ON DEMAND ARMS:
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

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By

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Executive Summary

Private Military Companies (PMCs) have become major actors in international affairs. As they continue to participate in internal conflicts throughout the developing world, PMCs are increasingly being relied upon to train forces, provide logistical support and engage in direct combat, as they have recently done in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While they have spurred countless debates about regulation, accountability and the changing nature of warfare, there has been little empirical research on the record of PMC use. This paper aims to fill that gap by examining four case studies, Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone and Angola, Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) in Croatia and Sandline International in Papua New Guinea. Based on the case studies, indicators of success and failure were derived in an effort to learn from the lessons of past experiences in order to better inform decision makers considering retaining PMCs to terminate ongoing conflicts.

This paper argues that several indicators are present in all instances of success: close cooperation with the indigenous military, simultaneous political processes to address underlying causes of the conflict, and foreign support for the use of a PMC. Additionally, several indicators are present in the failures, including a lack of popular support for the retention of a PMC, lack of parallel political processes to address root causes and international pressure to force out the PMC. Indicators which do not appear to correlate with particular outcomes include the regime type of the government retaining
the PMC, the type of conflict the PMC is called in to terminate, the goals the PMC is meant to achieve and allegations of abuse on the part of the PMC.

This is vital knowledge for policymakers considering the use of a PMC for ending a conflict as it helps them to evaluate whether a PMC can be successful in terminating the conflict and also provides them with information for how to increase the chances of success. For example, one indicator of success, the need for close collaboration with the indigenous military, means that a PMC is not likely to be able to terminate a conflict in a country that either does not have a military or one in which it will not be able to collaborate closely with the military. Furthermore, this information is helpful to policymakers since it shows that they can increase chances of success by mandating that the PMC train the military to be effective even once the PMC departs. It also leads to the realization that PMCs are not substitutes for standing militaries, as insurgents or rebels can simply wait for the PMC to leave the country, as they did in Sierra Leone.

The paper concludes with a series of lessons learned and policy implications which discuss whether PMCs could be used to address the ongoing conflicts in Darfur, Sudan and the Congo. Based on an evaluation according to the indicators distilled in this paper, it appears that PMCs are unlikely to present a viable solution to the conflicts given current circumstances.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in the post Cold War era has prompted both an academic and a political debate over the use of such firms as a policy for dealing with the multitude of conflicts taking place around the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, as major powers have become more hesitant towards engaging in internal wars in the developing world, PMCs have stepped in to fill a void. These corporate entities, which are staffed by ex-military personnel from around the globe and in possession of advanced weaponry, have played primary roles in conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, Papua New Guinea, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia and elsewhere. On one hand, several prominent academics and decision makers, such as Doug Brooks, tout the benefits of PMC use in internal conflicts that states themselves cannot resolve and that other nations do not wish to engage in for various reasons. On the other hand, many

1 PMCs are defined as legally established multinational commercial enterprises offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and by military means and/or the transfer or enhancement of that potential to clients. Carlos Ortiz. The Private Military Company: An Entity at the Center of Overlapping Spheres of Commercial Activity and Responsibility,” in Jäger, Thomas and Kümmel, Gerhard (eds). Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects. (Verlag, 2007), 60-61.

2 Such scholars include: David Shearer, “Outsourcing War”; Doug Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services.” David Isenberg, “Soldiers of Fortune, Ltd. For a discussion on the use of PMCs by democracies, see Martin Binder. “Norms versus Rationality: Why Democracies Use Private Military Companies in Civil Wars.” Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfall and Prospects. (VS Verlag, 2007), 307- 320. Binder asserts that “the contradictory effect of liberal norms and cost-benefit calculations can lead to the use of PMCs. When Western democracies are faced with internal wars in other countries, liberal norms foster support for intervention in humanitarian crises, while cost-benefit calculations often make these states reluctant to intervene in regions of little geo-strategic importance. This dilemma can lead to the use of PMCs in responding to the humanitarian impulse “to do something,” while also reducing the financial, military and
scholars caution against the proliferation of privatized security. They argue that these firms exacerbate conflicts instead of mitigating them and do not provide lasting effects, instead leaving more problems in their wake.\(^3\)

Given the rate at which security is becoming increasingly privatized, many scholars agree that PMCs are here to stay.\(^4\) In the words of one analyst, “as long as conflict persists, so will the PMCs.”\(^5\) As even governments of countries with advanced militaries, such as the United States, continue to rely on these firms in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is likely that PMCs will continue to play a role in conflicts around the world in the future.

Since the current manifestation of the mercenary as a corporate entity that has largely existed only since the end of the Cold War, PMCs have not been studied rigorously to determine what role they should play and how they should play it. In Africa, Europe and the Pacific Rim, governments have contracted with such companies with varying degrees of success to fight against opposition groups and maintain the status quo.

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\(^3\) Scholars on this side of the debate include: Sean Cleary, “Angola: A Case Study of Private Military Involvement”; Henry Sanchez, “Why Do States Hire Private Military Companies?”; Sanchez, for example, cites the continuing problems in Sierra Leone, Angola and Papua New Guinea, where conflicts are still ongoing.

\(^4\) Prominent scholars including Herbert Howe (Georgetown University, David Shearer (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Peter Singer (Brookings Institution), Doug Brooks (Harvard University), David Isenberg (Cato Institute) among others. During the period from 1987 to 1994, the figure for total military forces fell from 28,320,000 to 23,500,000, and these experienced military personnel formed dozens of PMCs, 90 just in Africa alone, according to Doug Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services.” *International Peacekeeping* Volume 7, Issue 4 (Winter 2000). Considering the fact that militaries continue to downsize in the post Cold War era, this trend will continue: “Basic economics explains that the intersection of a supply and demand curve in the case at hand creates a market in which a high demand dictates a high price.”

\(^5\) Kevin O’Brien. “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries.” *Royal United Service Institute Journal.* (February 2000).
But unless a country simply has no other options, how should it judge whether PMC involvement is likely to be a successful policy option?

While PMCs have been successful in achieving narrow mandates in many of the conflicts they have participated in thus far, it is important to understand what functions they can and cannot serve. Noted scholar Herbert Howe and analyst David Isenberg make the point that PMCs should not be seen as a solution to every problem. Indeed, if PMCs become the only alternative these countries see, this will only cause more problems. PMCs are at best a part of the solutions to every problem, since conflicts must be settled not only militarily but also politically. Scholarship on the topic so far has resulted in various in depth case studies of single operations or profiles of a single company. However, no typology has been attempted in an effort to compare cases and synthesize data from them. This paper is thus a natural outgrowth of the scholarship that has already been completed on the subject.

This paper aims to fill a research gap by first producing a list of factors with which to evaluate PMC use as a means for terminating a conflict. The second goal of the research is to then synthesize a list of indicators which would suggest that the prevalence

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6 Examples include:
of certain factors is indicative of whether PMC involvement is likely to be a success or a failure.

If all failed cases are ones where the PMC must work with the challenges posed by a failed state, and successes take place when a legitimate government with widespread popular support retains the PMCs, these indicators can prove to be highly indicative of the likely result in a similar future situation should a PMC become involved, or be considered as an option. Conversely, the conclusions can serve to warn policymakers that while PMC involvement may be viable, other political actions must be taken for a PMC military success to turn into a long term political success.

Scope of the Paper

This paper is not meant to serve as an endorsement for the use of PMCs as an ideal or even desirable option for ending conflicts. Instead, it explores the question of whether PMCs can be used as a viable policy option for ending conflicts and how to determine whether indicators of success or failure exist to better help policy makers by informing them about the potential outcomes of the use of a PMC in future situations. Policymakers can judge whether a conflict is conducive to PMC use and also ensure that past mistakes are not followed to increase chances of success. This paper does not make any assertions regarding issues of regulation, accountability or oversight. These issues,

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7 For more information on these issues see:
Accountability and Regulation-
International Law-
while important, fall outside the limited focus of this thesis. PMCs, as will be shown in the paper, may not be suitable for every conflict or situation.

Note on Data

While the topic of PMC use in conflicts has generated widespread scholarship over the last two decades, including some four dozen major publications from respected organizations published in leading journals, the fact that terms of contracts and other pertinent data remain classified or secret as proprietary information, presents a major hurdle to being able to study the phenomenon empirically. Even the seminal works on the subject, including books such as Armies without States: The Privatization of Security by Robert Mandel, one of the most oft-cited books on the subject, and Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States by leading scholar Herbert Howe, rely primarily on secondary sources and very few interviews with those involved.


For a complete listing of all publications dealing with PMCs since 1990, see “Publications” at http://www.privatemilitary.org/pmcbibliography.html.

This is unsurprising. The one contract that is available in the public domain, between Prime Minister Chan of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International, was made public after public outcry caused the contract to be broken and an investigation launched into whether PNG was still responsible for paying the PMC. It contains a provision that can be surmised to have been included in all of the contracts negotiated between the PMCs and their client governments: “Sandline will ensure that the contents of this agreement shall remain strictly confidential and will not be disclosed to any third party. Sandline will not acknowledge the existence of this contract…” “Agreement for the Provision of Military Assistance Dated this 31 Day of January 1997 between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International. http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/PNG/htmls/Sandline.html.
The only available contract between a PMC and a client government is the one signed by Sandline and Papua New Guinea. Given the similarities in the cases being studied, however, it can be surmised that the other contracts roughly paralleled that one. In addition, the British government’s investigation into Executive Outcome’s involvement in Sierra Leone, the “Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation,” provides information from interviews with those involved and makes reference to several of the other cases. Information in secondary sources has been cross-referenced with these available primary sources.

Given this data problem, the results of this research cannot be deemed conclusive, and the hypothesis will need to be retested once additional primary source data becomes available. Documents pertinent to any new analysis would include government records about the specific roles played by PMCs in the various conflicts, texts of the contracts signed between the PMC and client government and internal documents of the PMCs themselves about their involvement.

Since PMC use in conflicts around the globe has generated a great deal of interest and continues to increase, especially among leaders on the African continent and in the Middle East, it is therefore necessary to study the subject using currently available data. This paper relies on the few available primary sources, and the most oft-cited secondary sources in the form of peer-reviewed journal articles.

Inspired by the theoretical discussions of the costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages and other such debates in the literature, this thesis aims to answer the
following question: Is it possible to evaluate past cases of PMC use and synthesize indicators of success or failure to better inform policymakers considering use of a PMC? This research represents a step towards empirically testing the extent to which past PMC involvement has been successful, in an effort to better inform policymakers about how to use them in the future through the identification of indicators which can help policymakers determine if PMC use is a viable policy option for ending a particular conflict.

**The Proliferation of Privatized Security: Framing the Debate**

Private Military Companies are becoming an increasingly attractive policy option as they continue to make substantial contributions to conflict termination. PMCs rose to prominence in the post Cold War era, when the world’s superpowers became far less interested in engaging in battles in countries that were no longer strategically important nor worth the cost, risk and political capital. For example, France has stated that it will no longer “engage in unilateral military interventions in Africa,” creating what scholar David Shearer terms a “strategic vacuum.” Indeed, while the desire to exists to

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intervene to end bloodshed, serious cost-benefit calculations make intervention less likely when it does not further a state’s strategic interests.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the fact that major powers are now less interested in engaging in conflict resolution in the developing world than they were during the Cold War, (when these conflicts were viewed within the context of the war between capitalism and communism) internal conflicts in developing countries continue to proliferate.\textsuperscript{14} Examples include the genocide in Darfur, the civil war in the Congo and recently, increased piracy off the coast of Somalia. No country thus far has willing to take concrete steps to resolve the situations through military intervention. The costs are simply too high and the national will too low. PMCs, made up of experienced military personnel, are willing to take the risks when the price is right.\textsuperscript{15}

For the leaders/governments of countries in the developing world, many of whom face internal threats from opposition groups and armed insurgents, PMCs provide a possible solution in situations where, for example, no standing army exists and foreign intervention cannot be secured. They are a flexible, temporary and potentially less expensive option, when compared with the costs and infrastructure needs associated with assembling and maintaining a standing army.\textsuperscript{16} And most importantly, PMCs are able to deploy quickly, meaning that the conflict need not continue while a country works to

\textsuperscript{13} Binder, “Norms versus Rationality: Why Democracies Use Private Military Companies in Civil Wars.”
\textsuperscript{15} David Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”; Brooks, “Messiahs and Mercenaries.”
\textsuperscript{16} Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
raise, equip and train an army. For example, Executive Outcomes was paid $40 million a year for its work in Angola and less in Sierra Leone. This is far less than the amounts each spent on their armies, which nonetheless remained scattered and unable to effectively engage in the conflicts which erupted in each of these countries. According to Howe, “Angola spent an estimated $515 million on its military in 1994, while Sierra Leone spent $41 million in 1995.” For all of that expenditure, however, the Angolan military remained ineffective in fighting an insurgency force.

PMCs are quick to arrive, experienced, not as sensitive to casualties, and attractive options to governments wary of having an army turn against them in a military coup, for example. These private security providers have played varying roles in conflicts, including training forces (in Saudi Arabia), providing security (for diamond extraction companies in Africa and oil companies in Latin America), assisting with logistics (in Iraq) and engaging in combat operations (in Angola, Sierra Leone, etc.).

PMCs represent a different path to achieving a cessation of hostilities. Unlike multilateral forces, these firms step in to win a conflict for their client. They do not try to remain impartial or simply manage a conflict, because they are hired by only one side and it is to their client that they bear allegiance. Therefore, they stay until a conflict is over,

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18 Howe. “Global Order and Security Privatization.”
19 Ibid.
20 Isenberg, “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.” For example, former Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko refused to train his own military, fearing a revolt, and hired French mercenaries instead.
21 Sanchez. “Why Do States Hire Private Military Companies?”
unlike in situations of peacekeeping missions, which try to maintain an often fragile ceasefire, preventing bloodshed, but also preventing a resolution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{22}

This paper analyzes four prominent cases of PMC use. Indicators of success and failure are distilled from the case studies. Based on the findings, policy recommendations are offered for the use of PMCs in current and future conflicts.

\textsuperscript{22} Shearer, 75.
Chapter 2

Hypotheses

1) It is possible to distill a list of factors with which to evaluate the use of PMCs. **VALID**

2) It is possible to determine the extent to which individual factors have been associated with particular outcomes of PMC use. **VALID**

_Five of nine indicators correlate with a particular outcome._

Methodology

The goal of the research is to produce a list of indicators that are associated with whether PMC involvement is likely to be successful. If, for example, conditions x and y are present in a majority of case studies that ended in successful operations, these are deemed as being correlated with success. If condition z is always prevalent in the failures or those operations which had mixed results, it is deemed to correlate with failure. This analysis may indicate that a new situation where indicators x and y are present is one in which PMC involvement would likely be a viable policy option for terminating the conflict. In those cases in which the same variable is present in all cases regardless of outcome, that indicator’s correlation with a particular outcome is deemed to be inconclusive.

Criteria for Case Selection

To be included in the analysis, cases had to meet the following criteria:
1) To be included in the scope of the research, cases had to be complete, so that an outcome is evident.

2) PMCs were retained by a government to specifically work towards ending an internal conflict through participation in direct combat and/or operational planning.  

3) The conflict must have taken place in the post Cold War period, when PMCs first emerged as a major player in international relations.

4) A sufficient amount of data had to have been available on the case.

**Case Studies**

To that end, the following four completed cases of PMC involvement were analyzed:

1) 1993- Executive Outcomes (South African) in Angola

2) 1994- MPRI (US) in Croatia

3) 1995- Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone

4) 1997- Sandline (British) and Executive Outcomes in Papua New Guinea

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24 This allowed for various other cases to be excluded from the pool, including cases of PMCs training or equipping militaries in peacetime (such as Vinnell Corp is currently doing in Saudi Arabia, etc.) procuring weapons for governments, providing traditional security services for corporations rather than governments to protect assets or personnel or cases where PMCs were hired by governments to complete missions such as training forces in unstable environments that were not experiencing an active conflict. Examples of cases eliminated from the analysis include like British Pertoleum’s contract with Defense Systems Ltd. in Colombia or MPRI’s contract to pursue the War on Drugs in Colombia.

25 While other cases that fit the aforementioned criteria exist, including MPRI’s contract with Bosnia, the four cases chosen were ones about which the greatest amount of data was available and accessible.
Of those rejected from consideration, one case, that of MPRI’s involvement in Bosnia in 1995, was rejected because of similarity to the case in Croatia and because there was no active conflict taking place at the time.26 Another prominent case, that of Defense Systems Ltd’s involvement in protecting British Petroleum assets in 1992, was rejected because the PMC was retained by BP and not the Colombian government. Furthermore, various cases of PMCs training militaries or providing private security to leaders in unstable areas but not those engaged in a conflict at the time of the PMC’s retention, were also rejected because they did not meet the criteria.

Admittedly, there are no post September 11th cases in this study. This is largely because the two ideal case studies, PMC use in Afghanistan and Iraq, are still ongoing. Additionally, there is a lack of accessible information on these two cases as relates to the data that would be necessary to compare these two cases to the case studies in this paper.

**Definitions**

Success is defined by whether the PMC achieved the goal/assignment specified by the authority that hired it.27 For example, Executive Outcomes was retained to prevent the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from taking over Sierra Leone.28 Since the insurgency was defeated and a cessation of hostilities was achieved, this case can be deemed a success. Similarly, MPRI was able to help the Croatians defeat and remove the

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27 Information on goals was drawn from the firms’ websites, the text of available contracts, and interviews conducted by leading scholars such as Herbert Howe.
Serbians entrenched in the Krajina region, thus achieving the goal of training an effective military able to regain its territory.  

Failure is defined as a case in which the goal is not achieved/the conflict is not resolved. Sandline International, contracted to defeat an independence movement in Papua New Guinea, had its forces airlifted out after initial skirmishes between Sandline forces and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. The PMC was extracted before any progress could be made, after a political scandal broke out when the secret contract became public. This case is therefore considered a failure.  

A mixed result is one where only a temporary cessation of hostilities resulted or the PMC was only able to deliver partial achievement of goals. In Angola, Executive Outcomes was hired to defeat UNITA, a rebel group. While EO was able to achieve initial military successes, these were short lived and EO ultimately had to be removed after the Angolan government terminated its contract and replaced EO with a UN force.  

**Points of Comparison**

The following aspects of each case were examined based on available data:

1) Root causes of the conflict (Illegitimate government, failed state, etc)

2) Type of conflict (insurgency, guerilla war, etc.)

3) Reasons why the PMC was retained

4) Popular support for PMC involvement

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29 Silverstein, 169-174.
30 Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
31 Ibid.
5) Role played by PMC/ Types of operations (training, combat, logistics)

6) Terms of the contract/ Goals the PMC was retained to achieve

7) Concurrent foreign or UN involvement/Political processes

8) Allegations of abuse

9) Result- at various points in time (immediately, after a change in government)

10) Form of compensation to the PMC\(^\text{32}\)

11) Circumstances under which the PMC left the country (Forced out, etc.)

12) Consequences of PMC involvement

**Indicators of Success or Failure**

Examining these elements of each instance of PMC involvement provides a more complete picture of the case study. Based on this information, a list of possible indicators of success/failure was generated. This list of indicators is the result of examining salient features of each case, based on available evidence, and concluding that variance in these indicators accounted for the different results. Additionally, data on only these factors was available. It is possible that once more primary sources are available, other indicators could emerge.

Indicators suggesting a correlation with success or failure include:

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\(^{32}\) This is important because in some cases, PMCs have been paid with mining rights or future revenue from mining and problems have arisen in certain places over continued PMC presence after the termination of a conflict, leading to unrest/continuing problems. See Herbert Howe, “Ambiguous Order”; Henry Sanchez, “Why Do States Hire Private Military Companies?” and David Isenberg, “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
1) Regime Type of Client State (failed government with no professional military/government whose legitimacy is questioned?)

2) Type of conflict (Insurgency? Small rebel group demanding concessions?)

3) Goals PMC was meant to achieve and types of operations conducted (Direct combat? Training? Logistics? All three?)

4) Political support for PMC use (Widespread popular support? Foreign support?)

5) Cooperation with the indigenous army

6) Whether a peace settlement was subsequently negotiated and implemented

7) Concurrent foreign or UN intervention/political efforts

8) Allegations of abuse by the PMC

9) Circumstance under which PMC left the country

This list evolved as research was conducted and data on additional elements was located. Possible additional indicators, on which data was not available, include the details of the fighting between PMC forces, soldiers and insurgent/opposition group forces in individual operations. This would be valuable to the extent that it would demonstrate the role played by the PMCs in the individual battles. For example, if the PMC did most of the fighting and tipped the balance in their favor, this would be important and suggest that PMCs must take a lead role in combat. If, however, the PMCs played a small role or mostly played a support role, while the national forces did most of the fighting and won, this could suggest that PMCs are likely to be successful as force multipliers, but not as substitutes for a national force.
Additional information, which is not yet available but would be pertinent to the research, includes data dealing with the details of the individual contracts in the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola to help determine the extent to which the PMCs achieved the specific goals stipulated in the contracts. These contracts could also shed light on what the PMCs were and were not permitted to do in order to achieve their goals.
## Chapter 3

### Analysis

**Table 1: Background Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/ Result</th>
<th>Tactics used by PMC to Achieve Goals</th>
<th>Reasons for PMC Retention</th>
<th># of PMC Personnel</th>
<th>Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995 Croatia/ Success</td>
<td>Training, Operational Planning</td>
<td>Weak national army</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998 Sierra Leone/ Success</td>
<td>Direct Combat, Training</td>
<td>Lack of well trained professional army, International support for PMC involvement to prevent further bloodshed</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$60 million plus future revenue from diamond mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996 Angola/ Mixed Result</td>
<td>Direct Combat, Training</td>
<td>Lack of strong army</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>$60 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Papua New Guinea/ Failure</td>
<td>Direct Combat, Training</td>
<td>Lack of strong army</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>$36 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Assessing Indicator Correlation with Outcomes (Indicators 1-4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/Result</th>
<th>#1 Regime Type</th>
<th>#2 Type of Conflict</th>
<th>#3 PMC Mission</th>
<th>#4 Popular Support for PMC Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia/Success</td>
<td>Transition to democracy</td>
<td>Break up of Yugoslavia, Serb invasion of Krajina region</td>
<td>Train the military, help Croatia become a balancing force against Serbia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone/Success</td>
<td>Constitutional Republic</td>
<td>Rebellion-disputed election results</td>
<td>Status Quo-Defeat RUF, train forces restore order, secure mine, bring about democratic elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola/Mixed Result</td>
<td>Presidential Republic</td>
<td>Insurgency-UNITA</td>
<td>Status Quo-Defeat UNITA, train forces</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea/Failure</td>
<td>Federal Constitutional Monarchy/Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Independence Movement-BRA</td>
<td>Status Quo-Defeat BRA, Secure mine at root of secessionist conflict</td>
<td>Public outrage against Sandline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicators #1 and #2: Regime Type and Type of Conflict**

As the regimes and conflict types were different in each of the case studies analyzed, these two indicators do not appear to correlate with a specific outcome. Despite
the fact that PNG had a recognized, legitimate government in place, the mission failed. In contrast, the Croat government, a legitimate entity recognized by the US, reaped the benefits of successful PMC use. Sierra Leone’s government and that of Angola were both elected yet weak, and both cases saw initial successes. Similarly, the conflicts were each unique. MPRI had to contend with an invading force in Croatia. EO fought against a rebellion in Sierra Leone, and against an insurgency in Angola. Sandline was contracted to defeat an independence movement in Papua New Guinea. Given such wide degrees of variance in the circumstances in these cases, the effects of indicators 1 and 2 on the outcome are deemed to be inconclusive. It is therefore unclear what type of conflict PMCs are most likely to succeed in terminating.

**Indicator #3: PMC Goals/Tactics Used**

A further indicator that does not correlate conclusively with any outcome is that of the goals a PMC was meant to achieve and the tactics that the PMCs used to each them. In all three instances, MPRI, EO and Sandline engaged in combat/operational planning and training, though in the PNG case, direct combat was not included in the contract, but was rather forced upon the Sandline forces when they came under fire. MPRI’s assignment in Croatia was to strengthen the armed forces in the wake of Serbia’s attacks in the early 1990s in the midst of Yugoslavia’s collapse. Once the

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33 Mandel, 111.
34 Mandel, 113- 114.
36 David Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
contract was sanctioned, the PMC undertook military training and worked to help the Croats “run a military force in a democracy with a civilian controlled army.” Only seven months after MPRI began its work, the Croatian military mounted Operation Lightning Storm and was able to recover territory in the Krajina region, which had been held by the Serbs.

The goal in Sierra Leone was multifaceted: Executive Outcomes was tasked with defeating the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, an insurgent group whose aim was to destabilize the elected government, deemed by the group to be illegitimate. Hired by President Valentine Strasser in 1995 when the situation reached a critical point as the RUF seized diamond mines, cutting off a main source of government revenue, Executive Outcomes was tasked with achieving several interconnected goals meant to restore the status quo. The PMC was charged with defeating the RUF, establishing internal order, training the military, securing the mines and facilitating democratic elections. A total of 30 EO soldiers entered the country and completed the assignment. For its services, EO was compensated with $60 million and future diamond revenue.

The situation in Angola was similar in these respects. Facing an insurgency group that the military could not subjugate after two decades of civil war, Angola’s government

37 Mandel, 113.
38 Ibid.
39 David Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
40 Mandel, 110.
41 Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
42 Howe. Ambiguous Order. 201.
43 Cleary. “Angola” and Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
hired EO in 1993. Angolan army. "The purpose of EO’s engagement was to recover the territory captured by UNITA between January and August 1993, and to shift the balance of military power in the Angolan government’s favour." Approximately 550 EO soldiers were provided to complete the mission. Compensation amounted to $60 million for military services and additional compensation for weapons procurement.

The situation in Papua New Guinea (PNG) shares several similarities. The government of Prime Minister Julius Chan was considered legitimate. Chan hired Sandline International to deal with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, a secessionist movement which had continuously fought with PNG forces over control of a critically important copper mine since 1989. The contract with Sandline, which became public knowledge, lists the following goals that the PMC was meant to achieve:

The State, engulfed in a state of conflict with the illegal and unrecognised Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), requires such external military expertise to support its Armed Forces in the protection of its Sovereign territory and regain control over important national assets, specifically the Panguna mine. In particular, Sandline is contracted to provide personnel and related services and equipment to: Train the State's Special Forces Unit (SFU) in tactical skills specific to the objective; gather intelligence to

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45 Howe, Ambiguous Order.
46 Cleary, 159.
47 Howe, Ambiguous Order. 199.
48 Mandel, 111.
support effective deployment and operations; conduct offensive operations in Bougainville in conjunction with PNG defence forces to render the BRA military ineffective and repossess the Panguna mine; and provide follow-up operational support, to be further specified and agreed between the parties and is subject to separate service provision levels and fee negotiations.\footnote{Agreement for the Provision of Military Assistance Dated this 31 Day of January 1997 between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International.} The compensation was set at $36 million, payable in two installments, half initially and half upon fulfillment of the contract terms.\footnote{Agreement for the Provision of Military Assistance Dated this 31 Day of January 1997 between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International.} The mission was not completed.

In the three cases in which the PMC made progress, the roles evolved from those originally stipulated in the contracts; the PMC took on more combat responsibility as if became obvious that the national armies were not being effective. EO’s role was critical in the actual combat operations in Sierra Leone and Angola.\footnote{Howe. Ambiguous Order. 198- 202.} In Croatia, although MPRI did not fight, it did assist in the operational planning.\footnote{Silverstein, 172- 173.} Though originally meant to focus on training and planning in Angola, EO quickly took on a larger operational role and participated directly in combat.\footnote{Smith, 109.} Similarly, the 14,000 man national army in Sierra Leone, a poorly trained force generally believed to be corrupt and engaged in skirmishes with one another, failed to defeat the RUF, requiring that EO forces step in and take a leading role in mounting and carrying major operations.\footnote{Smith, 109.} However, while some military successes were achieved in the first three cases, it remains unclear what specific type of mission PMCs are best suited to achieve.

\footnote{Agreement for the Provision of Military Assistance Dated this 31 Day of January 1997 between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International.}
Indicator #4: Extent of Popular Support for PMC Use

Furthermore, the extent to which there is popular support for the PMC’s retention is correlated with success or failure. MPRI’s contract with Croatia was viewed as a positive development in the country’s transition to a democracy with a self-sufficient military.\(^55\) In the two African cases, there was no violent reaction and seemingly tacit support for Executive Outcomes’ presence in the countries. In PNG, however, there was popular outrage in protest of Sandline’s presence.\(^56\) Popular sentiment caused Prime Minister Chan to order all 40 Sandline soldiers out of the country.\(^57\) The people’s opinion matters therefore, in so much as it can prevent the use of a PMC or in fact make the PMC’s job more difficult if the population works against the PMC by harboring rebels, etc.

\(^{56}\) Mandel, 111.
\(^{57}\) Mandel, 111-112.
Table 3: Indicator Correlation with Outcomes (Indicators 5-8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/ Result</th>
<th>#5 Collaboration with National Army</th>
<th>#6 Simultaneous Political Action-Treaties, etc.</th>
<th>#7 Foreign Intervention</th>
<th>#8 Allegations of Abuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia/Success</td>
<td>Worked directly with Croat forces</td>
<td>Efforts to implement democratic institutions</td>
<td>US sanctioned the contract</td>
<td>Complicity in ethnic cleansing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone/Success</td>
<td>Training of forces, worked closely on operations</td>
<td>Peace settlement signed</td>
<td>Nigeria-supported PMC goals, which furthered Nigerian foreign policy goals, provided troops</td>
<td>No major allegations of abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola/Mixed Result</td>
<td>Close working relationship with Angolan forces</td>
<td>Lusaka Protocol</td>
<td>South Africa supported PMC use as it suited own foreign policy goals</td>
<td>No major allegations of abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea/Failure</td>
<td>None- army refused to work with Sandline</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>International outcry over PMC use undermined the PMC’s mission</td>
<td>Several troops arrested for possession of weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Indicator #5: Cooperation with Indigenous Forces**

An indicator that does correlate with an outcome is the extent to which the national military of the country cooperates with the PMC during its operations. MPRI trained and then worked with the Croatian military to plan Operation Storm to take back territory held by Serb rebels in the Krajina region in a targeted operation, resulting in a military success.\(^{58}\) In Sierra Leone, EO both trained the country’s forces and conducted operations with them. In Angola, the military assisted during operations; two battalions were paired with EO forces.\(^{59}\) In all three instances, initial military successes were achieved. Conversely, in PNG, the commander of the armed forces, PNGDF Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, refused point blank to work with Sandline forces, which came under attack and were forced to defend themselves.\(^{60}\) Thus, it appears that the extent to which the PMC cooperates with the indigenous military forces is associated with the outcome of the operation. The national army’s cooperation is vital to success.

**Indicator #6: Parallel Political Processes**

The existence of parallel political actions alongside the PMC’s efforts is an additional indicator of outcome. The situation in Croatia was slightly different as MPRI’s primary mission, to take back part of the country held by Serbian rebels since the outbreak of war, was conclusively achieved militarily. However, political processes had

\(^{58}\) Silverstein, 172.  
\(^{59}\) Cleary. 156.  
\(^{60}\) Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
to take place to solidify Croatia’s independence and construct democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{61} In Sierra Leone, EO’s performance forced the RUF to sign a ceasefire agreement.\textsuperscript{62} Because this agreement did not address many of the underlying causes which led to the emergence of the RUF, violence restarted upon EO’s exit from the country. In Angola, the government simultaneously worked to bring UNITA to the negotiating table and ultimately, the Lusaka Protocol was signed between the government in Luanda and UNITA representatives, with both sides agreeing to an end to the fighting and a new round of elections.\textsuperscript{63} In Papua New Guinea, the parallel political events which unfolded while Sandline began its operation actually undermined the PMC’s ability to fulfill its contractual obligations, instead of supporting its operations.

Since the underlying causes of the four conflicts were rooted in political problems, it is logical that any efforts to address those problems would result in a more positive outcome, since the sources of conflict would not remain and incite further violence. The PMC in each of these cases was able to achieve the accompanying military victory needed to make the political efforts viable and possible to enforce.

**Indicator #7: Foreign Intervention**

A further indicator associated with success is the extent to which there is foreign support for the PMC’s involvement. The United States pursued and sanctioned MPRI’s

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\textsuperscript{62} Conflict, Inc. Interview with Herbert Howe.

\textsuperscript{63} Cleary, 158.
involvement in Croatia in an effort to support Croatia and demonstrate that it was willing 
to provide substantial assistance. The US had little choice in the matter: a 1991 UN 
arms embargo deemed direct military support illegal. Burned by the unsuccessful 
experience of international intervention through a peacekeeping force (PFK) in Liberia, 
the nations of the region and the rest of the international community largely supported 
Executive Outcomes’ involvement in Sierra Leone. As Herbert Howe explains,

ECOMOG, a multinational African peace keeping force, tried for six years 
to end a devastating civil war in Liberia, but did not achieve peace during 
due six years there. In fact, several national contingents within 
ECOMOG prolonged the Liberian conflict by arming and abetting one or 
other of the factions, which subsequently turned against their regional 
benefactor and prolonged the war. While there are important differences 
between the two wars, EO helped to end Sierra Leone’s insurgency during 
its year and a half stay, even though political instability resumed after its 
departure.

Not surprisingly, Sandline International wholeheartedly agreed that a PMC would 
succeed where a PKF had failed. In a letter written in response to a Canadian NGO’s 
report critical of Executive Outcomes’ intervention in Sierra Leone, Sandline 
International asked, “In the absence of international intervention in 1995 would it have 
been preferable for the RUF to have been allowed to take control of the country rather 
than to have contracted with Executive Outcomes to prevent this from happening?”

Executive Outcomes’ success in bringing about a cessation of hostilities was only

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64 Edmunds, 54.
65 Ibid.
security forces and African stability: the case of Executive Outcomes.” 324.
68 “Corporate comments.” Sandline International 

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temporary, however. Violence re-erupted after EO’s exit and ECOMOG was forced to step in, followed by a peacekeeping force. Neither effort succeeded in quelling the violence. The situation in Angola was different however since the Luanda government remained under pressure to cease working with Executive Outcomes. The United States and the UN provided the greatest pressure, given the fact that they were wary of leaving the situation in the hands of a PMC they did not control, and because their own interests were involved. Foreign intervention played a major role in PNG, where nations having a strong interest in the country’s internal situation, including close ally Australia, exerted strong pressure on Chan to remove the Sandline forces. International support for a PMC operation can therefore provide it the legitimacy it needs to succeed or undermine it and prevent a mission from being completed.

**Indicator #8: Allegations of Abuse**

Allegations of abuse, which accompanied PMC involvement in the three cases, appear to have little effect on the outcome of each case. In the aftermath of Operation Lightning Storm and the deaths of Serbs, MPRI was accused of complicity in an aggressive ethnic cleansing campaign. The operation resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and 170,000 refugees. While MPRI denied involvement, observers contend that the Croatian military’s radical transformation from a scattered, untrained, unprofessional

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69 Mandel, 110-111.
70 Cleary. 156-158. The US was deeply involved in Angola during the years before EO’s involvement.
71 Mandel, 111-112.
73 Silverstein, 172.
army into a cohesive force executing complex maneuvers would only have been possible if MPRI were closely involved in the operational planning of the campaign and therefore was aware of the tactics to be used. Ultimately, the matter was not resolved, but MPRI earned the Croatian Prime Minister’s gratitude for playing a critical role.

Executive Outcomes was not accused of abuse in Sierra Leone, though the events which unfolded after EO’s departure raised questions about the whether the firm had only exacerbated the conflict. EO’s experience in Angola was similarly devoid of major allegations of abuse.

In Papua New Guinea, Sandline was forced to contend with the arrests of several personnel on charges of carrying weapons, which was deemed criminal given the fact that Sandline was not to be involved in direct combat there. While allegations of corruption were rampant, a subsequent investigation showed that Sandline was not guilty of the charges leveled against the firm. Allegations of abuse therefore seem to have little connection with the result of the operation, however they can lead to the loss of popular support or international support for the PMC mission, which are both indicators that correlate with an outcome. Therefore, allegations of abuse may indirectly correlate with failure.

74 Silverstein, 169.
75 Williams.
76 Conflict, Inc. Interview with Herbert Howe.
77 Cleary. “Angola.”
78 Mandel, 112.
79 Mandel, 112.
Table 4- Indicator Correlation with Outcomes (Indicator 9 and Results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/ Result</th>
<th>#9 Reason/ Circumstances under which PMC left</th>
<th>Result at time of PMC Pullout</th>
<th>Result after Change in Government and Current Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia/ Success</td>
<td>Contract ended, was renewed, MPRI continues to operate there</td>
<td>Cessation of hostilities, much stronger military</td>
<td>Stability was achieved and continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone/ Success</td>
<td>EO left in 1997, when the contract expired</td>
<td>Cessation of Hostilities</td>
<td>Democratic Elections occurred, but violence erupted soon after/ violence continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola/ Mixed Result</td>
<td>International pressure to discontinue contract</td>
<td>Cessation of Hostilities</td>
<td>Civil war restarted after change in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea/ Failure</td>
<td>Prime Minister was forced to order Sandline out of the country</td>
<td>Violence continued- Sandline forces were airlifted out</td>
<td>UN intervention was required after Prime Minister Chan resigned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator #9: Circumstances under which the PMC left the Country**

The final indicator tested, that of the circumstances surrounding the PMC’s exit from the country, is only loosely correlated with the outcome. MPRI completed its contract with Croatia and earned further contracts to continue training the military. It
continues to play a role in the country as part of other military assistance programmes. Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone at the completion of its contractual obligations, having successfully achieved a cessation of hostilities. EO was forced to leave Angola, however, when the Luanda government gave in to international pressure to discontinue its use of the PMC, yet the cessation of hostilities lasted for some time. Sandline was removed from Papua New Guinea by military personnel before its mission could be carried out. It stands to reason that if a PMC leaves voluntarily, it is likely because it has achieved its goals. Despite the fact that EO was asked to leave Angola, fighting had already ended. Sandline’s ejection from PNG before any operations could be carried out meant it failed to achieve its goals.

**Interaction Among Indicators**

The nine indicators derived in this research are all interrelated. The interplay between factors may contribute to the outcome as much as the individual indicators themselves. For example, the fact that PNG negotiated a secret contract with Sandline led to a collapse of popular support for Sandline’s involvement in the conflict with the BRA once the fact became public knowledge. This in turn contributed to the military’s refusal to cooperate with Sandline forces and the subsequent failure as the PMC was unable to achieve the intended goals. Additionally, foreign support (mainly from Nigeria and other

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80 Edmunds, 55.
81 Cleary, 163.
82 Mandel, 112.
major powers) for the use of EO in Sierra Leone contributed to close collaboration with the Nigeria forces and Sierra Leone’s military, resulting in a major military success there. Similarly, international support for MPRI’s involvement in Croatia led to close cooperation with the Croatian forces and resulted in the successful prosecution of Operation Lightning Storm. Conversely, lack of international support for EO’s contract with Angola led to the PMC’s forced exit from the country and subsequently violence re-erupted.

While any attempt to categorize these indicators along a spectrum from having the most to the least effect on outcome is beyond the scope of this study, such research would be highly relevant and informative for policymakers working to determine whether to retain a PMC and how best to increase chances of success.
Chapter 4

Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations

The foregoing analysis reveals that PMCs have not been able to successfully achieve long term cessation of hostilities in the areas in which they have been retained. In only once case was relative stability achieved: Croatia. Conflicts continue in Angola, Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea, among other countries. Military successes in Angola and Sierra Leone were short-lived and the countries continue to be destabilized by conflicts. What lessons can be learned from this analysis? Four major lessons emerge. They lead to four policy recommendations for governments considering PMC use.

Lesson #1

First, PMCs are not an option for solving every conflict and they are certainly not a cure for every situation. In two of the four cases, violence either continued or even intensified mere months after the PMCs left the countries. Nor are PMCs an ideal option at all. In all four cases, allegations of PMC abuses arose, tainting the reputations of the companies and undermining the legitimacy of governments that hired them. Deaths occurred and violence continued in the absence of processes meant to address the underlying causes of the conflicts that the PMCs were hired to terminate. PMCs cannot be used to shore up deficiencies such as illegitimate governments or a lack of a standing army; in Sierra Leone, the RUF continued to challenge the government’s legitimacy and even a military victory against the group did not result in anything other than a temporary
ceasefire. In two of the cases, in Sierra Leone and Angola, the insurgents simply waited until the PMCs left to restart the conflict.

Policy Recommendation #1

**Use PMCs as a force multiplier.** Those governments considering PMC use must first determine if circumstances on the ground are such that PMCs are able to tip the balance in the government’s favor. This means a military must exist and be trained to not only collaborate with the PMC in operations, but also continue to maintain peace once the PMC leaves. PMCs are meant to be a temporary solution.

Lesson #2

PMCs represent only a part of the solution. Simply achieving a military success was not enough to resolve the underlying problems which led to the conflicts and parallel political processes were crucial to success. Larger political issues were at play in each of the four cases. The PMCs, retained to achieve military goals in each case, were neither responsible for, nor equipped for, addressing those political issues, whether they were long present independence movements, rebel movements spurred by allegations of unfair mining practices or election result disputes. In each case, further intervention by foreign powers or the United Nations was required. PMC involvement must be accompanied by foreign intervention or UN involvement to address the underlying political issues which incited the violence and led to the rise of rebel/independence/insurgency movements. In
each of the case studies analyzed, these problems, whether contested elections (Sierra Leone), calls for independence (PNG) or transitions to democracy (Croatia) had to be addressed both domestically, within each country, and internationally, with support from allies or the UN.

Policy Recommendation #2

Initiate political processes that run parallel to PMC operations. Engaging in parallel political processes to address underlying causes of conflicts is vital so that while the PMC is working towards a military success, political progress can also be made to prevent violence from re-erupting. Political processes should take place not only within the country, but internationally, in concert with allies, who can help to address problems through the provision of aid to install institutions, provide long term military aid/training and observe fair and free elections. While a PMC can take the place of an international peacekeeping force to the extent that it can take over fighting, it cannot subsume the force’s responsibility for engaging in diplomatic processes to maintain the peace.

Lesson #3

Mechanisms for regulation and accountability must be integrated for the benefit of both PMCs and client states. Allegations of PMC abuse/complicity in war crimes exacerbated situations and led to further violence in two of the four case studies. Whether or not allegations of abuse themselves correlate with success or failure is largely
irrelevant. They can lead to further violence and indirectly cause other indicators, such as collapse of public support (correlated with failure) to emerge. A model for such mechanisms can be found in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. An system for international accreditation procedures would have to be pursued and data solicited from both PMCs and client states to compile a database of PMCs that have proven experience but also signed onto agreements to abide by certain practices/be held accountable in cases of abuse, etc. Unilateral regulatory mechanisms are unlikely to help mitigate the risks as PMCs operate globally. Therefore, an international standard must be formulated to broadly protect both PMCs and client governments around the world.

Policy Recommendation #3

**Participate in efforts to establish international regulatory mechanisms.** Until this effort is accomplished, governments considering PMC use should ensure that contracts include provisions for acceptable practices that a PMC must follow. Mechanisms must be put in place to hold a PMC accountable if its personnel violate any national laws or engage in criminal activities. The international community must work towards creating an accreditation process for PMCs so as to better evaluate such firms and reward compliance with national and international law. This is, of course, one of the hardest recommendations to implement, because in a conflict in a failing state, mechanisms for regulation or oversight cannot be set up overnight. The international

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83 Isenberg. “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.”
community must therefore work toward a general policy in this regard so that there are recognized norms for holding companies accountable, which can be adopted by all.

Lesson #4

Recent research in the field of conflict resolution suggests that “outright military victories, rather than negotiated peace settlements, have ended the greater part of the twentieth century’s internal conflicts.”84 In Sierra Leone, Angola and Papua New Guinea, negotiations failed to resolve conflicts and PMCs were supplanted by UN forces, which failed to achieve resolution of conflicts. Because there exists a void, given many countries’ hesitance in intervening in costly internal struggles of neighbors or former colonies, PMCs can step in to end conflicts and prevent further bloodshed, which could potentially continue without any sort of intervention. In the case of MPRI in Croatia, the UN ceasefire put in place failed to resolve underlying issues and convince the Serbs to give up the territory they had invaded and captured in the Krajina region. A military operation ultimately resolved the situation and brought about the stability which the UN intervention could not achieve.

Policy Recommendation #4

Develop a strategic plan for resolving the conflict before the PMC is contracted. Once this is in place, a PMC can contribute to reaching the desired end goal.

84 Shearer, 75.
In the two cases in Africa, there was a general mission, but no clear plan for what would be done once fighting stopped. Since a PMC can only be a part of the solution, a strategic plan for solving the conflict must exist. For example, the conflict can be decided militarily, in which case the PMC assists with one side defeating the other, or can be a negotiated peace, in which the PMC steps in to end bloodshed and force all parties to the negotiating table. Whichever plan is chosen will determine what other pieces must be in place to increase the chances of success.

Evaluating the Potential for Using PMCs in Sudan and the Congo

What implications do these lessons and recommendations have for ongoing conflicts in the Africa, a continent consistently plagued by internal wars? PMCs could be an option for resolving several. One candidate is the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. The other is the ongoing civil war in the Congo.

The ongoing violence in Darfur continues despite international condemnation. Described as genocide, the ongoing conflict has resulted in large numbers of refugees and fatalities.\(^{85}\) To date, no major or even regional power has been willing to step in to end the bloodshed.

While there are various options for addressing the conflict, including a UN peacekeeping force now being planned,\(^ {86}\) the retention of a PMC is a possible alternative and indeed there may be a desire to take that route if no country is willing to commit its

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\(^{86}\) "Sudan/Darfur."
own forces. But does the conflict in Darfur reflect indicators suggesting that a PMC could successfully solve the conflict?

The situation in Darfur currently has several parallels with the situation in Croatia before MPRI’s involvement. There is a UN effort to maintain an arms embargo and a peacekeeping force is being put together.\textsuperscript{87} However, just as in Croatia, this has caused a stalemate, leaving Darfur in a limbo- unable to resolve the problem and capable of erupting in violence again at any time.

Based on the indicators isolated in this paper, would PMC involvement be viable there? Using the indicators distilled in this paper, it appears that there is at least one indicator of success are present: There is foreign support for finding a solution for the conflict and it appears that the conflict could be solved militarily with parallel political processes.\textsuperscript{88} The research demonstrates that if a PMC is retained, parallel political processes will have to take place in order to address the underlying causes of the violence. The country’s neighbors, all of whom have an interest in solving the conflict given the refugee issue created by the violence, In addition, major regional powers will have to support the firm’s activities. The Sudanese army would also have to collaborate with a PMC’s forces and be trained to remain effective once the PMC’s contract ends.

At best, a PMC would be able to achieve a temporary cessation of hostilities, but the violence would likely re-erupt as soon as the PMC would leave if no action were taken on the political front to restore order and stability. In concert with the African

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
Union, however, a PMC would be able to take on the active role of pacifying belligerent militias, leaving the AU to protect refugees and concentrate on addressing the underlying sources of conflict.\textsuperscript{89}

One major hurdle must first be overcome, however, and that is the problem of neutrality, common to most humanitarian efforts. A PMC fights for one side: the government. This is very different than the approach taken by peacekeeping forces, which work to maintain neutrality. But a PMC cannot be a neutral actor. If the international community is not satisfied with the current government, it will not support efforts to maintain the status quo, which PMCs generally uphold. A decision therefore must be made as to what must be achieved in Sudan beyond a cessation of hostilities before a PMC can be retained.

Another conflict that could be addressed through the use of a PMC is the ongoing civil war in the Congo. During the worst of the fighting, from 1998-2004, 3.8 million people died as a result of both violence, and other problems directly caused by the war, including famine and disease.\textsuperscript{90} Would this conflict lend itself to PMC intervention?

The lack of central, legitimate military and disjointed support from neighboring countries suggests that a PMC would be largely unsupported in its endeavors. The absence of a cohesive standing army is another complication, as this study has shown that close collaboration with the military occurred in the cases which ended in successes.


Furthermore, many neighboring countries’ interests in the situation would have to be reconciled so that there is broad support for a PMC intervention, since foreign support for the PMC’s involvement was another feature common to the successes. Given the present conditions, therefore, it is unlikely that a PMC could be successful in terminating the conflict.

It appears that neither of these conflicts possesses characteristics that would suggest successful PMC intervention is likely given current circumstances. If the situation on the ground were to change and a vision for an end goal emerged, PMCs would be able to serve as a part of the solution.
Chapter 5

Alternate Explanations

The goal of foregoing analysis was to synthesize a list of factors with which to evaluate PMC use and to distill a list of indicators whose presence may influence the outcome of PMC involvement in a conflict. The list of indicators generated is not exhaustive due to the data problems already discussed. This research is based solely on data available in the public sphere. It is possible that information which is still classified could affect the results of the research. It is possible, and in fact probable, that given access to the more specific details of each case, additional indicators could be isolated which may have played a significant role in the outcome of the cases, thus either adding to the indicators distilled in this paper or rejecting certain indicators. For example, it may be that information exists which could further illuminate ways in which the indicators deemed inconclusive actually played a significant role in the outcome.

The research has failed to isolate a specific type of conflict in which PMCs are likely to be a successful, largely because very few case studies exist at present. Given time, a larger pool of cases may emerge, and it may become more evident that PMCs are better suited for certain types of conflicts and not others. For example, given the lack of long term stability in three of the four cases, it may become clear that PMCs cannot be used as more than simply a temporary solution and cannot achieve a long term cessation of hostilities. As new cases emerge, this analysis will have to be reproduced to determine whether new cases challenge the conclusions.
Definitions are an important element of the foregoing analysis. If the definition of success is tweaked only slightly to include political ramifications, etc., it can be argued that there have been no outright PMC successes. This has critical ramifications for the study of PMC involvement and may mean that limitations must be placed on the expectations of what such firms can achieve. Similarly, by redefining and broadening the criteria for case studies, cases such as that of Defense Systems Ltd. in Colombia and future case studies such as PMC use in Afghanistan and Iraq could have been included in the analysis and affect the outcome of the research. The latter two cases, for example, could lend more importance to indicator #7, the importance of foreign intervention either in support of or against the use of the PMC, since the US secured PMC contracts in both cases. Furthermore, the outcomes of these two conflicts will be important for determining whether PMCs can be effective specifically against insurgencies, thus challenging the conclusion drawn in this paper that is in unclear which types of conflicts PMCs best excel at terminating.

**Further Lines of Inquiry**

Large N Study of all PMC Activities

This paper leaves many questions unanswered, as it limited in scope and due to other constraints placed upon it, including data challenges and issues of time. Nonetheless it is an important first step in studying PMCs empirically to test the theories

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http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/41040.html.
that have emerged since the privatization of security has taken place. One of the most interesting lines of inquiry that this paper inspires is the need for a large-N study of all PMC activities, from engaging in direct combat to training soldiers to providing logistics support. Such an analysis could lead to the emergence of a more comprehensive analysis of the roles that PMCs are playing in international affairs, as well as current and likely future trends in the privatization of security. It could also more clearly reveal the effects PMCs are having around the globe and the extent to which PMCs are entrenched in various regions prone to conflict and exactly what roles they are playing in either resolving or perpetuating conflicts.

Are PMCs Proxies of their Home Nation?

In the case of MPRI in Croatia, the US firm was used by the US as a proxy, since direct military assistance was deemed illegal by the UN. The contract between MPRI and the government of Croatia was negotiated and sanctioned by the US, in order to demonstrate that the US was willing to support Croatia with more than words. An interesting further line of inquiry raised by this case regards the extent to which these companies, based largely in the US, UK, Israel and South Africa, already serve as proxies for their home government. That is, do they already serve in the capacity of advancing their nation’s foreign policy initiatives via the clients/contracts they choose to serve?

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Such a study would be able to better determine whether indicator 7, that is, the importance of foreign support for the use of a PMC, is one of the most important indicators of success or failure.

Evaluating Relative Importance of Indicators

The previous topic also leads to another related question: what is the relative importance of each indicator when compared to others? Are they of equal importance or is one more vital than the rest? This type of analysis, which fell beyond the scope of this paper, would greatly build upon the work accomplished in this paper and better inform policymakers considering the use of PMCs.

Effects of the Outsourcing of Traditional State Roles

Additionally, further research is necessary to determine the extent to which PMCs could be coopted into being a tool of the state, effectively pursuing a state’s foreign policy objectives at lower cost, both in terms of money and political capital, or the extent to which certain tasks should be relegated to the private sector, a phenomenon that is already taking place within the defense community both in the US and abroad. The consequences of outsourcing tasks that have traditionally been the bailiwisk of the state must be examined. The analysis in this paper demonstrates that a PMC can serve only a force multiplier, and not as a substitute for a standing force. It is necessary to determine whether private sector entities are effective in taking on these tasks and the extent to
which they can be depended upon to fulfill their roles given that they are not part of the
government and therefore susceptible to the risks inherent in business of failure or
collapse. For example, EO was eventually dissolved in 1999 for a variety of reasons\textsuperscript{93} and
those who depended upon it could do so no longer.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The fact that many of these conflict ridden countries supply mineral and other
natural resources, means that businesses are likely to increasingly pressure government of
these countries turn to PMCs to protect their assets and personnel. Many of these
countries, including the ones discussed in this paper, rely on the export of their mined
resources as major sources of government revenue. Given that most posses no strong
military capabilities, and peacekeeping efforts have failed to accumulate a successful
record,\textsuperscript{94} these states are likely to continue to rely on PMCs. This has widespread
ramifications for the international community.

David Isenberg asks, “if other nations are not going to step in to contribute to
multilateral peacekeeping or peacemaking forces, why shouldn't a state have a chance to
hire a force able to keep order?” As this research has shown, states must not only have
the option, but also need to ensure that the chances of success are increased by securing
foreign and popular support, mandating collaboration with the indigenous military and
engaging in parallel political processes to address root causes. They can also help to

\textsuperscript{93} Howe. \textit{Ambiguous Order}. 212.
\textsuperscript{94} Conflict, Inc. Interview with Herbert Howe.
mitigate the chances of failure by creating mechanisms to regulate the PMC’s activities to prevent abuses, and ensure that their militaries are strengthened so that they can continue to maintain stability after the PMC leaves the country. Though further research is necessary, the foregoing analysis contributes to a better understanding of the record of PMC use and provides policymakers considering PMC use with valuable insight.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


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