A Comparison of Great Power and UN Peacekeeping in post-Cold War Africa

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By

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, no region of the world has experienced more demand for peace operations than sub Saharan Africa. Whether under the auspices of the United Nations, regional or sub regional organizations or the interventions of great powers, Africa has seen more peace operations than anywhere else on the planet. And yet the record of success for these missions is decidedly mixed. To take one set of examples, there have been four separate peace operations conducted in Somalia in the past twenty years and yet the conflict in that country continues to rage. On the other hand, one mission in Mozambique has seemed sufficient to help that country transition out of civil war. Given such a disparity in results and the sheer number of operations and participating nations, the question arises: who is more effective at performing peace operations in Africa? This paper will examine this question by comparing the efficacy of United Nations and great power peace operations.¹

This question is of increasing importance in recent years for a variety of reasons. First, while the number of active peace operations worldwide has declined over the years, the percentage of active African peacekeeping missions has increased, making this the most important theater for peacekeeping operations. Second, the size and complexity of these operations have increased as well. For example, the mission to DRC

¹ For the purposes of this paper, great powers are used to collectively reference members of the P5 who have conducted peace operations separate of UN command and control. In the context of Africa, this limits the discussion to Britain, France and the United States.
is the largest peacekeeping mission operated by the UN with over 16,000 peacekeepers in the field. Third, the number of missions only seems likely to increase in Africa in the coming years. The ongoing conflict in Darfur, while already commanding the attention of five different UN/AU missions could well yet see further intervention. The AU mission in Somalia appears to be drawing down, but given the history of intervention in the country, its continued instability and the rise of piracy off its shores, future intervention seems possible. Finally, there are always wildcards in the system which can be difficult to predict, but one could easily speculate that countries such as Zimbabwe, Guinea or Guinea-Bissau could see some form of international intervention in the coming decade.

Returning then to the issue at hand, the question remains: by whom is effective peacekeeping to be accomplished? The hypothesis of this paper is that great power intervention is the most effective form of peacekeeping in Africa. This hypothesis is based on a casual review of operations and literature, but seems borne out by the success of the British in Sierra Leone (Operation Palliser) or the French in DRC (Operations Artemis). Immediately the reader will question how effective those operations were, but I intended to draw a distinction between the aforementioned operations and concurrent UN multilateral missions.

Indeed the research plan for this paper is to utilize a comparative case study approach utilizing several African peacekeeping missions as the data set. Within each selected mission there generally exists a dyad relationship that can be further explored.
As an example, within the case of Sierra Leone there exists both the UN mission (UNAMSIL) and the British mission (Operation Palliser). This will allow for comparisons both within and across cases. The full list of cases to be considered is: Somalia (UNOSOM I/II and Operation Restore Hope), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL/UNOMSIL and Operation Palliser), The Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC and Operation Artemis). To serve as a “control set” and avoid a selection bias of only selecting peace operations with the aforementioned dyadic nature of great power involvement, I will also look at the case of Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

In order to investigate this issue, this paper will begin with a review of relevant literature and from there derive criteria for determining the measurements of success for an operation. From there, it will examine the four aforementioned cases and analyze each of them with regards to the criteria for success and conclude by considering all missions together, derive lessons learned for potential policy makers and practitioners and suggest paths for future research.

Before commencing with the review of literature, there are several definitional issues and research decisions that must be addressed. There is a great deal of debate within the literature about the difference between peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement or other terms such as nation building. The definitions for these terms can vary widely in their precision as well. For example the US military defines peacekeeping as: “Military Operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long term political settlement” and Peace Enforcement as: “Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”\(^2\) The United Nations by comparison does not have a formal definition of either term,\(^3\) but the Department of Peacekeeping Operations does provide a working definition of peacekeeping as: “Action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”\(^4\) The UN has a similar definition of peace enforcement to that of the US military, although it does differ in that it emphasizes the importance of Security Council approval for an enforcement mission.\(^5\) Other authors vary in their definitions as well. Ultimately there is general agreement that peacekeeping refers to a mission undertaken with the consent of the parties involved and peace enforcement does not imply endorsement of the parties, although it may have the endorsement of an outside agency such as the Security Council. Since this paper examines both types of missions and, to avoid confusing the matter with yet another definition, it will use the term ‘peace operations’ to refer to these types of operations in a collective sense. This can be viewed as a compromise as obviously these two types of missions do have slight differences between them, but ultimately they have the same goal – that of establishing a self

\(^4\) UN (2008) 97  
\(^5\) Ibid
sustaining peace. It will also make reference to Chapter VI and Chapter VII UN missions. Colloquially, missions authorized under CH VI can be thought of as peacekeeping missions and CH VII missions as peace enforcement. This is common phrasing both within the literature and by practitioners but not fully consistent with UN doctrine.

Additionally, this paper does not address the history of peacekeeping as performed by regional or sub-regional organizations in Africa. This is predominately due to the relatively recent reorganization of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union – as such the AU simply does not have a sufficient track record of peace operations to examine and it seems unfair to blame the AU for the failings of other, earlier operations. Given the AU’s involvement in Darfur and Somalia, it may well be useful to examine their contributions in the coming years.

**Literature Review**

Given the breadth of the field and the numerous authors which have written on peace operations, it is somewhat difficult to find consensus on how to determine the efficacy of peace operations, to say nothing about the numerous supporting studies and questions which exist within the literature. While this review does try to synthesize some of these questions into several general groupings, is useful to begin by considering one study on its own as it is the one study which does provide a direct comparison of
UN and non-UN peace operations. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl’s study is a large-\(N\) quantitative analysis of 145 civil wars from 1945 until the end of 1999.\(^6\) They hypothesize that, after controlling for the particulars of various operations, there should be no difference in the performance of UN vs. non-UN operations. Instead however they find that non-UN operations have no significant effect on peace while UN operations have a large and significant effect on peace. Their study does not obviate the need for this paper as there are several significant differences between their approach and that of this paper. First, their measures of effectiveness are sovereign peace – defined as no war recurrence, no residual violence and no divided sovereignty – and participatory peace – a coding variable defined as a measure of political openness – for two years after the end of the war.\(^7\) The problem with using such a short time horizon will be discussed below, but between that restriction and their study’s data cut off, their analysis only fully captures two of this paper’s four cases. Additionally, this paper is focused strictly on the comparison of UN vs. great power led peacekeeping and not on non-UN operations per se. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl’s data set is coded in such a way that it does not take into account this specific distinction. For example, in Somalia they have two entries, one concerning Somalia from 1988 to 1991 and a second entry from concerning 1991 to the present. They code their data in this manner as they are also testing the effects of no peace operation, but the second entry is more germane for this paper as there were three

\(^6\) This data set is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2006)
peace operations in the period 1992 until 1995. Additionally Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl’s data set codes the type of UN operation as “Enforcement” – which, while true for some of those operations it was not true for all – and does not code for a non-UN mission in Somalia at all while this paper will argue that UNITAF was for all intents and purposes a US operation.

Schulhofer-Wohl’s study, despite its aforementioned problems is still useful in that it provides a direct comparison of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. When considering the broader peacekeeping literature, there is great deal less agreement amongst various authors about what constitutes effective peacekeeping or how to measure it. After considering several authors however, there are some strands of general agreement or interest that emerge from the doctrine.

The first is the concept of impartiality – that the peace operation should not favor any one particular side in the conflict. This doctrine is especially pronounced in either earlier writings or by earlier writers on the subject as this was considered extremely important for Cold War and early post-Cold War consent based peacekeeping missions, although even more recent writers still stress its importance. Paul Diehl, in *International Peacekeeping* emphasizes this point in particular when states that neutrality is a fundamental tenet of peacekeeping.⁸ Returning to Schulhofer-Wohl, they hypothesize that UN operations are more successful than non UN operations because of the fact that the UN enjoys greater legitimacy due to its perceived impartiality although they concede

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⁸ Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1993) 64
that controlling for impartiality may well be impossible.\(^9\) Virginia Fortna, in *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, also considers the case of impartiality when she speculates that peacekeepers are able to succeed in their mission based on their “moral authority” or perceived international legitimacy – particularly in consent based peacekeeping operations. She acknowledges however that this can be problematic and is more likely to be effective in cases of interstate war rather than civil wars.\(^10\) Fortna’s point about comparing interstate to intrastate here is important. It helps explain why earlier writers were more concerned about impartiality in an era when interstate conflicts were more prevalent and also serves as a warning that academic thought may not keep up with actions on the ground as the UN’s drive to remain “impartial” during its initial operations in Bosnia did not result in success. The point about impartiality being important for consent based operations is important though and suggests that impartiality may be an important component of some missions but is not necessarily critical in all.

Closely related to the concept of impartially is indeed that of consent – do the parties to the conflict want and acquiesce to outside actors assisting in the resolution of the conflict. Again, this is an older metric in the study of peacekeeping and perhaps better suited to assessing interstate conflicts as opposed to missions designed to oppose non-state spoilers. Lise Howard in *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* and Fortna both argue for the consent of actors in operations as a necessary – although in Howard’s case,

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\(^9\) Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 273
not necessarily sufficient – condition for a successful operation. Howard’s analysis is based on ten cases, but all of them are relatively early examples of post-Cold War consent based peacekeeping. In essence a tautology arises – consent is necessary for consent based peacekeeping. But this paper is concerned with peace enforcement as well – what role does consent have on an enforcement operation?

Another method of evaluating the success of peace operations is what I categorize as “Metrics Based” as a shorthand. As differs from a large-\(N\) quantitative or regression analysis, a metrics based study attempts to compare a variety of quantitative measures – number of troops deployed, police per capita, etc in order to assess the relative success of various peace operations. The best study within this realm is James Dobbins’ three volume assessment of American, EU and UN nation building. This three volume series considers a total of twenty two cases for Europe, the UN and the US attempts at nation building which he defines as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government”.\(^\text{11}\) This definition differs slightly from the issues this paper explores as I do not limit my investigations to post-conflict scenarios nor am I necessarily interested in the establishment of representative government. As for Dobbins’ methodology, he compares twenty two cases of nation building and compares all of them with regards to five inputs

\(^{11}\) James Dobbins, ed., Europe’s Role In Nation Building (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008) 3
and five outputs of quantitative comparison. The strength of Dobbins’ work – as it relates to this paper – is the depth and breadth of his cases although his case selection makes it difficult to generalize from his results. For example he considers the US experience in the reconstruction of both Germany and Japan which are, of course, quite different in degree and kind from post Cold War peace operations.

However, his metrics for the measuring of – or at least comparing – success are also somewhat problematic. For example he considers as an input to success the number of troops per 1000 inhabitants. I am leery of the use of troop-to-task metrics in this manner as they do not account for several factors. By way of comparison, the traditional metric for the success of a military unit attacking a defending unit calls for a force of 3:1. Using various enablers such as better intelligence, artillery or air support for example, a unit may be able to overcome the traditional math. In the same sense, simply comparing troop to civilian ratios cannot account for training, the situation on the ground, etc. To Dobbins’ credit, he does not state that there is a “correct” ratio he merely compares the ratios across the various operations and even states that his metrics may not be the best, only that they are ones for which more less reliable data was available. This of course leads into a measurement problem which is obvious when comparing the troop to civilian ratios his cases. To take a small example, for the cases in this paper the troop to civilian ratio as outlined by Dobbins ranges from a low .30 soldiers per 1000

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12 For Dobbins’ metrics, this paper will generally rely on the Europe’s Role in Nation-Building as it is the last book in the series and has the most comprehensive data sets, with the data having been updated from earlier volumes.
13 See figure 9.2, Dobbins (2008) 211, 209
civilians to a high of 5.7 soldiers per 1000 civilians – and yet there is no correlation with mission success as the two successful missions had ratios between those two extremes.\textsuperscript{14}

Additionally, the notion of using “troops” as a metric is problematic as well as it assumes that “troops” are fungible. In truth of course, given a certain number of deployed troops only a fraction are actually directly involved in peacekeeping with rest performing support functions. Consider an example from the US Army – an infantry battalion in 2004 battalion contained 735 soldiers, but this number would include everyone from riflemen to mechanics to the chaplain. The total number of actual troops who would be routinely be involved in actual combat or peace operations on a day to day basis would actually be somewhere between 400-450. Trying to evaluate missions based on types of units deployed rather than troop numbers is also problematic – simply counting the number of battalions for example could prove misleading as even within the US Army battalion sized units can vary wildly in size. Ultimately it is for these reasons that this paper rejects this sort of cross case quantitative analysis as simply lacking in fidelity.

There are three other lines of thought which are better described as issues bearing on the efficacy of peace operations rather than outright metrics by which to measure them. The first of these is case selection. That is, do certain practitioners select into harder cases and thereby affect their success or failure. Dobbins’ conclusion is that

\textsuperscript{14} This is very general example and it is not possible based on Dobbins’ data to break out the ratios for the great power interventions separately from the UN interventions. Therefore Somalia and DRC are the outliers while Sierra Leone and Mozambique are the middle cases. See figure 9.2 in Dobbins (2008) for more information.
the UN has been generally better at nation building than the US and although he does not provide definitive answers, he speculates that it could be related to case selection, that the US selects cases which are intrinsically more difficult and that the UN has done a better job of learning from its mistakes over the period from 1990 to 2005. By comparison, Fortna concludes that peacekeepers *in general* select into the hardest cases with those cases being defined as those situations where the chance of the conflict reoccurring is the greatest.\(^{15}\) Likewise she determines that the supply of peacekeepers is at least partly determined by the actions of the belligerents themselves. That is to say that the deployment of peacekeepers favors the status quo so that consent based peacekeeping is more likely when rebels are stronger and governments are weaker.\(^{16}\) On the other hand peace enforcement missions only require a decision on the part of the international community. Interestingly, Fortna finds that enforcement missions are more likely in countries which have a peace treaty but which also exhibit higher levels of mistrust and multiple factions.\(^{17}\) This last point is important because it leads to a discussion of what exactly constitutes a “hard” case. While outside the scope of this paper, it seems that defining hard vs. easy cases could constitute its own research design. For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to conclude that peacekeeping in the aftermath of intrastate conflict is harder than after interstate conflict and as such, should not be a variable for any of the examined cases.

\(^{15}\) Fortna 172  
\(^{16}\) Fortna 23  
\(^{17}\) Fortna 45
A second consideration is the degree to which an organization is able to learn from its experiences and inculcate those into its future operations. The biggest proponent of this element is Howard, who considers what she describes as first and second level learning in UN operations. By first level learning, Howard is interested in how the mission itself has learned and adapted over the course of its operation, although she is also interested in second level learning – or how the UN itself learns between missions and applies lessons learned to future operations.\textsuperscript{18} Notably, Howard directly contradicts Dobbins’ assertion that the UN has been a learning organization. While she finds numerous instances of first level learning at the mission level, she describes a UN which, as an organization, has been extremely slow to learn lessons between missions and inculcate those lessons across new missions. Indeed, Howard leaves one with the same impression about UN missions that the Dobbins leaves with US ones – both organizations have had the tendency to organize them as if they are their first missions.

A final consideration, and germane to this paper, is the degree of great power involvement. Paul Diehl writes extensively on this in his book, \textit{Peace Operations} although he also considers this to some degree in \textit{International Peacekeeping} as well. In \textit{Peace Operations}, Diehl has updated his book to include more recent examples but it is disappointing that his thinking on the issue has not changed as much. Diehl continues to be unimpressed with great power participation in peace operations – he acknowledges that great powers do have the ability to play a role in a conflict, but states that that role

\textsuperscript{18} Lise Morjé Howard, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 327
may be better played as impartial, supplemental role in support of the broader peace operation.\textsuperscript{19} Later, he acknowledges reality by stating that great powers have been – and may in the future – essentially be subcontracted by other international organizations to lead peace operations, thereby solving capacity problems.\textsuperscript{20} He laments this however as he states that these operations would not necessarily be accountable as he presumes that these states will protect their own interests first. This is a problematic view on two levels. First, even if we assume his hypothesis that great powers will look out for their own interests, if they do act in an “imperialistic” manner, they are accountable to their domestic constituencies or, barring that, to the organization that authorized their operation in the first place. A great power that did operate in such a manner would likely find its mandate for the operation challenged, not be allowed to lead such operations in the future, or may wind up threatening any future regime of great power interventions in lieu of multilateral ones under the auspices of an organization. Since great powers presumably would want to intervene as a single power to avoid the use of a multilateral grouping, it is difficult to see how the interests of the great power would be served by undermining itself. Moreover, Fortna has already addressed some of this argument. She does not address the involvement of great powers directly, but does find that there is no decrease in peacekeeping because of great power interest.\textsuperscript{21} To put it another way, great

\textsuperscript{20} Diehl (2008) 163
\textsuperscript{21} Fortna 34
powers do not show an increased tendency to prohibit multilateral peacekeeping in areas that the great power has cultural, historical or strategic resource interest.

Returning briefly to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, they make a point which is particularly relevant for this paper when they assert that, based on their analysis, a non-UN operation in the same conflict as a UN operation may complement the effectiveness of the UN operation (emphasis mine).\(^22\) Returning to the question of the reinforcing effect of UN vs. non-UN operations, they see a significantly improved relationship specifically between UN operations and non-UN operations from “advanced” countries (such as Europe and the US) which they hypothesize may be due technical capabilities of those nations, increased focus on peace enforcement rather than peace keeping or the fact that great power involvement signifies great power interest and commensurate support for the UN mission as well.\(^23\) They conclude by suggesting a better approach for analysis is to isolate at a high level of detail what characteristics are present in successful peace operations, which is generally the direction this paper intends to take.

Finally, within the literature, there are number of theorists whom, if they do not provide definitive theories of what constitutes effective peacekeeping, do provide useful considerations to take into mind as one attempts to develop a set of metrics. Returning to Diehl, he does have several salient points that are worth consideration. While Diehl does not provide specific metrics of success or failure of peace operations, he does provide several guidelines to help think about the process. First, success may be relative. Just

\(^{22}\) Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 254
\(^{23}\) Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 271
because one element of a peace operation “succeeds” it does not necessarily that the
mission itself has succeeded. Second, he addressed the issue of timelines in assessment.
There is great debate about whether to assess success or failure in a short term context or
a long term context. Diehl points out this is not at all an either/or question. Certainly a
long term assessment is more valuable, but to wait that long would prohibit making
judgments in time to be relevant to current or near-future operations. Finally, he
considers whether missions should be compared against one another or assessed against
a baseline standard. Both are problematic since, as he acknowledges, cross case
comparisons may be extremely difficult, but to judge against a baseline may skew our
assessments since almost any mission will be better than none at all. In the end Diehl,
while not establishing concrete proposals, assesses that the most common standard for
success in peace operations is conflict abatement. While the other studies do not
necessarily look at this variable specifically, there is much to be said for simply asking
“did the mission stop the violence or not?”

Stephen Rattner by comparison asserts that a singular abstract definition of
peacekeeping is impossible. He rather prefers a relative approach using four criteria:
comparison with the mission’s mandate, comparison with other missions, the impact on
the states concerned and the impact on the UN or implementing organization.24 Rattner’s
comparative approach has much to recommend to it. Rather than a comparison to doing
nothing – which Diehl has already pointed out will lead to overly positive assessments –

a cross comparison between missions may allow for better fidelity in terms of determining best practices. His decision to look at the impact on the state or organization performing the mission is also useful since – as the US in Somalia aptly demonstrates – failure may have a significant cascading effect on future missions. Some of his other criteria do have problems however, as even he acknowledges. The first criteria does not take into full account that mandates themselves may be flawed creations as Diehl points out in this same article. The second criteria cannot fully control for the different situational factors that all mission must face and overcome. In some ways it is similar to Howard’s measurement of first level learning although it remains an imperfect metric.

Robert Johansen’s criteria for success have shades of similarity to those of Howard and Fortna. Johansen begins by asking what the relevant parties expect the peacekeepers to do – similar to Fortna’s concern with the peace kept – and then turns to what extent the peacekeepers have the necessary resources and to what extent these expectations are realistic. Beyond that, he questions what impacts the operation had on global learning. This of course echoes both Rattner and Howard, although it is focused more at Howard’s second level of learning.

Finally, William Durch generally supports Diehl’s criteria for success, although he caveats in several ways. First, he specifically acknowledges the danger in relying on mandate enforcement as metric of success, echoing the previous concerns. Interestingly,

\[25\text{ Druckman and Stern 152.}
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\[26\text{ Druckman and Stern 157}
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\[27\text{ Druckman and Stern 158}
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he takes a very forthright stance on evaluating the success of the operation at its lowest level: “at the most detailed tactical/procedural level…universal performance standards may be applicable. Whatever the overall objectives of the operation, tactical proficiency at basic tasks…adequate pre-deployment training and recruitment standards and procedures…ought to be evaluated against standard performance norms.”28 One can imagine the difficulties in carrying out such a direct assessment of certain aspects of a multinational operation as it will certainly tread on some toes, but Durch’s direct method of assessment is refreshing. Durch also addresses Howard’s interest in second level learning by noting that the UN has established centers for lessons learned on operations, but points out that it is difficult for the UN to fully develop this analysis as it can upset those contingents which provide the mistakes to be learned from.29

**Metrics**

Having wrestled with just a fraction of the disparate literature on the topic, this paper will now outline its criteria for determining the success of great power peace operations as compared to UN peace operations. Mindful of the literature just reviewed, several challenges present themselves. As was established by the several of the aforementioned authors – and as a casual review of the operations themselves clearly show – different actors will have their own agendas and own definitions of success. The

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28 Druckman and Stern 158  
29 ibid
challenge for this paper is delineate a set of criteria which can be applied to all missions – UN or great power – to allow for comparison across all operations.

*Is the mission’s deterrent effect credible?* By deterrent effect, I mean: is the mission able to enforce both its mandate (mission) and its will on the situation? How a given mission will accomplish this will naturally differ based on whether it is a consent based mission or an enforcement based mission. A consent based mission will be dependent on its perceived impartiality, the strength of its mandate and its ability to convince actors and spoilers to buy into the peace process. An enforcement mission is more dependent on its ability to project and use force, and to compel actors or – especially – spoilers to submit to the mission’s operations. In both cases leadership – both by military and civilian components – can be decisive for mission success. Successful deterrent effect is necessary for mission accomplishment, but it is not sufficient. Ultimately, a mission has been successful in establishing its deterrent effect when it is taken seriously – be it respected or feared – as an actor in the environment in which it is operating.

*Conditions based exit.* Does the mission establish an exit strategy based on an expected end state based on conditions in its area of operation or does it plan to withdraw at a predetermined calendar date, regardless of the local situation? Announcing in advance that a unit will depart based on a calendar schedule can allow potential spoilers to simply wait out the mission. Additionally, a mission with a time based exit could
indicate to other actors or spoilers that the mission lacks a deep reserve of political
support.

*Mission Accomplishment.* As has been discussed throughout the literature, mandate
accomplishment is a problematic metric for success as the mandate itself may be flawed
or inadequate. Ultimately, a mission must be judged on whether it accomplished its tasks
or not – regardless of mandate, resources, or other support. Failure may be due to factors
outside the mission’s control, but presumably no mission is sent out with the expectation
of failure. Using mission accomplishment as a metric incorporates Howard’s emphasis
on first level learning – a learning organization will overcome the limitations of its
mandate in order to accomplish what it was sent to do. A mission that falls back on its
mandate, irrespective of conditions on the ground, is mostly likely not a learning
organization.

*Does the result of the mission strengthen its organization (or country) with regards to
peace operations?* Failure in a mission can have a significant cascading effect on future
operations – witness the effects of the US involvement in Somalia not only on US peace
operations but also on UN and other nations’ operations – most notably with regards to
the events surrounding the Rwandan genocide. Even success, if purchased at too high a
price, may set back the cause of peace operations. Spectacular failure or weak success
can lead to future crises not engaged and potential future instability
Somalia (UNOSOM I/UNITAF/UNOSOM II)

Like so many UN peacekeeping missions, the seeds of the problems in Somalia were sown as a result of the Cold War and the failures of decolonization. While Somalia enjoys ethnic and linguistic unity, it is riddled with clan rivalries which had only been tenuously controlled by the Siad Barre regime which ruled Somalia from 1969. After years of corruption and a failed attempted invasion of Ethiopia, by the late nineteen eighties what remained of civil society in Somalia began to fracture. Clans began to form their own militias and civil war was in full swing throughout 1990. By early 1991 the Somali government had collapsed, Siad Barre had gone into exile in Nigeria and clans were fighting to gain control of the country and its capital. Out of this, two leaders rose to preeminence, Mohammed Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideed. Their continued fighting in the southern half of the country in general – and the capital in particular – combined with a drought in the country led to widespread famine.

The Undersecretary General of the United Nations had nominally managed to negotiate a ceasefire between the two clan leaders by January 1992; this led to the issue of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 771 which authorized the deployment of UNOSOM I which was conceived as a traditional observer mission.30 UNSCR 771 called for the deployment of 50 observers and called on all parties to

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observe the agreed ceasefire. The mission was eventually modified to include the
deployment of a 500-man strong infantry battalion which Pakistan agreed to provide and
which was in place by September, 1992.\textsuperscript{31,32} Important to note about this expansion is
that it was also negotiated between the Special REpresentaitve of the Secretary General
(SRSG) of the operation, Mohamed Shanoun, and Ali Mahdi and Aideed. This
negotiation, rather than give the clan leaders a veto over UN operations, helped ensure
its perception as a neutral force. Ultimately, the mission of UNOSOM I could be
summed up in three tasks: monitor the ceasefire, ensure the safety of UN personnel and
escort humanitarian assistance (HA) missions.

However, the Secretary General of the UN – Boutros-Ghali – pressured the
Security Council to increase the UN’s commitment to Somalia above this level and won
the approval of the deployment of an additional 3000 troops. While no troops were ever
sent, this proposal significantly weakened the position of the SRSG who was not
consulted on this ahead of time and therefore was not able to negotiate the major clan
leaders. While Ali Mahdi- the weaker of the two clan leaders – welcomed this
announcement, Aideed did not.\textsuperscript{33,34} The SRSG, already at odds with the Secretariat, was
further frustrated by other aspects of the UN bureaucracy and wound up resigning. His

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[31] James Dobbins, ed., \textit{America’s Role In Nation Building} (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003) 55
\item[32] Durch (1996) 316
\item[33] It is useful to reflect on Fortna’s assessment of when peacekeepers will be deployed to a situation based
on the relative power of the combatants.
\item[34] Durch (1996) 316
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
replacement took a different tack with regards to negotiating with the clans that observers considered a failure.³⁵

By the latter part of 1992, the situation had deteriorated significantly. Humanitarian Assistance supplies were being labeled as inadequate and what was arriving was being looted or the NGOs were shaken down for protection money from the clans. More interest picked up worldwide about the plight in Somalia and increased HA flows started but to little effect. The US launched Operation Provide Relief, but the like the others it was criticized for not being sufficient. By the end of November, the Bush administration felt increasing pressure to do something in either Somalia or Bosnia. The US approached the UN about sending a force to stabilize the situation in Somalia with a preplanned hand off back to the UN. The US received its mandate on 3 December and proceeded to launch Operation Restore Hope/Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

UNITAF was a massive deployment onto the African Continent – the US contingent alone was larger than any UN peace operation which has deployed since. 28,000 US troops participated in UNITAF with another 9,000 allied troops. Its overall mission was to stabilize southern Somalia and enable the delivery of HA.³⁶ Crucially, the two major clan leaders stayed out of the way of the operation and in fact welcomed the operation. Ali Mahdi saw the deployment as way of keeping Aideed subdued while Aideed preferred an American operation – particularly one with a fairly short

³⁵ Durch (1996) 317
³⁶ Dobbins (2003) 56
deployment and one not committed to disarming him – as opposed to a continued UN presence.\(^{37}\) Interestingly, it was not simply US force of arms that achieved clan non-interference, but US diplomacy as well. US troops were preceded by the former US Ambassador, Robert Oakley, who as able to liaise with the clan leaders and impress upon them the need to acquiesce to the operation.\(^{38}\)

UNITAF quickly achieved the majority of its operational goals. Originally conceived as a four phase operation with control gradually being expanded from Mogadishu outward, culminating in an eventual hand off to the UN, UNITAF achieved its goals 146 days after coming ashore – over three months ahead of schedule.\(^{39}\) As per its plan, this success was generally limited to HA support. UNITAF did crack down on weapons through the use of voluntary cantonment, but did not undertake any serious disarmament programs. Ali Mahadi generally went along with these efforts more than Aideed who simply moved his equipment out of Mogadishu and sought to wait out UNITAF.\(^{40}\)

By the six month mark UNITAF was eager to hand over operations to the UN lest it be forced to begin rotating US personnel.\(^{41}\) The UN was not convinced that it was ready to take over from UNITAF, but with the US eager to exit the country, the mandate for UNOSOM II was established by March of 1993.

\(^{37}\) Durch (1996) 320  
\(^{38}\) Daniel P. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. (Novato: Presidio Press, 1995) 291  
\(^{39}\) Durch (1996) 322  
\(^{40}\) Bolger 294  
\(^{41}\) Durch (1996) 325
UNOSOM II was quickly handicapped due to a variety of factors. Most of the experienced contingents under UNITAF rapidly departed either to assist with the situation in Bosnia or because of concerns over the lack of US leadership of the operation. These forces were replaced by military contingents from the developing world which varied in quality and professionalism – as for one example, the Indian and Pakistani contingents refused to be assigned to the same sectors. Additionally, with the departure of most US troops, the US administration rapidly lost direct interest in the situation. In order to assuage UN concerns about the change in force structure, the US did agree to leave behind a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) designed to support UNOSOM II in case of emergency. However, the QRF was not placed under UN command. Rather, the US was given the deputy military commander for UNOSOM II and the QRF answered directly to him. As a further means of attempting to ensure American interest and involvement, the SRSG position was given to an American as well.42

One crucial, early setback to UNOSOM II was that the rapid issuance of its mandate was not tied to ongoing peace negotiations in Addis Ababa. As a result, despite the limited achievements made in these talks, UNOSOM II was perceived as taking sides and attempting to pick winners, thereby putting into question its impartiality. Of course, peace enforcement operations do not necessarily need to be impartial, but they need firepower and the will to impress their will upon the relevant actors. UNOSOM II,

42 Durch (1996) 328
which was at half its authorized strength when it took over from UNITAF and never got above 50% of its authorized strength – had neither ability to fall back on.43,44

Nonetheless, UNOSOM II began to attempt to execute its mandate and begin the process of disarmament of the clans. These operations were not well received by Aideed who retaliated by ambushing Pakistani troops at a feeding station and killing 24. The results of this encounter led to UNSCR 837, a strongly worded resolution drafted in approximately 48 hours, largely by the US. It authorized UNOSOM II to take “all necessary measures” against those who had carried out the attacks and those who incited them.45

The US responded by reinforcing its QRF with AC-130H gunships and positioning Marines off the coast. It then led the way by destroying Aideed’s radio station and commencing three days of raids of Aideed weapons caches. These events culminated in a large UNOSOM II raid on 17 June on Aideed’s main compound. Aideed escaped and the Moroccan contingent suffered several fatalities – including their regimental commander – but by the end of this week of contact, Aideed had if nothing else lost a great deal of equipment.46

Rather than follow up on this, UNOSOM II generally stood down. Its troops largely returned to their barracks and the US gunships and Marines were pulled out of

43 Durch (1996) 335
44 Dobbins (2003) 59
45 Durch (1996) 332
46 Durch (1996) 344
the area.\textsuperscript{47} At the same time, the US made questionable staffing decisions in how it swapped out the command of its QRF.\textsuperscript{48} All the while, the low level conflict between the UN and Aideed’s forces continued resulting in increasing rifts within the UN force driven by both national considerations and the US and UN’s desire to “increase the level of payback” against Aideed.\textsuperscript{49} This culminated in another raid by the US QRF on July 12 which failed to get Aideed, but did kill dozens of Somalis. Italy, already cutting deals with the clans in its sector, threatened to quit the operation.\textsuperscript{50} Out of increasing frustration, the US deployed elements of Delta Force and the 75\textsuperscript{th} Ranger Regiment to continue the hunt against Aideed. This deployment further muddied the command structure in Mogadishu as the commander of TF Ranger did not answer to the commander of the US QRF – though he did coordinate – and instead answered directly to commands in the US. There were now three military commands in Somalia with varying degrees of coordination between them.\textsuperscript{51} TF Ranger launched a number of raids which achieved some successes but failed to capture Aideed and culminated in the “Blackhawk Down” incident on 3 October.

In the aftermath of the raid, the US announced its withdrawal by March of 1994. UN forces remained until 1995, but their tenure was marked by general ineffectiveness on the part of the remaining contingents – elements failing to hold critical infrastructure

\textsuperscript{47} Bolger 302
\textsuperscript{48} Bolger 304
\textsuperscript{49} Durch (1996) 345
\textsuperscript{50} Durch (1996) 346
\textsuperscript{51} Bolger 309
or being overrun and stripped of their weapons and equipment.\textsuperscript{52} The US redeployed a large contingent of Marines to cover the UN’s withdrawal and all elements were out by March of 1995.

Assessing the Operations

As a cursory assessment, UNOSOM I and II must be assessed as failures and UNITAF a success, although the particular reasons why need some further explanation.

\textit{Credible Deterrent.} UNOSOM I failed in this in that it was unable to establish itself as neutral, impartial peacekeeping mission. While this paper does not consider impartiality as a separate variable, for UNOSOM I, lacking in firepower or a more robust mandate, impartiality was crucial to its success. Interestingly, it did not necessarily fail because of actions on the part of the mission per se. As was shown above, the SRSG generally did well in coordinating with the various actors to attempt to achieve their buy-in to the UN’s operation. It was rather the decision of the Secretary General to dispatch additional troops without coordinating with the SRSG which fatally weakened the mission. This experience demonstrates two issues. First, it demonstrates Diehl’s point about the necessity of impartiality for a lightly armed Chapter VI mission. Second, it shows how the actions of outside headquarters can have a decisive impact on the

\textsuperscript{52} Durch (1996) 350
operation in the field. Whatever Boutros-Ghali’s intent, he was perceived as biased against Aideed and his actions helped undermine the SRSG in the field.

UNITAF was clearly able to establish a deterrent both through the overwhelming combat power it brought to bear and the close coordination between the military and diplomatic aspects of the operation, although it is impossible to disaggregate how much of this was due to the US’s pre-announced departure date.

From the moment the lead elements of UNITAF hit the beach to the throng of assembled media, it was rapidly able to establish itself as the dominant element in the area. UNITAF was able to do this for three reasons. First, it brought overwhelming combat power to bear in both the quantity and quality of its troops which far surpassed the abilities possessed by UNOSOM I. Second, it was ready to use force to enforce its mandate – if the clans openly displayed heavy weapons for example, UNITAF was quick to respond militarily. Finally, UNITAF had a strong relationship established between its military and political leadership. Ambassador Robert Oakley was able to leverage his extensive knowledge of Somalia to engage the clan leadership both before and after UNITAF military action and was able to convince them to at least acquiesce, if not cooperate with, UNITAF actions. It is difficult to disaggregate how much of the clan’s acquiescence was due to the United State’s preannounced departure date – certainly Aideed felt he could wait out the Americans – but Oakley’s performance was impressive nonetheless.
UNOSOM II was never able to consistently exercise its will in Somalia, either militarily or politically. Politically, SRSG Howe lacked the experience and deft touch of Ambassador Oakley. Perhaps the largest political failing was treating Aideed explicitly as an enemy. While he may not have been friendly towards UNOSOM II in any case singling him out thrust UNOSOM II into the conflict as a participant and militarily it was not in a position to successfully oppose the clans. This leads to the second drawback faced by UNOSOM II – its military command structure was muddled and it lacked the same robust capabilities of UNITAF. The force commander lacked direct command over his best troops – the American QRF – but even the American force commander did not command all forces with his span of control. The political decision by the Clinton administration to no put US troops under foreign command can perhaps be understood, but the decision of the US military to not invest one single commander with overall authority cannot. Tactically, the Army inflicted additional wounds as well when it came time to rotate out the QRF command structure. Rather than replace the staff and commander with another infantry unit, the Army decided to replace it with an Aviation Brigade staff. While Army doctrine allowed for such behavior, its after action report concluded that “an aviation brigade is not organized or structured as well as other types of maneuver brigades for the command and control of what is predominately a ground maneuver force.”

UNOSOM II was further hampered by a lack of unity of effort perhaps best exemplified by the Italian contingent which disagreed with the

53 Bolger 304
aggressiveness of UNOSOM II operations and conducted its own operations in coordination with Rome. This culminated in the Italian contingent conducting secret deals with Aideed’s forces to ensure the Italians would not be attacked.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Conditions Based Exit.} UNOSOM I was deployed without an exit strategy although interestingly UNOSOM II did not have a strict conditions based exit. It was nominally planned to end in 1995 although it was assumed that its work would be done by then. In contrast, the US – due to domestic political concerns - announced its departure date before arrival. In fairness to UNITAF, it had generally accomplished its stated goals, but its preannounced departure date did not help facilitate the transition to UNOSOM II as this policy emboldened Aideed to go to ground.

\textit{Mission Accomplished.} UNOSOM I clearly failed in its mission of securing HA supplies, although there are several reasons for this. First, UNOSOM I was not properly resourced with sufficient forces to accomplish its task. This is, to be sure, a complaint which could be voiced by any UN mission – or indeed most military commanders of any nation – but a true test of success is what a mission does with the resources at hand. In this sense it is interesting to consider what SRSG Sahnoun might have accomplished given his attempts at building relationships with the actors in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{54} Durch (1996) 346
UNITAF did succeed in what it was sent to do – open the flow of HA and establish conditions for a follow on UN mission. Or at least, it did so by the American definition. Crucially, the UN expectation was that a necessary condition would be the disarmament of the clans, something the US never seriously attempted or even considered. While UNITAF is generally considered a success, this must be qualified. Operationally it may have been a success, but strategically it was a failure – certainly in conception and possibly in execution – in that it failed to help establish conditions for a successful follow-on force. The American defense would be that it was not intended to do so, but by failing set conditions for future success, the subsequent failure of UNOSOM II would undo whatever success UNITAF enjoyed.

UNOSOM II was also a failure but it was not entirely the failure of the UN. The mandate for the operation was probably unattainable but it is here that a skilled SRSG would be able to overcome a weak mandate or under resourced troops much like Sahnoun did before he was undercut by the secretary general. This is not to absolve the UN of its responsibilities – the UN was clearly unable to staff or execute a complex chapter VII operation or engage in significant urban combat at this point in its history and as mentioned above, many national contingents did not cover themselves in glory. Still, when so much of the decisive combat power and leadership is American, it is crucial to ask what responsibility the US has in UNOSOM II’s failure. The US and the UN were increasingly distracted by the “get Aideed” mentality and the US was able to

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55 Dobbins (2003) 69
draft the necessary resolutions at the UN to attempt to achieve this, but refused to
provide the combat power necessary to do so. Returning to the UN, there are serious
questions about what effects the UN had as well. Durch raises the point that the
deployment of certain national contingents weakened the mission – the Nigerians
because of their accommodation of Barre in exile and the Italians for their colonial
history in Somalia. Crucially though, the very fact that Boutros-Ghali was the Secretary
General may have weakened the mission most of all. When Boutros-Ghali was the
foreign minister of Egypt he was a strong supporter of Barre and as such was never
trusted by Aideed who felt that UN was always against him.  

*Strengthened the Organization.* Somalia significantly weakened the cause of UN
peacekeeping but it destroyed the US appetite for supporting such operations. The
effects of this were long lasting although most notable in the US’s efforts to prevent any
peace operation being sent to combat the genocide in Rwanda and the memory of
Somalia threatened US support for peace operations for the rest of the decade. Perhaps
the only significant, positive development was establishment of a Civil-Military
Operations Center (CMOC) during UNITAF where NGOs and the military could come

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56 Durch (1996) 317
together to plan and discuss operations.57 CMOCs have since become a staple of US peace operations.58

In the final analysis, the US and UN failed in Somalia because of an ends-means mismatch. The focus on “getting Aideed” without the requisite combat power, combined with an attitude that none of the clans “deserved” to lead Somalia led to an operation that increasingly saw itself as a “super clan” there to enforce order but not really having the ability to do so. Durch (1996) sums up the problem well when he states that: “either the outsiders feed, vaccinate or stand aside…or the outsiders quash local power centers and look for more acceptable local alternatives.”59 Ultimately, UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II did neither.

**Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**

Like Somalia, the civil war in Mozambique had its roots in the Cold War and decolonization but Mozambique was also a victim of neighboring states that sought to exacerbate the conflict for regional political reasons. The transformation of southern African politics managed to help bring about the end of the war, but it took a peace operation to secure the peace.

57 Dobbins (2003) 61
59 Durch (1996) 329
The civil war in Mozambique was an outgrowth of the country’s struggle for independence from the Portuguese. FRELIMO, organized in 1962 to fight against the colonial power, took control of the country in 1974 with the departure of the Portuguese. As befit its left leaning roots, it declared Mozambique a one party state and sought assistance from Russia and China, although it never formally allied with them. It also began to support one of the two resistance organizations in neighboring Rhodesia – Robert Mugabe’s ZANU party. As a means of disrupting this influence, Rhodesia established its own guerilla force in Mozambique in 1976 – RENAMO. RENAMO found support amongst traditional rulers and the church which had been marginalized by the Marxist government, although it was difficult to tell how much support was based on the dislike of FRELIMO or the fear of RENAMO. Regardless, through Rhodesian and later, South African support, RENAMO was able to contest the FRELIMO government for years.

By the 1980’s, FRELIMO had begun to moderate its political stance and reached out South Africa in order reach an accord. Both sides agreed to stop funding resistance organizations in each other’s countries and South Africa began to assist in reconstruction in Mozambique. At the same time South Africa generally cut off RENAMO from further aid, but by this point RENAMO was strong enough to continue to fight on its own although as the decade continued it was clear that while RENAMO

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60 Durch (1996) 278
61 Durch (1996) 279
62 Durch (1996) 280
could probably not be beaten by FRELIMO, it could not seize control of the country either.\textsuperscript{63,64} Nations outside of the region began to support FRELIMO’s change in polices, notably the Regan administration which began to provide a great deal of foreign aid to the country.\textsuperscript{65}

With the fight generally stalemated and both sides looking for an accord, but unwilling to trust each other, a Catholic lay organization stepped up as an honest broker between the two sides and helped commence two years of negotiations culminating in a peace treaty signed in Rome in October of 1992. The UN had been involved as an observer in the process and was formally invited to by Mozambique government to send a peacekeeping force to help implement the agreement.\textsuperscript{66} The Security Council passed UNSCR 797 formally authorizing the mission in December and charged ONUMOZ with four general sets of tasks: Political (facilitate peace agreement), Military (monitor the ceasefire, implement a Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration program (DDR)), Humanitarian Assistance (demining, return of refugees and IDPs) and Electoral (monitor and implement elections). Due to the lag between the signing of the peace agreement and the issuance of the mandate – compounded by the number of other UN missions in the world – ONUMOZ was slow to deploy and establish itself. Critically, the UN dispatched the SRSG – Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello – early and allowed him to begin the process with only five staff members and twenty five observes culled from

\textsuperscript{63} James Dobbins, ed., The UN’s Role In Nation Building (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005) 95
\textsuperscript{64} Howard 185
\textsuperscript{65} Howard 189
\textsuperscript{66} Dobbins (2005) 93
other missions. While the force would eventually grow to approximately 7000 troops and over 350 observers, Ajello was effectively on his own in the beginning. Nonetheless, he skillfully engaged the actors to the conflict and quickly made the UN an indispensable party to the situation.

Neither side could really be described as entirely wanting peace, even though both had negotiated for it. Indeed, the delay in UN deployment allowed both sides to dig in and harden their stances. Ajello was able to overcome some of these obstacles on his own. As per the peace agreement, Ajello was the chair of the Supervising and Monitoring Commission which oversaw the peace process. As a result, Ajello had an effective veto over the parties with regards to the peace process, although he had to tread carefully as FREMLIO remained concerned about Mozambique sovereignty. Lack of funding also threatened to delay the peace process repeatedly, but Ajello was able to overcome this as well. He was able to constantly bring donor nations to the table and ensure their commitments. By doing so, he not only helped forward the process, he made himself indispensible to FRELIMO and RENAMO if they wanted the process to continue. As Ajello noted, due to Mozambique’s reliance on foreign aid, if one had the donors in line, one had Mozambique in line. On the issue of donations, Ajello assessed

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68 Howard 179
69 Reed 290
70 Dobbins (2005) 99
71 Reed 290
72 Fortna 128
that RENAMO could, in effect, be ‘paid off’ to continue with the peace process. He established a RENAMO ‘slush fund’ – nominally to allow it to compete in the elections and ensure that its leader was able to control the organization economically.\textsuperscript{73} Cynical perhaps, but it kept the process moving.

Ajello had other tools which used to keep the political process moving. He coordinated closely with all of the relevant ambassadors in Maputo – this not only ensured the backing of outside powers but it also meant that FRELIMO and RENAMO could not play other nations off against one another.\textsuperscript{74} Finally, when confronted with RENAMO intransigence, he brought in Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to inform both parties that the UN would pull out if they did not begin to implement the accords. After that, cooperation improved and the process continued.\textsuperscript{75}

Militarily, ONUMOZ was never seriously challenged by either party. While the military units may not have been first rate, they were more than equal to their main task of securing key terrain.\textsuperscript{76} The DDR process was extremely slow and somewhat incomplete. Both sides dragged their feet in providing adequate rosters and demobilization sites to the UN and were then slow to send soldiers to the sites as a hedge against further conflict. DDR eventually occurred as most soldiers were in fact keen to demobilize but the process was not a smooth one.

\textsuperscript{73} Reed 290
\textsuperscript{74} Howard 192
\textsuperscript{75} Reed 291
\textsuperscript{76} Reed 292
Much like the military portion of ONUMOZ, the Humanitarian Assistance portion was generally completed, but in an uneven and slow manner. On the one hand, the UN did oversee the effective return of the majority of refugees and IDPs. It was able to do this despite the reluctance of RENAMO to allow aid workers into its regions or to allow civilians to leave their regions fearing a diminution of its power. On the other hand, the demining process was slow and marked by a lack of funds and bureaucratic infighting.\textsuperscript{77} When ONUMOZ left, it was estimated that there were still millions of mines still in the country.

Elections were scheduled for October of 1994 and despite the physical challenges – lack of infrastructure – and the human challenges – the need to train numerous elections observers - ONUMOZ was generally able to effect free and fair elections. The biggest challenge was to overcome last minute RENAMO objections, but Ajello, based on the relationship he had established up until that point, was able to bring them back around.\textsuperscript{78} In the end the elections were judged free and fair with FRELIMO winning outright but with RENAMO securing a sizeable minority. With the execution of elections, ONUMOZ began to draw down and was out of the country by 1995.

\textsuperscript{77} Dobbins (2005) 101  
\textsuperscript{78} Reed 301
Assessment of the Operation

_Credible Deterrent._ ONUMOZ was able to establish credibility as a peacekeeping force largely through the skills of the SRSG. There were no real military challenges to the military components of ONUMOZ as both sides more or less wanted peace but simply didn’t trust their opponents. As such, it is difficult to disaggregate the political and military abilities of ONUMOZ from the fatigue of the combatants involved in the conflict.

_Conditions Based Exit._ One can debate if the ONUMOZ plan to pullout after successful elections was conditions based or time based. Since the UN demonstrated that it was willing to pull out regardless of elections if the parities would not abide by the agreement, this must be viewed as conditions based exit.

_Mission Accomplished._ In the main, ONUMOZ accomplished what it was sent to do. In retrospect there have been charges that the mission was incomplete. Critics have since said that the UN left too many weapons in the country as a result of the DDR process with a commensurate increase in banditry. Other objections were that peace was purchased at the expense of justice as no leader in Mozambique was ever called to
account for their actions during the civil war.\(^7^9\) Against this it must be said that ONUMOZ got the big things right – it left behind a stable, peaceful Mozambique which has since conducted several elections and where the chance of renewed conflict is remote.

_Strengthened the Organization._ ONUMOZ is one of the biggest successes in UN peacekeeping but it is hard to ascertain how much of an impact it has had overall. The success of the operation was generally drowned out by the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Nonetheless, it shows what a superbly led UN operation is capable of given the right environment.

One final comment which must be addressed is to what degree was ONUMOZ the beneficiary of a country that simply wanted peace? In the final assessment, actors from within Mozambique, ONUMOZ’s presence was critical – while both sides wanted peace, they simply didn’t trust their opponents and needed an honest broker.\(^8^0\) Additionally, the fact that FRELIMO was willing to concede on an aspect of national sovereignty and accept peacekeepers demonstrated to RENAMO that it was serious about the peace process.\(^8^1\) Perhaps this sort of willing/hurting stalemate is not common, but it does show that in the right circumstances, UN peacekeeping can be effective.

\(^7^9\) Howard 220
\(^8^0\) Fortna 121
\(^8^1\) Fortna 148
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/Operation Artemis)

The seeds of the Congolese civil war were planted by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. After Tutsi forces retook Rwanda, Hutu militias fled to eastern DRC where they established camps which provided both the means to launch attacks on Rwanda and prey on the local Tutsi tribes. The corrupt and ineffective Congolese government headed by Mobutu Sese Seko was in no position to stop these militias and in fact, tacitly supported them as his government had revoked these tribes’ citizenship in 1981. As a result of these actions, the tribes finally rose up in 1996 and, with Rwandan support, attempted to overthrow Mobutu. The Congolese Army proved no match, and the rebel forces, led by Laurent Kabila, took Kinshasa by May of 1997. Kabila began to alienate his supporters, rule in way reminiscent of Mobutu and finally expelled his Rwandan allies in July of 1998. Surprisingly – or perhaps not - a new anti-Kabila rebel group emerged on the border with Rwanda the following month.

With the rise of this and other groups in the east, the DRC began its descent into Africa’s “First World War”. Rwanda and Uganda supported a variety of rebel groups both to harass the Kabila government and to provide cover for illicit resource extraction

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83 Roessler and Prendergast 236
in the east. Kabila was able to buy support from other African countries in exchange for resource concessions as well. The end result was an increasing spiral of violence.

Numerous failed peace attempts later, the warring parties finally agreed to the Lusaka Ceasefire, signed in Kinshasa by the warring parties on 10 July, 1999. While hailed at the time as an example of “African Solutions to African Problems” the accord was fatally flawed in a number of ways from the start. Kabila was not committed to the accord – he had only signed due to the successful advances of Rwanda and its allies and saw the accord as way to gain breathing room. More important was the fact that the parties that negotiated the settlement assigned implementation of the accord to the United Nations, which was not involved in the negotiations. Additionally, there were no implementing instructions as to how DDR would be performed or other aspects of implementation of the agreement nor was the proposed timeline realistic.

This left the UN in an uncomfortable position. The conflict in the DRC was not a strategic priority for most nations but it was too destructive for the UN to ignore completely. The UN had been leery of operating in the DRC since its earlier mission in 1960 and a UN study in March of 1999 had estimated that peacekeeping mission in the DRC would require 100,000 troops. Ultimately, the UN compromised – it authorized a force of several hundred observes and several thousand combat troops to

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84 Roessler and Prendergast 244
85 Roessler and Prendergast 247
86 Roessler and Prendergast 249
87 Roessler and Prendergast 259
88 Roessler and Prendergast 230
protect them. In retrospect this was an inauspicious plan – the UN deployed too few
troops to affect any success, but enough troops to take the blame for the continued
violence.

The first four years of MONUC were rough all the way around. Most parties to
the Lusaka accords did not honor their commitments and continued to support militias or
remain in the DRC. Laurent Kabila continually frustrated the UN’s mission although
cooperation improved after his assassination and replacement by his son in 2002. For
the UN, its number of troops was clearly insufficient for the task; those troops which
were present were extremely slow in arriving and what troops were available strictly
adhered to their observation and implementation mandate allowing fighting to continue
around them. This helped contribute to a vicious cycle – as the fighting increased the
more necessary additional peacekeepers became but the less likely they were to be
deployed as the continued fighting made the situation in the DRC appear intractable.

The UN did attempt to implement its DDR responsibilities, but was under
resourced and neighboring countries were slow to cease support for militias. Rwanda
was particularly complicit in this as a destabilized eastern DRC was in its interests
although through intense international pressure it was compelled to finally withdraw its
forces in 2002, although it was suspected of continued covert support. With the
Rwandans finally – nominally – in compliance with Lusaka, the UN turned its attention

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89 Roessler and Prendergast 254
90 Roessler and Prendergast 256
91 Roessler and Prendergast 277
to the Ugandan occupation in the northwest of the country. In a great – if unfortunate – example of strategic goals and tactical resources no being linked, the Security Council managed to compel the Ugandans to withdraw from their zone in early 2003 but MONUC did not have sufficient forces to fill the security vacuum filled by their departure.\textsuperscript{92} The militias which had been supported by Uganda continued to prey upon the area and the best the UN could do was to deploy a 700-man battalion of Uruguayans to the city of Bunia to replace nearly 7,000 Ugandans. Fearing a complete collapse of security in the area but unwilling to condone a Ugandan intervention, the Secretary General put out a request for UN nation to lead an operation to stabilize the area.

The French government responded that it was willing to lead an EU force provided that UN provided a mandate, that all relevant countries party to the conflict in DRC approved and that the mission would be of short duration with a specified end. As a result, the UN issued UNSCR 1484 and the EU approved Operation Artemis with France as the “Framework” or lead nation.\textsuperscript{93} There remains a great deal of debate as to whether Artemis was an EU mission led by France or whether it was French operation under the guise of the EU.\textsuperscript{94,95} The evidence points to the latter. First, an operation of some sort was already being planned by the French government prior to the request

\textsuperscript{92} Roessler and Prendergast 283  
\textsuperscript{94} Kees Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 3  
\textsuperscript{95} James Dobbins (2008) 111
made by the UN.\textsuperscript{96} Second, Jacques Chirac quickly realized that this operation could also be used to help strengthen European integration in the wake of the divisive debates over the American invasion of Iraq.\textsuperscript{97} Regardless, the French led force moved quickly and decisively putting troops into the DRC quickly and establishing their control over the area around Bunia. Ultimately, Operation Artemis consisted of approximately 1500-2000 troops, of which over half were French including the vast majority of combat troops.\textsuperscript{98} The French quickly established a reputation of using force against local militias who violated the French imposed “weapons free zone” or which fired at French troops. Even the United Nations after action report admitted that France was far more proactive in protecting civilians and engaging the militias than the Uruguayans had been.\textsuperscript{99} Indeed it was alleged that French Special Forces preceded their main force and conducted targeted engagements against militia leadership.\textsuperscript{100} Ultimately, the French force established solid control over Bunia, but at a cost of simply pushing the militias out into the bush. While the French operation terminated by September 1, the operation had bought enough time for the UN to organize a 5000 man brigade to replace the French.

Throughout 2003, the UN began to reassess its operations in DRC and implemented several adjustments over several months aimed at increasing its capability.
Most important was the change in MONUC’s mandate to a Chapter VII enforcement operation. Concurrent with that was a change in emphasis to ensuring that MONUC protected threaten civilians. The troop ceiling was gradually raised as well over the years to a max of 21,000 although the additions were slow in arriving. Finally, the UN appointed a new SRSG, the former US Ambassador to the DRC. While this did not bring about contributions of US troops, it did improve US political support for the operation.

Since 2004, the UN has achieved some moderate successes in the DRC. Politically it helped administer presidential elections in 2005 which were judged to be free and fair – or at least as much as could be expected – which confirmed the presidency of Joseph Kabila. The UN saw improvements militarily as well. Responding to a militia attack in early 2005, MONUC responded with a massive cordon and search operation in the eastern provinces. The operation, while successful, was also the largest tactical operation the UN had conducted since Somalia.

Since then, the UN has managed to at least maintain operations in DRC. The sexual abuse scandal of some peacekeeping elements and the uneven protection of civilians have hurt its legitimacy somewhat. On the other hand, continued pressure on regional actors has paid off as Rwanda cut off and finally captured Laurent Nkunda, one of the most important militia leaders in eastern DRC. MONUC cannot be said to a success yet but given size and complexity of the operation and difficulties it encountered early on, not failing can be considered a success of sorts.
Assessing the Operation

MONUC is difficult to assess overall as it has not completed its operations, but given the length of the operation, some assessments can be made.

Credible Deterrent. Prior to Artemis, MONUC did not establish itself as a viable actor in the situation in DRC. The UN’s own assessment agrees, at least in part: “Despite being mandated to use force beyond self defense and to afford protection to civilians under threat of physical violence the Uruguayans did not use force more actively to reestablish control of Bunia.”\textsuperscript{101} The consistent inability of the UN to gain a monopoly on violence in the east, to influence the militias or succeed in their demobilization echoes this assessment.

By comparison, Artemis rapidly established control in its area due not only to French material advantages but their willingness to engage spoilers. Admittedly this was a limited geographical area but it was an area that the UN had failed in already and there is no reason to suppose that, had the French had a larger area of operations that they would have been any less forceful. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the local groups might have resisted the French mission even more than they did had the French sought to expand their security area further around Bunia, regardless of the length of deployment. This supposition leads to a counterfactual that may be difficult to

\textsuperscript{101} United Nations (2004) 8
answer in that French success would then be predicated on both a military and political willingness to escalate. While it seems reasonable to assume that militarily the French were up to the task, the political side of the question is more problematic, especially given the perception that mission was as much about European issues as much as it was about creating peace in DRC. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the French mission was successful in gaining a monopoly on violence in the area and handing off the situation to a much more robust UN force.

Since UNSCR 1565, MONUCs record with regards to establishing itself as an effective implementer of force has certainly improved, but still leaves something to be desired. This improvement has come from both internal and external factors. First, the development of a ‘Duty to Protect’ doctrine has helped motivate personnel to act with initiative in ways that they might not have in the past. Second, increased training and professionalism of peacekeepers – due in no small part to increased great power training of deploying units – has increased the combat power available to commanders. Finally, the change of mandate to an enforcement style mandate gives more impetus to aggressive action in a region where not all parties to the conflict have bought into the peace agreements. Again, the mandate is only useful if the mission is willing to enforce it, but as the example of the large scale cordon and search operations of 2005 show, there is potential for increased action against spoilers.
Conditions Based Exit. Despite the temptation to pull out earlier in the operation due to lack of progress, MONUC has shown a remarkable consistency in sticking with the mission in DRC. Currently extended through December 2009, there is no reason to think that the Security Council will not extend the mission yet again. This perceived willingness to stay the course in DRC can only help improve the perception of the mission as willing to confront spoilers to the peace process. By comparison to MONUC, the French mission was launched with a specific end date in mind. While the desired end state was largely achieved by that time, the situation was not completely established and the Secretary General had to make a personal appeal for some personnel to stay on for a couple of weeks to complete the hand over to the UN. The lack of a conditions based exit most likely did not affect French success due to the hand over to a robust UN force which could capitalize on the French deployment, but absent that, spoilers may well have simply waited out the mission.

Mission Accomplished. MONUC clearly failed in its early mission in the DRC. In fairness, the mission as assigned to the UN by the Lusaka accords was probably impossible, but the UN must be responsible for its decision to allocate the resources that it did. This was in part due to American reluctance to fund a larger mission, but the fact that the Secretary General still considered aborting the mission early on indicates that the UN was aware of problems in implementation. By comparison, Artemis must be judged a success, both on its own terms and what it indicated for the follow-on UN
mission. A comparison here to UNITAF is useful. Like UNITAF, the French mission succeeded at its own mission, but unlike UNITAF it established conditions for a successful follow-on UN mission so that its gains would not be squandered.

Since Artemis, the UN has improved greatly. It is too early to assess success or failure of the operation, but as mentioned early, not failing for the UN can be success. As mentioned above, the development of new modes of conceptualizing missions – duty to protect – and the increased aggressiveness of the UN forces are promising indicators.

*Strengthened the Organization.* Despite the weaknesses of the early MONUC, the lessons learned from the operation have not hurt the UN with regards to African peacekeeping although it has possibly left it wiser and more proficient. Even with MONUC ongoing, the UN has launched new operations nearby in central Africa. Most importantly, the early failures of MONUC have begun to inculcate the doctrine of “duty to protect” amongst UN peacekeeping forces indicating an increasing decline in the notions of consent based or neutral peacekeeping.

Artemis certainly did nothing to dissuade the French from further operations in Africa – in some ways Artemis was *de rigeur* for them and the French have continued to play a role in African operations both unilaterally and as part of both EU and UN missions. For the EU the degree to which Artemis strengthened it is difficult to assess. It certainly did not harm EU attitudes towards peacekeeping as it has remained involved.
Africa both in the DRC and in anti-Piracy efforts in Somalia. Again, it is impossible to fully disaggregate French interests from those of the EU.

**Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL/Operation Palliser/UNAMSIL)**

The combination of rich natural resources and incredibly weak state structures directly led to the Sierra Leone civil war and the peacekeeping missions which followed. In March of 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone. Led by Sierra Leonean Foday Sankoh and supported by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, the RUF was nominally opposed to the widespread and pervasive corruption and lack of opportunity. In actuality, Sankoh was primarily interested in seizing control of the country’s diamond mines and extracting resources while Taylor’s interest was in destabilizing Sierra Leone as the country had been providing peacekeepers in Liberia.\(^{102}\)

Achieving initial success, the RUF was finally checked around 1995. A series of coups had installed various leaders who achieved minimal success by massively expanding the Sierra Leonean Army but especially by brining in the South African mercenary group Executive Outcomes. In 1996, another coup finally led to democratic elections and the election of Ahmad Kabbah. While the RUF had generally settled into a stalemate by the end of 1995, the previous governments had not given Executive Outcomes sufficient resources to finish off the RUF as these unelected coup leaders

were also able to profit off of the ongoing conflict. Kabbah was more committed to the fight and by the end of the year the RUF had suffered sufficiently at the hands of Executive Outcomes that Sankoh was willing to agree to a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{103}

The result was the Abidjan agreement, the first of several failed peace agreements in the conflict. The agreement nominally called for the RUF to be transformed into a political party, a DDR process, the departure of all foreign military forces – to include Executive Outcomes, and the dispatch of UN observers. Observers questioned Sankoh’s sincerity and as he was arrested in Nigeria in March of 1998 while trying to smuggle weapons, it seems the suspicions were well founded. By May, a group calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the Kabbah government, installed Johnny Koroma as the president and invited the RUF to form an alliance. This move was widely contested by outside actors – both the OAU and UN opposed Koroma and instituted sanctions by the end of the year. These sanctions were credited with forcing Koroma to sign the Conakry agreement agreeing to reinstate Kabbah by April of 1998. It soon became clear however that Koroma could not control the AFRC. As a result Nigeria, which had maintained a sizeable force in Sierra Leone as part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force, decided to force the issue and reinstate Kabbah through military action. Nigeria was successful although the distrust created by this action led the formation of the UNOMSIL observation mission. Additionally, the

\textsuperscript{103} Berman and Labonte 146
support Nigeria received from the British mercenary group Sandline embarrassed the British government and forced it to begin become more involved in the situation.\textsuperscript{104}

UNOMSIL viewed as an adjunct to the ECOMOG force which was increased in size and it was hoped that this combined force would be sufficient to implement the Abidjan agreement. Unfortunately the RUF remained recalcitrant and neither ECOMOG nor UNOMSIL fulfilled their mandated duties help in the facilitation of the accord.\textsuperscript{105}

Growing weary of the situation, the US government pressured Kabbah government to reach a negotiated settlement and dispatched Jesse Jackson to help facilitate one.\textsuperscript{106} The result was the Lomé agreement. Lomé would bring the RUF into the cabinet, provide amnesty and allow for the withdrawal of the ECOMOG forces. At roughly the same time, the UN authorized the dispatch of UNAMSIL. This was more robust mission that UNOMSIL, but still assumed that ECOMOG would provide for the majority of security in the country, despite the Nigerian government’s announced decision to withdraw.

UNAMSIL got off to a rough start. The UN had a hard time finding quality troops as it insisted that deploying units be self sufficient having learned from the lack of well equipped troops in previous operations.\textsuperscript{107} The mission was also marred by personality conflicts at the top. The SRSG and deputy force commander were Nigerians but the force commander was Indian and he accused the Nigerians of working at cross

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{104} Berman and Labonte 152
\bibitem{105} Berman and Labonte 159
\bibitem{106} Dobbins (2005) 136
\bibitem{107} Berman and Labonte 170
\end{thebibliography}
purposes against the operation. Indeed his allegations so enraged the Nigerians that he was effectively sacked in September 2000 in order to maintain the collation. Between the lack of well trained troops and bureaucratic dysfunction, it is no wonder the RUF saw UNAMSIL as not presenting a credible deterrent and they behaved accordingly through numerous cease fire violations and refusing the UN access to RUF controlled areas. ¹⁰⁸ UNAMSIL had an enforcement style mandate, but was unwilling or unable to successfully challenge the RUF.

The low point of UNAMSIL came in April, 2000 when the RUF began to harass and eventually lay siege to several DDR centers. The force commander dispatched a Zambian battalion to relieve one of the centers, but its movement to the area was slow and disorganized allowing the RUF to harden its position. ¹⁰⁹ As a result, the RUF managed to capture this battalion and hold its roughly 400 members hostage in addition to looting all of their equipment.

The British had already been planning a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and when the RUF captured the Zambian battalion, the UK executed the NEO out of fear the RUF would attack Freetown. The British quickly accomplished the NEO, but agreed to extend the mission due to the situation within UNAMSIL. While there was minimal direct contact between the British and the RUF, the very presence of the former colonial power had a stabilizing influence. The British patrolled Freetown in a highly visible manner and conducted several exercises. Operation Palliser was complete by

¹⁰⁸ Fortna 59
¹⁰⁹ Berman and Labonte 180
June 15, but British forces stayed on to help train the Sierra Leonean Army. In August, members of an AFRC gang captured several members of the British training team. The UK dispatched SAS commandos who raided the AFRC camp and crushed the gang. This action strengthened the local view of the interventions weakened RUF morale. By the end of the year between improved leadership and troops of UNAMSIL and a Guinean invasion against several RUF camps, UNAMSIL was finally able to gain control over much of the rest of the country.

This was largely done through a “good cop, bad cop” approach. The new force commander was able to impress upon the new commander of the RUF that UNAMSIL would not tolerate further non-compliance from the RUF but that the RUF would have UNAMSIL’s protection if it abided by the peace accords. UNAMSIL was helped by the perception that their actions would be backed by British force if necessary which was a sentiment generally echoed by the commander of the British training unit who stated: “they could either fight me [Sierra Leonean Army with British Advisors] and get killed or go to the UN and enter the DDR process. I did not really mind which.”

By 2002 the DDR process and level of security had progressed to the point where UNAMSIL could begin to drawdown although interestingly it was able to extend this timeline when some benchmarks were not met. UNAMSIL finally departed by 2005 although the British training mission has remained.

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110 Fortna 60
111 Dobbins (2008) 37
Ultimately, UNAMSIL did succeed and actors in Sierra Leone believe that it was a necessary element to bring about peace in the country. By the same token, it was able to succeed in no small part due to the fact that the RUF felt that while UNAMSIL may have been biased, it was better to deal with them than to take their chances with the British.

Assessing the Operation

Credible Deterrent. The operations in Sierra Leone are similar to the other examples of great power intervention studied in this paper in that the great power intervention was preceded by failure on the part of the UN mission. Much like the UNOSOM failures, the early failure of UNAMSIL can be attributed to both military and diplomatic failures. Diplomatically, UNAMSIL was clearly spilt with personality conflicts between the Nigerian and Indian leadership with attendant negative impacts on field operations.

With regards to field operations, the failures of the Zambian battalion resulting in its capture by the RUF involve a breathtaking display of incompetence. With troops so poorly led, or skilled, as to fall into such a predicament, it is no wonder the UN was unable to enforce or coerce the RUF into abiding by peace agreements. Again, it is worth noting that the UN is dependent upon its members for troops and must take what it is given. Still, it is incumbent upon UN leadership – either in the Secretariat or the

112 Fortna 124
mission – to offer candid assessments about what is and is not possible given the troops assigned to the task. In fairness to the UN, the Brahimi report offered similar observations and the UN has not seen incompetence on this scale since then, although the sexual abuse scandals in DRC are perhaps the largest lapse in professionalism since then. Returning to Howard’s emphasis on second level learning, one can only hope that the lessons of UNAMSIL’s early failures have been inculcated.

By contrast to UNAMSIL – and similar to the French in DRC – the British showed no reluctance to compel spoilers in Sierra Leone. Again, much like the French mission, its willingness to challenge both local spoilers and establish conditions for a successful handover to a follow on force ensured that the mission’s successes were built upon. Since Palliser, a rejuvenated UNAMSIL was able to establish its control of the situation throughout Sierra Leone.

*Conditions Based Exit.* Both UNAMSIL and Palliser’s exits were based on conditions on the ground rather than the calendar. UNAMSIL’s early failures in imposing its will on the situation demonstrate that a conditions based exit may not impress upon spoilers a willingness to see a situation through if that message is muddled through tactical incompetence. The British deployment was also marked by a willingness to stay past a predetermined date, although that extended deployment has been in the form of trainers rather than combat personnel. Still, as mentioned earlier, various enablers can change strict battle math in terms of numbers of troops required – after the British forces had
stabilized the situation and a more robust UNAMSIL had taken up operations, skilled
trainers may well have been more valuable than another battalion.

*Mission Accomplished.* Palliser both accomplished its initial objective (the NEO) and its
follow on objective of setting conditions for improving the lot of UNAMSIL. For
UNAMSIL, it is again a story of two different operations. The first several months of its
deployments were disastrous but in the end it absolutely achieved its goals in Sierra
Leone and more importantly the peace it instilled seems to have held.

*Strengthened the Organization:* It is difficult to assess the long term effects on British
participation in peacekeeping – Palliser was its last military operation prior to
participation with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan which are of course different
operations. Ultimately, Palliser was more of a trailing indicator than a leading indicator.
That is to say that it was launched with the failures of Rwanda and Somalia in mind and
western governments had begun to take an attitude less of “we can’t get involved” to
one of “we can’t afford to fail.”

For UNAMSIL it is also difficult to assess, but it seems that the experience was
ultimately a positive one. The success of the operation demonstrated that the UN could
succeed in a complex, relatively hostile peace enforcement operation. Certainly some of
these experiences were reflected in operations in the Congo. Ultimately the UNAMSIL

113 Fortna 70
could be defined as what didn’t happen – had the operation collapsed after the May hostage crisis, UN peacekeeping could have been significantly weakened. By pushing on and ultimately succeeding, UNAMISL gave the UN the chance to fight another day.

**Overall Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deterrent Credible</th>
<th>Conditions Based Exit</th>
<th>Mission Accomplished</th>
<th>Strengthened Org WRT PKO</th>
<th>Result of OP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palliser</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken as a whole, several trends emerge from the table above. First, great power interventions have indeed been more successful at peace operations according to the criteria laid forth, although the only mission to succeed in every category was the UN mission to Mozambique. This demonstrates a phenomenon that gradually became obvious during the breakdown of the individual missions in that there is some form of relationship between the great power intervention and the eventual success of the UN
mission which partially confirms Sambanis and Schulhoffer-Wohl’s earlier theory. To take one example, the fact that Artemis and Palliser did not have condition based exits should have, in theory, allowed spoilers to wait out the intervention and get back to harassing the UN as they had done before – yet in both cases the UN mission returned much improved and went to eventual success. This suggests a path to future research, namely what is the precise relationship between great power interventions and the success of a UN deployment. Is there a decisive movement when they are best deployed to handle a failing mission? More importantly, can the UN identify the weaknesses that lead to the necessarily for these deployments and fix this problem? Ideally UN peacekeeping would be strengthened to the point where it does not need outside interventions to be successful. The Brahimi report was supposed to assist with this and to some degree it has, although as experience in MONUC has shown, the process is not complete.

Going forward, further research should focus not only the interrelation between great power interventions and UN operations, but also the effects of regional organizations. The use of a typological study may allow for greater fidelity in examining variables than in this paper. The new, more robust AU forces in Darfur and Ethiopia may represent a new model for African peacekeeping and should be incorporated into future research – and should have compiled sufficient data for study. Likewise, a close study of MINURCAT, the UN mission to Chad and the Central African Republic would prove interesting as it is the most recently launched UN mission and – in theory – should
have fully inculcated the lessons of previous missions and the recommendations of the Brahimi report.

**Policy Considerations**

One common theme of criticism within the literature is that great powers need to start supporting UN operations more by providing troops to them. Dobbins explicitly states this when he discusses and evaluates the American and UN approaches to nation building and while he states that the UN is more successful overall. He attributes this to the UN’s greater legitimacy and to the fact that the US selects harder cases – an assessment not borne out by this paper – but he also conceded that “this does not mean that the United States would be better off emulating the UNs method of nation building.”\textsuperscript{114} However, in Europe’s Role in Nation Building he states that “it is time for European governments…to do their share of the staffing of UN led operations” and states via a footnote that this applies the US as well.\textsuperscript{115}

This argument is unfortunate as it assumes \textit{a priori} that strengthening UN peacekeeping should be the goal. Rather the goal should be effective peacekeepers regardless of who performs the mission. And indeed, this appears to be the direction that current policy is headed. While the enthusiasm for great powers to participate in peacekeeping operations has certainly not been in evidence in recent years – although

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Dobbins (2005) 245-246
\item Dobbins (2008) 236
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\end{footnotesize}
perhaps owing more to involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq – they have been much more involved in the training of forces and it is this trend which needs to be continued and strengthened.

The United States has had success with its Global Peace Operations Initiative\textsuperscript{116} which seeks to assist partner nations in the training of peacekeeping forces through the concept of a “train-the-trainer” approach with the intent of the partner nation developing self sufficiency in its training base.\textsuperscript{117} This operation has trained thousands of troops within Africa and has generally been successful at imparting basic military skills to partner countries.\textsuperscript{118} Great Britain and France have provided support to regional military training centers such as the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana which focuses on training mid level officers for peace operations. Recently, the United States has initiated the Africa Partnership Station – broad operation of engagement using naval ships and aviation with partner nations in west and east Africa. While primarily focused on maritime engagement, it does not limit its focus to working with host nation navies and the skills imparted by the operation can be of use in peace operations as well. There is of course the danger that increased training of local forces can lead to issues of moral hazard in both the employment and deployment of those

\textsuperscript{116} In Africa, GPOI is still known from its earlier version of ACOTA – African Contingency Training Assistance. GPOI is used here as it is the common term for the broader policy outside of Africa.


\textsuperscript{118} Based on the author’s opinion after witnessing ACOTA training in Rwanda, Nigeria and Uganda.
forces, but continued human rights vetting and monitoring by the nations involved in the training should be sufficient to provide adequate oversight.

With regards to future operational planning and concepts, the most important factor for a successful mission which this paper has identified was the ability to establish a credible deterrent whether it was a consent based or enforcement based mission. Therefore, the goal for the international community in the short term should be to continue to increase the capacity of peacekeepers to do their jobs effectively with regards to personnel and equipment. Suggestions for personnel are mentioned above. As for equipment, the UN facility at Brindisi, Italy is an attempt on the part of the UN to ensure that peacekeepers have proper heavy equipment. One consistent shortcoming in UN missions has been the lack of heavy transport for rapid deployment. One possible solution would be for the UN to procure and operate some small number – perhaps no more than two dozen – military cargo aircraft such as C130s or C17s. This would solve major capacity problem on the part of UN peacekeepers. The drawback is that this could be construed as the beginnings of a UN military force - which this paper does not advocate. There is precedent for this sort of arrangement however as NATO – as an organization – owns and operates several AWACS planes as joint venture within the alliance. Ultimately, these improvements to equipment and personnel cannot compensate for poor leadership with the mission, but well trained troops can also be of assistance to regional organizations as well – particularly if these organizations demonstrate an increased ability to handle peacekeeping on their own.
With regards to future research, the picture that emerges from this study is that the question of whether the UN or great powers are more effective in performing peacekeeping misses the broader point. Regardless of how effective great powers are at performing tactically, there is almost no chance that a great power will be willing to provide the necessary manpower for a given duration in lieu of a UN mission. It is impossible to imagine the United States, for example, being willing to provide up to 30,000 troops for the better part of a decade in the DRC – even more so after the experiences of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And yet, while it is unlikely to expect great powers to take over from the UN wholesale, this paper has also shown that great power intervention can be a critical force multiplier in advancing the cause of a UN mission. Not every UN mission needs this boost to be successful to be sure, but future research should therefore be focused on the question of exactly when and under what circumstances a UN mission could be predicted to have need of an additional boost from great powers. With that knowledge – ideally – DPKO can then adjust its operational plan to anticipate this and provide sufficient resources to a given mission to obviate the need for outside support. As the example of Somalia shows, great power failure will have debilitating and cascading effect on future peacekeeping missions. It is in the UNs and the great powers’ interests to prevent this from happening with the ultimate desired end state of a UN which is capable of handling peace operations without great power support and of allowing great powers to focus on areas beyond the purview of UN peace operations.
In conclusion, the question of whether the UN or great powers are better at peace operations in Africa misses the point. Clearly both have seen success and failure within Africa. What emerges from this paper is that both have a role to play with regards to implementing successful peace operations on the continent. For the great powers that means continuing to support the development of more effective peacekeepers and to potentially stand ready to assist the UN if needed. For the UN, it must ensure that operations have the right kind of leadership in place to maximize the utility of the forces under their command as the numerous examples of successful and failed SRSGs within this paper testify. The future of peace operations continues to change rapidly – the UN has continued to authorize new missions in Africa and regional organizations have begun to flex more muscle as well. Newer operations in areas such as Darfur or the AU mission to Somalia are no less complex than those that have come before and it is critical that peacekeepers learn from the mistakes of the past. Ultimately, it matters less who keeps the peace, only that it is kept.


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