A Few Clerics at Court

Catholic Clergymen in the lay politics and administration of Spain during the reigns of “Los Austrias Mayores”, Charles V/I and Philip II: 1516-1598

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May 9, 2011
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Introduction

During the sixteenth century, Spain was the preeminent power of the Western world. Its feared infantry formation, the tercio, dominated an empire that was based in the Iberian Peninsula but also included many other corners of Europe as well as the two continents of the Western Hemisphere, the Philippine Islands and after 1580 even held Brazil and the Portuguese dominions in Africa and Asia. Indeed, from 1503 to 1643 the Spanish war machine was virtually undefeated on the battlefield\(^1\). During that time, this massive state was ruled by the senior branch of the Habsburg family, which also held the throne of the Holy Roman Empire from its seat in the Archduchy of Austria. However, despite this importance to contemporary affairs, Habsburg Spain has been the subject of relatively few detailed studies.

The peninsular power is lacking from many of the general surveys of the time. In textbooks used at Georgetown University, the description of Spain itself is less than one page. The description of Spanish activity in the Netherlands, by contrast, is approximately four pages long.\(^2\) This has led to the view of Spain through the narrow lens of its opposition to Protestantism. This perspective first emerged as dominant during the sixteenth century itself, when the Spanish army was crucial to Catholic efforts to fight Protestantism in Germany, the Netherlands, and England.\(^3\) This view of Spain as a reactionary power in the grips of an extremely powerful Catholic Church has led to the assumption that Spain was a theocratic country.\(^4\)

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In their book on the era, the Durants wrote that “In Spain we must also look for the priest. Nowhere else on the globe had religion such power over the people.”\(^5\) Whether the second half of the statement can stand in Europe during the late sixteenth century, when religious wars were actively raging in virtually every country except Spain, is intriguing. But more immediately, the first half of that statement personalizes the religious force in the country in the person of the Catholic priest: the ordained clergy. It implies that the clergy in Spain had a greater impact on the course of events in Spain than in other countries in Europe. This assumption of Spain as a uniquely theocratic country was prevalent in many of the older works on Spanish history.\(^6\) By contrast, in modern works there are relatively few comments about the Spanish clergy. Furthermore, most of those comments, such as that of J. H. Elliott in his book *Imperial Spain*, relate to the spiritual activities of the clergy and the Inquisition.\(^7\) Indeed, in many ways recent scholarship has left the political status of the clergy in Spain completely absent from its studies.\(^8\) In a book with the grandiose title of *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire*, there are the same number of references in the index to Cardinal Richelieu, the famous chief minister of France in the early seventeenth century, as to all individually identified members of the Spanish clergy combined.\(^9\)

It is necessary to fill in some of the gaps of knowledge as related to the Spanish clergyman during the reign of the Spanish Habsburgs, so as to develop whether or not Spain actually was a theocratic country, dominated by a uniquely powerful Catholic Church. That is a grand project, and clearly unattainable in one single work, especially one of this relative brevity.

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\(^6\) Perez, p. 91


In one of the few pieces of editorial work of the *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España* (hereafter “CODOIN”), the editors wrote that nobody “despite the long life and strength of mind that heaven conceded to him can examine by himself the innumerable quantity of documents that two centuries of incessant activity in so many areas lit by the sun, study them and compose them with the object of uncovering the truth.”\textsuperscript{10} They are referring to the entire body of work represented by the Spanish Habsburgs, but it holds for the clergy as well. Therefore, the reign of the Spanish Habsburgs, and the activity of the Spanish clergy, must be broken down into segments where the truth can be uncovered in smaller pieces. The segment to be covered here is clerical involvement in lay politics and administration during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II.

True influence at court can best be analyzed by correspondence between figures at the Spanish court and by consequently placing less focus on public proclamations. But rhetoric in these private letters what was written did not always reflect reality, being either general forms and expressions or even purposeful occlusions. A study in rhetoric in Early Modern Spain dealt more with social, economic and cultural practices, and unsurprisingly found that the rhetoric of the time period often failed to reflect the realities of those practices.\textsuperscript{11} For example, it was common in the time period to rhetorically kiss the hands of the person to whom you were writing. However, given that rebels wrote in that language to the monarch against whom they were rebelling, the phrase conveys little intention of actual submission.\textsuperscript{12} While it did not explore political rhetoric, and deals with a later century, the warning of Richard Pym’s book is well understood to mean that the written word cannot always be trusted. Therefore, analysis is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[10] CODOIN 23, p. 9
\item[12] CODOIN 50, p. 193 – a letter from Gonzalo Pizarro, a Peruvian rebel
\end{footnotes}
substituted for quotations in most cases, and concrete actions are identified in place of words. However, since the subject material is political, sometimes words are important in and of themselves, and so quotations are used in that context.

While modern scholarship on Spain has tended to exclude statements about the clergy, other studies present views that contrasted with the theocratic model postulated by the Durants and other older historians. One such scholar identified the European heavy use of universities to recruit servants of the crown, as personified by “the Thomas Wolseys, Stephen Gardiners and William Lauds of England, the letrados of the Spanish crown.” Interestingly, the three men identified as representatives of the university tradition in England were all priests and bishops. Conversely, the letrados, one of the Spanish words for lawyer, were predominantly not members of the clergy, or at least not identifiably so from a historian’s perspective. While the two views were not contrasted in their own literature, they do present an intriguing contradiction. In one, priests acted everywhere while in the other there were no priests in the Spanish political equation. This promises an interesting examination of further detail.

What follows is a prosopography of Catholic priests who played a role in the political machinations at the Spanish court, in the policy formation of the Spanish government and even in the administration of the territories of the Spanish kings. Initially, the lack of individually identified clerics in many of the secondary sources about Spain led to the expectation that there were not any priests involved but that is not the case. However, while there were not many, a few priests during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II rose to a level of political importance. Nonetheless, clerics were less likely to be present in the Spanish court than in those of its contemporary powers. In addition, with the notable exception of Antoine Perrenot Cardinal

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14 Prosopography is the study of a group of people by way of so as to determine common characteristics.
Granvelle, these priests were also less entrenched in the court, and were frequently only relevant for very short periods of time and related to only one issue. Prosopography examines a narrowly defined group of people, and so the focus is only on those clerics who were involved in the formulation or implementation of Spanish policy.

**Thesis Statement**

Contrary to the view of Spain as a theocratic state, the historical record indicates that compared with many of their contemporaries, Spanish clerics were relatively uninvolved in the formation or implementation of policy. There were numerically few clerics at court, and with a few exceptions, clerics never exercised the same degree of clout that their lay and aristocratic counterparts in Spain or their clerical counterparts in other countries. Most clerics who became involved in the formation or implementation of policy were transient in their involvement at the Spanish court before returning to their clerical careers.
Organization and Explanation

Explanation of Terms

CODOIN
The Colección de Documentos Inéditos Para la Historia de España, hereafter shortened to CODOIN is a collection of letters, documents, and a few books from several different archives throughout Spain and published by the Royal Academy of History of Spain. The first volume was printed in 1842 and the final and one hundred thirteenth volume was printed in 1892. The original work was financed by a grant from the Spanish government and as a result in volume 78 there is a brief defense of the work offered by the publishers. In their words, CODOIN was worthy of a continuation of the grant because it contributed “to the progress and illustration of our historical literature.”¹ The historians of the Royal Academy identified that there was a dearth of any literature on Spanish that was not an anti-Spanish polemic, and so sought to publish CODOIN to provide a resource for future historians to conduct either neutral or possibly pro-Spanish research.² CODOIN contains letters in several non-Spanish languages, mostly Italian and Latin, but is predominantly in Spanish. Translations from it, as from other works in Spanish, were done by the author.

There are two caveats that must be made in regards to the use of CODOIN, one related to the nature of CODOIN and the second to the method used to extract information from it. The first caveat is that for all of its length and the astounding amount of material in its volumes, CODOIN is not comprehensive, meaning that it does not contain every letter written in that time period. One of the historically convenient things about the letters of sixteenth century Spain is

¹ CODOIN 78, p. ix
² CODOIN 23, p. 10
the care with which the authors dated their letters, and the first line of many of these letters was to reference the date of the letter to which they were responding. Unfortunately, that first letter was not always in CODOIN, whether or not it even survives is indeterminable. This was a problem endemic to the entire work, but one particular example shall serve as representation of the frustration that this could pose. On November 28, 1567 King Philip II wrote to Cardinal Granville, at the time in Rome, in praise of a particular theory and understanding presented by the Cardinal of the situation in the Netherlands. This explanation had been given in a letter that was written a month before the King’s which was not in CODOIN, and the King did not repeat the explanation in his own letter.\(^3\) As a result, the specifics of what Cardinal Granvelle cannot be known with certainty.

The second caveat to the use of CODOIN comes from how the catalog was used to select which letters from which volumes were important. Even with the work of the Spanish historians a century and a half ago to collate all of these letters and documents into one source, CODOIN is still too massive to be completely read for any one project, nor is all the material in it necessarily relevant to any specific project. During the 1930s Julian Paz created a catalog of the entirety of CODOIN. In it, Paz listed every document in CODOIN by its author, its recipient and usually a brief summary of its contents. Scrolling through the long list of documents yielded a second, and much shorter, list of letters and files whose authors, recipients, or subjects, were clerical. The primary way a clerical nature was determined was if there was an indicator such as Fray, Padre, Bishop or Cardinal or if the name was recognizable as belonging to a known cleric, such as Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas or Cardinal Granvelle. During the actual reading of the volumes, occasionally a letter was discovered that was not picked up from the Catalog, which indicates that in all likelihood there were resources in CODOIN missed because of the methodology used

\(^3\) CODOIN 4, p. 478
to select which letters to read. It is also possible that an entire person was missed by this methodology, but that seems unlikely, and further unlikely that any person so missed, meaning never once mentioned by clerical title or referenced in any of the letters read, was of significant import to the matter being investigated.

**Spain/The Spanish Empire**
Throughout the previous sections of the introduction it has been common to refer to the subject country as Spain. For the most part, that reflects the rhetoric of the time, and also to the modern scholarly consensus, terming the political entity on the Iberian peninsula as Spain and will continue. But for clarity it must be stated that this is not technically correct, as there was no single entity in the sixteenth century that could be independently identified as Spain. Spain was a collective polity formed of many smaller units. It came into existence when Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile married in 1469, but the two monarchs, commonly called Reyes Católicos or Catholic Monarchs, specifically did not merge their countries, and instead kept them as separate legal and administrative entities. Thus the Spanish Habsburgs inherited from the Catholic Monarchs is most honestly called “a body politic that united peoples with distinct national languages, traditions and histories, in which each one conserved its administrative autonomy and had its own economy.”

Not even the letters of CODOIN ever wrote out the full title of the Spanish Habsburgs. It was not until the reign of Philip V Bourbon in 1700, the subsequent dynasty, that the term King of Spain entered official use. Philip II, the second Spanish Habsburg monarch, went by the long title:

Don Felipe, By the Grace of God, King of Castile, of Leon, of Aragon, of the Two Sicilies, of Jerusalem, of Portugal, of Navarre, of Granada, of Toledo, of Valencia, of Galicia, of Mallorca, of Seville, of Sardinia, of Cordoba, of Corsica, of Murcia, of Jaen, of Algarve, of Gibraltar, of the Canary Islands, of

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4 Perez, p. 33
the Indies eastern and western, islands and terrafirma of the Ocean, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, of Brabant, of Milan, Count of Habsburg, of Flanders, of Tyrol, of Barcelona, Lord of Vizcaya and of Molina, etc.  

Please note the ‘etc’ at the end of the title, which indicates that even that lengthy exposé of the territories controlled or claimed by Philip II is incomplete.

Commonly these divisions are reduced down to the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, the first being all the possessions of Isabel and the second those of Ferdinand prior to their marriage. However, not even these entities were unified, and during the reign of the Habsburgs, there were Viceroys, or people who ceremonially stood in the place of the King, for Navarre as well as for Aragon, Naples and also Peru, among others. There was no legal distinction between these different Viceroys, although different prestige could be attached to them, which could even elevate the Governor of the Netherlands above the Viceroy of Aragon, despite the legal situation. The tensions between these states could be high at times, and many of them never forgot that they were different people from the rest. This was especially true of the Portuguese, who belonged to the same crown from 1580-1640, never forgot that they were different from and rivals of the Castilians and Aragonese, who they worked to keep out of their ports.

Initially, the only tie between these disparate kingdoms was the person of the King, and the only spheres yielded to central control were those of diplomacy, defense and the faith. Therefore, the theory of the state held that the only two unifying factors of these disparate peoples were the person of the King, and the Church. The King and the Church worked together

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5 CODOIN 42, p. 222
6 Perez, p. 35
9 Perez, p. 33
to enforce religious uniformity, which was the guarantor of political stability. As discussed later, this led to problems for the Habsburg monarchs and may help explain some the courses of action they undertook.

In general, Spanish political theorists spent less time discussing the ideal form of government and more on its function and good governance. Both theorists and practitioners openly rejected the ideas of Machiavelli, when he wrote them, as antithetical to what a good Christian leader should be. It should be said that this scholarly disinterest did not translate to practical disinterest, as many actions of the Spanish during the sixteenth century could be said to have been informed by the doctrines of Machiavelli. In addition, as mentioned, the common people and the aristocracy clearly had an attachment to their individual kingdom and the form in which it was governed. This led to conflict not only with the Portuguese but also with the Sicilians. When Charles first inherited the throne, the Sicilians took the opportunity of a young and remote monarch to rebel against Ferdinand’s Viceroy, Hugo de Moncado, initially on the grounds that his term expired with the monarch. But they also insisted on the right to elect his replacement from among their number. This second demand is why the unrest did not die down when Charles re-appointed Moncado as his own Viceroy and instead turned into a full scale rebellion behind a few Sicilian noblemen. The Spanish Empire was clearly not only polyglot in theory but also in practice.

These multiple realms were governed by a central structure in Madrid that was also, in the words of a modern Spanish government historian, “polynodal” or having many of different

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12 Barmejo Cabrero, p. 43
13 CODOIN 24, p. 137
14 CODOIN 24, p. 179
centers of decision making.\textsuperscript{15} Spain’s government in the sixteenth century was conciliar in nature, with several Councils that orchestrated affairs. It is convenient for historians to distinguish between those that were issue-based and those that were territory-based. This division did not exist at the time, and the three most prestigious Councils were those of State, which dealt with anything of importance, War, and Castile.\textsuperscript{16} The president of the Council of Castile was considered “the second-highest magistrate of the monarchy” presumably after the monarch himself.\textsuperscript{17} A fourth Council which was of great importance to Spain, although no clerics appear to have ever sat on it, was the Council of the Hacienda, which dealt with fiscal matters.\textsuperscript{18} These Councils were very small and very rarely had more than six members, with the exception of the Council of State which oscillated between as few as eleven and as many as twenty over the course of time.\textsuperscript{19} These Councils were depoliticized in their decision making, and were mostly a collection of lawyers and others who examined the technical methods of implementation and the implications of decisions reached by the King and a small group of his advisors.\textsuperscript{20} Although in theory a possibly efficient design, in practice the Spanish government was always marked as being difficult to manage, slow to respond to events because of an excess of people and the redundancy of consulting with the different councils.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{The Spanish Aristocracy}

If the clergy were not the primary actors of the Spanish political machine, that raises the question of who was. The answer is found in the Spanish aristocracy, whose members formed a

\textsuperscript{15} Barmejo Cabrero, p. 63  
\textsuperscript{16} Barmejo Cabrero, p. 64-5  
\textsuperscript{17} Barmejo Cabrero, p. 65  
\textsuperscript{18} CODOIN 36, p. 544  
\textsuperscript{19} Barmejo Cabrero, p. 66  
\textsuperscript{20} Perez, p. 62  
\textsuperscript{21} Barmejo Cabrero, p. 66
complex web at the top of the political arena that monopolized all power. The power of this group in Spain is difficult to overrate, as they formed less than 2% of the population yet owned, together with the Church, approximately 95% of the land. Membership was indicated in letters by the term Don, commonly abbreviated as D. Most of them were of families that traced their roots back to the Reconquista during the Middle Ages and had formed a challenge to monarchs on the Peninsula until the Trastamara, the dynasty of Ferdinand and Isabel, had brought them to work as part of the central government. That dynasty came to power in a coup, and those who supported the first Trastamara became the highest level of aristocrats, who were inside the central government from the very beginning. This was a trend the Habsburgs continued as they refused to employ the grandees unless they could be sure of their loyalty. The aristocrats accepted that loss of control over their independent political action because in exchange the monarchs gave increased economic privileges and immunities to the aristocracy, like the immunity from taxes which caused financial difficulties for the state.

The aristocrats collected into large familial clans, of which there were eighteen during the early Spanish Habsburg era. The Habsburg court was mostly comprised of the grandees, an English word itself a term which originated in the Spanish word grande used to refer to these aristocrats, although a few outsiders won positions through their ability. The term grandee initially referred informally to all Spanish nobles, but in 1520 Charles V took the title and narrowed it to only twenty-five so as to appease pressure from his German and Flemish

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25 Bastamente, p. 17
26 Lynch, p. 17
27 Bastamente, p. 20-22
28 Carter, p. 73
aristocratic subjects who objected to the extensive privileges enjoyed by the Spanish nobles in the presence of the King. This was merely recognition of a division within the aristocracy that already existed. Those twenty-five titles, including the Dukes of Alba, Medina Sidonia and Medina Celi, owned more than half of the land in Spain, especially in the recently conquered territories in Andalusia. Lesser aristocrats and the Church owned what was left, but with greater numbers, their land holdings were not as prosperous or powerful as those of the grandees.

**The Spanish Catholic Clergy**

Identification of the nobles as the primary actors is complicated by the fact that many bishops and other members of the upper reaches of the Catholic hierarchy were frequently drawn from the same families. These senior clerics moved among the same social circles as their secular brothers, which makes the simple division between cleric and aristocrat impossible. However, the clerics were also marked by their spiritual authority and were rarely ever referred to in letters of the time by secular or aristocratic titles, the exception being members of the royal family such as the Cardinal Infante Don Fernando of the seventeenth century. While there was a powerful idea of an alliance between “cross and crown, throne and altar, faith and empire,” the religious sphere was often functionally separated from the political.

In previous sections, and in subsequent ones, the term priest and cleric are used interchangeably, for the sake of variety and because all of the clerics discussed later are also priests. This was not universally the case, and the ranks of the clergy were filled with many people who were not ordained to be priests. There was a group of clerics who had only what

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29 Bastamente, p. 24
30 Lynch, p. 19
32 CODOIN 41, p. 422
33 CODOIN 99, p. 1
were called minor orders. They could claim clerical status along with the fiscal and judicial exemptions that accompanied it even if they were married.\textsuperscript{35} Numerically, this group of non-priestly clerics far outnumbered priestly clerics. In Barcelona during the years 1546-1570 4,502 men were tonsured, or became clerics, while only 284 of those men actually went on to be ordained priests.\textsuperscript{36} Those men who were tonsured but not ordained “exercised a part-time, non- or semi-professional clerical function.”\textsuperscript{37} These men would not have been identified by the methodology described in the section above on CODON as they would not have any identifying titles. However, the description by Rawlings seems to downplay their nature as clerics and also indicates that their level of education was probably not as high as those were ordained. Therefore, it is logical that many of them probably did not play a role at the level of politics under discussion, if any did, and that they were unlikely to have achieved that role as a cleric but as a member of the aristocracy.

\textit{Incidental and Career Clerics}

Not all members of the Spanish Catholic clergy in the sixteenth century took vows out of a sense of devotional piety. Often they were influenced by either family ambition or family desperation due to too many children.\textsuperscript{38} It is impossible for a historian to judge the nature of individual clerics as to what the reasons for their joining were, or the depth of their personal piety. However, that idea does raise the valid point that not all clerics approached their job in the same fashion. One of the goals of prosopography is to determine characteristics among the population being studied. One of the elements examined is whether the Spanish clergy studied

\textsuperscript{35} Astarita, p. 125  
\textsuperscript{37} Rawlings, p. 34  
were incidental or career clerics in how it related to their political activities. The distinction is between a politician who happened to wear the robes of a cleric and could therefore be called a cleric incidentally, and those for whom the clergy was a career that led them to be involved in politics. Incidental clerics were more involved in politics than in the pastoral or theological duties of a cleric while career clerics were involved in politics as a result of their clerical duties.

What is not covered

Equally important to an explanation of what this prosopography covers is an explanation of what it does not. Clerics may not have been heavily involved in the lay politics and administration of Spain during the sixteenth century, but this was not the only interaction between the Church and the Crown. As CODOIN’s primary focus is on the correspondence between officials in the government, especially royal correspondence, these areas are usually only discussed sparingly. Even to the extent that these other interactions were referenced in CODOIN, including them would occlude the analysis of clerics involved in Spanish government.

The State in Church Administration

Future sections focus on the role of clerics in the lay politics and administration of Spain. However, during the sixteenth century influence did not only flow in that direction: it was common for the King to have influence over the Church within his territory. While more commonly identified with the Gallican Church, the royally dominated Church in France, or with the Church of England, the Spanish Church was equally emphatically royally controlled.\(^{39}\) The precise level of control varied from kingdom to kingdom within the Spanish Empire. Within Castile and Aragon themselves, the King had uncontested control over the appointment of all

\(^{39}\) Mallet, p. 30
episcopal appointments.\textsuperscript{40} This extended to the Aragonese possessions in Sicily, where once again the Crown appointed virtually all bishops. The only significant possession to which this privilege did not extend was the Kingdom of Naples. There, Charles V was able to secure the right to appoint the occupants of only 24 sees, an improvement from the royal perspective over the previous situation where the Pope had appointed all office-holders. However, this development left over 120 papal appointees in Naples. Eventually, Philip II increased royal influence in Naples by securing for the throne the right to approve all the episcopal occupants that the Pope appointed.\textsuperscript{41}

Church administration was not extensively addressed in the letters which were published as part of CODOIN, and mostly in the context of people being recommended to hold various episcopal sees. For example, Cardinal Don Pedro Pacheco, referenced later as the Viceroy of Naples, during his subsequent service in Rome, in a broader letter to Philip II also included his recommendations for the position of Archbishop of Naples.\textsuperscript{42} CODOIN also contains a letter from the Archbishop of Santiago objecting to lay control of the Church in the 1560s, but there does not appear to have been any effect from this letter.\textsuperscript{43}

Churchmen depended on the state for their appointment in Spain no less than in other countries around Europe. Indeed, the Spanish state may have exercised even greater control over the Catholic Church within its territory than was common in many other European states, and certainly greatly influenced the Church in its own administration. This is the reciprocal of the role of clerics in lay politics and administration, which was much more limited.

\textsuperscript{40} Maltby, p. 90-91  
\textsuperscript{41} Astarita, p. 125-6  
\textsuperscript{42} CODOIN 29, p. 475-6  
\textsuperscript{43} CODOIN 97, p. 418
Church and State in the New World
CODOIN does contain a great deal of material related to the governance of the Spanish possessions in the Western Hemisphere. However, the structure of Spain’s government in those territories has been studied elsewhere and therefore does not need to be reanalyzed here. The Spanish colonies were an area where the operation of the Spanish government was significantly different than it was in its European territories, especially as it regarded the clergy. The Church did play a greater role in the Americas than in Europe, but this was mostly due to a lack of Spanish manpower in the region that led to a greater reliance on clergymen.

It was not only the Spanish state that operated differently in the Americas, but also the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church in Europe, even royally dominated as it was in Castile, was still a distinct entity. This was not the case in the colonies due to the system called the Patronado Real, or Royal Patronage. This system established the clergy as employees of the Spanish state as well as the Catholic Church.44 While in Europe the King appointed bishops and leaders of religious communities, in the New World the King possessed “direct and immediate” control over the entire Church, except in matters of dogma and doctrine. This control extended over every facet of religious life in the Americas: in addition to appointing all abbots and bishops, the King controlled the location of churches and other religious buildings; allocated Church revenues and decided the boundaries between dioceses; the King even had the authority to veto any Papal Bull or Brief as it applied to the New World.45 This right was first given in 1452 to the Portuguese for their African territories, and was not extended to the Spanish until 1508, although this was still before the accession of the Habsburgs to the Spanish thrones.46

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44 Boxer, p. 73
45 Boxer, p. 78-9
46 Boxer, p. 78
The conflation of religious and temporal authority in the Spanish colonies was not only a case of the Spanish Kings being entrusted with greater control over the Church. The lack of Spaniards in the colonies often led to the royal administration leaning on the Church and clergymen to fill in where it was necessary. The ultimate expression of this reliance came in 1573 when Philip II issued the “Ordinances Concerning Discoveries.” These ordinances forbade the operation of conquistadors in the style of Cortes or Pizarro, who had conquered Mexico and Peru respectively. Instead, the Church was responsible for pushing back the frontiers of Spanish territory. Members of the religious orders, specialized priests such as the Franciscans, Dominicans or Jesuits, established missions at the borders of Spanish territory and converted the local populace through words. They then handed the converted populations over to the secular clergy and Spanish bureaucrats to be ruled and established missions further out in the periphery. This system had always been in place in the Philippines, where the Spanish military garrison had never been very large and clergy were used to pacify the populace. In the Americas too, this system was chosen because the clergy were cheaper than military garrisons, whose soldiers were needed in Europe.

The Spanish colonies during the sixteenth century were a frontier zone whose administration was not solidly established and, despite the wealth and size of the territories, America was not a priority for the Spanish monarchs on par with their European possessions. Moreover, it was a place where the distinction between the Church and the State, and between clergyman and servant of the state, was practically nonexistent. The Americas must be excluded from this study because there was no administration in the colonies which was lay and no

47 CODOIN 2, p. 88
48 Boxer, p. 72
49 Boxer, p. 60
50 CODOIN 70, p. 456
clergyman who was not also involved in politics or administration simply by virtue of being where and who they were. The confusion and conflation of Church and State in the New World is why future sections focus on solely the European territories of the Spanish Empire.

**Clergy as Dissenters**

While future sections focus on clerics in the formulation and implementation of policy, it is important to note that not all clerics were involved in Spanish politics as protagonists. Instead of helping design or implement policies, clerics were sometimes the obstacles to these policies or to tranquil Spanish administration. The actions of these clerics frequently earned a mention in CODOIN but more frequently as the subject of correspondence than as an author or recipient. This opposition could prove problematic to the Spanish Empire but it is outside the scope of studying the role of clerics and their role in forming policy at court.

Charles Cardinal Borromeo was canonized for his work in the Catholic Reformation, much of which was done during his time as Archbishop of Milan.\(^51\) However, during the early 1570s his work in Milan was discomfiting to the Spanish government in that Italian Duchy. While CODOIN does not address the whole scope of Borromeo’s reforms it does address one of the results of his campaign against the corruption of the clergy and laity in the city. According to the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, Borromeo’s condemnations of these abuses was causing waves in Milan and forcing him to appeal to the Pope to reverse some of the condemnations so as to avoid unrest in Milan.\(^52\) In one particular example, Borromeo censured Don Luis de Requesens, the Spanish governor of Milan and the brother of the Spanish Ambassador in Rome.\(^53\) The Pope’s condition on lifting this censure was that Requesens cease interfering with

\(^{51}\) [http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bborrc.html](http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bborrc.html)

\(^{52}\) CODOIN 102, p. 269

\(^{53}\) CODOIN 102, p. 270
the work of the Archbishop of Milan. This affair as presented in CODOIN appeared briefly in 1572 and never resurfaced, indicating that the Spanish government of Milan either successfully avoided further conflicts with the Archbishop or managed to deal with them without intervention from Madrid or Rome.

A much more serious case of clerical complication to Spanish policy was found in the annexation of Portugal. The clerics involved here were not Spanish at the time, but their actions were in opposition to Spanish policy and were directly oriented towards not becoming Spanish in the sense of also being ruled from Madrid. The ecclesiastical hierarchy of Portugal supported the succession of Philip II to the throne of Portugal after the death of Cardinal Henry. Simultaneously, others among the lower ranks of the clergy were stridently opposed. According to the Spanish after the conquest, it had been two friars who were primarily responsible for convincing Don Antonio Braganza, the Portuguese Pretender, to revolt against the Spanish occupation. Other priests, including members of the religious orders, travelled the Portuguese countryside to rally support for the uprising, as indicated by the punishments handed out by the ecclesiastical hierarchy afterwards. Other monks were accused of smuggling weapons to the revolting army. A small group of clerics even fought alongside the Portuguese troops and were excommunicated for killing other Christians. While the majority of Portuguese may have stayed silent, these specific clerics posed a problem for the Spanish occupation of Portugal and were a fundamental part of the violent uprising in favor of the Portuguese Pretender.

Nor was it only non-Castilian clergy who posed difficulties for the Spanish Habsburgs. Charles V especially encountered problems with priests preaching against him in Castile. When

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54 CODOINI 102, p. 271
55 CODOIN 33, p. 95
56 CODOIN 35, p. 179
57 CODOIN 35, p. 197-9
58 CODOIN 35, p. 103
59 CODOIN 35, p. 180-1
he first arrived in Valladolid, the King found churches closed.60 The preachers in Castilian
churches were opposed to Charles’s court at the time of his accession to the Spanish thrones. It
was these preachers, predominantly Franciscan, who preached against the Flemish members of
the Charles’s retinue for mistreating the Castilians and sidelining them from power.61 They
further chastised Charles’s advisors for stealing the focus away from issues that were important
to Castile. This preaching eventually grew into the ideology of the Comunero Revolts of 1520-
1521 that erupted when Charles left Spain to claim the Imperial title.62 Clergy were also among
the leadership of those revolts in the person of the Bishop of Zamora.63 The Comunero Revolt is
addressed in more detail elsewhere, but it should be noted that the anti-foreigner rhetoric it
employed originated with the clerics. Clerical preaching against policies was never completely
stamped out by the Spanish Habsburgs.64 These Castilian clerics presented a serious challenge to
the Spanish Habsburgs, who relied upon religion for their legitimacy; opposition from the clergy
undermined that premise.65

While these few pages do not completely address all the facets of clerical opposition to
policy in the Spanish Habsburgs, they do serve as a reminder that clerics were also present in the
political opposition to Charles V and Philip II.

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60 Perez, p. 13
61 Perez, p. 19
62 Perez, p. 32
63 Rowden, p. 87
64 Perrone, Sean. "Clerical Opposition in Habsburg Castile," European History Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 3 SAGE
65 Perrone, p. 347
General History of the Era

“Los Austrias Mayores”

In Spanish the Habsburg monarchs of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are called “Los Austrias” because of their ancestral origins in the Archduchy of Austria, in which their cousins continued to rule. The Austrias in Spain remained allied with their cousins in Austria itself, at this time the Holy Roman Emperors. That alliance formed one of the cornerstones of Spanish foreign policy, even when it brought them into wars that were not strictly in the interest of Spain.\(^1\) Especially during the reign of Charles V, but even during that of his son, Philip II, service and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty was of principal importance.\(^2\) There were disputes between the actual Austrian ruling family, and the “Austrias” in Spain over which branch was senior and what course of action was the best to take, but the fundamental alliance between Spain and Austria during this time period was rarely if ever questioned.

Spanish Habsburg history is commonly divided into two sections: the reigns of Charles V and Philip II, known as “Los Austrias Mayores” or Greater Austrians, and those of Philips III, IV and Charles II who are called “Los Austrias Menores” or Lesser Austrians. All books which do not discuss all of the monarchs follow this distinction, such as John Lynch’s book, Spain 1516-1598 and A. W. Lovett’s *Early Habsburg Spain: 1517-1598*. This distinction is based on the notion that during the reigns of the Greater Austrians, Spain was growing in power whereas under the Lesser Austrians it was decreasing. This is a distinction historians have given to the era, as even during the reign of Charles V and Philip II Spanish politics took on the cast of

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\(^2\) Lovett, p. 40
fighting to reclaim lost rights.\(^3\) Another distinction often made between the two groups of monarchs regards the role the king exercised in decision making. Both Charles V and Philip II governed with the idea of an absolute monarchy: the king was not only the font of all authority but also who fundamentally held the kingdom together; therefore, the king had to be the person to take all final decisions.\(^4\) This contrasts with the actions of the second group of Spanish Habsburgs, who delegated a great deal of authority to their court favorites.

The rest of this chapter discusses the important events and trends of the individual reigns. Before getting into those specifics there were two general trends of Spanish policy during the sixteenth century: the struggle against Protestantism and financial exhaustion. Modern historians especially tend to place the blame for Spanish decline on the Habsburg struggle against Protestants. The common refrain is that it dominated the politics of Spain under both Charles V and his son Philip II, and “more than anything else it brought their empire tumbling down.”\(^5\) Indeed, it cannot be denied that Charles V and Philip II fought on the side of the Catholic Church in wars all over Europe, against both Turks and Germans. They were called “The Most Catholic King” and bled their kingdom of both men and money fighting for the faith.\(^6\)

During the seventeenth century many Spaniards knew that their country was in decline, and as a result the Spanish government commissioned scholars to find an explanation. Unlike modern historians their answer was not Protestantism, but related to financial and economic burdens. They did not discuss the reasons why the wars had been fought, but the scholars did say that under the previous monarchs, especially Philip II, Spain had consumed much of its

\(^4\) Rowden, p. 63
\(^5\) Rowden, p. 107
\(^6\) Perez, p. 96
money and power trying and failing to conquer, or as the Spanish preferred, recapture, England.\(^7\) Although the Spanish also knew that even if England had been the organizer and impetus of Spain’s decline, the Netherland had been the grindstone of Spanish fortunes.\(^8\) Spain had to default on its loans three times during the reigns of the Greater Habsburgs, with defaults in 1557, 1575, and 1596. These defaults continued into the next century as well.\(^9\) Unfortunately for the Spanish, as this timeline indicates, it was necessary for the monarchs to contract new loans immediately upon defaulting on the old, frequently from the same creditors, assuming that the default had not driven them into bankruptcy.\(^{10}\)

Part of the drain on Spanish coffers came from a paucity of tax revenue. Spanish carrying trade was dominated by foreign merchants, especially English and Dutch ships, even though their countries were frequently at war with Spain. One of the primary effects of this was that Spanish merchants were not making money that could be taxed. Furthermore, it meant that Spanish economic activity going on frequently profited the enemies of Spain as well as any tax revenue the state gained.\(^{11}\) The tax exemption status granted to the nobility by the Trastamara did not help the state’s balance sheet, and both Philip and Charles turned to the en masse sale of offices in an effort to raise revenue, which led to the corruption and contribute to the slowness of activity in Spanish government and administration, and still did not resolve the budgetary woes of the state.\(^{12}\)

Spanish financial and economic exhaustion was neither simply felt in the government’s budget, nor only during Philip II’s reign. When Philip II arrived in Spain in 1559 he is reported

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\(^7\) CODOIN 55, p. 10  
\(^8\) CODOIN 55, p. 16  
\(^9\) Durant, p. 275  
\(^{10}\) Rowden, p. 245  
\(^{11}\) CODOIN 36, 290-1  
\(^{12}\) Lynch, p. 274
to have remarked that the only money in the budget was his wife’s dowry.\textsuperscript{13} This insolvency was not unique to Spain, and in 1559 both France and Spain had to seek peace because of their budgetary woes.\textsuperscript{14} Due to the expense incurred by his many wars, Philip nationalized gold, silver and mercury mines and rapidly increased the tax rates in Castile, also applying its heavier tax burden in other states whenever he could.\textsuperscript{15} During the middle of the sixteenth century this dampening effect was offset by population growth but by the early 1590s population growth had ceased and this heavier tax contributed to an economic crash in 1597.\textsuperscript{16} This economic crash forced Philip to seek a truce with England, France and the Netherlands.

For the important and biographical events of the reigns of Charles V and Philip II several different texts offer the same information. Most of the dates and actions of the monarchs and their governments were reported in John Lynch’s \textit{Spain 1516-1598}, Lovett’s \textit{Early Habsburg Spain 1517-1598} as well as Maurice Rowden’s \textit{The Spanish Terror: Spanish imperialism in the Sixteenth Century}. Any information not from these three books is cited as appropriate, along with some points from those books which are not strictly biographical.

\textbf{Pietas Austriaca}

The role of the clergy in the Spanish Empire is discussed in later sections. The limited role that actual clergymen played in the formulation of Spanish policy does not diminish the overall importance that Catholicism had to the Spanish Habsburgs. Catholicism as an identity was one of the basic elements of the political identity of Spain and of the Habsburgs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{17} It

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} Lynch, p. 255  \\
\textsuperscript{14} Lovett, p. 248  \\
\textsuperscript{15} Lovett, p. 247  \\
\textsuperscript{16} Rowden, p. 303  \\
\textsuperscript{17} Chenel, Álvaro Pascual. \textit{El Retrato de Estado Durante el Reinado de Carlos II: Imagen y Propaganda}. Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid: 2010, p. 173
\end{flushleft}
took on the characteristics of what later generations would term an ideology and influenced the entire political culture. The term *Pietas Austriaca* refers to this pervasive piety that the Habsburgs expressed.\(^{18}\)

The full title of the Spanish Kings is given in the section on the Spanish Empire as an entity. But when the King was addressed in letters it was not in this form; the form that the Spanish did use was “Sacra Católica y Real Majestad” or Holy Catholic and Royal Majesty.\(^{19}\) The term Catholic Monarchs is most commonly reserved for Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, the immediate predecessors to the Spanish Habsburgs, but all of the monarchs after their marriage can also be called their Catholic Majesties. To use a vernacular phrase, the Spanish Kings were “more Catholic than the Pope.”\(^{20}\) They perceived their duty to be the protection and promotion the Catholic Church against all enemies, whether they were Muslim or heretical.\(^{21}\) Nor is that phrase a modern contrivance, for the Councils of Spain informed Charles V upon his inheritance that the King of Castile had to be more Christian than all others, including other Princes.\(^{22}\) The Spanish Habsburgs based their legitimacy as rulers on their faith and service to the Catholic Church.

Over the course of sixteenth century, this identification of Spain as a protector of the Catholic Church increasingly penetrated all levels of Spanish society. While the Catholic Monarchs had first deployed this ideology to harness popular support of their completion of the Reconquista and channel it into legitimacy for the union of the two crowns, the aristocrats of the court were not immediately swayed.\(^{23}\) During the reign of Charles V, some Castilians, including Cardinal Juan Pardo y Tavera, the Emperor’s Regent in Spain, argued that it was a distortion of Castilian interests for their country to be so occupied with events in Germany and the Netherlands.\(^{24}\) However, during Philip II’s reign that opposition wore away and in order to be a good Spaniard it was also necessary to be a good Catholic and

\(^{19}\) CODINO 34, p. 7  
\(^{20}\) Durant, p. 275  
\(^{21}\) Elliott, *Spain and Its World*, p. 165  
\(^{22}\) CODINO 1, p. 52  
\(^{23}\) Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, p. 46  
\(^{24}\) Perez, p. 25
*Pietas Austriaca* developed into what could be called a “religious nationalism” that in many ways resembled an ideology.\(^{25}\)

Under the Spanish Habsburgs Catholicism and piety became the lens through which the Spanish Habsburgs presented themselves to the Spanish public. The Trastamara, the previous Castilian dynasty, had seized power in 1379 in a coup and as the inheritors of usurpers the Spanish Habsburgs were not crowned at a formal coronation ceremony.\(^{26}\) As a result, they used other ceremonies and overt expressions of piety to give their monarchy the appearance of divine grace. One of the most repeated examples in the secondary literature was that the King washed the feet during the Holy Thursday service in imitation of Christ’s washing of his apostles’ feet during the Last Supper. In modern Catholic services, this imitation is always done by the highest ranking priest or prelate present and the only other contemporary dynasty to also participate where the Holy Roman Emperors, the cousins of the Spanish Habsburgs.\(^{27}\)

Catholicism served as a guiding ideology and as the source of legitimacy during the Spanish Habsburg era. However, this did not lead to greater influence for Catholic clergy at the Spanish court, as clerical involvement in the formulation of policy remained relatively limited throughout the Spanish Habsburg era.

**Charles V/I**

The first Habsburg monarch of Spain is more commonly referred to as Charles V, his title as the Holy Roman Emperor, than by his Spanish number as Charles I. This is despite the fact that he inherited his Spanish possessions first, from his grandfather Ferdinand in the year 1516. His mother, Juana the Mad, lived until 1555 but was never consulted on political affairs. He had inherited his titles in Burgundy and the Netherlands from his father, Philip I, on that man’s death

\(^{25}\) Perez, p. 88


\(^{27}\) Chenel, p. 175
in 1506 and had been living at that court until he came to Spain to take up his titles as monarch there. He immediately met with opposition from many domestic elements that considered him as a foreigner with a court made up of foreigners.28 Indeed, as discussed in the section on Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, Charles’ inheritance of his Spanish titles was not guaranteed for largely that reason. During his early reign Charles replaced many Castilians and other Spaniards at his court with Burgundians. 29 The most dominant member of his court was the man who had served as Charles’ mentor in Burgundy and Flanders, who was the Lord of Chiévres, William of Croy. He possessed a “narrow Flemish nationalism” and kept the young King firmly focused on affairs outside of Spain. 30

After his election as Holy Roman Emperor and his departure in 1520 to claim that crown, this resentment by his Castilian subjects boiled over in the Comunero Revolts, peasant and middle-class revolts that called for the removal of foreign influence in the politics of Spain. Interestingly, these revolts, although mostly opposed by the high-ranking Church figures, found a leader in the Bishop of Zamora, although was executed shortly after assuming that position. Historians generally judge it a political coup on Charles’ part that he was not targeted by these revolts which explicitly accepted him as King and instead targeted the foreign presence in his court.31 Even after the revolts were put down in 1521 Spain was not happy with their King also being the Holy Roman Emperor and politicians frequently wrote and asked him to return to Spain and govern directly there. In 1528 the Council of Castile issued a critique of the King for neglecting his Spanish subjects in favor of his wars elsewhere.32 Charles did return a few times

28 Perez, p. 73
29 Rowden, p. 72
31 Rowden, p. 76
32 CODOIN 1, p. 49
to the peninsula, but it was to organize his wars against France, and he spent little time at the center of Spanish administration.

Although he is more remembered for his wars in Germany against the forces of the Protestant Reformation, Charles V spent a greater part of his time fighting with Francis I Valois, the King of France. Both Francis and Charles considered the other their greatest dynastic threat, and with Charles reigning over Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and most of Italy, it was perhaps inevitable that war with France would result. Initially, Francis was also a candidate for Holy Roman Emperor, but after Charles won the election, Francis allied with any power he could, including Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and Barbary coast as well as Protestants in Germany, to try and weaken his rival. The led to several wars, mostly in Italy, from 1522-1529, again in 1536, again in the 1540s and finally one started in 1551 that Philip II finished. After the first war, very little territory actually changed hands. The French had to accept imperial, and later Spanish, control over the Italian countryside but neither the Holy Roman Empire nor Spain could support an invasion of France. With Francis even attacking Germany in the early 1530s, wars with France were easily the most constant effort of Charles’s reign.

The time period where Charles V was Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain is also heavily associated with the rise of Protestantism, especially in his German possessions. The story of the Protestant Reformation is very long, and its details are not germane to Spanish history, and so it is only addressed briefly. Initially, Charles V was less concerned with Protestant’s questioning of the Pope’s moral authority than the schism it was causing within his own Empire. Ferdinand, who governed Austria and the Holy Roman Empire for his older brother, was forced to work with the Protestants in order to gain their armies to fight against the

33 Lovett, p. 43
34 Lovett, p. 47
35 Rowden, p. 164
Turk in Hungary and in Austria itself. During the 1530s, Charles V was willing to negotiate with the Protestants and even encouraged the Pope to summon a council to reform the Catholic Church, which became Trent. However, during that time no progress was made and by 1541 Charles had exhausted his good will and the German Catholic Princes, who had always been pushing for a military solution, finally gained the political upper hand. This became the militant opposition to Protestantism for which Charles and especially his son Philip II are known.

One of the single most defining and striking features of the holdings of Charles V was their wide-ranging nature: he ruled an empire that stretched across all of Europe, and even into the new world. This is not to say that he governed the entire space, an impossible feat for the technology of the time. Instead, he delegated specific areas to members of his family, leaving his sister Margaret in the Netherlands, and his brother Ferdinand in Austria. Charles himself divided his attention between the hotspots of Germany and Italy, while Spain, after the 1520-1521 Comunero Revolts, was relatively peaceful and he let it administer itself. When the future Philip II turned 16 in the year 1543, and Charles left Spain for the last time, his father promoted him to helping the administration of the Spanish possessions, in which he had spent his entire life.

In many ways, however, this massive Empire was a detriment to Charles, as the historian Maurice Rowden wrote: “to say that Charles was now the focal point of European politics is far from saying that developments worked to his advantage.” The resources of this massive Empire had to be given to its defense everywhere, and his wars frequently required the

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36 Rowden, p. 172
37 Lovett, p. 40
38 Rowden, p. 174
39 Rowden, p. 159
combination of men and money from all of his territories.\textsuperscript{40} Even the use of his resources in this manner was controversial: when Spanish troops were used to put down the German Protestant revolt in 1546 it only fueled the nationalist component of the movement and also encouraged even Catholics to approach the French for help in 1551.\textsuperscript{41} While he was stretched thin, his enemies, Francis I of France and Suleiman of the Ottoman Empire, could better focus against a few fronts at a time. In addition, all the other powers of the region cooperated with each other and nurtured hostility towards Charles V.\textsuperscript{42} The Emperor King found his territories bordering on virtually every other state in Europe, and as a result had to contend with rivalries with all of these states.

While he defended the Pope in Germany, Charles had to contend with his intrigues against Spanish possessions in Italy. He frequently used his position in Germany to keep the Pope from moving too aggressively, but in 1527 Clement VII sided with the French in a war against Charles. As a result, the Emperor sent an army to attack Rome, which was sacked.\textsuperscript{43} The army was poorly paid and as a result the sack was very destructive, thus earning Charles a rebuke from his Spanish subjects, who called it “enough to break hearts of iron.”\textsuperscript{44} This sack did not deter future Popes from maneuvering against Spain in Italy, but it did render them considerably more circumspect and more readily willing to support the Habsburgs in their endeavors.

Reading histories of the reign of Charles V seem almost hectic as the Emperor King was running from conflict to conflict and issue to issue. In the end, perhaps the constant moving wore the man down. Afflicted by gout, Charles V declared his abdication in December of 1555, and his successors were crowned in January 1556. He divided his territory between Philip II,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Rowden, p. 93
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Rowden, p. 180
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Rowden, p. 159
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Lovett, p. 43
  \item \textsuperscript{44} CODOIN 7, p. 453
\end{itemize}
giving him Spain, the Netherlands and the Italian possessions while his brother, Ferdinand, took control over Austria and the German territories.

**Philip II**

Philip II inherited only the Western European possessions from his father, while those in Central Europe went to his uncle, Ferdinand. However, from the very outset of his reign it was clear that there was a close alliance between the two branches of the Habsburg family. This alliance became the foundation of Spanish foreign policy and continued unquestioned for the remainder of the Habsburg period.\(^\text{45}\) Children of the Austrian line came to live in Madrid with the Spanish court, where they were watched over by Philip II and spiritually overseen by confessors of his appointment.\(^\text{46}\) There was some initial confusion as to which sections of northern Italy passed to Spain and which to Austria, along with their governors. These conflicts were embodied in the person of the Bishop of Aquila, who held a position which had been historically imperial but with the way Charles V had divided his possessions passed to Philip rather than Ferdinand.\(^\text{47}\) These conflicts were quickly resolved and did not detract from future and extensive cooperation between the two powers.

The other main plank identifiable in Philip’s policy was the idea of being the *Defensor Fidei*, or Defender of the Faith. According to this plank, at least in theory, the interests of the Church always trumped those of the state.\(^\text{48}\) These were not, as they might seem today, to have been completely inseparable goals. In the minds of the Catholic monarchs of Europe, the Protestant movement had become identified with political subversives.\(^\text{49}\) For Philip especially,

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\(^{45}\) Perez, p. 95  
\(^{46}\) CODOIN 110, p. 203  
\(^{47}\) CODOIN 98, p. 42  
\(^{49}\) Rowden, p. 175
though, heresy was the equivalent of rebellion.\textsuperscript{50} This led to a general hostility between the two that led to bitter fights along an increasingly defined border in which both sides inflicted repressive states upon the other.\textsuperscript{51} When he returned to Spain in 1559 after having spent the last few years in other parts of his realm, Philip organized a massive \textit{auto da fe}, which some have interpreted to mean that he was declaring that he would not be as tolerant in Spain as his father had been forced to become in Germany.\textsuperscript{52} The actions he is most remembered for are those he took in defense of the Catholic Church, especially in the Netherlands and England.

Unlike his father, Charles V, Philip II generally had good relations with the papacy. There was initial tension between the new King of Spain and the Pope Paul IV, who reigned 1555-1559, but after that the relationship was described more by cooperation than competition.\textsuperscript{53} In 1556 Philip had ordered the Duke of Alba to lay siege to the city of Rome because of the Pope’s cooperation with France. However, by 1566 the King of Spain explicitly ordered the Spanish Mediterranean navy to be placed at the service of Rome to protect the papacy from attack. Indeed, the Pope in 1566 directly communicated and directed the navy without interference from the Spanish monarch.\textsuperscript{54} Unlike Charles, after concluding a peace treaty with the French in 1559, Philip II never faced a serious challenge to Spanish control in Italy, either from the French or from the papacy.

This Spanish King’s governing strategy was also radically different from that of his father’s. Philip II is sometimes called Philip the Prudent because of his method of governing, which was based around an extensive paper trail and slow and deliberate thought. It was said of him that he governed from his desk, making decisions and declarations through

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Rowden, p. 207
\item \textsuperscript{51} Astarita, p. 128
\item \textsuperscript{52} Lovett, p. 60
\item \textsuperscript{53} Astarita, p. 125
\item \textsuperscript{54} CODOIN 30, p. 343
\end{itemize}
Whereas his father, Charles V, had rarely stayed in the same section of his empire for even a decade, Philip II never left Iberia after returning there in 1559, although he did travel around frequently inside the peninsula itself. This cloistered manner of government was perhaps informed by his personality, which was reportedly withdrawn, quiet and reserved. Under Philip II the Spanish bureaucracy expanded to cover every affair, and it communicated with the periphery and even sometimes amongst itself by letters. Even Philip could not personally handle the immense quantity of letters flowing in and out of capital, and so relied upon personal secretaries, like Gabriel de Zayas, to take care of some of them. However, even in the case of these letters, Philip did not consider them unimportant and insisted on being briefed on their contents and making all the decisions himself. Events frequently overtook the speed at which this manner of government could respond to them, and Philip’s government was frequently slow to respond to crises simply because he refused to delegate responsibility. Maurice Rowden said of him that “he needed the radio and the telegraph system … only computerized information and the urgent telephone conversation could have made his system work as he wanted it to.” Speed of communication, or rather its lack, was in fact a problem for Philip II, who insisted upon making every decision himself. The scattered nature of his empire did not help, as it sometimes took several weeks for a decision to reach the outposts of his territories like Brussels or his representative in Rome.

In this highly centralized system, Philip II relied upon the advice of a small number of people. John Lynch identifies them as “the Castilian, the Duke of Alba, the Portuguese, Ruy Gomez da Silva and Christovão de Moura, the Catalan Luis de Requesens, the Basque Juan de

55 Lynch, p. 260  
56 Lynch, p. 256  
57 CODOIN 33, p. 91  
58 CODOIN 35, p. 141  
59 Rowden, p. 185  
60 Lynch, p. 261
Idiáquez, and the Burgundian Cardinal Granvelle.” Granvelle’s presence on this list is addressed in his section later, but it is an anomaly that he should be mentioned in this list of otherwise secular personages. However, none of these men came close to the influence held by the Duke of Alba, a member of one of the grandee families of Spain. He sat at the center of the schemes and political games of Philip’s court. Ruy Gomez was more frequently at the King’s side in Madrid and perhaps was one of his most consulted advisors, but in terms of execution of plans, from the siege of Rome in 1556 to the successful conquest of Portugal in 1580 no single member of the Spanish government was trusted with the level of authority and even autonomy granted to the Duke of Alba. Almost uniquely among Philip’s advisors, letters to the Duke of Alba addressed every issue in the world relevant to Spanish territories, and his advice was solicited on a wide range of topics. Philip also granted the Duke of Alba an unmatched level of autonomy in his decisions, including in the government of a sensitive area like the Netherlands. When communication with that region was disrupted by events in France in 1567, Philip expressed annoyance but ultimately trusted in Alba to make the correct decision without the King’s direction. Even when communications were restored, Philip often left the particulars up to Alba. When the time came when the King was convinced of the need to publish a general pardon in the Netherlands, he sent four copies to Alba and permitted Alba to determine which of these was the most appropriate to publish. By contrast, when sending the Ruy Gomez da Silva was sent to meet Elizabeth Valois, one of Philip’s wives, and escort her to Madrid, he was given extremely specific instructions on where and how she was to be met and conducted.

61 Lynch, p. 269
63 CODOIN 37, p. 87 and CODOIN 37, p. 285
64 CODOIN 4, p. 486
65 CODOIN 37, p. 236
66 CODOIN 3, p. 429
The Duke of Alba is most remembered for his role in the Netherlands, where he was governor from 1567-1573. He was one of the best generals in Philip’s service, and this was exhibited during that governorship, but he was also a brutal and bloody occupier of the territories. During his tenure there, he executed more people than the rest of Philip’s reign in the Netherlands and more books were confiscated than the Spanish Inquisition confiscated in its entire existence. But after his tenure there, he was shelved by Philip II, who had come to be paranoid about his powerful grandee generals, only to be briefly recalled during the conquest of Portugal before being sent back.

Philip’s reign was marked by two significant tensions with Protestant groups. The first was with the England of Queen Elizabeth I. Philip II had been married to Elizabeth’s older sister Mary when that Queen had tried to bring England back to the Catholic Church, and when Elizabeth inherited the throne, Philip tried to keep her on that course. He and Spain were unpopular in the island country in part because of their connection to Mary’s reign, but neither monarch was willing to disavow the other. The English were concerned with the French royals, who had a dynastic claim to the English throne. Therefore, the islanders needed the Spanish and the power Philip’s kingdom possessed, to keep the French from attacking England, while Spain needed England in part to help box in the French and also to help commercially support the Netherlands and to not have to contend with her warships in the English Channel. This led to a certain unofficial tolerance of Elizabeth’s embrace of Protestantism. However, the fear of a joint French-English-Scottish throne died with Francis II of France, who had been married to Mary,

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67 Kamen, p. 93-4  
68 Rowden, p. 218  
69 Rowden, p. 258  
70 Rowden, p. 187
Queen of Scots. Philip then began to plot against Elizabeth and prepare to invade England, although the Duke of Alba blocked such attempts for as long as he was in the Netherlands.

The second such tension was the revolt in the Netherlands. Philip II started his tenure as King in the Netherlands, but then left them to go to England and from there to Spain. He left his sister, Margaret of Parma, as governor of the territory, but it quickly became apparent that Cardinal Granvelle was the real power in the government of the territories until he was forced out. The Duke of Alba was then sent from 1567-1573 and launched a brutal crackdown on both religious and political opponents of the Spanish crown in Brussels. Whatever else could be said about his repressive tactics, they did succeed in stopping the chaos by 1570 and Alba attempted to settle into a regular administration. He was ordered to relax his iron fist in 1572, at which time the provinces rose in revolt again.\(^71\)

The Netherlands were at this time assisted by Protestants in France, which meant that the French St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the Huguenots in 1572 cut the wind out of the sails from this second uprising.\(^72\) As a result, Philip recalled Alba in 1573 and sent the civilian Don Luis de Requesens, the brother of his Ambassador in Rome. But when Requesens further relaxed the repressive strictures of Alba’s government, the area rose in revolt again, and Requesens was forced to reestablish many of the oppressive measures used by Alba to quell the revolt in 1570. In 1575 Philip II was forced to default on his debt, and in the Netherlands the soldiers’ pay stopped. This caused the Spanish army to rampage across the countryside, including in a particularly bloody sack of Antwerp in 1576. This particular sack motivated William of Orange, until then had been ambivalent about the revolt, to gather together the Dutch regardless of their religious confession to rebel against the Spanish, presenting a solid and

\(^{71}\) Rowden, p. 220
\(^{72}\) Rowden, p. 241
unified opposition. Also in 1576 Philip accepted that Requesens was not controlling the situation, and replaced him with Don Juan of Austria, his own bastard half-brother. Don Juan was another general, like Alba if not as capable, and launched a similarly bloody campaign. By 1579 he had not been successful, and so Philip replaced him with the Duke of Parma, Alexander Farnese, who proved to be a successful general as well as a good peacemaker in the provinces. This Duke saw to it that the army’s pay began to arrive more regularly and brought the Dutch Catholics back onto the side of the Spanish, although William of Orange remained an opponent of Spanish rule. Parma managed to recapture much of the territory lost in the previous several years of revolt.

This revolt was both religious and nationalist. Philip was prone to express himself in religious terms in the revolt, calling the rebels “heretics and evil-doers.” This led one priestly historian writing in the Escorial to say that Philip was more concerned about the loss of Catholicism in the territories than their loss to Spanish authority. However, other writers were more ambiguous in their characterization of the conflict. Even priests sent to observe the area noticed that it was more nationalist in character than religious. They said it was only natural that the locals would resent the administrative positions being held by Spaniards and not the Flemish. They urged Philip to leave Spain, as they said that his constant presence in Iberia meant that the Dutch felt like they were just occupied by Spain, rather than simply sharing a King. William of Orange was emblematic of this nationalist character: he did not join the revolt until late in the process and in his own personal affairs was not pronounced in religion

73 Rowden, p. 244
74 CODOIN 37, p. 199
75 CODOIN 7, p. 172
76 CODOIN 37, p. 44
77 CODOIN 37, p. 48
either way.\footnote{Rowden, p. 216} Cardinal Granvelle in 1573 recommended bribing him to return to the Spanish side, rather than continuing to fight and ruin the country.\footnote{CODOIN 102, p. 309} But he did use religion as a tool to rebel against Spanish centralized authority, claiming in a letter to the Holy Roman Emperor that the reason behind his revolt was the massacre by Spanish troops of “thousands of Christians who followed the Augustana confession,” also known as Lutherans. He claimed that Alba’s killing of these people had violated the terms of the religious truce in the Empire, along with the other repressive tactics of the Duke.\footnote{CODOIN 111, p. 21} Orange’s statements in this matter though, are mildly hypocritical as it had been Orange who had initially ordered his servants to militarily crack down on heretics on his own estates, thus beginning one of the first rounds of revolts in the Netherlands.\footnote{CODOIN 4, p. 291}

Regardless of its ideological origins, the revolt in the Netherlands drained the Spanish treasury. During the decade 1598-1609 the Spanish spent almost twelve and a quarter billion maravedis (the base currency unit of Spain) in the Netherlands while only taking in approximately 1.8 billion in revenue from those provinces.\footnote{CODOIN 36, p. 543} Therefore, income was 15% of expenditure when it came to the Netherlands. While the figures are from the reign of Philip III and not his father, Philip II, it is likely that the numbers were similar during that reign, since Philip II was forced to default twice after the revolt in the Netherlands began. At the end of his reign, Philip II once again attempted to resolve the Dutch situation, and passed it to his daughter Isabel Clara Eugenia and her husband the Archduke Albert of Austria, although he did mandate that all of their servants also be servants of the Spanish crown and good Catholics.\footnote{CODOIN 42, p. 224}
Another of the other major events of Philip’s reign was the annexation of Portugal in 1580 after the death of Cardinal Henry, Portugal’s last king. The Cardinal had recognized Philip as the nearest successor to his throne along dynastic lines, and the King in 1580 sought to make good on that claim. He used all means he could to try and prevent violence, working very closely with the Papal Nuncio in Lisbon to try and pacify the Portuguese nobility. \(^{84}\) Eventually, though, it required the Duke of Alba to come out of his perhaps forced retirement to launch a very rapid and successful campaign to conquer the territory. Philip II visited the new acquisition in 1582, leaving his cousin then-Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria (who later ceased being a Cardinal and married Philip’s daughter) nominally in charge in Madrid. \(^{85}\)

Philip ruled for almost another two decades after the annexation of Portugal in 1582. These years saw the launching of the Armada against England and a massive war starting in 1592 with the Dutch rebels, the French and the English simultaneously. However, after the death of Cardinal Granvelle in 1586, CODOIN reveals no cleric who emerged as an important member of the court, so it is not critical to present a broader understanding of these events.

\(^{84}\) CODOIN 32, p. 395

Comparative Situations

One of the elements of the thesis is that Spanish clerics played a smaller role in the governments of their own state than did Catholic clergymen in the other states of the contemporary time period, the era of the Reformation and the Counter Reformation. The role Spanish clergy played is discussed in the subsequent sections, but in order to establish that this role is smaller it is necessary also to discuss the role clerics played in other, contemporary states. The goal in this section is not to analyze the role of these other clerics, but merely to identify them and give a brief overview of what they did.

Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros

Cardinal Cisneros was the Archbishop of Toledo in his time and so the Primate of Spain, the highest ecclesiastical rank in the peninsula. He was the immediate antecedent to the clerics in the following section, as he served the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, the Spanish Habsburg’s immediate predecessors in the Iberian Peninsula. Theoretically, he could even have served as a precedent for later clerics to claim political power, but they did not do so. Cisneros held a level of political prominence unmatched by clerics of the Spanish Habsburgs.

He first emerged in Castilian politics following the death of Isabel of Castile. Cisneros represented Ferdinand of Aragon in the Castilian court against Philip the Handsome of Burgundy as Ferdinand attempted to limit the amount of influence that Philip had at the court. It was in this context that Ferdinand wrote to the Cardinal and issued a proclamation such that he “gave

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and grant all [his] complete power: free and full” to Cardinal Cisneros.\textsuperscript{2} The political alliance between Cisneros and Ferdinand continued for the remainder of both of their lives. On the other hand, relations between King Philip I of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon were very tense and Philip tried to promote a layman from Flanders to pre-empt Cisneros at court.\textsuperscript{3} These intentions were cut short when Philip died in 1506. At the time Ferdinand was away in Naples securing his power over that throne, which had only been firmly established a few years prior.\textsuperscript{4} The result was a debate over who should assume the regency of Castile, as Queen Juana was universally considered as an inappropriate ruler. The aristocrats were hesitant to recall Ferdinand of Aragon because they had backed Philip I against him and were still wary of allowing the “Old Catalan” into Castilian politics.\textsuperscript{5} Cisneros stayed faithful to Ferdinand, and his argumentation eventually convinced the nobles that Ferdinand was the best choice. They also established that Cisneros should be the regent for Ferdinand until he returned from Naples.\textsuperscript{6}

This was Cisneros’s first actual position of authority in the Spanish government. Ferdinand granted that the word of the Cardinal was basically his word until he arrived.\textsuperscript{7} Cardinal Cisneros was even able to exercise the royal prerogative to nominate appointments for bishoprics around the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{8} But Queen Juana refused to participate in politics completely, and never confirmed Cisneros in his position as regent. This left Cisneros and the rest of the Spanish government in limbo, to which they responded with inactivity and an attempt to not disrupt the Spanish domestic political scene.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{2} CODOIN 14, p. 311
\textsuperscript{3} CODOIN 8, p. 373
\textsuperscript{4} Rummel, p. 73
\textsuperscript{5} Rummel, p. 69
\textsuperscript{6} Rummel, p. 73
\textsuperscript{7} CODOIN 14, p. 312
\textsuperscript{8} Perez, p. 27
\textsuperscript{9} Rummel, p. 75
However, some of the grandees, such as the Duke of Medina Sidonia, still revolted against the tenuous government of the Cardinal, and matters were not resolved until Ferdinand was able to return in 1507. While the Spanish uprisings against his authority could have hurt Cisneros in his political position at Court, they did not. Whenever Ferdinand left Madrid, whether to fight or attend to affairs in Aragon, he left Cisneros in charge.\(^\text{10}\)

This was not a case of favoritism, as certain actions made it clear that Ferdinand of Aragon did not actually like the Cardinal very much. One of Ferdinand’s primary generals was Don Pedro Navarro, and when Ferdinand sent Don Pedro to be the commander against the Moors in Oran he was specially instructed to keep an eye on the Cardinal and prevent him from doing anything foolish. This did not translate into public estrangement, and when rumors of this tension surfaced the King was quick to write to Cisneros and state that there was no truth behind these rumors and that he stood behind the Cardinal’s decision to go to war.\(^\text{11}\) That does also highlight that it was the Cardinal’s decision in 1508 to go to war with Oran, in North Africa. Ferdinand appointed him Captain General of the expedition and he had supreme authority over it. Indeed, the territory was to be under his personal control until the debts he had contracted to finance the expedition were paid back by the Spanish state.\(^\text{12}\) He was able to garner from Queen Juana, by then already called the Mad, to declare war for him.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, even while Ferdinand was in Castile and Cisneros did not hold the position of Regent he continued to serve as a powerful politician and even personally led soldiers to war in North Africa.

Despite his prominent role during Ferdinand’s administration, on his deathbed Ferdinand of Aragon was hesitant to leave Cisneros with the Regency again because he had never held

\(^{10}\) Rummel, p. 76  
\(^{11}\) CODOIN 25, p. 435  
\(^{12}\) Rummel, p. 36-7  
\(^{13}\) CODOIN 25, p. 436
authority in his own right, but only as deputy. Cisneros and others were able to convince Ferdinand, and when he in 1516 Cardinal Cisneros became Regent of Castile once again. He was not given authority in Aragon, which instead went to the Archbishop of Zaragoza, who was Ferdinand’s bastard son.

Therefore, Cardinal Cisneros technically served as Regent of Castile during the beginning of the reign of Charles V. He is not included in the list of clerics during the Spanish Habsburg time period because he was a holdover from the previous dynasty and symbolically died just as Charles was entering Spain. Therefore, he never held authority or operated in Habsburg Spain. But until Charles arrived a year after inheriting the throne, Cisneros continued to dominate the Spanish political scene. Charles unhesitatingly endorsed him to continue to exercise power until he came in person. This included the suppression of plots against him from the Castilian nobility, such as that of the Count of Useña and his son. Finally, even though the Kingdom of Sicily belonged to the Aragonese crown, when it rose up against Ferdinand’s old Viceroy Hugo de Moncado, Charles specifically left the Cardinal in sole charge of the decision whether to send troops, which the Cardinal did. Cisneros did not have unlimited authority, as Charles could veto his decisions from the Netherlands if he was persuaded, and did so in the case of a public militia that Cisneros attempted to raise from the towns of Castile. However, in practice Charles exercised this right relatively infrequently, and Cisneros was able to orchestrate affairs in Spanish territories as he saw best.

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14 Rummel, p. 79
15 Rowden, p. 65
16 Rummel, p. 79
17 Rummel, p. 105
18 CODOIN 14, p. 359
19 CODOIN 14, p. 361
20 CODOIN 24, p. 182
21 Rummel, p. 89
22 Rummel, p. 90-91
Until Charles V arrived in Spain to take direct control over the government of the country, Cardinal Cisneros held the dominant position in Spanish politics. This was a position he had grown into after the death of Isabel of Castile through his service to Ferdinand of Aragon. Therefore, immediately prior to the Spanish Habsburg period, Spain saw a powerful clergyman in office, dominating the rest of the court to a degree achieved by none of the clerics discussed later.

**Charles de Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, France**

The de Guise family led the Catholic side of the civil wars in the French Wars of Religion that dominated the French domestic political scene during the latter half of the sixteenth century. The Cardinal of Lorraine was one of two leaders of the de Guise family during the early stages of those religious wars, sharing authority with his brother, Francis, the Duke of Guise.\(^{23}\) This family dominated French politics during the reign of King Francis II, who was married to Mary, Queen of Scots but during the reign of Charles IX their control was questioned by the more moderate Catholics led by Catherine d’Medici.\(^{24}\) Nonetheless, they continued to be powerful and after the 1563 assassination of his brother by Protestants, the Cardinal of Lorraine emerged as the sole leader of the ultra-Catholic bloc.\(^{25}\) By 1567, he was able to sideline the Queen Mother, Catherine d’Medici and dominated Charles IX’s council and is largely responsible for overturning the edicts of toleration that Catherine and her son had issued earlier in that decade. This, in addition to fear caused by the Duke of Alba’s repression of Protestants in the Netherlands, restarted the active hostilities in 1567.\(^{26}\)


\(^{24}\) Holt, p. 45

\(^{25}\) Holt, p. 63

\(^{26}\) Holt, p. 64-5
The Cardinal of Lorraine was the leader of France’s ultra-Catholic bloc. This led him to be politically close to the political centers of Catholicism in Madrid and Rome, and he was less concerned with maintaining French independence from Spain than with crushing Protestantism. 27 Perhaps confirming the fear of the Huguenots, the Cardinal approached the Duke of Alba in 1568 for help for the Catholics in the French Wars of Religion, and supported the idea of getting Spanish help for the de Guise family in overthrowing the Valois monarchy. 28 At this time, such help was not forthcoming, as Alba was busy in the Netherlands.

The Cardinal of Lorraine maintained influence at the French court even after his family as a whole fell from grace in 1572. 29 Upon his death in 1574 the Guise family turned away from attempting to pressure the French government and instead turned to raising its own army to pursue ultra-Catholic objectives separately from the new King, Henri III, who was unwilling or unable to do so. 30 Therefore, the Cardinal of Lorraine had controlled the ultra-Catholic part of the French domestic politics and was also the means by which that bloc had dominated the French throne for the period in which it did so. He was a central figure of French history in the sixteenth century. As shown later, this level of power and domination was not achieved by any contemporary Spanish clerics.

The England of Mary I

Under Mary I Tudor, Philip II’s second wife, who reigned in England from the death of her brother in 1553 until her own death in 1558, clerics played a very prominent part at court. Previously, it was written of universities that they turned out servants of the crown in England such as Thomas Wolsey and Stephen Gardiner. Thomas Wolsey was a very influential Cardinal

27 Holt, p. 65
28 CODOIN 37, p. 371-5
29 Holt, p. 77
30 Holt, p. 109
during the reign of Henry VIII, serving as Lord Chancellor and chief minister until 1529 when he abruptly fell from power because of his inability to procure an annulment for Henry VIII’s first marriage.\textsuperscript{31} That makes of him a contemporary of the early portion of the reign of Charles V.

Philip’s second wife structured her court very differently from her husband, and also staffed it with a different group of people. Her privy council controlled all affairs, as opposed to the several councils active in Philip’s Spain, although it was also significantly larger. While only four of the forty-three members of this privy council were clerics, their role in the politics of Mary’s reign was much greater than anything Philip gave to his own clerical servants.\textsuperscript{32} Her short reign saw more major clerical politicians than Philip’s much longer tenure, with the Bishops Stephen Gardiner and Nicholas Heath running her government while Cardinal Reginald Pole dominated her private council.

During the first part of her reign the most powerful man at her court was Stephen Gardiner, who was the Bishop of Winchester, who served as her first Lord Chancellor.\textsuperscript{33} He had been present in England during the initial disputes between Henry VIII and Rome, and seemed to want to achieve Wolsey’s level of prominence in Mary’s government.\textsuperscript{34} In this he was undoubtedly successful: during the early parts of her reign, Mary’s government changed structure and membership every few months, but Gardiner was always on the list of most important figures.\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, he was one of the few men she licensed to keep a private army for the purposes of putting down dissent in the countryside, despite his having raised the army before asking for permission.\textsuperscript{36} He was able to run the council in an autocratic fashion,

\textsuperscript{32} Loades, p. 23
\textsuperscript{33} Mallet, p. 22
\textsuperscript{34} Loades, p. 30
\textsuperscript{35} Loades, p. 31-2
\textsuperscript{36} Loades, p. 49
excluding his rivals from political power and monopolizing all decisions in himself.\textsuperscript{37} He used the restoration of Catholicism in England as his pretext for doing so, presenting to the Queen that those who encouraged moderation, and were his rivals, in the restoration were really heretics. In this way the secular nobles who opposed him were excluded from power and Gardiner was able to act as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{38}

Stephen Gardiner died in office, and the contrast between Philip II of Spain and Mary I of England can be plainly seen in their dispute over who should replace him. Philip II, who was present in England at the time, proposed using a secular noble who he favored to replace Gardiner. However, Mary believed that the position should only be held by an ecclesiastic, and so instead gave it to Nicholas Heath, the Bishop of York.\textsuperscript{39} He was a different personality type than Gardiner, whose inclination was more administrative and less political, and so he did not dominate the decision-making process in the council as much as Gardiner had, but he was still at its head.\textsuperscript{40} Heath held the position until her death, so it can be said that for her entire reign, clerics led the court of Mary I.

The two Lord Chancellors of Mary’s court were not the only two clerics who served the Queen of England. Cardinal Reginald Pole never took any councilor’s oath or served England in any official capacity, yet his view was always powerfully present at the court.\textsuperscript{41} Cardinal Pole was member royal lines of England, a great-nephew of King Edward IV who had been active in Henry VIII’s court as well. This ended when Henry broke from the Church and Pole went into exile.\textsuperscript{42} He then entered the Pope’s service until Mary I became Queen, at which point the Pope

\textsuperscript{37} Loades, p. 34
\textsuperscript{38} Loades, p. 35
\textsuperscript{39} Loades, p. 201
\textsuperscript{40} Loades, p. 204
\textsuperscript{41} Loades, p. 203
\textsuperscript{42} Loades, p. 121
sent him as Legate to England, but he was soon an advisor to the English Queen. Despite being suspected of heresy in Rome by Pope Paul IV, Pole’s personal influence over Mary only deepened as her reign progressed and the both of them suffered from deteriorating health.

Cardinal Pole never attended meetings of the council, which he was not a member of, and instead offered Mary his advice directly. The strength of his power over the Queen grew after Philip II left, and by the end of her reign, when the Spanish Ambassadors wanted to discuss important matters, they joined the Lord Chancellor Nicholas Heath at Cardinal Pole’s residence.

Chapter Conclusion

At Catholic courts contemporaneous with Charles V and Philip II clerics played a preeminent role in politics. In France, the Cardinal of Lorraine is one of the defining politicians of the middle of the sixteenth century. In England, Mary I entrusted her government almost solely to clerics, gave them extensive powers and relied heavily upon their advice. Her government was always led by a Bishop and Cardinal Pole was her closest personal advisor. Henry VIII, England’s King during the early part of Charles V’s reign, had done the same thing with Cardinal Wolsey, whose position at court had been overwhelming. Even in the Spanish court immediately prior to the Spanish Habsburgs, the cleric Cardinal Cisneros had held a central position and virtually unparalleled influence. All of these courts can be contrasted with the Spanish Habsburg court, where clerics were few and relatively removed from the center of power.

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43 Loades, p. 262
44 Loades, p. 370 for the heresy, p. 332 for his influence
45 Loades, p. 199
46 CODOIN 87, p. 7
Politician or Administrator?

This prosopography set out to identify clerics who served in either a political or administrative function in the early Spanish Habsburg era. It is therefore important, as José Luis Barmejo Cabrero wrote, to “distinguish between the simple offices of the administration and the highest positions of government and administration … to trace in that sense the difference between political careers and administrative careers.”

Naming the distinction is admittedly a historical anachronism for this time period, as it was possible for a cleric or other servant of the crown to belong to both groups and in contemporary political theory there was no such conscious division. However, there was a difference in the way a politician and an administrator interacted with the central state. Those clerics identified as politicians were those who operated either at or via correspondence with the central government in Madrid. They helped formulate and shape policy decisions and exercising influence on those decisions. The administrators were those who held a post in the executive structure of the state, frequently not at Madrid, where they implemented policy, either autonomously or as it was decided at Madrid. Additionally, in the former group, the power of the cleric was derived from himself and his personal political influence, in the latter from his title and official position. Therefore, establishing barriers between the groups, while anachronistic, can help to organize material so as to be better comprehended. It should be noted that those positions classified as administrative were not lower in prestige to those of the politicians. The first group to be discussed is the politicians while administrators are in the subsequent chapter.

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1 Barmejo Cabrero, p. 65
Clerics as Politicians

Major and Minor Politicians

Rather than simply arrange the clerics, even those who served as politicians, by chronological order, an attempt will be made to further categorize them: minor and major actors. The distinction is based on the qualitative level of their interaction with the central government in Madrid. Minor politicians, by far the larger group, were only involved for brief periods of time and frequently only on one issue. They were specialists who were brought in to offer counsel to the King and his advisors on their field of knowledge. The other clerics, those here termed major politicians, held longstanding positions at court and were agents in the political scene beyond simply the specific policies they advised for or against. This distinction bears no automatic relevancy to the discussion of incidental or career clerics addressed in the introduction, and each cleric has to be addressed individually. The four major clerical politicians were Adrian of Utrecht, Garcia de Loaysa, Cardinal Diego de Espinosa and Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle. They are discussed in chronological order of their deaths, as Espinosa and Granvelle were active at the same time.

Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, future Pope Adrian VI

CODOIN contains relatively little information about Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who Charles appointed as the bishop of Tortosa, Spain. It does say that prior to election as Pope Adrian VI, he served as an advisor to Charles V. The letter is not by or to the Cardinal, and so only praises him for his loyal service to the Emperor and presents him as offering advice on a
range of issues.\textsuperscript{1} His name does appear in Erika Rummel’s book on Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros and from there it is possible to see more of what his role was in Charles’ early court.

It is surprising that he was not better represented in CODOIN, as most of his service to Charles took place in the context of Spanish affairs. His first role was to represent Charles to his grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, before Charles inherited that throne. At the time, Ferdinand favored Charles’s younger brother, Ferdinand, who had been raised in Spain unlike Charles who had been raised in Burgundy and was in fact already Duke of that territory. It was Adrian’s lobbying on behalf of the elder brother that eventually convinced Ferdinand to appoint Charles as his heir in Aragon as well as Isabel’s in Castile, which was already set.\textsuperscript{2} After that Cardinal Adrian fell afoul of Cardinal Cisneros, and while Charles tried to keep him in Castile to represent the new King there, Cisneros cut him out of all decision-making and he returned to Brussels.\textsuperscript{3} There he attempted to intrigue against Cisneros and get Charles to fire the Castilian Regent, but to no apparent success as Cisneros did not fall from power until his death.\textsuperscript{4}

His vesture as bishop of Tortosa in 1516 was seen by Castilians as part of Charles’s portioning the wealth of Castile to the Flemings who dominated his court.\textsuperscript{5} Then, when Charles appointed him Regent in Castile when he left in 1520 to pursue his Imperial ambitions, his identity as a foreigner helped contribute to the Comunero revolts that struck in that year.\textsuperscript{6} As a result, the future Pope saw his authority in Castile diminished as Charles was forced to appoint several Castilian aristocrats as co-governors.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1} CODOIN 26, p. 40
\textsuperscript{2} Rummel, p. 83
\textsuperscript{3} Rummel, p. 84
\textsuperscript{4} Rummel, p. 96
\textsuperscript{5} Elliott, J.H. *Imperial Spain*, p. 145
\textsuperscript{6} Lynch, p. 54
\textsuperscript{7} Lynch, p. 57
Once in place as Pope, Adrian VI was an ally of Charles against Francis I of France, although his papacy was short and after that the papacy returned to a position of trying to hedge France and Spain against each other.\(^8\) In addition, he granted Charles the right to appoint the bishoprics of Spain in perpetuity, which placed the Catholic Church in Spain even further under royal control.\(^9\)

While Adrian of Utrecht, Pope Adrian VI, was not recorded in CODOIN in any significant capacity, it is clear that this man served as an advisor to Charles V. His only successful action, albeit one of extreme importance, was to secure Charles’s inheritance of the Spanish possessions but after that his career in Spanish service is marked more by failure than success until his election as Pope. His influence was undercut by Cardinal Cisneros and again when he could not put down the 1520 Comunero Revolt and so lost his position as sole Regent of Castile. During his tenure as Pope, Adrian VI continued to work closely with Spain, but at that point he was no longer a servant of the Spanish crown but rather an ally. Given the overtly political nature of his actions and the fact that the only episcopal appointment he held before his election in 1522 was that of Tortosa, it is likely that during his time before his election, Adrian VI was an incidental cleric. His continued alliance with Spain after his election until his death in 1523 indicates that this may have remained the case, but an in depth study of his pontificate is beyond the present affair.

**Garcia Cardinal de Loaysa, Bishop of Osma**

Garcia de Loaysa began his career in the Dominicans, and was elected as their General in the year 1518. Despite this position, he chose to return to Spain and live there. In 1520 Charles V faced the Comunero Revolts against his foreign-dominated court, and the Dominican General

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\(^8\) Lynch, p. 111  
\(^9\) Lynch, p. 370
drew attention to himself for opposing the revolts. In exchange for that support in the tough times of the revolt, Loaysa was granted several positions on the Councils of the Spanish state: the Council of State and was made President of the Council on the Indies. Therefore, where the revolts undercut the influence of Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, they enabled the rise of Loaysa. Little record survives in CODOIN of what he did with those posts. He was in contact with Hernán Cortes and the other Viceroy of the New World, albeit infrequently due to the large distances involved. Interestingly, one of the few letters which is preserved in CODOIN is a 1527 protest by Cortes to Loaysa not as the President of the Council on the Indies but as a high-ranking member of the Dominicans, because Cortes is asking for him to use his religious authority to bring a troublesome Dominican, Fray Tomas Ortiz, into line. Other than that brief contact for that purpose, it appears that Loaysa exercised little practical authority over the New World from his position on the Council, as distance made the Viceroy's basically autonomous.

Loaysa served as Emperor Charles V’s confessor from the years 1523-1530 and was elevated to the position of Bishop of Osma in the year 1525, thereby surrendering his position as General of the Dominicans. Any actions he took during this time period or any influence he had on the Emperor because of his role as confessor are not recorded in CODOIN. In 1530 the Bishop of Osma was sent to Rome by Charles V and remained there until 1532 while Charles continued his circuit among his territories. At this stage, he was clearly no longer held the position of Charles’s confessor.
The vast majority of the documents in CODOIN related to García de Loaysa are letters from the Bishop to either the Emperor or to his primary Councilor in Spain, Francisco de los Cobos, which he wrote during his two year tenure in Rome. There are hundreds of pages of these letters in several volumes of CODOIN, frequently dated as little as a day or two apart. There were far fewer responses from either Francisco de los Cobos or the Emperor in CODOIN, or referenced in Loaysa’s own letters. Overwhelmingly, the major message of the letters is that Loaysa did not want to be in Rome. He wrote to the Emperor imploring Charles not to forget about him. One of his phrases indicates that Charles placed him there as a punishment: “if then I was wanting in God and virtue.” Whether Charles V intended for the placement of Loaysa in Rome to be a punishment or not, the Bishop of Osma clearly saw it as one. Many of his letters included a reference to how he longed to leave Rome and either join the Emperor wherever he was or at least return to his see at Osma. This cleric claimed that he was not doing anything for the good of “Christianity or Your Majesty” remaining in Rome in no particular role. He was not the Ambassador of the Emperor in Rome, and in fact quarreled with the man who was. Despite that, after the Pope made the Bishop of Osma a Cardinal shortly after he arrived in Rome Loaysa took it upon himself to try and act as a second ambassador to the Pope to try and keep the man happy with the Emperor. However, it does not appear that he was acting on any orders when he did so, and there was never any confirmation from Charles or los Cobos regarding any actions he took in Rome.

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16 CODOIN 14, p.7
17 CODOIN 14, p. 8, 18, 144
18 CODOIN 14, p. 15
19 CODOIN 14, p. 78
20 CODOIN 14, p. 47
In addition to writing extremely frequently, the Bishop Cardinal of Osma frequently found himself offering the same advice on the same topic repeatedly. He offered what appears to have been unsolicited advice to the Emperor on a variety of topics, including the Protestants. Garcia de Loaysa initially encouraged the Emperor to take harsh action against Luther and his supporters, arguing for the use of arms, and if they failed to turn to money to suppress them. Eventually, he relented slightly and accepted that Charles could sign a temporary truce if fighting would lead to defeat. This is not to say that he accepted the Lutheran heresy, he merely said that the state should focus on its temporal authority and let the Church sort out the heretics. He continued to despise the Protestants, saying that “if they want to be dogs, let them.” There is little evidence that any of the advice Osma gave to the Emperor was heeded. He protested against summoning the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, which was when the Emperor summoned the Lutherans as a diplomatic step towards trying to get a handle on the domestic turbulence of Germany, yet it was summoned. When Charles V decided to extend the institution of the Viceroyalty to Naples, Loaysa wrote to him suggesting several Spanish noblemen as well as expounding the characteristics which should go into making that selection. The actual selection was Cardinal Pompeo Colonna, an Italian and someone to whom Loaysa never warmed and whose removal he encouraged, to no avail.

Cardinal Garcia de Loaysa was later appointed the Inquisitor General in 1546 but died in that same year. After 1532, he returned to Spain to take up pastoral duties and there are no other letters in CODOIN addressed from him to Charles V or to Francisco de los Cobos. He is

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21 CODOIN 14, p. 96
22 CODOIN 14, p. 71
23 CODOIN 14, p. 90
24 Perez, p. 90
25 CODOIN 14, p. 104
26 CODOIN 14, p. 51
27 CODOIN 14, p. 62
28 CODOIN 14, p. 182
accounted as a major politician because he was referenced in regards to two factors: his presidency of the Council of the Indies and later his role in Rome. However, it appears that the years 1530-1532 demonstrated to him that Charles V had no intention of listening to his advice. He even complained in a few of his letters that they were not responding to him, and indeed CODOIN contains little record of any return correspondence from Charles V or los Cobos to the Cardinal.²⁹ CODOIN also contains no letters from, to, or regarding him dated after 1532, which indicates that any active political career, even as a neglected advisor, ended when he left Rome in that year. Given that what can be defined as his political career began in 1524 with his appointment as President of the Council of the Indies and apparently ended in 1532 with his abandonment by Charles V, it can be stated that this political career was the exception to his otherwise clerical career. He had entered the political arena as result of his priestly activities and after a brief time as a politician, returned to ecclesiastical duties.

**Diego Cardinal de Espinosa**

Diego Cardinal de Espinosa is one of the few clerics in Spanish history that is ever mentioned in books on Spanish history. He was identified as someone Philip trusted during the late 1560s and early 1570s.³⁰ Although when he was asking for a favor, Don Juan de Austria, Philip II’s half-brother, called the Cardinal a principal minister in Philip’s court, CODOIN discusses his involvement in only one major event: a crackdown on the moriscos at the end of the 1560s through 1570.³¹

²⁹ CODOIN 14, p. 31
³⁰ Feros, p. 27
³¹ CODOIN 28, p. 125
Espinosa was ordained a priest when he was 62 and made a Cardinal shortly thereafter in 1568. Almost immediately he pushed Philip II to crack down on the moriscos in Andalusia, where he alleged that they had not really converted from their original religion of Islam. Don Juan de Austria was sent to lead the repressive strikes, and wrote back to the Cardinal as his ally at court in these affairs. The Cardinal helped allocate the supplies to support Don Juan’s attacks and also to help support the region which was affected by the shortages associated with the fighting. Until the end of 1570 Don Juan appeared content to ask for the Cardinal’s help in executing his assigned duties in Granada, but as the rumors of an alliance with the Papacy and Venice against the Turks began to circulate he wrote to the Cardinal to ask for help getting out of Granada and assigned to that fleet. Cardinal Espinosa was not the only person Don Juan turned to in this endeavor, and he also wrote to the Duke of Feria, Ruy Gomez da Silva, and even Philip II himself pleading to be reassigned to the fleet that eventually fought in Lepanto. Without details which probably do not exist, it is impossible to say whether the Cardinal was critical in lobbying Philip in regards to the transfer of the King’s half-brother, but the fact that Espinosa was included as one of the people contacted among so many who were powerful figures at the court does indicate that he was highly esteemed at the court of Philip II.

The other event for which Diego de Espinosa is remembered in the secondary literature unfortunately lacks any evidence from CODON. According to the historian Maurice Rowden, Espinosa was behind a push to send representatives of the Inquisition to the Netherlands to work with the Duke of Alba. This apparently backfired when Philip discovered how bloody the

33 Rowden, p. 230
34 CODON 28, p. 125
35 CODON 28, p. 143
36 CODON 28, p. 148
Inquisitors sent had been and earned the Cardinal royal condemnation shortly before his death in
1572.\textsuperscript{37}

Cardinal Diego de Espinosa may be one person for whom the methodology used to
extract documents from CODOIN may not have worked, as it is likely he was present at the
Spanish court prior to becoming a clergyman. He was ordained in 1564 and was already one of
Philip’s advisors, a role he continued to play for the rest of his life. This indicates that he already
had influence prior to becoming a priest, and that he was already a member of Philip’s small
circle of advisors. The Cardinal left no record of dedicating himself to his ecclesiastical duties.
Therefore, it can be said that he was an incidental cleric, one for whom joining the clergy was an
accident of a life spent in service to the Spanish Crown.

\textbf{Antoine Perrenot Cardinal de Granvelle}

Antoine Perrenot Cardinal de Granvelle is the one major exception to the general rule that
Spanish clerics are very rarely if ever mentioned in history books. Where Cardinal Espinosa
earned a small section on his actions in regards to the Netherlands in Maurice Rowden’s book on
Spain, even a few general history survey textbooks reference Granvelle, although this is
uncommon. In \textit{The Western Heritage Volume B} the editors name Cardinal Granvelle for his role
in the origins of the Dutch revolt, although he is only addressed in a few preliminary sentences of
the section which bears his name.\textsuperscript{38} Irrespective of his public recognition, it cannot be doubted
that Cardinal Granvelle operated near the top of the political structure of Philip II’s Spain. In
fact, from when he entered the political service of Philip II at the beginning of his reign until his
death in 1586, Cardinal Granvelle was an important politician in Habsburg Spain, although not
as dominant as the Duke of Alba. For the Cardinal, politics was his career, and he spent his

\textsuperscript{37} Rowden, p. 242
\textsuperscript{38} Kagan, p. 399
entire life in political affairs rather than ecclesiastical ones, revealing his nature as an incidental rather than career cleric.

**Background and Early Work**

Cardinal Granvelle was the son of the Chancellor of Charles V, an important man in the household administration of the Emperor. When the future Cardinal first appears in texts in CODOIN in 1544 this inheritance is referenced explicitly as a reason why he should be promoted. In 1544 he was the Bishop of Arras and Francisco de los Cobos, another of Charles V’s close advisors in Spain, recommends him for a few richer dioceses due to the way “Monsieur de Granvelle has served and serves [Your Majesty] and the good qualities and letters that are in the Bishop of Arras his son.” In the end, Granvelle was not given either the diocese of Jaen or the Archdiocese of Valencia that de los Cobos was recommending. Valencia went to Thomas de Villanueva, who was canonized in the seventeenth century, and Granvelle was still the Bishop of Arras in 1559 when CODOIN indicates that he was next consulted on a major issue.

In 1559 the Bishop of Arras is once again mentioned in correspondence about the Spanish state. This time he is already among a list of people consulted by Philip II on the matter of his marriage proposal to Elizabeth I and how it should be dealt with in the case of Elizabeth’s continued adherence to the Protestant Reformation. The Duke of Alba and Ruy Gomez da Silva were the other two approached. Who gave what advice is not recorded in the letter of Philip II explaining his decision, but ultimately he opted to scrap the marriage proposal if Elizabeth continued to persecute Catholics.

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39 CODOIN 23, p. 228
40 CODOIN 5, p. 74
41 CODOIN 5, p. 84
42 CODOIN 87, p. 121
43 CODOIN 87, p. 122
The Netherlands

When Philip II left the Netherlands to go to England and from there to Spain, he left behind his sister Margaret of Parma as the governor of the territory. She was not the only person he trusted in the Netherlands: he also left Granvelle, who was made a Cardinal in 1561, to advise her. The result was that Granvelle was the man who controlled the Netherlands during his time there. This caused opposition from the Dutch nobles who resented his control of the territory. William of Orange, the future leader of the rebels, wrote to King Philip II that Granvelle was “arrogating unto himself the absolute disposal of all things … disposes of these provinces as he would do of his own private house.” Another of the Prince of Orange’s complaints was that Cardinal Granvelle did not share his decision-making process with the Council of State of the Netherlands. This Council was in theory part of the governing structure of the area, much like its counterpart in Spain was theoretically the highest Council in the Empire. Philip II wrote to the Cardinal that he did not consider these particular complaints important and encouraged him to continue his work in administering the Netherlands.

During the period in which Granvelle dominated the politics of the Netherlands, religion became the dominant concern in the domestic unrest in the area. His unpopularity stemmed from more than just the manner in which he centralized decisions in himself. He also tried to reorganize the Flemish Catholic Church to have a more efficient structure, where it currently had a surplus of bishops with overlapping territories. This caused resentment among the local secular nobles, who saw it as a further attempt at grabbing more power for the central administration. His loyalty to Spain despite being Burgundian also meant that he was accused

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44 CODOIN 23, p. 230
45 The Prince of Orange’s Letter to the King. 1689
46 CODOIN 4, p. 313
47 Maltby, p. 105
of trying to introduce the Spanish Inquisition.\textsuperscript{48} This was another element which Philip II denied vehemently in his responses to Margaret of Parma, saying that such an introduction did not feature in either his or the Cardinal’s plans for the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{49}

Dissent among the Flemish nobility, and especially the pressure of William of Orange, forced Granvelle to issue a pardon to Protestants in the early 1560s, and say that they would not be persecuted by the central state. This naturally caused Protestantism to grow in the Netherlands, such that even William of Orange was forced to use force to crack down on its growth.\textsuperscript{50} Philip II later revoked this pardon when he sent the Duke of Alba to the Netherlands to put down their rebellion.\textsuperscript{51} The longer Granvelle remained in the Netherlands the more resentment of Spanish policy came to revolve around him to the point that the Prince of Orange said of him that “so long as the Cardinal Granvelle shall tarry in Flanders, so long will these inconveniences and disorders increase.”\textsuperscript{52} Finally, in 1564 Philip bowed to aristocratic and popular pressure and pull Granvelle out of the Netherlands, but he emphasized to the Cardinal that he did not want this to be considered as a “diminution in the good will” that the King had for his advisor.\textsuperscript{53} The Duke of Alba also granted his political protection to the Cardinal despite his setback in the Netherlands, which enabled Granvelle to stay an important figure at the Spanish court and in the King’s service.\textsuperscript{54}

After leaving the Netherlands, Granvelle went to Rome. Philip II wrote to him that the King desired his advice on any matter that was related to “[his] service and the good of religion,

\begin{footnotes}
\item Stradling, p. 80
\item CODOIN 4, p. 281
\item CODOIN 4, p. 291
\item Rowden, p. 217
\item The Prince of Orange’s Letter to the King
\item CODOIN 4, p. 314
\item Kamen, p. 58
\end{footnotes}
and of justice." He specifically asked him to always stay apprised of affairs in the Netherlands and continue to offer his opinion on events there, to which Margaret of Parma, who had remained, complained that the King was giving more weight to the word of a man who was in Rome than to the recommendations of his own governor in the territories. The King was unapologetic in his response to his sister, and basically wrote that he read all advice that came in and then made up his own mind regarding which action to order. Granvelle continued this heavy correspondence regarding the Netherlands after the Duke of Alba was dispatched there in 1567. In fact, since the Duke was his political ally at the Spanish court the volume likely increased and certainly Granvelle also communicated directly with the Duke, bypassing the King. There was one particular letter of the Duke of Alba to Philip II which referenced an idea that the Cardinal had given to the Duke which the King had not previously heard, therefore making a reference to check with the Cardinal.

It is easy to conclude from the extensive correspondence between Cardinal, King, and Duke that the Cardinal was a vital part of the government of the Netherlands. His advice was appreciated, and the Duke of Alba requested in 1570 that Philip II send Granvelle back to the Netherlands so that he could continue his work there. However, after his exile from the Netherlands, he was only an advisor whose word was not always taken. In 1576 Granvelle wrote directly to the Spanish government in Flanders, then under Don Luis de Requesens. In that letter he urged that no foreigner be given the reins of the government to deal with the Dutch revolt and instead that a local be chosen, probably to appease the nationalist sentiments aroused by the

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55 CODOIN 4, p. 314
56 CODOIN 89, p. 239
57 CODOIN 37, p. 52
58 CODOIN 37, p. 91
sacking of the city of Antwerp by Spanish troops.\textsuperscript{59} However, as stated in a previous section, Don Juan de Austria was sent in 1576 to command a second crack down, so it is clear that the King did reject some of the advice that the Cardinal gave him, even on matters concerning the Netherlands.

The height of Granvelle’s influence in the Netherlands, aside from when he was actually physically present, was during the governorship of Don Luis de Requesens, 1573-1576. Despite the distance between their two stations, as Granvelle was in Naples at the time, the two corresponded regularly. Granvelle sent information that his contacts had revealed to him, and in one particular letter Don Luis wrote back that he had complied with the instructions Granvelle had sent him.\textsuperscript{60} Unfortunately, only the letter where Don Luis professed to have followed the instructions survived, with no record available of what the instructions actually were. During this time, Granvelle emerged as a dominant part of the camp more inclined towards peaceful resolution in the Netherlands, encouraging Don Luis to reissue the pardon that Philip had revoked in 1567, even sending a copy that he himself had written up.\textsuperscript{61} The Cardinal urged that a pardon and peace for seven years would help resolve the Dutch issue and would let the commerce of the area regenerate, which he viewed as vital.\textsuperscript{62} While staying short of condemning the actions of the Duke of Alba, the Cardinal did write that the best hope for resolving the Dutch issue would come from establishing Don Luis as a clear break in policy from the Duke and in fact mobilized his own contacts in the area to help spread that message.\textsuperscript{63} After Don Juan de Austria was sent to the Netherlands in 1576 there were no more documents in CODOIN related to advice offered by the Cardinal on affairs in those territories. As discussed in the section on his

\textsuperscript{59} CODOIN 31, p. 45  
\textsuperscript{60} CODOIN 102, p. 376  
\textsuperscript{61} CODOIN 102, p. 430  
\textsuperscript{62} CODOIN 102, p. 431  
\textsuperscript{63} CODOIN 102, p. 432
term as Viceroy of Naples, during the first half of the 1570s, Cardinal Granvelle and Don Juan had become political adversaries and after the King’s brother was sent to the Netherlands Cardinal Granvelle was not consulted further on those issues.

**Rome and Italy**

In many ways, for Cardinal Granvelle being removed from the Netherlands actually served as a promotion, as by 1567 he was in Rome representing the Spanish King before the Pope. His first task was to persuade the Pope to grant a concession of the Cruzada, the special tax on the Church that supported the Spanish state in its war against the Muslims, most used by Philip to support his navy against the Ottomans. In this instance he failed to get the Cruzada that the King wanted, and the King was infuriated at the ingratitude of the papacy, but this failure does not appear to have done any permanent harm to Granvelle as a political advisor to the crown. On the contrary, it is during his time in Rome that Granvelle apparently became a universal advisor to Philip II on all issues, as his letters from Rome to Philip frequently reference problems facing the Spanish Empire throughout its territories.

One of the signature achievements of the Cardinal during this time period was the negotiation of the alliance between the papacy, Venice, and Spain that led ultimately to the battle of Lepanto. Initially, Don Juan and King Philip were reluctant to agree to the alliance, as they perceived it as a blank check for the Italian states to drag Spain into a long and expensive war against the Ottomans. It took a concerted effort by Granvelle in his correspondence with the King to persuade Philip that this was not the case and that if the alliance appeared to be stretching beyond its original intent that the King would have both the time and the right to back

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64 CODOIN 4, p. 341  
65 CODOIN 4, p. 475  
66 CODOIN 4, p. 378
out of the treaty.\textsuperscript{67} Interestingly, even though he supported the treaty itself, both he and the Duke of Alba opposed the resultant Battle of Lepanto itself, the Duke because he was skeptical of priests determining a strategy and the Cardinal because he felt that the resources could best be dedicated elsewhere.\textsuperscript{68}

Shortly after serving as King Philip’s representative in Rome and negotiating the treaty that led to Lepanto in 1571 Cardinal Granvelle moved to Naples and assumed the administrative position as Viceroy of Naples. His actions there are addressed in a section on the Viceroy of Naples in Clerics as Administrators.

\textit{After Naples}

After serving for four years as the Viceroy of Naples, Cardinal Granvelle returned to the purely political realm of activity and was recalled to Madrid. Once there he served as President of the Council of Italy and later that of Castile.\textsuperscript{69} This was the height of his political influence, and it is telling that he emerged after the 1573 death of Ruy Gomez da Silva, and the 1573 recall of the Duke of Alba in disgrace from the Netherlands. His height of power came about because his old political allies and rivals had all either died or fallen from grace, leaving the Cardinal alone among the first rank of advisors to the King.

The first major activity that Granvelle participated in was the invasion and annexation of Portugal in 1580. In this matter he was once again a secondary actor to the Duke of Alba, and focused mostly on gathering the domestic support of the Spanish nobles for Philip II adding on another domain.\textsuperscript{70} During the invasion itself the Cardinal played no discernible role, having remained in Madrid. However, when King Philip II left Madrid in 1582 to make an extended

\textsuperscript{67} CODOIN 3, p. 56
\textsuperscript{68} Kamen, p. 102
\textsuperscript{69} CODOIN 23, p. 232
\textsuperscript{70} Rowden, p. 256
visit to Portugal to help settle affairs in that country, it quickly became apparent that Granvelle was left in charge of the government in the King’s absence. Philip had actually left his Austrian cousin, the Archduke Albert of Austria, at the time a Cardinal but who was soon to be married to Philip’s daughter Isabel Clara Eugenia, in charge of the central government at Madrid, but as he had dominated Margaret of Parma two decades earlier, the aging Cardinal also controlled the Cardinal Archduke. In his correspondence, Cardinal Granvelle even remarked that he no longer had time for private reading because of how much time he spent with the public correspondence.

This was not the normal course of affairs, as Philip normally kept a firm handle on most of the business of the state. Cardinal Granvelle spent most of his time as the President of the Council of Castile dealing with more minor affairs. On two surviving occasions, Granvelle handled the appointment of military officials. In one, he notified the Duke of Medina Sidonia that he had been selected as the Governor and Captain General of Milan, a position to which Granvelle had persuaded the King to appoint him. Intriguingly, this is one instance where it is apparent that Granvelle was using his position on the Council to work around the King. Philip II had ordered that Medina Sidonia’s emphasis was supposed to be on the protection of the faith, but Granvelle told him that his priorities should lie with the preservation of order. Similarly, Philip wanted Medina Sidonia to be equitable in the affairs of justice, but Granvelle encouraged the new Captain General to leave such matters in the hands of the Milanese Senate. In the other case, Granvelle dealt with the leasing of the services of Colonel Mondragon to the Duke of

71 CODOIN 35, p. 350
72 CODOIN 35, p. 355
73 CODOIN 24, p. 552
74 CODOIN 24, p. 555
Lorraine, but he simply insisted on the terms that the Colonel be permitted to return to Spanish service should he be required.\textsuperscript{75}

In the year 1582 Granvelle’s correspondence reveals the peculiar way in which the President of the Council of Castile was engaged in some activities while not others. Granvelle reports in his correspondence to Philip on the preparations for what became the Spanish Armada of 1588, but he indicated no involvement in those activities and it was handled by others.\textsuperscript{76} On the other hand, he was intimately involved in the implementation of the new Gregorian calendar mandated by the Pope in Rome and held responsibility for resolving hiccups in bringing the Spanish possessions in line with the new calendar.\textsuperscript{77} His most significant action came at the end of his time as President of the Council, when it became obvious that the English under Queen Elizabeth I were supporting the Dutch rebels, Granvelle issued orders to detain all English ships and their dependents in Spanish ports.\textsuperscript{78} The King was pleased with this action and appointed the Cardinal as Archbishop of Besancon in 1584, the town where he had been born.\textsuperscript{79} He was replaced on the Council of Castile by an aristocrat, but never travelled to Besancon, instead dying in Madrid in 1586.\textsuperscript{80}

\textit{Incidental Cleric}

Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle served as Bishop of Arras until 1559, at which point the literature in CODOIN ceases to refer to him in terms of any see he held, and instead calls him Cardinal Granvelle. According to the website catholic-hierarchy.org, he was appointed and held the title of Archbishop of Mechelen, which in modern times is Mechelen-Brussels in Belgium,

\textsuperscript{75} CODOIN 31, p. 180
\textsuperscript{76} CODOIN 35, p. 352
\textsuperscript{77} CODOIN 35, p. 354
\textsuperscript{78} CODOIN 23, p. 232
\textsuperscript{79} CODOIN 23, p. 233
\textsuperscript{80} Lynch, p. 270
from 1561-1583, at which point he was made Archbishop of Besancon. However, he never set foot in Besancon as its Archbishop, and after his 1564 effective banishment from the Netherlands he could not have been to Mechelen. Mechelen was the home of Habsburg authority in the Netherlands, so his appointment there was likely incidental to his political responsibilities anyway. This Cardinal also left very little evidence of himself on theological matters, much less any record of himself as a pastoral figure, apparently having spent his entire time dealing with affairs of state instead. It can therefore be said that Granvelle was an incidental cleric, a politician who also happened to be a priest but whose clerical position was not an integral part of his political operations.

**Minor actors and advisors**

Cardinal Granvelle and to a lesser extent the other three bishops mentioned in the previous section contributed significantly to the formulation of Spanish policy and did so over an extended period of time. However, not all of the clerics who were involved in Spanish politics reached such heights. The following group of clerics, both priests and bishops, interacted with the Spanish court and informed the formulation of policy but were frequently outside the ring of actors who actually established the policy. Additionally, with one exception, they were each only involved in politics for a few years before fading from court life.

**Alonso Fonseca, Archbishop of Toledo**

The Archbishop of Toledo was frequently a part of the Spanish political scene because Toledo was the seat of the Primate of Spain, the most senior cleric in the ecclesiastical structure of the peninsula. Even after Philip II moved the royal capital to Madrid, Toledo continued to be

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82 Rummel, p. 80
the capital of the Spanish Church. Alonso Fonseca was Archbishop of Toledo before this, when Toledo was still the capital of Castile. In what survives in CODOIN Charles V consulted with Archbishop Fonseca on the matter of the captivity of Francis I of France. The other king had been captured at the Battle of Pavia, and Charles was debating whether or not to have him executed. The Archbishop responded firmly that the life of Francis I should be spared. Unlike the three clerics in the previous section, whose letters were frequently secular in tone and subject, the Archbishop specifically appeals to religion and to his moral authority in encouraging Charles in the decision to spare Francis, arguing that it is against Christianity to kill without need.

Another interesting thing about Fonseca’s testimony reinforces the point that the main body of the Spanish clergy did not see meddling in political affairs as their responsibility. He wrote to Charles that, even though he made his opinion clear, he was not lobbying for the Emperor to make any specific decision. He specifically left that to his advisors, the aristocrats, who were “so wise and expert in these matters” and perhaps more importantly, “so jealous of the honor and service of Your Majesty.” It was, in his mind, the place of the aristocrats to offer counsel on the affairs of state, and the Archbishop specifically presented his opinion only in the context of formulating how a Christian should think on the issue, “not so much in order to give counsel.” In a similar fashion, Charles wrote to the Bishop of Avila, another member of the hierarchy, asking for advice on the same question. The Bishop of Avila was even more direct in denying involvement, saying: “priests cannot and do not possess liberty to speak particularly on

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83 Redworth, p. 52  
84 CODOIN 1, p. 60  
85 CODOIN 1, p. 61  
86 CODOIN 1, p. 65  
87 CODOIN 1, p. 61
such things, because our weapons are more spiritual rather than temporal." In the minds of these priests at the beginning of the reign of Charles V, it was not the place of priests to get involved in political affairs, believing that they more legitimately belonged to the secular sphere of aristocrats.

Alonso Fonseca also appeared briefly in CODOIN in another capacity, but this was not directly related to secular politics. When the Ottomans besieged Vienna in 1529 the Pope ordered that the Church send a quarter of its revenue to the defense of the city. Fonseca, in his capacity as Archbishop of Toledo, was charged with collecting that money and forwarding it along. This matter was not directly related to any involvement on the part of the Archbishop himself in secular politics and is instead an example of how the Church supported the state in its endeavors.

This Archbishop of Toledo left behind no other record of political activity, at least not in CODOIN. In the absence of political activity, it is reasonable to assume that the Archbishop was engaged in clerical activity. Therefore, this Archbishop of Toledo can be labeled a career cleric who due to his clerical role was briefly engaged on a political matter.

Juan Cardinal Pardo de Tavera, Archbishop of Toledo

Juan Cardinal Pardo de Tavera also held the title of Archbishop of Toledo; he was appointed to that see following the death of Alonso Fonseca discussed above in 1534. He was important to the politics of Spain after Charles V departed Spain in 1543 because in addition to leaving his son, Prince Philip (the future Philip II) with some role in the government of the country, he left Cardinal Pardo de Tavera as the regent of Castile. Logically, this means that he

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88 CODOIN 1, p. 81
89 CODOIN 1, p. 141
90 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bpardo.html
91 Kamen, p. 48
was left in charge of running the country, but after the 1520 Comunero Revolts when Charles first ascended to the throne, the Spanish countryside was relatively pacific and not a pressing political concern.

Cardinal Pardo de Tavera is more remembered for his advocacy against Emperor Charles V’s policies. He opposed the wars in Germany and Italy against Protestants and France, or more specifically he opposed the use of Spanish resources in those wars. Instead, he lobbied unsuccessfully for a return to the priorities of the Catholic Monarchs and the wars in North Africa. 92 Similarly, when in 1544 Charles was planning to marry his daughter Margaret to one of Francis I’s sons in order to bring about peace between the two monarchs, Cardinal Pardo de Tavera objected to the plan to use Milan as the dowry and instead proposed the use of the Netherlands, which were not part of what he considered to be a part of the Spanish inheritance. 93 In the latter case his lobbying proved pointless, as Margaret of Parma was not wed to a member of the French royal family. In the former case though, his lobbying was unsuccessful and Charles V continued his policies as regarded the French and the German Protestants without any indication of bowing to the wishes of his regent in Castile.

On Tavera’s death in 1545 it was said that Charles had lost a “great, faithful and true servant.” 94 Certainly in his two years as Regent of Castile, Cardinal Pardo de Tavera had expressed himself freely to the Emperor, although without any apparent success in terms of influencing policy. For the rest of his life prior to that 1543 appointment the Cardinal did not play any role in politics, and instead was a career cleric in pursuit of other matters until the political sphere called him.

92 Lovett, p. 50
93 Lovett, p. 49
94 CODOIN 26, p. 472-3
Tomas de Villanueva, Archbishop of Valencia

Tomas de Villanueva was appointed Archbishop of Valencia in 1544 by Charles V; prior to that he had simply been an Augustinian monk, albeit one respected for his piety and intelligence.95 His involvement in Spanish politics is unique because it did not stem from the central government but rather from locals asking for his moral support. The record in CODOIN indicates that Villanueva was never in a position to order actions, instead he wrote requesting or encouraging that things be done. For example, when the Moorish raiders from North Africa increased their raiding on the area of Valencia, the general in charge of the area’s defense requested that in addition to his own letter, the Archbishop write to the central government in Madrid to use his moral authority to encourage a stronger response.96 The man who was canonized in the next century was certainly ready to do so, and wrote several letters to Prince Philip demanding a better defense of the area of his Archdiocese.97

Villanueva also used his position of more authority to offer critiques of the Spanish government in the area, in the form of recommendations on how to improve them. One such was to urge that the Viceroy of Valencia, who had been appointed but was still in Madrid, be encouraged to depart for his location immediately.98 The Archbishop also prepared a long list of ideas that could be implemented to improve the “defense, governance, reformation and wellbeing” of the Valencia area. Unfortunately, he sent a canon, Don Miguel Vich, to Madrid to deliver this list in person rather than putting it in a letter, so the precise contents of this idea were not recorded in the archives that became CODOIN.99

95 CODOIN 5, p. 81
96 CODOIN 5, p. 117
97 CODOIN 5, p. 101, 107
98 CODOIN 5, p. 121
99 CODOIN 5, p. 118
The Archbishop of Valencia also sent money to Charles for the defense of the Church and its territories when called to do so.\textsuperscript{100} However, when Charles V requested that he attend the Council of Trent, he declined to go, saying that he was too occupied with the affairs of his archdiocese.\textsuperscript{101} In addition to this statement, the fact of his 1658 canonization indicates that Tomas de Villanueva was a career cleric. In fact, he was barely involved in politics at all, and only because the moral weight of his clerical position was lent to trying to secure protection for the region of his archdiocese.

\textit{Fray Lorenzo de Villavicencio}

Fray Lorenzo de Villavicencio was an Augustinian friar who was operating in the Netherlands trying to combat the spread of Protestantism when King Philip II briefly called on him to return to Madrid and advise him on affairs in that territory. Villavicencio had spent time studying the rebelling territory on behalf of the King and had reached the conclusion that the Duke of Alba would be the best person to send in order to head off a full revolt. Interestingly, like Alonso Fonseca earlier with Charles V, Fray Villavicencio was hesitant to offer a direct suggestion to the King. His way of dealing with that was to tell the King’s secretary, Gabriel de Zayas, what should be recommended and then asking the secretary to make the actual recommendation.\textsuperscript{102}

At this initial stage the friar encouraged very harsh actions to be taken against the Dutch rebels. He joined the chorus of people, also including Granvelle, who believed that harsh action could prove a remedy to the situation.\textsuperscript{103} Villavicencio then proceeded to offer a list of the problems in the Netherlands: religion, justice, republic (which at the time meant governance

\textsuperscript{100} CODOIN 5, p. 98  
\textsuperscript{101} CODOIN 5, p. 118  
\textsuperscript{102} CODOIN 37, p. 41  
\textsuperscript{103} Kamen, p. 69
more generally), fiscal matters, security, punishing rebels, punishing heretics, the Inquisition, Ministers of Justice, and reordering the Councils, which he argued could be put in that order. The friar, even though he believed that the Duke of Alba was the best person to send in order to restore order in the territories, did also state that the situation would not be fully resolved until Philip II went up there in person to enact the necessary reforms, and that the revolts in the Netherlands were being shaped by nationalism. Accordingly, he recommended that Flemish knights and nobles be used in the government of the Netherlands rather than Spaniards, as they would already be conversant in the customs and languages of the area. He said specifically of the people of Friesland, an area in what is now the northern part of the country of the Netherlands, that they “would rather die than consent that a Spaniard govern them.” At this initial stage, therefore, Villavicencio wanted the Duke of Alba to go to suppress the initial dissent but then wanted a much broader program of reforms to answer the problems raised by the Dutch.

However, once the Duke of Alba was sent in 1567 his tune changed. The Augustinian friar, like Cardinal Granvelle, opposed the harsh measures used by the Duke to suppress the revolt. Villavicencio in his correspondence with the King tried to get Philip to rein in the Duke of Alba, arguing that repression could not be a permanent tactic and that the situation must be reformed if Spanish control over the Netherlands was to be salvaged. Again, in a departure from the works of the incidental clerics Granvelle, Espinosa and della Quadra, the policy ideas of Villavicencio relied on religious imagery and theologically informed rhetoric to make his

104 CODOIN 37, p. 42
105 CODOIN 37, p. 44-8
106 CODOIN 37, p. 54
107 Kamen, p. 85
108 CODOIN 37, p. 52
points. Ultimately, Philip II decided to side with Alba in this dispute between him and the clergymen who were urging more clemency. The result was that from 1567 to 1570 the Duke of Alba was given basically free rein to launch his bloody repression of the Dutch revolt. As discussed, this only had the effect of galvanizing opposition to Spanish rule and turned the Netherlands into a drain on Spanish resources far beyond the end of Philip II’s reign.

In contrast to his meticulous directions to Cardinal Mendoza in the previous section, Philip II was loath to order the Duke of Alba to implement any specific steps in the Netherlands. He eventually attached Villavicencio’s recommendations on the necessary reforms for quieting the Netherlands, literally including the letter with his own note to the Duke of Alba. This was not done until over a year after Villavicencio had initially made the recommendations, and even then Philip only requested that Alba look at the friar’s work and decide if any of the ideas were of substance; the King insisted only that he be informed if Alba took any of the steps outlined by Villavicencio. The Duke of Alba responded that although “I take him for a very good man; but here he is very hated and they do not listen to his doctrine.” Therefore, all of Villavicencio’s recommendations were eventually rejected after the man he had pushed for was appointed as governor of the Netherlands.

Fray Lorenzo de Villavicencio is in this section because he left no trace of other political activity. He was involved in advising King Philip II on affairs in the Netherlands from 1566 when he was first recalled to Spain to 1568 when Alba definitively rejected all of his proposals on the basis of his personal lack of stature in the Netherlands. What he did with the remainder of his career was not preserved in CODOIN, indicating that it was unlikely to have been political in

109 CODOIN 37, p. 50
110 Kamen, p. 86
111 CODOIN 37, p. 35
112 CODOIN 37, p. 203
113 CODOIN 37, p. 56
nature. Since man clearly lacked political capital of his own and failed to carve a spot for himself at court, it is likely that he returned to his clerical work after his brief foray into politics. He had initially emerged from a clerical background to argue for his political perspective, which indicates that his clerical background was more integral to his identity than this brief political activity. His career was in the clergy.

Fray Diego de Chaves

Fray Diego de Chaves was not an advisor on any policy of Philip II. He was the King’s confessor during the late 1570s and as a result Philip entrusted him with several duties that were of a sensitive nature. In 1578 the Duke of Alba’s son was being investigated for a love affair, and Philip II selected this friar to work with the group looking into the case. He was not one of the primary pushers of the group, as Philip also took a personal interest, but he did become an important member of the group whom others took care to keep informed of events as they unfolded.114 He also served Philip as a representative who could travel discreetly to meet with Antonio Perez, a former minister of the King who had been very high ranked but was now imprisoned for treason. Philip II and Perez both used Fray Diego to carry messages between each other so as to avoid leaving any record of what they were saying.115

In 1580 Fray Diego de Chaves was also part of a small circle of monarchist scholars, the rest were minor nobles, who wrote a tract expounding on the idea of an absolute monarchy in which the King “has no superior on Earth.” While in theory universally applicable, the purpose behind the tract was to justify Philip’s succession to the throne of Portugal and to counter the rhetorical attempts by the nobility to prevent him.116

114 CODOIN 7, p. 506
115 CODOIN 7, p. 368
116 CODOIN 34, p. 374
Fray Diego de Chaves was a loyal servant of the crown who took his office of confessor to the King to also include being a confidential messenger. However, what small political role he played seems to have stemmed from his clerical role as confessor. Therefore, as with the other minor clerical politicians, it is likely that he was a career cleric rather than an incidental one, as political ambition does not seem to have been part of his life, or at least not one that he managed to convert into political importance.

*Don Rodrigo de Castro, Bishop of Cuenca*

Don Rodrigo de Castro had a diverse clerical career. He was elevated to the Bishopric of Zamora in 1574, moved to Cuenca in 1578 and finally promoted to Archbishop of Seville in 1581. In the year 1580, he worked on the Council of State and was specifically tasked to help ease the Portuguese annexation through diplomacy. While the Duke of Alba prepared the army and Cardinal Granvelle provided domestic support to the logistics and politics of the mission, the Bishop of Cuenca wrote to the Braganza family in Portugal, who Philip II was replacing on the throne to try and persuade them not to start a rebellion in opposition to the Spanish takeover. His role in this operation was unpopular with other officials in the Spanish government, who accused him of dragging out the negotiations and unnecessarily slowing down the annexation process. In that role he was kept apprised of military events but he played no role in determining them. He was not successful, and when the Duke of Alba led the Spanish army across the border into Portugal they were met with an armed insurrection, although it was one that was easily put down and Alba secured complete control of the country relatively

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117 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bcaos.html
118 CODOIN 40, p. 313
119 CODOIN 40, p. 326
120 CODOIN 40, p. 322
quickly.\textsuperscript{121} After that, the others basically decided that the Bishop of Cuenca was no longer necessary and he was not called on to do anything else.\textsuperscript{122}

The bishop’s political influence was very short, as he was only relevant for a short period leading up to the invasion of Portugal. In a note in the margin of one of his letters, it is noted that the man’s handwriting was too small for King Philip II to read, which may have limited the amount of influence he could have had over the court.\textsuperscript{123} Finally, the Bishop of Cuenca, even while serving on the Council of State, was writing from the city of Cuenca itself, which is about halfway from Madrid to the eastern coast of the peninsula. The Spanish court felt no need for him to come to Madrid, and so let him remain in his diocese to exercise his clerical duties.\textsuperscript{124} With the exception of this brief span in 1580 Don Rodrigo de Castro did not play any role in the politics of Spain and instead dedicated himself to his career as a cleric. Even when called upon to act in a political capacity, he still remained in his diocese, and presumably continued to minister to his pastoral duties while there.

\textit{Fray Luis de Granada}

The final cleric in both the section on minor actors and advisors and as such on clerics as politicians is the Dominican Fray Luis de Granada. He was relevant to Spanish politics only after the 1580 annexation of Portugal. After the Duke of Alba conquered the territory, he was appalled at the state of the religious orders in the other Iberian Kingdom and with Philip II’s approval he set out to try and reform them.\textsuperscript{125} The Duke of Alba knew that he was not capable of ruling on ecclesiastical affairs, and so he trusted in priests who were brought in to help him do

\textsuperscript{121} Rowden, p. 257
\textsuperscript{122} CODOIN 40, p. 363
\textsuperscript{123} CODOIN 40, p. 323
\textsuperscript{124} CODOIN 40, p. 327, 342
\textsuperscript{125} CODOIN 32, p. 535
so. The first opportunity he had was the election of the Vicar General. Alba was able to convince Philip II to intervene in the election to bring in somebody who could start to reform the Portuguese Church, in this case Fray Luis de Granada. Granada tried to reform the clergy in Portugal, although it would require more interference from the secular authorities resulting in the dispersal of large sections of the clergy throughout Iberia as a way to prevent them from conspiring together. He also used his sermons at the pulpit to condemn the people, both lay and clerical, who supported Don Antonio, the Portuguese Pretender who sought to resist the conquest, and as Granada presented it, succeeded only in bringing ruin to the Portuguese countryside.

The most important part of Fray Luis de Granada’s tenure as Vicar General was the controversy over a motu proprio that was circulated condemning him. The motu proprio is a special papal document that is considered a direct expression of the ideas of the pope. In late 1580 this document began to circulate in Portugal and it condemned Granada for heresy. This was especially confusing as another papal decree had arrived shortly before that one in which the Pope had praised Granada’s theological ability and sanctity. The motu proprio became a large controversy in the newly annexed territory, as Granada felt he had no choice but to accede to it until the issue could be cleared up. Everybody believed at the time that it was the result of a campaign of misinformation that had deceived the Pope. Granada further believed that this campaign was being led by the man he had replaced as Vicar General. This led to some groups encouraging the Dominican friar to ignore the censure and still others appealed to Philip

126 CODOIN 32, p. 451
127 CODOIN 33, p. 8
128 CODOIN 35, p. 332
129 CODOIN 35, p. 178
130 CODOIN 35, p. 177
131 CODOIN 35, p. 456
II to intervene and straighten things out, as the decree was hurting the cause of the Spanish in Portugal.\(^{132}\) In the end, a study of the *motu proprio* conducted in early 1581 revealed the document to be a simple forgery, and Fray Luis de Granada was cleared and returned to work as normal. However, CODOIN contains letters that indicate that for those few months all levels of the Spanish government in Portugal gave their attention to this unfolding controversy.

Fray Luis de Granada was chosen to be the Vicar General because of his recognized sanctity, piety and orthodox theology.\(^{133}\) Since he was a Dominican and not a diocesan priest, having those characteristics was his clerical responsibility, and becoming Vicar General was part of his clerical career. The unique circumstances of the recent annexation of Portugal and the generally less severe division between state and Church meant that as Provincial he was expected to comment on political matters, and his own situation became a political event in and of itself. But ultimately Fray Luis de Granada was a career cleric who happened to get drawn into the world of politics as a result of his clerical duties.

**Chapter Conclusion**

As mentioned in the explanation of CODOIN, this list of clerics involved in politics could easily not be comprehensive. However, it is reasonable to be confident that the major actors were identified, and probably the majority if not totality of minor actors as well. Certainly, Spanish Catholic clerics who were active in lay politics possessed several common characteristics. When clerics became involved in Spanish politics in a major way, as in Cardinals Adrian, Espinosa and Granvelle, they were incidental rather than career clerics. Their nature as clerics was secondary in both their historical legacy in Spain and by appearances also their contemporary focuses while serving the Spanish crown. Loaysa is an exception to this rule,

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\(^{132}\) CODOIN 35, p. 477  
\(^{133}\) CODOIN 35, p. 177
but this probably stems from the almost accidental nature of his entering the political arena, which after a brief period caused him to retire to pastoral life. These incidental clerical politicians were the exception in the Spanish case, which featured many more minor actors who were only temporarily present on the Spanish political horizon before returning to their careers as clerics.

In comparison to clerical politicians in other countries during the same century, clerical politicians in Spain were less likely to serve for a sustained period of time. In this case, the only true exception is Granvelle, for Cardinals Adrian, Loaysa and Espinosa were each present as Cardinals in the Spanish court for under a decade. It is worth noting that Espinosa served at the Spanish court before becoming a cleric towards the end of his life, which makes him unusual as a clerical politician, even in comparison with those present at other courts.

Adrian and Granvelle were anomalies in the Spanish case but fit perfectly within the mold of clerical politicians elsewhere such as Thomas Wolsey, Stephen Gardiner and Nicholas Heath in England. However, the two of them were unable to achieve the levels of influence successfully exercised by those other clerics, much less the level of autonomous power held by Cardinal Jimenez de Cisneros during the period of the Catholic Monarchs or the Cardinal of Lorraine in France. Other Spanish clerics, the long list classified as minor politicians in this chapter, remained at the level of outside advisors attempting to inform the debate about what policy options were best, but did not exercise political influence on the inside of those decision-making processes. This list of minor politicians is with one exception also comprised of career clerics, unlike the major politicians. Their focus was on ecclesiastical affairs, and their political service was a result of their involvement in those affairs as a cleric. While the following chapter
addresses the role clerics played in the administration of Spanish Habsburg territories, in the politics of the country, clerics played a small and often supporting role.
Clerics as Administrators

Chapter Introduction

The previous chapter identified clerics who served as politicians or in political roles in the Spanish Empire during the Habsburg period. This chapter looks more at clerics serving a role in the bureaucratic structure of the Spanish Empire. On occasion, clerics were appointed to a bureaucratic or administrative position in the government. In these positions the greater emphasis lay on the implementation of policy at a locality rather than shaping it at the capital in Madrid. In this they could frequently exercise some autonomy in regards to what policies were implemented. As with the political roles played by clergymen, these positions were normally held by lay members of the aristocracy, with clerics operating as the exception to that idea. The main distinction between these clerical administrators and the politicians of the preceding chapter is that while holding these administrative positions, the authority of the clerics came not from themselves and their personal influence but from the royal writ that granted them their position.

As with the previous chapter, it is striking how few clerics served in administrative roles during the early Spanish Habsburg period. As with the politicians, these positions went mostly to aristocrats.

Don Alvaro della Quadra, Bishop of Aquila

The Bishop of Aquila was only entered Spanish service after 1558, but before that he was an Imperial politician. This caused a minor problem between Philip II and his uncle the Emperor Ferdinand in 1558. Charles V had decided that his Italian possessions should pass to the Spanish branch of the Habsburg family, but Quadra was serving in the city of Vienna as an assistant to
the Emperor.\textsuperscript{1} CODOIN, as a collection related to the history of Spain, does not detail what he did there, but the correspondence in 1558 does indicate that the Emperor Ferdinand was unwilling to let him leave Vienna and the Imperial service, although whether this was for the sake of Quadra himself or the territory he was associated with is unclear.\textsuperscript{2}

Finally, late in 1558 the Emperor relented and released Quadra to Philip II.\textsuperscript{3} Even prior to this, the Bishop of Aquila had been offering advice to the Spanish King, advising him that it was not important that Philip II come to Italy as the Emperor was requesting. The Bishop, part of the Imperial administration in Italy, did not see as how it served a purpose.\textsuperscript{4} As Philip II never visited his Italian possessions, this was clearly the position that he adopted, although whether it was due to Quadra’s recommendation cannot be known.

Once the Bishop entered Spanish service, Philip II sent him to be Ambassador to the English. The Bishop had the expressed purpose of negotiating a marriage between the King and Queen Elizabeth I of England, the younger half-sister of his recently deceased wife Mary I.\textsuperscript{5} Even before he arrived in 1559, the previous Ambassador, the Count of Feria, Philip’s representative during the reign of his wife, had begun to angle for such a marriage. In the beginning of the process, Philip II was very eager to secure such a marriage and encouraged the Count to pursue it but Elizabeth I quickly moved to distinguish herself as a Protestant ruler, which complicated things.\textsuperscript{6} The Count of Feria was slow to give up hope that Elizabeth could be turned back to Catholicism and an arrangement reached.\textsuperscript{7} However, as mentioned previously, Philip II asked for the opinions of his three most prominent advisors: the Duke of Alba, Ruy

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\begin{enumerate}
\item CODOIN 98, p. 24
\item CODOIN 98, p. 25
\item CODOIN 98, p. 31
\item CODOIN 98, p. 29
\item CODOIN 2, p. 537
\item CODOIN 87, p. 90
\item CODOIN 87, p. 150
\end{enumerate}
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Gomez da Silva, and the Bishop of Arras, about how he should proceed if Elizabeth remained Protestant. At the same time, the Bishop of Aquila, by then present in England, soured on the prospects as the persecution of Catholics in England worsened.\(^8\) He was also increasingly angered by the Austrian Habsburg representatives in England, who did not seem so concerned and continued to press for an Austrian marriage for the Queen.\(^9\) In the end, the differences between Philip’s fervent Catholicism and Elizabeth’s increasingly adamant Protestantism meant that there was no marriage between the two monarchs, although Philip wrote to the Bishop of Aquila that he still wanted to keep England relatively close to Spain so as to avoid a French foothold or a civil war in the country.\(^{10}\)

Whatever the Bishop of Aquila did in the Imperial court before being transferred to Spanish service is not recorded in CODOIN, so it alone is not sufficient to decide if he was an incidental or career cleric. However, he died in England in 1563, therefore spending the last years of his life in the diplomatic service.\(^{11}\) In addition, his position under Charles V was apparently an administrative one over the Emperor’s possessions in Italy, and one moreover that kept him in Vienna rather than at his pastoral location of Aquila, which is in central Italy. Therefore, it is more likely that he was an incidental cleric, as his pastoral and ecclesiastical duties ranked a distant second to his political functions. Certainly during his service to King Philip II of Spain from 1558-1563, his clerical functions went unfilled as he spent the entire time in England as the Spanish Ambassador rather than exercising is pastoral duties in L’Aquila, Italy.

\(^8\) CODOIN 2, p. 541
\(^9\) CODOIN 87, p. 193
\(^{10}\) CODOIN 87, p. 143
\(^{11}\) CODOIN 89, p. 89
Jaime Ximeno Lobera, Bishop of Teruel, Viceroy of Aragon

The Bishop of Teruel is never mentioned in CODOIN by his own name, only as the Viceroy of Aragon or as the Bishop. Other sources identify Jaime Ximeno Lobera as holding the position of Bishop of Teruel in the year 1591, the year in which he is referenced as the Viceroy of Aragon. Philip II chose the Bishop of Teruel because he was a minor figure who was easily controlled, as indeed proved to be the case. In addition, being in Aragon led Philip II to take a more active role in the government of the region anyway, and unlike the Viceroy of Naples in the next section, the Viceroy of Aragon was expected to communicate with Philip II on all non-emergency decisions and implement the decision which the King selected, although Lobera leveraged his local position in order to recommend policy to the King.

It is likely that under normal circumstances the Viceroy of Aragon were permitted more autonomy than was the Bishop of Teruel, as the records for the Bishop’s interaction with the King are from the affair of Antonio Perez, a former close advisor of Philip’s who had a very rapid descent from favor. Perez had manipulated Philip II into killing his rival Escobedo and when Philip discovered the manipulation he had Perez arrested. Perez managed to flee to Aragon where disputes over the extent of the King’s jurisdiction complicated the judicial process. The King took a very close interest in the matters of his imprisonment in Zaragoza. In this case, the only independent action that the Bishop of Teruel was able to take was to set a bounty on Perez’s head when he escaped. After that, he became the local coordinator for the royal policy as Philip II established. The King ordered a precise search of the Kingdom of

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12 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bxim.html
13 Lynch, p. 476
14 CODOIN 12, p. 445
15 Lynch, p. 431
16 Lynch, p. 477
17 CODOIN 12, p. 382
18 CODOIN 12, p. 425
Aragon, and the Viceroy was placed in charge of determining where people went in the
execution of this search. However, when King Philip ordered that the city of Zaragoza be
sacked in an effort to uncover Perez, the Viceroy wrote to the commander of the force who
would have done the sacking, Alonso de Vargas, and urged against it. How the Spanish
General responded to the Bishop’s plea is irrelevant because the city of Zaragoza surrendered to
his army, although Perez was able to escape into France.

There is very little record of Jaime Ximeno Lobera, the Bishop of Teruel, in CODOIN.
He apparently served only in that one ecclesiastical post, and no other document either in
CODOIN or in the secondary literature refers to him as Viceroy of Aragon at any other point.
The Bishop of Teruel does not appear to have held any other administrative posts and was not
separately involved in political affairs. More research from other sources would be necessary to
determine if he was an incidental or career cleric.

**Viceroy of Naples**

Apart from the one mention of the Bishop of Teruel as Viceroy of Aragon, CODOIN
does not reference other clerics in the role of Viceroy around the Spanish Empire. Other
literature indicates that when Ferdinand of Aragon died he left the Archbishop of Zaragoza as the
Viceroy in that Kingdom until Charles V arrived to claim the territory. In Naples, however,
clerics did occasionally serve as Viceroys of that Kingdom. CODOIN is mostly a collection of
letters and missives from various archives in Spain, but it also includes a reprint of some of the
books written in the time period. One such text is a collection of biographies of the Viceroy of
Naples, which was written in the mid-seventeenth century. As with the other positions that will

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19 CODOIN 12, p. 436
20 CODOIN 12, p. 428-9
21 Lynch, p. 479
22 Rowden, p. 65
be mentioned later, the Viceroy of Naples was almost always a noble. A few times, clerics served in that place instead. What is important to note is that all of these clerics were Cardinals.

During the reigns of Charles V and Philip II four clerics served in the post of Viceroy of Naples, whereas CODOIN only contains reference to one other cleric as Viceroy in any other kingdom, the Bishop of Teruel in Aragon as just discussed. Three of them held the positions as definite appointments, while Cardinal Bartolomé de la Cueva held the position as interim for the actual Viceroy while the latter was elsewhere.

The Role of the Viceroy of Naples in Spanish Italy

After Castile, the area of Southern Italy, encompassing the Kingdom of Naples as well as the island of Sicily, was the second wealthiest territory in the Spanish Empire. It was a relatively stable territory, and after 1529 did not face any significant land threat, although the Ottoman navy continued to harass the territory throughout the time of the Spanish Habsburgs. As such, it had a relatively small garrison while sending its men abroad to fight for the Kings of Spain in their wars elsewhere in Europe. A small local militia was founded in 1563 to try and augment the Spanish military presence, but during the time of Los Austrias Mayores it was not called on for defense of the territory.

The institution of the Viceroy was of Aragonese heritage, and it was Charles V who introduced it to Naples. The Viceroy was “the sovereign’s representative in a kingdom in which the sovereign did not reside.” He therefore was at the pinnacle of prestige and power as it could be accessed by somebody outside the royal family. Furthermore, as will be seen, in Naples the Viceroy enjoyed more autonomy than did his Aragonese counterpart. As with other positions in

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23 Astarita, p 103
24 Astarita, p. 99
25 Astarita, p. 100
26 Astarita, p. 89
the Spanish administration, lay aristocrats provided the vast majority of Viceroy in every Kingdom.\textsuperscript{27} That was the case in Naples as well, where lay aristocrats, including a few grandees, provided all the Viceroy of Naples except for the four here identified as clerics.

\textit{Cardinal Pompeo Colonna}

Cardinal Colonna is unique among the Viceroy of Naples in that he was not of Spanish origin. The Colonna family was one of the pre-eminent political families in Rome during the early modern era and was heavily involved in the Byzantine scene that was Roman court politics. In fact, initially Colonna had not been an agent of the Spanish Empire, but an actor in the Roman political scene. This member of the Colonna family did not forget his political origins even once elevated to the position of Cardinal. Pope Clement VII was a member of a rival faction in Roman politics, and so Pompeo Colonna was obligated by family loyalty to work against him. The biographer said of him that underneath his clerical robes he “concealed a warrior’s heart, and decided to confront the Pope and oppose his projects.”\textsuperscript{28} It was this animosity towards the Papacy that drove him to support Charles V. For various reasons, Pope Clement VII and Charles V did not cooperate on the Italian Peninsula, and in 1527 Cardinal Pompeo Colonna sent his forces to support the Emperor’s 1527 sack of Rome.\textsuperscript{29}

Equally, it was this opposition to the Pope that drew Cardinal Colonna to the Emperor’s attention and the Emperor decided to reward a Cardinal that through an accident of politics had become an Imperial ally. This enemy of an enemy was appointed to serve as the Captain General of Naples in 1530 in gratitude for his help against the Pope. This was the first time that a Cardinal had been appointed Viceroy, although bishops had previously served as regents for an

\textsuperscript{27} Bastamente, p. 17
\textsuperscript{28} CODOIN 23, p. 95
\textsuperscript{29} CODOIN 23, p. 94
absent monarch in other Spanish possessions.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 96} This new precedent was not universally accepted by other clergymen, and Cardinal Colonna was criticized for neglecting his religious duties in order to serve out this political appointment.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 97}

CODOIN gives very little record of actions that Cardinal Colonna took as Viceroy after his appointment. During his tenure, Charles required money to support his wars and the Cardinal raised taxes accordingly.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 98} Other than that, his only record in CODOIN is dying in office in 1532, two years after his appointment.

Cardinal Colonna was clearly an incidental cleric, joining the clergy because it was a route to power, especially in Rome. Before the death of his uncle and his subsequent ordination, Pompeo Colonna did not indicate any particular desire to be a priest. On the contrary, he penned the book *De Laudibus Mulierum*, or in English, *In Praise of Women*.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 95} As previously mentioned, during the 1527 Sack of Rome by the armies of Charles V, the Cardinal commanded his family’s personal forces in battle, fighting alongside the Emperor’s forces against the Pope. The mere fact of his commanding armies indicates that for him being a Cardinal was a means to greater secular power rather than a religious posting.

**Cardinal Don Pedro Pacheco**

Cardinal don Pedro Pacheco was appointed as Viceroy of Naples in the year 1553, and served until 1556.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 143} Prior to appointing him the Viceroy of Naples, Charles V had made Don Pedro Pacheco a bishop and sent him to various areas around Spain in order to enforce the administration of justice and prevent it, as the biographer described, from becoming “relaxed”.\footnote{CODOIN 23, p. 141}

It appears that he served the Emperor in this capacity for the next two decades before being
asked to attend the portion of the Council of Trent from 1551-1552. In both of these cases the pastoral role of the clergy was combined with working with the crown in an administrative function.

Immediately prior to being made the Viceroy of Naples, Pacheco was appointed to join the Papal Inquisition, and continued to hold both offices for his time as Viceroy. Probably because of his previous work as a roving justice working to ensure that the administration of justice did not become relaxed the work noted that upon his arrival Cardinal Pacheco had a reputation for extreme severity. Much like Cardinal Colonna, the record on Cardinal Pacheco’s tenure as Viceroy in CODOIN is relatively scant. However, there are a few interesting statements. One was that he specifically did not use secret prisons or exceptionally harsh punishments when dealing with criminals. Cardinal Pacheco was replacing the Don Pedro de Toledo, who was Viceroy from 1532 to 1552. Don Pedro de Toledo had implemented a secretive model of the judiciary in which secret charges and torture were common. This passage indicates that Cardinal Pacheco disposed of at least some of the elements of this model.

Cardinal Pacheco’s tenure as Viceroy overlapped with the period when Charles V abdicated and passed the Spanish territories to his son, Philip II. Philip sent the Marques de Pescara as his representative to meet with the Viceroy and take possession of Naples in the name of the new King. It was not a troubled transition and there was no resistance from the Cardinal, who was confirmed as Philip’s Viceroy as well. The new King did not keep his father’s appointment in place for very long before deciding that Cardinal Pacheco could better serve the interests of Spain if he went to Rome. The new Pope Paul IV was not welcoming of the Spanish

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36 CODOIN 23, p. 142
37 CODOIN 23, p. 143
38 CODOIN 23, p. 144
39 Astarita, p. 92
40 CODOIN 23, p. 144
presence in Italy, and so Philip II ordered Cardinal Pacheco to Rome to try and moderate the anti-Spanish sentiments of Paul IV.41

Cardinal Pacheco was not the Ambassador in Rome, a position then held by Don Juan de Zuñiga. In fact, as a result of a quarrel with the Ambassador, the Cardinal might have spent some time in the political wilderness.42 However, he continued to work with the Pope trying to persuade Rome to part with money to subsidize the Spanish war chest.43 The next date CODOIN associates with his activity after his 1556 transfer to Rome is 1565, when Cardinal Pacheco was able to secure a specific grant of money for the Spanish navy fighting against the Turks.44 After his period in the political wilderness, Cardinal Pacheco reemerged as an important figure in Rome, although he would never hold a position of authority. Instead, other Cardinals approached him to lobby with King Philip II for them although his letter does not specify what they were lobbying for.45 He also continued to report on the diplomacy that was occurring between various groups in the city of Rome, informing Philip II on the various affairs of the city.46

Cardinal Don Pedro Pacheco defies classification as either an incidental or career cleric. He is unlike the other clerics in this essay, who tended to either work in a political or administrative capacity to the exclusion of their pastoral duties or to only occasionally surface in politics as a result of their pastoral duties. The Emperor Charles V had made him a bishop and sent him around the Spanish countryside to enforce justice, but his sees had also moved around the Spanish countryside during the same time period, presumably to where he was working for

41 CODOIN 23, p. 147
42 CODOIN 97, p. 426
43 CODOIN 29, p. 423-4
44 CODOIN 29, p. 472-3
45 CODOIN 29, p. 426
46 CODOIN 29, p. 425
the Emperor. He was appointed to the Papal Inquisition shortly after becoming the Viceroy of Naples, and held both jobs concurrently. After leaving Naples to go to Rome, his duties assigned by his temporal superior, Philip II, were to interact with the Pope, which as a Cardinal was also his religious duty. Therefore, in the case of Cardinal Pedro Pacheco it must be said that he was a career cleric, but one who exercised his pastoral duties in the political and administrative sphere.

**Cardinal Don Bartolomé de la Cueva**

Cardinal Don Pedro Pacheco left Naples in 1556. He was replaced by the stern Duke of Alba, discussed in the background section on Philip II’s reign. Following the Duke of Alba was Don Juan Manrique de Lara. In late October, 1558 De Lara was called away from Naples, and when he left Cardinal Don Bartolomé de la Cueva became his lieutenant. In addition to being a cleric, Cardinal de la Cueva was also the brother of the Duke of Albuquerque, who was Viceroy in Navarre. This may have affected his selection, but unlike many other clerics who served a political function physically removed from their clerical duties, Cardinal de la Cueva was actually the Bishop of Avellino during his tenure as lieutenant for the Viceroy, a diocese near the city of Naples and inside the Kingdom of Naples. The biography of the Viceroy of Naples in volume 23 of CODOIN did not contain much information on Cardinal de la Cueva, and no trace of his activity in other volumes. Given CODOIN’s focus on the operation of the Spanish state, this implies that Cardinal de la Cueva was not a significant part of the political environment of the Spanish Empire. Given that and the proximity of his pastoral duties to his only administrative posting, it can be concluded that Cardinal Don Bartolomé de la Cueva was a career cleric for whom his primary work was pastoral, and that his clerical duties, along with a fortunate birthright, led him to temporarily hold an administrative appointment.

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47 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bpalg.html
48 CODOIN 23, p. 163
49 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bcual.html
His tenure as interim Viceroy for Don Juan Manrique de Lara was also short, for within a few months Philip II had asked him to join Cardinal Pacheco in Rome and watch over Paul IV.\(^{50}\) That was all the information that the biographer gave of the Cardinal. Despite his negligible action and short span in office, he still served in the capacity of Viceroy for a time, and so he was a cleric who was chosen to fill an administrative spot where a noble could have been. It is also worth noting that in the last two cases, those of Cardinal Pacheco and now Cardinal de la Cueva, Philip II did not appoint either: Pacheco was elevated by his father and de la Cueva was asked to serve in the interim by the current Viceroy. Philip in fact quickly urged both to go to Rome to serve Spain and the Church there, indicating that for these two men, neither of whom had particularly high political clout in the Spanish court, Philip was more comfortable using them in a clerical rather than temporal capacity.

**Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle**

Cardinal Granvelle was discussed in the previous section on clerics as politicians. He was one of the important statesmen of Philip II’s reign and as such, many of his other actions are discussed there. Also in that section he was identified as an incidental cleric in his role in policy formation. Granvelle was also the one cleric specifically picked by Philip II to be Viceroy of Naples. This section will address the actions that the Cardinal took during the time period of 1571-1575, his tenure in Naples and the period in which he implemented policy on his own but in the name of the King.

It was not initially Philip’s intention to choose Granvelle to be the Viceroy, but rather he was advanced as a compromise candidate between the interests of State and Church, which had reached a political impasse.\(^{51}\) Unlike for the other clerics who served as the Viceroy of Naples,

\(^{50}\) CODOIN 23, p. 164
\(^{51}\) CODOIN 23, p. 234
CODOIN contains extensive record of Cardinal Granvelle as Viceroy both in the seventeenth-century biography and also in other letters.

The Cardinal launched an ambitious program of legal reform during his four years as Viceroy. One of the reforms that he promulgated was to attack the power of sanctuary in Naples. It had grown to grant immunity for even the harshest of crimes, and Cardinal Granvelle passed a law severely curtailing its applicability. Various Cardinals in Rome brought him to the attention of the Pope on this topic, and as a result the Pope became enraged with Granvelle and it almost developed into a break between the new papacy of Gregory XIII and Philip II. The Pope threatened to place Naples under interdict unless Granvelle capitulated while the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, still Don Juan de Zuñiga, threatened to use the Spanish navy to sack Rome if he did so. The issue was eventually compromised and resolved without Rome and Spain splitting, but Granvelle had seriously antagonized the papacy. Sometime later, Granvelle also attempted to get the Cardinal Colonna, who was the Archbishop of Salerno, fired over disputes between the jurisdictions of Church and state. This again angered the Pope in Rome, but this time Don Juan de Zuñiga reported to Philip II that the Pope had decided to not pursue a confrontation because of the needs of the alliance against the Turks. The Viceroy promulgated about forty new laws during his time in an effort to crack down on some of the abuses of his time. Two of the more interesting ones aimed at corruption were laws intended to prevent public officials from either blackmailing people into doing their will or soliciting rewards for themselves or their families.

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52 CODOIN 23, p. 236  
53 CODOIN 102, p. 8  
54 CODOIN 102, p. 9  
55 Astarita, p. 126  
56 CODOIN 102, p. 55  
57 CODOIN 102, p. 63  
58 CODOIN 23, p. 236
The Spanish Viceroy in Naples was also theoretically the head of the Spanish presence in Italy, holding the highest prestige of all the royal appointments in that peninsula.\(^59\) Despite the need of Don Juan de Zuñiga to intervene to prevent a collapse of relations between him and Pope, of all the clerical Viceroyys this was clearest under Cardinal Granvelle. Perhaps his own political stature within the Spanish Empire helped him exercise this authority. But when most of the other Spanish in Italy wanted to go to war with Venice over some insult Zuñiga in Rome directly attributed the maintenance of peace to Granvelle’s adamant defense of the anti-Turk alliance. Unfortunately, in that letter to the King, Zuñiga does not tell us what the insult was, but he does write that it was Granvelle’s doing that things had not escalated to war. In another expression of the power of Granvelle as Viceroy of Naples, in 1573 the Cardinal issued orders to the Viceroy of Sicily, at the time an Italian nobleman, directing how the resources of his territory should be apportioned so as to protect both Naples and Sicily from Ottoman raids.\(^60\)

This authority stopped when it reached Don Juan de Austria, the commander of the Spanish forces at Lepanto and generally in the area afterwards. Before Lepanto the two cooperated, with Granvelle providing logistical support to the growing Spanish fleet that was to fight with the Holy League at Lepanto.\(^61\) After the battle, their relationship worsened and Don Juan took further steps to establish himself as completely autonomous of the Viceroy’s command. He moved the soldiers under his command around the region without consulting with the Cardinal, only informing him after the fact where they had gone.\(^62\) When Cardinal Granvelle asked Don Juan to delay an assault to wait for reinforcements because Venice had backed out of the Holy League, Philip’s half brother refused to wait and launched the assault of Tunis

\(^{59}\) Astarita, p. 89
\(^{60}\) CODOIN 102, p. 82
\(^{61}\) CODOIN 3, p. 49
\(^{62}\) CODOIN 3, p. 127
anyway. However, the Viceroyos of Southern Italy commanded the remainder of the forces in the region, and they responded to Don Juan’s increasing intransigence with their own. Both Cardinal Granvelle in Naples and the Duke of Terranova in Sicily refused to use their soldiers to reinforce Tunis against the Ottomans when Don Juan either ordered or asked for help (the biography in CODOIN was unclear). As a result, Tunis fell again and came back under Ottoman control, ending the period where Christian control in the Mediterranean expanded after Lepanto.

These events were the cause of bad blood between Cardinal Granvelle and Don Juan, so it is not surprising that when the aristocrat was sent to the Netherlands in 1576 it was the end of Granvelle’s influence in the affairs of that country, which he had enjoyed under the previous governors.

In 1575, Granvelle finished his four year term as Viceroy. The Cardinal returned to the Iberian Peninsula to serve in the central government in Madrid. His actions there are referenced in the section on him as a politician.

He was also the only Cardinal specifically appointed by King Philip II to the position, the other two from this time period having been the choices of other people. Nothing in his actions as a Viceroy contradicts the assessment in the previous section that he was an incidental cleric: one whose clerical robes were an unimportant part of his political power, and whose focus was on temporal affairs despite his spiritual authority. Like the other clerical Viceroyos, Cardinal Granvelle was not the Archbishop of Naples, a position held by Mario Carafa for the entirety of Granvelle’s time in Naples. In fact, he continued to be the Archbishop of Mechelen, a see in the Netherlands. In addition, while his program of legal reform is impressive, it was apparently

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63 CODOIN 102, p. 309
64 CODOIN 23, p. 238
65 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bcarafama.html
articulated against several of the historical privileges of the Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Naples and almost undercut relations between Philip II and the Pope in Rome.

Chapter Conclusion

Clerics served in the administration of the Spanish Empire as well as in the political scheming of the court. However, just as they did not dominate the political scene, their involvement in administration was also secondary to the lay aristocracy. Lay aristocrats constituted the majority of office holders, and their terms generally lasted longer. The Viceroys of Naples during the sixteenth century served an average of almost six years. This was led by Pedro de Toledo, the layman who held the title of Viceroy of Naples from 1532 to 1553. By contrast, Cardinal Granvelle served the longest term as a clerical administrator, and that was only four years.

In fact, clerics seem to have had less influence in the administration of the Spanish state than they did in its politics. Both Charles V and Philip II infrequently appointed clerics to be administrators, that is, to hold authority within the bureaucracy and to implement policy semi-autonomously. By contrast, the Spanish Habsburgs, especially Philip II, listened to the political opinions of several clerics, even if they did not become prominent members of his court.

An interesting feature of the narrative of these clerical administrators is that they were all bishops, unlike the previous chapter on clerics with political influence: no ordained clergyman was appointed to an administrative position unless he was also at least a bishop. In the previous chapter, many priests attained political influence while remaining friars, without holding positions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church, whether secular or specific to the religious orders.

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66 Astarita, p. 88
Finally, with the six clerical administrators discussed in this chapter, three, including Cardinal Granvelle, were clearly incidental clerics while two were more likely career clerics and one was impossible to judge from the sources in CODOIN. This makes clerical administrators far more likely to have been incidental clerics than the politically involved ones discussed in the previous chapter, many of whom were career clerics whose pastoral duties led them to be involved in politics for brief periods.
Conclusion

This thesis is a prosopographical study of clerics involved in politics and administration during the reigns of the Spanish Habsburg monarchs Charles V and Philip II. It primarily uses CODOIN but also references other sources to identify salient characteristics of these clerics and also their importance to the general Spanish Habsburg policy apparatus. The Spanish Habsburgs during this time period did not make heavy use of clerics at their court. There were relatively few clerics involved in politics and they did not influence policy to the degree experienced in other contemporary Catholic countries, such as France or the England of Mary I, where Cardinals and other clerics were routinely among the most powerful individuals at the Court. In addition, clerics in Spanish service were unlikely to be men whose actual clerical status was incidental to their ambition and had chosen it as a route to political power. Instead, the majority of clerics referenced in CODOIN were career clerics who happened to become involved in politics for a short period of time, usually as a direct result of their clerical duties.

A few clerics did serve at the Spanish Habsburg court. Some worked in the areas of policy formation and as such can be called politicians. With the exception of Cardinals Adrian, Espinosa and Granvelle, they were temporary parts of the court and served mostly as outsiders offering advice on specific issues for a limited period of time. The three Cardinals mentioned were involved with policy formation in multiple areas for a prolonged duration. Cardinal Granvelle especially spent his entire lifetime in political service despite holding clerical positions, whose duties he was not in a position to fulfill. CODOIN is primarily concerned with the political activities of the Spanish Habsburgs, but in the case of the career clerics it was common for there to at least be reference to a clerical career outside of their political activities.
and no such reference was present for Cardinals Espinosa and Granvelle or for Cardinal Adrian until he was elected Pope.

Other clerics served the Spanish state not in policy formation in the capital but in policy implementation in other parts of the empire. Unlike their colleagues who were classified as politicians, clerical administrators were less likely to be career clerics and to instead be incidental clerics. However, CODOIN contained even fewer of these clerics than those who had served in the field of policy formation. The administration of the state was far more tightly held by the lay aristocrats of the Spain.

Overall, a prosopography aims to discern the salient features of a group from their presence in a significant body of literature. CODOIN is a large collection of works from Spanish history, especially correspondence between the important political figures of Spain. This lends itself to a study of the political role of clergy as individuals operating and interacting with the Spanish court. The primary feature under consideration, after their influence at court, was whether they were incidental or career clerics. Numerically, the career clerics far outnumbered the incidental ones. However, the career clerics were concentrated in the group of politicians labeled as minor as well as a few of the administrators who served for brief terms. The incidental clerics among the administrators like Cardinals Colonna and Granvelle served longer terms, or like Colonna served until their death. Incidental clerics also accounted for three of the four clerical politicians identified as major contributors to Spanish policy. Cardinals Adrian, Espinosa and Granvelle were all incidental clerics, yet it was they who achieved the greatest degree of influence at the Spanish court. This cannot be explained by other factors such as noble birth, which Cardinal Adrian did not possess and which several of the less influential clerics did or the fact that they were not members of religious orders, a fact that was not unique to the
incidental clerics. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that a connection existed between their nature as incidental clerics and the level of influence to which they rose at the Spanish court.

The result of this prosopography is that clerics played a small role in both Spanish policy formation and its implementation; this role was smaller than that played by clerics in other countries. In addition, whereas in other countries it was common for clerics who were involved in politics to become prominent members of that scene for an extended duration, in Spanish politics the only cleric to be continually present on the political scene was Cardinal Granvelle during the reign of Philip II. Furthermore, no Spanish cleric during the reigns of the Spanish Habsburgs acquired the levels of influence and political prominence achieved by the prelates who served at the courts of contemporary Catholic countries. Therefore, it can be said that in Spain there were only a few clerics at court, both in terms of absolute numbers and also relative prominence.
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