DO HUMAN RIGHTS INFLUENCE STATE SECURITY?

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By

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ABSTRACT

This paper questions security justifications for human rights violations by testing the hypothesis that these violations, including government-sponsored indiscriminate killings, systematic torture, disappearances, and wide-scale imprisonment, are positively correlated with increased conflict. Regression analyses of 141 countries suggest that these violations are, in fact, significantly associated with conflict. However, the size of the relationship is extremely small. Gaps and inadequacies in the data prevent countries with the most conflict as well as those with the most widespread human rights abuses from being included in the study, which indicates that additional information is needed.
Dedicated to all of my supportive professors and advisors at Georgetown University, Alissa Emmel and Michelle Michaels for their advice, and the people who helped me get here:

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INTRODUCTION

This paper uses a large-n study to explore the relationship between human rights and security. Its focus is the impact of government-sponsored human rights violations on domestic armed conflict. Specifically, it attempts to answer the question of whether state-sponsored extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, and wide-scale political imprisonment contribute to increased violence within states, either among non-state actors or between non-state actors and governments. The prime hypothesis is that this is the case.

The findings present a mixed but intriguing picture. They are based on regressions which include all countries for which data exist. The regressions provide a high confidence level for rejecting the null hypothesis ($H_0$: there is no correlation between human rights and security). However, while the relationship between human rights and security appears to be real, it is also very small. Yet the direction of the correlation is consistently in the direction assumed by the prime hypothesis: human rights violations are seen to be inversely correlated with stability. Unfortunately, the study is not able to determine causation.

While the size of the relationship is too small to justify broad policy conclusions, my hope is that this paper does indicate the need for more attention to this issue. Chapters V and VI, “Analysis of the Data” and “Policy Implications and Lessons,” will summarize the shortcomings of the available data and describe the gaps that would need to be filled to address the research question more comprehensively.

This is an urgent question with profound implications for both the human rights and the security fields. Officials in diverse government types facing diverse threats use security as a
justification for human rights violations, including torture and imprisonment without trial. Former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney claimed in May 2009 that enhanced interrogation techniques have “prevented the violent death of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent people.”¹ These ideas were given legal weight in the 2002 and 2005 memoranda on harsh interrogation techniques supplied to the Central Intelligence Agency by the U.S. Department of Justice.² Security is used as a justification for human rights violations worldwide. In Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reportedly warned in November 2007 that feminism and religious pluralism, among other intellectual threats, posed a danger to the regime and justified crackdowns accordingly.³ Yet the experiences of security experts call these assumptions into question; for example, U.S. Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, the dean of the United States Military Academy at West Point, believes that the use of torture is counterproductive and has asked the producers of the television program 24 to “do a show where torture backfires.”⁴

Given the importance of the stakes, and the ubiquity of security justifications for rights violations, it appears timely to determine whether torture, imprisonment without trial, and other violations of “the rule of law” make states more or less secure. As stated above, the prime hypothesis of this study, based on a review of the literature, is that state-sponsored human rights

violations have a negative impact on state security. However, because there is a widespread belief that human rights violations can contribute to security, the research model is designed to test for this alternative possibility as well.

The study model is based on quantitative data. As the literature review will indicate, qualitative studies already suggest that human rights violations do indeed seem to be associated with reduced domestic security. However, because these studies all focus on specific cases, their lessons are not often applied more broadly. Although there are weaknesses to a quantitative approach, which will be discussed below, it is being employed here to help fill existing research gaps and point the way to future studies that may be perceived by policymakers as being more generally relevant. The analysis suggests that this approach has promise but that better data is needed.

I will begin by defining the terms “human rights” and “security.” A literature review will then place the research question in its broader policy context. The review will discuss why the question matters and present some of the evidence already collected by qualitative studies. It will demonstrate that major trends in the security debate presume a tension between human rights and security (contra my hypothesis), and conclude with a summary of a promising quantitative study.

Following the literature review I will describe the data sources, explain how they will be used, and present the findings of the regressions. The paper will conclude with the policy implications of the results and an evaluation of the information gaps that remain to be filled to facilitate more nuanced studies in the future.
CHAPTER I: DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY

It will first be necessary to define the terms “human rights” and “security.” Philosophically human rights can be considered those rights which are held to be inalienable and equally vested in all individuals, and for the purposes of this paper they can be defined as those rights which are included in the three human rights documents that have widespread international acceptance: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A review of the literature suggests that civil and political rights have the most bearing on security outcomes, and further indicates that within this category the greatest impact is due to “violations of personal integrity or security rights.” In particular, four rights violations stand out: indiscriminate killings, systematic torture, disappearances, and wide-scale imprisonment. These factors will therefore serve as the independent variables. (“Independent variable” refers here to the variable connected to the hypothesis’ causal phenomenon, per van Evera.)

This study will follow Cingranelli and Richards in referring to these variables as (state-sponsored) extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, and (wide-scale) political imprisonment. Indiscriminate or extrajudicial killings refer to government-conducted or -instigated killings without due legal process. Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme mental or physical pain or cruel, inhuman, or degrading force by or on behalf of

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5 Ibid., pp. 694-5.
6 Ibid., pp. 694-5.
government officials. Disappearances are cases in which people have been taken and their whereabouts are no longer known. Political imprisonment refers to incarceration due to speech, beliefs, or membership in a group.\(^9\)

State security can be understood in terms of a state’s ability to defend itself and its people from both external and internal violence. The Uppsala/Human Security Centre database compiles information on three categories of political violence: conflicts between states or between a state and a non-state actor, conflicts in which none of the parties is a government, and attacks on civilians by either a government or non-state actor.\(^10\) Because debates about rights violations and security most often occur in the context of conflicts with non-state actors, and abundant research has already been conducted on state-on-state war, this study will use domestic violence as a proxy for security. Within the domestic setting, it will focus on violence involving non-state actors to avoid conflating security breakdowns with the state-sponsored abuses they are being tracked against. Thus, broadly following the Uppsala/Human Security Centre categories, I will use violence between state and non-state actors, violence between non-state actors, and violence by non-state actors against individuals as the dependent variables. (“Dependent variable” refers here to the variable connected to the hypothesis’ caused phenomenon, per van Evera.\(^11\))

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\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Van Evera, p. 11.
Chapter II: Literature Review

An inverse relationship is often assumed between population or state security and human rights protections, and this perception shapes the decisions of policymakers.\(^\text{12}\) However, there is ample evidence to suggest not only that human rights violations are not necessary for security, but that they can be counterproductive. The stakes make it critical that this potential discrepancy between belief and reality is resolved by determining what the relationship actually is and how it is expressed. Unfortunately, although much has been written on the topic, most of the relevant studies are still speculative or preliminary. They nevertheless strongly indicate that a correlation between human rights violations and security breakdowns does exist, and this makes it urgent that more thorough and targeted studies be conducted to fill in the gaps of our knowledge. Below we will examine the current state of the security/human rights dialogue before considering some seminal and some synthesizing texts. We will then explore several key issues in more depth and identify questions which have yet to be resolved.

As noted above, human rights are rights which all persons are considered born with and which transcend the claims of states. State security can be understood in terms of a state’s ability to defend itself and its people from both external and internal violence. The Uppsala/Human Security Centre database defines security in terms of three categories of political violence: conflicts between states or between a state and a non-state actor ("state-based armed conflicts"), conflicts in which none of the parties is a government ("non-state armed conflicts") and

\(^{12}\) See, for example, the Justice Department and CIA justifications in CNN. “2002 memo: Had to be intent to inflict 'severe pain' to be torture.”
“deliberate, unopposed” slaughter by either a government or non-state actor (“one-sided violence”).

**Why it Matters**

The question about the relationship between rights and security has widespread implications. Kent Roach writes that counter-terrorism laws proliferated globally and rapidly following 9/11, following the lead of a few influential sources, such as the Security Council through its Resolution (SCR) 1373. Unfortunately, Roach states, these new laws were not informed by accurate information about how terrorist organizations actually work and what is needed to stop them. For example, SCR 1373 targeted refugee law (among other areas), despite the fact that none of the 9/11 terrorists had applied for asylum; many countries followed suit by melding immigration laws and anti-terrorism laws, with negative consequences for human rights protections. The reason for these problems, Roach asserts, is partly that SCR 1373 was formulated “under time pressures and with imperfect information about the causes of 9/11.” Roach recommends that counter-terrorism laws “be re-evaluated in light of their effectiveness and their effects on human rights.”

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15 Ibid., pp. 228-9.
16 Ibid., p. 253.
17 Ibid., p. 253.
18 Ibid., p. 229.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan claimed in 2005 that “international human rights experts, including those of the UN system, are unanimous in finding that many of the measures that States are currently adopting to counter terrorism infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹⁹ A 2007 study asserts that while governments, NGOs, and UN officials were successful in pushing back against and even reversing some of these abuses, “the human rights regime was damaged…perhaps to such a degree that the small changes noted above…have come too late.”²⁰

One significant reason for this “damage” is that human rights protections have been viewed by policymakers as impediments to realizing national security goals. Even officials publicly sympathetic to human rights norms may assert that tradeoffs have to be made. In 2009, for example, there was widespread media coverage of a statement in a memo by Dennis Blair, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, that “harsher interrogation methods” had yielded “high-value information” (an opinion omitted from the public version of the document).²¹ One of the methods to which he was referring was waterboarding, which the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo War Crimes Trials”) had found to be torture when used against Americans. With the consequences both of using these types of methods and of refraining from

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using them potentially so high, it is worth examining more closely whether they do in fact lead overall to increased security and the extent to which they do so.

Evidence of Correlation

At the same time, numerous studies point in the opposite direction by supporting a correlation between a variety of human rights abuses and state instability.\textsuperscript{22} In Bosnia, postmortems on the violence found that “the rapid escalation of conflict had been due partly to the sheer factor of uncertainty about the boundaries of the political community within which basic rights would be guaranteed and the preemptive mobilization of ethnic groups that ensued.”\textsuperscript{23} The Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom has mapped a correlation between freedom of religion and state stability.\textsuperscript{24} The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, which rates 177 national states according to twelve social, economic and political indicators, demonstrates a correlation between state failure and suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread human rights violations.\textsuperscript{25}

These failed states are ones which include the loss of physical control over their territory or the loss of their monopoly on the legitimate use of force,\textsuperscript{26} which are among the most

\textsuperscript{22} See Ibid., p. 514.
important conditions that can lead to insurrectionary violence.\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless, the results of the Failed States Index are broad for policy purposes, and in general both sides of the argument largely rely on assumptions and anecdotal evidence, leaving many gaps in the literature on the relationship between human rights violations and security breakdowns.

Michael Walzer helps to frame this debate. Through his work on justice in war he has analyzed the way that rights norms are and should be translated into the dialectic of violent conflict. For Walzer, justice in war primarily involves two themes: noncombatant immunity and the humane treatment of detainees.\textsuperscript{28} Broadly speaking, these are the ideals which are called into question by the perceived tension between rights and security.

For our purposes, one of the most important contributions to the field comes from Oskar N. T. Thoms and James Ron. By converting social science findings on conflict risk factors into human rights language, Thoms and Ron have determined that violations of civil and political rights based on discrimination can trigger conflicts.\textsuperscript{29} Although the causation is less direct, the violation of social and economic rights also appears to contribute to conflict, by “creating the grievances and group identities that may, in some circumstances, contribute to violence.”\textsuperscript{30} Thoms and Ron’s work is as direction-setting for this particular question as Walzer’s is for the field overall, although it still leaves open multiple questions which will we consider below. The pertinent issues are examined in more depth by Andrew Ashworth and Victor V. Ramraj, who explore practical ways that security systems can be adapted for the post-9/11 environment


\textsuperscript{28} It also demands that the damage caused by operations be proportional to their military necessity.

\textsuperscript{29} Thoms and Ron, pp. 692, 704.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 704.
without sacrificing rights and the rule of law. Their work is important in that it tries to determine what the interplay between rights and security actually means, but as we shall see below it is still speculative and does not provide the tools we need to assess the efficacy of alternative policy choices.

There are other findings which can inform our discussion. Experience in peace-keeping and nation-building, as well as in counter-terrorism, has provided experiential evidence about the interplay of rights and security. The RAND Corporation’s National Security Research Division has studied U.S. peace-building operations, and found that creating a secure environment in a country that has been torn apart by armed conflict is facilitated by police forces that are trained to respect human rights, and in order to be effective these police forces should be part of a justice system that ensures due process and equality before the law.\(^{31}\) An attempt to study the efficacy of coercive interrogation techniques was begun in *Educing Information*, a collection of articles that comprise the Phase 1 Report of the Intelligence Science Board, which was chartered in 2002 to advise senior U.S. intelligence officials on scientific and technical issues of importance to the intelligence community. The authors generally agree that the “scientific community has never established that coercive methods are an effective means of obtaining reliable intelligence information,” while also emphasizing that more research would need to be done to reach any firm conclusions.\(^{32}\)

There have been many suggestions about why torture and other human rights violations might backfire. While being tortured, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an accused al-Qaeda commander,  

invented stories linking Iraq to al-Qaeda and claiming that Iraq possessed biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, stories that were believed and cited by high-level U.S. officials including the president. According to two FBI officials, al-Libi later explained these fabrications by saying, “They were killing me. I had to tell them something.”33 As it turned out, the most wanted terrorist in American-occupied Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was located by an interrogation team led by an Air Force major who “strongly oppose[d] the use of torture or coercion in interrogations.” He was brought onto the case after “fear and control” techniques, which “are as obsolete as the buggy whip,” had failed. He explains, “Respect, rapport, hope, cunning, and deception are our tools.”34 On the other hand, “I listened time and time again to captured foreign fighters cite the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo as their main reason for coming to Iraq to fight.”35

In another article in *Educing Information*, Robert Coulam, Director of the Center for Health Policy Research at Simmons University, notes that among the factors which must be considered in deciding whether certain techniques are valuable is the effect they have on the legitimacy of the government which uses them, which in the case of democratic governments relies in part on ethical concerns and the rule of law.36 This is the same conclusion reached by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in its *Joint Operations* manual notes that stabilization

33 Quoted in Rich, Frank. “The Real-Life ‘24’ of Summer 2008.” *The New York Times*. July 13, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/opinion/13rich.html?em&ex=1216180800&en=0261ed250e2d7a9ab&ei=5087. It has also been suggested that this was a lie as well and that al-Libi was trying to provoke the United States into attacking Iraq to start a war that would benefit al-Qaeda; the only thing known for certain is that al-Libi was not telling the truth in the first place.


operations should include cooperation with other governments and organizations to “strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction” and warns that the use of excessive military force “could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy”.

Bruce Hoffman’s examination of terrorism demonstrates that terrorists commonly try to provoke disproportionate state responses. If states do nothing after their people are attacked, they look impotent. When states want to respond but aren’t sure how, they are prone to resorting to mass arrests and other suspensions of civil liberties, and they often target groups that the terrorists have identified with. This, in turn, helps terrorists to create a political identity among the targeted population. The power of the state is in effect used against itself.

A related issue is how rights norms impact military effectiveness. From Walzer we learn that militaries might wish to protect human rights through just war standards for entirely practical reasons, including preserving discipline and conserving resources that would be wasted, for example, through the indiscriminate use of firepower. Militaries treat noncombatants and detainees fairly in the hope that the treatment will be reciprocated and adhere to just war

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39 One example is that pronounced social stratification between officers and their subordinates can lead to morale problems which can reduce the effectiveness of military units, a problem which has been implicated by one study in the Egyptian defeats by Israel in 1948, 1956 and 1967, the losses by Italian forces in World War II, and the performance of Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands. Although beyond our present scope, one potential avenue of inquiry would be how this stratification is or is not reinforced by state-sponsored discrimination. See Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman. “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations.” *International Security,* Vol. 11 No. 1, Summer 1986, pp. 65-66, 70.
principles to maintain public support and allied cooperation, and to ensure the government legitimacy that is crucial to defeating insurgencies.⁴⁰

From a prescriptive approach, Howard Wolpe’s governance capacity-building exercises in conflict areas such as Burundi are claimed to have averted large-scale violence by addressing security concerns through the application of human rights norms. Wolpe advocates for “a transition from a set of highly personalized relationships, in which individuals and organizations seek access to ad hoc state-bestowed benefits as clients, to a system of transparent, institutionalized relationships between citizens and their governments.”⁴¹ Wolpe’s insights suggest a promising avenue of study, as it remains to be seen whether the links he discusses can be demonstrated quantitatively.

Assumptions of Perceived Tension between Human Rights and Security

The perceived tension between human rights law and security has occupied numerous scholars.⁴² According to Ashworth, the responses to this apparent quandary have settled primarily into two camps. In favor of the human rights approach is the “fundamental contradiction” thesis, which states that by their actions terrorists have attacked “democratic values, constitutionalism, and human rights,” and that to use those same methods against the

terrorists is to contradict the values that democratic states claim to be defending. According to this approach, responses to terrorism should take place within the rule of law.

Alternatively there is the “balanced response thesis,” which Ashworth states is the approach favored by the British government. It holds that the response to terrorist threats involves an unavoidable tradeoff between protecting the basic freedoms of citizens from attack, in other words defending the public interest, and upholding human rights values. This approach requires balancing both imperatives. Ashworth finds many problems with this thesis, among which is the fact that the public interest being defended should include rights themselves. This echoes Walzer’s assertion that “There is much else that we might plausibly want to preserve [in addition to life]: the quality of our lives, for example, our civilization and morality, our collective abhorrence of murder, even when it seems, as it always does [in utilitarian calculations], to serve some purpose.” Ashworth also observes that the word “balance,” as used, is nebulous in definition.

More pertinent to our present discussion, Ashworth also notes that balancing between these two supposed conflicting goals “assume[s] a hydraulic relationship between human rights safeguards and the promotion of security, that is as one goes up the other must go down, and vice versa.” But, he points out, support for this proposition is lacking: “governments make great play of the extra security allegedly provided by new measures, without providing the necessary

43 Ibid., pp. 206-7.
44 Ibid., p. 207.
46 Ibid., p. 208.
47 Walzer, p. 262.
48 Ashworth, p. 208.
49 Ibid., p. 208.
evidence.” Thus Ashworth highlights the fact that there is no demonstrated link between reduced rights and greater security, but he does not draw attention to the fact that even the fundamental contradiction thesis fails to consider whether human rights protections can enhance security.

Because the perceived tension between rights and security has commanded the dialogue, new theories address how governments should accommodate themselves to it. Prominent among the theorists are David Dyzenhaus and Oren Gross, who start from the shared assumption that the judicial systems in democratic countries are not well-suited to dealing with emergency situations. David Dyzenhaus responds to this dilemma by calling for the modification of government institutions to meld executive, judicial and legislative powers. He defends legality and the rule of law, but asserts that in order to cope with security demands during crises, new administrative mechanisms should be put in place to deal with security issues within a legitimate framework but outside of traditional channels, such as the UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which reviews deportation orders in national security cases. This response to emergencies does not bend substantive legal norms, but instead adapts institutions to address national security concerns.

Oren Gross, on the other hand, believes that crises are best managed by the experts in the executive who face them directly and presumably have experience in handling them. He writes that “there may be circumstances where the appropriate method of tackling grave dangers and threats may entail going outside the constitutional order, at times even violating otherwise

50 Ibid., p. 209. 51 Ramraj, pp. 186, 188. 52 Ibid., p. 189.
accepted constitutional principles, rules and norms.” Under Gross’ system, after “acting outside of the legal order” in “catastrophic cases,” the officials should publicly acknowledge their actions, at which point it is up to “society as a whole” to decide whether to hold each official responsible for his or her illegal activities or to “approve them retrospectively.” The justification for this optimistic system is that extra-legal actions must sometimes be taken but should be confined to exceptional situations, and they should always be treated as exceptions because if courts were to sanction them in general terms, they would set precedents that would undermine the rule of law.

Victor V Ramraj responds to Dyzenhaus and Gross by calling for a recommitment to, rather than a reluctant accommodation with, the rule of law. He advocates reforming institutions as necessary to entrench rule of law protections, to be accompanied by complementary political measures that would strive to resolve the underlying tensions that are contributing to conflict in the first place. For scholars such as Ramraj who wish to reconcile the perceived tensions between rights and security, as well as for Dyzenhaus and Gross who are trying to find ways around them, it would be beneficial to have a clearer view of what the impact of human rights protections actually is.

Quantitative Research

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53 Quoted in Ramraj, p. 190.
54 Quoted in Ibid., p. 190.
55 Ibid., p. 191.
56 Ibid., pp. 198-9.
While a positive relationship between the rule of law and domestic stability may be asserted by some qualitative studies and even military doctrine, we have already seen that it is not always accepted by policymakers. It is also rejected by other influential sources, such as creators of widely-consumed media. As noted above, Brigadier General Finnegan pleaded with television producers to change their portrayal of torture; he was accompanied by three of the country’s most experienced military and F.B.I. interrogators, and explained that the show mattered because it was influencing incoming West Point students.\(^{57}\) The fact that military leaders have to make their case to producers reinforces the need for a body of quantitative data that is seen as being broadly applicable.

This brings us to the quantitative research of Thoms and Ron, who describe their effort as “relatively unique, since human rights and political violence have infrequently been studied in tandem.” They explain that conflict is normally investigated by social scientists, but human rights violations are analyzed by lawyers and activists, and the “two groups use different concepts and theories and rarely address each other’s work.”\(^{58}\) Thoms and Ron examine the two primary categories of rights, “civil and political” and “economic, social and cultural,” and determine that the former can be linked clearly to security failures. The latter are found to be exacerbating factors, but not directly correlated. Thomas and Ron find that within the category of civil and politic rights, while the relationship between political participation rights and conflict is mixed (as other studies have also shown), “violations of personal integrity or security


\(^{58}\) Thoms and Ron, p. 675.
These particular rights are identified as indiscriminate killings, systematic torture, disappearances, and wide-scale imprisonment. This leads naturally to a testable hypothesis:

\[ H1: \] Human rights violations including government-sponsored indiscriminate killings, systematic torture, disappearances, and wide-scale imprisonment should be positively correlated with increased conflict.

Thoms and Ron suggest an avenue for further study when they write that “precise causal links are difficult to pin down.” In many cases, they note, “escalating conflict may promote state reliance on repression, rather than the reverse. More research on this relationship is needed, but the link is there.”

The question of causation is also raised by Neil A. Englehart, who argues that while human rights abuses are linked with failing or failed states, it is weak state capacity that leads to human rights violations and not necessarily the other way around. In a 2009 study, Englehart found that rights, in particular security rights and specifically protection from extrajudicial killings, are more likely to be protected in states with a developed policing capacity, which can better protect their citizens from “the depredations of non-state actors and rogue government...provide a clear link to escalation.”

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59 Ibid., pp. 694-5.  
60 Ibid., pp. 694-5.  
61 Ibid., p. 676.  
62 Ibid., p. 697.
officials.”63 Future studies will need to consider both correlation and causation in order to map
the relationship between rights and security.

The present study can only address correlation, not causality. However, it does attempt
to contribute to a more detailed understanding of their relationship by including a regression that
includes changes of human rights and security over time.

Another question which is worthy of attention by future studies is whether there is a
threshold at which the direction of the relationship between human rights and security flips. For
example, countries in which human rights violations are institutionalized and systematized on a
national scale, such as North Korea, do appear to have domestic stability. Unfortunately, a lack
of data about North Korea means that it could not be included in the regressions. Hopefully this
is an area which will be addressed by future research, perhaps combining quantitative and case
study methods.

The debate about rights and security is critical because it affects so many lives, it is far
from reconciled, and policymakers are not able to wait until the matter has been resolved before
making their decisions. Fortunately, the texts considered here suggest further paths of inquiry,
even while they highlight how much remains to be done. Resolving this issues with more
clarification and knowledge would profoundly improve both security and human rights, and thus
enhance human wellbeing overall.

CHAPTER III: DATA SOURCES

This study and its conclusions are constrained by the limitations of available data. In general, data gaps exist in states with severe human rights and/or security problems (my independent and dependent variables, respectively), meaning that the states of most interest to the study are also the ones most likely to be excluded. There is also a lack of granularity in much of the security data, making low-level conflicts as well as changes in conflict levels difficult to track.

Nevertheless, there is a large and growing body of relevant information which should be of benefit to policymakers. This study provides one approach to analyzing the existing data. At the same time, it indicates the need for data that is more complete and detailed.

There are difficulties of data collection which apply in some sense to all international surveys: differences of access, language, and interpretation (both linguistic and conceptual). In addition, there are challenges specific to human rights and armed conflict surveys: human rights metrics are by definition more difficult to obtain in societies with poor human rights scores, and conflict can make data collection difficult or impossible. There is also the challenge of trying to rate violence or human rights violations: even if there were a way to capture every event that took place in a given country in a given year, there will always be some subjectivity in how that data is scored on a scale. For that reason, some of the more robust datasets use binary or tertiary scales for key indicators (for example, was there or was there not armed conflict that resulted in at least 25 deaths in a given year). Unfortunately, the limited range of scores limits the ability to track variations in positive cases (e.g., the actual number of deaths).
For human rights metrics I draw from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, which covers 195 countries from 1981 to 2007. The variables of interest are “Extrajudicial Killing,” “Torture,” “Political Imprisonment,” and “Disappearance.” “Freedom in the World” contains data for 193 countries going back to 1972 (the measure of interest is “protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture,” which would need to be disaggregated from the Rule of Law indicator). Unfortunately, the Freedom House data is coded in a way which theoretically could permit inconsistency between country scores, and the Fund for Peace indicator is too broad for the present purposes. I considered but rejected using the World Bank’s *Governance Matters* Rule of Law indicator because it goes back only to 1996, measures too broad a set of factors, and focuses on perceptions rather than actual events.

For security metrics I draw from the University of Maryland/George Mason University Center for Systemic Peace database (CSP), as well as the Uppsala University “Uppsala Conflict Data Program” database (UCDP). The former provides a wider scoring range, but the latter includes more events (25+ deaths as opposed to 500+ deaths).

I do not include data from the Failed States Index in my regressions, but I do use the index to ensure that the cases include states across the stability spectrum. This is important because while I start with the universe of all states, a number have to be excluded due to lack of data on various indicators.

Table 1. Data Sources Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Database Source</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Countries</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Data Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>CIRI Human Rights Data Project: “Torture”</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide-scale political imprisonment</td>
<td>CIRI Human Rights Data Project: “Political Imprisonment”</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>CIRI Human Rights Data Project: “Disappearance”</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated killings, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances</td>
<td>CIRI Human Rights Data Project: “PHYSINT”</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated rule of law and human rights violations metrics</td>
<td>Freedom in the World, Failed States Index</td>
<td>0-16</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence between state and non-state actors</strong></td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace: “Civil War”</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>1946-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset</td>
<td>(0-2)</td>
<td>1946-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset</td>
<td>(0-1)</td>
<td>1989-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence between non-state actors</strong></td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace: “Civil Violence,” “Ethnic Violence” and “Ethnic War”</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>1946-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset</td>
<td>(0-1)</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence by non-state actors against individuals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregated domestic political violence</strong></td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace: “CIVTOT”</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>1946-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Periodicity of all datasets is annual.

Notes on Data Sources

- The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset
The CIRI dataset is the most comprehensive human rights dataset I have found, with key indicators disaggregated and a consistent method for coding across countries. Its greatest weakness is that like most human rights surveys it translates qualitative data into quantitative terms, risking precision. This also means that the data is no better than its sources, in this case the annual U.S. Department of State and Amnesty International human rights reports. Nevertheless, the Department of State reports are uniquely comprehensive (no other organization has the staff, resources and reach for a similar survey, even if it had the inclination), and cross-referencing its reports with the Amnesty International reports helps to identify and guard against bias. It should be noted that the aggregated “PHYSINT” score is a measure of the number of categories of human rights violations recorded, not the absolute number of violations.

- **University of Maryland/George Mason University Center for Systemic Peace**

  This is a comprehensive dataset, but has some problems. The types of intrastate conflict (e.g. “civil” as opposed to “ethnic” war) are somewhat arbitrary, although it is possible to render this moot when using the aggregated variable of intrastate conflict, CIVTOT. The gradations between conflict levels are also inevitably arbitrary to some extent. Most significantly for the present study, the dataset is limited to conflicts with 500+ deaths, which means that lower-level conflicts will be missing.

- **Uppsala University “Uppsala Conflict Data Program”/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIIO)**

  This dataset covers armed conflict exist where at least 25 people were killed, but it does not distinguish (except in broad, binary terms) the intensity of the conflict. One of the benefits
of this dataset, however, is that it codes conflict data by the actors (e.g., state or non-state), which is important for distinguishing between human rights and security variables (since a state attack on civilians could conceivably fall under both). Unlike many of the sources I reviewed, this dataset was refined specifically to meet the needs of academic research. It is unique among the datasets reviewed here in that it is organized by conflict rather than by year. The dyadic “intensity” variable for each conflict refers to the conflict from its start date through its end date. The ability to track conflicts from beginning to end adds an additional layer of useful information, but it means that this dataset does not capture fluctuating intensity across a conflict.

- **Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Index**

  Despite covering the most years, there are several challenges with the Freedom House data. The first is subjectivity: while the system has checks and balances, there is no absolute, objective basis for determining when a score should be lowered or raised by one, and this means that different researchers in different times theoretically could and quite possibly have produced different results based on similar inputs. In addition, the relevant ranking category groups multiple variables, including dependent and independent variables: “Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?” This, in turn, is aggregated with three other measurements to form a single broad indicator, “Rule of Law.” To make things even more complicated, the Rule of Law indicator is part of the broader category of “Civil Liberties.” The Rule of Law category is only disaggregated in the data on Freedom House’s website for four years: 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
The Fund for Peace “Failed States Index”

Although I do not include Failed State Index data in the regressions, I do use the index as a guide to make sure that the study avoids bias by including states from all stability categories (“Alert,” “Warning,” “Moderate,” “Sustainable”). The Failed States Index relies on a software search of open source documents. This would seem to create a problem for reports in languages that the software cannot read (the methodology page does not indicate whether searches are conducted in any language other than English). An even more basic problem is that the more repressive a system, the less likely it is that human rights violations will be openly reported. On the other hand, the dataset draws on a much wider range of data than others and this data should include the reports that are used by other datasets. The crucial question then is how these sources are weighted. In any case, the dataset cannot be used for anything other than comparative use in my study because it is a new index, and the current set of 177 countries is only covered for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. Like the Freedom House Data the relevant indicator is an aggregate of several factors, but the aggregated indicator is more directly relevant to my study.
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH MODEL

The independent variable, “human rights,” is the degree to which governments respect (do not engage in) state-sponsored extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, and wide-scale political imprisonment. (A zero score means that they are engaging “frequently” in all of these activities.) The dependent variable, “domestic conflict,” is the level of armed violence in the country. The research model is designed to test the strength, if any, and the relative size of the association between these two variables in the context of control variables. It includes a test of the association of the changes in all the variables over time.

The null hypothesis is that there is no significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the hypothesis can still be falsified if the relationship between human rights and domestic conflict is positive. If $H1$ is correct, we would expect to see an inverse relationship between human rights and domestic conflict.

Case Selection and Controls

The study looks at all states for which data is available in the years 1995 and 2000. It includes a regression for each year as well as for the changes between the years. A de facto control is population size, as the world’s smallest countries are not included in most of the available datasets.
Past studies have found that state weakness, including an inability by the government to retain its monopoly on violence, is associated with poverty and with a deficit of democracy.\(^{64}\) Therefore I will test the World Bank World Development Index (WDI) indicator of “GNI per capita, PPP (current US$)” as well as the Freedom House “Political Rights” score for significance as controls. I will also add the potential World Bank WDI indicators “GDP (current US$)” and “Population in urban agglomerations of more than 1 million (% of total population)” in response to a RAND study published in 2008 which found that insurgencies are less successful in middle-income countries, in urbanized countries, and in democracies than in poorer countries, countries with a preponderantly rural population, and anocracies.\(^{65}\)

Although democracy has been associated with domestic stability in general, there are exceptions; notably, states in transition are particularly prone to violence, including when transitioning to democracy from authoritarianism.\(^{66}\) However, to the extent that democracy is associated with the rule of law as well as elections, if this phenomenon is present it should already be captured at some level in the independent and dependent variables (i.e., human rights gains would lead at times to poorer security outcomes contra my thesis) and should not require an additional control variable.

The developmental level of state institutions, particularly policing and other rule of law mechanisms, is a factor in protecting human rights and may also be a factor in security


outcomes: a 2009 study found that rights are more likely to be protected in well-developed states with a mature policing capacity, where the government is capable of restraining predatory non-state actors and rogue officials.\textsuperscript{67} Therefore the regression was to have included the control variable “police officers per capita,” as reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Unfortunately, data was available for a small subset of (mostly Western) countries, which meant that it could not be included.

Also relevant are the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) “Government Effectiveness” (“the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation”) and “Rule of Law” (“the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the risk of crime”). However, data from this project is only available for the years 1996-2009.

Previous studies, such as the \textit{Index of State Weakness in the Developing World}, also make the present task easier by identifying variables which have not shown a strong positive relationship with state instability and can therefore be disregarded as potential controls, such as GDP growth and income inequality.\textsuperscript{68} In addition, while scholars such as Watson have speculated that culturally heterogeneous states require governments to use coercion to impose


stability,\textsuperscript{69} the evidence suggests that ethnic and religious diversity has no statistically significant relationship with the outbreak of civil wars.\textsuperscript{70} When there is ethnic conflict, it is most likely in the middle of the range between ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity, when one ethnic group is of sufficient size to permanently exclude other groups from power.\textsuperscript{71} It has been found that civil wars and insurgencies are also divided along ethnic lines where leaders try to create divisions for their own political gain.\textsuperscript{72} To address these issues I will create a control code for ethnic heterogeneity based on CIA World Factbook statistics.

The most recent decade for which there is the most data coverage for all variables is 1990-2000. I consider the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 because the urbanization data is only available for years ending in multiples of five.

Model Summary

1. Regression model

The model used is:

\[
\text{Domestic conflict} = \text{human rights protections} + \text{poverty} + \text{democracy} + \text{GDP} + \text{urbanization} + \text{ethnic heterogeneity} + \text{error term.}
\]

The variables are:


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. Page 480.

• **domestic conflict** = University of Maryland/George Mason University Center for Systemic Peace “CIVTOT” and Uppsala University “Uppsala Conflict Data Program”/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) “Armed Conflict Dataset”

• **human rights** = the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset “PHYSINT”

• **poverty** = World Bank World Development Index “GNI per capita, PPP (current US$)”

• **democracy** = Freedom House “Political Rights”

• **GDP** = World Bank WDI indicators “GDP (current US$)”

• **urbanization** = World Bank WDI “Population in urban agglomerations of more than 1 million (% of total population)”

• **ethnic heterogeneity** = Code based on CIA World Factbook data


2. Case selection

I include all cases in the universe of states for which adequate data is available, across the most recent decade for which relevant information has been captured: 1990-2000. This results in a final list of 118 countries for 1990 and 141 countries for 1995 and 2000. I compare the lists to the Fund for Peace 2010 Failed States Index to ensure that states representing all stability categories are included.
**CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF THE DATA**

The cross-sectional analyses demonstrate a significant correlation between human rights and security, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis. In addition, this correlation is negative for each regression, meaning that the test hypothesis is not falsified. However, the size of the relationship is extremely small. This means that the security impact of the human rights violations under consideration is very minor.

### Table 2. Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Human Rights (p value)</th>
<th>Poverty (p value)</th>
<th>Democracy (p value)</th>
<th>GDP (p value)</th>
<th>Urbanization (p value)</th>
<th>Ethnic Heterogeneity (p value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-0.52817 (9.06E-8)</td>
<td>6.88E-06 (1.661064)</td>
<td>0.117692212 (0.41151108)</td>
<td>1.64712E-13 (1.135986704)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-0.47165 (4.14E-14)</td>
<td>6.68E-06 (1.319534)</td>
<td>0.119989 (0.075684)</td>
<td>-2.3E-15 (1.973912)</td>
<td>-0.00098 (1.769432)</td>
<td>0.013515 (1.534958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-0.4008 (5.04E-11)</td>
<td>1.61E-05 (0.394158)</td>
<td>0.085805 (0.20838)</td>
<td>-4.8E-15 (1.930628)</td>
<td>-0.00041 (1.89929)</td>
<td>0.052393 (0.465308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-1995</td>
<td>-0.16528 (0.002778)</td>
<td>1.21E-05 (1.143768)</td>
<td>0.000258 (1.9937)</td>
<td>-3.1E-14 (1.483012)</td>
<td>-0.05729 (1.162008)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each case above, the p-values are two-sided (and thus relatively high) because the null hypothesis, that human rights have no relationship with security, refers to the possibility of both a positive relationship (per my hypothesis) and a negative relationship (contra my hypothesis).

The 1995 and 2000 figures are based on observations for 141 countries. For 1990, data was sufficient for only 118 countries.
The results of my observations follow:

- **Significance of the regression**: About one third of the dependent variable was explained by the independent variables. $R^2$ is 0.29415 for 1990, 0.399774 for 1995 and 0.336469394 for 2000. Interestingly, $R^2$ is lower for the period from 1995 to 2000: 0.076985.

- **Size of relationship of dependent and independent variables**: As indicated above, the size of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is quite small.

- **Confidence level of the relationship**: Although the size of the relationship between the IV and DV is small, the p-values provide a significance level of far less than 0.05 (for example, for 1995 for the IV, the two-sided p-value is 0.0000000000000413761525436464). Assuming normal distribution, this allows us to reject the null hypothesis, which states that human rights have no relationship with security.

- **Direction of the relationship**: As anticipated by the hypothesis, the direction of the relationship between human rights protections and conflict levels in each regression is consistently negative; in other words, there appears to be a (very small) inverse relationship between higher violence and human rights protections.

These results seem to indicate that this is an issue deserving of further study, but they are also far from complete. One immediate problem is that information on many indicators was lacking for countries experiencing high levels of conflict. In other words, the countries of most interest to students of security are the ones least likely to be included. Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Lebanon, Liberia, Serbia, and Somalia all had to be excluded for lack of human rights data. As discussed above, countries with high levels of human rights violations also tend to have less data available for their indicators. Thus, unfortunately, North Korea could not be usefully included in the study because data was lacking for almost all indicators.

Another problem highlighted by the study is the lack of granularity in the conflict data. Most countries have conflict scores of zero for each year. This means that there is very little variation of the DV between cases, which may help to explain why all of the coefficients for the control variables are relatively low. (Compared to the control variables, the IV on average has the lowest coefficients but also the lowest p-values; like the IV, none of the control variables had the coefficient size that I had expected.) This may indeed be because most countries don’t experience conflict in most years, but the data review also demonstrates that there is insufficient data on low-level conflicts across all countries and in variations in the levels of conflict, both of which would permit a more nuanced analysis.

Based on the results, \( H1 \) appears worthy of further research.
CHAPTER VI: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS

The results of this study confirm that the relationship between human rights and security is worthy of further attention. The study also indicates that in many ways the data is not sufficient to the task.

The small size of the IV coefficient reveals that human rights protections are much less important to security than other factors. At the same time, the small size and the direction of the relationship between human rights and security suggest that human rights violations are not effective in creating stability. At the very least, they do not seem to be worth the reputation and rule of law costs.

If repression by governments can no longer be justified on the security grounds, the benefits are clearly outweighed by the risks. As far back as 1968, a report to incoming president Richard Nixon by a committee of security experts called the Covert Operations Study Group warned that the exposure of the CIA’s clandestine operations in other countries “costs the United States in terms of world opinion,” both because it revealed the agency’s mistakes and because “exposure demonstrates the disregard of the United States for national rights and human rights…”  

For U.S. policymakers, who are not confronting an insurgency at home, the lack of evidence of a link between harsh techniques and improved security should call into question American support for foreign regimes which rely on repression. It should certainly cause decision-makers to question the direct facilitation of human rights violations by American partners through practices such as extraordinary rendition. Leahy Amendments, which limit

support for certain foreign countries or foreign elements for their failure to comply with human rights standards, are one example of a move in this direction.\textsuperscript{74}

Data Needs

As noted in the previous chapter, any conclusions we might draw from the study must be tempered by gaps in the data. In general, some gaps are inevitable: violent conflict and government repression both make it difficult to obtain information. Nevertheless, there are ways to make the data more relevant to policy discussions. One of the most critical needs is for more detailed data on conflicts, to include lower-level conflicts and to indicate gradations of conflict with more refinement. Datasets which were created to research major wars could be expanded to increase their relevance to the types of wars the United States is engaged in currently.

In addition to metrics on violence itself, there is also a need for more data on factors related to violence. For example, civilian policing capacity has been demonstrated to be a critical part of post-conflict population security,\textsuperscript{75} but data on police officers per capita is hard to come by for most countries. Hopefully as more attention is given to these issues, resources will follow.

Meanwhile, the data which already does exist calls into question security-based justifications for human rights violations. Both the size and the direction of the relationship between human rights and security indicate that extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances,\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74} I am appreciative to my thesis advisor, Dr. C. Christine Fair, for pointing me in this direction.

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, Dobbins et al, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, and Orr et al.
and wide-scale political imprisonment are not associated with stability. Hopefully future studies will examine this relationship further.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES USED

The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset

Source: http://ciri.binghamton.edu/

Key:

[PHYSINT] Physical Integrity Rights Index
This is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). Details on its construction and use can be found in: David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." International Studies Quarterly, Vol 43.2: 407-18.

[DISAP] Disappearance
Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge. However, while there is typically no way of knowing where victims are, it is typically known by whom they were taken and under what circumstances. A score of 0 indicates that disappearances have occurred frequently in a given year; a score of 1 indicates that disappearances occasionally occurred; and a score of 2 indicates that disappearances did not occur in a given year.

[KILL] Extrajudicial Killing
Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups if instigated by government. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. A score of 0 indicates that extrajudicial killings were practiced frequently in a given year; a score of 1 indicates that extrajudicial killings were practiced occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that such killings did not occur in a given year.

[POLPRIS] Political Imprisonment
Political imprisonment refers to the incarceration of people by government officials because of: their speech; their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, including an ethnic or racial group. A score of 0 indicates that there were many people imprisoned because of their religious, political, or other beliefs in a given year; a score of 1 indicates that a few people were imprisoned; and a score of 2 indicates that no persons were imprisoned for any of the above reasons in a given year.

[TORT] Torture
Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture
includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials. A score of 0 indicates that torture was practiced frequently in a given year; a score of 1 indicates that torture was practiced occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that torture did not occur in a given year.

Methodology Information:

“The primary source of information about human rights practices is obtained from a careful reading of the annual United States Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Coders are instructed to use this source for all variables. For a group of four rights known as "Physical Integrity Rights" (the rights to freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment) coders also use a second source, Amnesty International’s Annual Report. Both reports can be found online for recent years. If there are discrepancies between the two sources, coders are instructed to treat the Amnesty International evaluation as authoritative. Some scholars believe that this step is necessary to remove a potential bias in favor of US allies, although Poe, et al, (2001) have found evidence of great agreement between these reports.”

University of Maryland/George Mason University Center for Systemic Peace (CSP)

Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/

Key:

Major episodes of political violence are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude and assigned to one of seven categories of armed conflict: international violence (IV), international war (IW), international independence war (IN), civil violence (CV), civil war (CW), ethnic violence (EV), and ethnic war (EW). Each episode is designated to span a certain number of years (“inclusive years”) and judged to have been of a certain, general “magnitude of societal-systemic impact” (an eleven-point scale, 0-10; magnitude scores are considered consistent and comparable across categories and cases, that is, approximating a ratio scale). The episode’s “magnitude of impact” score is entered for each year of the designated time span and for each country considered to have been directly affected by the warfare experience. Countries that engage in military intervention in an episode taking place solely in another country are generally not considered to be “directly affected” by the violence. When more than one episode of a particular MEPV category occurs in a single country in a single year, the episode scores are summed and the sum is entered for that category variable in the data set.

- CIVVIOL (2-numeric) Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil violence involving that state in that year; Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes
- CIVWAR (2-numeric) Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving that state in that year; Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes
• ETHVIOL (2-numeric) Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic violence involving that state in that year; Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes

• ETHWAR (2-numeric) Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic warfare involving that state in that year; Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes

• CIVTOT (2-numeric) Total summed magnitudes of all societal MEPV; = CIVVIOL + CIVWAR + ETHVIOL + ETHWAR

• Category 10 -- Extermination and Annihilation
• Category 09 -- Total Warfare
• Category 08 -- Technological Warfare
• Category 07 -- Pervasive Warfare
• Category 06 -- Extensive Warfare
• Category 05 -- Substantial and Prolonged Warfare
• Category 04 -- Serious Warfare
• Category 03 -- Serious Political Violence
• Category 02 -- Limited Political Violence
• Category 01 -- Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence

Methodology Information:

“Variables in this sections were taken from the list of Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2006, found on the CSP Web site at <www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>. That comprehensive list of all types of major armed conflict episodes is a regularly updated version of Appendix C in Monty G. Marshall, Third World War, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) and further detailed in Monty G. Marshall, “Measuring the Societal Impact of War,” in F. O. Hampson and D. M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Prevention (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).”

Uppsala University “Uppsala Conflict Data Program”/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO)

Source: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/

Key:

UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Location: Country name(s) (The name(s) of the country/countries whose government(s) have a primary claim to the issue in dispute.)
Terr: Name of territory (The name of the territory over which the conflict is fought, provided that the incompatibility is territory.)
**Year**: Year of observation

**Int**: Intensity level (The intensity level in the dyad per calendar year. Two different intensity levels are coded: minor armed conflicts and wars. See Section 3.10 for definitions of the two categories.

**CumInt**: Cumulative Intensity (The intensity of the conflict, taking into consideration the conflict history.)

**Type**: Conflict type (Four different types of conflict: extrasystemic, interstate, internal and internationalized internal. See Section 3.12 for definitions of the four types.)

**Startdate**: Date of conflict initiation (The date, as precise as possible, of the first battle-related death in the conflict.)

**Startprec**: Precision of startdate (The level of precision for the initial start date.)

**Startdate2**: Date of fatality threshold in current episode (The date, as precise as possible, when a given episode of conflict activity reached 25 battle-related deaths in a year.)

**Startprec2**: Precision of startdate2 (The level of precision for startdate2)

**EpEnd**: Episode Ended (Codes whether this is the last year of conflict activity in this episode)

**EpEndDate**: Date when conflict activity ended

**Methodology Information:**

“The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) collects information on a large number of aspects of armed violence since 1946. Since the 1970s, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts. This effort continues to the present day, now coupled with the collection of information on an ever broadening scope of aspects pertaining to organised violence, such as the resolution and dynamics of conflict. The UCDP data is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. Data on armed conflicts have been published yearly in the report series States in Armed Conflict since 1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, the Journal of Peace Research since 1993 and in the Human Security Reports since 2005. In addition UCDP researchers conduct theoretically and empirically based analyses of armed conflict: its causes, escalation, spread, prevention and resolution. These studies are regularly featured in international journals and books.

“Since 2004, the UCDP also operates and continuously updates its online database on armed conflicts and organised violence, in which several aspects of armed conflict such as conflict dynamics and conflict resolution are available.”

**Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Index**

For the Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings, “The total number of points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom, corresponds to a range of total points…” I reversed these rankings so that a higher score corresponded with greater levels of political rights.

Source: http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
Methodology Information:

“Scores and ratings for each country and territory are proposed by an analyst (who also writes the narratives that accompany the ratings). These analysts are country or regional experts from the academic, media, think-tank, and human rights communities. Approximately one-third of these analysts are Freedom House staff members, while another two-thirds are outside consultants.

“The proposed scores and ratings are vetted thoroughly—both individually and on a comparative basis—in a series of six regional meetings: Asia-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. The relevant analysts, two to three senior-level academic academic advisors with regional expertise, and the Freedom in the World editorial team attend each daylong meeting.”

“Ethnic Diversity”

This variable is based on data from the CIA World Factbook. I coded one point for each ethnic or tribal group (including “Other”) comprising at least three percent of the population, up to “10.” While this may seem a low threshold, it is not unusual for ethnic groups comprising that proportion of the population to be in conflict with the central government; for example, Pakistan has a Balochi population of 3.57 percent. I have used 2010 figures for each year with the assumption that ethnic composition does not normally change on a year-to-year basis.

Unfortunately, while they are often used as a standard, the World Factbook statistics are questionable; for example, they identify 99.6% of Egypt’s population as “Egyptian,” without distinguishing between Arab and Coptic. Another challenge is that Africans are sometimes labeled “African” and sometimes broken into tribes, with varying degree of detail. The listing suggests that ethnicity is largely arbitrary and locally defined; for example, in the United States, most people fall into three categories, “white,” “black,” and “Asian,” but these categories each include ethnicities which are disaggregated for other countries.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


