ABSTRACT

During the 2000s, the Indian military notably deployed overseas including distant locations such as Nevada in the United States, the United Kingdom, Congo, off the Somali coast, the Far East, and the South Pacific to participate in joint exercises, carry out peacekeeping operations, and execute counterpiracy missions amongst myriad other deployments. Notably, these deployments coincided with India’s current rising economic, political, and cultural and political stature. Observing India’s overseas military deployments during this period prompts inquiry into how a rising power uses its military to underpin its rising status.

According to conventional international relations theory, India should act as a realist state securing its own interests including countering rivals such as China and Pakistan or protecting energy sources and associated trade routes. However, I argue acts through a unique paradigm, which I term “responsible power.” As a “responsible power,” India does not act purely out of self-interest and deploys its military to reinforce pre-existing economic relations with other nations such as major trading partners or fellow members in regional organizations and to execute non-offensive military operations such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance. To prove this concept, I first described India’s realist and “responsible power” interests worldwide. Then, I displayed where India actually deployed its military and demonstrated that acting as a “responsible power” drove India’s deployment of its military overseas.
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UNDERSTANDING INDIA AS A RISING POWER

Over the past decade, India’s increasing military presence overseas has matched its rising economic and cultural profile. In Afghanistan, the Border Roads Organization of the Indian Army is building a road linkage to Iran helping connect Afghanistan to the rest of the world. In 2008, Indian Air Force fighter jets flew in simulated wargames with U.S. Air Force, Navy, French, and South Korean fighter jets outside Las Vegas, Nevada. In late 2008, the Indian Navy dispatched vessels off the coast of Somalia to participate in the multinational counterpiracy effort. According to BBC reporting, on 5 February 2009, two destroyers of the Chinese Navy, which was also participating in the counterpiracy effort off the Somali coast, forced an Indian submarine that was tracking them to surface. Also during 2009, Indian troops performed peacekeeping operations in the Republic of the Congo.

This wide-ranging engagement of Indian military capabilities prompts questions related to both Realist and Liberal theories of international security. For example, as a rising “Great Power,” is India deploying military force to secure its growing economic interests against a potential rival, or is India deploying its military in ways that signal its interest in stability such as working through multilateral institutions promoting international peace-building? In the former, India would be expected to favor the offense, anticipating threats and preparing for the worst. In the latter case, India would be eschewing the extra protections aggressive military build-up might deliver in favor of reaffirming its commitment to act “responsibly” as a rising Great Power. My paper will address these questions. I make the claim that for the most part, India deploys its military as a “responsible power.” My claim differs from other author’s work, because I developed a new method coding the attributes of military activities of rising powers to
empirically determine the nature of India’s policy deploying its military overseas within the last
decade.

Several scholars have also assessed India’s growing worldwide interests and how it
employs its military to secure them. One of the most published is C. Raja Mohan, who is a
member of India’s National Security advisory board. In his book, *Crossing the Rubicon: the
Shaping of India’s Foreign Policy*, Mohan argues Indian foreign policy is transitioning from a
tradition of anti-imperialism and nativism towards a more activist policy especially regarding its
Southeast Asian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern neighbors. Traditionally, India maintained
an idealistic foreign policy of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation through
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. However, as a result of growing commercial
interests such as trade or access to energy sources, India has perhaps modified its role from an
idealistic champion of the Third World towards a realist position, where it simply secures its own
interests.

Mohan asserts this transition occurred when the Soviet Union, India’s former ally, collapsed
ending the Cold War causing India to shift its economic policy from socialism to capitalism.\(^a\)

Subsequently, Mohan explained the nature of India’s new geopolitical outlook as in his
2006 *Foreign Affairs* article, “India and the Balance of Power.” In this article, Mohan assesses
both realist and liberal institutionalist factors driving this new policy. Mohan argues India’s
geopolitical outlook consists of an expanding three-circle model consisting of India’s immediate
neighborhood, meaning the subcontinent, Asia with particular emphasis on the Indian Ocean,
and the rest of the globe. From a realist perspective, India is trying to assert hegemony over the

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subcontinent and balance against other powers in Asia and especially the Indian Ocean. At the
global level, Mohan assesses India is a rising “Great Power” in the international system. While
India may ally itself with the United States to balance against China, it would like to maintain its
autonomy and not be perceived as an Asian subsidiary of the United States as the United
Kingdom is portrayed as an American subsidiary in Europe.\textsuperscript{b}

Interestingly, Mohan also incorporates liberal institutionalist views of India’s new foreign
policy. Instead of promoting solidarity amongst the Third World as its ideal, India now
promotes the benefits of globalization and free trade. India manifests this ideal by negotiating
free and preferential trade agreements with regional organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). Mohan asserts these trade agreements could become
a basis for regional stability and make India the motor for economic growth in the Indian Ocean
region as China is the economic engine of East Asia.\textsuperscript{c}

In a more comprehensive volume, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign
Policy, Rajiv Sikri, an Indian Foreign Service officer discusses India’s growing overseas
interests on a regional case-by-case basis. He views Asia as having four arcs, an ‘arc of
prosperity,’ an ‘arc of energy,’ an ‘arc of instability,’ and an ‘arc of communications.’ In the
‘arc of prosperity,’ the dynamic economies of

China, Japan, South Korea, and an emerging Southeast Asia exhibit sustained growth. The ‘arc
of energy’ consists of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves, which extend between the Persian
Gulf through Central Asia and all the way to Russia’s Far East. Additionally, portions of those

\textsuperscript{c} Ibid.
areas lie within the ‘arc of instability,’ which includes the Middle East, Central Asia, and India’s subcontinental neighbors, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. And, the ‘arc of communications’ consists of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean that connect the aforementioned energy sources to Europe and Asia. According to Sikri, India lies at the vortex of these arcs and must employ a deft foreign policy to secure its military and economic interests. This paper builds on Sikri’s observations by assessing how and where amongst these ‘arcs’ India deploys its military forces.

For the subcontinent, Sikri discusses India’s interest in promoting economic integration and democratization through regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Interestingly, he links Pakistan and Afghanistan together as a policy focus for India. While, he expresses India’s concern with Pakistan and Afghanistan’s instability and both their uses as staging areas for terrorists, he also discusses India’s interest in Pakistan as a transit route for India to access Afghanistan’s hydropower and mineral resources.

Sikri maintains this dual economic and security outlook assessing India’s involvement in other regions. For example, although insurgents use India’s border areas with Myanmar as staging areas for operations in India’s troubled northeast, India also views Myanmar as a gateway to growing Southeast Asian markets and discusses how India is interested in developing water and road infrastructure in that country. The need to access resources and develop economic linkages is also a recurrent theme with regards to India’s relations with Sri Lanka, the

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\( ^e \) Ibid. 39-57.

\( ^f \) Ibid. 69-73.
Persian Gulf and especially Iran, which could serve as India’s gateway to Central Asian energy.\(^8\)

Sikri would also like India to maintain historical relations with Russia especially in the energy, defense, nuclear, space, science, and technology fields. Regarding defense, India and Russia cooperate on developing new weapons systems such as the Brahmos cruise missile, and a new Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft. In terms of energy, India is invested in an energy project near Sakhalin Island in Russia’s Far East.\(^9\) In Africa as well, Sikri discusses technical assistance to the continent, which may correlate with India gaining access to the continent’s resources.\(^i\)

Overall, Sikri expresses the idea that the Indian Ocean littoral is India’s strategic neighborhood with regional stability and especially economic linkages with countries in the region as its focus.\(^j\)

Across this region, India appears to have both a realist and liberal institutionalist agenda, but Sikri does not discuss substantive actions such as military deployments to pursue its foreign policy goals.

While Mohan and Sikri discuss India’s particular geopolitical interests, Walter C. Ladwig discusses how India could deploy its military to secure those interests in his article “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?”

Ladwig provides the following definition of power projection:

> [t]he ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.\(^k\)


\(^i\) *Ibid.* 237.


Ladwig asserts India currently lacks the political will and military capability to achieve its power projection goals but has real power projection needs. These needs include securing vital sea lanes, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, intervention, and deterrence. Even though India’s military has limited power projection capabilities, it has invested in the acquisition of power projection assets including aircraft carriers, amphibious vessels, refueling aircraft, and strategic airlifters.\(^1\)

Essentially, Mohan and Sikri provide the geopolitical framework for understanding India’s foreign policy, while Ladwig addresses how the Indian armed forces would like to invest in power projection systems to execute that policy. Mohan and Sikri assessments of India’s foreign policy during the 2000s display both realist and liberal internationalist tendencies. Through a realist paradigm, India may be trying to balance against China by seeking an alliance with the United States but would like to maintain an autonomous foreign policy. While India has moved from socialist leanings and identity as a Third World advocate, it still maintains an idealistic foreign policy with globalization and free trade as the ideals replacing socialism. India’s idealistic combination of free trade advocacy and continued commitment to multilateral institutions are the main elements of India acting as what I define as a “responsible power.” Ladwig addresses how India’s armed forces would like to invest in power projection systems to execute India’s strategic goals, which include both realpolitik and “responsible power” objectives.

Overall, Mohan, Sikri, and Ladwig provided the theoretical basis for India’s evolving foreign policy based on new objectives as India rises to “Great Power” status. Still, the current

\(^1\) *Ibid.* 1168-1184.
literature lacks empirical evidence on how India actually exercises its growing stature. For this paper, I will assess India’s overseas military deployments during the 2000s as empirical evidence to address this issue. I will correlate those deployments to either realpolitik or “responsible power” objectives and demonstrate India’s current military deployment policy generally follows a “responsible power” framework even while pursuing realpolitik objectives.

**WHY INDIA DEPLOYS ITS MILITARY OVERSEAS**

From the available literature, I assessed India deployed its military forces overseas either to secure its own interests as a realist state or to promote peace through multilateral institutions and free trade as a “responsible power.” In order to determine which assessment best describes India’s overseas military deployment policy, I structured both assessments into the following hypotheses:

A. *India deployed its military forces overseas to secure its own interests as a realist state.*

B. *India deployed its military forces overseas to promote peace through multilateral institutions as a “responsible power.”*

Since the drivers of military deployment are of greatest interest because they indicate India’s approach to great power politics, I have adopted an inductive approach. For each hypothesis, I determined both explanatory factors and their correlated indicators. Explanatory factors are causes for an action such as the necessity to secure a strategic trade route. For each such factor, there are correlated indicators such as the Indian Navy deploying warships to the Straits of Malacca. I assume that explanatory factors play some role with respected to their associated indicators, even if the relationship is not direct. For example, if India determines the
Straits of Malacca are a critical trade route vital to their national interest, Indian naval vessels should consistently provide the area security. If they were not present, it would suggest in this case a realist imperative is not a prime factor for deploying its military overseas. As a caveat, I did not include Indian Military activities near the Indian Navy’s homeports of Mumbai on western seaboard and Visakhapatnam on the eastern seaboard as the Indian military regularly trains in those areas and its presence in those area does not demonstrate force projection.

For each hypothesis, I developed both explanatory factors and correlated indicators. For the realist hypothesis, the explanatory indicators include the need to counter both state- and non-state adversaries and securing major sources of energy and threatened trade routes. Correlated indicators consist of military programs to build or acquire “power projection” military systems such as aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and strategic airlifters, military operations to counter an adversary, and military deployments to secure energy sources or threatened trade routes. As for the “responsible power” hypothesis, explanatory factors consist of trade volume with India’s major trading partners, membership in regional organizations with economic agendas, areas where India provides foreign aid or investment, and locations of major humanitarian disasters. Correlated indicators unique to this hypothesis include military visits to major trade partners or India’s fellow regional organization members and participation in peacekeeping or UN peacekeeping operations. Correlated indicators for this hypothesis also include acquisition programs for “power projection” systems.

I collected data corresponding to each of the explanatory factors and correlated indicators. First, I will present data that corresponds with the explanatory factors. Then, I will provide India’s overseas military deployments. For each of those deployments, I will associate
at least one correlated indicator. Bear in mind, each deployment may have more than one correlated indicator. For example, the Indian Army may deploy to Myanmar to build a road network connecting India to Southeast Asia, while also engaging northeast Indian insurgents with safe havens in Myanmar. In my conclusion, I will determine if in most cases, India deployed its forces as a realpolitik state or as a “responsible power.” I will also report any interesting findings and implications for American foreign policy regarding India’s military.

**Investment in Power Projection Systems**

If India intended to increase the deployment of its military overseas as a realist state or “responsible power”, it must invest in “power projection” systems. These systems allow a military to transport a significant amount of troops and their equipment by air or sea. India’s acquisition of these systems does not address whether it deploys its military to achieve realist state or “responsible power” objectives, but it does demonstrate India’s determination to amplify its military presence abroad. I identified four types of systems that qualify as power projection systems. First, strategic airlifters are large, military cargo aircraft, which can transport large numbers of troops, especially paratroopers, over long distances to reach their destination. Next, aerial refuelers allow military aircraft to fuel in flight without having to land.

Over the high seas, maritime surveillance aircraft fly high endurance missions including anti-submarine, intelligence, and search and rescue. On the high seas, aircraft carriers allow a navy to deploy airpower over a significant distance without the need to negotiate use of airfields in foreign countries, while amphibious warfare vessels deploy marines or soldiers, their air support, or equipment without the need of negotiating the use of a foreign seaport. To get those
aircraft carriers or amphibious vessels to their destinations, replenishment ships are required to refuel and reequip them during their expeditions.

In terms of airlifters, India has a significant inventory of 17 Russian-built, four-engine IL-76s, each of which can 225 paratroopers, or 40 tons of freight or armored vehicles. To augment this capability, the Indian Air Force acquired one C-130J, which can be used for special operations, from the United States and plans to purchase five more. Regarding aerial refuelers, the Indian Air Force currently has seven IL-78s and is courting bids worth $2 billion from Europe’s Airbus and Russia’s Ilyushin to purchase six new aerial refuelers.

For their maritime surveillance missions, the Indian Navy signed a $2.1 billion deal with Boeing to replace its eight ageing Russian-built Tu-142s with more modern eight P-8As, which are based on the Boeing 737 airframe. Currently, the Indian Navy has one aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, and is acquiring two more. In 2004, the Indian Navy purchased the former Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, for $974 million and an additional $700 million for the associated aircraft and weapons systems including 12 MiG-29K fighter jets. In 2005, India started construction of an indigenously-built aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which can carry 20 jet fighters and 20 helicopters.

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In 2007, the Indian Navy purchased the former U.S. Navy amphibious vessel, *USS Trenton*, for $48.4 million and renamed it *INS Jalashwa*, which is capable of transporting 1,000 troops along with their equipment and tanks. From 2007 to 2009, the Indian navy commissioned its three indigenously-built Shardul-class amphibious vessel, each of which can carry 10 main battle tanks, 11 trucks, 500 troops, and helicopters. In the near future, the Indian Navy plans to purchase four additional amphibious vessels that can carry main battle tanks, heavy trucks, armored personnel vehicles, and heavy-lift helicopters. To replenish both its aircraft carriers and amphibious vessels, the Indian Navy purchased one indigenously-built, replenishment vessel, *INS Aditya*, 2000. Earlier this year, the Indian Navy acquired another replenishment vessel, the Italian-built *INS Deepak*, which can carry 15,450 tons of liquid cargo, 510 tons of solid cargo, and 16 cargo containers on the upper deck. The Indian Navy is scheduled to acquire another vessel of the same type later this year.

Based on these air and naval acquisitions, it is clear India is embarking on a more robust overseas military deployment policy. In terms of aerial power projection assets, the Indian Air Force already has a robust airlift capability and is augmenting it with additional aerial refuelers.
In the realm of naval power projection systems, the Indian Navy has always sought to acquire new aircraft carriers and amphibious vessels throughout the 2000s and looks to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean and possibly beyond with the acquisition of new maritime surveillance aircraft and replenishment vessels. These new air and naval power projection systems allow India to execute operations to secure its economic interests, counter adversaries as realist state or perform humanitarian or peacekeeping operations in line with being a “responsible power.” Therefore, it cannot be determined just on these systems alone, which of these reasons guide India’s overseas military deployment policy. For the rest of this paper, I will discuss how India with the power projection assets it already possesses actually deployed its military forces during the 2000s.

**Realist Explanatory Factors**

If India acts as a realist state, then its military should deploy to areas it deems key to its strategic interests. These areas include India’s energy sources, maritime chokepoints to its trade, and areas, where its military engages state or non-state adversaries.

**Energy Sources**

India’s growing economy will demand more energy resources that India must import. India may deploy its military to those the sources of those energy resources. According to the U.S Energy Information (EIA) Administration, as of 2009, the Middle East accounts for 67% of India’s energy imports with the major export countries being Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The next significant portion comes from Africa accounting for 25% with Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea as the major exporters. By
2025, EIA expects India to become the fourth largest net importer of oil in the world by 2025, behind the United States, China, and Japan.\textsuperscript{w}

In addition to oil, India must also import natural gas as its natural gas consumption surpassed its domestic production since at least 2004. In 2008, India imported 372 Bcf of LNG, nearly 75 percent of it from Qatar, making it the sixth largest importer of LNG in the world.\textsuperscript{x}

India also engages in natural gas exploration through its state-owned energy company, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) worldwide. In Asia, ONGC is developing blocks offshore in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Sakhalin Island, Russia. In Russia, ONGC is investing in fields in the Tomsk region in Siberia. In the Middle East, ONGC invests in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. The exploration blocks include offshore blocks in the Persian Gulf off Iran and in the Gulf of Suez and in the northeast Mediterranean off Egypt. In the rest of the African continent, ONGC also explored blocks offshore of Libya, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe. Onshore, ONGC is exploring an area 700 km southwest of Khartoum, Sudan and has an agreement with the Sudanese government to construct a pipeline from a Khartoum refinery to Port Sudan for export. Elsewhere, ONGC is exploring blocks in Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{y}

While ONGC invests in natural gas fields that can be reached by sea, other natural gas sources that could be connected by pipeline remain on the drawing board. These include proposal for natural gas pipelines connecting India to sources in Iran, Turkmenistan, and Myanmar through these respective routes, Iran-Pakistan-India, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, and Myanmar-India. Hostile relations with Pakistan with respect to the first two

\textsuperscript{w} U.S. Energy Information Administration. 1 March 2011. \url{http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/}.

\textsuperscript{x} U.S. Energy Information Administration. 1 March 2011. \url{http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/NaturalGas.html}.

\textsuperscript{y} ONGC Videsh Ltd: The International Petroleum Company of India. 1 March 2011. \url{http://www.ongcvides.com/Assets.aspx}
routes and indecision with Bangladesh prevent construction of these natural gas pipelines to meet India’s natural gas needs.²

Maritime Chokepoints

In addition to potential natural gas pipelines, India is also concerned with maritime choke points according to the Indian Ministry of Defense’s 2007 Maritime Military Strategy. In the Middle East, these include the Strait of Hormuz through which India derives the majority of its energy resources, the Suez Canal, Read Sea, and the Bab-el-Mandeb, all of which important for India’s trade with Europe. In Southeast Asia, India is particularly concerned with the Strait of Malacca, which is a conduit through which India conducts trade with East and Southeast Asia as well as the main route for Persian Gulf oil delivered to East Asia. India is also concerned with the Six Degree Channel, which is the waterway between India and Indonesia and maybe considered the western “gate” to the Strait of Malacca, and alternates to the Malacca Strait, the Lombok Strait and Sunda Strait in Indonesia. And, India also has interests in the Nine Degree Channel amongst India’s Lakshadweep Islands off India’s southwest mainland and the Cape of Good Hope, which functions as an alternate to the Suez Canal.³æ

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Overland, India would like to create new trade routes through Myanmar to Southeast Asia for emerging markets in that region and through Afghanistan to Central Asia for that region’s energy, uranium, rare earths, copper, gold, diamonds, and defense production.\textsuperscript{bb}

\textit{State Adversaries}

The other major factor influencing India’s decision to deploy forces is to counter an adversary’s military deployments. According to its 2007 Maritime Military Strategy, the Indian Ministry of Defense is concerned with China establishing a toe-hold in the Indian Ocean Region.\textsuperscript{cc} The manifestation of this concern is the popular concept of the “String of Pearls,”


\textsuperscript{cc} Indian Navy. \textit{Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy}. 1 March 2011. <\url{http://indiannavy.nic.in/maritime_strat.pdf}>.
which is a Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) connecting China to its Middle East energy sources through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Reportedly, China invested in port infrastructure including foreign ports along this SLOC to support its naval forces operating along it. These ports include Hainan and Woody Island in the South China Sea; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sittwe, Myanmar; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan near the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Also, in Myanmar, China has invested in road/waterway/pipeline construction from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan Province bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Some sources report China established a surveillance facility on Coco Island, Myanmar to monitor Indian naval and air movements in the Bay of Bengal. With regards to Pakistan, this paper will only discuss India’s naval engagements against its historic adversary. Cross-border air or ground activities against do not represent India having the ability or the will to project power, which is indicative of India’s status as a rising Great Power.

While China and Pakistan may represent a state threat to India’s interest, India is also concerned with the terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani-supported Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jemaah Islamiyah, which operates throughout Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, India remained concerned with the Taliban, who threaten India’s interests in Central Asia and India itself. In its northeastern states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim, India is concerned with separatist groups, which operate in a little-governed maritime and borderland

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**Non-state Adversaries**

space astride the Bay of Bengal, through which they engage in illegal arms trafficking. These groups including United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang (NSCN-K) fighting in Assam and Nagaland states respectively also reportedly have support bases in adjacent areas of Myanmar.

And, during the 2000s, across its southern border in Sri Lanka, India was concerned with LTTE successes stoking Tamil regional sentiments in India.

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kk Sikri 76-79.
“Responsible Power” Explanatory Factors

If India acts as a “Responsible Power,” its military will deploy to areas, where a threat does not represent the primary reason for the Indian military to deploy. The primary reason for deploying would include cultivating friendly relations through trade and regional organizations, foreign assistance, peacekeeping, and responding to humanitarian crises.

Major Trade Partners

As a result of its expanding trade, India may deploy its forces with countries it has major trading relations in order to strengthen their diplomatic relationship as a whole. The following are the top 24 countries that India has the most trade volume in millions of US Dollars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>7,385.39</td>
<td>6,365.89</td>
<td>13,751.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>3,027.46</td>
<td>9,332.45</td>
<td>12,359.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6,066.23</td>
<td>4,361.45</td>
<td>10,427.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SAUDI ARABIA</td>
<td>1,175.59</td>
<td>4,866.23</td>
<td>6,041.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>2,812.99</td>
<td>1,740.75</td>
<td>4,553.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>2,296.01</td>
<td>1,647.60</td>
<td>3,943.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1,319.10</td>
<td>2,599.89</td>
<td>3,918.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>319.28</td>
<td>3,203.10</td>
<td>3,522.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>451.91</td>
<td>2,921.08</td>
<td>3,373.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>1,056.61</td>
<td>2,294.65</td>
<td>3,351.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>1,471.26</td>
<td>1,794.18</td>
<td>3,265.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>146.08</td>
<td>3,034.30</td>
<td>3,180.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>IRAN</td>
<td>343.66</td>
<td>2,733.64</td>
<td>3,077.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>816.22</td>
<td>2,236.91</td>
<td>3,053.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>KOREA RP</td>
<td>707.01</td>
<td>2,324.13</td>
<td>3,031.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>1,524.16</td>
<td>1,422.21</td>
<td>2,946.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1,487.14</td>
<td>1,100.05</td>
<td>2,587.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MALAYSIA</td>
<td>1,259.76</td>
<td>1,321.80</td>
<td>2,581.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>KUWAIT</td>
<td>171.07</td>
<td>2,409.95</td>
<td>2,581.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>829.38</td>
<td>1,240.68</td>
<td>2,070.06</td>
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Another reason India may deploy its forces would be to strengthen relations with other member states in regional economic organizations. For example, India and the sub-continental states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and India may deploy forces to other member states to ensure stability throughout SAARC. India may also want to ensure stability with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with whom India signed a free trade agreement in August 2009. ASEAN is also important to India as the region represents 35% of India’s foreign trade and is a major source of Foreign Direct Investment to India. India is also a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) consisting of Sri Lanka, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand. This organization is particularly important for India’s northeastern states, which have close cultural connections with the organization’s members. In the Indian Ocean littoral, India is a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which promotes economic promotion amongst its

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**Table 1: India’s Top 24 Major Trading Partners.** Source: Indian Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Dept. of Commerce Website

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<td>21</td>
<td>NETHERLAND</td>
<td>1,480.34</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>QATAR</td>
<td>71.37</td>
<td>1,641.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Regional Organizations**

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\[\text{References:}\]


\[\text{Sikri 32.}\]

\[\text{Sikri 116-117.}\]

\[\text{Sikri 112.}\]

\[\text{Sikri 72-73.}\]
members, with Australia, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Yemen to promote economic cooperation amongst Indian Ocean states.91 Beyond the Indian Ocean, India formed with other rising powers, Brazil and South Africa, the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 to enhance their trading relationships.92

Figure 4: SAARC Members

Figure 5: ASEAN Member States
Figure 6: BIMSTEC Member States
Foreign Assistance to Africa

Although India remains a developing country, it provides technical assistance to more than 150 countries through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program and other specialized training programs in the areas of agriculture and science and technology. Outside of South Asia, Africa is the largest beneficiary of such technical and economic assistance. India has provided lines of credit to Africa through various initiatives including $200 million for New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), $500 million to the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) group of countries in West Africa, as well as bilateral lines of credit to Sudan and other African countries. In terms of technical assistance, India is also helping establish a Pan African e-network project for tele-
education and tele-medicine. While these recent initiatives may represent India’s efforts gain access to Africa’s resources, India’s economic and technical assistance to developing countries in Africa and Asia go back nearly half century when India and other developing countries transitioned from colonial rule to independence. These forms of aid have generated goodwill and trust for India across Africa. India’s development projects for Africa are geared specifically towards Africa’s level of development and include expertise in developing small and medium enterprises, which are relevant to Africa’s economic needs. Indian may deploy its military to Africa as part of its longstanding assistance to the continent. For example, India may deploy military training teams as well as civilian foreign assistance professionals to improve African countries’ overall governance.

Peacekeeping Operations

According to India’s UN Mission, India remains committed to the UN’s mission of maintaining international peace and security takes pride in contributing nearly 100,000 troops in more than 40 missions dating back to the inception of UN peacekeeping in the 1950s. India’s peacekeeping has allowed it provide training specializing training including demining activities and peacekeeping training to foreign military officers. India’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations would also demonstrate its respect for international law, which is anathema to a realist outlook. This explanatory value of India’s participation in peacekeeping operations holds more significance if such operations take place in areas, where India is not trying to counter an adversary or secure vital economic interests.

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**Humanitarian Disasters**

During the 2000s, several notable catastrophic natural disasters occurred. These include the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, the 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, 2008’s China Sichuan Province Earthquake and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. The ability to render assistance to such humanitarian disasters anywhere in the world is also an indicator of a nation’s Great Power status and may also be an explanatory factor attributable to India viewing itself as a “Responsible Power.” In the aforementioned events, India did use its military to provide assistance.

**INDIAN OVERSEAS MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE 2000s.**

Using the Lexis-Nexis Search Engine, Indian Ministry of Defense Annual Reports, and some internet sources, I compiled a list of 325 reported Indian overseas military activities during the 2000s. These activities included joint exercises, surveillance patrols, port visits, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, reconstruction activities, and combat operations. Out of these reported cases, “responsible power” explanatory factors influenced 47% (154) of military deployments, while both “responsible power” and realist explanatory factors influenced 40% (131) of military deployments. And, realist factors alone influenced 13% (42) of military deployments. Based on these figures alone, it appears “responsible power” explanatory factors mostly influenced India’s overseas military deployments. However, we must examine each of the explanatory factors to discern the true nature of these deployments.
Deployments Influenced by Realist Explanatory Factors

Realist Explanatory Factors alone were correlated with 42 overseas Indian Military deployments. Many of these particular deployments occurred in or near two maritime chokepoints, the Bab-el-Mandeb with the adjacent Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz with adjacent Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Near the Bab-el-Mandeb off the coast of Somalia, the Indian Navy has deployed 23 ships since late 2008 in counter piracy operations to secure the vital waterway.\textsuperscript{u1} Notable incidents during this effort include the destruction of a falsely identified pirate ‘mothership,’ monitoring the hijacking of an Indian dhow, a joint hostage rescue operation with the French Navy, and the February 2009 incident, where two Chinese destroyers forced an

Indian submarine that was tracking them to surface. Along the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the Indian Navy conducted several port visits with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, where the Indian and Omani navies conducted a joint naval exercise known as Thammar al Tayyib in 2005. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are also among India’s major natural gas and oil suppliers respectively.

Within South Asia, realist factors influenced Indian military deployments to Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and off the coast of Pakistan. With the Sri Lankan Navy, the Indian Navy conducted at least three joint operations including a naval cordon and search operation against the LTTE, surveillance, and a joint special forces exercise. With both overt and covert support from India, the Sri Lankan government managed to defeat the LTTE insurgency by June 2009.

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Earlier in the decade, India established a hospital in Tajikistan to support the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban prior to the latter’s regime downfall in late 2001. During the decade, various outlets reported by December 2005, India operated an airbase in Ayni, Afghanistan; however, by January of this year, the Tajiks evicted the Indians from Ayni probably due to pressure from Russia. The withdrawal of the low-key Indian presence from Tajikistan deprived India of a toehold in Central Asia, where India has security interests such as the region’s energy resources and a staging area to confront non-state adversaries like the Taliban.

In terms of confronting a state-level adversary, the tensest situation was the deployment of Indian naval vessels to the Arabian Sea within striking distance of Pakistan’s major port city of Karachi. Following the December 2001 terrorist attack on India’s parliament by members of Pakistani-backed Lashkar-e-Toiba, India deployed its forces including naval assets in an activity known as Operation Parakram towards the border with Pakistan. The Indian Navy deployed vessels including its aircraft carrier INS Viraat from both its western base in Mumbai and eastern base Visakhapatnam into the Arabian Sea to confront Pakistan. The tension between the two countries did not de-escalate until June 2002 when the Indian naval vessels returned to their home ports.

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Besides the February 2009 Chinese vessel-Indian submarine incident in the Gulf of Aden and *Operation Parakram*, the Indian military rarely confronted a state-level adversary. Notably, the Indian military did not deploy forces to Iraq when the United States requested their assistance in 2004. Iraq is one of India’s major oil suppliers, but the realist motive to secure an energy source did not motivate the Indian military to deploy there. Responding to the request, the Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh stated he needed a consensus from both houses of the Indian parliament to take such an action. That particular instance demonstrated India’s foreign policy is not purely motivated by realpolitik.

Figure 9. Indian Military Deployments Influenced by Realist Explanatory Factors
Deployments Influenced by “Responsible Power” Explanatory Factors

Forty-five percent of India’s military deployments were probably influenced by India acting as a responsible power. Throughout the Indian Ocean in particular, India appears to be embarking on a “good neighbor” policy. During the decade, India conducted 35 overseas military activities amongst the Indian Ocean states of the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius that included military training, hydrographic surveys, military equipment deliveries, and port visits. These particular states are not situated along any strategic chokepoints nor are they major sources of oil or natural gas to India. However, they do share membership in the the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), therefore India’s military deployments to these states probably fall in line with India acting as a “Responsible Power.” Farther afield in the Indian Ocean basin, the Indian military also conducted port visits and joint military training exercises with African countries including Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa. Deployment of its military to Africa may be part of India’s longstanding technical and economic assistance to the continent. With South Africa in particular, India has conducted eight joint naval and air training exercises. In Africa and the Middle East, India is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations along the Israel-Syria border, the Lebanon-Israel border, the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, and Sudan.


Routinely, Indian forces deploy to the southern Indian Ocean island nations of Seychelles and Mauritius including performing a joint Army/Air Forces exercise with Seychelles in 2001 and a hydrographic survey with Mauritius in 2005. In July 2003, two Indian Navy vessels provided security to the African Union summit in Maputo, Mozambique. The following year Indian Navy vessels returned to Maputo to provide security for the World Economic Forum and Afro-Pacific-Caribbean (APC) Heads of State Summit. In terms of the convergence between economic and military connections, one of the best examples is the relationship between India and South Africa. India is interested in securing the Cape of Good Hope as a trade route and cultivating relations with South Africa and fellow rising power Brazil through the economic grouping known as IBSA (India-Brazil-South-Africa). In 2008, the three countries conducted their first joint naval exercise in Cape Town, South Africa and held another joint exercise in 2010.

In East and Southeast Asia and even the United States, India truly displayed its commitment to humanitarian operations as acutely severe natural disasters struck the region.

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during the 2000s. During the 2004 Tsunami, the Indian military deployed to Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Maldives to conduct relief efforts.\textsuperscript{11} The next year, an Indian airlifter delivered relief supplies to Little Rock, Arkansas following Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{12} In 2006, the Indian Navy again provided humanitarian assistance to Indonesia following an earthquake that struck the island of Java.\textsuperscript{13} And, in 2008, India vessels delivered relief supplies to Myanmar following the devastation of Cyclone Nargis.\textsuperscript{14}

In May 2008, an Indian Air Force IL-76 provided China relief following the major earthquake in Sichuan province.\textsuperscript{15} Outside of humanitarian efforts, India engaged in military-to-military relations with China, which is India’s second-largest trading partner.\textsuperscript{16} Examples include their first joint army exercise, which took place around the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan Province.\textsuperscript{17} In September of 2000, the Indian Navy destroyer Delhi paid a goodwill visit.\textsuperscript{18}
visit in Shanghai. Three years later off the coast of Shanghai, the Indian and Chinese navies performed a joint search-and-rescue operation. The following year, the Indian Army participated in a mountaineering expedition with their Chinese counterparts in Tibet.

Beyond Africa and Asia, the Indian Navy also showed the flag in far-flung locations such as the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Fiji, Turkey, Greece, and Israel. While the United Kingdom and Brazil may be among India’s major trading partners, many other countries, where the Indian military paid visits, are not. In such cases, India may not have ulterior motives for such visits and may reflect a broader “responsible power” outlook towards foreign policy that includes purely goodwill visits.

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Deployments with Both Realist and “Responsible Power” Explanatory Factors

Forty percent of India’s overseas military deployments appear to have been influenced by realist and responsible power explanatory factors. There are two major reasons for these particular set of deployments. First, these deployments took place in Southeast Asia, where India is concerned with Malacca Strait security, which is an identified strategic chokepoint. However, India also has interest in developing close economic ties with the region hinging economic development of its eastern and northeastern states with the rapidly growing economies of the region. Second, India’s deployments to Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States were also influenced by two factors. These particular countries are among India’s major
trading partners, but these countries may also be concerned with trying to work with India to balance against China to prevent it from becoming the hegemon of Asia.

With regards to Southeast Asia, India embarked on a policy of renewed engagement with the region known as “Look East” during the 1990s. Both “responsible power” and realist concerns drove this policy evolution. In terms of “responsible power” issues, India sought trade opportunities with the economically surging region, while in realist terms, India realized China also worked to create economic interdependence with the region that could leave India out. A physical manifestation of the “Look East” policy was the establishment of Indian military’s Tri-Services Command in Port Blair in India’s Andaman Islands in September of 2001. The Andamans are part of the Indian Union territory known as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and are located closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland. In effect, the Andamans are to India as Guam is to the United States in that Guam is a “launching pad” for U.S. military operations in Asia and the Port Blair is a “launching pad” for Indian military operations in Southeast Asia. Approximately 149 nautical miles northeast lies Coco Island, Myanmar, where China reportedly established a reconnaissance base to monitor Indian activity in the Bay of Bengal, which may have also influenced the Indian military to establish its Tri-Services Command.

Throughout the decade, Port Blair hosted several joint exercises between Indian and Southeast Asian military forces. These sets of exercises have the operational name, “MILAN.” During the decade, India conducted five MILAN exercises that involved India and Southeast

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Asian neighbors, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei, and Singapore. The MILAN exercises focused on engaging regional security problems such as maritime terrorism, poaching, and drug and gun smuggling.

Of all the Southeast Asian nations, India and Singapore appear to have a close working relationship. They participate in their own joint exercises known as SIMBEX. Throughout the decade, SIMBEX exercises were held off the southwestern coast of India, Port Blair and the surrounding Andaman Sea, and off the coast of Singapore in the South China Sea. Over time, the exercises grew from the 2001 edition that involved only surface vessels from both navies to the 2007 edition, where surface vessels as well as submarines, and fighter and maritime aircraft participated. According to former Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, Singapore does not seek to balance with India against China but to get South, Southeast, and East Asia to engage in dialogue through regional organizations including IOR-ARC and BIMSTEC. Besides regional organizations, India and Singapore also fostered links through a 2005 free trade agreement known as the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement.

Besides Singapore, India’s military also has a significant presence in Myanmar. There, the Indian military developed infrastructure as well as participated in joint military exercises. In 2000, the Border Roads Organisation of the Indian Army constructed a 160 km Tamu-Kalemyo-

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Kalewa road within Myanmar from the border with India to the interior of the country.

And, in April 2008, India was developing the Myanmar port of Sittwe possibly to counter China’s infrastructure development at the Myanmar port of Kyau Phyu. Infrastructure development in Myanmar allows India to connect its troubled northeastern states to the dynamic economies of Southeast Asia and relieve some of the economic grievances experienced in northeast India. In terms of military-to-military relations, the Indian Navy also performed joint maneuvers with the Myanmar navy staging out of the port city of Yangon. On 19 January 2006, two Indian Navy vessels delivered communications equipment, which were probably used by Myanmar’s military. Both infrastructure development and military relations probably also allow India to counter China’s influence in Myanmar especially with regards to the “Pearl” facilities China is developing in the town of Sittwe and to connect its growing economy to that of its Southeast Asian neighbors.

South of Myanmar in the Andaman Sea, India conducts joint naval patrols with their maritime neighbors Thailand and Indonesia. Since 2002, the Indian and Indonesian navies conducted joint patrols known as INDINDOCORPAT, in the Six Degree Channel, which forms

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the maritime boundary between both countries and serves as a western maritime gate to the strategically important Malacca Strait. The 2009 exercise featured maritime aircraft and surface vessels from both navies. Since 2005, India and Thailand held similar exercises known as INDO-THAI CORPAT along their maritime border.

Outside Southeast Asia, the Indian military conducted joint exercises with, Japan, Australia, the United States and Mongolia. The former four countries are among India’s major trading partners, while Mongolia is not. Still, realist and “responsible power” factors influenced Indian military deployments to these particular countries. In April 2007, India, Japan, and the United States conducted a trilateral exercise in Japanese waters that extended between Okinawa and the mainland port city of Chiba. This particular exercise may have been interpreted as a balancing alliance amongst the three seafaring nations against China. However, the following week, the Indian naval vessels, which participated in that exercise, participated in another joint naval exercise with China near the Chinese port city of Qingdao. The joint Indian-Chinese naval exercise may have been a deft measure to alleviate concerns of a balancing alliance. While India may not explicitly choose to from a balancing alliance against China, India is forging ahead with strengthening its security relations with the United States as demonstrated when the Indian

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105 “India Holds Joint Naval Drills off East Chinese Coast 12-16 April.”
Air Force fighter aircraft supported by their own aerial refuelers participated in aerial wargames in Alaska and Nevada in 2004 and 2008 respectively.

Interestingly, India participated in joint exercises with Mongolia that were known as “Nomadic Elephant” in 2007 and Khan Quest in 2009. Both exercises involved joint peacekeeping training, a subject for which India can impart experience. Khan Quest included 450 troops from some 20 nations, while “Nomadic Elephant” consisted of just India and Mongolia. While both peacekeeping exercises fall in line with India’s outlook as a “responsible power,” the realist perspective must be entertained. Mongolia is not a major trading partner of India nor does India have major energy investments in the country. So, perhaps India may be using the Mongolian exercises to establish a toehold in China’s literal backyard as China is trying to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean through its “String of Pearls.”

Additionally, India remains committed to its efforts in Afghanistan as illustrated by the deployment of a platoon of its Indo-Tibetan border police to protect Indian activities in the country following a February 26, 2010 attack on Indian personnel in Kabul. One of these activities includes the road being constructed by the India’s Border Roads Organization connecting the southwestern Afghan town of Delaram on the Afghan-Iran border.

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Afghanistan, India contributes to reconstruction of a fellow South Asian neighbor, however, India’s presence could also represent its foothold in the region to counter Pakistan or an early endeavor to secure a potential route to Central Asia’s energy resources.

![Indian Military Deployments Influenced by both Realist and “Responsible Power” Explanatory Factors](image)

Figure 11. Indian Military Deployments Influenced by both Realist and “Responsible Power” Explanatory Factors

**HOW INDIA PLAYS IT SMART**

After evaluating India’s overseas military deployment during the last decade, it is clear India is making its presence felt as a rising Great Power. Indian military aircraft fly to the United States using its own aerial refuelers, while Indian Navy vessels make port-of-calls from the United Kingdom to the South Pacific. India’s investment in “power projection” systems

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Sikri 210.
allow its military to deploy to such far-flung areas and conduct complex large-scale operations such as the 2004 Tsunami relief effort to four separate countries. Such operations demonstrate India has the ability and will to deploy its military in ways that are exceptional to Great Powers. For future research, one may try to investigate how defense firms or the Indian military cite these deployments to lobby the Indian government to indigenously build or purchase from abroad additional “power projection” systems.

Additionally, based on the distribution of correlated indicators, India most likely deploys its forces overseas when it has the opportunity to demonstrate it functions as a “responsible power.” In a plurality of deployments, India deployed its forces in peacekeeping or humanitarian roles, or paid goodwill visits with naval vessels. India backs its longstanding commitment to Africa by sending its military there to participate in joint or training exercises and peacekeeping operation. Even when India has realist interests in an area, it rarely deploys forces without also having the opportunity to play a “responsible power” role. This is evident in India’s military deployments to Southeast Asia, where India has both realist and “responsible power” objectives. Both policy objectives are best exemplified in India’s joint patrols with Thailand and Indonesia near the strategically important Nine Degree Channel. To secure the waterway, India did not act unilaterally but involved its neighbors in a liberal institutionalist manner.

Although India may have realist motives to work with Asian-Pacific countries to balance against China, India does not consistently deploy forces against Chinese overseas activities such as the facilities associated with China’s String of Pearls SLOC. When China might have interpreted a balancing coalition during the 2007 joint naval exercise between India, Japan, and the United States, India may have tried to alleviate China’s perception by following up with an
India-China joint naval exercise. While India may have an incipient rivalry with rising power China, it uses its military to engage in multilateral dialogue with other rising powers, Brazil and South Africa, through its IBSA group. Overall, even though India possesses some capability to act in a realist fashion, it declines to consistently do so.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS**

At this point, U.S. policymakers must understand India will not act in a realist manner and form coalitions to balance against other powers but it can play other important roles for international security. India still maintains its commitment to the United Nations and is an active participant in United Nations peacekeeping missions. If U.S. policymakers would like to see India participate in interventions such as Iraq in 2004, they should at least try to work through the United Nations to draft a resolution, which allows India to participate without infuriating domestic interests. During humanitarian crises, the Indian military demonstrated its effectiveness, so the United States should be ready to look to India when another such crisis arises.

Within the Indian Ocean basin, India can play first responder to humanitarian crises as well as security challenges such as piracy off the Somali coast. In a scenario to possibly stabilize Somalia, India’s military may act as a realist state initially countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Then, working within a United Nations Security Council resolution or some cooperative arrangement with regional organizations such as the African Union, it could apply its “responsible power” experience providing technical assistance and peacekeeping. In the long-term, India could provide military training and other technical assistance in order to stabilize the
Somali state. In the future, policymakers should not be surprised if Indian naval vessels routinely drop anchor in Rio de Janeiro or Indian Air Force fighter pilots fly with their American counterparts over the skies of Virginia.
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