TO ENGAGE OR NOT ENGAGE: EXPLORING PERCEPTIONS AND ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AMONG ACADEMIA, GOVERNMENT, AND THE MILITARY IN WARTIME

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TO ENGAGE OR NOT ENGAGE: EXPLORING PERCEPTIONS AND ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AMONG ACADEMIA, GOVERNMENT, AND THE MILITARY IN WARTIME

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores broad notions of academic engagement and a scholar-state divide in the United States in the context of the Global War on Terror. Specifically, four questions are examined: 1) How do academics, civilian government officials, and military personnel perceive each other in terms of credentials, duties and obligations, and professional constraints? 2) What informs these individual and group perceptions? 3) How do these intergroup perceptions shape intergroup engagement spaces? 4) Does engagement affect policymaking, specifically for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? This thesis employs three qualitative methods to address the research questions: twenty semi-structured formal interviews, discourse analysis, and instrumental case studies of the Iraq War, Human Terrain System and the Minerva Research Initiative. This thesis concludes that the scholar-state divide is constructed based on past and present collective experiences, histories and memories, and other contextual factors, and that prospects for more constructive intergroup engagement in wartime exist in spite of obstacles.
The research and writing of this thesis
is dedicated to everyone who helped along the way and to all those who forever tilt at windmills.

Many thanks,
Adam M. Farrar
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INTRODUCTION

Interviewee 10: You need to get in and do the work yourself, and figure out what’s being said, and what’s being done... I think group biases do affect our judgments on decisions, and not everyone has the academic integrity to admit their biases up front.

The concept of academic engagement with government institutions is rooted in “the progressive-era notion that knowledge must be brought to bear on government decision-making.”\(^1\) However, the use of social science in government decision-making processes raises important ethical questions about power relationships: What is the appropriate relationship between scientific knowledge and power? To what degree should scientific knowledge serve power projecting institutions? How, or in what ways, should scholars “engage” with power projecting institutions? A survey of popular and academic literature on this subject would lead one to conclude that there is “a gap... a disconnect, or a divide”\(^2\) between academia and government stemming from an “inherent tension between... or the clash of the academic and policy cultures.”\(^3\) This debate, sparking what Swedish anthropologist Mats Utas calls “moral panic,” is peculiarly Amerocentric and most acute within American anthropology.\(^4\) Therefore, this thesis examines these questions and scholarly engagement with government and military institutions in the United States (US) in the context of a Global War on Terror (GWOT).


\(^{3}\) McGann, *Think Tanks*, 11-12.

The broad research questions under consideration are: Is there truly an academe-state divide in the US? If there is a gap, then what creates and perpetuates it? If no such gap exists, then what explains “the stories of the gap?” The specific research questions are: 1) How do academics, civilian government officials, and military personnel perceive each other in terms of credentials, duties and obligations, and professional constraints? 2) What informs these individual and group perceptions? What is their origin? What perpetuates them? 3) How do these intergroup perceptions shape intergroup engagement spaces? 4) Does engagement affect policymaking, specifically for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)?

Engagement is a politically and emotionally charged topic. Studying engagement involves exploring notions of the “other” with a panoptic, reflexive lens, and requires a critical examination of communities and institutions which inevitably invites a range of criticism. However, this thesis neither uses a “historicist approach,” nor a “presentist perspective.” This thesis does not indict any community as responsible for the success or failure of intergroup engagement or policymaking outcomes. Neither does this thesis urge academics to engage or disengage in a binary fashion. Rather, it seeks to contribute to engagement literature and

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5 Mosser, “Puzzles Versus Problems,” 1078.
stimulate more constructive debates and interactions through grounded analysis. Finally, this thesis will not serve as an exposé or platform for *ad hominem* criticism.  

**Theses**

Engagement discourse largely reflects discrete, binary oppositions regarding two distinct questions: 1) Is engagement appropriate? 2) Who is responsible for initiating such engagement? Answers to these questions are often staunchly pro- or anti-engagement, and argue that one side is obliged to initiate contact on “the other’s” terms. The production and reproduction of this binary discourse stymies efforts at constructive interaction and dialogue.

This thesis posits that the dominant methodology, textual analysis of policy, utilized in the binary discourse, Orientalizes academia, civilian government departments and agencies, and the US military *qua* institutions and cultures. To use Said’s terminology, such Orientalizing reifies these communities as “static, frozen, fixed eternally.” Individuals frequently assert simultaneous membership in more than one community problematizing *a priori* categorizations. Contemporary understandings of engagement must traverse these reifications by employing methodologies that examine engagement from emic perspectives.  

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8 This is in contrast to work like David Price’s articles in *CounterPunch*. See, Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology*, 43.


10 Keith Brown also uses the Orientalism paradigm to critique both reductionist notions of culture taught to military personnel as well as negative stereotyping of the military as a result of such efforts. See Keith Brown, “‘All They Understand Is Force’: Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *American Anthropologist* 110, no. 4 (December 2008): 443-453. For a discussion of the dominant textual analysis methodology and the need for richer qualitative data see, Kerry B. Fosher, *Under Construction: Making Homeland Security at the Local Level* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 10, 14-18.


12 Emic is defined as “of, relating to, or involving analysis of cultural phenomena from the perspective of one who participates in the culture being studied,” “Emic,” *Merriam-Webster.com*, 2012. [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emic](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emic) For a more detailed theoretical discussion of this discursive approach, see Talal Asad,
This thesis does argue that distinct (i.e. recognizable) academic, civilian, and military cultures exist. However, these cultures are not behavioral scripts, but systems of meaning produced and reproduced at nexuses of interaction between social forces and creative human agency through which individuals and communities organize, process, and express/respond to events occurring and originating from inside and outside the individual and/or community. These cultures are dynamic, and various actors in different positions of power within institutions assert agency to define and redefine their discipline, community, and profession. This thesis challenges overdrawn notions of inert communities, and emphasizes the roles of experience and perception in creating and shaping the engagement terrain with the “other.”

Constructive engagement can have a meaningful, qualitative impact on policymaking and decision-making processes. This is not to say that more engagement will necessarily produce “better” policymaking or decision-making outcomes. Assertions of “better,” “good,” “bad,” “right” and “wrong” are normative judgments contingent upon one’s value system and politics. Moreover, not all engagement is, or can be, equally effective, and data suggest that some applications of academic knowledge are more helpful than others. The primary qualitative difference made by academic engagement lies in challenging assumptions and considering possible unintended consequences of decisions.

14 This definition of culture is heavily influenced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. For his view of culture, see Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward and Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30; See p. 5 for Geertz’s description of culture.
15 Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
Engaging with power projecting institutions in wartime is complex in theory and practice. Were it worry-free, the debate would be far less contentious. But challenges and complexity should not be conflated with impossibility. This thesis rejects the idea that disengagement is free of ethical concerns because “the consequences of inaction” also have ethical implications.16 Indeed, “there is nothing inherently unethical in the decision to apply one’s skills in a security context,”17 but the complexity and sensitivity are proportional to one’s institutional proximity.18

Terms and Actors
To avoid misusing terms, it is important to establish general meanings of “engagement,” “academic,” “policymaker,” “civilian government official,” “military personnel,” “policy,” “strategy,” “operations,” and “tactics.”19 It is also necessary at this point to briefly state the kinds of institutions involved in the engagement debate. Engagement is a polyvalent term difficult to define. The following definition attempts to capture the term’s various facets:

Engagement is both an abstract idea regarding, and the process of, applying knowledge toward, or conducting research about, a specific problem or issue in service of, or opposition to, the public sphere, civilian government entities, or military institutions, for purposes ranging from education to subject matter consultation to advocacy at the levels of policy, strategy, operations, and tactics, with degrees of transparency ranging from fully public to clandestine.

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18 CEAUSSIC 2007, 8, 14, 18.
19 For an example of such misuse and failure to clarify terminology see, Mosser, “Puzzles Versus Problems,” 1077-1086; and, Craig Calhoun, “Social Science Research and Military Agendas: Safe Distance or Bridging a Troubling Divide?,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 4 (December 2010): 1101. Calhoun is the president of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).
The definition of an “academic,” based on interviewee responses, was both a site of consensus and contestation. Nearly all interviewees agreed that being an “academic” is not a static condition determined by accreditation, but is instead a way of relating to knowledge and learning.\(^{20}\) This relationship to knowledge is inextricably linked, according to interviewee 10, a retired Air Force officer with a PhD in Political Science currently serving as a civilian Political Advisor in the Air Force, to an academic’s “contribution to the body of knowledge in the broadest sense.”\(^{21}\) For the purposes of this thesis, the term academic means:

> An individual who has a special relationship with knowledge and learning, usually acquired through “deep training”\(^{22}\) and advanced education, and fulfills requirements of teaching, scholarship, and service by contributing to the body of knowledge, all of which typically occurs in universities or as a “fellow of a research institute.”\(^{23}\)

“Policymaker” and “civilian government official” are two terms appropriately addressed together. Although it is tempting to use these words interchangeably, the key distinction lies in policymakers’ decision-making and legislative capacity as senior elected and appointed officials in the executive and legislative branches of the US government (USG). In contrast, interviewee 2, a career government official, said career civil servants make policy recommendations, but ultimately “execute... policy” decisions.\(^{24}\) Interviewee 15, a US Army Lieutenant General (LTG) and scholar-soldier with a PhD in History, concisely described the relationship between “policymakers” and government civil servants stating:

> Policymakers are elected and appointed officials with both the responsibility and authority to recommend or execute policies pursuant to the laws and traditions on our country... The Pendleton Act established a...

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\(^{20}\) Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.

\(^{21}\) Dr. Albert Mitchum (Political Advisor to the Commander of Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, VA) (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with author, Arlington, VA, 9 August 2011.

\(^{22}\) Personal interview with Interviewee 3 (academic historian), 18 April 2011.


\(^{24}\) Personal interview with Interviewee 2 (career government official), 13 April 2011.
professional Civil Service independent of partisan politics. Some positions, the so-called political appointees, remain subject to the nomination of the President and advise and consent of the Senate... In terms of policy recommendations, the Civil Service leaders tend to be non-partisan and attempt to remain objective. The political appointees usually reflect the views of the President.  

This thesis prefers the terms “military personnel,” or “military professionals” over “military practitioners.” As used by Michael Mosser, and defined by Craig Calhoun, “military practitioners” correctly refers to “line commanders and broader strategists,” but incorrectly includes “policy-makers.” None of the military personnel interviewed for this thesis indicated that the military has any role in making policy. Instead, military officers are “apolitical” professionals whose institutional identities and duties are encapsulated in the oaths an officer or enlisted person affirms, respectively:

I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.

The terms “policy,” “strategy,” “operations,” and “tactics” need definition only because of their repeated use, and misuse, in engagement literature. The clearest articulation of these terms was provided by interviewee 15:

25 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.
26 Calhoun, “Social Science Research,” 1101.
27 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.
28 Major General (MG) Jeffrey Buchanan (Director of Strategic Effects J9, United States Forces-Iraq) (Interviewee 8), telephone interview with author, Yorktown, VA, 21 June 2011.
31 For an example of misusing “doctrine” and “military policy” see, Robert Albro, “Writing Culture Doctrine: Public Anthropology, Military Policy, and World Making,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 4 (December 2010): 1087-1093;
Policy/Policies: This is the overall direction that defines the ends. Policymakers clearly lead, with military advisors among those counselors considered.32

Strategy: This is the art of balancing ends with ways and means to achieve success. Policy-makers lead here with strong reliance on the best military advice.33

Operations: This is the art of campaigning with combined (friendly) forces, joint forces, and interagency partners. The military leads, but policy-makers closely supervise, support, and audit.

Tactics: This is the art and science of defeating the enemy and securing terrain and populations. The military almost always leads here, but policy-makers follow with interest and may interject in certain delicate areas, such as detainee efforts or issues related to potential civilian losses.34

These terms exist in a hierarchical, stage-progressive continuum. That is to say policy precedes strategy which precedes operations which precedes tactics. But at each stage along the continuum there exists a murky borderland. Leadership at each stage is typically a matter of law and tradition, but who actually leads, plans, and executes is often a function of individuals involved in the process.35 This uncertainty is particularly acute at the borderlands. For example, policymakers certainly lead the development of national policy and providing strategic guidance, but at the borderland between policy and strategy military and executive civilian agencies play important roles.36 The Iraq War’s pre-war planning and decision-making processes provide an illustrative example of how these terms relate to each other, and Chapter Three will show how borderland uncertainty can skew processes and affect decision outcomes.

For confusion regarding the differences between “policy” and “strategy” see, Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 52, 60-61; For a confusion of the terms “policy,” “strategy,” and “operations” see, Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 2008), 283-284, 289, 318, 361, 368, 381.

32 Policies can also serve as signaling devices to other states providing general indications for how a state may conduct itself under various circumstances.

33 See also Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 13-17.

34 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.


36 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.
At this point, the communities of interest for this thesis are well-known, but what remains to be discussed are the institutions, organizations, and sectors which play a role in shaping the engagement environment. Universities, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), Congress, the intelligence community, and other executive and legislative government entities play significant roles. Additionally, think tanks, in James McGann’s terms “engagement organizations,” academic professional associations, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), and private sector contracting corporations all have, in different ways and for different purposes, a particular impact on the spaces for intergroup engagement.

Methodology

Semi-structured formal interviews, discourse/textual analysis, and instrumental case studies were used to understand the conceptual, processual, and perception components of intergroup engagement. Of these three methods, interviews served as the primary means of data collection, especially regarding perceptions, concepts, experiences, and practices. Discourse analysis served as both a baseline assessment of “the gap between scholar and practitioner” as well as a comparative referent for interview responses. The instrumental case studies selected served as analytical and conceptual units for understanding historical examples of engagement in addition to a comparative function. The decision to employ these three methods was made based on their suitability for gathering qualitative data. This thesis seeks to avoid the shortcomings of an overreliance on policy analysis observed in the engagement literature, by interviewing

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37 McGann, *Think Tanks*, 5.
38 CEAUSSIC Report 2007, 9-14, 35-42.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted using protocols developed by the author and designed to elicit participant views on “academia,” “policymakers,” and “military/security institutions.” Each community’s protocol was drafted to be both germane to each group and similar enough to allow for meaningful comparisons across communities. Adjustments were made as needed to meet individual participants’ time and access constraints. For example, interviewee 15 is currently serving in Afghanistan, but nonetheless participated through an iterative email interview process. Interviews were conducted in-person, over the telephone, or through iterative e-mailing, and were recorded and transcribed to ensure accurate quotations.

Individuals working for civilian government departments and agencies or the US military are generally cautious about participating in interviews, which presents a direct methodological challenge. Their concern is understandable. Former State Department Spokesman P. J. Crowley and former International Security Assistance Force Commander General Stanley McChrystal were forced to resign for giving personal opinions while acting in official capacities.\footnote{Matt DeLong, “P. J. Crowley Resigns After Bradley Manning Comment,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 13 March 2011. \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/44/post/pj-crowley-resigns-after-bradley-manning-comments/2011/03/13/AB1CvgT_blog.html} (accessed 20 December 2011); Shaun Waterman, “McChrystal Resigns Afghan Command,” \textit{The Washington Times}, 23 June 2010. \url{http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/23/mcchrystal-leaves-white-house-war-meeting/?page=all} (accessed 20 December 2011).} Thus, it is no secret that government civilians and military personnel must choose their words carefully to protect their careers and reputations. Therefore, established journalistic conventions regarding secrecy and attribution were incorporated into the research design submitted to Georgetown.
University’s Institutional Review Board. The author has taken great care to honor different conditions required for interviews with different participants, and all participants were involved in a voluntary informed consent process.

The discourse analysis method was used primarily to examine abstract, conceptual engagement. A literature review of books, monographs, and journal articles was conducted to understand the roles of different actors and organizations, themes and issues regarding intergroup engagement, and arguments for and against engagement. This review also included historical accounts of engagement in World War II, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and contemporary government and military social science programs. Finally, works discussing strategic analysis and decision-making theory were analyzed to better understand the mechanics of these processes, and how they compare and contrast to academic knowledge production and research.

Case studies for this thesis were chosen based on the literature review, and for the instrumental purpose of showing an example of engagement, or lack thereof, and how such presence, absence, or quality of engagement affected decision-making and policymaking processes. The cases selected were: 1) The Iraq War—specifically, the pre-war planning and decision-making processes, the policies of de-Ba‘athification policy and disbanding the Iraqi military, and the “troop surge” in 2007, and 2) The Human Terrain System program and the Minerva Research Initiative. These cases were examined using primary and secondary source material, and interviews with individuals familiar with these subjects.

Twenty participants were interviewed for this thesis, which is consistent with a similar study. Eight participants self-identified as academics and one self-identified as a quasi-academic. Seven of these academics teach at universities, one is employed at a professional military education institution, and one conducts research at a think tank. Five participants self-identified as current or former government civilians working in foreign policy positions or with policymaking experience. Six are military personnel, of which three serve or served in the United States Army (USA; two active duty, one retired), and three serve or served in the United States Air Force (USAF; one active duty, two retired). One academic previously worked as a government civilian, and three military officers met this thesis’s criteria to be considered academics. Thirteen participants held a doctoral degree, one of which had also earned a law degree, and six participants held one or more master’s degrees.

Judgment and “snowball” sampling were used to select interview participants. Participants were purposively sampled based on their affiliation with academia, civilian government agencies or departments, or branches of the US military as well as those connected to the engagement debate and accessed based on the author’s personal connections. Other participants were “snowball” sampled through referrals and intermediary connections provided by interview participants. These methods created a broad sample that reflects both the author’s choice and participants’ networks, which helps mitigate potential sampling biases.

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45 The similar study was conducted by the Practitioner Subcommittee of the AAA CEAUSSIC. However, this study only assessed academic perspectives, and did not explore those of civilian government officials or military personnel. See, CEAUSSIC 2007, 47-60.
46 Academic disciplines ranged from anthropology to psychology to history to interdisciplinary geography.
Positionality and Outline

This thesis is a both a product of my background growing up in a military family and attending graduate school at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Engagement is very much a relevant topic in Washington, and opportunities for intergroup engagement are myriad. The catalyst for this project came from conducting research into the Iraq War’s pre-war planning process, de-Ba‘athification, and disbanding the Iraq military. As a first-year graduate student, I was struck by the suspicion and perceived hostility regarding academic engagement with civilian government and military institutions. Surprise turned into interest in exploring the discourse and intergroup relationships among academics, civilian government officials, and military personnel. This interest and research culminated in the current thesis project.

The thesis is organized by chapter and addresses the following topics in sequence. Chapter One will refine and unpack the term “engagement” by exploring its history and evolution, spectral characteristics, and sites. Chapter Two focuses on engagement themes such as history, memory, institution-individual dynamics, ethics, and theory and practice, as expressed in interviews, the discourse, and case studies. Chapter Three examines how the Iraq War influences and impacts the broader engagement debate by understanding the different factors and individuals involved in the pre-war planning and wartime policymaking processes. Chapter Four examines the Human Terrain System (HTS) and the Minerva Research Initiative, focusing on the programs’ guiding concepts, the roles of social scientists in them, and issues raised by the programs from the viewpoints of two competing discourses, “Telling the Truth,” and “Setting the Record Straight.” The conclusion provides general observations on engagement prospects and obstacles and will suggest areas for further inquiry.
CHAPTER I: DISENTANGLING ENGAGEMENT

Author: What do you think about academic engagement, or academics who engage with government institutions, government agencies, or the US military...

Interviewee 7: Well it depends on what engagement means.

Conceptual Genealogy of Engagement

Engagement’s modern conceptual history in the United States comprises four periods: World War I and World War II, the early Cold War era, the Vietnam War era, and a post-September 11, 2001, GWOT era. Tracing the beginnings of engagement to just prior to World War I may seem arbitrary, but McGann’s research into the history of think tanks in the US as facilitating engagement concludes that “the United States has been home to think tanks for more than 100 years.”¹ Anthropologist David Price notes that World War I marked the first significant appropriation of academic knowledge by the USG to further the US war effort.² It also marked the first significant moment of academic resistance to engagement with the USG in wartime with Franz Boas’s 1919 “Scientists as Spies” letter to The Nation in which he criticized anthropologists who used anthropology as cover for espionage.³

The US entry into World War II touched off a new round of debates regarding the appropriate relationship between academic knowledge, academics, and a wartime state in this first period.⁴ During the interwar years distinctly applied academic disciplines emerged alongside a younger generation of scholars willing to lend their skills to the wartime state.⁵

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¹ McGann, Think Tanks, 8.
² Price, Anthropological Intelligence, 1-17.
³ Franz Boas, “Scientists as Spies,” The Nation 109, no. 2842 (20 December 1919) as reprinted in “From the Archives,” Anthropology Today 21, no. 3 (June 2005): 27.
⁴ Price, Anthropological Intelligence, 19-20.
⁵ Ibid., 23-35.
Furthermore, the Axis Powers posed, according to many at the time, an existential threat to democracy and made the prospect of using social science, such as anthropology, to aid war efforts “inviting.” By the end of this first period, academic engagement with state institutions was closely associated with direct government employment or applied academia in wartime.

This view of engagement and the possible uses of academic knowledge in furtherance of state objectives expanded after World War I and II into the second period, the early Cold War. It was during this period that social science also came to be seen as a useful peacetime tool in conceiving of and implementing policy. Dustin Wax’s edited volume, *Anthropology at the Dawn of the Cold War*, comments on post-war developments in anthropology, which are applicable to post-war social science more broadly. In his introduction, Wax notes that “The post-war decades are marked by a tremendous growth of the discipline [anthropology] in sheer numbers, accompanied by a significant decentering of the field from the hallowed ground that Boas and his generations of students had staked out.” According to Wax, this “restruct[ed]… the relationship between anthropology and the American state,” and reinforced WWI and WWII notions of engagement as direct involvement with the USG to advance institutional interests.

A critical moment in the Cold War period occurred in 1965 with the termination of the Department of the Army’s Special Operations Research Office’s (SORO) Project Camelot. The project was to conduct “basic research… designed to produce a better understanding of the processes of social change and mechanisms for the established order to accommodate change in

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6 Ibid., xiii, 269.
8 Ibid., 4.
But the project was perceived by some members of the anthropological and sociological communities as having “‘imperialist features’.” Interviewee 14, a “quasi-academic” anthropologist working with the US military, summarized the backlash and significance of Project Camelot as:

The one thing I would say about Project Camelot is that there’s a kind of mythology in the anthropological community that it was their intervention that got the project stopped which is actually completely untrue… [I]n 1965, I think it was very offensive to the anthropology community because it raised for them a lot of their own disciplinary history with colonialism. And it led, really, to the radicalization of the discipline.

Anthropologist Kathleen Gough’s (1925-1990) 1968 cited Project Camelot in her seminal essay “Anthropology and Imperialism,” which asserts “Anthropology is a child of Western imperialism,” and contributed to the memory of the project as an underhanded attempt by SORO to procure social science knowledge for the purpose of control and social engineering. Project Camelot is further memorialized among anthropologists as being the primary impetus behind the American Anthropological Association’s (AAA) “Statement on the Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics,” which unambiguously prohibited secret research thereby of the chief concerns anthropologists had with the project. Project Camelot’s actual history and objective are less important in the engagement debate than its legacy in collective memory.

No sooner had the “the Camelot Affair” ended on 8 July 1965 that US combat involvement in Vietnam began to escalate. Vietnam proved to be a watershed moment for the

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10 Ibid., 44.
11 George R. Lucas, Jr., Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology (Lanham, ML; Plymouth, UK: AltaMira Press, 2009), 59.
12 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
relationship between the American academy and the USG, with the mythologizing of programs like Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), the Phoenix Program, and the Thailand Counterinsurgency Project. Vietnam’s and these programs’ relevance to current engagement debates is not in their details, but how these programs are remembered and how academia’s broad mobilization in opposition to the Vietnam War has been memorialized.

At this point, “engagement” appeared in the discourse in its oppositional meaning. In War and the Ivory Tower, David Schalk defines Vietnam-era engagement with state institutions:

*Engagement*… ordinarily referred and continues to refer to political involvement by members of the intellectual class—however broadly or narrowly defined a social group that is widely viewed as not normally prone to descend from the ivory tower into the arena… True engagement cannot be coerced but is derived from the reflection on the external political and social situation, and a conscious and reasonably free decision to become involved.

Engagement, synonymous with the academic class’s political opposition to the state, is juxtaposed with “establishment intellectuals,” academics working with government institutions. Noam Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” is an exemplary text of academic engagement-as-opposition. In his piece, Chomsky clarifies Schalk’s engagement-as-opposition concept, writing: “It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies” by engaging in criticism and activism. Oppositional engagement, forged by the American academy’s Vietnam experience, has had a lasting impact on academe’s and

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17 Ibid., 39.
19 Chomsky, “Responsibility.”
academics’ communal self-understanding. Indeed, interviewee 7, an academic anthropologist at a teaching university, quoted Cesar Vallejo to summarize an academic’s duty: “Tell no lies.”

Conceptually, engagement is now embedded in a post-September 11, 2001, and US-led GWOT context, which anthropologist Joseph Masco argues facilitates American neo-imperialism. In the contemporary era, the scope of what constitutes engagement is broad, and academic engagement with civilian or military government institutions occurs in various modes and settings such as: conducting research, serving as subject matter expert (SME) consultants, teaching at military and civilian professional training institutions, holding fellowships at think tanks, directly assisting in policy development or implementation, or opposing and critiquing government policy. Thus, for academics the spectrum of 21st century engagement encompasses “any kind of public criticism or discussion of anything relating to the US… and/or the larger question of politics in the world…” as well as direct field implementation of policy.

This brief conceptual genealogy of engagement demonstrates that engagement is multivocal, evolving, and produced through debates situated in historical contexts, often in wartime. The clear element of warfare and violence in engagement’s modern conceptual genealogy is important in understanding the debate because war and violence make manifest the possible lethal consequences of engagement. Echoing fellow anthropologist Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Price highlights the curious effect war and violence have in initiating, reviving, or reframing engagement debates over what constitutes ethical engagement. Additionally, the

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20 Personal interview with Interviewee 7 (academic anthropologist), 17 June 2011.
22 For some examples of the various means by which academics may engage with state institutions see, CEAUSSIC 2007, 9-14, 41-42.
23 Personal interview with Interviewee 7 (academic anthropologist), 17 June 2011.
24 Telephone interview with Interviewee 13 (organizational behavior psychologist), 8 September 2011.
oppositional character of engagement during the Vietnam War is important because of its powerful effect in contextually framing current discourse. Given this complex history and evolution, engagement is not monolithic or univocal, but multivocal, existing along a continuum.

The Spectrum of Engagement

Drawing upon informant interviews and material from the engagement literature, particularly the results of the final report (2007) of the AAA’s Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), this thesis argues that the engagement continuum ranges from close engagement—direct and contributor—to non-engagement—non-participation and full disengagement. These two poles should not necessarily be thought of as fixed endpoints or discreet states of being. Instead, they are chevron-branched, processual end zones which bound the range of possible modes of engagement that lie in between. The following section will sketch out the contours of these different processual stations along the engagement spectrum.

Close engagement-direct exists at one of the spectral end zones, and is characterized by close, direct contact between individual academics and state institutional actors, be they civilian officials or military personnel. The hallmark of engagement in this manner is the hands-on role that academics in these positions often take in drafting and/or executing and implementing policy decisions. For certain disciplines, such as anthropology, this is “the most controversial form of

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engagement.” In fact, engagement at this proximity to state institutions and policymakers or military personnel may lead others to characterize such individuals as no longer being academics, but government employees.

A poignant example, but by no means fully representative, of this manner of engagement is the Department of the Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS). Although this type of engagement does occur and is not insignificant, it is important to note that it receives disproportionate attention relative to the other means by which academics may engage with USG institutions. Indeed, of all academic interviewees only two fit the profile of this station, with one being a former HTS participant. HTS, its role in the engagement debate, and the role of academics within the program will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

The other branch of close engagement is that of close engagement-contributor, which is characterized by a close relationship between academics and policy officials or military personnel. It differs from close engagement-direct in that individuals in these positions actively advise policymaking or decision-making processes but do not participate in their execution or implementation. To use Schalk’s term, these academics are “establishment intellectuals,” and may consult as SMEs, conduct research in FFRDCs, or work as applied academics for civilian or military entities. Two academic interviewees’ work and activities fit this particular profile of engagement. Interviewee 4, an interdisciplinary geographer at a teaching university who consults as a SME in Washington described his work in the following terms:

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27 CEAUSSIC 2007, 10.
28 Telephone interview with Interviewee 6 (US embassy official), 14 June 2011.
…often I play Devil’s advocate… I see that as my job, and I see that as an important thing to do. In that situation [policymaking or decision-making situation] they [military/civilian personnel] miss certain assumptions… and when we’re talking to one another and asking each other “How did you come to that conclusion?” “Well why? Why did you come to that conclusion?” So, [it’s] questioning underlying assumptions...

The next position along the continuum is critical engagement whereby academics work with government institutions, but are not as proximal to the institutions or institutional actors. Additionally, their contact with government institutions is less frequent than those academics operating within the previous station of close engagement-contributor. Sample activities include providing pre-deployment social science instruction for civilian or military personnel, conducting policy-oriented research in think tanks, conducting university-based research on topics relevant to government organizations for and of such organizations and institutions. The distinction between for and of is critical, particularly in ethical debates.

Four academic interviewees indicated that they work or have worked with government institutions in this manner. Based on this author’s research, this is the most frequent form of engagement among academics, the USG and the US military. Interviewee 13, a psychologist of organizational behavior at a research university, described such engagement:

I get funding from the Department of Homeland Security for some of my research so I have presented results to them. I also get funding from NASA so I present my results at NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] conferences a lot. That’s government but it’s not military. Actually, one my colleagues just presented our new research that I’ve been talking about at the Army War College. So mostly what my role has been has been to get money from these institutions that care about certain problems, and then do research that tries to inform their decision-making around certain problems. I’ve never been in a role as a consultant where I tell somebody what to do. I don’t have that knowledge.

In the middle of the engagement continuum is public engagement with state institutions and broader society. Five academic interviewees explicitly mentioned this mode of engagement.

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32 Skype interview with Interviewee 4 (interdisciplinary academic geographer), 10 June 2011.
33 Telephone interview with Interviewee 13 (organizational behavior psychologist), 8 September 2011.
as being the most consonant with the academic community’s disciplinary obligations to itself and society. Expanding upon interviewee seven’s earlier quote:

I think that any kind of public criticism or discussion of anything relating to the US… and/or the larger question of politics in the world… is engagement… And all those things [books, journal and newspaper articles] are public. They’re available. They can be bought. They can be borrowed from libraries. You can read them. You can get a hold of those people if you want… it’s public engagement.  

Public engagement is an indirect means of communicating with state institutions, and encompasses a range of public sphere activities like writing opinion-editorials for newspapers, publishing in peer-reviewed journals, or writing books. It also includes presenting papers at professional association conferences and educational outreach within one’s local community.

The comfort many academics have with this mode of engagement is its public nature; it can be reported in teaching, scholarship, and service portfolios, and poses almost no ethical concerns.

On the other side of public engagement are the various modes of non-engagement, with the closest to public engagement being critical non-engagement. Academics in this zone actively engage with and contribute to engagement literature from the position of critique. In “fulfill[ing] the requirements of scholarship, teaching and service within the academy” they avoid orienting their research agendas solely based on policy-relevance and strive to maintain independence.

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34 Personal interview with Interviewee 7 (academic anthropologist), 17 June 2011.
This mode of engagement should not be confused with hostility to the principle of engagement, but should be viewed as closest to Schalk’s oppositional engagement practiced by Chomsky. This engagement primarily serves as a check and balance to those more closely engaged with institutions of power. As Kerry Fosher writes: “I guess if I am going to rappel down that slippery slope and try to bring information back up, then I want… good critical thinkers… leaning hard on the rope so that I don’t go too far, too fast.”

The next station is non-engagement/non-participation, situated in the non-engagement end zone chevron. This mode is indifferent to the engagement debate, with such academics preferring to maintain their own research agendas without regard to policy-relevance.

Interviewee 9, a critically engaged historian working with the USG, described this mode as:

It’s “life of the mind.” The main duties or obligations of the academic is really to him or herself, to his or her own pursuit of knowledge, understanding, [or] insight, and to a certain extent, to the community of people with whom that academic could have a meaningful conversation, which is usually a pretty small group of experts… I don’t think academics should stay in a bubble only to themselves… that’s in a pure or ideal world. That’s [teaching and disseminating knowledge] a secondary obligation. The first obligation of the academic is to use his or her knowledge, understanding, [or] insight as best he or she can.

Such an ideal echoes Julien Benda’s sociology of intellectuals whereby intellectuals remain distant from temporal affairs, focusing solely on the “joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation.”

Finally, on the other branch of the chevron in the non-engagement end zone is full disengagement. This station is characterized by academics that fulfill their duties of teaching, scholarship, and service with research agendas, as a matter of principle, not oriented to policy-

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36 Skype interview with Interviewee 4 (interdisciplinary academic geographer), 10 June 2011.
38 Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
relevance, and who strive to be as independent of USG power projecting institutions as possible. What differentiates them from non-engagement/non-participation academics is that these individuals actively discourage any engagement with power projecting USG institutions in wartime. This is also differentiated from critical non-engagement and public engagement because such modes of engagement, although perhaps critical of the idea of engagement, nonetheless endeavor to speak, however indirectly, to power.

Full disengagement advocates a rupture between the academy and the state in times of war. Henry Giroux’s book, *The University in Chains: Confronting the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex,*\(^{40}\) advocates such full disengagement from the US military, urging “direct collective action to mobilize students and faculty in opposition to all connections between higher education and military research.”\(^{41}\) For Giroux, saving academia from the encroaching military-industrial complex “might require severing all relationships between the university and intelligence agencies and war industries.”\(^{42}\) Like close engagement-direct, full disengagement is a marginal, but not insignificant, position disproportionately represented within the discourse.

**Sites of Engagement**

In addition to describing the different spectral modes of engagement, it is appropriate to briefly mention the different types of organizations with which academics may engage. Broadly speaking, this author divided academic engagement with USG institutions based on whether the institution or organization is primarily civil or military. Although this bifurcation is crude, it is


\(^{41}\) Ibid., 57.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 75.
necessarily so because the realms of academic engagement with the USG are actually too numerous to be contained in a single thesis. Interviewee 9 described the idea of researching academic engagement with the USG as too daunting without narrowing the scope of the project:

There’s a longstanding history and connection... that exists between civilian government and academics... during the “Progressive Era” there were a lot of academics that were involved in trying to shape government policy on a whole range of issues like poverty [and] how to reduce poverty. There’s a whole range of disciplines that are involved with the civilian government, and have been for a long time. ⁴³

Thus, the following section will focus on those military and civilian institutions with which academics can engage that emerged throughout the course of this research.

On the civilian side of government, interviewees listed, and the literature describes, primarily foreign policy and civilian security institutions as possible sites of academic engagement. The most frequently cited organization was the DOS, and in particular the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) housed in The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) in Arlington, Virginia, and the DOS Office of Policy Planning. Two academic interviewees recounted anecdotes of teaching a lesson at the FSI due to their subject matter expertise. Interviewee 5, “a US government official,” described the Policy Planning staff as “an in-house think tank for the Secretary of State.” ⁴⁴

Another important location was the DOD’s civilian component, with which interviewee 17, an industrial/organizational psychologist at a research university with experience in the private sector and HTS, cited previous employment experience as “the director of research for an Undersecretary of Defense.” ⁴⁵ Interviewees 9 and 14 also noted other research opportunities for academics with the civilian components of the branches of the Armed Services. Although no

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⁴³ Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
⁴⁴ Telephone interview with Interviewee 5 (USG official), 10 June 2011.
⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
academic interviewees mentioned this specific option, working as a foreign language instructor at, for example, the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, is another possible site for academic engagement with the DOD and other USG entities. Finally, various interviewees mentioned the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and federally funded think tanks such as the United States Institute of Peace.

Within security-oriented civilian government organizations, interviewees cited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), including Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Quoted earlier, interviewee 4 described positively his SME consultation in the civilian security sector.

Interviewees 9 and 13 both mentioned conducting research for the DHS either in a research center or in a university. Institutionally, DHS is divided into crisis prevention and management and consequence/emergency management, of which Fosher studied the latter in her ethnography *Under Construction: Making Homeland Security at the Local Level*. All these organizations were cited in interviews, but the engagement literature, especially full disengagement texts, lists additional sites of possible academic engagement with civilian government organizations.

Among the branches of the US Armed Services are various opportunities with research, teaching, and operational dimensions. With regard to research and teaching, it is possible for academics to teach at any number of professional military education (PME) institutions such as the service academies, service War Colleges, officer staff colleges, and higher education centers.

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46 Fosher, *Under Construction*, 22, 33-34.
47 The most complete description of possible sites of engagement can be found in two books: Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology* and Giroux, *The University in Chains.*
like the Naval Postgraduate School and Air University.\textsuperscript{48} Research positions are expanding as “lessons learned” and cultural education centers are established. These include the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Office of Naval Research in Arlington, Virginia, the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning in Quantico, Virginia, and the Air Force Center for Language and Culture at Air University on Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama.\textsuperscript{49} As stated earlier, operational roles also exist for social scientists in the Department of the Army’s HTS program, as well as for psychologists teaching interrogation techniques and monitoring interrogations.\textsuperscript{50}

**Purposes and Issues Concerning Engagement**

Beyond civilian or military institutional engagement lies the private sector, which encompasses think tanks and government contracting corporations. Interviewee 11, a retired USAF Colonel with a PhD in Organizational Leadership currently working as a consultant and adjunct professor, noted that “Industry consistently call[s] on the expertise of academics,”\textsuperscript{51} and interviewee 18, an historian in a Washington think tank, described think tanks as “intermediate institutions”\textsuperscript{52} facilitating engagement between academia and government.\textsuperscript{53} The sites, then, of


\textsuperscript{50} Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011; Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{51} Dr. William Shirey (USAF Col (Ret.), consultant, and adjunct professor) (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, Yorktown, VA, 12 August 2011.

\textsuperscript{52} Dr. Martin Kramer (Wexler-Fromer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) (Interviewe 18), personal interview with author, Washington, DC, 18 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{53} CEAUSSIC 2007, 10-13, 22-25, 41-42.
potential academic engagement with US civilian government and military institutions and organizations are as varied as the modes of engagement. The question of engagement for many academics is multi-faceted, and individuals considering engagement are faced with a problem of choice and questions such as: In what manner should I engage (i.e. at what station along the spectrum); and, with what institutions should I engage? However, another consideration lies beyond these two questions entirely, and has no objective answer: For what purpose should I engage? This captures the oft repeated distinction within anthropological debates regarding engagement with the US military: Should anthropologists conduct research for or of the military?

This author’s research revealed that answers to these questions depend on a number of factors, among them: one’s subjective perception of the mode and site, the social, political, and temporal context, and the specific tasks involved. Regarding to the first factor, much depends on the academic’s ability to trust that engaging will have a positive impact for the organization, the individual academic, and other social actors affected by the organization’s action. Interviewee 13 summarized this sense: “My inclination is to trust. Not to be too simplistic about it, but I like to think that it [knowledge] will be used [by the government] for good, not for evil.”

Contextually, a number of factors are important, and some are constraining on academic decisions regarding engagement. These factors include academic professional associations, university or institutional policies; competing time commitments between teaching, scholarship, and service; whether or not an academic is tenure-tracked or has tenure at an academic institution; financial resources, as well as personal politics and ethics. Regarding the personal politics and ethics, there seems to be disagreement among academics regarding the role of one’s

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54 Telephone interview with Interviewee 13 (organizational behavior psychologist), 13 September 2011.
personal politics and the decision to engage. On the one hand, there is the position arguing that “judgment of what constitutes ethical engagement with MIS [Military, Intelligence, and Security Communities]… [cannot] be contingent on our approval or condemnation of political policies at a given time.” Interviewee 11 echoes this position:

Just because you oppose something, I don’t see any reason why, as an academic, if you’re asked help you couldn’t offer advice… I would hope that an academic could rise above personal disdains for the current policy, and when called to serve would see it as a higher calling than just personal dissatisfaction with what’s happening because they may be in a wonderful position to help make things better…

On the other hand, Price writes in *Anthropological Intelligence* that “There is no such thing as politically neutral science.” He reiterates this view in *Weaponizing Anthropology*: “…there is no political neutrality. There is only silence or engagement on these issues.” Price also rejects arguments appealing to government necessity as creating slippery slopes compromising ethics.

Interviewees 1 (a critically engaged anthropologist at a research university) and 7 expressed the unease associated with facilitating policies with which one disagrees and the task factor:

I think it depends on the context. I think it depends on what someone’s research is on. I think it depends on the context, on their own personal level… I think there are moments in our country’s history where engaging with the powers that be are more fraught than others… There are times when my country does things that I don’t believe in, and I would probably make the choice to refuse to engage with those bodies [government bodies/institutions] on that basis. But, [I] would have engaged in other activities to counter that in a different sort of way.

For instance, personally, [I would be] probably opposed at least. I’m very wary of doing something that wasn’t going to be public. So, something where someone came to me and said, “I would like to have some secret information, in confidence, about ‘X.’” For me that’s totally different. That’s engagement, but [of a] totally different flavor. So that’s where I’d start to have some issues. I think not in necessarily all cases, but I’d certainly start to suspect and say to myself “Well, this is a kind of different animal that we’re dealing with here.” And then it becomes a question of political principles, ethical principles.

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55 CEAUSSIC 2007, 7.
56 Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.
58 Id., *Weaponizing Anthropology*, 31.
59 Id., *Anthropological Intelligence*, 270.
60 Personal interview with Interviewee 1 (academic anthropologist), 5 April 2011.
61 Personal interview with Interviewee 7 (academic anthropologist), 17 June 2011.
Conclusion

Based on qualitative data gathered for this thesis, the discourse on engagement generally skews the debate to the margins. Interviewee 7 provided an example that depicts this process well:

The kinds of questions that are being asked outside the government circles have an effect on what is talked about inside the government circles. I felt this... most strongly after September 11th where there were some pretty obvious possibilities [to reframe discourses, consider alternative responses] after September 11th that simply were not on the table because they never were really articulated in the public sphere. And therefore, they weren’t even really in the realm of possibility. So it’s the strategic question of framing the debate. When you go into a [polarized] meeting with the people who know [they] have to put an opinion out there, even if it’s not really their opinion... often [they] have an upper hand in that meeting because they have said, “Ok, I’m willing to say this.” And sometimes people say, “Ahhh [i.e. disagree at the extreme view],” but most of the time people try to accommodate in some way. If you go [interviewee points off to an extreme] then it pushes everybody this way, right? That’s [moving debates to the extremes]... not [in a]... explicitly strategic sense all the time, but that’s what happens in terms of the larger public debates.

The process of normalizing the margin described by the informant above captures the essence of the engagement debate contained within the literature. The dichotomous picture painted by marginal enthusiasts obscures the diverse modes and various sites of possible engagement.

The continuum model of engagement, loosely bounded by chevron-branched end zones, displays the variety by adding layers of complexity. The continuum problematizes the discursive portrayal of zero-sum engagement by demonstrating that non-engagement is a recognizable form of engagement. The continuum also shows that despite qualitative differences among the modes of engagement they constitute engagement nonetheless. Consider that even though the message of full disengagement is of a qualitatively different nature than that of direct close engagement, the fundamental power relationship between the individual academic and state power projecting institutions remains intact. To clarify the paradox, consider that to advocate full disengagement, one must engage in the debate. Finally, engagement varies by degree of

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62 Ibid.
proximity and relationship to state power projecting institutions, and some modes of engagement are more appropriate under different circumstances.

The processual framing of the continuum maintains a focus on an academic’s behavior, their *habitus*. Engagement framed as a continuum is processual, and therefore engaged academics are constituted as engaged by virtue of their activities. However, the continuum is value neutral and does not speak to the specific institutions with which an individual academic can engage, nor to the implications of different stations of engagement. Conceiving of engagement as a loosely bounded continuum with chevron-branched ends problematizes the reductive portrayal that appears in the discourse by showing different ways one can engage closely or not engage at either end zone. By framing close engagement and non-engagement on the margins, the continuum highlights the spaces between these end zones where most engagement occurs. These spaces, as will be shown, hold the key for building more constructive relationships among academics, civilian policymakers, and military personnel.

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CHAPTER II: ENGAGEMENT: DISCOURSE AND THEMES

Author: ...would you say that academic knowledge is useful to policymaking or to even to other institutions like the military? Do you think the knowledge that gets produced is useful?

Interviewee 19: If you think of academia as being the theory side and government being the practice side, they do interact with each other, they do feed each other, but can you say one is useful? ... That’s a matter of opinion.

Engagement Discourses

This chapter outlines and comments on the engagement debate’s discursive themes, which are:

the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden… the variants and different effects—according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated…

Themes of history and memory, theory and practice, institution-individual dynamics, ethics and “do no harm,” the purpose of knowledge, and the roles of engaged academics emerge in both the textual analysis and in interviews. Collating text and interview data will illustrate how public (text) and hidden (interview) transcripts are mutually reinforcing and oppositional. However, it is both important to note that disciplinary differences exist regarding these themes, and worth restating that anthropology is a subject and object in much of the GWOT engagement debate.

I have constructed two basic discourses, “Telling the Truth” and “Setting the Record Straight,” to frame the ways in which poignant engagement moments are memorialized, produced and reproduced by interviewees and texts. Although inflecting history and memory through two discourses flattens some of the nuance, the purpose is not to depict engagement as

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1 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, 100.
2 James C. Scott defines public transcripts as “a shorthand way of describing the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate,” (p. 2). In contrast, hidden transcripts are “discourse that takes place ‘offstage,’ beyond direct observation by powerholders. The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offtstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript,” (pp. 4-5). For a fuller treatment of public and hidden transcripts see, James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1990), 2-5.
dichotomous, but to show how the debate over engagement, practical and conceptual, is situated in a discursive binary either supporting or critiquing the history and memory of engagement moments. In the following sections, I outline the basic features of these two discourses.

**Telling the Truth**

“Telling the Truth” asserts that historical moments of engagement between academia and the USG have been sanitized to conceal grisly details about the effects of such collaboration on academic disciplines, the USG, and affected populations. Accordingly, such history and details must be exposed in order to inform the broader public of what the USG has done in the past believing that awareness will prevent similar actions or policies in the future. This discourse is also presentist, and draws comparisons between the past and present engagement moments to apply lessons learned to present circumstances.

This discourse’s first feature is that the “official” story, the public transcript, of an event or description of a policy is false and deliberately obscures the truth about the event or policy. Actions or policies surrounding a particular event or period, however seemingly innocuous, are suspected as being sinister and promoting ulterior motives. A second characteristic is that governments have employed cover-up tactics to prevent the public from knowing the truth about a policy or an event. A third feature uses government cover-up as a means to deflect criticism in cases where supporting evidence lacks documentation or it is otherwise unavailable. “Telling the Truth,” then, relies on argumentum ad ignorantiam ("argument from ignorance") in alleging government cover-up.³ A fourth feature is the emphasis on and extrapolation of qualitative

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interview data, which is presented in a journalistic rather than academic format. Finally, a fifth feature is portraying the author and his/her informants as courageous whistleblowers, which is connected to the broader use of hyperbole. All of these features, in conjunction with one another, give “Telling the Truth” texts journalistic qualities, and many books I place in “Telling the Truth” are presented as investigative journalism or exposés.

Interviewee 16, a retired Army infantry officer with three Master’s degrees, described two signature phrases of “Telling the Truth:” “everybody knows” and “sources say.”

They [academics] take advantage of something within American society that I euphemistically call “everybody knows.” Everybody knows the government secretly tortures people, right? Everybody knows the government takes retaliatory action against people who speak against the government. Everybody knows intel [intelligence] is really the black, evil intel of the United States government… And it’s the assumed duty of the pure academicians…to hold the line against the evil government. And everybody knows that that can… never, ever be resolved. The government will always be evil, and we [academics] will always be good and we will always be fighting them…

The same interviewee regarding “sources say” within the discourse on HTS:

... you will notice that throughout his [HTS critic] writings he’ll use something that leads off all his statements are “sources say.” … Sources say—he can say anything he wants if he says that.

What research did they [academics] do? What is the research that underpins this? And the answer you get is… “Well, our sources—we have to keep them secret,” because, remember, everybody knows the government retaliates against people… So you don’t have to show any sources. You don’t have to show any numbers. You don’t have to validate anything. They’re saying they have a hundred different citations. Well, is that one person a hundred times? Is that five people twenty times each? … Well, I don’t have to show you because I’m protecting [my source from] this thing everybody knows about government.

“Telling the Truth” texts employing this discursive vocabulary are Weaponizing Anthropology,5

Anthropological Intelligence,6 The University in Chains,7 The Phoenix Program,8 American

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4 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain,⁹ and The Counter-
Counterinsurgency Manual; Or, Notes on Demilitarizing American Society.¹⁰

Setting the Record Straight

“Setting the Record Straight” contends that much of the available literature is discursively
“Telling the Truth” and unfairly assesses the historical context of the policy or program. This
discourse is defensive and apologetic, and asserts that to know the truth of a decision, policy, or
program one must expose and discard “Telling the Truth’s” sensationalism, misinterpretation,
and fabrication. An example of this feature is found in historian Dale Andradé’s introduction to
his book Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War:

Unfortunately, it will not be simple merely to step back and look because the Phoenix program remains
mired in myth and misunderstanding. A decade and a half of allegations, half-truths, and outright lies have
framed the picture the public sees when it hears the name ‘Phoenix.’¹¹

The first feature, described above, is also characterized by an author’s tone. “Setting the
Record Straight” exhibits an academic, reserved, and objective tone regarding the subject matter
to contrast its style with “Telling the Truth’s” journalistic qualities. This academic tone is often
accompanied by academic-style citations and/or extensive documentation. There is noticeably
less reliance on interview quotations to support broader arguments, but this does not mean that
“Setting the Record Straight” eschews interview data. Rather, documentation is a preferred
substitute to interview data because documentation is regarded as more objective. A fourth
feature is the systematic, methodical refutation of “Telling the Truth’s” criticisms by using

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methodological and/or source criticism. The preference for documentation is presented as both competing evidence and a means to magnify the contrast with “Telling the Truth.” A persuasive method unique to “Setting the Record Straight” is simultaneously arguing that critique is legitimate, but current criticism is distorted by an agenda.

Finally, “Setting the Record Straight” literature is often written by retired government civilians or military personnel in the form of a memoir, which sometimes creates a sub-discourse I call “Setting the Record Straight and Clearing My Name.” Douglas Feith presents such a view in his memoir’s introduction:

The narrative here… is thoroughly at odds with the conventional account provided in recent books and articles on President Bush, terrorism, and Iraq. The now-standard story portrays the President and his supporters in the Administration as militaristic and reckless, close-minded and ideological, thoughtless at best and even dishonest—hell bent on war with Iraq from the Administration’s inception. The record—much of it presented here for the first time—paints a different picture.

Interviewees also discussed such perspectives, particularly on questions revolving around other controversial topics such as HTS and the Minerva Research Initiative. The literature which produces and reproduces “Setting the Record Straight” includes: War and Decision, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, Ashes to Ashes, and “Limited Sources: The Phoenix Program.”

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13 “Throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” conceding mistakes, or “a few bad apples,” reflect this kind of persuasive argument.
14 Feith, War and Decision, x.
15 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011; Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
To reiterate, I present these discourses and describe their features not to force them on interviewees, including those quoted, or authors contributing to engagement discourse. Rather, they are constructs to help frame and understand the production and reproduction of memories about historical moments of engagement. Furthermore, they capture an important analytical tension regarding engagement within the GWOT context: the history and memory of engagement moments, situated largely within a binary discourse that adds to a constructed academe-state “gap,” enters interview hidden transcripts which, then, both reflect and contest this binary.

**Discursive Themes of Engagement: History and Memory**

This author’s research into engagement debates revealed the importance in understanding the construction and rehearsal of histories and memories at collective levels within and across communities. In dealing with memory, it is important to bear in mind that memory consists of that which is remembered and forgotten.\(^{20}\) At the collective level, memory is a function of the information that communities transmit and do not transmit vertically from one generation to the next and horizontally among themselves and across communities. It is important to know both what information is transmitted and lost regarding different historical contexts as well as what this information *means* to communities.\(^{21}\)

It is curious how past wartime social science engagement is remembered collectively among academia, US civilian government, and the military. Initially, this author suspected that differing communal credentials, duties/obligations, and institutional constraints would create distinctly recognizable collective memory and amnesia patterns over successive generations.

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This initial assumption was both correct and incorrect. Each community’s members do create, remember, forget, store, transmit, and reference collective memories in particular ways, but these processes are fluid rather than uniform.

Interviewee 7 captured what several informants, across communities, stated was a hallmark of academic enterprise: “writing to other people in response to their work… [with] a particular kind of citational format.” In response to questions about academia and academics’ relationship to knowledge, a broad relationship connecting publication, knowledge, and citation emerged. Commenting on the academy’s role in broader society, interviewee 18, stated succinctly: “the transmission of knowledge, and its preservation, and its development.” He also noted that in creating and preserving knowledge, the academy is “a repository of arcane knowledge, that is, knowledge which can’t be sustained anywhere else but which shouldn’t be lost.” Academia’s collective memory, then, is a function of significant knowledge production and accumulation through publication and citation, which upholds “the spirit of powerful disciplinary ancestors.” Understanding the accessible depth of academia’s collective memory of past wartime engagement helps explain and contextualize the wide array of disciplinary reactions to engagement within the GWOT context.

22 Personal interview with Interviewee 7 (academic anthropologist), 17 June 2011.
23 Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011; Personal interview with Interviewee 1 (academic anthropologist), 5 April 2011.
24 Dr. Kramer (Interviewee 18), personal interview with author, 18 November 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 Brown, “‘All They Understand Is Force’,” 443.
The collective memory structure of civilian government highlights the differences noted in the introduction between policymakers and career government officials.\(^\text{27}\) The legal separation of career civil servants from political appointees, dating back to the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, has practical implications for each sub-community’s degree of politicization and contact with collective memories.\(^\text{28}\) By virtue, appointed policymakers have closer ties to their appointing administration, and are subject to change according to favor and election cycles, which limits their contact with collective memories.\(^\text{29}\) In contrast, career government officials serve for many years under different administrations over the span of a career, and possess greater familiarity with institutional histories and collective memories.\(^\text{30}\)

The nature of knowledge and separating decision-making and executive duties between policymakers and careerists adds a layer of complexity to understanding civilian government collective memory.\(^\text{31}\) All careerist interviewees acknowledged that their work required them to be generalists, possess experiential knowledge and, at times, implement policies with which they may disagree. Although historical records such as the *Foreign Relations of the United States* allow foreign policy officials to study and reference diplomatic history, certain difficulties remain in transmitting, and absorbing vicariously, the necessary general, experiential knowledge


\(^{28}\) LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.

\(^{29}\) Personal interview with Interviewee 2 (career government official), 13 April 2011; LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.


\(^{31}\) LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011; Personal interview with Interviewee 2 (career government official), 13 April 2011; Schmierer, *Iraq*, 71-72.
across generations of careerists. Circumstances can, and do, change quickly, and history may not always be relevant to careerists’ present concerns.

Careerist interviewees did see historical analyses as important post hoc assessments of policies, strategies, and models, but they emphasized that present realities demand solutions which work in the present and anticipate future circumstances. That all careerists cited mentors from older cohorts helps alleviate some knowledge transmission issues, but some constraints, such as assignment rotations, in civilian government persist. Furthermore, careerists execute policy agendas determined by elected and appointed legislators, executives, and policymakers with lesser degrees of contact with institutional memories. This structural relationship can create a situation in which a new policy agenda negates potential benefits of careerists drawing upon collective memories and institutional histories created by earlier careerist generations.

The military’s collective memory shares certain similar structural constraints in transmitting experiential knowledge from one generation to the next. Interviewee 16 lamented what he viewed as the military’s inability to retain lessons from the past because of difficulties in linking reachback centers within and across services and classification networks. Retired Army General Jack Keane, speaking to Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks, was similarly frustrated over the loss of counterinsurgency [COIN] knowledge developed during the Vietnam War: “‘We’d studied the history, we’d learned the doctrine, and some of us had the experience,’

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33 Telephone interview with Interviewee 6 (US embassy official), 14 June 2011.
34 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011.
36 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
he remembered. After the war, the Army ‘purged’ that knowledge [COIN], he said. But ‘I kept the memory…”

Collating doctrinal and experiential knowledge can also be hindered by mandatory retirement requirements for all officers not promoted to the rank of general officer after 30 years of service. However, interviewee 16 noted that hiring retired officers “into the civilian service to write doctrine, to instruct at various levels within the Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], within Forces Command to operate on… various posts around the nation, [and] work in the [training] ranges” helps mitigate experiential knowledge loss.

Furthermore, PME institutions, Lessons Learned centers, and military academic journals, all of which publish analyses and theses, circulate and transmit doctrine, critiques, and experiences.

Yet, the experiential knowledge required to apply doctrine effectively resides in individual officers. As interviewee 15 noted, “Being a Soldier cannot be learned vicariously.”

Additionally, tour of duty rotations are for the US military what election cycles and assignment rotations are for political appointees and careerists, except the time frame is twelve months instead of two to four years. Furthermore, each successive deployment for a unit often means “that unit by that time is going to be completely different, full of completely different people.”

Thus, interviewee 16 asked the following question:

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37 Ricks, The Gamble, 81.
39 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
41 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
42 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011. See also US Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 36, Subchapter III, Sections 633-636.
So what are we learning as an Army about our experience there? It’s like you trying to write your thesis. You’re at your computer, you’re banging it out, and every ten minutes or every hour I reach over your shoulder and I reboot your computer. That’s exactly what it’s like. Over and over and over again.\textsuperscript{43}

Across the academic, civilian government, and military communities collective histories and memories are constituted and reconstituted with different types of knowledge in different ways. Although not entirely discontinuous, the collective memories of USG civilians and military personnel are affected by structural constraints on their ability to assemble, transmit, and implement experiential knowledge from one generation to the next. In contrast, academia retains a unique repository of memories of its forebears by translating research experiences into theories cited across successive generations. Responses to engagement within the GWOT context are informed by these collective memories, constructed by what is remembered and forgotten and produced in historical contexts. However, the historical background across communities are lost when histories and memories is refracted through a discursive binary which constructs an academe-state divide in the GWOT context.

Theory and Practice/Analysis and Experience

In their respective articles, Alexander George and Michael Mosser articulate what is now a truism of the engagement debate—scholars prize and refine theory while practitioners value and perfect practice because each has different interests in and purposes for knowledge.\textsuperscript{44} That practitioners desire “methods, not… theories”\textsuperscript{45} is supported by some interviewees. Interviewee 14 said: “…the domain that I work in… is really the application of tools and methods and understanding from the social sciences to public policy problems in the national security

\textsuperscript{43} Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{44} George, “Bridging the Gap,” 145; Mosser, “Puzzles Versus Problems,” 1078-1079.
\textsuperscript{45} Price, \textit{Anthropological Intelligence}, 167.
Key questions concerning engagement are: Can practices and methods be separated from theory? Is this ethical? How effective are methods if they are separated from theory?

Constraints on decision-making processes for policymakers and military personnel fostered analytical frameworks using methods, such as counterfactual reasoning to produce solutions, or “‘actionable deliverables.’”

David D. Newsom (1918-2008), former ambassador, Undersecretary of State, and academic professor, described in his article “Foreign Policy and Academia,” the pressured environment of USG officials (and military personnel):

For officials, the objective of action is to resolve or manage a problem. Their motives are operational, not intellectual. Often under intense pressures, they are engaged in reconciling domestic and foreign politics, resources, and realities abroad and hammering these factors into a workable policy.

Given these unique knowledge paradigms, interviewee 19, a DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator, described applying academic knowledge, acquired in different paradigms, to government policymaking as “trying to square the circle.” Elaborating on this point, he said:

To some extent academic-speak can’t really translate into government-speak. For one, the level that you’re dealing with is limited. There are so many details that in practice… a lot of it gets lost in translation. They [policymakers] take an idea from an academic paper and it gets mutated and goes to lots of different… secretaries and deputy secretaries who end up turning it into something different entirely…

Reconciling theoretical academic knowledge to policymaking and military decision-making (MDMP) processes is challenging but not insurmountable. Several participants agreed with interviewee 10 who argued that a balance can be struck in policymaking by supporting

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46 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
47 Krebs, “Right Balance,” 1115. For a justification (pp. 4, 6) and detailed examination of counterfactual reasoning see, Noel Hendrickson, *Counterfactual Reasoning: A Basic Guide for Analysts, Strategists, and Decision Makers*, Proteus Monograph Series 2, no. 5 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2008). See also, Mosser, “Puzzles Versus Problems,” 1079. This perspective was also conveyed in a Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
48 Newsom, “Foreign Policy and Academia,” 55.
49 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011.
50 Ibid.
“practical experience” with “a theoretical basis.” Through intergroup engagement, different communities can work together to address communication and translation issues by putting theory and practice into a reciprocal relationship. Such engagement can occur in direct, contributor, critical, and public modes. Naturally, some modes will be more effective depending on the circumstances, but contact among groups is necessary. Interviewee 9 summarizes well how engagement puts research and theory in relation to practice:

I think about who I am and what I’m representing; and, who I’m talking to or writing to; and, what I’m going to say, what the context is, what the moment is; and, what the impact will be; and, what the value of saying that thing, at that time, in that place, to those people will be. One always does that but I think I’ve become more conscious [of it].

Although theory/practice and analysis/experience differ, the dichotomy is misleading. Theory and practice can speak reciprocally, and, agreeing with Lt. Col. Paul Yingling (USA), the integrity of the critical reasoning process is more important than one’s epistemology.

**Institution-Individual Dynamics**

The notion of impact, or whether academic engagement affects policymaking or decision-making processes and/or outcomes, is central to this discursive theme. Arguing for engagement, Fosher, an anthropologist with the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Learning, writes:

Few policymakers read anthropological journals. To engage in the conversation, anthropologists must act in extra-disciplinary, often extra-academic contexts… we cannot expect people outside the discipline to listen to us if we pick and choose the problems with which we engage largely on the basis of our comfort level with possible partners and their politics. It is one thing to pick one’s path with care; it is another to refuse to leave the yard and then complain about what one sees over the fence.

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51 Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with the author, Arlington, VA, 9 August 2011.
53 Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
Interviewee 17, a psychologist with diverse engagement experiences, echoes Fosher’s words:

… I’m all in favor of… [having] healthy suspicousness of our government. I’m a product of Watergate and so I don’t just say, “Ok, yeah I completely trust you.” But if you’re irritated at something, work with the government. We are [in] the United States in the academy, so get in there and work with it. [The government is] not a separate entity that…[only] policymakers [can work with]… so inform it.

But interviewee 14, the anthropologist working with the US military, caveated that engagement does not guarantee impact, using Iraq War pre-war decision-making as an example:

Whether the government would have listened to them [academics] is a different problem, and it has to do with power and authority of advisors because, for the most part, people who are brought in to be subject matter experts or participate in these domains are brought in to advise and they’re not there to make decisions. So how effective they are depends on the kind of relationships they’re able to develop with policymakers or with military officers.

However, anthropologist David Price, based on his research of wartime engagement in WWII, is skeptical of academic engagement’s policy impact in wartime:

As anthropologists find themselves in recurrent advisory roles in which their advice is ignored or unwelcome, questions are raised about the wisdom of continuing to take on such roles… Anthropologists should question the wisdom of such advisory relationships when there is so little evidence that military and intelligence agencies actually use anthropologists to expand their understanding of such situation… anthropologists might… have an equal, if not better, chance to influence policy decisions by remaining outside the military and intelligence organizations. Working for military or intelligence agencies diminishes anthropologists’ abilities to speak out to the press, to other scholars, to Congress, and in other public venues, and internal pressures limit internal critiques.

Interviewee 9, an academic historian and USG researcher, also questioned a direct relationship between engagement and impact:

I actually haven’t had this too much, but I think that you can have more of a desire that your ideas do have a policy impact… One makes arguments, and one hopes that they’re heard and taken seriously and have an impact. But I don’t know that I have an expectation that because I’m working in the government, given the position that I’ve held, that what I do will influence or impact policy more than it would, or that they [participant’s writings and research] would, outside of this position. I suppose that there is some reason to believe that… you would be heard more, but I don’t know that I have a greater expectation or demand.

56 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
57 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
58 Price, Anthropological Intelligence, 270-271.
59 Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
These views, and those of other interviewees, support the conclusion that engagement does not categorically improve policies or policymaking processes. The contextual environment in which engagement occurs is too complex for such linear causality, but as the perspectives above indicate, different modes of engagement have different dynamics, costs, effects, and risks.

Yet, engagement can have a qualitative impact, most often on the policymaking process rather than the outcome. James McGann has devised metrics to measure think tanks’ impact on policy, but in his words: “measuring such influence is even more difficult than determining what qualifies as influence, especially in the United States where the policymaking process includes external actors and outside forces.”

Examples of direct academic impact on outcomes exist, but engagement is “most influential in the early stages… particularly in the problem definition and agenda-setting phases” of the policymaking process. Although many interviewees agreed with this assessment, some remained skeptical about “reform from the inside.”

This skepticism tends to come from three sources: the long time horizons by which large institutions change, the issue of leadership and personalities, and organizational structures.

Regarding time, anthropologist Mihir Pandya uses “the life of the F-117,” spanning twenty years from design to first operation, to illustrate the lengthy time horizon on which a large institution like the DOD operates. Thomas Ricks’s statement, “In both art and strategy, personality plays a large but murky role,” reflects what many interviewees described as a key factor in the

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60 McGann, *Think Tanks*, 40-44.
61 Ibid., 40. This view was also expressed by LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011, and Dr. Kramer (Interviewee 18), personal interview with the author, 18 November 2011.
62 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011.
policymaking or decision-making process, leadership. Finally, skepticism about engagement also stems from the idea that government bureaucracies are not just “flawed,” but “broken” and “will not be receptive to scholarly work…” Interviewee 4, the interdisciplinary geographer and USG SME consultant, counters skeptics’ assertions:

I remember a big case where the Bosnia Desk, in the State Department, resign[ed] en masse because they were all writing and making policy analysis, and it was all being ignored at the higher political level, or the higher political authority never read it. And there is some of that… I got into this discussion with very high-end people who are making policy… in the White House, and [they] had their agenda and it really wasn’t going to change because it was a political agenda. But at a lower level and [in] other circles, you make inroads… It’s like a snowball. That’s one of the things about Washington. The truth [is] that [if] something gets repeated over and over and over again, it becomes truth—you just have to start your own. You’ve got to keep on repeating it [and] keep meeting with enough people. It’s politics. You have to build a discourse of people that are listening to you in a community…. I have colleagues that I know just don’t want [to have anything to] do with policy. They stay in academia. They do not want to get involved in the policy stuff for that reason [politics]. They say, “[It] will have no impact. Why should we do it?” I don’t agree with that. I think it depends on your experience and your personality. I have a lot of patience.

And as interviewee 4 highlights, it is through engagement that one witnesses the human element inherent in bureaucratic decision-making, which problematizes institutional and group reifications. It is clear that the mechanics of the engagement process requires patience, time, and effort in cultivating relationships, and the qualitative impact of engagement lies in creating interviewee four’s discursive truth snowballs. But interviewees and texts also show that engagement’s complexity and potential impact are not just refracted through patience in dealing with bureaucratic time horizons, personalities, and structures. There are important ethical issues about warfare/violence, politics, and lending one’s expertise in a time of war.

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64 Ricks, *The Gamble*, 77. The issue of leadership and personality was discussed at length in one interview, Telephone interview with Interviewee 12 (USAF Colonel), 31 August 2011.
65 Fosher, *Under Construction*, 8
67 Skype interview with an academic, 10 June 2011.
Ethics and “Do No Harm”

Although ethics are a factor in wartime engagement decisions across social science disciplines, such considerations are especially acute for anthropologists because of anthropology’s colonial history and the USG’s concerted efforts to recruit anthropologists for programs like HTS. For anthropologists, ethical questions regarding wartime engagement are entangled in questions of how to “do no harm” or “to avoid harm or wrong.” This is particularly true for contributor or direct modes where perceived secrecy and possible lethal targeting raise “the ethical ante.” But many, like interviewee 16, recognize that “do no harm” is multivocal:

Do no harm. That’s a great statement, but it’s a negative statement based on inaction. In other words, I’m telling you about what I do in terms of what I don’t do. That’s inaction… “do no harm” is a great ideal, but it’s not useable in the real world just like “don’t make mistakes” and “do the right thing.” How can you know what will do harm? How can you know what will not do harm?

What constitutes do no harm is further complicated given that some social science professional associations’ codes of ethics (COE) lack adjudicative mechanisms to enforce ethical principles and sanction unethical behavior. Thus, a situation arises whereby professional ethics are interpreted through the lens of one’s personal sense of “do no harm” in context. As stated above, such ethical debates are particularly salient in anthropology. To address the ethics of wartime engagement, the 2007 CEAUSSIC report supports:

70 CEAUSSIC 2007, 17.
71 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011. See also, Fosher, “Yes, Both, Absolutely,” in *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency*, 266-267.
72 AAA, “Code of Ethics,” 1; Hugh Gusterson, “The Cultural Turn in the War on Terror,” in *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency*, 293. A notable exception is the American Sociological Association which does have adjudicative mechanisms to enforce ethics rules and sanction violations. See, ASA, “Code of Ethics,” 5, 26-29.
...a situational ethics, as determined by the activities characteristic of a given role and set of activities... A situational ethics is not against engagement in principle, but also does not subject our ethical principles to watered down qualifications, and nor does it embrace some sort of ill-defined relativistic ethics.  

But it is unclear how framing the AAA’s COE, already lacking adjudicative mechanisms, as situational would be different from the status quo, which places the ethical onus on individuals.  

An exchange with interviewee 11 calls such a distinction into question:

Author: Do you think there are any potential ethical or professional conflicts academics may face in terms of engaging with the USG or the US military?  

Interviewee 11: I think there could be. There could be conflicts where you would be asked [to give] advice or consulting. Maybe it would involve a military mission where people were going to be killed, and you just don’t agree with that and there’s an ethical conflict that you have. Perhaps you’re being asked to support a government position that you don’t agree with and your expertise is going to be used to further the government position and you know full well that you’re supporting something you don’t agree with… And then it’s very appropriate to recuse yourself if you just don’t feel like you can live with that.  

Author: Would you say that that would be an appropriate response then? To remove yourself?  

Interviewee 11: I don’t think I can answer that... I think that’s an individual choice that’s very circumstantial. It just depends on the circumstance… So, the long answer to your question is that it just depends on the circumstance. Each person has to answer to that individually, I think.  

Another ethical issue is whether the burden of proof that wartime engagement will “do no harm” falls on academia or USG institutions. In other words, who must prove whether or not others will be harmed as a result of academic engagement? According to interviewee 16, one position asserts that USG institutions must, beyond a reasonable doubt, “guarantee...that anything you do will not be used for the wrong purpose.” However, interviewee 18 critiqued such value judgments, countering that “[boycott] should have to be thoroughly rationalized.”  

Taking HTS as an example, anthropologist Roberto González argued in 2009 that:

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73 CEAUSSIC 2007, 45.  
74 Dr. Shirey, personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.  
75 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.  
76 Dr. Kramer (Interviewee 18), personal interview with the author, 18 November 2011.
The way in which HTS has been packaged… is completely unsupported by evidence. HTS supporters frequently assert that the program has drastically reduced US ‘kinetic operations’… in Afghanistan, but Pentagon officials haven’t responded to requests for data to back up the claims.  

In 2010, González argued that “there is no verifiable evidence that HTTs [Human Terrain Teams] have saved a single life,” and remained skeptical about intelligence gathering and lethal targeting. But one might also ask if skeptics like González have concrete evidence that HTTs have facilitated targeting and gathered intelligence to support such claims? These issues will be more fully discussed in Chapter Four, but the ethical issues concerning direct anthropological engagement in the context of the GWOT remain contested.

The ethical debate of wartime engagement tends to portray zero-sum ethical choices between direct engagement and full disengagement. This author agrees with Fosher that “[m]aintaining scholarly disinterest and detachment is, itself, a statement” with its own ethical considerations. Thus, there is no “most ethical” answer to wartime engagement debates because the multivocal language in COEs like the AAA’s places the ethical judgment on the individual. As the exchange with interviewee 11 indicated, “situational ethics” seems to describe that which already occurs—that is, individuals decide whether and how to engage in wartime.

The Purpose of Knowledge

Anthropologist Robert Albro argues that an obstacle to academic engagement with government institutions is epistemological, but this author argues that the more fundamental issue is teleological, that is, the purpose of knowledge. Interviewee 9 expressed a view that knowledge

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77 González, American Counterinsurgency, 3.
79 Fosher, Under Construction, 8.
80 Albro, “Writing Culture Doctrine,” 1087-1091.
should be pursued both for its own sake, and Price sees social justice value in anthropological knowledge, noting that “when practiced ethically anthropology can be transformative," in spite of “‘stud[y]ing] down’ steep gradients of power.” However, government institutions project power and utilize knowledge for the purpose of advancing state interests. In this sense, the distinction between academia and the USG and military is more like the distinction between basic and applied science. Their epistemology is not fundamentally different, but the knowledge is utilized for different purposes.

Critique and control are important issues within the broader purpose of knowledge theme. Critique of research, results, and actions are part of the public nature of academia. However, interviewee 6, a US embassy official, recognized the importance of academic critique but found the lack of alternative suggestions unhelpful. Government officials and military personnel have teleological orientations to produce results from knowledge that does not mesh with the academic telos of critique for its own sake. The issue of critique parallels the issue of control in that differing perspectives view the consequences of knowledge differently.

Interviewee 14 described knowledge as “a tool… [that] can be used in a variety of different ways.” Opposing this type of utilitarian view of knowledge is a utilitarianism based

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81 Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
82 Price, Weaponizing Anthropology, 3.
84 Price, Anthropological Intelligence, 32-33, 50; Telephone interview with Interviewee 5 (USG official), 10 June 2011.
85 Price, Weaponizing Anthropology, 42.
86 Telephone interview with Interviewee 6 (US embassy official), 14 June 2011.
89 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
on social justice, the idea that knowledge should be used “to serve the humane causes of global peace and social justice.”\footnote{AAA Executive Board, “Statement on the Human Terrain System Project.” See also, Gough, “Anthropology and Imperialism.” 13, 19, 23.} This notion fits well with postmodern ideas that “There is no such thing as politically neutral science.”\footnote{Price, \textit{Anthropological Intelligence}, xv.} However, eight interviewees opposed outright full disengagement over concerns about possible unintended consequences or misuse of knowledge provided to the USG. One such interviewee, interviewee 18, articulated this position succinctly: “The use of knowledge that you generate is not something that you can control. It’s almost futile and it’s a sign of hubris to think that you can.”\footnote{Dr. Kramer (Interviewee 18), personal interview with the author, 18 November 2011. For discussions about controlling knowledge distribution see, Fosher, “Yes, Both, Absolutely,” 268-269; Lucas, Jr., \textit{Anthropologists in Arms}, 31-35, 55; Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro, “Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years,” \textit{PRISM} 2, no. 4 (September 2011): 72; Price, “Soft Power, Hard Power, and the Anthropological “Leveraging” of Cultural “Assets”: Distilling the Politics and Ethics of Anthropological Counterinsurgency,” in \textit{Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency}, 258-259; and, Utas, “Mercenary Anthropology.”} Taking this position further, the only means one has to absolutely ensure that knowledge cannot be misused is to not publish, which is, according to interviewee 18, “almost antithetical to the mission of the truth-telling scholar.”\footnote{Dr. Kramer (Interviewee 18), personal interview with the author, 18 November 2011. See also, McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 72; and, Utas, “Mercenary Anthropology.” This view was also expressed in an interview with Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.}

The disagreement regarding the purpose of knowledge is not if knowledge should be used, but how and to what degree can one who produces knowledge control how it is used once published in a GWOT context. Because knowledge is a tool, engagement can be thought of as the process by which an academic attempts to ensure the best possible use of that tool, with each mode affording different means and degrees of knowledge control and interpretations. According to interviewee 14, the best means one has to observe how one’s knowledge is used, particularly in wartime, is to “work very closely with the military because that’s the only
opportunity you get to influence them is when you’re sitting there at the table.” But such proximity may be politically/ethically unsettling if one imbues knowledge with a social justice vector opposed to the GWOT and neo-imperialism. Interviewee 11 remarked:

Where it becomes a gray area… [is when] you don’t know how it might be used—and nobody really knows. Once you let go of the information as an academic, you don’t know how it might be manipulated or used. So it’s either you play or you don’t play. And so you have to ask yourself, “Do I want to contribute?” in the hopes that I can trust that it will be used correctly? Or if it’s such vital information that you’re afraid [and] you don’t want to let it out because of how it may be manipulated, that’s a personal choice. So I really can’t answer other than to say it’s an individual decision.  

Thus, like the discussion of ethics and “do no harm,” what constitutes appropriate use and social justice are, as interviewee 11 noted twice, individual appraisals of both the means and ends to which the knowledge will put within the GWOT context.

Roles and Engagement

Another contentious issue in engagement debate is what role should academics play? Much of the literature assesses this question presuming an advisory role for academics. The questions, then, become: What authority does an advisor have within the policymaking or decision-making process? To what degree can an advisor control policymaking or decision-making outcomes?

Interviewee fifteen’s response reflects other interviewees’ positions and McGann’s research:

An academic is most effective as an advisor or consultant. This allows the academic to preserve objectivity while making available thoughts worth hearing. As an advisor, the academic must be prepared to be ignored, in whole or in part. Academic advice is least helpful at the tactical level, where military skill and experience count most.

Interviewee 11 posed a hypothetical of an academic-as-advisor role in decision-making:

Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.
LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
mutual respect within the interaction… is absolutely critical. And whoever’s the leader… then that person works to bring out the best of each of those people, and is able to lead the discussion so that if the discussion starts to go outside the scope of where someone has a certain skillset, then you need to bring that in. You need to be able to recognize that the validity of that input may not be as much of a contributor as something else. But I certainly think there’s great value in having [academic input/engagement].

Interviewee 5, a USG official, supported this basic assessment of expertise boundaries:

I would have to fall back on a case-by-case reaction. I have seen some involvement that has been amazing and powerful [because of] the ability of whoever it is… [to be] a step removed from that policy process, and maybe [be] without ownership of that policy process and therefore [has] a greater ability to think objectively about what’s going on… But to temper that… I would have to say I have seen some instances where that step removed might be more than one step, and it might just be analysis that is divorced from the constraints that the policymaker is living with. And so it’s just not as useful as it should be or could be.

Based on these statements, constructive engagement hinges on the ability to understand one’s position and location within the policymaking or decision-making process. Most interviewees agreed that academic contributions were most effective at strategic and policy levels with diminishing utility at the operational and tactical level, but some participants questioned this assertion. The other key ingredient to constructive engagement is being “willing to accept that we [academics] will not always ‘win’ in terms of how information is used.” This attitude gives academics the patience necessary “to persist over the long haul” as he or she works to create “a snowball” that “can change trends.”

Conclusion

The discursive environment is complex, and to some observers disagreements concerning the themes listed in this chapter seem irreconcilable. However, this author agrees with interviewee 17 who, like other interviewees, argued that confronting and overcoming these differences

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97 Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.
98 Telephone interview with Interviewee 5 (USG official), 10 June 2011.
100 Ibid.
101 Skype interview with Interviewee 4 (interdisciplinary academic geographer), 10 June 2011.
102 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011.
requires compromise and understanding through contact with other groups: “If you keep these groups apart, then there’s all the suspicion. The government looks at social scientists and says, ‘These are people who… are totally irrelevant.’ And social scientists say, ‘It’s big brother…’”103 Neglecting each community’s organizational and operational cultures, then, all but ensures counterproductive engagement and may only reinforce communal tropes and cynicism. Contact and dialogue is preferable to separation and silence, and engagement is preferable to non-engagement and disengagement. Bearing in mind social locations within engagement environments, it is possible for engagement to occur as interviewee 15 describes:

The policymakers must have the wisdom to take expert advice (military and academic), develop a range of options, and then carry out the one chosen by their fellow citizens as expressed through elected representatives. Academics ensure consideration of context and consequences as options are considered and outcomes are assessed. Military and security leaders deliver their best estimates and then derive feasible means of carrying out directives from civil authorities. Precedence varies based upon the location and nature of the challenge. In Washington, policymakers and academics exert more influence. The closer you get to the shooting war, the military’s voice carries more weight. But in general, the roles are clear: policymakers decide, academics inform, and Soldiers execute.104

But for such a framework to exist, there must first be constructive dialogue and meaningful exchange, academic, civilian, and military communities, which requires mutual understanding and recognition of each community’s roles and scope of expertise.

Chapter Two adds to the spectral complexity of the engagement landscape by unpacking the engagement environment’s six most salient discursive themes. The two discourses and six themes presented show that engagement in wartime is not simply a matter of correctly applying expertise. The context of the GWOT and violence remains important for many academics, particularly anthropologists. It is the multi-directional interaction of the GWOT context, the six discursive themes, and the two discourses of history and memory which affects the broader

103 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
104 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
engagement environment in wartime. It is one’s experiences and perception of this contextual environment, across communities, which affects the spaces for intergroup engagement. Positive experiences often challenge discursive binaries and “gaps” and tend to reinforce engagement as worthwhile, and negative experiences tend to confirm discursive portrayals and devalue engagement. Interviewee 10 expressed a broader truth about experience inflecting discourse and vice versa: “[I]f all your experiences were bad, if you lost every game, maybe you’re not the right guy. You need a few wins in there somewhere.”

These “wins” and “losses,” memorialized in collective memories, are refracted through individuals’ personal ethics, which affects personal appraisals of engagement, possible impact, and perceptions of a scholar-state divide. To reiterate, it is this reciprocal discourse-experience interaction, refracted through discursive themes, particularly ethics, and context, which shapes the contextual engagement environment and makes engagement such a complex process. Although assessing impact is difficult, this author agrees with interviewee 19 that an academic’s ability to affect processes and outcomes is as much a function of his/her ability to 1) cultivate relationships, and 2) understand his/her social location within the process as it is about navigating the issues associated with applying theoretical knowledge to policymaking/decision-making paradigms.

Chapters Three and Four will examine the Iraq War, HTS, and the Minerva Research Initiative, and will explore how these themes manifested in these cases.

105 Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with author, 9 August 2011.
106 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011.
CHAPTER III: THE IRAQ WAR: A 21ST CENTURY VIETNAM

Interviewee 3: The Iraq War, as I said, [is] a perfect case-in-point.

An Engagement Case Study

The Iraq War is the watershed event through which 21st century, GWOT-context engagement is understood. This chapter’s title comparison of Iraq and Vietnam is not based on tactical or operational similarities, but their analogous impact on the engagement debate. The US-led war in Iraq bears striking resemblances to the Vietnam War in its memorialization as a generation-defining conflict, deeply unpopular among many academics across disciplines.¹ The Iraq War conjured up Vietnam’s specter for the academy, reinforced the loss of trust first experienced during the early years of the Cold War, and re-galvanized classical engagement-as-opposition.

I argue that “Silent Academics” and “Deaf Government,” which are parallel, subsidiary discourses of “Setting the Record Straight” and “Telling the Truth” respectively, frame the history and memory of state-scholar relationships regarding pre-war planning and wartime decision-making. “Silent Academics,” alleges that academics should have better informed USG decision-making prior to the war. This view’s rationale is that the USG and military would have been more prepared, and, thus, would have prosecuted the war effectively had academics been more engaged. Interviewee 14 captured this view well: “[H]ad there been more social scientists or people with understanding of Iraq… available during this policy determination phase that would have been beneficial overall to the government.”²

¹ Schalk, Ivory Tower, xxii-xxiii.
² Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
“Deaf Government,” rebuts these accusations, arguing that academics did “speak truth to power,” were engaged publicly, and did present the dangers and possible consequences of invasion and occupation through protest and dissent. This discourse alleges that academic advice opposing the war was disregarded. According to interviewee 1, the Bush Administration consulted academics, but only those who supported, rather than questioned, an invasion of Iraq:

I also think that certain administrations listen to [certain] people more than other administrations, or they surround themselves with [certain] people. I found this [to be the case] with the [George W.] Bush Administration. It surrounded itself with people who said what they wanted to hear. So it surrounded itself with the Fouad Ajamis and the Ahmed Chalabis… I think the [George W.] Bush Administration was fundamentally anti-intellectual. It didn’t want [anyone] knowledgeable. It wanted ideologues.3

Thus, academic criticisms and engagement fell on deaf ears, and a government determined to go to war carried on in spite of academic and popular protest. As will be shown, both discourses distort the reality: “Silent Academics” ignores the fact engagement was only effective if you could access the proverbial Bush Administration tent which meant not challenging the legitimacy of the war, and “Deaf Government” dismisses the impact of pre-war and in bello engagement.

The Iraq War is, in many ways, a paradigmatic case of engagement because it touches on many of the themes presented in Chapter Two. Seen as similarly unjust and based on pretense, the Iraq war triggered academia’s memory of its oppositional role during the Vietnam War. Theory and practice appear in discussions of the DOD’s “cultural turn” and desire for anthropological knowledge and methodologies to assist COIN via HTS.4 Institution-individual dynamics emerged as scholars and practitioners debated institutional or individual responsibility and/or culpability for the failures of the war and the occupation. Ethics and “do no harm” were pillars of disengagement discourse. Facilitating an illegal war was seen as unethical prima facie.

3 Personal interview with Interviewee 1 (academic anthropologist), 5 April 2011. Emphasis in interview.
4 González, American Counterinsurgency, ii, 26, 45-48, 57-59, 80; Gusterson, “Cultural Turn,” in Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency, 279-295; Price, Weaponizing Anthropology, 1-5, 95-179.
but the idea that academic knowledge might assist lethal targeting also raised ethical concerns. Additionally, to “know thy enemy” raises issues about the purpose of knowledge in a wartime state and in pre-war planning phases.\(^5\) Finally, the Iraq War demonstrates how role-conscious, closely engaged academics have a significant impact on policymaking and decision-making.

These constructed discourses will be interrogated by examining the pre-war decision-making as well as the key policy decisions of de-Ba‘athification, disbanding the Iraqi military, and the 2007 “troop escalation, or ‘surge’” in Iraq.\(^6\) By understanding these processes, one can better evaluate discursive claims of “Silent Academics” and “Deaf Government,” and speculate about the Iraq War’s possible effects on academic, civilian government, and military institutional memories and what the war may mean for future prospects of engagement. This chapter’s research regarding the decision-making processes is largely archival, but interviewees also provided insights into the Iraq War’s effect on the engagement debate.

**Going to War**

The decision to use military force results from the deliberations among various senior civilian and military personnel.\(^7\) Interviewee 10 described the calculus for decisions where lethal force may be used to achieve national security objectives: “If it is not linked to national objectives and the grand strategy of this country, it becomes little more than military vandalism.”\(^8\) Interviewee 10 also recounted his experiences in the interagency policymaking process, giving special attention to its hierarchical structure and efforts to find policy consensus “at the level of the sub-

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\(^6\) Ricks, *The Gamble*, 93.


\(^8\) Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with author, 9 August 2011.
DCCs [Deputy Combatant Commanders].” If no consensus can be reached, policy decisions “move up to the Deputies Committee [of the National Security Council].” Finally, “only… those issues that could not be resolved by the sub-DCC or the Deputies’ Committee… go to the Principal’s Committee.” At this level, the President makes a final decision based on the recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC) Advisor and other Principals.\(^9\) Important questions to ask are: Who was involved in the Iraq War interagency policymaking and decision-making processes? Was there was academic consultation? If there was academic consultation, what was the nature of the intergroup engagement and what impact did it have?

**The Pre-War Decision-Making Process: Actors, Organizations and Mechanics**

Policymakers, military personnel, and academics were involved in the Bush Administration’s pre-war planning process. The civilian policymakers were: President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Senior Advisor for Security to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Senior Civilian Advisor to the Ministry of Defense Walter Slocombe, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. The key military actors were: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (USAF), Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace (USMC), US Central Command (CENTCOM) Combatant Commander (CCDR) General Tommy Franks (USA), and Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki (USA). Finally, the academics involved were: Fouad Ajami, Bernard Lewis, Richard Perle, and Kanan Makiya.

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\(^9\) Ibid.
Each of the above actors had a role to play in the pre-war planning process, and the primary organizations involved were the DOD, DOS, and CIA, whose collective activities were supposed to be coordinated by the NSC.\textsuperscript{10} Much of the actual planning for the war was conducted within the DOD, specifically in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P), the Office of Special Plans (OSP), and the CENTCOM Combatant Command (COCOM). Rumsfeld understood himself as a manager, “not just running the Defense Department but also advising the President.”\textsuperscript{11} The purposes of Rumsfeld’s subsidiary offices were to assist him in providing strategic guidance to CCDRs with Feith’s OUSD-P, “formulating national security and defense policy” among other duties.\textsuperscript{12} The OSP, created by Feith, was a renamed incarnation of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs within the OUSD-P, and was to function as “‘policy planning group’” to provide “policy guidance for the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of issues” related to postwar Iraq.\textsuperscript{13}

It was the OSP which produced the de-Ba’athification policy, and CPA advisor Walter Slocombe with CPA head L. Paul Bremer devised the disbanding of the Iraqi military.\textsuperscript{14} Finally, the actual planning of military operations was left to CENTCOM under the direction of CENTCOM CCDR General Franks.\textsuperscript{15} The DOS provided input related to the postwar environment, most notably with the Future of Iraq Project (FOIP) study. FOIP was “the most comprehensive effort within the U.S. government to examine the challenges and requirements of

\textsuperscript{10} Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 53-55, 531.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{13} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, 24, 26; Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 294.
\textsuperscript{14} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, xx, 24; Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 427-434.
\textsuperscript{15} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, xx, 6-14.
Iraq after Saddam” and consisted of 2,000 pages over 13 volumes produced by 17 working groups composed of Iraqi nationals.\textsuperscript{16} Per its role in intelligence collection, the CIA contributed intelligence assessments to policymakers to aid their decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{17}

The mechanics of the interagency process are certainly complex, but the pre-war planning process for the Iraq War was, at best, uncoordinated.\textsuperscript{18} This author argues that there are four primary reasons for this, the first being President Bush’s transfer of postwar authority to the DOD through National Security Presidential Directive 24.\textsuperscript{19} This, in effect, gave the DOD control over combat operations and postwar reconstruction planning, and fueled a perception that the DOD was “first among equals in the interagency planning process.”\textsuperscript{20} It also added to a feeling expressed by interviewee 6, a US embassy official:

\begin{quote}
The Bush Administration fundamentally didn’t trust civilian agencies, particularly something like the State Department—and USAID as well—and so as a result, [the Bush Administration] gave the military lots of resources to do things that State, AID, and other civilian agencies have the background and expertise to do. And so what’s ended up happening is because they [DOD] have the money, they’re doing these things even though they don’t have the background or expertise to do it.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Second, coordination across and within agencies and departments was poor.\textsuperscript{22} The “NSC seems not to have mediated persistent disagreement between the Defense Department and the State Department that existed throughout the planning process” and failed to “provide strategic guidance on various aspects of U.S. policy during the postwar period.”\textsuperscript{23} Altogether, there was a “lack of clarity” and “basic disagreements were allowed to remain unresolved.”\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 30-32.
\textsuperscript{17} Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 98-99.
\textsuperscript{18} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, xx.
\textsuperscript{19} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, xxi.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., xxi, 28-29.
\textsuperscript{21} Telephone interview with Interviewee 6 (US embassy official), 14 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{22} Bensahel et al, \textit{After Saddam}, xix-xx.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 245.
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Third, different aspects of pre-war planning process varied in classification which hindered coordination between and among civilian and military planners. Bensahel et al note:

Early in the iterative process of developing his Commander’s Concept, General Franks limited participation to a small number of senior officers… On January 7, 2002, General Franks assembled his small group of planners engaged in compartmentalized planning for OPLAN 1003V… For the next three months, a handful of officers on the CENTCOM staff continued to plan for all four phases of OPLAN 1003V.

During the first few months, however, access to OPLAN 1003V was limited to a handful of senior officers at the CFLCC [Combined Forces Land Component Command]. Colonel Benson was the only officer below the rank of brigadier general who was “read-on” to OPLAN 1003V. Consequently, the CFLCC C5 [Director of Policy, Plans and Strategy, Col. Benson] planning team was constrained in its efforts to build a comprehensive supporting plan. In October 2002, the classification of OPLAN 1003V was downgraded to Secret and a large number of CFLCC planning staff gained access to it.

Feith writes that such compartmentalized planning also occurred in the DOD due to “Rumsfeld’s proper concern for secrecy and his management idiosyncrasies,” which even initially excluded Feith from “his [Rumsfeld’s] operational planning meetings with his commanders.” These coordination issues based on security clearances and “management idiosyncrasies” reflect interviewee seventeen’s description of government classification:

To get this information exchanged amongst people [is difficult] because the problem [is] when it goes to intel [intelligence], whether it’s military intel or… CIA-type intel, is that the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. Sometimes the right hand doesn’t know it has a left hand. We don’t connect dots [and] we don’t do these kinds of things [coordinate] because it’s classified.

Fourth, the pre-war planning process suffered from personality conflicts. Feith’s memoir, War and Decision, describes several instances in which Rumsfeld’s and Wolfowitz’s views clashed with Powell’s and Armitage’s. Institutionally, the DOD clashed with the CIA and

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26 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 6-7. Operations Plan 1003V was the emerging plan for the invasion of Iraq.
27 Ibid., 10-11.
28 Feith, War and Decision, 71.
29 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
30 Feith, War and Decision, 51, 61-63.
DOS on a number of pre-war planning efforts at the interagency level. For example, Feith describes tensions between the DOD and CIA and DOS over CIA and DOS advisors liaising with CENTCOM military planners:

Senior State and CIA advisers are regularly assigned to assist the combatant commands, working daily, shoulder to shoulder, with the military planners… These officials understandably exercise a great deal of influence—especially on political-military issues, about which military offices may have little background and no strong views of their own. (In contrast, members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff are not normally resident at combatant command headquarters.)… The makeup of the interagency teams at the combatant commands helps explain why CENTCOM’s thinking on contested issues—training [Iraqi] exiles, involving Iraqis in our war plans, setting up a provisional government—often clashed with the views of the Pentagon leadership. Rumsfeld wasn’t shy about imparting his thinking to his commanders, but no Secretary of Defense could contribute daily war-planning advice—or influence military officers’ attitudes—as persistently or effectively as the resident State and CIA advisers with whom those officers were in continuous collaboration.

Feith cites other instances of Rumsfeld “caus[ing] friction with his colleagues” by “encroaching on other departments’ turf” when providing advice to the President, and acknowledges that he had his own “bureaucratic rivals and policy opponents.” Personality conflicts are not unusual in bureaucratic decision-making processes, but these four factors taken together had a negative synergistic effect on the pre-war planning process, complicating combat and post-war operations.

Iraq War Decision-Making: War, De-Ba‘athification and Disbanding the Iraqi Military

The decision to go to war and operations planning, initially classified at the high levels that they were, appears to have been made with little consultation outside government and military organizations. However, other researchers have identified examples whereby academics were consulted about Iraq during the pre-war planning process. Three individuals that appear in the literature are Perle, an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) fellow and Chairman of the Defense

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32 Ibid., 371-372.
33 Ibid., xiv, 52.
Policy Board (DPB) at DOD,\textsuperscript{34} Ajami, then-director of The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Middle East Studies program;\textsuperscript{35} and Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies.\textsuperscript{36}

Each played different roles in the pre-war advisory process. Perle “counseled Rumsfeld on military and defense planning issues,” and organized a DPB meeting at the Pentagon on Iraq on 19 September 2001 which Lewis and Iraqi dissident and exile Ahmed Chalabi attended.\textsuperscript{37} Lewis legitimized the invasion intellectually by providing historical knowledge of the Middle East and Islam to White House and Pentagon policymakers.\textsuperscript{38} Ajami’s role in the decision was similar to Lewis’s except that he provided political science counsel, and was particularly influential with Vice President Dick Cheney. Together, Lewis and Ajami provided intellectual counterarguments against those “Powell and the internationalists made.”\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, in Cheney’s first speech arguing for war with Iraq, “he even cited Ajami by name”:\textsuperscript{40} “As for the reaction of the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the


\textsuperscript{37} Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 17-18.

\textsuperscript{38} Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 18; Judis, Folly of Empire, 180-181, 183.

\textsuperscript{39} Judis, Folly of Empire, 181.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 183.
streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’”

Given the difficulties in assessing scholarly impact on policymaking discussed in Chapter Two, it is difficult to know if, and to what degree, Perle, Lewis, and Ajami influenced or confirmed the Bush Administration’s pre-war decision-making processes. A timeline suggests that Perle, Lewis, and Bush Administration officials were in contact with one another following the 19 September 2001 DPB meeting. Cheney’s reference to Ajami occurred on 26 August 2002, and according to Feith, it was at a NSC meeting on 18 December 2002 when President Bush told “told his National Security Council that war was ‘inevitable.’” Based on these timelines, it would be unreasonable to suggest that Perle, Lewis, and Ajami were decisive in the actual decisions that led to the Iraq War. Instead, they were scholar-advisors who framed and legitimized the enterprise of regime change. However, this was not so with the de-Ba’athification and dissolution of the Iraq security sector policies, made in bello, where external advisors and academics exerted stronger influences on these policies.

Issued on 16 May 2003, CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society,” “removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector” all “Full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of ‘Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), ‘Udw Far’ (Branch Member). [sic] ‘Udw Shu`bah (Section Member), and ‘Udw Firqah (Group

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42 Judis, Folly of Empire, 181.
43 Feith, War and Decision, 339, 342, 347.
Member) (together, ‘Senior Party Members’). Interviewee fifteen’s comments on de-Ba‘athification reflect those of other interviewees: “We got this wrong. It was a classic ‘good idea at the time’.” The intent was to remove “25,000 full members… just over 1 percent of the 2 million people on the government payroll.” However, the actual effects of the policy disproportionately targeted Sunni Arab Iraqis, and resulted in the unemployment of anywhere from 35,000-50,000 to 100,000 civil servants. As a result, government ministries were severely understaffed, and many disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis joined the nascent insurgency.

De-Ba‘athification was the subject of “months of interagency work” and a topic of discussion at a 10 March 2003 meeting of the NSC. At this meeting, the NSC compromised between DOD’s stricter de-Ba‘athification and DOS’s and CIA’s narrower de-Saddamification, and agreed that only the top one percent of the Ba’ath Party would be removed. But the policy written by Feith and the OSP ultimately had a broader reach than the agreed upon compromise. The chief influences on Feith’s thinking appear to be Makiya and Chalabi.

46 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.
47 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 36.
50 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 79; Feith, War and Decision, 427-428.
51 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 28; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 79; Dr. Mitchum, telephone interview with the author, 9 August 2011.
52 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 28; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 79-80.
53 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 79; Feith, War and Decision, 416-418, 420-421.
paper written by his Iraqi National Congress comparing de-Ba‘athification to de-Nazification in post-war Germany.\textsuperscript{54} This comparison seems to have resonated with Feith: “There had been a case for de-Nazification of Germany after World War II, and there was a case for de-Baathification in Iraq—in some respects, perhaps, an even stronger one.”\textsuperscript{55}

For his part, Makiya advised Feith to establish an interim government run by Iraqi expatriate exiles. Feith quotes Makiya as saying: “You must pick and choose. Pick people who are with you. Do not be even-handed between those who are with you and those who are against you. Leadership is required—not laissez-faire politically [sic].”\textsuperscript{56} Finally, Makiya provided Feith with “his assessment” of a conference of “internals” in Nasiriyah, Iraq on 15 April 2003: “The overwhelming sentiment of the meeting was for a very strict and thorough de-Ba‘athification program…”\textsuperscript{57} These arguments seemed to persuade Feith to support an interim government of exiles and broad de-Ba‘athification.\textsuperscript{58}

The degree to which Chalabi and Makiya influenced Feith and DOD policymakers is much clearer than Perle’s, Lewis’s, and Ajami’s regarding the decision to go to war with Iraq. Chalabi was able to effectively network with the USG and gain audiences with and circulate his ideas among senior level policymakers in the DOD such that they reached Feith.\textsuperscript{59} Feith’s appraisal of Makiya as “the eminent Iraqi expatriate intellectual” also provides insight into the degree to which he was able to shape Feith’s thinking about Iraqi expatriates, exiles, and the

\textsuperscript{54} 109\textsuperscript{th} Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress,” (2006), 3-4, 26-27, 30; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 32-35, 78-79; Feith, War and Decision, 419, 430.
\textsuperscript{55} Feith, War and Decision, 430.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 420.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 417.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 416-418, 420-421.
\textsuperscript{59} Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 32-35.
Ba’ath Party. Compared to pre-war decision-making, Chalabi and Makiya had significant effects on the policies developed by Feith and the OSP regarding de-Ba’athification.60

CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” “was almost certainly the most controversial and arguably the most ill-advised CPA decision.”61 Annex A to the CPA decision lists the dissolved entities, which range from civilian government ministries to intelligence apparatuses to the entire Iraqi Armed Services to “The Youth Organization.”62 Conservative estimates suggest 250,000-300,000 uniformed, civilian, intelligence, and security personnel were affected.63 Other assessments peg the figure at 350,000-400,000.64 Some sources claim the actual number was 500,000-800,000.65 Furthermore, Order Number 2 worked in tandem with de-Ba’athification in that all officers “holding the rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a Senior Party Member.”66

Following its promulgation, mass protests erupted in cities across Iraq, like Baghdad and Mosul.67 This policy, even more than CPA Order Number 1, is widely seen “as an unmitigated disaster that greatly magnified, or even instigated, both the Sunni insurgency and the Shiite militias.”68 The order is largely a product of two decision-makers: Walter Slocombe and L. Paul

60 McGann, Think Tanks, 44.
63 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 85; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 484
64 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 139; Feith, War and Decision, 432; ICG, “Iraq,” 13; Wirtz, “Victory,” 276.
65 Ferguson, No End In Sight, 164.
67 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 139; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 87; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 484.
68 Ferguson, No End In Sight, 167. See also Ibid., 164, 184; and, Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life, 88.
Bremer, both influenced by Chalabi.\textsuperscript{69} The degree to which Chalabi influenced Slocombe and Bremer is difficult to discern. “[T]he strong ideological dimension” of de-Ba‘athification, championed by Chalabi, created an intellectual environment in which CPA Order Number 2 could be promulgated against civilian and military counsel once the decision was distributed through interagency channels.\textsuperscript{70} Research suggests Order Number 2 was subjected to little, if any, interagency debate, and Feith writes that he received a draft copy of the order on 9 May 2003, only 14 days before Bremer issued the order.\textsuperscript{71} Compared to the decision to go to war, Makiya and Chalabi exerted relatively greater influence over decision-makers’ views on what eventually became CPA Orders 1 and 2, affecting both the policy processes and the outcomes. The same would be true of the “surge” as the consequences of uncoordinated pre-war planning and problematic stability phase policies began to manifest themselves in a violent insurgency.

\textit{The Surge}

Following the 19 November 2005 Haditha massacre and the 22 February 2006 bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, “senior officials in the Bush administration and the U.S. military… recognize[d] that the U.S. effort was heading for defeat.”\textsuperscript{72} The new strategy, “the ‘surge’ counteroffensive in Baghdad in 2007,”\textsuperscript{73} was the result of different military and civilian actors merging their efforts to change course in Iraq. This basic civil-military split is important in understanding how academics and external advisors influenced the surge-as-policy and the surge-as-executed. The former was largely influenced by a cadre of loyal opposition, comprised

\textsuperscript{71} Bremer, “CPA Order Number 2,” 3; Feith, \textit{War and Decision}, 428, 431; Ferguson, \textit{No End In Sight}, 190-191.
\textsuperscript{72} Ricks, \textit{The Gamble}, 9. See also Ibid., 3, 32.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 60.
mostly of academics—Peter Feaver, Jack Keane (USA, Ret.), Eliot Cohen, Frederick Kagan, Michael Vickers (ex-CIA Paramilitary Officer), Stephen Biddle, and Robert Kaplan (journalist)—working to change policymakers’ thinking.\textsuperscript{74} The surge-as-executed was influenced by General David Petraeus’s “Brain Trust,” “dominated by military officers who possessed doctorates… [and] combat experience in Iraq,”\textsuperscript{75} Biddle, and “foreigners”\textsuperscript{76} like LTC David Kilcullen (Royal Australian Infantry Corps) and Emma Sky, an “anti-war British expert on the Middle East,”\textsuperscript{77} and ultimately LTG Odierno’s “advisor ‘without portfolio’.”\textsuperscript{78}

The loyal opposition cadre exerted its influence, augmented by growing uniformed opposition in the Pentagon, on the Bush Administration’s Iraq War policy in two different meetings.\textsuperscript{79} The first meeting, organized by Feaver (NSC Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform and Duke University political scientist), was in June 2006 at Camp David between senior Bush Administration officials and “those sympathetic war critics” Cohen, Vickers, Kagan, and Kaplan.\textsuperscript{80} The meeting was intended “to make Bush think about how to deal with his generals,” with Cohen drawing heavily upon civil-military relations arguments articulated in his book \textit{Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime}.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 41-44, 98, 136.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 140.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011; For a detailed discussion of both Petraeus’s “Brain Trust” and “foreigners” see, Ricks, \textit{The Gamble}, 133-147.
\textsuperscript{79} Ricks, \textit{The Gamble}, 42-45, 94-104.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 41-42.
\textsuperscript{81} Ricks, \textit{The Gamble}, 43. According to Ricks, Cohen’s \textit{Supreme Command} is “an influential study of how civilian leaders have intervened in wartime to oversee strategy and steer their wars toward success,” (p. 19). In his preface, Cohen writes, “The purpose of this book… is, rather, to make the nature of the challenges and complexities they [statesmen and soldiers] faced more comprehensible, and this book does unabashedly accept the notion that there are, occasionally, great statesmen whose skill in the politics of war exceeds those of the average run of political men and women.” See, Eliot A. Cohen, \textit{Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), xiii.

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This particular meeting did not alter Iraq policy, but it primed the conversation about strategic revision and help reposition Cohen, Vickers, and Kagan within the Administration’s policymaking process. Cohen became “a counselor at the State Department, where he became a major strategic voice in government”; “Vickers… became chief of overseeing Special Operations and strategy at the Pentagon”; and, “Kagan wouldn’t go into the government but would help redesign U.S. strategy in Iraq, both figuring out what to do and then helping sell the new approach to top White House officials” as a fellow at AEI.

The second meeting, held at AEI from 8-10 December 2006, featured Kagan, Keane, other AEI fellows such as Tom Donnelly, and active duty military personnel like Colonel H. R. McMaster. It “wasn’t intended to change the course of the war… Rather, it was to see if it was possible to devise an alternative military for Iraq.” The meeting did not yield a definite strategy, and “[n]ot all the officers attending bought into the American Enterprise Institute’s hawks’ view of the world.” But attendees did agree that “nearly seven brigades would be needed” in Baghdad and Al Anbar Province to control the deteriorating security environment.

According to Ricks, Keane was to speak with Bush and Cheney on Monday, 11 December. The AEI exercise gave “Keane… what he “needed to take to the White House” to demonstrate “not just why more troops were needed, but how they might be used differently.” It was at this third meeting, attended by Keane and “the two academics there, Cohen and Stephen

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82 Ricks, The Gamble, 44-45.
83 Ibid., 44-45, 82.
84 Ibid., 94-95. Note: McMaster is now a Brigadier General.
85 Ibid., 95.
86 Ibid., 96.
87 Ibid., 97.
88 Ibid., 97-98.
Biddle,” where David Petraeus was nominated by Cohen to implement the new strategy.\textsuperscript{89}

Although there was still opposition to the surge, the impact of the views presented by Keane, Cohen, and Biddle is clear. Ricks writes:

\begin{quote}
Not long after, Keane got a call from a White House official telling him that the meeting had had a decisive impact on the president’s thinking. A small group of NSC staffers had been pushing for a troop surge for weeks… Now this group, which dubbed itself “the surgios,” had been given ammunition by a respected group of outsiders.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Debates about changing the strategy continued, but ultimately on 11 January 2007 President Bush announced: “The new strategy I outline tonight will change America’s course in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{91}

To execute the new surge strategy, General Petraeus amassed a team of mostly doctoral-educated military officers. A critical difference was “Petraeus’s unusual internal think tank, the ‘Commander’s Initiatives Group.’”\textsuperscript{92} The purpose of this group was “to ask the hard questions and push the envelope” to foster creative thinking to accomplish the new mission of “secur[ing] the Iraqi people.”\textsuperscript{93} Petraeus’s and Odierno’s foreign advisors had roles similar to Petraeus’s military team. Kilcullen’s purpose was to help Petraeus craft effective tactical means of conducting the new COIN campaign in Iraq. His “influence on how the U.S. military thought about counterinsurgency campaigning cannot be overstated.”\textsuperscript{94} Sky, a developmentalist and adherent to “‘do no harm’,” eventually became Odierno’s “political adviser.”\textsuperscript{95} Although

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 98-100.  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 101.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ricks, The Gamble, 137.  
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 128, 137.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 140-143.  
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 145-147.
\end{flushright}
Kilcullen and Sky opposed the Iraq War, their positions as advisors provided opportunities to influence its course “from inside the tent.”

By charting the formulation of the surge policy over three senior level meetings, it, more than this chapter’s other examples, illustrates the complex mechanics and relationships involved in senior level policymaking engagement. The surge-as-policy also shows how important relationships are for individuals to gain the necessary access to engage with senior level policymakers. Furthermore, the surge-as-executed provides important examples of senior military leaders who made war critics advisors who assisted in implementing wartime policy, and offers a glimpse into the mechanics of such advisory engagement in wartime in-theater. Finally, the surge-as-executed demonstrates the qualitative impact that closely engaged advisors had on the process of implementing policy.

Conclusion

The Iraq War is a unique engagement case study for several reasons. First, it provides an example of how decision-making processes and civil-military relations can be skewed when senior level civilians, whether by Presidential order or management style, “exert full control over all the decision rights.” Senior leaders such as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, who ignored and/or circumvented professional military advice on critical pre-war decisions such as troop levels in

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96 Ibid., 140, 146.
the case of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, abused the US civil-military relations structure, and deviated from typical, iterative interagency decision-making processes.98

Iraq War policymaking also suggests that ideological orientations affected leaders’ judgments, as in the case of Bremer’s and Slocombe’s decision to dissolve the Iraqi security sector. Furthermore, consulted academics and senior level civilians in the Pentagon and NSC—such as Perle, Kagan, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Lewis—were signatories to open letters to President Clinton calling for regime change in Iraq in January and February 1998.99 These signatories certainly could have changed their minds or opinions in the intervening four years, but post hoc analysis of the decision-making processes does permit the suggestion that ideological orientations may have played in their policymaking decisions.

Pre-war planning and the surge also demonstrate that, however limited, the Bush Administration did seek the advice of, and in Feaver’s and Cohen’s cases hired, outside academics. Yet, these academics were confined to the cadre of loyal opposition. The academic advice sought out by the Bush Administration was for the purpose of mustering scholarly support or refining strategy rather than questioning policies or decisions. As a result, some outside voices experienced what Ricks calls “nirvana” because “[a]n academic exercise he [Kagan] had held a month earlier had helped alter the American approach to war, and the president was announcing that on national television.”100 The success of AEI fellows and other loyal

98 Ferguson, No End in Sight, 580.
100 Ricks, The Gamble, 124.
opposition academics supports interviewee nineteen’s general comments on the potential policymaking impact of USG academic advisors:

The government clearly brought them [academics] on in order to draw on their knowledge and expertise. So I would say they will probably be taken pretty seriously at a pretty high level. It’s clearly not to the same extent [on the outside]. Perhaps they will be taken seriously, perhaps not… If you can make the case and the circumstances are right for it, if people want to listen because a lot of times there are so many forces. Things that could be for [the] better sometimes go unnoticed… So if the circumstances permit and you are good at arguing, I think you can be taken seriously. But if you’re an academic, you certainly have more of an authority to make those sorts of recommendations. And again, people are probably looking specifically for the recommendations so it all depends on what the people looking for the answers… consider [to be] the problem and what are they looking for to solve it.  

It is clear that the Iraq War case study problematizes both discourses I presented at the beginning of the chapter, “Deaf Government” and “Silent Academics.” Prior to the start of the war, academics across disciplines were vocal in their opposition to war with Iraq, and despite the waning protests such opposition never abated. And the Bush Administration was not deaf to outside opinion on how to conduct the war. The truth of the Iraq War as a case study of engagement lies in between these discursive frameworks. Those opposed to the use of military force against Iraq because of their opposition to the policy were not, with rare exceptions like Juan Cole, Kilcullen, and Sky, interested in being “‘technicians’ for the state by providing specialized knowledge that may be ‘misused’.”  

Conversely, those who supported the Iraq War and Bush Administration policy and were willing to engage did so, and had remarkable impacts on the policies that were produced.

The Iraq War polarized the academy along a support/opposition binary, and shaped attitudes regarding engagement impact. The collective memorialization of the binary and views on impact is what makes the Iraq War a 21st century Vietnam. However, the Iraq War should be

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101 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2012.
102 George, “Bridging the Gap,”145-146.
viewed as the consequence of senior level civilians legally abusing civil-military relations and injecting ideology into policymaking. The Iraq War was the result of a unique confluence of factors that have manifested themselves in history before, as in Vietnam. However, this author agrees with Colin Gray’s view of history, quoting naval historian Geoffrey Till: “The chief utility of history for the analysis of present and future lies in its ability, not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need thinking about… History provides insights and questions, not answers.”103 One such issue to isolate, put forward by interviewee 10, is that the careerists remain in government despite changes in Administrations and policies over time:

The level of an elected official will go every two, four, six years, whatever their tenure in office is. The level that’s just below that… [are] the folks who are not going away. I’ve served under Republicans [and] I’ve served under Democrats at about this level of government. The decisions at the top may change, but you get some of the same people writing position papers and we tend to go to great pains to make sure we get all points on the table.104

This author, then, finds the influence of the Iraq War on engagement decisions both understandable and regrettable. Rather than seeing the Iraq War as indicative of all engagement with a wartime state, it should be understood for what it shows: poor interagency coordination and ideological decision-making have negative consequences.

104 Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with the author, 9 August 2011.
CHAPTER IV: THE HUMAN TERRAIN AND MINERVA

Interviewee 4: I guess it’s simply that I just hate to see the use of the academy or social sciences as a tool of war, as a tool of policy in that sense…

Interviewee 14: If the government is going to execute foreign policy, they might as well have a good one. And if it involves the use of force, they might as well be well-informed of what the consequences are of those decisions…

Few social science programs have engendered controversy like HTS and the Minerva Research Initiative. The two opening quotes reflect polarized views regarding HTS and Minerva shared by other interviewees and in the literature, particularly in early debates from 2007-2009. Again, I argue that “Telling the Truth” and “Setting the Record Straight” are useful discourses for framing critique and support of the programs. According to its website, HTS “provide[s] sociocultural teams to commanders and staffs… in order to improve the understanding of the local population and apply this understanding to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).” Likewise Minerva is a: “Department of Defense (DoD)-sponsored, university-based social science research initiative… to improve DoD’s basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S.”

Based on an article that appeared in Military Review by Jacob Kipp, LTC Lester Grau (USA, Ret.), LTC Karl Prinslow (USA, Ret.), and Captain Don Smith (USA), Roberto González has described HTS as being “created primarily as a tool for espionage and intelligence

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Similarly, anthropologist Hugh Gusterson has written that Minerva is “a project that would understand the other in order to subjugate and control it.”\(^5\) This chapter explores HTS and Minerva through the different engagement issues raised by these programs.

Déjà Vu: CORDS and Camelot, HTS and Minerva

In the discipline of anthropology, HTS generated such controversy that the AAA released a statement on 31 October 2007 “express[ing] its disapproval of HTS program,” regarding it “as an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.”\(^7\) This statement was released before the AAA’s CEAUSSIC had conducted any formal research of the program as indicated by two internal memos, dated 10 and 19 October 2007 respectively, between the Executive Board and CEAUSSIC members.\(^8\) The memos are unequivocal in their reticence to make a public statement regarding the program “until all the facts are in” fearing “possible unintended consequences of any such statement.”\(^9\) In the end, the AAA Executive Board issued its statement and CEAUSSIC issued its final report on HTS nearly two years later on 14 October 2009. The report recommended “that the AAA emphasize the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice” citing multiple concerns, especially ethical objections to possible intelligence gathering and lethal targeting.\(^10\)

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8 CEAUSSIC 2007, 30, 33.
9 Ibid.
Minerva was no less susceptible to academic scrutiny and criticism. Following its launch in 2008, the SSRC created a public forum, entitled “The Minerva Controversy Essay Forum,” in which contributors’ essays evaluated, critiqued, supported, or otherwise commented on Minerva.\(^{11}\) Of the eighteen essays posted to the forum, two thirds are critical or skeptical of Minerva. In fact, David C. Engerman wrote in the final essay: “as the contributions to this forum indicate, scholars are wary of support from an external source with an interested [sic] in applying the results.”\(^{12}\) In his “Reflections Symposium” article, Calhoun articulates Minerva’s critics’ concerns about research agendas, consequences of knowledge contribution, and risks of “[r]ushing into relationships that have produced so many problems in the past.”\(^{13}\)

The “past” to which Calhoun refers is Project Camelot and the Vietnam War.\(^{14}\) This author’s research supports his argument that Minerva evoked images and institutional memories of Project Camelot, which raised suspicions about “DOD motives or intentions.”\(^{15}\) For HTS, the comparison is not with Project Camelot, but with CORDS and the Phoenix Program, following the publication of Kipp et al’s article in *Military Review* entitled “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21\(^{st}\) Century.”\(^{16}\) In order to understand the “Telling the Truth” framework about HTS, Minerva, and discursive issues surrounding these two entities it is necessary to briefly describe CORDS and its relationship to the Phoenix Program.

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\(^{13}\) Calhoun, “Social Science Research,” 1101-1106.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 1104.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 1103.

CORDS and the Phoenix Program

Briefly, CORDS was a bureaucratic, structural framework, for the purpose of coordinating civilian and military counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Vietnam.\(^{17}\) The civilian aspect was primarily a USAID food distribution and development mission to win rural support for the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) by countering the Viet Cong’s provision of basic necessities.\(^{18}\) The Phoenix Program, “a central clearinghouse for intelligence collation and targeting information,”\(^{19}\) was one of the military components within CORDS civilian-military organizational structure designed to neutralize communist political-military leadership, or Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI), by coordinating various South Vietnamese and joint US-ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) units’ capture, kill, or rally efforts.\(^{20}\)

In non-engagement literature, CORDS represents “a counterinsurgency program developed during the Vietnam War… as a ‘pacification’ initiative” that “[a]mong other things… gave rise to the nefarious Phoenix Program.”\(^{21}\) Likewise, the Phoenix Program is glossed as “its [CORDS] paramilitary arm, replete with death squads that exterminated approximately 26,000 Vietnamese.”\(^{22}\) This presentation reduces the Phoenix Program to its base kinetic components, incorrectly conflates CORDS with the Phoenix Program, neglects the complex bureaucratic processes that created both entities, and obscures their structural relationship.\(^{23}\)


\(^{19}\) Andradé, *Ashes to Ashes*, 147.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{23}\) Andradé, *Ashes to Ashes*, 45, 47, 57-58.
Perceiving HTS and Minerva

Such understandings of CORDS, the Phoenix Program, and Project Camelot help create positioned frameworks through which HTS and Minerva Initiative are perceived negatively. This author’s research revealed that the primary objections among academics to these two entities revolve around familiar discursive issues: ethics, secrecy, intelligence gathering, impact, and academic freedom. Although these are separate categories of critique, all bear some relation to CEAUSSIC statement that HTS is incompatible with “disciplinary ethics and practice.”

By its very nature, social science research, and particularly anthropology, involves negotiating relationships between a researcher(s) and participant(s) or interlocutor(s). After the Camelot Affair and the Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War, Kathleen Gough wrote her influential article “Anthropology and Imperialism,” and laid out anthropology’s disciplinary framework of ethical obligations. Her framework sheds light on anthropological and general social science resistance to HTS and Minerva:

From the beginning, we [anthropologists] have inhabited a triple environment involving obligations, first to the peoples we studied, second, to our colleagues and our science, and third, to the powers who employed us in universities or who funded our research. In many cases we seem now to be in danger of being torn apart by the conflicts between the first and third set of obligations, while the second set of loyalties, to our subject as an objective and humane endeavor, is being severely tested and jeopardized.

This “triple environment” is both a hierarchy ranked by importance and a set of coequal obligations to three different communities. The issue with HTS, then, becomes to whom must one “do no harm”? Does an embedded social scientist have greater ethical responsibilities to “do

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24 CEAUSSIC 2009, 3.
27 Ibid., 17.
no harm” to the brigade’s soldiers or to his or her informants? Although the inevitability of conflict between these two relationships is dubious, suspicion and concern remain that circumstances may arise in which a social scientists cannot “provide military units with operationally relevant sociocultural information” without jeopardizing informants’ safety.28

Regarding Minerva, Calhoun recognizes that there are clear differences between it and HTS, most notably, “it would not place social scientists in combat zones.”29 However, he argues that Minerva and HTS share a common problem in knowing how the information provided by social scientists will be used.30 He writes that “there are risks that good knowledge will be used to pursue bad policies more effectively.”31 With HTS, there are strong concerns that it supports “lethal targeting;”32 with Minerva concerns center on the assertion that such research facilitates “streamlining the problems of empire.”33

Another concern for both HTS and Minerva is conducting classified research.34 The disciplinary COEs for anthropology, sociology, and political science state clearly that researchers should make results of their research public.35 The American Political Science Association is unequivocal: “Political science research supported by government grants should be unclassified.”36 Despite Calhoun’s acknowledgement that Minerva “would not classify research results or restrict publication… [or] ask researchers to provide confidential field notes,”

29 Calhoun, “Social Science Research,” 1102.
30 Ibid., 1103.
31 Ibid.
32 CEAUSSIC 2009, 32, 37, 41, 43, 57
33 Price, Weaponizing Anthropology, 65.
Gusterson, an anthropologist, writes: “If Minerva was not intended to be a classified program of research, it would make much more sense to make it a genuinely civilian program.” Albro is more direct in his belief that Minerva will facilitate “the recruitment of social scientists into clandestine research projects.”

HTS has also been criticized for issues relating to secrecy and intelligence gathering because participants are required to undergo security clearance investigations and HTS’s organizational location within TRADOC G-2 (Army Intelligence). Highlighting these concerns are questions the CEAUSSIC posed to HTS regarding publication and dissemination of program activities and data both inside and outside the military. The CEAUSSIC 2009 report cites HTTs correspondence over “SIPRNet (that is, the secret-classified Secure Internet Protocol Router Network)” in order to question “whether this is simply for convenience or if HTTs are in fact producing classified materials.” Following this quote, the report asserts:

In fact the HTS public account of dissociating it from any and all intelligence gathering runs contrary to a number of accounts from government insiders suggesting that the initial idea for some sort of human terrain program grew out of a growing recognition of the need to build up precisely that aspect of intelligence collection and analysis.

The report is even more direct in its conclusion: “There is a significant likelihood that HTS data will in some way be used as part of military intelligence.”

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40 CEAUSSIC 2009, 32, 58.
41 Ibid., 32-33, 37.
42 Ibid., 39.
43 Ibid., 54.
Finally, criticisms of HTS and Minerva argue they restrict academic freedom, which is connected to but also distinct from, the criticism that these programs impose military research and analysis paradigms on anthropologists and researchers which prevents them from providing the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the DOD with anthropological cultural information.\(^{44}\)

The idea is if DOD or a BCT determine research questions, then academics’ ability to fully explore topics and the range of possible answers are restricted. Engerman, on Minerva, writes:

> If he [former Defense Secretary Robert Gates] were truly interested in supporting scholarship that could inform Pentagon activities, Minerva wouldn’t fund a handful of senior scholars… Rather than dictating the major topics for research, it would have scholars themselves select projects that would [go] to deepen understanding of regions and trends that impinge on DOD operations.\(^{45}\)

Anthropologist Catherine Lutz argues that “Minerva’s choice of research topics constitutes the problem that needs to be addressed, not the questions that need to be answered.” She doubts proposals could receive grants without adopting “the Pentagon’s basic frame even as they might argue that the problem is… more complex than the military or its civilian leadership realize.”\(^{46}\)

With regard to HTS, CEAUSSIC noted that the “Research Questions and Priorities” of HTTs ranges “from the broad to the specific,” often as a function of “mission priorities of the unit with which a specific HTT is embedded.”\(^{47}\) As a result, CEAUSSIC concludes that “a variety of fundamental problems arise when anthropological research priorities are determined by military missions” because such circumstances create “[t]he high potential for the loss of a


\(^{47}\) CEAUSSIC 2009, 28.
critically independent perspective on the part of the researcher.”

This critique implies that social science knowledge, narrowed by unit priorities, translated into “terms more familiar to soldiers… might significantly undermine the value-added of the kinds of information that ethnographic research could provide.”

In summary, the broad criticisms regarding HTS and Minerva, particularly those articulated in 2007 and 2008 respectively, revolve around the ethics of wartime engagement in the GWOT context. The strongest concerns seem to focus on objections to potentially facilitating lethal targeting, intelligence gathering, and supporting an American empire.

However, there are also important criticisms about possibly losing the benefits and quality of academic research through secrecy and restrictions on academic freedom if funding or research priorities are subject to the strategic and operational needs of the DOD and a BCT. In the years since their launch, supports of both programs have challenged the aforementioned criticisms.

**Strategic and Operational Social Science**

The non-oppositional discourse regarding HTS and Minerva differs greatly along the same factors. This author attributes this to the largely different viewpoint of supporters or those who do not ascribe to the above criticisms and concerns. For many, this different viewpoint stems from direct experience with HTS or conducting government research. Also key to this point of view is understanding how HTS and Minerva are seen as responses to DOD needs.

HTS and Minerva supporters see these programs as unique, necessary, and effective means by which the DOD and US military is addressing gaps in its sociocultural knowledge.

48 Ibid., 54.
49 Ibid., 30-31
The rationale for HTS, as stated in Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Joint Operational Needs Statements (JUONS), is that by incorporating sociocultural knowledge at the brigade level, MDMP military commanders hoped to “improve operational decisions and chances for mission success” and “help ‘decrease both coalition force and local national casualties’.” Interviewee 16, who has experience working with HTS and HTTs, described HTS as a program designed “making the culture operationally relevant” by “pushing… social scientists to the lowest level where operations are being planned and executed… the brigade.”

Interviewee 8, a Major General (USA) with combat experience in Iraq who worked with HTTs on “a couple of tours,” said of the program: “It’s the Human Terrain Systems [that] have given us, more than any other organization I’ve dealt with over here, insights into the Iraqi people and their culture.” Interviewee 14 said that Minerva seemed “to do what HTS is doing at the operational/tactical level for policymakers at the strategic level: to provide them with background knowledge and understanding about some of the problems or issues that they were trying to deal with...” This view of Minerva is corroborated by the then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy Planning Thomas Mahnken, Minerva’s architect:

It [Minerva] is about laying the important foundations today to enable a more robust and long-term relationship between the Department of Defense and our nation’s diverse community of social science researchers. Minerva is about leveraging the so-called “soft power” potential that resides across this nation (and indeed across the globe) to help our government prevail in the face of challenges that are more complex, more interrelated and potentially more deadly than any we have previously faced. As a result, cultural knowledge and regional expertise become critical enablers that we must add to our quiver of capabilities to help us deal with this rapidly changing world.

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50 McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 67-68.
51 Interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
52 MG Buchanan (Interviewee 8), telephone interview with author, Yorktown, VA, 21 June 2011.
53 Interview with an academic Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
Thus, Minerva was created by Mahnken to fulfill a need identified by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The story of HTS, however, is quite different and is not well understood within the oppositional discourse. What “brought HTS into existence as an organization” were the ONS and JUONS produced by various military units between 2005 and 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^55\) These were described in detail by interviewee 16 and their role in HTS is supported by primary source documents and other literature, and are, curiously, largely absent in oppositional discourse.\(^56\) First submitted by the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division “in late 2005,” another ONS submitted in August 2006 by the 1\(^{st}\) Cavalry Division eventually became a JUONS that was signed by Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Combined Joint Task Force-82 in Afghanistan in April 2007.\(^57\) These JUONS were forwarded to US CENTCOM, which “consolidated the Afghanistan and Iraq JUONS in May 2007” and created HTS.\(^58\) In these documents, military commanders expressed an urgent operational need for a better understanding of the human terrain (i.e. sociocultural knowledge) in their operational environments.\(^59\)

Interviews and primary source documents reveal a different picture about the ethics of participating in HTS and conducting government funded research. Regarding Minerva and other DOD funded research, interviewee 14 criticized the assertion that social science was being “weaponized,” arguing that the information produced lends itself more to policymaking and

\(^{55}\) McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 67-68.


\(^{59}\) Ibid., 67-68.
strategic understanding than anything operational or tactical.\textsuperscript{60} Concerning HTS and ethics, interviewee 17, currently an academic industrial/organizational psychologist but a former HTT member, was unequivocal: “I think that in the HTS, having social scientists be able to communicate some cultural understanding to the brigade gets people on both sides less likely to die. So I had no ethical qualms whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{61}

This author’s research supports the conclusion that HTS was not created as a targeting program in line with interviewee fifteen, the LTG and scholar-soldier, who stated unambiguously that “The HTT does not target.”\textsuperscript{62} Other primary and secondary sources support interviewee fourteen’s point that “the military has so much capability in that domain [lethal targeting]” that creating HTS for that purpose “would be duplicative and… a real waste of resources.”\textsuperscript{63} However, there is ambiguity about whether the information produced by HTTs contributes to lethal targeting. One must recognize that HTTs are singular elements supporting a commander’s MDMP and a BCT’s mission, which comprises lethal and non-lethal elements.\textsuperscript{64} In providing the BCT commander’s sociocultural understanding HTTs: “…could sit in on a targeting meeting but the point of them being there in that meeting was to put a break on targeting and to come up with a non-lethal alternative… by saying ‘Look at the second and third order effects.’”\textsuperscript{65} In the

\begin{itemize}
  \item Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
  \item Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
  \item LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011; Responses in the CEAUSSIC 2009 report on HTS also indicate that participants did not participate in lethal targeting activities, but also noted ambiguities in responses found in press reports and blogs. See, CEAUSSIC 2009, 37-38.
  \item Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011. See also, McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 71. Primary source documents provided to the author by an interviewee also state that HTS is not designed, nor are HTTs trained, to duplicate the lethal targeting tasks performed by military intelligence.
  \item LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
  \item Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
\end{itemize}
end, a BCT commander’s MDMP may still lead him to follow a lethal course of action (COA), so the question becomes to what extent does this constitute lethal targeting by the HTT?

This raises González’s criticism, citing a DOD PowerPoint slide, that HTS “‘enables the entire kill chain for the GWOT’.” An important question interrogating this criticism is, if participating in HTS implicates one in the kill chain, then what of other modes of academic engagement with the US military? Do pre-deployment lectures enable the kill chain, or is it a matter of proximity to kinetic action? If so, where are the boundaries along the engagement spectrum that constitute engagement with the US military sufficiently removed from lethal targeting such that one can ethically engage? There are no clear answers to these questions, which leaves individuals to determine the kill chain’s boundaries lie in wartime engagement.

The idea that Minerva research is secretly classified stands in direct contradiction to its openness to foreign national researchers and Executive Order 12968, Mahnken’s public record statement that “all research will be unclassified,” and Minerva’s website which says “The Minerva program funds only unclassified basic research.” As for HTS, the program itself is, as recognized in the CEAUSSIC 2009 report, “‘open source, non-classified, no intel, no targeting’.” The confusion surrounding the relationship between secrecy/classification and HTS arises from its organizational location in TRADOC G-2. Interviewee 16 described HTS’s

66 González, American Counterinsurgency, 95-96
68 CEAUSSIC 2009, 38. This position was also expressed in a Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
location within TRADOC G-2 with DOD oversight by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence as a matter of convenience and necessity:

You have to use what is there at the time to innovate. In other words, to get to synthesis… you have to use your thesis and your antithesis because that’s all you got. I used that money [Military Intelligence Program funds], but when you go back and you look at the support I got from the leadership like General John Kimmons, the Army G-2 at the time, he looked at me and he said, “This is not intel. It is intel-centric. It’s involved in intel, but it is not intel. And if intel does not support this program who will? Who’s going to do it? No one.”

Speaking specifically to classification of internal HTS documents, interviewee 16 noted that documents were not top secret, secret, or even confidential but:

FOUO—For Official Use Only—because they were products [proprietary documents such as concept and training materials] that the government had paid for. And we didn’t want other contractors taking it, putting a different label on [it], reworking just a little bit of it, and selling it back to us.

Rather than an attempt to hide a hidden agenda, the FOUO classification was a cost-saving measure designed to prevent taxpayer dollars from paying for the same product twice.

Additional issues relating to the classification of HTS research, noted in the CEAUSSIC report, was explained by interviewee 17: “There’s just a culture within intel and that’s where HTS is. HTS is TRADOC G-2. There are those guys who are the biggies in TRADOC G-2 who say, ‘Ok, we want to classify, classify, classify.’” This issue, and its apparent remedy, was discussed in a 2011 article by Dr. Montgomery McFate and Col. Steve Fondacaro:

Having the HTT in the intelligence office (commonly called the S2) resulted in overclassification of research, reduced the ability to interact with the rest of the staff, and threatened to draw the HTT into kinetic targeting, an activity that was outside the scope of its mission… Recently, military staffs have adapted by creating the Effects Cell, generally known as the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell but also a Fusion Cell (but distinct from an Intelligence Fusion Center). An Effects Cell pulls together all nonlethal resources on a brigade staff, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S. Agency for International Development representatives, Civil Affairs, and so forth, to evaluate and plan nonlethal operations such as infrastructure repair, governance activities, and agricultural projects… Since the HTT mission was to

69 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011. See also, McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 71-72.
70 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
71 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
provide sociocultural situational awareness to “enable culturally astute decisionmaking,” the HTT was a natural fit within the Effects Cell.\textsuperscript{72}

The issues related to Mihir Pandya’s “defense time”\textsuperscript{73} and institutional change make it difficult to state definitively the impact of academic engagement and what effect, if any, any restrictions on academic freedom have on the quality of engagement. Regarding Minerva, Mosser’s “Author’s Response” to a “Reflections Symposium” “debate in print” is poignant:

Finally, I would ask a question of the Minerva critics: What evidence do scholars critical of the project need to confirm/disconfirm preconceptions of bias from Minerva funding? I speak only from my own limited experience with Minerva funding when I was part of the project on climate change and African political stability (CCAPS) at the University of Texas. UT received its grant in the category of “exploratory” research; there are no expectations of findings consistent or inconsistent with US national security objectives. Were that to change in any way, I guarantee that the scholars affiliated with the project would return their grants and walk away.\textsuperscript{74}

Similarly, interviewee 9 argued that assuming Minerva-like government-funded research limits academic freedom compared to research using other funds “may be… a false divide”:

I think the idea that only projects or some projects are funded and others are not… would have to do with the proclivities of the funder. [And this] is a larger issue in the academy, and it doesn’t have too much to do with working with the military…

I think that we have this idea that academic freedom is something that you have because you’re an academic… I think a lot of pressure is placed on universities and institutions that people, even when they achieve tenure, that [if] they write controversial things alumni associations can get together and decide that they’re not going to give money to universities that ignore pressures on the Dean or Provost, et cetera… While I think academic freedom is probably one thing that people would say you lose when you’re an academic and you go into the government there may be a bit of a false divide about how free one is when one’s in the academy and how constrained one is when one’s in the government.\textsuperscript{75}

The impact of HTS is more quantifiable than Minerva, particularly if one considers its rapid growth. As McFate and Fondacaro note in their reflections assessment, in four years HTS “expanded… from a 5-team proof of concept to a 30-team program,” and “from an unresourced

\textsuperscript{72} McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 69-70. McFate and Fondacaro also write in an endnote that overclassification was the result of intelligence offices classifying what they produce as part of organizational and operational procedure. See n. 18, pp. 80-81.

\textsuperscript{73} Pandya, “Defense Time,” in \textit{Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency}, 137-147.

\textsuperscript{74} Mosser, “Author’s Response,” 1124.

\textsuperscript{75} Telephone interview with Interviewee 9 (academic historian), 8 August 2011.
concept to a program with a $150 million a year budget.’’ Interviewee 16 related an anecdote in which deployed commanders’ responded to HTS concept briefs saying, “Please give us all of it” because it addressed “what units had put in their operational needs statements as shortfalls in terms of understanding the population.’’ This matches interviewee eight’s experience with HTTs, quoted earlier: “[I]t’s the Human Terrain Systems, more than any other organization I’ve dealt with over here, [that] have given us insights into the Iraqi people and their culture.’’ Interviewee 15 described the HTTs’ qualitative impact based on his experience: “I have watched some HTT people stand up to colonels and generals and lay out the awful truth, and that is a perfect example of independent academics making their own unique contributions to the war effort.’’ Although HTS is generally viewed as effective, interviewee 14 caveated by saying “I think the effectiveness depended on what kind of situation the unit itself was in to a great degree.’’ Additionally, interviewee 17 cited poor hiring practices by BAE Systems as an aspect that negatively impacted affected HTTs’ effectiveness.

The degree to which one can argue this constitutes a restriction on academic freedom is premised on a meaningful comparison between academic and HTS research. Interviewee 16 addressed this issue of HTTs academic freedom as follows: “They were attached, and that’s a very specific word in military terminology. When you’re attached you become part of that unit. You are owned by that unit. That commander gives you legal orders.” Thus, HTT personnel,

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76 McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 64.
77 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
78 MG Buchanan (Interviewee 8) telephone interview with author, 21 June 2011.
79 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
80 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
81 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011. Note: BAE Systems is no longer the hiring contractor for HTS.
82 Skype interview with Interviewee 16 (retired Army infantry officer), 3 November 2011.
as part of the BCT commander’s unit, respond to his demands for sociocultural information, not vice versa. Perhaps unknowingly, McFate, Fondacaro and CEAUSSIC all agree that what HTTs do is not traditional, academic ethnographic research, making criticisms of academic freedom misplaced.\(^8^3\) Furthermore, in his response to CEAUSSIC’s memorandum request, Fondacaro replied that HTS personnel producing material in their capacity as government employees are the “property of the US government.”\(^8^4\) But he also states that:

HTS as a program places no restrictions on its employees regarding publication before, during or after deployment. Nor does HTS restrict employees from disclosing program activities subject to standard security protocols. HTS members are required to submit materials written for publication to a security review to prevent dissemination of classified or sensitive information, which is standard practice in the Army and Department of Defense.\(^8^5\)

In short, “[w]ork done by HTS members on their own time (e.g., articles, books, blogs) is their own property” as long as it does not contain classified information.\(^8^6\) Such restrictions on the ability to disseminate knowledge, a central tenet to academic freedom, is not unlike contract anthropologists whose work is reviewed for proprietary information before publication.\(^8^7\)

**Conclusion**

HTS and Minerva are important case studies in engagement because of the attention they receive in the literature and the objections to and support for them draw upon the broader themes within engagement discourse. In the same way that Chapter Three argues that the Iraq War shaped the engagement debate and influenced academics’ engagement choices, so too has HTS and

\(^8^3\) CEAUSSIC 2009, 30; McFate and Fondacaro, “Human Terrain System,” 71.

\(^8^4\) CEAUSSIC 2009, 67.

\(^8^5\) Ibid., 66.

\(^8^6\) CEAUSSIC 2009, 67.

\(^8^7\) CEAUSSIC 2007, 27.
Minerva. But research of HTS and Minerva lacks the same depth quality as that of the Iraq War decision-making and policymaking processes.

What research does exist is prone to what interviewee 13 called “confirmation bias,” or “the idea that what we want going in tends to be the decision made on the other end.” That the CEAUSSIC report on HTS confirmed the AAA’s Executive Board statement on HTS nearly two years after the statement was released strikes this author as a possible instance of such confirmation bias. Interviewee 13 continued: “…we’re heavily biased by what’s called availability, data that’s available in memory. Recent incidences are overweighted rather than past incidences. It turns out that we tend to discount the future, and any future costs get heavily discounted.” Associating HTS with CORDS and Phoenix, and Minerva with Project Camelot, are based on the availability of recent (on institutional time scales) memories of CORDS, Phoenix, and Project Camelot, fueling charges that HTS and Minerva are “social engineering.”

The early critiques, primarily ethical, as laid out in oppositional literature from 2007-2009 are strongly influenced by Gough’s “triple environment” framework and particular beliefs about the purpose of knowledge. For many academics the purpose of knowledge is for its own sake and to enlighten others. However, when the discussion turns to applying academic knowledge to support military or government institutional objectives in wartime “moral panic” ensues. The concern stems from the perceived potential for lethal targeting or ulterior

88 Telephone interview with Interviewee 13 (organizational behavior psychologist), 8 September 2011.
89 Ibid.
90 Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology*, 64-65, 106
91 Utas, “Mercenary Anthropology.”
purposes. For some academics, such possibilities preclude participation in such programs absent guarantees that academic knowledge would not be “used in unintended ways” to harm others.92

These concerns do have a legitimate place in engagement discussion, but interviewees with direct experience with HTS rejected the argument that disengagement negates concerns about how information provided to the USG or US military could be used. The most common metaphor in an interview was a hammer:

… I think what they [AAA] really wanted to do is... control the way in which knowledge is used. And you can’t control the way in which knowledge is used. Once knowledge is out there in the world, it’s freely available to whoever wants to employ it. It’s like making a hammer and saying, “Ok, you can only use the hammer to hit nails into a board. You can’t use the hammer to pull nails out of the board.” Well you can’t stop people from doing that. That’s just part of the problem of making a tool. And it’s part of the whole Frankenstein myth, right? It’s part of the problem of creating anything in world… these things cannot be controlled by their creator. And I think a lot of academics have a false idea that they can somehow control what the military does with their knowledge… Look, knowledge is just a tool, and a tool can be used in a variety of different ways. Just to go back to the hammer. You can use it to drive a nail into a board to build a barn to shelter animals, or you can beat somebody over the head with it until they’re dead. It’s not that the hammer itself is evil or dangerous, it’s the people who utilize it. It’s what they’re intending to do with it. So talking about weaponizing social science is kind of a misnomer. It’s all about who’s going to use it and what are they going to use it for.93

With this understanding in mind, one can see how HTS and Minerva function and are perceived outside of oppositional literature using interviewee fifteen’s framework of engagement relationships: “…the roles are clear: policymakers decide, academics inform, and Soldiers execute.”94 Thus, each actor knows his or her role and, recalling interviewee eleven’s hypothetical, “contribute[s] within the scope of their skillset.”95 Furthermore, according to interviewee 10, there exists the implicit recognition that the decision-maker “makes the final call. And then we’ll salute smartly, change direction if necessary, and press in the new direction.”96

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92 CEAUSSIC 2009, 57.
93 Telephone interview with Interviewee 14 (anthropologist), 3 October 2011.
94 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with author, 22 November 2011.
95 Dr. Shirey (Interviewee 11), personal interview with the author, 12 August 2011.
96 Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with author, 9 August 2011.
Accounting for discursive positionalities and the engagement context of the GWOT is important. Commenting on HTS critics’ positionalities, interviewee 17 said: “They have no knowledge. They’re running off ignorance. And this is the very thing that academics pride themselves in not doing. Not reacting out of ignorance. They do with regard to these hot-button items, and we love to hate the military for some reason.”\(^97\) Opposition to the GWOT as neo-imperialism appears to magnify criticisms of HTS and Minerva because of their connection to the military within this context. But as HTS and Minerva critics should be heard so too should detractors of oppositional literature. Proximity to HTS or Minerva should not, \textit{per se}, constitute a filter by which such criticisms of oppositional literature are dismissed.

Research of HTS and Minerva can be conducted without regard to an administration’s or one’s own politics. It is in this spirit that this author found National Geographic’s “Talibanistan” documentary, which, in part, followed an HTT and David Rohde’s article based on his experience embedded with an HTT helpful contributions to the discourse.\(^98\) Such contributions are open to critique, but field experience and observation help understand HTS as practiced in the field.\(^99\) Constructive discussion of HTS and Minerva requires not just recognizing but transcending discursive positionality. Anthropologist Keith Brown offers a poignant critique of anthropology on this issue:

\begin{quote}
This [US military’s] institutional and attitudinal diversity is flattened in any anthropological discourse that insists on the monolithic dimensions of a fictively singular “security” culture… Apparent efforts at reform or initiatives that might subvert once-dominant paradigms can easily be dismissed as superficial, inauthentic, or naïve when one knows that, deep down, force is all they understand. But insofar as
\end{quote}

\(^97\) Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
anthropology retains its commitment to harness empirical evidence to deconstruct essentialism, such morally tinged certainty about the military “other” demands some interrogation of its own. 100

Essay fora like the Minerva Controversy Essay Forum and reflections symposia have their utility. 101 But what is equally, if not more, valuable is intergroup contact: “I mean, if you’re going to reduce prejudice have some contact with the group. I don’t know if I was so open, wrapping my arms around the military, until I worked with the military.” 102 Again, criticisms and concerns, particularly those rooted in ethics, should not be dismissed because HTS and Minerva do present individuals with ethical choices because the war and violence of the GWOT make manifest the possible lethal consequences of engagement. But these programs can be researched, discussed, and criticized, and have been since their initial articulations, without hyperbole. In the same way that the Iraq War should not taint all wartime engagement, one must remember that HTS and Minerva are one of many ways, among many different modes, of spectral engagement.

100 Brown, “‘All they Understand Is Force’,” 450.
101 “Reflections Symposium,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 4 (December 2010): 1077-1124
102 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011. 98
CONCLUSION

*Interviewee 12: Rather than engagement, I call it interaction. I think about academic interaction with the military… Each of them has a role to play…*

**Theses and Research Questions**

This thesis has explored the notion of a “gap” between the academy and the USG and military. If it exists what constitutes it; and, if it does not what gives rise to the myth? Qualitative research supports Mosser’s conclusion that “the alleged gulf between theory and praxis is… as much one of mindset as it is of empirical fact.”¹ This does not diminish the real and legitimate contestations that exist within engagement discourse about the appropriate roles for theory and praxis. A more nuanced answer, then, is that the divide between academia and the state is constructed, produced and reproduced through discourses in collective memories. Engagement between academic, civilian policymaking, and military communities occurs both in spite of and in response to this constructed gap.

The specific research questions were: Understanding intergroup perceptions of community credentials, duties/obligations, and constraints; uncovering the theoretical and experiential knowledge that informs these intergroup perceptions; determining the degree to which these intergroup perceptions shape spaces for engagement; and, understanding how these intergroup perceptions affect US foreign policy in the MENA. Rather than explicitly collating participant responses and comparing and contrasting them with discourses and case studies, this author chose a more thematic and narrative approach by examining discursive themes and using case studies instrumentally to illustrate these themes.

¹ Mosser, “Puzzles Versus Problems, 1084.
There were degrees of consensus and contestation across interview participants regarding each community’s credentials, duties/obligations, and constraints. For the academic community, consensus broke primarily over institutional affiliation and slightly less so concerning the appropriate role of academics in making or executing policy. Regarding civilian government policymakers/officials/analysts, disagreement revolved around the degree to which institutional structures and organizational pressures were more or less constraining than funding and appropriations. Finally, responses about the military were distinguished by the fact that all military personnel interviewed, and relatively few academics or government civilians, cited moral character as an important element in the military community.

Interviewee 20, a former US Senator, remarked: “You’re not… a blank slate when you come into these things [policy decisions].”² His response highlights an important point that participants’ views regarding each community and the idea of engagement are informed by a mixture of “theoretical” and “experiential” knowledge. In relating the two within an engagement paradigm, theoretical knowledge is one’s *a priori* views regarding a particular community and experience is one’s knowledge gained through praxis. Qualitative research revealed that *a priori* knowledge is not inherently riddled with misconceptions or inferior to experience, but experiential knowledge gained through intergroup contact did have a mediating effect, both positive and negative, on participants’ intergroup perceptions. Overall, experiential knowledge had a positive effect that gave individuals a more complete picture of other communities.

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This thesis emphasized that academia, civilian government, and the US military do not constitute inflexible communities with rigid boundaries that prohibit “cross-pollination.” But each community has a culture that is produced and reproduced through shared experiences which are contested and negotiated within the community. Few participants could be labeled an exclusive member of one community, and many had “cross-cultural” experiences from either their career paths or modes of engagement, which often broadened their a priori understandings. Conversely, participants who had less intergroup contact overall were more reliant on their a priori knowledge and tended to be more skeptical of the idea of engagement. This is all to say that intergroup perceptions, be they informed a priori, through experience, or both, did affect the spaces, or prospects, for engagement. Commenting on the relationship between theory and experience, interviewee 10 said: “I do think you need the practical experience having done it, and a theoretical basis that underlies it.”

This thesis’s specific research questions are sequentially linked. Individuals within each community have certain perceptions of other communities supported by a priori theoretical and/or experiential praxis knowledge about other communities, which shapes individual assessments about other communities and the utility of engagement. When aggregated from individual to communal levels, intergroup engagement perceptions, by shaping engagement spaces, affect policymaking. Nowhere was this clearer than with the decision-making process prior to and during the Iraq War where academics willing, and permitted, to enter policymaking spaces affected pre-war planning and wartime policies. Although this conclusion likely holds

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3 Personal interview with Interviewee 2 (career government official), 13 April 2011.
4 Dr. Mitchum (Interviewee 10), telephone interview with author, 9 August 2011.
across disciplines and policymaking foci, this thesis’s MENA scope prohibits unsubstantiated
generalizations and further research is needed.

Prospects and Obstacles

In displaying the complexity of engagement, Chapter One listed many different ways and
organizations in which academic engagement with USG institutions is possible. Engagement
can occur at policymaking levels, in operational environments, by means of consultation,
instruction, or research, and in the public sphere. Interview participants noted that engagement is
contextual and not all forms are necessarily beneficial for all policymaking or decision-making
issues. Individual idiosyncrasies also mean that some individuals are better suited for particular
modes. There are real prospects to more constructive engagement because of engagement’s
diversity, the various contributions individuals can make, and the different impacts different
modes and contributions can have on decision-making and policymaking. And if properly
acknowledged and addressed, the obstacles to engagement may be recast as challenges.

Interviewee 12 quoted at the start of this conclusion expressed what might be one of the
easiest and most promising prospects for more constructive intergroup engagement: Reframe the
concept with a term with less conceptual baggage. Although terms, per se, are value neutral and
only have the meanings and connotations imparted to them, there is an argument to be made for
linguistic relativism and the relationship between words and thought.⁵

Another prospect lies in individuals recognizing the different modes and various
engagement opportunities available. One of interviewee fifteen’s observations shows promise:

The academic environment of staff schools and war colleges offers a great venue for academic/military engagement. In a university classroom, the professor holds sway. In military training and operations, the uniformed officer is the expert. Military education combines both aspects. This is a wonderful bridge between the two domains.  

Laura McNamara and George Marcus write in their practitioner subcommittee report submitted to the CEAUSSIC 2007 report:

Anthropologists would do well to become aware of the manifold ways in which the discipline is growing and changing, particularly in nontraditional contexts that force the discipline into uncomfortable, but potentially highly productive and exciting directions.

One way that engagement is receiving attention, as a topic, is through academic conferences and new academic associations. For example, at the 2011 Middle East Studies Association (MESA) annual conference, two panels and one roundtable were devoted to communicating with non-specialists and state-academe relationships. Additionally, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa’s (ASMEA) 2011 annual conference specifically advertised that “top policymakers” would attend and present. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars also hosted a day conference, which this author attended, entitled “Accounting for Culture in the Military: Implications for Future Humanitarian Cooperation.” The conference “focus[ed] on the U.S. military’s efforts to develop cultural expertise.” Lastly, irrespective of one’s assessments, scholars such as Zachary Lockman and Martin Kramer have written and critiqued the disciplinary history of Middle Eastern Studies and posed worthwhile questions.

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6 LTG Bolger (Interviewee 15), email interview with the author, 22 November 2011.
7 CEAUSSIC 2007, 60.
concerning scholar-state relationships.\textsuperscript{11} All of this is to say that the prospects for further research and more constructive conversation regarding engagement in wartime are promising.

This research also identified a number of obstacles to intergroup engagement. Among these obstacles are secrecy/security clearances, perceived directed agendas, politico-ethical stances, professional pressures discouraging certain modes of engagement, cynicism, purity, and career constraints. Objections to wartime engagement articulated in politico-ethical language leaves little room for compromise. Thus, if one is politically or ethically opposed to a wartime state’s institutional practices and/or administration policies and politics, then the opportunities for engagement are largely limited to criticism and other means of engagement apart from the state. Such engagement certainly has value, but it must be understood that different modes have different possibilities to affect policies and decisions. As mentioned in this thesis, critique is valued by government civilians and military personnel provided that some consideration is given to alternatives. A quote by President Lyndon Johnson is applicable and instructive: “‘Well, it’s probably better to have him [FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover] inside the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in.’”\textsuperscript{12} The implication is that critique is more likely to be heard the more proximal one is to decision-makers, which is important for those who avoid “the tent” because of the issues of war and violence in the GWOT context.

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The aforementioned obstacles can be categorized as politico-ethical, structural-organizational, and institutional-attitudinal. These categories are not neatly bounded or so fluid as to lose meaning, but are amorphous. Security clearances and directed research present a politico-ethical challenge to engagement in both directions. On the one hand, many academics are reluctant to conduct research that may not be public disseminated. Additionally, the idea of directed research, as Chapter Four’s case studies show, flies in the face of what many academics understand to be a basic element of academic freedom, freedom of inquiry.

On the other hand, the USG and military cannot cease classifying information to facilitate engagement because “[s]ometimes there’s just going to be some stuff you got to keep classified.” Nor can the USG, in every circumstance, commission undirected research because public servants are “custodians of the public’s money.” For some, this will be an impasse, and for others it will not. But funding exploratory research through the Minerva Research Initiative, with program adjustments based on academic critique and feedback, is a step in the right direction toward forging “a more robust and long-term relationship between the Department of Defense and our nation’s diverse community of social science researchers.”

Professional associations and career constraints, particularly publishing and building a strong portfolio, present two very different sets of structural-organizational obstacles to engagement. Many academic interviewees identified with interviewee three’s point that finding time to engage with USG or military institutions after fulfilling their obligations of teaching,
scholarship, and service within the parameters set out by their universities was as a chief constraint. Moving beyond this particular obstacle is largely a function of an individual academic viewing the opportunity cost of engagement to be more worthwhile than the next best alternative, such as maintaining a rigorous research agenda and publishing frequently. Professional association constraints are another matter. Some interviewees echoed frustrations and concerns reported in the CEAUSSIC 2007 report about being “blacklisted” when professional associations take what are seen as political stances, such as the AAA’s condemnation of HTS. This author agrees with political scientist Ronald Krebs: “There should be no taint associated with short-term service in Foggy Bottom [DOS], the Pentagon, or even Langley [CIA].” Perceived politicization of professional associations has not dampened engagement and it is likely that this obstacle fluctuates with organizational election cycles, politics, and policies. However, professional environments supportive of engagement and individual choice would facilitate greater, more open intergroup contact.

Finally, cynicism and notions of academic purity are institutional attitudes likely to change as constructive discourse grounded in research replaces emotional, hyperbolic accusations of “militarization” and “weaponization” and experiential, contact knowledge challenges a priori assumptions. Additionally, “[t]here is a genuine desire among social scientists, especially younger social scientists, to undertake intellectual work that makes a

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18 Personal interview with interviewee 3 (academic historian), 18 April 2011.
19 For example see, Fosher, “Yes, Both, Absolutely,” in Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency, 268.
20 Telephone interview with Interviewee 19 (DOS Foreign Assistance Administrator), 22 December 2011. See also, CEAUSSIC 2007, 56-57.
difference to public affairs.”

As, according to Kramer, “[t]he 1960s generation… head[s] toward retirement, and its grip on the institutions of academe… weaken[s].”

As different means of contact between social scientists and the USG and military becomes more normalized terms like Schalk’s “establishment intellectuals” will likely fade and what constitutes academic “pure status” will be renegotiated.

Cynicism toward engagement impact may also diminish by adjusting expectations: “People are imperfect. Policy is imperfect… Implementation of policy, as well-intentioned as it is, is imperfect. Understanding of that policy is imperfect. So you’ve got to factor all of that in. And no one’s smart enough to have all the answers.”

The Marketplace of Ideas

An important question is who must initiate engagement? Must academia make itself available to the USG and military or vice versa? According to Krebs, “the changes Mosser calls for rest largely, if not entirely, on the academy,” to which Mosser replies: “If such a traditionally hidebound organization as the U.S. Army is making an effort to bring intellectual openness and honesty to its educational institutions, shouldn’t the academy at least applaud the effort and make its own effort to meet it halfway?”

From another perspective, interviewee 20 said: “I think, clearly, it’s the responsibility of the policymakers, or the member of Congress, or the policymaker to reach out… But you can send a note, you can make a call, you can see a Senator or Congressman somewhere and say, ‘By the way, I’m available if you want to talk to me.’”

22 Calhoun, “Social Science Research,” 1104
24 Schalk, Ivory Tower, 39.
27 Mosser, “Author’s Response,” 1123.
Reconceptualizing Paul Bracken’s “competitive market of ideas” is a possible means of fostering engagement while not dissolving Krebs’s “principled division of labor” that preserves academia’s “different comparative [advantage].” For better or worse, a marketplace of ideas exists, but this means that buyers and sellers have their own specific responsibilities. The USG and military, bearing in mind their constraints, are “buyers,” and have the communal responsibility to seek, as interviewee 20 stated, “a balanced perspective on different views” to avoid hearing only one voice or only those with which one agrees. Academics may loathe the characterization, but in the marketplace model they are the “sellers” and as a community, being mindful of constraints and obstacles, bear responsibility for the marketplace’s diversity of ideas and voices. As interviewee 17 said, “they’re [USG/DOD] going to try to get… information. Why not produce good information…?” Recalling that this thesis is not indicting any community for causing constructive or unconstructive engagement, the marketplace of ideas emphasizes that all communities shoulder responsibility for the quality of engagement.

**Interpretive Frameworks for Further Research**

Finally, there are useful theoretical and interpretive frameworks for further research. First, an approach used by Marshall Sahlins may stimulate more constructive intergroup conversation and honors Brown’s call to empirical deconstruction. In a well-known essay, “The Destruction of Conscience in Vietnam,” Sahlins describes himself as “an anthropologist and an academic critic

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31 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
of the war.’’\(^{32}\) However, he is confronted by the fact that according to his critics “Neither is a qualification… to speak on Vietnam: one ought to have been there.’’\(^{33}\) Although Sahlins rejects this argument, he states “as an anthropologist if not as a critic, I had to accept the argument: one should go into the field.’’\(^{34}\) Sahlins spent six days in Vietnam which “did not make me [Sahlins] an expert [on Vietnam]’’ nor did it change his views, but it gave him some experience such that he could meaningfully respond to his critics who supported the war.\(^{35}\) Critiquing engagement has value, but it is all the more poignant and valuable when one can cite personal experience or (participant) field observations, rather than offering most of one’s criticisms in the abstract.

The other frameworks, behavioral momentum and contact theory, are drawn from psychology. Behavioral momentum, researched and theorized primarily by John A. Nevin, posits that behavioral momentum, “the product of response rate and resistance to change,’’ is analogous to classical physical momentum.\(^{36}\) The details aside, the theory helps explain why certain behaviors persist under various circumstances, and what causes behaviors to change. Nevin’s research concluded that reinforcers, value of reinforcers, and value of reinforcer circumstances give learned behaviors momentum, which persists until they are acted upon by outside inputs that change one of the three variables.\(^{37}\) This model highlights the importance of engagement in different modes. The USG and military operate based on policy decisions, which have their own momentum. Metaphorically, then, the USG and military will continue to operate


\(^{33}\) Ibid., 233.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.


based on a policy in place until they are acted upon by external forces. The means by which this external force is applied is through engagement in its various spectral modes. Research similar to that of *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Policy* may choose to examine precisely how effective each mode is under different circumstances and what factors affect the efficacy of different modes of engagement under different circumstances.  

Similarly, intergroup contact theory posits that “positive effects of intergroup contact occur only in situations marked by four key conditions: equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom.” Further research revealed “that four interrelated processes operate through contact and mediate attitude change: learning about the outgroup, changing behavior, generating affective ties, and ingroup reappraisal.” Intergroup contact theory may provide a useful theoretical model for both understanding intergroup engagement processes and variables as well as a means of addressing engagement issues. Indeed, it was at the suggestion of an interviewee that this author investigated intergroup contact theory.

Engagement is a complex term irreducible to “silence or engagement.” The marginal, discursive extremes are, overall, unhelpful to pursuing more constructive engagement. As such, academics, policymakers, and military personnel interested in reaping potential benefits of engagement should not ignore possibilities that lie along the spectrum between the two poles.

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40 Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” 70.
41 Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
greater possibilities emerge for each group to benefit from other perspectives. Engagement may not always qualitatively impact outcomes, but this author agrees with interviewee seventeen’s remarks about the value of engagement as an interaction among groups that can have a positive effect decision-making processes:

I think communication and even healthy conflict is a good thing… sometimes we have to be able to live with no. And we’ll never know that until we have that dialog. Until we forge this better understanding and… remember the thinkers, the facilitators and the doers. We need to bring those groups together. It’ll be messy. It’ll be real messy. We might have some good screaming matches. I think that’s all very productive.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{43} Telephone interview with Interviewee 17 (industrial/organizational psychologist), 7 November 2011.
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