THE LINK BETWEEN EDUCATION AND SUPPORT FOR ANTI-AMERICAN MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

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By

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Introduction

In the last decade, particularly with the rise of terrorism, the discourse regarding education and propensity to approve of political violence has received renewed attention. In the context of violent extremism in Pakistan, this investigation has manifested itself in the intense attention the country’s educational systems have received. Low levels of literacy, a dismal public education infrastructure and the prevalence of madressas have ignited a heated debate about the role education plays in Pakistan in promoting support for militancy.

This attention is not unwarranted. Both scholars and policy practitioners emphasize the salience\(^1\) of popular support for the survival of organizations involved in civil war. Education offers a unique lever to affect public opinion, and the United States government has prioritized investment in Pakistani education as a key means of defeating hostile organizations.

Prevalent wisdom in the Unites States government, as evidenced by the language of the recent Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, expects increased educational attainment in Pakistan to cause a decrease in support for political violence. Section 4.5 C of the bill indicates the intent of the assistance to “support the strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan, including madrassas, in order to improve the prospects for Pakistani children’s futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance.”

This characterization of the relationship between education and anti-American militancy, however, faces both descriptive and empirical challenges. From the qualitative front, experts of the Pakistani educational system content that problematic content material in government

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prescribed textbooks is fostering a more anti-American polity instead of a more tolerant one. Qualitative analyses of support for anti-American militancy in Pakistan, while few, also find that better educated Pakistanis are more likely to be supportive of violent anti-Americanism.

This investigation seeks to contribute to the body of literature on the relationship between educational attainment and sympathy for anti-American militancy in Pakistan.

**Literature Review**

Three strands of literature are pertinent: (1) scholarship on the link between education and political violence; (2) scholarship on the support for anti-American militancy, and (3) scholarship on Pakistani attitudes towards anti-American militancy.

**Scholarship Exploring the Relationship between Education and Violence**

The dominant discourse on education and violence asserts that individuals with higher educational attainment are less likely to be supportive of or engage in violence. Causality is found in the critical thinking skills imparted in school that help individuals empathize with those from dissimilar backgrounds, the content of curricula that helped socialize individuals to the norms of equality and human rights, and the positive relationship between education and employment opportunities that diminished individual dissatisfaction and personal frustration.

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Empirical evidence further confirms a positive relationship between educational attainment and racial and ethnic tolerance in American\(^7\) and Western\(^8\) societies.

However, this characterization is not unchallenged. Exploring educational attainment and conflict across countries, Dawson and Lange find that nations with higher levels of schooling are significantly more likely to experience civil conflict\(^9\). They suggest that a vast body of literature has investigated only Western societies and that their optimistic findings have limited validity in non-Western contexts\(^10\).

Powerful critiques of the causal mechanisms also exist. First, educational systems need not promote liberal values and universal rights. As Walker-Keheler demonstrated in her investigation of curricula manipulation in Rwanda\(^11\), bigoted educational content can sharpen societal cleaves\(^12\). “The falsification of history led to genocide,” Walker-Keheler asserts.

Similarly highlighting the centrality of curricula content, UNICEF’s research on education in conflict-ridden communities shows educational systems, particularly religious and government-funded ones, are often utilized to systematically emphasize membership in a particular


\(^10\) ibid


\(^13\) ibid
community, potentially heightening communal distinctions and promoting an exclusionary perspective.\footnote{Bush, Kenneth and Diana Saltarelli. 2000. \textit{The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict}. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre}


More recently, in their July 2010 report, \textit{Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan}, Winthrop and Graff link public school education to support for Islamist militancy in the country.\footnote{Winthrop, Rebecca and Graff, Corinne. \textit{Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan}. Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 2010} The consensus emerges that the teaching material prioritizes martial achievements over civil ones, promotes an exclusionary conception of Pakistan and creates a polity sympathetic of violent means of achieving political ends.\footnote{Nayyar and Salim. \textit{The Subtle Subversion}. Sustainable Development Policy Institute. SDPI, Islamabad, 2003}
comes at the cost of creating a citizenry capable of meaningful civic participation and negotiating peaceful settlements of political differences\(^{23}\).

In addition to exclusionary ideological indoctrination, educational systems can be used more directly as a means of perpetuating dominance by hegemonic social groups. The right to education might be \textit{de facto} denied to certain ethnic or social communities. Martin demonstrated that educational systems are frequently employed to reinforce the “inequitable and unjust organization of production and political power.”\(^{24}\) In societies where subordinate communities perceive social belonging to trump educational merit, rising educational achievement rises among members of the dominant class is accompanied by increasing support for political violence among the subaltern\(^ {25}\). The Tamil experience in Sri Lanka\(^ {26}\) and racial tensions in Southern U.S. states in the early 19\(^{th}\) century exemplify this mechanism\(^ {27}\).

Greater educational attainment can also increase support and propensity for violence when graduates face unexpected unemployment or other social immobility. Writing in the late 1960s, Huntington demonstrated that rising levels of education were found to cause violence in circumstances where anticipated employment or other socio-economic outcomes were not realized. “The higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated or otherwise

\(^{23}\) ibid
\(^{26}\) ibid
disaffected person,” Huntington asserted, “the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results.”

The positive link between education and rejection of Islamist terrorism-linked violence is even more tenuous. Examining ethnically motivated hate-crimes, a qualitative cousin of Islamist terrorism, in Germany in the early 1990s, Krueger and Pischke find no link between educational attainment and the incidence of crime across 543 German counties.

Indeed, the background of most contemporary terrorists suggests the opposite: well-educated men disproportionately comprise terrorist organizations. Reinforcing this view, Krueger and Maleckova find that not only are militant organizations in the Palestinian territories comprised of highly educated individuals, but that support for violence against Israel is also strongest among Palestinians students. Similarly, Paz demonstrates that Islamists find particular successful among “intellectuals and highly educated Muslims” in promoting the view that conflict with the West is part of "a war of cultures.”

The link between education and support for Islamist and non-Islamist terrorist organizations among Pakistanis is similarly weak. Quantitative analyses find little conclusive evidence of the tolerance-inducing effects of education and educational attainment emerges as a poor predictor of support for militancy among Pakistanis.

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28 Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies. 1968. P48
Examining the role of education in support for suicide terrorism across six Muslim-majority countries, Shafeeq and Sinno find that while education reduces the propensity to approve of suicide terrorism against native civilians, this relationship does not hold for similar attacks on occupying forces and supporting civilians\textsuperscript{33}. Looking at this relationship specifically among Pakistanis, they find that no relationship exists between educational attainment and support for suicide attacks on Westerns in Iraq\textsuperscript{34}. Investigating support for militant Islamist and non-Islamist organizations in Pakistan, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro find no relationship between educational attainment and support for Kashmiri \textit{tanzeems} and al Qaida. They further find that increasing educational attainment does reduce support for the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani sectarian militant organizations\textsuperscript{35}. Similarly, Fair and Shapiro find that educational attainment among Pakistanis is correlated with lower levels of support for al Qaeda and the Taliban, but that no relationship exists for support for nationalist militant movements in the country\textsuperscript{36}.

**Scholarship Exploring the Drivers of Support for Terrorism**

Literature on terrorism in Muslim-majority countries has focused on the supply of terrorism – those who commit acts of terror – while inquiry into its demand – public approval and encouragement of terrorist tactics – remains scant\textsuperscript{37}.


\textsuperscript{35} Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. \textit{The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan}. Princeton University 2009. P. 25


\textsuperscript{37} Tessler, Mark and Robbins, Michael. \textit{What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?}. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.2, April 2007 pp 306
Explanations for support of terrorism can be classified into two broad categories: propositions that give primacy to religion and culture as drivers of support, and those that focus on economic and political considerations.  

**Religious and Cultural Explanations**

Linking Islam to anti-Westernism has a long history. Writing in *The Roots of Muslim Rage* in 1990, Bernard Lewis characterized the tension between the West and the Islamic World as “no less than a clash of civilizations – that perhaps irrational but certainly historic reaction of an ancient rival ancient our Judeo-Christian heritage.” The idea was further popularized by Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, which translated this cultural antipathy into violence, popularized in the phrase “Islam’s bloody borders”, asserting that violent anti-Westernism is intrinsic to Islam, and is the appropriate prism for analyzing Islamist militancy. More recently, Paz and Moghaddam have separately identified “religious and value conflicts” as critical drivers of Palestinian support for terrorist tactics. “The nature of Islamist anti-Americanism is cultural rather than military or political,” concludes Paz.

Challenges to this conceptualization come from qualitative and quantitative fronts. Analyzing an opinion survey from five Arab states, Hamarneh, for example, “does not find evidence that a clash of cultures explains the deteriorating relations between the West, generally, or the U.S.

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41 Reuven Paz. *Radical Islamic terrorism*. Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel. 2001
specifically.”\textsuperscript{45} Others argue that while terrorists might use religious justification, it does not follow that religious conviction fosters a positive attitude towards terrorism\textsuperscript{46}.

Another strand of investigation places emphasis on political Islam: that antagonism against the West is not rooted in Islamic ideology, but that the militant political entities that find legitimacy in Islam can effectively use its tenants to justify violence\textsuperscript{47}. Haddad and Khashan find support for this thesis in their examination of political Islam and support for militant ideology in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{48}

Investigating these propositions in the Pakistani context, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro find personal faith is uncorrelated with support for anti-American militancy. However views of what constitutes jihad serves as a good predictor.\textsuperscript{49}

**Political and Economic Explanations**

Narratives of socio-economic deprivation have an equally deep history in explanations for support for terrorism. In the lead-up to the War on Terror, public figures ranging from Elie Wiesel to George Bush\textsuperscript{50} asserted poverty was the primary cause of terrorism.

Academic investigation has frequently reported a similar relationship. Moghaddam finds that socio-economic deprivation causes a “groundswell of frustration and anger” and “greater sympathy for extremist ‘anti-establishment’ tactics.”\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{45} Hamarneh, M. *Revisiting the Arab street: Research from within*. Amman, Jordan: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. 2003, p97

\textsuperscript{46} Esposito, J. *Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press 2002

\textsuperscript{47} Atran, Scott. *In Gods we trust: The evolutionary landscape of religion* (Evolution and Cognition Series). New York; Oxford University Press 2002


\textsuperscript{49} Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. *The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan*. Princeton University 2009

\textsuperscript{50} For example, on March 22, 2002, President Bush announced in Monterrey, Mexico, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.” See (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-1.html)

\textsuperscript{51} Fathali M. Moghaddam, *The Staircase to Terrorism*, p163
However, this assertion has often floundered in explaining the supply of terrorism. Research from Lebanon and Palestine indicates that members of terrorist organizations are typically from higher socio-economic strata. In addition to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, evidence for this is found in Sri Lankan and African outfits. Similarly, Sambanis concludes that current data suggests no negative relationship between GDP per capita and terrorism across countries.

Examining the linkage in Pakistan, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro conclude, “wealthy Pakistanis… are more supportive of militant organizations than others.” This reverse relationship between economic status and militant ideals is also confirmed by Shepherd and Fair.

Adding some nuance to the relationship, Tessler and Robbins found support for and incidence of terrorism against specific actors particularly likely to rise when socio-economic grievances are perceived to be attributable to them. Several studies suggest this linkage between negative assessments of American foreign policy and support for militancy against the United States. Anti-establishment Islamist militancies have been identified as using perceptions of an

54 Berebbi, C. Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working paper no. 477. 2003
57 Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Princeton University 2009
unconcerned domestic and international leadership to garner support. Examining this relationship among Pakistanis, Fair and Shapiro, and Fair, Shapiro and Malhothra find little in its support. They conclude, instead, that mistrust of American foreign policy is linked to lower levels of support for anti-American militancy.

**Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis**

**Conceptual Framework**
Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro categorize hypotheses regarding support for anti-American militancy in Pakistan into five groups: (1) religiosity; that those with stronger religious conviction are more likely to be supportive of anti-American militancy that finds religious justification; (2) education; that educational attainment is correlated with tolerance and eschewing violent means of resolving political differences; (3) socio-economic deprivation; that poverty encourages violent anti-American militancy; (4) democratic values; that individuals who value democratic political processes are less likely to be supportive of militancy, and (5) mistrust of American foreign policy; that individuals who mistrust American policy objectives are more likely to be supportive of anti-American militancy. Examining the role of education in public support for suicide bombing among Muslim publics in six mostly Muslim countries, Shafeeq and Sinno consider the effects of education, economic status, dissatisfaction with home government,

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63 Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Princeton University 2009
64 Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Princeton University 2009
66 See: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, the Kerry-Lugar (Berman )Bill, Section 4.5.C
67 ibid
perception that Islam is under threat, gender, age, religiosity, marital status and unfavorable view of U.S. foreign policy\(^{69}\).

In a similar investigation of support for anti-American militancy in fourteen Muslim-majority countries, Fair and Shepherd consider demographic attributes, socio-economic status, religiopolitical sentiment, and perceptions of threat to national security as the primary drivers of support\(^{70}\). In the same vein, investigating support for terrorism in Algeria and Jordan, Tessler and Robbins consider personal religiosity; attitude towards political Islam; attitudes towards gender relations; hostility and mistrust towards American culture and U.S. foreign policy; personal and national economic circumstances, and evaluation of domestic leadership\(^{71}\). Examining support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan, Fair and Shapiro consider poverty, religiosity, democratic leanings and assessment of current Afghan government\(^{72}\).

**Hypothesis**

This paper employs a similar set of variables and examines the equation:

\[
\text{support for anti-American militancy} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ education} + \beta_2 \text{ religio-cultural attitudes} + \beta_3 \text{ demographic attributes} + \beta_4 \text{ economic status} + \beta_5 \text{ attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy} + \mu
\]

Support for anti-American militancy is captured by:

- Feelings towards al Qaeda
- Feelings towards Osama bin Ladin
- Approval of attack on American Civilians Working for American Companies in Islamic Countries


Approval of attacks on American Civilians in America
Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in Afghanistan
Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in Iraq
Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in the Persian Gulf

Religio-cultural attitudes are captured by the respondents’ religion, the respondents’ self-reported religiosity and the respondents’ opinion regarding the role of religious scholars in democratic legislative formulation. The final variable also captures the respondent’s attitudes towards the role of religion in a democracy.

Demographic characteristics are captured by the respondent’s gender and age.

Economic status is captured by the respondent’s monthly household income.

Attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy are captured by responses to the following prompts:

- Is it a US goal to impose American culture on Muslim countries?
- Is it a US goal to retain Control over the oil resources of the Middle East?
- Is it a US goal to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state?
- Is it a US goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world?

Data
Data from World Public Opinion’s May 2009 survey of Pakistani public opinion has been used in the empirical analysis presented in this paper. The fieldwork for this survey was conducted between May 17 and 28, 2009. All interviewing was conducted in Urdu. A total of 1,000 face-to-face interviews were conducted across 64 primary sampling units in rural areas and 36 in urban areas. Interviews were carried out by SEDCO (Socio-Economic Development Consultants, Islamabad, Pakistan) using a questionnaire developed by WorldPublicOpinion.org. In order to properly capture opinion in Baluchistan (a multi-ethnic, sparsely populated province), it was oversampled; results were then weighted back to reflect true proportions among provinces. Sampling error for a sample of this size is approximately +/-3.2 percentage points.
As with other survey data, there are potential limitations. First, given the politically sensitive nature of queries regarding attitudes towards militant outfits in Pakistan, potential exists that non-respondents were systematically different from respondents. This would cause bias in the data and skew results. Further, it is also possible that the politically sensitive nature of these questions might have prevented some respondents from revealing their true opinions, again skewing results.

**Descriptive Statistics**

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependant and independent variables used in the regressions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependant and Independent Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum Value</th>
<th>Maximum Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependant Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings towards al Qaeda</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>1.989</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings towards Osama bin Ladin</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>3.119</td>
<td>1.177</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of attack on American Civilians Working for American Companies in Islamic Countries</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>3.370</td>
<td>1.370</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of attacks on American Civilians in America</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>3.617</td>
<td>1.350</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in Afghanistan</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>2.057</td>
<td>1.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in Iraq</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>1.986</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of attacks on American Military Troops in the Persian Gulf</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>2.154</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>2.901</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's religion</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1.98998</td>
<td>.0996473</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's religiosity</td>
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<td>3.451</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religious scholars</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>1.620</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>34.181</td>
<td>11.217</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>2.402</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries  
US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East  
Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State  
US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependant Variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven dependant variables attempt to capture support for anti-American militancy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Feelings towards al Qaeda

Al Qaeda represents perhaps the most globally prominent anti-American militant organization. The organization was founded in Quetta in 1988 and, according to some experts, continues to operate out of the country’s tribal belt. Support for the organization is plausibly a good proxy for support for anti-American militancy.

(2) Feelings towards Osama bin Ladin

As the leader and founder of al Qaeda, Osama bin Ladin is perhaps the singular most globally recognizable personification of anti-American militancy. Attitudes towards the individual will serve as a good proxy for support for anti-American militancy.

(3) Attack on American Civilians Working for American Companies in Islamic Countries, and

(4) Attacks on American Civilians in America

The Geneva Convention and international human rights norms prohibit attacks on civilians. Since the United States is not engaged in conflict with any internationally recognized state-
actors, attacks on American civilians represent militant activity against American non-combatants. Sympathy for these attacks is plausibly a good proxy for attitudes towards anti-American militancy.

(5) Attack on American Military Troops in Iraq;
(6) Attack on American Military Troops in Afghanistan, and
(7) Attack on American Military Troops in the Persian Gulf

These variables are somewhat problematic in capturing anti-American militancy. While the preceding variables capture support for individuals and organizations that would carry out attacks against non-combatants, these variables measure sympathy for militant action against American fighting troops. Scholarship that employs these measures to assess support for anti-American militancy argues that organizations implementing these attacks are frequently involved in attacks on both host-country and American civilians73. This caveat is useful to keep in mind when analyzing results from the regressions on these variables.

All variables are captured as ordinal-level variables.

Given this nature of the outcome variables, ordered logistic regressions will be run to test the impact of the same independent variables on each dependant variable. Thus, a total of seven ordered logistic regression will be run and each will employ an identical set of explanatory variables.

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Variable of Interest: Education

Pakistan has three parallel educational systems: the madressa system; the public school system, and the private school system. About 63% of Pakistani children attend public schools, a third attend private schools, and roughly four percent attend madressas full-time\(^74\).

Private schools are bifurcated into English medium schools that typically service urban areas and teach a curriculum of their own choosing, and those that instruct in Urdu or a regional language and utilize the problematic government-prescribed curriculum\(^75\).

While extensive literature links government-prescribed curricula to sympathy for anti-American militancy, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro assert that the relationship also exists for those individuals not exposed to the problematic content\(^76\).

The dataset captures education as an ordinal variable, ranging from illiterate to university or professional degree. In indicating their highest level of education, respondents can choose between: illiterate; primary school education; middle school education, or Matric; secondary/high school, or Intermediate; thirteen or fourteen years of education, and university or professional degree.

Independent Variables

Variables capturing religious and cultural attitudes

The dataset offers a few measures of religious and cultural attitudes. Variables the study utilizes are:

\(^74\) No accurate estimates of school enrollment in Pakistan exists. These numbers are estimates based on data collected by International Crisis Group and the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan


\(^76\) Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Princeton University 2009
(1) Respondent’s Religion

The clash of civilizations argument suggests that Islam is inherently anti-American\(^77\). In order to appropriate capture the influence of Islamic values on one’s attitude towards anti-American militancy, it is necessary to identify that they are Muslim. 98.8% of the surveyed individuals are Muslim.

(2) Personal Religiosity

Arguments that find the source of anti-American militancy in Islamic values hypothesize that more religious people are more supportive of anti-American militancy\(^78\). The variable offers a means of further testing that proposition. Respondents were asked to self-assess their level of religious conviction on a four-point scale, ranging from ‘not religious at all’ to ‘very religious’. Roughly half the respondents answered ‘very religious’ and a quarter responded ‘somewhat’ and ‘not very religious’, each. Only 0.3% responded ‘not religious at all’.

(3) Role of Religious Scholars in Democratic Decision-Making

Another strand of investigation places emphasis on political Islam: that antagonism against the West is not rooted in Islamic ideology, but that the militant political entities that find legitimacy in Islam can effectively use its tenants to justify violence\(^79\). The respondent was asked to indicate if she would prefer a body of religious scholars to oversee democratically passed laws to ensure their compliance with Islamic values. The variable is captured as an ordinal variable.

Variables capturing demographic attributes

(1) Gender

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\(^{77}\) See for example: Huntington, Samuel. “Clash of Civilizations”, 1996, pp210-217

\(^{78}\) See for example: Moghaddam, A. Palestinain Suicide terrorism in the second intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 26:65-92. 2003

While men overwhelmingly compromise militant organizations, Fair and Shepherd find support for anti-American militancy higher among women. The survey is slightly skewed towards males and females comprise 46.9%. Societal norms are often an impediment in interviewing Pakistani women and while the slightly smaller proportion of women is to be noted, it is expected.

(2) Age

The youth bulge theory of propensity to support and engage in violence suggests that a young population will likely be more disposed towards militancy. The survey interviewed individuals between 18 and 80 years of age. Age is captured as a continuous variable and will be utilized as such.

Variable capturing economic status

(1) Household Income

Socio-economic deprivation explanations of support for anti-American militancy expect individuals of lower socio-economic strata to be more supportive of militancy. The respondents’ household income will capture his or her socio-economic status. Respondents were asked to classify their total pre-tax 2009 household income from among the following options: Rs.3,000 and less; Rs.3,001 to Rs.10,000; Rs.10,001 to Rs.15,000; Rs.15,001 to Rs.25,000, and Rs.25,000 and above. About half the respondents earned between Rs.3,001 and Rs.10,000, while another quarter earned Rs.10,001 and Rs.15,000.

Variables capturing attitudes towards American Foreign Policy

1) US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries, and

2) US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East, and

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81 A well established theory, it has several contributors. Prominent ones include Gary Fuller and Samuel Huntington.
3) US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State, and

4) US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World

Theories that find the source of anti-American militancy in one’s assessment of US foreign policy suggest that mistrust of US foreign policy is linked to approval of anti-American militancy\(^8^2\). Respondents were asked to share their belief about American foreign policy objectives, indicating whether they believed the statement to be ‘definitely a goal’, ‘perhaps a goal’, or ‘definitely not a goal’ of U.S. foreign policy. The extent to which an individual disagreed with states U.S. foreign policy served as a proxy for the extent of mistrust of U.S. intentions. The measures were captured as ordinal variables.

**Diagrammatic Representation**

The following diagrams represent the relationship between the dependant and independent variables. The seven diagrams correspond to the seven ordered logistic regressions to be run.

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Feelings towards bin Laden

Religio-cultural Attitudes
- Religion; Religiosity; Role of religious scholars

Assessment of US Foreign Policy
- Regarding: Palestine; ME oil reserves; Imposition of American culture; Weaken Islamic world

Approval of attacks on American civilians working for US companies in the Islamic World

Religio-cultural Attitudes
- Religion; Religiosity; Role of religious scholars

Assessment of US Foreign Policy
- Regarding: Palestine; ME oil reserves; Imposition of American culture; Weaken Islamic world

Education

Demographic Attributes
- Age; Gender

Socioeconomic Attributes
- Household Income
Results

This section presents the results of the ordered logistic regressions. Table 2 displays the results of these regressions with feelings towards al Qaeda as the dependant variable. Table 3 shows these results with feelings towards Osama bin Ladin as the dependant variable. Tables 4, 5 and 6 display the results for regressions with support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf as the dependant variables, respectively. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of regressions with support for attacks on American civilians working for U.S. companies in the Muslim world, and support for attacks on American civilians in America as the dependant variables, respectively.

Results of a simple OLS regression are also displayed alongside the ordered logistic results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Dependant Variable: Feelings towards Al-Qaeda</th>
<th>Ordered Logistic</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0578606</td>
<td>0.0237412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0599252)</td>
<td>(0.0220448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0.5838353</td>
<td>0.206232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7016894)</td>
<td>(0.2666157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal religiosity</td>
<td>0.341879***</td>
<td>0.1139068**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Education

An increase in educational attainment is associated with an increase in support for al Qaeda. The result is not statistically significant at 10%. While this result does not support the hypothesis prevalent in policy-making circles that education reduces the propensity to support Islamist militancy, it conforms to the results of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro who found no relationship between educational attainment and support for al Qaida in Pakistan\(^3\). This result is also in keeping with the findings of Tessler and Robbins, who find the relationship between educational attainment and propensity to support terrorism in Algeria and Jordan not statistically

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significant\textsuperscript{84}. Similarly, this result is also the assertion by Krueger and Maleckova, who find no relationship between education and participation in Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers\textsuperscript{85}. The positive sign associated with the coefficient, while not significant, does indicate contrast to the conclusions drawn by Paz who asserts that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to be supportive of Islamist militancy\textsuperscript{86}.

This result indicates that there is no conclusive relationship between educational achievement and support for al Qaeda among Pakistanis.

**Religio-Cultural Attitudes**

Being of Muslim faith is linked to higher levels of positive feelings towards al Qaida but is not statistically significant at 10%. This result is in keeping with the findings of Krueger and Maleckova, who assert, “[o]n reflection, this result is not terribly surprising, as terrorism has occurred throughout the world.”\textsuperscript{87}

Higher levels of religious devotion are correlated with positive feelings towards al Qaida; the result is statistically significant at 1%. The result is consistent with the findings of Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{88} who considered the Arab polity’s support for a variety of terrorist groups. Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{89} conclude a positive but not statistically significant relationship between religious devotion and support for terrorism amongst Pakistanis. Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro conclude the


converse: that religiously serious Pakistanis exhibit less support for al Qaida than those with less religious devotion. Their result is also in line with the conclusions of Fair and Shapiro, who find that religious devotion is negatively correlated with support for al Qaeda in Pakistan. Support for the view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is linked to positive feelings towards Al Qaida and is statistically significant at 5%. This result stands in contrast to Fair and Shapiro’s findings that support for greater “Talibanization” is negatively correlated with support for al Qaida in Pakistan. It is similarly opposed to Tessler and Robbins’ conclusion in the Algerian case, that increased support for political Islam is negatively correlated with support for terrorism.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman is associated with lower levels of positive feelings towards Al Qaida and is statistically significant at 10%. This result is in resonance to the findings of Shafeeq and Sinno who find Pakistani males more likely than Pakistani females to be supportive of violent extremism. It is also in agreement with the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which reports that women are less likely than men to be supportive of al Qaeda. It is, however, in contradiction to the conclusions of Fair and Shepherd, whose 14 country study finds women to be more likely to be supportive of Islamist terrorism.

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Higher age is linked to positive feelings towards Al Qaida but the result is not statistically significant at 10%. While the effects of rising age on support for terrorism does not conform to expectation of the youth bulge theory and to the results obtained by Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{96}, Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{97}, and Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{98}, the result is not significant and does not provide conclusive evidence for a relationship.

**Economic Status**

Higher levels of monthly household income are linked to positive feelings towards Al Qaida. The result is statistically significant at 1%. This result is an agreement with the findings of Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{99} and those of Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{100}. It calls into question the hypothesis that poor individuals are more supportive of terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Greater belief that it is a U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is linked to lower levels of support for Al Qaida but the result is not statistically significant at 10%.

Higher levels of belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is linked to greater support for Al Qaida but the result is again not statistically significant at 10%.


\textsuperscript{100} Fair and Shepherd. *Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries*. Princeton University 2009
Belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is associated with higher levels of support for Al Qaida; the result is statistically significant at 5%.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with a greater support for Al Qaida. This result is statistically significant at 10%.

Together, these results indicate only a weak linkage between mistrust of U.S. foreign policy and support for al Qaida. Negative assessments of American foreign policy, particularly mistrust of American intentions vis-à-vis Palestine are correlated with lower levels of support for al Qaeda.

These conclusions are opposed to those of Tessler and Robbins, whose analysis of surveys of Algerian and Jordanian publics finds that respondents’ negative judgments about U.S. foreign policy is correlated with approval of terrorism\(^{101}\). These results are also in contrast to the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project that unfavorable assessments of the United States’ foreign policy are correlated with higher support for terrorism\(^{102}\). Examining the Pakistani polity, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro\(^{103}\), however, find evidence that negative assessments of United States’ foreign policy are correlated with unfavorable views of anti-American militancy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Dependant Variable: Feelings towards Osama bin Ladin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordered Logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religious scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient 1</th>
<th>Coefficient 2</th>
<th>Standard Error 1</th>
<th>Standard Error 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.4869039***</td>
<td>0.3273509***</td>
<td>(0.1544065)</td>
<td>(0.0957893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.005965</td>
<td>-0.0043991</td>
<td>(0.0062642)</td>
<td>(0.0038904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>0.2082963**</td>
<td>0.0988311*</td>
<td>(0.0910412)</td>
<td>(0.0568294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Impose</td>
<td>-0.2062823**</td>
<td>0.1085149*</td>
<td>(0.0970452)</td>
<td>(0.0607313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.8850824***</td>
<td>0.4464007***</td>
<td>(0.1581504)</td>
<td>(0.0905154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Retain</td>
<td>-0.153413***</td>
<td>-0.0799041**</td>
<td>(0.0580549)</td>
<td>(0.035254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.767117***</td>
<td>-0.4133222***</td>
<td>(0.1283525)</td>
<td>(0.0734234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Weaken and</td>
<td>-3.35604</td>
<td>-0.32811</td>
<td>(1.513467)</td>
<td>(1.509191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.85637</td>
<td>-0.32811</td>
<td>(1.510106)</td>
<td>(1.509638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.95133</td>
<td>-0.32811</td>
<td>(1.509191)</td>
<td>(1.509638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.977867***</td>
<td>0.9604298</td>
<td>(0.9604298)</td>
<td>(0.9604298)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²                      | 0.0481         | 0.1253         |
| n                       | 759            | 759            |

*** represents statistical significance at 1%; ** represents statistical significance at 5%, and * represents statistical significance at 10%.

**Education**

Educational attainment is not statistically significantly linked at 10% to feelings towards bin Ladin. As with the previous regression, the result conforms to the findings of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro that no substantial relationship exists between educational attainment and support for al Qaida in Pakistan\(^\text{104}\). In its analysis of six Muslim-majority countries including Pakistan, The Pew Global Attitudes Project similarly finds a no relationship between educational attainment and confidence in Osama bin Ladin\(^\text{105}\).

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Osama Bin Ladin represents a recognizable figurehead of anti-American militancy. In that respect, this result urges a rethinking of the hypothesis popular in policy-making circles that education reduces the propensity to support Islamist militancy.

**Religio-Cultural Attitudes**

Being of Muslim faith has is linked to positive feelings towards bin Ladin but this result is not statistically significant at 10%. This lack of statistical significance renders the result unable to shed light on theories that Islam is inherently anti-Western and militant.

Religious devotion is linked to greater positive feelings towards bin Ladin and is statistically significant a1%. It implies that more religious Pakistanis are more likely to be have a favorable assessment of Osama bin Ladin. Once again, this result contradicts the findings of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro\(^ {106} \) and those of Fair and Shapiro\(^ {107} \). It finds some conformity with the results of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which concludes a positive but not statistically significant relationship between the strength of one’s Muslim identity and confidence in bin Ladin\(^ {108} \).

Support for the view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is associated with greater positive feelings towards bin Ladin. The result is statistically significant at 1%. It implies that that those with greater support for political Islam are less likely to be supportive of Osama bin Ladin. This result is in agreement with the findings of Fair and Shapiro’s findings\(^ {109} \) and those of Tessler and Robbins\(^ {110} \).

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Demographic Attributes

Being a woman is liked to greater positive feelings towards bin Ladin and is statistically significant at 1%. It implies that women are more likely to have positive feelings towards Osama bin Ladin. This result is in disagreement with the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which concludes that women have lower levels of confidence in bin Ladin\textsuperscript{111}. It similarly contradicts the findings of Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{112}, and Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{113}.

Higher age is linked to lower levels of positive feelings towards bin Ladin; this result is not statistically significant at 10%. It suggests that rising age is related to lower levels of support for bin Ladin. This is in agreement with the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project\textsuperscript{114}, which reported that age is not statistically significantly related to one’s confidence in bin Ladin.

Economic Status

Higher monthly household income is linked to greater positive feelings towards bin Ladin. The result is statistically significant at 5%. It indicates that individuals with higher levels of income are more likely to have positive feelings towards bin Ladin. This is in opposition with the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which finds that richer individuals have a lower

\textsuperscript{112} Fair and Shepherd. Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries. Princeton University 2009
degree of confidence in bin Ladin\textsuperscript{115}. It however conforms to the findings of Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{116} and calls into question the perception that suggest poverty is the root of terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is linked to lower levels of positive feelings towards bin Ladin and is statistically significant at 5%. It implies that individuals who believe it an American goal to impose its culture on Muslim countries are less supportive of bin Ladin.

Higher levels of belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East has is correlated with greater positive feelings towards bin Ladin and is statistically significant at 1%. It implies that individuals of the opinion that American wants to retain control of Middle East oil resources are more supportive of bin Ladin.

Belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is linked to lower levels of positive feelings towards bin Ladin; the result is statistically significant at 1%. It indicates that those who think that it is not an American goal to see the establishment of a Palestinian state are less supportive of bin Ladin.

Greater belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of positive feelings towards bin Ladin. This result is statistically significant at 1%. It implies that individuals who believe it an American goal to weaken the Islamic world are less supportive of bin Ladin.


These results suggest that negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy are correlated with lower levels of support for Osama bin Ladin. This finding stands in contrast to that of the Pew Global Attitudes Project that finds that unfavorable views of the U.S. and the Iraq war are correlated with greater confidence in bin Ladin\textsuperscript{117}. Once, again, however, it lends support to the findings of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro\textsuperscript{118}.

### Table 4. Dependant Variable: Approval of Attacks on U.S. Military Troops in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ordered Logistic</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.029277</td>
<td>0.0204955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0618028)</td>
<td>(0.0368319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0.8121472</td>
<td>0.5031473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.668757)</td>
<td>(0.4607495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal religiosity</td>
<td>0.496129</td>
<td>0.3481958***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124238)</td>
<td>(0.0744836)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religious scholars</td>
<td>-0.875108***</td>
<td>-0.5573644***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1679244)</td>
<td>(0.097526)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.2242475</td>
<td>0.1471642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1699552)</td>
<td>(0.101416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0073632</td>
<td>0.0039859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0069042)</td>
<td>(0.004501)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>0.2328196*</td>
<td>0.129141*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1011683)</td>
<td>(0.0597616)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries</td>
<td>-0.2269842**</td>
<td>-0.1618088**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1131048)</td>
<td>(0.0649144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East</td>
<td>1.039098***</td>
<td>0.6707385***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1613307)</td>
<td>(0.0960047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State</td>
<td>-0.0007436</td>
<td>-0.0475396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0606866)</td>
<td>(0.0373847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World</td>
<td>-0.605417***</td>
<td>-0.3637762***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1419442)</td>
<td>(0.0779946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>-2.59038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.468094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>-1.87042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.466821)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 3</td>
<td>-1.31628</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.4669)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 4</td>
<td>-0.02837</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46904)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{118} Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Princeton University 2009. P. 25
Education

Greater educational attainment is not statistically significantly correlated with support for attacks on Western forces in Iraq at 10%. This is in conformity with the results of Shafeeq and Sinno, who also find the relationship between education and support attacks against Westerns in Iraq among Pakistanis not statistically significant.

Religio-Cultural Attitudes

Being of Muslim faith is not statistically significantly linked to attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq at 10%. It implies that we can draw no conclusions regarding “clash of civilizations” hypotheses.

Greater religious devotion is linked to higher support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq and is statistically significant at 1%. This result suggests that those with greater religious devotion have higher levels of support for attacks on American forces in Iraq. Shafeeq and Sinno similarly conclude that greater religious involvement to be is correlated with higher levels of support among Pakistanis for attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. This result also lends some support to that of Tessler and Robbins who find a positive but not statistically significant relationship between religious involvement and support for terrorism.

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The view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq and is statistically significant at 1%. It suggests a strong negative relationship between the desire to see Islam play a larger role in government and support for attacks on American forces in Iraq. It agrees with Tessler and Robbins’ conclusion that increased support for political Islam is negatively correlated with support for terrorism. However, it stands in contradiction to Fair and Shepherd’s findings that support for religious leaders playing a greater role in government is positively correlated with support for terrorism.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman is not statistically significantly linked to support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq at 10%. This result is in line with those Fair and Shapiro who do not find a statistically significant relationship between being a woman and support for al Qaeda and the Taliban among Pakistanis. Shafeeq and Sinno, however find Pakistani women less likely to approve of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. It result casts doubts on the theory that men are more supportive of violent extremism.

Higher age is not statistically significantly linked to support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq at 10%. This result is in agreement with that of Shafeeq and Sinno, who find age to not be significantly correlated with approval of attacks on Western forces in Iraq. This insignificance of

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the result means it cannot shed light on hypotheses regarding age and support for violent extremism.

**Economic Status**

Higher monthly household income is positively linked to support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq. The result is statistically significant at 5%. It suggests that individuals with higher income are more likely to be supportive of attacks on American forces in Iraq. This stands somewhat in contrast to the results of Fair, Malothra and Shapiro\textsuperscript{126} and those of Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{127}, who find no relationship between income level of support for Islamist militancy and attacks on Western forces in Iraq, respectively. Together, these findings call into question arguments linking poverty as a cause for support for terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq and is statistically significant at 5%. This implies that those who believe that it is a goal of the United States to impose American culture on Muslim societies are less likely to be supportive of attacks on American forces in Iraq.

Rising belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is positively linked to greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq and is statistically significant at 1%. This implies that those who believe that the United States wants to control Middle Eastern oil are more likely to be supportive of attacks on American forces in Iraq.


Increasing belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq; the result is statistically insignificant at 10%. This result indicates that individuals who believe that it is not a U.S. goal to see the creation of a Palestinian state are less likely to support attacks on American forces in Iraq.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Iraq. This result is statistically significant at 1%. This result indicates that individuals who hold the belief that the U.S. wishes to weaken the Muslim world have less support for attacks on American forces in Iraq.

These results suggest that negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy are correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on western forces in Iraq. This finding disagrees with those of the Pew Global Attitudes Project that finds that unfavorable views of the U.S. and the Iraq war are correlated with greater support for suicide bombings in Iraq. It also disagrees with Fair and Shapiro who find that negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy are associated with higher levels of support for Islamist militancy. These findings contradict the idea that negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy are a primary driver of support for anti-American militancy.

| Table 5. Dependant Variable: Approval of Attacks on U.S. Military Troops in Afghanistan |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Ordered Logistic                          | Ordered Logistic            |
| Education                                 | 0.0935116                   | 0.0450269 |
|                                          | (0.0583217)                 | (0.0363116) |
| Religion                                  | 0.8762762                   | 0.5186913 |
|                                          | (0.6342851)                 | (0.4529941) |
| Personal religiosity                      | 0.532393***                 | 0.4131844*** |
|                                          | (0.119436)                  | (0.0734589) |

Role of religious scholars  -0.528673***  -0.417936***  
(0.1608159)  (0.0961803)  
Gender  -0.1445145  0.0696841  
(0.1640205)  (0.0999125)  
Age  0.0098482  0.0039356  
(0.0066249)  (0.0039872)  
Household Income  0.1614584*  0.1331661**  
(0.0928994)  (0.0588999)  
US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries  -0.309485***  -0.215102***  
(0.1057341)  (0.0639893)  
US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East  1.194432***  0.8217944***  
(0.159699)  (0.0947821)  
Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State  0.0282325  -0.025548  
(0.0603052)  (0.0369339)  
US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World  -0.1317291  -0.151237**  
(0.1230592)  (0.0768945)  
Cut 1  -1.61267  
(1.39153)  
Cut 2  -0.11835  
(1.390416)  
Cut 3  0.297931  
(1.390754)  
Cut 4  1.141981  
(1.39284)  
Constant  -6.066038***  
(1.016232)  
R²  0.0676  0.1630  
n  799  799  

*** represents statistical significance at 1%; ** represents statistical significance at 5%, and * represents statistical significance at 10%.

**Education**

Educational attainment is not statistically significantly correlated with support for attacks on American troops in Afghanistan at 10%. Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{130} find a similar lack of significant relationship among Pakistanis between education and support attacks against Westerns in Iraq. Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro\textsuperscript{131} who conclude that educational attainment among Pakistanis reduces their support for the Afghan Taliban. Further, Tessler and Robbins find a similar

negative but insignificant relationship between educational attainment and propensity to support terrorism in Algeria and Jordan\textsuperscript{132}.

This result suggests only a tenuous relationship between education and support for Islamist militancy.

**Religio-Cultural Attitudes**

Being of Muslim faith has a positive link with support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan but is not statistically significant at 10%. It suggests that there is no relationship between those of Muslim faith and support for Islamist militancy. Once again, its insignificance prevents it from sheds conclusive light on the “clash of civilizations” hypotheses.

Greater religious devotion is correlated with higher support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan, and is statistically significant at 1%. This implies that Pakistanis who are more religiously serious are more supportive of attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. This strong relationship is in conformity with the findings of Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{133} who find a significant positive relationship between greater religious involvement and higher levels of support among Pakistanis for attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. Somewhat similarly, Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{134} find a positive but insignificant relationship between religious devotion and support for terrorism in Jordan and Algeria. This finding is however in contrast to those of Fair

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and Shapiro, who find a significant negative relationship between religiosity and support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan.

Support for the view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan that is statistically significant at 1%. It indicates a negative relationship between support for political Islam and support for terrorism. Once again, this result is in contrast with Fair and Shepherd’s conclusions that support for political Islam is positively correlated with support for terrorism.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman is not statistically significantly linked to support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan at 10%. This result finds resonance with Tessler and Robbins’ findings that no relationship exists between being a woman and support for terrorism.

Age is not statistically correlated with support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan at 10%. This questions the youth budge thesis.

**Economic Status**

Increasing monthly household income is positively correlated to support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan; the result is significant at 10%. This suggests that those with higher levels of income are more supportive of attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. It

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conforms to the findings of Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{138} and calls into question the perception that suggest poverty is a root of support for terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Greater belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan and is statistically significant at 1%.

Greater belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is associated with greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan and is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is linked to higher levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan. However, the result is statistically insignificant at 10%.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in Afghanistan. This result is statistically significant at 1%.

Together, these results indicate a weak and complex linkage between mistrust of U.S. foreign policy and support for terrorism. These findings, once again, disagree with those of Tessler and Robbins, who conclude that disapproval of U.S. foreign policy is correlated with approval of

terrorism. It also disagrees with Fair and Shapiro’s findings and with those of the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

| Table 6. Dependant Variable: Approval of Attacks on U.S. Military Troops in the Persian Gulf |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Ordered Logistic | OLS |
| Education | 0.0699419 | 0.0405734 |
| | (0.0592643) | (0.0367425) |
| Religion | 0.602207 | 0.3732592 |
| | (0.6483438) | (0.4439612) |
| Personal religiosity | 0.545277*** | 0.3740543*** |
| | (0.1228868) | (0.0740088) |
| Role of religious scholars | -0.724008*** | -0.464129*** |
| | (0.1628844) | (0.0959838) |
| Gender | -0.393203** | -0.1166772 |
| | (0.1702145) | (0.104162) |
| Age | 0.0141719** | 0.0048869 |
| | (0.0067204) | (0.0040666) |
| Household Income | 0.258638*** | 0.198826*** |
| | (0.0963741) | (0.0604901) |
| US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries | -0.347732*** | -0.2354314*** |
| | (0.104957) | (0.0639661) |
| US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East | 1.158076*** | 0.7754434*** |
| | (0.1643218) | (0.0947491) |
| Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State | -0.0176758 | -0.0444502 |
| | (0.0614288) | (0.0371775) |
| US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World | -0.0566351 | -0.0655254 |
| | (0.1260337) | (0.0775532) |
| Cut 1 | -1.25229 | -1.414318 |
| | (1.414318) | (1.414318) |
| Cut 2 | -0.01321 | -1.414287 |
| | (1.414287) | (1.414287) |
| Cut 3 | 0.803016 | 1.414846 |
| | (1.414846) | (1.414846) |
| Cut 4 | 1.870968 | 1.417504 |
| | (1.417504) | (1.417504) |
| Constant | -5.561411*** | -1.008267 |
| | (1.008267) | (1.008267) |
| R² | 0.0735 | 0.1825 |

Education

Educational attainment is not statistically significantly linked to support for attacks on U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf at 10%. This is similar to the results of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro’s, who find no clear relationship between education and propensity to support political violence in Pakistan. It is also similar to those of Shafeeq and Sinno’s, who find no relationship between education and support for attacks on Western forces in Iraq among the Pakistani public.

This result once again lends little support to the hypothesis that education is correlated with peaceful ideals.

Religio-Cultural Attitudes

Being of Muslim faith is not statistically significantly associated with support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf at 10%. This implies that being Muslim has no impact on support for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.

Higher levels of religious devotion are correlated with greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf; the result is statistically significant at 1%. This result indicates that more religious minded individuals are more supportive of terrorism in Pakistan. This finding is opposed to the results of Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro.

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Support for the view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is associated with greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf. The result is statistically significant at 1%. This result is in consonance with the Fair and Shepherd’s findings that support for political Islam is positively correlated with support for terrorism in Pakistan\textsuperscript{145}. The Pew Global Attitudes project also concluded this positive relationship in its assessment of 6 Muslim-majority countries\textsuperscript{146}.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman has a coefficient is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf and the result is statistically significant at 5%. It is in line with the conclusions of the Pew Global Attitudes Project that also finds woman to be less supportive of terrorism\textsuperscript{147}. This lends credibility to theories that men are more likely to be supportive of terrorism.

Higher age in is linked to greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf; this result is statistically significant at 5%. The effects of rising age on support for terrorism oppose the expectations of the youth bulge theory as well as the results obtained by Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{148}, and Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{149}.

**Economic Status**

\textsuperscript{145} Fair and Shepherd. Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries. Princeton University 2009


\textsuperscript{149} Fair and Shepherd. Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries. Princeton University 2009
Higher monthly household income is associated with greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf. The result is statistically significant at 1%. This result stands in agreement with the findings of Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{150} and those of Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{151}, and calls into question the hypothesis that poor individuals are more supportive of terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Higher belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf and is statistically significant at 1%.

Greater belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is linked to greater support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf and is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf; the result is not statistically significant at 10%.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. military troops in the Persian Gulf. This result is not statistically significant at 10%.


Together, these results indicate no clear link between attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy and support for Islamist militancy. Although Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{152} and Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{153} find evidence that negative assessments of United States’ foreign policy are correlated with support for Islamist militancy, these results indicate no clear connection. The results suggest that attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy do not have a clear bearing on support for Islamist militancy.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
 & Ordered Logistic & OLS \\
\hline
Education & -0.08969 & -0.0420006 \\
 & (0.0564582) & (0.0322845) \\
Religion & 0.8362211 & 0.4690369 \\
 & (0.6848478) & (0.4036794) \\
Personal religiosity & -0.2397034** & -0.1096406* \\
 & (0.1152136) & (0.0653115) \\
Role of religious scholars & -0.3078013** & -0.2497209*** \\
 & (0.1512045) & (0.0856126) \\
Gender & -0.507863*** & -0.2708467*** \\
 & (0.157074) & (0.0889293) \\
Age & 0.0087094 & 0.0038997 \\
 & (0.0061528) & (0.00355) \\
Household Income & 0.0380277 & 0.0796819 \\
 & (0.0909735) & (0.0524314) \\
US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries & -0.496715*** & -0.2611827*** \\
 & (0.095931) & (0.0568673) \\
US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East & -0.0180843 & -0.0375063 \\
 & (0.1447658) & (0.0842217) \\
Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State & -1.150988*** & -0.6536782*** \\
 & (0.0702779) & (0.0328175) \\
US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World & -0.2364207** & -0.1080482 \\
 & (0.1146275) & (0.0684597) \\
Cut 1 & -2.07872 & \\
 & (1.469305) & \\
Cut 2 & -0.81272 & \\
 & (1.467016) & \\
Cut 3 & 0.193606 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Dependant Variable: Approval of Attacks on American Civilians working for American Companies in Islamic Countries}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{152} Tessler, Mark and Robbins, Michael. \emph{What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?}. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.2, April 2007. P 322
\textsuperscript{153} Fair and Shapiro. \emph{Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan}. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter, 2009/2010), pp. 103
Education

Educational attainment is statistically significantly related to support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries at 10%. This result is in keeping with the findings of Tessler and Robbins, who find no statistically significant relationship between educational attainment and propensity to support terrorism in Algeria and Jordan\textsuperscript{154}. This result is also in line with the findings of Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{155}, who find that education is not significantly correlated with support for attacks on westerns in Iraq.

Religio-Cultural Attitudes

Being of Muslim faith is linked to higher levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries, but the result is not statistically significant at 10%. The non-significance of the result prevents it from shedding light on the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.

Greater religious devotion is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries; the result is statistically significant at 5%.


This finding is in conformity with those of Fair and Shapiro who find a significant negative relationship between religiosity and support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan. It suggests that those who support political Islam are less likely to support Islamist militancy.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries and is statistically significant at 1%. Once again, this result agrees with the findings of Pew Global Attitudes Project that women to be less likely to be supportive of Islamist terrorism. It supports from the idea that men are more likely to be supportive of violent extremism.

Higher age is not statistically significantly linked to support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries at 10%. The non-significance of this result prevents it from shedding light on the youth bulge theory.

**Economic Status**

Higher levels of monthly household income are negatively linked to greater support for attacks on U.S. civilians in the Islamic countries. The result, however, is not statistically significant at 10%. This somewhat finds agreement with Shafeeq and Sinno’s conclusion that higher-income Pakistanis are less likely to be supportive of attacks on westerns and home-country civilians.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

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Belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries and is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries, but the result is not statistically significant at 10%.

Belief the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries; the result is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians working for American companies in Islamic countries. This result is statistically significant at 5%.

Together, these results suggest a strong relationship between assessment of U.S. foreign policy and support for Islamist terrorism. They indicate that greater mistrust of American foreign policy is associated with lower levels of support for anti-American militancy. These conclusions stand in contrast to the findings of Tessler and Robbins159, Fair and Shapiro160, and those of Pew Global Attitudes Project161 that finds that unfavorable assessments of the United States’ foreign policy are correlated with higher support for terrorism. Instead, this investigation suggest that

those with positive attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy are a more likely to be supportive of Islamist militancy. This result is similar to that obtained by Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro$^{162}$.

### Table 8. Dependant Variable: Approval of Attacks on American Civilians in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ordered Logistic</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.1102325*</td>
<td>-0.0330475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0567373)</td>
<td>(0.0325333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.7834732</td>
<td>-0.5454106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7450894)</td>
<td>(0.4067876)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal religiosity</td>
<td>0.0973661</td>
<td>0.0620959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1163054)</td>
<td>(0.0658115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religious scholars</td>
<td>-0.795753***</td>
<td>-0.6387915***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1556571)</td>
<td>(0.0863593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.731229***</td>
<td>-0.4372063***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1587714)</td>
<td>(0.089609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0091939</td>
<td>0.0049325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0062094)</td>
<td>(0.0035784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>0.1314716</td>
<td>0.1307304**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0900351)</td>
<td>(0.0527794)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Impose American Culture on Muslim Countries</td>
<td>-0.474231***</td>
<td>-0.2745247***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0924614)</td>
<td>(0.0574228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Retain Control over the Oil Resources of the Middle East</td>
<td>0.1588179</td>
<td>0.0383954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1427338)</td>
<td>(0.0848749)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a US Goal to see the Creation of an Economically Viable Palestinian State</td>
<td>-1.001405***</td>
<td>-0.6064864***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0695381)</td>
<td>(0.0330086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Goal to Weaken and Divide the Islamic World</td>
<td>-0.2155839*</td>
<td>-0.0210623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1127247)</td>
<td>(0.0691334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.077039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.598086)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>1.724219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.599258)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 3</td>
<td>3.007983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.602109)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 4</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.606906)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.274307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9122783)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.1501</td>
<td>0.3958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents statistical significance at 1%; ** represents statistical significance at 55, and * represents statistical significance at 10%.

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**Education**

Greater educational attainment is associated with lower levels of support for attacks against American civilians in the United States, and the result is statistically significant at 10%. Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro, while finding no clear relationship between education and support for a range of militant outfits, conclude a negative relationship between educational attainment and support for al Qaida and the Taliban among Pakistanis. This result supports the hypothesis prevalent in policy-making circles that education reduces the propensity to support Islamist militancy.

**Religio-Cultural Attitudes**

Being a Muslim faith is not statistically significantly associated with support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America at 10%. The non-significance of the result prevents it from shedding light on the “clash of civilizations” argument.

Greater religious devotion is linked to higher levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America, but the result is not statistically insignificant at 10%. Tessler and Robbins, and Shafeeq and Sinno, report a similar positive but not statistically significant relationship between religious devotion and support for terrorism. The non-significance of the result renders it unable to shed light on the link between religious devotion and support for Islamist terrorism.

Support for the view that religious scholars should be able to overrule democratically made decisions is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America and

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is statistically significant at 1%. This result conforms to Fair and Shapiro’s findings and those of Tessler and Robbins. It implies that individuals with greater support for political Islam are less likely to be supportive of Islamist militancy.

**Demographic Attributes**

Being a woman is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America and is statistically significant at 1%. It implies that women are less likely to be supportive of anti-American militancy. This result is in agreement with the findings of Shafeeq and Sinno, who find that men are more supportive of militancy in Pakistan. The results of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, in its 6 Muslim-majority country study, similarly reports that men are more supportive of terrorism. It supports the idea that Islamist violence has higher support among men.

Higher age is linked to greater support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America; however this result is not statistically significant at 10%. The result is in agreement with that of Shafeeq and Sinno, who find age to be positively but not significantly correlated with approval of attacks on Western forces in Iraq and civilians in Pakistan. This non-significance of the result means it cannot shed light on hypotheses regarding age and support for violent extremism.

**Economic Status**

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Greater monthly household income is correlated with greater support for attacks on U.S. military civilians in America, but the result is not statistically significant at 10%. This result stands in agreement with the findings of Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{171}, who find economic circumstances to be uncorrelated with support for the Taliban in Pakistan. Fair and Shepherd\textsuperscript{172} similarly find measures of economic status unable to predict support for Islamist militancy. The result questions the hypothesis that poor individuals are more supportive of terrorism.

**Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy**

Belief that the U.S. seeks to impose American culture on Muslim countries is linked to lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America and is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief that the U.S. wants to retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East is associated with higher levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America but is statistically significant at 10%.

Belief that the U.S. does not want to see the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state is correlated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America; the result is statistically significant at 1%.

Belief that it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world is associated with lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America. This result is statistically significant at 10%.

Once again, these results suggest a strong relationship between attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy and support for Islamist terrorism. It suggests that those who have greater trust in U.S.


\textsuperscript{172} Fair and Shepherd. *Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries*. Princeton University 2009
foreign policy are more likely to be supportive of anti-American militancy. This stands in contrast to findings of Tessler and Robbins\(^{173}\), Fair and Shapiro\(^{174}\), and Pew Global Attitudes Project\(^{175}\) that find unfavorable assessments of the United States’ foreign policy are correlated with higher support for terrorism. These results suggest that greater trust in U.S. foreign policy is correlated with greater support for Islamist militancy.

**Discussion**

**Education**

The results of the ordered logistic regression indicate that educational attainment is not a strong predictor of a support for anti-American militancy among Pakistanis.

Five of the seven coefficients are positive and not statistically significant at 10%, indicating no link between education and support for anti-American militancy as captured by: (1) support for al Qaeda; (2) positive feelings towards for Osama bin Ladin, and support for attacks on American forces in (3) Iraq, (4) Afghanistan and (5) the Persian Gulf. The remaining two coefficients are negative. One of these two is significant at 10% and indicates that Pakistanis with a higher educational attainment are more likely to be supportive of attacks on American civilians in the United States. The final regression finds no relationship between educational attainment and support for attacks on American civilians working for Western companies in Muslim countries.


These results largely conform to the literature. Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{176} find that educational attainment is negatively but not statistically significantly correlated with support for attacks on Westerners in Iraq. Similarly, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro find no relationship between educational attainment and support for Kashmiri \textit{tanzeems} and al Qaida\textsuperscript{177}. Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{178} conclude that rising educational attainment among Pakistanis is correlated with a reduction in support for the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, but find no relationship between educational attainment and support for other militant organizations such as the Kashmiri \textit{tanzeems} and Baluch and nationalist militancies.

These results lend some support to critiques of Pakistani curricula content. As Fair and Shapiro explicate, “the impact of education on political attitudes depends critically on the content of that education… Pakistan endorse[s] curricula that encompass[es] irredentist claims and intolerant attitudes... negating any tolerance-enhancing impact of education.”\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{Religio-Cultural Attitudes}

None of the coefficients associated with being a Muslim are statistically significant at 10\%. These results present no conclusive evidence of a link between being Muslim and support for Anti-American militancy.

\textsuperscript{177} Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. \textit{The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan}. Princeton University 2009. P. 25
\textsuperscript{179} Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro. \textit{The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan}. Princeton University 2009. P. 26-27
Six of the seven regressions find a positive but not statistically significant association between being Muslim and support for terrorism; the seventh finds a negative and similarly not statistically significant relationship. Specifically, the regressions find that being a Muslim reduces (1) support for al Qaeda, (2) positive feelings towards bin Ladin; support for attacks on American forces in (3) Iraq, (4) Afghanistan and (5) the Persian Gulf, and (6) support for attacks on American civilians working for U.S. firms in Muslim-majority countries. This relationship, however, is not statistically significant. The regressions also indicate that being a Muslim raises support for attacks on American civilians in the United States, but this relationship, again, is not statistically significant.

In their analysis of support for terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova find a similar lack of relationship between religious belief and support for terrorism. They attribute this to the observation that “terrorism has occurred throughout the world.”\[^{180}\] Our results suggest the same: being a Muslim does not imply higher support for all manifestations of anti-American militancy.

Religious devotion is significantly related to support for anti-American militancy among Pakistanis. The coefficients for all seven ordered logistic regressions are highly significant; six of the seven indicate that as religious devotion increases, so does support for militancy. The seventh coefficient, however, suggests the opposite relationship: that increasing religious devotion causes a decline in support for militancy. Specifically, a greater degree of religious seriousness is linked to higher levels of (1) support for al Qaeda; (2) positive feelings towards Osama bin Ladin; support for attacks on American forces in the (3) Iraq, (4) Afghanistan and 95) the Persian Gulf, and (6) support for attacks on American civilians working for American firms in Muslim-

majority countries. The seventh regression finds the converse relationship in support for attacks on American civilians in the United States: that more religiously minded Pakistanis are less likely to be supportive of these sorts of attacks.

In examining support for Islamist and nationalist militancies in Pakistan, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro find that “religiosity writ large is a poor predictor of support for militant organizations”181. Similarly, Fair and Shapiro182 conclude that religiosity is related to support for militancy in complex ways, and, “[i]t is not adherence to Islam per se that drives support, but rather a specific fundamentalist, textual reading of the Koran.” Our findings indicate a similar relationship: the significant positive and negative links between religious seriousness and support for various measures of militancy suggests that while religiously is a significant in predicting support for anti-American violence, the relationship depends on the sort of militancy being espoused.

**Demographic Attributes**

The results of the ordered logistic regression suggest no clear relationship between being a woman and support for anti-American militancy.

Being a woman lowers one’s (1) support for al Qaeda; support for attacks on American forces in (2) Afghanistan and (3) the Persian Gulf; support for attacks on (4) American civilians working for U.S. companies in Islamic countries, and (5) American civilians in the United States. Four of

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these five results are statistically significant; support for attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan being the exception.

Being a woman, however, is also linked to higher levels of (1) support for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and (2) positive feelings towards Osama bin Laden, the latter being statistically significant.

Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{183} find that an individual’s gender is statistically unrelated to support for al Qaida and the Taliban among Pakistanis. Sinno and Shafeeq\textsuperscript{184}, however, find that Pakistani males have greater propensity to support for suicide bombings against Westerns in Iraq. Looking at 6 Muslim-majority countries including Pakistan, the Pew Global Attitudes Project\textsuperscript{185} reports that women are less likely to support attacks against Western in Iraq and display lower levels of confidence in Osama bin Laden. The results of this investigation suggest that gender is related in no clear way to support for anti-American militancy among Pakistanis, and while it is a significant predictor of the level of support, the directionality of the association depends on the form and target of militancy.

Overall, the ordered logistic regressions indicate no clear relationship between age and support for anti-American militancy. Six of these seven coefficients are positive, but only one – that associated with support for attacks on the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf – is statistically

significant at 10%. The seventh coefficient indicates a negative relationship between age, but is not statistically significant at 10%. These findings suggest that an individual’s are and levels of support for anti-American militancy are unrelated. This relationship largely agrees with the literature.

Shafeeq and Sinno\textsuperscript{186} find a similar positive but not statistically significant relationship between age and support for suicide attacks against Westerns in Iraq. The Pew Global Attitudes Project also finds that increasing age is linked to higher support for attacks on Westerners in Iraq and confidence in bin Ladin\textsuperscript{187}, but that the relationship is not statistically significantly. Fair and Shapiro\textsuperscript{188} too conclude that age is unrelated to attitudes towards al Qaida and the Taliban among Pakistanis. Testing this relationship in Algeria and Jordan, Tessler and Robbins\textsuperscript{189} find a similar lack of relationship: age is negatively and statistically insignificantly related to support for terrorism among Algerians, and is positively and statistically insignificantly related to support among Jordanians.

The absence of a clear relationship between age and support for anti-American militancy among Pakistanis prompts us to rethink the youth budge hypothesis.


\textsuperscript{188} Fair and Shapiro. \textit{Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan}. International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter, 2009/2010), pp. 103

Economic Status

The ordered logistic regressions indicate that increasing monthly household income is linked to higher support for anti-American militancy. All seven coefficients are positive. The coefficients associated with (1) support for al Qaida; (2) positive feelings towards bin Ladin; support for attacks on American troops in (3) Iraq, (4) Afghanistan and (5) the Persian Gulf are statistically significant, while those associated with attacks on (1) American civilians in Muslim-majority countries and (2) those in the United States are positive but not statistically significant. These results suggest that support for anti-American militancy among Pakistanis defies Moghaddam’s characterization of support for terrorism in Arab states, that socio-economic deprivation causes “greater sympathy for extremist ‘anti-establishment’ tactics.”

Instead, these results provide support for Shaiq and Sinno’s findings that those with higher incomes are more supportive of anti-western militancy, a result similar to Fair and Shapiro’s, who find that while economic well-being is unable to predict support for al Qaida, respondents’ perception of Pakistani economic circumstances relative to India affected their support for the organization, with individuals with greater confidence in the Pakistani economy more supportive of al Qaida.

These results encourage a rethinking of the idea that economic deprivation is a cause of support for militancy.

190 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism, p163
Attitudes towards U.S. Foreign Policy

Responses to four questions were used to determine the relationship between attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy and support for anti-American militancy: Is it a U.S. goal to (1) impose American culture on Muslim countries; (2) retain control over the oil resources of the Middle East; (3) to see the creation of a viable Palestinian state, and (4) to weaken and divide the Islamic World.

The ordered logistic regressions find that individuals who think that it is an American goal to impose its culture on Islamic societies are expected to have lower levels of support for al Qaida. Six of the seven coefficients indicate a statistically significant relationship, the one associated with support for al Qaida being the exception.

The regressions suggest that rising belief that America wants to maintain control over Middle Eastern oil resources is correlated with higher support for anti-American militancy; this finding, however, is not as conclusive as the one prior. Four coefficients indicate that as belief that the United States seeks to retain control over petroleum resources rises, support for militancy does too; the other three present no conclusive link. Specifically, belief that the United States wants to retain control of Middle Eastern oil is linked to lower levels of (1) positive feelings towards al Qaida; support for attacks against American forces in (2) Iraq, (3) Afghanistan and (4) the Persian Gulf.

Similarly, the regressions suggest that the perception that the United States does not wish to see the creation of a viable Palestinian state is linked to lower levels of support for anti-American militancy. Four of the coefficients statistically significantly link the belief that the U.S. does not
seek to establish a Palestinian state with lower levels of support for al Qaida. Specifically, greater belief is linked to (1) lower levels of positive feelings towards Osama bin Ladin; (2) lower levels of support for attacks on American civilians in Islamic countries, and (3) lower levels of support for attacks on U.S. civilians in America. The remaining three regressions indicate no statistically significant link.

Finally, the regressions indicate a strong relationship between belief that the United States wants to weaken and divide the Muslim world and lower levels of support for anti-American militancy. Four of the seven regressions find this relationship statistically significant relationship while the remaining three suggest the same negative linkage but do not find it statistically significant.

Together, these regressions provide a somewhat counter-intuitive result, that Pakistanis with negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy are less likely to be supportive of anti-American militancy. Fair and Shapiro reach a similar conclusion: “respondents with negative views of the U.S. were actually less supportive of militants than others.”\(^\text{193}\) In finding lower levels of support for Kashmiri *tanzeems* among Pakistanis who perceive India to be treating Kashmiris unjustly, Fair and Shapiro offer the explanation that Pakistani respondents are strategic supporters of irregular warfare; that those who believe Indian treatment of Kashmiris to be unjust expect that supporting anti-Indian activities will result in greater unjust treatment of ordinary Kahsmiris.\(^\text{194}\)

It is possible that there is a similar mechanism at play here: Pakistanis who view the United


States’ goals as unjust espouse non-violence for fear of disproportionate American military reprisal.

Conclusion

Policy makers often see educational assistance to Pakistan is often seen as a primary means of reducing support for anti-American militancy. This perception typically expects that as individuals rise in educational attainment, support for violent means of gaining political ends, and hence, support for anti-American militancy drops. However, this study of Pakistani public opinion, in conformity with others investigating the link between education and support for anti-western militancy in the country, finds little evidence of the tolerance-promoting aspects of education.

A majority of qualitative work on Pakistani education suggests that educational curricula in the country are inhibiting the creation of a tolerant polity. Most recently, Winthrop and Graff draw our attention to this phenomenon in their 2010 study. However, as they urge in the conclusion of their report, there is urgent need to “[g]ather better empirical data on the relationship between education and militancy in Pakistan.”

These findings urge a rethinking of policy expectations of the sort expressed in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, as well as those of similar educational assistance programs managed by USAID and other developmental organizations.

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