Featuring:

On the Being with Hands and Mind
Freedom, Suffering, and
Realism in Dante
“A Losing Battle:” A Conversation
with George W. Carey

Also:

Traditionalism and Libertarianism:
A Fusion of Convenience
Fair Play and Political Obligation
The Globalization of the Cold War
Social Justice and the Liturgy
A Feeling of Foreboding
The Passion of Lacking All Conviction
“God for Harry! England and Saint George!” A
Review of Shakespeare's Richard II and Henry V
“If From the Public Way You Turn Your Steps...”
A Review of Michael: A Pastoral Poem
To Yearn, To Wonder, To Love: A Review of Letters
to a Young Poet, by Rainer Maria Rilke
Georgetown University, the “Kernel” of Student
Activism in the 1960s and 1970s
Eloquence in Defense of Liberty:
A History of the Philodemic Society, 1830-1865
Cultivating Virtue at Georgetown
A More Perfect University
Utraque Unum

Georgetown University’s seal is based directly on the Great Seal of the United States of America. Instead of an olive branch and arrows in the American eagle’s right and left talons, Georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. The American seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, E Pluribus Unum, or “Out of Many, One,” in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. The Georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, Utraque Unum.

As the official motto of Georgetown University, Utraque Unum is often translated as “Both One” or “Both and One” and is taken from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. This motto is found in a Latin translation of Ephesians 2:14: ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum. The King James Version of the Bible says, “For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one.” Utraque Unum is the Latin phrase to describe Paul’s concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles; that through Jesus Christ both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
Acknowledgments:

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As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in *Utraque Unum*. In addition to writers, we are looking for section editors, artists, graphic designers and web designers. Please e-mail the editors at utraque.unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
The Tocqueville Forum on the Roots of American Democracy

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Georgetown University
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Dear Readers,

With a new fall comes a new school year. As the new editor-in-chief of this journal, I am very excited to follow in the footsteps of my predecessors and continue their success providing a forum for students to discuss the great questions. I must thank Scott Gray, the outgoing editor, for all of his work and for all of our discussions while putting last year’s journal together.

On college campuses, constant change is often the norm. New classes, new students and, often, new professors create the novelty of each new school year. In the face of all of this, there is often an urge for something more permanent and familiar. Within the pages of this journal, you will see evidence of continuity in a rapidly changing world, both in the people honored and ideas presented. As always, we feature an engaging and thought-provoking essay by Father James Schall that reminds us of the uniqueness of humanity’s ability to comprehend and contemplate the things around us in order to find a purpose. While the majority of us will not and should not be philosophers, that does not stop us from being able to ponder.

Also featured is an article based on an interview done with Government Professor George Carey, the winner of the 2010 Rev. James V. Schall Award for Teaching and Humane Letters. The article discusses the changes Professor Carey has seen in his nearly fifty years on the Hilltop. In the corresponding lecture following the award presentation, Professor Carey discussed the continuity and change embodied by the U.S. Constitution and the crisis that has arisen due to more activist interpretations of the document. Seeing both men in the same room together was a rare privilege and reminds us of what a liberal arts education should be: a journey to understand from where we came and to learn about the permanent things in life. Our purpose is to search for continuity in an ever more hyperactive and transient culture that is fast losing grip on itself.

One way to find this continuity is through good literature, the value of which is lost on many college students today. The value of great literature is to be entertaining while having eternal lessons revealed to us. This summer I began an infatuation with the late American author Kurt Vonnegut. In a testament to the value of the liberal arts, this literature caused me to reevaluate the inherent value of human dignity. Samuel Johnson once said that “People need to be reminded more often than they need to be instructed.” Two of Vonnegut’s works in particular are especially valuable in
an age when progressivism in science—a limited but important benefit—leads to progressivism of spirit; a dangerous and deadly proposition. In *Cat's Cradle*, the product of science, “ice-nine”, has the potential to destroy the world when left in the hands of flawed human beings. In *Player Piano*, the world suffers an arguably worse fate: the humans remain but they are stripped of their humanity and their dignity by the unceasing and unquestioned march of efficiency, technology and progress. Like Vonnegut, this journal hopes to remind people that there are things more important than progress for the sake of progress.

While it would be foolish to want to return to a past time, we must always be cognizant of the hard-fought lessons of our ancestors and their relevance today. The namesake of our parent organization, Alexis de Tocqueville, grasps the danger posed by modern societies in the beginning of Volume II of *Democracy in America*. “The continuous activity which prevails in a democratic society leads to the relaxation or the breaking of the links between generations. It is easy for a man to lose track of his ancestors’ conceptions or not to bother about them.” This frenzy that we all feel in our lives for new things is not inherently bad, but we must always remain aware that there are some things worth holding onto. If the authors of the pieces in this issue have done their jobs—and I believe they have—then you will have seen at least a glimpse of the permanent things and the value of continuity. If at least one new person’s eyes have been opened to the rich and wonderful history of both this university and this country, and their respective origins, we have unearthed true progress and you will have begun real education.

Sincerely,

Collan B. Rosier
Editor-in-Chief
Politics as Manners and Morals

Patrick J. Deneen

The “Tocqueville Forum” is a program within the Department of Government at Georgetown. This would indicate that the program is focused primarily upon issues dealing with politics, policy, or public affairs. Yet, a glance at our programming in recent years may lead some to conclude that the program has been miscategorized. Among the topics we have explored are religion, education, economics, literature, “society,” philosophy and law. It would appear that we have not appropriately limited ourselves to our designated field.

Such a conclusion would reflect a too-contemporary view of “politics” as concerned solely or exclusively with things pertaining to government. In the classical understanding – one first articulated by Aristotle – politics is the “master science,” the science that governs and draws from all other sciences that pertain to questions of how humans live together. Politics is not merely about policy; etymologically, politics is also related to “polite” (or, in the Latin equivalent, “civil” is related to “civility”), thus suggesting that there is an intimate relationship between the grand questions of government and the modest but essential ways we relate person-to-person. “Manners and morals” – to use terms that are not very popular today – are as relevant to “politics” as are questions of great constitutional moment. Indeed – it could be argued that a society that shares well-grounded “manners and morals” is one that needs to turn less to the offices of formal law and politics for guidance on how we are to live together. Aristotle pointed out additionally that where there is a high degree of civic friendship, one can expect fewer lawsuits and the need for public intervention in the lives of citizens.

Too often today there is a belief among people of varying political perspectives that the key to ensuring the success of their viewpoint is through the auspice of electoral victory. We bemoan the polarization of political life in America today, but it’s likely that the society is so politically riven because we invest so many of our hopes in the narrow realm of “politics.” At the same time, “manners and morals” seem to be a neglected step-child of our political discourse, believed to be wholly “private” concerns, irrelevant in contemporary debates. Thus neglected, we see by are not sufficiently concerned for their daily erosion by a coarsened culture, particularly their portrayal on our popular media.

It is our belief that the beginning of a proper understanding of “politics” includes and highlights the relationship of “government” and “politeness,” of “policy” and “civility.” As understood by the ancients, “self-government” is required both of individuals and the polity as a whole; lacking one, the other will surely fail. If we see today what appear to be breakdowns of “self-government” at the level of government, then we should not be surprised to see a corresponding breakdown in levels of civility and politeness among citizens. One cannot be
repaired without the other. For “politics” to be healthful, the cultivation of civility and politeness must be a central concern. For that reason, a far more encompassing understanding of “politics” is necessary – one that is advanced and encouraged on the Georgetown campus through the auspice of the Tocqueville Forum.

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On The Being
With Hands and Mind

“Praise him with trumpet sound; praise him with lute and harp!
Praise him with timbrel and dance; praise him with strings and pipe! Praise him with sounding cymbals; praise him with loud clashing cymbals!”

— Psalm 150:3-5.

“But we exhort you, brethren, to do so (love one another) more and more, to aspire to live quietly, to mind your own affairs, and to work with your hands, as we charged you; so that you may demand the respect of outsiders, and be dependent on nobody.”

— St. Paul, 1 Thessalonians, 4:10-12.

“Idleness is the enemy of the soul; and therefore the brethren ought to be employed in manual labor at certain times of the day, at other times in devout reading.”

— Rule of St. Benedict, Ch. 48.

In reading both Aristotle and St. Thomas, we find a unique definition of man. He is the one being in the universe “with mind and hands.” Even though Psalm 118 speaks metaphorically of “the Lord’s right hand,” the gods are beings with minds but not hands. Animals can have hands or claws but not mind along with them. In man, mind and hands belong together in the same being for its end. All parts are ordered to the purpose of the whole. The internal ordering of the various sensory powers to each other points in turn to mind as their purpose. Hands reflect mind. Mind gets into the world through hands. Hands make it possible, through craft and art, so that what it knows can take actual physical shape in the world of things. Hands make tools that extend both hands and mind.

No one can play a trumpet, a lute, a harp, a timbrel, or make cymbals clash without hands. And if he just had hands, man would not know how to fit or weave the sounds together to become one harmonious, unified piece of music. One dances mostly with his feet, but it is the same point. The definition could just as well read “Man is that being in the universe with hands and feet.” The feet make local motion possible. They enable a man with the sensory powers to
“look at,” “hear,” “smell,” “taste” or “touch” better what exists around him. He can climb stairs, run to the store, and jump-shoot baskets.

This definition gives a remarkable insight into our being when we spell it out. First, it states a fact, namely, that the human being is endowed from nature with both a mind and hands. Secondly, both belong together, even though they have different functions or purposes. They are divided that they be united. “How did they get that way?” we wonder. The hand as hand does not think. The hand’s motions take place outside of mind. The mind as mind does not play the fiddle. Neither mind nor hand is complete without the other. Moreover, this “belonging together” was already there. No human agency plotted out their coordination. They worked together from their very beginnings though habits needed to be acquired and experience gained of how to do things easily.

When the hand touches something or eye sees the same thing, the mind judges what it is that same thing being touched and seen. It then estimates what, if anything, to do with what it touches. It would not make this estimate if the hand provided no reliable information to the mind. The hand in turn rested on or grasped something not itself. We have bodies that enable us to smell, see, taste, hear, and touch so that the things that exist outside of us may be also brought inside of us without changing what they are in themselves. The nature of knowledge is itself to change the knower, not the thing known.

The things of the world, moreover, are not complete until we know what they are. They bear their own unique reality that itself reveals intelligence, but an intelligence to be further known to be complete. We need to name the things that are. On the basis of knowing and naming particular existing things, a general understanding arises that we can act on things not ourselves for our purposes. We can only do this because they are first what they are and so identified. Through the human mind, we find a “man-centeredness” about what is not man. Many wild things grow without man. Gardens and farms make us realize that many things are even better with him. In principle, the world minus mind is useless because it is unintelligible.

II. We are to know things, contemplate them, but we are not to be “idle,” as Paul tells us. As a cure to possible idleness, St. Benedict, in his Rule, tells us to work with our hands, which is another way of telling us to be what we are. But working with our hands just to be working with our hands can itself be drudgery, even another form of idleness, even slavery. “Twiddling our thumbs,” it is sometimes called. Our work has to be “for” something, not just its own motions.

Aristotle said that things without purpose were “in vain.” This observation also applies to the things made by man’s work. Homo faber, man the carpenter, was not just occupied in cutting up boards to pass the time of day. The carpenter cut them in a certain way, at an angle, in which they would fit together. The boards were of different sizes and shapes. Some wood was better than others for the immediate purpose in this artifact to be made. Even sawdust came to be useful and itself a resource. In this sense, the occupation of St. Joseph has more philosophic grounding than we might at first expect.

Yves Simon somewhere proposed the following situation: Suppose we employ a man for eight hours a day. We pay him a huge wage, plus, vacations, benefits, and retirement. For the rest of his life, all he has to do is to dig a meaningless hole six by six by six. On completing the first digging, we pay him. Next we pay him to fill it up again. We then repeat the process and payment again and again. The result will be that the man will soon go mad. We simply cannot do such senseless things.

The laborer has to sense that what he does, however relatively unimportant, means something, contributes something to the whole. If we
dig a hole, it should be for a building foundation, water drainage, or a grave. The point is that we do not work just for the sake of work. We work in order that we might make something, or do something that has purpose. At our best, we want to make or do what we do well. Intrinsic to everything we do or make we find a certain concrete drive to do it well. Chesterton said that “if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.” Without this paradoxical principle, we could not begin to do anything. Most things we do need to be done, even if done poorly or imperfectly. Yet, we want to do them well and admire what we know to be well done or well made.

All “full employment” rhetoric suffers from this suspicion that no real purpose lies in the work itself. People paid to do nothing are corrupted. The working man is only worthy of his “hire” if what he does means something of value. John Paul II used to say the most important thing about “work” was the dignity of the worker. While this grounding may be true, we cannot avoid the fact that the worker himself and the economy in which he works must think that he is doing meaningful work, something worthwhile doing for pay or generosity. He ought not to be paid no matter what he does.

We too often speak of “full employment” without speaking of employment for what. The history of labor is filled with stories of governments who put men to work in war, in make-work projects, to keep them exhausted. Even Moses had to deal with this sort of thing. The Pharaoh who was concerned that the Hebrews were growing too strong. So the Egyptian ruler made them work harder and harder with less and less time and materials, with more punishment if they slacked off. But what the Hebrews build was obviously something useful to the Egyptians, however forced the labor.

Moreover, shoddy work or inexpert work plays a basic role in judging the worker. “An honest day’s work for an honest day’s pay” is a familiar slogan. The worker ought not to be able to demand his pay if he produces an inferior product, or cheats, or does not learn to do an honest or accurate job. Workers are “worthy” of their hire only when what they produce is itself worthy of purchase. The worker and his work are connected. Are they who grow poppies and work them over for the drug trade “worthy” workers at whatever pay? To make it otherwise evaporates the work done of all significance in relation to the worker.

One unnoted aspect of the history of modern communism and socialism seems to be that of the demoralization of the work force through working and being supported for things that were not worth having or that do not function properly. Socialist economies have always been notorious for keeping in existence, in the name of employment, enterprises that should have been closed in the name of inefficiency. The whole point of competition in economics is to provide an on-going corrective to this danger. It is of the nature of work that other people can also learn to do them, and often do them better than we can do them. This is not a bad thing in principle. It is one that creates a certain dynamism in economic society.

Yet, the term “idle” has two meanings. St. Benedict used it to depict a kind of aimlessness, a mind open to temptation and disorder because it was largely empty and unoccupied. Cicero, on the other hand, said that he was never “less idle” than when he had “nothing to do.” Idleness can mean lack of attention to the activity of the mind. But it can also point to the contemplative order. It can mean beyond the necessity or desire to work. A time comes when our needs are sufficiently provided for us. What do we “make” or “do” then? The answer is: we do or make nothing. That is, “doing” refers to our moral activities. We do not exist for our moral activities alone. “Making” refers to our capacity to use our minds to put something into the world. These are both good and human qualities. They are essential to our whole being.
Yet these powers in the human whole exist in
turn that man’s highest power may function as it
is intended. That is, as free to know what is. It is
at this point unimpeded by some urge to do or
make something. They at this point are distrac-
tions from the clarity that is needed to think.
And thinking means thinking on the highest
things about which we are given, their origins
and purposes. Our thinking, like our making
and doing, can be inadequate or wrong.
Thinking itself is not for thinking’s sake but for
thinking the truth of what we have before us
through our senses or our minds.

But our human perfection does include the
doing and the making. A famous scene in the
Gospels tells us of Martha’s impatience with her
sister Mary’s not pitching in to help her out with
serving the guests. The Lord tells her that she is
busy about “many things,” but that Mary has
chosen the “better part.” Yet, it would be wrong
to conclude from this scene that what Martha
was doing was either unnecessary or unimpor-
tant. Martha, in fact, showed herself to be quite
a perceptive lady when she was asked about the
resurrection (John 11:24). The whole essence of
the Christian Gospels is not directed merely to
contemplation and truth but, through it, to
action and to deeds, to cups of water and hospi-
tality to strangers.

III. Thus, St. Paul tells us to live quietly and
to work with our hands. Evidently,
working with our hands does not militate
against our living quietly in this world, but is
part of it. Indeed, the two seem to go together.
This situation is not far from Aristotle’s praise of
a “middle-class” polity. Ordinary things need to
be done, often daily, hourly. We work, moreover,
to merit respect from “outsiders.” We are to be
dependent on no one. Laziness is not a virtue.
This admonition does not advocate rugged indi-
vidualism. It does advocate doing what our
nature directs us to do.

We recognize that we are not to live our lives
as if everything is “owed” to us, as if we are all
victims of our own unwillingness to do what we
normally can for ourselves and for our homes.
We do not command the respect of outsiders if
everything about us is slovenly and ill-kept. We
are to pride ourselves in the fact that we can do
the basic things, manage our own affairs.
Civilization consists in its quiet allowing of most
people to do the most important things them-
selves and having the means to do so. That this
happy situation may arise, we need contempla-
tion and action, mind and hands.

The dignity of one’s own affairs is but another
way of illustrating Aristotle’s notion of art
and craft, of practical intellect. We have not only
the power to think but also the power to make
things. The principle of subsidiarity affirms that
we should leave things to be done to those who
can do them. This capacity to make things lies at
the origin of technology and the crafts. It is the
extension of our minds into the world through
our hands. A natural correlation, moreover,
exists between the world and our own good. We
are to improve the world in the process of devel-
oping ourselves. Modern ecological movements
often seem to set man against earth as if man is
simply an intruder in the cosmos rather than
someone whose presence is necessary for its
final purpose.

Disorders in men’s souls, to be sure, do result
in disorders in things. Psalm 115 touched on this
issue: “But our God is in the heavens; he does
whatever he wills. Their (pagan or Hebrew) idols
are silver and gold; the work of human hands.”
Here, be it noted, the “work of human hands” is
not praised. Human hands thus can and do pro-
duce idols as well as works of beauty and utility
ordered to noble ends. Behind the idol, of course,
is the notion that the power of making can be
used against man’s own dignity. Whether the
idol be a golden calf or a political kingdom, the
effect is the same. Through his action or his craft,
man can set up his own gods that signify an
order of being not based on the truth he finds in
reality, an order which he is to bring forth into the world in what he does and makes.

This theme that the works of man’s hands can be used against the human good has long been a concern of philosophers. Philosophers were thought by the common folks to be so impractical that they could not even tie the laces of their own shoes. Philosophers tried to prove the opposite by showing that their knowledge enabled them to establish monopolies and make fortunes if they wanted. They, however, did not want or need many things. Classical thought also understood that the philosopher, the man of thought, was potentially a danger to existing cities. This was the drama that swirled around the philosopher Socrates, who urged the citizens to the practice of virtue.

Of course, the idols are usually in the employ of the thinkers and the craftsmen who indicate what they are and who make them. Art differs from prudence because one can be a morally bad man and still be a good artist or craftsman. But no one can violate the rules of ethics or politics and remain a good man. Yet, cities tell us what they are by what is built in them, by what politicians symbolize in the city’s monuments. The craftsmen build the buildings and monuments according to what the city wants to say of itself. Politics erects tombs and statues to tell us what it thinks worthy. The preservation of the polity is a worthy cause, but both tyrants and kings strive to preserve their rule. To preserve a corrupt regime is itself corrupting, unless, as Aristotle implied, it is preserved against something worse.

What about “education?” Craftsmen have long learned by doing. They are “trained” if necessary as apprentices, journeymen, and masters, but not “educated.” No city can be a city of philosophers alone and still be a city. Wide varieties of skills and things need to be present, as Plato noted in the second book of the Republic. We still have remnants of the medieval notion of a “guild” in which crafts are learned gradually until one reached master-craftsmanship. The medical profession is like this. Skilled workers and ordinary laborers do learn something very concretely both about the things they work with, about the people who need what they do, and about the virtues and vices of those they work with and sell to. In other words, they see human nature in action.

A long debate, which is surfacing again, is about whether education in the highest thing is only for the few. Or put differently, when academic education is given to the many, does it prevent most people from learning in other, more practical ways? As several recent authors have shown, much can be learned by the repair and upkeep of one’s motorcycle. Joseph Pieper remarks, however, that, in every city, we should find those whose vocation it is to transcend the city, to devote their lives to the most important thing which is not the city. No city is safe that does not have at least some who are not spending their entire lives on practical things. The Church has always made this point in its treatment of Martha and Mary. Both were necessary, Mary chose the “higher part.”

Earlier writers, like Eric Gill and the distributists and more recent ones like Allan Carlson and Wendell Berry, appreciate the classic virtues of farm life. Many today begin to wonder about “education” and about ways to wisdom other than the “degree” way. Matthew Crawford recently wrote:

High-school shop-class programs were widely dismantled in the 1990’s as educators prepared students to become ‘knowledge workers.’ The imperative of the last twenty years to round up every warm body and send it to college, then to the (office) cubicle, was tied to a vision of the future in which we somehow take leave of material reality and glide about in a pure information economy. This has not come to pass. To begin with, such work often feels more enervating than gliding. More fundamentally, now as ever, somebody has to
actually do things: fix our cars, unclog our toilets, build our houses.\textsuperscript{2}

This passage raises the question of whether every one should go to college and, if not, is he deprived of access to the highest human things? These concerns are often voiced with an awareness of the moral and ideological disorders found in academia today.

Aristotle himself was remarkable in that he understood that philosophy was a way of life, not simply an academic discipline. The wise, as St. Paul intimated, could often be quite “foolish.” Aristotle, for his part, recognized that the source of philosophy is not books or in what philosophers say, but what could be seen in the being of things, including human things and that to which all things pointed. In other words, unlearned or ordinarily educated people could know, what human living was about, how it ought to be lived. They could learn from their own experience, or acquaintance with others, or from reading or, as in Plato, from tales. Just as the supposedly wise could be foolish, so the ordinary could know the basics of the great things. Both the learned and the ordinary needed virtue to approach the highest things, virtue and openness to grace.

Modern hopes in liberal education, no doubt, have presupposed a kind of aristocracy of the masses. Modern state educational systems were premised on the fact that everyone should have an opportunity to learn all he can. There is a certain embarrassment in the fact that some are brighter than others. The question of the existence of a hierarchy of things better to know was dicier.

Aristotle’s “polity,” his “democratic” form of the regime that rules for the good of all, recognized the advantage also of having aristocratic and monarchical elements. Plato had warned that from a democracy, we were likely to get a “leader” who would be a tyrant of the worst kind, the one who looked only to his own good in all things that involved others. It is difficult to show that educated societies are immune from the arrivals of tyrants among them.

Crawford’s concern about an education that puts everyone in college, often to their own detriment, along with the rise of interest in practical education, is worth looking at. The movement to put colleges on-line in some form or other whereby the student never actually has to be present in an actual class or university grounds is well under way. Many practical disciplines and crafts can effectively be put on-line. The very putting on-line is something of a craft with many different talents employed in its invention, construction, upkeep, and distribution. Many people today receive all or part of their education on-line. These on-line topics are more often practical subjects. Yet, most of the “great books” are already on-line.

In many countries, military service of a year or so is still required of young men and often now of young women. This service almost always involves a combination of personal discipline and practical knowledge from kitchen duty to shooting guns. Most colleges today, moreover, provide programs whereby, on graduation, students can volunteer for various local or overseas works of aid and service to the poor. These programs can easily become politicized but at bottom they are often a revitalization of the charitable and benevolent overtones of western culture. They recognize that a complete education involves more than academic discipline.

Eric Greitens, a graduate of Duke University, spent his time in Rwanda, an eye-opening experience for him in one of the world’s most troubled lands. He wrote in the \textit{Key Reporter}: “It is through service to others that we often learn how ideas can shape the word, yet we hardly think about service or service-learning as a formal part of the liberal arts education.”\textsuperscript{3} In his study of Strauss and Voegelin on the Bible, John Ranieri made much the same point about the
presence of this practical endeavor actually to help others that exists within the often unacknowledged religious heritage of the culture.

Classically “workingman’s” jobs, like carpentry or auto repair, now require a high level of technical knowledge and practical good sense. They also require experience not only of the trade itself but of how it fits into an economy. The tendency in unions is often to protect jobs from non-union workers or from seeing the very work itself sent overseas because of the costliness of labor. This latter phenomenon has been the story of much modern craft tradition, though the gaining what was lost in one country becomes the basis of work and wealth in another. Labor becomes a cost that cannot be afforded. This issue is partly related to Plato’s ungoverned desire that motivates many people to want more for its own sake and not for what is needed. Other workers can produce the same or better products with less income and more skill. This result goes back to what I said earlier about the work and the worker.

St. Benedict in his Rule advocated working with one’s hands for some of the day and “devout reading” for some other time of day. The order of the day was a prudentially designed balance between work and reading. The proportion of work and study will no doubt vary from one person to another, from one place or time to another. In modern times, we also have between “work” and “reading” what was called, even in the classics, sports or hobbies. These latter have their own justifications in Plato and Aristotle. They are not seen as opposed work or study. They are closer to contemplation. One cannot help but notice today in almost any city the amount of running that goes on. Often this running, or other sports exercises, is a counter to a work or study life that allows for little physical exercise. But the whole range of moral life is also displayed in sports, as it is in work or even in study.

It is well-known that one hardly ever has a bad meal in Italy. This happy result is in part because nothing is eaten unless it is fresh, but also because cooking is still considered a high craft if not a fine art even in the humblest of families. This cuisine will require farms and labor that can still produce quality foods. It requires a tradition of cookery. In America, it is possible to get beautiful looking fruits and vegetables all year round, but they are seldom fresh or ripe as in Italy. The earlier American tradition of the home garden in which such items were produced is practically non-existent. It is said that Americans watch the TV cooking channels but do not themselves cook actual meals.

Wendell Berry proposes the restoration of some personal agriculture on a wide scale. He envisions this as possible if there are local markets and demand. We do see “Farmers’ Markets” in almost every city today that seeks to foster this type of work and production. The people who grow or can or bake such items display a certain kind of practical wisdom that is not so prevalent in the mass produced farms and food processing companies. Many see the restoration of the family and children to be related to this notion of practically restoring things like cooking, gardens, and home schooling.

What I wish to suggest, in conclusion, is that those who work with their hands are not, for that reason, necessarily deprived of access to man’s higher wisdom. In fact, the practical way of knowing is essential for the balance of the whole man. The point to be made is not merely that we can learn a certain wisdom from practical doing and making, but that this experience is itself necessary to enabling us also to have a theoretical life.

Aristotle suggested that one of the principal reasons for ancient slavery was to insure that the heavy and inhuman work that was needed in any city just to survive had to be performed. He also suggested that if machines could take over
much of this work, man would be free to do the things more conducive to his nature. This use of machinery in fact is what happened. Man could make things of beauty and utility that would make human life more abundant and more dignified in its surroundings. Indeed, making such things was the burden of civilization, though civilization itself was the internal living of the life of the virtues, both practical and theoretical.

We have heard of expressions such as “gentleman farmer,” “gentleman doctor,” or even “gentleman priest.” These are not pejorative words. Rather they indicate that the man of craft or of spirit needed also to be accomplished in many things. He needed both to read and to make, and yes to fish and to hunt, to sing and dance. His outer world reflected his inner world. The things with which he surrounded himself were images of his soul and revealed what he thought important about human life and its final meaning. Thus St. Benedict’s work and pray, his ora et labora, made sense. The hand and the mind together were to make a world that could be both useful and beautiful, that employed all the virtues, that searched what transcends the daily world, that reflected the City of God, yea even in this world.

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The liturgy is the indispensable basis for Christian social regeneration,” affirmed Father Virgil Michel in the midst of the most productive period of his enormously fruitful life and only three years before his untimely passing in 1938. Father Virgil, a Benedictine “monk of the world” at St. John’s Abbey, has been recognized as one of the original founders of the liturgical movement in the United States, spearheading a visionary reconstruction of the Catholic liturgy throughout the former part of the twentieth century. Virgil Michel was indeed a visionary in every sense of the word, for his ideas for the greater participation of the Catholic laity in the liturgy became forerunners of the world-wide liturgical transformation at Vatican II. Father Michel’s ideas were not mere carbon copies of those put forth by the leaders of the liturgical revival in Europe during his time. Rather, they proved innovative, revolutionary and strikingly American, building upon and expanding on the ideas put forth by his European counterparts. In establishing the key relationship between the Church as a living, breathing and dynamic organism and the liturgy as the life of the Church which rehearses and prepares Catholics for daily living, Virgil Michel dispelled the commonly held understanding of liturgy as an end in itself. Liturgy, as the public work of the Church, was not the end but rather the beginning, for its aim was to prepare the Mystical Body of Christ to act out against the injustices of the world.

The initial part of my thesis will address the unique experiences, key mentors and some essential pieces of literature that propelled and inspired Virgil Michel to undertake the task of spearheading a transformative shift in Catholic thought, specifically in regards to the indivisible bond between liturgy and social justice. I will then address Virgil Michel’s pioneering idea, delving deeper into the liturgy-Church-social justice relationship. Lastly, I will attempt to analyze where and why it is that the Catholic laity today are failing to see the indissoluble link between liturgy and social justice. From this perspective, I will make several prescriptions, arguing that while some of Virgil Michel’s specific ideas of economic reform are perhaps outdated, the applicability of the fundamental model of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ in our daily lives transcends all time and space, and becomes particularly suitable to our rapidly globalizing world.
I. Inspirations: Ideas, Individuals and Experiences

Born in 1890, Virgil Michel grew up in an age inundated with individualistic capitalism: “At the beginning of his professional life, Virgil Michel faced a world reeling from the slaughter of World War I. Violence had wrecked many of Europe’s communities and undermined belief in the decency and efficacy of Western culture. But the peace of the 1920s that ensued brought a new rush to materialism in the West, particularly in the United States.”

As Paul Marx, Virgil Michel’s first biographer, emphasizes, “A new era had dawned, a time of world-wide social unrest; and pessimism of every kind flourished.” Morality was in decay, the American economy in disarray, and the lives of millions stood in shambles, very much like the Hooverville shacks on the outskirts of American cities. The epoch in which Virgil Michel lived exceptionally demonstrated the catastrophic effects that simultaneous poverty and materialism can have on “community life…Little wonder then that Virgil Michel’s work and writings are redolent of crisis—crisis in economics and politics, crisis in religion and the Church, crisis in the human soul.” It seemed, then, that Virgil Michel’s life was uniquely set in a context of crisis, that God was calling upon him to seek solutions to a world truly desperate for answers.

Several of his collaborators and mentors, including his novice master, his abbot, and his ecclesiology professor, fundamentally impacted Dom Virgil’s vision. It was his old novice master, Father Athanasius Meyer, who first impressed upon Virgil Michel the notion that human beings could—through their own actions—transform their world into a “paradise on earth,” and that we must do so by synthesizing tradition with an interest in the affairs of the world.

Dom Virgil’s abbot, Father Alcuin Deutsch, was an enormously instrumental figure in his life, not only sparking “Michel’s entering the Benedictine Order [but also deciding to send] him to Europe in 1924,” an experience from which Virgil Michel gained a clearer vision for the necessary revival among the Catholic laity in America. Alcuin impressed upon Dom Virgil the necessity of a uniquely American liturgical movement, providing him “with the impetus to direct the liturgical movement ever more ably from Saint John’s to Catholic America and even onward to reach the entire English-speaking world.”

A liturgical revival in America needed to be distinctly American.

Finally, Dom Lambert Beauduin, whom Virgil Michel met during his travels in Europe in 1924, is often noted as being the most fundamentally influential personage to Virgil Michel’s vision. Since Dom Lambert was widely recognized as the figure that spearheaded the liturgical movement in Belgium in the first decade of the twentieth century, Virgil Michel enthusiastically sought out his experience and mentorship, eventually letting Dom Lambert’s Mystical Body ecclesiology and the monk’s emphasis on the humanity as well as the divinity of Christ wash over and inspire him.

In his studies, Dom Virgil Michel synthesized the works, thoughts and writings of two figures, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Orestes Brownson. Through the writings of these monumental thinkers, Michel arrived at his own synthesis of the liturgy as the public work of the Mystical Body of Christ and the notion of social action and responsibility which flowed from this source. From Brownson, Virgil Michel received his enormous interest in contemporary thought and modern philosophy. Until he studied philosophy in Europe, Michel, like Brownson, was more interested in and certainly better acquainted with modern rather than Scholastic philosophy. However, Dom Michel synthesized Brownson’s critique of Catholic theology and defense of the Church with the Thomism of St. Aquinas in order to produce his
unique vision. After his undertaking of a doctoral program focused on the workings of St. Thomas at Louvain, Virgil Michel developed a more in-depth understanding of St. Thomas as a fundamental teacher of the truths of Christ and returned to America with a firm conviction to bring the philosophy St. Thomas to his country. It was Dom Virgil’s firmly rooted Thomism, enthused with an interest in the social problems of the world, which aided in his development of economic and social solutions to the problems of his day.

Two particular experiences that propelled Virgil Michel into his fervent undertaking were his interactions with ordinary people—first in his travels throughout Europe and later, at the Indian Reservations of Northern Minnesota. “While in Rome, he meticulously took note of the numerous sights, observing circumstance and custom in the ordinary living of lay people, monks and clergy.” Upon taking a series of trips throughout the European mainland, he clearly observed “a sharp distinction and broad distance between clergy and people…He deplored the absence of social responsibility on the part of the Spanish clergy and nobility [and thus,] his European sojourn brought countless ideas and realities into his experience” which became central to his doctrine of Christian social reconstruction.

Even more central to his developing vision of the lay apostolate was his experience at the Chippewa Indian missions in Northern Minnesota in the late spring of 1930. It was here that Virgil Michel was able to more fully realize “the conclusion that lay persons must act as leaders in carrying the social implications of liturgy out into the world.” Virgil Michel lived with the Indians as one of them, at ease with the simplicity of the community; and yet he worked among them zealously, putting “into practice all the maxims about pastoral life which had characterized his earlier liturgical apostolate.” Just as Virgil Michel touched the morality of those whom he had met, the experience of living on the margins of society touched Virgil Michel deeply, becoming truly transformative for him. No wonder, then, that upon his reluctant return from the Chippewa Indian missions, he vigorously set upon further developing the synthesis between liturgy and the laity of the Catholic Church, in a period that proved the most fruitful of his industrious life.

II. Virgil Michel’s Fundamental Vision

It is worth noting that in spite of the social principles put forth exactly forty years before by Pope Leo XIII in his Rerum Novarum, relatively few had been aware of the kind of social reconstruction proposed at the very end of the nineteenth century. American society was in danger of collapse and in urgent need of cure-alls to its problems. The uniqueness of Virgil Michel’s proposed solutions and remedies—his vision for social reconstruction—had to do with his ability to address “the roots of the problem and [to lay] bare underlying causes—godless individualism, hidden paganism, a subtle bourgeois spirit, rank materialism, and their supporting ideologies.” Virgil Michel stressed the vital importance of starting with the self first and foremost; that is, the fundamentality of initially recovering one’s own morality and human values in order to proceed and press forward in resolving the social questions of the day. In the words of Paul Marx, “social chaos about us is often only the reflection of spiritual chaos within us; that unless modern man recovered human spiritual values, there would be no lasting Christian social reconstruction.” Thus, social reconstruction must begin at the very root and source of the problem, dealing with the initial spiritual awakening of the individual to the values of human dignity and the common good. And it is precisely here that the liturgy proved central in its ability to compel a total reconstruction of society.

Virgil Michel argued that from the very beginnings of the Renaissance movement,
humanity became embroiled in a continually advancing individualism so that we had completely forgotten its corporate nature. We are, first and foremost, social beings. The Mystical Body of Christ on earth is then the model which must guide our daily efforts in reconstructing and rebuilding our communities. And while we must certainly shape our specific plans for social justice “according to current conditions of time and place”, the Mystical Body of Christ will serve as our eternal guide. This model of the Mystical Body is applicable to all times and places; it transcends age and space.

How, precisely, are we transformed into this Mystical Body of Christ? As initiated members of the Church, we are incorporated parts of a greater whole, each and every one of us called to share in the work and priesthood of Jesus Christ. Indeed, it is when we are incorporated into Christ that we receive the sanctifying grace which enables us to go out into the world and to further His mission of justice and peace. Incorporated into Christ, we must now become the living branches, living the “Christ-life” not only during Sunday liturgy but in our daily lives. Liturgy is rehearsal; our house of worship a rehearsal room. We must not stop there, for liturgy is not an end in itself but rather, the beginning. From the liturgy, we go forth, letting the teachings of Jesus Christ impressed upon us throughout our partaking and participation in the liturgy guide us in every aspect of our ordinary lives. “Together with Christ all the branches form a real, living, supernatural organism, permeated and vitalized by the indwelling Spirit of Christ. The Holy Spirit, as its vivifying soul, unites the whole organism into one living community of life. In this one living organism all are called to an active share, not only in the organic life and corporate worship of the undivided Mystical Christ—His Church—but also to an active share, according to the status of each, in His work and mission as continued on earth by the Church.”

This active share must first transpire in the liturgy and we then seek to let Christ’s mission on Earth become our daily work. Indeed, Virgil Michel’s emphasis on liturgy as the life of the Church was a fundamental element of his doctrine, from which the participation of the Catholic laity would then flow in all directions of the world. The basis of obligation for this social action lay in man’s inescapably social nature. For “his physical, moral, intellectual, and spiritual development every person is dependent on others. Whatever he or she achieves is in some way due to the work and accomplishments of those who have gone before him or who help him now...” This idea of the tightly interlinked nature of human beings and the fundamental role of the liturgy as the source from which our preparation and inspiration for our work emanates was the visionary element of Dom Virgil Michel’s thinking.

Thus, his central contribution to the world of Catholic thought lies in his tracing of the social implications of the liturgy for a living out of the Christ-life, for a complete transformation in human attitudes and thinking regarding the earthly world in which we live. To Virgil Michel, the liturgy was not a detached, performative ritual of Catholic worship; it was inseparable from daily living and social life. There was no dualism; no religious and secular; liturgy and social action were fused into one another. Just as human beings are bound to one another as the Mystical Body of Christ, so too is the liturgy bound to social justice as the foundation for all social action and daily living. “When we ask ourselves what should the right structure of any human society be, or how should the individual be related to any society of men,” asserted Virgil Michel, “we can always point to the Mystical Body and say: There is the model that we should try to follow in all our human relations; for God constructed it on the basis of what is best in and for our natures.”

As a further addition to his writings, Virgil Michel lent a generous and helping hand to an infinite number of movements—the most
prominent among them being the founding of the Catholic Worker Movement by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, the establishment of Catherine De Hueck’s Friendship House and the successful re-launching of the Inter-Student Catholic Action organization in Chicago: “It mattered little to him whether the group was large or small, whether their activities were far-developed or just emerging from the planning stage...And he possessed the rare talent to gather every manifestation of Catholic thought and life into a coordinated whole until a verifiable network of somehow related movements went out from the monastery cell of Father Virgil of St. John’s to well-nigh every section of the United States and Canada.” His ideas of the greater participation of the Catholic laity in the liturgy were deeply integrated into the 1963 Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of Vatican II, prophetically transforming Catholics’ participation in Sunday Mass. And social work movements sprung up everywhere across by the United States, a phenomenon quite evident when one examines the rapidly growing number of relief and social organizations under the Catholic Charities USA organization, among many others.

If we fast forward from Dom Virgil’s time to our very own time and age, however, one still finds ours replete with crisis. We live in a time not very different from that of Virgil Michel, for we also are now in the midst of a “War against Terrorism”, a global economic and financial crisis, and an immigration problem, while much of the world is experiencing a crisis of faith. At the same time, there is indeed a growing trend in the number of Catholic faith-based initiatives and social services across the country so that the total lack of a Catholic lay apostolate—as in 1930s America—no longer seems to be the problem. The missing link, however, lies in the failure of the lay apostolate to connect their work of the liturgy with that of social justice. It appears that in spite of Catholics’ greater sensitivity and heightened conscience towards the needs of society, this developing social justice trend is promising, but fragile at best. For in our inability to embrace the liturgy-social justice relationship, have we truly transformed our attitudes of individualism into a communal lens or view of the world? Surely, achieving peace and justice in the world is a difficult, unending process and a fundamentally monumental task, but in spite of the legacy of Virgil Michel, why do we often miss the key centrality of the liturgy to our social work?

Perhaps the failure of the Vatican II Constitution to “make a clear connection between liturgy and social justice” is to blame. Perhaps it is the fact that Virgil Michel’s specific ideas of socio-economic reform were very much products of his time and are therefore, not wholly applicable today. Some may even carry the misconception that in his zeal to catapult the Mystical Body of Christ into action, Virgil Michel sought to establish a theocratic state or society, when nothing could be further from the truth.

Surely, anyone hoping for a “revolution” will indeed be disappointed, for while Virgil Michel’s ideas were certainly groundbreaking, the revolution which he sought must take its root in the minds and hearts of the Catholic laity first. In light of the unceasing multitude of problems in our world today, a complete social transformation is likely to be a very gradual development. However, if Catholics fail to recognize the indispensability of liturgy and social reform to one another, it is a rather troubling yet commonsense prediction to make that the rising trend in social justice work and movements across the country could then only be a mere trend. In a world of dynamic and imminent change, if we do not deeply root the social work that we do into the one organic and living source of stability, the Church, what are the chances that our own social work will not merely be a worldly, temporary affair? What are the chances that the
model of the Mystical Body of Christ will become a model for all time and age if we do not understand it with full completeness?

In a world that is rapidly moving closer together day by day, with mass communications technology and the forces of globalization upon us, the disparities and the social ills of our time are clearer than ever before. In fact, perhaps we could use all the developments of our age and the empowering doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ to our advantage. It seems that our age of technological interconnectedness is uniquely suited to the fostering of corporality and fellowship in the world, for ideas today have the power to spread like wildfire when put forth with creativity, dexterity and zeal. I propose, then, that we must now seek to apply Virgil Michel’s doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ “to all the forms of our social life, the family, the community, the state, and thus build up anew a Christian social order of life.”139 Truly, there has never been a more appropriate time.

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It is undeniable that Nietzsche has made his imprint on the face of the philosophical landscape since his writing in the late 1700s. Although enduring relative obscurity during his life, Nietzsche has been rediscovered and reinterpreted countless times as the harbinger of the end of modernity and the prophet of a new type of philosophy. His is a complicated, subtle, and nuanced philosophy that does not easily open itself to the hasty reader, but must be pondered—“ruminated.” That is the ambition of this essay—to examine his philosophical system, specifically his critique of Christianity, so that the consequences of it are made explicit and judged on their merits.

It must be admitted at the outset that presenting a critique of Nietzsche—especially one from a Christian perspective—is fraught with inherent difficulties. Part of the challenge of critiquing Nietzsche in a systematic way is that he is anything but a systematic thinker. His witty banter and aphoristic style make it challenging to discern the consistency of his arguments and even more challenging to refute them. But the greatest obstacle to criticizing Nietzsche as an avowed theist is the wholesale lack of common ground that subsequently renders it difficult to determine a starting point from which to launch such a criticism.

Nietzsche insulates himself from attack from virtually every other philosophical system by portraying those systems as “slave morality” and therefore as positions incapable of lodging legitimate criticism. He himself castigates theories that are refutable as “charmingly seductive,” and therefore is entirely consistent in presenting a theory that is wholly non-falsifiable.

In fact, his method itself renders falsifiability both extraneous and unnecessary. His method, like that of Aristotle, was observation, and it is upon the power and accuracy of Nietzsche’s observations that his legitimacy primarily stands. It is true that Nietzsche was a prophetic thinker with a privileged glimpse into the shortcomings of modernity. He witnessed the decline of European philosophy, literature, and religion with disappointment. Something—something that eluded most observers—had occurred in the workings of modernity that killed God and birthed Zarathustra. It was one of the chief goals of Nietzsche to determine exactly what this “something” was.

Nietzsche points most definitively to Platonism and Christianity, which is “Platonism for the people” as a primary source of widespread discontent with the world. It is the corrupting, nihilistic influence of Christianity
which exalts a non-material, transcendent world over the present physical world which Nietzsche passionately loathes and against which he launches his most vitriolic barbs. Yet accounting for Nietzsche’s view of Christianity as a whole is difficult because his opinion of it evolved over time. In his youth he was an adamant Christian before disavowing the faith, after which his animosity against Christianity only increased and reached its culmination in his eventual self-identification as the antichrist. The process of Europe’s evolving relation to Christianity which Nietzsche witnessed paralleled his own personal experience with God. Nietzsche was deeply pious in his youth; Europe was formerly very Christianized. But through the process of modernization, Nietzsche saw Europe drifting away from Christianity just as he himself did; and he predicted that the culmination of this trend of secularization would be a wholesale rejection of Christianity.

Though his opinions fluctuated, it is not inaccurate to see Nietzsche as a religious writer. In a certain sense, Nietzsche owes a great debt to Christianity. In fact, he is incomprehensible without it. He is one who is virtually obsessed with the “errors” of Christianity even after he has rejected them as erroneous. He incorporates much of the language of Christianity into his own writings, but spins the vocabulary to present himself as the antithesis of Christianity. He claims that his system is a transvaluation of all values, but also that Christianity was the first such system. Nietzsche’s philosophical prescriptions are the direct antithesis of Christianity, just as his language of the superman is the direct antithesis of Christ: “This Jesus of Nazareth, as the embodiment of the gospel of love, this ‘redeemer’ bringing salvation and victory to the poor, the sick, to sinners—was he not seduction in its most sinister and irresistible form?” His superman takes on Christ-like qualities: “some time, in a stronger age that this moldy, self-doubting present day, he will have to come to us, the redeeming man of great love and contempt.” For Nietzsche, the failure of Christianity was so complete and the problems it caused so intractable that the only remedy to Christianity was its exact opposite.

But here Nietzsche’s intellectual program meets its first criticism. The difficulty posed to the Christian endeavoring to criticize Nietzsche due to lack of common ground also hampers Nietzsche’s own criticism. By comparing two opposing systems of value (the good and evil of Christianity the good and bad of Nietzsche), Nietzsche is faced with a difficulty. Either he must introduce a third element by which he can judge the two systems and determine which is preferable, or he must judge both systems by one or the other standard. He favors the second option, and employs the barometer of good and bad, with its implicit pragmatism, to judge both moral systems. But if the Christian criticism of Nietzsche is invalid due to the lack of common assumptions, then intellectual consistency mandates that Nietzsche’s own criticism of Christianity be likewise neutralized. Consequently, the extent of his criticism cannot go much further than simply to say of “good and evil” that it is not “good and bad”—an assertion that scarcely represents a landmark of philosophical thought.

Yet Nietzsche is not content merely to demonstrate the differences between the two systems; he does harbor a desire to rank value systems in relation to each other, which places him in the position of having to identify a barometer by which he can judge between the two systems. The barometer chosen is that a value system must be “affirming of life”—a nebulous criterion at best. Moreover, the barometer of being “affirming of life” is contained inherently within his system of good and bad. Therefore, he really is not engaging in
a revaluation of all values, but in a revaluation of some (namely, the Christian and Platonic) values. His revaluation is an attempt to return man to the center of the philosophical universe, to make him the measure of all things, and thus create an ideology which affirms human life and human experience above all other concerns.

Yet while Nietzsche’s agenda initially seems virtuous, it involves a perspective that is confined by the Death of God, and the subsequent loss of a transcendental basis for ethics. The return of man to the center of the philosophical universe is predicated upon the denial of anything more significant than man. Therefore Nietzsche’s ideological frame must a priori deny the possibility that there is another metaphysical realm in comparison to which this life is insignificant.

Though Nietzsche attempts to be life-affirming, he eventually becomes life-obsessed and runs a terrible danger of advocating a perilously myopic philosophical structure. Here, as much as Nietzsche would protest, he must at last be subjected to the test of truth. If, in fact, human life is the highest end, then Nietzschean philosophy (with all the consequences which follow) can be accepted as accurate and useful. But if there exists something that transcends human life, then Nietzsche is guilty of ignoring not only the significance, but also the very existence of the highest things. A philosophy which cannot account for a significant portion of reality—the metaphysical portion—is bound to have problematic conclusions.

Nietzsche’s rebuttal to this criticism is consistent with his overall philosophical program. The “will to Truth,” like all other values, is submitted to revaluation: “We ought to inquire about the value of truth.” Because Nietzsche is not willing to accept the possibility that his system fails to account for something, he denies not the existence of truth, but rather, the significance of truth. Consequently, the function of religion for Nietzsche is not the search for profound human truth (since such an endeavor is impossible), but rather a reinforcement of a certain system of valuation.

In theory, religion can be useful for instituting Nietzsche’s new moral code of good and bad, but only a very specific breed of religion. Christianity is not of this breed; its praise of virtue, humility, and placidity is directly antithetical to the will to power, and its claims to transcendent truth are merely glorified opinions:

“This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this ‘belief’ of theirs, the exert themselves for their ‘knowledge,’ for something that is in the end solemnly christened ‘the Truth’.”

Yet the legitimacy of truth as a viable criterion for evaluation is not as easily dismissed as Nietzsche might hope. By asserting that truth is insignificant, Nietzsche is himself making a claim about the way the world is organized—a truth claim. His Genealogy of Morality is an attempt to rationally explain the origins of what Nietzsche sees as a lamentable phenomenon—morality. As such, the genealogy necessarily makes certain truth claims. Nietzsche further implies that these truth claims have significance when he looks to them to validate his new system of values. Nietzsche cannot coherently formulate his philosophy without appealing to some sort of truth—a central tenet of the slave morality that he so roundly condemns as deficient and outdated. Nietzsche’s use of language itself betrays him.

The ramifications of the denial of truth are significant even beyond impacting our methods of discourse. One prominent consequence of Nietzsche’s revaluation of truth and his new system of good and bad is the denial of natural
law. Law and truth are no longer functions of reason, but functions of will. Therefore, the natural law, with its basis in transcendent reason, is denied: "You desire to live 'according to nature'? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words!" Natural law becomes not an ordinance of reason, but only the whim of those who desire to "recreate nature in their own image." Man's telos is stripped from him; life is no longer a search for the Good, as Plato and Aristotle had suggested, but "life itself is Will to power." By propagating a system of "unnatural law," Nietzsche represents the antithesis of Aristotle, and his analysis poses a direct threat to Aristotelian reason. It is this relationship of Nietzsche to Aristotle which largely cements his position not merely as a musing genius, but as a serious metaphysical philosopher concerned with the question of being.

But do Nietzsche's answers really represent an innovative way of doing philosophy? It is clear that Nietzsche sees himself as a prophetic philosopher, as the subtitle of his book Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, might suggest. But much of Nietzsche's substance is actually a reversion to the ideas of previous philosophers and writers. Seen in this light, the revaluation of values is actually a step backwards. Nietzsche's observations reveal that a world which claims to have seen the Death of God will look strikingly similar to a world that had never known God at all.

Nietzsche's philosophical forerunner was one whom his nemesis, Plato, had himself dealt with: Thrasymachus. When discussing the nature of justice as an interlocutor in the Republic, Thrasymachus foreshadows Nietzsche by arguing that justice is merely a contrivance and nothing more than the interest of the stronger. Therefore it is nothing revolutionary, and it is certainly not introducing an innovative system of valuation when Nietzsche declares that: “to talk of just and unjust as such is meaningless; an act of injury, violence, exploitation or destruction cannot be unjust as such, because life functions essentially in an injurious, violent, exploitative and destructive manner.”

Nietzsche's political forerunner was Machiavelli, who, like Nietzsche, is often read as a liberating author for moving beyond the constraints of morality. The greatest commonality between the two men is their idolization of the same political and heroic figure. Cesare Borgia represents the epitome of Machiavelli's political realism. Machiavelli said of him: "I know of no better precept to bestow upon a new prince than that he follow the example of [Cesare's] actions." Borgia is praised also by Nietzsche as "the man of prey who is fundamentally misunderstood." This is high praise for the man whose most notable act, recorded by Machiavelli, was to kill a consul which he had previously appointed through cronyism and placed "his body, cut in two, on view in the public square of Cesana with a wooden block and blood-stained knife resting reside it" in order to intimidate the citizens of the city into compliance. The fact that a man who employs such inhuman tactics is praised by a philosopher who claims to be "affirming of life" is at once farcical and patently absurd, but it demonstrates the difficulty which the Nietzschean system necessarily encounters. If transcendence is gone, what foundation other than the exercise of power remains upon which one can erect an ethical structure? If man can no longer be a rational animal, he must devolve into a barbaric animal.

Here it is necessary to address the relation between Nietzsche and the more modern political entity which co-opted him as part of its philosophical schema: Nazism. This author does not hold that Nietzsche was the forerunner to Hitler. Such a claim is both too ad hominem and too specious. Simply because a philosopher...
anticipated an event does not justify accusations that he somehow caused the event itself. In fact, a significant amount of literature exists which asserts that the adoption of Nietzscheanism by the Nazis was not legitimate. Nevertheless, several observations are beyond doubt: first, that the Nazis did appropriate Nietzschean philosophy for their political and social ambition, although admittedly the aphoristic nature of Nietzsche’s writings renders him especially susceptible to being read out of context or misinterpreted. Secondly, that Nietzsche does, in fact, contain some anti-Semitic diatribes that certainly appealed to the fiercely nationalistic Nazis. He blames Jews for the inversion of values and the origins of the slave insurrection of morality. It is a Jewish system of morality which wrought Christianity, and every attack on Christianity also contains an implicit attack on Judaism. However, it is primarily against the modern forms of Judaism that he reacts negatively; he is a proponent of ancient Israel because he sees them as having had a more free exercise of the will to power. While certainly not politically correct, these observations hardly constitute the intellectual foundations for a genocidal tyranny.

Therefore, it is not on the basis of the reappropriation of Nietzsche that one can criticize his philosophy, though many have taken that tact. Rather, Nietzscheanism ought to be criticized as an ethical structure because there is nothing in it that can be used to oppose an entity like the Nazis. Once one accepts the Nietzschean framework, there is no philosophical basis upon which to decry the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis when they claimed to be the first incarnations of the ubermensch. When challenged about the brutal extermination policies aimed at purification of the Aryan race, the Nazi party could respond: “Have you ever asked yourselves properly how costly the setting up of every ideal on earth has been?” If any member of the SS expressed personal qualms about the injustices he was ordered to commit, his superior officer could retort that “bad conscience is a sickness, there is no point in denying this.” By placing decisive power in the hands of the ubermensch and exalting him as a being superior to man, Nietzscheanism strips its adherents of the ability to oppose tyranny.

The Nazi example illuminates the fact that Nietzsche, by taking the vacuous assumptions of modernity to their logical conclusion, presents a philosophy that is in direct opposition to human reason, and does so on the basis of little more than conjecture. In short, Nietzsche attempts to subvert the prevalent system of morality by positing its antithesis, and thereby turning it on its head. Justice is replaced with prejudice. Mercy is replaced by domination of the stronger. Christ looks on the masses with compassion. The superman, on the other hand, looks at them with contempt.

Yet there is no scandal in thus overturning the contemporary moral system because that is exactly what Nietzsche’s experiment entails. He would undoubtedly consider his philosophical project a resounding failure were it not manifestly offensive to modern sensibilities, for it is modern sensibilities themselves which are under attack. Therefore, the modern man has no means of criticizing Nietzsche on the basis of reason (because reason is denied), or truth (because truth is insignificant), or compassion (since it is a hallmark of the slave). Nietzsche’s philosophical schema dwells safely within the fortress of non-falsifiability, and his insulation from criticism is complete. These are the dangers of which Nietzsche’s vision warns us. Nietzsche could see farther into Europe’s future than any other man of his day, and he foresaw the dangers which nihilism would bring. One must look to the consequences of what Nietzsche foresaw and
understand that if Nietzsche was right, the intellectual and historical ramifications of such a belief system represent nothing less than an egregious affront to the sensibilities of any but the most barbaric man.

But what if Nietzsche’s conclusions were wrong? His powers of observation were unmatched; nevertheless, the accuracy of his observations does not lead immediately to the cogency of his conclusions and predictions. If one recalls that it is only because of the rejection of reason and truth that the entire Nietzschean undertaking is necessary, it is accurate to say that if a rational basis for ethics can be defended sufficiently, Nietzsche’s entire undertaking is superfluous and the consequences of it can be avoided. Nietzsche’s distasteful conclusions are avoidable only if truth and reason are affirmed, and this is precisely what a vigorous, intellectually satisfying theism does. Nietzsche is correct in observing that the tepid and weak spirituality of the common man in Europe was no match for the impending nihilism. But perhaps a return to a significant and meaningful transcendence—a transcendence that is not defined by rote custom, but which is characterized by the exuberance of life which Nietzsche embraced so strongly—can stave off nihilism. Nietzsche’s accusations must be answered. If Nietzsche is understood as the harbinger of the failures of modernity, his prophetic voice might be exactly what reawakens and refocuses the Christian to his indispensable spiritual duty.

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The Passion of Lacking All Conviction: Secularism in Europe in the New Millennium

“Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain Britain. So conform to it, or don’t come here.”

Karl O’Hanlon

A group of militant “humanists” have lately emerged in the European public sphere, including journalist Christopher Hitchens and biologist Richard Dawkins, who like the fool of the Psalms believe in their hearts that there is no God (Psalm 53). These ‘New Atheists’ have propounded a bloodlessly positivist criteria of rationality, and advanced the case for science’s technological advances, sweeping away the ancient superstitions known as religion.

Charles Taylor’s magisterial study, A Secular Age, mounts a considerable assault on the misapprehension that conventional narratives of secularization hold: ‘secularity consists of the falling off of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God, and no longer going to Church. In this sense, the countries of western Europe have mainly become secular.’ He calls this “the subtraction thesis,” as if all we needed to effectively recognize the rise of modernity as a narrative of loss. Taylor shifts the parameters of the debate to include another sense in which our age may be termed “secular”: ‘a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and, indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others.’

It quickly becomes clear that Taylor’s adroit reconfiguration of the terms under debate allows us to conduct a discussion about secularism in western European social and political life that surpasses the shortcomings of the subtraction thesis. Not least of these is the inability of the latter to account for the enduring vitality of religion in the world at large; except, of course, to belittle and discount it as gory atavism, as does Christopher Hitchens: ‘the gnarled hands which reach out to drag us back to the catacombs and the reeking altars and the guilty pleasures of subjection and abjection.’

Such reductive, sensationalist responses to the complex problem of religion and secularism are increasingly difficult to countenance in a world that sometimes seems split between religious fundamentalism on the one hand and bare, instrumental Reason (always capitalized, in its godlike autonomy) on the other. This false dilemma sows the seeds of discord, and often results in extreme violence. Taylor’s approach has the salutary effect of unsettling these stark binaries of faith and reason, a prescient move in a multicultural, pluralist Europe.

One of the more fascinating elements of the contemporary debate on religion is the emergence of a radical ideology of science, most iden-
tifiable in the evangelical Neo-Darwinism of Richard Dawkins. In Dawkins, moral evolution and scientific development are glibly co-equalized. As Terry Eagleton writes, ‘There are, Dawkins is gracious enough to acknowledge, “local and temporary setbacks” to human progress (one thinks of such minor backslidings as Belsen, Hiroshima, apartheid, and so on), but the general upward trend is unmistakable. . . History is perpetually on the up.’

The effect of this new strain of hard-line secularism in the sciences has been to instrumentise reason, and subject critical thought to science’s own procedural systems of epistemology. Jürgen Habermas is an astute critic of this dangerous lurch towards technocracy: ‘The sciences emancipate themselves from the guidelines [Vorgaben] of philosophy in both directions: they sentence philosophy to the more modest business of retrospective reflection on, on the one hand, the methodologically proper advances of the sciences, and, on the other, on the presump-tively universal features of those practices and forms of life that are for us without alternatives, even if we find ourselves in them contingent-ly.’ In other words, the sciences have limited the role of philosophy to what is proper to scientific development, while cultural and historically specific modes of understanding have simultaneously been conflated into impersonal, ahistorical abstract universality. Man is alienated from the universe as never before, at the same time as his desire to master a runaway world and bring it to heel via the sciences becomes ineluctable.

It goes without saying that Habermas or other critics of the new scientism are not against scientific research or developmental progress. It is the ideology of science that is the damaging factor—a cock-sure belief in progress no less devout than those of the most egregious believer. The dangers of a technocratic system of knowledge are apparent, giving rise to the self-identification of Dawkins et al. as humanists. For the renowned Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain, such a humanism is a monstrous oxymoron, as it roundly denies the ‘supremely vital act of the intellect,’ the mind as a gift from God which is inductive and synthesizing as well as a merely passive recipient of data. Such falsification of the pursuit of knowledge and blindness to the frailty of progress leads inevitably to a brave new world, a totalitarianism of scientific rationality. In 1919, WB Yeats wrote in ‘The Second Coming’: ‘The best lack all conviction, While the worst are filled with passionate intensity.’ In our uncertain age we cannot say that the skeptics are any less dangerous than the zealots.

Are there any ways out of this impasse? Positions are so entrenched that imaginative and critically-responsible solutions will struggle to be heard above the din of accusations and rhetoric. Yet there are dark loomings that the need to seek such new trajectories is utterly crucial—the ban on the construction of minarets in Switzerland, and the outright ban of the burqa in public in France, bespeak a future of deep intolerance in Europe as secularism becomes defined against religion, and not as the political neutrality in which different cultural and ideological conceptions of human flourishing can be heard and responded to. Islamophobia, then, is one horizon on which the debate about secularism and religion hinges; but this debate is entirely loaded with Europe’s profound inability to come to terms with the mixed results of its Judeo-Christian heritage. On the one hand, secular Europe has retained the worst of Christendom in its intolerance towards the outsider, the infidel. On the other, it has repudiated its foundational beliefs, become hysterically defined against the truth and joy, and the tragic teleology, the recognition of human limitations and the need for redemp-
tion and forgiveness which its religious traditions embody. It is only by coming to terms with its origins that Europe can avoid wandering down yet another bloody, lamentable path, and instead imagine with humble confidence a brighter road to travel along. Georgetown, with its impressive international community and robust commitment to the mutually-enriching dialectic of faith and reason, is poised to lead that rediscovery.

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“God for Harry! England and Saint George!”
A Review of Shakespeare’s
Richard II and Henry V

Michael Fischer

From the glittering halls of the court of the King of England to the dirty, blood-stained fields of Agincourt, the Shakespeare Theater Company, in its performances of Richard II and Henry V, delves into the essence of leadership. From the indecisive, ineffective (yet pitiable) King Richard to the outwardly noble and inwardly corrupt Henry IV to the strongly conflicted Henry V, the Company’s Leadership Repertory transforms the wonderful and timeless pages of Shakespeare into a delightfully fun and impressively powerful stage experience. The Tocqueville Forum embarked for the double showing with a group of student fellows in the hopes of enjoying the performances and uncovering some of the key themes of the plays. Leadership, of course, was discussed, but so were the role of nature, the conflict of the nobility versus the commons, and the power of corruption, among others.

Henry V, the first of the two shown performances (though second chronologically) relates the nationalistic tale of Henry V’s struggle to obtain the throne of France, claimed as his right by a distant relationship. Though the main story follows the trials and travails as Henry crosses the Channel, besieges Harfleur, and battles to victory at Agincourt, it is the subtler and less-bombastic moments of the play that shine. Henry struggles with the vices and legacies of his former, less pristine life of a gambler, questioning his position on the throne and having to put down betrayal and treasonous plots against his life before even leaving for France. Perhaps the most powerful moment in the play comes when Henry is forced to kill one of his old, hapless former friends who is found plundering from a French church, an act forbidden by Henry in order to win good-will with the French people. The agony on Henry’s face as he secretly mourns over his friend’s corpse drives home to the audience the pains of leadership, and the tough choices that accompany ruling. Another though-provoking moment occurred as Henry, in disguise as a commoner, wanders his camp and questions his soldiers of their duties and feelings for battle tomorrow. Of course, the audience is eventually rallied from these foul moments and conversations with famous speeches (with lines like: “Once more into the breach, dear friends” and “we few, we happy few, we band of brothers.”) In the end, with the French defeated, Henry takes Princess Katherine as his bride and queen and makes way for his son to be the future king of England and France, though as the chorus relates as the curtain closes, the union of the two states would not last long after Henry’s death.

Richard II dramatically shifts from the loud and inspiring fields of war to the dark and prob-
ing halls of the king’s court. The play relates the fall of Richard II, as his misrule and untraditional ideas repeal one by one his lords, advisors, and friends. The play is certainly a tragedy, as Richard is eventually forced out of office by an usurper, Bolingbroke—later Henry IV and future father of Henry V. Slowly deprived of his power, crown, and even wife, Richard is left to philosophize on his condition in the damp depths of a castle prison, giving a masterful monologue on time and the ever-shifting fortunes of men. Meanwhile, Bolingbroke finds rule difficult as some former supporters realize the extent of their actions and attempt to restore Richard to the throne. Finally, a misunderstood comment leads a lesser lord to assassinate Richard, and Henry to repent for his sins with a planned journey to the Holy Land. Outside the story, what makes Richard II so powerful are scenes of great emotion and humor, from the tear-jerking forced separation of Richard and his wife to the side-splitting hilarity of the York family’s imploration before Henry IV. When the curtain closed, nevertheless, viewers left the theater in hushed voices and deliberate movements, for the play had struck a deep chord.

Performing in their theater directly across from the Verizon Center, the troupe majestically staged the two plays in near rapid succession, an amazing feat in that each actor and actress had a role in each play. The most amazing accomplishment, nevertheless, was the acting of Michael Hayden, who starred as both Henry V and Richard II (a combined total of memorized lines nearly equal to the entirety of Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors). With brilliance and emotion, he evoked strong pathos from his audience. Other top performances included Rachael Holmes’s hilarious French Princess Katherine and Tom Story’s wickedly delightful Dauphin in Henry V, as well as Ted van Griethuysen’s masterful portrayal of the Duke of York, Naomi Jacobson’s hilarious Duchess of York, and Philip Goodwin’s thought-provoking John of Gaunt in Richard II.

The stage work really set apart the Company’s performance. In Henry V, contrasts of dark and light were made with the uniforms of the soldiers: from the muddy, torn, and faded English garments to the outrageously bright magentas, cyans, and yellows of the French. Under-stage lights were used to produce realistic-looking fires, smoke machines provided fog and dust from battle, and historically accurate weapons, equipment, and shelters all added to the display. In Richard II, the use of the two stories of the stage, ropes, trapdoors, and vegetation all greatly enhanced the performance. The ridiculously pompous outfits of Richard were a must see, as well.

The double performance was remarkable, and in this student fellow’s opinion made for a fantastic excursion for the Tocqueville Forum.

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Immediately, William Wordsworth begins *Michael: A Pastoral Poem* by guiding away from the route dictated by development, commerce and common traffic. "Your feet must struggle," he warns, "in bold ascent/ the pastoral mountains front you." "Pastoral," here and in the title, at foremost means relating to a rural life, a shepherd’s life. But the word also draws with it a sense of the alternate definition relating to spiritual guidance. It is fitting then that the story Wordsworth proceeds to tell from this mountain top away from habitation is a parable that finds many Biblical parallels. Michael is a shepherd, "stout of heart and strong of limb" with a body of "unusual strength" and longevity, working the fields into his death in his nineties. He had his first and only child, Luke, in his late sixties with his wife, though "younger than himself full twenty year," was still exceptionally old for the age of child-bearing.

Michael is an unrefined man, but "these fields, these hills, / which were his living being even more / than his own blood." The land has been passed down to him through his family and the connection to the land is inextricably tied with his blood line. One without the other is incomplete. He is a man of perfect skill and courage in his trade and protecting his flock, but above all these accolades, Michael is filled with love and compassion for his son: "the dearest object that he knew on earth." He even had rocked Luke’s cradle "with a woman’s gentle hand." This effeminate side of Michael can only be read with the utmost respect for the man’s character; he has proven himself the strongest and most durable of man, in his eighties working vigorously on the mountains Wordsworth assumes would leave the reader flushed and panting. The raising of young Luke reflects this combination of sturdy and loving upbringing. Michael crafts for him a miniature wooden shepherd’s staff and the boy joins his father in the fields, learning the family trade. By ten years old Luke "could stand / Against the mountain blasts, and to the heights, not fearing toil." The enjambed line adds focus and power to "stand," it hovers over the mountain blasts with authority, and credits the man which Luke is already becoming. He is already becoming equipped to fend off the treacherous, to interact with the land and wild without any crippling fear.

In Luke’s eighteenth year, events are set in motion when Michael’s nephew defaults on a loan that Michael had made himself liable for,
costing Michael “but little less / Than half his substance.” In response, Michael decides he Luke must be sent into the city to work with a kinsman, because there is no employment available in the poor rural areas so that he may eventually return to take over the land. The elderly couple is very apprehensive about this decision until they recall Richard Bateman, the “parish-boy,” who was sent off just as Luke will be and became wildly rich and “left estates and monies to the poor, / And at his birthplace built a chapel, floored/ With marble which he sent from foreign lands.” With renewed hope and even enthusiasm, the family prepares for Luke’s departure. The day before Luke leaves, Michael takes him out to the area where they had collected stones in order to build a sheepfold, a building to shelter the sheep during storms. Here he asks Luke to “But lay one stone,” the first stone of the sheepfold. “Here, lay it for me, Luke, with thine own hand.” Michael tells Luke that he “thou hast been bound to me / Only by the links of love,” then questions more abstractly, “When thou art gone / What will be left of us?” But Michael rights himself and continues:

But I forget
My purposes. Lay now the corner-stone
As I requested, and hereafter, Luke,
When thou art gone away, should evil men
Be thy companions, let this sheepfold be
Thy anchor and thy shield. Amid all fear
And all temptation, let it be to thee
An emblem of the life thy fathers lived.”

This “covenant,” as Michael himself calls it, is his final gift and parting words to Luke.

Luke’s time in the city began well enough, he wrote home “loving letters, full of wondrous news” But soon after, the hopes begin to deteriorate: “Meantime Luke began / To Slacken in his duty, and at length / He in the dissolute city gave himself / To evil course; ignominy and shame / Fell on him, so that he was driven at least / To seek a hiding place beyond the seas.” In only six lines, everything which Michael and his ancestors have worked for has unraveled, he lives seven more years, his wife three years beyond that, and upon her death, the land is sold “into a stranger’s hand” The decision by Wordsworth not to melodramatize the disintegration of Luke’s morals speaks to the pressures and adverse effects of cities. It is not farfetched for Wordsworth to image a young person losing his way in a city and the modern reader also has no trouble imaging such a character: the fall of Luke is too quotidian to turn into a tragedy. The narration stays with Michael, and that is where the tragedy occurs- the land and his son both stripped away, his hereditary connection with each broken.

The new order created by the large city and the changed economy has torn through Michael’s way of life with terrible inevitability. Michael and the rich tradition he has come from is stripped down to a “straggling heap of unhewn stones,” the full realization of the tragedy encompassed in this hardly noticeable area is completed. They represent the broken “covenant” with his son, the loss of land, his lineage has become nothing but the wind over the land. It lives too, though, in the breath of the poet, and in the retelling of his story. Despite the overwhelming and emptiness of the closing lines, this is not a fatalist piece of work. The turn of Luke’s fortune is a near duplicate of the original shortcoming of Michael’s nephew, each has effectively robbed Michael of “half his substance,” yet the reaction of Michael to each renders them far different. The virtuous Michael forgives his nephew, but he becomes indignant at himself for allowing his years of labor to wasted as such: “the sun itself / Has scarcely been more diligent than I, / And I have lived to be a fool at last / To my own family” In the case of Luke, he has just as much a right to find himself
outraged, for his son has surely, maliciously or not, again made him the “fool.” The only reaction of Michael’s is that to the sheepfold “many and many times a day he thither went, / And never lifted up a single stone.” The small hope that Wordsworth provide seems meager: “There is a comfort in the strength of love, / ‘Twill make a thing endurable which else / Would break the heart.” The covenant between father and son here failed, as it often does, but the potential strength in the covenant has not been denied. Michael’s love and care for his son transcend the economic transaction that has fallen through. He will never abandon his half of the agreement; the “shield and anchor” remain resolute in spite of the sadness and pain it has caused.

It is incredible that a poem about sheepfolds, which Wordsworth himself had to define in a footnote in 1800, remains such a forceful poem. Countless numbers of Georgetown students have been in Luke’s position, leaving their family at age eighteen and moving to Washington, DC. One only needs to look at any college brochure or university website to see the shining face of “Richard Bateman” and testimonials to the child’s success, gained by “virtue” of being in the city. It is Georgetown’s responsibility to acknowledge the “covenants” with parents, traditions and home towns it can so easily break by uprooting young students. Wordsworth and the likes of Wendell Berry surely would like to terminate this system and leave young people to help strengthen the land, their home towns, and consequently the country. But even knowing Luke’s fate, it is hard to completely disagree with Michael when he tells his son, “it seem good / That thou should’st go.” There is no opportunity for advancement and in Michael’s case—he would leave his son worse off than he was. The search is for something reconcilable between personal heritage and the also very obvious potential upside for a big city that has attracted so many for hundreds of years. Wordsworth calls the family an “endless industry” in reference to their constant hard work, but the phrase also evokes a frightening and powerful ideal that drives the expansion of industry at all costs.

This poem rushes to an end, providing little more than a summary of the events starting with Luke’s departure to the city. The hollowed out framework of these lines do not tell the reader how to feel, but instead forces the reader to empty his own sympathies for Michael. The disorder of the remains of the tale, the “straggling heap of unheown stones,” that were introduced at the beginning of the poem, are the reminder of the covenant which could have been with terrible sadness. Upon reading and re-reading this poem, you cannot help but pose to the question to yourself whether or not you would have acted as Luke. Without ever mentioning the word, Michael demands a reflection on piety: whether we have attempted to give what is owed to our parents, our ancestors, the town we grew up in, where we come from. It is a debt that cannot ever be rightly balanced or repaid. With this in mind, perhaps we can keep the covenant which Luke could not. As student, when we begin to be taken away from home for longer and longer stretches from when we first depart, as we look for internships and, finally, jobs after college, it is a reminder which could not be more relevant. Georgetown would do well to include a copy of this poem along with every acceptance letter.

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had been long in love with Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry before discovering Letters to a Young Poet. A collection of ten exquisite letters written between 1902 and 1908, it is perhaps ironic that Rilke never intended these beautiful letters for publication, letters whose astounding and inspired prose has nonetheless reminded countless readers, especially those in the throes of youth, of what it means to yearn, to wonder, to love.

The recipient of the Austrian poet’s letters was a nineteen year old Franz Kappus, a young student at the Military Academy in Vienna, the institution Rilke had himself attended some years earlier. Seeking the literary advice of the promising poet, who had yet to pen what would be his most substantial works, Kappus sent Rilke a few poems, asking for feedback and guidance. A deeply heartfelt and intimate correspondence between these men developed, though they had never met in person. In 1929, three years after Rilke’s death, Kappus submitted his collection of the poet’s letters for publication as Letters to a Young Poet.

One of the most significant poets to write in the German language and, arguably one of the most artistic and sensitive minds to have put pen to paper, Rilke was seriously contemplative and deeply emotional. His artistic capacity impressed upon him so personally that it permeated every part of his existence, an interaction he tells Kappus is necessary for the organic creation of art. In his introduction, Stephen Mitchell says of the often tormented artist, “He was dealing with an existential problem opposite from the one that most of us need to resolve: whereas we find a thick, if translucent, barrier between self and other, he was often without even the thinnest differentiating membrane.” It was perhaps this fluidity between Rilke and the world that enabled him to talk of life with a rare kind of authority that nevertheless staved off didacticism, especially in Letters to a Young Poet. Whether because they attended the same university or were both poets or, simply, were both longing, one gets the feeling while reading Rilke’s letters that he might be addressing a younger version of himself.

Central to Rilke’s advice for Kappus on becoming a poet is the exhortation to seek solitude. According to Rilke, the only way to fully understand and cultivate one’s art – which is a creative act – is to be isolated. Yet, perhaps ironically, the trope of solitude that infuses Rilke’s rhetoric does nothing to diminish the closeness he seems to feel, both with Kappus and with the human experience of love more broadly. In another work, Rilke remarked:
Once the realization is accepted that even between the closest human beings infinite distances continue, a wonderful living side by side can grow, if they succeed in loving the distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other whole against the sky.

For Rilke, constantly conscientious of the limits of ephemeral man before eternal divinity, solitude was a human necessity that did not prevent love or friendship, but in fact facilitated it. By revealing human individuality to ourselves and others, solitude fostered recognition of the simultaneous uniqueness and unity characteristic of man and crucial for his social interaction.

Of the myriad of philosophical topics on which Rilke counsels his friend, my unequivocal favorite is his advice on reading great literature. Telling Kappus of the joys that await a perusal of the poetry of Jens Peter Jacobson, a Danish writer, Rilke says:

A whole world will envelop you, the happiness, the abundance, the inconceivable vastness of a world. Live for a while in these books, learn from them what you feel is worth learning, but most of all love them. This love will be returned to you thousands upon thousands of times, whatever your life may become – it will, I am sure, go through the while fabric of your becoming, as one of the most important threads among all the threads of your experiences, disappointments, and joys.195

Little more needs to be said about this passage. It is the description of its own effect on the reader. Rilke’s letters are pregnant with heartbreaking poignancy and honest emotional insight. His statements are often sweepingly general, unequivocal, and even at times polemic. And yet, he paints the human heart with such compelling simplicity that seems impossible to contradict. Without pretension, he orients Kappus – and all subsequent readers – towards the most important human task: love. “For one human being to love another human being: that is perhaps the most difficult task that has been entrusted to us, the ultimate task, the final test and proof, the work for which all other work is merely preparation.”197 Not politics, nor money, nor art, nor even goodness – but love, an action that requires the embrace of another, is man’s highest calling, according to Rilke. He gives no statistics, provides no logical progression, and cites no formal studies in making his truth-claim. He does not need to, for he lived deeply enough to speak for humanity.

His avid correspondence with Kappus exemplifies the poet’s personal dedication to love. In giving freely of his time and his most intimate thoughts, he was instrumental in Kappus’ development – as an artist and a man. So, although Rilke makes clear the necessity of solitude and the irreconcilable distances between people, his incredible correspondence demonstrates that the gap can be partially bridged. Ultimately, Rilke seems to conclude in his Letters to a Young Poet that we fundamentally need each other in order to understand ourselves.

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Object: Student flyer promoting a rally in 1969 to protest the District’s plan to build the Three Sisters Bridge over the Potomac. The headline of the flyer reads “Smash the 3-Sisters Bridge and has an illustration of a fist emerging from the water, destroying a bridge.

This student flyer protesting the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge was produced and distributed on the Georgetown campus by a group called the District of Columbia Student Committee on the Transportation Crisis (DCSCTC). The head office of this organization was located at 1730 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Apt. 103, Washington, D.C. with phone numbers 667-8941 and 234-6664. It was an organization established with a strong sense of social justice with the purpose of encouraging united community action for the “self determination and home rule—the right of the people to make decisions on all matters which effect their community”—upon which many people had, obviously, felt to be unconstitutionally infringed. DCSCTC neither originated from Georgetown, nor was it comprised of only Georgetown students; it incorporated students from various schools around the D.C. area and had been affiliated with a larger committee called the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis. The activities in which DCSCTC had mainly engaged were to publicize the issue of the Three Sisters Bridge to college students, to encourage students’ active participation in protests and rallies based on campus, and to, materially, sponsor those activities. At least three schools—Georgetown, George Washington, and American Universities—can be identified by some pieces of evidence left in their school archives as the ones whose students had definitely participated in the activities of the organization. On page 6 (six) of the October 17th, 1969 issue of The Eagle, student newspaper of the American University, there is a brief mention of a student protest in which not only students from American, Georgetown, and George Washington Universities participated, but also leaders from DCSCTC and the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis. In addition to this, a librarian of George Washington University had informed me that she found a brief record of a visit by Matthew Andrea, a chairman of DCSCTC, to the George
Washington campus. These materials verify the fact that students from these three universities had a close connection with DCSCTC and that student activity had been deeply engaged in the commitments of DCSCTC. I have also searched other universities’—Howard University and The Catholic University of America—archives but could not find evidence which demonstrates any connection or activity related to DCSCTC. While one cannot make a hasty conclusion of excluding the influence and activity of DCSCTC outside of Georgetown, American, and George Washington, the safe conclusion would be that the only campuses in which student activism had a close tie with DCSCTC in any significant degree were limited to these three universities.

I. The Context

The number 210-4 on the flyer indicates that the material came into the archive before 1970. It had more than enough reason to be preserved in the archive because the issue of the Three Sisters Bridge was a very heatedly debated topic which almost turned the D.C. area upside down; furthermore, among the three most actively engaged schools—Georgetown, George Washington, and American—Georgetown was the “kernel” of the student activism, whose students most enthusiastically took part in a significant role throughout the whole issue. I conducted a written interview with a Georgetown alumnus (the husband of current professor, Monica Maxwell, in ENFL (spell out entire abbreviation) Department of Georgetown!) who was a freshman at Georgetown in 1969, and who clearly remembers how numerous people had heatedly debated about this issue. He had responded that, not only students from Georgetown University, but also residents from Georgetown, other areas in Washington D.C., Virginia, and Maryland all often gathered together and planned various kinds of events and demonstrations which voiced their objections to the Three Sisters Bridge. This fact can be supported by numerous newspaper articles which dealt with protests and rallies against the construction at that time. In The Washington Post article, “Bridge Foes Vow to Fight” on November, 11, 1969, written by Paul W. Valentine, the large presence of Georgetown students appears in the phrase “so far more than 150 people (mostly students from Georgetown University) have been arrested while demonstrating at the construction site.” Another article of The Washington Post on October, 14, 1969 written by Lance Gay, stated that “about 200 college-age men and women, some with children, many from the Georgetown area and many from Georgetown University marched onto the construction site.” The significance I found in this energetic student activism from Georgetown is that it was, indeed, in every sense, a true “student” activism movement started, organized, promoted, and executed, I would even say, exclusively, by student leadership. The issue of Three Sisters Bridge was too big and significant to be ignored by school administrators and faculty members at that time; however, the letters from President R.J. Henle, S.J. and Father Joe Burke (S.J)? clearly show that the University had, basically, refused to employ any substantial means and to be involved with the issue by expressing either side, thus totally leaving the issue to individual students and student body discretion. In his letter to the whole university community on November, 6, 1969, the President said that, “it is neither proper nor possible for me to commit the University as a corporate entity to an institutional position on this issue” and on November, 25, 1969, Father Joe Burke also issued his agreement with this president’s neutral position by encouraging the President to avoid taking an official position or joining in suites. The University did not take an “oblivious” position on the issue; it actually held many
forums and tried to publicize the issue under the President’s counsel. However, the evidence shows the University’s general reluctance and unwillingness to go beyond the role of “passive informer,” a point which makes the demonstrations from Georgetown especially more valuable and exemplary as a true manifestation of student activism.

II. The Contents

Some pieces of evidence, dated before the actual execution of the street march on noon, Sunday, November 16th, suggest that the protest was a carefully planned and organized one with an expectation of gathering large crowds of people. The Washington Post article, “Bridge Foes Vow to Fight” on November 11th, 1969, written by Paul W. Valentine, mentions Matt Andrea’s statement that the Georgetown University students planned a “much larger” sit-in at the building site and that a mass march up K Street to the construction site was being planned. In addition to this, under the Sunday section of the short advertisement corner of The Washington Post issued on November 15th, 1969, there is a brief notification and reminder of the “march to protest construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. Marchers will gather at Georgetown University and go to construction site of the bridge.” The march mentioned here is definitely referring to the upcoming one on the following Sunday, the same with the one we are working on right now. Through all these indications of thorough preparedness expressed in major newspapers, one can see the degree of seriousness which people and students showed to their commitment. As a part of preparation done on the Georgetown campus, a huge amount of around 100,000 leaflets was distributed on the Georgetown campus as an attempt to publicize the issue and gather crowds.

I was able to find this number in another meeting announcement flyer preserved in the Georgetown archives. The flyer was informing about the time and location (7:30, Thursday, Nov 13th, 1969 at Gaston Hall) of a meeting held by DSCTC for the arrangement of the march on Sunday and was written on as “100,000 leaflets must be distributed this Friday and Saturday at the marches and rallies to advertise the Three Sisters issue and the rally schedule for Sunday the 16th.”

One important discovery I made about the actual implementation of this carefully planned and prepared protest on Sunday, the 16th, was that it was not carried out according to its original plan. Several pieces of evidence, which report the development of the protest, indicate many missed steps, resulting in the ambitiously-proposed march as neither mass nor non-violent. First of all, despite its active involvement in the preparation of the scheduled march, DCSCTC and other freeway opponents, large sponsors of the Georgetown campus rallies, actually asked the crowd of about 500 people initially gathered at the front gates on Sunday the 16th to refrain from going to street marches. This is a very perplexing point about which I could not find the exact relevant or reasonable answer. Why did they suddenly decide not to advance the carefully scheduled street rally for which they had produced pamphlets, advertised in newspapers, and held meetings? Why did they have to cancel the plan right on the spot, not beforehand? It would be most ideal if we are able to reach the material which testifies a perspective from DCSCTC; however, unfortunately, even the detailed Washington Post article, issued on November, 17, 1969, just mentions the fact that the DCSCTC decided on the cancelation, or I should say, the big alteration, of the street rally on the very day, but does not explain how they had reached such a decision. Following the advice of their sponsors, most people, 300 out of 500, did comply and leave, but about “200 mili-
tants and an assortment of hangers-on and curiosity seekers left the campus." One can see here, not only a significantly shrunken size of crowds, but also how the components of participants had changed from the seriously committed to “hangers-on or curiosity seekers.” The second significantly altered aspect of the protest was its development and the course taken. Originally, the protesters had planned to gather in front of the Georgetown University front gates, march down O Street, Wisconsin Avenue, and K Street to the construction site and to do the sit-in protest at the construction site. However, the supporters and participants in the protests were not the only ones who were informed of the event in advance; the police were also aware of the scheduled mass rally and, consequently, they dispatched a large number of officers to the Georgetown areas and prepared to block the proceeding. Thus, instead of marching down the streets and heading to the construction site, the protesters were just spread to the small alleys in the Georgetown neighborhood, formed small circles, and did their separate protests, for example, by setting a fire in a trashcan. Some of them proceeded to the Key Bridge and blocked the traffic there, although they were forced to scatter before long. One thing is sure—they had never even reached the construction site.

Considering the large presence of the police force, we can make a reasonable hypothesis of the aforementioned, seemingly incomprehensible, decision by DCSCTC. It is highly likely that DCSCTC - had gathered the information that a mass police force would be dispatched and, thus, would have reached a decision that mass protest against a large-scale police force would be both ineffective and too dangerous. A quote by Richard Gilfillan, a student committee spokesman, spoken to the protesters that “if you want a riot, go on down to Wisconsin Avenue and have it, but a riot isn’t going to do any good” strongly supports this hypothesis. This assumption also helps to explain the relatively small number of initially-gathered crowd members at the front gates of Georgetown. Of course, 500 people were not a small number; however, in consideration of the efforts taken (100,000 leaflets in Georgetown campus alone!) and time put forth for this rally, the number of 500 seems, inexplicably, too small. This is probably because, first being informed about the cancelation of the march, the people from DCSCTC and larger committees and organizations, who more often than not always joined and led the actual protests and rallies, had not joined the initial gathering at Georgetown. Thus, subtracting the number of people from outside the Georgetown area, the number of 500 only includes Georgetown students, nearby residents, and some curiosity seekers.

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I

Founding and Purpose

On February 22, 1830, the Philodemic Society was born, appropriately on the birthday of George Washington. Founded by Father James Ryder, Georgetown’s Vice President at the time, the Society was formed to cultivate eloquence in the student body through practice of debate. The name “Philodemic” was chosen for its Greek roots, meaning “a love of the people.” In a personal letter, one of Philodemic’s original students stated that the Society was founded for the people, paralleling the United States government.

Our motto, “eloquiam libertati devinctam,” or “eloquence in defense of liberty,” embodies the ultimate purpose of the Philodemic. Originally, the Society was seen as a forum for developing skills needed to watch over and defend the nation. The Philodemic was not only about rhetoric, but about protection of freedom and liberty through discussion of ideas. As Benjamin Floyd Rush said in this 1836 commencement speech:

...So many who deem it a sacred duty to unravel the mysteries of science, and instruct in the lessons of wisdom, and in the midst of so many disciples of learning.... Suffice it to say these were some of the inducements which urged us to associate ourselves as a Philodemic Society.

Mr. Rush lauded the natural inquisitiveness of Philodemicians, who lived for learning and the exploration of ideas. The early Philodemic was an elite institution, reserved for only the most intellectually curious and advanced students. In the first years of its existence, Philodemic was largely regarded as the “Society of the College.”

II. Structure of the Society

During the first years of the Society, special orations were given at four important events during the year: Commencement in June, Independence Day in July, Washington’s Birthday in January, and eulogies for departed members or men of note, like Andrew Jackson or the Philodemic’s own Father Ryder. Speakers for these special occasions were chosen by committee, and they were often the most revered, senior members of the Society. Notable members of society often attended these events, including...
congressmen and esteemed military officials. Indeed, President John Quincy Adams nearly attended one debate, but the course of Philodemic history was changed forever by his driver, who failed to show up for work that day.214

One special tradition, the Commemoration of the Landing of the Pilgrims in Maryland, was a flagship event for the Society. Beginning in 1842, this full day of activities involved traveling to Maryland with other members of the Georgetown community and creating a festive slate of events for the community. Important officials were invited to preside over the day’s activities, and a chosen Philodemician would give a speech.215 At this event, Philodemicians could expect to hear “The Philodemic March,” composed specifically for us in 1854 by Pedro A. Duanas.216 This event was particularly important to the Catholic community, because it was the only commemoration ceremony for the landing of the first Catholics in the U.S. This celebration demonstrates Georgetown’s essential leadership as a Catholic university at this time in history.

In its early years, the Philodemic Society played a much greater role in everyday life than it does today. Meeting between two and three times per week, the Society combined business meetings and more informal debates into one session. These meetings were called to order by the President, who was usually a faculty member, or the Vice President, who was a student representative. Attendance was required, and fines were imposed upon late or absent members. Philodemic meetings were also subject to the will of Georgetown’s governing prefects. Once, this tension even resulted in a Philodemic-led revolt of the student body.

III. Revolt

One Sunday night in 1850, the Philodemic wanted to hold a special meeting after study hours. When a prefect refused the meeting privileges, the Society disregarded his instruction and met as planned. As a consequence for their blatant disrespect, the prefect suspended their late night studying privileges and forbade them from meeting for a month. After protesting this punishment with a petition to the rector and being rejected, the Philodemicians spurred revolt in the student body. Students began hurling stones, exploding firecrackers, and protesting loudly on campus. When the night of chaos came to a close, three Philodemicians were expelled. One, Mr. Xavier Wills from Maryland, stayed on campus and attempted to make a speech before the student body.

As soon as he began to speak, and students were promptly dismissed to their quarters – and the true revolt began. As a body, the students went to the rector’s office, demanded redress, and were collectively expelled. Yelling and whooping, the students stormed into the city.

Negotiations between campus administration and the students continued for several weeks. The Washington Republic reported that a “foreign professor has been tyrannizing over the students…enforcing the most humiliating and demoralizing practices.” Several congressmen agreed to intercede on the students’ behalf. Finally, after writing several letters of petition to the administration, students were allowed back on campus once they gave a formal apology for the damage they had done.217

This anecdote is amusing and dramatic, but it is also an important reflection of the Philodemic’s influence on student life. Philodemicians were not the only rebels – they took many sympathetic, non-debating students
with them as well. After only 20 years of existence, Philodemic had become an organization with enormous influence over the student body.

IV. Conflict at the President’s Chair
To highlight even more drama in the Philodemic Society, one can turn to a fateful evening in 1859. Among many other topics concerning the mounting conflict with the South, including “Ought nullification be extended to the states?” the Philodemic chose to debate “Should the South now secede?”218 The debate spanned several meetings and two weeks, betraying the high emotions and strong opinions surrounding the topic. At the end of two weeks, a victory for the affirmation was won – the Philodemic decided that the South should secede. When the Vice-President made a disparaging comment about the South upon the announcement of the verdict, a member from Mississippi sprang at him, starting a brawl on the floor of the Philodemic. Members from North and South began attacking one another; the violence finally escalated so much that Father James Clark, the current President of the Philodemic, had to put out the lights to stop the fighting. As punishment, the President of the University, John Early, banned all further meetings of the Philodemic for that year.

This incident later led to the a new line in the Appendices of the Constitution, which states in the House Rules that no one shall approach the President’s chair during the debate.

V. Odd traditions – toasts and topics
Because the Society met several times every week, their topics were narrow in focus, requiring in-depth knowledge on a range of subjects. Many topics were historical and often pitted two great individuals against each other, such as on the question of “Whether Napoleon Bonaparte or General Washington was the greater man.”219 While many original debate topics would be irrelevant today, a surprising number still pose interesting challenges, such as “That her union with England may be detrimental to Ireland”220 and “Is civilization more affected by time than by a few select individuals?”221 Many contemporary Philodemicians would appreciate the Commencement topic from 1852, which asserted that “Socialism is an enemy more dreadful than vandalism.” Some topics also seem slightly ridiculous now, such as an earnest discussion of whether the female mind is as “susceptible to cultivation as the male.”222

The Philodemic had a strong tradition of giving toasts after special debates; these often lasted for quite a while, as members were free to chime in with unlimited toasts after some traditional statements were made. Some toasts showed up consistently, such as celebrations of Washington, the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the military; these are similar to our traditional Merrick toasts given today. Interestingly, the Irish and the Poles were often referenced; this may indicate strong patterns in the ethnic origins of Society. However, some curious toasts occasionally appeared, catering specifically to the event or the times. One particularly strange toast from July 14th, 1844 was “to Oregon – may the wretch who would refuse to fight for his country be flayed alive, anointed with honey, and set on the head of a hornet’s nest.”223

VI. How to make a great speech, nineteenth century style
Speeches during the first three decades of the Philodemic Society were similar in many ways, and were actually not that different from the speeches of today’s society. While Philodemicians met several times a week for informal debates and meetings, they often gave formal orations at big events for the Society and
the greater community. These speeches were always lengthy, sometimes spanning more than an hour.

To be truly eloquent and fit the 19th century norm of impassioned oratory, early Philodemic speeches had to include several components. To begin, the orator had to thank the society profusely for letting him speak, declaring himself unworthy in every possible way and apologizing in advance for the terrible speech he was about to give. This self-deprecation went on for several minutes, and afterwards the orator plunged into his topic. Many speeches celebrated specific holidays, such as Washington’s Birthday or Independence Day, so orators included the grandest patriotic imagery possible. The Founding Fathers were men who “loomed like mist through the ages,” Americans were “the freest, the best, the chosen people of God,” and Washington’s name was most likely out of all to “hold the place where angels assigned it in the Archives of Eternity.”

Flowing, patriotic imagery was not enough, however. Without Latin quotes, appeals to ancient Romans and Greeks, and frequent references to history, speakers could never have engaged their classically-educated audiences. At this time in Georgetown’s curricular history, the College placed strong emphasis on classical studies. As a result, Philodemic speeches were often inundated with appeals to the ancients. During the 1840 commencement address by Mr. Daniel C. Digges, one paragraph alone contained two Latin quotes and references to Dionysus, Cicero, Dante, Tasso, Milton, Shakespeare, Raphael, Titian, Phidias and Praxiteles. Religious references were also quite common, indicating the strong Catholic identity of the Society and Georgetown in these early years.

For all the similarities and differences in oratory habits, the Society’s aim has certainly stayed consistent throughout the years. Mr. P.P. Morriss said it well during his Farewell Address of Washington speech in 1836:

...Let eloqueta libertati devincta [sic] be your watch word through life, not the cold, insignificant collection of words without meaning, or thoughts without elevation, or fluency without interest.... That eloquence which comes from the heart.... let such be the eloquence you would aim at. Ponder on the relics of the orators who are past, imbibe their spirit and their zeal, their energy and their patriotism.

Still today, we hold these same virtuous goals in the Philodemic Society. Our pursuit of eloquence in defense of liberty is just as pure as in 1836, and our words are just as powerful.

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What should be the end of a college education today? For too many, the goal is simply a fancy document to place in a frame on the wall of one’s office.

Father John Carroll, S.J. articulated his vision for education in the “Proposals for establishing an academy at George-town Patowmack-River, Maryland” distributed in 1787. Although little-remembered at Georgetown today, this document is in many ways Georgetown’s most important document in that it is Carroll’s vision for Georgetown’s purpose.

Carroll explains at the very outset of his broadside:

The Object of the proposed Institution is, to unite the Means of communicating Science with an effectual provision for guarding and improving the Morals of Youth. With this View, the SEMINARY will be superintended by those, who, having had Experience in similar Institutions, know that an undivided Attention may be given to the Cultivation of Virtue, and literary Improvement; and that a System of Discipline may be introduced and preserved, incompatible with Indolence and Inattention in the Professor, or with incorrigible Habits of Immorality in the Student.

Needless to say, this view of education is not exactly the most widely-held view held at most elite colleges in the U.S. today. Rather, the collegiate system generally emphasizes knowledge and little else. In reality, this belief is completely backwards.

We live in an age of moral ambiguity and, as Father Edmund A. Walsh, S.J. once put it, a time when men are “encouraged to have light opinions on everything and firm faith in nothing—except in the impossibility of faith in anything.” At many institutions of higher education around the world any discussion of faith, morality, virtue, or any system of discipline is highly unfashionable, but being unfashionable is nothing new within Georgetown’s history. During the last decade of the eighteenth century, anti-Catholic sentiment led passersby to hurl stones at Father Francis Neale, S.J., a two-time President of Georgetown and the first pastor of Holy Trinity Church, in the streets of Alexandria. Similarly, Father James Ryder, S.J., a legendary President of Georgetown, was on two occasions pelted with rocks in the streets of DC around the middle years of the nineteenth century.

Father Walsh gave his own description as to the proper realization of education in a 1924 Baccalaureate Sermon at Georgetown: “[T]he ultimate achievement, the finest flower of Education, is Character.” This emphasis on character promotion is now largely forgotten at elite higher-educational institutions, and we have witnessed its consequences. As an exam-
ple, think about a few of the public figures brought low by sex scandals and their educational affiliations: Tiger Woods (Stanford), Eliot Spitzer (Princeton and Harvard), and Bill Clinton (Georgetown, Oxford, and Yale).

Later in that Baccalaureate Sermon, Father Walsh told the graduates, “Character, to which both Learning and Pedagogy are deemed in this institution to be ancillary, is the keystone of the arch which Georgetown University has ever aspired to erect in the souls of her sons, as her best contribution to human betterment... Instruction, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom, Character. But, the greatest of these is Character whereon rest the pillars of the Temple.”

The need for men and women of character is of as great of an importance now as it ever has been. Hoyas would do well to remember Father Carroll’s belief that education is not complete without the “Cultivation of Virtue.” For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?

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I hold the reins of an elite, private university. I carry the responsibilities of the thousands of undergraduates at the Harvard’s, Princeton’s, and Georgetown’s – those who have ascended to the peak of the American “meritocratic mountain,” and now look to my institution for direction for that flustered first month, for those incredible four years, for the rest of their lives. I have no budgeting constraints, no meddling Board of Trustees, no limits to my vision of the perfect institution of higher learning. Today, I am the Scholastic God, and my goal is to restructure the university into a more perfect form.

The education I am concerned with now is not of the average university, but of the top private colleges and universities in the country the minds and characters of the students at such institutions have demonstrated their intentions of pursuing academic excellence, and have thus won themselves admission to an institution that promotes such excellence. By focusing on the undergraduate years, I will thus aim to shape their minds and characters in such a way as to lay down a sound foundation for the rest of their lives, particularly instilling in them a passionate sense of humanity, duty, and action. This will be a school dedicated to educating the whole person – mind, body, and soul. I expect every kid who walks through my classrooms and hallways to graduate as flourishing and powerful men and women with sharp minds and even sharper characters – who know what it means to strive towards human flourishing, towards *eudaimonia*, and who hold an elevated human spirit.

These qualities that are central to an education of the person seem completely lost and out of place in the modern scholastic system. As highlighted by David Brooks in “The Organization Kid” and Walter Kirn in “Lost in the Meritocracy,” the students currently studying at the elite universities are exceptionally bright, but they are lost in a system that piles on accomplishment after accomplishment. Every award and every top prize is simply a stepping-stone onto the next award and accomplishment. Our heroes today are no longer adored for their excellence of character, but because they are our “hired mercenaries” or because they earn an exorbitant paycheck and hold tremendous power. By this logic, the contemporary college is just another step on the way to a five, six, seven-figure paycheck, or a regular spot in the newspaper and television headlines, or maybe even one’s own Wikipedia page. This aimless journey for more and more accomplishments and material wealth transforms the university – an institution with one clear purpose – into the university – an institution with no real goal. At the very foundation of this scholastic system lies not only a materialistic and base striving for honor and recognition, but also a life that is painfully deficient, unfulfilling, and purposeless.

Thus the main obstacle to a college that truly develops and builds men and women of
admirable human spirit and intellectual drive is this materialistic and base culture. My college will not fall in line with the other multiversities that have adopted this utilitarian ideal of education for Progress and education for an eternal accumulation of wealth. Students must grasp the Newman notion of Knowledge as an end unto itself. Thus the curriculum would be structured around a core of the humanities – philosophy, theology, history, literature, and art. Only through an education that defines the human condition will students be ready and willing to tie themselves to the ultimate questions that have dogged humanity for its entire existence and come to define it. The college must also recognize the importance of life outside the classroom, which in many ways is just as influential in the creation of higher minds and characters. It must be structured in a way that gives enough freedom to the students to grow toward human flourishing as individuals and friends, yet must also be directive enough to assert its goals. To this end, a residential – almost fraternal – college system will be instituted to provide students with a culture of self-improvement and to surround young students with dynamic mentors and role models. From these structural changes will rise a student body that does not subscribe to the passionless ideals of the “Organization Kid,” nor the sordidness of the money and glory chaser.

As endorsed by both Cardinal Newman and Anthony Kronman, the key to opening a mind up to the eternal human questions and to molding a correct character lies in the study of the humanities. Newman describes knowledge as a comprehensive, all-encompassing whole. However, only the humanities, the subjects that would apply to a liberal education, hold the distinction of being intrinsically good and valuable. While science and mathematics pursue an end – namely Progress – the liberal arts are an end unto themselves. They are beautiful. They exist as a human end. Through the study of history, literature, and most notably, philosophy and theology, one binds together all the different branches of Knowledge and begins to understand Truth.

Anthony Kronman echoes Newman as he sees the humanities as the only route towards the asking of the essential questions of human existence on the importance and meaning of life, on which everything is attached and dependent. Kronman sees a disturbing fatalism in the contemporary scholastic system that is goaded onwards by the Research Ideal. The human conversation is lost beneath the babble of scientific statistics and mathematical progress. Thus we are left without any guidance toward the meaning of the human life and the meaning of our own lives.

I share Kronman’s belief that a student’s years at college are the time to bring up the undying questions about life. It seems foolish to see four precious years of education culminating in a job on the trading floor, crunching numbers in a cubicle. No one needs to leave home and pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to learn to sit in an office, pecking away at a computer. Education must have a higher purpose.

My school will seek to address issues far more important than simply how to write an expense report. By instituting a Core Curriculum in philosophy, theology, and literature, students will understand what it means to live the Good Life. Freshman will begin with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – solidifying a foundation in Western thought. They will read St. Aquinas, touch upon the Bible, and delve into Shakespeare. By touching upon all of Western Humanities’ greatest hits, students will gain a sense of direction and a place in history – where humanity came from, where it is now, and where it is going. These works, which have molded the human mind and spirit for hundreds of years, will be given to the students, so as to give shape and definition to how they organize their lives, and to give them an understanding of how humanity should organize its lives.
Furthermore, the humanities are by definition, a study of the human condition – of what it means to be human. Cardinal Newman zealously emphasized the fact that a comprehensive understanding of the liberal arts is a comprehensive understanding of humanity as a whole. A man who is well versed in the humanities is transformed into a gentleman – who carries himself with an elegance and grace. He understands the human condition, thus he acts with grace and finds success in all he does. Each student will attain this air of elegance and grace. Only by immersing themselves in the liberal arts will they will be able to grasp Aristotle’s notion of the Good Life as human flourishing. Newman’s grace and elegance translates into Aristotle’s “being-at-work of the soul in accordance with virtue.” This is the educational goal of my college – to develop men and women who have a full grasp of what it means to be a human, to deeply embed Kronman’s eternal questions into the mind and soul of each student, thus giving rise to a higher, more spiritual character.

Yet, to remain relevant in the contemporary educational world, as well as to provide the basic training students may need upon entering the professional, political, or medical fields, my university must remain vigilant in all areas of study. This is not to say that its focus shifts to churning out doctors or senators, for its focus will always remain in the cultivation of correct character. But should a promising student aspire to use his elevated abilities in a professional field, the institution must prepare him for such an endeavor. The sciences will always remain relevant and useful, but of course, the Core Curriculum, with its towering presence on campus as well as in the minds and spirits of its students will always remain the premier mission of the college. However, the spiritual and intellectual development of a person cannot be totally accomplished through study, the environment in which one lives is of utmost important, as is friendship, both of which are highlighted as components of human flourishing by Aristotle. To this end, I turn from the spiritual to the physical – to the campus itself.

The social life of the student and its role in developing a “higher” sort of being cannot be understated. As vilified by Tom Wolfe in I am Charlotte Simmons and understood by current undergraduate students across the country, the culture that defines the undergraduate experience is not the life of the mind. When the overriding view of college from the students is a four year free pass to experiment however one pleases, the culture that develops will inevitably embrace the baseness of glory-chasing. The notions of the good life and an elevated human spirit are lost beneath an expectation that the undergraduate years are a chance to satisfy every sort of carnal desire. True, the universities of today may not be Sodom and Gomorrah, but they certainly are not Athens either.

At the same time, I recognize that this new culture may seem to be a prohibition on youthful fun, but that is not the case. As outlined by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, friendships play an essential role in the development of the good life, and friendships cannot simply be developed through study and academic work. College is a place of intellectual stimulation and character growth and there is no denying the importance of substantial conversations about the life of the mind. But there is also a place for those nights spent among close friends amid a haze of mood-altering materials, so long as the culture does not tip toward the materials and away from cultivating lasting relationships with your fellow students.

In Book Nine of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle thoroughly details the place of friendship in the good life. He describes friendship as “the greatest of external goods.” Aristotle sees human beings as social creatures, thus friends serve as outlets for his “being-at-work,” and they also provide support, for “it is not easy by
oneself to be at work continuously, but it is easier to be so among and in relation to others." Without good friends, Aristotle sees *eudaimonia* as impossible.

My college will aim to not only build characters in line with *eudaimonia*, but also, will strive to build an environment and culture that pushes each student to that highest of ideals. This goal simply cannot be realized with the current dormitory system prevalent in most colleges. By herding students, particularly freshman, into giant dormitories, there is nothing stopping the students from falling into the baseness that characterizes the typical university. Immediately upon arriving at college, they are swept into this new environment and new culture with no real direction – they are simply one huge horde left to find their own way. They inevitably are attracted to the people with whom they live, but they have no mentors in their lives to guide them along the good life, and they have no assurance of developing the friendships necessary for living the good life.

I propose dividing the college into smaller residential houses much like those at Yale and Caltech, where freshman will live alongside with sophomores, juniors, and seniors. Before the beginning of the academic year, each incoming student will have the opportunity to visit and live in each of these residential houses before selecting the house in which they choose to live. Each house will be comprised of rooms very similar to a dormitory, but will have its own community of students from all years and its own set of traditions and residential nuances. Furthermore, certain members of the faculty will also be required to live with in the students in these houses. By dorming seniors along with freshman and giving the faculty a part in the social life of the students, this housing arrangement will deliver a much more organic social atmosphere to the campus. Students will develop strong loyalties to their house, thus strengthening their bonds with each other. The upper-classmen and faculty member will provide an informal guidance to the underclassmen, giving them a sense of family and providing them with strong role models and future friends. Coming into college as an 18-year-old is difficult, but with the smaller, more organic communities and the guidance of upperclassmen and faculty who are experienced in the college life as well as the good life, this change does not have to be radical or earth-shattering.

This residential system also plays a role in the shifting of the college paradigm. By immersing each student academically in the humanities as well as socially with peers and mentors of high character and spirit, the culture of wanton “experimentation” will be dispelled. This is not to say that friendships cannot be developed and solidified with a night of fun, but at the heart of the belief that college offers a free four-year pass to “try new things” is simply the excuse to do these “new things” without any sort of consequences. This is a disturbingly pitiful and base view of college. Educationally, this school has the goal of creating young men and women who live the good life. This goal must be reflected in the social structure and atmosphere of the college. The residential system makes this goal clear for each student from the first day they step on campus. Immediately, they are given a sense of direction from the older students and the faculty – people who have an understanding of life on campus. They will be living alongside these older role models and they will be taking their meals with esteemed faculty members. It is the hope that by providing a much more direct environment, students won’t go through the torture that characterized Charlotte’s first semester. She would not have been randomly thrown into a dorm with people she could not live with, and she would not have lost herself in the world of alcohol and sex. With a true group of mentors and a much smaller community in which to live, students like Charlotte will be saved from her personal free fall. But more so,
they will be a part of a much different culture – one that is driven towards a much brighter and worthier goal.

These residential colleges will be built to reflect the college’s unifying mission to develop spirited characters, and together with the architectural structure of the campus, will not only be ascetically beautiful, but spiritually guiding as well. Each residential house will be unique, but each will share a commonality in the classical style, with grand buildings reflecting a natural order and instilling a sense of awe and wonder among the students. The college must be visibly seen to be its own community – an intellectual and spiritual stronghold – “ineffably beautiful and ineffably grand.” The architectural structure of an institution speaks for its purpose. Only a campus built to reflect the high ideals of its curriculum and of its students can possibly fulfill such lofty ambitions. It must provide a sense of the majestic journey taking place before them. Bland brick buildings cannot impart such a feeling, but quadrangles bringing together nature and buildings, designed grand in scale yet beautifully proportioned, can convey the spirit that is meant to develop and thrive at this college.

Ultimately, after four years of studying at this new model for an undergraduate college, each student who eventually ascends the stage to receive his or her diploma will walk out into the world with the grace and elegance expounded by Cardinal Newman. They will have thoroughly studied the liberal arts and asked the essential questions of humanity. They will have lived among fellow students in an environment and culture designed to promote the formation of character and strong lasting friendships. They will fully grasp the meaning of the good life – of eudaimonia.

On the campuses of universities across the nation, such a culture that was so prevalent in the early years of the 20th Century is suddenly no longer there – students are turning away from the formation of character and embracing the chase of dollar bills and recognition. The life of the mind is lost. Even characters such as Adam Gellin, another of Wolfe’s creations, who demonstrate the power of intellect, do not possess the moral fiber and spirit that such a mind deserves. Adam flat out says, “we’re flaunting our enthusiasm for academics. We’re all out to get Rhodes scholarships.” For all his intellect, Adam and students like him are nothing more than manifestations of Brook’s Organization Kid. They are at college to seek glory through academic and intellectual accomplishments, studying to win a prize rather than studying for the sake of gaining knowledge and building character. The current state of the university perpetuates this problem by egging its students towards education as accomplishments – viewing its graduates as products of an education rather than people whom are shaped by an education.

This college’s mission is to cultivate men and women in the mold of Hobey Baker – a man with an absolute sense of chivalry and heroic dignity. Hobey Baker, Princeton class of 1914, conducted himself with passion and class. He was an extraordinary hockey player, yet did not strut around with the baseness that characterized Treyshawn and André in I am Charlotte Simmons. He was admired for his character, for that air of elegance and grace described by Newman, for being “the nearly faultless realization of the ideal of his age,” so much so that many of his classmates named their sons after him. This was a man with the rare strength of character that comes with a thorough and complete understanding of what it means to be a human. He was a modern day Achilles – a hero in his day.

Hobey Baker lived in a culture that was not obsessed with a continual desire to reach the 99th percentile or chase fame and fortune. A university should seek to shape people and their spirits rather than an accolade-winning, money-
making machine. The spirit of Hobey Baker embodies the character that will be developed after a correct college education. Baker was a man of honor, duty, and courage. He held strong principles and he refused to compromise them. He is the antithesis of the award-hoarding student that too often walks the halls of the nation’s universities. He was a gentleman, and who also happened to have racked up plenty of accomplishments, such as the French Croix de Guerre as well as holding the namesake of the award given to the best college hockey player in the nation. 247

Obviously, such changes in the scholastic system are far-fetched and do not seem to be coming anytime soon. Yet, for all the faults of the current university system, it would be unfair to claim that it categorically fails to foster real human growth in its students. Such an appreciation for one’s life and the lives of one’s friends is definitely present in campuses nationwide, and students definitely recognize the importance of pursuing rewarding passions above aimless material gains, yet the university system is not geared toward such growth. A restructuring of the university is in order, and through it, parents, alum, and students alike will be able to see the development of characters of extraordinary intellect, unwavering passions and principles, and a steadfast duty to action.

This is what the ideal student is. This is what the ideal person should be. And this is the goal of a perfect college. At its core is a shift in the cultural paradigm and a return to the fundamental principle of an education. An education should not be about the attainment of wealth and fortune, or a MasterCard to do whatever you want. The time spent at college is a special time, and it should be reserved for the bettering of characters and the development of moral fiber and spirit. College is the ultimate mission of self-betterment, and it is simply not being realized at the majority of undergraduate colleges. To achieve this goal, every piece of the college must be taken apart and reassembled to guide the students toward the good life, toward eudaimonia. By focusing the students on the essential questions of humanity, putting them in communities that are conducive to such growth, and instilling in them a sense of character, morality, and action, this more perfect college doesn’t fill its student’s minds with facts, but gives them a code by which to live. The perfect college has the most perfect of goals – to teach its students how to live well, to fully flourish as students, as adults, and as human beings.

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The Forum

1 See James V. Schall, On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2001).


7 It may be objected that the proud do not seek anything outside of themselves, but it is precisely their love of the nothingness that is themselves that they seek erroneously. Essentially, they seek to fill nothingness with more nothingness. Furthermore, they refuse to see the nothingness that literally embodies themselves.


10 Ibid., Canto I Line 3.

11 To clarify this point think of two bottles, the first is one liter, the second two liters. If both are completely filled, they are still considered full, though the second has more liquid because it is bigger. Likewise, some in Paradise have more capacity to be filled, but everyone is completely fulfilled.

12 For an example of a similar criticism and response, one can look to Natural Law ethics. New Natural Law was formed so that the ethical system of Natural Law could be embraced by secular and humanist cultures. In New Natural Law an Aristotelian sense of flourishing has replaced the more traditional foundational principle of relationship with God.


15 Bloom, 59.
17 Kronman, 27.
18 Ibid., 193.

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20 Ibid., 16.
22 Ibid., 16-17.
29 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a, 37.
31 Meyer, In Defense of Freedom, 47.
32 Ibid., 52, 90-92, 116-117 and 127
33 Ibid., 52 and 58-60.
34 Ibid., 127.
35 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1117b-1119b, 77-82.
36 Ibid., 1099b, 23.


41 Burke, 118 and Kirk 483.

42 Kirk, 483.


50 Dagger, p. 72.


53 Klosko, p. 105.

54 Dagger, p. 74.


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 604-605.

58 Ibid., 605.


63 Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII*, 53.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 47.


67 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 634.

68 Ibid.


70 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 635.

71 Ibid., 637.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 638.

74 Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII*, 63.

75 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 647.

76 Ibid., 645.

77 Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII*, 67.

78 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 646.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 659.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 6.
85 Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII*, 92.
87 Ibid.
88 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 671.
90 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 673.
91 Ibid., 673.
94 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 673.
95 Citino, “Middle East Cold Wars.” 248, 249.
96 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 677.
98 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 678.
100 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 679.
101 Ibid., 683.
102 Ibid., 146.
104 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 685.
105 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 139.
109 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 685.
110 Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII*, 82.
111 Ibid., 88-89.
112 Ibid., 90.
113 Ibid., 90.
114 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 716.
115 Ibid., 719.

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119 Ibid., 178.

120 Franklin and Spaeth, *Virgil Michel: American Catholic*, 10.


123 Ibid., 30.

124 Calabretta, *Baptism and Confirmation*, 34.


127 Ibid., 43.
128 Ibid., 47.

129 Franklin and Spaeth, *Virgil Michel: American Catholic*, 81.

130 Calabretta, *Baptism and Confirmation*, 49.

131 Marx, *Virgil Michel and the Liturgical Movement*, 178.

132 Ibid., 179.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 50-51.
135 Ibid., 183-184.
136 Michel quoted in Marx, *Virgil Michel and the Liturgical Movement*, 182.
137 Marx, *Virgil Michel and the Liturgical Movement*, 382.
140 All references to Nietzsche’s primary texts refer to his own numbered sections rather than page numbers. References to secondary sources cite page number.
144 Santaniello, 137.
145 Ibid., 159.
146 Ibid., 1.
147 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 34.
149 Ibid., 2:24.
150 Ibid., 1:17.
156 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 5.
157 Ibid., 10.
162  Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 197.
169  Ibid., 2:19.
171  Mark 6:34.
173  MacIntyre, 111.
175  Ibid., 3.

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181  Ibid., Line 74-5.
182  Ibid., Line 160.
183 Ibid., Line 168.
184 Ibid., Line 226-7.
185 Ibid., Line 279-80.
186 Ibid., Line 396.
187 Ibid., Line 397.
188 Ibid., Line 442.
189 Ibid., Line 486.
190 Ibid., Line 242-6.
191 Ibid., Line 474-5.
193 Ibid., Line 390-1.
195 Ibid., xii.
196 Ibid., 17.
197 Ibid., 68.

**The Cellar**

198 Meeting Announcement Flyer by DCSCTC, GUA Varia Collection, B 12, F 219, Three Sisters Bridge, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Research Center, Washington D.C.
199 Ibid.
202 Meeting Announcement Flyer
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
209 Ibid.


212 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 1, Folder 18, Address by Benjamin Rush Floyd 1836.

213 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 5, Folder 2, Amanuensis Book May 1854


215 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 5, Folder 12, Correspondence May 1855.


218 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 2, Folder 5, Amanuensis Book *circa* 1845.

219 See footnote 1

220 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 5, Folder 3, *circa* 1849.

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223 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 3, Folder 11, Address by Eugene Cummiskey July 4, 1844.

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226 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 3, Folder 7, Address by Daniel Digges 1840.

227 Georgetown University Archives, Philodemic Society Papers, Box 1, Folder 19, Address by Mr. P.P. Morriss, 1836
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233 Mark 8:36


235 Ibid., 257.

236 Ibid.


238 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b25-7.


240 Ibid., 87.

241 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169b10.

242 Ibid., 1170a5-6.


244 David Brooks, “The Organization Kid.”

245 Tom Wolfe, I am Charlotte Simons, 412.

246 [Brooks, "The Organization Kid," 17.]

247 Brooks, “The Organization Kid.”
Tocqueville Forum Events

Welcome Week Discussion
“Understanding the Core Curriculum”
September 8, 2010 — 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM
Mark Henrie
Senior Vice President and Chief Academic Officer
at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute
Mortara Center Conference Room

Roundtable
“Constitutional Morality? A Constitution Day Roundtable”
September 17, 2010 — 4:00 - 6:00 PM
Dr. Richard Hassing
Professor of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America
Dr. Peter Lawler
Dana Professor of Government and International Studies at Berry College
Dr. Jeffry Morrison
Associate Professor of Government at Regent University
Intercultural Center Auditorium

Alumni Homecoming Lecture
“The Digital Age: Great Promise and Great Peril”
September 23, 2010 — 6:30 - 8:00 PM
Mark Bauerlein
Professor of English at Emory University, Author of The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future
Mortara Center Conference Room

Roundtable
“Economics at the Crossroads: A Forum Roundtable”
October 20, 2010 — 6:30 - 8:30 PM
John Mueller
Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Author of Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element
John Médaille
Author of Toward a Truly Free Market: A Distributist Perspective on the Role of Government, Taxes, Health Care, Deficits, and More
With a response by Barry C. Lynn
Director Markets, Enterprise, and Resiliency Initiative The New America Foundation
This event was co-sponsored by The Society of Catholic Social Scientists.
Gonda Theatre, Davis Performing Arts Center, Georgetown University

Forum Lecture
How the Federal Government is Trying to Destroy Your Liberal Arts Education
November 15, 2010 — 12:00 - 1:00 PM
John Seery
http://www.politics.pomona.edu/seery.html, Professor of Politics at Pomona College
White Gravenor Hall, Room #108

Fifth Annual Carroll Lecture
Charles Carroll: A Classical-Christian Nexus in the American Founding
November 18, 2010 — 7:00 - 8:30 PM
Bradley Birzer
Russell Amos Kirk Chair in American Studies, Hillsdale College, Author of American Cicero: the Life of Charles Carroll
Copley Formal Lounge

Forum Lecture
Church and State – Ever Separate?
December 8, 2010 — 6:00 - 7:30 PM
Rémi Brague
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9mi_Brague, Professor of Philosophy and Co-director of the Center for Research in the Tradition of Classical Thought at the Université de Paris I—Sorbonne, and Professor of Medieval Arabic Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich
Mortara Center Conference Room

For more information on upcoming Tocqueville Forum events, please visit: http://government.georgetown.edu/tocquevilleforum