DECIPHERING PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-NATO COOPERATION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY

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1 Introduction

1.1 Framing the Problem

Russian officials, including President Dmitriy Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin, have assured the West that Russia is ready to cooperate with the U.S. and NATO in spheres of mutual interest. Lavrov has even gone so far as to state that while differences remained between Moscow and Brussels, both sides are trying "to normalize relations and bring them to a new level."

Russia’s recent actions, however, send confusing and perhaps even conflicting signals to an international community hoping for a revived relationship with a certain level of predictability. For example, Russia has provided training to hundreds of local police in Afghanistan, yet has failed to agree to numerous NATO requests for military and logistical support. NATO has been left doubting Russia’s real interests, and its commitment to tangible bilateral cooperation in any sphere. In order to understand what seems to be unpredictable behavior on the part of the Russian Federation, additional analysis is needed. A discussion of Russian-NATO relations writ large is clearly beyond the scope of this paper; however, a discrete way to look at the much broader issue of NATO-Russian cooperation is to examine one specific, largely apolitical issue more closely. This paper will explore one of the more widely recognized of these issues: counternarcotics.

While counternarcotics can be politicized in terms of domestic policymaking, it is one of the least politically-charged issues in terms of international relations. The U.S., Russia, and the international community in general unequivocally regard illicit substances as a threat to public health and safety; 184 state parties have signed the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. If nations are unable to cooperate on such a widely regarded initiative as counternarcotics, it is unlikely they will be able to cooperate on issues where national interests are more divergent.

Both Russia and NATO have repeatedly touted the importance of counternarcotics efforts and continue to profess a mutual interest in stopping the production and trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan. In 2009, high-level officials on both sides agreed, once again, “that the Afghan narcotics challenge was a critical area for U.S. and Russian cooperation.”\(^2\) At the same time Rogozin has pled for a more robust fight against narcotics, asserting that Afghan heroin poses more of a threat to Russia than the Taliban.\(^3\)

However, it is unclear whether Russia’s actions fully correspond to its stated interests, even on this particular issue. NATO officials continued to grow frustrated with Russia’s “lukewarm” support in December 2009. \(^4\) If Russia were ready to cooperate with NATO on spheres of mutual interest, as Russian officials claim, one

\(^{3}\) “Russia’s NATO Ambassador on Afghan Conference: We Are Prepared to Cooperate.” Spiegel Online, 28 January 2010.
could expect Russia to actively contribute to ongoing counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, to include providing personnel support or military equipment. In particular, NATO continues to ask for Soviet-era helicopters and service support. This leads one to wonder, is Russia committed to cooperation? If so, why does its behavior appear unpredictable, even with regard to this specific, largely apolitical issue?

The comparative study conducted here supports the assumption that Russia does share a sphere of mutual interest with NATO, at least with regard to the specific and largely apolitical issue of counternarcotics. After outlining specific hypotheses and pertinent foundational discussions, this paper builds a benchmark for comparison: a model based on what three other countries have done to confront their drug problems in the past five years. The comparison of Russia’s activities against the model finds that Russia has pursued counternarcotics policies that are largely comparable to those of other countries confronting similar problems. By examining Russia’s commitment to this particular issue, both in terms of domestic and foreign policies, this paper is then better able to decipher Russia’s actual interests. Finally, the thesis concludes that if Russia continues to demonstrate lack of cooperation with NATO on counternarcotics, prospects for future cooperation on issues where national interests are more divergent are pessimistic.

1.2 Hypotheses and Methodology

In order to more closely examine the issue of Russian-NATO cooperation and determine whether Russia shares a sphere of mutual interest with NATO, this thesis supposes that Russia is not fully committed to counternarcotics efforts, particularly with regard to its foreign policies. Since it is easier to look at observable behavior rather than a lack of behavior, in order to prove that Russia is not fully committed to counternarcotics, it was first necessary to assume and disprove the inverse: Russia is fully committed to this interest, namely counternarcotics. Two explanatory hypotheses will support the inverse hypothesis: 1) If Russia is fully committed, it will have adopted domestic policies commensurate with such goals; and 2) If Russia is fully committed, it will have adopted foreign policies commensurate with such goals. In order to examine these hypotheses, three questions will have to be addressed:

i. What is commensurate; i.e., what measures do nations usually take to combat illicit drug trafficking;

ii. What measures has Russia taken, both domestically and internationally; and

iii. Do the measures Russia has taken correspond to what we might expect?

The first half of the paper will focus on the first question. Since there is no suitable pre-existing model or metric for comparing state commitment (accurate funding numbers, for example, are impossible to ascertain), it will be necessary to investigate the policies of several countries in order to extrapolate anecdotally what generic country \( x \) should be expected to adopt. The paper will summarize what measures other nations have taken to combat illicit drug trafficking. Then, having observed what these states
have done to combat their narcotics problems, it will then become possible to formulate a model of expected behavior.

The second half of the paper will focus on the next two questions. It will summarize the Russian Federation’s policies, statements, and actions. The last six years, 2004 to 2009, include the second Putin term, the first two years of Medvedev/Putin, the cooling of Western-Russian relations related to the August War, subsequent warming, and “restart.” This period should contain enough data points to discern a broad pattern of recent behavior. These data points can then be compared against the model discerned in part one in order to determine whether Russia’s policies are commensurate with those of other countries interested in combating narcotics.

Finally, this thesis will evaluate the results of the model analysis. There are several possible outcomes. First, if there are inconsistencies in both domestic and foreign policy, then Russia is likely not committed to the issue of counternarcotics. Despite Rogozin’s public assurances to the contrary, counternarcotics would not be an actual sphere of mutual interest between Russia and NATO. This would explain Russian behavior; namely, perceived unpredictability or lack of commitment.

Second, if the model analysis reveals that Russia’s policies are consistent domestically but inconsistent with regard to foreign policy, then Russia may be interested in combating narcotics. However, other foreign policy agenda items may take precedence.

Third, if the inverse hypothesis holds true and Russia’s domestic and foreign policies are found to be consistent with the model, then Russia is likely committed to
counternarcotics (as professed) and Russia shares a stated and actual sphere of mutual interest with NATO (as professed). Therefore, something else must be to blame for perceived unpredictability, such as the status of Russia’s relations with NATO in particular. If Russia cannot sustain cooperation with NATO on the largely apolitical issue of counternarcotics, then prospects for a revived relationship and broader, multi-issue NATO-Russian cooperation are unlikely. Ultimately, each of these possible findings has policy implications, which will be explored in the last section of the thesis.

1.3 Literature Review

In order to begin to examine the more narrow issue of counternarcotics, it is first necessary to acknowledge the historical and foundational basis for state policymaking within this particular sphere. There are numerous approaches that states could take to combat the flow and usage of illicit substances; various individuals have categorized these approaches differently. Ellen Benoit, for example, explains that “Various combinations of institutional dominance and programs generally yield four types of drug policy,” which she categorizes as criminalization, medicalization, harm-reduction, and libertarian.  

Under criminalization, or punitive prohibition, jurisdiction belongs to law enforcement, and the sale and possession of drugs are illegal; the policy goal is to eliminate use; state-funded measures to address the health consequences of drug use are minimal. In the medicalization model, jurisdiction belongs to the medical establishment, and the primary policy aim is to manage the disease of addiction; the drugs are otherwise illegal except for purposes identified by the medical establishment. In the harm-reduction or public health model, sale and/or possession of drugs may be illegal, but enforcement is de-emphasized in favor of state-sponsored efforts to curtail the

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negative health and safety effects of the black market and drug abuse. In the libertarian policy
type, psychoactive substances are legally available through normal commercial channels for both
therapeutic and recreational use; the health consequences of abuse are not formally addressed.

According to Benoit, no state is likely to adopt one approach in its purest form and may
even adopt multiple policy approaches to the same illicit substance.

More frequently, however, the drug control policy debate is simplified to a
discussion of two approaches: treatment vs. enforcement. With regard to the cocaine
problem in the U.S., Rydell, Caulkins, and Everingham have also categorized treatment
and enforcement programs as either “demand-control” or “supply-control” measures. A
treatment or demand-control approach would focus more on the social welfare aspect of
the problem and would include training and engaging primary health care to intervene
in emerging cases of drug abuse, expanding and improving specialty addiction care,
developing safe and efficient ways to manage drug-related offenders; and creating a
permanent drug monitoring system.

With an enforcement or supply-control approach, however, a nation would focus
more on improving drug enforcement capabilities, allocating resources for law
enforcement actions against drug traffickers, protecting public lands from illicit drug
cultivation, and drug interdiction. Frequently, this could also entail the deployment of
military resources.

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7 For example, see Gernot Tragler, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger, “Optimal Dynamic
Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control.” Operations Research, Vol 49, No. 3
8 C. Peter Rydell, Jonathan P. Caulkins and Susan S. Everingham, “Enforcement or Treatment? Modeling
Just as with Benoit’s categorizations, in practice, it is extremely unlikely that only one of these approaches would be pursued at any given time. Much of the literature deals with finding the ideal balance between the two. It is likely that a country would tend to emphasize one approach over the other; however, significant aspects of both can be seen in most comprehensive national drug control strategies.

In recent years, and especially since 9/11, scholars have noted the importance of studying the implications of the drug trade from a security perspective. The counternarcotics issue is no longer just a matter of criminal justice, but a transnational threat to regional security. One country’s counternarcotics policy does not just have implications for its domestic politics, but the international system as a whole.

This thesis will build on what has been written about approaches other countries have taken in practice. Russia is certainly not the only state to be faced with an influx of illegal drugs coming from a neighboring region. While some countries have adopted strategies aimed more at countering demand, most have adopted multi-faceted campaigns on both the supply and demand side to stop the trafficking of illicit drugs, to include increased border control efforts, bilateral and multilateral partnerships with

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neighboring countries, tough law enforcement and prosecution, media and educational campaigns.\textsuperscript{11}

This thesis will contribute to the discussion by attempting to provide the academic community with a comprehensive analysis of Russian domestic and foreign policies on the illegal drug trade during the last five years. Various organizations, such as the WHO, the UN, and the U.S. Department of State, have already provided the international community with statistics and narratives on the status of the drug problem in Russia. This paper will attempt to take these data points and extend them into a comparative analysis. It will describe the approach Russia is currently taking to the drug problem by mapping its policies and how they fit into a wider theoretical framework.

2 Building a Model for Expected CN Activities

2.1 Case Selection

In order to assess Russia’s domestic and foreign counternarcotics policies, and to provide a frame of reference for subsequent analysis, it is first necessary to investigate what policies other countries have adopted and build a model that encompasses these activities. Once a model has been established, it will be possible to measure Russia’s actions against expected (or at least previously demonstrated) state behavior.

There are inherent dangers in applying a comparative method; cases can be too dissimilar, thereby resulting in less meaningful analysis, and individual elements of policy can be taken out of context. In order to minimize these limitations, it is important to select the most appropriate cases for comparison. Also, in order for the model to be applicable in the next section of this paper, where we compare it against the situation in Russia, it is necessary to select countries that:

1) Are recognized as committed to combating their drug problems, and

2) Face drug problems that are “similar in nature” to that of Russia.

Numerous states meet the first criteria, but we must narrow down the cases to those few that best meet the second criteria; countries that face a drug problem similar in nature to that of Russia. First, it is important to define what type of problem Russia is facing and therefore, what is “similar in nature.”

Russia is “both a transshipment point and a user market for heroin, opium, marijuana, ecstasy and other dangerous illegal substances.” Russia cannot be categorized as a major drug-producing state; nearly all opiates (including heroin and opium) in Russia originate from Afghanistan. Mafia Trafficking remains one of the most critical problems facing Russian law enforcement and federal health agencies. The problem is transnational in nature; since most drugs originate outside of Russia’s borders, it faces unique border security, law enforcement, and diplomatic challenges.

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For the purposes of this thesis, then, a “similar” drug problem is one that can be categorized as primarily resulting from trafficking rather than domestic production.

However, one additional factor must be considered: the approach of the state. As previously discussed, there are several approaches that could be taken to combat the flow and usage of illicit substances. During the past two decades, Russia has consistently adopted more of a supply-based strategy\(^\text{13}\) (although it has taken on some demand-based strategies as well in recent years). Therefore, in order to provide a fair assessment of its commitment, it should be compared with countries that have adopted a similar strategic approach.

Unfortunately, identical situations do not exist. Russia’s problem is a result of a myriad of geographical, political, socio-economic, and cultural factors. The model cannot account for all of a country’s efforts or all of these factors. Nonetheless, by selecting against the aforementioned criteria, we can increase the relevancy of the results. The comparative method will allow us to assess and contextualize Russia’s commitment to counternarcotics against those of its international peers, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.

**The United States**

The U.S. is a significant state for comparison based on the above criteria. First and perhaps most notably, it is widely regarded to have committed to combating drug

usage and limiting demand, both domestically and internationally. It has made “significant efforts to disrupt the two-way flow of drugs, bulk currency, and other contraband,” and has attempted to address drug-related changes through bilateral initiatives and multilateral forums. Second, the nature of the drug problem is not unlike that facing Russia: the primary concern is the flow of illegal drugs from across the border rather than domestic production. In addition, throughout 2004-2008, the U.S. consistently adopted a more supply-based approach. Even though the Obama Administration has announced its attempt to find a balanced strategy “that focuses on stopping use before it starts, healing America’s drug users, and disrupting the market for illegal drugs,” the U.S. continues to request more funding annually for supply reduction. The U.S., therefore, is a valid case for comparison.

**Australia**

Australia also meets the above criteria. First, it is unquestionably committed to confronting its drug problem. The international community, including the UN

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14 White House to Secretary of State, memorandum regarding Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2010, 17 September 2009.
15 See, for example, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1 March 2010. “The majority of illegal drugs impacting American society are produced outside of the United States and smuggled into our country. These illegal drugs are smuggled from their country of origin and often transit other nations before arriving in the United States.”
International Narcotic Control Board,\textsuperscript{18} continues to praise Australia for its commitment to reducing the use and trafficking of illicit drugs. The U.S. has even recognized it as a “leader” in the international effort.\textsuperscript{19} Second, Australia’s problem is also primarily the result of trafficking rather than domestic production: “Asian, European, South American and Mexican drug trafficking organizations target Australia to facilitate the distribution of large quantities of heroin, cocaine, amphetamines…and precursor chemicals.”\textsuperscript{20} Lastly, Australia’s approach to its drug problem falls somewhere between a balanced and supply-reducing strategy, and would provide a worthwhile comparison. Australia asserts that its National Drug Strategy “involves a balance between demand reduction, supply reduction and harm reduction, and includes a renewed emphasis on prevention.”\textsuperscript{21} However, Australian authorities have continued to pursue some of the most aggressive law enforcement and border control initiatives, successfully targeting significant drug trafficking organizations.

\textbf{Brazil}

Brazil also provides an important and diverse case for comparison, selected as much for its dissimilarities from the first two cases as for its commitment to narcotics. Unlike the U.S. and Australia, Brazil has not been recognized as a world leader in efforts to stem the flow of illicit substances. Its economy is more closely related to that

\textsuperscript{19} INCSR 2010
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Strategies, Australian Federal Police website
of Russia and it also struggles with some degree of corruption among its law enforcement. Nonetheless, it has been recognized as committed to dealing with its drug problem. The U.S. in particular commended Brazil “on its efforts to combat the international trafficking of illicit drugs and the related crimes that perpetuate the drug trade.” In addition, Brazil’s drug problem is also primarily the result of trafficking from neighboring states. It shares “significant borders with all three of the world’s cocaine producing countries.”

2.2 Model for Expected Domestic Activities

Other countries were considered for the model, but failed to meet the criteria outlined above. The U.K., France, Canada, and Spain, for example, which are also committed to combating the drug trade, have pursued a much more demand-based approach to the problem.

Each of the above cases (the United States, Australia, Brazil) has expended significant capital against their drug problems. In terms of their domestic activities, they have all pursued initiatives in key areas, to include policy, law enforcement, and treatment and prevention. In order to more rigorously contextualize the above cases, this paper will attempt to compare representative benchmarks for these key areas.

State spending in these areas would provide one framework for comparison and indicate a state’s commitment, in dollar amounts, to various policies. Unfortunately,
precise budgetary figures are impossible to ascertain and vary greatly according to the state. The U.S., for example, conveniently breaks apart its federal drug control spending by function (law enforcement, interdiction, etc). Australia does not separate its drug control spending from overall law enforcement and border control allocations. A 2005 study attempted to estimate Australia’s federal and state drug control spending for 2003-2004 (Moore); however this data is dated, and reflects spending prior to the 2004-2009 Australian National Drug Strategy. With regard to Brazil and Russia, complete information is unavailable. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond financial analysis and pursue an alternative, more anecdotal, benchmark for comparison.

For each of the key areas for domestic activity (policy initiatives, law enforcement, and treatment and prevention) there are certain similar measures that the U.S., Australia, and Brazil have taken to combat narcotics.

### 2.2.1 Policy Initiatives

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First, with regard to policy initiatives, whether a national drug policy has been established is one preliminary insight into the commitment of the government. U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy drafts the President’s National Drug Strategy annually. Since 2004, the U.S. has continued to establish comprehensive national
strategies to reduce its drug problem, and each of our cases meets this benchmark. Every year, the President releases a national drug strategy through the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). This strategy establishes the program for meeting national goals, sets a budget, and develops guidelines for interagency cooperation. The Bush Administration prioritized law enforcement and border control; the Obama Administration, however, has indicated that it plans to pursue a more balanced national policy focusing on treatment and prevention.

The Australian National Drug Strategy 2004-2009 is a five year plan that outlined a comprehensive approach to combating its drug problem. It is “a national policy framework that is complemented, supported and integrated with a range of national, state, territory, government and nongovernment strategies, plans and initiatives. It builds upon the experience and achievements of its policy predecessor, the National Drug Strategic Framework 1998–99 to 2003–04, and is overseen and guided by key advisory and decision making bodies.”25 According to the Australian government, “the National Drug Strategy, a cooperative venture between Australian, state and territory governments and the non-government sector, is aimed at improving health, social and economic outcomes for Australians by preventing the uptake of harmful drug use and reducing the harmful effects of licit and illicit drugs in our society.”26

Brazil’s domestic policy is established and coordinated through the National Secretariat of Policy on Drugs (SENAD), which “falls under the Office of the President.

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26 Ibid.
It was created in 1998 and is charged with overseeing the modernization of the PNAD.”

The purpose of the PNAD, according to Brazilian officials, is to “orient and propose legislation…to ensure the implementation and monitoring of policy actions.”

During the past five years, all of these nations have also introduced new legislation to combat the drug problem. Although the status of pre-existing law varies country to country, the fact that such legislation was drafted and introduced demonstrates continued attention at the highest levels of legislative and executive government. In the U.S., the 109th and 108th Congress each took up seven pieces of legislation, respectively, ranging from reauthorizing the ONDCP through FY2010 and expanding its authority to authorizing National Guard counternarcotics schools.

The Senate Narcotics Caucus, which includes prominent Senators Feinstein, Grassley, and Sessions, continues to ensure that legislation is monitored and encourages the U.S. government and private programs.

Australia has also taken up numerous legislative initiatives. In 2006, it passed a law further limiting the availability of pseudoephedrine, a chemical used to make methamphetamine. In late 2009, Parliament was “considering several pieces of legislation aimed at least in part at combating narcotics. The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Bill is aimed at enhancing the ability of the police forces to prosecute large criminal organizations. It includes provisions that would

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27 INCSR 2010
29 Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
make it easier for police to pursue wiretaps, prosecute members of a group who conspire to commit a crime, and investigate people with wealth shown to be in excess of their legal income. The government has also proposed a bill banning the importation of tablet presses to help combat the domestic production of illicit pills.”31 32

Brazil continues to pursue drug legislation as well, albeit not as ambitiously as the U.S. or Australia. In 2006, Brazil passed new legislation that no longer mandated imprisonment for possession of small amounts of illicit substances for “personal use.”33 However, it also reinforced criminal penalties for trafficking and distribution. In 2008, Brazil took up drug control legislation: the Brazilian government passed a zero-tolerance law for drivers with any measurable content of alcohol or drugs in their blood. Pending anti-money laundering legislation would assist law enforcement officials in counternarcotics investigations.34

Another factor is whether presidents have announced that countering narcotics will be one of their Administration’s priorities. All of these countries have also demonstrated commitment through presidential statements, although not always throughout the entire period of 2004-2009. President Bush consistently professed the importance he placed on stopping the flow of illicit substances, vowing “to make the war one of his top priorities.”35 During his inaugural address, he said, “Take my word

32 INCSR 2010
34 INCSR 2010
for it. This scourge will stop.”  

President Obama, however, has been more reluctant to prioritize drug control efforts, especially compared with other policy initiatives. In 2009, he announced that the war on drugs had been an “utter failure” and indicated that his Administration would no longer raid medical marijuana distribution centers.  

In March 2009, he left Vice President Biden to announce the appointment of Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Kerlikowske.  

Australian Prime Minister John Howard, known for his uncompromising attitudes towards drug usage, also consistently announced the prioritization of counternarcotics efforts. In 2007, he asserted of his Administration that “We are the zero-tolerance coalition when it comes to drugs.” On the campaign trail, he announced, “I have for 11 1/2 years preached a policy of zero tolerance. It was ridiculed eight or nine years ago, even by people in my own party. They were wrong. And many people in the Labor Party were wrong. They wanted to legalize marijuana. I was always opposed to that. At long last the community, in some ways, has come to its senses on

36 Ibid.  
39 Remarks by the Vice President on the Nomination of Chief Gil Kerlikowske As Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The White House, 11 March 2009.  
marijuana.”41 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, speaking on Australian National Council on Drugs, noted that “the Australian Government will take a strong and active role in combating the scourge of illicit drugs, which costs the Australian community through health expenditure, crime and lost productivity, as well as the pain and suffering inflicted on individuals and families.”42

Brazilian President Lula da Silva has also spoken out about counternarcotics, albeit more in terms of the violence associated with the drug trade. In 2007, Lula announced that Brazil would spend a substantial sum, almost $2 billion, “to bring running water and other basic services to Rio slums to counter drug gangs that control many of the poor areas.”43 He also called for a tougher police stance against drug gangs.

In 2009, “two weeks after it was announced that Rio de Janeiro would host the 2016 Olympics, there was a dramatic flare in the city's gang wars. Rival factions battling over control of the drug trade in Morro dos Macacos triggered a police raid...At least 21 people were killed, and the violence spilled over into the city.” At a subsequent press conference, Lula indicated that he would take “all the measures necessary to fix this problem, but it [would] take time to solve these problems of violence. We want to clean the city because it is unacceptable. It really sends a negative image of our country

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41 Katharine Murphy, “I Was Right on ‘Evil’ Drugs, Says PM.” The Age, 18 October, 2007.
42 “The Prime Minister, Hon Kevin Rudd’s Message,” Australian Council on National Drugs.
abroad. Every day, we have a feeling this is a lost cause, but we should not give up. I think we have to be more forceful and severe.”

### 2.2.2 Law Enforcement

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In terms of domestic law enforcement, one consistency observed among the three cases is that all have devoted national-level law enforcement assets to drug control and enforcement. In the U.S, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the primary federal agency tasked with enforcing controlled substances laws and regulations. The Departments of Homeland Security and Treasury, with support from the Department of Defense’s National Guard, also “provide key domestic law enforcement support.” With regard to border control, Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard play the primary role in enforcement and interdiction. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the primary agency responsible for drug control enforcement, as well as import and trafficking cases. The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS), the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), and local authorities also participate in enforcement activities. The Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) is the lead

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agency tasked with drug control investigations and enforcement, but law enforcement efforts are carried out at all levels of government. DPF Special Investigation Units have become increasingly successful in high-profile cases.46

A second consistency observed among the three countries is that, in terms of drug enforcement, U.S., Australia, and Brazil also have good cooperation among their various law enforcement agencies. Even though there is room for improvement, such as an outdated interagency agreement, the U.S. DEA continues to cooperate with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection to stem the flow of illicit substances.47 48 Australian agencies also continue to successfully coordinate domestic law enforcement efforts. In 2004, for example, a joint agency operation between Australian Customs, Australian Federal Police, New South Wales (NSW) Police, Australian Crime Commission and NSW Crime Commission, resulted in what was then the largest seizure of ecstasy in Australian history.49 For Brazil, the U.S. State Department has asserted that cooperation between the U.S. and among Brazilian domestic law enforcement agencies, including Brazil’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ), National Secretariat of Public Security Enforcement Agencies and (SENASP), National Department of Prisons (DEPEN), and SENAD has been “excellent in the areas of drug prevention, combating

46 INCSR 2010
48 INCSR 2010
drug trafficking, money laundering and diverse financial crimes, arms trafficking, and other organized crimes.”  

The U.S., Australia, and Brazil have also begun to target the highest levels of drug trafficking, to include organized crime. According to the U.S. State Department:

Law enforcement tactics have grown more sophisticated over the past two decades to counter the ever-evolving tactics used by trafficking networks to transport large volumes of drugs internationally. Rather than measuring progress purely by seizures and numbers of arrests, international law enforcement authorities have increasingly targeted resources against the highest levels of drug trafficking organizations. Increasingly, international law enforcement authorities are learning the art of conspiracy investigations, using mutual legal assistance mechanisms and other advanced investigative techniques to follow the evidence to higher and higher levels of leadership within the syndicates, and cooperating on extradition so that the kingpins have no place to hide. These sophisticated law enforcement and legal tools are endorsed as recommended practices within both the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  

U.S. law enforcement has pursued such measures, with positive results. Upon indicting several members of the Gulf Cartel/Los Zetas drug trafficking organization, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer revealed, “We have learned that the most effective way to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations is to prosecute their leaders and seize their funding. Today’s coordinated actions by the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury will serve not only to bring these individuals to justice, but also to significantly slow the flow of cash that is so vital to cartel operations.”

Australian law enforcement has also targeted the highest levels of drug trafficking organizations. “In 2008, Australian law enforcement officials have successfully targeted significant drug trafficking organizations impacting the country...In June 2008, subsequent to the seizure of approximately 4.4 tons of ecstasy

50 INCSR 2010
51 Ibid.
tablets the previous year in Melbourne, the AFP conducted enforcement operations and totally dismantled an international ecstasy trafficking organization. The investigation revealed multiple criminal organizations with international links involved in this import, the largest ecstasy shipment ever seized.”53 In 2009, “Australian law enforcement authorities vigorously targeted and dismantled significant drug trafficking organizations.”54

Brazilian law enforcement has also devoted efforts towards the highest levels of traffickers. In 2008, law enforcement officials made “several key arrests, including that of a high level Colombian drug cartel leader who directed cartel operations in Brazil.” In addition, in late 2007 and 2008, the DPF along with DEA completed an investigation of “a major Brazilian trafficker, Luis Fernando da Costa, whose network had controlled drug activity in some of the most dangerous areas of Rio de Janeiro. As a consequence, the DPF has been able to arrest and indict ten other people, including da Costa’s wife, on charges of money laundering, narcotics, and weapons trafficking.”55

2.2.3 Treatment and Prevention Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federally funded treatment</th>
<th>National Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

53 INCSR 2010  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.
Even though our cases have traditionally focused more on disrupting supply than reducing demand, they have still pursued numerous social welfare programs throughout the last five years. First, the U.S., Australia, and Brazil have all provided federal funding for the establishment and maintenance of drug treatment options. In order to reduce drug abuse and addiction, the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Federal Block Grant allocates $1.8 billion annually\textsuperscript{56} and the access to Recovery (ATR) competitive grant program, launched in 2003, provides vouchers for treatment and recovery support services to states and tribes.\textsuperscript{57} In 2003, the U.S. also “began funding screening and brief intervention programs…through screening, brief intervention, and referral to treatment (SBIRT) cooperative agreements.”\textsuperscript{58} Australia also offers a variety of treatment options for various groups throughout the country. Under the National Illicit Drug Strategy, the Non Government Organization Treatment Grants Program “funds non-government drug treatment services across Australia to increase the number of treatment places and improve treatment for people with drug and alcohol problems.”\textsuperscript{59} Brazil’s SENAD has implemented a “Viva Voz 24-hour substance abuse counseling hotline.”\textsuperscript{60} Brazil’s SENAD “has responsibility for demand reduction and treatment programs. [It] supports drug councils that are located in each of the state capitals and which coordinate

\textsuperscript{56} Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration website.
\textsuperscript{58} President’s National Drug Control Strategy 2009.
\textsuperscript{59} “Illicit Drugs,” Australian Department of Health and Aging website.
\textsuperscript{60} INCSR 2010
treatment and demand reduction programs.” Its efforts are financed through the national budget.

With regard to education and prevention initiatives, the U.S. supports the activities of approximately 750 community-based substance abuse prevention coalitions through the Drug Free Communities program. Australia, as part of its 2004-2009 National Drugs Strategy, launched a National Drug Campaign (NDC) to promote awareness among youth about potential negative consequences of drug use. Brazil has undertaken numerous programs including: “a study of university students’ drug and alcohol usage, a study of the effect of controlled substance use on the transit system, drug prevention education in primary schools (with U.S. support), training on detection and treatment of drug abuse for health care professionals, implementation…and training of religious leaders in drug prevention for at-risk groups.”

2.3 Model for Expected Foreign Activities

These countries have also expended significant capital relative to foreign policy and international drug control efforts. Several similarities can be observed among these states committed to counternarcotics efforts, including signing foundational multilateral

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63 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration website.
64 According to “National Drug Strategy Campaign,” Australian Government website, “As part of the National Illicit Drugs Strategy and allocation of $2.75 million AUD was made for a comprehensive community education and information campaign — the National Illicit Drugs Campaign (NIDC).”
65 INCSR 2010
agreements, pursuing bilateral and multilateral partnerships, law enforcement efforts abroad, and border control efforts.

### 2.3.1 The UN and International Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol</th>
<th>1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances</th>
<th>1988 UN Drug Convention</th>
<th>Member, UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs</th>
<th>Voluntary Donor, UNODC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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With regard to multinational partnerships, these states have all signed the three major international drug control treaties, as recognized by the UN and the U.S. Department of State: the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and 1988 UN Drug Convention. According to the UN, these treaties are “mutually supportive and complementary.”

A large number of states, however, have signed on to the 1961 and 1988 conventions; therefore, while a state is likely to have signed if it is committed, the fact that a country has signed on to these two agreements may not necessarily confirm commitment.

Fewer states, however, continue to contribute resources to ongoing efforts. UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs is the central policy-making body of the United Nations.

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66 “Treaties,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime website.
in drug related matters.\textsuperscript{67} Fifty three states are selected as members (accounting for regional distribution), including our three cases. Another UN organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is “mandated to assist Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism.” Approximately 90\% of the UNODC budget comes from voluntary donations.\textsuperscript{68} Our three cases, the U.S. ($65.9 million), Australia ($18.2 million), and Brazil ($66.2 million), provide institutional support, and are ranked among the top 15 donors for 2005 to 2009.\textsuperscript{69}

\subsection*{2.3.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Regional Organization Participation & MOU with U.S. \\
\hline
U.S. & X & N/A \\
\hline
Australia & X & X \\
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Brazil & X & X \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Another common factor observable among our cases is that the U.S., Australia, and Brazil have also sought to stem the flow of illicit substances through additional multilateral cooperation outside of the UN. The U.S. and Australia continue to contribute to NATO anti-narcotic efforts, and Australia “is actively involved in many international organizations that investigate drug trafficking. Australia acts as co-chair of the Asia-Pacific Group on money laundering, is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, INTERPOL, the Heads of Narcotics Law Enforcement Association (HONLEA),

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{67}] “The Commission on Narcotic Drugs.” UN Office on Drugs and Crime website.
\item [\textsuperscript{68}] “About UNODC.” UN Office on Drugs and Crime website.
\item [\textsuperscript{69}] “List of Key Donors,” UN Office of Drugs and Crime website. Data as of 22 January 2009.
\end{itemize}
the International Narcotics Control Board, the South Pacific Chiefs of Police, the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) and the Customs Cooperation Council among others. Australia and the U.S. also have a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA).”\(^{70}\) Brazil actively participates in the Organization of American States Anti-Drug Abuse Control Commission and the Inter-American Commission for Drug Control of the Organization for American States (OAS/CICAD). \(^{71}\)

Another indicator of whether a country has taken drug control seriously is whether it has consented to bilateral agreements, particularly with the U.S. Both Australia and Brazil have documented their cooperation in formal Memorandums of Understanding with the U.S. government. According to the Department of State, the U.S. “undertakes a broad and vigorous program of counternarcotics activities in Australia, enjoying close working relationships with Australian counterparts at the policy making and working levels. There is active collaboration in investigating, disrupting, and dismantling international illicit drug trafficking organizations. The United States and Australia cooperate under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that outlines these objectives.”\(^{72}\) The U.S. and Brazil have also increased joint counternarcotics activities under a formal Memorandum of Understanding: “Bilateral agreements based on the 1988 UN Drug Convention form the basis for counternarcotics cooperation between the United States and Brazil, resulting in a new

\(^{70}\) INCSR 2010
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
\(^{72}\) Ibid.
Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement signed in August 2008.”

2.3.3 Law Enforcement Efforts Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperation in Joint Police Operations</th>
<th>Law Enforcement Stationed abroad</th>
<th>International Police Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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In terms of law enforcement, the U.S., Australia, and Brazil have also pursued a more transnational approach to drug control. Since 2004, each country has consistently pursued joint police operations with neighboring countries. The U.S. continues to pursue bilateral law enforcement and intelligence operations throughout the Caribbean, Mexico, and South America. Australia has continued to work with the U.S. and Southeast Asian nations. In 2007, Australia created the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP), under which it conducted cooperative law enforcement initiatives, including those pertaining to illicit drug trafficking, with Pacific Asian nations. Brazil “routinely cooperates with other countries in regards to narcotics-related crime investigations,” and throughout the past five years, Brazil has increased cooperation with its own neighbors, including Paraguay and Argentina.

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 “Law Enforcement Cooperation Program,” Australian Federal Police website.
76 INCSR 2008
Each country has decided to station a significant portion of their respective national drug enforcement personnel in other parts of the globe. In 2006, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration stationed 6.91% of its overall workforce abroad.\textsuperscript{77} The Australian Federal Police (AFP) continues to expand its global footprint and frequently stations 10% of its force overseas.\textsuperscript{78} Brazil’s Federal Police Force presence abroad is much more minimal. Precise figures are unavailable, but it still has collocated police in the embassies of Colombia, Argentina, and Paraguay.\textsuperscript{79}

Each of these countries has also volunteered to share their expertise by training foreign police forces on related initiatives to help counter the drug flow. The U.S. continues to provide counternarcotics training, sponsored by State Department and carried out by the DEA, the Customs and Border Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard, to numerous countries worldwide, including Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. Australia has continued to provide law enforcement training and financial support to Thailand, a key transit country for heroin and amphetamines into Australia.\textsuperscript{80} The AFP’s International Deployment group “continues to support regional Asian governments to ensure stability and combat drug and crime organizations,”\textsuperscript{81} and as of 2009, Australia had “22 AFP officers in Afghanistan involved in training and drug

\textsuperscript{79} “Organograma.” Departamento de Policia Federal.
\textsuperscript{81} INCSR 2009
investigations.”  

In 2009, “[Brazil’s] DPF began conducting training for police from several Portuguese-speaking African countries [Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, and Mozambique].” Brazil, through UNODC, “has been assisting Guinea-Bissau in the implementation of a drug control program…by providing specialized training to the Judicial Police of that country and by assisting in the establishment of a national police academy.”

3 Assessing Russian Activity against the Model

The U.S., Australia, and Brazil have all been identified for comparison contingent on their commitment to their respective drug problems, and certain consistencies, as demonstrated above, can be observed in their domestic and foreign policies. These similarities form the model of expected behavior. Assuming that Russia is indeed interested in addressing its illicit drug problem, it can be expected to act in a certain way; namely, to adopt policies in accordance with the model. The following section will address the inverse hypothesis, that Russia is committed to counternarcotics policies, by comparing Russia to the model established above with regard to domestic policy initiatives, law enforcement, treatment and prevention efforts, the UN, bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and law enforcement efforts abroad.

82 Ibid, see 67.
83 INCSR 2010
There are potential difficulties with applying the model to Russia. First, Russian media does not have the same level of freedom as many Western countries. Since much of the media is state controlled, it may also be difficult to find any negative accounts of high-level officials or balanced assessments of particular policies. Even anecdotal data on domestic counternarcotics efforts and criminal justice activities could be skewed.

Second, there is also a significant level of corruption in Russia, which could result in differences between high-level policy and implementation at the lowest levels. For example, even if the Russian government is committed to counternarcotics, appropriated funds may not reach their ultimate destination. There are accounts of contracts for Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) equipment, such as bullet proof vests or radios, being diverted to preferred suppliers or not reaching the officers at all. Therefore, the comparison offered here may be valid at the policy level, but may not account for a resulting disparity between policy and ground truth.

By gathering anecdotal evidence from a variety of sources, including other governments and multinational institutions, and contrasting this data with that of Russian sources, a more accurate data set can be ascertained and used in the assessment.

3.1 History of the Problem

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, “with the sudden opening of its borders, the collapse of economies in neighboring countries and the rise of regional conflicts
throughout the 1990s, Russia’s vulnerability to the drug trade increased.\textsuperscript{85} Combined with reduced capability to implement rule of law, corruption, and increased organized crime, the prevalence of drug use exploded.\textsuperscript{86} The problem continued to grow at an alarming rate into the current decade; academics observed that Russia had one of the fastest growing problems in the world.\textsuperscript{87} The primary illicit substances used in Russia have traditionally been heroin and other opiates trafficked from the Afghanistan border; however, the relative usage of cocaine and ecstasy has also increased.\textsuperscript{88}

### 3.2 Russian Domestic Policies

#### 3.2.1 Russian Domestic Policy Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Strategy</th>
<th>New legislation</th>
<th>Presidential priority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>

In terms of domestic policy initiatives, Russia does not yet meet all of the criteria set forth in the model. It fails the first comparison: a comprehensive national drug strategy. However, this alone does not necessarily indicate a lack of commitment. In 2005, Russia implemented a federal drug program to reduce the scale of drug abuse, and Russia continues to demonstrate significant progress towards meeting the remaining

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} INCSR 2010
benchmark. In 2007, President Putin formed a committee to develop drug policy and a national strategy is currently being drafted.

The State Anti-Narcotics Committee was established by Presidential decree on October 19, 2007. The stated purpose of the governmental steering body is to develop proposals for the President on national counternarcotics policy, to coordinate the activities of various government agencies, and to participate in international drug enforcement cooperation efforts. The Committee is chaired by the FSKN Director and is comprised of seven federal ministers, 14 heads of federal services, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, vice speakers from the Duma and the Federation Council, and other officials. Antinarcotics commissions have been established at the regional level and are headed by the heads of regional administrations. A national counternarcotics strategy is under development and expected to be released shortly.\(^89\)

In terms of new legislation, the situation is less ambiguous. Like our model, Russia has introduced a variety of measures to combat the drug problem. Many of these legislative efforts have dealt with strengthening the criminal code. On February 7, 2006, "amendments to the Criminal Code reduced the minimum punishable amounts of illegal drugs a user can possess before he/she is subject to prosecution. This reversed legislation adopted in November 2003 that reduced the sentence for possession of drugs for “personal use” from a maximum of three years in jail to a fine."\(^90\) On December 6, 2007, then “President Putin signed into law a bill amending the criminal code to criminalize imports into Russia of synthetic analogs of narcotic substances, to shift the authority to investigate such offenses from the Customs Service (FTS) to FSKN, and to stiffen the penalty from a fine to seven years in prison.”\(^91\)

Russia has also highlighted counternarcotics as a presidential priority. In 2004, Russia seemed to “intensify its counternarcotics efforts. President Putin and other leaders frequently highlight[ed] the drug trade as a threat to Russia's national security in

\(^{89}\) Ibid.  
\(^{90}\) INSCR 2008  
\(^{91}\) INSCR 2009
their public remarks.”92 From 2004 to 2009, both President Putin and President Medvedev have continued to emphasize Russia’s interest in counternarcotics. Then President Putin announced in 2004 that Russia’s drug network was one of the most serious threats to national security and stopping the transit of drugs was a “very important task.”93 In 2009, at a Security Council Meeting on Improving State Drug Control Policy, President Medvedev remarked that officials would address “a very difficult, complicated, and important issue – the measures we must take in order to counteract the threat posed by increasing drug use and to curb the widespread availability of drugs that we have in our country today.” He concluded by noting “it is perfectly clear that we must do everything we can in order to oppose the exceptional harm wreaked on our society by drugs.”94

### 3.2.2 Russian Domestic Law Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Effort</th>
<th>Domestic Coordination</th>
<th>High-level targeting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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In the past five years, Russia has also increasingly devoted national-level law enforcement assets to drug control and enforcement. Four federal agencies in Russia

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93 Opening Remarks by Vladimir Putin at the Board of the Federal Service for Control of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Given in Moscow, Russia, 30 March 2004.
94 Opening Remarks by Dmitriy Medvedev at the Security Council Meeting on Improving State Drug Control Policy. Given at the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, 8 September 2009.
conduct investigations into drug trafficking: FSKN, the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) and the Customs Service. The State Committee for the Control of Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances (GKPN) was established in 2003 and after restructuring in 2004, the GKPN expanded to become the FSKN. The FSKN has continued to expand throughout the past five years, and is now authorized 40,000 positions with branch offices in every region of Russia.

In terms of coordination between domestic law enforcement agencies, Russia has historically lagged behind expectations. In 2006, a UNODC report concluded, “The Russian law enforcement agencies, while continuing to improve their detection capabilities, reflected in the increasing number of covert drug operations, arrests and significant drug seizures are confronted with a certain level corruption and inter-agency rivalry. Some lack of coordination between the Russian law enforcement agencies (FSKN, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service and the Federal Customs Service), can hamper the implementation of efficient, comprehensive and integrated counter narcotics law enforcement efforts.” The situation has improved somewhat, however. In 2007, the newly formed State Anti-Narcotics Committee was put in charge of coordination. Also in 2007, the FSKN coordinated a massive interagency operation (involving FSKN, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service and the Federal Customs Service, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of

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95 INCSR 2010
96 Ibid.
97 INCSR 2009
98 Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation, UN Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for Russia and Belarus and the Paris Pact Initiative, April 2008.

Russia has also targeted resources against the highest levels of drug trafficking organizations. In 2009, for example, FSKN officials targeted and conducted an operation to shut down a large drug route from Central Asia, arresting organizational leadership. The FSKN also targeted an international criminal network that was smuggling drugs from Estonia. Two members of the group, “the organizers of a drug network in Moscow Region, were arrested in Moscow in December 2008. Prosecution of these high-level drug traffickers has proved difficult, but Russia is making strides to address the problem. In 2009, “the Duma passed a law, the development of which was supported by a U.S. technical assistance program, on cooperating witnesses. Russian organized crime investigations, including those of drug trafficking rings, have typically fizzled out at the lowest level due to the inability to develop accomplice testimony, a problem the new law is meant to address.”

100 INCSR 2008
102 “International Group of Drugs, Arms Traffickers Liquidated in Russia.” Interfax, as reported by BBC Monitoring, 17 April 2009.
103 INCSR 2010
3.2.3 Russian Treatment and Prevention Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Federally funded treatment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Expected</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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Russia has pursued limited social welfare programs throughout the last five years. First, it has provided some drug treatment options at state clinics; however, unlike our model, these options have been condemned by the international community as inadequate and ineffective. In 2007, the Human Rights Watch concluded that “the treatment offered at state drug treatment clinics in Russia was so poor as to constitute a violation of the right to health.”

Detoxification treatment is available at clinics throughout the country, but rehabilitation treatment is available in only select areas and “Russian law explicitly prohibits the use of the most effective and best researched drug dependence treatment approach for opiate dependence, methadone or buprenorphine maintenance treatment.” Moreover, individuals seeking treatment are placed on a national drug-user registry, which prohibits many from getting help. The U.S. Department of State assessed that, in 2009, “government-supported drug addiction treatment programs [remained] ineffective and in any case [were] not widely available.”

Russia has demonstrated slightly more commitment to its prevention efforts, but it terms of a national education campaign, its efforts are still rather minimal. It “has

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 INCSR 2010
begun to take steps to address the public health issues associated with drug use. Health education programs in schools and outreach programs for youth and other vulnerable populations are beginning to incorporate messages concerning the harmful effects of drug use and the links between injecting drugs and HIV/AIDS.”

3.3 Russian Foreign Policies

3.3.1 Russia and the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol</th>
<th>1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances</th>
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<td>Russia</td>
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With regard to foreign policies, Russia can first be expected to have adopted the three major international drug conventions: the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In addition, it should be involved in the relevant UN organizations. It can be expected to be a member of the UNCND, the policy-making body tasked with strengthening the international drug system. Lastly, it can be expected to be active in the UNODC.

Russia seems to have adopted the expected policies with regard to cooperation at the UN. It is a signatory to the major international drug conventions. It is also an active

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108 Ibid.
member in the UNCND; it continues to be one of six members selected from Eastern Europe.

Russia’s actions with regard to the UNODC also meet the criteria of the model. Russia continues to actively engage with the organization by hosting a field office in Moscow,\textsuperscript{109} and it continues to pledge to contribute to the UNODC operating budget. Between 2006 and 2009, the timeframe for which there is available data, Russia pledged $500,000 each year.\textsuperscript{110} While this does show commitment based on the model, it is worth noting that Russia’s pledge amounts are far less than those of the U.S., Australia, and Brazil over the same period.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Case_Nations_Pledges_to_UNODC_2006-2009.png}
\caption{Case Nations - Pledges to UNODC 2006 - 2009}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{109} “О Представительстве,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime [Russian regional office].
3.3.2 Russian Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Organization Participation</th>
<th>MOU with U.S.</th>
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<td>Expected</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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</table>

Russia can also be expected to demonstrate certain behavior with regard to bilateral and multilateral partnerships. First, it can be expected to participate in regional organizations’ efforts to counter drug trafficking. Second, according to the model, it should also have formalized a counternarcotics partnership with the U.S.

Russia meets the first expectation, participation in regional organizations. Russia has primarily participated in counternarcotics efforts with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russian FSKN head Viktor Ivanov is the current chairman of the coordination council of the heads of the bodies responsible for tackling the illegal drug trade of the CSTO.\(^\text{111}\) Russia continues to champion the role of the CSTO in fighting narcotics trafficking: in 2009 “President Medvedev announced that he considered it worthwhile to use the Collective Rapid-Response Forces [KSOR] of the CSTO.”\(^\text{112}\) However, Russia has also pursued initiatives with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) counternarcotics efforts. “Russia and the other member nations of the SCO have also


\(^\text{112}\) “CIS Military Bloc’s Forces Should Fight Drug Trafficking – Russian President.” Interfax, 10 June 2009.
attempted to use the SCO as a vehicle to combat narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia.”

With regard to bilateral drug control partnerships, Russia has signed “over thirty bilateral agreements on counternarcotics cooperation including a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to enhance bilateral cooperation to combat illegal drugs and their precursor chemicals.” On September 24, 2009, FSKN head Viktor Ivanov met with David Johnson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and Paul Jones, U.S. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan. Also in 2009, “the Working Group on Drug Trafficking was established within the framework of the United States—Russian Federation Bilateral Presidential Commission created by the decision of the Presidents of Russia and the United States on July 6, 2009. The Drug Trafficking Working Group, which had its first meeting in September 2009, promotes cooperation between the relevant authorities of the two countries, and identifies effective methods to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors.”

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113 INCSR 2009
114 INCSR 2010
115 “Washington Praises Visit of Russia’s Drug Control Service Head.” RIA Novosti.
116 INCSR 2010
### 3.3.3 Russian Law Enforcement Efforts Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation in Joint Police Operations</th>
<th>Law Enforcement Stationed abroad</th>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia continues to conduct joint police operations. The FSKN and CSTO member state law enforcement agencies have worked together since 2003 on Operation Kanal. The second phase of the operation, in November 2008, was notably successful:

The goal of the operation was to build a system of enhanced collective security to prevent trafficking in drugs from Afghanistan and the entry of precursor chemicals into Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. Representatives of the law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain and the United States took part in the operation. The joint operation resulted in the seizure of over 18.7 tons of drugs, including more than 2.4 tons of heroin, 1.6 tons of cocaine, 7.3 tons of cannabis resin, 6.8 tons of cannabis herb and 20.8 tons of precursor chemicals.\(^{117}\)

In addition, counternarcotics agencies from the CSTO have begun to share information pertaining to investigations. “Counternarcotics agencies from member nations of the CSTO have set up a database of transnational drug dealers…. Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) proposed to launch the database on December 1, 2009.”\(^{118}\)

Russia, as expected, has also stationed drug officers abroad. “The FSKN has been given authority to station drug liaison officers in foreign states to facilitate information sharing and joint investigations”\(^{119}\) FSKN reports that personnel have been

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\(^{118}\) Nargis Hamroboyeva. “CSTO counternarcotics agencies sets up database of transnational drug dealers.” Asia Plus, 12 February 2009.

\(^{119}\) INCSR 2009
stationed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, the U.S., Austria, Ukraine, China, and Uzbekistan.¹²⁰

Lastly, Russia has also volunteered to share its expertise by training foreign police on related initiatives to help counter the drug flow. “As part of the NATO-Russia Council’s counternarcotics project, Russian forces conducted training courses for Central Asian counterparts at the Domodedovo training centre of the Ministry of the Interior in Moscow during 2008. These training courses assist Central Asian police entities in combating major heroin trafficking organizations.” Russia has also volunteered to train Afghan police, both in Afghanistan and at Domodedovo.¹²¹ ¹²²

4 Findings

This comparative analysis, as outlined above, finds that Russia has pursued counternarcotics policies that are largely equivalent to those of other countries confronting similar problems. Remarkably, Russia demonstrates significant commitment to narcotics, both in terms of its domestic and foreign policies. It meets all of the established benchmarks with regard to law enforcement, the UN, bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and international police operations. With regard to domestic foreign policy, Russia does not yet meet the benchmark for a comprehensive national

¹²⁰ УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ Об официальных представителях Федеральной службы Российской Федерации по контролю за оборотом наркотиков в иностранных государствах.
¹²¹ Jeremy Page, “President Medvedev of Russia Offers to Help Train the Afghan Police.” The Times Online. 1 September 2009.
policy, but one is expected shortly. The most striking discrepancy is that its treatment and prevention measures do not meet benchmarks identified here; however, even in this area, modest progress continues to be made.

Based on the overall consistency of Russia’s activities with the model, this thesis assesses that it does share a sphere of mutual interest with NATO, at least in terms of counternarcotics. Russia, then, for the time period of 2004-2009, seems to be committed to counternarcotics but not cooperation with NATO.

5 Policy Implications

This analysis of Russian counternarcotics efforts has broader implications for the field of national security for several reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, NATO remains committed to supporting ongoing military operations in Afghanistan. Combating the production and trafficking of illicit substances in the region is one element of that overall objective: “Narcotics production and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for the control of drugs there, but also for the security, reconstruction, and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan.”123

NATO continues to try call for Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan, believing that cooperation is possible in spheres of mutual interest. In 2009, that seemed to be the case when Russia agreed to allow non-lethal supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan to fly across its territory. “About one-third of those international supplies now go

through Russia. More recently, armed U.S. forces also have been allowed through Russia and the Obama Administration has begun working with Moscow to stem drug smuggling from Afghanistan into Russia.”

In February 2010, NATO officials optimistically professed that the tone of relations was warm and again reiterated that NATO and Russia have “a number of areas, for instance in Afghanistan or in the area of counterterrorism, where we have a lot of overlapping interests, and a number of areas of common challenge, of where we want to work with Russia.”

There are brief instances of improved relations, but Russia and NATO continue to clash over potential joint counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. In March 2010, at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council attended by the FSKN head Ivanov and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, the differences once again became clear. Russia has pressed that NATO adopt a Russian strategy for combating drugs in Afghanistan. “Ivanov said at least 25 per cent of the opium crop should be destroyed as part of the proposed joint NATO-Russia plan. He added that Marjah, the former Taliban stronghold that NATO troops cleared in recent weeks, offered a 'unique opportunity' to start the effort.” But NATO spokesman James Appathurai responded that such an aggressive eradication strategy without crop replacement efforts was not a viable course of action. Instead, Appathurai noted that “the best way for Moscow to help control the drug would be to give more assistance against the insurgency.”

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125 James Mackey of NATO’s Euro Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate in “NATO-Russia Relations.” Natochannel.tv, 16 February 2010.
reiterated that “Rasmussen had asked Russia for increased support in Afghanistan, including in training counternarcotics officials and helicopters for the overall counterinsurgency effort.”

This thesis supports the assumption that counternarcotics is a sphere of mutual interest, as Western officials have assumed. This comparative study indicates that Russia is committed to combating the flow of illicit substances. Something else, then, must be responsible for perceived unpredictability in the Russian-NATO relationship. Western officials need to press harder for Russian assistance or be more realistic about the prospects for Russian-NATO cooperation. In terms of counternarcotics efforts, NATO officials need to reexamine long-term strategies. Rather than relying on Russian assistance, NATO should focus on strengthening its own border control efforts and increasing its own police training programs in order to achieve the desired goal. NATO officials should also focus on developing alliances with other regional powers in order to guarantee necessary logistical support and overflight rights. Moreover, if Russia is committed to counternarcotics but not cooperation with NATO, as this study indicates, Brussels should reconsider intelligence sharing with Russia on drug trafficking. NATO’s trust in Russian action is not justified; law enforcement benefits are unlikely to outweigh potential costs.

A comprehensive analysis of Russian-NATO relations writ large was beyond the scope of this paper; however, since Russia has seemed unable to consistently demonstrate commitment to cooperate with NATO on a relatively apolitical issue as

counternarcotics, where this study shows that Russia is committed, prospects for broader, multi-issue NATO-Russian cooperation on areas of divergent interest are extremely likely. Another higher interest, besides counternarcotics, must be driving Russia’s actions. This must inform the decision-making of policymakers. With regard to Russian-NATO relations writ large, Brussels should reconsider the status of the relationship and reevaluate prospects for inciting cooperation on other issues, such as increased dialogue on the European security structure.

Even though these findings primarily lead one to question prospects for NATO-Russian relations, the inconsistency between commitment and cooperation suggests several secondary policy implications. Policymakers and area studies experts “continue to disagree on the extent and manner of cooperation that the West should pursue towards Russia.”\(^{128}\) They are constantly trying to better understand Russian foreign policy priorities and more accurately differentiate between Russia’s stated and actual interests. While the counternarcotics issue alone does not definitively forecast Russia’s overall grand strategy, a deeper understanding of Russia’s commitment to this particular issue has implications for the overall tone of Russia’s relations with the West. If Russia continues to harbor suspicions towards the West, and has trouble cooperating on areas of mutual interest, “reset” may not be a viable policy towards Russia. Policymakers should invest less political capital in and rely less on Russian cooperation in other

spheres, such as non-proliferation or arms control, and further downplay such controversial issues as NATO expansion.

Moscow’s commitment to addressing its drug problem also has social and economic implications for the stability of the Russian Federation and surrounding territory. Since Russia demonstrates interest in implementing appropriate domestic programs and foreign policies, there is hope that certain dangerous trends may be reversed. Russia is the largest illicit market for opiates in Europe and as many as 1.65 million people in Russia are users. 129 As a direct consequence of heroin usage, “Russia now has a 1 percent HIV prevalence rate among its young people and the fastest growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world.” 130 “Health experts estimate that nearly 65 percent of newly detected HIV cases can be attributed to injecting drug use and that among HIV-positive injecting drug users, about 85-90 percent are Hepatitis C positive.” 131 To a country with an already declining population, this would have substantial long-term consequences for public health and mortality, demography, size of the work force, and economic output.

Lastly, these findings have implications for counternarcotics partnership building in a more general sense. Russia is not the only country that the West seeks to build relations with in order to confront this transnational threat to global security. NATO has also sought to build cooperative programs with numerous Central Asian and

130 Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation, UN Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for Russia and Belarus and the Paris Pact Initiative, April 2008.
131 INCSR 2010
Latin American countries. The Russian example provides a case study for how successful counternarcotics partnerships can be formed and maintained. Russia’s willingness to confront particular aspects of counternarcotics and the efforts on which it has chosen to contribute have implications for building better bilateral and multilateral relations with similar countries.

6 Conclusion

By examining anecdotal data available for 2004-2009, this thesis supports the claim that Russia is committed to counternarcotics. Russia has pursued expected measures, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy, in order to stop the flow of illicit substances.

However, this study leaves plenty of room for additional research. First, only anecdotal data was available for counternarcotics policy comparison. If state budgetary figures were released or ascertained, it would be interesting to pursue more quantitative analysis. This could provide additional clarity as to the level of commitment and would establish a better benchmark for comparison. Second, an analysis of Russian-NATO relations writ large was beyond the scope of this thesis; therefore, this paper delved into the particular issue of counternarcotics. It may be beneficial to analyze Russia’s commitment in additional spheres of perceived mutual interest over time.

Officials on both sides continue to assert that cooperation on issues of mutual interest is possible; however, despite periodic thaws in Russian-Western relations, the Russian-NATO relationship remains troubled. Nearly twenty years after the end of the
Cold War, fundamental disagreements remain.\textsuperscript{132} \textsuperscript{133} Something else, besides lack of interest in counternarcotics, must be to blame for any unpredictability observed by Western officials. Further analysis will have to be conducted to isolate the precise factor or factors responsible for remaining reluctance in working with NATO on issues of mutual interest. Until then, the prognosis for better and more predictable relations between Brussels and Moscow remains pessimistic.

\textsuperscript{132} Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia, A New Beginning.” Given at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{133} Valentina Pop, “Russia Does Not Rule Out NATO Membership.” EU Observer. 4 January 2009.
Appendices

Prevalence of Usage as a Percentage of the Population 15-64

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<th></th>
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Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2009 (U.S., Australia and Brazil data from 2007, Brazil from 2005)

UNODC Total Contributions 2009

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Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime Annual Reports for 2010.
## Major Donors - Pledges to UNODC 2009

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Major Donors - Pledges to UNODC 2009

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime Annual Reports for 2010.

Emerging and National Donors – Pledges to UNODC 2009

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Emerging and National Donors - Pledges to UNODC
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Case Nations - Proportional Percentage of UNODC Pledges to Total
2006 - 2009

[Chart showing the proportional percentage of UNODC pledges to total pledges for each country.]

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