THE PROMISE OF NO USE:
CONDITIONS FOR OFFERING NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES

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ABSTRACT

China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France at different times and different places have all given negative security assurances, which are guarantees to never use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear weapon states. This thesis seeks to understand the conditions under which countries are willing to offer their first negative security assurances. The hypothesis posits that a set of political, military, and economic factors is associated with countries that choose to provide negative security assurances. By identifying the factors in countries before they offer negative security assurances, this paper highlights factors that are present in all five countries. In order to analyze these factors, this paper traces shifts in the factors and examines the relationship between negative security assurances and the factors. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that political and military factors are associated with states offering negative security assurances. Political factors include foreign policies that prioritize relations with developing countries, attendance at international conferences, the presence of international anti-nuclear protests, and nonproliferation policies. Military factors include nuclear doctrines of deterrence. This thesis concludes with policy implications for country leaders seeking to offer negative security assurances, and for members of the international community advocating negative security assurances.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1964, immediately after detonating its atomic bomb, China issued an unconditional guarantee promising all non-nuclear weapon states that it would never use a nuclear weapon on them.\(^1\) Over a decade later, in 1978, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union offered similar guarantees to all non-nuclear weapon states, but with attached conditions.\(^2\) France subsequently offered this guarantee in 1982.\(^3\)

These guarantees, called negative security assurances (NSAs),\(^4\) are declaratory policies meant to reassure non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)\(^5\) that they have not jeopardized their own security by agreeing to forego nuclear weapons. NSAs have triggered contentious debate between the nuclear weapon states (NWS)\(^6\) and the non-nuclear weapon states.

For China, offering NSAs occurred immediately after acquiring its first nuclear weapon. Since the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\(^7\) began in 1964, NNWS have aggressively sought out NSAs, while NWS have been reluctant to give them. In fact, NNWS viewed NSAs as an integral part of the NPT in 1968, though most of the NWS were unwilling to

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\(^2\) Emily Bailey, Richard Guthrie, Darryl Howlett, and John Simpson, PPNN Briefing Book Volume I: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 6\(^{th}\) edition (Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation), chapter 6, [http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb1table.htm](http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb1table.htm), date accessed March 18, 2011.

\(^3\) Bailey et. al, Briefing Book Volume I: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, chapter 6.

\(^4\) To better clarify, negative security assurances (NSA) are official guarantees from nuclear weapon states to never use a nuclear weapon on non-nuclear weapon states. In this study, negative security assurances refer specifically to official, unilateral declarations made by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, negative security assurances offered to nuclear-weapons-free-zones are not included, because those assurances only affect a specific set of countries.

\(^5\) Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are states that do not have, and cannot develop, nuclear weapons as designated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty; all states except the five NWS. Note: Most NNWS tend to be developing countries and also non-aligned countries. Exceptions are countries within NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

\(^6\) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are the five states that legally hold nuclear weapons as designated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty; states are United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.

\(^7\) The Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, created the framework for the current non-proliferation regime. Five states are designated nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China). The other states are designated non-nuclear weapon states. (See United Nations, Non-Proliferation Treaty, [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html).)
provide the guarantee. During the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament from May 23-June 30, 1978, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union decided to give these sought after guarantees – the Soviet Union at the beginning of the session, the United States at the middle of the session, and the United Kingdom at the end of the session. France finally provided its guarantee during the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.

In this thesis, I seek to understand the conditions under which NWS have agreed to provide NSAs. Did all five states have common issues at the time they offered NSAs? What factors seem most important in determining whether countries give NSAs? What policy recommendations do these factors suggest?

**Main Question & Hypothesis**

The main question driving this research is: What are the conditions under which nuclear weapon states offer negative security assurances? To answer the question, I hypothesize that a set of political, military, and economic factors is associated with countries choosing to provide negative security assurances.

**Importance**

Studying the conditions under which NWS are willing to provide NSAs is important for three reasons. First, NSAs are promises that NNWS aggressively seek and view as critical to the

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non-proliferation regime; yet, relatively little research has been done on this issue. Second, the research that exists on NSAs tends to focus either on how effective the guarantees are with respect to non-proliferation, or on policy recommendations regarding NSAs such as ways to strengthen NSAs. Studies rarely examine the early stages of the process and the factors that prompt countries to offer NSAs. This analysis fills the gap in research by understanding the initial conditions for NSAs. Finally, the current discussions regarding NSAs in conferences and forums tend to be on ways to strengthen NSAs. However, more countries have acquired nuclear weapons since 1982 and none of these countries have offered negative security assurances. This study redirects attention back to encouraging states with nuclear weapons to offer NSAs.

Roadmap

The rest of Chapter 1 includes the methodology of this research. It explains the theoretical framework, parameters, choice for case studies, and limitations that frame this research.


11 A small handful of scholars and experts have written substantially on NSAs. They include Jeffrey Knopf, Joseph F. Pilat, Jean du Preez, and Bruno Tertrais. Jean du Preez discusses the role and status of NSAs in his articles “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcom” and “The Demise of Nuclear Negative Security Assurances.” The purpose of his articles aims to discuss the NSA policy and recommendations for the policy, not how countries converge on the policy in the first place. Joseph F. Pilat’s article “Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World” focuses on the ability of security assurances to address current threats. He provides the historical background to NSAs and discusses their uses and occurrences in recent years. He notes that creative approaches, such as working with NWFZs or have state tailored policies, should be taken to further interest in NSAs that would be more effective to international security. Yet, to increase interest in NSAs, it is necessary to understand the conditions under which countries would be willing to provide them – a topic Pilat does not address. Bruno Tertrais and Martyn Piper, in Deterrence, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Security Assurances: A European Perspective, have examined several cases when security assurances were provided to understand their effectiveness but they mainly focus on effectiveness of security assurances. Jeffrey Knopf’s upcoming book entitled Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation seeks to fill the hole on security assurance research to identify conditions under which security assurances are most effective. While this book does give background on when countries offer security assurances, its focus is also on effectiveness. It has been difficult to identify any studies on the conditions under which countries will declare security assurances.

research. It ends with a chart highlighting the overlapping factors. I discuss the identified factors with greater depth in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 then analyzes the factors in two ways. First, I examine the timing of the factors to determine if they underwent shifts near when countries offered NSAs. Second, I study the relationship between NSAs and the factors to better comprehend any connections between NWS offering NSAs and the factors. I use these two areas of analysis to identify whether certain factors are more significant to countries offering NSAs than others. Chapter 4 presents policy implications and recommendations that stem from the analysis.

Methodology and Parameters

Theoretical Framework: Arms Control Theory and NSA Literature

Negative security assurances are a type of arms control and reassurance policy. Part of the hypothesis of this paper derives from Thomas Schelling’s scholarship on arms control. Schelling, one of the earliest scholars of arms control theory, summarizes arms control as “all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope, and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs.” Schelling suggests that arms control becomes a stabilized form of mutual deterrence that allows countries to reach a level of security at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case. As expressed by Schelling, arms control policies cover military, political, and economic arenas, and serve as means to allow countries to lower those costs.

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16 To bolster Schelling’s framework, other scholars have touched on the aspects mentioned by Schelling. In Arms Control: Theory and Practice, Michael Sheehan’s definition of arms control highlights the military aspects of arms control. Sheehan defines arms control to encompass any agreements to regulate military capability or potential,
The other part of the hypothesis stems from existing studies of NSAs. Some scholars link nonproliferation efforts and No-First-Use (NFU)\textsuperscript{17} policies to explain why countries provide NSAs. They argue that NWS use NSAs to prevent proliferation and stop NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{18} Scholars connect NSAs to No-First-Use policies by suggesting that NSAs are simply more defined versions of No-First-Use policies.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, NNWS ask for NSAs collectively, indicating that there is an international component to countries offering NSAs. Therefore, I trace the presence of nonproliferation policies, NFU policies, and international situations as factors to consider when countries offered NSAs. For the purposes of this paper, I categorize No-First-Use policy as a military factor; I label proliferation concerns and international issues as political factors.

Case Studies

NSAs declarations have been given and re-given over the past five decades. This study attempts to better understand the conditions for only the initial NSAs. Therefore, the case studies are the first NSAs offered: China 1964, United States 1978, United Kingdom 1978, Soviet Union 1978, and France 1982. Later reiterations of NSAs by NWS are not discussed as they do not serve the purposes of this paper.

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\textsuperscript{17} No-First-Use policies are declarations provided by NWS to never be the first to use nuclear weapons.


Parameters

The first parameter limits the factors analyzed to state policies, because the theoretical framework of this paper focuses on state policies. This parameter implies that leadership styles, experience levels, personal relationships, and so forth are not included in the paper. The factors are then categorized broadly, with the intention of not mentioning specific states or individuals. For example, instead of noting the United Kingdom’s concerns with Rhodesia specifically,\textsuperscript{20} that issue is categorized under the United Kingdom’s general interest with developing states. These broad categories allow the results to be more easily generalizable. The second parameter limits the timeframe of the research to only analyze what occurred before and at the time the country offered NSAs. Issues that arise after the country makes its declaration are not considered because they were not factors present when countries offered NSAs. The last parameter requires a factor to occur in four out of five countries in order for it to be considered an overlapping factor. Overlapping factors are the factors analyzed to create the conditions associated with countries offering negative security assurances.

Assumptions

One significant assumption underlines this research. This study emphasizes timing and assumes that factors occurring at the time NSAs are offered are the factors that should be considered.

Together the assumptions and parameters frame the study to focus on policies of states that occurred at a specific time. As NSAs are policies, analysis on the policy level seems most appropriate and sufficient for this initial study. More specific analysis can be accomplished through later studies.

Areas for Future Research

The purpose of this research is to initiate the discussion on the factors that are present for NSAs. It sets the stage for future research to examine more deeply the conditions that are associated with NSAs. Additional factors such as interpersonal relationships, private discussions, debates from negotiations at the time, leadership styles, personal biases, and so forth are possible conditions associated with NSAs. This thesis does not examine those factors due to limits to information and the classifications in the analysis, as discussed in the parameters. Future researchers may have greater access to information and more time to discover or strengthen the conditions and associations presented here.

Identifying Factors

This thesis uses the comparative qualitative case study method to test the hypothesis. It examines five case studies – official NSAs given by China in 1964, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia in 1978, and France in 1982. The NSAs offered differed between countries. The Chinese NSA promised unconditionally to never use nuclear weapons on NNWS in 1964. In contrast, the other countries all have conditions placed on their NSAs. For example, the British NSA has the condition that the UK can use nuclear weapons “in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.” Despite their different forms, the definition of NSA, as provided above, indicates that these different forms of NSAs are accepted in the study.

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Testing the hypothesis requires two steps. First, I compile factors present in each country at the time the country offered NSAs. An analysis of three types of sources, two primary and one secondary helped identify the factors. First are annual publications such as *The Statesman’s Yearbook*, *Strategic Survey*, and *Military Balance* that provide political, military, and economic statistics, issues, and trends from the time periods (1964, 1978, 1982). Second, I consulted biographies, histories, and journal articles from the time periods to verify and expand if necessary the issues mentioned in the annual publications. Third, speeches, government and budget reports, and official policy papers support and supplement the other materials.

Drawing from these sources, the following chart depicts the issues present when states gave security assurances.²³

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²³ Factors described in chart are derived from the analytic sections of the thesis. For overview of the factors, see Chapter 2. For an analysis of their role in state decisions to offer NSAs, see Chapter 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country &amp; Date</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China 1964</td>
<td>Improve relations w/ Asia and developing countries to serve as communist model</td>
<td>Nuclear doctrine: deterrence</td>
<td>Economic policy: failure to present new five year plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declared break from superpower rivalry</td>
<td>Defensive military doctrine for attacks on China's mainland</td>
<td>Communist economic policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist foreign policy</td>
<td>Revolutionary military doctrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International anti-nuclear protests</td>
<td>No-First-Use Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proliferation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union 1978</td>
<td>Improve relations w/ developing countries by creating more stable relations</td>
<td>Military growth and modernization</td>
<td>Decline of economic growth rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Détente with superpower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on peripheral states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease in military interference in developing countries</td>
<td>Arms control discussions</td>
<td>Rise in standard of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International anti-nuclear protests</td>
<td>Support military alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International disarmament conferences (First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament)</td>
<td>Nuclear doctrine: deterrence</td>
<td>Economic policy: communist 5-year plan focused on production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonproliferation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States 1978</td>
<td>Separate countries by North-South designations</td>
<td>Nuclear doctrine: deterrence</td>
<td>Economic policy: expansionary policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve relations w/ developing countries by helping resolve conflict and promote peace</td>
<td>Arms control discussions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Détente policy with other superpower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral foreign policy; focus on human rights</td>
<td>Support military alliance</td>
<td>Recovering from recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International anti-nuclear protests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International disarmament conferences (First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament)</td>
<td>Increase in defense budget</td>
<td>Focus on rising energy costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonproliferation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 1978</td>
<td>Improve relations w/ developing countries through political and economic strength</td>
<td>Nuclear doctrine: deterrence</td>
<td>Economic policy: monetarism (control amount of money in circulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain influence in former colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance with superpower</td>
<td>Military dependence and consensus building within military alliance</td>
<td>Focus on rising energy costs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitments to providing foreign aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>International anti-nuclear protests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International disarmament conferences (First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament)</td>
<td>Increase in defense budget</td>
<td>Recovering from recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonproliferation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1982</td>
<td>Improve relations w/ developing countries as champion of developing countries</td>
<td>Nuclear doctrine: deterrence</td>
<td>Economic policy: expansionary policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialist foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance with superpower</td>
<td>Decrease in defense budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International anti-nuclear protests</td>
<td>Beginning of military reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International disarmament conferences (Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament)</td>
<td>Military independence within military alliance</td>
<td>Recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonproliferation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second step identifies the overlapping factors from the chart. The above chart designates factors that appear in at least four of the five countries with the same color. The following chapter discusses in greater detail those overlapping factors. Political factors include the focus on developing countries, nonproliferation, international disarmament conferences, and international anti-nuclear activity. Military factors consist of nuclear doctrines of deterrence.

It appears that economic factors do not overlap, contrary to Dr. Schelling’s theory. Also, only China had a No-First-Use policy when it offered NSAs. Thus, I do not discuss economic issues or NFU policies in this thesis.

Analysis

The analysis consists of two parts. First, I examine the timing of the overlapping factors to try and determine the degree to which factors are associated with NSA offers. I identify how long it had been present before the NSA offer in order to see if factors that shift closer to NSA offers may have greater significance than those that do not. Second, I study the relationship between NSAs and the factors with respect to NWS. I explore how beneficial the NSAs’ relationship with the factor is to NWS. By combining the two forms of analysis, I then try to determine whether certain factors are more closely associated with NSA offers than others.
Chapter 2: Factors

Political Factor: Countries Prioritize Relations with Developing Countries

Despite having very different political concerns, all five countries declared foreign policy that emphasized strengthening relations with developing countries during the periods when they offered NSAs. In fact, as discussed below, several countries gave NSAs during a time when they viewed themselves as the champions of developing countries.

In 1964, foreign policy in China focused on promoting China’s role as a leader and model to Asia and developing countries around the world. 25 Premier Zhou Enlai’s tour of African countries from December 14, 1963 to February 4, 1964 and his speech in Mogadishu on February 3, 1964 encapsulated China’s attention to the developing world, noting the friendship and help China was willing to provide African countries. 26

Declared Soviet foreign policy in 1978 focused on developing countries, especially the peripheral states. Soviet socialist doctrine emphasized the role of the Soviet Union as a leader for developing countries and a counter to the West. 27 To demonstrate the country’s commitment, General Secretary Brezhnev increased aid to developing countries in 1977-1978. In fact, economic aid commitments from the USSR to developing countries reached a record high in 1978. 28

In the United States, declared foreign policy during the first half of President Carter’s term from 1977-1978 focused on restoring the political appeal of the United States to the

24 Developing countries at the time were largely NNWS. Additionally, most developing countries were not aligned with the United States (NATO) or the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact); thus many states joined the Non-Aligned Movement.
26 Zhou Enlai, “Revolutionary Prospects In Africa Excellent,” speech at a mass rally held in Mogadishu, Somalia, 3 February 1964, in Alan Lawrance, *China’s Foreign Relations since 1949*, p. 171.
developing world. Furthermore, his foreign policy adhered to a worldview in which the most important relations were North-South relations, in contrast to the emphasis on East-West or capitalist vs. socialist relations from prior years. These priorities highlighted President Carter’s desire for the United States to have influence and good relations with developing countries.29

Before his tenure as Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1976 to 1979, James Callaghan was also the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. In this role, he sought to strengthen and enhance British international power, a focus that continued into his term as Prime Minister.30 Callaghan’s declared policy emphasized improving relations between Britain and Commonwealth countries in order to increase connections with the developing world.31

In 1982, President François Mitterrand advocated a Socialist foreign policy, which supported the developing world, humanitarianism, and self-determination.32 He wanted the developing world to perceive France not only as acting in solidarity with them, but also as the leading advocate for their cause.33

Political Factor: Nonproliferation Policy34

As mentioned earlier, scholars have linked NSAs to nonproliferation efforts and No-First-Use policies.35 In this study, four of the five countries had nonproliferation policies. The Carter

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34 Nonproliferation policies may be considered a military factor. However, they are categorized as political factors in this study because nonproliferation policies involve significant acts of diplomacy and governance. The Non-Proliferation Treaty required political negotiations and diplomatic considerations.
Administration put nonproliferation as a primary issue for the United States. PresidentialDirective 08 declared nonproliferation as the principal security issue for the United States and provided steps against proliferation. These declarations and policies for nonproliferation remained important throughout the first half of Carter’s term, covering the First UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The British government held a consistent stance against proliferation, since the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964. During the 1970s, British attempts to build consensus and solidarity within NATO reflected an ultimate goal to prevent proliferation.

The Soviet government held strong views against proliferation, as can be seen by their spearheading the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Additionally, speeches by Brezhnev discussed Soviet concerns for the spread of nuclear weapons and ways to curb proliferation.

Finally, socialist France viewed proliferation as an issue of concern. In his 110 Propositions for France, President Mitterrand identified actions against the spread of nuclear
weapons as the seventh issue. Additionally, in May 1982, the executive bureau of the Parti Socialiste published a report that emphasized the fight against proliferation.

Political Factor: International Disarmament Conferences – UN Special Session on Disarmament

For four of the NWS that offered NSAs, the first official declaration occurred during a Special Session on Disarmament. Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, gave their NSAs at the First Special Session on Disarmament; France offered its NSA at the Second Special Session on Disarmament. China had given NSAs fourteen years previous to the sessions, but reiterated its NSAs during both sessions.

Political Factor: Increase in International Anti-Nuclear Activity

The NSAs offered by each country all occurred at times (1964, 1978, 1982) when the anti-nuclear protests were prevalent. From the late 1950s through the early 1960s, anti-nuclear activity increased as organizations and countries became concerned about proliferation. Over this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established and the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty began.

Though the 1970s seemed to be a quieter time for anti-nuclear protests, a reemergence of anti-nuclear activity occurred from 1975-1978; many anti-nuclear organizations grew in scale and the movements spread to new parts of the globe. In the early 1970s, much of the anti-

nuclear activity had died down and the relevant organizations had dissolved. However, by 1975, anti-nuclear protests reemerged, starting in the Netherlands and spreading throughout Western Europe, North America, and even the Pacific Islands. Factors contributing to the anti-nuclear protests included the growth of environmental concerns, the deterioration of Soviet-US détente, and the end of the Vietnam War which allowed peace protestors to focus on a new issue other than Vietnam.\textsuperscript{47}

Finally, the early 1980s marked another wave of anti-nuclear protests. With the US and Soviet intermediate range missiles in Europe (Pershing IIs and SS-20s), a commitment to nuclear weapons build up by President Reagan, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, a series of international anti-nuclear movements started.\textsuperscript{48} France’s NSA was declared at this time.

**Military Factor: Countries’ Nuclear Doctrine Based in Deterrence**

The military factors that contribute to NSAs varied across the different countries. Even though the size, budgets, and policies of the militaries were different, they had similar nuclear doctrines: the primary purpose of nuclear weapons was for deterrence.

Ever since its nuclear test in 1964, Chinese policy declared that the only role for China’s nuclear weapon was to deter nuclear use by others. China’s leader at the time, Mao Zedong, did not believe it was possible to fight a war using nuclear weapons. Instead, he felt that they were a source of prestige and a defensive weapon.\textsuperscript{49}

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Despite years of what seemed to be a war-fighting nuclear strategy, by General Secretary Brezhnev’s time, nuclear doctrine shifted toward deterrence in the Soviet Union. In 1977 General Secretary Brezhnev gave speech declaring that the aim of Soviet defense policy and nuclear weapons was to deter aggression.

In the United States, the nuclear doctrine of deterrence had been in place since 1962. President Carter entered the presidency with the belief that mutual vulnerability and mutual assured destruction prevented the United States and Soviet Union from nuclear attacks.

British nuclear doctrine was always deterrence. The British kept a small arsenal but emphasized the credibility of their nuclear deterrence capabilities. British defense policy advocated for interdependence with the United States in NATO, and deterrence remained the basis of British nuclear doctrine.

President Mitterand stayed so close to the previous French doctrine of deterrence that he did not discuss any changes to the military institution until after 1982. At the time of the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, France’s military doctrine underwent some change in the reorganization of defenses. Nevertheless, the deterrence policy remained.

Despite myriad issues facing countries at the time they offered NSAs, only a few issues emerged as having affected countries across the board. Politically, the reoccurring issue is the focus on improving relations with the developing world. Other political factors included nonproliferation policies, international conferences on disarmament, and international anti-

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nuclear protests. Militarily, all countries had deterrence policies. China also had a No-First-Use policy.

I explore the timing of the factors and how the factors interact in the following section. The analysis attempts to identify which factors are more closely associated with NSAs.
Chapter 3: Analysis of Factors

Analysis: Timing

The first part of the analysis focuses on the timing of the factors. I trace the duration of the policies and events before the countries offered NSAs in order to identify which factors shifted close to the time when countries offered NSAs. I try to determine if the factors that shift closest to NSA offers may be more significant to NSAs.

Prioritize Relations with Developing Countries – Shifts in Policies when NSAs Offered

For most NWS, foreign policies regarding developing countries seemed to undergo a shift to more improved relations around the time the country offered NSAs. In 1964, China officially split its alliance with the Soviet Union. Without the alliance, China increasingly sought support and expected improved relations from developing countries, to enhance its role as the leader of communist countries. In 1964, China restructured its foreign policy, labeling non-western countries as underdeveloped countries and western countries as advanced capitalist countries. Relabeling the countries allowed China to target the underdeveloped countries, making efforts to gain support against both the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the United States, President Carter redefined US foreign policy during the first half of his term from 1977-1978 to focus on North-South relations instead of East-West relations. During this portion of his term, the president moved away from the traditional Cold War mentality which had up to that point framed relations with developing countries as East versus West. In contrast, scholars have argued the Nixon Administration did not have a specific policy

55 Lawrance, China’s Foreign Relations since 1949, p. 150-152.
57 Lawrance, China’s Foreign Relations since 1949, p.152
toward developing countries other than seeing these countries as tools against the Soviet Union. This shift in attitudes suggests that the Carter Administration valued developing countries more highly than previous administrations.

From 1975 to 1979, the Soviet Union actively engaged with developing countries to become more opportunistic and involved than before. Soviet military and economic foreign aid reached all-time highs between 1977 and 1978. This shift in foreign policy reflected the Soviet Union’s interests in maintaining a strong presence throughout the developing countries.

The United Kingdom’s foreign policy toward developing countries did not undergo the same clear shift as had occurred in the United States or the Soviet Union. Throughout his time as both Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, James Callaghan maintained his views on British international leadership and engagement with developing nations. Nevertheless, his position as Prime Minister allowed him to place even more emphasis on relations with developing countries than as Foreign Secretary. Moreover, the recession in England further increased Prime Minister Callaghan’s desire to better relations with all countries in order to improve the international economy and promote recovery. Thus, the focus on developing countries increased in the years preceding the NSA.

A shift in foreign policy toward developing countries also occurred in France. When President Mitterrand entered office in 1981, he supported the Parti Socialiste’s view of foreign

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63 Cooper and Fogarty, “Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less-Developed Countries, 1954-78,” p. 21
64 Lane, “Foreign and defence policy,” pp. 154-155.
65 Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, p. 593.
policy. He advocated for solidarity with the developing world and saw France as its champion. His predecessor, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing also supported a stronger international role for France, but his focus remained on France’s former colonies. President Giscard’s foreign policy also never declared France as a champion of the developing world. Thus, in 1981, France’s foreign policy did undergo a shift where declared policy indicated France’s increased and expanded support for the developing world.

International Disarmament Conferences – UN Special Session on Disarmament

Four of the five negative security assurances were offered during a UN Special Session on Disarmament. The UN Special Sessions on Disarmament are meetings that only occur every few years. The decision for states to announce NSAs at the Special Sessions on Disarmament indicate that these sessions, or international conferences on disarmament in general are a necessary condition for countries to give NSAs. Perhaps countries wait to offer NSAs during these sessions, or these sessions add extra pressure for countries to offer NSAs. Regardless, the links in timing between states offering NSAs and the Special Sessions point to the presence of these conferences as a necessary condition.

International Anti-Nuclear Protest Activity – Increased Activity

Finally, the rise of anti-nuclear protest activity is associated with the timing of the NSAs. Increased activity occurred from the late 1950s to 1964, from 1975-1978, and from 1979 through

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the early 1980s. \(^{68}\) Shifts of increased activity correspond with the timing of NSAs, which often occurred at the end of these periods of protests. Because the NSAs occur toward the end of the period of protest, an atmosphere of anti-nuclear protests in the international arena seems to be a supportive condition for NSAs. A shift toward anti-nuclear protests does not seem to immediately correspond to NSAs; however, it does seem to provide a background condition that helps lead to NSAs.

**Nonproliferation – No Shifts in Policies when NSAs Offered**

For the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, and France, nonproliferation policies maintained a consistent presence throughout the time countries offered NSAs. The Soviet Union, United States, and United Kingdom started to express their concerns over proliferation in the early 1960s when France and China obtained weapons. \(^{69}\) The three countries had also adhered to policies of nonproliferation since signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. France, though not signing until 1982, had announced its adherence to the treaty and principles of nonproliferation since 1968. \(^{70}\)

**Nuclear Doctrine Based in Deterrence – No Shifts in Policies when NSAs Offered**

All five countries maintained nuclear doctrines of deterrence. \(^{71}\) In China, nuclear weapons were consistently viewed as a deterrent, used as a scare tactic from as early as 1945. \(^{72}\)

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\(^{71}\) Deterrence, dissuading an entity from an act by frightening that entity with the consequences of the act, has been credited by some scholars as the method for preventing nuclear between nuclear weapon states. According to
In the United States, deterrence as strategy entered into place around 1962. In the United Kingdom, the purpose of nuclear weapons was always deterrence. The Soviet Union slowly underwent a shift in strategic thinking over fifteen to twenty years to view deterrence as the nuclear doctrine. The French consolidated their view of nuclear weapons as used for deterrence by 1969. Perceiving nuclear weapons as a deterrent has been a view all countries held well before they offered NSAs. Thus, rather than viewing a nuclear doctrine of deterrence as significant to countries offering NSAs, this factor suggests a supportive condition that encourages NSAs.

From the timing of shifts in factors alone, it seems possible that prioritizing relations with developing countries and international conferences may be the more significant factors to NSA offers. Because the other factors had consistent presence for several years before NSA offers, they may be contextual or background factors.

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deterrence, the consequences of a nuclear weapon state attacking another nuclear weapon state are too devastating, the consequences of nuclear war too much, that nuclear weapon states will not attack each other. Arising from the initial theory of deterrence was the question, “what deters,” as the nuclear world settles into a need for strategy. Some believe that minimal deterrence suffices. Minimum deterrence suggests that threatening the lowest level of damage, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons is enough to deter. Other levels of deterrence include “massive retaliation” which implies that deterrence is hard to reach, needing an extreme threat of punishment in order to dissuade a state from attacking. Additionally, there is the strategy of “assured retaliation,” intensified to “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). Assured retaliation focuses on the fact that other countries may be able to withstand an initial nuclear strike, and have leftover nuclear weapons capability to deliver a strike back. The state of MAD is reached when retaliation capabilities of states are enough for both states to completely destroy each other. Some scholars credit deterrence with allowing people to live in a nuclear weapons world that has yet to see nuclear war.


Lawrance, *China’s Foreign Relations since 1949*, p. 81.

Keir Lieber, “US Cold War Strategy” (Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March 29, 2010).


Analysis: Relationship between NSAs and Factors

The second part of the analysis section examines the relationship between NSAs and the factors from the perspective of NWS. This section identifies when the relationship between NSAs and the factors seem to benefit NWS, and when the relationship is not as clear.

NSAs and Political Factors: Beneficial Relationship

NSAs appear to help NWS improve relations with developing countries in two ways. First, when NWS offer NSAs, they give a highly desired promise to NNWS. Second, NSAs are effective confidence building measures for NWS and NNWS. The pledge itself reassures NNWS of NWS’ nuclear intentions; the act of offering NSAs allows NWS to demonstrate their consideration for NNWS’ concerns.77

NSAs are also measures to respond to international concerns about nuclear weapons. First, as policies that limit the use of nuclear weapons, NSAs could help NWS to address pressure from international anti-nuclear activity. Second, records from the first UN Special Session on Disarmament documented NNWS’ frustration that the leaders from several NWS did not attend the meeting.78 NSAs were a way to publicly build goodwill at the session.

NSAs also support NWS’ proliferation concerns. As mentioned earlier, scholars link NSAs with nonproliferation. NSAs are seen as tools to curb proliferation because they reduce the need for NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons. With NSAs in place, NNWS would not need

nuclear weapons to deter NWS or to protect themselves against nuclear attacks from NWS.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, NSAs are a means for NWS to curtail proliferation.

**NSAs and Military Factors (Deterrence): Unclear Relationship**

NSAs support for deterrence doctrine is less clear. NSAs are reassurance mechanisms that, as defined by Dr. Schelling and other arms control theorists, provide alternatives to deterrence. Therefore, NSAs can undermine the deterrence abilities of NWS by limiting the types of attacks against which NWS can deter. For example, once a NWS provides NSAs, it can no longer use nuclear weapons to deter against conventional attacks from NNWS. NSAs constrain the deterrence abilities of NWS against NNWS.

After examining both the political and military factors, it appears that the political factors, as defined in this thesis, are more closely associated with NSAs. Because the relationship between NSAs and deterrence is unclear and even possibly contradictory, it suggests that countries may place heavier weight on political factors when offering NSAs. This possibility is further bolstered by the arms control framework introduced early in the thesis. Arms control theory suggests that countries provide arms control policies because the policies lower political, military, or economic costs. With respect to NSAs, economic costs do not seem to be a factor. Furthermore, NSAs seem to contradict the one military factor. NSAs however seem to complement all of the political factors. Thus, it seems likely that the political benefits from NSAs trump the concerns of the other factors.

Combining the factors identified with the analysis of the factors, it seems possible to provide the probable conditions for the provision of NSAs. The political factors associated with NSA offers include foreign policies that seek improved relations with developing countries, nonproliferation policies, attendance at an international disarmament conference, and the presence of international anti-nuclear activity. The military factors include deterrence policy as the nuclear doctrine.

The analysis of the factors suggests that the political factors may be more important than the military factors. Of the political factors, prioritizing relations with developing countries and attending an international conference on disarmament may have the closest associations with NSA offers. In the background, nonproliferation policies, anti-nuclear protests and possibly a nuclear doctrine of deterrence may strengthen the chance for NSA offers.

Taken a step further, this analysis depicts a possible portrayal of the interaction of conditions during NSA offers. A country with nuclear weapons seeks improved relations with developing countries as one of its political aims. The country views NSAs as a tool to reach its goal, despite possible limits to its deterrence policy. An international disarmament conference provides a stage and reason for a country to offer NSAs. Additionally, international pressures from anti-nuclear protests help push states to offer NSAs.

My analysis suggests that a dominant theme NSA offers relates to the NWS’ political issues. Certain scholars studying negative security assurances have often suggested that NSAs are given for political reasons, which has been reaffirmed in this study.80

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Alternative Explanations

Because this paper focuses on overlapping factors, it does not acknowledge that the differences between states may be the cause behind NSA offers. For example, the different defense budgets in countries might have led to the same conclusions on NSA offers. Perhaps an increase in defense budget in one country caused it to offer NSAs to reassure NNWS as it built up its military; meanwhile, a decrease in defense budget caused another country to offer NSAs to focus its costs on deterring only NWS.

Second, all countries are held equal in this analysis. However, as this view may not be an accurate portrayal of the situation during the Cold War, it could also distort the different factors. For example, since the United States and the Soviet Union were the superpowers, their policy decisions may have had greater repercussions than the other countries. Thus, United Kingdom’s alliance with the United States could have been the only reason behind the British NSA, and not any of the factors discussed.

Third, there may be specific personalities, internal debates, and discussions which caused countries to offer NSAs that were not acknowledged by the study. It is possible that a trait of a leader or a specific relationship between two leaders led to certain countries offering NSAs.

Finally, this paper does emphasize the timing of policies. It is possible that the set of situations happen to be circumstantial and thus actually have no association to a country offering NSAs.

Nevertheless, the conditions found in this analysis do seem to be associated with NSA offers. The reoccurrence, timing, and relationship between the factors and NSAs suggest that the identified factors have strong associations with NSA offers.
Chapter 4: Policies

Policy Implications

Several policy implications for how NSAs may be used and perceived emerge from this examination. First, states seem to offer NSAs largely for political reasons and leaders seem to view NSAs as a tool for improving relations. For example, NSAs allow NWS to garner goodwill from NNWS, especially as NNWS have pushed extensively for NSAs. NSAs seem to be a way for NWS to demonstrate their commitment to NNWS. NSAs may also be a confidence-building tool for NWS to reassure NNWS; thus, NNWS can feel more secure from receiving guarantees that NWS will never use nuclear weapons against them.

Second, the nonproliferation policies of most NWS suggest that countries did see NSAs as a means to curb proliferation. As mentioned previously, NSAs reduce the need for NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons because NWS promise NNWS security without having nuclear weapons.

Third, international disarmament conferences and international pressure seem to help encourage countries to offer NSAs. A conference such as the UN Special Session on Disarmament seems to be an appropriate stage. Additionally, international non-governmental pressures from protests may further persuade countries to offer NSAs.

Finally, though the research suggests that deterrence policies are not as important as the above political factors, deterrence policies can still be associated with NSAs. States with deterrence policies view nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism and emphasize the dangers of nuclear war. These attitudes and views could influence states to offer NSAs.
Policy Recommendations

Policy recommendations result from the above implications. The recommendations suggest actions to establish a context that encourages states to offer NSAs. They target both the international community and the leaders who support NSAs in countries with nuclear weapons. Specifically, the purposes of these policy recommendations address situations with Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Policies of the Countries Seeking NSAs

To leaders in Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan who seek to offer NSAs, it seems important to cultivate the right domestic environment. Specifically, certain foreign policies will increase chances for NSAs.

Country leaders should promote foreign policies that place priority on relations with developing countries. Increased globalization and interconnectedness among all countries could be an impetus for countries to improve their relations with developing countries. Thus, leaders in India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan interested in NSAs should encourage and promote relations with developing countries. For India, a country recognized as a leader among developing countries, such a priority is already important. However, for an isolated country like North Korea, the case for better relations may be difficult to make.

Country leaders should encourage participation in international disarmament conferences. For country leaders who want to push their states to give official NSAs, international conferences provide a possible stage. In fact, because of the nature of the conferences, countries may feel certain pressure to give declarations or to act or an impetus to reformulate existing
policy. Additionally, these conferences allow different leaders to interact, thus making countries like India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan more susceptible to pressure from other countries.

Military policies may also encourage countries to offer NSAs. While NSAs could conflict with deterrence, deterrence policies may also change the way countries view nuclear weapons.

Country leaders should emphasize alternative measures to deterrence such as reassurance policies. India and Pakistan already have deterrence as their nuclear doctrines, whereas Israel and North Korea do not have declared nuclear doctrines. India’s nuclear doctrine is characterized as “credible minimum deterrence.” Though, Indian leaders have also stated that having such a policy does not mean India lacks first strike capabilities.\(^\text{81}\) Pakistan declares a “minimum defensive deterrence,” with intentions to deter against all forms of external aggression.\(^\text{82}\) Country leaders should suggest that India and Pakistan consider reassurance policies in general, rather than only deterrence policies. Reasons for reassurance policies could include lowering political, military, and economic costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals. Having not officially declared having nuclear weapons, Israel has not announced a nuclear doctrine.\(^\text{83}\)

From the available information publically available, North Korea gives little indication that it has a nuclear doctrine.\(^\text{84}\) For Israel and North Korea, reassurance policies may be very difficult to encourage. In Israel, a threatening environment in the Middle East affects its views on nuclear

weapons. North Korea would first need to develop a nuclear doctrine and internal leaders should advocate for reassurance policies in its nuclear doctrine.

**Policies for the International Community**

For the international community, this analysis provides policy recommendations for other countries to encourage India, Israel, and North Korea to offer NSAs.

Non-nuclear weapon states (developing countries) should pressure India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan to offer NSAs. In particular, NNWS should point to NSAs as an assurance they desire from countries with nuclear weapons, to demonstrate the specific policy that NNWS want. Thus, countries with nuclear weapons will know what type of action to take. Overall, the pressure from NNWS acts as another force to persuade states to offer NSAs. NNWS are especially important in this area, because NSAs directly affect them, and they have the most reason to require NSAs.

International groups can increase their anti-nuclear activity. While states can pressure countries with nuclear weapons, international groups seem to be important in adding pressure, as seen in the above analysis. Increased anti-nuclear activity may create an atmosphere that causes states with nuclear weapons to offer NSAs.

The international community can invite and pressure India, Israel, and North Korea to participate in international disarmament conferences. International disarmament conferences provide an opportunity for states with nuclear weapons to offer NSAs. The international community can emphasize the need and importance of these states to join in, thus placing them in a position where offering NSAs could become an issue on the agenda.
The international community can provide consultants, experts, and other resources to help states with nuclear weapons to implement policies that will be conducive to NSAs. Israel and North Korea have close relations with countries such as the United States and China, countries that can influence Israel and North Korea on the merits of employing deterrence as the nuclear doctrine and seeing relations with NNWS as important and a priority.

Finally, the international community can offer resources to demonstrate the importance of NSAs. The reasons behind offering NSAs and the global effect of this policy, from the above analyses, seem to be largely political. For countries that face international scrutiny for their possession and stance on nuclear weapons, NSAs are an option to reassure NNWS and to improve their perceptions in the international community. By sharing this type of research and expertise, states with nuclear weapons can better understand the role of NSAs and how to use NSAs as a tool to better relations or build trust with other countries, and so forth.

Pressuring India and Pakistan

Of the four countries with nuclear weapons that do not have negative security assurances, India and Pakistan seem to be the most likely candidates for offering NSAs. India and Pakistan’s respective nuclear doctrine may allow reassurance policies to be an option.\(^8^5\) India has declared an official No-First-Use policy, which may expedite NSAs, as in China’s example. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine suggests that its nuclear arsenal is intended for deterrence purposes, with a doctrine that seems directed at India. Because of the nature of Pakistan’s doctrine, it is in a good position to offer reassurance policies such as NSAs to other countries, since it seems to only

view India as the threat.\textsuperscript{86} Internationally, NSAs remain an important issue, having emerged during the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and recent disarmament conferences such as the Conference on Disarmament.\textsuperscript{87} Currently, anti-nuclear protests have increased.\textsuperscript{88} Additionally, Pakistan and India have both called for strengthened, legally binding NSAs.\textsuperscript{89} These factors indicate that India and Pakistan are in prime positions to offer NSAs. Perhaps with greater influence and pressure from NNWS, India and Pakistan can be persuaded to give official NSAs.

**Pressuring Israel and North Korea**

Convincing Israel and North Korea to offer NSAs will be much more difficult than convincing India and Pakistan. First, neither country has offered nuclear doctrines, much less provided reassurance policies. Second, North Korea seems to care very little about its relationship with NNWS, since it is fairly isolated. Meanwhile, Israel’s relations with many NNWS are hostile, especially Middle Eastern countries. Third, international conferences and anti-nuclear activities seem to have had little effect on these countries; they have been determined to keep and develop their nuclear arsenals. Thus, the likelihood that Israel and North Korea would offer NSAs is low.

**Conclusion**

Negative security assurances have been and still remain issues of contention. The current debate on NSAs has shifted toward a need for stronger, legally binding assurances. However,

\textsuperscript{86} “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, and the rise of proliferation networks,” p.37
the conditions associated with countries offering NSAs are still important issues for research; several countries have acquired nuclear weapons over the past decades but have not offered NSAs.

Perhaps the foundations and suggestions from this analysis will pave the way for further research, and encourage states with nuclear weapons to offer NSAs to all countries.
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