approximately every 2.5 years using explosive devices. This resulted in an average of 38 people killed a year and an average of 780 people injured a year from a terrorist attack linked to Al-Qaeda.

## U.S. Militant Policy

September 11, 2001 changed the way the world viewed terrorists and terrorism against the United States. This resulted in a variety of different changes to policy, as well as the addition of roles and responsibilities to several agencies to aide in combating terrorism. The traditional approach that was seen in the past began to evolve into a “boots-on- the-ground” militant strategy. Terrorist actions post- September 11, 2001 will now be evaluated to see if the changes in policy were effective in deterring and combating terrorism 7 years after Sept 11, 2001.

Table 4.12. 2001 Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, Data By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties	
2001	Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon through hijacked planes	Killed 2,946	Injured 6,294

The September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States prompted many firsts. This was the first time that NATO participated in a “hot” war since its inception. NATO acted in accordance with *The North Atlantic Treaty* Article 5.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an

armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, under "Article 5")

September 11, 2001 also prompted the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) whose primary mission is to "is to lead the unified national effort to secure the country and preserve our freedoms" (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, under "Introduction"). This creation of the DHS is a definite response to the lack of coordination in sharing intelligence and communication amongst the DOD, Department of Justice, and intelligence communities. The Patriot Act, which provides the law enforcement community with powers to invade privacy in suspicion for terrorist activity, was also made into law.

As far as the response from the United States for the terrorist actions, a War on Terror was declared and military troops deployed to Afghanistan were tasked to diffuse the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda and seek out Bin Laden.

Table 4.13. 2001 Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon,  
 Conclusions By: Nerman Syed

Year	Act of Terror	Casualties		Policy	Strategy
2001	Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon through hijacked planes	Killed 2,946	Injured 6,294	Combative	Militant

Due to the influx in number of attacks following September 11, 2001, the attacks will be listed in the same format as above, but will not list out specifics and, instead, provide an overarching statement that indicates the policies and approaches utilized. The incidents listed below are a selected sample and do not account for all of Al-Qaeda's activities during this time period; they focus on attacks geared toward the United States.

Table 4.14. Number of U.S. Casualties, Post-9/11 By: Nerman Syed

<b>Year</b>	<b>Act of Terror</b>	<b>Casualties</b>	
2001	Attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight by Richard Reid (the "shoe bomber")	Killed 0	Injured 0
2002	Bomb attack on the U.S. Consulate Karachi, Pakistan	Killed 12	Injured 0
2002	Firebombing of synagogue in Bjerba Tunisia	Killed 19	Injured 0
2003	Riyadh compound bombings Saudi Arabia	Killed 35	Injured 160
2006	Transatlantic aircraft plot (liquid explosives) foiled	Killed 0	Injured 0
2008	Suicide bomber on a motorcycle kills in Tarmiya	Killed 6	Injured 18
2008	A roadside bomb explodes near a U.S. military vehicle in Farah Province.	Killed 4	Injured 0
2008	A car bomb and a rocket strike the U.S. embassy in Yemen	Killed 16	Injured 0



Total (time in years post-9/11)	Total Acts of Terror	Total Casualties	
7	9	Killed 3,038	Injured 6,472

### **Conclusion**

According to the data analyzed post-9/11, an attack against the United States occurred approximately every 13 months using a variety of methods to inflict harm. This resulted in an average of 434 people killed a year and an average of 924 people injured a year from a terrorist attack linked to Al-Qaeda. Changes in U.S. policy did result in the successful prevention of two terrorist attacks; however, the new militant approach also prompted more attacks from Al-Qaeda. For the purpose of this thesis, the events analyzed were selected by their intentions to target U.S. personnel and civilians along with their proximity to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Taking into account both sets of data analyzed in this section, it is apparent that the appropriate strategy when evaluating deterrence vs. combative would lean toward deterrence. The data revealed an astronomical increase in casualties killed (1051%) and an increase in casualties injured (18%). In addition to the increase in casualties, the increase in terrorist activity also increased by 125%.

Table 4.15. Comparison of U.S. Casualties, Pre- and Post-9/11 By:  
Nerman Syed

**Pre-9/11**

<b>Total (time in years prior to 9/11)</b>	<b>Total Acts of Terror</b>	<b>Total Casualties</b>	
		Killed	Injured
7	4	264	5,466

**Post-9/11**

<b>Total (time in years post-9/11)</b>	<b>Total Acts of Terror</b>	<b>Total Casualties</b>	
		Killed	Injured
7	9	3,038	6,472

This data, however, is not enough to lean strictly toward deterrence because of the rapid advancement of Al-Qaeda. Policies from the Patriot Act have had a degree of success preventing terrorist attacks from happening, but the War on Terror has increased the casualty rate.

U.S. policies being effective in deterring and combating terrorism post-9/11 would have to account for both the success and failures. The policies were successful in positioning as stated:

. . . police forces and intelligence agencies by equipping them with the tools to successfully break up Al-Qaeda cells, close down front companies and freeze assets as part of the 'war on terror'.

Some of Al-Qaeda's top leaders have been killed or captured, and interrogations of some members at Guantanamo Bay have further weakened the organization. However, uprooting the organization in its entirety has been a highly complex and frustrating task. (BBC News Jul 20, 2004)

Al-Qaeda is still very much alive and functional, which creates the need to continue furthering U.S. security measures and contemplating new methods in which terrorists may attack.

Some suggestions to approach furthering U.S. measures of combating and deterring terrorism must define the difference between the two, and only use military strikes when necessary, to reduce the number of casualties. In addition, fostering better communication has been a common theme throughout this thesis. Bolstering interagency communications will enable for more efficient defenses for our nation and troops. It is vital to organize more "tiger team" efforts that leverage information from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities. The current policies have been effective in combating terrorism but the ultimate goal should be to deter and diffuse terrorist situations.

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