
A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies

By

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Washington, DC
April 15, 2011
Since 9/11, the rise of non-state actors and the threat of Islamic terrorism have become primary security concerns for Western nations. Recently, attention has shifted from a focus on threats posed by external actors to that posed by “homegrown” terrorists. Counterterrorism efforts have become more concentrated on the role that domestic Islamic diaspora and immigrant populations will play in the global jihad. As the Internet, mobile networks, twitter and facebook enable diaspora and immigrant communities to maintain strong connections to their states of origin, they enhance the ability of diaspora groups to develop transnational networks. Furthermore, the opportunity structure available in democratic countries makes it difficult for Western governments to discourage their diaspora populations from forming networks and mobilizing resources to facilitate political change in their countries of origin. In an effort to contribute to current literature on the role diaspora groups play in conflict promotion and transnational terrorism, this paper will provide a case study of the Algerian diaspora population in France and their role in conflict promotion throughout the Algerian civil war from 1992-2002.
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I. **Introduction**

Globalization has broken down traditional barriers in the international community, enabling immigrant communities to maintain transnational linkages to their countries of origin. These transnational ties generate multiple levels of loyalty within diaspora communities and facilitate the transfer of ideas, technology, people, and illicit material internationally. Recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt illustrate the role immigrant communities can play in international affairs today, as members of these diaspora groups in Western states have lobbied their host governments to support regime change in their states of origin. Additionally, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, the London bombings in 2005, and recent threats on the Eiffel Tower in Paris have heightened Western government’s attention to the potential presence of “homegrown” Islamic terrorists among their Islamic immigrant populations.\(^1\) As a result of these developments, it is important to study the role that incipient diaspora groups and ex-Patriot communities play in international conflict and transnational terrorism.\(^2\)

This thesis will argue that members of the Algerian diaspora\(^3\) in France participated in and exacerbated conflict in Algeria throughout the civil war by organizing a network of political,

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1. These “homegrown” terrorists may be first, second or third-generation immigrants who have Western passports, have been educated in the West and often have Western citizenship.
2. Despite the controversy surrounding the definition of “terrorism”, this paper will use the definition put forward by the United Nations High Level Panel on Threat Challenges and Changes in 2004, defined as “any action…that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants when the purpose of such an act…is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government…to do or to abstain from doing any act.”
3. For the purposes of this paper the Algerian diaspora refers to the community of ethnic Algerians in Europe and France in particular. I am operating under the assumption that the large Algerian immigrant population in France constitutes a diaspora community. I will use Robin Cohen’s theoretical arguments on diaspora construction as the theoretical basis of this
financial and material support for the insurgency within France and other European countries. Additionally, it will argue that members of the diaspora carried out terrorist attacks against their host state in order to promote political change in their country of origin. Through an in-depth analysis of this particular diaspora population’s participation in conflict, this paper will fill an important gap in the literature on the involvement of incipient diaspora groups in conflict promotion, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution.\(^4\) It will also attempt to analyze the motivations members of this diaspora population had to participate in transnational terrorism.

In order to contribute to an understanding of how incipient diaspora groups participate in conflict promotion in their countries of origin, this paper will trace the development of the Algerian diaspora community in France and analyze their involvement in conflict promotion in each stage of the conflict cycle, detailed by Bercovitch in the literature review portion of this study. First, this paper will provide a brief review of literature on diaspora formation and the participation of diaspora groups in conflict. Next, it will detail the development of the Algerian diaspora community in France during three phases of immigration. The background section will conclude by describing the evolution of the civil war in Algeria and identifying the parties to the conflict.

\(^4\) For the purposes of this paper, conflict promotion will include the participation of the Algerian diaspora community directly in conflict or their material/financial support for conflict. Conflict resolution refers to the active participation of the diaspora community in promoting political reforms peacefully through political activity in France, providing aid to refugee populations and encouraging a peaceful resolution to conflict in Algeria.
After the background material has been articulated, this paper will identify and analyze the role that a select number of religious institutions, political associations, social groups, individuals, and radicalized networks within France’s Algerian diaspora community played in conflict promotion in Algeria and transnational terrorism. The conclusion section will then summarize the role that members of this diaspora population played in each phase of the “conflict-cycle” as defined by Bercovitch in the literature review section of this paper. Ultimately, based on the conclusions reached by this analysis, this paper will discuss policy implications on the findings of the role that incipient diaspora groups play in conflict promotion and transnational terrorist movements.

II. DATA CAVEAT/SCOPE OF RESEARCH

Due to the extensive privacy rights valued in France, the French policy of universalism, and the inherent bias in interview collections and newspaper reports, this study will be limited based on data availability. Additionally, due to the fact that specific diaspora populations behave differently than others and not all diasporas have the same capacities, opportunities or motivations to intervene in conflict, this study does not intend to be generalizable to all diaspora populations. Instead, it should serve as a potential model for understanding the behavior of incipient diaspora groups in conflict.

This paper concentrates on the role that Franco-Algerians played in conflict promotion in Algeria. However, as the opportunity structure in France became inhospitable to political Islamic groups in the mid-1990s, many supporters of the FIS, GIA and GSPC were forced to set up networks in other European countries. This analysis would be enriched by further study of what
role Algerian immigrant populations in other European countries, Canada, and the United States played in conflict promotion and transnational terrorism during this time period.

Additionally, this analysis relied on open source information and secondary source material. In order to provide more insight into the motivations members of this incipient diaspora population had to participate in conflict, it would be useful to conduct interviews with imprisoned Franco-Algerian “terrorists” or Franco-Algerian activists. For instance, it would be useful to determine whether it was their Algerian identity or, alternatively, their Muslim identity that motivated members of the Algerian diaspora in France to participate in conflict. Determining their motivations would provide more insight into why incipient diaspora groups participate in conflict and would inform policy decisions geared towards interdicting their negative involvement in conflict promotion.

Although this analysis proposes explanations for how members of the Algerian diaspora were radicalized, the causality of their radicalization\(^5\) is not explicitly addressed due to a lack of primary source material. A more explicit understanding of what led to the radicalization of members of the Algerian diaspora in France could provide insight into similar developments among other incipient Islamic diaspora groups in the West.

Despite these shortcomings, this paper presents an in-depth analysis from the materials available of the Algerian diaspora’s participation in conflict promotion and transnational terrorism. It illustrates that the political opportunity structure of Western democratic countries enabled the formation of political groups that provided networks for recruitment into more

\(^5\) For the purposes of this paper, “radicalization” will be defined as the process by which members of the Algerian diaspora community in France became involved in supporting violence in Algeria or alternatively, using violence against France to promote political change in Algeria.
radicalized organizations. As globalization continues to break down the barriers that define loyalties and differentiate identities, it is important to consider the role incipient diaspora groups will play in international affairs and the potential threats they may pose to the United States and other Western nations. It is likely that diaspora groups will continue to play a role in conflict promotion and will remain a resource pool from which transnational terrorist groups can recruit.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

CONSTRUCTION AND TYPOLOGY OF MODERN DIASPORA

Traditionally, the term diaspora is used to refer to the Jewish Diaspora living outside of the biblical state of Israel, which has faced persecution and preserved a unique cultural identity while living in hostile communities for centuries. Other established diaspora populations are traditionally identified in ethno-nationalist terms, like the Armenian diaspora, the Palestinian diaspora and the Kurdish diaspora. However competing typologies inform theories on distinguishing diaspora populations from other immigrant groups.

Robin Cohen’s typology is the most inclusive and will serve as the theoretical framework for this paper’s classification of the Algerian diaspora community in France. He divides diaspora populations into five groups: victim, labor, trade, imperial, and cultural. He highlights that diaspora communities are characterized by the following factors: (1) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically; (2) alternatively, the expansion from the homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (4) an idealization of the supposed ancestral home; (5) a return movement;

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6 Sheffer, Yadlin, Bercovitch, Cohen
(6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies; (8) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries.\(^8\)

Gabriel Sheffer more narrowly classifies diaspora groups, highlighting the ethno-nationalist nature of diaspora communities. He defines them as a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, who’s members regard themselves as part of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries.\(^9\) Members of such entities create communal organizations to enable group cohesion and to help beleaguered societies back home. He emphasizes the role that cultural and political exchanges carried out through trans-state networks play in maintaining connections, such as the financial flows that travel through diaspora communities to homelands, including donations, remittances and investments.\(^10\)

Sheffer discusses how transactions between diaspora communities and populations in states of origin can be used to support subversive movements in “home” states. Sheffer argues that state-linked diasporas opt for locally oriented and more moderate strategies of communalism, like the Armenian diaspora, which have benign effects on host states. However, Sheffer highlights that stateless diasporas, particularly those which pursue or support secessionist and separatist movements in their homelands, can pose a threat to host societies and governments through their occasional participation in terrorist trans-state networks. He argues that stateless diasporas are more likely than state-linked diasporas to transfer seditious resources, including

\(^9\) Ibid, Cohen.
\(^10\) Ibid, Cohen.
combatants, weapons, military intelligence and money back to militant groups, arguing that state-linked diasporas engage in “perfectly innocuous exchanges through similar trans-state networks.”

Sheffer’s study ignores the role played by the Algerian diaspora in Europe—a state-linked diaspora group—in conflict. Early on, he stresses that he will not approach talking about the “pan” diaspora movements, like the pan-Islamic diaspora, but he fails to account for the ethno-nationalist motivations that Muslim immigrant populations may have in addition to those driven by their faith. Yadlin addresses the rise of a pan-Islamic diaspora community, composed of multiple ethnic and national groups supporting a common goal of global Islam.

Yadlin addresses the debate on the existence of a “muslim diaspora,” highlighting that it is an objectionable term to purist diasporic research because modern diasporas are classified in ethno-nationalist terms. Yadlin cautions against ignoring the inherent divisions between ethnic groups in Islam and the difficulty of identifying an ummah or “community of believers.” However, she does stress that regardless of other self-identities and affiliations Muslims in the West might have, the Muslim one is of primary importance. Yadlin highlights that the physical disconnection of Muslims in the West from their host societies can foster an affiliation with the “ummah” as a nation that can arch over the diversity of tribal, ethnic, sectarian and other divisions.

Yadlin’s debate on the existence of a pan-national “Muslim diaspora” is essential to understanding how European countries confront their diaspora populations that are Muslim today. Martha Crenshaw points out that although most Muslim immigrants and refugees are not

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11 Ibid, Sheffer.
“stateless,” many suffer from an existential sense of loss, deprivation and alienation from the countries in which they live. She stresses that members of diaspora populations are often exposed to extreme ideologies that lead to their radicalization, stressing that eighty percent of recruits joining transnational terrorist groups become radicalized in the diaspora.¹²

The idea that Islam is prominent in the lives of these individuals and that ethnic identification is subordinate informs how and why they will participate in conflict. It is important to distinguish “moderate” Muslims from “militant” ones and more so to distinguish these two groups from those Muslims who don’t identify themselves as either. Yadlin addresses this but stresses the fact that growing xenophobia in the West has pushed more Muslims into embracing their Islamic identity and the militant messages espoused by Islamist political leaders.

Although the Algerian diaspora population could be part of a larger pan-national Muslim diaspora population, for the purposes of this paper the Algerian diaspora refers to the community of ethnic Algerians in Europe and France in particular. In the following section on diaspora construction I will explain the waves of Algerian immigration to France and the evolution of this immigrant community into an incipient diaspora group.

DIASPORA POPULATIONS: PEACE-MAKERS OR PEACE-WRECKERS

Hazel Smith’s and Paul Stares’ edited volume, Diaspora Populations: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers, incorporates case studies on the role that established, new and incipient groups play in conflict. They stress the importance of studying the role that diaspora populations play in

conflict because of their new role as “powerful actors in international politics.” They highlight the effects that globalization has had on enhancing the capacity of diaspora populations to secure tangible and intangible resources in support of armed conflict. They point out that diaspora groups establish institutional and network structures to enable the transnational transfers of arms and money to state and non-state actors, including terrorist groups and humanitarian causes. A common theme stressed throughout the text is that the ability of diaspora groups to engage in conflict in the “homeland” is conditioned not only on their desire and capability but also on their opportunity to do so, highlighting the importance of having an opportunity-structure to operate out of host countries.

Jacob Bercovitch introduces the phases of the conflict cycle in this volume to serve as a framework to assess the role incipient diaspora groups play in conflict. In the latent phase, conflict may be present but the issues are not great enough to change a stable situation into a conflict situation. In the second phase, issue differences are articulated and given concrete expression, forcing conflict to emerge. In the third phase, conflict has emerged and resources are mobilized by opposing parties, enabling an escalation of the conflict to violence. In the fourth phase, the conflict continues to escalate until the parties reach a point of mutual exhaustion referred to as a “hurting stalemate phase.” In the fifth phase, a shift to de-escalation occurs when a dramatic transformation in the course of a conflict occurs, which is usually accompanied by a mutual desire to explore alternatives to violence or a change in leadership. Finally, in the last

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14 Ibid, Smith, Hazel.
15 Ibid, Smith, Hazel
phase, regional or international actors become engaged in a series of post-conflict and peace-building measures to ensure the conflict does not recur.16

Bercovitch highlights that diaspora communities can play a constructive role in conflict, by introducing norms and practices of cooperation, helping to reframe a conflict, and supporting moderate positions. Alternatively, they can serve as a destructive element, by exacerbating feelings of hostility or offering support for extremist positions. Bercovitch stresses that the diaspora’s level of participation will depend on multiple factors, including its level of its political organization in the host country, the issues at stake in the conflict, its ability to exert political pressure in the home country, and the international attention given to the conflict.

The following section will detail the growth of the Algerian diaspora community in France throughout three waves of immigration. Then, it will briefly detail the evolution of conflict in Algeria from independence-1992 and identify the parties to the conflict. Finally, it will analyze the role members of this diaspora population played in conflict promotion in Algeria throughout each phase of the conflict cycle.

IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

France is home to Europe’s largest Muslim population, with accepted figures being around 5 million, making up an estimated 10 percent of the population.17 France’s Muslim

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16 Bercovitch, Jacob in Hazel Smith
immigrant population is diverse, originating from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and North Africa. However, the majority of France’s Muslim immigrants are Algerian.\textsuperscript{18}

Three waves of immigration influenced by domestic factors within Algeria altered the composition of Algerian immigrant groups in France and the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{19} Over time these groups established themselves in French society, congregating primarily in the suburbs surrounding Paris and Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur, where they organized and established cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, Algerian officials emerged as important figures in Islamic cultural institutions in France, like the Paris Mosque established in 1929 and the Rassemblement Islamique, which enabled group cohesion and a connection with the motherland.\textsuperscript{21} These cultural ties were essential for the diaspora group to maintain a cohesive identity in host states that differentiated them from other Muslim immigrants.

\textbf{FIRST-WAVE OF IMMIGRATION AND INDEPENDENCE}

As a client state of France, primarily Berber Algerian workers began immigrating to France from the Kablyia region of Algeria in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{22} The first wave of Algerian immigrants were not fleeing persecution, instead these immigrants were predominately young, single men of Berber descent searching for work in the unskilled labor force where they could make enough money to send remittances home to their families. These emigrants were only “physically absent” from Algerian land and their tribal groups, but psychologically “remained wedded” to

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, Fetzer. p. 64
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, Fetzer. p. 65.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, Fetzer.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, Fetzer.
their communities in Algeria with strong ties to the land and community.\(^{23}\) Most of these immigrants did not intend to remain in France and practiced their faith with little fan-fare, practicing a kind of “cellar Islam” into the early 1970s.\(^{24}\) However, their lack of desire to integrate into French society due to their plans to remain in France temporarily reinforced connections with family members and community ties back home in Algeria, facilitating the foundations for the formation of a labor diaspora in France.

In the aftermath of World War II, nationalist movements gained popularity internationally with the break-up of colonial empires. The Front National Liberation (FLN) carried out insurgent activity against occupying French gendarmes, the acting colonial government and the Harkis—native Algerian troops supporting French colonial forces. In 1962, after a long war of independence, a secular, Islamic state was established in Algeria. Multitudes of European immigrants in Algeria, as well as Algerians who had supported the French government, fled Algeria throughout the conflict, seeking refuge and citizenship in France. These citizens came to be known as the “pied-noirs” and had a difficult time acclimating to French society.\(^{25}\)

**SECOND WAVE OF IMMIGRATION/TIGHTENING OF IMMIGRATION POLICY**

The second wave of immigration began in the early 1950’s and extended into the 1970s. It consisted predominately of Arab Algerians looking for work who mixed in with the Algerian Berber populations already present in France’s suburban communities. These groups intermarried, expanding and strengthening the diaspora community. Although they were initially


\(^{24}\) Sayad, Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Silverstein, Ibid
welcomed into the country as workers and given citizenship, eventually the French government became wary of their rapidly expanding numbers.

Uncertain economic conditions caused by the economic downturn of the mid-1970s reduced demand for labor, exacerbating tensions and reinforcing French public opinion that Muslim workers were no longer welcome in France.\textsuperscript{26} In response, the French government attempted to tighten its immigration policies and encourage Algerian immigrants to return to Algeria. However, President Giscard d’Estaing’s plan to ban family reunification was prevented by the Conseil d’Etat.\textsuperscript{27} Ironically, these prejudicial attempts to expel Algerian immigrants encouraged many of the “temporary” immigrants to remain in France permanently, bringing their family members to France as well.\textsuperscript{28} Family reunification deepened cultural and ethnic ties among Algerian immigrants in France as well as to their family members left back in Algeria, further solidifying their development into a diaspora community in France.

As Algerian immigrants became more committed to remaining in France, Algerian laborers, particularly in the auto-industry, turned to enhanced religious and cultural identification in order to facilitate group cohesion and lobby for more rights from the French government.\textsuperscript{29} Simultaneously, large-scale unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s heightened tensions between Algerian immigrants and their host population, as they turned to criminal and semi-criminal activities to make a living.\textsuperscript{30}

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\textsuperscript{26} Silverstein, Ibid
\textsuperscript{27} Silverstein, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Silverstein, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Silverstein, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Silverstein, Ibid
\end{flushright}
Throughout the 1980s, Muslim immigrants from different ethnic groups began to form community arrangements and student groups to provide a cohesive unit from which to lobby for equal rights.\footnote{Kepel, Gilles, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in the West and Europe*, (Polity Press, Cambridge), 1997.} Although groups like SOS-Racisme gained popularity during the Rushdie and Veil crises of the late 1980s, ethnic divisions among ethno-nationally disparate Muslim immigrant populations prevented a unified Muslim diaspora from evolving in France.\footnote{Kepel, Ibid.} Instead, second generation Algerian immigrants differentiated themselves from other Muslim immigrants, beginning to refer to themselves as “the beurs,” forming their own community arrangements to strengthen in-group cohesion.

**THIRD WAVE OF IMMIGRATION**

The third wave of Algerian immigration to France came in the early years of the Algerian civil war. From 1988-1991, widespread poverty and unemployment led to a series of protests in Algeria known as the “bread riots.” Initially, Algerian families sought refuge in France, reconnecting with family members living on the continent. However, as the following passages will outline, the coup in 1992 and the start of the civil war caused a massive displacement of Algerians both internally and abroad. For instance, from 1980-2004 100 percent of Algerian refugees sought asylum in France.\footnote{Fetzer. Ibid, p. 64} Since both the insurgents and the Algerian government targeted civilians as well as each other, both insurgents and civilians sought asylum in France. These groups mixed with family members and second generation Franco-Algerians already in

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32 Kepel, Ibid.
33 Fetzer. Ibid, p. 64
France, helping to politicize the situation in Algeria and encourage members of the diaspora to become involved in conflict.

**EVOLUTION OF CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA**

After winning its independence from France on July 5, 1962, Algeria’s new government attempted to rid itself of its colonial past. President Ben Bella instituted a policy of pan-Arabism, declaring Arabic as the official language of Algeria and Islam as the state’s religion.\(^{34}\) Despite attempts to unify the population, the new government suffered from a period of insecurity and instability, as attempts to Arabize the Algerian population led to outcries from Berber populations located primarily in the Kablyia region of Algeria. The FLN government responded by arresting prominent Berber leaders, who were viewed as a threat to national solidarity.\(^{35}\) Ben Bella aggressively pursued a policy of pan-Arabism, initiating Algeria’s integration into the international community as a member of the non-Aligned movement and adopting a socialist economic model for Algeria’s industries.

In 1965, Boumedienne successfully carried out a military coup against Ben Bella, ousting the prominent FLN leader and taking over as Algeria’s president.\(^{36}\) Boumedienne introduced two, four-year plans of economic development that would focus on the industrial economy, including hydrocarbon resources, heavy industries, construction and mining.\(^{37}\) However, demographic shifts following decolonization, including rapid urbanization, coupled with

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\(^{35}\) Le Sueur, Ibid, p.16.

\(^{36}\) Le Sueur, Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Le Sueur, Ibid
Boumedienne’s focus on industrialization caused Algeria’s agricultural economy to collapse entirely.\(^{38}\)

The Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent collapse of the U.S. economy put immense pressure on the Algerian economy. When President Chadli Benjadid assumed the role of President in 1979, he was forced to confront a largely stagnant Algerian economy that required liberalization and foreign direct investment to stay afloat. Additionally, Algeria remained an imperfect example of a “rentier state” because it derived only $350 per capita from gas and oil unlike its fellow OPEC country Saudi Arabia, which derived $5000 per capita in the 1990s.\(^{39}\) This put a strain on the government, which unlike Saudi Arabia, could not depend solely on energy resources to successfully appease its ballooning population, which suffered from massive unemployment and a weakening social service infrastructure into the late 1980s.\(^{40}\)

Algerians increasingly turned to political Islam as the FLN lost legitimacy with the collapse of the Algerian economy. By the late 1980s, state export revenues had collapsed, falling more than 40 percent, and by 1988 the national economy had sustained a growth rate of -3.6 percent.\(^{41}\) The ad hoc liberal reforms instituted by Chadli to meet current demands only further crippled the “socialist routine” of the administration leading to massive food shortages.\(^{42}\) The food shortages, in conjunction with widespread unemployment, led to the 1988 bread riots. Throughout the riots, Islamic centers served as rallying places for the disgruntled Algerian

\(^{38}\) Le Sueur, Ibid
\(^{39}\) Le Sueur, Ibid.
\(^{40}\) Volpi, Ibid.
\(^{41}\) Volpi, Frederic, Islam and Democracy, 39.
\(^{42}\) Volpi, Ibid.
masses. Imams became central negotiating figures with the government to reduce violence and to communicate the goals of the Algerian public.

As a response to widespread rioting, Chadli proposed the introduction of a new constitution in 1989 that would introduce party pluralism into Algeria, remove the FLN from official state party status, and open up Algeria to a more democratic process.  

**Growth of Political Islam in Algeria**

Algeria, like many of its Arab neighbors in the Middle East, suffered from a crisis of identity in the wake of the Iranian revolution. As in much of the Middle East, the failure of pan-Arabism led to the subsequent growth in popularity for the message of Salafist fundamentalist groups in Algeria. Salafist groups, like the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), gained local support throughout Algeria in both rural and urban communities. Increasingly, Algerians turned to religion as a way to unify communities and lobby the government for rights.

Additionally, in the late 1980s, Algerian mujhadeen who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan returned to Algeria. These fighters found refuge in Islamic political groups like the FIS and would serve as a catalyst for the development of insurgent splinter groups like the GIA and AIM following the coup in 1992.

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43 Ibid. Volpi. 45
44 The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state in Iran forced other Middle Eastern states to consider pan-Islamism as an alternative to the failed policy of pan-Arabism that had been advocated by Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein to unify and advance the Muslim world.
45 Salafism is a form of Sunni Islam that was popularized by Sayyid Qutb and would serve as the religious basis for the GIA, the GSPC, al-Qaeda and other transnational Islamic terrorist groups.
The FIS continued to gain popularity throughout Algeria as local elections approached in 1990. In 1990, the FIS attracted between 600,000 and 800,000 followers to a massive political rally in Algiers. The mosque served as a popular place for political discussion and community formation where FIS leaders could actively recruit Algerian popular support. In the June 1990 elections, the FIS won over 55 percent of the vote nationwide (except in the Berber Kabylia area), cementing a shift in the Algerian population’s allegiance to political Islam. The FIS became nearly “hegemonic” in the Local Councils of all of the main urban centers of the country including Algiers, Oran and Constantine.

In the interim leading up to the next round of elections, the standing parliament attempted to re-district areas to reduce popular support for the FIS. Moreover, in 1991, the government initiated a wave of arrests targeting Islamic leaders, including Madani and Belhadj, the two leaders of FIS. However, these steps to interdict the rise of the FIS had an alternative outcome and as the election approached it became clear that FIS would win a resounding victory over the FLN.

Days before the election, President Chadli covertly dissolved parliament, while insisting publicly that he would respect the results of the election. The election results indisputably revealed that the FIS had won almost half of the parliamentary seats in the first round of elections. Immediately after the results were revealed, Chadli resigned and the Algerian military issued a state of emergency.

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47 Ibid, Volpi, 46
48 Ibid, Volpi. 48
49 Ibid, Volpi. 50.
50 Ibid, Volpi, 51
On January 12, 1992, the Supreme Court transferred all powers to the High Security Council (HCS), a pre-existing consultative body on security issues, which consisted of all of Chadli’s primary confidants. The HCS ruled to suspend the electoral process. Hachani, the provisional leader of the FIS, denounced the decision as illegal. On January 14, the HCS relinquished presidential powers to a newly created institution, the State High Committee (HCE), which was to act as a provisional government. The HCE was to be led by Mohammed Boudiaf—the former leader of the war of independence—and elections were delayed to an unspecified later date. Subsequently, the HCE began to target FIS leadership for arrest.\(^{51}\) The FIS and its military offshoots—the AIS and GIA—responded by targeting security officials and HCE leadership, with GIA operatives successfully assassinating Boudiaf in June of 1992.

From 1992-2002, an insurgency led by the AIS and GIA, along with several other paramilitary groups, targeted government officials as well as civilians, resulting in over 100,000 casualties and the displacement of 1.5 million Algerians, most of who fled to France.\(^{52}\) The deadliest period of conflict lasted from 1992-1996, during which the FIS and GIA set up support networks in European countries with large Algerian immigrant populations, particularly France. In 1996, the Algerian government executed a more effective counterterrorism strategy against the GIA but fighting remained intense.

The brutal tactics of the GIA throughout the civil war and their unmitigated targeting of civilian populations eventually led to the group’s demise. In 1998, the GSPC was formed by a former GIA commander, Hassan Hattab, who left the GIA in protest of their continuous

\(^{51}\) Ibid, Volpi. 55
slaughter of innocent civilians. Hattab effectively recruited the 700 guerrillas under his command to GSPC.\textsuperscript{53} However, it was not until the election of Abedlaziz Bouteflika as president, in April 1999, that the GSPC rose to prominence.\textsuperscript{54} Bouteflika announced a form of amnesty as an inroad to peace, which the political and military leaders of the FIS/AIS supported.\textsuperscript{55} The GSPC won converts by both co-opting guerrilla units that rejected the amnesty and those who objected to GIA brutality, emerging as the most effective armed group in Algeria with 5,000 members.\textsuperscript{56}

Next, the GSPC worked to co-opt the networks established by the GIA among diaspora populations abroad to continue inflows of cash, arms, and transnational criminal enterprise. In the wake of the 11 September attacks, Algerian authorities claimed that the GSPC had released a statement from its leaders threatening US and European targets in Algeria. However, the group denied issuing such a statement and did not emerge as a key player in al-Qaeda until October 2003 when the leadership formally came out with a statement in support of al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{57} In 2007, an announcement made by al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, revealed that the GSPC had joined forces with al-Qaeda to become the backbone of AQIM.

\textbf{V. PARTICIPATION OF THE DIASPORA IN CONFLICT PROMOTION}

As a result of instability caused by the civil war, thousands of Algerians sought asylum in France as well as other European countries. Although many of those who fled were unaffiliated with the insurgency, others were exiled FIS supporters and GIA members, who re-established their Salafist movements in the French suburbs. This third wave of immigrants successfully

\textsuperscript{53} Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Index, Profile (GSPC)
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, Janes Profile GSPC
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, Janes Profile GSPC
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, Janes Profile GSPC
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, Jane Profile GSPC
exploited “the beurs” population in France, who had faced decades of discriminatory French policies in housing and employment, strengthening Islamist influence over these groups.\textsuperscript{58} Many of the FIS leaders fleeing persecution in Algeria resumed leadership positions within established Algerian diaspora communities in France, focusing the Algerian diaspora’s attention on the ongoing struggle in their country of origin.\textsuperscript{59} Simultaneously, Front National (an extreme right political group) became popular in France, blaming unemployment on immigrant populations and calling for their children’s expulsion from France. These two divergent groups augmented tensions in French society where Salafist Islamic groups began to take hold, supplanting traditional rights based groups like SOS-racisme.\textsuperscript{60}

Throughout this time period, numerous arrests were made in France targeting Algerian immigrant populations on conspiracy to commit terrorist acts as well as for participating in the illegal trafficking of arms and contraband.\textsuperscript{61}

In order to evaluate the involvement of the French-Algerian diaspora in conflict, this paper will identify different groups and individuals representing this diaspora community in France and trace their involvement throughout the phases of conflict that were laid out by Bercovitch in the literature review portion of this study. It will discuss the involvement of religious institutions, political groups, civil society groups, radicalized networks, and individual cases of the Algerian diaspora population’s participation in conflict in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{59} Silverstein, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Silverstein, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Silverstein, Ibid.
MOSQUES

The Paris Mosque was established in 1929 to serve as the “grand cathedral” of Islam in France. Although it was initially under Moroccan leadership, in 1962, an agreement with the Interior Ministry of France shifted leadership to represent the Algerian community in France.\footnote{Viorst, Milton, “The Muslims of France,” Foreign Affairs, Vol 75. No. 5, Sept/October 1996.}

However, after the outbreak of war in Algeria, Muslims in France and members of the Algerian diaspora community in particular, began to view the Mosque as an agent of the Algerian government.\footnote{Viorst, Milton, Ibid.} Cheikh Tedjini Haddam, the rector of the Paris Mosque from 1989-1992, was a member of the HCS interim government in Algeria, which suppressed the FIS following the coup.\footnote{Paris Radio France Internationale, Tedjani Haddam Returns to Paris, February 1992.} In 1992, the appointment of Dalil Boubaker, a largely secular scholar of Islam with French citizenship, as the Paris Mosque’s rector in 1992, solidified negative opinion of the Mosque’s biases towards the Algerian government.\footnote{Viorst, Ibid.} Boubaker was viewed by the Algerian populous as an important ally for the French Interior Ministry because of his “liberal interpretation” of Islam. Since Haddam and Boubaker’s had a close relationship with the French government and the security forces in Algeria, they were viewed primarily as agents of the French government and FLN, which stigmatized Franco-Algerian opinion against them.

Conversely, the “Stalingrad Mosque,” in the 19th Arrondissement (Addawa Mosque), was more popular than the Paris Mosque with members of the Algerian diaspora.\footnote{Viorst, Ibid.} Larbi Kéchat, the leader of the Stalingrad Mosque, was known to be sympathetic to the insurgent movement in Algeria. Kéchat was born in Algeria in 1952 and emigrated to France during the Second Wave of
immigration in 1972.\textsuperscript{67} He voiced his opposition to the Algerian security forces’ suppression of the political enfranchisement of the Algerian people. Additionally, he lobbied the French government to stop its support for the unelected interim government in favor of the democratically elected FIS.

Kéchat attempted to work with the Interior Ministry insisting that Algerian immigrant populations had “become part of the French family.”\textsuperscript{68} However, as conflict escalated in Algeria and insurgent groups began to target French nationals there, France’s Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, began to arrest members of the Algerian diaspora population in France. In 1993, Kéchat was one of 26 detainees to be held on suspicion of collusion with insurgents in Algeria. Shortly thereafter, 20 of the 26 detainees, not including Kéchat, were deported to Burkina Faso.\textsuperscript{69} Kéchat was kept under house arrest for over a year.

\textbf{POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS/GROUPS}

\textit{SOS-RACISME}

In the late 1980s, SOS-Racisme gained popularity among French Muslims during the Rushdie and Veil crises. SOS-Racisme lobbied against French racism, particularly in response to the expulsion of Muslim girls from French schools for refusing to remove their headscarves. Membership in the organization was diverse, including Islamic converts in France, French students, Franco-Algerians, and other Maghrebian immigrants and second-generation Muslim immigrants.

\textsuperscript{67} Viorst, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Viorst, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Viorst, Ibid.
Although SOS-Racisme served as an important counter to Front National, there is little evidence that it played a direct role in lobbying the French government to change its position on the Algerian war or in encouraging Franco-Algiers to involve themselves in conflict. Instead, SOS-Racisme was concerned primarily with the domestic treatment of Islamic populations in France and lobbying for greater social and political rights for Islamic immigrants.

However, as other political groups with more Algeria-specific agendas began to take hold in France in the late 1980s, membership of SOS-Racisme began to decline, perhaps indicating a shift towards groups with a more radicalized agenda. As Marc Sageman describes in *Understanding Terrorist Networks*, group affiliation can build networks of participation that transition loyalties, bringing other group members with them. The social networks forged in SOS-Racisme could have facilitated the transition for members of the Algerian diaspora to become active in networks participating in conflict in Algeria.70

**UNION OF FRENCH ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS (UOIF)**

The UOIF was established in 1983 as an umbrella association for some two hundred groups that promote Islamic orthodoxy in France.71 Additionally, the UOIF was rumored to be a branch of an Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, in France. Its headquarters in the Paris suburb of La Courneuve produced books, videotapes, and audiocassettes aimed at advancing political Islam. The group also conducted courses and camps to train Islamic activists.72

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71 Viorst, Ibid.
72 Viorst, Ibid.
Throughout the conflict in Algeria, the UOIF discouraged violence against civilians in Algeria and France. However, they continued to lobby the French and Algerian governments to respect the Algerian people’s rights to self-determination, insisting that France should do “its utmost for democracy to return as soon as possible.”73 There is little evidence to suggest that the leadership of the UOIF participated directly in conflict promotion in Algeria but it is possible that some of its members were able to network within the organization to find recruits to facilitate the conflict.

**FRANCE PLUS**

France Plus was founded in the 1980s to urge Muslim youth to become more French—to vote, finish school, join the police, and enlist in the army.74 France Plus, unlike other Islamic groups, defied the predominant Muslim position on the *hijab*, urging parliament to ban the veil in schools.75 France Plus largely alienated itself from the Algerian conflict to maintain its legitimacy and independence from “Islamist” causes and to continue to lobby the French government for equal rights.

**CIVIL SOCIETY/SOCIAL GROUPS**

**COMITES INTERNATIONAL DE SOUTIEN AUX INTELLECTUALS ALGERIANS (CISIA)**

As the violence in Algeria worsened, thousands of Algerians sought asylum in France. Simultaneously, Charles Pasqua tried to weed out insurgent bases in France. As a result, the French government introduced a policy demanding housing papers for immigration and cut off

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74 Viorst, Ibid.
75 Viorst, Ibid.
asylum visas. CISIA lobbied the French government for asylum rights for Algerian refugees, providing legal and administrative advice to those fleeing persecution, while garnering media attention to the suffering of civilians in Algeria.\textsuperscript{76} CISIA helped highlight the mistreatment of the Algerian populous by the security forces, bringing international attention to the civil war.

\textbf{WOMEN AND SOCIAL GROUPS}

In the 1980s, women took an active role in establishing social organizations both in France and in Algeria to facilitate political change. As the civil war worsened, more than one hundred groups throughout France engaged in solidarity activities with Algeria in order to bring international attention to the atrocities being carried out on the ground in Algeria and to highlight the French government’s inattention to this ongoing crisis.\textsuperscript{77} For instance, in the summer of 1999 in Toulouse, a group of Algerians organized to draw attention to the people “sans papiers:”\textsuperscript{78} the numerous Algerian refugees who had fled to France illegally throughout the civil war as a result of France’s newly strict immigration policy. When these immigrants were unable to find work, many became the target for French police investigations, leading to their imprisonment and exposure to radicalized networks.

\textbf{RADICALIZED NETWORKS IN FRANCE}

\textit{Fraternité Algérienne Français}

The Fraternité Algérienne Français (FAF) represented the political wing of the FIS in France. Its primary goal was to inform members of the Algerian diaspora on the ongoing conflict

\textsuperscript{77} Lloyd, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Lloyd, Ibid.
in Algeria, the efforts of FIS, AIS, and GIA mujhadeen in Algeria, and the role the French
government played in supporting the military “junta” in Algeria. These publications included the
weekly newsletter Le Critère, which was distributed every Friday to Mosque goers in France’s
main cities. Le Critère was printed in French and Arabic with over 20,000 copies distributed
each week. 79

Le Critère and its subsequent manifestations (La Résistance and L’Entendre) not only
highlighted atrocities being carried out by the Algerian government against civilians, but pointed
out the French government’s support for Algerian security forces and in turn, France’s
complicity in Algerian suffering. 80 FAF newsletters insisted that, “those who cooperate with the
[Algerian] regime…will be considered as parties to the crime against the Algerian people,” and
will have “their citizens attacked and their interests destroyed.” 81

FAF language in these publications recalled events that had occurred in the Algerian war
of Independence in order to increase the resonance of their message with first generation
immigrants and to encourage Franco-Algerian participation in the conflict. Additionally, Le
Critère praised the efforts of the mujhadeen in Algeria, calling on Franco-Algerians to engage in
jihad against the Algerian government and its supporters.

79 Collyer, Michael, “Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and

80 “Publicizing the Islamic Struggle in Algeria, published by the FIS supporters in Europe” --

16, 1993, p.14
As a result of growing tension between FIS supporters in France and the French government, from 1993-1995, Pasqua began to target all forms of Algerian political Islam in France to prevent the Algerian struggle from spilling over onto French territory. Pasqua warned, “Algerians, resident on our territory, who are close to the FIS…must respect our laws. They should not carry out any political activities on our territory that run contrary to French interests.”

Tensions between the Interior Ministry and the FAF/FIS continued to grow as the FIS set up networks that provided financial and material support to insurgents in Algeria—like the FLN had done during the war for independence between 1954 and 1962. During this period, ethnic profiling and arrests targeting North African immigrants further alienated these populations from the French state augmenting support of the FAF and likeminded organizations.

In November 1993, 88 people linked to the FAF were arrested and accused of associating with terrorists, including the FAF President, Djaffar El Houari. Moussa Kraouche and Abdelhak Boudjaadar, spokesmen of the FAF, were detained with Djaffar El-Houari under suspicion of affiliation with terrorist groups. After uncovering documents that appeared to establish France as a “rear base for clandestine fighters,” making French territory “a kind of backyard for the civil war.” During his detention, Kraouche was quoted in Le Monde offering advice “to anyone looking for asylum today, I certainly would not advise them to come to France.” Djaffar El Houari the leader of FAF was kept under house arrest for ten months and then removed to

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82 Collyer, Ibid.
83 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, GIA Profile, August 31, 2010.
84 “Roundup of Fundamentalists Yields ‘Little’,” LE FIGARO, Paris, 13-14 Nov 1993, p.6
Burkina Faso with 20 other Algerian Islamists allegedly linked to the FIS. France quickly shifted from being a place of asylum for people fleeing persecution, to being a place where young Muslims felt unwelcome.

As tensions increased in 1994, following the bombing of the French consulate in Algiers, all French consulates were closed. Additionally, following the GIA’s hijacking of an Air France flight in 1994, all Air France flights to Algeria were suspended. Other international airlines followed suit and by the end of 1999, only Air Algerie provided regular service to or from Algeria. From 1988 to 1995, the number of short-term visas granted to Algerians fell from 500,000 to 40,000. Finally, the former Algerian Prime minister Abdelhamid Brahimi was refused permission to continue living in France due to perceived links with political Islam and was re-located to the UK.

In 1994, The AIS, in a statement to al-Hayat, said the call for war against France was a policy change by the FIS, which had been distorted by the media. The AIS insisted that, "calling for war against France is a legitimate matter which we maintain in view of the fact that it (France) has become a part of the Algerian war by way of financial and military support to the oppressive regime, in addition to its military presence (hundreds of gendarmes) in Algeria." The message continued, "As for the matter of carrying the war into France, this is something that is absolutely not mentioned in the mujahideen (Islamic holy warriors') declaration." As evidenced through these proclamations, the message FAF leaders disseminated to their followers was

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86 Collyer, Ibid
87 Collyer, Ibid.
88 Collyer, Ibid.
sometimes confusing, highlighting the French government’s corrupt support for the Algerian government but insisting not to target French interests in France. This confusion among members of the diaspora community may have enhanced their vulnerability to the more extreme rhetoric espoused by the GIA.

*ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP*

Like the FIS, the GIA established a logistical infrastructure in Western Europe, which raised money, supplied arms, and provided recruitment to the insurgency in Algeria.⁹⁰ In addition to France, sources indicate that the GIA’s financial support predominately came from Algerian immigrants in the United Kingdom. In June 1995, the French Directorate of Judicial Police (DCPJ), the crime squad and the Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST) conducted a series of raids in Marseilles, Orleans, Villejuif, Tourcoing, Aubervilliers, La Plaine-Saint-Denis and the 18th arrondissement of Paris, detaining and questioning at least 70 Franco-Algerians.⁹¹ After initially conducting searches it appeared as though the groups were “oriented toward political activism,” however, “the discovery of major sums of money, which might be the result of fitra collection…[and] various trafficking operations, from pharmaceuticals to cars,”⁹² made officials concerned about augmented support among the diaspora for GIA activities in Algeria.

This operation uncovered a network of Algerian students predominately in the Paris and Marseilles areas who “made it possible” to send underground weapons, munitions and radio broadcast materiel to Islamists in Algeria.⁹³ French police also discovered a list of 128 names,

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⁹⁰ Janes, Ibid
⁹¹ Janes, Ibid
⁹³ *LE MONDE*, ibid. 40
which enabled anti-terrorism officials “to finger what immediately seems to be a true organized network.” In addition to cells in France and the United Kingdom, the list revealed that the GIA had successfully set up networks in Belgium, Germany and Italy.

Open source intelligence identified Boualem Bensaid as the leader of the GIA’s European branch. Bensaid was convicted in October 2002 of the 1995 Paris bombing campaigns. He established operational and logistical cells in Paris, Lille, Lyon, Vaulx-en-Velin and Chasse-sur-Rhone. Although the Vaulx-en-Velin cell actively carried out attacks in Paris and Lyon, most of the other cells in France served primarily a logistical function: smuggling weapons, funding and supplying recruits and material to the insurgency abroad.

However, in the mid-1990s, voluntary contributions to GIA activities became scarce when the atrocities GIA operatives committed against civilian populations in Algeria were publicized by the international media. As a result, the GIA used criminal methods to raise funds, including “war taxes, raised through extortion rackets levied on businesses and individuals in Algeria and Europe.” Throughout the 1990s, multiple Algerian-owned businesses in France reported suffering from intimidation from GIA members to provide funding. Additionally, the large influx of illegal immigrants flowing into France after the start of the civil war provided an

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94 LE MONDE, Ibid. 40
95 LE MONDE, Ibid. 40
96 LE MONDE, Ibid. 40
97 Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid
98 Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid
99 Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid
easy pool for GIA gangs to prey on since they could threaten them with exposure if they failed to provide a cut of their wages.\textsuperscript{100}

In the early 1990s, reports of an alleged “turf war” between members of the FIS and the GIA surfaced, where the groups were fighting over the “lucrative drugs, counterfeit and stolen goods trade between Algeria and France.”\textsuperscript{101} Additionally, the GIA actively recruited in Algeria and Europe from criminal populations in prison, promising them regular pay and a sense of belonging.\textsuperscript{102}

The GIA, like other radical Islamist organizations, put some emphasis on recruiting through social programs that targeted poorer families in the French suburbs and attempted to set up recruitment in Mosques. Although the GIA was successful in attracting European operatives to their cause, the recruitment and training of these volunteers was a tedious and difficult process because of the inherent risk involved in their radicalization. A trusted operational leader would encourage a group of potential recruits to join gun clubs and socialize, while discussing the evils of Western society.\textsuperscript{103} When potential recruits were identified for further training they would be initiated into the group by carrying out criminal activities. If they were successful in these more manageable tasks, they would be asked to take on a larger role within the organization and begin to plan attacks in Algeria or Europe.\textsuperscript{104}

In addition to the pool of available recruits within France, the Schengen Agreement enabled illicit networks to travel freely within the territories of the nine European signatory

\textsuperscript{100} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Le Monde, Ibid. 40
\textsuperscript{103} Le Monde, Ibid. 40
\textsuperscript{104} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
states. This enhanced the ability of GIA supporters to avoid detection while transferring weapons, radios, money, drugs and other illicit materials for transport to Algeria.

France was viewed by GIA leadership as a supporter of Zeroal’s corrupt regime, making it a legitimate target of attacks both in Algeria and in France. In 1994, GIA leader, Djamal Zitouni, masterminded the hijacking of the Air France plane at Algiers Airport and the kidnapping of seven French monks in Algeria. His successor, Antar Zouabri, released GIA leaflets in Algiers’ mosques that endorsed Zitouni’s legacy of struggle and the battle against France. Additionally, the GIA issued a statement distributed by fax in Europe saying that "France supplies all the reasons that justify our struggle against its policy."

As a result of the hijacking in 1994 and the Paris bombings in 1995, Charles Pasqua’s replacement, Jean Louis Debre, initiated an even more aggressive counterterrorism campaign. French anti-terrorist police discovered a GIA arms cache of in Choisy le Roy, a Paris suburb, including assault rifles, riot guns and a rocket launcher, together with ammunition and documents. Debre increased anti-terrorism initiatives aimed at dismantling the logistical support networks of the GIA in France to prevent the GIA from using France as a rear base for its Algerian operations.

In June 1995, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, the examining magistrate in charge of anti-terrorist activities in France, organized a raid, conducted by 400 hundred Police officers against suspected...
GIA support cells throughout Paris and its suburbs, as well as Orleans, Tourcoing, Perpignan and Marseille. They detained an Algerian imam in the Paris suburb of Vitry-sur where two air rifles and cartridges were reportedly found at his home.109 Police were provided 50 targets, including two hotels in the 18th arrondissement of Paris. Forty suspects were held in the Paris region and nine in Marseille, where police raided a garage in a hunt for vehicles suspected of carrying arms.110

On February 18, 2002, after sweeping arrests and searches spanning from 1996-1998, a Paris court sentenced 26 “suspected” members of the GIA network to up to 10 years in prison. The group consisted predominately of Algerian young men from Lyon, who received training in Algeria, Afghanistan and Bosnia.111

Although the GIA was able to establish a large logistical support network in France that enabled it to carry out operations in Algeria and in France, when the French government implemented stricter anti-terrorism measures, GIA resources were severely handicapped. This will be discussed further in the conclusions section below.

**GSPC in France**

After Hassan Hattab founded the GSPC—described in the background section of this paper—it grew in popularity and largely supplanted the GIA in Algeria, acquiring an estimated membership of 5,000.112 As the GSPC continued to gain popularity in Algeria, it began to work

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111 The Guardian, Ibid.
112 *Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index*, Ibid.
to co-opt the GIAs network of European suppliers.\textsuperscript{113} GSPC leadership set up safe houses in France and took over previously established GIA safe houses, exploiting existing supply lines to transport weapons, medicine and finances to fighters in Algeria.\textsuperscript{114} However, following Pasqua’s and Debre’s crackdown on North African immigrants throughout the 1990s, many of these networks were dismantled or forced to move into other European countries, with Britain becoming a popular destination for GSPC supporters.\textsuperscript{115}

**INDIVIDUAL CASES**

*CHALABI NETWORK/EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIMS IN FRANCE*

In 1994, investigations into a network of GIA supporters in France were tied to the AEMF, led by Mohamed and Brahim Chalabi.\textsuperscript{116} The cell’s headquarters, located in Val de Marne, was found responsible for distributing military and paramilitary equipment, ammunition, uniforms, and time fuses to GIA operatives in Algeria. The second site in Paris’s 10\textsuperscript{th} Arrondisement, was responsible for forging papers for fundamentalists belonging to the GIA. The third site stocked equipment and housed individuals engaged in criminal or terrorist activity. French surveillance revealed that the network served as a “logistical and transit base for militants fleeing Algeria, the acquisition and setting up of stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and explosives,” as well as, “the international links of the network [of GIA supporters] in Germany, Canada, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands.”\textsuperscript{117} Pasqua highlighted that “French citizens of

\textsuperscript{113} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism Index, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} *Paris LCI Television*, Ibid.
Algerian origin were involved in the network.”¹¹⁸ The 140 suspected GIA militants associated with the Chalabi network were held in France in August 1997 on charges of arms trafficking.¹¹⁹

Ali “Tarek” Touchent:

Ali Touchent, also known by the alias “Tarek,” was a 39-year-old Algerian architecture student in France, believed to have masterminded the wave of attacks in Paris in the 1990s, which left eight people dead and 151 injured. In March of 1995, Belgian officials attempted to arrest Tarek but he evaded capture and fled to the Netherlands where he arranged with militants in Lille to acquire forged papers to surreptitiously return to France.¹²⁰

By the end of April 1995, Touchent was spotted in Chasse-sur-Rhone near Lyon. Anti-terrorist investigators in France believed that Touchent was at the direction of a top GIA leader, Mohammed Said, who entrusted him to be the group’s representative in France. Touchent apparently liaised with GIA financier, Rachid Ramda, 36, from London.¹²¹ Touchent was also put in touch with Bouled Bensaid. Together, they established a network of supporters with French citizenship from among the Algerian diaspora in the Paris and Lyon suburbs, including Khaled Kelkal.¹²² Touchent was killed in Algeria in 1998.

Safe Bourada

Safe Bourada was arrested for leading a cell of French-Algerians and two converts in

¹¹⁸ Paris LCI Television, Ibid.
¹¹⁹ Paris LCI Television, Ibid.
the Chasse-sur-Rhone area of France. He is believed to be the right-hand-man of Ali “Tarek” Touchent, the “ring leader of the French support group” for the GIA. He was arrested along with thirty-six of the cell’s members and convicted by French courts for logistically assisting GIA activities in France, by providing GIA operatives with shelter, false documents, money, recruitment, training, transportation and weapons.\textsuperscript{124} During his trial in 1997, Bourada admitted to recruiting Khaled Kelkal but insisted that his cell played only a logistical role in facilitating GIA activities against the Algerian government and that they did not participate in attacks against the French state.\textsuperscript{125} Sixteen of the thirty-six accused were Algerian nationals, eighteen were second-generation Algerian immigrants with French nationality, and six had dual Algerian-French citizenship.\textsuperscript{126} At their homes, police seized firearms, ammunition, homemade detonators, Islamic propaganda material, and address books.\textsuperscript{127}

Two French converts to Islam, Jaime and Vallat, led to the cells arrest.\textsuperscript{128} They were under surveillance for undergoing military training in Afghanistan. The subsequent analysis of the documents seized and of telephone calls made by the two men, enabled investigators to piece together information about the network and its links to other GIA-support groups in Belgium,

\textsuperscript{123} “France puts Muslim Militants on Trial for bombings that killed eight,” \textit{The Independent}, London, November 25, 1997
\textsuperscript{126} “38 go on trial accused of backing Algerian extremis network,” \textit{Agence France-Presse}, November 24, 1997.
\textsuperscript{127} 38 go on Trial, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} 38 go on Trial, Ibid.
Germany, Britain and Italy. This information led to additional arrests and highlighted the disparate support network for GIA activities within Europe.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{KHALED KELKAL}

Khaled Kelkal was a French citizen of Algerian origin who was shot down by French gendarmes in Lyon in 1995.\textsuperscript{130} He was recruited by Safe Bourada and participated in transporting arms to Algeria for the GIA at least twice.\textsuperscript{131} Additionally, he was suspected of leading the Vaux-en-Velin cell of French-Algerians and Islamic converts outside of Lyon. On July 11 1995, he led the assassination of Sheikh Abdelbaki Sahraoui, an 85-year-old Muslim cleric and co-founder of the FIS, leading to the collapse of the Rome Agreement proceedings.\textsuperscript{132}

Additionally, Kelkal’s network was charged with placing four bombs, packed with nails and bolts to increase casualties, that exploded in the Paris RER in 1995 and the attempted bombing of a TGV Paris-Lyon train in 1995.\textsuperscript{133} Kelkal was also accused of working with two Algerian nationals, Boualem Bensaid and Ali “Tarek” Touchent, to carry out the deadly 1995 RER bombings in Paris.\textsuperscript{134}

Kelkal was one of ten children of an Algerian immigrant who had moved to France to find work.\textsuperscript{135} In 1990, Kelkal’s and his mother visited Algeria around 1992 when the conflict

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\textsuperscript{129} 38 go on Trial, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} “Debre: One Team Responsible for Terrorist Attacks, La police pense avoir découvert la trace de Khaled Kelkal près de Lyon”, \textit{Paris LCI Television}, 30 September 1995.
\textsuperscript{131} “French Trial to highlight Islamic terror network,” \textit{The Guardian}, November 24, 1997.
\textsuperscript{132} “Debre: One Team Responsible for Terrorist Attacks, La police pense avoir découvert la trace de Khaled Kelkal près de Lyon”, \textit{Paris LCI Television}, 30 September 1995.
\textsuperscript{133} Paris LCI Television, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Viorst, Ibid.
\end{flushright}
was taking shape.\textsuperscript{136} French police reports indicate that Islamist extremists recruited him during this visit.\textsuperscript{137} His fingerprints were found on several of the devices used in the bombings.\textsuperscript{138} His death generated a significant amount of controversy in France because of the French police’s treatment of his body post-mortem, kicking his body and firing at him multiple times in front of television cameras.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT CYCLE

LATENT PHASE (1988-1990)

There is little evidence that the Algerian diaspora in France participated in this phase of conflict. Instead, it appears they were engaged more domestically with issues they confronted within France, including the Rushdie and Veil Crises. Participation in pan-national Muslim groups like SOS-Racisme and the UOIF were popular during this period, where these groups could lobby the French government for greater equality in economic and political affairs within France. However, it is possible that involvement in these pan-national, rights-based groups facilitated networking amongst disaffected members of the Algerian diaspora. These networks could have facilitated recruitment to political groups like the FIS when exiled Salafist FIS leaders fled to France after the start of the civil war.

SECOND/THIRD PHASE (1990-1994)

During the second and third phases of conflict, as resources began to be mobilized for the conflict and the positions of the warring parties became articulated, the FIS established the FAF in France. Initially, there was a community of 800,000 Algerians within France that

\textsuperscript{136} Foreign Affairs, Ibid
\textsuperscript{137} Foreign Affairs, Ibid
\textsuperscript{138} Foreign Affairs, Ibid.
remained largely indifferent to the fiery sermons of preachers in Algeria and at home.\textsuperscript{139} However, in 1990, the spokesman for the National Federation of Muslims in France (FNMF) indicated that a “shockwave” from the election of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria “should not be long in reaching France.”\textsuperscript{140}

In 1992, 1993 and 1994 the FAF/FIS did not have “the resources nor the strategy to bring the war [to France].”\textsuperscript{141} The purpose of the FAF was to distribute pamphlets and publications in order to collect money and facilitate the political mobilization of the Algerian populous to do something for the cause in the “political arena.”\textsuperscript{142} As a result of these publications, members of the diaspora began to “smuggle arms to Algeria.”\textsuperscript{143}

The Algerian diaspora in France, which traditionally did not control any particular social movement, began to talk of an FIS outpost being set up in Paris that would provide aid and social support to immigrants from Algeria. Furthermore, suspected terrorists in Morocco began to reveal that Algerian insurgents had been actively recruiting from the Algerian diaspora within France.\textsuperscript{144} Additionally, the FNMF spokesman highlighted that the Association of Algerians in Europe and the Paris Mosque were losing favor with the Algerian populous because of their ties to the FLN.\textsuperscript{145} Franco-Algerians abandoned these associations when the Algerian government’s harsh treatment of Algerian intellectuals and civilians became apparent following the 1992 coup.

\textsuperscript{139} “Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France,” \textit{Paris LE FIGARO}, 28 June 1990, p. 44
\textsuperscript{140} “Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France,” \textit{Paris LE FIGARO}, 28 June 1990, p. 44
\textsuperscript{142} Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France, Ibid
\textsuperscript{143} Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France, Ibid
\textsuperscript{144} Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France, Ibid
\textsuperscript{145} Fundamentalists May Try to Infiltrate France, Ibid
During these phases of conflict, the Algerian diaspora became a welcome refuge for exiled political leaders from Algeria and Islamist ideologues. Additionally, thousands of Algerian civilians sought asylum and reunification with relatives in France. The mixture of disaffected second-generation Algerian youths with Islamist political figures fleeing persecution and civilians fleeing state oppression provided a ripe environment for the FIS and GIA to seek recruits to logistically support their efforts in Algeria.

**FOURTH PHASE (1994-1998)**

By the time the conflict was fully under way in Algeria, it became apparent that the FIS and the GIA were competing to recruit discontented members of the Algerian diaspora in France to provide support to their causes in Algeria. Pasqua’s failure to distinguish between the more moderate FAF and the militant GIA, led to an indiscriminate clampdown on Algerians within France, forcing FAF leadership out of France and many networks underground. The government raids encouraged “the transition to working underground” opening up the path to “all kind[s] of radicalization.”

Moreover, these indiscriminate arrests enabled the GIA to co-opt FIS supporters, as moderates were arrested or deported. A French diplomat claimed that “cutting off the foundations of [the Algerian diasporas’] officials and letting hatred win out…contributed toward filling out the ranks of the GIA underground…making it impossible in France to advocate a form of Islamism that calls for compliance with republican laws.” The targeting of Franco-Algernians by French anti-terrorism police forces contributed to the disaffection of more moderate

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146 Refer to Appendix for a timeline of attacks on France.
147 FIS leader: Pasqua Policy Bred Radicalization, Ibid.
148 FIS leader: Pasqua Policy Bred Radicalization, Ibid.
Franco-Algerians during this time period. As a result, Pasqua’s attempts to dismantle the FAF led many of their supporters to transfer their allegiance to GIA networks in France, which continued to operate underground and advocated that members of the diaspora use violence against their host state.

Despite opposition from the domestic Algerian diaspora population, the French government continued to support Algerian security forces throughout the conflict. As a result, terrorist activity targeting French interests escalated. Initially, attacks were primarily carried out against French interests in Algeria, including the murder of seven French monks and the destruction of the French consular housing units. However, during the Air France highjacking in 1994, the GIA announced that it was bringing the war to France. The GIA released a list of demands for the French government to comply with to prevent attacks being carried out on French soil. At the same time, the GIA began to train members of the diaspora community, like Khaled Kelkal, who had been involved in logistical support operations for the conflict, to carry out terrorist attacks against their host state. Despite GIA warnings, the French government refused to change its position on the war. As a result, in 1995, French citizens of Algerian descent began to execute terrorist attacks against their host state.

From 1991-1993, the FAF and GIA networks were able to recruit Franco-Algerians to their cause because of the political opportunity structure available in France, which provided its citizens with rights to freedom of speech and assembly. However, as insurgent activity spilled-over to target French interests, crackdowns intensified on illicit networks and suspected terrorist

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supporters in France. From July to October 1995, Pasqua and Debre initiated a huge “stop and search” operation against the whole North African community. Prime Minister Alain Juppe highlighted that “[the French government] ha[s] reintroduced border controls, including those countries with whom we have signed the Schengen agreement; we have twenty-eight mobile squadrons of police and army patrols. Since July 26, we have stopped and searched more than 660,000 people and more than 28,000 vehicles.” Finally, in September of 1995, President Chirac appeared on television to confirm that France had effectively suspended the Schengen agreement to ensure the safety of the French people and discourage further radicalization.

As the political opportunity structure in France became more rigid from 1995-1998, support networks and safe houses in France began to move to Germany, Belgium and the UK, where they were not as actively targeted by domestic intelligence services and police forces. This did not prevent the Algerian diaspora community in Europe from continuing to support insurgent activity in Algeria, but it did prevent members of the diaspora in France from playing an active role in conflict promotion and from executing additional attacks against their host government.


The French government’s crackdown on suspected terrorists from 1994-1998, in conjunction with the Algerian government’s targeted counterterrorism campaign, reduced the level of conflict and the participation of France’s Algerian diaspora groups in conflict promotion. Additionally, the Algerian government’s introduction of amnesty agreements helped reduce support for the insurgency from civilian populations in Algeria. Furthermore, the collapse of the GIA in Algeria and the rise of the GSPC mitigated the role Franco-Algerians played in conflict.

\[150\] Paris-France Teletext-2, Ibid
in Algeria. Although the GSPC co-opted many GIA cells in Europe for logistical support, Pasqua and Debre had dismantled most of the GIA cells within France by the time the GSPC began to actively recruit in Europe.

Despite the transfer of support to other European countries, the French government remained vigilant in its counterterrorism efforts. Two more waves of arrests in 1998, led to the arrest of 53 people as a security measure before the world cup in Strasbourg. Additionally, in 2001, after the World Trade Center attacks, targeted anti-terrorism investigations focused on Algerian networks within France. France, which was once a refuge for asylum seekers and refugee populations became an unwelcome place for North African and other Muslim immigrant populations.

Therefore, as the political opportunity structure in France became inhospitable to Islamic political movements, the networks of support set up in France by exiled GIA and FIS leadership quickly collapsed or moved location. Although Algerian diaspora groups in other European countries like Britain continued to lend logistical support to the conflict, the disruption of recruitment networks in France significantly reduced the pool of recruits the GIA and FIS could exploit to support activities in Algeria. The reduction of transnational support for the insurgency put the newly elected Algerian President Boutefilka in a better position to negotiate with these groups on the ground in Algeria. Thus, by dismantling the opportunity structure in France, the French government was able to interdict the Algerian diaspora’s promotion of conflict in Algeria.

151 “Bomb Suspects go on Trial in France, Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Center, October, 2004.
However, as this study indicates, the prejudicial targeting of Franco-Algerians in the early 1990s increased their feelings of alienation and exclusion from French society. This discrimination likely radicalized some members of the Franco-Algerian population who initially were not drawn to political Islam. Additionally, as previously stated, the French government’s decision to deport the leadership of non-violent, political groups like the FAF, encouraged members of the Algerian diaspora community to join the GIA’s underground network. GIA supporters subscribed to a more radical ideology that embraced violence, leading diaspora members to plan and execute terrorist attacks against their host state. Even though the French government was eventually able to move most of these networks out of France, the government increased the sense of alienation felt by members of the diaspora, augmenting the salience of the GIA’s jihadist ideology within its North African immigrant communities.

**SIXTH PHASE (2002-PRESENT)**

Although the Algerian government was largely able to resolve conflict in Algeria in 1998, with the introduction of amnesty agreements and elections, conflict transcended the Algerian state to become a regional issue. After 9/11, the GSPC’s was added to the State Department’s list of terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the GSPC continued to consolidate support in the Maghreb, and eventually would merge with GICM. In 2003, GSPC leadership pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. In 2007, the GSPC/GICM officially became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).\(^{152}\)

Although the role that Algerian diaspora populations played in conflict promotion in Algeria dwindled following the Pasqua and Debre years, members of the Algerian diaspora in

France and other Western European countries remained a concern for anti-terrorism officials. As a result, since 2002, there have been multiple arrests of French-Algerian citizens suspected of “homegrown” terrorism in support of al-Qaeda activity.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT CYCLE**

As discussed throughout this essay, members of the Algerian diaspora in France did play an active role in conflict promotion by providing a network of financial and logistical support for the insurgency in Algeria. At the outset of the conflict, exiled FIS leaders were able to set up outposts in France and disseminate information on the Algerian civil war to members of the diaspora. The French government’s continued support for Algerian security forces increased Franco-Algerian support for the FIS. As a result, Franco-Algerians transferred loyalty from institutions in France, like the Paris Mosque that represented the HCE, to those that lobbied the French government to change its position on the war. Additionally, the opportunity structure in France at the beginning of the 1990s enabled FIS leaders to set up networks of political support within France. However, as the conflict transformed in Algeria and as French police arrested and deported FAF leaders, the GIA successfully co-opted these existing networks to transport weapons and finance their operations in Algeria.

Despite domestic protest, the French government continued to support the HCE. As a result, the GIA used networks in France to target French interests to encourage the French government to change its position on the war. These terrorist attacks led France’s Interior Ministers, Pasqua and Debre, to initiate anti-terrorism campaigns targeting the Franco-Algerian population. These discriminatory arrests encouraged networks of support for the insurgency to go underground. As a result, members of the Algerian diaspora in France shifted loyalties from
the FIS to the GIA, embracing the GIA’s more violent and radical agenda. Members of the diaspora began to plan and execute terrorist attacks against their host state. As the conflict continued and terrorist attacks against the French state escalated, the Interior Ministry initiated harsher counterterrorism campaigns. Eventually, these anti-terrorism initiatives made the opportunity structure in France inhospitable to these networks and they were forced to relocate to other European countries where they could operate more freely.

VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Since 9/11, the rise of non-state actors and the threat of Islamic terrorism have become a primary security concern for Western nations. Recently, attention has shifted from a focus on threats posed by external actors to that posed by “homegrown” terrorists. Counterterrorism efforts have become more concentrated on the role that domestic Islamic diaspora and immigrant populations will play in the global jihad. As the Internet, mobile networks, twitter and facebook enable diaspora and immigrant communities to maintain strong connections to their states of origin, they enhance the ability of diaspora groups to develop transnational networks. Furthermore, the opportunity structure available in democratic countries makes it difficult for Western governments to discourage their diaspora populations from forming networks and mobilizing resources to facilitate political change in their countries of origin.

Additionally, incipient diaspora groups, like the Algerian diaspora in France, do not have long established political and community organizations that are recognized by their host states— unlike more established diaspora groups (the Jewish diaspora), which can use these organizations to lobby for peaceful change. Their disparate nature, lack of political organization, and potential segregation from the societies in which they live, make it more difficult for host
state governments to negotiate policies to interdict their negative involvement in conflict
promotion and alternatively promote their positive participation in conflict resolution.

As evidenced by this study, incipient diaspora groups can become ripe for radicalization
for transnational Islamist terrorist networks like the GIA. As youth in these groups continue to be
exposed to conflicts in their states of origin where terrorism is used to achieve military gains,
they can become prone to radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations with pan-
national agendas. As Marc Sageman notes, once in the network it is difficult to disassociate these
individuals from the groups and people with whom they have established relationships.
Therefore, it is important for Western states to consider how their foreign policy positions on
issues of interest to incipient diaspora groups can augment recruitment to terrorist and insurgent
groups.

The United States will face the most acute challenges in monitoring and discouraging
“homegrown” terrorism among its Islamic populations. The Constitution prevents the
government from conducting the same type of domestic surveillance and counterterrorism
initiatives used by the French in the 1990s. Due to these Constitutional protections, incipient
diaspora groups enjoy more freedom of action in the United States than any other Western
country. In light of current “democratic” revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the U.S.
should begin to consider the security threats posed by domestic incipient diaspora populations,
which come from unstable countries. U.S. Policymakers should consider these constituents when
formulating foreign policy initiatives directed at their countries of origin.

In a post 9/11 world, non-state and sub-state actors will continue to threaten international
stability and encourage conflict. In order to combat the negative role diaspora groups can play in
conflict promotion and transnational terrorism, it is important for Western states to reduce the salience of radical ideology with domestic populations. Participation in social and non-violent political group should be encouraged in order to reduce the resonance of radical messages and decrease the likelihood of “underground” movements from taking hold. The U.S. government should capitalize on the political environment created by revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to change Muslim public opinion of the U.S. by working with members of these immigrant populations to promote democracy and peaceful change in the Middle East.
APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR\textsuperscript{153}

1962 - Algeria gains independence from France.
1963 - Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first president.
1965 - Col Houari Boumedienne overthrows Ben Bella, pledges to end corruption.
1976 - Boumedienne introduces a new constitution, which confirms commitment to socialism and role of the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole political party. Islam is recognized as the state religion.
1978 - Boumedienne dies and is replaced by Col Chadli Bendjedid, as the compromise candidate of the military establishment.
1986 - Rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas prices lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.
1988 - Serious rioting against economic conditions.
1989 - The National People's Assembly revokes the ban on new political parties and adopts a new electoral law allowing opposition parties to contest future elections.
1989 - Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), founded and over 20 new parties licensed.
1990 - The FIS wins 55 per cent of the vote in local elections.
1991 December - In the first round of general elections the FIS wins 188 seats outright, and seems virtually certain to obtain an absolute majority in the second round.
1992 4 January - The National People's Assembly is dissolved by presidential decree and on 11 January President Chadli resigns. A five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, takes over. Street gatherings banned, violent clashes break out on 8 and 9 February between FIS supporters and security forces. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is ordered to disband and all 411 FIS-controlled local and regional authorities are dissolved.
1992 29 June - Boudiaf assassinated by his bodyguard with alleged Islamist links. Violence increases and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerges as the main group behind these operations.
1994 - Liamine Zeroual, a retired army colonel, is appointed chairman of the Higher State Council.
1995 - Zeroual wins a five-year term as president of the republic with a comfortable majority.
1996 - Proposed constitutional changes approved in a referendum by over 85 per cent of voters.
1997 - Parliamentary elections won by the newly-created Democratic National Rally, followed by the moderate Islamic party, Movement of Society for Peace.
1998 - President Zeroual announces his intention to cut short his term and hold early presidential elections.
1999 - Former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected as president after all opposition candidates withdraw from race, saying they had received inadequate guarantees of fair and transparent elections.
1999 - Referendum approves Bouteflika's law on civil concord, the result of long and largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are pardoned.
2000 - Attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are thought to be the work of small groups still opposed to the civil concord. Violence is estimated to have claimed over 100,000 lives in Algeria since 1992.
2001 April/May - Scores of demonstrators are killed in violent clashes between security forces and Berber protesters in the mainly Berber region of Kabylie following the death of a teenager in police custody.
2001 May - The mainly Berber party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy, withdraws from the government in protest against the authorities' handling of riots in Kabylie.
2001 October - Government agrees to give the Berber language official status, as part of a package of concessions.
2001 November - Several hundred people are killed as floods hit Algiers.
2002 March - President Bouteflika says the Berber language, Tamazight, is to be recognized as a national language.

\textsuperscript{153} Timeline Algeria, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/811140.stm

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Appendix B: Glossary of Terms

AEMF: Associations des Etudiants Marocains de France

AIS/AIM: Armee Islamique du Salut/ Islamic Army of Salvation (armed wing of the FIS)

AQIM/AQMI: Al Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique/ Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CISIA: Comites International de Soutien Aux Intellectuals Algerians

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut/ Islamic Salvation Front

FAF: Fraternite Algeriene Francais (FIS wing in France)

FNMF: Federation National Muslim Francais

GIA: Groupe Islamique Arme/Armed Islamic Group

GSPC: Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat/ Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

HCE: Haut Comite d’Etat/High Committee of State

SOS-Racisme: Anti-racist movement in France

UIOF: Union of French Islamic Organizations
APPENDIX C: TIMELINE OF GIA TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS


December 1994: An Air France flight to Algiers was hijacked. One passenger was murdered before French commandos killed the hijackers. The hijackers reportedly originally intended to fly the aircraft into the Eiffel Tower.

July 1995: The GIA conducted a series of bombings against subways, markets, a Jewish school, a high-speed train and the Arc de Triomphe in France. Ten people were killed and more than 200 injured.

May 1996: Kidnapping/Assassination of seven Trapist monks from the Monastery of Tribhine.

August 1996: A bombing at the home of the French Archbishop of Oran, Algeria, killed the archbishop and his driver.

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