

TESTING THE PRESIDENT'S HYPOTHESIS: ARE TERRORIST ATTACKS  
THE RESULT OF FREEDOM IN THE WORLD?

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**ABSTRACT**

On the evening of September 11, 2001 President Bush addressed the American people with the following words: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts... America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” Here we see the President of the United States framing the conflict between al-Qaeda and his country in terms of liberty. President Bush asserted that “our very freedom came under attack” and the reason we were attacked was “because we're the brightest beacon for freedom.” No one questions the propositions that (a) America was attacked and (b) America loves liberty. What is debatable, however, is whether a causal relationship exists between these statements. This inquiry seeks to determine if being a free society is synonymous with attracting terrorist aggression.

The desire to better understand what motivates our adversaries to behave the way they do is not a new phenomenon. Two and one half thousand years ago the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu instructed his followers to not only “know thyself,” but also “know thy enemy.” Tzu went on to write: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt.” This philosophy, if true, has significant implications for our present situation. Given the protracted difficulties endemic to America’s conflicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be wise to reassess how well we understand our adversary. Is freedom the issue at point, as President Bush suggests, or are these conflicts fueled by other factors which, if adjusted, could produce a different outcome? One final axiom from Sun Tzu will be mentioned here: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Approaching this ideal involves better understanding why our enemy wants to fight to begin with. It is to that end this thesis is written.

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Richard Edward Hayes, for his guidance and assistance from day one of this endeavor. Thanks also to my professors, whose tutelage enabled me to perform the kind of quantitative analyses used in this paper. I want to additionally thank Eric Gardner for his assistance with some of the more technical issues. Finally, a special thanks to my sister, Mary-Clare, for her careful proofreading of this document.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction

On September 11, 2001 nineteen men hijacked four commercial airliners and used them as guided missiles, resulting in approximately 3,000 American deaths. One week after that event President Bush declared: “Terrorism knows no borders, it has no capital, but it does have a common ideology, and that is they hate freedom, and they hate freedom-loving people.”<sup>1</sup> Eight months later, while discussing the attack on the World Trade Center, the President warned: “we must never forget there are people in the world who hate what we stand for. People who can't stand the thought that a diverse nation can be a free nation. People who hate freedom -- freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of press.”<sup>2</sup> Six months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq the President insisted that terrorists “can’t stand the thought of a free society in the Middle East. They hate freedom. They hate the thought of a democracy emerging. And therefore, they want to violently prevent that from happening.”<sup>3</sup> On these and other occasions the President of the United States has suggested that a causal relationship exists between being a free society and being the target of terrorist attack. As the leader of the free world, it would only seem natural for him to view the conflict through this lens. America, undoubtedly, is a freedom-loving country. The question this paper asks, however, is whether the United States and other free societies are targeted by terrorists for this reason in particular.

The empirical record leaves room to question the President’s position. One considers a country like Russia, which is constantly beleaguered by terrorist activity.

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-1.html>

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020517-10.html>

<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030822-6.html>

Does President Bush or anyone else argue that the Russians are targeted for their love of freedom? On February 24, 2005 and other occasions the President voiced “concerns about Russia’s commitment” to the rights and liberties of its people.<sup>4</sup> Russia is not an isolated example in this respect. Other countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Colombia have had to deal with the scourge of terrorism for years. By contrast, relatively free countries like Iceland, Australia, Luxembourg and New Zealand have experienced little to no terrorist aggression. We ask ourselves then: is being targeted by terrorists really a function of freedom?

This paper has devised a method for testing the President’s Hypothesis empirically. Using measurements for freedom and terrorism for every country of the world, it is possible to quantitatively assess whether more freedom equals more terrorism. Before performing these tests, however, it is the initial proposition of this essay that the relationship between a country’s commitment to liberty and its attracting terrorist activity is not as robust as President Bush would suggest. Actions a government takes that adversely affect terrorists, or which terrorists perceive to be detrimental, seem a more likely rationale for a behavior as extreme as terrorism.

## **Literature Review**

This inquiry is not alone in questioning the purported connection between terrorism and hatred of freedom. In his book, *Understanding Terrorism*, Gus Martin argues that terrorists do not seek to reduce freedom, but to enhance it. According to Martin, terrorists universally view themselves as freedom fighters involved in a struggle

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<sup>4</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-9.html>

to preserve freedom.<sup>5</sup> Martin invokes an interesting quote when making his argument: “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.”<sup>6</sup> Oddly enough, this statement did not come from a foreign extremist. It came from U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater during his 1964 bid for the White House. Goldwater’s logic has found appeal at home and abroad. Osama bin Laden, addressing the American public prior to the 2004 presidential election, declared that: “security is an indispensable pillar of human life and that men do not forfeit their security, contrary to Bush’s claim that we hate freedom. If so, then let him explain to us why we don’t strike, for example, Sweden...No, we fight because we are free men who don’t sleep under oppression. We want to restore freedom to our nation.”<sup>7</sup> Yasser Arafat exhibited similar thinking in a 1974 speech to the United Nations when he said: “For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called terrorist [sic].”<sup>8</sup> In Martin’s analysis, the conflict between America and al Qaeda is not over the existence of freedom but over who gets to define it.

The suggestion that terrorists harbor a deep seated hatred of freedom subsumes religious innuendos. The idea here is that Muslim fundamentalists despise the immoral, secular and unrestricted nature of American freedom, and that is the reason why the attacks of September 11, 2001 occurred. In his book on the *Root Causes of Terrorism*, Tore Bjorgo disputes the purported connection between terrorism and extremist religion.

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<sup>5</sup> Martin, Gus. *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003), 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Osama bin Laden, “Message to America,” October 30, 2004. Available on the al-Jazeera Web site, English.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm, as cited in Richardson, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> See [http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/UN/arafat\\_un.html](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/UN/arafat_un.html)

A primary objective of his work is to debunk several widely held misconceptions about the root causes of terrorism. These include the errant beliefs that there is a strong connection between poverty and terrorism, state sponsorship is a root cause of terrorism, terrorists are insane and religion is the primary cause of suicide terrorism.<sup>9</sup> Bjorgo writes:

Many suicide terrorists around the world are secular, or belong to other religions than Islam. Suicide terrorists are motivated mainly by political goals, usually to end foreign occupation or domestic domination by a different ethnic group. Their 'martyrdom' is, however, frequently legitimized and glorified with reference to religious ideas and values.<sup>10</sup>

As will become apparent, Bjorgo is not alone in his position that the connection between terrorism and religion is flawed.

In her book, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, Jessica Stern explores the nature of the relationship between terrorism and religious extremism. Her book is the result of several years of worldwide travel, during which time she interviewed numerous extremists. Relying on her considerable research, Stern describes how terrorist organizations are created by rational opportunists who successfully use religion as a recruitment tool for the disenfranchised. Public discontent and humiliation over ills they associate with foreign influence provide an ideal breeding ground for potential terrorists. Recruits are made to believe that justice will prevail and the world will become a better place by their acts of violence, which serve a greater good. Extremist religion provides an enabling ideology in this situation.

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<sup>9</sup> Bjorgo, Tore. *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 256-257.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 257.

What began in the name of moral fervor, however, soon develops into a sophisticated organization that vies for money, publicity and influence.<sup>11</sup> While religion provides an initial recruitment tool, Stern believes that terrorist recruits eventually develop into cynical, professional killers. The root issue, according to Stern, is political. She sees government actions which disadvantage terrorists and/or their communities as a primary contributing factor to the violence. Stern disagrees with the typical government response of enacting policies to crush terrorist groups militarily. This impedes our ability to penetrate terrorist communities and win the greater war for the hearts and minds of young extremists. If military action must be taken, Stern advocates covert action whenever possible.<sup>12</sup> The rough justice meted out to prisoners and terror suspects has an undermining effect on America's moral standing and tends to elevate the stature of our opponents. Stern advocates that we take "public relations and public education as seriously as the terrorists do."<sup>13</sup>

Her answer to the question of why terrorists hate us "is not only the 'axis of envy' inevitably engendered by our military and economic might, but also our policies, and, more importantly, how they are perceived by potential recruits to terrorist organizations."<sup>14</sup> U.S. policies that Stern cites as contributing to terrorist activity include: globalization, stationing troops in restive regions, imposing sanctions on Iraq, practicing double standards with respect to international law and allowing failed states to fester.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Stern, Jessica. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 282.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 290.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 293.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 294

<sup>15</sup> Idem.

Her recommendation is that we “take into account how our policies play into the hands of our terrorist enemies.”<sup>16</sup> She also advocates changing “policies that no longer serve our interest or are inconsistent with our values, even if those happen to be policies that the terrorists demand.”<sup>17</sup>

Other inquiries have gone so far as to almost completely divorce religious extremism from terrorist activity. In his book, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Robert Pape argues that the purported connection between Islamic fundamentalism and suicide terrorism is misguided. According to Pape, “the data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions. . . . Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”<sup>18</sup> Pape observes that the worldwide leader of suicide terrorist attacks are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group strictly opposed to all organized religion. While religion can be used as a recruitment tool, Pape argues that it is rarely the root cause driving terrorist behavior.

In Pape’s analysis, terrorists do not seek to combat or reduce freedom, but to take any action necessary to remove foreign forces from territory that terrorists view as their homeland. A captured jihadist, who pled guilty to five charges in connection with a broad terrorist conspiracy, exhibited this thinking during his October 2000 trial. At the

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 295.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 296.

<sup>18</sup> Pape, Robert. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. (New York: Random House, 2005), 4.

Federal District Court in Manhattan, Ali A. Muhammad testified: "...I was involved in the Islamic Jihad organization, and the Islamic Jihad organization had a very close link to al-Qaeda, the organization for bin Ladin. And the objective [was]...just to attack any Western target in the Middle East, to force the government of the Western countries just to pull out from the Middle East..."<sup>19</sup> More conspicuous examples supporting this theory include Palestinian attempts to oust the Israelis, Chechnian attempts to oust the Russians, Irish attempts to oust the British and colonial American attempts to oust the British. When discussing this principle in relation to Muslim terrorism directed at the United States, Pape cites Osama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa:

The Arabian Peninsula has never...been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations....For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples....We issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies...in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam...<sup>20</sup>

It is worth noting that al-Qaeda was born as an uprising against the Soviet *occupation* of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in response to the country's surge in Islamic fundamentalism, which had the potential to spread to satellite Soviet republics. Al-Qaeda was able to successfully recruit thousands of volunteers, primarily from Middle Eastern countries, to make war with the Soviets. The new organization was extensively armed, trained and financed by the United States,

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<sup>19</sup> Rubin, Barry and Judith Colp Rubin. *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 210.

<sup>20</sup> World Islamic Front Statement, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," February 23, 1998, as cited in Pape, 2005.

Pakistan and China. President Reagan viewed this fledgling organization as freedom fighters engaged in a struggle to defend liberty.<sup>21</sup> The mujahideen would ultimately prevail when Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. In light of this brief history, it should not come as a surprise that al-Qaeda wants to see American forces withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula as well.

Louise Richardson would agree with Robert Pape that the connection between religious fanaticism and terrorism is misguided. In her book, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*, Richardson argues that terrorists are not religious fanatics, but instead are rational actors who seek to execute carefully planned and timed tactics to produce a given political outcome. Richardson posits that the nature of terrorism did not change after September 11, 2001. What did change, in her view, was our response to it. According to Richardson, President Bush's Global War on Terror was doomed to fail from the outset because of a misunderstanding about why terrorists do what they do. Richardson would not agree with the assessment that terrorists are religious fanatics motivated by a hatred of American freedom. She argues instead that heavy-handed actions taken by a government have a major impact on the decision to engage in terrorism in the first place. In Richardson's assessment terrorists are driven by secular desires for revenge, renown and reaction.<sup>22</sup>

Containing the terrorist threat, in this analysis, does not involve launching an international campaign to smash every terrorist cell of global reach. History is rife with

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<sup>21</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign\\_Interventions\\_of\\_the\\_Reagan\\_Administration](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Interventions_of_the_Reagan_Administration)

<sup>22</sup> Richardson, Louise. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*. (New York: Random House, 2006), 71.

examples of government crackdowns having the opposite of their intended effect. In Richardson's estimation, the public declaration of a War on Terror, coupled with the invasion of Iraq, played into bin Laden's hands by giving him the major government reaction he seeks to attract attention and recruits to his cause. Richardson writes: "Governments are invariably placed under enormous pressure to react forcibly and fast in the wake of a terrorist attack," and this kind of response "is not likely to be most conducive to long-term success against terrorists."<sup>23</sup> As was the case with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Richardson believes that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has served as a lightning rod for attracting, mobilizing and motivating terrorist recruits throughout the region.

Richardson posits that terrorism is a tactic, and as such, cannot in and of itself be defeated. "One would never hear of war being declared on, say, precision-guided bombing."<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, a declaration of war evokes images of victory and defeat, and making the U.S. permanently invulnerable to any terrorist attack is a victory we cannot deliver. While the terrorist threat cannot be eliminated, it can be contained. To do this, Richardson offers six guidelines: 1) have a defensible and achievable goal – e.g. stopping the spread of Islamic militancy, not eliminating terrorism, 2) live by your principles – scandals like Abu Ghraib tend to wind back the clock, 3) know your enemy, 4) separate terrorists from their communities, 5) engage others in the war against terror and 6) maintain a sense of patience and perspective.<sup>25</sup> Adverse actions taken by a foreign

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 203.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 175.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 203-233.

government against the community she grew up in had a radicalizing effect on Richardson during her younger years. Her ardent desire to join the Irish Republican Army after the Bloody Sunday massacre of 1972 has given her insight into the terrorist mindset.

Ted Gurr's text on *Why Men Rebel* was written several years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, but his insights on why men engage in political violence transcend time. Gurr believes that the more protracted and acute the adverse government action, the more likely it is to produce adverse reaction. He writes: "The coercive capacities of a regime and the uses to which they are put are crucial variables, affecting the forms and extent of political violence in both the short and the long run."<sup>26</sup> In this respect, he agrees with Stern, Pape and Richardson that heavy military involvement in a conflict with sub-national extremists will often produce more harm than good. Gurr would likely endorse Richardson's belief that:

...by placing our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are ensuring that there will be many other actions to be avenged, whether it is the killing of civilians in air strikes, the abuse of prisoners or desecration of corpses in Afghanistan, or military operations and prisoner abuse in Iraq, those hurt by these actions are likely to swell the ranks of those seeking vengeance. Thanks to the role of the media, evidence of these abuses is presented for all the world to see, so that those seeking revenge are not just those who have suffered but also those who identify with those who have suffered and are radicalized by the experience.<sup>27</sup>

In his book, Gurr discusses the frustration-aggression theory, which posits that the primary source leading men to violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism.<sup>28</sup> He opines that while frustration does not always lead men to violence, the length of its duration and severity of its impact enhance the likelihood of this result. Gurr writes:

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<sup>26</sup> Gurr, Ted. *Why Men Rebel*, 14.

<sup>27</sup> Richardson, Louise. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*, 197.

<sup>28</sup> Gurr, Ted. *Why Men Rebel*, 36.

“men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustrations.”<sup>29</sup> His research has significant implications for any government’s foreign policy.

Martha Crenshaw has authored multiple leading works on terrorism prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Her research has also found that adverse government actions, such as a strong show of force, often serve to create more terrorists than it eliminates. In her 1981 article on “The Causes of Terrorism” she outlines several conditions that she considers to be direct causes of terrorism: (1) the existence of grievances among a subgroup of a larger population, (2) a lack of opportunity for political participation, (3) the context of elite dissatisfaction and (4) the occurrence of a precipitating event, such as an excessive show of government force.<sup>30</sup> Crenshaw believes that the use of government force:

...often compels terrorist retaliation. The development of such an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime and its challengers. There are numerous historical examples of a campaign of terrorism precipitated by a government’s reliance on excessive force to quell protest or squash dissent.<sup>31</sup>

The image brought to fore here is similar to the one describes in the Greek classic *Oresteia*, where Aeschylus paints a picture of grievances begetting violence, which beget more violence, leading to a potentially infinite regress.<sup>32</sup> Crenshaw, Gurr, Richardson and Stern agree that adverse government actions, like the heavy use of military force, often create more terrorists than they eliminate.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 37.

<sup>30</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics* 13 (1981): 383-385.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 384-385.

<sup>32</sup> Aeschylus. *Oresteia*. Trans. Peter Meineck. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998).

The Pentagon's Defense Science Board (DSB) is a resource particularly worthy of consideration given the topic at hand. The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee that was established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. This committee published a report on strategic communication in September of 2004. The study emphasized the importance of winning the battle for the hearts and minds of today's Muslim youth as part of a larger strategy of winning the War on Terror. Such an objective is critical for separating the vast majority of non-violent Muslims from their more radical counterparts. According to the study, America is failing badly in this effort. Additionally, "direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States."<sup>33</sup> The report concluded that "Muslims do not 'hate our freedom,' but rather, they hate our policies."<sup>34</sup>

Not only did the DSB posit that freedom is not the reason terrorists attacked us, they also argue that the Muslim world does not view what America is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan as freedom-enhancing. According to their report: "when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy."<sup>35</sup> The report goes on to observe that "saying that 'freedom is the future of the Middle East' is seen as patronizing, suggesting that Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World — but Muslims do not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved."<sup>36</sup> A final quote this essay takes from the DSB's report

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<sup>33</sup> See [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic\\_Communication.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

is that “*in the eyes of Muslims*, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self-determination.”<sup>37</sup> These findings, if correct, accentuate the difficulty Muslims have connecting America’s foreign policy to the ideal of freedom.

Another federal report of interest comes from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). In May of 2006 the GAO published a report titled, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges.” This report made use of several polls taken on Muslim perceptions of the United States. One of these focused on the principle reasons underlying anti-American sentiment among Muslim countries. This poll, which was based on a series of surveys probing the root causes behind anti-U.S. sentiment in ten Muslim-majority countries, was released in March of 2003 by the State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It found that “the belief that the U.S. is hostile toward Muslim countries was the single largest component of anti-American sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing even the publics’ view of how the United States treats their own country.”<sup>38</sup> The report goes on to add:

Our roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts noted that this view is grounded in Muslim concerns over U.S. foreign policies and actions in the Muslim world. All of our panelists agreed that *U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations* and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government officials. According to our panelists, these core issues include the Arab/Israeli conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support for antidemocratic

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> See <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf>

regimes in the region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism, and U.S. support for globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims [italics added].<sup>39</sup>

The GAO's report came to the same conclusion as did the Pentagon's Defense Science Board: Muslims do not hate our freedom--they hate our foreign policy.

### **Policy Relevance**

The answers to the questions raised in this essay have significant policy implications for the United States as well as foreign countries. From a domestic perspective, it cannot be overemphasized how important it is to continually study and better understand what motivates our adversaries to do what they do. We cannot know how to prepare for or prevent tomorrow's attack if we do not understand why we are being attacked today. U.S. homeland security and international peace depend on this understanding. The implications are equally consequential for foreign governments, especially those countries considering democratic reform. A clear and alarming disincentive exists for developing countries to pursue a path of greater openness if such will eventually lead to violent attack by extremists bent on death and destruction.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 2. Conceptual Model and Data

The null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) tested in this paper is the position that a meaningful relationship can be established between being a free society and being the target of terrorist attack. Our alternative hypothesis ( $H_A$ ) is the opposite position. The primary tool used to test our null hypothesis is multiple regression analysis. Regression analysis is a quantitative tool used to model the relationship between two or more variables. For example, the simple regression  $y=3x$  tells us that a 1 unit increase in  $x$  is associated with a 3 unit increase in  $y$ . The regression analysis performed in this paper models the relationship between terrorism and freedom. This model is used to better understand how our dependent variable (frequency of terrorist activity) responds to changes in one or more of our independent variables (conventional measures of freedom). The full model we will consider can be expressed as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \beta_4X_4 + \beta_5X_5 + \varepsilon$$

where:

$Y$  = Terrorist Incidents  
 $X_1$  = Political Liberties  
 $X_2$  = Civil Rights  
 $X_3$  = Economic Freedom  
 $X_4$  = Press Freedom  
 $X_5$  = Religious Freedom  
 $\varepsilon$  = error term

The variables used in this model are outlined below:

### (1) Terrorist Incidents

The definition of terrorism used in the paper is the same as the one set forth in Title 22, Section 2656f(d) of the U.S. Code: “Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated

violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>40</sup> Data on terrorist incidents comes from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s databank.<sup>41</sup> This resource provides statistics on terrorist incidents for every country of the world from 1968 to the present. For accounting purposes, an event is labeled a terrorist incident against a country if its intended target was that country’s government, irrespective of whether or not the attack occurred on the target country’s soil.

## (2) Political Rights and Civil Liberties

These measures are provided by Freedom House. According to Freedom House’s website:

Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process through the right to vote, compete for public office and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.<sup>42</sup>

Freedom House measures both of these variables on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being most free and 7 being least free. Data for these variables measure freedoms for 192 countries and 14 territories from 1972 to the present.<sup>43</sup>

## (3) Freedom of the Press

This measurement also comes from Freedom House:

“Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology questions divided into three subcategories...Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having "Free" media; 31 to 60, "Partly Free" media; and 61 to 100, "Not Free" media.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> See <https://www.cia.gov/terrorism/ctc.html>

<sup>41</sup> See <http://www.mipt.org>

<sup>42</sup> See <http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=265#7>

<sup>43</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls>

<sup>44</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=56&year=2006>

Press freedom scores range from 0 to 100, with 0 being most free and 100 being least free.

The data used for this variable measures press freedom for 194 countries and territories from 1980 to the present.<sup>45</sup>

#### (4) Economic Freedom

This measurement is provided by the Heritage Foundation. According to their website:

Economic freedom is defined as the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. In other words, people are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in the ways they feel are most productive.<sup>46</sup>

The Heritage Foundation measures economic freedom on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 being most free and 5 being least free. The data used for this variable measures economic freedom for 161 countries from 1995 to the present.<sup>47</sup>

#### (5) Religious Freedom

For the purposes of this paper, religious freedom is defined as the extent to which citizens can practice the religion they believe in without government interference. The data source for religious freedom comes from the Association of Religion Data Archives.<sup>48</sup>

Religious freedom is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 being most free and 10 being least free. The data used for this variable measures religious freedom for 191 countries and territories for the year 2003.

The two primary measures of freedom used in this paper, Political Rights and Civil Liberties, come from Freedom House (as does Press Freedom). Critics of Freedom House have argued that the organization's "standards are elastic, bending to the dictates

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<sup>45</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274>

<sup>46</sup> See <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/faq.cfm>

<sup>47</sup> See <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index>

<sup>48</sup> See <http://thearda.com/internationalData>

of American foreign policy.”<sup>49</sup> It should be noted, however, that Freedom House has criticized both the United States and its allies. It is also worth noting that Freedom House’s baseline measurement for freedom is taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>50</sup> This document was drafted by a Canadian named John Peters Humphrey and ratified by the United Nation’s General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Support for the document was unchallenged: no country voted against it.

## Methodology and Findings

The President’s Hypothesis is first tested by regressing frequency of terrorist activity, by country, by year, on four conventional measures of freedom: Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Economic Freedom and Press Freedom.<sup>51</sup> Complete data for all of these variables go back to 1995. Consequently, the regression performed below covers an eleven year span: from 1995 to 2005, inclusive. Simple descriptive statistics for all variables related to freedom and terrorism are listed below.

Table 1. Simple descriptive statistics for the datasets used to model freedom and terrorism.

Variable	Sample Size	Missing Values	Average Value	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
YEAR	2222	0	2000	1995	2005
TERRORIST INCIDENTS	2222	0	8.181	0	2344
POLITICAL RIGHTS	2109	113	3.419	1	7
CIVIL LIBERTIES	2109	113	3.482	1	7
ECONOMIC FREEDOM	1626	596	3.151	1.538	5
PRESS FREEDOM	2039	183	46.28	5	100
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM	191	11	3.061	0	10

<sup>49</sup> The Devil's Christmas, [www.antiwar.com](http://www.antiwar.com)(online), as cited in [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedomhouse#\\_ref-4](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedomhouse#_ref-4).

<sup>50</sup> See <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

<sup>51</sup> Religious Freedom is excluded from our initial regression because data for it was available only for the year 2003.

The statistics above also indicate that there is a small amount of missing data for Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Press Freedom. There is a moderate amount of missing data for Economic Freedom but, as will become evident, not enough to alter the results of this analysis. The sample size for Religious Freedom is smaller than the other variables because it only covers one year.

Our first regression is for all countries of the world.<sup>52</sup> Using data from 1995 to 2005, it regresses terrorist incidents on four measures of freedom: Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Economic Freedom and Freedom of the Press. The measures of freedom used are expressed as indicator variables (also known as binary or zero/one variables). This term is used because these variables indicate a category of interest.<sup>53</sup> The results are discussed below.

Binary Freedom Regression The REG Procedure Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS			
Number of Observations Read			2222
Number of Observations Used			1614
Number of Observations with Missing Values			608
	F Value	7.86	
	Pr > F	<.0001	
	R-Square	0.0192	
	Parameter		
Variable	Estimate		P-value
Intercept	6.79984		<.0001
Political Rights	13.53649		0.0002
Civil Liberties	-19.8135		<.0001
Economic Freedom	0.80281		0.8443
Press Freedom	7.16494		0.0652

<sup>52</sup> For an analysis of the relationship between terrorism and freedom solely for the United States, see Appendix A.

<sup>53</sup> The category of interest here is freedom. In terms of Political Rights, a country is said to be free if it has a score between 1 and 3. The same is true for Civil Liberties. A country is said to be economically free if its Economic Freedom score is between 1 and 2. Finally, a country is said to have a free press if its Press Freedom score falls between 0 and 31.

This regression takes the following form:  $\text{Incidents} = 6.79984 + 13.54 (\text{Political Rights}) - 19.81 (\text{Civil Liberties}) + 0.80 (\text{Economic Freedom}) + 7.16 (\text{Press Freedom})$ . In a binary regression, an independent variable (in this case, any freedom variable) can assume a value of either 1 or 0 to indicate if it does or does not assume the variable's category. Hence, when Political Rights is set equal to 1, we observe that being free in this category is associated with a 13.54 point increase in terrorist incidents, on average. The converse is also true: if a country is not politically free (i.e. for Political Rights = 0), this is associated with 13.54 fewer terrorist incidents than countries which are politically free. Note that while freedom in terms of Political Rights is associated with more terrorist incidents, freedom in terms of Civil Liberties is associated with less. If we set all freedom variables in this model equal to 0, we are left with the intercept (6.79984). This represents the number of terrorist incidents we would expect for a country that is not free in terms of any of the above measures.

The F-value, which measures the overall goodness of fit for our model, has a probability ( $\text{Pr} > F$ ) of less than 0.0001. This tells us that the regression as a whole is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. The statistical significance contained in this model is a function of its large sample size (2,222 observations). In the language of statistics, a result is said to be significant if it was unlikely to have occurred by chance. Furthermore, there are different levels of significance. The three used in this paper are  $\alpha = 0.10, 0.05$  and  $0.01$ . A significance level is the probability that the null hypothesis will be rejected when it is actually true (also known as a Type I error). A statistic's significance is also called its p-value, and the lower this number is the more significant its

statistic becomes. Four of the five p-values for the parameter estimates above are statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.10$  level (i.e their p-values are less than 0.10).

Salient in this first regression is the small  $R^2$  term (0.0192).  $R^2$ , also known as the coefficient of determination, represents the proportion of response variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables in a model. To interpret this statistic in our model: an  $R^2$  term of 0.0192 tells us that the four measures of freedom used, by themselves, explain approximately 1.92% of the variation in terrorist activity, by county, by year, on average. In other words, conventional measures of freedom accounted for somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of all variation in terrorist activities around the world from 1995 to 2005. This number is not sufficient for establishing a meaningful relationship between being a free society and attracting terrorism. Alternative approaches are considered below.

Some of the observations in our sample have an unusually high number of terrorist incidents. Colombia, for example, does not fit neatly into the average trend we see between terrorism and freedom for most other countries. While its citizens do not enjoy the same level of freedom offered by many other democracies, Colombia has experienced an unusually high number of terrorist incidents.<sup>54</sup> This works against the President's Hypothesis. To control for the effect of outliers, or extreme values, we take the logarithm, or log, of the dependent variable. By logging the dependent variable from our previous regression we prevent countries with abnormally large values from disproportionately influencing our results. In a log-level model, the coefficients are

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<sup>54</sup> From 1995 to 2005 Colombia averaged 122.8 incidents per year. By contrast, all countries of the world averaged 8.2 incidents per year during the same period.

interpreted as a *percentage change* in the dependent variable (this allows us to evaluate proportional, instead of absolute, changes in our response variable). Performing a logistic regression for all countries yields the following model:

Logistic Binary Regression The REG Procedure Dependent Variable: log(Incidents)		
Number of Observations Read		2222
Number of Observations Used		651
Number of Observations with Missing Values		1571
F Value 4.69		
Pr > F 0.0010		
R-Square 0.0282		
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	1.44414	<.0001
Political Rights	0.48541	0.0251
Civil Liberties	-0.86058	0.0004
Economic Freedom	-0.19715	0.4194
Press Freedom	0.50749	0.0493

The regression takes the following form:  $\text{Log (Incidents)} = 1.44 + 0.49 (\text{Political Rights}) - 0.86 (\text{Civil Liberties}) - 0.20 (\text{Economic Freedom}) + 0.51 (\text{Press Freedom})$ . Our  $\text{Pr} > F$  statistic tells us that the regression as a whole is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. Each of the individual coefficients, except for Economic Freedom, are statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level (i.e. their p-values are less than 0.05). Interpreting the significant coefficients this model, we say that being free in terms of Political Rights is associated with 48.5% more terrorist incidents than those countries not free by this metric. Conversely, being free in terms of Civil Liberties is associated with 86% fewer terrorist incidents than those countries not free by this measure. Finally, having a free press is associated with 50.7% more terrorist incidents than those countries without a free press.

The results appear to be mixed. Our  $R^2$  term increases, but not by much (i.e. measures of freedom in this model are unable to explain even 3% of the variation in terrorist activity from 1995 to 2005). The explanatory power offered is still insufficient for establishing a meaningful relationship between being a free society and attracting terrorist activity.

The previous regression adjusted for outliers, or extreme values. A brief survey of the extreme values contained in our dataset may, in and of itself, shed light on the President's Hypothesis. Let us briefly consider the frequency of terrorist activity for countries with extreme freedom scores. In other words, we will compare the frequency of terrorist activity for the most and least free countries in the world. How can we determine which countries are most and least free? Recall that all of our freedom variables are constructed with lower scores indicating more freedom and vice versa. Hence, if we sum all freedom variables for each country, per annum, the country with the lowest total score would be the most free country for that year. The country with the highest total score in a given year would be the least free. Ergo, our unit of analysis is country-years. In order to prevent individual freedom variables from having a disproportionate influence on the summed score (like freedom of the press, which is scored from 0 to 100), we will peg all scores to a 1 to 10 scale. This ensures that each of our variables hold equal weight.

The results of these calculations reveal that the 20 most free country-years, from 1995 to 2005, had a total of 7 terrorist incidents. By contrast, the 20 least free country-years in the world, over the same period, had a total of 47 terrorist incidents. Expanding our sample size yields the following results:

Table 2. Number of terrorist incidents for most and least free countries of the world, by year, from 1995 to 2005.

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Country-years	Incidents
30 most free	17
30 least free	49
40 most free	22
40 least free	65
50 most free	23
50 least free	77

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These results do not support the President’s Hypothesis. Keep in mind, however, that they are taken from the outermost ends of our frequency distribution and are therefore not necessarily representative of our population base.

The data used in our first two regressions is not normally distributed. Skew occurs when an uneven number of values are clustered on the left or right side of a frequency distribution. We have the following skew measures for each variable:

Table 3. Skew measurements for all variables measuring terrorist incidents and freedom.

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Incidents	25.58
Political Rights	0.33
Civil Liberties	0.26
Economic Freedom	0.15
Press Freedom	0.16
Religious Freedom	0.56

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Generally speaking, a skew exceeding  $\pm 3$  indicates bias. Fortunately only one of our variables falls into this category (Incidents), but it is quite skewed (25.58). In the case of Incidents, a large number of 0-valued incidents (1,501) are clustered on the left side of the frequency distribution (positive skew). Approximately 68% of the countries in our population have no terrorist incidents. To correct for this we consider a model which excludes those countries with zero terrorist incidents:

Binary Regression for Countries with > 0 Incidents  
The REG Procedure  
Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS

Number of Observations Read	721
Number of Observations Used	651
Number of Observations with Missing Values	70

F Value 7.27  
Pr > F <.0001  
R-Square 0.0431

Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	15.82853	<.0001
Political Rights	27.10159	0.0013
Civil Liberties	-40.06205	<.0001
Economic Freedom	-5.42437	0.5675
Press Freedom	20.84104	0.0377

This regression takes the form:  $\text{Incidents} = 15.83 + 27.10 (\text{Political Rights}) - 40.06 (\text{Civil Liberties}) - 5.42 (\text{Economic Freedom}) + 20.84 (\text{Press Freedom})$ . Notice that our number of observations drops by approximately 68%. This regression, as a whole, is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. With the exception of Economic Freedom, each of our parameter estimates are significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level. Consequently, being free in terms of Political Rights is associated with 27 more incidents than countries not free in this area. Having a free press is associated with 20.8 more incidents, but being free in terms of Civil Liberties is associated with 40 fewer incidents. We see that the significant coefficients in this model approximately double in size compared to our first model (which included all countries). The  $R^2$  term for this regression also increases but not substantially so (freedom variables in this model explain approximately 4.31% of the variation in terrorist activity from 1995 to 2005).

Our next regression includes a religion variable. Data for this variable was only available for the year 2003, so it did not appear in any of our previous analyses (which all included data from 1995 to 2005). A regression including all five freedom variables appears below:

2003 Binary Regression The REG Procedure Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS		
Number of Observations Read		202
Number of Observations Used		153
Number of Observations with Missing Values		49
F Value    3.62		
Pr > F    0.0041		
R-Square   0.1096		
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	12.81909	0.0092
Political Rights	42.52460	0.0004
Civil Liberties	-41.92170	0.0010
Economic Freedom	0.21521	0.9851
Press Freedom	9.63973	0.3961
Religious Freedom	-14.11312	0.0581

This regression takes the form:  $\text{Incidents} = 12.82 + 42.52 (\text{Political Rights}) - 41.92 (\text{Civil Liberties}) + 0.22 (\text{Economic Freedom}) + 9.63 (\text{Press Freedom}) - 14.11 (\text{Religious Freedom})$ . Notice that our number of observations drops to 202. This is a result of our using data for only one year (we measure approximately 202 countries and territories each year). The decrease in sample size affects the model's statistical significance. While the model as a whole is significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level, for the first time we have more than one parameter estimate that is not significant (Economic Freedom and Press Freedom). Interpreting the parameters which are significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level, we say that being free in terms of Political Rights is associated with 42.5 more terrorist incidents

than not being free in this area. Conversely, being free in terms of Civil Liberties is associated with 41.9 fewer terrorist incidents than not being free in this area. Finally, a country with Religious Freedom (significant at the  $\alpha = 0.10$  level) is expected to have 14.1 fewer terrorist incidents than a country without this freedom.<sup>55</sup>

Note that our  $R^2$  term climbs into the double digits for the first time (10.96%). A few comments on this: first,  $R^2$  is likely to increase as more variables are added to our model, and this model contains more freedom variables than any other. To control for this, statisticians compute what is known as an adjusted  $R^2$ , which takes into account the number of independent variables used.<sup>56</sup> Second, while the  $R^2$  in this model accounts for more variation in terrorist activities than it did in previous models, we should consider whether this variation works in favor of the President's Hypothesis. This can be done by calculating the number of terrorist incidents expected for a country free in terms of the above measures, and also for a country not free. According to this model, a country free in terms of each of the above measures should expect 9.16 terrorist incidents, on average.<sup>57</sup> By contrast, the average country not free in terms of any of the above measures should expect 12.82 terrorist incidents (the intercept). And so while this model accounts for more variation than our previous models did, its net effect actually works against the President's Hypothesis: the variation explained in the above model equates more freedom with less terrorism. Hence, it does not bring us any closer to establishing a meaningful relationship between being a free society and attracting terrorist activity.

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<sup>55</sup> For the purposes of this study, a country is said to be religiously free if its Religious Freedom score falls anywhere between 0 and 4 (recall that our Religious Freedom variable is measured on a 0 to 10 scale).

<sup>56</sup> The adjusted  $R^2$  for this model is 0.0793.

<sup>57</sup>  $12.8191 + 42.5246 - 41.922 + 0.21521 + 9.63973 - 14.113 = 9.16$

Many of our freedom variables are, at least partially, measuring the same thing.<sup>58</sup> Thus, some of them overlap in effect, producing a stronger influence than is warranted for the purposes of our inquiry. The matrix below contains the Pearson's r for each of the freedom variables used in this analysis. The Pearson's r is a measure of correlation between two variables. It tells us the strength and direction of a linear relationship between them. All of the values below are positive, which indicates that they all move in the same direction. If two variables are correlated we say that they are multicollinear. A value of 1.0 indicates that a Variable A is perfectly correlated with Variable B (this occurs when a variable is being measured against itself). Correlation measures are presented below.

Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients for all freedom variables.

	POLITICAL RIGHTS	CIVIL LIBERTIES	ECONOMIC FREEDOM	PRESS FREEDOM	RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
POLITICAL RIGHTS	1.00000	0.94463	0.66631	0.93265	0.67067
CIVIL LIBERTIES	0.94463	1.00000	0.69235	0.94220	0.67517
ECONOMIC FREEDOM	0.66631	0.69235	1.00000	0.73820	0.42916
PRESS FREEDOM	0.93265	0.94220	0.73820	1.00000	0.66955
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM	0.67067	0.67517	0.42916	0.66955	1.00000

All of these correlations are statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. As can be seen from this matrix, the variables used in this analysis are highly correlated. These variables are, at least partially, measuring the same thing. Generally speaking, a correlation in

<sup>58</sup> Recall that Freedom House's definition of Civil Liberties includes the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights and personal autonomy without interference from the state. This coincides with Religious Freedom.

excess of 0.4 is considered large enough to justify remove one of the variables from a model. To control for the misstep of measuring the same effect twice, we will regress Incidents on just one freedom variable at a time. Regressing Incidents on Political Rights produces a regression that is not statistically significant at any conventional level. The same result occurs when Incidents is regressed on Economic Freedom and when it is regressed on Press Freedom. When Incidents is regressed on Civil Liberties, however, the following model is obtained:

Binary Regression for Civil Liberties		
The REG Procedure		
Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS		
Number of Observations Read		2222
Number of Observations Used		2109
Number of Observations with Missing Values		113
F Value	3.77	
Pr > F	0.0524	
R-Square	0.0018	
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	10.63943	<.0001
Civil Liberties	-5.66911	0.0524

This regression is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.10$  level. The coefficient Civil Liberties is statistically significant at the same level (i.e. it is the only independent variable used). The  $R^2$  term, however, is not large (0.0018). According to this model, Civil Liberties explains less than 1% of the variation in terrorist activity, by country, by year, on average.<sup>59</sup> What's more, the relationship between Civil Liberties and Incidents is

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<sup>59</sup> Parenthetically, if we divide all countries into three economic categories: free, partly free and not free (by partitioning the range for economic freedom into thirds), we find that the economically free countries incurred 9.5% of all terrorist incidents, the partly free 80.7% of all terrorist incidents and the not free 9.8% of all terrorist incidents.

a negative one: being free in this category is associated with 5.7 fewer terrorist incidents than those countries without strong Civil Liberties.

When Incidents is regressed on Religious Freedom the following model results:

Binary Regression for Religious Freedom (2003)		
The REG Procedure		
Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS		
Number of Observations Read		202
Number of Observations Used		191
Number of Observations with Missing Values		11
F Value	2.79	
Pr > F	0.0964	
R-Square	0.0146	
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	15.72222	0.0004
Religious Freedom	-9.29365	0.0964

This regression is also statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.10$  level. Our new  $R^2$  term, however, is still not large (0.0146). In this model, religious freedom explains less than 2% of the variation in terrorist activity, by country, by year, on average.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, the little variation it explains works against the President’s Hypothesis: according to this analysis being religiously free is associated with an average of 9.3 fewer terrorist incidents than being religiously not free.

The results of the above two regressions indicate that the presence of multiple freedom variables produced a stronger than warranted, or overlapping, effect on the relationship between freedom and terrorism. While our previous regression models

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<sup>60</sup> If we divide all countries into three religious categories: free, partly free and not free (by partitioning the range for religious freedom into thirds), we find that the religiously free countries incurred 29.8% of all terrorist incidents, the partly free 48.5% of all terrorist incidents and the not free 21.7% of all terrorist incidents.

produced  $R^2$  terms which explained upwards of 10% of the variation in terrorist activity, the latter two models indicate that a more realistic  $R^2$  term explains not more than 2% of this variation. Not only does this negate the existence of a meaningful relationship between being free and attracting terrorist activity, it negates the presence of almost any relationship between these variables.

### **Chapter 3. Conclusion**

Available data for terrorist activity and conventional measures of freedom do not support the President's Hypothesis. Conventional measures of freedom are unable to

explain more than 2% of the variation in terrorist activity, by county, by year, on average. Furthermore, the modest variation that is explained equates more freedom with less terrorism. These findings leave no choice but to reject the null hypothesis that a meaningful relationship can be established between being a free society and attracting terrorist activity. The results of this study lead us to conclude that the President's Hypothesis is pretty poetry but ugly philosophy. President Bush, however, continues to stand firm on the issue. In August 2005 the President asserted: "Our enemies murder because they despise our freedom."<sup>61</sup> How can the President's unwavering position be explained? One explanation is based on political strategy. In *American National Security* authors Amos Jordan, William Taylor and Michael Mazarr describe the tactic of entwining a cherished national value with a difficult political objective:

One time-tested means of generating consensus is to couch policy in terms that command a broad value base within American society, that is, in terms describing values so cherished by the polity that they are virtually beyond challenge; or, at least, such that it would appear almost "un-American" to challenge them. This practice is generally recognized by policymakers as desirable, on occasions politically necessary...Cognizant of this, Lyndon Johnson told Eric Sevareid, 'I can arouse a great mass of people with a very simple kind of appeal. I can wrap the flag around this policy, and use patriotism as a club to silence the critics.'<sup>62</sup>

Indeed, there is no more patriotic value for Americans than freedom. We allow for the possibility, then, that the President's Hypothesis is part of a larger strategy. President Bush, cognizant of the value Americans place on freedom, was able to entwine the War on Terror to this ideal in a plausible manner—at least plausible enough to garner the support necessary for his military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Garnering the

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<sup>61</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050824.html>

<sup>62</sup> Jordan, Amos, William Taylor and Michael Mazarr. *American National Security*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 50.

support necessary to prosecute a war does not bring us any closer to realizing Sun Tzu's admonition to "know the enemy," however.<sup>63</sup>

We ask ourselves then: if conventional measures of freedom cannot adequately explain variation in terrorist activity over time, what else can? Alternative explanations will be drawn from three primary sources: the literature on this subject, terrorists themselves and the communities from which terrorists emerge. Specific instances of these which directly lend themselves to quantitative analysis include: Robert Pape's hypothesis in *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, statements issued by Osama bin Laden and the findings contained in a GAO report on Muslim perceptions of the United States.

As discussed previously, Robert Pape explains terrorism as a reaction to the foreign occupation of territory that terrorists view as their homeland. The object of terrorism under this paradigm is to compel foreign powers to withdraw military forces from territory that terrorists consider to be their own. One way to quantitatively assess this hypothesis is to regress U.S. Incidents on the number of U.S. troops stationed in foreign countries. Statistics for the latter measure are made available by the Heritage Foundation. Using data from the Department of Defense, the Heritage Foundation has published a spreadsheet for global U.S. Troop deployments by country, by year, from 1950 to 2005.<sup>64</sup> Regressing terrorist incidents on overseas U.S. troop deployments, in 100,000s, yields the following:

Regression for US Troop Deployments  
The REG Procedure

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<sup>63</sup> Tzu, Sun. *Art of War*. Trans. Ralph Sawyer. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 135.

<sup>64</sup> See <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda06-02.cfm>

Dependent Variable: Incidents

Number of Observations Read 38  
 Number of Observations Used 38

F Value 1.59  
 Pr > F 0.2156  
 R-Square 0.0423

Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	9.59596	0.0470
US Troops Abroad in 100,000s	1.25012	0.2156

This model is not statistically significant and we therefore cannot draw any conclusions from it (a sample size of 38 is not large enough for our purposes). Even if it were significant, however, we would not expect a basic increase in the overall number of U.S. troops abroad, in and of itself, to be an accurate predictor of terrorist activity, since not all countries hosting U.S. troops are angered by our presence (and among those that are, not all can be expected to resort to terrorist tactics). It would seem that a more accurate relationship could be obtained by regressing U.S. Incidents on U.S. troop levels by theater of operations:

Regression for US Troop Deployments by Theater  
 The REG Procedure  
 Dependent Variable: Incidents

Number of Observations Read 38  
 Number of Observations Used 38

F Value 1.33  
 Pr > F 0.2757  
 R-Square 0.1723

Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	12.5024	0.0945
US Troops in East Asia in 100,000s	2.57292	0.1325
US Troops in Europe in 100,000s	4.53144	0.1541
US Troops in Middle East in 100,000s	-3.14671	0.4988
US Troops in Africa in 100,000s	-144.428	0.4725

US Troops in Americas in 100,000s            -71.0508            0.1153

Once again, neither this model nor its coefficients are statistically significant and we therefore cannot draw any conclusions from it. As with our previous model, the sample size is not large enough to obtain statistical significant results. Additionally, a precise measurement between terrorism and U.S. troop size is likely to be compromised in this model as well. The next logical step would be to regress U.S. Incidents on U.S. troop deployments at the country level. Regressing U.S. Incidents on all of the Muslim majority countries in the Middle East produces a model that is not statistically significant. Regressing U.S. Incidents on one country at a time, however, produces significant results for the following countries: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. The following chart lists the intercept, parameter estimates, R<sup>2</sup> term, significance level, and total U.S. force size (for all years between 1968 and 2005) for these countries.

Table 5. Statistically significant regressions for Muslim majority countries in the Middle East (where U.S. Incidents is the dependent variable and U.S. troops deployed to a given country is the independent variable).

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Country	Intercept	Parameter Estimate	R <sup>2</sup>	Pr > F	Total U.S. Force Size (1968-2005)
Egypt	18.06	-4.07	0.10	0.0473	29,557
Iran	10.64	18.27	0.31	0.0003	8,846
Jordan	33.76	-814.76	0.18	0.0086	880
Syria	23.31	-1,114.85	0.15	0.0153	287
Yemen	19.18	-386.95	0.10	0.0543	421

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Note that for four of these countries, terrorist incidents are negatively related to U.S. troop size. It is difficult, on the basis of these results, to conclude that an increase in U.S. troops in the Muslim world produces terrorism. It is also difficult to conclude that it does

not: statistically significant results cannot be obtained for at least two-thirds of all Muslim majority countries (in the Middle East or in the world). Hence, suspension of judgment is the most rationale position until more data is available.

A second theory that can be measured quantitatively comes from Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden has issued at least two fatwas calling on Muslims to kill Americans until the U.S. withdraws military forces from Islamic countries and discontinues its support for Israel.<sup>65</sup> One way to assess the shared sentiment behind bin Laden’s fatwas would be to regress U.S. Incidents, from 1968 to 2005, on U.S. troop presence in all Muslim majority countries as well as America’s financial aid to Israel.<sup>66</sup> This regression takes the following form:

Regression for US troops in the Muslim World & Aid to Israel  
The REG Procedure  
Dependent Variable: Incidents

Number of Observations Read      38  
Number of Observations Used      38

F Value      1.61  
Pr > F      0.2139  
R-Square      0.0844

Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	22.42756	<.0001
US troops in the Muslim World in 1,000s	-0.04609	0.2622
US aid to Israel in \$1,000,000s	-0.00483	0.1027

As with our previous model, neither this regression nor its coefficients are statistically significant. We cannot draw conclusions from this model until more data is available.

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<sup>65</sup> See [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa\\_1996.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html)

<sup>66</sup> Data for U.S. aid to Israel comes from USAID’s website: [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

A third theory that can be measured in quantitative terms comes from a March 2006 GAO report (GAO-06-535). As mentioned previously, this report makes use of several polls taken in ten Muslim-majority countries on the primary reasons underlying anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. The results of these polls cite perceptions that the U.S. takes a hostile stance in its foreign policy towards Muslim countries in its military conflicts, supports antidemocratic regimes in the Middle East, pursues an imperialistic agenda, and supports globalization, which is viewed as bad for Muslim countries. It is difficult to measure U.S. support for antidemocratic regimes or perceptions of U.S. imperialism in precise terms. We do, however, have access to a comprehensive dataset indexing globalization over time.<sup>67</sup> The KOF Index of Globalization provides measurements for economic, social and political globalization from 1970 to 2004.<sup>68</sup> These variables are scored from 1 to 100, with higher values indicating greater globalization. Regressing U.S. Incidents on U.S. globalization measures for the past 35 years produces the following model:

Regression for US Globalization The REG Procedure Dependent Variable: Incidents		
Number of Observations Read		35
Number of Observations Used		35
F Value	12.71	
Pr > F	<.0001	
R-Square	0.5516	
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	21.69312	0.7574

<sup>67</sup> Dreher, Axel (2006): Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization, *Applied Economics* 38, 10: 1091-1110.

<sup>68</sup> See <http://www.globalization.kof.ch>

Political Globalization	0.91310	0.0147
Economic Globalization	-0.62350	0.5167
Social Globalization	-0.54329	0.0008

This regression is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. It also has an encouraging  $R^2$  term. Two of the coefficients (Political and Social Globalization) are statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level. Hence, a 1-unit increase in political globalization for the U.S. is associated with 0.91310 increase in terrorist incidents. The  $R^2$  term of 0.5516 enables us to claim, with 99% confidence, that conventional measures of U.S. globalization explain approximately 55% of variation in terrorist activity directed at the U.S. from 1970 to 2004.

When we examine the relationship between U.S. terror incidents and globalization from 1994 to 2004 (the most recent years for which we have data), these relationships become even more pronounced:

Regression for US Globalization (1994 - 2004)		
The REG Procedure		
Dependent Variable: Incidents		
Number of Observations Read		11
Number of Observations Used		11
F Value	4.43	
Pr > F	0.0479	
R-Square	0.6552	
Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	-905.739	0.5559
Economic Globalization	3.77579	0.0891
Social Globalization	0.17975	0.9914
Political Globalization	6.07493	0.0250

Notice that this new model is significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level. Notice also that our  $R^2$  term jumps from 55.16% to 65.52%. Additionally, the effects of Economic Globalization (significant at the  $\alpha = 0.10$  level) and Political Globalization (significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$

level), become much stronger: a 1-unit increase in Economic Globalization is associated with a 3.78 unit increase in Incidents, and a 1-unit increase in Political Globalization is associated with a 6.07 unit increase in Incidents.<sup>69</sup> Because of the small number of observations used, however, this model cannot be admitted as definitive evidence that more globalization has always been associated with more terrorism (at least 30 observations are needed to establish statistically valid relationships, and we obtained this number in our previous regression). The reason this most recent model is included is to point out that if trends of recent history continue, we should expect to see a discernible increase in the casual relationship between globalization and terrorism. It would be prudent, therefore, to come to better terms with this concept.

Globalization, generally speaking, refers to the worldwide convergence of markets, political systems and ways of life. The movement of people, capital and ideas across borders underpin this phenomenon. While the term globalization is country-neutral for many Americans, “most non-Americans consider globalization and Americanization to be one and the same phenomenon, which explains why many anti-globalization demonstrations are almost indistinguishable from anti-U.S. protests.”<sup>70</sup> The United States has, in word and deed, consistently promoted globalization. The following scatterplot, which includes a regression line, plots US Incidents against the KOF Index for US Globalization from 1994 to 2004:

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<sup>69</sup> If present trends continue, we would expect these coefficients to become more statistically significant as our number of observations becomes large (note that a sample size of 11 observations is quite small).

<sup>70</sup> Kohut, Andrew and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked*. (New York: Times Books, 2006), 139-140.




Figure 1. Scatterplot for terrorist incidents directed against America and the Index of US Globalization from 1994 to 2004, inclusive.

We see from the above that recent history has witnessed a strengthening in the relationship between U.S. globalization and terrorist attacks against the United States. The challenge facing us now is to understand why globalization is associated with terrorism.

U.S. Globalization is the process of spreading American culture, values, and political and economic arrangements into foreign societies. One way to project this influence is through military power. Because U.S. troop deployments can serve as a vehicle for this process we cannot discount overseas military presence as a contributing factor to terrorist activity.<sup>71</sup> Opponents of globalization view it as forced upon an unwilling audience. According to University of Jordan Professor Ahmad Y. Majdoubeh:

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<sup>71</sup> The correlation between U.S. troop levels in the Muslim world and U.S. Globalization is 0.37844, and this figure is statistically significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level.

“those who oppose globalization, or are skeptical of it, see it as an imposed, and thus unnatural, ideology of means (militaristic, political, and economic) by which the strong or the big dominate and manipulate the weak or the small.”<sup>72</sup> In his essay, “Terrorism, ‘True Believers,’ and the Attack on Globalization,” Sheldon Smith “explains the attacks of September 11, 2001 as reactions to the spread of globalization and Western influence in the Islamic world.”<sup>73</sup> By declaring jihad on the West, Smith argues that Muslims seek to check the spread of U.S. influence. While many in Muslim countries see integration into global economic and political systems as a path for their country’s improvement, religious and lower classes tend to “view the elites and middle classes as corrupt in support of globalization.”<sup>74</sup> They view American influence to be the source of this corruption.

Several years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation wrote that America’s pervasive influence is what makes it the number one target of international terrorism. According to Jenkins, “Anti-American terrorism is the price paid for influence and presence.”<sup>75</sup> Whether this influence takes a military, economic or cultural form, Americans are seemingly ubiquitous. U.S. presence is felt on every continent and in almost every country of the world. The globalization process ensures that U.S. influence will continue to be sustained, and foreign perceptions of this trend are cause for concern.

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<sup>72</sup> Ahmad Y. Majdoubeh, *Jordan Times*, November 28, 2003, as cited in Kohut and Stokes, 2006.

<sup>73</sup> Nyatepe-Coo, Akorlie and Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted. *Understanding Terrorism: Threats in an Uncertain World*. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2004), 65.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>75</sup> Jenkins, Brian. “Defense Against Terrorism.” *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 773-786.

In her book, *Terror in the Name of God*, Jessica Stern interviews several Muslim leaders about their thoughts on globalization. Here are a few of their reactions, which are representative of how many in the Islamic world view globalization: Hafez Sayeed, a Pakistani extremist, asserted: “Globalization is similar to what the British did when they established the East India Company. They established a company as a pretext for occupying the land. That is what globalization is all about—a pretext and a prelude to occupation.”<sup>76</sup> Abu Shanab, a leader of the terrorist group Hamas, also views globalization as a de facto policy of colonial powers: “Globalization is just a new colonial system. It is America’s attempt to dominate the rest of the world economically rather than militarily. It will worsen the gap between rich and poor.”<sup>77</sup> Stern also cites an interview of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s right-hand man and the operational brains behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. “Globalization—and the spread of Western power and values—is humiliating to Muslims, Zawahiri says. In his view, taking up the gun is a way to restore dignity to the Islamic world.”<sup>78</sup> The fact that these individuals speak for a considerable percent of the Muslim world is confirmed by the GAO report cited above.

Why does much of the Muslim world dislike globalization? On an economic level, many in the third world view globalization as benefiting the economies of stronger nations much more than weaker. “Global publics believe the United States...supports, if

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<sup>76</sup> Stern, Jessica. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, 120.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 285.

not advances, policies that increase the gap between rich countries and poor countries.”<sup>79</sup> Dependency theorists argue that poor, underdeveloped states will be inevitably taken advantage of by entering into trade relationships with more wealthy, powerful and developed countries. The outcome of economic transactions with between these groups, in this view, will invariably maintain the status quo of wealth and dominance among the elite minority. In his article on “Terrorism and Globalization,” Atanas Gotchev discusses widely held perceptions of globalization “as a new form of imperialism, suggesting power struggles, the domination of the stronger, and—therefore—a sequence of conflicts.”<sup>80</sup> Gotchev observes that while globalization has produced positive results for developed and newly industrialized countries, it has by and large produced negative results for the less developed world.<sup>81</sup>

Political globalization is also a sore issue for many in the third world. According to Moghaddam and Marsella, “for the terrorists, their hatred, contempt, and resentment are fueled, in part, by their perceptions of the massive, dislocating societal changes and questionable political...policies they feel the United States is imposing on the non-Western world through the forces of globalization.”<sup>82</sup> While their country’s movements towards globalization may have been effected by their own political leadership, terrorists often view their government as subservient to the will of the United States. Many feel

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<sup>79</sup> Kohut, Andrew and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked*, 37.

<sup>80</sup> Gotchev, Atanas. “Terrorism and Globalization.” *The Roots of Terrorism*. Ed. Louise Richardson. (New York: Routledge, 2006). 103-115.

<sup>81</sup> See David Dollar and Paul Collier, *Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, as cited in Richardson, 2006.

<sup>82</sup> Moghaddam, Fathali and Anthony Marsella. *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions*. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), 29.

that: “Rulers of Muslim countries do what they are told to do by the West. They are not true leaders. They are puppets of the West.”<sup>83</sup>

Social globalization is an equally difficult issue for many Muslims who are not fond the idea of U.S. culture being exported to their country. They view America’s way of life as immoral and corruptive. The image of U.S. troops setting up base camp on Islamic holy land in Saudi Arabia is not one which makes them happy. If the British, during World War II, were not shy about asserting that Americans are “oversexed, overpaid and over here,” it should not come as a surprise that many Muslim societies feel the same way.

The effects of globalization in the Muslim world can be filtered through a psychological prism as well. In his book *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy*, social psychologist Fathali Moghaddam argues that the Islamic world is experiencing an identity crisis of sorts and that members of this group are striving for authentic identity in an increasingly globalized world.<sup>84</sup> The pervasiveness of U.S. influence exacerbates this inclination. For many young extremists, a primary and distinctive instrument to combat the forces of global assimilation is terrorism. Moghaddam’s psychological training and interaction in the Islamic world give him insight into contemporary Muslim thinking.

## **Discussion**

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<sup>83</sup> Stern, Jessica. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, 119.

<sup>84</sup> Moghaddam, Fathali. *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 29.

The results of this analysis find that the effects of America's globalization policy provide a more compelling rationale, from a quantitative viewpoint, than do conventional measures of freedom in terms of explaining variation in terrorist attacks against the U.S. over time. Perhaps it would not be such a bad thing if America were to assume less intrusive or visible posture, at least among the more sensitive elements of the third world. This suggestion does not necessarily imply a foreign policy overhaul. What it does imply is that by carefully selecting the mode of implementation, it is often possible to accomplish the same or similar policy objectives without unnecessarily angering those affected by them. Louise Richardson raised this very point with Michael Sheehan, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department between 1998 and 2001. After a student asked him why terrorists hate America, he said it was because we love freedom. Richardson then describes the following exchange:

I countered with another question: 'What if we learned that, in fact, what they hated was our policies? If we learned that the deployment of our troops in Saudi Arabia was what caused the enmity against us, would this cause you or the administration to reevaluate the wisdom of our policies?' He responded emphatically: 'No. We will never let terrorists determine our policies.' He won the debating point, but I was stunned then, and remain so now, by how shortsighted a policy this was. There were many alternatives to this deployment that would have provided ample reassurance to Saudi Arabia: an additional American aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, for example. But we insisted on our right to implement a policy that was hugely unpopular, and we appeared to be completely oblivious to the way it could be used against us.<sup>85</sup>

Richardson's logic is difficult to contend with: if two or more policies accomplish the same objective, why select the one which unnecessarily angers those affected by it? Why make enemies if we don't have to? The recommendation suggested here is not so much a reevaluation of foreign policy objectives, but a better understanding of the effect their implementation has on the behavior of those affected by them. If a given policy's

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<sup>85</sup> Richardson, Louise. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat*, 146.

current implementation produces negative results for those affected by it, why not seek alternative implementations that accomplish the same objective in a less aggravating manner? Why not conduct business in a way that minimizes externalities?<sup>86</sup>

The U.S. government does not argue with the proposition that much of the world hates the way it conducts business. Its typical response to numerous polls citing widespread discontent with its policies has been cite polls of its own, especially those taken by the U.S. Information Agency.<sup>87</sup> Since the 1950s this agency has found that foreign attitudes towards the U.S. “depended heavily on the news of the day, suggesting that anti-Americanism was a transitory phenomenon.”<sup>88</sup> This paper’s response to the above line of reasoning is to question the assumption that the current ill-will towards the United States is, or will remain, a transitory phenomenon. This paper also questions the wisdom of pushing the envelope of transitory grievances too many times. Over the long-haul, numerous transitory effects can aggregate into a cumulative and permanent effect. It would be prudent to adjust our posture before that happens.

As a final note it will be emphasized that America’s globalization policy is a contributing factor, but by no means the sole precipitant, of terrorist activity. Other factors, which do not neatly lend themselves to quantitative analysis, also play a role. America’s globalization policy is emphasized in this essay because, from a quantitative standpoint, it offers greater explanatory power than does freedom in terms of accounting

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<sup>86</sup> In the language of economics, a negative externality occurs when the cost of a transaction is born by a party who did not participate in or benefit from it (e.g. the adverse health effects of second hand smoke).

<sup>87</sup> See <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia>

<sup>88</sup> Kohut, Andrew and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World: How We are Different and Why We are Disliked*, 24.

for variation in terrorist activity over time. Does this mean that if America were to adjust its globalization and other controversial policies, terrorism directed at the U.S. would instantly cease? Probably not, at least not for the current generation of extremists. The reforms suggested in this essay are meant primarily for the next generation of potential terrorists, the battle for whose hearts and minds continues to rage.

## **Appendix A: Freedom Analysis for the United States**

What is the relationship between freedom and terrorism for the United States in particular? The U.S. exhibits very little variation for in its freedom scores (it has always had the same score for Political Rights and Civil Liberties). Hence, we cannot obtain a full rank model for the U.S that produces unbiased or statistically significant estimates when regressing incidents on our four conventional measures of freedom. We can, however, adjust all four freedom measures to a 1 to 10 scale (where a lower score = more free), and sum them into a new variable called FreedomSum. Regressing Incidents on FreedomSum for the U.S. produces the following regression, which is graphed on the scatterplot below it:

Regressing Incidents on FreedomSum for the US  
The REG Procedure  
Dependent Variable: INCIDENTS

Number of Observations Read	11
Number of Observations Used	11
F Value	0.33
Pr > F	0.5798
R-Square	0.0353

Variable	Parameter Estimate	P-value
Intercept	98.03535	0.5310
FREEDOMSUM	-10.67810	0.5798

### FreedomSum Scatterplot for the US




Figure 2. Scatterplot for US Incidents and US FreedomSum for all years from 1994 to 2004, inclusive.

The result, as can be seen above, is not statistically significant. A sample size of 11 observations is not large enough for our purposes. Even if we had a larger sample size, however, the variation in freedom scores for the United States is relatively small, which makes our ability to explain it more difficult. While we cannot, at present, obtain a statistically significant regression model for US Incidents and US Freedom, we can chart movements in these variables over time. The graphs which follow display trends in each.




Figure 3. Graphs charting movements in US freedom and terrorist incidents directed against the United States for all years from 1994 to 2004, inclusive.

Comparing these two visuals, we see that the lines do not move in sync with one another. In other words, we cannot discern any correlation between changes in freedom and parallel changes in terrorist activity for the U.S. on the basis of these charts. That said, it should also be mentioned that this comparison is not a flawless one: our sample size is just 11 observations, and the range for our Freedomsum variable is only 0.5 (on a

1 to 10 scale). These do not allow for conclusive results. Running a correlation between these variables yields the following:

Correlation between Incidents and Freedomsum for the US  
The CORR Procedure  
2 Variables: FREEDOMSUM INCIDENTS

Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 11  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0

	FREEDOMSUM	INCIDENTS
FREEDOMSUM	1.00000	-0.18801 0.5798
INCIDENTS	-0.18801 0.5798	1.00000

The correlation between Freedomsum and Incidents is not statistically significant at any conventional level (i.e. its P-value is 0.5798). This is a function of our small sample size. Hence, statistically significant results cannot be obtained for the President's Hypothesis when applied solely to the United States.

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