BECOMING ONE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION IN VIETNAM, YEMEN AND GERMANY

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The purpose of this research is to understand the dynamic processes of modern national unification cases in Vietnam (1976), Yemen (1990) and Germany (1990) in a qualitative manner within the framework of Amitai Etzioni’s political integration theory. There has been little use of this theory in cases of inter-state unification despite its apparent applicability. This study assesses different factors (military force, utilitarian and identitive factors) that influence unification in order to understand which were most supportive of unification and which resulted in a consolidation unification in the early to intermediate stages. In order to answer the above questions, the thesis uses the level of integration as a dependent variable and the various methods of unification as independent variables. The dependent variables are measured as follows: whether unified states were able to protect its territory from potential violence and secessions and to what extent alienation emerged amongst its members. Based on an examination of the case studies, I found the most effective unification mechanism (utilitarian factors and military force) did not, however, necessarily lead to the most successful consolidated unified state. This implies that a successful and consolidated national unification process requires certain levels of identitive factors be shared between the two states. I argue that the most effective and successful factors for unification is a combination of identitive and utilitarian aspects: utilitarian factors are crucial for bringing a relatively quick,
peaceful and comprehensive unification process while identitive factors are vital in order to help bind people together during tumultuous unification process.
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I. Introduction

Throughout history, divided peoples have attempted to achieve national unification through war, the forging of a shared national identity, and cultivating joint political and economic interests.\(^1\) Three recent unification cases demonstrated the different means to achieve unification: Vietnam was unified through a war of conquest, while Yemen and Germany created political and economic links to bridge the divisions between their two states. Despite the mechanisms used to achieve unification, the outcomes varied across the cases: Vietnam underwent significant internal turmoil following conquest of the south, Yemen suffered a bloody civil war four years after unification and Germany experienced some muted social unrest. Why did the three cases endure different unification processes? And what, if any, relationship did this have with the outcomes after unification? This paper seeks to answer this question while focusing on the degree and types of unification seen in the three cases through the framework of political unification set forth by Etzioni in *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*.

Political integration theory mainly focuses on the study of the regional (mainly European) and global level integration of states to create supranational polities (like the European Union).\(^2\) Although the theory itself allows for great flexibility to understand various models of integration beyond the regional and global levels, few studies have examined inter-state unification cases with the application of political integration theory as this paper intends. Thus far, Hancock and Welsh’s


research on the unification of Germany is notable within the framework of political integration theory; yet it has failed to examine integration models in a comprehensive manner. A comparative study of national unification is particularly important, allowing us to understand: 1) the conditions in which different means of unification are mobilized; 2) the relationships among different means of unification; and 3) the necessary and sufficient conditions for unification. In this regard, this paper aims to fill the gap between political integration theory and the study of national unification with comparative case studies of Vietnam, Yemen and Germany.

In order to examine national unification cases, the paper adopted Etzioni’s model due to his flexible analytical framework of political integration. The paper draws upon Etzioni’s conceptualization of unification, defined as a process to integrate two systems into a single administrative-economic unit with a central decision-making authority that has the capacity to prevent internal conflict. A structural definition of unification, however, is not sufficient for understanding a nation formation. For a nation to form there must be a dominant identification among the majority of citizens – as the foundation of national identification. Etzioni also identified three distinct factors that bring about integration: coercive, utilitarian and identity aspects. The use of the different integrating factors should have an impact on the unification process and may result in different levels of integration across the three cases. In short, the level or degree of integration is a dependent variable and the three unification factors are independent variables in this study. Based on this framework, this paper seeks answers to the following questions:

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3 Ibid.
combinations of integration methods were the most effective during the unification process of divided nations, and to what extent did the different uses of integrating factors result in varying levels of integration in early-intermediate stages of unified Vietnam (1976), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990)? The timeframe for early-intermediate stage after unification will be defined as five to ten years following unification to allow for comparison across the cases.

First, this paper conceptualizes unification by summarizing existing political integration theories. Most of all, Etzioni’s theory will be examined in detail in order for analyzing the three cases of unification. In addition, Etzioni’s instruments of unification – coercive, utilitarian and identitive factors – will be modified in this paper to understand the dynamic processes of national unification in Vietnam, Yemen, and Germany. Throughout the case study, the paper attempts to discuss: the role of each factor during the process of unification; the relationship among the unification factors; a necessary and sufficient factor for unification; and the effective combinations to consider for higher levels of integration in the post-unified countries.
II. Political Unification Theory

Modern political unification theories evolved from the 1930s through the late 1960s in order to address the successful transformation of nation-states into new forms of trans- or supranational political communities in Europe, which were totally devastated by two consecutive world wars.\(^4\) Since British Prime Minster Winston Churchill delivered a speech in Zurich in 1946, various European integration models have been developed and suggested as a pathway to restore peace and security in the region. One of the most popular cases of political integration is the European case featuring the Western European Union in 1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, ultimately culminating in today’s European Union.

Does the European model of political integration apply in cases of divided nations? Jo and Walker examine this idea of adapting European models to cases of divided nations elsewhere.\(^5\) Admittedly, most of the models were developed and analyzed based on regional and global levels of study, which clearly require different conditions and strategies to achieve unification than in divided nations. Michael Haas, however, believed that there is a commonality shared by the various political integration theories and that unification can be considered simply an advanced version of integration.\(^6\)

A. Unification via Mutual Communication and Transaction

Karl Deutsch, a notable exemplar of political integration theory, sought to define the necessary political conditions for the peaceful resolution of social conflict

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\(^4\) Hancock and Welsh, *German Unification: process and outcome*, 2.


in the North Atlantic area.\textsuperscript{7} He defined integration as the processes that create unifying habits and institutions among participating units or groups.\textsuperscript{8} This process leads individual political communities to form joint security communities “where the war among its constituents population is neither expected nor in fact probable.”\textsuperscript{9}

Deutsch created a classification scheme of four different security community types with two being integrated security communities and two being non-integrated; the most ideal case of unification is when states merge formally into a new unit called an amalgamated security.\textsuperscript{10}

In particular, Deutsch stressed that patterns of social communication – which once played a large role in the formation of the European nation-states in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century – were also responsible for supranational integration in Europe in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{11} Deutsch assumes that constant transactions and other forms of social communication connect people with one another, which creates a sense of belonging among them and leads them toward a political integration. His emphasis on mutual communication and transaction as a driving force for the unification is critical also for assessing success and failure of political integration. His notion of a successful integration was meant to attain “a sense of community”


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 37. Deutsch differentiated integration from amalgamation. Amalgamation is defined as a merging of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit with the result being a common government with one supreme decision-making center. Integration, on the other hand, requires attitudinal changes among members to share common community identity. Any integrated system is not necessarily amalgamated the same as amalgamated system is not necessarily integrated. I contend that amalgamated and integrated community with both structural and attitudinal changes is the most desired model for the national unification. See Karl Deutsch, \textit{Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement}, (New York: Archon Books, 1970), 5-6.

\textsuperscript{9} Karl Deutsch, \textit{Political Community at the International Level}, 40-41.

\textsuperscript{10} Deutsch, et al., \textit{Political community and the North Atlantic area}, 5-8.

which he defines as a mutual sympathy and loyalties, a common identity, and partial
identification in terms of self-images through constant mutual communications.\textsuperscript{12}

Deutsch also broadened the importance of transaction in *Nationalism and social
communication*, so that it might include the process of nationalism created in different
countries outside of Europe.\textsuperscript{13}

Although Deutsch provides insightful perspectives on unification, his analysis
holds some limitations for the three case studies under consideration. First of all,
Deutsch’s notion of unification factors is too limited to mutual transaction and
communication. I believe that other mechanisms can play a role in the process and
are therefore deserving of attention. In the case of national unification, for instance,
non-peaceful measures, such as the use of force, seem to play a greater role in the
process of unification. His significant underestimation of military force in
integrating independent political systems (states) provides limited explanation of why
some countries experienced success in national unification through war. For
instance, 1994 civil war in Yemen provided “the way for real unity through the
elimination of a rival ‘sovereignty’” even though the official unification occurred in
1990.\textsuperscript{14} The Vietnam War actually allowed the communist party to unify the nation
for the first time since its independence, something that had been constantly refused
by southern leaders during the division.

In addition, Deutsch argues that there is a high correlation between the level
of transaction and the possibility of bringing about unification. However, his

\textsuperscript{12} Deutsch, et al., *Political community and the North Atlantic area*, 36.
\textsuperscript{13} Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and social communication*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
\textsuperscript{14} Michael Hudson, “Bipolarity, Rational Calculation and War in Yemen,” in *The Yemeni war of
argument is not sufficient to explain current cases where national unifications were completed under conditions of low levels of transaction and communication between two states. Rather, it seems that in many cases, the process of national unification emerged dramatically with insufficient communication between two states to develop a sense of nation. Against Deutsch’s assumption, Cobb and Elder’s empirical study suggests that there is minuscule correlation between transactional exchange and its impact on ensuing unification.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, according to Merritt’s study of England and the American colonies, significant transactions alone do not necessarily guarantee cohesion.\textsuperscript{16}

B. Unification via Dynamic Factors

Ben Rosamond commented that the integration theory of sociologist Amitai Etzioni have great advantages since it does not pre-judge the outcome of political unification in a typological manner.\textsuperscript{17} Etzioni’s theory has particularly innovated and advanced the study of integration beyond the theories of transactional flow (Deutsch). His theory focused on the relative status between states prior to the unification process to identify how power is allocated once the unification begins and to examine the changed system following unification.\textsuperscript{18} Etzioni also pursued a theoretical flexibility throughout his analysis for the potential applicability of his theory to “not only nation-nation but also state-state, and possibly state-society”


\textsuperscript{17} Ben Rosamond, \textit{Theories of European Integration} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 28.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
Therefore, I attempt to apply his framework to state-state unification cases to assess the validity and applicability of his theory to the national unification process.

First of all, he conceptualizes integration (and by implication, unification) as a process in which political units “increase or strengthen the bonds” among themselves. Then, a community is established “when the maintenance of its existence and form is provided for by its own processes and is not dependent upon those of external systems of member units.”

A political community is the highest level of unification, which possesses three types of integration, similar to what sociologists refer to as “cohesion”:

(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may “delegate” some of this control to member-units);
(b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community;
(c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens

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Table I. Etzioni’s Unification Phases

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20 Ibid., 3. The notion of integration defined by Deutsch and Etzioni is used differently in scope. Etzioni notes that his definition of integration is more stringent than those of Deutsch. For Etzioni, integration is a condition or end-state at a particular point in time that meets three criteria, and the process of meeting the criteria is unification (Ibid., 6n5).
21 Ibid., 4.
22 Ibid., 19n11.
23 Ibid., 4.
24 The table II is adopted from Jo and Walker, "Divided Nations and Reunification Strategies," 251.
Etzioni presents five different phases of unification, based on how three types of integration (monopolization of force, a central decision-making authority, and dominant identification) are scored. Three factors – that bring unification and further integration – are identified as “coercive” (military forces), “utilitarian” (administrative-economic) and “identitive” powers. According to Etzioni’s ordinal typology, a political community is the highest level of unification system and has three characteristics, while an international system does not have any of these characteristics. An empire (such as Rome or Great Britain) is more integrated than the international system, monofunctional organization, blocs, and union, which has a greater ability to control violence and decision-making within the polity while retaining representation of members. An empire, however, is less integrated than a political community, since effective control of violence is often challenged by member units, decision that made in the center are often less legitimate and thus with less authority, and has features a less encompassing and intensive identification among members. Becoming a nation, on the other hand, requires more than a level of political community with a stronger sense of national identification among members. According to Jo and Walker’s analysis, divided nations in pre-unification stages can be classified as two-unit international systems which integrate and transform into the level of either unions, empires or political communities, depending

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25 Etzioni, Political Unification, 9-13. Etzioni notes that precisely measuring the scope and level of integration is “possible to determine the comparative position of a particular international entity by using these dimensions” (ibid: 10).
26 Ibid., 37.
27 Etzioni, Political Unification, 7-9.
how three unification factors (coercive, utilitarian and identitive factors) play a role during the process.

Etzioni based his conclusions on four case studies involving two failed unions (The United Arab Republic in 1958-1961, and The Federation of the West Indies in 1958-1962), one stable union (The Nordic Associational Web 1958-1964) and one growing Union: (The European Economic Community 1958-1964). He found out that 1) the more identitive and utilitarian power are utilized, the more successful unification tends to be and 2) the more coercive power is utilized, above a given level, the less successful the unification tends to be (if all other powers being equal).\textsuperscript{29} Can his findings be applied to national unification in divided countries?\textsuperscript{30} Was the coercive power used in the unification of Vietnam less effective than the utilitarian power utilized in Yemen or Germany? Did the identitive factor in each case bring about the more successful unification outcomes? This paper responds to these questions in greater detail through a comparative study of the aforementioned three cases.


\textsuperscript{30} Based on his findings among regional integration cases, Etzioni tentatively argues that national unification involving coercion of one state – rather than through the influence of an identitive factor – is likely to bring alienation among members as an outcome of the process. See Amitai Etzioni, \textit{Political Unification Revisited}, 11.
III. Methodology

This section will draw on Etzioni’s theoretical framework of analysis in order to examine the three national unification case studies. The objective of this paper is neither to predict trajectory of future national unification in currently divided countries nor to offer judgment about whether the unification was good or bad. It is also not the intent of this paper to provide strategy for successful unification which most of national unification studies have already examined. Instead, this paper seeks to understand the dynamic processes of modern national unification cases that occurred since World War II in a qualitative manner. This study will examine different combinations of factors and situational contexts of each of the three national unification processes to test the validity and applicability of Etzioni’s theory. This paper should prove useful for further research by assessing the main factors presented by Etzioni in his study of political integration. Each individual case of unification is unique with distinct historical context of national division and differing degrees of socio-economic conditions throughout the division. However, this study will only examine the contemporary contexts of unification process in order to make comparisons across the different cases of unification. The cases of Vietnam, Yemen and Germany are selected because each case highlights diverse unification processes and outcomes.

My central question of this study is: what types of unification factors were the most effective during unification processes in divided nations and what forms of factors were utilized and resulted in the different level of integration in early-intermediate stage of unification? Was the use of force in Vietnam more effective
than the use of other integrating factors in Germany and Yemen? To what extent and for how long was it effective? Furthermore, what were the necessary and sufficient factors for the successful integration? In order to answer the above questions, this thesis uses the level of integration (as presented by Etzioni) as a dependent variable and various methods and powers of integration as independent variables. Etzioni’s three integrating powers, as independent variables, will be applied against the unification experiences of Vietnam, Yemen, and Germany. The level of integration will depend on how three unification factors were applied and integrated. The dependent variables are measured by the following aspects: whether newly formed states were able to protect their territories from potential violence that threatens national integrity; whether a dominant identification among members was able to be established. The study will not consider the level of institutional integration, since each case shows a successful merging of institutions by one dominant state throughout the unification process. Regarding significant time differences of the cases, the level of integration is measured during the early-intermediate stage shortly after unification took place.

Image I: Framework of analysis for national unification cases
A. Independent Variables: Identifying Unification Factors

Unification is not a random phenomenon; rather it has a clear pattern that is determined by representative factors. Etzioni identifies these factors as three different integrating powers of coercive (force), utilitarian and identitive factors.

*Coercive power* results when “coercive assets are pursued by one unit to impose its will or norms on the others, or by the system to impose its norms on the member units” which implies either the use or threat of physical violence.\(^{31}\) Etzioni, unlike Deutsch, emphasizes that the role of force as “an essential element in the fabric of every fully integrated union” which has “deterring capacity when it is not used and a unifying function when used sparingly at critical moments.”\(^{32}\) Other modernist theories of nationalism also support the use of force in national unification processes. Anthony Giddens– in an argument parallel to that of Etzioni – emphasizes the importance of “a systematic interpretation of the rise of the territorially bounded nation-state and its association with military power.”\(^{33}\) For Giddens, a nation-state is “a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders),” which has bureaucratic power and capacity to control any means of internal and external violence.\(^{34}\) Michael Howard further argues that warfare has the greatest impact on administrative efficiency of the modern state.\(^{35}\) Also, military factors are recognized by Michael Mann as being critical to the formation in the emergence of modern forms of nation-states. The role of war, Mann contends, was critical to unite fragmented territories.


\(^{32}\) Ibid., 72.


\(^{35}\) Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 79.
into one, when ethnic networks were weak in antiquity and the Middle Ages and remained weak until the rise of Western forms of democracy, which brought people into the political sphere to create a new mechanism for unity.36

In this regard, the use of force will be examined with the following questions of this study: 1) how significantly did military force impacts the unification process and its outcome; 2) was coercion necessary or sufficient for unification and integration; and 3) under what conditions military force was mobilized during the process of unification. This paper, in particular, examines the use of coercive factor in both Vietnam and Yemen during their respective unification processes, and to what extent it was crucial to unifying the two states.

Utilitarian power is the most comprehensive type of unification force in Etzioni’s analysis. This type of power includes “utilitarian assets... [including]...economic possessions, technical and administrative capabilities, manpower, etc.”37 Integration occurs “when these assets of a unit are allocated or exchanged in such a fashion as to bring another unit to comply with norms it upholds, or which the system upholds for its members.”38 In other words, utilitarian factors in unification mainly refer to economic/political incentives or sanctions from one state which can influence others to be cooperative in unification process. In this way, utilitarian power can have an impact on the process of national unification. Alexis de Tocqueville (1985-1859), in particular, attempted to analyze the forces of modernity and how to respond to them. In a series of studies, particularly about those on America and democracy, he found that integrating the diverse fragments of

37 Etzioni, Political Unification Revisited, 38.
38 Ibid.
modern society into a cohesive whole is largely related to maximizing individual utilitarian interest.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, Ernest Gellner views that economic interest with the rise of industrialization in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe served as a crucial factor to unify individual states into nation-state.\textsuperscript{40} However, it is hard to argue that economic reasons and utilitarianism alone were sufficient to sustain internal cohesion in modern nations.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, a new sense of community might be required to provide order and stability and bring a sense of attachment and belonging among those self-interested people.

In light of the utilitarian view on unification theory, the paper examines: 1) whether political and economic interests were mobilized during the process of unification in each case; 2) under what conditions these material motivations for unification were utilized; 3) whether this factor was sufficient or necessary for the process; and 4) to what extent it forged the higher level of integration. In line with the above discussion, the paper assumes, utilitarian factors can bring a national unification, but may not bring a successful outcome. This aspect will be further discussed followed by Yemen and German case studies.

Last, Etzioni argues that \textit{identitive power} can be utilized during the unification process “when a member unit or the system (through its representative) succeeds in establishing that a particular course of action which it wishes other units or all member units to follow is consistent with, or an expression of, the values to which the participants of these units are committed.”\textsuperscript{42} Identitive factors include values or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} James Dingley, \textit{Nationalism, Social Theory and Durkheim} (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 19.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ernest Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism} (New York: Cornell UP, 1983).
\item \textsuperscript{41} Dingley, \textit{Nationalism, Social Theory and Durkheim}, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Etzioni, \textit{Political Unification Revisited}, 19.
\end{itemize}
symbols that are built up by educational and religious institutions, national rituals and other mechanisms. For the current study, these factors will be modified to include emotional forms of nationalist rhetoric, ethnic symbolism and other nationalist sentiments that emerged during the unification process. Divided nations are unique cases of political integration, in that their separated societies often share identitive factors to some degree prior to unification due to their historical experiences of division. But, the existing identitive factor may or may not be utilized during the unification process. And post-unified countries may have different outcomes depending on its utilization. I do not assume that the identitive factor is a necessary condition for national unification process— as will be shown in the cases of Germany and Yemen— because unifying states do not necessarily require a strong sense of national consciousness. However, the identitive factor might be necessary in order to hold people together during the tumultuous unification process by providing some psychological and emotional glue among them.

Non-material factors in integration— which is a critical factor for nation formation— were also supported by comments made from Giddens, Howard, and Mann, who concede that ideology and ethnic symbolism are crucial elements in formation of the nation-state as a political community. Especially for Giddens, nationalism— primarily a psychological phenomenon— brings territorial cohesion among members and strengthens “reflective qualities of the nation-state.” Karl Deutsch expands on the role of nationalism and argues that the ultimate exercise of national power relies upon “the relatively coherent and stable structure of memories.

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43 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 75.
44 Ibid., 72.
habits and values.” He further argues that the nation is “the source of legitimate authority in the communal system …[with] the symbol of solidarity, collective identity, and sentiment of an ethnic group.” In light of importance of above discussion, the paper will examine the identitive factor by following aspects in three case studies: 1) whether national identity and consciousness among members was utilized during the unification process; and 2) to what extent the use of identitive factor influenced each case five to ten years of unification.

B. Dependent Variables: Measuring the Degree of Integration

Etzioni defines the termination of unification as when two political units become an individual unit as exhibited by a political community – a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point of identification. The political community has attained the three integration aspects: power to control potential violence, a central decision-making authority to allocate resources, and a dominant identification of the community (by implication, national identification). The three types of integration are ‘dualistic’ in a way that both material and attitudinal factors are considered. Achieving political integration with these three integration aspects, however, does not necessarily mean a nation which requires additional characteristics, such as a common territory, common customs, common language, common descent, common religious, and common laws. According to Otto Bauer – whose theory is based on the Austrian-Hungarian Empire during the early twentieth century – these

45 Deutsch, Nationalism and social communication, 75.
46 Ibid., 286.
47 Etzioni, Political Unification, 4.
national characters are viewed as integral elements of a “historical phenomenon, none of which could be reduced any further, as fixed bodies which would clash in space, and act upon each other by pressure and collision.” For Bauer, a historic legacy of national character is critical to influence subjective awareness among people and becomes important precondition for national communities. This, however, did not mean that the social development of a nation is impossible; rather, it suggested that some nationalities were slower to integrate than other to share national cultures.

According to Bauer’s idea of a nation, it might be impossible to expect recently unified states to reach the nation stage of integration in the early stage of unification. However, three unification factors – military force, utilitarian interests and identitive factor – would influence to the process and outcome of unification in varying degrees in Vietnam, Yemen and Germany. Hence, this paper will attempt to measure the early to intermediate stages of unification by asking 1) whether each newly formed state attained the capacity to protect its territory from potential violence and secessionist movements and 2) to what extent alienation emerged amongst its members as an alternative way to measure national identification.

The first aspect of integration can be observed in both an empire and a political community. Once previously independent states merge into a single bureaucratic organization, the central authority should attain power that is sufficient to protect the community from arbitrary interference of subgroups and potential secessions that can ultimately dilute the unified state. This aspect of integration was greatly emphasized by Etzioni, in that the control of the means of violence in

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
particular distinguishes a political community from other communities, such as religious and ethnic ones. What distinguishes an empire from the higher integrated form of community – such as a political community – is the degree of power to control over potential secession and violence. Since most of individual states joined empire in an involuntarily, a central bureaucratic authority often has less legitimacy amongst member units and is often threatened by succession more than a political community or a nation. This aspect of integration will be examine in the three post-unified cases to see whether or not internal armed conflicts and secessionist movements emerged in five to ten years following unification.

The second aspect of integration – a dominant identification among majority citizen – is required for full-fledged unification. In particular, Etzioni focused on dominant political parties within the community rather than religious or ethnic ones that may undermine the integration of the community. He contends that political identification, such as political parties, is not “dysfunctional so long as identification with the community is dominant” which means that “the greater the attraction of such egocentric subgroups existing within a community, the less integrated that community is likely to be.” This view, however, cannot particularly distinguish a nation from other forms of political communities. National unification does require attaining national consciousness and an identity that represents the majority of citizens to increase internal cohesion as a nation-state. Political identification by a dominant political party alone does not necessarily represent the nation as a whole, as we will see in Vietnam, Yemen and Germany. Nonetheless, measuring the degree of

53 Ibid., 5.
54 Ibid.
national consciousness in the early to intermediate stage of unification is nearly impossible. Instead, this study assesses the degree of alienation among members as demonstrated by such forms of social behaviors (such as protests, non-violent resistances and exodus from the country) among newly unified Vietnamese, Yemeni, and Germans five to ten years after unification. Although this aspect of integration does not provide a precise measure of national identification in each case, it gauges the degree of national consciousness among those affected by the unified political structure five to ten years after unification.
IV. National Unification Case Studies

The three cases of Vietnam (1976), Yemen (1990), and Germany (1990) show different combinations of unification factors and a varying degree of outcomes the first five to ten years following unification. In order to compare dynamics of integrating factors during the unification process, each case study will contain a brief historical overview of the nation’s division and unification, which identifies unification efforts, an analysis on integrating factors, and a measure of its level of integration.

A. Vietnam Unification

Overview of Vietnam Unification

It is unclear to say that Vietnam had a history as a nation-state in the pre-modern period. However, they have claimed that Vietnam was unified in the 1600s under the Nguyen dynasty for about 220 years. In 1880, Vietnam fell to French colonialism until 1940 when it was occupied by Japan throughout World War II. During the French colonial occupation, Vietnam was ruled by three administrative regions: Tonkin (North), Annam (Central), and Cochin-China (South). From 1940 to 1945 when Japan took over direct control from France, Bao Dai was installed as puppet ruler of Vietnam. At the end of the World War II when Japanese surrender seemed imminent, the August Revolution broke out in 1945. Ho Chi Minh led the

\[\text{\footnotesize 55 Actually, the notion of unification is perceived by Vietnamese as reunification since they regard the Nguyen dynasty as unified Vietnam nation. In the case of Vietnam, I use the term unification rather than reunification, unlike the majority of the literature on this particular case. Since Vietnam had not experienced the formation of a nation-state prior to colonial occupation by France, it is theoretically safe to say that the unity of 1976 is its unification. 56 By that time, Ho Chi Minh mainly controlled the northern part of Vietnam.}\]
uprising and declared independence, establishing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).\textsuperscript{57}

As a response to Ho Chi Min’s government, France installed Bao Dai as a leader of the State of Vietnam (South) in 1948. Each side claimed itself as the legitimate government of Vietnam, subsequently engaging in military conflicts for almost a decade. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, both parties finally agreed to cease hostilities with a provisional partition along 17\textsuperscript{th} parallel. As part of the Final Declaration at Geneva, national elections were to be held no later than July 1956 and the two governments were required to hold consultations before July 1955. However, the national election did not materialize due to the strong objection by the Southern politicians. A chance to unify the nation through peaceful means faded away with the rise of the new leader Ngo Dinh Diem in the South in 1956 until his overthrow by \textit{coup d’etat} in 1963.\textsuperscript{58}

From partition in 1956 until the fall of Saigon in 1975, national unification had been the first priority for both government policies: the constitution of North Vietnam affirmed that “the territory of Vietnam is a single, indivisible whole form North and South” while that of South Vietnam stated that “no Vietnamese government would long survive if it did not espouse reunification.”\textsuperscript{59} Before Hanoi decided to seek unification through military means, there was a historic moment when unification of Vietnam could have been managed peacefully.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} S. N. B. Murti, \textit{Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle} (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968), 164.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 176.
\item \textsuperscript{59} François Sully, ed., \textit{We the Vietnamese: Voices from Vietnam} (New York: Praeger, 1971), 150.
\end{itemize}
The first, and the last, peaceful attempt at unification was made by Ho Chi Minh between 1954 and 1958. He proposed diplomatic normalization with the South in communications linkages to include the posts, roads, and railways. Northern leaders hoped that this diplomatic effort could carry favor from France that could in turn influence the Diem regime to hold national elections per the Geneva Agreement. The Diem regime in the South, however, strongly refused Hanoi’s offer and asserted that the proposal had “no other aim than to infiltrate agents or propaganda into the Southern zone.” Despite Hanoi’s attempts to hold off elections until 1960, southern politicians refused to partake. A general election was considered a risky political gamble by American backed southern political leaders. The nationalist credentials and name recognition of Ho Chi Minh in both the north and south convinced southern leaders that an electoral victory was impossible. Instead, southern leaders refused to hold elections and were about to wait until “the people would be more aware of their best interests, more conscious of ideological affinities and an atmosphere of freedom.” Unfortunately, the elections never came again and North Vietnam began to take bolder action to unify the nation in the 1960s.

The second unification attempt by the DRV was the proxy military campaign from 1959 to 1965 in which the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, known as Viet Cong, fought the government of South Vietnam. Northern elites

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60 Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1975), 34.
62 Ibid., 9.
63 Ibid., 10.
64 Murti, Vietnam Divided, 196.
expected that an intensified NLF guerrilla war could bring “social pathology” or “simple anarchy” to the South, which the North could use as leverage to force the Diem regime to accept unification. The Front was established in 1960 and recruited southern Vietnamese opposed to the Diem government’s policies of alienation, repression and corruption during its consolidating period. The NLF was a grassroots organization with combined administrative-military capacity, which at one point controlled the greater part of the countryside in central Vietnam and in area between the 14th and 17th parallels. The strongest draw of the organization was not necessarily communism as much as nationalism and patriotism, which brought about half of the popular support in the south. Although there was no direct intervention by the North in forming the NLF, Ho Chi Minh fervently supported the Front’s activities and hoped that the Diem regime would disintegrate because of its own weakness. Despite the Front’s incessant attacks to the regime, however, the collapse of the government was not realized due to continued U.S. military support. Finally, around mid-1960s, Hanoi recognized the need for direct military intervention to force national unification.

The final attempt at unification was a direct military operation from 1965 to 1975 when North Vietnam began infiltrating its soldiers into South Vietnam followed by two invasions. In 1968, the northern military and NLF initiated the largest joint military operation with the encouragement of Ho Chi Minh and others. Ho Chi Minh, who dreamt for a peaceful political unification of Vietnam, decided that

65 Ibid., 34.
66 Ibid., 7.
67 Ibid., 5.
68 Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong, 34.
immediate unification was necessary during the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{69}  Known as Tet offensive, the Viet Cong (the NLF) and North Vietnamese army conducted attacks in 32 of 44 cities in South Vietnam, targeting South Vietnamese government officials and army, U.S. political and military sites and their allies. The communist army and its southern allies seemed successful in a very initial phase but suffered tremendous manpower casualties when the U.S. and its allied troops counterattacked. Although the communist allied troops were unable to continue additional large-scale operation after the Tet offensive, it was enough to shock the U.S. public. With completion of U.S. troop withdrawal in 1975, the city of Saigon finally was taken by North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{70}

**Integrating Factors: War and Nationalism**

The Vietnamese case demonstrates an interesting power dynamic among integrating factors between the two states during the unification process. During the unification efforts between 1950s and 1970s, coercive and identitive factors clearly dominated the unification process, while utilitarian factor was not mobilized at all. A lack of political and economic ties between the two states created room for the coercive component to dominate the unification process. But, there was a critical historical moment that utilitarianism could have been expanded upon and thus lessened the necessity of using force. In the mid-1950s, both states had the opportunity for peaceful unification through national elections as a part of the Geneva Agreement. In particular, northern leaders felt adherence to the Geneva Agreements “would encourage the other side to do likewise, paving the way for peaceful

\textsuperscript{69} Sully, *We the Vietnamese*, 187.

unification and fulfillment of revolutionary objective.”71 Northern leaders firmly believed that “peace under the Geneva Agreements would be more promising than war as a vehicle for encouraging national reconciliation after reunification.”72 In order to initiate the process in 1955, Hanoi initially proposed to normalize inter-Vietnam relations by expanding formal communication, economic trade and transportation. The proposal was rejected, however, by southern politicians for their own political rationale and the Agreement failed. North Vietnam changed its position on the unification strategy by relying on military force which had been escalated until victory in 1975.

Without the utilitarian factor, the role of identitive factor was important to support military activities among southerners during the unification process in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist sentiment mobilized a number of southern Vietnamese to fight against their government, U.S. and allied troops for the goal of national unification. As the most popular nationalist hero in the fight against external powers, Ho Chi Minh blended post-colonial Vietnamese nationalism with his second and third unification attempts in the 1960-70s. Stanley Karnow describes how Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist ideology supported the Vietnamese unification struggles:

What he brought was a spirit of rebellion – against first the French and later the Americans. As Ho's war escalated in the mid-1960s, it became clear to Lyndon Johnson that Vietnam would imperil his presidency. In 1965, Johnson tried a diplomatic approach. Accustomed to dispensing patronage to recalcitrant Congressmen, he was confident that the tactic would work. "Old Ho can't turn me down," L.B.J. said. But Ho did. Any settlement, he realized, would mean accepting a permanent partition

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72 Ibid.
and forfeiting his dream to unify Vietnam under his flag…There was no flexibility in Ho's beliefs, no bending of his will. Even as the war increasingly destroyed the country, he remained committed to Vietnam's independence. And millions of Vietnamese fought and died to attain the same goal…

Without mobilizing economic and political interests to unify the two states, Northern Vietnamese leaders gained support from southern Vietnamese (Viet Cong) during the course of war for unification by fomenting Vietnamese nationalism – which was not necessarily based on communist ideology. Once the unification occurred, however, the communist party transformed Vietnamese identity – which was driving factor to glue South-North people during the war – into the communist ideology to consolidate its legitimacy and integration after the unification. Also, the use of coercion had been a central mechanism for the communist party of Vietnam to consolidate its regime and further protect its territory from secessionist movements during the transitional year in 1975-76. Soon after the unification, the communist party began to lose political and military power to control social and armed resistance from the mass.

Transitional Period to Communist Unity

Immediately after the fall of Saigon, there was no a formal government in South Vietnam. During the transitional year in 1975, the Communist party of North had to rely on the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) which was composed of indigenous South Vietnamese Communists (Viet Cong) and the remaining NLF members. With representatives from the PRG and the communist party, formal unification talks opened in Saigon (later changed to Ho Chi Minh City)

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in November 1975. As a result, both parties agreed to hold a general election for
National Assembly in April 1976 with the reunification referendum.\textsuperscript{74} Since then,
the new regime initiated various repressive policies to build socialism among
southerners and eliminate remnants of their non-communist behaviors.

Initially, Hanoi intended to give the southern communists (PRG) time for a
slow and gradual integration into the North.\textsuperscript{75} The communist leaders of the North
recognized the great socioeconomic and cultural difference between North and South
which stemmed from the different political system during the division. Hanoi,
however, became impatient when they saw the rise of a political subgroup within the
unified political structure during the transitional period. While the northern
politicians considered slow integration of Vietnam, the NLF leaders and the PRG
were planning to remain independent of the North. Deviating from the Northern
plans, the PRG leaders pursued capitalist policies which recognize private ownership
and openness to foreign investment. They also pursued independent foreign policy
by deploying six foreign ambassadors during the first two weeks of September 1975
and expanding foreign affairs activities in the third world as a separate PRG entity.
Meanwhile, South Vietnam requested UN representation separately from North
Vietnam.\textsuperscript{76} The PRG’s policy discrepancy with the North drew Hanoi’s suspicion
and disfavor. Hanoi started to eliminate key PRG members who had fought during
the unification war but now favored independence. By the time of the referendum

\textsuperscript{74} Canh, \textit{Vietnam under Communism}, 13.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 19.
and the election in April 1976, most PRG officials advocating for independence were 
retired or relegated to the lower-level positions and had lost their influence.77

The emergence of this political subgroup alarmed the communist leadership 

enough to change the policy from gradual to rapid integration. By effectively 
eliminating the potential political subgroup at an early stage, the northern communist 
party dominated the policy agenda for unification. The party imposed various 
socialist measures during the second and third five-year plan in 1975-85, which aimed 
for building a material and technological base for the new socialist state and raising 
the standard of living of the population.78 It had also included introduction of the 

state ownership to boost the post-war reconstruction and to abolish the business 
classes in South. Farm collectivization was implemented in the south to recover 
from food shortages, and currency reforms were introduced as a way to deprive 
individuals of private wealth and eliminate the private commercial sector.79 In 
addition, the northern communist party attempted to forcefully integrate southerners 
into communist ideology through the re-education of 400,000 people at ideological 
camps.80 Known as thought reform, this policy required every adult citizen to attend 
at least one party-sponsored organization where Marxist-Leninist ideology was 
discussed. The press in South Vietnam was no longer allowed to publish except for 
information intended as propaganda from the regime.81

Failed Integration in Communist Vietnam

81 Ibid., 145-163.
Beginning with liberalization policy called *doi-moi* (revolution) in 1986, the forced socio-economic integration eventually failed to integrate southerners into the communist hold. The party continued to face strong systematic resistance as well as social resistance among people despite of a decade of efforts aimed at eliminating capitalist economic behaviors. First, collectivization of farm lands in 1970s literally failed with very limited success rate of less than 30 percent at the end of 1978 in South.\(^{82}\) The total amount of food production in 1978 hit a lowest record as 12.9 million tons as a result of farm collectivization with the average Vietnamese receiving only 251 kilograms of food that year. In contrast between 1965 and 1973, northerners themselves grew enough to supply each of their citizens. However, 1978-79 food crises were so bad that for the first time in two decades after the land reform, the government was openly concerned about hunger riots.\(^{83}\)

The communist assimilation policy in the South – often enforced by military forces suppressing dissent – failed to eliminate capitalist economic behaviors among southern Vietnamese. The black market thrived in cities and individual properties remained. A journalist Rober Shaplen described the situation in Ho Chi Minh City in 1985 this way:

> The government now reluctantly concedes that, even after a decade of attempted reforms, the south – particularly Ho Chi Minh City – remains ‘culturally decadent.’ An article a year or so ago in *Tap Chi Cong San*, a magazine devoted to Party theory, criticized southerners for ‘not attending the recommended cultural things but the ones that are not recommended.’ It admitted that ‘not too much progress had been made in eradicating all this,’ and bemoaned that ‘twenty years of U.S. puppet regime rule has left its impact’...The article went on to lament that, despite cleanup campaigns to get rid of half a million copies of undesirable magazines and newspapers, mostly Western

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 33.

publications that had been smuggled in sporadically, a black market still existed for such undesirable material…  

Cultural resistance against communism also appeared as the regime became increasingly unpopular among southerners. Regardless of the most rigorous censorship, people in the south circulated rumors of communist defeats by resistance troops, assassinations of high-ranking officials, and corruption and ineptitude of the regime. The legitimacy of unified authority significantly decreased over time and the government was no longer able to control social resistance from the mass. Southerners continued military activities to sabotage the communist regime.

During a decade of integration, a number of communist cadres were assassinated not only in Ho Chi Minh City but also in rural villages. There are some records about the concern of a party official at the worsening security in South, “…In Ho Chi Minh City, communist cadres dare not walk the streets alone. In rural areas, military forces withdraw to their stockades at night. Government officials dare not move freely in the southern countryside…”

For ten years of integration efforts, the communist regime failed to protect its territory from internal military resistance but also to create a new national consciousness among southern Vietnamese. A number of southerners decided to escape from their country in the 1970s-80s after losing hopes. Known as boat people, Vietnamese refugees fled to the U.S., Australia, Germany, France, Canada with a total population of about 57,000 according to the official UN total in 1981.

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84 Ibid., 27-28.
85 Canh, Vietnam under Communism, 141.
86 Ibid., 137.
87 Ibid., 139.
88 Ibid., 132.
The social composition of exodus varied from the educated and high party officials to fishermen and peasants living in costal areas. These thousands of boat people – many of whom used to devote their lives to fight for the reunification in the 1960s-70s – risked their lives to flee their now repressive country in the 1970s-80s. Once the communist party assimilated southern Vietnamese into communist ideology – not by Vietnamese identity as a whole – during the transitional period of unification, southern people who identified with capitalist culture during the division were excluded from ‘communist identity’ and resisted the integration efforts. Finally, a decade of efforts by the communist party to integrate southern Vietnamese into ‘a new Vietnam’ had failed by 1985, when the regime began economic and political liberalization.
B. Yemen Unification

Overview of Yemen Unification

The “dream of unity” created bonds among Yemeni who shared a sense of common cultural heritage and history. However, the idea of Yemen as a nation-state had not been so clearly defined throughout history. During the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, many of the political structures were defined as either religious or dynastic entities, rather than as territories of a ‘Yemeni nation.’ Also, language division between South and North Yemen was another factor that likely prevented a nation-state in from forming in Yemen. Instead, ‘Yemen state’ and ‘Yemeni identity’ were somewhat developed from colonial experiences by the British and the Ottoman empires in modern history. The presence of the Ottoman Empire in Yemen dates back to the early 1800s. During this time, the Ottoman’s economic interests clashed with that of Britain in South Yemen. Accordingly, territorial conflict between two empires established a de facto division between North and South Yemen in early 1900s without clear boundary divisions, which later led to a series of border conflicts between South and North Yemen in the 1970s.

In the 1910s, a number of guerilla warfare units emerged against colonial rulers—particularly in the north—led by Imam Yahya. As a result of intensified military resistance, the Ottoman Empire withdrew from the north in 1918-19 and

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80 Yemen has two dominant living languages – Sanaani and Ta’izzi-Adeni. The Sanaani-speaking population lives primarily in the South, extending as far as Dhamar. The Ta’izzi Adeni-speaking population, on the other hand, can be found in areas of all Northern provinces. Though both are spoken in Yemen, the two languages differ greatly. For further reading, see Raymond Gordon, Jr., ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 15th ed. (Dallas, Tex: SIL International, 2006).
82 Ibid., 3-6.
recognized Imam as a ruler of North Yemen. Imam extended his control over the most of the southern part of Yemen by urging for “Greater Yemen,” which later remerged as a popular nationalist rallying cry against British colonial rule in the 1960s. Following the Ottoman Empire’s exit in North Yemen, Imam Yahya established Kingdom of Yemen in 1935, which later was changed into the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1962. Meanwhile, British rule in South Yemen faced the number of challenges in the 1950s and 1960s with growing nationalist military groups – the socialist National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). In 1967, the British began to withdraw and South Yemen became independent as the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY). Immediately after its independence, South Yemen was under catastrophic economic conditions, which allowed the radical Marxist wing of NLF to gain power. After the NLF dominated political structure in south by eliminating the FLOSY, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was established in 1970 as a motto of “socialism in one country.” Clearly, there was a potential time to unify when the South gained independence from Britain in the 1960s. The rhetoric throughout the war was about national unity; South Yemen fought with the republicans in the North against the royalists; and North Yemen offered logistical support for the liberation movements in the South. However, the chance for unification – for the

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94 Dresch, History of Modern Yemen, 35.
95 Ibid., 118.
96 Ibid., 119.
97 Braun, “Prospect for Yemeni Unity,” 262.
first time – was missed when South Yemen declared itself as a sovereign state and began to consolidate its socialist regime throughout the 1970s.\(^98\)

Nonetheless, national unification was a key element of the constitutions of both Yemen states and the rhetoric of unity was endlessly expressed by politicians since independence.\(^99\) In the 1970s, political leaders of the two states constantly promised to work towards Yemeni’s unification, and citizens in both states shared public broadcasts about the cultures and history of Yemen.\(^100\) In fact, unification was regarded as so important to both states that “one or the other side was prepared to sacrifice its political value system for the sake of a higher goal.”\(^101\) Although a series of government-to-government dialogues continued, however, they were always interrupted by armed clashes and ideologically infused political disputes throughout the 1970s.

In September 1972, five years after South Yemen’s independence from Britain, armed tension escalated into a brief border conflict that ended in a Northern victory. Soon after the fighting, leaders from both sides made a verbal commitment toward unification through the establishment of joint technical committees. However, progress toward unity that had began in 1972 failed after a series of tumultuous political events in late 1977 and 1978 the assassinations of three key political leaders in both countries and the overthrow of the government in North Yemen. The second border war broke out in February 1979 with a decisive victory.

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\(^{98}\) Pan-Arab nationalism is a nationalist ideology concerning cultural and political unity among Arab countries from the early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century and onwards. Though the movement for regional unity was at its highest in the 1960s, Arab nationalism did not have any significant impact on bringing the unification of North and South Yemen.


\(^{100}\) Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen*, 150.

\(^{101}\) Braun, “Prospect for Yemeni Unity,” 263.
for the South that was at the time allied leftist rebels in the north (the National Democratic Front: NDF). Again, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to unity with agreements for mutual troop withdrawals and non-interference, cessation of media attacks, and a dedication to draft a unity constitution. This course of government level dialogue in the 1970s paved the way for unification, but it failed to reach its potential. Although both governments wanted unification, they remained rigid in their positions as to how to proceed with unifying the nation. South Yemen continuously urged for socialism, while North Yemen stressed Islamic and traditional social values as the basis for unification.

While political ideology dominated the unification debate in the 1970s, pragmatism took hold in the 1980s after changes in both governments resulted in less ideological rigidity. In January 1982, the constitutional committee finalized a draft constitution for a united Yemen. Commercial exchanges expanded and both states coordinated a common diplomatic agenda for the Pan-Arab summit in 1982. Inter-government collaboration for unity, however, dramatically decreased in the 1980s with the rise of opponents to unification, particularly the Saudi government. Both President Salih of North Yemen – who took office in 1978 after his predecessor’s assassination – and his counterpart in the South were reluctant to resume unification negotiations in the face of strong Saudi opposition.

By the spring of 1988, however, the prospect of unification revived after two meetings between President Salih of the North and General Secretary Bidh of the

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103 Braun, “Prospect for Yemeni Unity,” 263.
104 Ibid., 264.
105 Ibid., 267-8.
South. After a meeting in May, both leaders reached an agreement to establish a demilitarized zone on the North-South border to permit citizens to travel across the frontier using only identification cards and to collaborate for a joint oil-investment project.\footnote{Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen,” 459.} Following a series of close diplomatic consultations, both governments reached a more substantive agreement on November 30\textsuperscript{th} 1989 as the final phase of a unification process. Both parties committed to drafting a unity constitution, accelerating the work of various joint administrative bodies, and establishing a joint political committee.\footnote{Ibid., 460-461.} By early 1990, discussions continued regarding technical issues such as power-sharing of government posts and allowing a 2.5 year ‘transition period’ before a permanent unification.\footnote{Ibid., 462.}

Integrating Factors: Political and Economic Interests

What integrating powers brought the two Yemens together after 20 years of lingering border disputes and delayed political commitment? Rober Burrowes notes that the normalized inter-Yemeni relations were a repeated pattern of “two steps forward and one back” that created the “major source of the cautious optimism of some in 1989.”\footnote{Rober Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990,” Middle East Studies 23 (1991): 500.} Normalized inter-government relations – which gradually developed throughout a history of division – engendered a “mutual trust and confidence in the likelihood of friendly relations over the long term,”\footnote{Ibid.} which might help reduce the chance for a mobilization of coercive power to force unification.
However, inter-government interaction did not directly lead to the abrupt agreement for unification. Changes in political and economic conditions in the late 1980s brought greater pragmatism to both states that furthered progress in the actual unification negotiation by normalizing relations. First of all, the consolidation of the authority by Salih in the North Yemen in the 1980s allowed him increased room to maneuver during unification negotiations with the South. Historically, tribal opposition in the north had undercut unification initiatives in the 1960s-70s. Once the Salih regime tightened control over tribal strongholds in the northern and eastern areas in 1980s, the northern state could force tribal leaders to be more cooperative with the government’s major policies – including unification. The new relationship between tribal leaders and the state allowed the Salih regime to pursue unification initiatives, regarded as “the most important North Yemeni contribution to the success of the unification effort.”

Secondly, the collapse of the South Yemeni economy in late 1980s caused the two states to resume unification negotiation. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union significantly reduced military and economic aid to South Yemen which had been vital to its survival. A series of socialist land and fisheries reforms had failed to increase agricultural production in 1980s, industrial production declined, and commercial trade in the port of Aden significantly decreased. Also, a 20 year

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112 The degree of tribal dominance on politics appeared different in South and North. In the South where the state was ideologically oriented (socialism) with one-party domination, the state could disarm the tribesmen in the region, enforce law and enforcement, and control resources over tribes. By contrast, in the North where identified as more republican state, the state had limited capabilities to control tribal’s political and economic activities. Only since 1970s, the North could establish some sort of central authority over tribesmen after two decades of civil war within the region. For more information, see Paul Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis.” In The Yemeni Civil War of 1994: Causes and Consequences, ed. by Al-Suwaidi, Jamal (London: Saqi Books, 1995).


114 Ibid., 469.
socialist economic effort failed as at least 50 percent of the national income was generated from the private sector. Hard currency remittances from workers abroad constituted half of the governments’ revenue source in late 1980s.\textsuperscript{115} South Yemeni leaders initiated the number of economic and political liberalization measures in the latter part of 1989 to improve the situation by allowing political parties to challenge the single-party system, encouraging freedom of press, and allowing domestic and foreign investors.\textsuperscript{116} But these liberalization attempts failed and the number of demonstrations and strikes increased as people rallied against the economic crisis in the spring of 1990. The South Yemeni government had no choice but to resume unification talks with North due to the unpopularity of the regime and the popular support for unity being “too strong” to ignore.\textsuperscript{117}

Economic incentives were an added motivation for unification. Both Yemeni leaders sought to reverse their economic downturns and to launch a joint exploitation of the newly discovered oil reserves along the border zone (at Shabwah) in mid-1980s, seemingly a good path for mutual gain. Shelia Carapico points out that economic similarity between two states – both of which where heavily dependent on overseas development aid – could have helped entice the two states toward unification.\textsuperscript{118}

Thus, unification of Yemen was dominated by utilitarian factors – such as economic and political interests – that significantly drove unification efforts in 1990. However, limited identitive factors were utilized in the process. Yemeni unity was

\textsuperscript{115} Hudson, “Bipolarity, Rational Calculation and War in Yemen,” 30.
\textsuperscript{116} Dunber, “The Unification of Yemen ,” 465
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 456.
achieved “by merging institutions, government authorities and legal codes without addressing lingering ideological and cultural differences among people.”  

The absence of an ideological glue between the Yemens during the course of unification undermined Yemeni unity during the transitional period in between 1990 and 1994.

On the other hand, utilization of national identity seemed to be not possible for both states during the unification process in 1990.  Historically, Yemeni national identification remained tenuous since Yemen had had no historical experience as a single nation-state preventing “Yemeni citizens...who could identify themselves with an existing common political authority.”  Instead, many Yemenis were parts of tribal organizations that continued to play key roles in the political, social, and cultural aspects in Yemeni society.  Those tribal groups were an important source of armed strength in Yemen and had been considered as “inimical to the state’s interests.”  Under the strong tribal identity and its contradictory relationship with the state, economic and political interests for unity could threaten unity later, which resulted in 1994 civil war.  Although a democratic system introduced a means to bridge different sub-identities, the competitive nature of democratic elections in 1993 resulted in violence and armed struggles among different groups who urged for their own legitimacy over a unified Yemen.

Limited integration: 1994 Civil War

While the Vietnamese transitional period (1975-76) was dominated by a political and military monopoly of the communist party, the Yemeni transitional

121 Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification,” 484.
period (1990-1992) was filled with flourishing political activities in various levels of society and with the emergence of various political subgroups. As part of the unification agreement, political leadership in both states encouraged the construction of a new political community with democratic foundations. Elections were promised for November 1992 and a 50-50 power sharing of government posts and multi-party politics were suggested as a resolution for the great political differences between North and South. The dominant Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) of the South and the General People’s Congress (GPC) of the North were soon challenged by newly emerging political parties, new tribal forms of association thrived and a number of civil societies was mobilized.

The absence of a particularly dominant political and the state authority during the transitional period, however, proved risky. Two years after unification, these political developments resulted in inter-elite conflicts (especially between the two former regimes) as the leadership of the former North and South became embroiled in a power struggle within the new Yemen political landscape. During the first year of the power-sharing arrangement, northern politicians held three to two majorities on the all-important presidential council. Former Northern President Salih controlled the Ministry of Finance, which allowed the northern leaders control over the southern economic resources, mainly oil revenue. By the second year, the situation got a lot worse: a campaign of assassinations and violence in the country began, which mostly targeted the Yemen Socialist Party (South). Yemen’s Socialist politicians

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124 Ibid.
started withdrawing from the capital of Sana’a in 1992 and mobilized their own resources and power in the southern provinces.\textsuperscript{125}

The first parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened political disputes and further inhibited their long-term commitment to national unity. No single party was able to dominate the Yemeni parliament providing President Salih with more – although still limited – authoritative power. But Salih’s political legitimacy was not recognized among southern politicians who accused his government as being “inferior, if not totally subordinate, to executive authority.”\textsuperscript{126} In retaliation, President Salih and other northern officials accused southern politicians of being “secessionists.”\textsuperscript{127} Also, the Salih regime faced potential defection by tribal leaders and southern members of the military that were ready “if needed, to move against them with impunity.”\textsuperscript{128}

Tribal representation in democratic system exacerbated the confused situation during the transitional period. Tribes sought to assert authority, particularly in the rural areas, during the transitional period by emphasizing the tribal identity of Yemen: “Yemen is the Tribes and the Tribes are Yemen” as one of the slogans of a tribal conference.\textsuperscript{129} Their demands frequently appeared as kidnappings of foreigners, sometimes motivated by concerns for proper tribal justice or expression of long-standing grievances against the state that was perceived to be withholding funds from oil extraction on tribal lands. As Dresch describes the transitional period, “a

\textsuperscript{127} Day, “Updating Yemeni National Unity,” 421.
\textsuperscript{128} Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen,”470.
\textsuperscript{129} Dresch, “Tribal Relations and Political History in Upper Yemen,”47.
small class emerged (some of tribal background, some not) whose interests became
distinct from those of their immediate neighbors. The distinction between those in
power (the state, roughly speaking) and society at large arose within a previously
quite integrated setting."\footnote{Ibid., 38-39.} Accordingly, a strong sense of political alienation of the
tribesmen from their tribal leaders was apparent. For example, between 1990 and
1994, one tribal leader was the target of mounting accusation by other tribal groups as "his men's misfortunes."\footnote{Ibid., 40-41.} Whether it is true or not, Dresch points out, the post-
unified Yemen hold complex power dynamics of not only state-tribal but also tribal-
tribal groups.

The fragmented political and societal conflict in Yemen during the
transitional period was exacerbated by the 1993 election which led to the two-month
bloody armed conflict in April 1994. The civil war was ended with a victory for the
months after the conflict, Northern politicians retracted a number of progressive
reforms introduced after unification, such as power-sharing and democratization
measures. The GPC passed a constitution amendment that strengthened the
President’s executive power. The North’s military dominance after the war flooded
into the South by appropriating lands and extending authority of northern elites in the
region.\footnote{Ibid., 8.}
Actually in light of a political domination, the 1994 Yemeni civil war paved the way for real unity through the elimination of the rival south political groups. But, the dominant political identity did not necessarily mean a successful integration in Yemen. Although political unity was accomplished by armed conflict in 1994, tension between state and tribal groups remained in the post-war Yemen. The government considered tribalism as a potential threat of the integrity while some Yemeni tribes perceived the state as illegitimate political entity. Against the government’s rule, tribal groups continued to control their own territory with armed personnel in many of the rural areas of Yemen and carry out the normal functions of state by providing a network of social security for their own members.\(^{134}\) Although unified Yemen had not experienced major secessionist threats since the 1994 civil war, the weak national loyalty among tribal groups limits national integrity of unified Yemen until today.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., 19.
C. Germany Unification

Overview of German Unification

Unlike the two previous cases of Vietnam and Yemen – wherein it is hard to determine whether the case was one of reunification or the first case of unification—Germany had already existed as a nation-state since 1871 when Bismarck successfully consolidated the independent German states through three military successes: the Danish War (1864), the Austrian War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). The new German Empire began nation-building under the leadership of Bismarck and Prussia from the 1870s until World War I. After 70 years of unification, however, Germany was divided into two states in 1945 as a result of the World War II, this being considered the best means to prevent the revival of a strong and aggressive Germany.\textsuperscript{135} Following the war, East and West Germany were occupied by the Soviet Union and allied countries respectively. The West German government was established in September 1949 under Konrad Adenauer and East Germany was declared as a sovereign state in 1955 after the Soviet occupation.\textsuperscript{136}

Since partition in 1945, the issue of German reunification was a controversial one in German politics. The controversy was not so much about whether the two Germanys should reunify or not, but how it was to be achieved.\textsuperscript{137} As the political environment changed during the 1970s and 1980s, policy interest in the reunification decreased significantly. In the late 1980s, however, the inter-German relationship faced a dramatic turn-around and the two Germanys reunified in October 1990.


\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{137} Dieter Mahncke, “Reunification as an Issue in German Politics 1949-1990,” in German Unification: The Unexpected Challenge, ed. by Dieter Grosser (Providence: Berg, 1992), 34.
Largely, German unification progressed through four stages of reunification: the Adenauer period in 1950s, the beginning of détente in the 1960s, Ostpolitik period in the 1970s, and the collapse of East Germany in the 1980s and finally reunification in 1990. As I will examine in following section, the German case demonstrated a high degree of utilitarianism as the basis of unification.

The reunification of Germany was not a priority for West German politicians during the 1950s when West Germany was governed by Chancellor Adenauer. Although he favored reunification, he felt it should occur within the western framework, which would face strong opposition from the Soviet Union. In particular, the domestic political opposition (the Social Democrats) fiercely criticized Adenauer’s unification policy, as Adenauer rejected a Soviet offer of reunification in return for neutrality in 1952. In April 1952, the Soviets accepted in principle for the first time the idea of holding free all-German elections under the supervision of the four Allied powers. However, there was opposition in West Germany – especially from Adenauer’s party – which strongly rejected the unification opportunity via elections and argued that “a united, independent Germany would not become an ally of Soviet Russia or abandon its moral association with the free powers of Europe and America.”

When the Soviets built the Berlin Wall in 1961, the likelihood of reunification had decreased. The Social Democrats – whose approach to reunification was more nationalist than Adenauer’s party and more inclined toward

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138 Ibid., 35-36.
139 Ibid., 37-38.
a socialist system – felt that the Adenauer’s government is too rigid and they opposed joining NATO and membership in the European Economic Community.\textsuperscript{141}

In the early 1960s, genuine concern for the Adenauer’s policy emerged among not only politicians – mostly from the Social Democrats – but also the general population of West Germany. There was a growing demand for the government to “grasp every opportunity to normalize relations between the FRD and the Eastern European states without the sacrifice of vital German interests.”\textsuperscript{142} When Adenauer was replaced as Chancellor by Kurt Kiesinger in the mid-1960s, West German unification policy changed drastically into the détente relationship with the Soviet-backed regimes and East Germany. The policy of the détente developed further under the leadership of Willy Brandt in the late 1960s (labeled Ostpolitik) and remained a major pillar of West German foreign policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

\textit{Ostpolitik} provided the cornerstone of German reunification in 1990 by decreasing the chance of using force for unity.\textsuperscript{143} Brandt’s policy sought to improve relations with the East and decrease unnecessary tensions between the Soviet regimes. The policy contributed to the signing of a host of bilateral treaties between the West German Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and communist Eastern European countries. East-West diplomatic activities expanded in the 1970s leading to the Treaty of Basic Relations (the Basic Treaty) in 1972. It was known as the “mother treaty” of more then thirty treaties, agreements and protocols concluded between the

\textsuperscript{141} Mahncke, “Reunification as an Issue in German Politics,” 39.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 41.
FRG and the East German Democratic Republic (GDR) until the 1980s.\textsuperscript{144}

Ostpolitik was continued by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl who gained power in 1982. The Kohl government further strengthened economic and technology cooperation between East and West and extended personal contacts between the two states.\textsuperscript{145} The number of East German visitors increased from 36,000 in 1981 to more than one million by 1987 creating growing dissatisfaction among the young generation of East Germans who could now see firsthand the advantages of the capitalist and democratic system of West Germany.\textsuperscript{146}

Normalized relations and increased informal interaction did not necessarily lead to the reunification in 1990. Until 1989, a number of domestic politicians and international observers still believed the division of Germany to be permanent, and that reunification was not possible.\textsuperscript{147} However, the prospect for unity became clear in 1989 when dissent and dissatisfaction among Germans radically increased with the deteriorating domestic situation. Emigration of East Germans during 1989 significantly increased: from 4,600 in January 1989 to 10,600 in May of that year; 21,000 in August, 33,000 in September, and 57,000 in October, reaching a monthly high of 133,000 in November.\textsuperscript{148} Also, the number of demonstrations against the communist regime rapidly spread into other part of the East Germany in 1989. The famous Leipzig Monday demonstrations, for instance, grew from a few hundred

\textsuperscript{146} Mahncke, “Reunification as an Issue in German Politics,” 45.
\textsuperscript{147} Steininger, “The German Question, 1945-95,” 20.
people, who demanded the free right to travel during the spring and summer of 1989, increased to 6,000-8,000 on 25 September and to about a half a million on 6 November. This series of popular demonstration was the most remarkable phenomenon of the summer and fall of 1989, which showed the willingness of the GDR citizens to confront the communist party, and resulted in the collapse of the regime. In particular, the lack of identification with a socialist system was great particularly among young generation: roughly 51 percent of refugees emigrating from East to West in 1989 were between the ages of 18 and 29, and 47.8 percent of all members of socialist party who retired as of December 1990 were under 30 years of age.

Although political leadership in East Germany was replaced by Egon Krenz on October 1989 to change the unfavorable domestic conditions, Krenz was unable to implement any reform measures against by his own citizens. Finally the decision to open the Berlin Wall was made on November 9 1989, but Krenz relinquished his government post after only forty-four days with the dissolution of the Politburo and the communist regime. The Volkskammer election was held in March 1990, and the coalition of newly formed and reformed center-right parties dominated East German politics, which received strong support not only from East Germans but also West German politicians. As a result of the election, the unification of two Germanys seemed imminent, especially when Helmut Kohl proposed ‘Ten Point Plan’

149 Ibid., 79.
151 Henry Turner, Germany from Partition to Reunification (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), 239.
152 Huelshoff and Hanhardt Jr., “Steps toward Union,” 83.
for some form of German unification. In fact, politically, the two German states could be united either by a formal treaty between the two governments and an adoption of a new all-German constitution, or by total dissolution of the GDR and its citizens’ inclusion in West Germany. However, the second strategy was demanded by East German citizens and West German politicians, which brought quick and total elimination of all elements of the communist regime. Kohl’s party argued that the rapid and complete unification through absorption of the GDR into the FRG was the only way for East Germans to improve their economic conditions swiftly with comprehensive introduction of market economics. Also Kohl’s government promised that “no one would be worse off materially after unification.” The rhetoric for economic unification truly moved East Germans for quick unification, as demonstrated by the results of the Volkskammer election of 1990. Finally a treaty for unity was signed on August 1990, and the two states formally unified on October 1990.

Integrating Factors: Economic Interests

German reunification was motivated by strong utilitarian factors among East and West Germany. Most precisely, the unification process was moved by a high level of economic motivation among East Germans at the end of the 1980s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Ostpolitik provided continuous flow of information – mainly through the electronic media and relatively less restricted travel opportunities in the GDR – and significantly affected expectations and behaviors in

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153 Ibid., 86.
154 Turner, Germany from Partition to Reunification, 245.
155 Huelshoff and Hanhardt Jr., “Steps toward Union,” 82.
both Germanys.\textsuperscript{156} When the border opened to the West, millions of East Germans had been able to compare their living conditions to that of the West Germans, and had returned to the East with high skepticism about their political system and reform efforts. Compared to the uncertain prospects of reform efforts in the East, unification with the prosperous West Germany seemed more attractive to East Germans leading up to the 1990.

Rhetoric of Kohl’s government for unification voiced that all Germans should live in freedom and live equally well. This might also have instigated the rationale for unity among the majority of East German citizens, motivating them to vote for the Alliance for Germany in the 1990 Volkskammer election and thereby for quick unification. As Hancock and Welsh quote, most East Germans gradually realized in late 1980s that “indigenous solutions to East German problems were far beyond the reach of GDR resources.”\textsuperscript{157} This growing economic frustration as a decisive motivation for the unification among East Germans is well expressed in their demonstrations in the late 1980s. People in the street who in October 1989 chanted “We are the people!” later chanted “We are one people!” or “Germany, united fatherland” in late November of that year called for the fall of the Berlin Wall.\textsuperscript{158}

Meanwhile, West Germans hardly showed any overt political demonstrations in favor of unification even in the spring and summer of 1990 when specific unification processes were negotiated.\textsuperscript{159} In opinion polls, reunification was considered “impossible” by two thirds of West Germans, regardless of cross-border ties and their

\textsuperscript{156} Turner, Germany from Partition to Reunification, 27.
\textsuperscript{157} Hancock and Welsh, German Unification: process and outcome, 314.
\textsuperscript{158} Turner, Germany from Partition to Reunification, 242. Rhetoric of the Leipzig protest reflects the deep dissatisfaction felt among East Germans living under the post-Stalinist regime.
\textsuperscript{159} German Unification: process and outcome, 323.
sense of cultural community. Also, the lack of nationalist fervor for unity appeared in the unification rhetoric of Kohl’s government in 1990, which pledged to the Western military alliance that the reunification is overwhelmingly “practical task of integrating East and West.” Foreigners in Germany also noted with relief that unification lacked nationalist fervor among Germans in 1989-1990. This unbalanced enthusiasm for national unification between East and West Germany prior to and during the unification process shows that reunification issue was clearly based on utilitarian interests for East Germans, rather than emotional issue.

Then why did German unification lack the influence of identitive factors? Although Germany once had been successful a nation-state, German intellectuals were hesitant to reconstruct German national consciousness and identity since the war in 1945. For them, the destruction of the German nation in 1945 was perceived as a “punishment” for the total misuse of power in the Third Reich. The rebirth of a strong national consciousness in Germany – which includes a historical legacy of inhumane crimes from 1933 to 1945 – was politically imprudent. And leaders were genuinely concerned about creating strong nationalism, which might be misused by “right-wing hooligans.” Thus, even in 1989 when reunification was imminent, the number of intellectuals – especially Günter Grass – forcefully opposed the reunification of Germany with a great concern about encouraging national identity:

We have every reason to be afraid of ourselves as a unit capable of action. Nothing, no national emotion, no matter how idyllically tinted,

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162 Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity*, 199.
164 Ibid., 17.
not even any protestations of the amiability of those born afterwards, can relativize or easily do away with this experience which we as the guilty have had with ourselves, and which the victims have had with us as unified Germans. We will not get around Auschwitz. We should not even attempt such an act of violence, no matter how much we might wish to do so, because Auschwitz belongs to us, it is a permanent scar on our history, and it has, on the positive side, made possible an insight which might run like this: now, finally, we know ourselves.  

German unity suddenly occurred much to the world’s surprise. The surprising collapse of East Germany and growing frustration among its people single-handedly revived the chance for unification and made it “irresistible.” Unification based on utilitarianism and the absence of identitive factor during the unification process left the post-unified society vulnerable. Soon after unification, there was stark disillusionment among East Germans when anticipated economic benefits were not achieved as they had previously expected. Compared to Yemen case, however, German unification shows successful integration. Perhaps, a shared cultural and historic legacy among West and East Germans prior to the division mitigated potential secessionist attempts or extreme forms of resistance against unity.

Limited Integration: The Wall in the Mind

The unification process – including political and economic unification – rapidly began right after the first free election in the GDR in March 1990, with an astonishing victory for the newly reform minded political party, the Alliance for Germany. In July 1990, the GDR finally gave up its monetary sovereignty and monetary institutions were transferred to Western counterparts. A 1:2 conversion rate was settled for the exchange of the former GDR currency into DM, and the number of nationalized companies stationed in East Germany was totally privatized.

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165 Ibid., 189.
166 Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 203.
Unlike the South Vietnamese who resisted against the communism of the north, the majority of East Germans rushed to embrace the ways of western capitalism in order to enjoy the economic benefits of a free market society. In the meantime, West German entrepreneurs hurried to take advantage of opportunities in the East by taking over those privatized state industries.\textsuperscript{167} Although new roads, phone lines and shopping centers were being built in eastern Germany, the economic challenges of transition become evident in the early 1990s, followed by severe economic depression.\textsuperscript{168}

The sudden unification process was much more costly and traumatic than Kohl’s government expected. In combination with a worldwide recession in 1992, Germany’s leadership faced tremendous public debt, which reached a record high of 1.6 trillion DM – as compared to 929 billion in 1989. The privatization of state-owned industries in East Germany was successfully implemented; but the number of core industries rapidly disappeared. In particular, by the end of 1992, the labor force shrank from 10 million to 7.4 million and true unemployment was closer to 25 percent in the former GDR. More than a million eastern Germans were unemployed. Another million were subsidized part-time workers, and more than 500,000 easterners moved to the West.\textsuperscript{169} Preventing explosive social unrest caused by the tremendous

\textsuperscript{168} Jarausch, \textit{The Rush to German Unity}, 203.
unemployment rate was only possible by extending the Western “safety net” of unemployment insurance and retraining measures.\textsuperscript{170}

A large part of the East Germans, who initially expected that freedom of democracy would greatly enhance their living standard, began to recognize ‘the wall in the mind’ between former western and eastern societies. Easterners struggled with a loss of identity, “living in two worlds, but not feeling at home in either one.”\textsuperscript{171} Under the significant rates of unemployment in the east and an unfavorable economic situation in general, the majority of eastern Germans began to experience a sense of frustration, feeling that they were being abused, manipulated and exploited by westerners who were perceived as arrogant and fast-dealing.\textsuperscript{172} They resented even helpful advisers from the west as arrogant “Besserwessis.”\textsuperscript{173} Meanwhile, westerners failed to understand why Ossis were not more grateful about the situation. There were general sentiments among West Germans – who felt themselves as “victims of unification” – against the greater financial aid to the East, and resented paying the cost of unification, or even showed patronizing sympathy to East Germans.\textsuperscript{174} According to a survey conducted in 1995 showed that the majority of Germans agreed with the statement: “even though the Wall is gone, the wall in people’s minds keeps growing.”\textsuperscript{175}

Although there was no evident military violence against unity, specific economic problems contributed to rising political extremism and xenophobia in the

\textsuperscript{170} Jarausch, \textit{The Rush to German Unity}, 203.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 204.
\textsuperscript{172} Corson and Minghi, “Reunification of Partitioned Nation-States,” 129.
\textsuperscript{173} Jarausch, \textit{The Rush to German Unity}, 204. “Ossis” (Easterners) and “Wessis” (Westerners) were derogatory terms formerly used to refer to easterners and westerners and to highlight negative stereotypes in post-unified Germany.
\textsuperscript{174} Kienbaum and Grote, “German unification as a cultural dilemma,” 225.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 227.
new German during early 1990s. In post-unified Germany, an economic crisis combined with a large influx of newcomers contributed to a resurgence of an extreme form of nationalism and racial exclusionism among East Germans. Young people especially, disoriented by the transition, blamed their problems on those foreigners. With the collapse of the Eastern youth organizations, pressures from new school systems and the danger of unemployment, many bored teenagers turned into “skinheads” by adopting the forbidden symbolism of a Nazi past.\textsuperscript{176} Mainly targeting Vietnamese and Turkish guest workers in Germany, neo-Nazi groups urged for German superiority and exploded into violence against them. Such incidents erupted almost daily during 1992, involving 2,200 victims, with seventeen people dead.\textsuperscript{177}

At the same time, the extreme nationalist rhetoric appealed to many groups in the country, which showed in the strong electoral support for extreme right-winged parties among younger age groups, lower working classes and unemployed people–who were largely located in the eastern part of Germany.\textsuperscript{178}

After the first five-years of unification, the newly unified Germany achieved only a limited degree of cohesive national integration, as demonstrated by a trend of social unrest and peculiar political behavior among East Germans, as well as a psychological separation between easterners and westerners. It is true that the utilitarian interest (mainly economic interests) among East Germans prior to unification was the decisive factor to break through the opposition and skepticism against unification in 1989-1990. However, these interests have the limited capacity

\textsuperscript{176} Jarausch, \textit{The Rush to German Unity}, 209.  
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.  
to integrate the people on an emotional level. In a national holiday on October 3
1990, President Richard von Weizsäcker of the FRG (1984-1994) delivered a speech
with pride: “For the first time Germany finds its lasting place in the circle of Western
democracies.” But, he also warned that material equity requires a psychological
reconciliation between East-West Germans.179 As he warned, once their utilitarian
gains were not attained among East Germans during economic downturn in post-
unification period, nationalist sentiments urged by East Germans for unity rapidly
faded away with the emergence of grievances and distress against unified Germany.
However, I must note that German unification shows the most successful outcome, in
comparison to the previous cases of Vietnam and Yemen, in that Germany sustained
its territorial integrity without military conflicts involving potential secessionist
movements. In addition, the degree of cohesiveness among members in Germany
today is much higher than in Yemen, where unification was also based on the
utilitarian factor. The reason for greater success in Germany, I assume, is due to pre-
existing German national identity before the division, which might likely mitigated
potential break-up of unity

179 Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, 178.
V. Discussions

Although the three cases did not show any clear successes in integration – as a full-fledged a political community – in the early phases of their unification, I found that different integrating factors influenced integration levels to varying degrees in the early-intermediate stage. I have identified various unifying factors which were utilized during the unification process, by differentiating the historical context of each case. For example, identitive factors measured “high” in the case of Vietnam because national sentiments were highly mobilized by Ho Chi Minh during the process, even though Vietnam had no historical experience as a nation-state. But its use of identitive factors became “low” after the military victory, as the communist party transformed nationalist sentiments into communist ideology to assimilate southerners under socialist Vietnam. On the other hand, identitive factors in the case of Germany measured “low” because there was no utilization of national identity during the process, although German national consciousness already existed among populations than two cases. I did not include historical contexts of national consciousness within the independent variable of this study. But I believe that historical context of national unity can provide a great deal of insight in some unification cases (Yemen and Germany), which have similar unification factors but have different outcomes. Based on the previous analysis, the following table identifies the different degrees and uses of integrating factors in the three national unification cases, as well as their relative integration levels.
As the table identifies, Vietnamese unification showed high levels of coercion led by the Northern Vietnamese government to overtake the southern part, which continuously refused to partake in unification efforts. In order to gain support for military force toward national unity, northern leaders – especially Ho Chi Minh – effectively mobilized Vietnamese national identity among the southern population (mainly the Viet Cong) during the course of the war. Despite continuous military support by allied countries for Diem regime of the south, the communist party, with strong support from the Viet Cong, finally took over Vietnam as a whole in 1975.

On the other hand, utilitarian factors – which can be identified as political and economic interests in both states – were not heavily utilized during the unification process. In the 1960s, there was only once chance for peaceful unification through a general election as a part of the Geneva Agreement. Once the opportunity passed, unification policy had radically changed into military intervention by North Vietnam.

On the other hand, the Yemeni case shows high levels of the utilitarian factor, while the coercive and identitive factors did not play a large role during the course of unification. Although unification efforts had been attempted and encouraged since Yemen’s internal division in the 1960s, the actual process of unification had never been realized due to different political/ideological orientations regarding unity and emerging tribal identity against unification. However, the moment for unification
arrived when political and economic interests were complemented by both states at the end of the 1980s.  South Yemen had tremendous pressures from the public for unification due to its poor economic performance, while North Yemen had finally gained control over the tribal groups fighting against unification, and was looking to further its political reach.  Also, newly discovered oil resources in the 1980s along the border between the two states seemed to drive a rapid unification negotiation process in 1989.  Since the two states were highly engaged in benefits for unification – either politically or economically, or both – any coercive aspects did not appear during the unification process.  It is interesting to note that the Yemeni unification in 1990 could have been processed by military force, particularly since both states were already engaged in two border wars in the 1970s.  In this regard, high utilitarian factors likely or possibly mitigated the potential for war and led the two states toward cooperative attitudes in unification negotiation.

While political and economic interests of both states brought about unification, identitive factors failed to mobilize in the Yemeni case.  Although both Yemeni states have a shared history and a sense of unity (but it is lower than other two cases), especially from their colonial experiences, the two states failed to reconstruct ‘a new Yemeni identity’ during the course of the unification negotiations.  Perhaps it was impossible for them to recreate such an identity, due to the existing strong tribal identities throughout their history.  However, whether or not it was impossible for them to utilize the identitive factor during the unification process, the lack of such identitive factor for unification proved to be fragile in the post-unification situation.  As an alternative, a democratic political system was introduced by
Yemeni leaderships as a mechanism to bridge fragmented societies into one. In contrary, the democratic election instigated political and economic interests and competition among those groups, which became one of causes for armed conflicts in 1994. Thus, the utilitarian factor of unification alone brought about actual unification in the two states, but it was not sufficient for integrating the fragmented societies into a single cohesive society as a nation. In fact, the 1994 civil war helped somewhat in achieving unity with a political dominance of northern leaders by eliminating subgroups that emerged during the transitional period; but a dominant political identification did not forge a cohesive identity among North-South Yemeni and diverse tribal groups.

Integrating factors in German unification have a similar composition with that of the Yemeni case, including: a high level of utilitarian factors with a low level of identitive and coercive aspects. Throughout the 1950s-80s, both East and West governments pursued their second national unification with different strategies. Ideological discourse for unification dominated in 1950-60s, whereas the détente approach was initiated by Ostpolitik in 1970s-80s. Although inter-German relations were much improved throughout the détente period, the actual moment of unification did not arrive until 1989. When the Soviet economic system was about to collapse in late 1980s, a number of East Germans faced frustrations regarding their economic conditions and began to resist the communist regime, as illustrated by massive exodus and demonstrations. Ostpolitik – which expanded personal contact between two divided people – motivated economic interests among East Germans for unity and a yearning for regime change as a result of the 1990 Volkskammer election. Although
interaction between the two states brought an emotional motivation for unity, the actual unification in 1990 was not derived out of national identity. As a consequence of the World War II, Germans intellectuals were reluctant to reconstruct national identity due to their sense of guilt. Avoidance of the identity factor was clearly reflected in the government’s rhetoric for unification, and few, if any West Germans favored political movements for unification. Once economic interests among East Germans were not achieved as they expected; social unrest prevailed and unusual electoral support for extremist political parties emerged in the five years after 1990. The two Germanys did, however, have a strong sense of national consciousness prior to the division, especially in comparison to Yemen, where national identity was already absent. This aspect might have mitigated potential negative outcomes of material interests driven unification than Yemeni case.

In order for actual unification, political and economic interests must be compatible between states at a certain time of history – such as when the collapse of communism was visible in Yemen and Germany in 1980s. If utilitarian interests between states are incompatible, however, the prospect for unification seems to either be delayed (Yemen and Germany) or to be complemented by forceful measures (Vietnam). An interesting aspect of the relationship between the utilitarian and coercive factors is that when high utilitarian interests exist between states, the tendency for the use of military force is reduced. In the case of Vietnam, when political interests for unity lacked in the 1960s, the coercive option was selected among northern leaders to pursue unification. On the other hand, in the case of Yemen, when economic and political interests were the greatest in 1988-89, military
use for unification was not a priority between two governments. In addition, mutual interaction in both governments and at the personal level in Yemen and Germany, however, did not by itself bring actual unification. In the Yemeni case, the two states constantly worked for unification for about twenty years, but the tangible unification negotiation process had not appeared until mutual economic and political interests emerged in both states in 1989. Likewise in the German case, the two governments continuously agreed to pursue unification since the division, but the actual moment for unification did not occur until 1989 when the economic interests of unification for the East Germans was the greatest.

Indeed, the utilitarian factor was decisive in achieving unification in the cases of Yemen and Germany, but alone was not sufficient for integration. Material interests for unity seem to be fragile once intended expectations among members are not attained after unification. For instance, Yemeni civil war in 1994 was partly caused by accumulated grievances among southern leaders who failed to attain intended economic and political gains during the transitional period, as northern leaders dominated economic resources by controlling government main positions. The Germany case shows a similar outcome, though the intensity is much lower than in Yemen. East Germans began to feel disillusioned when their intended economic conditions failed to materialize in the face of the economic downturn of post-unified Germany.

However, the negative outcomes followed by material interests-oriented unification both in Germany and Yemen might be mitigated by the identitive factor, which this paper did not observe in each case. If Yemeni leadership could have
brought about a sense of national consciousness during the process of unification, and if German leadership could have reconstructed national identity among Germans, potential secessionist movements and social unrests which followed their utilitarian interests based unification could have been greatly reduced. On the other hand, once emotional aspects for unity are combined with military force (as in Vietnam), unification can be successful and effective for the very initial stage of unification, either when potential succession is imminent or unification is not feasible due to the other party’s strong resistance. However, coercive factors of unification are only effective in achieving political dominance but have very limited capacity to integrate divided people after unification, as seen in Vietnam and Yemen.
VI. Conclusion

The purpose of this research is to understand the various mechanisms – military force, utilitarian and identitive factors – supportive of national unification in order to ascertain whether or not each mechanism was sufficient and necessary for unification processes and its early-intermediate stage of integration. Examination of the three case studies found that national unification was most effective when the political and economic interests of both states were met. When these conditions are met, the process of unification was much faster and often more peaceful. If utilitarian interests were not met, the unification process either delayed until utilitarian interests were met again or unification resulted through conquest by war. National unification by military force was effective for achieving unification under certain conditions – such as, when unification was not feasible due to strong objection from one state or when a political subgroup emerged for potential succession in a very early stage of unification. Gradual inter-state interaction between states during a division did not necessarily lead toward actual unification, a finding counter to Deutsch’s thoughts on unification theory.

The most effective unification mechanism did not, however, necessarily lead to the most successful consolidated integration as a nation. When utilitarian interests were not met as expected during unification process, civil war and social unrest occurred within five to ten years after unification in the post-unified countries. Although intensity of social unrest was less in Germany than in Yemen, it clearly shows that utilitarian factor alone had a limited capacity to integrate divided states into a nation. Although both Germany and Yemen were not able to utilize identitive
factors, the reason for the more successful integration in Germany than Yemen can be explained by its existing historical legacy as a nation-state prior to division while Yemen had no experience as a single nation until it unified in 1990. The next most effective mean of unification, military force, had the least capacity to integrate the conquerors and conquered, as Vietnam case demonstrated.

These findings clearly imply that national unification requires certain levels of identitive factors for a successful integration as a nation. Military force and utilitarian interests supporting unification are not sufficient for the subsequent national integration. Thus, I argue that the most effective and successful factors for unification is a combination of identitive and utilitarian aspects: utilitarian factors are crucial for bringing a relatively quick and comprehensive unification process while identitive factors are vital for successfully integrating divided populations in the long term. Through these case studies, I discovered that Etzioni’s conclusion that utilitarian and identitive factors as the most effective combination for attaining regional and international unification, also applies to national unification. His comments on coercive factors with regards to national unification – in which he asserts that coercion should result in a high degree of alienation among members – were also proved by the outcomes in Vietnam and Yemen.

This research is not intended to prejudge a particular national formation or political integration theory; instead, I embrace all possible mechanisms for national unification and assessed which factor brought more effective process of unification and successful integration as a nation-state. This research, however, needs to be strengthened by more sophisticated measurements for integration level for further
analysis on unification. In this regard, interviews and surveys in each case could fortify to measure integration level. Also, the study lacks rigorous analysis on why Germany and Yemen have different outcomes despite of similar unification factors of the process. In this regard, future studies should include the historical context of each case (such as pre-existing national consciousness) and socio-economic differences during the division – as independent variables – in order to analyze unification process and outcomes more precisely. In addition, the research is limited in scope since the study limited the timeframe into five to ten years after unification. It is required, in the future studies, to prolong the timeframe of post-unification period under examination to best assess the evolution of national identity in each unified country.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


