

LIMITS OF THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE INSTABILITY-INSTABILITY
PARADOX

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ABSTRACT

S. Paul Kapur's instability-instability paradox does not provide sufficient explanatory power to explain India's response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. This paper will provide an alternate explanation, using Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis, of Indian behavior in the wake of the Mumbai attacks that better explains the lack of a military response on the part of India.

The research and writing of this thesis
is dedicated to my parents,
Margery Subic and Stein Skattum,
who saved my life more times than I can count,
and without whom I would not be where I am today.

Much Love,
Kai A. Skattum

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Methodology	5
<i>Data Caveats</i>	7
Background.....	7
<i>Indo-Pakistani Rivalry</i>	8
<i>Lashkar-e-Taiba</i>	11
Literature Review.....	15
<i>Strategic Stability on the Subcontinent</i>	15
<i>Instability-Instability Paradox</i>	17
<i>Kenneth Waltz's Three Levels of Analysis</i>	19
The Mumbai Attacks and India's Response	20
<i>Planning for the Attacks</i>	20
<i>The Attacks</i>	23
<i>India's Response</i>	25
Analysis of India's Response to the Mumbai Attacks	28
<i>Kapur's Instability-Instability Paradox</i>	28
<i>First Image Analysis</i>	30
<i>Second Image Analysis</i>	35
<i>Third Image Analysis</i>	40
Implications of the Mumbai Attacks.....	46
Bibliography	51

Introduction

The Mumbai attacks, which occurred on 26 November 2008 and lasted until the 29th, killed 166 people and wounded at least an additional 308 individuals. The attacks, perpetrated by the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), were the most significant terrorist attacks against India in recent memory. While other attacks such as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings killed more individuals, the 2008 Mumbai attacks had a greater effect on India's collective psyche. The attacks themselves were of a greater scope and coordinated against multiple targets. Furthermore, the attacks lasted for a period of 60 hours, in large part due to the incompetence of the Indian response, and the entire ordeal was played out on live television in India and across the world.¹ Much as the horror of the 9/11 attacks mesmerized the United States, the 2008 Mumbai attacks similarly affected the Indian people.

Given these factors, and that LeT was formed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization and continues to respond to ISI's diktats, it would be reasonable to assume that India might undertake a military response. However, India did not retaliate militarily against LeT facilities or the Pakistani state. The purpose of this paper is to understand why this is the case. A leading scholar on South Asian security and nuclear issues, S. Paul Kapur, had argued prior to the Mumbai attacks that India would respond forcefully to any serious Pakistani provocations. Despite the escalatory risks associated with a military response, Kapur had argued that Indian government officials were not necessarily dissuaded by Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, and that

¹Angela Rabasa et al., "The Lessons of Mumbai," RAND Occasional Paper, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), p. 1.

military response against Pakistan was likely in the event a serious terrorist attacks could be linked to them.²

However, other scholars, such as Sumit Ganguly, have argued that the existence of an overt nuclear weapons capability has increased stability on the subcontinent, rather than decreasing it. Ganguly states that the transition to an overt nuclear weapons capability after the 1998 nuclear tests has eliminated some of the confusion on the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan, and thus some level of strategic stability has developed on the subcontinent.³ This finding is opposed by Kapur's instability-instability paradox, which argues that the small arsenals possessed by India and Pakistan have led to greater strategic instability, which in turn has allowed Pakistan to pursue lower level irregular conflict under the shield of their nuclear deterrent.⁴ The existence of strategic instability between India and Pakistan leads to conventional instability, thus resulting in an instability-instability paradox that increases the risk that any future conflict on the subcontinent might escalate to the nuclear level.

In this paper, I will test Kapur's theory against the specific event of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, perpetrated by the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Given the inherent escalatory dynamics of the instability-instability paradox, India and Pakistan should have engaged in some sort of armed conflict in the wake of the attacks. The LeT organization has extensive ties to the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Pakistan's main intelligence arm. While it is disputed to what extent Pakistan's civilian leadership was aware of the attacks, it is

² S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 180.

³ See Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2008), p. 45-70.

⁴ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, p. 36-41.

likely that at some level the military and intelligence services of Pakistan were at least aware of the coming attacks.⁵

This paper will argue that Kapur's instability-instability paradox does not sufficiently explain India's response in the wake of the attacks, especially in regards to the lack of a military response. The shortcomings of his prediction will be assessed in a following section. Thereafter, it will introduce a new hypothesis that uses Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis to construct a more complete explanation of India's response to the Mumbai attacks. Specifically that resistance from the Indian political leadership, especially Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the lack of applicable and proportional retaliatory options, U.S. pressure not to retaliate, and changed regional dynamics worked in concert to ameliorate the Indian response. These issues correspond to Waltz's three levels of analysis – individual, domestic, and structural. While it is likely that no sole factor was a key variable in determining India's response, this paper posits that it was the individual factor that played the most important role.

This topic is important because of all the states that possess nuclear weapons today, Pakistan and India are involved in the most intense security competition, and the possibility of escalation to the nuclear level is greatest there. It is in every state's interest, including India and Pakistan, to avoid a nuclear conflict. This is doubly true for the United States, given its ongoing and likely future interests in region, including its military operations in Afghanistan, its long term relationship with Pakistan, and its burgeoning relationship with India. Another Indo-Pakistani conflict would have an extremely detrimental effect on U.S. policy within the region, even if it did not escalate to the nuclear level. Additionally, the risk of conventional war appears

⁵ Samarjit Ghosh, "Mumbai Terrorist Attacks: An Analysis," IPCS Special Report 66, February 2009, p. 2.

to be increasing, as India is working to develop its limited war fighting doctrine.⁶ Should this doctrine ever be put into practice, it is possible that a future incident between India and Pakistan might lead to another war, which would then be prone to the same escalatory dynamics inherent in all wars.

Paul Kapur's instability-instability theory is held by many to be an appropriate model for the current Indo-Pakistani security dyad. However, in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, it appears that there were additional constraints operating on Indian foreign policy that prevent it from taking the aggressive international response indicated by Kapur's theory. Through evaluating India's response to the terrorist attacks using Waltz's three levels of analysis this paper hopes to draw out these intervening variables that played a role in moderating India's response. These variables would provide insight into future Indo-Pakistani crises and possible methods for reducing the risk of another Indo-Pakistani war.

This paper will be structured as follows. First, it will address its methodology, including its choice of the Mumbai attacks as a case study and its data sources and data caveats. It will then include a brief background section on the history of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization. It will then move on to a literature review which will cover the details of Kapur's instability-instability paradox and Waltz's three levels of analysis. Following that, a brief description and timeline of the 2008 Mumbai attacks is included to highlight the audacious scope of the attacks and how they differed from previous terrorist attacks in India. The rest of the paper will then demonstrate the limits of the explanatory power of the instability-instability paradox in this case, and provide an alternative explanation based on Waltz's three levels of

⁶ Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," p. 65.

analysis. Finally, a brief implications section will consider the future ramifications of this analysis.

Methodology

This section will cover this paper's proposed methodology, including a justification of its use of the Mumbai attacks as a case study, its use of S. Paul Kapur's *Dangerous Deterrent* as an anchor text, a brief review of Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis of international relations, and finally a data caveats section.

The Mumbai attacks serve as an excellent case study of India's policy making as it relates to Pakistani military provocations. While not the most horrific terrorist attack in terms of casualties (the 2006 Mumbai train bombings killed more individuals), the fact that the 2008 Mumbai attacks took place over a three day period in which India was slow to respond, the specific targeting of Westerners, and the intense international media coverage of the attacks all raise it to a more prominent place in India's collective memory than other attacks. Given Kapur's argument that India was likely to retaliate in response to a serious Pakistani provocation, and that several Indian policymakers had made statements indicating that they believed a limited conventional conflict with Pakistan was within the realm of possibility, it is important to understand why these predictions failed to come to pass. India is one of the two major rising powers in the world right now. Its economy, population, and military capability are all growing. It possesses nuclear weapons, yet it remains locked in continual hostilities with its neighbor Pakistan. Given the importance of India as a rising power, and as one of the most likely sites of

nuclear escalation, understanding India's policy making process in response to external attack is important for determining its future security goals and policies.

In this analysis I will use Kapur's *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* as the basis for this paper. The details of Kapur's work will be covered in the literature review section, but at this point I would like to point out that Kapur's theory has some shortcomings. Despite India's growing economic, political, and military capabilities, the model fails to properly explain Indian restraint in the case of the Mumbai attacks. That said the instability-instability paradox does provide an accurate model for explaining Pakistan's propensity to conduct low-level irregular warfare against India in Kashmir. This constant low level conflict is the basis from which India is operating in the international system vis-à-vis Pakistan, and it must be taken into account during any attempt to divine India's policy making process.

Given the limited explanatory power of Kapur's instability-instability theory, this paper will apply Waltz's three levels of analysis to India's response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. This will provide a more complete understanding of why India did not employ military force against Pakistan in the wake of the attacks, as it allows for multiple variables that could affect the formulation of state policy. Waltz includes the individual, state, and structural levels in his analysis of international relations, and while he favors the third level, the first and second levels also play a role.⁷ Waltz's three levels of analysis will be covered in greater detail the literature review section.

⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). p. 232-238.

Data Caveats

While there is significant data on the operational side of the Mumbai attack, as well as plentiful news reporting and other secondary documentation of India's, as well as the world's, response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, much of the primary documentation remains classified. This paper will use government documentation where available, specifically Congressional Research Service Reports, the plea agreement David Headley reached with the Department of Justice, and official statements from the Indian government regarding the attacks, including speeches by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In addition to these sources, the paper will also rely on news reports concerning the Mumbai attacks and their aftermath, as well as secondary scholarly sources. It is important to note that the news reports at the time were inaccurate and incomplete. I have accessed a wide variety of news reports on the attacks in an attempt to limit any inaccuracies. Furthermore, as with any governmental response to a military crisis, statements made by public officials could be biased in favor of their own interpretation of events or in favor of their desired policy.

Background

This section will briefly cover background information on the history of India and Pakistan's half-century of rivalry on the subcontinent, as well as the history of the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organization. This is pertinent to the topic as the long history of conflict between the two states has influenced their development and must be taken into consideration when determining each state's policies toward one another. The background of LeT will be covered to

demonstrate that it has extensive ties to the Pakistani state, as well as a long history of aggression towards India.

Indo-Pakistani Rivalry

Since their founding India and Pakistan have fought several wars with one another, in addition to multiple other lesser conflicts. These include the three major conventional wars during the pre-nuclear era, fought in 1947, 1965, and 1971. In 1999, a year after their respective nuclear tests, India and Pakistan again fought a significant conventional conflict in Kashmir, known as the Kargil War. This conflict did not escalate to the nuclear level, but both states were cognizant of the dangers of escalation. While Pakistan believed escalation was unlikely, India took steps to limit the risks, such as keeping their planes on their side of the Line of Control.⁸ In addition to these major conflicts, there have been additional conflicts and crises at lower levels of conflict, such as the Siachen Glacier conflict in the mid-1980s and the 2001-2002 military standoff between the two countries.

Much of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is rooted in the process of partition that created the two states as separate entities out of colonial British India. Indeed, the first war between India and Pakistan began immediately after partition. Leading up to partition, the different sub-national states of what would become India and Pakistan held referendums to determine which country they would join. Predictably, the Hindu majority states joined together to form India, while the Muslim majority states joined together to form Pakistan (which at the time consisted of modern

⁸ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 117.

day Pakistan and East Pakistan, now Bangladesh). However, there were a few holdouts that did not hold referendum, the most prominent of which was the Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The ruling Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu, had designs for the independence of his state. However, with a majority Muslim population, it was feared that a vote would lead to accession with Pakistan.⁹ The newly formed Pakistani army agreed, and in October 1947 began to infiltrate fighters into Jammu and Kashmir. Maharaja Singh appealed to India for help, which was provided only in return for Jammu and Kashmir's accession with India, which was formally signed on 27 October, 1947, thus beginning the first Indo-Pakistani war.¹⁰ Neither side achieved total victory in the war. While a ceasefire was reached in 1948, neither state withdrew from their positions, thus leaving the territory of Jammu and Kashmir divided.

The 1965 war was again fought over the issue of Kashmir, as Pakistan once again began to infiltrate forces into Kashmir to foment an insurgency against the Indian occupation forces. It escalated to full scale conventional war along the Indo-Pakistani border.¹¹ The 1971 war was unique in that it began as an internal Pakistani conflict between the Eastern and Western parts of the country, in which India eventually intervened to support the independence of East Pakistan, which became the independent country of Bangladesh.¹² Later conflicts between India and Pakistan, such as the Siachen Glacier conflict and the Kargil War, returned to the historical pattern of having a basis in the underlying Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir.

⁹ Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 36-38.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹¹ See Ganguly, "The Second Kashmir War," in *Conflict Unending*, p. 31-50.

¹² See Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).

Indeed, the process of partition and the disputed status of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir are at the heart of India and Pakistan's continued rivalry. Partition was itself a violent and bloody process that caused approximately 14.5 million refugees to flow back and forth across the new international border. There was significant resistance to the process of partition in many places, resulting in rioting and other acts of violence. Estimates of the number of killed vary between 200,000 to as high as one million.¹³ Furthermore, individual territories such as the Punjab were partitioned, with part going to Pakistan and part to India which resulted in further grief and confusion among the population as they struggled to remain on their preferred side of the new border. The partition of Punjab also significantly affected the Sikh community, splitting it among the two new states.

Beyond the direct suffering caused by partition, the territory of Jammu and Kashmir is essential to both India and Pakistan's conception of themselves as states. Pakistan was founded expressly as a home for South Asian Muslims. Jammu and Kashmir, its population being primarily Muslim, should thus have been part of Pakistan. If a Muslim majority territory could exist relatively peacefully and contently in a majority Hindu state, the rationale for Pakistan's existence would be undermined.¹⁴ In the same way Jammu and Kashmir is vital to Pakistan's identity, it is also vital to India's. India sees itself as a secular democracy under which people of many faiths, ethnicities, and creeds can co-exist. Thus, maintaining control of a majority Muslim territory helps demonstrate India's secular creed. If it were to lose Kashmir, then the rest of India's states would all be predominately Hindu, thus undermining their secular argument.

¹³ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 211n12.

¹⁴ Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 51-54.

Furthermore, India fears that if it gives up Kashmir, other states might attempt to secede.¹⁵ It is for these reasons, as well as more recent concerns over water rights, which keep India and Pakistan's hostility alive. Both view Jammu and Kashmir as vital components of their identity. India, however, is the status quo power in this relationship, as they do not need to regain control of all the original territory of Jammu and Kashmir to justify its inclusion into India. Pakistan, on the other hand, is the revisionist power which believes that the entirety of the territory must be ceded to them, and thus remains the main driver of the conflict.

Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba is an Islamist terrorist organization dedicated to the expulsion of India from the parts of Jammu and Kashmir they control, thus "freeing" their co-religionists. While this is their most immediate goal, LeT has also stated that their long term desire is to establish an Islamic state over the whole of the Indian subcontinent.¹⁶ LeT was founded in 1986 by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and Hafiz Adul Rehman Makki. It is based in Muridke, near Lahore, Pakistan.¹⁷ Like many organizations formed at the time, its genesis can be traced to the anti-Soviet Afghan war. Saeed, Iqbal, and Makki formed the Markaz Daawat wal Irshad (Center for Preaching and Guidance) that sought to promulgate the Ahl-e-Hadith school of Islam (similar to Wahhabism) and train mujahideen anti-Soviet fighters.¹⁸ However, as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan ended, the group re-oriented and set its sights on the issue of Kashmir. By 1993, the

¹⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, p. 129.

¹⁶ "Lashkar-e-Toiba – Army of the Pure," South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for Conflict Management. Online at http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.

¹⁷ Yoginder Sikand, "Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-e Taiba," in *The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction, and Communication of Armed Conflict*, eds. Apama Rao, Michael Bollig, and Monica Bock (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 216.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

group had formally assumed the title of Lashkar-e-Taiba operating as a proxy for Pakistan in their conflict with India.

Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, LeT was active in Kashmir, carrying out attacks against Indian security forces and civilian targets. Notable examples from the early period of LeT's attacks include the December 1999 suicide attacks against India's Special Operations Group headquarters that killed twelve policemen and three Lashkar activists. The previous year they also killed 23 people in Wandhama and 25 people in Doda, as well as 35 Sikhs in Chattisinghpura in 2000.¹⁹ As the first decade of the twentieth century continued, many LeT attacks grew in scale and complexity. They also expanded their range of targets to include locations inside India itself, not just Indian controlled Kashmir. Examples of more recent attacks Indian investigators believe LeT to be responsible for include the 2005 Diwali bombings in New Delhi, which killed sixty-two people²⁰, as well as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings which killed 186 people.²¹ Most recently, India and the international community has blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for perpetrating the 2008 Mumbai attacks. LeT tends not to claim responsibility for these more recent attacks²², given their ties to the ISI and Pakistan's interest in maintaining plausible deniability. Yet despite their protests to the contrary, India and most of the international community believe the ISI maintains strong ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

¹⁹ Santosh Sina, "Violent 'army of the pure,'" *BBC News*, 14 December, 2001. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/865818.stm.

²⁰ "Subdued Diwali in bomb-hit Delhi," *BBC News*, 1 November, 2005. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4395346.stm.

²¹ "Pakistan 'role in Mumbai attacks,'" *BBC News*, 30 September, 2006. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5394686.stm.

²² Mark Mazzetti and Salman Masood, "U.S. Intelligence Focuses on Pakistani Group," *New York Times*, November 28, 2008. Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html#>

Under the logic of the instability-instability paradox, as discussed previously, Pakistan conducts low-level irregular warfare against India under the protection of its nuclear deterrent. Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the key organizations in that fight. Since its founding it has maintained strong ties with elements of the Pakistani state, especially the ISI. During the Afghan war in the 1980s, the ISI was responsible for directing much of the funding that was going towards the mujahideen. In its pre-LeT formulation as the Markaz, Lashkar-e-Taiba gained ISI assistance in its early years.²³ After the end of the anti-Soviet jihad, as the organization reoriented towards the liberation of Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir, the ISI continued to provide them with aid as they hoped they would be a more reliable proxy than the local Kashmiri militants.²⁴

Lashkar-e-Taiba quickly became Pakistan's favored proxy in its covert war over Jammu and Kashmir. Not only did they alleviate the need to support local Kashmiri insurgents whose goals might not match up with Pakistan's, LeT also did not have any desire to alter the Pakistani state, unlike other Islamic organizations operating in Pakistan at the time. For example, Jaish-e-Mohammad, another terrorist organization operating in Pakistan with the occasional support of the ISI, has at times opposed the army. This is due to its desire to transform Pakistan into a more Islamist state,²⁵ an objective Lashkar-e-Taiba does not necessarily share. Indeed, LeT has proven extremely loyal to the Pakistani state. In return for their assistance in Kashmir, the Pakistani

²³ Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror* (Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books, 2004), p. 61-62.

²⁴ Mariam Abou Zahab, "I Shall be Waiting For You at the Door of Paradise': The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)," in *The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction, and Communication of Armed Conflict*, eds. Apama Rao, Michael Bollig, and Monica Bock (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 134.

²⁵ Mir, p. 71-72.

government provided Lashkar-e-Taiba with a safe haven, as well as funding, training, weapons, intelligence, and covert insertion assistance into Kashmir.²⁶

Over time, Lashkar-e-Taiba has diversified its sources of funding as it gained increased international recognition. While it is difficult to pin down exactly where their funding comes from, many analysts believe that a significant portion of their funds comes from donations made abroad, specifically Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates and businessmen in the Persian Gulf and Britain.²⁷ However, Lashkar-e-Taiba remains reliant on Pakistan to provide them with a safe haven that allows them to continue operations, such as their main headquarters in Muridke and their training camps located in Azad Kashmir. Not only are the launching points for their attacks into Kashmir based in Pakistan, but over 80 percent of their recruits are Pakistani.²⁸ Some reports place the number of offices LeT maintains in Pakistan at around 500,²⁹ many of which play a role in recruitment. Despite Pakistan declaration of the group as a terrorist organization in 2002, it has continued to operate relatively unimpeded within its borders. For example, the LeT commander of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, while being held in prison in Pakistan, continues to direct LeT operations and has not been sufficiently interrogated.³⁰

Pakistan's assistance of Lashkar-e-Taiba has continued to this day. While Pakistan has repeatedly denied that they were involved in training or supporting LeT in the planning or operational phases of the attack, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of

²⁶ Ibid., p. 63-70.

²⁷ Jayshree Bajoria, "Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) Backgrounder," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 14 January, 2010. Online at <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar--taiba/p17882#p3>

²⁸ Abou Zahab, p. 137.

²⁹ Sikand, p. 219.

³⁰ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 365-366.

the ISI, admitted to then CIA director Michael Hayden that there was some level of ISI connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba's actions. As reported in Bob Woodward's latest book, *Obama's Wars*, General Pasha said that the planners of the 2008 Mumbai attacks included at least two retired Pakistani army officers who had links to the ISI. However, he did reiterate that it was not a formally sanctioned ISI operation.³¹

Literature Review

This section will review the two major arguments underlying the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan, providing a base from which the paper's analysis of the Indian response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks can begin.

Strategic Stability on the Subcontinent

One school of thought, spearheaded by Sumit Ganguly, argues that the introduction of overt nuclear weapon capabilities into the Indian subcontinent have increased stability and made a devastating war less likely. The basis of their arguments revolves around the fact that India and Pakistan have fought a war and endured a major crisis since their 1998 nuclear tests, and in both instances the conflict has been resolved without a major conventional war, let alone an escalation to the nuclear level. For Ganguly, this demonstrates that Indian and Pakistani policy makers are rational and are not likely to risk serious escalation. For example, during the Kargil War, the Indian military restricted its air attacks to their side of the Line of Control, thus demonstrating

³¹ Ibid., p. 46-47.

restraint against their Pakistani opponents. He argues that the primary reason for Indian restraint was Pakistan's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent.³²

Additionally, Ganguly contends that India and Pakistan have historically shown surprising levels of constraint during the wars they fought in the first decades after partition.³³ A history of strategic restraint would help India and Pakistan limit the risk of escalation in future crises. In sum, Ganguly argues that the tradition of restraint in Indo-Pakistani conflicts, combined with the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, has significantly reduced the risk of a major war on the subcontinent and increased strategic stability. If this is the case, then it is likely that similar factors were at play during the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Since India did not respond forcefully against Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Pakistani state, Ganguly would contend that this was due primarily to Pakistan's possession of an overt nuclear deterrent. Security factors trumped all others in determining India's response.

However, Ganguly's argument is incomplete. While nuclear weapons are believed to have a deterrent effect, it is not clear that they played a major role in moderating India's response to the Mumbai attacks. Other factors, such as the preference of Prime Minister Singh to avoid a conflict that might bring harm to India's economic growth, could have played a role as well. Ganguly had argued previously that it was Pakistan's possession of a nuclear deterrent that induced Indian restraint during the 1999 Kargil War. Further scholarship has demonstrated that other factors, such as Indian desire to maintain international sympathy, especially of the United

³² Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," p. 58-59.

³³ Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," p. 50.

States, played a more prominent role in moderating their response.³⁴ Therefore, simply relying on a nuclear deterrence argument to explain India's hesitance to respond forcefully in the wake of Mumbai is likely to be an incomplete explanation.

Instability-Instability Paradox

Paul Kapur takes the opposite view of Sumit Ganguly – that the introduction of an overt nuclear weapons capability on the subcontinent has increased strategic instability and increased the risk of war. The thrust of his argument revolves around the instability-instability paradox, as opposed to the stability-instability paradox that was developed during the Cold War to apply to the United States and the Soviet Union. The stability-instability paradox holds that, as both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed sufficient numbers of nuclear warheads to ensure survivability and retaliation, it was unlikely that the two would enter into a major conventional war with one another, given the risks of escalation to the nuclear level. However, these same risks allowed both states to test each other at the margins of their interests and at lower levels of unconventional or proxy warfare, where the risk of escalation was minimal. Thus, while strategic stability was maintained, the risk of low level unconventional war rose.

Kapur's instability-instability theory, on the other hand, posits that it is the existence of strategic instability between India and Pakistan that leads to instability on the conventional level. The major difference between the Indo-Pakistan security dyad and the U.S.-Soviet one is that in the case of India and Pakistan the revisionist power is also conventionally weaker. If there was a

³⁴ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, p. 118.

high degree of strategic stability, Pakistan would not incite low level conflict as India would be relatively free to retaliate. Instead, the existence of strategic instability makes nuclear war much more likely, as any conflict between India and Pakistan risks escalation to the nuclear level. This works to limit India's possible responses to Pakistani provocations.³⁵ Yet at the same time, it makes low level conventional war much more likely, as Pakistan can engage in asymmetric conflict against India without seriously risking a devastating Indian conventional response.

Given these constraints on Indian retaliatory options, it is unlikely that India would launch a large scale conventional attack in response to Pakistani provocations. However, some of the Indian government believes that the strategic balance between the two states is more stable than the instability-instability paradox would indicate. With the development of the "Cold Start" limited war doctrine, it is possible that Indian policymakers and military officials would be more likely to consider the use of force in a future crisis.³⁶ While the instability-instability paradox might induce India to moderate its policy, Kapur believes that India would likely respond forcefully in the event of a serious Pakistani provocation.³⁷ The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, which left over 166 people dead and almost double that wounded, would constitute a major provocation, especially given Pakistan's longstanding ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba. Since India's response was relatively mild, it appears that the explanatory power of Kapur's theory is lacking in this specific case.

³⁵ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, p. 40-41.

³⁶ Ladwig III, p. 168.

³⁷ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, p.174.

Kenneth Waltz's Three Levels of Analysis

Given the shortcomings of Kapur's theory, and the incompleteness of Ganguly's, it is necessary to look for a more detailed explanation of Indian behavior in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. Kenneth Waltz's three images of international relations, also known as the three levels of analysis, provide an appropriate framework in which to undertake this task. Kenneth Waltz's seminal work, *Man, State, and War*, revolutionized the field of international relations when it was first published in 1959. In this book he argues that there are three levels of analysis, or images, that can be used to explain the choices made and policies adopted by different states. His first image, that of the individual, argues that it is the leaders of states which determine its policy choices, and these can vary based on the personal characteristics, beliefs, and temperaments of different leaders. Waltz's second image is the domestic or state level. At this stage he argues that it could be the domestic political situation and the internal structure of states that drives policy creation – states respond to internal stimuli. The third and final image is the international or structural level of analysis. Waltz argues that it is the international system, specifically the existence of anarchy and a self-help world that determines state policy. In short, states respond to external stimuli and the structure of the system. While Waltz favored the third level of analysis as the most accurate predictor of state policies, he admits that the first and second levels of analysis do play a role, especially in understanding the proximate causes of war.³⁸

Waltz's three images of international relations provide an excellent framework through which to analyze India's response to the attacks. This paper's hypothesized answer, that a

³⁸ See Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

multitude of factors likely played a role, but that the policy position of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (individual image) played the greatest role in ameliorating India's response. However, this does not discredit the role played by other factors, such as the lack of a usable military plan (second image) and the involvement of the United States (third image).

The Mumbai Attacks and India's Response

This section will provide a brief overview of the timeline of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, as well as the position India took and the policies it carried out in response to the attacks. Not only will this provide background information, but it will provide the necessary context for the scope and horror of these attacks. The Indian people watched them unfold live on television over a three day period, thus creating a larger impression than previous terror attacks.

Planning for the Attacks

A study of the planning for the operation suggests that Lashkar-e-Taiba devoted a significant amount of time and effort into planning and training the operatives who would undertake the 2008 Mumbai attacks. This is consistent with their usual method of operations involving highly skilled operatives trained to operate offensively in small groups.³⁹ Indeed, it appears that the 10 gunmen had received training from former Pakistani military officers and ISI agents.⁴⁰ The lone survivor of the attack, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, confirmed that they

³⁹ Abou Zahab, p. 138.

⁴⁰ Eric Schmitt and Somini Sengupta, "Ex-U.S. Official Cites Pakistani Training for India Attackers," *New York Times*, 3 December, 2008. Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/world/asia/04india.html?hp>.

were trained in Pakistan by Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁴¹ According to the Indian government's final report on the terrorist attacks, the training process was quite extensive, involving multiple training modules of escalating difficulty in order to find the best candidates to carry out the mission.⁴² Kasab has discussed the training he underwent, confirming that it was similar to what LeT recruits routinely undergo. After approaching LeT recruiters, he was taken and given 21 days of training on how to operate small arms weapons, such as pistols and AK-47. After three months of additional training Kasab was taken to Azad Kashmir, the portion of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, where he undergoes another three months of training where he learned to handle rocket launchers and grenades. Also included in his training was time spent in Karachi, where he was acclimated to the sea.⁴³ This was likely to prepare him for the boat-insertion into Mumbai.

Strategic planning for the operation ran on a much longer time scale. It was this aspect that most involved David Headley, otherwise known as Daood Gilani, an American citizen of Pakistani descent. He surveyed prospective target locations for Lashkar-e-Taiba over a period of several years in advance of the attacks. In 2010 he plead guilty to 12 terrorism related counts, 10 of which are related to the attacks that took place in Mumbai or general support for Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁴⁴ In his plea agreement Headley concedes that from 2002 to 2005 he attended several Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps in Pakistan, at which he was trained in principals of jihad, as well as weapon usage. Furthermore, in late 2005 he met with representatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba

⁴¹ "Kasab's confession – how the LeT trained Mumbai attackers," *Indo-Asian News Service*, July 20, 2009.

Online at <http://www.newkerala.com/nkfullnews-1-77027.html>.

⁴² Ashok Duraphe, Chief Investigating Officer. "Final Report: Mumbai Terror Attack Cases," (Government of India, February 25, 2009), p. 5. Online at <http://www.hindu.com/nic/mumbai-terror-attack-final-form.pdf>.

⁴³ "Kasab's confession – how the LeT trained Mumbai attackers."

⁴⁴ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, "Plea Agreement, United States of America vs. David Coleman Headley," *No. 09 CR 830-3*, 18 March, 2010, p. 1-2.

and agreed to conduct surveillance of multiple locations in India, including the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai. After several trips to conduct surveillance throughout 2006 and 2007, Headley again met with his Lashkar-e-Taiba contacts in Pakistan to provide them with video footage he had taken of the prospective targets.⁴⁵ Headley returned to Mumbai in 2008 to conduct further surveillance, specifically of other targets for the November attacks, including the Oberoi Hotel, the Chabad House, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus train station, and the Leopold Café, as well as possible landing sites for the sea infiltration.⁴⁶ In sum, it is clear that Headley was deeply involved in the attacks, and indeed knew many of the planned details of the assault.⁴⁷

India's National Investigative Agency (NIA), a new agency set up to combat terrorism in India, interrogated Headley over the summer of 2010. While their report remains classified, elements leaked to the press indicate that Headley claimed that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) was heavily involved in the planning and funding of the Mumbai attacks. The report claims he recounted meeting with ISI handlers, and speculated on their motives for supporting the attack. Specifically, Headley claimed the ISI wanted to refocus Islamic militant's attention on India, rather than the Pakistani state.⁴⁸ However, the United States disputes Headley's claim that the ISI was heavily involved in the attack.⁴⁹ Despite having worked for the Drug Enforcement Agency in the past as an informer, it is unclear to what extent the United States was aware of Headley's association with Lashkar-e-Taiba. Intelligence officials say they did not connect Headley to terrorism until months after the Mumbai attacks, however

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3-6.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁸ Emily Wax and Greg Miller, "Indian report accuses Pakistan's intelligence service of significant role in Mumbai siege," *The Washington Post*, 19 October, 2010. Online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101907356.html>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

privately some suspect that the U.S. was tracking Headley without realizing how deeply he was involved with Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁵⁰ The NIA report goes on to state that Headley returned to India after the Mumbai attacks to continue surveillance on sites in New Delhi for possible future attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁵¹ In sum, despite U.S. and Pakistani protestations to the contrary, the Indian government and most the international community believe that the Pakistani government, and specifically the ISI, was involved at some level in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The Attacks

The 2008 Mumbai attacks began with the 10 gunman seizing control of an Indian fishing trawler sometime in the weeks prior to the attack. Using this vessel, they approached the coast and landed using inflatable dinghies early on the morning of 26 November. From there they split into five two-man teams and spread out over the city to cover all the targets that had been surveyed by David Headley. Having taken taxis to their intended targets, the gunmen left explosives behind when they exited, which killed two drivers and a bystander, formally marking the beginning of violence.⁵²

The major targets of the attack consisted of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, the Leopold Café, the Taj Mahal Hotel, the Oberoi Trident hotel, and the Nariman House. Each of

⁵⁰ Sebastian Rotella, "An intricate plot unleashed in Mumbai, the West confronts a new threat," *The Washington Post*, 15 November, 2010. Online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/14/AR2010111404515.html>.

⁵¹ The Economic Times, "Headley Surveyed for Delhi's 26/11," 20 October, 2010. Online at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Headley-surveyed-for-Delhis-26/11/articleshow/6777915.cms>.

⁵² "How Mumbai attacks unfolded," *BBC News*, 30 November 2008. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7757500.stm.

the two man teams took one of the locations. Armed with AK-47 rifles, two of the gunmen hit the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus first. The gunmen fired indiscriminately into the crowds at the Terminus, and as they fled the scene they attacked and killed three policemen they encountered. Stealing their police van, the two men fled through the streets of Mumbai, firing indiscriminately out of their vehicle. The police pursued and eventually cornered them by the seafront, where the pair was successfully engaged, killing one gunman and arresting the other, who would be the only gunmen to survive the attacks.⁵³

The Nariman House, also known as the Chabad Center, was a Jewish center that was targeted during the attacks. Prior to entering the building, the two gunmen placed explosives near the building, and then proceeded to enter and take hostages, mainly Jewish or dual American-Jewish citizens. While Indian police blockaded the building, there were reports that the gunmen fired into the crowd. Indian commandos did not move into the building until early morning on 28 November, landing on the roof to gain access to the building's interior. The fighting lasted most of the day and by the time it was over that evening, the two gunmen were dead, but some of the hostages were killed, most likely before the commandos stormed the building.⁵⁴

The attack on the Leopold Café was carried out in a similar fashion to the other attacks, with two gunmen spraying indiscriminate fire into the building, as well as employing grenades. This resulted in the death of 11 civilians and the injuring of over 28. Non-Indian citizens were among those killed and wounded in this attack. The two gunmen were able to successfully flee

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Angela Rabasa et al., "The Lessons of Mumbai," p. 5-6.

the scene and rendezvous with their compatriots who were assaulting the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels.⁵⁵

The attacks on the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels were the most violent of all the attacks. Again, prior to entering the buildings, the terrorists planted explosives on the exterior; however they were disarmed by the police before they could be detonated. Once inside the lobby they opened fire, and were eventually joined by their two compatriots from the Leopold Café attacks. Together, they moved through the hotel floor by floor. Eventually army forces and navy commandos were brought in to deal with the four gunmen, who had managed to evade police custody by moving through the hotel. It wasn't until 29 November, almost three days after the attacks began, that the gunmen in the Taj Mahal hotel are all killed.⁵⁶ Similarly to the Taj Mahal hotel, the attack on the Oberoi consisted of two gunmen who fired indiscriminately into the crowd. The attack also ended in a similar fashion, with military commandos storming the building and engaging in a running battle with the gunmen until they could be brought down. By 29 November, all the gunmen had either been killed or captured, and the LeT operation had been brought to an end.

India's Response

India's immediate response to the attacks has been criticized for being slow and poorly implemented. The gunmen quickly proved to be well trained and largely outclassed the local

⁵⁵ Duraphe, p. 15-16.

⁵⁶ "Timeline: Mumbai under attack," *BBC News*, 1 December, 2008. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7754438.stm.

police contingents, requiring the use of military Special Forces. However, these units were located far away from Mumbai and did not possess adequate transportation capabilities that would have allowed them to get onto the scene quickly. For example, the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos were stationed in New Delhi, over 1000 miles away from Mumbai. They were not contacted until 11 pm on the 26th, two and half hours after the attacks had begun. Once roused, it took additional time to find an aircraft large enough to transport 200 men from New Delhi to Mumbai. Once an appropriate aircraft was found, the pilot had to be awakened and the plane refueled. It did not reach New Delhi until 2 am. The flight to Mumbai took an additional three hours as it was a slower model plane. Finally, transportation from the airport into Mumbai itself took additional time. It was not until seven and a half hours after the attack that the commandos began to take up station.⁵⁷

Beyond the immediate response to the attacks, India has taken several steps to improve their anti-terrorism laws and their response capability in the event of future terrorist attacks. Locally, both the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra resigned in the wake of the attack, as did the Indian Minister for Home Affairs and the national security advisor.⁵⁸ In the wake of the attack Prime Minister Singh promised that anti-terrorism laws would be strengthened. A bill passed through India's lower and upper houses of Parliament in December 2008 that established the National Investigative Agency (NIA), an organization that would

⁵⁷ "Why did NSG take 10 hours to arrive?" *The Economic Times*. 30 November, 2008. Online at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-11-30/news/27703778_1_nsg-commandos-nsg-men-il-76.

⁵⁸ See "Officials quit over India attacks," *BBC News*, 30 November, 2008. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7757122.stm; Aditi Pai, "Vilasrao Deshmukh quits as Maharashtra CM," *India Today*, 4 December, 2008. Online at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/21767/Mumbai%20Terror%20Strikes/Vilasrao+Deshmukh+quits+as+Maharashtra+CM.html>; "Maharashtra Deputy CM RR Patil resigns," *CNN-IBN*, 1 December, 2008. Online at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/21767/Mumbai%20Terror%20Strikes/Vilasrao+Deshmukh+quits+as+Maharashtra+CM.html>.

function similar to the American FBI. It would be used to investigate the 2008 Mumbai attacks, as well as any future terrorist threats. However, the law did not go as far as some wanted, as it did not allow for security forces to tap phone and internet lines without a court order.⁵⁹

On the international stage, India's response was relatively muted. Prime Minister Singh condemned the attacks yet counseled for restraint.⁶⁰ The main Indian response revolved around pressuring Pakistan to comply with its 2004 commitment to bring an end to terrorist groups operating on Pakistani soil. Pakistan had failed to eliminate terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba in the past, despite repeated promises to do so. Many Indian officials lacked confidence that Pakistan's response would be significantly improved, despite increased pressure. India has also expressed displeasure with Pakistani efforts and mechanisms for intelligence sharing and investigative cooperation.⁶¹ While Indo-Pakistani relations suffered in the immediate aftermath of the attack and the bilateral dialogue was paused,⁶² neither country suffered long term diplomatic costs. Prime Minister Singh worked instead to keep the lines of communication open with the Pakistani government and endeavored to prevent the hard liners in India from pushing him towards a military response.⁶³ Instead, with assistance from the rest of the international community, India chose to focus on pressuring the Pakistanis to comply with prior commitments to shut down the terrorist camps and prosecute the terrorists through the legal system.

⁵⁹ "India to tighten anti-terror laws," *BBC News*, 17 December, 2008. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7787434.stm.

⁶⁰ Heather Williams, "Nuclear and Strategic Implications of the Mumbai Attacks: One Year Later," *WMD Insights*, January 2010. Online at http://www.wmdinsights.com/I31/I31_SA2_NuclearandStrategic.htm.

⁶¹ K. Alan Kronstadt, "Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests," *Congressional Research Service*, December 19, 2008, p. 9.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ C. Raja Mohan, "After Mumbai: U.S. Can Help India and Pakistan Move Towards Cooperation," Asia Foundation, December, 17, 2008. Online at <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2008/12/17/after-mumbai-us-can-help-india-and-pakistan-move-towards-cooperation/>.

Analysis of India's Response to the Mumbai Attacks

This section will analyze India's response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks against Kapur's specific prediction of Indian retaliation, and demonstrate how that argument does not provide a sufficient explanation for India's actions. It will go on to address India's policy making process through Waltz's three images, combining them to create a more detailed accounting of India's response to the attacks and identify the key variables behind their decision making.

Kapur's Instability-Instability Paradox

Kapur's prediction that India would retaliate militarily given a significant Pakistani provocation has proven to be incorrect. In the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks the Indian military was not mobilized as it was in the aftermath of the December 2001 attacks on Parliament. In that instance, Jaish-e-Mohammed launched an assault on India's Parliament House, killing 9 individuals before they were themselves shot by security forces. In response to these attacks, the Indian government mobilized and deployed soldiers along the international border with Pakistan in Punjab and the Line of Control in Kashmir. Pakistan responded with its own troop deployments, which resulted in a prolonged military standoff that lasted until the latter part of 2002. Post November 2008, the Indian Air Force was put on higher alert,⁶⁴ but there were no massive deployments of troops to the border.

⁶⁴ Barbara Starr, "U.S.: India's air force 'on alert' after Mumbai attacks," *CNN*, 15 December 2008. Online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/15/india.pakistan.tension/index.html>

Kapur argued that India was likely to retaliate because members of the Indian government, especially within the security establishment, had become more convinced since 2001 that a greater level of strategic stability existed on the subcontinent than his instability-instability paradox would support. Kapur, quoting a senior scholar involved in the formation of India's nuclear policy, states that Indian officials believe that any escalation would be a rational act that could be controlled. Both India and Pakistan, being rational states, would have no desire to see nuclear weapons deployed, as they would likely destroy Pakistan and cause significant harm, if not complete collapse, to India.⁶⁵ Even if India did initiate a limited war against, Pakistan, the military believes it would be able to calibrate its attack to stop short of any Pakistani "red lines" that might trigger the use of their nuclear arsenal.⁶⁶ Despite the pro-limited war beliefs of many Indian defense officials, war between India and Pakistan did not break out after Mumbai. In part, this is due to the Ministry of Defense not playing a significant role in Indian policymaking.

Unlike within the Department of Defense in the United States, the Indian military is not heavily involved in the decision making process. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense on the whole is not the most important organization when it comes to foreign policy. Most foreign policy issues are handled by the Ministry of External Affairs. While the armed forces prepare for conflict, the decision making split between civilian bureaucrats and uniformed military officers is apparent and significant.⁶⁷ For example, during the 2001-2002 military standoff along the international border and the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, the military believed

⁶⁵ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, p. 180.

⁶⁶ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 78.

⁶⁷ Ladwig III, p. 170.

that it could successfully engage in a limited war that would punish Pakistan for supporting the terrorists that had attacked Parliament.⁶⁸ When the standoff ended without leading to war, many Indian military officials and independent analysts argued that India had lost face and achieved nothing. Former Indian Army Chief of Staff Shankar Roychoudhry said that the build-up and demobilization was a “pointless gesture...that compromised Indian credibility greatly.”⁶⁹ Yet the civilian leadership had determined during the crisis that it was not necessary to initiate a war with Pakistan, despite the military’s apparent eagerness to retaliate. Similarly, in 2008 the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, did not feel it was wise to retaliate against Pakistan in response to the Mumbai attacks.

Kapur’s prediction that greater faith on the part of the Indian defense establishment in their ability to conduct limited war did not translate into a more aggressive Indian policy vis-à-vis Pakistani provocations, despite the horrific nature of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. It is necessary then to turn to other factors to explain Indian behavior. As mentioned above, the beliefs of Prime Minister Singh were likely a major factor in determining India’s response.

First Image Analysis

Having suffered a devastating terrorist attack in their largest city and financial center, which was carried out by a terrorist organization with ties to elements within the Pakistani military establishment, India’s response could be considered extremely mild. Parts of India’s

⁶⁸ Steve Coll, “The Stand-Off: How Jihadi groups helped provoke the twenty-first century’s first nuclear crisis,” *The New Yorker*, 13 February 2006. Online at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213fa_fact_coll.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, p. 136.

media and defense establishment called for a forceful response to the attacks, including Vikram Sood, a former head of the Research and Analysis wing of India's intelligence agency. He argued that restraint will only embolden future attackers. Instead, India should target Lashkar-e-Taiba's and other militant groups' infrastructure. Some defense officials even argued for conventional attacks against Pakistan itself.⁷⁰ However, most civilian officials and politicians were supportive of Prime Minister Singh's tempered response that focused on pushing Pakistan to crack down on its own militant groups while working to improve India's domestic security and intelligence agencies.⁷¹

The Indian leadership was extremely unwilling to escalate tensions with Pakistan in any appreciable way. Prime Minister Singh's remarks on 27 November, while the attacks were still ongoing, struck a delicate balance. While acknowledging that the attacks likely had some external linkages and promising to bring the perpetrators to justice, there was no explicit statement about the use of military force. Rather than threaten Pakistan with military retaliation, he instead said they would "take up strongly with our neighbors that the use of their territory for launching attacks on us will not be tolerated, and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them."⁷² While costs could include military action, it is important to note that Prime Minister Singh did not overtly threaten the use of military force. The only foreign action Prime Minister Singh promised was that India would force its neighbors (i.e., Pakistan) to work harder to prevent terrorist organizations from operating within their territory. This would be done

⁷⁰ Heather Williams, "Nuclear and Strategic Implications of the Mumbai Attacks: One Year Later."

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Full Text: PM Manmohan Singh Address to Indian People Regarding Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai," November 27, 2008. Online at < <http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2008/11/27/full-text-pm-manmohan-singh-address-to-people-regarding-terrorist-attacks-in-mumbai/>.

prior to any unilateral action on India's part.⁷³ Instead, most of the speech focused on India's domestic response to the crisis, the need for unity in the face of tragedy, sympathy for the victims, and praise for the police. Singh emphasized that the attacks were intended to create havoc in India's commercial capital, and that India must remain calm and not overreact.⁷⁴

He promised to strengthen domestic law so that there would be no loopholes terrorists could use to escape justice. Additionally, a new Federal Investigation Agency would be set up that would help bring terrorists to justice. In short, he promised that changes would be made to help reduce the likelihood of future terrorist actions.⁷⁵ In sum, the speech was a mild statement that was indicative of India's government's hesitancy to punish Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba, despite the severity of the terrorist attack.

Reaction to the attacks among the Indian public was split. While condemnation of the attacks was universal, as was the belief that there was Pakistani involvement at some level, the public was not united in calling for a military response despite the severity of the attack. This is contrary to some analysts' predictions, such as Gurmeet Kanwall, who had said that "in the event of another major terrorist attack there will be an uproar and it will be politically impossible for the government not to respond."⁷⁶ Much of the media coverage was nationalistic in nature, and immediately accused Pakistan of involvement in the attacks, despite their denials. This helped stoke anti-Pakistani resentment within part of the Indian population.⁷⁷ However, anti-Pakistani

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p. 73.

⁷⁷ Rina Chandran, "Indian media under fire for Mumbai attacks coverage," *Reuters*, 5 December, 2008. Online at <http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/12/05/idINIndia-36891720081205>.

resentment was not universal. For example the Times of India, the most widely read English language newspaper in the country, published an editorial in late November 2008 which stated that while India was at war against deadly terrorist enemies, retaliation against Pakistan was not necessary. Rather, it advocated strengthening India's internal security apparatus and working to stabilize the entire region, including Pakistan.⁷⁸ This type of split in public reaction gave the Indian government and Prime Minister Singh the space in which to temper its response and avoid an unwanted military escalation.

The desire to avoid an armed conflict with Pakistan stems largely from Prime Minister Singh's, and the Indian government more broadly, concern over maintaining India's economic growth. It is likely that the 21st century will see India rise to be one of the great powers in the international system, along with China and the United States. However, given its large and growing population, India must maintain significant economic growth rates to support its rising stature on the international stage. Despite the recent global recession, India maintained a growth rate above that of most developed Western countries.⁷⁹ India possesses a rapidly growing middle class that aspires to reach the quintessential "American Dream." Not only has this improved India's economic standing, but it has driven rising expectations among India's electorate.⁸⁰ This in turn has made it necessary for Indian politicians to prioritize continued economic growth above almost all other issues.

⁷⁸ "Editorial Comment: It's War," *Times of India*, November 28, 2008. Online at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/EDIT_Its_War/articleshow/3766472.cms.

⁷⁹ Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p. 69.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Despite amazing progress over the last twenty years, in many ways India's economic rise is still fragile. Wealth and income inequality, always a problem in Indian society, remains a serious issue and has grown worse during the last twenty years. There is a large urban-rural divide, with significant portions of India's rural population lacking access to electricity while facing increased poverty and child malnourishment.⁸¹ In addition to these more obvious economic problems, India's public education system and its public infrastructure are weak compared to many other states. Thirty-three percent of children in India do not complete 5 years of schooling.⁸² India's transportation system is dated and desperately in need of significant improvements. For example, the lack of adequate transportation infrastructure causes India's agricultural sector to lose 30 to 40 percent of its output as waste.⁸³

It is these types of issues that drive Prime Minister Singh, who as Finance Minister in the early 1990s implemented many free market reforms that put India on the path of its current economic growth, to seek to maintain relative peace and stability with Pakistan. Any escalation in the conflict between the two states, or the outbreak of even a limited war, would divert government resources that could be better spent on ensuring the continued growth of India's economy. As Prime Minister Singh notes in a speech to the Lok Sabha in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, the attacks were meant in part to undermine India's continued economic progress.⁸⁴ This is indicative that Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as the Indian government, is aware of the importance of continued economic growth to India's future.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 70.

⁸² Ibid., p. 70.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 70-71.

⁸⁴ Manmohan Singh, "Excerpts of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh intervention in Lok Sabha during discussion on the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai," Indian Embassy Press Release, 11 December, 2008.

This first image analysis of India's response to the Mumbai attacks, from the point of view of their Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, has significant explanatory power. In sum the views of the Prime Minister, specifically his desire to focus on India's economic growth rather than the perpetual Indo-Pakistan conflict, lead him and the Indian government to ameliorate their response to the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Creating conditions favorable to India's economic growth is currently India's primary domestic goal under the Congress Party, and Prime Minister Singh was not willing to sacrifice that in order to retaliate and severely escalate tensions with their Pakistani neighbor. However, other factors likely played a role in determining India's response as well. This paper will now turn to a second image analysis of India's response.

Second Image Analysis

Under Waltz's characterization, second image analysis determined state policy through the types of institutions they set up. For example, under the second image, it is implied that democratic states would behave a certain way in certain situations, whereas autocratic states would behave a different way in those same situations. While it is indeed possible that an autocratic India would have responded differently to the Mumbai attacks, that is beyond the scope of this paper. This section will instead delve slightly deeper into Waltz's second image analysis to address specific programs of the Indian government that might have affected their response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, specifically the limited war doctrine known as Cold Start.

Cold Start is a military doctrine that was introduced by the Indian military in 2004. In its simplest form, Cold Start is a doctrine that, when fully implemented, would theoretically allow

India to fight a limited war with Pakistan that would not cross the Pakistani “red lines” and escalate to the nuclear level. Under Cold Star, Indian military strike formations would be reorganized. These would be smaller in size than their current organization as large strike corps, instead transitioning them into multiple smaller integrated battle group formations.⁸⁵ These formations, consisting of elements of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, would be trained in joint operations to allow them to carry out difficult tasks swiftly and effectively. These highly trained, more mobile battle groups would, in the event of a war with Pakistan, launch strikes into Pakistan along multiple axis of advance. The quick mobilization and rapid attacks would allow India to engage Pakistani military forces before they can begin their own military buildup along the Indo-Pakistan border. An additional benefit of this doctrine is that it would allow India to respond quickly in a crisis scenario, before the international community or international public opinion had a chance to react.⁸⁶

Once the Pakistani forces along the international border were defeated, India would proceed to occupy a segment of Pakistani territory, generally estimated to be less than 100 miles deep but extending along a large section of the international border. This strip of territory could then be used as a bargaining chip in post conflict negotiations with Pakistan. Not only would such an action provide India with leverage in post conflict negotiations, but it is likely that the quick assault outlined by Cold Start would significantly degrade the operational capability of the Pakistani armed forces, thus further strengthening India’s post-war position.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p .76.

⁸⁶ Ladwig III, p. 166.

⁸⁷ Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p .76-77.

Though the Cold Start limited war doctrine was introduced in 2004, by 2008 India had made little headway in putting it into practice. Indeed, at the time of Mumbai attacks, India did not possess the requisite capacity to respond per the guidelines laid down in Cold Start. The organization of India's armed forces remains a major issue. Simply put, as of 2008 different branches of India's armed services were unable to effectively coordinate their actions. This was exemplified in several war games India had conducted since the introduction of Cold Start in 2004.

While much improved from their combined operations during the Kargil War, army and air force units have yet to fully operate in tandem with each other. For example, in the Divya Astra military exercise conducted in 2004, army and air force units were unable to operate simultaneously in the same environment, instead relying on sequentially operations.⁸⁸ This is indicative of a failure to execute an effective joint warfare capability. Communications between the services have improved at a strategic level; however, deficiencies remain at the operational and tactical level. Some exercises did demonstrate improvements in coordination among the armed forces. However units involved in these war games needed time, immediately before the war games ranging from several days up to a month, to practice their assigned maneuvers. Even the elite, offensive oriented units in the strike corps required additional rehearsal time.⁸⁹ These results of the training exercises are not indicative of a force that is capable of executing complicated joint warfare maneuvers on short notice.

⁸⁸ Ladwig III, p. 182-183.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 182.

However, some progress has been made on the mobilization front. During the course of the Indian war games the strike corps mobilization times had shrunk considerably compared to how long it took to mobilize the armed forces during the 2001-2002 standoff.⁹⁰ Additionally, these war games were executed to varying degrees of success under multiple alternative scenarios. For example, the different exercises featured night fighting, nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare conditions, desert operations, and canal bridging scenarios.⁹¹ These are all realistic situations that an Indian army attempting to fight a limited war using the Cold Start doctrine would have to face. Additional improvements have been made in the Indian military's capability to use network-centric warfare. Real-time satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other advanced communications, target acquisition, and surveillance equipment have all been successfully integrated into the armed forces. However, the recent advances in technology have strained the military's communication network.⁹²

The Indian military has also lagged behind projections in the organization of its forces into the newer, more maneuverable battle group formations. While a new area command has been created (South Western Command) that covers the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan, there is no evidence that any of the strike formations that would be necessary to execute Cold Start have been deployed to the region.⁹³ For the Indian military to be able to successfully attack Pakistan within 72 hours of a go-order, it would be necessary to station the majority of the required forces near the border. Not only would this put them in close proximity to their intended targets, but it would also prevent Pakistan from responding to large troop

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 181-182.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 182.

⁹² Ibid., p. 183-184.

⁹³ Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p. 76.

deployments to the border once a crisis had begun. However at the time of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, it appears that India did not have the requisite forces positioned appropriately for the application of Cold Start.

In addition to the operational shortcomings of the Cold Start doctrine at the time of the Mumbai attacks, India's civilian leadership had not taken significant interest in the doctrine as a policy option. In general, India's civilian leadership has remained aloof from security matters during times of peace. In fact the Cold Start doctrine has developed with minimal guidance from India's civilian leadership.⁹⁴ Indeed, it remains unclear under what circumstances and with what goals in mind the Indian government would employ the Cold Start doctrine. Would they use it to target Islamic militant support facilities in the Punjab region, or would they focus on degrading the capabilities of the Pakistani army, or focus solely on seizing territory? Would it be used in response to a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist attack in India, or would a more overt act of aggression on the part of Pakistan be needed? Furthermore, what level of punishment would be necessary to induce Pakistan to end its support for Islamic militants? Given the lack of interest the civilian government has displayed in Cold Start as of yet, and its incomplete implementation, it is unlikely that the civilian leadership will come to a decision about the usefulness of the doctrine anytime soon. Furthermore, limited war strategies tend to provide the military with a great role in decision making,⁹⁵ something the Indian government might be unlikely to support given their history of civilian control of the military.

⁹⁴ Ladwig III, p. 170-171.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 171

The civilian leadership's hesitancy to engage with the Cold Start doctrine, coupled with its lack of operational functionality at the time of the Mumbai attacks, indicate that even if Prime Minister Singh and the Indian government had desired to respond to the attacks with a military attack on Pakistan, India lacked the capacity to do so quickly and decisively. While a long term build-up similar to Operation Parakram (the 2001-2002 standoff) was a possible solution, it was unlikely that such an operation could have achieved anything more than what India could force Pakistan to do through the application of international pressure. While the lack of a reliable Indian limited war strategy was a limiting factor during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, it is important to note that that will not necessarily be the case in future crisis, in which Indian officials might be presented with a wider range of policy options, including the use of military force. However, it was not primarily the lack of Indian military capability that drove their decision making post-Mumbai. In addition to Prime Minister Singh's desire to avoid upsetting India's economic growth, international and structural factors also played a role.

Third Image Analysis

Many international relations scholars, Kenneth Waltz among them, believe the third image of international relations to be the most important determinant of a state's policies. Given that states exist in an anarchic world order, each must take steps necessary to defend themselves and their own interests, especially in the security realm. It is this self-help system that drives their decision making process. It is likely that the structure of the international system did play a role in determining India's response to the Mumbai attacks. Given renewed U.S. interest in the region following the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, India

was cognizant of the desire of the United States to avoid escalation. Specifically, Pakistan is a major U.S. non-NATO ally, and retaliating against Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks would draw Pakistani attention and efforts away from combatting al-Qaeda and other Islamic militant organizations in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Furthermore, given that both states possess nuclear weapons, it is within the United States' interests to prevent a conflict between two powers that could escalate to the nuclear level. Finally, Indo-U.S. relations have improved dramatically over the last decade, culminating in the passage of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement in 2008. Undoubtedly, the desire not to overly upset a burgeoning ally played into India's considerations. These factors would all combine to encourage Indian restraint in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.

The terrorist attacks in New York city on 11 September, 2001, while not changing the underlying structure of the international system, brought about a significant change in how the United States operates within that system. Focusing on the unilateral use of military power, the Bush Administration invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime by the end of 2001. However, what was hoped would be a quick and easy military operational became a decade long counterinsurgency and nation building campaign. Today the United States and its NATO allies maintain over 100,000 troops in the country. As Afghanistan is a landlocked nation, keeping these soldiers supplied poses significant problems. Everything must either be airlifted in or unloaded from ships in Pakistan and taken by land routes into Afghanistan. There is a northern route as well, but it is more expensive to use and takes a significantly longer period of time to

traverse.⁹⁶ Eighty percent of all cargo destined for Afghanistan travels along the land routes (mainly the south); only twenty percent comes into the country via airlift.⁹⁷ Pakistan's position as the vital supply corridor has made it an extremely valuable ally to the United States. A minimal level of stability is needed to keep the supply corridor open, and an Indo-Pakistan war would threaten the stability of the subcontinent. Because of this, the United States has pressured India and Pakistan to avoid a conflict, not only in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but during the 2001-2002 military standoff as well. Indeed, U.S. mediation during the 2001-2002 standoff played a significant role in bringing the crisis to an end.⁹⁸

During the 2001-2002 standoff the Pakistan built up its military forces stationed on the border with India, weakening its forces deployed along the border with Afghanistan. Upwards of 70,000 soldiers were transferred from west to east.⁹⁹ This allowed for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to disappear into the Federally Administered Tribal regions along the Afghan-Pakistan border. This was a serious setback to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. By 2008, Pakistan had placed more emphasis on counterinsurgency in this region, especially with the rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, an indigenous Islamist militant group whose goal is the overthrow of the Pakistani state. Had the 2008 Mumbai attacks resulted in another buildup along the border, these counterinsurgency efforts would largely have been abandoned, again to the detriment of the United States and their efforts in Afghanistan. The United States, having suffered the consequences of the 2001-2002

⁹⁶ Report of the Majority Staff, "Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan," Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair. U.S. House of Representatives, June 2010, p. 6-7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7

⁹⁸ Ganguly and Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, p. 55.

⁹⁹ Steve Coll, "The Stand-Off: How Jihadi groups helped provoke the twenty-first century's first nuclear crisis,"

standoff, were aware of the costs of allowing a crisis between India and Pakistan to escalate, and was determined to prevent that from happening again.

Pakistan is fully aware of the United States altered priorities in the region since 2001, and has used their position to their advantage. They have long been recipients of large amounts of U.S. aid, most of it military, in the sum of \$12.6 billion from 1954 to 2002.¹⁰⁰ This figure has only increased since that time in the hopes of stabilizing the country and inducing it to further contribute to America's global war on terror. Specifically, from 2002 to 2009, Pakistan has received almost \$12 billion in aid from the United States, seventy-five percent of which was for military use.¹⁰¹ However, Pakistan's major security concern remains its Indian neighbor, and its current position as a major U.S. ally has allowed them some amount of freedom to continue their covert support of Islamic militant groups targeting India. While the United States disproves of these actions, it cannot control everything Pakistan does. And because they remain the key strategic corridor to support resupply of military operations in Afghanistan, the United States cannot push the Pakistanis as far as they might otherwise be able to. Rather than threaten Pakistan, the United States most often offers inducements such as increased military aid for compliance, rather than threats of withdrawing aid and support.¹⁰²

Similarly to the 2001-2002 standoff, the United States moved quickly to mediate between India and Pakistan in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew to Islamabad to impress upon the Pakistani leadership that any

¹⁰⁰ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 324

¹⁰¹ Azeem Ibrahim, "U.S. Aid to Pakistan – U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption," *Belfer Center Discussion Paper #2009-06*, (July 2009): p. 8

¹⁰² Woodward, p. 284-286.

increase in tensions with India should not subtract from their efforts to combat militants along their border with Afghanistan.¹⁰³ Simultaneously, the United States also sent Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to New Delhi to demonstrate the U.S.'s desire to keep Indo-Pakistani tensions from escalating. The United States had no desire to repeat the 2001-2002 crisis. While there, she spoke of the need for both states to cooperate over the course of the investigation to find and prosecute those responsible. She specifically singled out Pakistan as a state that would need to act transparently in this matter. Additionally, she warned that India should not take any actions that might have unintended consequences in the region.¹⁰⁴

Despite Indian claims that Pakistan was involved in the attack and that Kasab, the captured gunman, was a Pakistani, the United States refused to publicly support that viewpoint. While in India Secretary Rice stated that “we have not been given any tangible proof to say that he is definitely a Pakistani.”¹⁰⁵ However, many within the United States government privately admitted that the attacks were likely perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Taiba, with possible Pakistani involvement.¹⁰⁶ The United States remained hesitant to admit that there was Pakistani involvement in the attacks, only going so far as to admit that there have been contacts between Lashkar-e-Taiba and the ISI but that the evidence at the time did not indicate that Pakistan had supported the Mumbai attacks in any significant way.¹⁰⁷ By not fully supporting India's proclamations of Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba's involvement in the attacks, the United States hoped to induce Indian restraint and keep the situation from escalating.

¹⁰³ Jeremy Page, “Condoleezza Rice urges India-Pakistan cooperation in Mumbai attacks aftermath,” *The Times*, December 3, 2008. Online at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5278428.ece>.

¹⁰⁴ “US Presses Pakistan over Mumbai,” *BBC News*, December 3, 2008. Online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7762058.stm>.

¹⁰⁵ Jeremy Page, “Condoleezza Rice urges India-Pakistan cooperation in Mumbai attacks aftermath.”

¹⁰⁶ Schmitt and Sengupta, “Ex-U.S. Official Cites Pakistani Training for India Attackers.”

¹⁰⁷ Emily Wax and Rama Lakshmi, “Indian Official Points to Pakistan; Sources say Intelligence Agency Aided Mumbai Terrorists; U.S. Unconvinced,” *The Washington Post*, 5 December, 2008. P. A8.

The United States also placed pressure on Pakistan in the wake of the attacks to crack down on militant groups operating from their territory. Admiral Mullen, during his visit to Islamabad, stated that Pakistan must “take more, and more concerted, action against militant extremists elsewhere in the country.”¹⁰⁸ While denying any involvement in the attacks, the Pakistani government did take some steps to crack down on Lashkar-e-Taiba. For example, several members of LeT accused of plotting the Mumbai attacks were captured and put on trial in Pakistan. It was hoped that this action would demonstrate that the Pakistani military has indeed cut all ties to the terrorist organization.¹⁰⁹ Indo-Pakistani relations took a hit in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, with dialogue between the two states largely cut off. It wasn’t until 2010 that both states agreed to resume their bilateral communications.¹¹⁰ This was likely done in an attempt to split the difference between international pressure to resume dialogue and domestic pressure to ensure Pakistani compliance with efforts to reduce Pakistani based anti-Indian terrorist groups. Importantly though, India does not expect Pakistan to fully follow through on its commitments to reign in Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorist organizations, despite the arrest and trial of the men held responsible for the Mumbai attacks.¹¹¹

In sum, India did take the international order into account when formatting its response to the Mumbai attacks. Like in 2001 and 2002, the United States played the role of mediator between India and Pakistan. While tensions between the two countries hardened in the

¹⁰⁸ “US Presses Pakistan over Mumbai,” *BBC News*

¹⁰⁹ Jane Perlez and Salman Masood, “Terror Ties Run Deep in Pakistan, Mumbai Case Shows,” *New York Times*, 26 July, 2009. Online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/world/asia/27pstan.html>.

¹¹⁰ Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Engaging Pakistan: Shift in the Post-Mumbai Posture,” IDSA Comment, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 7 June, 2010. Online at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/EngagingPakistanShiftinthePostMumbaiPosture_sspattanaik_070610.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

immediate aftermath, Pakistan did take some minimal steps to meet Indian demands and dialogue between the two states was resumed. However, it is important to note that while U.S. pressure played some role in ameliorating India's response, the U.S.-India relationship is largely based on global issues, whereas the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is based solely on the war on terror.¹¹² As the war on terror winds down and if the U.S.-India relationship continues to grow, the United States role as a mediator in future crises could be considerably different than it was over the last decade

Implications of the Mumbai Attacks

This section of the paper will address the implications of the above analysis in regard to India's response to Pakistan post-Mumbai, and pose some speculative questions about India's position vis-à-vis future Pakistani provocations, given their increasing power differentials.

India's response to the Mumbai attacks can only be explained through a complicated confluence of variables. The 2008 Mumbai attacks was the most recent crisis between India and Pakistan, yet despite some predictions to the contrary, India did not retaliate militarily against Pakistan in the wake of Lashkar-e-Taiba's attack. As this paper has demonstrated, India's decision making process in this instance was highly complex and driven by multiple factors. The factors that encouraged scholars such as Paul Kapur to predict that India would retaliate against Pakistan were much weaker than expected, or simply not present in the case of a viable Cold Start option. Instead, the factors that would have induced a more measured, diplomatic response on the part of India were in operation at the time, primarily the belief on the part of Prime

¹¹² Ibid.

Minister Singh and others in his government that a war would be disastrous for India's economy, as well as mediation on the part of the United States. While all these different factors played a role in shaping India's response to the Mumbai attacks, some were more important than others.

Given the complexity of the situation, it is difficult to say with full certainty to what extent one factor may have played a larger role compared to the others. However, based on India's response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks compared to their response to the attacks on Parliament in 2001, it is fair to say that the individual level factors were most important in determining their response. In both cases, India suffered a terrorist attack perpetrated by an organization based in Pakistan that was operating with the tacit support, if not outright consent, of elements within the Pakistani government. Yet these two crises played out quite differently. After the attacks in 2001, India mobilized its armed forces under Operation Parakram, which led Pakistan to mobilize as well. This led to a prolonged armed standoff along the international border, which only ended after prolonged U.S. intervention and the deterioration of both states' armed forces operating in the field for an extended period of time.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks were much more severe than the Parliament attacks, both in terms of the economic and human impact. Despite the weakness of the Cold Start doctrine at the time, India was arguably in a stronger position to fight a limited war then than they were in 2002. Former Indian Army chief V.P. Malik said that India could successfully prosecute an air war against terror camps in Pakistan if it could maintain international support.¹¹³ Its relationship with the United States had been solidified by the passage of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Yet India's

¹¹³ "India Shouldn't Rule Out Military Option: Former Army Chief," *Thaindian News*, December 17, 2008.

response was in many ways weaker than what they did in 2002. India did significantly mobilize its armed forces, let alone engage in a prolonged military standoff with a hostile power. Instead, bilateral dialogue was cut off and they worked to pressure Pakistan to crack down on Islamic militants.

The major difference between 2008 and 2001-2002 was that a new government had come to power in India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Congress party (in alliance with other parties) had regained control of the government from the more nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). While it is true that Prime Minister Vajpayee had chosen not to go to war with Pakistan in 2001, Prime Minister Singh made the same choice when India was in a much better position to prosecute a war. Had Vajpayee and the BJP still been in power, the 2008 Mumbai crisis might have ended quite differently.

Given the factors that lead to the 2008 Mumbai attacks ending without a major military confrontation between India and Pakistan, and given India's rising power, it is possible to project how a similar conflict might be resolved in the future if the situation between the two states evolves. Most importantly, power of the individual to shape a country's course should not be underestimated, despite the influence of domestic political situations and the international system. Whether BJP or Congress is in power at the time of the next Indo-Pakistan crisis will likely play a major role in shaping India's response. The BJP is inherently more nationalistic than the rival Congress Party. Prior to the 1998 nuclear tests, the BJP ran an electoral campaign in which they explicitly advocated overtly testing a nuclear weapon.¹¹⁴ They followed through on this promise despite the international condemnation they would face. This, coupled with India's

¹¹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 170.

forceful response to the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-2002 standoff, indicates that the BJP would be more willing to risk a conflict with Pakistan should India suffer another severe terrorist attack that can be linked to them.

While the individual factor is important, other factors do play a role, and at times can outweigh the beliefs or preferences of an individual statesman. Looking to the future, it is likely that India will continue to see its stature rise on the international stage. India has global aspirations – a seat on the U.N. Security Council, a blue water navy and continued military modernization, a growing economy and population, and stronger ties with the United States. If these trends continue uninterrupted, India will leave its Pakistani neighbor further and further behind. Cold Start could one day be a workable military doctrine, and India is considering developing ballistic missile defenses. If India's conventional forces continue to improve and become capable of fighting a limited war India will be in a much better position to confront Pakistani support for terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Additionally, the United States' support for Pakistan will likely wane once it has withdrawn from Afghanistan. A seat on the Security Council would give India veto-power over any resolutions condemning their actions, somewhat mitigating official international opprobrium in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war. Once the United States draws down in Afghanistan, it will no longer be compelled to support Pakistan as it has in the past as the major rationale for U.S. support, the supplies lines into Afghanistan, will no longer be a factor. Indeed, the United States and India might possess a stronger bilateral relationship, especially if they are balancing a rising China. The United States might then not object to a forceful Indian response against a

provocative move by Pakistan. It is possible that within the next ten, fifteen, or twenty years, assuming the above mentioned factors have come to pass, India would face fewer restraints on its response to a terrorist attack similar to the one that took place in Mumbai in 2008.

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