Languages and Linguistics: The Interdependence of Theory, Data, and Application

Deborah Tannen
James E. Alatis
editors

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Since this series has been variously and confusingly cited as: Georgetown University Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, Reports of the Annual Round Table Meetings on Linguistics and Language Study, etc., beginning with the 1973 volume, the title of the series was changed.

The new title of the series includes the year of a Round Table and omits both the monograph number and the meeting number, thus: Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1985, with the regular abbreviation GURT '85. Full bibliographic references should show the form:


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WELCOMING REMARKS

James E. Alatis
Dean, School of Languages and Linguistics
Georgetown University
Co-chair, GURT '85

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure indeed to welcome you on behalf of Georgetown University and its School of Languages and Linguistics to the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (GURT) 1985.

First of all, I would like to thank my co-chair, Deborah Tannen, who, in the process of assembling a stellar faculty for the 1985 joint Institute of the Linguistic Society of America and the Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (the LSA/TESOL Institute), identified some of the best scholars in linguistics and related disciplines for this 36th annual Round Table, thus ensuring a most exciting and productive conference. The program she has prepared is impressive, and the superb organization of all the conference details is her work.

Ever since 1950, scholars in linguistics and related disciplines have assembled each year on this campus for the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics. This year's meeting, however, is especially significant for two reasons.

First, this year's Round Table is not being held at the usual time, during the spring, in March, but rather in June. This was done so that it might take place during the first week of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute. This Institute has brought together people with a great variety of backgrounds, training, and experience, making for an invaluable exchange of approaches to linguistics and language, including language teaching and learning. This is a tribute to the vision, energy, and enthusiasm of the Institute's director, Deborah Tannen, and her able assistant, Carol Kaplan. We are all grateful for the enormous amount of time and effort they have both dedicated to the success of this year's Institute as well as the GURT.

Second, this evening's session is held in honor of Dr. Robert Lado on the occasion of his 70th birthday. I would like to take
this opportunity to wish him a belated happy birthday, and as we say in Greek, 'Chronia Polla!'—'Many (more) years'! This is also his 45th LSA Institute! Congratulations, and many happy returns.

I know that you look forward, as I do, to hearing the distinguished speakers who will address the conference on many vital aspects of this year's theme: 'Language and linguistics: The interdependence of theory, data, and application'. I would like to emphasize that the Georgetown University Round Table is an expression of this university's efforts to heighten the public's awareness of language teaching and linguistics and their importance in this multicultural, globally interdependent world. Thus I am very pleased to welcome you to a conference that will indeed contribute to the humanistic goals which we all cherish and which are the special concern of this year's Round Table.
INTRODUCTION

As the director of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute as well as co-chair of the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1985, I am excited about—and grateful for—the opportunity to have these two events coincide. With the exception of our first speaker, Reinhold Freudenstein, translator of Robert Lado's books into German, who was invited to deliver a special address at the Round Table's opening ceremony in honor of Dr. Lado, all visiting LSA/TESOL faculty in residence at the Institute during its first week were invited to be speakers at the 1985 GURT.

Note that I said all visiting faculty. In addition to 41 professors visiting from institutions of higher learning around the United States and the world, the LSA/TESOL Institute faculty includes 15 members of Georgetown University's permanent faculty. These numbers—and these numbers alone—made it impossible to invite Institute faculty who are also Georgetown faculty to address the Round Table. Surely their absence from the roster of speakers is a loss to us all, in reflecting the Institute's themes and spirit as represented in the work of its faculty.

Among the many advantages of linking the 1985 GURT to the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute in both time and faculty/speakers is the opportunity for Institute participants, many of whom have come from great distances and at great cost, to attend the Round Table. Moreover, it is an opportunity for all of us, both those who will be staying for all or part of the Institute and those who are able to attend only the Georgetown University Round Table, to hear the lectures of many of the Institute's faculty and thus get an overview of the concerns and themes of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute which furnishes the exciting background against which the 1985 GURT is foregrounded.

Another, related benefit of linking the LSA/TESOL Institute and the GURT is that the Round Table volume provides a permanent record of the Institute's theme, which has been incorporated in the theme of the Round Table: the interdependence of theory, data, and application.

Thus all of us associated with the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute, operated under the auspices of Georgetown University's School
for Summer and Continuing Education, are indebted to Dean James Alatis and the School of Languages and Linguistics for making it possible for the Round Table to take place at this time and in this way, just as all of us associated with the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1985 are indebted to Dean Michael Collins and the School for Summer and Continuing Education for providing the Institute as a backdrop and resource.

I would like to acknowledge another debt as well: the coincidence in time and cast of characters of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute and GURT has placed an extra and unusual burden on many people. First and foremost, the faculty who were planning their courses for the Institute at the same time that they were packing to leave their homes in order to take up summer residence at Georgetown, found themselves laboring under the additional burden of preparing Round Table papers. I became aware of this imposition when, a few weeks ago, during a long-distance telephone conversation, I casually asked one of these faculty/speakers how he was. He replied, 'Terrible', and referred to the pressure of juggling these three demands. He added that he was sure there were others all over the world laboring under the same triple burden. Indeed, there were 24 others. I am grateful to them all and all the more appreciative of the results of their creative efforts undertaken under this strain.

A person similarly burdened was Carol Kaplan, my assistant in directing the LSA/TESOL Institute who became, automatically, the Round Table assistant as well. I want to express my gratitude to her and the many other Georgetown students who volunteered their time to make both events possible. I also want to thank Jackie Tanner, Director of Language Learning Technology at the Georgetown University School of Languages and Linguistics, for audio-visual support above and beyond the call of duty.

The one person who did the most in terms of nuts and bolts preparation for and running of the Round Table is the Assistant Director of the LSA/TESOL Institute. She knows all about organizing Round Tables because she chaired one in 1982. I want therefore to offer special thanks to my colleague, Professor Heidi Byrnes.

Yet a third event coincides with this summer's LSA/TESOL Institute and GURT: another Institute, supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, entitled 'Humanistic Approaches to Linguistic Analysis'. By bringing to the site of the LSA/TESOL Institute 25 college and university faculty who teach linguistics and language-related courses at the undergraduate level, as well as three additional world-renowned scholars to serve as their faculty, the NEH Institute makes an invaluable contribution to the humanistic spirit and goals of the LSA/TESOL Institute as well as their continuation beyond the temporal and physical boundaries of this massive multifaceted event. For this we are all indebted
to the National Endowment for the Humanities and its staff members Jack Meyers and David Wise.

In a sense, the combined GURT, LSA/TESOL Institute, and NEH Institute all constitute a unified event serving a common goal: emphasizing and encouraging the humanistic foundations of linguistics and language learning and teaching. By 'humanistic' I mean the broadly interdisciplinary, context-sensitive, hermeneutic, text-based study of language which characterizes the work of the scholars assembled here as well as the heritage of many of our great forebears in linguistics—in particular, Edward Sapir, whose centennial year has just been celebrated by the Linguistic Society of America.

The relationship between the 1985 GURT and the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute accounts for the unusual diversity of topics and approaches represented by the papers assembled here. Participating in the 52nd annual Linguistic Institute of the Linguistic Society of America and the 7th Annual Summer Institute of Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages, the Institute faculty, and consequently the Round Table speakers, are leading scholars in both these fields. Papers address such divergent topics as semantics, the relationship between discourse and syntax, the teaching of pronunciation, and the teaching of teachers. The range of papers thus reflects the nature of our enterprise as well as one of its major strengths. If we are to explore the interdependence of theory and application, we must have a view of the best work being done in both.

To reinforce this point, I will close by citing two of the papers included here, those of Wallace Chafe and Haj Ross, which argue for pluralism in our scholarship.

As LSA Associate Director of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute, Wallace Chafe played a crucial role in shaping the theme and selecting the faculty of the Institute. It is therefore fitting that his Georgetown University Round Table paper set the tone for the Institute and the GURT. Chafe (whimsically) notes that a whimsical creator gave us 'a motley collection of approaches' in our various fields, each of which has strengths and weaknesses. But we humans have a disappointing penchant for 'noticing nothing but the good in one approach and nothing but the bad in all the others.' In his 'plea for catholicism', Chafe demonstrates that findings of three disparate approaches—introspection, observation, and experimentation—collectively shed more light on language than can any one approach in isolation.

In a similar spirit, Ross suggests that language be seen through transparent overlays of varied theories, or as a symphony in which each individual theory is one instrument's voice: 'We will not fully experience this symphony, or sounding together [of language], until we have stretched our theoretical ears and allowed ourselves to hear the particular beauties to be found in each individual theoretical voice.'
The perspectives of Chafe and Ross can be seen as transparent overlays through which all the papers presented here can be viewed, or as two individual voices in the symphony—interdisciplinary, multifaceted, and humanistic—which is the joint endeavor of the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute and the 1985 Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics.

Deborah Tannen
It was exactly 20 years ago when I first came across the name of Robert Lado, and at that time nobody in Europe really knew whether his name was pronounced L[aː]do or L[ei]do. In 1965 I was teaching at a church-owned German high school—a 'Gymnasium' actually—and in addition to teaching in the morning I was also in charge of two dormitories, which meant I had a lot to do. But at night, when everybody else had gone to bed, my silent conversation with Robert Lado began. I opened a book entitled *Language Teaching*, and I studied it literally word by word, surrounded by dictionaries. These were not always very helpful because Lado's ideas and concepts, his linguistic and psychological terminology, his pedagogical and methodological statements could not always be expressed in the prevalent professional language of that time.

My interest in Lado's book was twofold. I had just built the first language laboratory in the secondary school system in Germany, and I wanted to learn how to use it effectively. And I had been asked by a German publisher to translate *Language Teaching* (Lado 1964) into German. So I sat at my desk until two or three o'clock in the morning and I thought of German phrases for 'establishing a linguistic beachhead' (which became 'Der Einstieg in die Fremdsprache' because 'sprachlicher Brückenkopf' sounded too military as the title of a chapter), 'phonemes across languages', and 'pattern practice', which, by the way, was not translated because I feared that if readers came across the word 'Satzmusterreihenübung', they would refuse to go on studying the book.

What fascinated me was the fact that Lado had succeeded in combining structural linguistics with a scientific view of language teaching and learning as a coherent, systematic field of study. Now this is a description in the language of today of his work at that time. In 1965, I think I simply admired the way he put his ideas across so that language teachers could understand and
follow his proposals. At the same time he maintained the high professional standard which he felt was necessary to support the improvement of teaching and learning foreign or second languages. In German, his book was called *Moderner Sprachunterricht* (Lado 1967), and it was to become the most successful publication on foreign language education in this century, both in the number of copies sold and in the impact it had on language teaching in general. The addition of the word *modern* to the German title was not a haphazard decision. It was supposed to indicate that Lado's book should not be accepted as just another traditional publication in the field. The title suggested that he had something different to offer, something that opened up new, 'modern' directions in language teaching.

In order to understand why Lado's ideas were so different from the thinking of foreign language educators in Germany and Europe in the sixties, one must take a closer look at the historical development of foreign language teaching. Until the late nineteenth century, the teaching of French and English was regarded as a contribution toward humanistic education, as was the teaching of Greek and Latin. Living modern languages were taught as a key to the understanding and appreciation of literature. Of course, from the Middle Ages onward there had always been movements for the support of oral language skills for particular purposes in concrete situations. But they were the exception.

The first serious opposition to foreign language teaching on the basis of grammar, translation and literary education occurred toward the end of the last century. In 1882, Wilhelm Viêtor, who taught at the University of Marburg, where I come from, challenged the language teaching profession by demanding a radical turnaround (Viêtor 1882). He initiated a reform movement which resulted in a number of individual methods with various names such as the 'new method', 'reform method', 'natural method', 'oral method', and others. However, they can all be categorized as 'direct' methods. This reform movement paved the way for basic discussions on objectives and on the contents of foreign language education.

But in spite of all these efforts, nothing really basically changed. On the contrary, after the First World War a cultural movement once again supported the philological basis of foreign language instruction. Thus, as a middle way between grammar-translation techniques and direct approaches, a so-called 'compromise method' emerged. It became the leading point of reference in all questions of foreign language methodology. According to this instructional philosophy, the living languages were regarded as very valuable tools for the future life of those who learned them. Their practical value was no longer neglected but neither was it particularly emphasized. Modern languages thus remained part of an educational program that was set up for a selected elite in order to introduce
them to the cultural heritage of other peoples, as manifested mainly in their literatures. Learning foreign languages served the goal of higher education. By the middle of the century, the teaching of foreign languages in almost all school systems in Western Europe aimed at four objectives, and none of them had priority over any of the others.

First, there was the language—not the linguistic—aspect. Foreign language teaching was supposed to introduce students to the everyday use of the language as the basis for the study of the language of literature.

Second, foreign language teaching had to contribute to the teaching of systematic thinking and help the students to learn how to concentrate.

Third, it had to acquaint students with the cultural heritage of other nations and bring them close to great European traditions.

Finally, foreign language teaching had to stress the importance of certain values such as love of truth, justice, tolerance, peace, freedom, and respect for foreign peoples.

This rather complex philosophy of foreign language teaching resulted in certain methodological strategies and materials which put theory into practice. For example, for instruction in formal thinking the teaching of grammar was utilized because rules, definitions, declensions, conjugations, and so on forced students to get acquainted with logical patterns and systems. Educational goals were mirrored in texts which presented representatives of other nations in an ideal way—from Caractacus, an ancient British chieftain who fought the Roman invaders, to Henry Ford, who was praised in one German textbook as the benefactor of mankind because he built cars for everybody, and on to President Kennedy or Martin Luther King. The everyday use of foreign languages was not entirely neglected, but the emphasis remained where it had been since the seventeenth century: on the value of foreign language teaching and learning as a component of general education. Even in 1957, the curriculum of one German state still had the following to say about foreign languages at school: 'The highest goal of foreign language teaching is penetration into the essence of the spirit of a foreign nation through examples of great literature' (Der Hessische...1957:523).

But there were also first signs of insecurity and disbelief. Particularly in Germany, events before and during the Second World War had led to great doubts about the value of humanistic education. Moreover, after seven or nine years of language learning hardly any student was actually in a position to use the language she or he had learned functionally and effectively outside the classroom. The scene was prepared for another change, and this change was inseparably connected with Robert Lado.
Seen from a European point of view, Lado was in a good starting position. First of all, he was an American. After the Second World War, the United States was regarded as the most powerful nation in the world, politically, economically, and culturally. Ideas that came from America were accepted without question. And then there was the scientific orientation that overwhelmed every possible opposition. It was Lado who introduced the scientific approach into foreign language teaching. He showed how to plan, how to conduct, how to analyze, and how to further develop foreign language instruction as a field of study valid in itself. This is his first great contribution to the profession, perhaps even his greatest. He has developed a model which separates foreign language teaching from a complex network of philosophical, philological, and general educational aims and perspectives. He has made it possible to look at foreign languages not as tools for something else but as a field of study with its own identity, independence, and value. With Lado, foreign language teaching and learning have become the object of empirical research in its own right.

Looking back on those years, it is hard to believe how revolutionary Lado's influence on European foreign language education actually was. When we use the term 'communicative competence' today—and who doesn't?—we seldom remember that the strategy behind it was introduced with the audiolingual approach and its focus on the spoken language. When we speak of someone who works in a department of 'applied linguistics' in France or Denmark or the Netherlands, nobody finds this strange or extraordinary. Before Lado, 20 years ago, things were different. Linguistics was the study of classical languages and their grammar; it was the analysis of Old and Middle English, the study of the language of Chaucer and Shakespeare. Even today there are still departments of linguistics at European universities that do nothing else. But they are in a minority. Since Lado's basic books—Language Testing (Lado 1961) and Language Teaching (Lado 1964)—'applied linguistics' means the study of living languages. Never before in the history of our profession has a single personality succeeded in convincing not only the colleagues working with him, not only the profession in his own country, but the whole language community around the world: convincing them of the importance of scientific orientation for the improvement of foreign and second language instruction. Keeping that in mind, it does not really matter at all that certain linguistic positions have changed, have become outdated, or that new ways of linguistic research or thinking have been discovered (or rediscovered) since then. What matters is the fact that Robert Lado postulated and practically introduced the necessity of scientific proof and empirical study in the language field. It is no longer possible to speak about objectives, methods, techniques, testing, media use, or even about cultural and literary issues without referring to the basic scientific foundations which Lado introduced more than 20
years ago. The 'scientifically inclined language teacher' (Lado 1964:8) was his vision, his invention, his creation.

In his book, Language Teaching, Lado referred to the medical profession in order to prove his point, and I sometimes wonder whether he did so by chance or on purpose because, in view of recent research, language learners could very well be compared to linguistically deficient—that is, sick—persons who must be cured. In 1964, Lado said of a physician:

Armed with knowledge of the medicines that are effective for each disease, he applies them in doses that seem most appropriate for each patient. When a medicine produces undesirable side effects, he suspends it and substitutes another. He must do this in accord with standard scientific knowledge and not according to his whim and fancy... Before he prescribes a drug, he expects information on controlled experiments showing its effectiveness and safety (Lado 1964:8).

And then Lado continued by transferring this observation to the language teaching profession:

Similarly, the language teacher cannot ignore the results of linguistics (the scientific study of language), the psychology of human learning, the age and education of the pupils, or the personality and capacity of the individual student.

A scientific approach to language teaching applies the best that is known to each particular class and its students. When a better way to teach something is reported, the teacher incorporates it into his courses, just as a physician incorporates into his practice new and more effective ways of treating each disease as reported in medical literature (Lado 1964:8).

This is one of the fundamental guidelines which Robert Lado has always observed. Last year, in an interview with a leading German professional journal, he was asked: 'Looking back over the years, which basic ideas from the time of the audio-lingual approach would you no longer stress today?' His answer was:

First, I do not consider necessary the verbatim memorization of dialogues. In fact, it may be more effective to allow changes in what I would call a 'creative memory' mode, that is, having the students remember the context and the ideas but encouraging them to change the conversation according to their interests and communicative needs. Second, I no longer use pattern practice out of context. Third, I no longer limit the students to the vocabulary introduced in the text. I encourage them to introduce or ask for additional words and expressions relevant to the context. Fourth, I no longer limit myself to helping them master the
language, leaving it up to them to use the language according to their needs. I give more attention to features of discourse (Lado 1985:167).

What did Lado say more than 20 years ago? 'When a better way to teach something is reported, the teacher incorporates it into his courses.' That is exactly what he has done over and over again throughout the years, and by doing this he has proved to be more flexible than those of his critics who today still refer to Lado as if he had stopped working and thinking and researching in the sixties when he became well known all over the world.

The scientific orientation which Lado introduced into language teaching and research did not stop with linguistics and learning psychology. Other fields of study have since become relevant and important for the language profession, among them sociology, political science, anthropology, and many more. They do not, of course, play major roles, but the fact that they are recognized as being relevant must be attributed to Lado's concept of scientific orientation.

Next to the scientific orientation of language teaching, Lado stressed the importance of language knowledge for the purpose of communication. Before Lado entered the scene, written prose was at the center of language teaching and learning in Europe, even when the language was spoken and acted in classroom situations. Today, the spoken language is being taught, and none of the recent developments in foreign language research and practice could have come into existence without this focus on the spoken language. Let me mention just a few of these developments.

One of the most influential advances in the promotion and teaching of modern foreign languages is the unit/credit system which has been developed by the Council of Europe for modern language learning by adults as well as by children (Trim 1980). This system concentrates entirely on the communicative skills which are necessary for mastering everyday situations. This work could never have been started without the spoken language orientation that Lado advocated.

A second example. Based on Lado's work on teaching and testing, a certificate program has been set up in Europe which has continually expanded since its creation in 1967 (International...1984). People in nine countries can take tests in six foreign languages in order to determine their proficiency in the languages they have learned at school or in institutions of adult education. These tests concentrate on everyday situations, and spoken communication plays an important role. This testing program was constructed within the framework of the objective testing theory as outlined by Lado. I still remember very well that at the first international conference of experts in the field of foreign language testing in adult education, a conference which took place about 1965, there was not a single paper in
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which Lado was not mentioned, quoted, or referred to. At that conference, the European Certificate Program was born, and one can therefore say without exaggeration that Lado has contributed a great deal to cooperation, exchange of ideas, and foreign language learning in European countries. Present participants are Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Malta, Great Britain, France, and West Germany. Greece and Spain are very interested and will probably soon join this program.

The term 'communication' has also prevailed in school curricula in the countries of the European Community. There is not a single nation in Europe that does not prescribe the teaching and learning of foreign languages as a means of communication in secondary education. In one state of my own country, the Rhineland-Palatinate, the 1978 curriculum for English included, among other things, the following formula:

Nothing should be spoken that has not been heard before.
Nothing should be read that has not been spoken before.
Nothing should be written that has not been read before.
(Kultusministerium...1978)

Sentences like these show that Europe's reception of Lado was sometimes more rigid than what he actually had intended. Of course, he was in favor of a certain order of skills 20 years ago, but let me remind you that his own way of thinking was much more sophisticated, as the following quotation shows (Lado 1964:43-44):

More fundamental than whether the correct order of teaching the skills is listening, speaking, reading, and writing is the fact that reading and writing are partial skills and exercising them constitutes partial language experiences, whereas speaking and listening are total language experiences. The person who learns the total skills can more easily learn the partial ones than vice versa.

This observation also holds true for many other aspects of Lado's thought. Quite frequently, Lado was misinterpreted, misunderstood, and misrepresented because people had not studied closely enough what he had actually said and written. I can only recommend those who condemn the audiolingual approach today to read Lado's Language Teaching again. I am certain that they will discover ideas which they would never have dreamed Lado could have put on paper.

'Communication' actually became a kind of magic formula not only for language teaching but for many other school subjects as well. I know of cases where 'Visual Communication' was used for the traditional subject 'Art', and 'Motoric Communication' for 'Physical Education'. But basically, the term became the key phrase for language teaching and learning. Since
Lado you won't find a single textbook in Europe—for children or for adults—that would not put everyday situations, the language of everyday dialogues, at the center of the materials offered in the beginning stages of language learning. No textbook has a realistic chance of being widely accepted if it is not accompanied by tapes or cassettes with the voices of native speakers. All this is the result of Robert Lado's work and influence.

I know, of course, that Lado's success was the result of teamwork. If he had not had the chance, for example, to work with Professor Charles Carpenter Fries in Ann Arbor in the early fifties, his further career might have turned out to be very different. If he had not accepted $200 for the printing of the first issue of Language Learning, his ideas might perhaps only have become known to very few people and not across the nation and beyond its boundaries. But it is a fact that in spite of that, he was the one whose thoughts and language were widely understood and accepted, and therefore I think we have every right to associate the reorientation of foreign language education after the middle of this century with his name.

I would like to add a third thought in connection with the influence of Robert Lado on language teaching and learning in Europe. His influence could become as powerful as it did only because something typically European crept into the concept that came to Europe from across the Atlantic. Long-lasting educational innovations in Europe have succeeded in the past only if new ideas, new proposals, new ways could be directly connected with traditional elements in education that had proved to be reliable, successful, and suitable for modification. Many reforms that tried to replace something old and common by something entirely new could never be kept alive for a long period of time. New ideas must have the capacity to incorporate the best of what is known and already practiced, and Lado's concept obviously had this capacity. This is the reason why the audiolingual approach in Europe was from the very beginning different from the audiolingual approach in the United States. In Europe, it was never accepted or exercised in its 'pure' form. Pattern practice, to give an example, was in general not used out of context, and mechanical exercises were normally embedded in meaningful situations. One of the first language laboratory programs in Germany was entitled 'English Grammar Programmes in Dialogue Form'; it was published in 1966 (Bauer 1966). Language students in Europe therefore never experienced the audiolingual method in a form which, rightly, was critically discussed a few years after it had come into existence.

Let me say in this connection that I think it is a pity that the professional dialogue between the United States and Europe has, in the past, largely taken place in a kind of one-way street, a one-way street from the West to the East. If there
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had also been an acceptance of ideas in the opposite direction, Lado could most probably have said many years earlier than 1985 the sentences which I quoted previously about the changes he would propose for the audiolingual method today. I have the feeling, however, that we are now in the process of doing exactly what was neglected in the past. TESOL--another powerful influence operating from Georgetown University--has done much to initiate and support the dialogue of teachers and researchers all around the globe.

So far I have only mentioned the positive aspects of Lado's influence in the light of our experience in Europe. However, one cannot treat the subject without also speaking about a tendency which has evolved since Lado's plea for a scientific approach and which has not always influenced the development of foreign language teaching and research in a positive way. At the beginning of the seventies, structural linguistics was viewed more and more critically. New linguistic movements and schools entered the scene, such as transformational grammar, contextualism, pragmatics, and--most recently--the postulation of various hypotheses about language acquisition that appear to be the result of scientific research and as such are accepted as the latest and most modern strategies when planning language teaching. The acceptance of the scientific approach brings with it the danger of accepting new theoretical concepts too quickly and without proper educational and methodological consideration simply because these concepts claim to be the result of research projects. As an example, I would like to refer to transformational grammar and the way it was considered valuable for language teaching. Great were the expectations with respect to this linguistic school. But nothing resulted in the long run in terms of practical consequences for classroom teaching. The same holds true for the pragmatic approach. A vast new terminology was introduced into the professional discussion but in spite of all the great expectations nothing fundamentally new was actually practiced in the classroom. This is a dangerous trend because teachers are made to believe that new research always leads to progress, and if then no positive results can be achieved, teachers might well lose both interest and trust in scientific research and its value for the everyday teaching process.

On the other hand, there is the danger of presenting something old and common as entirely new and progressive just by assigning a new terminology to long-established practices. This happened with the term 'communication'. When one comes across the words 'communicative competence' in professional journals nowadays, what is meant in most cases is basically nothing less than the concept of 'communication' that Lado talked about 20 years ago. When the term 'acquisition' is used in contrast to 'learning', nothing basically different from Lado's ideas of 1964 is necessarily intended. Reading his Language Teaching now, I often cannot but feel that—with slight modifications—he could
have written it again today, 20 years later, and given it the title Language Acquisition.

It is almost impossible, within such a short period of time, to pay appropriate tribute to a man who has done more for the development of language teaching and research than anyone else in the twentieth century. All I would like to say is: Thank you, Dr. Lado. Without you, language teaching in the United States, in Europe, indeed all over the world would be less advanced, less profitable for the learners, less effective in its results. When, many years from now, the history of foreign language teaching in the twentieth century comes to be written, your name will most certainly have a prominent place in it.

References


AN UNEXPLORED SEMANTIC RELATION
BETWEEN VERB AND COMPLEMENT: RECIPROCAL

William G. Moulton
Princeton University, Emeritus

In the course that we are holding this summer at the George-town LSA/TESOL Institute, my students and I are investigating what I have called 'semantic valence'. The notion of 'valence', a term obviously borrowed from chemistry, is by no means new to linguistics. It was first introduced in the 1950s by the French linguist Lucien Tesnière (1953, 1959). For whatever reasons, relatively few American linguists have written about it—with one shining exception, the linguists at Georgetown University. It is therefore foolhardy of me to bring valence to Georgetown, as foolhardy as bringing the proverbial coals to Newcastle. I have dared to do so because I would like to show how valence can be applied to foreign language teaching, TESOL and beyond, though only if we approach it semantically rather than syntactically.

To refresh your memory of valence, let me begin with a simple example. In terms of meaning, the English verb give has valence 3, that is to say, it requires or at least implies three different nominal complements: 'Someone gives something to someone.' An example: 'We gave ten dollars to the Red Cross.' In this particular case we can omit the second complement, keep the third, and say: 'We gave to the Red Cross.' Or we can keep the second complement, omit the third, and say: 'We gave ten dollars.' Or we can even omit the second and third complements, and then paste in our window the sticker that they ask us to display: 'We gave.' Regardless of what we keep or omit, however, no native speaker of English is fooled. He or she knows that, in terms of meaning, the verb give always implies three complements: 'Someone gives something to someone.'

Let me now explain why I have chosen to analyze valence semantically rather than syntactically. German linguists have written extensively about valence, and we now have no less than four dictionaries for valence in German: from the German
Federal Republic, one for the valence of verbs (Engel and Schumacher 1976); and, from the German Democratic Republic, one each for the valence of verbs (Helbig and Schenkel 1969), the valence of adjectives (Sommerfeldt and Schreiber 1974), and the valence of nouns (Sommerfeldt and Schreiber 1977). All of these works analyze valence syntactically. For example, the dictionary from the German Federal Republic tells us that German *geben* 'give' takes three complements: one in the nominative, one in the accusative, and one in the dative.

This information is indispensable for German. At the same time, it is of no use to us at all if we wish to compare the valence of German *geben* with the valence of English *give*, as we obviously wish to do in foreign language teaching. The reason, of course, is that English has no syntactic 'cases', corresponding to German nominative, accusative, and dative. Yet we all know (should I say 'intuitively'?) that German *geben* and English *give* have exactly the same valence. But how do we know this? Clearly not for syntactic reasons, because English has no 'cases'. Our intuition must be based on meaning, on semantics. In terms of semantics, the meaningful relations between German *geben* and its three complements are exactly the same as the meaningful relations between English *give* and its three complements. This obvious identity between the two languages cannot be revealed through a syntactic approach to valence; such an approach leaves us empty-handed when we wish to compare two or more languages. This identity can be revealed only if we use a semantic approach to valence.

This brings me to the topic that the students and I are investigating in our seminar. We are investigating the meaningful relations between all verbs/adjectives/nouns and their semantic complements. Not the least of our problems involves terminology. As soon as we have identified such a meaningful relation, what term should we use for it? Here we have borrowed shamelessly from Wallace L. Chafe's wonderful book, *Meaning and the Structure of Language* (Chafe 1970). In the case of German *geben* and English *give*, we have borrowed the following terms. One complement bears the meaningful relation Agent, roughly the one who 'performs' the meaning of the verb. A second complement bears the meaningful relation Patient, roughly that which 'undergoes' the meaning of the verb. The third complement bears the meaningful relation Beneficiary, here quite literally the one who 'benefits' from the meaning of the verb.

How many different meaningful relations are there between a verb/adjective/noun and its complements? We believe that we have identified eight such meaningful relations, though there may well be more. One such meaningful relation is what I shall call Reciprocal. I find it interesting because, as far as I know, it has not been mentioned previously in the literature on valence.
The notion 'reciprocal' is, of course, an old familiar one. If we wish to coordinate such a pair of sentences as 'John loves Mary' and 'Mary loves John', the result is 'John and Mary love each other', with the familiar reciprocal pronoun each other (or one another). However, if it is true that 'John loves Mary', it is by no means necessarily true that 'Mary loves John'—perhaps she does, perhaps she doesn't. That is to say, reciprocality is not part of the meaning of the verb love.

In contrast with this, there are numerous English verbs that do have reciprocality as part of their meaning. An example is resemble. If it is true that 'Patrick resembles Henry', the meaning of resemble tells us that it is also true that 'Henry resembles Patrick'. In the former sentence Henry is therefore a reciprocal complement, and in the latter sentence Patrick is a reciprocal complement. If we coordinate these two sentences, the result is 'Patrick and Henry resemble each other'. This looks deceptively like 'John and Mary love each other'. However, the verbs love and resemble differ in that love does not require a reciprocal complement, whereas resemble does require a reciprocal complement. Reciprocality is part of its meaning.

In a sentence like 'Patrick resembles Henry', the meaningful relation of Patrick to the verb is not that of Agent: Patrick does not 'perform' the meaning of the verb. Instead, he 'undergoes' the meaning of the verb, and for this relation we have used the term Patient. Of course, in this same sentence Henry also 'undergoes' the meaning of the verb, though in a different way—in the way that we have called reciprocal, namely, reciprocal with the Patient Patrick. In this rather special way I believe it is proper to say that the meaningful relation of Henry to the verb is Reciprocal—not reciprocal with the verb itself but, through the verb, with the Patient Patrick.

Another example of a verb that requires a reciprocal complement is match. If it is true that 'The hat matches the coat', then it is also necessarily true that 'The coat matches the hat'. If we coordinate these two sentences, it turns out that we have a syntactic choice. As before, we can say 'The hat and the coat match each other'. However, because match by virtue of its meaning implies a reciprocal complement, in syntax we can omit each other and say simply 'The hat and the coat match'. No meaning is lost; the meaning 'reciprocality' is part of the meaning of the verb match. (Two parenthetical remarks here. First, I have carefully said that, syntactically, we can 'omit' each other, and not that we can 'delete' it. I say this because I see no reason to believe that, syntactically, it was ever there in the first place; it didn't need to be. Second, I have no idea why each other cannot be omitted when we use the verb resemble, that is, why we cannot say *'Patrick and Henry resemble'. This seems to be yet another example of the whimsicalities that we constantly encounter in exploring human languages.)
Perhaps the quintessential example of a verb that takes a complement with the meaningful relation Reciprocal is the verb equal. Example: 'A equals B.' This necessarily implies 'B equals A.' And the coordination is 'A and B equal each other.' Alongside this plain verb there is the adjectival verb be equal to. As far as I can see, the two verbs are semantically identical, yet it turns out that they are syntactically different. We can say 'A is equal to B.' This necessarily implies 'B is equal to A.' But in the coordination we have two syntactic choices. Keeping the reciprocal pronoun, we can say 'A and B are equal to each other.' Omitting the reciprocal pronoun, we can just as well say 'A and B are equal.' I have no idea why this should be so. But there it is: another whimsicality?

English has a large number of verbs that take a complement as Reciprocal. Some examples: to meet ('A meets B'), to fit ('The nut fits the bolt'), to correspond to ('A corresponds to B'), to differ from ('A differs from B'), to rhyme with ('Money rhymes with funny'), etc. It has an even larger number of adjectival verbs that take a complement as Reciprocal. Some examples: be similar to, be different from, be identical with, be related to, be parallel to, be distinct from, etc.

The verbs considered thus far take only two complements, with the semantic relations Patient and Reciprocal. There are, however, further verbs which take three complements, with the semantic relations Agent, Patient, and Reciprocal. These verbs are interesting because they are of two types. Some of them show a reciprocal relation—through the verb—between Agent and Reciprocal; others show a reciprocal relation—through the verb—between Patient and Reciprocal.

A verb which shows a reciprocal relation between Agent and Reciprocal is to share with. Example: 'Jack (Agent) shares the office (Patient) with Jill (Reciprocal).' This necessarily implies 'Jill (Agent) shares the office (Patient) with Jack (Reciprocal)'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'Jack and Jill (Agents) share the office (Patient) with each other (Reciprocal)'. Here we have the same syntactic choice as before. We can omit the reciprocal pronoun each other and say simply 'Jack and Jill (Agents) share the office (Patient)'.

A verb which shows a reciprocal relation between Patient and Reciprocal is to mix with. Example: 'You (Agent) mix the oil (Patient) with the vinegar (Reciprocal)'. This necessarily implies 'You (Agent) mix the vinegar (Patient) with the oil (Reciprocal)'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'You (Agent) mix the oil and the vinegar (Patients) with each other (Reciprocal)'. Here again English syntax permits us to omit the reciprocal pronoun each other. We can say simply 'You (Agent) mix the oil and the vinegar (Patients)'.

Quite by chance, I have actually worked more with semantic valence in German than in English. During the four summer semesters from 1980 to 1983, I was visiting professor at the University of Munich, and in the first and fourth of these
summers I taught seminars on semantic valence in German. Understandably, I constantly compared the semantic valence that the students and I worked out for German with the semantic valence of my native English. As I had rather suspected, the two systems of semantic valence turned out to be not merely similar but, in fact, identical: in both languages there is the same set of eight meaningful relations between a verb and its complements. And typically, though not always, we find comparable verbs in the two languages with the same meaningful relations between the verb and its complements. There were, of course, always syntactic differences, but never semantic differences. Let me give a few examples.

For the type 'Patrick resembles Henry', we used a sentence meaning 'The son resembles his father': 'Der Sohn ähnelt dem Vater'. This necessarily implies 'Der Vater ähnelt dem Sohn'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'Der Sohn und der Vater ähneln sich', using the reflexive pronoun sich reciprocally—though more formally the reciprocal pronoun einander can also be used.

The example 'The hat matches the coat' is, in German, 'Der Hut passt zum Mantel'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'Der Hut und der Mantel passen zueinander'. In this particular case, the reciprocal pronoun einander cannot be omitted: there is no sentence 'Der Hut und der Mantel passen' comparable to English 'The hat and the coat match'. This is, of course, only a syntactic difference, and not a semantic difference, between German passen and English match. (The sentence 'Der Hut und der Mantel passen' is entirely acceptable, but in a different meaning. Here passen is the equivalent of English to fit.)

The example 'A equals B' is in German 'A gleicht B'. This necessarily implies 'B gleicht A'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'A und B gleichen sich'—or, more formally, einander. As in English, alongside the plain verb gleichen 'to equal' there is an adjectival verb gleich sein 'to be equal to'. We can then say 'A ist gleich B'. This necessarily implies 'B ist gleich A'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'A und B sind sich gleich', or 'einander gleich'. In this case, however, we have the same syntactic choice as in English. We can omit sich and say simply 'A und B sind gleich'.

For the example 'Jack shares the office with Jill', I used a sentence reflecting my own personal experience: at the University of Munich I shared an office ('Dienstzimmer') with a colleague named Stocker. This gives 'Moulton teilt das Dienstzimmer mit Stocker'. This necessarily implies 'Stocker teilt das Dienstzimmer mit Moulton'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'Moulton und Stocker teilen das Dienstzimmer miteinander'. Here again there is the same syntactic choice as in English. We can omit the reciprocal pronoun einander and say simply 'Moulton und Stocker teilen das Dienstzimmer'.
For the example 'You mix the oil with the vinegar', the usual German equivalent is 'Man mischt Öl mit Essig'. This necessarily implies 'Man mischt Essig mit Öl'. And we coordinate these two sentences as 'Man mischt Öl und Essig miteinander'. But again as in English, we can syntactically omit the reciprocal pronoun einander and say simply 'Man mischt Öl und Essig'.

These examples suggest that, despite many annoying differences in syntax, in terms of the meaningful relations between a verb and its complements, German and English show exactly the same structure of semantic valence. Could it be true that all human languages show this same structure of semantic valence? Are we dealing here with a linguistic universal? It would be absurd to make this claim after investigating only two languages, especially two such closely related languages as German and English. And yet, who knows? It just might be true. More research is obviously needed.

References


Valence dictionaries for German:

INTERLANGUAGE FADS AND LINGUISTIC REALITY: THE CASE OF TENSE MARKING

Walt Wolfram
University of the District of Columbia
and Center for Applied Linguistics

Deborah Hatfield
Center for Applied Linguistics

Over the past decade, the study of interlanguage has carved out an important niche as a legitimate domain of linguistic inquiry. As a type of data, interlanguage provides a proving ground for examining some of the important tenets of language organization and variation. Evidence from interlanguage provides an essential and, in some ways, unique data base for understanding the dynamics of language. At the same time, interlanguage seems to be an area of study which is particularly subject to the application of current models and approaches from 'mainstream' linguistics. Thus, it is fairly common to find studies which show how a particular approach in linguistic analysis neatly explains some phenomenon in interlanguage.

Ideally, the interplay between the unique data base and the application of mainstream linguistic models should serve to develop the field in important ways, and there are certainly a number of cases where this ideal has been fulfilled. But there is a significant danger to be recognized in serving two masters, for it cannot simply be assumed that some of our most cherished linguistic models will neatly apply to explain the data base that we call interlanguage. In the following sections, we will demonstrate the sensitive balance that must be maintained in applying current linguistic approaches at the same time that we call upon the data to help us refine our understanding of language dynamics. In our discussion, we shall show how we can sometimes allow our view of linguistic organization to interfere with the language facts that confront us. We do this by presenting in some detail the case of one important structure in the interlanguage literature.
Tense marking and discourse. There are few features of English L2 acquisition that are as noticeable as the absence of tense marking on verb forms. Virtually all profiles of L2 acquisition in English cite it as a prominent characteristic of interlanguage (e.g. Burt and Kiparsky 1972; Krashen 1982), and its status as a diagnostic item in acquisitional studies of English is secure. In the days of concentrated morpheme studies in second language acquisition (Dulay and Burt 1974a, 1974b; Bailey, Madden, and Krashen 1974), it was always included in the basic inventory of morphemes that was tabulated for English. With a shifting emphasis to the higher levels of language organization, in particular, the discourse level (e.g. Larsen-Freeman 1980), patterns of tense marking in interlanguage are getting a fresh look. However, it is important to stand back at this point and ask if the new view is really as insightful and revealing as it claims.

Recent studies of tense marking in interlanguage have maintained that perhaps the most critical constraints on the marking of tense in sentences such as Yesterday he missed a boring lecture or Yesterday he went to class are related to the discourse level. Thus, for example, Godfrey (1980) makes the following observations in his study, 'A Discourse Analysis of Tense in Adult ESL Monologues'.

It is not the case, however, that speakers can switch indiscriminately from one tense to the other; they must obey discourse-level constraints on tense continuity if their production is to be acceptable. (p. 93)

Viewing second language learners' errors from a discourse-level perspective helps identify specific sources of errors which would otherwise go unnoticed. Any effort to describe learners' acquisition of a linguistic element must surely be incomplete without an accounting of more than the form of the elements in sentences. (p. 109)

A similar appeal to higher level organization is indicated by Kumpf (1984), although the particular details of discourse considered to be relevant in Kumpf's study differ considerably from those discussed by Godfrey. Kumpf asserts (1984:132):

The assumption is that any grammatical form appears to fulfill a function in the discourse: it is the discourse which creates the conditions under which the forms appear, and in order to explain the forms, it is necessary to refer to this context.

In these statements, it is clear that discourse is assigned a primary role in explaining interlanguage tense marking. The extent to which this approach is justified as an explanation in
Tense marking in Vietnamese English. In a recent study of interlanguage in a Vietnamese settlement community in northern Virginia (Christian, Wolfram, and Hatfield 1983; Wolfram and Hatfield 1984), we analyzed fairly extensive data on tense marking in interlanguage. In all, we extracted data from 32 different speakers representing four different age groups (10-12, 15-18, 20-26, and 35-55), two different lengths of residency within the United States (1-3 and 4-7 years), and both sexes, based on spontaneous conversation of approximately one hour per subject. These samples were selected from a larger pool of natural language interviews with almost 100 subjects in a community setting. In addition, we collected over 50 written language samples representing 13 different writers as part of a comparison of tense marking in written and spoken language. The data that we report here thus form a fairly substantial base, particularly by comparison with the studies under review here (i.e. Godfrey 1980; Kumpf 1984).

Our initial tabulation of tense marking followed some fairly traditional lines of categorization, with somewhat more refined subclasses of items and surface linguistic environment than most of the earlier morpheme acquisition studies. Morphological tense marking in English takes a number of different surface forms, including three forms of the regular /t/ following voiceless nonalveolar stops as in /mist/ 'missed' or /klkt/ 'kicked', /d/ following a voiced nonalveolar stop as in /peyd/ 'paid' or /raemd/ 'rammed', and /id/ following an alveolar stop, as in /tritld/ 'treated' or /reydld/ 'raided'. In addition, there are a number of irregular formations for tense marking, including suppletive forms (e.g. go /went, am /was), internal vowel change (e.g. come/came, run/ran), internal vowel change plus a suffix (e.g. keep/kept, do/did), and replacive final consonants (e.g. have/had, make/made).

In Figure 1, the incidence of tense marking in our sample is given for the three regular shapes of the past tense as compared with irregular past tense forms. The figures represent the cumulative percentage of unmarked tense forms. For our purposes here, the figures are combined for all speakers in the two basic length of residency (LOR) groups, but are not broken down further (cf. Wolfram and Hatfield 1984:56ff. for individual scores and tabulations according to the variables of age and sex).

For both LOR groups, the distinction between the various phonetic forms of the regular and irregular forms is significant, with irregular forms favoring tense marking over regular ones. The various shapes of the regular are also subject to further constraints based on phonetic composition and surrounding phonetic environment, which we have discussed in detail in
Wolfram and Hatfield (1984). The constraint based on whether the form is regular or irregular is, of course, a constraint which has been shown in earlier studies of tense marking in interlanguage (Dulay and Burt 1974b; Bailey, Madden, and Krashen 1974).

In Figure 2, various forms of the irregular are compared with each other and with the regular forms. The figures combine the totals for all 16 speakers in the 1-3 LOR group and 16 in the 4-7 LOR group.

The figures again suggest an ordered variable relationship in which suppletive forms are most typically marked for tense and final replacive consonants are least marked for tense. The systematic relationships of the various shapes of irregulars suggest a 'principle of perceptual saliency' in which the more distant phonetically the past tense irregular form is from the non-past, the more likely it is to be marked for tense (Wolfram 1985). While individual speakers may differ somewhat from the pattern.
Figure 2. Incidence of unmarked tense for types of irregular verbs versus regular verbs, by length of residency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb type</th>
<th>1-3 LOR</th>
<th>4-7 LOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. Unm/Total</td>
<td>% Unm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>777/818</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacive</td>
<td>351/381</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal</td>
<td>131/158</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal vowel</td>
<td>495/930</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vowel + suffix</td>
<td>367/824</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppletive</td>
<td>283/643</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of ordered constraints (Wolfram and Hatfield 1984:76ff.), irregular verb type appears to constitute a genuine case of 'systematic variability', in which particular irregular types favor the variable marking of tense over other types.

The constraint of verb type has been found not only in spoken language. An investigation of tense marking in the written language data, as summarized in Figure 3, supports the general tendency to mark suppletive forms the most and replacive forms the least, with internal vowel change forms falling between the extremes. Thus, we seem to have a pattern of systematic variability which is manifested in both written and spoken language modes.

One final constraint on tense marking with irregular verbs is considered here. This is the constraint based on verb frequency. Our rough, operational definition of a frequent verb in this study is based simply on which verb for each irregular
type most frequently occurred in our corpus. For replacive forms this is have/had, for internal vowel change come/came, and for internal change plus suffix this is do(nt)/did(nt).
Since go/went and be are, for all practical purposes, the only suppletive forms, these are not included in this tabulation. The most frequent verb form is then compared with all others in the category, simply to give a rough approximation of the effect of frequency, or from the standpoint of linguistic structure, a lexical constraint. The figures for frequently occurring verbs are given in Table 1.

The results for this tabulation are not nearly as uniform as the others reported, but they do suggest that at various stages of acquisition (e.g. internal vowel change and internal vowel plus suffix forms for the 1-3 LOR group and replacives for the 4-7 LOR group) the frequent use of a verb form may increase the likelihood of tense marking.

We may summarize our findings up to this point by saying that there appear to be a number of constraints on the systematic
Table 1. Incidence of unmarked tense for frequent irregular verbs vs. others, by irregular verb type and length of residency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of residency</th>
<th>Irregular verb type</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Replacive (F = have)</td>
<td>Internal vowel (F = come)</td>
<td>Vowel + suffix (F = do)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>Frequent No. Unm/T % Unm</td>
<td>Other No. Unm/T % Unm</td>
<td>Frequent No. Unm/T % Unm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>299/322 92.9</td>
<td>109/306 35.6</td>
<td>119/337 35.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52/59 88.1</td>
<td>386/624 61.9</td>
<td>248/487 50.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 years</td>
<td>Frequent No. Unm/T % Unm</td>
<td>Other No. Unm/T % Unm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111/227 48.9</td>
<td>62/151 41.0</td>
<td>67/215 31.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20/28 71.4</td>
<td>115/406 28.3</td>
<td>84/291 28.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

variability of tense marking, most importantly, various forms related to surface verb type. This includes a basic distinction between regular and irregular forms, and specific shapes of the irregular. With a careful examination of surface influences on tense marking accomplished, we can now turn our attention to the possible role of discourse level constraints that might be operative.

The discourse constraint. Having considered the systematic surface constraints on tense marking, we can now return to the specific discourse constraints that have been offered by Kumpf (1984) and Godfrey (1980). The hypotheses in these two studies are actually quite different, so each needs to be considered in its own right.

Kumpf has proposed that one of the major constraints in interlanguage tense marking is that of narrative 'foregrounding' and 'backgrounding'. A foreground clause is defined as 'any clause that pushes the event line forward' (1980:141) and background clauses are defined as 'clauses which set the scene, make digressions, change the normal sequence of events, or give evaluative remarks' (1980:141). The data base used to illustrate this constraint is the extensive examination of a single narrative by one native Japanese speaker who, over a period of years, has attained a fossilized, relatively stable interlanguage system. It is concluded that foreground action is expressed with categorical tense unmarking and background action is expressed with 'many marked forms'. In other words, the clauses carrying forward the story line have no tense marking, and the clauses carrying background information have variable, but predominantly marked tense forms. To check out this hypothesis, we have attempted to replicate Kumpf's study on our Vietnamese English data. In Figure 4, we have indicated tense marking on the basis of the foreground/background distinction for one of our speakers in the 4-7 LOR group, a 33-year-old
Figure 4. A sample spoken narrative, by clause type (CT),
tense marking (TM), and verb type (VT).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreground</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>TM</th>
<th>VT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: ...and we have a very nice man, American man live in Charlestown, West Virginia. He usually come to visit our family every year New Year or Christmas he come to eat with us and give something like present. He very friendly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W: How did you know him?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When we come to in United States, we go uh we have a sponsor in Manassas uh that lady from Philippines. He has a big house and about twenty or over twenty dogs Yes, many, many dogs. But uh, and her husband American I think she divorce And she have big house we live about just one month. And then we go to the we said we want to move to area have the Vietnamese we live that night in the wood, very lonely, we didn't know anything, couldn't talk any people, and never see Vietnamese, and never see church, shopping, very very far yeah so we said we would like to go to area have Vietnamese and want to go to school to learn some English. Yeah. So uh We tell her that.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4. Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreground</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>TM</th>
<th>VT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My father help her to like cut and cut the wood.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So we just live with her one month,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and she took</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think over $400 from our family,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yeah,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>she said that for food</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>he, she didn't count for rent,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we live with her,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>she said</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>she didn't count for rent.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W: How long were you living there?) Just one month,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I say/said(?) only one month.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W: Just one month, and that was $400?) Yes,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and we didn't know anything,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oh,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I couldn't understand at all,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>my sister understand some</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because she went to</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>she learn uh English before in my country</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so she understand,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But I and my family nobody understand only her, the one now have a good job in California.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And uh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so we move.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we we at that time we couldn't rent any apartment,</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because we didn't know anywhere</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and couldn't talk</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and no job</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nobody ?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So we ask a father</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese father at a church,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like a Catholic priest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
he help us
have you heard
about CC?
some one man is working for CC
to find out find out
this man is Mr.
he has a big house in downtown Alexandria.
Yeah,
so he very good man,
he said
oh now he has a house
nobody live
so "just come to live."
Yeah
so we move to his house,
we live,
and we didn't have anything,
just clothes,
and we have no pot nothing to cook,
no...no bed nothing.
So he said
he have a bed,
he have something like dishes,
bowl and pot for cooking.
"So just use".
Yeah,
we live about 8 months
and he didn't take any money.
He said uh "OK".
He help my father to find a job,
my sister and my brother go to school
and we just pay for electric,
gas, telephone
something like that.
So we live uh 8 months
and he said now
he need to fix the house to sell,
so we move to near Landmark Shopping Center.

Key: S, subject; W, fieldworker; 1, marked for past tense; 0, not marked for past tense; NT, no tabulation (for various reasons); F, foreground; B, background; R, regular; I, irregular.
female fairly comparable to Kumpf's speaker. In addition, all verb forms are broken down on the basis of whether they are regular or irregular forms. The tabulation at the end of the narrative gives a breakdown by type of irregular form, in addition to the basic regular/irregular distinction. Although this is only a limited text, it serves our purposes here (for other samples, see Wolfram and Hatfield 1984).

No pattern of tense marking remotely suggestive of categorical unmarking for foregrounding and variable marking for backgrounding emerges on the basis of Figure 4. In Figure 5, a similar tabulation is undertaken for a written sample.

Again, the results do not support Kumpf's hypothesis, particularly when the different verb forms are considered. Furthermore, these results are substantiated by analyses of other representative spoken and written texts from our pool of data (Wolfram and Hatfield 1984). The only conclusion that can be made on the basis of our data is that the foregrounding and backgrounding distinction, which is offered as a 'universal' principle for tense marking in interlanguage, does not hold up to the test of replication. There is nothing here to indicate that the surface constraints we isolated earlier obscure an important foregrounding/backgrounding constraint on the discourse level.

The second higher level hypothesis to be considered concerns the continuity of tense as it is carried forth in the discourse. This hypothesis is found originally in Godfrey's study, with additional input from Wolfson (1982). The important part of Godfrey's proposal which concerns us here is the claim that patterns of tense marking occur in clustered series within the discourse. This claim is made without regard to surface forms. At various points in a discourse, related to a set of internal and external factors, there may be a shift of tense. A particular value for tense marking (marked or unmarked) is then maintained until there is some reasoned basis for shifting to the opposite value in a series. In Wolfson's (1982) review of Godfrey, episodic boundaries are highlighted as one of these important places of shift. To examine tense sequencing for the spoken narrative introduced originally in Figure 4, we have,
"Gone with the Wind" is an exciting love story, *has been written* by Margaret Mitchell. This story, *has begun* on a bright April afternoon of 1861, in Atlanta, Georgia. The main character in this story was Scarlett O'Hara. She was one of the Coast Aristocrat of French descent. Her father was Gerald O'Hara, the owner of Tara. Tara is a plantation which has a length of more than 200 miles. And the important characters in this story are Melly Hamilton, Charles Hamilton, Rhett, Ellen O'Hara, Ashley Wilkes and much much more.

Scarlett O'Hara was a beautiful, charmy girl. But she was also an unfortunate girl. This story *has written* about her during the civil war between Southerners and the Yankees. Scarlett was fallen in love with Ashley Wilkes, but he was going to marry his cousin which is Melly Hamilton. Scarlett became miserable from that time. After a few years, *she's* married Charles Hamilton, and *has married* him. After two months of living with Charles, she had a baby, and Charles's dead in the war. And the important characters in this story are Melly Hamilton, Rhett, Ellen O'Hara, Ashley Wilkes and much much more. Melly was a very nice little girl. She had a few years, *she's* married the man who loved her so much, and she *never love* him any more. Everything was reveal, and [Rhett knew everything, now is the time he understand about his wife. At last he decided to go back to his own place of birth, and forget everything. He try to find his own new life, and people whom he's never known before. He would enjoy hunting, and fishing in the rest of his life. This happened make Scarlett felt crazy.

At last Scarlett felt so guilty; she thought the only man she love was Rhett. But now is too late for her to say that, when she already lost Rhett, the man who love her so much, and she *never answer* him by the nice words. She has always run along with the man who never love her. After reading the story, I thought it was so sad, but I liked it. It *has help* me learn a lot of new words, which I haven't known before. It helped me to practice in reading. This was the most interesting story I've ever read. It took me a long time to sit there and read. Sometimes I laughed and sometimes cried.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause type</th>
<th>Foreground</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verb type</td>
<td>No. Unm/Total</td>
<td>% Unm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>9/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppletive</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>6/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>1/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacive</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>8/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4/10</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: 1, marked for past tense; 0, not marked for past tense; NT, no tabulation (for various reasons); F, foreground; B, background; R, regular; S, suppletive; I, internal change; M, modal; H, replacive.
in Figure 6, shown the sequences of tense, with marked and unmarked verb forms on opposite sides of the line and the succession of episodes indicated by the broken, horizontal lines drawn under the verb initiating the new episode.

An initial glance at Figure 6 might suggest that there is some clustering of tense sequencing. However, when the potential series and shifts are examined in terms of verb types and individual lexical items, sequencing continuity does not emerge as a significant factor. Basically, the items didn't, said, and modals are marked for tense regardless of where they occur in terms of preceding and following verb forms, and there is no consistent correlation of tense shifts with episode boundaries. The apparent sequencing of tense appears simply to be a function of the distribution of the various surface forms throughout the text.

Finally, we may look at the written language sample introduced originally in Figure 5. In Figure 7, different episodes, which include the supradiscourse surrounding the narrative, are denoted by letters, with shifts again indicated by the broken lines under the verb at the beginning of the episode.

For the most part, shifts in tense marking do not appear closely correlated with episodic boundaries, and again the factor of surface form is critical in accounting for systematic variation. There are, however, a couple of instances in which tense sequencing continuity may be indicated, namely, in the penultimate (L) and final paragraph of the story (M). In the penultimate paragraph, three regular forms (all the form love), a suppletive form, and two instances of have are unmarked for tense, whereas in the final paragraph, five regular forms and two suppletives are marked for tense, with the one instance of have remaining unmarked. In light of the fact that we have controlled for surface form, this may qualify as a genuine case of tense sequencing related to the discourse level. The penultimate paragraph gives the final details of the story, and the final paragraph the writer's reaction to the book. The tense sequence shift correlates with a fairly clean break between the supradiscourse and the embedded narrative.

Given the case of tense sequencing in Figure 7, it does not appear that we can ignore higher level constraints altogether. We may encounter occasional instances of discourse constraints related to tense sequencing. However, these factors hardly operate independently of surface linguistic constraints. It is obvious that no conclusion about tense serialization in terms of discourse can be made before the surface forms are carefully controlled. From all appearances, it seems that ignoring surface considerations will lead to greater obscurity of linguistic patterning than ignoring discourse considerations, although there is no reason to think we must settle for the lesser evil in this analysis by narrowly choosing only one level of approach to the problem.
Figure 6. Tense sequencing in a spoken narrative, by episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marked</th>
<th>Unmarked</th>
<th>Marked</th>
<th>Unmarked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>come</td>
<td></td>
<td>help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>go</td>
<td></td>
<td>talk(ed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have</td>
<td></td>
<td>is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has</td>
<td></td>
<td>is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have</td>
<td></td>
<td>has</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live</td>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td>has</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>live</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>want</td>
<td>move(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have</td>
<td>live</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live(d)</td>
<td>didn't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>didn't</td>
<td>help</td>
<td>have/had</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couldn't</td>
<td>see</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>see</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td>have</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>would</td>
<td></td>
<td>have</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>live</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have</td>
<td>didn't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>want</td>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tell</td>
<td></td>
<td>help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help</td>
<td></td>
<td>go</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live</td>
<td></td>
<td>pay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>took</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>move(d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td>said</td>
<td>need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>didn't</td>
<td>live</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>said</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>didn't</td>
<td>move</td>
<td>move(d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>didn't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couldn't</td>
<td>understand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>learn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>understand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>understand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>move</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>couldn't</td>
<td>didn't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>couldn't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ask</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7. Tense sequencing in a written narrative, by episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marked</th>
<th>Unmarked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>H has written</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H has begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I became</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H had</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M could</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R lived</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H had</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R loved</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M would</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M could</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H had</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S was</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I didn't</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R remembered</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M would</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dotted horizontal lines indicate marked tense forms; solid horizontal lines indicate unmarked tense forms.
Figure 7. Continued.

S was
S was
M would
S was
S was
I didn't
S was
I knew

S' s coming
H has

R decided

R wish
M can

M would
P happened
I felt
I felt
I thought

S was
S is
I lost
R love

R love
S is
H has
H has
R love

I thought
S was
R liked
R helped
R helped
S was
I took
R laught
R cried
H haven't
Conclusion. The empirical evidence that we have presented here and in Wolfram and Hatfield (1984) clearly challenges the conclusions of some recent studies on the role of discourse in tense marking. We found no evidence to support one of the proposed discourse constraints (the foreground/background hypothesis), and severe qualifications had to be placed upon the other (the tense sequencing hypothesis). We must therefore ask how the recent studies of tense marking from a discourse perspective could come up with conclusions that seem so far removed from apparent linguistic reality. Several observations, related to fundamental approaches to data of any type, seem appropriate here.

First, we must observe that the fashionability of particular approaches hardly seems to warrant exaggerated claims based on limited data. In the case of the foregrounding/backgrounding hypothesis detailed earlier, we have evidence from a single speaker in one narrative that is offered as the basis for a universal of interlanguage. That is a lot of mileage out of one case study.

A second observation concerns the need for replication in linguistics. In this regard, we would do well to learn from our colleagues in some other disciplines where replication is considered a critical component of acceptance. In our profession, replication seems to be consigned to those incapable of more creative insight. It would be interesting to see how many ideas would survive if we instituted a ban on citing all research studies which did not have independently corroborative studies by critical researchers.

Finally, we must point out the need to identify and control relevant linguistic (and, of course, nonlinguistic) variables. Again, we may learn from some of our colleagues in fields with strong traditions in experimental design, where the identification and control of variables in research design is taken much more seriously than it is sometimes taken in our field. Without the imposition of such controls, reality may be severely distorted. Our skepticism about the role of discourse in tense marking does not derive from a disbelief in the importance of discourse per se, but rather from the 'baby and the bathwater' syndrome that has accompanied some of its applications in interlanguage studies. Interlanguage is ultimately a very complex phenomenon, demanding the consideration of variables on several different levels as the speaker attempts to sort out the forms and functions of communication (cf. Long and Sato 1985). It may not be nearly as exciting to see tense marking patterns in interlanguage so strongly constrained by surface forms when there seem to be so many higher order constraints on language currently under review, but until these forms can be controlled in the empirical study of tense and discourse, we must maintain our healthy skepticism. Having now lived through several purported 'revolutions' within the field, we must warn that sometimes the revolutionaries who free us from enslaved
perspectives simply subject us to a new procrustean mold. If the study of interlanguage can refrain from the unguarded and uncritical application of approaches to the description of language data simply because they are popular, it will, in fact, be one step ahead of 'mainstream' linguistics.

References


THE SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
OF THE CODE-MIXED COMPOUND VERB
IN PANJABI/ENGLISH BILINGUAL DISCOURSE

Suzanne Romaine
Merton College, Oxford University

1. Introduction. The data to be discussed here come from a sociolinguistic study of Panjabi speakers in Birmingham, who are to differing extents bilingual in Panjabi and English. Its aims were to investigate the present range of language skills and patterns of language use as well as the attitudes of the community to language maintenance and changing patterns of language use.

Although a high degree of bilingualism now exists in the Panjabi-speaking community, this cannot be equated with language shift; nor does switching or mixing between the languages necessarily indicate incipient loss. An important factor in the present situation is the use of code-mixing or code-switching as a discourse strategy (cf. Chana and Romaine 1985). I will use the term code-switching in the sense in which Gumperz (1982: 59) has defined it, as 'the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems'. In code-switched discourse, the items in question form part of the same speech act. They are tied together prosodically as well as by semantic and syntactic relations equivalent to those that join passages in a single speech act.

2. Factors constraining code-switching. It has long been recognized that a variety of social factors constrain code-switching, such as setting, topic, degree of competence in both languages, etc., but I will focus here on the more purely linguistic factors which are involved. Most of the early studies did not concern themselves with formulating general constraints on code-switching. In fact, Lance (1975) suggests that there are perhaps no syntactic restrictions on where it can occur.

Probably no one believes this now. The question seems to be rather how we can best formulate the observable constraints.
Are they language-specific, or do they arise from an independently motivated principle of universal grammar which applies cross-linguistically? The first attempt to formulate general constraints can be found in Sankoff and Poplack's (1980) study, where they propose that Spanish/English code-switching can be generated by a model of grammar which is governed by two constraints. The first of these is the 'free morpheme' constraint, which predicts that a switch may not occur between a bound morpheme and a lexical form unless the lexical form has been phonologically integrated into the language of the morpheme. The second, the 'equivalence constraint', predicts that code switches will tend to occur at points where the juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language. That is, code-switching will tend to occur at points where the surface structures of L1 and L2 map onto each other.

Poplack and Sankoff assume that the languages involved have corresponding grammatical categories. Moreover, since the equivalence constraint essentially predicts constraints on linear ordering, it is not surprising that it underpredicts the sites at which switching between Panjabi and English will occur. It will fail in any case where two typologically different languages are mixed. Panjabi is canonically SOV and English SVO. Spanish and English, on the other hand, are similar in word order and have rough categorical equivalence. Woolford (1983) has more recently tried to account for the constraints on Spanish/English code-switching within government and binding theory. She says that Sankoff and Poplack's predictions follow from more general constraints on the constituency of certain structures such as NP and VP within X-bar theory.

Sciullo, Muysken, and Singh (1985) have proposed that code-switching is in general universally constrained by the principle of government. That is, X governs Y if the first node dominating X also dominates Y, where X is a major category (i.e. N A V P). They claim that switching is only possible between elements that are not related by government. They assume further that there is a principle of language indexing whereby major categories assign language indexes both to the node dominating them and to its immediate constituents. Minor categories assign a language index only to the node dominating them. When the governed element is a maximal projection, it will be assigned a language index by the highest lexical element in its projection. Assuming that q is a language index, the constraint on code-switching can be formulated in the following way as a Language Government Principle:

\[ \ldots X_q \ldots Y_q \ldots \], where X and Y are elements related by government. If X governs Y and has language index q, Y must have language index q also. Points at which items from either language can occur are neutralization sites.

Let us turn now to the mixed compound verb constructions from Panjabi/English bilingual discourse to be discussed here.
3. The compound verb in Panjabi. Emeneau (1956) cites the compound verbs in the modern Indo-Aryan languages as one of the important areal linguistic features of India. In Panjabi (as well as Hindi, Urdu, etc.) there is a class of so-called compound or conjunct verbs consisting of a major category (such as verb, noun, or adjective) plus operator. The operators comprise a small class of simplex verbs with lexical meaning in their own right. The main ones are *karna*- 'to do' and *hona*- 'to be, become'. The basic meaning of the compound is determined by the first element and modified by the verbal operator.

Partial relexification from English has led to a restructuring of the Panjabi verb system and has created a number of 'new' verbs which form part of bilingual code-switched discourse. The operator *karna* is particularly susceptible to being used in the construction of new compound verbs. It is now being used with English verbs, not only in cases where the equivalent Panjabi meaning would be expressed with a compound verb, but also in cases where the Panjabi equivalent would be a simplex verb. Thus, while Panjabi has *khelna*- 'to play', mixed Panjabi-English has created the new compound *ple karna*- 'play do'. Another example of a mixed compound verb using the operator *hona* is *guilt feel hona*- 'to feel guilt(y)'.

This general pattern of restructuring in the verb system could be cited as an areal feature of language contact in South Asia. Kachru (1978:36), for example, shows how in Hindi different styles drawing on Sanskrit, Persian, and English are demarcated at least in part through the use of mixed compound verbs.

Sanskritized: Persianized: Englishized:

'to pity' daya karna raham karna pity karna

There have been a few studies of transplanted Hindi (e.g. in Fiji [Moag 1977] and Trinidad [Bhatia 1982]), which also mention the creation of a new class of compound verbs, e.g. *phonam karna*- 'to telephone', and *trabal karna*- 'to make trouble'. The mixed compound verb is also found in the Dravidian languages; for example, Tamil has *clean pannu- pannu*- 'to do' (Annamalai 1978).

There has been no general agreement among the Indian and other grammarians regarding the analysis of the so-called compound verbs (cf. the discussion in Bahl 1969:175-83 and Hook 1974). The majority of Hindi and Panjabi grammars do, nevertheless, mention the fact that certain verbal constructions, although they are a combination of a noun/adjective and a verb, function as one semantic and syntactic unit. They are often replaceable by a single verb (in some cases by one which is lexically related to the noun or adjective, e.g. *svikar karna*- 'accept' can be replaced by *svikarna* or *manna*; compare Panjabi: *manzur karna*- 'accept!', *manna* and *accept karna*). These (and often other) constructions have been variously referred to as
nominal compounds, compound verbs, conjunct verbs and complex verbs. One point of contention concerns the categorical status of the first, i.e. preverbal, element of the compound. That is, is it a verb, adjective, or noun, or even phrase?

Another matter of disagreement is the degree of internal cohesion of the constituents of the compound, and the extent to which the preverbal element bears grammatical relations to other sentence constituents.

Similar analytical problems apply in the case of the mixed compound verbs. For example, exam pass kərna consists of the English noun + verb sequence of exam pass followed by the Panjabi operator kərna, while ple kərna and look down upon kərna have a somewhat different internal constituent structure. These differences have implications for the manner in which and degree to which they are integrated into larger syntactic structures. Due to the multifunctionality of play in English, it is not entirely clear whether we are dealing with a sequence of two verbs or a noun + verb. Some criteria do, however, emerge when we look at the frequency distribution of types of mixed compound verbs. Similarly, there are different analyses of so-called phrasal verbs or verb plus prepositions or particle constructions like look down upon.

Table 1 shows the distribution of different types of mixed compound verbs classified according to their internal constituency. There is a total of 77 verbs drawn from a sample of 11 speakers. Kərna is the most frequent operator. There are only 12 verbs (6%) with hona. Five of these have variants with kərna (i.e. mix hona/kərna, depend hona/kərna, and use hona/kərna). Most of these consist of an English verb acting as the preverbal element and the Panjabi operator; there were three instances where the preverbal constituent was an English phrasal verb (i.e. show off hona/kərna, cut off hona, and used to hona).

Table 1. Types of mixed compound verbs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Compounds with hona</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Verb(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. involve hona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Verb + preposition(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. cut off hona</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2.</th>
<th>Compounds with kərna</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>verb(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. appreciate kərna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>verb + preposition(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. pick up kərna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>noun(Eng) + verb(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. exam pass kərna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>gerund/verbal noun(Eng) + operator(Pan), e.g. lobbying kərna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Type 2.1 is the most frequent (N = 50). The next most frequent is 2.2 (N = 5), followed by 2.3 (N = 4). There was only one instance of a verbal noun + kərna, i.e. lobbying kərna. Thus, there would seem to be a case for arguing that the earlier example, pie kərna, consists of a verb + verb structure since there are no instances of a noun + verb pattern. Moreover, it seems to be the case that Type 2.3 consists of a compound verb of type 2.1 followed by an object which may be either in English or Panjabi. There does not seem to be any semantic reason for taking the noun + verb as a unit which functions as the preverbal element of the compound. Thus, the basic syntactic frame can be summarized as follows.

Preverbal element

verb+(prep)_{E/P} + operator (hona/kərna)_{P} (ing)

That is to say, the preverbal element can be either in English or Panjabi. When it is in English, it takes the form of a verb (optionally followed by a preposition) or an -ing form of the verb. The operator, on the other hand, must always be in Panjabi. This rules out constructions such as *express do. The choice between hona and kərna appears to be constrained by the stativity of the verb. Generally, stative verbs do not occur with hona, or in the passive form. Khurana (1981:26) observes that generally all classes of English verbs can be mixed in Hindi. This would appear to be true for Panjabi; in general, there is no great overlap between speakers as far as the choice of verbs is concerned. Only 15 of them are used by more than one speaker (namely, communicate, depend, explain, employ, force, feel, hesitate, learn, pick up, pass, realize, translate, use, encourage, and express, all with kərna). However, I will have more to say about this later. I turn now to the question of how these compounds are syntactically integrated into bilingual discourse.

4. The integration of mixed compound verbs in bilingual discourse. I assume in the following that Panjabi has the basic clause structure: Subject INFL VP, where VP may be expanded as follows: VP→(PP) (O) (V). Let us now look at the structure of 2.1 compounds, as in sentence (4).

(4) jİthe vi hoa education di gal andi å, o help karde ne

Whenever anything to do with education// they help arises

Here the compound consists of a verb in English and a Panjabi verbal operator with no complement. The auxiliary agrees with the subject pronoun o, which is a 3rd person plural form. We can assume the following tree diagram, where the projection of
VP includes a branching nonterminal V node. Assuming that a relation of government holds between the two V nodes, the lowest V node will index the one above by percolation, but not further above; i.e. VP is the maximal projection of V, and maximal projections are absolute barriers to government.¹

Type 2.2 presents a more complicated picture. Consider the following sentences, which involve depend karna/hona.

(5) Parents te depend karna ε
    It depends on the parents.

(6) Ona te depend karde ε
    That depends on them.

(7) o te individual te depend karde ε
    It depends on the individual.

We can assume the following tree diagram for a sentence like (5).

Sentences (4) and (5) violate some of the major constraints which have been proposed for code-switching. In general, for example, Poplack (1979:16) found that switching within the verb
phrase was the least frequent type of code-switching for Spanish-English bilinguals. In a sample of 400 code-switches she found only one which took place within the verb phrase. A number of other researchers noted that a switch between pronominal subjects or (direct and indirect) objects and the adjacent finite verb was not possible (Timm 1975:478). And still others (e.g. Lipski 1978:253) have observed a reluctance for switching within the boundaries of the prepositional phrase and a constraint on switching at the boundary between V and Prep P. The extent to which Panjabi/English code-switching violates these and other proposed constraints depends, of course, on what the constituent structure of the mixed compound verbs is assumed to be, and whether my lexical projection of portions of the constituent structure under VP is correct. A related issue is whether one can use code-switching data to support arguments about the internal constituency of projections and the nature of government relations. I have assumed here that the terminal V node lexicalized by the operator takes the same language index as the node dominating it, but that it does not act as a governor to its lexical sister. The latter node is a neutralization site where a lexical item from either language can be inserted.

The problem of deciding where the switch site lies is complicated by the indeterminate constituency of the English verb plus preposition depend on. These verbs vary in the degree of tightness of the lexical bond between them. Huddleston (1984:200-206), for example, suggests two possible analyses for these phrasal verbs—one in which the verb plus preposition forms a single unit, and another in which the preposition is the head of a prepositional phrase. He opts, however, for the configuration illustrated in (b), rather than (a), for a number of reasons, one of which is the fact that adjuncts can be inserted between the verb and preposition. Thus, (9) is grammatical, but (10) isn't.

(a) depend on = verb + object complement

```
  VP
   \   /  \\
  V   NP
   \  /  \\
depend on the individual
```

(b) depend on = verb + prepositional phrase

```
  VP
   \  /  \\
  V    Prep P
   \   /  \\
depend on the individual
```
(9) She depended confidently on the minister.
*(10) She depended on confidently the minister.

I have chosen the equivalent of analysis (b) for Panjabi/English code-switching as well, but in either case, one of the major constraints on code-switching is violated, namely, the one which disallows a switch within PREP P, or the one which disallows a switch between VP and NP.

In terms of Poplack's equivalence constraint, a switch within the prepositional phrase would be ruled out. It would predict the nonoccurrence of either: *parents te or *te parents, because both violate the rule order rules of one or the other language. Panjabi presumably has a rule which would be violated by *te parents, because it is a postpositional language, while English has a rule which would be violated by *parents te.

Similarly, the language government principle would rule out switches between V and Prep P, and within PREP P. That is, we would assume that major categories assign language indexes both to the node dominating them and to its immediate constituent. Minor categories assign a language index only to the node dominating them. So the language index of V should govern that of PREP P, and within a PREP P all constituents should have the same language index because the language index of P should govern that of NP.

The same sort of argument would apply to rule out switches between the verb and object. That is, the language index of V will govern NP.

Before attempting further resolution of these issues, let us look at how some of the other types of compound verbs are integrated syntactically. Consider the following sentences, where the compound takes an object complement.
Syntax and semantics of the code-mixed compound verb / 43

(11) əsti Panjabi learn kərni ə, just like French, German or We want to learn Panjabi you know, so they'll learn it, həna.

(12) mē apni language learn kərni.
I want to learn my own language.

(13) baceā nū tusi force noi kər sakde.
You can't force children.

(14) ke əsti language nū improve kər la ge.
That we'll improve (the) language.

(15) o apni own language nū look down upon kərēn.
They perhaps look down upon their own language.

(In 11) and (13), the complement of the mixed compounds learn kərna and force kərna, respectively, are in Panjabi, while in (12), (14), and (15), the complements of the mixed verbs are in English. In all three cases, however, the objects are integrated into the syntactic structure of the larger discourse. This is shown in two ways. In (14) and (15), they are accompanied by the object marker nū (cf. baceā nū in (13)); and in (12) and (15), the feminine form of the reflexive apni (cf. masculine apne) occurs. Thus, these English nouns bear grammatical relations with other sentence constituents and trigger gender agreement just as Panjabi words would in an otherwise monolingual discourse. In this case (as well as in many others) the English noun takes on a feminine gender classification, which is the equivalent one in Panjabi (boli- 'language') (cf. also zabān, fem.).

We can assume that the tree diagram for the structures in sentences (11-14) is as follows:

```
S
     /\     
    /   \   
   NP   VP  INFL
      /\    |
     /  \  |
    N   Vq |
       /\ |
      /  |
     q  |

tusi  baceā nū  force  kərna  səkna
əsti  Panjabi  learn  kərna  ə
mē apni language learn kərna ə
əsti language nū improve kərna la ge
```

The existence of these compound verbs would argue against recognizing type 2.3 as a separate type, or more specifically,
against an analysis in which it was assumed that the compound formed a single syntactic unit consisting of noun + verb + verb. Instead, it appears that we must recognize that the boundary between V and NP is a permissible site for code-switching. Constructions like time waste kurna, exams pass kurna etc. do not have any special syntactic or semantic status in bilingual discourse. Assuming, too, that there are ordering restrictions governing the internal constituency of X under V, if we allowed exams pass to function as a unit, it would violate English word order. If we allow it to serve as the preceding object complement, Panjabi word order constraints are preserved.

The syntactic behavior of look down upon kurna, however, justifies treating the English phrasal verb look down upon as a single unit which functions as the preverbal element in the mixed compound, as in the following tree diagram.

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This means that there is no need to recognize the verb plus preposition as a special category.

5. Discussion. There are a number of parallels to the mixing between Panjabi and English which can be cited from various studies of language contact. For example, the transplantation of Norwegian to the United States, as discussed by Haugen (1969), shows a number of similarities.

At the level of the particular structure of the compound verb there are also parallels in other cases of language contact. Something similar happens in Japanese when English verbs are borrowed and integrated. Most loan words which can be used as verbs take the auxiliary suru- 'to do', e.g. rabu suru- 'love + do', and tenisu o shiamsen- 'tennis' + case marker + suru + tense marker (cf. Stanlaw 1982). Another similar case is reported for contact between Warlpiri and English by Bavin and Shopen (1985). Warlpiri has a productive system of compound verb derivation using the pattern preverb + verb, with the verb carrying all the inflections for the compound expression. English verbs which are borrowed into Warlpiri become preverbs, thus allowing the Warlpiri system of inflectional morphology to be retained. Verbs borrowed with intransitive
Syntax and semantics of the code-mixed compound verb / 45

meanings are usually attached to the inchoative jarrimi, e.g. 
grow jarrimi, play-jarrimi, and those with transitive meanings 
to mani- 'to get, take, affect', e.g. hold mani, ju mani 'chew'. 
The verb mani is used for causative expressions in traditional 
Warlpiri. Some of the English verbs have adapted to Warlpiri 
phonology, but the Warlpiri verbs carry all the regular Warl-
piri verb inflections. In many cases, English borrowings are 
used where there are traditional words with the same meaning, 
e.g. play jarrimi is used alongside manyu-karrimi- 'to play'. 
The compound is made up of the preverb manyu, a noun mean-
ing 'fun, play', and the verb karrimi- 'to stand'. Similarly, 
the mixed compound hold mani is used alongside mardani- 'to 
hold'.

What is interesting about all these cases of mixing in the 
compound verb system is that it allows the borrowing and inte-
grant of foreign items, in each case English verbs, without 
restructuring or otherwise interfering with the native system 
of verbal morphology. Thus, one might say that in each of 
these languages the typology is receptive to integration. And 
in the case of the Indo-Aryan languages in general, this pat-
tern of borrowing has been maintained for centuries without 
leading to the restructuring of the system.

However, that may be just a superficial interpretation of the 
facts. In general, I have said more about syntactic than 
semantic constraints on the code-mixed compounds. In order 
to do complete justice to the semantic aspects, we would need 
to go into the semantics of causativity. There may be a case 
for arguing that there is covert semantic interference and 
restructuring, which in the long run will have implications for 
the language (see Klein 1980 for discussion of such a case in 
Spanish). To some extent the infiltration of English words 
into the compound verb system is a reflection of the fact that 
Panjabi lacks productive word formation rules for creating new 
verbs, except for a few denominalized and deadjectivalized verb 
stems (Bahl 1969:184). In the creation of the compound verbs 
(both mixed and unmixed), we see syntactic procedures com-
ensating for the lack of morphological patterns. This has 
consequences for the structure of the lexicon.

Many Panjabi/English bilinguals use English words for what 
would traditionally be called 'core' vocabulary, where Panjabi 
equivalents exist and are widely used, e.g. children, parents, 
etc. Thus we could not say that Panjabi needed to borrow 
these words; nor is it sufficient to invoke prestige, although 
this is certainly an important factor. There are, of course, 
cases where English words are used in compound verb con-
structions because no Panjabi equivalent exists, e.g. lobbying 
karna. There are others where Panjabi equivalents exist with 
a slightly different meaning or, that is, where there is a wider 
or narrower semantic scope in Panjabi. For example, one 
reason why we find the mixed compound mold hona/karna 
appears to be that there is no general cover term for molding
something, although there are separate words for molding clay, shaping wood, and shaping metal. One could probably only use bōnā in this general sense. Similar factors are at work in other cases, for example, when Panjabi bilinguals use the mixed compound pick up karna in the sense of 'pick up a language'. Panjabi has chokna, which means literally 'to pick up something', but it does not have the equivalent semantic extension that English has and is therefore not available for lexical mapping in a Panjabi construction such as *boli chokna. One could, of course, say boli sikhna- 'to learn a language'. Indeed, it is interesting that some informants use this term as well as pick up karna and even learn karna. So in some cases these mixed compound verbs exist alongside simplex verbs. The case of khelna/pile karna discussed previously is another example. In the case of accept karna there is both a simplex and a complex equivalent (i.e. monzur karna and monēna). And in other cases there is a parallel Panjabi compound, e.g. show off karna and Panjabi dikhava dena/kornā- 'to give/make a show'.

In general, it would not be correct to say that speakers code-mix or switch to fill lexical gaps, at least not in the case of fluent bilinguals. Although it is popularly believed by bilingual speakers themselves that they mix or borrow because they don't know the term in one language or another, it is often the case that switching occurs most frequently for items which people know and use in both languages (cf. Zentella 1981). It is also true that one of the most common discourse functions of code-switching is to repeat the same thing in both languages. Mixing and switching for fluent bilinguals is thus in principle no different from style shifting for the monolingual. Bilinguals just have a wider choice--at least when they are speaking with other bilinguals. In effect, the entire L2 system is at the disposal of the code-switcher.

At the semantic level, however, we need to raise the question of whether sentences with karna are implicated in the semantics of causativity, and whether they are in any sense to be regarded as equivalent to the periphrastic causatives of English, e.g. to cry/to make X cry. In Panjabi (as well as Hindi) causatives are formed mainly morphologically (by suffixation), and in some cases lexically (cf. Hindi: sikhna- 'to learn', sikhana- 'to teach' = 'cause to learn', sikhvana- 'to cause to teach'). The question is where a construction like teach karna fits into this system, if at all? Is it related to sikhna as a degree of causativity? If so, one could argue that if enough new compound verbs become established in the language, particularly in the speech of younger less fluent speakers, the traditional system of grammaticalized causatives may give way to a new analytical one (see Kachru 1976 for discussion of Hindi/Urdu causatives). Such a development would be well in line with trends in the Indo-Aryan languages which have worked to create a close correspondence between form and meaning in the verbal system and, of course, as well with
6. Conclusion. It seems to me that the most reasonable analysis of the mixed compound verb involves accepting it as a convergent structure of a 'third system' phenomenon. That is to say that the mixed compound verb is the outcome of contact between two systems and must be analyzed in terms of its own structure rather than in terms of one language or the other. One could say then that the internal constituency of these mixed structures is autonomously generated by a separate set of rules. The one crucial constraint is how the mixed element behaves with regard to its external relationship with elements of the discourse unit of which it is a part, and not the constituent structure rules of the two systems in contact.

In some ways modern linguistics has been no less reluctant to recognize the existence of 'mixed languages' than its nineteenth century ancestor. Müllner (1873), for example, said that it was impossible to admit the existence of a mixed idiom. Whitney (1874) similarly remarks that 'Such a thing as a language with a mixed grammatical apparatus...would be a monstrosity...it seems an impossibility.' Strevens (1982), however, takes a view which is increasingly being taken into account by linguistic theory: namely, that 'a central problem of linguistic study is how to reconcile a convenient and necessary fiction with a great mass of inconvenient facts. The fiction is the notion of "a language"--English, Chinese, Navajo, Kashimir. The facts reside in the performance of individuals when they use a given language.'

Strevens's view serves to remind us that linguistic theory is still a long way from being able to deal analytically with performance and what people do when they use 'language' (rather than a 'given' language).

Notes

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1. This follows from Chomsky's (1982:19) definition of government in the sense of X-bar theory, where $\alpha$ governs $\beta$ if $\alpha = X^0$, $\alpha$ c-commands $\beta$, and $\beta$ is not protected by a maximal projection. It is assumed that $\beta$ is protected by a maximal projection if the latter includes $\beta$ but not $\alpha$. I assume for present purposes that INFL dominates AUX, and is the head of S. Modals and tense auxiliaries do not govern V, which can have a different language index. Nothing hinges on this particular analysis. More detailed discussion of the issues raised by Panjabi/English code-switching in relation to government can be found in Romaine (forthcoming).
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DISAGREEMENT: THE CASE OF PRONOMINAL AFFIXES AND NOUNS

Marianne Mithun
State University of New York at Albany

Verbal affixes like those underscored in (1) are often called 'agreement markers', because they match external noun phrases in person, number, and/or gender. In the German sentences in (1), the verbal suffix is -t when the subject is 'dog', but -en when the subject is 'dogs'.

German:
(1a) Der _Hund_ bellt.
   the.M.SG dog bark-PRES.3.SG
   'The dog is barking.'

(1b) Die _Hunde_ bellen.
   the.PL dog-PL bark-PRES.3.PL
   'The dogs are barking.'

The term 'agreement' is often extended to languages with more elaborate verbal marking for the same reason. In many languages, verbal affixes match all primary arguments. Compare the underscored prefixes in Wyandot, a Northern Iroquoian language, in (2).

Wyandot (Barbeau 1960:291.57):
(2) Ta'a skatégah dńéhó'mänd dé de wándáát
   no one-only not-M.PL/M.SG-catch the Wyandot
   'They did not catch a single Wyandot, but,
   de hunó:má'ó ahomáttie'dáá
   the M.PL-self PAST-M.PL/M.PL-catch
   instead, the Wyandots themselves captured
   detíñóncẹnóndé
   the-M.PL-Seneca
   the Senecas.'
The term 'agreement' can be slippery. In principle, it can refer to a symmetric relation, since we can say that A and B agree without assigning priority to either. In fact, however, we often assume that agreement is asymmetric. We may say that adjectives in some language agree with the nouns they modify, but would certainly deny that nouns agree with the adjectives that modify them. The use of the term 'agreement markers' for verbal affixes or clitics often implies that these are mere copies of features from noun phrases.

It is not clear, however, that all verbal affixes or clitics referred to as 'agreement markers' are simple copies of features. Grammarians of languages that mark all primary arguments on verbs or auxiliaries, like Wyandot, usually refer to these markers as pronouns or pronominal affixes. DuPonceau, addressing the American Philosophical Society in 1818, remarked on 'the general character of the Indian languages' as follows (1819: xxxi).

Another striking trait which may be generally observed in their construction...is the transitive form of the verb, which combines in the same word the ideas of the governing pronoun and that which is governed.

Boas (1911) described a number of languages in similar terms. He, like many after him, pointed out that in languages of this type, in which pronominal affixes represent the primary arguments themselves, separate noun phrases often function more as adjuncts than as integral components of the nuclear class. Describing Chinook, he wrote (1911:646):

> Every verbal form contains incorporated pronominal representatives of the subject, and of the direct and indirect objects when these occur...The nominal subject and the object are treated as appositions, without any organic connection with the sentence.

It is probably significant that when asked, bilingual speakers of such languages respond, without hesitation, that the affixes seem more akin to the stressless pronouns of English than to the number agreement markers.

Recently, the status of pronominal affixes as verbal arguments rather than simple copies of features from noun phrases has been discussed by Hale (1983) in terms of the 'configurationality parameter'. The discussion has been taken up in interesting ways by several others, including Jelinek (1984) and Van Valin (in press). All provide further evidence that pronominal affixes do indeed represent primary arguments. They postulate, furthermore, that in languages of this type, 'nominals are not verbal arguments, but are optional adjuncts to the clitic pronouns that serve as verbal arguments' (Jelinek 1984:73).
It has been suggested that even if pronominal affixes are arguments in their own right, the relation between the affixes and nominals might still be agreement: features of the pronominal affixes might be copied onto noun phrases. Copied features might include such distinctions as person, number, gender, and case. In many instances, however, the match is not perfect: pronominal affixes and coreferent noun phrases disagree.

Sometimes the person or number does not match. In a number of languages, dual or plural clauses can be formed as in (3).

Mohawk:

(3) Sawdtis Œkene
  John there-FUT-1.DUAL.EXCLUSIVE-go-PUNCTUAL
  'John and I are going.'

Sometimes the genders of pronominal affixes and coreferent nouns do not match. Boas noted, for example (1911:647), that 'in the Lower Chinook text cases occur in which the noun has indefinite (neuter) gender L-, while, according to the actual sex or number, the incorporated pronoun is masculine, feminine, or plural.'

In most Bantu languages, nouns have lexicalized genders. Some gender classes have some semantic cohesion, others less. Katherine Demuth (p.c.) reports that in SeSotho, for example, a Bantu language of Southern Africa, nouns of gender class 9 often refer to large animals. Noun classes often have some phonological integrity as well. Many class 9 nouns begin with n-, such as ntja 'dog', nku 'sheep', ntou 'flea', etc.

Pronominal prefixes on SeSotho verbs match the noun classes of subjects and, under certain conditions, objects. The verbal prefix for class 9 subjects as e-, as in the sentence in (4).

SeSotho (Katherine Demuth p.c.):

(4a) Ntja e^batla lejo
    9.dog 9-want food
    'The dog wants food.'

The noun ngaka 'doctor' also belongs to class 9, and can accordingly appear with the verbal prefix e-, especially in written language. In spoken language, however, a different verbal prefix is usually used, the class 1 prefix o-.

(4b) Ngaka o-batla lejo
    9.doctor 1-want food
    'The doctor wants food.'

Class 1 nouns are usually human. Speakers prefer to mark the verbal prefix for semantic rather than lexical gender.
An even more interesting type of disagreement occurs when both a pronominal affix and a coreferent noun phrase bear case, but the cases do not match.

1. Types of case marking systems. As is well known, the principal function of case marking is to signal the relationships of participants to an event. Case marking systems differ, however, in the ways they group the roles of primary (direct) arguments into case categories.

The most widely used case marking system is the nominative-accusative or subject-object type. Mallinson and Blake (1981: 73) estimate that approximately 70% of the world's languages exhibit this type alone. In canonical accusative systems, subjects of all verbs appear in one case, the nominative, while direct objects appear in another, the accusative. English pronouns exhibit such a distinction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominative (subject)</th>
<th>Accusative (direct object)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(5a) I left.</td>
<td>(5d) He found me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5b) I found him.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5c) I fell.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the first person pronoun functions as subject, it appears as I and precedes the verb. The form remains the same whether the verb is transitive (5b) or intransitive (5a) and (5c), and whether the subject functions as an agent (5a) or patient (5c). When it is a direct object, it appears as me and follows the verb.

Ergative-absolutive systems group primary case relationships differently. In canonical ergative systems, subjects of intransitive verbs and direct objects appear in the same form, the absolutive. Compare the form of the noun for 'dog' in the following sentences from the Mpakwithi dialect of Anguthimri. It is 'wa' when it is the subject of the intransitive verbs 'bark' (6a) or 'get sick' (6b), and also when it is the direct object of 'kick' (6c).

Anguthimri (Australia) (Crowley 1981):

Absolutive

(6a) \( ^* w a \) dog(-ABS) gægi. bark-PRES
    'The dog is barking.'

(6b) \( ^* w a \) dog(-ABS) lwaga-imri-ðeni-ni.
    fever-PROP-INCH-NON.FUT
    'The dog got sick.'

(6c) Lu ma-ra \( ^* w a \) dog(-ABS) jnu-qi.
    he man-ERG kick-PAST
    'The man kicked the dog.'
Note that the absolutive form remains the same whether the noun functions as an agent (6a), or a patient (6b) and (6c).

The noun for 'dog' appears in a different case, however, when it is the subject of a transitive verb like 'bite' (6d). This case, used exclusively for transitive subjects, is known as the ergative.

**Ergative**

(6d) \[\text{dog-ERG} \quad \text{child-ABS} \quad \text{bite-PAST}\]

'\text{The dog bit the child.}'

A third type of case marking system is the agent/patient or active type. In canonical agentive systems, primary arguments are distinguished according to their roles as agents or patients, regardless of whether they appear with transitive or intransitive verbs. Compare the pronouns in the Central Pomo sentences of (7). Whenever the first person is an agent, the pronoun appears as \(\text{'aa}\), both with intransitive verbs like 'leave' and transitive verbs like 'find'.

**Central Pomo (California):**

**Agent**

(7a) \[\text{'da eeyo.}\]

'I left.'

(7b) \[\text{Miye th\text{e}\_ th\text{e}\_ maq\text{\text{}o}\_ \_}\]

'His mother found me.'

When the pronoun functions as a patient, it appears as \(\text{'\_oo}\), whether it is the subject of an intransitive like 'fall' (7c), or object of a transitive (7d).

**Patient**

(7c) \[\text{T\_oo ch\text{\text{}na\text{}w.}\}

'I fell.'

(7d) \[\text{Miye th\text{\text{}e}\_ t\_oo maq\text{\text{}o}\_ \_}\]

'His mother found me.'

The agent/patient distinction is also marked on Pomo nouns. When the noun 'mother' functions as an agent, it appears as \(\text{th\text{\text{}e}}\). The agent form is used for the subject of both the transitive verb 'find' (7d) and the intransitive verb 'leave' (7e).
Whenever the noun functions as a patient, however, it bears the suffix -l. The form is thēl whether the patient noun is a direct object, as in (7b), or a subject, as in (7f).

(7f) Mtye thēl-1 chîndw.
    his mother-PAT fell
    'His mother fell.'

All of these case marking systems collapse three primary case relationships into two case categories, as in Figure 1.

Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intransitive:</th>
<th>Transitive:</th>
<th>Intransitive:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A1 left.)</td>
<td>(A1 found Pat.)</td>
<td>(A1 fell.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>PAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three systems prevent ambiguity with equal efficiency. Each distinguishes who from whom in transitive clauses, and operates with a single primary case distinction. For this reason, it has often been assumed that the differences among the systems are purely formal. They are not, however, completely arbitrary alternatives.

Figure 1 suggests that all three systems are based on the semantic distinction between agent and patient, and such a hypothesis has been proposed on a number of occasions. Agent systems could be said to represent these semantic roles directly, while accusative and ergative systems are the result of alternate but symmetric grammaticizations of them. Accusative systems group the single arguments of intransitive verbs with the agents of transitives, while ergative systems classify them as patients. (See Plank 1979:7-8, and Mallinson and Blake 1981:101-103 for discussion of this point of view and further references.) A closer look at the nature of these three case marking systems reveals, however, that they grammaticize subtly different functions.
2. Bases of primary case marking systems

2.1 Agentive systems. The semantic basis of agentive systems is clear. In such systems, however, the case roles are no less grammaticized than those of subject or absolutive. Agentive languages typically collapse a range of different semantic roles into the categories of agent and patient. In many languages, for example, experiencers of verbs like 'see' are classified grammatically as agents, along with the agents of verbs like 'hit' and 'drag'. Typically, human beneficiaries of verbs like 'give' are classified as patients, along with the patients of verbs like 'cut' or 'die'. Some languages utilize agent/patient case marking to reflect distinctions of control, like the 'fluid case marking' of Eastern Pomo reported by McLendon (1978). There, the same verb is translated 'slide' with an agent argument, but 'slip' with a patient argument. Holisky (MS, to appear) describes a similar phenomenon in the North Central Caucasian language Tsova-Tush. In most languages, however, case frames are highly lexicalized, so that a given verb always appears with nuclear arguments in specific cases. Case frames for verbs in agentive languages are typically highly predictable semantically, although seemingly idiosyncratic case marking does occur, like the Mohawk verb 'work' which requires a single patient argument.

2.2 Accusative systems. Several facts indicate that the basic category in accusative systems is the subject. Subjects are typically unmarked morphologically, in contrast to direct objects. Nominative case nouns are also normally provided as citation forms.

The properties associated with subjects vary considerably from language to language (Keenan 1976). It is generally agreed, however, that subjects are fundamentally grammaticized topics. (See, among many others, Chafe 1976, Li and Thompson 1976, Plank 1979:14, Mallinson and Blake 1981:106-109). As Chafe states, 'In communicating new knowledge, some particular is identified as a starting point, and the speaker then adds to the addressee's knowledge about it' (Chafe 1976: 44).

The category of topic is primarily a discourse notion. The choice of topic implies a decision about the organization of information to be presented. Speakers establish a topic, or point of view, then maintain this orientation over a certain stretch of discourse, rather than shifting it with each new clause. Accordingly, topics, and therefore subjects, are more often definite than indefinite, and more often pronouns than full noun phrases. (See Givón 1983 on topic continuity in discourse.)

As is well known, the choice of topic is by no means random. Although in principle any entity could be taken as a point of departure, speakers tend to choose topics closest to their own
point of view: those persons or entities with which they can best identify. This means that topics tend to share certain semantic features, such as humanness or at least animacy. (The relative likelihood of various arguments serving as topics is captured by the animacy/agency/topicality hierarchy first proposed by Silverstein 1976.) Thus (8b) is more natural than (8a). We are more likely to be interested in George than in the car.

(8a) A car has hit George.
(8b) George has been hit by a car.

Overall, topics, and therefore subjects, are more often agents than patients. Links between topicality and agency are discussed by Hopper and Thompson (1980), who point out (p. 286) that 'story lines are typically advanced by people who perform actions, and especially by people who deliberately initiate events.' Sentence (9a) is not ungrammatical, but it is peculiar; most English speakers would present such information from the point of view of the agent, rather than the patient.

(9a) The waiter was called over by the elderly gentleman.
(9b) The elderly gentleman called the waiter over.

Subjects, however, are not necessarily pure topics any more than agent arguments in active systems are pure semantic agents. The topic of the exchange in (10) is probably the book, but it is not the subject of the second sentence. Inanimate patient arguments are not favored choices for subject in English, even when they are topics.

(10a) Where's my book?
(10b) I just saw it on the table.

Accusative languages vary in the relative importance of topicality, agentivity, and animacy, etc. in subject selection. Yet in essence, accusative systems are based on the clause-level grammaticization of a discourse notion, namely topic, that is strongly associated with certain semantic features, including animacy and agency.

2.3 Ergative systems. The basic category in ergative systems is the absolutive. Absolutives are usually unmarked morphologically. They are also typically citation forms. (See, for example, Heath 1978:42.) Yet absolutives do not all share the types of semantic features that subjects do, such as animacy or agentivity. Absolutives of transitive verbs are generally patients, while absolutes of intransitives are more often agents. Nevertheless, the combination of transitive patients with intransitive agents and patients in a single category is no
accident. These absolutes share an important function. They are the nominals used to introduce significant new entities into a discourse. New topics are typically brought into discussion as objects of verbs like see, meet, get, run into, etc., or as subjects of verbs like arrive, appear, stop by, etc.

Anyone familiar with transcriptions of spontaneous spoken discourse has probably noticed that clauses, or intonation units, seldom contain multiple separate noun phrases. Speakers tend to introduce only one significant new piece of information into a discussion at a time. (See, among others, Chafe this volume, DuBois in press, Mithun 1985 and in press.) They typically introduce a character or entity in one clause, then comment on it in succeeding clauses. Clauses in spontaneous spoken language thus generally contain a single important noun phrase, or a single informative predicate, perhaps accompanied by established or ancillary information. Most speakers would not open a conversation with a sentence like that in (11a).

(11a) George Johnson speared a five-pound sockeye salmon a week ago Tuesday.

Something like (11b) might be more usual.

(11b) Remember George Johnson? Seems he got a sockeye last week. Tuesday, I think it was. Five pounder.

This tendency to introduce one significant new idea at a time is discussed by DuBois (in press). In examining narrative texts in Sacapultec, a Mayan language with ergative pronominal affixes, he found that approximately 60% of the clauses consisted of a verb plus a single primary noun phrase argument, and almost 40% consisted of a verb followed by no primary noun phrase argument at all. Clauses with two full noun phrase direct arguments were extremely rare. Furthermore, 'this strong tendency holds whether the verb is transitive or intransitive...The single direct argument with intransitives is most commonly the subject, but with transitives it is the object.' Absolutives thus reflect the grammaticization of a purely discourse notion: significant new information.

As I have noted, the absolutive is nearly always the morphologically unmarked form. This is not unexpected, in that the absolutive represents the basic grammaticized category: significant new information. It is also economical, since the majority of full noun phrases are absolutive. As DuBois points out, it is efficient for absolutive pronominal affixes to be unmarked as well. Since absolutes are used to introduce new information, they are usually identified by full coreferential noun phrases. Extra overt marking on verbs would be redundant. Ergatives, however, usually convey topical or known information, so they are represented by the pronominal affixes
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alone. Pronominal marking is the only overt marking they usually have.

Ergative systems thus represent a clause-level grammaticization, but not of a semantic role like patient, nor of a semantic-pragmatic role like topic, but a purely pragmatic discourse category: significant new information.

3. Devices for marking primary case. The case relationships of primary arguments can be indicated by a variety of formal devices. In some languages, the cases of arguments are marked on pronominal affixes or clitics within verbs or auxiliaries, as in the Wyandot examples of (2). In others, cases are marked on noun phrases, as in the Anguthimri (6) and Central Pomo (7) examples. In some languages, the case relationships of primary arguments are expressed by the relative order of noun phrases in clauses, as in English.

The task of determining the type of system underlying verbal and nominal case markers is usually straightforward. Agents and patients of transitives are always distinguished. It is a simple matter to determine whether the marking on intransitive subjects matches that of transitive agents (accusative system), transitive patients (ergative system), or alternatives according to semantic function (agentive system).

Identifying the type of case system represented by word order can be more problematic. In rigid verb-medial languages like English, the task is simple. All English subjects appear before verbs, and only transitive objects appear after them, in pragmatically neutral contexts. In verb-peripheral languages, however, the task can be impossible. Consider the two possibilities in (12).

(12a) Verb-final

\[ NPX \quad V \]  

(12b) Verb-initial

\[ V \quad NPX \]

\[ NP^1 \quad NP^2 \quad V \]  

\[ V \quad NP^1 \quad NP^2 \]

In a verb-final language (12a), it is impossible to know whether the single noun phrase argument of an intransitive verb is aligned with the first NP of a transitive, sharing clause-initial position, or with the second, sharing preverbal position. In a verb-initial language (12b), the single NP of an intransitive may share the postverbal position of the first NP of a transitive, or the clause-final position of the second. In a few cases, some insight might be gained from the position of other constituents in the sentence, but in fact this is usually not revealing.

There is still another possibility. The ordering of nominals in many languages is not a function of syntactic case at all, but, rather, pragmatic role (Mithun in press). Constituents may be ordered such that there is a continuous rise in 'communicative dynamism', so that old information appears first,
followed by increasingly new and important information: theme-rheme. (See Mathesius 1928, 1939; Firbas 1964, 1972.) Alternatively, pragmatic order may operate in the reverse, such that the most 'newsworthy' information, that is, the newest, most pertinent information to the discourse, appears first, followed by progressively more predictable constituents: essentially a rheme-theme order.

Many languages express primary case relationships with only one of these devices: (1) verbal marking: case marking of all primary arguments on pronominal affixes or clitics, attached to verbs or auxiliaries; (2) nominal marking: case marking on noun phrases; or (3) word order. A large number of languages, however, use several simultaneously. Many languages with multiple case marking devices exhibit the same type of system in each. Bantu languages generally show accusative verbal case marking and accusative word order. German shows accusative nominal marking and accusative word order. Basque provides a well-known example of a language with ergative pronominal affixes on verbs and ergative case marking on nouns (Brettschneider 1979). In many languages, however, verbal affixes are distinguished according to one case system, but noun phrases another. It is intriguing that while some combinations are very common, others have never been attested.

4. Reported combinations of primary case marking systems. A number of researchers, among them Mallinson and Blake (1981: 73), have noticed a strong relation between accusative and ergative systems. In many languages, verbal case affixes operate accusatively, while nominal case affixes operate ergatively. Ngandi, an Australian language of Arnhem Land, illustrates such a combination. Compare the form of the noun 'aboriginals' in the sentences of (13).

Ngandi (Heath 1978):
Absolutive
(13a) najugi?-wala  ba-yul-yuŋ  ba-ga-rudu-ŋ.
somewhere else-ABL  PL-aboriginal-SBS  3.PL-SUB-go-FUT
'Aboriginals will come from somewhere else.'

(13b) gu-wolo  ba-yul-yuŋ  ba-na?-wildfellow-?gu?.
GU-that  PL-aboriginal-SBS  PL-still-wild-while
'That was when the aboriginals were still wild.'

(13c) barguni-?-randa-ni  ba-yul-yuŋ.
'He used to spear aboriginals.'
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Ergative

\[(13d) \text{ba-yul-}t \mu \text{-yu}t \] \text{ba-bir-}t \mu \text{-yu}t \] \text{buluki?}

\[ \text{PL-aboriginal-ERG-SBS} \] \text{PL-many-ERG-SBS} \text{also}

\[ \text{barba-}na-\acute{\text{c}}-\text{may?}. \]
3PL/3PL-see-NEG-PR

'Most aboriginals do not see them at all.'

(The accusative basis of the verbal prefixes is not completely transparent in (13), due to extensive fusion. Note that the verbal prefix \text{ba-} is used for the third person plural intransitive subject of both 'go' and 'be wild'.)

While a large number of languages combine accusative verbal marking with ergative nominal marking, the opposite has never been found. This is not the only gap.

A number of languages, like Wyandot, show agentive pronominal affixes on verbs, no case marking on noun phrases, and purely pragmatic word order. The opposite, pragmatic verbal marking and agentive word order, has never been documented. Other languages, like Central Pomo, lack pronominal affixes on verbs, but show agentive case marking on noun phrases and pragmatic word order. Again, the reverse does not occur. Some languages, like Gunwinggu, another Australian language, show accusative pronominal affixes on verbs, no case on noun phrases, and pragmatic word order (Oates 1964). The reverse, pragmatic verbal marking and accusative word order, is nearly inconceivable. Finally, some languages, like Ngandi, exhibit accusative pronominal affixes on verbs, ergative case affixes on nouns, and purely pragmatic constituent ordering. No other combination of these three has been attested. The patterns of occurring combinations are so strong, and so consistently irreversible, that their distribution cannot be an accident.

As shown in section 2, all three case marking systems, agentive, accusative, and ergative, represent the clause-level grammaticization of roles which primary arguments may serve. Agentive systems have grammaticized the predicate-level semantic notion of agent. Accusative systems have grammaticized the discourse-level notion of topic, with strong concomitants of semantic features like agentivity and animacy. Ergative systems have grammaticized a purely discourse-level notion, that of significant new information. The three systems can thus be arranged along a continuum according to the type of function they have grammaticized, from semantic, predicate-level functions to pragmatic, discourse-level functions: agentive—accusative—ergative. The most pragmatic system of all is that based purely on the relative communicative dynamism of constituents, pragmatic word order.

The relationships among cooccurring case marking systems can now be generalized as in Figure 2. If a language shows case marking both on pronominal affixes in verbs and on noun
phrases, the nominal marking will encode functions equivalent to or more discourse-sensitive than the verbal marking. Word order encodes functions equivalent to or more discourse-sensitive than nominal marking.

Figure 2.

<predicate-level----discourse-level >
<agentive——accusative——ergative——pragmatic >
<verbal——nominal——order>

Once the reasons behind the absolute predictability of occurring case disagreements are understood, another fact becomes clear. Dismissing all verbal indexing of arguments as mere redundant agreement would be a serious mistake, perhaps even prematurely arresting investigation into the exact functions of nominal and verbal constituents.

Notes

I appreciate helpful comments on this topic contributed by Sandra Thompson, Paul Hopper, and especially Wallace Chafe. I am also grateful to Frances Jack, of Hopland, California, for sharing her expertise on her language, Central Pomo, and to Katherine Demuth for discussing SeSotho.

1. As is well known, differences between verbal and nominal marking do not constitute the only splits in case marking systems. Within a language, different case systems may be exhibited in clauses with different aspects, for example, or in different types of nominals, such as nouns versus pronouns, nouns versus determiners, common nouns versus proper names, or first and second person nominals versus third persons. Each of these splits occurs in a predictable direction and has a clear functional basis. See Planck (1979) for further discussion of such case splits.

2. The significance of this case split was recognized and discussed extensively by Jelinek (1984). She proposed that ergative splits, where clitics (on Warlpiri auxiliaries) are marked accusatively and nominals ergatively, are due to differences in their government and syntactic function. Her explanation is essentially as follows. Clitic pronouns are governed jointly by the 'verb plus the AUX tense/aspect', which assign 'grammatical case': nominative, accusative, etc. Nominals are governed by their case particles/postpositions, which assign nongrammatical (oblique) case, also termed 'lexical case': ergative, absolute, etc. The grammatical cases of the clitics reflect their grammatical function. The primary lexical case particles are
meaningful in a different way: 'they serve to identify which clitic the nominal may be coindexed with' (1984:59).

Jelinek has also suggested (1984:60) that the existence of alternative case choices with particular verbs in some languages indicates that nominal case markers are more 'semantic' than the cases of pronominal affixes on verbs. As is well known, in many languages case distinctions can reflect the degree of participation of arguments in events, or the 'effectiveness with which an action takes place' (see Hopper and Thompson 1980). While patients that are completely affected by or involved in an action appear as accusatives or absolutes, for example, incompletely involved patients may appear in some oblique case, such as a dative, genitive, partitive, locative, etc. Hale (1973:336, cited in Jelinek) contrasts the following two Warlpiri sentences, for example.

(i) nyuntulu-rlu 0-npa-ju pantu-ru
   you-ERG PAST-2SG.NOM-1SG.ACC spear-PAST
   ngaju-0
   me-ABS
   'You speared me.'

(ii) nyuntulu-rlu 0-npa-ju-rla pantu-ru ngaju-ku.
    you-ERG PAST-2SG.DAT spear-PAST me-DAT
    'You speared at me; you tried to spear me.'

Referentiality is obviously related to this distinction. To be completely affected, an argument must be referential. It is not uncommon for languages to distinguish the goals of verbs like find from those like look for, by using accusative or absolutive nominals with the first, and oblique with the second. Jelinek (1984:60), citing Blake (1977), points out that 'In Alawa hunting narratives, the nominal referring to the animal being sought is DAT until it or its tracks are sighted; after that it is marked objective.' Not surprisingly, goals of imperfective, irrealis, and negative clauses often bear oblique case markers rather than primary ones (Blake 1977, Hopper and Thompson 1980). Thus, while the letter in a sentence like (iii) would bear a primary case, usually accusative or absolutive, it might bear a secondary or oblique case in (iv), (v), or (vi).

(iii) I wrote a letter.
   (iv) I was writing a letter.
   (v) I would have written a letter.
   (vi) I did not write a letter.

Case differences like these are especially pervasive in ergative languages.
Such case distinctions are, of course, associated with differences in meaning, but their effect goes beyond the semantic content of the verb with which they appear. A review of the types of distinctions indicated by such case alternations indicates that their major function is to distinguish primary arguments from oblique ones. Primary arguments play a central role in the discourse. They provide the pivots and foci of narratives. If I mention that I wrote a letter, we will probably proceed to discuss the letter. If I say that I was writing a letter, or would have written it, or did not, the letter is much less likely to be the center of subsequent discussion. Thus, rather than providing evidence that nominal case markers in languages like Warlpiri are primarily semantic, case alternations indicate that the nominals serve a specific discourse function, distinguishing those entities that will play a significant role in the discussion as a whole, from those that supply additional background information. Primary arguments are significant and topicworthy. Oblique arguments provide information ancillary to the discussion, what Hopper and Thompson describe as 'that part of a discourse that does not immediately and crucially contribute to the speaker's goal, but merely assists, amplifies, and comments on it' (1980:280).

References


FORCE DYNAMICS AS A GENERALIZATION OVER 'CAUSATIVE'

Leonard Talmy
University of California, Berkeley

0. Introduction

0.1 A neglected semantic category. A semantic category that has previously been neglected in linguistic study is 'force dynamics'—how entities interact with respect to force. Included here are the exertion of force, resistance to such a force, the overcoming of such a resistance, blockage of the expression of force, removal of such blockage, and the like.

Though scarcely recognized before, force dynamics figures significantly in language structure. One major manifestation of this, the focal topic of this paper, is that force dynamics is a generalization over the traditional notion of 'causative'. It places naturally within a single framework not only 'causing' but also 'letting' together with a set of notions not normally considered in the same context. In doing so, it replaces the usual view of basic causation as an irreducible concept, showing it instead as a complex built up of novel primitive notions.

Force dynamics, furthermore, plays a structuring role across a range of language levels. While such properties are mainly treated elsewhere (Talmy 1985b), I point them out here to indicate the larger context of the present discussion. First, force dynamics has direct grammatical representation. In English, our main language of demonstration, such representation appears not only in subsets of conjunctions, prepositions, and other closed-class elements but also, most significantly, as the semantic category that the modal system as a whole is dedicated to expressing. Force dynamic patterns are also incorporated in open-class lexical items, and can be seen to bring numbers of these together into systematic relationships. Lexical items involved in this way refer not only to physical force interactions but also, by metaphorical extension, to psychological and social interactions, conceived in terms of psychosocial 'pressures'. In addition, force dynamic principles can be seen to operate in discourse. Here, it is especially evident in the rhetoric of 'persuasion', which
includes attempts to exhort, convince, and logically demonstrate. Finally, the force dynamic system is a major conceptual organizing system. It incorporates schematic conceptual models of physical phenomena, which it extends, by analogy, to psychological and social phenomena. These models provide comparison with conceptual organization in other cognitive systems.

In historical perspective, developed concepts of force interactions are of course not novel, in particular, for physical phenomena, which have long been the object of study in disciplines like physics. Outside the physical, perhaps the most familiar application is that of Freud to the psyche, with such psychodynamic concepts as libido and drives, repression and resistance, id-superego conflict and a tension-reduction model for restoring equilibrium. To my knowledge, however, systematic application of force concepts to the organization of meaning in language remained neglected until an initial endeavor in Talmy (1976) and a more developed account in Talmy (1981). Of course, earlier reference to force is to be found. Whorf (1941) cited and diagrammed force opposition as the referent of a particular Shawnee root, and the psychologist Heider (1958), whose work has recently come to my attention, discussed force concepts in modality. But these treatments were neither systematic nor explanatory. More recently, Gee and Kegl (1982:348-50) have developed a system involving forces to account for certain motion concepts in ASL. And Sweetser (1982, 1984), adopting the present force dynamic framework, has carried it into an account of the epistemic senses of modals.

The approach I adopt here in investigating the category of force dynamics is based within a broader view of semantics. This is characterized by the idea that language uses certain fundamental notional categories to structure and organize meaning. Such fundamentals are most directly evident across languages in the semantic categories expressed by closed-class forms—or, broadly speaking, by grammar—such as inflections and particles, as well as grammatical categories, relations, and constructions (Talmy 1978b). Many of these same notional categories play a prominent role as well in structuring lexicalization patterns for open-class lexical items (Talmy 1985a). To illustrate, many languages have noun inflections that indicate the 'number' of the noun's referent, but they never have inflections that indicate this referent's 'color'. From similar observations, we can form two lists, one with notional categories like 'color' that never appear in languages' closed-class forms, and the other with those that regularly do so and thus play a basic conceptual structuring role. In addition to number, this list will contain such generally recognized categories as aspect, mood, and evidentiality. One purpose of this paper is to establish force dynamics as a member of this list of fundamental semantic categories.
0.2 Illustrating the category. Since force dynamics (FD) is a novel category in linguistics, it would be best to give it immediate illustration. The minimal pairs in (1) mostly contrast force-dynamically neutral expressions with ones that do exhibit force-dynamic patterns, showing these in a succession of semantic domains.

(1)  
A. be VPing / keep VPing —physical  
   a. The ball was rolling along the green.  
   b. The ball kept (on) rolling along the green.  
B. not VP / can not VP —physical/psychological  
   a. John doesn't go out of the house.  
   b. John can't go out of the house.  
C. not VP / refrain from VPing —intrapsychological  
   a. He didn't close the door.  
   b. He refrained from closing the door.  
D. polite / civil —intrapsychological:lexicalized  
   a. She's polite to him.  
   b. She's civil to him.  
E. have (got) to VP / get to VP —sociopsychological  
   a. She's got to go to the park  
   b. She gets to go to the park.  

Illustrating the purely physical realm, (Aa) depicts a force dynamically neutral event. The use of the word keep in (Ab), however, brings in either of two force dynamic patterns: either the ball has a tendency toward rest which is being overcome by some external force acting on it, say, the wind, or the ball presently has a tendency toward motion that is in fact overcoming external opposition to it, say, from stiff grass.  

In (B) a psychological force factor joins the physical one. The force dynamically neutral expression in (Ba) merely reports an objective observation: John's not going out. But (Bb), in addition to the same observation, also sets forth a full force dynamic complex: that John wants to go out (conceivable as a force-like tendency toward that act), that there is some kind of force or barrier opposing that tendency, and that the latter is stronger than the former, causing a net resultant of no overt action.

Example (C) illustrates that language can depict a force opposition as wholly psychological and, in fact, as occurring within a single psyche. Again, both (Ca) and (Cb) refer to the same overtly observable situation, an agent's nonaction. But (Cb) in addition represents this situation as the result of an intrapsychological conflict, one between the agent's urge to act and the same agent's stronger inhibition against acting.

Example (D) exhibits the same type of FD contrast as (C) but demonstrates that this can be lexicalized. While the polite of (Da) is neutral, (Db)'s civil indicates that the subject's basic tendency here is to be impolite but that she is successfully suppressing this tendency.
Example (E) demonstrates that language extends FD concepts as well to interpsychological—i.e., social—interactions. Here, both of the expressions exhibit force dynamic patterns, but of different types, ones that yield the same overt resultant for different reasons. In (Ea) the subject's desire (= force tendency) is not to go to the playground, but this is opposed by an external authority who does want her to do so, and prevails. In (Eb), the subject's desire is to go to the playground, and stronger external circumstances that would be able to block her from doing so are reported as either disappearing or not materializing, thus permitting realization of the subject's desire.

1. Basic force dynamic distinctions

1.1 Steady-state force dynamic patterns. Underlying all more complex FD patterns is the steady-state opposition of two forces, and we now examine the factors that comprise it. The primary distinction that language marks here is a role difference between the two entities exerting the forces. One force-exerting entity is singled out for focal attention; the salient issue in the interaction is whether this entity is able to manifest its force tendency or, on the contrary, is overcome. The second force entity, correlatively, is considered for the effect that it has on the first, effectively overcoming it or not. Borrowing the terms from physiology where they refer to the opposing members of certain muscle pairs, I call the focal force entity the 'Agonist' and the force element that opposes it the 'Antagonist'. In the system of diagramming used in this paper to represent FD patterns, the Agonist (Ago) will be indicated by a circle and the Antagonist (Ant) by a concave figure, as shown in (2).

(2) Basic diagrammatic conventions for force dynamics.

force entities
Agonist (Ago): ○
Antagonist (Ant): □

intrinsic force tendency
- toward action: →
- toward rest: ←

resultant of the force interaction
- action: >
- rest: •

balance of strengths
- the stronger entity: +
- the weaker entity: –
As language treats the concept, an entity is taken to exert a force by virtue of having an intrinsic tendency toward manifesting it—the force may be constant or temporary, but it is in any case not extrinsic. In an entity's force tendency, language again marks a two-way distinction: the tendency is either toward motion or toward rest—or, more generally, toward action or toward inaction. Diagrammatically, an Agonist's tendency toward action will be represented by an arrowhead and a tendency toward rest by a large dot, as seen in (2), when placed within the Agonist's circle. Unless needed for labeling purposes, no tendency marker is shown within the Antagonist symbol, since it is understood to be opposite that of the Agonist.

A further concept in association with opposed forces is their relative strengths. As language treats this, the entity that is able to manifest its tendency at the expense of its opposer is the stronger. In the diagrams, a plus is placed in the stronger entity (and a minus, when necessary, can indicate the weaker entity). Finally, according to their relative strengths, the opposing force entities yield a resultant, an overt occurrence. As language schematizes it, this resultant is one either of action or of inaction, and it is assessed solely for the Agonist, the entity whose circumstance is at issue. The resultant will be represented as a line beneath the Agonist, one bearing either an arrowhead for action or a large dot for inaction, as in (2).

With these distinctions in hand, we are able to characterize the four most basic force-dynamic patterns, those involving steady-state opposition, as diagrammed and exemplified in (3).

(3) The basic steady-state force dynamic patterns.

(a) The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it.
(b) The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing against it.
(c) The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.
(d) The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there.
To describe these in turn, (a) involves an Agonist with an intrinsic tendency toward rest that is being opposed from outside by a stronger Antagonist, which thus overcomes its resistance and forces it to move. This pattern is one of those to be classed as 'causative', in particular involving the extended causation of motion. The sentence in (a) illustrates this pattern with a ball that tends toward rest but that is kept in motion by the wind's greater power. In (b), the Agonist still tends toward rest, but now it is stronger than the force opposing it, so it is able to manifest its tendency and remain in place. This pattern belongs to the 'despite' category, in this case with the force of the Antagonist ineffective against the Agonist's stability. In (c), the Agonist's intrinsic tendency is now toward motion, and although there is an external force opposing it, the Agonist is stronger, so that its tendency becomes realized in resultant motion. This pattern, too, is of the 'despite' type, here with the Antagonist as a 'hindrance' to the Agonist's motion. Finally, in (d), while the Agonist again has a tendency toward motion, the Antagonist is this time stronger and so effectively blocks it, rather than merely hindering it: the Agonist is kept in place. This pattern again represents a causative type, the extended causation of rest.

Of the four basic FD patterns, each pair has a factor in common. As the diagrams are arranged in the matrix in (3), each line captures a commonality. In the top row (a,b), the Agonist's intrinsic tendency is toward rest, while in the bottom row (c,d), it is toward action. In the left column (a,c), the resultant of the force opposition for the Agonist is action, while in the right column (b,d), it is rest. More significantly, the diagonal starting at top left (a,d), which represents the cases where the Antagonist is stronger, captures the factor of extended causation. These are the cases in which the resultant state is contrary to the Agonist's intrinsic tendency, results because of the presence of the Antagonist, and would otherwise not occur. And the diagonal starting at top right (b,c), which gives the cases where the Agonist is stronger, captures the 'despite' factor. In fact, the very concept of 'despite/although' can be characterized in terms of the common factor in this subset of FD patterns. Here, the resultant state is the same as that toward which the Agonist tends, results despite the presence of the Antagonist, and would otherwise also occur. In capturing the 'despite' notion and counterposing it to 'because of', an advantage of the present analysis becomes evident: it provides a framework in which a set of basic notions not usually considered related are brought together in a natural way that reveals their underlying character and actual affinity.

As the examples in (3) demonstrate, certain force dynamic concepts have grammatical—i.e., closed-class—representation. With the Agonist appearing as subject, the role of a stronger Antagonist can be expressed by the conjunction because or the prepositional expression because of (which in other languages
often appears as a simple adposition), while the role of a weaker Antagonist can be expressed by the conjunction although or the preposition despite. Force dynamic opposition in general can be expressed by the preposition against, as seen in (3b) or in such sentences as She braced herself against the wind/They drove the ram against the barricade. Perhaps the single form most indicative of the presence of force dynamics here is keep -ing. Technically, of course, this expression is not a closed-class form, since it is syntactically indistinguishable from any regular verb taking an -ing complement, such as hate. Nevertheless, its very frequency and basicness suggest for it a status as an 'honorary' auxiliary, in the same way that have to can be taken as an honorary modal akin to the authentic must. Moreover, in the course of language change, keep is likelier than, say, hate to become grammaticalized, as its equivalents have done in other languages and much as use to, which stems from a syntactically regular verb, is now special in its limitation to a single form. Whether keep is taken as closed-class or not, its FD role can be seen as well in other forms that are unimpeachably closed-class, such as the adverbial particle still and the verb particle on, as illustrated in (4).

(4a) The ball kept rolling
(4b) The ball was still rolling
(4c) The ball rolled on

1.2 Shifting force dynamic patterns. At this point, another factor can be added—change through time—and with it, the steady-state FD patterns give rise to a set of change-of-state patterns. In one type of these, the Antagonist, rather than impinging steadily on the Agonist, instead enters or leaves this state of impingement. The cases with a stronger Antagonist (based on (3a,d)) are the most recognizable and are considered first. As they are diagrammed in (5), these shifting patterns are not indicated with a sequence of static snapshots, but with the shorthand conventions of an arrow for the Antagonist's motion into or out of impingement, and a slash on the resultant line separating the before and after states of activity. These patterns are exemplified in (5) with sentences now taking the Antagonist as subject.

To consider each in turn, the pattern in (5e) involves a stronger Antagonist that comes into position against an Agonist with an intrinsic tendency toward rest, and thus causes it to change from a state of rest to one of action. Thus, this is another pattern to be classed as causative, but this time it is the prototypical form, the type most often associated with the category of causation. If the two steady-state causative types (3a,d) may be termed cases of 'extended causation', the present type can be called a case of 'onset causation', in particular, onset causation of motion. The pattern in (5f), correlative,
is that of onset causation of rest. In it, the stronger Antagonist comes into impingement against an Agonist that tends toward motion and has been moving, and thus stops it.

(5)

(e) The ball's hitting it made the lamp topple from the table.
(f) The water's dripping on it made the fire die down.
(g) The plug's coming loose let the water flow from the tank.
(h) The stirring rod's breaking let the particles settle.

The four patterns that thus constitute the general causative category, (3a,d; 5e,f), have in common one property, absent from all other FD patterns, that emerges from force dynamic analysis as definitional for the concept of causation. This property is that the Agonist's resultant state of activity is the opposite of its intrinsic actional tendency. In the remaining patterns, these two activity values are the same. The FD interpretation is that an object has a natural force tendency and will manifest it unless overcome by either steady or onset impingement with a more forceful object from outside. This is a family of circumstances that language classes together under a single conceptual aegis, one that can appropriately be termed the 'causative'.

In the next pattern, (5g), the concept of 'letting' enters, and with it, further demonstration of the FD framework's power to bring together, in a systematic account, notions whose relatedness may not have previously been stressed. In (5g), a stronger Antagonist that has been blocking an Agonist with tendency toward motion now disengages and releases the Agonist to manifest its tendency. This is the prototypical type of letting, onset letting of motion. In (5h), accordingly, is a nonprototypical type of letting, onset letting of rest, where an Antagonist that has forcibly kept in motion an Agonist tending toward rest now ceases impinging on this Agonist and allows it to come to rest. Where the category of causing was seen to
depend on a notion of either the start or the continuation of impingement, the present 'letting' patterns involve the cessation of impingement.

As the shifting FD patterns are arrayed in (5), each line of the matrix again isolates a systematic factor. The diagonal starting at top left, (e,h), holds as constant the Agonist's tendency toward rest, while the opposite diagonal (f,g) does this for the tendency toward action. The top row (e,f) indicates onset causation, while the bottom row (g,h) indicates onset letting. And the left column (e,g) represents the Agonist's starting into action, while the right column (f,h) represents its stopping. The patterns as they are arrayed in columns thus serve to represent the category of force-related starting and stopping.2

It was said at the beginning of this section that an Antagonist's entering or leaving impingement with the Agonist was only one type of shifting FD pattern. We can now outline another form. The Antagonist and Agonist can continue in mutual impingement but the balance of forces can shift through the weakening or strengthening of one of the entities. For each impingement-shift pattern in (5), there is a corresponding balance-shift pattern. The correspondence can be understood this way: instead of a stronger Antagonist's arriving or leaving, to thus begin or end its overpowering effect, an Antagonist already in place can become stronger or weaker with the same results. One of these patterns is selected for illustration in (6), with the arrow here indicating the shift in relatively greater strength (of course with no implication of any actual transfer of force from one entity to the other). In one of its usages, the word overcome represents this pattern and is shown exemplifying it.

(6) (e')

The enemy overcame us as we stood defending the border.
[enemy = Ant, us = Ago]

1.3 Secondary steady-state force dynamic patterns. The cases in (5) where the Antagonist moves away from the Agonist suggest further cases in which the Antagonist remains away. In fact, corresponding to each of the steady-state patterns in (3), with an Antagonist opposing an Agonist, is a secondary steady-state pattern with the Antagonist steadily disengaged. Where this Antagonist is stronger, we have the two patterns for 'extended letting'. Illustrated in (7i) is extended letting of motion and, in (7j), extended letting of rest. These together with the patterns for 'onset letting' seen in (5g,h) comprise the general category of 'letting'. It can now be seen that the major delineations within the overall causing/letting complex can be characterized in terms of types
of impingement by a stronger Antagonist. Causing involves positive impingement: onset causing correlates with the start of impingement and extended causing with its continuation. Letting involves nonimpingement: onset letting correlates with the cessation of impingement and extended causing with its nonoccurrence.

(7)

(i) The plug's staying loose let the water drain from the tank.
(j) The fan's being broken let the smoke hang still in the chamber.

I have called the present group of steady-state patterns 'secondary' because, it seems, they must be considered conceptually derivative, founded on a negation of the basic steady-state forms. The notions of Agonist and Antagonist, it can be argued, intrinsically involve the engagement of two bodies in an opposition of force, and reference to an Agonist and Antagonist not so engaged necessarily depends on their potential for such engagement. In Fillmore's (1982) terms, the disengaged cases presuppose the same semantic frame as the engaged cases.

1.4 The relation of agency to the force dynamic patterns. I should make clear why I have used for illustration, as in (5) and (7), sentences based on two clauses and without an agent, when linguists familiar with the causative literature are used to sentences like I broke the vase. The reason is that I regard such nonagentive forms as more basic than forms containing an agent. As argued in Talmy (1976), the inclusion of an agent in a sentence, though often yielding a syntactically simpler form, actually involves an additional semantic complex. An agent that intends the occurrence of a particular physical event, say, a vase's breaking, is necessarily involved in initiating a causal sequence leading to that event. This sequence must begin with a volitional act by the agent to move the whole body or certain body parts, and this in turn leads either to the intended event or to a further event chain, of whatever length, that does so.

To represent a whole sequence of this sort, many languages permit expression merely of the agent and of the final event, like English in the vase example. Here, the sequence's remaining elements are left implicit with their most generic values. The next element that can be added by itself to the overt
expression is the one leading directly to the final event, that is, the 'penultimate' event, or its (so-called) instrument, as in I broke the vase (by hitting it) with a ball. This privileged pair of events, the penultimate and the final, forms the identifying core of the whole agentive sequence, and can in fact be excerpted from there for expression as a basic precursor-result, as in The ball's hitting it broke the vase.

This is the basic sequence type of our illustrative sentences. In it, all the causal and other force dynamic factors can be worked out in isolation, and yet be known to hold as well when occurring within a larger sequence containing an agent. In this way, the sentences of (5) can be immediately associated with corresponding agentive sentences, as exemplified in (8), and there maintain all the same force dynamic properties.

(8) Autonomous: Agentive:

The ball's hitting it
made the lamp topple.        I made the lamp topple
                            by hitting it with the ball.

The plug's coming loose
let the water flow out.      I let the water flow out
                            by pulling the plug loose.

1.5 Alternatives of foregrounding in force dynamic patterns. All of the interrelated factors in any force dynamic pattern are necessarily co-present wherever that pattern is involved. But a sentence expressing that pattern can pick out different subsets of the factors for explicit reference, leaving the remainder unmentioned, and to these it can assign different syntactic roles within alternative constructions. Generally, the factors that are explicitly referred to, and those expressed earlier in the sentence or higher in a case hierarchy, are more foregrounded, that is, have more attention directed to them. As with the agentive situation, those factors not explicitly mentioned are still implicitly present, but backgrounded.

With respect to representation, we can identify the explicit factors and their syntactic roles with a system of labeling on the FD diagrams. For this system, I borrow from Relational Grammar the use of '1' to indicate the element appearing as subject, and '2' for direct object. The label 'VP' is placed beside the element that will be expressed as a verbal constituent. The particular syntactic character of this constituent can range widely, as we will see, so that the 'VP' must be construed to designate a form of abstracted verb-phrasal base. An element not labeled is generally not represented explicitly in the construction. When labeled, a complete diagram thus represents a specific construction, usually of sentential scope, with particular lexical inclusions. One convention for capturing a commonality: where two patterns differ over only one factor—say, tendency toward action vs. tendency toward rest—and underlie the same construction, they can be represented in a single
diagram with both values marked, say, with both arrowhead and dot.\footnote{3}

Turning now to actual cases, a difference in foregrounding due to syntactic role can be shown for the steady-state FD patterns of (3a,d), diagrammatically combined in (9). Familiar already from (3), the Agonist can be foregrounded by subject status, while the Antagonist is backgrounded either by omission or as an oblique constituent, as shown in (9A) with constructions involving intransitive keep or prepositional/conjunctional because (of). Alternatively, the same FD configurations can be viewed with the reverse pattern of salience, where the Antagonist is foregrounded as subject and the Agonist back-grounded as the direct object, as shown in (9B) with constructions involving transitive keep or make.

(9)

\begin{align*}
\text{(A)} & \quad 1 \quad (a+d) \\
& \quad \Downarrow \quad \text{keep VPing} \\
& \quad 1 \quad \text{VP because (of) Ant} \\
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{(B)} & \quad 1 \\
& \quad \Downarrow \quad \text{keep} \quad 2 \quad \text{(VP VPing)} \\
\end{align*}

(A) The ball kept rolling. / The ball is rolling because of the wind.

(B) The wind kept the ball rolling. / The wind is making the ball roll.

The other main alternation in foregrounding pertains to the actional properties of a FD pattern. Either the Agonist's actional tendency can receive the main explicit representation in a construction, or its actional resultant can. Of course, this distinction in emphasis can apply only to causative patterns, since in these alone do the two actional values differ. The chart in (10) brings together all the causing and letting patterns we have seen, with the Antagonist foregrounded, and the constructions that represent them. The new constructions are those in (B) and (D), referring to the Agonist's tendency. (Examples appear in (7) for the (E) and (F) patterns.) Note that here the key FD word keep occurs again, now in conjunction with \textit{from} in a construction indicating 'prevention'. With these additions, the FD analysis relates still further linguistic phenomena within a single framework.
1.5.1 Asymmetry in the expression of 'make' vs. 'let'.
English offers more syntactic options for the expression of 'making' than it does for 'letting'. For 'making', the Antagonist can be mentioned either by itself or along with the event in which it is involved, while 'letting' has only the latter option, as illustrated in (11a,b). This asymmetry continues when the 'making' and 'letting' patterns are embedded within an agentive matrix (as also noted by Jackendoff 1976a), as seen in (11c,d). It is for this reason that in the 'letting' diagrams of (10E,F), the '1' indicating subjecthood was shown marking the Antagonist together with the Antagonist's activity. The explanation for this asymmetric behavior may lie in a notion of 'instrument' that involves only positive impingement, but this will not be explored further here.

(11a) The piston's pressing against it made the oil flow from the tank.
The piston made the oil flow from the tank.
(11b) The plug's coming loose let the oil flow from the tank.
*The plug let the oil flow from the tank.
(11c) I made the oil flow from the tank by pressing the piston against it.
I made the oil flow from the tank with the piston.
(11d) I let the oil flow from the tank by loosening the plug.
*I let the oil flow from the tank with (*of/*from) the plug.
1.6 Force dynamic patterns with a weaker antagonist. Since our initial look at the basic steady-state patterns, all the force dynamic patterns dealt with have had a stronger Antagonist. But the present framework allows for a set of eight patterns with weaker Antagonist. These are the two steady-state patterns in (3b,c) with the Antagonist impinging against the Agonist, and correspondingly: two with this Antagonist coming into impingement, another two with the Antagonist leaving impingement, and a final two with the Antagonist remaining out of impingement. As a set, these patterns seem to play a lesser role than the set with stronger Antagonist, but certain patterns among them are nevertheless strongly represented in English. This is certainly the case with those formulations expressing 'despite/although' that take the Agonist as subject. And we see it, too, for cases with the Antagonist as subject. Thus (12) shows patterns with the Antagonist engaged (the same as the steady-state (3c) pattern, now labeled), disengaging, and steadily disengaged, where these underlie constructions with hinder, help, and leave alone, respectively.

(12)

(a) Mounds of earth hindered the logs in rolling down the slope.
   The benches hindered the marchers in crossing the plaza.
(b) Smoothing the earth helped the logs roll down the slope.
   Removing the benches helped the marchers cross the plaza.
(c) I left the rolling logs alone.
   The police left the marchers alone in their exit from the plaza.

It is significant that the lexical verb help should be found in a force dynamic context. As illustrated in (13), there are four verbs in English that take an infinitive complement without to, namely, make, let, have, and help (that is, outside of perception verbs, which can also take an -ing complement. We have already seen make and let figure deeply in the expression of basic force dynamic patterns. Have is also force dynamic, expressing indirect causation either without an intermediate volitional entity, as in I had the logs roll down the south slope, or, as is usual, with such an entity: I had the boy roll the log along. And now we find help also with force dynamic usage.
The significance of this is that a syntactically definable category can be associated with a semantically characterizable category, thus lending relevance to both and support to the idea of structural integration in language.

(13) I made/let/had/helped the logs roll along the ground.

2. Force dynamics as a generalization over 'causative'.
Given this survey of the basic force dynamic patterns and their linguistic expression, we are now in a position to view the whole system for its properties as an integrated framework. One main understanding that emerges is that force dynamics is a generalization over the traditional notion of 'causative' in the linguistic literature. That tradition itself has a progression of treatments. The earlier ones, such as in McCawley (1968), abstracted an atomic and uniform notion of causation, often represented as 'CAUSE', that countenanced no variants. Later treatments, e.g. Shibatani (1973) and Jackendoff (1976a, 1976b), perceived a finer complex of factors. Talmy (1976, 1985a) has distinguished at least the following: resulting-event causation, causing-event causation, instrument causation, author causation, agent causation, self-agency, and inductive causation (caused agency). But even these treatments did not analyze far enough. While they revealed the factors that go into more complex forms of causativity, these were all still founded upon the same, unanalyzed notion of primitive causation. With the force dynamic framework, now this too gives way. What had been viewed as an irreducible concept is now seen as a complex built up of novel primitive concepts. And because these finer primitives recombine in a system of different patterns, the idea of causation is now seen as just one notion within a related set.

To detail the generalization, the force dynamic analysis provides a framework which accommodates, among the patterns with a stronger Antagonist, not only 'causing', but also 'letting'. And it accommodates not only the prototypical forms of these, but also the nonprototypical, in the sense in which Lakoff (1986) characterizes prototypicality for a conceptual category. Thus, it accommodates not only the prototypical type of causing, 'onset causing of action', which all accounts treat, but also 'onset causing of rest'. The neglect of this latter pattern is evident in the very terminology that has been selected. Thus, Shibatani's (1973) term most closely corresponding to the present 'onset' is 'ballistic causation', a term that could never have been meant also to include causing to come to rest. (The term in Talmy 1976, 'beginning-point causation', fares a bit better in this regard.) The nonprototypical pattern 'extended causing of action' has had some prior recognition, e.g. with Shibatani's 'controlled causation' or my 'extent causation'. But neither of these authors envisioned the correlative pattern, 'extended causing of rest'. As for 'letting', this notion has in most treatments gone unmentioned beside discussion of causing. If
mentioned, it is generally the prototypical type, 'onset letting of action', that is treated. Though Talmy (1976) and Jackendoff (1976a) did include analysis of several further types, it has remained for the present FD analysis to provide an adequate matrix for the inclusion of 'onset letting of rest' and 'extended letting of action/rest'.

The next major generalization in the FD framework is that it classes both causing and letting together as cases involving a stronger Antagonist and then counterposes to these the cases with a weaker Antagonist. This larger picture now contains a set of notions not normally considered in the same context with causation. Included among them are the general notions of 'despite' and 'although', and such particular notions as 'hindering', 'helping', and 'leaving alone', as well as such further notions as 'trying', not treated here.

Finally, with the idea of alternative foregrounding, the FD framework is able to capture the concept not only of the causing of a result, but also of the prevention of a tendency. The set of the FD framework's generalizations can be summed up as in (14).

(14) Force dynamics provides a framework in which can be placed:

not only 'causing', but also letting'
not only the prototypical cases of 'causing/letting', but also nonprototypical:
prototypical causing: 'onset causing of action' (5e)
seldom considered: 'onset causing of rest' (5f)
sometimes considered: 'extended causing of action' (3a)
seldom considered: 'extended causing of rest' (3d)
prototypical letting, sometimes considered: 'onset letting of action' (5g)
seldom considered: other three 'letting' types (5h) (7i,j)
not only the stronger-Antagonist types ('causing/letting'), but also the weaker/Antagonist types
('despite/although', 'hindering/helping/leaving alone', 'trying...')
not only cases with the result named, but also cases with the tendency named ('causing' vs. 'preventing')

The important point to draw in this analysis is that force dynamics does not simply add cases; rather, it replaces an earlier limited conception, taken as a primitive, with a more general and systematic set of concepts. Ultimately, the traditional causative notion by this analysis resolves into an advanced conceptual complex and takes its place beside other such complexes, and all of these are founded upon new primitive notions of forces and their interactions.
Notes

My great thanks to Eric Pederson for assistance with the content, organization, editing, and diagramming of this paper.

1. As they function within language, I regard Agonist and Antagonist as semantic roles, on a par with, say, Agent. The roles that they represent for force interactions, moreover, are wholly parallel to those within spatial and temporal relations that I have designated 'Figure' and 'Ground' (Talmy 1975, 1978a, 1983).

2. Language is also able to represent starting and stopping as autonomous events, independent of force interactions, as in sentences like The wind started to blow / It stopped raining, and such cases join with the force-involved case of (5) to form the general 'start/stop' category.

3. A developing practice is the systematic use of schematic labeled diagrams to represent the meanings of linguistic forms. Perhaps with an origin in Whorf (1956), this practice is seen, among other contemporary writers, in Talmy (1972:413-20) (Talmy 1976 contains the first FD diagrams), Fillmore (1977), showing alternative labelings for the same diagram, and Langacker (1985) with the most elaborated system. Whereas I use different labelings for alternatives of foregrounding, Langacker draws with bold lines different 'profiles' within a single 'base'.

References


1. Introduction. Compounds occur across a wide variety of the world's languages, and are common even in morphologically 'isolating' languages such as Chinese and Thai. Superficially, English compounds seem to be little more than the juxtaposition of two independent words. For example, in the prototypical English compound, *blackboard*, the juxtaposed forms *black* and *board* are readily apparent. In addition, English compounds are typically phonologically marked as such by the placement of stress on the first member of the compound rather than the second. Thus we have the compound *blackboard*, with the stress on *black*, and the phrase *black board*, with potential for stress on either *black* or *board* (Bolinger 1972).

A compound, however, is not a simple juxtaposition of two words since the compound itself is a word. Since a blackboard is typically a piece of slate on which to write or draw with chalk, and since the term refers with equal precision to a green or black writing surface, it is evident that the meaning of this compound is not compositional (i.e., it is not a function of the meanings of the parts). Treating this compound as being made up of two morphemes, makes the claim that the *black* in *blackboard* is the same morpheme as the *black* in *The mark was black*. It is true that phonologically the two instances of *black* are the same. Semantically, however, they function differently. The *black* in the compound does not identify the color of the object being named, but the *black* in the cited sentence does. At some time in the past when blackboards were typically black, this compound could be said to be highly motivated, but not at a time when blackboards are green.

Some native speakers might speculate that a chuckhole is analogous to a hole made by a woodchuck, or even a hole big enough to chuck things into. Although it entered English as a compound word, its two parts were *chock* (meaning 'a block or wedge') and *hole*. This category of compounds is typically referred to as 'partially motivated'. Synchronously, however,
the issue of full or partial 'motivation' appears to be moot. Calling a green piece of slate a blackboard, or even calling a bird a titmouse (or two of them titmice), does not appear to cause any internal conflict for native speakers. Native speakers seem to regard such words as two-part words, regardless of their history.

For another class of compound words, which includes compounds such as understand, the two parts of the compound have no conceivable semantic relationship to the meaning of the compound itself. This class would have to be regarded as semantically 'unmotivated'. But there is a problem. An analysis which claims that a word is compound if it consists of two independently occurring forms, whether or not those forms make a semantic contribution, has no principled way to exclude words from that analysis that were not created from two parts. For example, mushroom has all the appearances of a compound, because it also can be divided into two parts, mush and room. But in fact, this word entered late Middle English as a borrowing formed from the French word mousseron (Whitney 1914:907). If the meaning of the parts (i.e., the semantic 'motivation') is not significant in the identification of a compound, then synchronically it must be regarded as a compound because of the forms mush and room. But what about asphalt? It too can be broken into two phonological parts, which correspond in form to the words ass and fault. Yet, something is clearly wrong with an analysis which treats asphalt as a compound.

Thus we have a range of word types which can be divided phonologically into two parts. Some are referred to as compounds, and are commonly believed to consist of two morphemes. Others, like asphalt or mushroom, are formally similar but are not regarded as compounds. But how does one decide? If only phonological criteria are used, then asphalt and mushroom would be included as compounds. If semantic criteria are used, then not only are asphalt and mushroom excluded, but so are understand and titmouse.

2.0 ASL compounding processes. American Sign Language (ASL) uses compound formation processes which are quite different from those known to occur in English and other spoken languages. In spite of the differences, however, there are also strong parallels which seem to shed light on the problems discussed in section 1.

2.1 Semantic analyzability. ASL compounds also fall along a range from semantically 'motivated' to semantically 'unmotivated'. On the well-motivated end of the scale, we find compounds like RED\(^\text{FLO}^\text{W} \ '\text{blood}', \text{BLUE}^\text{\textquotesingle\text{SPOT} \ 'bruise', and THINK\^\text{SELF 'use one's own judgment'}\). Closer to the center of the scale we find a large number of partially motivated forms, such as BLACK\^\text{NAME} 'bad reputation', TRUE\^\text{\textquotesingle\text{WORK} 'seriously}', and THINK^\text{\textquotesingle\text{ROCK 'stoned'}. On the less well-motivated end of the
scale, ASL has compounds like THINK MARRY 'believe', and WRONG HAPPEN 'accident'. In this respect, ASL compounds demonstrate the same semantic properties discussed in section 1 for English compounds, and commonly found in spoken languages. ASL is quite unusual, however, in the phonological effects of the compound formation process.

2.2 Phonological issues

2.2.1 The form of the two morphemes. Compounding in ASL is a very productive morphological process which combines two free morphemes to form a new sign (Klima and Bellugi 1979, Liddell 1983). In contrast to the English examples we have cited, where the phonological effects of compound formation are minimal, ASL compound formation always results in a change in the form of the input morphemes. We will use the compound BELIEVE as an example of a typical compound. The two source morphemes which were combined to form BELIEVE are THINK and MARRY, in that order. An abbreviated schematic representation of those two signs is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Segmental representations of THINK and MARRY.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THINK</th>
<th>MARRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sign THINK is a two-segment sign, with the two segments represented by the M and the H. The M stands for a linguistically significant interval of time in which the articulator changes from one posture or location to another. The H stands for a linguistically significant period of time in which the hand maintains a particular posture and location. Each segment consists of a bundle of features, describing segment class and manner of articulation (Liddell 1984a, Liddell and Johnson 1985a). Attached autosegmentally to each of the segments is a bundle of articulatory features which provides the phonetic details of the shape of the articulator, the location of the articulator, and its orientation in space or with respect to some part of the body. The initial bundle of articulatory features in THINK is labeled arbitrarily as a, the second as b. In producing the sign THINK, the hand does two things. It moves from a point in space near the forehead to a point on the forehead. Once it
contacts the forehead, it briefly remains there. The fact that it moves from one location to another is represented by the M. The fact that it remains in a certain place is represented by the H. The initial handshape, the initial location of the hand, and the initial orientation of the hand are specified by the features contained in bundle a. The final handshape, the final location of the hand, and the final orientation of the hand are specified by the features contained in bundle b. Every M is attached autosegmentally to two bundles of articulatory features. The M in THINK is attached to bundle a and bundle b. The features within the M itself specify the details of how the articulator moves from the initial configuration to the final configuration.

The sign MARRY is a three-segment sign: HMH. Attached to those three segments are two bundles of articulatory features, arbitrarily labeled \( x \) and \( y \). The first H takes place at configuration \( x \). The M moves the hand from configuration \( x \) to configuration \( y \). The final H takes place at configuration \( y \). In contrast to THINK, MARRY is a two-handed sign. In this notation system, the activity of the left hand is represented under the right hand. In MARRY the left hand does not move. It remains in position in front of the body throughout the sign. The location of the H in the transcription shows that the hand activity first appears simultaneously with the first segment of the right hand, and the arrow indicates that it continues unchanged throughout the duration of the sign. Thus the left hand in Figure 1 stays in place while the right hand performs the HMH sequence.

2.2.2 Rule-governed phonological changes. Regular rules determine the form of ASL compounds. Here we only summarize the effects of the rules, rather than lay out the details of the operation of these rules, which can be found in Liddell and Johnson (1985b). These rules systematically delete phonological information from the morphemes which enter into compound formation. Figure 2 shows the result of the application of those rules to THINK and MARRY.

Figure 2. BELIEVE: Output of the compound formation rules.
In establishing the compound, THINK has lost both its initial M and its initial bundle of articulatory features (a). What remains is the final H and the final bundle of articulatory features (b). The changes to MARRY have been less drastic. It has lost its initial H segment, but has not lost either of its articulatory bundles. The one additional thing which has happened is that the left hand is now present throughout the entire sign, rather than only during the part of BELIEVE that came from MARRY. This is represented in Figure 2 by placing the base hand information under the first segment of the compound.

Although the sign BELIEVE no longer consists of the phonological forms associated with THINK and MARRY, the two morphemes THINK and MARRY are recoverable through reversing the effects of the compound formation rules.

The form described in Figure 2 is not the synchronic form of the sign BELIEVE. It has undergone phonological changes since its creation as a compound. It is currently produced as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. BELIEVE: Assimilated form.

In this form of BELIEVE, the features in the first bundle of articulatory features have undergone a change. This is symbolized by the $b'$ in Figure 3. Specifically, the palm of the hand faces outward rather than inward, in anticipation of the upcoming contact with the left hand. As a result it is no longer analyzable as the output of ASL's compound formation rules, and there no longer seems to be any reason to regard it as a compound. The status of this form is similar to that of breakfast in English, which although historically derived from the morphemes break and fast, is no longer analyzable as the combination of those forms. The phonetic strings [brek] and [fæst] do not correspond to the surface forms of any English morphemes. As a result there is no longer any apparent structural motivation for regarding breakfast as a compound word in English.

There is, however, motivation for treating the assimilated form of BELIEVE as a two-part sign in ASL. That motivation comes from its behavior when inflected for unrealized-inceptive aspect.
2.2.3 Unrealized-inceptive aspect. Certain volitional, process verbs in ASL can be marked for unrealized-inceptive aspect. If the verb ASK, for example, were marked with this aspect, the meaning would be something like, 'just about to ask when ...' (some interruption prevented the asking). The morphological rule which marks verbs for this aspect is remarkable in its phonological effects. The rule selects the first bundle of articulatory features from the stem and inserts that bundle into an 'unrealized-inceptive frame', as shown in Figure 4. The rest of the stem does not appear.°

Figure 4. Normal application of the unrealized-inceptive aspect marking process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb stem (ASK)</th>
<th>Unrealized-inceptive frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="Image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="Image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inflectional frame has the segmental structure MH, with only a single bundle of articulatory features attached (p). The morphological rule takes the first bundle of features from the verb stem and inserts it into initial position under the M in the inflectional frame. This bundle then attaches autosegmentally to the M. This is a very regular rule in ASL. One of its most interesting properties is that regardless of the segmental structure of the input verb, the inflected form of the verb will always be MH. This is because the segmental structure of the output is provided by the inflection itself. The verb only contributes its initial bundle of articulatory features. Thus even a verb like STUDY, which is composed of only one segment (H), will have the form MH when inflected for unrealized-inceptive aspect. The unrealized-inceptive form of BELIEVE, however, is exceptional. The derivation of that form is illustrated in Figure 5.

Rather than taking the initial bundle of articulatory features (b'), attached to the initial H, as expected, the inflectional process has applied to the phonological information which follows the initial segment. It selected the first bundle of
articulatory features from the second element of the compound and everything in front of it.

Figure 5. Application of the unrealized-inceptive process to the verb BELIEVE.

In sum, although the process might be expected to take only a single bundle of articulatory features from the stem, it takes the entire first segment and the next bundle of articulatory features. Recall that the first segment is the part of the sign which is ultimately traceable to the sign THINK. The inflection has passed over the first part of the sign, and applied to the second part of the sign. Thus, although BELIEVE has undergone phonological change subsequent to its creation as a compound, the morphology treats it as still composed of two parts. The same unusual behavior can be found in the sign AGREE. This sign is traceable to the two signs THINK and SAME, and has undergone extensive phonological assimilation but retains a division between its two original parts.

3.0 Theoretical issues. In our earlier discussion of English compounds, the conclusion that blackboard is composed of two morphemes was based primarily on diachronic evidence and the fact that the phonological form of the two parts of the compound matched the phonological forms of independent English morphemes. Typically, the idea that a compound consists of two morphemes is assumed to be correct without the need for any supporting argumentation (Bloomfield 1933, Jespersen 1937,
Nida 1949, Mathews 1974, Selkirk 1982). The problem with that analysis is that the individual parts of the compound do not contribute meaning in the same way that the independent morphemes do. Aronoff (1976) observed this problem and dealt with it by drastically revising the definition of the term 'morpheme'. He treats a morpheme as a meaningless, but 'recognizable' form. Thus, since the string [bord] in blackboard has the same form as the string which appears in cut the board in half, he would treat these as instances of the same morpheme. The semantic difference between the two would not matter in this view since morphemes do not have to mean anything.

In ASL there is also diachronic and synchronic motivation for treating the signs BELIEVE and AGREE as compound signs. The situation in ASL, however, poses more difficult theoretical problems. In ASL compounds the forms of the two parts need not correspond in form to independent morphemes. The initial H in BELIEVE neither contributes any independent meaning to the compound, nor corresponds in form to any ASL morpheme. If we were to call this segment a morpheme, we would be forced to say that a morpheme is a form which has no meaning and which does not correspond in form to any other forms in the language. This is clearly an unsatisfactory conception of the term 'morpheme'.

We are unable to use either Aronoff's definition of the term 'morpheme' or a more classical definition of the term to describe the two parts of ASL compounds. We are forced to conclude that ASL compounds consist of two phonological parts which are nothing more than historical phonological remnants of the two signs which originally went into the formation of the compound. We are reluctant to give these remnants any special status by calling them 'morphemes' (using anyone's definition of the term) because we would then no longer have a principled way of identifying morphemes. We reserve the term 'morpheme' for minimal, meaningful phonological forms.

There are no meaningful phonological parts which combine to form the sign BELIEVE. Using the definition of morpheme we have just described, we must treat BELIEVE as a single morpheme. Because of its behavior when inflected for unrealized-inceptive aspect, we will represent the sign BELIEVE with an internal phonological boundary, but no internal morphemes.

4.0 Analyzability versus productivity. The fact that native speakers can recognize the parts of compounds is one form of support for the argument that compounds are composed of two morphemes. But, while it is true that if a process is productive the resulting forms must be analyzable, the reverse is not necessarily true. The fact that a form could be analyzed by native speakers in a specific way does not imply that the result of the analysis mirrors the synchronic structure. When an
English speaker reflects about the word *blackboard*, and imagines a time when black slate 'boards' were written on with chalk, that is an analytic process. The speaker hears the forms *[blaek]* and *[bord]*, and can access English morphemes which have those forms. Each of those accessed morphemes has meaning, and the speaker can attempt to rationalize the appearance of those forms in the word *blackboard*. The same analytic process may be applied to *mushroom* or *asphalt* to derive a totally faulty claim about the composition of the word. Thus, analyzability does not necessarily support the claim that compounds are bimorphemic.

Another line of evidence brought out in favor of considering a word like *understand* to be composed of two morphemes, is its irregular verb morphology. *Understand* shows the same irregular past tense verb morphology that *stand* does. This is counted as evidence in favor of the existence of the morpheme *stand* in the compound. This is certainly not the only possible explanation. It is equally as plausible that *understand*, at the time it was lexicalized, took on the irregular morphology of one of the parts from which it was formed.

On the other hand, if a compound had regularized its morphology, but the morpheme believed to be inside the compound had not, that would be extremely strong evidence against a two-morpheme analysis. Such regularization has taken place.

(1) She babysitted at her neighbor's house. (*babysat*)
(2) The computer output-ed the data. (*output*)
(3) Two of the three Pacmans were killed by the same ghost. (*Pacmen*)
(4) I saw two muskoxes at the zoo. (*muskoxen*)

The explanation in the model being proposed here is that the lexical items *babysit* and *output* now allow a regularized past tense form, in addition to the irregular form. This should not be possible if the *sit* in *babysit* and the *put* in *output* are both morphemes. The same problem is evident in the regularized plural forms *Pacmans* and *muskoxes* in (3) and (4).

In the model we are proposing here, there is a potential contrast between a lexicalized compound and a productively formed compound. Indeed, such contrasts exist.

(5) The box is made of cardboard.
(6) The board where I display my cards is my cardboard.
(7) A mark made by a book is a bookmark.
(8) No massage is complete without a good backstroke.

If the structure of *cardboard* in (5) is the same as the structure of *cardboard* in (6), then there is no simple way to account for the fact that they are totally different words. We would propose that the crucial difference between the two is that the *cardboard* in (5) resides in the lexicon and has a
lexical meaning. The form in (6) does not reside in the lexicon. It is the result of a word formation process, and its interpretation depends on the meaning of the two parts, rather than on any meaning which resides in the lexicon. Similarly, the compounds in (7) and (8) also depend on the meanings of the parts for their interpretation.

We have considered the semantic grounds for considering the two parts of compound words like blackboard to be merely historical phonological remnants. The ASL compounds provide additional reasons for not giving any special status to those parts. If the two parts of the compound had their source in two synchronically independent morphemes, their forms should not change from that predicted by the compound formation rules. But they do. In ASL the two parts of the compound sign typically undergo considerable phonological change. We saw an example of this with BELIEVE. Of course, this also happens with English compounds (i.e., Sunday, boatswain, breakfast, cupboard, handkerchief, chuckhole). The differences between English and ASL in this regard are differences of degree. In ASL the change is ubiquitous and apparently quite rapid. In English it occurs more slowly. Analyzability, perhaps due to spelling conservation, appears to play a more major role in English compounds.

5. Conclusion. The meanings of compounds pose serious theoretical problems to anyone who claims that English words such as blackboard or ASL words such as BELIEVE are synchronically derivable from two morphemes. Their meanings are not compositional. Although the problem is apparent in English compounds, the data from ASL demonstrate the problem more clearly, and require a more conservative solution. ASL compounds are formed through a process which systematically alters the form of the two morphemes which enter into the process. These altered forms themselves undergo further historical change, to such an extent that the parts no longer correspond in form with any recognizable morphemes. Further, they do not contribute any meaning to the compound. In spite of this, words such as BELIEVE must be treated as 'compound' signs, because of their behavior when inflected for unrealized-inceptive aspect. Thus, we are led to the conclusion that in ASL a lexical compound (but not a productively formed compound) is a morphologically simple word (i.e., a single morpheme) with two phonological parts. This view is equally applicable to compounds found in spoken languages, and helps eliminate some of the vagaries and inconsistencies surrounding the concept 'morpheme'.

Notes

1. The details of the phonetic notation system we use for ASL can be found in Liddell and Johnson (1985a). For
analysis of a spoken language with similar autosegmental attachment, see McCarthy (1981).

2. This notation for the base hand is used here rather than the typical autosegmental notation because its appearance is less confusing. It is not meant to reflect any extension of autosegmental theory. It is simply a reflection of the attachment of the single set of base hand features to each segment of the active hand.

3. The phonological issues involved with the base hand in compounds are discussed in Liddell and Johnson (1985b).

4. We are only presenting an outline of this process here. For a more detailed description of this inflection, see Liddell (1984b).

5. We will not deal here with the problems caused by metaphorical or other creative uses of language. For example, it is unlikely that English compounds such as spacecadet passed from a stage of literal interpretation 'cadet (in training for a job in outer) space' to its current meaning 'someone who typically acts in weird or unusual ways'. Under such circumstances, a form like spacecadet would be likely to become a new lexical item immediately.

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LEXICALIZATION

Andrew Pawley
University of Auckland

0. Introduction. Our point of departure is the question: When can a linguistic usage be said to be lexicalized? This small question is basic to the theory and practice of descriptive linguistics, as it concerns the placement and nature—indeed, the existence—of a boundary between syntax and lexicon.

The answer, it seems, depends on your purpose and assumptions about the structure of language. It happens that there are two relatively independent traditions of research concerned with lexicon and these define its content differently. I refer to grammarians working within the framework of structural linguistics, and to conventional lexicographers, such as the compilers of Webster's and the OED. While the two traditions agree that morphemes and out-and-out idioms belong in the lexicon, they diverge radically in their treatment of morphologically complex usages, which form the large bulk of candidates for lexemic (lexical item) status. Evidently, grammarians and conventional lexicographers have divergent ideas about what a 'lexeme' or 'lexical item' is.

In the discussion to follow, the views of grammarians and lexicographers are compared with special reference to the treatment of English. Then the question is asked whether native speakers of English have folk terms or constructs comparable to any of the technical linguistic notions of 'lexical item'. These inquiries lead us to a number of conclusions of some theoretical interest.

Ultimately, I believe, the divergent views of lexicon held by grammarians and lexicographers reflect different assumptions about what a language is.

1. The lexicons of grammarian and lexicographer: Different horses for different courses. To pin down the assumptions and principles distinguishing the grammarians' and lexicographers' treatments of lexicon is not easy. For one thing, lexicographers say little on matters of theory. And although their practice is extensive and detailed, it is not especially consistent. On the
other hand, grammarians do not actually compile dictionaries according to the theoretical principles which they spell out; when they do tackle dictionary making, grammarians generally switch hats and become conventional lexicographers. We may say that by and large lexicographers do not theorize about language and grammarians do not do lexicography. No doubt it has been this separation of research into theoretical and practical domains that has allowed the two groups to pursue their work independently without feeling uncomfortable about—perhaps without even noticing—how differently they define lexemes.

Grammarians working in the framework of structural linguistics have been quite explicit about some of their assumptions and principles. Although ideas about the lexicon have changed in certain respects over the last decade or two, I think the following statements are a fair summary of the position of most structural linguists between 1930 and the present.

(1a) A language description is conceived of as a grammar. The task of a grammar is to distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences, and to specify the structure of grammatical sequences.

(1b) The lexicon is viewed as a component of the grammar. Sometimes called an appendage, nowadays often called central, the lexical component is nevertheless complementary to the general, productive rules of syntax.

(1c) Parsimony of description being highly valued, any one form-meaning pairing should be specified only once in the grammar, whether it be in the lexicon or by the syntactic rules which apply to lexical items.

(1d) If a given form-meaning pairing (expression) cannot be predicted by the productive rules of grammar, it must be listed in the lexicon; if it can be predicted, it does not belong in the lexicon.

(1e) Although containing some compounds, the lexicon consists essentially of single words and morphemes.

Space allows me to support these generalizations with only a handful of quotations. All are from American grammarians, writing between 1933 and 1976.

(2a) 'The lexicon is really an appendix of the grammar, a list of basic irregularities' (Bloomfield 1933:274).

(2b) 'The three central subsystems [of language] are: The grammatical system: a stock of morphemes, and the arrangements in which they occur; . . . the phonological system; . . . the morphophonemic system' (Hockett 1958:137).
(2c) Any morpheme combination that occurs only as a grammatical form (construction), and is not part of a large grammatical form, is a lexeme. (Paraphrase of Hockett 1958:169-70.)

(2d) 'The base of the grammar will contain a lexicon, which is simply an unordered list of all lexical formatives.' 'The lexicon is a set of lexical entries, each...[pairing] a phonological distinctive feature matrix [with] a collection of specified syntactic features' (Chomsky 1965:84).

(2e) 'I will assume that a grammar contains a base consisting of a categorical component (...a context-free grammar) and a lexicon.' 'In general, it is to be expected that enrichment of one component of the grammar will permit simplification of other parts' (Chomsky 1972:12, 13).

(2f) 'The lexicon of a language is its inventory of morphemes, together with information about how these morphemes can be combined to form more complex lexical items, such as words. In some cases the combination of morphemes into complex lexical units is very regular' (Langacker 1973:79-80).

(2g) 'The lexicon is the repository of all of the morphemes but of only some of the words.' '...one cannot suppose that all the words known by speakers are contained in their lexicons. Rather, infinitely many words are formed by various productive rules from independently characterized constructions' (Keyser and Postal 1976:174, 173-74).

Grammarians have always conceded that idioms and semi-productive derivational processes present special difficulties, but until recently, many assumed that the syntax-lexicon boundary is otherwise clearcut and relatively unproblematic. That is to say, languages have productive syntactic rules and they have lexicons, and the problem is simply to discover the details of each.

During the last decade or two, however, writers on syntactic theory have come to acknowledge that where you draw the boundary between syntax and lexicon is to some extent a function of your theory. One may work with a theory that 'simplifies' or 'complicates' the lexicon in relation to the other components of grammar (see, for example, Chomsky's remarks cited in (2e)). Weinreich (1969) pointed out that the class of idioms is not a given but varies according to one's theoretical assumptions. Zimmer (1964) drew attention to the fact that analytic and productive competence vary, at least with respect to semi-productive processes, so that a homogeneous generative treatment of such processes is unrealistically simple.
Lately, the trend in grammatical theory has been to extend the role of the lexicon. But the extension has taken place piecemeal, largely in relation to mechanical problems, without giving up the bundle of basic assumptions about the nature of linguistic descriptions summarized in (1). However, it seems to me that as they pay more attention to lexicon, generative grammarians are inching towards a view of language as a whole that is radically different from the one that has prevailed for generations in structural linguistics. I return to this point later.

Consider now the content of conventional dictionary entries. Besides morphemes, nonproductive derivations, and idioms, a dictionary like Webster's contains thousands of morpheme sequences that the grammarian counts as literal expressions, formed by productive processes; their inclusion in the dictionary is, for the grammarian, a redundancy. In Webster's, for instance, we find the derived words brother-less, without a brother; brother-like, characteristic of or befitting a brother; brotherly, 1. pertaining to brothers...; brotherliness, the quality of being brotherly. As well as listing forget, Webster's also gives such forms as forgettable, forgettableness, forgetful, forgetfulness, forgetfully and forgetter, all defined in their literal senses.

Many multiword or compound literal expressions are also included in Webster's. Thus, among the compounds beginning with blood, are: blood-colored, having the color of blood; bloodstain, to discolor with blood; bloodstained, blood test, blood type, and bloody-faced. Under bottle we find, e.g. bottle-neck 3. the neck of a bottle; bottle-holder, 3. a stand or rack for a bottle (but not bottle-opener, bottle-top, or bottleable).

What is going on here? How did the compilers of the great English dictionaries decide which form-meaning pairings should be included? It must be admitted that their actual practice is somewhat inconsistent, but certain principles stand out plainly enough. The composite forms which the great dictionaries include are those which, in one way or another, claim special, conventional status in the eyes of a language community, in contrast to those morpheme sequences which are merely products of the grammar. The fact that a morpheme sequence is a literal expression, predictable by rules of grammar, is no bar to its inclusion. To count as a lexical item, however, the sequence must have other special characteristics. It is not easy to say exactly what these characteristics are. It seems that possession of one or two of a set of fairly diverse features, to be described later, may be sufficient to give a sequence lexical status in the operational sense—inclusion in the dictionary.

Perhaps we can summarize by saying that dictionaries may include any composite form if it is a common usage, i.e. if it is recognized by members of the language community as a standard way of referring to a familiar concept or conceptual situation.
Together, the form and the meaning make up a unit that has the status of an institution in the culture or social life of the community. Bloodstains, bottle-holders and hair brushes are recognized entities in English-speaking society, and the recognized labels for these entities are bloodstain (not, say, stain left on a surface by bleeding), bottle-holder (not device for holding a bottle in place), and hair brush (not device for brushing hair with). Webster's lists the familiar derivations manly, kingly, and princely, but not the less familiar dukely, or the unfamiliar boyly and duchessly. Boyish is entered but not the unfamiliar kingish.

How should we react to the discrepancy between the practices of lexicographers and grammarians? It is tempting to say that dictionary-makers are influenced by practical concerns that should not concern the grammarian striving for a description that is descriptively adequate in the sense of Chomsky (1965). Whether or not a possible sequence is common usage, or denotes a familiar entity—these are considerations which do not belong to the language system as such; they have to do with the use of the language. If bloodstained is an expression predictable by rules of grammar, it has no right to be in the linguist's dictionary.

But there would be no special virtue in taking such a position, other than adherence to tradition. Grammarians might point out that their model is more parsimonious; it specifies the possible form-meaning pairings with fewer redundancies. However, the evaluation procedures proposed by Chomsky make no reference to parsimony for parsimony's sake. These procedures require us to ask: What do language users know and how do they organize their knowledge?

2. Laymen's lexemes. Linguists recognize that native speakers' mastery of a linguistic system is largely based on tacit knowledge, and that laymen have no terms for most of the constructs which linguists postulate to be part of linguistic competence. The question arises, however, whether ordinary English speakers have a vernacular metalanguage for talking about lexemes. If so, does it indicate a notion of lexeme that resembles either the grammarians' or the lexicographers' constructs?

In vernacular English there is no term exactly corresponding in function to the grammarian's 'lexeme' or 'lexical item'. But English speakers do have a number of ways of talking about conventional usages. Consider the following examples, in which I have italicized the expressions which belong to the layman's metalanguage for language. Examples (3c,g,i) are from written sources, the rest are from speech.

(3a) The scientific name for this plant is Solanum tuberosum. Otherwise known as the potato.
(3b) There was no term for it in English because it was a new idea.

(3c) For want of a better word, I'll call it 'pastoral care'.

(3d) You might call it good luck; I'd call it good management.

(3e) The legal expression is 'driving without due care and attention'.

(3f) He was labelled a coward.

(3g) That's not just my description. That's the official designation.

(3h) All the technical terminology frightened him.

(3i) The word 'surrender' was not in her vocabulary.

The various names for kinds of conventional expressions are not synonymous. They can be placed in one or more taxonomies having several levels. For example, 'expression' is for me the most inclusive term. 'Names' are a particular class of expressions which contrast with speech act formulas (greetings, compliments, etc.), clichés, proverbs, and so on. 'Terms' are (in one sense) a subclass of names exhibiting systematic semantic relationships with other members of a terminology. In another sense, all names are terms. 'Legal terms', 'titles', and perhaps 'designations' are subclasses of 'name'.

It is convenient to have a term for all expressions that native speakers recognize as conventional or institutionalized, in one or another sense other than being well formed according to the conventions of syntax and semantics. Let us call such expressions 'laymen's lexemes'. Though heterogeneous in structure and function, laymen's lexemes have this in common, that they are common usages, holding some degree of status in the language community as official expressions for particular purposes--as standard labels for standard ideas, as recognized speech formulas for carrying out certain social acts, and so on. These are essentially the same characteristics that appear to unify lexicographers' lexemes. A distinction is made between well-formed expressions that are lexicalized (lexemes) and those that are not (free expressions or nonce-forms).

In contrast, what is common to grammarians' lexemes is that they are not fully predictable by the rules of grammar and semantics. In a sense, as Hockett (1958:172) pointed out, all grammarians' lexemes are idioms, whether they be morphemes, derived words, ill-formed phrases, or well-formed phrases with an idiomatic reading.

Referring to a usage as a 'name', 'term', etc. is not the only way by which speakers and writers signal their award of lexemic status to a usage. The following paragraph from a popular science book, Steven Rose's The Conscious Brain, uses six different means to show that a certain expression X belongs to the official terminology of experimental psychology:

Pavlov's experiment may be said to relate only to one type of learning, which may be called associative conditioning...A
second type of learning...involving the Skinner boxes, is sometimes known as type II, operant or INSTRUMENTAL CONDITIONING. The boxes are named for one of the leading exponents of behaviourist psychology...and the experiments they involve are generally of the lever-pressing type ...

There may be other types of learning as well; LATENT LEARNING, where stimuli are associated without obvious reward, and a type best summed up as 'insight'...Negative learning...sometimes known as avoidance conditioning, is yet another type. (Rose 1976:234)

The means consist of (1) writing X in capital letters, (2) writing it between quotation marks, or saying that something (3) is 'called' X, (4) is 'known as' X, (5) is a 'type' of some other named entity, or saying that (6) X is 'named for' someone.

3. Criteria indicative of lexical status. Criteria relevant to identifying laymen's lexemes are numerous and heterogeneous. The following list of 27 features is certainly not exhaustive. The features may be roughly classified under six headings, with some belonging to more than one class: institutional status in a culture (3.1), resemblance to simple lexemes (3.2), special syntactic restrictions (3.3), ellipsis (3.4), writing conventions (3.5), arbitrariness (3.6).

The criteria are not all of equal weight. Some are by themselves diagnostic of lexical status; others are simply suggestive. A given criterial feature may said to have three possible values if it applies to a particular linguistic usage: positive, negative, or variable. A feature may be irrelevant, e.g. the features applying to multiword usages are not relevant to single derived words.

A particular expression may show one, a few, or many positive feature values; the converse is true for negative feature values. In other words, an expression may be more or less lexicalized. There are not only different kinds of lexical items or statuses, but different degrees of lexicalization.

3.1 Criteria related to institutional status in a culture

3.1.1 Naming. The naming test, which I have already mentioned, is much used by native speakers as well as by scholars investigating linguistic terminologies (lexicographers, naturalists, anthropologists, etc.) (see, for example, Conklin 1962, Frake 1962, Berlin et al. 1973, Zgusta 1971, Downing 1977). Names, terms, etc. may have varying degrees of official status. Members of a language community may disagree: 'Some people call it X, others call it Y', or dispute the legitimacy of a name: 'the so-called X'. Concepts may be recognized as nameworthy but lacking in a standard label: 'let's call it X', 'That's just a made-up name, used in our family'.
3.1.2 Membership in a terminology. There is one sense, perhaps, in which 'name for X' and 'term for X' are synonymous. Every lexeme which names something can loosely be said to be a term in the language. However, the relations holding between certain names may be of a more or less systematic nature. I use 'terminology' here to refer to those subsets of names that form a system defined by such semantic relationships as inclusion ('a kind of X'); contrast at one level ('a kind of X, but not a Y'); synonymy; antonymy; and intersection. Terminologies range from two-word sets (e.g. good/bad) to large, open sets (kinds of diseases, makes of cars).

The nature of certain kinds of terminologies, chiefly for kinship, flora and fauna, has been a field of fruitful inquiry by anthropologists. It seems that, in traditional societies, there is a tendency for generic or higher-order terms to be morphologically simple and for varietal terms to be complex (Berlin et al. 1973). The new folk taxonomies, which the Age of Science and Analysis has spawned by the hundreds, are perhaps not much different, except that the number of varietal terms is often very large so that the bulk of the terminology consists of phraseological expressions. Legal terminology is a case in point. Linguistics is also a rich source of examples. One can hardly converse on syntax without an easy familiarity with phrase structure rules, context sensitive rules, surface structure, root transformations, lexical insertion, complex nominals, and nonrestrictive relative clauses. 4

3.1.3 Customary status. Society has other ways of putting its weight behind a linguistic usage besides recognizing it as an official name for an entity. Many named concepts are backed by customary ways of behaving which confirm and reinforce their status as social institutions. To take the most mundane examples possible, a house has a back door and a front door. People are aware that these are distinct in various ways; for example, front doors are often wider and more ornate than back doors; tradesmen traditionally enter through the back door, while visitors come through the front, unless they are intimate friends on a casual visit; and so on. These observations indicate that the concepts are nameworthy; other observations confirm that back door and front door have a higher claim to be their official designation than, say, door at the rear, and entrance located at the front of the house. Members of the society will not often be heard to say 'I knocked at the door at the front of the house but no one answered', for instance, or 'Leave the parcel at the rear door'.

Other more or less mundane examples of terms deeply embedded in custom are go to church, go to school, go to work, leave school, take a day off, take a vacation, take care of (someone), refuse to answer, and disobey an order. Some phrasal expressions have single-word synonyms or near synonyms (e.g. out of
work and not have a job are nearly synonymous with unemployed, while the expressions say hallo and say goodbye have the more formal equivalents greet and farewell (a verb in British English), but most do not. Probably the large majority of customary institutions are denoted by phraseological expressions.

3.1.4 Legal status. The customary status of some form-meaning pairings is formalized to the extent of being codified in legal statutes. Many phraseological terms have legal status, e.g. driving without due care and attention, with malice aforethought, breach of promise, breaking and entering, strike with intent to injure, accidental death. A concept codified in law may have more than one legally acceptable designation, but it is usually the case that certain designations are regarded as more proper, or are more frequently used than others.

3.1.5 Speech act formulas. It is useful to distinguish between 'speech act formulas', which carry out conversational moves, and 'designating' or 'naming formulas', which name objects, actions, etc. Certain sentences and phrases are recognized speech act formulas, ritual sayings for getting jobs done: I pronounce you man and wife; I declare this (meeting, etc.) open; Stand at ease; Excuse me; How are you?; May I come in? In some cases, members of a speech community can isolate and name the type or function of a speech act formula (e.g. as an order, promise, declaration, complaint, apology, and so on). In other cases, the function and status of the expression cannot readily be elicited from informants but can be worked out from observation of conversational procedures, social sanctions, etc.

3.1.6 Use of acronyms, etc. Proof that a multiword expression names an institutionalized concept consists in the practice of reducing the expression to an acronym or similar spelling-based abbreviation. While most such abbreviations represent complex nominals, e.g. VIP (very important person), IQ, RBI (runs batted in), NATO, P and Q (peace and quiet), R and R (rest and recreation), various other constituent categories from sentences down may be abbreviated, e.g. SOS (save our souls), PTO (please turn over (British)), ASAP (as soon as possible), AWOL (absent without leave) and the French RSVP (répondez s'il vous plaît).

3.2 Resemblance to simple lexemes

3.2.1 Single-word synonym. The observation that a phrasal expression is synonymous or nearly so with a single-word lexeme is an indication that at least the semantic half of the phrasal expression has conventional status. It remains to be established by other means whether or not the phrasal expression itself is a common usage. Is tell a lie a lexeme? It has a
single-word near synonym, lie. We may also note that these two items belong in a minor terminological set, having the antonym tell the truth; that lying is widely regarded as morally bad; and that under certain conditions, one can be sent to jail for telling a lie. On the other hand, tell a lie shows some of the characteristics of a free expression, e.g. it can be pluralized or made into a passive or nominal, and modifiers can be inserted into the phrase.

Phrasal lexemes must belong to the same major constituent category as their simple synonyms, but may have quite complex internal structure. For example, compare obey and do what (one) is told; unique and the only one of (its) kind; irrelevant (to something) and have nothing to do with (something).

3.2.2 Belonging to terminology with single-word members. Even if a phrase has no single-word synonym, its lexical status may be indicated by its belonging to a terminological set (see 3.1.2) and specifically by its standing in some well-defined semantic relation to a single-word lexeme, e.g. antonymy. The case of tell the truth has been discussed. Other examples are lie and tell the truth, neglect and take (good) care of, misfortune and good fortune, and retire and start work.

The existence of a single-word antonym constitutes prima facie evidence for regarding a phrasal expression as a lexeme, but again we need to confirm the presumption by other tests.

3.2.3 Base for inflected or derived forms. Any expression which can serve as the base for inflected or derived formations can be regarded as lexicalized to some degree. Examples are short change in He's short-changed me once too often; one-eyed in His one-eyedness made him a bad selector; Get at in It's not get-at-able; and ooh and ah in What are you oohing and aching about?

3.2.4 Internal pause unacceptable. Just as It was a bladdock...bird is less natural than It was a bladdock...bird, so pauses within lexicalized phrases are less acceptable than pauses within free expressions, and after a hesitation the speaker is more likely to restart from the beginning of the expression. To deliberately pause before a noun, verb, or adjective can, under certain conditions, be a highly effective speech strategy, giving an impression of weighty deliberation or of spontaneous (unrehearsed) speech. In a dramatic narrative, for example, the narrator may pause in the middle of a phrase to heighten the suspense, but not in the middle of a cliché.

3.2.5 Inseparability of constituents. It sometimes happens that a morpheme sequence, unlike other expressions of similar surface structure, cannot readily be interrupted by other morphemic material without changing its meaning or losing its naturalness. Compare first (and only) attempt and first (and
3.2.6 Written as a single word. People (and dictionaries) sometimes acknowledge the lexemic rank of a phrasal expression by writing it as a single word, with or without hyphens, as in one-upmanship, his never-to-be-forgotten feat, the man-in-the-street reaction. While English is far outstripped by German in the compound noun wordstakes, English writers produce some lengthy compound adjectives. (See also 3.3.5.)

3.2.7 Conventional reduced pronunciation. When a morpheme sequence has a reduced pronunciation which is regarded as standard, as opposed to substandard or casual speech, it can be regarded as a phonological word. Examples are tuppence (two pence), o'clock, can't, won't, Newfoundland, cupboard, bosun (boatswain), irresistible, and hopeful.

3.2.8 Stress and intonation pattern. On July 25, 1973, I happened to be listening to the Senate hearings on the Watergate affair, and heard a number of new phrases having the form modifier + noun, as shown in (4).

(4a) I would prepare what we called a talking paper for Mr. Haldeman.

(4b) Would you agree that a plan, such as the so-called Liddy plan, to engage in political intelligence, was prepared?

(4c) You say that you prepared a political matters memorandum?

One clue that the italicized expressions were standard terms for the speakers lay in the stress and intonation pattern. In a nonlexicalized adjective + noun sequence, the noun is likely to carry a stress that is equal to or more prominent than the adjective, whereas in adjectival compounds the adjective is more prominently stressed, e.g. black bird vs. blackbird, fine table vs. timetable. In (4a) and (4b), the stress pattern was that of an adjectival compound. Other clues (e.g. the use of so-called) also pointed to their lexical status. But when I first heard (4c) I was uncertain whether memorandum, carrying phrase stress, belonged to a single term with political matters. An answer was soon provided as the interview continued.

(5) Yes, it was political matters memorandum number eighteen.

How many political matters memoranda did you prepare after that?
Twénty eight.
The absence of internal hesitation and the uniform intonation contour and stress pattern on each repetition reinforced other indicators that this phrase was lexicalized.

The Watergate examples illustrate a number of things. First, it is not always obvious to a native speaker whether a certain locution is lexicalized or not. Second, stress and intonation are not by themselves certain indicators of the status of an expression. Third, there is often a cluster of indicators over a stretch of discourse which clarify the status of an expression.

3.3 Syntactic restrictions

3.3.1 Invariable constituents. It is characteristic of a large class of phraseological units that, while they are syntactically well formed, they are not freely variable according to the phrase structure rules. That is, particular grammatical or lexical constituents cannot be substituted or expanded on without changing the status of the phrase from lexical item to free expression. Compare Who do you think you are? (in the sense of 'What makes you think you have the right to act in that manner?') with Who do you think you will be?, and I ask you! ('Wasn't that outrageous?') with I asked her.

3.3.2 Transformational defectiveness. Some formulaic phrases are transformationally defective. Under transformation the expression may retain its literal meaning but not its idiomatic sense, e.g. The bucket was kicked by John, John's kicking of the bucket; Jennifer's hair was let down by her; What Bill put in it was his foot. In other cases, the transform retains the idiomatic meaning but sounds odd: My mind was crossed by a thought; The law was taken by him into his own hands.

It is a mark of its lexical status that a literal expression loses its status as familiar or standard designation when transformed. It has been argued that hair brush and brush for the hair derive from the same deep structure, but it cannot be said that these phrases have equal rank as terms. Compare people who go to the theatre with theatre-goers. To go to school is no less a culturally authorized activity but school-goer, although grammatical and sensible, does not have the official status of the terms pupil, student, or schoolchildren.

3.3.3 Derived compound with no underlying structure. Fraser (1970:28-31) remarks on the existence of formulaic sentences which are frozen in a derived syntactic form. That is, there is no semantically equivalent expression which, in terms of generative grammar, represents a base structure. Examples are It's easier said than done and Spoken like a man! (Compare By their deeds you shall know them, where a change to 'basic' word order hardly changes the meaning.)

Recent work on compounds (Downing 1977, Levi 1978) has shown that many have no clear source in a clause or
independent construction, e.g. foothold, footwork, doorstep, makeshift, necklace, handicraft.

3.3.4 Use of definite article on first mention. To introduce a new nominal into the discourse with the definite article is to assume that the referent is familiar to the addressee, e.g. Call the doctor/the priest/the fire brigade! I'll join the foreign legion. He potted the seven and then the eight (ball). He met the girl of his dreams. In such cases the speaker is not referring to a definite individual thing, but to a representative of an institutionalized category.

3.3.5 Sentential modifiers. Under 3.2.6 it was noted that English writers may hyphenate lengthy strings of words to indicate that they are a unit. A sentential modifier may precede a noun, provided that it is a familiar expression. It is normally spoken without internal pause and often written with hyphens, e.g. I woke up with a let's-take-no-more-of-this-nonsense feeling.

3.3.6 Syntactic idioms. Certain expressions are idiomatic, not in the sense of being semantically ill formed but in being syntactically irregular, having a form not predicted by the normal rules for forming constructions. Examples are: long time no see, easy does it, trip the light fantastic, once upon a time, ours not to wonder why, (it was) no go, (he's a) no good (bum), methinks (the lady doth protest too much), waste not want not, be that as it may, as needs be, (I) want in, and \( \text{NP}_i \) give \( \text{NP}_j \) what for.

Some of these are fixed formulas. Others show a small degree of productivity, e.g. easy does it belongs to a class of commands having the unusual form \( \text{ADVERB} \text{ does it!} \) where for some speakers \( \text{ADVERB} \) may be gently, slowly, carefully, and perhaps a few others. But \( \text{ADVERB} \text{ does it!} \) cannot be put in the past or future tense, or otherwise changed in its internal structure.

3.4 Ellipsis

3.4.1 Omission of final constituents. A frequently observed habit of speakers uttering two clause formulas is to say only the first clause. As the whole expression is familiar, the hearer can safely be left to supply the rest: A stitch in time..., A bird in the hand..., Count your blessings..., If you can't beat 'em.... Conventional omission of a final constituent occurs with some single clause formulas, e.g. I haven't the faintest (idea).

Note that there are certain conventional abbreviations for a general or indeterminate class of sentences; i.e., it is not possible to supply a unique termination, as e.g. I ask you...! Do you mind...!
3.4.2 Ellipsis of headword. Slightly different from the preceding are those metonymic usages in which an original modifier + head sequence is reduced to the modifier: He's down at the local (public-house, hotel, tavern), We got caught on a sticky (wicket), She had an internal (examination), A short (circuit) put out the (electric) power.

3.5 Writing conventions

3.5.1 Capitals. The use of capitals in written English indicates that a complex expression is regarded as a name, rather than (or as well as) a description, e.g. the Central Pacific, the Inner City, the Western World, Great Dane, the Big Bang. Writers may use capitals to give a sequence of words temporary or ironic official status, as in The message conveyed by his accent was: I have Been to School. I am an Educated Person.

3.5.2 Quotation marks. Writers often enclose an expression in quotation marks to show that it is so common a usage as to have semi-official status as a lexeme, e.g. He was told to mix only with 'nice girls'. He was considered a 'dangerous type'. And just as speakers may use so-called X to dissociate themselves from a certain expression, writers may also disclaim responsibility for or approval of a term by writing it X.

3.6 Arbitrariness. Arbitrariness or unpredictability of the form-meaning relation is, for structural linguists, the essential feature which marks lexemes off from free forms. 'What cannot be predicted by general linguistic principles must be learned separately for each lexical item' (Langacker 1973:81). But arbitrariness is a problematical notion. There is more than one kind, and there are degrees of arbitrariness. Whether a relation is predictable or not depends on what is taken as given. Morphemes are arbitrary in the sense of being non-iconic pairings of form and meaning; the connection is language-specific, not shaped by nature. However, we tend to think of the meanings of morphemes as natural, the forms being the unpredictable, language-specific part. But that is not entirely true; semantic packaging is always to some degree language-specific.

Three kinds of arbitrary or partly arbitrary connections which distinguish certain strings from free expressions are noted here.

3.6.1 Semantic idioms. Some morpheme strings have two meanings, one of which is not predictable from a knowledge of its constituents, e.g. lead up the garden path in the sense of 'deliberately mislead' and drop a brick in the sense of 'commit a social gaffe'. The class of semantic idioms is, however, not well defined. Many usages commonly termed idioms can be analyzed as free expressions if the analyst is willing to
recognize special, contextually conditioned senses for certain of their constituents (Weinreich 1969:40).

3.6.2 Arbitrary selection of one meaning. Certain morpheme sequences admit of several literal readings, of which one is the common or lexicalized one. In a sense, the lexicalized meaning is unpredictable, but in a different way from true idioms. This fact has been noted as presenting a problem for those who would derive compound nouns from underlying syntactic structures. Downing (1977:820) observes that the compound bullet hole, though lexicalized in the sense of 'hole made by a bullet', has other possible readings, such as 'hole shaped like a bullet' and 'hole for (putting) bullets', which are not precluded by the grammar. Levi (1978:141) says that 'lexicalization is a result of a historical or cultural process which associates with a given NP only ONE of its possible readings'.

3.6.3 Arbitrary selection of one form. Many forms are called by the grammar but few are chosen. A grammar may allow a familiar idea to be expressed in many ways, but of the various paraphrases we often find that one (or perhaps two) are used 99 percent of the time and the others rarely if ever. Insofar as the selection is not predictable on grammatical grounds we may say that it is arbitrary, and so to that extent the standard expression is lexicalized. Examples are given in later discussion.

The foregoing list of features indicative of lexical status is certainly not exhaustive. It should not be thought that these criteria are simply a set of discovery procedures, by which the language learner or lexicographer can distinguish between laymen's lexemes and free expressions. They are that, but they also provide the justification for making such a distinction in the first place. I believe it is these very practices and intuitions of native speakers which lexicographers try to capture in their selection and definitions of lexemes. An ideal lexicographer would be more systematic in selection, and in grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic information given in each entry, but it seems to me that a dictionary such as Webster's is essentially an account of laymen's lexemes in the sense described here.

4. Questions of descriptive power. A lexicographer's dictionary which truly incorporated all laymen's lexemes together with a grammar of each would have certain descriptive powers which generative grammarians do not concern themselves with. (1) They would distinguish between those well-formed strings that are part of the repertoire of names and speech act formulas of the language-culture community, and those well-formed strings that lack that status. (2) They would provide a formal account of the intuition of native speakers that certain expressions are lexicalized to a high degree and others to a low degree.
(3) They would provide a partial explanation of the puzzle of nativelike selection—an account of how speakers distinguish between idiomatic and unidiomatic sentences. (4) They would contribute to an account of normal or unmarked context associated with certain usages.

Points (1) and (2) have already been discussed in some detail, but something more needs to be said about (3) and (4).

Nativelike command of a language requires more than knowledge of a generative grammar. Among the other essentials is the ability to speak in a way that is not only grammatical but nativelike. It happens that only a small proportion of the total set of possible English sentences of, say, one or two clauses in length, are readily acceptable to native speakers as natural usages. This is true even if we leave aside those sentences which do not make sense. Compare (6a) with (6b-d) and (7a) with (7b-d).

(6a) I'm so glad you could bring Harry.
(6b) That Harry could be brought by you gladdens me so.
(6c) Your bringing of Harry causes me to be so glad.
(6d) I am in a high state of gladness because you could bring Harry.

(7a) The time is twenty to twelve.
(7b) The time is eleven o'clock and two-thirds.
(7c) The time is a third to twelve.
(7d) The time exceeds eleven by fifty minutes less ten.

Now, it is possible to imagine contexts in which any of the 'odd' sentences might be spoken by a native speaker of English. But the fact remains that native speakers distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary contexts as well as between ordinary and extraordinary ways of expressing a familiar idea. A similar distinction holds between ordinarily grammatical and extraordinarily grammatical sentences. Haiman (1980:346, citing Morgan 1973) notes that Kissinger conjectures poached is a natural reply to the question How does President Ford like his eggs? I dare say that Poached conjectures Kissinger is also grammatical in this context, and that with a little imagination Conjectures Kissinger poached can also be accounted grammatical. No one blames the grammarian who appeals to a notion of normal use or decontextualized use to exclude such problematic cases from the data. But the same grammarian cannot then dismiss the notion of normal use as of no linguistic significance when it is applied to fully grammatical sentences of differing degrees of naturalness.

There is something of a parallel between nonnativelike or nonoccurring sentences and nonnativelike or nonoccurring derived words. Various writers (e.g. Zimmer 1964, Downing 1977, Meys 1975) have commented on the restricted productivity of derivational processes for forming new words by, say, negative
prefixes and compounding. What should the grammarian's reaction be to native speakers' nonuse or highly marked use of such forms as *unmodest, *immutable, *inethical, *skinbrush (vs. hairbrush), *necklock (vs. headlock), and *under-eager? The grammarian might well argue that the gaps are of no concern, given that the derivational rules are productive. But there is a groundswell of opinion in favour of listing all occurring derived words in the lexicon, when dealing with restricted productivity in actual usage. If this is done for words, why not for phrases and sentences? What is the principle restricting the practice to words? Why should the principle of common usage or acceptability apply to words but not to other units?

The ideal lexicographers' lexicon provides a partial explanation of nativelike selection at the phrase and sentence level by entering all familiar expressions and stating the grammatical and pragmatic constraints on their use. In describing lexicalized phrases, it is useful to make certain analytic distinctions broadly similar to those made in morphological analysis, as in (8) (after Pawley and Syder 1983).

(8) A lexicalized phrase consists of obligatory constituents (its 'nucleus') and optional constituents (its 'expansions'). The nucleus consists of a 'stem', the collocation of morphemes which is fixed, and 'inflections', constituents whose lexical content is variable. In the following examples, stem constituents are underlined, inflectional constituents are in capitals, and optional elements are in parentheses.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NP}_1 \text{be-TENSE (modifier}_1\text{)sorry to AUX keep NP}_2 \text{waiting (modifier}_2\text{)} \\
: \text{modifier}_1 = \text{very, terribly, etc.} \\
: \text{modifier}_2 = \text{such a long time, etc.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NP AUX tell the truth} \\
\text{NP}_1 \text{have-TENSE nothing to do with NP}_2 \\
\text{NP}_1 \text{AUX do what NP}_2 \text{AUX tell PRO}_1
\end{align*}
\]

The description of each lexicalized phrase stem in an ideal lexicographer's dictionary will be a mini generative grammar, containing an account of the syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and phonological features characteristic of the usage, some of which will be idiosyncratic, some shared with other usages.

My guess is that the bulk of laymen's lexemes in English—perhaps 90 percent of them—consists of phrases which are also literal expressions. If that is the case, then there is an enormous difference between the laymen's lexicon and that posited by generative grammarians, which excludes all literal expressions which can be generated by rule. The cost principle that is behind this exclusion—that duplication should be minimized—
has no bearing on whether a usage is lexicalized or not, in the sense of laymen's lexemes.

5. Implications: Two views of language. Finally, I touch on some wider implications of the differences I have argued exist between grammarians' and lexicographers' lexicons.

The two treatments of lexicon reflect disparate conceptions of language, disparate assumptions both about what a language is for and what is in a language. My understanding of these assumptions has been greatly sharpened by the work of George Grace, especially Grace (1984). Grace contrasts the view of language as a 'universal encoder' with that of language as a 'cultural encoder'.

In the universal encoder view, anything that can be said in any one human language is sayable in any other. Many linguists appear to hold this opinion, but not without some embarrassment about the notorious difficulty of translating precisely across languages, especially languages associated with markedly different ways of life. It is common for translators to find that something said easily in language A can be expressed in language B only with much difficulty. Not only is the literal translation not structurally isomorphic with the original, but it is not readily intelligible to speakers of language B.

Grace suggests that the view of language as a universal encoder is most easily assumed if one thinks of the human conceptual world as a mapping of nature. There is a world 'out there', and in common human experience, which languages map. The mappings are not identical, to be sure, but they are fundamentally similar (recall the universal deep structure hypothesis). And as each language has a grammar which provides for new ideas to be encoded, translation is always possible. It follows from the intertranslatability postulate that a language is an expressive system that can be separated from the culture of its speakers.

Contrasting with this view is one in which each language is closely associated with a particular culture. The resources of the language are specifically adapted to encode the perceptions and conceptions characteristic of a particular language community. In fact, the language plays a crucial role in constructing and maintaining a worldview or system of ideas that is common to members of the same language-culture community. It is natural to think of language in this way if one assumes that conceptual reality has only a very indirect relation to the external world and raw experience; if one assumes, instead, that conceptual reality is largely created by language.

Grace comments that there is some truth in both views. This is why both have, in various guises, been widely held. In their extreme forms, however, neither the universal encoder nor the cultural encoder conception can be justified. The history of science, for instance, provides some dramatic episodes
showing that human thinking is not completely imprisoned by the prevailing language–culture system. On the other hand, these same episodes often show that it takes a mighty effort to break free of the biases and limits imposed by this system. In Grace's opinion, the real nature of language and its role in human affairs is better dealt with if one thinks of a language as playing a major part in the construction of the conceptual reality of its speakers.

These are two views of what languages do. What about the content of language, what languages are? Our ideas about what a language is are not independent of our assumptions about language functions. If we think of a language as a universal encoder, separable from culture, then no one conceptual situation and no one grammatical string has special status. All sentences are equal, regardless of whether they encode ideas that are familiar in the language community or ideas that are novel or exotic. What is important, then, are the conventions for expressing meanings in a grammatical way. It is natural to conceive of a language as essentially a system of rules and elements for forming sentences—as grammarians have long done.

If our concern is with the ideas that are familiar to the language community, with how things are commonly said in that community, we will want to build these things into our definition of language. In the ideal lexicographers' description, it is important to separate those form–meaning pairings that have institutional status in the culture from those that do not, as well as to denote particular kinds and degrees of institutionalization. The pragmatic conventions associated with speech act formulas will be part of a proper description.

I don't think we can say that one conception of lexicon is right and the other wrong. There are two subdisciplines, each concerned to characterize differing facets of linguistic knowledge. In recent years grammarians have begun to develop a richer conception of 'lexicon'. It seems to me that in doing so they are moving, bit by bit, towards a richer conception of 'language', acknowledging the role of language as a cultural encoder. But grammarians still tend to write of elements belonging to 'the grammar' or 'the lexicon' (but not both), as if these terms refer to natural objects of unquestioned status. If this paper has a moral, it is that neither 'lexicon' nor 'language' is a given. There is a certain irony in the observation that we linguists have lived in our conceptual world with its own special language for so long that we sometimes forget that the basic constructs of linguistic description are just that—constructs, reflecting the assumptions and biases of a particular tradition of thought.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was read at the Fourth Congress of the Linguistic Society of New Zealand, Christchurch, August 1982. I am indebted to Ralph Bulmer, Christopher
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1. The relatively detailed consideration given to the role of lexicon in Chomsky (1965) stimulated generative grammarians to develop various alternative treatments, e.g. those proposed under the rubric of generative semantics. The wholesale derivation of nominalizations by syntactic transformation, proposed by Lees (1960), has given way to analyses that treat many derived nouns and complex nominals as basically lexical, e.g. Chomsky (1972), Jackendoff (1975), Meys (1975), Downing (1977), Levi (1978). The special difficulties presented by semiproductive or frozen usages have been examined, e.g. by Zimmer (1964, 1971), Weinreich (1969), Fraser (1970), and Makkai (1972), among others.

2. Zgusta (1971:144-51) mentions nine criteria as relevant to identifying multiword lexemes, several of which coincide with features discussed here, e.g. my criteria 3.1.1, 3.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.5, and 3.3.1. One or two of Zgusta's indicators of lexical status are of doubtful validity, e.g. his criterion 8, that the lexical status of a phrase is suggested by the existence of single-word equivalents in another language. The often-mentioned idea that lexicalized phrases are characterized by having a 'unitary meaning' or a 'unified designatum' (Zgusta 1971:144) strikes me as a tautology, i.e., a phrase has conceptual unity just to the extent that it is lexicalized.

3. Zimmer (1971) is one who emphasizes the difference between naming and describing, not made clearly in Lees (1966). For a description to count as a name, or potential name, according to Zimmer, the relationship between the constituents must be one that in the beliefs or culture of the language users is 'appropriately classificatory'. However, he allows that particular descriptions may be acceptable as names, or lexicalized, in varying degrees.

4. When referring to lexicon, we can hardly equate 'native' knowledge of a language with 'knowledge learned as a child'. A great deal of one's mother tongue is learned fairly late in life.

5. The fact that the 'same' language is often spoken by people of diverse beliefs and cultures is not a problem for the cultural encoder view of language, any more than for other views. 'Language', 'language community', and 'culture' are all hypothetical entities. When we say that an Indian shopkeeper, an Australian taxidriver and a West Indian fisherman speak one language, English, we are speaking loosely. Their languages have much in common, and for certain practical or theoretical purposes can usefully be considered variants of one language. Conversely, it is notorious that the conceptual frameworks and vocabulary of certain theoretical schools in, say, linguistics, are so divergent that members of one school find it very hard to understand the professional discourse of
members of another school. In popular parlance, 'they don't speak the same language'.

6. Grace (1981, 1984) says that a basic function of human language is to 'say things'. That may sound like a truism, but the question of what it is to say something is a difficult one. Grace considers that this ought to be a central question in linguistics; in varying ways it concerns all students of language, including philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, and poets.

Saying things is very different from hinting or producing triggering signals, which is what animals do. In order to say something we must, at least, analytically specify a conceptual situation, along with the conditions of instantiation, and hook this specification onto the discourse context. The usual means for specifying conceptual situations in English is the clause, together with lexemes or phrases expressing conceptual elements, e.g. an action, an actor and/or a patient, a place, and so on. The speaker has not really said anything, however, before indicating whether the situation is questioned, asserted, negated, hypothesized, etc. and connecting it to the discourse, e.g. by exploiting syntactic devices such as definite or indefinite markers on nominals, or by exploiting pragmatic conventions of conversation.

In Grace's terms, perhaps what I have suggested here is that ordinary language users and grammarians have a different idea of a 'sayable thing'. For grammarians, the class of sayables in a language equals the class of grammatical strings. For a member of a language community, the class of sayables is much more restricted.

7. Hockett (1958:138) comments that 'The choice of broader or narrower definition of the term ['language'] is a matter of personal taste, and not important...[A]nyone is free to focus on the central subsystems or to invade the peripheral ones as he pleases.' If such freedom were truly maintained in the scholarly world, and if scholars refrained from reifying their constructs, the difference would not be important.

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INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIPS:
'MISSING PEOPLE' IN ARGENTINA

Beatriz R. Lavandera
University of Buenos Aires
and Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas de la República Argentina

0. Overview. In this paper, the author proposes the notion of a 'discursive formation' to characterize a set of texts closely related to one another in content, purpose, and perspective. She shows how five texts concerned with the issue of the desaparecidos or 'missing people' in Argentina all echo one another in their lexical choices, uses of quoted material, and treatments of theme/rheme relations.

1. Introduction. The only possible way of studying the global 'sense' (Voloshinov 1926) of a given text is to consider it as a unit that carries not only sense but also referential meaning. To understand the meaning of a text, it is necessary to take into account the concrete communicative situation in which it was produced, as well as the texts preceding and influencing it (Faye 1972). For our purposes here, 'discourse' comprises a text and the production conditions that indicate how it has been 'mise en communauté' (Jacques 1983).

1.1 Discursive formation. We conceive of every discourse as a response to, or an explanation, enlargement, etc. of, one's own or somebody else's discourse (Pecheux 1969). This implies that every discourse is embedded in a 'discursive formation', here defined as a set of discourses dealing with the same subject or group of subjects and thus building up a discursive reality which, in turn, defines that subject or group of subjects in a given historical moment.

Intertextual relationships can be studied only within a discursive formation, a formation which endows lexicographic units with meaning and so determines what can and must be said (Pecheux 1969). Thus, a linguist's task consists in finding the functional traces of these intertextual relationships.
1.1.1 Advantages. Taking a discursive formation as the starting point of an analysis offers a number of advantages over working with isolated texts, i.e. the possibility of (1) making a concrete analysis of the communicative situation that gives rise to a given text; (2) studying the intertextual relationships; and (3) studying a number of linguistic resources used to support or disallow a previous discourse (the degree to which the previous discourse is accepted or responded to).

Such an investigation does not assume that one of the participants in the communicative circuit is passive, not even in a turn-alternating way (Jakobson 1963). Rather it takes into account two very important elements in any communicative situation: Participants interpret and appraise their own or others’ discourse as it develops, since every discourse not only bears the traces of previous ones but also prepares for or anticipates the response it may arouse.

1.1.2 'Emergent discourse'. From the methodological point of view, it is not easy to establish the boundaries of a discursive formation. The best way we have found so far to have a corpus that is manageable within a reasonable period of time is to identify the discourse which may be considered the starting point of the series. We refer here to the notion of 'emergent discourse' (as opposed to 'repetitive discourses'), i.e. a discourse that has no clearly traceable 'memory space' and lacks immediate antecedents (Giménez Montiel 1983) which may constrain the following discourses to refer to it. Obviously, this is not a clearcut distinction, since every discourse, insofar as it is embedded in an actual communicative situation, has some antecedent. This notwithstanding, in a discursive formation one can always find a discourse which constitutes a change in the way of expressing or reporting the facts that enables us to hypothesize a break with the rest within the discursive formation. It is only in this sense that we refer to a certain discourse as the starting point of a series within a discursive formation.

2. Background. The Armed Forces assumed power in Argentina on March 24, 1976. Under the pretense of fighting terrorism, the military government unleashed a brutal repression, partly overt but mostly illegal and under cover. This illegal repression, which was never officially acknowledged in spite of denunciations by human rights organizations at home and abroad, was implemented by the military government by making use of the state apparatus and the Armed Forces, and included clandestine detention and torture centers and concentration and extermination camps. Those who disappeared into these centers were referred to as desaparecidos 'missing people'.

The defeat of the military government in the Malvinas Islands had disastrous political consequences, forcing the government...
to promise to hold elections in the near future. Human rights organizations, left-wing political parties, a group within the Christian Democratic Party, and independent groups of citizens demanded the 'aparición con vida' (that is, the live appearance) of the 'desaparecidos', as well as the 'juicio y castigo a los culpables del genocidio' (trial and punishment of those guilty of genocide).

Within this social and political framework and as its first and final document, not subject to negotiation or revision, the military government issued the *Documento Final* 'Final Document', designed to prevent any further debate on the question of illegal repression and to prepare the way for an 'amnesty law' for the crimes committed during that period.

2.1 Selected texts. We have chosen the topic, 'missing people', because it clearly constitutes a discursive formation, since it has the following characteristics. It began to be dealt with in connection with a very concrete, sad reality in Argentina, at a discursively traceable moment whose beginning may be established (although the attempt to set a closing date for its discursive treatment may prove difficult; in fact, this is still open). It is also easy to identify the production conditions of the different discourses on the basis of facts such as censorship, the danger implicit in referring to the topic under the military government, and the possibility of talking freely about it after December 1983, that is, after the election of President Alfonsín.

In order to make a thorough analysis, we have chosen a number of texts out of the whole series: (1) the Final Document, issued April 28, 1983, as the only 'explanation' offered by the military government in connection with the 30,000 missing people; (2) two statements issued by the Catholic Church immediately following the Final Document: one by the 'Episcopado' (the Episcopacy) and the other by a group of laymen, 'Justicia y Paz' ('Justice and Peace'); (3) the first postelection statement on this issue, made by the Home Minister, Dr. A. Tróccoli, at the opening of the TV show 'Nunca Más' ('Never Again'), screened all over the country—which marks a parallel with the final Document; (4) President Alfonsín's speech before the Mexican Parliament.

2.1.1 Final Document. We shall take the Final Document as the starting point of the series because it marked the first time the military government admitted there were missing people; this admission (apparently denied, as the analysis will show) made it possible for other social sectors to participate in a hitherto clandestine controversy in the country. The military government had been in power for seven years by then.
2.1.2 Responsive documents. There were several responses to the Final Document. We shall consider the statements made by the Episcopacy and Justice and Peace because they were given ample coverage in the newspapers and on TV. Since the political parties and human rights organizations were at the time semilegal, no other documents had as wide diffusion as those analyzed here.

2.1.3 Television testimony. Soon after Argentina returned to democracy, a TV show, 'Never Again', presented the testimony of survivors of detention and torture, and of relatives of missing people (90 percent of whom had been seized at their own homes or in public places). Home Minister Troccoli made a short statement before the beginning of the show, apparently in order to appease the Armed Forces. This was taken to be the official stand on the question of the desaparecidos 'missing people' and is included here.

2.1.4 Alfonsín speech. In a speech delivered before the Mexican Parliament and after his visit to the United States, President Alfonsín touched upon the question of the 'desaparecidos'. We have decided to analyze this text because of the importance of its source. Many other documents have also been analyzed, but the sample offered here is adequate for the purposes of this paper.

3. Methodology of the analysis

3.1 The hypothesis of interdiscursiveness. Our claim for the existence of a discursive formation will be stronger if we can prove the following two hypotheses about the way in which the five documents described are related:

(1) All of them ignore the military government's responsibility for the disappearance of their 30,000 'political opponents' by referring to the 'circular nature of violence', that is, repression was the consequence of 'terrorism'.

(2) All of them raise the 'desaparecido' label to the status of a datum which must be taken for granted and even legalized in order to 'avanzar hacia el futuro' (step into the future). The obvious implication is that the problem should not continue to be debated.

To achieve what (1) and (2) suggest they try to achieve, the five discourses make use of a number of linguistic resources which can serve as cues in an analysis and have been examined elsewhere in detail (we here offer a synthesis of how some of these resources work in each discourse) (Lavandera 1984, 1985). Hypotheses (1) and (2) will be proved, simultaneously showing
the place occupied and meaning assigned to the single discourses in a discursive formation made coherent by their coincident use of the same linguistic resources. The linguistic resources to be illustrated are: vocabulary (3.2), quotations (3.3), discourse theme and rheme (3.4).

3.2 Vocabulary. From the lexical point of view, the documents analyzed show, on the one hand, a different treatment of the lexical elements corresponding to terrorism, repression, and missing people with respect to their frequency of occurrence and their connotative weight. On the other hand, they also show a deliberate attempt to obscure the boundaries of the semantic fields corresponding to the terms subversion and terrorism. Therefore, in our analysis we take into account the presence or absence of the aforementioned lexical items in the discourses and the delimitation of the semantic fields corresponding to these lexical items.

As the starting point of the series, the Final Document establishes the guidelines to be followed by the rest of the discourses. Although the Final Document was offered by the military government to account for the question of the disappeared, the lexical items occurring in the text make little reference, if any, to this issue. Instead, the main topics are terrorism and subversion. The seven years of illegal repression are made to appear as a 'war' in which the 'legal forces' (Armed Forces), obeyed the order of the constitutional government to fight terrorism, identified as the enemy of Argentine society and the opponent of the Armed Forces. In view of the 'state of war', missing people are regarded as 'killed in combat' and the prevailing situation or subversive acts are made responsible for them. The frequency of occurrence of the items terrorism, repression, and disappeared shows the prevalence of the first over the two others.

In the Final Document, terrorism occurs 70 times, as compared to 19 occurrences of repression and 9 of disappeared. Even more revealing is the analysis of the linguistic contexts surrounding these items, since these contexts determine their connotations. The word disappearance is mentioned for the first time in the context of the aftermath of the war, but only in connection with the casualties sustained by the Armed Forces and as a synonym of death. The lexeme disappearance is typical of the discourse of human rights organizations, which use it in connection with civilians seized and/or murdered by the Armed Forces. The inclusion of this lexeme in a context dealing with Armed Forces casualties deprives it of the connotation of illegality with which it is loaded in the discourse of the human rights organizations. This allows the Final Document to equate casualties on both sides. The word disappeared occurs:
(1) As the completive in a prepositional group modifying a noun (a mitigating position), for instance: 'el tema de los desaparecidos' (the question of the missing people), 'la nómina de los desaparecidos' (the list of missing people). In these cases, the lexeme desaparecidos becomes a mere identificatory label, partially emptied of its content. It no longer refers to the object of the reality it designated ('people seized and/or murdered by the repressing forces'—the military government) but merely states the 'list' or 'topics' in question, thus differentiating them from other possible 'topics' or 'lists'.

(2) Preceding or following lexemes with a negative connotation designed to disallow its use by questioning the existence of the designated referent. For instance: 'presuntos desaparecidos' (people allegedly missing), 'personas denominadas como desaparecidas aparecieron' (some allegedly missing people turned up alive).

(3) Between quotation marks, which have the same invalidating effect. For example: 'Se habla de personas "desaparecidas"' (missing people are often mentioned).

In the Final Document, pejorative adjectives and nouns are constantly used in connection with the lexical items of the lexical group terrorismo. For instance: 'insidioso accionar' (treacherous actions), 'un ataque tan injustificado como artero' (an attack both unjustified and sly). Thus, the whole lexical group terrorismo is associated with negative connotations such as illegality, clandestinity, terror, aggression, and crime. In contrast, the lexical group represión is connected with adjectives and nouns having a positive connotation derived from the notions of law and order. For example: 'fuerzas legales o regulares' (legal or regular forces), 'cumplimiento de la misión asignada' (to comply with an assigned duty).

The Final Document sets the guidelines followed by the other discourses as regards the frequencies of occurrence and connotative load of the lexical items used. In addition, the Final Document introduces confusion of the semantic fields of the terms subversión/terrorismo. At the beginning of the Final Document, terrorismo is used to refer to those opposing the Armed Forces. Toward the end, the term subversión is used with the same meaning. Moving from 'agresión terrorista' (terrorist aggression) to 'agresión subversiva' (subversive aggression) requires deliberate lexical confusion which turns two different semantic fields into two analogous fields.

The 'agresión terrorista' is mentioned at the very beginning of the Final Document:

"La República Argentina comenzó a sufrir la agresión del terrorismo que intentaba hacer efectivo un proyecto político destinado a subvertir los valores éticos y morales compartidos por la inmensa mayoría de los argentinos."

The Argentine Republic began to suffer the aggression of terrorism designed to implement a political plan aimed at
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subverting the ethical and moral values shared by the vast majority of the Argentine people.'

Thus, 'terrorist aggression' is turned into a subversive element, and this subversion is dealt with on two different planes: an immediate one (political) and a mediate one (values). The term *subversión* is used with a twofold meaning: as an action and as an ideological procedure (infiltration).

'grupos subversivos actuaban desembozadamente con la mayor impunidad.' 'La capacidad de actuar del gobierno se veía seriamente comprometida por la infiltración de la subversión.' 'subversive groups operated openly and with complete impunity.' 'The government's power was seriously impaired by subversive infiltration.'

In the first instance, the 'subversive groups' are said to operate but no details are given concerning against whom, since the 'subversive groups' are equated with 'criminal terrorist gangs' whose actions have already been described. In the second instance the Final Document speaks about government and infiltration. Here the stress is on the ideological apparatus of subversion that hinders the government's action. Thus, there are two semantic fields the Final Document sets out to delineate: *las conductas subversivas y los actos terroristas* (subversive behavior and terrorist actions). The two semantic fields are: (a) an ideological one: subversion = infiltration—behavior; (b) a material one: terrorism = crime—actions.

While at the beginning the Final Document distinguishes between these two semantic fields and presents them as separate, later on it establishes that (a) implies (b), subversion implies terrorism. Therefore, all subversives are terrorists.

The discursive strategy used in the Final Document, then, consists in confusing the semantic fields of the terms *subversión* and *terrorismo* in order to establish the aforementioned equation: All subversives are terrorists.

3.2.1 The remaining discourses. The striking difference in the frequency of occurrence of the terms *terrorismo*, *represión*, and *desaparecidos* in the Final Document persists in the
remaining discourses. The same may be said of the negative connotation associated with the lexical items of the group *terrorismo* and the fact that the terms *desaparecidos* and *desaparición* are partially emptied of their content. Furthermore, the confusion of the semantic fields of the terms *subversión* and *terrorismo* persists in two of the discourses (the statements by the Episcopacy and by Home Minister Tróccoli), while in the two others (President Alfonsín's speech and the statement by Justice and Peace) the two fields are kept separate.

In the Episcopacy statement, the term *terrorismo* is not mentioned, while *subversión* occurs only once and as a synonym of *terrorismo*; the semantic fields of the two terms are no longer separate: 'el documento de la Junta Militar sobre la lucha antisubversiva' (the Military Junta's document on its fight against subversion). The lexeme *represión* is not included in the discourse either; the repressive operations of the Armed Forces are presented as 'la necesaria defensa del ser nacional' (the necessary defense of our national being). In the statement by Justice and Peace, the word *terrorismo* occurs two times and *subversión* only once: 'las acciones seguidas contra la subversión y el terrorismo' (actions taken against subversion and terrorism). Although at the beginning the two terms seem to be used as synonyms, this is no longer so when the term *guerrilla* is introduced. It occurs twice, and on both occasions it is used as a synonym of *terrorismo* but not of subversión; *guerrilla* cannot be a synonym of *subversión* because in this discourse *subversión* is not a synonym of *terrorismo*, since the fields of these two terms are kept separate. While the lexical items of the group *terrorismo* occur five times, *represión* occurs only once and in this case it is presented as a consequence of terrorism.

In Home Minister Tróccoli's postelection statement, *terrorismo* occurs five times and *subversión*, six. At the beginning, they do not overlap: 'la irrupción de la subversión y el terrorismo' (the outbreak of subversion and terrorism). But then the two terms are equated in such a way that the lexeme *terrorismo* disappears since it is no longer necessary: 'la irrupción subversiva' (the subversive outbreak). Finally, the overlapping is complete: *terrorismo* is nothing but an attribute of *subversión*; it has become *terror*. 'La violencia a través del terror y la subversión' (violence through terror and subversion). Compared to 11 occurrences of lexical items of the group *terrorismo*, repression is never mentioned, and the repressive action of the Armed Forces is described as 'aberrant methodology'.

President Alfonsín's speech does not mention the word *represión* either; rather it also refers to a 'methodology'. In this discourse, the word *terrorismo* occurs three times and always in connection with actions taken: 'la acción de grupos terroristas' (the action of terrorist groups). The term *subversión* does not occur. Of the two semantic fields at play,
Alfonsín's speech uses only terrorismo = action and does not take into account the ideological side of the problem (subversión = behavior).

The terms desaparecidos and desaparición never or very seldom occur in the discourses and when they do occur, they are partially emptied of their content through being used as completives in prepositional groups which modify nouns. In the statement by Justice and Peace they never occur, and they occur in the Episcopacy's statement only once: 'niños desaparecidos' (missing children). Likewise, they occur only once in Tróccoli's statement: 'la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas' (the National Committee on the Disappearance of Persons). Finally, there are two occurrences in President Alfonsín's speech: 'metodología de la desaparición de personas', 'una comisión sobre la desaparición de personas' (a methodology of the disappearance of persons; a committee on the disappearance of persons). In Tróccoli's and Alfonsín's discourses, the term desaparición becomes a mere identificatory label of the 'committee' or the 'methodology'. As in the Final Document, it no longer refers to the object of the reality it designates.

3.2.2 Summing up. The Final Document argues that Argentina went through a 'war' in which the Armed Forces, in order to defend the established order and our national being, fought terrorism, the country's enemy, and, as in every war, there were many casualties and missing people on both sides. The Armed Forces, only doing their duty in guaranteeing the nation's internal security, should not be considered guilty of creating this 'war' situation, since it was initiated and carried on by terrorism and its violent methods. Nor are they responsible for killed or missing people, since this is a natural consequence of any war; the Armed Forces assume responsibility only for 'los errores que pudieron haberse cometido en el cumplimiento de la misión asignada' (mistakes possibly committed while fulfilling an assigned duty). As far as can be observed at the lexical level, this way of reasoning is not questioned in the other discourses:

(a) The item represión is either omitted or replaced by other terms with a positive ('defense') or neutral ('methodology') connotation. When it occurs, it does so less often than terrorismo.

(b) The items desaparecidos and desaparición are omitted, disallowed, or partially emptied of their content.

(c) Terrorismo is the most frequent item in all the discourses and is always associated with negative notions; it is presented as the only cause of the 'war' and violence.
(d) The boundaries between the semantic fields subversión and terrorismo are blurred in order to introduce the equation: subversive = terrorist. This justifies having extended the scope of repression from the field of action (terrorism) to the ideological field (subversion), since the two fields are made to overlap and are treated as one.

3.3 Quotations. Two procedures were found to characterize the use made of quotations in the documents: (1) the speaker of the statement quotes another source and incorporates it into his own; (2) the speaker of the statement quotes himself and thus becomes the source of the quotation. These procedures may be understood as: (a) approaching the present from the past by proclaiming the 'saying' as the 'said' to avoid responsibility for a confrontation; (b) withdrawing from the present by transforming the speaker of the statement into a mere introducer of another source of the quotation that now becomes incorporated into a discourse where responsibility is always mediated.

This criss-crossing between time present and time past allows three of the discourses to appear to accept the very responsibility they are evading, insofar as no difference is established between the saying and the said. Such is the way in which the Final Document quotes the decrees of the constitutional government the Armed Forces overthrew, the Episcopacy quotes the Final Document and other documents produced by the bishops, and Justice and Peace quotes the Final Document, the Episcopacy, and even Pope Paul VI.

3.3.1 Final Document. The Final Document includes full quotations of the decrees authoring the Armed Forces to fight terrorism (first in the province of Tucumán and then in the whole country). There is an explicit appeal to a MANDATE:

'Las Fuerzas Armadas fueron convocadas por el gobierno constitucional para enfrentar a la subversión. (The Armed Forces have been summoned by the constitutional government to fight subversion (...))'.

Later on, it is explicitly stated that the Armed Forces are only an instrument of the government's will:

'por intermedio de las Fuerzas Armadas (el gobierno) imponía el logro del restablecimiento de los derechos de todos los habitantes y de las condiciones esenciales que deben garantizar la inviolabilidad del territorio y la convivencia social, y así facilitar la capacidad de funcionamiento del gobierno'. (through the Armed Forces [the government] reestablished the citizens' rights and the basic conditions that must guarantee territorial
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inviolability and social peace and thus facilitate the govern-
ment's action).

It is omitted that from March 1976 onward, the Armed Forces
ceased to be an instrument of the government. They were the
government. The only (very indirect) reference to the coup
d'etat is to be found in the 'Acta Institucional' (Institutional
Act):

'y por la Junta Militar a partir de su constitución (and by
the Military Junta as from the moment it became constituted
(as a military government)).

Thus the Final Document avoids responsibility through the
deliberate effacement of the speaker of the statement and his
confusion with the source of the quotation presented as instru-
ment for rather than cause of the actions undertaken against
terrorism.

3.3.2 Episcopacy's statement. The statement by the Episco-
pacy is quite a paradox. The military government's respon-
sibility is taken for granted, although it was not acknowledged
by the Final Document. The bishops presume responsibility
that the military did not assume. However, there is no out-
right confrontation; at most, only some marginal notes indicate
a slight disagreement:

'La reconciliación como la paz es un don de Dios que
debemos implorar por la oración, pero es un don confiado
a los hombres que exige una disposición interior y un
esfuerzo de todos' (Like peace, reconciliation is a gift
from heaven we must pray for, but such a gift demands
that all of us make an effort and be internally prepared
for it).

The italicized verbs point to the imperative character of the
Episcopacy's proposal. The bishops' criticism is only on the
surface, for their discourse strategies are those of the
prevalent authoritarian 'ideology'. Can there be any criticism
when the discourse strategies are the same? Or is the
authoritarian message merely attenuated by speaking of
reconciliation and then demanding it? Evidently, the Episco-
pacy's message is rather more obvious: the objective is not
re- but con-ciliation.

The other quotation found in the Episcopacy's statement
follows:

'debemos lamentar que esta defensa no se ajustara a
"elementales criterios éticos individuales o sociales"' (we
must deplore the fact that this defense did not respect
'elementary individual or social ethical criteria').
Before, something was demanded. Now, the military government's 'mistake' (its having ignored those 'elementary ethical criteria') is simply deplored and not condemned. Such is, again, the prevalent ideology: to deplore the Armed Forces' 'excessive zeal' in fighting terrorism without pointing out the precise nature of the 'excesses' they engaged in. The Episcopacy demands reconciliation. However, is reconciliation possible when the elementary ethical criteria have been ignored, as the bishops deplore?

TheEpiscopacy also advises the military government:

'hoy como siempre y en toda circunstancia conserva su valor ético el principio ético: "el fin no justifica los medios"

(today as ever and under any circumstance, one's actions must be ruled by the unalterable ethical principle that 'the end does not justify the means').

'Hoy' (today) implies 'I', but 'siempre' (ever) is rather too impersonal to imply responsibility. The ethical principle is here a quotation within a quotation: discursive responsibility is even more mediated. One can ask: If this quotation is the moral foundation of the discourse, why is it not stated as the dominant voice instead of being subordinated to a source who quotes himself and appears in his own quotation?

The bishops want the Episcopacy's statement to be read as if responsibility had been acknowledged, but we can also read it from quite the opposite point of view. In this case, we find it paradoxically committed to denouncing the military government's behavior, as it (a) demands reconciliation, (b) deplores the absence of elementary ethical criteria, (c) requires actions to be ruled by ethical principles.

3.3.3 Justice and Peace. The statement by Justice and Peace includes four quotations. The first (no quotation marks in the text) is from Pope Paul VI and says: 'Si quieres la paz, defiende la vida' (If you want peace, protect life). Although aphorisms like this are abstract and general, and can be used for very different purposes, the statement by Justice and Peace stands explicitly for life (one must bear in mind that the Final Document was about death).

After quoting the Pope, the laymen quote the Episcopacy's statement and the Final Document. They never quote themselves or appear as the source of the quotation. They take their stand and accept responsibility for what they say, without ever attenuating anything.

The quotations in the statement by Justice and Peace are used to criticize the Final Document. One of them reads (the context is provided because the quotation cannot be understood without it):
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'Su contenido no cumple con la exigencia de verdad "de lo que fuimos y debemos ser y de lo que somos y debemos ser" que la Asamblea Plenaria del Episcopado Argentino reclamó como primer elemento del examen de conciencia nacional que propiciaba en reciente declaración' (Its [the Final Document's] content does not fulfill the requirement of being true to 'what we were and must be and what we are and must be' that the Plenary Assembly of the Argentine Episcopacy demanded as an essential element in the national self-examination it recently proposed.)

This quotation is not used by the laymen to avoid responsibility for their discourse; on the contrary, its aim is precisely the opposite, as can be seen by its context, from which it is completely inseparable. The quotation, however, acknowledges the existence of a discourse of a higher value, which in a certain sense must authorize the words of Justice and Peace:

does not fulfill the requirement of being true to 'what we were and must be' that the Plenary Assembly of the Argentine Episcopacy demanded

The laymen take their stand; truth is required because it has already been demanded.

The third quotation found in the statement by Justice and Peace is from the Final Document. The laymen fear that the Armed Forces may react in the same way again if events like those leading up to the coup d'état were to take place again in the country. Justice and Peace reads the Final Document as the 'ideologeme' it is; the military government's document can be the final one of a certain stage but it is certainly not definitive; as soon as the interests behind the Final Document (and the military government) are menaced, everything will start anew. Justice and Peace is crucial in the discursive formation because it does not arrive at an agreement with the military government and goes against the prevalent ideology, at least in that it does not find (as the bishops do) any 'positive aspects' to the matter; the Final Document is for Justice and Peace a falsehood, but one which must be tolerated in order not to provoke the Armed Forces.

The laymen are worried; they criticize but have no power. The bishops are also worried, but as they do have power, they are conciliatory and try to find 'positive aspects', although they know (and let others infer) that the Final Document is a falsehood which it is convenient for the country to consider true.

3.4 Theme and rheme. The linguistic theory known as 'Functional Sentence Perspective' (FSP) considers that most sentences can be divided into two parts, a 'theme' and a 'rheme' (the rheme being that part of the sentence which 'pushes
communication forward'). We think these notions can be successfully applied to discourse analysis; the essential methodological criteria in the 'Functional Discourse Perspective' (FDP) we propose are the following (Pardo forthcoming): (1) the rhemes of the different sentences are compared so that (2) the one which is semantically more important and less context-dependent is considered the 'Discourse Rheme', and (3) the one which is directly or indirectly alluded to by all the others, has the greatest degree of communicative dynamism (Firbas 1964), and is highly cohesive with the text that follows, is considered the 'Discourse Theme'.

Figure 1 shows some important interrelationships among the five discourses analyzed in terms of the Functional Discourse Perspective. The theme of the Final Document allows the discourses to establish a series of intertextual relationships through the discursive themes and rhemes of the different texts. This theme declares that the Armed Forces 'accept their share of historical responsibility'; doing this, however, implies for them: (1) to circumscribe their share of responsibility in order to establish who else should be held responsible for what happened, and (2) to aim at reconciliation, so that an amnesty law may cover it all up.

With respect to circumscribing their share of responsibility, the Armed Forces report the violent events of the seventies in order to establish (a) the causes and effects of those tragic events and (b) those who were to blame for the violence. As regards reconciliation, they asked for the help of another power (the Roman Catholic Church) which would recommend 'forgiveness' to the Argentine people.

Figure 1 shows that the discourse themes of the Episcopacy's, Tróccoli's, and Alfonsín's statements are completely dependent on the discourse theme of the Final Document:

'Las Fuerzas Armadas asumen su cuota de responsabilidad histórica que les compete frente a la Nación en el planeamiento y ejecución de las acciones en las que no se agotan las responsabilidades que frente a la República pudieran corresponder a otros estamentos, sectores e instituciones' (The Armed Forces accept their share of responsibility before the Nation as regards planning and carrying out actions, although [the Armed Forces'] planning and carrying out of actions does not exhaust the share of responsibility before the Republic that may be due to other groups, sectors and institutions).

The discourse theme of the Episcopacy's statement is related to that of the Final Document in that it recommends reconciliation, but also because it echoes the following paragraph from the Final Document:
The Armed Forces accept their share of responsibility before the Nation as regards planning and carrying out actions, although the Armed Forces' planning and carrying out of actions does not exhaust the share of responsibility before the Republic that may be due to other groups, sectors and institutions.

Reconciliation is the difficult beginning of an era of maturity and responsibility that should be accepted in a realistic way by all of us.

The people of this country, the victims of an aggression they never deserved.

Violence made to essential human rights: murder, torture, abduction.

The document as a whole
'La Reconciliación es el comienzo difícil de una era de madurez y de responsabilidad asumida con realismo por todos' (Reconciliation is the difficult beginning of an era of maturity and responsibility that should be accepted in a realistic way by all of us) (Final Document, paragraph X).

'...exhortar a la comunidad nacional para seguir buscando los caminos de reconciliación' (to exhort the Nation's inhabitants to continue seeking reconciliation [Episcopacy, discourse theme]).

The discourse themes of the statements by Tróccoli and Alfonsín are related to the discourse theme of the Final Document in that they narrate past events, but also because they have a lot to do with a paragraph from the Final Document which mentions such events:

'El pueblo de la Nación, víctima de una agresión que nunca mereció' (The people of this country, the victims of an aggression they never deserved [Final Document, paragraph Y]).

drama de la violencia en la Argentina' (the tragedy of violence in Argentina [Tróccoli, discourse theme]).

'la Argentina padeció' (Argentina suffered [Alfonsín, discourse theme]).

The discourse theme of the statement by Justice and Peace is not related to the Final Document in the same way as the other discourses; it is not related to any specific paragraph in the Final Document or to its discourse theme, but rather to the Final Document as a whole:

'...cuando la Junta Militar ha dado a conocer su informe—llamado Documento Final—sobre las acciones seguidas contra la subversión y el terrorismo...' (when the Military Junta released its report—called the Final Document—on the actions undertaken against subversion and terrorism [Justice and Peace, discourse theme]).

As can be seen in Figure 1, the themes of each discourse except that of Justice and Peace are related to the discourse theme of the Final Document. The same happens with their rhemes and that of the Final Document, but in this case Justice and Peace is not an exception. There is a curious fact about the discourse rhyme of the Final Document: It obviously goes 'involuntarily' beyond its own framework or purposes insofar as it declares the missing people dead, something which was not contemplated in its
proclaimed aims and even less in the share of responsibility the Armed Forces were prepared to accept.

The rheme of the statement by the Episcopacy points out that what is declared in the Final Document 'is not enough', while Tróccoli's statement prudently keeps its distance, maintaining that 'what we are judging' are 'methodological aberrations'. This is ambiguous because it can either refer to the rheme of the Final Document (the 'methodological aberrations' being the ones that caused the death of the missing people) or to the previously quoted paragraph from the Final Document which describes some 'methodological aberrations' engaged in by terrorism:

'...violencia de los más fundamentales derechos humanos: asesinatos, torturas, secuestros' (violence done to essential human rights: murder, torture, abduction [Final Document, paragraph Z]).

However, as Tróccoli's statement was presented a few minutes before the screening of the TV show 'Never Again' (in which the Armed Forces and the military government were judged), we may consider this context to have eliminated the ambiguity and related Tróccoli's rheme to that of the Final Document.

The discourse rheme of the statement by Justice and Peace is related to that of the Final Document (and so are the rhemes of the other texts) in that it refers to the 'nómina de desaparecidos que se consideran muertos' (list of missing people considered dead) as 'represión ilegal' (illegal repression). This is the harshest answer to the rheme of the Final Document. Although Tróccoli's 'metodología aberrante' and Justice and Peace's 'represión ilegal' may seem equally harsh at first glance, the words of Justice and Peace are harsher because the Home Minister, with his de-focalization strategy, succeeds in depriving what he says of most of its weight.

The rheme of President Alfonsín's speech is related to that of the Final Document in that it mentions the death of missing people which the latter acknowledged. The expressions used by President Alfonsín ('violados'—violated; 'derechos fundamentales del hombre'—the essential rights of man) imply that he is not referring to natural deaths or war casualties, but to murders; unfortunately, such an inference is lost in the context of Alfonsín's speech.

Certain relationships have been detected between the theme and rheme of the Final Document and those of the other discourses. The coincidence among the discourse themes of the five discourses is of no great surprise, considering that the Final Document was the starting point of the series and so the rest had to refer to it. But that the discourse rhemes are also closely related, suggests that not much has been added to the starting point. This is precisely the case with the dis-
courses we have analyzed: none of them says much more than the Final Document about the missing people and their 'death'.

On account of the strong relationships among the theme and rheme of the Final Document and those of the other discourses, the four subsequent discourses show a great degree of cohesion, but also create an impression of circularity because they do not properly 'answer' the Final Document (except perhaps the statement by Justice and Peace, and that only up to a certain point).

4. Concluding remarks. Our claim for the existence of a 'missing people' discursive formation (that is, of a series within such a discursive formation which had the Final Document as the starting point) depended on two hypotheses about the way in which the five discourses analyzed were related: all of them (a) avoided responsibility and (b) raised the 'desaparecido' label to the status of a datum that had to be taken for granted and even legalized. Proving (a) and (b) was then a matter of analyzing how each discourse made use of certain linguistic resources: (1) vocabulary, (2) quotations, (3) discourse theme and rheme.

(1) Vocabulary. The differences in frequency of occurrence of certain key lexical items and the fact that the boundaries between the semantic fields of subversión and terrorismo were nearly always obscured showed that the four subsequent discourses did not say much more than the Final Document, thus avoiding responsibility (and overlooking the military government's responsibility for the 'missing people').

(2) Quotations. We found that in each discourse the speaker of the statement talks about the country's recent history mostly through quotations. Such quotations (the sources of which are sometimes uncertain) authorize the discourse and at the same time allow the speaker not to commit himself to an interpretation of the country's recent history.

(3) Theme and rheme. We discovered that the themes and rhemes of the four subsequent discourses contributed practically no new information when compared to the Final Document; all of them accepted the guidelines of the Final Document to a greater or lesser degree.

This analysis has shown how five discourses use the same strategies to achieve the same goals (those suggested by our hypotheses). Both the goals and the strategies were established by the Final Document; the four subsequent discourses just followed suit. As the starting point of a series, the Final Document established the boundaries between what could or had to be said and the 'unsaid' reality lying beyond. Such a series of closely related discourses cannot but be part of a discursive formation.
Notes

This paper was written with the collaboration of María Marta García Negroni, Carlos R. Luís, S. Martín Menéndez, María Laura Pardo, Alejandro Reiter, Daniel Romero, and Mónica Zoppi.

1. The concept of 'discursive formation' was originally introduced by Michel Foucault (1969).

2. Work on this project began in April 1985, and it is planned to continue for at least three years.

3. The TV show was prepared by the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) (National Committee on the Disappearance of Persons), created by President Alfonsín in order to investigate the 'disappearance' of persons during the 1976-1983 period. The Committee's objective was to investigate and not to pass judgment on the facts.

4. When translated, quotations from the documents maintain here their original word order; consequently, they may sound awkward in English.

References


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Introduction. Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus* is interesting not only for its content, but also for the way it is presented as a piece of reported speech. There is a rather complex hierarchy of speakers and writers: the participants of the dialogue proper are Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus. Their conversation was recorded by a narrator, Euclides, who is at the same time one of the speakers of the frame dialogue. The other is Terpsion, his friend, who is eager to hear about the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus. Thus Euclides has a servant read his report to Terpsion. The report is based on what Socrates had told Euclides, and therefore Plato lets Euclides say the following:

I have nearly the whole conversation written down....

Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words 'I said', 'I remarked', which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, 'he agreed', or 'disagreed', in the answer, lest the repetition of them should be troublesome.

There are various ways to report the speech of another, a problem Plato must have thought about often. Of course, he could have presented the dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus to his readers without any frame, but apparently he wanted to direct their attention to this problem and teach them to distinguish between the voice (the servant, significantly), the reporter of a message (a marginal character), the speaker (a central character), and the author (the source of
The 'interlocutory words' are omitted here 'for the sake of convenience'. What this means, among other things, is that the reader is spared the trouble of determining the reference of the many deictic words which would be necessary if the dialogue were to be presented in the way it was supposedly presented to the narrator.

How 'troublesome' the repetition of interlocutory words can be is illustrated in the following dialogue from Kurt Vonnegut's novel, *Deadeye Dick*. For stylistic reasons of his own, Vonnegut makes rather excessive use of such words.

'Tell me again about my great death scene in the arms of Dr. Brokenshire in Katmandu, with the sitar music,' said Woodcock.

'Okay,' I said.

'I think I'm in Shangri-La,' he said.

'That's right,' I said.

'And I know I'm dying,' he said. 'I don't just think I'm sick, and I'm going to get better again.'

'The doctor makes it clear you're dying,' I said.

'Then how can I believe I'm in Shangri-La?' he said.

'Pardon me?' I said.

'Another thing I say all through the play,' he said, 'is that nobody dies in Shangri-La. But here I'm dying, so how can I be in Shangri-La?'

'I'll have to think about it,' I said.

'You mean this is the first time you've thought about it?' he said.

And on and on like that.

'Seventeen times,' he said.

'Pardon me?' I said.

'Seventeen times I say that nobody dies in Shangri-La.'

Both Plato and Vonnegut present their readers with fictional dialogues which are phrased as if they were faithful reports of actual conversations. A conscious reader is, of course, aware that what he reads is something clad in the form of a dialogue and that using the form of a dialogue and reporting the speech of another speaker are two very different things.

For the analysis of reported speech this is very important. A style of presentation is one thing, and the question of how a piece of spoken or written narrative relates to what a speaker actually said is another thing. This is one reason why a truth-functional analysis of reported speech is so very difficult. The claim that part of what one says is an exact repetition of what somebody else said must be distinguished from the stylistic possibility of saying something in such a way as if somebody else said it. The various ways of reported speech must be understood as stylistic possibilities rather than in terms of truth functions relating an utterance to another. Keeping this in mind, we can now turn to a more specific analysis of kinds of reported speech.
Kinds of reported speech. Traditionally, two kinds of reported speech have been distinguished: *oratio recta* (direct quotation) and *oratio obliqua* (indirect quotation). The former evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims to convey, the exact words of the original speaker in direct discourse, while the latter adapts the reported utterance to the speech situation of the report in indirect discourse. The fundamental difference between the two lies in the speaker perspective or point of view of the reporter. In direct speech the reporter lends his voice to the original speaker and says (or writes) what he said, thus adopting his point of view, as it were. Direct speech, in a manner of speaking, is not the reporter's speech, but remains the reported speaker's speech whose role is played by the reporter.

(1) 'Have you pray'd to-night, Desdemona?' asked Othello, and Desdemona answered: 'Aye, my lord.'

The speaker of (1) phrases his report like a dialogue. Even though Desdemona is not present in the report situation, Othello's utterance is phrased as if she were, and, conversely, Desdemona's utterance presupposes the presence of Othello. The reporter thus steps back behind the characters whose words he purports to report.

In direct speech, on the other hand, the reporter comes to the fore. He relates a speech event as he would relate any other event: from his own point of view.

(2) Othello asked his wife whether she had said her nightly prayers, which she affirmed.

Example (2) differs from (1) on several counts. First of all, there is no direct address in (2), as direct address requires the presence of the addressee. The second person address pronoun and the vocative *Desdemona* in Othello's utterance in (1) are replaced by a third person pronoun, *she*, and a descriptive term, *his wife*, both reflecting the reporter's point of view. The tense of Othello's utterance is also changed: present perfect in (1) becomes antepreterit in (2). Finally, Desdemona's utterance in (1) is reduced to a relative clause in (2), where *which* refers to the content of the indirect question in the preceding clause, *whether she had said her nightly prayers*. Alternatively, her utterances could be rendered, somewhat redundantly, by making the contents of her affirmation explicit: *She affirmed that she had said her nightly prayers*. Notice that Desdemona's utterance has no propositional content of its own. Its function is purely communicative, and this communicative function, the affirmation of the proposition of Othello's question, cannot be expressed but only described in indirect discourse. The expressive term *aye* is
thus replaced by a descriptive term *affirm*, which gives a category label to her speech act.

Another apparent difference between (1) and (2) is the descriptive term referring to Desdemona in (2). Othello, of course, knows that Desdemona is his wife—this relationship is, after all, at the bottom of all his troubles—but he doesn't say so. *His wife* is a term that is provided by the reporter, who knows more about Othello and Desdemona than can be inferred from (1). In indirect speech, the reporter is free to introduce information about the reported speech event from his point of view and on the basis of his knowledge about the world, as he does not purport to give the actual words that were uttered by the original speaker(s) or to restrict his report to what was actually said. Indirect speech is the speech of the reporter; its pivot is in the speech situation of the report.

Because this is so, the reported speech in indirect discourse is processed by the reporter. It presupposes his analysis. 'Analysis', says Voloshinov (1973:129), 'is the heart and soul of indirect discourse.' The reporter's analysis consists in distinguishing illocutionary function and propositional content of the reported utterance, and it may include an interpretation of the reported utterance as it is to be understood in the light of the reporter's knowledge of the world. In those cases where it is impossible to decide whether a given part of indirect speech is being reported or supplied by the reporter, the famous *de dicto-de re* ambiguity arises (cf. Banfield 1973; Coulmas 1986a).

Without going into the intricacies of *de dicto* and *de re* indirect speech, it is useful here to note that there are different kinds of indirect speech. They differ in terms of how far they are removed from their presupposed real or fictional model sentence(s). Some purport to be very close to the model while others are identified as paraphrases conveying the gist of the reported utterance only. For this reason the distinction between direct and indirect speech is more complicated than a mere dichotomy. Rather there is a scale of several forms of reported speech varying with respect to a set of parameters, such as (a) faithfulness to the form of the model utterance, (b) faithfulness to content, (c) deictic homogeneity, and (d) syntactic integration.

The important point is that all of these parameters are scalar rather than discrete. To some extent. Thus this is my hypothesis: The distinction between direct and indirect speech is a grammatical artifact. Direct speech is supposed to be absolutely faithful to the form and by implication to the content of the model utterance, and indirect speech is supposed to be faithful to its content only (Partee 1973). However, there is a continuous crossover between one and the other.

In order to elaborate this point and to show how it relates to the foregoing claim that a clear-cut distinction between direct
and indirect speech is an artifact, consider briefly the question of what counts as the same.

What counts as the same? Example (3) can be used to make a statement about the time of day, an appointment, a schedule.

(3) It is too late.

But if the speaker continues, as in (4), then he, the speaker, makes no statement at all with (3) and does not refer to any particular time, but only reports Othello's words.

(4) This is what Othello said to Desdemona before he killed her.

It is Othello who is making the statement. The deictic word this in (4) refers to (3), and (3), in the context of (4), refers to itself. Alternatively, this could also be supplanted by (3), which would thus become the subject of (4), as in (5).

(5) 'It is too late,' is what Othello said to Desdemona before he killed her.

In (5) the expression enclosed in quotes behaves much like a demonstrative which in conjunction with a physical gesture of pointing is used to identify an object. Likewise, (3) in (5) functions as a means of naming a referent by demonstration. This is what quotation is all about: the speaker does not claim authorship for a part of his utterance which he ascribes to another speaker or unspecified source. This part of his utterance does not serve a regular referential function such that words refer to things. Rather, they refer to words; not to any arbitrary words, that is, but purportedly to those words that some other speaker uttered at some other time.

The foregoing may look like a rather cumbersome way of saying that quoting means to repeat the words of another, but it isn't all that easy. Words are ephemeral entities and cannot be repeated in the same sense as the showing of a slide on a screen can be repeated. We can, of course, use a tape recorder and play the same recording over and over, but this is not what we usually mean by 'to repeat one's own or another speaker's words'. What we mean is that we produce a word or words of the same type as the ones uttered by the quoted speaker. The physical tokens are singular events and as such, not reproducible. Yet we can repeat the words of others and reasonably make statements such as the one in (6).

(6) Mary just said what Othello said to Desdemona before he killed her.
Clearly, (6) does not mean that Mary reproduced the physical events that Othello once produced with his vocal tract before stifling Desdemona. Rather, it means that Mary produced an utterance token of the type of which Othello's utterance was also a token. Quotation in natural languages, and in other sign systems as well (see Goodman 1968), presupposes the structural possibility of establishing type-token identity for utterances.

To repeat the words of another in the sense just explained is something that in principle can be done in any language. But notice the qualification, 'in principle'. That something can be done in principle does not imply that it is done, or that it is done in the same fashion in all natural languages. Lyons (1977:17) offers some interesting considerations in this connection. He suggests that sentences like (7) 'could not be true... unless John and Mary had produced two different tokens of the same type.'

(7) John said X and so did Mary.

He then continues:

So much is clear enough. The difficulty lies in specifying precisely what X can cover and the criteria for type-token identity between different instances of X. As long as we restrict our attention to some standardized written language or operate solely with written representations of spoken forms (and especially so, if we make use of non-cursive, printed representations in an alphabetical script), we may be inclined to underestimate the difficulty of specifying the conditions under which [7] would be true or false.

Type-token identity is a rather rigid notion whose meaning, Lyons suggests, is easily understood in a literate culture where the relevancy of this principle is omnipresent, since the technique of writing, and printing in particular, is the technique of linguistic repetition. In other cultures, it may be more difficult to specify exactly what counts as the same.

That exact repetition of form and meaning is very rare in actual language use is well known by psychologists and rhetoricians. Experimental studies of the linguistic memory have shown that 'memory for form appears to be tied to memory for meaning' (Olson and Hildyard 1983:291) and that, therefore, long-term memory for language 'is rarely word for word, verbatim memory' (p. 294). Moreover, there are different criteria for identity. While semanticists may argue that, except for ironic utterances and other conventional distortions of meaning, identity of meaning is implied by identity of form, rhetoricians would not agree, as is seen in the following observation by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969:317):
Even the words of other people, when repeated by a speaker, have changed their meaning, for in the process of repetition he always adopts toward them a position that is in some way new, even if only in the degree of importance he attaches to them.

The question of what counts as the same thus allows for different answers. It appears, however, that the awareness of this distinction is—to some extent, at least—culturally determined. Not all speech communities make a rigorous distinction between 'same form' and 'same meaning'. And, more importantly, not all speech communities equate direct speech and verbatim quotation. Rather, this equation seems to be a product of literate culture. Lack of clearly marked boundaries between direct and indirect speech and the confounding of direct and indirect viewpoints is reported for many languages, such as Ancient Greek (Rösler 1980), Old French (Voloshinov 1973:150), Mambila (Perrin 1974), Nootka (Sapir 1915). I am not talking here about quasi-direct discourse as a consciously cultivated literary style (style indirect libre; cf. Banfield 1973), but rather about a kind of speech reporting where author's utterance and reported utterance, as well as the corresponding deictic centers, are not always held distinct, a kind of confusion more likely to occur in speech than in writing.

Writing is an eminent cultural achievement which, in contradiction to many other such achievements, is closely linked with language. A historical and cross-linguistic study of reported speech has to take into account the possibility that writing itself influences the way speech reporting is carried out and understood. In Latin, for instance, there is an epistolary style in which all deictic elements, including tense, are pivoted to the reader's point of view—obviously an outgrowth of literacy.

To some extent, grammatical structures are the product of 'language makers' (Harris 1980). A general claim like this is hard to substantiate, but I think that the study of reported speech is a field that is promising for such an endeavor. Languages differ widely as regards overt distinctions between kinds of reported speech, which is only natural as some of these distinctions are coded in the grammar. It is desirable, therefore, to take a look at how direct and indirect speech are distinguished across languages and at the grammatical means by which this is done.

How much is coded in the grammar? Every speech report consists of two parts, the reporting part and the reported part. There are different ways of integrating the latter into the former; there are differences as to how reporting devices get grammatically coded; and there are differences concerning the kinds of reported speech that are distinguished in language.
Some languages have several different means of indicating whether a given report is direct or indirect: tense, mood, complementizer, and word order. In German, for example, these grammatical devices are employed for this purpose. The distinction between direct and indirect speech is hence highly prominent. In other languages only some of the aforementioned categories are used. English, for instance, has no subjunctive mood, and changes in word order are fewer than in German. Thus, ambiguous sentences that could be read as both direct and indirect speech are relatively more frequent than in German. They are more frequent yet in a language such as Japanese where no changes in word order or tense occur, and mood is not used to mark a piece of discourse as the speech of another, as in French subjonctive or German Konjunktiv. In Russian, too, indirect speech is not so clearly marked, because it has neither a subjunctive mood nor a consecutio temporum.

The so-called sequence of tenses is a grammatical feature of indirect speech that many languages lack. In some—for instance, Russian—the inflected verb in indirect speech remains in the same tense as would be used in the corresponding independent utterance, no matter how its original time reference relates to the report situation. In other cases, however, there is no back-shifting of tenses simply because there is no tense system. Yoruba may be cited as an example of this type (cf. Bamgbose forthcoming).

An important conclusion to be drawn from the observation that there are languages that have morphological tense systems but no sequence of tenses rules is that back-shifting of tenses is a conventional phenomenon rather than a necessary consequence of tense as a grammatical category. Tense and sequence of tenses are independent features of individual grammars. In The Philosophy of Grammar, Jespersen remarks that 'the shifting of tenses in indirect speech is very natural and in many cases even inevitable' (1924:293). But if seen from the point of view of languages with no tense system or no sequence-of-tense rules, it is hardly so natural. Rather, for native speakers of such languages it may be hard to understand that (8) does not mean that John referred to Mary's prettiness as a matter which now, unfortunately, belongs to the past, or why somebody's presence here is referred to in the past tense, as in (9).

(8) John said to Mary that she was pretty.

(9) He said you were here.

Shifting of tenses is 'natural' within the confines of a given grammatical system but is by no means logically necessary or implied by the presence of a tense system.

Unlike English, German has both tense and mood shifts. Not all morphological forms are distinct, however. The first person singular present indicative form is by and large the same as the
corresponding subjunctive form (except for the verb sein 'to be': Ich gehe, ich nehme, ich komme, ich habe, etc.). In general, the past tense distinguishes the subjunctive mood more clearly than the present and therefore is often used where the present tense should be used if the sequence of tenses were the only determining factor.

(10a) Er behauptet, ich habe das getan.
'He claims I did it.'

(10b) Er behauptet, ich hätte das getan.

Example (10b) is preferred over (10a), although the latter harmonizes the tenses of matrix and complement clauses in accordance with the consecutio temporum, i.e. present in the matrix clause and perfect in the complement clause, whereas the complement clause in (10b) is in pluperfect.

It seems likely that sequence-of-tense rules are a result of conscious language cultivation. That they are not in any sense necessary is evidenced by the many languages that have no grammatical tense system, such as Yoruba, and even more clearly by those languages that have a tense system but no sequence-of-tenses rules, such as Russian or Hungarian.

Tense is a means of temporal deixis. It would not be altogether unreasonable to assume that tense shifts have to occur in indirect speech in tense languages, because they are deictic rather than only grammatical shifts having to do more with the physical world and the speaker's location in it than with language. However, this is not the case. Languages like Russian allow for a split deixis in indirect speech where the pronoun deixis is adjusted to the reported situation. It appears, therefore, that in Russian the reported part of indirect speech is integrated into the reporting part to a lesser degree than in other languages, such as English or Latin, where tense forms in indirect speech must be adapted to the report situation.

Tense is only one of several means of integrating the reported and reporting parts of indirect discourse and thus only one of several factors determining the relative depth of integration.

Grammatical integration. The general conclusion that follows from the foregoing is that the extent to which reporting and reported parts of indirect discourse are harmonized and integrated with one another varies within and across languages. If we compare, for example, (11a) and (11b), the Latin sentence exhibits a higher degree of integration than its English counterpart.

(11a) Dico Ciceronem edere oleas.
(11b) 'I say that Cicero is eating olives.'

In the English sentence, what follows the complementizer that is a potentially independent sentence whose subject is in the
subjective case. By contrast, the reported sentence in (11a) has lost its independence completely by being put in an accusative-cum-infinitive (ACI) construction, typical of indirect discourse in Latin, where the verb of the embedded clause is nonfinite and its subject appears in the accusative case.

An even higher degree of integration than in ACI sentences can be found in constructions where the reported part is reduced to a noun phrase, as in (12).

(12a) He asked for permission.
(12b) She denied the existence of God.
(12c) They announced the victory.

It may seem far-fetched to subsume sentences such as these under the notion of reported speech, but notice that they share some crucial features with indirect speech: there is a report verb and a 'propositional' part. The latter is syntactically reduced to a noun phrase in object position, but then this is exactly the position that a complement sentence occupies. It is surely no coincidence that complementizers such as German *daβ*, English *that*, or French *que* are identical in form with demonstratives or relative pronouns that point to an object.

(13a) Kurt told Pete that. *Nobody dies in Shangri-La.*
(13b) Nobody dies in Shangri-La. That is what Kurt told Pete.
(13c) Kurt told Pete that nobody dies in Shangri-La.

Functionally, the *thats* in (13a), (13b), and (13c) differ. In (13a) and (13b), *that* behaves like a proform whose referent is another sentence, as in *That's true*. But in (13c), *that* behaves like a syntactic connector within a sentence by establishing a relation of subordination between its parts. To present-day native speaker intuition, these two *thats* are rather distinct; but the underlying grammatical distinction has only gradually emerged from a common source. The same is true of the German complementizer *daβ*, whose spelling differentiation from the article and demonstrative *das* is of recent origin.

Both the English and German examples show what a complement clause is: a sentential object. This is also very clearly evidenced in Japanese, where the direct object particle *-o* can be used for embedding indirect speech. Thus, nominal objects of report verbs as in (12) are not all that different from complement clauses. Yet a significant difference can be seen in the respective degree of integration of reporting and reported parts of the sentence.

The reduction of a proposition to a noun phrase is the extreme form of integration of reporting and reported parts in speech reporting. The other extreme is direct speech, where reporting and reported parts are distinct to the extent that
they are phrased in separate sentences. In between lies the interesting transition zone of indirect speech forms of varying degrees of integration. It is in this transition zone that languages differ most. The important question to ask here with respect to any given language is that of what and how much is coded in the grammar.

The most important grammatical categories used for marking indirect (or direct) speech, and for integrating the reported part into the reporting clause, are the following: tense, mood, word order, and complement formation. In the context of the languages where they are functional, they seem indispensable, but cross-linguistic studies show that none of them is. The subjunctive mood, for instance, is the criterion of the grammatical dependency of indirect speech in German, but it does not exist in most languages. The sequence of tenses may be an essential feature of indirect speech in English or Latin, but when we look at other tense languages it turns out to be rather contingent. The available evidence (cf. Coulmas 1986b) suggests that this is true of all grammatical and lexical markers of indirect speech.

A pronoun system enabling unequivocal reference seems to be essential for a proper interaction between reporting and reported parts of speech. It is particularly important in this respect to distinguish reference to an individual whose speech or thought is reported from reference to other individuals. Some languages have developed such forms that are used to establish coreference with individuals whose point of view is reported in indirect discourse. Hagegèe (1974) introduced the term 'logophoric pronouns'. Their use permits a speaker to avoid ambiguity of reference in many cases. Sentences such as (14), where it depends on the context whether he refers to John, Danny, or a third person, may seem intolerably ambiguous from the point of view of languages employing such logophoric pronouns.

(14) John said to Danny that he was a lady-killer.

Reflexive pronouns are sometimes used in logophoric function, for instance in English, as illustrated in example (15), slightly adapted from Kuno (1975).

(15) Mary said to John that lady-killers like himself were a pleasure to meet.

But morphologically distinct logophoric pronoun systems are a rather special property of a few languages.

Another feature worth mentioning is the lexical or grammatical means of distinguishing different kinds of reported speech with respect to evidentiality, that is, with respect to the nature of the quoted source and the authenticity of the report. Bloomfield (1927) reported about Navajo that whatever is hearsay
and not the speaker's own experience has the predicate verb or predicate in a special quotative form' (see also Collins in press). Jakobson made similar observations for other languages, including Kwakiutl, Hopi, Tunica, and Bulgarian, where the verb conjugation 'distinguishes two semantically opposite sets of forms: "direct narration" vs. "indirect narration"' (1971:135). Many languages use adverbs to differentiate degrees of authenticity. Japanese has a sentence suffix, -sō, which in conjunction with a form of the copula indicates hearsay quality. German and Danish use modal verbs for the same purpose. When used in this function, the verb sollen indicates lack of a specifiable source of information and hence the speaker's unwillingness or inability to verify the reported proposition. Its correlate wollen is used to show that the speaker reports another speaker's statement but doesn't believe it.

(16) Er soll ein Schürzenjäger sein.
   'He is said to be (lit. shall be) a lady-killer.'

Conclusion. Most of the features that I have discussed here seem to be fairly arbitrary grammatical or pragmatic conventions of individual languages rather than logical requirements of integrating the speech of another into one's own. Mood, tense, word order, and complementation do not necessarily get categorized, or categorized in the same manner, in all languages. Moreover, the intensity of integration of reporting and reported parts varies within and across languages. There are, on the one hand, highly integrated languages, such as Latin, having special constructions for indirect speech and making use of most of the available grammatical means of connecting reporting and reported clause; on the other hand, there are languages where the integration of reporting and reported clause in indirect discourse is very loose as, for instance, in Japanese, where indirect speech is not differentiated from direct speech by tense, mood, word order, or complement formation. Languages may thus be compared with respect to relative intensity of integration in accordance with the matrix shown in Figure 1 (see page 152). Speech reporting is a universal function of language. Its realization across languages, however, is highly variable.
Figure 1. Linguistic means of indicating indirect speech and integrating reporting and reported clause in indirect speech.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L₁ (German)</th>
<th>L₂ (Latin)</th>
<th>L₃ (English)</th>
<th>L₄ (Japanese)</th>
<th>Lₙ...</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>mood</td>
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<td>word order</td>
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<tr>
<td>complementizer</td>
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<td>deixis</td>
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<td>spatial</td>
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<tr>
<td>personal (honorific)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes

Some parts of this paper overlap with Coulmas (1986b).
1. I would like to thank Hartmut Haberland for bringing this to my attention.

References


REPORTED SPEECH AS EVIDENCE IN AN AMERICAN TRIAL

Susan U. Philips
University of Arizona

1. Introduction. In this paper I look at reported speech in an American criminal trial, focusing on how quoted speech—that is, reported speech framed as what another person actually said—is functionally differentiated from other forms of reported speech. We will see that in this courtroom trial data, quoting is reserved for speech which constitutes evidence or potential evidence relevant to elements of the charge on which the criminal defendant is being tried.

Framing information as reported speech is a widespread phenomenon, as is the distinction between different types of reported speech, and the idea that different kinds of reported speech encourage different interpretations of the experience being reported (Coulmas 1985; Goffman 1974, 1981; Gumperz 1982; Hymes 1971, 1981). The special status of quoted speech as a form of reported speech has also been discussed. Jacobs (1959, 1960) held that the quoting of central characters in which the storyteller takes on the voice and personality of the character carries and moves ahead the plot in Clackamas Chinook myths, making them more like dramas accompanied by brief description than narratives. Hymes (1971, 1981) developed this line of thought further in treating quoted speech as critical to the accurate interpretation of such myths. For English usage, Tannen has argued (1982) that quoted speech brings oral qualities into written discourse, giving it the immediacy of face-to-face interaction; and more recently (1983), that quoted speech is a way of involving the hearer in what the speaker is saying.

I propose here that data from an American trial indicate that quoting is reserved for information being presented as evidence directly related to proof of the elements of a criminal charge, to foreground this information, and to give it more fixedness and credibility as 'exact words' than other forms of reported speech are given. Quoting signals to the jury that the quoted
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information requires more of their attention than nonquoted information, and signals to other lawyers and the judge that such information must be treated differently from less central evidence or reported speech presented as background information or as context for the presentation of more crucial information.

2. The data base. The data for this analysis come from a trial for possession of cocaine which lasted about four hours altogether. Transcripts of taperecordings of the trial are part of a larger data base of 26 hours of transcripts from the Pima County Superior Court, an Arizona state court of general jurisdiction. The major purpose in gathering these data was to study variation in judges' use of language in the courtroom and the factors influencing this variation. Repeated observation and taperecording of courtroom legal procedures of nine judges was regularly accompanied by interviews with the judges after and sometimes before each period of taping. The judge who presided over the trial analyzed here was committed to public access to the judicial process, and allowed me into in-chambers conferences among the two lawyers and the judge on this case that provided considerable information on the case beyond what is evident in the transcripts themselves.

The lengthy excerpt from the County Attorney's opening statement, which follows, provides a summary of what this case was about from the prosecution's point of view, as well as constituting data illustrating the range of kinds of reported speech which are discussed further on in the paper.¹

(1)

County Attorney:
1 ...right into what I feel this...the evidence is gonna show.
2 Now this case is a narcotics case. You're gonna learn that
3 on August twenty-one nineteen seventy-eight--agents
4 from the Department of Public Safety and one agent from
5 the Drug Enforcement Administration went to nine ten
6 south Stevens the residence of Elliott Jenkens and Rosanna
7 Jenkens. They went there--with arrest warrants,
8 federal arrest warrants, for the arrest of these two indi-
9 viduals.
10 You're gonna learn that Agent Lorenzo went to the door,
11 knocked, identified himself, announced his purpose, showed
12 the warrant and advised Rosanna Jenkens that she
13 was under arrest, and that they had the authority to do
14 it and they had the warrant. (Gonna) also tell you that
15 at that point he asked for uh, Elliott Jenkens. You're
gonna

Defense Attorney:
16 I'm gonna object uh, (uh) your honor, that (calls) for hearsay 
17 (on ( )) Rosanna Jenkens' response. [2 sec]

Judge:
18 Go ahead 'n'...overruled. Go ahead (tell the statement).

County Attorney:
19 Rosetta...Rosanna Jenkens' response was 'I don't know where he's at. I've no idea where he's at'. So the agents 
20 asked fo...asked for advice. They were...had the author-
21 ity 
22 to go into the house and conduct, ( ) (cooperate) 
23 a search just to make sure that uh, Elliott Jenkens wasn't 
24 in the house. You're gonna learn that they did, in fact, 
25 go through the house, walked through it, looked in each 
26 room and uh, did not disturb or move any furniture. 
27 Merely walked through and satisfied themselves that Mr. 
28 Jenkens was not there. Uh, you're gonna learn also that 
29 during this time uh, the Agent Lorenzo, in uh, advising 
30 uh, Rosanna Jenkens of what was ( )...what was going 
31 to happen from this point on, since it (appeared) that she 
32 was going to be taken to jail um, had uh, agreed to allow 
33 her to call various people ( ) her employer, her mother 
34 to come pick up her child and make arrangements so that 
35 the child wouldn't have to be taken into (protective) 
36 custody 
37 and ( ) other uh,...wouldn't have to be taken to any of 
38 these other agencies. In other words, let the family (take 
39 care of her). You're gonna learn that during the time 
40 that they were in this house, which was uh, (mostly) a 
41 short period, approximately uh, ten minutes, I believe. 
42 You'll have a...a more exact time from uh, Agent Lorenzo 
43 when he testifies. But in any case, you're going to 
44 learn that he was in there for a short while when one of 
45 the officers who had gone in with him noticed an object 
46 sitting on the dining room table within (feet) and in plain 
47 view of uh, anybody in the living room. You're going to 
48 learn that uh, the objects that were there on the...on the 
49 table were...consisted of a tray, some vials a razor blade 
50 and a card. That they were s...uh, situated in such a way 
51 that it was consistent with the way uh, cocaine is used 
52 and it appeared to uh, have cocaine un, residues or uh, 
53 powdery substances laying on it. Awri you're gonna learn 
54 that at that point the items were seized, suspicion of uh... 
55 that 
56 it was cocaine and uh, the items were uh, ultimately taken 
57 to uh, the crime laboratory, the Department of Public 
58 Safety for analysis. You're going to learn that shortly 
59 after that uh, seizure occurred Elliott Jenkens came home.
With groceries uh, sin...in grocery bags and uh, inquired what was going on. He was told that he was under arrest, (was served a) federal arrest warrant. Um, some discussion occurred, uh, with reference to what was going to happen to his child. He was advised that th...that his wife had been allowed to make arrangements for her and she'd been allowed to make (their) phone calls to her employer so she wouldn't uh, so she wouldn't uh...so they'd know where she was at that day and uh, he was uh, ultimately taken into custody. You're going to learn that uh, when Elliott Jenkens was advised that the tray, the card, the razor blade, were going to be...were going to be seized he made the remark to Agent Lorenzo, 'I thought you had to have a search warrant in or...in order to seize a man's property.'

Now that, in essence is...are the facts that occurred on August twenty-one nineteen seventy-eight. It took a very short period of time. It did not...the uh, incident itself did not last or was not ex...uh, extended over a...over a day's period. It lasted uh, not much more...or even...uh, probably less than thirty minutes. Ultimately uh, the items (are) analysed, turned out to be cocaine. Substance that was uh, found in one of the vials. And hence the charge in this case. That is what the state contends the facts are going to show and it's gonna be on the basis of that evidence that uh, the state will ultimately argue the eve...the defendant in this case, Elliott Jenkens is guilty of unlawful possession of a narcotic, (which is) cocaine.

Thank you.

(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 97-102)

3. Law shaping the use of reported speech in court. In order to understand how and why quoted speech is reserved for certain kinds of information being brought into a trial, it is necessary first to understand something of the various kinds of law governing a trial, particularly a trial for cocaine possession. One major way in which courtroom speech is specialized is in the constraints placed on what kind of witness can say what kinds of things during a trial. In general, some kinds of evidence are viewed as more relevant and more reliable than others. Often evidence which has been deemed by courts to be irrelevant or unreliable is excluded or disallowed, so that it will not be presented to a jury at all.

There are three kinds of law which affect the presentation of evidence in the cocaine possession trial analyzed here. First, substantive criminal law requires that there must be evidence for each element of a crime as it is defined in criminal statutes, in order for the jury to be allowed to decide whether the person charged with a crime is guilty or innocent. If there is not evidence for each element, a point which the presiding trial judge decides, then the judge will rule that there is to be a directed
verdict of acquittal. For possession of cocaine in the state of Arizona, there must be evidence: (1) that the substance was cocaine, (2) actual or constructive possession by the defendant of the cocaine, (3) a usable amount of cocaine, (4) knowledge of possession, and (5) knowledge that the substance was cocaine. In this particular trial the judge viewed the evidence for possession as quite flimsy, and ended up making the decision to rule for a directed verdict of acquittal. As we will see, both the judge's and the lawyers' arguments regarding whether or not there was sufficient evidence of possession for the case to get to the jury centered on their interpretation of a piece of quoted speech attributed to the defendant, namely, 'I thought you needed a search warrant to take a man's property.' Was the defendant admitting possession of the cocaine seized by the police when he produced this utterance?

A second kind of law affecting the presentation of evidence in this cocaine possession trial is criminal procedural law. Generally speaking, such law is concerned with protecting the constitutional due process rights of the criminal defendant as he is dealt with by legal authorities both in gathering and presenting evidence. Thus, for example, officers of the law must make sure that they do not illegally search for or illegally seize materials, or else the evidence obtained illegally will be excluded from the trial, even if it is relevant to proving a particular element of a charge. Because of such laws, criminal prosecutors present information during trials that elaborately displays the way in which evidence has been gathered to make it clear for 'the record', and for a higher appellate court that could examine that record in the form of a trial transcript, that the evidence was indeed acquired without violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Thus, from the beginning of the trial in the County Attorney's opening statement, we see such display as we are told that the police officers had arrest warrants, showed the warrant, 'advised' Rosanna Jenkens of what they were doing, seized only objects which were in 'plain view', and so on.

The third kind of law which shapes the presentation of information in this cocaine possession trial is evidence law. Of the three kinds of law considered here, evidence law is most explicitly concerned with the reliability and fairness of evidence presented. Thus evidence law entails arguments showing why certain kinds of evidence should be excluded as too prejudicial against a criminal defendant, or included because of its reliability and relevance. The aspect of evidence law which is most pertinent to our consideration of the treatment of reported speech is the exclusion of 'hearsay' as a form or type of testimony, in American trials.

The exclusion of hearsay is one of the more misunderstood evidence rules. Many people in the United States, including some lawyers, apparently think the exclusion of hearsay means that you cannot testify in court as to what someone else told
you he or she heard, or what we sometimes refer to as 'second-hand' information. For example, if I try to testify that Jane told me her sister said, 'I am going out of town', many people would consider what Jane told me hearsay. It is, in fact, but the hearsay rule also generally precludes Jane from testifying what she heard her sister say. In other words, generally you can't say what you heard someone else say.

However, speech framed as attributable to another is only defined as hearsay if the purpose of its presentation is to prove the truth of the statement asserted. If the reported speech is not presented to prove the truth of what is asserted, then it is not hearsay. Thus John may testify that Mary said, 'There's a robber in the house', if it is not to prove there was a robber, but only to prove Mary said it in order to establish, for example, her state of mind (that she was excited or upset).

In addition, some kinds of utterances attributed to others by a witness which are quite central to a case have also either been defined as not hearsay or have been declared exceptions to the evidence rule excluding hearsay because they are too fundamental to the adversarial process and/or are held to be more reliable than most hearsay. A rule of this sort is the federal and Arizona state rule that defines as nonhearsay the admissions of a party opponent such as the defendant's statement 'I thought you needed a search warrant to take a man's property'.

4. Reported speech in the trial for possession of cocaine.

It is important to consider first the point that when reported speech is identified as such, it is because it has been framed as attributable to someone other than the speaker. This phenomenon is understood by lawyers, who say that if it is possible to present evidence obtained through hearsay as something other than hearsay, then it can be gotten into a trial as evidence. Such evidence is permissible, for example, when it can be framed not as reported speech but as an expert witness's specialized knowledge. Thus, in the trial for possession of cocaine which forms the data base for this paper, the Defense Attorney has as his first and only witness the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who did the chemical analysis for the County Attorney's office which determined the cocaine was a usable amount. In the transcript excerpt which follows, the Defense Attorney raises questions about this expert witness's ability to determine what constitutes a 'usable' amount of cocaine.

(2)

Defense Attorney: /you.../you've never been in the presence of a cocaine user. Is that correct? Using...while he's using cocaine.

Witness: No, sir, but I am familiar with their practices.
Defense Attorney: Through hearsay information, is that correct?
Witness: Written documented information, yes sir.
Defense Attorney: 'R talking to agents like uh, the agents uh, sitting here, is that correct?
Witness: Yes, sir, and other publications put out by DEA and uh, the like.

(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 203-4).

Here the defense attorney tries to suggest the witness's sources are hearsay, which they are. But when the witness is an expert witness and such information is 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject' (Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 703), then such information is admissible on cross-examination.

In the County Attorney's opening statement, excerpted in (1), we see also that much information which could be framed as reported speech, because that is quite literally what it is, is not. Thus, for example, in lines 2 through 6, the County Attorney explains to the jury that a DEA agent went to a house to arrest two people. Ultimately, the source for this information provided by the County Attorney is someone else's reported speech, whether written (as in an arrest report) or spoken (as in hearing it from the officer who went to the house). But this information is not framed as attributable to another. Only in line 10 are we told that the DEA agent identified himself, from which we can infer that he said certain kinds of things to the person who answered the door. It should be clear, then, that speech which is ultimately reported by someone to someone is only framed as such some of the time.

When we examine actual instances of speech framed as attributable to another in the County Attorney's opening statement, three different kinds of framing can be identified. They differ in the degree of detail and specificity of their accounting of what another said, and in their directness versus indirectness.

First, there are instances of 'Topic Naming' in which the speaker and what he talked about are identified. There are basically two types of Topic Naming in the opening statement. In the first type, the speaker is identified as the agent of a verb which is a lexicalized speech act, usually with a simple verb complement.

Agent Lorenzo:
(3) identified himself (line 10)
(4) announced his purpose (line 10)
(5) asked for advice (line 21)
(6) agreed to allow her to call various people (lines 32-33)

In the second type of Topic Naming, there are similarly identifiable agents of lexicalized speech acts, but in these the verb complement is more complex and contains a dummy or
pro-form, in this case *what*, which indexes information not actually specified.

(7) Agent Lorenzo, in uh, advising uh, Rosanna Jenkens of what was ( )...what was going to happen... (lines 29-31)
(8) Um, some discussion occurred, uh, with reference to what was going to happen to his child. (lines 60-62)

The second major category of reported speech in the opening statement is 'Reports of Substance'. Here we have the classic form of indirect speech discussed by Coulmas (1985), in which we actually hear what another said, not in quoted form, but so that a direct or quoted form of speech can be inferred or derived from the indirect form.

(9) Agent Lorenzo...advised Rosanna Jenkens that she was under arrest, and that they had the authority to do it and they had a warrant. (lines 11-13)

As for Elliott Jenkens:

(10) He was told that he was under arrest... (line 59)
(11) He was advised that th...that his wife had been allowed to make arrangements (lines 62-63)
(12) 'You're going to learn that uh, when Elliott Jenkens was advised that the tray, the card, the razor blade, were going to be...were going to be seized...' (lines 67-69)

Thus, in each of these examples what was said can be transformed into direct speech, as in 'You are under arrest' and 'Your wife has been allowed to make arrangements...', through systematic changes in the dropping of *that* as a relativizer, a switch to second person pronominal reference in subjects, and a change from present to past tense.

Some such versions of speech directed to an addressee sound more plausible as possible real or actual utterances than others. Thus 'You are under arrest' seems likely, while 'Your wife has been allowed to make arrangements...' sounds less likely as an actual piece of speech within the dialogue with the excited Mr. Jenkens.

Note that in these particular utterances, in which the substance of what was said is offered, both the addressee and the addressee can be identified, whereas in the Topic Namings, only the addresser is identified in the first set, so that in line 10 we only know that Agent Lorenzo identified himself and announced his purpose, but not to whom.

The third kind of reported speech we find in the County Attorney's opening statement is 'Quoting'. There are two Quotes by the County Attorney in the opening statement. The
The first Quote is attributed to the wife of the defendant, Rosanna Jenkens.

(13) County Attorney: ...You're gonna learn that uh, Rosanna Jenkens' response...
Defense Attorney: I'm gonna object uh, (uh) your honor, that (calls) for hearsay (on( )) Rosanna Jenkens' response. [2 sec] 
Judge: Go ahead 'n'...overruled. Go ahead (tell the statement).
County Attorney: Rosetta...Rosanna Jenkens' response was 'I don't know where he's at. I've no idea where he's at.'
(Opening statement, lines 14-20)

The second Quote is attributed to the defendant, Elliott Jenkens.

(14) County Attorney: You're going to learn that uh, when Elliott Jenkens was advised that the tray, the card, the razor blade, were going to be...were going to be seized he made the remark to Agent Lorenzo, 'I thought you had to have a search warrant in or...in order to seize a man's property.'
(Opening statement, lines 67-71)

As the framing of reported speech becomes more speech-like, its functions in the opening statement change. There is first of all a functional differentiation between reported speech which is potential 'evidence of the elements of the charge' and speech which is or becomes defined as 'background information'. In general, Quotes are reserved for reported speech which is or could be evidence of one of the elements of the charge and are never used for background information. While Reports of Substance are used for both elements of the charge and background information, all background information is in the form of Topic Namings or Reports of Substance. Reports of Substance are generally reserved for more important information than is reported through Topic Namings. Thus in the opening statement, Reports of Substance provide information that demonstrates that the constitutional rights of the defendants are being protected.

This functional differentiation of different forms or framings of reported speech for different kinds of information which is evident in the opening statement is generally maintained throughout the trial. Background information is never framed in quoted form, and for background information no effort is made to commit the witness to an exact wording of the reported speech.

Generally too, the information conveyed through Topic Naming in the opening statement is also conveyed through Topic Naming during testimony.
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(15) County Attorney: What followed, uh, 'r(what) occurred after uh, or when Rosanna Jenkens (get) to the door? What did you advise her?
Witness: Well we explained to her why we were there. We identified ourselves as police officers.
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 107-8)

The same pattern exists with the Reports of Substance, so that what was reported as indirect speech in the opening statement generally is reported in the same form in the trial testimony.

(16) County Attorney: ...and upon her response, what occurred?
Witness: Uh, we, at that point, indicated that uh, we-(per) the uh,...the authority in the uh arrest war-

rants themselves that we were gonna enter the house and...and look to see if Elliott was in fact not home.
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 111)

This relationship between form of reported speech and type of information reported is sustained in spite of the fact that the witnesses were not present in the courtroom during the opening statement, and so cannot be copying and repeating what the County Attorney said.

Just as background information continues through the trial to be framed in Topic Namings and Reports of Substance, only the reported speech being presented as evidence of an element of the criminal charge continues to be framed as a Quote. Only the defendant's protestation over the taking of 'a man's property' is quoted and quoted repeatedly, while the fate of the other Quote from the opening statement is somewhat different, and highlights this contrast in uses of different ways of framing reported speech.

Both pieces of speech quoted in the opening statement could be evidence that the cocaine was in the possession of the defendant. In the first Quote the wife's statement could be used as an admission that the house she is in is also the home of (i.e., lived in by) the defendant. Living in a structure in which an object is situated is commonly accepted evidence of 'constructive' possession. The fact that the Quote is viewed as such potential evidence is apparent in the Defense Attorney's objection to it in the opening statement, and later during the testimony of the first witness for the prosecution.

(17) County Attorney: Did you inquire of uh, Rosanna Jenkens uh, - where her husband was at?
Defense Lawyer: I object (calls for) hearsay.
Judge: Overruled.
Witness: Yes, I did.
County Attorney: And what was her response?
Witness: She said uh, that she didn't know where he was. -wasn't...he wasn't home an' she didn't /know where he was/.

Defense Lawyer: /uh, I.../ Your Honor, I object to that comment.

Judge: Overruled. [5 secs] Ya'll come up here please...

(Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 109)

Out of the hearing of the jury, the judge explained to both attorneys that he was not allowing this reported speech in to prove an element of the charge but as background. Therefore, it is not hearsay, and so need not be excluded.

(18) Judge: /( ) the/reason I'm letting it in is to show the purpose that they went into the house an not... not for the truth of it.

(Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 110)

Consistent with the judge's ruling and explanation, this particular piece of reported speech is not transformed into its directly quoted form here or when it comes up again in the third witness's testimony. Nor is the Quote dealt with in cross-exam or the later motion for a directed verdict.

The second Quote, from the defendant himself, can be viewed as an admission that the cocaine is his, or as evidence of possession. As an admission of a party opponent, this reported speech is defined by the rules of evidence as nonhearsay and as admissible.

The fate of this second Quote is quite different from that of the first Quote, because it may be evidence of possession of the cocaine. First of all, it is not objected to, either in the opening statement or when it is first elicited in testimony from the same first witness by the County Attorney.

(19) County Attorney: What did the defendant say in response to that?

Witness: He uh, indicated that uh he thought we needed a search warrant to... 'fore we could take a man's property.

County Attorney: Were those his exact words?

Witness: Yes (to the best of my recollection).

(Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 141)

Second, whereas the first Quote, which is presented in testimony as a Report of Substance, is not transformed into quoted speech when it comes up again, this second Quote is transformed into quoted speech by the Defense Attorney during cross-examination of the witness who gave the testimony in example (19).
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(20) Defense Lawyer: (N'it) 's this time that he indicated uh, 'I thought you needed a search warrant to take a man's property'?
Witness: Yes.
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 143-44)

Third, in contrast to the first Quote, this second Quote is oriented to and brought up over and over throughout the rest of the trial. After the opening statement, the first Quote is framed only as a Report of Substance and only once each by two different witnesses. The second Quote is repeated as a Quote in various forms seven times during examination of the first witness, and four times during the later motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

In addition to being brought up frequently, the second Quote is also treated as subject to more than one interpretation, in a way that turns out to figure centrally in the disposition of the case. Thus, in the cross-examination of the first witness, the Defense Attorney argued that 'a man's property' could refer to anyone's property, and not the defendant's.

(21) Defense Lawyer: Wasn't 'my' property. Is that correct? -Thought he needed a search warrant to take my property/was that.../
Witness: /'Take'/ a man's property is what he said, yes.
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 153)

Later, in the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the Defense Attorney argues that this quote is not an admission of the defendant's possession of the cocaine being seized, as part of his more general argument that there is not enough evidence of possession for the case to go to the jury.

(22) Defense Lawyer: ...In this all we have is officers coming over to a house uh, no uh, indication of joint tenancy or living together at that time uh, and the only uh, thing ya have is the officer showing the box and he says 'I thought you needed a search warrant to take a man's property.' Obviously in the vernacular of today's day 'man' can refer to woman's, person's or whatever....
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 215-16)

The County Attorney responds by arguing in part that this Quote doesn't mean anyone's property, but the defendant's.

(23) County Attorney: ...Um when the uh, items were seized Elliott Jenkens makes a statement that uh, uh, 'I didn't know you could take a man's property
without a search warrant.' Not referring to some other man's property (then).

(The Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 217-18)

The judge agrees with the Defense Lawyer's interpretation of this Quote in his decision to agree to a directed verdict of acquittal.

(24) Judge: ...Or an' if I find a bunch of police officers there 'n' takin' stuff outta there an' I say, 'Hey, you guys can't take that stuff without a warrant,' is that enough evidence uh, y'know, if she's got uh, cocaine or marijuana or som'n else in there ta...ta get me to a jury?

County Attorney: I'd say just on that bawe...on that (baldfaced) assertion, yes. It is. /An I...

Judge: /You/ really believe so?

County Attorney: Yes. I do, your honor.

Judge: Well, I don't. The motion for judgment of acquittal's granted.

(The Cocaine possession trial transcript, p. 240)

It should be evident from the examples I have extracted from the trial transcript that the form in which the Quote from the defendant is expressed is quite variable. Moreover, that variation is systematic.

First of all, it is the lawyers and the judge who frame the defendant's and his wife's speech as Quotes. Neither of the witnesses who report their speech frames it in Quotes. Instead, they give Reports of the Substance of what was said. In addition, only the judge and one of the lawyers play with possible hypothetical versions of such testimony, as when the Defense Attorney makes sure the defendant didn't say my property, and the judge refers to that stuff rather than a man's property to offer a paraphrase of what the defendant said.

A second way in which the variation in the form of the defendant's reported speech is systematic is that the quoted versions of the lawyers vary considerably less in form when they appear as testimony than when they appear not as testimony, or evidence, as in the opening statement and the motion for a directed verdict.

In the testimony elicited from and offered by the first witness for the prosecution, which is where all the references to what the defendant said appear as testimony, the witness says in a Report of Substance, 'He uh, indicated that uh he thought we needed a search warrant to...'fore we could take a man's property.' Later on in cross-examination, however, it emerges that in the same witness's arrest report, written just after the arrests of defendant and wife, the defendant is quoted as having said something slightly different.
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(25) Defense Lawyer: ...Uh, and then later on your report - uh, concerning Elliott, 'When advised of the wooden box, subject Elliott Jenkens stated, 'I thought you needed a search warrant to take a man's property.' Is that correct? Is that what's in your report?
Witness: That's what's in there, sir.
(Cocaine possession trial transcript, pp. 148-49)

In other words, the witness's initial Quote says 'to take' where his later claim of exact wording of the defendant says '... 'fore we could take'. In all of the Defense Attorney's quoting of this reported speech, he exactly repeats what was in the witness's arrest report. Thus, this slight rewording by the witness is the only variation in the form of the reported speech attributed to the defendant offered as evidence during testimony.

In the parts of the trial which are not governed by the rules of evidence, and are not defined as testimony, there is considerably more variation in the form in which the reported speech of the defendant is rendered. And the County Attorney's renderings of the initial Quote in the witness's arrest report are considerably more variable than the Defense Attorney's. Thus, where the Defense Attorney quotes the defendant twice in the motion for a directed verdict, he only once substitutes search for take, and otherwise repeats the quote exactly as it was in the arrest report. The County Attorney's two versions depart more from the original, and are also more different from each other. In the opening statement, he says, 'I thought you had to have a search warrant in order to seize a man's property.' Thus had to have replaces needed, in order to replaces to, and seize replaces take. In the motion the County Attorney says, 'I didn't know you could take a man's property without a search warrant.' Here the entire utterance is transformed into a negative statement, with I didn't know for I thought, could take for take, and without a search warrant for had to have a search warrant. The order of elements in this proposition are also rearranged, so that man's property and search warrant have traded places and had their syntactic roles in the sentence altered in the process.

The judge's quote during the motion is the most radical transformation of the speech attributed to the defendant, and is not meant to be what the defendant said, but what the judge himself considers to be its equivalent as evidence: 'Hey, you guys can't take that stuff without a warrant.' This version is also in negative form, like the County Attorney's last quote, which immediately precedes the judge's. Most notably, this is the only instance of quoting in which the phrase a man's property is substituted for, in this case with that stuff, which semantically lacks the possessive relationship made explicit in the original quote.
Thus, the Quotes in evidence display more constancy in form than the Quotes brought in in other parts of the procedure where truth and reliability are not at issue in the same way.

5. Discussion. At this point, it may be useful to review and discuss what has been said so far about the role of Quotes as evidence in this cocaine possession trial. Quotes are used to report evidence relevant to elements of the charge, and are not used when background information is being provided. Reported speech which is potential evidence relevant to those elements is initially quoted in the opening statement. Then witnesses giving evidence in testimony frame the reported speech of defendant and wife as indirect speech in the form of Reports of Substance. The one such report which is allowed the status of evidence—namely, the defendant's utterance—is then reframed by the Defense Attorney as a Quote, and continues to be framed in this way by the Defense Attorney, the County Attorney, and the judge for the rest of the trial. It is the only piece of reported speech which is repeatedly framed as a Quote in this way.

Although stress is placed on the exactness of what was said by the defendant, exactness is not maintained in what actually goes into either the Report of Substance or the Quotes which were brought in as evidence against the defendant. The variation is context-sensitive, in that there is less variation in the Quote when it is part of evidence in testimony and more variation in the quote in the opening statement and the motion for a directed verdict, both as measured by the similarity of the quotes to each other and by the extent to which the original quote in the arrest report is held to or departed from. Some parts of the Quote are held constant more than others too, so that a man's property, which is most critical to the status of the utterance as an admission, is more constant in form than the other lexical items in the Quote.

Why is this variation in the form of reported speech patterned in these ways? There is a preference for putting evidence of the elements of the charge in the form of Quotes because Quotes are seen as more reliable, as if a witness is more certain of what was said if he is willing to claim exact wording, which is what we are inferred to be doing when we quote. While this claim may give more credibility to the witness's testimony, it can also be to the disadvantage of the witness to be locked into having claimed certain words were said, because he must then deny that other things were said or could have been said in order to maintain his credibility. That is what occurs in this trial. It is the Defense Attorney who initially insists on framing what the defendant said as exact and as a Quote, so that he can later argue that the defendant said a man's property and not my property, and thus was not admitting possession. Thus, both sides can have reasons for framing evidence as a Quote and as exact wording.
One purpose of this paper has been to show how different ways of framing reported speech cue listeners that such reported speech has different functions or meanings in the discourse, and is to be interpreted variably. In the American court trial discussed here, a major distinction being cued by the use of different kinds of reported speech is the difference between evidence which is central to the elements of the charge and background information.

Cross-cultural and cross-linguistic evidence suggests that quoting or the taking on of another's voice is commonly the form of reported speech which is more central to the development of a coherent topic line, which identifies central characters and the more important things they have to say. Quoting cues the listener to focus more on what is quoted than on other forms of reported speech, and is thus a widespread foregrounding device.

In the American courtroom data discussed here, this functional differentiation of various kinds of reported speech is probably exaggerated, compared with the use of different forms of reported speech in nonlegal contexts, because of the need in the trial context to separate and distinguish reported speech which is subject to the rule excluding hearsay from reported speech which is not. By putting reported speech in Quotes, the lawyers signal to the jury that it should be given more attention than other reported speech, that its truthfulness and reliability matter. The lawyers make use of the American cultural notion that speech which a person is willing to quote is remembered better and is more exact than other reported speech, and hence is more reliable. At the same time, the lawyers signal to each other and to the judge which pieces of reported speech are to be oriented to as evidence of elements of a charge and which are not.

From this more specialized use of the functional differentiation of forms of reported speech, we can see that such framing or cuing devices can have both general and specialized uses, which may be invoked simultaneously, so that even though the jury does not know and will not learn the rules of evidence, they will orient to the Quotes differently than to other forms of reported speech, just as the lawyers and judge do.

Notes

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1. Notational devices, modified from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), include the following:

( ) inaudible speech of less than 2 sec. duration. No instances over 2 sec. appear in the examples in this paper.

(crime) tentative transcription due to inaudibility.

[3 secs] length of pauses over 2 seconds.

/and then/ speech which overlaps with that of adjacent speaker

[ ] links the speech of adjacent speakers where they overlap.

References

Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 703.


MY LIFE IN COURT

Robin Tolmach Lakoff
University of California, Berkeley

1. Introduction. In September and early October of 1984, I served on a jury in the Alameda County, California, Superior Court. From both the nature and outcome of the trial itself (which I will summarize shortly) and the situation in the courtroom and jury room, I learned a great deal. I want to talk about some of this, concentrating here on the area of language in court: the courtroom as a discourse context. For while in many ways the communication that formed the trial and the deliberation of the jury resembled ordinary informal dyadic conversation, in more ways it did not. Some of these differences are obvious to the most casual viewer of 'Perry Mason'; in other ways, though, the novelty of courtroom talk repays close observation by opening a window to ordinary conversational behavior, allowing us to observe and understand it from a new perspective.

I should make it clear before proceeding further that my comments are based upon this single six-week observation of one trial, one set of dramatis personae. So I am not writing to describe what necessarily always happens in court. Rather, I am commenting as an observer (relatively sophisticated as a linguist but a neophyte in the courtroom) on what I encountered: what seemed strange in terms of what I might have expected had this been ordinary conversation. The question I have at the back of my mind, which I hope my observations will begin to answer, is this: How do we know how to engage in conversation? Faced with a situation in which at least some of the rules are new, and contradict or make irrelevant the discourse rules we had always lived by, how do we construct a new grammar to make sense of the situation? In a more practical vein, in court perhaps more than anywhere else in society, it is crucial that the neophytes (that is, of course, the jurors) exposed to the novel situation become comfortable with it, and able to understand what is being communicated and why, as thoroughly and quickly as possible. Much has been written about the final and most formal stage in this process, the judge's explicit
communication of instructions to the jury as to how it shall reach a verdict, and much as well about how juries deliberate (for the latter, cf. especially Garfinkel 1967). But if the days or weeks preceding have been mystifying and incompletely understood, the most careful and intelligent communication of, and following of, instructions will be of no avail. So there is some ultimate practical value for linguists and jurists alike in coming to understand how juries come to understand what is going on around them.

My jury service involved a capital case, though a rather weak one. The defendant was accused of murdering someone, and attempting to murder another, in order to steal their car and subsequently sell it. By California law, the fact that the murder was committed 'for financial gain' made the defendant liable for the death penalty. A trial of this kind is conducted in two parts. In the first, the jury determines guilt or innocence. If the defendant is found guilty of murder with special circumstances, after a short recess the same jury hears evidence in aggravation or mitigation, and on that basis determines the penalty: the choices are only life without possibility of parole, or death in the gas chamber. In this case, the defendant was found guilty of all charges after a trial of three weeks, with the jury deliberating for about three hours. In the second phase of the trial, lasting two weeks, the jury voted for a sentence of life without possibility of parole, after deliberating for about two hours.

Notable in this trial, and part of what made the experience so meaningful for me, was the competence of most of the participants. Aside from one member of the defense team (who actually got a good deal better as he went along), the attorneys on both sides were articulate and organized, and insulted the intelligence of the jury rather less than I would have anticipated. The jurors, drawn from the proverbial cross-section of the community, were interested, dedicated, and responsible from the start. During deliberations, I was impressed with their intelligence in being able to grasp and use complicated instructions (given only orally); their articulateness in arguing for their positions; and their compassion. As the presiding official, the judge in a very real way set the style for everyone else. His lucidity in explaining things to the jury, coupled with his very real sympathy for what they were going through—demonstrated in many ways throughout—made the experience memorable.

As a linguistic event, a trial is unique in many ways. I will organize my remarks about courtroom discourse under six subheads: (1) the trial as a kind of discourse situation; (2) special functions of speech acts; (3) conversational rules; (4) conversational logic; (5) ritual and spontaneity; (6) the creation of sympathy: persuasion.

2. The trial as a discourse situation. In any discourse, there is presumed to be a speaker and a hearer. In dyadic
conversation, these roles are reciprocal: the participants exchange them. It is reasonable to assume that the more a type of discourse deviates from this fundamental behavior, the more counterintuitive it will be, and the harder to learn. Thus, classroom behavior is new for children because discourse is no longer reciprocal; and for adults, psychotherapeutic discourse is special for the same reason. In court, too, the roles of the various participants are strictly defined and not interchangeable.

In any conversation, there are certain kinds of business to be transacted. In most, outside of the informal dyad, the exchange of information is perhaps the most crucial. Questions are asked, and answers are given, with this aim in mind. Normally, in any kind of conversation, the person needing the information will frame the questions, directing them at the person assumed to possess it. Further, under normal conditions the assumption is that a question is appropriately asked just in case the questioner has reason to believe the addressee has the necessary information and is willing to supply it; and the addressee will respond with that information just in case the foregoing conditions are met and, besides, it is determined that the speaker needs the information sought.

In court things are very different. In direct examination, the attorney asks his witness questions to which he already knows the answer; indeed, I am informed that lawyers are taught to frame questions to friendly witnesses using some where we might expect any, in order to encourage them to give a positive answer:

Prosecutor: Was there something in that newspaper article that caused you to do something?

Such a question, obviously, could be asked only by someone quite sure (through prior discussion with the addressee) of the sort of response that was likely. Under these conditions, we might normally assume the question would be treated as rhetorical and not answered. But, of course, the witness does answer. Even in cross-examination, the attorney is unlikely to ask a question the response to which will come as a surprise. So what is the purpose of this discourse, if speaker and addressee are not exchanging needed information?

The answer, I think, can be found only if we can see that in this situation the people actually carrying on the 'conversation' in question are not really the participants—or at least, that the questioner is not playing the normal role. Attorneys, in questioning witnesses and making objections (their two roles), are acting in the jury's behalf: the jury, though silent throughout, is really the participant who requires the information, who alone can make use of it. It is extraordinary that the one participant in the discourse who must be silent is the one who, in the end, plays the truly significant and
This goes counter to all of our expectations about how discourse occurs and is understood, and contributes to the mystique of the experience in the jurors' eyes. As I said, the learning of any new linguistic behavior takes effort; but learning a role that is anomalous, contradictory to the old, familiar, and by now unconscious rules is especially difficult and disturbing—even if, as is usual, the jurors cannot themselves identify the source of their discomfort explicitly.

Likewise, in ordinary conversation, participants all have access to the complete repertoire of speech-act types (cf. Searle 1969), and can further expect their contributions to be understood as others' would be (a declaration as a declarative, and so on, unless signaled otherwise). But in court, the kinds of utterances each participant may make, and be understood as making, are severely restricted, in terms of the use and understanding of speech acts. And this is true (as with psychotherapy) both superficially (e.g. the attorney can only ask questions of witnesses; the witness can only give declarative answers) and more abstractly. For example, at a point at which a lawyer may be expected to make an objection, technically a declarative speech act, even what looks like a question may be interpreted by the judge as an objection.

Defense (with reference to witness' testimony): What does that mean?
Judge: Sustained.

3. Speech acts in court. Similarly, speech acts may play unusual roles in this situation, related to the special powers and functions of the participants. Tag questions have been discussed at length, largely from the perspective of their role in ordinary conversation, where they may function as disempowering devices: their use invites the addressee to control the conversation, both in terms of defining content and holding the floor (for more discussion, see Lakoff 1985). But if we superimpose the special power dynamic of the courtroom, we see that even a form such as the tag, with its clearly specified pragmatic functions, can have quite different implications. Consider that a tag, in its ordinary-conversation function, is an elicitor par excellence of response from an addressee. In dyadic discourse, in which participants really or conventionally are equal in power, this is most often felt as an opening-up of the floor. But now imagine a prosecutor cross-examining a defendant who has already been found guilty of murder with special circumstances. The attorney clearly has the power; he has no need to invite a response, since the witness is compelled by law to reply. And the questioner, as we have seen, doesn't even need the information himself, so the addressee can't do anything for him. Imagine the prosecutor hurling tag after tag at the reluctant respondent, and
think of the latter's tricky position. If he replies, he damages himself. But if he doesn't, not only does he risk a citation for contempt, but (probably worse), he risks labeling himself conversationally inept: he shows he doesn't know how to respond to a tag question, which demands a response.

Prosecutor: You don't want to die, do you?
Witness (defendant): You're treating me like a criminal!

Thus, the prosecutor, by placing him in a double bind, drew from the defendant 'crazy' behavior, losing him any possible sympathy from the jury and earning him a warning from the judge. An utterance type normally used to hand power over to the addressee has been utilized here by the prosecutor to underline and reinforce his own already explicit power; what is ordinarily an invitation becomes an act of coercion.

4. Conversation analysis. We are aware of the basic underlying principle in ordinary conversation: one party at a time (Schegloff 1972). We are, of course, also aware that in most informal conversation, this rule is violated rather often. We may surmise that a principal reason for this rule is that it facilitates the function of the Cooperative Principle (CP) (Grice 1975): it encourages the optimal transmission of information. (Hence, the circumstances under which it is most easily violable are informal gatherings among intimates, in which rapport rather than information is the coin of the realm.) Since the courtroom is the scene of maximal CP operation, we may expect whatever facilitates it to be strictly enforced. And indeed this is true. In six weeks of often heated, highly emotional discourse, I virtually never detected any interruption or overlap; there was perhaps one, for which the perpetrator immediately apologized. (It's true that the defense attorney rather frequently muttered to himself, but this was not perceived as a disruption of anyone's turn, and he was chastised for it by both judge and prosecutor.)

Also characteristic of the assignment of the floor in ordinary conversation is its implicitness. Very seldom does anyone have to (or feel able to) say, 'It's my turn', or 'Let her talk', unless negotiating with young children. But in court, the judge often performed this function, largely for the witnesses (of all the active participants, they alone were assumed to be unaccustomed to the procedures). 'You may answer', he would say after overruling an objection; 'You may step down', at the end of their testimony. The attorneys had their floor-yielding formula, of course: 'Your witness'.

5. Conversational logic: The Cooperative Principle. Of all types of discourse, a trial is one in which 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' is explicitly and exclusively enjoined as permissible. That is, the Cooperative Principle is
explicitly and formulaically stated to be in effect. Here more than anywhere information is what is sought, and anything clearly noninformational (in some sense of the term) is impermissible. Further, more than is ordinarily the case, the participants in the business normally have no prior relationship with one another, and therefore the CP violations and implicatures that intimacy allows do not occur. But although informativeness is a major consideration, it would be incorrect to suggest that there are no allowable violations of the Cooperative Principle. Rather, they are of a different kind than we normally encounter, and hence are unusually hard for the neophyte to understand. They come under the heading of 'legalese'.

In theory, legal formula has acquired its cumbrous shape in order to preclude the ambiguity to which ordinary conversation is prey. But at the same time, any violation of the Cooperative Principle is apt to lead to breakdowns in intelligibility: we have to make an extra effort to process the unexpected. The language of the courtroom eschews the deletions and compressions we normally make use of in informal discourse, both to save time and to signal that we--speaker and addressee--are members of the same group because we both share information. This brevity, of course, is a significant aspect of what Bernstein (1973) calls a 'restricted code'. By contrast, courtroom talk can be seen as hyperelaborated. Things are said that would ordinarily be ignored or assumed, and things are repeated that would otherwise have been said but once. So the maxims of quantity and manner are violated here as well, but in the opposite of the usual direction.

The automobile she had for sale--did she place an ad in the paper for the purpose of selling it?

With regard to the sale of the truck, was there anything unusual about the sale of the truck?

Similarly, witnesses tended to answer questions with full sentences rather than the fragments we would expect in ordinary conversation.

We might note finally that if members of minority groups have especial difficulty in achieving competence in the use of an elaborated code (as Bernstein 1973 argues) or in using public language (as Gumperz 1982 suggests), such groups will encounter especial difficulties in the courtroom on these grounds.

6. Ritual and spontaneity. It is an error to suppose that the simple discovery of information is the court's only business. Superimposed on this 'real' function of the court system is its symbolic function as the upholder of traditional mores, the enforcer of law and order. As a basically conservative structure, then, the court utilizes a language that supports and
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derives from its symbolic function. The archaism of legalese and the pomp and ceremony of much courtroom behavior thus have no utility in terms of the court's fact-finding function. But as a means of expressing, to all participants, the strength of the justice system as rooted in tradition, the use of ceremonious forms is of extreme importance. It functions also as an additional message for the jury. Jurors are instructed from early on in their service that the modes of reasoning they will be required to use in reaching a verdict are different from those in effect in their everyday lives. But it is difficult to learn new ways of doing what has been second nature, and always a temptation to fall back into the old. If, however, there are continual reminders that this situation is special, the rules are different, more is expected of one, it may be easier to stay on the straight and narrow. And although it is fashionable to criticize the pomp and circumstance of the courtroom and its communications, I think that—as long as they do not impair intelligibility—they have a very real function, and we should think long and hard before we dispense with them in the name of 'accessibility'.

The fact that linguistic behavior is ritualized and nonsynchronous in so much of court procedure leads in turn to special forms of interaction that could occur only in such a context. Thus, for instance, it could be assumed that an attorney would object to certain kinds of behavior on the part of his opposite number. In ordinary conversation, even if someone's next utterance is fully predictable, we can't normally act as if it were: we are supposed to work on the assumption that we are behaving spontaneously. But in a situation in which the rules of discourse are explicit and acknowledged by everyone, the ritualization can permit some (tongue-in-cheek, but nonetheless real and serious) play on expectation.

Defense (in cross-examination): You mean he just dropped off the face of the earth, like [the defendant]?
Prosecutor: (Says nothing)
Pause.
Judge: Sustained.
Prosecutor: Thank you.

(We might note here that ordinarily, when the judge sustained an explicit objection, 'thank you' would have been inappropriate: it was part of his job.)

7. The elicitation of sympathy. Finally, we can look at some of the more obvious ways in which lawyers do their job: winning sympathy from the jury for or against the defendant by establishing identification between them and the defendant, or by facilitating an identification of the jurors with 'society' and as the agents for enforcing responsible behavior. Both sides, in their summations, made much use of the pronoun we.
But the defense meant by it, 'You (the jury) and the defendant and I, as human beings': the prosecution, 'You and I as representatives of society'. To this end, the defense regularly referred to the defendant by a nickname; the prosecution, by title and last name. To the same end, both sides tried to establish themselves as authoritative and trustworthy. A significant argument in mitigation involved the defendant's service in Vietnam. Both the male defense attorney and the male prosecutor referred in their statements to 'Nam, or the 'Nam. In my experience, these terms are used only by men, and normally only by veterans, or those who seek to present themselves as such. In using these terms, both sides were suggesting, to different purposes, that they understood what it was to serve in Vietnam, that they were one with those who had had that experience.

Finally, both defense and prosecution made use, where useful, both of technical legalese even where it was unnecessary, to establish authority, and of slang, to suggest identity with the jurors and impress them as regular guys. Thus, the defense attorney referred to certain arguments as hypotheticals; the prosecutor, in talking about the defendant's aberrant behavior, suggested several times that he wasn't wrapped too tight. Ordinarily, the self-presentation of the prosecutor (as befitted the representative of law and order) was formal and conservative; by using slang, he showed he was at heart a regular guy. The defense attorney, on the other hand, was generally studiously (and often quite inappropriately) informal. So his use of a bit of legalese was to signify, 'See? I really can play this game'. Besides, the prosecutor's use of the colloquial term for crazy helped to undermine the defense contention that the defendant, due to his Vietnam experience, really was seriously disturbed. No, the prosecutor suggested, just a little nuts like everyone, no need for special sympathy or exoneration.

8. Conclusions. We see, then, from these few examples, that in the courtroom language is used differently in many significant ways than it is elsewhere, and all participants must learn new rules and new interpretations of old ones. But at the same time, we necessarily bring to the courtroom our familiar grammars; these may be used or abused by the various participants. It is incumbent upon us as linguists and as citizens to understand the interplay between ordinary language and the language of the courtroom. In this way we learn more about communication in general, and encourage the best use of language in a situation in which everything said or heard is of unusual importance.
Note

I am grateful to the many people who helped, in one way or another, to make my debut into the mysteries of the legal universe meaningful. In particular, I would like to thank Judge Stanley P. Golde, Deana Logan, Mike Millman, and Harriet Verbin for aid, comfort, encouragement, and clarification, and in their several roles, for restoring my faith in our system of criminal justice and its practitioners.

References

LANGUAGES AS POEMS

Haj Ross
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

0. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a
new metaphor by which to live as we continue to deepen our
relationship to language. I have Pete Becker to thank for the
question which this paper attempts to answer. It is a question
which I would recommend to everyone, not because it is easy to
answer, but rather because the clarity of the answer that each
of us can find may reveal to us unexpected aspects of our
stance toward language, and toward life. Pete's question is:
What is your image of language?

He suggested that I take plenty of time to answer, that I
just tell him sometime, when I felt I knew. I would echo his
suggestion for you, as you turn this question over and over
in your mind, for if your experience is anything like mine was,
it will take you some time to settle on an answer.

For this question asks us to choose a basic metaphor around
which to organize our thinking, and even though we may know,
for example, from Lakoff and Johnson (1980), that many meta-
phors can 'compete' for the same semantic domain (thus Lakoff
and Johnson observe that English structures the domain of
ideas with the metaphors of animals [the father/birth of quan-
tum physics], of plants [the roots/blossoming of the notion of
free trade], and of food [you can really get your teeth into
this theory: I couldn't digest that article], to name a few),
still we are being asked by Pete to see if for us, there is one
primary way of seeing languages, a way which 'makes' more
sense to us than any other way.

This notion of sense-making is itself an interesting one, and
is explored expertly and insightfully by Elbow (1973:147-91).
A good example of the activity he refers to as 'the believing
game' is provided by a common experience. Suppose we are
walking down a road, and ahead of us, in the distance, we see
an animal in a field. At first, we cannot tell whether it is a
dog or a horse, and as we walk on, we try out both of these,
to see which gives us a better fit. At some point, when we
have drawn close enough, we make a decision: The animal 'is' a dog. In Elbow's words, we 'get more out of it' by seeing it as a dog than by seeing it as a horse. In our context, Pete's question asks us to decide whether we get more out of seeing language as a machine, a code, an organism, a system, and so on. And of course, we might have no metaphorical preference.

For me, the most sense was made by seeing a language as a poem. I find this a valuable analogy to draw in my own thinking, and in order to be able to explain to you why this is so, I had better say something about how I see poems, for it is in the way poems work, in the way poets make them mean, that the power of this way of seeing lies for me.

1. Before I start, let me name a few ways in which I am not suggesting that languages are like poems. First, I know that various poetic genres make use of particular conventions of stanzaic form (for example, the quatrain, the [Elizabethan] sonnet, the haiku, the sestina). I am not claiming that languages have anything comparable to stanzas or to particular rhyme schemes. Second, I know that abstract definitions have been advanced of what kinds of phonetic pairs can constitute rhymes (or alliterations) within a poetic tradition; I do not suggest that such literary conventions have a large role to play in our everyday use of language. Nor do I wish to claim that there is anything like iambic pentameter or dactylic trimeter in everyday conversation, though it does now seem clear that when we interact, linguistically or otherwise, we do so in time, keeping 'in step' with a regular beat which synchronizes our interactions in an essentially musical way. (See Erickson's and Scolon's papers in GURT 1981 [Tannen 1982].)

2. I am not, then, saying that as we speak, we behave like poets who are writing poems within some identifiable literary canon. But if it makes sense to see languages as if they were poems, then it should presumably make sense to identify some people as the poets—the authors of these poems. And who could that be but us? If anyone is to be 'the' poet of American (I think it is high time we stopped talking about 'English' and started distinguishing among American, and British, and Canadian, and Strine, and...), it had better be us. So let me talk a bit about what we say, each of us, in particular.

To be sure, there is a set of sentences that all speakers of any of the varieties of English will agree on. Some well-known sentences are: The farmer killed the duckling. The cat is on the mat. But these are also boring sentences. Because anyone who is determined to stay firmly within the bounds of the uncontroversial will not learn much about the processes that structure it. As Gregory Bateson observes (somewhere), there is more information at the boundary than in the middle, in the steady state. So, for example, while it is a fact, of interest to Passive aficionados, that almost any volitional verb taking a
nominal direct object will have a passive counterpart for anyone (this is a fact about the 'middle' of the space of passivizability), we have a lot more to learn about the function of and reasons for passivizing at the kinky, idiosyncratic dangerous 'edge' of the construction, trying to ascertain: Which nonvolitional verbs allow their objects to passivize? For which speakers? Under what pragmatic/discourse conditions? Why, moreover, these contrasts? The rollerskates were found by Mrs. Engeliano/*Adherents were found by the proposed tax cut; The watch was made by Joachim/*The party was made by your cupcakes. His resignation was not desired/wanted by many.

I am not suggesting that either type of work--'middle' or 'edge'--can be, or should be, avoided. I am suggesting only that we try for a balance. And when we start looking at how speakers of 'the same dialect' can vary among themselves, we may find our breath taken away. This happened to me in connection with apparently harmless sentences like (1).

(1) We have barely $500 in the bank.

At issue here is not the grammaticality of (1)--I believe that most speakers of American find it grammatical. Rather, let us ask a semantic question: What does it mean? I will ask the reader to answer the same question I asked the audience at the oral version of this paper, a question that I have been asking groups of speakers since about 1965--by now probably around 3,000 in all. Does (1) mean (2a), (2b), or (2c)?

(2a) We have just over $500 in the bank--say $501, $502, $503...
(2b) We have just under $500 in the bank--almost $500, not quite $500, say $498 or $499.
(2c) We have around, close to, $500 in the bank--say between $495 and $505.

By now, the range of responses that reach me when I ask this question has settled into the following rough predictability: for most audiences, around 40-45% will prefer (2a) as the meaning for (1); 50-55% will prefer (2b), and usually around 5-10% will go for (2c). Furthermore, none of the people I have asked over the years has had any idea that there was any range of variation at all. If you are a (2a) speaker, as I am, you will probably regard the claim that there are (2b) and (2c) speakers with not a little incredulity--how could anyone say (1) and mean (2b)? The converse is true for (2b) or (2c) speakers. For some reason, this seems to be an area of variation which we all remain unaware of.

I will return later to discuss my conclusions from the existence of these variations around 'the' meaning of barely. Let me first, however, give two other cases with the same general characteristics.
The first is the case of [z] plurals that cause the voicing of the preceding spirant. I guess that all speakers of 'English' change the [s] of house to [z] in houses; probably most would favor knives, wives, lives, elves, selves, and halves over lifes, elfs, selfs, and halfs, but what do we do with wharves/wharves, dwarfs/dwarves, scarfs/scarves, calves/calves, and hoof/hooves? Does anyone feel strongly that there is a norm to which they are adhering? And what of 'our' usage when the plural follows Germanic -th? Do we choose [zs] or [sz] for paths, baths, truths, wreaths, and moths? Make up your mind what you do for these words; and ask ten other speakers of American what they do. See if any patterns emerge that remain when you have asked 20 or 50 people.

The second is the case of the ordering of color terms in cases like black-and-white striped cloth. Probably all of us prefer this one to white-and-black striped cloth, but when we investigate the set of possible color-pairings with some care, as Conley and Cooper (1981) have done, we find that some speakers prefer, say, red-and-yellow striped, whereas others prefer yellow-and-red. And while some prefer blue and green or green and blue (or vice versa), most would feel that less rode on their choice for this last pair than for the choice with red/yellow.

What unites the three cases I have focused on here: (1) barely, (2) 'irregular' [z] plurals, and (3) the ordering of pairs of color terms? The point is that there are cases where 'the' grammar doesn't care; each of us is left to our own devices in making a choice. We are not required to choose, and a decision to say paths 50% of the time with [z] and 50% with [s] is also a choice, one of the infinitely many available. We are given free rein to erect any kind of preference network that we would like. The preferences are in no sense necessarily bland, or wishy-washy. I, and the 40-45% who agree with me as (2a)-ists, are radically (2a): we can't believe that you (2b)-ists and (2c)-ists could possibly talk so sloppily. Nor can you believe that I do.

This is the point. In these areas, and in unguessably many more, the construction of an idiolect is guided by aesthetic considerations—not necessarily conscious ones, but aesthetic ones nonetheless. I may choose to reduce the first vowel of identify to [a], feeling that you, who always produce a clear [ay], are too fussy; you, for your part, will hear me as being too loose, or permissive. Other speakers of 'English' (or American—there is no Atlantic isogloss in such matters) will put down roots in other areas on the continuum between the extremes just described. We have the personal freedom to live anywhere on that continuum that we want to. And this is a poetic freedom.

3. In the first and third of the foregoing three cases, I doubt that any of us will have a clear intuition of the direction
of an ongoing linguistic change. It is not that those of us who prefer red-and-yellow striped to yellow-and-red striped feel that this year our numbers are greater than they were last year; that speakers who like yellow and red are fossils, and are dying out. I think that we are probably unaware of differing preferences in this area, and are therefore a fortiori unable to detect any historical shifts in progress. Exactly the same is true with the semantic 'facts' of barely; while I have not asked red-and-yellowers whether they thought they were in the majority or minority, I have asked many groups whether anyone realized other types of preferences existed, with, as I noted, no one saying they did.

With the 'irregular' [z] plurals, I would imagine that people might feel the draughts of the winds of change—that paths with [əs] is more modern, while [ɔz] is more traditional. It is a bit like we feel about whom: we know there used to be lots more whom's around than there are now (whether we regret this fact or rejoice over it).

But let us pass on to cases where we know for sure that a construction is new, is marching to wider acceptance. Do we feel comfortable in saying business-wise? opportunity-wise? How about This policy will impact on us heavily? Or You will have to corridor this area more adequately? And, how about new pronunciation? Do we embrace [nɔwkyələ] for nuclear, or insist on [nɔwkələɣə]? Or for library, can we stomach [læybəɾiː] or do we stick to our two-r guns with [læybəɾiː]? In all of these cases, we have our choice (a poetic one) to go for a new beauty, the excitement of linguistic novelty, or to join forces with such staunch supporters of traditional values as Newman and Safire. We know that as we speak, our language changes under us, around us, with us, and our aesthetic choices lead us either to embrace the newer forms, and contribute to their spread by using them ourselves, or to dig in and resist them, tooth and nail, remaining bloody but unbowed. (There are still people today who use whom as they 'should', decrying their laxer fellow speakers as sellers-out (or seller-outers?) of their language, as people who would allow their language to go to the dogs.)

It is (possibly? probably?) true that speakers can be placed in general at a point, or in a general range of the continuum that runs from fire-breathing, to-the-barricades radical innovators to copper-clad, clear-water Calvinist conservatives. Nonetheless, each of us can, if they? he? she or he? he or she? we? will, cheerfully be basically radical, while containing conservative pockets, or basically conservative, with radical tumors. Or any mix of these whatsoever. Thus I view myself as being basically pretty much of a fire-breather, and willing to let just about any junk pass under my (ex-)tonsils, but for some reason, the pronunciation of nuclear as if it were spelled 'nucular', which it doubtless will be, all too soon, sticks in my craw.
The point of this discussion is that we all have a vote in the future of American (or British, Strine,...; and in the long run, English in general). The productivity of -wise, the pronunciation of nuclear, the [m] on whom—all depend on each individual one of us, though sociopolitical or biographical considerations weight our votes differentially. (Thus Dwight David Eisenhower's use of nucular on national media will doubtless count infinitely many times more than my steely resolve never to say it until my dying breath.) When we perceive a change in progress, we may drag our feet or put our shoulder to the wheel. While our instruments for assessing the differences made by an individual are not up to the task (and they may never be), there can be no doubt that 'the' overall grammar of a dialect must be some composite function of the individual preferences of its speakers, its poets.

4. What else does each of us poets do? It is clear that each of us makes individual decisions about how much agency or intentionality we wish to impute to someone in a situation:

(3a) Teresa [murdered] Harriet.

(3b) Harriet [was] [murdered].

(3c) Harriet died tragically.

Or about how much subjectivity we wish to impart to our utterance—how much we wish to hide ourselves:

(4a) I'm angry.

(4b) I feel [angry].

(4c) I have a feeling of anger.

(4d) There is a feeling of anger (in me).

We also decide how much politeness and/or formality we want to put in each sentence, and how vague or clear we wish to be, and how fast we want to speak (therefore, how many of the fast speech rules will apply). Will four hundred and seventy-five be [fo:w hændrə dænd ˈseɪvnti ˈfeɪv] or [fəhˈɑrsɛfˈɛɪ] or something in between? The choice here is up to us, and as with the above cases, it is a choice made on aesthetic grounds. Each of us has feelings about what sounds sloppy or too prissy for a given situation, and the degree of speed that we use is chosen as a consequence.

In all of the cases discussed so far, what was at issue was where individual speakers chose to position themselves within the space of possibilities that are already present in the language, in some sense. But in addition, each of us takes a stand with respect to how much we are willing to break new ground. This summer, I heard a speaker on a Georgetown
University podium say conspirational (with a meaning roughly like 'conspiratorial'). Tom Robbins, in *Jitterbug Perfume*, coins the word *deathist*. And I once said something like *I'm going to de-Agatha-Christify my solution*. These are new by virtue of being stretchings of word formation rules; it is easy to find stretchings of conditions on syntactic rules as well.

(5) The *by now on their feet and cheering wildly* delegates approved the proposal on the first ballot. [Stretching of the normal conditions or prenominal modifiers.]

(6a) Is it OK to park your car on the bridge tonight?
(6b) Is it OK to park my car WHAT the bridge tonight?!?
[Stretching of the normal condition limiting WH-words to NPs, PPs, APs, and verbs (*You're going to WHAT my proposal!??*)], in that order of preference to include prepositions.]

(7) ...you've got to be grabbed by this knowledge, lived by it--you've got to be *beed* by it. [Approximate quote from a Ram Dass talk. Note how he has, in analyzing *be* as a transitive, passivizable verb, made it into a regular one: the irregular (normal) *been* is replaced by the irregular (abnormal) *beed.*]

In a sense, we can view each such innovative use of the system that is American as a referendum, to be rejected or ratified by later speakers, just as some great lines or phrases from previous poets get ratified and become part of the prior texts (Becker 1984) of most educated speakers (the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune; seen through a glass darkly; To be or not to be; not with a bang but a whimper; Things fall apart--the center cannot hold). (Some truly incredible things have been voted in--a personal favorite of mine is *stick-to-it-iveness*. Who would have given that one a chance to survive? Maybe there is yet hope for *de-Agatha-Christify*.

The American language of today, full of the results of countless referenda, with their fallout--words like *be-in, stick-to-it-iveness, airhead, far out, to streak NP*--is a bit like what we might call *The* Book of American Folk Songs, which contains 'De Camptown Races', 'Go Tell Aunt Rhody', 'You Are My Sunshine', 'Roll Out the Barrel', and so on. American is like a living artistic tradition.

5. Thus one of the things that American, like all languages, shares with a poem, is the fact that it is in part the result of happy accidents, like the fact that the verb phrase *stick to it* ends with the [st] which often precedes -ive: additive, operative, figurative, administrative, diminutive, intuitive. This accident of phonetics made it possible for some unremembered poet to take a flyer on *sticktoitive*, the presumed base of
stick-to-it-iveness. Enough people liked this flyer to vote (with their tongues) for its adoption, et voilà! Another word is born.

Having laid some weight on the serendipitous aspects of American, let me counterbalance by insisting that Ferdinand de Saussure was absolutely right in his dictum 'La langue est un système où tout se tient' ('Language is a system in which all parts hold together'). This finds an echo in the great poet-painter William Blake's statement from 'A Vision of the Last Judgment' (cited in Jakobson 1970), as he was comparing his two artistic media: 'Not a line is drawn without intention ...as Poetry admits not a Letter that is Insignificant. So Painting admits not a Grain of Sand or a Blade of Grass Insignificant, much less an Insignificant Blur or Mark.'

I want to emphasize one phrase of Blake's in particular: 'Poetry admits not a Letter that is Insignificant'. In my work on poems over the past eight years, I have taken Blake at his word, and have benefited enormously from doing so. To live by this maxim of Blake's has been to dedicate myself to finding explanations for the distribution of each individual phoneme (and of course, a fortiori, for the distribution of every linguistically significant higher-order property--e.g. initial consonant clusters, or polysyllabicity, or morphologically complex words, or prepositional phrases).

I have found Blake's maxim, which I will refer to as the Assumption of Total Significance (ATS), to be an extraordinarily tough drillmaster, but I see no alternative weaker than the ATS which it seems to make sense to adopt. So let me show one case in which living under the discipline of the ATS brought rich rewards. The poem in question is a justly famous one by William Carlos Williams (from Williams 1970).

The Red Wheelbarrow

so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow

glazed with rain
water

beside the white
chickens.

A cursory inspection suggests that this poem concerns the mental state of reflection--reflection about the interconnectedness of the ecological web of which we are a part. As George Miller suggested to me, the poem might evoke the kind of experience we could imagine as follows: we have been working
in the garden, and the rain has come, forcing us to interrupt our work and seek shelter. After the storm has passed, we open the door to go out again to our farming, and we see the tableau the poem describes: the wheelbarrow, a symbol of the implements and artifacts we humans use to make our planet feed us; the glaze of the water that the sky gives us to satisfy our thirst, and make our crops grow; and the chickens, symbols of the animal world whom we have tamed and who feed us. The colors are the primal ones of red and white, and the transparency of the clear water we need to drink—three of the most basic visual experiences. Williams has made this a static scene: by calling the water a glaze, he has stopped it from flowing, made it into a mirror. And Williams reverses normal order by placing the wheelbarrow beside the chickens. We normally say, as Ann Borkin helped me to see,

*The farmer (movable) was beside the barn (immovable)*, rather than the reverse. To say *The barn was beside the farmer* seems to freeze the farmer in his tracks. Williams has drained the motion from the chickens.

As the time around us has slowed to a stop, we sink into our reflection of how much we depend upon the simple tools and foods and water, and upon the good Earth from which they come—until the last word of the poem, the only one of the poem's four disyllabic even lines that has a short, quick high front vowel: *chickens*. Paradoxically, despite the fact that *beside* seems to have frozen the chickens into immobility, the sound of this word breaks the spell, snaps us out of the mystical feeling of union with the things of our mother, the Earth, who supports us. We return to life as usual, pick up our wheelbarrow, get back to our work. Thus, the experiential journey that the reader is invited to participate in is a voyage from usual time, to stopped, mystical time, the time of the state of Union with Universe—to return, with a jerk, to everyday, regular time, again—but with everything changed, freshened—as the earth itself is freshened, the air cleansed, by the rain.

If the basic experiential journey is thus the ABA of the sonata form, what has Williams done with the forms his words take? For as Williams says before reading aloud one of his poems from *Spring and All* (which contains our poem about the wheelbarrow):

> You notice what I said: there is no subject the modern poem cannot approach. There is no selected material. It's what you do with the work of art. It's what you put on the canvas and how you put it that makes the picture. It's how the words fit in.

> Poems are not made of thoughts, beautiful thoughts—it's made of words, pigments, put on—here, there; made; actually.¹

So let us see how Williams has made his canvas.
Each of the four four-word verses of 'The Red Wheelbarrow' has a rigid form: three words on its first line, and one disyllable as its second, giving even the visual shape, as Mieke Hoffmann has pointed out to me, of four small wheelbarrows. Aside from these four even-line disyllables, there are only two in the poem: depends in the first stanza, and beside in the last. And each of these two consists of an unstressed prefix ending in [a], followed by a stressed root. This extra syllable in lines 1 and 7 thus links first stanza to last, as does the fact that the two [z] suffixes are placed to end the poem's first and last lines. The two central stanzas are also linked together by salient properties: they contain the poem's only two compound nouns, wheel/barrow and rain/water, placed identically so that the first half of each compound comes at line end. And these two stanzas also contain all of the poem's six liquids: one [r] per line, and one [l] in each odd line of the central pair of stanzas.

Thus if we refer to our four wheelbarrows as A–D, we see clear evidence that Williams has shaped them into the reflecting structure shown in (8).

(8)

```
A

B

C

D

```

Since the location of polysyllables plays such a salient role in the establishing of this mirror structure, let us look inside the individual syllables, to see how Williams has made use of the possibilities that the syllabic structures of American afford. Overwhelmingly, the poem's 22 syllables are of the simplest types: 10 are of the form (C)V, and 7 more are closed by a single consonant: CVC. The first word to contain a syllable which contains a consonant cluster is the last word of the first line: depend + s. Its cluster, though clearly triconsonantal /nds/ morphophonemically, is probably realized as the phonetically biconsonantal [nz] in the speech of most Americans, who do not distinguish between fends and fens. The last syllable to contain a consonant cluster is the last word of the last line--also a bisyllable: chicken + s, and its cluster is also bimorphemic, since it contains the plural morpheme -s. Thus, seen from the point of view of final clusters, the poem pairs its extremes in yet another way: [nz] opens and closes the poem.

When we turn to initial clusters, we find the same phenomenon: the first candidate for cluster pronunciation is wheel, which can in careful speech be realized with an initial [hw]. I suspect that in 1921, when the poem was written, this was even more
the case, though in listening to Williams' own pronunciation, say of the short quote above, the three occurrences of what are all spoken without clusters, as [w]. At any rate, it is clear that most speakers would feel that any word spelled with <wh> could be pronounced [hw], in a sufficiently careful pronunciation, so I think it is relevant that the first initial cluster (possibility) in our poem, namely, the [(h)w] of wheel, is matched by the last initial cluster: the [(h)w] of white. And both of these words are at line ends, in corresponding lines in the two halves of the poem—the third line of the first half (AB), and the third line of the second half (CD).

Let me de-Agatha-Christify slightly: I have been trying, dear Reader, to lull you into overlooking the fact that there is one syllable in the poem, and only one, which both begins and ends in a cluster:

    glazed

This word, coming as the ninth of the poem's sixteen words, opens the poem's second half. Geometrically, with respect to the mirror symmetry displayed in (8), it comes immediately after the invisible mirror axis dividing CD from AB. And this word, highlighted as it is by being the poem's most complex syllable, is also given a high profile by virtue of containing the only other suffix, the past tense/participle forming -d, besides the -s of depends/chickens.

Meanwhile, what is the syntax saying? Very much the same thing. The poem's first clause, which ends with wheel/barrow, has two constituents: a two-word abstract subject and a six-word verb phrase. A relatively uncontroversial parsing of this clause would be something like the tree shown in (9).

![Syntax Tree](image)

What we note about this tree is that it is very right-branching. Every one of the words following the subject (except the last, of course) introduces a new constituent.
There are no constituents which have following modifiers, nor are there any coordinate nodes. After wheel/barrow, however, all this is changed. The third verse is a postnominal modifier of this central noun of the poem, as is the fourth verse. These two modifiers feel coordinate to me, rather than nested; thus a fair guess at their syntactic structure would be that shown in (10).

\[(10)\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
S_2 \\
S_{21} \\
V \\
glazed \\
p \\
\text{with} \\
N \\
\text{rain} \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
S_{22} \\
PP \\
P \\
beside \\
NP \\
\text{the} \\
Adj \\
N \\
\text{white chickens} \\
\end{array}
\]

Presumably, this coordinate modifier would be attached in an expanded (9) to another NP directly above NP_2. The subtree would look like that in (11).

\[(11)\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
NP_2 \\
\text{a} \\
\begin{array}{c}
Adj \\
\text{red} \\
\end{array}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
S_{21} \\
P_2 \\
S_2 \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
S_{22} \\
\\end{array}
\]

The point is that after wheel/barrow, which ends the long right-branching constituent of (9), we find the poem's first posthead modifier, which is the entire tree of (10). All of (10) depends, syntactically, on wheel/barrow—that's how much depends on it. As we pass from barrow to glazed, we shift from one kind of syntax (right-branchingness) to another (that of posthead modifiers), and from a general pattern of subordination to the large coordinate node (whether it be S_2 or some other is irrelevant) at the root of (10), the node which loosely links the two last verses of the poem. I think this latter change—from subordination to coordination—is a good syntactic analog for the change from the normal perception
of time as an evenly flowing medium (cf. many expressions like as time went by, etc.) to the static perception of mystical time.

And now let us return for another look at the poem's swing word—glazed. For its morphological complexity goes deeper than the fact that it contains a suffix, because the verb glaze, to which the suffix is attached, is itself the only derivationally complex word of the poem. Its root is the noun glass, and the translucency of glass is the visual experience that is shared by the denominal verb glaze and its base glass. As Pete Becker called to my attention, here is a fundamental point of fusion for form and function: formally, glazed comes at precisely the turning-point in the A B C D mirror antisymmetry whose properties I have been describing; functionally, the meaning of glass, and the visual experience of clarity coupled with light reflection, is the point of our mental re-fection, of our being flexed back. And the seeing of rain into a glaze, the stopping of time by imputing viscosity to water coincides with the visual experience. Thus Williams' gift to us, in these diamond-bright 22 syllables, is one of those magical cusps, or nodes, of life, in which properties of sound and vision and mind interpenetrate and become one.

6. But I have yet to honor Blake's insight fully, for I have not shown what results when we examine the dance that each individual sound enters into. I have deferred this matter until I had taken up the broader issue of the experience-concept that the poem centers around, for it is only against the background of reflection, in both its primary visual sense, and in its metaphorical sense of musing, turning over in one's mind, that we can see the fullest significance of the distribution of individual segments on the poem's structure.

Deagathachrististically, what happens is that the theme of reflection is reenacted in the lives of almost every sound we consider in the poem, for almost all of them occur in pairs. Three—all dentals (namely, d, n, and r) occur in pairs of pairs, and one—the central vowel /ə/ ([a] when unstressed) occurs eight times. Furthermore, the way these segment pairs are deployed in the poem makes structural sense. For example, the two [ɔw]'s are the first and last vowels of verses A and B; thus I will say that [ɔw] 'brackets' the first half of the poem. And the two [ɔw]'s though they are not the first and last consonants of the poem, still occur in its first and last line, so I will say that they too have a bracketing function: they bracket the whole poem, as do the [nz] final clusters.

The two [hw] initial clusters do not bracket, but they function to establish a kind of equivalence between the two halves AB and CD, since these clusters show up in the last word of the third line of each half. Similarly, each of the four audible [d]'s shows up in an odd line. In such cases, I will use
a metaphor from forestry: I will say that the [d]'s 'blaze' the odd lines, and the [hw]'s the even stanzas. And similarly, the liquids blaze the poem's two central stanzas, B and C.

In (12), I have listed the pairs of segments, and to the right, where appropriate, I have named the function that I ascribe to them.

(12a) s: 1so, 7beside Blazes AD (or brackets the whole poem?)
(12b) ðw: 1so, 4barrow Brackets first half
(12c) ç: 1much, 8chickens Brackets whole poem
(12d) p: 1depends, 2upon Blazes A
(12e) ĕ: 1depends, 3red Blazes AB
(12f) :hw: 3wheel, 7white Blazes BD
(12g) l: 3wheel, 5glazed Blazes BC
(12h) b: 4barrow, 7beside Blazes BD
(12i) ĕy: 5glazed, 5rain Blazes C
(12j) w: 5with, 6water Blazes C
(12k) ď: 5with, 7the Blazes CD
(12l) I: 5with, 8chickens Blazes CD
(12m) t: 6water, 7white Blazes CD
(12n) ĕy: 7beside, 7white Blazes D

In (13), I have arrayed the poem's three sounds that occur four times: the obstruent [d] and the two sonorants, [n] and [r].

(13a) d: 1depend(d)s, 3red, 5glazed, 7beside [Occurs in a mirror-image sequence: disyllable-mono-syllable-mono-syllable-disyllable]

(13b) n: 1depend(d)s 2upon [n], 5rain [n], chickens Brackets A [Note that all [n]'s occur line-finally, in a mirror-image sequence: nz - n - n - nz 2 syll 1 syll 2 syll]
The four [r]'s alternate between monosyllables and disyllables, and between prevocalic and postvocalic position.]

Finally, in (14), I have shown how the distribution of the mid central vowel [ʌ]~[ɔ] supports the basic mirroring pattern which sets peripheral stanzas AD off against central ones BC.

What can be said about the nonpaired sounds, which I will call orphans? There are seven sounds which occur just once; I list them in (15).

They have a kind of logic, despite their irregularity: they occur just once per line, in every line but the seventh.

There is just one other segment to be mentioned. In addition to the 14 paired segments and nuclei of (12), the three quads of (13), the lone octet of (14), and the seven orphans of (15), there is one sound that occurs three times: [z].

Thus [z]'s function is to appear in all final clusters: to appear as the second consonant of the cluster as it ends the first and last lines of the poem, and to appear as the first consonant of its cluster at the mirror axis of the poem as it begins the line that starts the second half of the poem. So [z] opens, closes,
and splits the poem, and is the consonant which the [s] of glass is linked to as it turns into the [z] of the crucial verb glaze.

There are many more beautiful patterns that appear as we look ever more closely at the dynamic structure into which Williams has made, actually, them, but I must return to my major theme, and leave this dazzling, bottomless work of art until I can return for a future visit.

Let me close, however, with two final observations about this poem. The segmental doubling (quadrupling and octupling) that I have pointed out here is unique in my experience of poetry. It grew organically out of Williams' caring for the reflection that leads to the realization of interconnectedness, and it may or may not ever have been used before or be used again by any poet to make words shine. It is, in Pete Becker's words, a particularity. Robert Frost, in his important essay on composition, 'The Figure a Poem Makes', says it clearly:

Just as the first mystery was how a poem could have a tune in such a straightness as metre, so the second mystery is how a poem can have wildness and at the same time a subject that shall be fulfilled.

It should be of the pleasure of a poem itself to tell how it can. The figure a poem makes. It begins in delight and ends in wisdom. The figure is the same as for love. No one can really hold that the ecstasy should be static and stand still in one place. It begins in delight, it inclines to the impulse, it assumes direction with the first line laid down, it runs a course of lucky events, and ends in a clarification of life—not necessarily a great clarification, such as sects and cults are founded on, but in a momentary stay against confusion. It has dénouement. It has an outcome that though unforeseen was predestined from the first image of the original mood—and indeed from the very mood. It is but a trick poem and no poem at all if the best of it was thought of first and saved for the last. It finds its own name as it goes and discovers the best waiting for it in some final phrase at once wise and sad—the happy-sad blend of the drinking song."

What is relevant to note in the particular context of this paper is that Frost's observation about the uniqueness of poetic structures imposes upon the student of poetry a very delicate task. We must approach the poem with the greatest respect. While we may have read many poems before, poems which have suggested theories of possible meters, possible rhymes, possible rhyme schemes, possible stanzaic types, and so on, we must hold these theories, these previous understandings of poetry, with a feather-light touch, and be ready to abandon them instantly in case we should be presented with a structure that
has never before been seen in any poem in the history of poetry (which may well be the case for the 'segmental rhyme' that Williams shows us). Our stance toward the poem must be like that of the martial arts master, or of the Zen swordsperson—expecting no particular kind of attack, thus ready, or open, for attack from any quarter. The type of stance that has proved to be necessary for me in my work with poems is described by the biologist T. H. Huxley (quoted in Marilyn Ferguson's article in Wilber 1982): 'Sit down before fact like a little child, and be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses Nature leads, or you shall learn nothing.'

How does this stance of openness to the particular in a given poem translate, for the major concern of my paper? If we are to see any language we work on as a poem, this means that we must be ever alert for what that language may be doing in its articulation of its structure that is absolutely unique in the history of the world. To be sure, we study universal grammar and language typology intensively, in as great a depth as possible before we approach our language, but we hold all of our conclusions as lightly as we hold our theories of possible poetic form when we approach a poem. For we are aware that a case of theoretical lockjaw is always a danger; that if our commitments to what we have seen in our previous work ever leads us to say anything like

my theory forces me to say ...

then we may miss entirely the unique gift that this particular language has for us. Pete Becker has told me that older grammars used to have a section called 'The genius of the language'; there they would discuss those features of the language's structure that gave it its unique stamp, its individuality. As syntacticians, we can readily identify some features of this type, after working with a range of language. Some candidates that I would suggest are: for English, the system of auxiliary verbs and its interaction with adverbs of negation and other types; and the system of verbal particles like up, down, out, etc.; for French, the system of preverbal clitics, and their interaction with causatives; and the mare's nest of problems associated with être (qu'est-ce que c'est que and so on); for Japanese, the tangled lives of the particles wa, ga, o, mo, ni, and the system of honorifics; for German, the problems of the Vorfeld—what constituents can occur preverbally in main (and in subordinate) clauses—and of so-called Satztonungspartikel (ja, doch, mal, schon, aber, etc.) predominate.

I'm sure that all of us who have worked in any depth on any aspect of a language (phonology, morphology, semantics, whatever), would have their favorite bog to contribute. But my feeling is that we have been taught either to disregard such
kinky uniquenesses that we encounter, or to 'explain them away', as the locution goes (away? Where could they go?), by showing how they all follow as corollaries of universal principles. To hold the vision that languages are to be seen as poems is to commit oneself to the ATS in all our work as linguists, not only when we look at literary works of art. And this raises mind-boggling swarms of questions for us. For we will have to note not only that a given language is or is not subject to some syntactic constraint; or is agglutinating or synthetic; or has vowel harmony or not—we will have to try to connect the answers to all of these questions. I do not say that there is no work that has this type of holistic bent. Lehmann (1973) and Donegan and Stampe (1983) have exactly this flavor, and there are doubtless many others that I do not know. Nonetheless, if we divide the work of linguistics along the lines laid down by the sociologist Wilhelm Windelband (cited in Kramer 1980:68) into the 'nomothetic' (having to do with finding general laws and typological implications) and the 'ideographic' (concerning the unique, the nonrepeatable, such as the structure of particular transcripts, particular histories of language acquisition or loss, particular works of art), then the bulk of work in linguistics has been nomothetic.

In arguing that we should view languages as poems, I am suggesting that we right an imbalance. I have done a lot of nomothetic linguistics myself, and I hope to continue. But the taste for the ideographic which working with poetry has given me has convinced me that far better than doing only nomothetic, or only ideographic, work is finding a stance toward language in which both emphases are in dialogue, and mutually inform each other. And in such thinking, we cannot let our theories force us to say anything. The etymology of theory suggests that since this word derived from the Greek verb *theasthai* 'to watch, observe' (from *thea*, 'a viewing'), it was originally taken to be something like a vantage point from which to view the object of study. I have often found myself arguing for 'the' theory of language, of passives, of universal grammar. But now it seems to me far more fruitful to return to the vantage-point conception of theory; for obviously, the more vantage points we have to look at something from, the fuller will be our understanding of it.

We can return to William Carlos Williams' poem for a helpful analogy. In my discussion, I was concerned with showing how phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics unite to give us the experience of reflection upon our interconnectedness. But how do these four great pillars of linguistic theorizing interrelate? How, exactly, do they unite?

In generative grammar, we have talked about a phonological or a syntactic component of the grammar as a whole. But I have come to feel that this word may be inappropriate, since it suggests a metaphor of division, of cutting into pieces. The prototypical entity that has components, after all, is the
machine. Carburetors and distributors are components, or parts, of automobile engines. And parts can be removed, or interchanged, or studied (and repaired) in isolation.

I would like to sidle up to a different metaphor for the way phonology, morphology, and so on interconnect. Let me start first with a visual analog, which I think John Lawler first suggested to me. As we study the patterns of distribution of individual segments, of bisyllables, of noun phrases, of morphological complexity, of words that refer to visual experiences, suppose we think of ourselves as putting the results of each investigation on a transparent sheet of plastic, like those used in overhead projectors. Each sheet will have its own internal logic: that for \([\text{ Ow}]\) in our poem will be concerned with setting off the first half of the poem against the second, while those for \([b]\) or for color words will set off even stanzas against odd ones, and thus contribute to a feeling of alternation, and so on for all of the indefinitely many other sheets we would need. The way we could look upon what happens to us as we read the poem is that we peer down from above, our gaze passing through the whole stack of transparencies.

If we are visual people, the image of passing over a thick stack of transparencies and peering down through them, noting similarities between patterns (say, between two patterns each having the function of separating our four-stanza poem into two halves) as visual alignments, may speak to us clearly. However, not all of us are visual, so let me suggest one more metaphor—the metaphor of music.

If we listen to a great symphony, like Beethoven's Ninth, we are first struck by the immensity of the total work. But if we are interested in appreciating this awesomeness further, we can go to the score and examine each individual part, each voice of the symphony. Because Beethoven is an inspired creator, every voice we look at/listen to will have its logic, harmony, and beauty. Whether we listen to bassoon, third violin, French horn, or tympani, we know that Beethoven's love and caring extended to the part that each of these instruments plays. So if we listen just to the bassoon's voice, we will hear a beautiful melody. And we will hear, albeit dimly, The Ninth. For the business of the great composer is to find a bassoonic way of 'saying' the beauty of The Ninth, a way that is particularly suited to the range of the bassoon and to the particular timbres it affords the ear. Or, said slightly differently (visually, in fact), this business is to find a bassoon 'take' of The Ninth. So we can get a taste of The Ninth by listening to the bassoon's voice, another by listening to the tympani's, and yet another from the French horn's. But not until all of these voices are integrated, i.e. sounded simultaneously, will we hear the majesty of the symphony as a whole.

To me, it 'makes' sense to see, i.e. to think of, the phonological patterns of our poem as individual voices in a symphonic score, and to think of a morphological voice and of a syntactic
voice, and of a semantic one. Because Williams is a master poet, each individual voice must within itself articulate the particular beauty of this poem. Let us say, for the purposes of discussion, that in this case it is a beauty which revolves around the peace and clarity that come from the experience of reflecting upon our interconnectedness. We can 'hear' this experience of re-flectedness possibly most directly in the many phonological voices of this poem, but it is there morphologically, syntactically, and semantically/imagistically as well. And not until we hear all of these voices at once can we participate in the great architecture of coincidences and synchronicities—temporal alignments, if you will—that Williams has put on—here, there; made; actually.

7. Let me remind you that I have been discussing the visual metaphor of transparencies and the auditory one of musical voices in the context of my concern with finding a helpful way to deal with the pluralism of all the theories that have been created in linguistics over the years. Insofar as each theory has been made with the same kind of love and caring and respect for language that Beethoven had when he wrote the bassoon voice of his Ninth—and I think that this is almost universally the case—then each theory will give us a 'take', or a way of hearing, the central symphony of Language—and we will not fully experience this symphony, or sounding together, until we have stretched our theoretical ears and allowed ourselves to hear the particular beauties to be found in each individual theoretical voice.

If we collect and classify the kind of work on language that we have all been doing collectively over the years into the two great rivers called nomothetic and ideographic, then we realize that we must stretch our ears to be able to hear nomothetic beauties (if we are primarily ideographs), or ideographic ones (if we are nomothetes). These two basic scientific 'takes' are also voices that we must allow to sound together.

How does this work, concretely, this 'sounding together'? In the case of the Williams poem, being open to the nomothetic means noticing ways in which the poem conforms to patterns we have seen elsewhere in our work with poetry. Noting, for example, that the first stanza is perfectly iambic, and that the fact that the last word of the poem is a trochee itself does not preclude the last stanza from also being given an iambic scan-sion. So we use an already developed theory—in this case, a theory of iambic meter—as far as we can, but we do not let it 'force us to say' anything about the second stanza of the poem, which seems completely uniambic. And being open to the ideographic means seeing the pattern of segmental rhyme, in all its intricacy and particularity, even though it may never contribute anything to any theory of possible sound harmonies, because it may never have been used before, and may never be used again.
8. I said earlier that there were two more things to be pointed out in connection with our poem; the first has been the foregoing discussion of the need to counterpoint our usually predominantly nomothetic ways of study with an equally strong ideographic voice, so that a rarely beautiful uniqueness, like segmental rhyme, can be held up to be marveled at.

The second thing to be observed is possibly so obvious as to be coals to Newcastle, but I think it deserves at least passing mention. It is that, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Ross 1982a,b), poems have what I have called holographic structures. That is, they say what they say neither one time only, nor in only one place. Rather, their 'message' (I have been trying to avoid this odious term--poems are not about things, they are things. They constitute experiences, they are musicians, inviting us to dance to their tunes) is shot through them, a bit like a theme through a symphony. Thus it makes no sense to ask of our poem where the notion of reflection is expressed, for it appears everywhere—in every pair of segments that we encounter. This means that the conduit metaphor, which Reddy (1979) discusses and exemplifies brilliantly, while it is unquestionably valid and of great importance for many types of communication, is not relevant for poetry. The conduit metaphor views communication as proceeding on the analogy with the transfer of physical objects. Meanings are seen as objects which are located inside the heads of speakers and hearers. Words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs are seen as containers, into which speakers may put meaning. Once a speaker has filled a linguistic object with meaning, it is pushed through a conduit, a tube-like passageway, to the hearer, who 'unpacks' the linguistic containers, putting their meanings into her or his head. Some conventionalized expressions clearly exhibit the conduit metaphor at work: Take that thought and put it earlier in the sentence. She really crams a lot of information into this chapter. Am I getting through to you? We couldn't get anything out of this phrase. Her words carry a lot of weight with my boss.

This image, which we might call the American Airlines view of communication, just isn't relevant for the way poetry affects us, which, as I have tried to show, is multilayered (or polyphonic) and simultaneous. Indeed, the degree to which a given text is multiply interconnected and asequential may well be just the degree of poeticality with which the text was written.

9. I come now to an aspect of poetry which is absolutely central to my theme, yet also hardest to say anything about. I refer to the mystical aspects of poetry. Possibly the best way to begin is with the words of the poet-philosopher Gary Snyder (1980:21):
The true poem is walking that edge between what can be said and that which cannot be said.

It is obvious, as soon as we think about it even a little, that for all the infinities of things that any language allows us to say, these infinities are dwarfed by the immensity of what lies beyond the edge of the sayable. A quick example comes from José Ortega y Gasset’s brilliant paper, 'On the difficulty of reading.' There, Ortega y Gasset points out that no language has a word for the precise order of white on which the words you are now reading are printed, though it is easy to discriminate visually between that white and dozens of other shades of paper that a half-hour’s search will reveal.

And of course, if describing this white is impossible, how much more so is describing the changing colors of a sunset, or the feelings that the sunset touched off in you? When we look at the vocabulary for emotions that American provides and compare them with those we would like to be able to convey, we can only cry or laugh.

The language in which we live is like a small, though infinite, island, and all around us is the vast ocean of the unsayable. But poets, when they write what Snyder calls true poems, are not content to let this situation obtain. With the help of the kind of symmetries and patternings that we have seen in our poem, they stretch the envelope of the sayable.

And why do they do this? Why bother? Why all the effort? While there is great utility in our language, while it allows us to infer the existence of other beings as complex and indescribable as we are, through the words they say to us, there are truths and beauties all around us, at every moment, which enrich our lives immeasurably, on our island, if we have ever experienced them: the miracle of love, of forgiveness, of grace. And as we are social beings, we want to tell our friends of these experiences, to share them, for they are truly what makes our lives full, and worth living. All those of us who study language with every ounce of energy at our command, know that if our efforts are pure, and if we persist, and if we are lucky enough, we will be blessed with an Aha! Or even with an Eureka!!! The Light will come to us. I think the whole of science, at its best, is an enterprise for trying to share, and pass on, just one of the unsayable experiences: the experience of Light.

If we regard languages as poems, and thus ourselves as the authors of the collective poem that we speak in, we are led to ask such questions as: What has the creation of American made sayable that would not be sayable without it? Or: What things are sayable in Lakhota but not in American? (For each poem stretches the boundary of our island differently.) And since we study poems to search them for meanings, we can ask: What are the meanings of American?
I do not say that these are easy questions—merely that they are beautiful ones, for me. And I have always been inspired by this line from an introduction by e.e. cummings to a volume of his poems (1963:332):

Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question

I think it is always horizon-expanding to leave the closed realm of the questions that we know how to go about finding answers for and to confront questions that take our breath away. To be baffled is a sacred experience.

For when we leave the island of answerability, we embark on a voyage that takes us not merely beyond what is known; it may even bring us face to face with the Unknowable. The Fathomless. Gary Snyder (1980:65) has said it better than I know how to:

We all know that the power of a great poem is not that we felt that person expressed himself well. We don't think that. What we think is 'How deeply I am touched.' That's our level of response. And the great poet does not express his or herself, he expresses all of our selves. And to express all of ourselves, you have to go beyond your own self. Like Dōgen, the Zen master said, 'We study the self to forget the self. And when you forget the self, you become one with all things.'

10. I have been going on about languages and poems for probably too long already. I feel like I am arguing a point. But arguing is just the wrong mode. Fusing my vision of poems and that of languages has just been the deepest answer to Pete Becker's question that has come to me. I don't want to urge you to find my answer, or indeed any particular one. I would just like to invite you to open yourself to Pete's question, and to follow wherever and to whatever abysses that question leads you.

Notes

Permission for use of quotations from William Carlos Williams (The Red Wheelbarrow) and from Gary Snyder is gratefully acknowledged, as follows:


To whom is my debt for what I have seen in poetry the most enormous? There are too many to name you all—so let me just say three, and thank the others in silence: Rosália Dutra, Pete Becker, and Roman Jakobson.

2. Exactly what this node should be called, if anything, is controversial, so I'll give it the '?' label.

3. I don't know whether these S-nodes (or indeed any) should be pruned; let's leave them in for discussion.

4. From the Preface to Frost (1949). I am indebted to Anneliese Kramer for giving me this powerful quote, and for her many insights into poetics, and into linguistic theory. Cf. her penetrating thesis (Kramer 1980).

5. A beautifully argued and lucid exposition of a formal theory of iambic meter is found in Halle and Keyser (1966).

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THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

Charles A. Ferguson
Stanford University

1. In many speech communities a formal presentation would begin with a piece of God-talk. In some Islamic universities, for example, this paper would begin with the Koranic formula Bismillahi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm 'In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate'. The speaker might even go on to recite further material from the Holy Koran, the Traditions of the Prophet, or other writings.

As students of discourse analysis, we might ask what communicative functions are served by such an opening move. The most obvious function is that of a boundary marker or segmentation device; many forms of discourse have conventional indicators of beginnings and endings and markers of structural segments of the discourse. If we are sociolinguistically oriented, we assume also that the use of the opening God-words affirms the group identity of speaker and audience and reinforces shared beliefs and values. It may even make a partisan statement showing that the speaker takes a certain position on how explicitly Islamic the university life should be.

On those occasions when speakers add further material beyond the opening formula, they are giving their hearers advance notice of points they will make in the paper, and the hearers may also appreciate the sensitivity and good judgment of the speakers in selecting appropriate quotations. This is the communicative function of the clever, witty, or poetic epigraph at the head of an essay, chapter, or whole book in our own tradition.

All this is well and good, but I want to note one further function that is likely to be neglected or disregarded by analysts. The opening God-words in our example transmit—at some level of sincerity or hypocrisy, with some kind of theological understanding—an unmistakably religious message. The speaker expresses his intention to present his paper 'in the name of God'.

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I have spent a precious minute or two of my allotted time on this introductory point in order to note that religious discourse, whether in extensive texts or barely present in other discourse, is not often analyzed at all, especially in our own society, even though it may have lessons to teach us. The study of religious discourse from a sociolinguistic perspective is likely to teach us something about how a language works and might even teach us something about the nature of religious knowledge and religious behavior (cf. Samarin 1976).

The particular kind of religious discourse I want to deal with is the kind of extended text associated with a certain group religious activity type. I am using 'activity type' here in the sense of Levinson (1979), who calls it 'a fuzzy category whose focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded events with constraints on participants, setting and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contribution.' The activity type in question is the American Sunday 'church service', even though Levinson dismisses that (or at least the Roman Mass), with considerable exaggeration, as a 'totally prepackaged activity'. On any Sunday, millions of Americans participate in this activity, in which a body of verbal discourse is jointly produced in a framework of shared understandings and expectations about the constraints on the participants' respective contributions.

If the leaders and the people are viewed as professionals and clients, this kind of discourse could be included under the general rubric of 'language and the professions', but the Sunday morning rituals do not fit too well with the kinds of discourse typically analyzed in studies of professional language (Shuy 1984). With somewhat greater justification the discourse of the church service could be seen as an example of 'institutionally regulated communication', as is done in Gülich (1981), where pieces of church service discourse are treated along with pieces of courtroom discourse and other institutional behavior. I am tempted myself to include this kind of religious discourse in the category of what I have come to call 'formatted discourse', in which the texts are composed and produced on the spot but within quite rigid guidelines or formatting, as, for example, the discourse of all-news radio stations. Here, however, I prescind from further efforts at discourse classification and proceed with the paper.

The data on which my remarks are based come from three sources: Pike's description of an 'informal evangelical' church service published in his Language in relation to a unified theory (Pike 1967), the detailed description of an Old Order Amish church service by Enninger and Raith (1982), and observations of my own on the 12:15 Sunday Mass at Dahlgren Chapel here on the Georgetown University campus.

In any full description of church service discourse, it is necessary to specify in some detail the significant facts of setting, participants, nonverbal behavior, and so on into which
the verbal behavior fits. Here, however, I focus on the discourse itself and mention other phenomena only when required for the point being made.

First, we notice that this activity-discourse is somewhat sharply segmented into a succession of speech events, each of which can be characterized on various levels. In a few instances, to be sure, different events are simultaneous. For example, in the Old Order Amish service, while the first hymn is being sung, the ministers withdraw from the room to discuss and reach a decision on which of them will be responsible for various parts of the service. In the Dahlgren Mass, the congregation sings at the same time that the couple selected bring the bread and wine from the back of the chapel to the altar. In general, however, the events are successive and each has a characteristic pattern of behavior of speaker and hearers as well as a characteristic message-form and cluster of speech acts. The Amish service has 14 such segments/speech events for which Enninger and Raith specify the identity of the speaker, his posture, and gestures; the posture and singing vs. silence of the hearers; the identification of the message-form by various linguistic features; and finally the speech acts manifested.

2. One obvious characteristic of church service discourse is the amount of register variation among the different segments. I use the term 'register variation' here in the accepted sense of structural variation conditioned by use, as opposed to dialect variation, which is conditioned by user, disregarding for our purposes various problems associated with that conceptualization (cf. Hudson 1980:48-55). In each of the three church services there is register variation on at least four dimensions: morphosyntax; singing vs. speaking; fixed vs. free text; and performance features of loudness, pitch level, and tempo.

On the dimension of morphological and syntactic variation, the Amish service shows the greatest differentiation. Some of the discourse is in Pennsylvania German, the first language of most of the participants; some is in an archaic-sounding form of Standard German, Enninger and Raith's 'Amish High German'; a very small amount is in American English, which everyone present can speak with considerable fluency; and parts are in intermediate or mixed forms of these fairly distinct registers. The Dahlgren Mass shows the least grammatical variation. The discourse is, in general, close to everyday English in form, the only occurrences of a religious register with archaic pronouns, verb forms, and features of lexicon and syntax being in some of the hymns sung from printed texts and in the Our Father prayer, which is recited in unison from memory.

The song-to-speech dimension is hardly recognized as a parameter of register variation in English, and indeed the church service is one of the rare activities--apart from some
forms of musical entertainment—in which intermediate forms between song and speech have a regular place. Amish and Dahlgren services both have a kind of chant in certain segments of the service, and the Amish, according to Enninger and Raith, have not only a fourth variety, 'declamatory' style, between chant and speech, but also subvarieties of both chant and declamation.

One might suppose that the four dimensions of register variation I have mentioned would covary in some simple relationship. For example, the greatest grammatical distance from everyday speech might cooccur with the most fixed texts, the fullest type of singing, and the slowest tempo. The covarying is, however, much more complex, and it is a challenging task to separate out the effects of the different dimensions as they cluster in the various message-forms.

This brings me to the notion of message-form, as used by Enninger and Raith. I prefer the traditional term 'genre' as long as it is not limited to literary discourse or associated with prescriptivism, and I use it in the accepted sense of a unit of discourse conventionalized in a given community at a certain time, having an internal sequential structure and a set of features of form, content, and use that distinguish it from others in the repertoire of the community.

Some religious genres such as sermons, prayers, and creeds have been much studied by liturgists, literary scholars, and theologians, but relatively little has been done by socio-linguistically oriented discourse analysts. How are these genres used in the speech community that validates them? How do community members evaluate them? How do they fit into the genre systems current in the spoken and written discourse of their community? What do they accomplish in the work of human interaction that gets done in the church service? Also among the phenomena of interest are the bits of talk around the structured genres, the free-text, everyday talk communications that precede the beginning and follow the ending of some of them. They are improvised, but patterned, and include greetings, apologies, reassurances, background explanations, and other speech acts. The analysis of these little items is in some ways the nearest we get to the more usual kind of conversation analysis when we examine church service discourse.

3. Since it is not possible within the confines of a brief paper to report in any detail on church service discourse, I would like to pick out several issues that have struck me as particularly promising for research in discourse.

3.1 One of these is the phenomenon of semi-free texts. In some sense all discourse is a mixture of fixed and freely constructed texts, or better, there is no dichotomy at all but a great variety of intermediate types and different kinds of
fixedness. Yet in the context of the church service there are mixed genres that have no close parallels elsewhere. The Old Order Amish second Scripture reading, for example, requires the minister to read aloud the prescribed passage of Scripture in Amish High German in a leveled chanting style and then to follow each section of the passage with an improvised commentary in Pennsylvania German in declamatory style which applies the meaning of the Scripture to the current life of the community. This mixed genre is similar to the preceding sermon, which also mixes Amish High German Scripture with Pennsylvania German exhortations, but the Scripture reading genre is executed without gestures and with few marks of emotion, whereas in the sermon genre the Scripture pieces are quotations from memory, not sequential reading from the Bible, and the preacher may show emotion by such means as pounding the chair or declaiming with vibrato.

These two genres resemble the genre of the black 'folk sermon' as described by Rosenberg (1970), Heath (1983), and others, in that they are a mixture of fixed and free text and have musical structure as an important characteristic; but the Amish and black sermon genres are poles apart in other ways. For example, the black sermon requires vocal feedback and musical interaction from the listeners while the two Amish genres require complete silence and lack of movement from the people. In any case, it is chiefly folklorists who have been concerned with discourse genres that improvise by pattern in this way (cf. Abraham 1969). The study of religious discourse will force us to find out more about how human beings can interweave fixed sacred texts with free texts in ways that accomplish various communicative goals to the satisfaction of the participants.

3.2 A second phenomenon of interest is the 'one-many dialog'. Most modern discourse analysis has dealt with narratives of one kind or another or with dyadic conversation, and valuable insights are accumulating in these and similar kinds of discourse. A very common pattern of church service discourse, however, is the one-many dialog, in which a speaker addresses the whole group and receives a unison response. A 'systematics for turn-taking' (Sacks et al. 1974) in this context is yet to be developed. How does the single speaker, who is almost always the initiator, assure the appropriate group response, delivered in the appropriate manner? Let's begin this morning by singing the Doxology—we will stand (Pike 1967: 76); Kommt, lasst uns anbeten, und knien, und niederfallen vor dem Herrn ... (Enninger and Rait 1982:49, 53).

In the three services under study, the one-many dialog event that probably demands the most from the many in skill of execution is the chanted intercessory prayer or Prayer of the People in the Dahlgren Mass. A lay cantor sings the refrain-like response for the people, who repeat it once and
then know it for repeating after each petition. The prayers themselves are composed for the occasion, referring to current prayer concerns of the parish and of the world. The cantor sings each prayer and the people sing the response they have just learned, and in the course of the prayer the people also have an opportunity to speak out in everyday language additional prayer concerns to be incorporated in the dialog. This one event is enough to give an indication of both the range of possible patterns of one-many dialog and some of the differences between one-many dialog and dyadic conversation.

3.3 A third phenomenon of interest is the use of variable performance of fixed genres as an indicator of social values. Linguists naturally look first at textual variation as a social indicator and next at salient paralinguistic and nonverbal performance features. In genres of fixed texts, however, it may be that even a very subtle variation is a telling social indicator. The example I have in mind is the tempo at which the Amish sing the invariant second hymn, the Loblied. Research has shown that the speed of singing this hymn correlates very closely with the overall conservatism of the particular community in dress, hairstyle, and so on: the slower the hymn, the more conservative the community (Hostetler 1980, cited in Enninger and Raith 1982:29).

3.4 Other phenomena are just as interesting as these, such as the conversational implicatures of discourse addressed to the Deity or the linguistic structure and communicative function of various kinds of blessings. I would like, however, to turn now to the general question of what it is that the participants are accomplishing with this activity discourse.

There are, of course, some of the ordinary accomplishments of everyday conversation. Information is transmitted, perhaps especially in the announcements, the sermon, and the conversations before and after the service proper. Also, as I emphasized in connection with the opening formula, there is the reinforcement of group solidarity and the shared beliefs and values. And these can be spelled out more precisely with the specific components of the service. A point I have not made is that all three services vary somewhat in their overall structure and quite considerably in the fillers for particular slots, depending on an annual cycle of special days and seasons, and the services thus reaffirm the significance of those times. Again, the participants have a chance to repeat familiar texts with the pleasure that comes from knowing and appreciating them. Finally, the participants are given the chance (mostly after the service) to discuss and evaluate the performances of the speakers in accordance with the group's expectations and standards of judgment.

But, as I said before, other functions are accomplished that the participants themselves would recognize more readily than
these functions that are more obvious to the outsider. The people praise God, they hear the messages of their faith, they make requests of God, they feel repentance and are reassured, they feel the Spirit at work, and so on. It is the task of the discourse analyst to investigate just how the words of the service accomplish these things for the participants, and in general what the underlying assumptions of the community must be as to how language in this particular activity can mediate so powerfully.

4. I have examined in a rather hurried way the structure of discourse occurring in connection with the activity type (or 'speech situation' or 'ceremonial event') of the church service, and I have drawn attention to several issues of particular interest for the discourse analyst. But the discussion so far has been essentially static, in spite of the mention of variation. Before closing, it is important to give some indication of where church service discourse fits diachronically—both in the history of the speech community and in the history of the individual participants, who must after all somehow learn over time how to produce this discourse appropriately. Like any set of linguistic conventions, the register variation, genre structuring, speech act expression, and the overall structure of the service change over time. It is possible to trace the Old Order Amish chant back to medieval models (Enninger and Raith 1982:40), the hymns back to the sixteenth century, Scripture texts to the revised Luther Bible, and so on. But it is not true that the discourse was frozen four centuries ago; various bits of historical research have shown that changes have occurred steadily over the years, and the substantial differences in local usages are witnesses to different histories of change. Tracing the history of the whole activity-discourse would be an instructive exercise in one kind of historical sociolinguistics.

The other diachrony is of interest not only for coming to understand the path of acquisition and its possible implications for discourse analysis, but also for studying the personal extension of elements and structures of the church service discourse to other functions. For example, it is highly likely that individual prayers—whether silent, like one type of filler for the prayer slots in the Amish service, or aloud in private settings—are constructed on the basis of prayers, exhortations, and blessings repeatedly heard in the church service. There is ample evidence of this kind of functional transfer reported in studies of religious discourse.

An extreme case of functional transfer is described in McDowell (1983): the ritual language of the Kamsá Indians of southwestern Colombia, in which a whole complex of features, most of them derived from the ceremonial discourse of Spanish Catholics of the sixteenth century, has become conventionalized for a number of different communicative functions. A special
lexicon of Spanish loanwords, prosodic features of chant similar to those of the Amish, a piling up of derivational affixes, and various other features combine to characterize the Kamsá ritual language, which is now used for speech events ranging from political oratory to respectful greetings. Thus church service discourse, which may have complex historical sources itself, may also in turn serve as a starting-point for other forms of discourse. This process of metaphorical extension of discourse structure is a basic characteristic of human language and merits whatever analytic sophistication we can bring to bear on it.

5. It is time to bring this paper to a close, and I must do it with an appropriate device. The importance of appropriate boundary markers in religious discourse is well illustrated by Pike's account of one potential churchgoer who rejected attendance at the church being described because the people in it neglected to end their hymns with the traditional amen that he expected. Perhaps in concluding this text of academic discourse devoted to religious discourse I can translate and modify the Amish formula used after the reading of Scripture: So weit hat die Schrift sich erstreckt and say, 'Here endeth the reading of the paper'.

References


I had a dream the other night: a Breughel type scene in which a villageful of linguists were animatedly engaged in their favorite pastimes.

In the foreground was a large, especially lively group, many of whose members were holding copies of *Linguistic Inquiry*, to which they referred as 'LI'. From this I gathered that they must be formalists of a certain persuasion. There were others who formed tight little knots somewhat apart from this central group, some of them carrying other journals. I heard other initials in the air: 'GB', 'RG', 'LFG', 'GPSG', and so on.

Many of these linguists were writing peculiar sentences in English, and sometimes Italian, on large blackboards. Not infrequently, one or another of them would call out to others, 'How many of you get this one?' Sometimes only one or two of the others would raise their hands, at which point the first would triumphantly place a large asterisk before the sentence he or she had invented. Sometimes the response would be more evenly divided, whereupon the questioner would look less satisfied and would place a question mark before the sentence, mumbling something about 'different dialects'. Sometimes all but one or two would raise their hands, when the first would look content and move on to something else.

Well behind this foreground group lay a large field, in which other, more thinly scattered linguists were working. Most of them carried tape recorders. Some of them also carried copies of the *American Anthropologist* in their back pockets. I had the impression that they never read this journal, but that they needed it in order to participate in annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association.

These field workers, like the formalists, were divided into several types, but it seemed to me that the division was more along functional lines than lines of doctrine. Two types were conspicuous.
Beneath an apple tree here and there sat an individual linguist, each in the company of someone called a consultant. The consultant was translating words and sentences from the linguist's language into a language which the consultant knew, but the linguist did not. Now and then a consultant would tell a story into the tape recorder. These stories stimulated the linguist to make up words or sentences in the consultant's language. The consultant seemed to accept or reject these inventions at random, but in either case the field worker appeared satisfied.

Other field workers, however, were doing something quite different. Under a large banner that read 'ethnography', they were making a great effort to record language in its natural setting. As I looked at them, the apple trees dissolved into homes, schools, and workplaces. They seemed especially happy when they could record the language of an ethnic minority, or a sexual majority. It was hard to make out exactly what they were doing, once they made these recordings, but I could tell from their manner that it was very important.

Farthest off in the left portion of the field was a small group of linguists, many of whom were carrying the *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*. They seemed to be spending a lot of time thinking of some portion of language on which they could do experiments. They were actively recruiting their own students and colleagues as sources of data, and were placing them in uncomfortable positions in order to vary some variable while carefully monitoring their subjects' reactions. In contrast to the last group, it was crystal clear what these linguists were doing, and they were obviously very self-conscious about their procedures.

Over this busy scene hovered a shadowy figure I took to be God. So far as I could tell, He or She was smiling. I had some feeling that God might have had some favorites down below, but was not letting on. I was about to ask about this, when I woke up.

This dream got me to thinking that maybe God wasn't about to tell us everything about language, and that He or She had been whimsical enough to provide a motley collection of approaches, each of which had some good things and some bad things built into it. Given the perversity of us humans, the result was that some of us were noticing nothing but the good in one approach and nothing but the bad in all the others, with different ones among us noticing good and bad in different places. Which approach we liked and which we hated might be determined by our genes, our education, or our personalities.

Suppose we call the most conspicuous of these approaches introspection, observation, and experimentation. To consider introspection first, it appears that we humans do have some ability to attend to the ingredients of our own consciousness. We can be aware, for example, that we have mental images, that we can perform mental arithmetic, and that we talk to ourselves.
We can observe our inner speech, make up new things to say, and make judgments about them. It is remarkable that we can do this, and we should certainly take advantage of it.

On the other hand, introspection is famous for its penchant for being strongly influenced by the introspector's idiosyncratic experience and expectations. Different introspectors often come up with different results, even when they are introspecting about the same thing, although they often appear not to be doing even that. Many arguments arise from these difficulties. Beyond that, as psychologists have been quick to point out, there are many things we do that we are not aware of, things that are not accessible to our consciousness. I will be able to point to some things of that sort in the second half of this paper.

As for observation, its good points are immediately apparent. If we want to know about language, why shouldn't the primary data consist of real examples of real people using language in real situations? Both the ethno- and the socio- brands of linguistics have exploited this approach, keeping it alive under trying circumstances during the last few decades.

On the other hand, others may argue that observing real language can lead to accidental findings, that the possibilities inherent in language are quite vast, and that it may be fortuitous whether something turns up in one's 'corpus' or not. Beyond that, some contemporary linguists believe that we should not be interested at all in what people normally do, but only in using introspection to push the possibilities of language to their outer limits. According to this view, it is only by looking at the margins of grammaticality that we can determine what the interesting constraints on language are.

There is a different objection to observation that perhaps should be taken more seriously than those just mentioned. What is recorded by a tape recorder is not the whole story. In fact, for a naive speaker or hearer, there may be little or no consciousness of these sounds themselves. It is the message or the interaction that is apprehended and remembered. This is not to say that the tape recorded sounds are not a rich source of data; it is only to say that there is much more to language—its content and the goals of its speakers—that tape recorders can only indirectly capture.

How about experiments? Borrowed ultimately from the physical sciences, experimentation is in some sense the most objective pursuit a researcher can engage in. Experiments avoid the subjectivity inherent in introspection, and, by focusing deliberately on particular issues chosen by the experimenter, they also avoid the element of chance occurrence that may be a drawback of observation.

On the other hand, by removing language from the situations in which it is naturally used, by placing it in an antiseptic environment, experimenters cannot help but affect their results in a serious way. While they may feel secure about their
findings, their findings may have little relevance to any broader reality. Experiments have an inherent tendency to be trivial. It is instructive to look back at the history of psychology during most of the twentieth century, when, in that field, experimenting was the only acceptable pursuit, and to note with sadness that from all that work we know very little more, perhaps in some respects even less about the human mind than was known in the days of William James.

God is still smiling. Perhaps what He or She is thinking, but won't tell us, is that we would be better off taking an approach to language that is catholic. Instead of enthusiastically embracing one approach to the exclusion of the others, each of us according to our tastes, perhaps we should be using all possible approaches in a comprehensive, concerted effort to understand what we would all have to agree is an amazingly complex phenomenon. We can feel especially good when different ones of us converge on similar findings. In my opinion we should also feel especially good when we are able to integrate hypotheses about language with hypotheses about more general operations of the human mind, and about human interaction.¹

A case study. What I am going to do for the rest of this paper is to illustrate how such a catholic approach might be applied to a particular notion about language that I think may turn out to be fairly important. It is a notion that would never have emerged, and that would not even make any sense, without both introspection and observation. It is also a natural target for experimenting.

The notion I have in mind can be stated in the aphorism, 'one new concept per intonation unit'. Before we are through, I hope that will mean more than it probably does now. There has been some convergence on this notion in the work of Givón (1975) and Pawley and Syder (e.g. 1983), but its full implications remain to be explored. I have discussed it in more detail in Chafe (in press).

There are two elements of this notion that need to be discussed before we get to the notion as a whole: what is meant by an 'intonation unit', and what is meant by 'new'.

Exactly ten years ago a group of us in Berkeley made a film that we used to collect examples of different people talking about the same thing (Chafe 1980). In the course of analyzing these 'pear stories', as we came to call them, we noticed that there seemed to be certain minimal units of discourse that had certain characteristic properties. For a while we called them 'minichunks', the idea being that they seemed to be minimal chunks of discourse. Later I called them 'idea units', and most recently I have been calling them 'intonation units'.

I myself first became aware of the significance of intonation units through observing the pear stories, but it was then
reassuring to realize that other people had observed them too. Among the notions that converge most directly on what I am talking about I can mention the 'information units' of Michael Halliday (1967), the 'information blocks' of Joseph Grimes (1975), the 'tone units' of David Crystal (1975) and other British linguists, and the 'idea units' of Barbara Kroll (1977).

It may be helpful to look at an example of a piece of discourse that has been segmented into intonation units. Example (1) is an excerpt from a conversation between Speaker A and Speaker B. Speaker A had just been telling about a train ride, at the beginning of which he was determined to find a seat where he would be able to read a book, and not be disturbed by someone who was trying to have a conversation with him. Having described his search for someone to sit next to who would be unlikely to say anything, he went on:

(1) A: 1. ... and so I zeroed in on this guy,
   2. who was obviously Japanese.
   3. mhm,
   4. ahah.
   5. ... and looked like he didn't have any English.
   6. ... and I sat down,
   7. ... and uh opened up my book and,
   8. read along for a couple of hours,
   9. and the guy was very polite.
  10. ... and didn't say anything,
  11. sat there,
  12. and minded his own business,
  13. and after about two hours,
  14. he couldn't stand it any more,
  15. ... and he said,
  16. would you mind if I looked at your book.
  17. it turned out he's a mathematician.

B: 18. [laugh] oh no,
   A: 19. ... works for GE.

It may be noticed that a typical intonation unit has a form that can be represented schematically as ... xxxxx. There is an initial pause, represented by three dots for a normal pause and two dots for an especially short one. Then there is a sequence of words ending in an intonational cadence of some kind. A final comma represents a clause-final pitch contour, and a final period represents a sentence-final falling pitch. At least one of the words has intonational prominence; primary and secondary prominence are indicated with acute and grave accent marks.

These intonation units emerged from convergent observations, but introspection has suggested to me, at least, that each of them might be the expression of a single 'focus of consciousness', or a small chunk of thought on which the speaker was focusing his or her attention at the time the intonation unit
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was produced. One thing that might make one feel more secure about this hypothesis is the psychological notion of short-term memory, the experimentally backed idea that people have a kind of mental buffer, or workspace, capable of holding something on the order of seven plus or minus two items (Miller 1956). (There is a sense in which I want to suggest here that the number is more like one than seven.) According to another classic approach, it seems that the retention of items in short-term memory falls off rapidly after a short period of time (e.g. Peterson and Peterson 1959). Although the details need more discussion that I can give them here, the general point is that a variety of experiments support the idea that our minds are restricted to focusing on small amounts of information for a limited period of time. It is a relatively small step to suppose that when we speak, we verbalize a series of such focuses, each of them as an intonation unit.

It should be apparent that intonation units, if they are indeed verbalizations of the information contained in focal consciousness or short-term memory at a particular moment, can provide precious evidence regarding the functioning of the mind through time: the amount and kind of information that is focused on, and the relations that lead from one such piece of information to the next. The segmentation of spontaneous speech into intonation units thus provides a unique window into on-line mental processing.

What then does it mean to say that an intonation unit can express no more than one concept that is 'new'? What does it mean to be new, in this sense?

Introspection, observation, and experimentation have all converged in this area. The issue is one that has occupied both linguists and psychologists of various schools (e.g. Firbas 1966a, Haviland and Clark 1974, Prince 1981). One line of introspection has suggested that 'old' or 'given' information is that which is already present in the speaker's focal consciousness and assumed to be present in the hearer's focal consciousness as well, whereas 'new' information is that which is being recalled into the speaker's focal consciousness from long-term memory (Chafe 1974, 1976, in press).

The observation of real discourse has, I think, repeatedly confirmed the general nature of the given-new distinction, as well as its important role in assigning intonational peaks and valleys. Recent observations have suggested that a simple binary distinction is not enough, that something intermediate between given and new seems to be needed as well.\(^2\) The pear stories data suggested that, in addition to information in focal consciousness, there is other information, not directly focused on, that is in a state of peripheral consciousness (Chafe 1980: 40-47). This has led to the notion that information can be not only 'given' (in focal consciousness), or 'new' (not in consciousness at all, before this point in the discourse), but also 'accessible', or already in peripheral consciousness. In
general, information may be in peripheral consciousness either because it was in focal consciousness at some earlier point in the discourse, because it is inferrable from some other information that was present in focal consciousness, or because it is present in the immediate environment, though not previously focused on.

I need also to say something about what I mean by 'concept'. The three-way distinction between given, accessible, and new information seems to be reserved for the linguistic expressions of objects, events, and properties. More needs to be said and more exploration needs to be done, but for present purposes it may be enough to suggest that something like the classic distinction between content words and function words is relevant here, and that it is only what is expressed by content words (or phrases) that can be given, accessible, or new. I will be using the term 'concept' for such items; that is, for the ideas of objects, events, and properties.

Let me try to clarify all this by discussing briefly each of the intonation units in the excerpt I have given. In so doing, I will be able to illustrate the nature of given, accessible, and new information, and to relate all of these things to the one new concept per intonation unit hypothesis. There follows a new version of the excerpt in which I have marked accessible concepts by putting the words expressing them in italics, and new concepts by putting the words expressing them in italics and also underscoring them. Given concepts will have neither italics nor underscoring. Parenthesized items lie outside the realm of 'concepts' as just described.

(2) A: 1. ... (and so) I .. zeroed in on this guy,
     2. .. who was .. (obviously) Japanese.
B: 3. (mhm),
     4. (ahâ),
A: 5. ... (and looked like) he .. (didn't) have (any) English,
     6. ... (and) I sat down,
     7. ... (and uh--) .. opened up my book (and),
     8. r--ode along for a couple of hours,
     9. ... (and) the guy was .. (very) polite.
    10. ... (and) .. (didn't) say anything,
     11. .. sat there,
     12. .. (and) minded his own business,
     13. ... (and) after about two hours,
     14. ... he couldn't stand it any more,
     15. ... (and) he said,
     16. ... (would you mind if) I looked at your book.
     17. ... (it turned out) he's a mathematician.
B: 18. [laugh] (oh no),
A: 19. ... works for G.E.
In intonation unit 1, the parenthesized words and and so are assumed to express 'nonconcepts', that is, they do not express ideas of objects, events, or properties. The word I expresses given information—given by virtue of the fact that both the speaker and the hearer are focally conscious of the speaker himself. The phrase zeroed in on expresses what I am calling an accessible concept. Just before this quoted portion, the speaker had expressed his desire to pick a seat that has somebody that looks harmless. If the concept verbalized as picking a seat is equivalent to the concept of zeroing in, this concept must then have still been in the speaker's peripheral consciousness. We are left with the concept expressed by this guy as the only one in line 1 that expresses new information.

Intonation unit 2 is relatively straightforward. The concept referred to by who is given, having been activated by the introduction of this guy in the preceding unit. The new concept here is the one expressed as be Japanese. The word obviously needs some comment. What it evidently does is to add information about the epistemic status of the assignment of the property of being Japanese. Numerous examples suggest that modifiers involving either the degree or the epistemic status of some property, although they may have intonational prominence, as here, do not have the status of concepts, as I am using the term. They do not express ideas of objects, events, or properties in themselves, but modify properties. Thus, like and and so, they do not enter separately into the calculation we are making. A parallel example is the very in intonation unit 9, where the general layout of given and new information is parallel to that in 2.

Intonation unit 5 requires more comment. The reporting of sensory evidence in English commonly takes place through the expressions look like, sound like, and feel like (Chafe in press). If we interpret look like in 5 as an evidential expression, then it too fails to enter into our calculations. He, of course, expresses given information. If we also exempt the negation and the article any from our calculation, we are left with the peculiar phrase have English as the words that express new information. My introspective judgment is that we do not have two separated concepts here, one expressed by have and one by English. The central concept is one involving the English language, and have is a relatively contentless item whose function is to create a predicate expressing a property as unitary as the property of being Japanese.

Intonation unit 6 should need no further comment at this point, moving as it does from a nonconcept to a given one to a new one. I hope it is obvious that sit down falls into the class of what I am calling unitary concepts.

Intonation unit 7 is interesting from the point of view that open up and my book might both be candidates for independent new concepts, thus violating the one new concept per intonation
unit constraint, except that the concept expressed by my book was in focal consciousness previously. The speaker said earlier, I had taken along a book, whereupon he proceeded to describe the book in some detail. The mention of the same referent in 7 was thus a refocusing on accessible information. The only new concept in 7, therefore, was that expressed by opened up. 4

Intonation unit 8 illustrates another manner in which concepts may become accessible. We knew from the previous discourse that this man was on a train, and that the train was already under way. Thus, although the concept expressed by rode along in 8 had not been introduced explicitly, it was inferrable from what had been said before. That leaves the unitary concept expressed by for a couple of hours as the only new one in 8.

Intonation unit 9 is interesting for two reasons. First, the concept expressed by the guy is an example of accessible information that had previously been given. This referent was introduced in 1, was refreshed in 2 and 5, but was then allowed to fade into peripheral consciousness during 6 through 8, three intonation units focused on the activities of the protagonist. It was reintroduced in 9 as accessible, not new information.

The other interesting point in 9 is that the guy appears as the subject of the clause. My own and others' observations of extensive discourse materials have suggested that there is a special constraint pertaining to the given, accessible, or new status of subjects. In by far the greatest number of cases, subjects express given information. In a small number of cases, they express accessible information, as here. It is rare for subjects to express new information. When they do, it is almost always at the beginning of a paragraph or other major section of a discourse. Such a boundary is not present here. It follows that the distribution of information in 9 would have been impossible if the guy had not been accessible information at this point.

The new information in 10 and 11 is expressed by (not) say anything and sat there, respectively, both unitary concepts. In 12 there is the idiom mind one's own business. The conceptual unitariness of idioms has been a favorite idea of mine (Chafe 1968). There is no basis for separating mind and business into two independent new concepts here.

The temporal concept expressed by after about two hours in 13 is parallel to the new concept for a couple of hours in 8. Line 14 contains another idiom, can't stand it any more. Line 15 has the same classic pattern as 6.

Intonation unit 16 is a quote, and we have to imagine the Japanese person saying out of the blue, Would you mind if I looked at your book. We can take would you mind if to be a pragmatic formula which does not play a role in our calculations. The question arises as to whether the concept expressed by your book can be considered accessible in the quote. There is
good reason to think that it can, since both parties were sitting next to each other, with the book clearly visible. (It was, in fact, this common visibility that aroused the Japanese person's curiosity.) We have here a good example of the third basis for accessibility: being of common interest in the environment. This is not the same as environmentally determined givenness, as in the case of the I in 1, where the concept of the speaker is assumed to have been in both parties' focal consciousness. Here the book was not judged by the Japanese person to have been in the focal consciousness of Speaker A at this moment. Otherwise he might have said, Would you mind if I looked at it.

In 17, we can assign it turned out to the epistemic framework, so that be a mathematician is left as the one item of new information.

The last unit in this excerpt, 19, raises the question of whether works for G.E. can be regarded as a unitary concept, as it must be if the one new concept per intonation unit hypothesis is to be supported. Why shouldn't works for and G.E. be regarded as two separate new concepts? It may be relevant that the participants in this conversation lived in an area where the General Electric Company is a major employer. For them the concept of working for G.E. was a common and institutionalized one, just as 'working for the government' might be in Washington. We evidently have here, then, a concept that is just as unitary as 'being Japanese' in 2 or 'having English' in 5.

In conclusion, a combination of introspection, observation, and experimentation has supported the hypothesis that an intonation unit can tolerate no more than one new concept, or one concept recalled by the speaker from long-term memory. That suggests that a producer of language proceeds by recalling one concept at a time, perhaps during the initial pause that precedes an intonation unit. A speaker then proceeds to verbalize that new concept by embedding it in a framework of already given or accessible concepts, often including one or more nonconceptual embellishments to provide information on connectivity, on the degree of some property, or on the epistemic background.

My larger intention has been to use this hypothesis as an example of how introspective, observational, and experimental evidence can be combined to shed more light on language than can ever be shed by restricting oneself exclusively to one or another of these approaches.

Notes

1. I am reacting here against the 'modularity' notion, as expressed, for example, in Fodor (1983).

2. The Czech linguists have long suggested that there is something intermediate between 'theme' and 'rheme', a
'transition' element of intermediate 'communicative dynamism' (Firbas 1966b). But that is not what I have in mind here.

3. To be noticed also is the neat way in which intonation unit 1 reflects the 'functional sentence perspective' idea of communicative dynamism increasing from left to right, from nonconcepts (and so) to a given concept (I), to an accessible concept (zeroed in on), to a new concept (this guy).

4. Of interest also is the fact that this intonation unit orders new information (opened up) before accessible information (my book), showing that the sequence described in note 3 is not always followed.

References


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DOES PRONUNCIATION TEACHING HAVE A PLACE IN THE COMMUNICATIVE CLASSROOM?

Rita Wong
American Language Institute
San Francisco State University

It was not very long ago that pronunciation teaching was the sine qua non of the second language curriculum. Today, however, it seems to be regarded as a luxury which many programs that teach English to nonnative speakers in the United States find unaffordable. This is an assumption that requires examination, because the neglect of pronunciation may have serious consequences for second language learners in the U.S., as well as in other English-speaking contexts. I would like to begin this examination by considering three factors which have contributed to the declining interest in teaching pronunciation.

First of all, instruction has apparently had a minimal effect on students' pronunciation, leading many teachers to conclude that pronunciation development is impervious to instruction. Studies such as the ones done by Suter (1976) and Purcell and Suter (1980) seem to corroborate this belief. Additionally, the debate over whether there is a critical period beyond which learners cannot achieve an accent-free level of proficiency has helped to weaken the position of pronunciation in the classroom (Scovel 1969; Oyama 1976; Flege 1981). In view of this resistance or inability to develop pronunciation, some teachers have turned to admittedly unorthodox methods, including hypnosis (Schumann et al. 1978; Acton 1984). Others have abandoned the ship and the sheep altogether.

A second factor which has shaken the foundation of pronunciation teaching is a change in the goal of language teaching from a focus on language form to a concern for language function, which Higgs and Clifford (1982) have labeled a 'push toward communication'. In this view, pronunciation is seen as a skill with little communicative value. Unfortunately, most of the instructional materials we have for teaching pronunciation seem to confirm this assumption, since they generally promote attention to language form apart from language use.
A third factor which has influenced the current attitude toward pronunciation is the change in assumptions about language learning. One well-known view, that of Krashen (1982), advises that language learning develops not through conscious study of the language but through a subconscious acquisition process, which is facilitated by exposure to comprehensible input. The teacher's energies, therefore, must be redirected from the specifics of language to the more general task of providing this comprehensible input to the learners. Pronunciation work has no place in this approach.

That pronunciation instruction has failed in the past does not mean that it cannot be done or that it is dispensable. It only means that our assumptions about what is important to teach and the methods that we have used to teach it may be at fault. While the shift to communicative goals is a welcome one, I believe that pronunciation teaching is not irrelevant to these goals. In fact, if we look closely at the components of the communicative process, we will see that pronunciation is one of the more important means by which we achieve our communicative objectives. What I would like to do, then, is to show how nonnative pronunciation directly affects the communication process and what specific pronunciation factors affect this process. I will also show why pronunciation teaching has been generally unsuccessful and propose some steps we must take in order to promote the communicative effectiveness of nonnative speakers by developing their pronunciation skills.

The communicative import of pronunciation is most clearly seen beyond the classroom walls and from the perspective of the nonnative speakers themselves. Let us take a look at how pronunciation affects five groups of nonnative speakers. The first group consists of nonnative speakers whose pronunciation is so unintelligible that there is no question that some pronunciation teaching is essential. A good example of this type of speaker can be found in the community of recent Vietnamese refugees. While teachers of second language learners are noted for their ability to comprehend the interlanguage of nonnative speakers, even they have expressed frustration over the unintelligibility of many Vietnamese speakers. This group poses a major challenge to language teachers.

The second group consists of foreign students in American universities who, while in language courses, may have apparently adequate communication skills. However, when they are assigned as teaching assistants, their students complain that they cannot understand them (Bailey et al., 1984).

The third group consists of long-term residents in the United States, many of whom have lived here for five or ten years or even longer. Many of these nonnative speakers, often graduates of the U.S. educational system, having entered the workforce, now find that their communication skills are inadequate to meet the demands of their jobs.
The problems of the foreign teaching assistant and the non-native professional are significant enough that universities have responded by establishing special training courses for the teaching assistants, and corporations have set up in-house courses for their nonnative employees (Bailey et al. 1984; Browne and Huckin 1985; Eaton et al. 1985).

The fourth group comprises all those nonnative speakers who have experienced difficulty in establishing and maintaining relationships with native-speaker schoolmates, co-workers, colleagues, or neighbors because their communication skills are inadequate or because their pronunciation marks them as outsiders.

The fifth and last group is composed of the nonnative speakers of English living in other countries who, for political, business, educational, or social reasons, need to interact with Americans. I include also in this group the speakers of non-native varieties of English—for example, Indian English, Singapore English, Philippine English, and Nigerian English. For the purpose of communicating with American-English speakers, the members of this last group need to identify those areas of English use which are most likely to affect communicative clarity.

These real world needs present a dilemma for language teachers which is complicated by the facts that (1) many nonnative speakers in the United States have spoken English for many years without attention to pronunciation; (2) speakers of non-native varieties of English may not perceive that there are differences between their English and American English; and (3) many teachers are uncertain about how to address these needs. In today's confusion over pronunciation teaching and its value, solutions have ranged from adhering to the known techniques of consonant and vowel exercises to exploring more general aspects of the communication process, such as cross-cultural comparisons of the structure and dynamics of the American classroom or the American corporate culture. While I would not want to say that these activities are not valid for specific groups of learners, I believe that major aspects of the spoken language system itself are being overlooked, aspects which play a major role in communicative interaction. These aspects are stress, rhythm, and intonation; and they should be a part of any second language curriculum that purports to teach oral communicative competence, because they influence communication in very real ways.

First of all, everyday judgments of speakers are often made on the basis of these features. To illustrate, let me read you the comments of three native speakers of English who were asked, 'What's wrong with your voice?' for a column called 'Question Man' published in the San Francisco Chronicle (June 1, 1985).

'I'm from Newcastle,' said the first man, 'a working class area, and it's the heavy Geordie accent. It's a class thing in
England. It's important to talk right. Correctly. An accent tends to be looked down on. The second man responded by saying, 'I'm disappointed that I still have a New York accent which is associated with a certain kind of person—pushy, aggressive and not necessarily trustworthy—and I left New York for all those reasons.' The third man said, 'I'd like it lower. I talk more through my nose rather than my mouth and diaphragm. I feel it's not as masculine as a man's voice should be. I try to lower it in mixed company.' For these three men, pronunciation communicates class distinctions, as well as characteristics related to personality and masculinity. So, on one level, pronunciation is viewed as a means of identifying ingroups and outgroups, us vs. them. Such attitudes have consequences for nonnative speakers. If their speech is distinctively different, it leaves them open to many more judgments of this type and may keep them as outsiders.

We have seen a sample of how English speakers judge the pronunciation differences of speakers of the same language. How would they evaluate the pronunciation differences of non-native speakers? In an article in *The Washingtonian* (July 1985), writer Michael Weiss describes a Ghanaian cabbie's English as 'syncopated'. Another writer, Andrea Lee, in her book *Russian Journal* (1984:27) describes the effect a Russian speaking English had on her in this way:

His voice was loud and hoarse, with a peculiarly irritating, insistent edge to it. I had never heard such an accent and intonation: a haphazard mixture of American and British pronunciation, bound together by a heavy monotonous stress on every syllable, which after a few sentences began to strike my ears like the thud of a boot.

*Irritating, insistent, monotonous, like the thud of a boot* -- these words vividly describe the potential effect of nonnative rhythm on American ears. In this case the nonnative rhythm is so disruptive to the listener that she processes the sounds no longer as language but as noise. The noise has caused communication to come to a grinding halt.

Communication may also be affected by nonnative ways of using stress because stress, as a feature of rhythm, and rhythm itself are believed to provide a structure for the way we understand the spoken message. Ladd (1978:25) cites Lenneberg, who described rhythm as 'an organizing principle for the timing of articulations and as a grid against which we match our perceptions.' Thus, if a nonnative speaker fails to employ this pattern, the mismatch between the nonnative pattern and the expected English pattern will interfere with comprehension and communication.

What Andrea Lee described as a heavy, monotonous stress on every syllable, and *Washingtonian* writer Weiss as syncopated rhythm, is noticeable because it differs from the alternating
patterns of stressed and unstressed syllables found in English, and it is typical of many varieties of nonnative speech. Because a pattern of syllables of equal duration is characteristic of many languages, such as French, Spanish, Tagalog, and Indonesian, speakers of such languages are expected to have the most difficulty with English rhythm. However, speakers of languages such as Arabic and Russian which are, like English, so-called stress-timed languages, also seem to have difficulties, as Taylor (1981), of the University of Leeds, has observed. Taylor points out that the explanation lies in the nature of English syllables, some of which can bear stress while others cannot. As this tendency is specific to English, and the written language offers few clues, all nonnative speakers who wish to speak English, regardless of language background, have to learn how these syllables behave.

Stress is also important because it is one of the identifying characteristics of words. That stress patterns function in the word recognition process is substantiated by evidence which shows that listeners who do not hear a word clearly will substitute words with identical stress patterns. For example, in a study by Bansal (cited in Cutler 1984), when Indian English speakers incorrectly pronounced words with the stress on the second syllable instead of the first (for example, atMosphere for ATmosphere), British English speakers misidentified what the Indian speakers said. The English speakers heard: YEsterday as STUdy, CHAracter as diRECtor, WRIttten as reTAIN. Conversely, when words were incorrectly stressed on the first syllable instead of the second, they identified: preFER as FEARful, corRECT as CARried, aBOUT as COME out.

In my own class, I once heard a student say what I thought was two more. As it turned out, he was trying to say tumor, but he had stressed the second syllable instead of the first and pronounced what should have been a reduced vowel as a full vowel. In another instance, a student told our secretary that he needed insulin. His problem was compounded by the substitution of /s/ for /$/ and /l/ for /r/, and he had also deleted the final /s/ of insurance. Despite these segmental problems, if he had stressed the correct syllable, inSUIlin, I suspect that our secretary would have identified the word insurance more quickly from the context.

Stress, then, contributes to the characteristic rhythm of English and to word identification. In addition, stress serves to mark what a speaker considers to be the important words in a sentence. Because British and American English speakers expect the important words to be more prominently articulated, they can listen selectively for those words. But if nonnative speakers fail to employ stress properly, their listeners will be lost in a sea of syllables. Since stress plays such an active part in word identification, in organizing the flow in information, and in directing the listener's attention to what is
important in that flow, it should clearly occupy a place in the communicative syllabus. In fact, Gillian Brown (1977:52) has said, 'It is this aspect of spoken English, more than any other, which the teacher of English to foreign students should concentrate on. From the point of view of production the correct pronunciation of /θ/, /ð/, and /a/ fades into insignificance beside the ability to produce correct stress patterns on words.'

Having briefly considered stress and rhythm, let us look at intonation and its role in communicative interaction. We know that intonation helps to convey how speakers feel about what they are saying and--of equal importance--how they feel about the people they are talking to. The New Yorker who associated the New York accent with pushiness or aggressiveness may have based this evaluation in part on intonational cues. Likewise, Saudi Arabian businessmen have been judged by American managers to be abrasive, again an evaluation that may have been made partially in response to intonational cues (Adelman and Lustig 1981). The intonation of Danes, it is suggested, gives English listeners the impression that they are hesitant, apathetic, and sombre (Phillipson, cited in Albrechtsen et al. 1980:366).

How are these perceptions formulated? Possibly in the way suggested by the now familiar example from Gumperz (1982), which illustrates so well how cross-cultural stereotypes may germinate from misinterpretations of intonation. Indian women, newly hired to work in a British airport cafeteria, were having problems with their supervisors and their customers, both of whom felt that the women were surly and uncooperative. The Indian women, for their part, were perplexed by the reactions that they were getting and consequently felt discriminated against. From the tape recordings of the interactions, Gumperz observed that when customers who had ordered meat were asked whether they wanted gravy, the Indian workers would say gravy with a falling intonation. As Tannen (1984) has pointed out, this would be heard by the British English speakers as 'This is gravy. Take it or leave it.' When the Indian and British workers examined the tape with Gumperz, the Indian workers could not see any difference in the way they made the offer of gravy from the way the British employees did. It was only after their attention was called to the way British employees made the same offer by using a rising intonation (gravy?) that they could see the source of the problem. The British supervisors, on the other hand, learned that the Indian women had not intended to be rude; their falling intonation was simply a carryover from their native language.

If Gumperz had not intervened, the British supervisors may have begun to formulate a stereotype of Indians as surly and uncooperative and, as a result, conveyed their dissatisfaction toward the Indian employees, who in turn would have felt permanently discriminated against. Because intonation operates on a subconscious level, cross-cultural miscommunications, such
as the one in this example, may occur without either party knowing its true roots. Consequently, all concerned would be helpless to resolve problems or to prevent them from recurring.

In addition to communicating speaker attitudes, intonation plays a part in the structure of conversations, for example, as a cue to turn-taking and to topic shifts. Gillian Brown and her colleagues (Brown, Currie, and Kenworthy 1980) observed that, among Scottish English speakers, high pitch was used when a speaker began a new topic. Generalizing from this observation, if a nonnative speaker does not recognize this signal or understands it to have a different meaning in conversation, it could result in miscommunication. In fact, such an instance of miscommunication was observed by Gumperz (1982). He reports than an Indian English speaker, who was a part of a conversation with British English speakers, frequently interrupted the other participants and was herself interrupted more frequently than the others. In discussing the conversation with the participants, Gumperz learned that neither the Indian English speaker nor the British English speakers had intentionally interrupted each other. They all thought the others had finished speaking before they took their turns. Gumperz identified the problem as stemming from a misinterpretation of the function of pitch. Whereas in British and American English, a rise in pitch is used to mark a shift in focus or to introduce new information, as Brown and her colleagues observed, in Indian English, speakers mark new information with low pitch. Thus, when the Indian English speaker heard the rise in pitch, she identified it as carrying not new but old information and felt that she could begin to take her turn. The British English speakers assumed that her low pitch carried old information and would begin to take their turn. Both groups felt frustrated because each would be interrupted just before they were about to make a new point.

We have seen from these examples how cross-cultural miscommunication can occur because conversational participants misinterpret intonation signals as rudeness or other forms of negative behavior. Conversations may lurch along because intonational signals for turn-taking are not shared. Communication may be frustrated or prematurely curtailed because listeners cannot identify important words or even recognize words at all if nonnative speakers do not use stress properly. Stress, rhythm, and intonation, then, are important components of the communication process; yet pronunciation teaching has not focused on these components sufficiently and specifically with respect to the way they function in communication. It is for this reason that pronunciation teaching has not met communicative goals.

What must be done? The two areas that require immediate attention are: (1) the need for explicit pronunciation instruction and (2) the need for new instructional materials. The long-term effects of neglecting pronunciation are most
dramatically exemplified by the accountants, programmers, police officers, telephone operators, and engineers enrolled in 'accent improvement' and 'effective communication' courses. They now have to pay a high price to untangle the linguistic morass that is strangling their ability to communicate at the level demanded by their jobs. These long-term residents and citizens of the United States demonstrate that pronunciation is not simply picked up through interaction with English speakers. Moreover, instead of bringing about linguistic improvement, interaction with native speakers can sometimes lead to serious miscommunications, as the example of the Indian cafeteria workers shows.

Where language learning takes place formally in classrooms, the only native-speaker interaction that occurs is with the teacher, whose pronunciation cannot always be taken as illustrative of natural speech because it is often more characteristic of foreigner talk (Hatch et al. 1978). When learners have progressed beyond the initial stages of language learning, explicit pronunciation instruction will be essential. The rhythm of English, which depends on the employment of stressed and unstressed syllables, was found by Taylor to be difficult for nonnative speakers to incorporate into their speech, regardless of whether or not the rhythm of their native language resembles that of English. And the nonnative speakers in his study were foreign teachers of English! The Indian cafeteria workers were unaware of intonation and so had not noticed any difference between the way they offered gravy and the way the British workers did, until it was pointed out to them explicitly. The phenomena of stress, rhythm, and intonation, as these examples show, are invisible not only to nonnative speakers but also to many language teachers. We know so little about how they function.

The second area requiring immediate attention is that of instructional materials. The materials we have now in the United States describe only the most elementary details of stress, rhythm, and intonation. For example, our textbooks tell students that there are just three intonation patterns: a sentence-final rise, a sentence-final fall, and a nonsentence-final rise. The rise is applied to yes/no questions, the fall to statements and WH-questions. The nonfinal rise applies between phrases and clauses within sentences. The rules that are given are typically hedged: 'Stress usually falls on content words.' 'Phrasal stress usually falls on the stressed syllable of the last content word.' 'Compound nouns usually bear stress on the first noun.' But how are we to explain the exceptions? No American texts that I know of cover the cases not addressed by these rules, which generally analyze stress on the basis of syntax rather than on the basis of meaning. As Bolinger's (1965) work suggests, stress placement might be more adequately explained by looking at what speakers want to express. Our texts also need to show how stress and intonation operate
at the discourse level and in interactions, so that nonnative speakers do not get into the kinds of fixes I have described. What we have now focuses mainly on the sentence level, with some limited exchanges of dialogue. Clearly, we need textbooks that can demonstrate how stress and intonation operate in functional discourse, and can answer questions such as: How is sentence stress really determined? How does intonation connect parts of texts? How does intonation signal the beginning of new topics? How does intonation distinguish background information from new information? How does it communicate attitude and emotions? Are there specific contours which convey specific meanings? For example, is there a contradictory contour, a contour of concession, a contour of deference? Until texts include such information, what we can offer students is sketchy at best and will continue to create the misleading impression that the role of pronunciation in communication is peripheral.

To paraphrase the theme of this year's Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics, theory, data, and application are indeed intertwined. However, although numerous linguistic studies of stress, rhythm, and intonation exist, for the most part they remain in the theoretical domain. Communication between linguists and language teachers is essential to bridge the gap. Gilbert (1984) pioneered the way. I hope that the 1985 joint LSA/TESOL Institute will pave the way for more partnerships of this kind. A large-scale collaborative effort between linguists and teachers will be necessary if we are to develop the kind of communicative description of stress, rhythm, and intonation that we need in order to make second language teaching more responsive to communicative needs. Such an application of linguistic insight would make a major contribution to facilitating cross-cultural communication and to enhancing the lives of nonnative speakers who want to function comfortably and with dignity in English-speaking communities and contexts.

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YOU CALL YOURSELF A TEACHER?
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR DISCUSSING LESSONS

John F. Fanselow
Teachers College, Columbia University

The most memorable lesson in my work in teacher preparation came during a practice teacher's class that I was observing with one Mr. Ononye, a supervisor charged with showing me how to help practice teachers. Halfway through the lesson, Mr. Ononye literally leapt out of his seat and shouted these words at the practice teacher: 'You call yourself a teacher? I'll show you how to teach.' After a short demonstration, Mr. Ononye gave the class back to the practice teacher with these encouraging words: 'Now see if you can teach the way I want you to.'

Much of what I have heard in discussions of teaching and have read in books about teaching since this lesson, I have interpreted through the filter this incident set up in my mind. Thus, when I read methods books or teachers' guides to textbooks or hear discussions of teaching that urge us to use meaningful material, be enthusiastic, give clear directions or provide supportive feedback, I see these seemingly reasonable suggestions as prescriptions that imply that the authors or supervisors know what good teaching is, just as Mr. Ononye acted as if he knew what good teaching was.

When I hear teachers discussing their teaching or that of others with judgments added to prescriptions such as 'Your lesson was great, especially the dictation and group work, but why don't you have them write more quickly?', I hear Mr. Ononye saying 'I'll show you how to teach!' Even when the prescription accompanying the judgment is communicated less directly, with the most delicate modal, such as 'Great lesson... ah...but...I wonder whether you might want to have them write a bit faster during the dictation', I hear Mr. Ononye, because on one level both judgments and prescribed suggestions imply that we know what good teaching is.

In fact, there is little evidence strongly supporting one particular practice over another in all settings, in part because the tests used to compare different practices are not always
related to instruction, in part because many out-of-class variables are not controlled in comparison-of-methods studies, and in part because the practices have been described with so little precision that in some cases the differences between the practices do not exist in reality and in others the critical differences have been overlooked (Critique of the Pennsylvania Project 1969; Jonas 1976).

The Ononye model (or an adaptation with polite variations), methods books, teachers' notes for textbooks, and the comments we make and hear about our teaching, in addition to being prescriptive also tend to be general. Suggestions like 'Get them to communicate, give them less time, be clear' and judgments like 'great' are general. Even a model lesson one demonstrates is general because so much is presented that it is hard to pinpoint the precise communications that are being demonstrated and thus advocated. The general words not only make it difficult to know what to do differently, but they also make it difficult to see the extent to which what we do matches the prescriptions we are given as well.

Finally, the sources of the prescriptions in books, as well as in discussions with supervisors, tend to be outsiders—experts, people in charge, or authorities. The suggested alternatives are generated from others, not by ourselves, from within. This is not to imply that outsiders are necessarily bad or not liked. Many authors of methods books and articles on how to teach are popular, sought out, and acclaimed as well. Even Mr. Ononye was popular and considered very helpful in the setting we were in.

Judgments and prescriptions based on preconceived notions of good teaching given by outsiders, general in nature, and with no means to explore congruence between practices and prescriptions, obviously serve a critical function in teacher preparation and development. These practices are widespread, and almost all teachers have experienced them. It is partly because of the fact that most teachers are aware of the normal rules in teacher preparation and development that I provide a different set of practices. The practices I invite you to experience are basically the exact opposite of those most followed. Thus, I invite you not to judge, or if you do, to withhold your judgment; to substitute specific descriptions for general prescriptions, and as a result be free to generate alternatives unrelated to your preconceived notions of good and bad teaching; to serve as your own expert rather than to depend on those in authority; and to explore congruence between what you think you do, what you want to do, and what you actually do.

It is perhaps ironic that though prescriptions mandate change, and judgments about our teaching imply change, they are rarely accompanied by any means whereby we can see the extent to which we are carrying out practices that others have prescribed for us. Mr. Ononye did say, 'Now, see if you can do it!', but he gave no help either to the teacher or to me as an observer.
to determine congruence between what was demonstrated and what was done by the teacher after the demonstration. Nor do prescriptions such as 'be clear', 'get them more involved', or 'show some enthusiasm' help us see to what extent what we do matches the prescriptions. In the case of Mr. Ononye, there is no indication of what the it refers to. In the case of judgments, there is normally no indication of what precisely was great in a 'great lesson'. Partly because of the general nature of both judgments and prescriptions, the communications the supervisor has in mind are often different from those the teacher has in mind. When each party is referring to a different it, there is little chance that each can see the same congruence between prescriptions or judgments and practices, since in many cases the practices each has in mind refer to a different moment in the lesson.

To explore congruence between what you yourself think, plan, and actually do, I suggest two steps. First, transcribe some actual communications or find exchanges or exercises in texts or tests that you want to explore. Then, code them. Thus, to explore the congruence between actual practices and a general prescription such as 'get them more involved' or a global judgment such as 'The students were really involved—great', I would listen to a recording of a small segment of the lesson and make a transcription that would look like this:

Jake: This is silly work (said with annoyance).
Maria: Come on, let's copy the sentence.
Jake: OK, give me the first one.
Misu: (erasing some incorrect sentences from her notebook)
Tadashi: (taking some stickers off his old notebook cover and putting them on his new notebook cover)
Maria: There were two men in the cell.
Jake: (writes the sentence) This is stupid!

I'd then label some characteristics of the communications I transcribed with a metalanguage (Fanselow 1977, 1978, in press). In English we might describe the exchanges by saying that Student 1 (Jake) made negative comments about the work that was to be done in the group; that Students 3 and 4 (Misu and Tadashi) did not participate in the group activity; and that Student 2 (Maria) was on task. In the metalanguage I use, I'd say that Student 1 (Jake) reacted with both a linguistic aural medium and a paralinguistic aural medium used to evaluate both the content being studied and the type of activity assigned. All the communications would be coded in a similar way, using terms that are all part of a conceptual system. The coding—or a detailed description in English, for that matter—helps us see what the students were actually doing during the group activity, while the usual judgments or prescriptions do not.
Without coding, based on a set of operationally defined labels that are part of an overall concept, each of us is more likely to see and describe events through our own preconceived notions, as I see discussions of teaching through my Ononye filter. After viewing the same class, I have heard contradictory comments from different observers: The teacher had rapport; the teacher was condescending; there was too much silence; there was too much noise; the material was too easy; the material was too difficult; the students were involved; the students were uninterested. Such discussions are analogous to one in the Japanese movie Rashomon, where four people give contradictory and equivocal accounts of an event they have all witnessed. Since in Rashomon, one of the four has supposedly killed another while another of the four, the dead man's wife, looked on, different perspectives are predictable. But in discussions of teaching, where it would seem that much less intense feelings would be generated, radically different perspectives are often communicated too. Because category labels, by definition, are designed to describe, using such words in discussions of teaching can sometimes begin to move us beyond the Rashomon effect. This, of course, is not to deny the excitement and value of the effect. But as I said before, since most of us have a great deal of experience with this perspective, I concentrate on an alternative perspective.

The coding serves an additional purpose that a specific description in normal language of what went on does not: Because all the categories are part of a limited range of options, the categories that do not appear in the coding of a particular series of communications become alternatives that can be generated in a subsequent lesson on one's own, without the advice of an expert.

The transcribing and coding I urge you to experience are, of course, based on some assumptions, which means that on one level they are based on my preconceived notions of what is important to note in looking at communications. Not only does the coding system highlight some characteristics I consider important, but it reflects an underlying premise about communications as well. The premise is that each small, precise change we make affects the entire set of arrangements we are immersed in. For example, asking students to say the name of their favorite color or film star when responding to the roll rather than saying 'here' not only alters each response, thus affecting the teacher's knowledge of each student. The change also alters the perceptions some will have of the teacher, requires the use of different sounds, and might alter in some way the relationships between some students. A comment after class such as 'I like him too' is more likely when students state favorite film stars than when they say 'here'. In addition to urging small, precise changes because I believe they alter the whole arrangement among those in the setting, I urge them because, as I said before, most people have experience with
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the global ones often urged in methods books and in the Ononye type of discussion of teaching. My premise is reflected in these words from William Blake (quoted in Bronowski 1956:66):

1 He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars:
2 General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite & flatterer.
3 For Art & Science cannot exist but in minutely organized Particulars.

In addition to describing my premise in lines 1, 2, 4, and 5, with the words scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer in line 3, Blake provides a background for the Ononye model of discussions of teaching.

Difficult vocabulary—rules

Sandals with a suit?—The importance of rules. Over time, as I have seen how stable communications in classrooms and in discussions of teaching are, I have begun to describe them with the same word many others use to describe patterned communications that occur nine times out of ten: rules. The idea that much of what we do is controlled by rules—unconscious conventions and habits—is central to my thinking. If we tend to do the same thing nine times out of ten in a particular situation, I don't think we do it because we are particularly clever or stupid. I think that the patterns that occur in our lessons and our discussions of teaching are so predictable because much of what we do is the result of following invisible rules which, although they become quite obvious as soon as we point them out, still can control us after we realize they exist.

It is easy to think of rules we all follow in our teaching. Who has trained us all to say 'OK. Now, we're going to have a test'? Though I've never seen the advice that we should 'Use OK and Now to introduce a new topic or activity or a shift in activity in your teaching', I have looked in vain for classes where shifts are not marked by 'OK. Now', at least nine times out of ten. Masters of ceremonies on television talk shows use the same markers; few of them have been trained in our profession. What methods book has prescribed such markers?

The idea that rules control much of our teaching and discussions of teaching is, of course, not particularly surprising, if we just reflect for a moment. After all, we follow hundreds of rules outside of teaching settings as well. You've observed people buying newspapers at newsstands. Which newspapers do we tend to take from each stack when we buy our papers? In most large cities on the continents where I have observed newspaper stands, the paper below the top one is taken, not the top one, at least by those we would normally refer to as middle class. And you've seen how strong the rules are that
we follow with telephones. Don't you feel compelled to answer ringing telephones on empty desks even though you are not expecting a call, and there is hardly one chance in a million that the call could possibly be for you? Don't you use baby talk when you play with babies and pets, and talk differently at a funeral and a sports event? Do you wear sandals with a suit or a fancy party dress? It is hardly surprising that we follow rules in teaching and discussions of teaching, since we do so in most other activities (Bellack 1966; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1974).

An invitation—discovering and breaking rules. On the surface, advocating the breaking of rules might imply that I don't believe in order. I realize that rules are necessary for society in general, and classes in particular. Without rules, chaos reigns, and predictions are impossible. But because the breaking of rules requires as a first step precise description of the rules we follow, by breaking rules we become more aware of them. They become more visible, and we become more conscious of them. Paradoxically, the breaking of rules is likely to lead to control rather than chaos, and the more we know about what we do and the consequences of what we do, the more accurate will be our predictions.

When we see writing on classroom walls or desk tops, the rule to write on paper and blackboards that we normally take for granted leaps to visibility, literally. Though we can see how strongly the pull of the front of the classroom is just by describing the fact, if we try the alternative of teaching from the back of the class one day, thereby breaking a rule, the usual rule becomes even more visible.

Of course, if we moved around the room and broke other rules just to realize more consciously how strong the rules are, the value of such an enterprise would be limited. But each rule we break both provides us with another alternative that is self-generated and tests the validity of our preconceived notions. If we always explain all the new vocabulary items before a reading passage, we can never see the consequences of explaining no new vocabulary items before a reading passage. If we never ask students to deliberately produce incorrect utterances, we can never compare the consequences of this practice with the more normal one of asking students to deliberately produce only correct communications. Over time, we realize that on our own, without outsiders, each of us is capable of generating more variety and freer to inquire into the consequences of our teaching than we thought (Cogan 1973).

This is not to say that teaching is just the deliberate substitution of one rule for another, or the bringing to consciousness of a wide repertoire of rules in order to generate alternatives. Teaching is also a sharing in the hopes, sufferings, and aspirations of those with whom we work. But I believe that
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to make such sharing more likely, we must feel free to do what we are capable of and to question what we do. What are new trends in art, fiction, dance, advertising, and science but the questioning and altering of the normal patterns, either accidentally or deliberately? Just as alternatives in other fields are the result of the breaking of rules, so one central way in which alternatives in our own teaching and discussions of teaching can be generated is by breaking the normal rules of the classroom game (Kuhn 1970).

As we break rules by choice and deliberate control rather than by chance, I think we can become truly self-reliant, and we can remind ourselves and others of a very central lesson of learning: never to think we have the answer. Like many of the lessons we learn by observing from a different perspective, this one is obvious, just as putting an important letter in full view in order to hide it is an obvious alternative to try when endeavoring to keep a letter secret. Because much of what we see as the result of breaking rules is obvious, it is all the more likely to be obscured or ignored if we look in the usual way, colored by our preconceived notions of what is right and wrong and good and bad. For example, as soon as you observe people teaching others, you notice that the person doing the teaching tends to say 'OK very good' each time the learner performs some task that was set, even when the task was not necessarily performed very well. Likewise, when one person turns the door-knob the wrong way, and the door does not open, an onlooker is likely to say 'turn it the other way', even though the person turning the knob might have started to turn the knob the other way as soon as the door did not open when the knob was turned in the original direction. Whether the 'OK very good' and 'turn it the other way' types of comments are the result of anxiety, a belief in reinforcement, a need to maintain control and stay in control, the following of a discourse pattern, or any other reason, is hard to determine. What is clear is that we do follow many such rules. What is also clear, to me at least, is that change is more likely if we deliberately substitute an alternative rather than simply advise change with a general prescription such as 'give more specific feedback' or with a judgment such as 'don't continue to do such a stupid thing' (Alexander 1969).

For too long, we have sought suggestions, insights, and information only from psychologists, linguists, researchers who conducted studies comparing methods, advocates of particular schools of language teaching, authors of texts or tests, or other experts. Of course, these sources have been helpful and should not be discarded. But they can be supplemented by self-generated alternative suggestions, insights, and information. Initially, we may not trust our own self-generated alternatives as much as those provided by experts. But confidence comes as we remember the Socratic idea of teaching: aiding each other to remember what each already knows, helping each of us to see what is within each. Ultimately, I break
rules, and invite you to join me, in order to see more clearly what each of us is capable of and how our preconceived ideas sometimes limit this capability. If we realize how much more is within us, it is more likely that we will be able to aid our students in coming to the same realization. Such conscious realization, paradoxically, leads in my experience to more freedom, for as we become aware of a greater range of rules on the conscious level, we are able to use a greater range unconsciously. Said another way, as we explore our craft by describing—recording, transcribing, and coding communications—rather than by seeking prescriptions and judgments from others, rules are broken that say we teachers must seek alternatives from those in charge rather than from ourselves or our peers, and that we must work alone within our autonomous but isolated and lonely classrooms rather than with colleagues.

Teaching and nonteaching settings—substituting opposite rules. We can deliberately break rules in two ways. One way is to substitute rules opposite to those we follow in our teaching. For example, if we always ask students to underline words they do not understand—something that is likely to happen nine times out of ten in reading lessons of a particular type—two opposite rules are possible, at the least. One opposite rule is to ask students to cross out and obscure words they do not understand, making it easier to ignore these words and move on perhaps to capture the meaning from subsequent lines, as in a cloze test. Another opposite rule is to ask them to underline only the words they do understand, perhaps astonishing some students by helping them realize that they know more words in a passage than they don't know. Each opposite rule also forces us to question the commitment to the idea that individual vocabulary items are central to the reading process.

Another way to break classroom rules deliberately is to substitute in the classroom those rules we normally follow outside of the classroom and other teaching settings. For example, if you look at people reading outside of most classrooms and many libraries, in lounges, people's homes, or on buses, trains, or planes, you no doubt notice that many of them read with a lot of noise or music around. You might also see many of them reading with their feet up on tables or foot rests and in a lounging position, rather than sitting upright and erect. You might further see some of them eating or drinking as they read and looking up from their pages occasionally. Trying these rules in classrooms or libraries would mean that the silence usually demanded during silent reading would be replaced with noise or music. Substituting these rules would also mean that students could read in a range of positions and accompany their reading with a snack or a drink now and then. Finally, following the rules we observe in nonteaching settings for silent reading in class would mean that students would be free to
look up from their books to gaze out the window, at another student, or even at the ceiling or the teacher. Such opposites call into question the preconceived notion that concentration is best obtained in total silence, and reading is best done in a certain position.

Notice that whether we break classroom rules by substituting opposites for rules found in teaching settings or in nonteaching settings, the first step is to describe precisely and without judgment the rules we think we are following. By advocating the generation of alternatives to see what we are doing, including the consequences of what we are doing, I am contending (or perhaps the better word is admitting), that we do not know precisely what we are doing nor what consequences we are producing, let alone the best way in which to proceed to achieve particular results.

Imagine all the possibilities—some reflections on teaching. At this point, I had better indicate that I do not consider that all of us who teach are totally programmed robots completely under the control of invisible rules we neither see nor understand. We obviously exercise some control over what we do, and we vary our teaching somewhat. Some days we have students write; other days they ask each other questions. Some days we teach the entire class; other days we work with groups or assign tasks in pairs; and so on. One time out of ten, we might even describe part of a lesson to see what is happening rather than to support a preconceived notion we have of what should be done. Indeed, we tend to rebel against sameness and routine, always searching for ways to keep out of the proverbial rut. What are criticisms about schedules, tests, texts, and lessons on one level but an expression of our ennui with things as they are?

But in spite of our efforts to vary our teaching, most systematic studies, as well as many casual observations, have shown that we tend to operate within a rather narrow range most of the time, not making use of a great number of available options. The rules of the classroom game are remarkably stable. And often what we think we are doing is different from what observers perceive us doing. Even when we try alternatives, we are more likely to judge them in relationship to our preconceived notions of what good teaching is, rather than by including the consequences of the alternatives in our descriptions and comparing them. In short, though we do exercise some control and are somewhat aware of what we do, for most of us there is a whole alternative world of possibilities to discover and try out (Hoetker and Ahlbrand 1969; Shapiro-Skrobe 1982).

Tennis, St. James?—description in other areas. Though a major reason I advocate alternate practices is because most of us have a great deal of experience with common practices, some ideas about change from other areas can be related to the
practices I advocate you experience. In fact, you might at first wonder whether it might seem easier to follow the usual rules in discussing teaching; ignoring actual communications; being general and judgmental so that some comments sound like cliches; limiting the alternatives we generate because of our preconceived notions of what good teaching is; and not bothering about congruence between ideas and practice. As St. James said, 'Ye shall be compared to a man beholding his own countenance in a glass, for he beheld himself and went his way, and presently forgot what manner of man he was.' Seeing precise details can shock! But in my experience, as we begin to observe what we see, without judgment, sometimes we experience a type of liberation.

Just as the pain we imagine we'll feel is often more severe before we get in the dentist's chair than after the drilling begins, so the fear of seeing ourselves is often decreased, if not eliminated, by observing nonjudgmentally. Though the goal of observing is to describe rather than to say how terrible or wonderful we sound or look, we usually cannot avoid seeing and hearing ourselves as a critic for a while. But as we describe more and more, fear and anxiety usually decrease. Energy is devoted to trying to describe and discover what we do, including the consequences, rather than to lament our looks or the sound of our voice. Since the aim of the description is only to see, not to prove or disprove our preconceived notions, comments like 'I sure did a stupid thing'; 'wow, that was really great'; 'I handled the questions perfectly', become less frequent.

Using a coding system—a set of operationally defined descriptive terms—to describe communications in place of general words that imply judgments, can provide distance from what we do to help us see differently. Gallwey—a famous tennis coach—once demonstrated on television two approaches to getting players to send the ball over the net more than three times during the opening volley. He started by shouting 'Great!' after a volley was completed and 'Almost' when the ball went out of bounds or hit the net. After some out-of-bounds balls he made comments such as 'try harder--you can do it.' The more he praised the players—a type of judgment—the fewer times they could get the ball over the net and back.

He then told them that rather than trying to get the ball over the net more than three times, they should just describe what was happening. He asked them to supply one word to describe the ball when the racket came in contact with it, and another word to describe the ball when it touched the ground, either inside or outside the serve lines. They chose the words bounce and hit. One player started the volley, and as he did, he, of course, said hit as he whacked the ball. Each player called out bounce as the ball touched the court on each player's side.
The players were able to keep the volley going for 13 exchanges as they accompanied their playing with the naming of the two elements of their exchange. The coach contended, of course, that helping them to observe and describe what they were doing nonjudgmentally helped them. Rather than tightening their muscles in preparation for a judgment, or as a result of a judgment, they simply looked at what they were doing. Since they were looking at what they were doing rather than trying to decide what manner of people they were, they were free from anxiety, and so they could let their muscles move without tightening to do the job at hand (Gallwey 1974).

Whether we are in the tennis court, a classroom, or any other setting, much of what we do we are not conscious of. 'Hold your feet so they give more power and sit up straight', shouts the parent teaching a child to swing in the park. If the child does not know how to determine how much power his feet are presently producing, and he is not aware of his current posture, he cannot alter his way of swinging, except by accident. 'Your back is now on an angle—line it up with the chains on each side of the seat' is a command that is descriptive and so allows the child to see both what he is presently doing and how the suggested alternative is different. It is also nonjudgmental, not implying that the child is in some way inadequate as the usual shouted 'Sit up straight' does.

A comment like 'Get them more involved' is closer to 'Sit up straight' or 'Great shot!' than to 'bounce-hit' or 'line up your back with the chains'. I find general, judgmental comments such as 'get them more involved' harder to translate into practice and do not see how I can observe the extent to which I follow the advice. So I emphasize descriptive comments that are specific, such as 'Make your back even with the chains' or comments that include categories—such as 'bounce-hit'. As a result, we are perhaps less likely to avoid beholding ourselves, to paraphrase St. James. And perhaps we will be less likely to forget what manner of person we are as well if we continue to look and try to see ourselves over a long period of time.

Note

This paper is an adapted version of the first chapter of Breaking Rules--Generating and Exploring Alternatives in Language Teaching, to be published by Longmans (White Plains, N.Y.).

References

The title and general focus of this paper have emerged from two sources. The more obvious one is the late Marshall McLuhan's notion that the medium is the message; this notion is used here to suggest that language assessment as a social event conveys quite strong messages to learners and educators about underlying purposes, cultural values, appropriate behavior, and the like. The less obvious source is a recent article by Richard Larson, editor of *College Composition and Communication*, who writes (1983:9):

> The makers and scorers of tests and the interpreters of test scores need, I think, to be attentive not only to statistics about the validity, reliability, and comparability of test scores, but also to the messages that the tests themselves send to students—and to teachers—about what writing is, how one writes, and what characteristics of writing entitle it to be called "good." Those of us who engage in the testing of writing win a pyrrhic victory, I suggest, if in order to produce scores that satisfy statisticians and attorneys, we give tests that communicate erroneous messages about what writing is and what writers do.

Larson's specific concern with writing assessment is reflected here in a broader concern about the questionable views of language proficiency that are communicated by many of the most widely used language tests and assessment techniques.

Given these two sources of insight, my main purpose is to argue that many current methods of language assessment, and not just the content of assessment instruments, convey seriously misleading and counterproductive messages to learners and educators about the nature of assessment and the nature of language, language learning, and language use. Moreover, these messages help create and maintain images of language assessment
that are difficult to modify and displace, and hence impede progress in the field of language assessment. The following sections address briefly some of the most disturbing messages and images conveyed by current assessment methods, some of the main consequences of these images, and several different methods that may provide more adequate and productive images of language assessment.

1. Current messages and images. Two recent cartoons from a U.S. magazine illustrate some of the most disturbing messages that current language tests often send to learners and educators. The first cartoon showed a child looking up from a test and thinking 'Why should I care if I pass this exam or not?' The second cartoon showed a man interrupted from his reading by a small bird with a small cannon; the bird says to the man 'This is only a test.'

The first cartoon draws our attention to the role that the learner is frequently assigned in current achievement testing: he or she often becomes an obedient examinee, a disinterested consumer, a powerless patient, or even an unwilling victim. Questions such as what to test, how to test, when to test, how long to spend on the test, what constitutes success on the test, and how to interpret and use test results are all generally asked and answered on behalf of the learner but rarely in whole or in part by the learner. As a result, learners are often not encouraged to become increasingly active agents of their own learning and assessment, not guided to analyze their own learning processes and outcomes, nor prepared to accept the transfer of responsibility for further learning and assessment that is required for successful transition from the classroom to the world outside. From the learner's point of view, testing can be a rather meaningless and impersonal routine. In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that even on proficiency-oriented achievement tests (such as extended writing tasks on topics selected by learners), detailed feedback to learners is often ineffective in promoting further and successful efforts to improve performance (see Semke 1984, for example).

The second cartoon focuses our attention on the type of social event that current achievement testing often represents: it is frequently a crude, contrived, confusing, threatening, and above all intrusive event that replaces what many learners (and teachers) find to be more rewarding and constructive classroom opportunities for learning and use. Furthermore, classroom achievement testing often seems to be an afterthought in curriculum design and hence is not always well integrated—in content, format, and scheduling—into language learning and use activities; on the contrary, it is often experienced by learners as the 'cold shower' that inevitably follows such activities. Not surprisingly, learners frequently misunderstand the why and how of classroom achievement testing and must be persuaded and trained to participate in these events (see Deyhle 1983, for
example), even when such testing is intended to be more proficiency-oriented, as in cloze tests of reading comprehension (see Shohamy 1983, for example).

The most direct sources of this image of language assessment—and more specifically, of our common assumptions about learner roles and types of social event characteristic of language assessment—are most likely found in the traditional and psychometric-structuralist trends as defined by Spolsky (1978 and elsewhere). In both approaches, learners are neither expected nor encouraged to share responsibility in deciding what, how, and why to assess; the learner's role is simply to take tests designed, administered, and interpreted by sanctioned experts. Likewise, both approaches represent language testing as a formal, product-oriented, scheduled event that is primarily intended to generate grades, to rank learners with respect to one another, and to assert standards. It is worth noting that the third trend in language testing identified by Spolsky—the integrative-sociolinguistic one—is less a source of our current image than a reflection of the tenacity of already accepted assumptions in the previous two trends. In this vein, we can thus more easily understand why even the most heralded examples of the integrative-sociolinguistic approach (e.g. dictation, cloze, and oral interview techniques) generally reflect learner roles and social events that differ little from those common in the other two approaches.

In considering these direct sources of the image problem in language testing, we should bear in mind Spolsky's (1978) more general observation that trends in language testing by and large reflect trends in linguistic theory, language learning theory, and educational practice. With respect to educational practice, it is obvious that mass education has imposed significant constraints on our image of language testing. Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz (1982:20) succinctly describe the nature of these constraints:

...In their practices, mass education systems do not, and cannot, take into account the nonstandardizable experiential learning practices of different groups [and individuals]. Mass education systems focus on readily accessible information and accountable means of evaluating skills and educational achievement. This results in a focus on specific aspects of verbal learning skills as the medium of education.

Ultimately, of course, we must understand these more fundamental sources of influence on our image of language testing if we are to propose and implement more suitable images.

2. Main consequences of the image problem. Our current image of language testing has had perhaps two main negative consequences in language classrooms.
First, the most widely available and influential language achievement tests and assessment techniques have improved very little during the past half-century. This lack of progress has been noted by historians and experts in language testing such as Buros, who wrote shortly before his death: "Essentially, achievement tests are being constructed today in the same way they were fifty years ago—the major changes being the use of more sophisticated statistical procedures for doing what we did then—mistakes and all" (1977:10). In view of the washback or steering effect that major language achievement tests may have on language classroom practice, many persistent inadequacies in these major tests are no doubt reflected in teacher-developed classroom achievement tests as well.

Second, in classrooms where primary emphasis is on language use rather than on knowledge about language, there is often a fundamental mismatch between teaching/learning practice and testing practice. The actual extent of this mismatch is unclear and presumably varies from one classroom to another; as well, one can only speculate as to the actual effects of this mismatch on learners and teachers. But it is clear that many of the distinguishing characteristics of state-of-the-art language learning and language use activities are largely at odds with those of current language assessment activities. Figure 1 summarizes, in a preliminary and tentative manner, some of the differences that have struck various classroom teachers with whom I have worked in graduate courses over the past few years.

3. Some suggestions for more suitable images. The major characteristics of learning activities outlined in Figure 1 can also serve to guide our search for more suitable images for language assessment. In particular, exemplary activities for language learning and use do not seem to be as narrowly constrained as do current language assessment activities in terms of the learner roles and types of social event that are deemed valuable and legitimate for classroom purposes. Furthermore, it is perhaps reasonable to assume—at least as a working hypothesis—that the conditions under which language proficiency develops most adequately would be similar to those under which language proficiency may be displayed and assessed most adequately; presumably, such a working hypothesis underlies naturalistic and ethnographic approaches to the study of language acquisition (e.g. Wells 1981 and Fillmore 1979). For these reasons, we might turn our attention to such exemplary learning activities in order to understand both how well they encourage more responsible roles for learners and how well they incorporate assessment as a very natural, intrinsic component of language learning and language use.

The following five examples illustrate a wide variety of activities for language learning and use in the various language skill areas. These examples are presented in an order that
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reflects my own view of how radically the images they reflect differ from our current images of language achievement testing.

Figure 1. Mismatch between learning activities and testing activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proficiency-oriented learning activities</th>
<th>Current achievement testing activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large variety of tasks and contexts</td>
<td>Little variety in test methods and formats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of language skill areas</td>
<td>Focus largely on separate receptive skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis of knowledge and skills in extended and global tasks</td>
<td>Diagnostic discrete-point tasks and scoring procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on message, function, and form</td>
<td>Focus on form before function and message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group collaboration and individual work</td>
<td>Individual work only (group effort = cheating)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage resourcefulness in resolving authentic problems in language use (e.g. cognitive and interactional ones)</td>
<td>Encourage accuracy in resolving contrived problems that arise at the linguistic level but rarely at cognitive, affective, and other levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the learner as a responsible agent of his or her own learning</td>
<td>Treat the examinee as one who simply takes tests but does not contribute to their design and use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploit assessment as an inherent and natural activity in any authentic learning and use of language</td>
<td>Treat assessment as obligatory and scheduled activity imposed on learners after authentic learning and use of language take place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 'Hybrid' language achievement tests. Building on the work of Slager (1978) and others, Omaggio (1983) provides numerous interesting examples of what she labels 'hybrid' language tests: classroom achievement tests that are designed to elicit specific language features within natural language-use contexts. One example of such a test item in the area of listening comprehension is to ask learners to complete an information form about an apartment for rent based on a taped telephone conversation in which the apartment is described (Omaggio 1983:14-15). In suggesting such a task, Omaggio makes clear her image of testing and learning activities (1983:6):

...Since a test is fundamentally a task to be observed and evaluated, it seems logical, and indeed advisable, that we use the same types of tasks in language practice activities as we use in testing.
However, Omaggio does not go so far as to recommend that learners be encouraged to assume more responsibility for their own assessment nor that testing events be fully integrated into learning events (although such recommendations would be consistent with her image of parsimonious testing and learning activities). Her hybrid achievement tests thus constitute a significant but not radical departure from our current image of language achievement tests. For examples of language achievement tests similar to Omaggio's but that do seek to incorporate learners' input into test design, see Swain (1984).

3.2 Classroom testing as collaborative research. In their extensive study of the development of writing skills, Scardamalia and Bereiter (1983) have discovered that their 'tests', or methods of study, are frequently of great interest and use to the learners under study. Examples of these methods are observation, semi-directed interviews, and various types of support as learners confront problems in the actual planning, composing, and revision processes in writing. In other words, these methods seem very much in line with our emerging image of learning activities in proficiency-oriented classrooms; yet these methods were originally designed exclusively for evaluation purposes. Scardamalia and Bereiter (1983:62, 79) express clearly their own emerging image of classroom assessment:

...In the course of some 70 experiments we have employed numerous methods for probing mental processes in young people, and a frequent side effect has been that the children themselves became actively interested in what the experimental procedures were allowing them to discover about their mental processes....This allowed children, in effect, to participate as coinvestigators—to function not only as sources of data but as seekers and interpreters of data as well....Students who have not liked writing have nonetheless seemed to like analyzing the task and the process. We have consequently been led to think about possible educational uses of this sort of collaborative inquiry....The principal value that we see in acquiring personal (as contrasted with theoretical) knowledge of cognitive processes is that it enables students to take a more self-directive role in their mental development.... Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of developing a self-directed mental life is that meaningfulness ceases to be a property that is "found" or not "found" in external activities and contexts. It becomes a property that people invest activities with, by virtue of assigning them a role in their mental lives.

Thus the image suggested by these authors is quite different from our current image of achievement testing in its view both of the learner's collaborative role in assessment and of the
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assessment event as an ongoing and meaningful one that learners willingly seek as a part of language learning and use activities.

3.3 Exploiting inherent evaluation. Breen and Candlin (1980) have argued that language learning and use are inherently evaluative activities since they crucially involve interpretation, negotiation, and expression of both culturally shared meaning and personal meaning. As such, they further argue that assessment of classroom achievement should not be considered as external to authentic language learning and use activities but rather as an immediate, ongoing, and shared responsibility of learners and teachers. The focus of these authors' efforts has not, however, been on achievement testing activities but rather on classroom materials and methodology, that is, on how to assure that our activities for language learning and use are authentic and, thus, do in fact allow us to exploit this inherent evaluation. In this respect, they provide (Candlin and Breen 1979:105–106) many insightful questions and suggestions:

Are there criteria within the materials useful as a basis for evaluating learner performance? Are such criteria... sufficiently explicit to different learners so that the materials can act as a stimulus for learner self-evaluation and for evaluation by the learners of themselves as a group?...Do they give clear guidelines on the direction learners should take after success or failure at a task? Are such guidelines and such feedback premised upon predetermined criteria, or do they allow for different learners achieving different tasks, in different ways and at different times?...Can learners apply their own evaluation to the contents and activities of the materials? If we accept the significance of personal socio-cultural attitudes in language learning, and the importance of learners' values and emotions, then this becomes an important question for materials designers....Since learners do evaluate the usefulness of materials against a range of sociocultural and personal criteria, perhaps materials should exploit this evaluation, rather than assuming that they can be value-free and infallible.

A concrete example of the type of material suggested by the foregoing is an oral interaction activity in which groups of learners are required to find a treasure hidden on a farm (Breen and Candlin, personal communication). It can be described briefly as follows.

Learners are divided into groups of four such that within each group they vary in their oral proficiency in the target language. Each group is given a map of the farm and each member of the group is given a different clue (written in the most commonly shared language of the learners) about the
location of the treasure. All four clues are necessary in order to locate the treasure and all communication must take place in the target language; each group member thus has a specific responsibility and all must assist one another to achieve a common goal. As a result, learners must negotiate, interpret, and express meanings at cognitive, social, linguistic, and affective levels. Learners' performance may be tracked through audio or video recording and through observation notes taken by other learners or the teacher. Teachers and learners can then analyze the performance, focus attention on strengths and weaknesses, redo the activity using different clues prepared by teachers and learners, design similarly structured activities based on relevant themes, etc.

In sum, this one example provides an image of classroom language assessment in which learners share responsibility for the design, implementation, and interpretation of activities that are intended to exploit authentic language learning and use for assessment purposes in a very natural, unintrusive manner.

3.4 Project-based language programs. An even more radical image than the previous one is suggested by the practice of several groups of teachers and learners who have organized their language program in terms of projects to be completed during the course of study. Two examples of such project-based curricula have been brought to my attention by teachers with whom I work.

First is the extreme case of a teacher who arranged job training integrated with language training for a group of 15 adult immigrants to Toronto. The teacher arranged with a building contractor for the learners to assist in the renovation of an unused warehouse. Learners were assigned to work with different construction workers on different tasks throughout the semester. The teacher assisted as well in the renovation activities, primarily as a language resource person but also as a co-worker. Both teacher and learners acquired direct experience in language use in a specific job situation, experience that the teacher and learners could help one another analyze, build upon, and extend to other job situations. The project thus provided a sort of apprenticeship approach to language training.

The second case is that of a Grade 6 class that decided to complete five projects during a one-semester course in French as a second language (that met one hour per day). Teacher and learners decided on a list of projects from which small groups of learners selected four. The fifth project was an individual effort based on each learner's own idea. The ten or so projects from which groups of learners could choose included a science experiment, a geography report, an artistic creation (for example, a musical composition, a play, a film), an interview with a well-known member of the community, and a biography of a famous French Canadian (or other francophone) person. Each project was completed over a three-week period.
during which the first week was devoted to brainstorming and planning the project, the second to an informal class presentation and discussion of the project, and the third week to a final write-up on the project. Teacher feedback was available but optional during the first week, informally provided during the second, and formally offered during the third. I attended an informal presentation by three young women on their science project: with a large, blank poster as their only prop, they described (in French) why and how they designed an invisible robot!

What is perhaps most radical and striking about these two images is not only that the learners shared so much responsibility for their learning and assessment but that they worked on extended projects in which this learning and assessment systematically culminated in a final product useful for themselves and for other learners.

3.5 Intelligent computer-assisted activities. More radical than any of the preceding images for achievement testing are the 'intelligent tutoring systems' that have emerged from artificial intelligence research during the past ten years. Venezky (1983:41) describes such computer-assisted activities as follows:

Programs such as [these] have in common the capability to build a model of the students' abilities, a representation of expert behavior in relation to the skills to be taught, and a representation of the subject matter itself. Through diagnosis of the students' strategies and their relationship to expert strategies, instruction is generated....There are no predetermined, frame-by-frame sequences, nor are there fixed responses to be given to particular student answers.

For our purposes, one of the best examples of such a system is not a language activity at all but rather a math game (for the PLATO computer system) entitled 'How the west was won' (Burton and Brown 1982). This example is valuable in several ways: it is process-oriented rather than product-oriented; it is intended to diagnose and construct a model of the learner's strengths and weaknesses in an unintrusive manner; it has a game format; and it adapts the game to the learner's level of performance while still seeking to 'coach' or offer the learner assistance to find out how much his or her abilities and performance can be improved as well as what types of assistance are effective. Learners are relatively free to use or ignore the assistance offered.

The educational philosophy behind such adaptive coaching environments has been articulated and explored by Papert (1980) and Burton, Brown, and Fischer (1984), among others. Burton and Brown's own image of such an environment is expressed as follows (1982:89):
In these environments it is best for the student to discover for himself as much of the structure of a situation as possible. Every time the Coach tells the student something, it is robbing him of the opportunity to discover it for himself. Many human tutors interrupt far too often, generally because of a lack of time or patience, and they may be preventing the development in their students of important cognitive skills—the cognitive skills that allow students to detect and use their own errors.

The classroom implications of this image can be interpreted as quite radical ones: teachers should not interfere in their students' discovery learning processes, and intelligent machines may be more competent than human teachers in adapting learning environments to individual student needs.

However, such radical interpretations are not necessarily intended by proponents of intelligent computer systems. In fact, Burton and Brown (1982) and Venezky (1983) argue strongly that such computer-assisted activities are still very unintelligent and need to be evaluated themselves by intelligent classroom teachers and learners. Yet the image of achievement testing suggested by such activities is valuable if we are interested in more learner-controlled and unintrusive assessment events in the language classroom. Such an image is especially valuable since much current research in language assessment is devoted to computerized-adaptive techniques which in principle reflect revolutionary changes in testing, yet in practice often seem designed primarily to mechanize existing product-oriented tests for improved administrative efficiency (see Canale 1985 for discussion).

4. Summary and preliminary conclusions. In summary, this paper has addressed two main points. First, it has argued that a fundamental problem in language assessment is the message and image conveyed about learner roles and types of social event that constitute such assessment. Some of the sources and consequences of this image problem have been briefly outlined. Second, a broad range of examples of other images has been suggested in order to illustrate how we might encourage and exploit the intrinsic evaluation characteristic of any authentic language learning and use. Though it is unlikely that any one of these examples would serve all language assessment needs and purposes in even a single classroom, these different images do provide a rich context in which to examine and enhance our current practice.

In exploring these other images, we might try to keep three final considerations in mind.

First, our focus on assessment methods must not exclude a focus on the content of language assessment. This is not only because test content has been repeatedly shown to be problematic from many different perspectives (e.g. in terms of content
validity, cultural bias, motivation). Rather, perhaps equally importantly, it is because we as linguists still understand so little of what constitutes crucial data for language acquisition, i.e. how to define linguistically what Lightfoot (1982) refers to as the learner's 'trigger experience'. Research in language assessment could contribute to this goal.

Second, we must consider the various strengths and weaknesses of these other images in more detail than has been possible here. Some preliminary comments are, of course, in order.

With respect to possible strengths, several come to mind. For instance, if testing activities become increasingly similar to language learning and use activities, then presumably teachers and learners will be more involved in every aspect of classroom assessment. Achievement testing will be less and less the domain of external experts. Another strength is that, from a purely measurement perspective, assessment of achievement can only benefit from assessment methods that are unintrusive, ongoing, varied, familiar, meaningful, adaptive, informal, and collaborative. Finally, improved classroom achievement testing can perhaps serve and improve large-scale achievement testing (where such large-scale testing is judged appropriate). An excellent example of this is the use of writing portfolios by groups such as the San Francisco Bay Area Writers Project (Jan Curtis, personal communication) and the Ontario Writing Evaluation Project (Peter Evans, personal communication). Such portfolios are assembled for large-scale program evaluation purposes and draw upon random samples of student writing elicited through regular classroom assignments over the course of a semester or year. Oral proficiency 'portfolios' can and have been used in similar ways (for example, by the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages and by the New Brunswick Ministry of Education). Other examples and advantages of such longitudinal monitoring models of assessment are discussed by Cummins (1984:258-64).

With respect to possible weaknesses of these more recent images, there are many. A significant one is the extent to which innovative classroom achievement testing will in fact satisfy important criteria of any good measurement instrument—validity, reliability, practicality, acceptability, and potential for feedback. Careful empirical study will be needed to supplement our current promises and perhaps overly fashionable opinions. Another possible weakness is the extent to which increasingly proficiency-oriented assessment may frustrate and discourage learners who have not become proficient in the target language. As pointed out by Lowe (1985), for example, it is unlikely that there is a simple linear progression from achievement to proficiency; more likely there is a quantum leap, at many different stages of language development, from learning about the language to using the language. Although adaptive and collaborative assessment techniques may in principle console and encourage the nonproficient learner, actual practice may
generate assessment events and scoring procedures that are not experienced as consoling and encouraging. Again, careful monitoring is in order.

Finally, we should bear in mind that perhaps the most disturbing possible weakness of any of the images suggested here is that teachers and learners who desire to implement them may not have the power to do so. In other words, their joint roles may be limited and the classroom events in which they jointly participate may be intrusive and formally imposed. This point has been persuasively made by Amarel (1983:25) and others. In this light, one of the most important messages for language assessment to convey is that written by the late Robert L. Jackson as the last of his 70 or so recommendations in the final report of the Ontario Commission on Declining Enrollment: Let us never forget that the learner is not just the client or focus of schools and educational systems; rather, the learner is the only reason for their existence.

Note

Many of the examples and ideas in this paper are based on those in the paper 'Proficiency oriented achievement testing' prepared by the author for the ACTFL (American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages) Master Lecture Series and to be published by the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California.

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DEVELOPING A LANGUAGE-COMPETENT AMERICAN SOCIETY

G. Richard Tucker
Center for Applied Linguistics

My purpose here is to argue for the desirability of developing a language-competent American society and to share with you some steps which are currently being taken to implement that objective. I have suggested elsewhere (Tucker 1984) that all residents of the United States should have a real opportunity to develop the highest possible degree of proficiency in understanding, speaking, reading, and writing English, whether it is their mother tongue or a second language. Furthermore, English-speaking individuals should have an opportunity to develop an ability to understand, speak, read, and write a second language, while those who are not native speakers of English should have an opportunity to develop proficiency in their mother tongue. In these days of increasing global interdependence, all American residents will benefit—personally and socially—and our nation will benefit if the largest possible number of residents can speak, read, write, and understand at least one language in addition to English.

At a previous Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics, James Alatis and I (Alatis and Tucker 1979) noted that language is an important thread which runs, albeit too often without recognition, through a variety of issues fundamental to national development and public life. We argued then, and I believe it important to reiterate today, that educational practice can be improved and social equity can be facilitated by applying knowledge gleaned from research conducted within the domain of the language sciences. If one accepts the underlying premise which I have just outlined—namely, the desirability of developing a language-competent society—even the most casual observation will reveal that we are far from attaining this societal goal. The number of English mother tongue residents who possess a 'working proficiency' or indeed even minimal proficiency in some second or later acquired language is discouragingly small. American residents are, for the
most part, not studying foreign languages; and those who do are not becoming very proficient. It has been estimated, for example, that fewer than one-tenth of one percent of the small number of American residents studying foreign languages are studying languages other than French, Italian, German, Portuguese, and Spanish—this despite the fact that these other 'less commonly taught' languages comprise 99% of the world's languages (and with the addition of English, of their speakers). It is not my intention in this paper to describe in detail the sad state of affairs of foreign language study and foreign language proficiency in the United States. This has been done elsewhere (President's Commission 1979; Lambert 1985). Rather, I would like to describe a series of initiatives currently under way. These initiatives hold promise of significantly improving our understanding of the second (and foreign) language learning and teaching process and of leading to the development and implementation of a research agenda which will be interdisciplinary, longitudinal, quantitative, and qualitative; such an agenda should improve our understanding of the theoretical bases of language learning/language teaching and directly inform and help to improve educational practice. In particular, I would like to call your attention to two specific domestic occurrences which, from my perspective, signal the fact that the development of a language-competent society is now being accorded high educational priority.

I would also like to call your attention to two new international developments which will complement, extend, and broaden the potential generalizability of the American-based activities. I have argued at previous Georgetown University Round Tables (Tucker 1970; Tucker 1983; Tucker and Cziko 1978) that a good deal of very important language education research is conducted outside the United States—much of it in less developed countries—and that American language educators should remain as closely in contact as possible with their international colleagues.

Exemplary activities. Let me now describe briefly salient characteristics of four exemplary research activities—each of which is or will be characterized by the guiding premises that: (1) theoretically driven research can and should inform educational practice, and sound pedagogical practice can and should inform theory; (2) the articulation of a cogent research agenda involves consultation among community members, educators, researchers, and research sponsors; and (3) research to examine diverse facets of the relationships between academic learning and the development of first and second language proficiency can best be conducted by interdisciplinary teams of researchers working collaboratively with practitioners.

Let me now describe four exemplary activities: (1) the Center for Language Education and Research, (2) the National Center for Foreign Language Pedagogy, (3) the evaluation of
Center for Language Education and Research. In the fall of 1984, the National Institute of Education issued a request for proposals (RFP) which called for the development and implementation of a Center for Bilingual Research and Second Language Education. The specific goals of this research center were to be multifaceted. The RFP was clear in asking that research be conducted which addressed educational concerns for both language minority and language majority students. Basic research was called for which would help to clarify the nature of language proficiency; the nature of bilingualism or bilinguality; the cognitive and linguistic underpinnings of the mastery of academic content; and the constellation of affective, cognitive, social, and pedagogical factors which facilitate the learning/teaching and retention or attrition of languages. At each step, those charged with responsibility for implementing the work of the research center were asked to involve as broad a spectrum of community members as possible—parents, educators, and interested others who could help to inform, to fine-tune, to sharpen the research agenda, and to ensure the maximum usefulness of the resulting information. The research was to be conducted with members of different ethnonlinguistic communities, at various school sites, with youngsters and with adults in various formal or nonformal settings throughout the United States.

Professional development was viewed as a crucial component of the overall mission of the research center, and a specific requirement was built into the RFP to ensure that such activities were an ongoing concern of the Center's staff. Likewise, attention was paid to ensuring that innovative materials would be collected, evaluated, and disseminated to ensure a systematic network of information sharing and maximizing of scarce resources.

The RFP to which I refer was, from my perspective, the single most intellectually exciting one to be issued during the six and a half years that I have been at the Center for Applied Linguistics. It provided a framework for initiating a multifaceted research agenda which is, of necessity, interdisciplinary and longitudinal, and which calls for both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. On June 1, 1985 the activities of this Center—now referred to as the Center for Language Education and Research—were begun. Scholars and practitioners were involved from a consortium of institutions at the University of California, Los Angeles, Yale University, Harvard University, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the Center for Applied Linguistics.

It is beyond the scope of this presentation to describe in detail the activities of the Center for Language Education, but I would like to share with you the flavor of a few of the
proposed tasks for this five-year effort to examine diverse aspects of the acquisition of academic learning and language proficiency by language minority and language majority individuals. The activities of the Center are organized around eight required tasks.

Task 1 (coordinated by Amado Padilla, Russell Campbell, and myself) will serve as an initial orientation period for the Center; during this time the broadest possible input will be sought from representatives of community-based organizations, educators, researchers, and interested others to examine critically and to fine-tune the research agenda proposed by Center staff. As one of the many parts of this orientation phase, five 'working seminars' will be convened, involving representatives of the groups named, together with Center staff and senior advisors, to examine in detail the following topics: (1) measurement and description of language proficiency, (2) cognition and problem solving, (3) reading and writing skills, (4) effective teachers and teaching practices, (5) development and implementation of interlocking educational programs for language majority and linguistic minority students.

It should be noted that our concept of seminar does not imply the static notion of a meeting of professionals occurring on a single occasion and then forgotten. Rather, the term implies protracted study of a specific theme over a period of time that will involve diverse individuals engaged collectively in refining each proposed study with regard to underlying assumptions, hypotheses, site selection, sampling specifications, assessment instruments, data analyses, etc. We intend to expose for the broadest possible critical discussion the research agenda proposed by Center staff so that this unique opportunity for examining factors associated with the acquisition of content knowledge and language proficiency will be used as effectively as possible.

The Center's Tasks 2 and 5 involve an interrelated set of activities which will be coordinated by Evelyn Hatch of UCLA, a faculty member at the 1985 LSA/TESOL Institute. Task 2 will investigate diverse linguistic and cognitive factors associated with problem-solving by minority students in mathematics and science classes; the use of dialogue journals as a research and pedagogical tool with language minority students; processes and significant features of cooperative learning programs; cross-language transfer of skills; the development of contextualized and decontextualized language skills; and a variety of other topics. Research will be conducted in continuing collaboration with educators at local educational agencies. The input of community-based organizations and practitioners will be sought on a continual basis. Research plans will be widely disseminated and will be debated among Center staff as well. What is proposed is the development of an ongoing dynamic dialogue among researchers, practitioners, and clients, in order to understand
better the linguistic and metalinguistic underpinnings of the mastery of academic content.

Task 3 (coordinated by JoAnn Crandall of CAL and Concepcion Valadez of UCLA) will involve the Center in the preparation and implementation of an ongoing professional development program. Our intention will be to work collaboratively with educators in key sites throughout the United States over a five-year period to assess their needs with respect to professional development, to assist them in meeting those needs through a collaborative working relationship which will result in the transfer of capacity for addressing these needs from the 'Center' to the local level. In this instance, CAL will have lead responsibility for working collaboratively with sites in the eastern United States, and UCLA will take a similar responsibility for the southwestern and western part of the country. Continual communication between the two task leaders will ensure full sharing of information, commonality of approaches, etc.

Task 4 (coordinated by Donna Christian of CAL and Concepcion Valadez of UCLA) staff will be involved in the identification, review, evaluation, and dissemination of information about materials, curricula, and programs for language minority educators and for second language educators. We intend to collect and examine as fully as possible extant materials and to undertake during the latter portion of the Center's lifespan the development of prototype pedagogical materials—at least some of which will involve utilization of newer technologies. CAL will have lead responsibility for materials and curriculum review for second language education programs, and UCLA will assume comparable responsibility for programs for language minorities.

Task 6 (coordinated by Tracy Gray of CAL) involves examination of diverse facets of second language education. Within this task we intend, for example, to conduct a national survey of elementary, secondary, and tertiary foreign language programs—particularly innovative programs which offer promise of enhanced language proficiency development, etc. Further attention will also be given to the relative pedagogical effectiveness of different approaches to second language education, and in Task 7 (coordinated by John L.D. Clark of CAL) attention will be paid to language attrition. That is, specific quantitative and qualitative studies will be carried out to examine the process, course, causes, and correlates of language attrition among individuals who have participated in conventional language instruction programs, as well as among those who have participated in innovative immersion-type programs.

Task 8 (coordinated by Kathryn Lindholm of UCLA) is really the culminating and integrative activity of the Center's mandate. In a sense, all of the other tasks will inform the implementation of Task 8. In Task 8, Center staff propose to examine existing interlocking programs such as those mandated by the State of New York in their recent decision to implement innovative language education programs, and others that remain as yet
unknown. The aim will be a five-year collaborative effort with a number of school districts throughout the United States to implement and document programs of instruction giving language minority youngsters an opportunity to study via their mother tongue and add English as a second language in schools with language majority youngsters; the language majority students will have an opportunity to study English and to add the mother tongue of their peers to their repertoire. The intention will be to offer language arts instruction in both of the contact languages and to offer the teaching of content material in both languages in highly complementary, integrated, and supportive ways. In this way, we will examine empirically and qualitatively the hypothesis that such an approach should facilitate both the development of language skills and the acquisition of content material.

From a research perspective, all agenda items alluded to previously (but unfortunately not described in great detail) will be brought into focus in Task 8. That is, we intend to look in detail at the linguistic and metalinguistic underpinnings of the acquisition of content material; to scrutinize the cross-language transfer of skills; to examine the development of contextualized and decontextualized language abilities; to investigate the affective, cognitive, and social correlates of good language learning for both language majority and language minority individuals; and to determine whether language attrition does occur for students who drop out of such programs after participation for specified periods of time.

Unfortunately, time constraints prevent me from sharing with you the details of the research plans. My major purpose in alluding to this activity today has been simply to call to your attention the fact that in many parts of the country over the course of the next seven months a very extensive dialogue will be conducted with all of you, for the purpose of articulating, sharpening, and focusing the research agenda for the Center. Simultaneously, work will begin with the needs assessment portion of the professional development activities and with the collection and evaluation of materials.

With the establishment of the Center for Language Education and Research, we envision the implementation of a long-term research agenda in which researchers, graduate students, practitioners, administrators, and parents who share a common interest in the role of language in personal growth and development will have an opportunity to pose and investigate commonsensical questions within a rigorous research framework. Answers to those questions will be sought and relevant data collected, and information and results of such studies will be disseminated to a broad and interested group of practitioners. We envision a Center committed to the carrying out of research which will immediately and continually serve the needs of practitioners, a Center which places a high priority upon the sharing of information among the broadest possible clientele.
We envision a Center in which a high priority is placed upon younger scholars—particularly those from language-minority backgrounds—to conduct research, but to conduct it with the aim of translating and transmitting the results for use by practitioners. In essence, we envision the establishment of a Center which takes as its primary goal the development of a language-competent American society.

National Center for Foreign Language Pedagogy. During the academic year 1983-1984, a team of scholars (Richard D. Lambert, University of Pennsylvania; Elinor G. Barber, Institute of International Education; Eleanor H. Jorden, Cornell University; and Leon Twarog, Ohio State University) conducted a Department of Defense-funded study to investigate the present capacities of the nation's universities to provide advanced training and research in foreign language and area studies. Their report examined the state of our 'language competency', our 'area competency', and the available resources such as campus-based and national organizations which provide support, leadership, and training. They looked at the goals and needs of both the academic community and the Defense community. The report (Lambert 1984) led to the development by Richard Lambert of a prospectus calling for the establishment of a Center for Foreign Language Pedagogy to 'address our national need to improve the quality of our foreign language teaching both in and out of our formal education system.' In his remarks and survey, he saw a surprisingly weak tradition of empiricism in the search for what works and does not work in foreign language training. He also saw relatively little mechanism for sharing experience, particularly with respect to the teaching of the less commonly taught languages. Lambert argued that the time is right to plan, and hopefully to inaugurate, a national resource center devoted to the systematic study and implementation of pedagogical advances in foreign language study. He views such a center, as do we all, as being perfectly compatible with and complementary to that of the Center for Language Education and Research.

Lambert has proposed for discussion the implementation of an agenda for the Language Pedagogy Center which would involve research intended to develop a common metric for language proficiency measurement to cover as many of the world's languages as possible for each of the four skill areas—speaking, reading, writing, and listening. This effort, particularly the expansion into the non-Western languages and those with complex orthographies—will require the development of more satisfactory measures, especially for the assessment of reading.

Lambert also argues that high priority should be given to conducting national needs assessments or surveys of foreign language use and foreign language need by our general adult population for a number of occupational groups throughout the country. He argues convincingly (as do policy planners in
many other parts of the world) that it is impossible to determine what our national needs are and how well they are being served until we look critically at the users and bring needs, techniques, and students together once again. He calls for the center to gather and collect feedback from many, often informal developers of innovative material, particularly material for the teaching of the less commonly taught languages, since preparation of such material is often a 'cottage' industry. Lambert describes an agenda for an organization devoted to the systematic study and implementation of pedagogical advances in foreign language study. This organization will bring together empirical research to deal with a range of pedagogical issues of how students learn and retain language, what techniques work, how, with what effects, and at what degree of efficiency. The center will attempt to facilitate and coordinate a concerted national effort to upgrade our language teaching capacity and to expand the use of foreign languages in American society.

It should be emphasized that Lambert's vision—which is shared by many individuals and many organizations—is that the existence of such a center would be complementary to that described a few moments ago. The emphasis here would be on the teaching of foreign languages—particularly the less commonly taught languages. Attention would be focused on facilitating a sharing of information between academic communities, particularly at the tertiary level, and governmental language teaching organizations. Attention would also be given to the development and preservation of advanced levels of proficiency to enable individuals to undertake complex original scholarship and research using the language.

An invitational conference has been scheduled, to be hosted by the Ford Foundation with support provided by the Exxon Educational Foundation. At this conference a number of practitioners and researchers will discuss and articulate more fully an agenda for the proposed center. It is hoped that the serious work of commissioning background papers which will lead to the development of the structure of such a center, as well as of the research, development and information sharing agenda, will be completed during the 1985-1986 academic year, with possible implementation by fall, 1986. Although the locus or loci of the Foreign Language Pedagogy Center(s) has yet to be determined, the goal of developing a mechanism which ensures the maximum possible collaboration among professional organizations, research centers, university teaching or training programs, and other interested organizations will remain as the chief objective.

Evaluation of Philippine Bilingual Education. Let me now switch abruptly from the domestic to the international scene to share with you glimpses of two important exemplary activities related to our understanding of the language learning/language teaching process and to the improvement of (language) educational practice. In June 1974 the Department of Education and
Culture of the Philippines mandated the use of English and Pilipino as joint media of instruction throughout the country to develop full bilingual proficiency in all Filipino students. The notion was that all students at all levels from grade 1 through the end of high school would study English language arts and Pilipino language arts as subjects. They would study mathematics and science via English, and all other subjects (for example, history and geography) via Pilipino. The intention was to develop and implement a language by subject matter specialization and to utilize this approach throughout the country. Pilipino, the national language, is based upon Tagalog, the language of Manila. Although Tagalog is quite widely spoken as a mother tongue and a lingua franca within the country, it is not spoken as a mother tongue by a majority of the residents of the Philippines. The Philippines is a country of rich ethnolinguistic diversity spread over several thousand islands with the problems of communication, distribution of materials and resources, etc. that are endemic to many developing nations. This initiative taken by the Ministry of Education and Culture was a bold and interesting one.

In the spring of 1984 a proposal was prepared by representatives of the Linguistic Society of the Philippines (cf. Gonzalez 1984) to evaluate the results of the bilingual education program ten years after its implementation.

This proposal was prepared and submitted to the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Philippines, to the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the United States Agency for International Development (AID), all of which acted positively and collaboratively to fund a three-part project which was begun in the spring of 1985. The evaluation is a tremendously exciting one which has implications not only for Filipino educators, but also for American educators concerned with the development of a language-competent society. In fact, we who are working with the Center for Language Education and Research are in constant contact with our Filipino colleagues, clearly realizing that their work will inform our own research agenda as well.

There is a three-part research plan for this evaluation:

(1) Early in 1985, a quantitative evaluation was conducted in 78 locations throughout the country. Sites were selected to represent a randomly stratified sample of schools with respect to location, ethnolinguistic composition of students, and a variety of other community factors. In each site, students and teachers were tested at grades 4, 6, and 10 in English, Pilipino, science, mathematics, and social studies. The data analyses will examine students' proficiency and achievement as a result of ethnolinguistic background, teaching program, length of participation in the program, congruence between mother tongue and language of instruction, and a variety of other factors. The results, in preliminary form, should be available late in 1985.
(2) A qualitative study will be conducted during the academic year 1985-1986 to examine the implementation of the bilingual program in selected grade levels (i.e., 4, 6, and 10) throughout the country. The objective is to conduct what we here would refer to as a series of 'ethnographic' studies examining the processes and dynamics of teacher-pupil, pupil-pupil, pupil-parent, and other interactions, particularly with a view to understanding the multiple patterns of language use in formal and nonformal settings.

(3) A language policy study will be conducted during the academic year 1985-1986 to examine and describe in detail diverse facets of the implementation of the bilingual education policy. What really happened after the issuance of Department Order No. 25 on June 19, 1974? What, if any, mechanisms or institutions were set in place? What resources were placed at the disposal of those who were charged with responsibility for implementing a bilingual education policy at all grade levels? This will provide an extremely important opportunity to scrutinize the major components of language planning activities: planning, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

I believe that this is one of the most exciting international language education activities to be undertaken in the past several decades and I await eagerly the results of this research.

Language of Instruction and School Achievement. Lastly, let me mention a proposal which will be considered by the General Assembly of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement at its August 1985 meeting in Auckland, New Zealand. The planning group has proposed (cf. Churchill, Brimer, and Tucker 1985) a cross-national study of school achievement of students who, for whatever reason, attend schools where the language of instruction is different from the students' mother tongue. The study is designed to be suitable for all situations currently represented among potential participants, including: (1) countries where the majority of students--often having numerous different mother tongues--study in a second language adopted as the language of schooling; (2) countries where the students studying through a second language belong to one or more groups which, taken together or separately, are in a minority situation. It is not expected that the mother tongue of students will always have a written form.

The study design is intended to take into account the important variables currently believed to explain: (1) the acquisition of the second language used for schooling, (2) the use of the second language for study, and (3) the interaction between proficiency in the second language and achievement in other subjects--in short, many of the issues to which I alluded when describing the Center for Language Education agenda. The study is designed as a cross-national one based on the
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model of former IEA studies of French achievement, mathematics achievement, science achievement, etc. which have been conducted over the past several decades. There have been initial expressions of interest and intention to participate from approximately two dozen countries. The study, like all IEA studies, is viewed as producing information and results which will be useful at a national level. All nationally based researchers will collect and analyze their own data, using common assessment instruments and analytic procedures, and also share their data with an international resource center having responsibility for carrying out cross-national comparisons. Should the study be approved by the General Assembly, activity would probably begin during the academic year 1986-1987. Again, the project is an exciting one which would offer an opportunity to collect data complementary to those being sought by the Center for Language Education and Research for the investigation of diverse aspects of the development of language proficiency and of the mastery of academic content material.

Concluding remarks. I have attempted to convey my belief that the development of a language-competent American society should be accorded our highest educational priority over the next decade. I then attempted to describe, albeit briefly, four exemplary research activities—two domestic (one ongoing, one proposed) and two international (one ongoing, one proposed). I believe that these activities will have as their central by-product the sharing of information, the marshalling of resources, and the acquisition of new knowledge, all of which will clearly inform learners and teachers of languages and help us move toward the development of a language-competent American society.

References


SELLING LANGUAGE REFORM

Robert L. Cooper
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

It is a truism that we can understand neither the processes nor the outcomes of language planning without reference to its social context. Thus while the discipline of language planning can probably be located at the intersection of applied linguistics and the sociology of language, it also impinges upon other fields as well, including political science, economics, social psychology, anthropology, and communications. It is not surprising, therefore, that language planning has been examined from several disciplinary perspectives. Examples of such efforts include Thorburn’s (1971) application of cost-benefit analysis, Fishman’s (1973) comparison of language planning with other types of national modernization and planning, Weinstein’s (1982) political analysis, and my own attempt to view language planning within a framework suggested by the diffusion of innovation (Cooper 1979). In the present paper I treat language planning within a marketing paradigm. To illustrate the usefulness of this paradigm, I refer to the campaign by American feminists against sex-biased language, particularly the use of androcentric generics.

1. The women’s liberation movement and sex bias in language. The current feminist movement seems to have arisen in the late 1960s in the wake of the rise of black militancy, the ensuing revival of ethnicity, and the resistance of established authority evoked by opposition to the war in Vietnam. Narrowly conceived, it is a movement for economic equality. Broadly conceived, it is a movement for developmental equality, i.e., equality of opportunity to develop one’s full potential by removing social stereotypes which channel men into one set of occupations and avocations and women into another. These social stereotypes are so entrenched that we scarcely notice them. They are the grounds of everyday life. One of the strategies of the women’s liberation movement has been to raise people’s consciousness about the extent of this stereotyping and about its impact on their personal lives.
Language, of course, is part of the grounds of everyday life. It is, perhaps, the most basic, least noticed part. Thus until the rise of the movement, few of us paid attention to sex bias in language. We paid no attention, for example, to the fact that terms which refer both to men and to women, such as *craftsman*, *sportsman*, and *chairman*, are formed with a masculine suffix. We paid no attention to the fact that the pronouns *he*, *him*, and *his* can be used to refer to females as well as to males when the sex of the antecedent is indefinite. Nor did we pay attention to the use of the term *man* to represent all persons, male and female, as in 'The proper study of mankind is man', 'Man is the measure of all things', and 'What is man that thou art mindful of him?'

Feminists began to make an issue of such usage in the late 1960s. There were at least three reasons. Some feminists hoped that pointing out such usage would raise people's consciousness about the suppressed condition of women. Others believed that changing such usage might help improve women's economic and social position, on the grounds that language usage not only reflects social structure but also reinforces and maintains it. Still others, once their consciousness had been raised, found such usage offensive, in much the same way that racial and ethnic epithets are offensive. With this as background, I now analyze, via a marketing framework, the feminist campaign for the removal of sex bias in language.

2. The four P's. The marketing problem is typically viewed as 'developing the right product backed by the right promotion and put in the right place at the right price' (Kotler and Zaltman 1971). McCarthy (1968) calls these the four P's.

2.1 Product. Like all marketers, language planners must design products which the potential consumer will find attractive. When a language academy undertakes the preparation of a list of new technical terms, for example, it ought to consider what characteristics of terms are most likely to lead to their acceptance. Similarly, when workers for the Summer Institute of Linguistics translate the Gospels into an unwritten language with considerable dialect diversity, they must consider which of the dialects (including, possibly, a composite variety created by the linguist) potential readers will find most acceptable as a literary standard.

Perhaps the first to suggest that effective marketing principles can be applied to nonbusiness organizations were Kotler and Levy (1969), who proposed at least three principles relevant to the design of an attractive product. These are principles which they claimed are effective for business organizations. These principles are defining the product generically, defining the target group of consumers, and analyzing customer behavior.
According to Kotler and Levy, business organizations recognize the value of defining their products broadly, emphasizing the basic customer need which the product meets. Thus the generic product for a soap company is cleaning, whereas for a cosmetics company it is beauty or romance. Kotler and Levy argue that nonbusiness organizations should also define their products broadly. For a church, this might be human fellowship; for a foundation seeking funds for medical research, this might be relief of fear or guilt, or maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem. For language planning, the product definition would vary with the object of planning. For a language academy, it might be national pride rather than the production of dictionaries or the standardization of terminology, whereas for a mass literacy campaign, it might be the enhancement of economic opportunity rather than reading and writing. With respect to the feminist campaign against sexist language use, the generic product appears to have been defined in terms of social justice—either social justice for all, on the ground that liberation of women will liberate men, or social justice for women. This is an attractive product inasmuch as most would agree that they are in favor of social justice.

Kotler and Levy point out that a generic definition of the product results in a wide market. Because each organization has limited resources, it must limit its product offerings to clearly defined groups. While an automobile's generic product might be transportation, it does not produce bicycles, steamships, or planes. It produces cars, but even here, it does not produce every conceivable type. Similarly, Kotler and Levy point out, a school system might define its product generically as the social and intellectual development of young persons, but it restricts the ages of its pupils as well as the subjects and the extracurricular activities which it offers them. With respect to the feminist campaign against sexist language, there appears to have been a restriction both in the product and in the audience to whom it was marketed. If the generic product was social justice for women, then the avoidance of sexist language is one of several 'buyable' products that advance this cause. Others might be support for the Equal Rights Amendment, joining a consciousness-raising group, and demanding equal pay for equal work. Even with respect to the avoidance of sexist language there appears to have been a restriction of the product inasmuch as most attention was focused on androcentric generics. There appear to have been four target audiences. These were (1) those feminists who had not yet changed their usage; (2) university lecturers and similar academics whose conversations and lectures were sometimes stopped cold by someone's pointing out an instance of sexist biased usage; (3) professional organizations, such as the American Psychological Association, which were pressured into changing their publications' style manuals, and (4) editors of
mass-circulation publications whose sexist usage was pointed out via letters and face-to-face interaction.

Products are defined and audiences targeted on the basis of consumer needs. Kotler and Levy assert that these needs are not obvious without formal research and analysis. Thus marketers should not rely on impressionistic evidence. Social psychologists and sociologists of language conduct research relevant to the motivations of potential adopters of language-planning decisions, particularly research on language attitudes. While planning agencies may occasionally consider such research findings when evaluating alternative choices, they rarely commission or carry out such work themselves. Those involved in the feminist campaign were no exception. True, some research has been carried out concerning the perception of texts which contain androcentric generics, and these results could be used to support the campaign. However, little if any research has been undertaken to determine the motivation of different target groups to avoid (or retain) sexist usage. Feminists indeed relied on impressionistic evidence.

2.2 Promotion. The feminist campaign employed two major promotional tools. One tool was publicity: letters to the editor, op-ed pieces, and news releases, for example, about revised liturgical texts which refer to the Deity in a sex-indefinite fashion. The second tool, and probably the more important one, was the face-to-face intervention of feminists, who pointed out to speakers, on the spot, occurrences of sexist language and supplied alternative forms. This behavior is of particular interest in view of an early article by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1949), who explained why mass media are unlikely to be successful very often in propaganda campaigns. Three elements must all be present, they claimed, for mass media propaganda campaigns to succeed. One of these is what they called 'supplementation', a kind of step-down communication process whereby a message presented by the media is passed on and discussed in more familiar surroundings. The feminist campaign was not a media campaign primarily. Its main vehicle was face-to-face communication. And perhaps face-to-face communication is a sufficient condition for the success of a campaign. At any rate, to the extent that the feminist campaign employed the media for promotion, we see a three-step rather than a two-step sequence. Face-to-face communication led to mobilized opinion. Mobilized persons then sought avenues of expression and promotion via the media. Messages transmitted by the media were then discussed in step-down fashion.

2.3 Place. Place refers to the provision of adequate channels of distribution and response. A person motivated to buy a product must know where to find it. Promotion of a consumer product is futile if there are no outlets where the consumer can buy it. Similarly, promotion of an idea in the service of a
Social cause will fail if adopters of the idea do not know how to put their new principle into practice. For example, once one has accepted the idea of the importance of safe driving, one needs to know what practices to follow in order to minimize the likelihood of being involved in a road accident. Similarly, once one has been persuaded to contribute to a charitable foundation, one needs to know where one can send a contribution. In the case of the feminist campaign, one needs to know what to do to change one's behavior or how one can find out. So feminists convened task forces to suggest alternatives to sexist usage, e.g., chairperson, letter carrier, police officer, and weather forecaster in place of chairman, mailman, policeman, and weatherman, and the pluralization of referents in order to avoid use of sex-indefinite he. These task forces produced manuals which gave examples of acceptable and unacceptable usage, and they distributed these manuals to encourage individuals and organizations to use them. Potential adopters could readily find appropriate models. So instead of being told to sin no more, we were told how to be good.

2.4 Price. The price of a consumer good or service is an important determinant of its appeal. The marketer has to try to lower the cost in relation to the reward (satisfaction of need) or raise the reward in relation to its cost. With respect to the feminist campaign, there are no money costs involved, apart from the purchase of a style manual, but there are energy costs and psychic costs. It requires a conscious effort to learn these new ways of speaking and writing and to unlearn or resist the habits of a lifetime. Furthermore, one sometimes must withstand a certain amount of the ridicule which is often attached to the adoption of something new. There are, however, costs of persisting in one's old behavior. One cannot, for example, publish papers in any of the journals produced by the American Psychological Association if one uses sex-indefinite he, or expressions such as man in the street. Worse perhaps, one may appear retrograde, illiberal, or insensitive if one does so.

3. Successes and obstacles to continued success. To what extent has the feminist campaign succeeded? We have no empirical evidence with respect to speech. But there is empirical evidence with respect to writing, which some of my students at the 1980 LSA/TESOL Institute and I gathered (Cooper 1984). Based on a corpus of more than half a million words of running text, systematically culled from daily newspapers and other mass-circulation publications of various types, we found a dramatic decline in the use of androcentric generics in the period 1971-1979, dropping from 12.3 instances per 5,000 words in 1971 to 4.3 per 5,000 words in 1979, with successive declines registered for each of the surveyed years in between.
This must be counted as a success, although the use of androcentric generics is still widespread.

What obstacles might prevent a further reduction? Two are suggested by Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1949) analysis of constraints on mass media propaganda campaigns. As I have mentioned, they claimed that three conditions must be met in order for mass media propaganda campaigns to succeed. One of these, supplementation, has been described here. The other two are 'monopolization of the media' and what they termed 'canalization'.

Monopolization of the media is usually required to prevent the appearance of counterpropaganda. Such monopolization is rarely found outside totalitarian states. Thus antismoking campaigns compete with cigarette advertisements, the American Heart Association competes with the American Cancer Society in soliciting funds, and the proponents of birth control compete with proponents of the right to life. With respect to the feminist campaign, there has been explicit counterpropaganda. Editorials and op-ed pieces sometimes ridicule the campaign. More damaging, perhaps, is the argument of many feminists that the campaign is harmful to the ultimate cause of women's liberation, on the ground that it deflects attention from the central issue to a peripheral one. It is easier to say chairperson than to give a chairwoman the same salary as a chairman. Furthermore, the women's liberation movement is in competition with many other campaigns for social justice, a competition which reduces the salience of the feminist campaign.

Canalization refers to the reshaping of existing attitudes. It is easier to reshape existing attitudes than to induce a major attitudinal reorientation. For example, it is easier to persuade consumers to buy a particular brand of shoe polish if one does not first have to convince them to wear shoes. In the case of the feminist campaign, all the people who wear shoes, so to speak, may have already been reached. The campaign may already have convinced most of those people who are favorably disposed toward the cause of the women's liberation movement. Their favorable attitudes may already have been canalized towards the change in language use advocated by feminists. If those who have not changed their usage are hostile or indifferent to the movement, it will be much harder to get them to change their behavior.

Another reason that it may be difficult to reduce further the rate of androcentric generics is that the campaign is ad hoc and diffuse: no single organization assumes responsibility for it. Consequently, it is not surprising that there has been no fact-finding or market research to determine the motivation of potential adopters nor any systematic attempt to monitor rates of acceptance by various target populations.

Still, a consumer-goods marketer might well envy the success of the feminist campaign. That a diffuse and poorly financed movement has been able to effect so dramatic a change in written
usage in so short a time is remarkable. My analysis of this campaign in terms of a marketing paradigm suggests reasons for its success as well as factors which may retard its progress. I hope that this discussion has demonstrated the usefulness of a marketing framework for the analysis of language planning more generally.

References


LITERACY AND LANGUAGE CHANGE

Shirley Brice Heath
Stanford University

Education would begin by placing in the mind of the student the nature of knowledge—in the dead state and the nature of the force which may energize it. This would clarify his field at once—He would then see the use of data.

*Spring and All* (1923, 1970:139)
William Carlos Williams

The argument I make here is merely an amplification of the notion expressed by the poet William Carlos Williams that education has left behind a major long-standing tradition of Western learning: Energizing knowledge depends on learners who can change the language of the original presentation of knowledge into their own. Through such change learners infuse knowledge with data—experience, compared instances, affect, and evaluation.

Just as my point is merely a reformulation of Williams', so his is drawn ultimately from classical and medieval rhetoricians and grammarians who asserted that literate knowledge depended ultimately on oral reformulations of that knowledge—alterations of given forms of knowledge by learners who extend and create knowledge by infusing their own data, uses, and imagination. The central argument here is that literature—written forms of language currently most revered—depends ultimately on transference to oral language as readers energize the inevitable dead state of its written form and assign it significance.

In a recent seminar in California, public school administrators and education researchers asked business leaders to offer their views on the widely publicized 'literacy crisis'. One idea dominated contributions from the business leaders; they were far less concerned with 'literacy' than with what might be termed
'literateness'. Their major complaint sounded familiar: 'High school graduates are not literate'. But discussion revealed that they did not mean that high school students could not read and write, but that they could not talk as though they read and wrote. These employers said they wanted speakers who 'sounded literate': individuals who talked and thought like 'literates'. In the workplaces of their businesses, these businessmen argued that efficiency, safety, and rapid assimilation of new directives depended on workers' abilities to understand, transmit, clarify, and apply oral information. Talking was the primary contractual obligation necessary to accomplish transactions in the workplace.

These business executives and managers believed that English classes and the entire language arts curriculum placed too much emphasis on reading and writing for their own sakes, and far too little emphasis on reading and writing for the influence they 'should' have on thinking and talking. Service industry representatives judged prospective employees by their oral performance, and they downgraded or even fired employees who demonstrated no willingness to listen to 'more literate' workers and model their language uses accordingly. When asked if their conception of 'literate' assumed a familiarity with literature, these business leaders responded that they saw English classes where students studied literature as the primary opportunity for students to learn to think and talk out their ideas for challenge by peers. No specific body of content had to be transmitted in such classes; instead, habits of literate talking and writing were to be developed there.

During the year in which this conference with business leaders and educators was held, I was also doing historical research on the foundations of the study of literature in English education and basic literacy programs. The views of these businessmen echoed in uncanny fashion the stated ideals for grammar classes given by scholars from the first through the eighteenth centuries. Theories of communication in Western education depend on the precepts for discourse—oral and written—laid down for future generations by ancient and medieval rhetoricians and grammarians, who asserted that oral interpretation of the writings of poets and historians enabled those who would be educated or 'literate' to find meaning beneath the surface of texts. By the eighth century, Rabanus Maurus, a key figure in the transition from prescriptive traditions represented by Ciceronian rhetoric, specifically set forth the pragmatic goal of seeking the significance of written texts through both oral and written discourses (Murphy 1974). A tradition of using oral negotiation of meaning as a foundation for extending, understanding, and negotiating meanings of written texts continued in several strands of formal learning through the Middle Ages, in spite of numerous pressures from authorities who recognized the potential for societal change in oral interpretive communities which debated written texts.
The recent work of social and cultural historians in Great Britain, Europe, and the United States enables us to understand the relationships of authors and readers in the multiple interactive settings of their associations across different times and places. Natalie Davis, a cultural historian who has studied the influence of print on sixteenth century French peasants, points out that evidence for these interactions exists in book editions, records left reporting institutions in which authors and their readers met in discussion, and general sources on the customs and associational life of past communities. Research on such sources demonstrates, for example, the types of activities in which peasant readers engaged in book shops, preparation of town dramas, and women's groups. Davis can thus conclude (1975:214) that 'reading from printed books did not silence oral culture. It gave people something fresh to talk about. Learning from printed books does not suddenly replace learning by doing. It can provide people with new ways to relate their doings to authority, new and old.' Inspired by Deuteronomy 6:7, peasants took to heart the message that they should speak of God's written word, however small their learning.

Carlo Ginzburg's story of the sixteenth century miller, Menocchio, told in the delightful book The Cheese and the Worms (1982), lets us in on the internal and external conversations of the peasant miller as he debated and questioned the meanings of the various religious and scientific texts he read and heard about through others. We hear him stretch, test, and combine texts in the verbatim transcriptions of the testimonies which brought him before the Inquisition Court in the late 1500s.

Jean Paul Sartre's metaphor for the literary object was 'a strange top' which could be set turning only by the combined effort of author and reader. We can best understand this relationship if we supplement linguistic analysis of texts and literary theorizing about texts and their authors with evidence about how particular audiences create meaning and provide contexts for transforming these meanings into action (cf. Darnton 1982, 1984). We must consider all writing, but most especially literary writing (because of its confirmed place in formal schooling) not merely as a source for ideas and images, but as a carrier of relationships.

Social historians of education, as well as current ethnographers of communication, provide evidence of such relationships. Through the work of historians such as Keith Hoskin of the University of Warwick (1983), we hear students in the early classrooms of England and Europe read texts aloud and debate, through classical rules of rhetoric, their meanings. For nearly a hundred years in the formal educational system, oral language performance marked the academic achievement of the student. Only gradually did teachers turn their attention to writing as well as reading. Slowly, near the end of the
eighteenth century, the earlier emphasis on reading aloud gave way to silent reading, and silent writing came to incorporate a rhetorical approach to creative composition. Student writing as well as classroom debate focused on interpretations of written texts; neophyte readers and writers learned to be literates through classroom emphases on the art of rhetoric—mastered first through oral language and then in written forms.

However, in both England and the United States, by the mid-nineteenth century, the profession of authorship and the development of a notion of 'literature' foreshadowed changes in language arts and English curricula. Raymond Williams (1977) has traced the history of the institutionalization of 'literature' in the English tradition which brought about some of these changes. As literary texts by known and acknowledged authors became the central focus of language learning in formal instruction, a host of supporting artifacts, personnel, and institutions evolved as well: literary magazines, literary critics, handbooks of literary terms, and a redefinition of rhetoric to an almost exclusive reference to written language norms. By the mid-nineteenth century in England and the early twentieth century in the United States, exercise books, written examinations, and standardized tests silenced classrooms. Learning to read and write one's mother tongue depended on written practice to reproduce standard language norms, which at the lower levels were isolable mechanical features of the language (e.g. spelling, subject-verb agreement, vocabulary development, etc.), and at the higher levels relied on predictable responses to literature. Once students learned basic terminology surrounding the identification of authors, genres, and literary conventions, they moved on to write the essay, the dominant productive genre in classrooms. For the instruction and testing of such learning, silence became de rigueur, and evaluation of a student's knowledge depended exclusively on the written record.

Alas, standardization of response seems to have to accompany such testing; yet literature is by its very nature nonstandardized in style, content, and interpretation. Hence, the secondary authority of critics and theorists became the standard of uniform and unified comprehension on which students were tested as they were asked to give not their own interpretations of literary texts, but those of the critics. Doris Lessing, in the introduction to The Golden Notebook (1962:xix), describes students who must study literature in school as prisoners of the dogma of critics and teachers: 'These children who have spent years inside the training system become critics and reviewers, and cannot give what the author, the artist, so foolishly looks for—imaginative and original judgment.' The area of the curriculum which in the origins of classical education began by drawing on the learner's daily experiences and facility as a speaker of his or her mother tongue has become a content area in which specialized content from secondary
authorities dominates reading and writing and silences the negotiation of meaning by talk.

Norms of speaking and developing interpretation through oral language have become implicitly those of writing. As the essay has become the dominant genre for presenting short written answers in content classes and for displaying agreement with literary experts' analysis of literature, those students who 'speak literate' learn to do so without explicit instruction or extended practice in formal schooling. Hence, literate behaviors have implicitly influenced the oral language performance of those who silently succeeded in learning to read literature, write succinct summaries of content, and paraphrase correctly the views of secondary authorities on literary texts.

The influence of written language norms on oral language has received almost no attention from linguists (but see Lakoff 1982). Yet in almost all societies which have writing, even the man in the street—or village path—acknowledges the influence of written language on oral forms as well as the role that talk about written knowledge serves for the development and refinement of ideas. Clearly, some types of change in the oral language come as both individuals and societies acquire, retain, and extend written language. Some of these changes have only recently been acknowledged: the increase in the range of the linguistic repertoire, shifts in syntactic forms, and the freezing of certain phonological and morphosyntactic features to mark genre openings. Much more research is needed before we know the extent of these types of influences of literate forms on oral forms, and the social conditions which facilitate or retard the influence of written language on oral forms (e.g. Largon 1977, esp. 208-32).

A variety of research methods now enables scholars to trace the spread of influence of written language forms and functions on oral forms. In newly literate societies, long-term fieldworkers can document such changes in specific speech communities (e.g. Coulmas and Ehlich 1984; Duranti and Ochs forthcoming). Documents which attempt to represent both spoken and written varieties and ideally provide contextual evidence of the circumstances of their uses and users have been sifted through by cultural historians, such as Natalie Davis and Carlo Ginzburg. Other sources include the self-report of individuals who have undergone such changes or observed shifts in the language of institutions. In the latter case, as more uses of written language occur in organizations undergoing changes (such as increased bureaucratization), oral language tends to become more formal and to incorporate features of written language (Bakhtin 1981, especially 288-305).

It is to one such self-report that I now turn. In the past year or so, I have been engaged in a project designed to collect data from contemporary members of the American literary community--writers who are anthologized, read, and studied in college English classes, given critical attention in major literary
publications, and acknowledged by national acclaim as major literary figures. My data have focused on these writers' reports of their language uses as well as on the roles they believe their writings should play in the society at large.

It is a paradox of postmodernist literature in the United States that what is considered most literary is that which is most like oral language. Both modern prose and poetry can be understood as a rediscovery of oral language in a period of literary production which seeks to cast off established literary genre conventions and style dictates. Such a cyclical change was predicted early in this century by literary writers and academic scholars alike. Gertrude Stein and William Carlos Williams foretold this shift during the rise of modernist literature. Their writings revealed the underlying formal structure of the vernacular (Bridgman 1966). Both writers argued that literature had moved too far away from oral language and that literary forms had come to exert too strong an influence not only on oral language but also on standards of judgment of generalized language usage. Both these literary figures would therefore have been quite puzzled that in the past decade linguists have spent considerable effort displaying differences between spoken and written language and trying to dispel notions of an oral-literate dichotomy or a unidirectional single-dimensioned oral literate continuum.

William Carlos Williams, a physician, poet, novelist, and essayist, college roommate of Ezra Pound and frequent correspondent with major literary figures of his day, lived in Rutherford, New Jersey, and his long poem, Paterson, about that site is perhaps his best-known work. He grew up in a home in which French and Spanish, as well as English, were spoken; he studied in Germany and was never a member of any academic establishment—all facts which relate to some of his views about language and language change. In numerous ways, his approaches to language foreshadow those of current literary theorists, ranging from the reader response proponents to the deconstructionists. In Spring and All (written in 1923), the piece from which I draw my examples, Williams provides a collection of poems interspersed with prose which discusses the role of language and the reader in interpreting and re-creating literary expression. In this piece, Williams tries to indicate his view of what modern poetry and prose can become if they engage readers in joint production. To do so, Williams tries (as Gertrude Stein had also done) to create in written form the language of oral debate as well as the dialogic argumentation of the inner voices of the writer reflecting uncertainty, idea association, and image extension. He uses devices described by Chafe (1982), Tannen (1982), and numerous other linguists of oral language or unplanned discourse: incomplete sentences, mixed genres, numerous openings of subgenres without closure of these, repetition, false starts, switches across topics within the midst of paragraphs, incomplete or unclear pronoun
reference, incomplete references to other actual texts upon which this text depends, and direct dialogue cited without indication of speaker. The piece is indeed a masterpiece of a parody of what linguists have described as oral or unplanned discourse. Throughout this piece and in Paterson, Williams argues for 'ordinary language' as he rebels against the use of literature as official subject matter through which English teachers force students to canonized assessments and interpretations.

It is indeed ironic—and almost cruel to his memory—that the Williams poem 'The Red Wheelbarrow', which is most widely used for just such performance in English classrooms, appears in this work. Within Spring and All, Williams wrote immediately following the red wheelbarrow poem a denunciation of teachers and critics who fail to understand the relevance of each piece of language to its larger contexts and its link to various communicative tasks. He predates current theorists who talk of the 'implied reader' when he writes that it is through the central shared exchange of reader and author that imagination results; only through the self-reflecting reader talking to self and to hypothesized others can imagination result. Williams writes (1970:89): 'In the imagination, we are from henceforth (so long as you read) locked in a fraternal embrace, the classic caress of author and reader. We are one. Whenever I say, "I" I mean also, "you." And so, together, as one, we shall begin.'

Again and again, Williams reminds the reader and himself, the literary artist, of this union and of the fact that what the reader brings to the work which Williams has written will shape the result of the reading. For Williams, it is only through this unique creation by reader and writer that both avoid plagiarism. He regards the academics who place knowledge 'before a man as if it were a stair at the top of which a DEGREE is obtained' as 'traditional plagiarists' who cannot rely on their own reading of literature, but must turn to ages past and to critics. Similarly, those writers who model their work on established canons are plagiarists or 'great copiers' who repeat 'move for move every move' of past artists. He predicts the end of such plagiarism in the new forms of postmodernist literature. He accuses those who depend on the canonical forms of trying to 'get hold of the mob' and to solidify the traditional in science, philosophy, and art. One of his most cutting comments is: 'Fruitless for the academic tapeworm to hoard its excrementa in books!' (p. 128).

Williams argues for the 'cleared field' or the 'blank field' of the farmer or the fisherman—who can read their own lives into literature. Hence they rediscover or replace the 'demoded' meanings savored by institutions which canonize literate learning and insist on intertextuality with critical authors and readings from past ages. He condemns as 'crude symbolism' the urging of English teachers to insure that students see the symbolism, for example, in red, the cyclical nature of things
in the wheel, and the purity of white. Images over-invoked also empty language of the power of composition which is at once that of both the writer and the reader. 'Composition is in no essential an escape from life. In fact if it is so it is negligible to the point of insignificance' (p. 101).

Such composition is, however, hard work, for it is not an escape from life, but an involvement with 'the common thing which is anonymously about us' (p. 101). Virginia Woolf tells us (1977:27): 'The poets and the novelists are the only people from whom we cannot hide.' Some literary artists—especially novelists—have claimed that they do not express their own thoughts and experiences, but those of all of us (see quotations in Ross this volume). This claim that the writer must make the text reciprocal emerged for some literary writers as early as the eighteenth century. For example, Laurence Sterne wrote: 'The truest respect which you can pay to the reader's understanding is to halve this matter amicably, and leave him something to imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself.... To keep his imagination as busy as my own' (Tristram Shandy, bk. 2, chap. 11, quoted in Kahler 1972:175). Williams would add to this notion that readers must therefore be given equal time for expressing themselves on literary works; otherwise, there can be no 'ultimate expression'. Only through joint oral negotiation with others or extended self-talk about literary pieces can readers link themselves as particulars with whatever is universal in humankind—and coincidentally, learn to write. Taught by the largeness of one's imagination, each reader can feel every form which he sees moving within the self and thus prove the 'truth of this by expression'. It is only by this internal means of expression that one reaches the 'essential nature of technique' (Williams 1923:105).

Williams picks up a theme not only from recent cognitive scientists, but also from early grammarians and those who helped form English teaching: it is most difficult to talk about that which is most real, but these topics are those which we as ordinary human beings talk most about in our daily interactions. He worries that the working class has, however, become so fragmented and forced in its alliance with institutions that there is no time to talk about the feelings associated with the daily events of living. Thus, in his poetry, and especially in Paterson, Williams lets the working-class man and woman speak. In the midst of his poems, we hear the patient tell the doctor his rudimentary complaint, fathers and mothers complain about the disappointments their children bring, and workers express their boredom with their daily work. Williams tells us that 'life becomes actual only when it is identified with ourselves' (p. 115). The only way the reader and writer can bring about a shared reality is through representing the actual existence of a jointly remembered narrative, which depends upon placing events in space and setting up common words of experience: '...the author and reader are liberated to pirouette with the
words which have sprung from the old facts of history reunited in present passion' (1923:149).

Why talk, however, to linguists on the theme of literacy and language change by using the words of a poet of earlier decades? How are ideas relating the history of literacy teaching and the teaching of reading and writing and studying literature relevant to linguists? Increasingly, I see students of language specializing themselves into what Hayden White (1978) calls Absurdist theory. Linguists and literary theorists alike take extreme positions in which they deny the social interactional nature of language; some explain away the text itself or the role of social institutions in constructing the meaning of texts; still others place the entire responsibility for text interpretation on the psychological self—the individual. Still others borrow from semiotics, structuralism, and other pieces of language study to 'explain' literary texts. It is rarely the case that literary theorists or linguists have learned about language from literary writers reflecting on their processes of constructing literary texts. My thoughts here echo those of Wolfram, Lavandera, and Chafe in this volume in pointing out the need for linguists to find ways to learn more than we have in the past about literary language from different sources, related fields, and new combinations of methods.

Yet ironically, the independent spiral of change currently seems to separate those who teach, those who write, and those who depend upon the employment of readers, writers, and literate speakers from each other. Change within each area may tear apart what can be fundamentally linked (Berger 1977). Postmodernist writers create 'oral prose' and cry out for readers who will speak of them and about them. Being read means having one's writing talked over and about. To help insure that the text does not exist only for itself, postmodernist writers across genres depend more and more on the reader's construction of the text. Raymond Carver, for example, leaves us a bare description of events and circumstances and strips away all but the barest hints of the genre of the short story. Similarly, postmodernist novelists such as Robert Houston, Gerald Rosen, and Clarence Majors give us novels which closely resemble oral history narratives. Poets such as Robert Pack give us dramatic monologues which bear far less resemblance to poetry as we have known it than to transcribed conversations or transcriptions of what Erving Goffman termed 'self-talk'. These literary pieces side-step canonized genres; they cannot be read with the usual schemata of poem, novel, or short story; instead their writers create mixed or 'blurred' genres (Geertz 1983) which take away the reader's dependence upon externalized genre conventions. Readers must search for the structural code for assembling the piece within the work itself, just as James Joyce forced readers of *Finnegan's Wake* to do. The complex linkage of oral and written forms demands constant participation by the reader who must attend to the
questions the text asks about itself. This dialogic nature of reading forces the reader to recognize what Ernest Hemingway called the 'iceberg principle'—the tip of the iceberg is the manifest text; hidden is the part which the author refrains from telling and which reading communities must create through dialogue with self and with others in the reading community. This dual voice linkage—as Bakhtin has termed it—brings reader and writer together, as the reader alters or reverbalizes the written text.

While writers and literary critics are recognizing the necessity of these dual voices, schools and most functional literacy programs silence classrooms and learning situations around texts. Standardization and accountability in education emphasize the single voices of authority—teacher, critic, and test. The few programs which promote dual voices manage to do so on the edges rather than at the center of formal schooling. Employers, meanwhile, ask for more literate speakers, linking themselves with the members of the literary community who make the same appeal for and from their readers. To meet these pragmatic goals means, ironically, a return to classical and medieval forms of learning: negotiation, imagination, and debate. A return to these 'basics' can insure for learners the benefits of the fundamentally interactive nature of author, text, and reader (Ong 1984-85). Moreover, the essential language change—the transformation of a written text into oral or inner debate—can close the gap not only between literature and life but between action and creativity. In William Carlos Williams' words (1923:129): 'First must come the transposition of the faculties to the only world of reality that men know: the world of the imagination, wholly our own. From this world alone does the work [of art] gain power, its soil the only one whose chemistry is perfect to the purpose.'

Note

1. In his introduction to the 1984-85 issue of New Literary History, Walter Ong treats the inevitable interdependence of orality and text interpretation, especially in the European Middle Ages. All the writers in this special issue take up oral-literate mixes in one way or another, and ideally their discussions should be read as complements of the modern views of William Carlos Williams briefly summarized here.

References


LISTENING AND SPEAKING

Frederick Erickson
Michigan State University

To Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is the Alone Distinction of Merit. General Knowledges are those Knowledges that Idiots possess. --William Blake

0. Introduction. This paper examines relationships between listening action and speaking action. Its emphasis is on the influence of listeners' communicative behavior upon the communicative behavior of speakers.

The paper has three main sections. The first considers some theoretical issues and terms for listener-speaker collaboration in the production of oral discourse. That discussion emphasizes the role of practical reasoning in the communicative competence of speakers and hearers. Section 2 presents data: four examples that illustrate differing aspects of mutual coordination between speakers and listeners. The examples also show that varying types of oral discourse appear to be influenced, during the course of their production, by the behavior of listeners. Two of the examples involve situations of cultural difference between interlocutors in which the use of culturally learned patterns of practical reasoning seems to have increased the interactional difficulty experienced by the interlocutors. Section 3 sketches some implications for applied work on reducing miscommunication in situations of interactional difficulty, including those situations in which cultural difference between interlocutors is involved.

1. Theory

1.1 Toward a model of a practical speaker-hearer. One way to begin is to consider what might be necessary in a model of a practical speaker-hearer. A point from computer science is relevant at the outset. Some years ago at a cocktail party I

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met an eminent scholar in that field. He was one of the people who originated the work that led to theory and research in artificial intelligence. After we had chatted a bit about what each of us did he said, 'What you've been telling me reminds me that in my own work we've discovered that it's impossible for humans to build a machine that can climb a tree.'

The problem of a machine equipped with built-in general intelligence confronted by the unique particularity of an actual tree is akin to the problems faced and solved continually by speakers and hearers engaged in face-to-face interaction. The interlocutors confront the unique exigencies of the moment as they conduct oral discourse together in the real time of actual performance. These exigencies are even more complex and particular than those encountered by the machine trying to climb a tree. In human social intercourse one is being climbed at the same time as one is climbing. There is, in other words, a relationship of intertextuality between speaking and listening.

What kind of communicative or interactional competence does this require? That question is fundamental for contemporary linguistic theory if it is to take adequate account of performance in speaking. A model of a practical speaker-hearer is needed. Although developing such a model fully is a task beyond the scope of this paper, we can here envision a few of the salient features that it would possess.

The interactional competence of a practical speaker-hearer must be many-layered, involving capacities for differing kinds of practical reasoning. Two major kinds of communicative knowledge are needed—the institutionalized and the emergent. Among the institutionalized kinds of knowledge are those that can be seen as strictly linguistic, e.g. phonology, syntax, lexicon, and perhaps certain aspects of discourse organization. Other kinds of institutionalized knowledge include culturally learned patterns for the uses of speech, e.g. knowledge of register in relation to situations of use, schemata of expectation for patterns of sequencing in customary activities, co-occurrence principles in the organization of customary discourse routines and of connected sets of speech acts, and schemata of interpretation for momentary communicative acts. Such aspects of institutionalized knowledge are considered in the ethnography of communication (e.g. Blom and Gumperz 1972, Hymes 1974), in linguistic pragmatics (e.g. Levinson 1983), and in speech act theory (e.g. Searle 1969). The range of differing knowledges studied by these related streams of inquiry all are knowledges that regulate the different levels of the organization of performance in speaking. As Hymes noted in the study of style in ways of speaking, constructing a model of interactional competence in a practical speaker-hearer necessarily entails looking across levels of organization that not only have been kept distinct analytically by linguists, but have often been considered as separate fields of inquiry with no necessary conjunction.
...one must attend to the specific units of language or one will not see any relationships at all (just as ignorance of the speech sounds of a foreign language will yield a sense of noise, not of phonology). But the relationships that are there will not all come into view if one stays at a given level. Each functional sector or level of language organizes units in a way not given by the units themselves (Hymes 1980:66-70).

All these culturally learned, institutionalized forms of communicative knowledge are general systems of rules or operating principles for the conduct of talk. Some of them (e.g. the overall phonological system of a language) apply very broadly to usage across many different kinds of speech situations. Others of them (e.g. register) can be thought of as applying probabilistically to particular situations of use. These forms of communicative competence are instances of the 'General Knowledges' commented upon by William Blake in the quotation at the head of this paper.¹

In addition to institutionalized forms of knowledge, the practical speaker-hearer must possess yet another order of knowledge and skill. We can call this the dimension of the emergent. It is the domain of praxis in reasoning, the capacity to create sense in addition to following rules, to go beyond what is culturally learned and, in the midst of the fortuitous contingency of the moment, to play interaction by ear. Conversational analysts in sociology (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) have called this process 'local production'.

Both forms of interactional capacity, the institutionalized and the emergent, are necessary in our model of a practical speaker-hearer. In communicative performance a speaker-hearer draws on the institutionalized kinds of knowledge. But if such knowledge were the only kind available, the resulting performance would be very stilted. The consistent, recursive application to a particular speech situation of prior knowledge, in the form of cultural and linguistic general rules, would, in the absence of emergent knowledge, produce communicative thought and action that was robot-like.

Here we can recall Blake's image of the idiot, whose idiocy consists in only being able to understand the particular situation through the crude (and, as it were, Procrustean) application of general schemata to it. It is instructive that in his critique of this oversocialized conception of the human actor in society, Garfinkel reiterated Blake's terms almost to the letter by characterizing as a 'cultural dope' the hypothetical, modal member of a social group who takes action only on the basis of institutionalized knowledge previously learned (Garfinkel 1967:67-68). It follows that if our model of a practical speaker-hearer is not to be that of a linguistic dope (a model that generates a communicative Frankenstein), we must take account theoretically of the human capacity for emergent
sense-making in the performance of oral discourse in interaction face to face.

In sum, the general theoretical issue here is speculation upon the nature and definition of the role of practical reasoning in social interaction, and the implications of that speculation for our conceptions of interactional or communicative competence. Within the frame of that general concern, the particular focus of this paper concerns the influence of the communicative action taken by listeners on the communicative action taken by speakers producing discourse. Perhaps the main significance of this topic for contemporary linguists is that it calls attention to ways in which certain aspects of discourse form can be seen to be generated in and through the functional workings of listener-speaker collaboration as that takes place face to face.

1.2 Previous research on listening. There is little prior research on listening as an activity of communicative production as well as one of reception. Even less has been done on the relationship between listening behavior and speaking behavior. It appears that Edward T. Hall was the first person in the literature to treat listening as a communicative action in its own right (Hall 1964, 1969, 1974). His work, which combined perspectives from anthropology, ethnology, and descriptive linguistics, was influenced by the work of Birdwhistell (1952) and Bateson et al. (n.d.). These researchers, in doing slow motion analysis of cinema films of human social interaction, looked at the simultaneous cooccurrence of what all interactional partners were doing together in constructing a communicative ecosystem in real time. Condon, a student of Birdwhistell's, described this perspective as one which was concerned with 'while', taking analytic account of what the listener was doing while the speaker was talking, and vice versa (cf. Condon 1967). Work by Scheflen (1973) and Kendon (cf. 1977) was done from a similar perspective. All these approaches can be characterized as 'context analysis'—a term used by Scheflen and Birdwhistell.

A subsequent stream of related work is found in the research tradition of 'conversational analysis', which developed as a school of thought among sociologists. Their notions of 'joint production', 'recipient design', and 'repair' are of special relevance here. 'Joint production' refers to the dialectical, reflexive character of social interaction, to relationships of mutual influence among interactional partners. 'Recipient design' refers to the immediately addressed character of speech, which is a result of the tendency of speakers to adapt their utterances to the moment-by-moment reactions of their audience. 'Repair' is a subcategory of the notion of recipient design. It is the tendency of a speaker to adapt the form of adjacent utterances, in retrospective and prospective attempts to fix what the speaker perceives as mistakes. In retrospective adaptation, the speaker takes account of the listener's present
and immediately past reactions to what the speaker is saying. In prospective adaptation, the speaker anticipates a likely listener reaction (e.g. incomprehension, disagreement) and takes corrective action as a kind of conversational preemptive strike. It is thus apparent that repair attempts involve two different kinds of interpretive work by the speaker—reception assessments of the immediate reactions of the listener and production assessments grounded in the speaker's culturally learned schemata, especially the speaker's assumptions of conventions regarding appropriateness and rhetorical strategy in talk. This point about the interpretive work of the speaker is of crucial significance for the argument of this paper, and I will return to it in the next section.

To conclude this brief survey of notions from conversational analysis, the term 'local production' is one that sums up all the rest. Talk can be seen as locally produced, in that the form of utterances is powerfully influenced by reflexive relationships of immediate mutual influence between interlocutors, and in that an extremely important aspect of this reflexivity consists in the various kinds of correction that are continually being made by speakers during the course of oral performance in real time. These local mid-course corrections are seen not simply as error phenomena—random or nonrandom noise in the system which is in the final analysis theoretically irrelevant. Rather, the processes of local production are seen as functionally essential in the performance of oral discourse. Consequently, they are viewed as theoretically central in the study of speech form as well as speech function.

The main differences between the approaches to the study of listener-speaker collaboration taken by the context analysts and the approaches taken by conversational analysts may be the result of the use of differing recording media by the two schools of microanalysis. The context analysts chose at the outset of their work to use sound cinema film as their primary research materials. The conversational analysts chose at the outset to use audiotape, although later many of them used videotape. The initial use of audiotape by conversation analysts may have led them to focus attention on the vocal reactions of listeners to speakers and of speakers to listeners. From this may have come their theoretical emphasis on adjacency relationships of cooccurrence across time—on pairings of antecedent and consequent utterances by interlocutors who exchange turns at speaking. Conversely, the initial use of sound cinema film by context analysts (and slow motion viewing of the film) may have led them to focus not so much on adjacent, reciprocal relationships of cooccurrence between what the speaker is doing and what the listener is doing, vocally and nonvocally, at a given moment. Thus it is possible that the use of different primary research procedures, which make available to the analyst very different kinds of information on differing sensory channels, may have resulted in the development of theoretical
lines of interest that have run along differing paths, albeit complementary ones. There is need for unified analysis of listening and speaking in relation to each other. Such analysis takes account of both channels of communicative activity, the vocal and the nonvocal. It takes account as well of both dimensions of cooccurrence—the reciprocal/sequential dimension and the complementary/simultaneous dimension.

Some examples of the unified analysis of listening and speaking exist. Most notable are studies by Kendon (1967), Goodwin (1981), and McDermott (1976), as well as the study by Erickson and Shultz (1982). Kendon's work has been influenced most by context analysis. In an early paper (1967), he showed ways in which speakers were influenced by shifts in the gaze of listeners. Goodwin (1981) has been influenced mainly by conversational analysis, but his work is also informed by the perspectives of context analysis. He has done a detailed study of the ways in which listener gaze prompts repair and other mid-course corrections by speakers within single turns at talk. McDermott has been influenced most by context analysis but is also aware of perspectives from conversational analysis. His microanalytic study of interaction in first grade reading groups (McDermott 1976, McDermott and Gospodinoff 1979) stresses the complementary nature of listener-speaker interaction, showing ways in which postural positions of members of the total group as audience are related to the form and content of talk by speakers. He also shows how the speech of the speaker influences the listening reactions of members of the audience, especially when they want to gain a turn speaking.

Erickson and Shultz (1982), in a study of academic advising interviews in junior colleges, explored ways in which culturally differing forms of providing listening reaction (nodding, gesticulation, and vocal backchannels such as yeah and mhm) seemed to be noticed or ignored by speakers, depending on their cultural background. In addition, Erickson and Shultz identified culturally differing forms by which speakers signaled to listeners that some active listening response was appropriate in the next moment. The syntactic and prosodic cues by which speakers signaled these implicit invitations for listening response were differentially responded to by listeners, depending on the listener's cultural background. The radically interdependent process of signaling and interpretation by listeners and speakers was found to be complex and culturally variable. In that complexity and variability, the potential for miscommunication was viewed as a risk factor when the interlocutors came from culturally differing speech networks, e.g. during an encounter in which a black working-class student was talking with a white middle-class academic advisor. Erickson and Shultz reported microanalytic case studies of misunderstanding and alienation that took place when the listening styles of interlocutors differed considerably because of culture difference.
Instances of unified analysis of listening and speaking, such as those just reviewed, remain rare in the literature. The notion of listening as an activity involving production, rather than as a passive process of reception, is virtually absent from the literature of social psychological studies of face-to-face interaction, a field in which much study of so-called 'nonverbal behavior' has been done. In cognitive psychology, the emphasis in studying listeners has been on their interpretive schemata and informational needs to enable comprehension. To my knowledge, cognitive psychologists with interests in discourse analysis have not examined what the listener does as an active agent in influencing the speaker's production of discourse. Among linguists with interests in discourse phenomena, discussions of such matters as oral discourse form and strategies for discourse coherence have not apparently been influenced much by the perspectives of the context analysts or the conversational analysts. As with the cognitive psychologists, linguists seem to have viewed the listener as a receiver rather than as an active agent in the joint production of oral text. A significant exception to this is the recent work of Gumperz (1982a) and Tannen (1984), whose conceptions of 'conversational inference' and 'conversational style', respectively, include both the interpretive work of speaker vis-à-vis listener and the interpretive work of listener vis-à-vis speaker.

To conclude, we still know relatively little empirically about listener-speaker collaboration in the production of oral discourse. Such knowledge would be of worth in its own right, as well as being useful in providing a foundation upon which to develop a more adequate model of a practical speaker-hearer. It is thus appropriate to turn to data at this point in our discussion.

2. Data. I am going to consider here two types of influence of listeners on speakers. The first type is 'prospective recipient design'. It arises through the speaker's anticipation of some specific reaction from the listener in the next moment. Strategically, the speaker takes mid-course preventive action—in order, as it were, to head the listener off at the pass. The second type of listener influence is 'retrospective recipient design'. This seems the most important of the two types, and it receives the most attention in the discussion that follows. Retrospective influence arises as the speaker notices in the present moment some reaction in the listener. Then in the next moment the speaker takes mid-course corrective action, often in the form of some sort of repair.

The two types of listener influence on speakers are illustrated by examples of four different types of oral discourse: a question-answer routine, a narrative, an expository passage in the form of an explanation, and an insertion sequence in which a reprimand appears during recitation of a written text.
(in this instance a children's poem being read aloud by an adult). 2

2.1 Example 1: Prospective recipient design in a question-answer routine. At age five, my son David came up to me in our living room to ask if he could visit his friend Kit, who lived right across the street. There was a family rule that he could not cross the street by himself, except to go straight over to Kit's. At the curb he was to look both ways before he crossed the street. David said,

Dad can I go over to 'Kit's [thanks

Notice that David's prospective recipient design appears to have been strategic. The latch mark in the notation shows that David left me no space for a turn in which to deny his request. The request form was unmarked, with the usual rising intonation at the end of the syntactic unit. What was unusual was the absence of time for me to reply before he thanked me for granting the request. His work of recipient design, a kind of interactional judo, influenced turn allocation. In so doing he influenced the form of a culturally conventional discourse routine: (turn 1) question of permission; (turn 2) granting or withholding permission; (turn 3) acknowledgment of reply. This brief example shows that at age five my son, as a practical speaker, was already a very hearer-sensitive language learner.

2.2 Example 2: Retrospective recipient design in a narrative. Example 2 is of a narrative from an interview with a job applicant that was filmed and simultaneously videotaped in 1970 at a large insurance company in a major American city. The applicant and the interviewer participated in separate research interviews shortly after the job interview had taken place. The research situation was a viewing session in which the informant was asked to watch a videotape of the original job interview and to stop the tape whenever he wanted to make comments on his recollections of what had taken place (see Erickson 1982:56ff., for further discussion on the viewing session as a research technique).

The interlocutors at the job interview came from differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The interviewer was a sixth generation German-American. The applicant was a third generation Italian-American, i.e. both sets of his grandparents were immigrants. His parents spoke some Italian to each other and also spoke Italian to his grandparents. The applicant had just graduated from college and this was his first job interview.

The job interview had been successful for the applicant in that he was offered a job. Right at the outset, however, distinct discomfort occurred both for the applicant and for the interviewer. Example 2 is the first instance of reported
discomfort. This exchange between the two parties was the first talk that occurred after the two had entered the room, exchanged greetings, and sat down in their chairs. After sitting down, the interviewer looked down at the job application, which was lying flat on the desk. While looking down he said, 'Just got your degree...one year in Rome huh...'

Now consider the applicant's turn at talk. One striking feature is the relative fluency at the beginning and end of the turn (a, b, f) and the dysfluency that occurs in the middle (c, d, e):

A: (a) Right....
(b) Loyola University offers a junior year abroad program and
(c) .. ah.. at the moment of
(d) .. ah.. accepting or not I
(e) .. ah.. decided to go
(f) .. ah.. it was a great experience

The portion (c, d, e) is dysfluent because of hesitation phenomena (pause and ah) which produce breaks in the stream of speech at points other than at the usual syntactic boundaries. The portion is also dysfluent at the level of discourse structure, for the narrative flow is broken, and steps that might have appeared in the narrative are elided. At (c), after the first pause followed by ah, the job applicant goes on to say 'at the moment of accepting or not'. This is not a fully connected account of a sequence of successive actions. He has not discussed the procedures of application and selection by which he arrived at the point of deciding whether or not to go to Rome. He could have said, 'Loyola University offers a junior year abroad program and I applied for it and then I had second thoughts. But then at the moment of accepting or not I still decided to go. I'm glad I did. It was a great experience.' This is not, however, what he said.

The full transcript (Example 2) includes information on nonverbal actions. It not only shows the speech of the two interlocutors, but also reports information about the gaze, posture, and arm motion of the interviewer that occurred at the same time as the job applicant was speaking. This information about the cooccurrence of nonverbal actions by the listener with verbal actions by the speaker suggests that the speaker was being influenced by what the listener was doing as the speaker was talking. Notice that the first vocal hesitation by the applicant at (c) occurred at the same instant as the interviewer averted his eyes to look down at his coffee cup. This broke the gaze that had just been established. The interviewer and applicant had been gazing intently at each other, looking fovea to fovea—as we say colloquially, 'eyeball to eyeball'. What happened next becomes apparent in slow motion analysis of a cinema film of this interview. As the interviewer looked down at the coffee cup,
the very next frame of film showed the applicant beginning to hesitate vocally and to squirm slightly in his seat. Cinema film is exposed at a rate of $1/24$ second per frame, which means that the actions of the interviewer and the applicant occurred virtually simultaneously.

Example 2: Narration.

(Interviewer speaks while looking down at job application form lying on his desk.)

(1) I: (a) Just got your degree ..
   (b) one year in Rome huh ..

(2) A: (a) Right... (b) Loyola University offers a junior year abroad program and
   [I looks up at A] 
   (c) .. ah.. at the moment of.. ah..
   [I looks down at I ] then lifts cup and drinks from it, looking cup
   [I nods, down at ]
   (d) accepting or not I.. ah.. decided to go.. ah..
   at it and holding cup up to face near lips cup
   (e) it was a great experience
   [I looks at A] starts down
   [cup down on desk]

During the next few minutes of the interview, the same pattern occurred three more times in succession. In each of these four instances, the applicant began to speak while the interviewer was looking at him. Then, when the interviewer averted his gaze, the applicant began to squirm slightly in his seat, bring his hand up to his face, and hesitate in speech. He began to recycle chunks of syntax and he skipped over steps in narrative sequence. As the interviewer reestablished gaze engagement, the applicant's speech became fluent again.

The applicant and the interviewer were each shown a videotape of the job interview. In these separate viewing sessions, one or the other of them was asked to stop the tape and comment whenever something struck him as an especially new or significant action. The applicant was shown the videotape in three viewing sessions, held about once a week over a three-week period. Each time he viewed the tape, he stopped it at those four instances at which he hesitated vocally and squirmed in his chair. His comments were audiotaped. This is what he said when he stopped at the first instance (Example 2) during his last viewing session:
A: I think I can see it now that right at the beginning he had very little eye contact with me. He was staring at his coffee cup and this signified to me that he doesn't care about what the applicant has been doing. It's just his job to do, and you know, he's just not going to get involved deeply with the applicant.

What frame of interpretation might the applicant have been using in making sense of the interviewer's gaze behavior as a lack of interest? It seems that the applicant was using a culturally learned interpretive schema. His ethnicity was Italian-American and he had had rich exposure to Italian-American communicative style. His networks of informal association had been, until college graduation, mostly contained within the boundaries of the Italian-American neighborhoods and communities of substantial size and political and economic significance in his city, which was Chicago. A kind of invisible ethnic isolation is possible in American cities of that type.

Let us review briefly the applicant's networks of association and patterns of exposure to Italian-American communicative style. His parents' parents were immigrants from Italy. Some Italian was still spoken at home by his parents (to each other, not just to their parents) and he had lived at home until finishing college, which was the point at which this job interview had taken place. He had relatives in Rome who were known to his family, and he visited them during his junior year abroad.

During his childhood, his family lived in one of the two oldest Italian-American neighborhoods in Chicago. The neighborhood, called the Near West Side, is described in the now classic urban ethnography titled *The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City* (Suttles 1968). The applicant attended a Roman Catholic parochial school with other Italian-American children, in which classes were taught by the nuns of a religious order whose members were predominantly Irish-American. He then attended the Jesuit high school for boys which was two blocks down the street from the parochial school. Although boys came to this high school from all over the city, and therefore, from many different white ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Irish-American, Polish-American) and although most of the teachers of the school were Irish-American, our job applicant went through high school with a group of close friends from the Italian-American neighborhood. He and his friends then went on to Loyola University, the Jesuit university in Chicago. During that time, his family moved to a new neighborhood which was not so ethnically homogeneous as the former neighborhood; however, he maintained ties in college with his friends from the old neighborhood.

In the third session I conducted with him after his job interview, the applicant said he had realized that throughout his whole life almost all his informal contacts had been with fellow
Italian-Americans. For the most part he had interacted with non-Italians (his term) only in formal situations—in the strictly run elementary school and high school classrooms, at the university, and 'Downtown'. As an urban working-class white ethnic Catholic, then, he could grow to young adulthood up to the threshold of entry into the middle class (i.e. receiving a college diploma and beginning a white collar job) while still having the vast preponderance of experience in two-party interaction conducted with fellow Italian-Americans, according to Italian-American conventions of communicative style. (Space limits prevent us from considering here what is problematic in the notion of 'Italian-American' as a label for a social category or for a subculture).

The interviewer, in contrast, had been raised in rural and small-town central Indiana, in a family at least five generations removed from emigration from Germany. During the nineteenth century, the family had come to Indiana from Pennsylvania, at what date the interviewer was not sure.

In sum, the German-American interviewer and the Italian-American job applicant met each other as strangers, both parties having had relatively little experience in face-to-face interaction with members of the other's speech community. This was true despite the fact that both parties spoke during the interview in what were very similar forms of Standard English, phonologically and syntactically. The language of interaction was similar, yet the cultural assumptions about the conduct of interaction, I would argue, were different.

Among the most important of these cultural assumptions, or schematic expectations, are those regarding appropriate listening behavior. The applicant was talking about what had been the most exciting experience of his life, his year of study abroad. He sensed that the job interviewer was not interested in what he, the applicant, had been saying about his exciting experience. In the third and last viewing session, I asked the young man how the interviewer might have shown interest—what would be really responsive listening behavior. The applicant said, 'When you listen to someone and you are really interested, you don't just sit there. You move while you're listening. And you don't just keep quiet. You say something while they are talking. You don't just sit there.'

The interviewer, in his viewing session, said something quite different. He stopped the videotape to comment at almost all the same places at which the applicant had stopped and commented. These were the places at which the young man had hesitated vocally and squirmed slightly in his chair. At the first of these instances (Example 2), the interviewer said, 'He's nervous. He looks more nervous now (i.e. as seen on the television monitor) than I remember him being in the interview. I remember thinking, 'He's nervous, so I'd better let him talk more about Rome. He's interested in that, so maybe after talking about it more he'll calm down and we can go on with the
In the viewing session, the interviewer gave no evidence that he was aware that his own listening behavior, which was kinesically and vocally less animated than that expected by the applicant, was influencing the vocal and non-vocal behavior of the applicant. The very steps the interviewer was taking to put the applicant at ease were progressively making the young man more and more nervous.

Their actions together were reciprocal but not complementary. In their mutual tree climbing, the interactional partners did not appear to be climbing each other, but someone else. What happened was jointly produced, to be sure, but the joint action was not cybernetically calibrated so that the attempts at repair by one party matched the attempts at repair by the other party. Bateson (1972:61-72, 107-127) called this process 'complementary schismogenesis': the interaction of two subsystems across time that produces progressively greater difference and distance between them. Analogous instances of interactional schismogenesis are reported in Gumperz (1982a, 1982b) and Tannen (1984).

Example 2 illustrates the phenomenon of differing subcultural schemata of interpretation and expectation regarding appropriate and expectable listening behavior. We can speculate that when these schemata differ between two interlocutors, trouble over repair is the likely result—all other things being equal. This qualification refers to the fact that high solidarity between culturally differing interlocutors, with consequent high motivation by both parties to overcome any interactional difficulties that might occur, can apparently override the tendency toward interactional schismogenesis that seems to be present when interlocutors differ in their cultural assumptions about the proper conduct of listening and speaking. This is an extremely important corollary to the proposition that cultural difference in communication style tends to make for trouble in face-to-face interaction. The point is discussed at length in Erickson 1975, McDermott and Gospodinoff 1979, and Erickson and Shultz 1982:179-190. In this last, the argument is that culture difference should not be thought of in a positivist sense as somehow causing trouble. A position of cultural determinism seems unwarranted empirically as well as unfounded theoretically. Culture difference is not, in some cases, a sufficient condition for interactional trouble, nor is it in every case a necessary condition. In instances such as Example 2, however, culture difference seems to be the most economical and persuasive explanation for the interactional trouble that occurs.

2.3 Example 3: Retrospective recipient design in an explanation. Example 3 is another instance of progressively more and more damaging interactional repair work that is attributable to subcultural differences in interpretation of listening behavior. Here the discourse type is oral exposition. The example comes from another job interview, filmed originally by William Condon.
and Edward T. Hall, in which a white American male interviewer is explaining to a job applicant what is involved in performing the job task: setting up a metal lathe to run work orders, each of which is slightly different from the next. This is a job that requires great precision in measurement, and the interviewer appears to be trying to emphasize the importance of precision in following a set of necessary steps in producing machined parts. The interviewer is middle-aged and white. He is also the president of the company, a small machine tool plant. The job applicant is a black high school dropout in his early twenties. He has come to be interviewed through the sponsorship of a job training and employment program run with federal funds by a large youth service agency in the city of Chicago.

During the course of exposition, the interviewer begins to perform a type of discourse I have called elsewhere 'hyper-explanation' (Erickson 1979, Erickson and Shultz 1982:117-136). This differs from the typical (unmarked) iterative routine for an explanation of a complicated phenomenon involving more than one facet or sequential step: make a point (i.e. describe one of the phenomenon's facets or steps), then proceed to the next point. Unmarked and felicitous explanations appear to be in accord with two of Grice's conversational maxims: the maxim of manner (be perspicuous) and the maxim of quantity (make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange) (see Grice 1975 and the discussion in Levinson 1983:100-117). But explaining face to face is a speaking activity that is highly audience-sensitive. Felicity in explaining requires felicity in the reactions of the person being explained to. Hence, for the speaker as explainer, a problem of practical reasoning and action occurs if the listener as explainee does not show evidence of understanding and/or agreement. The Gricean maxims of manner and quantity are suddenly in tension, for the 'current purposes of the exchange' have changed. One is now as a speaker climbing a different tree than one had been climbing the moment before. The need to fulfill the maxim of manner, which also involves avoiding obscurity and ambiguity, is in conflict with the need to be as brief as possible.

What results, apparently, is that speakers begin to violate the maxim of quantity in the interest of being clear. They begin to repeat the same point, adding no new information, or adding only minimal new information. Sometimes the repetitions occur in the form of paraphrase, sometimes they are literal reiterations of what was just said. When this is done, an issue of impression management develops: maintenance of 'face', of positive social identity. (See discussion in Goffman 1967:5, 14.) The speaker's repetition of the same point during an explanation sequence suggests that the hearer has not understood the point just made. This implication can be taken as face-threatening, interpreted as a way of saying that the other person is less
knowledgeable than s/he should be at that moment. The result is that the explainee loses face slightly. It is a small step from that to an inference by the explainee that the explainer thinks that s/he is stupid. (Explanations are risky anyhow, since the fact that one is offered implies that the listener doesn't understand what one has just said.)

Example 3: Retrospective recipient design in an explanation

(a) I: to be able to set a job: complete...
[A looks at I without moving]
(b) grind your tools......
(c) set the job:b from a 'print...
(d) ah 'change your chucks...
(e) depending on the size of the piece you're going to run....
(f) 'I mean you might be running a 'six-inch piece
(g) you might be running a 'ten-inch piece
(h) you might be running a 'fourteen-inch piece...
[I moves forward leaning toward A]
[A remains stationary]
(i) OR A 'SIXTEEN-INCH PIECE . see....
[I leans further forward across desk]
[A nods slightly, says 'm:]
[j] so that's why I'm quite anxious that we a::h..
[I sits back in chair]
[k] we have an understanding amongst ourselves that this is something..
[l] this is something you 'really want to ~do...
[m] because you don't do it 'quickly... see....
[I leans forward slightly]
[back]
[A says]
['A::h']

= continues in same configuration of posture/gaze. UPPER CASE = louder volume.

Notice that in Example 3, the speaker begins to reiterate, listing more and more pieces of different sizes that might be cut by the lathe. The speaker does this while the listener gives no apparent listening response, vocally or kinesically. The speaker moves closer and closer to the listener, repeating in more and more animated fashion prosodically and with gesture, until the listener finally nods slightly and provides a vocal back-channel (mm) as a listening response. Only then does the
According to the interviewer's explanation, 'to be able to set a job...complete', we can infer that the whole process consists of two major constituent steps: (1) grinding the cutting tools needed, and (2) setting up the lathe with a cutting tool and a piece of steel to be cut by the tool and, with the blueprint as a guide for measurement, adjusting the chuck that holds the cutting tool so that the chuck is set and locked at the right distance to cut the size piece desired. To have done that is to have 'set a job'.

In the actual oral discourse, the interviewer begins to hyper-explain at either (b) or (e), depending upon one's assumption of what he meant to say after (a). He could have said (a-1) 'To be able to set a job complete is complicated and each step requires accuracy. So that's why it must be something you really want to do---because this work is precise and gives lots of responsibility to the individual worker. And that's why the pay is so good.' Our reading of this single turn by the interviewer, as well as a reading of the larger text before and after the quoted example, suggests that the sense of (a-1) was what the interviewer was trying to communicate to the applicant---i.e. this is not a typical assembly line job. That could be read as a compliment to the applicant: 'I'm considering hiring you for a job that involves skill and responsibility on your part, for which I am willing to pay relatively high wages to an entry level employee.' Such a reading would enhance rather than detract from the applicant's positive social identity---his face. But such a reading is not likely because of the form the explanation took in oral discourse.

One could argue that hyperexplanation began at (b), where the interviewer began to list constituent steps in setting a job rather than going on to the next main point, which was that the applicant needed motivation in order to do such complicated work accurately. If we assume that hyperexplanation began at (b) by lowering the level of abstraction as the interviewer started to elaborate upon 'set a job' by describing constituent steps in setting a job, then we can see each of the next clauses (b, c, d, e) as repeating the main point of (a), simply at a lower level of abstraction. All those clauses could be interpreted as attempts at repair in which the interviewer was holding the applicant accountable for the absence of some listening response in the pause after 'job' or 'complete' in (a).

If we argued that hyperexplanation did not begin until (f), then we would be assuming that the speaker intended to list the steps involved in setting a job, and so such listing is not to be seen as occasioned by the applicant's not having provided listening response. From (f) on, however, it seems that the shift to almost exact repetition (a more direct strategy than paraphrase) at a very low level of abstraction is functioning as a signal to the applicant that some listening response is desired.
by the interviewer. At (e) the speaker had emphasized the importance of size, since the size of the piece as indicated by the blueprint required that the chuck holding cutting tool be set at a particular point on the machine. At (f) he began to reiterate the importance of size, by lowering level of abstraction in giving an example of a size (six inches). From then on, he repeated formulaically, holding constant every constituent of the clause except the size of the piece, as expressed in numerals.

My interpretation of this odd locution at (f-i) is that it is an indirect request for listening response from the applicant. This interpretation gains force not only from the formulaic character of the repetition, but from the shifts in kinesic and vocal prosody at (h) and (i), the last repetitions in the set. At (h), which is the last of the fully formulaic repetitions, the interviewer shifts postural position, leaning forward in what we can see as a means of providing emphasis. To that is added kinesic prosody, and at (i) some shifts in vocal prosody were added as well. The pitch of 'six' in 'sixteen' is at the highest level that occurs in the whole passage of text to this point (notice that this appears as the last numeral in a list and that this is the peak of a rising pattern of list intonation). To this pitch emphasis is added volume emphasis—this is the loudest the interviewer has spoken in the whole interview up to this point. Moreover, at (i) the syntactic formula for repetition that was established at (f) changed by the substitution of 'or' and the deletion of 'you might be'. Finally, at the end of (i) there is an almost direct request for some response by the applicant in the shift to a question form ('see?') which can be read not as a tag-question but as a real request for information: 'Do you see what I mean?' In the light of all the contextualization cues that have piled up from (f-i), we could read the final 'see' as meaning 'For God's sake, say something! Or do something! You're driving me crazy!!'

Of course, as Gumperz (1982a) and Jupp, Roberts, and Cook-Gumperz (1982:252-55) point out, such requests for change in the other party's behavior are not stated directly, if indeed they are stated at all in interethnic encounters. As analysts, we can never be sure that such extreme emotional reactions lie beneath the surface of the contextualization cues by which very indirect requests seem to be communicated. The constraints of positive politeness seem to operate powerfully in these situations, preventing each party from making explicit what he or she wants from the other party. For this example we do not have viewing session data. But in the previous example we could see that the job applicant's reaction was vehement as he perceived an absence of adequate listening response from his interlocutor. He felt insulted. In that case, and in many of those reviewed in Erickson and Shultz (1982), we do have direct evidence of what the interlocutors thought and felt during what one of them perceived as absence of adequate listening response.
As the speaker perceives inadequate listening response, distortions begin to appear in the speaker's discourse. These distortions can be seen as attempts at repair—attempts to make what one has said more clear and to signal to the listener that some indication of understanding and/or agreement is desired.

Hyperexplanation is the most extreme form of repair reaction of speakers to listeners that I have found in the various sets of research films and videotapes collected in my various studies to date. Interestingly, I have found hyperexplanation only in situations in which the speaker-explainer is white and the listener-explainee is American black. (Interestingly, in a doctoral thesis that is in progress as of this writing, Fiksdal found similar hyperexplanation by Anglo academic advisors talking with foreign students in a major American university). This suggests that differing speech community expectations for appropriate listening behavior present a practical speaker with a problem of interactional inference. The usual signals by which interlocutors steer one another through the joint production of discourse in conversation do not seem to work in such cases. The practical speaker-hearer in these situations confronts a special tree-climbing problem.

The attempts at repair that result in hyperexplanation in these special speech situations are of empirical and theoretical interest because they point us to the regulatory mechanisms by which talk and listening activity are articulated in the conduct of ordinary, nonproblematic oral discourse. Hyperexplanation does not seem to occur in those ordinary conversations, perhaps because practical speaker-hearers avoid attempts at repair unless they perceive some damage to the normal felicity of speaker-listener reciprocity. One aspect of the practical speaker-hearer's competence, in other words, would be to conduct oral discourse according to a non-Gricean maxim. This is currently used in evaluating proposals for change in standard operating procedures in formal organizations: 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' (Again, limits of space prevent full report of the empirical warrant for this discussion of explanation and hyperexplanation. For a more complete exposition on the issue of culturally differing systems of speaker and listener cues in explanations, see Erickson 1979 and Erickson and Shultz 1982:118-36).

2.4 Example 4: Retrospective recipient design in an insertion sequence. The last example comes from an early grades classroom in mid-December. The teacher is seated on a chair and the children sit on a rug at her feet as she opens a large illustrated book and begins to read from Clement Moore's poem, The Night before Christmas:
(1) T: (a) 'Twas the night before Christmas  
(b) and all through the house..  
(c) not a creature was stirring..  
(d) LOUIE.. (low pitch register, volume stress)  
(e) not even a mouse

This example, like the first, will be treated very briefly. Here, an attempt at repair is made directly, in the surface structure of talk, rather than indirectly, as in hyperexplanation. Recall that in the previous example, one direct request was made of the listener by the speaker, the question 'see?' at the end of a string of hyperexplanations. That question notified the listener that some response indicating comprehension was desired by the speaker. In this example, the speaker does not need to be so polite and does not wait so long before becoming direct. The example is also interesting because it involves the insertion of one text (a directive speech act) into a text of another genre (a story being read aloud to children) as a negative sanction for inappropriate listening behavior.

3. Applications. Let us begin this section by summarizing the argument of the paper. The most fundamental point is that the listening actions of listeners influence the speech of speakers. This paper has shown such influence appearing in examples across a range of types of oral discourse: a request sequence, a narrative, an explanation, and an insertion sequence in which a directive speech act appears as an improvised comment during the reading of a written text. The influence that listeners have over the forms of oral discourse produced by speakers appears to reside in the sense-making capacity of the speaker as a practical reasoner. The speaker makes interpretive judgments of the significance of the listener's listening behavior. These interpretations are both retrospective, taking account of what the listener has just done, and prospective, taking account of what the speaker expects the listener will do next. The interpretations appear for the most part to be made intuitively rather than deliberately.

A second fundamental point is that there are cultural differences in expectations for appropriate listening. I have presented examples of troublesome interaction in which cultural difference seems to have played a part in the origin and development of the troubles that took place. One of the most important characteristics of that kind of interactional trouble is that it often escalates across time as one or both interactional partners make ineffective attempts to repair the trouble. The ineffectuality of the attempts at repair seems to be due to lack of coordination between the communicative actions of the various parties engaged in speaking and listening together.
What are the implications of this argument when one attempts to reduce difficulties of communication between members of differing speech communities? A first implication is that we need to adopt strategies that at first seem counterintuitive as we try to understand what is going wrong. What may strike us immediately is the distortion that is apparent in the speaker's discourse. Consequently, the source of the trouble would appear to reside inside the speaker. This paper has argued the contrary: when speakers produce odd discourse, we need to consider first what the listener is doing, and then consider the relations of mutual influence between speaker and hearer. The unit of analysis is the relation between speaker and hearer, not the actions of either party considered separately. It follows that what is happening is no single party's 'fault', but that trouble in conversation, or felicity in it, are both jointly produced as an accomplishment of interlocutors who are joined in a radically interdependent partnership. Felicity in oral discourse, then, appears to be a phenomenon of intertextuality between speaking and listening.

A related implication is that when interactional trouble and infelicitous oral discourse occur, it is no single person's fault. That can be a liberating insight for professionals whose daily practice is conducted through oral discourse, e.g. teachers, counselors, physicians, lawyers, receptionists. When interactional troubles happen, there is a tendency to blame the other party or oneself. Blaming the other party often takes the form of clinical or quasi-clinical labels that are also emotionally loaded, e.g. 'passive aggressive', 'resistant', 'unmotivated', 'not very bright'. Recall that in the second example, the interviewee's first reaction was to think that the interviewer was not interested in what he was saying. The interviewee had strong feelings about that. It was only after the job interview, during the third viewing session, that he realized the behavioral grounds for his inference that the interviewer was showing lack of interest. Blaming oneself, on the other hand, can produce guilt. This can lead to overcompensation or denial, neither of which is very helpful in emotionally stressful situations of miscommunication.

It follows that a useful thing to do when interactional trouble of this kind occurs is to look diagnostically at the organization of the listener–speaker relationship before rushing to clinical judgment of one's interlocutors or of oneself. There are three aspects of this critical scrutiny that make it different from our ordinary use of common sense: (1) to look behaviorally, (2) to look at listening as an activity in its own right, and (3) to look dialectically at the listener–speaker relationship rather than at the actions of any single actor considered in isolation from the actions of the other actors in the encounter. By looking for specific features of behavior (e.g. gaze, speech prosody, postural positioning) in one's own actions and in those of the
other parties in the scene, one not only can discover differences in the signal systems being used—the contextualization cues—but one also curbs the tendency to leap to clinical inference about the other party's intentions. In other words, looking behaviorally at what has just taken place as one has gotten uncomfortable has the effect of taking some of the emotional pressure out of the discomfort. It does not completely relieve the discomfort, but it makes it less frightening. By looking at listening behavior itself, one begins to realize new aspects of the cue systems by which interactional partners indirectly tell each other what they expect communicatively from the other. By looking dialectically at this process of mutual steering, one escapes the common-sense reaction of guilt and blame, while at the same time the dialectical perspective on interactional trouble does not allow one to ignore the consequences of one's own behavior.

In sum, looking behaviorally and dialectically at listening-speaking relations can make it safer to pay attention to interactional trouble as it begins. From this perspective, within the experience of talking with culturally differing people one can learn about others' culturally differing and idiosyncratically differing ways of listening and speaking, and one can learn how to accommodate as an interlocutor with a wider range of interactional styles than one had been able to handle previously. In addition, one can learn how to spot interactional trouble in listener-speaker collaboration early in the course of its development. This awareness can help one take corrective action that does not lead to complementary schismogenesis. The attempts at repair that seem to work best in such situations are the direct ones rather than the indirect ones. In other words, saying 'I'm sorry but I'm not sure if you understood what I just said', as an opener for explicit discussion of the process of speaking-listening, can often be less embarrassing and troublesome than using an indirect attempt at repair such as hyperexplanation.

From the point of view set forth here, the last thing one would want to do would be to attempt a 'quick fix' for difficulties that arise in inter-ethnic and cross-cultural encounters by giving one of the parties group-specific performance lessons—e.g. a unit on how to listen with black Americans, another on how to listen with Italian-Americans, and yet another on how to listen with Japanese businessmen. Since the interactional troubles and their resolution are jointly produced and are locally unique, such attempts at remediation are bound to fail. Moreover, they are likely to lend so-called 'scientific' support to new versions of old intergroup stereotypes.

It seems more useful to cultivate skills of critical reflection by using them in actual situations of interaction. This clinical analysis draws on the same capacity for retrospective interpretation that the speaker-hearer already possesses as part of his or her total communicative competence. As speakers, we
already know how to react to what listeners have just done in the previous moment. What the process of clinical self-analysis does is help one make more explicit his or her own interpretive processes and reactions. Thus, when one finds oneself beginning to hyperexplain to an interlocutor, one can try to remember what has just happened in the listening behavior. One can say, 'What was the listener doing a moment ago? Let me watch what happens when something like that happens again. If I find myself hyperexplaining I'm going to try to focus on what the listener is doing right then.'

Another set of implications of the paper's argument concerns recent work on transitions from speaking to writing. The perspective sketched here helps one consider audience-utterer relations in a somewhat new light. Of course, one can push too far the notion that oral discourse and written discourse are fundamentally discontinuous. Yet oral discourse involves an important factor that is not present in writing—the real-time production of audience reaction. Face to face with the audience, the speaker gets immediate feedback moment by moment from the listener. Having come to rely on that information as grounds for mid-course corrections in producing discourse, sitting down to write in the absence of an immediate audience may indeed be alienating. This is not at all to say that writing is decontextualized while speaking is contextualized. That seems an overstatement. But the relations of intertextuality between utterer and audience do differ in the two situations of communication. Are these differences only in amount, or in kind, or are they differences in both amount and kind? In the study of oral and written discourse, it is too soon to know the answers to these questions.

4. Conclusion. Listening and speaking seem to go hand in hand. For the speaker, the reactions of the audience must be taken into account. Thus, to talk is also to listen—to attend, by watching and hearing, to what the audience is doing from moment to moment. The speaker is not simply an information sender but is also an information receiver. Conversely, the listener is a sender as well as a receiver. Listening is an activity that is manifested in observable action. Since speakers take practical account of listening behavior as they produce oral discourse, the scholar needs to take it into account in studying the performance of speaking.

Communicative or interactional competence seems to involve the use of institutionalized forms of communicative knowledge in concrete situations in which the local features of the case at hand do not quite fit the frame of the culturally learned schema. Thus interpretation is necessary. It is a particular tree that must be climbed and for that no algorithms can be devised in advance. Practical reasoning, then, is an essential component of interactional competence. One of the ways to
reveal the workings of such reasoning is to study what speakers do in dialectical relations of joint production with listeners. Studying the mutual coordination of speaking and listening is an especially appropriate research site for developing a model of a practical speaker-hearer because of the nature of the communicative task faced by interlocutors. That task is radically particular, since talking with another person is even more tricky than climbing an actual tree. It is like climbing a tree that climbs back.

Notes

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1. The quote from Blake is from the marginal notes in his copy of Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses (Keynes 1966:569). This was a treatise in which Reynolds presented an aesthetic theory with which Blake disagreed violently. Reynolds' position was the normative one of the school or academy—an opinion that is found in many different style periods. This normative view is that particular works of art derive from the artist's application of relatively fixed, general principles of form to the representation of a specific case. Thus, for example, the genus heroism is manifested by the use of principles of 'heroic' style in painting a specific historical figure. In his marginal notes, Blake celebrates concrete particulars in arguing the contrary. He asserts that 'A History Painter Paints The Hero, and not Man in General, but most minutely in Particular' (Keynes 1966:465). The argument is reminiscent of that over the performance-competence distinction in Chomskyan linguistics and is thus relevant to the discussion here of aspects of an adequate model of a practical speaker-hearer. (See also Becker 1984, on 'A linguistics of particularity'.)

2. Transcription conventions follow, in general, the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson, in collaboration with Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff (see Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). There are a few exceptions and additions to their scheme, the most notable being that each line of text represents a single chunk of speech, usually a clause, and usually a major tone group. Hence, each line of text is usually unified both syntactically and prosodically. Additional conventions follow:

.. = approximately one half-second pause (typically clause-terminal), with longer pauses indicated by increments of
dots, usually in pairs. Thus, four dots indicate a one-second pause and six dots indicate a pause of one-second-and-a-half.

:: = sound stretch; elongation of a phoneme
A set of diacritical marks indicates volume and pitch stress:
'print = increased volume and high pitch, with no pitch shift
print = increased volume and low pitch, with no pitch shift
print = increased volume and high fall
print = increased volume and low rise

UPPERCASE = louder volume

[ ] = latch mark, indicating no gap or overlap in speech between turns

[ ] = occurrence of some nonverbal behavior or back channel. Horizontal placement of the brackets indicates position in time relative to the vocal actions of the other interlocutor

[ ] = continuation across time of some kinesic action (e.g. leaning forward as gesture) or postural position or gaze

References

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CONVERSATIONAL NARRATIVES AS ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Mark A. Clarke
University of Colorado at Denver

'If it isn't true, it ought to be.'
--Italian proverb

Two eight-year-old Anglo boys are seated at a table in an empty classroom, engaged in somewhat self-conscious conversation in front of a video camera. A teacher has organized the session and can occasionally be heard behind the camera, moving the microphone, adjusting chairs, giving instructions to the boys. As the conversation continues, the boys seem to relax somewhat, and they fall into a rhythmic interaction of storytelling, question/answer, and youthful observations on family, friends, and school. An example:

Lonnie's Shoe

Collin: Dilbey:

Well, um have you ever gotten in a fight? yeah. I got with big fights with Chad Bussey, um-

I heard that Sam Ferris, um Sammy Sam Ferrison or something like that threw Lonnie's shoe on the bus.

I heard that. oh yeah. That was funny. (laughs)

It was funny? yeah. He went 'phitt' (motions with hands)
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Collin: Dilbey:

he was on the bus an'
he was cryin' an'
we didn't know n' that
he said, 'Lonnie you better
get runnin'
and he just stand there
crying/
and star-

Lonnie?
yeah
it was Lonnie's shoe got on
the bus
no. Sammy Ferris didn't
frow it on.

he tried to kick a cup

it went 'tchiew' on the bus.

Well, I heard that he
threw it up there.

Well, Jon's?
Yeah of shoes

Who? Jon's?
Well Sam Ferris
Sam Ferris had to buy
Lonnie new shoes/

Yeah. Jon's
but/he got it back.

Di-have you ever/
Yeah of shoes

No. I think he got him
cowboy boots because
Lonnie doesn't wear tennis
shoes
He usually wears boots.
Like, you mostly wear

a new pair?

of the same kind?

tennis shoes and
I mostly wear em/

yeah
Chri- Um Chris is a crooked
he's a bad pest

'Lonnie's Shoe' is one of 16 stories which occur in the course of
32 minutes of interaction. Like the other stories, this one
arises in an apparently natural fashion out of a discussion of
school-related events. Judging from the enthusiasm of the
narrator and the attention of the recipient, the story concerns a topic of interest to both boys, and there is no evidence that Collin fails to understand the details or the importance of the event related by Dilbey. Yet, for us, the story poses problems of description and interpretation. On one level, it is difficult to tell who did what to whom, and what importance the event or events have for Collin and Dilbey. On another level, the content, form, and negotiation of the story pose challenges for conventional definitions of narrative, narrator, and audience, and for the way in which these and other factors figure into that common human preoccupation—conversation.

Conversation, of course, involves the negotiation of meaning between two or more individuals, and convention demands that the conversationalists pay attention to what is going on between them. But an interesting thing happens when a story is told: the narrator creates a 'story world' which is different from the world in which the conversation occurs. 'When a story is told, either in conversation, through letters, or in any sort of literary work, a story world is created with its own spatial and temporal reference points' (Polanyi 1982:156). The narrator produces a portion of discourse which has its own texture (Halliday and Hasan 1976) and which stands out, semantically, syntactically, and interpersonally from the conversation in which it is embedded. To tell a story requires a shift in one's perspective of reality from the 'here and now' of conversation to the time, place, and mood of the event portrayed in the story.

Mature users of the language are able to negotiate the slippery boundaries between the story world and the world of the conversation, and skillful narrators exploit the language so that the audience becomes involved in the story, entering the story world, experiencing, to some degree, the events and emotions of the story. Children, on the other hand, often have difficulty narrating an event. They appear to be caught between the delight of reliving an incident and the requirement of comprehensibility. 'Lonnie's Shoe' provides an interesting example of this. The boys are seated at a table, turned slightly toward each other. At this point in the conversation, they have been talking for approximately 18 minutes. It is clear that they are performing a school task (they have been asked to help out their teacher by talking in front of the camera), yet they have developed a rhythm of turn-taking, topic change, reminiscing, question and answer, etc. which seems 'natural' enough in spite of the conditions under which it occurs.

The two boys provide a dramatic contrast in conversational style. Collin seems calm, relaxed, and committed to the task throughout the 32-minute conversation. Dilbey fidgets, looks around the room, leaves his chair on several occasions, and appears to tune in and out of the conversation. Just prior to Collin's question concerning fights, the bell rings and Dilbey turns around to look at the clock, muttering under his
breath, 'What bell was that? The last bell? What time is it? No that wasn't our bell.'

He is sitting in the chair on his heels, leaning forward with his elbows on the table. As he completes his observations concerning the bell, his voice trails off and the turn shifts to Collin, who dutifully asks a question, thereby taking his turn and giving it back to Dilbey: 'Well, um, have you ever gotten in a fight?' Dilbey responds, 'Yeah, I got with big fights with Chad Bussey, um...'

He utters these words with a low-volume throaty rasp. As he speaks, he stretches out on the table, his chin resting in the crook of his left elbow. He rolls his head slightly from one side to the other of his arm, looking distractedly at his right hand as he traces a pattern on the table. He presents a picture of barely contained tolerance, the marginal patience of a veteran of compulsory activities. The camera angle allows us to observe his face as Collin makes his next statement: 'I heard that Sammy Sam Ferrison or something like that threw Lonnie's shoe on the bus. I heard that.' As Collin speaks, Dilbey gradually stops fidgeting and then, still resting on his outstretched arm, seems to focus on the middle distance. When Collin reaches the end of his comment, Dilbey abruptly sits up and exclaims with a short burst of laughter, 'Oh yeah, That was funny.'

The dramatic change in Dilbey's posture, the alertness in his eyes, the animation in his gestures and his voice signal a shift to the day of 'Lonnie's Shoe'. What follows are rapid bursts of exclamation as Dilbey recites the event. Each utterance provides us with surface structure evidence of Dilbey's shifts in focus of consciousness (see Chafe 1980), the verbal traces of a mental sequence. We are given brief glimpses of what might be a rapid slide show, each image representing a high point of a film which is replaying in Dilbey's mind, a rapid flickering of impressions, as if we were on a dark dance floor where a flashing white strobe light reveals the syncopated motion of other dancers. We cannot see everything that occurs; the brief, frozen images provide fluttering impressions of motion, but we must struggle to make the connections ourselves. Collin's is the task of all story recipients—to understand the story as the narrator tells it, to see the events as they occurred, to understand how those events relate to each other, to comprehend what the story means. In addition, as is often the case among friends, Collin shares in the negotiation of the narration, asking questions, prompting details, providing options.

Dilbey does not have a task so much as a series of options. He has been reminded of an event which prompts pleasurable memories. He needn't speak at all; he could choose to keep the story to himself, to shift his gaze toward the window and to lose himself in pleasant reverie. But he is constrained, by the setting and by obligations to Collin, to say something, so
he chooses to tell the story. However, committing himself to relating the incident of 'Lonnie's Shoe' sets him on a course between two worlds—the mildly exciting world of parks, lost shoes, and buses, and the mundane world of obligatory speech.

If Dilbey were an accomplished storyteller, this would provide fewer perils. He would shift into the story world of 'Lonnie's Shoe' by relating the events in such a way as to take Collin along with him. However, as we have seen, Dilbey struggles with the demands of both levels of consciousness.

The nature of conversational narratives. A number of researchers have attempted to establish minimal criteria for the definition of narratives (see, for example, Ames 1966, Applebee 1978, Labov and Waletsky 1966, Labov 1972, Rumelhart 1975). Figure 1 presents a distillation of numerous points of view; this perspective permits us to examine both the context and form of stories and their connections to the ongoing conversation.

Figure 1. Story and context of conversational narrative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story: A construal of experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction, orientation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Contextualization (evaluat-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Conclusion (reentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>into conversation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stories are viewed as construals of experience consisting of frame and incident. The incident is the event itself, the recreation of the events by the narrator. This is a story world, and to the extent that the storyteller becomes absorbed in the narration, this world becomes separated from the conversation. The frame constitutes the narrator's efforts to connect the story to the conversation. The frame represents the narrator's response to physical and interpersonal constraints on the storytelling, while the incident reflects personal constraints.

It is instructive to examine 'Lonnie's Shoe' from this perspective. Dilbey introduces and evaluates his story in the same comment ('Oh yeah. That was funny. ') and then cuts directly to the action. His next 14 utterances, with few exceptions, constitute an interior monologue of the incident, a headlong rush from one image to the next as he flashes from scene to scene. We understand the words, and we develop mental images to go with them; these provide us with the trace of a story line:
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A number of boys are playing in a park. One of the boys is kicking a cup near the water. Then, just as a bus begins to pull away, one of the boys throws Lonnie's shoe on the bus. Lonnie begins to cry, rather than running to stop the bus, and he loses his shoe. Sam Ferris has to buy Lonnie a new pair of shoes.

A rather spiritless rendition, but certainly a defensible interpretation of the events recounted by Dilbey. The complication and resolution, which involve the loss of the shoe and the buying of a new pair, are actually shared by the boys. The contextualization and conclusion, as is often the case in school tasks, are not particularly remarkable; the boys merely return to the task of talking.

So, the episode can be treated rather easily within the tradition of conversational analysis. In addition to meeting the criteria outlined in Figure 1, it satisfies a number of other commonly invoked conditions. The story demonstrates temporal ordering (Labov 1972); as one of 14 narratives told by the boys at one sitting, it might qualify as a 'story round' (Tannen 1984); Dilbey creates 'involvement' through the use of gestures, constructed dialogue, and sound effects (Tannen 1980, 1983, 1985); the story also reveals aspects of what Heath (1983: 166-68) would call 'talking junk'—embroidering on the facts to make a good story. Yet, a number of questions remain.

Who went 'phitt'? Sam, Jonathan, or Lonnie? Or some other individual?
Who was on the bus?
Who was crying?
What didn't 'we know'? and who is 'we'?
Who told Lonnie to 'get runnin'?
Is it Lonnie who just 'stand there cryin'/
Who tried to kick a cup?
What went 'tchiew' on the bus? The cup or the shoe?
How does Jonathan figure in? When Dilbey mentions Jonathan, has he shifted to another day, another event, another story?
Does Collin wonder about any of these questions as he participates in the narration?

Questions similar to these arise after viewing most of the narratives that occur in our data, especially in cases where the children appear to be absorbed in the conversation. The difficulty arises in part, I think, because we bring certain assumptions to the task of understanding the stories. The list of expectations displayed in Figure 2 provides a summary of the reactions of scores of adults--parents, teachers, researchers--as they viewed our videotapes of children's conversational narratives. It is unlikely that any of the adults sampled would list all of these ten points as defining criteria for conversational
narratives, but their comments make clear why they consider particular stretches of discourse to be good or bad examples of stories. It is significant that all of the points reflect the assumption that narratives are social phenomena. This is not surprising. We are, after all, discussing conversation, a quintessentially social act. Yet, the assertion that narratives constitute an altered state of consciousness requires us to address the apparent contradiction between the social and personal aspects of storytelling.¹

Figure 2. Expectations of conversational narratives.

1. Construal of experience: A story is the narrator's view of an incident.
2. Temporal ordering: The chronology of utterances in a narrative matches the chronology of events portrayed.
3. Cohesion: A story 'hangs together', has a beginning, middle, and end.
4. Point: Stories are told for a reason; we expect the narrator to have a purpose and to get to the point.
5. Complication, resolution, evaluation: A story contains some element of conflict, confusion, or crisis which is resolved in the course of the telling.
6. Truth: As story tellers and receivers, we expect stories to be true, or to deviate from the truth in expected ways.
7. Coherence: Stories must make sense; they must conform to our perceptions of reality.
8. Context: Stories exhibit certain semantic and morphosyntactic ties to the conversation in which they are embedded.
9. The floor: The narrator has the responsibility and the right to continue a story until it is finished.
10. Audience: Narrators require an audience.

World of discourse and definitions of narrative. The contradiction can be resolved by viewing the tension between the personal and social demands on speakers as a species of double bind. Bateson (1972b,c) developed the concept of double bind to explain the behavior of schizophrenics, whom he characterized as making a healthy adjustment to an unhealthy situation. Essentially, a double bind occurs when an individual finds him/herself in an important relationship, in which s/he receives two conflicting messages; neither message can be obeyed without disobeying the other, nor can either of the messages be ignored. This maddening (literally, for schizophrenics) conflict is exacerbated by the fact that the individual cannot step outside the situation to comment on the difficulty s/he is in. Bateson (1972b:208) uses the example of the Zen master's attempts to
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instruct his pupil: "One of the things he does is to hold a stick over the pupil's head and say fiercely, "If you say this stick is real, I will strike you with it. If you say this stick is not real, I will strike you with it. If you don't say anything, I will strike you with it." The archetypal example from the field of mental health is the situation of abused children whose parents say they love them even as they punish them. The children are forced to reconcile the contradiction between the parents' behavior and the proclamations of love, and they are incapable of articulating their confusion.

In the sense in which we are using it here, the double bind is less extreme but no less real. Human interaction requires, by definition, the contact of private worlds. The double bind occurs because the individual is placed in the position of having to reconcile the demands of public and private spheres of constraint. As Scollon and Scollon (1981:344-45) put it: 'In any communication, the participants are faced with the dilemma of respecting the other's right to be left alone (negative face) and the other's right to be accepted as a participating member of society (positive face).' The physical and interpersonal constraints on participants in a conversation force them to focus their attention and effort on the ongoing situation; they (individually and collectively) must negotiate a satisfactory interaction. At the same time, however, each individual must channel internal forces, the kaleidoscope of emotions, perceptions, interests of his/her individual consciousness. The everyday, commonplace status of human interaction should not lead us to diminish the importance of this conflict between private and public spheres of constraints. In fact, it is precisely because of its familiarity and ubiquity that communication is the matrix of mental illness (see Ruesch and Bateson 1968).

My primary concern here, however, is not with pathological extremes of communication breakdown, even though these can be viewed as extreme points on a continuum, and therefore, relevant to the discussion. I am interested in one aspect of interaction, namely, the narrative, and its nature and function in conversation.

Let us consider function first. Stories may be told to meet the communicational goals of a participant in a conversation. In such situations, if a narrative is to make sense, or to be received uncritically, it must conform, to some degree, to the ten points presented in Figure 2. However, a narrative may serve the opposite function, namely, to mitigate the pressures on the speaker of the conversational double bind. That is, the story may serve not as a tool of communication but as a refuge from interaction. At one extreme, this would be akin to speaking in tongues, where the narrator's production would be unintelligible to the audience. At the opposite extreme is totally ritualized language--the intoning of a fable or a prayer, for example, where the narrator is invoking a text familiar to the audience. At both extremes, the threat of interaction is
reduced. Viewed from this perspective, narratives provide an escape from the here and now of the conversation, rather than a strategy for accomplishing some communicational goal.

To the extent that this is true, the nature of conversational narratives also changes. Rather than a construal of experience—or perhaps, in addition to this—narratives serve as attempts at re-creating experience. Narrators respond to the interpersonal constraints of conversation by attempting to render intelligible some experience they have had. They provide background information, explain the motivations of actors in the story, evaluate events by giving their opinions, etc. As they move into the story world, however, they are released from these demands, and they are free to move from event to event in their egocentric exploitation of the narration. There are times, of course, when this causes no difficulty for the audience. Close friends or family members often share so much of each other's lives that the merest mention of a person or activity evokes the entire story.

We also noticed, with several of the pairs of children in our study, that their demands on each other were far fewer than ours would have been had we been the recipients of the stories. The questions posed earlier concerning 'Lonnie's Shoe' are examples of the kinds of information that an adult might demand of Dilbey in the course of the narration. These questions focus on the cohesion of the story, and on the complication, resolution, and evaluation. Countless adult viewers of the tape remain confused about the sequence of events, the relationship of the protagonists to each other, and the nature of the conflict and its resolution. And we never do understand whether the whole thing was considered funny or serious by anyone other than Dilbey. There is no evidence, however, that Collin suffers from doubts such as these, whether in this story or in any of the other stories which Dilbey tells. (Many of Dilbey's narratives pose problems of interpretation similar to the ones mentioned here.) This can also be said of most of the recipients of narratives in the data. The most obvious explanation for this high level of tolerance is that children between the ages of five and nine have not yet internalized adult models of narration. However, another explanation may apply, one which is relevant to all age groups: the audience of a narrative may become so caught up in the emotion of the narration that the experience 'feels' right, even though later reflection (or, in the case of research, viewing of videotapes) reveals numerous gaps in information and inconsistencies of narration.

This last point raises an issue which is essential to the identification of narratives as distinct from other discourse units such as descriptions, lists, explanations, etc., and that is the temporal ordering of a narration. Labov (see Labov and Waletsky 1969, Labov 1972) has made temporal ordering a defining characteristic of narratives:
We define narrative as one method of recapitulating past experiences by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred. With this conception of a narrative, we can define a minimal narrative as a sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered: that is, a change in their order will result in a change of the original semantic interpretation (Labov 1972:357-60).

The problem with using temporal ordering as a defining characteristic of narratives is that it reflects only the social view of the behavior, ignoring the possibility that stories may also be an intensely personal experience in which the narrator shifts from one event to another without concern for the order in which they actually occurred. The difficulty becomes especially acute when we are pondering the narratives of children, whose storytelling skills are still developing; but I would guess that many stories delivered and enjoyed among adults would not meet the temporal ordering criterion.

The problem here, I believe, stems from a confusion of Logical Types—that is, a confounding of levels of abstraction. One axiom of the Theory of Logical Types holds that whatever involves all of a collection cannot be one of the collection. Examples include: the group is not a member of the group; the word is not the same as the thing to which it refers; the map is not the territory; the menu is not the meal. And an example from text analysis: the narrative is not the event. Further, the events as they occurred are not necessarily the events as they were perceived by the narrator. In other words, as researchers examining conversational narratives, we attempt to understand (a) the verbal encoding of (b) a narrator's perception of (c) an incident from that person's experience. We are, therefore, removed from 'reality' by three levels of abstraction.

Now, this causes no problem for us as researchers because the narration on our video screen constitutes, in its own right, an event amenable to analysis. That is, it is appropriate for us to attempt to understand the structure, motivation, and functions of narratives in conversation as perceived and transcribed by us. We can also develop hypotheses concerning what constitutes 'good' storytelling, just as we can attempt to develop prototypes of 'working-class narratives', or 'Greek narratives', or 'children's narratives', etc. The difficulty arises when we cross boundaries of abstraction, confusing levels of logical type, because then we are making judgments appropriate to one level about data which come from another level. This is what happens when we require that narratives be defined as any sequence of utterances which exhibit temporal ordering. This definition involves an error in logical type because the attributes of physical chronology (level c) are being conflated with the narrator's perception of events.
(level b) and that person's narration of the perception (level a). It may be accurate to state that events occur in chronology, that is, that they are organized sequentially through time. But we enter increasingly dangerous waters when we attempt to claim that events are perceived in temporal sequence, or that we organize and narrate our experiences in a chronology that matches the events.

Oiler (1983:40) appears to make this error in developing an argument for episodically ordered language teaching:

Many readers have heard the riddle that asks, 'Do you know how to eat an elephant?' The answer, of course, is 'One bite at a time.' This little conundrum is instructive. In a microcosm it reveals the problem of understanding experience. If we tried to take in everything all at once, it would be impossible. So, experience comes to us in manageable doses, and we digest it one bite at a time. What is more, it is somehow the sequence in which all the events and sub-events take place that is crucial to our ability to understand and negotiate the elements of our world. The textuality hypothesis...says that the elements of experience are organized into hierarchies of sequences and subsequences much the way text is organized. (Emphasis in original)

This perspective of the relationship between experience and understanding, mediated by language, is intuitively appealing but it may be an example of culturally induced myopia. That is, because we are speakers of an Indo-European language, members of a Western culture heavily influenced by industrial notions of componentiality and causal sequence (see Berger and Luckmann 1967, and Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973 for elaboration), we may be too easily won over to the point. Oiller anticipates this objection, and in a companion paper (Oiler 1982) he cites research in brain functions to support his 'textuality hypothesis':

...the organization of language seems to me to be characteristic of almost all other cerebral activity. There is a series of hierarchies of organization; the order of vocal movements in pronouncing the word, the order of words in the sentence, the order of sentences in the paragraph, the rational order of paragraphs in a discourse. Not only speech, but all skilled acts seem to involve the same problems of serial ordering, even down to the temporal coordinations of muscular contractions in such a movement as reaching and grasping (Lashley 1951:187).

Oiller goes on to assert that the sequentiality of experience is not a cultural artifact, but rather, a biological endowment: 'In other words, the textuality hypothesis argues that event-structures are propositional in nature quite independently of
any cultural overlay that may, over the course of development, result in adjustments in their interpretation' (Oller 1982:10)."

It is not at all clear that there exists an unbridgeable gap between Oller's point of view and mine, given the cultural 'adjustments in interpretation' mentioned in the foregoing quotation. However, I will continue with my line of argument, citing cross-cultural comparisons as reason for caution when considering the temporal ordering of utterances in narratives. On the Indonesian islands of Java and Bali, for example, people perceive of time as cyclical, not as a linear sequence. Judith Becker (1982:198), comments:

In Java, time is represented as cyclical. Furthermore, time in Java is not represented as a single recurrent cycle, but several concurrent cycles running simultaneously. Important days of the week are reckoned as those points of coincidence between the different, continuously ongoing cycles.

This has a profound effect on Javanese perceptions of experience, leading perhaps to different ways of consuming elephants than 'one bite at a time', and, I would add, different ways of talking about the event afterward.

Geertz (1973), citing the cyclical and coincidental nature of their calendars, asserts that for the Balinese, time is not so much cyclical or durative as it is particulate. Time does not accumulate, and one does not spend it or save it. The important thing is the point in time, so that 'when you ask a Balinese when he was born his reply comes to the equivalent of "Thursday, the ninth," which is not much help in determining his age' (Geertz 1973:396). This punctual, point-specific perception of time and events pervades the culture, with the effect that day-to-day life consists of self-contained, monadic encounters, in which something either happens or does not, but in which there is no building toward a climax. To the Western observer, these events (and individuals' perception of events) would seem to lack coherence. Because we are conditioned by our cultural heritage to see linear connections, we set great store by causality, whereas in Bali and Java, coincidence is of far greater importance.

A. L. Becker (1979:216, 226) examines in detail the differences between Aristotelian and Javanese conceptions of dramatic coherence, and these may be taken as illustrative of the types of differences which are possible in people's construals of experience. Of primary importance to my discussion are contrasts of temporal/causal sequences. In the Western tradition, coherence is achieved through time—stories have beginnings, middles, and ends—and temporal linkages—temporally contiguous events are seen as being casually related to each other. In Javanese tradition, coherence is achieved through spatial relationships; the plot of wayang, the Javanese shadow theatre, must begin and end in certain places. Furthermore,
coincidences, far from being avoided, are a primary motivational force in the action. 'In Javanese and Indonesian, the word used to describe what we call a coincidence (a causeless interaction) is Kebutulan (or Kebenaran), literally a "truth"... (A.L. Becker 1979:225). Individuals raised in Java and Bali acquire, as they mature, their culture's perspectives on dramatic unity and, whether or not they are able to articulate the criteria for a 'good story', their production and critical reception of narratives reflect their cultural traditions. Thus, just as we, as beneficiaries of Aristotelian tradition, expect stories to have beginnings, middles, and ends, and to portray events as being logically (that is to say, causally) related, the Javanese and Balinese expect stories to exhibit a particulate perspective of time and to be motivated by coincidence.

This rather lengthy digression into one aspect of Southeast Asian coherence systems was prompted by the need to establish a feasible alternative for temporal ordering as a foundation for narrative structure. I realize that this discussion of Javanese and Balinese cultural and linguistic constraints on narratives is superficial, but I hope that I have presented enough information to establish the possibility of other perspectives of coherence, and to prompt the interested reader to pursue the topic.

To return to the central point, narrative as an altered state of consciousness: once we have removed (either partially or wholly) narrative from the demands of social interaction, and once we have established that there exist worlds of discourse which do not conform to Western idealization of temporal and causal sequence, we alter the importance and the nature of coherence, truth, and point as qualities of conversational narrative. The most obvious implication of this view is that these qualities become, to a certain extent, irrelevant, at least in the sense originally discussed. Coherence, for a narrator who is mentally reliving an event, is achieved merely by focusing on the people and/or incidents of the event. Dilbey, for example, has become totally absorbed in the 'shoe' incident when he says:

No. Sammy Ferris didn't frow it on.
he tried to kick a cup
it went 'tchiew' on the bus.

Collin interjects, however, that he heard that 'he threw it up there', with contrastive stress on 'threw', indicating that he has heard a version that conflicts with Dilbey's. This forces Dilbey to reconsider:

Oh yeah. That was Jonathan.
we're at this park an'
he tried to kick a cup in the water an'
his shoe went 'tchiew' right in the water.
Now, there is no way of knowing precisely and conclusively what Dilbey meant when he said these words. That is, we cannot know what events he was referring to nor precisely when they occurred nor in what order, etc. However, we can speculate that the 'coherence factor' for Dilbey in this narrative is 'shoe' or perhaps 'shoe flying through the air', as in 'it went "phitt" or "tchiew",' and that this forms the central focus of his narrative. His narration, therefore, shifts time and place without difficulty, from the day and place when Lonnie lost his shoe on the bus (the focus for Collin) to another day and place when Jonathan kicked his shoe in the water. This is possible because Dilbey has entered into the timeless and dimensionless story world created by the act of narrating. On one level, at least, the 'truth' of the story is irrelevant; there are no immediate consequences to come from this narration. Dilbey has not been called as witness for either Lonnie or Sammy, nor for that matter, for Jonathan. So it does not matter if what he said matches what actually occurred. The 'point' of the story is likewise unimportant. Dilbey has enjoyed telling the story and Collin has (apparently) enjoyed hearing it. It does not seem to matter to either boy that Dilbey has shifted to another story, or that there is a lack of clarity regarding who threw whose shoe where.

The ultimate importance of recognizing that narratives may constitute, under certain circumstances, an altered state of consciousness lies in the realization that, as students of human interaction, we cannot assume that speakers operate under uniform, unvarying social constraints. Rather, much like receivers of a radio transmission whose signal fades and becomes stronger, people tune into and out of conversation in which they are engaged. In fact, they are able to leave the conversation entirely, merely by telling a story. It seems that, in this sense at least, audience is not an essential aspect of storytelling, after all.

Notes

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1. This tension between the personal and the social demands on speakers constitutes the fundamental dynamic of maturation,
the cybernetic integration of the individual into society. The developmental perspective of this issue is beyond the scope of our discussion at this point; suffice to say that this is precisely the approach of Piaget and his followers (see, for example, Piaget 1973).

2. A. Becker (1979:211-13) makes the same observation to support his contention that a text always contextualizes the present in the past. For Becker, the unintelligible extreme of speech is the completely spontaneous language of the schizophrenic, the lonely alienated poet, or the foreign language learner. These individuals are speaking entirely in the present. Speaking entirely in the past would involve repetition, whether of something just said or of an ancient and revered text. The vast majority of language is, however, somewhere between these extremes, containing novel information but expressed through familiar words and grammatical structures.

3. The Theory of Logical Types comes from the mathematical/philosophical speculations of Whitehead and Russell (1910), but my understanding of the application of the concept rests on the work of Bateson (1972b) and Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974).

4. Even the neurobiological processes of perception and brain functioning cannot be unequivocally categorized as sequential. Watzlawick (1984) has gathered a fascinating collection of papers which argue that order in reality exists only because we require it. See especially the chapters by Glaserfeld, 'An introduction to radical constructivism', and Von Forester, 'On constructing a reality'.

5. Michaels (1981) would call this a 'topic-associating' (as opposed to 'topic-centered') style of narration—one in which cohesion for the child is accomplished by the fact that a particular topic figures prominently in all the utterances.

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KEEPING IT TOGETHER: TEXT AND CONTEXT IN CHILDREN'S LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION

Jenny Cook-Gumperz
University of California, Berkeley

Twenty years ago, in a seminal paper on the role of parental verbal expansions in the child's acquisition of syntax, Brown and Bellugi (1964) mentioned the following problem:

It seems to us that a mother in expanding speech may be teaching more than grammar; she may be teaching something like a world-view... As yet it has not been demonstrated that expansions are necessary for learning either grammar or the construction of reality. All we know is that some parents do expand and children do learn.

Following this comment, Brown and Bellugi went on to study not the acquisition of a world view but the ordered progression of syntactic and morphemic development. And in the following years, much of the research in child language continued in a similar vein. As a result we now know a great deal about the developmental sequences in which children learn grammar and other semantic and lexical features of their language, and about the different strategies mothers employ to help them acquire this language. But as yet we know very little about how language enters into the child's construction of reality and little about how parents provide the language learning child with something like a world view.

Influenced by the linguistic theories of the sixties, child language research through these years assigned primary importance to sentence-level syntax. Such an emphasis conceives of the language learning child essentially as a grammarian, not as a social communicator. The analytic focus is on written texts and transcripts from which the typicality of utterances produced can be assessed in accordance with a theory of adult grammatical competence. By contrast, earlier work in child language had taken a slightly different, somewhat more child-centered
approach, studying the process of learning to speak with all that this implied in terms of the acquisition of meaningful sound distinctions, utterances, and symbolizations, as a way of gaining insight into the development of children's ability to communicate, and to manage social relationships (Stern and Stern 1928, Weir 1962).

The influence of the grammatical/syntactic model has meant that concern with the way speaking practices formed part of the child's communication matrix has been replaced by concern with the growth of logical reasoning and grammar, and more lately with the cognitive consequences of language acquisition. In this way, children's talk becomes a natural experimental laboratory to explore the acquisition of language and of universals of understanding in a limited domain. While making an important contribution to our understanding of how language works, such an approach neglects the issue of how the child works to construct social meanings.

Two problems tend to arise in this connection. First, the focus on the child as a young grammarian has not satisfactorily accounted for communicative growth beyond the first few years, once an approximation to adult syntax is achieved (Ingleby 1980). Second, the imperfect character of the child's contribution in interaction often makes it necessary for contextual knowledge to be contributed by adults or by analysts and for them to go beyond the text to discover the communicative intents and interactional outcomes achieved by the participants. In other words, the separation of text from context in the analysis of child speech has never been absolutely maintained in practice. Context in some ways has always had to be taken into account, although the tendency has been to treat the contextual knowledge necessary for the interpretation of child speech as a separable domain of social facts and categories. The result is that what is important to the sociolinguist who seeks to find out how social regularities are interactionally accomplished and how these become part of a pattern of normative social expectations is not problematic from a linguistic standpoint, where the achievement of discourse coherence and interpersonal understanding have been seen as outcomes of purely linguistic choices.

Pragmatics provides a different perspective on the relationship of social-contextual to linguistic knowledge; for in speech act theory, language becomes constitutive of conventional social acts. Here students of child language have investigated how the speaker's intent as well as the hearer's understanding can be shown to be mapped onto the different linguistic frames, which constitute these acts. Through speech act analysis we can begin to see how universal social characteristics of causation, agency, dominance, and control can take different linguistic forms. How this knowledge is coded in discourse and so cognitively available to the child as part of the speech interaction have become new concerns in child language studies.
Some recent researchers seeking to deal with the apparently simultaneous acquisition of grammar and social knowledge suggest that this process is best seen as the search for a grammar of social action such that social and syntactic knowledge are seen as being acquired in similar ways. Shatz (1981) comments:

It would not be surprising to find evidence in the development of children's social knowledge of a stage at which they do the equivalent of morphemic analysis. Indeed the anecdotal reports of reduplicative phrases like "boy brother", "mommy lady" may be attempts to mark separately each of the relevant dimensions along which distinctions in the child's social world are drawn.

Here the child's social reality or world view is seen as made up of discrete semantic units within a grammar-like system of social knowledge. In practice, however, as Bruner (1981) has recently pointed out, speech act analysis, despite recognizing that understanding is a discourse-level phenomenon, has not abandoned the linguists' concern with sentence units and with a monologic, that is, an individual speaker-based view of communication. Yet Levinson (1983:284), in his recent review of pragmatic theory, points out:

It is not hard to see why one should look at conversation for insight into pragmatic phenomena, for conversation is clearly the prototypical kind of language usage, the form in which we are all first exposed to language—the matrix of language acquisition.

For if pragmatic theory assumes the primacy of the social uses of language both for adult mature users and for children, the study of children's language acquisition within this framework must eventually take into account some part of the interactional consequences of both linguistic and sociolinguistic regularities for generating social understanding in discourse. In fact, we can now see that the separation of text and context is only part of the problem. It is indicative of the wider issues of how we keep the linguistic and social aspects of communication together, such that one informs the other. The tendency in all child language analysis has been to see these as separable aspects of a common reality, lending weight to each other but not simultaneously constitutive of this reality.

To overcome this problem we must move both backwards and sideways: sideways because we must begin by focusing not on language or speech as such but on the social interaction of which acts of speaking are constitutive, and backwards because this entails a return in some ways to the earlier scholars' views of the child as a speaker whose situated acts of speaking are a significant part of the communicative message. Thus, analyses
of children's social performances provide a way of reuniting text and context, in looking at the socially constitutive character of language. This view was implicit in Roman Jakobson's writings (Jakobson 1981), although it seems to have been neglected since.

A basic assumption for such a perspective must be that social knowledge frames linguistic interpretation, which in its turn provides essential coding of the sociocognitive information that establishes the guidelines for what can be expected in further social interaction. In other words, the relationship of language to social knowledge is both interactive and reactive. In short, it is constitutive of social reality in the performance of the everyday activity of speaking.

1. The shift into the study of performance. Performance becomes the analytical prime in the recent work of folklorists on oral literature and poetics. Here, in the rhetorical analysis of story telling, ritual language, and other ceremonial occasions for talk, the notion of performance as verbal art gives us a more integrated view of the relationship of speech to language, than the basic structural opposition of 'langue' and 'parole' which has long dominated the study of language-in-use and which was responsible for the initial separation of text from context. Although earlier studies in this tradition tended to be limited to specific genres of literature, a shift to the analysis of the discourse and stylistic aspects of performance took place when interest began to focus on the different contexts of telling and on accounting for what it is that distinguishes individual instances of spontaneous performance (Bauman 1975; Hymes 1975). More recent studies (Briggs 1984; Bauman 1983) build on the work of Parry and Lord, who deal with the performer's ability to create spontaneous, rhythmically fast and complex narrative poems and songs in long narratives, rather than on the narratives as text.

Lord (1960) raises the question of how singers and tellers of tales, in solo performance, can remember or generate complex, lengthy folk epics. He suggests that a young singer does not acquire his skills by verbatim memorization but rather learns to create a performance out of a stock of narrative themes and expressions that he has internalized through apprenticeship. The singer knows the story as a 'basic theme' and knows how to put together the rhythmically and lexically appropriate phrases in which to tell the story. Thus certain types of lexical-syntactic combinations occur with great frequency. Analysis centers around such recurrent sequences or 'formulae' defined as 'groups of words which are regularly employed under the same metrical conditions' (p. 30). However, the formula provides more than a slot filler; that is, it is more than a formulaic set of words that speakers can use to gain time for further speech planning. What characterizes the formula is its lexical variability and metrical-syntactic fixity. This provides
an element of organization for the performance. Lord speaks of stylistic and rhythmic substitution as operating within a grammar of poetry, where substitution into a line must match metrically (p. 35) and must maintain the rhythmic and contrastive balance of the line. The speaker can work toward the formula and arrange his choices around it like islands in a stream of talk. Within a story certain choices at the levels of style and content will be available both as substitutions and as items which maintain a contrastive balance.

We can build on the folklorists' findings on the use of formulae in different thematic environments (Lord 1960), the fuzzy nature of the boundaries between performance and non-performance aspects of the same event in everyday contexts (Briggs 1984), and the emergent properties of what makes for differences in the enactment of any event (Bauman 1983) to investigate children's play. In what follows I would like to apply these concepts to the perhaps less symbolically dense materials of game performance in order to see how much insight they can give us into the nature and functioning of the verbal art children need and display in the conduct of such games.

2. Children's play as performances and games as research sites. Children's games are arenas where children themselves are in charge of setting the pace and flow of their own communications. Games, particularly fantasy and pretend games, are social projects where children are spontaneously involved in self-organized settings and where speech is a naturally occurring part of the context. Garvey (1974), in writing about social play, has commented that in pretend games, played mostly by 3-6-year-olds, 'the saying is the playing'.

In the study of children's play, the transformation of objects and persons from the everyday world into a play or fictional reality is one of the most salient features noticed by researchers (Bateson 1972; Garvey 1982; Auwarter in press). Such transformations are also characteristic of the ritualized aspects of adult verbal encounters where everyday objects or acts of speech become endowed with special symbolic values within an integrated system of significances as a way of indicating that a particular activity is taking place (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1978). The similarities and differences between a state of play and ritual have been the subject matter of much anthropological attention, although the nature of the difference between everyday ritual and occasions of ritual 'high' ceremony do need to be specially considered. I will quote from an earlier discussion of this issue:

In less formal everyday situations where members are known to each other, it becomes necessary to make special provision for marking the ritualized aspects of the discourse. Lacking the societally transformational semiotic of special occasions, everyday encounters must fall back on the
symbolic resources of everyday language to gain discursive power needed to make the event into a ritual occurrence. For this reason the ritualization of everyday communicative exchanges has a negotiable value and one that can be influenced by the interactional history of the participants from outside of the event (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz in press).

What is true for everyday ritual may also hold for children's play. As Speier (cited in Goodwin 1984), building on Sacks's analysis, has argued: 'While it may be a popular lay conception that game activity is divorced from the realities of everyday life, one consequence of children's games may be that children initially find out how the social order works through game participation'. In other words, when children engage in what are usually called fantasy or role-playing games, they also access the kind of social knowledge which is performative and constitutive of their ongoing reality, as a discourse occasion. Use of such knowledge is evidence that they experience the universal parameters of agency and exchange, of power, dominance, cooperation, and alliance in engaging in conversational exchanges and in making their actions effective. But their performance must contain special markers to signal shifts in footing, markers which may differ from adult practice. In order to become mature communicators, they must eventually learn to work within the universe of adult social relations, and it is play experience which enables them to acquire and practice the necessary discourse strategies. However, in exchanges with adults and older siblings, the young language apprentice child is handicapped and in a limited role as a conversational partner either accommodated to, or excluded and made into a watchful participant (Ochs and Schieffelin 1984), so that learning opportunities are limited.

It is only in play that children's activities are set apart and form an arena where they themselves can have some autonomy in controlling conversational outcomes. It is not that, as Fine (1983) has recently suggested, children seek alternative realities in play. Rather, play provides a heightened understanding of and control over a reality which is part of everyday world knowledge. Through game events and by improvising and controlling their own strategies for producing what Habermas (1970) has called 'dialogic constitutive universals', children come to construct a sense of social reality of their own.

It is this line of reasoning that leads us to look at children's play as everyday rituals which therefore have the character of specialized oral performances. Through games and game talk, we are examining a situation where children are aware of a special self-created need for using language in ways that have an intrinsic relevance for shaping the outcomes of their own actions, rather than entering into adult-dominated settings. Thus, by studying how children construct a game world through
talk, we are getting closer to the children's understanding of the socially constitutive nature of talk itself, and so to what, following Brown and Bellugi's suggestive comment, we might be able to call their 'world view'.

Pretend or make-believe games have a quality of being spontaneous speech performances where children blend talk and social and physical action into a developing series of activities which have a meaning and a satisfactory outcome created among the several children (usually groups from 2-5 or 6) involved in the play. The relation of talk to action and the interpretation of intent inherent in specific linguistic forms does not appear to worry children in game talk. Contrary to what happens in adult-dominated talk situations, little attention is paid to potential miscues. In fact, the specifically attractive feature of these pretend games is the fluency with which the game solutions are verbally defined or negotiated. Furthermore, game discourse has a naturally progressive quality. Games are necessarily concurrent stretches of speech and social acts organized into a sequence which is meaningful and coherent for the participants, even if the cohesive qualities expected of adult conversation are not apparent on the surface. That is, in the playing of games, there must be some 'plot' development, one event following another, and the transition from one event to the next must be verbally accomplished, that is, spoken out loud.

It is for these reasons that I refer to such games as 'narrative games'. For in these games not only do children adopt different voices to play differentiated characters, but, as my analysis will show, children also construct a narrative level of game planning which describes the details of the game's actions. Such a description may be dismissed as an analyst's construct, but Heath (1985), in her recent discussion of discourse genres, presents independent evidence to show that children themselves recognize similar distinctions. Furthermore, as Dore (1985) points out, even young children who are just beginning to speak can use intonation contours to mark genres of discourse and thus enact distinctive voices as part of a monologue of recollections spoken aloud.

3. Analysis of the narrative game of 'Mummies and Babies'. It is with these questions in mind that I decided to look in depth at a fairly complex and rapid game of 'Mummies and Babies' between two 3-1/2-year-old girls for whom this game and variations on this theme are a regular part of their play repertoire. It is necessary to examine the game in its entirety from its beginning on the audiotape, with some simple description of how the game was started, until its conclusion, to see the scope of children's ability to keep such oral narrative performances going. The initial and the final portions of the game from which most of the examples are taken are reproduced here.
LUCY AND SUSIE PLAYING MUMMIES AND BABIES

The four different voices:

Mummy to mummy in italics
Mummies to babies in CAPITAL ITALICS
Narration in CAPITALS
Real life voices in ordinary script

1. L: OH...OH YES THAT...THAT CAN BE THERE,...THAT CAN BE THERE...YES.
2. S: AND WE SIT DOWN AND HAVE A GLASS OF...ORANGE JUICEY...[whisper] THERE...SIT DOWN ( )
3. L: I haven't got a cup
4. S: ...go and get one...go and get...a bigger cup.
5. L: ...SHH...SHH...WANT IT. [play drinking sounds]...shh...( ) me some more...it's gumpy-shekh,...it's macacamba...it's macacamba,
6. S: ...THE BABIES DON'T LIKE IT.
7. L: ...NO THE BABIES DON'T LIKE MACACAMBA...shh l/I/
8. S: AND THIS/I I'm not having mine to be the golliwog...AND AND AND HE SITS
9. L: I haven't got one
10. S: ...here you are...AND THEY SIT ON OUR...LAP WITH US
11. L: ...BABY DO YOU LIKE...CANALUNGE?...CANALUNGE...ALL RIGHT BABY...I'LL GIVE YOU CANALUNGE...AND YOU'LL SEE WHAT HAPPENS...IF/IF YOU CA/IF YOUR CANALUNGE...GIVE ME YOUR LET...CAUSE YOU'RE VERY SICK...AW WANT CANALUNGE,...SHH. AWW. YOU'RE VERY SICK, AREN'T YOU?
12. L: ...LE/SHH,...( )...BABY...VERY SICK!...ALL RIGHT, BABY...SIT SOMEWHERE ELSE...I DON'T WANT/I DON'T WANT YOU TO SHOUT AT SANDRA, AND YOU...SIT HERE.
13. S: YOU GO ON THE HORSIES...WITH SALLY MANGIE....LOOK!
14. L: ...SALLY MANGA,...STOP IT...NOW YOU MADE ME SPILL MY TEA!
15. S: ...YOU MADE ME SPILL MY TEA. ( )...SHH [whisper]...CHIKAPKOO...SHH...CHIKAPKOO...AH!
16. L: ...WHY DON'T YOU...WANT TO HIT...SANDA LANDA? LOOK
17. S: ...HE'S PUSHING,
18. L: ...WHEN YOU...GOT ON MY BACK,...DON'T PUSH... HIM, AND DON'T PUSH HIM ...ALL RIGHT YOU...PUSHED. DON'T PU 19. S: ...YOU PUSHED!...YOU'RE NAUGHTY, YOU'RE GOING IN BED ...TOMORROW YOU SLEEP THERE 20. L: ...ALL RIGHT...LET SALLA LANGA SIT THERE,... AND YOU SIT HERE ...( ) SANDRA SOUND ASLEEP ALL RIGHT...WHAT 21. S: MY BABY'S GOING TO SLEEP...'CAUSE SHE'S NAUGHTY. 22. L: ...AND MY BABY'S GOING TO SLEEP...AND DON'T WAKE UP IN THE NIGHT ...AND DON'T GET OFF OF...YOUR BED...LOOK! ...STOP THAT! 23. S: ...'CAUSE WE'RE GOING...LET'S TAKE...OUR BEDS ...PLAY...LET 24. L: AND BABY SPILT HER FALALANGA,...LOOK BABY, DON'T SPIT IT OUT ...my baby's spittin' at your baby...AND STOP THAT! ...ALL RIGHT...I'LL BRING IT TO YOUR MUMMY ...MY BABY ( ) MY BABY...S/S/SPITTIN' IT. 25. S: HERE'S A/AT HER...MY BABY'S SPITTIN' HERE'S/ HERE'S A 26. L: it out her water ( ). 27. S: ...what can this be? 28. L: ...a stekacha...ALL RIGHT...(are you about)...shh... not you! shh! all right...Sandra, and I'll give you a picnic....I'll give you a drink....[drinking sound]...you want a big drink

154. S: ...my/my...s/...my sister has...c/...coffee because he/ ...she's big girl.
155. S: ...my baby's got a...( )
156. S: shh!
157. L: ...my baby needs a pin stuck in her.
158. S: ...why?
159. L: ...have you got a pin?...uh/ [adult mother interjects: why does your baby need a pin stuck in her?]
160. S: UM, MY/...MY BABY HAS GOT A/...A PIN STUCK IN...HER AND BECAUSE...WE HAVE TO GO TO THE DOCTOR'S, DON'T WE ( )
161. L: ...AND HE CAN/CAN YOU/...can...um,...sandra, have you got pins?
162. S: ...uh, yes...and/...and no, I'll go and get...some pins
163. L: let's
164. S: I've got some pins...in here.
Discourse planning. Two issues of discourse planning need to be discussed here. First, there are the choices by which speakers create patterns of expectations for listeners. These enable listeners both to process the information being received and to prepare for their turns as speakers. Second, there is the speakers' more immediate problem of encoding their own talk, the need both to talk and to plan ahead in order to (1) maintain the right to speak and (2) sustain the pace and flow of the speech.

The first issue of speaker/hearer expectations can be looked at in three ways.

1. Expectations set up by prosodic contours in certain linguistic environments. For example, rising intonation indicates that more is to come in some contexts, or signals a question, or a change in voice in others.

2. Syntactic expectations. For example, expectations set up by utterance strings that break off before a clause is complete, by varied repetitions, by use of cohesive markers such as but and because, or by deixis.

3. Expectations set up by what is known about thematic structures or discourse frames. For example, knowledge that a story requires and will be given an ending.

The second issue of the speakers' planning their own speech can be looked at in two ways: in terms of the rhythm and pace of exchanges and in terms of the speakers' ability to maintain the flow of their talk. Neither of these is an easy task for young children. Both of these planning problems are of particular importance in studying young children whose control over grammar and lexicon is still limited. What is more, the issue of fluency and effectiveness of production within social interaction is something
that has been too often overlooked. One of the reasons that
these self-organized games stand out from the more usual child
language corpus is the amount of speech that even very young
players produce and the richness of its content and fluency.
Clearly, game situations where children control their own social
interaction can provide sociolinguistic experiences which demand
more from the interactants than exchanges with accommodating
adults.

In looking in detail at the analysis of this game, I will focus
on three issues: (1) The progression of the narrative and the
development of themes throughout the game. (2) The levels of
the narrative: the ways in which the participants structured
the discourse (and thus the game world) for themselves through
their speaking performances. In this the ability to give special
significance to prosodic and rhythmic distinctions was very im-
portant. (3) The use and recognition of formulas to resolve
some of the important issues of discourse planning.

Table 1. Progression of events.

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<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The babies are given a drink</td>
<td>One baby is sick</td>
<td>One baby is shouting at</td>
<td>One baby spills the tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(M. to mummie)</td>
<td>Sandra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susie</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>One baby is pushing</td>
<td>The baby is put to bed for pushing</td>
<td>The baby spilt her Falalanga, spit it out</td>
<td>One baby spits at the other baby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to mummie)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susie</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The baby gets sent to bed</td>
<td>One baby is given a drink</td>
<td>One baby wets</td>
<td>One baby cries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mother decides to take babies for a walk</td>
<td>Babies are given drinks</td>
<td>The babies are held by the mummies</td>
<td>One mummy takes babies and Sandra is to follow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Susie</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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First, a great deal of content and action is generated in these games. In Table 1, the entire game’s action is shown to be divided into 26 different event phases, all of which take place in the 15 minutes of the game. There is thus a very direct immediacy that connects talk to the realization of game action, with the result that these games may strike the adult listener as strangely fast-paced and somewhat confused narratives. I have used arrows to show how each phase of action is responded to so as to further the game’s development. Note that only after item 24, toward the end of the game, are there two alternate resolutions to a previous action phase.

In moving from one phase to the next both within and across speaker turns, the responder to any suggestion can accept this suggestion by using or adding to the information provided by the first speaker. In this way the progression of events appears to be smoothly negotiated by the two participants. Even in episodes 24 and 26 (lines 157-174), where the two participants have differences over the use of pins and their babies, the

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<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A top is put on the juice</td>
<td>One baby is put for a nap</td>
<td>The mummies get strollers</td>
<td>One mummy is Mary; the other is Sandra (old info)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(Real life)</td>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
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Table 1. Continued.

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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One mummy will buy a nappy</td>
<td>The drinks can be replenished at the park</td>
<td>The mummies have a picnic in the park</td>
<td>One mummy needs a pin for her baby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
<td>(M. to babies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The baby needs to go to the doctor because it has a pin stuck in it (This is not followed up)</td>
<td>One mother tries to procure pins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Narrative)</td>
<td>(M. to mummies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susie</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
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disagreement is resolved by one participant's persuasive strategies. There is no evidence that the two players have different expectations as to where the action is going. Throughout the game each of the girls seems to be quite prepared to accept and respond to the other's contributions to the plot and to recognize any change in voice when it occurs.

While in adult encounters the absence of overt markers of cohesion across turns might have made it difficult to see thematic connections, for the two girls, this does not present any problems. Fluency and cohesion are achieved and maintained through two signalling devices: (1) prosodic/intonational cues that, when cooccurring with certain lexical characteristics, mark what I will call different voices; and (2) the use of a rhythmic and metrical formula which provides a frame for contributions within the different voices. While these devices also occur in adult talk, they are here used in quite distinctive ways.

Furthermore, children also provide signalling cues to set up the context so that each utterance can be placed within the narrative progression. Generally, as with most very young children, these are largely prosodic cues. Most listeners will readily recognize these cues as marking different voices. In studies of pretend play, it is usually assumed that such voice distinctions indicate different characters or roles. However, as I worked at the transcription I realized that the different voices did not merely mark in-character or out-of-character speech as I had first assumed, but constituted a series of organizational levels in the performance, that is, different discourse contexts. These voices are identified as follows: (1) in-character speech (5.1): (a) mummies to babies, (b) mummies to mummies; (2) off-record, that is, real-life talk or organizational comment with Lucy and Suzy in their real-life characters as themselves (5.2); (3) narration, that is, description of things and events in the game (5.3). By utilizing these voices to mark the game's different organizational levels, the children are structuring their performance through discourse strategies and conventions of their own making.

5. Characterization of game voices

5.1 In-character speech. There is a clear distinction between mummy-to-baby and mummy-to-mummy talk. Mummy-to-baby talk has a noticeably sing-song rhythm, as in 'All right baby...I'll give you canalunge' (line 11). Occasionally, reprimands are delivered in a loud voice, as in line 24, which begins with a narrative comment and then shifts into mummy-to-baby talk: 'AND BABY SPILT HER FALALANGA...LOOK BABY DON'T SPIT IT OUT'. The last utterance here reflects a shift from narrative voice (caps) to mummy-to-baby talk (capital italics) and is spoken with crescendo volume. At times, when a message needs
to be repeated, the repetition is marked by pitch rise and vowel tensing, as in 'Come let's carry you' (line 46), where the vowel in 'you' is almost a squeal.

Mummy-to-mummy talk lacks the rhythmic character of mummy-to-baby talk and has higher than normal pitch register, as in lines 6 and 7: 'THE BABIES DON'T LIKE IT. NO, THE BABIES DON'T LIKE MACACAMBA'.

5.2 Real-life talk. In real-life talk, the two principals speak to each other as Lucy and Suzie. Topics include side comments unrelated to the game, as in 'Cause you like that one don't you ...don't you Suzie' (line 89), as well as discussions of matters of game management, i.e. of how x in the real world relates to y in the game world: 'I'm not having mine to be the golliwog' (line 8). Both the lexical usage and the prosody of real-life talk are close to that found outside of play contexts. Since it tends to be used for urgent negotiations that cannot be settled any other way, real-life talk often carries a tone of urgency, as in 'No that's my cup' (line 45), where the vowel in cup is lengthened and my carries heavy contrastive stress. In 'No I want it there' (line 75), the vowel in there is lengthened and sounds whiney.

5.3 Narrative talk. Narrative talk refers to the game world only and not to the real world. It includes describing and commenting on the actions of the two mothers, who are referred to by I and you, and of the two babies, as well as commenting on game organization. The voice quality here is often close to an ordinary tone. Narrative has many of the lexical characteristics of ordinary life. The prosody is also similar, but it is marked by a measured and more evenly paced tempo, pitch variation is kept to a narrow range, and the paralinguistic features of the other three voices are lacking. A special feature is the formulaic use of and, sometimes in connection with cause which serves to introduce new information and not as a clause connective, e.g. 'AND THEY SIT ON OUR LAP WITH US' (line 10), and also line 24, cited above: 'AND BABY SPILT HER FALALANGA.' Initial and also occurs elsewhere, as in the following real-life talk example: 'And then you can have ...yeah...but what shall you have?' (line 100), but it is the cooccurrence of such lexical features with measured rhythm that identifies narrative.

By means of the stylistic distinctions among these four voices, the children transform everyday reality into a game world and so mark the ritualized aspects of their performance. Discourse planning problems in this game world are resolved by use of the formula, which provides a slot in which made-up words and routinized exchanges can rapidly be inserted to maintain the pace and fluency of the performance.
6. The use of the formula. The distinctive prosody of in-character talk gives the entire game a characteristic metrical rhythmic pattern which enables the children to resolve potential encoding difficulties by inserting made-up words that fit into the game's metrical pattern. With one or two exceptions, such made-up words mostly occur in in-character speech. They refer to people's names ('Sally Mangie', 'Sally Lunga', 'Semolina'), or to names of objects ('It's macacamba', 'Canalunge', 'Falalanga'). These made-up names do not seem to have fixed meanings. They can be quickly transformed and may refer within a short time span to several people or objects.

The distinctive metrical slot for the mother-to-baby talk seems to be three stressed syllables either with a marked fall:

\[
\text{All right baby}^2 \quad \text{Poor baby}^2 \quad \text{Go to bed}^2
\]

or with a marked rise on the last syllable:

\[
\text{canalunge}^4 \quad \text{semolina}^4 \quad \text{macacamba}^4
\]

The rhythm is kept by formulaic pause fillers that take the form of drinking or water pouring sounds, like 'uhh...Shh...', which occur throughout the mothers' talk and mark their handling of the babies. All right (with the marked falling tone), which can be characterized semantically as 'exasperated', can also be seen to operate in a formulaic way, as a pause filler. It also serves to introduce and monitor much of the mother speech to babies that Lucy performs, as in (line 11):

\[
\text{All right baby, I'll give you canalunge...and you'll see what happens.}
\]

The formula also provides a slot for other made-up words which show the following types of rhythmic patterns:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{gumpy skëkh} & \quad \text{mă că cámbă} & \quad \text{wët shët} \\
\text{golli wog} & \quad \text{sally mangie} & \quad \text{san der} \\
\text{can na lunge} & \quad \text{sally manga} & \quad \text{kæn sah} \\
\text{chi kap koo} & \quad \text{sanda landa} \\
\text{ste ka cha} & \quad \text{salla langa} \\
\text{ka ka ka} & \quad \text{fa la langa} \\
\text{shë kë shədë lĕng ā} & \quad \text{sa mo lina}
\end{align*}
\]

7. Narrative strategies. Narrative voice is important because it provides evidence of the children's ability to manage game organization through concurrent selections of stylistic options at the prosodic and semantic levels. For example, Susie's (2):

\[
\text{And we sit down and have a glass of...orange juicey},
\]

can be identified as narrative and thus different from Lucy's preceding utterance by the initial 'AND' as well as by its prosody. The same stylistic features also serve to contrast
the initial and subsequent parts of Susie's (10): ...here you are...AND THEY SIT ON OUR...LAP WITH US!

Quite frequently, narrative voice serves to introduce a new activity or game phase which is then acted out by shifts to other voices. In (21)-(22), Lucy echoes Susie's narrative comment and then goes on to talk to her baby, who is now presumably sleeping:

S: MY BABY'S GOING TO SLEEP...CAUSE SHE'S NAUGHTY.
L: ...AND MY BABY'S GOING TO SLEEP...AND DON'T WAKE UP IN THE NIGHT.

In (24), Lucy switches several times in a relatively short single turn, first using narrative voice to announce the activity, then using mummy-to-baby talk to react to the new context, then interjecting a comment addressed to the other mummie before going on to deal with her baby:

L: AND BABY SPILT HER FALALANGA...LOOK BABY, DON'T SPIT IT OUT...my baby's spittin' at your baby...AND STOP THAT!...ALL RIGHT? (m to b)

In (160), after the adult mother's interruption, Lucy signals a return to the game with her narrative: 'UM-MY/MY...BABY HAS GOT A/...A PIN STUCK IN...HER AND BECAUSE...WE HAVE TO GO TO THE DOCTOR'S, DON'T WE'.

In the next example, a new activity is announced by Susie. Lucy continues the announcement and then Susie shifts to mummy-to-mummy voice to act out her interpretation. When Lucy then shifts to real-life talk to signal her disagreement, this sets off a long real-life argument over the cup (43-46ff.).

S: AND MY-MY-MY BABY GOES TO BED THERE, DON'T SHE
L: AND YOU GIVE HER A DRINK OF SALLALANGA. AND
S: Not that babe...I'll give her some...shh tea because...She wants tea, don't she? (m to m)
L: ...No that's my cup! (real-life)
S: ...wh-where?...I'll go and get- where's my cup? (real-life)
L: ...Here...now...I'll give you...some (real-life)

As this example suggests, narrative voice can do more than provide game directions. It may signal an indirect command or lend persuasive force to a speaker's argument against the other's plans. In the next example (126), Lucy switches to narrative to try to resolve a difficulty about who should have a doll: 'You have that...(real-life) AND YOU HAVE...YOU CAN CARRY IT LIKE THAT QUICKER AND I CAN'T'.
Another time (119-120), narrative is used to counter what the other person has done and alter the course of the action without overtly contradicting her.

S: I've finished (drinking sound) (m to m)
L: NO NO YOU SHOULDN'T DRINK IT. YOU SHOULD LEAVE IT UNTIL WE GET TO THE PARK...AND THEN THERE IS ANOTHER TAP AT THE PARK.

Before Lucy's move, the intention was to go for a walk. What she says leads to an alteration of Susie's game plan. Narrative can also be used to rehearse and plan out more directly what is to be enacted, as in the final examples (165):

L: ...ANYWAY...AND YOU SAY, 'SANDRA, HAVE YOU GOT PINS', AND I'LL SAY 'YES'.

8. Conclusion. Let me briefly summarize what we can learn about children's understanding from our analysis of language-in-use. In a previous paper (Cook-Gumperz 1981), I have explored some of the consequences of children's rhetorical uses of language as a force to shape and control interpersonal relations. In the case of the present game, we see that by separating out a narrative level to comment upon the action itself, children demonstrate their recognition of the need to stay within the game world while at the same time reflecting or acting reflexively upon the course of the action. Narrative, in other words, serves as a special metaprocedural level of discourse which frames sequences of talk (Goffman 1974).

Furthermore, the use of the narrative level of game talk suggests, even more clearly than the stylistic marking of voice differences, the way in which the game event is separated from everyday talk as a ritual transformation. However, there is a flow back and forth between daily talk, in the persons of Lucy and Susie, and that used to construct the game world. In this way, these game ritual performances are similar to those found in adult talk where performance boundaries are fuzzy and styles shift back and forth between daily talk and ritually marked discourse (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz in press; Briggs 1984). We can also suggest that in their game talk children may be demonstrating a communicative competence that is in advance of their control of adult grammar and discourse strategies. It is in looking at the child as a performer of speech in action and at how the child's social world is constructed through talk that we gain a more general notion of the communicative competence children possess.

In conclusion, how can we account for the feat of presenting a narrative performance containing 26 events in 15 minutes by two 3-1/2-year-old girls who are still at a stage far from full adult grammatical competence? How can they so successfully negotiate the relationship between talk and its resolution in
activity? First, children provide the information necessary for the implicational and contextual understanding of their speech not only by its semantic and grammatical organization but by the clear prosodic marking of contexts or discourse levels in the game. Such discourse information provides a very clear and easily available informational cue for interpretation. Second, the strong rhythmic character of children's pretend games provides a governing coherence or frame into which specific verbal productions can be slotted (especially made-up words or routines). The surprising fluency of these games can be explained, therefore, partly by the specific performance criteria which govern them. The way coherence is created here differs from the way it is created in usual conversation since not the speaker but the discourse level is the key to understanding any utterance in context. Third, this kind of discourse organization provides a certain amount of thematic and semantic freedom and allows the children to make maximal use of their developmentally limited lexical and grammatical resources. In many ways these features of rhythm, prosody, and thematic freedom are similar to those described by Lord for the telling and singing of long epic folktales. However, the use of the narrative voice also indicates the deep influence on these not yet technically literate children of their immersion in the surrounding literate culture. It is in these ways that we can see children generating a world view through their own acts of speaking. Such a view is created not only through their interaction with their mothers but also through their own performances.

Note

The title of this paper is a response to an earlier call to extend and enrich the study of the social context of language learning by Bambi Schieffelin (1979), in 'Getting it together: An ethnographic approach to the study of the development of communicative competence'. Nancy Eighler made significant contributions to the narrative analysis of the game. I would also like to thank Shirley Brice Heath and Ann Peters for their discussion of this paper and of the data partly reported on here.

References


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