OVERCOMING APOCALYPTIC IDENTITIES IN RWANDA: 
THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT AFTER GENOCIDE

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By

Gina N. Vorderstrasse, B.A.

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Gina N. Vorderstrasse, B.A.

Thesis Advisor: William Mark Habeeb, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Conflict resolution theory and practice increasingly incorporates concepts relating to development as a cause of violence and as a possible solution to conflict. Yet, a nuanced understanding of the social and economic dimensions of development – and their interactions – is lacking from the field. This thesis explores the successes and challenges of development in the aftermath of brutal collective violence and entrenched social divisions, specifically focusing on national development programs in Rwanda following genocide. In this context, it is important to ask how political discourses and national development policies have transformed ethnic and national Rwandan identities in the aftermath of genocide. This discursive approach investigates elite and grassroots perceptions of development and identity transformation in the post-genocide years. While this analysis reveals that Rwandans construct nationhood, togetherness, and mutual dependency through development, these unifying programs have also produced exclusion and marginalization among groups that are not perceived to be part of the “Rwandan” national identity. By examining identity construction and development as interrelated and inextricable processes, theorists and practitioners can better understand the ways in which groups are included or excluded from key social, political, and economic structures in post-conflict environments.
Twese Turi Abanyarwanda.
We are all Rwandan.

In peace,
Gina N. Vorderstrasse
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INTRODUCTION

“This is not a new round of the blame game. In the context of the survival of our country, pointing fingers would not only be in poor taste but also counterproductive. Rather, what is urgently required is a shared responsibility […] that leaves no one behind because we are all in this together.”

- Rwandan President Paul Kagame

After decades of interethnic turmoil culminated in the horrific violence of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s political, economic, and social structures were destroyed. While this 100 day massacre – which left one million dead and displaced hundreds of thousands – remains the most notable in Rwandan history, the years preceding were typified by political power struggles that occurred along ethnic lines, reified social cleavages, and positioned violence at the center of social and political relationships. Following this extensive intergroup bloodletting and mutual mistrust, Rwanda faced a bleak future of division and poverty. Yet, eighteen years later, the country has achieved remarkable levels of economic development and social cohesion. Proposing to study this progress, I ask; how have political discourses and national development policies transformed ethnic and national Rwandan identities in the aftermath of genocide? By pursuing national unity through development programming, I posit that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government introduced superordinate goals that effectively superseded violent ethnic divides and allowed perpetrators and survivors to overcome the seemingly irreconcilable traumas experienced during genocide. This careful construction of nationhood, togetherness, and mutual dependency through development allowed remarkable social and economic growth in a post-conflict context where nihilistic “us-versus-them” mentalities dominated political and social relationships for over fifty years.
However, these development practices based on unity also produce exclusion among groups that are not considered “Rwandan.” The vast literature on collective identity fundamentally posits that inclusion – in this case, through the national identity of “Rwandan” – is only possible through practices of exclusion and the creation of an Other – e.g. the Batwa minority, protracted refugees, and members of the LGBTI community. In this way, the social integration of Hutu and Tutsi persons under the monolithic banner of “Rwandan” is paradoxical because it simultaneously creates categories that cannot be included therein. While the case of Rwanda after the genocide reinforces theoretical concepts of inclusion and exclusion, my examination of economic processes alongside these social changes allows a uniquely important observation; in Rwanda, political, ethnic, and cultural minorities are not only excluded from Rwandan national identity, but also from critical development processes. As a result, exclusion from nationality breeds impoverishment and reinforces the peripheral placement of marginalized groups. Furthermore, the potential for these groups to contribute to economic liberalization and development are overlooked as exclusionary identities preclude their participation in these mainstream processes.

By examining the intersection of identity and development, my thesis illustrates the ways in which national political discourse, local constructions of identity, and development programming are mutually reinforcing – particularly during post-conflict reconstruction. Through this analysis, my research not only encompasses the combined importance of articulations of identity at national and local levels, but also investigates the limitations of national identity for marginalized groups in the context of development projects. Challenging the conceptual separation of identity and development – one as a cause of conflict, and the latter as the answer
to violence – I demonstrate the fundamental linkages between social and economic realms and the roles they each play in promoting peace and violence. The case of Rwanda is an apt example of the disparate examination of these processes; although the politicization of identities prior to the 1994 genocide has been well documented and analyzed, there is a dearth of information regarding politics and identity after genocide. By excluding such analysis, the existing literature overlooks key reconciliation processes that connect identity and development and occur outside of international and local justice systems.

After the 1994 genocide, the shaping of political, social, and economic structures in Rwanda was clearly at a cross-roads. The immense challenge was to balance economic and social development in a manner that simultaneously enabled Rwanda to find its way out of the darkness of poverty, while encouraging social relations across historically antagonistic divides. By understanding the creation of national unity through development, I posit three hypotheses: first, the Rwandan government effectively utilized superordinate goals¹ and created a national identity that displaced ethnic division. Second, these national level discourses were reinterpreted and reproduced at a local level, emphasizing the local nature of development and the partnership necessary to achieve it. However, I lastly hypothesize that this monumental progress in social relations and economic development also marginalizes groups that are not regarded as “Rwandan.” As a result, these ethnic, political, and cultural minorities are also excluded from development programming.

¹ According to Sherif, superordinate goals are common objectives that may only be achieved through intergroup collaboration. Furthermore, the benefits of such projects are mutually beneficial and shared equitably among social groups. In Rwanda, development projects are superordinate goals that are employed for the purpose of creating national unity.
My investigation of unity and development in Rwanda offers important implications for conflict resolution theory and practice. As the conflict resolution field increasingly incorporates development in broad understandings of the causes, mitigation, and resolution of conflict, it currently pursues this in a way that segregates social elements – particularly identity. Indeed, nation-building cannot be unbound from its societal elements; this work illustrates how identity and development mutually enforce and affect one another. As the case of Rwanda demonstrates, this understanding of development is particularly crucial in post-conflict societies characterized by collective violence and entrenched narratives of trauma. Although development is largely forward looking, conflict resolution and its greater interaction with historical narratives in current conflicts is appropriately situated to make these linkages explicit and visible. By ignoring the powerful forces of the past, development projects cannot interact meaningfully with important stakeholders or understand the transformation of oppositional identities through programming. Furthermore, national and local discourses problematize forgiveness models; rather than fostering unity, forgiveness triggers memories of trauma and entrenches divisions between ethnic groups and victim/perpetrator distinctions. In stark contrast, development enables survivors to envision and work toward a future without genocide. Reconciliation efforts must be dynamic and may not always include traditional models of forgiveness or justice. Superordinate goals – like those pursued in development programs – may also offer reconciliation, but only if interactions between groups are sustained, input is equal, and benefits are shared (or are perceived as equitable). Finally, observations of the marginalization of impoverished groups

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2 Beswick and Jackson 2011.
often emphasize the cyclical nature of underdevelopment and othering; \(^3\) peripheral groups are impoverished because they are marginalized, and they are marginalized because they are impoverished. \(^4\) The case of Rwanda allows a deeper examination of the mechanisms of social and economic exclusion, processes that are relevant to development everywhere. Ultimately, the linkages between identity and development are powerful, inextricably linked, and perhaps more causal than the predominant literature allows conflict resolution practice to capture. Rwanda illustrates the power of identity to do ‘good’ and do great harm.

My first chapter examines identity and development by elucidating upon the political and social structures that led to genocide. Next, I review three relevant literatures: identity as it relates to conflict, nationality, and collective traumas; the positive and negative influences of social capital in post-conflict settings, and; development in conflict resolution, which draws on social capital theory to relate economic and social processes and express the utility of superordinate goals. Finally, I present my hypotheses in my research design for the subsequent empirical chapters. My empirical work begins in my second chapter, where I analyze political discourses and the relationship they construct between national unity and development; I find that political discourse is oppositional to Hutu discourses, emphasizes togetherness and cooperation in development, and refers to “Rwandans” rather than Hutu and Tutsi. In the third chapter, survivor testimonials reveal a rejection of traditional reconciliation mechanisms – particularly forgiveness, seek to prevent genocide through partnership, and emphasize working for development to achieve a better future. The fourth chapter examines the exclusion of Batwa,

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\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Berdal and Malone 2000.
refugees, and LGBT persons from these development processes. Finally, I offer my theoretical and empirical conclusions, which include policy implications and potentials for future research.
CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF RWANDA’S GENOCIDE AND TRANSFORMATION

*Background: Ethnic Antagonism, Political Rhetoric, and Communal Violence*

In July of 1994, Rwanda was emerging from the horrific violence of 100 days of genocide that dismantled the country’s political, economic, and social structures. In order to understand Rwanda’s transformation, it is critical to first examine the context of genocidal violence and systematic underdevelopment. This background section will explore the evolution of identity and its politicization during colonialism and the post-independence era. These explorations will specifically address the perceived origins of Hutu and Tutsi, the role of agricultural and pastoral traditions in Rwandan society, and the transitions that occurred between colonial control and a Hutu-led government. Furthermore, I examine the political-level discourses of Hutu Power and their role in inciting widespread communal violence. In this context, I briefly investigate the depth and brutality of Rwanda’s genocide to illuminate the destructive legacy left by this violence. Finally, I address the current state of Rwanda’s political, social, and economic stability and its relation to emergent Rwandan nationalism. This section provides the basic context for the subsequent literature review, which explores the theoretical drivers of collective violence.

The violent animosities between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda were fundamentally the products of political constructs.\(^5\) Because these groups shared a common cultural community through speaking the same language, practicing the same religion, and living on the same territory, the perceived differences between these ethnicities were drawn from claims of origin – the majority Hutu claimed indigenous status while Tutsi ancestors were native to eastern Africa. These concepts of indigeneity and migration not only solidified perceptions of Tutsis as

outsiders, but allowed “the celebration of Hutu resistance to Tutsi intrusion [and] enabled this
historiography to become an ideological theme of the 1994 genocide, perpetuated in the name of
repelling RPF incursion.”6 In addition to this construction of difference, modes of economic
systems characteristic of these ethnic groups were emphasized to create dissimilarity. However,
“these identifications – of Tutsi with cattle and Hutu with land – need to be understood less as
mere facts unrelated to power than as historical artifacts created alongside the institutionalized
power of the Rwandan state.”7 Indeed, these manipulated histories were later codified in the
political practices of the newly independent Rwandan state, and the economic narratives created
“unprecedented tensions between identities of origin, identities of residence, and identities of
aspiration.”8

The Hutu majority wielded an enormous amount of power in Rwanda and became “too
successful as a state,”9 meaning that illiberal democracy allowed the Hutu government to solidify
a historical narrative in which the Tutsi minority – historically favored by Belgian colonialists –
were perpetually seeking to steal political power and subjugate Hutus to an oppressive rule.
Furthermore, the government effectively transmitted these powerful myths to the majority of the
Rwandan population through expansive media outlets and formal state institutions. Ultimately,
“extremists who were ready to use slaughter to hold on to political power constructed an
ideology of genocide from a faulty history that had long been accepted by both Hutu and
Tutsi.”10

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9 Des Forges 1995, 44.
10 Ibid, 46.
Therefore, the political rhetoric used by Hutu power was an important catalyst for mass violence and it frequently recalled these narratives of origin, livelihoods, and ethnic stereotypes. Most notably, Hutu officials became preoccupied with creating a “Hutuland”\textsuperscript{11} which would expand beyond the boundaries of the Rwandan state. These aspirations for expansion and purity were buffeted by desires for “food self-reliance,” a romanticization of a Hutu agricultural past, and the disposability of the “elitist” Tutsi in this new socio-economic structure.\textsuperscript{12} Former Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana stated, “Rwanda is a peasant economy and should remain one.”\textsuperscript{13}

However, this elite discourse also differs in important ways from other genocidal regimes; rather than using perceptions of Hutu superiority to justify the elimination of Tutsi Rwandans, Hutu power largely relied on common fears that arose from a colonial imprinted belief that Tutsis were intellectually superior to their Hutu counterparts. Hutu existential fear would have been incomplete without their widely accepted inferiority to the minority population.\textsuperscript{14} Although the term “cockroach” readily dehumanized Tutsis through frequent usage, a central fear was that the “cunningly malicious cockroaches” would wrestle power from an intellectually impotent Hutu majority.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, “predatory identities arise in those circumstances in which majorities and minorities can plausibly be seen as being in danger of trading places.”\textsuperscript{16} Today, we see that the discourses of RPF leaders – and notably current President Paul Kagame – not only oppose the explicitly violent characteristics of these articulations, but also adopt development narratives that challenge the Hutu government’s romanticization of Rwanda’s peasantry past.

\textsuperscript{11} Kiernan 2007.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid; Mamdani 2001.
\textsuperscript{13} Kiernan 2007, 565.
\textsuperscript{14} Staub 1989; Des Forges 1995; Mamdani 2001.
\textsuperscript{15} Kiernan 2007.
\textsuperscript{16} Appadurai 2006, 52.
Through the politicization of ethnic groups and the dissemination of divisive political discourse, the Rwandan state restructured social relationships; indeed, the genocide was not only pursued through state resources but efficiently executed at the local level by ordinary citizens. This pattern of violence emphasizes the mechanism through which violence occurred; dissent between Hutu and Tutsi did not arise from disparate histories or distinct cultural traditions. Rather, social tensions were manifested at political levels and reified through state authority and power.\(^{17}\) In the decades preceding – and in the days during – the genocide, whatever social cohesion existed across ethnic lines was destroyed. Prior to the bloody massacres that escalated to full genocide in the early 1990s, intergroup relationships were deteriorating because of segmented economic activities, the rapid dissolution of business and agricultural activities ceased, the intentional dispersal or slaughter of skilled people and the intelligentsia, the purposeful destruction of national infrastructure, and the termination of non-militaristic government operations.\(^{18}\)

In addition to these pervasive forces that dissolved a functional Rwandan society, the method and nature of genocidal violence itself contributes to an immensely fragile post-conflict environment. Following the genocide, Rwandans were forced to confront a troubling question: “how can friend kill friend, neighbor kill neighbor, even kinsman kill kinsman?”\(^{19}\) This intimate violence perpetrated between acquaintances and even family members left Rwandans exposed to brutality, prolonged displacement, and civil disorder leaving individuals psychologically

\(^{17}\) Mamdani 2001, 41.


\(^{19}\) Appadurai 2006, 47.
Localized violence – particularly when utilizing the crude weaponry of machetes and maces – results in the loss of normal individual and interpersonal function. Even so, the methods of violence that relate to “new barbarism” are not “proof that the actions are without meaning or are, in some depictions, ‘ancient evils’.”\textsuperscript{21} Arjun Appadurai argues that intimate violence is not always paradoxical; instead, “the body, especially the minoritized body, can simultaneously be the mirror and the instrument of these abstractions we fear most.”\textsuperscript{22} The symbolism of intimate violence – regardless of its reasoning or history – leaves prominent scars on social relations. A victim of communal violence “has conceivably been assaulted herself, and she might have witnessed indiscriminate killing and torture of others, including close members of her family.”\textsuperscript{23} Additionally, 91 percent of children in Rwanda experienced the death of a family member – many of whom witnessed the death firsthand.\textsuperscript{24} As well as the scars left by machetes, the genocide and decades of interethnic turmoil marred the Rwandan population with deep psychological pain and communal mistrust.

Today, approaching two decades since the genocide, the social, political, and economic landscape of Rwanda is vastly different. Philip Gourevitch summarizes simply that Rwanda today is “unrecognizable” from the immediate post-genocide years, during which “the country was still pretty well annihilated: blood-sodden and pillaged, […] its humanity betrayed, its infrastructure trashed, its economy gutted, its government improvised.”\textsuperscript{25} Instead of constant insecurity and pockets of insurgency throughout rural Rwanda, a growing police and army is

\textsuperscript{20} Maynard 1997.
\textsuperscript{22} Appadurai 2006, 47.
\textsuperscript{23} Maynard 2006, 205.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Gourevitch 2009.
ensuring the safety of civilians and is an indicator of central government control of its security forces. Former rebel leaders fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are integrated in Rwanda’s national army as part of disarmament processes. The national parliament – the only in the world composed of a majority of women – is socially progressive and environmentally conscious. It has achieved steady improvement of the educational system and what many developed nations have not – a national system of affordable healthcare.\textsuperscript{26} In terms of economic development, “per-capita gross domestic product has nearly tripled, even as the population has increased by nearly twenty-five percent, to more than ten million. Tourism is a boom industry and a strong draw for foreign capital investment.”\textsuperscript{27} Although nearly half of the national budget is dependent on international aid, Rwanda increasingly seeks aid independence, and encourages entrepreneurship and small business growth.\textsuperscript{28} Most strikingly, social dynamics rarely reveal that the perpetrators and survivors of genocide live integrated lives.\textsuperscript{29} The once ubiquitous and emotive labels of Hutu and Tutsi are non-existent, except in history lessons and genocide memorials. Considering the context of total devastation following genocide, the rate of growth and progress in Rwanda is extraordinary and nearly unprecedented.

However, this remarkable progress does not deny the legitimate and difficult challenges ahead for Rwanda. Although the stabilization of Rwanda and its economic development are impressive, Rwanda is far from being prosperous, and its democratic system is “unapologetically authoritarian.”\textsuperscript{30} Grinding poverty persists; “nine of every 10 adults are subsistence farmers, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid; HDI 2011. The average Rwandan pays approximately $2 annually in healthcare fees.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Gourevitch 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Sommers 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Chu 2009; Gourevitch 2009; Sommers 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Chu 2009; Reyntjens 2004.
\end{itemize}
per capita income is [just above] a dollar a day.” Economic growth is slow, but it is steady – averaging six percent annually. Furthermore, the impetus behind national development programs is rooted in the belief that poverty exacerbated the tensions that erupted into 1994's genocide. In 2009, President Paul Kagame remarked, “We know that if that past is never going to happen again, we must grow our economy, create opportunities for higher wages, so that we create the conditions for tolerance, trust, and optimism.” Rwanda’s enduring fragility is undeniable, but its progress in the last 18 years is worthy of recognition.

**Literature Review: Identity in Conflict, Social Capital, and Development**

Ultimately, the confluence of historical narratives of ethnic difference, political rhetoric, and the modes of violence in Rwanda created a devastated landscape for the new RPF government. The following literature review examines the mechanisms that drive identity conflict and the transformations needed to allow Rwanda to recover from the brutal, intimate, and expansive violence of genocide. My central research question requires identifying the theoretical and practical linkages between identity and development; I seek to establish an understanding of how political, economic, and social reforms were driven by national discourses of a new Rwandan identity through participation in development initiatives. Rather than analyzing economic and identity transformation as disparate processes, the case of Rwanda illustrates the interconnectivity of identity formation and development following collective trauma.

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31 Chu 2009; Sommers 2011. At the time of the Chu 2009 article, the per capita income was below one dollar. The most recent World Bank per capita index suggests that the per capita income has increased in the last two years. 
32 Chu 2009.
Although the formation of identity through ethnic entrepreneurs prior to the 1994 genocide has been well-documented and definitively tied to the formation of apocalyptic identities,\(^{33}\) political approaches to identity and its relation to social cohesion after 1994 has not be investigated similarly. As such, my theoretical approach will emphasize development as a superordinate goal; a tool for building bridges between oppositional groups and rebuilding a nation after destruction. However, I assert that material objectives are not sufficient to consolidate national identity, economic progress, and intergroup reconciliation. Rather, trust across oppositional identities and widespread commitment to development goals are necessary for sustainable transformation and continued cooperation. To address this theoretical gap, I explore three main theoretical categories of literature: identity and conflict resolution, social capital, and development.

*Understanding Apocalyptic Identity and Official Nationalism: Identity in the Wake of Collective Trauma*

The discussion of identity will encompass 1) the relationship between the construction of identity and conflict – and particularly the salience of apocalyptic identities;\(^{34}\) 2) the importance of chosen traumas in the formation of identity;\(^{35}\) and 3) identity as a product of national and political discourses.\(^{36}\) By addressing these core areas, I examine identity as both a divisive and unifying force and problematize its use in political discourse. Furthermore, the literature

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concerning trauma not only addresses shared traumas as an important source of common identity, but also as an increasingly critical area of consideration in conflict resolution and transitional justice theories. The juxtaposition of identity and trauma suggests that models of forgiveness\(^{37}\) oversimplify the complicated procedures of recovering from communal violence. Furthermore, my investigation of grassroots discourse in Rwanda reveals that forgiveness separates communities rather than unites them; those who seek forgiveness and those who forgive become bound to dynamics of Otherness and division. This analysis suggests that viable conflict transformation may not only necessitate a transformation of oppositional identities, but also a transformation of the social constructions that surround shared trauma.

*Collective Identity and Conflict: The Othering Processes that Justify Violence*

Identity fundamentally begins with an understanding of self. However, when investigating violence it is not this micro-lens that is of greatest importance, but of how identity manifests among collectivities and influences positive and negative intergroup interactions. Essentially, “identity needs to be understood in terms of self-understanding and self-interest, [but also] denotes a fundamental and consequential ‘sameness’ among members of a group or category.”\(^{38}\) Importantly, identity allows individuals to organize the world into manageable and simplified categories – namely, in-groups and out-groups.\(^ {39}\) Indeed, “the creation of collective others, or thems, is a requirement, through the dynamics of stereotyping and identity contrast, for

\(^{37}\) Long and Brecke (2003) advocate for various forms of social and public forgiveness as tools to overcome civil war and reflect a wider reliance in conflict resolution and transitional justice on mechanisms of forgiveness.

\(^{38}\) Brubaker 2004, 33-34.

\(^{39}\) Berreby 2005; Rouhana 1997, 12.
helping to set boundaries and mark off the dynamics of the we.”\textsuperscript{40} The creation of belonging to an in-group is an inherently social process that simultaneously fulfills individual psychological needs,\textsuperscript{41} making identity a matter of existential necessity and collectively sacred values. Yet, “human kinds, whose memberships fall between All and One, map a much more variegated world.”\textsuperscript{42} Identity is not singular, but plural; individuals inhabit multiple overlapping and occasionally contradictory identities that require fluidity and compromise.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Historical Narratives}

Although certainly not immutable, identity maintains its salience and rigidity because of vibrant shared memories and the historical narratives that are created from them. “Memory supports or even creates the assumption of stability, permanence, and continuity in distinction to the incessant change of the phenomenal world and sets up a horizon, a frame, a space of possible pasts.”\textsuperscript{44} By relying on an often distant past, identity and othering continually (re)invent histories for political or other purposes while incorporating antiquity into modern discourses and narratives.\textsuperscript{45} The incorporation of the past into present – no matter how factually sound – perpetually contains elements of construction as individual and grouped actors choose how and why to recall and interact with varied histories. In the end, “history […] is the base clay of our own stories. History is not only forever in the eye of the beholder – it is the beholder.”\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{40} Appadurai 2006, 50.
\textsuperscript{41} Volkan 1998; Vlahos 2008.
\textsuperscript{42} Berreby 2005,15; Brubaker 2004.
\textsuperscript{43} Sen 2006.
\textsuperscript{44} Alexander et al 2004, 112.
\textsuperscript{45} Kaldor 2007; Maalouf 2000; Anderson 2006.
\textsuperscript{46} Vlahos 2008, 81.
Plurality, Sub-Identities, and Potentials for Peace

As previously mentioned, the plurality of identity challenges the objective ‘truth’ of shared histories, but also breeds uncertainty about individual roles and in-group belonging.\(^{47}\) Plurality and the prominence of sub-identities are important when considering the displacement of ethnic Hutu and Tutsi identities by the broader Rwandan identity because it is possible that these opposing identities did not disappear, but have been temporarily displaced by another label. An understanding of sub-identities allows theorists to comprehend the reemergence of past identities; “sub-identities emerge from continuous interaction between the core and the periphery – the self as perceived by the individual and the self as presented to the outside world. Sub-identities represent the internalization of various social roles the individual plays.”\(^{48}\) Therefore, the invisibility of Hutu/Tutsi nomenclatures does not necessitate their complete eradication from identity in Rwanda. Because ethnic identity gains salience through conflict – and the historical narratives that may drive violence – the absence of conflict potentially affects the visibility of this form of identification.\(^{49}\) Despite this complexity wrought by plurality of identity, sub-identities – and particularly cross-sectional identifications – create potential for interaction and cooperation across oppositional identities.\(^{50}\)

It is this topic – the creation of peace despite oppositional identity – upon which the literature on identity is varied and underdeveloped. According to Roger Brubaker,

\begin{quote}

The argument that ethnic groups are not primordial but the products of history – including the reifying of cultural difference through imposed colonial identifications – became a staple of African studies. Even so, scholars have tended
\end{quote}
to emphasize boundary formation rather than boundary crossing, the constitution of groups rather than the development of networks.51

Thus, even constructivist interpretations of identity favor the relationship between identity and violence rather than intergroup cohesion. Ethnic, racial, and national categories in particular make difficult the analysis of identity as a contingent, yet fluctuating phenomenon. Predominant theoretical approaches to the creation of in-groups and out-groups propose that identity is not necessarily defined by political or cultural structures, but initially created as a mechanism to easily categorize different peoples.52 Essentially, these approaches assume the preexistence of groups, difference, race, and ethnicity in the context of collective identities. In contrast, Brubaker advocates for a different approach; “instead of asking ‘what is race? What is an ethnic group? What is a nation?’, a cognitive approach encourages us to ask how, when, and why people interpret social experience in racial, ethnic, or national terms.”53 In post-modernist approaches to identity, the boundaries of identity are not fluid and fluctuating, but often transparent, porous, or fragmented. This conceptualization allows for a more nuanced understanding of identity that recognizes cross-sectional allegiances and augments the theoretical exploration of the relationship between identity and conflict, which I will explore next.

Collective Identities and Violence

Based on the desire to understand the numerous and pernicious wars that are fought on a local level between neighbors and community members across identity lines, a more extensive literature exists that attempts to understand the vast and complex linkages between identity and

violent conflict. Indeed, because of “brutality in the name of collective identities, we can no longer imagine a simple opposition between nature and war on one hand and social life and peace on the other.”

Collective violence exposes the innately social character of conflict and problematizes the foundations of collective identity – self/other, memory, and plurality. The creation of identity itself is made difficult; “the freedom in choosing our identity in the eyes of others can sometimes be extraordinarily limited.”

Identity groupings may well promote internal cohesion and productive allegiances while simultaneously restricting the ability of external parties to determine their own identity in their own terms. Furthermore, “it’s difficult to say where legitimate affirmation of identity ends and encroachment on the rights of others begins.”

This oppressive nature is overwhelmingly relevant to the case of Rwanda. Prior to genocide, strong Hutu (and Tutsi) identities confined members of these groups to specific roles that ultimately manifested in violence. Today, the analysis applies – to a less catastrophic extent – to the Rwandan identity; although this cohesion has been critical to national recovery following genocide, it simultaneously confines non-Rwandans to marginalized roles and separates entire communities from key services.

Apocalyptic Identities

Nevertheless, the scale of genocidal violence requires an explanation that cannot apply to the current status of identity in Rwanda. Pre-genocide Rwanda exhibited apocalyptic identities, though this empirical case diverges from the model in important ways. This model proposes four

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54 Appadurai 2006, 36.
56 Maalouf 2000, 32.
major components; first, the predatory identity must believe in its collectivity as comprising a chosen people. Not only does this label assume innate superiority and righteousness, it also draws on historical narratives and collective memories that support this presumed supremacy. Second, such a collectivity believes itself to be under attack because of moral, militaristic, or historical advantages. While this attack may manifest internally or externally, apocalyptic regimes – thirdly – suspect an internal traitorous component, a population upon whom fears of extinction can be displaced and claims of dominance may be reinforced. Finally, the only acceptable defense of such identities is total war conducted versus the Other, in which all actions are justified and even necessary.

Clearly, this model applies to modern history’s most violently genocidal regimes – Nazi Germany, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, and Hutu Power in Rwanda. Each regime targeted its aggression on internal and non-military groups: the European Jewish population; Khmer intellectuals, religious groups, and foreign “invaders;” and Tutsi citizens and moderate Hutus, respectively. Against these groups, brutal acts of violence were utilized and legitimized; sadistic experiments in the name of science exposed human nature, torture supposedly revealed traitors to the state, and sexual violence – often perpetrated publicly – maintained ethnic purity. Where an apocalyptic Rwanda differs from these other cases is the initial criterion – the supposition of superiority. As illustrated by the colonial legacies created in Rwanda, Hutus were widely believed to be the ‘lesser’ ethnicity. It was the historically-defined inferiority of Hutus – accepted and internalized by political elites and the wider Rwandan population – that drove extreme violence against internal dissidents. In fact, I propose that it is this deep belief in

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57 As articulated by Prof. Mark Habeeb, September 2011; Vlahos 2008, 56-58.
58 Discussed in this paper, background section.
inferiority that necessitated the world’s most efficient genocide; Hutu Power enacted a plan in which 1,000 people would be killed every 20 minutes.\textsuperscript{59} Such a pace was not to re-assert Hutu superiority, but because the genocidaires believed it was the only way to survive Tutsi aspirations for power. Although this analysis presents an anomaly for the apocalyptic identities model, it does not undermine its validity. Rather, it presents a complimentary explanation for why and how regimes justify genocidal violence in the context of an existential threat.

Conflicts driven by apocalyptic identities not only create enormous physical devastation, but produce social-psychological wounds on the entire surviving population of an apocalyptic regime. The process of how this past is overcome is what I seek to understand. Indeed, “legacies of mistrust, fear, hatred, and trauma characterize the politics and social systems of many societies that have lived through recent civil wars,”\textsuperscript{60} creating sometimes inescapable cycles of violence. Ben Kiernan – a scholar of genocide in Cambodia – notes, “Perpetuator regimes appear to sense that if genocide can ever be justified, it is only as a defense against genocide.”\textsuperscript{61} As such, the intense fear which justifies communal violence does not disappear after the end of genocide. Although this insecurity may not manifest violently, it requires a political structure that does not alienate members of the perpetrating group and protects against reprisal killings. For a post-genocidal Rwanda, apocalyptic identities were only part of the legacy of violently-opposed identities with which the new government would need to reconcile. Specifically, ethnicity and its historical politicization were key obstacles to peace in the years following 1994.

\textsuperscript{59} Kigali Memorial Center Archives 2011.
\textsuperscript{60} Anderson 1999, 15; Appadurai 2006, 10.
\textsuperscript{61} Kiernan 2007, 569.
Identity and the State: the Politicization of Ethnicity

As Rwanda demonstrates, some of the most bitter conflicts have taken place within collectivities that are relatively uniform culturally and linguistically, requiring the use of superficial intergroup differentiation as a political weapon. While many emerging analyses of identity in a globalizing world emphasize the degradation of national identities to transnational religious, ethnic, or cultural categorizations, the continuing importance of the state to the formation of identity – particularly for Rwanda – is undeniable. Benedict Anderson argues, “The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations.” Even so, the politicization of ethnicity fuses these dimensions, linking desires for purity with historical destiny and constructing political preoccupations with racism, antiquity, and territorial ambitions. By creating political categories from constructed or historical ethnic differences, the state generates visible allegiances to which membership is predetermined, allowing ethnicity to be revived during or after violent episodes. Ultimately, politicized ethnic divisions challenge the cohesion of states, strain the social bonds that allow civility, and are often at the root of violence. As Amartya Sen argues, “Our shared humanity gets savagely challenged when our differences are narrowed into one devised system of uniquely powerful categorization.”

However, the case of Rwanda offers a paradox; the state has both manipulated identity to augment violent division and to promote interethnic cohesion. Identity’s politicization, therefore,

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63 Beswick and Jackson 2011; Kaldor 2007.
64 Anderson 2006, 149.
is not inherently negative and potentially shapes productive social interactions. In this process of moving from genocide to development, however, the ethnic labels of Hutu and Tutsi were dissolved and replaced by the broader Rwandan identity. An understanding of this transformation is incomplete without an examination of how collective traumas affect intergroup interactions and political projects.

**Chosen Traumas: Histories of Violence and Mutual Dependency**

Previously, I discussed the psychological traumas that are generated by genocide. These effects are undeniable, but these factual consequences of communal violence should be differentiated from shared, or chosen, trauma. Similar to the construction of identity, the transgenerational representation of these traumas has an intrinsic social component. Such traumas occur when “members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”67 This mode of trauma externalizes individual traumas and connects suffering to complex histories, memories of conflict, current intergroup relations, and – importantly – the norms and mores of the community.68 Referring to a past as a collective trauma transcends the contingent relationships between individual persons and forges them into a collective identity, and “cultural experiences solidify as communal memory.”69

Collective traumas not only create constructed memories, but also redefine intergroup relations and identities through the filter of that trauma. One possible outcome is the social

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69 Berreby 2005, 141.
labeling of victims and perpetrators; “experiencing trauma can be understood as a sociological process that defines a painful injury to the collectivity, establishes the victim, attributes responsibility, and distributes the ideal and material consequences.” This typology of collective traumatization certainly applies to Hutu actions in the post-colonial years; in a new position of power, these elites based their political authority on the historical oppression by the Tutsi minority. By characterizing colonialism as an exclusively Hutu trauma and assigning blame not to Tutsi elites or Belgian officials but to the entire Tutsi population, the Hutu government was able to effectively revive this cultural trauma continuously to incite violence and justify the forced migration of Tutsis.

Despite this example, assigning blame and recognizing victimization does not necessarily indicate a state policy built upon revenge. “Whereas societies overall are responsible for their own warring or nonwarring decisions and actions, within societies many individuals and groups feel powerless in relation to those decisions;” the sometimes ambiguous distinction between victim and perpetrator makes it essential for post-war societies to cope with trauma through such sociological processes. However, when trauma is strictly understood as perpetrated by one group against another, blame and victimhood may emerge as catalysts for future violence. Furthermore, this inflexible categorization denies the reality that across even severely divided groups, there exist individuals who “struggle against the politics of exclusivism – the Hutus and Tutsis who tried to defend their localities against genocide.” Stories like these that contradict the collective trauma narrative may decelerate the transmission of destructive trauma narratives that place

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70 Alexander et al 2004, 22; Marvin and Ingle 1996.
71 Anderson 1999, 68.
72 Kaldor 2007, 11.
blame on a collective Other. Yet, representations of trauma that ignore these nuances risk the creation of enduring sources of division, particularly for generations that did not directly experience the trauma.

Transgenerational transmissions are not simply the result of handing down stories about a humiliating calamity from one generation to the next. [...] The transmissions of traumatized self-images occur almost as if psychological DNA were planted in the personality of the younger generation, affecting both individual identity and later adult behavior.\(^{73}\)

Addressing – or ignoring – collective trauma at a national level not only affects those persons who were directly affected by the traumatic events, but also future members of the collectivity. Vengeful instincts can be bolstered or assuaged, making official responses to collective trauma a critical component of conflict transformation. By guiding the ways in which collective traumas are understood, government structures have the ability to manage intergroup relationships in the aftermath of such a trauma in ways that can produce violence or peace. “The collectivization of coping responses is rarely, however, achieved by a proclamation by political leaders,”\(^{74}\) and these transformations must also occur at local levels. Nevertheless, the creation of a national Rwandan identity – and the framing of the 1994 genocide as a distinctly Rwandan trauma – allowed a national cohesion that dissuaded destructive ethnic allegiances.

*Official Nationalism after Genocide: the Creation of the Rwandan Identity*

Nationalisms have both positive and negative connotations; Hutu aspirations for a pure and expansive Hutuland, pursued through the systematic extermination of Tutsis, are clear evidence of pervasive claims to state power. However, in negotiating the potential negative

\(^{73}\) Volkan 1998, 44.

\(^{74}\) Alexander et al 2004, 49.
outcomes of nationalism, it is important to address nationalism’s constructive qualities – particularly in the aftermath of a collective trauma. As Bendict Anderson notes, “In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love.” In the case of post-genocide Rwanda, nationalism was pursued not as a mechanism for expansion and destruction, but as a method to heal and with the intention to create a broadened community with the ability to overcome humanity’s worst crimes. Nevertheless, nationalism of any kind has limits to its inclusivity; nations inherently are finite and bounded and based on the exclusion of an Other. This analysis of Rwanda’s emerging nationhood first addresses the constructions of nationality, then examines the official mechanisms (such as education and memorials) that consolidate a national identity.

Nations are not born but made, and this nation-building process is inherently fraught with conflict. The struggles associated with nationhood largely revolve around nostalgic representations of the past, national histories that legitimize revenge, and the “subordination” of local heterogeneity in traditions and norms. At its theoretical core, the official pursuit of nationalism is a quest for survival to ensure that ideological or cultural fragmentation across the state does not shift the dynamics of political power. Essentially, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.” For Rwanda, this creation of a nation, and of nationality, clearly reflected this reality – not out of

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75 Anderson 2006, 141.
76 Anderson 2006; Appadurai 2006; Berdal and Malone 2000.
78 Anderson 2006, 101; 159-161.
79 Ibid, 6.
designs for political power, but absolute necessity. In mid-1994, the territory of a Rwandan state existed, demarcated by international boundaries. Yet, the genocide and the eradication of the interim Hutu government, all state services and institutions, businesses, and civil society resulted in the non-existence of a nation. In every sense, Rwanda and what it meant to be Rwandan had to be recreated.

In such situations, the emerging state leadership functions as a powerful identifier – not because it is able to entirely manufacture an identity, but because it holds the material and symbolic resources to determine what shape national identity will take.\textsuperscript{80} However, for these national-level processes to resonate with the population, there must be methods of transmission; education and memorials hold critical roles in the definition of identity – particularly in the wake of a collective trauma.\textsuperscript{81} These institutions both help define the roles of oppositional groups after conflict, create a historical record about traumatic events, and form a cohesive national narrative; ideally these objectives result in lessened conflict while honestly acknowledging past failures. Essentially, such systems pursue both peace and justice and simultaneously construct a national identity.

Education is a critical node through which information about and understanding of collective traumas are transmitted to younger generations. Since schools provide an environment in which children develop a sense of differentiation and learn how to operate in a world of constructed boundaries, the ways in which histories are transmitted are abundantly important.\textsuperscript{82} Prior to 1994, educational materials in Rwanda were scrutinized for biased and unethical

\textsuperscript{80} Brubaker 2004.
\textsuperscript{81} Alexander et al 2004; Anderson 2006.
\textsuperscript{82} Staub 1989.
influences on youth. These materials were manifestations of the prominent beliefs of Hutu power, which emphasized ethnic differentiation and glorified resistance to (violence against) Tutsi peers. Similarly, the educational materials following the genocide reflected the emerging concepts of Rwandan identity; the antiquated educational resources were replaced with stereotype-reducing curriculums that supported moral development, healthy dialogue, and messages of integration and peace. Another critical dimension of official nationalism is memorialization of the past – particularly of chosen traumas. Memorials provide emotional cues and “remind nations of ‘already forgotten’ tragedies” and aid “the construction of national genealogies.” In Rwanda, these structures also serve as reminders of the danger of ethnic division; they are simultaneously a testament to the horror of genocide, a shrine to lives lost, and evidence for the necessity of a cohesive Rwandan identity above all else. As exhibited by the Hutu regime, “societies have systems and institutions that historically or traditionally separate people and thus can cause tension between them.” Yet, these same institutions can create unity and form networks of persons dedicated to peaceful nation-building.

The theoretical approaches to identity – and particularly its relation to conflict – are vast and composed of numerous nuances that allow this literature to conceptualize identity as both a broker of peace and a catalyst for violent conflict. Apocalyptic identities were enacted during Hutu leadership, justifying the slaughter of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus. Rather than duplicate this construction of identity, political leadership after the genocide emphasized national unity rather than differentiation along ethnic lines. For these transformations in identity to have

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85 Anderson 2006, 201; Berreby 2005.
86 Anderson 1999, 32.
lasting effects, however, a substantive engagement at local levels is critically important. In order to truly accept a Rwandan identity in place of ethnic labels, Rwandans would need to participate in a cooperative environment based on mutual trust. This prerequisite for sustainable peace – the problematic formation of this trust – is addressed by theoretical approaches to social capital.

**Linking Identity and Development: The Creation of Trust and Social Capital**

In this second set of theoretical literature, I problematize the common conceptualization of social capital as a tool for building societal trust and reconciliation and argue that this predominant view overlooks the impact of negative social capital. Within this literature, I analyze 1) strong social capital and its positive and negative effects;\(^87\) 2) the need for sustainable – rather than transitory – positive social capital;\(^88\) and 3) the role of trust in nation-building.\(^89\)

The social capital literature connects identity and development through understandings of social relationships before, during and after violent conflict; this theoretical association is particularly important within nations recovering from divisive intergroup conflict where identity is linked to violence and development is necessary for reconstruction. However, my analysis illustrates that social capital is both a precedent for and a product of development; while social capital allows formerly oppositional groups to work to a common end, engagement through development processes has the potential to create a framework in which social cohesion can be sustained in the long-term.

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\(^{89}\) Anderson 2006; Anderson 1999; Coleman 1988; Jok 2011; Marvin and Ingle 1996; Maynard 1997; Mertus and Sajjad 2005; Olson 1982; Reyntjens 2004.
Key to the creation of sustainable peace is the resonance of peace processes with local populations. Essentially, national discourses concerning identity and cross-ethnic cooperation are only legitimate and lasting if they are reproduced and internalized by local audiences. Officially, no national-level reconciliation processes have been created in Rwanda, making development programming critically important to intergroup engagement. Such informal structures and interactions help create social capital – “the sociopolitical environment that shapes norms and social structures that bond communities together as well as the bridges between communal groups and civil society and the state” and act as resources that foster trust, belonging, and effective signaling between social groups. Social capital allows diverse groups to concentrate on their similarities, allowing disparate identities to overlap and fostering empathy among these groupings. Among social capital theorists, it is argued that conflict is caused by a deficit of social capital. Although the construction of social capital does have positive effects in post-conflict states, this assumption is deeply flawed. Social cohesion and capital – like identity – breeds both inclusion and exclusion. Thus, positive results of social capital do not naturally evolve, but require the careful support of substantive interactions across bounded and oppositional groups; networks must be built across social boundaries. Before I discuss the problematic effects of social capital, I first review the predominant social capital literature.

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90 Arguably, the gacaca system was a national program that allowed community-level dialogues about genocide and responsibility. However, these courts were still part of a punitive justice system and not aimed towards restorative justice, though this may have been an effect of such institutions.
93 Colletta and Cullen 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993.
Apart from the assertion that insufficient social capital causes violence, the theoretical literature also posits that social capital creates networks, norms, trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit in post-conflict environments. Such networks function horizontally (between social peers) and vertically (between individuals where there exists a power differential; e.g. between citizens and state officials). The necessity of both vertical and horizontal capital divides this literary field. In many ways, the development of horizontal social capital compensates for state inadequacies, which makes vertical relationships only marginally important. Although the functioning of post-war states are often limited, the reconstruction of government and state infrastructure cannot be so quickly dismissed since neglect of these structures would limit long-term growth. For post-genocide Rwanda in particular, each of these categorizations are important; vertical relationships help elucidate the mechanisms that allow national identity to be internalized at local levels, and horizontal networks help analysts understand how local communities interacted after severe and localized violence.

However, the construction of such networks is no easy task after conflict; “in war-torn societies, healthy social patterns between dissimilar groups are replaced by distrust, apprehension, and outrage, impairing community cohesion, interdependence and mutual protection.” Further complicating this process, peacebuilders may focus on the more apparent groups or identities involved in conflict, ignoring sub-groups that have legitimate claims to state resources or reconciliation processes. Indeed, an exclusive focus on the formation of networks in Rwanda between Hutu and Tutsi would overlook the multitudinous identities that existed before

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94 Putnam 1993.
95 Colletta and Cullen 2000; Putnam 1993.
96 Maynard 1997, 207.
or were created after – the genocide. Yet, “overcoming the new schisms and reconciling old differences may take generations.”\(^97\) Additionally, proponents for social capital creation note that “social capital, the crucible of trust and critical to the health of an economy, rests on cultural roots.”\(^98\) While true, the cultural aspects of social capital can be problematic for reconciliation; if conflict arose out of the construction of cultural differences – as occurred in Rwanda – the cultural components of social capital may well serve as instigators of violence, rather than incentives for peace. Drawing on “cultural values” as a basis of social capital may ultimately enliven tensions rather than assuage them. The danger of this cultural logic is particularly clear in relation to the Rwandan exclusion of Batwa, refugees and particularly the LGBT community.

**Negative Social Capital: the Creation of Violent Networks and Unsustainable Peace**

The central weakness in the social capital literature is that it does not sufficiently address the negative effects of social capital, assuming that the formation of networks around community and cultural values results in non-violent interactions and long-term peace. Yet, social capital can also be accumulated within groups that are not committed to peace. Rather than assuming that internal conflict results in the destruction of social capital, conflict resolution theories should also consider that social capital contributes to conflict. By forming networks, wide-scale violence becomes possible and even legitimized through communal norms that justify exclusion, ethnic superiority, and vengeful actions. As Philip Gourevitch observed in Rwanda, “genocide, after all, is an exercise in community-building.”\(^99\)

\(^{97}\) Colletta and Cullen 2000, 22.

\(^{98}\) Fukuyama 1995, 33.

An important distinction that social capital theory overlooks is whether social capital is built across or within social groups. Although intergroup interactions may occur, these interactions alone do not create trust or incentives to cooperate non-violently and are an insufficient indicator of the positive effects of social capital. As Muzafer Sherif notes,

Shared attitudes, aspirations, and goals are related to and, in fact, are implicit in the concept of common values or norms of a group. […] Solidarity within the group need not be transferred to solidarity between groups, and in fact may contribute to sharpened delineations between groups with all the attendant by-products.\(^{100}\)

That is, strong intragroup dynamics foster intergroup conflict. If social capital is strong within socially bounded groups, this will not lead to the mitigation of conflict, but has the potential to deepen divisions between groups. When conceptualized in this way, social capital may also fragment societies that are generally cohesive or peaceful; by fortifying social groups, social capital may increase heterogeneity. Although this diversity is not necessarily destructive, it makes problem-solving across groups and other cooperative activities more costly and less likely. Furthermore, strong horizontal social capital may be destructive to vertical social capital; a mobilized “civil society has the potential to hinder, rather than enhance, civic nationalism and thus, to create a weak state [and] tensions between civil society and nation-building.”\(^{101}\) Ultimately, social capital is a double-edged sword; although it can help reinforce national-level reconciliation efforts, it may also undermine these initiatives.

Even when social capital generates positive outcomes, its permanence is often fleeting – which is another understudied phenomenon within this literature. As previously discussed, “when representatives of large groups in conflict meet to attempt reconciliation, the movement

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\(^{100}\) Sherif 1988, 26-27.

\(^{101}\) Mertus and Sajjad 2005.
one observes in their deliberations is not a steady progression toward ‘togetherness’ but rather an oscillation between closeness and separation.”\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, change in individuals, unless it leads to changes in culture and social structure, will remain unstable and will not spread.\textsuperscript{103} Unsustainable social capital – meaning short term intergroup association, ephemeral social institutions, or social capital that promotes groupism – has the same effect. Rather than effecting a true transformation of relationships, this form of social capital only creates the superficial impression of societal cohesion. In addition to consistent and positive group interactions at local levels, such exchanges must establish “common components of collective identity, [which are] essential for the resolution of interethnic conflict within a multiethnic state.”\textsuperscript{104} By creating a mutual understanding and enabling empathy, this recognition of similarity and common pursuits creates social bonds and builds trust. This precise outcome was the aim of the Rwanda’s unity through development; trust – and mutual dependency – would play a key role.

\textit{Trust as a Tool of Nation-Building}

Trust is seen as a necessary social characteristic for long-term peace and stability,\textsuperscript{105} particularly in the aftermath of apocalyptic identities like those witnessed during the genocide in Rwanda. Nevertheless, trust alone – similar to positive social capital – is not permanent but transitory, and it is not only a precursor to peace, but also a product of peacebuilding efforts. Trust is composed of “reciprocity, civic duty, and moral obligations” and is central to the social

\textsuperscript{102} Volkan 1998, 101.
\textsuperscript{103} Maynard 1997; Staub 1989.
\textsuperscript{104} Rouhana 1997, 20.
\textsuperscript{105} Fukuyama 1995; Maynard 1997; Putnam 1993.
and economic well-being of the state.\textsuperscript{106} These mechanisms do not exist to produce cooperative action alone, however; an important effect of trust is the re-humanization of the Other.

Restoring the adversary’s humanness and honor is an essential step in recovering from psychological trauma; it also plays a critical role in reestablishing interpersonal relationships and thus community-wide interaction. Renewed trust in war-torn society includes general belief in the good intentions of other community members, reliance on them for common services, willingness to assume a responsible role in society, and commitment to the joint future of the community.\textsuperscript{107}

In post-war societies, the establishment of trust contributes substantially to the redefinition of identities and social roles.\textsuperscript{108} This process of redefinition often revolves around a ‘sink-or-swim’ mentality, where the success of the state is contingent upon the cooperation of formerly warring parties. Shared goals – like nation-building – bring groups together so that there may be substantive interactions between parties.\textsuperscript{109} Such superordinate goals will be discussed in greater depth, as I establish development programming as a type of superordinate goal. However, these understandings of trust clearly connect its establishment to common objectives, cross-cutting identities, and the re-humanization of the enemy.

In the immediate aftermath of extensive collective trauma – like the Rwandan genocide – the creation of trust can be enormously difficult because vivid memories of betrayal and violation readily vindicate desires for revenge.\textsuperscript{110} Collective traumas make the creation of trust difficult; rigid narratives of victimization and differentiation may preclude trust entirely. Therefore, the formation of positive social capital is fundamentally important to the survival of

\textsuperscript{106} Colletta and Cullen 2000, 3; Fukuyama 1995.
\textsuperscript{107} Maynard 1997, 214.
\textsuperscript{108} Long and Brecke 2003.
\textsuperscript{109} Staub 1989.
\textsuperscript{110} Maynard 1997; Volkan 1998.
the fragile state. Post-1994 associations in Rwanda have been criticized for increasing social cleavages, though not necessarily along ethnic lines. Such critics argue that new associations – created around exclusive memberships, e.g. widows, child orphans, or amputees – do not allow these groups to relate their experiences to one another, allowing division and isolation, undermining trust.\textsuperscript{111} This analysis overlooks vertical social capital; because of the national-level project of creating a singular Rwandan identity through which reconciliation could be pursued; these informal associations relate to a larger cause – that of unity through development.

\textit{Unity through Development: Superordinate Goals and Transforming Identity}

Within this final literary review, development is explored as a mechanism of political, economic, and social reconstruction after communal violence. This analysis explores 1) the relationship between development and conflict resolution;\textsuperscript{112} 2) the theoretical connections between state-building, nation-building, and economic reconstruction;\textsuperscript{113} and 3) the relationship between superordinate goals and development programming.\textsuperscript{114} Conflict resolution effectively explores the connections between development and political, economic, and social processes; however, the material aspects of superordinate goals do not sufficiently address the transformations of identity as both a driver and result of such goals. Similar to social capital, superordinate goals have a danger of effecting only superficial or short-term intergroup dynamics. By understanding the role of identity in the context development, I examine why and how sustainable development

\textsuperscript{111} Colletta and Cullen 2000.
\textsuperscript{112} Anderson 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Galtung 1996; Long and Brecke 2003; Olson 1982; Paris 2004; Unvin 2002; Woolcock 1998.
\textsuperscript{114} Anderson 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Maynard 1997; Sherif 1988; Staub 1989; Vlahos 2008.
measures are central to – not distinct from – political and social reconciliation. Together, these three literatures create a sufficient framework to explore the consolidation of Rwandan identity as it occurred after genocide, through national-level discourses, and in a way that fostered social cohesion.

Conflict Resolution and Development: Connecting Political, Economic, and Social Transformation

According to Nadim Rouhana, “Developing common social and political components is not a sufficient basis for creating a common collective identity.”115 As weaknesses in the social capital literature demonstrate, sustainable transformations are difficult to achieve and intergroup understanding must be augmented by common objectives. Furthermore, a focus on development processes in conflict resolution allows the identification of an important nuanced argument; although conflict may “destroy primary bonds, thus undercutting indigenous social capital,”116 development after conflict may also create opportunities for bridges to other networks and can displace antagonistic intergroup relations. In post-war societies like Rwanda, where interethnic oppression is a notable characteristic of the political and socioeconomic landscape, costly conflict may create an urgency for reconciliation and peacebuilding that did not previously exist.117

This is not to say that development is an exclusively positive post-conflict project; like social capital, development is wrought with the potential for violence and exclusion. Although underdevelopment is increasingly regarded as an issue of concern for international security, a

116 Colletta and Cullen 2000, 27.
117 Anderson 1999.
holistic approach to development is needed.\textsuperscript{118} That is, “achieving positive peace requires development and transformation of structures at the local, national, and international level. […] Recognizing development as a tool for promoting human security necessitates a system-wide approach.”\textsuperscript{119} If perceived as exclusive, unequal, or unnecessary, development can contribute to “boundary-strengthening and group-making projects”\textsuperscript{120} that undermine efforts to consolidate peace. Yet, development programming is critical to political and economic reconstruction, but it also has tremendous impact on social relations.

\textit{State-building, Economic Reconstruction, and Fears of Exclusion}

National reconstruction after extensive civil violence is a daunting project, particularly so in Rwanda – where political liberalization (a Hutu majoritarian democracy) contributed to the efficacy of genocide. The development of political and economic structures after intense violence exposes many of the insecurities created by war; “people who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under a system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced.”\textsuperscript{121} Yet, a system that is too forceful at the national level is in danger of weakening the public’s trust in the state, creating perceptions of official actions as ethnically biased, or reviving collective memories of oppression by the state.\textsuperscript{122} Weak states destroyed by violence require time to consolidate institutions and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, political and economic processes have a distinctly social

\textsuperscript{118} Anderson 1999; Beswick and Jackson 2011.
\textsuperscript{119} Beswick and Jackson 2011.
\textsuperscript{120} Brubaker 2004, 105.
\textsuperscript{121} Fukuyama 1995, 27; Appadurai 2006.
\textsuperscript{122} Reytjens 2004.
\textsuperscript{123} Berdal and Malone 2000; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Mertus and Sajjad 2005.
component. “Putting more emphasis on the construction of effective institutions is only one part of the solution. [...] Limiting the intensity of societal conflicts should also should be part of the revised peacebuilding strategy.”

Although this social context makes reconstruction more difficult, effective development strategies – like positive social capital – can build connections between the state and its constituents, as well as among constituency groups themselves. These group dynamics must be carefully negotiated in the creation of political structures;

for a minority in a state to feel attachment to the state, it should have cultural values and political views in common with the majority's, and it should be convinced that the state is designed to serve its needs – as individuals and as groups – on an equal basis with the majority. Although each group holds to its own collective identity, there should be enough commonality between the groups for a new common collective identity to emerge.

Even with national-level cooperation across ethnic lines, this same heterogeneity at a grassroots level may create insecurity and sustain division. In addition to the macro-processes of political and economic reconstruction, nations divided by conflict require local processes through which individuals may begin to trust the state – and one another.

**Development as a Superordinate Goal**

Superordinate goals represent common objectives that may only be achieved through intergroup collaboration. In Muzaffer Sherif’s foundational examination of shared goals in the context of intergroup conflict, the introduction of superordinate goals to oppositional groups aimed to reduce intergroup tension, establish norms of cooperation and mutual dependency, and

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allow oppositional identity groups to find cultural commonalities.¹²⁷ Not only do these objectives require cooperation, but ideally, the benefits and rewards are shared equally among groups. To reduce the future possibility of genocide, “helping must be inclusive, across group lines, so that the evolving values of caring and connection ultimately include all human beings.”¹²⁸ In Rwanda, development programming is described in similar terms; national level discourse defines development in terms of collective action, public goods, equal benefits, and an outcome achievable only through shared responsibility. In this context, I argue that development acts as a superordinate goal; by bringing groups together for the vital reconstruction of the destroyed state and devastated economy, development after genocide in Rwanda solidified dependency among Hutu and Tutsi groups. Through political discourses, it was made clear that without intergroup cooperation, Rwanda would continue a trajectory of interethnic bloodletting and everyone would suffer. The only conceivable alternative was development, through which ethnic groups work together and survivors of the genocide – including victims and perpetrators – unite in partnership for this purpose. Fundamentally, the Rwandan development project understood that “We devalue those we harm and value those we help.”¹²⁹

Requiring not only intergroup contact, the success of superordinate goals is the extent to which they create long-term intergroup understanding and integration. Cross-cutting relations overcome tendencies to segregate, and cooperation toward a common goal must “have a cumulative effect in the direction of reducing existing tensions between groups.”¹³⁰ Essentially, cooperation connects people in a manner that is more substantial than simple contact;

¹²⁸ Staub 1989, 276.
¹²⁹ Staub 1989, 276.
cooperation requires and creates interdependency, while mere contact does not. Indeed, “not all contact improves group relations. [...] Equal-status contact between the members of interacting groups; cooperation between them to fulfill shared goals’ intimate rather than casual contact; and authorities or the social climate approving of and supporting the intergroup context”\textsuperscript{131} are critical elements of the constructive implementation of superordinate goals. Of course, the pursuit of superordinate goals in Rwanda are complicated by the nation’s long history of mutual distrust and a monumental trauma that, in addition to destroying the nation’s social fabric, has also destroyed economic and political institutions. For Rwanda, it is not only a question of unity through superordinate goals, but sustaining the trust needed to maintain development and peace after the attainment of primary shared goals. As I will later demonstrate, this has been sustained by political discourses of unity through development and local articulations of partnership despite victimization.

Within the literature concerning reconciliation and reconstruction, there is an emphasis on forgiveness as a prerequisite for long term peace and stability.\textsuperscript{132} However, national and local discourses in Rwanda demonstrate that forgiveness is neither sufficient nor necessary to effect this social change. By linking forgiveness to the transformation of oppositional identities, this theory asserts that peace can only be sustainable – and superordinate goals only effective – if forgiveness exists. Essentially, “reconciliation events restore lasting social order only when they are part of a forgiveness process characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the former belligerents, partial justice, and a call for a new relationship.”\textsuperscript{133} Ultimately, a forgiveness

\textsuperscript{131} Staub 1989, 277.
\textsuperscript{132} Long and Brecke 2003.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 3.
process requires a hardened notion of perpetrators and victims, which may in fact cause greater division. Unlike superordinate goals, forgiveness processes do not allow equal exchanges across bounded groups. Rather, victim-perpetrator delineations create groups and forgiveness processes only allow superficial contact; punitive justice procedures and forgiveness models maintain “norms of social distance between the groups and [...] a derogatory picture of the out-group.”\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, the advocacy for forgiveness – particularly from an international level – often undermines local traditions and norms. Indeed, “western connotations of trauma may be easily misconstrued in other countries; causes, symptoms and recovery processes may vary significantly from culture to culture.”\textsuperscript{135} The ability and need to forgive is culturally contextual and needs to be abandoned as a universal cure for deep wounds.

Through development programming, the Rwandan government has made enormous social and economic strides in national reconstruction and the creation of durable peace. Hutu and Tutsi have banded together to rebuild their lives from the devastation of genocide; through national-level initiatives to reconcile these groups and encourage growth and development, these labels have all but disappeared, allowing space for a Rwandan national identity to emerge. Development is a particularly potent superordinate goal; “rather than abstract designs for improving ‘humanity’, ideals that are rooted in the welfare of individual human beings, small and intermediate goals along the way, commitment, and the courage to express ideas in words and actions – all are essential to fulfill an agenda of nonaggression, cooperation, caring, and human connection.”\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{134} Sherif 1988, 198.  
\textsuperscript{135} Maynard 1997.  
\textsuperscript{136} Staub 1989, 283.
Research Design and Methodology

Through an understanding of the theoretical mechanisms that link identity and development, I argue that the Rwandan government effectively utilized superordinate goals and created a national identity that displaced ethnic division. However, this monumental progress in social relations and economic development also marginalizes groups that are not “Rwandan.” As a result, these ethnic, political, and cultural minorities are also excluded from development programming. By examining the intersection of identity and development, my thesis illustrates the ways in which national political discourse, local constructions of identity, and development programming are mutually reinforcing. Through this analysis, my research not only encompasses the combined importance of articulations of identity at national and local levels, but also investigates the limitations of national identity for marginalized groups in the context of development projects.

From this central argument, I form three main hypotheses concerning Rwandan national identity after genocide that will be explored in three empirical chapters. First, the political discourse hypothesis (1) posits that national-level discourse adopted a frame of “unity through development” after genocide. Political discourse in the aftermath of genocide (a) adopts many frames that are oppositional to the discourses of Hutu Power. In particular, the new Rwandan government emphasizes unity in place of ethnic rivalry and future development rather than a romanticization of Rwanda’s peasantry past. This approach (b) emphasizes togetherness and cooperation as critical to the common goal of Rwandan development. As a result, (c) “Rwandan” emerges as a common identity that supersedes the divisions that led to genocide and the traumas experienced during it.
These national level articulations of togetherness are reflected and reproduced through grassroots discourses (2), wherein individuals and local communities became committed to development. The analysis of individual discourses show that in post-genocide reconstruction, (a) Rwandans are wary of imported reconciliation mechanisms – such as forgiveness and formal justice structures. Furthermore, (b) many survivors believe that future genocide can only be prevented through interethnic (and even victim-perpetrator) partnership in education and development. When local discourses are understood in the context of national narratives, (c) together these mechanisms contribute significantly to the dissolution of ethnic identities, the formation of national unity and economic development.

The emergence of “Rwandan” in place of discrete ethnic identities has enormous effects on national unity and the success of development programs. However, as the identity literature illustrates, inclusivity occurs only at the exclusion of an Other. I argue that the formation of a Rwandan identity through development programs has resulted in a system that excludes those who are not “Rwandan” from key development processes that meet basic needs (3). To demonstrate this exclusion, I present three groups who have been determined non-Rwandan through ethnic, political, and cultural definitions of who is Rwandan. First, (a) the minority group Batwa is not considered Rwandan because of ethnic differences from the Hutu/Tutsi ethnicities which converged after genocide. Next, (b) refugees – mainly displaced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo – are not considered Rwandan in a political sense, though they compose a significant population within Rwanda that struggles to be partners in development, and are rather seen as pariahs in the Rwandan state. Finally, (c) the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community in Rwanda has been excluded from development
benefits. These individuals are not perceived as Rwandan because same-sex relationships are not accepted as Rwandan culture. All three groups have not only been excluded but also face further dehumanization and marginalization if they are not able to contribute to Rwandan development.

In order to address these hypotheses, I will conduct a frame analysis\(^{137}\) of national-level and individual articulations of identity and development after genocide. These speeches and interviews will be concentrated between 1995 and 2011 in order to capture transition and transformation in Rwanda and to illustrate the linkages between this formation of identity and the groups who are not considered Rwandan. The analysis of political discourse includes 44 speeches that target both domestic (Rwandan) and international audiences and on those delivered by President Paul Kagame. In order to gather information about local-level discourse, I gather evidence from the Kigali Memorial Archives, which include extensive transcripts and videos of Gacaca proceedings and survivor testimonials that were conducted between 2001 and 2009 unless otherwise noted. Total, I use 68 documents for frame analysis. Finally, the support for my third empirical chapter will be drawn from reports published by Rwandan non-governmental organizations as illustrations of the difficulties faced by ostracized populations.\(^{138}\)

As a sociological research method, frame analysis typically uses media publications as mirrors of popular knowledge. For my purposes, I use Kagame’s discourse and archived testimonials of genocide survivors to represent the knowledge and opinions possessed by

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\(^{138}\) The research conducted here meets the standards for robust analysis as defined by the critical discourse analyses performed in the above articles.
political leaders and Rwandans. This approach allows a more precise political picture to be drawn and deals exclusively with Rwandans who experienced the genocide firsthand, reside in Rwanda, and interact with developmental projects. Although this focus on survivors enables a sharper analysis of identity and development constructions in Rwanda, the literature analyzing chosen trauma suggests that post-genocide generations of Rwandans are significantly shaped by this collective memory. Many Rwandans who returned after the genocide are also important players in the development regime. Future research that incorporates these views through primary interviews would be a welcome addition to the information analyzed here. However, by relying on interviews conducted by Rwandans and for Rwandan memorials, the cultural sensitivity of this project remains intact, stories are shared voluntarily, and the identities of the survivors are protected.

This discursive frame analysis aims to illustrate the complementary ways in which elite and grassroots constructions of identity shape, interact with, and are reinforced by development in Rwanda. Fundamentally, this project seeks to understand the rhetorical mechanisms through which Rwandans understand national unity and development as inextricably linked and how the social construction of unity through development excludes vulnerable groups. In contrast, my research is not concerned with the ways in which development ‘causes’ shifts in identity. I do not attempt to exhaustively investigate development projects themselves, but rather explain how national political discourse, local constructions of identity, and development programming are mutually reinforcing. The transformation of Rwanda after genocide is a story that is best told by Rwandans; fundamentally, this thesis attempts to share these perceptions as a tool to better understand the social impact of development in post-conflict environments.
CHAPTER II: UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NATIONAL LEVEL DISCOURSE

This chapter explores the three major discursive frames in national level discourse in Rwanda. Collectively, they illustrate the ways in which Rwandan President Paul Kagame constructs national identity and unity through the lens of development in the aftermath of genocide. First, development and unity are approached as a critical break from and transformation of Rwanda’s troubled past and the legacies of genocide. This is achieved rhetorically by countering the political discourse of the previous Hutu government by emphasizing unity instead of ethnic rivalry and future development rather than a romanticization of Rwanda’s peasantry past. Furthermore, Kagame explicitly galvanizes Rwandans to learn from the past and actively create a better future. Second, national level discourse defines development in terms of collective action, public goods, equal benefits, and an outcome achievable only through shared responsibility; essentially, development is composed of superordinate goals. Third and finally, ethnic sectarianism dissolves in national discourse as development becomes a task by and for all “Rwandans”. Cumulatively, these speeches advocate for unity through development; according to Kagame, “we as Rwandans have the principle responsibility to take charge of our own development, find solutions to our own problems, and also tell our own story.”

Hypothesis 1a: The Past

There are four major trends that emerge from national discourse and the relationship between development and the past. First, allusions to the past in Kagame’s discourse occur more frequently in speeches that occurred in the initial 10 years following genocide and are

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predictably used more strongly in speeches performed at genocide commemoration ceremonies or independence day celebrations. Second, this discourse defines the Rwandan state as emerging from the civil war fought by the RPF beginning in 1990, not as a colonial nation or even in the post-colonial years where Hutu extremism dominated the political sphere. Third, more recent linkages between development and the past are often embedded in the wider context of development across East Africa and the entire continent. Finally, Kagame articulates the necessity of transformation, but a specific form through which Rwandans are the architects of the new Rwandan state and the essential components to its triumph over decades of unequal social and political relationships. Ultimately, this frame addresses how Rwandans can and should play a role in transforming Rwanda into a successful state after genocide.

Earlier speeches recalling Rwanda’s past note the destruction that the nation was facing in the aftermath of genocide. Kagame remarks that “in rebuilding Rwanda after the 1994 genocide we started from scratch. And yet every aspect of reconstruction was a priority. We had to restore the security and unity of Rwandans.”\textsuperscript{140} Concerned with security and preventing future atrocities, these items attempt to understand the mechanisms that culminated in extensive collective violence. For new Rwandan leaders, it was clear that “genocidal ideologies [are] traceable to colonial rule,”\textsuperscript{141} but “although genocide was a culmination of hatred initiated during the colonial period, it was also due to the failure of post-colonial rulers in Rwanda to reverse the legacy of that colonial past.”\textsuperscript{142} While Kagame admits the responsibility of former leaders of Rwanda in the planning and execution of genocide, his speeches carefully separate genocidal

\textsuperscript{140} Kagame 2/14/2011.  
\textsuperscript{141} Kagame 9/18/2006.  
\textsuperscript{142} Kagame 1/21/2004.
architects from the new Rwandan state. However, this articulation of responsibility also compels ordinary Rwandans to participate in reconstruction processes:

Genocide was, in all honesty, a defining moment in the history of our country. In the eyes of many observers, Rwanda was a failed state. But given the huge sacrifices our people had made, we did not have a choice. We refused to be a failed state. Together, we resolved to uplift ourselves from the abyss and strive to build a new Rwanda, peaceful and stable, and fit for us all.\textsuperscript{143}

This excerpt ties together the major themes of the use of the past in political speeches; the 1994 genocide is framed as a turning point for the Rwandan state and its people. Furthermore, the participation of survivors in rebuilding the nation is a necessary component of a successful transformation. More recently, at the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, Kagame states, “We have to continue to move forward. That is what will give real meaning to the many sacrifices that the people of Rwanda have rendered to their country.”\textsuperscript{144} Therefore, development and progress become the foundation for Rwanda’s rebirth following the collective trauma of genocide.

The way in which Kagame defines Rwanda as a country also demonstrates an important break from the past. His description of the state itself indicates that the Rwandan state was not formed by colonial powers or by the post-colonial Hutu government. Rather, Kagame claims, “My country’s story begins with our four-year armed struggle from 1990 in which women and men shared a common purpose of ending a legacy of hatred, divisionism, and exclusion.”\textsuperscript{145} Rwanda’s very nationhood is not linked to the sectarianism that drove genocide, but instead is marked by the forces and individuals who opposed genocidal ideologies. Again, the genocide marks a point of transition for Rwanda and Rwandans; “It was these circumstances that inspired

\textsuperscript{143} Kagame 1/21/2004.
\textsuperscript{144} Kagame 4/7/2009.
\textsuperscript{145} Kagame 3/7/2009.
us to liberate our country and begin the journey of building a nation worthy of our people. This is a most appropriate time, then, to acknowledge and appreciate all of your Rwandans for your tenacity and continuous commitment in this endeavor.”

Even in a liberation movement that was predominantly militarized, Kagame regularly links nation-building to individual responsibilities. According to Kagame, “Our liberation was not just an armed struggle or an exercise to simply remove bad governments. It was also about ensuring improved quality of life of our otherwise impoverished nation. We therefore envisaged a better Rwanda with greater productive capacity based on its primary assets – its people.”

This framing of Rwandan nationhood is critical; through the process of defining the new Rwanda as a state existing after the genocide, political discourses effectively shift both the new and old ethnic identities. In the emerging construct, Hutu and Tutsi are not perpetual enemies created by the colonial system. Rather, these distinctions represent a different time in Rwanda’s history during which political leaders and people were not committed to development and national unity. The new Rwandan state presents an opportunity for each – and necessitates both development and unity – as mechanisms to build a successful nation.

As time passes, the frames of transformation and development are not only linked to Rwanda’s genocidal past, but also to the wider African struggle for autonomous socioeconomic development. In situating itself as a regional leader, Rwanda relates its triumph over the past to the current struggles of many African nations to modernize politically and economically. From Kagame’s perspective, “Rwanda is pleased to share our ongoing experience in recovering from

147 Kagame 10/21/2011.
conflict, and reconstructing what was a devastated country less than two decades ago.”\textsuperscript{148} In this international context, Kagame similarly cites individual responsibility in development; “It is clearly up to us to ensure that both the image and the reality truly represent what we as Africans stand for, and there is no better time than now to break away from the past and indeed, once again take charge of our destiny.”\textsuperscript{149} In addition to implicit linkages between Rwanda’s reconstruction and African development, Kagame explicitly relates these processes; “our efforts of nation-building should be contextualized within the broader historical and other circumstances and continental quest for effective leadership to galvanize, nurture, and challenge ourselves African people to build healthier, skilled, and economically prosperous societies.”\textsuperscript{150} This evolution in political discourse demonstrates that political discourse in Rwanda is not operating in a vacuum, but is responding to and interacting with international development frameworks – such as the economic integration of East Africa and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although this outcome does not specifically relate to the original hypotheses set forward, it does indicate that another larger identity – an overarching African identity – has been recently evoked in national level discourses. While this discourse may have a greater impact on regional relationships and international identity formations than within the national Rwandan identity, the role of globalization in development and identity is another critical aspect to consider.

Throughout these dimensions of political discourse that connect modern development to a transformation from Rwanda’s past, one aspect remains constant: the crucial role of individual

\textsuperscript{148} Kagame 11/8/2011.  
\textsuperscript{149} Kagame 11/19/2010.  
\textsuperscript{150} Kagame 10/21/2011.
Rwandans in the reconstruction process. Kagame articulates simply, “Rwandans must draw lessons from our past and work diligently for a better future.” In this way, Kagame is unequivocal about the critical link between Rwanda’s tragic past and its hopeful future – the Rwandan people. However, this assertion is also clear that social, economic, and political transformations in Rwanda are not abstract, but require tangible work and measurable outputs. References to the past in political discourse are both interesting and important because they articulate a pragmatic approach to development (a grassroots framework) while insisting that this process involves as many Rwandans as possible. Although development in Rwanda is largely organized through national and international level programming, Kagame explicitly places ownership in local levels and with individual Rwandans. This prominent trend recurs throughout political discourse, bringing together development and national unity.

Hypothesis 1b: Development through Cooperation

The Rwandan government’s approach to development asserts that the common goal of development can only be achieved through togetherness and cooperation. For Kagame’s administration, this is largely achieved by integrating the concepts of economic and social development, emphasizing the role of cooperation in this integration, and framing development as producing communal goods to be shared equally by Rwandans.

Political discourse after the genocide emphasizes both the economic and social dimensions of development; indeed, “[d]evelopment is not an end in itself, but the means to […]

\[151\] Kagame 2/15/2011.
\[152\] Sommers 2012, 82-89; Gourevitch 2009.
social inclusiveness.”

By integrating these processes, Kagame notes the complexity of reconstruction – particularly after a polarized history and the escalation of intergroup strife to intergroup bloodletting. According to Kagame, “Post-conflict nation-building is a complex and challenging task. For Rwanda, it has consisted of rebuilding the state […] but it has also meant reconstructing the country’s social fabric and establishing mechanisms for social and economic development.” An important subcategory of this development is the sense of ownership, which again places responsibility with Rwandans themselves. Kagame argues, “Building our nation means striving for development of the country and the people. We cannot achieve this task without the conscience of ownership. Rwanda belongs to all of us, and all of us have a role to play in our country’s development.” Furthermore, Kagame insists that Rwandans must “find lasting solutions to our own problems of peace and security and take development matters in our own hands.”

The link between the involvement of Rwandans and the integration of social and economic development is clear in the logic of national level discourses. For Kagame, “our national socio-economic transformation project hinges on developing our greatest resources – the Rwandan people. They are our drivers of change and the managers of our production for greater overall prosperity.” Undeniably, this frame uncovers an emphasis on Rwandan dignity and self-reliance; Kagame strongly and regularly articulates the need for Rwandans to independently devise solutions to national problems and to maintain ownership of its economic and social development.

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153 Kagame 2/10/2011.
155 Kagame 12/21/2010.
156 Kagame 10/21/2011.
In Rwanda’s political discourse, the involvement of individual Rwandans does not indicate separated paths of development, but coordinated and cooperative collective efforts. Simply stated by Kagame, “all of us must cooperate in building the new Rwanda,”158 and “success will depend on our ability to consciously take collective action.”159 Immediately following the end of the genocide and spanning until current day, Kagame consistently remarks upon the necessity of cooperation in development. Indeed, he encourages Rwandans to “stand up and work together […] in the hope that it will lead this country along the path of its development.”160 Ultimately, Kagame views “development as the embodiment of better mutual understanding.”161 For Kagame and other Rwandan leaders, individual contributions in an atmosphere of cooperation ensure that “every Rwandan has a voice [and] creates a sense of shared responsibility.”162 The emphasis on local involvement promotes inclusivity and serves to remind the population that Rwanda (and Rwandans) will only prosper through willing and collective involvement in development efforts.

Finally, the political discussion of development and togetherness frames this process as producing communal goods to be shared by all Rwandans; the communal nature of development refers to both the inputs of Rwandans and the benefits of growth. Kagame states, “No challenge is insurmountable when people have the right attitude, are committed and focused on the common good.”163 In addition, Rwanda’s development “demanded the best of women and men, leading to significant changes in Rwandan society in the past fifteen years of reconstruction and

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Like development itself, the goods produced aim to be both economic and social. Material goods provide the “dynamism of new ideas, products, and services that we can build on for further growth to transform our society.” Furthermore, the economic growth created by development schemes produce social progress that is an equally important component of the overall development plan. For Kagame, “History is replete with illustrations of how nations, immersed in crises, changed the underlying assumptions by which they acted, and created new institutions and tools to solve problems, and emerged from the process as stronger societies.” Indeed, Kagame encouraged Rwandans to understand and believe that “when we work together, we win together. […] Cooperation and partnership are key, where the rules to be followed are clear, fair, and equally applicable to all. What supports this is mutual respect and understanding.”

Hypothesis 1c: Unity through Development

Finally, this discourse emphasizes “Rwandan” as an identity to be held by all Rwandans and their leaders. This identity both suggests removing ethnic identifications and divisions as well as forming an entirely new national consciousness related to the Rwandan nation itself and its development. Although the former dissolution of identities is not explicitly linked to development processes, Kagame does challenge the validity of earlier understandings of sectarianism in Rwanda. In the immediate years following the genocide, Kagame redefines the meaning surrounding ethnicity; “You are aware that we have various tribes, the Hutu, the Tutsi,
and the Twa. [...] I do not truly know how to describe [them] except by calling them Rwandan.”168 In later years, Kagame argues that “the three groups constituting Rwandan society were not distinct tribes,”169 but are in fact “social groups.”170 At times, the national Rwandan identity is political in nature; Kagame asks, “Who is a minority? I am not from the minority. I am from the RPF and it’s the majority. I am from these Rwandans and they are not minorities in their own country.”171 Rather than suggesting that being “Rwandan” is exclusively related to associating with a particular political party, Kagame is asserting that minorities and majorities in Rwanda are no longer evaluated on ethnic grounds. Despite occasional inconsistency in how he defines the historical ethnic divisions in Rwanda, it is clear that he challenges the legitimacy of these antiquated groupings of Rwandans and insists that they have been reshaped since the genocide; “Over time and with progress made, Rwandans have redefined themselves and are determined to forge ahead.”172

Instead, Kagame focuses on a unity formed at the national level, which would rely on “all Rwandans, the conduits of building the nation.”173 “To Rwandans everywhere,” Kagame posits that “sacrifice, dedication and patriotism are what have brought us to where we are today.”174 Within this frame, he also suggests that the tragedy of genocide should be a catalyst for both unity and development; “We should convert our grief into strength and determination to build a better future that we deserve. We have the capability in us to do this – we should make this a

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170 Kagame 10/21/2011.
171 Kagame 12/15/2011.
culture.”

In this way, the genocide not only serves as a point of transformation for Rwanda, but a significant testament to Rwandan resiliency. According to Kagame, “When survivors of genocide manage to live with those who killed their loved ones, it shows that anything is possible. Sometimes we ignore this fact.”

Regardless of this vision for a national identity and acculturation based on a collective trauma, Kagame pursues this end cautiously. For Kagame, “pursuing national unity does not blind us to the value of diversity and the benefits that come with it. It simply means that our common interests supersede what separates us.”

However, this discussion of national unity is incomplete without revisiting the multitudinous ways in which Kagame frames this unity as a both a creator and product of development. “It is up to the people of Rwanda – up to me and you – to know how to build our future. […] No one else other than ourselves owns that future, no one can decide it for us.”

Kagame is clear that development and social transformation are interrelated processes; “We need to continue to work together and listen to each other, as we are serious about our commitment to develop and achieve results for our people – who must remain at the heart of everything we do. That is what real partnership is about. And this will lead to the transformation of our country and our people.”

Rwanda’s development model is designed to “encourage broader citizen participation and ensure that Rwandans have a real stake in their country.” In doing so, it aims

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175 Kagame 4/7/2010.
176 Kagame 4/7/2009.
178 Kagame 4/7/2009.
180 Kagame 10/21/2011.
to “achieve development objectives by allowing greater trust in partnerships and recognizing that this is a shared responsibility built on common values and goals.”

Conclusions

Political discourse in Rwanda illustrates the complex and important interconnectivity of economic development and identity (re)construction. Their interrelated nature meld social and economic spheres through consistent references to Rwanda’s tragic past and the need for transformation; by speaking of reconstruction in terms of rebuilding institutions and social relations; through an emphasis of Rwandan ownership and mutually beneficial rewards; and by positing a vision of the Rwandan state as a post-genocide entity and the Rwandan people as separate from their ‘apocalyptic’ ethnic labels. The 1994 genocide vividly represents decades of inequality and sectarianism; because many Rwandans are also survivors of this genocide, it is a notable and undeniable collective trauma in the Rwandan consciousness. As the literature suggests, chosen traumas not only create constructed memories, but also redefine intergroup relations and identities through the filter of that trauma. In national level discourse, the genocide represented a fundamental shift in how Rwandans would understand themselves and their nation. However, this transformative effect would be incomplete without tangible work and its benefits. Kagame effectively presents development as the ultimate superordinate goal; rebuilding Rwanda would be impossible without the contributions of all Rwandans, and the benefits would be shared by all. Ultimately, development in Rwanda not only results in higher standards of living and a functional state, but in widespread togetherness and unity. The next chapter explores the ways in which these national sentiments are reproduced and interpreted at a local level.

\[181\] Kagame 11/30/2011.
CHAPTER III: PARTNERSHIP AND OVERCOMING ADVERSITY IN GRASSROOTS DISCOURSE

The national level articulations of togetherness and unity through development analyzed previously are reproduced in complementary ways within discourse at a grassroots level, illustrating local commitments to partnership and development despite the traumatic events of genocide. The analysis of grassroots discourses show that in post-genocide reconstruction, (a) Rwandans are wary of imported reconciliation mechanisms – such as forgiveness and formal justice structures. Furthermore, (b) many survivors believe that future genocide can only be prevented through interethnic (and even victim-perpetrator) partnership in education and development. In planning for the future, (c) local discourses emphasize partnership and hard work in developmental projects and construct optimistic visions for Rwanda’s future despite the lingering legacies of genocide. Together, national and local discursive mechanisms are powerful indicators of the dissolution of ethnic identities, and the formation of national unity through economic development.

Hypothesis 2a: Development in place of Forgiveness

A clear trend in individual testimonies about life before, during, and after the genocide, is the observation that the end of the genocide in and of itself did not transform the lives of survivors. Indeed, life after the genocide was filled with injustices for many survivors; one man remarks, “The life of genocide survivors is not easy; we are not treated the way we should be treated. We always hear someone is dead, a genocide survivor, and another day you hear a criminal was released. That is the way we live, a criminal was released and a genocide survivor
was killed.”\textsuperscript{182} Although poverty was rampant in Rwanda before the genocide, impoverishment following the genocide is worsened by the loss of many – if not all – family members; many survivors “are traumatized when remembering that someone who had a family of ten people now is left alone.”\textsuperscript{183} Rwandans recognize that this trauma is not relievable, certainly not in the short-term. Yet, many survivors express the desire to transform themselves and communities; for one man, “We had such a very bad experience that affected our hearts and feelings that it will take us a long time to recover, but as long as we live we shall keep on working for us and teaching [our children] about how we survived this tragedy.”\textsuperscript{184}

As a result of the continuing traumas of genocide and difficulties facing survivors, many express cynicism toward the forgiveness model and, indeed, the concept of forgiveness itself. Simply, many Rwandans feel that “the word ‘forgiveness’ is a tough one.”\textsuperscript{185} For one survivor – who was 13 years old at the time of the genocide – “forgiveness is not easy. I cannot just say that I can forgive the person who took my parents away.”\textsuperscript{186} Others do not know what forgiveness should look like in practice, or who should be asking for forgiveness. One survivor claims, “There is this thing of asking forgiveness between each other and I find it bad. What are they going to ask forgiveness for? It is because they killed us!”\textsuperscript{187}

Forgiveness is made more difficult when perpetrators are left unidentified; as one survivor notes, “it is possible to forgive but you ought to know whom you are forgiving. You

\textsuperscript{182} Rutayisire 2001-2009.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} Mutezintare 2001-2009.
\textsuperscript{185} Murengezi 2001-2009.
\textsuperscript{186} Kamuronsi 2004.
\textsuperscript{187} Uwanyirigira 2007.
cannot just ‘forgive’ in general. Who is it you’re forgiving?” Adds another, “For one to be able to forgive, you first of all need to know whom you’re forgiving, you cannot forgive if you don’t know who it is you’re forgiving.” With only marginal exceptions, Rwandans overwhelmingly reject the possibility of forgiveness. One woman is unequivocal; “Forgiving is not an easy matter, and it does not even seem worth it.” Indeed, “Forgiveness is not easy and it is not something I could do on my own. […] It is something that would require that I think about it for a long time.” For many survivors, “when someone comes to me asking for forgiveness because he killed people, my people, I can only remember that they killed intentionally with all their hearts.” As these excerpts indicate, issues of forgiveness are not only largely rejected by Rwandans, but also elicit tendencies to separate Rwandans into groups of victims and perpetrators; while these classifications may be accurate, they foster division and a dichotomous vision of the Rwandan state rather than promote unity. Beyond being an incomplete and ineffective substitute for fully transformative reconciliation, pressure to ask for or provide forgiveness may ultimately exacerbate cleavages in Rwandan society, causing identities to regress to their apocalyptic states.

In addition to this general rejection of forgiveness, many survivors also feel that justice has not been achieved and that it might be impossible to actually do so. Many survivors insist that any punishment for genocidal crimes is insufficient. One man asks, “Justice? To me, it is like nothing has been done as far as justice is concerned. When you see someone who killed your

188 Murengezi 2001-2009.
190 Uwanyirigira 2007.
family members being condemned for something like five years, you know that, sooner or later, the five years will be over and then he will be released.”193 Another reiterates these sentiments; for him, “no justice has been done! What justice can be done to somebody who wiped out your children, all your family? What do you gain when they are imprisoned for five, or six or ten years? What punishment is that?”194 Indeed, survivors agree that “there is no indemnity that can replace a human.”195 The community court system – Gacaca – is controversial among Rwandans. Although some acknowledge its constructive qualities, many question if Gacaca “can really allow people to live together easily.”196 In general, “to grant pardon is not easy at all; we cannot do them any harm, but to pardon someone […] is hard.”197 Although the need for justice following atrocities like genocide is clear, the limited ability of the Rwandan state and the international tribunals to provide justice for individual suffering makes the concept of justice less realistic and desirable for Rwandan survivors.

**Hypothesis 2b: Genocide prevention through partnership**

Despite concerns with the possibility of justice and forgiveness in Rwanda, local level discourses focus heavily on preventing the genocide from occurring again. First, preserving the memory of the genocide for future generations is important for survivors. According to one survivor, “For Rwanda to avoid falling into the same problem again, the first thing is to teach people. I am happy about the work of today’s government, taking people in training camps and

197 Uwanyirigira 2007.
showing them all the consequences.”

Another remarks, “What I wish [for] the youth of tomorrow is not to live what we lived. They cannot ignore our history. Of course I cannot hide them [from] the truth.” These sentiments – and the deeper desire to prevent genocide – are explicitly linked to development in Rwanda; “rebuilding our country will help us from forgetting all the suffering that we went through. We should work hard so that our children and grandchildren don’t experience what we saw.”

Despite the atrocities witnessed and experienced during the genocide, survivors feel a commitment to work in order to prevent genocide and as a mode to remember those who died in the genocide and civil war. One woman says, “I never got to a point where I felt discouraged and didn’t want to live. I didn’t want to give up.” Others believe that no one “should forget [the victims]; it is something we have always to make sure it is not forgotten. […] Myself, I never spend a day without thinking about them. We should remember them day and night, when working and sleeping. It may help us stop from genocide happening again.

Rwandans not only express a desire to memorialize the genocide, but also take responsibility for how to prevent future atrocities; for Rwanda, remembrance is not a passive task, but an active pursuit to be accomplished through productive and coordinated action. As one man claims, “I believe that it is a privilege to be a survivor, and I believe it is a big responsibility.”

In addition to remembering the genocide, local discourses overwhelmingly emphasize the need for Rwandans to work together to prevent its recurrence. The genocide was a collective
trauma; “it is a tragedy that befell all Rwandans throughout the country.” Local discourses reveal common beliefs about the source of the genocide: self-interested behavior and dehumanization. One woman argues, “Selfishness caused the genocide. Selfishness for one’s own best interests. To avoid greed and prevent genocide, we must let ourselves come together and cultivate.” Others mention, “Tutsis were no longer human beings then. I remember how Tutsis were denied their rights as human beings. They believed they were killing something else, not human beings. I remember that thing so well and it hurts me.”

The clear antidote, then, is cooperation in development and responsibility to one another; “[the genocide] taught me respect for both my life and for other people’s lives. We are connected.” This is not to say that the transition from genocide has been or will be easy. Many Rwandans recognize that “we are not all progressing at the same level; it is not possible in this world. […] Some have managed to access a better life and some have struggled. We must help those who are less fortunate.” Indeed, “life before or even after the genocide has always been hard. Thinking about what had just happened and seeing the life I was living, we cannot be indifferent.” Despite these circumstances, Rwandans strongly assert that through awareness and coordinate effort, genocide will not recur. One man insists,

I think it is impossible. From what I see I believe it can never happen again. When I look at the way today’s youth really fights against it all and the way they really want to fight it and remember it no matter how hard it is. When we look at the consequences it had on us, and what we have done since, I don’t think it is

204 Mutezintare 2001-2009.
possible! I think it is impossible! And as we were saying, we need to do all we can for it not to happen again.\textsuperscript{210}

This perspective spans a diverse set of survivors. Even those living in difficult circumstances maintain that genocide is an unlikely recurrence in Rwanda. According to one woman, “Personally, as someone who lost everyone and is now living miserably, I believe those who killed should be strongly punished in a way that would affect them. But, I trust that the genocide will never happen again. I have the conviction that the genocide will never happen again.”\textsuperscript{211} Through a process of ‘not forgetting’ and taking responsibility to rebuild the country and teach about the genocide, Rwandan survivors remain certain that the ideologies and divisions that drove the genocide will remain in the past.

\textit{Hypothesis 2c: Rebuilding Rwanda, foregoing ethnic rivalry}

Analysis of local discourse reveals that the devastation of genocide changed the way many people lived, but also indicates a greater drive within these individuals to contribute, improve, and work across ethnic lines (or victim-perpetrator lines if necessary) to improve Rwanda as a whole. After the genocide, “We went on and started new hard lives where there is no father, no mother only you alone. We found the houses already destroyed. That is the kind of life I lived in. So, your neighbors became your family and helped you.”\textsuperscript{212} More often than not, neighborhoods were composed of both those who committed crimes and others who lost family members; for many Rwandans, “It is not easy at all for genocide survivors to live with people

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} Kamuronsi 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Umulisa 2001-2009.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Rutayisire 2001-2009.
\end{itemize}
who killed our families.” As previously discussed, forgiveness or forgetting is not an option, but integration is a reality facing many Rwandans in the years after genocide; “you can never be the same person again, your character and your whole being change. You can never forget; it is impossible!”

Excluding these options of forgiveness and forgetting, Rwandans turn to development to both take responsibility in rebuilding and as a mechanism to achieve unity. Rwandans agree, “All Rwandans should love their country and try their best to look back, condemn the mistakes of the past and try to do everything possible so that what happened does not happen again in our country.” Importantly, local discourse recognizes that development is a shared endeavor; “It is not only [my] responsibility or the government’s responsibility. All Rwandans need to understand that if we want to build a better future and to avoid what we went through in the past, we will have to work on it. Things will never happen miraculously.” Indeed, development is a responsibility felt by a variety of Rwandans; “Being a survivor is luck, yes, but it is also a big responsibility. Many Rwandans are very poor and do not even have the least necessary for life [food and a shelter]. That’s why those who have something to share need to feel responsible for the ones who do not have anything.” As another survivor expresses,

My family and Rwandans in general, I think we should all take part in all developmental activities that will help Rwandans and our country to progress. We should avoid conflicts, ethnic division because we saw how such things devastated our lives to the extent that our country became famous worldwide for using machetes, spears. But in doing this, we need to love each other.

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The frame that Rwandans should “love each other” appears in various forms in relation to rebuilding, but is noticeably absent from discourse concerning forgiveness. This originates from the idea that “for thirty years each generation was taught hatred. It will take the same amount of time for the next generations to be taught that Hutu do not have to hate the Tutsi or vise-versa. But when we grow, we don’t need hate.” Forgiveness – a one-time act – cannot capture the complexity of such entrenched divisions, and survivors of the genocide recognize this. Development, alternatively, offers productive interactions and progress. Rwandans encourage one another to embrace this challenge; “the main message I can send to Rwandans is to walk straight. Life still goes on; we were killed but we did not die. We lost a lot of ourselves. It is not easy for other people to understand our pain. Survivors shouldn't give up.” Another woman agrees that forgiveness is not an option for her, but hopes Rwanda will grow from its past. She states, “Me, I won’t forgive. Things that happened in Rwanda, […] it’s beyond your imagination. But still Rwanda needs to live. We need to live, and now it is really difficult. Let us come home and build.”

This sense of responsibility and progress that resonates in grassroots discourse leads Rwandans to embrace an optimistic vision for the future, but only if Rwandans continue to work together and collaborate to find solutions to persistent challenges. For many Rwandans, “the future will be good; my desire is to be responsible for my life and to be able to help others. Others who are poor and whose lives are worse than mine. I will be able to help them out with

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221 Karuhimbi 2001-2009.
the little I have. I believe the future will be better than the last ten years.” Development is pursued with this future in mind; “Rwandans have to […] think about the future. We only know the past; we don’t know the future. We can only work for the future, to be good. In life it is important to work for what’s ahead of us.” Repeatedly, optimism is tempered with the requirement that Rwandans work – together – for a better future. Another survivor adds, “I have faith that things will be good. I trust in a better future for our country. The future of our country will be good; but for it to be good, we will all need to work towards it. If we do not work for it, it won’t happen; but if we do, our future will be good.” In the minds of Rwandans, the link between work and progress is clear, as is the relation between working individually and collectively. Local discourse shows that working in isolation produces self-interested action. Real progress and genuine unity exists in cooperative spaces;

Rwanda is a small, beautiful country and I believe all Rwandans should learn to love each other by helping each other. We need to always remember what happened and to try and love each other and to help each other out. For all this to happen, people did not love or respect each other. Nobody respected other people’s lives. It will take a lot to make it happen as each Rwandan has his or her own problems; but if people are understanding of what challenges we go through individually, we would be able to help each other more effectively.

Conclusions

Grassroots level discourse further reveals the transformative power of development; life after genocide produced struggle and hardship for many Rwandans, leading survivors to reject forgiveness in favor of working together to rebuild the nation. Discourse in Rwanda thoroughly problematizes forgiveness. It also illustrates the powerful utility of a viable alternative.

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223 Umulisa 2001-2009.
Forgiveness is associated with Rwanda’s painful past, the tragedy of loss of family, and ethnic division; in stark contrast, development is a product (and a producer) of cooperation, togetherness, progress, and unity. Simply, for Rwandans, forgiveness is stuck in the past, while development allows them to imagine and work towards a better future. The frames that resonate with survivors – remembering the genocide, helping the less fortunate, hard work, and preventing future genocide – all integrate concepts of unity, cooperation, and concrete plans or programs for development. Similar to national discourse, local articulations suggest that Rwandans fully believe in the ability of individuals and the country as a whole to make substantive progress toward a better future. Yet, survivors recognize that this shift cannot occur without dedication, hard work, and foundations built on mutual respect.
CHAPTER IV: EXCLUDED IDENTITIES, EXCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

As local and national level discourses indicate, national unity is pursued through development programs; each are central to political rhetoric and desire expressed by survivors to build a better future for Rwanda. Through grassroots and elite visions for social and economic development, Rwandans pursue progress in a way that necessitates partnership and broad, national unity. From the resources analyzed here, it is clear that development has shaped Rwandan understandings of reconciliation in ways that culturally insensitive forgiveness models were unable to do. In effect, “Rwandan” has emerged in place of discrete ethnic identities. Yet, as the identity literature posits, inclusivity occurs only at the exclusion of an Other. I argue that the formation of a Rwandan identity through development programs at both national and local levels results in a system that excludes those who are not “Rwandan” from key development processes that allow communities to meet basic needs. To demonstrate this exclusion, I present three groups who have been determined non-Rwandan through ethnic, political, and cultural lenses. First, the historically marginalized Batwa are racially and ethnically distinct from the mainstream Rwandan identity that blurred the line between Hutu and Tutsi. Second, refugees – mainly displaced from the Democratic Republic of Congo – are not considered Rwandan in a political sense. Indeed, they are not technically ‘Rwandan’. Nevertheless, refugees compose a significant population within Rwanda and struggle to be partners in development. Instead, they are perceived as pariahs in the Rwandan state and are excluded from development programs through political justifications. Finally, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)226

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226 LGBT rights internationally typically include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and asexual populations. However, Rwandan activists and civil society utilize the rubric “LGBT”, so that is what will be used here to encompass this wider community.
community in Rwanda has been excluded from development benefits, namely key health and legal services. These individuals are not perceived to be Rwandan because same-sex relationships are not accepted as part of Rwandan culture. These three social groups compose Others within the Rwandan state, helping solidify and strengthen the national Rwandan identity. As this exploration of marginalization illustrates, all three groups have not only been excluded from mainstream development but also face further dehumanization and marginalization if they are not able to contribute to Rwandan development.

_Hypothesis 3a: The Ethnically Excluded Batwa_

Perhaps the group facing the greatest marginalization and underdevelopment challenges in Rwanda is the Batwa.\textsuperscript{227} Historically, the Batwa were the third ethnic group in Rwanda; though thought to be indigenous to the region, there are now approximately 30,000 Twa living in Rwanda – less than one percent of the total population. During the 1994 genocide, the Batwa were never fully aligned with one side or another; although Batwa advocacy groups emphasize their victimization, documentation also exists proving that certain communities of Twa were complicit in the genocide.\textsuperscript{228} However, the marginalization of the Batwa is largely because their communities are both physically and socially removed from mainstream Rwandan society.\textsuperscript{229} Generally, Batwa communities are segregated and located in rural areas with severely limited – if any – access to major cities, electricity, or plumbing. Furthermore, they report significant

\textsuperscript{227} In Kinyarwanda, “Batwa” refers to the larger socio-ethnic group, whereas Twa is used to refer to single members of that group. Simply, Batwa alludes to a group of people, and Twa is singular; each refers to people of similar and specific ethnic ancestry.

\textsuperscript{228} The advocacy group COPORWA suggests that as many as 20,000 Twa were killed during the genocide.

\textsuperscript{229} The conclusions presented here are drawn from civil society reports on two Batwa communities – one in the western province of Rwanda in the Mubuga community, and the other located just miles outside of Kigali. Each are at very different levels of development and integration, but high levels of poverty in each speak to the difficulties faced by Twa. Reports gathered from COPORWA, HDI, and AJPRODHO, 2009-2011.
stigma that prevents individuals from meeting basic needs, seeking education, and accessing health services. The position of the Batwa has been further complicated by national policies restricting the use of ethnic identities; a 2001 law prohibits segregation based on ethnicity and a 2009 law limits the use of ethnic identities in any way that could be construed as promoting genocide ideology.\(^\text{230}\) As a result, the Batwa are now legally referred to as “Potters” – a title related to their traditional profession and a categorization many reject.

The challenge posed by the question of identity to the Batwa is significant; the physical characteristics of Twa make them visibly distinct from other Rwandans, a fact that is frequently used to justify their segregation.\(^\text{231}\) Furthermore, many Twa do not consider themselves Rwandan; one representative of a Batwa community in western Rwanda remarked that they would only call themselves Rwandan when they have equal rights. The label of ‘Potter’ elicited similar resistance; the Batwa maintain that although pottery is an important aspect of their traditions and identity, it is too limiting. Much of the Batwa identity is ascriptive rather than descriptive.\(^\text{232}\) As a result, there is a broad range of labels that have been applied to the group; these designations include designations like “autochthon population,” “Batwa,” “Potters,” “Pygmies,” “former hunters and gatherers,” and “historically marginalized population.” Seemingly, these identities – particularly Batwa, Rwandan, Potter – are not pluralistic or multi-layered, but often mutually exclusive for this group.

Further identity conflicts arise when considering the tension in Rwanda between modernity and tradition; as exposed in national political discourse, Rwanda’s transformation is

\(^{230}\) AJPRODHO 2011.
\(^{231}\) Des Forges 1995; Mamdani 2001.
\(^{232}\) Berreby 2005.
explicitly linked to overcoming its past and progressing to a future. Although this transformation also includes preservation of a Rwandan culture, the genocide affected what that culture is in actuality. For the Batwa, the oppositional forces of modernity and tradition have placed them in a precarious position vis-à-vis Rwanda’s development programing; much of Rwanda’s modernization nullifies their main source of income (pottery), seeks to destroy their traditional homes (with grass roofs), and wishes to move them from land that is traditionally ‘theirs’. One political official from the Karongi district remarked that pottery is no longer a feasible profession for Rwandans because “it is impossible to become rich living that way.” The Rwandan Development Organization – a local NGO – remarked that development programs in Rwanda “do not target particular ethnic groups” because of legal limitations. Rather, they broadly aim to “build the culture and tradition of Rwanda through its goal of modernization and moving beyond traditional ways of life.” By emphasizing a break from the past, national discourse creates an environment conducive for development, but also rejects the validity of lifestyles sustained by tradition. The identity of Batwa, then, is not just about nationality; it also encompasses a deeper struggle in Rwanda between the past and the future.

Partially due to these identity differences and racial distinctions, Batwa face substantial social marginalization and stigmatization. Many Twa report being rejected by neighboring communities, ostracized during intergroup dialogue sessions, excluded from market places where they try to sell pottery, and intimidated through violence or harassment to remain confined to their villages in the forest. Many Twa children do not attend school because of the harassment and violence they face from neighbors and other children. When NGO workers asked one boy if

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233 Mayor Kayumba Bernard 2010.
234 RDO 2011.
he belonged to the Batwa community, he spat and said, “They are not human.” Although the government provides school supplies as an incentive to send children to school, such attitudes nullify these positive steps. This isolated incident is indicative of a wider trend and illuminates the challenges faced by Twa in mainstream Rwandan society. Undoubtedly, this thorough stigmatization contributes to the wider social, cultural, and economic marginalization experienced by the Batwa. As a result, the majority of the Batwa community lives isolated from the rest of the population because of extreme and chronic poverty and discrimination. Their level of income, their standards of housing, health and life are all very low.

Undeniably, the Batwa are far behind in terms of development; many Batwa communities exhibit “poverty at the most extreme level in Rwanda.” Although living standards have improved in recent years for the Batwa, select development programs pose critical challenges to the group. One such policy is bye-bye-nakatze, the removal of all homes with grass roofs. As part of its modernization regime, the Rwandan government prohibits the construction of such homes and is now in the process of destroying homes that do exist. Not only does this prevent Batwa from building the most affordable housing, but it also suggests that the few homes these communities have will be destroyed. Indeed, in one community of 23 families, only three have permanent housing. All three of these lack the steel sheeting required of the bye-bye-nakatze policy. While the local government pledges to build new houses before this destruction, such projects would often require entire Batwa communities to relocate and lose access to the limited clay and land they currently possess. Previous attempts by the government to move Batwa

235 AJPRODHO 2011.
236 COPORWA 2010.
237 HDI 2010.
238 COPORWA 2010.
communities have resulted in the group moving further into forested areas or simply refusing to leave. In response, local officials state, “The mindset of those people is a big problem. […] The government can help them, but cannot make them solvers of their own problems.”²³⁹ Such interactions “reflect the government’s apparent frustration with the community for its lack of conformity to ‘modern’ norms and ways of life.”²⁴⁰ Again, the tensions between modernity and tradition place the Batwa in a disadvantaged position while making it more difficult for government to help the population through its development programming. Indeed, development projects like bye-bye-nakatze are more destructive than constructive for the historically marginalized Batwa.

**Hypothesis 3b: The Politically Excluded Refugee Population**

While Twa compose an indigenous group that is excluded, refugees in Rwanda – largely from the Democratic Republic of Congo – are excluded on this basis of political differentiation. Although this division is accurate – refugees are not technically “Rwandan” – there is no basis for their exclusion from community development projects. Indeed, with approximately 48,000 refugees settled in three UNHCR-operated camps within the Rwandan borders, refugees are a significant group in Rwanda. The camps reflect a protracted refugee situation; the camps were built in 1996-7 under the “care and maintenance” mandate, meaning that they intend to provide for basic needs. Since this time, the camps have received large influxes of refugees in 2006 and 2009 with minimal repatriation because of continuing insecurity in the DRC. Furthermore, 60% of refugees in Rwanda are under the age of 18; many have spent the majority – if not the entirety

²³⁹ Kayumba 2011.
²⁴⁰ AJPRODHO 2011.
– of their lives within Rwanda, but are strictly regarded as foreigners coming from distinct social, economic, and cultural circumstances. Rather than being integrated into Rwandan society or development goals, refugees are largely regarded as pariahs in the Rwandan state and in local communities. Because refugee camps are specifically protected by the UN’s Refugee Declaration, UNHCR provides access to health care, education, and food; yet, there is no legal reason to exclude refugees from community building projects. Nevertheless, government officials – and many local civil society organizations – will not explicitly pursue development by or for refugees as it is “not the responsibility of the Rwandan state.”

The political categorization of refugees becomes an excuse for exclusion, and this framing is both convenient and effective. Technically, the Rwandan government is not responsible for providing education or health services to refugees; this exists under the UNHCR mandate. In fact, the attention that refugees receive from the international community is perceived to be at the expense of local Rwandans who lack educational or other opportunities. As a result, there are deepening cleavages between Rwandans and refugees – particularly with regard to youth. Addressing these conflicts provides further difficulties, as the Rwandan government often requires any projects pursued by local organizations to concentrate on advocating for repatriation rather than establishing bonds between local communities and refugee populations. Furthermore, Rwanda’s largest development organizations reify the distinctions made by the Rwandan government; “civil society organizations concerned with development provide services for Rwandans. Refugees have a different status and are thus not

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241 Kayumba 2011.
243 AJPRODHO 2011.
targeted.” In Rwanda, development is centrally concerned with building Rwanda’s culture in modernity; refugees have different cultures and traditions so these processes not seen as compatible. While refugees create initiatives within camps to “improve their lives where they can,” these efforts occur in a vacuum separate from Rwandan development projects. As a result, resources are scarce and delineations between “Rwandan” and “refugee” are hardened.

Workshops conducted involving refugee youth and members of Rwanda’s National Youth Council suggest that there are more opportunities for younger generations of refugees and Rwandans to cooperate for development, but these potential structures are still limited by lingering animosity and mutual distrust. While Rwandan youth perceive refugees as being opportunistic – and well cared-for via international organizations – young refugees largely feel removed from Rwandan society, despite the fact that many relate more to local customs and norms than those of their home country. For many, Rwanda is the only home they have known, yet their social and economic segregation from Rwanda (re)constructs their differentiation through nationality. To help overcome these divisions, youth leaders from refugee and Rwandan communities are currently partnering to build a local youth center that would be accessible by Rwandan and refugee youth. Coordinating advocacy for the center and approaching local government officials has contributed to both horizontal and vertical social capital within and among these groups. Although this indicates significant progress in refugee-Rwandan relations, it is limited to a narrow portion of these communities; older generations continue to be excluded and cleavages appear wider at this level.

244 RDO 2011.  
245 AJPRODHO 2011.  
246 NYCR 2011.  
247 Kayumba 2011.
Hypothesis 3c: The Culturally Excluded LGBT Community

In a nation that is widely respected for its gender equality programming and gender mainstreaming in development, progressive gender policies have overlooked members of the LGBT community. Unlike other central African nations, homosexuality is not criminalized in Rwanda, more LGBT persons are expressing themselves openly without retribution, and there are a growing number of services sensitive to the LGBT community. Yet enormous challenges face the LGBT community in relation to development; both homosexual acts and same-sex relationships are seen as “culturally unacceptable.” As a result, discrimination – which often takes violent forms – is rarely reported to health or law officials because of deep stigma. Such difficulties are deepened with the narrow definitions of gender that appear in the Rwandan constitution and in much of its development policies; the Rwandan definition of gender strictly refers to “traditional” male and female roles, is exclusively heteronormative, and effectively excludes LGBT sensitivity as a gendered issue to be mainstreamed in development. The same policies that advocate for the placement of women at the forefront of Rwandan development overlook other groups disadvantaged by traditionally patriarchal structures. As people outside of Rwandan culture – and the Rwandan definition of gender – members of the LGBT community remain on the periphery of development; while Rwanda modernizes, this group cannot effective access key services.

The intersection of politics, culture, and gender creates an untenable environment for the development of LGBT rights. Generally, gender in Rwanda is inextricably linked to gender

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248 HDI 2011.
249 Minister of Gender Aloisea Inyumba 2011.
equality, which is pursued through the idea of “complementarity.” Essentially, this approach to gender suggests that the term equality implies sameness; complementarity embraces the differences in sex and encourages men and women to offer their unique contributions to development. However, this conceptualization suggests that gender is dyadic, rather than dynamic; lifestyles that exist outside of heteronormative constructions do not easily fit within this model. Expressions of “Rwandan culture” further limit the integration of LGBT persons in Rwandan society and LGBT concerns in development structures. As previously mentioned, LGBT membership is not considered a part of Rwandan culture. Indeed, the Minister of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) Aloisea Inyumba remarks that “policies regarding LGBT issues [are] not addressed in the constitution because culturally they are not an issue in Rwanda. These issues are hidden by our culture, so there cannot be discrimination. The need to address LGBTI issues is non-existent.” Not only does the frame of “unacceptable” limit the ability of groups to seek services, but political elites assert that being LGBT is a “private” issue. Similar to Minister Inyumba, Rwandan parliamentarians maintain, “Laws are formed in accordance with our country’s culture, so issues of sexual orientation remain private according to the Rwandan culture. It is therefore an issue that will take time; now is not the appropriate moment.” These sentiments are reiterated throughout Rwandan society; many Rwandans believe that being Rwandan and being LGBT are mutually exclusive, leading to entrenched stigma and marginalizing LGBT positions in development.

AJPRODHO 2011.
Inyumba 2011.
HDI 2011.
Indeed, the interpreted relationship between culture, gender, and LGBT status translates to a rigid development structure vis-à-vis this marginalized group. Many politicians note a lack of systematic discrimination as reason enough to leave LGBT issues unaddressed; one notes, “Alternative family styles are not recognized, but the constitution did not discriminate and also does not recognize specific issues.” As a result, health and legal services “struggle to offer egalitarian services for LGBT people. There is a lack of sensitivity, of understanding. Because homosexuality is often associated with prostitution, the criminality of their actions is often assumed by the police.” Furthermore, the debate continues among civil society groups whether or not advocates should push for legislation that would specifically recognize the rights of the LGBT population; it is unclear if this distinction would hinder or help service providers cater to LGBT persons, given that Rwandan culture rejects this terminology altogether. Indeed, one parliamentarian remarks, “We should use the current laws, not add new ones. Currently, they protect everyone equally from discrimination.” This denial of discrimination (or any LGBT “problem”) further emphasizes the invisibility engendered by popular conceptions of Rwandan culture. Not only are members of the LGBT community outside of Rwandan culture and identity, but they are excluded from key services and development practices.

Conclusions
Ultimately, Rwanda does not embrace the same responsibility to the well-being of these ethnically, politically, and culturally marginalized groups as they express for development of Rwanda and Rwandans in general. Neglect is justified through differentiation. For Twa, their

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253 Inyumba 2011.
254 HDI 2011.
255 Ibid.
mindsets are the problem; for refugees, UNHCR is responsible for their care; and for LGBT persons, issues of discrimination do not exist because homosexuality and “alternative” lifestyles are not part of Rwandan culture. As long as the Rwandan government and Rwandans themselves continue to deny accountability for the systematic marginalization and impoverishment of minority groups, development as a cooperative process will be inherently limited – and limiting. Not only will national development remain exclusive to groups who are considered Rwandan, but it will also overlook the powerful potential for including these groups into constructive programming. Since 1994, Rwanda has exhibited enormous growth, both socially and economically. Yet, the promise demonstrated by this development ultimately lacks its most fundamental pillars: togetherness, cooperation, and mutual benefits for all.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Through my investigation of development programming, national discourse, and grassroots testimonials, I argue that the Rwandan government introduced development projects as superordinate goals that effectively superseded violent ethnic divide. National discourse emphasized togetherness, cooperation, and work for the sake of Rwanda’s transformation from decades of inequality, genocide, and divisive civil war. Furthermore, I posit that these government initiatives would be meaningless without the buy-in of the Rwandan public. Indeed, ordinary Rwandans – while expressing skepticism toward forgiveness models – embrace partnership and work as key methods of preventing future genocide and creating a brighter future for Rwanda. However, national unity pursued through development links Rwandan identity to modernization programs. As a result, these same development practices produce exclusion among groups that are not considered “Rwandan.” The creation of national identity is simultaneously produces, e.g. the Batwa minority, protracted refugees, and members of the LGBT community. Exclusion from nationality breeds impoverishment and reinforces the peripheral placement of these vulnerable populations. Ultimately, the potential for these groups to contribute to social and economic development are overlooked as exclusionary identities preclude their participation in these mainstream processes. I conclude this project by summarizing my empirical findings, providing theoretical implications, and suggesting further avenues for policy and research.
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications

In chapter 2, I investigate the major development programs in Rwanda – including housing, educational, and health initiatives. Although not exhaustive of development efforts in Rwanda, these sectors represent the government efforts to consolidate national unity and identity through community-level initiatives. National political discourse – represented by Rwandan president Paul Kagame – constructs national identity and unity through the lens of development in the aftermath of genocide. Development programming embodies a transformation of Rwanda’s past, a collective pursuit to be executed through cooperation, and a task by and for Rwandans. Essentially, unity is pursued through development, and national identity is inextricably linked to nation-building processes.

As such, political discourse in Rwanda illustrates the complex and important interconnectivity of social and economic development and identity (re)construction. Theoretical approaches to identity suggest that the Hutu discourse preceding the genocide framed ‘trauma’ as owned by Hutus and prescribed blame upon the Tutsi Other. By identifying wide swaths of Rwandan society as responsible for the systematic oppression of Hutus during colonialism, the genocidal regime effectively mobilized collective violence around a troubling collective narrative. Rather than continue this violent trend, political discourse following 1994 in Rwanda emphasized the future – rather than the past. This new focus enabled nation-building and development to be accessible by Rwandans of different ethnic heritage. In fact, the discourse necessitates the involvement of diverse groups. These components suggest that development in Rwanda is a critical superordinate goal that holds the potential to build positive intergroup relationships, trust, and create mutually shared benefits. Rather than understanding collective
trauma, nationalism, social capital, and development through distinct lenses, the case of Rwanda suggests that the integration of these concepts can better illuminate the potential of development projects in post-conflict societies. Conflict resolution is increasingly incorporating developmental approaches into its field of theory; yet, its incorporation of social and economic aspects are limited; understanding how identity transforms development – and vice versa – will be a critical task in rebuilding of deeply divided societies. Development does not merely improve livelihoods; it is a mechanism for the sustainable transformation of intergroup relationships.

The way in which development affects and is interpreted by ordinary Rwandans is explored in Chapter 3. Most critically, this examination reveals a broad rejection of forgiveness mechanisms. While development looks to the future, forgiveness undeniably dwells in the past. Furthermore, forgiveness reifies “us-versus-them” distinctions by entrenching the roles of the “victimizer” and the “victimized.” Although critiques within reconciliation literature have rightly identified external pressures to forgive as cultural imperialism,256 they fail to acknowledge the ways in which forgiveness may also exacerbate conflict and division. Rather than transform, forgiveness – particularly in the context of Rwanda – threatens to restore violently opposed identities.

However, Rwandans show remarkable agency in their rejection of forgiveness and their pursuit of development. Grassroots discourses reveal an overwhelming desire to prevent future genocide – and understandably so. Rather than concentrating on the wrongs done by genocidaires, Rwandan survivors – of Hutu and Tutsi identities – focus first and foremost on changing the intergroup dynamics that lead to genocide. Specifically, interethnic and victim-

perpetrator partnerships in education and development are fundamental components of this task. The frames that resonate with survivors – remembering the genocide, helping the less fortunate, hard work, and preventing future genocide – all integrate concepts of unity, cooperation, and concrete plans or programs for development. For Rwandans, rebuilding the nation is no passive task; it requires hard work and dedication.

Although discourse in Rwanda thoroughly problematizes forgiveness, it also illustrates the powerful utility of a viable alternative: active involvement in development. From a theoretical perspective – and supported by this empirical work – development as a mechanism to transform relationships is more useful than forgiveness. First of all, development is a long-term task, and forgiveness can be a single event. Development emphasizes sustainability and continuity, while acts of forgiveness are isolated, singular, and insufficient when attempting to address the deep wounds of genocide. Furthermore, forgiveness enacts only horizontal social capital; it is about relationships between socioeconomic peers rather than society as a whole. As theoretical approaches to trust explore, social relationships must be improved among peers and between members of different social strata for transformations to be sustained. Discourse suggests that development in Rwanda was simultaneously pursued by national elites and local people, creating vertical connections and placing responsibility for social and economic development throughout society. Together, national and local discursive mechanisms are powerful indicators of the dissolution of ethnic identities, and the formation of national unity – including the supra-identity of “Rwandan” – through development.

In the post-genocide landscape of Rwanda, development is an inclusive process structured around ideas of unity and transformation. Yet, theoretical approaches to identity argue
that the inclusivity of identity is inherently limited by basic principles of exclusion. Furthermore, an identity is strengthened by the exclusion of an Other – or of multiple Others. This process of inclusion and exclusion is remarkably clear in the case of marginalized groups in Rwanda – particularly the Batwa who are excluded on an ethnic basis, refugees who face political exclusion, and the culturally excluded members of the LGBT community. However, the othering processes which marginalize these groups and exclude them from mainstream development programs are much more complex than these delineations suggest. Often, layers of political, cultural, social, and economic exclusion overlap to enhance impoverishment and social segregation. For example, the Batwa are primarily differentiated upon their physical appearance and distinct ethnic ancestry from other Rwandans. In addition, their mode of life – traditional housing, and traditional pottery – emphasize their separation from Rwanda’s modernization. As such, Twa not only represent a separate ethnic group, they embody the past – the pre-genocide era in Rwanda, a time that Rwandans and the Rwandan government actively try to separate from the modern Rwandan state.

Development effectively, if unintentionally, creates a vicious cycle in which exclusion engenders marginalization, which engenders further exclusion. As the pre-genocide period suggests, these dynamics of exclusion – particularly when embedded in social, economic, and political structures – will not fade with time. Rather, concerted efforts from government elites and citizens are needed to transform these relationships. However, the marginalization of these populations provides evidence of a troubling aspect of the theoretical approaches to superordinate goals; this literature posits that such objectives only effectively improve intergroup relationships if the input of both groups is necessary to reach completion. The attitudes toward
these ostracized groups suggest that they are not perceived as integral to Rwanda’s development process; thus, they are excluded from both contributing to and benefiting from this programming. Indeed, with the success of Rwanda’s development project, it would appear as though Twa, refugees, and LGBT persons do not need to be integrated socially and economically for Rwanda to meet its developmental objectives. Yet, such perceptions weaken the cooperative and inclusive spirit of development in Rwanda and ultimately reinforce impoverishment and exclusion.

The conflict resolution field must better understand the ways in which the social and economic aspects of development interact, as well as their engagement at elite and grassroots levels. While Rwanda’s exact integration of nationalism and development is unlikely to be replicated in other contexts because of its distinct ethnopolitical history, other post-conflict nations undeniably face similar challenges and must confront how to transform the relationships and institutions that shaped conflict. Furthermore, the examination of political, ethnic, and cultural exclusion from development should compel theorists and practitioners to be more systematic in their assessments of why and how vulnerable groups become marginalized. In the case of Rwanda, the formation of Rwandan identity around development explains impoverishment through a more nuanced, more in-depth lens. Development must be understood socially, politically, and economically. Only through this integrative approach will theory be able to construct more thorough understandings of the intersection of conflict resolution and development and will practitioners be able to grasp the vast complexities of implementing or supporting development programs in deeply divided societies.
In Pursuit of Development: Opportunities for Future Research

Rwanda vividly portrays both the conflict resolution opportunities provided by development programming and its destructive effects. While inclusion and unity prevails for some, exclusion and discrimination dominates others. This analysis provides a necessary – and previously absent – examination of the interrelated processes of collective trauma, national identity, social capital, and development as a superordinate goal. Political and grassroots discourses illustrate the centrality of development to conflict transformation. Yet, many questions remain that this discursive analysis does not address; how do development programs themselves create unity, and foster improved vertical and horizontal relationships? What are the mechanisms that bridge deep, persistent ethnic cleavages within these projects? How can development transform oppositional identities and build peace without producing exclusion?

Although Rwanda faces many dire challenges – primarily incorporating marginalized groups in development programming – this case importantly offers optimism. Despite the worst depths of entrenched conflict, massive collective violence, unimaginable tragedies of genocide, and failed statehood, eighteen years of peace and remarkable development illustrate that powerful transformations are possible. Rwanda today is not beyond reproach, but its transformation should give reason to hope and compel peace builders to “work hard for a better future.”

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