IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and the nexus between the two are inarguably among the greatest threats facing international peace and security today. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, obligating states to take steps to counter the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to non-state actors. Regional organizations are widely considered an important part of the puzzle to implement Resolution 1540. To that end, this thesis analyses the oft-overlooked complementary relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations in maintaining global peace and security. It demonstrates that regional bodies have evolved throughout history to become assistant guardians, together with the UN, against regional and international perils. In turn, it explores the opportunities and limitations of regional bodies—specifically the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—in the Middle East to assist their memberships in complying with the Resolution 1540. This region was selected because of its relatively low 1540 implementation rates, porous borders, lax export controls, challenges stemming from transnational crime, and the increased interest in nuclear power—all which make Middle Eastern states attractive and prone to being exploitation
by non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD or transfer such devices through the region. The thesis concludes that key features of the League of Arab States and the GCC—scope and focus, current and evolving institutional infrastructure, and ongoing and prior work related to 1540 implementation—make them appropriate bodies that can effectively assist their membership with 1540 implementation. Policy recommendations include that the League of Arab States and the GCC request assistance available under 1540’s mandate to employ a dual-hatted 1540 Coordinator for their overlapping memberships to further 1540 implementation in the Middle East.
Denna avhandling och min mastersutbildning vid Georgetown University tillägnas Rolf Bergenäs, min pappa, på hans 60-årsdag i November 2010. ”Evigt ung” med trygghet, inspiration och fortsatta gränslösa drömmar från Vetlanda till Washington.

Din ”lille pojk”

JOHAN BERGENAS
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations is inarguably one of the greatest menaces threatening international peace and security today.¹ Since the turn of the century, this sentiment has grown in strength across the world, and as a countermeasure to this threat, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540 to combat the dangerous nexus between the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution mandates that all member states criminalizes and put into place a national enforcement system to deter and punish proliferation activities. Additionally, provisions under Resolution 1540 entail physical safety and security measures, as well as the adoption of border and export controls to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking.

Implementing Resolution 1540 is a long term goal that poses significant challenges to all states because of the time and resources necessary to fully comply with the Resolution. This is especially true for states that lack financial, human and technical capacity to take steps toward 1540 compliance. While resource-rich countries in the Middle East have financial resources that could be diverted toward implementing this nonproliferation measure, many states come up short on human and technical expertise.²
In seeking to increase the level of 1540 implementation, a concept that has gained traction in recent years is the role played by regional organizations in assisting states to implement Resolution 1540. Regional organizations are important pieces of the 1540 implementation puzzle, and this thesis explores the opportunities and limitations of Middle Eastern regional bodies—the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council—in assisting their memberships with that task.

There are multiple advantages in examining these bodies and ultimately taking advantage of their potential ability to assist their member states in implementing Resolution 1540. The Middle East is widely considered a region where proliferation of WMD, terrorist activities, and transnational threats are of considerable concern. Greater implementation of Resolution 1540 could assuage these problems simultaneously. For example, today in the wider region, about 20 countries are at various stages in pursuing nuclear energy. For countries to build safe and secure nuclear programs, and to make sure that they are proliferation-resistant and that materials and key technologies are not diverted to non-state actors, nearly all Middle Eastern states will require extensive human and technical support (some will also require significant financial assistance). Such assistance can be provided to states under the auspices of Resolution 1540.

Beyond the nuclear issue, governments in the region are also confronted with challenges stemming from porous borders, inadequate judicial systems and deficient law enforcement institutions. As a result, parts of the Middle East have become ripe for
terrorist organizations to find safe havens and move freely across borders, which also allows transnational criminal activity – including illicit finance, and drug and dual-use trafficking – to flourish and directly threaten the quality of life of populations in the region. However, border security measures, various forms of training, regulatory development, supply of equipment, financial regulation and legal training all falls within the framework of Resolution 1540 and “would go far to ameliorating immediate national security challenges [in the Middle East] while reinforcing the rigor of the global nonproliferation regime” in that part of the world. In short, implementing Resolution 1540 can have “dual use” and regional organizations in the Middle East can be one important piece of the puzzle to capitalize on these opportunities.

The analysis of the role of regional organizations in implementing resolution 1540 in the Middle East begins with a critique of the data sources used and the methodology applied. The following section discusses the origins and content of Resolution 1540 and identifies key implementation challenges as well as ongoing efforts to alleviate them. The thesis then turns to examining the evolution of regional organizations throughout the Cold War and what role they are believed to be able to play today in safeguarding international peace and security. A discussion on the specific role of regional organizations in facilitating and promoting implementation of 1540 then follows, including examples where these bodies have had an impact. The subsequent section then analyze the League of Arab States and the GCC as it pertains to their ability to play a role in efforts to implement Resolution 1540 in the region. The concluding section
illuminates opportunities and limitations for these regional organizations in facilitating and promoting Resolution 1540 implementation and offers policy recommendations.
Chapter 2: Data and methodology

A number of key points deserve attention with regard to the data and methodology used in this thesis. Most importantly, in connection to Resolution 1540 implementation levels, there is no exact method to assess how far UN member states have gone to implement the UN measure. This is due to the fact that the reports (discussed below) that states are obligated to submit to the 1540 Committee detailing 1540 implementation activities are productions of the state itself. However, many countries do not have the financial or human capacity to comprehensively identify if, and to what degree, they fulfill specific Resolution 1540 provisions. Subsequently, when the 1540 Committee’s group of experts review and seek to determine the level of implementation in any given country, the data in many cases are to various degrees already flawed upon receipt. As such, the analysis of this data will be imperfect as well, a point that the 1540 Committee experts acknowledges.

While the states’ reports to the 1540 Committee are posted on a website, the 1540 Committee experts’ analysis of each individual’s countries implementation rate is not for public consumption. The implementation generalizations made in this article represents a general overview of the 1540 reports submitted, as well as several years of following this issue, which has given the author a solid general understanding of the various countries’ implementation standards. It must be noted that for the purpose of this thesis, a general understanding of implementation trends is sufficient and
widespread agreement exist about the regional implementation claims made throughout this thesis.

This thesis focuses on the League of Arab States and the GCC because their overlapping membership encompass all but one Middle Eastern country, Israel, which does not belong to any regional body in that part of the world for historical and contemporary political reasons beyond the scope of this thesis. The third regional organization that could have been subject for analysis is the Arab Maghreb Union, which membership encompasses Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. This regional body, however, is in the authors opinion, after initial research, significantly underfunded and lacks both institutional and human capacity to be playing a role in assisting its membership with any form if implementation of international measures. All Arab Maghreb Union member states are also state parties to the League of Arab states, meaning that all states besides Israel are under consideration in this thesis.

Resolution 1540 aims to prevent non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, from gaining access to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as means of their delivery, such as missiles. The measure was adopted under Article VII of the UN Charter, which means that implementing it is binding on all UN member states. Specifically, Resolution 1540 requires all countries to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” It also calls on countries to establish a domestic judicial and law enforcement system appropriate to criminalize and punish terrorists who “manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use,” WMD, missiles to deliver these weapons, and related materials. Additionally, under the terms of Resolution 1540, UN member states shall account for and maintain security for all WMD, delivery systems and related materials, on their territories as well as to put into place border and export controls to prevent them from being transferred through or stored on the national territory. In short, Resolution 1540 has become an important component of the international nonproliferation regime, and its intent is to prevent the spread and use of WMD by a terrorist organization.

Recognizing that complying with all of Resolution 1540’s provisions requires a major time and resource commitment from states in the developing part of the world, the measure calls on able states to support others’ implementation efforts, including
with financial, technical or human capacity and support. With regard to states failing to implement the resolution, as 1540 was adopted as a Chapter VII measure the UN Security Council can take punitive action against non-complying states. However, because of the general nature of Resolution 1540’s language – for example, it notes that states should take “appropriate” and “effective” measures to implement 1540’s measures, but does not specify what that means – full compliance, or noncompliance, are terms up for interpretation. Also, much of the work under Resolution 1540 is a constant work in progress as updates to, for instance the judicial system of any state, is a constant work in progress. One can therefore argue that no state will ever be in full compliance of 1540 and as such it is unlikely that the UN Security Council will ever consider singling out one or a group of state to punish them for not implementing Resolution 1540. Also, one 1540 expert has noted that the UN measure should not be considered a burden, but a “vision” for how to strategically plan for taking steps to implement the Resolution.11

**Trigger events and precedents for Resolution 1540**

The terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 brought the perils of non-state actors to the forefront of the international security debate. The events on September 11 were catalysts for the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates the international community to take measures to halt or disrupt funding to terrorist groups worldwide.12 Subsequently, the terrorist
attacks against the American homeland also increased the focus on the threat that non-state actors were actively seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, or radiological materials for a so called “dirty bomb,” and highlighted the dangerous nexus between WMD and terrorism. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 both passed unanimously and set the precedent of being the only UN Security Council Resolutions that were not made in response to a specific phenomenon and do not target a specific country; instead Resolution 1373 and 1540 hone in on the general threat posed by terrorism and non-state actors acquiring WMD respectively.

Revelations that A.Q. Khan, former head of Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, had successfully headed a nuclear black market by exploiting weak links in the global security chain was also an incentive to seek additional measures to combat the WMD terrorism threat. Peter Crail, a nuclear analyst with the Arms Control Association, noted in 2007 that the illicit network verified that non-state groups “may be the recipients as well as the suppliers of [WMD] and technologies [and that the] traditional international WMD nonproliferation regime was not formed to address these types of proliferation considerations…”13 This was dangerously coupled with the absence of measures to combat WMD proliferation to non-state actors.14

Simultaneously, in the years leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1540, the United States was in a hurry to put on the books a measure that obligated the entire international community to take steps to shut down or disrupt terrorist networks seeking
WMD. More specifically, the George W. Bush Administration did not believe that the time-consuming process of negotiating a multilateral treaty was an appropriate path, considering the urgency of generating a WMD terrorism nonproliferation tool. In fact, the United States mirrored Resolution 1540 after the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was an all-voluntary measure guarding against the high seas being used as WMD trafficking routes. In sum, there were many events that triggered the passage of Resolution 1540, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing advanced consciousness of the threat posed by WMD terrorism, revelations about the A.Q. Khan network and the need for effective WMD terrorism security measures, and the Bush Administration’s rejection of the multilateral treaty route.

**Early implementation challenges and current 1540 compliance rates**

During the consultation process prior to 1540s adoption and immediately following the passage of the measure, numerous states questioned the legitimacy of the measure. The Non-Aligned Movement, but also countries such as New Zealand, Switzerland and the Republic of Korea, objected to their limited opportunity to impact 1540 negotiations and also that the Resolution was passed pursuant to Chapter VII under the UN Charter, making 1540 implementation an obligatory exercise for all states under international law. Egypt, Pakistan and South Africa were among over a dozen states that believed that in adopting Resolution 1540, the UN’s executive body, the Security Council, had effectively overtaken the legislative powers of the General Assembly and other
multilateral negotiating bodies. The inarguably heavy emphasis on nonproliferation compared to disarmament also frustrated many non-nuclear weapons countries, among them Germany, Canada and Norway.

Another, less political, initial speed bump for the implementation of Resolution 1540 was the ambiguous resolution language, making it difficult for states to actually understand what was expected of them. The Resolution, as noted above, in several places calls on countries to take “effective and appropriate measures” with regard to, for example, border and export controls, but provides no further explanation.

Today, however, several indicators point out that early legitimacy questions have been assuaged. First and foremost, in December 2009, then-1540 Committee Chairman, Ambassador Jorge Urbina, said “that the questions that were initially posed regarding the legitimacy of the resolution seem to have disappeared, as have the initial doubts on the need for the Committee. This represents a concrete achievement by the Committee and the Group of Experts that supports it.” In line with that pronouncement, one no longer hears countries challenging the legal mandate of Resolution 1540 or complaining about the skewed balance between nonproliferation and disarmament. Indeed, the UN Security Council, with a new set of member states, has twice extended the 1540 Committee. Its current mandate runs through April 2011, at which point it is expected to be extended for an unknown number of years, perhaps even indefinitely. States and regional organizations have also publicly endorsed the implementation of the
Resolution and in the latter case called upon member states to take all steps necessary to implement 1540.\textsuperscript{20}

Turning to current levels of implementation, in 2004, the UN Security Council, when passing Resolution 1540, also established a Committee, the 1540 Committee, consisting of all Security Council states and a Group of Experts charged with monitoring 1540 compliance among UN member states. As a first implementation measure, countries were obligated to submit a report to the 1540 Committee six months after the Resolution’s passage on “steps [countries] have taken or intend to take to implement [1540].” To date, over 160 states, or some 80 percent of UN member states, have submitted that report.\textsuperscript{21} Non-reporting countries are all located in the Global South, and while all Middle Eastern states have fulfilled this aspect of the implementation process, most reports are inadequate insofar as length and depth goes. For example, one state simply submitted a one page statement to the 1540 Committee saying that the country “does not possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.”\textsuperscript{22} By contrast, countries that have more resources to devote to Resolution 1540 implementation activities, such as the U.S. and Germany, submitted elaborate reports that provided detailed descriptions on, inter alia, interagency implementation coordination efforts, future plans of action, and next steps to be taken to comply with the UN measure.\textsuperscript{23}

To a large extent, poor reporting on 1540 implementation by developing countries indicates, more than anything, how difficult and expensive the task of complying with
Resolution 1540 can be. This is particularly true for governments that have other legitimate priorities that more directly threaten the quality of life for their populations. For example, extreme poverty, public health challenges such as widespread HIV-/AIDS epidemics, domestic instability, and drug, human and small arms and light weapons trafficking are often more pressing security issues in the developing world. As noted by Brian Finlay in a 2010 report on implementing Resolution 1540 in Central America:

Yet while few can question the disastrous consequences of a WMD terrorist incident, in the face of the daily threats to citizen safety and security—both economic and physical—in Central America and much of the Global South, such pronouncements are not only inaccurate, they are prima facie unreasonable. Requiring resource-strapped governments to divert attention from more immediate challenges to the seemingly distant threat of WMD terrorism is a proliferation-prevention strategy that is destined to fail—if not from a lack of political will then from a sheer lack of implementation capacity in these countries.

As a result of competing priorities and finite time and resources that can be committed to countering the WMD terrorism threat, implementing Resolution 1540 is in many cases an afterthought in the Global South.

There is no exact science in assessing to what degree states have implemented Resolution 1540. The 1540 Committee experts are charged with analyzing and determining the level of compliance and use a 1540 matrix to log states’ self-reported achievements. A general overview of the reports and some matrices that are not made available to the general public indicate that some states have addressed numerous Resolution 1540 measures, while most countries are in compliance with only a limited number of the steps called for in the resolution. However, one committee expert has noted that the 1540 Committee had seen a significant increase in implementation efforts.
in recent years, indicating that Resolution 1540 implementation is gaining traction.\textsuperscript{26} That states today pay more attention to Resolution 1540 is also the result of extensive worldwide awareness-raising programs and outreach events held and sponsored by developed countries governments, regional and international organizations. Requests for assistance to implement the Resolution have also trickled in to the 1540 Committee. It should be noted that even though many of the early 1540 implementation challenges have been addressed, lack of capacity and resources remain crucial obstacle to complying with Resolution 1540.

**Ongoing efforts to assuage implementation challenges**

Self-finance and bilateral assistance are two avenues for states to pursue in seeking greater Resolution 1540 implementation. Outreach and awareness-raising seminars and workshops organized by UN bodies are also ongoing. For example, in late 2009, Egypt hosted a 1540 implementation workshop in Cairo, which was attended by over a dozen African states.\textsuperscript{27} Another African seminar took place in Kenya in February 2010 emphasizing, \textit{inter alia}, the importance of in-region sharing of knowledge from Resolution 1540 implementation experiences and capacity-building, principally in the biosecurity area.\textsuperscript{28} Similar workshops, focusing on various aspects of Resolution 1540, have in recent years been organized in Brazil, Qatar, Vanuatu, Costa Rica and Vietnam in order to target their respective regions or sub-regions.\textsuperscript{29}
Besides states, regional workshops are often attended by representatives of international organizations with specialized knowledge in subject matters connected to the issue at hand. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons can assist states with technical and human capacity in regards to their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention nonproliferation treaties intrinsically linked to the implementation of Resolution 1540. Other multilateral arrangements, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are helping their states implement 1540. Moreover, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in the United Kingdom, the Center for International Trade and Security, the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Stimson Center in the United States are just a few nongovernmental organizations that work with individual states or groups of states to, for example, provide legal and scientific expertise and train customs, border, and export control officials on the ground. An additional source of assistance is regional organizations, which have proven to play an important role in implementing Resolution 1540 among their member states. To provide context and explain these bodies’ current and potential future successes in the Middle East and North Africa, the following section will discuss the historical foundation of these groups, their place in the international system, and how regional organizations evolved throughout the Cold War. Then, the relatively recent emergence of the regional-global security mechanism will be examined, and ultimately, their role in connection to Resolution 1540.
Chapter 4: Regionalism as an international security paradigm

Regional organizations are groups composed of geographically proximate nations sharing various characteristics and values that tie the states together. Compared to ad hoc collaborations between two or more states, regional organizations have, among other things, founding documents, formalized organizational structures, including budgetary means and staff, permanent headquarters or rotating chairmanships, annual summits, and/or lower level meetings throughout the year. Regional organizations can possess varying degrees of advanced bureaucracies to adopt binding resolution and implement decisions made by the member states. Regional and subregional organizations can focus exclusively on one set of issues, like economic cooperation, or include cooperation on a range of regional and international matters. They often will also have overlapping memberships.

By continent, examples of regional and subregional organizations across the globe include: in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; in Europe, the European Union; in Africa, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community; in the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); and in Australia, the Pacific Island Forum. One prominent scholar in the field, Muthiah Alagappa, an expert on international politics, describes the assets, roles and strategies of regional institutions in the following manner:
In theory, regionalism should facilitate communications and socialization, information sharing, increase in consensual knowledge, and growth in power through the pooling of resources and collective action. Based on these assets, regional institutions should be able to avail themselves of one or more of the following interconnected strategies: norm-setting, assurance, community-building, deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intermediation, enforcement and internationalization. Norms can define identities of states as well as regulate their behavior. Through norm-setting, regional institutions can influence the collective expectations and the internal and international behavior of member states in the political, economic and security arenas.30

The role assigned to regional organizations in the UN Charter

Regional organizations’ formal role in maintaining international peace and security is only vaguely defined in the UN Charter, and there is no language that details the mechanisms of interaction with the UN Security Council.31 Article 53 in Chapter VIII of the Charter reads that regional organizations “shall, where appropriate, utilize…regional arrangements…for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…”32 The rather undefined position assigned to regional organizations in maintaining peace and security is largely because, according to Tania Felizio at the UN University, “the notion of regionalism was still in its infancy” at the time when the Charter was drafted in the mid 1940s.33 Alagappa provides an additional reason for the relatively weak role assigned to regional organizations in the UN’s founding document, writing that during the organization’s formative years, regional organizations “were seen as competing with and detrimental to the universal approach embodied in the UN.”34
Emergence of a regional-global security mechanism

Despite weak treatment of regional arrangements in the UN Charter, regional and sub-regional infrastructures emerged strongly in the latter half of the 20th century, not only in Europe, but also in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and in the Pacific. Early criticism of regional bodies, however, claimed that they were “hostages of bipolarity or mere debating chambers, ineffective through lack of capacity and resources.”

The end of the Cold War provided a much better climate for regional arrangements to make positive contributions to peace and security issues in their regions and beyond. By the mid to late 1990s, it was “widely accepted that global [organizations, such as the UN] and regional institutions can and should work together in promoting international peace and security.” This realization sprung from the general recognition that the UN could not alone address the changing nature of the security landscape following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this light, regional organizations were seen as appropriate arrangements to help share the burden of combating national, regional and international security challenges.

Alagappa sums up well why academics and policy-makers have become increasingly interested in the role of regional organizations in combating threats to global peace and security in the post-Cold War era. He writes that, besides the end of the bipolar Cold War superpower struggle, “[r]egionalization of international politics, [the] inability of
any one state or organization to manage the resulting world order [after the collapse of
the Cold War security architecture], the growth of regional powers and the desire on
their part as well as on the part of other regional states to seek greater control over their
strategic environment, and growth of economic regionalism…underscore” the growing
interest in examining the potential contributions of regional arrangements in
maintaining peace and security worldwide.\textsuperscript{39}

The argument that “the UN and regional organizations should play complementary
roles in facing the challenges of international peace and security,” has taken root among
academics, policy-makers and practitioners, who refer to this dynamic as the “regional-
global security mechanism.”\textsuperscript{40} This is, for example, evident by the numerous UN and
Security Council meetings with representatives from regional bodies which have taken
place since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{41} Also, UN Secretary Generals Boutros Boutros-
Ghali and Kofi Annan both stressed the importance of strengthening regional
organizations during their tenures. Perhaps the strongest endorsement came from the
latter when writing in 2006 that the UN “is not equipped to handle every crisis in the
world on its own. It is acknowledged that a partnership between the United Nations and
regional and other intergovernmental organizations should be developed if peace and
security are to be maintained.”\textsuperscript{42} Upon taking office, current Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon said that the UN “partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations are
stronger and more active than ever [and that]…[t]he United Nations is committed to
helping build up the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations…”\textsuperscript{43}
Inarguably, despite the vague role assigned to regional organizations in the UN charter, these bodies have over time evolved, and today they are recognized in all quarters of the world as important players in the international system.

**The width and depth of regional organizations today**

The pros and cons of the role of regional organizations are often discussed through various peace and conflict-related prisms. However, many of the advantages and limitations can also be applied to other security related matters, such as the role of regional organizations in facilitating implementation and compliance of international security measures. In fact, regional organizations are particularly suited to play a role in managing conflicts within their constituencies because they “can provide legitimacy, local knowledge and experience, and some resources especially in the form of personnel.”

Ramesh Thakur, former senior UN official, reinforces this view when writing that regional organizations “have the advantage of closeness to the conflicts, deeper familiarity with the issues underlying the conflict, and the social and political contexts encasing them, and awareness of the urgency to deal with the crisis [at] hand.”

In addition, Louise Fawcett, an international relations scholar, points out that “regional institutions are seen to enjoy comparative advantages in certain areas, because of factors like geographic proximity and sensitivity to local issues; they may be willing to act and provide goods and services to regions that other institutions cannot…”
Despite their excellent positioning to deal with these issues, regional organizations often have shortcomings that prevent action. Regional arrangements sometimes lack a mandate to act and have difficulty reaching consensus among member states. There can also be issues over scarce resources, especially in the developing world. Local rivalries, partisanship, a fear of threats to national sovereignty, and a tendency to replicate local power imbalances within the organizations themselves are also issues hindering progress.\(^{47}\) However, some of these shortcomings are not a concern when thinking about the role of regional organizations in facilitating the implementation of international nonproliferation measures, which makes these bodies well-suited to assist in Resolution 1540 implementation.

**Regional organizations beyond issues of war and peace**

At the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century, a group of scholars, regional experts and practitioners set out to explore the role of regional organizations in WMD treaty implementation and compliance.\(^{48}\) The project sprung to life out of the perception that states were losing interest and political will to implement and comply with WMD treaties. In particular, the efforts focused on the AU and subregional organizations on the African continent, ASEAN, ARF, and the OAS. The authors of the studies concluded that in all regions examined:

Regional organizations are one of the ways to deal with [implementation and compliance] challenges. Given the complexity of reasons for non-compliance such as ambiguity of treaty language, limitations on the capacity of states to carry out their responsibilities, and the temporal
dimension as well as political decisions leading to deliberate non-compliance, there seems to be substantial opportunity for regional organizations to undertake activities with respect to treaty compliance and with regard to facilitating members who are delinquent to move toward compliance.\textsuperscript{49}

Specific suggested functions of the regional organizations included capacity building, establishing confidence building measures, resource assistance and verification participation. It was also noted that in some areas, “regional organizations have more legitimacy than global multilateral institutions, and cooperation could develop through bilateral and regional relationships.”\textsuperscript{50}
Chapter 5: Regional organizations and Resolution 1540

In addition to emphasizing the role of bilateral assistance and implementation support from international organizations, Resolution 1540, and its follow-on resolutions 1673 and 1810, stress the importance of regional implementation efforts. The current and previous 1540 Committee Chairmen have continuously reiterated this mode of 1540 implementation, and there is a record of support among UN Member States and the secretariat leadership as well. For instance, in 2006 then-Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized that implementation of Resolution 1540 was part of the burden-sharing concept between the UN and regional organizations. In turn, and as noted above, the UN, independently and in cooperation with other states and organizations, has organized several regional workshops in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Implementing Resolution 1540 through a regional approach is logical because the transnational nature of several of the resolution’s provisions unavoidably entail cooperation between neighboring countries. The regional perspective can help ensure consistency so that efforts are not duplicated, already scarce resources do not go to waste, and one country’s advances are not immediately undercut by a gap in its neighbor’s implementation. The regional context provides an opportunity for states to, among other things, discuss and establish cost-sharing plans, exchange model legislation and collaborate on enforcement mechanisms.
With this historical and contemporary backing in mind, in 2006, two years after the
resolution was adopted, a team of researchers set out to gain further understanding on
the potential role that regional organizations can play in facilitating and promoting
Resolution 1540 implementation.\(^{51}\) The starting assumption of the team of six
individuals was that since regional arrangements consist of similar states with shared
histories, interests and concerns, they inherently understand local priorities, strengths
and weaknesses. As such, there is potential for collaboration within regional entities
which ultimately could lead to the effective pooling of resources, sharing of Resolution
1540 implementation experiences among their membership, identifying where
assistance is necessary, and pinpointing potential donors within and outside their
membership. The study focused on organizations in Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific because states in these regions experience
particularly low 1540 implementation rates.\(^ {52}\) The findings of the study were presented
in a book published in 2008, and in the first chapter project director Dr. Lawrence
Scheinman writes:

In short, authority, legitimacy and confidence are all issues in play [with regard to Resolution
1540 implementation] and regional organizations are one way – an important way – to address
them. They enjoy legitimacy among their members who freely joined them and who benefit
from the resources these organizations have at their disposal, and they have authority deriving
from the mandates granted by their member states. Because of these attributes regional
organizations are in a position to direct and assist member states in a variety of ways that might
be seen as intrusive if coming from a global organization or a powerful out-of-region state
whose direct involvement might be interpreted in neocolonial terms. Indeed, it has been noted
that for some states—particularly in the developing world—anti-terrorism, especially in
conjunction with WMD, is not their problem, but a problem of the United States, or any
advanced industrial western state more generally, and they should not be put in the position of
being drawn into facing such challenges. Regional organizations that include members with a
more global perspective can help to bridge the differences between local issues and those of the
broader international system.\(^ {53}\)
The book honed in on the AU, ASEAN, the ARF, OAS, CARICOM and the PIF and identifies the opportunities and limitations of the role these organizations can and currently do play in facilitating the implementation of Resolution 1540. Limitations include that in some cases institutional cultures do not lend themselves to quick decision-making procedures (e.g. ASEAN), WMD terrorism may not be a priority issue in certain regions (most prominently in Africa), and there may be a lack of capacity in the regional organizations to assist their membership in implementing the resolution (an issue across the board).  

However, the authors highlighted the potential of these institutions for success, arguing (1) that the scope and mandate of all the regional bodies include international peace and security or regional security (not always the case as some regional bodies focus exclusively on economic regional cooperation); (2) that all the regional organizations had established infrastructures in the form of forums or bodies in which Resolution 1540 implementation could be addressed or were currently discussed (for example, OAS’s Committee on Hemispheric Security, or more specifically the regional organization’s body fighting terrorism, the Inter-America Committee Against Terrorism); and (3) that there were precedents with regard to activities either directly focused on Resolution 1540 implementation, or activities similar to what would be required, in all regional bodies.
A general doctrine on the roles of regional organizations in facilitating the implementation and promotion of 1540 among member states can hence be discerned from this study. For any given regional organization to be able to play these roles with regard to implementing Resolution 1540, the body’s scope and work must include a mandate for international and/or regional security; regional organizations must have or be able and willing to build infrastructures to support 1540 implementation work; and it is certainly helpful, although perhaps not necessary, to have some experience connected to the work required to implement Resolution 1540, for example in the areas of combating terrorism or the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Practical examples of Resolution 1540 implementation by regional organizations

While several of the previously identified regional or sub-regional organizations have taken important steps to assist their member states in implementing Resolution 1540, two examples stick out, CARICOM and the Central American Integration System (SICA). In the CARICOM case, during a May 2008 workshop, several countries recognized the important role of regional organizations in assisting their memberships with implementing the resolution. Subsequently a CARICOM 1540 Coordinator was hired.

Prior to these workshops, as well as additional outreach activities and investment in human capital through the hiring of a 1540 Coordinator, the Caribbean region’s track
record with Resolution 1540 had been nearly non-existent. Since the hiring of the 1540 Coordinator, however, all CARICOM countries have fulfilled the initial 1540 implementation step by submitting a report to the 1540 Committee. Also, more than half the states in the Caribbean region have established points of contact for 1540 implementation, several countries have formed interagency coordination groups, and half a dozen or so have drafted national action plans. CARICOM has also co-hosted an experts’ workshop on export controls and maritime security and sought and received resources to evaluate member countries’ national legislation relevant to Resolution 1540 implementation. The Caribbean countries are also receiving assistance drafting appropriate legislation where necessary. These streams of funding are the result of CARICOM Secretary General Edwin W. Carrington’s submission of a proposal for assistance to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee, which was subsequently funded by the United States and Canada.

A similarly successful engagement is currently taking place in Central America under the auspices of SICA. Following the lead of CARICOM, this regional arrangement too has submitted to the 1540 Committee a request for resources to hire a SICA 1540 Coordinator to guide implementation efforts in the region. The pragmatic use of regional organizations in the Caribbean and Central America bode well for other regions to utilize their regional bodies. The Middle East, which we shall now turn to, is in the main, more developed in comparison to the Caribbean and Central
America. Hence, countries there are in a good position to capitalize on taking advantage of the benefits of regional cooperation with regard to implementing Resolution 1540.
Chapter 6: Middle Eastern regional organizations and Resolution 1540

The GCC and the Arab League are regional organizations that encompass all Middle East countries besides Israel. Furthermore, membership includes Arab states in North Africa. The introduction of this thesis laid out the “dual use” benefits for Middle Eastern actors to implement 1540; this section examines regional institutions’ ability to assist its memberships in that process. While originally intended for different reasons than the specific security and development opportunities that 1540 offers, today the GCC and the Arab League have the scope, the institutions (or evolving infrastructures), and precedent that suggest there is an opportunity that they can be important pieces of the puzzle to increasing region-wide 1540 implementation.

League of Arab States

Formed in March 1945 in Cairo, the League of Arab States originally consisted of Syria, Jordan (back then Transjordan), Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen. The League’s current membership totals 22 states, with 4 additional observer nations, all of which have populations that primarily speak Arabic. Although other countries have wielded influence at various times, the organization is dominated primarily by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The effectiveness of the Arab League has at times been significantly reduced, for example during large periods of the Cold War when the membership sympathized with opposing sides in the superpower struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Divisions based on regime type between monarchies and new republics
have also hindered collaborative progress. To this day, deep seated divisions among member states continue to hamper collaborative efforts.

The League of Arab States focuses on a rather broad range of economic, peace and security issues. How the latter two correspond with Resolution 1540 is self-explanatory due to the nature of the measure, but economic collaboration laid out in Article II of the League of Arab States’ founding document, “Pact of the Arab League of States,” is also directly connected to 1540 implementation activities. It calls on the League’s membership “to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them” *inter alia*, in the areas of “[e]conomic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.” As pointed out appropriately by Lars Olberg, a German nonproliferation expert, who has written on Resolution 1540 and regional organizations in the Middle East, “export controls, transshipment, and end-user controls and licenses,” which are key aspects of Resolution 1540 implementation, “can be subsumed under the terms ‘economic affairs,’ ‘commercial relations,’ and ‘customs.’” Moreover, the 1950 “Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty Between the States of the Arab League,” provides similar legal foundation for Resolution 1540 implementation to take place under the auspices of the League of Arab States. In short, the League of Arab States’ scope, as laid out in key legal documents, encompasses work necessary to help its membership toward greater Resolution 1540 implementation.
With regard to current or evolving organizational infrastructures that can support Resolution 1540 implementation, during a UN Security Council meeting in October 2009, Radwan ben Khadra, head of the League’s legal department, said that his organization was considering the establishment of an office to specifically coordinate 1540-related implementation activities among its membership. At the same meeting, Egypt’s representative stated his country’s commitment to promote 1540 implementation at the regional level through mechanisms such as the League of Arab States. That Egypt, and as shall be discussed below, also Saudi Arabia, are supporting regional implementation of Resolution 1540 are important developments because these two countries are leading actors in the League of Arab States.

Further, following the UN October gathering, the Department of Legal Affairs of the League of Arab States organized a workshop focused on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The meeting was attended by representatives of the 1540 Committee as well as officials from 17 Arab countries’ Ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense. The League’s Department of Legal Affairs has also recently participated in regional 1540 workshops, including seminars on the preparation of 1540 reports. These activities by the League of Arab States represent capacity-building measures, which will help member states take greater use of its regional institution with regard to 1540 implementation.
The League of Arab States also has experience with working issues related to Resolution 1540 implementation. The organizations has for instance engaged with the UN and its specialized security and development agencies to further increase cooperation on many of the “dual-use” regional security concerns identified previously in this thesis (trade and finance are additional areas where the League has sought outside assistance). The League has also gained prior experience dealing with counterterrorism and the arms trade through both the 1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and activities connected to the development of the Arms Trade Treaty, which includes various border and export control considerations for all states. Most recently, in June 2010 the League co-hosted a symposium together with the UN Institute of Disarmament Research during which the League’s membership exchanged views with each other and with international experts on a prospective conventional arms treaty.

Many countries in the League of Arab States are more advanced and developed than their counterparts in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. However, even though the League of Arab States has achieved various degrees of regional cooperation, this does not necessarily mean that the organization stands ready or is willing to immediately take the progressive steps made by CARICOM and SICA. The League’s membership is much larger than both these Latin American organizations and lack of trust and tensions among Arab states have in the past hindered cooperation on issues such as terrorism and transnational crime. However, based on the level of political
support and prior and current activity, a regional approach under the purview of the
League of Arab States should not be ruled out; especially if the previously discussed
dual use connection between regional security and Resolution 1540 implementation is
sufficiently established (pragmatic recommendations to this end is discussed in the
concluding section).

**Gulf Cooperation Council**

The Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of member states Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, was formed on May 25, 1981 as a
regional common market and a defense organization. With regard to its scope in
connection to Resolution 1540, the GCC Charter provides ample opportunity for such
cooperation, especially in areas of economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs,
communications, education and culture, as well as science and technology.63

An additional legal mandate for 1540 implementation on a regional level can be
found in the 1981 “The Unified Economic Agreement Between the Countries of the
Gulf Cooperation Council,” which calls for GCC countries to coordinate activities in
the areas of trade, commercial, customs, financial, import, export, transportation,
communication policies, professional and technical training, as well as in projects
facilitating overall economic development.64 As noted, these are all relevant activities
under Resolution 1540.
Regional infrastructures of interest include the GCC Ministerial Council, which according to the GCC Charter shall:

Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in various fields and adopt the resolutions or recommendations required in this regard…Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields…Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities, develop existing cooperation between the member states’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry…Refer any of the various aspects of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized committee for study and presentation of appropriate recommendations.65

With regard to GCC 1540-related activities in the past, in particular on terrorism and transnational issues, the GCC signed an anti-terrorism security agreement in 2004, and more recently, it has hosted seminars discussing regional initiatives to combat fraud and money laundering.66 With specific regard to nuclear energy, the GCC has partnered with groups like the European Union and the IAEA to ensure safe and secure development of nuclear energy. In 2008, at the 18th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, the two regional organizations stressed “the importance of the establishment and implementation of effective systems of national export controls in accordance with UNSC resolution 1540.”67 The EU and GCC built upon this call to action with a 1540 workshop hosted by Qatar in 2009, and the GCC Secretariat led a workshop on nuclear safety and security in June 2010.68 The GCC also engages with the IAEA on the members’ various nuclear activities.69

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At the GCC summit in Riyadh in December 2006, member states adopted a proposal to begin investigating the viability of a joint, peaceful nuclear program. Under the GCC Secretariat, a Gulf Team was created in 2007 to prepare a pre-feasibility study conducted in coordination with the IAEA. Subsequently, the IAEA and nuclear agencies of GCC members launched a program involving studies and workshops designed to assist members in establishing the appropriate legislation, infrastructure, and training to ensure that standards of efficiency, safety, and nonproliferation are met. The second of two workshops, which trained 80 GCC delegates in methods for establishing effective nuclear safety legislation, was conducted in June 2010 in Abu Dhabi.

In this light, one analyst has suggested that due to the territorial proximity and shared economic interests among the member states, the GCC “would be an ideal forum to coordinate” 1540 implementation, including information exchanges and reporting assistance. And there are indeed 1540 lessons to be learned among GCC states. For example, in 2007 the United Arab Emirate adopted Federal Law Number 13, regulating imports and exports in order to prevent illicit transshipment and movement of illegal materials throughout the country. The law in various ways contributes to greater compliance with Resolution 1540, including the banning of unlicensed imports and exports on chemical and biological materials, and dual-use items. Violations of Federal Law Number 13 can result in prison time and fines up to US$270,000, and an oversight
and management committee was set up that categorizes strategic goods and determine whether materials and technologies can be used for military purposes and WMD.

In 2008, with a view to streamline its export control and enforcement system the UAE updated Federal Law Number 13. According to the UAE government the measure has effectively thwarted and closed down numerous, as many as two dozen, UAE and international companies involved in illicit finance and illegal dual use exports. Enforcement of the export control law also includes several cases of interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying illicit goods, including to Iran.

For the UAE to share its experience with neighboring countries on both the drafting of and enforcing Federal Law Number 13 would go a long way to implement Resolution 1540. Key regional countries seem to agree that a regional approach is of considerable value. For example, during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, Saudi Arabia announced that Riyadh would be hosting at the end of the year a regional 1540 workshop inviting GCC member states. This workshop is another important step toward maximizing the benefits that a regional approach may yield with regard to Resolution 1540 implementation.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The preceding pages demonstrate that Resolution 1540 is an important internationally recognized measure that will, if implemented effectively, play an important part in combating the threat posed by WMD terrorism. Regional organizations have previously, and are currently making important contributions to the implementation of Resolution 1540, which is but one example illustrating their post-Cold War role as assistant guardians of international peace and security together with the United Nations and other actors. The Middle East has been identified as an area of the world in need of increased 1540 implementation, and regional organizations have the scope, the institutions (or evolving infrastructures), and precedents that suggest they can be important pieces of the puzzle to increasing regional-wide 1540 implementation rates and in so doing, providing additional stability and security in the region.

However, there is no one-size-fits-all template detailing how a region can make the best use of its regional organizations, and legitimate challenges to that end in the Middle East exist. Yet, implementing Resolution 1540 has been demonstrated to serve dual applications, providing not only a stronger national and regional nonproliferation framework, but also assuaging regional security and development challenges important to actors in the region. The experience of the League of Arab States and the GCC suggest that a regional or sub-regional approach for burden and capacity sharing should not be rejected at face value. Several programs and initiatives are ongoing, and overtures toward further cooperation have been presented. Honing in on “dual-use”
issues – for example transnational crimes and energy diversification – could create the traction necessary for these organizations to take further steps as laid out throughout this thesis. In this light, 1540 implementation should not be seen as a burden, but an opportunity to attract international funding that will help address regional development and security challenges while at the same time moving toward compliance with the Resolution.

Examples of hands-on activities that can be facilitated by the League of Arab States and the GCC can include crafting national Resolution 1540 implementation plans, helping states increase existing assistance to the region and identifying new streams of aid, and avoiding duplications of specialization, which drain national resources. A regional approach can prevent overlapping expertise and ensure that finite resources do not go to waste. A full-time 1540 Regional Coordinator inside the League of Arab States’ proposed 1540 unit would assist Member States in meeting their commitments under the UN Resolution. The overlapping memberships of the League of Arab States and the GCC could also encourage a dual-hatted role for the Middle East 1540 Coordinator. Furthermore, the 1540 Coordinator would be unlikely to impose a financial burden on member states. In the cases of CARICOM and SICA, such coordinators have been the result of available funding from the UN and elsewhere and have come at no cost for the organizations or their memberships.
The Coordinator would be responsible for outreach efforts that would link Resolution 1540 to the broader security and economic development mandate of the host organization(s). This individual should develop a robust work plan in close consultation with the organization’s membership. Execution would begin with the Regional Coordinator working systematically with Member States to provide updated national reports to the 1540 Committee and then initiating the development of national implementation action plans. The Coordinator would be responsible for working with member states of the League of Arab States and the GCC on trainings, evaluations and compliance with 1540 provisions. Other avenues for the Coordinator to explore would be to formulate best practices and propose and facilitate workshops in areas of additional need for the Middle East. The Regional Coordinator could also assist the organizations or member states in the development of requests for assistance to the 1540 Committee, as well as for assistance requests from bilateral and other regional or international organizations. The 1540 Coordinator, being a spider in the web as discussed above, would reassure donor states that all assistance across the region is harmonized and leveraged. The coordinator would also provide donors with a regional ally to promote the long-term sustainability of those investments.

Just like the member states, the regional organizations in question are developing entities, and a key obstacle to fulfilling their objectives is insufficient financial capacity. In addition to the sources of such assistance identified above, an additional vehicle to pursue to come to grips with this problem is the G8 Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). Since its inception in 2002, the GP has focused on nuclear threats in Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Union states. While states during the 2010 G8 meeting in Canada did not recommit to extending the Global Partnership beyond its current 2012 deadline or expanding it beyond its current geographic focus, some policymakers and analysts believe that such a course of events is likely.\textsuperscript{75} If the GP were to be extended and geographically expanded, implementation of Resolution 1540 would be identified as a prioritized area. The Canadian government is one actor that is likely to favor such an extension and expansion, as evidenced by a 2009 statement made by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper: “The G8 is an institution with a proven record of moving agendas forward, of drawing attention to overlooked issues and, perhaps most importantly, of being able to mobilize resources to meet global challenges.”\textsuperscript{76}

The GP countries have also stated correctly that “maintaining a high level of global security will only be possible by strengthening the weakest links.”\textsuperscript{77} In the Middle East, there are many such links in the form of states lacking the capacity to take on key steps crucial to promoting global security. Implementing Resolution 1540 is one tool for furthering that trajectory, and regional organizations are important pieces of the puzzle to successfully achieving it.
Endnotes

1 During the 2010 Washington, DC Nuclear Security Summit, the United States President Barack Obama stated that “it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security—to our collective security.” The White House, “Remarks by the President at the Opening Plenary Session of the Nuclear Security Summit.” Office of the Press Secretary, April 13, 2010. Upon submission of this thesis to the Georgetown Graduate School, a version of this thesis will be published by the Stimson Center.

2 When referencing the Middle East region, this thesis is referring to member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States, including Arab states located in North Africa. Member states in these organizations include: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.


4 For a discussion on these and other regional security and development challenges in the Middle East see Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, Veronica Tessler, “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” Stimson Center and Stanley Foundation Report, September 2010.


12 Security Council, UN document S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001


15 During Security Council meetings, including UN Security Council 4950 Meeting on April 22, 2004, UN Security Council 4956 Meeting on April 28, 2004, UN Security Council 5106 Meeting on December 22, 2004, UN Security Council 5375 Meeting on February 21, 2006, UN Security Council 5886 Meeting on May 6, 2008, and in their reports to the 1540 Committee, the following states raised concerns with Resolution 1540 not being negotiated in a multilateral forum or called for such negotiations: Algeria, Chile, Benin, Peru, New Zealand, India, Singapore, Switzerland, Cuba, Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Republic of Korea, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Namibia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Brazil, and Libyan Arab Jamahirya.

16 For example, the following states raised concerns about the UN Security Council’s role as a legislator compared to an enforcer as is the case with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention: Pakistan, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Lichtenstein, Nepal, Namibia, Brazil, and South Africa.

17 States concerned with the imbalance between nonproliferation and disarmament included Namibia, Germany, Canada, Peru, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Switzerland, Cuba, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Syrian Arab Republic, Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Mexico, Norway, Kazakhstan, Austria, Lichtenstein, Nigeria, Namibia, Kuwait, Thailand, Chile, Algeria, and Brazil.

18 Briefing by Ambassador Jorge Urbina, Chairman of the Committee Established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), 14 December, 2009.

19 The adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008) extended the 1540 Committee’s work for two and three years respectively.


24 Finlay, pp. 5-6.


26 Ibid.

27 The Egypt workshop was held from December 7-10, 2009 with financial support from the European Union and the Governments of Norway and the United States. Officials from the Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, as well as representatives from a number of international, regional and sub-regional organizations, were invited to participate.

28 The Kenya workshop was held in Nairobi between February 2-4, 2010 and was attended by government officials from Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda.

29 The Workshop on Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia was held on September 28, 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam. It was organized by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and was funded by the EU and governments of Norway and the U.S.


32 Charter of the United Nations, chp. VIII, art. 52.


34 Alagappa (1997), p. 422.

35 Felicio, pp. 8-9.


40 Felicio, p. 12.

41 Between 1994 and 2007 the UN Secretary-General convened seven meetings between the UN and Regional organizations to explore the potential for broader and deeper cooperation. The UN Security Council has also invited regional organizations to meetings six times since 2003.


43 Fawcett, p. 3; UN Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council debate on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security New York, 6 November 2007.


46 Fawcett, p. 3


48 This project was led by the Dr. Lawrence Scheinman of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.


52 Crail, pp. 355-399.

53 Scheinman, ed., p. 5.

54 Scheinman, ed., pp. 156-158.

55 Scheinman, ed., p. 154-156.
The discussion on CARICOM and SICA reflects the ongoing work of the Stimson Center’s Managing Across Boundaries program. See for example, Finlay and Turpen.

The League of Arab States, “Pact of the Arab League of States,” art. 2, 22 March 1945.

Olberg, p. 28.


“Charter of the Cooperation Council For The Arab States of The Gulf,” art. 4.


Olberg, p. 27.


The recommendations in this section mirrors those identified in the CARICOM and SICA cases. See Finlay.


77 Global Partnership Review, G8 Summit, June 6 - 8, 2007, G8 Summit 2007, Heiligendamm, Germany.