

PICKING THE RIGHT FIGHT:
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATIONSHIP IN PERU AND
AFGHANISTAN

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown university
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies

By

Michael Harry Press, B.A.

Washington, DC
April 15, 2011

Copyright 2011 by Michael Harry Press
All Rights Reserved

Table Of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Background of Coca and Sendero Luminoso in Peru.....	9
Background of Poppies and Taliban in Afghanistan.....	24
Analysis of Peruvian and Afghan Strategies and Situations.....	46
Conclusion.....	59
Bibliography.....	71

Figures

Figure 1 – The Illicit Triangle in Peru.....	12
Figure 2 – Peru-Coca Cultivation (ha) 1986-1997.....	22
Figure 3 – Destruction of the Illicit Triangle in Peru.....	23
Figure 4 – Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (ha).....	37
Figure 5 – The Illicit Triangle in Afghanistan.....	40
Figure 6 – Annual Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan vs. Monthly Number of Taliban Attacks.....	42
Figure 7 – Opium poppy cultivation trends in Afghanistan, 2002-2009 (at province level).....	44
Figure 8 – Security and opium poppy cultivation, 2009.....	44
Figure 9 – SL Annual Violence Compared to Annual Coca Cultivation (ha).....	49
Figure 10 – Afghan Families that Grow Poppy by Province (2008).....	52
Figure 11 – The Illicit Triangle.....	55
Figure 12 – Destroying the Illicit Triangle.....	56

**PICKING THE RIGHT FIGHT:
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATIONSHIP IN PERU AND
AFGHANISTAN**

Michael Harry Press, B.A.

Thesis Advisor: Adam R. Grissom, Ph.D.

Abstract

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can significantly counteract the destructive conditions caused by the Taliban and the illicit opium harvest by analyzing the methods used by the Peruvian government in the 1990's and molding them to the unique Afghan situation. These techniques focused on prioritizing counterinsurgency policies before invasive counternarcotics operations in order to gain the allegiance of the local populous and let them voluntarily give up their participation in the drug trade. By offering farmers meaningful alternative livelihoods and not unilaterally denying these peasants of their sole means of income, these methods seek to not alienate them from accepting the government's authority and deny an insurgency with this popular support which it needs to survive. The triangular relationship in Peru in the 1980's/1990's between peasant farmers who cultivated coca, cocaine traffickers, and the Shining Path insurgency, is similar enough to the current relationship seen in Afghanistan between opium farmers, heroin trafficking networks, and the Taliban insurgency. This resemblance warrants applying policies that prioritize counterinsurgency before aggressive counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan, as they were adopted in Peru, in order to disrupt this relationship and thus diminish the threats both the narcotics industry and an insurgency represent to the state.

Introduction

The current conflict in Afghanistan is a multi-spectrum fight pitting International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) against the Taliban opposition with their Al Qaeda allies. Counternarcotics (CN) programs that are occurring (along with counterinsurgency (COIN) operations) are being conducted to stop and/or impede the illicit growing and trafficking of opium in the country. Unfortunately, the opium trade has gained such momentum that it has become the chief export of Afghanistan and is now the main source for heroin worldwide, filling the pockets of many Afghans, both pro-Government and pro-Taliban alike. The broad umbrella of Taliban groups have taken advantage of the opium trade since this illicit industry greatly increased in production in 2002 because of government-backed warlords exploitation of poppy cultivation for their own economic gain and the people's growing dependence on the crop due to a lack of appropriate alternative livelihoods. The insurgents have increased their political, financial, and military strength through the opium trade by utilizing methods such as charging "taxes" for growing, protecting, and trafficking the illegal substance in areas outside of the Afghan national government's control. Opium and the Taliban have cemented themselves as fixtures in the country. As unique as these circumstances may be, Afghanistan is not alone in simultaneously confronting an insurgency and an endemic illicit drug trade. By analyzing successful policies utilized by other countries to significantly diminish an illegal industry and an insurgency, perhaps Afghanistan can institute comparable strategies to also reduce their insurgent/drug threat.

Peru provides a potential model for Afghanistan to follow. The Andean nation saw a parallel narcotics-funded insurgency develop within its borders beginning in the 1980's and finally diminishing in the mid-1990's. This insurgent group, *Sendero Luminoso* (SL) or Shining Path, garnered enough weapons, manpower, and public backing from its dealings in the illegal coca trade that it constituted a serious threat to the Peruvian government by the latter 1980's. The Peruvian national government's long inability to concoct a unified COIN/CN strategy added to SL's meteoric rise to power. However, the Peruvian government was able to greatly diminish the danger to its rule by deciding to first prioritize the fight against SL rather than against the coca trade. Once the threat of SL was greatly reduced, the government

was able to institute other CN operations that also vastly shrank coca crops within Peru. CN programs would be specifically instituted so as to not alienate and leave destitute the thousands of families who had earned a living from coca cultivation.

As the struggle in Afghanistan continues, the presence of international forces has brought little more than a weak Afghan central government whose authority is almost non-existent outside its own capital city's limits. This alarming state of affairs necessitates that COIN/CN strategies and tactics that proved successful for the Peruvians in their diminishment of SL and the coca trade should be utilized in Afghanistan. War is not simply won by fighting harder. Victory can be achieved by also fighting smarter.

Although, these nations may appear to have nothing in common, upon further examination, the drug/insurgent problems in Peru and Afghanistan are definitely analogous. The similarities between these two countries offer hope that the Peruvian path to reducing SL and coca cultivation can be adjusted to combat the Taliban and opium trade in Afghanistan by prioritizing the fight against the insurgency before the fight against narcotics. However, the uniqueness of each circumstance means that tactics and programs should be tailor-made to the Afghan situation to take into account the social, political, and economic factors specific to that nation's instability.

It should be noted that previous studies largely fail to supply a concrete plan of action for dealing with the threat generated by insurgencies taking advantage of a lucrative drug trade. There is instead a focus upon providing the historical background necessary for better understanding the conflict in a broader context. Tarazona-Sevillano's Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, for example, sheds light upon the correlation between the rising power of the Shining Path and the explosive growth of coca in the region. The author points out that Peru's volatile transformation from a democratic government to a military dictatorship, coupled with the dire economic crisis in the region, provided an excellent opportunity for both the insurgency and the drug trade to thrive. Other historical accounts such as Palmer's The Shining Path of Peru and Taylor's Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997 provide further analysis of the coca trade, the rise and fall of the Shining Path, and the Peruvian government's attempts to quell both problems. These works offer excellent insights into the

underpinnings of the conflict, yet tend to shy away from offering policy suggestions for dealing with future struggles of this nature. The main exception to this trend is the work of Vanda Felbab-Brown, who translates her extensive analysis of the friction between COIN and CN in Peru into valuable suggestions for forcibly dealing with both drug traffickers and insurgents. Her articles “The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru”, “Getting Hooked: The Insurgency/ Drug Nexus”, and “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade” in conjunction with her recent book Shooting Up will be applied below for further understanding both the Peruvian struggle and the current conflict in Afghanistan.

As a result of Afghanistan being such a topical subject with the immense international involvement in the country, there is a significant amount of historical and analytical literature available. Gretchen Peters’ Seeds of Terror and Ahmed Rashid’s Descent Into Chaos are excellent resources for providing a chronology, as well as first-hand accounts from the main players in Afghan history in the past thirty years, of Afghan recent history leading up to the chaos that currently is predominant. Peter's work especially almost mirrors the analysis and recommendations of those seen in the Peru case study. Vanda Felbab-Brown’s articles “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism” and “Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention”, she gives a examination of the insurgent/opium relationship similar to what she did for the Peruvian situation. David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla also gives insight about how improving COIN is among the most effective CN measures that can be employed in Afghanistan, since, by his own analysis, poppy cultivation has the tendency in Afghanistan to be located in Taliban-controlled territory, especially Helmand province. He states the Taliban’s strong reliance with opium can be turned into a weakness from which International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) can, using alternative livelihoods and other modes of economic viability for poppy farmers to sway them to the government’s side, weaken them financially and politically. Although he does back forced eradication in narrow circumstances where the Taliban is strongest based on the fact that this would alienate a small percentage of the Afghan population, a fact Ms. Peters also concurs with¹, he also describes how increased eradication in government-controlled areas will simply penalize friendly populations while leaving those who have been able to pay off officials or

those in Taliban- controlled areas alone.² He also directly states that prioritization should be nation-building first, then COIN, then CN.³ US Air Force Major Glen Weaver, in an article for the U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) titled, Afghanistan's Opium Alternative, does provide a lesson for not initiating hurried eradication programs without rural development in Afghanistan by offering the example of how similar plans in Peru and Colombia disaffected the populous and reinforced the insurgents. Most appropriately, this article clearly affirms:

“Abruptly burning or spraying fields will only enflame the insurgency and fuel allegiance to the Taliban. Our goal in defeating an insurgency is to win the support of the population, and destroying their crops will only give local tribesmen a reason to join the insurgency. Rural development programs have the potential to bring farmers into the political fabric by creating a sense of vested partnership and relationship between farmers and the Government of Afghanistan.”⁴

International Governmental Organizations studies such as Drugs and Development In Afghanistan by the World Bank and UN reports such as various editions of their World Drug Report are good sources for quantitative data. Through these documents, I will quantitatively analyze how the number of insurgent activities is directly correlated with the amount of opium grown, by comparing the two amounts as they occur in some of the most violent/opium infested provinces and as they occur in the least violent/least opium intense provinces. The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan is a great source for understanding US strategy at a pivotal time in Afghanistan. This strategy is based on “Five Pillars”: Public Information, Alternative Development, Law Enforcement/ Justice Reform, Interdiction, and Elimination/Eradiation.⁵ In this document, which is an updated version of a 2005 strategy made in response to massive increases in poppy cultivation, it can be seen major elements that hampered and damaged COIN operations and resulted in further increases in poppy growth and a reinvigorated insurgency. US governmental documents such as Congressional hearings as well as GEN

Stanley McChrystal's 2009 COMISAF Initial Assessment are also good sources for understanding the evolution of US CN and COIN policy in Afghanistan.

While there is plenty of quality information about Peru and Afghanistan's respective drug-fueled insurgencies, no work distinctly answers if the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan are comparable enough to the Peruvian situation of the 1980's and 1990's to successfully be able to adapt a strategy in the former, akin to that instituted by the Peruvian government, based on prioritizing COIN practices ahead of invasive CN policies to successfully diminish the threat the Taliban and opium represent to the state. This project seeks to fill this gap provided by these and similar worthwhile resources to show how NATO/ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can significantly counteract the instability caused by the Taliban and the illicit opium harvest by analyzing the Peruvian methods and molding them to the unique Afghan situation. Specifically, this work seeks to examine how true the triangular relationship in Peru in the 1980's/1990's between peasant farmers who cultivated coca, cocaine traffickers, and the Shining Path insurgency, is similar enough to the current relationship seen in Afghanistan between opium farmers, heroin trafficking networks, and the Taliban insurgency along with their affiliates, to warrant applying tactics, strategies, and programs that prioritize counterinsurgency before aggressive CN policies in Afghanistan, as they were adopted in Peru, in order to disrupt this relationship and thus diminish the threats both the narcotics industry and an insurgency represent to the state. These techniques are meant to gain the allegiance of the local populous and let them voluntarily give up their participation in the drug trade by offering them meaningful alternative livelihoods and not unilaterally denying these peasants of their sole means of income. Without substitute sources of revenue, history has shown farmers will become disaffected from accepting a government's political influence and instead provide an insurgency with the support it needs to survive.

This work will analyze the historical backgrounds of the conflicts which gave rise to the drug and insurgency problems in both Afghanistan and Peru. It will further build upon this information by employing concrete data to help formulate policy suggestions for how to deal with instability in Afghanistan by gaining a better idea of which COIN/CN tactics worked best in Peru. This will occur by

using data analysis to indicate a dual decline in the annual average of SL attacks and coca growth when the military banned forced eradication and utilized alternative development more. Afterwards, an examination of the correlation between increased insurgency activity and opium growth in Afghanistan will be shown by quantitatively analyzing their amounts chronologically as certain policies were instituted that affected them both. By making the argument that the strategy and programs instituted by Peru against the insurgent/narcotics threat eventually led to the diminishment both represented to the state, I will assert that similar practices can be relatively applicable to the challenges now present in Afghanistan.

The research available has all the information to show the methods above. The many historical analyses of Peru provide in-depth look at the triangular relationship between the growers, traffickers and insurgents, as well as the various strategies the Peruvian government and military used and why they failed or were successful. However, as more than a decade since the end of the crisis, analysis has occurred to truly examine the factors that led to the massive decrease of SL and coca in Peru. Regarding Afghanistan, although the conflict is certainly not complete, the strategy regarding CN and COIN that US/ISAF/ANSF have put into practice has gone through such different changes, that analysis has yielded some theories on what beneficial or detrimental effects these changes have had on the course of the war and possibly why they transpired. Additionally, quantitative data on opium cultivation and insurgent-related hostile events, or significant actions (SIGACTS), is widely available because of US/ISAF and UN reporting that is much more transparent than what is provided by the Peruvian government.

This project is designed to communicate to policymakers from the various countries involved in Afghanistan who have spent blood and treasure in seeking to stabilize this war-torn country. Since a CN and COIN campaign is a multi-spectrum conflict, this work is meant for not only politicians, safe in their capitals in the West, who can provide the resources to make such changes, but also military personnel, from the top generals who oversee the so-called “big picture”, to the Platoon Leaders and Sergeants in Kandahar, Paktia or Nangarhar Province, who are on the ground everyday with the local populous, whose efforts will be essential to enforcing any policy changes. This is also designed for the civilians in charge

of the many governmental development agencies, PRTs, and NGOs whose efforts are especially critical in order to give the opium growers a substitute to an illegal activity that has far-reaching detrimental effects on Afghanistan and the region.

Currently, policy is indicating that the US government is understanding that at this point in Afghanistan, involuntarily forcing opium cultivators to cease this source of revenue is not helping the situation. In 2009, after years of debate between US, European and Afghan officials about the relative merits and drawbacks of supporting Afghan government poppy eradication efforts, the Obama Administration decided that U.S. support for eradication in Afghanistan was to be “phased out” after a strategic analysis found that eradication programs were not only inefficiently costly, but eradication activities had been often counterproductive, partly leading to the Taliban resurgence. In addition, roughly \$150 million of eradication funding as well as air assets were diverted to support other counternarcotics efforts that are less invasive on the general public, such as interdiction, public information, and advisory teams. It appears Western politicians finally understand that eradicating opium crops only benefits the insurgency by angering the farmers as well as angering warlords that support themselves partly from opium. This can easily be seen in May 2010 with Operation Moshtarak, an offensive conducted by ANSF/ISAF into the poppy-growing belt of the Helmand Province against the Taliban. As US Marines moved to positions outside the city of Marjah, they walked through the poppy fields, doing nothing to destroy them.

There are problems though that could develop with this aversion to eradication into official ISAF policy. ISAF acquiescence of poppy cultivation could easily be seen as the organization tacitly allowing the production of the heroin that ends up in their respective homelands, causing political firestorms in the capitals of Western nations. Also, countries in Afghanistan’s periphery, such as Iran and Russia, who are being directly affected by the illicit trade from Afghanistan, might end whatever aid, material or diplomatic, that they were providing because of the appearance of the Afghan government’s complicity in this immense threat to their own nations. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov has said that heroin emanating from Afghanistan in his country results in 30,000 deaths annually.⁶ The Russians are

adamant that NATO, who they blame in part for the increase in heroin trafficking, can never defeat the Taliban as long as they can finance its operations through the millions of dollars that it gains from their role in the heroin trade. Therefore, the destruction of the poppies via aerial eradication as soon as possible must be the focus of operations eradication is the only means to defeat the insurgency, despite of the popular anger that it may produce.⁷ Also, warlords, whose allegiance to the government in Kabul and to the US-led foreign forces in desperately needed to keep stability in many areas of the country, may block any CN policies if they are successful, because of the loss of funds and thus weakening of their control over their fiefdoms.

There is a firm understanding within the US military of how eradicating opium alienates the people, as well as destroys alliances with warlords who are gaining money from the illicit trade. This is why prior to 2005, the US military in Afghanistan took no actions to involve or even aid in CN missions. It was only after a huge increase in 2004 that US politicians forced the military to aid CN officials. This time period also happens to be the time when the resurgence of the Taliban began. While there are many factors that allowed for this revival, such as the repugnance that many Afghans have for the presence of foreign troops or the massive corruption of the Afghan government, the alienation that the eradication caused by destroying the livelihoods of scores of families can also be identified as a major cause. The CN operations that eradicated the only way of life for many Afghans, especially in the southern provinces, which is currently the stronghold of the Afghan Taliban, allowed the insurgents to step in and play the role of protectors of the farmer's livelihood. This permitted the organization to gain political and financial support to become the threat they are today. In 2010, Former Special U.S. Representative to Afghanistan Richard C. Holbrooke declared that these previous eradication operations had been an expensive failure and had simply disaffected farmers by leaving them impoverished, pushing them to the Taliban.⁸

Government and military officials that have a vested interest in the long-term stability of Afghanistan need to take notice of the Peruvian strategy. COIN and CN are a long-term investment. Neither threat will ever be completely erased. Victory will only come in the form of eternal vigilance. However, the regional stability that will come as a result of a long-term focus of diminishing opium and

the Taliban in Afghanistan is well worth the spike in opium cultivation that may occur short-term, or the shifting of resources needed for strengthening alternative development and interdiction/border security programs to counter the trafficking of the illicit trade. As much as the Taliban exploited opium to help it politically and financially resurge, their reliance on opium for these reasons is a potential weakness that could lead to their diminishment of power again. With the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, the disadvantages in prioritizing COIN ahead of aggressive CN, such as a temporary increase in the drug trade or corruption that may occur, is outweighed by the long-term regional instability that could occur if Western forces leave the country in a weak and precarious position, with the Taliban still a viable threat.

The main body of this paper will be broken down into three sections. The first section of the body will be a broad historical synopsis of the strategies and programs Shining Path, narcotraffickers, and various elements of the Peruvian government used to accomplish or fail in their individual goals. The next section will also be a historical analysis of Afghanistan militant/ opium problem, beginning with the start of its troubles since the Russian occupation, to the lawless period after their pullout, to the American invasion until now. The third part will be a scrutiny of the individual policies adapted by the Peruvians to see why some succeeded and why some failed in order to see if it would be wise to apply them to Afghanistan. Also, an investigation into a common theme among many of these plans will be examined to see point out how different policies could be used in Afghanistan, but ones with an overarching premise similar to those utilized in Peru.

Background of Coca and Sendero Luminoso in Peru

Coca has been grown in Peru for centuries. Yet, by 1949, compelled by international pressure because of coca's use in the production of cocaine and to curry American favor at the beginning of the Cold War, the Peruvian government severely constrained its growth by the Peruvian peasantry until it was finally made illegal.⁹ However, in the 1970's, the illegal cultivation of coca was exploding as a result of the massive demand of cocaine within the United States and the significant money a Peruvian peasant

could earn by supplying coca to the Colombian cartels that manufactured and transported this illicit product.


The upsurge in the black-market traffic of coca coincided with the development of SL, which officially started its Maoist-inspired revolution on May 18, 1980, the very day elections were transitioning Peru from a military dictatorship to a democracy.¹⁰ SL provided a basic outlet for the many disenfranchised peasantry of Peru, which primarily blamed the government for their plight. The position of the government was worsened by the fact that the Peruvian economy during the 1980's, along with other economies of South America, was suffering the worst financial crisis in their history.¹¹ By seizing on the situation of the nation beginning in 1980, SL offered an opportunity to those with little hope whatsoever of piercing the social and economic strata that dominated the Peruvian state.¹² Yet, the Peruvian government did not in the beginning of the group's emergence take heed of the threat the rebels represented, allowing for the ranks of SL to slowly swell with discontented citizens, mostly peasants.

In December 1982, the armed forces were finally tasked with combating the insurgents. However, the Peruvian military were not trained for fighting the asymmetric war SL was waging. Then Minister of Defence Luis Cisneros's quote of describing the coming operation as resembling a "turkey shoot" is evidence of this lack of understanding. By employing guerrilla tactic of "swift advances and withdrawals", the SL fully gave up the territory in the provinces of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac it had held, but simply consolidated their group by 1984 in another area of Peru absent of significant Peruvian forces.¹³ Unwittingly, the government had thrust the SL into a region of Peru where the group could take advantage of disaffected peasants who were vulnerable to narco-traffickers and government coca eradication operations, all while enabling the rebels to enlarge their infrastructure and resource base in the process.

The Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) of Peru was ripe for an organization such as SL to step into. Political grievances abounded in the area as a result of coca eradication programs of the Peruvian government that destroyed the livelihood of many local peasants.¹⁴ Fortuitous to SL, the UHV's jungle habitat also happened to be perfect for guerrilla warfare as well as be the main coca cultivation area of

Peru. However, the group did not take advantage of this illicit crop at first. SL originally forbade coca as it did other vices such as alcohol and prostitution. The growing of coca reaped the farmers' considerable profits, in contrast to alternative legal crops. In the late 1980's-early 1990's, coca farmers could earn four to ten times more than growing cacao, thirty-four times more than corn, and ninety-one times more than rice. Estimates of net income for just 1-2 hectares of coca were between \$1,000- \$10,000, depending on the fluctuation of coca prices.¹⁵ Coca's ability to be harvested several times a year compared to legal crops which were more expensive to grow, were rather incompatible with UHV's environment, and generally sold at lower prices were huge incentives for peasant farmers in the UHV to include themselves in this economy. Additionally, traffickers, or *narcos*, close proximity to coca fields meant growers did not have to deal with expensive transportation over long distances as they had to deal with when selling legal crops. Finally, as coca's demand became higher, the UHV locals increasingly used the leaf and paste as currency, as the Peruvian *sol* sank into hyperinflation.¹⁶ In fear of alienating this popular base as the Peruvian government had, the group finally sought to take advantage of the resentment and allowed for the growth of coca in territory under its control.¹⁷ SL was able to justify this reversal of policy by using an explanation in line with their Maoist ideology that the cocaine that was produced from coca leads to the erosion of consumer capitalist countries such as the US.¹⁸ Once the guerilla group permitted this crop's cultivation, they would learn the immense benefit they could gain and the role they could fill in Peruvian coca trafficking. As **Figure 1** best exemplifies, this was the beginning of a mutually beneficial relationship for the insurgency, the cocaleros, and the narcos.

Figure 1



Prior to the entrance of SL into the UHV, the local coca farmers or *cocaleros* livelihood had been threatened by forced eradication and exploitation by the narcos. Although SL were not saints themselves, as **Figure 1** shows, they offered a certain buffer and protection between the coca growing peasantry and outside elements. This was a very worthwhile arrangement especially for the SL, since the growers represented two-thirds to three-fourths of the entire Peruvian coca economy.¹⁹ The forced government eradication of coca primarily represented the biggest threat to the cocaleros. Before SL was established in the UHV, Peru, with US help, created the Special Project for the Upper Huallaga or PEAH, which sought alternative crops for coca growers, and the Agreement for the Control and Reduction of Coca in the Upper Huallaga or CORAH, which sought to eliminate all coca in the UHV. In the end, these programs accomplished little headway in affecting the coca in the UHV and actually made the situation even worse for the government. Locals saw these “Yankee-backed” plans as direct assaults on their local economy, directly playing into the hands of SL.²⁰ The group continually used US aid to the Peruvian government as propaganda to advance a nationalist agenda against foreign intervention.²¹ The disaffection this caused enabled SL to step into this role of protector, earning the peoples’ consent and aid

in pushing the police, military, and political structure from whole swaths of Peru, besides the UHV. SL became the government in this power vacuum. The group provided significant public services that had been lacking when the Peruvian government was in control. Additionally, SL established a legal code based on its Maoist ideology, which at times could be harsh, but fairer than the corrupt local officials that had governed prior.²²

Another significant threat to the peasants was their severe exploitation by the narcos for their coca crops. This mistreatment ranged from threats of death if cocalers were unable to harvest a certain amount of coca, to having coca prices set that were heavily skewed to the benefit of the narcos. The guerillas did not hesitate to quickly communicate to narcos working in territory under their control, even through horrendous acts of violence if need be.²³ Out of this arrangement, SL was able to win more accolades from the cocalers by negotiating better prices from the narcos as well as protecting them from their aggression. The impact SL had on the coca trade can easily be seen by the explosion of coca cultivation coinciding directly with the expansion of territory under SL control.²⁴ By the mid-1980's, the SL had broken the dominance of the Columbian narcos in the UHV. In protecting the cocalers from the narcos and from eradication, along with establishing order and public services, SL was able to gather a following of 50,000 to 100,000 of direct followers in the communities, with many more quietly accepting their agenda.²⁵

In spite of the dominance SL was able to exert on the narcos, the protection SL provided in letting opium grow worked to the narcos advantage. War makes strange bedfellows. The war on drugs and on the insurgency that the Peruvian government was waging would prove no different. A loose alliance ended up forming between the two entities based on the advantages each group gained from working together, starting at least by December 1983 with the murder of three Peruvian Civil Guards conducting CN in the UHV.²⁶ Despite SL's authority in certain coca areas, the rebels' presence allowed the traffickers to more capably conduct their business. First, SL ensured the obedience of the coca growers and also managed the laboring of the fields for maximum efficiency.²⁷ Further, the insurgency provided the narcos safety from government intervention, intelligence on Peruvian security forces movements, and

significant armed response to combat CN operations in regions under SL's control, easing the narcos' ability to transport coca to refining centers in Colombia.²⁸

As the narcos were able to expand their agenda with the help of the insurgents, SL was able to increase their offensive on the government with the financial earnings they gained from this partnership. Since the group acted as an intermediary between the narcos and the cocaceros, SL collected a fee for their efforts of 5-10% per kilo of coca paste and leaves sold between the two parties. Beginning in 1986 until the early 1990's, when SL was able to fully consolidate its power in the UHV from the narcos and the Peruvian government, the insurgency was collecting \$30 million a year from just this tax alone.²⁹ However, SL received the bulk of its revenue by providing the traffickers access to the 120+ covert air strips it maintained in the jungles of the UHV by charging \$3,000- \$10,000 for landing fees.³⁰ From the second half of the 1980's until the early 1990's, estimates of annual profit from the air strips ranged from \$20 million to \$550 million, although the latter number is probably wildly overstated.³¹

Proceeds from these "revolutionary tithes" were primarily directed towards operations against the Peruvian government. These funds allowed the insurgency to organize itself more as a conventional military force, consolidate greater resources, and construct fortified bases.³² Moreover, the advanced armaments and the expanded capabilities SL attained broadened the conflict throughout the country and increased the intensity of the violence, so that by 1990, 3,000 people a year were dying from the conflict.³³ The additional assets also allowed for the group to enlarge its ranks to nearly 10,000 by offering a prosperous living to the large number of unemployed youths in the countryside and cities.³⁴ SL guerillas were not only provided food and housing, they were also paid substantially in Peruvian terms, between \$250-\$500 monthly by the 1990's.³⁵ As many Marxist groups crumbled after 1991 from the loss of funds once their patron, the Soviet Union, went by the wayside, SL remained unfazed; the group had been self-sustaining since at least 1986.³⁶ SL was so effective in bankrolling their insurrectionist policy that by 1992, the group was on the threshold of being on par with the government in terms of conventional force magnitude.³⁷

The phrase “narcoterrorist” has been used to describe the relationship between the narcos and SL. This term might seem appropriate, especially when in 1987-1988 narcos sided with SL in their battles with the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) when that group advanced into the UHV to also take advantage of the coca market. Yet, as **Figure 1** illustrates, the reasons for the narcos allying themselves were for simple pragmatic reasons. The narcos were merely convinced that SL was stronger than the MRTA and thus aligned with the group they thought had the better odds in winning a confrontation.³⁸ There was no sharing of ideology between the two groups. Like the cocaleros, the pact between the narcos and the SL was not strong enough to merit the characterization of “narcoterrorist”, as all parties had only one link that perpetuated their association: the government’s goal in destroying the cultivation and trafficking of coca.³⁹ The triangular bond the cocaleros and the narcos had with the SL was strictly utilitarian. For SL and the cocaleros, the fragile alliance was simply based on SL defending the coca fields from government eradication operations and stopping narco violence, in exchange for taxes on coca transactions and popular support for SL’s brand of governance. Between the narcos and SL, collaboration centered on the monetary revenue SL strength was able to provide, despite the huge amounts of fees it cost the narcos, as well as SL obstructing the government from conducting eradications.

The greatest threats facing SL to maintaining these connections were mainly twofold. The first being the Peruvian state creating a practical unified plan to counter the SL and the second for indigenous communities to have the capacity to govern and secure their districts themselves.⁴⁰ Once these and other vulnerabilities were finally realized by the government, the bonds the cocaleros and narcos held with SL would be broken. In spite of this, the illicit network still had the ability to be mended once the SL was able to circumvent the governments’ actions or the government altered their strategy.

By 1984, the Peruvian government recognized the crisis developing in the UHV with the establishment of an SL presence in the region. In July, the area was designated as being under a state of emergency, placing all political and military command into the hands of Army General Julio Carbajal D’Angelo. General Carbajal shared a certain mode of thinking in line with that of the cocaleros; that the coca industry was actually advantageous to the Peruvian people by generating capital for the state and

providing job opportunities for society. These two economic benefits of the coca trade cannot be denied. Annual profits from this commerce within Peru by the end of the 1980's were approximately \$1 billion, easily becoming the nation's #1 export by constituting 30% of exports. Additionally, coca employed 15% of the nation by the late 1980's.⁴¹ In accordance with this, the General's plan on establishing order in the UHV centered on COIN operations against the SL rather than on CN programs against the cocaleros and narcos. Further, General Carbajal feared the same drug-related corruption that was rampant in the police could envelop his ranks by involving his soldiers in an anti-coca campaign. The General's strategy basically negated the protection SL offered the narcos and cocaleros by destroying the utilitarian nature of the bond between the two groups had with the insurgency. With their fields and trafficking routes in no danger from the government, the narcos and cocaleros aided security forces by providing support and intelligence to combat SL. By the end of the year, Peruvian forces had successfully routed the insurgents from most of their defensive positions in the UHV.⁴²

Although SL had been ejected, Gen. Carbajal's plan did have negative effects. By preventing eradication and other CN programs from being conducted, coca cultivation exploded in the UHV. Yet, without the SL's protection and negotiation, the cocaleros were unable to take true advantage of these profits and again were terrorized and exploited by the narcos. The police continued the corruption that they had profited from before being driven away by the SL, doing nothing to defend the people from the narcos, who were rich enough to buy them off.⁴³ Additionally, the military, in their search for the remnants of SL afflicted massive human rights violations against the indigenous people of the UHV, producing deep animosity from the people.⁴⁴ These conditions were similar to the situation present in the UHV when SL had originally taken control of the UHV, allowing for SL to begin a drive to reconquer the area. Even worse, the military, including General Carbajal himself, were implicated in working with the narcos and taking part in trafficking.

SL would receive significant help in its plan to take back the UHV as a result of a change in strategy by the state. In 1985, President Alan Garcia Perez ended the state of emergency in the UHV, but as a result of significant coca growth in that area and US prodding and aid, he reinstated the CN

operations that had grown the ire of the inhabitants previously. The reinforced eradication CORAH and alternative crop PEAH programs were main catalysts to pushing the 60,000- 300,000 coca-growing families in the UHV, along with the traffickers, who were greatly affected by police and US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) coca paste interdictions, in seeking again the protection of the SL.⁴⁵ The aggressive tactics of the police and the DEA further increased the ranks of SL supporters. By 1987, the state of emergency for the UHV was reinstated. The cocaleros antagonism culminated in 1989 in response to a controversial herbicide spray, Tebuthiuron, codenamed Spike, was employed in the UHV. SL took advantage of the cocalero's outrage against not only the potential the spray had for destroying their crops, but also the possible side-effects the spray could inflict on humans and the environment. Thousands of peasants blockaded the main roadway for entering the UHV, allowing SL to launch an attack on a police post that killed ten officers. This defeat represented one of the more disastrous losses that government forces experienced against the group.⁴⁶

A new strategy was required in order to combat the epic instability in the UHV. Brigadier General Alberto Arciniega, named the political-military commander of the UHV in April 1989, brought the ingenuity needed to reestablish Peruvian sovereignty in the region. However, the basis of BG Arciniega's thinking was strikingly similar in certain ways to Gen. Carbajal's strategy to defeat the SL in the UHV earlier. To defeat SL, as BG Arciniega wrote:

*"[i]t is necessary to consider that any rebel group seeks to gain the people's support, and in the Huallaga Valley these are primarily cultivators of coca and are repressed... CORAH harassed them by eradicating their crops, the police by considering that they were engaged in criminal activities... We are talking about 80% of the population! What we do then is to change the situation to keep the coca grower, the group which Sendero supports in order to accomplish its goals, from being subject to harassment. If we can persuade the people to join us, the war is won."*⁴⁷

Gen. Arciniega began to gain the support of the cocaleros early in his tenure in the UHV by not simply offering words but also action by not cooperating with the police. He did not provide troops to

protect the police on their drug operations nor did he even make army installations available to the police in the UHV.⁴⁸ Furthermore, he stepped into the role the SL had reserved for itself in negotiating between cocaleros and the traffickers to keep the peace, but did not collect any taxes in doing so as the SL had done.⁴⁹ This “laissez-faire” attitude towards coca growing, along with assurances of alternative development funds, and not eradication, helped shift the political momentum towards the government. Despite the evidence that the army was brutal in some instances against the SL and their local supporters, SL did not help their situation by turning more violent to the locals by their acquiescence to Peruvian forces. The cruelty led to the expansion of *rondas campesinos*, rural militia supplied by the government, that were instrumental in expanding security to where the army could not maintain a permanent presence. Politically, the groups added to the popular support of the government by allowing average citizens to have a stake in their own security and basically be a part of the government. Tactically, they had the advantage of knowing the local area and also which members of their community were SL. By BG Arciniega proving to the cocaleros and traffickers that “they were not considered delinquents but participants in the informal sector”, the Peruvian army acquired enough intelligence and allegiance of the locals to push SL from much of the valley within months of his appointment, and destroy the triangular relationship that the insurgency benefitted from.⁵⁰ In Maoist terms, which the SL loved to employ, Arciniega’s strategy was slowly killing the fish (SL) by separating them from the river (people), their only natural habitat.⁵¹

Although the people’s backing of Arciniega was a prime factor in the victories against the SL in the UHV, the halt of many CN operations to enable this cooperation was gaining the ire of the US. Collaboration between the DEA and the Peruvian Army was turning hostile as many in the ranks, as well as in the Peruvian government and society, saw the developments of Arciniega’s strategy as the means to preserve the Peruvian state.⁵² In their eyes, it was not Peru’s fault if the US was suffering from the demand of cocaine within their borders. Additionally, SL represented more of a clear and present danger to the state. A 1989 DEA internal review expressed the sentiments the majority of Peruvian politicians by

stating their belief that, “Peru can live with the narcotics problem for the next fifty years, but may not survive the next two years if the economic and insurgent problems are not dealt with now.”⁵³

The imbroglio turned into a public affair starting in 1989 when the US offer of \$35.9 million in aid specifically for eradication and interdiction was spurned by President Alan Garcia because none was reserved for COIN, alternative development, or other economic assistance for cocalers. Garcia’s successor, President Alberto Fujimori, likewise declined the package for similar reasons the following year.⁵⁴ A US General Accounting Office 1991 Report to Congressional Requestors about US funding in Peru makes the priority of US CN interests before Peruvian COIN programs clear, and thus the US naiveté in regards to the relationship of CN and COIN, when it stated that better monitoring of the potential aid money was needed, not because of the massive corruption mentioned throughout the report, but, “because of the potential for misuse by the [Peruvian] military, which may attempt to use the aid for counterinsurgency purposes not related to the counternarcotics missions... Peru’s military is much more committed to fighting insurgents than drug traffickers and would attempt to use US aid for counterinsurgency missions unless the aid was closely monitored.”⁵⁵ Although the plan later involved economic aid to help Peru qualify for loans that would enable it to institute alternative crop programs” as well as an awareness “that this aid will be needed for many years before Peru will become less dependent upon coca leaf production,” in the words of a Peruvian senator, “the amount of U.S. economic aid is small relative to the impact of coca on Peru’s economy.”⁵⁶

This dispute would put the governments of Peru and the US at loggerheads until 1996, when the US was somewhat appeased when the Peruvian government reinstated eradication programs, but only once the SL was a severely diminished threat to the state. The position of the Peruvian government in this dispute is most easily summed up in a speech by President Fujimori in October 1990:

“In no way are we opposed to an effective program to eradicate illegal coca crops... But we wish to address repression in a larger context... An effective program of repression that leaves the peasants without alternatives would sharply increase the number of those in extreme poverty and could unchain a civil war of unsuspected

proportions... We will not push peasants and their families into the arms of terrorists and drug traffickers.”⁵⁷

Gen. Arciniega found himself in the middle of a controversy when, in September 1989, Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters at the US Department of State testified before a Senate committee that, based on information from the police, who had no affinity for the general since he had excluded them from the UHV, that Arciniega had personally taken bribes from the narcos.⁵⁸ Arciniega defended himself from these charges in the media, personally rebutting articles of this nature in newspapers in Peru and the US, including the New York Times.⁵⁹ The charges of bribery were never proven, but in spite of this and of his success, the General was relieved of his command after seven months on the job in the UHV as a result of US pressure and a purge of the military by President Fujimori so as to cement control over the armed forces.⁶⁰

The General's successors in the UHV were aware of the enemies in the government that Arciniega had made despite his successes in the valley. General Chacon, Arciniega's replacement, began the trend of moving the army's policy in the UHV more towards that of the police. However, he resigned within two months after taking the post after he was implicated in a bribery scandal with the narcos. General Britto, Chacon's successor, had a hands-off approach to the UHV by placing his command outside of the region to shield himself from any bribery charges. As a result, Britto's absence did not enable him to understand the cocaleros' plights as the police and CN programs began to fill into the area once again, bringing back the policies that would thrust them back to SL.⁶¹ As one cocalero put it:

*We really want to move out of coca production because we know that it is harmful and because of all the problems it causes us. But if we can't count on help from our own government or from foreign aid, then our only recourse may be to get Sendero's support.*⁶²

The intergovernmental hostilities that were prevalent during the most intense periods of the conflict with SL highlight a significant difference between the mission objectives of the military and of anti-drug programs in drug-fueled insurgencies. Mainly, the Peruvian army was primarily tasked with


COIN operations against SL and the MRTA, which CN missions of the police and the DEA sometimes interfered with. As BG Arciniega clearly states in a speech, “There are 150,000 *campesino* cocaleros in the zone [UHV]. Each of them is a potential *subversivo*. Eradicate his field and the next day he’ll be one.”⁶³ By COIN’s initial goal of gaining the trust of the people by not threatening their livelihood, eradication operations especially can destroy that relationship between the people and COIN forces. Without a unified plan of action for COIN/CN strategies, the accomplishments gained in one area can be detrimental to the other. In the event of this, the only people who win are the traffickers, the insurgent group, or both.⁶⁴

Yet, CN forces in Peru would later institute some methods into their overall approach that recognized the COIN priority of earning the locals trust. Their strategy altered to target the interdiction of coca, coca paste, or cocaine leaving Peru. In doing this, the hope was to not anger the peasants by not directly destroying their fields and to force a drop in the price of coca leaves, thus forcing cocaleros to move to a legal and more profitable crop. Instituted in 1989, but stepped up in 1990, Operation Condor was the joint US-Peruvian aerial interdiction campaign that sought to greatly disrupt the “air bridge” existing between Peru and other countries in the Americas by targeting the narco clandestine air strips. The operation became even more successful once Colombia took an active role after the assassination of a presidential candidate by narcos in 1989.⁶⁵ In 1991, American supplied radar stations greatly added to the effort by directing the Peruvian air force to engage suspected narco aircraft. In 1995, the Peruvian-US Air Bridge Denial program provided the Peruvians with more cooperation and resources to expand aerial interdiction. By 1997, narco pilots were charging \$180,000 per flight because of the hazards of Air Bridge Denial. By 1999, land for coca farming sank to a 25-year low.

Concurrently, the military was promoting a “hearts- and-minds” campaign in various former coca-growing enclaves to offset the potential destabilizing effects the decline in the price of coca would have on the rural population.⁶⁶ The decline in coca prices aided alternative development plans by the Peruvian government and NGO’s to gain more adherents in the UHV and other coca areas. The government organized programs to entitle land to peasants so as to not be forced to sharecrop coca and

build roads to enable farmers to get their crops to market.⁶⁷ International Organizations (IO), such as the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), for example, were able to aid licit industries by constructing a palm-oil extraction plant in 1996 and revitalizing local coffee cooperatives to enable them to sell on the world market.⁶⁸ In tandem, the interdiction and economic development programs took millions of dollars from SL and thousands of supporters from their ranks, breaking the triangular relationship that SL used to become so powerful. While not totally defeated, the group is currently a shadow of the fighting force it once was.

Fig. 2




69

However, in the new millennium, various problems have developed. Even though interdiction was successful in coca-growing areas of Peru, a “balloon” effect occurred where the effective efforts stemming the growth in certain areas actually promoted the spread of coca to other areas to circumvent security forces. Thus, coca growing has spread to other areas of Peru, Columbia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.⁷⁰ Additionally, the Air Bridge Denial program was ended after an airplane of US missionaries was shot down after they mistaken as narcos. The US government was forced to pay millions of dollars in compensation because of their involvement in the program. To not be implicated in any further

mistaken shoot-downs, the US ended its financial and cooperative support of the program, which the Peruvians do not have the resources themselves to undertake.⁷¹ Further, narcos have found ways to circumvent interdiction by utilizing water and land routes to get their product out of Peru. The US has the technical capabilities to assist in operations in these areas but for unknown reasons, they have not provided such resources.⁷² Also, a combination of a lack of funding for alternative development plans as well as climbing coca prices has led to coca growth increasing.⁷³ Since the government does not want to anger the peasants with forced eradication, authorities have begun a “gradual and negotiated self-eradication”.⁷⁴ Yet, the system has somewhat faltered as a result of the slow progress of the program and the lack of funding to provide coccaleros with financial settlements and alternative development in exchange for their termination of growing coca.⁷⁵

Figure 3



There are several significant factors in the CN/COIN relationship that severely reduced the power of SL as seen in **Figure 3**. Primarily, the prioritizing of counterinsurgency operations before eradication, as emphasized by Generals Carbajal and Arciniega, showed how such a strategy can diminish both an

insurgent group's popular base as well as much of its financial support. The shifting of CN operations from eradication to interdiction had beneficial effects, as well. Interdiction allowed Peruvian forces to have a serious detrimental impact on coca trade by hunting down the mid-level traffickers and not disturbing the masses of cocaleros. With the capture of these individuals and others hiding for fear of being arrested drastically reduced the number of buyers for the leaves. The low amount of buyers resulted in a glut of supply that plunged the price of coca to a level where cocaleros were forced to engage in alternative legal crops which became more lucrative.⁷⁶ The fact that farmers did not need SL protection for their legal crops and market forces, not government eradication, required farmers to seek alternative livelihoods significantly diminished the farmer's reliance, and thus support, for SL, while also not alienating them from the government. Overall, the Peruvians realized that it would take time to seriously reduce the threats SL and coca represented to the Peruvian state. Today the various factions in which the group broke up into still provide the cocaleros and narcos with protection in exchange for financial and political support, yet they currently are a manageable threat. However, just as SL took advantage of the financial and political events of Peru in the 1980's and 1990's to be a strategic threat to the state, if the factors are right again they could easily become powerful once again. It is up to the Peruvian government to not just deal with the COIN and CN danger as purely separate problems in need of separate solutions, but deeply integrated problems in need of a comprehensive solution.

Background of Poppies and Taliban in Afghanistan

Afghanistan, along with Pakistan and Iran, form the Golden Crescent, the origin for most of the opium poppies grown in the world. Legend holds that opium had originally been brought to Afghanistan by Alexander the Great and has been cultivated legally and illegally ever since.⁷⁷ Once Iran, the major supplier to Europe, banned opium's cultivation in the 1950's, Afghan growth of the crop underwent a considerable increase. The nation would see a further spread of opium within its borders in the 1970's, when political instability in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle interrupted opium farming in that area,

shifting demand to other areas, such as Afghanistan.⁷⁸ By the late 1980's the Golden Triangle would be surpassed by the nations of the Golden Crescent.⁷⁹

Yet the greatest factor that caused the Golden Crescent to flourish in opium was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Opium was a prime crop for Afghan rural farmers even before the Soviet occupation, since it only takes 4 months to grow. The short maturation time allowed the farmers to grow more harvests. Since Afghanistan contains about 12% of arable land, whose access was further limited by the hostilities from the occupation, poppy cultivation allows farmers to earn as much or more money as other licit crops, such as wheat, yet with less effort and less land needed.⁸⁰ The durability of opium was especially appealing since Soviet forces, as well as rival Mujaheddin groups, destroyed much of the Afghan agricultural infrastructure by mining and poisoning aqueducts and irrigation canals. Additionally, the short maturation time and the less time needed for caring for their crops enabled some growers to devote more time to their Mujaheddin duties.⁸¹

The rise of opium during the 1980's was further encouraged by the commanders of Mujaheddin forces. Despite the potential earnings opium could add to the local economy and to their pockets, the commanders were at first wary to reap the windfalls of this illicit crop for fears of losing the Islamic justification they took for fighting the Soviets. Under Islamic tenets, opium is a substance not permissible, or *haram*, according to the Koran.⁸² The two competing views were rectified by the commanders simply rationalizing that the urgency of the fight for Islam validated opium cultivation. As the brother of the powerful warlord Mullah Nasim Akhundaza stated, "We must grow and sell opium to fight our war against the Russian nonbelievers." Further, with the control of funds from the US and Mid-East nations being directed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), various militias were enticed to gain funds on their own so as to be independent from the Pakistanis or forced to as a result of not being in the good graces of the ISI.⁸³

Two of the biggest militia commanders who established much of the infrastructure and methods for the growing, production and transportation of opium were Akhundaza in the south and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the northeast. Akhundaza as early as 1981 had made it legal in his section of Helmand

province to grow poppy to gain funds and fight the Soviets. By 1989, he had organized growers in his territory to cultivate 50% of all farmland opium. With the crop that year producing 250 metric tons of opium, he earned the epithet “King of Heroin”. Akhundaza also sought to control the trafficking by establishing an office in Iran to manage deliveries to Europe.⁸⁴ Yet his greatest invention was the “salaam system”, which had farmers pre-sell their opium in order to get cash advances for buying the materials needed for growing the crop. The system, used to this day, has trapped many an opium farmer into a cycle of debt, since if they could not provide the agreed amount opium, they must pay for the shortfall or suffer other penalties such as castration or death. The easiest way to get out of the debt is to grow opium which can only be done by obtaining an advance payment again.⁸⁵

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is still currently the head of the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) resistance group, a Taliban ally, and originally received profits from opium from collecting *ushr*, a 10% religious tax, on opium trafficking in his area. By the late 1980’s, Hekmatyar began to work in tandem with Akhundaza by controlling six opium refineries on the Pakistani border that processed the raw opium from Helmand, helping fund his militia into one the preeminent fighting forces of Afghanistan. However, he did not get his funds simply from opium. He was adored by the ISI for conducting operations at their behest and was the recipient of the greatest share of international funds that they delved out.

Yet, the relationship between the Pakistanis and Hekmatyar ran much deeper than simple funding. The ISI knew of his opium dealings since he operated in territory controlled by them on the border. Opium was a significant asset through the 1980’s and 1990’s to achieve certain strategic objectives by allowing Hekmatyar to use opium proceeds to control other Afghan militias of which the ISI had little sway over. In fact, following the 1979 invasion an advisor to the Pakistani dictator General Zia ul-Haq convinced the general that income from drugs would be significant in aiding to defeat the Soviets.⁸⁶ In 1985, newspapers were widely reporting that trucks of the National Logistics Cell (NLC), a transportation company owned by the Pakistani army, were routinely bringing in CIA-supplied materials to the Afghan mujaheddin only to return with heroin headed for the seaport of Karachi.⁸⁷ Heroin smuggling infiltrated

the top ranks of the Pakistani government to such an extent that Haq himself was nicknamed “Pakistan’s Noriega.”⁸⁸

American complicity in the opium dealings also has been found. Although officially unable to cross into Afghanistan, DEA operations in the Pakistani tribal belt had uncovered 40 heroin rings that crossed the borders of both nations. The CIA, in this matter, refused to uncover the rings because it would expose many top Pakistani military officers as well to sully the image much of the world had of “brave” Afghan rebels fighting the “Evil Empire” of the USSR.⁸⁹ CIA complicity could as well have been unintentional in many instances since the inability for many US agents to conduct wide-spread operations in Afghanistan made it especially difficult to see who was actually involved with the drug trade. The scant information that the US government was receiving clearly should have led to a full investigation, however, this was never undertaken. To put it bluntly, national security requirements necessitated that the US do nothing to slow the booming of the Afghan and Pakistan heroin markets in order to combat the Soviet occupation. In the eyes of US Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, drugs were a tertiary priority behind fighting the Soviets and stopping nuclear proliferation.⁹⁰ As one former CIA official said, “We all knew what was going on. The people who could do something about it wouldn’t hear about it, or they would listen and do nothing.”⁹¹ More damning for the CIA was the 1995 statement made by Charles Cogan, former CIA director for the Afghan effort:

“Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn’t really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade.

I don’t think that we need to apologize for this. Every situation has its fall out...

There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished.

The Soviets left Afghanistan.”⁹²

Opium not only was serving as a source of revenue in Afghanistan but also as a weapon, further justifying its usefulness in the war. Heroin, as well as hashish, was purposely spread through the Soviet forces by the Mujahiddin to deplete the fighting ability of those forces.⁹³ As one Mujahideen put it, “We

try to poison the Russians with it...they sell opium and hashish but now also heroin to the Russian soldiers in exchange for guns and to poison their spirit.”⁹⁴

The efforts of the Afghan Mujahideen, as well as those of Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia, finally paid off on February 15, 1989 when Soviet forces officially left Afghanistan. The Soviets installed President Najibullah as ruler, but without the aid of the Soviet military, his government would only last three more years until Mujahideen forces took control of the capital, Kabul.⁹⁵ With the Soviet pullout and the inevitability of the fall of the Najibullah regime, Washington severely cut aid to Afghanistan in 1990, only allocating \$280 million to the Afghan effort, a 60% cut from the previous year’s funding. But events in the years following the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf War, further led to a shifting of attention, and thus funds, by the Mujahideen’s primary aid providers, the US and various Middle East nations.⁹⁶

Militia commanders, Hekmatyar being the prime example, anticipated the drying up of funds, of which \$6 billion in total were provided by the US and Saudi Arabia in the 1980’s.⁹⁷ Individual leaders deepened their involvement with the opium trade even further, consolidating their power by carving out territorial fiefdoms and creating conventional military forces, displacing the traditional tribal elites and intelligentsia that Afghanistan had relied on to shape society before the Soviet invasion.^{98 99} The jostling for territory and power would thrust the nation into civil war. Hekmatyar, with the continued blessing of the ISI, attempted to control as much of Afghanistan as possible, massacring liberals, academics, and royalists who began to return to Afghanistan to rebuild the government. Yet, poppies meant power. Thus, by mid-1989, Hekmatyar invaded the Helmand so as to seize the opium fields of Akhundzada and the Panjshir Valley, controlled by Ahmed Shah Massoud, to control the trafficking routes in that section of the country.¹⁰⁰

Satellite photography of Afghanistan verified the increase of poppy growth during the years following the Soviet exit and the Afghan civil war. Opium production had grown tenfold during the 1980’s from 250 to 2,000 tons, and then doubled on top of that to 4,600 tons during the civil war.¹⁰¹ The opium money allowed many commanders to acquire weapons and materials, vastly extending the period

of violence as well as its severity. By April of 1992, with the fall of Kabul and Najibullah, an interim government was established by the various factions of the Mujahideen. However, internal power squabbles fractured the tentative peace throughout the country highlighted by the fight for Kabul between Massoud and Hekmatyar.¹⁰² Fighting over control of the capital would last two years and leave 50,000 dead in the city alone.¹⁰³

Some militias attempted to end their reliance on opium in exchange for international aid. In Nangarhar, the second-largest opium producing section in the country, Haji Abdul Qadir, accepted financial support for cutting opium growth in half. Despite the fact that he controlled the Jalalabad airport which was a prime smuggling outlet and still allowed him to collect off of the trafficking of heroin, opium in Qadir's region was cut.¹⁰⁴ Yet, with the lack of adequate international financing for alternative development to provide a sufficient equitable livelihood for the former-opium farmers, along with the inability for smuggling from the airport alone to provide enough funds as well, public pressure forced Qadir to encourage opium growth once again.¹⁰⁵ In Helmand, Mullah Akhundzada also agreed to a cessation of opium farming after getting personal assurances of aid to pay for fighters and to build health clinics from the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, in late 1988. Akhuzada stood by the agreement, with aerial reconnaissance as well as officials on the ground verifying that poppies in his area had been eradicated, although opium growth had simply ballooned across the border in Pakistan. However, the agency that was to provide the aid money in return for the eradication, USAID, refused to do so, stating to Oakley, "You can't do deals with a known drug dealer."¹⁰⁶ The local economy had been severely shaken by the loss of the income from the drug trade, with the population directing their anger at Akhuzada. In addition, opium prices had tripled, infuriating Hekmatyar who relied on Helmand opium for his refineries. Six months after USAID's refusal to provide assistance, Akhuzada was gunned down in Pakistan, at the behest of Hekmatyar. Ghulam Rasul, the brother of Nasim, took over Helmand, reinstating opium cultivation in the area. His death would influence many other Afghan power players, for several years, to not involve themselves with the US or CN programs because of the disadvantages

associated with both. The death of the Mullah illustrated how desperate it was for Afghan militia leaders to be involved with the opium trade, for profit and the power it provided.¹⁰⁷

Much of the violence and the opium explosion that followed the Soviet withdrawal was presaged by some US government officials. As a former CIA officer said following the end of Mujahideen funding in 1992, “Overnight, that left 135,000 armed Afghans and their families with no way to support themselves. What do you think happened? The commanders turned to gun running to make money, and in no short time, most turned to drugs too.”¹⁰⁸ Ambassador Oakley, in a Dec. 1988 cable stated:

*“We and the Pakistan government believe the situation will become worse in terms of both heroin and arms entering Pakistan from Afghanistan as the war winds down unless urgent, effective measures are taken right away. The fight against ‘heroin-Kalashnikov culture’ is almost as critical to the future of Pakistan’s security as the fight against Soviet domination of Afghanistan has been.”*¹⁰⁹

More prophetic in regards to the next stage of the Afghan struggle was a 1992 cable by US special envoy Peter Thomsen writing that USAID budget reductions would slowly erode the US’ sole political influence in Afghanistan, giving Afghans a mindset that the US was leaving them, and allowing Afghanistan to be used as a center for Islamic radical terrorism. In March 1992, while Najibullah pleaded with the West to help construct an Afghan moderate government, he gave an interview warning that inaction by the international community would not only ruin his nation, but have negative effects on the outside world. “Afghanistan will turn into a center of world smuggling of narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a center for terrorism.”¹¹⁰ Unfortunately, his appeals fell on deaf ears. Even though the UN had estimated \$1 billion would be needed to restore the Afghan landscape, President George H. W. Bush cut US aid for rebuilding the nation by 60%, at a pivotal time when reconstruction could have facilitated for farmers alternatives to opium cultivation. As former CIA Pakistan chief Milton Bearden, eloquently summed up the US pullout, “We just walked away, walked away from it all.”¹¹¹ This power vacuum created by the US’ and the international community’s inattentiveness to Post-1989 Afghanistan allowed an entity along the lines that Najibullah and Thomsen warned about to step in and fill this void.

By 1994, Afghanistan had broken into a patchwork of fiefdoms. Some warlords were notorious for using cruel repression to consolidate their power over the territory they ruled. Further, funds gained from illicit industries such as the 3,416 metric tons of opium garnered in that year alone, was allowing Mujahideen leaders the funds to maintain their mini-kingdoms and keep Afghanistan shattered.¹¹² Out of this lawlessness a new group emerged, armed with the legitimacy emanating from their protection of the population from the warlords. Although, the means for accomplishing their goals was through medieval brutality, so as to rule based on a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam known as Deobandi.¹¹³ Within months, the ranks and popularity of this group, the Taliban, and their one-eyed, veteran Mujahideen leader, Mullah Omar, had swelled with volunteers from the *madrasas* in Pakistan, as well as from Afghans who had had enough of the warlords and the years of war. By February 1995, armed with little more than divine inspiration, the Taliban swept through the south and into the east, capturing nine provinces through armed conflict or by warlords acquiescing to Mullah Omar.¹¹⁴ In September of that same year, they would capture the western province of Herat and a year after, Kabul itself.

As the Taliban became a force to be reckoned with, patrons flocked. The group's sweep through the Afghan countryside would garner the attention, and later material support, of the ISI. The Pakistanis had become frustrated with Hekmatyar's continual inability to take control over the country. The Taliban offered an alternative to the warlord, which Pakistan hoped would establish a pliant government on their western border. Additionally, many traders in illicit goods supported the group since their power consolidation ended many of the roadblocks, fighting, and tolls that had deeply affected all types of commerce. However, at the inception of the group, the strict adherents of Islam sought to end the opium trade based on their interpretation of the Qur'an.¹¹⁵

The need for financial aid brought the Taliban into collaboration with the drug smugglers, overruling their previous caveats against the cultivation, but still outlawing opium's use.¹¹⁶ In addition, popular resentment at the Taliban's initial barring of opium also led the group to end the ban in 1996, after discontent in Helmand province began to sway the populous back to the warlords, who allowed the growth.¹¹⁷ The original sponsor of the Taliban had won the group their initial flow of money by

convincing the Quetta Alliance, a drug cartel of three that regularly exported tons of heroin and hashish from Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as other businessmen, to back the group. This patron, Haji Bashir Noorzai, controlled thousands of acres of opium-cultivated land which greatly benefitted from the Taliban's legalizing of the crop. Here we see the origins of the triangular bond between the Taliban, traffickers, and farmers that would allow for a mutually beneficial relationship akin to that seen in Peru. By 2001, practically all of Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban, save for an alliance of Mujahideen led by Massoud, known as the Northern Alliance (NA) in the narrow northeast land of the Panjshir Valley, who themselves were financially supporting themselves from the opium trade.¹¹⁸

Nonetheless, the Taliban felt as if power was securely enough in their hands to reinstitute the ban in 2000, which they vigorously enforced. Opium-cultivation between 2000 and 2001 sank from 82,171 to 7,606 acres, with metric tonnage shrinking from 3,206 to 185.¹¹⁹ This meant a decline of 70% of the world's opium. 83% of the world's opium total was grown in NA-controlled areas alone.¹²⁰ The prohibition seemingly had two advantages. First, the Taliban was hindered from receiving international recognition. With the eradication of opium, they hoped to drop their pariah-status in the world. Yet, another reason appears to have been to regulate the drug trade in order to increase their share of profits.¹²¹ Reports have surfaced that the Taliban was able to stockpile about 300 tons of opium, enough to supply Western Europe for 2-10 years.¹²² Immediately, the price of opium on the borders sprang from \$28 per kilo to \$350-\$400. Unfortunately, the majority of the population would not be on the receiving end of the profit and suffered greatly from the ban. Despite the brutal repression that would result from getting caught growing poppy, faced with starvation and debt, many were forced to secretly grow the crop.¹²³ By September 2001, the crop would be legalized because of the need to regain the popular support needed to counter the impending invasion of the nation by US and Allied forces responding to 9/11.

Operation Enduring Freedom could be argued as to have benefited from the drug trade. The warlords of the NA saw before them Taliban fleeing from their sanctuaries, leaving behind fresh poppy-growing areas and routes to inhabit and take advantage of. With US help, this initially is what happened. By the spring of 2002 warlord factions were fighting among themselves for trading routes and poppy

fields.¹²⁴ Yet this was simply fallout from the “warlord strategy” enacted by the US until late 2003 that allowed the US a “light footprint” of forces while giving the warlords responsibility for security as well as political and human rights.¹²⁵ Consequently, the drug trade revival of the warlords, among other issues, was sapping power from the federal government and the new president, Hamid Karzai, deteriorating security outside of Kabul, and impeding the government to enforce its counternarcotics operations.¹²⁶ Within a year, poppy acreage had exploded to 74,100 with opium tonnage going to 3,400 tons.¹²⁷

Corruption has run rampant throughout the government as a result of officials’ dealings in the drug trade. With hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to be earned for those in office, compared to the \$70 in legal pay, they are truly worth the \$40,000 payment to those in charge of the appointing.¹²⁸ In the past, Afghan CN officials affirmed that “high government officials, police commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade and identified “former commanders and warlords who are still in power” serving as “district chiefs and local police” as the main problem with regard to corruption, especially in the Ministry of Interior.¹²⁹ Corruption at the local level dealing with police has been active since the 1990’s when law enforcement merely enforced the will of the warlords. This continued into the post-Taliban era when the newly created Afghan National Police (ANP) formed from these officers. Allegations are rampant of corrupt police securing routes for drug trades as well as simply selling whole districts’ opium rights to the Taliban.¹³⁰

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schweich, who resigned in mid-2008 as the U.S. Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, wrote in July 2008 that “while it is true that [President] Karzai’s Taliban enemies finance themselves from the drug trade, so do many of his supporters.”¹³¹ High-level government nominees also allegedly are involved in narcotics trafficking. UN researchers have named Ahmed Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s brother, as the head of the group that receives money from those purchasing appointments as well as numerous times being indicated in drug trades by Western intelligence.¹³² The former governor of Helmand province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, was sacked from office after nine tons of opium were found at his offices in June 2005. Karzai and Akhundzada reportedly have been close friends since the 1980s. When asked about the matter,

President Karzai said, “We don’t need to have an investigation on him [Sher Mohammed]. We will remove him from his place and bring him to do some other government work. Maybe he should become a senator or something.” President Karzai selected Akhundzada to Afghanistan’s House of Elders (Senate equivalent) in December 2005. US allegations also surround President Karzai’s running mate in the 2009 presidential election, Mohammed Fahim, for involvement in narcotics smuggling to Central Asia during his former appointment as Afghanistan’s defense minister.¹³³

Much of the warlords’ power and thus the expansion of the drug trade after the fall of the Taliban can be traced to policy decisions of the West. Besides the “light footprint” strategy that allowed the Taliban to only be deposed and not completely destroyed, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) who are in charge of carrying out small infrastructure renewal projects, such as alternative development programs that could wean local economies off of their reliance of opium growing, helping train the local Afghan government and maintaining security for NGOs, had many obstacles that greatly weakened their abilities. The PRTs were seriously hampered with a shortage of budgetary resources, lack of authorization to settle local disputes, and deficiency of any real structure or order of how teams were to attain their objectives.¹³⁴ The feebleness of many PRTs meant a continued absence of infrastructure, irrigation, markets, and credit for farmers. One-third of all farmers surveyed in 2004, noted poverty as their principal reason for growing opium.¹³⁵

Further evidence of how reconstruction was not a main concern of the US in the years following 2001 can be seen in the interaction of the US military and other US agencies tasked with reconstruction in Afghanistan. The military and the CIA would not aid such efforts unless they directly aided in operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Even when reconstruction operations did proceed, the military would not provide support to US agencies or NGOs. In 2006, USAID and NATO agencies had huge amounts of international aid set to be used in the four southern provinces which have produced the most opium as well as being the base for the Taliban left in the nation. Yet, these organizations were unable to use these funds as a result of the lack of security available.¹³⁶

CN efforts have greatly faltered since the 2001 invasion. Britain originally took the helm of counternarcotics efforts, along with US support. In 2002, the British sought to disrupt the major flow of opium by simply buying off the farmers by way of the local officials. As a result of the level of corruption, this program was a massive failure. The \$80 million set for the program quickly ran out, especially in the pockets of the officials while farmers who did eradicate their crops got nothing. Others simply bribed the officials to keep their yields. That year, opium cultivation rose to 3,400 tons from 185 tons the previous year.¹³⁷

CN efforts were seriously hampered by the lack of material resources that only the US military could provide. As Congressional testimony best evokes, in 2006 “DEA made 23 such requests [for air support of interdiction operations] before realizing that DoD has very little interest in supporting the counter-narcotics mission in Afghanistan.”¹³⁸ The US was content with keeping CN primarily at spraying of crops, which the British and Afghans contested since it would be simply targeting the vast majority of poor farmers.¹³⁹ The US military was initially extremely hesitant about involving itself with counternarcotics on the ground in fear of “mission creep”, taking on more objectives than it had the troops to do so with, as well as angering the local warlords and poppy farmers. The military had been unenthusiastic to take part in these operations because it still needed many of the warlords involved in the drug trade for intelligence provision and military support.¹⁴⁰ Official policy stated that US military commanders could destroy opium but they were not forced to do so nor interdict suspected traffickers. Also, as evidence slowly made it clear that the Taliban was profiting from the drug trade, as seen by soldiers finding Taliban hideouts with bags of raw opium, US officials were denying such a relationship existed in hopes of keeping the military out of counternarcotics.¹⁴¹


However, the stance of the US military was forced to change with the realization of the massive amounts of opium harvested in 2004. In response to the record growth of that year, the executive director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes stated “opium cultivation, which had spread like wildfire throughout the country, could ultimately incinerate everything- democracy, reconstruction, and stability... The fear that Afghanistan might degenerate into a narco-state is slowly becoming a reality.”¹⁴² In the begin-

ning of 2005, a renewed US CN strategy based itself on 5 pillars: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. An Afghan government CN strategy included variants of these five plus three more: demand reduction, institution building, and international and regional cooperation.¹⁴³ Although the US military continued to dread that eradication would have harmful repercussions for COIN operations, the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs backed by prominent members of Congress were adamant that burgeoning drug cultivation was at the core of Afghanistan's struggles and that it was time to deal with the problem aggressively.¹⁴⁴ US forces were tasked in March 2005 with taking part and providing support in counter-narcotics operations. Pentagon officials were nonetheless wary about involving troops in eradication and losing support of the people. In early 2005, the deputy commander of American forces in Afghanistan recognized the complicating role of drugs in COIN:

*"We would prefer not to be in the [drug crop] eradication business. We have spent a lot of capital in trying to build relationships with the people and now this has the potential for us to do things that wouldn't be popular."*¹⁴⁵

The US military was justified to an extent in fearing involving itself in the stepped-up CN missions. The enhanced CN programs that occurred beginning in 2005 would offset the gains of military operations against the Taliban. Instead of targeting those at the top of the drug trade, many of whom had considerable political sway, the Afghan-led eradication and interdiction operations were largely conducted against small, vulnerable traders and poor farmers who could neither sufficiently bribe nor adequately intimidate those within the Afghan government. These missions were used by powerful tribes and officials to weaken their rivals and to aid in consolidating the opium trade in their areas. Traffickers actually welcomed to an extent some CN because it would raise the price of the drug.¹⁴⁶ From the periphery, the plan was lauded as a major success since it decreased the area of cultivation from 131,000 acres in 2004 to 104,000 in 2005 (**Figure 4**), even though the actual tonnage output of opium shrank only by 2 per cent (due to better yields that year).

Figure 4



147

Most of the reduction in cultivation was achieved by suppression in Nangarhar province in 2005, where, through promises of alternative development and threats of imprisonment, production was slashed by 90%. However, Nangarhar’s initial eradication program is most indicative of the shortcomings of CN programs and their subsequent failure. The alternative employment promised never materialized for many. Cash for-work programs, which paid people for taking part in public works projects, reached only a small percentage of the population in Nangarhar, mainly those living close to cities. Much of the population was left destitute as a result.¹⁴⁸ The failure of many former-opium farmers to pay back their creditors because of eradication sent many deeper into debt, pushing them to grow even more poppy the next year.¹⁴⁹ Farmers could not financially afford to support the ban for another year. Rumors circulated that the people would back to the Taliban who passed through the area, a serious threat considering the province was rather secure compared to other areas. Two important tribes in the south, the Shinwari and Khogiani, selected not to go by the province’s ban. By 2006, opium growing began to intensify in secluded areas of the province inhabited by both. By 2007, Nangarhar poppy cultivation increased by

285%, returning the province to its former status as the second-highest cultivator in the nation. Further eradication in 2007 incited the highest number of eradication-related hostile actions in the country. US military forces noticed a shift from attacks on coalition forces to attacks on the ANSF, which were responsible for governor-led eradication in the province.¹⁵⁰


However, Nangarhar following 2007 provides lessons on how a territory can transition to being drug-free under a manageable insurgent threat, based on its status of being relatively more secure province when compared to Helmand and Kandahar. During the fall of 2007, the governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, launched a pro-active anti-poppy campaign with the help of the coalition. It was a three-pronged approach. First, the governor, local officials, and the provincial council all collaborated to help eliminate poppy cultivation. Governor Sherzai threatened to fire local officials if poppy grew in their districts, and gained credibility when he did just that to three district governors. Fearing for their jobs, local officials aggressively worked with community leaders to accentuate what could be gained by not growing the crop. As in previous campaigns, the leaders were paid for their compliance with the ban. Governor Sherzai also rewarded areas that reduced poppy cultivation with increased development assistance. In consequence, tribal leaders all agreed not to grow poppy and not to aid Taliban in their areas. Second, the plan was strictly imposed, unlike in earlier eradication campaigns. If poppy fields were found, local leaders gave farmers the choice to eradicate the crop themselves and avoid jail. Additionally, Governor Sherzai's ultimatum of, "Plow up the poppy fields, or go to jail" helped sway many farmers' minds.¹⁵¹ As a result, in 2008, ANSF took part in the least amount of eradication than in any previous year. Finally, government officials throughout the province, through the monitoring of the eradication process, learned more about what local communities needed by engaging with the local population, making it possible to better tailor the pace and the uniqueness of development to what specific areas needed most to succeed. Due to the governor's strong anti-poppy campaign, Nangarhar province became designated "poppy free" for the first time in 2008. As many as 40,000 farming families received some kind of compensation for the loss of opium revenues. This result was also aided by wheat prices increasing concurrently, giving farmers a licit economic alternative. Although the Nangarhar's strong governor, lack of a Taliban

stronghold in the area, and widespread government presence are unique to the province, this is a clear example of how a sustained poppy diminishment can occur once the insurgent threat is minimal, and the capacity for alternative development in an area is strong.¹⁵²

The dissatisfaction caused by the increased eradication without adequate development assistance has played directly into the insurgency's hands. The missteps of the Afghan government and NATO powers have greatly strengthened the Taliban politically by allowing the insurgents to defend the population's basic livelihood. CN efforts to eradicate the illicit economy permitted the Taliban to offer itself as a protector of the population's source of revenue and provide economic benefits in conditions of poverty, accruing popular support in the process. In fact, the Taliban sponsorship of the opium economy is the basis for much of its relationship with the people in opium areas. As one poppy farmer stated, "The only people who ever visit this village are opium agents who come to buy the crops, and they come with the Taliban."¹⁵³ This has critically undermined the motivation of the local population to provide intelligence on the Taliban to ISAF and the ANSF and given them all the reason to provide intelligence to the Taliban, either out of support for their cause or fear. The sponsorship of the opium trade has strengthened the insurgent force by enhancing their financial resources and simplifying their procurement and logistics by being able to rely on such materials from the people.¹⁵⁴ "Alliances of convenience" based on the use of drug money to recruit tribal "foot soldiers" for insurgent activities as well as being hired by drug traffickers for protection has also been noted.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, CN operations meant to deny significant income from the group has not bankrupted the Taliban or severely weakened a single belligerent group because such organizations (as well as the producers and traffickers) adapt in a variety of ways. The Taliban has diversified, only collecting now between 20 to 40% of its income from drugs.¹⁵⁶

Figure 5

The Illicit Triangle in Afghanistan



The situation in Afghanistan during the past several years has become drastic. Even though 18 of 34 provinces in 2008 were considered opium-free, the country remains the source of over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Roughly 1.6 million people (6.4% of the Afghan population) cultivated opium poppy in 2008-2009 with many more earning livings from activities generated indirectly from demand created by the opium economy in, for instance, construction and trade.¹⁵⁷ Opium accounts for 52% of Afghanistan's licit GDP and about 30 percent of the total GDP.¹⁵⁸ However, in many areas, regional insecurity and corruption continue to complicate CN initiatives and thus present formidable challenges. Almost the entire opium poppy-cultivating area was located in regions characterized by high levels of insecurity. Ninety-eight percent of cultivation for 2008 was confined to seven out of 34 provinces, all of which had security problems: five in the south (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykundi and Zabul provinces) and two in the south west of Afghanistan (Farah and Nimroz provinces) with two thirds of opium poppy cultivation in Helmand alone. In addition, in less hostile provinces, areas controlled or heavily influenced by Taliban or their affiliates generally cultivate opium, such as Surobi district in Kabul


province.¹⁵⁹ The statement which summarizes the current situation in the south best is a January 2009 quote by an unnamed U.S. military officer: “Drugs out, guns in.”¹⁶⁰

Despite the decrease of opium cultivation in recent years, past occurrences demonstrate that if there is an absence of dedicated alternative development programs for former-illicit farmers, these growers would eventually revive the crop again in the same area or they would simply move to cultivate in other areas. Additionally, supply-and-demand principles show how just wiping out poppy crops would simply raise prices for the stockpiles of heroin the Taliban and traffickers currently have, becoming more of an incentive for farmers to grow the crop once more if they have no legitimate substitutes.¹⁶¹ The Obama Administration deems alternative livelihood and agricultural development assistance as pivotal in its new strategic concerns in Afghanistan to initiate and sustain areas in moving away from opium cultivation. In October 2009, to better concentrate on these invigorated interests, USAID’s alternative livelihood programs were altered to be based on a two-track approach. In areas that have reduced poppy cultivation in the north, east, and west of the country, all projects under USAID would be aimed at providing broad-based agricultural development assistance designed to consolidate positive changes in poppy cultivation patterns, such as in Nangarhar. In southern and southwestern areas of the country where COIN operations are ongoing in the midst of opium cultivation and production, all USAID projects there plan to provide better targeted, quick-impact agricultural and development assistance as a means of fortifying efforts to secure newly cleared areas along with a massive influx of US troops to provide security. Crop substitution will play an especially prominent role in these programs. However, after years of debate between US, European and Afghan officials about the relative merits and drawbacks of supporting Afghan government poppy eradication efforts, U.S. support for such efforts in Afghanistan were “phased out” after a strategic analysis found that eradication programs were not costly and inefficient, but eradication activities have often been counterproductive and have at least partly led to the Taliban resurgence. As a result, roughly \$150 million of eradication funding as well as air assets were diverted to support other CN efforts that are less invasive on the general public, such as interdiction, public information, and advisory teams.¹⁶²

Figure 6 can show that there is a strong correlation to the increase of Taliban violence and renewed eradication as of 2005. That year saw a huge drop occur from forced eradication in Nangarhar which was also met by a spike of violence that has steadily increased. However, as poppy increased in that province, and other provinces, in 2006-2007, the strengthened alternative development campaign undertaken in Nangarhar as well as other provinces did much to diminish poppy cultivation beginning in 2008 and continuing in 2009. The rise in violence comparable to the diminishment in opium levels could potentially be explained by the Taliban's current lack of dependence on the illicit trade as a result of a diversification of funding. As General Stanley McChrystal summarized in late 2009, only 20-40% of the Taliban's financial resources come from the opium industry.¹⁶³ While the Taliban may have used this resource to resurge, perhaps now they are not as dependent on this source and are relying more heavily on other means, such as donations from around the world or other criminal activities such as ransoms from kidnappings.¹⁶⁴

Figure 6

Annual Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan vs. Monthly Number of Taliban Attacks




165

Part this decline is a direct result of a poppy blight that diminished the overall volume of opium in 2010, seen in **Figure 4** previously, and continues to affect the crop today.¹⁶⁶ While it is unknown how

long it will take to reduce the crop, this could be used by the government and PRTs as an inroads for allowing farmers who have been affected to take up a licit alternative livelihood. However, the decline beginning in 2008 is debated. Some experts affirm that this decline is no way due to eradication or other CN policy measures. In testimony before the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in Oct 2009, Ms. Vanda Felbab-Brown stated that, “Much of [the 2008-2009] decline in cultivation was driven by market forces largely unrelated to policy: After several years of massive overproduction in Afghanistan that surpassed the estimated global market for opiates by almost three times, opium prices were bound to decline.”¹⁶⁷ Anthony Cordesmann, a noted Afghanistan expert, disagreed with this assertion that the Afghan opium market had become oversaturated, causing this decline. In December 2009, he responded to Ms. Felbab-Brown’s statement by saying, “[f]rankly, the data and modeling aren’t good enough to tell. Moreover, much depends on the nature and outcome of a new strategy that is just beginning to be implemented.”¹⁶⁸ Therefore, there could be other factors at work other than market forces that have led to this decline.


Despite this decline, **Figure 7** explains that the general trend in Afghanistan of opium cultivation has been to the south, where the Taliban is strongest in the country. **Figure 8** reveals how the eastern portion of the nation is also especially dangerous in spots. However, in general, this involves insurgents crossing the porous border from sanctuaries in Pakistan to stage their attacks. In the south, where the threat is from insurgents who have control of areas, this is where the triangular relationship is prevalent. Although the general trend in Afghanistan has been to decreases in opium for the past couple of years, especially from areas in the north, as the two figures below show these areas do not have opium or a huge insurgent presence. Even in the west, where there is cultivation and some insurgent risk, both are very low in comparison with the south, where poppies and the danger are the highest in the country.

Figure 7



169

Figure 8



170

While the Obama Administration's new strategy offers hope to countering the explosion of opium in Afghanistan by seeking to address some key economic drivers that give the people ample reason to take

part in the illegal crop, they will not be effective in reducing the illicit economy unless firm security throughout the entire territory has been established first.¹⁷¹ Hopefully, by ending US complicity in eradication and giving the people sustainable alternative development, this will remove a prime reason for the people interacting with the Taliban. Yet, CN and COIN fights are multidimensional. Corruption is certainly a significant reason why Afghans have sought protection from the insurgency, but it also has led government officials/ warlords who wish to earn money from opium to form illicit partnerships with the group. As the Afghan government develops stronger CN policies and capabilities, groups that are involved with the opium trade may unite with others in seeking to upset security or challenge Afghanistan's democratic progress. However, further success in the CN realm could help diminish such widespread corruption by reducing the corrupt incentives represented by the massive amounts of drug money flowing through the government, possibly in the range of \$3.2 billion. Therefore, successful CN strategies could reduce graft that could make government officials more honest in the eyes of its citizens, taking support away from the insurgency and aiding COIN activities.¹⁷² Thus, the intricate link between CN and COIN calls for an integrated operational plan to reduce the insurgent groups as well as the opium industry to manageable levels that do not threaten the security or the stability of the Afghan state.¹⁷³

In March 2009, President Obama declared that Afghanistan's "economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency." Afghan President Hamid Karzai has singled out the opium industry as "the single greatest challenge to the long-term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan." Congress appropriated nearly \$3 billion in regular and supplemental CN foreign assistance and defense funding for Afghanistan programs from 2001 through 2009. Yet, as there have been certain areas cleared of opium, they are usually either short-term or the opium is simply cultivated in areas where the government has no control, such as in the south. In 2009, Former-Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke singled out eradication operations in Afghanistan as "the most wasteful and ineffective program I have seen in 40 years in and out of the government."¹⁷⁴ The US government has begun to embark on fresh alternatives reorganizing CN and COIN efforts as part of a new strategy to secure Afghanistan. Recommendations for

the Afghan narcotics and insurgency campaigns must ensure that policies do not solidify opium's stranglehold on the nation, do not alienate the people, and shift power from the warlords and the Taliban to the central government.

Analysis of Peruvian and Afghan Strategies and Situations

Peru's recent turbulent history bears some similarities to Afghanistan's own current situation, namely the symbiosis of drugs and insurgencies. Although, circumstances certainly cannot be remedied by taking the exact programs and policies in Peru and placing them in Afghanistan since too many factors such as regional differences as well as the political situations among other matters make this highly undesirable. Yet, as seen in the previous analyses of the two countries, certain parallels do exist that do bear hope that CN and COIN strategies can work in tandem to assist in stabilizing Afghanistan.

The most obvious similarity between Peru and Afghanistan is the relationship each internal conflict has between insecurity and narcotics, most exemplified by the triangular relationship between illicit growers, traffickers, and insurgents. The Taliban and SL relied extremely on opium and coca, respectively, for a variety of reasons. Financially, each received a major amount of their resources from the trade by taxing growers and traffickers. The Peruvian and Afghan national governments, both fragile new democracies, had banned the cultivation of narcotics in their lands, yet a considerable amount of the population relied on these illicit economies for financial reasons, either for just bare sustenance or for gaining power through accumulating wealth. This loss of livelihood, in addition to a lack of public infrastructure and massive corruption alienated many of the people from the legitimate government in these illicit economy areas. Out of this political vacuum and disenchantment in the countryside, these ideologically-based insurgencies were able to gain political support with the average peasant, who simply wanted protection to grow their opium or coca and not be taken advantage of by corrupt officials and traffickers. These traffickers also were forced to deal with the insurgents because they operated out of territory under the insurgency's control, helped provide protection from government forces, and aided in dealings with farmers. Financially, the Taliban and SL each received a significant amount of their

resources from the trade by taxing growers and traffickers for the security both groups provided.

Additionally, in each nation, the major drug-cultivating regions turned into the most violent areas in the country.

Therefore, the analogous backgrounds of these conflicts do allow for the devising of certain plans from Peru to establishing stability in Afghanistan. Some approaches used in Peru have also been applied to the Afghan situation. Both the Taliban and SL were left seriously damaged, after offenses taken by pro-government forces in areas under insurgent-control were conducted in which illicit crops were left alone. This negated the need for the peasants to rely on the insurgents to protect their crops from eradication and for these masses to give either radical organization popular support. This policy is evident in Peru under Generals Carbajal and Arciniega as well as in Afghanistan when the US military abstained from involving itself in CN operations until they were mandated to in 2005. However, once eradication began after the removal of the two Peruvian generals and greatly increased after 2004 in Afghanistan, these initial advancements against the Taliban and SL led to reversals. Without proper alternative development programs in place to provide other means of support, peasants were left destitute. In both events, the people who relied on this prohibited industry once again allowed for the insurgent groups to recover in these areas to again provide security from the government.

The military, in both circumstances, were widely against anti-drug policies, especially eradication, for these exact reasons, to the point that the military provided little, if any, support. BG Arciniega took such a stand when he was in charge of the UHV and notably, US GEN Benjamin Freakley halted DEA operations in 2006, to stop the deteriorating situation in Nangarhar.¹⁷⁵ Peru eventually learned from the negative effects of eradication and ended the involuntary aspects of this program, shifting to other less invasive CN techniques in conjunction with the application of alternative development programs in the UHV and other coca-growing areas. Peru's strategy best demonstrates how CN efforts can only be effective once the security has improved and there is not a significant insurgent threat, not the reverse. Nangarhar's CN efforts in 2007-2008 also yield a similar lesson. A government's local capabilities need to be at a certain strength to enable redevelopment and protect the people from hostilities before efforts

against illegal industries, such as large-scale eradication of illicit crops, can be effective without sparking a resurgent rebellion. National development and military ‘victory’ have been achieved without the annihilation, or considerable decrease, of the narcotics trade in Peru as well as in Colombia, China, Burma and Thailand.¹⁷⁶ Once the security of the state was intact, the state could more forcefully engage the narcotics industry. Peru and Afghanistan have shown how eradication of illicit narcotics in areas where insurgents are more than marginally active will not work and is likely to be counterproductive, resulting in incentives for farmers to grow more drugs to pay back loans, “ballooning” of production to other areas, and a resurgence of particular state–subverting elements. The US is taking a similar stance as Peru against eradication since the Obama Administration changed policy and disbanded CN teams specifically designed for eradication. In 2009’s Afghan-led push in the town of Marjah in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province, making peace with the locals by not interfering with their illicit livelihood was instituted by the US military as a higher priority than eradicating their opium poppies so as to diminish the farmers support for the Taliban.¹⁷⁷


In addition, as greatly decreasing opium around Afghanistan will affect the Taliban negatively, the group does not depend strictly on the trade for its financial survival. It only relies on the opium industry for about 20-40% of its resources. According to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s 2009 Afghanistan Assessment:

“[e]liminating insurgent access to narco-profits -- even if possible, and while disruptive-- would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact....Insurgent groups also receive substantial income from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups 'tax' the local population through checkpoints, demanding protection money, and other methods.”¹⁷⁸

Additionally, the diminishment of the coca trade was not the only factor in the decline of SL. The rebel group was drastically affected with the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzman, ruining his legendary

status that inspired so many of his foot soldiers. The crucial information he gave Peruvian authorities as well as the decapitation of its operational head did considerable damage to the organization. After SL was severely weakened and security able to be established were CN efforts that did not alienate the rural population able to be further institutionalized.¹⁷⁹ However as **Figure 9** shows that if we compare annual increases and decreases of violence by SL, compiled from statistics by the Peruvian Truth Commission established after the crisis was over, with the annual coca cultivation in Peru, we see that there was already a decline in violence occurring before September 1992 when Guzman was captured. This leads to believe that perhaps the diminishment of coca may not have been the only factor in the fall of SL from its height in 1990, when coca reached its highest level.

Figure 9



Alternative development offers the best way to allow the majority of individuals in illicit drug cultivation a path towards a legitimate substitute. Unfortunately, no crop exists that can legitimately be sold on par with either coca or opium. Nonetheless, many peasants in Peru and Afghanistan would engage in legitimate trades if given the chance. As one Afghan puts it, “We know that planting poppy is

bad, but our country is destroyed and we have received little assistance, so we have no real alternative to poppy.”¹⁸² These mirror the same statements made by Peruvian growers who saw no options as well. Therefore, the will that was present in Peru is present as well in Afghanistan. As seen in Peru, once there is steady funding for long-term development, this can be a major deterrent to illicit growing. However, making premature eradication a condition for development assistance work without alternative development programs already in place, as occurred in Peru under Gen. Arciniega and in Nangarhar in 2005, can alienate the affected population and damage future rural development.¹⁸³ Moreover, there must be security provisions for those who engage in such alternative livelihoods since they are susceptible to repercussions from insurgents as well as warlords reliant on the drug trade. SL has aggressively opposed legitimate farming as part of their propaganda which labels such crop conversions as “Yankee imperialism” and “bureaucratic capitalism.”¹⁸⁴ In Afghanistan’s ever-violent southern provinces, Taliban allied with drug traffickers have been known to force some farmers to grow opium as well as punishing those who take part in CN programs.¹⁸⁵

The challenge is to keep the voluntary eradication and trafficker-focused interdiction/border protection in place, while launching programs to provide small farmers with alternative sources of income.¹⁸⁶ With both of these systems complimenting each other, together they attack the traffickers who gain the most money off the illicit goods (interdiction) as well as concentrating on basic economic and public safety issues (alternative development with government protection). The main issue is who to target first. Is it farmers, who do it out of need, or traffickers who are doing it out of greed? The farmers, who represent the majority who earn a living through opium, receive less than 20% of the drug profits in Afghanistan. The rest goes to insurgents, traffickers, warlords, and corrupt government officials. These figures are comparable to Peru in the heyday of the SL. Therefore targeting those who receive the 80% of income can have a much greater blow on the business.¹⁸⁷

Peruvian interdiction yielded excellent results while not forcibly intervening in the lives of growers. By zeroing in on the known trafficking patterns of drug shipments, such as with aerial interdiction, Peru, with US help was able to significantly achieve this. Afghan interdiction has shown

similar effects towards illicit farmers. This can be taken advantage of since it is generally assumed that the Afghan opium landscape has consolidated in recent years and is dominated by approximately 25 networks or “key traffickers”. Therefore, more harm can be caused to trafficking by taking out the small amount of networks that are thought to exist.¹⁸⁸ However, Afghan CN police and DEA resources have a limited capacity, destroying about 180 heroin laboratories and 200 tons of narcotics in 2005, with the 2005 interdiction amount only representing less than five percent of opium production.¹⁸⁹ Even so, President Obama’s new strategy which removes US support for eradication and towards interdiction as well as alternative development heralds hope for gaining the average opium farmer’s support against the Taliban. The Marjah operation may suggest that with the U.S. and NATO supervising COIN and CN activities, interdiction of traffickers may well take primacy over eliminating the poppy fields of besieged Afghan farmers.¹⁹⁰

However, there are those who purport that eradication and other strong CN measures will not alienate the rural population and drive them to the Taliban. According to Australian counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen:

“The facts do not support this view [that eradication alienates farmers]. According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) figures [from 2005], less than 10% of the Afghan population is engaged in poppy cultivation. Thus even the harshest efforts to eradicate poppy would not alienate the majority of the population. Similarly, by far the largest areas of cultivation are Helmand and Badakshan provinces. Together, these provinces account for 49.9% of poppy cultivation...but only 5.6% of the Afghan population. The largest pockets of cultivation—in rural northern Helmand province—are in the least populated areas of Afghanistan. The insurgency is where the people are, but the poppy is not.”¹⁹¹

Noted counterterrorism expert Dr. Michael Scheuer has also responded similarly. When asked how he felt about eradication being a central reason farmers go to the Taliban’s side, he was quoted as saying, “They already work for the Taliban.”¹⁹²

As of 2009, 1,845,000 individuals were directly involved with the cultivation and harvesting of poppy. Yet, while this only represents 6.4% of the population of Afghanistan, it must be realized they represent families who contain many members who are also supported by this income (**Figure 10**).¹⁹³ And if massive eradication would have to take place in Helmand province, it needs to be employed in other provinces to preempt criticism that the policy is biased against some areas and to stop the ballooning of poppy in other areas. These numbers do not even include the numbers of people who depend on poppies in their own livelihoods, from laborers who help with the seasonal harvesting to shopkeepers and merchants who receive the earnings from farmers and others for their poppy cultivation. Even if a massive undertaking of eradication were to take place, the huge amount of infrastructure and funds needed to support farmers and their families into giving them alternatives to poppies and to stop them from being co-opted by the insurgency because of their financial dire straits is not present in the nation yet.

Figure 10

Afghan Families that Grow Poppy by Province (2008)

Province	Number of families
Helmand	109,935
Kandahar	78,031
Farah	48,338
Badghis	45,738
Uruzgan	38,677
Zabul	36,908

194

While it is enticing to apply Peruvian CN and COIN strategies in Afghanistan, such optimism is fraught with consequences. The situations in Peru and Afghanistan may appear to be similar, yet

significant differences and other factors may not improve the Afghan situation. First, Afghanistan's current drug problem is of far greater magnitude than that of Peru. The Peruvian government, while being a new democracy like Afghanistan, at least had some infrastructure and government institutions, such as a Western-trained military, before taking over from an authoritarian government. Afghanistan has seen over thirty years of war, which has destroyed what little infrastructure the nation had before the Soviet invasion. Many of the opium farmers are detached from the government since they do not have the technological or physical means to be integrated into the central government or receive its alternative development services. If these people are to be weaned off relying on poppy cultivation, it will take many years and much funding from the West to ensure this happens. The will from NATO states, already wavering, may not last the time needed.

Although interdiction appears to be a rational course based on the example of Peru, it could have negative results for US COIN policy in Afghanistan. Interdiction could alienate local warlords who earn capital from the drug industry and whom US forces have come to be dependent on for intelligence and support in operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda.¹⁹⁵ Opium is profoundly intertwined in the fabric of the country, and unavoidably, in its political arrangements and power structures. The Taliban profits from the drug trade, and since corruption is as widespread as it is, so do Afghan police, tribal elites, warlords and many government officials.¹⁹⁶ These dishonest entities have already undermined past CN efforts. They could continue this behavior, totally subverting attempts to deny opium as a significant tool from the insurgency.

Short-term opium cultivation could grow even further, additionally affecting regional states whose own populations are suffering from the opium trade. Essentially these states, whose support is needed for conducting operations, could place undue pressure on the US and Afghanistan through a variety of means to restart massive eradication. Iran is suffering considerably since 83% of the opium exports from Afghanistan is refined there and passes to the West. The trade has not only developed into criminal enterprises but has resulted in nearly 2.8% of the population becoming addicts. The Russian Federation has the largest opiate-using population in Eastern Europe with estimates of users comprising

1.6% of the population aged 15-64.¹⁹⁷ Such a development has dramatic effects on public health and social stability in a country already facing dire demographic challenges. At a NATO conference in Brussels in March, 2010, NATO spokesman James Appathurai rejected suggestions from Russian CN director Victor Ivanov that an opium crop eradication program be implemented in Afghanistan. If the opium situation in the regional states continues to decline because of Afghanistan, this could have adverse affects for the progress of COIN programs.¹⁹⁸

Finally, SL and the Taliban are very different in their organizational structure. SL had a hierarchical structure, with Guzman having significant power and control over the group. Although the efforts of the military, highlighted by BG Arciniega definitely were the beginnings of the turning the tide of the group, Guzman's capture in 1992 was seen as a significant blow to the group and is seen by many analysts as the event that most recognizably led to the downfall of the group. The Taliban that has reformed in the wake of the 2001 invasion is completely different from the old group. The 'New' Taliban is, "fragmented, transnational force devoid of many of the group's prior characteristics and political aspirations."¹⁹⁹ While Mullah Omar is the unconditional head of the core group, a senior Afghan security official states, "[w]e could round up the entire Quetta *shura* [Omar's inner circle] and we would still be no closer to ending the insurgency."²⁰⁰ The organizational arrangement of the Taliban could complicate the scaling back of opium. CN operations were more effective in withering the coca trade once the head of SL's Colossus was separated from the body. The Hydra that the Taliban currently resembles, without a single entity to eliminate to destroy the group, has proven to be especially resilient. As a result, a change in CN operations may not yield as beneficial results as they did in Peru.

At first, these major differences might lead one to dismiss any COIN/CN comparison between the two nations. The cultural and geographic variations between Peru and Afghanistan are two areas where criticism could be directed at. However, as much as these are prominent, neither appears to have any bearing on the general elements behind the triangular relationship in either setting. The porous border that Afghanistan shares in its east with Pakistan has been used by the insurgents to establish a sanctuary. However, this area has always had higher violence in compared to more peaceful regions and only

increased more in 2005. While the border has definitely made violence in the country more deadly and is an advantage for militants, it has always been a tool for the Taliban, pre- and post-2005. This border does not offer any explanation for why violence all of a sudden increased in 2005 increased and thus cannot be used as a strong focus of criticism.

As seen in **Figure 11**, a valid construct can be made based on the basic factors that the utilitarian alliance between the three entities that both countries share. Thus, this framework, as well as the similarity of reactions of actors within it, crosses over these huge cultural and geographic idiosyncrasies. Out of this framework we can also devise a model, based on the Peruvian experience, as well certain historical occurrences in Afghanistan, of how to destroy the relationship (**Figure 12**).

Figure 11





Figure 12



Another potential issue can be seen in the difference in the level of infrastructure between the two. There is no argument that Peru during its struggle against SL had much more infrastructure built in comparison to Afghanistan. Yet, access to much of this infrastructure was not available to all, especially those farmers in the UHV who were a support base for the insurgency. The poor condition of roads and bridges in the valley, or lack thereof, greatly inhibited the transportation of licit crops. Coca's durability allowed it to survive the time it would take to transport it, compared to the same time that would cause legitimate crops to spoil. Additionally, farmers generally were not forced to move their coca product; traffickers would come to their farms to pick it up. Aware of this problem, the Peruvian army, upon moving into the UHV with BG Arciniega, made it a point to allow legitimate farmers primary use of the roads and bridges it constructed in the area in order for them to get to markets in a timely manner and dissuade them from feeling as if they had to grow coca for this reason.²⁰¹ Afghanistan has also suffered from this very same problem with transportation. Under the Alternative Development Pillar of the 5-Pillar CN strategy, the US paid \$32 million in cash-for-work salaries for infrastructure rehabilitation

resulting in the construction of 1,000 km of rural roads to directly encourage economic alternatives for the Afghan people by making it easier for them to transport licit crops to markets.²⁰² Also, in both countries, one of the major platforms for insurgent groups is to provide essential services to the people because of the lack of infrastructure that the government has previously been unable, or unwilling, to provide.

The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan has also been seen as a distinct difference between the two countries that greatly alters the situation in either country. The continued existence of US and ISAF militaries in the country is certainly a point of contention for some segments of Afghan society. However, from invasions by the Mongols, the Russians, British, and the Soviets, Afghans have always had an aversion to the presence of foreigners on their land. There is no reason why all of a sudden in 2005 this would cause this major increase in violence. This hatred could have added more to this intensification since the eradication was vigorously backed by the US Government and not by the Afghan government themselves at first.²⁰³ Eradication has only increased this hatred for foreign occupation, because of the loss of livelihoods by poppy farmers. Yet, this revulsion for foreign intervention was also seen in Peru when SL used US eradication to construct a nationalist agenda to entice people who might not have been attracted by their Marxist policy, but more so hated “Yankee interference.”²⁰⁴ Thus, a foreign military presence, while it can be an irritant, was present in both situations and only seemed to add to the rage that eradication fomented.

Current CN strategy in Afghanistan does look optimistic in some areas. One of the greatest hurdle overcome was the US has abandoning eradication in 2009. Since then, there now appears to be four pillars in the CN strategy. However, as the case of Nangarhar in late 2007 demonstrates, eradication can be used if an insurgent threat is extremely low and if alternative livelihood opportunities are robust. There was poppy grown in Afghanistan before the Taliban; there will be poppy grown after. Presently, eradication is a tool that should be kept aside from use in the riskiest provinces now because the need to gain the allegiance of the people is the priority. If the Taliban is able to be diminished to such a low level so as to not constitute a threat, involuntary eradication WITH appropriate alternative livelihoods should be utilized to suppress the drug trade and hopefully impede the illicit product’s usefulness to the

insurgency to once more stage a comeback.²⁰⁵

Though eradication has ceased with the US and ISAF, the Afghan government still utilizes it.²⁰⁶ Despite the US State Department listing, in mid-2010, expansion of alternative development programs as an objective, it will still take time to develop the capacity and manpower to see this through. If this increase is not able to meet the demands of the people for aid because of Afghan-led eradication, then the insurgency could again use this as a way to expand in some areas.²⁰⁷

Joint operations between COIN and CN agencies have resulted in the interdiction and conviction of high value Afghan traffickers. This has allowed intelligence that has been used to piece together their connections to their insurgent contacts and led to their capture or harassment that has kept them from continuing some operations. Additionally they have diminished the entire industry while not negatively affecting the farmers. Resources to continue and expand these investigations should be increasingly allocated because of their usefulness to both COIN and CN platforms.²⁰⁸

Finally, as the US begins to decrease its forces in the country in summer 2011, new demands have surfaced. First, since both COIN and CN strategies are long-term endeavors, the US and ISAF are now even more impelled to establish policies to expedite success in both areas. However, with the dependence of CN operations on US and ISAF resources, developing the capability for CN agencies to continue independently is a priority. One key aspect of this is transportation, namely helicopters. As a 2010 GAO report states “The shortage of helicopters in Afghanistan for counternarcotics missions is similar to a big city in the U.S. without patrol cars.”²⁰⁹ The report also clearly illustrates this importance of air assets to CN by adding, “**There is no end game capability in Afghanistan without the appropriate number of helicopters.**”²¹⁰[emphasis in bold from original] The helicopter issue is just one of many that planners must delve in to ensure that the essential elements for CN and COIN success continue to remain present in Afghanistan as Western forces slowly depart.

Conclusion

In narcotics-involved insurgencies, vigilance is the price of victory; vigilance to ensure the population is not enticed to support the insurgents and renew their involvement in narcotics. Unfortunately we can see that vigilance is slipping in Peru. 2009 was the third consecutive year coca cultivation has increased.²¹¹ Even more worrisome is this headline from the same year: “Cocaine Trade Helps Rebels Reignite War in Peru.” SL has reemerged from the jungle; defending traffickers, extorting taxes from farmers and running its own cocaine laboratories. Alarmed about the revived group and increasing coca, the government re-strengthened the COIN campaign in August 2008, and the violence surged. The guerrillas killed at least 26 people that year, including 22 soldiers and police officers, the bloodiest year in almost a decade. Additionally, ghosts of the past have resurfaced with allegations that Peruvian soldiers killed at least five civilians and are involved in the expulsion of dozens of families from villages where SL is active.²¹²

Alternatively, NATO forces seem to be understanding that they must integrate their COIN and CN strategies. In a June 2010 international forum in Moscow, titled “Drug Production in Afghanistan: A Challenge for the International Community”, NATO officials tried to rebuff Russian calls for mass aerial eradication by arguing that the most successful way to restrain Afghan trafficking would be to diminish the insurgency, build up a strong central government with the ability to maintain law and order throughout the nation, and restore the national economy so that citizens can earn their livings through licit means. In the meantime, NATO officials present were adamant that the coalition could make considerable improvement through interdiction and focusing on the major Afghan trafficking networks while continuing to create independent Afghan law enforcement agencies and pursuing other redevelopment programs that concentrate on the core reasons why people turn to the drug trade in the first place.²¹³ While these attitudes are encouraging, developing these into actual widespread policies to be put into practice is what will actually change the situation on the ground and what is always the most difficult. Only outcomes will dictate how much the ideas expressed by these NATO representatives in Moscow is shared and effectively applied in the field.

Illicit drug markets and armed conflict fundamentally alter one another when both intertwine. A majority of insurgent groups engaged in hostilities seize the opportunity of being involved in narcotics. This broadens their resources and complicates the threat they present to nations. By creating economic opportunities for insurgents, illegal drug production increases the violence and period of conflicts.²¹⁴ To greatly diminish the threat that insurgencies and narcotics represent, it is necessary to deal with the most urgent danger to the state first: the insurgent group. CN operations may continue, but since many outcomes of these can be detrimental to the COIN strategy, their goals must be secondary to those of the fight against rebel groups. Stability is the foundation that allows CN operations to begin that address the economic and political incentives for the population to voluntarily forsake their roles in the illicit industry. The history of SL and the Peruvian government is testament to this description. After years of failed policies that have led to the resurgence of the Taliban, ISAF and ANSF have begun to introduce policies that seek to redress the grievances farmers have for supporting the insurgency and growing poppies.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16, 2010 General David Petraeus, current ISAF Commander, then Commander of U.S. Central Command, said, “[a] major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which provides significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has been the “oxygen” in the air that allows these groups to operate.”²¹⁵ The illicit drug industry is a dangerous tool insurgencies can use to increase their popular legitimacy and financial means. But as SL has shown, the group’s firm reliance on coca was also a weakness. Once the right government strategy denied SL the use of coca as a grievance for the people and a financial outlet, using General Petraeus’ analogy, the organization was deprived of its “oxygen” and the narcos were later denied its product when legitimate opportunities flowed to the coccaleros, allowing the coca industry to wither. Evidence in this paper has clearly shown that the basic elements of the Peruvian situation also appear to be in Afghanistan. Subordinating anti-drug operations to strategies that seek the defeat of the insurgency by prioritizing operations that seek to break up the financial and political relationship between the growers, the traffickers, and the insurgents, such as in Peru, offer a fresh approach in Afghanistan to

establishing the nation-wide stability that can aid in building peace and legitimate prosperity to this war-torn land.

¹Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 225.

²David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, (Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York), pp. 63-66.

³Ibid., p. 110.

⁴Glen Weaver, "Afghanistan's Opium Alternative: Poppy Fields to Wheat Fields," *Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal* (Volume 12, Issue 2, Summer 2010), p. 49.

⁵Thomas A. Schweich, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy For Afghanistan, (US State Dept.: August 2007), pp. 17-18.

⁶Robert Bridge, "Russia slams NATO for losing Afghan opium war" *RT* (March 1, 2011).
<http://rt.com/politics/russia-opium-afghanistan-nato/>

⁷Richard Weitz, "Russia's dangerous fix," *Foreign Policy* (June 21, 2010).
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/russias_dangerous_fix

⁸Kathy Lally, "Russia's heroin problem and ongoing battles over Afghan poppy fields" *Washington Post Foreign Service* (October 30, 2010)
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/30/AR2010103002117.html?sid=ST2010103005003>

⁹Paul Gootenberg, "Reluctance or resistance? Constructing cocaine (prohibitions) in Peru, 1910-50," *Cocaine: Global Histories* (Routledge: London and New York, 1999), p. 69.

¹⁰David Scott Palmer, "Introduction: History, Politics, and Shining Path in Peru," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 14.

¹¹Peter R. Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris F. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Dead-End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* (No. 85, Winter 199-1992), p. 113.

¹²Gabriela Tarazona- Seviliano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 75.

¹³Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, (Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, UK, 2006), p. 140.

¹⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 40-41.

¹⁵T. David Mason, Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational Peasant, (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Md., 2004), pp. 255-256.

¹⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 38-39.

¹⁷Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html

¹⁸Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 104.

¹⁹T. David Mason, Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational Peasant, (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Md., 2004), p. 255.

-
- ²⁰Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 111.
- ²¹Vanda Felbabova, "Getting Hooked: The Insurgency/ Drug Nexus" *Breakthroughs* (Vol. 12: No.1, Spring 2003), p. 19.
- ²²Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html
- ²³ Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 48-49.
- ²⁴Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 123.
- ²⁵Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 47.
- ²⁶Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 123.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 118.
- ²⁸Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 103.
- ²⁹Vanda Felbabova, "Getting Hooked: The Insurgency/ Drug Nexus" *Breakthroughs* (Vol. 12: No.1, Spring 2003), p. 17.
- ³⁰Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 103.
- ³¹Federal Research Division, A Global Overview Of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist And Other Extremist Groups, (Library Of Congress: Washington DC, 2002), pp. 67-68.
- ³²Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 140.
- ³³Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, p. 2, www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html
- ³⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 44.
- ³⁵Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 104.
- ³⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 44.
- ³⁷Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 97.
- ³⁸Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 126.
- ³⁹Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade," *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Vol. III, Root Causes* (Praeger: Westport, 2006), p. 181.
- ⁴⁰Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 140.
- ⁴¹Peter R. Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris F. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Dead-End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* (No. 85, Winter 199-1992), p. 113.

-
- ⁴²Vanda Felbabova, "Getting Hooked: The Insurgency/ Drug Nexus" *Breakthroughs* (Vol. 12: No.1, Spring 2003), pp. 20-21.
- ⁴³Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 126.
- ⁴⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, p. 2, www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html
- ⁴⁵Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 127.
- ⁴⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, p. 2, www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html
- ⁴⁷Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 133.
- ⁴⁸Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 54.
- ⁴⁹Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 134.
- ⁵⁰Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 54-55.
- ⁵¹Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 148.
- ⁵²Peter A. Stern, *Sendero Luminoso : An Annotated Bibliography of the Shining Path Guerrilla Movement, 1980-1993*, (University of New Mexico: New Mexico, 1995), p. xvi.
- ⁵³Peter R. Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris F. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Dead-End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* (No. 85, Winter 199-1992), p. 114.
- ⁵⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 55.
- ⁵⁵US General Accounting Office, "The Drug War: U.S. Programs In Peru Face Serious Obstacles" Report to Congressional Requestors (GAO/NSIAD-92-36: October 1991) pp. 5,33.
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ⁵⁷Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 58.
- ⁵⁸Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 135.
- ⁵⁹Gen. Alberto Arciniega Huby, "Rebuttal to In the Cocaine War... the Jungle is winning," *New York Times* (April 1, 1990), <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/01/magazine/1-jungle-is-winning-the-cocaine-war-585690.html?pagewanted=1>
- ⁶⁰Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 56.
- ⁶¹Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 136.
- ⁶²Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 57.

⁶³Peter R. Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris F. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Dead-End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* (No. 85, Winter 199-1992), p. 116.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 122.

⁶⁵Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 107.

⁶⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 58-62.

⁶⁷Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca" and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 114.

⁶⁸United Nations International Drug Control Program, Alternative Development In The Andean Area (United Nations Publication: New York, 2001), p. 70.

⁶⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010, (United Nations: New York, 2010), p. 16.

⁷⁰Peter R. Andreas, Eva C. Bertram, Morris F. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Dead-End Drug Wars," *Foreign Policy* (No. 85, Winter 199-1992), pp. 121-122.

⁷¹Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 63.

⁷²Bruce H. Kay, "Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of "King Coca and Shining Path", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Vol. 41: No. 3, Autumn, 1999), p. 110.

⁷³Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 64-67.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.61-62.

⁷⁷Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 29.

⁷⁸Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 114.

⁷⁹Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 319.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 318-319.

⁸¹Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 115-119.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁸³Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 33.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸⁵Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 116.

⁸⁶Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War : the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina, (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2003), pp. 46-49.

-
- ⁸⁷ Alfred W. McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade" *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes* (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 55.
- ⁸⁸ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 44.
- ⁸⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 319.
- ⁹⁰ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), pp. 48-49.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
- ⁹² Alfred W. McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade" *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes* (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 55.
- ⁹³ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 45.
- ⁹⁴ Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris, *The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border*, (Ashgate: Burlington VT, 2003), pp. 53-54.
- ⁹⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 119.
- ⁹⁶ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 57.
- ⁹⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 119.
- ⁹⁸ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 53.
- ⁹⁹ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 118.
- ¹⁰⁰ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 55.
- ¹⁰¹ Alfred W. McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade" *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes* (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 66.
- ¹⁰² Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, (Rand: Santa Monica, 2008), p. 27.
- ¹⁰³ Alfred W. McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade" *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes* (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 66.
- ¹⁰⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 121.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- ¹⁰⁶ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 62.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 58.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
- ¹¹² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2009*, (United Nations: New York, 2009), p. 34.

-
- ¹¹³Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (Rand: Santa Monica, CA, 2008), p. 38-39.
- ¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ¹¹⁵ Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 77.
- ¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 77.
- ¹¹⁷Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 125.
- ¹¹⁸ Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris, The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, (Ashgate: Burlington VT, 2003), p. 56.
- ¹¹⁹United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009, (United Nations: New York, 2009), p. 34.
- ¹²⁰Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War : the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina, (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2003), p. 33.
- ¹²¹Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 131.
- ¹²²Kristin E. Boon, Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., "Document No. 13 Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy, Hearing Before the Commotee on International Relations, February 12, 2004," *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 462.
- ¹²³Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 93-95.
- ¹²⁴ Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 133.
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- ¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 197.
- ¹²⁷United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009, (United Nations: New York, 2009), pp. 34.
- ¹²⁸ Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 204.
- ¹²⁹Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 28.
- ¹³⁰Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 136-137.
- ¹³¹Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 27.
- ¹³²Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 2009), p. 136.
- ¹³³Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), pp. 27-28.
- ¹³⁴ Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 199-200.
- ¹³⁵Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 133.
- ¹³⁶ Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 373.
- ¹³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 321.

¹³⁸Kristin E. Boon, Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., "Document No. 16 Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?", Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-13, February 15, 2007," *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 630.

¹³⁹Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 193.

¹⁴⁰Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 106.

¹⁴¹Kristin E. Boon, Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., "Document No. 16 Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?", Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-13, February 15, 2007," *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 630.

¹⁴²Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), pp. 141-142.

¹⁴³ Thomas A. Schweich, *U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy For Afghanistan*, (US State Dept.: August 2007), pp. 17-18.

¹⁴⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 107.

¹⁴⁵Paul Rexton Kan, "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* (Vol. 19: No. 4), p. 587.

¹⁴⁶Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 326.

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment 2011 (Phase 1)*, (United Nations: Vienna, Austria, 2011), p. 1.

¹⁴⁸Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 107.

¹⁴⁹Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Vol. 28: No. 4, Autumn 2005), p. 62.

¹⁵⁰Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, Jim Gavrillis, *Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How different units adapted to local conditions*, (CNA Analysis & Solutions: Alexandria, VA, 2010), pp. 84-85.
<<http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Counterinsurgency%20on%20the%20Ground%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>>

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁵³Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 125.

¹⁵⁴Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 100.

¹⁵⁵Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 31.

¹⁵⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 101.

¹⁵⁷United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2009*, (United Nations: New York, 2009), p. 187.

¹⁵⁸Ali A. Jalali, "The Future of Afghanistan," *Parameters* (Spring 2006), p. 13.

¹⁵⁹United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009), p. 106.

¹⁶⁰Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 26.

¹⁶¹Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 221.

¹⁶²Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), pp. 18-19.

¹⁶³ Gen. Stanley McChrystal, "COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified)," *Washington Post*, (September 21, 2009).
<http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf>

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009), pp. 17, 77.

¹⁶⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment 2011 (Phase 1), (United Nations: Vienna, Austria, 2011), p. 11.

¹⁶⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Statement Of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow In Foreign Policy At The Brookings Institution to U.S. Senate Caucus On International Narcotics Control" (October 21, 2009).
<<http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/VANDA-FELBAB-BROWN-10-21-09.pdf>>

¹⁶⁸ Michael Huffman, "The Churchill Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan," *Newsflavor* (January 15, 2010).
<<http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/2010/01/15/the-churchill-counternarcotics-strategy-for-afghanistan/>>

¹⁶⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009), pp. 79.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁷¹Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 111.

¹⁷²David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, (Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York), p. 64.

¹⁷³Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 29.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. i.

¹⁷⁵Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 154.

¹⁷⁶Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 110.

¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁷Stratfor Global Intelligence, "Afghanistan: Global Trade Hub for Illicit Opiates," *Stratfor* (March 29, 2010), p.2.

¹⁷⁸Gen. Stanley McChrystal, "COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified)," *Washington Post*, (September 21, 2009).
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf

¹⁷⁹Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 60-61.

-
- ¹⁸⁰ Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación – Perú, *Hatun Watanay* (2003), p. 31.
http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/17123/original/Hatun_Willakuy.pdf
- ¹⁸¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2010*, (United Nations: New York, 2010), p. 16.
- ¹⁸² Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, (Viking: New York, 2008), p. 318.
- ¹⁸³ William Byrd and Christopher Ward, “Drugs and Development In Afghanistan,” *The World Bank Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction* (No. 18, December 2004), p. 13.
- ¹⁸⁴ Paul Rexton Kan, “Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (Vol.19: No. 4, 2006), p. 595.
- ¹⁸⁵ Kristin E. Boon, Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., ”Document No. 16 Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-13, February 15, 2007,” *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 628.
- ¹⁸⁶ United Nations International Drug Control Program, *Alternative Development In The Andean Area* (United Nations Publication: New York, 2001), p.
- ¹⁸⁷ Ali A. Jalali, “The Future Of Afghanistan,” *Parameters* (Spring 2006), p. 12.
- ¹⁸⁸ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium*, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009), p. 105.
- ¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ¹⁹⁰ Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Afghanistan: Global Trade Hub for Illicit Opiates,” *Stratfor* (March 29, 2010), p. 7.
- ¹⁹¹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*, (Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York), pp. 64-65.
- ¹⁹² Caucus on International Narcotics Control, *U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy In Afghanistan*, (US Senate: Washington DC, July 2010), p. 38.
- ¹⁹³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium*, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009), p. 98.
- ¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 81- 88.
- ¹⁹⁵ Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service* (October 7, 2009), p. 32.
- ¹⁹⁶ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention,” *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1), p. 101.
- ¹⁹⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2009*, (United Nations: New York, 2009), pp. 44-55.
- ¹⁹⁸ Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Afghanistan: Global Trade Hub for Illicit Opiates,” *Stratfor* (March 29, 2010), p. 2.
- ¹⁹⁹ Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror*, (Picador: New York, 2010), p. 104.
- ²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.
- ²⁰¹ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington DC, 2010), p. 39.

-
- ²⁰² Thomas A. Schweich, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy For Afghanistan, (US State Dept.: August 2007), p. 17.
- ²⁰³ Richard Holbrooke, “Still Wrong in Afghanistan,” *The Washington Post* (January 23, 2008), p. A19.
- ²⁰⁴ Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990), p. 111
- ²⁰⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Statement Of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow In Foreign Policy At The Brookings Institution to U.S. Senate Caucus On International Narcotics Control” (October 21, 2009).
<<http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/VANDA-FELBAB-BROWN-10-21-09.pdf>>
- ²⁰⁶ Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy In Afghanistan, (US Senate: Washington DC, July 2010), p. 2.
- ²⁰⁷ Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Report on U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan: Strategy to dismantle insurgency, drugs, corruption and criminality, (U.S. Department of State: Washington DC, March 24 2010)
<<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100506165948xjsnommis0.6096765.html>>
- ²⁰⁸ Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy In Afghanistan, (US Senate: Washington DC, July 2010), p. 6.
- ²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ²¹¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010, (United Nations: New York, 2010), p. 162.
- ²¹² Simon Romero, “Cocaine Trade Helps Rebels Reignite War in Peru,” *The New York Times*, (March 17, 2009).
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/world/americas/18peru.html?_r=1>
- ²¹³ Richard Weitz, “Russia’s dangerous fix” *Foreign Policy* (June 21, 2010).
<http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/russias_dangerous_fix>
- ²¹⁴ Svante E. Cornell, “The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* (Vol. 42: No. 6, November 2005), p. 757.
- ²¹⁵ Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy In Afghanistan, (US Senate: Washington DC, July 2010), p. 24.

Bibliography

Boon, Kristin E., Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., "Document No. 13 Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and US Security Policy, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, February 12, 2004," *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Boon, Kristin E., Aziz Huq, and Douglas C. Lovelace, ed., "Document No. 16 Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-13, February 15, 2007," *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, Narco-Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Bridge, Robert, "Russia slams NATO for losing Afghan opium war" *RT* (March 1, 2011).
<<http://rt.com/politics/russia-opium-afghanistan-nato/>>

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Report on U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan: Strategy to dismantle insurgency, drugs, corruption and criminality, (U.S. Department of State: Washington DC, March 24 2010)
<<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100506165948xjsnommis0.6096765.html>>

Byrd, William, and Christopher Ward, "Drugs And Development In Afghanistan," *The World Bank Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction* (No. 18, December 2004).

Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy In Afghanistan, (US Senate: Washington DC, July 2010).

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación – Perú, *Hatun Watanay* (2003).
http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/17123/original/Hatun_Willakuy.pdf

Cornell, Svante E. "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* (Vol. 42: No. 6, November 2005).

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Vol. 28: No. 4, Autumn 2005).

Felbabova, Vanda, "Getting Hooked: The Insurgency/ Drug Nexus" *Breakthroughs* (Vol. 12: No.1, Spring 2003).

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, "Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 16: No. 1, 2001).

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Shooting Up, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2010).

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, "Statement Of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow In Foreign Policy At The Brookings Institution to U.S. Senate Caucus On International Narcotics Control" (October 21, 2009).
<<http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/VANDA-FELBAB-BROWN-10-21-09.pdf>>

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, "The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, (Winter 2005)

www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=Winter05/&filename=felbabbrown.html

Felbab-Brown, Vanda, "The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade" *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Vol. III, Root Causes* (Praeger: Westport, CT, 2006).

Kilcullen, David, The Accidental Guerilla, (Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York).

Lally, Kathy, "Russia's heroin problem and ongoing battles over Afghan poppy fields," *Washington Post Foreign Service* (October 30, 2010)

<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/30/AR2010103002117.html?sid=ST2010103005003>>

McChrystal, Stanley, "COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified)," *Washington Post*, (September 21, 2009).

<http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf>

McCoy, Alfred W., "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade," *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes* ed. Michael K. Steinberg, et al. (Oxford University Press: New York).

Meyerle, Jerry, et al., Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How different units adapted to local conditions (CNA Analysis & Solutions: Alexandria, VA, 2010).

<<http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Counterinsurgency%20on%20the%20Ground%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>>

Palmer, David Scott, "Introduction: History, Politics, and Shining Path in Peru" *The Shining Path of Peru* (St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Peters, Gretchen, Seeds of Terror, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 2009).

Rashid, Ahmed, Descent Into Chaos, (Viking: New York, 2008).

Romero, Simon "Cocaine Trade Helps Rebels Reignite War in Peru," *The New York Times*, (March 17, 2009).

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/world/americas/18peru.html?_r=1

Schweich, Thomas A., U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy For Afghanistan, (US State Dept.: August 2007).

Tarazona- Sevillano, Gabriela, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, (Praeger: New York, 1990).

Taylor, Lewis, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, (Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, UK, 2006).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment 2011 (Phase 1), (United Nations: Vienna, Austria, 2011).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, (United Nations: Vienna, 2009).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009, (United Nations: New York, 2009).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010, (United Nations: New York, 2009).

US General Accounting Office, “The Drug War: U.S. Programs In Peru Face Serious Obstacles” Report to Congressional Requestors (GAO/NSIAD-92-36: October 1991).

Weaver, Glen, “Afghanistan’s Opium Alternative: Poppy Fields to Wheat Fields,” *Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal* (Volume 12, Issue 2, Summer 2010).

Weitz, Richard, “Russia's dangerous fix,” *Foreign Policy* (June 21, 2010).
<http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/russias_dangerous_fix>