EFFECTIVE MILITARY ADVISING OPERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE KOREAN AND AFGHANI ADVISORY EFFORTS

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By

Steven M. Forsyth, B.S.

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ABSTRACT

The use of a blended composition of resources to develop the internal security forces in both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts displays a significant divergence of officially declared doctrine by which the U.S. Army Special Forces maintain purview over training and advising of foreign forces. The relevant question that is drawn from this divergence is whether the U.S. military currently has adequate force structure to train and organize the internal security forces of a host nation. This study attempts to answer that question through a comparative analysis of the current military advising operation in Afghanistan with the U.S. development of the South Korean Army from 1946-1950. The primary hypothesis driving this research is that the length of time that is required for the internal security forces of a host-nation to become fully effective is directly determined by certain factors involved in the military advising operation. These factors include types of units employed, overall experience level of the advisor team, training received by the average advisor, and structure of the military advising organization. The results display a much more rapid development with the Korean advisory effort than with the Afghanistan advisory effort, even though the Afghanistan campaign held a substantial advantage over the Korean effort in every area except structure. The conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that the structure of a military advising operation has a far greater impact than any other factor in reducing the time required to build internal security forces, and that lack unity of command and unity of effort within the Afghanistan advisory effort is at the center of the continuing struggle to build effective internal security forces in that country.
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Introduction

Over the past 50 years the world has witnessed an increasing trend towards low-intensity conflict and the use of unconventional tactics to counter the military forces of great powers.\(^1\) Since the end of World War II, the ability to successfully conduct counterinsurgency operations has become readily apparent to nation-states in hard-fought conflicts like Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan. It is widely acknowledged by authorities on counterinsurgency such as Galula and Manwaring, that developing professional security forces within the host nation is critical to the long-term successful outcome of a counterinsurgent campaign.\(^2\) The U.S. Army also officially recognized this as key requirement when it published its current field manual on counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.\(^3\) Accordingly, one would expect the U.S. military to devote significant resources to developing a robust capability to train and organize professional security forces within foreign countries.

In terms of doctrine, the U.S. Army Special Forces is designated by the U.S. military to hold the responsibility of developing the internal security forces of allied nations, or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as it is also called.\(^4\) However, in both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts we have witnessed the U.S. military become increasingly reliant on personnel pulled from conventional military forces for temporary assignments on military advisor teams. As conventional military units deployed into the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters they were required to provide numerous officers and non-


commissioned officers (NCOs) to form ad-hoc Military-Training-Teams (MTT), Special-Police-Training-Teams, and Border Police Training Teams (BTT). These teams were then tasked to train, organize, and advise Iraqi and Afghani units to provide internal security. In addition, the U.S. military continues to hire specialized trainers contracted from the private sector in order to supplement its military advising capability. Private contracting firms such as MPRI, Blackwater, and DynCorp are still responsible for a significant portion of the U.S. military’s effort to develop Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

Concurrently, U.S. Army Special Forces have become less involved with military advising requirements and increasingly been directed to conduct direct action operations such as intelligence collection, raids against high-value-targets, and long range special reconnaissance missions. If the U.S. Special Forces is the military’s primary organization responsible for training and organizing internal security forces and if this training is such a critical element in successfully conducting a counterinsurgency, then why has the bulk of the responsibility for establishing the Iraqi and Afghan Army been transferred to conventional forces and private security firms? Some experts believe that the U.S. Special Forces simply do not have the numbers to be able to adequately complete such a manpower intensive task as building a fully functioning internal security force. Others have argued that the U.S. Army Special Forces were created to act as liaisons for local indigenous forces and were only meant to instruct small guerrilla forces,

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5 Ibid, 2.
8 Petraeus, 203.
not build professional military organizations.\textsuperscript{9} Regardless of the reason, the use of a blended composition of resources to develop the internal security forces in both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts displays a significant discrepancy between officially declared doctrine, and the ability to execute that doctrine.

The relevant question that is drawn from the U.S. military’s divergence in both Iraq and Afghanistan from its previously declared doctrine regarding military advising operations, is whether the U.S. military currently has adequate force structure to train and organize the internal security forces of a host nation. Put more simply, what are the factors within military advising and assistance operations that most directly affect the length of time required to effectively develop the internal security forces of a host-nation? Further, if the U.S. military currently does not maintain the most effective force structure, what would such a force look like? Moreover, is it cost-effective or even feasible to field and maintain such a force? This study seeks to answer those questions through a comparative analysis of the current military advising operation in Afghanistan with a classic historical example of a military advising operation that was highly successful; the U.S. development of the South Korean Army from 1946-1950.

The primary hypothesis driving this research is that the length of time that is required for the internal security forces of a host-nation to become fully effective is directly determined by certain factors involved in the military advising operation of the occupying nation. These factors include types of units employed, overall experience level of the advisor team, training received by the average advisor, and structure of the military advising organization. By conducting a side-by-side comparison of the military

\textsuperscript{9} Henry A. Crumpton, “\textit{Intelligence and War}” in Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. \textit{Transforming US Intelligence} (Washington D.C.: Georgetown, 2005) 162-179
advising operations in Korea from 1946-1950 and Afghanistan from 2002 to the present, it is the aim of this study to isolate and identify the primary factor, or factors, in these military advising operations that most contributed to the length of time that was required for the internal security forces of the host-nation to reach independence. More simply stated, which military advising model is best able to establish, organize, and train host-nation forces to effectively maintain internal security in the shortest amount of time? The significance of this evaluation is of course to determine the factor within military advising operations that most directly influences the developmental timeline of host-nation security forces so that successful operations can be replicated in future efforts.
I. Conceptual Framework

Before a proper analysis of the two relevant case studies can be conducted it is first necessary to establish a conceptual framework for this study in order to narrow the scope regarding the type of military advising operations this study concerns and supply a common understanding of the terms used throughout the discussion. For example, one must define what is meant by internal security before we can discuss what is required to train and organize a host-nation force to effectively maintain its own internal security. We begin this section with a brief review of the different types of military advising operations conducted by nation-states, to include the nature and underlying conditions of the conflicts in which these types of military advising operations are executed, and then narrow our focus to supply a general description of the type of military advising operation depicted in our two case studies. Following this, we define internal security and outline the standards and milestones required for a host-nation force to achieve effective internal security.

After framing the type of conflict and defining necessary terms, a brief description of the primary elements within military advising operations that will drive the analysis of the case studies will be provided. These primary elements include type or specialization, experience level, training, and structure/organization. At the completion of this section, the reader should be familiar with the general concepts and terms necessary to fully understand the analysis of the factors affecting influencing both historical case studies as well as the primary hypothesis driving this research.
Subject Matter Expertise and Technical Support for Established Government Forces

The vast majority of advising operations that the U.S. military currently conducts are in the form of subject matter expertise and technical support provided to existing, well-developed military and national police forces. The common manifestations of this type of support are the deployment of special operations teams to generally stable countries with friendly governments which have national interests that are in-line with the United States such as, countering narcotics trafficking or maintaining open trade routes. In these situations the government forces that are attempting to counter an insurgent, terrorist, or criminal organization that is strong enough to represent a threat to the security of the host-nation but is not yet developed enough to directly challenge the government forces for control of the nation-state. Some examples of this type of military advising support include U.S. Special Operations support to Columbia for counter-narcotics, and support to both Yemen and Pakistan in their counterterrorism operations.

Although this specialized advice and technical support usually comes from within the special operations and intelligence community, it can come in many different forms such as the exchange of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) during joint exercises that occur on a regular basis between U.S. and middle-eastern nations like Jordan and Saudi Arabia; communications experts assisting in the setting up advanced radar or air defense systems which occurs when the U.S. provides Patriot missile systems to allied nations such as Israel; or visiting liaison officers that provide training in traditional

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12 Ibid.
planning and operations management for conventional mechanized forces to eastern European states, that are attempting to modernize their forces like Romania and Poland.

Providing subject matter expertise and technical support to friendly nations is an important aspect of military advising operations, but this category is generally excluded for the purposes of this discussion. The reason for this exclusion is centered on the environment under which these types of military advising operations take place. All of these military advising operations are directed at existing government forces within a nation that maintains legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population and the international community. Although some arguments can be made about the legitimacy of nations who do not exercise complete control over certain regions within their borders, such as Pakistan in regards to its northwestern region, the government institutions and security forces in these nations are well-established and are able to maintain its national integrity and a level of civil order. For the purposes of this discussion we are only concerned with situations in which no established government institutions or security forces exist, or are in such disarray that they cannot maintain its national borders or enforce civil order.

*Fundamental Guidance and All Purpose Support for Guerilla and Resistance Forces*

A second category of military advising operations is providing fundamental guidance to guerilla forces and national resistance forces inside a hostile nation-state. In this category the military advisory effort focuses only on training tactics, techniques, and procedures that will enhance a rebel force’s capabilities to attack and defeat government forces, such as the ability to effectively execute ambushes on enemy patrols, or emplace explosives for sabotage. The military advisors may also act as liaisons to coordinate
operations between the local forces and an external military force that may be at war with the host-nation force. This type of military advising operation is prevalent in covert paramilitary operations normally conducting by national intelligence organizations in coordination with military special operations assets. Good examples of this type of military advising operation include U.S. efforts against the Soviet Union over contested regions during the cold-war like South America and Africa, Allied efforts against the Nazi’s in Europe during World War II, and U.S. special operations activities against the Taliban in the early stages of the Afghanistan conflict.\textsuperscript{13}

Although this is another important aspect of military advising, we are excluding this category for the purposes of this discussion. The military advising elements in this category are primarily concerned with providing the essential training and logistic support including weapons, ammunition, and explosives necessary to harass and assist in the defeat of the national military forces of the host-nation state, not build the effectiveness of the resistance fighters to eventually maintain internal security. There is no emphasis on training and organizing the guerilla or resistance fighters to maintain population control, enforce civil order, or confront other internal threats, all of which are essential to the evaluation of an organization’s ability to train forces to conduct counterinsurgency and maintain internal security.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Primary Training and General Support for Developing National Forces}

The type of military advising operations that are of direct concern in this discussion deals with the training and organization of security forces within a newly formed nation-state. Unlike the previous two types of military advising operations, this

\textsuperscript{13} Crumpton, 162-179.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
category requires an external military force to recruit, train, organize, and then advise indigenous security forces. In this category there is a minimal or non-existent level of existing government forces and the external security force is required to build organizations and units from the ground level. This type of military advising operation entails a much more robust effort because it must provide support to all levels of the national security structure.\(^{15}\) Not only must these military advising operations provide fundamental military training for raw recruits and guidance to units during combat operations, it must incorporate the selection and grooming of competent leaders, as well as establish the essential organizations and institutions that will sustain the force.\(^{16}\) The host-nation security force must be trained to a level where it is able to enforce basic civil order, as well as being capable of directly confronting and defeating any insurgent force that is challenging the legitimacy of the government institutions.\(^{17}\)

Historically, this type of military advising operations has occurred in situations where new nation-states were formed by international treaty or force-of-arms, including seceding from a federation or the invasion, occupation, and removal of threatening regimes. Excellent examples of this category include U.S. efforts in Vietnam, the British campaign in Malaya, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Allied occupation of post World War II Germany and Japan, and the U.S. effort in Iraq. However, as previously stated, this study will only be concerned with a comparison of the U.S. development of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) national army and the current efforts of U.S. and NATO led forces in Afghanistan.

\(^{15}\) Petraeus, 200.
\(^{16}\) Ibid, 201.
\(^{17}\) Ibid. 199.
Defining Internal Security within a Host-Nation

There are multiple factors that influence the internal security of a nation-state, each of which must be considered when organizing a security force capable of maintaining internal security. There must be adequate law-enforcement capabilities in order to keep the public safe from criminal activities, and also maintain civil order and the rule-of-law.\textsuperscript{18} Border protection must be effective in preventing hostile forces from moving freely across national boundaries, as well as preventing heavy trafficking in destructive materials like weapons and narcotics.\textsuperscript{19} However, we are not concerned in examining the aspects of a nation-state’s ability to protect its borders from invasion by another external nation-state. For the purposes of this discussion we are assuming that the occupying external military force that is responsible for training the internal security forces of the host-nation would guarantee its external security from other threatening neighbors.

Most importantly, the national security forces must be able to confront and defeat any organized resistance that could call into question the government’s legitimate right to rule over its sovereign territory. Legitimacy in the eyes of the national population is the single most critical factor in successfully conducting a counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{20} Without the perception of legitimacy the government will not be able to effectively rule over its territory and it will eventual collapse without external support.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, if the government forces cannot directly confront and soundly defeat threats to control its own territory

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 208, 213.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. 199
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
from insurgent organizations and other terrorist groups, then it will not be able to maintain the internal security of the nation-state.\(^{22}\)

Standards and Milestones for Developing Host-Nation Security Forces

The development of host-nation security forces is often a complex and volatile process that is difficult to template. However, for the purposes of this discussion we are outlining common milestones during the development of host-nation security forces that are evident in most military advising operations. This will provide a common timeline by which we can compare our two case studies, with the end state of this timeline naturally being the point at which the military advising operation has successfully established effective internal security forces within the host-nation. The descriptions of the various levels of internal security to be used for this discussion are as follows:

- Level 0 – This level of internal security is defined as the initial conditions of the occupation of the host-nation by the external security force. At this level, for all intents and purposes the host-nation is not capable of maintaining its own internal security and the external occupying force has the internationally recognized responsibility of policing the population and maintaining civil order. This level is where external security force assumes control of the region in question, and serves as the starting point in our assessment of the timeframe required to develop an effective internal security force.

- Level 1 – This level of internal security will be defined as the point where the host-nation forces have effectively been established and organized but remain only as a supplementary element and are largely regarded as incapable of operating without the

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
direct support of the external security force. The host-nation forces are not able to
directly engage and defeat insurgent elements and have no supporting infrastructure.

- Level 2 – At this level of effectiveness the host-nation security forces are now
capable of policing and maintaining civil order within the nation-state, but still do not
maintain the supporting infrastructure necessary to sustain their operations. Although
the host-nations forces are able to conduct effective combat operations at this level,
the vast majority of the functions required to support effective security units like
logistic re-supply, equipment maintenance and repair,
intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance operations (ISR), and command and control
are still provided by the external security force.

- Level 3 - This level is defined with the general independence of the host-nation
security forces from the external occupying force. Although the external force may
still provide some level of expertise, advice, and advanced combat support (such as
close air support and logistic resources) the capabilities imperative to conduct and
sustain internal security operations are organic to the host nation including command
and control systems and logistic re-supply.

Framework for Analysis and Comparison: Common Factors within Advising Operations

In order to determine the factor or factors of military advising operations that
most directly affect the timeframe in which the internal security force of a host-nation
achieves independence it is necessary to analyze both case studies with a common
framework. This common framework will provide a basis for an objective comparison
of the case studies and will allow a clear view of the factor or factors that contributed the
most towards an effective military advising operation. It is the objective of this analysis
to illustrate a direct correlation between certain elements of military advising operations and the timeframe required to develop effective internal security forces within a host-nation. The analysis of the two advising operations will be broken down, and then compared and evaluated in four primary categories: type of unit employed, experience level and composition of the primary advising element, training received, and structure of the command and control system. A general description of each category is as follows:

- Category I: Type. The initial analysis of each military advising effort will focus on the general type of unit or force employed during the development of the host-nation security force. The three common types of forces used for this study include conventional military units, special operations units, or private contracted units. We will be regarding conventional forces as military units that would normally conduct conventional order of battle operations using standard formations in a high-intensity conflict and received no further specialized training. Common examples of conventional military units include infantry, armor, field artillery, transportation, intelligence, and other combat/combat support roles. Special operations units will be regarded as units that normally conduct operations outside the scope of conventional order of battle using non-standard formations and requiring training in irregular warfare. Common examples of special operations units include U.S. Army Special Forces, British SAS, Russian Spetznaz. Privately contracted units will be regarded as any security element that is directed to conduct military training or instruction to the host-nation force for a negotiated fee paid by either the external military force or the host-nation.
• Category II: Experience. Analysis of the experience level of the military advising operation will focus on the number of years within the military or rank that the average military advisor team maintains. This experience will be analyzed in aggregate relative to the advisor team size and composition in comparison with the task it is assigned to perform. For example, a team of five Captains advising one battalion could easily be argued to have more experience than a team of two majors advising the same level of command. General levels will be regarded as follows: high (ten or more years of experience), intermediate (three to ten years of experience), and low (less than three years of experience). Military advisors with a high-level of experience will generally be equivalent to field-grade officers, warrant officers, or senior-enlisted non-commissioned officers (NCO). Intermediate level military advisors will generally refer to senior company-grade officers such as Army Captains and experienced Staff Sergeants. The low experience level will generally be regarded as personnel with little to no-experience within the military such as junior lieutenants, and lower-ranking enlisted personnel.

• Category III: Training. Analysis of the military advising operation in this section will focus on the training that was received by the average military advisor prior to his employment by the external force in instructing the host-nation internal security forces. Not only the length or amount of training received but also the primary focus of that training will be analyzed and compared. Training areas of concern include cultural, occupational, and instructional. A military advisor with a primary focus of cultural training will have received instruction on the language, culture, and customs of the local host-nation population. Advisors with occupational training will have
received instruction on the certain occupational area that they will be required to
teach the host-nation forces, such as logistics, communication, intelligence, or general
security operations. Instructional focused advisors will have gone through unique
training in order to prepare for the requirements of having to teach others.

- Category IV: Structure. The analysis of the structure of military advising operations
  regards both the organization and training program used to organize, instruct, and
  advise the internal security forces of the host-nation. The structure of a military
  advisory effort can be seen as linear, non-linear, and hybrid. A linear operation can
  be described as a more formal composition for advisor teams and a systematic
  training program that is standardized throughout the theater of operations. A non-
  linear operation usually consists of independent irregular teams of advisor following a
  non-standard training regimen with flexibility given to local commanders to make
  changes as necessary. A hybrid operation generally allows both team composition
  and training programs to be tailored by local commanders with a certain set of
  requirements that are standardized across the entire theater.
II. Comparative Case Study Analysis

Establishing Congruence between Korea and Afghanistan

Prior to conducting an in-depth comparative analysis of the military advising operation in Korea from 1946-1950 and Afghanistan from 2002 to the present, it is important to first provide a brief background on both operations and establish a basic congruence between the two case-studies. This is necessary so there is not only a general context for the discussion, but any arguments made regarding the suitability of the two case-studies for comparison can be properly addressed. General concerns that will be spoken to regarding the compatibility of these two particular case studies involve general social/geographic factors, fundamental cultural differences, scale of effort/resources and the presence of an insurgency.

In 2002 after the fall of the Taliban the United States led a NATO coalition in Afghanistan with a mandate to establish a provisional authority and rebuild the governing institutions of the country. Afghanistan had been ravaged from decades of conflict and had little semblance of a functioning government. Authority in Afghanistan was based on the tribal militias of local warlords who ruled according to Afghan custom. Within this turmoil the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was tasked with the long-term goal of re-establishing the internal security forces of the nation. Similarly, in 1946 with the end of World War II (WWII) the United States occupied the Korean peninsula south of 38th parallel and established a provisional military government in accordance

25 Ibid.
with a U.N. mandate. Like Afghanistan, Korea had been devastated from several years of invasion and occupation by foreign powers including Russia, China and Japan. There was no central authority left in Korea and the United States was given the monumental task of reestablishing the nation’s armed forces in order to provide internal security for a future freely-elected government.27

In comparing the principle geographic factors involved in both case-studies a surprising similarity is seen. Afghanistan boasts a very formidable environment with extreme temperatures and rough mountainous terrain making even basic military operations difficult. Its population of 30 million is a rural agriculturally based society with more than 60 percent of it illiterate.28 It also lacks effective communications, banking, and transportation systems.29 There is no nationwide radio broadcast system and the road system is severely degraded.30 Although such geographic factors do indeed make developing national forces difficult, these conditions are no different than conditions that were present in South Korea from 1946 to 1950. In 1946 Korea was a small country numbering only 30 million people with little infrastructure, inadequate roads, and a poor rail system.31 It is a mountainous peninsula with a rugged rural landscape and that did not allow for efficient mechanized warfare.32 Further, climate extremes in Korea make military operations in general extremely difficult, summers are

29 Ibid.
30 Jennings, 26.
32 Ibid.
hot and humid and winters are cold and harsh. Of the 21 million people in the south, 70% were engaged in agriculture and the vast majority of Koreans recruited for the military were illiterate. Thus, there is no reasonable argument that Korea and Afghanistan are incomparable on the basis of divergent geographic factors.

Another potential argument for the incapability between the Korean and Afghanistan case studies is centered on a fundamental cultural difference. Some would claim that the Afghan tribal culture is so completely different from the United States in terms of language and beliefs that it serves as underlying obstacle for military advising operations. Although cultural differences are an important aspect in analyzing the effectiveness of military advising operations, the American and Korean cultures were entirely alien in almost every respect; values, beliefs, social practices, religion, and history. The language barrier was also a major obstacle for the advisory mission. By 1953 only one KMAG advisor could speak Korean with any degree of fluency and the shortage of translators made even rudimentary communication difficult which commonly created confusion and misunderstandings. Therefore, it is clear that to dismiss a comparison of the military advisory efforts in Korea with Afghanistan on the grounds of cultural divergence seems illogical.

Opponents of a comparison between the Korean and Afghanistan advisory models contest that the scale of effort placed into building the Korean military was far greater than Afghanistan. They cite that the advising mission in Afghanistan has never been

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. 5.
36 Ibid. 14.
37 Ibid. 15.
staffed at more than 71% and that there were far more numbers of U.S. forces placed into
the Korean peninsula.\(^{38}\) Although the United States did maintain a much larger force in
Korea once the conventional conflict with north began, from 1946-1950, it maintained
numbers in Korea on the order of 20-30,000 combat forces which are very close to those
currently seen in Afghanistan.\(^{39}\) Due to the rapid increase of Korean military KMAG
was never able to achieve the comprehensive advisory mission for every Korean division,
regiment, and battalion, as well as Ministry of Defense’s primary staff.\(^{40}\) Additionally,
the total number of advisors employed for the U.S. advisory was never greater than 500,
whereas there are approximately 5,000 troops currently involved in training and advising
Afghan Security Forces.\(^{41}\)

The most vehement dispute critics have with a comparative analysis between the
Korean and Afghanistan advisory efforts is in regards to the presence of a strong
insurgency. They contend that the presence of Afghanistan’s insurgent elements
consisting of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other associated groups with strong support
bases in Pakistan, introduces an element of instability into the equation that significantly
complicates the development of a strong internal security force. Critics argue that the
training effort is severely hampered because the Afghan military is attempting to build up
its forces while fighting a conflict at the same time. However, to suggest that the Korean
advisory effort did not have the same difficulties due to the lack of presence of a strong
insurgency would be completely inaccurate. As early as 1947 North Korean communists

\(^{38}\) Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, 15.
\(^{39}\) Afghanistan Fact Sheet: The Numbers Behind the Troop Increase (Salem-news.com, 1 December 2009).
\(^{40}\) History of Joint US Military Assistance Group – Korea, 6.
employed propaganda and guerilla operations to instigate an armed overthrow of the South Korean government. The guerillas conducted staged executions, sabotage, and orchestrated full scale uprisings against the elected government. Armed clashes between the south and the north were also common along the 38th parallel prior to the invasion. Hundreds of small-scale assaults occurred including an armed uprising on Cheju-do island that spread to the mainland in 1948. However, in each case the Korean forces were able to deal with the situation while continuing to develop there capabilities.

Effectiveness of Advisory Efforts (Resulting Timeline Comparison)

In this section the effectiveness of both military advising operations is illustrated through a comprehensive analysis of the timeline to attain the previously defined levels of independence. Starting from the year each country was occupied by an external military force through the time period when all security responsibilities are turned over to the host nation, attainment of each level is demonstrated through significant national events and milestones achieved by the host-nation forces. These events include foreign and indigenous troop levels, establishment of advisor commands/units or indigenous military commands/units, and operational readiness ratings or major engagements that signify the host-nation forces capability. By conducting a simple side-by-side comparison of the developmental timeline of the internal security forces for Korea from 1946 to 1950 and Afghanistan from 2002 to present, it is the objective of this study to

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42 Webb, 8.
44 Webb, 3.
46 Ibid.
depict a clear distinction between the two different advisory efforts in terms of length of
time required for the host-nation forces to achieve independence.

Korea (1946 – 1950)

The date this study sets for level zero for the U.S. military advising effort in Korea was the fall of 1945 directly after the capitulation of Japan and the establishment of the U.S. military government in Korea. At this point no indigenous Korean forces existed and the United States was the declared legal authority over the southern half of the peninsula. Almost immediately following this, the internal security forces of Korea were at the level one rating due to the formation of multiple constabulary units. The Korean National Constabulary was established on 14 January 1946 by COL Arthur Champeny under the provisional government’s Department of Internal Security. Authorized only 90 personnel the Dept. of Internal Security served as the forerunner to the Korean Military Advisory Command (KMAG). Initially, the constabulary held an authorization of 25,000 men configured into eight light infantry regiments and by November 1946 Korean Constabulary posts were established at Ch’ongju, Ch’unch’on, Iri, Kwangju, Pusan, Seoul, Taegu, and Taejon. Although the constabulary only numbered about 3000 men in April, by the end of 1947 it had grown to roughly 20,000 men with brigade sized units formed and beginning to assume security over the southern half of the peninsula.

48 Bryan Gibby, American Advisors to the Republic of Korea: America’s First Commitment in the Cold War (Routledge: Oxford Press 2008)
49 Ibid. 87.
50 Ibid. 81.
51 Patton.
52 Webb, 6.
53 Gibby, 88.
The U.S. military occupation of Korea formally ended on August 15, 1948 with the election of President Rhee. Afterwards, all U.S. advisory personnel were assigned to US Armed Forces-Korea (USAIFIK) under the Provisional Military Assistance Group (PMAG).\textsuperscript{54} PMAG was established on 15 August 1948 and replaced the Dept of Internal Security as the primary conduit for advising Korean forces.\textsuperscript{55} In 1948 with Brigadier General William Roberts in command its total authorized personnel more than doubled from just 100 assigned advisors to a total strength of 241.\textsuperscript{56} Additionally, in November 1948 South Korea passed the Armed Forces Organization Act which created a department of defense and by March 1949 it had converted its Constabulary force into an Army of 65,000 men organized into eight divisions (1\textsuperscript{st}, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 5\textsuperscript{th}, 6\textsuperscript{th}, 7\textsuperscript{th}, 8\textsuperscript{th}, and Capital Div).\textsuperscript{57} On 3 May 1949 when the North launched its first open attack into the south in the vicinity of Kaesong, the South Korean Army had already firmly established a level two capability and was able to soundly repel the incursion.\textsuperscript{58}

On 1 July 1949 all US combat forces left Korea effectively leaving complete responsibility for maintaining internal security to the South Korean Army,\textsuperscript{59} which by definition establishes it as maintaining a level three capability. Concurrently, with the withdrawal of the remaining US forces from Korea, PMAG was officially re-designated as KMAG with 186 officers, a warrant officer, a nurse, and 288 enlisted persons assigned.\textsuperscript{60} After KMAG officially assumed control it continued on with the mission of

\textsuperscript{54} History of Joint US Military Assistance Group – Korea, 5.
\textsuperscript{55} Gibby, 88.
\textsuperscript{56} History of Joint US Military Assistance Group – Korea, 5.
\textsuperscript{57} Webb, 6.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. 8.
\textsuperscript{59} Gibby 103.
\textsuperscript{60} History of Joint US Military Assistance Group – Korea, 5.
training and advising the Korean Army. On 26 January 1950 the Republic of Korea and the United States signed a formal agreement establishing KMAG after the US Congress passed the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 that earmarked 10.2 million in aid to Korea mainly in the form of maintenance and supply equipment. By 1950 South Korean forces had virtually eliminated the insurgency and claimed roughly 5,000 communist guerillas killed in action. At the time North Korean began its conventional invasion on 25 June 1950, South Korean forces firmly controlled internal security for the nation and consisted of the following: Army-94,808, Coast Guard-6,145, Air Force-1865, and National Police-48,273. The total amount of time that had elapsed from its initial rating of level zero was only five years, approximately.

Afghanistan (2002 - Present)

The date this study sets for the level zero for the military advisory effort in Afghanistan is December 2001 directly after the fall of the Taliban regime and NATO assuming legal control over security in Afghanistan by UN Mandate. Following this mandate, the Bonn Agreement in Germany established the general objectives for developing the Afghan internal security forces as follows: total forces consisting of no more than 70,000, with 43,000 ground combat troops, 21,000 logistic support staff (4 regional commands) 3000 Ministry of Defense, and 3000 Presidential airlift. Additionally, the “lead nation” model to develop Afghan National Security Forces

61 Gibby, 103.
63 Webb, 8.
64 Ibid. 6.
(ANSF) was also adopted at international conference in 2002.\textsuperscript{67} However, despite these international agreements, the ANSF did not reach a level one capability until 2003 with the first official formations of the Afghan National Army and the Formal Regional Recruiting Centers.\textsuperscript{68}

The overall training and development of ANSF struggled significantly from 2003 to 2006.\textsuperscript{69} The Office of Military Cooperation Afghanistan (OMC-A) that was established by the U.S. Army in 2003 made some significant gains in building the individual units but the overall capability of the Afghan National Army was still largely considered to be relatively low.\textsuperscript{70} Additionally, US State Department initiated its own police training under a contract with DynCorp in 2003 because the German led effort was not developing at a satisfactory pace.\textsuperscript{71} However, by 2005 this effort was also assessed as very poorly progressing and was transferred to the Department of Defense. Consequently, the Office of Military Cooperation was re-designated on 12 July 2005 as the Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan (OSC-A), and given responsibility over the training of both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police with Germany providing principle support to the Police Effort.\textsuperscript{72} By the end of 2006, the corresponding result of this mismanagement was that the ANA, with only 50,000 personnel roughly, was still at a level one capability while the ANP was considered to be completely ineffective altogether.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{67} Bowman, 14. \\
\textsuperscript{68} Cordesman, 63. \\
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. 52. \\
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. 63. \\
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. 8. \\
\textsuperscript{72} Frederick Rice, Afghanistan Unit takes on New Mission, Name (www.defense.gov/news, 13 July 2005). \\
\textsuperscript{73} Cordesman, 58.
By 2006 the international community recognized the failure to develop the ANSF and began placing a much greater emphasis upon the development of the internal security forces as well as the transfer of responsibilities. In Jan 2006, the Afghanistan government signed the Afghanistan compact which was a formal statement to shift responsibility of internal security away from the international community on to the Afghanistan government.\(^74\) Funding for both the ANA and the ANP was dramatically increased with an estimated $7B allocated in 2007, up from only $110M in 2002.\(^75\) By 2008 the ANA maintained 95 active units, of which 34 held a Capability Milestone 1 (CM1), one Corps HQ, nine BDE HQs, and 24 Kandaks (Battalions).\(^76\) Additionally, ANA took the lead in 61% of all operations conducted in 2008 and reportedly performed well in combat.\(^77\) Although the ANA was effective at the small unit level it lacked the capability for large scale sustained operations.\(^78\) ANA forces also suffered from a lack of equipment and proper supplies.\(^79\) Taken as a whole, by the end of 2009 the capability of the ANSF was still impeded by higher level staff functions such as operational coordination, intelligence collection and analysis, and logistic re-supply thus, providing it with overall level 2 effectiveness rating.\(^80\)

By early 2009 a growing number of members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort required greater national attention.\(^81\) On 3 December 2009 President Obama ordered an additional 30,000 troops

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\(^{74}\) Bowman, 15.
\(^{75}\) Cordesman, iii.
\(^{76}\) Ibid. v.
\(^{77}\) Ibid. 33.
\(^{78}\) Ibid. 63.
\(^{79}\) Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, 14.
\(^{80}\) Cordesman, 75.
\(^{81}\) Bowman, 1.
into the Afghanistan theater to a total of almost 100,000 troops with an emphasis to
develop Afghan National Security Forces.\textsuperscript{82} As of Dec 2009, numbers for the ANA were
as follows: 97,000 troops assigned with 90 active battalions; 28 CM1; 30 CM2; 30
CM3.\textsuperscript{83} Further, in January 2010 the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, the body
setup to oversee the 2006 compact, set the goal to expand the ANA to 171,600 by
October 2011.\textsuperscript{84} However, despite all of these measures taken there is still no clear
evidence that the ANSF has moved beyond a level 2 effectiveness rating or will do so
anytime in the near future. Currently, there is still a very large contingent of external
security forces in Afghanistan actively performing internal security functions. If the U.S.
government meets its stated goals of removing all combat troops by 2014, then the total
will have elapsed from its initial rating of level zero to level three rating will be 12 years,
approximately.

\textit{Analysis and Comparison: Common Factors within both Advising Operations}

In comparing the two timelines for both Korea 1946-1950 to Afghanistan 2002-
present, a clear distinction can be seen in the amount time that was required for the
internal security forces of the host-nation to achieve independence. Accepting that a
basic congruence exists between the advisory efforts as previously illustrated, the
fundamental task that remains is determining which of the previously described factor, or
factors, differ between the two advising efforts and to what extent that factor, or factors,
contributed to the success or failure of the advising operation. This will be done through
a side-by-side comparison of each factor for the two operations starting with the type of
units employed.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. 13.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. 38.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
In analyzing the U.S. military advising operation in Korea from 1946 to 1950 it is clear that no effort was made to employ units with special capabilities, privately contracted firms, or any other type of organization besides conventional military forces. Officers and enlisted personnel were assigned from the general pool of troops stationed in Korea. No attempt was made to qualify personnel for the assignment and they were often junior company or field grade officers eager to do the job but professionally weak. Due to the austere nature of Korea, assignment to Korea was considered a hardship tour with a length of 18 months, and KMAG service was not considered particularly desired, important, or popular. Further, chances of recognition or promotion from KMAG duty were minimal at best. KMAG units were poorly resourced and logistically supported and Tasks for advisors were all encompassing including recruitment, organization, induction, administration, and training. With only one US advisor per Regiment, usually a Major/Captain, advisors were left up to their own ingenuity and institutional knowledge in order to train the Korean unit on tasks necessary for internal security operations.

In stark contrast to Korea, the military advising operation in Afghanistan is heavily supplemented with Special Operations Forces and privately contracted defense firms. One example includes U.S. Army Special Forces A-teams who are the principle trainers and are directly partnered with both the Afghan National Commando Units and

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85 Ramsey, 11.
86 History of Joint US Military Assistance Group – Korea, 6.
87 Ramsey, 11.
88 Ibid.
89 Gibby, 84.
the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). Additionally, the Dept of State contracted out the training and development of the Afghan National Police to DynCorp who provided 245 instructors consisting of former US police officers and sheriffs. These contractors taught basic and advanced courses at the Central Training and Regional Training Centers focusing on specialized training including firearms handling, range training, building searches, and vehicle searches, drill and ceremony, defensive tactics, baton training and handcuffing techniques. Although the bulk of personnel serving in advisory role remain conventional military forces, it is clear that these other types of units supply a specialized capability that serves as a force multiplier to the overall effort.

**Overall Experience Level of the Advisor Team**

The overall experience level of the average military advisor team in Korea was relatively moderate to low. The average division advisory team in KMAG consisted of five officers and three enlisted personnel with Lt Col or Major in lead. The Regimental team was only two officers preferably led by a Major or a Captain. Ideally, KMAG called for at least one advisor per battalion, however due to significant shortfalls many advisor teams did not meet rank authorizations and KMAG advisory teams were considered bare-bone outfits with no redundancy. US advisors were generally much younger and 2-3 ranks inferior to their Korean counterparts. Even though advisor teams consisted mostly of officers, there was very little NCO presence, they were often junior company or field grade officers who as stated before, were eager to do the job but

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90 Naylor.
92 Ibid.
93 Ramsey, 10.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. 11.
96 Ibid.
97 Gibby, 99.
professionally weak.\textsuperscript{98} Even though the commander of KMAG, Brigadier General Roberts, was very selective for field duty and ensured only the best and most experienced of his personnel were given those assignments,\textsuperscript{99} the overall experience level did not improve until after the North Korean invasion when the unit structure was expanded dramatically to include 21 officers and 11 men per division team.\textsuperscript{100}

The overall experience level of the average military advisor team in Afghanistan is much greater and can be assessed as high to moderate. The current model for military advisory teams in Afghanistan is referred to as an Embedded Training Team (ETT) which is based on 10-15 man team structure primarily consisting of company and field grade officers, as well as senior NCOs selected from the overall conventional force.\textsuperscript{101} Attachments and detachments are added to this baseline structure as needed, which allows a minimum level of operational planning to be conducted.\textsuperscript{102} Each ETT is assigned to the equivalent of an Afghan battalion and covers all the primary functional areas of a battalion staff in addition to acting as liaisons to provide the ANA with critical combat enablers such as, close air support, indirect fire, medical evacuation, as well as quick reaction reinforcement.\textsuperscript{103} Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT) are the international equivalent of ETTs under the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).\textsuperscript{104} By 2008 there were 37 OMLTs and 55 ETTs for a total of 95 ANA

\textsuperscript{98} Ramsey, 11.
\textsuperscript{99} Gibby, 89.
\textsuperscript{100} Ramsey, 10.
\textsuperscript{101} ISAF Official Transition Team Website (www.taskforcephoenix.com, 10 March 2011).
\textsuperscript{102} Joseph Jones, Advancing the Military Transition Team Model (USMC Command and Staff College, 2008).
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} ISAF Official Transition Team Website.
units thus supplying a much greater overall level of experience to the ANSF than was present in Korea from 1946-1950.\textsuperscript{105}

*Training Received by the Typical Military Advisory Team*

The training received by the average military advisor in Korea prior to his assignment was virtually non-existent. They generally did not understand the culture, the language, or the capabilities and limitations of the Korean unit he was instructed to advise, much less the very unique nuances of the role of an advisor itself.\textsuperscript{106} KMAG simply provided all incoming personnel with a handbook on key tasks, terms, and concepts and then sent them on to their units.\textsuperscript{107} By June 1949 BG Roberts did systematically begin orienting all incoming officers on his strategic vision with a reception brief and instituted a policy of having the incoming personnel spend a week working with the primary staff before being assigned to a unit.\textsuperscript{108} However, KMAG advisors received no special training or preparation in terms of language and culture or the nuances of instructing indigenous forces before or after their arrival in Korea.\textsuperscript{109} Further, without occupational specialists like quartermasters or personnel officers, logistic training and advising represented a major difficulty.\textsuperscript{110} Advisors did try to provide cooperative training with the US units when possible but most of they curriculum was based upon “on-the-job” training.\textsuperscript{111} As result, most training for the Korean Army

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Cordesman, iii.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ramsey, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Gibby, 102.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ramsey, 12, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Gibby, 99.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid. 84.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
emphasized basic infantry operations and small unit tactics like marksmanship, maneuvering under fire and combat patrolling.\textsuperscript{112}

The training received by the average military advisor team in Afghanistan prior to their assignment addresses both cultural issues of dealing with the Afghan people and instructional nuances of being a military advisor. Although there is no academic program of study to prepare personnel to serve as advisors, US personnel assigned to combat advising positions in Afghanistan are given 60 days of training at a centralized facility at Ft. Riley, Kansas prior to their deployment.\textsuperscript{113} While not entirely adequate, the curriculum does include cultural awareness, language familiarity, combat lifesaver, general combat skill development and general lessons in military advising.\textsuperscript{114} Additionally, personnel assigned to each team maintain a sufficient level of experience in the functional area to their military occupational specialty including intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and medical support.\textsuperscript{115} For instance, the position of logistic advisor on the team is usually filled with quartermaster or equivalent. This results in the ETT being capable of mentoring the ANA in leadership, staff, and support functions such as planning, assessing, supporting and executing battalion level operations.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Organizational and Command Structure Employed}

After conducting a thorough analysis of the organizational and command structure employed by the United States military Advisory Effort in Korea from 1946-1950 the

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. 94-98.
\textsuperscript{113} Jones, 5.
\textsuperscript{114} Christopher Bluesteen, \textit{Combat Advising: Three Challenges We Must Overcome to Succeed in Afghanistan} (Small Wars Journal, 2009).
\textsuperscript{115} Jones, 3.
\textsuperscript{116} ISAF Official Transition Team Website.
overarching theme that is easily recognized was unity of command. All military advising efforts were initially under the U.S. occupational government’s Dept. of Internal Security which started with 20 officers but grew to approximately 90 officers in 1947 when it was re-organized as PMAG. BG Roberts, the commander of PMAG, was able to institute several policies that aided in the rapid development of the Korean internal security forces.

Roberts brought much needed standardization to the Korean Constabulary. He introduced initial training and ordered the creation of the Advisors Handbook to familiarize and prepare all incoming personnel for their duties as military advisors. He also immediately instituted the “counterpart” system where one advisor was paired directly with the commander for each unit level from Division down to Battalion. Most importantly, he streamlined the headquarters of the advisory group to ensure resources flowed to the most critical areas while freeing up personnel for more important field assignments.

After PMAG was re-designated KMAG, unity of command was maintained by having KMAG report directly to the Pentagon on all matters of military command and administration, even though it was officially under the operational control of the US ambassador to Korea. The unified command continued to demonstrate its ability to solve critical issues by addressing the need to sufficiently outfit the Korean military with the equipment required to meet the overall strategic goal of establishing a strong internal security force. The United States provided an array of light infantry weapons to the Korean Forces including the American M1 rifle, .30 caliber carbine, and 60/81 mm

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117 Gibby, 87.
118 Ibid. 89.
119 Ibid.
mortars. Additionally, by 1950 the Koreans had received 2,100 serviceable army motor vehicles including 830 2 ½ ton trucks and 1,300 jeeps. The Air Force had only 22 liaison/trainer type aircraft. The Koreans had no tanks, medium artillery, or fighter/bomber aircraft.  

The U.S. advisory operation also took effective action to address the lack of institutional knowledge within the Korean military. PMAG quickly established centralized schools for critical skills like weapons training and officer development. Further, promising Korean officers were selected to attend US infantry officer training at Ft. Benning in Columbus GA. Other Korean officers were also sent back to the United States to attend technical schools in logistic functions in order to increase the speed of the transition of those functions from the US to the Korean Army. By May 1950 the US Army allocated 27 slots to US Service schools for Korean officers.  

Establishing a single point of authority allowed the U.S. advisory effort in Korea to make quick and effective decisions on all issues regarding the training of the Korean military which, prior to the invasion in 1950, was predicated solely on the policy of developing it into an internal security force. All advise, equipment and training provided to the Korean Armed Forces facilitated the goal of establishing an organization that could maintain law an order within the borders of the Republic of Korea and only deter attacks from the north. Thus, it is clear that the end result of concentrating all authority in a single unified command was that by the summer 1950 KMAG had accomplished its strategic objective of organizing, training and equipping host-nation forces capable of

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121 Webb, 6, 7.  
122 Gibby, 89.  
123 Ibid. 92.  
125 Ibid.
maintaining the internal security of the country and that the Republic of Korea was well on its way to becoming a dominant regional power.

In complete contrast to the military advising operation in Korea, the organization and structure of the military advisory effort in Afghanistan is characterized by the lack of a single clear command authority. The United States believed that the warlords and militias that it used to help defeat the Taliban could easily be integrated into the national government and would serve as the primary basis for the ANA. Consequently, the US approached the early years of the advisory effort with very little focus on building the internal security forces and instead concentrated on more of a peacekeeping and humanitarian aid role.

Initially, the United States was given the responsibility of developing just the ANA but even within that effort there appeared a complicated dual chain of command. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC-A) in Kabul assumed overall responsibility of developing the ANA but a separate joint coalition task force designated Task Force Phoenix was assigned control over organizing and training the army battalions at Kabul Military Training Center. The Afghan Battalions received 14 weeks of training (6 basic, 6 AIT, 2 collective) but the dual chain of command and complicated organizational structure severely hindered the advisory and training effort. Additionally, OMC-A only concentrated on developing the combat forces of the ANA and failed to establish the logistic components needed for support. As a result the ANA is a force composed of

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126 Cordesman, 59.
127 Ibid. 33.
129 Ibid. 12.
several separate unsupported infantry battalions instead of single integrated organization.\textsuperscript{130}

The Bonn Agreement, which called for an end strength of 70,000 in the ANA by 2006, pushed a large portion of the responsibility for developing the rest of the ANSF to European allies not capable of training professional fighting forces.\textsuperscript{131} Currently, there are 19 separate nations involved in advising and training ANSF.\textsuperscript{132} Coalition partner countries in Afghanistan include France, Germany, Spain, Romania, Great Britain, Netherlands, Canada, Croatia, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Serbia.\textsuperscript{133} Since there was not a single point of authority within the advisory effort to maintain focus on strategic objectives the enormously diverse multinational effort naturally caused both funding and priorities to be divided.\textsuperscript{134}

The most prevalent example of this lack of overall coherent strategy for developing the internal security forces of Afghanistan is seen in the development of the Afghan National Police. Both Germany and the U.S. State Department maintained responsibility for establishing the Afghan National Police.\textsuperscript{135} As previously stated, due to Germany’s slow progress in building up the necessary number of police officers the State Department initiated a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology to train and equip the general police force while Germany continued to train the Afghan police officer corps.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. 17.
\textsuperscript{131} Cordesman, 57.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. vi.
\textsuperscript{133} ISAF Official Transition Team Website
\textsuperscript{134} Cordesman, 40, 41.
\textsuperscript{135} Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, 1.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. 8.
Despite the significant funding put into the effort, a joint State and DoD Inspector General Report conducted in 2005 indicated a number of critical shortcomings.\textsuperscript{137} This report centered its criticism on a failure to provide training that adequately reflected the security needs of the country, such as paramilitary skills, and would allow the ANP to keep pace with the growing instability.\textsuperscript{138} When DynCorp began its contract in 2003, Defense Dept. objected to the program arguing that the training should emphasize these types skills needed to conduct a counterinsurgency over general police work.\textsuperscript{139} However, DynCorp was just tasked to provide trainers and did not have control over policies, recruitment, or program design and the State Dept. did not have necessary manpower to provide effective oversight.\textsuperscript{140} The report also cited an inadequate ratio of police mentors to field operations, which is imperative to sustain and reinforce training received at the national centers.\textsuperscript{141} In the end, the program was so poorly managed that the military was eventually forced to assume control over the training of both the ANA and the ANP under a consolidated command designated the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A).

Another illustration of a lack of a single clear command authority within the advisory effort is the coordination between NATO and US advisory teams. As previously stated, ISAF employs advisory teams designated as Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) that are distinct from U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETT). These OMLTs maintain various types of restrictions because NATO countries

\textsuperscript{137} Lisa Novak, DoD takes over Afghan Police training after IG cites State Dept. failures (Stars and Stripes: www.stripes.com, 25 February 2010)
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Hosenball.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, 19.
contributing forces to ISAF have placed significant limitations on how their forces may be used. Naturally these restrictions significantly limit the scope of military operations the OLMTs can conduct.\textsuperscript{142}

The American led CSTC-A has absolutely no control over OMLTs which causes assets to be used inefficiently and prevents the proper integration of priority resources such as intelligence, reconnaissance, air support, medical evacuation, logistic support, and most importantly quick reaction forces.\textsuperscript{143} There are even some cases where both types of advisor teams are assigned to the same Afghan unit.\textsuperscript{144} Poor coordination between coalition forces prevents advisor teams from functioning effectively when embedded with Afghan forces and breeds confusion and mistrust within Afghan military and police forces.\textsuperscript{145} Ultimately, the lack of a clear command authority in the Afghan military advising operation is causing the Afghan National Security Forces to be developed as separate isolated units instead of a single integrated national security apparatus.

\textsuperscript{142} Feickert, 6.
\textsuperscript{143} Bluesteen.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
III. Conclusions, Implications, and Policy Recommendations

Conclusions and Implications

The results of this study show a clear divergence between the military advising operation conducted in Korea from 1946 to 1950 with the operation conducted in Afghanistan from 2002 to the present. This divergence is evident in both the developmental timelines and the analysis of the common factors of the two efforts. The resulting effectiveness of these two advising operations is very succinctly depicted in the graph below portraying the comparative timelines of the development of the Korean and Afghan internal security forces towards a complete independent capability level (level 3).

Chart 1: Comparative Analysis of Afghanistan and Korean Internal Security Forces Developmental Timelines
The results of the timeline comparison clearly display a much more rapid development of the internal security forces with the Korean advisory effort than with the Afghanistan advisory effort. Consequently, it is fair to state that the Korean military advising operation was far more effective than the current Afghanistan advisory effort. When examining a cause for this greater level of effectiveness, the summary chart outlining the comparative analysis of the two advisory efforts shown below illustrates how the Afghanistan campaign held a substantial advantage over the Korean effort in every area save one; structure.

**Table 1**: Comparative Analysis of Afghanistan and Korean Advisory Efforts by Common Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Conventional forces supplemented by special operations forces and civilian contractors with specialized capabilities</td>
<td>Conventional forces only with no specialized capabilities</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>10-15 man teams of company/field grade officers and senior enlisted at Battalion level with comprehensive staff experience</td>
<td>2-5 man teams of company/field grade officers at Regimental level with only basic operational experience</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>60 day orientation course on culture, language, and advisor mission. Comprehensive coverage of military occupational specialty (MOS)</td>
<td>One week orientation visit at Command. No occupational, cultural, language or advisor training received.</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Highly complex, multi-national, multi-echelon command structure, with complete division of effort.</td>
<td>Single streamlined command structure, with sole unified point of authority over all advising operations and mission resources</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The immediate conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that the structure of a military advising operation has a far greater impact than any other factor in reducing the time required to build the internal security forces of a host-nation. This data also implicates that the source of the continuing struggle to build effective internal security forces in Afghanistan centers on a lack of unity of command and unity of effort within the military advising operations there. The critical issue in Afghanistan appears to be an unsynchronized effort brought on by an incoherent strategy, as well as poor planning and management. In short, combat advising operations in Afghanistan have severely suffered from a lack of synchronization between strategic objectives tactical operations.\(^\text{146}\)

The most troubling conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the apparent lack of institutional knowledge that was carried over after the Korean military advisory effort ended. This is likely the result of the military’s tendency to purge innovations gained during an unpopular campaign or a conflict considered to be a strategic failure.\(^\text{147}\) Another example of this purge can be seen with the changes instituted in the Army in the aftermath of Vietnam.\(^\text{148}\)

Historically this purge occurs in three main areas:

- Innovative programs and capabilities used in the field
- New doctrine, organizations and other systems that push beyond core service concepts
- Policymakers and the public stop supporting innovative programs\(^\text{149}\)

It appears that the multitude of what was done in Afghanistan to correct the failing advisory effort was simply relearned from Korea as well as other previous

\(^{146}\) Ibid.
\(^{148}\) Ibid.
\(^{149}\) Ibid.
conflicts like the Philippines, Greece, and Vietnam.\footnote{Michael Jason, Integrating the Advisory Effort Into the Army: A Full Spectrum Solution (Military Review, October 2008) 28.} Many former Iraq and Afghan advisors when asked about advisor duty detail a lack of focus, priority, quality of personnel, and a general degree of frustration; all issues seen in previous advisor efforts due to lack of institutionalization.\footnote{Ibid. 29.} Due to the unpopular nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan the military is at risk of losing all the innovations and doctrinal knowledge gained in counterinsurgency such as the development of a robust military advisory effort, and integrated civil-military reconstruction teams.\footnote{Brimley.}

Policy recommendations

The number one policy recommendation presented by this study is the establishment of a military organization that will retain the institutional knowledge gained during military advising operations so that it may be used in future conflicts, most notably the need of unity of command within the organizational structure. The most obvious solution would be the creation of a separate advisory organization. However, the first step in creating such an organization is to amend official U.S. doctrine on military advising.

As witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, US conventional forces are taking on the bulk of the military advising responsibilities, while Special Operations Forces are being primarily used for direct action missions and only supplementing the advisory effort.\footnote{Krac.} However, the most recent version of FM 3-0, Full Spectrum Operations, did not break from the past with regard to advising. By placing it under the auspices of irregular warfare, the U.S. military maintained the special operations community’s purview over
military advising operations. Many experts, like Lieutenant Col (ret.) John Nagl and Andrew Krepinevich, have already proposed the need to create a separate advisor organization. However, Nagl argues for a permanent 20,000 man advisory corps, headquartered at FT Bragg. Krepinevich proposes a similar concept. Although such a massive organization would provide the immediate capability of handling efforts the size of Iraq and Afghanistan, given the constraint of resources and the overwhelming number of critical core tasks the military must perform, including its traditional role of winning high intensity conventional conflicts, it is simply not feasible to dole out 20,000 personnel to exclusively focus on such a narrow mission. Further, as shown in this study’s analysis of the Korean military advisory effort, an effective operation can be conducted with as few as 500 personnel if properly organized, supported, and directed.

Another solution is to establish a relatively small advisor command (500 personnel) responsible for maintaining a separate military advising school tasked to train qualified candidates on the necessary skills. This concept would be similar to the Army’s development of its current Ranger units. The 75th Ranger Regiment currently maintains three separate active battalions fully staffed and organized to conduct a very specific mission set. However, Ranger School continually recruits and trains relatively large numbers of the conventional force and returns them to their units to act as force.

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154 Jason, 28.
155 Jason 27.
156 Ibid.
multipliers by spreading the institutional knowledge they gained from Ranger school to the conventional unit. The Ranger graduates continue on in their previous positions within the conventional units but retain a Ranger identifier and provide a much larger pool of candidates from which the active Ranger battalions can draw.

The advisor command itself would provide a construct for deploying a mission focused fully integrated advisory group with a fully unified chain of command, support staff, and established organizational structure that could rapidly expand as necessary leaving the Advisor school in place to continue training additional advisors to support the deployed command. Concurrently, during peacetime the advisor school would offer an organizational shelter to retain many of lessons learned from previous advising operations such as, a counterpart system, unit partnering, and the art of advising with personal influence, workable suggestions and good guidance rather than command direction. Conventional force officers and senior enlisted would be able to attend the school, gain expertise in military advising operations, and return to the conventional unit to spread the institutional knowledge. Further, these officers or enlisted personnel would then provide a fully trained pool of field advisors if the military required a rapid expansion of a military advisory effort, or would theoretically act as force multipliers if their conventional units became partnered with a host-nation force.

This study clearly shows that the U.S. military’s current system for conducting large scale military advisory efforts is inadequate. Historically, most postwar occupations have an 18 month window of relative peace in which they can take action before violence and popular discontent begins to dramatically increase. With such a

157 Bluesteem.
158 Jennings, 26.
small window of time to act the military must have deployable elements ready to
organize, train and advise host-nation security forces. Regardless of the specific actions
taken the U.S. military must begin reforming its current force structure so that such a
capability exists.
Bibliography


