Featuring

On Living to Some Purpose: How to Get an Education While Still in College

Also

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Farewell to Professor Patrick Deneen
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Amor in Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics
Dust, Our Mutual Friend, and the Capitalization Function
The Evolution of Education at Georgetown
A Conversation with Denis J. M. Bradley
The Philodemic Society in Recent Memory, 1989-2011
Georgetown University’s seal is based directly on the Great Seal of the United States of America. Instead of an olive branch and arrows in the American eagle’s right and left talons, Georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. The American seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, E Pluribus Unum, or “Out of Many, One,” in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. The Georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, Utraque Unum.

As the official motto of Georgetown University, Utraque Unum is often translated as “Both One” or “Both and One” and is taken from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. This motto is found in a Latin translation of Ephesians 2:14: ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum. The King James Version of the Bible says, “For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one.” Utraque Unum is the Latin phrase to describe Paul’s concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles; that through Jesus Christ both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
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In Latin, a translation of Ephesians 2:14 says, "ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum." The King James Version of the Bible says, "For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one." The Latin phrase "Utraque Unum" describes Paul's concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles through Jesus Christ; both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity, faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
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The Tocqueville Forum promotes events and activities devoted to furthering and deepening student understanding of the American constitutional order and its roots in the Western philosophical and religious traditions. The Tocqueville Forum sponsors these activities solely through the contributions of generous supporters of its mission. If you would like further information about supporting the Tocqueville Forum, please e-mail tocquevilleforum@georgetown.edu or visit www.TocquevilleForum.org.

As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in *Utraque Unum*. In addition to writers, we are looking for section editors, artists, graphic designers and web designers. Please e-mail the editors at utraque.unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
Cultivating Knowledge of America and the West
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In my previous Director’s letter, I reflected on the remarkable ability of a healthy culture to regenerate itself in spite of the rapid turnover of membership. I spoke specifically of the turnover of students in editorial positions of this very journal, marveling at the ability of younger students to step into the shoes of older students who had graduated.

Little did I expect as I wrote those words that within a few months there would be turnover in my position as Director of the Tocqueville Forum. In a quick succession of events, I was offered a position at the University of Notre Dame and, after agonizing reflection, long discussion with family, and prayer, I decided to depart for that westward destination after the conclusion of this academic year. This is thus my last letter as the Director of the Tocqueville Forum.

In the intervening months, there has been intense effort behind the scenes to ensure continuity of the Program. And, again, I must remark on the ability of a healthy culture to ensure its own continuity. A myriad of faculty and student leaders have stepped up to offer their assistance in continuing the vital tradition of conversation, exploration and reflection that have been the hallmark of the Forum since its launch in 2006. I am very pleased to be able to leave the Program in the very able hands of its new Interim Director, Professor Joshua Mitchell, and a host of eager and energetic students who refuse to let the Tocqueville Forum shut its doors with my departure. While this change came quickly and without warning, the test of any organization is its ability to outlive its Founder(s), and in this respect I can state with delight that the Tocqueville Forum has passed that test.

I depart with no little wistfulness of what I leave behind, especially this robust and remarkable program. But I also depart with great joy, knowing that I leave behind an institution that did not exist before its establishment in 2006. I had arrived a year earlier at Georgetown, and noted that there was a surfeit of programming devoted to policy and politics, but no real dedicated program for the exploration of the ideas that underlie each. In the intervening six years, we have regularly attracted hundreds of students who discovered a hunger for a sustained encounter with those ideas, and particularly deeper knowledge of the origins of their own political system and many unexamined assumptions that governed their daily lives. It is profoundly gratifying that this tradition will continue and outlive not only successive generations of students, but its Founding Director.

I will always treasure my time at Georgetown, and feel profound gratitude for all that my colleagues, students and friends have given to me over the years. I first entered the main gates in 1995, a newly-minted Ph.D. needing to do some research for a speechwriting position I had recently accepted. As I passed through those gates and gazed up in awe at the Healy clock tower, I wished fervently that I might someday be able to teach at Georgetown. Ten years later I was offered a position on the faculty, and an endowed Chair to boot. Seven years later I have had the pleasure of starting this program, of teaching hundreds of students, of watching many go on to personal and professional success, and in the meanwhile establishing many deep and abiding friendships. Those, too, like this Program, will remain after my departure, and for this, and much more, I can only express my gratitude, my thanks for many blessings, my prayers for Georgetown and its people, and my best wishes. Hoya Saxa, forever!
Farewell Letters to Professor Patrick Deneen

All of your students have been blessed by your many gifts, especially in the way they have coalesced in the Tocqueville Forum. The Tocqueville Forum, the greatest fountain of student intellectual life at Georgetown today, and *Utraque Unum*, Georgetown’s only journal principally dedicated to the publication of undergraduate research, would not exist without you. As a token of our thanks, and so that all of our readers might have the opportunity to gain a glimpse of the great and life changing work that you have done while you were here, we send you off to Notre Dame with these letters, and the editors of *Utraque Unum* dedicate this issue to you and your work at Georgetown. This handful of letters speak on behalf of the hundreds at Georgetown you have influenced. Thank you, Professor Deneen. The students of Notre Dame are blessed to have you. We wish you fare well and God bless.

–Editors of *Utraque Unum*

Professor Patrick Deneen was someone whom I grew close to while at Georgetown. We arrived at Georgetown University at the same time: fall 2005. Although I never had the opportunity to have him as a professor, I did consider him to be one of my teachers. I enjoyed our conversations and took every opportunity I could get to hear him speak, for he is a man full of insight and wisdom into the great questions of life.

Professor Deneen valued the idea that a few of us had of creating a journal to be run by undergraduate students under the auspices of the Tocqueville Forum about important matters, whether items related to the study of the American founding or Georgetown University. It is always amazing to me how many copies of *Utraque Unum* I see floating around on the desks of influential people in Washington, DC. When I ask these individuals about why they have the journal, to a person they say that they are impressed by the quality of the undergraduate work in them and that it keeps them wanting to read the next issue.

There is no question that Professor Deneen will be sorely missed at Georgetown University and in Washington, DC. I am grateful for the opportunity to have learned from him and benefited from the activities of the Tocqueville Forum while as an undergraduate student and alumnus in DC. I am grateful for his support and leadership in helping to create *Utraque Unum*. But more importantly, I am grateful to call him a friend.

Professor Deneen, thank you.


Cardinal Newman stated in the Idea of a University: “The process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education.” Dr. Deneen tirelessly championed Liberal Education, from his engaging classes to the unique institution he championed—the Tocqueville Forum.

Dr. Deneen’s vigorous advocacy of Liberal Education at Georgetown recognized both the promise of youth and the benefit of experience. His Tocqueville Forum has provided an unrivaled forum for students devoted to scholarship analyzing traditional American and Western ideals. Similarly, the Forum has honored great thinkers with its Schall Award, paying homage to towering figures such as Father James Schall and Professor George Carey.

However, Dr. Deneen’s contributions to
Georgetown are far greater than the institutions he has created and leaves behind. His greatest contribution lies in the minds he has cultivated during his years at Georgetown—individuals in various fields interested in being more vigilant citizens, more devout believers, more thoughtful thinkers, and more complete people. Dr. Deneen focused on education as its own end, for the better development of the person, and he left that impact on his students.

I will be forever grateful for the opportunity to have begun my collegiate experience with Dr. Deneen’s “End of Education” seminar, which served as a foundation for my years at Georgetown. I will also remember fondly dinners at his house and long conversations about political theory. As Dr. Deneen moves on, I am simultaneously grateful for his innumerable contributions to intellectual life at Georgetown and saddened for those students planning to enter Healy Gates who will be unable to have him as their professor.

Professor Deneen, thank you.


I want to thank you for your work at Georgetown and the Tocqueville Forum. The Forum was an integral part of my Georgetown education in many ways. Throughout my time at Georgetown, the lectures and discussions—both formal and informal—provided an outlet for intellectual curiosity and stimulation. The Forum is an environment of kindred spirits who find something lacking in college education and realize that in the midst of an ever-changing and cosmopolitan academic environment, there are aspects of the American, and more broadly Western, political, religious and philosophical traditions, which are worth knowing and discussing.

*Utraque Unum* allows many, including me, to join the conversation, rather than be mere bystanders. The journal allows us to reflect on the Georgetown experience, as well as develop many ideas that are sparked in classes and Forum events and provides an intellectual outlet that would otherwise be unavailable. Additionally, if it weren’t for *Utraque Unum*, I wouldn’t have met my wife, at the Collegiate Network’s editors conference in Texas!

In addition to the journal, the class “The American Regime” was a needed and welcome aspect of my Georgetown experience. I was fortunate to be part of the class as a discussion leader and appreciated the provocatively unnerving analysis of many of the unquestioned and unchallenged aspects of modern life such as the decline of the family and of the small community.

As you can tell, the Tocqueville Forum had a major impact on me. I hope the Forum, *Utraque Unum*, and “The American Regime” can be sustained as part of your legacy on the Hilltop. I want to say thank you and good luck as you move to Notre Dame and instill these same principles (and hopefully many of the same institutions).

Professor Deneen, thank you.


It is impossible to capture the meaning and place the Tocqueville Forum had in all four years of my time on the Hilltop in a short letter, but I hope you have some sense of just how big an impact your work and associated endeavors have had on me. Whatever the place of the organization in the context of the University as a whole, for more than a few of us it was the center of our educational and social lives at Georgetown, and it integrated the various facets of our education in a way that nothing else did.

The Forum occupied not a central role in my college years, but really the central role. And were it not for you, I cannot say who I would have become, but it would have been a very different person. It’s always difficult to speculate on these kinds of alternate histories, of course, but it’s no over-dramatization to say that you shaped my character. From the first lecture I attended, almost by accident, as a freshman (Professor Mitchell, fortuitously, discussing three possible amendments of “history, memory, and identity” to Tocqueville’s “fable of liberalism”) to working
as a teaching assistant in "the American Regime" senior year to the countless times I articulated and ruminated over things you had taught me in conversations with friends, family, and exchanges with other students and scholars, you singularly made the much-hyped "college experience" what it truly ought to have been. You were an irreplaceable figure, and a much needed voice crying out in the wilderness. Thank you again for everything you have done.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
–Matt Cantirino, COL 2011.

I vividly remember the esteemed Father Schall once telling me that an undergraduate education can only be called proper when it not only requires you to read the greatest books of all time, but also when it humbles you by revealing to you how much you do not know. Such has certainly been my experience with the Tocqueville Forum. Under your tutelage and at your emphatic suggestion, I have read, re-read, and grappled with the books that have shaped the west for three millennia. And for four years at Georgetown, I walked away from Tocqueville Forum lectures, book readings, and even simple conversations with others in the Forum experiencing the full exhilaration of knowing afresh how much there was to be known, how much I myself did not know, and the inestimable value of true education in closing the distance between the two. It is no hyperbole to say that you were more influential in my experience with the Tocqueville Forum than any other professor, and even beyond the Hilltop, I still frequently find insights you have shared with us clambering about in my head, demanding my consideration. Your influence has been such that I anticipate those questions and thoughts will linger for many years to come, both in my mind, and in the minds of all of the students you have touched at Georgetown. So thank you, Professor Deneen, for all you have done in making my Georgetown years exceptional. Notre Dame will be enriched by your presence there, as Georgetown was when you were with us. So I say to you, a good man and a great professor, farewell and Godspeed.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
–Justin Hawkins, COL 2011.

Before I met Professor Deneen and joined the Tocqueville Forum, I was in an academic rut. I went through the motions of school but dispassionately and uninterested. Professor Deneen's vigor and blatant love of truth showed me that the genuine exchange of ideas is not taboo and is worth seeking. This re-invigorated my intellectual experience at Georgetown. Not only through the programming of the Tocqueville Forum, but through Professor Deneen's example as someone who is not afraid to stand for what he believes. For this I would like to thank him, and wish him the best of luck at Notre Dame.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
–Brendan Gottschall, COL 2012.

I cannot express how thankful I am for your influence at Georgetown. Though I have had a limited experience with the Tocqueville Forum, the past year may have single-handedly redeemed my academic experience. After three years of being disavowed of my high school dreams of collegiate intellectual life, contemplating the highest things, it was a relief to be introduced to a group of people and professors who care about ideas and learning for learning's sake. The retreat and our trips to Princeton and Notre Dame will be some of my fondest memories of college and not just for the lectures, but also for the discussions we were privileged to have with you. Thank you so much for all the ways you have generously gifted me and my friends through the Tocqueville Forum. Furthermore, your "American Regime" class has influenced me exponentially more in my daily life than I ever would have expected. Your lectures truly made the "algae in the fishbowl" neon green and it has made me examine my expectations and desires for post-graduation life in a timely and challenging way. It was a true humanities course: it taught me about myself.

I am profoundly thankful to you for the care
you have for students: not only in our academic pursuits, but for our character as well. For a professor to invite me to his home to spend Thanksgiving with his family is nearly unimaginable, and makes Georgetown’s pursuit of the whole person complete. It has been exceptionally encouraging to hear you mention that you view your students in a manner similar to the way you view your children. I have seen this attitude in action. With a dearth of examples of good men in the lives of college students, you have been a mighty role model for my brothers in Christ. You have influenced so many people through advising them and, in no small part, you have influenced me through your guidance of my dearest friends and directly through your enthusiasm for the right things and your gracious conversation. Your love of God, country, family and learning is unique among the faculty here and while you will be moving on to the wider pastures of the Midwest, I know your voice will be heard at Georgetown through your students for years to come. You will be missed, Professor Deneen.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
—Julia Polese, SFS 2012.

I am deeply grateful for the impact you have had on me, which has in more ways than one shaped my experience as a transfer SFS student at Georgetown. Your teaching of the ancients in Political and Social Thought, where I first read Plato and Aristotle, sparked in me a fascination with the liberal arts and political philosophy which is sure to last long after graduation. I have avidly sought to feed this passion during my time at Georgetown with the help of my friends at the Tocqueville Forum, and through other courses that have happily taken me out of the usual SFS neighborhood. I remember the day in class when you suggested we take a course with Professor Jean Elshtain, one of Georgetown’s “best kept secrets” (unfortunately, she has since returned to Chicago). The next semester I took her course, and through her class discovered a deep interest in matters of religion and international affairs, an interest I have been fortunate to be able to pursue in depth through work at the Berkley Center. But my heart remains with the liberal arts, and particularly with philosophy in the tradition of the ancients. In fact, one of the things I most look forward to about life after Georgetown is the freedom I will have to reread, say, the Republic, at a leisurely pace. Reading such things has made me not merely a better student at Georgetown, but a better student of life – and I have you to thank for imparting to me this gift.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
—Javier Peña, COL 2012.

As you move to Notre Dame, it seems incumbent upon us to press upon you just how much you have meant to us individually and as a community. Thinking back over the past three years, I cannot recall anyone who has had a larger direct or indirect impact upon my own life and philosophy than you have had. My first week at Georgetown, I attended your preorientation lecture, where I was absolutely captivated by an exploration of the end of our education. The things I took away from that lecture carried through the whole semester, as much as any of the classes I spent hours toiling at. Since then, like a trellis and a vine, every part of my intellectual growth seems tied up in your work. Through the Tocqueville Forum, I have met my dearest friends, had incredible conversations, studied the Great Books, and spent some of my most wonderful time at Georgetown contemplating the higher things with people I love. In your own person, I have found a source of inspiration, wisdom (so rare in a professor!), and insight. I have utterly enjoyed our conversations in any context, and they have been (again) some of my most valuable at Georgetown. Through these interactions and more, the intellectual and moral example you have provided has influenced me far beyond the classroom.

Over the past three years under your tutelage, I have drunk deeply from the great books of ethics and philosophy, finding in them much wisdom and instruction in virtue. Throughout
the semester, the growing imminence of your departure has cast light on your role at Georgetown and silhouetted the void that will be left by your absence. For me, this has been greatly illustrated in your seminar “The Humane Economy”. The mix of political philosophy, left and right critiques of unchallenged economic thinking, and Catholic social teaching was by itself a great rarity in Georgetown. But, more than this, you raised vital questions challenging us to marry our intellectual and moral educations. You refused to maintain the vicious veil between the content of our coursework and the direction of our lives and instead pushed us to gain real-life wisdom and judgment through our classroom experiences. You exposed us to concepts of locality, community, subsidiarity, family, and labor that will shape my thinking for years to come as I make life-altering decisions. This is your unique legacy to us, your students: in a place which assures us that we can do anything we wish and that there are no limits on our future, you have provided us with both the confidence that liberty within limits is a greater form of virtue and the means to make wise, soul-nourishing choices based on our natures. In both speaking wisdom and living it, you have been a light on the Hilltop. We all will miss you greatly.

Professor Deneen, thank you.

I want to wish you the best of luck and happiness in your new position at Notre Dame. Although I am an enthusiastic Tocqueville Fellow, our paths have not crossed as much as I would have liked, but your reputation and influence have nonetheless impacted me profoundly. Nonetheless, I hope to amend this somewhat with my farewell to you and with the energy I will put into helping to keep the Forum going in your absence. I have heard nothing but good things about the vitality of Catholic intellectual life and conviction at Notre Dame. I am Anglican myself and a native of Washington DC, but as I have transitioned into the alienating individualism of urban and upperclassman life at Georgetown, I can fully sympathize with what you found lacking here. As I have grown in my spiritual and religious life, I can also more fully understand many of the traditional, Catholic, and communitarian themes which the Forum has espoused under your stewardship. They are values which I have begun to incorporate into my life in major ways and to temper my Conservatism. In my discussions with some of the other Fellows, I have increasing hope that your wisdom and the wisdom of the thinkers we study in the Forum is beginning to catch on. I formed a heartfelt connection with the State of Indiana this past summer by working in Senator Richard Lugar’s office and making some fine Hoosier friends. In maintaining that connection with the Hoosier State, I look forward to paying you a visit at the University of Our Lady of the Lake.

Professor Deneen, thank you,
I wouldn’t know how to begin to tell anyone how important Professor Deneen has been for my education. The best events that I have experienced through Georgetown were all Tocqueville Forum events, and I simply can’t imagine Georgetown without them. It has been an inextricable part of my Georgetown education, as has, by consequence, all of his work. The Tocqueville Forum retreats (how many students’ lives were permanently changed those weekends and filled with a love of learning!), the Conference on the American Polity at Princeton, the LFN conference, the trip to Notre Dame, the Gettysburg camping trip (what professor loves his students and nation so much he’ll go camping with them in the rain?) and more. Each has had a profound and lasting impact on my life. Professor Deneen, you have been a ceaseless teacher to me, End of Education being the single most influential class of anything I have ever taken, and American Regime being the class I have recommended most to other students. And you have been a great mentor. I remember so many great conversations I had with you, from dinner at the Tombs when you encouraged me to return to Georgetown, to advice on careers, education, family, and the future in your office, to hours spent in the car hearing your thinking, to your touching comparison of us to your own children at dinner at Princeton. My primary inspiration for being a teacher has come from you, and I think because of that I’ve always somehow managed to imagine Georgetown whenever I think of being a professor. And I know I would not have experienced my truly life-changing conversion to Christianity were it not for your influence, direct and indirect, on my life.

The Tocqueville Forum really is the place that students at last see the university for what they always dreamed it would be. I really can’t begin to recall the countless conversations I have had back home beginning with, “You remember that professor I told you about? Well…” My friends, high school teachers, and family have heard more about you and the Tocqueville Forum than you can imagine. Professor Deneen, I really think you are the reason I can go home every semester and see how remarkably my life has been changed, that I am one of those blessed few who truly is a different person because of college, that Georgetown has become for me a school that changes lives. You will be sorely missed.

Professor Deneen, thank you.
–Chris Mooney, COL 2013.

I truly think that, through the unique admixture of our Jesuit legacy, a few solid faculty members, and the Tocqueville Forum, the classical liberal arts are sustained at Georgetown to a degree that surpasses any of her peers. Ironically, when I enrolled at Georgetown I was somewhat apprehensive that there would not be classes, faculty, or peers in which and with whom to engage the classical subjects and ideas of Western tradition. But after a few weeks on campus, engaging with the Tocqueville Forum, and your Elements of Political Theory, I was cured of that false notion! I have difficulty imagining a better educational experience than what we have here; foremost in that experience is the community offered by the Tocqueville Forum. The classical
liberal education at Georgetown is unique and strong, thanks in no small part to your work here, Professor Deneen.

I really cannot think of a better class with which to have begun my four years at Georgetown than your Elements of Political Theory. It greatly influenced my views on just about everything. Previously, I had not thought to question many of the principles we Americans hold as fundamental, concerning individualism, the role and very concept of government, among much else, and I think it’s safe to say that’s true for most people. Your clarity and insight in contrasting modern and contemporary thought with classical thought shed some much needed light on the most important issues of the day, and I can confidently say that because of that I came away from that class with the one of the most valuable things an education can provide: a deeper understanding of the world in which we live. There are surely many more who would say the same. I think there are few who can spur students on to proper, informed thinking about life as an American, and as a human being, with your wisdom and eloquence.

I have personally been inspired by your work and example, as I’ve had the privilege of sitting under your tutelage in class, traveling to places like Mount St. Mary’s and Princeton with you, seeing how your passion for important ideas overflows out of the classroom, and, of course, sharing Thanksgiving with you, your family and friends (I got to enjoy looks of awe and surprise as I shared that experience with friends and family back home). I have been particularly struck by your selfless dedication to your students and family. You put flesh and bones onto the noble talk of community we all engage in at the Tocqueville Forum, and the promise of Georgetown to pursue the life of the mind and educate the whole person. The tried saying holds true: actions speak louder than words. I have always been interested in teaching, and if I choose to go that route your example will no doubt be foundational for me, even after only a few months of knowing you, Professor Deneen. With most respect, gratitude, and every good wish for your future at Notre Dame.

Professor Deneen, thank you.

--Jordan Rudinsky, COL 2015.
On Living to Some Purpose
How to Get an Education While Still in College

James V. Schall, S.J.

“I am not sorry to have lived, since the course my life has taken has encouraged me to believe that I have lived to some purpose. But what nature has given us is a place to dwell in temporarily, not one to make our own. When I leave life, therefore, I shall feel as if I am leaving a hostel rather than a home.”

--Cicero, De Senectute, 44 B.C.

“The point is not that this world is too sad to love or too glad not to love; the point is that when you do love a thing, its gladness is a reason for loving it, and its sadness is a reason for loving it more.”

--G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy

“Then, when someone’s desires flow towards learning and everything of that sort, he’d be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he’d abandon those pleasures that come through the body if indeed he is a true philosopher and not merely a counterfeit one.”

--Socrates, The Republic, VI, 485d

It seems only fitting to begin a lecture at the Augustinian-founded Villanova University by citing not just Cicero, Chesterton, and Socrates, but also St. Augustine himself. In his treatise, On Christian Doctrine, Augustine, of whom it is said that no one could read everything he wrote, entitles a chapter in Book IV: “Wisdom Has More Importance than Eloquence to the Christian Teacher.” If someone fails to understand the ambiguous charm that eloquence can have on our souls, he will not grasp the import of Augustine’s priority of wisdom to eloquence.

And, too, we want to know precisely what is a “Christian teacher?” Is he a Christian who teaches anything at all, whatever it is? Is he a teacher who elaborates only what Christian doctrine is about? Is he one who understands that nothing is understood unless his mind is open both to reason and to revelation, even then with the realization that we are not gods, that we are finite? We have knowledge but not divine knowledge, unless the divinity itself decides to inform us of what more there is than what we can know by our own finite powers.

In this discussion, Augustine writes:

Now a man speaks with more or less wisdom just as he has made more or less progress in the knowledge of Scripture; I do not mean by reading them much and committing them to memory, but by understanding them aright and carefully searching into their meaning. For there are those who read and yet neglect them; they read to remember the words, but are careless about knowing the meaning.

We are not to read simply to remember the words, but to know their meaning. Yet, we do
not disdain the fascinating endeavor to learn rhetoric or oratory, to learn how to understand and speak words well. Words bear to us the intelligibility of what they signify. They enable us to be where we are not, to awaken ourselves to things that are absent in time or place, yet things still alive in our minds, memories, and souls.

The title of this lecture is from Cicero’s famous essay “On Old Age,” the De Senectute. I have always insisted young students in my classes read with me as I read it again. To be free to read something again and again is one of the intellectual experiences that we all should have. Many things, certainly most great things, we will not be free to understand until we read again and again the passages that contain what they have to tell us. When students have finished reading “On Old Age,” I tell them: “Now give this essay to or better read it to your grandfather or grandmother.” How often is it our experience that when we read something great or something amusing we look for someone to whom to tell it! It is not complete if it is only ours.

This memorable essay of Cicero, I explain, binds generations together in an almost tangible way. Cicero is not a Christian but what he says is fully human. He is indeed one of the founders of classical humanism. It is said that once “liberal education” meant nothing less than simply reading Cicero. What we call “liberal education” today is rarely superior to the reading of Cicero, something we find almost incomprehensible if we identify what is best with what is recent.

Cicero wrote “On Old Age” in 44 B.C., the year before he died, murdered really under the orders of Anthony. Cicero was 63 years old at his death. Looking back on his life, through the eyes of Cato the Elder, he tells us that he is “not sorry to have lived,” itself a wonderful, almost defiant, sentiment.

Moreover, Cicero thinks that his life was “of some purpose.” We might say that the very fact that Cicero recorded this affirmation the year before he died incites us to wonder about the same thing about ourselves: “Is our life to some purpose?” The fact that we are alive suggests that it does, that our ultimate origins lie in the same cause that brought the world into being out of nothingness in the first place. Yet, in the order of intention, human beings come before the cosmos itself which was created for their purposes not its own purpose. As I like to put it, we look at the cosmos to understand it. It does not look at us to figure out what it is about.

In the Book of Ecclesiastes, Quoheleth tells us, following the same line of thought about our purpose, that “I have considered the task which God has appointed for men to be busied about. He has made everything appropriate to its time, and has put the timeless into their heart, without men’s ever discovering, from beginning to end, the work which God has done” (3:10-12). That we have “the timeless in our hearts” without our ever suspecting or discovering God’s work is almost the definition of what we are. Here we have Augustine’s “restless hearts” that will not allow us to settle for anything less than that for which we are created.

II. We live, no doubt, in a relativistic, unbelieving age. Unlike the “wicked and adulterous generation” of which Christ spoke (Matthew 12:39), the generation that demanded a sign, we expect no signs of anything much beyond ourselves. The signs of transcendence are largely removed from our thinking and even our seeing. Rarely will we find a student who knows the first thing about our classical and medieval tradition or about the content of Scripture. As my Jesuit friend, John Navone once put it: “No tradition, no civilization.”

Tradition is a topic about which the great Joseph Pieper often wrote. “To hand down does not mean to give somebody something, to bring it, share it, or deliver it.” Pieper wrote in his book Tradition: Concept and Claim. “It means rather to deliver something that has previously arrived in your hands, which was consigned to you, to share something that was handed over and handed down; to hand on something that you received—so that it can be received and handed on again.” Our theological tradition, the ac-
account within it of what we are and what we are intended to be is, of this nature. Its essence is not something we concoct for ourselves, but something we have received to be handed on as we received it, something that of its very nature is better than what we can imagine for ourselves.

A life of purpose, then, is a life of responsibility, a life in which truth and good make a difference to the meaning of life itself. When he understands that he is to become what he already is, the rational being has to take account of himself. To tell a human person to “Be what you are,” implies that he has direct charge over what he becomes. This alone is why we can praise or blame him for what he makes of himself. No one else can simply “be” what he is to “become.” He does not begin his individual life as a fixed, complete reality without, as Aristotle said, his own rule of himself.

It is not our project to make ourselves to be human beings; we are already that—something Aristotle also taught us. Though we can fail to do this, we are to make ourselves to be good, worthy human beings as if that project is already found within us. It is something to be freely accomplished or rejected. The “timeless” is indeed already in our hearts, to recall Quoheleth. But we are free to ignore what we are. We have the power to reject what we are and, in so doing, to reject what caused us to be what we are. Without this capacity, not even God could be much interested in us. Since God is love, He cannot make a creation in which the freedom of love is not what operates at its highest point, the point of contact between man and God.

Allan Bloom began his famous book on The Closing of the American Mind, by remarking that no professor walks into a classroom without assuming that each student out there is either a relativist or thinks he is one. I would hope that this observation is not entirely true, but I know that it largely is, though with little intellectual justification. We like to say, as if it were a real reason, that it is just the culture that makes us this way, which it is. But culture only lives in hearts that allow it to enter and flourish there.

Many think, indeed it is taken for granted, that by denying any purpose in things, including especially in human things, in denying what used to be called “final causes” or “first things,” we could be “free” of the gods, free even of any norms in nature. Supposedly then, we can do whatever we want, with no suspicious shadow of judgment hovering over our thoughts and deeds. Nothing is out there to violate, which, if true, considerably reduces our sense of drama and importance. There are, it is said, no natural laws to be broken.

Yet, the liberty to do whatever we want, when activated, that very “what-we-want” becomes, on that score alone, meaningless. On this hypothesis, the opposite of whatever we do would be just as meaningless or meaningful as what we do. If in principle everyone creates his own world, then no one, except accidentally, is related to anyone or anything else in any binding or significant manner. The world becomes filled with myriads of unconnected beings.

We thus live philosophically meaningless lives because of the way we think independently of what is. We find ourselves increasingly lonely. Nothing is worth talking about to anyone. We ironically find ourselves in the same loneliness that was said to characterize Aristotle’s god, only now it is applied to us, not to the god. We have nothing in common with anyone except the suspicion that nothing matters because nothing means anything, including meaning nothing. Our own meanings put on things are simply our own meanings. They are imposed on a reality that has no order or resistance of its own. And everyone’s imposed order is different. No one lives in the same world. This is the direction in which the logic of mindless freedom leads us.
a profound question, ponders this issue “Sure,” he finally replies, “I feel I’ve changed a lot this past year.” To which Lucy quickly deflates his response by adding: “I meant (do they) change for the better?” It is not precise just to ask whether we “can” change.

Actually, most of Aristotle’s ethics are contained in this amusing scene in which Lucy acknowledges that Linus has changed but doubts if it is for the better. We have first a denial of Parmenides’ notion that being is one, therefore nothing changes. We recognize that things can and do change, but not just haphazardly. We also see that they can change in two directions, for better and for worse. In which direction they change is the whole point of morality in the first place. And if we are going to change, it should be for what is better. Therefore, we need to have some notion of what we mean by better and worse, otherwise the words would be meaningless.

Praise and blame, the touchstone of the ethical, would have no grounds for distinction if change could not be for better or worse. So at the heart of Peanuts, as well as in Aristotle and in the account of the Fall in Genesis, we have free will, deliberation and decision about what we do. The Peanuts scene is only funny, moreover, if we realize Linus’ innocence about the direction of change. His sister’s sophisticated, if not sophistic, insight doubts that Linus has gotten any better this past year, though, contrary to her judgment, he obviously assumes that he has.

The sub-title of this presentation is, briefly: “How to Get an Education Even While Still in College.” It implies that hundreds of thousands of highly degreed people are none the less mostly uneducated in the highest things even if they are degreed from the best institutions of higher learning. It is quite possible to attend what I call the “Resume University” or the highest tu-tioned colleges, to acquire there a straight “A” GPA on all the 128 credits that guaranteed a student a “liberal education.” Yet, most still come away with an empty soul, to become, as C.S. Lewis called them, “men without chests.”

When I think of these things, I often recall the remark that Eric Voegelin made in 1976 to a group of students in Montreal. He told them that “No man has to participate in the errors of his time.” In these days of growing ideological democracy, it is becoming more difficult than even Voegelin seems to have imagined. But to follow his admonition, we have to be able, to avoid them, to know that errors are errors. This knowledge is not something we can know if we are relativists of whatever variety. In a sense, if we are relativists we must participate in the errors of our time because we do not know that they are errors or that there is a meaningful difference between one view and another. By tolerating everything we stand for everything and nothing.

So where to go? To answer this question, I have always proposed a list of books or essays. This is initially a contemplative exercise. We have to know of and read books that no one will tell us about. The first thing we want to know is simply: “How are things?” as Yves Simon put it in his seminal book, A General Theory of Authority. We frequently see the questions proposed: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” or “Why is this thing not that thing?” “Or what is the purpose of my existence?” Voegelin asks these questions, as did Vatican II, as does Benedict XVI.

The Catholic mind, as I like to call it, has been unique not only because it is open to all sources, but because it sees that intelligence and faith relate to each other, seek each other. This is why it is under such pressure today to deny itself so that it can accommodate itself to what is becoming the public order. Catholics, though this has been coming for some time, have in recent months become aware that their very existence as an organized society in the public world, the principles on which it was based, are being denied by the culture and the government itself. It is what I have called a “legal persecution” that we do not yet know to what extent it will be pursued. The first steps are already taken. It has already proceeded faster and more thoroughly than any one might have imagined five years
ago. And its logical consequences set the relativist culture and political system that puts it into law or decree directly against things Catholic and things rational.

Each year, when I read with a class Herbert Deane’s book, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, I always leave it with this passage ringing in my ears. Deane writes that in Augustine’s view “as history draws to its close, the number of true Christians in the world will decline rather than increase. His words give no support to the hope that the world will gradually be brought to belief in Christ and that earthly society can be transformed, step by step, into the kingdom of God.”

We know this is already true for Europe and in many ways for America. People like Philip Jenkins, and even the papacy, look with hope to Africa and Asia to counter this dramatic loss. Needless to say, the modern understanding of what is our purpose in the world, to spell it out, is precisely that we can, by our own efforts, establish this kingdom of God on earth. This has been the driving force of modernity since its inception in the sixteenth century.

So, how does someone manage to acquire an education while still in college? Msgr. Sokolowski once remarked to me, and I think it true, that all that a student needs is one or two good professors, or even classmates. That is very often sufficient. This advice has to be read, however, in the light of Yves Simon’s admonition that there is “nothing to prevent a young philosopher from giving his soul to an unworthy professor.” Plato’s dialogues, on the other hand, are filled with bright and intelligent young men whose souls seek nothing but power and glory, not truth and wisdom. That is but the other side of the advice that Augustine gave us about oratory and wisdom.

I think in addition to this advice about worthy and unworthy professors, we need to reflect a bit on what Aristotle advised us about why it is we cannot or do not understand the first principles of reason. These are, in themselves, self-evident, though it is amazing how frequently otherwise intelligent persons can be talked out of them. Aristotle also told us that if we have a good upbringing, we will grasp such when we are old enough to understand them. By this advice, he implied that living an irregular or immoral life when one is young will inevitably prevent the young student from seeing the truth of things when he is old enough to grasp the principles on which they are grounded. In this sense, morals come before truths. If we do not live rightly, we will not think rightly at least about the important things.

Such considerations are why Aristotle understood politics to deal primarily with virtue and vice. He thought metaphysics followed politics in the sense that one needed to have his soul in order to admit that the truth was the truth. Otherwise, he would spend his time not with the truth itself but with arguments that allowed him to do what he wanted or willed to do. The reading of Augustine reminds us again and again how this use of specious philosophy to allow us to do what we want to do works. Augustine recognized it at work in himself, something we all need to do if it is our problem, as it usually is.

In #73 of The Rambler, for Tuesday, February 5, 1751, Samuel Johnson brought up the topic of the books that young students read that filled their minds with characters and opinions that they would later be required to abandon when they came later to a more complete knowledge of things. In the end, Johnson thought that it is “more natural” for a man of learning and genius to apply himself to writers who have more beauties than faults. “The duty of a critic [sic],” Johnson concluded, “is to hold out the light of reason, whatever it may discover; and to promulgate the determination of truth, whatever she shall dictate.”

Thomas Aquinas could not have said it better. As Aristotle said, it is useful for us to understand the arguments against a proposition as a more complete way to know the good sense of its truth.

In conclusion, in the spirit of these reflections, I should like to recommend to you five books and four essays for your education while

These are, I think, soul-changing books and essays. I have others, but let these stand for now. Together they illustrate the two fundamental principles of the liberally educated and Catholic mind: 1) that faith is addressed to reason and reason is addressed to faith. When we understand these things, we have begun our education. 2) We have a lifetime and more in which to complete it and we do think it will be completed but not fully in this life. In the end, it all is “to some purpose.”

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The Liberation Theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez was one of a multitude of Christian social philosophies that arose during the twentieth century as Christian theorists and philosophers struggled to adapt to the challenge of the Enlightenment while maintaining fidelity to a liberal version of Christianity. Yet above the harmonious strains of the choir of twentieth-century historical progressivism, the realist voice of Reinhold Niebuhr rings cacophonous with prophetic denunciation and dogged opposition to the optimism of the modern project. Niebuhr is a peculiar sort of liberal who positioned himself as a theorist of intractable, original sin and of human nature as immutably sinful; he is a skeptic of the efficacy of liberal institutions to spread peace, and a Protestant. As such he is the quintessential foil to Gutiérrez. This paper is a Niebuhrian critique of Gustavo Gutiérrez’ A Theology of Liberation that points to significant flaws in that work which render it untenable as a guiding Christian political philosophy.

The critique will focus on two interconnected aspects of Gutiérrez’ theology: his view of man (his anthropology) and his view of the end toward which man strives within history (his eschatology). A Niebuhrian critique of these two aspects of liberation theology reveals that Gutiérrez operates from an undue optimistic view of human nature by accepting an Enlightenment anthropology wherein human sin is finally surmountable. Furthermore, his elaboration of the doctrine of sin focuses too exclusively upon a mere epiphenomenon of sin: unjust economic structures. This erroneous interpretation of human nature leads him to the error of accepting a quasi-Marxist eschatology in which the advent of the Kingdom of God occurs within history as a necessary outworking of that history. In contrast, Niebuhr asserts that human sin is an irremediable fact of all human interaction and therefore any eschatology is flawed which does not first identify a divinely-instigated break with the current state of human nature. Indeed, the eschatological hopes of the utopians may

“What causes quarrels and fighting among you? Is it not this, that your passions are at war within you? You desire and do not have, so you murder. You covet and cannot obtain, so you fight and quarrel.”

–James 4:1-2

“If the liberal Church had less moral idealism and more religious realism, its approach to the political problem would have been less inept and fatuous.”

–Reinhold Niebuhr, “An Interpretation of Christian Ethics”
form a pretext for violence when the desire for peaceful attainment of those hopes is seen to be illusory. Niebuhr’s work indicts Gutiérrez for advocating a philosophy which, informed as it is by insufficient conceptions of anthropology and eschatology, is in tension with and even contradictory to essential Christian doctrines.

I. I begin my comparison of the theological structures of Niebuhr and Gutiérrez with a point of apparent similarity. Both place a significant emphasis on the problem and social implications of sin, a peculiarity given that most modern theologians relegated the doctrine of sin to obsolescence or tended to view it only as a metaphor for ignorance. Gutiérrez holds that sin is at the root of every unjust social institution and the root cause of every evil in the world. Niebuhr likewise identifies the locus of the problems of all social institutions in the evil embedded in the heart of man. But it would be simplistic to assume since Niebuhr and Gutiérrez both talk often of sin that they mean the same by that language. The similarity of their rhetoric belies the dissimilarity of their actual theology, and it is here that Niebuhr’s system identifies the central error in Gutiérrez’ anthropology. Niebuhr identifies sin as the hubristic machinations of man—both individually and collectively—to escape his finitude and arrogate to himself a limitlessness that belongs only to God. Conversely, for Gutiérrez, sin is a real aspect of the nature of man, but it is not primarily a personal issue of the will, but rather a feature of social institutions. Even more significantly, the presence of sin in humanity is an eventually surmountable flaw. Gutiérrez maintains that “it is important to keep in mind that beyond—or rather, through—the struggle against misery, injustice, and exploitation the goal is the creation of a new humanity.” For all his disdain for European theology, he accepts the anthropology of the Enlightenment that holds that man’s nature is not essentially and necessarily sinful (the historic Christian, and particularly Reformed Protestant view) but is instead naturally good or neutral. Furthermore, the project to create a new humanity presupposes that human nature is essentially malleable, and if malleable, then perfectible.

From a Niebuhrian perspective, Gutiérrez is right in identifying sin as the root of the injustices of the world, but his notion that sin can be overcome to usher in a new humanity betrays an optimistic naivety that is entirely unwarranted and unrealistic. For all his consonance with Niebuhr over the devastating perniciousness of sin, Gutiérrez’ tenor changes drastically from that of Niebuhr when he discusses the possibility of overcoming that sin. Gutiérrez speaks of sin requiring a “radical liberation, which in turn necessarily implies a political liberation,” and he identifies this liberation as a total one: “By his death and resurrection [Christ] redeems us from sin and all its consequences.” The assertion that even the consequences of sin are removed in this life exposes Gutiérrez particularly to a common Protestant critique of Catholicism, that it conflates justification with sanctification by presupposing that one’s forensic justification necessarily and immediately entails their moral sanctification. It is this vision of sin and of anthropology that makes his entire liberational project possible, and Niebuhr does not share his optimism for two reasons: it accepts an Enlightenment anthropology that underestimates the reality of human sin, and it focuses primarily on the economic symptoms of that sin rather than its root causes in the human person.

First, Niebuhr opposes Gutiérrez’ hope of creating a new type of man because that hope is a fantasy sprung out of the anthropology of the Enlightenment and not based on the historic Christian understanding of the nature of man’s relationship to sin. Niebuhr identifies himself with the historic Christian doctrine of the ineradicability of Original Sin. While his constant iteration of the theme of original sin was a source of constant criticism, the target of his “writings on original sin was always the claim of the possibility of human perfectibility.” It is not, as Gutiérrez claims, only the “subhuman condition [that] is characterized
by sin and injustice,” but the very essence of the human condition that is sinful. For Niebuhr, sin pollutes not only man’s actions, but also his personality, will, and reason. To be human is to sin, therefore sin cannot be removed unless and until one ceases to be human. The redemptive work of the cross and all it signifies has made possible the removal of God’s judgment for sin in eternity, but makes possible only the amelioration of sin in history: “Sin is overcome in principle but not in fact.” Sin is not only pervasive; it is original and therefore indelible. The salvation offered by Christ retards the effects and dominion of that sin in this life, but neither sin nor its temporal consequences are removed.

The second major critique Niebuhr offers of Gutiérrez’ theology of sin is that it focuses too exclusively on the mere symptoms of sin, specifically as they are manifest in unjust economic systems. While Gutiérrez’ focus on economic structures is understandable given his theological project of bringing economic justice to Latin America, Niebuhr contends that even if the sin manifested in economic institutions could be overcome (and, though himself a socialist avowedly committed to social action, Niebuhr is clear in his assertion that it could not), it would quickly spring up in another place. Gutiérrez fails to convey the reality that sin corrupts governments, the Church, and even the very proletariat that he champions, just as pervasively as it corrupts economic structures. This is because, as argued earlier, the locus of sin is in the individual heart, and unjust economic structures are merely manifestations of a deeper deviance of human nature. In such a world the ethic of love and mutual brotherhood can exist, but it “must continue to be suffering love rather than a triumphant love” just as Christ’s Incarnation was in suffering and not in triumphant love. It is true that scripture depicts the parousia as marked by triumphant love, but it is unrealistic to expect love to be triumphant in the world before God reveals himself in triumphant love, which Niebuhr insists will not happen apart from a definite break with history.

II. Liberation Theology, in order to support its central theme of the progressive maturation of humankind eventually culminating in the kingdom of God within history, is heavily eschatological. Gutiérrez himself makes this explicit when he argues that “the full significance of God’s action in history is understood only when it is put in its eschatological perspective; similarly, the revelation of the final meaning of history gives value to the present.” This view of the eschaton is predicated upon Gutiérrez’ anthropology of man as a malleable and perfectible being. Since, under his system, “sin and all its consequences” are being steadily and indefinitely eroded by the incarnation of Christ in suffering love which needs no second coming to perfect the erosion, man has already been provided with all of the requisite resources to surmount his sin and create the Kingdom. If no intervention is necessary other than that which has already been provided by the first coming of Christ, then the Kingdom of Heaven does not require a break with history or a new economy of redemptive history but merely a fuller maturation of the current epoch of history. If “the eschatological promises are being fulfilled throughout history” then history is itself redemptive and not in need of another divine intervention.

The central rhetorical image that both Niebuhr and Gutiérrez employ to explain their respective theologies of history is the picture of the Kingdom of God. Yet just like in the discussion of sin previously addressed, rhetorical similarity does not guarantee doctrinal sameness. For Gutiérrez, the Kingdom of God is the anticipated and already inaugurated reality toward which liberational efforts within history are painstakingly but undeniably progressing. It comes in history as a natural progression of the prior trajectory of man. Human history is itself salvation history, and the world situation moves seamlessly into the Kingdom just as history moves seamlessly into the eschaton. His entire vision is animated toward this eschatological narrative that culminates in the coming of the kingdom of heaven, and social action now
is inseparable from the fulfillment of the eschatological promise within history: “the Bible presents eschatology as the driving force of salvific history.” Furthermore, it is unwarranted to expect any divine intervention more than what has already been seen in Christ’s Incarnation.

Against Gutiérrez’ vision of the Kingdom of God as the telos of history, in Niebuhr’s theology, the Kingdom of God is the finis of history—the radically differentiated and historically unattainable ideal that stands in judgment over all the incomplete, sin-laden efforts of mankind to approximate it within history by our own efforts. Niebuhr’s approach is non-eschatological and views the kingdom of God as a definite break with human history. It is not a total salvation that takes place in history, but rather a salvation from history with all of its failed and futile attempts to bring the kingdom. This is not to say that history is meaningless, but only that it is less redemptive than what Gutiérrez’ vision requires. While the exact balance between the error of viewing history as meaningless and the error of viewing history as redemptive is incapable of being precisely expressed, it is necessary to maintain the tenuous balance between them. To desire redemption from history is to fail to see the meaningfulness of history (as does much of Greek philosophy) and to fall into cyclical pessimism. And to desire it fully within history is to give way to the naïve utopianism that Niebuhr’s version of the destiny of man indicts as naïve.

If the vision of the final utopian Kingdom of God is the animus for all of Liberation Theology, it is also the transgression that solidifies Niebuhr’s objection to it, for it is not merely progressivism to which he was opposed, but the jejune vision of fanatical progressivism climaxing in the realization of perfect justice within history that historic Christianity does not provide. Niebuhr identifies this narrative of inexorable and indefinite progress as another hallmark assumption of modernity’s philosophy of history. In Gutiérrez’ philosophy this narrative serves as an unquestioned supposition; social action now is aimed toward bringing the eschaton to fulfillment. But in Niebuhr’s view, to confuse mere chronological and historical progression with ethical maturity on behalf of nations or civilizations is to assume a falsehood. The 20th century showed mankind that the spread of democratic institutions is still an imperfect check on human selfishness and ultimately, on human violence. Instead of uniting the world into a peaceful brotherhood of mankind, technology offered man the possibility to shed each other’s blood in newer, more effective, and more creative ways against which the forces of democracy offered only late and sporadic resistance. Therefore in Niebuhr’s account, history itself is thus far the most compelling objection to the argument that history itself is redemptive.

Within Niebuhr’s framework, history therefore has intrinsic value but not redemptive value. It is not true that “to build a just society is already to be part of the saving action,” for even the advent of the institutions that a just society entails would do little to negate the root problem of social injustices and inequalities since that root is buried into the heart of man. Those like Gutiérrez who believe that the advent of such institutions would signal the decline of oppression and injustice “have a touching faith in the power of a formula over the raw stuff of human history.” But in Niebuhr’s estimation, it is a faith that is ultimately unjustified both by the nature of man and by the words of Christ: “Whatever may be the meaning of Jesus’ parables...he certainly does not present the ‘Kingdom’ which has entered into history...as a force which will gradually transmute history into something quite different from what it is.” Niebuhr rightly observes that the New Testament does not allow a theology that places the ultimate telos of history within the temporal process of history, but neither does it assent to the other-worldliness that flees from history. It neither deifies nor denigrates history, but dignifies it by placing it in proper relation to the eschaton. Christ interprets history as an interim and a tension between “the kingdom of heaven is here” and “the kingdom of heaven is near.” History
now has a partial embodiment of its own meaning but yet stands in contradiction to its ultimate meaning. Christianity recognizes “that there is no point in history, whatever the accumulations of wisdom and power, in which the finiteness of man is overcome.”

Gutiérrez’ view of history warrants the classification of utopian because it posits the necessity of conditions of justice that are prevenient to the complete advent of the Kingdom of God, and those conditions of justice are to be attained entirely through the human efforts of liberation. In fact, the advent of the Kingdom is hindered only by that very dearth of justice which man can and must eventually overcome: “The prophets announce a kingdom of peace. But peace presupposes the establishment of justice...the struggle for a just world in which there is no oppression, servitude, or alienated work will signify the coming of the Kingdom.” That is, God will bring his Kingdom of peace if man first creates the groundwork through justice. If that groundwork is not created then the Kingdom does not come. But this implies a quasi-utopia that is anterior to the Kingdom, and this utopia is brought about by purely human efforts. On this view, the Kingdom of Heaven is not salvific out of futility but comes about after man has already overcome his futility.

Gutiérrez’ notion that man must create the necessary conditions for the Kingdom before it will come is denied by Niebuhr as too optimistic because it attempts to marry a secular utopianist vision and the Christian understanding of the Kingdom of Heaven. But these are irreconcilable for Niebuhr; the utopian vision is flawed and antithetical to the Christian idea of salvation from history. Niebuhr notes that “history must be purged as well as completed; and that final completion of history must include God’s destruction of man’s abortive and premature efforts to bring humanity to its culmination.” So it is not that Gutiérrez’ idealism is simply in tension with the eschatological doctrines of Christianity, but that they are actually contradictory to each other. To hope in the fulfillment of utopia outside of the coming of God is symptomatic of human pride in our own attempts at self-perfection. The meaning of history consists in the fact that while it is not futile, neither is it self-sufficient; just like man cannot by his own efforts extricate himself from his situation of sin, so too, history must be redeemed from itself. Within any view of history that sees all of the unfolding of God’s plan occurring within that history “the Christian claim that God has been revealed in Christ cannot be taken seriously” because the Christ narrative interacts with history but is not confined to history and must often alter history to accommodate his intrusion into it.

These variegated conceptions of the eschaton produce varied understandings of the hope that must characterize the expectant follower of Christ. Niebuhr insists that the hope that animates our action is not tied to the progress of history but to the interruption of that history by the coming of an intruding eschaton. This notion of hope conflicts with Gutiérrez’ version of it. Gutiérrez’ hope is a future-oriented acceptance of the continual unfolding of history. He praises Moltmann’s realization that “if hope does not take shape in the present to lead it forward, it will only be an evasion, a futuristic illusion.” Gutiérrez’ hope is not distinct from historical optimism but is rather the engine for bringing the anticipated eschaton into reality within history. It is hope in the indomitable efforts of man working to move history forward. Hope is to Gutiérrez’ optimism what the present is to his utopian future; it is the current, tangible assurance of an unseen yet predetermined eschatology that occurs within history as the present world merges itself into the kingdom of God. Instead of connecting hope in the present and optimism in the future, Niebuhr divorces them into separate perspectives in tension with one another. Hope is not in the efforts of man but in the knowledge that “the divine power which bears history can complete what even the highest human striving must leave incomplete and can purify the corruptions which appear in even the purest human aspirations.” This hope is not born of a prideful
overestimation of human effort but of a humble acknowledgment of our own limitations.

Concomitant with Niebuhr’s concerns over the feasibility of the utopian vision are his prophetic cautions about the inevitable failure of the utopian project. Setting expectations unreachable high contains a danger even greater than merely failing to reach that goal, for the anxiety that springs out of a continual expectation of the eschaton without satisfaction of that desire forms the basis of all utopian tyrannies. Surveying the pinnacle of human efforts motivated by the purest of aspirations and finding even there the intractable traces of sin, the idealist, frustrated and jaded by this failure, despairs of making any progress at all by peaceful means. This frustration leads him to one of two courses of action. Convinced that the error was not in the utopian goal but in the means employed to reach that goal, he may find it impossible to resist the allure of bringing about that eschaton through violence and coercion. Attempting to lift man to a newer, higher plain of humanity, he abases himself by becoming violent and savage. Or instead of the coercive response, he may lament the impossibility of any progress whatsoever and abandon his noble efforts altogether, leaving a vacuum of power quickly filled by an authoritarian realist. For Niebuhr, overly optimistic expectations, when directed toward an unreachable eschaton, will devolve into cynicism and violence. Instead of such unrealistic expectations, one must act out of a hopeful faith that works for progress without forgetting that the setbacks of history are nothing less than “permanent characteristics of man’s historic existence.”

Niebuhr’s critique of Gutiérrez amounts to a recognition that the work of liberation theology strays from essential Christian doctrines and from empirically verifiable facts about the predicament of man in history. Gutiérrez’ failure can be explained by his attempt to superimpose a vision of man and history that is informed by the Enlightenment onto a moral structure that is informed by Christianity. The contradictions that stem from these two divergent and opposite philosophies explain the confusion that pervades his system. He neither goes far enough with his Enlightenment Marxism to supersede the Christian narrative that he operates within, nor does he go far enough with his Christianity to realize sin as an intractable and defining characteristic of both mankind and of the social order. By trying to wed these inimical partners, Gutiérrez officiates over a dysfunctional marriage.

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The better angels of our nature war continuously against our worst impulses, and the outcome is never a given thing. What behaviors will predominate within us and, by extension, within our society? Plato thought the determinate was the nature of our education. Madison, Adams, and Jefferson agreed, as demonstrated by their writings. I submit that Plato infused their opinions and informed the dawn of our Republic with his thoughts. Freedom and liberty, as conceived by our Founding Fathers, cannot exist without self-mastery, as conceived by Plato.

James Madison depicts democratic society as a fluctuating entity shaped by the competing virtue and depravity of human nature. Without the practice of restraint, vices grow so overpowering that, in Madison’s words, “nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”\(^53\) If it is true that despotism can overtake a wicked electorate, then the inner life of the citizen is the ultimate center of freedom. The shaping of one’s inner life is the focus of much of Plato’s teachings.

Professor R. F. Stalley of Glasgow University warns modern readers of Plato that the concept of freedom valued by the ancients bears little resemblance to that endorsed by the “liberal tradition” that now dominates western society.\(^54\) The liberal tradition tends to regard freedom as “some faculty of free choice.”\(^55\) In contrast, platonic philosophy “sees freedom as a matter of knowledge rather than choice.”\(^56\)

In the Republic, Plato’s mentor, Socrates, finds himself in heated argument with the sophist Thraxymachus over the nature of justice. Thraxymachus asserts that the pinnacle of freedom lies not with the just man, but with the supremely unjust one. Thraxymachus’ ideal is the man who has dominated everyone around him and stands as the master of all he surveys. In the liberal tradition, this tyrant is regarded as free, for he can do whatever he wills to whomever he wills. This leads Thraxymachus to decide that injustice is “a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice.”\(^57\)

Antiquity’s account of tyranny does not present the tyrant as a caricatured villain we can easily disregard as hopelessly blind to the merits of a free society. In an essay on the problem of democratic tyranny, Father James V. Schall notes that, “for the classics, the tyrant came to power usually out of a democracy.”\(^58\) The classical tyrants were like the Athenian Alcibiades: smart, handsome, well spoken, and beloved by the people they sought to rule. This sort of tyrant is a crowd pleaser; “He hates not to be loved and admired. He has no principle of his own except what the people want, something he constantly seeks to know”\(^59\) for it is through satisfying their wants that he satisfies his own lust for power. These tyrants were the most glorious men of
their age. It is reasonable that Thracymachus takes the position he does, for who could deny these men were the freest of their peers?

Plato, through the character of Socrates, challenged this vision by asking Thracymachus to reflect on the psychological impact of this kind of supreme political authority. Though the tyrant may appear to be master of all, a closer look will find him to be the most abject of slaves. His soul is “riven by dissention;”60 torn between the vacillation of the people, his sense of justice, and what he must do to hold his position. He is unable to be his own master because he must always be the advocate of what the people want, and they want “anything and everything.”61 His appetite for power requires heeding the siren call of the people even though he knows, in the words of Alcibiades, that “my life – my life! – … [is] no better than a miserable slave’s.”62

This state of spiritual slavery affects the tyrant’s inner life. In The Need For Roots, the modern Platonist Simone Weil lists what she calls the “needs of the soul,”63 including order, obedience, responsibility, equality, hierarchism, honor, punishment for wrongdoing, freedom of opinion, security, private and collective property, and truth.64 The tyrant is a spiritual drug addict, bound by his lust for power and “unable to resist his craving.”65 He is unable to provide for the majority of Weil’s “vital needs of the human being.”66 The result is a wilting of the spirit where, in the words of Weil, “little by little we fall into a state more or less resembling death, more or less akin to a purely vegetative existence.”67

The tyrant’s inner life falls into decay because he lacks the wisdom needed to order his soul. Plato conceived of wisdom as “knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole.”68 Platonic knowledge is not just awareness of facts. Alcibiades illustrates this point. In the Symposium he bemoans his inability to respond to Socrates’ teachings, saying “I know perfectly well that I can’t prove he’s wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways.”69 Alcibiades’ case illustrates Michael Frede’s conviction that “knowledge, or at least a certain kind of knowledge that Plato is particularly interested in, is a highly personal achievement,”70 involving not just awareness of truth, but the ability to live in accord with it. Alexander Nehamas argues that, to Plato, this kind of knowledge is so powerfully convincing that “there is no such thing as knowing the better and doing the worse: there is only ignorance of the better.”71

Wisdom is a blending of truth and willpower. In order to possess it a person must perceive the truth and have the willpower to have that perception influence his actions. A tyrant like Alcibiades, who is made aware of truth but lacks the will to improve his conduct, is only made to feel the misery of his condition more acutely. Andreas Esheté has argued that the will to order the soul to higher goals is “perhaps best characterized as self-mastery.”72 The person who has ordered his soul in this way and has come to believe that living in accord with truth is the best way to live is what Plato describes as the just man.73

Thracymachus’ tyrant may have every physical choice available to him, but that doesn’t seem relevant to an understanding of freedom. Without the knowledge and willpower needed to order his inner life, the tyrant is left at the mercy of whichever appetites pull him the strongest. His platonic ignorance makes him, in Esheté’s terms, a “prisoner of his own conflicting desires.”74 He is anything but free.

If freedom is not the number of choices available to us, what is it? Plato says it is a condition of a person’s inner life rather than the sum of choices available to them. It consists of the “capacity to recognize the truth” and live by it.75 The person who can live in this way is, in Plato’s eyes, just. The just man is liberated from the dissonance that imprisons the tyrant because he understands the needs of his soul and has ordered his life around fulfilling those needs.

While Plato’s explanation clarifies the nature of freedom, it doesn’t provide a clear picture of what the just life looks like. To understand this we can look to Plato’s teacher, Socrates, whom
he viewed as the paradigm of the just man. Socrates would call the just life the examined life; a life grounded in the pursuit of truth, doing what Socrates calls the “very best thing that a man can do.” Socrates did not claim to have a perfect understanding of what truth in human living looks like. He admitted his ignorance on the topic, but was devoted to getting as close to the truth as possible. The admission of ignorance left him with one foundation on which to build his identity: the questions themselves. This way of handling universal questions of human living is what the poet Rainer Maria Rilke calls the “need to live the question.”

Living the question is a metaphor for a certain perspective on life. It encompasses a devotion to truth, recognition of one’s limitations, and a determination to put theory into practice as best one can. Socrates lived the question by devoting his life to understanding virtue and seeking knowledge from his fellow Athenians. He became convinced that the care of the soul consisted of pursuing virtue. Defining excellence in the pursuit, rather than the attainment, was a way of recognizing the ambiguity of the human condition. Though it is unlikely any of us will come to definitive conclusions about the good life, concerning ourselves with it in speech and deed is among the most important things a person can do. This simple commitment, when articulated clearly, has great power.

In this view, achieving freedom is an “art of living,” that stresses the importance of constructing one’s identity around the search for truth. As Nehamas points out, “Philosophy is not here a matter only of reading books: it is a whole way of life, even if...it does not dictate a single manner of living that all should follow.” Living an examined life doesn’t mean living like Socrates, instead one can “interpret his activity on a more abstract level and imitate not the content but the form of his life.” One doesn’t need to pursue the same path as Socrates to live an examined life built around truth.

The examined life is a process around which identity forms. Our beliefs regarding fundamental questions of virtue “are central to our whole life, to who we are. To examine the logical consistency of those beliefs, when undertaken correctly, is to examine and mold the shape of our self.” In the process of pursuing truth and incorporating it into our lives we become different people. To Plato the acquisition and incorporation of truth is a transformative process that liberates us from the internal conflicts of an improperly ordered soul.

For Plato, education is the process most helpful to creating a just order in the soul, and consequently, the most essential tool for attaining freedom. We see this in book seven of the Republic through the allegory of the cave. The prisoner of the cave is freed from the world of shadows into the world revealed by the light of fire. Eventually, he emerges from the cave and experiences the true world in the brilliant light of the sun. Stalley notes that Plato’s point in the allegory is that “ignorance and false belief constrain the mind much as chains constrain the body,” such that an ignorant man with all the choices in the world can still be in a state of abject slavery.

Through the process of education, we begin to liberate ourselves from mental shackles and find our conceptions of reality broadened. Education helps to train discipline. Discipline assists in justly ordering our souls. The connection between the Platonic idea of mental freedom and more conventional notions of political freedom cannot be emphasized enough. Edmund Burke notes that education “renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of resources.” The educated man is freer than his ignorant counterpart because he is able to understand the world around him and react to it in a way appropriate to what it actually is. He is able to think ahead, to use reasoning to predict misfortune and avoid it. His ignorant counterpart is shackled to reacting to his environment, never anticipating it.

The level of education of the average citizen is relevant to the viability of freedom within democratic forms of government. An ignorant populace is subject to the same competing im-
pulses as the ancient democratic peoples. If the citizenry of a democracy is not educated, they are unlikely to achieve the justice of the soul that allows them to control their appetites, prioritize their goals, and live in harmony with their fellow citizens and the law. Such a people will elect leaders as debauched as they are. The demagogues that come to power in an ignorant polity take their “cue from what the people want at any given moment” instead of committing themselves to principle and the just application of the law. Such leaders will trample on the integrity of the law and the liberty of the community in order to satisfy the passions of the moment. An ignorant citizenry will, if given time, opt for a tyranny if only to end the unsustainable chaos of democracy gone awry.

This course can be reversed by education. Thomas Jefferson writes at length on the relationship between a free society and an educated citizenry. In Notes on The State of Virginia, he writes that laws regarding public education have the explicit purpose of “rendering the people safe, as they are the ultimate guardians of their own liberty.” In a letter to John Adams in 1813 Jefferson divulges his hopes for a bill calling for universal education, he writes, “This [bill] on education would have raised the mass of the people to the high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety, and to orderly government…I have great hope that some patriotic spirit will…call it up, and make it the key-stone of the arch of our government.” In the eyes of the author of The Declaration of Independence, the institution of civil society that is the backbone of a free republic is education. It is a clear endorsement of the necessary link between freedom of the mind and political freedom. An educated people are able to understand the workings of government and the world around them. This understanding is their shield against the honeyed words of the demagogue and the passions of the moment that brought ruin to the democracies of antiquity.

This view was not unique to Jefferson. In a dissertation written for the Sodalitas Club (a small group of fellow philologists), John Adams writes that our fledgling nation is a providential dispensation “for the illumination of the ignorant and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth.” Many quotations of Adams stop at this point and wax about generalities of political freedom that one typically associates with the American Revolution. Adams feels this way about the settlement of America not because of some sense of political opportunity, but because “Provision was early made by law that every town should be accommodated with a grammar school under severe penalty, so that even negligence of learning was made a crime.” Adams saw a direct link between the emancipation of the slavish part of man and the liberating power of an educated mind.

Here our Founding Fathers bring us full circle. They show us that true freedom is the inheritance of an active mind, a mind that has been disciplined through the rigors of education, and that has an arsenal of knowledge with which to guide its decisions and order its life. It is education that, in the words of Plato, “gives the man within us complete dominion over the entire man and makes him take charge of the many headed beast” that represents the appetites pulling us away from the life we know we should lead. Platonic justice is centered on the liberating power of the search for truth and living according to the fruits of that discovery. That power is what animates the responsible, intelligent, and active citizenry that is essential to the maintenance of good government and political freedom.

Freedom is more complex than the liberal tradition allows. While the liberties of political freedom are desirable, they are contingent on the possession of inner freedom. Inner freedom is centered on the search for truth and the possession of a justly ordered inner life. It is cultivated by self-mastery achieved through discipline, which itself is developed and strengthened through education. An educated citizenry is thus a critical element of a free society engaging in self-government. While universal education has long been a priority of our society, the role
of education in shaping citizens for self-mastery and, ultimately, self-governance has often been obscured by a focus on the economic advantages that accrue to an educated work force. If we take the Platonic argument seriously, as the Founding Fathers seem to have done, it follows that economic advantage is only a part of the larger educative project. Our efforts at repairing the defects of our public education system should not focus simply on test scores and graduation rates, but on what sort of people we are graduating and whether or not they have been trained in the self-discipline necessary to perpetuating a free society.

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Managing Progress: The Dangers of Technological Excess, and What Liberal Societies Can Do About It

Eric W. Cheng

In Introduction: The Problem of Technology, Leon Kass promotes a comprehensive conception of technology that extends far beyond the ‘common’ view that technology is the morally neutral accumulation of humanity’s ability to control the environment for its own benefit. For Kass, technology is a way of life, “a way of thinking and believing and feeling, a way of standing in and toward the world... to order and predict and control everything feasible... all in the service of human benefit” that has integrated its mechanistic system of knowledge deeply into the human experience. He proceeds to detail how technology creates serious problems for liberal democracies, from the unintentional creation of integral negative effects and the annihilation of a societal moral compass to the destruction of satisfaction and the transformation of old desires into new dependencies. Ultimately, Kass concludes that liberal democracies must reject the rationalist/utopian dream of the attainment of human perfection and that liberal democracies must endorse self-rule over the self-indulgence afforded by technology, reassert the importance of privacy, and appreciate the importance of the non-technological knowledge of liberal education.

I agree with many of Kass’ observations, from the importance of moral awareness to the complexity of technology’s philosophical implications. Certainly, we have significant differences - I do not oppose the ‘technological way of thinking’ with Kass’s vigor, and I hold a friendlier attitude towards technological abundance. However, as I do believe that the most immediate concerns created by technology are those which Kass would label as ‘common,’ I shall focus on a different concern: how can liberal democracies address the negative excesses associated with technology when doing so requires liberalism to restrain its own impulses?

Technology as an Amoral Means

Technology can be seen on a non-philosophical level as a means through which people try to harness nature’s hidden powers to pursue a variety of ends, from the extension of life to the development of weapons capable of tremendous destruction. Whether one uses technology to support human dignity or to erode dignity by treating humanity as merely a means ultimately depends on the reasons for which one uses technology and on the intended or unintended consequences of that use, not on the initial decision to use technology.

From this perspective of utility, liberalism has utilized technology remarkably well to pursue its goals. Liberal technological advances have enabled liberal societies to pursue distributive justice, and to replace the former aristocratic
order based on relative scarcity with a robust egalitarianism (at least in terms of opportunity) based on unprecedented abundance. While some have complained that this abundance has rendered liberal societies too dependent on technology and resulted in a tremendous sense of uniformity or homogeneity that inhibits individual expression, it is hard to imagine how societies like the United States can maintain both order and liberal democratic norms/practices without the use of technology to satisfy economic needs and ensure the efficient transportation of goods, information, and people. The robust egalitarianism that liberalism has pursued, as permitted by technological advances, has enabled them to better live up to one of their central creeds - that all people be treated as individuals with equal moral worth.

However, it is also clear that technology can facilitate the pursuit of distinctly illiberal ends, not to mention its potential contribution - intentional or unintentional - to human destructiveness. Regarding the former, technology tempts governments (liberal democracies included) and private actors with the ability to collect information to an unprecedented scale, to destroy privacy, to transform liberal societies into surveillance societies, and potentially to control the lives of individuals sociologically and biologically. Regarding the latter, as the result of international power politics, humanity has harnessed, in weapons of mass destruction, the capacity to destroy at almost unfathomable scales. Similarly, mass consumption of natural resources has unintentionally altered the planet so that it may no longer be suitable for human living in the long term.

The Real Problem of Technology for Liberalism

To address these harmful excesses of technology, one may simply suggest that liberal democracies develop greater appreciation for technology’s amoral power. That is, liberal democracies should encourage their citizens to ask themselves if their ends contribute to the enhancement or the denigration of human dignity whenever they utilize technology. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. On a philosophical level, asking liberalism to restrain technology is very much akin to asking liberalism to restrain itself. As children of progress and of the Enlightenment, liberalism and modern technology share certain core philosophical tenants and motivations that significantly complicate their relationship beyond liberalism’s dependence on technology. Indeed, although the potential use of technology to facilitate the pursuit of illiberal or destructive ends is certainly a problem, the deeper - and perhaps more probing - problem posed by technology to liberal democracies is how liberal democracies can effectively manage technology’s excess: how can liberalism morally constrain technology’s potentially negative excesses when it is exactly excess, along with their other philosophical similarities, that drives liberal democracy? After describing the shared roots of liberalism and technology and explaining why this relationship complicates liberalism’s ability to manage technology’s excesses, I shall submit that liberalism must execute a rather delicate balancing act to manage technology’s excesses; that it must expand technology’s possibilities while adding a holistic dimension to its conception of inquiry in order to induce a moderating force on the pace of progress and thereby allow for greater reflection on the ends for which technology is employed.

The Close Philosophical Relationship of Liberalism & Technology

Both liberalism and technology are members of a larger movement dedicated to progress - described by Arthur Melzer as “the commitment to humanity’s gradual self-liberation through its progressive appropriation of the natural and historical worlds” - that was initiated by humanism and the Enlightenment’s triumph over traditionalism. Traditionalism had sought to reign in human power and freedom, as such no-
tions undermined the foundations of traditional legitimacy - namely, the reverence of an immutable past and a deeply communal way of life. The Enlightenment transformed the individual into the final arbiter of knowledge and of political consent, undermined authority based on custom, religious dogma, and traditional consensus, and altered the focus of human affairs to be forward looking and progressive.

With the Enlightenment, liberalism - the philosophy of consent of the governed and rule by (ideally) reasonable debate - eventually emerged as the primary organizer of political life, while technology became the primary vehicle of progress and, thus, replaced tradition to become the moral center of liberal life.

Due to this shared heritage in individualism, progress, and rationality, liberalism and technology share several core philosophical tenents. Both are traditions of artificiality that are unsatisfied with naturalness and exert human supremacy over nature. Technology unleashes forces that are alien to natural experience, allows humanity to manipulate nature to enhance human comfort, and is furthered not by understanding its greater, metaphysical purpose (which it doubts), but by decomposing nature into its component parts and subsequently devising new, artificial combinations of those component parts. Likewise, liberal theorists, from Thomas Hobbes (a quasi-liberal) and John Locke to John Rawls, have treated community and the state not as natural, but as artificial arrangements that are binding because rational individuals either have consented to the arrangement (in Hobbes and Locke’s cases) or would have consented to the agreement’s principles had they participated in the Original Position (in Rawls’s case).

Furthermore, as members of the league of progress, both liberalism and technology are motivated by excess (in the sense that both seek constant expansion, not in the sense that both hold unreasonable expectations). Specifically, liberalism’s excess motivates technology’s excess. Through the Enlightenment, liberals rejected the ancient sense that happiness is achieved through moderation and recognition of natural limits, and instead embraced interminable (or seemingly-interminable) projects like the protection of human rights, the avoidance of death, and the realization of widespread prosperity (which, specific to the liberal case, is necessary to pursue its brand of egalitarianism). That is, liberals dismissed the notion that they must merely work with what they have in favor of an ambitious and never-ending expansion of rational control over as much of ‘nature’ as possible, be it the expansion of economic wealth, the attainment of knowledge, or the lengthening of life. Unsurprisingly, liberalism has treated technology as the primary tool to satisfy its insatiable desire to achieve progress and, in doing so, has grown technology to unprecedented scales. Liberalism’s goals of excess have created technology’s excesses.

The Solution

Given that its desire for continual expansion motivates the realization of technology’s excesses, liberalism cannot comfortably constrain its use of technology without constraining its own impulses. To refresh, technology is, in many respects, an amoral tool that anyone - liberal or illiberal - can use to pursue certain ends. Although its excesses are not problematic per se - that is, dependence on technology is not that significant of a problem as long as it enhances human dignity - technology needs to be restrained because its excesses, if used for destructive purposes, can lead to calamity and deep violations of human dignity. Similarly, technology’s unintended consequences, such as climate change, can threaten the livelihood of many and, perhaps, humanity’s existence. Yet, as I have demonstrated, liberalism and technology do not merely share incredibly close philosophical tenents; liberalism’s excessive goals continuously push technology to increasing levels of excess. Thus, any realistic proposal regarding how liberal democracies can manage technology’s destructive excesses would be a proposal that would show how liberalism can restrain itself.
One solution is to ‘double-down’ on technology, to essentially place faith that future technology can solve technology’s current negative excesses. This attitude would suggest that we should trust that the future technology will be able to solve the climate crisis or to shield societies from weapons of mass destruction. Certainly, even though it is somewhat risky to entrust future salvation to as-yet unimagined and perhaps unrealizable technological development, liberal democracies must continue to push the boundaries and possibilities of technology in order to defend themselves from the potentially destructive ends sought by their enemies and/or certain illiberal actors; liberals ultimately cannot control how others choose to utilize technology. However, this option cannot really be considered a solution, as it obviously protects liberal democracies from the negative excesses of technology by further increasing the excessive scale of technology, by increasing the ability to manipulate life and to monitor and collect information. Such an increase in power would further tempt leaders and decision makers of liberal democracies to pursue illiberal ends like the strangling of privacy or ignoring inadvertent threats to human existence (i.e., climate change) in the name of efficiency and security.

Liberalism must manage its own excess (and, thus, technology’s excess) by refining the core moral system that grounds its institutions and politics. First, we must clarify that there is a long-standing misconception that liberal democracies function simply through the “invisible hand”-styled, self-regulation of self-interested individualism. William Galston correctly observes that liberal societies have always been anchored by the widespread acceptance of certain core values including the rule of law, the necessary protection of the political community, pluralism, tolerance, individual respect, and work ethic. In other words, liberalism possesses and is anchored by a core moral system.

To deal with its problem of excess, liberalism must refine this core moral system by adding to its system of inquiry a new dimension of what it means ‘to understand.’ Currently, liberalism endorses an Enlightenment - or, as Melzer infers, a technological - mode of inquiry which rejects integral wholes in favor of decomposition. That is, liberals pursue knowledge by decomposing nature into its component parts, learning about the quantitative aspects of those parts, and experimenting with new combinations of those parts. We should not be surprised that liberals have largely dismissed more abstract, holistic inquiries: contemplation about purpose requires time, and time slows down the pace of progress.

However, such contemplative inquiry is exactly what liberalism needs to incorporate into its pantheon of understanding. While the decomposition method of inquiry remains, this active process of inquiry blinds liberal democracies from contemplating more grandiose questions like, “What is technology’s purpose?” or, “How does this particular piece of technology affect or relate to the broader liberal project?” This expansion of liberal inquiry to include broad contemplation would inject a renewed appreciation for the ethics and virtues that anchor liberal society and, with that, a new sense of moderation - not of the liberal goals which I described earlier as ‘projects of excess,’ but of the pace at which liberals seek to transform the fruits of new knowledge into actual technology that can do good or harm.

More than simply dictate that liberals utilize technology more responsibly, this new dimension would provide liberals with the ethical framework necessary to judge or at least contemplate when it is suitable for a particular technology to be used. Likewise, it would motivate liberals to ensure that their political system contains the institutional safeguards necessary to defend liberal society from illiberal or destructive uses of technology.

For instance, technology has given society an unprecedented ability to collect information; to electronically store and harmonize medical records and to constantly survey streets in the name of security. Certainly, this ability is not entirely negative; the electronic storage and harmoniza-
tion of medical records can help make patient care much more efficient by eliminating a lot of bureaucracy, and surveillance can help law enforcement better ensure order and identify those who threaten society and its members. However, it should also be clear that, if unchecked by an understanding of what purpose they serve in a liberal democracy, electronic records can be sold to public or private entities and carelessly used for sinister purposes, while the fear of being constantly surveyed can restrict people's ability to live free lives. A greater understanding of the greater purpose of technology would safeguard society from such uses of powerful technology. With this greater awareness, liberals could then define with greater clarity and moral impetus what constitutes acceptable use of a given technology: for example, electronic sharing of medical records is permissible, but only if there are clear safeguards against and strict penalties for inappropriate uses of such technology; surveillance is acceptable, but only in strategic areas and with strict provisions on how the government may use that information - or, perhaps, the idea of constant surveillance by the government is absolutely unacceptable by liberal standards and cannot be tolerated, even if such a prohibition makes law enforcement less efficient.

The Unclear Future

One might argue that my proposal is unfeasible and that this is apparent by my not having explained how liberals can add a new dimension in their method of inquiry (and thereby moderate the pace of action). Indeed, it seems like revising a method of inquiry rooted in a 300 year-long tradition would take a very long time, even though current and potential problems created by the negative excesses of technology are imminently threatening. I will not rebuff this claim, for I agree that my solution has an uncomfortable uncertainty regarding how it can be accomplished. I do not claim to know how it can be accomplished; I am merely stating what sort of change is necessary. How this change can be achieved - and, even more seriously, whether or not this change can be achieved before the temptation of using technology's excesses for illiberal or destructive purposes becomes too great for liberals to resist - is indeed too unclear for comfort. But, that lack of clarity is the reality of the situation.

Although it can be interpreted as a comprehensive philosophical system, technology can be viewed on a non-philosophical level as an amoral tool which can be used for the enhancement or the denigration of human dignity; and, as it has grown to extraordinary scales, technology can be used to create the material abundance necessary for the pursuit of a liberal egalitarian society and for the facilitation of illiberal and (intentionally or unintentionally) destructive ends. However, it is difficult for liberal democracies to restrain the negative excesses of technology while maintaining the benefits of positive technological excess because liberalism's philosophical similarities (with technology) drive both good and bad technological excess. I have proposed that even though it cannot abandon technology, liberalism must learn to restrain its use of technology by adding a new holistic (or metaphysical) dimension to its understanding of what it means to understanding. This new dimension would act as a moderating force on the pace of progress and ultimately allow for a greater awareness regarding the ends for which technology is employed.

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The Loss of Community in a Pluralistic America

Margaret Beedle

Increased mobility and the rise of the creative class in the United States over the past fifty years have led to a decrease in social capital and, thus, a breakdown of the civic associations that are consistently seen as essential to democracy. Heterogeneity of the community is not the main cause for this breakdown; rather the economic benefits of loose social ties encourage a focus on financial self-interest and the individual over the community. Many theorists see the loss of social capital as undermining democracy; others argue that economic capital compensates for this loss. The origins of this decline go beyond economic pressure to the very founding of America and the debates over the meaning of individual liberty; these debates not only anticipated the current social capital problems but warned against them as dangerous to a functioning democracy.

Social capital is the main unit of measurement for analyzing a community and its members’ orientation to the whole. If the social capital is high, then the community creates an environment that benefits democracy. Robert Putnam defines social capital as different “features” of a community that foster “coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn argue for an individual-focused definition, the “social characteristics” that allow a person to obtain “market and nonmarket returns from interactions with others” analyzed with regard to “the social structure” in which the person lives. The World Bank describes social capital as not only “the sum of the institutions which underpin a society” but “the glue that holds them together.” Social capital is measured in a variety of ways with a focus on volunteering, club participation and membership, voting participation, political campaign participation and level of trust. Each different definition leads to a different understanding of its value as either interactions between citizens or a deeper connection that unites people.

These kinds of social capital characterize a community that encourages social and political participation. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville remarks on Americans’ “infinite art” to unite groups with “a common goal” and “to advance it freely,” which he believes is “necessary” to democracy. Putnam also emphasizes the benefits of associations, especially in controlling “education, urban poverty, unemployment... crime and drug abuse” as well as in facilitating “job placement.” He views “organized reciprocity and civic solidarity” as a “precondition” for a successful government. Strong community ties as measured by social capital are important for their immediate benefits to the community and for a functioning democracy. Given Tocqueville’s and later Putnam’s emphasis on the importance of social capital, the following authors examine the ongoing and potentially detrimental decreases in social capital as communities become more diverse.

Authors Costa and Kahn argue on the strength of several studies that increased diversity decreases the social capital in any area. The studies on which they focus use one of three measures of “civic engagement: group participation, state spending, and trust.” In each type of survey, the
researchers find that participants living in areas with more racial and economic diversity are less likely to participate in an organization, to agree to income redistribution, or to trust others of their community.\textsuperscript{147} Costa and Kahn also discover that people aged between twenty-five to fifty-four are less likely to volunteer in heterogeneous communities-especially in those with income disparity. Moreover, a control for heterogeneity explains “anywhere from one-third to almost all of” these declines.\textsuperscript{148} In Americans over sixty-four, the most influential factor in social capital is “birthplace fragmentation.”\textsuperscript{149} Costa and Kahn conclude that community heterogeneity in terms of socioeconomic class, ethnicity, or geographical birthplace decreases social capital.

Bill Bishop also studies the impact of geographic diversity in communities with otherwise homogeneous lifestyles in his book, \textit{The Big Sort} which highlights the migration of the “creative-class workers” to specific high-tech cities and its economic and social consequences.\textsuperscript{150} He divides cities by those with more working-class jobs and those with more creative-class workers.\textsuperscript{151} Little overlap of the two job types exists in the same cities. Age also sorts young people into more “central cities” that produce more patents and have a higher economic status and older people into “less dynamic” and less patent-producing cities with more social capital.\textsuperscript{152} Bishop asserts that, in high-tech cities, the only measures of social capital above the national average are an interest in politics and “a high degree of interracial trust.”\textsuperscript{153} He also discovers more civic participation in organization membership, volunteering, and social activities in low-tech cities.\textsuperscript{154} Bishop attributes this migration and its effect to a person’s increasing choice in their location which creates a “kind of cultural separation” as people pick cities by social engagement or “anonymity” and “opportunity for self-invention.”\textsuperscript{155} While the high- and low-tech cities have generally become, more homogeneous in socioeconomic class, education, and lifestyle, the creative class’ lifestyle of individual freedom and loose bonds leads to a decrease in social capital. In these cases, heterogeneity is not the only reason for social capital’s decline. Communities that are homogeneous in many ways but heterogeneous in geographic origins thus lead to declines in social capital, because the largely homogenous citizenry lack shared experiences.

Disputing heterogeneity as a negative influence on social capital, David Campbell, in “Community Heterogeneity and Participation,” argues that two different types of social capital exist and thrive in different communities. He describes these two types as “civic and political,” which thrive in homogeneous environments and heterogeneous environments respectively.\textsuperscript{156} The “fundamental distinction between them” is “their means” rather than “their ends.”\textsuperscript{157} He defines political capital as anything “directed at influencing public policy” while civic capital “does not have a policy focus” and can include anything from volunteering to participating in a group without a specific policy focus.\textsuperscript{158} Campbell cites several studies to support his thesis that community heterogeneity and homogeneity encourage different kinds of social capital. Political capital increases in heterogeneous areas because “political engagement is sparked by conflict,” whereas participation in “voluntary associations” is due to “commonality” and thus civic capital increases in homogeneous environments.\textsuperscript{159} The studies that Campbell cites measure political capital through “turnout in local elections and…localized political involvement” including “displaying a campaign sign,” working for “a candidate or political group,” and “protesting.”\textsuperscript{160} Campbell attributes this increase in political involvement to people’s desire “to advance or defend their interests” and, therefore, to “participate more when they feel that those interests are threatened.”\textsuperscript{161} While heterogeneity discourages social capital, ideological differences increase political capital.

Although Campbell argues that heterogeneity does not discourage all social capital, political capital does not have the same function as civic capital. In other analyses of social capital, the authors generally rely on what Campbell would
define as civic capital in terms of volunteering, participating in clubs and trusting neighbors. They also discuss voting turnouts and interest in some political topics, but the importance of social capital is in its role as a community event rather than as a political movement sparked by conflict. In Bishop’s study, one of the only factors with an above average score in the high-tech cities was political interest, which arguably does not foster a greater sense of connection in the community. Political social capital, especially when sparked by conflict, does not lead to the same “desire to associate with each other” that allays people’s “natural repugnance...for acting in common” and allows them to act together, a quality that Tocqueville finds vital for democracy. However, while Campbell makes an interesting argument, his idea of political social capital ultimately rings hollow.

However, even if meaningful social capital is declining, authors such as Robert Putnam still see possible positive effects of this diversity. Putnam continues his study of social capital and analyzes the possible long-term benefits of diversity, specifically ethnic diversity, in “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century.” He begins by declaring “increased immigration and diversity” as “not only inevitable” but “over the long run... also desirable.” While admitting to diversity’s negative impact on “social solidarity and...social capital” in the “short to medium run,” he believes these negative influences can be improved and will later lead to positive benefits, including “creativity” and “better, faster problem-solving” as well as “more rapid economic growth.” Putnam thus views the current decrease in social capital as less worrying than it may seem and as a positive influence to the better community and nation over time.

Putnam concludes “diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us.” Geographic self-selection, group identity, and economic level have, according to his studies, little additional effect on an already ethnically diverse area. These findings then lead Putnam to surmise that while Americans today are “uncomfortable with diversity,” this attitude will change over time and end its negative effects, because this kind of “social change” occurs frequently “in any dynamic and evolving society.” However, Putnam’s idea of the long-term benefits of diversity such as creativity and problem-solving does not address the current loss in social capital and may not answer the overall problem of declining community ties. Creativity and problem-solving are more economic and work force-based advantages than the currently declining measures of social capital such as volunteering and trust. Therefore, the long-term benefits that Putnam lists simply demonstrate the overall victory of economic influences over the community and do not lead to the close community ties necessary for the individual and democracy.

This movement toward economic and individual-based benefits over social or political benefits developed in the rise of the creative class. While the trends of the creative class do not necessarily reflect all Americans, the leading role of the creative class will likely lead to a trickle-down effect as their status increasingly becomes a national goal. Richard Florida examines in detail the rising creative class and their tendencies in The Rise of the Creative Class. As highlighted previously, the creative class, while living in somewhat homogeneous communities, scores low on most measures of social capital due to their choice of communities without high social capital. This trend underscores the common characteristics of the creative class that Florida finds.

The first quality of the creative class, “a strong preference for individuality,” results from a desire to avoid conforming to “institutional directives and...traditional group-oriented norms.” This tendency to avoid groups, especially those that encourage communality, is diametrically opposed to community as a cohesive group with a common goal. Therefore, this aspect of the creative class actively works against the role of community and could account, at least in part, for the decrease in social capital. Second,
the creative class has a desire for a “diversity of peoples.”168 While the diversity of the creative class is limited by required educational and employment standards, the people within this emerging class favor “diversity” of “race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference or appearance.”169 The desire for diversity is due to its “meritocratic norms” of placing talent over all else and the comfort it provides the members’ feeling of being an outsider.170 This trend again leads to a movement away from a connected community to a diverse community that is unlikely to unite its occupants under commonality and, thus, lose high civic engagement.

The characteristics of the creative class and their approach to community are all indicative of the emphasis on self-interest in the economic and political structure of America. Florida continues his discussion of the creative class and economically viable social ties in his article “Cities and the Creative Class.” The emerging workforce prefers “weak ties to strong,” because the “social structures” of strong communities, which were previously important, “now work against prosperity.”171 The previous ideal of “a close, cohesive community” now inhibits “economic growth.”172 Florida also questions the value of social capital which can both “reinforce belonging and community” and “raise barriers to entry and retard innovation.”173 The emerging economic system is changing the needs of the population; in doing so, a close-knit community of place may lose its former value.

Florida argues that the worry over decreasing social capital and the interest in simply recreating the older form of community is both unproductive and likely impossible. Instead the focus should be on what he terms the new “communities of interest” which are “defined by weak ties and contingent commitments.”174 Florida’s outlook again demonstrates the increasing focus on self-interest given the word “interest” in the name instead of the traditional idea of a community as an inherited rather than chosen association. The economic system and its view of the individual as a consumer now takes precedence over the older democratic perspective of the individual as a part of a whole, which was an association necessary to achieve one’s full potential.

Stephen Marglin also discusses the effect of economics on community in The Dismal Science and emphasizes the “limits of thinking of human behavior in terms of individuals calculating their self-interest” and its effect on community.175 He begins by highlighting the “essential” aspect of a community as its “rarely…freely chosen” identity, at least in the past.176 However, instead of inherited community ties, the ties have become a choice due to “the American Dream…of mobility.”177 Mobility not only allows people freedom to change their location but also encourages and even expects movement of the younger generation away from their birthplace, increasing the weakening of community ties.

Marglin argues that “the importance of ties of necessity” leads to a conflict between the “community” and “the foundational assumptions of economics.”178 The market encourages and relies on “voluntary…opportunistic relationships” which are “diametrically opposed to the long-term commitments” in a community.179 These two aspects of American culture, the self-serv- ing, economic and the inclusive, community-fo cused, actively work against one another, resulting in an economic victory. As Marglin writes, “the apparatus of economics itself influences the kinds of choices both individuals and societies make” and, therefore, the current economic system “is part of the problem” of decreasing social capital.180 The two competing views of both the individual and their proper environment cannot exist together and currently result in a movement away from community and the strong ties originally thought to be necessary for democra- cy as well as individual well-being.

This tension between self-interest and community outlined in this literature review originates from the founding of America and its two conflicting presuppositions of human nature. While the Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed on the end of government, “namely the security of individual rights,” their disagree-
ments over the idea of liberty originated from different views of man and his natural state.\textsuperscript{181} The Federalists agreed with the Lockean concept that “the individual takes precedence over the political community.”\textsuperscript{182} In this view, the human characteristics of “ambition” and self-interest are encouraged “to counteract” opposing interests.\textsuperscript{183} Unrestricted choice is the ideal and, thus, the Federalists worked to create a system that gives the individual as many options and as much power to choose as possible with a representative democracy. With the ability to choose whether to participate in government and which representatives to pick and, additionally, the chance to spend time exploring other interests without the burden of political participation, the Federalists’ new model of democracy for America allows the country and its political, social and economic structures to all be dictated by individual and personal choice.

In contrast, the Anti-Federalists believed that community is central to democracy and saw “devotion to the community as the basis of liberty and good government.”\textsuperscript{184} They drew from Aristotle’s concept of man as “a political animal,” who requires political participation to fulfill his telos.\textsuperscript{185} A community provides an individual with the ability to “play their part in the whole in order to become fulfilled as individuals.”\textsuperscript{186} The whole that a community creates is “greater than the sum of its parts” or its citizenry and, therefore, gives the individual more power as part of a group than they would have alone, according to the Anti-Federalists.\textsuperscript{187} A community is necessary to teach citizens “a love of liberty” and to act as “a school of citizenship as much as a scheme for government.”\textsuperscript{188} The Anti-Federalist adhered to the ancient science of politics that viewed community as a necessary condition for democracy without which democracy will fall apart and the individual will become completely separated from the government.

These two contrasting views of government reveal the origin of the current conflict between the economic benefits of loose ties and the community advantages of close ties. The individual and personal desires are more important to economic prosperity than any group commitment. While the American economic system and the Federalists’ system encourages satisfying personal desire, the Anti-Federalists considered the encouragement of self-interest as dangerous to disturbing “the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions.”\textsuperscript{189} Instead, the Anti-Federalists championed a small, community-based republic “to set bounds” on the individual’s “passions and appetites.”\textsuperscript{190} With the current trend of disassociation from the community, Americans and their increasing focus on personal and economic benefit are moving toward a destruction of the community and individual benefits that a community provides, while individuals become increasingly secluded from one another and the places that they live.

The risks of separating from community are anticipated by Tocqueville. He writes that “associations are more necessary” in democratic countries than other political systems.\textsuperscript{191} Close-knit communities are essential to counteract the encouragement democracy gives people to loosen their familial and community ties and to “have interest” for “only those nearest.”\textsuperscript{192} Bit by bit democratic citizens are pushed to separate and, ultimately, “confine” themselves “wholly in the solitude of” their “own heart.”\textsuperscript{193} While democracy requires community to function properly, it also encourages avoidance of associations and increasing individualism. Tocqueville cites “prosperity” as “the greatest danger that threatens the United States” as it leads to “envy, distrust, and regret.”\textsuperscript{194} The economic prosperity of America directly endangers democracy by dividing citizens and fostering isolation as economic inequality leads to tension. Thus, the economic viability of loose social ties aggravates an already present pressure toward individualism that is present within but detrimental to democracy.

The current trends in decreasing social capital are a result of not only the influence of the economy but also the central concept of a citizen on which the nation was founded. If American society continues to foster self-interest through
movement and choice, community ties are likely to dissolve completely. Diversity and loose ties promote economic well-being but do not encourage similar individual and political well-being. Data revealing an overall preference for the individual’s interests over the group’s question the overall goal of individual development and force us to ask whether economic benefit has become the sole measure of personal well-being. If citizens continue to focus on benefiting economically from separating themselves from society and avoiding close ties, then will every other measure of personal success be forgotten? The role of community and the strong support structure that it provides both for the individual and for government may no longer have its former worth. The Federalist idea of individual liberty has thus become the primary national goal. While this may have some personal and monetary benefits for citizens, the erosion of community will lead to limited potential for individual development and flourishing as well as the eventual breakdown of a functioning democracy.

The majority of authors surveyed here see the increasing heterogeneity and diversity in communities as the reason for the decline in social capital, but the true origins of this decline are clearly more complex and originate with our nation’s founding, since the Federalist and Anti-Federalists debated the same underlying questions on the eve of our republic. While Americans were once known for their ability to create many and varied associations, increased mobility and individualism in the second half of the twentieth century have led to a decrease in social capital in communities. Nevertheless, these factors, which negatively impact community, positively influence economic prosperity and individual self-interest leading to an inherent conflict between the economy and the community that threatens to dissolve close community ties and, in so doing, prohibit the functioning of an effective democracy.

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Popular protest occasionally brings down tyrants, but rarely replaces tyranny with democracy. In this essay, I argue that popular protest is an inadequate means of democratic regime change for three reasons that encompass structure and agency. First, popular protest seldom wins the support of the entrenched elites, who generally maintain their political, military and economic power after the fall of a tyrant. Second, mass mobilization alone lacks the resources to establish formal democratic institutions that self-enforce rules and facilitate active political participation among citizens. Last, a close association between popular protest and violence can greatly undermine the democratic legitimacy of the new regime. Although popular protest can provide momentum for democratic transition, it does not offer long-term solutions for democratic consolidation.

In order to discuss the details of why popular protest hardly consolidates democracy, it is important to first address the conditions in which popular protest can lead to democratic transition. Here, I define democratic transition as the movement away from dictatorship and toward the beginning stages of democracy. For a democratic transition to begin, popular protest must be accompanied by a strong sense of national unity among the people. It is thus necessary for the public to share a prolonged political struggle that is characterized by “crosscutting cleavages.” In other words, popular protest needs to carry a common cause that can unite people across different regional and ethnic divisions within a state in order to successfully overthrow a tyrant. Whereas power of the masses is weak and dispersed in regional and ethnic protests, it is highly concentrated in a nationwide mass mobilization. Consequently, the latter has much more potential to spark a revolutionary fervor that can drive people out to the streets to challenge the tyrannical regime.

However, the role of popular protest is limited to bringing down tyrants as it often fails to carry its democratic momentum all the way to consolidation. Building on Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan’s definition of consolidated democracy as a state that has successfully completed a democratic transition, I further define it as a stable democratic system in which governance follows the rule of law and politics reflects the true interests of the citizens. Why is popular protest not a good instrument for attaining consolidated democracy? First of all, popular protest does not entirely remove the remnants of the old regime, especially the elites. Historically, winning the support of the country’s entrenched elites by guaranteeing their privilege and wealth has been key to the survival of many tyrannical regimes. For example, more than 500,000 core members of the Pyongyang elite have served as a foundation for the North Korean regime. Most of them are high-ranking members of either the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) or the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and have enjoyed lavish privileges such as wearing designer clothing and living in an exclusive quarter of luxury homes built by Kim Jong-il himself for their loyalty to his regime. Although ordinary North Koreans live in extreme poverty, North Korea is no less than a paradise for its elites. Unlike tyrants, however, the masses are unable to provide simi-
lar incentives for the ruling class to cooperate, leaving many of them largely dissatisfied. This directly affects the post-revolutionary political outcome, because the elites are likely to maintain their influence over the national politics, military and economy even after the fall of a dictator. The failure to win the support of the elites thus brings three main obstacles to democratic consolidation.

On the individual level, the elites’ decision to not cooperate with the masses can lead them to cling to power. The elites can always take advantage of the power vacuum that exists between the removal of the dictator and the next national election to establish one of their members as a new ruler; in this case, the result is a restoration of dictatorship as opposed to an establishment of a new democratic regime. The Romanian Revolution of 1989 serves as a good example. Although the revolutionary forces successfully overthrew the Communist ruler Nicolae Ceausescu, Ion Iliescu, a second-rank leader of the communist party, soon emerged to fill the resulting power vacuum. As the previously second-ranked communist party members of the National Salvation Front took over the political scene, the Romanian masses were thrown back into the politically disconnected status that had characterized them under Ceausescu’s regime. This is also a trend in the contemporary Arab world, where the army and previous ruling class show few signs of receding from power after the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar Gaddafi.

Shifting the focus from individual to class, the elites can also become a structural issue. Even if the immediate political acquisition by the ruling class does not occur, the public still needs to seek cooperation from the elites in order to run the state affairs and stabilize the new regime in the long-run. This is because the elites will eventually be the ones representing the interests of the masses as newly elected officials in the government. Unlike the majority of the public, who lack the material implements, the elites have the sufficient amount of time, education and resources that provides them higher chances of becoming vocational politicians. Therefore, if the entire class of political elites is cut off from the citizenry, the country is likely to remain in a state of “feckless pluralism.” Given no particular incentives by the protesters, the elites will tend to pursue their self-interests rather than those of the people.

Furthermore, such disconnection between the elites and the citizenry can also create a “dominant-power system,” in which every aspect of power falls into the hands of the ruling class. There is no clear line of distinction between the state and the ruling class in a dominant-power system, because the elites have become the source of money, jobs and public information. Here, the concentration of wealth at the top is particularly problematic in consolidating democracy. As the long hold on financial power and resources by one group continues, the masses are likely to suffer from poverty and starvation. Under such circumstances, people naturally place the survival of their family as a higher priority than the democratization of their state; it is difficult to expect that the starving people will care much about expanding their freedom and political rights. As a result, the public will be excluded from national politics once again and the revolution will be left without direction in the aftermath of a dictator’s overthrow.

In addition to the problem of entrenched elites, popular protest lacks the resources to establish formal democratic institutions that can ensure the rule of law and facilitate active political participation among citizens. In order to achieve a consolidated democracy, there must be constitutional arrangements to protect both the civil and the political realms of the state. It is especially important that the government and other state apparatuses exhibit the characteristics of a Rechtsstaat; the power of the state is limited by law in order to protect its citizens from the arbitrary exercise of authority. This will allow citizens to turn to courts and defend themselves in the case of the governmental abuse of the state power. If the system lacks the insti-
tutional measures that hold the legislators also accountable to the law, it is not a complete form of democracy. Without the rule of law, the political rights of citizens cannot be guaranteed full freedom and independence.

Another structural mechanism that consolidated democracy requires is the development of political parties. Political parties are significant in that they “bridge the gulf between the citizenry and the formal political system.” They listen to demands from society, discuss and evaluate these issues and formulate them into policies. In that process, political parties improve the number and quality of political actors by recruiting people for the government and the legislative office. Without the parties that create a link between the masses and political society, citizens cannot fully participate in national politics and the system thus cannot be called democratic. While popular protest is sometimes good at bringing down tyrants, it fails to provide these structural mechanisms that help sustain democracy.

Moreover, popular protest is a dangerous means of regime change due to its close association with violence. Although a great level of public discontent can quickly unite people and sometimes successfully remove tyrants, the use of violence as a political tool in these uprisings can hinder democratic consolidation by undermining the legitimacy of the new regime and leaving its future vulnerable to instability. How can a regime that came to power through violence simultaneously claim to rule by law? In fact, such a regime might be perceived as no different from the old dictatorship, since tyrannical regimes often attain and sustain power through violence. On the other hand, a consolidated democracy requires people to resolve any type of crises within the parameters of democratic procedures. When people become used to the democratic norms, they begin to realize that using violence to resolve political issues is not only ineffective but also costly. But once violence is used to achieve political goals, it serves as a precedent that creates a notion of violence as acceptable and leaves the future open to similar occurrences. One instance of violence is likely to lead to another; the habit of protesting thus increases the chance of instability rather than consolidation of the new democratic regime. The norm of nonviolence is the structural variable that is largely missing in popular protest.

Popular protest may seem like an effective means of regime change at first. In fact, it can be quite successful at bringing down tyrants from power. Nevertheless, popular protest is inadequate in terms of both structure and agency to continue the democratic transition into consolidation. For structure, popular protest neither reduces the gap between the masses and the ruling class nor develops formal democratic institutions that will self-enforce rules and facilitate active political participation among citizens. It also undermines the democratic legitimacy of the new regime through the use of violence. For agency, popular protest does not provide incentives for the elites to make decisions that are favorable to the masses. Based on these reasons, I conclude that popular protest more often fails to replace tyranny with democracy than it succeeds.

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From East to West: The Architectural, Liturgical, and Theological Implications of Orientation

Kieran Raval

"When we rise to pray, we turn East, where heaven begins. And we do this not because God is there, as if He had moved away from the other directions on earth..., but rather to help us remember to turn our mind towards a higher order, that is, to God.”

–St. Augustine, De sermone domini in monte

In the preface to the English edition of Leisure: The Basis of Culture, Josef Pieper offers an uncommonly fascinating observation: “Culture depends for its very existence on leisure, and leisure, in its turn, is not possible unless it has a durable and consequently living link with the cultus, with divine worship.” If architecture may reasonably be considered a constituent part of culture, then the indispensable link between worship and culture of which Pieper speaks becomes clearer. One need only consider the great medieval cathedrals or the baroque genius of St. Peter’s Basilica to begin to grasp Pieper’s point.

Central, then, to divine worship is man’s offering of sacrifice to God. Such has been the mode of worship for millennia, from pagan sacrifices to the offerings burnt at the Temple in Jerusalem, and finally, to the Christian sacrifice of the Mass. To offer to God what God has given seems to be a primordial impulse in man. Critical to the act of sacrifice is the altar, that particular physical location whereon or wherein sacrifice is offered. The Christian altar, upon which the Eucharistic sacrifice takes place, is of such importance that it is even identified as a symbol of Christ Himself. So central is the altar to the Church’s liturgical life that Steven Schloeder asserts that “[The church] is to be planned around the altar. The altar is the center of the church, it is the raison d’etre of the building.” Indeed, the altar, perhaps better than anything else, expresses the intimate relationship between architecture and liturgy. Yet, within the past fifty years, this harmony between liturgy and architecture that is expressed in the prayer of the Church at the altar, has been violated. The nearly universal shift from ad orientem worship to versus populum worship that the Church witnessed in the wake of the liturgical reforms of the Second Vatican Council has had profoundly negative architectural, liturgical, and theological consequences.

In discussing the consequences of this shift, it is imperative that we first consider the history of orientation in the Church’s worship. Serious scholarship on the period of Christ’s life has shed light on the event that is the genesis of the Church’s liturgy: the Last Supper. According to the table arrangements of antiquity, the Last Supper would have witnessed everyone reclining on one side of a long table, facing the vacant side, from which food was served; the seat of
honor, presumably that of Christ, was that one farthest to the right.\textsuperscript{215} Louis Bouyer notes:

The idea that a celebration facing the people must have been the primitive one, and that especially of the last supper, has no other foundation than a mistaken view of what a meal could be in antiquity, Christian or not. In no meal of the early Christian era, did the president of the banqueting assembly ever face the other participants...The communal character of a meal was emphasized... [by] the fact that all the participants were on the same side of the table.\textsuperscript{216}

This analysis of the Mediterranean culture of antiquity dispels the myth that the Last Supper mandates a liturgy in which everyone “gathers around the table.”

Considering the arrangement of early churches, critical scholarship demonstrates that “historically there is a strong, and practically conclusive, argument for preferring the priest and people to face the same direction.”\textsuperscript{217} As the seminal study by M.J. Moreton shows, this common direction of prayer was to the East, and we find evidence in early Christian buildings and archeological remains of such an orientation in early prayer and liturgy.\textsuperscript{218} Citing F.J. Dolger and E. Peterson, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger writes: “…from early times, this orientation of prayer towards the East, by which the cosmos becomes a sign of Christ and thus a space for prayer, was underlined visually by the tracing of a cross on the east wall of the buildings where the Christian assembly met.”\textsuperscript{219}

The decision to face east in prayer is hardly arbitrary. Such orientation (the word itself is from the Latin \textit{oriens}, east) is steeped in profound eschatological and cosmological theology, which is often lost on modern man. As Cardinal Ratzinger notes, “Early Christians, as they prayed turned towards the East, the rising sun, which is the symbol of the risen Christ who rose from death’s night into the glory of the Father and now reigns over all.”\textsuperscript{220} In looking to the east in prayer, the early Christians expressed their eschatological hope in the second coming of Christ, who would “appear as the rising sun which will never set.”\textsuperscript{221} This orientation evokes a dynamism of the pilgrim moving, praying, and gazing hopefully toward the east to “meet the coming Christ.”\textsuperscript{222} In later centuries, as it became practically impossible to build every altar in an eastward orientation, the Church relaxed its regulation that every church be constructed with its apse facing geographical east. However, the Church retained the practice of priest and people together facing “theological east,” that is, towards the cross to express the same theological and liturgical principle of a people hopefully gazing towards the Lord: “…The symbolism of the Cross merges with that of the east. Both are an expression of one and the same faith, in which the remembrance of the Pasch of Jesus makes it present and gives dynamism to the hope that goes out to meet the One who is to come.”\textsuperscript{223}

Given that eastward orientation in prayer was the tradition of the Church for centuries, stemming from the earliest Christian communities and rooted in significant theological principles, it is curious, if not alarming, that the Church all but abandoned this practice in a matter of a few short years following the Second Vatican Council. Perhaps more curiously, the Council is entirely silent on the matter of the orientation of prayer at the altar. In no document of the Council is there found any instruction to reverse the longstanding and ancient practice of \textit{ad orientem} worship: “One would look in vain for a statement in the \textit{Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy} of the Second Vatican Council that said that Holy Mass is to be celebrated facing the people.”\textsuperscript{224} What, then, was the justification for the sudden shift to \textit{versus populum} worship that led to a radical reordering of liturgy and sanctuary?

Some point to the Roman basilicas as an early example of \textit{versus populum} worship.\textsuperscript{225} Some basilicas, such as St. Peter’s, were constructed with a western apse, so that in order to offer the Mass facing east, the priest would be facing the nave, and, thus, the people. However, Louis Bouy
veals the flaw in this conception of early church liturgy, namely that, prior to the consecration, the people would be instructed to turn and face east, with their backs to the altar. Though this seems to be an awkward arrangement by modern standards, it underscores the importance the early church placed on unity of orientation in prayer.

Aiden Nichols traces the origins of versus populum worship to the Enlightenment and a “conscious effort to divert attention away from the Eucharist as a sacrifice...and toward the much more comprehensible notions of the Eucharist as assembly and as meal.” In more recent manifestations, the practice of versus populum worship began in the German youth movements of the early 20th century. This established a precedent of practice and a foundation of expectation that was brought to fruition by reading what was not there into the liturgical reforms mandated by the Council.

The most explicit call for versus populum orientation in the Mass seems to come from the General Instruction of the Roman Missal (GIRM), which contains the official rubrics for how the Mass is to be celebrated. Paragraph 299 of the GIRM states: “The altar should be built apart from the wall, in such a way that it is possible to walk around it easily and that Mass can be celebrated at it facing the people, which is desirable wherever possible.” This directive is echoed and expounded upon in Environment and Art in Catholic Worship, a booklet issued by the U.S. Catholic bishops to interpret and direct, in a specifically architectural and artistic sense, the liturgical reforms of the Council: “[The altar] stands free, approachable from every side, capable of being encircled.” This document, which echoes the thought of Edward Sovik, is considered by many to be the impetus and guiding principle for much of the “reordering” of churches witnessed since its publication.

While it appears that the post-conciliar shift in orientation finds its justification in these documents, it is not that simple. Despite the widespread impact and influence of Environment and Art, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, by its own admission, has said that the document never carried the force of law, as it was never approved by the entire conference of bishops; it was merely a commentary, though clearly a potent one. Regarding the GIRM, the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments issued a clarification on paragraph 299 in which the Congregation denies that this paragraph abolishes ad orientem worship. The Congregation goes on to say that paragraph 299 does not constitute an obligation to versus populum worship, but an option to be exercised according to “the topography of the place, the availability of space, the artistic value of the existing altar, the sensibility of the people participating in the celebrations in a particular church etc.” This clarification echoes the Vatican’s 1971 letter Opera Artis, which was written, it seems, as an attempt at “damage control,” to stem the tide of post-conciliar church reorderings that saw the outright removal and destruction of priceless works of art, most notably ornate altars and reredos. There even exists good argument that, based on the rubrics for the Mass found in the GIRM (namely, instructions for the priest to ‘turn towards the people’ and then “turn towards the altar”), the post-conciliar liturgy envisions the ad orientem position as the norm. Thus, while the versus populum orientation has been the de facto post-conciliar norm, it is, in liturgical practice and discussion, increasingly becoming a point of contention at best and a point of confusion at worst.

Since liturgical orientation is expressed as an action that takes place in a space designed for such action, it follows that any confusion about liturgical orientation would be reflected in the very space where such action takes place. At present, we consider churches constructed before the Council and reordered thereafter. Such churches poignantly exemplify and manifest the Church’s confusion about liturgical orientation and the problems with versus populum worship. Theological and liturgical confusion thus becomes architectural confusion.

Churches built prior to the Council were
designed and constructed for a liturgical dynamism very much tied to *ad orientem* worship. Generally speaking, such churches exhibited a cruciform shape, or at least a linear nave, leading to a demarcated sanctuary. Within the sanctuary the altar was further elevated on a number of steps and a crucifix was placed prominently in the center, which, together with the altar, became the focal point. Richard Kiechefer refers to this traditional church design as the “longitudinal plan.”\(^{235}\)

It was within the architectural context of the longitudinal plan that the dynamism of the liturgy unfolded. The priest, in procession down the nave, establishes the unity and relation among clergy and congregation.\(^{236}\) Emerging from the people, the priest enters the sanctuary and, in the Missal of 1962, begins the Mass with the antiphon *Introibo ad altare Dei*, “I will go to the altar of God,” taken from Psalm 42. These initial words of the Mass announce the dynamism of the Mass that is then manifested as the priest ascends the steps of the altar to lead the congregation in prayer and journey to God. The unity of priest and people is maintained and underscored in their common orientation in the liturgy and it is in the context of this unity that the priest offers the sacrifice of the Mass in an echo of the Old Testament Temple liturgy.\(^{237}\) The longitudinal architecture facilitates and invites both physical movement towards the altar, and spiritual movement in prayer towards God, both of which converge and culminate at communion.\(^{238}\) This liturgical and architectural movement reaches its highest expression at both the elevation of the Eucharist wherein everything and everyone in the space, in the entire cosmos, converges in adoration of the Body and Blood of Christ.

It is evident then that the longitudinal plan is intimately bound up with the cosmological dynamism and imagery of *ad orientem* worship: “There is perhaps no better space [than the longitudinal plan] for inviting movement, for suggesting a sense of passage or of kinetic dynamism.”\(^{239}\) Such “kinetic dynamism” is precisely that liturgical process of “going out to meet” God, of which Ratzinger speaks.\(^{240}\) That liturgical process is reflected in Kieckhefer’s summation of the theological undertones present in the longitudinal plan: “The ebb and flow of liturgical movement echoes the rhythms of spiritual life and the Neoplatonic theme of procession and return: all things flow out from God and return to God; the worshiping soul turns to God in prayer and returns into the world.”\(^{241}\) By echoing and facilitating the movement of the spiritual life, in the context of the liturgy, the longitudinal plan is perhaps the highest expression of Sullivan’s maxim that “form ever follows function.”

The harmony between the architectural movement of the longitudinal plan and the spiritual movement of the liturgy breaks down when the orientation of the liturgy is turned completely around. The epicenter of this breakdown is the altar, which is the architectural and liturgical focal point of the church. In the post-conciliar reordering of churches, two modes of introducing *versus populum* worship have emerged, both of which disrupt the architectural and liturgical dynamism of the longitudinal plan.

The first model of reordering consists of the complete removal of the old high altar and insertion of a new freestanding altar (see Figure 1 below). This approach has the common result of leaving behind bare, stripped sanctuaries, often at the cost of the destruction of priceless altarpieces. Furthermore, it flies in the face of Vatican directives on the preservation of art: “Disregarding the warnings and legislation of the Holy See, many people have made unwarranted changes in places of worship under the pretext of carrying out the reform of the liturgy and have thus caused the disfigurement or loss of priceless works of art.”\(^{242}\)

The alternative reordering model inserts a new freestanding altar within the sanctuary in front of the old altar, which is left partially or totally intact (see Figure 2 below 2). Arguably, this presents more problems than the first approach, chief among which is the existence of two altars in the sanctuary. The unity of liturgy and architecture is violated, for the sanctuary is
left with two distinct focal points. The new altar, the site of the celebration of the Mass, becomes the liturgical focal point while the old high altar, elevated and often highlighted by a reredos or a ciborium, remains the architectural focal point of the church. In 1993, the Congregation of Divine Worship and Discipline of the Sacraments published an editorial that, in part, addressed this issue:

The placement of the altar versus populum... is not, nevertheless, an absolute value over and beyond all others. It is necessary to take into account cases in which the sanctuary does not admit of an arrangement of the altar facing the people, or it is not possible to preserve the preceding altar with its ornamentation in such a way that another altar facing the people can be understood to be the principal altar. In these cases, it is more faithful to liturgical sense to celebrate at the existing altar with the back turned to the people rather than maintain two altars in the same sanctuary. The principle of the unicity of the altar is theologically more important than the practice of celebrating facing the people.  

The Congregation’s statement reveals an admission of the architectural and liturgical confusion that arises when spaces that were designed and constructed for ad orientem worship are suddenly transformed in a way that literally turns the entire intention of the space on its head. It remains, then, to find a solution to the confusion of orientation that, with few exceptions, plagues the Church’s liturgy and architecture. Any such solution must begin with first principles, namely the vision of the Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy and the tradition and experience of the Church in light of that vision. Two principles set forth by the Council are particularly critical: “The liturgy is the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed,” and: “There must be no innovations unless the good of the Church genuinely and certainly requires them; and care must be taken that any new forms adopted should in some way grow organically from forms already existing.” It is within this context that one considers the scholarly research, which definitively shows that ad orientem worship is the ancient and long-standing practice of the Church. It is also within this context that one considers the Church’s hesitation about versus populum worship, as evidenced in ambiguous documents and clarifications of such documents.

Thus, one must inevitably come to the conclusion that the only long term, viable solution to these problems that is architecturally, liturgically, and theologically coherent is a return to ad orientem worship. Recent developments, including Pope Benedict’s liberalization of the Tridentine Mass and a growing respect for tradition in ecclesiastical architecture, suggest that the Church is slowly recovering her understanding of the importance of liturgical orientation. Only therein will the Church find a true end to the current confusion that besets her sanctuaries and her liturgies. Only “by turning to the east, does the community declare the temple to be superseded by Christ who is the true temple, the world’s future in the world’s present.”

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Christianity and the Fulfillment of Plato’s Quest for Absolute Justice

Brandon Sharp

“If we are just, our only gain is not to be punished by the gods, since we lose the profits of injustice. But if we are unjust, we get the profits of our crimes and transgressions and afterwards persuade the gods by prayer and escape without punishment.”

-Plato, Republic, 336a

“He was delivered over to death for our sins and he was raised to life for our justification.”

-Romans 4:28

Following the death of Socrates in 399 BC, Plato spent the remainder of his life meditating on how Athens, the best existing city, could kill a truly just man. We find his obsession with the pursuit of ascertaining what justice is reflected in nearly all of his dialogues. In the Republic, perhaps his most famous work, Plato methodically examines this very question. While he thoroughly deliberated and discussed the virtue of justice for over half a century, his extant writings indicate that he died without a satisfying answer as to why the city could kill the just man and the philosopher seemingly without consequence. Plato, like his mentor Socrates, operated within the philosophical framework of natural law according to which justice necessitates that the perpetrator of a crime fully compensate the victim and publicly acknowledge his wrongdoing, accepting the proper punishment of his deed. As we see in the Gorgias, only through this procedure could the disorder, writ small in the criminal’s soul and writ large in the society as a whole, be rectified. Yet, in supporting this position, Plato still fails to answer several vital questions. Of these, two stand out as the most significant. First, are there consequences for all evil deeds given that no human polity can possibly render perfect justice? If not, does this mean the cosmos is created in disorder?

Profoundly concerned with the order of justice in the polis, Plato, in both Book II of the Republic and Book X of the Laws, notes that the young men of Athens believe they can get away with committing evil deeds because they do not believe in the existence of the gods and, consequently, there is no authority in the afterlife to punish their hidden transgressions. For those who did believe in the existence of the gods, Plato writes that most of them believed that the gods do not take interest in the affairs of men or that the wrath of the gods can be appeased through simple supplications and gifts. For Plato, this presented a significant political issue for the polis because he knew that men would commit evil deeds without restraint if they knew these deeds would go unpunished.

Plato fails to fully resolve these issues because his concept of justice premised on the natural law was intended to bring out order in the
polis and was not intended to render “absolute justice.” Yet four centuries following the death of Plato, Jesus of Nazareth, whom Christians regard as the Savior of the world, introduced just such a transcendent order of justice. By paying for every single sin and wrongdoing man ever committed with his divine sacrifice on the cross and not excusing or dismissing a single one of man’s transgressions, Jesus delivered absolute justice and order. The questions Plato leaves open, therefore, Jesus answers, and hence the Passion is the true consummation and fulfillment of Platonic justice.

Let us first examine Plato’s concept or notion of justice. In the Gorgias, Socrates engages in a discussion on the use and purpose of oratory with the sophist Gorgias and several young men whom we might identify as potential philosophers. But when the question of whether it is worse to suffer evil or to do it arises, the topic of justice enters the discourse and Plato, through his interlocutor Socrates, presents his understanding of proper justice. One of the potential philosophers, Polus, echoing Thrasymachus’ positivist definition of justice articulated in Book I of the Republic, claims that justice is simply whatever is in the interest of the stronger man and that it is far better to do wrong than to suffer it. Socrates, who repeatedly in the Platonic dialogues champions the principle that it is never right to do wrong rebukes Polus and states that “doing what’s unjust is actually the worst thing there is.” He proceeds to assert that doing wrong creates a disorder in the perpetrator’s soul and should lead that person to feel miserable and shameful.

Socrates goes on to say that this shame will continue to afflict the culprit until he accepts and receives a punishment, which demonstrates his acknowledgment of his sin and his willingness to suffer to make it right. Thus, much to the amazement of the young potential philosophers, Socrates declares that an unjust person could never be happy while his sins go unpunished and that society as a whole is only reordered when the unjust actions of a man are corrected through punishment.

The dialogue then addresses the hypothetical question of whether man does not or cannot acknowledge his sins and accept the punishment deemed necessary to restore order to his soul. In stating that, “Not paying what is due when one has done what is unjust is by its nature the first worst thing,” Socrates reveals that the refusal to truly acknowledge what is wrong and to accept the penal consequences deserves nothing less than the worst punishment, which for the Greeks would mean some sort of eternal suffering in the afterlife, somewhat analogous to the Christian concept of hell.

Thus we see that, for Plato, the rendering of justice involves several key components. First, the evil deed must be brought to light by the wrongdoer’s own admission, which is a sign of the contrition necessary to rectify the disorder resulting from his action. The community must then be able to assess and administer a penalty that renders to the criminal what is objectively due to him. A subjective feeling on the part of the judge of what is just does not suffice to restore order in the community and the cosmos more broadly. Also, if recompense is due to specific individuals harmed by the infraction, it too must be objectively determined by the polity and exacted from the wrongdoer.

But this conception of justification has a serious problem. No human polity can possibly render perfect justice because most crimes will never be brought to light and hence will go unpunished. If this is the case, then how will justice ultimately be rendered for hidden transgressions? Without a complete revelation of all crimes committed in a society, complete harmony and absolute justice cannot be realized. And even if every crime were to be revealed and publicly acknowledged, this concept of justification suffers another obstacle on the path towards achieving absolute justice for the arbiter whose objective assessment of the penalty is needed to fully restore order in the polis, are naturally fallible and non-omniscient human beings. With such judges, how can a “sinner” ever know if he has “properly” atoned for his sins? How can
human beings quantify sinfulness in order to decide on the truly proper punishment?

Believing that the order of things was indeed a cosmos and not created in injustice, Socrates proposes in the eschatological myth of the Gorgias that the soul is immortal and will be judged in the afterlife by the deistic judges for its actions on earth. When the immortal judges Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus will judge the actions of each individual, they would take in account all crimes, including those committed and not punished and atoned for, into consideration when deciding each soul’s place for eternity. While this concept of justification seems to solve the dilemma of crimes going unpunished and of dealing with mortal, infallible judges, it still fails to bring about absolute justice. For, when these deistic judges arbitrate whether a soul before their court, based on its worldly deeds, deserves either a favorable eternal dwelling or eternal punishment, the judges must somehow weigh all of that soul’s good and evil actions. If they decide that a soul’s good deeds have outweighed the evil ones and that the soul therefore deserves eternal reward, these judges have failed to achieve absolute justice because they have effectively ignored all of the evil transgressions committed by the soul, since nobody, with the exception of Jesus, is truly blameless. Even if the judges disregard those crimes committed in the name of mercy, the judges still fail to achieve absolute justice because mercy, by its very definition, comes at the expense of justice. In short, how could the judges possibly justify their decision to permit the soul’s entry into Elysium when it has not properly atoned for all of its crimes? This question is never sufficiently answered, and Plato remained troubled by it throughout his life.

Yet this question does have an answer, though one which Plato could never have fathomed, for it remained unknown in Greece for nearly four hundred more years. The solution is Jesus Christ’s divine sacrificial death on the cross that paid for all the sins of mankind. According to Christian theology, Jesus, the Son of God, came to earth incarnated in order to bestow the world with Godly teaching and, ultimately, to be offered up as a perfect sacrifice on behalf of mankind so that all of our sins could be forgiven. Previously, those who “knew” God’s law, primarily the Hebrews, tried to achieve justification by following the commandments handed down to them from God via Moses. When they inevitably failed to perfectly observe these laws, they would offer up an animal sacrifice as an act of repentance. As recorded in the Tanakh, the Hebrews, for hundreds of years, continually sinned and displayed wavering faith and obedience to God. Eventually, God ended the need for this ceremonial animal sacrifice when he sent his Son to the earth to willingly offer himself as a divine sacrifice so that all who accepted his act would be “credited” as redeemed.

And so, by this act of propitiation, he assumes these transgressions and pays the objectively just penalty, the penalty necessitated by God’s own perfect justice, for all mankind. With man’s sinful debt having been paid, man was then given the option to choose Jesus Christ’s sacrifice as a substitution for his own punishment, a punishment any sinner fully deserves, and for those who choose to substitute the punishment Christ took on their behalf, they are “credited” with the full atonement. Jesus’ resurrection on the third day both revealed to the world that Christ had indeed overcome the consequences of sin, death, and signaled to the world that Jesus’ perfect and divine sacrifice truly fulfill God’s desire for justice. Only the example of the paschal mystery does mercy not come at the expense of justice, for God’s desire for absolute justice was fulfilled when Jesus, who as the second part of the trinity was fully God, bore the punishment for the world’s sins on the cross, yet as a result, allowed for mercy to be extended to all.

At this point we begin to see how Christian revelation is the natural answer to the questions involving absolute justice that troubled Plato all his life. While the judges of the Greek afterlife took all crimes into consider, so many injustices were dismissed and thusly went unatoned for
when these arbiters decided that these injustices did not deserve eternal punishment. On the contrary, Christ’s sacrifice left no injustice unpaid for and put to rest Plato’s worry that there would be no consequence and justice for men’s actions in the world. This is not to say Jesus gave the world a “free pass” by taking on their punishment, for the faith that the believer places in this sacrifice is false if not accompanied by genuine repentance. Had Plato lived in Athens four hundred years later, he would have definitively found that the world is made in justice, man’s actions do have consequences in eternity, and the universe is indeed an ordered cosmos. And I am sure Plato would have enjoyed discussing these topics with the architect of the cosmos when he came into the world in the first century AD.

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Most Americans are familiar with the story of Rip Van Winkle. Falling asleep before the American Revolution, Rip awakens twenty years later to find that everything in his village has changed: the people are restless; the village has increased in size; even the portrait of King George III has been replaced by that of George Washington. Rip is, in short, bewildered by the staggering amount of change that has taken place over the course of a mere twenty years. It could be said that Americans of the late 19th century faced a similar identity crisis; they no longer lived in Abraham Lincoln’s America. From the end of the Civil War to the dawn of the 20th century, American life experienced transformation on virtually every level: culturally, socially, economically, industrially, and perhaps most significantly, politically. Such changes raised some very important questions. Above all, how should American government deal with these changes? Could it deal with them? Men and women of all backgrounds grappled with these questions, often without coming to a satisfactory answer.

This essay will focus on two literary works in particular: Henry Adams’ Democracy: An American Novel and William Riordon’s Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. Though there is significant overlap in the themes of these two books, I will evaluate them separately; to evaluate them side-by-side is to primarily engage in a literary, not historical, endeavor. By doing so, I hope to elucidate the individuality of each work, the historical contribution each makes to this era in American history.

Let us begin our discussion of the novel in medias res, as it were, with Mrs. Lee’s trip to Mount Vernon. It is here that we truly feel the sense of a bygone era. Beginning in pre-revolutionary times, and continuing well into the 19th century, much of America survived on an agrarian lifestyle. Slaves, indentured servants, plantation owners—all were removed from the urban way of life. Indeed, this setting gave rise to what would be known as the “leisured aristocracy” of the South: slaveholding aristocrats who enjoyed a life of relative ease. As the century progressed, however, forces of industrialization drove the urbanization of America, effectively eradicating the possibility of a pastoral or agrarian lifestyle for many. Mrs. Lee, herself a product of this urbanization, points out:

Is not the sense of rest here [at Mount Vernon] captivating?...Look at that quaint garden, and this ragged lawn, and the great river in front, and the superannuated fort beyond the river! Everything is peaceful, even down to the poor old General’s little bedroom. One would like to lie down in it and sleep a century or two. And yet that dreadful Capitol and its office-seekers are only ten miles off.

This idea of a moderately restful, rural lifestyle is now a quaint memory of the past. Mount Vernon may only be ten miles away from the Capitol, but it might as well be a hundred, nay, a thousand miles removed. Work on the farm or plantation has been replaced by ceaseless hours at the textile mill, the slaughterhouse, the shoe...
factory. Farmers and slaves alike have become mere wage-earners; they are but small cogs in the growing machine of corporate America, wholly divorced from the fruits of their labor.

What’s more, it seems that the power of political parties has grown alongside that of the corporations. In George Washington’s eyes, parties were the tools that “cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men” used “to subvert the Power of the People and to usurp for themselves the reins of Government.” A century later, for men like Ratcliffe, loyalty to party is only (supposedly) surpassed by loyalty to country. Reelection is what really matters most: “Public men...cannot be dressing themselves today in Washington’s old clothes. If Washington were President now, he would have to learn our ways or lose the next election.” Adams, then, has purposely chosen Mount Vernon as the site of this comment, for it is the place to which George Washington retired, in Cincinnatus-like fashion, after eight years as president. The United States had effectively written Washington a blank check concerning the extent and duration of his power—“many people, including [Thomas] Jefferson, expected that he might be president for life, that he would be a kind of elective monarch.” Washington did not cash this check, however, and instead returned to his idyllic abode at Mount Vernon. Through this trip to Mount Vernon, Adams contrasts Washingtonian virtue and humility with the rapaciousness and lust for power of Ratcliffe and other modern politicians.

Party politics of the late 19th century merits some further consideration. Time and again, Ratcliffe insists that political parties are necessary, if for no other reason than to bring unity to the nation. But is such a statement true? Was the country united on any issue at all? These questions lead to the ultimate question of all, which Ratcliffe asks twice in the novel: “What is most for the public good?” Here, it seems that Ratcliffe tacitly admits there is no such thing as the “public good” in a society so fractured among regional, racial, and economic lines. Instead, there can only be an aggregation of private interests masquerading as a force for public good. These, of course, are political parties; any politician who appeals to the “public good” is either a simpleton or master propagandist.

What—or who—were these “private interests,” then? Broadly speaking, one can group them into categories of competition: North vs. South; city vs. countryside; laborers vs. owners; “Americans” vs. immigrants (the list could expand almost without end). The salient point is this: in the decades following the Civil War, there would inevitably be “winners” and “losers.” Furthermore, it is immensely difficult to label a certain side as morally “right” and the other “wrong.” By making this claim I do not mean to suspend all historical judgment whatsoever, but rather to highlight the moral ambiguity in this epoch of American history. Henry Adams makes this point clear in his choice of characters. The morally sound man, Carrington, is a former Confederate rebel—in other words, for many of that age, Carrington defined immorality. Conversely, we find the antagonist, Ratcliffe, to be from a “respectable” New England family. Whatever the case may be, it is evident that competing interests led to innumerable political problems. By the end of the novel, the reader cannot help but feel that these problems are left unresolved.

George Santayana once stated that Americans don’t solve problems, they leave them behind. This spirit is epitomized in Mrs. Lee’s decision to flee to Egypt at the end of the novel. She came to Washington “bent upon getting to the heart of the great American mystery of democracy and government,” and soon discovered that American politics is hardly a mystery at all. More importantly, though, we see this spirit embodied throughout the novel as a whole. Race relations, perhaps the most fundamental issue in the postbellum period, are mentioned less than a handful of times, and even then only obliquely. It appears that even the government wants to leave certain issues behind rather than solve them. Washington’s predictions have now come to fruition: party politicians subordinate
the good of the people to their own personal ambitions. Much of the book thus deals with brazen political corruption—using taxpayer money for personal gain, etc. But politicians like Ratcliffe engage in a deeper, more pernicious sort of robbery as well: failing to provide citizens—black or white, farmer or wage earner, male or female—with viable solutions to the most divisive issues of the day. In this regard, Adams’ novel casts serious doubt on the government’s ability to effect positive change.

We now turn from the national scene to late 19th century New York City. Given the staggering urbanization of America during this time, one could say, without much exaggeration, that the city was a microcosm of the nation at large. Nevertheless, we must not conflate the national with the truly local, for politics at the citywide level was—and remains—something altogether different than the politics of Washington. In New York City, the term “political party” morphed into the institution of political machine, in turn guided by a political “boss.” These bosses—and George Washington Plunkitt in particular—enjoyed incredible (though often overstated) amounts of power and wealth. In many respects, Riordan’s Plunkitt commands more respect and power than the bumbling President depicted in Democracy. The remainder of this essay will thus devote itself to the examination of the complex relationship between the political machine and the constituents it purports to serve.

It must be remembered that Plunkitt of Tammany Hall is not, as it were, an “objective” account of George Washington Plunkitt—it is, above all else, “a piece of persuasive or argumentative writing.” Even so, this fact does not preclude the possibility that Plunkitt contains kernels of the truth, or indeed that it is largely truthful. The veracity of Riordon’s account is not what is at stake. Rather, considering the book’s almost ubiquitous and immediate acclaim among American readers, I shall treat it as a portrayal of Plunkitt and Tammany Hall, focusing on the spirit it is meant to convey rather than its historical accuracy.

To fully understand the meaning of Plunkitt, it is useful to draw a comparison to political philosophy. Plunkitt often rejects philosophy and “book learning”—“Tammany leaders are not bookworms”—in favor of a more practicable form of politics, yet it becomes increasingly clear that he himself adheres to a specific political philosophy—namely, that of Machiavelli. Machiavelli, it is well known, propounded a politics guided exclusively by considerations of expediency, which uses all means, fair or foul, iron or poison, for achieving its ends—its end being... the self-aggrandizement of the politician or statesman or one’s party.

Stated differently, the successful politician (i.e., the Prince) must dispense with any ideas of “virtue;” since most people are driven by visceral passions most of the time, those passions must form the foundation of any type of politics. By playing to popular desires, the Prince can successfully maintain his grip on power. Plunkitt seems to have grasped this reality: “There’s only one way to hold a district; you must study human nature and act accordin’.” He is, in other words, the Machiavellian Prince par excellence.

We must, however, refine our definitions—for example, what do we mean by “passions” in the context of 1890s New York? Most simply, we mean the basic necessities of living: food, employment, shelter, etc. Plunkitt boasts that he “can always get a job for a deservin’ man,” an ability which no doubt earned him the loyalty of those he helped. He assisted citizens in other tangible ways as well, covering their housing rent or paying off fines, for instance. The results of this beneficence, Plunkitt hoped, would be felt at the ballot box, and he proved to be correct. He held his position for about 35 years.

According to Plunkitt, the relationship between boss, political machine, and everyday citizen was thus a symbiotic one: “The politician looks after his own interests, the organization’s interests, and the city’s interests all at the same...
time.” While it is tempting to reject this statement out of hand, the quote certainly contains some truth. Many immigrants, such as Irish-American Catholics, could not have fed their families without the support of George Washington Plunkitt. Tammany Hall helped fulfill the basic needs of countless others, as well. It is, therefore, simply incorrect to label Tammany Hall as an inherently evil institution, capable of doing no good.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to call the political machine a predatory organization. The working poor of New York City had nowhere else to turn to for help; they were essentially “forced” into their support of Tammany and of Plunkitt. Plunkitt’s definition of the political machine—that it helps the politicians and the city at the same time—is therefore technically true, though highly misleading. Over time, what was once a symbiotic relationship—and I use that term loosely—corrupted into a decidedly parasitic one. People began to realize where Plunkitt’s true loyalties rested: he used his political knowledge “for the benefit of his organization and himself,” not for the welfare of the people. With this realization evaporated the political machine’s claim to the best form of governance. Out of this environment grew the Progressive Era, with people like Jane Addams and Lincoln Steffens calling for a different sort of reform, one that would meet the “human needs” of everyday people. In short, Plunkitt and others like him forgot Machiavelli’s other key piece of advice for the successful Prince, namely: to avoid hatred and contempt.

Henry Adams humorously writes that “democracy, rightly understood, is the government of the people, by the people, for the benefit of senators.” Though the quote is delivered in a lighthearted way, its implications are profoundly serious. Indeed, these implications lie at the heart of both Democracy and Plunkitt: if American democracy is comprised of the people and by the people, why does it fail to work for the people? Who is to blame? Ratcliffe provides a facile answer: “[N]o representative government can long be much better or much worse than the society it represents. Purify society and you purify the government.” It doesn’t take much imagination to dismantle this totalizing statement.

So what do Adams and Riordon mean to tell us? On a basic level these men share a mistrust in an increasingly centralized government, as well as in powerful political parties. The major trends of their time—growing urbanization, industrialization, politicization—raised issues heretofore unknown to Americans. Through their writings, Adams and Riordon at least acknowledge many of these major problems. Perhaps above all else, these authors have their misgivings about men (and women) with totalizing worldviews—people like Ratcliffe. Evil can be found as much in politicians as it can in the populace at large. Consequently, any “solutions” to societal, cultural, or political evils must be met with suspicion, especially when the government is involved. Since democracy is the rule of “the people,” everyone plays an equal role in its health and particularly in its sickness. The problem of democracy, in other words, is democracy itself.

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Mark Twain was the man of his time. A study of the esteemed author’s life, habits, difficulties, struggles, questions, and writings yields a compelling and surprisingly complete narrative of life in late 19th century America. Twain was, after all, the man who gave title to his time period, the Gilded Age; but beyond a title, he contributed so much more. As a man and a writer he serves perfectly as a medium to explore the greater picture of America during his time. Twain’s contributions to the topics of American exceptionalism, the transition from Victorian to American culture, the changing of the West, travel, and confusion over moral subjects can be used as a microcosm of ideas corresponding to the greater state of America.

During the time of Mark Twain, particularly the latter half of his life, America was in a place of transition. Coming off of the hugely destructive Civil War, America struggled to find an identity amidst the rapidly changing characteristics of the industrializing world which dominated the late 19th century. During this period there were opportunities for men and in some cases women to do exceptional things with their lives. One case of an exceptional life lived was Mark Twain himself. Twain reflected upon this fact in a March 19, 1893 letter to a Ms. Susan Crane, saying: “I dreamed I was born, & grew up, & was a pilot on the Mississippi, & a miner & journalist in Nevada, & a pilgrim in the Quaker City, & had a wife & children & went to live in a Villa out of Florence- & this dream goes on & on & sometimes seems so real that I almost believe it is real. I wonder if it is?”

In this personal example we see Twain reflecting, perhaps in a boastful manner, upon the incredible opportunities he had enjoyed and the experiences he had been able to cultivate over his lifetime. In a sense, he lived a dream.

During the second half of the 19th century the idea of the American Dream became prominent in the public discourse. There was a fundamental belief that in the United States of America, opportunities existed beyond those of Old World Europe. Whether due to the belief in the vast availability of uncultivated land or simply in the character of the American people, having won their independence from the tyranny of Europe, Americans felt they had something special in their cultural framework. Twain, despite his later wariness of imperialism, was at the forefront of inspiring this belief in the idea of American exceptionalism which would perpetuate the sense of an American Dream. He traveled abroad extensively and wrote with fondness about the opportunities in America and his affinity for his homeland. He conversed with the leading figures of his time, all living their own American dreams, and his novels romanticized quintessentially American cultural elements. In exploring the latter half of the 19th century, Twain first lands us in a culture oriented towards American exceptionalism.

The notion of American exceptionalism stemmed from the cultivation of a unique American identity, which was still very much underway throughout Twain’s life with the movement from Victorian ideals towards modernization.
As Alan Trachtenberg, the noted American Studies scholar, discusses extensively in his landmark book *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age*, there existed a strong overtone of Victorian cultural sentiment in the United States both during and immediately following the Civil War, particularly among the Southern gentry. Even in American cities, there was “a double-edged tradition [which] bequeathed (with the help of Bunyan) images of Vanity Fair as well as of a city upon a hill, a fabric of images of corruption, sin, and destruction, which colored the secular perceptions of many Americans in these years.” America was flirting between the Old World adherence to Victorian ideals and the onslaught of a new culture brought forth by modernization. Twain, as an individual, played the line between the modern man and the Victorian man fairly often. Known by some as a traveling vagrant, he married into as Victorian of a family as possible through Olivia Langdon. He could in many ways fit into both worlds. Thus his occasional ventures into the life of a modern man, which generally included drinking alcohol and being crude in a workplace setting, conflicted with society’s expectations of a Victorian mannered gentleman. Take, for instance, the Whittier Dinner Speech (given by Twain in honor of General John Whittier’s birthday in December 1877 in front of a gathering of famous American writers including Emerson, Longfellow, and Holmes) which “provides an excellent account of both [Twain]’s motivation for using his humor to deconstruct this cultural idol, and middle-brow American society’s angry response to the speech.” “On December 26, for example, the *Globe* reprinted an attack from the *Cincinnati Commercial* that accused Twain of lacking ‘the instincts of a gentleman.’” As far away as Colorado, the *Rocky Mountain News*, while poking fun at Boston’s excessive outrage, called Twain’s “bar-room” speech offensive to every intelligent reader.” Twain’s involvement in this affair perfectly represents the tension between the end of the Victorian era in America and the rise of the modern man.

The modern man was accompanied by, or perhaps created by changing dynamics in the West, which Twain both experienced and documented throughout his life. In general, throughout his writings Twain exhibited “the tendency to romanticize the past, especially life in small towns and rural areas.” He had great nostalgia for the past state of life along the river and in the West in general. Indeed, Twain once wrote in his personal notebook, “the romance of boating is gone, now. In Hannibal the steamboatman is no longer a god...Their pride is apparently railways …an affection which prevails all over the west.” The West slowly changed: “As railroads replaced old transportation systems and bridged the nation’s open space, vast demographic, social, political, and cultural changes were on their way, as Twain, nostalgically notes.” With the rise of the railroad and the increasing industrialization of America, the prospects of mining out West and the mass production of food, the West gradually changed from the romantic notions Twain loved to write about in works like *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* and *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*.

That Twain could even have this romantic perspective on the past relied on his ability and privilege to travel and see many different aspects of changing America. Here we encounter another key in exploring the 19th century: the upsurge in the amount of travel by Americans. Twain’s travels are legendary and took him not only all over the country (including modern day Hawaii) but all around the world. Along the way, Twain found himself examining the social and cultural fabric of the places with which he came into contact. This much is clear through his many letters and writings documenting his journeys. In his life of travel, “Mark Twain...in addition to questioning his own assumptions about America, also confronted the larger world of colonialism, by Western European powers, as well as the Russian conquest of Central Asia and the Ottoman domination of vast stretches of the Middle East.” Having the opportunity to interact with the cultures and political frameworks
of this vast number of places, Twain was on the cutting edge of the travel movement. He specifically writes about his experiences in these international places in *Innocents Abroad* and *A Tramp Abroad*. Throughout these accounts and just in his own thinking, Twain became emblematic of the new type of American traveler, one who was not just touring Europe for the sake of a traditional survey of the Old World but instead traveling for leisure, travel’s own sake, and in order to glean material for literary works.

As Twain travelled, he encountered a number of issues abroad, around America, and at home, all of which left him flustered, like much of American society, as to the state of the country and world. Twain was “ultimately dominated by the world around him, (as he was always) struggling to understand his role within it.”

This, the world around Twain in the 19th century was characterized by complex moral issues in the areas of religion, race, and imperialism.

Foremost, on the subject of religion, in analyses of his works, Twain is often characterized as hating Christian religion. In reality, his struggles with religion reflect the confusing and unclear trends at work within American culture regarding Christianity, the dominant religion. Twain’s musings about God through the voice of Huckleberry Finn are extremely well known and they highlight a vast dichotomy in American culture: how a religion could be practiced by both the slave-owners and the enslaved of society. Twain could not stand the hypocrisy committed by Christians over slavery and other issues during this time. His direct writings concerning religion, such as his novella *The Mysterious Stranger*, often concerned and “affirmed a darker view of humanity.” But Twain’s grappling with religion highlights the fact that in late 19th century America, religion was changing and seeking to find its place as people looked hard at the questions which Twain raised in his works and opinions.

Second, Americans at the end of the 19th century were grappling with the results of the Civil War and the aftermath of slavery. Shelley Fisher Fishkin, in her famous work *Was Huck Black?*, points out an exceedingly important aspect of Twain’s writings by highlighting “the role previously neglected African-American voices played in shaping Mark Twain’s art in *Huckleberry Finn*. Twain understood the role that African-Americans played in American society, and despite his short stint in the Confederate Army, he was a fairly outspoken critic of slavery. His representation of the struggle Huck Finn has with regard to dealing with the realities of slavery are a perfect depiction of the identity crisis America was going through leading up to the Civil War. Further, it captures the portrait of America after the Civil War, as the nation had to figure out how to move on following the end of the slavery system. Managing to reconstruct the nation with African-Americans in society as freemen was as confusing as Huck’s struggle to figure out how to relate to Jim on his raft. Here again, Twain’s writings and real life struggles with a complex issue parallel the wider dynamics at work within the American public.

The final moral qualm which was particularly noteworthy in the life of Mark Twain was the growing sentiment of imperialism in America. Exploring Twain’s perspective on this issue demonstrates the confusion within American society as to whether the country should engage in imperialism or not. Twain himself was staunchly on one side of the issue. For “Twain’s writing in *The Innocents Abroad* can be contextualized in a nearly lifelong anti-imperialist position, perhaps inaugurated on this voyage across Europe and the Near East.” His experiences in the Old World left Twain believing that America had a duty to rise above the impulse to take over other territories as a rising powerhouse in the world order. However, his moral objection to the issue, juxtaposed with the political benefits of overtaking land beyond the boundaries of America, perfectly describes the macro level argument regarding imperialism in America in the late 19th century: whether America should extend its influence for reasons of gaining more power through imperialism or uphold a moral
standard by not subjugating other populations for control of their lands.

As demonstrated by these key issues—American exceptionalism, the transition from Victorian to American culture, the changing of the West, travel, and confusion over moral subjects—Mark Twain’s writings and lifestyle are woven into the very fabric of the latter half of America’s 19th Century. Twain served as a microcosm of America in his time, and the amount that can be gleaned from the exploration of his life and writings regarding America in the 19th century is truly remarkable.

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Historians disagree over the boundaries of the American antebellum South. For some, the South exists below the Mason-Dixon Line or in the states that joined the Confederate States of America; for others, it crosses the Mississippi River and extends westward. What is certain, however, is that there were edges of the South where slavery was contested. Here in the geographic margins there were individuals who felt distanced from the institution of slavery. But by examining the life and writings of Joseph Mobberly, a Jesuit brother from Maryland, it becomes clear that support for slavery was strong in these margins, although people here weighed the economic, moral, and social justifications for slavery differently than Southerners for whom slavery was a more central part of their lives. Mobberly’s perspective demonstrates the resiliency of slavery; in geographically and demographically diverse regions, slavery was a uniting force for Southerners. An examination of Mobberly’s Maryland, at the margins of South, will show how in such places this was true.

Before we can understand how people from the margins valued certain justifications for slavery over others, it is necessary to establish the extent to which economic motivations compelled people in the heartland of the South to support slavery. For white Southern planters who grew cotton or sugar or rice, slavery was logical; planters purchased slaves, and gleaned free labor for these physically demanding duties. In addition to harvesting crops, slaves cared for planters’ families and maintained their homes. For landowners, slaves were an extension of their property and had “measurable monetary value.” As historian James Oakes writes in The Ruling Race, “If the initial price was exorbitant the slave was still a profitable investment as far as slaveholders were concerned.” Slaveholders felt that if they managed their slaves well, they could create a larger, more self-sustaining workforce. Even if an individual was not a landowner himself, he might be an overseer, a slave-trader, or a merchant who in some way benefited from the income that planters were earning because of their slaves.

White Southerners connected to the web of slavery in different ways, yet the “majority of white families in the Deep South had a direct material interest in the protection and preservation of slavery.” Planters, overseers, traders, buyers, and newspaper publishers all had a vested financial interest in slavery as an industry, whether it was earning money from the crops that slaves harvested or from advertisements in local periodicals. In Soul by Soul, Walter Johnson suggests that while people facilitated the preservation of slavery in a myriad of ways because of its economic profitability, they often justified their involvement by adopting “paternalistic” attitudes. Oakes agrees when he writes that “Paternalism was an articulate ideology in the
but he acknowledges that there were unique “areas of settlement around the South’s perimeter,” where “political and social traditions were...distinct from the typical patterns of slaveholding.” He suggests that paternalism was more pronounced in these regions as slaveholders here had a “sense of isolation [which] was soothed only by their pride in the patriarchal ideal.” However, Oakes fails to note the religious influence on such paternalism. Many slaveholders reasoned that as owners, they provided slaves with religion, familial stability, or support, but this paternalism had a high degree of “plasticity.” While economics were the most significant reason for supporting slavery in securely-Southern areas, vocalizing economics as the main reason made some people feel uncomfortable, and so they attempted to justify their relationships with slavery as “paternalistic.”

This religiously informed paternalism was especially prevalent among Evangelical Christians who initially rejected slavery because of the moral evils that it propagated, but later changed their position on slavery, claiming that it was a force for moral and social good. Writing during the 1820s, before the change of Evangelical opinion, Joseph Mobberly criticized Evangelicals for their abolitionist views. He was not aware that an “Evangelical metamorphosis from alienation to influence” was already taking place as Evangelical Christians began to accept and promote slavery. They went from being viewed as “a movement with radical implications to a model of social propriety.” Georgetown University’s own Professor Adam Rothman writes in Slave Country that “strong pressures muted evangelical antislavery” and as a result, these “pious white people in the Deep South turned their attention to improving slaves’ conditions instead of attacking slavery.” Donald G. Mathews explores this further in Religion in the Old South, suggesting that Evangelicals’ change of views was due to their realization that slavery was economically beneficial. He argues that Evangelicals, who made up a substantial portion of the South’s population, were opponents of slavery until “social and economic change had encouraged Evangelicals to assimilate.” For thousands of Evangelical Southerners, economic pressure eventually overpowered and reshaped their moral convictions concerning slavery.

Although they believed in the institution of slavery, many white Southerners, including Evangelicals, did not own many slaves since “statistically...the typical slaveholder was not even a planter.” White Southerners across socio-economic levels tended to support slavery since racism “made believable an ideology that placed all whites on an equal social and political level.” Many lower-class white people believed that one day they or their children could be slaveholders because of opportunities for “social mobility.” These economic motivations for supporting slavery were also present in Southern cities as a tenth of slaveholders lived in urban settings. In Origins of the Southern Middle Class, Jonathan Daniel Wells suggests that instead of viewing slavery as something removed from capitalism, Southerners were in fact capitalists. “Industrialization and urbanization...tended to facilitate the maturation of abolitionist sentiment in the North, [but they] only strengthened the hold of slavery in the South” since Southerners viewed slavery as “the foundation upon which southern manufacturing could build.” While the South was mostly characterized by vast rural plantations, Southern cities like Charleston and New Orleans were rapidly industrializing. Urban areas should not be considered marginal locations within the broader “South,” as the people who lived here had strong financial and personal ties to slavery.

White people who lived incontrovertibly in the South (as opposed to those who lived in the margins) supported slavery primarily because they viewed it as financially beneficial, regardless of their socioeconomic status. While they might have justified slavery because they perceived its positive moral and social implications, they ultimately engaged in the slave-trade because of its enormous economic impact on Southern life. How then do we explain the at-
attachment that those in the geographic margins of the South felt towards slavery, although they were not financially profiting from it? The life and writings of Brother Joseph Mobberly, S.J. demonstrate how the economic, moral, and social justifications for slavery were adapted in the margins of the South.

Born in Montgomery County, Maryland, in 1779, Joseph Mobberly enrolled nineteen years later at Georgetown College where he began studying for the priesthood. However, at some point during the next several years Mobberly departed, but “returned to Georgetown as a brother of the Society of Jesus” in 1805. In a written account from 1825, Mobberly remembered, “After remaining about 6 months at the College in different occupations, I was, in June of 1806 sent to St. Inigoes farm in St. Mary’s County.” St. Inigoes was one of several Jesuit-owned plantations in Maryland, and Mobberly “managed” this property from 1806 until 1820, when he “was relieved of his plantation duties” by the Jesuits’ Corporation of the Roman Catholic Clergymen.

Peter Kenney, an Irish Jesuit, visited St. Inigoes in 1820 and reported that the plantation was in debt and the slaves were living in poor conditions. At this time, “only fourteen of the sixty-one slaves at St. Inigoes [sic] were working the land.” Mobberly’s slaves “compiled a litany of complaints to cite against” him, which they presented to Kenney. As a result, Mobberly was forced to return to Georgetown.

Between 1823 and 1825, Mobberly recorded his version of some of the events that had occurred during his fourteen years at St. Inigoes. He reflected on his interactions with slaves and slavery to such an extent that historian Thomas Murphy, S.J. calls Mobberly “the most prolific Jesuit author on the slavery issue.” In his writing, Mobberly criticized slaveholders and slave managers, complaining, “The present white generation seem to lose sight of the old observation ‘the better a negro is treated, the worse he becomes.’” He also blamed slave-owners for their harsh treatment of the land, saying that they had wrecked “poverty of the soil.” However, he recognized that this agricultural practice was necessitated by the fact that “Their slaves must have employment – hence they must cultivate extensive fields which are much to [sic] large for their stocks of manure – but their people must not only be employed they must also be supported – hence the necessity of the corn & tobaccos systems.”

After observing slavery’s destructive effect on the agriculture of Maryland plantations, Mobberly concluded that slavery was an unwise practice at St. Inigoes and the other Jesuit plantations. R. Emmett Curran, a Jesuit historian, explains that “As early as 1815 Mobberly was urging that the mission rid itself of its slaves and entrust the land to tenant farmers and the production of wheat.” The timing of Mobberly’s position on this issue is significant: in 1814 “an abortive uprising had occurred within sight of St. Inigoes.” However, Mobberly’s views were also motivated to a lesser degree by economic factors. In 1823, he reflected on his time at St. Inigoes, writing, “I formerly made a calculation of what the farm expended in the support of the Blacks – the amount of that year was more than $1800 – I repeated the calculation a few years after, & found that it exceeded $2000.” Mobberly then proceeded to consider other factors, such as the price of bread and wood and rechecked his work before stating, “Having duly considered all things, I then thought as I do now, that the farm would do much better without [slaves] than with them.”

While Mobberly recognized that he was just one of many Maryland Jesuits who had opinions on the issue, he believed that allowing slavery to continue on the Maryland Jesuits’ plantations did not make sense. Economically, it was proving difficult, and the slaves were becoming “more restless under the influence of abolitionists” as time went on. Mobberly believed that selling the slaves was the solution because it did not undermine the institution of slavery. The social
order would remain intact, just not on St. Inigoes or in Maryland. Eighteen years after Mobberly was fired from his managerial role at St. Inigoes the Jesuits chose to sell their slaves, as Mobberly and others had suggested. Henry Johnson, the former governor of Louisiana, and his business partner bought all 272 of the Maryland Jesuits’ slaves in 1838 for $115,000, $17,000 of which “was applied to the $30,000 debt Georgetown had incurred through [Fr.] Mulledy’s ambitious building campaign when he had been rector.”

European and American Jesuits differed in their views on the place of slavery on Maryland plantations, but neither group viewed economics as its chief priority. One of Mobberly’s letters reveals that there was a diversity of opinion between international and American Jesuits when he wrote, “Our Society (as it seems to me) is divided into two factions, of which one is made up of the Americans and the Irish, the other the Germans and other Europeans.” Interestingly, the Irish were already aligning themselves with Americans, perhaps because of their shared language. The division among Jesuits grew as the possibility of selling the Jesuits’ slaves increased, and “It was the Europeans [Jesuits] who were most vocal in opposing the sale.” These foreign Jesuits believed that slavery needed to be sustained on their plantations, probably because they saw themselves as having a greater moral role to play in the lives of their slaves. Curran explains: “Had the alliance between European Jesuits and local procurators had its way, there might well have been increasing efforts to make the Jesuits’ estates models of Christian slavery, such as Christian evangelists were attempting to create elsewhere in the South.” Conversely, Mobberly, who had died in 1827, was interested in preserving slavery, but not in Maryland. The institution of slavery was not functioning properly there, so slaves needed to be transplanted to places farther south, like Louisiana, where slaveholders and the land could better support slaves.

Thus, in his 1823 “long philosophical defense of slaveholding in his private diary” titled “Slavery, or Cham,” Mobberly mentioned neither agricultural nor economic stresses as reasons to end slavery. What was most important to him was that slavery continue to exist because of the social structure that it provided. He advocated for the existence of slavery broadly (he did not make any specific references to St. Inigoes, the Jesuits’ plantations, or Maryland), implicitly suggesting that these agricultural and economic reasons were less significant to him.

In “Slavery, or Cham,” Mobberly argued that slavery played a critical role in society, stating, “Where slavery exists, beggars are rarely found. We must therefore conclude that slavery is not only lawful, reasonable and good, but that it is also necessary.” His racism permeated the whole document. At one point he said, “It may be asserted with confidence that at least two fifths of the human family are deficient in parts of intellect.”

To justify his position, he looked to the Bible, but also relied heavily on secular sources. Mobberly mentioned Thomas Jefferson’s opinion on slavery’s necessary social function in three distinct places within “Slavery, or Cham.” He appreciated the Old Testament because it presented evidence for slavery and hierarchy in Abraham’s life, and criticized interpretations of St. Paul’s writings that suggested that St. Paul viewed slavery as immoral. Mobberly insisted that when “St. Paul often mentions spiritual freedom,” he is advocating for Christian mastership, and not physical freedom since St. Paul “never would have requested Philemon to receive and set free his slave Onesimus that had absconded for a time; but he would have commanded him to do it.” Informed by his textual engagement with Biblical and non-Biblical sources, Mobberly’s racism caused him to see slavery as socially necessary.

Some could argue that as a member of the Jesuit community, Mobberly would have been less interested in the economics of slavery than the average Southerner who lived in Maryland or in other parts of the geographic margins of the South. But Mobberly’s economic concern shows that he shared a concern with laymen on this issue, and it was this concern that compelled him
to advocate for the sale of the Jesuits’ Maryland slaves. He recognized that slavery was financially draining the Maryland Jesuits’ plantations, but he continued to support slavery as an institution because of the structure that it provided to Southern society.

Interestingly, the moral ramifications of slavery do not appear to be a significant concern for Mobberly. He rarely mentions Christ in his writing, although his Christian outlook is evident in the way that he viewed the responsibilities of masters to teach and offer sacraments to their slaves. He saw no conflict in being both a slaveholder and a Jesuit, and he directly addressed the issue of his concurrent identities in “Slavery, or Cham,” writing, “Can a man serve God faithfully & possess slaves? Yes.” Mobberly’s main concern about slavery was that it upheld its important social function of maintaining social hierarchy. Just as economic strains were secondary concerns for Mobberly, so too were any moral advantages that slavery could provide.

As mentioned earlier, Mobberly was highly critical of early Evangelical Christians because of their abolitionist tendencies and their “wish to meliorate the temporal condition of the human race.” In “Slavery, or Cham,” Mobberly enjoyed mocking Martin Luther and his followers in the “Presbyterianism, Baptism [sic], Quakerism and Methodism” traditions. But Mobberly’s references to Evangelicalism reveal his own insecurity that these Protestant revival traditions were challenging systems of authority in the South. Mobberly wrote numerous lines of “Slavery, or Cham” in Latin, emphasizing his education and intellectual superiority, whereas Evangelicals were just beginning to value formal education to a greater extent during this time.

Thomas Murphy, S.J. agrees that Mobberly felt threatened by these congregations of Protestants and that this made him an opponent of abolition, explaining:

> It is pertinent that [Mobberly] chose four sects [to mention] which were all noted for government by congregational participation rather than centralized authorities. All four denominations posed a direct threat to the social paternalism nurtured by the Jesuits... Mobberly’s hostility to them showed that clericalism was a major but unappreciated reason why Jesuits generally resisted abolitionism.

In addition to this vulnerability toward congregational Protestants, it is possible that Mobberly’s position as a Jesuit brother, and not a priest, accentuated his feelings of clerical vulnerability, since brothers traditionally “supported the Society by undertaking the daily domestic chores and craft trades necessary for maintaining the Society’s communities and institutions” and did not have to be as accomplished as Jesuit priests.

With experience as the manager of a St. Inigoes, Mobberly feared insubordination, and wanted to protect the social structure that slavery provided. In “Slavery, or Cham” he argued that “Man, being the noblest work of God’s Creation is constituted Master and King over all living creatures,” taking this to justify slavery. Mobberly saw the dark skin of slaves as a direct correlation to Cham’s curse as recorded in Genesis: “a resemblance exists between the circumstances of Cham’s crime, & those of negro infants at the present day.” He transposed the racial hierarchy that he read of in Noah’s lineage in the Old Testament into the Antebellum South. To soften his pronouncements, Mobberly said that black people “do not differ in their nature from the rest of men. The only distinction that exists is the mark of a particular crime.” Mobberly’s acceptance of his own position in this ordered hierarchy is evident through his deferential tone and diction in his December 7, 1824, letter to the Jesuit’s Father General, where he uses phrases such as, “It is not appropriate for me to write anything to you because I am lowly and of humble station.”

Mobberly’s writing also reveals that Southerners still strongly viewed themselves as part of a united “America” during the 1820s. He was
equally connected to his country as a whole as he was to his region, although he lived right on the border where the divide would develop over the next several decades. As a Southerner and an American, Mobberly would have viewed the eventual sale of the Jesuits slaves as morally defensible and financially savvy.

Mobberly’s writing is widely accessible thanks to the transcribing done by those involved with the Jesuit Plantation Project. His essays and journals demonstrate that economics was not the only, or even the strongest, factor influencing the institution of slavery in the South’s margins. Mobberly’s view from the margins of the South explains why white people who did not greatly benefit financially from slavery still supported the institution: it created a rigid social hierarchy that automatically placed white people at an elevated level. While his perspective is at times surprising given his vocation as a Jesuit brother and his writings as a proponent of slavery, Mobberly shows why slavery was supported by so many people across the broader “South” and why slavery as an institution existed for so long. His actions and writings reflect the struggles that many people at the margins of the South experienced as they tried to sort out the economic, moral, and social demands of slavery in their regions.

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in *Le Morte Darthur*, Sir Thomas Malory presents two moral codes for the Knights of the Round Table. The first, prevalent through most of the work, values a knight’s skill in battle, service to ladies, and loyalty to kin and lords – the classic conception of chivalry. The second, introduced in the quest to achieve the Holy Grail, expects knights to be penitent, chaste, and devoted to God above all – essentially the morality of monasticism. Unsurprisingly, most knights live in accord with the values of the former, yet the fall of Camelot points to the code’s ultimate hollowness. Nevertheless, it retains an allure for Arthur’s knights, despite their failure within its confines. These dueling moralities are encapsulated in the character of Sir Bors, kinsman of Lancelot and achiever of the Holy Grail. In turns chivalrous and chastened, proud and penitent, Bors illustrates the deep hold of knightly values, the rewards of adhering to monastic ones, and the relationship attained between the two moralities by the last pages of *Le Morte Darthur*.

When readers are first introduced to Bors, they see a young knight who wants to establish his reputation. Bors urges his companions to carry out an assignment to escort prisoners despite a possible ambush, and in doing so reveals his own motivations: “Let us set on them fresh-ly, and the worship shall be ours and cause our King to honor us forever and to give us lordships and lands for our noble deeds.” Bors’ statement highlights the incentives of the chivalric code. By adhering to its tenets, one is honored by others and receives material rewards. The most likely path to this illustrious future is through conquest – on the fields of battle and at the jousting tournament. Martial prowess becomes the key to future happiness.

Bors’ next return to prominence in the plot, in “The Book of Sir Tristan,” serves as a vehicle to introduce spiritual worthiness as a key element of knighthood. The knight comes by chance to the Castle of Corbin, where he sees a vision of the Grail. Bors is amazed, but King Pelles warns him, “Here shall no knight win worship but if he be of worship himself and of good living, and that loves God and dreads God – and else he gains no worship here, be he never so hardy a man.” Bors, undeterred, requests to stay the night, and is shriven. At this point in the narrative, it is revealed that Bors has only lapsed from his chastity once, resulting in a son, but has not strayed since. In the course of the night, Bors is pierced by a spear, battles Sir Be-divere of the Straight Marches, kills a lion, and witnesses a battle between a dragon and a leopard. Finally, an old man enters, sings a song of Joseph of Arimathea (who brought the Grail to Britain), and tells Bors to leave, “for here shall you have no more adventures; yet full worshipfully have you achieved this – and better shall you do hereafter.” Bors’ evening in the chamber at Corbin is a turning point in the conception of knighthood. Although known as a good knight, it is not his physical prowess or defer-
ence to the customs of chivalry that enable him to complete the trial at Corbin, but rather his piety and pure lifestyle.

As the Grail Quest begins, the link to monastic values is further strengthened, not least because hermits are frequently guides on the quest. Soon after departing Camelot, Bors encounters a holy man who predicts that Bors shall achieve the Grail. To aid in his adventures, the hermit recommends a diet of only bread and water and gives Bors a scarlet overcoat to wear for mortification.\textsuperscript{359} These penances highlight that Bors is a man not only of chastity but genuine holiness. Beyond his physical mortification, he consistently prays at moments of crisis throughout the quest and seeks guidance from holy men.\textsuperscript{360} Contrast his spiritual goodness with that of other knights such as Gawain, who hears a voice declaring, “Knights full of evil faith and of poor belief, these . . . things have failed you; and therefore you may not come to the adventures of the Grail.”\textsuperscript{361} Bors learns early in the quest that he shall be one of the few to achieve the Grail. His previous holy living is enhanced by measures that demonstrate spiritual rigor. By taking seriously the quest and not treating it as another adventure, Bors sets himself apart from the worldly knights of the Round Table.

Bors’s penances do not secure his escape from continual trials of his purity. He encounters a woman who threatens to kill herself, joined by all of her ladies-in-waiting, if the knight does not yield to her love, but he tells her, “There is no lady in this world whose will I would fulfill as of this thing.”\textsuperscript{362} The ladies appear to carry out their threat, only for Bors to learn that the whole episode was a devilish illusion. Bors also faces the difficult choice of rescuing his brother Sir Lionel from evident death or a maiden threatened with rape. Recognizing that “if I help not the maiden, she is shamed, and shall lose her virginity which she shall never get again,”\textsuperscript{363} he saves the woman but earns his brother’s enmity. These trials illuminate how divergent the chivalric and monastic moralities can be. Bors agonizes over yielding to the lady and saving his brother, actions expected of knights, but the heightened spiritual atmosphere of the Grail Quest alerts him to the value of purity. Such tests prove ongoing.

After many adventures, the Grail is achieved. Strikingly, for Bors’s companions Galahad and Percival, this essentially means the end of their earthly lives. Soon after the conclusion of the quest, Galahad proclaims his desire to leave his mortal life, one which is quickly fulfilled, and his companions glimpse the knight’s soul assumed into heaven. Percival, too, maintains no interest in the secular world and enters a hermitage, dying after a year. These two knights, unlike Bors, never lapsed in their chastity, making them exceptionally well-suited to the morality of monasticism. Their utter disinterest in the pursuit of glory and favor indicates their expectations for this morality’s viability in the world. Departing from the scene after the Grail Quest suggests that the virtues that won them the Grail will prove either unhelpful or unappreciated in the secular world. The continuing saga of Bors, who does return to Camelot, shows the incompatibility of monasticism with a knight’s world.

Once back at Camelot, Bors reunites with his cousin Lancelot, who tells him, “Know you well, gentle cousin Sir Bors, that you and I shall never part in sunder while our lives may last,” to which Bors fathfully replies, “Sir, as you will, so will I.”\textsuperscript{364} Throughout \textit{Le Morte Darthur} up until the Grail Quest, Lancelot served as the epitome of chivalry. He was a valiant, nearly invincible knight. Always fighting in the name of Queen Guinevere, the wife of King Arthur, Lancelot’s prowess earned him renown throughout the land. His closeness to Guinevere, however, also attracted attention. Through much of the narrative, until near the downfall of Camelot, Malory is cagey about the nature of the relationship between Arthur’s best knight and his queen. Some characters are not so reluctant to opine. In fact, during Bors’ night at the castle of Corbin, the old man he encounters gives a message for him to take to Lancelot:
This adventure had been most convenient for him of all earthly knights; but since so foul in him that he may not achieve such holy deeds, for had not been his sin, he had past all the knights that ever were in his days. And tell Sir Lancelot, of all worldly adventures he passes in manhood and prowess all others, but in this spiritual matter he shall have many his betters.365

In the world of monastic morality, Lancelot’s knightly exploits are insignificant. His sinful relationship with Guinevere nullifies his courage, honor and overall loyalty to Arthur and his knights. On the Grail Quest, Lancelot learns that his sinfulness costs him the chance to achieve the holy vessel. This grieves him and makes him vow to change his life, but no long-lasting change results.

Bors’s behavior in the final two tales of Le Morte Darthur reflects the hold of knightly morality. The achiever of the Holy Grail leaves aside the aura of holiness that enabled that achievement. He now becomes Lancelot’s loyal sidekick, guarding the great knight’s interests and offering advice. Bors’ new role clashes with his status as a holy knight, for most of Bors’ actions aid Lancelot in continuing his affair with Guinevere, the very sin which prevented him from achieving the Grail. Thus the chaste knight becomes complicit in an affair that threatens Camelot’s stability.

Why is it so simple for Bors to revert to the world of knightly morality, after the wonders he partook of during the Grail Quest? In the narrative, great emphasis is placed on their blood relationship, and Lancelot’s earthly glory remains undiminished.366 Yet it had once been Bors who had chosen to save an unknown maiden’s virginity over the life of his own brother. It may be asked, as well, why Lancelot so quickly returns to Guinevere’s embrace despite its cost. He seems to be undergoing a kind of “spiritual sloth.” Immediately after learning that the Grail is beyond his reach, Lancelot accepts his sinfulness, does penance, and promises reform during the Grail Quest. Guinevere proves too tempting, however, and with the Grail a remote idea requiring stringent asceticism compared to the immediacy of the queen’s charms, Lancelot’s fidelity to religious principles lapses.367 Immediacy plays a large part in Bors’ conduct as well. No longer is the Holy Grail held as a great, divine reward for righteous living, and holy men evidently no longer dot the wilderness to offer encouragement and warning. With the glory of the Grail receding into memory, the tangible benefits of the earthly conception of knighthood regain their desirability. Having already acquired the Holy Grail, Bors puts aside his holiness when confronted with the urgent requirements of a favored and popular relative.

As Camelot crumbles, Bors remains Lancelot’s closest adviser, which ultimately leads him back to a holy life and seemingly finishes off the golden age of chivalry. Bors predicts the trap lain for Lancelot and Guinevere by the jealous knights Aggravain and Mordred, but Lancelot persists in the affair and it is revealed to the kingdom. Bors affirms, “As we have taken much weal with you and much worship, we will take the woe with you as we have taken the weal,”368 and prepares to serve his kinsman as war with Arthur looms. Serving as Lancelot’s right-hand man leads Bors to behave as any earthly knight, prepared to fight for honor and on behalf of family. He remains by Lancelot’s side as Arthur besieges his castles, first in England, then in France. Then, when Arthur returns to England to wrest back control from his usurping son Mordred, Bors urges him to avenge the king and Guinevere. They return to England and learn of Arthur’s demise. Guinevere, now a nun after the death of her husband, shuns Lancelot, driving him to seek a hermitage. Bors and Lancelot’s other knights eventually join him. As monks, the knights reject their old lives of glory-seeking and adventures, instead embracing penitence, fasting and prayer. This time there is no going back, no return to old habits. In a poignant scene, a hermit finds Lancelot weeping over the grave of Guinevere. Although the hermit initially believes
the old knight’s sadness stems from his lust for the late queen, Lancelot’s grief arises from guilt:

Truly, I trust I do not displease God, for He knows my intent; for my sorrow was not, nor is not, for any rejoicing of sin – but my sorrow may never have end. For when I remember of her beauty and of her noblesse, that was both with her king and with her, so when I saw his corpse and her corpse so lie together, truly my heart would not serve to sustain my troubled body. Also, when I remember how by my failing and my arrogance that they were both laid full low, that were peerless that ever was living of Christian people, know you well, this remembered, of their kindness and my unkindness, sank so to my heart that I might not sustain myself.369

Faced with the consequences of his sin, and with its enjoyment long evaporated, Lancelot finally and fully recognizes the error of his ways. It took the complete collapse of the kingdom, and the vanishing of all the sources of his earthly pride. Even in the way he mourns, Lancelot is shown to be a changed man. No sweeping gestures or ritualized moments indicate shame to a court of knights and ladies. The disillusioned knight has internalized his guilt and, before the hermit intrudes, expresses it only to God at the graves of those he has wronged. Lancelot becomes a monk, and adheres to its morality, because he has nothing left.

Lancelot passes from the scene soon after the death of Guinevere, but the surviving knights persist in their lives as holy men. Bors and his fellows Ector, Blamour and Bleoberis venture to the Holy Land: “And once they had established their lands – for the book says, so Sir Lancelot commanded them to do before he passed out of this world – these four knights did many battles upon the unbelievers or Turks; and there they died upon a Good Friday for God’s sake.”370

Even these last sentences of the narrative contain an ambiguity about the knights’ true loyalties. They remain holy men, and do their work in the name of God – yet that work is fighting, just as it was in the days of Camelot, and they do it at the last request of their leader Lancelot. To the end, there is a reluctance to devote everything to God, an inability to fully abandon the lifestyle of knighthood and its earthly trappings.

Though the legend of King Arthur and his knights is often raised up as the epitome of chivalry, yet Sir Thomas Malory’s treatment of the story belies this narrative. His depiction does not attribute the fall of Camelot only to one jealous antagonist of Arthur or one adulterous relationship, but to the whole system of values that undergirds the kingdom. The chivalric thirst for glory, the defense of kin despite the costs, the role of women within the court, actually hastens Camelot’s demise. The moral code of the knight sowed the seeds of its own destruction. It was not the only alternative, though. Even before the quest to achieve the Holy Grail, a morality of renunciation emerged as a path to bounties far beyond those of the jousting tournament and battlefield. By living a life of chastity, devotion to God, and humility, the knights who achieved the Grail were able to participate in the divine. Yet even this did not suffice. Bors, the only successful knight to return from the Grail Quest, enabled the infidelity of his cousin Lancelot, who knew the cost of his sin but disregarded it. This return to the old chivalric code obliterated Camelot, and the remaining knights adopted the morality of monasticism only amidst the ruins of the old morality. But the allure of chivalry survived, and as seen in the enduriness of the legend of King Arthur and Camelot, it survives still.

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Amor in Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics

Roseann Day

“Omnia uincit amor.” –Virgil, Eclogues, 10.69

These immortal words celebrate the power of love and extol love as the most desirable goal in life. Yet a closer contextual examination of these words reveals that the sentiment of their author is not so simple. Indeed, Virgil’s treatment of amor in Eclogue X, and in the Eclogues and Georgics as whole, is a complex and dynamic reflection that explores both positive and negative aspects of love. The role of love in his poems becomes more serious and layered as Virgil moves through the Eclogues and into the Georgics. Along the way, he evokes imagery of love as frustrating and burning, examines the destructive nature of love, and reflects on love in the context of its paradoxical relationship to poetry. Ultimately, his conclusions on love affirm Virgil’s identity as a powerfully inspired poet.

In Eclogue II, Virgil introduces several motifs concerning love that continue throughout subsequent poems. In contrast to the other poems, Eclogue II has a much lighter tone. The poem, a monologue by the shepherd Corydon about his love for his master’s slave Alexis, is modeled on Theocritus’ Eleventh Idyll, a monologue by Polyphemus about his unrequited love for Galatea. Like Polyphemus, Corydon is frustrated by the futility of love, a prevalent motif in Eclogue II. He has little hope (nec quid speraret habebat) and his words are spoken in vain (ibi haec incondita solus / montibus et silvis studio iactabat inani). The use of imperfect tense and choice of words such as adsidue denote that the frustration of a rejected lover is constant and unending. Another significant image introduced in Eclogue II is that of love as fire, burning, and heat. The first line contains the word ardebat, and later Corydon laments, me tamen urit amor. Corydon’s desire is a spark that can be extinguished or reignited at any moment; in later poems the fire of love will be much more consuming and relentless.

The fire of love is not confined to mankind. Indeed, an idea that will come up again in both the Eclogues and the Georgics is the universality of love’s effects. Corydon compares his passion to that of animals (torva leaena lupum sequitur, lupus ipse ca pellam, / florentem cytisum sequitur lasciva capella, / te Corydon, o Alexi; trahit sua quemque voluptas). Indeed, love is hardly a lofty ideal here, but rather an animalistic and irrational urge that can lead to destruction. This potential for damage is only hinted at in Eclogue II, through the mention of Corydon’s neglect for his crops as a result of his amorous pursuits. His vines untended, Corydon remarks that his energy could be better spent on agricultural pursuits (semiputata tibi frondosa vitis in ulmo. / quin tu aliq- uid saltem potius, quorum indiget usus, / viminibus mollique paras detexere iunco?). The description of Corydon as perditus looks forward to love’s potential for destruction, an idea that will be developed further in later poems.

Within Eclogue II, the subject of love never becomes too serious. The poem’s interaction with its Theocritan precedent is significant in this regard; just as readers are aware of the Greek model, so does Corydon seem to have some sense of self-consciousness throughout the poem. His
awareness and his ability to poke fun at himself prevent the situation from adopting dark tones. Indeed the monologue is humorously self-deprecating at times (nece sum adeo informis; nuper me in litore vidi, / cum placidum ventis staret mare. non ego Daphnin / iudice te metuam, si numquam fallit imago). Corydon openly recognizes his own foolishness (rusticus es, Corydon). Virgil makes it clear that the situation is not dire—there are other objects of affection available to Corydon. This idea is hinted at as the speaker recalls several past lovers, and is returned to at the conclusion of the poem when Corydon resolves to find alium Alexin.

Thus the first foray into the subject of love: though Virgil hints at love’s potential as a burning, powerful, and destructive force, he ultimately has created a light-hearted poem about an individual whose love is not so serious as to cause him any great devastation. In Eclogue X, Virgil continues to develop many of the themes introduced in Eclogue II, including the irrationality of love, its universality, and the harm that it can inflict. Unlike the earlier poem, Eclogue X has more serious undertones, and here Virgil begins to expand and layer his treatment of the concept of love.

The speaker of Eclogue X is an essential part of these shifting themes and purposes. He is not an amusingly love-struck shepherd with a stock pastoral name, but rather one of Virgil’s close friends and a respected contemporary poet. Gallus Cornelius Gallus (69—26 BC) was a prominent political and military figure as well as a poet who was highly influential in Latin elegiac poetry. The choice of Gallus is significant not simply because Virgil wished to pay tribute to him in the poem, but also because his very presence elevates the seriousness of the poem. While Virgil encourages a mixture of amusement and pity towards the rusticus Corydon of Eclogue II, such bemusement has no place in Eclogue X towards a figure like Gallus.

The frustration and torment that love causes Gallus is indicated from the start of the poem, whose subject is labeled sollicitos Galli amores. Again Virgil uses the imperfect tense to convey repeated frustration, and words such as peribat recall perditus from Eclogue II, highlighting the destruction of love only hinted at before. Gallus’ words are useless (amor non talia curat, / nec lacrimis crudelis amor nec gra- mina riuis / nec cytiso saturantur apes nec fronde capellae). Amor is not only unsympathetic, but also explicitly characterized as malevolent (crudelis amor). The military metaphor heightens this sense of violence associated with love. In addition, the image of love as madness appears again in Gallus’ monologue. Apollo asks Gallus what has driven the man to the insane pursuit of an unfaithful woman (insanus). Love is labeled insanus amor; this word choice—literally “not well”—reflects the damaging, masochistic nature of an enamored individual.

Gallus’ situation is hopeless. Though he briefly toys with the idea from Eclogue II of entertaining other lovers, he ultimately rejects the notion. While Virgil limits Corydon to an idyllic pastoral setting, Gallus imagines his lover traversing cold, dangerous lands (Alpinas, a, dura, niues et frigora Rheni). There is no light-hearted conclusion, no way out of his torment (omnia uincit amor: et nos cedamus amori).

This line signals the introduction of a further layer of meaning surrounding love: its relationship to poetry. The paradoxical interaction between love and poetry is first outlined in Eclogue X and expanded later, specifically in Geog- ric IV. Love’s torments are not alleviated by Gallus’ words, yet his words are inspired by love. Gallus’ poetry (and by extension, Virgil’s poetry about him) can exist only because of his experience with love. Yet his verses bring him no relief from the pain of love (amor non talia curat). As much as Gallus, or any poet, might labor over his poetry, it will make no difference (non illum nostri possunt mutare labores). The connection between Gallus’ monologue and written poetry is explicit (certum est in siluis inter speulae ferarum / malle pati tenerisque meos incidere amores / arborebus: crescent illae, crescitis, amores). His love will grow as his words grow, and his words are in-
spired by his love—an inextricable relationship. Virgil carefully crafts the line so as to conflate the two concepts; love is equated with poetry even as the pair are placed in contrast elsewhere in the poem. This complex dynamic—at times casting love and poetry in opposition, at times equating the two—will be revisited in the Georgics.

When viewed from a broader prospective, the treatment of love in the *Eclogues* and *Georgics* has a synchytic pattern of arrangement, with Georgic III closely paralleling many of the motifs introduced in Eclogue II and Georgic IV incorporating these themes into a more complex discussion of love in its relation to poetry, a discussion initiated in Eclogue X. This synthesis and the development of themes about love began in the *Eclogues* and continued in the *Georgics* allows Virgil to bridge the gap between his pastoral and agricultural poems. This is significant because it establishes continuity between the two works, an important effect that will be discussed in more detail later.

The *Georgics* focus on a different subject matter yet still reinforces the imagery of love seen in the *Eclogues*. In Georgic III, love is again imagined as burning and fiery (*ignem; calor redit ossibus*). Unlike in Eclogue II, here the fire of love cannot be extinguished or lit with ease; it penetrates into the very bones of the lover’s being (*magnum cui uersat in ossibus ignem / durus amor*).

And just as love caused Corydon to neglect his vines, rendering them lifeless, the passion of love drains strength from animals. It is for this reason that Virgil outlines strict procedures for the separation of male and female livestock at specific times, should one wish to raise a robust herd (*sed non ulla magis uiris industria firmat / quam Venerem et caeci stimulos auertere amoris,*).

Georgic III reinforces Corydon’s earlier remarks about the universal effect of love on humans and animals (*omne adeo genus in terries hominumque ferarumque / et genus aequoreum, pecudes pictaee volucres, / in furias ignemque ruunt: amor omnibus idem*).

Though the poem is ostensibly about the proper care of animals, the serious nature of its subject matter is evident; the nature and habits of animals in love are closely related to those of men. For example, the anecdote about a bull defeated in a contest for a female mate focuses on the bull’s expulsion. Virgil uses words such as *exsulat* and *regnis* that are often applied to human exile and the kingdoms of men, thus drawing a close parallel between the similar effects of love on man and animal.

Perhaps most notable for this poem in particular is its virulent treatment of the madness of love. In Georgic III, this motif reaches a feverish pitch. Virgil achieves this effect by listing the unusual behaviors of a wide range of animals that result from the insanity of passion in a crescendo (e.g. *quid quae imbelles dant proelia cerui*).

The story of Glaucus represents the ultimate example of love’s lunacy: love, symbolized by Venus, drives his mares to kill their own master.

Clearly, Georgic III contributes to the testament to love’s destruction that has already been seen in earlier poems. Virgil’s description of the young, pathetic Leander, who perishes after attempting to swim across the Hellespont to reach his lover Hero captures this idea. The waters are *caeca*, as blind as Leander himself has been rendered by love. The image of parents standing over their *miseri* son, an inversion of the natural order, highlights the sad destruction of love. When describing Hero’s reaction to Leander’s dead body, Virgil uses a line almost exactly identical to a line from the *Aeneid* describing Dido. The link between the *Eclogues* and *Georgics* introduced earlier now extends forward to the *Aeneid* as well. The cohesion between Virgil’s three works becomes clearer; the significance of this effect in relation to his treatment of love emerges only at the conclusion of the *Georgics*.

Returning to Georgic III, we notice that before Virgil moves on from his discussion of love in the context of livestock care to other aspects of instruction, he inserts a transition that foreshadows his return to the relationship between love and poetry, an idea first touched upon in Eclogue X. Reminding himself of other topics he has yet to cover, he remarks that he has gotten caught up and carried away by love, much
like the subjects of the preceding lines (sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, / singula dum capti circumuecatamur amore).\textsuperscript{420} The diction is significant; Virgil uses the same phrase captus amore when referring to a reader entranced by love of poetry.\textsuperscript{421} The parallel use of the phrase again conflates love and poetry even as it juxtaposes them: caught up by love, Virgil must break free from it to continue his poem, yet his reader is ensnared by poetry just as one might be by love. Here, then, is another layer to add to the ever-growing picture of love: the element of control. The entire passage on love in Georgic III is marked by a loss of control caused by the madness of love. This pattern is underlined at the close of the section when Virgil admits he has lost control of the poem and needs to reign in his subject matter. Though it can certainly be argued that Virgil intended this loss of control the whole time, the end result is the same: the message conveyed is that both love and poetry can exert an influence that causes loss of control.

Georgic IV delivers the culmination of Virgil’s multi-layered presentation of love. As in the above poems, Virgil draws comparisons between humans and animals. While before, Virgil highlighted the similarities between love’s effects on mankind and animals, in Georgic IV he presents bees as the antithesis to the human experience of love. Unlike the rest of the animal kingdom, bees do not reproduce sexually, according to Virgil’s account (illum adeo placuisse apibus mirabere morem, / quod neque concubitu indulgent nec corpora segnes / in Venerem solvunt aut fetus nixibus edunt).\textsuperscript{422} The placement of adeo directly before illum is used similarly in Ecl. 4.11 and G. 1.24 to denote something particularly remarkable.\textsuperscript{423} Indeed, the bee’s strange custom should be admired; they do not simply accept their way of life, rather it pleases them (placuisse). Bees are exalted as a species with divine links. Virgil refers to the caelestia dona of honey\textsuperscript{424} and mentions the conviction that bees hold a heavenly wisdom, though he does not confess to believe it himself.\textsuperscript{425} The application of Virgil’s bee treatise to human themes is controversial. Does the poet intend bees to serve as a model for humanity? It is tempting to conclude this, since some very tantalizing links exist between bees and mankind in the poem. Indeed, bees encounter many of the same obstacles that the farmer encounters in the preceding books of the Georgics, such as disease,\textsuperscript{426} a main focus of the end of Georgic III. The personification of bees leading a funeral procession out of the hive strongly invites comparison with men (tum corpora luce caretum / exportant tectis et trista funera ducunt).\textsuperscript{427} Likewise, the description of civil war between swarms painfully calls to mind the many instances of civil discord that have arisen in the history of man, most especially for Virgil’s contemporary readers, the recent civil war between Octavian and Antony.

Should one conclude, then, that Virgil intended bees as the utmost model, indicating that mankind would be better off if humans abstained from passionate activity just as bees do? While making any definite claims about a poet’s intentions—particularly of an author of such complexity as Virgil—is impossible, I believe that when viewed in the context of Virgil’s overall development of love, one can conclude that bees are not meant to be humanity’s model. Ultimately, humans are not bees and despite the destruction that love can bring us, we cannot live without it. Though Virgil toys with the idea that humans should emulate the bee lifestyle, the end of Georgic IV suggests instead that for Virgil, love, like poetry, is essential to life.

In the last half of Georgic IV, Virgil introduces his final lover-poet figure. From stock shepherd to contemporary friend, he now comes to the mythological figure Orpheus. He could not have chosen a more elevated focus for his final poem, and indeed the picture of love becomes the most serious and complex in Georgic IV, as Virgil ties in various strands of meaning from the previous poems.

The story of Orpheus coalesces ideas about love seen throughout the poems. While Orpheus’ pain comes from love lost through death rather
than rejection, the end result is the same: continuous, unending torment (veniente die, te decedente canebat). His love is madness (quis tantus furor) and he is ultimately destroyed by the crazed passion of the Ciconian women. The idea of love as destructive is particularly graphic here.

In addition to these images, if there was any doubt before regarding the connection between love and poetry, Virgil dispels it by including Orpheus’ story. Orpheus is the ultimate mythological poet. His verses have the power to soothe tigers and gather mighty oak trees. Poetry makes Orpheus so powerful that he can safely visit and return from a place where no living person is supposed to venture—the Underworld. Yet as we saw with Gallus, Orpheus’s poetry stems only from his loss of Eurydice. He sings of nothing else; his love is his only subject matter, the only fuel for his poetry. Like Gallus, no matter how long he sings, he is still miserable. Ultimately, his unbearable desire for his wife brings disaster upon them both when he cannot resist looking back at her, breaking his promise to Proserpina and banishing Eurydice to death once again.

Love has given Orpheus the power of poetry, but he has no control over his power. While Virgil imagines his readers capti amore, just like the tigers who soften to Orpheus’ song, Orpheus surrenders control to love in the same way that Virgil surrenders Georgic III, if only briefly, to the tantalizing discussion of love. Overall, love is a powerful force that through its madness can inspire powerful poetry. Yet this poetry can do nothing to protect the author from the inevitable pain and loss of control caused by love. Ultimately, we are humans, not bees; despite the complex dual nature of love, we must always choose it, just as Gallus, Orpheus, and Virgil himself must always choose poetry.

While Virgil has courted the idea of abandoning poetry and shunning love, seeing the former as futile and the latter as destructive, the conclusion of Georgic IV suggests that he ultimately chooses both while recognizing the loss of control and potential for damage that comes with both love and poetry. His decision to pursue poetry is clear, as the end of the Georgics looks forward to the Aeneid, the finishing piece of his literary career. As mentioned earlier, establishing the link between the Eclogues and Georgics was important in terms of creating continuity between his works. At the end of the Georgics, Virgil extends this continuity forward, looking ahead to his final work. The epic content and style of the end of Georgic IV looks forward to the Aeneid, while use of the imperfect canebam indicates that Virgil is ready to move on to a different genre. In the concluding line, he mentions Tityrus, a figure from the very first line of the Eclogues, making a clear connection between the first and second works once again. That Virgil took such care throughout to establish his writings as a cohesive unit shows his dedication to the poetic career and his ambitions to model himself as an influential, career poet. Clearly, whatever the drawbacks of poetry may be, Virgil has demonstrated that he has chosen this power for himself, and with this choice has surrendered himself to uncontrollable, maddening, and inspiring love.

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“Little Things Mean a Lot”
Dust, Our Mutual Friend, and the Capitalization Function

Michelle K. Dailey

From the very beginning – the title of the introduction, no less – of Joseph Anthony Amato’s Dust, readers learn “little things mean a lot.” This core concept fuels his book, which is, as the title suggests, all about dust. Amato comments that this subject “would appear to be neither a subject worthy of reflection nor meritorious enough to serve a history of smallness.” Yet, he wrote an entire book about it, which indicates that there must be something more to it than just what meets the eye. “Unnoticed, trodden underfoot, [dust] is associated with the lowliest things, with what is broken, discarded, and formless.” However, it is also “found within all things” because it is so small and amorphous. This relationship creates an odd paradox of the tiny suddenly becoming ubiquitous and important. One can see this paradox in Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend by way of the “Dust”; this essay will seek to describe the capitalization of that word is a critical component to this understanding.

At its most literal level, dust first appears in Our Mutual Friend early in the course of the text. Readers are introduced, via Mortimer talking to Eugene, to a man described as “a tremendous old rascal who made his money by Dust.” As Mortimer explained,

[H]e grew rich as a Dust Contractor, and lived in a hollow in a hilly country entirely composed of Dust. On his own small estate the growling old vagabond threw up his own mountain range, like an old volcano, and its geological formation was Dust. Coal-dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust, crockery dust, rough dust, and sifted dust, – all manner of Dust.

This man was the father of John Harmon; this man’s will is the main impetus behind the action of the novel’s plot. Without the specifications of the will – which explains that Harmon’s son would inherit his fortune only if he married a particular woman (Bella Wilfer), and that if he did not, the wealth would transfer over to Harmon’s servant (Mr. Boffin) – the drama would be severely lacking, and the novel itself would struggle to exist in any readable or intriguing form.

This description of Harmon is entirely couched in terms of “dust.” He is described through his profession (Dust Contractor), his estate is described as a mountain range of dust, and his wealth came from dust. Thus, Amato’s paradox of the infinitesimally small being found in everything is here in play: dust, which “once more than anything literally and metaphorically defined smallness,” is so pervasive throughout the novel that its presence has become critical for the main plot. Furthermore, it should be noted that Harmon profited by this particle that was associated with “what is broken, discarded, and formless.” This observation feels out of place, as one does not usually profit from broken and discarded things. Perhaps, then, “dust” is functioning in ways other than just the most literal.

On one hand, readers get a list of possible definitions straight from Dickens himself: “Coal-dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust, crockery
dust, rough dust, and sifted dust.” However, this list at first seems rather puzzling: Crockery dust? Vegetable dust? Isn’t dust that fine, usually gray or white, powdery substance? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, though, the word “dust” is “often extended to include ashes and other refuse from a house.” Thus, “dust” would seem to be able to be equated with other words such as “trash.” Harmon’s profession could then turn from “Dust Contractor” into “Trashman,” and the dust heaps on his estate could be viewed as trash heaps. Nonetheless, this distinction, however accurate it may be, feels rather inadequate on its own. Why did Dickens choose the word “dust,” then, if it were only to be completely synonymous with words like “rubbish” and “garbage”?

Adrian Poole dealt with this question of the composition of the dust-heaps – and thus the definition of the word “dust” itself – in the notes to the Penguin Classics edition of Our Mutual Friend. He called attention not only to its “material meanings,” but also to its “religious connotations of the word, above all the judgment incurred by Adam in Genesis 3.19 (‘for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return”), as well as to Humphry House’s declaration that the “dust-heaps must have contained human excrement.” However, he also stated that whatever “these dust-heaps are composed of is a riddle without an answer,” and later said that, “[i]n the course of this novel, ‘dust’ takes its elusive place amongst all sorts of shifting matter, solid and liquid, dense and dispersed, ashes and ooze.” One must turn away from straight literalism towards more metaphoric and symbolic layers to make any sense of this slippery term.

When revisiting the grounding paragraph for this essay, something rather odd should become apparent: the word “dust” is incongruous to itself. The word appears ten times in a single paragraph, but on four of those occasions, Dickens capitalizes the word. Thus, the question of what this capitalization is doing to the term arises – what is the difference between “Dust” and “dust?” If Dickens hadn’t meant something by it, he would not have capitalized it sometimes while leaving it lowercase other times. When one chooses to capitalize a noun, he does so in order to signify that there is some greater meaning behind the word that simply cannot be explained by more words. It is an attempt to bring the reader’s attention to this deeper meaning by setting the word apart from the other words in the sentence. Throughout the remainder of this essay, I will refer to this phenomenon as the “capitalization function.”

One good example of this capitalization function that can help our understanding of “Dust” is the treatment of “nature” versus “Nature.” The word “nature,” like the word “dust,” can mean many things. People talk of “human nature” and “animal nature,” referring to specific characteristics that make a particular living being distinctly “human” or “animal.” People also talk of “nature versus nurture,” intending the term “nature” in this context to refer to one’s hereditary background and things about oneself that one cannot control (such as who one’s parents are, where one was born, and what genes one was born with). In other instances, the word can be used in an attempt to describe the natural world – the “environment.” However, even here, the word does not have a singular meaning. It can be used to describe the seas or the skies, the desert or the countryside, the jungles or the mountains. Thus, it is clear that “nature” is, as Raymond Williams puts it in his essay, “Ideas of Nature,” “both complicated and changing” – which explains why one might turn to capitalization in an attempt to pin down this complex concept. When one talks of “Nature,” with a capital “N,” he is generally making an attempt to describe all of the splendors of the natural world in a single word. Williams alludes to this massive undertaking by explaining that “just as in religion the moment of monotheism is a critical development, so, in human responses to the physical world, is the moment of a singular Nature.” Here, Williams both uses “Nature” with a capital “N” and explains how the appearance of this particular framework becomes a “critical development” for
“human responses to the physical world.” He links this development to another development— that of monotheistic religion.

Religion is another instance where the capitalization function can clearly be seen at work. For the purposes of creating one strong and coherent example, I will focus here on the monotheistic religion of Christianity. Within Christianity, there are many words that gain new meaning when they are capitalized. For instance, “Father” with a capital “F” means something radically different from “father” with a lowercase “f”. “My father” means a father figure in the human sense—whether that refers to biological, adopted, or honorary fathers. A “father” in this sense is ideally someone who loves you unconditionally and who is willing to provide for you and be there for you in times of need. However, it also is used to refer to someone who is—or was—present on this Earth, in flesh and blood form. In Christian theology, however, “My Father,” refers to God. In this understanding, too, God is supposed to love you unconditionally and be willing to provide for you, just as one’s human “father” is—however, He is understood to be not of this world. He is incomprehensible, only able to be known through what He chooses to reveal. You cannot touch Him; you cannot see Him.

Even my brief description of God bears the mark of the capitalization function, through the usage of the pronoun “He.” “He” takes on a completely different meaning when capitalized than it does when it is kept in its lowercase form, “he.” When one says “he,” one could be referring to literally any male who has ever existed in any form—human or animal, living or dead. However, when one capitalizes the “h,” suddenly “He” carries a whole new connotation. “He” means God— or Jesus. “He” means, in other words, the Creator of the universe, the Son of God ... the list goes on and on, and in each instance, the capitalization function is seen, through words such as “Creator” and “Son.” Simple, everyday words suddenly take on new and radically different meanings when a single, seemingly unimportant, letter is capitalized.

A single, seemingly unimportant, thing that suddenly becomes absolutely crucial to some other concept should sound familiar, as this trope is the exact same one as that of dust itself. To return to what Joseph Anthony Amato said in Dust—and to the title of this essay—“little things mean a lot!” Tracing the capitalization function through both “Nature” and religious terminology helps one to examine the role of “Dust” within Our Mutual Friend. “Dust” appears to have two roles in the novel—first, it can be read literally, both as the tiny powdery particles that accumulate everywhere, and as trash. This literal reading must not be brushed aside or taken for granted, as it is, I believe, crucial for understanding the paradox of profiting or benefiting from something that is supposed to be useless and meaningless. The literal meaning is also useful for studying the oddity of the idea that something small and/or unwanted could end up being extremely mobile and important, even to the point of being essential to the forward movement of the novel’s plot.

However, it can also be read on a higher level as something that is trying to explain a movable and overarching concept— a concept that cannot be pinpointed by any one word, which is why it then relies on the capitalization function to draw attention to its significance.

When Dickens uses the word “Dust,” he is trying to refer to it as a multitude of concepts outside of the literal meaning of tiny particles and trash: a plot device and pollution (by way of, according to Amato on page 8, the dust and smoke created by industry that led to city-specific “haze and smog”). Also, as evidenced by the scenes in Our Mutual Friend regarding Harmon’s will that was hidden in the dust-heaps, dust can act as a concealer due to its inherent smallness and supposed insignificance. However, these are by no means the only meanings that he is trying to assign to the word. Below the grounding paragraph for this essay, Mortimer explains to Mrs. Veneering about Harmon’s daughter and how Harmon tried to choose a husband for her. In this explanation, he uses “Dust” as an apparent synonym for money, when he says that
Harmon “proceeded to settle upon her, as her marriage portion, I don’t know how much Dust, but something immense.”448 Directly after that, he seems to use “Dust” to imply some form of destruction, when he says that the girl felt that “such a marriage would make Dust of her heart and Dust of her life.”449

Therefore, even as I have attempted to explain Dickens’s implied meanings vis-à-vis “Dust,” it is clearly evident that words alone are simply not sufficient to describe such a broad sweeping significance that can crop up in any number of places with any number of definitions. This is precisely why the capitalization function is put into use – whether that be in this particular case with “Dust,” or with other subjects, such as “Nature” and religion. Ultimately, the capitalization of the noun is more telling than any number of description words that I, or anybody, can attach to it. It speaks to the fundamental difference between the capitalized word and any other word in a sentence, and it leaves the reader with a framework that is not only meaningful in and of itself but also capable of letting the reader supplement this meaning with personal interpretation.

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One summer’s day early in August 1797 two young boys, Bushrod and Augustine Washington waited eagerly in front of the fledgling Georgetown College for their beloved Uncle George. In a graceful trot, the steed of the former president carried him to the front lawn of his nephews’ boarding school; he dismounted, and within a few minutes was delivering a speech, as every Georgetowner knows, on the top step of the Old North staircase. In this small scene we see just how much things have changed since then. No longer can a president make personal outings unaccompanied, and no mother, to my knowledge, names her child Bushrod or Augustine anymore. Furthermore, the curriculum these two young boys would have been engaged with was vastly different from the curriculum we associate with Georgetown today.

In light of our origins, how did Georgetown education become what it is today?

We start at the beginning of university history. Writing the 1798 Prospectus for his new academy, Georgetown founder Archbishop John Carroll was not unclear about his intention “to establish suitable provisions for the approvement [sic] of youth in the three important virtues of physical, moral, and literary education… [T]he directors of this institution openly profess that they have nothing so much at heart as to implant virtue and destroy in their pupils the seeds of vice.” To implant and to destroy were the tasks of the first Georgetown professors. If “destroying vice” sounds barbaric it is worth noting that Father Carroll’s Georgetown was different from ours in that her youngest pupils were but small children, as young as eight. What is most striking, however, about Carroll’s language is its emphasis on the individual student. For him, the university was centered concretely on the formation of virtuous persons. Georgetown existed for the sake of her students.

To this end, Carroll formulated a curriculum anchored firmly in classical languages and literary works, with a healthy smattering of modern languages (especially French), philosophy, and natural sciences. Born of the Ratio Studiorum, Ignatius of Loyola’s sixteenth century plan for a Jesuit education, the first Georgetown curriculum was intended to cover seven years of schooling. In the first years of preparatory, the boys studied English, Latin, and Greek grammar, along with arithmetic, geography, and Bible History. As they progressed they would apply their language skills in reading the fables of Phaedrus and Aesop, Caesar’s prose, and Cicero’s orations. Studies in Greek, Roman, and American history, philosophy, and a helping of natural sciences rounded out the older students’ course load.

The rigorous language training was not just for the sake of reading old dusty books. It had a second component, dare we say, a practical one. Even in 1599 Ignatius knew that “nothing slackens youthful diligence more than monotony,” and therefore called for educational dramatic productions, debates, contests, and exercises. By junior and senior year professors would actually lecture in Latin on such subjects as ethics and metaphysics. After having mastered the basics of grammar, pupils turned their focus to the finer points of rhetoric, prosody, and dia-
lectics, and by their final years were themselves producing original compositions of Greek poetry and Latin dialogues imitating Horace, often memorized and recited orally. To showcase the consummation of the Georgetown gentlemen, commencement ceremonies always included student performances of poetry or music. At the 1825 Commencement sixteen such works were performed (thus it is not surprising that these events often lasted all day). *Eloquentia perfecta*, eloquence, effectiveness in expression—these were chief goals of Georgetown educators; what good is an educated man if he cannot communicate his knowledge well? Indeed, assessment for these young men heavily stressed verbal recitation. Hence the formal title of what we now know as weekly “discussion sections.”

This plan of studies was prescribed; elective courses were few. As with most things, Father Carroll had his reasons for this as well: “It will be required of every one who may be admitted, to pursue the course of studies above mentioned, as experience has proved exceptions in this regard to have been a great source of idleness,” read another early prospectus. Nevertheless, each student could choose a small number of elective courses each year. William G. McEvitt, M.D. tells of his experience with elective courses in 1927:

When my turn came to enter the building, I saw a row of tables behind which sat the Registrar’s staff. I noticed a priest standing by the first table. He had horn-rimmed glasses which he wore on the end of his nose, and held a single sheet of paper in his hand. The college catalogue had indicated a choice between Greek and R.O.T.C. I was leaning toward R.O.T.C... I had no sooner given my name when the priest spoke. He said ‘This one will take Greek’... So much for elective choice!

So much indeed! Other elective choices offered since Georgetown’s inception included navigation, surveying, use of globes, astronomy, bookkeeping, music, drawing, dancing and fencing. Note the vocational nature of some of these. Even in the ivory tower of early twentieth century Georgetown College, allowance was made for “usefulness.”

By and large, though, a Georgetown education was dedicated to wisdom, eloquence, and virtue. Even so, many students found ways to turn these noble acquisitions into instruments for their own ends. In a prime example of such utility, during a student/faculty meeting in 1845, a student, one E.R. Smith, in good democratic fashion, requested of the president and faculty a holiday for him and his fellow students, in verse. His last two lines: “Then would you answer? Could you answer, nay? The boon we ask is—one, short HOLIDAY!” Similarly, John Duncan, class of 1948, employed his poetic skill to praise the very experience of acquiring it:

For what can compare
With the pleasure rare
Which reward his daily toil?
And where will you meet
With flowers more sweet
Than those of the classical soil?

All these pieces—the varying required subjects, the dramatic exercises, the religious foundation—joined together to make an education that was a composite whole, with an intentional end in mind, toward which each separate part was aimed. Edwin W. Passarelli (BSM 1930, MD 1932) recalls the effectiveness of the execution of this holistic vision:

I remember the teacher who gave us philosophy and later led us through theology. In time, he became President of the University, but at the humble level as our mentor he brought philosophy alive and made religion a reciprocal partner and somehow led us to correlate our other work and studies into this vital framework, so that purpose and order evolved from the seeming isolations. Thus, the beginnings of our maturity.
Even men like Dr. Passarelli, training to be physicians, were not spared from Father Carroll’s original intent to produce virtuous men. Speaking of his experience some twenty years later, Mr. Louis Mendez, Jr. (MA 1956) had similar remarks:

[M]y distinguished professor did so much, intentionally or unintentionally, to bring me to realize how ignorant I was. This realization, he told me, was the beginning of wisdom. With wisdom comes that desire to learn, if only for the pure love of learning. I soon found myself developing mentally in the easy, personal, nonbureaucratic atmosphere of Georgetown... [T]he high state of student morale in a genuine academic atmosphere, flavored with the personal attention of men like Dr. Rommen and Father Horigan, left no doubt in my mind that Georgetown is highly dedicated to the proposition that the University’s mission is to turn out a good product, a man armed with the beginnings of wisdom, an essential force for freedom.458

Curricular change came midway through the first half of the twentieth century. Up until then the leaders of the university had stressed their curriculum’s time-tested integrity. In his study of Catholic Higher Education, Andrew Greeley notes that administrators and faculty “were not so much concerned with the pushing back of the frontier of truth as with passing on a given tradition of truth in which little in the way of addition or alteration was necessary.”459 Repeatedly, faculty would stress the time-tested success of the Ratio. But the great cultural changes that followed World War I produced a strong emphasis on “organization, efficiency, and standards.”460 In came inter-collegiate accreditation associations and out went Georgetown’s academic independence. In response, an administration that had always been inward-looking, working with the faculty toward the same goal, was forced to turn outward to meet new demands of those outside the front gates; its priorities were forever changed.

While Georgetown first stood for accreditation in the 1920s, the effect of these changes on students’ educational experience was not immediate. In 1951 the university changed the tone of her mission statements. John Carroll’s concrete intention of creating wise and virtuous young graduates was replaced by endorsements of ill-defined ideals. That year, Georgetown’s report to the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools proclaimed that she “represented certain established principles, specific ideals, and definite traditions through which she seeks to uphold, defend, propagate and elucidate the integral Christian and American cultural heritage.”461 The same year requirements in philosophy went from 36 hours to 26; electives increased from 18 to 36 hours. Despite this reduction, the accrediting team expressed concern about the high amount of philosophy required, in addition to the need for new classes, and the fact that almost all members of the faculty were Jesuit-trained.462 The pressure was on from outside the front gates. Once exclusively focused on her students, Georgetown became much more conscious of her image in the greater world of higher education.

This transformation has come into such full fruition that it is hard to believe what the history books tell us Georgetown used to be like. Look around. Verbal championing of hopeful but vague ideals is in no short supply. But what became of Father Carroll’s intent of forming a certain kind of person? Today it seems the only concrete results Georgetown can promise her students are the abilities to think, read, and write “critically.” These are not worthless things, to be sure, but much different, and more myopic than the holistic vision of earlier Georgetown education, whose ultimate goal was a graduating class marked by character and wisdom. I would be remiss to discount all the dedicated professors who do teach toward this end in light of the doctrine of cura personalis. But the formation of souls requires the
concerted and cooperative effort of the whole institution. The Aristotelian principle of the priority of the community applies just as much to the academy as it does to the political regime. The cohesiveness of Georgetown’s old mission has given way to fragmentation, and the common purpose has given way to departmental purposes. But as things change ever more rapidly it becomes of growing importance that we hold on to the time-tested wisdom of the past. Just as, in the midst of the last hundred years of change on Georgetown’s campus, one can still stand on the very stone step upon which Washington spoke, one can still extract a rich classical educational experience from Georgetown, thanks in no small part to Professor Patrick Deen’s work with the Tocqueville Forum.

In 1789 President Washington declared the newly ratified Constitution to be in effect, and the United States of America as we know it was established, with one driving motivation: to ensure man’s freedom under law. In the same year, Georgetown University was founded for a similar purpose: to prepare her pupils to bear the responsibility of this freedom. Let us pray she may continue to do so.

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Denis J. M. Bradley has lived an introspective life firmly planted in the present but spent sifting through the discourses of medieval philosophers. After being awarded a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, Bradley left the University of Windsor one year early at the age of 20, entering the University of Chicago in 1963, where he studied under the likes of Leo Strauss and Richard McKeon—citing the latter’s dialectical approach to the “philosophy of philosophy” as particularly influential. In 1970 he was ordained as a Roman Catholic priest, but, in 1998, was received into canonical communion with the Eastern Orthodox Church. After earning his doctoral degree from the University of Toronto in 1970 and spending two years as a fellow at the American Academy in Rome, he came to Georgetown’s philosophy department in 1972, and never seriously considered leaving even though not a few opportunities arose over the years. Bradley is retiring at the end of this academic term, and after a career that spans forty years, he has garnered a unique viewpoint on the evolution of the role of Catholic ideology at Georgetown and the results of the institution’s full-fledged embrace of modernity over the past decades.

“I would say that there’s been a change in Georgetown, probably before I came, in the 60s, where it was no longer Catholicism as the intellectual standpoint and critique of modernity but rather that modernity could be used to mediate Catholicism,” Bradley noted in a long conversation at the local restaurant where he is a regular and has been sitting in the same booth for more than 30 years.

This change of course did not happen in isolation at Georgetown, but is a reflection of a general trend across the post-Vatican II Church to reconcile modernity and Catholicism and to communicate that the two are not in diametric opposition but work together. As Bradley puts it, the current rhetoric posits that “Catholicism helps modernity understand its deepest aspirations” while “modernity can reveal to Catholicism some of the aspects of its own internal history obscured by the counter-reformation.” Bradley asserts that this has been the mindset of the Jesuits at Georgetown who have largely sought to show that modernity and Catholicism are compatible.

Asked whether he thought this was a severe compromise for the faith, he was less fire and brimstone and more realistic. “Certainly there are Catholic intellectuals of a certain bent who think that’s a betrayal” but it is difficult to sell an education when “you’re telling people that most of what you’re doing in your future professions is counter to the basic metaphysical truths of Catholicism.”

This strikes at the heart of Georgetown’s most difficult circumstance over the past several decades: the gap between its rhetoric about care of the soul and appreciative learning and the reality of its faculty hiring practices and the active recruitment of a student body that largely views
the university as its stepping stone and port of entry into an elite political and professional realm. The university “rhetorically challenges this fact” but ultimately “bows to it in a thousand ways.” This pre-professional approach, despite what some current critics given to nostalgia might say, is consistent with a previous history of Georgetown being a vehicle for Catholic men to gain access to the law firms and top-tier institutions of an American society formerly dominated by a Protestant and insular group that often explicitly excluded Roman Catholics.

Bradley notes that this legacy of pre-professionalism is a double-edged sword for the university, serving as both its weakness and strength, gathering a “very hard-working” group of students but fostering a “deeply anti-intellectual attitude,” in the sense of a lack of concern with ideas and different ways of thinking.

In perhaps his sharpest critique, Bradley says this mentality and approach to education is in fact quite in line with a long history of not just Georgetown traditions but the whole Jesuit methodology of plotting inroads with the powers that be and becoming “advisors to the throne.” “I don’t see this [pre-professionalism] as a betrayal of Jesuit history—it’s just that the throne has changed,” he notes.

Though Bradley criticizes Georgetown, its student body, and its approach to education, his reflections are always characterized by graciousness and filled with high praise and the personal warmth and respect he feels for his colleagues, the way he was treated at the university over his forty year career, and the affability and overall intellectual heft of his students. “I’m leaving Georgetown with very positive feelings about the experience and the students and the institution.”

He is also no doom and gloom, everything’s going to hell in a handbasket sympathizer given to waxing nostalgic about better days. Bradley clearly sees Georgetown’s positioning within the context of a wider American higher educational landscape and an understandable response to the academic situation. Georgetown is constantly striving to maintain its position as an elite university in the immediate outer ring of the Ivy League on a budget that has always been too small, leveraging its core affiliation with the nation’s capital as intrinsic to its identity. The obsession with specialization and research, driven by a myriad of factors, is not the type of environment in which Georgetown is naturally calibrated to excel. It’s a noble idea—one Bradley says is risky but he would like to see attempted in some form—to stop catering to and actively recruiting the high achieving pre-professionally minded students Georgetown is most well known for, but one that runs the risk of cutting the legs out from under the whole institution. “You’d risk becoming a Holy Cross in Washington,” he says. Bradley calls the current approach “a realistic assessment of [Georgetown’s] position in the world.”

The reality gap between the rhetoric and the actual functioning of the university is what explains Georgetown’s precarious position. Surely there is a “critical point” past which the rhetoric rings so false as to leave the university without a core—where one draws the line of this critical tipping point (and whether or not it has already been crossed) is a matter of perspective and opinion. Bradley describes the voice of Georgetown’s Jesuit values as “one of many in the choir” competing to be heard as opposed to its previous function as the prism through which most of the decisions of the university were made.

The reality is that a series of changes and decisions, made not in a vacuum but over a period of time in a complex milieu of evolving educational landscapes and societal shifts in approaches to faith, have diluted the thrust of a Catholic voice. Bradley offered up changes in the philosophy department as an example, stating “once you open the professorate to anyone with excellent and usually secular academic training, you can’t expect them to take up the whole traditional Georgetown theme song.” When a majority of people in the philosophy department do not share the metaphysical views of orthodox Catholicism, one isn’t going to find a ready group of standard bearers of Jesuit educational ideology.
Bradley says those battles were fought in large part just before his time when the department was “predominantly manned by Catholics of a Thomist bent,” with some leaving with bad feelings over claims that Georgetown had bowed to secularism—sentiments one still hears in discussions about the university.

Discussions about the gap in reality and rhetoric are even more apposite with the recent and very public announcement of the departure of Patrick J Deneen, the current Tsakopoulos-Kounalakis Professor in the department of Government and the head of the Tocqueville Forum, for Notre Dame University in part because of his concerns about the marginalized role Catholic thought and educational philosophy play in faculty hiring decisions, campus discourse, and decision making.

Deneen’s departure is relevant because it also sparked concern about the potential demise of pockets of Georgetown where intellectual debate and discussion are thriving on campus. Asked whether he thought these areas would still be around in 10 or 15 years, Bradley was pessimistic, saying he has no doubt the current administration wants these communities to survive but the actual institutional commitment to ensure that they do so is not very strong.

This sobering image of Georgetown is a far cry from the ideals of John Henry Cardinal Newman whose reflections on and prescriptions for universities envisioned them as communities striving to raise the intellectual tone of society. Bradley was pessimistic here, as well, calling what I referred to as the pre-professional mindset on campus “pervasive” and “vulgar.”

Here, again, Bradley comes off sounding harsher than he really is—more a reflection of his philosophical approach than his personal sentiment on the matter. Over the course of his professorial career, a use of “the ancients to gain a point of view on the moderns”—and their intrinsically non-egalitarian approach—has been his modus operandi in the classroom. Bradley believes Georgetown has something to offer the world at large in its Jesuit humanist philosophy of education.

There is much agreement around this idea, but it is the theme of Georgetown sacrificing its rhetorical and practical integrity in a feverish attempt to keep pace with the elite institutions it longs to be equal with which sets the tone for fears of Georgetown sloughing off the last vestiges of its heritage and ideological traditions.

Bradley’s stalwart character and imperturbability have kept him grounded; he says that he has felt personally at home in the ambiguous matrix of a Catholic institution, even with the rhetoric and realities that come with it and the radical secularism of the base of a large portion of its faculty and students. He is leaving feeling that Georgetown has changed and is changing, not that it is on a “slippery slope to oblivion,” calling that sentiment “untrained nostalgia” that fails to take a sophisticated look into what Georgetown is, why it is so, and where it might be. “Being something of a Platonist, what do you expect in the ‘world of becoming’ but change?” Bradley asked at the end of the conversation. It will no doubt require a collective effort to ensure that the flame of intellectual life continues to blaze in the pockets of Georgetown where it has been ignited. As the pool of resources continues to be spread thin, the ideological landscapes continue to shift, and peer institutions still hold their standards high, it is only these discussions of ideas and the cultivation of the mind that will provide truth to the worthy rhetoric of the educational philosophy that is the foundation of Georgetown.

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Capturing recent memory is difficult. All Philodemicians who have joined our ranks in the last two decades have their favorite memories and their own unique spin on the events and politics of the Society. Much of our memory of these two decades has been filtered through long years of scattered records and fluctuating interest. We must capture our history now, while the Philodemic remains strong and our connections to alumni remain active. In undertaking this history of the Philodemic Society from 1989-2011, today’s Philodemicians hope to capture a bit of what has made us into the Society we are today – in all of our quirky, eloquent glory. Certainly, this account will be incomplete, but hopefully it will provide the University community with some good background on our recent history and the inspiration to undertake historical projects of their own.

The Years Before: The 1980s in the Philodemic Society

Our former Grand Librarian, Daniel Rendleman (COL ’09), left the story of the Philodemic in the age of the 1980s. By his account, our Society had firmly shifted away from the tradition of literary debate and weekly meetings by this time – we had become a small team of competitive debaters who focused almost exclusively on policy. While the face of the Philodemic had certainly changed, we still count among our ranks the small but mighty contingent of Philodemicians who persevered through these years.

As had been the tradition since the beginning of the Philodemic, until 1983, our organization had a coach that helped us with weekly debates and intercollegiate competition. But in the fall of 1983, Philodemic Coach James Unger was suspended from the University under suspicion of misappropriating funds and made a quick exit, leaving the Philodemic in its “survival years.”

During this time, a series of part-time coaches cycled through, but debate efforts were largely sustained by dedicated students like Steve Larson (a former United States District Court judge), Mike Mazarr (a current adjunct professor at Georgetown University), Stuart Rabin, and Gary Thompson. Mr. Thompson describes these years as “rag-tag” but “lots of fun,” full of road trips in old BMWs, tie-dye T-shirts, and a surprisingly strong competitive showing.

But in the wake of the graduation of some of these few remaining Philodemicians, the debate program at Georgetown all but died. By 1988-1989, the program was almost non-existent. Although a small band of students continued to compete in national debate tournaments, the Philodemic had only a handful of regular participants and little institutional support during this era. The “reconstitution” of the Society that followed during the 1989-1990 academic year rescued the Philodemic from near death and reconnected us to our roots.

Our Reconstitution: 1989-1990

For Georgetown’s Bicentennial celebration in 1989, an excellent project was undertaken: the publication of Swift Potomac’s Lovely Daughter, a volume of student research papers on the history of the University. It is a testament to the Society’s historical significance to Georgetown that not
one, but three chapters of this volume are dedicated to the history of the Philodemic Society. At a time when our organization was nearly non-existent, interest in reviving one of the University’s oldest traditions was clearly growing. One of the student authors, Eric George, came together with several other dedicated Georgetown alumni – including Richard Gordon, who was the Assistant Dean of Georgetown Law School at the time – to reconstitute the Philodemic Society as a literary debating group.

At this point, an aside about Dean Gordon is in order. As a student of the Philodemic Society the 1950s, he served as President and won the Merrick Medal. Fortunately for the future of our Society, during his undergraduate years, Dean Gordon became friends with Leo O’Donovan, who later became a Jesuit and President of Georgetown University. When Fr. O’Donovan began his term in 1989, he sat down with Dean Gordon and asked him, “What’s the first thing I should do as President of Georgetown?” Without hesitation, Dean Gordon replied, “Give the Philodemic its room back.” Within two years, the Philodemic had gone from being a fledging idea discussed in Healy Pub to a small (but enthusiastic) group that met weekly to defend liberty with eloquence in the style of a traditional literary debating society.

The Early Years: Philodemic in the 1990s

In its early years, the Philodemic was small, passionate, and conservative. But our loyalty to one another was strong from the beginning. When a Philodemician, Andrew Booth, died in May of 1993, Philodemicians went on a campaign to get a memorial service for him in the Philodemic Room. They passionately argued that the Philodemic Society had been one of the most important things Mr. Booth did on campus, and worked to bring the Philodemic together as a community to commemorate his death.

But, as it were, this sad part of our history marks a larger story in the Philodemic’s recent past – our tenuous relationship with the Georgetown administration. Throughout the early 1990s, the Philodemic wandered in and out of the Philodemic Room on Thursday nights, and we were ultimately denied access to the room for Mr. Booth’s memorial service. During some weeks, our debates were held in the Philosophy Department conference room. The small but resilient group of Philodemicians was given a boost when the chair of the Philosophy Department wrote a “letter of recommendation” on our behalf to help us get back into the Philodemic Room, although to little avail. Other debates were held in off-campus locations, like the City Tavern Club.

Our struggle to regain our hallowed hall continued during the beginning of the 1990s. The alumna who had served as the first female President of the Society, Rita Jankovich, led an alumni letter campaign on behalf of current Philodemicians to help them secure permanent access to the Philodemic Room on Thursday evenings. A letter drafted to President O’Donovan traced the past conversations with the President’s Office, noting that the only effective communication occurred when current Philodemicians were backed by an alumni threat to cut off donations. While we have not regained full access to our room, this story took a happy turn in 2011 when President John DeGioia’s Chief of Staff, Joseph Ferrara, promised the Society priority over all other reservations for the Philodemic Room.

In addition to our tumultuous relationship with the President’s Office, the Philodemic also had an on-and-off relationship with Georgetown administration at large early on during our reconstitution, particularly with the Student Activities Commission (SAC). Admittedly, all student organizations can empathize with the challenges of creating good programming, and SAC has certainly shifted quite a bit over time for the better. But as we moved into the 1990s, the Philodemic faced several significant issues of cooperation and reputation, dubbed by one amanuensis as “The Persecution.” During the
1995 academic year, the Philodemic was put on probation for its exclusionary induction policies, including accusations of discriminating against certain students and having a closed induction ceremony. This was based on the accusations of several prospective members of the Society, who felt as though the group was unfairly biased in its selection of members. The fall-out from this was divisive, and ultimately resulted in the resignation of the standing president and vice president. Our Constitution and By-Laws were edited to accommodate a more “open” induction policy while still adhering to our long-standing traditions, and many of these changes dictate our induction policies today. No interested student who consistently attends debates will ever be denied induction into the Society, and moreover, we are thrilled to welcome anyone who values eloquence in the defense of liberty into our community.

Some stories also claim that during this time period, Associate Dean of Students Penny Rue accused the Philodemic of being “racist because of its dress code.” This sort of accusation has followed us – at times, we have struggled with the reputation of being an “old boys’ club,” which probably harksens back to the days when Philodemic was an all-male organization. This incident marks a height in tension between the Society and the University; according to alumni sources, however, Dean Rue’s departure significantly helped strengthen the Philodemic’s position within the Georgetown community.

Culture

Many of the alumni who contributed to this project commented on the culture of the Society throughout the early years following our reconstitution, and the results were not quite what one would think. Although many early Philodemicians recalled the Society as overwhelmingly white, male, Catholic, and intellectual in an old-fashioned way, enamored of Chesterton, Neuhaus, Lewis, Newman, Descartes, Aquinas, St. Paul, and Plato. Some of the “Diaspora” included “socialists; the committed (but non-socialist) left; partisan politicos; parliamentary and policy debaters; a strong contingent of geeks; and a few people who came by simply for the

Another aspect of our culture during this era was the relationship between the Society and other organizations on campus. Oral tradition used to frame Philodemic as part of a “triumvirate” of sorts on campus: the International Relations Club, the Delta Phi Epsilon Foreign Service Fraternity, and the Philodemic Society had many overlapping members. Indeed, one of the strongest points of political controversy in the Society was whether or not these alliances were becoming too strong.

The size of the Philodemic Society also fluctuated quite a bit throughout the early years of our history. During the early parts of the 1990s, we were a small (but dedicated) band of debaters. Starting around 1993, the Philodemic had about 20 members, only 10 of whom were active. Toward the end of the decade, by 1997, the Philodemic had about 65 inducted members, about 40 of whom were active. This surge in membership and attendance marked a new era of success in the Philodemic, one which was marked with innovation and the beginning of many traditions which we cherish today.

Party Like It’s 1999: New Philodemic traditions at the turn of the Millennium

By the turn of the millennium, attendance at weekly debates had stabilized to an average of 40 or 50, but attendance at larger debates – like the Hamilton or Merrick debates – came to about 100. The community was growing stronger and more active, and this growth was marked by several important changes.

First, the Philodemic became more diverse. The earlier “core constituency [of the Philodemic] was white, male, Catholic, and intellectual in an old-fashioned way, enamored of Chesterton, Neuhaus, Lewis, Newman, Descartes, Aquinas, St. Paul, and Plato.” Some of the “Diaspora” included “socialists; the committed (but non-socialist) left; partisan politicos; parliamentary and policy debaters; a strong contingent of geeks; and a few people who came by simply for the
show.” As membership grew, however, many new voices were heard. Significantly, much new input came from other parts of the campus community, including members from the College Democrats, the College Republicans, and the International Relations Club. These students gravitated strongly toward policy, and “Plato became a dirty word.”

But our older traditions were not forgotten, and in the spirit of the past, several new traditions were established. One of the Philodemic’s fondest traditions, the Dean Gordon Debate, was established in 1995 to commemorate Dean Gordon’s contributions to the reconstitution of the Philodemic Society. Until his death in 2003, Dean Gordon personally attended these debates, which award the wittiest speaker of the night in honor of Gordon’s own reputed wit. One alumnus recounted a particularly delightful exchange with Dean Gordon who, when asked what he thought of that year’s debate, replied, “It was terrible,” in his “unforgettable baritone.” Later, a donation in his honor was given to the Society, and this helped us create the pins that read “Dean Gordon” on the back.

Another cherished tradition of the Philodemic Society was created around 1997 or 1998: the legendary “Senior Debate,” our yearly send-off to the senior class. Anyone who has attended this event will know that the “roasts” of members of the senior class are particularly fierce and the insults go flying, but a good time is had by all. And if the reader will indulge a brief moment of this author’s self-regard, the Librarianship was also re-established in 1998. Jordon Nardino, serving as the first of the new group of Librarians of the Society, undertook several historical projects; notably, he compiled some key facts about the Society’s history and lobbied the University to restore some of the original artwork to the Philodemic Room.

Looking a bit forward into the history of the Society, three other, newer Philodemic traditions are worth noting. One, the Orange Cactus Award, was awarded beginning in 2003 to the speaker who most consistently offered outrageous comments on the floor of the Philodemic. The story behind this award has been warped slightly by the waters of history, but seems to have been named for an inexplicable comment by a member named Amar Weisman about an orange cactus and a convenience store. Allegedly, a physical orange cactus actually existed for a time, but the award was given for the last time in 2005 or 2006.

President Jonathan Deutsch (2005) and future President Patrick Connolly (2006) helped create two new traditions that still exist today: the Father Ryder Award, given to the best floor speaker during the Merrick Debate; and a more unstated tradition, that of no politicking before the election of our officers at the Grand Semi-Annual meeting. While both of these traditions seem well-established in our Society today, their birth was relatively recent, showing just how powerfully culture can sway perceptions of history in our Society.

Recent Memory: A healthy, happy Society

In recent years, the Philodemic has become stronger than ever. Within the past few years, membership began to take a “40-60” shape, with the goal of beginning the year at 40 inducted members and ending with around 60. But more than that, the regularly-attending non-member community exploded – by the fall of 2008, the Philodemic Society routinely saw more than 100 members at its first few debates of the year. By the 2011-2012 academic year, the Society consistently sustained 80-100 members at most of its weekly Thursday night debates.

Excitingly, new generations of Philodemicarians have continued to bring innovation to our Society. Off and on, the Philodemic has competed with literary debate societies at other Universities, such as the Winchester Cup debate with the Jeffersonians at the University of Virginia and the Columbia Cup with the Enosinian Society at the George Washington University. During the spring of 2009, the Philodemic Society hosted Qa-
tari delegates from the Doha Debates, engaging in a smaller, more intimate debate in Riggs Library about the role of women before the nationally-televised debate was hosted at Georgetown the next day. In the spring of 2011, the Society hosted a debate against Bruce Friedrich, Vice President of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) setting record attendance and drawing several members of the faculty.

Along with this impressive growth in membership, the Society has striven to coalesce as a community. Andrew Rugg (President in 2007) began our tradition of hosting regular “President’s Dinners” as a way for members and non-members to get to know one another outside of the debate setting. Every week after debates, we walk as a group to Martin’s Tavern on Wisconsin Avenue for food and conversation. And during a short-lived and perhaps ill-advised bout of athleticism, the Philodemic even fielded a flag football team during the fall of 2008, resulting in only a few minor injuries.

Of course, a Society’s history stretches far beyond these few pages, and much has been missed. Hopefully, this account will cast some light on our reconstitution, the origins of some of our newer traditions, and our shifting set of interests and backgrounds over time. Whatever conclusions you may draw, fair reader, take heart that the Philodemic is on its way up, developing more and more into a forum for debate on campus.

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Endnotes

The Forum

2 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Chicago: Moody Bible Institute, [1908] 2009), 102.
4 St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (Mineola, N. Y.: Dover, 2009), 126.
5 New American Bible, and throughout.
6 (Homiletic and Pastoral Review, October 2002).
7 Josef Pieper, Tradition: Concept and Claim (South Bend, In.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), 14.
8 Charles M. Schulz, Being a Dog Is a Full-Time Job (Kansas City: Andrews & McMeel, 1994), 47.
12 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. 2 Vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,1964), 2. Because this work consists of two volumes with discontinuous pagination, in the following footnotes I cite only Nature or Destiny, referring to volume one and two respectively, following by the relevant pagination within those volumes.
13 Niebuhr, Destiny, 16.
14 “But in the liberation approach sin is not considered as an individual, private, or merely interior reality” (Gutiérrez, 102).
15 Gutiérrez, Theology, 81. Emphasis original.
16 Ibid, 103. Italics mine.
17 Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), 95. This ought not be construed to make Gutiérrez a representative of Catholic orthodoxy, as John Paul II’s opposition to his project demonstrated. Nevertheless, it is on this point about the remediability of sin that Gutiérrez’ brand of Catholicism most clashes with Niebuhr’s Protestantism. Niebuhr regarded the post-Incarnational continuance of evil in the world to be a tenant of Protestantism the denial of which entails a radical departure from the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. See also Langdon Gilkey, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theology of History,” The Journal of Religion 54, no. 4 (Oct. 1974), pp. 370-372.
18 For Niebuhr’s most succinct definition of the Modern View of Man, see Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny, 18.
19 How literal Niebuhr is in using this term is matter of contention. For a fuller treatment of this question, see Geoffrey Rees, “The Anxiety of Inheritance: Reinhold Niebuhr and the

20 Rees 2003, 79.

21 Gutiérrez, Theology, 100.

22 Gilkey, Theology of History, 368.


24 Niebuhr, Destiny, 49.

25 Gutiérrez' primary focus on economics is an application of Marx' understanding of the epiphenomenalism of culture to economics, and Niebuhr's more comprehensive focus can be understood as an implicit rejection of that approach.

26 Niebuhr, Destiny, 49.

27 Gutiérrez, Theology, 95.

28 Ibid, 97.

29 Ibid, Theology, 86.

30 Gutiérrez, Theology, 93.

31 A promising topic of inquiry that lies beyond the scope of this present paper is whether Niebuhr's category of worldviews “where a Christ is not expected” can be expanded to modern, possibly post-Christian philosophies, even though Niebuhr himself only applies the category to pre-Christian philosophies. See Niebuhr, Destiny, 16-34.

32 Gilkey, Theology of History, 364.


34 Though this section focuses on Niebuhr’s skepticism that history is redemptive, that is only half of his theology of history. Although it falls beyond the scope of this paper, it is necessary to note that Niebuhr was equally concerned with those whose overemphasis on the eschaton evacuated history of all meaning. His primary criticism of Karl Barth was exactly that his identification of the sinfulness of all human institutions vis a vis the Kingdom of God devolved into an escapism that eviscerated the strength of Christians to make any meaningful objections to the violent injustice of Soviet Communism (Niebuhr, How My Mind has Changed, 128). In fact, some of his comments made in private correspondence suggest that he felt a greater antipathy toward escapism than toward utopianism. See Roger L. Shinn, “Realism, Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Reassessment,” The Journal of Religion 54, no. 4 (Oct. 1974), pp. 419. http://jstor.org/stable/1201831 (Accessed October 21, 2011).

35 Niebuhr, Destiny, 11.

36 Rees 2003, 90.


38 Gutiérrez, Theology, 91.

39 Niebuhr, Children, 164.

40 Niebuhr, Destiny, 49.

41 Ibid, 291.
42 Ibid, 48.
43 Ibid, 51.
44 Ibid, 4.
45 Gutiérrez, Theology, 97.
46 Niebuhr, Destiny, 4.
48 Niebuhr, Destiny, 54.
49 Gutiérrez, Theology, 124.
51 Niebuhr, Children, 189.
52 Ibid, 187.
55 Ibid, 151.
59 Ibid.
60 Stalley, Plato’s Doctrine of Freedom, 146.
64 Ibid., 7-39.
65 Stalley, Plato’s Doctrine of Freedom, 148.
66 Weil, Need For Roots, 7.
67 Ibid.
68 Plato, Republic, 684.
69 Plato, Symposium, 67.
71 Ibid.
73 Plato, Republic, 684.
75 Stalley, Plato’s Doctrine of Freedom, 157.
77 Ibid, 7.
79 Plato, Apology, 23.
81 Nehamas, Art of Living, 45.
82 Ibid, 43.
83 Ibid, 44.
84 Ibid, 42.
85 Ibid, 147.
86 Edmund Burke, On Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies, ed. Thomas Arkle Clark (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 23.
91 Ibid.
92 Plato, Republic, 816-817.
94 Ibid, 4-5.
95 Ibid, 6-8.
96 Ibid, 12.
97 Ibid, 17.
99 Ibid, 22.
100 Ibid, 22-3.
102 I shall largely treat ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as interchangeable terms, as liberal
democracy is the institutional fruition of liberalism. Likewise, I shall refer to ‘liberal’ or ‘liberals’ as the citizens of liberal democracies, not necessarily as those that adhere to liberalism as a political philosophy.

This is not surprising. Even though it has always been committed to a market economy (of various extents), liberalism focuses more on its ultimate commitments - the furtherance of progress, the expansion of free choice, and the protection and enhancement of human dignity - than on the means it employs to realize those commitments. So, liberalism has displayed an inherent bias towards pragmatism and, with that, a largely centrist attitude towards mechanisms like the market, the state, and technology. It has largely refrained from glorifying or demonizing these mechanisms and has defended them from attempts to completely discredit their usefulness and/or moral worth. For example, despite starting off as an extremely individualist philosophy that did not favor much government intervention in the economy, liberalism (granted, partially out of political necessity) willingly accepted a more robust role for the state to ensure economic stability and material decency during and after the Great Depression.


Ibid, 243.

Ibid, 244-3.

Ibid, 247.

Even though I shall focus on technology as a means to manipulate nature, it is important to stipulate that technology can also be understood as the infrastructure of human society (i.e., government, corporations, bureaucracy, institutions, regulation) which inevitably control human life, and that the analysis provided in ‘Technology as an Amoral Means’ also applies to this conception of technology. For example, certain regulations can help protect people from, say, poisoned food and unsafe machinery. Yet, other regulations can be used to censor free speech and to maintain monopolies in industries and influence - in other words, to hamper the individual’s ability to determine how to live his/her own life.

This is not the proper forum to fully inquire what dignity means in the liberal sense. However, to state my conception briefly, dignity is the individual’s right to be respected by others, to be treated as someone of equal moral worth, and to self-legislate his/her personal conception of the good.


Ibid, 301-2.

Ibid, 302-3.

Ibid, 303.

Ibid, 290.

Ibid, 295.

Yes, liberal communities as envisioned by these theorists arise out of human nature and its subsequent consequences, such as the perceived needs to restrain humanity’s natural predisposition towards selfishness or to secure humanity’s natural rights. Regardless, the liberal tradition has never accepted the viability of societies regulated simply by human nature, nor has it viewed community as the result of some teleology or of a natural chain of
dialectics. For liberalism, humanity secures the viability of its existence and of just principles through the explicit creation of unnatural, governing institutions.

119 Ibid, 310-1.
121 Ibid, 241.
122 Melzer, 296.

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125 Ibid.
129 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Stevens, holding).
130 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Scalia, concurring).
131 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Stevens, holding).
132 United States v. Darby Lumber Co. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Stone, holding).
135 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Stevens, holding).
143 Tocqueville, 491.
144 Putnam, 66.
145 Putnam, 66.
146 Costa and Kahn, 4.
147 Ibid, 4-5.
148 Ibid, 7-8.
149 Ibid, 7.
151 Ibid, 135.
152 Ibid, 133.
153 Ibid, 142.
154 Ibid, 142-3.
155 Ibid, 153.
157 Ibid, 4.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid, 9.
160 Ibid, 7.
161 Ibid, 10.
162 Tocqueville, 496.
164 Ibid, 138-140.
165 Ibid, 151.
166 Ibid, 158-9.
168 Ibid, 79.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Richard Florida, “Cities and the Creative Class,” American Sociological Association (March 2003), 5.
172 Ibid, 5-6.
173 Ibid, 6.
174 Ibid, 16.
176 Ibid, 21.
177 Ibid, 24.
178 Ibid, 27.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid, 32.
184 Rosano, 26.
185 Aristotle I. 1253a2.
186 Rosano, 27.
187 Ibid.
188 Storing, 19-21.
191 Tocqueville, 183.
192 Ibid, 483.
193 Ibid, 484.
194 Ibid, 368.
196 Ibid, 440.
203 Ibid, 12.


Carothers, 19.

Linz and Stepan, 208-209.

*Ibid*, 464.

**The Sanctuary**


Sacred Congregation for the Sacraments and Divine Worship, *Dedication of a Church and an Altar*, 1977, Ch. 4, No. 4. [www.liturgyoffice.org.uk/Resources/Rites/RDCA.pdf](http://www.liturgyoffice.org.uk/Resources/Rites/RDCA.pdf)


A note on terminology: In the present paper, worship in which priest and people face a common direction, regardless of cardinal direction, will be referred to as *ad orientem*. While this can be a bit of a misnomer when an apse is constructed to the North or West, it is a misnomer that is commonly used. Worship in which the priest faces the people will be referred to as *versus populum*. This use of terminology is consistent with that of many liturgists etc.

A note on scope: The present paper is limited to considering churches constructed before the Council then reordered in some way thereafter because they far outnumber churches constructed after the Council. While some conclusions may be applicable to modern churches, a thorough consideration of modern churches would require its own systematic study.


224 Gamber, Reform, 142.
225 Ibid., 151, 157.
226 Bouyer, Liturgy, 55-56.
228 Gamber, Reform, 143.
234 Moyra Doorly, No Place For God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 50.
236 Kieckhefer, Theology, 25.
237 Schloeder, Architecture, 54-56.
238 Kieckhefer, Theology, 25.
239 Ibid., 25.
240 Ratzinger, Spirit, 70.
241 Kieckhefer, Theology, 27.
245 Ibid., § 23.
246 See the work of Franck & Lohsen, Gardiner Hall, Duncan Stroik, and Matthew Alderman, among others.
247 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 7.
Figure 1 [right]. Dahlgren Chapel of the Sacred Heart, Georgetown University, Washington DC, before and after reordering: complete removal of high altar and insertion of new freestanding altar roughly at the transept.

Figure 2 [right]. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington DC. Insertion of a new free standing altar in the midst of the sanctuary, with the high altar left intact behind it.


249 Rom. 4:28 (NIV)

250 In this paper, the term “the city” refers to any society and/or polity. At Apology 18a, Socrates states that the philosopher does not know his way around the city or the law court, revealing that while the philosopher physically lives in the city, his mind does not exist and align in concordance with it.


252 Plato, Republic, 359d-360d.

253 Absolute justice is the idea that all transgressions matter and are wrong and ought to be redressed in some manner. No state or society can achieve absolute justice (not even a totalitarian society that attempts to) for it would require the impossible task of ensuring every sin committed by one of its members be acknowledged and atoned for. A discussion of absolute justice will be included later in this paper.

254 Plato, Gorgias, tr. Donald J. Zeyl, Plato: Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 469b. N.b. In the Crito (50a), Socrates refuses to take advantage of his opportunity to escape Athens after he is unjustly sentenced to death. He states that the government has been given authority to rule and create order (c.f. the Christian concept of government’s right to create order in Rom. 13:4) and it would be wrong to evade his punishment, whether it was decided justly or unjustly.
255 Seth Benardete, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 36. N.b. that the Greek word for justice, δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosune), is the same word used for punishment in the *Gorgias* and much of the Platonic corpus, thus indicating that Plato believed punishment and justice were inextricably linked.

256 Plato, *Gorgias*, 473a-474d. N.b. In Plato’s concept of justice, all of society suffers disorder and injustice as a result of the wrongdoing of one of its members. Thus, it is the duty of all members of a given to society to expose each other’s crimes and to convince that person to accept a punishment in order to redress his own crime and restore the orderliness of his soul.

257 As defined by Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Mainline Protestants, and Evangelicals.

258 Lev. 5:35.

259 To Christians, that is to say, the Old Testament.

260 Sin is defined as man’s choice to separate himself from God by acting in a way that defies God’s Laws.

261 1 Jn. 2:2. Jesus could have evaded his captors and even accepted Pontius Pilate’s offer to release him, but he willing accepted God’s will that he die by crucifixion so he could sacrifice his life for the sins of the world (Lk. 22:42). I use the term “credited,” because Christ’s sacrifice does not justify man in the sense that it converts him to being intrinsically right, but pardons his sins so that he can be “deemed” right and thus worthy of eternal salvation.

The Archive


265 qtd. in Wood, 207.

266 Adams, 47.


268 Wood, 74.

269 Adams, 61.


276 Riordan, 62.

277 *Ibid*, 64.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 64-65.
Ibid., 102.
Ibid., 23.
Adams, 18.
Ibid., 42.
Mark Twain, Tom Quirk, ed The Portable Mark Twain (New York: Penguin Classics, 2004), 573
University of Virginia Library, Albert & Shirley Small Special Collections Library, Digital Resources & Texts, Mark Twain in His Times, Mark Twain on Stage, MT Live – After Dinner Speeches, Whittier Dinner Speech. “sassing such famous littery people.” <http://etext.virginia.edu/railton/onstage/whittier.html>
Ibid.
Brown.
quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb00050.0001.001> (accessed December 11, 2011).


300 Oakes, 41.
301 Johnson, 111.
302 Oakes, 196.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
305 Johnson, 111.
307 Mathews, 124.
309 Rothman, 65.
310 Mathews, 47.
311 Ibid, 95.
312 Oakes, 39.
314 Ibid.
315 Oakes, 50.
317 Ibid, 182.
318 Thomas Murphy, S.J., Jesuit Slaveholding in Maryland, 1717-1838 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 130.
319 Ibid.
323 Curran, 127, 133.
324 Ibid, 129-130.
It is important to point out that black southerners, the majority of whom were slaves, are largely missing from this paper. The author does not want to minimize the agency of slaves, who asserted themselves and rebelled in response to the actions of their masters in many ways, but this paper is primarily interested in the views of white slaveholders. It is necessary to point out however, that black slaveholders are found also in the demographic margins of the South, many of whom worked to claim their family members or friends from the ownership of white slave owners.

Mobberly, “Slavery, or Cham.”

Mobberly Diary, “Letter” from December 7, 1824. vol. 4, 27.

The Parlor


*Ibid*, 469.


Malory, 539-540.


*Ibid*, 469.

Weis, 426.

Felicia Nimue Ackerman, “‘I may do no penaunce’: Spiritual Sloth in Malory’s *Morte*,” *Arthuriana* 16.1 (2006), 48-49.

Malory, 652.


Pevear, *Demons*, xv-xvi.

Dostoevsky, *Demons*, 619.


Dostoevsky, *Demons*, 558.

*Ibid*, 419.

Dostoevsky, *Demons*, 585.

*Eclogues*, 583-584.


*Ibid*, 2.4-5.


*Ibid*, 2.68.


*Eclogues*, 2.25-7.

*Ibid*, 2.56.


*Ibid*, 2.73.

NB: Corydon’s name seen also in Theocr. 4 and Ecl. 7.


*Eclogues*, 10.6.


*Ibid*, 10.44.


*Ibid*, 10.64.


See *exsul*, Ecl. 1.61; *regna*, Ecl. 1.69. In addition to relating the human and animal worlds with this common experience, this direct connection to Eclogue I strengthens the link between his two works further.

Georgics, 3.265.


Eclogues, 6.10.

Georgics, 4.197-200.


Georgics, 4.1.


*Ibid*.

Amato, *Dust*, 14.


*Ibid*.


*Ibid*.

Amato, *Dust*, 1.


*Ibid*.
The Clock Tower


453 Catalogue of the College of Arts & Sciences, 1941-1942, 20-22, as quoted in Brown, 113.

454 The original 1798 curriculum was fairly unchanged at this point.


456 Georgetown University Library: Special Collections Archive, source unknown.


461 Georgetown University Report to the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, February 1, 1951 as quoted in Brown, 84.

462 Brown, 85.

463 Durkin, 1.


465 Gary Thompson, personal email correspondence with Emma Green, May 2011.


467 Jordon Nardino, personal email exchange with Emma Green, June 2011.

468 Letter to the University from Rita Jankovich, Georgetown University Archives (GUA), Philodemic Collection, Box 010202.

469 Letter from Philosophy Department, GUA, Philodemic Collection, Box 010202.

470 Russell Smith, personal email exchange with Emma Green, June 2011.

471 Memo to alumni, GUA, Philodemic Collection, Box 010202.

472 Amanuensis Book from spring 1994 and fall 1995, entry by Russell Smith, GUA, Box 960515.

473 Smith.

474 Nardino.
Rita Jankovich, the first female President, Kathy Homoki (now Trimble), and Tera Brown. Apologies to any others whose names may not have been included.

Nardino

Smith.

Jack Massey, email exchange with Emma Green, June 2011.

Ibid.

Smith.

Nardino.

Ibid.

Martin Skold, email exchange with Emma Green, June 2011.

Jonathan Deutsch, phone conversation with Emma Green, June 2011. In this Librarianess’s humble opinion, the end of this award was perhaps for the best.

Randy Drew, Membership Report 2008, GUA.

NB: The Enosinian Society was revived ca. 2007 by a young woman who was later inducted as an honorary member of the Philodemic Society, Ms. Jacqueline Posada. To our knowledge, however, their Society no longer exists. The Jeffersonians, on the other hand, just happen to be quite difficult to contact. We did, however, visit them in the springs of 2008, 2010, and 2012, and a very good time was had by all.
Tocqueville Forum Events

Conference Co-Sponsorship
Annual Cardinal O’Connor Conference on Life
January 22, 2012
Georgetown University

Jesuit Heritage Week Lecture
John Paul II and the Catholic Human Rights Revolution
January 22, 2012 – 5:30pm-7:00pm
George Weigel
Distinguished Senior Fellow,
The Ethics and Public Policy Center

Forum Lecture
The West and Islam: The Theology Behind the History
February 8, 2012 – 6pm-7:30pm
Robert R. Reilly, author

Forum Lecture
Blue Collar Intellectuals: When the Enlightened and the Everyman Ruled America
February 29, 2012 – 7pm-8:30pm
Daniel J. Flynn, author

Conference Co-Sponsorship
Fifth Annual Undergraduate Scholars Conference on the American Polity
March 17, 2012
Georgetown University

Forum Lecture
In Search of the City on a Hill
March 21, 2012 – 7pm-8:30pm
Richard Gamble
Anna Margaret Ross Alexander Chair in History and Political Science and Associate Professor of History,
Hillsdale College