MILITARY NONALIGNMENT AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY:
EUROPEAN CASE STUDIES

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By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the contributions of the European militarily nonaligned states—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland—to nuclear nonproliferation discussions with actual or suspected proliferators. I isolate two hypotheses. First, the relatively close relationships that these states often have with proliferators enable them to play key roles in nonproliferation discussions. Second, it is possible to identify certain types of roles and policy activities that have facilitated these states’ contributions to nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy. I test these hypotheses by examining case studies of Swedish and Swiss efforts to enhance dialogue between Iran, North Korea, and their U.S. and European Union interlocutors. My analysis supported the first hypothesis. Economic and diplomatic ties with proliferants, and the ability to pursue autonomous foreign policy agendas, have enabled Sweden and Switzerland to act as intermediaries in nonproliferation talks. The data also supported the second hypothesis. Militarily nonaligned states have contributed to nonproliferation efforts by passing messages, holding consultations with negotiating parties, developing compromise proposals, hosting direct talks and track II diplomatic engagements, and influencing the policies of international organizations. Based upon strong support for each hypothesis and the generalizability of my analytic conclusions, this thesis underscores the need for greater inclusion of European militarily nonaligned states in nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Successful employment of these states’ intermediary diplomatic capabilities will require both open-mindedness from negotiating parties and more assertiveness from militarily nonaligned states.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND METHODS

Project focus and research questions
This research project addresses the contributions of European militarily nonaligned states to international nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy. In general, the literature on negotiating with actual or suspected proliferators of nuclear weapons technology focuses on the efforts of powerful countries such as the United States and international organizations like the European Union (EU). However, the European militarily nonaligned states—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland—have taken an active interest in nuclear nonproliferation. For example, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has said that “further dissemination of weapons of mass destruction is probably the most serious of the security policy threats we face.” Additionally, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey has referred to nuclear weapons as “extermination weapons” that are “immoral and illegal.” European militarily nonaligned states are also all members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, and they are active participants at review conferences of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

1 I focus on “militarily nonaligned” rather than “nonaligned” states. During the Cold War, the term “nonaligned” became associated with the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a large group of states that chose to ally with neither the eastern nor western bloc. The NAM still exists today, and its members have forsworn alliances with contemporary great powers, although they may enter into defense pacts with other states. In contrast to nonalignment, states that claim military nonalignment remain outside of military alliances and are essentially neutral. I have opted to use the descriptor “militarily nonaligned” rather than “neutral,” as some European states, such as Finland and Sweden, have begun to avoid using the term “neutrality.” Additionally, I would like to thank Mike Winnerstig of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) for recommending this phrase as a possible alternative to neutrality.


5 Founded in 1974, the NSG is an organization comprised of 46 state suppliers of nuclear materials and technologies that seek to reduce the risk of proliferation “through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.” For more information on the NSG see Nuclear Suppliers Group, “What is the NSG?” n.d., http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm.

6 The Zangger Committee is a relatively informal group of nuclear exporter states that began meeting in 1971 in order to interpret the nuclear safeguards provision established by the second paragraph of Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At present, the Zangger Committee has 37 member states. For more information on the Zangger Committee see Zangger Committee, “Our Mission,” updated 13 January 2010, http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Mission/Seiten/default.aspx. And for the full text of Article III of the NPT see...
Because these countries have displayed interest in nuclear nonproliferation and have made efforts to remain impartial in global affairs, they appear to be well positioned to act as mediators or messengers between proliferants and their interlocutors. Still, analyses of the nonproliferation activities of these states usually discuss their promotion of a general disarmament agenda such as adherence to Article VI of the NPT. To determine if the existing literature has overlooked valuable nonproliferation contributions by European militarily nonaligned states, I isolate two main research questions for consideration:

1.) Have these states played important roles in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue?
2.) If so, can we identify the types of policies that have enabled these countries to contribute effectively to diplomatic efforts aimed at prompting nuclear rollback?

Hypotheses

To pursue the answers to these research questions, I test two different hypotheses:

1.) The relatively close relationships that militarily nonaligned European states often have with proliferators enable them to play key roles in nuclear nonproliferation discussions.
2.) It is possible to identify certain types of roles and policy activities that have facilitated these states’ contributions to nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy.

Importance of militarily nonaligned states to nuclear nonproliferation

The seeming inability of the global community to convince Iran and North Korea to reverse course on their nuclear programs threatens international norms, regional security environments, and the vitality of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Some analysts even worry that continued nuclear development by

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7 Throughout this thesis, I use the term “interlocutor” to refer to the great powers and international organizations that seek to engage in negotiations with actual or suspected proliferators.
Pyongyang and Tehran may eventually cause states like South Korea, Japan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to reconsider their adherence to the NPT, potentially leading to destabilizing nuclear arms races in East Asia and the Middle East. With these stakes, the time is right to explore new policy options. European militarily nonaligned states may have the leverage and diplomatic skills necessary to enhance current nonproliferation efforts and help redefine approaches toward actual or suspected proliferators.

Miscommunication and mutual distrust plague current attempts by great powers and international organizations to engage Iran and North Korea. Discussions with Iran and North Korea have taken the form of negotiations through the P5+1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Six-Party Talks (involving China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States). While these formats have stimulated dialogue between Iran, North Korea, and their interlocutors, neither set of discussions has produced the desired result of denuclearization. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has carried out two suspected nuclear weapon tests since 2006, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has indicated that Tehran will pursue “its inalienable right to nuclear energy” regardless of international pressure. With these types of actions and declarations, unless the negotiating parties can overcome obstacles to productive dialogue, two options appear likely: a world with additional nuclear-armed states and/or a series of surgical strikes and potentially even violent attempts at regime change. If the intention of nonproliferation efforts is to preserve global peace, then neither outcome is desirable.

Although negotiations with Iran and the DPRK appear to have reached stalemates, heavily coercive alternative approaches do not have a strong post-Cold War record for generating nuclear rollback. The United States and the EU are usually the players at the forefront of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear

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weapons. These actors have used coercive sanctions and nuclear export controls in an attempt to prevent states of concern from acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies. However, these efforts do not address state motivations for proliferation, including security threats, domestic politics, and a desire for international prestige.\textsuperscript{12} In the case of Iraq, the Hussein regime resisted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in the face of sweeping sanctions. During his imprisonment after the U.S. invasion, Saddam Hussein even told his interrogators that he tried to project the image of a nuclear-armed Iraq to deter potential adversaries.\textsuperscript{13} With regard to the Libyan case, often touted as a success story for sanctions, there is credible evidence suggesting that a U.S. assurance of regime survival prompted Qaddafi’s nuclear rollback.\textsuperscript{14} Given the historical record and Iranian and DPRK resolve, negotiations addressing the motivations for proliferation appear to be the way forward in efforts to prompt rollback.\textsuperscript{15}

European militarily nonaligned states have several characteristics that might enable them to “bridge the gaps” in the stalled motivations-based negotiations between proliferators and their U.S. and European interlocutors. Chief among these attributes are their efforts to remain impartial and their dedication to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additionally, these states are stalwart advocates for international peace and cooperation. The Finnish Constitution proclaims: “Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of peace and human rights and for the development of society.”\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, Ireland’s Constitution declares: “Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.”\textsuperscript{17} Countries around the world profess commitments to peace, cooperation, and nonproliferation, but militarily nonaligned states combine these

\textsuperscript{15} This argument is not meant to imply that sanctions and negotiations are mutually exclusive courses of action. In fact, sanctions can be a useful tool in motivating proliferants to engage in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue. For instance, after years of economic isolation, the struggling status of the DPRK economy motivated Pyongyang to return to the bargaining table and negotiate with the United States in the early 1990s. [Ibid., pp. 114, 257.]
pleads with diplomatic impartiality. Accordingly, these states are in positions to act as dialogue facilitators and to promote new approaches to nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

European militarily nonaligned states show promise as reliable third party actors that might be able to provide critical assistance to ongoing international nonproliferation initiatives. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether these states have served in key nonproliferation roles. If this has indeed been the case, isolating these contributions could be an important step toward dialogue promotion, more effective nonproliferation policies, and the potential resolution of nuclear impasses that threaten global peace.

**Research scope and methodology**

I use a qualitative approach employing comparative case studies. In so doing, I limit my frame of reference to European militarily nonaligned states. These states appear to have been active in post-Cold War nonproliferation diplomacy, and they maintain amicable relations with leading interlocutors like the United States and the EU. Sweden and Switzerland serve as my case study states because these countries have comparatively close relations with Iran and North Korea. For instance, Sweden holds regular meetings to discuss nuclear issues with North Korean diplomats, and Switzerland does so with Iranian officials. While Austria, Finland, and Ireland maintain embassies in Tehran, they have nonresident embassies to the DPRK located in Beijing and Seoul. By contrast, Sweden and Switzerland each maintain diplomatic delegations in Iran and North Korea, and there is more data available on their intermediary activities than those of the other European militarily nonaligned states. Nevertheless, Austria, Ireland, and Finland may still be in positions to provide critical assistance to nuclear diplomacy efforts because of their impartiality and dedication to the nonproliferation regime. Therefore, my conclusions have immediate relevance to Austria, Finland, and Ireland. They might also have some applicability to non-European militarily nonaligned states. These states may not have the same quality of relations with the

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18 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author, August 2010. All citations for interviews with experts who requested anonymity omit day, location, and medium of communication to protect interviewee identity.

19 Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Section at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, Bern, 17 August 2010.
United States or the EU, but their nonalignment may permit them to function as links to proliferators—by pursuing some of the policies discussed in this thesis—in the event of future nuclear standoffs.

Because of my case selections, I am able to conduct some controlled comparison across cases. Despite the military nonalignment of both states, they maintain different levels of institutional affiliations. Sweden is an EU member state, whereas Switzerland has a strict neutrality policy and has eschewed membership in nearly all international organizations with exclusionary membership criteria. Consequently, I use a small-N research design analyzing two types of militarily nonaligned states. To demonstrate the constraints of alliance membership, I also reference small NATO member states like Denmark and Norway in comparison to my case countries.

While militarily nonaligned states may negotiate bilaterally with proliferators, independent efforts by Sweden and Switzerland are unlikely to prompt nuclear rollback. As a result, I focus on these countries’ activities as intermediaries between proliferators and great powers, and as members of—oftentimes economic—nonmilitary international organizations. By looking at a “true neutral” and a militarily nonaligned EU member, I identify the policies—and their attendant national roles—that have succeeded in facilitating or enhancing nonproliferation dialogue. The term “national roles” refers to a set of 17 different functions that political scientist K.J. Holsti developed to explain the behaviors of states on the international stage. Holsti’s often-cited work identifies potential role designations for states such as “Mediator/Integrator” and “Balancer.” A state can play multiple roles in international affairs, and each national role encompasses certain types of policy actions that countries are likely to pursue.

I develop a series of typologies based upon the roles and policy actions of my case states in their efforts to contribute to nuclear nonproliferation discussions. These typologies illustrate successful and unsuccessful nonproliferation contributions by Sweden and Switzerland. By analyzing the data regarding the activities of these states, I identify the national role designation that best corresponds to each specific policy activity. Accordingly, I am able to observe the roles of militarily nonaligned states that have been

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most conducive to successfully contributing to nuclear nonproliferation dialogue. In Chapter 7, I generalize from the typologies and discuss a series of policy implications and future directions for policy.

In order to maintain the highest degree of relevance to the current international environment, I limit my research to post-Cold War negotiations with actual or suspected proliferators. For the purposes of data availability, the vast majority of my research focuses on Swiss and Swedish roles in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises. To identify these states’ activities, I draw upon newspaper articles, books, and policy documents. Because few sources discuss the “intermediary” activities of my case study states, I also conducted interviews with Swiss and Swedish government officials and nongovernmental experts.

State secrecy and nuclear nonproliferation: Research limitations
Many of the nuclear nonproliferation activities of militarily nonaligned states occur in secret settings away from the public eye. Because these countries strive to maintain good relations with states spanning the ideological spectrum, they must take steps to protect confidential information and ensure that they do not compromise their bilateral relationships. Consequently, it is challenging and sometimes impossible to gain access to certain information regarding Sweden’s and Switzerland’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Several of my interviewees requested anonymity when answering my questions, and one government official even joked that I should wait a decade for him to publish a book before even bothering to pursue this research topic. Despite these limitations, I believe that this thesis provides a concise, analyzable survey of Swiss and Swedish nuclear nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis actual or suspected proliferators. Through my analysis, I explore a multitude of often-overlooked nonproliferation activities by the Swiss and Swedish governments and assess their effectiveness in enhancing dialogue.

Contribution: Supplementing the existing body of literature
Literature on the nuclear nonproliferation contributions of European militarily nonaligned states limits its focus to their promotion of a general nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. On the other hand, models for successful nonproliferation talks—such as the one developed by nuclear policy analysts

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21 It was extremely difficult to obtain data discussing the nuclear nonproliferation activities of militarily nonaligned states toward Iraq during the 1990s. Additionally, several of my interviewees noted that negotiations with Libya involved Britain and the United States acting without the assistance of intermediaries.
Virginia Foran and Leonard Spector\(^2\) focus on the negotiating efforts of great powers and international organizations. Unsurprisingly, Foran and Spector predict that mistrust and miscommunication between the proliferant and its interlocutors may prevent the desired rollback outcome.\(^3\) Through my case studies of Sweden and Switzerland, I investigate whether militarily nonaligned states have been able to help negotiating parties overcome these sorts of obstacles. This thesis fills a notable gap in the existing literature. While news articles sometimes mention the contributions of these states vis-à-vis proliferants, policy and academic literature overlooks their efforts, many of which have facilitated dialogue.

This project is a step toward the development of a more complete body of literature that examines the activities of nontraditional players and the effects of policy alternatives. My research supplements the existing literature in two ways. First, I address the contributions of states normally absent from academic and policy discussions of nonproliferation diplomacy. Second, by examining these states’ past activities, I draw attention to policies that scholars have not yet addressed in the literature. Since my research indicates that European militarily nonaligned states have aided the process of nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, future negotiation models should make note and take advantage of their contributions.

Roadmap of the thesis

This paper analyzes a broad range of Swedish and Swiss nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Chapter 2 discusses the relationships that these states currently maintain with Iran and the DPRK. Chapter 3 focuses on their intermediary nonproliferation activities, and Chapter 4 analyzes their efforts to host nuclear negotiations and track II diplomacy engagements.\(^4\) Chapter 5 addresses Swiss and Swedish nuclear nonproliferation promotion within international organizations, while Chapter 6 discusses a possible alternative explanation for these states’ nonproliferation contributions. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the

\(^2\) See Foran and Spector, “The Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation.”
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 30-33.
\(^4\) I discuss track II diplomatic engagements in the context of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear standoffs at length in Chapter 4. Track II diplomacy is a process that involves meetings between nongovernmental experts such as scientists, policy analysts, former government officials, and academics. These influential individuals often represent countries that are not on friendly diplomatic terms, and they usually brief officials about the content of their dialogue.
implications of my research and puts forth a series of policy recommendations for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

CHAPTER 2: HYPOTHESIS 1 - CLOSE TIES WITH PROLIFERANTS ENABLE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

This chapter provides support for my first hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the relatively close relationships that European militarily nonaligned states often maintain with actual or suspected proliferators enable them to play key roles in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue. My analysis revealed that Sweden’s and Switzerland’s efforts at impartiality have helped these states to cultivate lasting diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea. The data also indicates that military nonalignment and comparatively strong relations with proliferators and their interlocutors have allowed Bern and Stockholm to serve as trusted intermediaries in nonproliferation discussions.

Sweden and Switzerland meet Holsti’s criteria for the role of the “Active Independent,” a nonaligned state that may engage in “active efforts to cultivate relations with as many states as possible.” Despite the international condemnation of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, as indicated by UN Security Council Resolutions, Bern and Stockholm have numerous connections to these regimes. Relative to the size of their economies, Sweden and Switzerland have fairly significant economic interests in Iran, but this is not the case for the DPRK. However, Swiss and Swedish development aid expenditures provide a critical source of income for the cash-strapped North Korean regime. These ties contribute to the overall closeness of Switzerland’s and Sweden’s relationships with Iran and North Korea.

Tracing economic ties between proliferators and European militarily nonaligned states

While economic ties are not necessarily indicative of the overall status of bilateral relationships, they are one point of reference for measuring the connections between states. My research showed that Sweden

and Switzerland maintain notable economic ties with Iran and North Korea. Sweden and Switzerland are small states, and their economies only account for approximately $330 billion\textsuperscript{27} and $315 billion\textsuperscript{28} annually. By comparison, the gross domestic products (GDPs) of the EU and the United States account for over $16 trillion\textsuperscript{29} and $14 trillion\textsuperscript{30} respectively. Nevertheless, relative to their economic strength, we can observe strong monetary ties between European militarily nonaligned states and proliferators.

Despite three decades of U.S. sanctions and several rounds of UN sanctions, including Resolution 1929 of June 2010, Iran’s significant oil reserves have helped to insulate Tehran from coercion. Even the EU, an organization that is usually at the forefront of nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, maintains significant economic interests in Iran. The EU is Iran’s largest trading partner and imported over $12 billion of energy products from Tehran in 2009.\textsuperscript{31} In 2007, Sweden-Iran trade accounted for over $500 million.\textsuperscript{32} And in 2009, trade between Switzerland and Iran totaled over $750 million.\textsuperscript{33} The Swiss-Iran total is expected to increase dramatically in the coming years; in 2008, the Swiss energy company EGL signed a 25-year gas deal with Iran worth approximately $1 billion annually.\textsuperscript{34} Further, undisclosed amounts of Iranian government funds remain in bank accounts in Switzerland, the location of an estimated one-third of global undocumented wealth.\textsuperscript{35} Although the Swedes and the Swiss have economic interests in Iran, Tehran’s GDP was over $800 billion in 2009,\textsuperscript{36} indicating that unilateral sanctions by Stockholm or Bern would be unlikely to have significant effects.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Financial Times}, “Banking Secrets,” 27 October 2010.
While North Korea’s population is roughly one-third of Iran’s, the DPRK economy is merely a small fraction of its Iranian counterpart. Decades of international sanctions and ruthless totalitarianism have produced a GDP of roughly $40 billion annually.\(^{37}\) The regime of Kim Jong-il is so desperate for funds that it engages in mass production of narcotics and the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and cigarettes.\(^{38}\) The DPRK has few desirable exports, and its ally China and neighbor South Korea account for the majority of its trading activities. Even though European trade with Pyongyang is negligible, a Swedish department store made headlines in 2009 when it considered selling jeans manufactured in the communist state.\(^{39}\)

Apart from their limited trade relations with North Korea, Sweden and Switzerland have other economic ties to Pyongyang. Although Switzerland’s banking confidentiality laws prevent me from obtaining official statistics, Asian security analyst Paul French estimates that the North Korean regime may keep up to several billion dollars in Swiss bank accounts.\(^{40}\) Additionally, Sweden and Switzerland have both allocated millions of dollars in aid to the country in the past several years. In 2007, these states were among the top five national contributors of development aid to the DPRK.\(^{41}\) Switzerland funds the Pyongyang Business School, while Sweden supports a banking and finance education program in Pyongyang.\(^{42}\) These types of cooperative development activities fall under Holsti’s national role called the “Developer,” which describes states that undertake “to assist underdeveloped countries.”\(^{43}\)

**Importance of relatively close diplomatic relations**

In addition to measurable economic ties to Iran and North Korea, the evidence indicates that Sweden and Switzerland have closer diplomatic relations with these regimes than NATO member states do. These ties

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\(^{38}\) For further analysis of North Korea’s economic activities of a criminal nature see Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., and Robert M. Collins, *Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit Economic Activities* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).


\(^{43}\) Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” p. 266.
are integral to their abilities to serve as intermediaries in nuclear nonproliferation discussions.\textsuperscript{44} Like most European countries, Sweden and Switzerland maintain embassies in Tehran. However, some NATO states such as Norway and Denmark do not have diplomatic delegations stationed in Pyongyang. By contrast, Sweden has an embassy in North Korea, and Switzerland maintains a Cooperation Office. The purpose of the Swiss Cooperation Office is to engage the DPRK in humanitarian dialogue and assist in North Korean institution-building.\textsuperscript{45} Switzerland and Sweden are not the only European countries with diplomatic delegations in North Korea. NATO member states the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom all maintain embassies in the North Korean capital.

The status of protecting power mandates\textsuperscript{46} reveals the relative closeness of Sweden and Switzerland to Iran and North Korea. When two states do not maintain diplomatic relations, each can request for a third country—a protecting power\textsuperscript{47}—to represent its interests and provide services to its citizens within the territory of the other. Because the United States does not maintain relations with Iran and the DPRK, Sweden serves as the protecting power of U.S. interests in Pyongyang, and Switzerland does so in Tehran. As a result, the Swiss and Swedish diplomatic delegations in these countries deal with issues affecting U.S. citizens in Iran and North Korea. The protecting power must also maintain “an indispensable minimum of contact…between states that have broken off diplomatic relations.”\textsuperscript{48} In performing this service, protecting powers act in the role that Holsti described as a “Bridge”; Bridges provide open channels of communication between other countries.\textsuperscript{49} The 1961 Vienna Convention on

\textsuperscript{44} Andreas Persbo, Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, interview by author, email communication, 25 October 2010.
\textsuperscript{45} Anne-Lise Cattin Hennin, Political Affairs Officer at the Swiss Embassy to the United States, interview by author, Washington, 10 September 2010.
\textsuperscript{47} Protecting powers are also sometimes referred to as “interim protecting powers,” as these states may serve in this capacity until the resumption or establishment of relations between adversaries.
\textsuperscript{49} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” pp. 266-267.
Diplomatic Relations also stipulates that protecting powers “must be acceptable to the receiving State.” DPRK and Iranian officials must approve protecting power mandates, and it is in the interests of the United States to select states that are best positioned to communicate with these regimes. These factors point to the comparatively close relationships that Sweden and Switzerland maintain with today’s actual or suspected proliferators.

Relevance of military nonaligned status to nuclear nonproliferation discussions

Military nonalignment has allowed Sweden and Switzerland to cultivate relationships with proliferants that enable them to contribute to international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Belgium and Iceland, for instance, have reputations as peaceful countries with limited military capabilities, yet these states do not maintain the same types of relationships that Sweden and Switzerland have with Iran and North Korea. The constraints of alliance membership point to one convincing explanation for these disparities.

NATO membership decreases a country’s credibility as an impartial actor in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue. As NATO members, Brussels and Reykjavik fall under the Atlantic Alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense commitments and the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Like Sweden and Switzerland, they have chosen to abstain from nuclear weapons development, but their continued reliance on extended nuclear deterrence for security may weaken their credibility as nonproliferation advocates. On the other side of the equation, Bern’s and Stockholm’s disavowal of nuclear weapons as legitimate security instruments may enable them to serve in the role that Holsti referred to as the “Example.” This term refers to states that derive international influence from their pursuit of certain domestic policies. Further, security cooperation with the United States can constrain a country’s ties with Iran and North Korea, as the rhetoric of leaders such as Kim Jong-il and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad indicates that they view Washington as their chief adversary. In fact, due to fear of U.S. regime change attempts, both Iran and the DPRK have

51 For the full text of Article 5 see North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Washington, TIAS 1964, 34 UNTS 243.
52 Peter Braun, Strategic Planning Project Manager at the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, interview by author, email communication, 20 October 2010.
54 Ibid.
sought negative security assurances from Washington as incentives in exchange for rollback activities. Consequently, Swedish nuclear policy analyst Anne-Charlotte Wetterwik explains that by distancing themselves from NATO, and the United States by extension, European militarily nonaligned states appear “less threatening” to actual or suspected proliferators.

Swedish and Swiss government officials also highlight their countries’ military nonalignment as a key determinant in bilateral relations with Tehran and Pyongyang. Jean-Daniel Praz, the Deputy Head of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Swiss Foreign Ministry, asserts that neutrality has enabled the Swiss to cultivate close ties with Iran and play a “special role” in helping to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Further, the website of the Swiss Cooperation Office in Pyongyang reads, “As a neutral and trusted partner, Switzerland continues to engage with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

Turning to Sweden, one senior defense official who firmly believes that Stockholm is moving toward eventual NATO membership explains that Sweden’s rhetorical commitment to military nonalignment allows Stockholm to discuss nuclear security issues with the DPRK. The official states, “As long as we are not members of NATO, DPRK officials are happy to live in their own perception of Sweden.”

**Typology of militarily nonaligned state relations with proliferants**

The table below illustrates the data in this chapter as a typology of Swedish and Swiss policy activities in their relationships with Iran and North Korea, and it isolates the overall nuclear nonproliferation contributions of each action. From Table 1, I explicate several notable analytic conclusions regarding the significance of comparatively close ties between European militarily nonaligned states and actual or suspected proliferators of nuclear weapons technologies.

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56 Anne-Charlotte Wetterwik, Senior Research Associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, interview by author, email communication, 12 November 2010.

57 Praz, interview by author.


60 Senior Swedish defense official, interview by author, August 2010.
Table 1: Bilateral Relationships with Actual or Suspected Proliferants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Close economic ties with Iran</td>
<td>Potential closeness in relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Non-membership in NATO</td>
<td>Distance from United States; evidence of impartiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Diplomatic presence in Pyongyang and Tehran</td>
<td>Potential closeness in relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>Protecting power mandates for the United States in Iran and North Korea</td>
<td>Evidence of solid relations with proliferants; offers communication channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>Development and relief aid to DPRK</td>
<td>Potential closeness in relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Renunciation of nuclear weapons as security tools</td>
<td>Increases nonproliferation bona fides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in this table strongly supports Hypothesis 1. Swiss and Swedish Active Independent—and Developer to a lesser extent—behaviors are oftentimes controversial, but these types of policies enable militarily nonaligned states to serve as protecting powers and bridge-builders. My analysis also revealed that efforts to remain outside of NATO and serve in the role of an Example by wholly renouncing nuclear weapons are particularly influential in permitting Sweden and Switzerland to act as intermediaries in nonproliferation discussions.

This data set is specific to Sweden and Switzerland, but is it applicable to other states? Austria, Finland, and Ireland are not protecting powers for the United States, and these states do not maintain delegations in North Korea. Nevertheless, these states have several characteristics that are integral to success as an intermediary. Vienna, Helsinki, and Dublin maintain diplomatic and economic relations with Iran and North Korea, are non-members of NATO, and invest heavily in development aid.61 These countries are also strong nonproliferation advocates that are not protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Ireland formally proposed the NPT, and Austria and Finland joined Ireland in signing the treaty on July 1, 1968, the first day it was opened for signature.62 With their impartiality, nonproliferation bona fides, and

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economic and diplomatic ties with states spanning the ideological spectrum, these states appear well positioned to contribute to nuclear rollback efforts. Non-European states may also share these characteristics, but close relations with proliferants and their interlocutors, and the economic strength to invest heavily in development aid and bilateral trade, are significant assets in promoting dialogue. Due to their diplomatic relationships, impartiality, and developed economies, European militarily nonaligned states are strong candidates for third party facilitators of nuclear nonproliferation dialogue.

CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS 2.1 – INTERMEDIARY NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES ENHANCE DIALOGUE

In the next three chapters, I support my second hypothesis by analyzing a wide range of Swedish and Swiss efforts to contribute to international nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy. My research revealed that it is indeed possible to identify policies by these states that effectively contributed to nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, as well as actions that were less successful. In this specific chapter, I discuss Swedish and Swiss nuclear nonproliferation contributions that occur through the provision of intermediary diplomatic services to proliferants and their interlocutors.

The relationships that Sweden and Switzerland maintain with Iran and North Korea—as discussed in Hypothesis 1—enable these states to engage in the intermediary nuclear nonproliferation activities that provide support for Hypothesis 2. These activities have included message-passing, developing compromise proposals, and holding private consultations with proliferants and their interlocutors. While Swedish and Swiss officials have passed messages and held consultations, Stockholm’s current center-right government has been less interested than previous administrations in unilaterally developing compromise initiatives.63

Intermediary nonproliferation activities fall under the national roles described by Holsti as the Bridge and Mediator/Integrator, and these policies have benefited the dialogue process in several different ways. These efforts have provided channels of communication between negotiating parties, allowed the sides to

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63 Senior Swedish official, interview by author, August 2010.
better understand each other’s strategic objectives, and introduced compromise policies to nuclear nonproliferation discussions. Although intermediary activities have the potential to influence global viewpoints on nuclear nonproliferation, their overall contribution depends upon the negotiating parties’ open-mindedness and willingness to talk.

Message-passing between hostile parties
By acting in conjunction with their protecting power mandates and their roles as Bridges, Switzerland and Sweden have passed numerous messages between the United States and Iran and North Korea. In doing so, the Swedish and Swiss governments have contributed to nuclear nonproliferation dialogue by helping to maintain communication between proliferants and the United States. My research produced more information on Swiss than Swedish message-passing activities.

Switzerland has a long tradition of passing messages between states that lack diplomatic relations. Message-passing is a historical component of Swiss diplomacy, and Bern was an active messenger between the belligerents in both World Wars. Jean-Daniel Praz explains that the United States, EU, and suspected proliferators view Switzerland as a trusted intermediary because the Swiss have developed a reputation for reliability and speed in these forms of communication. In addition, Anne-Lise Cattin Hennin, a diplomat at the Swiss Embassy in Washington, states the Swiss are well aware of their role as a facilitator of communication. But despite this commitment to bridge-building, the Swiss Federal Council (Parliament) ruled in 2000 that Switzerland may discontinue its cooperation with states that threaten international peace, violate human rights norms, or reject democratic governance. North Korea meets the criteria, and depending on whom one asks, Iran does as well. Alternatively, Article 2 of the Swiss Constitution commits the country to working toward a “just and peaceful international order.”

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64 Praz, interview by author.
65 Ibid.
66 Cattin Hennin, interview by author.
Praz and Cattin Hennin note that this overarching principle has driven Switzerland to offer intermediary diplomatic services between state parties that are not on friendly terms.

Sweden has passed messages regarding nuclear security issues between the United States and North Korea. One Swedish official notes that, unlike Western European NATO members, Stockholm developed its relationship with the DPRK early in the Cold War. The official asserts that this longstanding relationship has been instrumental in permitting Sweden to pass messages regarding nuclear issues between North Korea and the United States. However, the official would not divulge additional information about the substance of these types of communications.

Message-passing has only limited utility in stimulating dialogue. First, the proliferant or its interlocutor must have an interest in discussing nuclear nonproliferation issues with the other side. And second, even if one side displays an interest in talking, there is no guarantee that the other will reciprocate. For example, in May 2003, one of Ayatollah Khamenei’s lieutenants asked Tim Guldimann, then-Swiss Ambassador in Tehran, to pass along a comprehensive proposal for the normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations. The proposal included an offer by Iran to become more transparent with respect to its nuclear program. However, the George W. Bush administration refused to respond to the offer and even reprimanded the Swiss for communicating it to Washington. A U.S. State Department official explained this reaction: “There was a worry that we would be maneuvered into a grand bargain, that the Iranians were sneaky and liars and couldn’t be trusted. They were seen as the source of the problem.”

**Adding innovative compromise proposals to discussions**

In addition to their dialogue stimulation efforts via message-passing, Bern and Stockholm have put forth compromise nonproliferation proposals intended to assist in the resolution of nuclear standoffs. While these proposals are usually not successful, the data indicates that they have been influential in shaping the direction of nuclear nonproliferation discussions at times. These efforts fall under the role that Holsti

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69 Senior Swedish official, interview by author.
labeled as Mediator/Integrator, as Sweden and Switzerland have attempted to take part in dispute resolution activities.\textsuperscript{73} Like message-passing, third party policy proposals require that disputants maintain a level of open-mindedness toward alternative solutions. Even if both sides ultimately reject compromise proposals, their mere introduction and consideration can influence future policymaking.

Sweden developed a reputation during the Cold War for assembling compromise policies for use in nuclear nonproliferation discussions. For instance, Jan Prawitz, a retired Swedish nuclear negotiator, recalls efforts by Swedish technical experts to resolve disputes between the Soviet Union and the United States during the negotiations on the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. When U.S. and Soviet diplomats could not find common ground regarding on-site inspection procedures, Prawitz notes that Swedish technical experts worked to assemble a mutually acceptable compromise package.\textsuperscript{74} The U.S. and Soviet governments considered but eventually rejected the verification measures discussed in the Swedish proposal. This sort of initiative was commonplace in Swedish Cold War nuclear diplomacy, and even if it was rejected, it influenced the conduct of future test ban discussions.\textsuperscript{75} However, in recent years, most of Sweden’s nonproliferation and disarmament policy proposals have dealt with the more general goal of working toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

By contrast, the Swiss government has taken the opposite approach. During the Cold War, the Swiss feared that activist foreign policy would compromise their reputation as a trusted intermediary, but Switzerland now pursues a policy known as “active neutrality.” According to a senior Legal Officer at the Swiss Foreign Ministry, this policy entails that Switzerland use “its position to actively engage of [sic] itself in favor of international peace and justice.”\textsuperscript{76}

We can observe the influence of “active neutrality” in a series of proposals put forth by Switzerland over the past several years. In 2007, Switzerland contacted numerous countries with a stake in the Iranian

\textsuperscript{73} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” p. 265.
\textsuperscript{74} Jan Prawitz, visiting scholar at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, retired diplomat, and nuclear nonproliferation policy advisor, interview by author, 25 August 2010, Stockholm.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Senior Legal Officer at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, August 2010.
nuclear crisis and asked for their participation in a broad-ranging conference. While Iran agreed to take part, the meeting did not materialize because of a lack of interest from the United States and several of its NATO allies. And after Iranian diplomats told their Swiss counterparts that they did not trust the IAEA, Switzerland proposed the creation of a neutral commission to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities. In 2008, Switzerland disseminated the “freeze-for-freeze” proposal to Iran and the P5+1 parties—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States. The proposal called for “simultaneous suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program and international sanctions.” The parties on both sides of the table initially rejected the Swiss proposal. But in future negotiations, the P5+1 parties proposed variations of this concept to Iranian negotiators without success. Although the “freeze-for-freeze” option has not been successful, it provides an example of a militarily nonaligned state influencing the conduct of nonproliferation diplomacy. However, Daniel Möckli of the Center for Security Studies in Zurich explains that the Swiss have been less active in developing compromise proposals since the 2008 EGL gas deal with Iran, as officials believe that it may have tainted the Swiss reputation of impartiality.

Politics appear to underlie the post-Cold War differences in Swedish and Swiss compromise proposal efforts. One Swedish official argues that the current center-right government of Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt is less likely to fund policies for use outside of EU nonproliferation efforts. Still, the official insists that the government remains interested in developing compromise solutions. Further, Thomas Jonter of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute believes that there are few constraints preventing Sweden from developing these types of proposals.

77 Praz, interview by author.
78 Ibid.
81 Daniel Möckli, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, Zurich, interview by author, email communication, 18 October 2010.
82 Senior Swedish official, interview by author.
83 Thomas Jonter, Head of the Department of Economic History at Stockholm University and guest researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, interview by author, 27 August 2010, Stockholm.
Jean-Daniel Praz of the Swiss Foreign Ministry even notes that Switzerland is interested in working with Sweden to develop joint nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.84

“Bridging the gap” through consultations with negotiating parties
European militarily nonaligned states also act as Bridges and Mediators/Integrators by holding consultations with proliferants and their great power and international organization interlocutors. The benefits of these activities are two-fold: states like Sweden and Switzerland can assist in facilitating mutual understanding between adversaries, and they can provide negotiating advice to the parties involved in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue.

Pursuant to the policy of “active neutrality,” the Swiss government frequently holds private nuclear security consultations with countries that have a stake in the Iranian and North Korean crises. In 2003, then-Swiss ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann worked with Iranian diplomat Sadegh Kharrazi to develop the “grand bargain” proposal for the normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations.85 And since 2006, Swiss diplomats have had regular meetings with their Iranian counterparts to discuss the nuclear issue.86 Prior to the 2008 gas deal controversy, Michael Ambühl, then-Switzerland’s top diplomat, held numerous meetings in Tehran. According to one analyst, “Once [Ambühl] had sort of an agreement with the Iranian side on how to proceed in the nuclear crisis, [he] went back to the P5+1 and checked whether there was a basis for compromise.”87 A Swiss Foreign Ministry official even notes that Swiss diplomats have helped Iranian officials to restructure and develop content for the proposals that they present to the P5+1 parties.88 The official also indicated that the government has been involved in meetings and consultations with diplomats from the United States, North Korea, and European countries.

84 Praz, interview by author.
85 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation, p. 204.
87 Möckli, interview by author.
88 Senior Swiss Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
Swedish officials have also participated in meetings of this nature. For instance, in February 2008, Mats Foyer, the Swedish ambassador to the DPRK, organized a luncheon in Pyongyang. At this event, a staff member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with resident diplomats from EU states to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue, among other subjects. Additionally, Swedish officials anonymously acknowledge that the government has held private talks with Iranian and North Korean officials focusing on these states’ nuclear programs. Officials are unwilling to discuss the substance of discussions on nuclear issues. Still, one interviewee notes that it is standard practice for Swedish diplomats to hold bilateral meetings with officials from the United States and EU countries following talks with suspected proliferants. The interviewee explains that the purpose of these meetings is to brief foreign officials on the information that Swedish diplomats learn from their North Korean counterparts.

Typology of intermediary nuclear nonproliferation activities
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, Switzerland and Sweden engage in a series of intermediary nuclear nonproliferation activities that fall under Holsti’s national roles of Mediator/Integrator and Bridge. Table 2 depicts the relevant data from my research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>Message-passing between the United States, Iran, and North Korea</td>
<td>Provides channel of communication; limited by willingness of parties to talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Mediator/Integrator</td>
<td>Compromise proposals</td>
<td>Can influence strategic thinking; limited by open-mindedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Mediator/Integrator; Bridge</td>
<td>Private consultations with proliferants and their interlocutors</td>
<td>Communicate interests of other side; can help shape negotiating stances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author. Senior Swedish official, interview by author. Andreas Persbo, a Swedish nuclear policy analyst with numerous contacts inside of the government, also corroborates that these meetings take place. [Persbo, interview by author.]
91 Senior Swedish defense official, interview by author.
The items in Table 2 provide support for my second hypothesis, although not without limitations. The Bridge and Mediator/Integrator actions of message-passing and hosting private consultations with proliferators and their interlocutors have the potential to enhance dialogue, facilitate communication between adversaries, and influence the positions of negotiating parties. However, as the U.S. rejection of the Iranian “grand bargain” indicates, these efforts are limited by the levels of open-mindedness and willingness to engage in negotiations exhibited by proliferants and their interlocutors. Another way in which Switzerland—and Sweden to a lesser extent under the current center-right government—has attempted to assist nonproliferation talks is by advancing compromise proposals. While negotiating parties often reject initiatives like the “freeze-for-freeze” proposal, the introduction of alternative solutions to nuclear dialogue can influence the long-term policymaking of the countries involved.

The ability to engage in intermediary activities is contingent upon cultivating relationships with proliferators (the subject of Hypothesis 1). Austria, Finland, and Ireland may meet this criterion in many respects, but intermediary activities require countries to independently involve themselves in nuclear nonproliferation discussions. Ireland has a strong reputation for pursuing activist policy stances on issues of nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Because Irish positions on nuclear security issues often mirror those of Sweden and Switzerland, the analytic conclusions put forth in this chapter bear a great deal of relevance to Ireland. These conclusions appear less relevant to the nonproliferation policies of Finland and Austria. Finnish officials view their EU membership as a potential source of national security; thus, Helsinki has been reluctant to engage in activist foreign policy at times. Meanwhile, Austria has a reputation for being a quiet neutral rather than an assertive player on the international stage.

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92 See Sinnott, “Ireland and the Diplomacy of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Politics of Incrementalism.”
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS 2.2 – HOSTING TALKS FACILITATES CRITICAL NONPROLIFERATION DISCUSSIONS

This chapter provides additional support for Hypothesis 2. By hosting track II diplomatic engagements\textsuperscript{95} and/or direct negotiations between proliferants and their interlocutors, Sweden and Switzerland have contributed to nonproliferation diplomacy as Bridges and Mediator/Integrators. While the results of such discussions depend upon the conduct of the participants, my analysis indicated that hosting track II efforts and direct nuclear talks is a critical component of facilitating productive dialogue.

Sweden and Switzerland have hosted various nonproliferation discussions. Each state has hosted track II diplomacy pertaining to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues. With respect to the DPRK, the results of such engagements are far from conclusive. But in the case of the Iranian nuclear standoff, my research showed that track II talks between U.S. and Iranian experts influenced the policies of the administrations of George W. Bush and Mohammad Khatami.\textsuperscript{96} In the realm of direct dialogue, hosting talks is a critical component of facilitating discussion. Geneva has a rich tradition of hosting nuclear security dialogue, and the international institutions that are present in the city provide negotiating states with permanent office space and support staff. Stockholm’s lack of institutional infrastructure and Sweden’s EU membership make the city a somewhat less desirable location for negotiations than Geneva. Interestingly, as I will discuss in this chapter, the Swedish and Swiss governments both agree to host nonproliferation discussions upon request; they do not actively promote their cities as sites for dialogue.

Importance of track II diplomacy engagements hosted by impartial states

One way in which Sweden and Switzerland have helped to facilitate conversations between proliferants and the great powers and international organizations that seek to engage them is by hosting track II diplomatic engagements. As my analysis below indicates, track II engagements have enhanced confidence-building and communication, and influenced official policies and negotiating postures.

\textsuperscript{95} See note 24 for a description of the fundamentals of track II diplomacy.

Limited information is available on Swedish and Swiss contributions to track II efforts on the North Korean nuclear issue. In September 2010, Swedish and South Korean experts met in Stockholm to discuss how Sweden could contribute to potential DPRK denuclearization. One Swedish research institution is currently engaged in academic exchanges that involve the hosting of North Korean security policy analysts. Turning to Switzerland, a Swiss diplomat notes that humanitarian and confidence-building track II engagements involving North Korea routinely occur in Geneva. On a joint basis, the Swiss and Swedish Foreign Ministries funded a 2007 study discussing a wide range of potential confidence-building measures intended to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Swiss researcher Daniel Möckli explains that the purpose of this report was to support the conduct of track II diplomacy.

Geneva has hosted track II engagements between Iranian and U.S. experts aimed at improving relations and discussing solutions to the nuclear standoff. In April 2009, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey revealed that Geneva had hosted academics, scientists, and strategists from both countries since 2003. The Los Angeles Times reported that Geneva was an ideal site for the discussions because “Iran and the U.S. consider Switzerland neutral ground.” An anonymous participant praised the dialogue because “participants could say whatever they wanted during freewheeling discussions, unrestricted by the ideological straitjackets imposed on diplomats in Washington and Tehran.”

97 For example, a senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official noted that the government was aware of such engagements occurring in Stockholm, but the official would not divulge any additional information. [Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.]
99 Persbo, interview by author.
100 Cattin Hennin, interview by author.
102 Möckli, interview by author.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
Stockholm has also hosted sweeping track II diplomatic engagements between Iranian and U.S. experts. Perhaps the most notable of these activities were discussions organized by the New York-based Rockefeller Brothers Fund that took place from 2002-2008. U.S. and Iranian representatives felt particularly comfortable meeting in Sweden because they perceived the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as a neutral and impartial host.\textsuperscript{106} The participants engaged in discussions of culture, politics, and nuclear nonproliferation that often culminated in the production of joint documents for dissemination to officials in Washington and Tehran. According to reports from U.S. participants, officials indicated that the results of the dialogue helped to shape Washington’s approach toward Iran.\textsuperscript{107} On the Iranian side, the talks encouraged Mohammad Khatami’s pursuit of diplomatic normalization, although the successor government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad put less stock in their recommendations.\textsuperscript{108}

Providing a mutually acceptable site for direct dialogue

Hosting dialogue is a vital service to the nonproliferation regime; without mutually agreeable negotiation sites, discussions that may lead to nuclear rollback simply cannot occur. Geneva has hosted many rounds of talks on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues. Stockholm does not have the same status when it comes to hosting dialogue on nonproliferation issues, and the reasons for this appear to pertain to Sweden’s membership in the EU and the amount of institutional infrastructure in Geneva.

Geneva has a long tradition of serving as a venue for nuclear negotiations. During the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. and the United States negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties—among others—in this Swiss city. The United States and North Korea also signed the October 1994 Agreed Framework stipulating the conditions for DPRK nuclear disarmament in Geneva. Additionally, the P5+1 countries and Iran have held negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program in Geneva. However, the Swiss government has a tradition of acting as a host

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 14.
only when the negotiating parties ask it to do so. One Swiss official notes that, in the case of the P5+1-Iran talks, both Iranian officials and Javier Solana, then-EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, requested the use of Geneva as the host city.

Another Swiss official believes that Geneva has become a desirable location for dialogue because the Swiss have developed a reputation for ensuring a high level of privacy and seclusion from the media, thereby providing a comfortable forum for dialogue. In making this argument, the official points to the July 2008 P5+1 talks in Geneva. U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns sat at the table during these discussions, marking a sharp change from the George W. Bush administration’s policy of refusing to engage with Iran. The media reported that Burns “would not negotiate with the Iranians nor hold separate meetings.” However, the Swiss official reports that once away from the cameras, Burns privately spoke with Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, for around 40 minutes in a garden at the host site.

While there is little doubt that Stockholm could offer the same privacy as Geneva, the Swedish capital has not been the host site of many rounds of nuclear negotiations. Sweden joined the EU in 1995, and since then, the most notable nuclear discussion that has occurred in Stockholm was the IAEA’s 2001 International Conference on the Security of Material. Because Sweden is an EU member, and the organization develops its economic nonproliferation policies unanimously, Stockholm cannot serve as an impartial host of negotiations involving the EU. And like their Swiss counterparts, while Swedish leaders are open to hosting discussions between proliferators and their interlocutors, they would prefer to be asked to do so by the negotiating parties. Despite their stalwart support of dialogue, for both states, hosting discussions appears to be a service that they can provide to negotiating parties upon request.

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110 Praz, interview by author.
111 Senior Swiss Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
113 Senior Swiss Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
115 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
rather than an active foreign policy initiative. But in order for Stockholm to serve as a host city, it must compete with cities like Geneva and Vienna that have more extensive records of hosting nuclear talks.

Sweden’s EU accession does not explain why Geneva was a more popular site for dialogue in the Cold War and the early 1990s. Historically, the Swiss public has disliked international organizations that lack a universal basis for membership,\(^ {116}\) and concern that UN membership would compromise Swiss neutrality led voters to reject UN membership in referendums until 2002.\(^ {117}\) By comparison, Sweden joined the UN in 1946. Switzerland’s staunch neutrality enables Geneva to host organizations like the Conference on Disarmament and the World Health Organization. Peter Braun, a Project Manager for Strategic Planning with the Swiss Armed Forces, notes that the presence of these types of organizations has transformed Geneva into an international city where countries maintain permanent contingents of diplomatic support staff.\(^ {118}\) Diplomat Anne-Lise Cattin Hennin agrees, arguing that Geneva has become “a platform to come together.”\(^ {119}\) Given the consequent multitude of secret talks that occur in Geneva, Cattin Hennin explains that an old Swiss jokes states: “We have no hidden agenda, except for Geneva.”\(^ {120}\)

**Typology of efforts to host various nonproliferation discussions**

Table 3 shows efforts by Switzerland and Sweden to host track II engagement and direct dialogue between proliferants and their interlocutors. As the data indicates, although hosting efforts have their limitations, these bridge-building and mediation activities support my second hypothesis.

| State         | Role                      | Action                                         | Analysis                                                                 |
|---------------|---------------------------|                                               |                                                                         |
| Both          | Bridge                    | Hosting track II talks on DPRK and Iranian nuclear issues | Confidence-building; potential to influence official policy positions |
| Switzerland   | Mediator/Integrator; Bridge | Hosting direct negotiations between adversaries | Limited by willingness of sides to talk; will only do so if asked; Sweden less impartial |


\(^ {118}\) Braun, interview by author.

\(^ {119}\) Cattin Hennin, interview by author.

\(^ {120}\) Ibid.
Both countries have hosted track II diplomacy efforts, but Switzerland has been a more frequent host of direct dialogue than Sweden. By acting as Bridges and Mediator/Integrators, these states have facilitated nuclear nonproliferation conversations that might not have taken place otherwise. As my research indicated, having an impartial host is critical to providing a level of comfort and security that promotes a productive atmosphere for the exchange of ideas. Still, my research revealed that both Sweden and Switzerland prefer to be asked by negotiating parties to host negotiations and do not issue unsolicited hosting offers. Therefore, their hosting activities are contingent upon the motivation of proliferants and their interlocutors to engage in dialogue. And while European militarily nonaligned states may host talks, at the end of the day, the conduct of the proliferant and its interlocutors ultimately determines the success or failure of the discussions. However, by passing messages, holding private consultations, and advancing compromise policies, militarily nonaligned states have the ability to influence the negotiating positions at the table and improve communication and understanding between the sides.

These analytic conclusions have mixed relevance to the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of Austria, Finland, and Ireland. They are perhaps most relevant to Austria, as Vienna has hosted nuclear discussions for decades. As in Geneva, states maintain diplomatic delegations and support staff in Vienna because this city is the location of several international organizations such as the IAEA and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. During the Cold War, numerous rounds of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) took place in Vienna. Like Sweden, Austria would not be an impartial host of direct talks between the EU and proliferators, but Vienna has hosted P5+1-Iran conversations involving members of the organization. Austrian research institutions also participate in exchange programs that include hosting North Korean delegations. Unlike Vienna, Dublin has not been a major host site for nuclear security dialogue. And although Helsinki hosted some of the SALT deliberations, in the post-Cold War era, the Finnish capital has not been a frequent site for these types of discussions. Additionally, literature searches for track II diplomacy efforts in Dublin and Helsinki on the Iranian and DPRK nuclear issues fail to yield

notable results. Perhaps this is because these cities must compete with Geneva, Stockholm, and Vienna for hosting privileges. But with their impartiality and dedication to the nonproliferation regime, outside of EU membership, there appear to be few constraints preventing Finland and Ireland from hosting dialogue.

CHAPTER 5: HYPOTHESIS 2.3 – MILITARILY NONALIGNED STATES INFLUENCE INSTITUTIONS AND VICE VERSA

This chapter partially supports my second hypothesis by showing that militarily nonaligned states have made efforts to promote nuclear nonproliferation dialogue in the context of international organizations. But my analysis indicated that in their quests to promote dialogue, these states have often resisted implementing strict coercive measures against actual or suspected proliferators. Consequently, they have sometimes angered proliferators’ interlocutors and hindered their credibility as impartial intermediaries. However, I conclude that if European militarily nonaligned states were to implement certain coercive measures, they might risk damaging their critical relationships with proliferants.

I frame my discussion around Swiss and Swedish positions on international sanctions and nuclear exports controls, and I also address Stockholm’s activities within the context of the EU. My research revealed that both countries attach a high priority level to their roles as Bridges and Mediators/Integrators; thus, Switzerland and Sweden have been vocal supporters of mediation and critics of coercive sanctions targeting actual or suspected proliferators. In terms of export controls, both Sweden and Switzerland have been the targets of North Korean and Iranian front companies seeking to acquire dual-use technologies. Sweden has acted in the role of a “Regional/Subsystem Collaborator” by maintaining strict nuclear export controls and helping to design many of the international community’s export control regimes. On the other hand, Switzerland has often taken a more relaxed position on nuclear export controls and has acted as an Active Independent, often prioritizing Swiss industrial interests over global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. By making it potentially easier for proliferators to acquire nuclear technologies,

122 As I have learned throughout the course of my research, this does not definitively prove that these often-secretive discussions are not taking place in Finland and Ireland.
123 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” pp. 265-266.
the Swiss might actually undermine coercive measures designed to prompt Iran and North Korea to return to the bargaining table. Finally, the evidence indicates that while Sweden’s EU membership has both constricted and enhanced Stockholm’s dialogue promotion attempts, Sweden has still been able to pursue independent efforts working toward this goal.

**Mixed records of implementing economic and financial sanctions**

To this point, this paper has dealt with direct Swiss and Swedish efforts to stimulate dialogue between actual or suspected proliferators and their interlocutors. I now shift my focus to coercive economic and financial sanctions. As U.S. nonproliferation negotiations with the DPRK during the early 1990s demonstrated, harsh sanctions sometimes provide sufficient pressure to motivate proliferants to return to the bargaining table.\(^{124}\) The evidence indicates that while Switzerland and Sweden are often resistant to the implementation of stringent sanctions, as members of the EU and/or UN, these countries have levied coercive measures against actual and suspected proliferators.\(^{125}\) However, these types of policies may conflict with their Bridge, Active Independent, and Mediator/Integrator roles. This dilemma has fostered a situation where Bern and Stockholm have oftentimes been resistant to implementing sanctions that are more comprehensive than those adopted by the UN Security Council.

As UN members, Sweden and Switzerland are obligated to implement Security Council resolutions levying sanctions on Iran and North Korea for their nuclear activities. Recent examples include Resolution 1929 targeting Iran and Resolution 1874 targeting the DPRK.\(^{126}\) While Sweden has been a dedicated UN member since 1946, Switzerland has been a member for less than a decade, and in the past the Swiss public has debated the compatibility of neutrality and sanctions.\(^{127}\) Arms control official Jean-Daniel Praz indicates that this is no longer an active debate and states that Switzerland has “always implemented very swiftly the UN resolutions, and we have no problem with neutrality looking to these


\(^{126}\) For the full text of these documents see Note 26.

questions.”

A group of Swiss foreign policy analysts explains Bern’s new perspective on UN sanctions: “Neutrality does not exist where a quasi-world community imposes sanctions against a single law-breaker, since any act opposing the group’s intention means taking the side of the offender.”

Even though Sweden has implemented—and generally supported—UN sanctions dealing with the Iranian and DPRK nuclear programs, the Swedish government has often shown resistance to more stringent EU economic and financial measures. A Foreign Ministry official explains, “We have always acknowledged the primary role of the United Nations when it comes to sanctions. We are not overly keen on the EU trying to go beyond the Security Council where there is no UN mandate.” The official also notes that the Swedish government has deep reservations about the effectiveness of sanctions compared to dialogue addressing Iranian and North Korean concerns and motivations. In February 2009, Sweden opposed new EU sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals with suspected connections to the development of weapons of mass destruction. Despite Swedish reservations with regard to the EU levying sanctions on Iran, Stockholm usually votes in support of sanctions while under pressure from other member states not to compromise unified EU policy positions. But in the case of North Korea, where the evidence of illicit nuclear activities is clearer, Stockholm has condemned Pyongyang’s suspected nuclear weapon tests and supported the EU’s Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP. This initiative implemented sweeping restrictions on economic and financial transactions with North Korea, including the prohibition of luxury good exports—a measure targeting the elites—to the DPRK and efforts to inspect cargo coming from or bound for the communist state.

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128 Praz, interview by author.
131 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
133 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
Swiss officials have also resisted sanctions exceeding those of the Security Council. Although trade between Iran and Switzerland accounts for over $750 million annually, the Swiss have only frozen approximately $1.4 million of Iranian assets. And in mid-September 2010, EU, U.S., and Israeli officials criticized Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey for dismissing the possibility of Switzerland adopting harsher sanctions against Iran. Calmy-Rey justified her position by noting that such activities would compromise Switzerland’s record of “neutrality and impartiality.”

Looking beyond neutrality, perhaps this position is also a product of Swiss business interests, as harsh sanctions could threaten the Swiss ability to engage in transactions like the controversial EGL-Iran gas deal.

Nevertheless, Switzerland has demonstrated a willingness to implement sanctions exceeding those of the UN Security Council. A legal expert working for the Swiss Foreign Ministry contends that the government would be willing to freeze additional Iranian and DPRK assets if there were proof that these funds were connected to illicit nuclear activities. Additionally, during the 1990s, Bern surprised the international community by levying strong economic, financial, and military sanctions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. Further, under pressure from the United States, EU, and Israel, Swiss firms such as Credit Suisse, Glencore, Vitol, and Trafigura have significantly curtailed their economic activities in Iran.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, although Sweden and Switzerland have notable economic ties with Iran and the DPRK, these relationships are somewhat insignificant relative to Tehran’s and Pyongyang’s annual GDPs. For that reason, sanctions by these countries are unlikely to generate the levels of pressure that might be needed to convince Iran and North Korea to return to the nuclear bargaining table. And as my previous analysis has demonstrated, the implementation of harsh coercive measures by these states risks jeopardizing their impartiality and their resultant abilities to act as intermediaries and dialogue hosts.

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136 European Commission, “EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World: Iran.”
139 Quoted in Ibid.
140 Senior Legal Officer at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author.
Differences in Swedish and Swiss nuclear export controls

Nuclear export controls are a method by which the UN, EU, NSG, and Zangger Committee have attempted to prevent actual or suspected proliferators from acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies. Export controls, like coercive sanctions, can exert pressure on proliferators to engage in nonproliferation discussions. Technology denial export controls are crucial nonproliferation tools because agreements at the bargaining table become more difficult to reach as the sophistication of a proliferant’s nuclear program increases.\textsuperscript{143} As exporters of dual-use goods, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s participation in international export control regimes has great importance for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In the past, Sweden has acted in the role of a Regional/Subsystem Collaborator\textsuperscript{144} by promoting a strong nuclear export control agenda. Switzerland has behaved similarly at times, but Bern has often conformed to an Active Independent role by favoring Swiss industrial firms at the expense of strict export controls. While the effects of Swedish and Swiss sanctions vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea are fairly insignificant, firms in these countries manufacture sophisticated civilian nuclear energy technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Given the importance of technology denial, strong Swedish export controls might promote dialogue and successful nonproliferation outcomes, whereas somewhat more permissive Swiss measures could actually undermine negotiations.

Sweden has an active export control program administered by the Agency for Non-proliferation and Export Controls (ISP).\textsuperscript{145} Current and former Swedish officials also note that the country was one of the pioneers of nuclear exports controls during the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{146} Swedish export controls have particular significance with respect to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, as a 2003 report by the Swedish Security Services warned that front companies controlled by Tehran and Pyongyang were attempting to subvert international export controls by purchasing sensitive dual-use technologies in

\textsuperscript{143} Foran and Spector, “The Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 31.
\textsuperscript{144} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” pp. 265-266.
\textsuperscript{146} Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author. Prawitz, interview by author.
Sweden. And because Stockholm experimented with nuclear weapons development during the 1960s, the nuclear knowledge possessed by certain experts at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has enabled Sweden to play an important role in the development of international export control regimes. In EU discussions, Swedish experts have argued on behalf of restricting certain products, and they have worked to prevent the regulation of products that are not relevant to nuclear weapons development.

The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) functions similarly to Sweden’s ISP, but because Switzerland is an EU non-member, the country does not have to implement rigorous EU export controls. Accordingly, Swiss nuclear export controls are often less rigid than their Swedish counterparts. The Swiss waited until 1978 to develop their first export control regulation, the appropriately named Atomic Ordinance of 1978. In more recent years, the Swiss have received criticism from the United States and EU members for having insufficient export controls that allow Iranian and North Korean front companies to acquire specialized nuclear technologies. A Swiss official notes that nuclear export controls are a very sensitive subject in Switzerland, and there is an ongoing debate in the Federal Council regarding the balance between taking steps to prevent proliferation and facilitating business opportunities for Swiss firms. The official observes that SECO representatives have come under significant pressure to adopt more stringent EU export controls and are constantly working to prevent Switzerland from becoming a safe haven for Iranian and North Korean front entities. Back in 2000, a report by three Swiss export control experts criticized the Federal Council in part for its “reluctance to voluntarily go beyond the international minimum requirements” when considering military and nuclear export controls.

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148 Senior Swedish defense official, interview by author. Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
149 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
151 Senior Swiss Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
EU constraints and benefits for Swedish nonproliferation policy

As I explained in Chapter 1, one of the main differences between Sweden and Switzerland is Stockholm’s membership in the EU, an organization that implements economic nonproliferation policies on a universal basis. In general, Sweden’s dominant role in EU nonproliferation policy has been that of the Bridge, as Stockholm has frequently criticized sanctions and attempted to promote dialogue. My analysis indicated that EU membership both hinders and enhances Swedish efforts to facilitate nuclear negotiations. Consequently, I identify Swedish nonproliferation contributions in an EU context and the limitations that EU membership places on Stockholm’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

I analyzed many constraints of EU membership in previous chapters. EU membership may prevent Stockholm from serving as a neutral location for nuclear negotiations and—under the current center-right government—has resulted in decreased funding for nonproliferation proposals outside of the European framework. Further, while Swedish officials have deep reservations about the effectiveness of sanctions, Sweden has often implemented EU sanctions that its parliament would likely reject on the national level.

In spite of limitations, EU membership also bolsters Swedish nonproliferation policy by enabling Stockholm to influence the policies of a powerful international organization. During Sweden’s EU presidency in the first half of 2001, then-Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson made stimulating dialogue with Pyongyang a high priority on his agenda. In May 2001, Persson visited Pyongyang with then-EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and then-EU Commissioner Chris Patten.\textsuperscript{153} Persson established relations with the DPRK on behalf of the EU, and since then, dialogue on nuclear security and other issues has taken place between Brussels and Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{154} Turning to Iran, a Swedish official notes, “Sweden has possibilities to veto or stop a consensus from building on Iran sanctions.”\textsuperscript{155} While Stockholm has not vetoed EU sanctions targeting Iran, the need for unanimous decisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy issues enables Sweden to influence the scope of the EU sanctions regime. For

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., pp. 36-37.
\textsuperscript{155} Senior Swedish defense official, interview by author.
these reasons, alongside sovereignty concerns, Swedish officials have expressed worries about the possibility of greater levels of majority voting on foreign policy issues. The EU does have a process for abstaining from voting on—and implementing—foreign policy measures, but like vetoes, abstentions on critical security issues might weaken the organization’s voice and create divisions among its members.

Being a member of the EU does not prohibit Sweden from pursuing independent nonproliferation policies. Even though Sweden has implemented strict sanctions and cannot claim impartiality in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations involving the organization, Stockholm’s military nonalignment has allowed Sweden to host track II discussions and private consultations with proliferators and their interlocutors.

**Typology of nuclear nonproliferation efforts within international organizations**

Table 4 displays my data on nonproliferation activities in international organizations. This typology differs from the previous tables by revealing significant disparities between the policies of each case state. The data supports Hypothesis 2 by showing militarily nonaligned state contributions to nonproliferation efforts, but it also draws attention to Swedish and Swiss shortcomings in these endeavors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Providing critical opinions of EU sanctions</td>
<td>Can shape EU policy; might adopt rigid sanctions Parliament would not approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Adopting minimum international export controls</td>
<td>Benefits industry; increases front company proliferation risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Rejection of sanctions beyond UN Security Council levels</td>
<td>Benefits economy; can facilitate closer ties with proliferants; may harm ties with interlocutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mediator/Integrator; Bridge</td>
<td>Facilitating dialogue between the EU and potential proliferators</td>
<td>Foundation for rapprochement and future negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Regional/Subsystem Collaborator</td>
<td>Implementing Security Council resolutions</td>
<td>Fulfills UN membership obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Regional/Subsystem Collaborator</td>
<td>Designing and implementing stringent nuclear export controls</td>
<td>Critical to stopping front companies and proliferation efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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My data revealed that Sweden has the ability to influence EU nonproliferation positions, and Stockholm’s membership in the organization affects Swedish national policies toward proliferators. The Swedish government has worked in Active Independent, Bridge, and Mediator/Integrator roles within the EU to promote dialogue. These activities have included spearheading EU rapprochement with North Korea and pressuring the organization to engage Iran. As a Regional/Subsystem Collaborator, Stockholm has helped to design and has implemented strict nuclear export controls that might eventually drive Iran and the DPRK back to nonproliferation talks with their interlocutors. In many respects, EU membership has allowed the Swedish government to influence nuclear nonproliferation efforts to an extent that would not have been possible through purely national initiatives. Nonetheless, by acquiescing to EU sanctions exceeding those of the UN Security Council, Sweden risks jeopardizing the relatively close relationships with proliferants that have permitted Stockholm to act as an intermediary and host of track II dialogue.

My controlled comparison between Sweden and Switzerland demonstrated that, as non-members of the EU, the Swiss are able to pursue relatively more autonomous policies toward proliferators than their Swedish counterparts. As an Active Independent, Bern has usually rejected sanctions and nuclear export controls exceeding those of the UN, NSG, and Zangger Committee. To this point, these types of policies have benefited the Swiss economy, but their consequences for nuclear nonproliferation might not always be as positive. In addition, Switzerland’s controversial dealings with proliferators, such as the EGL-Iran gas deal, have often sparked criticism from the United States, EU, and other interested actors. Regardless of this criticism, these activities contribute to Switzerland’s closeness with proliferants; thus, they enable Bern to act as a Bridge and Mediator/Integrator between these states and their interlocutors. However, the Federal Council’s apprehension regarding export controls that exceed international minimums might make Iranian and DPRK front company acquisition of dual-use technologies less complicated. If illicit technology transfers help to increase the strength of these countries’ nuclear programs, then this has the potential to undermine dialogue aimed at prompting rollback.

Among European militarily nonaligned states, Switzerland’s policies with respect to international organizations are somewhat of an anomaly. My analytic conclusions regarding Bern’s positions on
sanctions and nuclear export controls have relevance to non-European states that do not belong to organizations like the EU, which has its own regulatory guidelines. Austria, Finland, and Ireland are all members of this organization and are accordingly subject to its sanctions and export control regulations.

As EU members, the activities of Austria, Finland, and Ireland in international organizations more closely mirror those of Sweden than those of Switzerland. Like Sweden, these states support Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP on North Korea and contribute to the development of EU nuclear export controls, and coercive economic and financial sanctions. While Austria has been hesitant to pursue nonproliferation activities outside of the EU, Vienna has acted as an Active Independent in the EU by championing dialogue and criticizing sanctions.\footnote{Oezbek, “The EU’s Nonproliferation Strategy: Iran as a Test Case,” p. 73.} Austria has banking and energy interests in Iran,\footnote{See Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Austria-Iran Foreign Relations,” American Enterprise Institute, 12 May 2010, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/sweden-iran-foreign-relations.} and harsh sanctions could compromise the impartiality and closeness to Iran that have facilitated its ability to serve as a Bridge or Mediator/Integrator by hosting direct negotiations and track II efforts. And while Finland has abstained from nonproliferation activism, Helsinki has acted as an Active Independent by arguing that coercive measures against Iran lack credibility due to insufficient progress by nuclear-armed states—including EU members Britain and France—toward disarmament.\footnote{Johan Bergenäs, “The European Union’s Evolving Engagement with Iran: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (November 2010): p. 499.} Interestingly, Ireland, a state that has often pursued activist policies on nuclear security issues, has acted as a Regional/Subsystem Collaborator by consistently supporting EU coercive measures targeting the Iranian nuclear program.\footnote{The Jerusalem Post even reports that Ireland is “inside the EU mainstream” with respect to its stance toward Iran. [Herb Keinon and E.B. Solomont, “UN set to approve new Iran sanctions,” Jerusalem Post, 9 June 2010, LexisNexis.]}

**CHAPTER 6: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION – DOES MIDDLE POWER STATUS SUPERSEDE MILITARY NONALIGNMENT?**

Chapters 2 through 5 provide considerable support for both of the hypotheses I tested. My analysis revealed that military nonalignment has enabled several European states to engage in intermediary
nonproliferation activities, host nuclear discussions, and use their positions as members of international organizations to promote dialogue. While I explained some of the limitations of these analytic conclusions in the preceding sections, my examination of Swedish and Swiss policies appears to validate both hypotheses. But is military nonalignment really the main determinant of these states’ abilities to participate in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts? To answer this question, I assess a possible alternative explanation involving the status of European militarily nonaligned states as middle powers.

In the context of nuclear security issues, middle powers are those “politically and economically significant countries that have renounced nuclear arms.”\(^{162}\) Europe’s militarily nonaligned states satisfy these criteria, and thus it is possible that their standing as middle powers is a more significant determinant of their ability to contribute to nonproliferation discussions than their independent security policy. However, my research showed that middle power status in itself does not enable states to have relatively close diplomatic relationships with actual or suspected proliferants. In addition, middle powers that fall under the U.S. nuclear umbrella may not have the same level of nonproliferation *bona fides* as their militarily nonaligned counterparts. Therefore, my analysis provides a better explanation for the phenomena that I examined than the middle power status alternative.

**Middle powers, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament**

Middle powers have often been at the forefront of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives. Sweden and Ireland belong to the New Agenda Coalition, a group of middle powers seeking global nuclear disarmament. Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland—along with other states, including some in alliances—work with the nongovernmental organizations of the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) to encourage nuclear weapon states to move toward disarmament.\(^{163}\) The literature on middle powers and nuclear nonproliferation indicates that they have pushed for the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, strict adherence to the NPT, and several other


measures. In so doing, middle powers have collectively negotiated with the NPT-designated nuclear weapon states and attempted to do so with their de facto counterparts.

Despite middle power interest in nuclear nonproliferation, negotiations with Iran and North Korea have occurred on a bilateral basis with great powers, or in the P5+1 and Six-Party Talks formats. As a statement from the Global Security Institute—MPI’s parent organization—suggests, middle powers largely use their rejection of nuclear armaments as leverage to convince nuclear-armed states like France, Russia, and the United States to fulfill their Article VI NPT commitments. The statement says that middle powers “serve as a bridge to influence nuclear armed countries to keep treaty promises and reduce nuclear dangers.” Consequently, groups like the New Agenda Coalition and MPI have left nuclear negotiations with Iran and the DPRK to great powers and international organizations rather than attempting to use middle power status as leverage to facilitate discussions with actual or suspected proliferators.

**Alliance constraints support the greater influence of military nonalignment**

Middle powers that are NATO members and protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella may have difficulty sharing the same types of relationships that militarily nonaligned middle powers often have with proliferators. Unless aligned middle powers can maintain relatively close relations with states that are considered proliferation concerns as discussed in my analysis of Hypothesis 1, then they will have difficulty carrying out the types of policies encompassed in my testing of Hypothesis 2. While middle power status can increase militarily nonaligned states’ nonproliferation bona fides, the evidence does not support the conclusion that this status is the primary facilitator of their relationships with proliferants.

Swedish and Swiss officials have spoken about the benefits of their military nonalignment in cultivating relationships with Iran and North Korea. My research indicated that these states were able to serve as intermediaries and dialogue hosts because the parties involved considered them to be “neutral.” NATO countries such as the United States, France, and Britain often spearhead coercive nuclear nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis actual or suspected proliferators. Middle powers in NATO like Canada,

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164 Middle Powers Initiative, “Fulfilling the NPT Bargain for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: The Role of Middle Powers,” pp. 6-8.
165 Global Security Institute, “Mission & Overview.”
Germany, and Norway are military allies of these states and are unlikely to be regarded as impartial intermediaries or hosts. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland do not face this constraint.

In addition, a survey of today’s proliferation cases shows that middle powers in defense pacts are less likely to have close diplomatic ties with proliferants than militarily nonaligned states such as Sweden and Switzerland. Stockholm and Bern are active players in nonproliferation diplomacy, while some middle powers in defense pacts—like Norway and New Zealand—have been less active and, for example, do not maintain representation in Pyongyang. The United States has also chosen Sweden and Switzerland, rather than close NATO allies, to serve as its protecting powers in Pyongyang and Tehran. Protecting powers help to maintain an open channel of communication between states that lack diplomatic relations, and as I have discussed throughout this thesis, Sweden and Switzerland have cultivated relationships that allow them to effectively communicate with the Iranian and North Korean regimes.

Still, in areas outside of nuclear nonproliferation, middle powers in defense pacts have often served as mediators and hosts of negotiations. One notable example is Norway’s efforts in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{166} Norway has mediated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, hosted the signing of the Oslo accords, and contributed troops to peacekeeping missions throughout the greater Middle East region. Nevertheless, while a thorough literature search produces various articles discussing Swedish and Swiss intermediary activities in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises, the same cannot be said for Norway. Although Norway has decided to forego the development of nuclear weapons, its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella may hinder its nuclear nonproliferation credibility.\textsuperscript{167} Commenting on the differences in Swedish and Norwegian intermediary nuclear nonproliferation contributions, Swedish nuclear policy analyst Anne-Charlotte Wetterwik notes that the Norwegians “have NATO behind them and [by] talking to any partner in a military alliance, you talk to the alliance itself.”\textsuperscript{168}


\textsuperscript{167} Braun, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{168} Anne-Charlotte Wetterwik, interview by author.
Serving as a facilitator of nuclear nonproliferation dialogue is a multifaceted task. In nonproliferation efforts, European middle powers have the opportunity to serve in the role Holsti described as an Example because of their decisions not to develop nuclear armaments. However, NATO member states’ credibility on nuclear issues is still affected by their reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Additionally, in Chapter 2, I discussed how remaining outside of NATO enhances the Swedish and Swiss reputations as impartial intermediaries in nuclear nonproliferation discussions. My examination of Swedish and Swiss actions supports the conclusion that the impartiality stemming from being a non-member of NATO permits European militarily nonaligned states to develop relatively close ties with proliferators that allow them to serve as Bridges and Mediators/Integrators by hosting dialogue and acting as intermediaries.

Turkey exception does not discount the influence of military nonalignment. I have concluded that my analysis of military nonalignment stands when compared with the alternative explanation of middle power status. In spite of this, Turkey is a middle power that is a member of NATO and has been active in nuclear discussions with Iran. A careful examination of Turkey’s geographic and cultural ties to Iran shows that these factors, rather than middle power status, have enabled Ankara to serve as a Bridge and Mediator/Integrator in nonproliferation dialogue. This assessment does not weaken my argumentation regarding militarily nonaligned states that may also play these roles in international affairs. European militarily nonaligned states do not share common geographic and cultural ties with Iran and the DPRK, and thus impartiality has been the main facilitator of their relationships with proliferants.

Turkey’s most notable activities in the Iranian standoff include the May 2010 nuclear fuel swap deal that Ankara and Brazil brokered with Iran. In its agreement with Turkey and Brazil, the Iranian government pledged to ship 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor to produce medical isotopes. Brazil, Iran, and Turkey intended for the deal to demonstrate Tehran’s willingness to part with uranium that could be further enriched to produce nuclear

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weapons. However, the deal was canceled after the P5+1 parties rejected the offer on the basis that Iran would still maintain enough low-enriched uranium to eventually build a bomb.\textsuperscript{170}

The ability of Turkey to engage with Iran and its interlocutors, and to pursue initiatives like the fuel swap deal, is a product of its geographic location and cultural demographics. As a NATO member with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkish officials have long promoted their country as an important link between Europe, the United States, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{171} Turkey and Iran share a common border and are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization, an international organization consisting of Eurasian states with heavily Muslim populations.\textsuperscript{172} Each state also faces security threats from Kurdish separatist organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Party of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK).\textsuperscript{173} The evidence suggests that Turkey and Iran’s geographic and demographic commonalities have resulted in close diplomatic ties and shared strategic interests. In March 2009, officials from the two states even signed a memorandum agreeing to increase their bilateral trade to $20 billion a year.\textsuperscript{174} States like Austria and Sweden do not share these same types of cultural and geographic commonalities with proliferants; thus, my conclusions regarding the influence of military nonalignment in enabling these states to contribute to nonproliferation efforts stand.

\section*{CHAPTER 7: THE WAY FORWARD – POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS}

Since nuclear nonproliferation discussions with Iran and North Korea face numerous obstacles, the international community must find ways to improve upon traditional methods of dialogue between proliferants and their interlocutors. At times there are limitations to European militarily nonaligned states’


\textsuperscript{172} For additional examples of Iranian and Turkish ties and commonalities see Stephen Kinzer, \textit{Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future} (New York: Times Books, 2010).


abilities to influence nonproliferation outcomes. However, this project largely revealed that these states have used their relatively close relationships with proliferators to pass messages, host negotiations and track II efforts, hold private consultations, develop compromise proposals, and influence the policies of international organizations. My analysis supported both hypotheses, as militarily nonaligned states have the relationships and diplomatic skills to enhance and redefine motivations-based dialogue. Because the spread of nuclear weapons threatens global and regional security architectures and international norms, policies by these states could be integral to securing world peace. But how can the international community make use of the efforts of militarily nonaligned states? And what steps can these countries take to improve upon their promotion of nonproliferation dialogue? The analytic findings of my research suggest a series of implications and future directions for nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy.

Implication 1: Militarily nonaligned states offer alternative tools for improving dialogue
Traditional conceptions of nonproliferation diplomacy focus on the negotiating roles of great powers and international organizations, and the relevant academic and policy literature supports this viewpoint. This thesis demonstrates that this perspective overlooks notable contributions to nonproliferation dialogue by European militarily nonaligned states. When evaluating the prospects for the success or failure of negotiations, mainstream approaches to nuclear nonproliferation do not consider the impact of Austria hosting visiting DPRK delegations, a Swedish research institute providing a private environment for U.S.-Iran track II diplomacy, and Swiss arms control experts developing compromise proposals like the “freeze-for-freeze” option. My research indicates that by acting as Active Independents that remain outside of NATO, militarily nonaligned states can cultivate close relationships with proliferators and their interlocutors that permit them to engage in activities that improve the prospects of success for

176 In this chapter, I focus on policy implications and recommendations specific to European militarily nonaligned states. As I have argued in this thesis, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland have fairly close relations with the United States and strong economies that allow them to invest heavily in bilateral trade and development aid. These characteristics are integral to their ability to cultivate ties with proliferators and to act as impartial intermediaries in nuclear nonproliferation discussions. Many non-European militarily nonaligned states do not possess these important qualities, but this does not rule out the possibility that states from outside of Europe could satisfy the requirements of my hypotheses. For this reason, my analysis might have some relevance to the conduct of non-European militarily nonaligned states.
nonproliferation dialogue. As Bridges and Mediator/Integrators, these states can facilitate communication between proliferators and their interlocutors, potentially assisting the negotiating parties to overcome the frequent mistrust and miscommunication that characterize contemporary nonproliferation dialogue.  

The purpose of policy-specific literature is to affect the course of policy. Because the literature pays little attention to the intermediary nonproliferation roles of militarily nonaligned states, this may cause policymakers who seek to engage proliferators to overlook the diplomatic services of these states. This thesis establishes that these states have innovative ideas, skilled technical experts, and a willingness to assist in the peaceful resolution of nuclear standoffs if asked to do so. But to be fair, some militarily nonaligned states have been more active than others in the context of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises. Austria’s and Finland’s records imply that these states would be more willing to host track II dialogue and direct negotiations than to engage in activist nonproliferation initiatives. Although Irish policy toward Iran and the DPRK has rarely deviated from the mainstream EU position, Dublin’s long history of nonproliferation and disarmament activism suggests that Ireland might be willing to join Sweden and Switzerland in pursuing intermediary activities like message-passing.

Implication 2: Successful dialogue depends upon actions by negotiating parties

European militarily nonaligned states have acted in the roles of the Bridge and the Mediator/Integrator in order to facilitate dialogue between actual or suspected proliferators and their interlocutors. And as Swedish and Swiss efforts vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea indicate, these countries can influence the negotiating positions of the states at the bargaining table. Nonetheless, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland are simply not in positions to offer the incentives necessary to address the usual motivations for nuclear proliferation: security concerns, domestic politics, and international prestige. Still, even if the negotiating parties reject the ideas put forth by militarily nonaligned states in private consultations and compromise proposals, the P5+1 states’ eventual embrace of the “freeze-for-freeze” illustrates that the mere introduction of alternative initiatives can influence future policy formulation.

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Ultimately, the success or failure of nonproliferation dialogue hinges upon the actions of the parties sitting at the table. In order for talks to take place, the proliferant must be willing to discuss its nuclear program, and great powers and international organizations must be willing to engage in discussions. Government officials from both Sweden and Switzerland even noted that they host dialogue upon request from negotiating parties and do not actively offer to host talks as a proactive foreign policy measure.179

Logic dictates that the actions of outside third parties will not have determinative impacts on the outcomes of nuclear nonproliferation conversations between proliferants and their interlocutors. Swiss diplomats assisted Iran by transmitting the “grand bargain” proposal to Washington, but the George W. Bush administration’s refusal to respond signaled the failure of this initiative.180 Irrespective of Swedish intermediary activities, in 2003, Kim Jong-il rejected an informal security assurance from the United States in exchange for denuclearization because it was not a binding nonaggression treaty.181 For their part, European militarily nonaligned states are capable of making modest contributions to facilitating dialogue and assisting negotiating parties to develop their positions. These actions can range from providing a garden in which officials from opposing sides hold a secret conversation to urging the EU to prioritize dialogue with proliferators over coercive economic and financial sanctions.

Implication 3: EU membership can enhance and hinder national nonproliferation strategies
For European militarily nonaligned states seeking to contribute to nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, EU membership has both benefits and constraints. The advantages of membership include the ability to influence the sanctions and export control policies of a powerful international organization. Another notable benefit is the potential to act as a Bridge and Mediator/Integrator by promoting dialogue with proliferants, as demonstrated by the establishment of EU-DPRK relations under the Swedish presidency in 2001.182 Nonaligned EU members Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden have all been proponents of nonproliferation dialogue at times, and my data showed that Austria and Sweden are vocal critics of EU

179 Cattin Hennin, interview by author. Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
180 Hossein-zadeh and Hansen, “Why the US doesn’t talk to Iran.”
182 Lee, “The Two Faces of EU-North Korea Relations,” p. 36.
sanctions targeting Iran. Despite the benefit of being able to influence a powerful international organization, EU membership might prohibit militarily nonaligned states from serving as impartial hosts for nuclear negotiations involving the organization. With its institutional infrastructure, Vienna has served as a host for P5+1-Iran discussions, but Geneva remains the preferred city for post-Cold War nonproliferation diplomacy due to Switzerland’s strict policy of neutrality and EU non-membership.

Beyond hosting activity limitations, the universal nature of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy initiatives can constrain the diplomatic flexibility of militarily nonaligned members of the organization. For instance, while my research showed that Austria and Sweden—and Finland to a much lesser extent—have spoken out against EU sanctions exceeding those of the UN Security Council, under pressure from other members, these states have adopted sanctions that they probably would not have approved in their national parliaments. In this respect, these militarily nonaligned states have acted as Regional/Subsystem Collaborators by helping the organization to maintain a unified voice on coercive sanctions. But in the future, embracing strict EU coercive sanctions might compromise the relations that militarily nonaligned states have with proliferants. These ties are integral to their pursuit of bridge-building and mediation.

Recommendation 1: Increased U.S. engagement with militarily nonaligned states

For decades, the United States has had significant tensions in its relationships with Iran and North Korea. The U.S. rejection of the Iranian “grand bargain” proposal and the North Korean demand for a formal nonaggression treaty with Washington highlight the poor state of relations between these countries. Complications in the U.S. relationships with Tehran and Pyongyang may prove detrimental to the realization of any sort of mutually acceptable resolution to the standoffs over these states’ nuclear programs. My research showed that U.S. policy toward these states is particularly important—and of disproportional weight among the P5+1 and Six-Party interlocutors—because Iranian and North Korean leaders view the United States as their chief adversary. In fact, previous DPRK and Iranian demands in
nuclear nonproliferation discussions suggest that negative security assurances from the United States might eliminate some of these regimes’ threat-based motivations for proliferation.\textsuperscript{183}

If the Obama administration hopes to discover the types of incentives that might be instrumental in convincing these regimes—and future proliferators—to reverse course, then Washington should be in constant contact with diplomats from militarily nonaligned European states. This research revealed that Sweden and Switzerland maintain relatively close ties with Tehran and Pyongyang and even hold frequent discussions with these states on nuclear security topics.\textsuperscript{184} As the protecting powers of U.S. interests in North Korea and Iran, the Swedish and Swiss governments can provide a channel of communication between Washington and these states. And through private consultations, Swedish and Swiss officials are in positions to help their U.S. counterparts understand proliferant perspectives and motivations. These countries have functioned as reliable Bridges and Mediators/Integrators in the past, and my analysis indicated that they would be willing to do so in the future. Further, militarily nonaligned states are often prepared to host track II engagements that may result in productive intercultural exchanges that promote mutual understanding and influence nonproliferation policy formulation.

Even though—as protecting powers—Sweden and Switzerland are best positioned to facilitate dialogue between the United States and proliferators, Austria, Finland, and Ireland have economic and diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea, and firm commitments to the principles of the nonproliferation regime. Vienna and Helsinki have both hosted direct nuclear talks between adversaries in past decades. And even though Tehran has become increasingly isolated as time passes, in June 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki visited Ireland and Austria for talks on foreign policy issues.\textsuperscript{185} The analytic conclusions of this research support the position that European militarily nonaligned states can assist Washington to communicate with proliferators and provide information to the U.S. government that may contribute to the eventual success of motivations-based nuclear nonproliferation negotiations.


\textsuperscript{184} Praz, interview by author. Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author. Senior Swedish official, interview by author. Persbo, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{185} Keinon and Solomont, “UN set to approve new Iran sanctions.”
Recommendation 2: Decreased pressure on nonaligned states to implement strict sanctions

This research showed that actors like European NATO members, Israel, and the United States have exerted pressure on militarily nonaligned states to adopt economic and financial sanctions exceeding those approved by the UN Security Council. As EU members, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden must implement sanctions adopted on a unanimous basis by the organization. Even though these states have not vetoed such proposals, countries like Britain, France, and Germany have pushed nonaligned countries to adopt additional sanctions. Austria and Sweden have frequently resisted such measures.\(^{186}\) Turning to Switzerland, as a non-member of the EU, Bern has often rejected sanctions exceeding those of the UN Security Council out of fear that they might compromise Swiss neutrality.\(^{187}\) Like those of its militarily nonaligned EU member counterparts, Switzerland’s Active Independent behaviors have triggered constant criticism from governments pursuing aggressive approaches to proliferators.

Countries that pressure European militarily nonaligned states to implement stricter sanctions policies than those required by their UN and EU membership commitments should cease these efforts. Today’s European militarily nonaligned states have small populations and economies compared to countries like the United States and France. Unlike robust nuclear export controls—which Switzerland may lack—this thesis indicated that sanctions by small militarily nonaligned states have dubious utility in prompting proliferants to return to the bargaining table. Further, additional Austrian or Finnish sanctions on Iran and the DPRK, for instance, risk damaging these states’ relationships with proliferators and their resultant abilities to engage in bridge-building and mediation efforts. Put simply, another $2 million of Swiss sanctions on Iran would be unimportant relative to the intermediary diplomatic services that Bern can provide to the United States and the EU in efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. Active Independent behaviors such as criticizing EU sanctions or concluding business deals with proliferators can help militarily nonaligned states to develop ties that enable them to facilitate nuclear nonproliferation dialogue. Harsher sanctions by small militarily nonaligned states will not cause proliferators to engage in nuclear

\(^{186}\) See for example Weir, “EU trio propose tougher list of Iran sanctions: report.” Oezbek, “The EU’s Nonproliferation Strategy: Iran as a Test Case,” p. 73.
\(^{187}\) See for example Weinthal, “Swiss FM under fire for blocking Iran sanctions.”
rollback, but compromise proposals, message-passing, hosting activities, and private consultations have a real possibility of enhancing dialogue aimed at addressing the motivations for proliferation.

Recommendation 3: Continued EU consensus-based voting on security policy issues

As it stands now, the evidence indicates that the need for unanimity voting on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy issues allows militarily nonaligned states to influence the organization’s positions. When it comes to North Korea, Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP shows the consensus within the EU on punishing the Kim Jong-il regime for its actions in violation of international norms. Turning to Iran, while EU members have not vetoed sanctions against the Islamic Republic, my research showed that consensus voting has given strong critics of sanctions such as Austria and Sweden the opportunity to weaken the intensity of EU coercive measures. Technical experts from national organizations like the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have also been able to contribute to the development of EU nuclear export controls.188 Additionally, Stockholm has influenced European foreign policy by acting as a Bridge and pushing for the establishment of EU relations with the DPRK, which occurred in 2001 under the Swedish EU presidency.189 While my analysis showed that EU membership has benefits and constraints for national nonproliferation strategies, militarily nonaligned members of the organization currently have the ability to influence the development of the policies that they must eventually adopt.

Despite their varying levels of nuclear nonproliferation activism and dialogue promotion inside and outside the EU framework, a trend toward increased EU majority voting on foreign policy issues could compromise the Austrian, Finnish, and Irish records of military nonalignment and impartiality. Even though majority voting on Common Foreign and Security Policy issues usually occurs on procedural matters, movement toward further majority voting has been particularly worrisome to Finnish and Swedish officials.190 Although militarily nonaligned EU members have the ability to influence the organization’s sanctions and export control policies, my research revealed that these states often end up

188 Senior Swedish defense official, interview by author. Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
189 Lee, “The Two Faces of EU-North Korea Relations,” p. 36.
190 Ojanen, Herolf, and Lindahl, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work, p. 244.
adopting stronger measures than they would have approved on the national level. Future coercive nonproliferation measures developed by a process of majority voting could be stricter than those created by compromise. If the EU does move toward additional majority voting on critical security policy issues, strong sanctions proponents like Britain, France, and Germany might overpower the voices of militarily nonaligned states attempting to pursue Active Independent activism and promote nonproliferation dialogue. The adoption of strict coercive measures has the potential to diminish relations between militarily nonaligned states and suspected proliferators, which is an issue of serious concern since these ties are critical to their provision of current and future intermediary diplomatic services.

In Chapter 5, I noted that EU member states have the ability to abstain from voting on and implementing the organization’s foreign policy measures. However, some EU members have pressured Sweden to adopt stringent coercive economic and financial sanctions in order to ensure that the organization maintains its unified voice on the international stage. Member state abstentions from nuclear nonproliferation policies could also create divisions within the organization. To protect key relationships between militarily nonaligned members and proliferators, and to prevent the emergence of organizational divisions, EU member states must continue to vote on critical foreign policy measures by unanimous consent. Doing so would also help militarily nonaligned member states to maintain their opportunities to influence EU policies and promote activist positions on matters relating to nuclear nonproliferation. Fortunately, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden will have the opportunity to reject future EU legislation calling for significant increases in majority voting on foreign policy issues.

Recommendation 4: Proactive efforts by militarily nonaligned states to promote dialogue

Lastly, European militarily nonaligned states should make greater efforts to promote the values of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Discussions between Iran, North Korea, and their interlocutors are not making visible progress toward denuclearization, and many East Asian and Middle Eastern states are
growing increasingly anxious as time passes. This research showed that the actions of proliferants and their interlocutors ultimately determine the outcomes of nonproliferation talks, but militarily nonaligned states have the diplomatic skills and relations with proliferators necessary to “bridge the gaps” in the ongoing discussions. Nevertheless, my analysis revealed that these states are taking somewhat passive positions on the Iranian and DPRK nuclear standoffs. Finland and Ireland generally support mainstream EU policies that have thus far failed to generate concrete rollback results. Austria promotes dialogue and criticizes sanctions in the forum of the EU, but Vienna has been hesitant to engage in independent nonproliferation activism. Meanwhile, Switzerland and Sweden appear to be the most active militarily nonaligned players in current nonproliferation discussions with Iran and North Korea, but Swedish officials note that their countries usually only become involved in dialogue on nuclear issues when proliferators or great powers request their assistance. Swiss officials seem to believe that the EGL-Iran gas deal has compromised Bern’s record as an impartial actor, and Sweden’s center-right government appears less interested in unilateral nonproliferation efforts than its predecessors. Still, officials indicated that both countries are willing to offer further intermediary services.

With their dedication to nuclear nonproliferation and diplomatic relationships with states spanning the ideological spectrum, militarily nonaligned states are in positions to facilitate critical exchanges of information between proliferants and their interlocutors. An increasingly proactive—but still impartial—foreign policy, where European militarily nonaligned states offer their diplomatic services to negotiating parties, would be compatible with military nonalignment and in line with the commitment of these states to global peace and cooperation. Even if the sides are not ready to talk, standing offers to provide private consultations could begin a process of confidence-building aimed at eventual discussions at the

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191 See for example Mark Fitzpatrick, “Drawing a Bright Redline: Forestalling Proliferation in the Middle East.”
192 Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.”
193 Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
194 Cattin Hennin, interview by author.
195 Möckli, interview by author.
196 Senior Swedish official, interview by author.
197 Cattin Hennin, interview by author. Senior Swedish Foreign Ministry official, interview by author.
bargaining table. And although negotiating parties may initially reject compromise proposals and suggestions put forth by militarily nonaligned states in consultations, the record indicates that these initiatives can influence the future posturing of actual and suspected proliferants and their interlocutors.
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*- I also examined numerous news articles that are either cited in footnotes or are uncited references that helped to inform the general course of my research. Due to space constraints, I have omitted these sources from my bibliography. The full list is available upon request.