PROTRACTED STATE INSURGENCIES: COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM SRI LANKA, INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND COLOMBIA

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This thesis applies counterinsurgency theory to four cases of protracted state insurgency to determine common failures in state counterinsurgency response. State measures in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia exhibit common trends that perpetuate internal conflict. The paper developed three sets of findings. The first set of findings support the hypothesis that states perpetuate conflict through ineffective counterinsurgency measures that fail to address the root causes of the insurgency. These findings are: counterinsurgency strategy inadequately integrates political and military measures; failure to give political objectives primacy over military action; and a lack of consistent counterinsurgency direction at the national level. The second set of findings support the hypothesis that states engage in de-legitimizing acts that alienate the target population. These findings are: repressive tactics, emergency regulations, and martial law are counterproductive; ineffective population security de-legitimizes the state government; and states inadequately control and employ paramilitaries and militias in an effective counterinsurgency role. Negotiations and reconciliation emerged as a major factor between the insurgent group and the state. This paper considered negotiations as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. The third set of findings support the hypothesis that negotiations rarely result in success and often lead to an escalation in hostilities. These findings illustrate that ceasefire violations and spoilers on both sides frustrate state attempts at negotiations.
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Policy implications

State counterinsurgency begins with a national plan
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States engage in negotiations; this phenomenon requires further study

Policy recommendations

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Bibliography
I. Introduction

Focus and Main Questions

Internal armed conflict between state and non-state actors has become a predominant trend in warfare since World War II.¹ Rebel groups within a state, eager to enact political change based on deep rooted grievances, often take up arms in an attempt to reallocate state power, overthrow the existing order, or break free from state control.² A better understanding of the dynamics between the state and the individual groups that challenge state sovereignty and integrity may offer valuable lessons for governments in crafting counterinsurgency response. This paper examines specific protracted state-level insurgencies in an attempt to determine common state counterinsurgency trends that prolong the duration of internal conflict.

Several state-level counterinsurgency campaigns have spanned numerous decades. Insurgencies in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Colombia provide four such examples. Throughout their history, these states have displayed varying levels of effectiveness in conducting counterinsurgency operations while often combating numerous insurgent movements at once. While Sri Lanka and Indonesia have only recently experienced a relative degree of counterinsurgency success, insurgencies in the Philippines and Colombia continue.³ This study aims to answer two main questions. First, why do certain state-level insurgencies survive numerous decades without significant government progress towards ending the

¹ Out of the 79 conflicts identified within the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Armed Conflict Database, 52 are categorized as internal conflicts in either an active, dormant, or ceasefire status. They are officially unresolved. An additional 10 internal conflicts are categorized as resolved based on a mutually recognized peace accord. A further 12 conflicts are identified as terrorism. Only 5 are identified as international conflicts between two governments. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, in the Conflict List, http://0-acd.iiss.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictList.asp (accessed March 10, 2010).
³ The level of success within a counterinsurgency campaign can be deceptive. This is due to the metrics many states apply in determining their level of success. The number of insurgents killed or captured has been one metric that states consistently rely on. Many times, this results in a gross underestimation of the insurgent’s influence and strength, and can lead to a false sense of security within the state.
insurgent movements? Secondly, is the duration of internal conflict a symptom of inadequate or failed state counterinsurgency practices? This study attempts to address these questions by utilizing counterinsurgency principles to evaluate state effectiveness across cases and determine common failures in state counterinsurgency response.

Importance

A government’s response to internal challenges affects insurgency duration and outcome. This research highlights the key counterinsurgency failures in government response. Numerous publications exist that are dedicated to identifying counterinsurgency best practices.\(^4\) This research identifies those most critical to state counterinsurgency efforts. As governments combat insurgent movements on indigenous soil, informed decision making by state leadership will facilitate effective counterinsurgency planning. This thesis presents historical trends among states that prevent governments from implementing sound counterinsurgency measures. These trends, developed based on observable state actions, consistently appear counterproductive. States that currently, or in the future, find themselves combating an insurgent movement must consider these failures and lessons when developing counterinsurgency strategy. As insurgency has become the most prevalent form of warfare since World War II, insurgent groups are likely to challenge state authority well into the future.\(^5\)

Protracted insurgent movements directly threaten state and regional security while gaining strength over time. From their inception, the insurgent groups within this study

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developed from bands of guerrillas relatively few in number to sizeable military forces. It is the author’s opinion that the longer an insurgent group exists, the more difficult it becomes to defeat. Logic dictates that an insurgent group is most vulnerable to counterinsurgent action at the early stages of an insurgency, prior to developing the numbers and capability to challenge state authority. By considering the lessons presented within this study, states can improve the probability of defeating an insurgency during its embryonic stage. Defeating an insurgency early is especially critical within the ongoing Global War on Terror. In this environment, insurgent groups share information while many coordinate terrorist activities. According to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “There is a connection among most of the terrorist activities that we’re seeing around the world. They get encouragement from each other. They exchange training, explosives, information.” States must take effective action to defeat an insurgency before it gains strength from regional and global terrorist affiliation.

Differences between state insurgencies and those fought on foreign or colonial soil present significant implications for this research. In the post-9/11 environment, the United States assumed the lead in the Global War on Terror, reinvigorating interest in the nature of insurgent conflict. As a result of the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency practitioners have sought to better understand the dynamics of insurgencies as well as the strategies necessary to defeat them. Practitioners have implemented counterinsurgency practices based on lessons from previous counterinsurgency campaigns fought on foreign or colonial soil. These campaigns have become the predominant historical cases when discussing

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counterinsurgency failure and success. They include the United States in Vietnam, the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Although the lessons of counterinsurgency campaigns waged on foreign soil are well documented, campaigns fought by states on their native soil are an often overshadowed phenomenon.

The study of state-level insurgencies provides further insight into the dynamics of insurgent conflict. In this author’s opinion, the one predominant difference between the two types of insurgencies is time. A state engaged in counterinsurgency on foreign soil, such as the U.S. in Iraq, often faces public and political pressure for disengagement. Over time, this pressure may contribute to the withdrawal of troops due to a stalemate in counterinsurgency operations. For a state combating an internal conflict, disengagement is not an option. Whether faced with a secessionist or revolutionary insurgency, disengagement weakens the state counterinsurgency effort and strengthens the insurgent cause. States that combat an insurgency on foreign soil must prepare for a long-term commitment if they plan to effectively defeat an insurgency. States that combat an insurgency on native soil have no option regarding an all-out commitment to maintain the integrity of the state. As will be seen throughout this study, states continually fail because they implement ineffective counterinsurgency practices that exacerbate the conflicts over time. The conflicts within this study illustrate the truly protracted nature of insurgency that an internal war can assume.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on the research methodology, specifically key concepts, the hypotheses, analytical framework, and case selection. Chapters two through four present the findings of this project as common trends associated with all cases. Chapter five outlines alternative explanations for protracted insurgency. Finally, chapter six provides policy

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implications and recommendations for states who find themselves in combat against an insurgent movement.

Methodology

Key Concepts

Examining state measures associated with insurgency and counterinsurgency begins by defining the critical terms. *Insurgency* may be defined as a political-military campaign waged by non-state actors directed at the ruling government authorities.\(^9\) Insurgent movements are traditionally motivated by either one of two primary objectives: the revolutionary overthrow of the country’s existing government or territorial succession from the state.\(^{10}\) Insurgent activity may take the form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization designed to weaken state legitimacy while increasing the insurgent’s control.\(^{11}\) A critical component of an insurgency is the level of influence the movement achieves over the population. Insurgent groups compete against the government for political control of the people in an effort to be viewed as a legitimate alternative to state authority.\(^{12}\) In his analysis of guerrilla warfare, Chinese leader Mao Zedong emphasized the role of the population by stating that a successful insurgency “derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”\(^{13}\)

*Counterinsurgency* may be defined as actions taken by the state to combat the insurgent movement. These actions consist of military, political, economic, psychological and civic

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\(^{11}\) CIA, 2.

\(^{12}\) U.S. Army, 1-1.

measures designed to weaken or defeat the insurgency.\textsuperscript{14} According to David Galula, counterinsurgency is a political campaign that harnesses all aspects of a state’s capacity towards eradicating an insurgency.\textsuperscript{15} While military action may be necessary to neutralize insurgent forces, these actions should be performed in support of non-military state measures such as re-establishing local governance, economic reform, or infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{16} While military measures are directed at the insurgent group, the non-military measures are directed at the population in order to enhance state legitimacy and reduce the insurgent’s support base.\textsuperscript{17} The struggle over the population between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is often referred to as the battle to win “the hearts and minds of the people.”\textsuperscript{18}

This study’s focus is on protracted insurgencies. The author defines a protracted insurgency as having been active for a duration of three decades or longer. This definition isolated only the most resilient of insurgent conflicts. Additionally, the popular grievances that triggered the insurgent movements were apparent long before each group began armed resistance. While all insurgencies are considered a form of protracted internal conflict, only the most durable and survivable are considered.\textsuperscript{19} The insurgent groups within this study have passed through multiple organizational phases ranging from dormancy to conventional military warfare. The cases are further discussed later in this section.

\textsuperscript{14} U.S. Army, 1-1.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Army, 1-1.
\textsuperscript{18} O’Neill, 169.
\textsuperscript{19} The CIA’s “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” defines all insurgent movements as a form of protracted conflict. See CIA, 2.
Hypotheses

This paper attempted to search for common factors within the dynamics of protracted state counterinsurgency with the objective of evaluating each campaign over time. Though the author acknowledges that each case is unique and must be studied in its own right, there may be benefits in conducting cross-case comparisons to determine the most consistent areas of failure. The following hypotheses provided the framework for evaluating state counterinsurgency within protracted internal conflict:

1) States perpetuate conflict through ineffective counterinsurgency measures that fail to address root causes of the insurgency.

2) States engage in de-legitimizing acts that alienate the target population.

3) Negotiations rarely result in success and often lead to an escalation in hostilities.

The factors utilized to test the hypotheses and determine common failures in state counterinsurgency are discussed below.

Analytical Framework

The case study methodology follows Alexander George’s Controlled Comparison methodology as outlined in “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison.”20 In this methodology, protracted insurgent conflict is the phenomenon of investigation, with counterinsurgency theory as the means for assessment and analysis of state practices. Various publications exist to draw theoretical counterinsurgency variables for analysis.21 This presents several challenges in identifying the primary variables for inquiry.

While many variables are the same across the literature, differences exist between publications

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that must be considered. Additionally, the publications fail to distinguish between strategic, operational, and tactical level counterinsurgency factors. Admittedly, many factors cross strategic, operational, and tactical boundaries, but it is this author’s belief that certain variables may prove more valuable in analyzing the strategic level of state counterinsurgency effort. Lastly, many publications fail to adequately distinguish between variables integral to those states conducting counterinsurgency on native soil vice those conducting counterinsurgency on foreign soil. The intent of this study is to focus on the strategic element of state counterinsurgency on native soil. After considering these challenges, the author prioritized the following counterinsurgency variables as the baseline factors for conducting the cross-case comparison:

1) Government Legitimacy. According to the Manwaring Paradigm, this is “the single most important dimension” in explaining counterinsurgency success or failure. State legitimacy gains and maintains public support in counterinsurgency. Actions that destroy state legitimacy reduce the population’s confidence in the government and lend credence to the insurgent cause. Observable phenomena served as an indicator of state attempts to improve legitimacy among the population. These actions consisted of government measures to provide effective security, control of human rights violations by state security forces, and effective governance to meet the basic needs of the population.

2) Unity of Effort. Counterinsurgency requires unity of effort at all echelons of a campaign with the intent of integrating military, political, economic, and social measures aimed at common objectives. This includes synchronizing civil and military departments towards the goal of

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22 For instance, while the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 emphasizes political factors as primary in a counterinsurgency campaign, there is no mention of political primacy as a critical factor in the Manwaring Paradigm.
23 Corr and Sloan, 12.
conflict resolution while addressing the insurgent cause.\textsuperscript{24} This study assesses the manner in which state governments implemented both military and non-military aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign. Specific focus is placed on the ability of national leadership to synchronize counterinsurgency efforts. Actions that appear inconsistent within the governments’ strategic objectives are reviewed.

3) Political Primacy in Counterinsurgency Strategy. Political factors must maintain predominance within a counterinsurgency campaign. While military operations are necessary to combat violent acts perpetrated by rebel groups, they must maintain the state’s legitimacy within an overall strategic plan. According to U.S. Army \textit{Field Manual 3-24}, “resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that counterinsurgent actions do not hinder achieving that political solution.”\textsuperscript{25} State counterinsurgency measures are reviewed to determine if military operations serve greater political objectives. Military action that appears as an end in itself indicates that political primacy does not govern state counterinsurgency strategy.

4) Security under the Rule of Law. Population security is the key component of counterinsurgency that enhances state legitimacy and prevents expansion of the insurgent support base. Successful security operations performed under the rule of law ensure human rights, gain popular support for the state, and limit the insurgent sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{26} The consideration of human rights within each case is assessed. Repressive tactics, draconian security regulations, and civilian abuse indicate a failure in providing effective population security.

5) Extent of External Support for the State. External support exists in numerous forms that may range from monetary aid, to advisor support, to direct military intervention. The targeted

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{25} U.S. Army, 1-22.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 1-24.
government may receive this support through allied governments, neighboring countries, the United Nations, or non-governmental organizations that specialize in conflict resolution. The presence and type of external support in each case is reviewed. External support is assessed to determine its level of effectiveness in improving state counterinsurgency capacity.

6) Ability to Reduce External Support to the Insurgent. Insurgent groups seek external support to gain material, political, and diplomatic initiative in furthering their cause. Insurgent groups may receive support from both state and non-state actors sympathetic to the insurgent cause. The presence and extent of external support to the insurgent is considered. State measures to combat external support are assessed as a factor in reducing insurgent capability.

Case Selection

The study consists of the following cases:27

1) Colombia vs. Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army)
2) Sri Lanka vs. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
3) Indonesia vs. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (Free Aceh Movement)
4) The Philippines vs. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) / Mora National Liberation Front (MNLF)28

With a large number of past and current insurgent conflicts, analysis of more than a handful of conflicts within the limitations of this paper is impossible. In performing case selection, the initial discriminating criterion consisted of conflict duration. The selected insurgent groups waged internal armed resistance against the state for a period of over three

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28 The paper utilizes the term Moro insurgencies when talking about both groups. The two organizations officially split in 1984.
decades with grievances rooted within society that began far earlier than the outbreak of violence. This criterion excluded insurgencies such as those in Chechnya (1994-present), Nepal (1996-present), Peru (1980-1995), and Germany (1970-1992). All of the conflicts selected are also ongoing. Though many may interpret the conflicts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka as resolved, the International Institute for Strategic Studies categorizes each of the conflicts as active or in ceasefire status. None have been resolved within a mutually acknowledged peace accord and the threat of violence remains.

All the cases consist of a state government that has waged protracted counterinsurgency on native soil. Governments engaged in counterinsurgency on foreign soil and those recognized as colonizing authorities were eliminated from analysis. Additionally, the states within the study have engaged in conflict with more than one insurgent group over the periods in question. In order to provide a wider variance in state experience, and due to time constraints, these subsequent groups were eliminated from the study and are only considered as they relate to the conflict in question.

The differences among the selected cases are stark. The cases represent various national, ethnic, ideological, and class-based conflicts. This typological variance may allow for more general findings and lessons for a variety of current and future conflicts. The governments of all four countries have at various times used both political and military tools to combat the insurgent movements, with varying degrees of success. In the case of Sri Lanka,

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29 Refer to Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” for a comprehensive list of major historical insurgencies.


31 Those groups are listed as follows: Colombia: the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC); Philippines: New People’s Army (NPA) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Indonesia: Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) and Jemaah Islamiah (JI); Sri Lanka: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

32 Refer to Jane’s Information Group, “Group Profiles,” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre for a thorough description of the insurgent groups, to include ideology and objectives.
military operations decisively weakened the LTTE in 2008 and 2009. In Indonesia, political concessions in Aceh led to reconciliation between GAM and the Indonesian government in 2005. The conflicts in both the Philippines and Colombia continue. In the Philippines, the MNLF and MILF, originally one faction, splintered in 1984 due to ideological differences. The government of the Philippines successfully negotiated a peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996, while the MILF continued the secessionist movement in the province of Mindanao. In Colombia, the FARC continues its insurrection based on grievances of peasant reform and greater political participation, though analysts question the legitimacy of this cause due to the group’s involvement in the illegal narcotics trade.\footnote{Marc Chernick, “FARC-EP: Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejercito del Pueblo,” in \textit{Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts}, eds. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 71-74.}

A number of states that have battled protracted insurgencies were excluded from this study. Though significant, the author deemed insurgencies in Northern Ireland, India, and Israel as outside the limits of this paper’s analysis. Britain’s struggle against Irish separatists began in 1916, only achieving significant progress in 2007 with a mutually agreed upon peace accord.\footnote{International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Armed Conflict Database}, in the Conflict List under “United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)”, \url{http://0-acd.iiss.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=188&RegionName=Europe\%20and\%20Russia&RegionID=2} (accessed March 10, 2010).} Israel has battled numerous Palestinian insurgent groups since the 1960s including Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas.\footnote{International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Armed Conflict Database}, in the Conflict List under “Israel (Intifada)”, \url{http://0-acd.iiss.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=165&RegionName=Middle\%20East\%20and\%20North\%20Africa&RegionID=3} (accessed March 10, 2010).} India has struggled against Jammu and Kashmir insurgent groups in the Indian administered Kashmir region since the 1960s.\footnote{International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{Armed Conflict Database}, in the Conflict List under “India-Pakistan (Kashmir)”, \url{http://0-acd.iiss.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=170&RegionName=Central\%20and\%20South\%20Asia&RegionID=6} (accessed March 10, 2010).} The dynamics of
these insurgencies and each state’s counterinsurgency response requires a more in depth analysis than possible within the confines of this paper.

Summary of Findings

By applying the counterinsurgency factors to the four cases, trends in state counterinsurgency measures became apparent. Failures in state legitimacy, security under the rule of law, political primacy, and unity of effort appear significant throughout each case. These factors led to the trends, or findings, that supported the first two hypotheses. Many of these factors are also interrelated throughout the analysis. The findings of the first hypothesis are: counterinsurgency strategy inadequately integrates political and military measures; failure to give political objectives primacy over military action; and a lack of consistent counterinsurgency direction at the national level. These findings contribute to protracted internal conflict because they fail to properly address the insurgent’s cause, which defines its reason for existence.

Findings that support the second hypothesis are: repressive tactics, emergency regulations, and martial law are counterproductive; ineffective population security de-legitimizes the state government; and states inadequately control and employ paramilitaries and militias in an effective counterinsurgency role.

A major counterinsurgency factor that emerged during analysis was the role of negotiations and reconciliation between the insurgent group and the state. This paper considered negotiations as part of a broader state counterinsurgency strategy that augmented military and non-military measures. Negotiations between the state and insurgent group appear significant, though fraught with failure. Ceasefire violations and spoilers on both sides frustrate state attempts at reconciliation. Negotiations alone appear inadequate to resolve an insurgent movement.
A number of alternative explanations are considered. The level of external support for both the insurgent and targeted government varied. Though important, these factors provided inconsistent findings from case to case. They are considered as alternative explanations for protracted conflict that appear to have an impact on individual cases. Other factors not initially identified in the analytical framework also emerged. These factors appear unique to certain cases as it relates to the duration of conflict. They include the flexibility of the insurgent cause and the insurgent groups’ leadership. These factors are also considered in the alternative explanation section.

**Contribution**

This research attempted to bridge a gap between the study of protracted conflict, indigenous state insurgency, and counterinsurgency theory. Many of the findings within this paper reinforce existing counterinsurgency best practices. For instance, the importance of government legitimacy, political primacy, and effective population security within counterinsurgency are undisputed. These factors are often cited as critical variables to military organizations that conduct counterinsurgency on foreign soil in conjunction with a host-nation government. This research finds that these factors also appear true to those states combating insurgencies on native soil. In determining trends in counterinsurgency response, two factors stand-out that seem to differentiate state strategy: the phenomenon of negotiations and the state’s ability to maintain a consistent effort over time.

Negotiations between the state and insurgent group have received little attention by counterinsurgency theorists. In Galula’s seminal piece *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, he mentions the role of negotiations only once. He argues that “the counterinsurgent

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37 These principles of counterinsurgency are emphasized throughout the works of O’Neill, Nagl, Krepinevich, and Sepp.

38 Ibid.
cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength” but makes no reference to negotiations within a broader counterinsurgency strategy.\(^{39}\) In Bard O’Neill’s *Insurgency and Terrorism*, he fails to mention negotiation as an option within state counterinsurgency response.\(^{40}\) In the study *Terror, Insurgency, and the State*, O’Leary and Silke find that “governments and insurgents generally negotiate even though they say they never will.”\(^{41}\)

Although O’Leary and Silke acknowledge the potential positive influence of negotiations on conflict duration, they make no reference to the counterinsurgency measures that facilitate it. While this paper reinforces Galula’s, O’Leary’s and Silke’s observations, it argues that negotiations may be a viable political objective within a state’s counterinsurgency strategy. State political objectives may be twofold: to win the hearts-and-minds of the people and to force the insurgent group to the negotiating table. It is the author’s belief that these two objectives within a wider counterinsurgency strategy provide the greatest opportunity for internal conflict resolution.

A second factor that appears to stand out within protracted state insurgency is the ability of the government to maintain a consistent counterinsurgency direction over time. Theorists emphasize unity of effort as a guiding principle in successful counterinsurgency; however a consistent direction by national leaders appears just as crucial. Unity of effort refers to the mobilization of all elements of government capability towards a common objective.\(^{42}\) In this study, consistency of direction refers to the ability of government leadership to maintain successful practices across government administrations. According to Galula when discussing

\(^{39}\) Galula, 55.
\(^{40}\) O’Neill does briefly reference reconciliation measures such as reintegration of combatants, though not as a result of negotiations. See O’Neill, 190.
\(^{42}\) Refer to Corr and Sloan, 12; O’Neill, 181; and Galula, 61.
unity of effort, “More than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end.”43 This study finds that in order to facilitate this direction, a consistent approach by national leadership is necessary. Over time, government regimes that alternate priorities between reconciliation and military operations appear counterproductive. States cannot achieve unity of effort because inconsistent policies impede the mobilization of government resources towards a common objective.

A number of studies on protracted internal conflict fail to consider a state’s counterinsurgency strategy as a plausible explanation.44 James Fearon and David Laitin emphasize state conditions as critical factors that determine the onset and duration of conflict.45 They identify factors that include poverty, political instability, rough terrain, large populations, external assistance, and illicit goods as conflict enablers.46 Fearon additionally identifies land or natural resource conflict and those where guerrilla groups derive funding from contraband activities as long-lived.47 While these factors are important, the studies fail to qualitatively consider state decisions as catalysts for protracted conflict. They better describe the internal environment that counterinsurgents must consider prior to crafting a successful strategy. This study extends Fearon and Laitin’s work by considering their factors within the overall state counterinsurgency response.

43 Galula, 61.
44 These studies are discussed in the following two paragraphs.
46 Ibid.
Other studies conducted by Professor Paul Collier and colleagues for the World Bank identify factors conducive to conflict duration as “less political and more commercial.” His studies point to the lucrative nature of rebellion as the catalyst in conflict longevity. Basically, groups maintain the insurgency because it is profitable to do so. This study contradicts Collier’s finding and reinforces that of O’Leary and Silke in *Terror, Insurgency, and the State*. They find that “causes matter more than “greed” in initiating insurgencies; “supply-side explanations” may help explain the duration of insurgent organizations, but not their origins, their ceasefires, or their termination.” In the alternative explanations section of this paper, external support, financial autonomy, and flexibility of insurgent cause are reviewed. Because of the variance found between cases, this study refutes the commercial explanation as the predominant factor in conflict duration.

**II. States perpetuate conflict through ineffective counterinsurgency measures that fail to address root causes of the insurgency.**

Successful counterinsurgency depends on military and non-military measures aimed towards overall political objectives. In order to be effective, these measures must adequately address the insurgent cause to reduce the movement’s base of popular support. The insurgent’s cause manifests in grievances proposed by the insurgent group that appeal to a wider constituency. This section first reviews the role of the insurgent cause and its importance. It then reviews findings that show why state counterinsurgency measures were ineffective in addressing the insurgent cause. The states exhibited inconsistent political and military strategy, an absence of political primacy within overall counterinsurgency strategy, and a lack of consistent direction at the national level.

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49 O’Leary and Silke, 400.
50 Galula, 11-16.
51 Ibid., 13.
Importance of Insurgent Cause

The insurgent’s cause gives a rebel movement its initial focus and direction while providing an attractive means for gaining popular support. According to David Galula, “The best cause for the insurgent’s purpose is one that, by definition, can attract the largest number of supporters and repel minimum opponents.” An appealing cause provides the basis for an insurgent group’s sustainment over time by recruiting individuals sympathetic to that cause. Causes often stem from existing political, social, or cultural grievances within a particular sector of society. Causes vary among insurgent groups, but can consist of marginalization of a particular class or ethnic minority, resource exploitation, income inequality, economic neglect and poverty, or ineffective governance. Insurgents usually employ a grand strategic cause, such as secession or the overthrow of the existing regime, or minor causes based on local grievances. The manner in which state institutions address the insurgent cause can lend legitimacy to the insurgent movement. If the state dismisses the insurgent cause entirely, it can provide a rebel group the foundation of continued popular support.

Effective counterinsurgency strategy must employ both political and military measures aimed at weakening the insurgent cause. In addition to security operations, this includes those elements of political, economic, and social reform present in the grievances of the marginalized population. As this research shows, failure to properly coordinate these elements of counterinsurgency can intensify the existing internal conflict. Because an insurgency is a form of armed political action against the authority of the state, security operations alone rarely

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 14.
55 U.S. Army, 1-10.
56 See O’Neill, 169-177, for further discussion of popular support as related to insurgent grievance and cause.
57 U.S. Army, 1-1.
resolve an insurgent movement. The following findings highlight flawed state counterinsurgency measures and reinforce the importance of integrated political and military strategy.

**Counterinsurgency strategy inadequately integrates political and military measures**

The states failed to implement integrated political and military counterinsurgency measures to win the hearts-and-minds of the people. Counterinsurgency operations appear to be strictly military in nature, while non-military measures aimed at addressing popular grievances failed. This can be attributed to two predominant scenarios that occurred within the cases. First, even a counterinsurgency campaign that attempted to follow a holistic approach often failed to fully implement the planned non-security measures. This outcome was evident in Indonesia’s approach towards dealing with the GAM separatists during two major counterinsurgency operations since 1998. The first, from 2001 to 2002, included a six-point plan based on security operations, restoration of the rule of law, economic recovery, autonomy legislation, social recovery, and the promotion of Acehnese culture. By March 2002, the implementation of this holistic approach seemed questionable. Dr. Kristen Schulze, reporting on the conflict stated “the most important factor undermining Indonesia’s comprehensive strategy is the lack of implementation of its non-security aspects...so far virtually no movement

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58 U.S. Army, 1-1.
59 Hearts-and-minds refer to the government’s attempt to win popular support among the masses in a counterinsurgency campaign. Refer to O’Neill, 93.
60 Holistic counterinsurgency can be used to describe security operations combined with re-establishing legitimate governance and rule of law, socio-economic development, infrastructure development, and information operations within the community with the intent of addressing an insurgencies root cause while shifting popular allegiance from the insurgent group to the state government.
61 From GAM’s inception in 1976 until 1998, Indonesia was under authoritarian rule. Counterinsurgency in Aceh focused on military operations only.
has occurred on the economic, political, legal, social, and cultural elements. In May 2003, Indonesia began a second counterinsurgency operation under martial law. Although the operation was again described as holistic in nature with emphasis on security, law enforcement, humanitarian aid, local governance, and economic recovery, the military led the operation and failed to implement the non-military aspects of the plan. The military operations failed to gain popular support and the internal conflict resulted in a stalemate.

The Philippine government consistently failed at implementing the holistic approach. During the period of 1972 to 1986, the Marcos regime implemented a flawed holistic counterinsurgency strategy that ignored the insurgencies root causes. Two operational plans (OPLANs) combined military and non-military measures. OPLAN Bagong Buhay, from 1972 to 1976, combined military operations with the re-establishment of civil authority, re-opening of schools, strengthening of local police forces, and infrastructure development designed to improve local economies. OPLAN Katatagan, from 1981 to 1986, emphasized security operations followed by civil development to address economic and social inequalities within the

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64 Matthew N. Davies, Indonesia’s War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca’s Porch (New York: Routledge, 2006), 69-70.


population. While Marcos emphasized both military and non-military measures, the population received little gain from economic or social reform. According to the Asian Development Bank’s assessment of Philippine governance, “In the late 1970s and early 1980s, while most Southeast Asian countries were flourishing economically, the Philippines was stuck in the mire of economic stagnation.” Marcos refused to upset the political and economic status quo in the country, which was dominated by landholding elites. The failed implementation of non-military measures allowed the insurgent movement to persist.

From 1992 to 1998, Philippine President Fidel Ramos attempted a holistic counterinsurgency approach but was found ultimately incapable of successfully implementing the non-military measures. Ramos’s “The Six Paths to Peace National Unification Commission” best describes his counterinsurgency strategy. The plan prioritized six points for resolving the insurrections: 1) Social, economic, and political reforms that addressed the root causes of conflict; 2) Consensus and empowerment of the people towards peace; 3) The pursuit of peaceful, negotiated settlement with the armed rebel groups; 4) Programs for reconciliation and reintegration of guerrillas into mainstream society; 5) Addressing concerns of the population from continued hostilities; and 6) Nurturing a positive climate for peace. Ramos officially institutionalized the plan by enacting “Executive Order No. 125” of 1993 which identified the
principles and components of a comprehensive peace strategy. The plan achieved some success, but failed to completely resolve the Moro conflict. This failure can be attributed to two factors. First, nowhere in the “Six Paths to Peace” or “Executive Order No. 125” were non-military measures directly linked to military operations. This link is critical in counterinsurgency because military operations are normally required to separate the insurgent from the population and allow non-military measures to take root. During implementation, the Philippine government favored negotiation and reconciliation with the Moro guerrillas outside of a wider counterinsurgency strategy. The plan achieved partial success with the MNLF, culminating in the 1996 ceasefire and Tripoli Agreement, yet the struggle against the MILF continued. Second, the government proved incapable of fully implementing the social, economic, and political measures necessary to win the hearts-and-minds of the people. The Ramos administration gained little public confidence due to perceptions of weak governance, corruption, ineptitude, and a lack of commitment to reform. According to the Asian Development Bank, “In fact, its [the government’s] lack of administrative capacity made institutionalizing much-needed reforms extremely difficult.”

The second common scenario from the cases included alternating periods of military operations and political negotiation with the insurgent group. Negotiations were rarely conducted within an overall strategic counterinsurgency plan. After failed negotiations, military operations appeared ad hoc and necessary to respond to an increasing insurgent threat.

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74 U.S. Army, 1-23.
75 Hernandez, 5.
77 ADB, 12.
78 Ibid.
79 The effect of ceasefires on increasing insurgent capability is discussed in further sections of this paper.
of this disconnect can be attributed to the government’s focus on addressing the grievances of the insurgent group as opposed to the population.

Government focus on insurgent grievances appeared evident in Sri Lanka’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers. In an attempt to negotiate with the LTTE in June 1985, the government signed a ceasefire that restricted security force operations in the conflict zone. During three months of talks, the Sri Lankan government confined its security forces to the barracks. This created a dynamic in which the LTTE negotiated from a position of strength. After negotiations failed, military operations recommenced. A similar scenario occurred after failed negotiations in the mid-1990s that led to a re-escalation in hostilities. According to former Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga, “The Government during the discussions with the LTTE in 1994-95 gave almost everything they asked for. The LTTE did not give anything.” In response to LTTE ceasefire violations, Kumaratunga stated, “The LTTE is solely responsible for the military operations that have been launched again under my government in reply.” The dynamic of negotiations followed by government-initiated military operations occurred repeatedly throughout the Sri Lankan-LTTE conflict. The Sri Lankan government gave precedence to the demands of the LTTE. This strategy contrasts with political and military counterinsurgency best practices designed to address root causes of the insurgency within the population.

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83 Ibid.
84 Attempts at ceasefire and negotiations were made four more times between 1987 and 2006; each followed by government initiated military operations.
85 The Tamil insurgency was ultimately rooted in marginalization of the Hindu Tamil minority at the hands of the Buddhist Sinhalese majority. Economic inequality, unemployment, educational exclusion, language
Failure to give political objectives primacy over military action

During various periods, state governments utilized military action as the primary tool to counter the insurgent movements. This method runs contrary to sound counterinsurgency practices. According to David Galula, “The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature.” Political actions that address grievances must reinforce military operations, while military force must be employed to support the implementation of political measures. Because armed political action manifests as insurgency, it ultimately requires a political solution. Military action itself should not be the ultimate end.

The military focus many times fails because it disregards the political nature of the conflict. Throughout much of the FARC’s existence, the Colombian government regarded the insurgency as a law and order problem suitable to military solutions. From 1970 to 1982, the government never attempted to address the social class-based inequity of the rural peasant and religious recognition, and minority rights were the foundational grievances of the LTTE. The LTTE designated itself as the voice of the Tamil population and embodied these grievances in the separatist cause. When negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE occurred, they were based on the four principles of the Thimpu Declaration: 1) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation; 2) Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka; 3) Recognition of the right to self determination; and 4) Recognition of the right to citizenship and fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon Sri Lanka as their country. Though the LTTE sought the recognition of an identified homeland, there was no historical precedence of a separate Tamil state that lent legitimacy to this cause. For additional information, see Bandarage, 125-128; Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 1021-1051, http://0-caliber.ucpress.net.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/0.1525/as.2009.49.6.1021 (accessed February 16, 2010); and the “Thimpu Declaration: Joint Statement made by the Tamil Delegation consisting of EPRP, EROS, PLOT, LTTE, TELO and TULF on the concluding day of Day 1 of the Thimpu Talks on the 13th of July 1985,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/thimpu_declaration.htm (accessed March 10, 2010).

Galula, 5.

U.S. Army, 1-22.

The government resorted to military measures that resulted in the FARC’s increase from about 500 guerrillas in 1970 to approximately 3000 in 1982. In the 1990s, after the FARC became heavily involved in the drug trade, the government’s focus shifted from counterinsurgency to counter-narcotics. The FARC utilized the coca farmer as its support base, while Colombian security forces focused on crop eradication without providing the farmer an alternative means of economic prosperity. Peasant strikes in 1996 due to government policies met with harsh repression at the hands of security forces.

In Indonesia, military primacy is evident throughout counterinsurgency operations. Driven by marginalization of the Acehnese people due to the state policies of centralized governance and economic exploitation, GAM’s initial attempt to organize support was met by harsh repression from 1977 to 1979. This drove GAM underground until 1989. Upon emerging, the movement again met with harsh repression and no attempt at political and economic reform on the part of the government. The regime approached the movement as a security problem, and according to Rizal Sukma, identified the group as a “gang of peace.

89 \begin{enumerate}
\item Beginning in 1970, state economic policies expanded commercial agriculture to the rural regions of Colombia, forcing peasants and small tenants from the land. The National Civic Strike of 1977, organized by peasants alienated by the economic policies of the state, met with harsh military repression by security forces. These actions drove the peasant population into FARC controlled territory and provided the FARC a base of popular support.
\item Molano, 30-32.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Initial GAM numbers are estimated at 70. For a primary account of GAM’s early years, refer to Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro (1984), http://www.asnlf.com/asnlf_int/about_us/headofthestate/walinangroe.htm (accessed February 12, 2010).
\end{enumerate}
From 1989 to 1998, the authoritarian government imposed a state of martial law focused on brutal repression of the Acehnese. According to Sukma, “while the politics of excessive exploitation and centralization can be seen as the roots of the problem, it is the politics of oppression and impunity that sustain them.”

The governments of the Philippines and Sri Lanka exhibit periods that disregarded the political nature of insurgency. In the Philippines, the Marcos and Estrada administrations gave complete control of counterinsurgency operations to the military. Marcos expanded military authority and, as already discussed, gave little credence to political solutions. From 1998 to 2001, the Joseph Estrada administration implemented a strategy of “all-out war” against the MILF. Estrada dismissed the political objectives of the previous Ramos administration in favor of a military solution. Both strategies had little impact on defeating the Moro insurgents.

During the early stages of the LTTE conflict, the Sri Lankan government responded to the Tamil uprising with military means. President Kumaratunga attributed the evolution of the Tamil insurgency to repressive military measures between 1977 and 1983. During an address to the Sri Lankan Parliament in 2000 she called for an end to the Tamil conflict “which was started under the patronage of the UNP government by killing, burning, and looting the..."
Tamil people and their property.”

Most recently, President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration unleashed military operations designed to eradicate the LTTE. From 2007 to 2009, Rajapaksa gave the military “carte blanche to fight the LTTE to the end – irrespective of the economic, human, and diplomatic costs.”

Despite statements of a political solution to the Tamil conflict, military measures became the predominant counterinsurgency tool. These measures disregarded the traditional hearts-and-minds approach, instead focusing on indiscriminate force, extrajudicial killings, and media censorship. Though Rajapaksa declared victory over the LTTE on May 19, 2009, time will tell whether these methods were ultimately successful. Without a future political solution that addresses Tamil grievances, a return to guerrilla warfare by the oppressed Tamil population may occur.

Lack of consistent counterinsurgency direction at the national level

Throughout much of the previous discussion, presidential administrations served as reference periods for counterinsurgency analysis. When comparing counterinsurgency measures across administrations, inconsistent direction at the national level emerged as a factor in the duration of conflict. Presidential changes also marked turning points in state counterinsurgency strategy. While not every administration drastically altered previous direction, a number enacted significant change. It appears that the lack of consistent approach hindered potential state success and negated even rudimentary progress. Without an overall

103 Ibid. UNP, or the United National Party, was the party of then-President Jayewardene.
104 DeVotta, 1042.
105 Rajapaksa issued a policy statement to Parliament that emphasized political solutions to secure peace that included: dialogue with the Tamil insurgents; constitutional reform; strengthening the rule of law; economic development; and infrastructure programs. See Mahinda Rajapaksa, “President’s Policy Statement” (November 25, 2005), South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/srilanka/document/papers/President_Policy_Statement.htm (accessed March 10, 2010).
strategic plan that built upon previous measures, states found themselves in a repetitive cycle of reconciliation and armed conflict.

Appendix A summarizes the state counterinsurgency measures of each administration. Throughout the cases, the conflicts traverse between periods of military focused counterinsurgency and political negotiations. Non-military measures aimed social, economic, and governmental reforms are largely absent or ineffective. The uncoordinated nature of state counterinsurgency led to poor decisions by state leaders. These decisions complicated state counterinsurgency efforts and resulted in little progress towards conflict resolution.

The governments of the Philippines and Colombia present the two most compelling cases. Counterinsurgency in the Philippines between the Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada administrations faltered due to a lack of consistent approach. After the fall of the Marcos regime, Aquino pursued a strategy of reconciliation and negotiations with the MNLF and MILF.\textsuperscript{108} To entice negotiations, Aquino declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1986.\textsuperscript{109} The Jeddah Accord, signed in January 1987 by the Philippine Government and the MNLF, was the first step towards a peaceful conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{110} The Accord led to the official establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in 1989.\textsuperscript{111} Though the peace talks eventually broke down, they were reinitiated by the Ramos administration and culminated in the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippine Government and MNLF.\textsuperscript{112} Ramos further agreed to the 1997 “Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities” with the MILF in an attempt to build

\textsuperscript{108} Hernandez, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. Also see the Conciliation Resources web site at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-mindanao/key-texts.php for a timeline of key texts and agreements.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
upon previous success.\textsuperscript{113} When Estrada became the President in 1998, the direction of state strategy changed. Though the previous administrations declared ceasefires with the insurgents, the Estrada administration went one step further and acknowledged insurgent controlled areas.\textsuperscript{114} This act provided legitimacy to the MILF and improved its capacity to wage the insurgency. While expanding its forces, the MILF committed ceasefire violations that utilized the recognized bases as reconsolidation zones.\textsuperscript{115} In response, the Estrada administration abandoned the negotiations process in favor of “all-out war” that displaced 900,000 civilians and resulted in little progress towards defeating the insurgents.\textsuperscript{116}

The Colombia-FARC conflict is littered with alternating periods of political negotiation followed by military operations. It appears the Colombian government failed to realize that negotiations were counterproductive when disconnected from military measures. These alternating periods made it impossible to achieve counterinsurgency success. Ceasefire concessions provided by the government accommodated FARC requests, but did nothing to further reconciliation. In fact, they served to strengthen the FARC military capacity.\textsuperscript{117} When military operations became the priority, Colombian security forces were largely ineffective because of expanded FARC strength and influence. Disastrous counterinsurgency measures implemented by the Pastrana administration saw FARC strength increase to its height of approximately 16,000 by 2001.\textsuperscript{118} In 2002, upon assuming the presidency, the new administration under Álvaro Uribe revised counterinsurgency strategy.\textsuperscript{119} Uribe abandoned

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{114} ICG, \textit{Southern Philippines Backgrounder}, 5-7.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Decisions by President Pastrana during negotiations are discussed in the third chapter of this paper. Ceasefire concessions provided the FARC legitimacy due to recognized insurgent controlled areas.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Jane’s Information Group, “\textit{Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)},” \textit{Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre}, in the Jane’s Defence Magazine Library, \url{http://0-jtic.janes.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/JDIC/JTIC/vie wGroups.do?changeView=true} (accessed January 20, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Uribe’s approach to counterinsurgency is published in the \textit{Democratic Security and Defence Policy} of 2003. See Colombian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Democratic Security and Defence Policy} (Bogotá, Colombia,
negotiations and accommodation of the FARC in favor of a holistic, population centric counterinsurgency approach that combined both military and non-military measures.\textsuperscript{120} In 2006, Uribe succeeded in gaining a second term in office, providing continuity and consistent direction to reinforce his plan. From the estimated strength of 16,000 at the start of Uribe’s presidency, his approach successfully reduced FARC numbers to its current estimate of 7,000 while greatly reducing its operational capability.\textsuperscript{121}

III. States engage in de-legitimating acts that alienate the target population.

The insurgent-counterinsurgent dynamic is essentially a battle over legitimacy within the population. The state needs legitimacy to gain and maintain the hearts-and-minds of the people. The insurgent group needs legitimacy to maintain its strength and expand its sphere of influence. This chapter begins by providing further explanation into the definition and importance of legitimacy. Findings are then reviewed that appear to degrade state legitimacy. These findings include: the use of repressive tactics, emergency regulations, and martial law; ineffective population security; and inadequate control over paramilitaries and militias.

Definition and Importance of Legitimacy

Legitimacy describes the acts or measures undertaken by the government that are interpreted by the population as either right or wrong, moral or immoral.\textsuperscript{122} The goal of the insurgent is to destroy or undermine the legitimacy of the target government.\textsuperscript{123} The goal of the

\textsuperscript{120} The priorities of Uribe’s policy included the restoration of order and security throughout the country, upholding standards of a professional military force, strengthening democratic institutions, broadening state services, and medium and long-term civil development projects. See Colombian Ministry of Defense, Democratic Security and Defence Policy, 5-7. For a review of Uribe’s strategy, see Thomas Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency,” 41-56.
\textsuperscript{121} Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).”
\textsuperscript{122} O’Neill, 15.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
state must be to “protect, maintain, and enhance its right to govern.” In order to maintain legitimacy within a counterinsurgency strategy, a government must balance the means in which both military and non-military measures are applied. Governments undermine their legitimacy by relying solely on coercive measures to maintain security. They utilize fear as a primary tool to maintain order. A government’s repressive tactics can backfire by alienating the population while reinforcing the goals and ideology of the insurgent group.

The most effective means of reinforcing state legitimacy is establishing effective governance under the rule of law. While this may initially require military operations to separate insurgents from the civilian population, long-term measures to maintain security while upholding the rights of citizens becomes essential. Unfortunately, many states fail in this endeavor. As will be discussed, repressive tactics, martial law, and human rights violations at the hands of security forces became widely utilized tools to maintain order. By focusing on security of the state as opposed to the individual, state counterinsurgency operations created an environment of impunity and distrust between the government and civilians. Conversely, insurgent groups that targeted violence towards civilians maintained control of a support base through fear and intimidation. While this may be counterproductive to the overall cause of the insurgent group, it undermines the legitimacy of the state by displaying its inability to provide effective population security.

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124 Corr and Sloan, 12.
125 U.S. Army, 1-21.
126 U.S. Army, 1-23.
127 Long-term measures are essential to maintain effective government presence within populated areas. Without long-term programs of governance and security, insurgent groups may re-infiltrate areas previously cleared of insurgent influence. Upholding the rights of citizens and rule of law is essential to gain and maintain popular support for a legitimate government. See O’Neill for further explanation of legitimacy and security operations under the rule of law.
128 There is a trade-off that exists for the insurgent group. While it may alienate its constituency, it simultaneously displays the government’s inability and incapacity to provide security. A population faced with violent acts by an insurgent group may provide passive support to the insurgents because of a failed government presence. See U.S. Army, 1-9.
Repressive tactics, emergency regulations, and martial law are counterproductive

The excessive use of force by government security forces resulted in extensive human rights violations. Security statutes and state emergency regulations either directly enacted periods of martial law or expanded the security force authority without an official martial law proclamation. In all circumstances, the government response was directly related to an increase in guerrilla activity. While emergency regulations may become necessary to quickly establish order within periods of increasing violence, their maintenance over the long-term can be detrimental. They can degrade government legitimacy by creating additional grievance due to repressive state actions. These acts alienate the population that security forces must protect through the use of indiscriminate force that fails to distinguish between the insurgent and normal citizen. After enacting emergency regulations, government failure to effectively monitor and control the methods of security forces can deal a lethal blow to state legitimacy. Repressive tactics can manifest in increased support for the insurgent movement.

Sri Lanka presents the most compelling case for the effect of emergency regulations on the conduct of security forces. In response to the Tamil insurgency, the government enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 that authorized broad measures to combat the growing threat. Some of the more draconian regulations included: the security force authority to arrest any person, enter and search any premise, stop and search any individual or vehicle, and

seize any document or thing suspected of connection to unlawful activity without a warrant; the
detention of any individual suspected of hindering an investigation up to a period not exceeding
seven years; and the property forfeiture of convicted individuals.\textsuperscript{131} While the Terrorism Act
included provisions that designated acts of murder and kidnapping as punishable by life in
prison, it designated acts including intimidation, firearm possession, vandalism of public
property, or any acts of “ill-will” between communities as punishable between five to twenty-five
years in prison.\textsuperscript{132} The act further provided immunity from prosecution to law enforcement
officials acting in “good faith” within the boundaries of the regulation.\textsuperscript{133} According to Amnesty
International, the far reaching authority provided to security forces within the Terrorism Act
caused widespread human rights violations throughout the 1980s and 90s. Tools such as mass
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and seizure of civilian property were heavily
utilized in combating the Tamil insurgency.\textsuperscript{134} Analyst N. Manoharan of the East-West Center
states that the PTA “established the mindset among security personnel that any means, no
matter how ruthless, can be used in curbing secessionist and militant forces.”\textsuperscript{135}

Scholars differ on the utility of emergency regulations and legal regimes. Brendan
O’Leary and Andrew Silke argue that “a government’s best response to small-group violence
from within its territory may often be a “no-response” response.”\textsuperscript{136} They argue that existing
regulations should be sufficient in the conduct of police and intelligence work, and that enacting
emergency regulations provides legitimacy to the insurgent group.\textsuperscript{137} Alternatively, Thomas

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} See AI, “Disappearance” and Murder as Techniques of Counterinsurgency; and AI, Sri Lanka:
Balancing Human Rights and Security: Abuse of Arrest and Detention Powers in Colombo (February 1,
\textsuperscript{135} N. Manoharan, Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy (Washington D.C.: East-
(accessed February 2, 2010).
\textsuperscript{136} O’Leary and Silke, 406.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
Marks, an expert on counterinsurgency in Colombia, advocates the use of emergency regulations. He stated in 2003 that the Colombian government hindered counterinsurgency operations due to an “inadequate legal environment” that failed to provide legal protection to security forces in the case of an inadvertent civilian strike. While O’Leary and Silke make a compelling argument, Marks’ point is valid. It is the author’s opinion that the key to effective employment of emergency regulations is the professionalism of the security force and the level of impunity the government allows. A government that turns a blind eye to repressive acts actually contradicts efforts to reduce insurgent strength and influence. Emergency regulations provide an effective tool to attain a short-term reduction in violence. They must be reviewed over the long-term to assess utility. A careful and timely review of the regulations, combined with an analysis into the actions of the security force it enables, can lead to effective government control.

Ineffective population security de-legitimizes the state government

Counterinsurgency strategy must emphasize the principle of population security as the foundation for all military and civil actions. Not only must security forces ensure their actions conform to the rule of law, but they must emphasize protection of the population from insurgent violence. A substantial, lasting security presence reinforces state legitimacy and allows non-military aspects of counterinsurgency, such as the restoration of civil governance, to take root. Without a consistent and effective security force presence, insurgent groups maintain influence

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139 Ibid.
140 U.S. Army, 1-23.
on the population either through fear and intimidation, or by providing aspects of security that
the state government cannot.\textsuperscript{141}

Deliberate repressive actions of security forces, counterproductive counterinsurgency
strategy, and deliberate decisions by state leaders to withdraw security forces from insurgent
areas led to ineffective population security.\textsuperscript{142} These acts occurred frequently during periodic
ceasefires between the insurgent groups and the government. In certain cases, the government
agreed to withdraw security forces from insurgent areas as concessions to advance the
negotiation process.\textsuperscript{143} This action provided de facto legitimacy to the insurgent group, and
weakened the government’s position in negotiations. The most egregious instance of
government concession took place in Colombia during the Pastrana administration. In January
1999, against counterinsurgency logic, Pastrana withdrew security forces from five
municipalities within Colombia and ceded a 16,000 square mile demilitarized zone to the
FARC.\textsuperscript{144} Without the presence of state security elements, the civilians of the region
succumbed to FARC violence. According to one resident interviewed at the time, “Right now we
are all kidnapped in our own city. We can’t leave by car and we are kidnapped on our own
streets.”\textsuperscript{145}

Ineffective population security allows insurgents to exploit the civilian population base.
This can take the form of illegal extortion and taxation. It may also lead to forced labor,

\vspace{1em}

\textsuperscript{141} The FARC in Colombia provides an example of providing security that the state cannot. In the 1980s,
civilians formed paramilitary groups to protect communities against FARC violence. The FARC provided
rural peasant communities protection from paramilitary reprisal attacks.

\textsuperscript{142} The effect of repressive action has been discussed in the previous section.

\textsuperscript{143} This occurred in the Philippines during the 1997-1999 ceasefires. The Philippine government provided
“acknowledgement” of seven MILF camps in Mindanao as a way to hold the MILF accountable for any
violent act that occurred in the region. See ICG, \textit{Southern Philippines Backgrounder}, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{144} This action provided a base area for FARC consolidation and coordination of future attacks. See Scott

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
recruitment, and expansion of insurgent ranks. Without effective security that provides a foundation for economic development, the conditions created by violence, unemployment, and poverty provide a fertile recruiting ground for insurgent groups. The state can further exacerbate this situation with repressive action. Members of the population follow the insurgent group for fear of retribution at the hands of security forces. This fear legitimizes the insurgent cause and strengthens a movement’s level of support.

**Inadequate control and employment of paramilitaries and militias**

The cases exhibited varied levels of paramilitary and militia activity. Large civilian paramilitary forces developed in the Philippines and Colombia during the early stages of insurgency. As insurgent violence increased, these groups filled power vacuums created by the lack of governmental presence and effective state security. The government’s failure to control or outlaw the groups throughout the 1980s exacerbated the security dilemma within each country. Accusations of ties between security forces and militia groups working outside of

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146 Fearon and Laitin, 75-76.
147 In the Philippines, the Ferdinand Marcos regime established the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in conjunction with the 1972 martial law declaration. The force consisted of civilians recruited and supervised by the Philippine Constabulary with the original function of a neighborhood watch. CHDF bands ranged in size from 60 to 500, and by 1980 grew to an estimated strength of 70,000. Through the 1980s, the groups were poorly supervised and led to increased tensions due to violent clashes between security forces, the Moro insurgencies, and the New People’s Army (NPA). See Justus M. van der Kroef, “Private Armies and Extrajudicial Violence in the Philippines,” *Asian Affairs* 13, no. 4 (Winter 1986/1987): 1-21, [http://0-www.jstor.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/stable/pdfplus/30172017.pdf](http://0-www.jstor.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/stable/pdfplus/30172017.pdf) (accessed March 5, 2010). Paramilitaries in Colombia originated from Colombian Law 48 of 1968 which authorized the creation of self-defense militias to protect private citizens and large land-owners. In the 1980s, in response to increasing FARC violence, civilian paramilitary groups formed to protect communities due to the security vacuum created by the Colombian security forces. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia was officially founded in 1997 with the aim to “cleanse areas of Colombia in which there is Marxist rebel presence.” Though the group officially demobilized as of 2006, factions have devolved into organized crime and drug trafficking. See Jane’s Information Group, “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC),” *Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*, in the Jane’s Defence Magazine Library, [http://0-jtic.janes.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/JDIC/VTIC/viewGroups.do?changeView=true](http://0-jtic.janes.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/JDIC/VTIC/viewGroups.do?changeView=true) (accessed January 20, 2010); and Fernando C. Cubides, “From Private to Public Violence: The Paramilitaries,” in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*, eds. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez G (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 127-149.

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the governments’ control persist today.\textsuperscript{148} Reprisal attacks, disappearances, paramilitary extrajudicial killings, and government connection to illegal militias degrades state legitimacy within the population.\textsuperscript{149}

The use of civilian forces in Indonesia and Sri Lanka consisted of army sponsored paramilitaries and death squads.\textsuperscript{150} In both cases, the military provided them training, equipment and funding. The groups performed intelligence, surveillance, security, and patrols. Conversely, they also employed indiscriminate violence, as security forces utilized the groups to hunt and kill suspected insurgents.\textsuperscript{151} Within both countries, the manner in which the groups were employed created environments of distrust and fear within the civilian population.\textsuperscript{152} Militia information led to mass detentions, interrogations, torture, and executions.\textsuperscript{153} The environment of impunity again undermined the legitimacy of the state in its attempt to separate the insurgents from the population.

The manner in which each country handled paramilitaries and death squads creates a dilemma for the counterinsurgent. If employed properly, a local civilian auxiliary can increase security force capability by providing intelligence while augmenting security force tasks such as guard duty or local patrols. Auxiliary forces can provide an additional security element to free

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\textsuperscript{150} DeVotta, 1042-1043; and Davies, 158-183.

\textsuperscript{151} AI, “Disappearances” and Murder as techniques of Counter-Insurgency, 2-4; and AI, \textit{New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh}, 5-10.

\textsuperscript{152} DeVotta, 1042-1043; and Davies, 158-183.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
the traditional forces for further counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{154} In order to be effective, the state and the military must maintain strict control over those elements. The use of civilian auxiliaries must enhance the legitimacy of the state by empowering civilians to legally and effectively augment the security force. In both the Philippines and Colombia, the historical role of paramilitaries soured state leaders on the use of civilian auxiliaries to enhance security force capability.\textsuperscript{155} The lack of civilian auxiliaries stressed the limited counterinsurgency resources within both states. The perception of a security force-paramilitary relationship not only undermined the legitimacy of the state, but negated a potentially effective counterinsurgency tool.

IV. Negotiations rarely result in success and often lead to an escalation in hostilities

States must incorporate negotiations into a wider counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines all utilized negotiations as a means to end their internal conflicts. Yet negotiation efforts consistently failed. To improve effectiveness, states must consider impediments to successful negotiation. Those that are intent on utilizing dialogue as a counterinsurgency tool face challenges within and outside of the government that must be addressed. This chapter begins by expanding upon the importance of negotiations within state strategy. It then highlights two challenges that appear predominant during the negotiation process: ceasefire violations and spoilers.

Importance of Negotiations

Negotiations between the state and the insurgent group appear to occur regularly, though they rarely result in significant progress towards peaceful conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{156} While

\textsuperscript{154} O’Neill, 163.

\textsuperscript{155} Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” 94-95; Cubides, 127-149; and Van der Kroef, 1-16.

\textsuperscript{156} Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers experienced five periods of negotiation and ceasefire from 1976 to 2009; The Philippines and the Moro Insurgencies (MNLF and MILF) experienced nine periods of
both sides seem consistently willing to negotiate, talks usually end with the re-escalation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{157} This escalation may result from state-initiated military operations directed at reducing insurgent strongholds.\textsuperscript{158} Ceasefire violations, questionable intentions, and spoilers on both sides contribute to the breakdown of formal talks. These challenges must be considered and managed within the overall counterinsurgency strategy.

Negotiations are rarely discussed when describing counterinsurgency. The political element of counterinsurgency usually refers to the economic, social, and governmental measures necessary to win the hearts-and-minds of the population.\textsuperscript{159} This view of counterinsurgency seems to disregard the political and diplomatic role of negotiations as a possible means to end an internal conflict. Negotiations seem ad hoc in relation to the wider counterinsurgency strategy even though a state government may declare negotiations as an objective. This disconnect may be due to the diplomatic nature of negotiations vice the operational and tactical nature of a counterinsurgency campaign. In order to improve effectiveness, states must include negotiations as part of the wider counterinsurgency strategy that takes into consideration the battlefield conditions and the potential long-term repercussions of ceasefire concessions.

\begin{itemize}
\item negotiation and ceasefire from 1969 to present; Colombia and the FARC experienced five periods of negotiation and ceasefire from 1964 to present; and Indonesia and GAM experienced three periods of ceasefire and negotiation from 1976 to 2005 (until 1998, the Suharto Regime remained unwilling to negotiate or recognize the insurgent group).
\item The two exceptions were the Philippines' negotiations in 1996 that ended in a peace accord with the MNLF. Despite the peace agreement, the MNLF has reinitiated a low level of violence within recent years. The second exception is the Indonesia-GAM ceasefire in 1995 that resulted in the Helsinki agreement and regional autonomy for the Aceh province.
\item O'Neill, 169-177; Nagl, 28-29; and Galula, 4-5.
\end{itemize}
Ceasefire violations frustrate state attempts at negotiation

A problematic factor within the negotiation-ceasefire dynamic is the recurring phenomenon of ceasefire violations. Though both sides agree to uphold the principles of a ceasefire, this rarely occurs on the ground. Insurgent groups continue targeted attacks against civilians and security forces. These actions usually spark retributive attacks directed at the insurgent group or its support base. To avoid this ceasefire trap, state governments must better understand the motivations behind insurgent actions.

One possible explanation for continued ceasefire violations may be the degree of control the insurgent leadership holds over subordinate elements. Separate insurgent factions may develop due to subordinate leaders who disagree over political concessions. These factions may initiate violent acts in order to undermine the peace process. “Rogue” or “lost commands” operating away from the insurgent headquarters may maintain hard-lined ideology that’s incompatible with central leadership.

A second explanation for continued ceasefire violations focuses on the true nature of insurgent leadership’s intent. Without being truly committed to negotiations, the insurgent leaders may utilize the ceasefire as a means to reorganize for continued armed struggle. Ceasefire agreements provide breathing space for the rebel group that relieves it from security

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160 Various databases allowed a limited assessment of the number of attacks during periods of negotiation and ceasefires. Precise numbers were impossible to ascertain due to different reporting requirements and a lack of consolidated information. For Sri Lanka, the *South Asia Terrorism Portal* lists a total of 351 government violations and 3,830 LTTE violations from February 2002 to April 2007. Other databases provide information only on terrorist attacks. *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism* database cites 930 MILF attacks during periods of negotiation and ceasefire from 2001 to 2007. The author utilized the University of Maryland, *Global Terrorism Database*, [http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) (accessed April 1, 2010) to estimate the number of attacks for the FARC and GAM. The FARC committed approximately 556 attacks during periods of negotiation and ceasefire beginning in 1984. GAM committed approximately 86 attacks during negotiations from May 2000 to May 2003.

161 Some analysts believe this phenomenon may be jeopardizing the Philippines peace process. There is disagreement over the current level of control the MILF leadership has over certain commands under its organization. See ICG, *Southern Philippines Backgrounder*; and Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (November 2005): 458-461, [http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713742821](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713742821) (accessed February 5, 2010).
force targeting. Insurgent groups within this study utilized these periods to consolidate, re-equip, recruit, and train. The LTTE benefited from this tactic throughout periods of negotiation with the Sri Lankan government. Poor decisions by state leaders can further compound this problem. Acknowledgement by the government of militant controlled areas and withdrawal of security forces from insurgent contested terrain creates tension between the military and the government. One police chief in Colombia, commenting on the demilitarized zone ceded to the FARC during the 1999-2002 negotiation period, stated, “This whole region is a theater of war, and in the middle of it they have a place to hide, a place to gather men and make their attack.” Continued ceasefire violations create tension between the military and state leaders. As negotiations drag on and resolution seems improbable, the military fears expansion of the insurgent group. When talks ultimately break down, the state unleashes security forces that target the acknowledged insurgent strongholds.

The insurgent’s desire for legitimacy indicates a third explanation for the frequency of ceasefire violations. Insurgents may benefit from continued armed action to gain the government’s perception as a continued threat to state security. A state inclined to negotiate may provide greater concessions when faced with the possibility of further violence. In the

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162 For example, at the time of the Sri-Lankan-LTTE ceasefire in December 2001, the LTTE strength had reached a low of approximately 7,000. The LTTE utilized the ceasefire to increase its recruitment and fighting cadre to upwards of 10,000 members by 2003. See Jane’s Information Group, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”
163 Wilson, “Colombian Rebels use refuge to expand power base.”
164 During ceasefire negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government in July 1997, the two parties implemented the “Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities” that required the withdrawal of Philippine security forces from the recently assaulted MILF base camp in Raja Muda after 15 days from the signing. Despite the agreement, MILF attacks on Philippine security forces continued. Further agreements reaffirmed the MILF commitment to the ceasefire despite the ongoing violence. On 10 February 1999, the MILF and Philippine government signed the “First Joint Acknowledgement” which recognized MILF Camps Abu Bakar and Busrah as covered by the original cessation of hostilities agreement. A second agreement was signed by the two parties in October 1999 that recognized five additional MILF base camps. Formal peace talks began on 25 October 1999 amidst continued skirmishes between MILF and security force elements. The ensuing violence resulted in a breakdown of talks and the initiation of a major military operation directed at MILF Camp Abu Bakar which had become the central logistics and training site of the group. For an overview, see ICG, Southern Philippines Backgrounder.
event of successful security force operations, the violations may indicate a group’s show of strength in order to present an image of a formidable military force despite losses. By maintaining legitimacy as a viable armed threat, the insurgent maintains leverage at the negotiating table in the pursuit of political objectives.

Spoilers frustrate state attempts at negotiation

Spoilers in the peace process appear to present a major obstacle towards a negotiated settlement. These obstacles exist in many forms. Within the cases these forms included: political opposition within the state; military influence; rival insurgent or paramilitary violence; and the aforementioned factors of factionalism and ceasefire violations. Political opposition between rival political parties can block efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Failure to achieve and maintain political consensus prior to and during negotiations undermines the efforts of mediators to achieve an agreeable solution. Parties threatened by the intended level of concessions can pressure political leadership to alter or cease the peace talks entirely. Potential progress on key issues can abruptly dissolve due to modifications in the state position

165 For instance, during negotiations that started in 2000 with GAM, the Wahid administration in conjunction with the Henry Dunant Center – a Swiss-based NGO for conflict resolution – pursued concessions based on autonomy for the Aceh region. Some military and government leaders were against the foreign assistance for fear of international recognition and legitimization of GAM. Resistance eventually contributed to a break-down in peace talks. See Aleksius Jemadu, “Democratisation, the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Resolving of the Aceh Conflict,” in Reid, 272-291.

166 Political spoilers plagued the Sri Lankan-LTTE negotiations from 2002 to 2004. Three parties - the United National Front (UNP), the People’s Alliance (PA), and the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) – failed to agree on the level of concessions during negotiations. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, a member of the UNP, agreed to concessions with the LTTE that consisted of a greater autonomy for the Tamil region of Sri Lanka based on a decentralized federal political system. Fearing a collapse to the unity of the Sri Lankan state and the appeasement of the LTTE, both the PA and SLFP pressured President Kumaratunga (a member of the PA party) to intervene. Amidst continued LTTE ceasefire violations, on 5 November 2003 she evoked a state of emergency in the country and, with executive powers, dissolved the UNP government. For further details see Rajat Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroads between Peace and War,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004): 903-918, http://0-www.jstor.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/stable/pdfplus/3993700.pdf (accessed February 5, 2010).
towards the insurgent group. These actions contribute to perceptions of bad faith and lack of political will towards peaceful solutions.\textsuperscript{167}

The level of influence the military maintains over civil authority can similarly block or undermine negotiations.\textsuperscript{168} Failure by the military to adhere to ceasefire agreements by carrying out targeted killings or continued repression of the population can undermine the peace process and lead to a cycle of retributive violence.\textsuperscript{169} Without strong civil authority over military actions, security forces are free to execute missions that may be outside of the civilian leadership’s intended direction. Consistent strategy at the national level that incorporates security operations and negotiations within a wider counterinsurgency strategy can reduce discontinuity between military and political goals.

Paramilitaries and multiple insurgent groups operating within the state present a complicated scenario for governments to reconcile. A state’s inability to provide effective security from these groups can lead to an escalation in violence. A lack of security may leave the insurgent group little choice but to revert back to armed conflict if it fails in pursuing its political goals through peaceful means. The Colombian government’s inability to provide effective security in the mid-1980s illustrates this point. The FARC and Colombian government signed “The Uribe Accord” in 1984. This agreement implemented a ceasefire that provided the FARC authorization to pursue economic and social reform through organized, peaceful political representation.\textsuperscript{170} The agreement ultimately dissolved in 1987, due to a continued cycle of

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Civil authority refers to the level of control civilian leaders hold over military affairs.
violence among the insurgents, the paramilitaries, and the security forces. Paramilitary extrajudicial counterinsurgency operations indiscriminately targeted insurgents. The FARC’s political party, the Union Patriotica, became a primary target. After the ceasefire dissolved in 1987, the targeted violence of paramilitaries became a major grievance in future negotiations between the FARC and Colombian government.

V. Alternative Explanations for Protracted State Insurgency

This chapter considers alternative explanations for protracted internal conflict. Four alternative explanations are considered: external insurgent support; the insurgent’s flexibility of cause; insurgent leadership; and external state support. Though this paper reviewed common counterinsurgency factors, these explanations focus predominantly on the insurgent. With the exception of external state support, they provide competing explanations for the durability of insurgent groups. External state support provides an explanation for the duration of conflict based on the intentions and motives of intervening states. Though not consistently present in all the conflicts, these factors influenced certain cases to a significant degree.

External insurgent support sustains a rebel group’s capacity to fight

A dearth of information prevented an acute analysis of state counterinsurgency measures designed to separate the insurgent from its external support. Conversely, what became evident throughout the literature was the role of external support in providing training,

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171 Four insurgent groups operated within Colombia during this time period: the ELN, EPL, M-19, and FARC. The government signed subsequent ceasefires with the M-19 and EPL that failed to last beyond 1985. While the FARC stated its commitment to the ceasefire, violence between the three other insurgent groups, the paramilitaries, and the security forces propelled the country into a state of chaos. Indiscriminate paramilitary and army counterinsurgency operations targeted all four insurgent groups. See ICG, Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace, (Bogotá: International Crisis Group, 2002), 5-6, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1538 (accessed February 12, 2010).

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.
The insurgent groups utilized external resources in varying degrees and at different periods of insurgency. GAM appears to have received only external training support during the earlier stage of its movements. Between 1986 and 1989, approximately 700 GAM members trained in Libyan camps. This contrasts with the FARC, which received little initial external training but sought the assistance of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) beginning in the 1980s. MNLF insurgents received extensive training throughout the 1970s and 80s from Malaysia, Libya, Syria, and the PLO. By the late 1980s, they had sent groups to train in the Soviet-Afghan War, and in the early 90s received training inside the Philippines from Jemaah Islamiyah. The LTTE similarly received training throughout the 1980s and early 1990s from camps in India and Palestine.

External financing similarly varies. The LTTE, GAM, and Moro Insurgencies received extensive external funding from diaspora communities. The LTTE received financing from an

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174 Bard O’Neill in *Insurgency & Terrorism* identifies external support as critical to the success of the insurgent organization. He categorizes external assistance into four basic categories: moral support, political support, material support, and sanctuary. Moral support consists of statements directed towards the insurgent group praising its activities or struggle against the state. Statements may also condemn actions of the state towards the insurgent population. Political support takes the form of diplomatic or direct public backing of the insurgents. The supporting state may lobby on behalf of the insurgent group within an international forum. Material support consists of resourcing in the form of funding, equipment, and training. Lastly, state assistance in the form of sanctuary provides safe havens for security, reorganization, and consolidation of insurgent forces. While the state actor normally provides these forms of support, insurgents may receive different levels of assistance from NGOs, religious organizations, or other guerrilla groups.

175 Kristen E. Schulze, “The Struggle for an Independent Aceh,” 244-245.
177 TCG, *Southern Philippines Backgrounder*, 4-5.
178 Ibid., 4, 13.
179 Bandarage, 99-100.
estimated 500,000 person diaspora in 50 countries beginning after 1987. Similarly, GAM received significant funding beginning in the 1980s from a large Malaysian diaspora. The Moro Insurgencies secured external funding from a number of different sources. Libya provided funding for the MNLF in the early 1970s. Diaspora communities based in Malaysia and the Middle East, as well as various Islamic charities continued to provide funding to the MILF through the 1990s up until 2001. This contrasts sharply with the FARC which received little external financing. Links to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have only recently revealed a possible connection to an external funding stream. Because of FARC involvement in the drug trade since 1982, the group required few external resources due to its financial autonomy.

The insurgent groups utilized external sanctuary to gain safe haven from state counterinsurgency forces. In 1979, GAM leader Hasan di Tiro fled Indonesia for Sweden where he directed GAM operations until the 2005 peace agreement. Between 1983 and 1987, LTTE leaders utilized the southern region of India - Tamil Nadu - to establish training camps and evade Sri Lankan security forces. The LTTE developed these camps with the acknowledgement and approval of the Indian Government. Leadership of both the MNLF and

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184 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).”
186 Bandarage, 99-116
187 Ibid.
MILF periodically sought refuge abroad in Malaysia and the Middle East. In Colombia, FARC rebels utilized the border regions of Venezuela and Ecuador as safe havens to evade Colombian security forces.

The variance in external support suggests that at some point during the movement, insurgent groups require external assistance to ensure survival. This assistance may be early in the movement to gain initial funding and competency to rival state forces. Or it may be later in the movement if security forces weaken the rebel movement. The latter case appears to be consistent with the FARC due to the Uribe government’s counterinsurgency success. The presence or absence of external funding also suggests that finances are critical to insurgent resiliency. The FARC required little external funding because of its financial autonomy, while the LTTE profited from an expansive diaspora beginning in the late 1980s that facilitated the group’s development. Safe havens appear necessary to ensure leadership survival. Without effective sanctuary, it may be unlikely that insurgent leaders can evade the counterinsurgent’s targeting. Taken together, the factors of external training, funding, and sanctuary play a significant role in an insurgency. If the counterinsurgent can eliminate the insurgent’s external support, the state may experience a reduction in the duration of conflict.

**Flexibility of the insurgent cause determines the likelihood of negotiated settlement**

A flexible insurgent cause can facilitate successful negotiations. An inflexible cause may result in further conflict. In other words, the more an insurgent group is willing to compromise on its requested concessions, the greater the prospect for conflict resolution. This phenomenon became evident in the Moro, GAM, and LTTE insurgencies. The groups’ secessionist cause called for greater autonomy through a free and independent state apart from existing

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188 Jane’s Information Group, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)”; and Jane’s Information Group, “Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).”
189 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).”
government authority. Negotiations resulted in stalemate and resumption of violence in 15 out of 17 combined periods.\(^\text{190}\)

Two instances of successful negotiations exhibit the insurgents’ flexibility. In the Philippines-MNLF negotiations from 1994 to 1996, the group agreed to a peace accord that established a decentralized regional autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao.\(^\text{191}\) While this was a satisfactory concession for the MNLF, the MILF failed to agree to the concessions and maintained its secessionist cause until 2005.\(^\text{192}\) Only after 2005 did the MILF modify its demand for complete independence. Though a peace accord remains elusive, the MILF’s flexibility gives hope for future conflict resolution.\(^\text{193}\) The second instance of flexible cause appeared during the 2005 Indonesia-GAM peace talks. GAM modified its stance on full succession and agreed to a federalized system of regional autonomy that provided for greater Acehnese self-determination.\(^\text{194}\) International pressure due to the Asian Tsunami of 2004 combined with the state’s counterinsurgency operations between 2004 and 2005 left GAM little choice but to modify its stance during negotiations.\(^\text{195}\)

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\(^{190}\) Refer to footnote 163 for numbers on negotiation periods.

\(^{191}\) Republic of the Philippines, “Peace Agreement.”

\(^{192}\) Disagreement within the MNLF over concessions led to a fracturing of the group in 1984 that resulted in the formation of the MILF. The MNLF observed a more moderate agenda based on Moro nationalism and self-determination for the Moro people. The MILF retained its agenda of complete independence based on Islamic nationalism and Sharia (Islamic) law. See Abuza, 453; ICG, *Southern Philippines Backgrounder*, 4; and Jane’s Information Group, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).”

\(^{193}\) The MILF conducted two additional periods of negotiations after 2005 on a revised stance of greater regional autonomy. Talks broke-down due to further disagreement over the acknowledgement of Muslim Moro ancestral domain in Mindanao.


Insurgent leaders control a group’s preference for peace

Insurgent leadership makes a difference in a rebel group’s level of resolve. The insurgent leaders within each case differed in their level of organizational control and willingness to negotiate towards peaceful conflict resolution. While some were amenable and flexible in negotiations, others stuck to rigid demands. Analysts often cite LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran as the primary impediment to a peaceful resolution to the Sri Lankan conflict. Prabhakaran vowed to never give up the quest for Eelam and directed his own assassination in the event he gave in to government influence. International charges of human rights abuse, as well as implications in the assassinations of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993 and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 made Prabhakaran’s immunity to prosecution and imprisonment impossible. His egoism and fear of losing control over the organization resulted in his ultimate demise in 2009. During Sri Lankan military offensives, the LTTE suffered major losses in conventional military battles. Analysts often cite his decision to maintain conventional operations instead of reverting to guerrilla tactics as a major factor in the LTTE’s military defeat.


See DeVotta, 1029-1040; Van de Voorde, 185-186; Bandarage, 161-162, 182-185; and Ganguly, 908.

This led many to question the LTTE’s sincerity during negotiations from 2002 to 2004 prior to President Kumaratunga’s state of emergency declaration.

Van de Voorde, 187-188; DeVotta, 140-141.

The Sri Lankan Government, frustrated with the direction of peace talks and the continued ceasefire violations of the LTTE, abrogated the 2002 ceasefire agreement in late 2007. The government implemented a full military counterinsurgency approach in northern Sri Lanka aimed at the military defeat of the LTTE. Prabhakaran was killed by government forces on May 19, 2009.

Jane’s Information Group, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

See Jane’s Information Group, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),”; and DeVotta, 142-151.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared military victory over the LTTE on May 16, 2009.
External state support may intensify an existing conflict

The external support a state receives can be detrimental to counterinsurgency effort. External support may ultimately trigger continued hostilities based on the motives and goals of the intervening state. External state influence may result in counterproductive measures that result in little progress towards conflict resolution. The United States influence in Colombia during the Pastrana administration and the Indian influence in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s are two instances where external support failed. The U.S. intervened in the Colombian conflict in 1999 with the intent of supporting the Colombian counternarcotics (CN) effort. It pledged a $1.32 billion support package based on military aid and assistance, but failed to connect counterinsurgency efforts with the CN assistance. The U.S. restricted its support for counterinsurgency operations and supported the Colombian Government’s flawed negotiations strategy. It also limited CN support to the southern region of the country, failing to realize that FARC base areas throughout Colombia served as major drug production zones. The U.S. focus had a detrimental effect because it treated counterinsurgency and counternarcotics as two separate entities when in fact they were linked. According to Thomas Marks, “U.S. officials, forces, and individuals tended to embrace the flawed logic that Colombia’s problem was narcotics, with the security battle merely a by-product.” U.S. influence resulted in a fractured Colombian counterinsurgency effort. CN policies supported by the U.S., such as crop eradication, legitimized FARC grievances among coca farmers and expanded the rebel’s base of popular support.

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204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” 98.
207 Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency,” 43.
208 Redfern, 13.
Indian intervention in the LTTE conflict resulted in little gains for the Sri Lankan Government. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi appeared sympathetic to the Tamil cause and offered India’s services of mediation towards a political solution. In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord with the objective of achieving peace between the LTTE and Sri Lankan Government. Part of the agreement stipulated recognition of the Northeast and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as historical habitats of the Tamil speaking people. This controversial concession resulted in violent objections by the Sinhalese population. To combat a growing insurgency, President Jayawardena requested military assistance from India to ensure state security. From 1988 to 1990, Indian security forces occupied the Northern, Tamil dominated province of Sri Lanka. They conducted a brutal and ruthless counterinsurgency campaign. Their acts alienated the Tamil people who viewed the LTTE as protectors against foreign occupation. After India withdrew forces in 1990, the LTTE redirected armed resistance against Sri Lankan security forces.

The previous examples illustrate the effect of misdirected external support. States that fail to understand the true nature of the insurgent threat create more problems than they solve. External state assistance can exacerbate an already violent conflict due to counterproductive

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209 India was sympathetic to the Sri Lankan Tamil cause due to the large number of Indian Tamil’s living in southern India. The Indian Tamil community appealed to the Indian President to prevent Sri Lankan directed violence against its Tamil population. Fearing a political uprising in the south, Indian leadership believed it necessary to promote a peaceful resolution to the Sri Lankan-LTTE conflict. See Bandarage, 111-112.

210 Ibid.


212 Bandarage, 135.

213 Ibid.

214 Bandarage, 149-152.

215 The military solution in the north achieved a moderate level of success in pushing the LTTE out of the province. However, the new President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, wanted the Indian Security Forces removed from the country. As a result, he struck an alliance with LTTE leadership that provided logistical and arms support to the LTTE. After India withdrew, peace talks quickly stalled between Premadasa and the LTTE. See Bandarage, 152-154.
policies that reinforce rebel grievances. States that depend on external support to solve internal problems risk much for minimal potential return. External support is not a ‘silver bullet’ for conflict resolution and in the long run can hinder state counterinsurgency efforts.

VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations

Policy Implications

State counterinsurgency begins with a national plan

Insurgents utilize violence to attain political objectives through armed action. States that fail to recognize this begin a counterinsurgency campaign at a severe disadvantage. States must devise counterinsurgency strategy based on legitimacy, effective security, and attention to the economic, social, and political causes of insurgent actions. Without these elements, states are destined to experience a protracted internal conflict. At the operational level, states must implement effective tools such as civilian auxiliaries that enhance, and not harm state legitimacy. The use of martial law and emergency regulations in the short term may restore a level of security within the state, but over the long term may degrade the state’s capacity to provide effective governance to counter the insurgent cause. The state must consistently review these declarations in order to determine their effectiveness while ensuring the accountability of counterinsurgent forces. At the strategic level, states must establish political objectives within an overall counterinsurgency campaign that integrates elements of security, governance, economic reform, and civil development. Only by ensuring tangible progress in these areas can the state government effectively counter the insurgent cause and weaken a movement’s popular support base.

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216 U.S. Army, 1-1-1-3; O’Neill, 32-37.
217 For a description of the factors that determine early counterinsurgency success in the initial stages of insurgency, see O’Neill, 155-164.
State counterinsurgency success must begin with the development of a national counterinsurgency plan endorsed across party lines. The development of this plan must include military and political officials throughout the government who can influence their subordinate organizations. Integration of all state elements ensures not only the unity of effort critical in a counterinsurgency campaign, but consistent direction over time. A consistent counterinsurgency approach that builds upon previous success rooted in sound counterinsurgency decisions enables future progress. States leaders must also understand that counterinsurgency success does not occur overnight. This becomes especially critical across presidential administrations where different individuals implement different methods of conflict resolution.

**Measures that alternate between military operations and reconciliation do not work**

Counterinsurgency that alternates between military operations and reconciliation with the insurgent group appears ineffective over the long term. This inconsistent means of approaching counterinsurgency leads to an endless cycle of cat and mouse between the insurgent and counterinsurgent. During reconciliation periods marked by ceasefires and negotiations, continued violence committed by both sides undermines a potential resolution. Conciliatory measures of security force withdrawal and acknowledgement of insurgent controlled areas provides legitimacy to the insurgent group and disregards the hearts-and-minds approach to winning popular support. These actions degrade effective governance and make the implementation of economic, social, and civil reform measures difficult. In order to avoid these mistakes, states must realize that the key to counterinsurgency may not be security of the state, but the security and welfare of the people. By achieving the later, the former follows.

A government’s counterinsurgency effort must sustain pressure on the insurgent group through continued security operations performed within a wider political strategy. The state
must establish mechanisms to determine military progress in conjunction with political goals. Though military force remains necessary, proportional force that upholds human rights must be emphasized. By engaging in repressive military operations, the state validates the insurgent cause and counteracts the political objective of a peaceful conflict resolution. As negotiations become part of the wider strategy, states must consistently monitor and balance security operations with diplomatic initiatives. With a focus on security and welfare of the population as opposed to the grievances of the insurgent group, the state may effectively weaken the insurgent’s position while maintaining leverage throughout negotiations.

**States engage in negotiations; this phenomenon requires further study**

The role of diplomacy and negotiation requires further study as a state counterinsurgency tool. Though negotiations may be a departure from the traditional hearts-and-minds approach, they inevitably occur. A resolution to an internal conflict may appear sooner rather than later by engaging insurgent leadership in sincere discussion based on valid popular grievances. An opportunity to quell an insurgent movement before it gains momentum may save the state decades of violent conflict and thousands of useless deaths. This type of dialogue can only be attained, however, if the state recognizes the problem and is willing to provide a solution. According to Bard O’Neill, “A government that misunderstands the type of insurgent movement it is facing can blind itself to the policy options that might end the insurgency at lower costs. Conversely, one that does understand is in a better position to craft appropriate and rational responses.”

While O’Neill bases this statement primarily on the hearts-and-minds approach of winning popular support, this statement is also true when considering negotiations. By incorporating negotiations into a wider counterinsurgency strategy, O’Neill, 157.
states may exploit early opportunities to achieve peace before grievances become entrenched in the wider population.

Negotiations appear as a distinguishable characteristic of state counterinsurgency campaigns. This phenomenon requires further inquiry and analysis. The most popular counterinsurgency works from David Galula and Bard O’Neill lack attention to this important counterinsurgency tool. While the most frequently referenced works emphasize non-military counterinsurgency measures within a hearts-and-minds approach, negotiations must be considered as part of these non-military measures. Counterinsurgency scholars and practitioners must view negotiations as a valid means of ending insurgent conflict. Best practices, lessons learned, and conditions suitable for successful negotiations must be examined. This analysis is a step in that direction, but only begins to explore the negotiations dynamic within insurgent-counterinsurgent conflict.

Policy Recommendations

With an impending presidential transition, Colombia must maintain the present course

On May 30, 2010, Colombia will hold presidential elections to determine the successor of President Álvaro Uribe. Uribe was the first president in Colombia’s democratic history to serve a second term in office. He successfully modified the constitution to run for a second term in 2006.\(^{219}\) The future of Colombia’s counterinsurgency effort depends on the continuity between Uribe’s policies and his successor. Uribe’s stance on no negotiations, military operations that target insurgent strongholds, re-establishing governance and security throughout the whole of Colombia, and non-military measures designed to enhance government legitimacy have proven successful throughout his eight years as President. The manner in which the incumbent builds upon Uribe’s policies will dictate the future of the conflict. Uribe’s no

negotiation stance towards the FARC has worked. The incumbent must avoid negotiations and build on the holistic counterinsurgency approach based on security, intelligence, legitimacy, and reform. He must publish counterinsurgency policies immediately upon assuming office, and ensure members of the government, military, and civil society understand and support the continued national direction. To deviate from Uribe's plan would be a disastrous mistake. It might spell a reversal of the gains Colombia struggled to achieve after 40 years of internal conflict.

_The Sri Lankan government must implement reform to gain the trust of the Tamil population_

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s declaration of victory over the LTTE on May 19, 2009 does not mark the end of the Tamil conflict. Though the Tamil insurgency may lay dormant in the short-term, without addressing the root causes of conflict the long-term prospects for violence remain. While the military approach was surprisingly effective in destroying LTTE leaders and supporters, the Sri Lankan Government must pursue a long-term political solution to stabilize the country and enhance government legitimacy. Reconciliation with the Tamil population must occur beginning with devolution of power to Tamil dominated regions in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The rights of the Tamil minority, with assured self-determination and ethnic identity are the only means to maintain peace. In response to the occupation of Sri Lankan security forces and the increasing presence of Sinhalese in the Northern Province, one Tamil citizen stated, “Jaffna is being invaded by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture.” Continued media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights abuses

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must be addressed to allow for greater freedom of Tamil citizens.\textsuperscript{221} A so-called democratic nation, Sri Lanka must return the democratic rights to the people.

The withdrawal of security forces and transition to normalcy must be carefully orchestrated and closely monitored. Without implementing economic, political, and social reform measures to address grievances of the Tamil minority, a security force withdrawal from the Northern Province would be premature. The Sri Lankan government must coordinate the downgrade of military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil populated regions. This can take the form of infrastructure development, increased economic aid, and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil participation in local and national governance. Without government implemented non-military measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant - only waiting for the right opportunity to re-emerge. As witnessed by the GAM insurgency in Indonesia between 1979 and 1988, an insurgent movement may lay dormant for a significant period of time before suitable conditions enable its return.

\textit{Jemaah Islamiyah threatens Indonesian and Acehnese peace; law and order, human rights are key}

While the GAM insurgency in Aceh transitioned from armed conflict to peaceful political participation, the presence of the Al Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continues to threaten the region’s stability.\textsuperscript{222} To combat JI, the Indonesian government must strengthen the capacity and capability of local police forces while ensuring human rights of the Acehnese. An


effective police force that upholds human rights during counter-terror operations will strengthen the stability of the region and enhance government legitimacy. A repressive military approach to JI’s presence threatens alienating Acehnese civilians and reversing gains from the previous five years. According to a report in The Jakarta Post, the police have sole responsibility for fighting terrorism but “the TNI (Indonesian military) is ready to assist the police if they are requested.” Indonesia must refrain from inserting troops into Aceh unless the security situation truly degrades. The TNI’s history in Aceh is one of repression and exploitation; one that the Acehnese are unlikely to support. If Indonesia deploys military forces, government leaders must maintain strict control over their operations. Indonesian officials must ensure military and police forces remain accountable, punish those that engage in repressive activities, and place the safety of local civilians as the top priority.

The Philippines and MILF must achieve peace through negotiations

The process of continued negotiations between the Philippine Government and MILF has legitimized the insurgent group within the international community. Presently, it appears improbable that government initiated operations to reduce MILF strength and influence would further the Philippines’ counterinsurgency effort. Both the Philippine Government and MILF have stated a willingness to achieve peace through negotiations. The MILF dropped its cause of separatism, and seems willing to accept concessions based on greater autonomy within a unified Philippine nation. It has also shown a willingness to support the government in its

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223 Ibid.
225 The U.S. has supported the Philippine Government in the negotiations process. The U.S. has also supported the Philippine Government’s cooperation with the MILF to combat terrorist violence from JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group. See ICG, The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), 1-26, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5441=1 (accessed February 12, 2010); and Jane’s Information Group, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).”
226 Ibid.
effort to combat criminal gangs and terrorist groups such as JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The primary impediment to the peace process appears to be ceasefire violations and spoilers that threaten to thrust the conflict into an increased state of violence. In order to facilitate peace, the government must acknowledge the MILF’s status as a fractured movement. The government must reinitiate negotiations with MILF central leadership while continuing security operations directed at rogue elements, JI, and ASG. The Philippine leadership must plan for continued militant activity initiated by the rogue MILF rebels. It must incorporate this condition into its negotiations strategy.

In an attempt to reduce factionalism, the US and Philippine Government have increased aid to MILF strongholds. This action attempts to increase long-term support for MILF leadership through tangible socio-economic development. In addition to strengthening the socio-economic conditions of MILF controlled regions, security operations must be coordinated to reduce the rogue element’s strength. The combination of military and non-military measures within the overall plan for negotiations may enable future peace. After reaching a negotiated settlement with the central MILF leaders, the Philippine Government must continue socio-economic development of Moro populated regions to enhance a peace accord’s legitimacy. Further cooperation with central MILF leaders and emphasis on population-centric counterinsurgency can reduce the popular support for the rogue insurgent elements, increase support for government acknowledged MILF leadership, and provide a foundation for continued peace.

227 Ibid.
228 Jane’s Information Group, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).”
229 Ibid.
### Appendix A: Summary of State Counterinsurgency Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Summary of Counterinsurgency Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ranasinghe Premadasa</td>
<td>Jan 1989 - May 1993</td>
<td>Military approach with no political concession or accommodation of either the insurgents or the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dingiri Banda Wjetunge</td>
<td>May 1993 - Nov 1994</td>
<td>Interim President; continued military approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chandrika Kumaratunga</td>
<td>Nov 1994 - Nov 2005</td>
<td>Political approach attempted accommodation through negotiation; resorted to indiscriminate military operations when negotiations failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahinda Rajapaksa</td>
<td>Nov 2005 - Present</td>
<td>Military approach; indiscriminate force; no negotiations or political reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Suharto</td>
<td>Mar 1967 - May 1998</td>
<td>Military approach with indiscriminate force; no political accommodation or negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie</td>
<td>May 1998 - Oct 1999</td>
<td>Withdrew security forces from region; no attempt at negotiations or political reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Megawati Sukarnoputri</td>
<td>July 2001 - Oct 2004</td>
<td>Military approach; attempted hard-line negotiations; resorted to military options when negotiations failed; no effective political reform or non-military COIN measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
<td>Oct 2004 - Present</td>
<td>Combined military operations with negotiations and political reform to achieve an effective and lasting ceasefire agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Philippines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand Marcos</td>
<td>Dec 1965 - Feb 1986</td>
<td>Martial law era; Military approach; Combined indiscriminate force with insincere negotiation and grievance accommodation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Estrada</td>
<td>Jun 1998 - Jan 2001</td>
<td>Military approach; attempted hard-line negotiations with MILF; resorted to military options when negotiations failed; no effective political reform or non-military COIN measures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo</td>
<td>Jan 2001 - Present</td>
<td>Political approach that attempts to combine military and non-military measures with negotiations.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colombia</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belisario Betancur</td>
<td>Aug 1982 - Aug 1986</td>
<td>Political approach focused on negotiations and accommodation of FARC. No emphasis on the peasant population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>César Gaviria</td>
<td>Aug 1990 - Aug 1994</td>
<td>Political approach focused on negotiations and FARC accommodation. No emphasis on the peasant population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Álvaro Uribe</td>
<td>Aug 2002 - Present</td>
<td>Attempts holistic counterinsurgency combining military and non-military measures focused on protecting the population. Does not include FARC negotiations within a wider counterinsurgency strategy.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Bibliography

Primary Sources


**Secondary Sources**


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