THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DURING THE COLD WAR: HOW SMALL POWERS CAN SOMETIMES BE STRONG

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies

By

Rodica Eliza Gheorghe, B.A.

Washington, DC
April 16, 2010
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Methodology for Measuring Intelligence Effectiveness in International Politics</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpower Confrontation and Détente: Romania’s Intelligence Effectiveness during the Cold War</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unipolar Moment: The Current Relevance of Studying the Role of Intelligence in International Politics</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Motto: “Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes” (Beware of Greeks bearing gifts) - Virgil,

*Aeneid*, II, 49

As the United States and the entire Western bloc helplessly watched Soviet tanks rolling into Prague in August 1968, Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), created waves of euphoria in the West by launching a virulent attack against the ‘limited sovereignty’ doctrine professed by Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).¹ Ceausescu’s dissidence was regarded as ‘the return of the prodigal son,’ confirming a long-held belief that “ethnically, culturally and historically, Romanians belong to the West.”² Yet recently released Romanian documents suggest that the euphoria was misplaced and that Ceausescu was actually putting the final touches on his

¹ Minutes of Conversation at the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, August 21, 1968, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund of the Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party (Fund CC of RCP), Chancellery Section, Folder 133/1968, pp. 16-18.

The doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ was announced by Leonid Brezhnev at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party on November 13, 1968. The Soviet leader retroactively justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Hungary in November 1956 by stating that: “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”


² Robert Thayer to the Secretary, Assessment of Situation in Rumania, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C., January 27, 1958, United States National Archives and Records Administration, RM/R File, 766.00/1-2758.

Rumania: The Maverick Satellite, October 1968, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030017-8, 10, retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.
‘Trojan Horse:’ his feared intelligence services (the Securitate, including its foreign intelligence branch, DIE). To prepare the way for his “gift” Ceausescu conducted massive purges aimed at de-Russification, and claimed, at the height of the Prague Spring, that Romania’s path was diverging from Moscow’s. Researchers have recently suggested that he had sealed a secret deal with the Soviets to appear independent in order to open the door of diplomacy with Western countries, win their trust, gain valuable intelligence about their intentions and capabilities, and then provide the Soviets with decision advantage in the superpower competition.

Ceausescu took great pride in the ability of his intelligence officers to gain access and influence over decision-making forums of both international allies and competitors. Foreign leaders often praised his constant shuttle diplomacy and his independent foreign policy. A later Romanian president, Ion Iliescu, also tried to project

---


One of the most important pieces of evidence is the Letter brought to the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, on the night between 20 and 21 august 1968 on behalf of the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of RCP, Foreign Relations Section, Folder 3u/1968-1970, vol. II, 6-20.

The predominant view in the literature on Romania’s position on the invasion of Czechoslovakia is that Ceausescu did not know about the intention of the Soviets and was awaken in the middle of the night by phone calls from journalists in Prague. However, the head of the Romanian State Security Council (Securitate) from 1968 to 1972, Ion Stanescu, stated in an interview with Lavinia Betea that Ceausescu had learned about the invasion in May or June 1968, from a Polish officer working in the Headquarters of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. He ordered the creation of 8 additional battalions of Securitate special troops, under the pretext of strengthening Romania’s defenses against a potential Soviet invasion.


the image of a reformed apparatchik, who resisted Moscow’s pressure during Romania’s NATO accession bid. However, both Ceausescu’s and Iliescu’s carefully crafted roles as ‘mavericks,’ elicited a strange response from Moscow: silence. Why was Ceausescu allowed to defy the Soviet line in international affairs? One possible answer is that the Soviet Union was the masterminds in the effort to use Romania’s intelligence services as a ‘Trojan Horse’, infiltrating them into the Western bloc and the Third World in order to gain access to inaccessible targets. After 2001, Romania’s competitive advantage resided in counter-terrorism, drawing upon its intense interactions with terrorist organizations, dating back to the 1970s. The US may be facing another ‘Trojan Horse,’ as some sources have suggested that high-ranking officials have closed a blind eye to the infiltration of terrorist organizations throughout Romania. Recently, President Traian Basescu has announced Romania’s participation in the Missile Defense Shield, under the configuration proposed by US President Barack Obama. This plan may offer decision-makers in Washington the opportunity to verify Romania’s ability to transform itself from a ‘security consumer’ to a ‘security provider.’

---


7 Raluca Dumitru, Basescu: Exista informari trimise lui Ion Iliescu si Adrian Nastase despre ilegalitatile lui Omar Hayssam. Le voi desecretiza [Basescu: There are memos sent to Ion Iliescu and Adrian Nastase about Omar Hayssam’s illegal activities. I will have them declassified], Gandul, November 13, 2009, http://www.gandul.info/politica/basescu-exista-informari-trimise-lui-ion-iliescu-si-adrian-nastase-despre-ilegalitatile-lui-omar-hayssam-le-voi-desecretiza-5102481

Romania’s behavior on the international arena since the beginning of the Cold War gives rise to a final question: Did the intelligence services of a small state gain a disproportionate influence relative to their international homologues and, if so, how did it do so?

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Intelligence, understood as a form of power used for ‘decision advantage’ in competitive enterprises on the international arena, has received little attention in Romania. The brutality of the Romanian intelligence services at the domestic level is

---


The few Romanian intelligence managers that have published their memoirs and attempted to define intelligence acknowledge that the role of intelligence is to serve decision-makers but make no mention to the way in which ‘the structure of uncertainty,’ in the terms of Jennifer Sims, influence intelligence effectiveness.


Viorel Rosu, *De la Securitate la Doi si un sfert, via SRI* [From the Security Police to the Service for the Protection of Objectives of Political Interest, through the Romanian Information Services] in Romanian (Bucuresti: Grupul Editorial RAO, 2008), 9.

Stelian Octavian Andronic was recruited as a foreign intelligence officer for the Securitate in 1958, being the head of Special Foreign Currency Division after 1980. After the 1989 overthrow of the Ceausescu regime, he became the economic adviser of the new head of the Romanian Information Services (SRI, in charge of domestic intelligence).

Viorel Rosu was the head of the Counterintelligence Unit U.M. 0672 until 1989. In 1996, he resumed his activity within U.M. 0215, the Service for the Protection of Objectives of Political Interest, within the Ministry of Interior.

Some of the documents that form the legal framework of the Securitate stress on defensive measures and counterintelligence, spelling out the enemies that it had to protect itself against (the American, British, West-German and French intelligence services are the ones explicitly mentioned). The apparent lack of attention paid to the socialist camp (one of the few mentions refers to the fact that some officers in the Counterintelligence Department covertly operated in other socialist countries) is contradicted in practice, where Romania seemed to be extremely adroit at understanding and adapting itself to the structure of the international system.

Consiliul Securitatii Statului, Directia Generala de Contraspionaj, *Regulament de organizare si functionare a Directiei de contraspionaj din cadrul Consiliului Securitatii Statului* [Regulations for the organization and functioning of the Counterintelligence Direction within the State Security Council], Top
widely known, yet their performance at the international level has not been analyzed in a comprehensive manner, primarily because of insufficient evidence. On the one hand, when discussing Romania’s intelligence strategy, most scholars adopt a historical approach, with little if any consideration for theory. On the other hand, when discussing Romanian intelligence, most scholars fail to take into account the broader foreign policy goals it served, which can now be reconsidered through the lens of recently declassified documents. Both these approaches take at face value the rhetoric of both decision-makers and intelligence officers, perpetuating the view supported by a majority of historians, that Romania enjoyed an independent position during the Cold War.\footnote{Secret, April 13, 1968, Archives of the National Council for the Study of the Security Police Archives (A.C.N.S.A.S), documentary fund, folder 88, vol. 4, 424-435, published in Florica Dobre (ed.), Securitatea. Structuri-cadre. Obiective si Metode, [The Security Police. Cadres, Objectives and Methods] in Romanian. 2 vols. (Consiliul National pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii, Bucuresti: Editura Enciclopedia, 2006), 2:80-86.}


\footnote{Lavinia Stan, Rodica Milena Zaharia, “Romania’s Intelligence Service: Between East and West” in Problems of Post-Communism 54 (January/February 2007): 3-16.}


\footnote{Kieran Williams, Dennis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 160-263.}

\footnote{Robert Weiner, Romanian Foreign Policy and the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1984), 58-80.}


\footnote{Ronald Linden, Communist States and International Change. Romania and Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 7-54.}


\footnote{Liviu C. Tarau, Intre Washington si Moscova: politicile de securitate nationala ale SUA si URSS si impactul lor asupra Romaniei, 1945-1965 [Between Washington and Moscow: the National Security}
Nicolae Ceausescu’s nationalism in foreign policy still inspires the discourses of post-communist leaders, including former President Ion Iliescu.\(^\text{12}\)

In fact, Ceausescu’s active diplomacy provided an official cover for his intelligence services to penetrate the Western and the Third World. Vladimir Tismaneanu is among the few historians that challenge the prevailing paradigm built around Ceausescu’s independent foreign policy. Tismaneanu argues that “in fact, for Ceausescu, Brezhnev was quite a comfortable partner; although there were crises in Romanian-Soviet relations, they never reached the point of an open clash.”\(^\text{13}\) As more and more documents become available, substantiating Tismaneanu’s assumptions, the paradigm on Romania’s foreign policy during the Cold War starts to change, casting a different light on the legacy of Ceausescu’s regime on contemporary Romanian politics.

---


\(^\text{13}\) Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons, The History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 188.

Tismaneanu’s statements are corroborated by recently declassified documents from the Romanian Archives:


A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

A neo-realist theory of intelligence, circumscribed in the wider framework of the neo-realist school of thought in International Relations, may explain some of the peculiarities of the Romanian intelligence services, offering insights on future trends and potential developments. The neo-realist paradigm predicts that the dynamics of the international system will influence the strength of an intelligence community.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the neo-realist theoretical framework can contribute towards formulating an answer to the question: “when is the intelligence community of a country like Romania more likely to gain influence on the international stage?”

The neo-realist framework can offer a better understanding of the risks and opportunities inherent in shifts in polarity in the international system. This approach also casts light on the relationships established between superpowers and their junior partners, with a particular focus on how intelligence sharing can work to the advantage of the smaller power.\textsuperscript{15} Jennifer Sims’ scholarship offers the theoretical underpinnings for the study of Romanian intelligence, suggesting that small powers with strong

\textsuperscript{15} Idem, \textit{Adaptive Realism: A Theory of Intelligence in International Politics}, forthcoming book.

Jennifer Sims proposes four categories of intelligence liaison: simple/complex (in simple liaison, the two parties interacting usually exchange only intelligence collection; in complex liaison, the parties involved trade collection assets for a combination of political, economic, military and operational goods provided through intelligence channels), symmetric/asymmetric (in symmetric liaison, the relationship between the two parties is balanced while in asymmetric liaison, one party gets more advantages than the other party); adversarial (intelligence is exchanged in spite of diverging interests between the parties involved); bilateral/multilateral (bilateral liaison occurs between two parties; multilateral liaison implies three or more participants).
intelligence can punch above their weight. Sims states “that advantages in intelligence can cause seemingly weak armies or states to prevail against seemingly stronger ones.”\textsuperscript{16}

According to the definition given by Jennifer Sims, intelligence effectiveness is the ability of policy-makers, relying on the decision advantage offered by their intelligence services, to influence the dynamics of the international system.\textsuperscript{17} During the Cold War, the strength of the Romanian intelligence services resided in their ability to help the communist leadership understand the interests and the capabilities of the two superpowers and bandwagon with the camp that could cause greater damage, under the illusion of balancing. Maintaining this illusion represents the arch stone of Romanian intelligence advantage during détente.

According to Sims’s theory of decision advantage, effective intelligence has four key capacities that must be optimized in support of decision-makers: collection, anticipation, transmission and denial-based deception. Effective collection is a function of a large number of collectors, able to cover a wide range of targets, operating within an integrated and collectively managed system, which enables target tracking and prioritization.\textsuperscript{18} Collection systems include, for example, sensors, the vehicles on which sensors ride, and their communications. These components need to be well integrated so

\textsuperscript{16} Idem, 60-61.
\textsuperscript{17} Idem, 68.
\textsuperscript{18} With respect to vertical and horizontal integration, Jennifer Sims in “A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics” states that “Only collection managers with good knowledge and control of all five components of each collector as well as across collection systems (such as human, signals, and imagery collection) can make the tradeoffs that optimize the collector’s performance against a shifting array of adversaries.” Idem, 69.
that collection managers can tailor the system to the target. Space-based platforms need, for example, cameras adapted to work in a vacuum and communication systems that are reliable over long distances. With well-integrated collection systems, managers can optimize the quantity of data obtained from the collector, the ratio of production over cost, the ability to shift from target to target without a negative impact on productivity, the extent of communications with decision-makers, the capacity of decision-makers to use the information collected, the ability to resist external interference and the ability of a collector to enhance all these characteristics of another collector’s work.19

Effective warning, what Sims refers as to the “anticipation function of intelligence,” depends on the ability of the intelligence community to operate independently of decision-makers: un-politicized and willing to gather and report what decision-makers may not want to hear. According to Sims, the independence of a service can be roughly measured by its degree of professionalization, because it indicates apolitical career paths, promotions and longevity. An effective intelligence community identifies emerging rivals and potential competitions and can analyze them in a disinterested manner, that is, irrespective of the political-military culture in which it operates.20

Effective influence in the policy process, what Sims refers to as “the transmission function of intelligence,” is the result of a high degree of connectedness between decision-makers and the intelligence community. Oversight and internal

---

19 This metric formulated by Sims is known under the acronym PETCURB, standing for productivity, efficiency, tunability, connectedness, usability, robustness and boosting capacity. Idem, 68.
20 Idem, 71-77.
transparency help the intelligence community establish a relationship of trust with decision-makers, enhancing the capacity to be heard and thus to deliver decision advantage.\textsuperscript{21}

Degrading the adversary’s intelligence capabilities, through Denial and Deception (D&D) is a function of the service’s ability to employ secrecy in a selective manner. D&D has two aims: protecting the interests of decision-makers from the attacks of their competitors; and obtaining a competitive advantage from degrading the other side’s own ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate information.\textsuperscript{22} Effective D&D implies coordination of positive intelligence and counterintelligence operations, so that the information discovered with the help of CI is integrated in the positive intelligence cycle.\textsuperscript{23}

Sims’ theory of intelligence also offers the necessary tools for analyzing the structure of the international system. The basic assumption of her neo-realist approach is that states are “unitary actors in anarchic competition. States matter most because they set the rules of international discourse and they endure.”\textsuperscript{24} Sims argues that a state is strong when it demonstrates a capacity to affect another entity more than vice versa. The unequal distribution of power determines the manner in which countries interact,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Idem, 77-82.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Sims identifies four types of counterintelligence operations: active-offensive (for example, double-agent operations); active-defensive (such as capturing spies; interrogation; surveillance); passive-offensive (like camouflage); passive-defensive (for instance, classification systems; vaults; locks; safes). Idem, 85.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Idem, 82-87.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Idem, \textit{Adaptive Realism: A Theory of Intelligence in International Politics}, forthcoming book.
\end{itemize}
and implicitly it influences the extent to which intelligence services can provide a
decision advantage to policy-makers.\textsuperscript{25}

Traditionally, states have been ranked according to their wealth, population,
military strength and other tangible indices. However, Sims’ theory calls for a different
approach to small states, which places them in their geopolitical context. In this respect,
Robert Rothstein’s definition proves very useful. Rothstein states that a small power is a
state “which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by used of its own
capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions,
processes or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to do so
must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics.”\textsuperscript{26}

Rothstein is primarily concerned with small powers which feel “they are potentially or
actually threatened by the policies of the Great Powers,” in other words those states
which are within an area of great-power confrontation.\textsuperscript{27} Neorealists have built on this
view and asserted that small states are driven to bandwagon by their inability to mount
opposition to superpowers.\textsuperscript{28}

According to Sims, bipolar systems are inherently more stable, since the two
contenders armed with nuclear weapons fear a mutually-assured destruction scenario.
Superpowers provide protection to small powers in exchange for sharing the burden of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[25] Ibid.
\item[27] Idem, 4, 8.
\end{footnotes}
intelligence gathering and gate-keeping. Moreover, as Sims argues, “because two superpowers will be sensitive to the slightest shifts in the balance of power, subordinate states will have great capacity to trade information for other forms of power.”

If one of the superpowers wishes to reduce uncertainty by unilaterally increasing transparency, like the United States did by initiating détente, then small powers allied with the other superpower can assume the role of a ‘Trojan Horse.’ Small powers can walk through the door opened by the superpower initiating the dialogue, offering the gift of reconciliation and mediation. By securing this foothold, the small power gains access to a wide variety of benefits, which it then shares through secret back-channels with the contending block, transforming the gift into poison.

This pattern of interaction, a peculiar form of intelligence ‘liaison,’ has been characterized in the literature as particularly dangerous for the superordinate partner. What the prior literature has not suggested is that the intelligence advantages obtained by superpowers from triangular relationships trickle down to their satellites, making them more powerful international actors than they would be outside their ‘Trojan Horse’ role.

30 Ibid.
Gaddis and Nijman discuss asymmetry between superpowers, however they do not discuss the ‘Trojan Horse’ concept. As there are no theoretical works on the ‘Trojan Horse’ concept in International Relations, the author of the present paper claims responsibility for the definitions provided.
Sims’ theory casts light on the policy implications of studying Romania’s intelligence capabilities and role during the Cold War, with respect to current developments. In the unipolar world, there are no superpower rivalries to be exploited by small powers, which should enable the hegemonic power to shape international affairs as it wishes.\footnote{Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment” in Rethinking America’s Security. Beyond Cold War to New World Order edited by Graham Allison, Gregory F. Treverton, 295-306. New York: W.W. Norton, 1992.} However, Sims has suggested that a unipolar international system is one in which uncertainty is greater for the superpower because it must cover a larger domain of competition than potential challengers do.\footnote{Jennifer E. Sims, Adaptive Realism: A Theory of Intelligence in International Politics, forthcoming book.} This is because the small states are certain that the hegemon must be watched, even if they have some uncertainties about who the other challengers might be. This uneven terrain of uncertainty will lead, in the case of the superpower, to an ever-expanding intelligence service that drains resources from the state even as its abilities to monitor the rise of multiple competitors decline. This imbalance and vulnerability provides opportunities for small states to use their intelligence services to gain relatively more decision advantages than they would in a bipolar world.

The present research contributes to the literature in two ways. On the one hand, it integrates new materials on Romania’s security strategy, which cast doubt on the traditional view of Romania as a Western-oriented country. It connects the intelligence dimension to the security framework, understood in the light of these new sources. On the other hand, it analyzes the data through a neorealist theoretical lens, which enables
the researcher to recognize certain policy implications. A study of Romanian intelligence focusing on particular events in such a broad time framework contains inherent weaknesses and gaps. The examples discussed in the present paper do not offer the ultimate explanation of the capabilities of Romania’s intelligence services. As more pieces of evidence come to the surface, not only in Bucharest, but also in Washington or in Moscow, the findings of the present study may need to be updated.

SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION AND DÉTENTE: ROMANIA’S INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE COLD WAR

For the Cold War period, most scholars have discussed Romania’s intelligence strength in terms of its ability to suppress domestic dissent and to silence the Diaspora, with the final goal of insuring the survival of the communist regime. However, intelligence policy in Romania also had an external dimension, which in the late 1960s and 1970s instilled fear not only in the Romanian population, but also raised concern in foreign intelligence agencies.\(^{35}\) The present study proposes a broader perspective which integrates Romania’s experience in the global history of the Cold War.

In March 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu inherited a rather weak intelligence community, as the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Directorate had been banned by Moscow until 1951.\(^{36}\) In the aftermath of World War II, the systemic transformations of the international order were reflected in the emergence of the two spheres of influence:


the American and Western bloc versus the Soviet and Eastern bloc. The polarization of
the international arena and Romania’s inclusion in the Soviet bloc gave rise to a security
doctrine which initially focused on isolationism as a defense strategy against the
principal adversary: imperialism.

The intelligence services of the Soviet Union established a strong foothold in
Romania, forcing their junior Romanian counterparts into submission. In the first years
of the Cold War, Moscow was preoccupied with consolidating communism in its new
sphere of influence, prohibiting interactions between its satellites and the outside
world.\textsuperscript{37}

The United States and the West tried to put pressure on the newly established
communist government in Bucharest by refusing to recognize it. Yet these roll-back
efforts had little effect.\textsuperscript{38} As a response to the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation created under the Marshall Plan in 1948 and to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization established in 1949, Moscow initiated its own multilateral frameworks for
regional integration: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, which restricted even more the scope of Romanian foreign and
intelligence policy. This confined space of maneuver affected Romania’s ability to
develop a full-fledged intelligence system.

The year 1956 offered the Romanian intelligence services one of its first
opportunities to alter the international balance of power. By leaking Nikita

\textsuperscript{37} Hugh DeSantis, “Conflicting Images of the USSR, American Career Diplomats and the Balkans, 1944-

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 through Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, the CIA managed to foment unrest in Moscow’s satellites, especially in Poland and Hungary. However, the success was temporary, as the Western world soon proved to be unable to deal with the new dynamics of the international system. For instance, the concomitant outbreak of the Suez Crisis and the Budapest uprising prevented the United States from taking action to support the Hungarian reformers and roll-back the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow’s forceful response to what it perceived to be a crack in Soviet orthodoxy reinforced the underlying bipolar structure of the international system.

The intervention of the Soviet Army in Hungary provided the Romanian intelligence services an advanced course in the art of denial and deception. The government in Bucharest was co-opted in Moscow’s shrewd disinformation campaign, through which the Committee for State Security (KGB) managed to counter any attempts by Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, to resist the Soviet invasion. Yuri Andropov, then Soviet ambassador to Budapest, “demonstrated his mastery of

40 The events in Budapest created a ripple effect in the Hungarian minority in Romania, particularly in large cities, such as Bucharest, Timisoara, Brasov, Cluj, and Iasi. Romanian students of Hungarian descent mobilized to display their solidarity with the Imre Nagy government and to demand the replacement of the communist regime in Bucharest with a democratic one. However, they failed to gain the support of other social groups, like peasants or workers, which made them very vulnerable to the Securitate retaliatory measures. Only 88 people were arrested, and 81 were indicted with sentences from 3 months to 20 years in prison. The Counterintelligence Directorate within the Securitate failed to prove that the revolting students were linked to imperialist agents, for which it was severely criticized by the political leadership. It was perhaps this failure that convinced policy-makers to take initiative and get directly involved in the operation orchestrated by the KGB to overthrow Imre Nagy.
deception, successfully persuading Nagy that the Red Army was being withdrawn while simultaneously plotting his overthrow.\(^{41}\) The plot had begun on November 1, when Khrushchev and Georgy Malenkov, member of the CPSU Presidium, visited Bucharest to instruct Gheorghiu-Dej and his intelligence officers about the plan of the invasion.\(^{42}\) Emil Bodnaras, which several historians identify as a KGB officer operating within the Romanian government, played an important role in the unfolding of the events.\(^{43}\) In his position as Romania’s Minister of Transportation and Communications, Bodnaras allowed Soviet troops to cross Romanian territory on their way to Hungary. Then, together with the leader of the Romanian Workers’ Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, left for Hungary’s capital, Budapest, under the pretext of offering assistance to Nagy.\(^{44}\) The Hungarian Prime Minister asked the Romansians to serve as mediators between him and


\(^{43}\) It was not too unusual for KGB officers to assume leadership positions in the Romanian government. It was a means through which the Soviets insured that Romanian complied with Moscow’s directives. One of the most important examples is Aleksandr Sakharovsky, who organized Romania’s first intelligence service after the advent of communism, later on being promoted as the head of the KGB First Chief Directorate. Another example is the Soviet agent Gheorghe Pintilie, born under the name Pantelie Bodnarenko, who became the first director of Siguranta, in 1948.


Khrushchev, in order to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops.\footnote{Johanna Granville, *Anticipating the Ripple Effects of Military Interventions: A Case Study of the Reactions of Romania and Moldova to the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956*, International Research and Exchanges Board, 2004, 1, \url{www.irex.org/programs/stg/research/04/Granville.pdf}} Nagy’s blind faith in the Romanians’ offer of communist solidarity brought about his subsequent arrest, deportation and incarceration in Snagov, in the vicinity of Bucharest.\footnote{Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Cartea neagra a Securitatii [The Black Book of the Securitate]* in Romanian. 3 vols (Bucuresti: Editura Omega, 1999), 2:29.} After being interrogated by Boris Shumilin, the head of KGB counter-revolutionary department, Nagy was then shipped back to Budapest and executed in July 1958.\footnote{Christopher Andrew, Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB. The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Sceptre, 1991), 435}

While in Budapest, Bodnaras also participated in the restructuring of the Hungarian State Security Service (AVH), by bringing Romanian intelligence officers of Hungarian origin to restore the ranks of the Hungarian intelligence service.\footnote{Cristian Troncota, *Duplicitarii. O Istorie a Serviciilor de Informatii si Securitate ale regimului communist din Romania, [The Duplicitious. A History of Communist Romania Intelligence]* in Romanian. (Bucuresti : Editura Elion, 2003), 214.} Moreover, the Romanian intelligence services managed to penetrate the dissident groups in Hungary by infiltrating officers under Western identities. The purpose of this operation, which some believe to have been orchestrated by Nicolae Ceausescu, was to identify counter-revolutionary forces which could have reached Romania.\footnote{Ibid.} Through this active-offensive counterintelligence operation which relied on selective secrecy and deception, Siguranta enabled decision-makers in Bucharest to foresee and take action against external threats that put the internal security of the regime at risk, boosting what Sims calls “the warning function of intelligence.”

Nagy’s precedent served as a reminder for Soviet satellites that any sign of
disobedience would be severely punished. Yet, the Kremlin started allowing its trustworthy satellites to get involved in international affairs, under KGB’s close supervision.\textsuperscript{50} Romania’s participation in crushing the Hungarian uprising, together with the firm control Siguranta establish over the country, convinced Khrushchev that there was no need for Soviet troops to be stationed in Romania.\textsuperscript{51} Prior to the withdrawal of the Red Army, Moscow made sure to strengthen Romania’s counterintelligence operations, by integrating them in a multilateral framework, together with Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{52} The Romanian intelligence services leaked the news to American diplomats, in an attempt to manipulate Washington’s view about Moscow’s grip on its satellites.\textsuperscript{53} Romania was supposed to make the United States believe that the USSR was no longer willing to maintain a strong military

\textsuperscript{50} Christopher Andrew, Oleg Gordievsky, \textit{KGB. The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev} (London: Sceptre, 1991), 435.


Robert Thayer to the Secretary, Assessment of Situation in Rumania, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C., January 27, 1958, United States National Archives and Records Administration, RM/R File, 766.00/1-2758.
presence in South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, since Romania was the only country in the Soviet bloc to obtain such a concession from Moscow, it could attract the attention of the West and thus create the conditions for a denial and deception operation.54

However, the involvement of the Romanian government in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising did not pass unnoticed in Washington. US diplomats in Bucharest were cognizant of the fact that Romania facilitated the transportation of Soviet troops from the Soviet Union to Hungary.55 Romania’s relentless efforts to please Moscow were not backed by robust counter-intelligence measures, to prevent the West from understanding the intentions of the government in Bucharest. As a consequence, Romania’s attempts to convince the West that it decided to move away from the Soviet bloc were initially rather unsuccessful.

 Nonetheless, the head of the US Legation in Bucharest, Robert H. Thayer, was not aware of the depth of intelligence liaison between Romania and the Soviet Union and firmly believed that the US could “woo the Rumanians [sic] away from dependence on the Soviets” through economic, cultural and scientific exchanges.56 Thayer recognized the danger that the Romanians may want to “[have] their cake and [eat] it too,” in other words, that it will try to enjoy all the benefits without breaking its relations with the Soviets. The solution he proposed was to “cut off immediately all

55 Robert H. Thayer, Despatch from the Legation in Romania to the Department of State, Bucharest, November 14, 1956, Department of State, Central Files, 611.66/11-1456, Confidential.
56 Ibid.
trade negotiations of any kind and permit no more export licenses to be issued to Rumania [sic].” However, the American diplomat did not suggest any means through which the US could mitigate the advantages that the Romanians obtained from goods and technology already transferred. Nor did he make any recommendations with respect to monitoring Romania’s activities, other than increased diplomatic activity. However, diplomatic contacts could not compete with Romania’s adroitness in using selective secrecy.

Meanwhile, the KGB continued to train the Romanian intelligence services, probably hoping to strengthen their counterintelligence capabilities. This schooling increased their professionalization, yet, poor oversight and collapsing trust weakened the relationship between Romanian decision-makers and intelligence officers. Gheorghiu-Dej ruthlessly eliminated high-ranking intelligence managers, which convinced some circles in the United States that the old guard disappeared. These repeated purges only aggravated the lack of communication between policy-makers and intelligence services. As the memoirs of former intelligence officers reveal, on some occasions, the political leadership completely lost touch with the activities of the intelligence services that were supposed to serve them. For instance, the relationship between the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Directorate (DIE) and the KGB was in the beginning stronger than between DIE and the Romanian government. This asymmetry

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
indicates that the aforementioned lack of communication had more severe harmful consequences than policy-makers in Bucharest would have expected.

In December 1958, the Foreign Intelligence Directorate (DIE) deployed Major Mihai Caraman, an intelligence officer serving both Romania and the KGB, to Paris, in one of the largest sabotage operations against NATO. Until 1969, Caraman provided Moscow with NATO strategic plans, helping the Soviet Union better predict the reaction of the Western world in tense situations. The Romanian spy network infiltrated NATO headquarters by recruiting Robert van der Vielle and Francis Rousilhe, both within the Secret Documents Section of NATO’s Translation Bureau. Moreover, DIE also penetrated the office in Quai d’Orsay of the World Bank, the headquarters of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the French Ministry of Economy and Finance. The wide variety of targets covered by the Caraman network indicates an improvement in DIE’s collection capabilities. However, this advance was set back by the lack of central management from Bucharest. Until 1964, all the intelligence gathered by the Caraman network was entirely sent to the KGB, which provided the resources for running the operation. After 1964, Caraman continued to supply Moscow with intelligence through a back channel, in spite of Romania’s claims

---

of independence. Between 1958 and 1969, DIE demonstrated acumen in exploiting France’s position toward the United States to weaken the Western bloc, to Moscow’s benefit. Caraman’s success attracted numerous young intelligence officers in the realm of clandestine operations, boosting the ranks of the Military and Foreign Intelligence Directorates. Thus, penetrations that served the interests of the Soviet Union first and foremost also contributed to a more effective intelligence collection capability for the country willing to do Moscow’s ‘dirty jobs.’

The Sino-Soviet split signaled a new phase in the evolution of the international system, which suited Romania’s ambitions to influence the dynamics of the superpower confrontation. As the Communist leadership in Beijing sought to assert its power position first within the socialist bloc and then on the international arena, Romania seized the opportunity to enhance its independent rhetoric. As the schism between the two most powerful players in the communist bloc deepened, Gheorghiu-Dej played the role of mediator. Romania’s involvement in the clash of the giants bolstered its international prestige, making the West hope once again that the strength of the Soviet

---

Union was waning.\textsuperscript{64} Contrary to their official pro-Beijing position, the Romanian communists continued to back Moscow.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, by sending intelligence officers to mediate the dispute, Gheorghiu-Dej could timely sense any shift in the international balance of power, increasing the warning function of the Romanian intelligence services.

The Soviet Union managed to keep Romania within its gravitational pull, using it as a source of intelligence on Beijing’s intentions, especially in the turmoil created by Khrushchev’s downfall. In February 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej sent a party delegation to Beijing, including Nicolae Ceausescu and Emil Bodnaras. The latter’s double position as a Romanian official and a KGB agent insured that Moscow was kept informed of any moves on behalf of the Chinese. The purpose of the delegation was to persuade the Chinese leadership to suspend their polemics against Moscow for at least six months, or, better, for a year and then to organize an international conference to discuss the controversial issues.\textsuperscript{66} This delay was essential for the Kremlin, which in the early months of 1964 was deeply affected by the internal struggle between Nikita Khrushchev

\textsuperscript{64} Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate. Soviet Foreign Policy, February 19, 1964, O/DDI Registry: Job 79-R01012A, Secret., retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.
Upon Khruschev’s removal from power, the CIA stated that “There are no indications that the new Soviet leaders mean to try to impose a strict authority,” a belief which was probably at the origins of the poor anticipation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
\textsuperscript{66} Transcript of the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Politburo of the Romanian Workers’ Party, February 28, 1964, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund of the Political Bureau of the Romanian Workers’ Party, folder 207/28.III.1964, 4.
and Leonid Brezhnev, supported by the KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny and former KGB head Alexander Shelepin.\(^67\) The Chinese waited until Brezhnev assumed power in October 1964, after which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Moscow in an attempt to mend the broken relations, only to discover that the Soviets remained firm on their positions.\(^68\)

Romania exploited its role, using it as a form of power in its relationship with Moscow.\(^69\) In exchange for its contribution to Moscow’s lead in the superpower confrontation, Romania was given the opportunity to intensify its contacts with Western countries, which increasingly viewed Romania as a potential trade partner. Continuing the duplicitous policy of independence inaugurated in 1958, in April 1964 the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) launched its most virulent attack to date against the Soviet Union. Known as the “April Theses,” the declaration issued by the RWP, blamed Moscow for the crisis of the international communist movement and called for the removal of KGB officers from the ranks of the Romanian intelligence services, in particular the Securitate (the successor of Siguranta). Soviet sources indicate that the Romanians coordinated with the Soviets before issuing the declaration.\(^70\) This recent


\(^{69}\) In exchange for its mediating efforts, the Romanian government asked for supplies of energy resources, namely coal, which China readily provided at no cost. This barter proved advantageous to the Soviet Union, since it could cut down its coal exports to Romania, which in turn reinforced the image of independence, especially within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

\(^{70}\) In an interview with Romanian historian Armand Gosu, Vladimir Bukovsky, the famous Russian dissident, declared that he saw the document in the Soviet Archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
finding suggests that one of the goals of the RWP was to use this declaration to open the
door to the Western world, and thus grant the Soviets access to previously unavailable
intelligence. After creating the illusion of a clash, the CPSU and RWP continued their
fruitful collaboration. From this position of seeming independence, Bucharest appealed
to Western countries for technological assistance, effectively launching an industrial
espionage operation under the cover of economic cooperation. DIE targeted Great
Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States for transfers of
advanced technology, loans and know-how.\textsuperscript{71} These benefits were afterwards transferred
to the Soviet Union, granting it an advantage in its economic competition with the
Western world. While the West was spending hundreds of millions of dollars on
research and development, the Soviet Union could obtain it for a fraction of the price

\textsuperscript{71} Pierre Accoce, Jean-Daniel Pouget, \textit{Le réseau Caraman. 13 Roumains font trembler l'OTAN [The
Caraman Network. The 13 Romanians that Made NATO Tremble]} in French (Paris : Fayard, 1972), 54.
[Romania – Federal Republic of Germany. The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations 1966-1967]}, in
Romanian (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Archives Division, Bucuresti: Editura
Enciclopedica, 2009) documents:
Nota de informare a Reprezentantei Comerciale romane in RF Germania adresata Ministerului Afacerilor
Externe al RS Romania referitoare la dezvoltarea cercetarilor nucleare in RF Germania [Note from the
Romanian Trade Mission in FRG to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to nuclear
research development in FRG], March 16, 1967, doc. 55, 136-141.
Comunicare a Directiei III Relatii a MAE al RS Romania adresata Reprezentantei Comerciale romane la
Frankfurt am Main, referitoare la activitatea acestei misiuni diplomatice [Message from the IIIrd
Direction within the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Trade Mission in Frankfurt
am Main, with respect to the activities of this diplomatic mission], April 11, 1967, doc. 59, 147-149.
with the help of the Romanian ‘Trojan Horse.’

Soon after assuming power in March 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu accelerated Romania’s efforts to acquire American oil drilling technology, the most advanced in the world at the time, which would have helped Romania increase its output of petroleum products on the world market. While the Department of Defense, Department of Interior and Department of Commerce opposed Ceausescu’s efforts, the impetus for cooperation with Bucharest came from the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. The Department of State based its policy on Bucharest’s ‘good behavior,’ such as defiance of Moscow and willingness to engage with the Western world.

Yet, Secretary Rusk used several arguments which suggest that he had a poor understanding of the internal situation in Romania. First, he mistakenly attributed Nicolae Ceausescu the position of ‘prime minister,’ which indicates that he misunderstood the political hierarchy of the Romanian regime. Second, he assumed that the deceased leader of the Romanian Workers’ Party was Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and not Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Maurer, who was Gheorghiu-Dej’s Minister of Foreign Affairs for a long time, remained in power until 1974, occupying various positions and insuring the continuity of Dej’s legacy in Romania. The CIA and the DOD, although

---


74 Ibid.

75 There are a few possible explanations for the mistakes contained in Rusk’s arguments. On the one hand, it is possible that the CIA and the DOS did not communicate efficiently. Most CIA weekly reports
possessing better intelligence on the situation in Bucharest, could not oppose Rusk. CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline used Romania’s trade in petroleum products with North Vietnam, Communist China and Cuba to underline the deceitful nature of the request. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and Interior Secretary Steward Udall pinpointed another issue: Romania presented little guarantees that it would not duplicate and re-export the drilling equipment.

“[…] the USSR is very much in need of advanced deep drilling equipment and Romania [sic] could not hold our equipment and technology away from the USSR.”

The panel estimated that it would take Romanian engineers 2 to 3 years to copy the equipment provided by the US, a task mainly assigned to the SD Directorate within the Securitate. The CIA Deputy Director also noted that in 1964 Romania signed “a new agreement with the USSR to exchange technical know-how in oil, chemical and other industrial fields.”

Secretary Rusk, however, appealed to the necessity of establishing “a policy of differentiation,” similar to that implemented toward Yugoslavia and Poland. He also

from that period contain accurate information. Since the DOS did not, it is likely that it did not consult with the CIA.

On the other hand, the interpretation which Rusk gave to the foreign policy orientation adopted by Romania was deeply rooted in previously, over-optimistic assessments, expressed by previous US diplomats in Romania. These assessments started from the assumption that Romania ethnically and culturally belonged to the West and that the Romanian hard-core communist leadership was the least numerous in Eastern Europe.


Idem, 408.


proved willing to take the matter to President Johnson, in case Bucharest’s requests were denied. Poor coordination between State Department and CIA and DOD proved to have worked to Romania’s advantage. Eventually, the panel agreed to the transfer of advanced catalyst material, anti-knock compound, while denying for the time being advanced catalyst technology and advanced petroleum exploration equipment. The CIA and the DOD correctly assessed the process through which Romania was passing on information to the Soviet Union. KGB agents exfiltrated the data gathered by Romania through diplomatic contacts and industrial espionage under the cover of the State Committee for Economic Liaison (GKS) subordinated directly to the USSR Council of Ministers.79 This mechanism, kept secret from most policy-makers and intelligence managers alike, insured that Moscow was getting the intelligence it needed, allowing Romania in exchange to maintain the façade of independence80.

The relaxation of superpower relations during the era of détente created a new set of requirements for the Romanian foreign intelligence service. With intensified international contacts, DIE officers had to demonstrate versatility and flexibility. The Securitate adopted new recruitment criteria for its officers: instead of workers or peasants, Romanian intelligence officers pursued recent graduates, especially in Law, with strong language skills.81 Contrary to the message that Ceausescu tried to send to

80 Ibid.
the West, that his intelligence services had no connection to the Soviet Union, many intelligence officers, at regional and central levels, attended specialization courses organized by the KGB or GRU. This training not only increased their productivity and efficiency, but also secured a lasting relationship with the Soviet Union.

Collection duplication remained a perennial characteristic of the Romanian intelligence services throughout the Cold War period. Decision-makers sought to prevent individual departments within the Securitate from gaining too much power relative to the political leadership, and therefore assigned the same task to two or more units. For instance, surveillance of foreign citizens was performed simultaneously by various departments in the national intelligence apparatus, such as DIE, border troops,

---

82 Recently released documents reveal the names and positions of several intelligence managers who were trained in Moscow: Lt.-Colonel Ionescu Dumitru (Director of the regional branch of the Ministry of Interior in Iasi County), Lt.-Colonel Vlad Iulian (Head of the Training Division within the State Security Council, promoted in 1972 as Head of Criminal Investigations and in 1989 Head of the Securitate), Lt.-Colonel Andreescu Gheorghe (nominated for the position of Director of the regional branch of the Ministry of Interior in Arges County), Colonel Borsan Ion Dumitru (Deputy Director of the General Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, promoted in 1972 as the Head of the Counterintelligence Directorate), Lt.-Colonel Burlacu Victor (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Constanta County), Colonel Dumitrascu Niculai (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Bistrita-Nasaud County), Hritan Nicolae (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Maramures County, party member since 1946), Ilie Puscas (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Salaj County, party member since 1954), Colonel Erdelyi Elemer (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in Harghita County), Lt.-Colonel Rizea Craiu (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in Braila County), Major-General Popescu Constantin Romeo (nominated in 1972 for the position of brigade commander in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate), Major-General Ristea Ioan Gheorghe (nominated in 1974 as head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in Mures County), Lt.-Colonel Csomoos David Alexandru (nominated in 1974 as head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in Mures County), Colonel Blaga Ion Stefan (Deputy Director of the Counterintelligence Military Directorate), Major-General Stan Nicolae (head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in Bucharest).

These documents cover the period 1967-1974, when Ceausescu was trying to create the impression of a purge through which the old-guard was purged. However, as these documents suggest, the affiliation of these high-rank officers with Gheorghiu-Dej and the Soviet Union did not represent an impediment in their promotion.

police forces, passport regional bureaus, national press agency and the national tourism
bureau. While the existence of these parallel agencies imposed additional financial
burdens on intelligence managers, Ceausescu managed to transform it into a strength,
by rendering collection less conspicuous. These coordinated operations boosted DIE’s
ability to maintain a low profile, which was a prerequisite for making the independence
façade more credible and thus to attract Western targets to Romania.

One of Ceausescu’s most impressive achievements was the inculcation of the
illusion of autonomy into the mindset of his intelligence services, especially DIE. The
materials currently available suggest that very few intelligence officers were aware of
the liaison between the Securitate and the KGB. His anti-Soviet rhetoric convinced a
large majority of the population, including the Counter-intelligence Directorate, which
uncovered some of Ceausescu’s Moscow liaison officers, such as Gen. Floca Arhip,
Vasile Petrut, Ion Serb, or Iulian Ungureanu. Instead of arresting and debriefing them,
Ceausescu released them to the Soviet Union or degraded their military ranks, but never

---
83 Idem, 2: 364-374.
84 Minutes of Conversation between Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae
Ceausescu and Secretary General of the Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest V.I. Drozhdenko, August 25,
1972, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of RCP, Foreign Relations Division,
folder 90/1972, 3-5.
Minutes of Conversation between Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae
Ceausescu and V.S. Tikunov, Minister-Councilor at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, September 18,
1972, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of RCP, Foreign Relations Division,
folder 104/1972.
Minutes of Conversation between Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae
Ceausescu and Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, January
16, 1973, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of RCP, Foreign Relations Division,
85 Cristian Troncota, Duplicitarii. O Istorie a Serviciilor de Informatii si Securitate ale regimului
communist din Romania, [The Duplicitous. A History of Communist Romania Intelligence] in Romanian
(Bucuresti : Editura Elion, 2003), 138-147.
convicted them for treason or espionage. The two levels at which DIE operated, motivated by the need to preserve the secrecy around the connection with the KGB, affected its cohesion and ultimately resulted in various cases of ‘fratricide.’ The effectiveness of these passive-offensive counterintelligence operations against segments of the DIE itself, relying on camouflaging KGB officers within the Romanian security apparatus, implied cultivating a weaker active-defensive strategy, which would prevent uncleared intelligence officers from finding out about the back channel from debriefings and interrogations.

The Vietnam War exposed the vulnerabilities of the United States and offered Ceausescu and DIE an opportunity to weaken the Western bloc even more, through industrial espionage operations. Ceausescu anticipated Richard Nixon’s ‘linkage policy’ and offered to help the United States in the conflict in South-East Asia by facilitating negotiations not only with the North Vietnamese, but also with the Soviet Union and China. The complex, adversarial liaison between Romania and the United States, established with the help of both official diplomats and under cover intelligence officers involved trading information about the intentions of the leaders in the communist bloc for technology transfers.

86 Idem, 145.
In order to make the Americans less suspicious of the quid-pro-quo, the Romanians operated through multiple simultaneous channels. Soon after diplomats delivered the messages they were entrusted with by the North Vietnamese, delegations from the Romanian State Committee for Nuclear Energy quickly arranged meetings with the political leadership in Washington, in an effort to secure the needed technology. Romania’s tempting offer of asymmetric liaison was well-received by the Americans, who failed to notice Ceausescu’s true intentions. As Sims predicts, the superordinate partner in a complex, asymmetric liaison relationship is likely to become vulnerable in relation to the subordinate partner, allowing it to dictate the dynamics of the relationship.88

In the first months of 1968, the United States believed that the war in Vietnam was coming to an end. Ceausescu, through his special envoys and intelligence officers, carefully fed that belief by delivering positive and peaceful messages from Hanoi. However, this operation may have been aimed at misleading policy-makers in Washington and diminishing their ability to react to North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive. One of Ceausescu’s special envoys, George Macovescu, the Deputy Foreign Minister later to be promoted Romania’s Foreign Minister, made sure to keep the Soviets informed by consulting with the Kremlin before delivering the message to the

88 Telegram from the Secretary at the Romanian Embassy to Hanoi, S. Celac, to the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, George Macovescu, January 17, 1968, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Folder, obtained by Mircea Munteanu for the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Telegram from the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu to the Romanian Ambassador to Washington, D.C., Corneliu Bogdan, January 16, 1968, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Folder, obtained by Mircea Munteanu for the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Moreover, as the Romanians were claiming to be a channel of communication between Hanoi and Washington, they were also delivering Soviet weapons to the North Vietnamese. The relationship Ceausescu maintained with Washington may have helped Moscow understand when the North Vietnamese would be under attack, enabling the Soviets to provide timely assistance.

In parallel, the Romanian Nuclear Energy Committee continued its efforts to gain access to nuclear technology. On March 27 1968, Myron B. Kratzer, Assistant General Manager for International Activities with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), reported on the state of Romania’s nuclear program before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Although the AEC was fully aware of the potential military use of nuclear technology, it decided to grant the technology Romania requested, pointing to the advantages such a decision had for the US economy. The fact that the AEC was not aware that a few days before, on March 6-7 1968, Romania adamantly refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia suggests that the intelligence community did not communicate properly with the

---

89 Minutes of Conversation between M.A. Suslov, Secretary of the CPUS CC and Teodor Marinescu, Romanian Ambassador to Moscow, January 24, 1968, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Folder, obtained by Mircea Munteanu for the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Summary of the 2nd Visit to Hanoi of Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, George Macovescu (January 18-February 1, 1968), February 3, 1968, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Folder, obtained by Mircea Munteanu for the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.


91 Letter from Myron Kratzer to Ioan Ursu, October 17, 1969, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Series: Travel Chronological Files, Romania, box 721, folder 4, 2, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
Executive Branch, or it had little influence in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{92} The State Department had known about Bucharest’s position since March 1, 1968, when George Macovescu informed Dean Rusk of Romania’s position on the NPT.\textsuperscript{93} Romania’s initial refusal to sign the NPT reinforced, however, Ceausescu’s claims of independence from Moscow. He argued that “the NPT did not provide any guarantees that nuclear weapons could not be used against non-nuclear countries,”\textsuperscript{94} and that signing such a document would mean that the Soviet Union could continue its imperialist policy over communist countries. Later on in 1968, in a low-profile visit to Moscow, the Romanian leader signed the treaty, even if no changes were brought to its substance.\textsuperscript{95} This episode suggests that through the effective use of selective secrecy, Romania and the Soviet Union continued to cooperate on strategic issues.

The heavy water plant negotiations and the refusal to sign the NPT evidenced two enduring traits in Romanian intelligence. On the one hand, the Romanian intelligence services would try to hide their intentions in plain sight, taking advantage of the poor counterintelligence capabilities and the inefficient integration of intelligence in the case of their rivals. On the other hand, as long as Romania would share the intelligence it gathered with the Soviet Union, it was allowed to use the DIE ‘Trojan Horse’ to influence the decision-making processes of Moscow’s rivals.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.

This type of deception operation implied that the Soviet Union had to incur some losses. For instance, on some occasions, Romania provided the West with information on Moscow’s intentions and capabilities. Moreover, Ceausescu’s anti-Russian rhetoric sometimes proved to be an embarrassment for the Soviets at international level. As Moscow seemed to be unable to maintain the Soviet bloc cohesive, many countries believed that the Communist leadership in the Kremlin was severely weakened. However, the Kremlin accepted Ceausescu’s self-proclaimed maverick position because he created the illusion in the eyes of decision-makers in the West that the balance of power could be shifted to their advantage.

---

96 For instance, in 1964, the Romanian President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy, Gheorghe Gaston-Marin discussed with Averell Harriman the state of Romanian-Soviet nuclear cooperation. One of the biggest worries for the Americans was the fact that Romania had been supplying in the 1950s and 1960s significant amounts of uranium ore. The CIA actually deployed the CORONA satellite to monitor the uranium extraction sites in North-Western Romania and the routes that took the ore to the USSR. Romanian documents reveal that between 1951 and 1965 Romania delivered 19,000 tons of uranium to the Soviet Union. In 1964, while Romania was still supplying the Soviet Union with uranium ore, Gaston-Marin claimed that “Rumania [sic] had uranium which it prefers to put into generating electric power rather than in fissionable material.” Gaston Marin tried to build Romania’s bona fide by admitting that it was a supplier of uranium ore to the Soviet Union. However, he did not tell the entire story, as even after his visit Romania continued to supply the USSR with uranium. This episode suggests that selective secrecy was the preferred strategy through which Romania tried to infiltrate the West, while defending the interests of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Ioan Ursu and Horia Hulubei continued Gaston-Marin’s policy. Romania’s perseverance and eventual success indicates that its national intelligence systems were robust, since foreign agencies could not penetrate them and find out the real intentions of the Romanian communist leadership.


Minutes of the Meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, April 6, 1970, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Chancellery Section, folder 44/1970, 15.

After Prague Spring in August 1968, the Romanian communist leadership skillfully exploited the “maverick” reputation it acquired by defying Brezhnev’s ‘limited sovereignty’ doctrine. Only a few months after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in November 1968, AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg invited the delegation from the Romanian State Committee for Nuclear Energy, headed by Horia Hulubei and accompanied by Ionel Purica and Marius Petrescu, on a tour of nuclear installations in San Francisco, Chicago, Boston and Oak Ridge. Seaborg and Hulubei signed a Memorandum of Cooperation providing for reciprocal exchanges of information regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy between the two countries.

What Seaborg seems to have been unaware of was that in 1958 CIA encountered Hulubei for the first time, at the workings of the committee “Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests.” According to the CIA report, Horia Hulubei had no knowledge of the facts of the conference, his “presentations were obviously prepared by the Soviets and [he] did not contribute to the work of the conference.” The fact that Seaborg did not manifest any concern about Hulubei’s past relationship with the Soviets suggests that he may never have seen CIA’s previous assessment. Hulubei’s influence over Seaborg might

99 Ibid.
100 Violations of Possible Agreements on a Suspension of Nuclear Tests, Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, October 28, 1958, retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.
have been the result of poor coordination between AEC and CIA, combined with an effective denial and deception operation on behalf of the Romanians.

Moreover, as archival documents reveal, the Romanian State Committee for Nuclear Energy was probably seeking to acquire intelligence on security measures that the West was taking with respect to nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{101} The US was also unaware that at the time Bucharest cooperated with Moscow on designing and producing equipment for radiation detection, a matter for which the intelligence obtained by the Romanians may have been useful.\textsuperscript{102} Romania’s advantage in selective secrecy reinforced the intelligence liaison that Ceausescu maintained with Moscow, which could use the Trojan Horse that Bucharest put at its disposal to influence the competition with the United States.

The presidency of Richard Nixon gave additional impetus to these technology transfers. His visit to Bucharest on August 2, 1969 marked a turning point in East-West relations, as Romania became the first socialist country visited by an American president.\textsuperscript{103} He believed the Romanians were a useful channel in negotiations with Beijing and Hanoi.\textsuperscript{104} The status of ‘maverick’ that Ceausescu acquired on the

\begin{flushright}
\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{101} Letter from Myron Kratzer to Ioan Ursu, October 17, 1969, Glenn Seaborg Papers, Series: Travel Chronological Files, Romania, box 721, folder 4, 2, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.


\textsuperscript{103} Intelligence Information Cable, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1969, United States National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files – Europe, Romania, Vol. I-8/69, Secret.

\textsuperscript{104} Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard M. Nixon and President Nicolae Ceausescu, August 2, 1969, United States National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu, Top Secret.
\end{quote}
\end{flushright}
international arena served the policy of ‘differentiation’ that Nixon tried to implement. The message he tried to send through his special relationship with Romania was that Washington was willing to negotiate with communist regimes as long as they did not follow the official line imposed from Moscow. He attempted to influence the balance between the Soviet Union and the United States by exploiting the cracks in the communist bloc. However, Nixon’s strategy lacked two important elements: an effective monitoring system, to verify the commitment of the junior partner in this asymmetric complex liaison, and a prompt reaction mechanism, to retaliate in case the junior partner broke the terms of the agreement. Romania took advantage of the vulnerabilities inherent in Nixon’s complex asymmetric liaison, managing to conceal its relationship with the Soviet Union through the use of selective secrecy. Ceausescu used Nixon’s visit to bolster his domestic legitimacy and his posture on the international arena.

Cooperation on nuclear technology was the first topic addressed by Ceausescu in his meeting with Nixon on August 2, 1969, which suggests the importance that the Romanian political leadership attached to this field. After his visit, Nixon urged the Atomic Energy Commission to approve Romania’s bid for the heavy water plant, sending Seaborg on a special trip to Bucharest. At Ceausescu’s instructions, the Romanian State Committee for Nuclear Energy designed a very shrewd transfer

Memorandum of Conversation between President Richard M. Nixon and President Nicolae Ceausescu, August 3, 1969, United States National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu, Top Secret.

Ibid.

mechanism, purchasing mainly technology licenses, which diminished the leverage that the United States could exert over Romania’s nuclear program. Once Romania got hold of the license, it could modify it, patent it and re-export it, either to the Soviet Union or to the Third World, outside of US’ reach. The memoires of DIE’s Deputy Director, Ion Mihai Pacepa, reveal that Brezhnev personally asked Ceausescu to acquire these licenses, which suggests that Romania played the ‘Trojan Horse’ role once again.\textsuperscript{107}

The heavy water plant represented only the first stage in the deception operation meant to drain the West of technological secrets. The Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) became Ceausescu’s next target. Over a 10-year period, the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Services gained access to 75\% of the CANDU technology: security systems for nuclear plants, heavy water production technology and equipment as well as construction plans for nuclear power plants built in Canada, West Germany and France.\textsuperscript{108} The fact that Romania was the only country to obtain heavy water technology from the United States and Canada suggests that it managed to punch above its weight. Hoping that “our enemy’s enemy is our friend,” the West provided Romania with the international support it needed to advance its intelligence officers in strategic forums. Ion Mihai Pacepa argues that almost everything the Romanian intelligence services obtained on nuclear technology reached the KGB.\textsuperscript{109} Documents from the Romanian Archives reveal that the Communist leadership in Bucharest drafted their national

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
nuclear strategy in close cooperation with the Soviets. Moscow’s involvement in this dimension of Romania’s national security strategy implies that the Kremlin was hoping to get its own benefits from the arrangement. Although the documents currently available do not provide any details on how the USSR integrated the information it obtained from Romania, it can be assumed that the intelligence Bucharest obtained on security systems could have been used to increase the ability of the Soviet intelligence services to penetrate Western facilities.

As the Middle East became yet another theater of confrontation between the two superpowers, Romania suddenly expressed its interest in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict, as an impartial third-party. Washington welcomed Ceausescu’s proposal, having full confidence in his ‘friendly’ intentions. Yet, this peace initiative introduced the Romanian intelligence services to a new dimension of international politics: that of non-state actors. The rise of terrorism provided Romania with more opportunities to influence the structure of the international system. For instance, Israel’s trust in the Romanian communist leadership increased when the Counterterrorism Directorate within the Securitate (USLA) thwarted several Palestinian attacks on Israeli diplomats stationed in Romania. In 1969, USLA managed to infiltrate a group of Palestinian students, who were planning to kidnap and assassinate the Israeli Ambassador to Bucharest. USLA had access to all the details of the operation: the means, timing and

---

110 Minutes of the Meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, April 6, 1970, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Chancellery Section, folder 44/1970.

111 Rumania: The Maverick Satellite, October 1968, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030017-8, 10, retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.
tactics devised to carry out the attack. It first neutralized the Palestinians’ offensive capabilities, modifying their weapons so that they could not be used in the attack. Then, it blocked the access to the embassy, under the pretext of an impromptu road reparations operation, organized with the help of local authorities. After having been arrested and debriefed, the Palestinians were forced to leave Romania, at Ceausescu’s request.\footnote{Cristian Troncota, \textit{Duplicitarii. O Istorie a Serviciilor de Informatii si Securitate ale regimului communist din Romania}, [The Duplicitous. A History of Communist Romania Intelligence] in Romanian (Bucuresti : Editura Elion, 2003), 76-83.}

USLA thwarted an even more important terrorist attack planned by PLO against Golda Meir during her second visit to Romania in May 1972.\footnote{Ibid.} A few hours before Meir’s visit to the synagogue in Bucharest, DIE received a warning from its office in Beirut. With no time to infiltrate the terrorist cell that plotted the attack, USLA launched a very rapid offensive, neutralizing the attackers upon their arrival at the synagogue. The Counterterrorism Directorate, through effective control over its international branches, prevented a worsening of the situation in the Middle East, contributing at the same time to Ceausescu’s goal to maintain good relations with both Israel and the Arab world. USLA’s ability to provide decision-makers with an advantage in a relative short period of time after its creation suggests an effective integration of intelligence into the policy-making cycle.\footnote{Cristian Troncota, \textit{Duplicitarii. O Istorie a Serviciilor de Informatii si Securitate ale regimului communist din Romania}, [The Duplicitous. A History of Communist Romania Intelligence] in Romanian (Bucuresti : Editura Elion, 2003), 76-83.}
The Yom Kippur war of 1973 threatened to upset the balance of power between the US and the USSR, as Egypt sought to establish a position of superiority to obtain concessions from both Israel and the US in the peace process.\textsuperscript{115} The Soviets sought to increase their presence in the Middle East not by perpetuating the Arab-Israeli conflict but by means of participating, as sponsors and guarantors together with the Americans, in the peace process.\textsuperscript{116} Romania closely followed the Moscow’s line, which strove to prevent Israel and Egypt from reaching an agreement with the help of the US. Through both intelligence and diplomatic channels, Ceausescu pursued an aggressive campaign to sway the course of events in the direction dictated by Moscow. For instance, throughout 1973, Romanian envoys transmitted messages back and forth between Tel-Aviv and Cairo, trying to convince the two countries that US intervention would be unbeneﬁcial. The solution Ceausescu suggested was for Israel and Egypt to hold conﬁdential direct talks.\textsuperscript{117} Ceausescu made another attempt to transmit Israel’s message to the Egyptians on the occasion of his visit to Rabat on September 21, 1973. He asked King Hassan II to tell President Sadat that “some circles in Israel would like to negotiate directly.”\textsuperscript{118} On October 17, the Egyptian Ambassador in Bucharest


\textsuperscript{117} Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Sayed Marei, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt, March 9, 1973, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 24/1973, 17.

\textsuperscript{118} Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Hassan II, King of Morocco, September 21, 1973, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RWP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 291/1973, 11.
requested Ceausescu’s assistance in the peace negotiations, inviting the Romanian leadership to Cairo to discuss the matter with President Anwar al-Sadat.\textsuperscript{119} Sadat requested that Ceausescu invite the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, to Bucharest and convince the Israelis to consider a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{120} The Israeli Cabinet accepted and Eban arrived in Bucharest in the middle of the hostilities, on November 6, 1973. Upon his arrival, Eban realized that the invitation was a diversion, as Sadat’s message did not leave room for concessions on Egypt’s part.\textsuperscript{121} He also realized that Ceausescu was supporting the Egyptian plan, demanding an Israeli withdrawal from the area west of the Suez Canal, which was what the Soviets also wanted.\textsuperscript{122} The urgent and promising tone of the invitation was meant to distract the attention of the Israelis from the situation on the battlefield, so that Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) could gain an advantage, implicitly to Moscow’s advantage.

\textsuperscript{119} Minutes of Conversation between the Delegation of the Romanian Communist Party – Bucharest Circumscription, and Anwar el-Sadat, to Deliver the Message of Friendship from Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, Cairo, October 24, 1973, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 234/1973, 5.

\textsuperscript{120} Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Osman Asal, Ambassador of the, Arab Republic of Egypt to Bucharest, October 17, 1973, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 193/1973, 2.


While Moscow soon realized that Sadat was a lost cause, Syria and PLO continued to be two vital instruments in the Kremlin’s policy in the Middle East. According to Moscow’s directives, Romania provided the PLO with financial assistance, military equipment and diplomatic support. The Romanian-Palestinian relationship was institutionalized through the creation of a permanent PLO legation in Bucharest, which facilitated communications and boosted cooperation between the RCP and the PLO. The support Ceausescu granted to the PLO represents the harmful poison that he was trying to insert in the Israeli camp, under the illusion of a peace negotiation effort. By claiming to be an impartial player attempting to broker an agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis, Ceausescu managed to affect the regional

Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Delegation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, August 19, 1974, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 165/1974, 15.
Note from the Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest, V.I. Drozhdenko with respect to the visit of Palestinian Liberation Organization delegation to Moscow, August 1974, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 325/1974, 56-100.
125 The PLO legation enjoyed all diplomatic privileges and the special PLO representative met frequently with Ceausescu, informing him about PLO’s intentions.
Note from the Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest, V.I. Drozhdenko with respect to the visit of Palestinian Liberation Organization delegation to Moscow, August 1974, Romanian National Central Historical Archives, Fund CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations Division, folder 325/1974, 67-82.
balance of forces by covertly providing the camp supported by the Soviet Union, in other words, the Arabs, with financial assistance and indispensible intelligence on the intentions of the adversary. This diplomatic effort helped Ceausescu’s domestic policies, as he managed to secure a promise from oil-rich Arab countries that Romania would not be affected by the spikes in the prices of energy resources.126

Romanian intelligence officers started developing a long-lasting relationship with their PLO counterparts, adopting some of their tactics. After 1979, USLA began training its employees in Beirut, under PLO’s supervision.127 Ceausescu used his counterterrorism specialists and his contacts with the PLO for targeted assassinations of


Romanian dissidents working for Radio Free Europe in Paris. For instance, in June 1981 RFE commentator Emil Georgescu was stabbed 22 times in his own apartment in Paris by PLO operatives hired by DIE. Another prominent opponent of Ceausescu’s repressive regime was Monica Lovinescu, brutally beaten in her home in Paris. The defection of Matei Haiducu, a DIE officer who was in charge of silencing the diaspora, provided the West with very important information about Ceausescu’s real intentions. These poor counterintelligence measures started to erode the effectiveness of DIE’s operations. The Western world, particularly the United States, attempted to put more pressure on Ceausescu to respect basic civil rights and to implement internal reforms. However, this effort came too late, as Ceausescu already managed to consolidate his grip on power, being willing to make few if any concessions.

After reaping the benefits of the bipolar structure of the international system for decades, Romanian intelligence as a whole suffered a major blow with the 1978 defection to the United States of the Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Intelligence, Ion Mihai Pacepa. Disgruntled with the system he was supposed to serve, Pacepa joined the Western camp, uncovering Romania’s back channel to

---

130 Idem, 155.
132 Ion Mihai Pacepa was also personal adviser on foreign affairs to Ceausescu. He entered the Romanian intelligence service in 1951, when he was 23. He is the highest-ranking Soviet-bloc intelligence officer ever to defect to the West.

*Industrial Espionage Activities of Soviet Bloc, July 1984, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP86M00886R001200070004-1, 1, retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.*
Moscow. The Communist leadership reacted by repeatedly restructuring DIE in an attempt to protect itself from the attacks of Western intelligence agencies, which gained a valuable insight into the inner workings of the Romanian intelligence services. Many operations targeting the West and the Third World were cancelled, preventing the Communist regime from gaining access to the much needed loans, raw materials and technology. With internal repression worsening and vital intelligence about his foreign policy agenda revealed, Ceausescu found himself marginalized in international affairs. DIE and all other Romanian institutions involved in foreign intelligence activities faced severe difficulties in their operations, being of no use to the Romanian communist leadership or to the Soviet one. The weakening of Romania’s intelligence capabilities after the major counterintelligence failures that plagued DIE at the end of the 1970s suggests that in some cases, a small country attempting to influence the international system may get burnt in the flames it was trying to fan.


The Archives of the Securitate indicate that in September 1978 Ceausescu purged the following intelligence managers: Major-General Bolanu Gheorghe (Unit Commander in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate), Major-General Angelescu Gheorghe (Deputy Unit Commander in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate), Major-General Luchian Eugen (Secretary of the National Passport Authority), Major-General Popescu Romeo (Head of the National Passport Authority), Major-General Ghenoiu Ion (Chief of Staff of the Border Corps), Colonel Rizea Craiu (Head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Braila County), Colonel Burlacu C. Victor (Head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Constanta County), Colonel Hitan Nicolae (Head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Maramures County), Colonel Puscas Ilie (Head of the regional Intelligence Directorate in the Salaj County). The affiliation with Moscow of some of these intelligence officers was discussed on footnote 77.


With the decline of the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, Romania lost the advantages it had accumulated throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. By playing the independence card in a bipolar order through a skillful, comprehensive denial and deception operation, the Romanian intelligence services managed to gain access to international forums that would otherwise have been out of Romania’s reach. The wide variety of environments in which DIE operated, together with the close ties that the political leadership cultivated with intelligence managers, insured that decision-makers were offered timely, relevant information for their policy needs. However, the politicization of intelligence and the repeated purges aimed at strengthening the control of the Communist party over the Securitate prevented the emergence of a truly professional service, and triggered the defection of important intelligence managers, like Pacepa. Moreover, the indoctrination of intelligence officers with Marxism-Leninism ideology skewed their interpretation of international affairs, reducing their ability to foresee the downfall of the Soviet Bloc. Pacepa argues that DIE officers often lied about the benefits that technological espionage operations were bringing to the Romanian economy. This phenomenon indicates that the relationship between intelligence officers and decision-makers was dysfunctional, preventing the latter from

---


efficiently implementing the policies that would have given Romania an overall stronger position on the international arena.

THE UNIPOLAR MOMENT: THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF STUDYING THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe allowed the Western bloc to claim victory in the superpower confrontation. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that no single country could pose a serious enough threat to US’ security and ultimately, to the stability of the international system.\textsuperscript{139} Nonetheless, the euphoria ended soon after, as new threats emerged and the US intelligence community faced difficulties tuning its capabilities to the new circumstances.\textsuperscript{140} As Jennifer Sims predicts in her theory, the new structure of the international system did not favor the hegemonic power, i.e. the United States.

However, Washington was not the only place where the legacy of the Cold War had a long-lasting effect. Romania was one of the countries to resist reform, preferring to remain in the crumbling Soviet sphere of influence. Some factions within the Romanian intelligence services continued to hope that Moscow would recover from its

\textsuperscript{139} Christopher Andrew, \textit{For the President’s Eyes Only. Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush} (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 503-541.


downfall. As a result of their opposition to the social, political and economic transformation on the international arena and within Romania, the December 1989 popular uprising ended up as the bloodiest revolution in the entire Eastern Europe. Both military and civilian casualties were blamed on “terrorists”, a term which Dennis Deletant explains as an attempt to “rationalize opposition to the fledging authority of the revolutionary government.”

In the aftermath of the 1989 Revolution, the Romanian intelligence services were hardly affected by the arrests and trials filed against the top communist leadership. As a matter of fact, in August 1990 Mihai Caraman, the former head of the Counterintelligence Directorate and the recipient of KGB decorations, was reactivated in his function as head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Other intelligence managers, such as Lieutenant General Gheorghe Vasile, the military counter-intelligence chief, together with Colonel Gheorghe Goran, head of the Bucharest Securitate Department, were acquitted of all charges. General Aristotel Stamatoiu, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, was given a prison sentence but he

144 Ibid.
was released shortly after his incarceration. Some of these intelligence managers and policy-makers, such as Ion Iliescu, Alexandru Barladeanu or Dumitru Mazilu, were already well-known in Washington, as they were Ceausescu’s international envoys during the 1970s. Moreover, the information that the American Intelligence Community may have obtained from the defection of Ion Mihai Pacepa made it easier for the US to understand the intentions of the new Romanian government. Ion Iliescu tried to hide the fact that he had requested the help of the Soviet Union in the midst of the December Revolution, which may be interpreted as an attempt to maintain Romania’s role as a ‘Trojan Horse.’ Yet, he could not win the support of the United States, which implied that Romania’s international posture also weakened. With the advent of a free media in Romania, decision-makers and intelligence managers in Washington were better informed about the internal situation. Open source intelligence proved extremely valuable for decision-makers and intelligence managers in Washington, in their assessments of the likely course on which the new regime in Bucharest would embark.

In May 1990, as groups of people, peacefully protested against the results of Romania’s first democratic elections, the recently installed government resorted to the miners to break up the crowds, publicly thanking them afterwards. Coal miners from the

148 Urgent Message from Bucharest to Director J. Makosa, December 23, 1989, Archive of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated by Tomasz Kluz.
Jiu Valley were brought to Bucharest and asked to “restore order.” The new regime set the requirements for the miners, blaming the havoc in Bucharest on students, professors, and journalists. As they roamed through the Romanian capital, the miners targeted people that appeared to be intellectuals: wearing glasses or Western clothes, showing that the conspiracy-theory mindset instilled by the Securitate endured. The fact that these abuses were broadcast live on television enabled the US to take issue with the events rather promptly and warn Bucharest of the consequences that these internal developments could have on Romania’s ability to financial assistance from the developed world, which was paramount given the poor state of the Romanian economy. As the Iliescu government made little if any amends about the violence it fomented, the international community chose to isolate it.

Between 1990 and 1997, the interest of the Western world in Romania was minimal, starting from the premise that the first post-communist regime was merely “old wine in new bottles.” Romania tried to replay the intermediary role it assumed during the Cold War, with little success. It offered its support to some of US’s political and military actions, such as 1991 Gulf War, or the 1993 757 UNSC resolution to impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. In 1995, the political leadership in Bucharest claimed to have redefined its foreign policy goals, opting for NATO and EU accession. Nonetheless, the US, aware of the presence of former Securitate officers in

151 Ibid.
153 Idem, 45-47.
the new government, refused to grant Romania the recognition it needed to restore its status as an important player on the international arena. Romania’s denial and deception capabilities declined to such a level that the Western world no longer needed to deploy sophisticated TECHINT or HUMINT assets to obtain the necessary information. The actions of the new government, broadcast on television, spoke for themselves.

It was the victory of democratic, pro-Western forces in 1996 that convinced the West to give Romania another chance. As Sims’ theory predicts, the United States decided to recruit Romania as a ‘sentinel’ in the Balkans, co-opting the Constantinescu government into its operations in Yugoslavia. In 1997 and 1998, Romania granted NATO forces access to its air space, in spite of Russia’s support for Serbia. In this manner, the US managed to reduce the level of uncertainty inherent in the new configuration of the international system. However, the intelligence services, in particular the Romanian Information Service (SRI), intensified their efforts to prevent a rapprochement with the United States. High-ranking intelligence managers in SRI proved unwilling to cooperate with President Constantinescu, threatening to destabilize the country once again. Moreover, Moscow opposed Bucharest’s NATO bid, conditioning its support on strategic issues such as nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet republics with concessions on behalf of the West with respect to NATO enlargement.\(^{154}\)

Yet, the contacts established with NATO led the way to intensified bilateral intelligence liaison and to procurement of new technical collection capabilities. The US

\(^{154}\) Ibid.
offered Romania a series of incentives to become a reliable ‘sentinel,’ inviting the Romanian armed forces to participate in the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), which aimed at increasing interoperability with NATO structures and the creation of the necessary institutional framework for enhancing the democratic control of the military.155 Moreover, in 2000 the US funded the establishment of an Export Control System, instrumental in enhancing Romania’s counterterrorism intelligence capabilities.156 These programs allowed Washington to monitor Romania’s performance, being able to get early warning on any attempts from the old-guard of the Securitate to revive the ‘Trojan Horse.’157

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 proved to be a window of opportunity for the Romanian government, which had the chance to profess its commitment towards the Strategic Partnership it signed with the United States in 1997. On September 19, 2001, the Romanian Parliament gave its consent for Romania’s support toward the United States, acting as a de facto NATO member. Joseph Harrington notes that Romania offered its help but no one asked for it, putting its airspace and airbases at the disposal of the US and later deploying troops in the military intervention launched by the US in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom.158 In exchange, the United States augmented its assistance to Romania in the field of training

156 Idem, 30.
157 Ibid.
military intelligence personnel. The US Counter Terrorism Fellowship (CTFP) program, which trained officers from the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service (SRI) and the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) within the 1st Romanian Special Forces Battalion, has been instrumental in increasing Romania’s Special Operations Battalion and THTs readiness for deployment, as well as for expanding inter-agency cooperation and intelligence sharing. Likewise, US Navy SEAL, Green Berets, Delta Force, Marine Force Recon education and training programs trained a great number of officers within the Romanian Rapid Intervention Units. The US Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) conducted annual programs in intelligence, including democratic control of the intelligence, intelligence and combating terrorism, ethics in intelligence, the intelligence and the media, which brought together both intelligence professionals and representatives of the parliament, government and civic groups.159 These programs were aimed at deepening the Romanian-American bilateral relationship and at achieving the successful transformation of the Romanian intelligence apparatus. The US counted on Romania’s past relationship with terrorist groups to illuminate the new structure of the international system, transforming the sentinel into a regional lighthouse.

The benefits of this strategy soon became obvious, as the performance of the intelligence units detached by Romania met the expectations of the US and the allied forces. In Iraq, Romania’s intelligence efforts received the appreciation of US

leadership and of other partners in the international coalition, such as Poland. In December 2006, the Pentagon appointed a Romanian general to coordinate the Intelligence Operations Directorate of the Multinational Force. In addition, the commander of the Ad-Dwanivah Polish Division praised the Romanian human intelligence capabilities, which, under pressing conditions, provided early warning to the allies.  

However, the Romanian intelligence services did not manage to prevent all terrorist infiltrations, posing a threat to the security of the US and the allied forces as well. Lavinia Stan and Rodica Milena Zaharia quote a 2004 declaration by Osama bin Laden, which stated that his organization had offered financial support to high ranking members of the Romanian government. In 2005 the Gendarmerie Anti-Terrorist Battalion managed to identify and neutralize an Al-Qaeda cell targeting the Bucharest subway system. The core of the cell included Musaab Ahmed Mohamed Mujalli, Khaledoon Walid, Monir Nabhan, Yousuf Ali Mohamed Al Balushi, Aymen Ahmed Fouad Jadkareem and Asad Abrar Qureshi. The operation to neutralize the cell was deployed after two years of surveillance and tracking. The extent to which the Romanian Counterterrorism Directorate allowed the terrorist cell led by Mujalli to continue its activity suggests that the Romanian intelligence services may not be as robust as they used to during the Cold War. At the same time, the delay with which the

---

160 Idem.
161 Al-Qaeda may have targeted Romania as it was the weakest link in an international coalition determined to annihilate terrorism.
Counterterrorism Directorate reacted may have enabled it to gather more intelligence, so as to develop more effective disruption campaigns.

During his third term, from 2000 to 2004, President Ion Iliescu cultivated close ties with Omar Hayssam, a Syrian businessman who soon after Traian Basescu assumed power in December 2004, orchestrated the abduction of three Romanian journalists in Iraq. According to the prosecutors, Hayssam planned to organize the abduction, then provide the authorities with intelligence on the location of the victims, with a view to emerge as the savior of the journalists. Hayssam wanted to use the reputation he would have acquired after solving the crisis against prosecutors who were investigating him for financial fraud. Yet, the Counterterrorism Directorate caught him one week after the abduction, which took place on March 28, 2005. Hayssam managed to escape from prison, during a medical check, after invoking health issues. His flight to Syria triggered the resignation of the head of SRI, Radu Timofte, and that of the head of Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), Gheorghe Fulga. This episode implies that the Romanian intelligence services are still vulnerable to terrorist penetrations, in spite of the sustained effort made by the United States to improve Romania’s counterintelligence capabilities. Moreover, the fact that the Omar Hayssam episode caused such a strong reaction at the

Raluca Dumitru, Basescu: Exista informari trimise lui Ion Iliescu si Adrian Nastase despre ilegalitatile lui Omar Hayssam. Le voi desecretiza [Basescu: There are memos sent to Ion Iliescu and Adrian Nastase about Omar Hayssam’s illegal activities. I will have them declassified], Gandul, November 13, 2009, http://www.gandul.info/politica/basescu-exista-informari-trimise-lui-ion-iliescu-si-adrian-nastase-despre-ilegalitatile-lui-omar-hayssam-le-voi-desecretiza-5102481
top of the intelligence community suggests that the political leadership may not have given the IC enough support in dealing with failure. A dysfunctional relationship between decision-makers and intelligence managers may degrade the ability of a state to defend its interests on the international arena.

A few lessons can be drawn by comparing recent developments in Romania with its Cold War experience. Western powers should put pressure on the government in Bucharest to sideline the former communist leadership more effectively. Romania could face difficulties in preserving the benefits it has been obtaining from its relationship with the US unless it demonstrates an ability to break with the past. In its search for sentinels, Washington should rely on a strategy which includes punitive measures to enable it to respond to the incapacity of the junior partner to respect its commitments. The superpower could chastise its subordinates by restricting funding for modernization and interoperability programs, by withdrawing its political support and even by altering the balance of power in the neighborhood of the small power. If the subordinate power feels its regional power position is threatened, it may instill more discipline in its intelligence apparatus, which would boost its defensive capabilities and would increase its robustness as a sentinel. The hegemonic power should advertise itself as the sole reliable guarantor of security, so that junior partners do not attempt to become local or even global challengers themselves.

CONCLUSION

In a bipolar system, a superpower may become vulnerable when accepting offers for intelligence liaison from former enemies. While it is true that “keeping your friends
close and your enemies even closer” could be a sound policy, this alliance of convenience can nonetheless prove harmful. Therefore, before engaging former enemies, a superpower should establish the bona fide of these spontaneous “allies,” carefully assessing their stakes in the conflict.

Small powers are also exposing their vulnerabilities when functioning as ‘Trojan Horses.’ A two-layered intelligence system, which allows for the establishment of back channels, may result in poor counterintelligence, and coordination. By pursuing such deceitful practices, small powers lose their credibility to both domestic and international audiences. Application of this expanded neo-realist theory of intelligence power on the Romanian case can offer a better understanding of the circumstances in which a satellite state is most likely to gain power disproportionate to its capabilities, as traditionally measured. It can help superpowers, like the United States, understand the risks and opportunities inherent in shifts in polarity in the international system, as well as in partnerships established with small countries with powerful intelligence communities. In a bipolar system, smaller allies with good intelligence capabilities can assume the role of a ‘Trojan Horse’ in an attempt to sway the course of events to their best advantage. In a unipolar system, small states cannot play a ‘balancing role’ anymore, and will more likely seek to change the focus of their discourse, from the distribution of power to identity-building and shared values.

The application of the neo-realist framework to Romania’s example shows that ideology, the factor that has received most of the attention in the study of Romanian intelligence, has a limited explanatory value with respect to the relationship between
intelligence institutions to the power and status of the state. Adopting a neo-realist perspective could help filter out the propagandistic use of foreign policy.

Studying Romania’s intelligence strength and its reaction to the shifts in the distribution of power at the international level contributes to the neo-realist theory of International Relations. The ‘Trojan Horse’ concept suggests that small countries will try to hide their bandwagoning behavior under the pretext of balancing and vice-versa. Ceausescu relentlessly rejected the view that Romania was bandwagoning with the Soviet Union, branding his foreign policy as a non-aligned one, although he never withdrew from the Moscow-led Warsaw Treaty Organization or from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Thus Romania exploited the policies of “differentiation” employed by the West and granted Moscow access to otherwise inaccessible targets.

Some intelligence services in the West and the Third World did not question Ceausescu’s self-proclaimed ‘maverick’ status. Many analysts and policy-makers believed that his independence was the result of a shrewd strategy of playing the two powers against each other. It is true that Ceausescu realized that Romania could not affect the international system through the use of threats or even military force. He engaged with the West and obtained significant advantages from his sporadic lambasts against Moscow. Yet, as the recently released documents integrated in this study

---

166 Rumania: The Maverick Satellite, October 1968, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030017-8, 10, retrieved from CREST, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park.
suggest, through his foreign policy, Ceausescu could provide significant advantages to the Soviet Union, opening doors that were inaccessible to the Kremlin. His position on strategic matters was almost always aligned with that of the Soviet leadership, with whom he consulted before making any significant move on the international arena. He managed to hide this association, through the selective use of secrecy and helped Moscow alter the balance of power in the era of détente.

Romania’s behavior in the first years after the collapse of the communist government partially contradicts this view, showing that small powers may have difficulties in adapting to the new structure of the international system, being unable to tune their intelligence services to deal with the new configuration. In 1989, in spite of the wave that swept Eastern and Central Europe causing the collapse of the Communist bloc, the Romania intelligence community did not anticipate the fall of the Soviet Union. The new government inherited many politicians and intelligence managers from the communist regime, which made it easier for the United States to understand the nature of the new regime in Bucharest, accurately interpreting their behavior through a Cold War lens. Romania was not a ‘new player’ on the international arena, in spite of the bloody revolution of December 1989 and the commitment the new leadership professed to democratic principles and values. The reaction of the US when confronted with “old wine in new bottles” was to isolate Romania from 1989 to 1995, showing that hegemonic powers can take advantage of the weaknesses of smaller competitors and diminish the increased degree of uncertainty inherent in the unipolar world.
Sims’ theory also explains why, after initial isolating Bucharest, the United States chose to engage the Romanian government and establish a strategic partnership with it. With the election of President Emil Constantinescu, which marked the victory of democratic, genuinely pro-Western forces, Washington recruited Romania as a sentinel, to illuminate regions that were relatively less known to the West, namely the Balkans and the Middle East. As Sims predicted, it was still possible for Romania to gain competitive advantage in a unipolar system by trading its access to knowledge of threats at the periphery in exchange for political, economic, or military assistance from the over-stretched hegemon.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest.
Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool, United States National Archives and Records Administration Library, College Park, MD.
Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
Romanian National Central Historical Archives (ANIC), Bucharest.
United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Private Papers


News

BBC
Amos News
Gandul
Global Politician
Hotnews
Revista 22
Reuters
The Washingtonian

Documents and Official Publications


