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Utraque Unum

Georgetown University’s seal is based directly on the Great Seal of the United States of America. Instead of an olive branch and arrows in the American eagle’s right and left talons, Georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. The American seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, E Pluribus Unum, or “Out of Many, One,” in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. The Georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, Utraque Unum.

As the official motto of Georgetown University, Utraque Unum is often translated as “Both One” or “Both and One” and is taken from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. This motto is found in a Latin translation of Ephesians 2:14: ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum. The King James Version of the Bible says, “For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one.” Utraque Unum is the Latin phrase to describe Paul’s concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles; that through Jesus Christ both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
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As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in *Utraque Unum*. In addition to writers, we are looking for section editors, artists, graphic designers and web designers. Please e-mail the editors at utraque.unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
Cultivating Knowledge of America and the West
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The Editor’s Desk

Dear Readers,

The purpose of organizations like the Tocqueville Forum and our publication, *Utraque Unum*, is to create a sense of belonging and community and to give Georgetown students grounding in an increasingly lost world. From the family to friendships, and, increasingly, the community at large, relationships are being destroyed and redefined. The statistics are everywhere and overwhelming: marriage is under assault and dying as a viable institution, the nuclear family is nearing extinction, and the country has moved from the public front porch to the very private back patio. These are very daunting challenges for recent graduates as they enter and seek to make sense of an increasingly confused and misdirected world. The Forum seeks to provide students, willing to receive it, with a roadmap on how to endure life on the right track and to remind students that the destination and the path taken are vitally important.

The most disturbing part is that we are increasingly told, in our education and in our interactions with others, that these changes are positive, or at least neutral. The destruction of society is deemed as “progress.” Society is not a shark; it will not die simply because it has ceased to move. C.S. Lewis properly grasped the nature of progress in a more complete understanding. In *Mere Christianity*, he noted, “We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the place you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong turning [sic], then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If you are on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; and in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive man.” Undoing a wrong is not necessarily reactionary and changing in order to improve can be conservative if it preserves something of greater value than that which is lost. What matters is whether it is best for society to change or to preserve that which is best about itself.

When it comes to personal and civic morality, America took a wrong turn somewhere. All of this stems from a declining respect for traditional morality, whether based in faith, in reason, or their union. The name of our journal and the motto of Georgetown University, *Utraque Unum* is a reference from one of St. Paul’s letters to the Ephesians and meaning “Both one.” In order to turn back, we need to know where we went wrong and how to get back through understanding of our basis in faith.
and reason. We at Utraque Unum believe that we have been provided a guide in the form of the political and religious traditions we have inherited from Western Civilization and the Founding Fathers.

Only through the unity of faith and reason can the republic survive. John Adams said “Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.” The further off the map we go, the less adapted our system of government is to its people. The problem is not with the Constitution, but with the people. By increasing understanding of our past and the rich lessons and traditions passed down to us—both religious and secular—the next generation of citizens can build stronger marriages, families and communities in order to keep the republic strong and help it to endure the many challenges faced in the struggle to improve society.

Within these pages, I hope you will find enlightenment on how we can renew ourselves and remind ourselves where the map leads us and how to get where we are trying to go. It is never too late, but the longer we head down the wrong road, the longer it will take to get back and the more difficult it will be to retrace our steps. This is cause for optimism not pessimism as the authors of Utraque Unum point to various road signs along the way. Safe travels and enjoy!

Sincerely,

Collan B. Rosier
Editor-in-Chief
Faith, Reason, and Liberty

Patrick J. Deneen

I have just returned from a week in Krakow, Poland, where Karol Wojtyla served as priest, bishop, and cardinal until his election as Pope John Paul II in 1978. His spirit and memory in that city was greatly present in the wake of his recent beatification on May 1, 2011. I was honored to deliver a set of lectures to audiences of students and the general public during that time, as well as attending many informal gatherings in which I had the opportunity to discuss Polish history, culture and politics. I had been invited to Krakow to teach, but I ended up concluding it was I, and Americans generally, who stand to learn much from the Poles.

I was particularly struck by the deep piety of the people of Krakow. Catholicism in Poland is vibrant and exciting, sustained especially of the recent memory of the Church’s role in the liberation of Poland from the totalitarian plagues that ravaged that nation in the twentieth century. While most nations of Europe have moved gradually or precipitously away from Christianity in general, and Catholicism in particular, Poland shows a singular devotion to the Church and particularly strongly identifies Christianity with political liberty.

This connection is becoming less self-evident for many Americans, growing numbers of whom regard Christianity in general, and Catholicism in particular, to represent restrictions upon the unencumbered liberty of modern individuals. Instead, it is argued that religion should be a matter of private preference, and otherwise people should be at liberty to live their lives in whatever manner they see fit, short of harming or injuring others. Christianity’s historic role in seeking to promote a view of liberty as self-governance over the will and the curbing of appetite is increasingly replaced with a view of liberty that regards such teachings as unjustified structures upon individual preference.

Nevertheless, this intuitive understanding of the Poles—the equation of Christianity and self-governance, of Church and political liberty—is present to us in daily evidence in the central symbol of Georgetown: the University seal. Portrayed on the seal is an understanding that American liberty—represented by the American eagle—is buttressed by a combination of reason (represented by the globe held in one of the eagle’s claws) and faith (represented by the cross grasped in the other claw). American liberty, the seal discloses, is based in the twin inheritances of rationalistic philosophy and Biblical faith—the inheritances of Athens and Jerusalem. Reason and faith combine in a powerful witness for liberty in light of Truth, as articulated powerfully by Blessed Pope John Paul II in his encyclical “Fides et Ratio” [“Faith and Reason”].

Faith without reason threatens to become untethered, a mere assertion of belief ungrounded in the reality of the created world. At the same time, reason without faith is prone to increasingly narrow forms of self-serving instrumentalism—and would appear, in the context of the modern university, to the more imminent of the two threats. As Pope John Paul II wrote, in Fides et Ratio, “Reason [alone], in its one-sided concern to investigate human subjectivity, seems to have forgotten that men and women are always called to direct their steps towards a truth which transcends them. Sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice, and their state as person ends up being judged by pragmatic criteria based essentially upon experimental data, in the mistaken belief that technology must dominate all. It has happened therefore that reason, rather than voicing the human orientation towards truth, has wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by little has
lost the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the truth of being.”

Universities throughout the nation and world are increasingly dominated by the utilitarian logic described here by Blessed Pope John Paul II. As Georgetown becomes dominated by the language of “assessment” and “measurable learning outcomes,” it too is susceptible to the reductionism provided by “pragmatic criteria.” Like all institutions of higher learning today, there is tremendous pressure to demonstrate the pragmatic usefulness of a Georgetown degree, and the increased emphasis upon science and research are some of the responses to this pressure. Yet, in losing sight of the corrective of faith to the reductionism of reason, we endanger our ability to “rise to the truth of being,” and the capacity to live in liberty in the light of truth.

As we begin activities to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Georgetown’s beloved Jan Karski—the hero who desperately sought to inform the West about the slaughter of the Jews by the scientifically advanced and instrumentalist Nazis—we need to recall and commit anew to that deep connection between Christianity and liberty in light of the truth, and recognize that we stand to benefit in no small way from the great example and triumph of that humble priest and great pontiff from Krakow and Poland.

Patrick J. Deneen is a professor in the Georgetown University Department of Government and founding director of the Tocqueville Forum on the Roots of American Democracy.
Books that are “Great”—Books that are “True”

“The Good Shepherd (school) and Pigeonville College were trying to be the world of the past. The university was trying to be the world of the future, and maybe it has had a good deal to do with the world as has turned out to be, but this has not been as big an improvement as the university expected. The university thought of itself as a place of freedom for thought and study and experiment, and maybe it was, in a way. But it was an island too, a floating or a flying island. It was preparing people from the world of the past for the world of the future, and what was missing was the world of the present, where every body was living its small, short surprising, miserable, wonderful, blessed, damaged, only life.”

Wendell Berry, Jayber Crow

“The study of philosophy is not directed toward discovering what men may have thought but toward knowing what is true.”

Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s de Caelo et Mondo, I, 1

“The scholastic tradition was intended to be spoken out loud as I have insisted earlier. These two worlds cannot be lumped together under the rubric of ‘Great Books.’ Great Books fanaticism, once again, ignores the audience and in so doing reveals its parochialism, its innocence toward history. We no longer live in a book-dominated culture; to treat our students as though we did is to violate their very psychic structure. Today we enter a new kind of Middle Ages, but Great Books people still absent-mindedly behave as though they were living in the eighteenth or nineteenth century.”

Frederick Wilhelmsen, “Great Books: Enemies of Wisdom?”

Let me begin with some autobiography. For those who know me, they will attest that I often, from out of nowhere, suggest to them books or essays to read. Read Dorothy Sayers’ “Lost Tools of Learning!” Read The Habit of Being! Read Hans Urs von Balthasar’s “A Résumé of My Thought!” Read the Path to Rome. Read Ratzinger. Read Sokolowski. Off-handedly, I will affirm that you can probably save your soul and your mind by reading only three books—Josef Pieper—an Anthology, Chesterton’s Orthodoxy, and Kreeft’s the Philosophy of Tolkien. And I expect that whomsoever I am talking with will immediately drop his life duties and read Schall’s suggestion.

In a number of my books, I include a list of twenty or twenty-five books to “keep sane by,” or books “that tell the truth,” or books that
“awaken the mind.” These are never lists of what are ordinarily called “great books,” though, in another way, I think they are “great” if you grant that a book that keeps you sane, wakes you up, or tells you the truth is something you have been looking for all your life. It has long been my contention that someone could go to the best (or worst) of the universities, read the “greatest” of books assigned there, listen to the most famous professors, either on-line or in person, and still never come close to inciting that drive to know what is that lies at the heart of our personal existence.

I frankly envy you students here at Belmont Abbey College, since all you need to do to come in contact with the highest things is simply to go and chat with your Academic Vice-President for three minutes, which, alas, is about all the time she has left over from her daily duties. Ask her about fairy tales, mysticism, Ireland, Mt. Holyoke, horses, the speech of Parisian women, David Jones, Houston, the Blessed Virgin, science, her favorite poems, our last end, or just about anything else a body can think of. You will be, as I have often been, amazed and indeed amused. She is herself a “liberal education.” And what is so good about Carson Daly is that she has a twin sister who can cover the same route just as well as she can and in French, not that Carson does not also know French.

I give a short informal sub-title to my book Another Sort of Learning, a book that tells you much of what I want to speak of today. My short sub-title, in lieu of the much longer one on the book itself, is: “How to Get an Education Even While You Are Still in College.” Think about it. I usually add, “or anywhere else,” since I think the country and the world are full of people who realize that they really did not learn many of the important things as a result of their formal education. I do not think that knowing, or better learning to know, is painless.

What I do think, however, is that once we realize that “things exist and we can know them,” to use Gilson’s memorable phrase, we are on our way. In my experience, what usually sets some-one off in this pursuit is a book read, one usually encountered by chance in some odd hour or out of the way place. The book indeed can be Plato or Aristotle, and we always go back, or more likely, go forward to them, once we begin. But in saying these things, we are reminded that philosophy is not reading a book. Philosophy is closer to conversing than to reading.

But there are books that teach us ourselves to philosophize. And to philosophize is simply to know the truth and know that we know. Philosophy’s method is, as Msgr. Sokolowski says, to make distinctions and to delight in making them. What we find, I think, on reading such a book as I have in mind, say Pieper’s Leisure: The Basis of Culture or Benedict’s “Regensburg Lecture,” or Lewis’ Till We Have Faces is that we simply cannot contain ourselves. We want to tell someone about what we read, as if it is too great for us to keep to ourselves, which it is. This is why reading leads to conversation by its inner nature. The best thing you can do for a boy, Samuel Johnson says in Boswell’s biography, is to teach him to read. This will give him the whole world to talk about.

One further thing needs to be attended to. It is something I learned, I think, from Aristotle. It is that the adventure of learning is also an adventure in the morality of how we are living, of how we choose to live our lives. The Aristotelian distinction between practical and theoretical intellect is a most important, but it is not intended to tell us that we have two intellects. We have but one mind that we did not give ourselves. We can use it in two ways, 1) to know how and what things are, and 2) to know how to live and how to make, be it tables or symphonies. The first is the sphere of wisdom, first principles, and science; the latter is the arena of ethics, politics, rhetoric, craft, and art. We should seek to know, as I have put it in the title of a book, from Aquinas, “the order of things.” This is our delight.
the latter part of the 19th Century as American models of German “research” universities. They were conceived, perhaps, as a higher form of university being. The German universities did arise, however, out of a definite philosophical presupposition, namely, that truth was the result of “research,” of modern science. What was important was the “method” by which a thing was known. But a “method” can only reveal what the method is designed to reveal. Reality is always larger than any human method to discover it.

The English universities had a different idea, that of the “liberal arts,” a notion that goes back perhaps to Aristotle and Plato. Something was “liberal” when it freed us to be what we are, even in spite of ourselves. Liberal arts were concerned with what living well means. There were things for their own sakes that each person was delighted to pursue, if he would. He followed this path, to be sure, with the help of the great thinkers, including the religious thinkers. But the emphasis was on understanding the things that are.

No human person, not even Shakespeare, created the world or what was important in it. But most us wanted, out of a spirit of wonder, to find out what life was about. This indicated a world of speech and conversation. None of us have enough experience in our own lives to know what the range of human life is about. This is why, as C. S. Lewis also said, that we are given books so that we can know more lives than our own. We do this vicariously, by reading of them.

Earlier this year a friend gave me a copy of Waugh’s A Handful of Dust, a title that probably comes from Genesis through T. S. Eliot. The novel was about a rather dysfunctional English aristocratic family. The only child dies in a hunting accident. The couple breaks up. The husband goes on a scientific expedition to South America with a German scientist. In the course of things, they wend their way from Guyana to the Amazon. Everyone leaves or is killed except the Englishman. He stumbles on a very remote outpost in which there was a man who saved him from the jungle. The man was peculiar. The only thing he had was the complete works of Dickens, which he wanted read over and over again aloud. It became the function of the Englishman to read Dickens day after day for a few hours.

At first, he enjoyed rereading Bleak House and Pickwick. But he began to think that he should try to get back to England. It was then that he discovered that he was in prison. The Guyanan gentleman had a gun. He had evidently killed a previous reader who tried to escape. One night, the Englishman was deliberately drugged. When he came to, he found that there were three Englishmen who came to the outpost to find him. But the Dickens listener did not tell them where he was. The searchers returned to England to report that the man was dead. In the meantime the only future that the captive Englishman had to look forward to was death and the endless re-reading of Dickens to his jailor.

Not too long ago, I gave a lecture at Blessed Sacrament Parish in Arlington. I told this story. A couple of weeks later, I received a letter from a gentleman who heard the lecture. He sent me a copy of a chapter of a book entitled Great Fishing Stories. The story was about a man who was a great fly fisherman. The man died and went to heaven. When he got there, St. Peter had to look over is record. He saw that he was an avid fisherman. He asked him what he wanted to do in heaven. The man told him that he wanted always to fish in a perfect trout stream; that would be his idea of heaven. So Peter thought that could be arranged.

So Peter provided the best fly-fishing equipment. The man found himself by a very lovely trout stream and he saw a trout rising. He grabbed is rod and cast out. Sure enough he had a strike and brought in a very plump three pound Dolly Varden. The Man thought, “Well, this is terrific.” Just as he started to leave. He saw another trout rising in the same spot. He cast again. Bingo, another beauty. As he left again, he noticed a third ripple. Yet another fine trout was reeled in. The man began to be bored with this same spot so he started on. Peter asked him where he was going. He found out that he could
not go anywhere else in his own chosen heaven. The man said to Peter, “I got what I asked for but it is not heaven, it’s more like hell.” Peter said, “That’s right, that’s where you are.”

I tell you these stories only to explain to you what Schall learned this summer from his reading. Hell is getting want you want over and over again. Heaven is not what you want, but what God has offered to you, the scope of which you cannot imagine. This is, in fact, a rather rough summary of what the Book of Genesis is about.

I would tell you also of the western story that took place in Dodge City about a fighter with the symbolic name, Mr. Littlejohn. Its essence was that if a man did a cowardly thing to the woman he loved, he spent the rest of his life in seeking to do something brave that would save her. This too is right out of Aristotle.

III. The classic Jesuit schools, those that followed the Ration Studiorum, looked overall to eloquence, to the ability to speak and know how to deal with the world. They could not do this unless they first knew what the world was intended to be. This curriculum was much influenced by Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Cicero’s De Oratore. It was not enough to know, but one had to be able to speak, to convince, and to persuade. Students were to understand that knowledge was not effective if it could not be spoken or written well. Truth not only existed in judgment, but in knowing how to make this judgment persuasive in terms of words. There is a world of words as well as a world of things. Like liberal arts education, classic Jesuit education was aware of the effects on truth and action when our souls were formed by vices, pride, and vanity.

Ralph McInerny has often pointed out that the ambition of universities today is to be classified as “research universities.” We often see universities advertising their program as preparing undergraduates to be “research” oriented. Belmont Abbey College, I believe, is the only place you can go to learn to manage a motor speedway, something I would not mind knowing how to do myself.

In the “research university” model, before students have any clue about the whole, about the human and divine worlds, they narrow themselves to be “research” specialists. They neglect the what goes on in the thinking of any man, that thinking that we are still best exposed to by reading Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas. It is not that science does not have something to tell us, but that real education is about what science does not and cannot tell us.

Almost all schools of higher learning today, moreover, do have a program that, in one way or another, are designed to be a “great books” program. Often a certain mystique or elitism hovers above these programs. In his 1987 essay, “The Great Books: Enemies of Wisdom?” Frederick Wilhelmsen addressed himself to the subject of the great books program, usually associated with St. John’s College in Annapolis and the University of Chicago, with Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler, themselves liberally educated men, though some petulantly thought overly educated. Wilhelmsen thought that such programs were a substitute for a much better program, that of the direct study of philosophy from common sense. This was a method usually associated with the much-denigrated system of scholasticism. Josef Pieper’s book entitled, exactly, Scholasticism, is not to be missed on this topic.

This scholastic method, in Wilhelmsen’s view, did not confuse philosophy with the history of philosophy. And it did not think philosophy was something for the specialists, something that Benedict XVI also touched on in Spe Salvi when he remarked that Christ came to be depicted as a philosopher in the classical sense of that term. He was someone who knew and was wise about how to live. He was not a professor in a philosophy department.

Leo Strauss had also remarked that, not infrequently, it happens that the study of great books leads students to skepticism. When examined carefully, the great thinkers contradict each other. The student is thus thrown into confusion as he has not the wit or experience to see the dangers of these contradictory positions. He be-
gins to doubt if anything can be known if those said to be great prove each other wrong.

I once remarked this problem to the late Thomas Dillon, the President of Thomas Aquinas College, a school that might, at first sight, seem, like St. John’s, to be the epitome of a “great books” program. Dillon was quite sure that the careful study of “great books” would indeed result in this skepticism if no genuine philosophic understanding of things surrounded thinking of the great books. It is indeed part of truth to know what the great thinkers hold, even when in great error. Study of error is an intrinsic part of the study of truth, as Aquinas always reminded us.

Wilhelmsen himself gives the following description of a curriculum of studies that he himself took as a young man. This was before Catholic universities dropped what was, in fact, their strength. They suddenly themselves began voluntarily to imitate the great books programs or education based on electives, wherein the student went to college to study whatever he wanted.

“At the University of Detroit, where I began my studies, during my junior year,” Wilhelmsen wrote, “Father Bernard Wuelnner, S. J., introduced a textual course in the Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas; we read only the Latin original, something no junior class could do today.... Towards the end of the period I am discussing these subjects were often located within history. Etienne Gilson’s influence was crucial. But the goal remained the same: mastery of subjects and the acquisition of habits in pursuit of that mastery. When the stout lad who had done his apprenticeship was examined by a board of his betters at the end of his studies, he might have been asked to defend Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory or Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence or the principle of the double effect. He was rarely called upon to exegetize the texts in which these doctrines might be found. He was asked to break down a problem to its essentials, to reason about it, and, if possible, to make a conclusion and thus affirm a truth. We wanted truths, the reasons for them, and the capacity to orchestrate them. That constituted the study of philosophy on the undergraduate level in the vast majority of American Catholic colleges and universities.”

Wilhelmsen’s point is, of course, that what the student is to learn is philosophy itself, not the history of philosophy or the sundry opinions of the philosophers. Such things are worth knowing, but knowing them was not preparing a young student for the philosophic life, no matter what kind of life he chose to live in making a living.

Wilhelmsen points out further that the superior system of education that in fact existed in Catholic schools at the time was not “taken” away from them by some totalitarian government or some overzealous department of education. It was given up voluntarily in the name of imitating the “elite” schools. Wilhelmsen is quite blunt about this:

Philosophy is not the reading of books; philosophy is not the contemplation of nature; philosophy is not the phenomenology of personal experience; philosophy is not its history. These are indispensable tools aiding a man to come to know the things that are. But that knowing is precisely knowing and nothing else. We once were given this, not too long ago, in the American Catholic academy. With a few honorable exceptions, we are given it no longer. This is why philosophy is no longer talked into existence. It is no longer talked into existence because it is no longer thought into existence.4

Such are remarkable words, really.

Msgr. Robert Sokolowski, in his essay on “Philosophy in the Seminary Curriculum” touches on this same point. He is not at all opposed to textbooks that summarize and distill philosophic issues so that the student can see the issue itself apart from, though not neglecting, the historical or contextual origins of the problem. “Philosophy helps to articulate the way things are and the way they appear to us...,” Sokolowski wrote:
A very good way of presenting the Christian things is to contrast them with natural things: to develop some human good, some human truth that people know from their own experience, and then to show how the Christian truth both confirms this good and goes beyond it. The Christian sense of God, for example, is best conveyed to people by developing for them the human sense of an ultimate meaning in the world, and then showing how Christian revelation transcends it, and fulfills that meaning even while speaking about a God who is not part of the world.5

What Sokolowski is getting at is that we need to see these things in our own souls, in our own activities. We need ourselves to begin to philosophize, which does not mean that we need to become faculty members with “great” degrees.

To conclude where I began, I cited three things, one from Wendell Berry about the need to realize what is the present we ourselves live in, the actual people, the actual life that confronts our own lives. A second citation was also from Wilhelmsen who again urges us to look to conversation, to seeing things. He is not anti-book unless the book is separated from our lives. The book, as I see it, is often what wakes us up, what begins our search for the truth, for what is. The third citation was the famous one from Aquinas, who tells us that we study philosophy not to know what men thought but to find out what is true.

Recently, I received a letter from a man in Ohio who told me of the death of his wife. Along the side of his stationary, he affixed another citation from Aquinas, one that, in its way, completes the citation that I just read. This one affirms—and I have never found its exact source—“The greatest good that one can do to his neighbor is to lead him to the truth.” You might notice that here Aquinas does not say “Give him a cup of water or needed clothing,” not that this should not also be done. The greatest good is that we learn the truth and we will not find it if we do not seek it.

You have already been exposed to many things that are not true. That is not such a bad thing. You will be told that all is relative, that you make your own truth, that truth is peculiar to your time or place. But someday, I hope, you will come across a book, or a poem, or a teacher, or a musing of your own that will wake you up, make you curious. You will know when this happens. Plato called it a “turning around.” Augustine called it a “restlessness.” I call it a grace. “The greatest good that one can do to his neighbor is to lead him to the truth.” This latter good cannot happen in the neighbor unless it has first happened in oneself, in the realization that truth is first given to us, that we find it, we do not make it.

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Kant employs the terms “revolution” and “rebellion” to delineate two unique phenomena. I find the specificity of Kant’s terminology significant because it underscores the revolutionary potential of ideas in Kant’s philosophical system. Kant refers in his essay “Theory and Practice” to the concept of political revolt as rebellion, and not as revolution. Indeed, Kant never uses the term revolution in the German edition of “Theory and Practice.” Kant does, however, employ “revolution” in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in reference to the “revolutionary” change in the point of view (Denkweise) of modern science. The German terminology is important because it helps mediate the ostensible paradox posed by the “liberal” Kant’s “conservative” prohibition of rebellion.

This paper argues that Kant’s condemnation of rebellion is consistent with his larger philosophical project, specifically with his identification of duty as the ideal principle of morality and politics. Ultimately, Kant’s prohibition of a “right to rebellion” emerges as consistent with his general attempt to ground moral and legal judgment in the a priori principle of duty. Moreover, Kant’s moral and political theory offers more than a polemic against traditional theories of action and politics: it promotes the principle of duty for ethical and political judgment.

Kant’s main thesis in “Theory and Practice” is that the validity and value of theory does not depend on its immediate practical efficacy. More lucidly stated: the truth of a theory should not be evaluated according to its revolutionary potential, i.e. its ability to precipitate practical change; but to the extent that it discovers a rational purpose in nature behind human relations and a valid a priori basis for judgment and action. Kant’s argument for “theory” aims against moral and political theories that ground precepts in empirical experience. Kant argues that such theories fail to provide any “pure” bases for moral and political action. On the contrary, empirical theories reveal themselves to be completely contingent, and in Kant’s opinion unworthy of universal significance. Kant writes in “Theory and Practice:”

This maxim [that may be true in theory, but does not apply in practice], so very common in our sententious, inactive times, does very great harm if applied to matters of morality, i.e. to moral or legal duty. For in such cases, the canon of reason is related to practices in such a way that the value of the practice depends entirely upon its appropriateness to the theory it is based on; all is lost if the empirical (hence contingent) conditions governing the execution of the law are made into conditions of the law itself, so that a practice calculated to produce a result which previous experience makes probable is given the right to dominate a theory which is in fact self-sufficient.
Kant’s “anti-empiricist” position here is a moral and political formulation of his epistemic insights in The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). The CPR, which is often considered Kant’s magnum opus, initiated a Copernican shift in epistemology that reoriented knowledge around the subject. Kant appreciated the scientific method and strived to import its methodology to inquire about the possibility of a priori and transcendental truths in human relations. In particular, Kant valued the recognition in the historical development of science that reason ought to uncover permanent natural laws, rather than impose arbitrary principles upon material relationships that were at best approximations of reality itself. Kant writes in the CPR:

> But in a theory founded on the concept of duty, any worries about the empty ideality of the concept completely disappear. For it would not be a duty to strive after a certain possible to experience (whether we envisage the experience as complete of as progressively approximating to completion). And it is with theory of this kind the present essay is exclusively concerned

Aside from being a point at which Kant employs “revolution” to describe conceptual change, Kant’s favorable evaluation of the turn in scientific methodology from arbitrary imposition of “rational categories” to critical disclosure of a priori structures is the theoretical backbone of Kant’s moral and political project. Kant’s general aim is to synergize the epistemic methodology of Empiricism and Rationalism to overcome the problems he finds in the moral and political theories of utilitarianism (materialistic and eudemonistic) rationally posited abstract right (Natural Law), and power politics (Hobbes). Additionally, the CPR provides a narrative of the development of metaphysics that provides an archetype for Kant’s philosophy and teleology of history. The narrative underscores Kant’s belief that “revolutionary” theory affects the rational progression of history. Kant notes that without Copernicus’ revolutionary astronomical insights, Newton’s laws of physics would not have been possible. Kant has a similar goal in his moral and political theory: he aspires to initiate a revolutionary shift in the understanding of morality and politics, and in so doing, to push history in the rational direction of increasing freedom. From this contextualized “judicial perspective,” let us return to the “right of rebellion” within Kant’s political theory. Kant’s arguments against the right of rebellion can be schematized into an argument from law, morality, and history.

Kant’s arguments from law and morality provide the basis for his rejection of the right of rebellion and engender the ostensible paradox in Kant’s political theory between the particular limits of duty and the general telos of freedom. Kant’s arguments from history and those that draw upon the efficacy of theory provide the transcendental key to grasping the limits of freedom in light of the constraints of duty. It is important to note that Kant’s idealism is not ideologically naïve; it does not place its hope in an idealistic principle that has no relation to reality. On the contrary, Kant states in the forward to “Theory and Practice:”

> Aside from being a point at which Kant employs “revolution” to describe conceptual change, Kant’s favorable evaluation of the turn in scientific methodology from arbitrary imposition of “rational categories” to critical disclosure of a priori structures is the theoretical backbone of Kant’s moral and political project. Kant’s general aim is to synergize the epistemic methodology of Empiricism and Rationalism to overcome the problems he finds in the moral and political theories of utilitarianism (materialistic and eudemonistic) rationally posited abstract right (Natural Law), and power politics (Hobbes). Additionally, the CPR provides a narrative of the development of metaphysics that provides an archetype for Kant’s philosophy and teleology of history. The narrative underscores Kant’s belief that “revolutionary” theory affects the rational progression of history. Kant notes that without Copernicus’
of non-compliance, is contradictory to a foundational principle of a constitution as a political (or “social”) contract. Moreover, Kant argues that the possibility of non-compliance is contradictory because “such resistance would be dictated by a maxim which, if it became general, would destroy the whole civil constitution and put an end to the only state in which men possess rights.” Kant later provides a legal argument against the right to rebellion based on the fact that a constitutional government would have no means to adjudicate between parties in the social contract because both the head-of-state and the subject are parties in the case. Kant recognizes the insufficiency of these legal arguments. Consequently, he proceeds to a moral justification for the absolute demands of duty.

Kant’s moral argument against the right of rebellion is anti-utilitarian. Kant critiques a utilitarian justification for rebellion in his movement against the idea that the ends justify the means. In line with his moral philosophy, Kant’s political theory leaves no space for a right to rebellion grounded in the superior utility or happiness of the end state of things. Thus, Kant writes in “Theory and Practice”: “No generally valid principle of legislation can be based on happiness.” On the contrary, Kant argues that the general welfare should be considered according to Right and not in relation to utilitarian principles:

The doctrine that salus publica suprema civitatis lex est retains its value and authority undiminished; but the public welfare which demands first consideration lies precisely in that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law, so that each remains free to seek his happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large.

Indeed, Kant’s theory protects the freedom of the individual to determine his subjective eudemonistic ends. The general will in Kant’s system is the rule of law that grants freedom to pursue subjective ends (not the Hobbesian conception of the general will as the arbitrary determination of the sovereign authority). Moreover, the contractual obligations of the constitution in Kant’s system are binding by virtue of their rationality, not by virtue of any actual assent of the will to a contract. Indeed, Kant’s basis for contract is rational not arbitrary (dependent on the will). Thus, the obligations of the constitutional contract extend beyond the willed assent of the subject: “For so long as it is not self-contradictory to say that an entire people could agree to such a law, however painful it might seem, then the law is in harmony with right.” Although the subject is bound by the rationality of the law (rather than by virtue of his willed assent), Kant’s system (moving against Hobbes) allows for the retention of certain inalienable rights by the subject. In Kant’s system, the sovereign can only act coercively if there has been a violation of right, i.e. if a subject has infringed on the freedom (through violence or breach of contract) of another. In other words, the sovereign is bound by the principle of right:

Hobbes is of the opposite opinion. According to him (De Cive, Chap.7) the head of state has no contractual obligations towards the people; he can do no injustice to the citizen, but may act towards him as he pleases. The proposition would be perfectly correct if injustice were take to mean any injury which gave the injured party a coercive right against the one who has done him injustice. But in its general form, the proposition is quite terrifying.

Kant obviously positions himself against Hobbes, but does Kant’s prohibition of the right to rebellion lead to the same practical end? The answer is no and lies in Kant’s philosophy of history and epistemology.

In the context of Kant’s general philosophy, Kant advocates a right of revolution in so far as he sanctifies the “freedom of the pen” and believes that men are “unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature.”
Given Kant’s belief in the efficacy of revolutionary ideas on the course of history (in the CPR), Kant’s advocacy for freedom of expression in the public realm is a radically revolutionary concept. Kant discusses the suspension of the civic life between the freedoms of public realm and the obligations of private realms in “What is Enlightenment.” Kant’s argument there is paradigmatic of how it is that a citizen can be absolutely obligated by the law and simultaneously capable of initiating reform in his capacity for expression. Moreover, Kant’s discussion of the teleology of history in the “Idea of Universal History” is the most explicit exposition of his understanding of rebellion and reform.

In the “Idea of Universal History,” Kant recognizes that proximate arbitrary actions (like rebellion) rarely follow a rational pattern in history. Yet, the “free exercise of the will on a large scale” (in adherence to duty) opens up the possibility for a rational progression in human relations. Viewed from a historical perspective, rationally motivated arbitrary actions, such as those existing in the actions of non-compliance and rebellion, are meaningless. Nonetheless, a reform in the structure of compliant action, according a principle like duty, has the potential to affect a meaningful turn in the progression of human actions. Consequently, Kant’s system aims to open up the possibility for sustainable revolutionary change in a rational direction. Not only does Kant’s entire philosophical system move against Hobbes’ mechanistic and arbitrary appraisal of the political, Kant’s prohibition of rebellion functions and is grounded in fundamentally different metaphysical, epistemological, and moral precepts. Indeed, Kant’s “dualism” engenders ostensibly paradoxical demands on the political subject. Nevertheless, a critique of Kant ought to follow Copernicus’ movement from within to without: it is only from the judicial perspective of the entirety of Kant’s general philosophy that dualistic tensions can be synergized within the whole. The right to revolution and prohibition of rebellion in Kant stand in union under the principle of duty and the rational potential of history, and against Hobbes’ conception of the surrender of natural rights to the arbitrary dictates of the sovereign. At last, it is only “on the large scale” that Kant’s paradoxical demands on the political subject reveal their rational unity and progressive potential in the course of history.

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In 1821, Greece was far removed from the days of voting at the acropolis or of Plato’s Academy. The country was controlled by the powerful but waning Ottoman Empire. When Greece revolted in 1821, they turned to the inheritors of the Athenian traditions: Europe—especially Great Britain—and the United States. Unlike earlier foreign policy decisions for the United States about the use of force, “the Greek war posed an even more fundamental question. Should the United States give precedence to its economic interests in the Middle East or should democratic ideals?” This dilemma arose because America engaged in substantial trade with the empire while also seeing itself as the successor to classical Athens. Public opinion was diametrically opposed to America’s foreign policy interests. “America’s reaction to the Greek revolt was in large measure an outgrowth of Philhellenism, or ‘love of all things Grecian,’ a political and intellectual movement dedicated to ancient Greek civilization.”

The movement was influential and widespread across the entire nation. It claimed such patrons as Daniel Webster and Edward Everett, along with countless other elected officials and public intellectuals. Just as notable were the opinions expressed in newspapers and by common citizens who were vehemently pro-Greece, staging meetings and donating supplies and money. These groups disagreed sharply with the attempts by the United States to negotiate a commercial agreement with the Ottomans, and were perceived as undermining the foreign policy being implemented by President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. Although the influence of Philhellenism was commanding and widespread in America, the desire to free the Greeks from political and religious oppression was ultimately not strong enough to overcome the United States’ diplomatic and commercial interests with Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

In the early nineteenth century, the nation was swept up in a renewed religious fervor known as the Second Great Awakening in reaction to the widespread conception that economic concerns should be paramount in foreign and domestic policy. One major by-product of the Second Great Awakening was the advent of an Americanized secular faith in the benefits of democracy and a desire to ensure these same principles for other peoples. The United States saw itself as a guiding light for the world. “Many Americans shared that dream, viewing Greece, along with Biblical Israel, as their cultural birthplace and Greece’s quest for freedom as identical to America’s own recent struggle against misrule.” Public support for the Greek cause was
national; it crossed geographic and economic boundaries. Mass meetings and societies sprang up in areas such as Washington, D.C., Albany and New York City, Charleston, South Carolina, Springfield, Massachusetts, New Orleans, Baltimore, Cincinnati and countless cities in between. As quickly became apparent, “popular support for the Greek insurrection meant that Congress could no longer ignore the issue.” This recognition spurred Daniel Webster to involve himself in the Greek cause.

Although the American public held a civic faith of sorts, one must remember the role of traditional religious faith in influencing public opinion on Greece. “The Greek revolt appealed not only to Americans’ romantic side but also to their religious convictions. Large segments of the American population viewed the conflict as a showdown between Islam and Christianity, and the Greeks as later- day Crusaders.”

Due to the efforts of journalists, public officials, and American eyewitnesses, a polarized view developed between Americans’ views of the Ottomans and the Greeks. This view was designed by pro-Greek groups to reinforce philhellenism and sway public opinion in favor of proactive engagement, as

Most Americans thought of the Turks as barbarians—uncouth, uncivilized and destructive. As Christians, Americans applauded the uprising of Greek Christians against the infidel Turks…Clergymen especially were shocked by the execution of the Patriarch and the dragging of his body through the streets of Constantinople…Greek atrocities against the Turks, on the other hand, were usually excused.

Americans and Greeks alike both made a conscious effort not to misguide the public, but did not shy away from influencing attitudes. They hoped to underpin a particular mindset and to properly utilize public outcry to the best effect. “The intensity of American Philhellenism and opposition to Islam was undoubtably [sic] known to the provisional Greek government when it asked the ‘fellow citizens of Penn, of Washington, and Franklin’ to help ‘purge Greece from the barbarians, who for four hundred years have polluted its soil.’” These tactics were incredibly successful. Food, arms, supplies and capital were raised and sent to the aid of the rebels, often through British intermediaries. “In all, Americans raised some $100,000—about $2 million today—and [even] helped finance the building of the sixty-four-gun frigate Hudson, Greece’s flagship.” It is safe to say that the philhellenes exerted amazing influence over public opinion toward the revolt.

Perhaps the specific American individual most associated with the cause of Greek emancipation was then Congressman Daniel Webster. Though it is true that he was a staunch proponent of extending diplomatic relations to the Greeks and moving toward recognizing independence, it appears he did not personally believe in the arguments regarding civic or religious faith. He seems to have recognized the overwhelming public support for Greece and for reasons of political expediency, to advance and repair his reputation after his opposition to the War of 1812. “He believed he could…[turn] the Greek revolution to his own advantage. He knew the Greek struggle had become a popular cause with many Americans.” This does not, however, detract from his impact on the formation of pro-Grecian sentiments in America. His biggest impact on the debate was in a resolution and subsequent speech he gave on the floor of the House of Representatives on January 19, 1824. In his private correspondence with Edward Everett while planning the speech the previous November, he noted, “the message will contain strong expressions of sympathy for the Greeks, & [propose] that…Congress should pass a Resolution, appropriating a fund for some sort of agency to Greece.”

That was the express purpose of the resolution, but the speech’s importance comes from his compelling reasons as to why American should support the Greeks. In fact, the speech contains...
many of the central arguments in favor of extending relations to the Greeks used in the public discourse. Citing the philhellenes’ view that the roots of American liberty were based in Ancient Greece, Webster declared: “This practice of free debate and public discussion, the contest of mind with mind...even the edifice in which we assemble...all remind us that Greece has existed, and that we, like the rest of mankind, are greatly her debtors.”

The torch from ancient Greece had been passed on to the new bastion of liberty, the United States. The glory that was Greece had faded though, and they were now being oppressed by the Ottoman Empire. “[Webster] addressed the House at length and argued that Americans, as custodians of liberty for the world, had an obligation to publicize their moral support for the cause of Greek independence.”

Beyond expressing the views of the philhellenes, the speech also contained arguments of a religious nature in favor of American support of the revolutionaries, stating that “the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte feel daily all the miseries which flow from despotism, from anarchy, from slavery, and from religious persecution...In the whole world, sir, there is no such oppression felt as by the Christian Greeks.”

Strong language like this begs a response and increasingly enlivened the public fervor. The resolution ultimately failed due to the maneuverings of the Monroe administration, Webster’s considerable oratorical repertoire helped propel the cause.

Although Webster provided the lungs of the American Philhellenes, he needed the assistance of Edward Everett to supply the intellectual vigor to the pro-Greek argument. Everett, himself a Congressman, was a former Harvard professor and editor of the influential North American Review, which he used to advocate for the Greek cause. More importantly, Everett had perhaps the longest history of Philhellenism of any prominent American at the time. His Master of Arts oration at Harvard was on Greek independence. While in London, Everett met with Lord Byron—the ultimate champion of the Greek cause—and travelled Greece extensively, forming amicable relationships with the Greek elites. Webster, admittedly ignorant of many of the particulars of the Greek cause, naturally turned to his friend and colleague. In 1823, Webster wrote to Everett regarding his forthcoming resolution and speech: “I feel a great inclination to say or do something in their [the Greeks’] behalf...If you can readily direct me to any sources, from which I can obtain more information than is already public, respecting their affairs, I would be obliged to you.”

Everett was the brain behind the eloquence of Webster primarily because of Everett’s long-held advocacy of Greek independence. It appears, however, that Everett also saw some professional gain in Greek independence. “Webster prevailed upon Everett, whom he implied might well become the first American ambassador to Greece, to join him as a silent collaborator.” Although Everett was eminently qualified, the chance for promotion undoubtedly weighed on his mind.

Everett’s journal was not the sole voice of literary support for the Greeks. “[G]enerally speaking, the American Press was pro-Greek and sought to arouse public interest in the Greek struggle. It praised Greek victories and denounced Turkish atrocities in detail and horror while explaining away Greek atrocities.” The journals purposely hid the dissension amongst the Greek revolutionaries, the reality of which would have undermined public support for the Greek cause. These journals idealized much of the news coming from Greece to appeal to the newfound civic and religious faith sweeping the country after the Second Great Awakening. “American journals praised Greek revolutionary leaders... They depicted them as true heirs of the ancient Greeks, fighting, as their ancestors once did, at Marathon, Thermopylae and Salamis for civilization and freedom against hordes of barbarians.”

Papers from New England to Richmond and Kentucky to Pittsburgh all expressed a desire for the United States to openly endorse Greek freedom. These journalists were successful mainly...
because they tapped into and expanded a fervor that already existed in the general population. Indeed, “the press received news about Greece from letters from Americans in Greece and Turkey and American seamen in the eastern Mediterranean. These letters were almost always sympathetic to the Greek cause.”36 The journalistic outpouring of support, though, was matched by the views of many prominent figures in education, the arts and the government—beyond those already mentioned. American poet William Cullen Bryant following the example set by Lord Byron, joined the cause. The author Washington Irving attended major events, as did Yale University President Jeremiah Day, and Noah Webster of dictionary fame. Nicholas Biddle, later to become president of the Second Bank of the United States, former Treasury secretary and minister to France Albert Gallatin, and William Henry Harrison, a hero from the Battle of Tippecanoe and the War of 1812 as well as later President of the United States, among countless others also heralded the Greek cause. Even former president John Adams gladly offered monetary donations to the Greeks. In addition, governors and state legislatures from across the country sent petitions and resolutions to Washington in favor of the Greeks.57 Support for the Greek cause was widespread and deeply felt, but the question remained whether this would lead to official government action.

Despite the widespread support of politicians and the general public, one very important person was not pro-Greek: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. “Adams viewed pro-Greek agitation coldly, and adamantly opposed official recognition and aid. He regarded the philhellenic movement as a threat to the isolationist foreign policy that he had gradually persuaded Monroe and his cabinet to accept.”38 Adams embodied the diplomatic corps of the United States before one was formally created. He had served in many of the most prominent diplomatic positions in the new republic before becoming Secretary of State under James Monroe. Widespread acceptance of his prominence in foreign affairs led to Adams having an unusual amount of control over American foreign policy during this period. One of the major dilemmas of his tenure revolved around whether or not to recognize and officially aid the Greeks. “How could the interests of merchants and missionaries in the Middle East be reconciled with the philhellenism displayed by much of the American public? This was the predicament that confronted John Quincy Adams.”39

Although Adams shared a very deep religious opposition to Islam and the Ottoman Empire, he came down on the side of America’s diplomatic and financial interests. At this time, Adams was leading American efforts to secure the first United States commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire. In the summer of 1822, before Webster’s speech, “the administration sent into Greek waters a naval squadron...Both the Greeks and their friends abroad regarded this move as evidence that America was considering giving them her support. Actually, the administration was interested only in protecting American commerce.”40 Whereas the philhellenism exemplified the spirit of liberty and the idealism for global democracy, Adams took a very cautious and realistic approach.

Adams maintained that the most important goal for America should be the expansion of her commercial empire and the protection of her sphere of influence in the Americas. “[Adams] worried that by intervening on the European continent in favor of Greece America might undermine its opposition to further European conquests in the Western Hemisphere, as stated in the Monroe Doctrine.”41 The Monroe Doctrine originally “contained a broad acknowledgement of the Greeks as an independent nation, and a recommendation to Congress to make an appropriation for sending a minister to them.”42 Adams, however, utilized his influence within the cabinet to have the passage removed. The only agent appointed to the region was George B. English, who served as Adams’ secret envoy to the Ottoman Empire to negotiate the commercial agreement.43 When it came to the federal govern-
ment choosing between its philosophical motivations and the preservation of its commercial and diplomatic interests, economics and realpolitik clearly won.

In America’s first real foreign policy dilemma between upholding its principles and securing interests abroad, the Monroe Administration responded by protecting its material wealth. America did this in stark opposition to pervasive and vehement public support for Greek independence. The fervor surrounding Greece at the time also claimed many of the most important minds in American politics and culture and saw widespread support from newspapers of the time. While the American people as well as many of their elected representatives were publicly supportive of the Greek revolutionaries, even going as far as to send supplies and money to them, the official government policy was to maintain and secure the country’s economic interest and protect spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams managed to prevail over a seemingly inexorable tide of public opinion. Despite public attitudes and the private efforts to help the revolutionaries, the idealism of a reinvigorated Greek democracy was not enough to dissuade the American government from securing the economic power of the nation above ideology.

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Pope Benedict’s Liturgical Vision and its Implications for Young Catholics

“P. Introibo ad altare Dei. S. Ad Deum qui laetificat juventutem meam.”

From the 1962 Missal of Blessed John XXIII

For centuries these words immemorial began the Catholic Mass: “I will go in to the altar of God: to God, who giveth joy to my youth.” However, following the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Mass, and the liturgy as a whole, was reformed, culminating in the issuance of the Roman Missal of Paul VI in 1970 (while ‘liturgy’ encompasses more than just the Mass, the term will generally be used in this paper to refer to the Mass, as the Mass is the principal liturgy). This reform was called for and supposedly guided by the first document issued by the Council, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Concilium, promulgated in 1963. Despite the number of positive developments brought about by this liturgical reform, it has become increasingly evident that deficiencies and discrepancies exist between the proposed reform outlined in Sacrosanctum concilium and the reality of the liturgy as implemented in the Church following the Council. One of the most influential and important theologians to write on this point is Joseph Ratzinger, who became Pope Benedict XVI in 2005. Having been ordained at a Mass as it existed before the council, having taken an active role as a theologian in the Second Vatican Council, and having experienced the liturgical reforms implemented following the Council, Ratzinger offers a unique and valuable perspective and vision on the liturgy. It is precisely this vision which the Church must contemplate and put into practice, in order that the Catholic liturgy might constantly “give glory to God and bring salvation to souls” by more fully and faithfully implementing the Council’s teachings. Thus, the liturgy might benefit the spirituality of young people, in particular, as they seek to build what Pope John Paul II called a “civilization of love.”

Over the years, Ratzinger has developed a vision for the liturgy that is both critical of the post-conciliar liturgical state of affairs and formative on the basis of an authentic reading of Sacrosanctum Concilium. This latter aspect is emphasized by Fr. Glen Tattersall in his discussion of the fundamental principles that influence Ratzinger’s understanding of the liturgy: “There is no question of [Ratzinger’s] commitment to the doctrinal content of Sacrosanctum Concilium.”

As for the reasoning behind Ratzinger’s development of his vision, the then cardinal himself explains:

I am convinced that the crisis in the Church that we are experiencing is to a large extent due to the disintegration of the liturgy...
then, is the Church to become visible in her spiritual essence? Then the community is celebrating only itself, an activity that is utterly fruitless.\textsuperscript{159}

Thus, Ratzinger sees the liturgy as an issue of paramount importance, one that impacts all other areas of the Church’s life. Accordingly, he has often been grouped with theologians and liturgists, such as Klaus Gamber and Aidan Nichols, who advocate for a “reform of the reform.”\textsuperscript{160}

Indeed, this is not an unfair characterization, as Ratzinger himself has stated his support for a new liturgical movement: “If this book [The Spirit of the Liturgy] were to encourage, in a new way, something like a “liturgical movement,” a movement toward the liturgy and toward the right way of celebrating the liturgy, inwardly and outwardly, then the intention that inspired its writing would be richly fulfilled.”\textsuperscript{161}

Specifically, what elements would characterize Ratzinger’s vision for a new liturgical movement? Broadly speaking, Ratzinger’s liturgical vision is built on the central theological premise that liturgy must “look, not at itself, but at God [and] allow Him to enter and act.”\textsuperscript{162} John Baldwin, SJ states that the greatest strength of Ratzinger’s “analysis of liturgy and sacrament today is his insistence on keeping God at the center of the liturgical celebration.”\textsuperscript{163} On this cornerstone are laid other key elements of Ratzinger’s liturgical vision including active participation as involving an inner process,\textsuperscript{164} the importance of silence,\textsuperscript{165} the proper physical and spiritual orientation in the liturgy,\textsuperscript{166} and the use of Latin in the liturgy.\textsuperscript{167} None of these tenants in any way defies or contradicts the teachings of the Council in Sacrosanctum Concilium. In fact, the document specifically mentions the importance of silence and that, contrary to the general de facto reality of the domination of the vernacular in the liturgy, the “use of Latin is to be preserved in the Latin rites.”\textsuperscript{168}

In order to understand better Ratzinger’s liturgical vision, it is important to place it within the context of the post-conciliar liturgical landscape by briefly examining a number of the specific concerns that Ratzinger has regarding that landscape. Drawing on Sacrosanctum Concilium, Ratzinger first reflects on the critical principle that liturgy “grow[s] organically from forms already existing.”\textsuperscript{170} He writes, “In the wake of the Council a lot of things happened far too quickly and abruptly, with the result that many of the faithful could not see the inner continuity with what had gone before. In part it is simply a fact that the Council was pushed aside.”\textsuperscript{171} Ratzinger shows the disparity between Sacrosanctum Concilium §23, which mandates that liturgical reform take place organically, and how the reform of the Roman Missal proceeded in reality: “With all its advantages, the new Missal was published as if it were a book put together by professors, not a phase in a continual growth process. Such a thing has never happened before. It is absolutely contrary to the laws of liturgical growth...”\textsuperscript{172} The aforementioned principle found in Sacrosanctum Concilium is then applied to the phenomenon of ‘creativity’ that often marks modern liturgies in one way or another:

Only respect for the liturgy’s fundamental unsopontaneity and pre-existing identity can give us what we hope for: the feast in which the great reality comes to us that we ourselves do not manufacture but receive as a gift. This means that ‘creativity’ cannot be an authentic category for matters liturgical...[It] has no place within the liturgy. The life of the liturgy does not come from what dawns upon the minds of individuals and planning groups. On the contrary, it is God’s descent upon our world, the source of real liberation.\textsuperscript{173}

Finally, Ratzinger concludes that the result of localized creativity in the liturgy turns the true nature and purpose of liturgy on its head, instead making the liturgical action into mere entertainment: “…If the liturgy is to be the work of the community, it must also be created by it; and, putting it crudely, this led to its being measured...
by its entertainment value...as a result of all this, the liturgy actually lost its authentic inner vibrancy." Exemplifying this point by reflecting on the not uncommon occurrence of applause in the liturgy, Ratzinger states, “Whenever applause breaks out in the liturgy because of some human achievement, it is a sure sign that the essence of liturgy has totally disappeared and been replaced by a kind of religious entertainment.” Thus, Ratzinger finds in the inorganic development, creativity, entertainment factor, and other phenomena of modern liturgy cause for great concern and for the need for a reform of the reform.

Having confirmed the existence of major challenges to authentic liturgy and the corresponding need for reform, the present liturgical situation ought to be examined in its relation to young Catholics. One might begin by assuming that youth are the “modern people” of whom Paul VI spoke in his general audience on November 26, 1969, who, for instance, are supposedly “so fond of plain language [as opposed to the traditional language of the liturgy, Latin] which is easily understood and converted into everyday speech.” The mentality of this sort of assumption is certainly evident in practices such as youth masses, which, it would seem, tend to approach the aforementioned entertainment-focused venue particularly through various modes of creativity and popular forms of music.

Yet Kevin Irwin, reflecting on his observations of college students and the profound differences that exist even between his and their generations, offers a different, and arguably more accurate picture of young people today: “I judge that underlying [young people’s] frequent participation in devotions [including those which might be considered more ‘traditional’, such as Eucharistic adoration] is a hunger for silence...My generation cultivated silence and solitude. These students live in an iPod, earbud, YouTube, IM, text message, Blackberry, iPhone, iTunes, Myspace, cellphone culture in which it is rare to see any of them without something in or at their ears...” Irwin’s observations lead to the conclusion that in the rush to modernize following the Council, particularly with regard to the liturgy, it is not outrageous to say that reformers, because they could not envision the extent to which modernity would influence the individual and the culture (such as through the omnipresence of mass media) at the dawn of the 21st century, partially or totally stripped the liturgy of certain qualities, such as profound lengths of silence, which had always been necessary for one’s spirituality but are ever more necessary today.

Furthermore, to the detriment of the Church, many in positions of liturgical leadership have continued to hold fast to such emaciated reforms even as the situation of modern society and culture is quite evident and causes the believer, especially the younger ones, to cry out for want of stability, tradition, depth, and meaning. Thus Tracey Rowland is accurate in her assessment of modernity and liturgy: “Anyone wanting to escape the culture of modernity with its lowest-common-denominator mass culture will find it difficult to do so at many contemporary Catholic liturgies based on the Lercaro-Bugnini principles.” Not only do such liturgies deny young people a spiritual alternative to modernity, they deny them the rich spiritual, theological, and liturgical heritage of the Catholic faith: “Certainly, listening to a sustained lament over the loss of certain ancient forms has meant that young Catholics have grown up with a nagging sense of liturgical inheritance denied. Intense forty hours’ devotion, churches stuffed with flowers and candles, Benediction with ear-ringing Latin and eye-stinging incense, whispered prayers and booming hymns—all described a veritable phantasmagoria that was within cultural memory but usually outside contemporary experience.” John Heard refers to his experience as an altar boy growing up, often hearing the regrets of priests and elders over the various liturgical losses that followed the Council, concluding that “The implication was often that if things were not exactly done wrong now, then at least they were too often done in a manner
that was less than heavenly. The wider point was that our generation had missed out.”

To correct this depravation and to promote Catholic liturgy in its authenticity, Ratzinger, in his vision for the liturgy “believes that showing respect for faithfully transmitting the Liturgy to the next generation has the effect of guaranteeing the true freedom of the faithful.”

In order to accomplish this goal of the faithful transmission of the liturgy to the next generation, Ratzinger, now as Pope Benedict XVI, undertook what Thomas Woods termed a “revolution,” by issuing the motu proprio Summorum Pontificum in July of 2007. This move, allowing for the liberalization of the Traditional Latin Mass, now termed the “Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite,” is clearly in line with Benedict’s vision for the liturgy, as outlined and discussed above.

Critical reaction to the Pope’s move ranged from viewing it as a radical rollback of the Second Vatican Council to the more common dismissive approach that saw the motu proprio as pertaining only to “a tiny minority.” While the former approach is generally hysterical and has already been shown to be severely lacking in substance, the latter criticism must be examined in the light of Benedict’s liturgical vision.

In his Letter to the Bishops, which accompanied the motu proprio, Benedict explains that his directive is to be understood as recognizing the existence of two forms of the same Roman Rite: the Ordinary Form (the Missal of 1970) and the Extraordinary Form (the Missal of 1962). Furthermore, Benedict boldly asserts the principle that is evidently the basis for the reform of the reform, his liturgical vision put into practice: “The two Forms of the usage of the Roman rite can be mutually enriching.” Rowland’s explanation neutralizes both of the aforementioned criticisms: “In other words...Benedict would simultaneously affirm the rights of those who prefer the [Extraordinary Form] at the same time as fostering a reform of the reform based on what he regards as an authentic reading of Sacrosanctum Concilium.” Three ways in which the liberalization of the Extraordinary Form will lead to the greater realization of Benedict’s vision for the liturgy are “the hope that even those who decline to use the Missal of [1962] will be encouraged to celebrate the Novus Ordo of 1970 with the reverence and solemnity that befits the ineffable mystery of the Mass,” the “strengthening [of] the continuity of the Catholic tradition in matters pertaining to lex orandi,” and regarding the Missal of 1962 as “an essential point of reference for the reform of the Pauline Missal [of 1970].” These three factors point to the reality that Benedict “has no desire to return simply to the pre-Vatican II liturgy.” Rather, Summorum Pontificum should be viewed in the context of being both a gift to the “good number of people [who are] strongly attached to [the Extraordinary] usage of the Roman rite” and a major dynamic in and impetus for the reform of the reform.

If one read the aforementioned standard criticisms of Summorum Pontificum in isolation (or as some agenda-driven critics would prefer their pieces be read), one could easily draw the conclusion that the motu proprio has little or no bearing on young Catholics. Yet, as it has been demonstrated, young people especially are in need of a reform of the liturgy and a major element of such reform is the opening of the Church’s rich liturgical patrimony through Summorum Pontificum. Furthermore, as explained, Summorum Pontificum also has implications for those many young people who may prefer the Ordinary Form. “By liberalizing the use of the 1962 Missal, the object is not then the scrapping of the ‘new’ Mass, rather a perfecting of the Roman Rite as a whole and a way of more perfectly implementing the teachings of Vatican II on the liturgy, in their entirety.” For example, Tracey Rowland points to Benedict’s promotion of the use of Latin in the Ordinary Form of the liturgy, even in those liturgies “geared” towards young people: “In these times of globalization it is useful to have a liturgical language which is transcultural and transnational. [Benedict] has therefore expressly recommended the use of Latin.
for large-scale liturgies such as those associated with papal events. The clearest example would be the World Youth Day Masses attended by millions of pilgrims from all over the world.”¹⁹⁵

Benedict also draws attention to the phenomenon of young people being drawn to the Extraordinary Form, a phenomenon that seems to run contrary to the mainstream accepted wisdom: “Immediately after the Second Vatican Council it was presumed that requests for the use of the 1962 Missal would be limited to the older generation which had grown up with it, but in the meantime it has clearly been demonstrated that young persons too have discovered this liturgical form, felt its attraction and found in it a form of encounter with the Mystery of the Most Holy Eucharist, particularly suited to them.”¹⁹⁶ This truth has been confirmed by Archbishop Burke of St. Louis¹⁹⁷ and by the existence of the Juventutem International Federation, an international organization of young people attached to the Extraordinary Form, conceived from the World Youth Day gatherings.¹⁹⁸

Why then are many young people in particular drawn to the Extraordinary Form? Recalling both his observations of young adult liturgical practice and taste and his reflections on 21st century society and culture compared to that of the mid-20th century, Kevin Irwin offers insight: “I suspect that some of their fascination with the [Extraordinary Form] is its plentiful silence (for the congregation), its strict controls that avoids (sic) having to engage the vagaries and vicissitudes of different priest celebrants, and an automatic sense of otherness and transcendence by the use of Latin, incense, and ritual silence… this generation seeks out devotions [such as the Extraordinary Form] precisely because they participate at Mass and have so much noise in their lives.”¹⁹⁹ All of the factors listed by Irwin correspond neatly with the liturgical vision of Benedict outlined above. In particular, the last part of the quote underscores the Pope’s point that the post-conciliar liturgy has often lacked the contemplative silence, which is so necessary, especially for today’s young people: “Certainly, even before the Pope’s motu proprio, many young people had developed a sense of alarm about liturgical reform. Faced with what the Pope has called ‘arbitrary deformations of the liturgy’ in the years since Vatican II, young people have looked at the Catholic liturgical past and sometimes regretted the way our liturgical present fails to match up.”²⁰⁰ Thus, with noise and clutter in both their secular culture and their standard liturgies, young people have sought out and found something more spiritually profound and fulfilling in both the Extraordinary Form and in Benedict’s liturgical vision as a whole. This phenomenon attests to the validity of Pope Benedict’s own words: “What earlier generations held as sacred, remains sacred and great for us too, and it cannot be all of a sudden entirely forbidden or even considered harmful. It behooves all of us to preserve the riches which have developed in the Church’s faith and prayer, and to give them their proper place.”²⁰¹

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Contesting The Secular
Aquinas and Charles Taylor on Reason in the Public Sphere

Karl O’Hanlon

In the section of the Summa Theologica dubbed the “Treatise on Law,” Aquinas defines law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community.” Initially, this definition seems salutary, in light of the historical post-World War II awakening to the dangers of legal positivism. Hitler’s maxim that “the total state must not know any difference between law and ethics” is the apotheosis of the non-difference between will and good, circumventing reason, which Aquinas dismisses as lawlessness masquerading as law. Nevertheless, despite the historical recommendations for a renewed Thomistic theory of law, there are, as Fergus Kerr elucidates, “incommensurable readings” of what exactly that theory consists, and how it is to be posited in contemporary pluralistic society.

There is no shortage of fronts on which these debates are arranged; I want to focus on one of the chief contemporary complaints about Aquinas’s definition of law: namely, that it is beholden to Aquinas’s Christianity, and as such is either inaccessible in the public sphere to “secular reason” so-called, or to be instantly rendered inadmissible as contravening some untouchable totem of modern political identity (e.g., laïcité, or a total, secular society). The aim of this essay is threefold: (a) to set out Aquinas’ political philosophy as a theological politics (though the term needs clarification); I will focus particularly on Aquinas’s definition of reason, from which the other features of law take shape; (b) to draw on the political thought of contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor in relation to secularism and public reasoning; and finally, (c) to present a dialogic statement of Aquinas’s thought alongside Taylor’s to show the Thomistic definition of law bears relevance to current problems concerning religious diversity in the public sphere.

I. Aquinas’s Theological Politics

The classical reading of Aquinas’s treatise on law has been to emphasize the centrality of natural law to the entire project, and its derivation in turn from the eternal law of God. This is the interpretation given by A.P. d’Entrèves in his seminal study Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, which “insists strongly on the metaphysical foundation of Aquinas’s natural law doctrine, seeing this as supposing the world to be governed by divine providence.” In this reading, the natural law is an ordinance placed in the human heart by God, and ineradicable, at least in first principles (cf. IaIae, Q. 93, art. 6). Nevertheless, this has been contested by Anthony J. Lisska, who argues that rather than natural law being something “in the human heart” it is rather “…the ontological foundation in human nature which explains the possibility of a moral theory and of lawmaking in the first place.” Lisska maintains that the Thomistic theory of law is not drawn from his theology, but rather is better understood as a modification on the Aristotelian metaphysics of human nature; that, as Brian Davies has it, “the idea here is that there is such a thing as what we might grandly call ‘the human project.’” This ‘human project’ is con-
ceived of as sufficient within a purely immanent scheme.

Nevertheless, Lisska’s commentary neglects the way in which transcendental and theocentric underpinnings impinge upon Aquinas’s definition of positive law. The first feature of positive law, that it be an ordinance of reason, is rooted not only in the Aristotelian definition of “man as a rational animal,” but in Aquinas’s Neo-Platonic and Christian notion of rationality as participation in the divine light: “…the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.” If we understand reason as the first feature in the constitution of a law, the sine qua non for the other constituent features, then it follows that the constitution of law as a whole is, for Aquinas, a kind-of participation in the divine light.

Therefore, Lisska’s immanent foundationalism fails to elucidate the insuperability of Thomas’ theory of law from his theological work that emerges in the Summa. Moreover, as Alasdair MacIntyre observes rather caustically, to subtract God from Thomistic ethics is not to arrive at Aristotle, but rather “a radically truncated version of the Nicomachean Ethics.” In the very specific sense of God being the true source and foundation of Aquinas’s theory of law, it can be said that we must accept his as a theological politics.

II. Charles Taylor: Religion, reason, and the Public Sphere

The question arises: why would it be desirable to eliminate theological foundations from Aquinas’s work in the first instance? Pushing this question towards a proximate answer will elucidate the problematic reception Aquinas’s definition of law receives in our modern pluralist democracies. Firstly, we must remind ourselves that natural law theory seems to offer a bulwark against the dangers of legal positivism. Rationality is the key factor in this, since it is the first principle (so to speak) of the constitution of positive law for Aquinas. After the horrors of Nazi Germany, where “law” and will fused in an unholy matrimony, it became necessary to reiterate that the will must be seen as subordinate to reason, otherwise a state of lawlessness rather than one of law prevails. Thus, for a non-theist contemporary theorist such as Jürgen Habermas, who lived under the Nazi regime, the emphasis on reason in natural law is attractive. Nevertheless, here Habermas broadly parts company with the intellectual presuppositions of natural law. As has been shown, Aquinas envisaged reason as “nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light”; it is precisely this that Habermas reacts against in his definition of reason:

Political liberalism (which I defend in the specific form of a Kantian republicanism) understands itself as a nonreligious and postmetaphysical justification of the normative bases of the democratic constitutional state. This theory is in the tradition of a rational law that renounces the “strong” cosmological or salvation-historical assumptions of the classical and religious theories of the natural law.

Thus, while Kantianism shares with natural law theory the necessity of the formulation of rational law as against legal positivism, it defines itself against, not legal positivism, but rather natural law theory. Tellingly, the justification for modern democracies is to be “nonreligious and postmetaphysical.”

Charles Taylor has consistently exposed the assumptions entailed in such a definition of rationality, and in a vast and scattered philosophical output has sought to trace the emergence of such a project in discrete historical struggles towards nationhood, which often entailed reductive “fetishes” of certain historical arrangements, e.g. the laïcité of the French First Republic. In a speech titled ‘How to define secularism’ given at the Institute for Public Knowledge at NYU, Taylor attacks the presuppositions of Habermasian secularism:
The idea seems to be something like this. Secular reason is a language everyone speaks, and can argue and be convinced in. Religious languages operate outside of this discourse, by introducing extraneous premises which only believers can accept. So let’s all talk the common language.\(^{212}\)

For Habermas and other liberals such as John Rawls, Aquinas’s natural law theory is inadmissible in political debate within the public sphere, since it is a discourse inaccessible to secular reason. It is a different language. Taylor roots this epistemic distinction in a certain myth that is propagated about the Enlightenment, namely that there was a self-evident move from Revelation to reason alone.\(^{213}\) This is on the epistemic level.

There is another level at which the trajectory from the Enlightenment is working to delegitimize the admissibility of Aquinas’s theological politics in the modern public sphere: on the political level, for some, the return of religion would simply be “full of menace.”\(^{214}\) This is where the formulae of “separation” or “laïcité” become inescapable for some. There is perhaps the fear that religious legal discourse would be detrimental to pluralism. With reference to Aquinas, however, that claim is not easily made, unless pluralism is seen in a radically libertarian and divine law, the things of Caesar and those of God, and though human law is derived from God, divine law is distinct from human and natural law in ordaining man “to an end of eternal happiness, which exceed man’s ability.”\(^{215}\)

To return to Lisska’s reading of Aquinas’s natural law theory, there is now some clarity regarding why a subtraction of its theist foundations seems inescapable: reason, in a “nonreligious and postmetaphysical” democracy, must be sold as reason alone, divested of religious foundationalism. Yet, as Taylor argues, this burden of translation for religious interlocutors in the legal discursive process amounts to negative special treatment. He writes, “for all their differences, [Rawls and Habermas] seem to reserve a special status for non-religiously informed Reason (let’s call this reason alone) as though (a) this latter were able to resolve certain moral-political issues in a way which can legitimately satisfy any honest, unconfused thinker and (b) where religiously-based conclusions will always be dubious…”\(^{216}\)

III. Aquinas, Taylor, & Pluralism

Secularism so defined cannot help but discriminate against religion, making a special case of it. In such an understanding of the very normative conditions of liberal democracies, it would be impossible for Aquinas’s definition of law to receive fair hearing as soon as it is acknowledged that his rational principles are implicated in a theological anthropology. Yet, it is precisely in fidelity to this “implication” that the hard-line of laïque-secularism is challenged and eroded. Let us suppose that Aquinas’s reason as an imprint of divine light is reckoned by a modern liberal to favour a narrow and homogeneous view of human flourishing: instead, as the second feature of positive law highlights, reason tends to its last end, which is happiness or beatitude, and “since man is a part of the perfect community, law must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness.”\(^{217}\) Aquinas rebuts the liberal charge, and inverts it: by positing atomistic, “uncumbered selves” to adopt Michael Sandel’s term, secularism as defined against conceptions of the good rooted in a theological anthropology cannot fulfill the plurality of goods demanded by a pluralist society.

We see the extent of Aquinas’s relevance to lawmaking in pluralist democracies in the 21st century in his assertion that positive law must be framed in a common rather than particular way: since the end of law is the common good, it “comprises many things. Therefore law should take into account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. For the community of the state is composed of many persons, and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established
to endure for only a short time, but to last for all
time by the citizens succeeding one another.”
Aquinas’s premodern theory of law, inextricable
from its theological bases, arguably provides
much greater scope to plural societies than the
hard-secularist line of modern liberalism.

In conclusion: despite Lisska’s attempts to
laicise Aquinas, his definition of law remains
deply embedded in his theological not to
mention Christian principles. This religious
discourse prescinds Thomistic accounts of law-
giving for the large part in the contemporary
secular public sphere, where secularism, instead
of allowing for a plurality of conceptions of the
good, actively excises religion from the public
sphere. The reasons for doing so, Charles Taylor
argues, are historical and political, and largely
untenable on an epistemic level (even though it
is here and only here that Habermas seems to
maintain a distinction). Moreover, natural law
theory and Kantian rationality are in agreement
against legal positivism.

Yet, the inability of liberalism to allow a plu-
rality of goods undermines its attempts to forge
pre-political solidarity. If religious justifications
for action (i.e. reason is the imprint of the divine
light of God) were admissible, alongside Kantian
justifications, Marxist justifications, etc., consen-
sus becomes stronger, not weaker. In closing, the
words of Jacques Maritain, that singularly gifted
Thomist and modern, are apposite:

I am quite certain that my way of justifying
belief in the rights of man and the ideal of
liberty, equality, fraternity is the only way
with a firm foundation in truth. This does
not prevent me from being in agreement on
those practical convictions with people who
are certain that their way of justifying them,
entirely different from mine or opposed to
mine… is equally the only way founded
upon truth.219

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The Politics of Ridley Scott’s “Robin Hood”

Matt Hoyt

In Ridley Scott’s new movie, “Robin Hood,” the eponymous hero (played by Russell Crowe) looks upon the citizens of England and declares, “Rise, and rise again—until lambs become lions.” Though the resilient Robin Hood myth has been played out in hundreds of adaptations over hundreds of years, Scott’s “Robin Hood” strikes a novel chord. Unlike the famous outlaw who steals from the rich and gives to the poor, Scott’s version resonates with the political and philosophical course of English liberalism: man must rise into his own power, an echo of John Locke, not Karl Marx.

The movie, set in 12th century England, thrusts us into the throes of medieval politics. There’s a king, a crusade, and warring polities, France and England. In England, we see feudal labor relations. In Prince John’s court, we hear of taxes, debt, divine right, law, and order. Center of all the elaborate, historical scenery, Scott prefigures the future of English political philosophy through his representation of the world’s most famous criminal. Robin Hood, a socio-political leader in Scott’s eyes, brings about a question of obligation: What does the polity (England) owe its citizens? At the start of the movie, Robin speaks of King Richard’s monetary debt to the soldier. By the end of the story, though, Robin reflects on Prince John’s (who has since seized power) obligation to serve his citizens. The course of outlaw rebellion, instead of defiant redistribution, speaks of vested empowerment.

From money to morals, Robin follows the same political path as John Locke. Locke, the father of liberalism, famously tailored Hobbe’s Leviathan for a new social class. Rather than an absolute monarchy, Locke realigned the polity: in place of the king, the upper middle class would rule. “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common,” wrote Locke in his Second Treatise of Government in 1690. Man, born in a state of nature, joins a society of previously independent citizens in his effort to avoid war. Once in society, man claims what his labor creates.

Robin Hood, in Scott’s account, mirrors Locke, declaring “there is no difference between a knight and any other man aside from what he wears.” All men join the polity as equals before nature, a notion accepted by both Locke and Robin. For each icon, this freedom prefigures value-labor economics; the product of man’s labor is his property, and its value coincides with the labor put into it. “Every Englishman’s home is his castle,” Robin tells the skeptical Prince. Without rights over his own property, man is a slave. Hence, every property is as valuable as a castle, at least in symbolic gesture. It follows that, in the state of nature, it’s the polity’s duty to protect man’s most basic freedom: property rights.

With these duties, however, Locke feared “… men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.” In this statement, Locke sanctions new purveyors of the polity. When threatened by an absolute monarch who, unable or unwilling to till land and produce his own profit, exploits the landowner, the owners can and must rise to power. This re-
relationship, carried out over time, empowers an aristocratic class—eventual members of England’s Parliament. As Locke allows aristocratic defiance to the monarchy, he provides course for significant change to all politics.

Robin, as Scott’s representation of English social change, notes “in tyranny lies only failure. Empower every man and you will gain strength.”236 Men—more specifically land-owning men, whom Robin addresses before battle—have a right to protect their property, or to overthrow the tyrant that steals it. When the Prince infringes on Lady Marian’s property through taxation (exaggerated through pillage and murder, but nonetheless taxation), Robin objects. “If it’s illegal for a man to fend for himself, how can he be a man of his own right?”237 Robin, like Locke, philosophically justifies the rise of the landed class over the monarchy.

Scott’s Robin plays an interesting role in relation to Locke, especially in this context. Rather than serving the starving peasantry, Robin serves the noble barons and distances himself from the poor. Locke’s aristocrat supersedes the democratic rights of the peasant-citizen, a group not philosophically empowered until Rousseau. Looking at the greater spectrum of Robin Hood myths, Scott’s version stands unique for its implications. We’re reminded of endowed power, wholly unlike the redistributive equality of most outlaw folklore. The most famous discourse on outlaws—Eric Hobsbawm’s “Primitive Rebels,” where he describes the ‘social bandit’—depicts a pseudo-socialist ethos in peasant society.238 Scott twists the iconography of Robin Hood and creates a new version, a herald to liberal reconstitution rather than social revolution.

Though it’s tempting to discard Ridley Scott’s representation of Robin Hood as anachronistic, he explores questions of power and right, like most of its predecessors. Using a similar character and context, Scott reinterprets Robin Hood as a historical predecessor, not a historical anomaly. When Prince John announces “henceforth I declare you to be an outlaw,”239 it’s the beginning of the Robin Hood myth, and a movement towards Locke’s accession. Unfortunately, in Ridley Scott’s new version of “Robin Hood,” it’s the end of the movie.

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Housed on the fifth floor of Lauinger Library, Georgetown University's special archives collection preserves records of university activities dating back to 1786, three years before its official founding. Among the more intriguing documents in this collection is a letter from Dolley Madison, wife of President James Madison, to Zachary Taylor during the Mexican-American War. While it appears initially inconsequential in content—a mere two lines introducing then-General Taylor to his newly appointed chaplain, Rev. James McElroy—historical analysis unveils a complex tale that explains the social and political culture of ante-bellum America, with a Georgetown Jesuit at the crux.

The question remains, however, of why Mrs. Madison was even involved in affairs of state 29 years after her husband left office. Moreover, one wonders how she related to General Zachary Taylor, and how she knew Rev. John McElroy.

To start to put the puzzle together, the analysis begins with Mrs. Madison, determining why, in fact, she was at all involved with the American government during this time period. Once this is established, Zachary Taylor comes into view, and it eventually becomes clear why it was a natural fit for Dolley Madison to write him the letter of introduction. Then, the analysis of the written content will demonstrate what one of Georgetown’s Jesuits, Rev. James McElroy, had to do with the letter (and the Mexican-American War) at all. Following a general conclusion, an annotated version of the letter is included.

Mrs. D. Madison
Wife of President Madison
To Matamoros, Mexico

Brigadier General Taylor
Matamoros,

Revd. Mr. McElroy
Mexico

Washington June 8th 1846

It is with singular pleasure that I greet General Taylor with many wishes for the continuance of his health, good fortune and that beautiful determination to mercy, which embellishes the Patriots glory with which he has covered himself.

The respected and good chaplain McElroy who will present these lines to you has been long known to me as one of high character and regarded by all as one of a pure spirit, and integrity. I trust you will meet him happily.

Your Friend and Relation,
D.P. Madison
Dolley Madison

Dolley Madison is perhaps most remembered for saving the portrait of George Washington from a burning White House during the War of 1812. She strolled arm in arm with James Polk at his last social outing as President in 1849. Madison was so well-regarded that, at her funeral, Zachary Taylor coined the term “First Lady” to honor her unprecedented work. Many similar events of great consequence during the life of Dolley Madison are recorded. But why did Dolley Madison write the letter in question?

The answer is mildly underwhelming. Mrs. Madison had strong ties to the Polk Administration, which was in power at the time of the Mexican War. Her prominence in Washington was well established when the Polks arrived in 1844. After a brief retirement following the death of her husband, Dolley Madison returned to Washington with a great deal of social and political capital. Serving as a sort of national hostess, Dolley Madison received guests as frequently as the President and played host to the most prominent parties in Washington. The U.S. House of Representatives honored her by granting her full access to all proceedings and debates. It is no wonder, then, that Sarah Polk quickly befriended Dolley upon the Polk Administration’s arrival to the city.

During the middle of his presidency, President Polk came under political fire due to the poor treatment of Catholics in the U.S. Army. Protestants with nativist inclinations hated Catholics, and showed it. Catholics faced ridicule and punishment for refusing to attend Protestant services, for example. Also, Polk faced persistent accusations of attempting a religious crusade against Catholics in Mexico. In response, he commissioned Father John McElroy, an Irish immigrant and Jesuit priest from Georgetown, to serve as Chaplain to the armed forces under General Zachary Taylor in Matamoros, Mexico. As a relative of Zachary Taylor through her husband, as well as a common political patroness of the time, Dolley Madison wrote a letter introducing Fr. McElroy to Taylor. Because of her association with the Polks, Zachary Taylor and a connection to Fr. McElroy through her ties at Georgetown, Mrs. Madison served as an appropriate intermediary in the situation.

Zachary Taylor

Zachary Taylor was one of the most eminent figures of his time. His life before the mid 1840’s was admirable and note-worthy. Serving courageously in the War of 1812, he received a major’s brevet. After his service in 1832 during the war against the Blackhawk American Indians, he oversaw combat command during the Seminole War in Florida in the late 1830s. Due to his bold leadership style and his cantankerous character, his soldiers gave him the nickname “Old Rough and Ready.” He was ready for retirement, but the imminent Mexican-American War called him back to service. Little did he know that his service for Polk’s Army would catapult his career to the highest office in the land, and make his name even more immortal.

At sixty, Zachary Taylor reluctantly continued his service to the United States Army, serving as Brigadier General during the Mexican War. Commanding the occupational forces in newly annexed Texas, Taylor was ordered by the ambitious President Polk to push his men to the border of the Rio Grande. Taylor and his troops established Fort Brown (also known as Ft. Texas), across from Matamoros, Mexico. After successfully repelling the Mexican offensives at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Taylor galvanized his troops and took the town of Matamoros. Taylor’s fame in the U.S. began to grow, though the battles at Monterrey and Buena Vista, the watershed victories of his career, were still to come.

Shortly after Taylor’s success at Matamoros however, President Polk was ridiculed for his lack of concern for Catholic troops. The treatment they were receiving in the U.S. military was far from acceptable. A controversy arose, for example, when Irish-Catholic immigrant John Riley and a few members of the U.S. military were punished and tormented for refusing to attend Protestant services. For political cover, Polk
appointed two Catholic priests, Father Rey (a German) and Fr. McElroy (an Irishman) to serve as army chaplains. Polk also used Fr. McElroy to assure the Irish, who composed twenty-five percent of the military at the time, that he had their interest in mind. Fr. McElroy was sent to Taylor’s brigade in June of 1846.\(^\text{323}\)

**The Letter**

Though brief in its content, this seemingly innocuous letter illuminates its social, political, and religious context, as well as Dolley Madison’s influential connections and opinions. The letter starts with Dolley Madison congratulating and praising Zachary Taylor’s for his service during the Mexican War. The date of the letter signifies that the battles for which Mrs. Madison is thanking Taylor occurred right as the war began (i.e. Palo Alto and Resaca de la Plata), before Taylor’s most important victories at Monterrey and Buena Vista.\(^\text{324}\) Mrs. Madison then introduces Fr. John McElroy to Zachary Taylor. She commends McElroy as a man of “pure spirit and integrity” and asks Taylor to receive him warmly.

It is not completely clear how Mrs. Madison knew Fr. McElroy. Many elements of Madison’s life, however, seem to suggest that she and Fr. McElroy were acquaintances or perhaps even friends. Mrs. Madison had a strong connection to Georgetown College primarily through her husband. In 1815, James Madison signed Georgetown’s charter.\(^\text{325}\) Also, Mr. Madison had a close relationship with John Carroll, the university’s founder. While James was serving as Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of State, then-Archbishop Carroll facilitated the matriculation of John Payne, Dolley Madison’s son from her first marriage, to St. Mary’s School in Baltimore.\(^\text{326}\) Additionally, many of Mrs. Madison’s friends and relatives sent their daughters to Georgetown Visitation, a school for young ladies affiliated with Georgetown College. As Fr. McElroy had been a member of the Georgetown community since 1806,\(^\text{327}\) it is not a stretch to believe that Fr. McElroy and Mrs. Madison knew each other.

The context of the letter is daunting, including nationwide disagreement over issues of expansionism and slavery. But even as this letter does little to address the hot-button political issues slavery, it does broaden our understanding of a few equally important, religious and social tensions of the time: xenophobia and anti-Catholicism.

As previously mentioned, an incident occurred at the outbreak of the Mexican War that exposed the nativist and anti-Catholic tendencies of many men in the U.S. army. Moreover, Mexican leaders attempted to motivate their country and their soldiers with claims that Polk was attempting an anti-Catholic crusade.\(^\text{328}\) The mistreatment of U.S. Catholic servicemen coupled with the anti-Catholic crusade rhetoric from Mexico motivated Polk to try and appease Catholic contingents. He asked the Provincial Counsel of Bishops, which met in Maryland in May of 1846, to recommend two Catholic priest to serve as chaplains. Directed to Georgetown College, Polk found Fr. McElroy and another Jesuit by the name of Fr. Rey.\(^\text{329}\)

A confidential letter written by Secretary of War William Marcy to Zachary Taylor provides stunning evidence of President Polk’s motives. Marcy explains to Taylor that Polk was very aware and nervous of his Catholic controversy. Marcy makes clear that the maneuver was purely political, and that, constitutionally speaking, Polk could not appoint chaplains. Fr. McElroy and Fr. Rey were to serve in that capacity anyway, only without formal title.

Another alarming fact that sheds light onto Polk’s true motives is that Fr. McElroy and Fr. Rey were paid by secret service funds. As they were not actually commissioned as chaplains, they couldn’t receive official pay. Instead they were enlisted as regular civilian employees to the U.S. Army. Polk did this to quell the Protestant backlash that would result from pandering to the Catholics. He also avoided the inherent unconstitutionality of the situation.\(^\text{330}\)

Ironically, Fr. McElroy’s own theological intolerance toward Protestants can be seen in his journals during the war. He describes that dur-
ing his time in Mexico he baptized about 100 non-Catholics, saying, he was “… consoled that they all made a happy end,” suggesting that only through conversion to Catholicism would the American servicemen leave earth in God’s good graces.

As an additional note of interest, Dolley Madison’s participation in the events contrasted with her husband’s own opinions concerning matters of religious establishment. In his memoirs, James Madison made it very clear that he firmly believed in the separation of church and state. He even went as far as saying that the use of chaplains in the military was unconstitutional, calling it a clear violation of the establishment clause.332

CONCLUSION

Through Fr. McElroy and Fr. Rey an important precedent was set, one that would have a large impact on a war fought only a few years later. The secretive appointment of Catholic Chaplains during the Mexican-American War, facilitated by an unusual intermediary in Dolley Madison, served as precursor to Catholic involvement in the Civil War. This letter, by revealing Polk’s intention to appease Catholic interests, illustrates a broader attempt to bridge social and cultural divides. It also betrays the reasoning for this attempt, which was to bolster the American army and its war efforts in spite of cultural divides between Protestants and Catholics. The lasting consequence was an increase in the number of Catholics fighting for the army, including a number within the Union Army even greater than the number that fought during the Mexican-American War. The role of Catholic chaplains, throughout this evolution, fostered and encouraged Catholic participation in war efforts. Without the contributions of Fr. Rey and Fr. McElroy, the Union may not have tapped into the weight of Catholic soldiers.333

Annotated Text

Mrs. D. Madison
Wife of President Madison
Sent to Under Courier334
To Mattamoros, Mexico335

Brigadier General Taylor
Matamoros,

Revd. Mr. McElroy
Mexico

Washington June 8th 1846

It is with singular pleaser that I greet General Taylor with many wishes for the continuance of his health, good fortune and that beautiful determination to mercy, which embellishes the Patriots glory with which he has covered himself with.336

The respected and good chaplain McElroy who will present these lines to you has been long known to me337 as one of high character and regarded by all as one of a pure spirit, and integrity.338 I trust you will meet him happily.339

Your Friend and Relation,340
D.P. Madison

Michael Meaney is a junior is in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service studying International Politics.
he volumes of books filling Father Collins’s windowless office in the ICC seem to consume you, never letting you forget that they are there. Despite the fact that he is a medieval historian who focuses mainly on intellectual and cultural history (with a special current interest in the history of science and magic), he is not trapped in the Middle Ages. The volumes of books filling the shelves of his office representing large swathes of the past are the limit of his desires to travel back in time; when asked jokingly if he’d rather live in the 13th century, he laughed and asked if I was kidding.

Georgetown University, like the country it has grown up with, has changed greatly since 1789. The education required for its citizenry has changed too. As an educator and as a member of the Society of Jesus, Father Collins thinks his job is neither to bemoan the lack of Aquinas or Aristotle in the classroom nor idealize the past but to face the challenges of students and society today with the help of the lessons from yesterday. Whether he is elaborating on a certain point in class or driving a student to clarify and expand on an idea in a discussion section, he cannot hide his excitement for what he teaches students today. History for him isn’t just “one-damn-thing after another” but a carefully crafted storyline of the notable people and events and a host of other pieces of evidence. While the content itself is important, the process of analysis develops capacities useful for students to take outside of the university. The students attending Georgetown University are not the same students who attended twenty-five or even fifty years ago and expect different outcomes from their education.

When asked about this change, Collins said he would love it if Catholic students were better catechized in the faith as they generally were in Georgetown’s past. “You can’t roll back the clock though” he said. “You can’t pretend the students today aren’t in an educationally different place than they were a half century ago.” But he’s likewise skeptical of claims that the university’s job is to do the remedial work too. Efforts to get nineteen and twenty-year old kids to believe in God as if they were still twelve are silly. Students, regardless of their religious background, need to be challenged with questions and ideas appropriate to their intellectual capacity.

Despite more than two centuries of history, the heart of a Georgetown education has remained perennially influenced by the mission of the Society of Jesus. One of the greatest charges of the Jesuits is to go out to the frontiers, and there, on the margins, to explore, defend, and expand the Catholic faith. Father Collins remarked that he has been especially encouraged by Pope Paul VI’s call on the Society of Jesus to investigate and address the challenge of atheism, in few places more prevalent than the modern western academy. He notes that as a particular irony given the university’s origins. In 2008, the Society reaffirmed its mission to provide a thoughtful check upon “the spread of a dominant culture,” which “has been marked by subjectivism, moral relativism, hedonism, and practical materialism leading to... a new apostolic challenge and opportunity” for the Jesuits (Decrees of the General Congregation 35). Father Collins firmly believes that Georgetown attracts students who take seriously the life of the mind and also have serious
questions about God, and more broadly, religion.

Collins noted that the university must be responsive to the shifting condition of student’s arriving on the Hilltop, however. Students have different interests and desires than they did in the past, and the university must remain attuned and responsive to the tides of the times. While they have little ability to change the way students come to them, the university has a responsibility to help guide the interests of students by posing good questions. Father Collins takes seriously these challenges and has confidence in the value of the liberal arts and theology in posing these types of informative questions. In his field of history, Father Collins observed that there is “something intrinsically social about the liberal arts in that they are about understanding the human experience and engaging the fellow human.” Meaningful endeavors into these areas of study are done among others, creating a dialogue between members of the various faculties and their students alike.

Father Collins thinks that the communal dimension of the liberal arts themselves and the ways that students might be introduced to them point to the value of a core curriculum. Engaging in and fostering discussion of serious matters of intellectual discourse requires shared materials. “Right now there is no course in the College that everyone has to take,” he noted. The closest universal course at Georgetown is “The Problem of God,” but even there differences exist between sections offered. What common courses facilitate, Collins believes, is the easier continuation of conversations begun inside the classroom outside the classroom and vice versa. Problem of God is especially suitable in such a role because its subject matter is theology, a critical aspect of Georgetown’s Jesuit influence. It offers, in an age where Collins fears many question the intellectual value of religious inquiry, critical questions that students need—and indeed want—to grapple with. Georgetown’s Jesuit influence directly impacts the creation of this dialogue between all members of the community. A commonly asked question, according to Father Collins, is “how do you foster a conversation outside the classroom inspired by one inside the classroom?” Enhancing the strength of the core curriculum through more common classes can only help orient students towards serious intellectual engagement of critical questions at the heart of Georgetown’s mission. The communal aspects of writing, analysis and discussion that shape and inform the liberal arts and theology prepares students, in Collins’ view, for life after Georgetown in the workforce and more importantly, in enriching the whole person.

The principles that inform and shape Georgetown’s mission are the heart of true academic endeavors in the liberal arts and theology. The act of engaging in these great questions sparks the growth of students throughout their four years on the Hilltop and in their role in society beyond the front gates. The opportunity Georgetown University has as a Jesuit institution founded alongside the United States is profound. While the unceasing changes of time have shaped the world dramatically since Georgetown’s founding, the principles at the core of the mission have remained. Father Collins embodies this type of learning in all of his classes, whether sparking conversation in a discussion section or framing issues for students in his lectures. The cultivation of students with deep, intellectual questions is what Georgetown has done and will continue to stand for with Jesuits and professors like Father Collins at the front lines.

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Endnotes

The Forum

1 Wendell Berry, Jayber Crow (Washington: Counterpoint, 2000), 70-71.
4 Wilhelmsen, 329.
7 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface, 11.
8 Kant, Idea For a Universal History, .42)
9 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, xi.
10 (Preface CPR pg. 25)
12 Ibid., 81
13 Ibid., 81
14 Ibid., 80
15 Ibid., 81
16 Ibid., 84
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 110.
22 Ibid., 108.
25 Ibid.


Bartlett, Daniel Webster, 102.

Wiltse and Berolzheimer, Speeches and Formal Writings, 101.

Pappas, The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 29-30.

Wiltse and Moser, Correspondence, 332-333.

Bartlett, Daniel Webster, 102.

Pappas, The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 30.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid.

Ibid., 43.

Ibid., 45.

Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 110.

Pappas, The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 48.

Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 110.


Pappas, The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 56.

**The Chamber**

See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000), 301. Here he writes that “there will soon no longer be room in them except for either democratic freedom or the tyranny of the Caesars,” but years later says “A tyranny of the Caesars was a scarecrow which could frighten no one.” See Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville on Threats to Liberty in Democracies,” in The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 245-275 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), 253.


Tocqueville, Democracy, 7, 662.

Ibid., xv.

Tocqueville, Democracy, 650.


51 Tocqueville, Democracy, 661. As Pierre Manent argues, the location of the problem also indicates where the solution must come from. Tocqueville’s aim is to go beyond the projects of Guizot and Montesquieu, each of whom stop at the level of institutional reform. See Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, trans. John Waggoner (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 5.

52 Ibid. This is the “single principle” alluded to earlier.

53 Ibid., 516.


55 Tocqueville, Democracy, 507. Cf. 603: “equality makes the passion for material enjoyments and the exclusive love of the present predominate in the human heart.”

56 Ibid., 506. “What attaches the human heart most keenly is not the peaceful possession of a precious object, but the imperfectly satisfied desire to possess it and the incessant fear of losing it,” he states.

57 Ibid., 508. Cf. Manent, Tocqueville, 56.

58 Ibid., 515.

59 Tocqueville, Democracy, 608.


62 Tocqueville, Democracy, 617.

63 Tocqueville, Democracy, 663.


65 Tocqueville, Democracy, 664.

66 Tocqueville, Democracy, 663.

67 Ibid. This is analogous to Aristotle’s “magnificent man,” who will “spend large sums gladly and lavishly,” but only “for honour’s sake,” Ethics 1122b1-6, as in Aristotle, Basic Works, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001).


69 Tocqueville, Democracy, 662-3.

Tocqueville, Democracy, 663.
Tocqueville, Democracy, 515.
Ibid., 663.
Ibid., 605.
Ibid., 606.
Ibid., 663.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 662.
Ibid.
Tocqueville, Democracy, 662.
Ibid.; c.f. 661.
Ibid.
Ibid., 662-3.
Ibid., 665.
Ibid., 663.
Tocqueville, Democracy, 519.
Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, ed. JP Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 249. Here he writes of “the moment of plentitude, which is so much to be feared.”
James Schleifer, The Making of Democracy in America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980), 173. Tocqueville adds in the margin, “This was written before we saw a despotism of an assembly under the Republic. It is necessary to add ‘of a single power.’”
Some elements of Montesquieu’s thought seem more favorable to acquisitiveness, such as his concept of “doux commerce” in Spirit, XX.1. However, he is still clearly against materialism proper. See Spirit, XX.2: When “one is affected only by the spirit of commerce,” even the “smallest things, those required by humanity, are done or given for money...[and] there is traffic in all human activities and all moral virtues.”
Montesquieu, Spirit, VIII.2.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Montesquieu, Spirit, VIII.2. Again, this is very similar to Aristotle. "History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues," Aristotle writes. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1310b15.

Montesquieu, Spirit, VII.7.

Ibid., V.15.

Ibid.

Ibid., XX.3.

Boesche, “Fearing Monarchs and Merchants,” 753.

This is a term often used to describe government sponsored distractions, and is first found in Juvenal, Fourteen Satires, trans. Alexander Leeper (London: Macmillan, 1912), X.63.

This is why he needs to appoint a “vizier” to do the work of ruling for him. Cf. Montesquieu, Spirit, II.5. Cf. Boesche, “Fearing Monarchs and Merchants,” 744: “once the despotism becomes lasting, despots leave the violence to those who rule in their names, while they fall into lethargy or “apathy” interrupted only by ceaseless rounds of sensual pleasures.”


Montesquieu, Spirit, II.10. Cf. V.14: they are a “timid, ignorant, beaten-down people.” It should be noted that Montesquieu also used meteorological arguments to explain different nations’ servility. Cf. Spirit, XIV.1-3, and Young, 400.

Montesquieu, Spirit, V.14. Thus there is no unity in this order. Cf. Montesquieu, Consideration, 94: “if we see any union [in despotism] it is not citizens who are united but dead bodies buried one next to the other.”

“What fears, what suffering I am setting in motion! Nevertheless, despite the turmoil within, the surface will reveal nothing but tranquility; fierce rebellion will lie buried deep within the heart, misery stifled and joy repressed; and for the very blackest despair a mask of studied sweetness will emerge,” writes the eunuch to Usbek in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, 129.

This is a term used by Dionysus of Syracuse to describe the harsh measures necessary to keep a populace subdued. See Plutarch, “Life of Dion,” in Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, 2nd Edition, trans. John Dryden (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), 784.

Cf. Montesquieu, Persian Letters, 8. Even in the seraglio, where it seems as if Usbek is providing for his wives, we see that it is still only motivated by selfishness: “But above all, my heart is troubled about my wives…. It’s not that I love them… but out of my very indifference has come a deep-seated jealousy, which devours me.”

Boesche, “Fearing Monarchs and Merchants,” 746.

Cf. Tocqueville, Democracy, 661-2. Other important causes of the new character of the regime will be the “universal moderation” of the social state (although as we have seen this is also connected to materialism), as well as the new perfection of “administrative proceed-
ings.” These will affect the despotism’s desires, as well as its capacity to achieve them. Tocqueville himself says, “Independently of these reasons... I could add many others... but I want to stay within the bounds I have set.”

118 Montesquieu, Spirit, II.2.
119 Cf. Boesche, Strange Liberalism, 250. “Its strength would derive not from force but from the material enjoyments it could provide; not from fear, but bribery.” Cf. Richter, 256.
120 Cf. Krause, “Despotism,” 241: there will be no “courageous opposition.”
121 See Tocqueville, Democracy, 509, 662: enjoyment of material well-being is “moderate and tranquil,” and “passions are naturally contained...[and] pleasures simple.”
123 Tocqueville, Democracy, 509. Cf. Tocqueville, Letters, 150-1. In this letter to JS Mill in 1841 he writes, “One cannot let a nation that is democratically constituted... take up easily the habit of sacrificing what it believes to be its grandeur to its repose...[and] console itself by making railroads and by making prosper... the well-being of each private individual.”
125 Ibid.
128 Ibid, 11.
131 Ibid, 11.
132 Kramer.
Tocqueville Forum Endnotes  

141 Ibid., 29-41.
143 Ibid., 314.
144 Ibid., 334.
145 Ibid., 19.
146 Ibid., 19-23.
147 Ibid., 27.
148 Ibid., 9.
149 Ibid., 3-16, 171-213 and 237-260.
150 Ibid., 263.
151 Ibid., 233.
152 Ibid., 271-290.
153 Ibid., 352.
154 Ibid., 358-359.
155 Ibid., 262-263.
156 Ibid., 284.

The Sanctuary

160 John F. Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy: A Response to the Critics (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2008), 143.
162 Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 199.
163 Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy, 67.
164 “Many protagonists of liturgical reform seemed to think that if we only did everything together and in a loud voice, the liturgy would automatically become attractive and ef-
fective...They failed to notice that the actio [active participation] does not consist only or primarily in the alteration of standing, sitting and kneeling, but in inner process...Compared with the merely external busy-ness which became the rule in many places, the quiet “following” of Mass, as we knew it in former times, was far more realistic and dramatic: it was a sharing in the action at a deep level, and in it the community of faith was silently and powerfully mobilized. Of course, to say this is not to impugn “active participation” as I have defined it; the criticism only applies where this participation has degenerated into mere externals.” Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 89-90.

165 “If there is to be a real participatio actuosa, there must be silence.” Joseph Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 72; “We are realizing more and more clearly that silence is part of the liturgy. We respond by singing and praying, to the God who addresses us, but the greater mystery, surpassing all words, summons us to silence. It must, of course, be a silence with content, not just the absence of speech and action. We should expect the liturgy to give us a positive stillness that will restore us.” Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 209.

166 “The positive content of the old eastward-facing direction lay [in]...the priest and people together facing the same way in a common act of Trinitarian worship...making the cosmos a sign of Christ...underlined very early on by the custom of placing a cross on the east wall of Christian meeting-houses...The new celebration facing the people, a change which has taken place with amazing unanimity and speed, without any mandate...[has the danger of making] the congregation into a closed circle which is no longer aware of the explosive Trinitarian dynamism which gives the Eucharist its greatness.” Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, 140, 142.

167 “[Ratzinger] insists...that there is still a place for Latin in the liturgy.” Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy, 78.


169 Ibid., § 36.

170 Ibid., § 23.

171 Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, 84.

172 Ibid., 86.

173 Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 168.

174 Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, 149-150.

175 Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 198.


178 Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 141.

180  Ibid.
181  Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 134.
185  Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy, 133.
187  Ibid.
188  Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 142.
189  Neuhaus, “The Pope’s Liturgical Liberalism.”
190  Ibid.
191  Tattersall, “Pasch and Eschaton in Ecclesia.”
192  Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy, 79.
193  Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops.
194  Heard, “Summorum Pontificum, Young Catholics, and the Roman Rite.”
195  Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 130.
196  Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops.
197  Woods, Sacred Then, Sacred Now, 27.
199  Irwin, “Authentic Worship.”
200  Heard, “Summorum Pontificum, Young Catholics, and the Roman Rite.”
201  Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops.
204  Aquinas, IaIae, Q. 90, art. 1, ad. 3.
206  Ibid., 98.
209  Aquinas, IaIae, Q. 91, art. 3.


212 Charles Taylor, ‘How to define secularism’ (paper given at the “Rethinking Secularism” Symposium, 22nd October, 2009, Institute for Public Knowledge, NYU), 10.

213 Ibid., 12.

214 Ibid., 10.

215 Aquinas, I1Iae, Q. 91, art. 4.

216 Taylor, ‘How to define secularism,’ 12.

217 Aquinas, I1Iae, 90, art. 2.

218 Ibid., I1Iae, Q. 96, art.1.


222 Ibid., 11.

223 Ibid., 12.


225 Schall, op. cit., 9.


227 Ibid., 200.


229 Ibid.

The Parlor


233 Robin Hood.

234 Ibid.

235 Locke, Ch. 19, Sec. 220.

236 Robin Hood.

237 Ibid.

239 Robin Hood.

240 Larkin, Philip. “Next, Please.” The Less Deceived (Marvell Press, Yorkshire: 1955) p. 20

241 Ibid.

242 Larkin. “Church Going.” p. 28-9

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.

245 Ibid.

246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid.

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Ibid.

253 Ibid.

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.

256 Ibid.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid.


263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.

269 Larkin. “Sunny Prestatyn.” The Less Deceived p. 35

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid.

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid.

274 Ibid.
This change in approach to Healy’s identity, manifested in the acknowledgement of his African ancestry and later on by the proclamation of him as a black American was also influenced by the investigative research in the 1950s of Albert Sidney Foley, S.J. who, while conducting research at St. Louis University on race relations, confirmed the more than a half-century old rumor that was circulating concerning the African ancestry of the Healy siblings by tracing their ancestry back to their mother, Eliza Healy, who was documented in Georgia records to have been of mixed ancestry. Foley published a book in 1954 on Patrick’s brother, Bishop James Healy of Portland Maine, and a year later a work on black clergymen in America that spanned the years 1854 to 1954 in which a chapter focused on Patrick Healy. With the subsequent publication of articles around the country on the Healy siblings focusing on their race and proclaiming them as “Negroes,” Patrick Healy’s African ancestry could no longer be kept a secret or avoided, as it was in the first half of the twentieth century when a general silence in print publications concerning the Healy siblings’ African ancestry existed. The change in the university’s approach to Healy’s racial identity was gradual, with authors such as Joseph T. Durkin, S.J., professor of history at Georgetown, at first only acknowledging Healy’s birth to a slave mother of African descent and attempting to downplay this aspect of Healy’s identity (early 1960s). However, by the early 1970s, the university’s sentiments had evolved into an explicit celebration of Healy’s ancestry and proclamation of him as a black American.
289 Robert Henle, “Father Healy’s Anniversary,” Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 197.

290 Robert Henle, “Father Healy’s Anniversary,” Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 197; “Minutes, Meeting of Father Patrick Healy Steering Committee, Faculty Dining Room, Georgetown University, January 16, 1973,” Georgetown University Archives, Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 196.

291 Robert Henle, “Father Healy’s Anniversary,” Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 197.

292 Ibid.

293 “Minutes, Meeting of Father Patrick Healy Steering Committee, Faculty Dining Room, Georgetown University, January 16, 1973,” Georgetown University Archives, Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 196.


297 Philip St. Laurent, “Father Patrick Healy,” Tuesday Magazine, a supplement to Washington Sunday Star, July 1973, 16, 17, 22, in Georgetown University Archives, Office of University Relations, Box 5, Folder 197.


300 Ibid.


303 Ibid., 23.


305 Ibid., 113.

306 Ibid., 104.


309 Box 6, Folder 1


314 Polk, 69.


320 Holly C. Shulman. Interview via E-mail. April 19th through 27th, 2009.


322 Ibid.

323 Stevens,133.

324 Frazier, 406.


328 Frazier, 257.


331 Ibid.


333 O’Connor.
This is a nearly indecipherable part of the letter.

This indicates that Taylor and his forces have already advanced past beyond the Rio Grande, and have set up camp in the northeastern border town of Matamoros, Mexico. Also, Dolley Madison spells Matamoros differently (and incorrectly) at this point then she does later.

Dolley Madison speaks to Taylor’s recent success in the battles at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, where he defeated the Mexican forces that outnumbered his men.

The language is ambiguous. It is likely that Dolley Madison new Fr. McElroy but not certain. This use of language was often used as a “formal nicety” (Allgor, interview) during this time period; this could be an alternative explanation for the language used.

Madison introduces Fr. McElroy to Taylor and praises McElroy’s character. “Regarded by all” may refer to the fact that the Provincial Council referred him to fill the post of chaplain.

This may be a subtle reference to the reluctance on the part of both Madison and Taylor, who were Protestants, concerning the appointment of an Irish-Catholic immigrant as Chaplain.

Zachary Taylor is a distant cousin of James Madison; hence Dolley Madison and Taylor are related through marriage.

The Observatory


Ibid.


Tocqueville Forum Events

Forum Lecture
“God, Notre Dame, Country: Rethinking the Mission of Catholic Higher Education in the United States”
February 3, 2011 – 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM
Dr. Michael Baxter
Visiting Associate Professional Specialist in Theology, University of Notre Dame

Film Screening
Pre-Screening of Rediscovering Alexander Hamilton
February 7, 2011 – 7:00 PM – 9:30 PM
Michael Pack
Producer, Manifold Productions

Forum Lecture
“God and the Founders: Madison, Washington, and Jefferson”
February 24, 2011 – 5:30 PM - 7:00 PM
Dr. Vincent Phillip Muñoz
Tocqueville Associate Professor of Religion and Public Life, University of Notre Dame

Forum Lecture
“Grand Strategy: An American Foreign Policy Problem”
March 15, 2011 – 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM
The Honorable Charles Hill
Brady-Johnson Distinguished Fellow in Grand Strategy and Senior Lecturer in Humanities at Yale

Annual Celebration
Founders Day Celebration
March 25, 2011 - 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Fr. Stephen Fields, S.J.
Associate Professor of Theology, Georgetown University
The Georgetown Chimes

Jack Miller Center - Veritas Fund
Post-Doctoral Fellow Lecture
April 12, 2011 - 6:00 - 7:30 PM
Dr. Sarah Houser
Post-Doctoral Fellow for the Tocqueville Forum

Forum Lecture
“Human Rights between the Scylla of Relativism and the Charybdis of Fundamentalism”
April 18, 2011 – Monday – 6:00 pm - 7:30 pm
Professor Janne Haaland Matlary
Professor of international politics at the University of Oslo

4th Annual Schall Award sponsored by the Maibach Fund
“Truth and the Human Person”
April 28, 2011 – Thursday – 8:00 – 9:30 PM
Msgr. Robert Sokolowski
Elizabeth Breckenridge Caldwell Professor of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America
Recipient, The Schall Award for Teaching and Humane Letters

Forum Lecture
“Energy and America’s Future: An Alumni Reunion lecture”
June 4, 2011 - 2:00 – 3:30 PM
The Honorable C. Boyden Gray
Former US Ambassador to the EU and former Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy