STATE MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL COMPETITION IN HYBRID REGIMES

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By

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ABSTRACT

State mobilization strategies are a crucial yet frequently underemphasized key to explaining regime dynamics in non-democracies since the end of the cold war. Through the creation of a novel classification system and a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, this dissertation demonstrates that state mobilization strategies are a primary tool that rulers in so-called “hybrid regimes” use to ensure electoral victory. This research also shows that the specific mobilization strategy chosen matters, as certain strategies are significantly more likely than others to contribute to long-term electoral dominance. The strategies most effective in this regard are those that “crowd out” opposition voices and organizations within the public sphere and supplant them with organizations that are neutral to or supportive of the regime. This crowding out effect helps create an atmosphere where those in power are viewed as the only popular and legitimate option, while political alternatives are marginalized and starved of a critical source of strength—diverse organizational roots within society.

A real-world demonstration of how this crowding out occurs is shown through an in-depth case study of three types of social organizations in post-communist Russia. This study demonstrates that the long-term popularity and stability of Vladimir Putin’s regime is linked to the administration’s adoption of mobilization strategies that help prevent social organizations in Russia from developing a strong political rival. In 2011, these same mobilization strategies
served as an insurance policy in the face of large-scale protests: despite a drop in the regime’s popularity, protests that do not include a viable political leader are unlikely to meaningfully change the balance of power at the expense of ruling elites in the near future.
Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the help of many different people and organizations. First, I am indebted to the members of my dissertation committee for all of their time, support, and advice. I especially thank Professor Marc Howard, who has served as an indispensable mentor and advocate throughout my time at Georgetown. His constant support and willingness to spend countless hours discussing comparative measurements made this dissertation possible. Professor Harley Balzer has long served as my guide through the complexities of Russian politics, and his contacts during fieldwork as well as his sharp editorial eye contributed significantly to this project. Professor Charles King’s extensive comparative knowledge and insights into fieldwork also substantially contributed to the dissertation.

My research in Russia was made possible by a summer grant from the Harry S. Truman Good Neighbor Award Foundation. I would also like to specifically thank Samuel Greene and the Carnegie Moscow Center for providing me with an office and scholarly camaraderie while in Moscow, making my fieldwork experience significantly richer and more enjoyable than it otherwise would have been. Special thanks go to Sergei and family for opening their home to me and their generous hospitality and friendship. I am also deeply grateful for all of the representatives of social organizations in Moscow, Volgograd, and Ekaterinburg who generously gave their time to speak with me.

Many thanks are due to fellow graduate students at Georgetown whose conversations and helpful critiques greatly contributed to the project. In particular, Hamutal Bernstein, Enrique Bravo, Felipe Mantilla, Lindsay Pettingill, and Jocelyn Weiner provided helpful comments and feedback. Also thanks to all of the participants of the Georgetown Comparative Graduate
Student Workshop for their helpful critiques and advice about my dataset and results. Special thanks are due to Payam Mohseni whose friendship and collaboration on the classification of hybrid regimes is an essential cornerstone of this project.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, who inspired me to learn about other languages and cultures from an early age, my daughter, Talia, for providing me with a welcome distraction from dissertation writing, and my husband, Dan, for his love, support, incisive logic, and masterful editing skills. I dedicate this dissertation to you.
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NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

All translations in the dissertation from the Russian into English unless otherwise indicated are my own. I used the Library of Congress system of transliteration except for well-known names, i.e. Yeltsin rather than El’tsin. When quoting already transliterated texts and authors, I maintain the source’s form of transliteration.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Hearing the words “state mobilization” typically conjures visions of choreographed marches, rallies, and parades of thousands of citizens in totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. In these settings, widespread mobilization is an intended byproduct of an all-encompassing ideology that requires active citizen devotion and participation. This ideology ultimately leaves no room for alternative (i.e., non-state sponsored) forms of mobilization or organization.

With the demise of these totalitarian regimes and the end of the cold war, it has been easy for state mobilization to fall out of our sight. However, despite a lack of scholarly attention, mobilization by the state still occurs in non-democracies—albeit in a more subtle way. Indeed, modern forms of state mobilization are common in countries that combine competitive multiparty elections with authoritarian practices such as widespread media manipulation and incumbent abuse of state resources. This combination of both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule has become increasingly pronounced since the end of the cold war (Diamond, 2002), which makes it ever more important to understand how rulers in these so-called “hybrid” regimes seek to mobilize their citizens.

In this dissertation, I focus on hybrid regimes and the state mobilization strategies they employ to win elections and maintain power. I demonstrate how state mobilization strategies offer an illuminating lens with which to view and understand the competitive dynamics of hybrid regimes. A brief picture of mobilization strategies in four hybrid regimes underscores the variety of tools at the disposal of rulers to manipulate the mobilization of their citizens. It reveals the
surprising fact that regimes with no shared history and little connection have chosen to adopt similar mobilization and demobilization practices.

Since its creation in 2006 the Russian youth organization *Nashi* (“Ours”) has grabbed media attention for its large rallies and provocative anti-opposition stunts. *Nashi* is closely connected to the state and is viewed by many as a Kremlin project to target and control the mobilization of youth in support of the regime. Over 4,000 miles away in Cambodia the pro-government youth organization, the Pagoda Boys, plays a similar regime supportive role. The Pagoda Boys have become notorious in Cambodia for staging demonstrations and counter demonstrations against the opposition to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

In countries such as Venezuela pro-regime organizations have a slightly different character. In 2000 President Chávez encouraged citizens throughout the country to organize into local neighborhood groups called “Bolivarian Circles.” This effort is focused on the widespread organization and mobilization of ordinary people, especially the poor and marginalized, to promote the “Bolivarian Revolution.” Similarly, rulers in Bangladesh rely on grassroots mobilization through their links to long-standing unions and student groups. These strong organizations and ties mobilize thousands of people in demonstrations, sometimes paralyzing the capital city, Dhaka.

In addition to the two types of mobilization strategies highlighted above, these four countries share many strategies intended to demobilize certain groups or individuals. For example, rulers in each of these countries use state agencies such as security services, local police, or tax inspectors to investigate, harass, or imprison members of independent groups. They employ tactics specifically designed to restrict rallies, strikes, and public meetings of
groups that they dislike. Precise tactics vary, but typical measures include the selective denial of demonstration permits, prohibiting certain organizations from demonstrating in central locations, or the failure of police to maintain peace and order at demonstrations.

This brief snapshot of mobilization and demobilization highlights three important themes. First, there is a wide variety of strategies available to rulers of hybrid regimes in adjusting combinations of mobilization and demobilization of their citizens. Second, out of the great variety of strategies, specific combinations of strategies are common. And third, there are surprising similarities among countries located in very different world regions.

I use these insights to produce a typology of state mobilization strategies that enables cross-national as well as longitudinal comparisons. This makes it possible to examine what effect, if any, these strategies have on politics, thereby shedding greater light on the dynamics of hybrid regimes. Finally, I leverage quantitative and qualitative forms of analysis as part of a nested research design (Lieberman, 2005) to study state mobilization strategies in both a general as well as in-depth manner.

Why Should We Study State Mobilization?

In his seminal work on non-democratic regimes, Juan Linz identified political mobilization as a key dimension of regime type (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Linz argued that the extent to which a regime activates its citizens to take part in public affairs sheds light on the regime’s character by clarifying the way rulers connect with society and the role of citizens in the political process (Linz, 2000: 160). Despite Linz’s insight, as the number of highly mobilized regimes diminished in the second half of the 20th century, so too did the study of
regime based mobilization. Scholars such as Richard Snyder have recognized this deficiency and started to call for a renewed focus on the mobilization policies of non-democratic regimes, noting that the importance placed on political mobilization in countries like Venezuela demonstrates that “it would be a mistake to treat the post-cold war era as post-ideological, and hence, post-mobilizational” (Snyder, 2006: 288). Graeme Robertson (2011: 3) goes a step further, arguing that the study of mobilization in hybrid regimes is essential as rulers seek to manage politics both in elections and in the streets.

I seek to better integrate mobilization within contemporary regime studies. I do so by arguing that state mobilization strategies are central to understanding new forms of non-democratic rule such as hybrid regimes. Unlike the situation under full scale authoritarianism, competitive politics force political insiders to mobilize their supporters to win elections. At the same time, conditions such as a weak rule of law or a minimally independent press enable ruling groups to employ tactics against the political opposition that would be unacceptable in a democracy. Overall, the use of mobilization in hybrid regimes contrasts with its application in both democratic regimes (where mobilization is critical, but less likely to be abused by authorities) and authoritarian regimes (where those who rule typically depend upon a demobilized populace) (Linz, 2000). And finally in stark contrast to totalitarian regimes, the state does not hold a monopoly over the mobilization of its citizens in hybrid regimes.

Rather than looking at mobilization as a whole, however, I focus on state mobilization strategies. The burgeoning literature on hybrid regimes has stressed the importance of elite strategies in explaining regime dynamics (Case, 2006; Hale, 2005; Schedler, 2002a, 2002b, 2009b). The strategies from the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002a) are quite diverse and
range from imposing limits on civil liberties to vote buying and intimidation. The study of elite strategies is therefore a crucial starting point to better understand the dynamics of hybrid regimes. While scholars such as Schedler (Schedler, 2002a, 2002b, 2009b) and Case (2006) have analyzed the various strategies available to rulers in hybrid regimes to maintain their control over the electoral arena, not as much comparative attention has been devoted to strategies of mobilization towards social groups other than political parties.¹ This is a significant lacuna because mobilization of supporters and demobilization of opponents is one of the most important iterated games that regimes must play.

The study of state mobilization strategies is important not only for the advancement of regime studies, but it also contributes to important debates in the broader policy community. Noting the prevalence of measures to blunt the impact of democracy promotion efforts around the globe, policy makers have conducted a series of studies of the so-called “backlash against democracy assistance.” This backlash is generally identified as a series of legal as well as extra-legal tactics to inhibit the activities of democratic activists (Carothers, 2006; Freedom House, 2008; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law & National Endowment for Democracy, 2008). Despite this awareness, no framework currently exists that can predict and categorize the pressures states put on voluntary organizations across countries and over time. A cross-national framework of state mobilization strategies may therefore help NGOs, interest groups, and scholars to develop effective and potentially transnational strategies to combat repressive states’

¹ An important exception to this rule is Robertson’s (2011) work on protest in hybrid regimes. I will discuss Robertson’s framework in Chapter 3. In addition, policy orientated work has begun to examine these issues, especially in regards to civil society (see for example (Heydemann, 2007) and (Freedom House, 2008)). A scholarly cross-regional comparison that synthesizes these findings has not yet been conducted.
efforts and in this way contribute to democracy promotion.

**Argument Overview**

I analyze the mobilization strategies pursued by rulers in hybrid regimes to win elections and stay in power from 1990 to 2009. I examine if and how rulers in hybrid regimes seek to make the playing field unequal for social organizations other than political parties and the consequences that this has for political competition over time. One of the main questions animating this research is not only whether there are ways to group the myriad pressures states place on social organization across hybrid regimes to manipulate and control mobilization, but also whether certain strategies are more or less effective at producing electoral victories or even electoral dominance.

To answer these questions I first present an innovative means to identify hybrid regimes around the world. This new classification highlights the unique institutional features of hybrid regimes that distinguish them from either democratic or authoritarian multiparty regimes. I then present an original typology of state mobilization strategies by cataloguing the strategies into three overarching types: centralized, decentralized, and diffuse. A **centralized** strategy is when a government establishes or sponsors groups in key organizational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment, or labor. While certain groups are targeted for mobilization, the general purpose of this strategy is to demobilize the majority of the population except at the time of elections. In contrast, governments that adopt a **decentralized** strategy seek to mobilize large sectors of the population. The state invests in grassroots and highly participatory groups and at

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2 Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010) focus extensively on the ways that rulers in hybrid regimes make the playing field unequal for the opposition more generally defined.
the same time exerts less direct control over these organizations in comparison to the centralized strategy. Finally, states that adopt a diffuse strategy only minimally invest in either demobilization or mobilization except directly before elections.

This typology brings together insights from diverse sources into a single framework of analysis, promoting interesting and fruitful cross-national comparisons. Using this typology as a guide, I then create an original dataset of state mobilization strategies from 1990 to 2009 based on content analysis of U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House reports. I argue that the way rulers in hybrid regimes seek to mobilize as well as demobilize organized social groups sheds light on varying patterns of political competition, a key component of a hybrid regime. I maintain that the adoption of a centralized strategy reduces political competition over time. The centralized strategy is linked to decreased political competition because it “crowds out” opposition voices, organizations, and agendas within the public sphere and supplants them with organizations that are neutral to or favor the regime. This crowding out effect helps create an atmosphere where those in power are seen as the only popular and legitimate option, while alternatives are marginalized to play minor roles in public debates. Thus, the crowding out effect is potentially a key way that the regime maintains its legitimacy without resorting to large scale repression and violence.

To make these arguments, I employ a nested research design, combining statistical analysis with in-depth examination of one or a few cases in the sample (Lieberman, 2005). This research design allows me to leverage the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative forms of analysis. This design is especially suited for cross-national analysis, as it enables the study of general patterns as well as the analysis of a specific country case (Lieberman, 2005: 450).
I begin the nested research design by conducting statistical analyses of the effects of state mobilization strategies on political competition over time, and find that adopting a centralized strategy reduces political competition. The countries that pursued a centralized strategy at some point during the examined time period are Armenia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia. To elucidate the mechanism behind the statistical correlation between the adoption of a centralized strategy and decreased political competition, I conduct an in-depth analysis of Russia.

Russia was selected for a variety of reasons. First, Russia has the greatest geostrategic importance out of these countries due to its sheer size, oil wealth, military capability, and international influence. More importantly, Russia is an exemplary case for the present study because the Putin administration changed its mobilization strategy in 2001 from diffuse to centralized, and in the subsequent period, politics became less competitive. Russia therefore offers an opportunity to see the distinct effects on political competition caused by a state imposing a centralized strategy. Finally, I selected Russia for further analysis so that I might directly contribute to the considerable literature about the causes and consequences of Russia’s failed democratization (Aslund, 2007; Steven Fish, 2005; McFaul, 2001).

Preliminary Definitions of Key Concepts

*Hybrid Regimes*

In response to the complexities of democratization during the third wave, scholars created a host of new terms to classify so called “hybrid” regimes that display elements of both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule. In the 1990s scholars stressed the democratic nature of these regimes, producing the trend commonly referred to as “democracy with adjectives” (D.
Collier & Levitsky, 1997). A few examples are “semi-democracy” (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1988) and “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997). More recently, scholars have shifted their focus to the non-democratic aspect of rule in hybrid regimes, creating instead “authoritarianism with adjectives.” Examples include “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002a, 2006a) and “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010).

In this dissertation I provide an in-depth conceptual analysis of hybrid regime concepts, demonstrating that there is much conceptual fog surrounding the definition of a hybrid regime. Building on the work of classic regime studies as well as innovations from more recent literature, this dissertation offers a new classification of hybrid regimes that clarifies a key site of conceptual confusion—the boundary between authoritarian and non-authoritarian multiparty regimes. This effort is part of an on-going project with Payam Mohseni (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011).

Building on the work of Juan Linz, my perspective is rooted in a multi-dimensional understanding of regimes. This perspective accounts for a variety of regime types based on differences in kind rather than degree. Thus, rather than placing regimes on a single continuum from authoritarianism to democracy, my configurative approach provides scholars with an alternative view of political systems by highlighting the multiple dimensions of regimes.

I propose that competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference constitute the three main axes by which contemporary multiparty regimes can be most clearly and effectively classified. These dimensions are based on my conceptual analysis of the relation of hybrid regimes to both democracy and authoritarianism in the extant literature, a topic I cover at length in Chapter 2.
Hybrid regimes are those that hold competitive multiparty elections for the executive and legislature, but have either poor civil liberties, an unelected reserved domain of power that is actively engaged in politics, or both—thereby disqualifying them from being classified as a democracy. Despite low civil liberties or tutelary interference common in authoritarian regimes, hybrids are distinct from their authoritarian counterparts because they hold competitive multiparty elections. Competitiveness is a crucial indicator that distinguishes hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones, and as such, is identified as a defining attribute of a hybrid regime (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002a). I therefore regard those regimes with competitive multiparty elections to have “elections as a regime dimension.” In other words, elections play an important role in the distribution of power. In contrast, in those regimes that hold uncompetitive multiparty elections, the electoral arena does not play an important role in the distribution of power. Rather, elections are a means by which rulers ensure their own survival. These regimes can be considered to have “elections as a strategy.”

I argue that there are three different types of hybrid regimes. While all three types are similar in that they hold competitive elections, they differ based on their particular arrangement of nondemocratic attributes, such as low civil liberties and/or tutelary institutions. The most common type is the “illiberal hybrid regime.” Illiberal hybrid regimes are those that have competitive elections, low civil liberties, and low tutelary interference, if any. Examples from different world regions include Croatia, Peru, and Madagascar in the 1990s. In contrast, “tutelary hybrid regimes” are those that have competitive elections, high civil liberties, but also

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3 Tutelary bodies, or reserved domains of power, refer to non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities that engage in politics.
4 Elections in the USSR are a classic example of this strategy.
have high tutelary interference. Chile in the 1990s is a classic example of this type. Finally, “illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes” have competitive elections, low civil liberties, and high tutelary interference. Examples of this type at different points in the post-cold war era are Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey.

Table 1-1: Hybrid Regimes 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illiberal Hybrid Regime</th>
<th>Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime</th>
<th>Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1995-1999)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania (1990-1993)</td>
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<td>Russia (1991-2009)</td>
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<td>Slovakia (1993-1997)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Sri Lanka (1990-2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela (1999-2009)</td>
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In making these determinations, elections are considered competitive if they result in at least one presidential or legislative turnover during a period of four multiparty electoral cycles. A country has poor protection of civil liberties if it receives a 4 or greater on Freedom House’s
(1990-2010) annual civil liberties score. Utilizing Samuel Fitch’s (1998) typology of civil-military relations, a country is classified as having either low or no degree of tutelary interference if non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities do not participate actively in the policy-making process.

Although there are three types of hybrid regimes, the focus of this dissertation is limited to the most common of the three—illiberal hybrid regimes. This is because state mobilization strategies are likely very different in countries with tutelary institutions due to the role of ideology and the diversity of regime insiders who have the potential to conduct mobilization.

**Typology of State Mobilization Strategies**

State mobilization strategies can be observed based on what government actors say and the policies they pursue. To make sense of the large array of strategies, I draw on Henry Hale’s (2002) discussion of statist and liberal conceptions of state-society relations to formulate overarching strategy types. The first type is a *centralized* strategy and it follows a highly statist version of state-society relations. The state initiates organization and encourages moderate participation within specified, albeit often changing parameters. In order to control and manage mobilization, the state will generally establish or sponsor groups in key organizational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment, or labor. It may even create pro-government civil

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5 Certainly governments may pursue policies that are opposed to the content of their rhetoric. In the case of conflict, emphasis will be placed on what governments actually do.
6 According to Hale’s (2002: 307, 309) characterization of the statist version of state-society relations, the state takes on an active and protectionist role vis-à-vis society. This model places a premium on order, but risks falling into tyranny.
7 This insight is drawn from Harley Balzer’s (2003) discussion of “managed pluralism.” Managed pluralism refers to the state’s encouragement as well as constraining of societal and organizational diversity within constantly shifting boundaries (Balzer, 2003: 190). The concepts of managed pluralism and the centralized strategy share many features; however, they differ in terms of their application. For example, Balzer argues that managed pluralism is not only a form of state-society relations, but also a type of hybrid regime.
society oversight bodies or councils. While certain groups are targeted for mobilization, the centralized strategy’s general purpose is to demobilize the majority of the population except at the time of elections. Groups targeted for demobilization are those that have been outspokenly critical of the regime and/or work in sensitive policy areas. Policies of demobilization include enacting burdensome regulations on independent organizations or employing media resources to paint independent organizations as unpatriotic or the tools of western governments. In some cases, ruling groups direct state agencies to harass independent groups or individuals. Examples of this strategy type include Russia under Vladimir Putin and Cambodia under Hun Sen.

In contrast, a *decentralized* strategy of mobilization follows a more liberal state-society model. In this case, the state invests in grassroots and highly participatory groups. It frequently draws on or forges alliances with the leadership of existing organized social groups to turn out at elections and demonstrations on behalf of the regime. Therefore semi-autonomous, rather than controlled mobilization characterizes this strategy type. Demobilization techniques consist mainly of unflattering media coverage of opposition groups, but unlike the centralized strategy, states do not set up elaborate legal hurdles or restrictions on organizations. Thus, while some groups that are openly critical of the regime and work in sensitive policy areas are targeted for demobilization, the decentralized strategy generally tilts in the direction of widespread mobilization. Examples include Venezuela under Chavez, Bangladesh during the 1990s, and Sri Lanka.

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8 This includes actively demobilizing mobilized citizens and maintaining the demobilization of demobilized citizens. 9 According to Hale’s (2002: 307-308) characterization, the independence of society vis-à-vis the state is the defining element of a liberal version of state-society relations. As such, the state should provide only minimal institutional guarantees to enable non-state organizations to operate. This model places a premium on freedom while running the risk of anarchy.
The third type is a *diffuse* strategy. Overall, the state invests minimally in either demobilization or mobilization except directly before elections. In this case, the media is often the primary tool for mobilization or promises of patronage via coalitions formed with already existing social organizations. Government neglect rather than formal institutional or legal rules creates barriers for independent organization. On the whole, ruling groups do little to systematically encourage widespread organization in support of the regime. Therefore, in comparison to the other two strategies, this type is reactive, rather than proactive in its policy orientation. Examples include Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia in the 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-1: State Mobilization Strategies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controlled Mobilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized: High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralized: Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffuse: Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-Autonomous Mobilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized: Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized: High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffuse: Med/Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demobilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized: High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized: Med</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffuse: Low</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In Chapter 3, I discuss these strategies at length, including the particular policies that make up each, but for now it is important to establish a broad characterization of each strategy type in the typology. If a state pursues a *centralized strategy*, there is a high likelihood the state will establish and fund voluntary organizations or movements. In other words, we would expect that government sponsored organizations exist in multiple organizational spheres and that these organizations have a relatively high profile in the country given its general organizational environment. In this way, it is expected that there will be high controlled mobilization. In
addition, it is expected that controlled mobilization will be combined with multiple measures to
demobilize the rest of the population.

In contrast, states that pursue a decentralized strategy are more likely to initiate the
creation of local voluntary organizations and forge alliances with existing social groups. Here it
is expected that there is a high level of semi-autonomous mobilization and low levels of
controlled mobilization. Third, states that pursue a diffuse strategy are unlikely to undertake any
of these policies. Therefore it is expected that they will have low levels of controlled and semi-
autonomous mobilization as well as demobilization. Overall, Table 2-1 represents a novel way
to typologize the myriad mobilization strategies employed by hybrid regimes around the world.
This framework allows scholars and policymakers to systematically analyze state mobilization
strategies in countries in different world regions, as well as assess various trends over time. In
this way, and as I will detail more fully in Chapter 3, the typology sheds further light on the
theoretical literature on hybrid regimes, the literature on contentious politics, country specific
scholarly analyses, policy briefs, and country reports on these issues.

The Puzzle: Explaining the Effects of State Mobilization Strategies

As stated previously, competition is one of the defining attributes of a hybrid regime
(Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002a). At the heart of this concept is
the understanding that competitive multiparty elections produce a qualitatively different type of
regime than one with uncompetitive multiparty elections. When elections are competitive, they
play an important role in the distribution of power. In contrast, in regimes with uncompetitive
multiparty elections, mechanisms other than elections distribute power and the possibility for
change in the status quo through electoral processes is severely curtailed. Understanding patterns of interparty competition within hybrid regimes, especially understanding how some rulers are able to produce strong electoral victories over time while others do not, illuminates a key part of these regimes’ general political dynamic and their prospects for a transition to either democracy or authoritarianism.

How might mobilization strategy and interparty political competition be linked? Do mobilization strategies differentially impact competition over time? These questions are best answered by utilizing a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. I employ descriptive statistics and regression analysis to assess general trends of state mobilization strategies and political competition from 1990 to 2009. This analysis is based on an original dataset of state mobilization strategies formed from content analysis of U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House reports. I find that the mobilization strategy chosen has a significant effect on the margin of victory in presidential elections, but not in legislative elections. Specifically, the centralized strategy is associated with larger margins of victory in comparison to the decentralized or diffuse strategy. The centralized strategy provides significant support to rulers’ “friends,” while at the same time making it more difficult for their “enemies” to mobilize their ranks. The centralized strategy is thus an effective tool of power.

I then focus on Russia for in-depth analysis to determine how the centralized strategy is linked with decreased competition. I find that the centralized strategy is linked to decreased political competition because it “crowds out” opposition voices, organizations, and agendas within the public sphere and supplants them with groups that are either neutral to or in favor of the regime. This “crowding out” effect minimizes the possibility of a popular alternative
developing in a grassroots fashion that could later challenge rulers in the electoral arena. Put in the Russian context, Vladimir Putin enjoys great popularity among Russians not only because he is seen to have brought relative stability and prosperity, but also because his administration and/or the Putin/Medvedev tandem has pursued policies which ensure that a popular alternative will not arise from society to challenge him. Thus, the crowding-out effect is potentially a key way that the regime maintains its legitimacy without resorting to large-scale repression and violence. If there is a drop in popularity, as occurred as a result of alleged electoral fraud during the 2011 parliamentary elections, the centralized strategy can serve as an insurance policy against electoral defeat even in the face of large protests. Protests without a viable leader who can serve as an alternative in the electoral realm will likely not fundamentally challenge the balance of power at the expense of ruling elites in the near future.

My research on Russia further demonstrates that the “crowding out” effect occurs in four main ways. First, independent and critical groups are forced out of the public sphere by government policies that make it harder for them to operate. Second, government policies prevent groups critical of the regime from effectively advocating their positions in public spaces, such as street demonstrations and the news media. Third, critical groups are crowded out by organizations established or funded by the state that have similar stated purposes, but are either neutral or loyal to the regime. States grant these pro-regime groups significant funding and publicity, which these groups then use to appropriate the agendas (and in some cases even the memberships) of independent groups and thereby dominate the public arena. Fourth, the regime often co-opts neutral groups by offering them additional funding or influence as long as they either become or remain openly uncritical of the regime. This action contributes to the crowding
out effect as it minimizes the number of groups available for mobilization against the regime: whereas previously these groups may have joined opposition mobilization, they are now unlikely to do so based on their ties to the government and reliance on government financing.

These conclusions about state mobilization in Russia result from my analysis of fifty-eight in-person interviews that I conducted with representatives of social organizations in three Russian cities: Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and Volgograd. These cities were selected based on M. Steven Fish’s (1995) methodology in his study of democratic mobilization in Russia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In terms of organizations, I selected groups for analysis that work on three different issue areas: human rights, women, and youth. I provide an in-depth discussion of the three types of groups as well as the reasoning for their inclusion in Chapter 5, but generally I selected these groups based on the varying degree of threat that they pose to the regime. Organizations, such as human rights groups, which advocate issues that are considered to be politically sensitive, may experience greater interference from the authorities than groups that work on politically safe or neutral topics. Therefore, to more completely analyze the effects of Putin’s policies towards social organizations, I examine threatening as well as non-threatening types of organizations. The fieldwork in Russia is an essential part of the present study, as it allowed me verify hypotheses and leverage in-depth knowledge of a particular case to shed light on the general pattern observed in the cross-national analysis.

Overall, my research illustrates how some hybrid regimes need not resort to overt forms of repression to become less competitive over time. While certain tactics described in this dissertation may overlap with those utilized by some authoritarian regimes, the typology of state

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10 I conducted an additional ten expert interviews.
mobilization strategies as well as the broader argument about political competition applies specifically to countries that have at one time or another been hybrid. Notably, this dissertation is not intended to provide a theory of state mobilization strategies that extends beyond the hybrid type, as I fully expect that a different set of state mobilization strategies would be available to rulers in different types of regimes. This is because the space of permissible state involvement in other types of regimes such as democracies varies quite substantially. As stated previously, the use of mobilization in hybrid regimes contrasts to its application in both democratic regimes (where mobilization is critical, but less likely to be abused by authorities) and authoritarian regimes (where those who rule typically depend upon a demobilized populace) (Linz, 2000).

That said, there is significant overlap in terms of the demobilization tactics used by both hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It is not without reason that scholars in the twentieth century have stressed the authoritarian nature of hybrid regimes, as they are for the most part illiberal.\(^\text{11}\) In addition, there is increasing documentation of authoritarian learning across state boundaries and time. Savvy rulers look to neighboring countries or their own past experiences to devise ways to update or modernize their repressive techniques so that they appear less overtly coercive (Beissinger, 2007; Carothers, 2006; Heydemann, 2007). To be sure, there are international pressures on both hybrid and authoritarian regimes to maintain a veneer of democracy, no matter how thin or thick that veneer may be.

\(^{11}\) The liberal tutelary hybrid regime is the least common type of hybrid regime in my classification.
Plan of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I present an in-depth discussion of the classification of hybrid regimes used in this dissertation. As such, I appraise the state of the field on hybrid regimes by depicting the tensions and blurred boundaries of democracy and authoritarianism “with adjectives.” I then detail how a configurative approach helps alleviate much of the conceptual confusion in the literature and provides a useful way to measure and integrate hybrid regimes into our classificatory schemes.

In Chapter 3, I focus on the typology of state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes. I fully outline the specific policies associated with each strategy type and introduce a cross-national dataset of state mobilization strategies. This data set includes 25 countries from 1990 to 2009. I conclude this chapter with descriptive statistics of overarching trends as well as different components of state mobilization strategies across countries and time.

In Chapter 4, I present the statistical analysis of state mobilization strategies and political competition from 1990 to 2009. The statistical analysis includes important variables from comparative politics considered integral for explaining levels of political competition. I demonstrate in this chapter that the mobilization strategy chosen has a significant effect on the margin of victory in presidential elections, but not in legislative elections. Specifically, the centralized strategy is associated with larger margins of victory in comparison to the decentralized or diffuse strategy.

It is well documented that statistical analysis is best attuned to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship rather than the process or means by which that relationship exists (Brady & Collier, 2004; George & Bennett, 2004). Therefore, in Chapter 5 I delve into a qualitative
analysis of post-communist Russia to examine the causal link between the centralized strategy and decreased political competition. I draw on 58 in-depth interviews I conducted in 2009 with representatives of youth, women, and human rights organizations in three Russian cities.

In the final chapter of the dissertation I explore the broader implications of the typology of state mobilization strategies. I explain how the findings of the dissertation contribute to the literature on hybrid regimes, democratization, and post-communist politics. I also detail the broader implications that the dissertation has for the policy community and the study of efforts to minimize the impact of democracy promotion. Finally, I conclude my study of state mobilization strategies by speculating about the future evolution of repressive techniques to blunt transformative mobilization as a result of the color revolutions and the recent popular upheavals in the Middle East.

In sum, in this dissertation I examine the ways rulers attempt to manipulate mobilization by making the playing field unequal for some social groups and organizations. I ultimately find that the type of strategies rulers employ have far reaching effects on political competition because of the close interrelation between the realm of social organizations (civil society) and political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). When independent or critical organizations are effectively marginalized it makes it very difficult for opposition political movements to have a popular basis in society and thus to serve as a viable alternative to the ruling regime. In this situation, ad-hoc protest may be the opposition’s only choice.
CHAPTER 2

Conceptualizing and Defining Hybrid Regimes

Defining the often “blurred” and “imperfect” boundary between democratic and non-democratic regimes has never been easy (Diamond, et al., 1988), but this task has become even more difficult after the end of the cold war. An unprecedented number of countries began holding multiparty elections around the world, but at the same time these elections have taken place in an atmosphere skewed by authoritarian practices such as widespread media manipulation, incumbent abuse of state resources, or vote fraud. The “hybrid” nature of these new political systems has perplexed scholars, producing a number of competing concepts and definitions of political regimes, leading to what some have called the “babel of democratization studies” (Armony & Schamis, 2005).

The sheer number of competing concepts of hybrid regimes and general confusion about their empirical classification makes it essential to thoroughly examine and explain my understanding of hybrid regimes and how they differ from their democratic or fully authoritarian counterparts before it is possible to analyze the state mobilization strategies of hybrid regimes or examine their impact on political competition over time. This chapter therefore serves as the conceptual foundation for my wider study of state mobilization strategies and political competition.

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12 Terry Lynn Karl (1995) introduced the term “hybrid regime” to refer to a state that contains both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule. This chapter uses the concept of “hybrid regime” to highlight the multiple ways in which regime attributes can be configured. The term serves as a general frame of reference to discuss work dealing with regimes that cannot be easily classified as full instances of authoritarianism or democracy. Thus, the notion of “hybrid regime” will be applied to work that may not explicitly use or acknowledge the term.
I begin this chapter by providing an in-depth analysis of hybrid regimes concepts in the democratization literature since the end of the cold war. While in the 1990s the boundary between democratic and hybrid regimes posed the greatest challenges to scholars, today confusion stems from the blurred boundary between hybrid and full scale authoritarian regimes. The conceptual confusion in the hybrid regime literature must be addressed because the cases one selects and the attributes they contain are critical for both causal theory and policy formulation. I then focus on an important source of conceptual confusion identified in the analysis: the overarching concept of electoral and non-electoral regimes. To bring greater clarity to classificatory schemes, I argue for a shift in the definition of an electoral regime from one that simply holds multiparty elections to one that holds competitive multiparty elections. I discuss how and why this re-definition emphasizes as well as systematizes the conceptual space that hybrid regimes occupy.

Building from the analysis of hybrid regime concepts, I then show a new way to conceptualize and empirically classify hybrid regimes. This is part of an on-going project with Payam Mohseni (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011) to develop an innovative means for conceptualizing and ordering regime types using a configurative approach. Rather than place regimes on a single continuum from authoritarianism to democracy, a configurative approach provides scholars with an alternative view of political systems by highlighting the multiple dimensions of regimes. Building on the findings from the chapter’s conceptual literature review, competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference constitute the three main axes by which contemporary regimes can be most clearly and effectively classified. While it would be ideal to

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13 The majority of material in this chapter was previously published as (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011).
have dimensions that can classify all regimes, the possible combinations of these three dimensions provide a nuanced framework for mapping the relationship between multiparty regimes and for clarifying and organizing the conceptual space for hybrid regimes. To conclude the chapter, I propose a method of measurement of hybrid regimes and present a list of all hybrid regimes in the world between 1990 and 2009 using this method. I also discuss preliminary cross-national trends and comparisons.

Overall, I present a configurative approach to classify multiparty regimes that both builds and improves upon previous classification systems in a variety of ways. First, the new classification system is constructed from a theoretically rigorous analysis of classical and contemporary regime concepts. Thus, the resultant classification better systematizes the meaning of hybrid regimes than previous measures by relieving a key source of conceptual confusion about the definitional boundary of a hybrid regime. Second, many existing cross-national measures of hybrid regimes do not account for the multiple dimensions of regime types. In comparison, a multi-dimensional view provides a fuller understanding of the relationship of regimes to one another and better clarifies the field of hybrid regimes. Finally, the concepts formed through a configurative approach are well suited for the formulation and testing of causal theory because of the stress this method places on the variety of institutional features that cut across a variety of regime types.

A Conceptual Map of the Hybrid Regime Field

Since the end of the cold war, hybrid regimes have been defined and measured in a number of conflicting ways. The resulting confusion is not necessarily a product of any one
individual’s work, as many scholars are quite clear, explicit, and consistent in the concepts they employ. Rather, it is the absence of a standardized conceptualization among scholars that creates difficulties for the field (Armony & Schamis, 2005; Munck, 2001).

In order to make sense out of the large array of concepts, I analyze the two dominant approaches to the classification of hybrid regimes: variants of democracy or authoritarianism. The central aim of this review is to present a conceptual map of the current state of the field. This map, including visual diagrams of popular regime concepts, demonstrates that current classifications now have the problem of authoritarianism with adjectives in addition to democracy with adjectives. Notably, this conceptual map will form the basis for my argument in the proceeding section that identifies the electoral regime concept as a major source of conceptual confusion.

Conceptual disagreements have been at the heart of the hybrid regime literature, defining the fault line between diminished subtypes of democracy and diminished subtypes of authoritarianism. In the 1990’s, scholars most commonly classified hybrid regimes as diminished subtypes of democracy as a response to the complexities of democratization during the third wave. The dominant trend of classifying hybrid regimes changed course after the new millennium by favoring diminished subtypes of authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Ottaway, 2003; Schedler, 2002a, 2006b). Thus, while the first approach

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14 Another approach of regime classification differs substantially from the first two by giving hybrid regimes neither a democratic nor an authoritarian label. Examples of this approach include concepts such as “hybrid regime,” “managed pluralism,” and “liberalized autocracy.” See Karl (1995); Balzer (2003); Brumberg (1995). It is interesting to note that Balzer and Brumberg’s concepts refer to uncompetitive multiparty regimes and Karl’s to competitive multiparty regimes. While Morlino (2009) uses the term democracy in her conceptualization of a hybrid regime, she argues uniquely that the prior regime type of a hybrid regime is essential to its classification.

15 A diminished subtype is a concept that does not meet the full definitional requirements of a root concept as it lacks “one or more of its defining attributes” (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997: 438).
stresses the democratic nature of hybrid regimes, the second emphasizes their authoritarian form of rule despite the “guise” of democratic institutions.

Different and conflicting definitions of hybrid regimes, however, persist within each approach. Both include concepts with broad and narrow intensions\(^\text{16}\) that overlap at multiple discrepant points. I begin with the diminished democracy approach. Examples include widely divergent concepts such as Zakaria’s (1997) “illiberal democracy” and Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s (1988) “semi-democracy.” Zakaria’s concept of “illiberal democracy” refers to regimes that combine the adult franchise and multiparty elections with a failure to protect civil liberties. Because the definition of illiberal democracy does not have many attributes, its extension is broad from “modest offenders like Argentina to near tyrannies like Kazakhstan or Belarus” (23).\(^\text{17}\) In comparison, Diamond et al.’s concept of “semi-democracy” includes a greater number of attributes such as competitive elections and the effective power of elected officials.\(^\text{18}\) The cases Diamond et al. label semi-democracies comprise only a small proportion of Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy” category. These two examples are reflective of the larger conceptual confusion and boundary fuzziness of the diminished democracy approach, a topic that has been well documented (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997).

\(^{16}\) The most basic way to compare and analyze concepts is to focus on their intension and extension. The intension of a concept refers to its defining attributes, while the extension of a concept indicates the breadth of empirical cases to which it applies. As we increase the intension of a concept (number of attributes), we decrease its extension (number of empirical cases) (Goertz, 2006: 10).

\(^{17}\) Other similarly broad categories include terms such as “weak democracy” and “partial democracy.” See Carothers (2002: 10).

\(^{18}\) Semi-democracies are: “those countries where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of election so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; and/or civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves” (Diamond, et al., 1988: xvii).
While the shift to authoritarianism sought to alleviate conceptual confusion, conflicting definitions of hybrid regimes persist. As examples, I compare Levitsky and Way’s (2002, 2010) “competitive authoritarianism” and Schedler’s (2002a, 2006b) “electoral authoritarianism.” Despite these scholars’ contribution to standardizing the fine line between democracy and nondemocracy, they disagree on the boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes. According to Levitsky and Way (2010: 5), competitive authoritarian regimes regularly hold inclusive, competitive elections that occur on an uneven playing field, i.e. “competition is real but unfair.” Schedler’s concept of electoral authoritarian regimes is similar, but has a much thinner intension and broader extension. As in competitive authoritarian regimes, elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are unfree or unfair. These regimes need not be competitive in the sense described by Levitsky and Way; instead they need only allow multiparty elections for the executive or legislature (Schedler, 2002a: 47; 2006b: 5; Way, 2004: 146-147). For example, many of the regimes Schedler considers to be hybrid regimes, such as Egypt, Singapore, and Kazakhstan, are deemed full-scale authoritarian by Levitsky and Way (2002: 54). These examples highlight the general fact that there is still considerable debate about the definition of a hybrid regime and its conceptual boundary with authoritarianism.

19 Ottaway’s (2003) concept of “semi-authoritarianism” is similarly broad.
20 This variation is not only limited to these three states. A comparison of country lists reveals the following potential examples: Burkina Faso, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia. See Schedler (2002a: 47); Diamond (2002: 34-35); Levitsky and Way (2006: 213). These differences have not disappeared over time. For example, Levitsky and Way (2010) specifically mention Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan as cases of electoral authoritarianism, but not competitive authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010: 16) explicitly state that their conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism is more restrictive than Schedler’s.
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Map of the Current Field of Regime Types

Figure 2-1 presents a conceptual map, arranging regime concepts relative to one another on a spectrum from democracy to authoritarianism. Diamond’s (2002) regime typology serves as the foundation for the spectrum. The regimes located below Diamond’s classification are those analyzed in this section. I place them relative to the spectrum based on their conceptual intensions. Looking at the figure, it becomes evident that electoral authoritarianism can capture both the hegemonic electoral authoritarian and the competitive authoritarian type, while illiberal democracy spans from electoral democracy all the way to the hegemonic electoral authoritarian type. Furthermore, each approach includes concepts with broad and narrow intensions that overlap at multiple discrepant points. Competitive authoritarianism is narrow, while electoral authoritarianism is broad; semi-democracy is narrow, while illiberal democracy is broad.

21 Generally, Diamond’s regimes have the following definitions (for more nuanced definitions see Diamond (2002: 29-33)): Closed Authoritarian regimes do not hold multiparty elections; Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian regimes hold uncompetitive multiparty elections that are not free or fair; Competitive Authoritarian Regimes hold competitive, albeit unfair or un-free multiparty elections; Electoral Democracy holds free and fair multiparty elections although civil liberties are not fully protected and enforced; Liberal Democracies hold free and fair multiparty elections and broadly protect civil liberties. We exclude his residual category of ambiguous regimes.
Overall, Figure 2-1 demonstrates that, regardless of the approach taken thus far, the blurred boundaries of hybrid regimes persist. This situation has resulted in authoritarianism with adjectives in addition to democracy with adjectives, creating a number of problems for the field. Scholars are in disagreement about how authoritarian a hybrid regime can be, as some equate multiparty elections with a hybrid form of rule, while others do not. Should countries such as Kazakhstan and Singapore be considered hybrid regimes, as characterized by Schedler? Or, should they be viewed as full instances of authoritarianism, as argued by Levitsky and Way? These questions highlight the fragmented nature of the field, posing obstacles for the accumulation of knowledge. Stated differently, it is difficult to evaluate causal claims based on diverse conceptualizations of hybrid regimes. In addition, since regime classifications have important policy implications, problematic conceptualizations can impede proper policy decisions and jeopardize expected outcomes. Consequently, there is a need to more fully standardize the relationship between regime types, as the cases one selects and the attributes they contain are critical for both causal theory and policy formulation.

**Conceptualizing Electoral and Non-Electoral Regimes**

Drawing on Sartori’s (1970) ladder of abstraction, this chapter conducts a multi-level analysis of regime types that builds on the conceptual map in the prior section. This analysis reveals a major source of conceptual confusion within regime classification, and I subsequently propose a useful remedy. I argue that the current definition of an electoral regime prevents the drawing of a clear boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes since many deem the

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22 On the point of fragmented knowledge, see Brownlee (2007: 27).
presence of multiparty elections as an indicator of a hybrid regime. However, multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge existing classifications of authoritarian regimes. Instead, *competitive* multiparty elections that take place in a nondemocratic context do, and their presence is a helpful way to define an electoral regime in order to separate hybrid regimes from their authoritarian (non-electoral) counterparts.

A multi-level analysis of regimes allows greater attention to be placed on the concept of an electoral regime, a concept that has been infrequently discussed in the literature. Electoral and non-electoral regimes are meta-level concepts that organize and distinguish lower-tiered regime concepts. The presence of multiparty elections is the defining factor of an electoral regime. For example, the Soviet Union was *not* an electoral regime because it did not hold multiparty elections. Instead it was a non-electoral regime, or a regime that does not hold elections or only holds single party elections. Figure 2-2 illustrates how electoral and non-electoral regimes structure and organize the root level concepts of democracy and authoritarianism as well as their respective subtypes in the field today.

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23 Collier and Levitsky (1997: 449) write that the most general and overarching level of a concept is the meta-level, followed by the root and then the subtype. For example, the concept “blue” is at the root level, whereas “color” is at the meta-level. A possible subtype of “blue” is “navy blue.”
Figure 2-2 reveals that the electoral regime level is the cause of much of the conceptual confusion about authoritarianism. The current definition of an electoral regime prevents the drawing of a clear boundary between authoritarianism and hybrid regimes, creating tension within the authoritarian type as depicted in Figure 2-2. When looking at the figure, we see that democracy and its respective subtypes conceptually refer up the ladder of generality to the electoral regime category. This is because these regimes all hold multiparty elections. In contrast, authoritarianism and its subtypes refer up the ladder of generality to both the electoral and non-electoral regime categories, as some hold multiparty elections whereas others do not.
For example, some authoritarian regimes, such as Belarus, can be electoral regimes and others, such as Syria, can be non-electoral regimes.

I argue that the current definition of an electoral regime is not useful for present day classification. This outdated definition is the precise source of the implicit conceptual tension detected within the authoritarian type. First, after the end of the cold war, there has been an unprecedented expansion in the number of countries that hold multiparty elections. As a result, the distinction between electoral and non-electoral regimes has come to produce less and less meaningful differentiation over time as both democratic and nondemocratic multiparty regimes have become common. Second, the current definition of an electoral regime only obfuscates the fact that multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge existing classifications of authoritarian regimes. While some see the presence of multiparty elections as an indicator of a hybrid regime, other scholars have astutely pointed out that Linz’s definition of authoritarianism accounts for multiparty elections and limited levels of pluralism (Armony & Schamis, 2005: 122-124; Brownlee, 2007: 26; Diamond, 2002: 24; Snyder, 2006: 227-228).

A brief analysis of the Egyptian political system prior to the ousting of President Mubarak in the wake of popular protests in 2011 illustrates the continued relevance of Linz’s definition of authoritarianism. Many scholars have classified Mubarak’s Egypt as a hybrid regime because of the emergence of multiparty elections in the 1970s (Ottaway, 2003; Schedler, 2006b). Yet these elections were never competitive. The National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling hegemonic party, had monopolized the executive and legislature for decades. While opposition parties and movements, including the officially banned Muslim Brotherhood, were

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24 Linz (2000: 159) defines authoritarianism as a regime with limited levels of pluralism, a mentality rather than ideology, weak political mobilization, and a relatively unrestrained leadership.
given limited space in the electoral arena, they never threatened the ruling party’s dominance in the legislature. The Egyptian political situation, despite the changes it experienced over time, did not defy the authoritarian ideal type discussed by Linz. It had limited pluralism, a relatively unrestrained leadership, a demobilized populace, and the regime lacked an ideology—all the quintessential elements of the authoritarian type. Therefore, to classify pre-2011 Egypt as a hybrid regime, or a diminished subtype of authoritarianism, is problematic.

I do not wish to belittle the fact that many authoritarian regimes, including Egypt, have changed in substantially complex ways since the third wave of democratization. Scholars have correctly pointed to the manner in which authoritarianism has evolved (Heydemann, 2007). While these changes and subtleties matter in important ways, I maintain that such regimes have not experienced a transition to a different regime type. Considering such regimes as hybrid regimes rather than authoritarian ones only produces conceptual confusion and inhibits proper cross-national comparison.

Redefining Electoral Regimes

In order to standardize the application of Linz’s definition of authoritarianism within the field of hybrid regimes, I recommend a shift in the definition of an electoral and non-electoral regime. I do so following one of the conceptual strategies outlined by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 445-448). The purpose is to bring greater consistency to the field and to disperse much of the conceptual fog that surrounds the study of hybrid regimes. Specifically, I argue that electoral regimes need to be re-defined to those that hold competitive multiparty elections. This shift
clarifies the conceptual space within which hybrid regimes belong and identifies its unique institutional features.

I define competitive multiparty elections using the insights gained from the writings of Sartori and Levitsky and Way. Competitive elections are those in which more than one center of power with different socio-economic interests can participate and “present a serious electoral threat to incumbents” (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55). The greater the competitiveness, the greater the closeness of the electoral returns should be between different centers of power (Sartori, 1976). Thus, elections in competitive arenas distribute power between different political groups. In contrast, uncompetitive elections take place in an environment in which there are no serious threats to the ruling party’s monopoly of power.

In my view, turnover is a crucial indicator of competitive elections. Along with Huntington (1991), Geddes (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Ghandi (2008), I maintain that turnover confirms incumbent defeat and hand over of power. It therefore both indicates a real challenge to the incumbent and it concretely impacts the distribution of power amongst the political elite. I argue that a regime that experiences an alternation of power is critically different from a regime in which a single party rules for a substantial period of time because of the broad implications that alternations of power can have on regime dynamics such as the formulation of

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25 By center of power, I mean an individual, faction or institution, such as a party, with a distinguishable political platform and resource base. Centers of power can be distinguished from one another based on Lijphart’s (1999) seven key issue dimensions that structure partisan conflict: socioeconomics, religion, culture and ethnicity, the urban and rural divide, degree of regime support, foreign policy, and materialist and post-materialist values. While it is clear that most countries in the world will have multiple centers of power, I argue that it is essential to ask whether these centers of power compete against each other in the electoral arena. This builds upon Sartori’s cogent argument that intraparty elite competition in a single party system is not a functional equivalent of a multiparty system. Sartori (1976: 49) maintains that citizen involvement via interparty competition is essential to multiparty systems because it forces them to “vie with each other with an eye to the voters—and this entails far-reaching consequences.”
public policy and state-society relations. Although I recognize that turnover could be appropriately used as an indicator of democracy before the end of the cold war, the emergence of competitive multiparty elections under nondemocratic conditions complicates this task today. In other words, turnover does not necessarily indicate a democratic regime. Instead it is an indicator of an electoral regime, or a regime that has competitive multiparty elections. Both a democracy and a hybrid regime are subtypes of an electoral regime.

An electoral regime requires a turnover in at least four consecutive electoral cycles or twenty years in either the presidency or the legislature, distinguishing it from the length requirement of a dominant party system. I concede that turnover is not a perfect measure of competitiveness like other scholars, but it appears to be better than the alternatives and it produces an alternation of rulers that can be significant for regime dynamics. Turnover is an observable indicator and does not require relying on an artificial threshold (Przeworski, et al., 2000). Thresholds above 50% can be useful when differentiating between different types of authoritarian regimes rather than between authoritarian and hybrid regimes. For example, Howard and Roessler’s (2006; 2009) 70% threshold is helpful in distinguishing regimes within

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26Schedler (2009b: 303-304) argues that alternations in power do not necessarily indicate a democratic regime, rather there can be thee different types of alternations. Levitsky and Way (2010: 23-24) also assert that many electoral turnovers in the post-cold war period did not inspire a democratic transition. Instead “the removal of autocratic incumbents brought little institutional change, and successor parties did not govern democratically. Such cases are too numerous to be ignored or treated as exceptions.”

27 Intrusive tutelary institutions affect whether a regime is classified as an electoral regime. Some, such as the military in Turkey, may veto policies or ban parties but are not active in day-to-day governance. This situation contrasts with the extensive governing authority of other tutelary institutions, such as King Mohammed VI of Morocco. Based on this distinction, regimes that have multiparty elections and even turnover, such as Morocco, are non-electoral regimes, whereas those such as Turkey are electoral.

28 For a thorough discussion of this point, see Greene (2007: 16).

29 The case of a highly satisfied populace complicates the use of turnover as an indicator. Here turnover as an indicator falters and this situation has been well documented by Przeworski et al. (2000). With any type of measurement there will be error, and like Przeworski et al., I have decided to err on calling potentially competitive regimes non-competitive.
the non-electoral category by identifying hegemonic parties that exercise a firm grip on the electoral arena from those whose hold on power is weaker or may be slipping, yet do not experience turnover. This distinction sheds light on cases such as the PRI in Mexico where competitiveness increased in the latter part of the twentieth century, as opposed to its more hegemonic past. It did not become an electoral regime, however, until the PAN’s electoral victory in 2000.

The new conceptual map following the shift is presented in Figure 2-3. This strategy codifies Linz’s conceptualization of nondemocratic rule, standardizing the threshold separating hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones. Authoritarian, totalitarian and sultanistic regimes are
non-electoral regimes because they do not have competitive elections. As the figure illustrates, the tension surrounding the authoritarian type is alleviated, reducing a source of confusion.

Significantly, the redefinition of electoral regimes points to the main conceptual space of hybrid regimes. The hybrid regime type, as represented by the label “competitive authoritarian” in Figure 2-3, has not been accounted for in classical conceptualizations of political regimes due to its competitive nature. As such, nondemocratic regimes with competitive multiparty elections are absent in Linz’s classification. A similar theoretical gap can be found in the writings of Sartori (1976) as well. In the past, it was generally assumed that regimes that held competitive multiparty elections were democracies, while those that did not were authoritarian. Diamond (2002: 24) correctly notes that:

Certainly Linz does not identify, among his seven principal authoritarian regime types, anything like the ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime type discussed by Levitsky and Way—and for good reason. This type of hybrid regime, which is now so common, is very much a product of the contemporary world.

The difference that Diamond highlights is illustrated in Sartori’s (1976: 217-221) discussion of competitive and non-competitive party systems. According to Sartori, competitive party systems are those in which the rules of the game fairly structure competition among parties during elections. In contrast, noncompetitive party systems do not have rules of the game that fairly structure competition and lack competitiveness. Sartori’s classification does not account for regimes that have unfair competition but demonstrate competitiveness. Contemporary hybrid regimes occupy this key theoretical space whereby competitive multiparty elections occur despite an uneven political playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010).

30 While not explicitly stated as such, competitive party systems are considered democratic. Systems that are uncompetitive are considered nondemocratic.
The above discussion highlights two important regime dimensions for classification—“competitiveness” and “competition” as defined by Sartori. Democracies are competitive regimes with fair competition whereas authoritarian regimes are uncompetitive regimes with unfair competition. Hybrid regimes occupy the conceptual void of competitive regimes with unfair competition. Consequently, emphasizing the boundary between competitive and non-competitive regimes is essential to distinguish democracies and hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones. In contrast, the quality of competition is an important element to differentiate democracies from nondemocratic regimes (e.g. hybrid and authoritarian regimes).

In addition to the quality of competition, another key element that establishes the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is tutelary interference. Scholars such as Diamond (1999, 2002) and Schedler (2002a, 2006b) have valuably established the minimum requirements a country must meet in order to be considered a democracy. An important element in these requirements, besides the quality of competition, is that unelected bodies, such as the military, religious authorities, or a monarch, must not unduly constrain the agency of elected leaders or veto national legislation. Accordingly, the three dimensions of competitiveness, competition, and tutelary interference form the main axes of a configurative approach to political regime classification, a topic that will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.

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31 Schedler (2002a: 39) discusses the chain of democratic choice, which is based on the idea that “democratic elections are mechanisms of social choice under conditions of freedom and equality.” The chain of democratic choice includes seven essential elements or links (39-41):  
Empowerment: Elections select the highest decision-makers who are unconstrained by tutelary power  
Freedom of supply: citizens must be free to associate  
Freedom of demand: alternative sources of information must be available  
Inclusion: elections are based on universal suffrage  
Insulation: citizens must be able to express their votes freely  
Integrity: election results are counted fairly  
Irreversibility: in accordance with constitutional rules, the winners of elections must be able to take office as well as govern until the conclusion of their term.
The redefinition of electoral regime, therefore, advances the literature on hybrid regimes in a number of ways. First, it provides clarity by keeping with classical understandings of nondemocratic rule. Authoritarian, totalitarian and sultanistic regimes are non-electoral regimes because they are monopolized by a single center of power that does not face strong opposition in the electoral arena. Second, this change emphasizes the new conceptual boundary of hybrid regimes by highlighting their competitiveness. As scholars have critically advised, it is important to maximize the conceptual potential of prior typologies (Armony & Schamis, 2005; Snyder, 2006: 227). In other words, the conceptualization of hybrid regimes is only justified when prior classifications prove problematic or inadequate. Therefore, the shift I call for highlights those regimes that are truly “hybrid” and cannot be classified by previous scholars due to competitiveness and some form of undemocratic rule. This shift prevents authoritarianism from becoming a residual category for various nondemocratic regime types. Hybrid regimes are nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes that must be conceptualized on their own. Third, since the new classification excludes hybrid regimes from the non-electoral and hence authoritarian category, the number of mistaken conceptual and empirical classifications will be limited. If a country has uncompetitive multiparty elections, it is a non-electoral regime and, consequently, not a hybrid.

**Hybrid Regimes**

I argue that nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes be called “hybrids” rather than democracy or authoritarianism with adjectives. First, this general name without reference to
authoritarianism or democracy is appropriate because it prevents conceptual confusion and conceptual stretching. Referring back to Figure 2-2, competitive authoritarianism and a segment of electoral authoritarianism refer up the ladder of generality to electoral regimes, not aligning with the non-electoral regime category of authoritarianism. To improve conceptual clarity, these regimes should not be categorized as diminished subtypes of authoritarianism, particularly when they are electoral regimes. Second, a general name without reference to authoritarianism or democracy will better match the theoretical understanding of hybrid regimes, as many scholars assert that they are neither democratic nor authoritarian, see (Diamond, 2002; Ottaway, 2003). I believe that our terminology should reflect this claim. Lastly, the term “hybrid” highlights the configuration of electoral competitiveness along with possible undemocratic regime attributes, such as unfair competition or the presence of tutelary bodies.

The Configurative Approach and Regime Conceptualization

A configurative approach can provide scholars with fresh insight about the field of hybrid regimes. While a multi-dimensional approach was often used in the past, as illustrated in the work of Linz, it has been overshadowed by the conceptualization of regimes on a single continuum spanning from liberal democracy to closed authoritarianism. I argue that a multi-dimensional view needs to be revived in order to clarify the field of hybrid regimes and to provide a fuller understanding of the relationship of regimes to one another. In addition, the concepts formed through a configurative approach are better suited for the formulation and testing of causal theory because of the stress this method places on the variety of institutional features that cut across a variety of regime types.
The configurative approach is suitable for constructing complex concepts based on the multiple combinations in which different attributes, or the defining characteristics of an object, combine. The resulting object concepts are viewed in a dichotomous fashion as their features are uniquely configured to form a variety of meaningfully distinct entities. Besides the graded approach, the dichotomous position is a major ontological view used to conceptualize regimes (Ghandi, 2008; Linz, 2000; Przeworski, et al., 2000; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Sartori, 1984, 1991).32 Scholars who have a dichotomous view consider concepts to be contradictories. A phenomenon either belongs to a concept or it does not: a person is pregnant or not pregnant; a regime is a democracy or nondemocracy (Sartori, 1984). Thus, the defining attributes that comprise a concept tie it into a bounded whole, or an object concept such as “regime.” The emphasis of this method rests on differences in kind rather than degree. This is particularly the case for political regimes, as they are complex phenomena that can be constructed through various combinations of possible regime attributes and dimensions.

Therefore one of the central premises of the configurative approach is that regimes are not compared or measured in terms of other regimes. Consequently, nondemocracies are not measured by their degree of democracy. This is because it is equally nonsensical to ask the following two questions: How totalitarian is a democratic regime? How democratic is an authoritarian regime? Instead I apply Linz’s insightful recommendation to systematically

32 A third approach less common in the political regime literature constructs concepts with a “fuzzy logic” perspective. Here the distinction between dichotomous and continuous concepts is less pronounced than the one developed in the current regime classification literature. The distinction I place between dichotomous and graded approaches does not preclude a fuzzy logic approach. My goal is to emphasize the importance of differences in kind rather than degree in a language appropriate for and commonly understood by the political regime field. See Goertz (2006) for a discussion of the fuzzy logic approach to concept building.
analyze different types of regimes in their own right and not view them as merely deviations from a single ideal type (Linz, 1970: 253).

Regimes can only be compared to one another based on their specific properties. A property concept is a single attribute, such as pluralism or competitiveness in the case of political regimes, rather than a combination of attributes bound as a whole (Sartori, 1984, 1991). The configurative approach emphasizes the multiple ways in which properties can combine to determine regime type. For example, Linz uses the three dimensions of mobilization, ideology, and leadership constraint in order to construct regime ideal types. Later, the attribute of pluralism is added to his model (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Figure 2-4 illustrates Linz’s conceptualization of regimes based on the particular configurations of these four dimensions.

![Figure 2-4. Property Concept Continuums for Regime Types (Linz 1973; Linz and Stepan 1996)](image)

Legend:
- ● Totalitarianism
- ▲ Authoritarian
- ■ Authoritarian
- ○ Democracy

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In contrast, a graded approach understands object concepts in terms of degree. It considers a concept to be comprised of a linear continuum connected to two opposite poles—democracy and authoritarianism in the case of the contemporary regime continuum (Bollen & Jackman, 1989; Elkins, 2000). While graded measures are appropriate for many research questions, graded measures can be problematic for complex concepts such as political regimes. As I will show, multiple combinations of significant regime features may produce different concepts that cannot be accurately placed on a single continuum. A configurative approach enables and highlights unique institutional characteristics that may be crucial for both case selection and the testing of causal theory.

The field of hybrid regimes includes many scholars who employ thresholds in conjunction with the traditional continuum view (Brownlee, 2009a; Diamond, 1999, 2002; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Hallaran, 2006; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Munck, 2006; Roessler & Howard, 2009; Schedler, 2002a, 2006b). This more nuanced approach intrinsically contains a graded position, even if it attempts to capture the dichotomous nature of a concept with the addition of thresholds (D. Collier & Adcock, 1999). In other words, although there is a difference in kind between two different regimes separated by a threshold, the concepts only relate to one another based on the unified continuum underlying the specific classificatory scheme used.

While many scholars who use a continuum approach have mapped the relationship of various regimes, including hybrid types, to one another, those with a configurative view have only infrequently done so. For example, although Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010) accept that

33 While Brownlee (2009a, 2009b) uses Geddes’ approach for the classification of closed regimes, his conceptualization and measurement of hybrid regimes is based upon a continuum with thresholds view.
multiple types of hybrid regimes exist, they do not conceptualize them formally or contextualize them within the larger field of political regimes. The brief attention they give to other types of hybrid regimes adds to conceptual confusion. Hadenius and Teorell (2007, November 2006) employ a configurative approach to hybrid regimes and build upon Geddes’ (1999) work. Nevertheless, their detailed classification lacks parsimony, and they add to conceptual confusion by introducing multiple regime types without adequately contextualizing them within the literature.34

Outside of the field of hybrid regimes, the configurative approach has been extensively used to conceptualize other regime types. As mentioned previously, Linz (1970, 2000) employs a configurative approach to conceptualize authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Later, Geddes (1999) innovatively creates a variety of non-electoral typologies with this method, while Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) do the same for democratic regimes. However, these classifications do not capture the conceptual notion of contemporary hybrid regimes due to the time period examined.35 Indeed, while Linz’s work provides us with a particularly useful method for conceptualizing nondemocratic regimes, the dimensions he identifies are better attuned for conceptualizing and differentiating between different types of non-electoral regimes, such as totalitarianism, sultanism and authoritarianism.

An alternative set of dimensions is needed in order to capture the more recent phenomenon of hybrid regimes. Theory should guide us in the selection of important regime

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34 Likewise, while Storm’s (2008) configurative approach of the elements of democracy is innovative, her method risks undermining the importance of nondemocratic regime types. This is because all regimes are conceptually classified as diminished subtypes of democracy to varying degrees. Rather than missing a single element as is typical of the diminished approach, regimes may lack multiple elements that may combine in a number of ways.

features necessary for proper and effective regime classification. Furthermore, these new attributes should reflect the theoretical developments accomplished by scholars of hybrid regimes over the last two decades as discussed earlier in the chapter.\textsuperscript{36} This will not only promote the accumulation of knowledge but will also help clarify the conceptual field by highlighting the important advancements made in hybrid regime classification.

\textit{Competitiveness, Tutelary Interference, and Civil Liberties}

Drawing from my conceptual analysis of the relation between hybrid regimes to both democracy and authoritarianism, I assert that competitiveness, competition, and tutelary interference are the three dimensions that are important for regime classification today.\textsuperscript{37} More specifically, these dimensions are necessary to place multiparty regimes into democratic, hybrid or authoritarian categories. Based on my analysis of the hybrid regime field in the proceeding sections, competitiveness produces an alternation of rulers and concretely impacts the distribution of power in a regime. It is verified by at least one turnover in four electoral cycles for the executive or legislature. Reflecting my understanding of electoral and non-electoral regimes as summarized by Figure 2-3, I maintain that competitive multiparty elections produce a qualitatively different type of regime than one with uncompetitive multiparty elections. As I showed previously in the section “Conceptualizing Electoral and Non-Electoral Regimes,” competitiveness is the key component absent in previous classifications of authoritarian regimes.

\textsuperscript{36}For example, while Wigell (2008) incorporates a two-dimensional approach for the conceptualization of hybrid regimes, his framework does not clearly depict the relationship between his new types and those previously created by the field. In addition, it is unclear how Wigell’s conceptual schema can be measured empirically.

\textsuperscript{37}Wolfgang Merkel (2004) uses similar dimensions in the study of democracy. He theorizes that “liberal democracy consists of five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives” (36).
(Linz, 2000; Sartori, 1976), and at the same time competitiveness is astutely identified as a defining attribute of hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002a). Building on this significant insight, I characterize those regimes with competitive multiparty elections for the executive and legislature to have “elections as a regime dimension.” In other words, elections play an important role in the distribution of power.

In contrast, in those regimes that hold uncompetitive multiparty elections, the electoral arena does not play an important role in the distribution of power. Rather, elections are a means by which rulers ensure their own survival. The possibility for change in the status quo through the electoral mechanism is severely curtailed. These regimes can be considered to have “elections as a strategy.” Thus, while we may witness an opening and closing of the electoral arena depending on the strategies of the ruler or ruling party (Brumberg, 1995), the regime type will not change as a result of this often cyclical process.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, limited political suffrage produces uncompetitive elections as broad sectors of the population are effectively excluded from the electoral arena.

The quality of competition, understood as the broad rules of the electoral game, is the second dimension in my regime classification. Building on the earlier discussion of Sartori (1976), “competition” differs from the first dimension of “competitiveness” presented in this section. For the sake of clarity, I label this dimension as “civil liberties,” building on Dahl’s (1971) understanding that civil liberties provide the minimum conditions of procedural democracy by ensuring fair competition. The degree of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly and the right to alternative sources of information are indicative of particular

\(^{38}\) On this latter point, see Henry Hale’s (2005) insightful discussion of cyclical changes in presidential patronal regimes.
liberal/illiberal state-society relationships. In respect to competition, the strong enforcement of civil liberties creates a fairer electoral playing field for competing parties. In other words, those regimes that protect civil liberties provide a broad arena in which citizens can participate and thus have fair competition. In contrast, those regimes that poorly protect civil liberties constrain the possible avenues of meaningful citizen participation in social, economic, and political life and accordingly have unfair competition. Furthermore, the protection of civil liberties not only sheds light on the way rulers govern but impacts empirical research in areas such as civil society and democratization.39

The degree of tutelary interference is an important dimension of regime classification. Tutelary bodies, or reserved domains of power, refer to non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities that engage in politics. Multiple scholars have highlighted the role of tutelary bodies that circumvent the political mechanisms of democratic decision-making, effectively disqualifying such regimes from being classified as democracies.40 Bolstering the line between democracy and nondemocracy, Schedler (2002a: 39) argues that tutelary institutions that constrain the agenda of elected officials or veto their decisions violate essential links in the chain of democratic choice. In addition, the institutional make-up of tutelary bodies must be taken into consideration when identifying regime type, as different nondemocratic institutions have important implications for comparative research. For example, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Geddes (1999) make significant contributions to regime

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39 For an example on civil society see Howard (2003). An example on democratization is O'Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) discussion of dictablanda.

40 Some examples include Karl (1990); Schmitter and Karl (1996); Levitsky and Way (2002); Schedler (2002a).
theory by showing that various types of authoritarian regimes, such as military and single-party systems, produce different regime life spans and transition pathways.

A Multi-Dimensional Map of Regimes

In contrast to a one-dimensional and linear classification of regimes, Figure 2-5 shows a multi-dimensional matrix of regime types. The cube is constructed on the theoretically identified axes of competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties. The three dimensions on the cube measure only multiparty regimes, political regimes that have multiple parties and factions present in the electoral arena. Non-multiparty regimes are not classified by these regime attributes and are outside the purview of this dissertation.
The three dimensions shown in Figure 2-5 are incommensurable and cannot be combined into a single continuum, even though for presentation purposes the sides of the cube are equal in length. As will be illustrated below, each dimension impacts regime classification in unique ways. Reflecting my discussion of the re-definition of electoral regimes and its significance for conceptual clarity, the competitiveness dimension is key to separating electoral regimes (democracy and hybrid regimes) from non-electoral regimes (authoritarianism). The other two dimensions are important for distinguishing regimes within the electoral and non-electoral categories.

The competitiveness dimension is the x-axis of the diagram and differentiates electoral and non-electoral regimes located at the left and right sides of the cube respectively (see Figure 2-6). Electoral regimes are those that hold competitive multiparty elections, while non-electoral regimes do not. The tutelary interference dimension is the z-axis and differentiates tutelary
Figure 2-6. Competitive Dimension of Regimes

Figure 2-7. Tutelary Interference Dimension of Regimes
regimes from non-tutelary ones. Multiparty regimes that have active monarchical, military, or clerical domains are found on the front side of the cube and those that lack or have inactive tutelary institutions, such as the British monarchy, are on the back side (see Figure 2-7). The y-axis represents the civil liberties dimension, separating liberal multiparty regimes at the top of the cube from illiberal multiparty regimes at the bottom (see Figure 2-8).  

Composite scores, such as those from either Freedom House or Polity IV, cannot be used to measure concepts constructed with a configurative approach. Aggregating or averaging sub-indicators into a single measure inhibits regime identification based on particular combinations of dimensions (Gleditsch & Ward, 1997; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, November 2006; Munck &

41 The illiberal regime category approximates Zakaria’s (1997) concept of “illiberal democracy.”
Verkuilen, 2002). Multiple types of regimes, in other words, may receive the same score, blurring their diverse institutional features. As a result, a single continuum cannot account for institutional differences or similarities that span across distinct regime types. This difficulty is particularly acute when studying concepts at the middle range of the continuum, where hybrid regimes are located (Goertz, 2008).42

For example, to create the commonly used polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset, the scores of different measurements of democracy or autocracy are combined into a unified score for the purposes of regime type classification. Interestingly, Marshall et. al. (2010: 16-17) caution users about the implications of this measurement method, stating that such a method runs counter to the original theory proposed by Eckstein and Gurr. Eckstein and Gurr did not accept that autocracy and democracy are opposites in a unified spectrum. And they warn that the polity2 score should not be used to study the middle of the Polity spectrum, as various combinations of the democracy and autocracy sub-indicators are masked. Similarly, Freedom House’s system of regime classification cannot capture institutional configurations, as it combines both civil liberties and political rights scores to produce a single score.

Important works that create cross-national datasets of hybrid regimes with a continuum approach encounter these measurement difficulties as well. Epstein et al.’s (2006) measurement, for example, is unable to account for conceptual variations in hybrid regime types as they only have a single category, partial democracy, measured by a middle range of the aggregated Polity IV score. In comparison, while Howard and Roessler (2006) have a conceptually nuanced understanding of different regimes, they are inhibited by the continuum with thresholds approach

42 Goertz’s (2008: 109) analysis of the variance of Polity and Freedom House at the middle range of their scales leads him to conclude: “In particular, the gray zone needs to be examined independently of the two extremes.”
as well. Their method cannot present the overarching similarities and differences across regime

types. Likewise, each of their concepts captures a variety of distinct institutional configurations.

In contrast, surprising overarching patterns that may have previously been overlooked are
highlighted with a configurative approach by comparing regimes located in the different regions
of the cube. For example, as depicted in Figures 2-6 through 8, liberal, tutelary, and competitive
dimensions can each be used to compare different multiparty regime types to one another. The
ability to do so is important, as Goertz (2006: 6) incisively illustrates, because the attributes of
concepts are important in the formulation and testing of theory. For example, Dahl’s (1971) two
dimensions of contestation and participation comprising the democracy type can be used
separately to develop causal theory. In terms of this chapter’s argument, liberal regimes can be
compared to illiberal ones, tutelary regimes to non-tutelary ones, and competitive regimes to
non-competitive ones. This condition also holds true for an analysis of regime subtypes as will
be demonstrated further below. A configurative approach is well-suited to account for the
multiple dimensions of regime types as it does not aggregate or average these secondary
attributes into a single score.

The above discussion does not suggest that scholars should avoid the use of properly
constructed dataset sub-indicators that measure a single regime property. In other words, a
configurative classification could be constructed in a methodologically proper manner by using
the disaggregated dimensions of continuum-based datasets, such as Polity. For example, either
the civil liberties measurement in the case of Freedom House or POLCOMP in the case of Polity
can be used to measure the civil liberties (i.e. competition) dimension of the cube. Indeed, I use
Freedom House’s civil liberties score to measure the quality of competition present in a country,
drawing from Dahl’s work on the importance of civil liberties in the assessment of political competition.

While dataset sub-indicators can be used for proper concept measurement, not all sub-indicators are useful for the purposes of regime classification. Regime theory must first guide our selection of the minimum key attributes necessary for concept-building. Only once these regime properties have been identified can the task of measurement begin. This chapter argues that the three necessary conceptual dimensions for regime classification are competitiveness, civil liberties (i.e. competition), and tutelary interference. Consequently, any dataset variable that provides a proper measurement of one of these dimensions can be used for the purposes of regime classification. In contrast, other dimension measurements can be useful for the creation of regime subtypes or for testing causal theory. This is because such variables would mostly provide variance within each regime category rather than between regime categories. For example, indicators that measure the strength of the executive or the degree of political party polarization will theoretically produce variance within each regime type. For the purposes of regime classification, regime dimensions that can create variance between regime categories are necessary. Otherwise, it is difficult to identify and separate authoritarian, democratic and hybrid regimes from one another in a theoretically grounded manner.

Returning to the discussion of the cube, a configurative approach reveals a variety of regime ideal types that have been previously unaccounted for in graded approaches. By definition, an ideal type may not represent an actual regime, which in reality falls somewhere between these extreme points on the cube. Instead, it serves as a useful analytical tool for differentiation. Although the three dimensions I propose for regime classification are continua, I
employ dichotomous measurements of each to create parsimonious ideal types.43 A graded measurement could be used in this task, but without a dichotomous measurement the proliferation of types and subsequent classification would become overly complex and unwieldy, and would undermine the central goal of this project to bring greater conceptual clarity to the field. This insight builds on Dahl’s persuasive discussion of the difficulties scholars face in making both a conceptually valid as well as parsimonious and useful regime typology. Consequently, in his discussion of contestation and participation, Dahl (1971: 6-7) creates only four ideal regime types within a matrix that may have included many more.

Subsequently, each of the three dimensions is measured empirically as dichotomous variables. Countries where at least one turnover occurs in four electoral cycles44 for either the executive or legislature are coded as competitive while those that do not are coded as uncompetitive.45 To measure whether countries are either “liberal” or “illiberal” I draw on Freedom House’s (2012) civil liberties scale, which ranges from 1 (high protection of civil liberties) to 7 (low protection of civil liberties).46 I define a liberal regime as one that receives a 3 or lower (i.e. 1-3) on Freedom House’s civil liberties scale and an illiberal regime as one that receives a 4 or higher (i.e. 4-7).47 Utilizing Samuel Fitch’s (1998) typology of civil-military

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43 Note that a dichotomous measurement of a regime dimension is distinct and separate from the topic of a dichotomous understanding of a regime concept itself, as the former only deals with a single property concept (a regime attribute) and the latter with an object concept (a regime type).
44 I count term extensions/constitutional amendments for never ending presidential terms as “elections”.
45 For parliamentary regimes if there is any change of partner in the coalition, there is turnover in the legislature (Przeworski, et al., 2000; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Because electoral cycles are much more sporadic in parliamentary regimes, I look for a turnover during a span of 20 years rather than four electoral cycles.
46 The component elements of the scale include multiple indicators for freedom of expression and belief, associational and organization rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
47 In order for a country to be labeled “liberal” it must have a score of 3 or less for at least four years in a row. Similarly if a country is generally liberal, but receives illiberal scores, it must do so for four years.
relations, a country is classified as having either low or no degree of tutelary interference if non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities do not participate actively in the policy-making process.

Returning to the figures, the non-competitive face of the cube in Figure 2-9 presents multiparty authoritarian regime subtypes in the year 2005. These regimes represent electoral authoritarian regimes as conceptualized by Schedler excluding competitive regimes, such as Levitsky and Way’s competitive authoritarian regime. Looking at the bottom right hand of the figure at the back of the cube, we see an authoritarian regime with the label (0, 0, 1). This means that this regime is uncompetitive, has low civil liberties, and does not have a tutelary institution. In other words, it is a non-electoral, illiberal, non-tutelary regime. Real world examples include Mubarak’s Egypt and Kazakhstan. This subtype has been identified as “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” by Diamond (2002). My multi-dimensional representation, however, reveals three additional subtypes. Moving to the authoritarian regime with the label (0, 0, 0), we see that this type is very similar to the previous one, as it is uncompetitive and has low civil liberties. It

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48 Because I would like to emphasize the political influence of tutelary institutions over elected officials, I selected Fitch’s classification, which privileges military control over civilians and not necessarily civilian control over the military. In other words, Fitch is primarily concerned with the military’s veto power over matters not in the military’s direct defense purview, which is a key way that Fitch differentiates his classification from other scholars working on this issue (Fitch, 1998: 42). Fitch’s classification has four stages (39): “(4) the military has political control over civilians (Military Control) (3) the military has direct and indirect control over civilians and civilians have low policy control over the military (Military Tutelage) (2) The military has limited scope and limited influence over civilians and civilians have limited policy control over the military (Conditional Subordination) (1) civilians exert policy control over the military (Democratic Control).” I consider those countries in steps four and three to have tutelary interference while two and one do not. Finally, note that I expand Fitch’s classification to unelected institutions such as monarchies or clergy.

49 I also consider whether the country has a history of coups. Beginning in the 1980s, if a country has experienced a coup they must have at least 3 electoral cycles in which the military does not intervene to be coded as low tutelary interference. If the country does not meet this test they will automatically be coded as having high tutelary interference in the interim period. For countries that have a history of coups, attempted coups are treated like actual coups for this coding rule.
differs however in that it has an active tutelary institution. Morocco and Jordan are examples of this type as they both have monarchies. These two authoritarian subtypes have liberal counterparts as well; examples are Namibia (0, 1, 1) and Fiji (0, 1, 0).

On the other hand, the electoral regime category includes both democratic and hybrid regimes (see Figure 2-10). As the cube shows, there are three different subtypes of a hybrid regime. They are all similar in that they hold competitive elections. They differ based on their particular arrangement of nondemocratic attributes, such as low civil liberties and/or tutelary
institutions. One subtype is the “illiberal hybrid regime” (1, 0, 1), which is the most similar type to Levitsky and Way’s concept of competitive authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{50} These regimes hold competitive multiparty elections but have low civil liberties. They do not have reserved domains of power. Sri Lanka is an example of an illiberal hybrid regime. While experiencing multiple turnovers and divided government, the Sinhalese-dominated regime uses the Tamil insurgency as a pretext to employ violent and repressive measures against their own Sinhalese critics in political and civil society (Devota, 2004: 311-312). Therefore, the rules of competition are unfairly skewed toward regime insiders, as opponents are deprived of adequate civil liberties to meaningfully campaign and organize.

\textsuperscript{50} While an illiberal hybrid regime is essentially competitive authoritarianism as conceptualized by Levitsky and Way, my measurement differs by excluding dominant party systems (K. Greene, 2007). A dominant party system is one in which a single party or the same coalition of parties has ruled a country over four electoral cycles or twenty years. I exclude dominant party systems even if they win by bare majorities because they represent a single center of power that dominates the electoral arena. Elections should not be considered competitive until the incumbent actually loses power, thus allowing another center of power to rule the country.
Another subtype is the “illiberal tutelary hybrid regime” (1, 0, 0). These regimes are competitive, illiberal and have tutelary institutions. Iran is an example of this subtype. First, clerical authorities ban secular parties and veto policies deemed un-Islamic. Second, civil liberties are poorly enforced, as some opposition figures are jailed and the freedom of expression is limited by state censorship. Yet, despite these elements, multiple political factions competitively vie with one another over state institutions through electoral means (Moslem, 2002; Sadowski, 2006: 230). While evidence of turnover is frequent, notable elections that spot the uncertainty and competitiveness of the electoral arena include the shock presidential elections of Mohammad Khatami, of the republican left in 1997, and that of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, of
the theocratic left, in 2005. Both represent unpredictable and substantial victories against regime insiders who have considerable power and influence.

The last subtype is the “tutelary hybrid regime” (1, 1, 0). While these regimes broadly protect civil liberties and have competitive elections, tutelary institutions interfere in politics. Chile in the 1990s is illustrative of this subtype. As a result of its “pacted transition” from authoritarian rule, critical vestiges of military power remained in Chile (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1995). The military appointed members of the Senate, made its own budgetary decisions, and received judicial immunity. These features demonstrate the continued influence of the military on politics in Chile. Tutelary hybrid regimes like Chile as well as other electoral and non-electoral regime types are presented in Figure 2-11, providing a comprehensive picture of multiparty regime classification using a configurative approach.

51 “Republican” and “theocratic” refer to Islamist commitments, while “right” and “left” refer to economic preferences.
While I already introduced Table 1-1 that shows all hybrid regimes according to my classification from 1990-2009, I present it again here for further discussion. First it must be noted that Table 1-1 depicts only hybrid regimes, although the method of measurement developed in this chapter can be used to identify democratic and multiparty authoritarian regimes as well. The only limitation of the three dimensions discussed in this chapter is that they cannot account for nondemocratic regimes that do not have multiparty elections. Single party regimes such as Cuba and North Korea as well as some sultanistic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are consequently unaccounted for by this method. But due to the ever
increasing number of multiparty regimes in the world, particularly since the end of the cold war, the number of cases that evade my classification system are few in number.

### Table 1-1: Hybrid Regimes 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iliberal Hybrid Regime</th>
<th>Tutelary Iliberal Hybrid Regime</th>
<th>Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1995-1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (1990-1993)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1991-2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (1993-1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (1990-2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (1999-2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 Total 15 Total 7 Total

Furthermore, while my classification system is geared towards capturing the electorally competitive yet nondemocratic hybrid regime that has become widespread after the cold war, it is not necessarily limited to this time period. Some regimes such as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand, to name a few, have been hybrids much earlier than the end of the cold war. That being said, the cold war is an important turning point for regime classification. If the number of hybrid regimes
had remained relatively small after the cold war, the field would not have the practical justification to conceptualize a new regime type without adding to conceptual confusion. Under these circumstances, understanding the pattern of regimes in the post-cold war world is significant and worthy as many regimes important for scholarly study cannot be properly classified. Without abandoning classification schemes prior to the end of the cold war, this chapter creates the conceptual space with which to understand the position and properties of these new hybrid regimes independently and in relation to both democratic and authoritarian ones.

Returning to Table 1-1, it is apparent that there are a number of interesting cross-national trends in terms of hybrid regime type and their geographic concentration. With a total of 25 different countries, the illiberal hybrid regime type is the most common, followed by the tutelary illiberal and then the liberal tutelary type. While hybrid regimes with tutelary institutions are concentrated in East Asia and Latin America, there are no tutelary hybrids in central Europe or in the former Soviet Union. While communism failed to produce many of the goods promised to those living under its application, Table 1-1 suggests that it was adept at dismantling tutelary institutions such as monarchies and providing a more stable, albeit far from perfect, balance in civil-military relations than in other regions. Table 2-1 summarizes these trends graphically.
The empirical classification of hybrid regimes reflected in Table 1-1 serves as the basis for case selection in subsequent chapters. While there are three ideal hybrid regime types, this dissertation focuses on the most common—the illiberal hybrid regime—and the state mobilization strategies used by their rulers to maintain power. What exactly these state mobilization strategies are and how they can be measured empirically is the subject of the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

Classifying political regimes has always been a difficult enterprise. As Diamond, Linz, and Lipset insightfully noted in 1988, there is an incredible range of nondemocratic regimes and their relationship with each other and democracy is often imperfect and unclear. While it is
certain that the complex realities of political life will always pose significant challenges for the conceptualization and classification of regime types, a configurative approach is well-suited to address some of these difficulties as it provides a multi-dimensional view of regimes.

After presenting the source of much conceptual confusion in contemporary classification at the electoral regime level, I advocate a redefinition of the overarching concept of electoral and non-electoral regimes. Such a redefinition allows us to underscore the contribution and continued relevance of scholars such as Linz and Sartori in classifying regimes today. At the same time, it shows the theoretical gap in older work that creates the conceptual space for nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes, which I call hybrid regimes. Second, by highlighting the possible multi-dimensional configurations that may comprise regime types, a different ordering of democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regime relationships can be posited. While contemporary regime classification is predominantly based on a one-dimensional continuum, my approach revives the multi-dimensional conceptualization of regimes based on competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties. As a result, this conceptual perspective may help standardize the meaning of a hybrid regime and alleviate some of the conceptual confusion in the literature.

In addition, in this chapter I innovatively incorporate diagrams into the theoretical discussion of regime types. The visualization of theoretical concepts can play an important role not only in providing greater understanding of the literature on regime concepts but also in establishing a common ground from which scholars can constructively engage in debate and discussion. By offering a more tangible sense of the relationship of regime concepts to one another, these visuals may inspire future improvements and revisions of my diagrams and the
theoretical state of the field. Furthermore, the cubic representation of regime types provides an alternative multi-dimensional visualization of regimes to a continuum based view.

Finally, the classification I present in this chapter opens the door for new comparisons, possibilities and puzzles for research. By stressing the importance of multiple dimensions of regime types, previously unnoticed similarities and differences between countries are highlighted. The sides of the cube, based on competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference illustrate the ways in which countries can be grouped together for comparative study. For example, Table 1-1 and 2-1 show that while there are hybrid regimes in all world regions, those with tutelary institutions are concentrated in East Asia and Latin America. And there are no tutelary hybrid regimes in central Europe or in the former Soviet Union. What effect the presence or absence of tutelary institutions has on the dynamics of hybrid regimes is a very promising area of research. I take a step in this direction by focusing on the most common type of hybrid—those that lack tutelary interference. Among these illiberal hybrid regimes I examine not only what state mobilization strategies are commonly used and how they should be understood—the topic of the next chapter—but also how they affect the significant dimension of competitiveness.
CHAPTER 3

State Mobilization Strategies: Creating a Typology and Dataset

In this chapter I explore the mobilization strategies that rulers employ in illiberal hybrid regimes, thereby shedding light on an important way that states deal with competitive multiparty elections in the context of non-democracy. As detailed in Chapter 2, competitive multiparty elections are a defining feature of hybrid regimes. I build on this argument and assert that the presence of competitive multiparty elections in combination with the poor protection of civil liberties in illiberal hybrid regimes makes the strategies that states have towards mobilization different than those employed by democracies or authoritarian regimes.

I begin this chapter by defining the general term “state mobilization” and examining its relationship to “state mobilization strategies.” I next review the current literature on state mobilization strategies. This review demonstrates that while academics and policy makers have increasingly taken notice of state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes, there remains a strong need to analyze these strategies in a systematic, widely cross-national fashion.

I therefore propose an original typology to classify state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes. I first identify three types of state mobilization strategies: centralized, decentralized, and diffuse. A centralized strategy is when a government establishes or sponsors groups in key organizational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment, or labor. While certain groups are targeted for mobilization, the general purpose of this strategy is to demobilize the majority of the population except at the time of elections. In contrast, governments that adopt a decentralized strategy seek to mobilize large sectors of the population. States that adopt this strategy invest in grassroots and highly participatory groups, although they exert less direct
control over these organizations than do states employing the centralized strategy. Finally, states that adopt a *diffuse* strategy only minimally invest in either demobilization or mobilization except directly before elections. Building on this typology, I create a dataset of state mobilization strategies for 25 illiberal hybrid regimes from 1990-2009 based on content analysis of U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House reports.

In the next part of the chapter I provide an in-depth discussion and review of my original typology and dataset. When examining all country years, I find that the most common mobilization strategy out of the three is diffuse. However, after the turn of the new century there is a noticeable increase in the frequency of both the centralized as well as decentralized strategy. This finding suggests that rulers in hybrid regimes have become much more cognizant of the need for a proactive mobilization strategy and that they have become increasingly sophisticated in dealing with multiparty elections on an uneven playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010). I conclude this chapter by making general empirical observations of state mobilization strategies based on the data collected for the study and provide an overview of state mobilization strategies in the cases of Venezuela and Cambodia. These cases from two different world regions show what these strategies, and their combination, look like in practice.

**What Do We Already Know about State Mobilization Strategies?**

This section defines “state mobilization” and reviews the current literature on state mobilization strategies, determining that scholarship on this issue would significantly benefit from a systematic, cross-national analysis. My definition of political mobilization draws on Juan Linz’s work on regimes (2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). In his path-breaking typology, Linz
identified mobilization along with pluralism, ideology, and leadership as a significant regime dimension. According to Linz, the mobilization dimension captures whether and to what extent a regime mobilizes its citizens. While Linz never explicitly defines mobilization, he does discuss the differences between mobilized and demobilized citizens in his description of totalitarianism. According to Linz (2000: 73), mobilized citizens are collectively orientated and are interested in changing their societies. In contrast, demobilized citizens are “passive subjects” only interested in their private narrow goals or are “alienated in view of the lack of opportunities for any participation in efforts directed at changing their societies” (73). A close reading of Linz’s work thus suggests that mobilization refers to the activation of citizens to collectively take part in public affairs. And demobilization signifies the deactivation or depoliticization of citizens into passive subjects. Following Linz, when examining state mobilization strategies, I am interested in capturing the measures taken by states that are intended to mobilize as well demobilize their citizens.52

Building further from Linz’s classic regime typology, I maintain that mobilization strategies in a hybrid regime are different than those employed under a democratic or authoritarian regime. Unlike the situation under full scale authoritarianism in which leaders prefer a passive citizenry in order to rule (Linz, 2000), in hybrid regimes competitive politics force political insiders to mobilize their supporters to win elections. At the same time, conditions such as a weak rule of law or a minimally independent press enable ruling groups to

52 The study of mobilization usually falls under the rubric of social movement theory. While the definition of mobilization is similar, I draw on Linz’s understanding, since he explicitly examines the challenges and capacity of states to mobilize their citizens. Social movement scholars have primarily focused their analytic attention on collective action dilemmas, and typically did not view states, which are hierarchically organized and control substantial coercive means, as facing such difficulties. See for example Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 4-10).
employ tactics against opposing social groups that would be unacceptable in a democracy. Overall, the use of mobilization in hybrid regimes contrasts to its application in both democratic regimes (where mobilization is critical, but less likely to be abused by authorities) and authoritarian regimes (where those who rule typically depend upon a demobilized populace) (Linz, 2000). And finally, in stark contrast to totalitarian regimes, the state does not hold a monopoly over the mobilization of its citizens in hybrid regimes. Thus, rulers in hybrid regimes use a combination of measures intended to mobilize as well as demobilize (repress) their citizens and this combination is distinct from that found in either authoritarian, democratic, or totalitarian regimes.

In order to determine what form these measures take and how they can be combined to produce identifiable overarching strategies, I review work that analyzes how states attempt to both mobilize and demobilize their citizens. Since demobilizing or repressive measures are most commonly associated with non-democratic rule, I turn first to a review of scholarship on these methods. Such scholarship can be classified into two major strands: policy orientated work that focuses on the “backlash against democracy assistance” and the contentious politics literature on state repression of mobilization. 

Policy orientated scholarship focuses on the many methods that rulers in non-democratic regimes have used to blunt the impact of Western efforts to empower democratic activists and

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53 A potentially helpful way to understand this difference is to imagine what political strategists like Karl Rove would do to help a candidate win elections in the United States if an independent media or functioning checks and balances were not present. Indeed, the prominence of so-called “political technologists” or image makers in political campaigns throughout the former Soviet Union is a testament to the crude as well as sophisticated means that public opinion and the electoral process can be manipulated in non-democratic contexts (Wilson, 2005).

54 It is important to note that these literatures are about non-democratic regimes broadly understood and include the study of potential hybrid regimes along with other types of non-democratic regimes. One of the major challenges for the current study is to parse out from these literatures what can/should apply specifically to hybrid regimes.
groups within their borders (Carothers, 2006; Freedom House, 2008; Gershman, 2006; Gershman & Allen, 2006; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law & National Endowment for Democracy, 2008). Methods to block Western democracy promotion became especially visible—and thus came under increased scrutiny—after the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the first five years of the 21st century. As described by the President of the National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman, “this resistance has come in the form of legal constraints as well as extra-legal tactics such as the use of thugs or auxiliary forces to assault or intimidate democracy activists” (2006). Gershman then lists a total of nine different measures, including examples of restrictions on foreign grant funding to social organizations in Belarus, laws that allow arbitrary shut-down of NGOs in Egypt, and harassment of civil society activists or groups by state security services in Russia.

The listing of a variety of tactics to curtail certain social organizations using specific country examples in multiple world regions is emblematic of this type of work and is certainly an important step forward in understanding the way that rulers have updated and modernized their repressive techniques. However, while articles such as these point to a set of similar measures states use to demobilize particular social groups in multiple countries, they do not attempt to analyze these measures in a systematic, cross-national fashion over time. In addition, while a distinction is often drawn between the types of tactics used in full scale authoritarian regimes versus hybrid ones, there is no comparison of these tactics across rigorously defined regime type

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55 On this point see especially (Heydemann, 2007).
categories. Instead, hybrid regimes are broadly defined as countries that mix multiparty elections with undemocratic forms of rule.\textsuperscript{56}

In contrast to policy orientated work, the contentious politics literature on state repression of mobilization (Davenport, Johnston, & Mueller, 2005) focuses much more on “tried and true” forms of repression. These measures are diverse and include harassment, investigation, or imprisonment of activists; restricting rallies, strikes, and public meetings; or even using systematic violence against activists. This literature examines how, when, and to what extent these measures may be used in a variety of democratic and non-democratic contexts.\textsuperscript{57} Nevertheless, it is difficult to directly apply this literature to the study at hand because it does not examine demobilization policies in specific reference to organized social groups other than political parties. Rather, the major groups analyzed are much broader and include the “political opposition” or “dissidents” (Davenport, 1999; Davenport, et al., 2005; Gupta, Singh, & Sprague, 1993; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998) or the population as a whole (Fein, 1995; C. Henderson, 1991; Krain, 1997). In addition, as Graham Robertson (2011: 30) astutely points out in his analysis of this literature for his study of protest in hybrid regimes, scholars of contentious politics have examined rulers’ strategies to either repress or not to repress. In hybrid regimes another option is available—mobilization.

Scholarship on mobilization that is relevant to the study of hybrid regimes include country reports, policy briefs, and small to medium-N analyses of state-society relations. Of these, the most sophisticated and in-depth scholarly analysis is Graham Robertson’s (2011) study

\textsuperscript{56} This definition is similar in scope to concepts such as “illiberal democracy” or “electoral authoritarianism” discussed in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{57} One of the main findings of this literature is that there is less state repression in democracies than in other types of regimes (Davenport 1995).
of protest in post-communist Russia. Based on the Russian case, Robertson creates a general theory of protest in hybrid regimes, which includes state mobilization strategies as one of the key explanatory factors.\(^{58}\) As such, one of the main state mobilization strategies put forward by Robertson is the central government’s creation of so-called “ersatz” social organizations. This strategy is highlighted in the work of many other scholars and policy makers (Balzer, 2003; Evenson, 2008; Gershman & Allen, 2006; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law & National Endowment for Democracy, 2008; Robertson, 2011). “Ersatz” social organizations, also named government organized non-governmental organizations or GONGOs, are largely created and run by the state to mobilize citizens in support of government ideals or aims. While these groups may look like regular social organizations, they have close ties to regime insiders and in some cases take direction from the highest level of state (Robertson, 2009: 194). The purpose of this strategy is show pro-regime strength “on the streets” as well as during elections (Robertson 2011: 180).

The second type of state mobilization strategy proposed by Robertson is regionally based. In this case, regional state elites mobilize local groups to extract some kind of benefit from the center.\(^{59}\) Roberson argues that this strategy was especially prominent in Russia during President Boris Yeltsin’s second term.

Despite the importance of Robertson’s insights on state mobilization strategies, there are a number of limitations in applying his argument more broadly to hybrid regimes as a whole. First, while Robertson incorporates regional dynamics into his study, this is only possible

\(^{58}\) The other two variables are organizational ecology and patterns of elite competition.

\(^{59}\) Robertson (2011) focuses in particular on the use of labor strikes by regional governors to extract transfers from the Kremlin.
because his analysis is limited to an in-depth longitudinal analysis of a single case—post-communist Russia. While regional dynamics certainly play a role in describing a state’s mobilization strategy, it is not feasible to incorporate them in a wide scale cross-national study. Second, when Robertson concludes his study by drawing broader comparisons to empirical cases other than Russia, he does so by reducing state mobilization strategies into a simple dichotomy of either mobilization or demobilization. Robertson himself admits that this dichotomy is an oversimplification (203). I agree, and my analysis shows that there are critical differences in state mobilization strategies that are not shown in the dichotomy proposed by Robertson.

One especially important cross-national difference is that not all ersatz social organizations or GONGOs are alike. In-depth country analyses of cases outside the post-communist region (Devota, 2004; Hawkins & Hansen, 2006; Ramirez, 2007), two country comparisons (Krastev, 2006), and regional reports (Evenson, 2008) reveal strong differences among so-called GONGOs in terms of the level of autonomy from the government, the intended geographic reach, as well as the scope of the population intended for mobilization. This work suggests that it is important to draw a distinction between attempts to inspire mobilization of large social groups throughout the country and instances where mobilization is more targeted in nature (Krastev, 2006). Except for these few studies, state inspired mobilization has often been overlooked by scholars and it has not been systematically examined in a wide scale, cross-national fashion over time. The present study seeks to address this lacuna by introducing an original typology of state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes that can be used to craft practical indicators for cross-national as well as longitudinal analysis.
Typology of State Mobilization Strategies

As the above review suggests, there are a broad array of policies that rulers in hybrid regimes may use to either mobilize or demobilize organized social groups to maintain power. In order to make sense of this broad range of policies, this dissertation draws on Henry Hale’s (2002) discussion of statist and liberal conceptions of state-society relations to formulate overarching strategy types.

The first type is a centralized strategy and it follows a highly statist version of state-society relations. The state initiates organization and encourages moderate participation within specified, albeit often changing parameters. In order to control and manage mobilization, the state generally establishes or sponsors groups in key organizational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment, or labor. It may even create pro-government civil society oversight bodies or councils. While certain groups are targeted for mobilization, the centralized strategy’s general purpose is to demobilize the majority of the population except at the time of elections. Groups targeted for demobilization are those that have been outspokenly critical of the regime and/or work in sensitive policy areas. Policies of demobilization include enacting burdensome regulations on social organizations or employing media resources to paint independent organizations as unpatriotic or the tools of western governments. In some cases, ruling groups

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60 According to Hale’s (2002: 307, 309) characterization of the statist version of state-society relations, the state takes on an active and protectionist role vis-à-vis society. This model places a premium on order, but risks falling into tyranny.

61 This insight is drawn from Harley Balzer’s (2003) discussion of “managed pluralism.” Managed pluralism refers to the state’s encouragement as well as constraining of societal and organizational diversity within constantly shifting boundaries (Balzer, 2003: 190). The concepts of managed pluralism and the centralized strategy share many features; however, they differ in terms of their application. For example, Balzer argues that managed pluralism is not only a form of state-society relations, but also a type of hybrid regime.

62 This includes actively demobilizing mobilized citizens and maintaining the demobilization of demobilized citizens.
will direct state agencies to harass independent groups or individuals. Examples of this strategy type include Russia under Vladimir Putin and Cambodia under Hun Sen.

In contrast, a *decentralized* strategy of mobilization follows a more liberal state-society model.\(^6^3\) In this case, the state invests in grassroots and highly participatory groups. It frequently draws on or forges alliances with the leadership of existing organized social groups to turn out at elections and demonstrations on behalf of the regime. Semi-autonomous, rather than controlled, mobilization therefore characterizes this strategy type. Demobilization techniques consist mainly of unflattering media coverage of opposition groups, but unlike the centralized strategy, states do not set up elaborate legal hurdles or restrictions on organizations. Thus, while some groups that are openly critical of the regime and work in sensitive policy areas are targeted for demobilization, the decentralized strategy generally tilts in the direction of widespread mobilization. Examples include Venezuela under Chavez, Bangladesh during the 1990s, and Sri Lanka.

The third type is a *diffuse* strategy. In this scenario, the state only minimally invests in either demobilization or mobilization except directly before elections. Moreover, in regimes employing the diffuse strategy, the media is often the primary tool for mobilization or promises of patronage via coalitions formed with already existing social organizations. Government neglect rather than formal institutional or legal rules creates barriers for independent organization. On the whole, ruling groups do little to systematically encourage widespread organization in support of the regime. Therefore, in comparison to the other two strategies, this

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\(^6^3\) According to Hale’s (2002: 307-308) characterization, the independence of society vis-à-vis the state is the defining element of a liberal version of state-society relations. As such, the state should provide only minimal institutional guarantees to enable non-state organizations to operate. This model places a premium on freedom while running the risk of anarchy.
type is reactive, rather than proactive in its policy orientation. Examples include Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia in the 1990s.

The above descriptions provide a general overview of the three strategy types. Tables 1-2 and 3-1 extend the discussion and list the policies observed in various illiberal hybrid regimes during the relevant time period, and groups these policies into three main component elements (bolded and listed on the left hand side of the table): controlled mobilization, semi-autonomous mobilization, and demobilization. Along with detailing the specific policies observed in illiberal hybrid regimes, Table 3-1 establishes a rough score for the classification of regimes into each type. Table 1-2 summarizes these expectations. The expectations in both tables are ideal types, and no state fits each criterion perfectly.

**Table 1-2. State Mobilization Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
<th>Diffuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controlled Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-Autonomous Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demobilization</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-1. State Mobilization Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controlled Mobilization</th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
<th>Diffuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Establish high-profile, state-funded voluntary organizations or movements</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Create civil society oversight bodies or councils</td>
<td>Yes 1</td>
<td>No 0</td>
<td>No 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Autonomous Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Initiate the creation of local voluntary organizations throughout the country</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Draw upon or forge alliances with the leadership of existing organized social groupings</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enact burdensome legal regulations on voluntary organizations</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Manipulate media resources against independent groups</td>
<td>High 1</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employ state agencies to investigate, interrogate, or imprison members of independent groups</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Restrict political rallies, strikes, and public meetings of independent groups</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Medium .5</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Use systematic violence against independent groups/leaders</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
<td>Low 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To classify a regime’s strategy as centralized, it must exhibit the following scores: Controlled Mobilization Score of 1 or greater and an Autonomous Mobilization Score of less than 1 and a Demobilization Score of 1.5 or greater.\textsuperscript{64}

*To classify a regime’s strategy as decentralized it must exhibit the following scores: Controlled Mobilization Score less than 1 and an Autonomous Mobilization Score of 1 or greater and a Demobilization Score of 3 or less.\textsuperscript{65}

*To classify a regime’s strategy as diffuse, it must exhibit the following scores: Controlled Mobilization Score less than 1 and an Autonomous Mobilization Score of less than 1 and a Demobilization Score of 1.5 or less.

\textsuperscript{64} Based on a breakdown of total state demobilization, which can range from 0 to 5, I created three roughly equal categories: \textit{low total} state demobilization $\leq$1.5; \textit{medium total} state demobilization $>1.5$-$3.0$; \textit{high total} state demobilization $>3$.

\textsuperscript{65} I selected 3 as the upper threshold for a medium level of demobilization based on breakdown of the demobilization variable into three approximate, but relatively, equal categories. See also the above footnote.
Table 3-1 brings together the insights from the literature review on state inspired mobilization and demobilization into a single framework of analysis. Thus, the specific policies listed on Table 3-1 are derived from the theoretical literature on hybrid regimes, the literature on contentious politics, country specific scholarly analyses, policy briefs, and country reports. Note that a number of the strategies in the demobilization category are part of what I previously described as the “backlash against democracy promotion.” And again, while these restrictions intensified after 2004 as governments attempted to avoid the spread of a “color revolution” to their country, they are by no means new (Gershman & Allen, 2006).

Beginning with the first policy on Table 3-1, scholars and policy makers alike assert that high-profile, state funded voluntary organizations and movements are an important feature of the post-cold war organizational landscape (Balzer, 2003; Evenson, 2008; Gershman & Allen, 2006; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law & National Endowment for Democracy, 2008; Robertson, 2011). This indicator therefore seeks to capture this increasingly popular form of state directed mobilization. The second policy in the controlled mobilization category is the creation of civil society oversight bodies or councils in which the state exerts considerable influence over which organizations are allowed to participate. This policy is included on Table 3-1 because a number of different countries, especially in the Eurasia region, have established oversight bodies, NGOs, or chambers in an attempt to channel and control civil society (see Nations in Transit country reports on Russia 2005 and Armenia 2008).

In the semi-autonomous mobilization category, the initiation of local voluntary organizations throughout the country is included based on the observation of countries which rule based on a highly participatory and pseudo state directed fashion (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006;
Ramirez, 2007). In comparison, drawing upon or forging alliances with the leadership of existing organized social groups is a much more frequent form of state mobilization and is used to some extent in all kinds of political systems (see for example the expansive literature on the mobilization of unions in both democratic and non-democratic contexts (R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Schmitter, 1974; Schmitter & Lehmann, 1979)).

When examining the policies in the demobilization category, it becomes clear that it is here that illiberal hybrid regimes especially exhibit their non-democratic nature. Some of the techniques described in this category are comparatively “tried and true” forms of repression, while others are nuanced innovations of the post-cold war era. One such noteworthy innovation is the manipulation of the legal regulation of voluntary organizations to inhibit and constrain organizational activity in countries around the world (Carothers, 2006; Freedom House, 2008; Gershman & Allen, 2006; Heydemann, 2007; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law & National Endowment for Democracy, 2008). These regulations are the main actions described in policy circles as the “the backlash against democracy promotion.” Such regulations include burdensome registration procedures or laws that enable invasive government supervisory oversight. Thus, governments can couch decisions to shut down or hamper the activities of groups they dislike in legal reasoning, providing their actions with a veneer of legitimacy before domestic and international audiences.

The second policy in the demobilization category is innovative and builds on the finding from the hybrid regime literature on the importance of media manipulation for the maintenance of competitive authoritarian rule (Case, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002a, 2006b). However, rather than looking at general media manipulation, this study is concerned
about the ways that the media is manipulated against independent social organizations. Single country analyses of state-society relations in countries as diverse as Sri Lanka, Russia, and Colombia reveal a pattern of government manipulation of the media to characterize certain social organizations as representations of foreign interests or agendas to discredit them and diminish their domestic societal support.

The next three policies in the demobilization category on Table 3-1 are drawn from the contentious politics literature on state repression of mobilization (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005). These policies are: employ state agencies to investigate, interrogate, or imprison members of independent groups; restrict political rallies, strikes, and public meetings of independent groups; and use systematic violence against independent groups/leaders. However, as previously described in the literature review, where the current study departs from the general contentious politics literature is to examine these policies in specific reference to independent social organizations rather than broader groups like the “political opposition” or “dissidents” (Lichbach 1987, Gupta et al 1993, Moore 1998, Davenport 1999, Davenport et al 2005) or the population as a whole (Fein 1993, Conway 1991, Krain 1997).

As shown on Tables 1-2 and 3-1, some of the key differences among the strategies are highlighted by varying levels and combinations of mobilization (whether controlled or semi-autonomous) with demobilization. Generally states that pursue a centralized strategy engage in high levels of controlled mobilization along with high levels of demobilization. In contrast, states that pursue a decentralized strategy are more likely to conduct semi-autonomous mobilization by initiating the creation of local voluntary organizations or forging alliances with existing social groups. While demobilizing tactics are part of this strategy, it is expected that less
demobilizing policies occur than under a centralized strategy. Finally, states that pursue a diffuse strategy exhibit low levels of either controlled or semi-autonomous mobilization. Demobilizing tactics, while certainly present under this strategy, are less severe than under the other two.

Nonetheless, one of the striking aspects of Tables 1-2 and 3-1 is not only the clear differences among the strategies, but also the similarities. For example, Table 3-1 shows that most illiberal hybrid regimes do not employ overtly coercive methods to demobilize individuals or groups as identified in the contentious politics literature. Frequently employing state agencies to harass independent organizations, constantly restricting political rallies, and employing large-scale, systematic violence against independent groups and their leaders are strategies much more in the preserve of full-scale authoritarian regimes rather than hybrid regimes. Instead, across all three strategy types it is much more likely to observe the use of more subtle coercive methods such as burdensome legal regulations of social organizations. Such methods enable the regime to maintain its appearance of openness and tolerance of political diversity while at the same time fostering an unequal playing field for social organizations.

In sum, Tables 1-2 and 3-1 represent a novel way to typologize the myriad mobilization strategies employed by hybrid regimes around the world. This typology incorporates the findings from disparate literatures into one overarching framework. Such a framework will allow scholars to systematically analyze state mobilization strategies in countries in different world regions, as well as assess various trends over time. This framework thus contributes to existing research on hybrid regimes, as it enables scholars to better explore and understand the dynamics of hybrid regimes.

82
Identifying Practical Measures of State Mobilization Strategies

Table 3-1 outlines the theoretical basis for the identification of a state’s mobilization strategy in a given year. However, it is necessary to develop a series of indicators related to the items in the table to both *practically* and *systematically* determine a state’s mobilization strategy. And practical measures largely depend on the availability of systematic evidence in sources with worldwide coverage to ensure comparability. Consequently, the three major sources used in this study are yearly publications from the U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House.\(^6^6\)

Out of the sources listed above, the majority of information for this study was obtained from a content analysis of U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports from 1990-2009. While the reports by no means offer a perfect or unbiased account of the protection of human rights in a country in a given year,\(^6^7\) they offer some of the most detailed as well as systematic information on the indicators of interest. To supplement U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports, I examined Human Rights Watch World Reports\(^6^8\) as well as Freedom House Country

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\(^{6^7}\) There is a broad range of criticism leveled at U.S. Human Rights Reports. For example, there are claims that the reports rely on information from politicized NGOs (NGO Monitor, 2007) or are based on double standards (Weisbrot, March 11, 2009).

\(^{6^8}\) Human Rights Watch Reports are not available for every country for every country year considered. In these cases, I consulted Amnesty International World Reports (1990-2010). I did so in order to best triangulate the data and to ensure that I would not miss a mobilization or demobilization event that would otherwise have gone unreported. In addition, to obtain supplementary information about the legal regulatory environment for NGOs, I consulted the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law database of legal documents and commentary (http://www.icnl.org/) as well as data from the NGO Law Monitor (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).
Reports for the time period 1990-2009.\textsuperscript{69} Finally, for post-communist countries I also consulted yearly USAID NGO Sustainability Index Reports (1998-2009) beginning in 1998.\textsuperscript{70}

Before discussing the indicators themselves, it is important to review two issues related to data limitations. First, to deal with difficulties locating comparable data in the demobilization category, I chose to focus on the treatment of human rights groups. I concentrate on human rights groups because they research and defend citizens against government abuse and, almost by definition, work on areas that are potentially politically sensitive to any type of regime. Therefore, the government’s treatment of human rights organizations is in many ways illustrative of the government’s tolerance towards social organizations that are critical of them. In addition to these theoretical reasons, U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports include a special section on human rights groups and their treatment. Human Rights Watch World Reports, while having less geographic reach than State Department Reports, include a special section about the treatment of human rights organizations. Therefore, for both theoretical and practical reasons, human rights groups are an important focus of the current study.

Second, because of the deficit of systematic information, I was unable to collect data on whether and when states give pro-government voluntary organizations preferential access to state resources or benefits, and whether and when they offer material incentives to individuals or groups to mobilize directly before elections or other critical junctures in support of the


\textsuperscript{70} Because I had less detailed information for cases without a communist experience, I consulted country experts to check the general coding of state mobilization strategies. I received feedback from experts for all countries except Guatemala. In addition, because of conflicting information in their country reports, I consulted experts for the post-communist cases of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
government. In my close readings of various yearly reports, I found that these activities were mentioned only infrequently and somewhat randomly. I believe that this is the case because such activities are difficult to verify and not because they are rare. Thus, while it is highly likely that these actions play an important part in a state’s mobilization strategy, they unfortunately are not considered in this study due to data limitations.

Taken together, content analysis of U.S State Department Human Rights Reports, Human Rights Watch Reports, and Freedom House Reports provide the empirical foundation for the coding of state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes. A more detailed discussion of the coding rules applied across countries is set forth in the following sections.71

**Controlled Mobilization Indicators**

There are two indicators in the controlled mobilization category in Table 3-1. The first examines whether the state establishes or maintains high-profile, state-funded voluntary organizations or movements in a given year. To determine a high score on this indicator I examine whether government sponsored organizations exist in multiple organizational spheres such as: youth, human rights, environment, or labor. To determine a medium and low score respectively, I examine whether government sponsored organizations exist in one sphere versus none reported.

The second policy in the controlled mobilization category is the creation of civil society oversight bodies or councils in which the state has a considerable influence over the selection of organizations allowed to participate. For example, in 2005 the Russian leadership initiated the creation of a Public Chamber with the official goal of promoting greater interaction between

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71 The exact coding rules and worksheet is included in the Appendix.
society and government authorities, all the while maintaining an influential role in the selection of the Chamber’s 126 members. This indicator is coded dichotomously: a council of civil society is either created by the government or maintains its operations throughout the year or no such institution exists.

_Semi-Autonomous Mobilization Indicators_

The first indicator in the semi-autonomous mobilization category on Table 3-1 captures whether or not the state initiates the creation of local voluntary organizations throughout the country. A prime example is the creation of citizen networks called Bolivarian Circles (*círculos bolivarianos*) in localities throughout Venezuela. These groups were intended to provide grassroots support for social services and work on pressing local problems such as housing, health, and transportation—and, during campaigns, to support Chavez. In comparison, the second indicator, whether the state draws upon or forges alliances with existing organized social groupings, is more complex. To determine a high, medium, and low measure I examine whether reports note affiliation between the government and specific unions, student groups, or religious organizations. If reports note that these groups participate in demonstrations, this indicator is coded as high. For example, in Bangladesh reports note that the two major political parties, the

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72 One third of the members are appointed by the president. These members then elect another one-third of the members from national social organizations. The remaining one-third of the members are selected from regional organizations via conferences in each of the seven federal districts.

73 It is beyond the purview of this study to analyze the history of already existing social organizations and their relationship to the state and political parties. In my study, longevity will serve as a proxy for semi-autonomy. While this practice is imprecise and introduces bias based on the time period covered, there is reason to believe that the longer an organization exists, the more difficult it is for the state to simply “do away with” the organization and hence the more autonomous it often becomes. Trade unions in South Korea are a case in point. Originally established by the state to serve its development goals, over time unions developed greater and greater levels of autonomy from their creators and ultimately served as one of the key interest groups that pushed for democratic reform and change in South Korea (Cumings, 2005)
Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party, have strong affiliations with unions and student groups—and these groups are frequently mobilized to participate in political demonstrations, sometimes leading to the paralysis of daily life in the capital. If affiliation is noted, but these groups are not mentioned to take part in demonstrations, this indicator is coded as medium. If no affiliation or connections are noted, this indicator is coded as low.

**Demobilization Indicators**

The first indicator in the demobilization category on Table 3-1 considers the legal regulation of voluntary organizations in the country. To determine whether or not legal regulations are burdensome, I focus on what the 2008 “Defending Civil Society: A Report of the World Movement for Democracy” calls barriers to entry and barriers to operational activity. Barriers to entry include burdensome registration procedures while barriers to operational activity entail invasive government supervisory oversight or restrictions on foreign funding. A high score on this indicator signifies that registration is burdensome and that laws enable officials to monitor associations in an intrusive manner. A medium score signifies that either registration is burdensome or laws enable intrusive means for officials to monitor associations. A low score signifies that registration is fairly straightforward and there are no laws that invite invasive oversight of NGOs.

The next mobilization indicator considers whether the government manipulates media resources against certain social groups, especially human rights organizations. A high score signifies that government officials publicly disparage NGOs. For example, throughout the 1990s ultra-nationalist leaders and the government-controlled media in Serbia made public insinuations
that human rights groups were traitors. According to the State Department (1995), the constant stream of invective left human rights activists vulnerable to public animosity. A medium score denotes that an official publicly disparaged NGOs once in a given year. A low score signifies that reports do not mention whether government officials publically disparage NGOs.

The next indicator focuses on human rights groups and takes into account whether the government uses state agencies to harass them. Considered here are threats to human rights monitors and/or legal harassment through the use of various state agencies (security services, tax police, fire inspections, criminal prosecution, etc). If reports note that state agencies are frequently employed to harass human right groups, the indicator is coded as high. If general harassment or only a handful of cases are mentioned, the indicator is coded as medium. A low score signifies that human rights organizations faced little to no harassment from state agencies.

The next indicator in the demobilization category examines whether the government restricts rallies, strikes, and public meetings of voluntary organizations. Here the focus is broader than human rights organizations. A high score denotes that officials frequently do not allow demonstrations by organizations, organizations are frequently not allowed to hold meetings in central locations, the legal requirements to hold a public rally are very difficult to fulfill, or multiple rallies are broken up by the police and demonstrators are detained. To qualify in the high category, at least two of the “or” conditions must be met. In Russia in 2009, for example, reports detail how local officials selectively denied certain groups permission to assemble or offered alternate venues that were located in inconvenient locations. Reports also describe how authorities arrested activists taking part in multiple demonstrations throughout the year. In contrast to the high score, a medium score signifies that there is some restriction of
demonstrations or that legal requirements to hold a public rally are difficult to fulfill. Such a case is Moldova in 2007, where officials at times limited the right of freedom of assembly, but reports noted only three relatively minor incidences of authorities interfering in demonstrations. A low score denotes that either there were no reports of denials of registration of demonstrations or other ways the authorities attempted to block a demonstration from happening, or only a small number of small meetings were blocked. In Colombia, for example, it was noted throughout the 1990s that the authorities did not interfere with public meetings and demonstrations, and usually granted the required permission.

The final indicator in the demobilization category considers the extent to which the state employs violence to demobilize societal groups. To code this indicator, I examine two main incidences of violence. Following the general focus on human rights groups, I consider how frequently human rights defenders are killed in a given year. I examine whether or not demonstrations are broken up or end violently, resulting in either injury or death. It is important to note that it is very difficult and in many ways arbitrary to establish thresholds for measurement, as a single casualty is one too many. However, in order to make a more informed approximation of such a threshold, I employed an inductive process to determine cut-off points for the high, medium, and low categories. I tallied the number of injured and dead for each category for all illiberal hybrid regimes (see Appendix for these graphs). The high category signifies that multiple rallies are broken up violently by the police resulting in over 150 injuries.

74 The data on the violence measures are often imperfect and unclear. And the numbers collected in this study are approximations and estimates. In many instances reports do not detail the exact number of injured, but rather say “several” or even “unknown.” And sources often vary in terms of the number of injured or dead reported, especially when considering official statistics. For example, on May 17th and 18th 2002, the State Department lists 6 killed and 24 injured during demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan, while Human Rights Watch claims 5 demonstrators and some 90 people were injured in the same time period.
or 20 deaths. Also included is whether human rights activists are frequently murdered or are physically threatened (more than 4). The medium category denotes that rallies are broken up violently by the police resulting in a range of 50 to 150 injuries or 6 to 20 deaths. Or in the medium category it is noted that human rights defenders are occasionally murdered (2-4). A low score signifies that rallies rarely end in violence resulting in 0 to 49 injuries or 0 to 5 deaths. In addition, human rights defenders are infrequently physically threatened or murdered (one or less).

In sum, Table 3-1 provides a detailed list of the expectations of state mobilization and demobilization indicators. Beneath Table 3-1 is a practical summary of the overall numerical scores necessary to classify a state’s mobilization strategy in a given year. For example, to classify a state’s strategy as centralized it must have a total controlled mobilization score of 1 or greater. This means that if the component indicators of controlled mobilization do not equal at least one, then the state has not performed enough controlled mobilization to be classified as the centralized strategy. Because it is expected that states employing a centralized strategy will undertake multiple policies intended to demobilize independent social groups, they should have a total demobilization score that is greater than 1.5 to reflect at least a medium level of state demobilization. As such, based on a breakdown of total state demobilization, which can range from 0 to 5, I created three roughly equal categories: low total state demobilization ≤1.5; medium total state demobilization >1.5-3.0; and high total state demobilization >3. In total, this

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75 Additionally the 1.5 low threshold makes sense due to the mean demobilization score for all country years, which is 1.58 for all 282 country years.
study introduces a unique and practical coding scheme of state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes.

Already Existing Measures Related to the Current Study

Before proceeding to the initial results of the 25 illiberal hybrid regimes identified in the time period 1990-2009, I review how the coding system detailed in this chapter compares with already existing measures.

One of the best known data sets of human rights directly related to the study at hand is the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (2010). Like the current study, the main source of this project’s data is U.S. State Department Human Rights reports. This project includes variables on basic human rights, one of which is “freedom of assembly and association.” Based on content analysis of State Department Reports, countries are given a score of 0) freedom of association and assembly is severely restricted 1) freedom of association and assembly is limited or denied for certain groups and 2) freedom of association and assembly is virtually unrestricted. While this measure provides an essential macro comparative measure across all countries of the world, it is not nuanced enough to capture the differences among hybrid regimes identified by this project.

A second measure is Freedom House’s “associational rights” indicator from the yearly Freedom in the World survey. As detailed in the survey’s methodological appendix, this indicator is composed of three sub-indicators: 1) freedom of assembly 2) freedom for nongovernmental organizations and 3) the right of trade unions to exist independent of the state and to take part in effective collective bargaining. Each of the sub-indicators is measured on a
scale of zero to four, with four representing greater protection/freedom, which yields a total of 12 possible points for the associational rights score. These sub-indicators contain a wide range of policies and questions that are similar to the current study such as:

- Are peaceful protests, particularly those of a political nature, banned or severely restricted?
- Are peaceful protestors detained by police in order to prevent them from engaging in such actions?
- Are registration and other legal requirements for nongovernmental organizations particularly onerous and intended to prevent them from functioning freely?
- Are members of nongovernmental organizations intimidated, arrested, imprisoned, or assaulted because of their work? (Freedom House, 1990-2010)

However, the associational rights indicator was not directly used in this study for two reasons. The first is due to the limited time period that the associational rights score is publicly available (only 2006-2009). Second, the publicly available data only include the overall “associational rights” score, and not the individual sub-indicators. Thus, it is impossible to tell what specific policies or activities are associated with a given overall score.

Take as a whole, either because of the measures themselves or the coverage of the indicators in already existing datasets, I conducted my own coding of the component elements of state mobilization strategies identified in this study. The rest of the chapter provides a series of descriptive cross-national and longitudinal comparisons of the nine component elements of state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes.

**Descriptive Results of State Mobilization Strategies in Hybrid Regimes**

Before presenting the classification of state mobilization strategies for all illiberal hybrid regimes, it is essential to make a few general observations about state mobilization strategies.
When examining all country years, the most common mobilization strategy is diffuse. Indeed, states pursue a diffuse strategy in approximately 70 percent of all country years. The other two strategies are comparatively rare, as states only pursued a decentralized strategy in 16.7 percent of country years and a centralized strategy in 13 percent of country years.

**Figure 3-1. Demobilization Additive Measure (0-5) by Percent of Country Years**
Building from the observation that the diffuse strategy is the most common, it is unsurprising that on the whole, there are generally low amounts of demobilization tactics employed by illiberal hybrid regimes when considering all 282 country years. As demonstrated in Figure 3-2, this theme continues when examining the frequency across each of the five individual demobilization tactics. Figure 3-2 reveals that out of all of the demobilization tactics, enacting or maintaining burdensome legal regulations is the most common, while employing violence against human rights organizations and demonstrators is the most rare. Hybrid regimes generally do not employ overtly coercive methods to demobilize individuals or groups as
identified in the contentious politics literature. Frequently employing state agencies to harass independent organizations, constantly restricting political rallies, and employing large-scale, systematic violence against independent groups and their leaders are strategies much more in the preserve of full-scale authoritarian regimes rather than hybrid regimes. Instead, across all three strategy types one is much more likely to observe the use of more subtle coercive measures. Such methods enable the regime to maintain its appearance of openness and tolerance of political diversity while at the same time fostering an unequal playing field for social organizations. This finding echoes Schedler’s (2009b: 183) claim that hybrid regimes “do not rely on naked repression” but instead “engage in a game of illusions and contradictions.”

**Figure 3-3. Comparison of Demobilization Indicators by Era**
While on the whole rulers employed relatively few demobilization tactics, this picture changes when looking at these rates over time. Figure 3-4, which shows mean demobilization tactic levels by year, demonstrates a clear trend of increased amounts of demobilization over time, especially after 1999. This trend is further illustrated when comparing the frequency of individual demobilization tactics by time period (1990-1999 versus 2000-2009) as shown in Figure 3-3. In the case of each individual demobilization tactic, there were more instances of their medium or high usage in the 2000-2009 time period than in the 1990-1999 time period. In particular, in the 2000-2009 period, the number of country cases in which high amounts of media manipulation against independent groups occurred and/or state security services were used to investigate, harass or intimidate human rights groups dramatically increased.
This time effect is significant not only for demobilization tactics, but also for mobilization as well (see Figure 3-5). These differences over time may reflect greater experience managing multiparty elections after the end of the cold war. In the 1990s many rulers may have simply lacked the experience or know-how to manipulate multiparty elections,\(^76\) providing further support for what Lucan Way (2005) terms “pluralism by default.”\(^77\) That said, as time went on, rulers have become much more cognizant about the need for a mobilization strategy. In addition, increased mobilization and demobilization levels could be a reflection of the lessons elites learned from popular protest that ousted rulers in the post-cold war period in

\(^{76}\) Perhaps in some cases rulers overestimated the consequences of deviations from democratic practices in their relationship with the international community.

\(^{77}\) According to Way (2005), politics in many post-Soviet countries were competitive and open in the 1990s mainly because rulers lacked the coordination and know-how to be successful autocrats.

Classification of State Mobilization Strategy for all Hybrid Regimes, 1990-2009

Moving from a general discussion of mobilization strategies for all country years, Table 3-2 introduces the country specific classification of state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes from 1990-2009. Note that a country is only listed in Table 3-2 during the years in which it is classified as a hybrid regime during the 1990-2009 time period.79 The mobilization strategy is not coded for countries that are some other type of regime during this time period.

Recall that to classify a regime’s strategy the following scores are used:

1. **Centralized**
   - a. Controlled Mobilization Score of 1 or greater
   - b. Autonomous Mobilization Score of less than 1
   - c. Demobilization Score greater than 1.5.80

2. **Decentralized**
   - a. Controlled Mobilization Score of less than 1
   - b. Autonomous Mobilization Score of 1 or greater
   - c. Demobilization Score 3 or less.

3. **Diffuse**
   - a. Controlled Mobilization Score of less than 1
   - b. Autonomous Mobilization Score of less than 1
   - c. Demobilization Score of 1.5 or less.81

78 For example, in the post-communist region, scholars have noted that some states created pro-regime youth movements and restricted the operation of foreign funded NGOs because of the lessons they learned from the events surrounding the colored revolutions (Beissinger, 2007; Hale, 2006). These issues and themes will be discussed much more at length in the Conclusion.

79 The exceptions are the countries of the former Soviet Union. Although Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, all become hybrid regimes in 1991, I do not code their mobilization strategy until 1992 due to limited information in the three main source reports in 1991.

80 As Table 3-2 shows, there are sometimes lower than expected levels of demobilization in countries that pursue a centralized strategy. Because the next chapter is concerned with margins of victory, I tested whether there was a significant difference between high and low mobilization levels in the centralized category on margins of victory. These tests did not produce any statistically significant patterns or trends and therefore I classify even the low cases as demonstrating the centralized strategy.

81 As Table 3-2 shows, there are higher than expected levels of demobilization in countries that pursue a diffuse strategy in many cases. Because the next chapter is concerned with margins of victory, I tested whether there was a
Table 3-2. Categorization of Mobilization Strategy, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
<th>Diffuse</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (1990-1997)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru (1995-1999)</td>
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significant difference between high and low mobilization levels in the diffuse category on margins of victory. These tests did not reveal any statistically significant patterns or trends and therefore I include all cases within the broad diffuse category.

82(##) Country displayed a low level of demobilization ≤1.5; (*) Country displayed a medium level of demobilization ≤ 3; (!) Country displayed a high level of demobilization >3.

83 2005-2007 #
84 2006!
85 1996-1997 *
86 1996, 1999#
87 1996 *
88 2003-2004 #
89 1999, 2009#
90 2001-2002#
91 1997#
92 2008!
93 1992-2009 *
96 2001-2003 *
97 1999, 2001-2003, 2008*
101 2007*
102 2009!
103 1995-1999*
The sheer number of countries listed under the diffuse category on Table 3-2 shows that this strategy is the most common. And this is especially the case in the 1990s. A frequency analysis for the first decade after the cold war reveals that the diffuse strategy was employed almost 83 percent of the time. After the turn of the new century, this rate dropped to around 55 percent. In this same time period, the frequency of the centralized strategy was around 24 percent and the decentralized strategy around 21 percent, which significantly increased from approximately 4 and 13 percent respectively in the 1990s.

Table 3-2 indicates that the mobilization strategies rulers pursue are relatively stable over time. Nevertheless, there are various circumstances in which these strategies change. For example, all of the countries listed under the centralized strategy first pursued a diffuse strategy. The case of Moldova is especially interesting in this regard. As shown on Table 3-2, rulers in Moldova generally pursued a diffuse strategy. However, after a 2002 government initiative revealed a low level of support from NGOs, the communist government attempted to infuse civil society with loyal groups. In spite of this, the Nations in Transit report (2006) notes that attempts to formulate pro-government groups other than unions had largely failed in 2005. The government then reverted to its diffuse strategy. Cases other than Moldova exhibit short-lived mobilization strategies. For example, rulers in Madagascar, Romania, and Georgia pursued a

103 1993! 1995! 1998-2000!; all other years *
104 2002!
diffuse strategy in all but one year. When rulers in these countries pursued a different strategy important elections took place either that year or the year after.

Table 3-2 provides the overall classification of state mobilization strategies among the 25 illiberal hybrid regimes in this study. The next section provides a more descriptive, narrative account of these strategies in two countries from different regions: Venezuela (diffuse and decentralized) and Cambodia (diffuse and centralized). This narrative fills in and elaborates what these strategies, and their combination, look like in practice.

*Venezuela*

As reflected in Table 3-2 I classify Venezuela as displaying a diffuse state mobilization strategy under President Hugo Chavez from 1999-2001 and then a decentralized strategy from 2002-2009. During the 1999-2001 period country reports did not discuss highly visible ways that the state attempted to mobilize organized social groups, either by creating state funded movements, establishing semi-autonomous organizations, or forging alliances with already established social groups.\(^{105}\) Reports mention minimal amounts of demobilization tactics. Generally it was reported that human rights and other organizations were able to freely conduct their work without intimidation or threats from state security services. Rallies, even those held by the opposition, were allowed to take place without restriction. Demobilization tactics that were employed at medium levels include the legal regulation of social organizations, media manipulation, and systematic violence at demonstrations. For example, the Supreme Court made

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\(^{105}\) One exception is the government’s repeated attempts to influence and interfere in elections of the leadership of the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (CTV), which represents most unionized workers in Venezuela (U.S. State Department Reports 2001-2002). In 2000 a Bolivarian Workers Force (FBT) was created that is allied with the Chavez government (U.S. State Department, 2000).
a series of restrictive rulings about the activity of foreign funded NGOs and the general regulation of NGOs. But despite the signals that rulings such as these send to social organizations, the government did not actually implement the Court’s decision.106

After 2000 politics became increasingly polarized in Venezuela and a powerful anti-Chavez alliance developed among established groups such as the trade union federation, the business federation, the Catholic church, and the mass media (Levine, 2006). These organizations were capable of organizing frequent and large anti-Chavez rallies and demonstrations. These efforts culminated in a nationwide strike in April 2002, leading to the temporary overthrow of the Chavez government (U.S. State Department, 2002). Beginning in December 2001, the Chavez regime responded to this threat by forming a series of increasingly structured semi-autonomous107 citizen networks to support the regime including, most prominently, the “Bolivarian Circles” (círculos bolivarianos), the Community Planned Councils, and Communal Councils.108

From 2002 to 2009 the Chavez regime initiated more demobilization tactics. In 2005 Venezuela revised its penal code to impose new restrictions on certain types of demonstrations. This soon led to significant police crackdowns on demonstrations,109 leading me to code

106 This remained the case until the end of this study in 2009.
107 It is difficult to ascertain how indirectly or directly financed these groups are from the government. Scholarly accounts are divided. See (García-Guadilla, 2007; Harnecker, 2007; Hawkins & Hansen, 2006; Lovera, 2008).
108 The Bolivarian Circles were the first to form and were intended to provide grassroots support for social services and work on pressing local problems such as housing, health, and transportation—and during campaigns—to support Chavez. As such, these groups were a major source of Chavez’s support during during the events in April 2002 (Freedom House, 2003). However, by 2005 the number of círculos declined and were replaced by Community Planned Councils, a new initiative intended to enhance participatory democracy. These councils evolved into Communal Councils. The Councils have many of the same goals and format of the círculos, but are much more formally structured and run.
109 From 2003 to 2005 it is important to note that while the police did not detain or break up opposition rallies, numerous marches or demonstrations were disrupted by supposed government supporters, giving Venezuela a medium score.
Venezuela as highly restrictive of public rallies in 2007 and 2009.\textsuperscript{110} The number of injuries at demonstrations since 2007 led me to code Venezuela as using high levels violence as a demobilization tactic.\textsuperscript{111} While the legal regulatory environment of social organizations remained at a medium level during the 2002-2009 time frame,\textsuperscript{112} this period saw a significant increase in anti-NGO media coverage and government representatives and supporters repeatedly threatened and sought to intimidate human rights groups.

\textit{Cambodia}

Like Venezuela, Cambodia began its status as an illiberal hybrid regime with a diffuse strategy (1994-1995), but then changed its strategy to centralized from 1996-2009. During the 1994-1995 time period, country reports discussed only limited ways that the state attempted to mobilize organized social groups, such as by fostering and maintaining historic alliances with unions developed during the communist period.\textsuperscript{113} Reports mention minimal amounts of demobilizing tactics. At this time, there was little to no evidence of manipulation of the media against NGOs, restriction of rallies, or systematic violence. The legal regulatory environment for NGOs was not very restrictive, but received a medium score due to the confusion about the rules for registration and delays. Generally human rights organizations were allowed to operate freely

\footnotesize\
\textsuperscript{110} Not coincidentally, these years are also when crucial referendums on President Chavez’s rule took place. The 2007 referendum was a vote on two blocks of constitutional amendments, including among many other things, abolishing term limits for the presidency. The 2009 referendum was a vote of whether to abolish term limits for presidents, state governors, mayors, and national assembly deputies.\textsuperscript{111} In 2004 the number of injuries at demonstrations was quite high, leading to coding of high violence for that year. In this year the important 2004 referendum took place in which voters had to decide on whether to recall President Chavez from office.\textsuperscript{112} In 2006 the Chavez regime proposed a new NGO law that would significantly increase the reporting requirements as well as discretion of government officials to regulate the activities of social organizations. However, as of 2009 this law was not passed.\textsuperscript{113} In 1979 Vietnamese forces installed a new communist government to replace the Khmer Rouge. Subsequently civil war raged until 1991 with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, which called for new elections and disarmament. Despite the treaty, the Khmer Rouge continued their insurgency until the late 1990s.
in the country, but there were reports of their restriction at the provincial level, leading to a medium scoring of state security service harassment.

Since 1996, however, the state began to invest in both mobilization and demobilization tactics. And in many ways this change coincided with the increased power struggle between the Communist People Party’s (CPP) and its coalition partner, the royalist FUNCINPEC. A military buildup on both sides led to a brief outbreak of fighting in the capital in July 1997, which resulted in the CPP’s Hun Sen as the undisputed leader of Cambodia (Ledgerwood) while still serving in a coalition government.\(^\text{114}\) As such, since 1996 state-sponsored organizations began to crop up in various spheres such as unions, youth, and electoral monitoring. The pro CPP youth group, the Pagoda Boys, became especially prominent. This group became famous for its counter-opposition tactics and rallies, including the use of violence in some cases.\(^\text{115}\)

The use of various demobilization tactics also increased. In 1997 the government launched an NGO Monitoring Commission that especially focused on groups believed to be linked with politics or human rights (Human Rights Watch, 1998).\(^\text{116}\) That said, after the 1997 crisis the state did not use the legal regulation of NGOs as an important tool of repression. Instead, state security services stepped up their harassment and intimidation of human rights groups after 1996, with numerous reports of such activity at the local level.\(^\text{117}\) The government’s restriction of rallies increased to a high level, as the government routinely refused to issue

\(^{114}\) After the events in July 1997 FUNCIPEC members still remained in the government, but the previous co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was replaced.

\(^{115}\) For example, in September 2005 counter demonstrators described as members of the Pagoda Boys assaulted demonstrators at an unauthorized Students for Democracy protest (State Department, 2005).

\(^{116}\) The legal regulatory environment did not remain highly restrictive for long, however. In 2001 the government adopted a Memo of Understanding for NGOs, which reduced confusion about registration and other practices.

\(^{117}\) This harassment decreased to a medium level in 2008 and 2009.
permits for demonstrations and forcibly dispersed many demonstrations actually held. And finally, in a selection of different years, public officials derided various NGO groups.

This review of Venezuela and Cambodia illustrates how state mobilization strategies look in practice. It further demonstrates the ways in which rulers like President Chavez and Prime Minister Hun Sen have updated and modernized their repressive techniques to deal with competitive multiparty elections in the context of non-democracy.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I presented an original typology of state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes. Incorporating insights from multiple literatures and sources into one framework of analysis, this typology categorizes state mobilization strategies into three overarching types: centralized, decentralized, and diffuse. I put forward practical empirical measures of these strategies to form an original dataset. This dataset was compiled based on content analysis of U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House reports for 25 illiberal hybrid regimes in the first decades after the end of the cold war (1990-2009). This innovative dataset enables systematic analysis of state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes both cross-nationally and over time.

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118 Prominent among these incidents was the harsh crackdown of post-election demonstrations in September 1998. For example, Human Rights Watch (2001) notes that: “Local and national authorities, including the prime minister, made threatening statements against the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), a coalition of human rights organizations, after it publicly condemned the executions and "disappearances" [of supposed coup plotters]. He [the prime minister] accused the CHRAC of ‘protecting criminals who have killed people.’ On August 29, in what appeared likely to become the strongest move against rights organizations in eight years, the Ministry of Defense announced that it would file defamation charges against the CHRAC because of its public statement.”
Preliminary statistical analysis of this dataset confirms that the type of state mobilization strategy employed by a hybrid regime does not necessarily remain static and illustrates a number of noteworthy trends. One, illiberal hybrid regimes have updated and modernized their repressive techniques, largely abandoning the “tried and true” repressive techniques emphasized in the contentious politics literature. In modern hybrid regimes, demobilizing tactics are now largely limited to a relatively small subset of actions that appear less overtly repressive, like burdensome legal regulations for social organizations. Indeed, policy makers have been rightly concerned about the increasingly burdensome legal regulations these regimes place on social organizations, as this is the most widely used demobilizing tactic in illiberal hybrid regimes.

Another significant finding is that the diffuse strategy is the most common of the three strategies—and was especially dominant in the 1990s. However, after the turn of the new century, the centralized and decentralized state mobilization strategies, which are more proactive in nature, increased in frequency. A final striking trend is that while there is a large amount of stability over time in the mobilization strategies rulers pursue, there are various instances in which these strategies change. Moreover, a very preliminary exploration of countries that changed their mobilization for short periods of time reveals that important elections occurred either that year or the year immediately after.

On the whole, the evidence presented here suggests interesting and politically relevant trends associated with state mobilization strategies. In the next chapter I focus on one such trend: the relationship between mobilization and electoral outcomes. Specifically, are particular strategies associated with different levels of political competition—one of the key attributes of a hybrid regime?
CHAPTER 4

Time Series Analysis of State Mobilization Strategies and Political Competition

In Chapter 3 I introduced an original typology and dataset of state mobilization strategies in illiberal hybrid regimes. I sketched a series of trends across illiberal hybrid regimes from 1990-2009, such as the frequency and timing of particular state mobilization strategies. Out of these trends, the interplay between short-term changes in state mobilization strategies and elections was especially striking. In this chapter I delve more deeply into the relationship between these two variables. In particular, I ask whether certain state mobilization strategies are associated with more or less interparty competition across illiberal hybrid regimes.

I focuses on political competition in this chapter because it is a defining feature of a hybrid regime (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002a). As set forth in Chapter 2, the entire hybrid regime concept is based on an understanding that competitive multiparty elections produce a qualitatively different type of regime than one with uncompetitive multiparty elections. When elections are competitive, they play an important role in the distribution of power. In contrast, regimes that hold uncompetitive multiparty elections utilize mechanisms other than elections to distribute power and the possibility for change in the status quo through electoral processes is severely curtailed. Understanding patterns of competition within hybrid regimes, and especially how these may result in the regime becoming more or less competitive over time, illuminates a key part of these regimes’ general political dynamic and their relative prospects for transitioning either to democracy or authoritarianism.

I contribute to this important topic of research by investigating the impact of state mobilization strategies on patterns of political competition in 25 illiberal hybrid regimes. The
central question I analyze is whether certain strategies are more or less effective at producing electoral victories or even electoral dominance. Despite the existence of only a limited number of elections in illiberal hybrid regimes since the end of the cold war, I find the emergence of a clear trend: a combination of descriptive statistics and regression analysis shows that the mobilization strategy chosen has a significant effect on the margin of victory in presidential elections and legislative elections that occur in presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) systems. Specifically, in presidential systems the centralized strategy is associated with larger margins of victory than the decentralized or diffuse strategy. Interestingly, the form of mobilization chosen does not appear to be a statistically significant factor in determining the margin of electoral victory in parliamentary systems. Through the lens of state mobilization strategies and their effects, this chapter demonstrates how hybrid regimes in presidential systems need not resort to overt forms of repression to become less competitive over time.

State Mobilization Strategies and Political Competition

Political competition is one of the defining features of a hybrid regime. The qualitatively new phenomenon that inspired the concept of a “hybrid regime” is the existence of competitive multi-party elections despite an uneven playing field (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002). In order to examine dynamic trends over time within the subset of illiberal hybrid regimes, I measure competition as the margin of victory or the difference in the percent of votes for the first and second place finisher in presidential elections.\textsuperscript{120} In legislative elections, competition is measured as the margin of victory or the percent difference in the number of seats between the

\textsuperscript{120} Referendums for term extensions or constitutional amendments for never ending presidential terms are treated as “elections.”
first and second place finisher.\footnote{Because independents are by definition, a heterogeneous group of individuals, they are not considered as a group in legislative elections.} In both cases, margins of victory range from 0 to 1. Greater margins of victory signify less political competition, while smaller margins of victory denote more political competition.

I employ margins of victory as a measure of political competition in order to analyze and capture trends among illiberal hybrid regimes. Specifically, this form of measurement allows me to make fine-tuned distinctions among hybrid regimes,\footnote{This form of measurement is based on Sartori’s (1976) classic understanding of competitiveness.} rather than focusing on turnover. It also skirts potential methodological issues of endogeneity, as I use turnover as an indicator of a hybrid regime.

Measuring political competition based on margins of victory is common in the hybrid regime literature. One, this measure is often used to establish different levels of competition, usually by creating a threshold (Brownlee, 2009b; Ekman, 2009; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Wantchekon, 2003). Two, this measure is preferable to others that examine interparty competitiveness such as the effective number of parties. As Schedler (2009b: 192) astutely notes, the margin of victory measure is most useful for the analysis of hybrid regimes because it is straightforwardly linear. Conventional counts of parties suggest that more is better, but in hybrid regimes, the existence of numerous, small parties often signifies low levels of competition. And on a more practical level, Schedler points out that margins of victory are relevant to the political actors themselves.\footnote{For example, during his 2012 presidential campaign Vladimir Putin publicly announced that achieving more than 50 percent of the vote to avoid a run-off election was very important ("Putin Says he May Face Run-Off in Russia's Presidential Election," February 1, 2012).}
Having established the measure of political competition used in this section of the study, it is next essential to review potential hypotheses about state mobilization strategies and margins of victory. I derived four hypotheses based on my theoretical understanding of the three different strategies:

H1: The centralized strategy provides significant support (resources, opportunities, etc.) to rulers’ “friends,” while at the same time making it more difficult for their “enemies” to mobilize their ranks. There are, however, mitigating factors, as the centralized strategy will not eliminate all forms of diversity, nor will it overly mobilize society. *The centralized strategy is associated with large margins of victory over time in comparison to the other two strategies. The centralized strategy is an effective tool of power.*

H2: The decentralized strategy aids in the large-scale mobilization of rulers’ friends across the country. However, because rulers do not employ numerous policies to demobilize organized social groups, it may be possible for their enemies to mobilize their ranks to match the rulers’. Therefore the decentralized strategy may be linked with either large or small margins of victory, depending on the mobilization power of the opposition. *The decentralized strategy is associated with medium margins of victory over time in comparison to the other two strategies. The decentralized strategy is a moderately effective tool of power.*

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124 Examining whether strategies are an effective “tool of power” is inspired by Schedler’s (2009b) analysis of strategies of electoral manipulation on margins of victory.
H3: The diffuse strategy does not significantly help rulers’ friends mobilize, nor does it prevent their enemies from mobilization. Ruling groups are therefore highly vulnerable to changes in the political winds and the mobilization potential of their enemies. *The diffuse strategy is associated with variable margins of victory. This variability will average out to low margins of victory in comparison to the other strategies. The diffuse strategy is not an effective tool of power.*

H4: The above hypotheses will especially be evident for presidential elections, where the stakes of a loss are highest.

**Empirical Testing of Hypotheses with State Mobilization Strategy Dataset**

This section presents a series of empirical tests of the four proposed hypotheses of state mobilization strategies and political competition. These analyses are based on the original data set of state mobilization strategies in 25 illiberal hybrid regimes introduced in Chapter 3. Out of the 282 country years in the overall sample, 92 are election years. During the relevant time period (1990-2009),\(^\text{125}\) there were a total of 49 presidential elections and 71 legislative elections (see Tables 4-1 and 4-2). As Figure 4-1 shows, the elections are fairly evenly distributed across time. In comparison, the regional concentration of elections is uneven. In the case of presidential elections, the majority occurred in the former Soviet Union and Latin America (see

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\(^{125}\) Elections that are excluded from the analysis for illiberal hybrid regimes during this time period are the Russian presidential elections in 1991, the Kyrgyz presidential elections in 1991, the Ukrainian presidential elections in 1991, and the Moldovan presidential elections in 1991. These elections are excluded because I was unable to code their mobilization strategy until 1992 due to limited information in the three main source reports in 1991. In addition, because I was unable to find an accurate breakdown of legislative election results before 2007 in Kyrgyzstan, this data is missing.
Table 4-3). Legislative elections are much more evenly distributed, but the former Soviet Union still has the highest percentage of elections out of any other region.

**Table 4-1. Presidential Elections and State Mobilization Strategies in Illiberal Hybrid Regimes (1990-2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Brazil 1998, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Colombia 1990, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Colombia 1994, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Colombia 1998, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Colombia 2002, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Colombia 2006, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Guatemala 1999, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Guatemala 2003, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Guatemala 2007, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Peru 1995, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Venezuela 2000, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Venezuela 2004, Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Venezuela 2006, Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Venezuela 2007, Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Venezuela 2009, Decentralized</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Europe</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. Croatia 1992, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Croatia 1997, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Romania 1990, Decentralized</td>
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<td>19. Romania 1992, Diffuse</td>
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<td>20. Serbia 1992, Diffuse</td>
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<td>21. Serbia 1997, Diffuse</td>
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<td>22. Serbia 2000, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23. Armenia 1996, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Armenia 2003, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Belarus 1994, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Georgia 1995, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Georgia 2000, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Georgia 2004, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Georgia 2008, Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Kyrgyzstan 1995, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Kyrgyzstan 2000, Centralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Kyrgyzstan 2005, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Moldova 1996, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>36. Russia 1996, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>37. Russia 2000, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>38. Russia 2004, Centralized</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>39. Russia 2008, Centralized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Ukraine 1994, Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>41. Ukraine 1999, Diffuse</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-2. Legislative Elections in Illiberal Hybrid Regimes (1990-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Central Europe</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Inter Parliamentary Union Parline Database, Election Results Archive, African Elections Database, and IFES Election Guide.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mobilization Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2008</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database, Election Results Archive, African Elections Database, and IFES Election Guide.

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127 The state mobilization strategy one year before the 2008 election took place was decentralized.
128 The state mobilization strategy one year before the 2005 election took place was centralized.
Table 4-3. Regional Distribution of Elections in Illiberal Hybrid Regimes, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Presidential Elections</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number of Legislative Elections</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-1. Number of Elections in Illiberal Hybrid Regimes 1990-2009

The preliminary results of the empirical tests are seen in Figures 4-2 and 4-3 and Tables 4-4 and 4-5.\textsuperscript{129} The descriptive statistics generally paint a picture of margins of victory in line

\textsuperscript{129} Note that in the case of the one year lagged mobilization strategy (\textit{i.e.,} when the state implemented its mobilization strategy in the year immediately prior to the election), I did not input a lag for a small selection of countries. I did so because those countries that held an election in the first year that they are coded as hybrid did not have a relevant year with which to compare their mobilization strategy, since in the previous year politics operated according to a very different set of rules. The following elections are in the analysis, but their mobilization strategy
with the four hypotheses, but also with a few key exceptions. As a reference point, the general mean margin of victory is .28 in presidential elections and .27 in legislative elections. As expected (H1), the mean margin of victory is highest for the centralized strategy for both types of elections, but especially so for presidential elections where the mean margin of victory is greater than a 50 point spread. The centralized strategy thus appears to be an effective tool of power in delivering large victories.

Figure 4-2. Mean Margin of Victory in Presidential Elections by State Mobilization Strategy

is not lagged: the presidential and legislative election in 1995 in Peru; the presidential and legislative election in 1990 in Colombia; the presidential and legislative elections in 1990 in Romania (please note that in the Romanian case the dramatic events that occurred after the presidential election precipitated the decentralized coding and therefore it is coded as diffuse in the lag portion of the analysis); the presidential and legislative elections in Georgia in 1995; the presidential and legislative elections in 1993 in Madagascar; the legislative election in 1991 in Bangladesh; the legislative elections in 1991 in India; the legislative elections in 2005 in Lebanon; and the legislative elections in 1992 in Albania. In the statistical analysis that follows, I ran all models without this information inputted and report those differences when applicable.

While the theoretical range of margin of victory is from 0-1, the actual range for presidential elections is .01 (Madagascar 1996) to .95 (Georgia 2004) and in legislative elections it is .01 (Papua New Guinea 1997) to .8 (Albania 1996, Georgia 2004).
Figure 4-3. Mean Margin of Victory in Legislative Elections by State Mobilization Strategy

Table 4-4. Mean Margins of Victory in Legislative Elections by Mobilization Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse (1 yr lag)</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decentralized strategy has the second highest mean margin of victory for legislative elections by a small margin. Higher standard deviations suggest greater variability in the margin of victory in comparison to the centralized strategy (see Tables 4-4 and 4-5). However, contrary to the expectation that the decentralized strategy is a moderate tool of power (H2), it has the lowest mean margin of victory for presidential elections. And the standard deviation, especially for the lagged variable, is quite low.

Finally, the diffuse strategy results are as expected in legislative elections, as it has a comparable mean margin of victory to the decentralized strategy and a fairly large standard deviation. Nevertheless, for presidential elections it does not have the lowest mean margin of victory nor the highest standard deviation out of the three strategies. Therefore, the diffuse strategy does not appear to be as weak a tool of power as initially hypothesized (H3). All told, these results provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 1 and parts of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.

A series of regressions help to test the descriptive findings in Table 4-4 and 4-5 in a more rigorous fashion. Specifically, regression analysis allows for the consideration of structural

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131 When significant outliers are taken out of the analysis, the difference in means, especially for legislative elections, are closer to expectations. Major outliers in legislative margins of victory include the 1996 election in Albania (.8 margin of victory) and the 2004 election in Georgia (.8 margin of victory). When these outliers are out of the analysis, the mean margin of victory for the decentralized strategy is .27, two points higher than the mean for the diffuse strategy at .25, showing that the decentralized strategy is a slightly more effective tool of power than the diffuse strategy in legislative elections.
conditions and institutional constraints that may also affect margins of victory in addition to state mobilization strategies. Consistent with most studies on competition or regime outcomes (Brownlee, 2009b; Haggard & Kaufmann, 1995; Przeworski, et al., 2000; Schedler, 2009b), the first control, percent growth in GDP, captures a country’s level of macro-economic performance. The next set of control variables address established literatures on the importance of institutions in shaping interparty competition (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1999; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Sartori, 1976). In the case of legislative elections, these variables are type of system (presidential or parliamentary) and type of electoral system (plurality or proportional representation). In the case of presidential elections, I include the type of presidential electoral system (simple majority (SM) or two round majority system (TRM)). For presidential elections, I consider whether the incumbent is running, as incumbency is potentially influential in shaping electoral outcomes (Jones, 2004; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). The next control variable, ethnic fractionalization, accounts for the influence of social cleavages on electoral outcomes (Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Another important and intuitive control variable for both types of elections is the margin of victory in the previous election (Schedler, 2009b). Because the preliminary descriptive analysis of mobilization strategies over time in Chapter 3 revealed compelling “era” effects, I include a dummy variable to control for differences between the 1990-1999 and 2000-2009 time periods. Finally, to ensure that the mobilization strategies I have identified are not a simple proxy for state capacity or strength, I include a measure of perceptions of government effectiveness compiled by the World Bank as a final control variable (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2012).
Before moving to the regression analysis, it is important to consider endogeneity in the present study. As Schedler (2009b: 193-194) writes: “authoritarian elections are haunted by endogeneity” due to fact that strategies of manipulation may “affect electoral competitiveness, as well as the other way around.” While it is not a perfect solution, like Schedler, I will employ measures that I am confident occurred temporally prior to the election. Thus, because I coded mobilization strategies based on the full year report for a given country, I use a one year lagged variable for the three strategies to only capture the time period directly before the election. For similar reasons, I use a one year lag variable for economic growth.
Table 4-6. OLS and Fixed Effect Models Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable= Margin of Victory</th>
<th>(1) OLS</th>
<th>(2) OLS</th>
<th>(3) OLS</th>
<th>(4) Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(5) Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(6) Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Decentralized Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-0.36*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.30**(-0.10)</td>
<td>-0.30*** (-0.10)</td>
<td>-0.42** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.46** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.45** (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Diffuse Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-0.22*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.11 (.09)</td>
<td>-0.12 (.09)</td>
<td>-0.17 (.11)</td>
<td>-0.08 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged % Growth in GDP</td>
<td>0.01* (.003)</td>
<td>0.01* (.004)</td>
<td>0.01** (.004)</td>
<td>0.01** (.004)</td>
<td>0.01** (.004)</td>
<td>0.01** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent 1=yes 0=no</td>
<td>-0.01 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.002 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.002 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Rules 1=SM 0=TRM</td>
<td>0.04 (.10)</td>
<td>0.03 (.08)</td>
<td>0.04 (.10)</td>
<td>0.03 (.08)</td>
<td>0.04 (.10)</td>
<td>0.03 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization Index</td>
<td>0.06 (.16)</td>
<td>0.06 (.17)</td>
<td>0.06 (.16)</td>
<td>0.06 (.17)</td>
<td>0.06 (.16)</td>
<td>0.06 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Margin of Victory</td>
<td>0.42** (.18)</td>
<td>0.43** (.19)</td>
<td>0.42** (.18)</td>
<td>0.43** (.19)</td>
<td>0.42** (.18)</td>
<td>0.43** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era 1=2000-2009 0=1990-1999</td>
<td>0.09 (.08)</td>
<td>0.08 (.08)</td>
<td>0.09 (.08)</td>
<td>0.08 (.08)</td>
<td>0.09 (.08)</td>
<td>0.08 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.18 (.13)</td>
<td>0.15 (.16)</td>
<td>0.47*** (.11)</td>
<td>0.37* (.17)</td>
<td>0.33 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-7. OLS and Fixed Effect Models Legislative Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable= Margin of Victory</th>
<th>(1) OLS</th>
<th>(2) OLS</th>
<th>(3) OLS</th>
<th>(4) Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(5) Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(6) Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Decentralized Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-.09 (.12)</td>
<td>-.04 (.12)</td>
<td>-.04 (.13)</td>
<td>.02 (.14)</td>
<td>.08 (.12)</td>
<td>-.04 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Diffuse Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-.10* (.05)</td>
<td>-.04 (.08)</td>
<td>-.04 (.09)</td>
<td>-.16 (.11)</td>
<td>-.11 (.11)</td>
<td>-.11 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged % Growth in GDP</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.001 (.003)</td>
<td>.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System 1=Parliamentary 0=Presidential</td>
<td>.12** (.06)</td>
<td>.126** (.06)</td>
<td>.07 (.14)</td>
<td>.03 (.16)</td>
<td>.03 (.16)</td>
<td>.03 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Rules 1=PR 0=No PR</td>
<td>.06 (.05)</td>
<td>.06 (.05)</td>
<td>.10 (.13)</td>
<td>.01 (.15)</td>
<td>.01 (.15)</td>
<td>.01 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization Index</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Margin of Victory</td>
<td>.21** (.09)</td>
<td>.21** (.09)</td>
<td>-.14 (.13)</td>
<td>-.17 (.16)</td>
<td>-.17 (.16)</td>
<td>-.17 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era 1=2000-2009 0=1990-1999</td>
<td>.08 (.06)</td>
<td>.08 (.06)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.01 (.09)</td>
<td>.01 (.09)</td>
<td>.01 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>.36*** (-.04)</td>
<td>.07 (.09)</td>
<td>.06 (.12)</td>
<td>.40*** (.10)</td>
<td>.44* (.23)</td>
<td>.58** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.36*** (-.04)</td>
<td>.07 (.09)</td>
<td>.06 (.12)</td>
<td>.40*** (.10)</td>
<td>.44* (.23)</td>
<td>.58** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p≤.001; **p≤.05 p *p≤.10. Two-tailed tests. For OLS model, cluster (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses. For fixed effects models robust standard errors in parentheses.

Sources for the dependent variables: Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database, Election Results Archive, African Elections Database, and IFES Election Guide. Sources for independent variables: World Bank, Keefer (2009), and Alesina et al (2003).
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 present the results of state mobilization strategies on margins of victory in presidential and legislative elections. I employ two different types of regression analysis in these tables. The first is OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. This form of analysis allows me to test the effects of differences across countries on margins of victory, while recognizing that the observations are not entirely independent of each other by clustering the standard errors by country (i.e., Russia in 1999 is not completely independent from Russia in 1995). The second type of analysis is a fixed effect model, which allows me to test within country variation. By calculating different intercepts for each country, this model allows me to take into account unspecified differences that distinguish countries from one another. Thus, it captures the unknown quality that makes Bangladesh distinct from Russia. This difference is assumed to remain constant over time.\(^{132}\)

Now moving to the results, Model 1 on both tables is a bivariate regression of state mobilization strategies on margins of victory without any controls using OLS clustered standard errors by country. Note that the centralized strategy dummy variable is omitted, and therefore it serves as the baseline category with which to compare the results. Consequently, a negative sign on the decentralized or diffuse strategy dummy variables indicates that they have smaller margins of victory in comparison to the centralized strategy dummy variable.

\(^{132}\) However, the main drawback of this method is that it reduces the degree of freedom in the study from which to evaluate the impact of the explanatory variables. In order to mitigate the degree of freedom problem, I ran the models presented in Tables 4-6 and 4-7 using interpolated election data generated by STATA and report them in footnotes when discussing each model. The method of interpolation in STATA fills in data only in the years between two observed elections. STATA takes the difference between the two reported margins and averages them out over the intervening years. Although it is certainly the case that actual elections were not observed in these years, and therefore it is important to be very cautious about making causal inferences from these models, interpolation does provide some advantages. One, the model enables the wider analysis of trends suggested by the observed data. And two, interpolation helps ensure the relationship between two variables is not unnecessarily rejected due to a lack of enough observations.
Returning to the results, Model 1 for both presidential and legislative elections is a difference in means test and mirrors the results on Tables 4-4 and 4-5. Model 1 for presidential elections (Table 4-6) demonstrates that the type of mobilization strategy employed has a statistically significant impact on margins of victory. The results show that the centralized strategy is associated with larger margins of victory than the other two strategies (36 and 22 points respectively)—and that this difference is statistically significant. The centralized strategy helps deliver larger margins of victory on average than the other two strategies. The diffuse strategy is associated with comparatively smaller margins, and the decentralized strategy is associated with the lowest margins of victory out of all three strategies. In contrast, Table 4-7 shows that the type of mobilization strategy does not have a statistically significant impact on margins of victory for legislative elections except when comparing the centralized to the diffuse strategy. In that case, the centralized strategy helps delivers an electoral spread 10 points higher than the diffuse strategy.

Model 2 on Tables 4-6 and 4-7 presents the OLS regression results with the inclusion of control variables except for government effectiveness. In the case of executive elections, the statistical relationships between the mobilization strategies remain. The centralized strategy is associated with higher margins of victory in comparison to the other strategy types.\(^{133}\) Model 2 further demonstrates that the type of mobilization strategy continues to have an insignificant impact on margins of victory in legislative elections.\(^{134}\) That said, the centralized strategy is still

\(^{133}\) In the exact same model calculated with interpolated executive election data, the diffuse dummy variable became significant at the .05 level.

\(^{134}\) The mobilization strategies are not significant even when run with interpolated legislative election data.
associated with higher margins of victory, even if this difference is not statistically significant when taking the control variables into account.

Model 3 on Tables 4-6 and 4-7 presents the OLS regression results including all control variables. Model 3 on Table 4-6 shows that even when including government effectiveness as an additional control variable, the comparison between the centralized and decentralized strategy is still a statistically significant predictor of margins of victory in presidential elections across countries. Indeed, the centralized strategy is associated with a 30 point higher margin of victory in comparison to the decentralized strategy.

Models 4, 5, and 6 present regression results using a fixed effects model that tests within country variation. Beginning with Model 4 on Table 4-6, in the case of presidential elections, when controlling for differences among countries, higher margins of victory are still statistically associated with the centralized strategy and lower margins of victory with the decentralized strategy, and this difference is in the 40 point range. In the case of legislative elections, there is not a statistically significant distinction between the strategies. And, somewhat surprisingly, when examining within country variation, the decentralized strategy has a slightly higher margin of victory in legislative elections than the centralized strategy.

Models 5 and 6 on Tables 4-6 and 4-7 present the results of the fixed effect model with the addition of other control variables. Even with the addition of multiple controls, the difference between the centralized and decentralized strategy on margins of victory in

---

135 The same model calculated with interpolated executive election data shows significance on the diffuse dummy variable at the .05 level, giving further evidence of the strength of the comparison of the centralized strategy to the other two.

136 In a similar model without the lags filled in for missing country data, the decentralized dummy variable is significant at the .10 level and not the .05 level for models 5 and 6.
presidential elections remains significant and substantively large. Not surprisingly, the type of mobilization strategy employed continues to have a statistically insignificant impact on the margin of victory in legislative elections.

**Figure 4-4. Mean Margin of Victory in Legislative Elections (Presidential Systems) by State Mobilization Strategy**

**Figure 4-5. Mean Margin of Victory in Legislative Elections (Parliamentary Systems) by State Mobilization Strategy**

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137 When I ran the exact same model with interpolated executive election data, the diffuse dummy variable was also significant at the .05 level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Decentralized Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.22* (0.12)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.22* (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Diffuse Strategy (Centralized Strategy Base Category)</td>
<td>-0.18** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged % Growth in GDP</td>
<td>0.001 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Rules 1=PR 0=No PR</td>
<td>0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.19** (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization Index</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.23** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.23** (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Margin of Victory</td>
<td>0.28* (0.14)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.28* (0.15)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era 1=2000-2009 0=1990-1999</td>
<td>0.04 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.42*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.32*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p≤.001; **p≤.05 p *p≤.10. Two-tailed tests. For OLS model, cluster (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses.

Sources for the dependent variables: Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database, Election Results Archive, African Elections Database, and IFES Election Guide. Sources for independent variables: World Bank, Keefer (2009), and Alesina et al (2003).
While state mobilization strategies appear to be insignificant predictors of electoral competition in legislative elections, the cluster OLS models (Models 2 and 3) on Table 4-7 illustrate that the type of system, whether presidential or parliamentary, is a good predictor of margins of victory. Furthermore, because of the potentially important difference in the meaning of legislative elections for the distribution of power in presidential systems versus parliamentary ones (H4), I broke down the data by system. Figures 4-4 and 4-5 present a first cut analysis of state mobilization strategies in legislative elections broken down by system of governance. This preliminary analysis shows that in both types of systems, the centralized strategy is associated with the highest margins of victory, although the difference from the other two strategies is not as dramatic in parliamentary systems.

In the analysis that follows, I employ only OLS cluster models and I present the results excluding two major outlier cases—the legislative elections in 2004 in Georgia (.8 and presidential) and 1996 elections in Albania (.8 and parliamentary). I ran the same analyses with these cases included, and while overall the findings are very similar, I report any differences when applicable.

As Table 4-8 shows, the majority of legislative elections that occur in illiberal hybrid regimes are in presidential systems (51 versus 18). Beginning with legislative elections in presidential elections (see Models 1, 3, and 5), state mobilization strategies are significant predictors of margins of victory. There is an especially significant difference between the

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138 There are not enough degrees of freedom to run fixed effects models in parliamentary systems only.
139 The next highest seat share spread is .68 in Georgia in 2008.
centralized and diffuse strategy in Models 1, 3, and 5. A centralized strategy is therefore a much more effective tool of power in delivering higher margins of victory in legislative elections than is a diffuse strategy. The comparison between the centralized and decentralized strategy is somewhat significant in the full models (3 and 5), although the difference between these two strategies is smaller than the difference between the centralized and diffuse strategies. In sum, the results for legislative elections in presidential regimes are largely consistent with initial hypotheses (H1-H3) about state mobilization strategies: the centralized strategy is the most effective tool of power in delivering large margins of victory, while the diffuse strategy is the least effective.

A different outcome emerges when we analyze the results for legislative elections in parliamentary systems, as state mobilization strategies no longer serve as a good predictor of margins of victory. Indeed, once controls are included, the results are completely at odds with initial expectations (H1-H3), as the decentralized strategy produces the largest victories and the centralized strategy the least—although these relationships are not statistically significant. These results show that state mobilization strategies do little to explain the dynamics of margins of victory in parliamentary systems. Other factors, like electoral rules and ethnic diversity are much better predictors of margins of victory than state mobilization strategies. This finding was largely unexpected and determining why state mobilization strategies play such different roles in presidential versus parliamentary systems is a prime area for future research.

\[140\] The comparison between the centralized and diffuse strategy is significant at the .05 level rather than the .01 level in Models 3 and 5 when the outliers are included.

\[141\] The comparison between the centralized and decentralized strategy is not significant in Models 3 and 5 when the outliers are included.
In sum, the type of mobilization strategy the state pursues has an impact on margins of victory. The predictive powers of state mobilization strategies are strongest in presidential elections, as the margin of victory in all model specifications is affected by whether a state pursues a centralized versus a decentralized strategy. All model specifications of presidential elections suggest that the centralized strategy is associated with comparatively high margins of victory and the decentralized strategy with comparatively low margins of victory. The results for the diffuse strategy are not as robust across the models, but still show that the margins of victory for the centralized strategy are comparably high.

In contrast to presidential elections, the type of state mobilization strategy employed contributes little to explaining margins of victory in legislative elections overall. However, when the data is divided into parliamentary and presidential systems, state mobilization strategies remain significant predictors of margins of victory in presidential systems, but not in parliamentary ones. In presidential systems, the contrast between the centralized and diffuse strategy is the most robust. The centralized strategy is associated with high margins of victory and the diffuse strategy with much lower margins of victory.

Taken as a whole, the results provide significant support for Hypotheses 1: the centralized strategy appears to be an effective tool of power in establishing comparably large margins of victory (H1). However, contrary to Hypothesis 2 and 3, the decentralized strategy is associated with the lowest margin of victory in presidential elections. While these findings are somewhat preliminary due to the relatively small number of relevant elections, they suggest that

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142 This may be a function of the low number of cases in which to effectively analyze their impact with statistical methods. However, similar trends were repeated with more significance with interpolated data. Although again, interpolated data should be interpreted with great caution because of the very strong, and potentially erroneous, assumptions that are made with such data (i.e. that elections occurred in years in which they actually did not).
to be an effective tool of power, large amounts of mobilization must be combined with higher levels of demobilization. That said, the decentralized strategy appears to be a moderately effective tool of power in legislative elections in presidential regimes, as it provides smaller margins of victory than the centralized strategy, but more than the diffuse strategy.

Finally, the results show partial support for Hypothesis 4: when looking at a general comparison between presidential and legislative elections, the results for all of the strategies are amplified for presidential elections, when the stakes of an electoral loss are highest. When examining legislative elections in presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems, state mobilization strategies continue to be significant in explaining margins of victory in presidential systems, but not in parliamentary ones.

**Conclusion**

Employing the original dataset of state mobilization strategies developed in Chapter 3, I demonstrate how rulers have updated and modernized their repressive techniques by utilizing state mobilization strategies to reduce political competition. To draw this conclusion, I presented and tested four hypotheses about the relationship between state mobilization strategies and margins of victory. While only a limited number of elections in illiberal hybrid regimes have taken place since the end of the cold war, there are nonetheless strong indications that the mobilization strategy chosen has a significant effect on the margin of victory in presidential elections and a somewhat lesser effect on legislative elections in presidential systems. This result is not particularly surprising, as Rakner and Van de Walle maintain: “the key political competition inevitably concerns the presidency, in which resides a disproportionate amount of
institutional power and resources” (2009: 205). What is somewhat surprising, however, is that state mobilization strategies do little to explain legislative elections in parliamentary regimes, despite the high-stakes of these elections. Determining why state mobilization strategies have such different effects in presidential versus parliamentary systems is therefore a prime and necessary area for future research.¹⁴³

The second major finding involves the relationship between high margins of victory and the centralized strategy (H1). All presidential election models, even when including various controls and employing different methods, consistently show a statistical relationship with higher margins of victory. In presidential systems, this statistical relationship continued in legislative elections as well. These results suggest that the centralized strategy is an effective tool of power.

In contrast, the decentralized strategy is associated with low margins of victory in comparison to the other strategies in presidential elections. This finding suggests that, contrary to expectations, the key to establishing high margins of victory in presidential elections is a combination of healthy levels of mobilization and demobilization. Savvy rulers may have already recognized this fact, which could explain why leaders in two of the main cases of the decentralized strategy, Venezuela and Sri Lanka, have recently increased their demobilization efforts. However, it is important to note that the constraints that impact a state’s choice of mobilization in the first place likely continue to exist. As such, while rulers may wish to

¹⁴³ There is not much research about the ways that parliamentary systems, as opposed to presidential ones, function under conditions of non-democracy. This is likely because a) a major strand in comparative research contends that parliamentary systems are better suited to maintain democracy than presidential systems, see for example the debate on institutional choice and design among leading scholars in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Diamond & Plattner, 1996); and b) there are empirically fewer non-democratic parliamentary systems. In fact, in this study the majority of illiberal hybrid regimes are presidential systems.
demobilize their opponents as much as possible, due to a deficit in resources, international pressure, or the strength of social organizations, they may be unable to effectively do so.

This study provides only a preliminary step towards analyzing state mobilization strategies in hybrid regimes. In this chapter I showed that a strong relationship exists between the centralized strategy and electoral dominance in presidential elections and legislative elections in presidential systems. However, this analysis does not show how these variables are linked. In the next chapter I conduct an in-depth analysis of post-communist Russia in order to uncover the potential causal mechanism that links the centralized strategy to decreased levels of political competition. I will therefore explain in much more detail in Chapter 5 how an illiberal hybrid regime can become less competitive without its rulers needing to resort to large amounts of overt repression, and how state mobilization strategies may be best understood as an example of the way rulers have updated and modernized their repressive techniques.

**Description of Variables**

*Dependent Variables*

Margin of Victory (Legislative Elections): This dependent variable is the difference in seat share between the first and second place political party in legislative elections. Mean=.27; Std. Dev=.20; N=71.\(^{144}\)

Margin of Victory (Presidential Elections): This dependent variable is the difference in vote share between the first and second place candidate in a presidential election. Mean=.28; Std. Dev=.22; N=49.

*Independent Variables*

Lagged Percent Growth in GDP: This independent variable is calculated by the World Bank and is one of its World Development Indicators (2010). This measure is “the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on

\(^{144}\) Again, because I was unable to find accurate of the breakdown of electoral results of legislative elections before 2007 in Kyrgyzstan this data is missing.
constant 2000 U.S. dollars.” Presidential Elections: Mean=1.6; Std. Dev=8.7; N=49. Legislative Elections: Mean=1.6; Std. Dev=10.3; N=71.

System: This independent variable comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer & Development Research Group, 2009) or “DPI”. This variable is coded as a 1 if the country has a parliamentary system or has an assembly-elected president and 0 if it has a presidential system. There are a total of 9 countries that are parliamentary at least one year in the data set, all of the rest (16) are presidential. The 9 countries that are parliamentary are: Albania, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Lebanon, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Slovakia, and Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁴⁵

Electoral Rules (Legislative Elections): This independent variable comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer & Development Research Group, 2009). This variable is coded as a “1 if candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party and/or if DPI’s sources specifically call the system ‘proportional representation’ and 0 if otherwise.” In legislative election years, there were 12 cases of 0 (17.9%) and 55 (82.1%) cases of 1.¹⁴⁶

Incumbent (Presidential Elections): This independent variable is coded as a 1 if an incumbent ran in the election and 0 if otherwise. Out of 49 elections, no incumbent ran in 16 elections. In the other 33, an incumbent stood in the election.

Electoral Rules (Presidential Elections): This independent variable is coded as a 1 when the country has a simple majority system (SM) and 0 if a country has a two round majority system (TRM). There are only three countries in the sample: Venezuela, Sri Lanka, and Malawi which use the simple majority system.

Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index: This independent variable was calculated by Alesina et al. (2003). The ELF reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. Presidential Elections: Mean=.49; Std. Dev=.19; N=49. Parliamentary Elections: Mean=.42; Std. Dev=.20; N=71.

Era: This independent variable is coded as 1 when the time period is 2000-2009 and 0 when the time period is 1990-1999. 24 presidential elections took place during 2000-2009 and 25 presidential elections took place during 1990-1999. 31 elections took place during 2000-2009 and 40 legislative elections took place during 1990-1999.

¹⁴⁶ Missing data on this variable that includes election years are: Croatia 1992, Romania 1990, Russia 1993, and Georgia 1995.
Past margin of victory: This independent variable represents the margin of victory candidates or parties received in the previous election under consideration. Presidential Elections: Mean=.34; Std. Dev=.28; N=47. Legislative Elections: Mean=.30; Std. Dev=.23; N=70.147

Government Effectiveness: This independent variable comes from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and measures “the perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, et al., 2012). This variable ranges from a weak score of -2.5 to a strong score of 2.5. There are only data for years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003-2009. I therefore inputted the data in the following way to avoid missing cases: 1990-1996 = 1996 data; 1997-1999 = 1998 data; and 2000-2001 = 2000 data. Presidential Elections: Mean=-.49; Std. Dev=.31; N=49. Parliamentary Elections: Mean=-.49; Std. Dev=.31; N=71.

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147 Because executive elections in Belarus 1994 and Croatia in 1992 were the first of their kind, they are missing in the analysis of presidential elections. Because of missing election data for legislative elections in Kyrgyzstan, it is missing for the analysis of legislative elections.
CHAPTER 5
The Centralized Strategy and Decreased Political Competition: Assessing the Causal Link in Post-Communist Russia

In the previous chapter I used statistical analysis to examine the relationship between a state’s mobilization strategy and political competition. I demonstrated that, when control variables such as economic growth and electoral institutions are taken into account, a centralized mobilization strategy is highly correlated with patterns of low political competition. Despite demonstrating this correlation, statistical analysis cannot answer how these phenomena are linked. In this chapter I investigate the causal link between the centralized strategy and patterns of low political competition by focusing on post-communist Russia.

As elucidated in Chapter 1, Russia has several attributes that make it an exemplary case study. In addition to Russia’s outsized geopolitical importance among relevant regimes, the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that the link between the centralized strategy and low political competition is greatest in countries that, like Russia, have presidential systems. Moreover, the change in mobilization strategy from diffuse to centralized in 2001 offers an opportunity to see the distinct effects on political competition caused by a state imposing a centralized strategy. This is particularly important given the significant scholarly disagreement about the meaning and trajectory of Vladimir Putin’s policies towards diverse social organizations.

148 Out of the countries (Armenia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia), whose rulers pursued a centralized mobilization strategy, Russia has by far the greatest geostrategic importance due to its sheer size, oil wealth, military capability, and international influence.

149 Despite minor changes, the Medvedev/Putin tandem continued to employ these centralized strategies until 2009, the end of the time period covered by this chapter. The Conclusion (Chapter 6) discusses Russia’s mobilization strategy from 2010 through May 2012.
Qualitative methods are well suited to uncover the causal mechanism that links a centralized strategy with decreased competition.\textsuperscript{150} The findings presented in this chapter are primarily based on 58 in-depth interviews I conducted between April and August 2009 with representatives of social organizations in three Russian cities: Moscow, Volgograd, and Ekaterinburg.\textsuperscript{151} These interviews focused on three types of organizations: human rights, women, and youth. The interviews, combined with newspaper and secondary literature research, demonstrate that the changes in Russia’s mobilization strategy from Yelstin to Putin resulted in decreased political competition over time due to the way that the strategy marginalized independent and critical organizations. Contrary to the government’s claims that its programs were intended to strengthen the development of civil society, the effect of these policies has been to help civil society organizations that are neutral or loyal to the regime, while weakening and harassing those groups that are not.

State officials and their policies can systematically marginalize or “crowded out” independent groups that are critical of the regime. First, these groups were/are forced out of the public sphere by government policies that make it harder for them to operate. Second, governmental policies prevent groups critical of the regime from effectively advocating their positions in public spaces, such as the streets and the news media. Third, critical groups were/are crowded out by organizations established or funded by the state that have similar purposes, but are either neutral or loyal to the regime. These well-financed and promoted pro-regime groups are able to appropriate the agendas (and in some cases the memberships) of

\textsuperscript{150}For more on the strength of qualitative methods such as the case study to uncover causal mechanisms see George and Bennett (2004), Brady and Collier (2004).
\textsuperscript{151}Additionally, I conducted ten expert interviews.
independent groups and thereby dominate the public arena. Fourth, the regime often co-opts neutral groups by offering them additional funding or influence as long as they either become or remain openly uncritical of the regime. This action contributes to the crowding out effect as it minimizes the number of groups available for mobilization against the regime: whereas previously these groups may have joined opposition mobilization, they are now unlikely to do so as a result of their ties to the government and reliance on government financing.

Overall, I assert in this chapter that the marginalization of independent organizations sheds light on important regime dynamics. Via the crowding out effect, the regime’s policies reduce the possibility that a challenge to ruling groups will emerge at a grass roots level. As such, the crowding out effect is potentially key to understanding how the Putin/Medvedev regime has been able to maintain its legitimacy and control over the electoral arena without having to resort to large-scale repression and violence. Specifically, this strategy fosters an atmosphere where those in power are seen as the only popular and legitimate options, while potential alternatives are marginalized and play little role in public debates. As explained in the Conclusion (Chapter 6), this strategy remained stable until large-scale protests challenging the 2011 parliamentary election results forced the regime to enact certain modifications.

In order to demonstrate these government policies and their effects, I focus on the differences in the mobilization strategies adopted under Yeltsin and Putin. I then specify the methodology used in the fieldwork by discussing the three cities and types of groups analyzed. In the final part of the chapter I delve into the evidence from the fieldwork, arranging this material based on issue area and group type.
State Mobilization Strategy from Yeltsin to Putin

After becoming the second President of post-communist Russia in May 2000, Vladimir Putin made significant changes to the political status quo that he inherited from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. New laws on political parties, greater government control over the news media, and the abolition of gubernatorial elections are only a few examples of the changes Putin steadily enacted after taking office. During Putin’s presidency, the Kremlin’s approach toward the mobilization of its citizens changed substantially. This section details this shift by reviewing the respective mobilization strategies of the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. This section draws primarily on the coding sources employed for all countries detailed in Chapter 3, but includes additional references from newspapers and the secondary literature on post-communist Russia.

After becoming President of Russia, Yeltsin employed a mobilization strategy best categorized as “diffuse.” Under Yeltsin, the state minimally invested in demobilization and mobilization, except during the October 1993 constitutional crisis and the 1996 presidential election. The media was often the primary tool used for mobilization and manipulation; however, there were no instances mentioned in the source reports of officials making disparaging remarks about particular NGOs. The government maintained alliances with already existing

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152 This draws significantly on material I have previously published on Russian civil society. See (Balzer & Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert, 2009).

153 Scholars widely credit pro-Yeltsin media coverage, which resulted from negotiations with key oligarchs, as a decisive element in Yeltsin’s comeback victory in the 1996 presidential election (McFaul, 2001; Shevtsova, 1999). Media manipulation was widespread during the first Chechen war (December 1994-August 1996), although alternative views were still aired, especially on the television station NTV. During the war, the U.S. State Department reported that various NGOs received widespread media coverage. According to the U.S. State Department in 1994: “The Committee of Soldier’s Mothers, Memorial, and Glasnost Defense Fund have gotten considerable exposure and recognition both at home and abroad for their stand against the incursion (943).”
social organizations, in particular the Orthodox Church\textsuperscript{154} and unions,\textsuperscript{155} but reports do not detail these groups’ mobilization in demonstrations or rallies by the central government.

During the Yeltsin presidency government neglect, rather than formal institutional or legal rules, created barriers for the registration and operation of independent organizations. In 1995 the Yeltsin government established the legal status of independent organizations\textsuperscript{156} in a manner that made it relatively cheap and easy for them to register (Weigle, 2002). While the regime’s taxation of foreign funding was somewhat onerous, foreign funding was generally permitted with few legal requirements. The exception to this generally open legal environment for social organizations was the re-registration process for active NGOs with the Ministry of Justice in 1999. Many prominent NGOs, particularly human rights groups,\textsuperscript{157} had their registrations delayed or denied, but after appeal they ultimately were registered. And the difficulties with the registration process were not long lasting (Squier, 2002: 172-173).

Human rights groups were generally allowed to operate freely throughout the country and there were few instances of harassment by state security services. This remained true even during the 1993 constitutional crisis (U.S. State Department, 1993; Human Rights Watch, 1994). However, in 1995, soon after the beginning of the first Chechen war, monitoring of the human

\textsuperscript{154} According to the U.S. State Department in 1993: “Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Government have grown closer in recent years. The Patriarch claims that the Church seeks no role in politics but has insisted that the Church act as a moral influence in Russian society. In March he appeared on national television for political reconciliation between the legislative and executive branches, while during the September/October crisis in Moscow he mediated negotiations between presidential and legislative representatives.”

\textsuperscript{155} Anders Uhlin asserts (2006: 64): “…independent unions, notably the Independent Miner’s Union, were close allies of the Yeltsin government.”

\textsuperscript{156} Prior to this law, I coded Russia’s legal environment for social organizations as moderately restrictive because the legal environment was so much in flux.

\textsuperscript{157} Human Rights Watch (2001) details how local justice departments refused to register or reregister human rights organizations on baseless grounds. For example, “The Krasnodar Department of Justice refused to re-register the Regional Association for the Defense of Human Rights, among others, because ‘it was impossible to understand what kind of verification of human rights violations this organization will carry out when checking reports on human rights violations [sic].’”
The rights situation in Chechnya was frequently disrupted and blocked. This disruption, combined with the problems groups faced attempting to monitor internal security forces in other parts of Russia (U.S. State Department, 1995), led to a high coding of harassment for the year. From 1996-1999, harassment of human rights organizations was moderate. While most human rights organizations were permitted to conduct their work freely and with little harassment by state security services, groups that focused on the situation in Chechnya were significantly impeded. There were also reports of harassment at the regional level and the central government’s inadequate response to punish this abuse (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

In addition to its largely hands-off approach with independent organizations, during this period the government rarely interfered in public assemblies. According to U.S. State Department reports in the 1990s: “citizens freely and actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to demonstrate were readily granted to opponents and supporters of the government.” In addition, violence levels at demonstrations and violence against human rights defenders was low. During the Yeltsin period, government neglect is thus the best characterization of the overall relationship between social organizations and the state.

158 This harassment included forbidding human rights organizations and/or particular activists access to certain locations, confiscating their research materials, or in one case threatening an activist with physical harm (Human Rights Watch, 1996).
159 A good description of the general environment is the following: “it appears that one can criticize the federal government or the regional government in general, but that harassment occurs if a particular regional politicians or police member is singled out” (U.S. State Department, 1997).
160 A key exception is the 1993 constitutional crisis. During the crisis the Yeltsin government actively attempted to demobilize its political and societal opponents (U.S. State Department, 1993). It especially restricted rallies, issuing decrees banning demonstrations on red square and its vicinity in April and then banning public demonstrations altogether in October after the assault on the White House (U.S. State Department, 1993).
161 Scholars are in general agreement that despite its rhetoric otherwise, the Yeltsin government largely wasted its opportunity to promote independent activism (Hale, 2002; Henry, 2010; Weigle, 2002).
In contrast, the Putin regime has pursued a centralized strategy. Organization is initiated by the state and moderate participation within specified, albeit frequently changing, parameters is encouraged (Balzer, 2003). In order to control and manage mobilization, the state has established or sponsored groups in key organizational spheres such as youth, human rights, environment, and labor. It also created a pro-government civil society oversight body. While certain groups are targeted for mobilization, the primary purpose of the centralized strategy is to demobilize the majority of the population except at the time of elections. Groups specifically targeted for demobilization are those that have been outspokenly critical of the regime and/or work in sensitive policy areas. Methods of demobilization include enacting increased regulations of social organizations and employing media resources to paint organizations that are critical of the regime as either unpatriotic or as tools of western governments. The specifics of Russia’s implementation of this strategy are detailed below.

Instead of continuing the Yeltsin regime’s laissez faire approach to social groups, the Putin administration sought to harness societal protest by developing state sponsored groups in key organizational spheres, with an emphasis on youth mobilization. In 2000 the first pro-Kremlin youth organization, \textit{Idushchie Vmeste} (Walking Together), appeared on the scene. In March 2006, following significant reorganization, Walking Together was folded into the \textit{Nashi} (Ours) movement. Under the leadership of Vasilii Yakemenko, the former head of Walking Together, Nashi mobilized thousands of young people to take part in a series of actions,

\footnote{The 2002 NGO Sustainability Index references NGOs set up and financially supported by central authorities to work in the areas of elections and environmental assessment. And in 2004, the Nation in Transit report (2005) discusses the creation of a government funded International Human Rights Center.}
\footnote{According to Squier (2002: 176): “[as of 2002] the most prominent example of a GONGO is the reportedly Kremlin backed Idushie Vmeste “Walking Together” youth organization.”}
events, and mass rallies. As Regina Heller (2008: 2) writes: “Within only three years, its membership figures grew to over 120,000, and the number of sympathizers is likely even higher.” Nashi’s large budget and extensive media following aided its mobilization of youth. Its influence was further elevated by visits from major politicians to its summer camps, as well as by meetings with Putin himself.

After helping ensure smooth 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections, Nashi’s political role was significantly reduced. Nashi’s organizational presence was reduced from fifty regional branches to five (Savina, Taratuta, & Shevchuk, January 29, 2008) and several of the movement’s leaders took posts in the government. However, Nashi still provided visible support against regime critics well after its restructuring, as evidenced by the controversy in September 2009 over an editorial written by journalist Alexander Podrabinek. Discussion of Nashi’s continued role in Russian politics will be addressed in the Conclusion.

Another important part of the Kremlin’s strategy to assert central state control over social organizations became clear during the 2001 Civic Forum organized by both government and civil society organizations. Although President Putin attended the forum and emphasized his willingness to cooperate with civil society and its important role in Russian society, (U.S. State Department, 2001; Weigle 2002), the government attempted to use the forum to organize social

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164 The Nashi movement espouses a patriotic nationalist ideology that seeks to prevent the destabilization of Russian politics by possible international and external enemies, see http://nashi.su/position.
165 See Doug Buchacek (2006) for an excellent review of Nashi’s financial support and media strategy.
166 For example, Yakemenko became head of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs.
167 In an editorial, Podrabinek criticized local authorities for pressuring a Moscow restaurant to change its name from “Anti-Soviet.” Podrabinek further criticized the authorities as well as veteran’s groups for glorifying Soviet history. Nashi responded by disparaging Podrabinek publicly and picketed his home. When Ella Pamfilova, the head of the President’s Human Rights Council, stepped in to defend the rights of Podrabinek and asked Nashi to stop their picketing, United Russia deputies called for Pamfilova’s resignation (Khamrayev & Granik, October 7, 2009).
groups into a single chamber to represent society. Some of the organizations involved feared that the government wished to establish this new chamber to better control them and therefore led an effort that successfully resisted the state’s attempt to transform the forum into a more permanent public chamber.\textsuperscript{168}

The Kremlin revived the idea of a public chamber after the tragedy in Beslan.\textsuperscript{169} In 2005 the Public Chamber (\textit{obshchestvennaia palata}) was created with the official goal of promoting greater institutionalized dialogue between society and government authorities (\url{http://www.oprf.ru/ru/about/}). The Kremlin has influence over the selection of the Chamber’s members, as one third of the Chamber is appointed by the president, another third is selected by the members appointed by the president, and the remaining third is selected from conferences in the seven federal districts. The Chamber’s enactments serve as recommendations to government authorities and bodies. The Chamber oversees grants to social organizations awarded from the federal budget on a competitive basis. These “presidential grants” for social projects resulted in the allocation of 500 million, 1.25 billion, 1.5 billion, and 1.2 billion rubles in funding during 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively.\textsuperscript{170}

In combination with the mobilizing policies described above, the Putin administration adopted demobilizing tactics. Beginning first with the legal regulatory environment, after the re-

\textsuperscript{168} As Richter (2009: 46) asserts: “In 2001, for example, Surkov and fellow Kremlin ideologist Gleb Pavlovskiy organized a Civic Forum designed to create a body much like the Public Chamber, which would bring together social organizations sympathetic to the Kremlin’s vision in an institutionalized dialogue with the state. Several prominent independent activists, most notably the human rights activist Lyudmila Alekseyeva, resisted these plans and, with vocal support from their transnational allies, succeeded in negotiating changes in the meeting’s organization and agenda. The plans for a more permanent body were shelved.”

\textsuperscript{169} The Beslan school hostage crisis occurred in September 2004 when Chechen terrorists held over a thousand children and teachers hostage.

\textsuperscript{170} See the following websites for lists of grant winners: \url{http://portal-nko.ru/finance/konkurs2009} and \url{http://rosspending.ru/grants/oprf/?q=&op=1&year=all} (Accessed May 14, 2012).
registration controversy in 1999-2000 ended, the barriers to entry and operation of social
governments were low. The Putin regime changed this considerably by enacting the 2006 NGO
law “Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” This law gave the
Ministry of Justice extensive supervisory powers over foreign nongovernmental organizations
(U.S. State Department, 2006), including the right to compel production of documents detailing
an organization’s governing body and operation and the ability to send Ministry representatives
to organizational events (Bourjaily, 2006: 5-6). The law requires organizations to report all
funds received from foreign sources and how they are allocated or used. As summarized by
Natalia Bourjaily (2006: 5), Vice President for Newly Independent States of the International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law: “These new requirements restrict who may form an organization
in the Russian Federation, expand the grounds on which registration may be denied, and enhance
the supervisory powers of the state over organizations.”

The state increased its manipulation of the media to paint particular social organizations
as unpatriotic or tools of foreign governments. Starting in 2004, official rhetoric against NGOs
that receive foreign grants increased dramatically. In that year, Putin used his “state of the
government” address to the Duma to assert that NGOs receiving foreign funding follow the agendas of
foreign donors (U.S. State Department, 2004; Nation in Transit, 2005). Other officials
followed suit and made statements about the questionable patriotism of foreign funded NGOs
(Evans, 2006; Lipman, 2005).

\[171\text{ See Putin (May 26, 2004).}\]
The media campaign against foreign funded NGOs reached its apex in the months leading up to the passage of the NGO Law. In January 2006, the state television channel RTR (Rossiia) broke what became known as the “spy rock” scandal, when it reported that employees of the British Council were using a rock in a Moscow park to transmit espionage. The Putin regime sought to link this espionage to civil society, by claiming that one of the alleged spies funneled money to twelve NGOs. Efforts to discredit human rights and foreign-funded NGOs in the media did not end with the scandal, but continued throughout Putin’s presidency.

The harassment of human rights organizations by state security services increased during the Putin period. In 2003 this harassment increased from a moderate to a high level due to tax audits and raids at two of Russia’s most prominent NGOs (U.S. State Department, 2003) and reports that human rights groups like the Soldiers' Mothers' Committee, Memorial, and the Moscow Helsinki Group were being harassed in retaliation for their opposition to the second Chechen war (Nations in Transit, 2003). Groups that attempted to operate in the North Caucuses faced formidable obstacles from authorities to conduct their work. A high level of harassment by state security services via investigations, audits, and raids continued throughout Putin’s presidency.

Another area in which the level of demobilization tactics increased was the restriction of rallies and public demonstrations. From 2001 until 2005 demonstrations were considered

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172 Various sources note the critical timing of the spy rock scandal (Ferran, January 19, 2012; United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 8, 2006).
173 For more on the spy scandal, see (Bigg, January 25, 2006). Later in January 2012 the chief of staff to former Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted in a BBC documentary that the rock was in fact used for espionage by the British (Ferran, January 19, 2012).
174 On two separate occasions in 2007 President Putin declared that foreign funded NGOs in Russia are instruments of foreign influence. In one instance, he called organizations that receive such funding “jackals” (U.S. State Department, 2007).
175 Human rights groups further continued to be harassed by regional authorities (U.S. State Department, 2003).
moderately restricted, based on reports that officials occasionally curtailed the right of groups to assemble, but that this mostly occurred at the regional level (U.S. State Department, 2001-2005). However, after 2006 U.S. State Department reports detail the multiple and systematic ways that officials restricted the rights of groups to assemble by selectively denying permission to demonstrate; allowing protests to occur, but only in places inconveniently located; and arresting protestors at unauthorized demonstrations. While the regime occasionally utilized violence to break up demonstrations, overall systematic violence remained low throughout most of Putin’s presidency.\(^{176}\)

Russia’s mobilization strategy was not altered when Medvedev was elected President in 2008, as the Medvedev administration continued to make life difficult for independent civil society organizations. For example, during Medvedev’s presidency, Prime Minister Putin introduced a new policy that significantly reduced the number of international donors that have tax-exempt status in Russia.\(^ {177}\) On the other hand, in April 2009 there were signs of a slight thawing in the relationship between the government and independent civil society organizations, as Medvedev reinstated the President’s Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, whose members spoke freely and openly about the state of human rights and civil society in Russia. After this meeting, a working group was established to review the most restrictive aspects of the NGO law.\(^ {178}\) In July 2009 changes to the law were enacted, which limit the grounds on which

\(^{176}\) Systematic violence did increase in 2008 to moderate levels.
\(^{177}\) The decree reduced the number of foreign and international organizations allowed to give tax-free grants to Russia from 101 to 12 (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Another development is a decree on May 13, 2008 disbanded the Federal Registration Service created by the NGO Law and transferred its authority to the Ministry of Justice.
\(^{178}\) Although it is important to note that: “NGO representatives have also expressed bewilderment at Medvedev's decision to name Vladislav Surkov, his first deputy chief of staff, as the head of the working group. Surkov, who held the same post in Putin's Kremlin, is believed to be the man behind the tough NGO law that is now under scrutiny” (Von Twickel, May 28, 2009).
registration may be denied and restricts the list of documents that an authorized body can demand that an NGO submit. The frequency with which an organization can be audited was decreased from once a year to once every three years (RIA-Novosti, July 20, 2009).\(^{179}\) Despite these slight concessions towards social organizations, the main elements of Putin’s program remained in place.

**Methodology**

*Debates about the Effects of Putin’s Policies*

While scholars largely agree on what programs Putin implemented, there is little consensus regarding the actual impact of these programs on social organizations. Some scholars are largely critical of these reforms, asserting that Putin’s policies represent a clear assault on civil society. Others take a middle ground, noting that certain measures constrain organizations, while others empower them. Finally, a few other scholars are much more sanguine about these policies, maintaining that they are largely beneficial to the NGO sector.

Critics of Putin’s policies (Evans, 2006; Hashim, 2005; Jordan, 2010; Lipman, 2005; Rutland, 2004; Taylor, 2011) maintain that they were enacted to bring organizations under greater government oversight and to make them dependent on the state. Once the government had brought wayward governors and the media under Kremlin control, civil society was the only remaining sphere of significant independent activity and voice in Russia. The Putin regime therefore enacted these rules and regulations to effectively manage and control civil society (Balzer 2003). According to this view, Putin’s policies support organizations that are either

\(^{179}\)These changes do not impact the audits that are permitted by arms of the government other than the Ministry of Justice.
apolitical or supportive of the regime’s agenda and undermine and marginalize organizations that are openly critical, have liberal agendas, or are foreign funded. This argument is substantiated by highlighting how the Kremlin effectively neutralizes or coopts organizations that are critical of the regime by applying the NGO Law in a discriminatory manner, selectively funding pro-governmental organizations at the federal and local levels, utilizing state-controlled media to question the patriotism and legitimacy of foreign funded or anti-regime groups, and limiting access to the government through selections to the Public Chamber or other citizen advisory councils.  

Scholars who take a middle ground focus on how Putin’s policies serve to both constrain and empower organizations. For example, Chebankova (2009) conceptualizes civil society as three interactive spheres: state sponsored groups, western sponsored groups, and domestic grassroots movements. While she concludes that Putin’s policies have subjected the first two of these groups to state control and repression, she also finds that these policies have helped grow grassroots movements that address issues like motor vehicles, housing, and the environment.

A similarly complex picture is drawn by Robertson (2011), who argues that Putin’s legacy on social organization is “multivocal” (217). While Robertson carefully details how the Kremlin’s policies create an incentive structure for organizations to “cooperate” with the regime to survive, he also claims that of Putin’s major policies each has included elements of genuine

180 In addition, the limited influence of societal advisory councils over authorities is compellingly detailed by Taylor (2011) and Jordan (2010). In his in-depth study of state building under Putin, Taylor (2011: 234) finds that law enforcement reforms that brought greater formal involvement of NGOs on pardon commissions in the regions actually resulted in fewer pardons because the commissions were less powerful and the presidential administration and governors had to agree as well. Looking at a completely different type of advisory council, the Civil G8, which was organized in conjunction with Russia’s holding of the G8 rotating presidency in 2006, Jordan (2010) finds that the Civil G8 was largely window dressing for dialogue with civil society that was quickly dismissed by decision makers.
effort to exchange information (214) and that it is too early to tell how the laws and institutions introduced by Putin will work in practice. Robertson argues that preliminary analysis reveals that the NGO law did not lead to the widespread shuttering of NGOs and that no matter its problems; the Public Chamber does offer routinized access to public officials and the possibility for civil society organizations to comment on issues of importance (215).

Scholars who focus on the new institutions spawned by Putin’s policies further echo these contradictory effects. In particular, Richter (2009) and Evans (2008) separately conducted in-depth analyses of the Public Chamber and concluded that the Chamber cannot be viewed as a mere puppet of the government, as it has at times criticized the government over sensitive issues. They further found that the Public Chamber can provide participants with additional attention, resources, and voice. On the other hand, Richter and Evans demonstrate the difficulty the Chamber has in balancing its dual role as internal critic and loyal Kremlin supporter. This difficulty is enhanced by the organization’s weak institutional structure, which creates incentives for its members to pursue their own personal agendas instead of working together to respond to demands from below in a systematic way (Richter, 2009). Like Robertson, these scholars argue that the meaning of the Public Chamber is still unclear.

A different perspective on Putin’s policies is put forward by Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova (2010). These scholars decry the lack of systemic data to analyze the impact of Putin’s policies on social organizations and use this lack of analysis to claim that there is no conclusive evidence of a widespread crackdown on NGOs—and not even for those receiving foreign funding. They instead maintain that scholars have used the experience of a few human rights groups in Moscow to generalize Putin’s policies to Russia as a whole. They further
contend that the NGO law has not harmed organizations, but has instead benefited them by rooting out corrupt organizations and bringing greater transparency to the third sector. Finally, they argue that positive developments in Russia, such as the ability of social organizations to receive competitive grants from regional and federal governments and expanded self-government at the local level, are not adequately taken into account by current scholars.

Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova are unquestionably correct to note the dearth of in-depth and systematic research available on how Putin’s policies have affected social organizations in Russia. In the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars conducted a wealth of empirical studies on diverse types of groups.\(^{181}\) However, other than monitoring conducted by human rights groups, there are currently few scholarly studies that draw on surveys or extensive field work of social organizations from Putin’s second term and beyond.\(^{182}\) While the lack of fieldwork on social organizations in Putin’s second term is somewhat understandable given the increasingly closed nature of Russian politics, it severely inhibits scholarly understanding of Russia as a hybrid regime, despite Russia’s remaining geo-strategic importance (Goode, 2010).

This chapter seeks to take an important step towards systematically analyzing the effects of Putin’s policies towards social organizations as recommended by scholars in this review. It does so by testing whether groups that are critical of the regime are systematically crowded out of the public sphere by government policies and supplanted by groups that are either neutral to or in favor of the regime. To test this crowding out hypothesis, I draw on the results of in-depth

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\(^{182}\) Exceptions include excellent theses by Greene (2010) and Lussier (2011).
interviews I conducted with 58 representatives of human rights, women and youth organizations in Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and Volgograd.

City Analysis

In order to conduct an in-depth analysis and draw broader conclusions about the effects of government policies on social organizations, I examine organizations in three Russian cities. I chose to analyze Moscow, Russia’s capital, and two medium sized cities: Ekaterinburg, and Volgograd. I selected these cities based on M. Steven Fish’s methodology (1995) in his study of democratic opposition mobilization in Russia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although Fish’s research includes an analysis of St. Petersburg, Tula, and Orel as well, I decided to limit my study to only three cities instead of six for practical reasons. Scholarship has shown that St. Petersburg and Moscow, while the most influential cities in Russia, are not representative of Russia as a whole. Therefore I wanted to include only one of these cities in my study and opted for Moscow based on its capital status. Additionally, I wanted to achieve the largest geographic diversity within Fish’s set of cases. I therefore omitted Orel and Tula since they are close to Moscow.

The cities selected for analysis have important similarities and differences. Ekaterinburg and Volgograd are in many ways typical provincial capitals, although there are important differences between the two. The provincial cities differ substantially from Moscow on a

\[\text{183} \text{ Moscow is an exceptional city in many regards. Moscow is Russia’s largest city with a population of over ten million. Moscow is its own administrative unit within the Russian Federation and has the highest gross regional product out of any region.} \]

\[\text{184} \text{ Fish (1995: 138-139) asserts that Ekaterinburg and Volgograd (along with the omitted cities Tula and Orel) represent typical provincial cities. In these cities ethnic Russians are the majority, there are significant cultural and educational institutions, and there is not a history of powerful organized labor movements.} \]
number of political, economic, and social indicators. These differences and similarities offer a good opportunity to test general hypotheses about the effect of the centralized state mobilization strategy in Russia. If the effect on social organizations is fairly similar across different cases, this finding will lend greater support for the argument for Russia as a whole.\footnote{These findings are of course limited in application to urban environments, as rural areas were not considered.}

Moscow is the political capital of the Russian Federation and in many ways is an exceptional Russian city. Moscow is Russia’s largest urban center with a population of over ten million.\footnote{See Table 5-1 for population statistics.} It is the wealthiest city and is a major financial center.\footnote{Moscow had the highest gross regional product of all subjects of the Russian Federation in 2009 (Rosstat, 2001-2012c).} Except for St. Petersburg, Moscow is the only city in the Federation that controls its own administration and is not a constituent part of a region or oblast. Other important characteristics that differentiate Moscow from other cities include its diversified economy, highly educated workforce, and low level of unemployment (Sundstrom, 2006: 105). Moscow is a major cultural center as well as home to top universities.

Because of its capital status, the political situation in Moscow is relatively unique. Events that take place in Moscow, like the resistance to the August 1991 coup, have had a large impact on politics generally in the Federation. In addition, since Moscow is not part of a regional administrative unit, the mayor does not compete for power and budgetary status with a governor. Iurii Luzhkov was the mayor of Moscow at the time of my fieldwork, having served in this position since 1992.\footnote{Luzhkov was first elected as mayor in 1996, and re-elected in 1999 and 2003.} In the 1990s, when many governors strengthened their powers vis-à-vis the center, mayor Luzhkov was no exception. In 1999 Luzhkov even had presidential
ambitions and established an alternative political party to contest the Federal 1999 Duma elections. After the party’s defeat, Luzhkov gave his allegiance to Putin\textsuperscript{189} and managed to maintain a steady hold over local politics in Moscow until he was fired from his post by President Medvedev in September 2010.\textsuperscript{190}

Moscow is distinguished by its status as the home of one of the largest and most diverse NGO communities in Russia. According to the Ministry of Justice of the City of Moscow, the overall number of non-commercial organizations registered in the city in 2008 was 22,354 (Moscow City Resource Center MDOO, 2009).\textsuperscript{191} Such estimates of the number of NGOs should be taken with caution, as such estimates often vary quite widely and do not capture the number of groups actually functioning or the size of such groups. Nevertheless, official numbers do provide a broad picture of the size of the NGO community. Returning to official estimates, the number of registered non-commercial organizations in 2008 was almost double the number reported in 2003 (11,067). The NGO density for Moscow based on 2009 census data is 2.2 organizations per thousand residents.

Moscow is also unique because many of the largest and most influential NGOs have their headquarters in Moscow. NGOs in the capital city are major recipients of international funding and have benefitted from high levels of contact with foreign researchers, NGOs, and other foundations (Sundstrom, 2006). Furthermore, the Moscow city government has provided a

\textsuperscript{189} Luzhkov’s Fatherland party was one of three parties that merged to form United Russia.

\textsuperscript{190} On September 28, 2010 Luzhkov was fired via decree by President Medvedev. Two weeks previous to his dismissal, Mayor Luzhkov wrote an op-ed article in Novaia Gazeta criticizing Medvedev’s stance on the highway through the Khimki forest. Commenting on the dismissal, then Prime Minister Putin told Channel One television that: “Yury Mikhailovich has done a lot for the development of Moscow and is, to some extent, a landmark figure for modern Russia, but it's absolutely clear that the Moscow mayor didn’t get along with the president, and the mayor is subordinate to the president, not the other way around.” (Odynova, September 29, 2010).

\textsuperscript{191} This number includes various kinds of non-commercial organizations that have a distinct juridical status such as social organizations, non-commercial partnerships, funds, institutions, unions, and religious organizations.
generally favorable atmosphere for NGOs to operate (Sundstrom, 2006: 136).\textsuperscript{192} Since 1996, the Moscow government has given funds for organizations that conduct socially meaningful projects. Around 200 organizations receive partial support through this competition each year (House of Public Organizations of the City of Moscow, 2007).\textsuperscript{193}

Ekaterinburg, known as Sverdlovsk in the Soviet period, is located in the central part of Russia in the Ural mountains. Often called the “Capital of the Urals,” Ekaterinburg is Russia’s fourth largest city.\textsuperscript{194} During the Soviet period Ekaterinburg was closed to foreigners. Ekaterinburg is the capital of Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is a wealthy region from natural resources and manufacturing (Nelson & Kuzes, 2002a: 87). In 2009 Sverdlovsk Oblast’s gross regional product was the 8\textsuperscript{th} highest out of the 83 subjects of the Russian Federation listed (Rosstat, 2001-2012c). Ekaterinburg is home to multiple educational and cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{195}

As the home of former President Boris Yeltsin, Sverdlovsk oblast is known as an anti-communist stronghold and is a traditionally liberal area of the federation (Moser, 1998: 399, 427). It is one of the few regions in Russia in which both the executive and legislature supported Yeltsin (Ge‘iman & Golosov, 1998: 33). Despite this, there has been considerable tension between the central and regional government. This tension developed in the mid-1990s after Eduard Rossel, the regional administrator appointed by Yelstin, founded the movement, Transformation of the Urals, to shore up his political support. This movement called for regional autonomy at the national level (Moser, 1998: 426) and in 1994 Rossel was removed from his

\textsuperscript{192} Out of the seven cities in Sundstrom’s study, the political environment in Moscow has the third highest score with a total of five points. It is tied with Ekaterinburg (2006: 136). Sundstrom calculated the political environment by examining material support and institutional dialogue with NGOs among other indicators.

\textsuperscript{193} For more information about these contests, including winners, see http://www.mosportal.ru/6/1/index.htm (Accessed July 20, 2012).

\textsuperscript{194} As of January 1, 2009 the population is 1,401,729 (http://www.ekburg.ru/aboutcity/population/).

\textsuperscript{195} For more information see: http://yekaterinburg.usconsulate.gov/yekat_and_sverdoblast.html.
post by Yeltsin. However, with the help of the Transformation of the Urals movement, Rossel won the position of governor in the first direct election for the post in 1995. In 1996 Rossel softened his stance towards the center, but Sverdlovsk still managed to be the first region other than a republic to sign a power sharing agreement with the federal center (Nelson & Kuzes, 2002b).

In addition to the political conflict at the regional and federal level, there was a significant amount of tension between the governor, Eduard Rossel, and the long-time mayor of Ekaterinburg, Arkadii Chernetskii. The conflict began when Rossel backed an alternative candidate against Chernetskii in the 1995 mayoral election. At the time, Chernetskii had connections to democratic reform groups as well as Yeltsin (Gel’man and Golosov, 1998). Afterwards major turf battles ensued in both the electoral and non-electoral arena between the two politicians and their respective factions. NGOs were affected, as the political conflict between the governor and mayor created problems as well as opportunity. Groups were forced to take sides or were able to use the conflict to create greater bargaining space. However, after Rossel and Chernetskii officially pledged their loyalty to United Russia this conflict was no longer expressed openly. In November 2009, the 72-year-old Rossel was dismissed by President Medvedev and replaced by Alexander Misharin, a candidate with strong ties to the Sverdlovsk region and Moscow ("Uralskii Patriarkh Ushel Na Ponizhenie," December 30, 2009).

196 In the non-electoral arena, budgetary conflicts were quite common. To read more about the history of budgetary conflicts between the municipal and regional levels of government in the oblast see ("Municipal Head on Situation in Yekaterinburg ", April 24, 1999 ). In the electoral arena, during the 1999 election for governor of Sverdlovsk oblast both Rossel and Chernetskii ran for the post ("Five Governors' Races Examined," August 23, 1999).
197 In her study of women’s and soldier’s rights organizations, Sundstrom (2006) found that political battles often detracted from NGOs ability to get things done (106-107).
198 Rossel then became Sverdlovsk Oblast’s representative to the Federation Council.
Like Moscow, Ekaterinburg has a history of civic activism, but has a comparatively smaller NGO community in terms of aggregate numbers of NGOs. In July 2008, 7,026 non-commercial organizations were registered in Sverdlovsk oblast, and out of this number 4,996 were registered as social organizations, excluding political parties.\textsuperscript{199} The NGO density for Ekaterinburg based on 2009 census data is 5.3 organizations per a thousand residents, which is much higher than in Moscow. In Ekaterinburg there are various organizations that seek to network social organizations with each other, foremost of which is the NGO led “NGO Forum.”\textsuperscript{200} Like Moscow, the Ekaterinburg city administration holds a yearly competition among interested social organizations to receive grants. In 2009 there were twenty-two grant winners who received a subsidy in the amount of 20 to 150 thousand rubles (about $650 to $4,864).\textsuperscript{201}

In contrast to Moscow, Ekaterinburg has received much less attention from western donors. In her in-depth study of foreign assistance in Russia, Sundstrom (2006) asserts that groups in Ekaterinburg received a significant amount of foreign funding in the beginning of the 1990s, but this funding declined substantially by the late 1990s. Comparatively, Ekaterinburg’s level of foreign assistance is low. In sum, Sundstrom categorizes the political atmosphere for NGOs in Ekaterinburg as equal to Moscow.\textsuperscript{202}

Volgograd, formerly known as Stalingrad in the Soviet period, is located on the Volga River in the southern European part of Russia. Volgograd is the administrative center of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[199] Furthermore, out of the 4,996; 2,741 organizations are unions and 620 organizations are religious in nature (Lawyers for Civil Society).
\item[200] The forum was created in 2005 and its website lists 100 organizations as members. See: \url{http://www.nko-ural.ru/?forumnko&item=11}.
\item[201] To access lists of past winners of the grants since 2000, see the website of the NGO resource organization, Good Will, at \url{http://www.nko-ural.ru/?projects&item=5} (Accessed December 17, 2009).
\item[202] It is important to note that Sundstrom conducted her research in 1998 and 1999-2000.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Volgograd Oblast and is Russia’s twelfth largest city. Volgograd is home to a number of cultural as well as secondary educational institutions. Volgograd’s economy is centered around industry, including steel and aluminum production, machine manufacturing (especially tractors), oil refining, and chemical production. Volgograd experienced high unemployment and economic difficulties in the 1990s, but the situation improved in the 2000s. In 2009, Volgograd oblast’s GNP was rated 23rd out of 83 subjects of the Russian Federation (Rosstat, 2001-2012c).

Candidates for Volgograd city and oblast governments experienced considerable amounts of political competition since the late Soviet period, and like Ekaterinburg, politics have been filled with conflict between the mayor of Volgograd and the governor of the oblast at different periods in time. In 1990 popular mobilization forced the oblast communist secretary to resign and Yeltsin supporters became head of oblast and city administrations in 1990 (Fish 1995: 144). However, the communists made a political comeback in 1995 when they won 22 out of 24 constituencies in elections to the Volgograd City Duma ("Communists Win the Elections to Volgograd Duma," October 2, 1995). In 1996 the communist candidate, Nikolai Maksiuta, achieved a surprise victory against incumbent governor Ivan Shabunin and Volgograd mayor Iurii Chekhov. By 1998 the communists won control over the Volgograd regional duma. Volgograd therefore became a key part of the so-called “red belt” ("United Russia Party To Work for Change of Power in 'Red Belt' Region", June 6, 2003). Nonetheless, while Nikolai Maksiuta remained a communist and the governor of Volgograd through the end of 2009,

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204 After the relevant time period for this study, Anatolii Brovko, a United Russia member, became governor of Volgograd. Shortly after becoming governor Brovko was enveloped in criminal proceedings. The combination of these proceedings and a poor showing in the region for United Russia in the 2011 Duma elections (and resultant
United Russia achieved various electoral victories in Volgograd. In 2003 United Russia candidate Yevgenii Ishchenko won the mayoral post, but in 2006 resigned due to a corruption scandal. After regional elections in 2003, United Russia had a strong showing in the Volgograd parliament. In 2007 the communist candidate, Roman Grebennikov won the mayoral election, but later announced his support for United Russia (Iashchenko, May 23, 2007).

Volgograd oblast has a small but active NGO sector, especially in the youth and patriotic organizational sphere. In December 2007, 4,493 non-commercial organizations were officially registered with the government, and 2,579 of these organizations are registered as a type of social organization. The NGO density for Volgograd based on 2009 census data is 4.6 organizations per thousand residents, which is lower than in Ekaterinburg and higher than in Moscow. To give a better sense of the number of highly active organizations, 35 organizations are listed on the oblast government website, along with information about their activities, under the heading “organizations with a social orientation” (Administration of Volgograd Oblast, 2007). Eleven youth organizations are listed in addition to the 35 on the website. Unlike Moscow and Ekaterinburg, there is not an official municipal NGO grant competition.

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205 Ishchenko and Maksiuta had very contentious relations especially when Ishchenko attempted to enter the 2004 election for governor. Ishchenko was ultimately disqualified from the race ("Russia: Supreme Court Denies Volgograd Mayor's Appeal To Run for Governor ", November 19, 2004).

206 After Anatolii Brovko became governor in early 2010, conflict between mayor Grebennikov and Brovko ensued. Ultimately this conflict led to Grebennikov’s dismissal by Brovko in February 2011 (Weaver, July 26, 2011).

207 Volgograd is a very patriotic city because of its history as the location of the famous World War II battle of Stalingrad, which completely destroyed the city. Youth organizations are especially high profile and active organizations in the city as noted to me by various youth activists. Youth organizations are well networked and many are part of an umbrella youth forum (Interview 62). Finally, the oblast department of youth is very powerful and gives a large amount of financial support to youth initiatives (Interview 68).

208 Social organizations include social organizations, social movements, social funds, public institutions, organs of self-government, and political parties.
Table 5-1. Three City Comparison on Social and Economic Indicators in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population (^{209})</th>
<th>Per Capita Monetary Income/ Rubles Per Month (^{210})</th>
<th>Unemployment Level in 2000 and 2009 (^{211})</th>
<th>Number of Non-Commercial Organization</th>
<th>NGO Density (^{212})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>10,508,971 (1(^{st}))</td>
<td>43,098</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>22,354</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinburg</td>
<td>1,332,264 (4(^{th}))</td>
<td>19,350</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,026</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>981,909 (13(^{th}))</td>
<td>12,635</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the cities in this analysis have important similarities and differences. As demonstrated in the previous discussion and in Table 5-1, Moscow is clearly an outlier on various indicators such as population, economic development, and total number of social organizations. Its political situation as the capital of the Federation and its status as a region are unique. In contrast, Ekaterinburg and Volgograd are provincial capitals and, despite different political orientations, politics in both cities have been patterned by political conflict and battles between the mayor and the governor of Volgograd and Sverdlovsk oblast respectively.


\(^{210}\) The figures for Ekaterinburg and Volgograd are those reported for Sverdlovsk and Volgograd Oblasts (Rosstat, 2001-2012a).

\(^{211}\) The figures for Ekaterinburg and Volgograd are those reported for Sverdlovsk and Volgograd Oblasts (Rosstat, 2001-2012b).

\(^{212}\) Per thousand residents. Calculated by dividing the overall number of non-commercial organizations (Administration of Volgograd Oblast, 2007; Lawyers for Civil Society; Moscow City Resource Center MDOO, 2009) by the city population.
However, economically Ekaterinburg has fared much better than Volgograd. Ekaterinburg also has a higher number of non-commercial organizations and the highest overall NGO density. The three cities in the study therefore offer a good opportunity to test general hypotheses about the effect of the centralized state mobilization strategy in Russia. If the effect on social organizations is fairly similar across these different cases, such a finding will lend greater support for the argument in Russia as a whole.

**Human Rights, Women, and Youth Groups in Russia**

Russia has a diverse NGO community and includes groups that work on a variety of cultural, social, and political topics. To capture some of this diversity, I selected groups for analysis that work on three different issue areas: human rights, women, and youth. In addition, I selected these groups based on the varying degree of threat that they pose to the regime. Groups that work on topics that are considered to be politically sensitive to the regime may experience greater intervention and interference from the authorities than groups that work on politically safe or neutral topics (Evans, 2006; Robertson, 2011). Therefore, to more completely analyze the effects of Putin’s policies towards social organizations, it is essential to examine threatening as well as non-threatening types of organizations.

The first type of organization I selected for analysis is human rights groups. Because human rights groups research government abuse and defend citizens against such abuse they, almost by definition, work on areas that are potentially politically sensitive. In Russia, human

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213 Of course the interpretation of this data point is limited because it does not take into account how large organizations are in terms of their memberships or staff.
rights activists have a long history of voicing their criticism of the regime. Furthermore, scholars and activists alike have claimed that human rights groups are viewed as threatening to the government and have been especially targeted for suppression by the Putin administration (Evans, 2006; Lipman, 2005; Mendelson, 2002). Human rights groups are therefore a group most likely to experience the hypothesized crowding out effect from the regime’s centralized strategy.

The second type of organization I selected for analysis is women’s groups. Women’s organizations have been widely studied by scholars (Uhlin 2006: 61) and are noted as one of the major civil society groups in Russia. In addition to their general importance in Russian civil society, women’s groups are an interesting case because their work is generally considered to be less threatening to the government than the work of human rights groups. This is mainly because women’s groups largely avoid conflictual forms of interaction with the authorities. And in contrast to human rights groups, women’s organizations have not been among the key targets of repressive tactics towards NGOs under the Putin administration. Women’s groups are therefore a neutral case from which to evaluate the crowding out hypothesis.

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214 Many of the most famous human rights activists in the movement today were dissidents in the Soviet period. Examples include Alexander Kovalev, Liudmila Alekseevna, and Lev Ponamerev.

215 The statement of Barry Lowenkron, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is instructive: “These and other developments, Mr. Chairman, suggest that the Russian Government harbors a deep mistrust of civil society, and especially of organizations that receive foreign funding and are engaged in politically sensitive activities, like human rights monitoring” (February 8, 2006: 5).


217 Sperling (1999: 258) argues that: “recent political history and instability had instilled an aversion to measures perceived as instability-provoking, including mass demonstrations or protests, which suggest an explanation for the movement’s preference for less conflictual means of protest.”
The third type of organization I selected for analysis is youth groups. I chose to focus on youth because they are one of the key social groups actively mobilized by the Kremlin via groups like Nashi (Blum, 2007; Heller, 2008; Robertson, 2009, 2011; Schwirtz, 2007). Furthermore many, though by no means all, youth groups in Russia are apolitical in nature and seek to involve youth in various pursuits such as sports, creative writing, or musical performance. Youth therefore offer the opportunity to analyze groups that pose a low level of threat to the government and that are, in many ways, often very supportive of the regime. Overall youth groups represent a least likely case for the crowding out hypothesis, meaning rather than being crowded out, they should be supported by Putin’s policies.

In sum, the three groups chosen for analysis represent a cross-section of social organizations in Russia, including organizations ranging from those most likely (human rights groups) to least likely (youth groups) to experience the effect of the crowding out hypothesis. Including multiple group types, rather than focusing on one type alone, allows the study to make broader statements about social organizations in Russia.

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218 In his in-depth study of youth policy, Blum (2007: 126) argues that government officials in post-Soviet Russia still view youth as a strategic resource and seek to control their activities. Blum writes that: “the ideal format is a government-run event in which delegates from ‘respectable’ youth organizations are invited to participate. Furthermore, in an obvious institutional carry-over from the Soviet period, the state’s bid for control also includes building a semi-official (or pseudo-independent) organization to oversee youth activities on the ground.”

219 In contrast, some youth organizations are highly critical of the regime or are directly connected to the political opposition (i.e. youth wings of opposition parties). These groups are highly threatening and are viewed as key opponents.

220 For comparability reasons, youth groups that are directly affiliated with political parties will be excluded from the analysis. This is because this study focuses on social organizations that are not wings of political parties, but rather are their own stand-alone organization. Social groups may of course be affiliated with certain political parties, but those considered in my analysis will not be direct wings of political parties.

221 This is not to say that youth as a social category are not viewed as potentially threatening to regime stability. Certainly youth as a social group have played a very integral role in mass movements that significantly changed the status quo in multiple countries (e.g. youth in the U.S. and Europe). However, youth organizations before Vladimir Putin took office were largely apolitical or regime supportive.
Evaluating the Crowding Out Hypothesis

To evaluate whether organizations critical of the regime are crowded out of the public sphere, I asked representatives from 58 groups in the three cities a series of questions about their membership, activities, media coverage, relationship with the authorities, and relationships with other organizations and the government, among other things. These queries did not include direct questions on whether the groups felt crowded out by the government and its policies. Instead, the interview questions sought to establish the environment in which organizations work and how these settings may or may not have changed over time.

Table 5-2. Groups Interviewed in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinburg</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organizations I spoke with by no means represent a complete sample of human rights, women, or youth groups in these three cities. In Moscow especially, where the NGO community is large and diverse, it would be physically impossible to interview all relevant and

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222 I conducted all but three of these interviews in Russian. Separately I conducted all but three interviews face to face. The duration of the interviews ranged from thirty minutes to four hours. Most interviews lasted approximately an hour and a half. All translations in the dissertation from the Russian into English unless otherwise indicated are my own.

223 I define youth groups as organizations whose membership or target audience for participation are primarily young people. In the case of overlap with other group types, I will give precedence to the youth factor. In addition, as mentioned earlier, it is outside the scope of this paper to consider political organizations and therefore I will not analyze youth groups that are explicitly youth wings of political parties. Molodaia Gvardiia, Red Youth Vanguard, and Young Yabloko among others are not considered.

224 In my study I define women’s organizations as those that are created and run by women and focus on issues that affect women. Importantly, following Sundstrom (2006), I consider whether the group identifies itself as a women’s organization or some other type.

225 I define human rights groups as those that research, monitor, or defend the rights of various groups in the population be it prisoners, soldiers, journalists, refugees or citizens against police abuse.
active organizations. Instead, my strategy was to include a mixture of the most famous and high-profile organizations along with a number of smaller and less well-known organizations in each group type. I also attempted to get a mixed sample of both old and new organizations. In Volgograd and Ekaterinburg, where the NGO communities are much smaller, my sample is more representative. However, in all three cities, it was difficult to know exactly how many active organizations exist, as many lists with local governments and other NGO resource centers are incomplete or outdated. I therefore determined which organizations to interview through a combination of these lists, newspaper analysis, and asking respondents who they worked with and which organizations they think work actively. In sum, while they are by no means a perfect sample, the interviews offer an important first-step in collecting systematic evidence about the experiences of multiple group types in Russia during Putin’s second term and beyond.

Layers of Expectations: City Level Variation

As discussed earlier, conducting a multi-city study enhances the generalizability of the central argument put forth in this study. If the crowding out hypothesis is an accurate explanation for Russia in general, the available evidence should support the hypothesis in all three cities. Previous work on social organizations in Russia has shown divergent results based on region (Petro, 1995; Sperling, 1999; Sundstrom, 2006; Weigle, 2000), and indeed this variation provides a tough test of the general argument. Nevertheless, while some regional variation is expected, this variation should not contradict the main expectations of the crowding

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226 My study has the unfortunate bias that it can not account for those organizations that closed or have been shut down, as it is difficult to locate or know who these people are and then to interview them about the reasons for ceasing their organization’s operations.
out hypothesis. Overall, the multi-city study is designed to rigorously test the crowding out hypothesis.

Nonetheless, some regional differences may be reflected in the strength of the observed results. On the one hand, the crowding out hypothesis may be especially pronounced in Moscow because it is the home of the central government, has the most high-profile social organizations, and is often seen as the benchmark for other regions. On the other hand, the crowding out hypothesis may be amplified in the provincial capitals because there is less Western media attention on crackdowns of organizations and the organizational community is smaller and thereby easier to control (Weigle, 2000: 6).

Layers of Expectation: Group Level Variation

In order to further generalize my findings with respect to the crowding out hypothesis, I selected social groups that posed varying degrees of threat to the regime. If the crowding out hypothesis is correct, my interviews should find that organizations critical of the regime, such as human rights groups, will experience a decline in membership, while comparatively neutral groups, like women or youth, will experience stability or even an increase in membership. These interviews should reveal that human rights organizations both report a larger decrease in the number of public events they organize and describe greater difficulties in holding public events such as rallies or demonstrations than will women or youth groups; that there has been a decline in reported media coverage of human rights groups, while the public exposure for neutral and

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227 Sundstrom (2006) finds that the way regional governments relate to social organizations vary substantially across Russia.
228 The funding decisions of local governments can be more consequential because groups in the regions often have less access to international funding.
pro-government groups will increase; and that human rights groups experience more pressure from the authorities, be it from the NGO law or more generally, than do either women or youth groups.

Of course, no single one of these findings would itself provide sufficient evidence to ascertain whether the crowding out hypothesis is valid. For example, a decline in membership for critical groups may be the result of poor outreach to the community rather than government policy per se. However, a confirmation that all, or nearly all, of these anticipated scenarios have played out in Russia would provide strong evidence from which to draw conclusions about the validity of the crowding out hypothesis and the ultimate results of the Putin regime’s policies on social organizations in Russia.

**Interview Results**

The results of the 58 interviews are organized by issue area rather than by city or group type in order to best show broad trends in the operation as well as working environment for the three types of social organizations. The issue areas are membership, media coverage, public events, experience with the NGO Law, and relationship with the federal public chamber. When applicable, city differences will be highlighted, although a key part of the unfolding story is how similar the working environment has become for social organizations throughout Russia.

This section will conclude with a comparison of women’s groups. Since women’s organizations are mainly neutral in status they do not as a whole exhibit clear patterns by issue area like human rights or youth groups. Consequently, women’s groups will not be discussed as much as the other types of organizations in the issue area portion of the chapter. Instead, it is
necessary to break women’s organizations into two groups, based on their source of funding, to more accurately examine the crowding out hypothesis.

Membership

Membership is one of the defining features of a group and gives a sense of the level of participation within it.229 As stated in the previous section, I expect that, as the groups most critical of the regime in the study, human rights organizations in all three cities will likely report a decrease in membership since the 1990s. Since women’s groups are generally more neutral, they should exhibit less of this trend. Finally, if government policies do in fact encourage organizations that are viewed as neutral or supportive of the ruling regime, I expect that youth groups should generally experience an increase in membership.

Table 5-3. Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>% Youth</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>% Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership Increase</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Stable</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Decrease</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Membership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Response Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general trends among the interviewed groups matched the theoretical expectations listed above, with no significant differences in the responses by city. When examining the responses of organizations for which I have information, almost 40 percent of human rights 229 Membership is a classic measure of participation in voluntary organizations. For example, according to Robert Putnam (2000: 49): “Official membership in formal organizations is only one facet of social capital, but it is usually regarded as a useful barometer of community involvement.”
groups reported a decrease in membership. No human rights organization reported an increase in membership. In contrast, 18 percent of women’s groups reported a decrease in membership, but 41 percent have no membership at all. Finally, 29 percent of youth groups in all of the cities reported a decrease in membership, with almost 50 percent of youth groups reporting increased membership.

In sum, the trends reported by the groups interviewed are consistent with the expectations of the crowding out hypothesis. Human rights groups on the whole reported either a decrease in membership or no membership at all, most women’s organizations exhibited less of this trend, and youth groups in all of the cities generally reported an increase in membership. Membership rates, which are a direct indicator of participation and societal support, show that groups critical of the state have experienced a decline, while those that are neutral or loyal have experienced stability or even an increase in participation.

**Media Coverage**

A group’s relationship with the media is critical to getting its message out to average Russians. Media coverage plays an important role not only in providing information, but also in shaping public perception of groups and their activities. Disparaging coverage or refusing to

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230 Note that two groups mentioned increased numbers of volunteers in the last year.
231 Some groups are not membership based, but are professional non-profit advocacy groups.
232 Media here generally refers to newspapers, radio, and TV. I did not ask respondents specifically about their group’s on-line exposure. At the time of the study, the use of the internet for independent views and social networking was growing in importance, but was not as widely used as it today. In 2009, the year I conducted my study, 29 percent of Russians used the internet. This number increased to 43 percent in 2010 (International Telecommunications Union, December 2011). According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 33 percent of adult respondents in Russia used social media in 2010, but this number grew to 43 percent in 2011 (Kohut, Wike, Horowitz, Poushter, & Barker, 2011). The internet, and social media in particular, has helped facilitate protests after the 2011 Duma elections, and future studies of the crowding out hypothesis must include questions about groups’ on-line presence.
provide coverage of particular organizations is likely an important way that critical groups may
be crowded out of the public sphere. As the most critical groups in the study, I expect that
human rights organizations will more often report a decrease in media coverage in comparison to
women or youth groups. And because they are on the whole the most neutral or pro-government
organizations, I expect that youth groups will report having the highest amount and most positive
media coverage.

Before analyzing the specifics of each type, it is important to note that the baseline media
coverage of NGOs in Russia is low. A majority of the groups, regardless of type, were
unsatisfied with their media coverage. It was noted on multiple occasions in all three cities by
human rights, women, and youth groups alike that NGOs have little media coverage. As one
respondent put it, “it’s sadly the case that often when there’s a scandal of some sort, that only
then is an organization well covered” (Interview 48). Various respondents in each of the cities
noted that coverage has worsened in recent years because organizations must pay to be
mentioned (a form of social advertisement), and they have little money to do so.

While all three types of groups reported consistently low media coverage, human rights
groups frequently noted a change for the worse, not only in terms of the amount of coverage, but
also in the content of coverage. One human rights activist (Interview 16) stated that the negative
coverage of human rights groups around the passing of the 2006 NGO Law was the worst ever.

Human rights groups experienced a huge reputational loss after the spy scandal, which

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233 While concrete measures of media exposure are hard to come by, USAID’s Sustainability Index covers the public
image of NGOs. Accordingly, in 2009: “media in general paid little attention to the NGO sector, but covered youth-
related civic initiatives as well as volunteer work” (USAID, 2010: 187).
234 It is interesting to note that a number of organizations in Moscow had the perception that it was easier for NGOs
in the regions to get media coverage of their activities. However, interviews with NGOs in the regions did not
substantiate this perception.
implicated a connection between human rights groups and supposed spies from the British Council. After the scandal regional governments stopped wanting to work with them. While still confirming the negative content of the coverage, a different respondent (Interview 34) added the caveat that, despite the negative media campaign against human right NGOs, many people do not believe the government’s propaganda about spies.

In contrast to the other types of groups, human rights organizations linked the decrease in media coverage to pressure from the authorities on journalists, rather than simple market pressures on the media. In Ekaterinburg, a long-time human rights defender explained that ten years ago it was possible for him to appear and present his views on various media platforms. Now he believes that local journalists would be fired if they interviewed him (Interview 43). While human rights organizations speak plainly about problems of media coverage and pressure on journalists during the Yeltsin years, they still note a clear change for the worse. According to a human rights activist (Interview 18) in Moscow, during the first Chechen War, the activist’s organization experienced a large drop in TV coverage. The situation improved after the war, but did not reach pre-war levels. The situation became even worse after Putin. Finally, as further evidence of the crowding out of human rights NGOs, a different human rights activist in Moscow (Interview 19) noted that it is now even harder to get airtime because legitimate human rights groups must compete with GONGOs.

Thus, despite the fact that almost all Russian NGOs suffer from inadequate media access, the evidence is still consistent with the crowding out hypothesis. While women’s groups and youth organizations would obviously prefer more media attention, the coverage that they do receive is largely neutral and the lack of media exposure can largely be attributed to market
pressures. In contrast, many human rights groups are essentially denied the opportunity to present their points of view and when Russian media describes these organizations or individuals, it is often done in a negative manner. Indeed, the little positive news media that is granted to human rights organizations is increasingly bestowed upon the government financed (and friendly) GONGOs rather than independent NGOs.

Events

Holding events such as rallies, processions, or demonstrations to gather supporters and bring attention to a group’s cause is an important way that groups take part in public life. I expect that, as the most threatening groups in the study, human rights organizations should experience greater difficulties in holding public events, a decrease in the number of people who attend the events, and a decrease in the general number of public events that are held. In contrast women and youth organizations should not report such difficulties.

Before discussing the results, it is worth noting the difficulty in comparing the respondents’ answers to questions about events. Interviewees from human rights groups generally focused on their freedom to assemble and conduct protests and processions.\(^\text{235}\) In contrast, the repertoire of action of women’s groups does not include protest activities to the same extent,\(^\text{236}\) and interviewees focused on conferences and festivals. Similarly, representatives of youth organizations discussed events in terms of their public festivals, celebrations, and summer camps. Because of the difficulty in comparing the different type of events by group, the

\(^{235}\) This is consistent with Uhlin’s (2006: 75) findings that human rights groups in Russia and the Baltic states engage frequently in protest action against authorities in comparison to other types of groups.

\(^{236}\) Again, see Sperling (1999: 258). She argues: “recent political history and instability had instilled an aversion to measures perceived as instability-provoking, including mass demonstrations or protests, which suggest an explanation for the movement’s preference for less conflictual means of protest.”
analysis below focuses on human rights and youth groups, as these are the organizations which I expect to show the strongest trends in opposing directions if the crowding out hypothesis is accurate.

In the area of events, regional differences play a role. In Moscow it is difficult for human rights groups to hold large public events. This is especially the case for shestvie or processions. A human rights activist in Moscow (Interview 16) stated that currently processions are almost never allowed, and those that are require the organizers to work very hard to get permission.237 Similarly, a human rights defender in Moscow (Interview 15) mentioned that under Yeltsin, meetings, rallies, and processions were more or less allowed. In the 1990s, groups were allowed to have processions on Tverskaia (the main thoroughfare in Moscow), but after Putin came to power the Moscow administration began to reject his group’s applications for public meetings. To show the difficulties they currently face, the respondent discussed a procession that the human rights community wanted to hold after the murder of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasiia Baburova in January 2009. Human rights activists were only given permission one day before the event was to take place. That human rights organizations were allowed to organize at all for this event was actually quite rare. According to a different activist in Moscow (Interview 18), since the early 2000s it has been very difficult to get permission to hold public assemblies, and requests for processions are regularly denied—and if they are held anyway they are harshly dispersed. The respondent contrasted this with the experience of pro-Kremlin groups, which do receive permission for processions. The respondent

237 In this case, the respondent referenced the procession regarding the murder of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasiia Baburova.
did, however, mention that public gatherings that simply consist of standing pickets are generally allowed.

Not surprisingly, the increased difficulty in holding public events in Moscow has resulted in a decrease in the overall number of public rallies held by human rights activists there. It is instructive to note that one of the respondents (Interview 20), who is part of the leadership of one of the largest and most successful civil society organizations in Russia, said that the number of human rights “rallies” has decreased to such an extent that they are no longer utilized by the organization.

In contrast to Moscow, human rights groups in Ekaterinburg reported taking part in public protests quite frequently and noted that a large majority of their rallies and protests are permitted. However, human rights groups in Ekaterinburg noted a decrease in the number of people who attend their protests. As recounted by one respondent (Interview 43), in the past they could mobilize around 1,000 people to attend a rally and today they consider 15-20 people to be a good turnout. Similarly, in response to my question about the number of participants, another human rights activist (Interview 47) said that if a new person comes to one of their events it is certainly noticed, as there are far fewer participants than previously.

In Volgograd, two out of the six human rights groups interviewed specifically discussed protests. As the director of one of these groups noted (Interview 60): “In contemporary Russia holding rallies means sitting under arrest 15 days. The powers are afraid of public action and that is why even the lawful holding of rallies is not possible.” The rest of the human rights

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238 However, some respondents noted exceptions during the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2009 in Ekaterinburg (Interview 43).
groups in Volgograd focused more on conferences and similar types of events, and they noted their participation in these activities has either remained stable or declined.

In contrast to human rights groups, a clear majority of youth groups in all three cities noted an increase in the number of events that they hold. If the number of events decreased, it was largely attributed to an increase in the overall quality of the events. For example, a youth organization in Moscow noted that previously they may have quickly put together an event because someone had an idea, but now the events they do hold are better organized and planned (Interview 23).

Only two out of seventeen youth groups mentioned any difficulty in receiving permission to hold events, and these groups are located in Moscow. One organization noted that their events are not forbidden, but that it sometimes takes a while for the administration to respond to their request (Interview 23). A different group stated that little by little the system for applying for processions had become more difficult over the years (Interview 26). In comparison to human rights groups in Moscow, these difficulties appear to be relatively minor, as youth groups do not face large obstacles to assemble in public spaces.

In sum, human rights groups in the three cities noted either a decrease in the number of public events that they hold or a decrease in the number of people who attend their events. And in Moscow, these groups noted greater difficulties in gaining permission from the authorities to hold public events like processions and rallies. In contrast, youth groups largely reported an increasing number of public events and few difficulties in holding them in all three

\[239\] Youth groups in Volgograd and Ekaterinburg did not mention any difficulties.
cities. The differences in these trends shed light on a key way that critical groups are marginalized from public life in Russia.

NGO Law

The 2006 NGO Law is controversial and studying its effect on the three types of groups provides yet another way to assess the crowding out hypothesis. First, the law may crowd out critical organizations by giving the authorities the pretext to close them.\footnote{240} Similarly, it permits the authorities to so involve organizations in expensive and time-consuming bureaucratic compliance procedures that these organizations have little time or resources to conduct their normal work. It has the potential to increase the difficulty for groups to receive foreign funding, an essential source of revenue for operations. A substantial loss of foreign funding may even cause the group to scale down its activities or close. Faced with these obstacles, many organizations may choose to temper their criticism and look to government sources for funding instead. Thus, two critical questions are whether the NGO Law affected all organizations equally and whether the law has been applied in a different manner in various regions.

The reporting procedures appear to affect all types of organizations. Eight women’s groups and four youth groups in the three cities noted that the reporting procedures required by the law are difficult and time consuming, but most said that the new requirements do not inhibit their activities. Almost all human rights groups reported that they were affected by the reporting procedures, but mentioned that well financed or large organizations were better prepared to deal with them because they often have a staff and bookkeeper who can focus on the extra work. In

\footnote{240} Note that because I spoke with groups that are still working and/or functioning, I am not able to capture any trends of organizations that have permanently closed down because of the law.
this regard, human rights groups in Moscow were largely able to cope with the increased requirements and their responses therefore focused on the political environment the NGO Law created for their group. Respondents said that the law signaled to bureaucrats that it was fine to target NGOs. Human rights groups in Ekaterinburg and Volgograd said that they spend significant amounts of time filling out reports on their activities as required by the law. A few groups in each of the cities said that they did not want to receive any grants because they did not want to deal with the reporting.

An aspect where the NGO Law has not been applied equally to all types of organizations is the number and nature of proverki or checks/audits that authorities are allowed to conduct as a result of the law. It is telling that the majority of youth groups in this study either did not experience any of these audits from the authorities, or they did not report any significant problems with these audits. Similarly, women’s groups either were not audited or did not experience any problems with these audits. 241

In contrast, almost all of the groups that experienced difficult checks were human rights organizations. Out of the twenty-two human rights groups in the study, eight or 36 percent (five in Moscow, two in Ekaterinburg, and one in Volgograd) had very difficult audits.242 Organizations reported that it took significant time and effort to respond to requests, often paralyzing the work of the organization during the audit. In one case, so many papers were

241 Note that there may be a slight bias in this statement regarding women’s groups in Moscow. When I began my interviews I asked an open-ended question about the effects of the NGO Law. It was not until after I interviewed representatives of human rights organizations and learned about the issues surrounding the audits that I began to explicitly ask about them.

242 This echoes the finding of the USAID Sustainability Index: “Tax inspections and financial and legal audits are often spearheaded against organizations that voice views that differ from official ones. These are mostly human rights organizations” (2008: 194).
demanded of the organization that the staff was unable to physically carry them out of the office (Interview 18).

Members of groups themselves fully understand which types of organizations are likely to be checked/audited and which are not. Organizations that have good relations with the government or are known by officials are not chosen to be checked. In response to my questions about checks, a respondent who is affiliated with an organization well connected to the Public Chamber, responded that the organization has not been checked because everyone knows them. The respondent further commented that she does not think that organizations with good biographies would be checked (Interview 27).

Although the NGO Law has impacted all types of groups, the degree of this impact is largely left to the government’s discretion. This, in turn, has resulted in human rights groups describing numerous invasive audits that make it much harder for them to operate than it is for regime-friendly organizations. The NGO Law is therefore another element that makes the operational playing field for social organizations uneven.

Public Chamber: Federal and Local

There has been significant controversy over the role of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Some suggest that the Public Chamber may at least have the potential to help organizations by providing new sources of funding and engagement with public officials (Evans, 2008; Richter, 2009; Salmenniemi, 2008). Others claim that the Public Chamber is a government attempt to build a quasi-civil society and is yet another way for the state to control the activities and agenda of social organizations (Lipman, 2005). However, no matter their
viewpoint, scholars do not dispute that the Chamber offers access to government officials, potential funding, and media exposure to those who participate in the chamber’s activities and competitions.

In order to better understand how the Public Chamber affects groups and may contribute to the crowding out effect, I asked respondents a variety of questions about the Public Chamber such as: whether they were members; whether they applied for grants from the Chamber; what, if anything, is the relationship between the group and the Chamber; and whether they had seen any clear results for their representative organization as a result of the Chamber. I expect that if the Public Chamber is a way for the Kremlin to control civil society and to favor loyal organizations over others, these questions will result in a combination of responses from interviewees depending on the type of organization represented. I expect that human rights groups will be critical, have no relations with the Chamber (or do not apply for or receive funding), and see the general body as ineffective in the area of human rights. I expect women’s organizations to have variable stances, with certain organizations being critical, but with neutral women’s groups likely to have relations, take part, and see potential benefits of the Public Chamber. I expect that youth groups, as the potentially most neutral and loyal organizations, will have relations with the Chamber and will see the body as effective. I further expect the results for all groups to be amplified in Moscow, due to Moscow’s status as the home base for many organizations and, as such, the location most likely to have significant connections with the Chamber. Additionally, organizations in Moscow generally have more resource potential and can therefore afford to be more critical. Organizations in the regions are likely to think it is better that the Chamber exists and gives grants than if it did not exist at all.
These expectations were largely confirmed. All interviewed Moscow human rights groups were critical of the Public Chamber, especially in regards to what it represents and how it was formed. One group leader’s comment is particularly representative. The respondent said that the Chamber pretends to be a ministry of society and that he had no desire to join the power vertical (Interview 15). In sum, the human rights groups interviewed in Moscow refused to take part in the Chamber because of their perception of the Kremlin’s influence and control over the organization.

Not only do human rights groups in Moscow believe that the Kremlin influenced the composition of the Public Chamber, but by extension they also believe that the Chamber’s members, while potentially respected members of society, were chosen based on either their neutrality or loyalty to the regime. Because of the Chamber’s composition, some groups reported that they had poor or no relations with the Chamber. For example, the director of one human rights group (Interview 14) stated that they do not have good relations and that there are not any real human rights defenders in the Chamber. Similarly, the director of a separate human rights organization stated that the main human rights groups the organization would not work with are GONGOs, which usually have strong ties to the Public Chamber (i.e. their directors are members of the Public Chamber). In addition, the respondent described a situation in which the organization attempted to work with the Public Chamber. While the respondent’s group’s relations with the Public Chamber are generally non-existent, they were asked to prepare materials for a committee hearing within the Public Chamber. The results from the hearing were

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243 The power vertical refers to the centralizing tendencies in Russian politics into a hierarchy, with Putin as the chief decision-maker. Other similar characterizations include “directed by the Kremlin system of NGOs” (Interview 18).
later made into a brochure, but the aspects of the organization’s materials that were critical of the authorities were taken out. In the respondent’s opinion, this demonstrates how members of the Public Chamber shy away from criticizing the government (Interview 19).

While critical of the Chamber’s composition, a number of human rights organizations noted their willingness to work with the Chamber. As mentioned above, one human rights leader (Interview 15) is highly critical of the Chamber, yet he noted his willingness to work with the Chamber. In one instance, the respondent even wrote a recommendation on behalf of a colleague who wished to take part in the Chamber, and that colleague was accepted. In the respondent’s opinion, the respondent’s organization cooperates with the Chamber much like it would the Procurator. As the respondent cautioned: “in Russia things are not that simple.” Another human rights activist echoed this sentiment and said that even though he disagrees with the way the Chamber is organized and run, he is still willing to work with it—especially as some commissions in the Public Chamber, like the Commission on Donations, are legitimately trying to effect positive change (Interview 16). Other groups have a different tactic: they refuse to take part in the Public Chamber, but they remain willing to work with any individuals (Interview 20).

These interviews revealed that an overwhelming majority of human rights groups in Moscow do not apply for funding from the Public Chamber (otherwise known as presidential grants).\(^{244}\) This is for a number of different reasons: (1) they believe they are unlikely to receive a grant; (2) they disagree in principle with the organization and do not want to receive money from it; (3) the system of awarding the grants is not transparent; and (4) they believe that receiving a grant could potentially result in more government interference.

\(^{244}\) One organization applied, but did not receive funding.
Based on these findings it is not surprising that human rights groups did not view the Chamber as either effective or influential. Instead, a number of respondents noted that the main purpose of the Chamber is to shore up the state’s legitimacy by showing that it actively engages with society—even as the definition of society is carefully managed and regulated by the Kremlin. Nonetheless, most agreed that there are respectable people there and these individuals sometimes do helpful things. As one respondent mentioned above further described (Interview 16), people in the Public Chamber are not marionettes whose strings are constantly being pulled by the government. Rather, they have their own interests and, working within the system, they sometimes can effectively pursue their positive objectives.

The trends mentioned above in Moscow largely hold for human rights groups in Ekaterinburg and Volgograd. Most groups were critical of the federal Public Chamber, seeing it as largely ineffective, and have no direct relationship with it. However, some groups have a more neutral stance and do not appear to be necessarily opposed to receiving funding from the Chamber, if they expected that they could actually win funding. In comparison, women’s groups in all three cities showed a greater variety of responses. Women’s organizations in Moscow were largely critical of the Chamber, with a few groups being neutral and one group that was positive. Women’s organizations in Volgograd and Ekaterinburg were split evenly among organizations that were either positive or neutral, with only a few that were highly critical. Despite their mixed responses about the Chamber’s activities, over half of the women’s organizations either applied or plan to apply for presidential
only a small number of them received grants in different years. Finally, most women’s groups, including those in Moscow, did not have any relations with the Public Chamber. And most groups did not view the Public Chamber as very effective in advancing the interests of women.

In contrast to women and human rights groups, youth groups in all three cities were largely positive or neutral in their comments about the Public Chamber. Specifically, a significant majority had no criticism regarding the purpose of the Chamber, the way that the Chamber was formed, or the composition of the Chamber. Instead, respondents focused on the Chamber as a forum for discussion, a body with famous people, or as a source of additional funding. In turn, almost all groups had either applied for funding from the Public Chamber or were planning on doing so.

When discussing relations with the Public Chamber, regional differences played a key role. Many of the youth organizations in Ekaterinburg and Volgograd had no real connection to the federal Public Chamber other than as a source of potential funding. In contrast, in Moscow the majority of youth groups had positive relations with the Public Chamber. Groups stressed their role as experts to the Chamber on youth issues and financial support. In terms of specific results for youth affairs, the responses were more diverse and did not display any clear pattern by city. Responses ranged from “do not know,” to “hopeful expectations about the future,” to “no real results.”

In sum, the responses of interviewees from the three cities generally fit the hypotheses put forward at the beginning of this section. As the most critical organizations, human rights

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245 Four groups out of the twenty women’s organizations in the study received grants.
groups critiqued the composition of the Chamber, were not members, did not apply for grants from the Chamber’s competition, and generally saw the Chamber as largely ineffective. Women’s groups showed more variable responses, while youth groups were on the whole supportive of the Chamber. These responses were amplified by region, specifically, human rights groups in Moscow were most critical of the Chamber while youth groups in Moscow were most supportive. Since the Public Chamber offers organizations government connections, potential funding, and media exposure, these responses show how the Public Chamber is yet another way for the Kremlin to channel civil society by promoting neutral or loyal organizations at the expense of independent organizations.

**Local Chambers**

Because the analysis of the federal Public Chamber focused primarily on organizations in Moscow, this section will consider organizations and their relations with local public chambers in Volgograd and Ekaterinburg. Both Sverdlovsk and Volgograd have oblast level public chambers. In Volgograd the oblast public chamber was formed in 2005, whereas in Sverdlovsk it was formed much earlier, in 1994. City-level chambers were also created in Volgograd in 2008 and in Ekaterinburg in 2007. Like the federal Public Chamber, these chambers can only make recommendations to the authorities about policy changes.

The majority of all types of organizations in Ekaterinburg and Volgograd had few connections with their respective oblast public chambers. Most organizations in both Ekaterinburg and Volgograd do not view the oblast chamber as either influential or important. Some said that it is just a “talk shop” or that they did not understand the purpose of the chamber.

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*One exception is women’s groups.*
Others, especially human rights organizations, stated their belief that the oblast chamber is a quasi-governmental body and expressed doubt that such a chamber would go against the will of the authorities. It is important to highlight that while human rights organizations’ view of the oblast chamber in both cities are similar today, that this was not always the case in Ekaterinburg. Respondent 43 in Ekaterinburg was one of the activists who originally pushed for the creation of a regional public chamber in the 1990s. According to the respondent, in the early days the chamber was very independent and included various human rights defenders, but over the years the chamber became loyal to those in power. Although the respondent thinks that the chamber now presents the views of the authorities, the respondent does believe that some active people remain in the chamber. The respondent added that if the general population is passive, the public chamber will also be passive.

Along these same lines, another human rights group leader (Interview 47) in Ekaterinburg answered a question about local and federal Public Chambers by stating that the chambers are a form of GONGO and that the harm of imitation chambers of society is that words like “public chamber” lose their real substance and meaning. Much like the word “liberal” and “democratic” become confused to the average person when parties like Zhirinovskii’s use these terms. People then do not understand the meaning of these words and the potential arises for their meaning to be manipulated.

Interestingly, most interviewed organizations did not express any opinion on city public chambers. In Volgograd those who commented emphasized the newness of the chamber and

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247 Vladimir Zhirinovskii is the founder and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, which is a right-wing nationalist party.
expressed a hopeful “wait and see attitude.” This type of comment was echoed in Ekaterinburg. And in Ekaterinburg groups not in the city chamber commented that the individuals chosen obtained their position because they are “known by bureaucrats.”

As mentioned previously in the city section of this chapter, Ekaterinburg is unique in that it has an NGO forum that was founded and organized by local NGOs. The forum originally began with 19 organizations in 2002 and according to its website has over 100 members. Interviewees in Ekaterinburg noted that this NGO-led body has not received much government support or attention in the years preceding the study in 2009, but instead had difficulty with funding and office space. This situation occurred while the city administration created its own public chamber. The decline of the NGO forum shows another way that initiatives from society that are not directly in line with forms delineated by the central government are marginalized.

Overall, it appears that local public chambers are not viewed as being overly influential or important and, as such, exclusion from the chamber is not a significant problem for organizations. However, this may change in the future and may further divide organizations into categories of those that “work with us” (i.e. the government) and those that do not on a local level and award or punish organizations accordingly.

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248 Generally groups that made this comment happen to be members of the new city-level chambers.
249 Groups who are members of the city’s public chamber reported good relations with city authorities.
251 Signs of this already exist. As the director of a human rights organizations in Volgograd related to me, the respondent’s group did not apply to receive a grant from the Public Chamber because it was necessary to receive a recommendation from the local public chamber, and the respondent was doubtful that the organization would receive such a recommendation (Interview 59). Thus, the group decided not to apply for funding because it is not an “in” group at the local level.
Women’s Groups

Departing from the general presentation of the interview results, this section will focus on women’s groups alone. I examine the hypothesis that independent groups may be crowded out by neutral or loyal groups with similar agendas. In previous sections, women’s groups were under-analyzed because they showed divergent patterns. This section will attempt to make sense of these trends by categorizing women’s groups based on their funding sources. “Government sponsored” groups are those that either (1) receive greater than 50 percent of their funding from the government, whether it be federal, oblast, or the city; or (2) have significant ties to government institutions or the ruling political party. “Independent” groups are those which receive less than 50 percent of their funding from the government or do not have strong ties to the ruling party. In my study there were eleven groups fitting into the “government sponsored” category and eight groups in the “independent” category.

On the whole, government sponsored groups exhibited the following trends in the three cities: their membership increased or remained stable (if they have a membership at all); the number of events increased or remained the same; the NGO Law did not affect their activities; and representatives were neutral or positive about local public chambers, and indeed some were members of such chambers, and reported good relations with the authorities. In contrast, independent groups largely reported that their membership decreased (if it has a membership); their number of events decreased; the NGO Law negatively affected their activities; and representatives were critical of local public chambers, were not members of such chambers, and did not report good relations with the authorities. These multiple indicators reveal that independent women’s groups have been marginalized in all three cities.
At the same time that independent women’s groups have been crowded out of the public sphere in Russia, they have been replaced by new organizations with platforms more friendly to the authorities. Multiple respondents noted that many active women’s organizations from the 1990s have disappeared. While new organizations arose to replace them, respondents noted that many of the new organizations are more “club-like” in nature or are supported by local governments. Instead of lobbying to change laws for women (as in the 1990s), these new organizations focus on social outreach and other policies. Respondents noted the importance of the decline in western engagement and funding for the women’s movement that has occurred since the 1990s, which has added financial problems and insecurity for groups that relied on such sources for funding. Groups increasingly feel pressure to turn to government funds as other sources of funding dry up. Finally, activists associated with the women’s movement in the 1990s are worried about the future direction of the movement. As one respondent noted: “In the near future I do not see any possibility for the renewal of the women’s movement in Russia and fear that gender studies programs in educational and academic institutions will soon be extinguished” (Interview 11).

Thus, while a few successful independent groups remain, the women’s movement is less focused on a feminist/gender agenda than before and, not coincidentally, has become more reliant on government funding. The increase in local funding for women’s groups has provided the government with a greater ability to direct and manage the movement in a manner that does not radically change the status quo for men. In this way, the policies enacted by the Putin regime have effectively replaced politically active advocacy networks with politically neutral social groups (Lipman, 2005: 6).
Conclusion

The analysis of 58 organizations in three Russian cities provides empirical support for those who are skeptical about the Putin regime’s policies towards society: these policies have crowded out organizations that are critical of the regime from the public sphere. In this study human rights groups were the most critical of the governing regime and, as such, they reported a significant decline in membership, media coverage, and events. They also reported having greater difficulties with the NGO Law than any other type of organization. In stark contrast, the most neutral or potentially pro-regime organizations in the study, youth groups, reported a general increase in membership and events. Youth groups experienced a decline in media coverage but, contrary to human rights groups, they attributed this decrease in media coverage to the increased business pressures placed on the media, rather than to the authorities putting pressure on journalists to not cover these groups. Women’s groups as a whole show a mixture of these trends. However, when women’s organizations are separated into government supported and independent groups, they follow patterns consistent with the crowding out hypothesis.

While highlighting these patterns, this study does not suggest by extension that the operating environment for NGOs was excellent during the Yeltsin years. In particular, human rights groups experienced various forms of government pressure in the 1990s. However, the main difference with the situation today is the systematic nature and scale of this pressure.

In addition, while regional dynamics played a role in public events and the relationship between organizations and the federal Public Chamber, one of the findings of this study is the homogenizing effect that the centralized strategy has had on the environment for independent

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252 Respondents especially noted pressure during the first Chechen War.
NGOs in the regions. In this regard, my study finds support for Sundstrom’s (2006) hypothesis about the trajectory of Putin’s reforms. Although Sundstrom’s work mainly details the large differences in the atmosphere for NGOs operating in various Russian cities and regions, she hypothesizes that this situation may not continue in the future and that: “increased central government vigilance in limiting the ability of civil society to question the state suggests that this more homogenous environment will also be less supportive of democratic civil society” (181). My study echoes this claim and shows how the centralized mobilization strategy has led to an increasingly uniform, albeit unequal, environment for the operation of independent NGOs in Russia’s regions.

Indeed, the unequal environment for organizations is perhaps best demonstrated by the Russian understanding of the words “ours” nashi and “others” chuzhie. Government policies are aimed at dividing organizations into “our” kind of groups (those that have government connections, funding, influence, seats in the public chamber, are neutral/loyal) and “other” kinds of groups (those that lack government connections, funding, influence, seats in the public chamber, are critical). The groups that are deemed “others” are now systematically marginalized, playing relatively minor roles in the public life of the Russian Federation.

The marginalization of critical societal groups has important consequences for broader political dynamics. As the statistical chapter has shown, on average a centralized strategy is associated with low political competition as represented by large margins of victory. The in-

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253 The uniformity I observed in my study is further supported by Brian Taylor’s (2011) assertions about the outcome of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to increase state capacity in Russia. Taylor argues that Putin’s reforms to centralize and strengthen law enforcement capacity across Russia has led to increased ability to conduct “special” law enforcement tasks, like cracking down on those deemed part of the opposition, but that the ability to conduct “routine” law enforcement has not increased to the same extent.
depth analysis of the Russian case shows that one of the mechanisms that links low levels of political competition and the centralized strategy is the “crowding out effect” of opposition organizations, voices, and agendas within the public sphere. Vladimir Putin enjoys great popularity among Russians not only because he is seen to have brought relative stability and prosperity, but also because his administration has pursued policies that ensure that a popular alternative will not arise from civil society to challenge him. By controlling the mobilization potential of organized civil society groups through either co-optation or marginalization, the crowding out effect is a key way that the regime maintains its legitimacy without resorting to large-scale repression and violence.

As explained in the Conclusion (Chapter 6), Russia’s pursuit of a centralized strategy meant that there was no viable opposition member to lead the large-scale protests that occurred in response to alleged electoral fraud in the 2011 parliamentary elections. In this way the centralized strategy can serve as an insurance policy against electoral defeat even in the face of large protests and a drop in popularity. Protests without a viable leader who can serve as an alternative in the electoral realm are unlikely to fundamentally challenge the balance of power at the expense of ruling elites in the near future.
CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

I have shown in this dissertation that despite a decline in the overall number of highly mobilized non-democratic regimes, mobilization by the state still occurs in certain non-democracies. This is particularly true in so-called hybrid regimes, which combine competitive multiparty elections with aspects of authoritarian rule. Indeed, within hybrid regimes, state mobilization plays a particularly significant role that is demonstrably distinct from the role it plays in its authoritarian or democratic counterparts. By focusing on state mobilization strategies, I argued that in order to better understand politics in the 21st century we must reintegrate Linz’s insight about the importance of mobilization to regime dynamics. In so doing, I demonstrate how state mobilization strategies offer an illuminating lens with which to view and understand the competitive dynamics of hybrid regimes.

This concluding chapter is organized into three sections. In the first section, I both summarize the main findings of the dissertation and review Russia’s state mobilization strategy since 2009, with a particular focus on the state’s response to large protests for fair elections after the 2011 Duma elections. I then detail how these principle findings contribute to diverse scholarly literatures such as Russian politics, regime classification, and hybrid regimes. I briefly discuss how my arguments contribute to wider policy debates outside of academia regarding the impact of democracy promotion. The second section of the conclusion is devoted to discussing how the dissertation can be extended and suggesting potential avenues for future research. I end the dissertation by using my research to date to forecast the trajectory of state mobilization strategies both around the world and in Russia in particular.
Summary of Findings

This dissertation focused on the state mobilization strategies of rulers in hybrid regimes—a class of regimes that has grown both in size and geostrategic importance since the end of the cold war (Diamond, 2009). My examination of state mobilization strategies went beyond simply examining if and how rulers in hybrid regimes seek to make the playing field unequal for social organizations other than political parties, and investigated the potential consequences that this has for levels of political competition over time. Specifically, I asked whether certain state mobilization strategies are more or less effective at producing electoral victories or even electoral dominance.

I began my analysis by establishing a clear definition of hybrid regimes. In Chapter 2, I presented a configurative approach to conceptualize and order hybrid regimes that I developed with Payam Mohseni (2011). Building on the work of classic regime studies as well as innovations from more recent literature, I then demonstrated that competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference constitute the three main dimensions by which contemporary regimes can most clearly and effectively be classified. Based on a combination of these dimensions, I determined that hybrid regimes are best defined as those countries that hold competitive multiparty elections for the executive and legislature, but have either poor civil liberties, an unelected reserved domain of power that is actively engaged in politics, or both—thereby disqualifying them from being classified as a democracy. Classifying hybrid regimes based on these attributes yields three sub-types of hybrid regimes, two with tutelary institutions and one without such institutions. However, the uniting dimension among all types is the existence of
competitive multiparty elections—a trait that distinguishes them from their authoritarian counterparts.

Utilizing this definition of hybrid regimes, I then sought to identify state mobilization strategies among the most common type of hybrid regime—illiberal hybrid regimes, or those hybrids that lack tutelary institutions. In so doing, I found that while there is widespread agreement that these regimes routinely mobilize their supporters and demobilize their opponents, there is no systematic, cross-national analysis of how this is done to organizations other than political parties. I therefore proposed an original typology to make sense of the myriad pressures states place on social organizations across illiberal hybrid regimes and identified three types of strategies that are commonly employed: centralized, decentralized, and diffuse. I then created practical empirical measures of this typology to form an original dataset based on content analysis of U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House reports.

The result is a comprehensive dataset of 25 illiberal hybrid regimes from 1990-2009 that enables systematic trend analysis of state mobilization strategies both cross-nationally and over time. This analysis revealed that: (1) illiberal hybrid regimes have updated and modernized their repressive techniques, largely abandoning the “tried and true” repressive techniques emphasized in the contentious politics literature; (2) the diffuse strategy has always been the most common of the three strategies, but after the turn of the new century the centralized and decentralized state mobilization strategies, which are more proactive in nature, increased in popularity; and (3) while there is a large degree of stability over time in the mobilization strategies pursued by a particular state, certain events—especially elections—are commonly linked to a shift in strategy.
In Chapter 4, I further investigated the link between state mobilization strategies and elections by examining levels of political competition across illiberal hybrid regimes. Using a nested research design, I conducted a statistical analysis of all 25 illiberal hybrid regimes from 1990-2009. While there are a limited number of elections in illiberal hybrid regimes since the end of the cold war, regression analysis indicates that the mobilization strategy selected has a significant effect on the margin of victory in presidential elections and a somewhat lesser effect on legislative elections in presidential systems. All presidential election models, including those incorporating various controls and employing different methods, consistently show a statistical relationship between the centralized strategy and higher margins of victory. However, while this statistical analysis suggests that the centralized strategy is an effective tool of power, it cannot by itself explain why this is the case.

In order to uncover the causal mechanism that links the centralized strategy to decreased levels of political competition I conducted a qualitative analysis of post-communist Russia. Through the use of in-depth interviews with three different types of Russian social organizations, I determined that the shift in Russia’s mobilization strategy from diffuse (under Yeltsin) to centralized (under Putin) resulted in a demonstrable decrease of competition over time due to the way that the centralized strategy marginalized independent and critical social organizations. Contrary to the Putin regime’s claims that its new programs would strengthen the development of civil society, the effect of these policies has been to benefit those social organizations that are neutral or loyal to the regime, while weakening and harassing those groups that are not.

The marginalization of social groups independent or critical of the regime has important ramifications for political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996), because it is these organizations that
often lend organizational and mobilization support to opposition political parties, candidates, and campaigns and they can also serve as a source of new leaders, ideas, and programs. Marginalizing independent groups thus starves alternative leaders and parties of a critical source of strength—diverse organizational roots within society. As a result, this “crowding out” effect helps to create an atmosphere where those in power are seen as the only popular and legitimate option, while alternatives are marginalized to play minor roles in public life. This strategy can serve as an insurance policy against electoral defeat even in the face of a drop in popularity and large protests. How exactly this process played out in the case of Russia after the 2011 Duma elections is detailed below.

**Russia’s State Mobilization Strategy Beyond 2009**

In Chapter 5, I detailed the main elements of the Kremlin’s centralized strategy through 2009. These elements remained largely unchanged until the regime was faced with large-scale civil protest following the December 2011 parliamentary elections.254 As explained below, while the unprecedented intensity of these protests ultimately caused the regime to somewhat modify

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254 One additional element was the creation of an All-Russian Popular Front of social organization based on the initiative of Prime Minister Putin in May 2011. According to Putin, the purpose of the front is to “bring new faces, and fresh ideas and suggestions” to United Russia (RIA-Novosti, May 7, 2011). The front includes unions, veterans groups, business associations, youth groups and other NGOs that support Putin, but are not necessarily United Russia members. The unofficial purpose of the front is to broaden the electoral base of United Russia to enable it to retain its parliamentary majority despite sagging popularity (Meyer & Arkhipov, May 8, 2011). According to the framework presented here, in many ways the front further formalizes the categorization of social organizations that are “nashi” or “ours”, i.e. with the state, and those that are not, by providing strong incentives (Duma seats) for groups to show their support and loyalty.
its strategy, in many ways the state’s response\textsuperscript{255} to the protests sets the centralized strategy and its utility as an effective tool of power into further relief.

Elections for Russia’s lower house of parliament were held on December 4, 2011. According to official results (Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, 2011-2012), United Russia received 49 percent of the vote, but took almost 53 percent of the seats. The remaining votes were received by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (19 percent), A Just Russia (13 percent), and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (approximately 12 percent). A variety of citizen monitors, political activists, and journalists reacted to these results by almost immediately claiming that falsifications and vote rigging had taken place.\textsuperscript{256} A day after the elections, approximately five thousand people gathered to protest the results in an upscale neighborhood, Chistye Prudy, in Moscow. The Chistye Prudy protests were followed by a series of subsequent protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg on December 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th}.

During the period immediately following the elections (December 4-9, 2011), the Kremlin applied its centralized strategy without significant modification. First, these protests were frequently joined by counter protests of regime supporters, especially youth. For example, on December 6th, Nashi,\textsuperscript{257} Young Guard, and other pro-Kremlin youth groups gathered near protests and attempted to drown out anti-government protestors with their pro-Putin cheers

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\textsuperscript{255} The following review is not exhaustive in its presentation of the state’s response to the protests, which included high-profile personnel reshuffles among other things. Instead I discuss those elements that directly pertain to the state’s mobilization strategy.

\textsuperscript{256} This reaction largely occurred over the internet. However, nationalists staged an unsanctioned protest on election day in Moscow (Yudina & Alperovich, 2012).

\textsuperscript{257} According to Anna Sulimina (December 8, 2012): “By December 4, election day, Nashi had brought about 15,000 young people from some 20 regions to Moscow’s Forum of Civil Activists, held in the All-Russia Exhibition Center (VVTs) in order to “supervise the election process and maintain order on the streets.” The members who traveled to Moscow voted with absentee ballots. They held meetings and concerts on the Revolution and Manezhnaya Squares to show their devotion to President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”
Second, Russian TV did not cover any protests criticizing the election results, and focused instead on the pro-government demonstrations (Zav'ialova, December 10, 2011). Third, anti-government protests were broken up by riot police while pro-government rallies were allowed to occur unhindered. Finally, Prime Minster Putin and other government officials repeatedly accused the United States of fomenting instability in Russia and charged Russia’s only independent election organization, Golos, with working on behalf of its foreign donors (Lally & DeYoung, December 8, 2011).

Interestingly, the regime’s strategy shifted during the period of December 10- May 6, 2012—the day before Putin’s’ inauguration as president. During this time, the government significantly relaxed many of the demobilizing aspects of its centralized strategy and permitted a series of large protests to occur both in Moscow and in multiple cities across Russia, without disruption by the police. In Moscow, major protest events included the December 10 rally on Bolotnaia Square, the December 24 rally on Prospekt Sakharova, the February 4 Bolotnaia Square rally, and the March 10 protest on Novy Arbat Street. While participation estimates for these protests vary significantly, depending on whether one goes by the event organizers’

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258 As Tom Balmforth (December 6, 2011) poignantly describes: “One pro-government youth rally featured hundreds of Young Guard activists trying to drown out the opposition by beating on drums and chanting, ‘Down with the fascists!’ The teen-heavy crowd chanted ‘Russia! Putin!’ and waved United Russia banners and teddy bears, symbolic of the party. Across the street, opposition protesters chanted, ‘Russia without Putin!’”.

259 The protest at Triumph Square on December 6 was broken up by police, resulting in more than hundreds of arrests, as were protests in St. Petersburg. 25 protestors were detained in Rostav-na-Donu (Balmforth, December 6, 2011).

260 Furthermore: “Days before the vote, he [Vladimir Putin] said nongovernmental organizations who accept foreign grants were traitors like Judas Iscariot” (Von Twickel, December 16, 2011).
numbers or the police’s, there is no dispute that these protests represent the largest continuous mobilization of Russian citizens since the end of communism.

Beyond the state’s decision to permit large-scale protests, this period also saw a marked change in how these protests were covered by the state-controlled media. While high ranking officials continued to disparage the protestors and attempted to discredit their message, state-controlled media for the first time began to cover the protests, and even granted televised interviews to protest leaders and participants. Perhaps the best example of the change in public discourse during this period is that Putin himself addressed protestors’ demands directly in a series of articles he published in the newspaper Izvestiia, in an attempt to explain why he was seeking to return to the presidency.

While this period saw the state moderating its demobilizing tactics, the regime continued to actively use pro-government mobilization in the run up to the presidential election. Foremost among these actions was the “Anti-Orange” rally on February 4, 2012 at Poklonnaia Hill Memorial Park. This rally was organized by a number of patriotic social organizations and was

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261 In the aptly titled article “The Politics of Crowd Estimates” Balmforth cites the following estimates: December 10 estimates: police 25,000, independent observers 70,000. December 24 estimates: police 28,000, independent observers 80,000-100,000 (Balmforth, February 6, 2012).

262 One particularly crude comment by Putin during a televised call-in show suggested that the white ribbons protestors wore to signify clean elections looked like condoms. During the same show he claimed student participants were paid to attend the December 10 rally and accused unidentified persons of serving foreign interests (Von Twickel, December 16, 2011). Various other officials further reiterated Putin’s assertion that foreign subverters were behind the protests, for example the Russian Prosecutor General, Iurii Chaika (Interfax, January 12, 2012).

263 Even in February, when pro and anti-government rallies were held simultaneously, the essence of what happened at the opposition rally was clear despite differences in emphasis and editing (Borodina, February 6, 2012).

264 These articles also addressed a wide range of topics, including the state of the economy, the current social structure, and the future of democracy among other things.

265 On January 26 unions of factory workers rallied for Putin in Ekaterinburg. The crowd was estimated to be about 12,000 people (RIA-Novosti, January 28, 2012). On February 23, the All-Russia Popular Front organized a Pro-Putin election rally, drawing more than 100,000 people to Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow (Earle, February 27, 2012). For a further description of the Luzhniki rally slogans, including the link between patriotism and Putin, see (BBC News, December 7, 2011).
based on the contention that the 2004 orange revolution in Ukraine was instigated by foreign interests and only served to produce instability.\footnote{For an interesting comparison of the slogans of the anti-orange rally and the alternative Bolotnaia Square protest see (Svanidze, February 9, 2012).} The success of this rally was critical to the regime, as it took place exactly one month before the presidential elections. Perhaps more importantly, this rally was convened on the same day as a major march organized by the For Fair Elections Movement at Bolotnaia Square and thus served as a public test of the regime’s ability to mobilize large numbers of its supporters. Because of the high stakes for both sides, much ink was spilled in commentating and comparing the attendance of both rallies. Estimates of attendance differ substantially, ranging from 38,000 (police estimate) to 120,000 (organizers’ estimate) for the “anti-Putin, for clean elections” rally, and 25,000 (other estimate)\footnote{“Reporters for The Moscow Times estimated the crowd at the opposition march and rally at roughly 50,000 and the Putin loyalists closer to 25,000” (Bratersky, February 6, 2012).} to 140,000 (police estimate) at the anti-orange rally (Bratersky, February 6, 2012).\footnote{There were rumors and allegations that participants of the anti-orange rally were paid to attend or were pressured by their employers (Oliphant, February 4, 2012). On the other hand, some commentators claim that the Western media significantly underestimated the size of the anti-orange rally in their reporting due to an anti-Kremlin bias (Armstrong, February 7, 2012).} Regardless of the precise numbers, the attendance at the anti-orange rally was substantial and showed that the government retained the ability to mobilize its supporters.

Any thaw in the regime’s attitude towards protesters swiftly came to an end following Putin’s decisive victory in the March 2012 presidential elections. In April, United Russia Members in the Duma proposed a draft law that substantially increases the fines\footnote{“Organizers of street rallies would pay up to 100,000 rubles (US$3,400) for violations, while participants in such events would pay up to 10,000 rubles (US$340). Currently, the maximum penalty for such violations is 2,000 rubles (about US$67)” (Russia Today (RT), April 17, 2012).} and levels of community service that must be paid by those convicted of holding unsanctioned rallies. On the eve of Putin’s inauguration as president in May, largely peaceful protests in Moscow under the
banner “March of Millions” turned violent, as police harshly prohibited protestors from breaking
from the crowd, resulting in multiple injuries and arrests (Eremenko & Bennetts, May 6,
2012).\footnote{For vivid pictures of these clashes, see http://redhotrussia.com/march-of-millions-pictures/ (Accessed May 20,
2012).} In the weeks following the March of Millions, police systematically prevented
opposition activities such as protest walks and dispersed opposition camps at various locations in
Moscow (RIA-Novosti, May 19, 2012).\footnote{In an interesting turn of events, patriotic Russian public organizations put together an on-line petition to tighten rules for NGOs to receive foreign funding. The organizations did not appear to be aware that many of the procedures they commended are already part of the 2006 NGO Law (Rothrock, April 2, 2012). This draft law will soon be sent to the Duma for consideration (Khomchenko, May 16, 2012).}

The overall meaning of the May protests and the government’s renewed crackdown on
dissent was addressed on a LiveJournal blog by Grigorii Iavlinskii, the long-term leader of the
liberal political party Yabloko: “Of themselves, civic protests, actions and walks, and other kinds
of flash mobs, while humanly worthy, will change nothing political and by virtue of their
pointlessness will often escalate to fights and seizures”(Iavlinskii, 2012).\footnote{Quoted translation provided by Balmforth (May 11, 2012). Later in the same posting, Iavlinskii posed the question, “what is to be done?” His response emphasized in capital letters that in order for meaningful change to occur, an alternative to Putin must be established, which will require serious politics by forging new political programs, ideas, organizations, and personnel.

Iavlinskii’s comments precisely encapsulate my central argument on the political effects
of Russia’s adoption of the centralized strategy and explains why the protests of 2011-2012 were
unlikely to succeed in producing meaningful political change. Simply put, protests without a
viable leader who can serve as an alternative in the electoral realm are unlikely to fundamentally
challenge the balance of power at the expense of ruling elites in the near future. Time and time
again political commentators, as well as presidential contenders (RIA-Novosti, December 8, 2012), agree that there are no viable alternatives to Putin. I argue that the centralized strategy helped prevent the formation of a viable alternative to Putin because it is difficult for opposition political movements to have a popular basis in society when independent or critical organizations are effectively “crowded out” or marginalized. In the most recent presidential election, this mobilization strategy served as an insurance policy against electoral defeat even in the face of large protests. In many ways the current situation in Russia is reminiscent of Przeworski’s famous argument about the relationship of legitimacy and stability in authoritarian regimes. An authoritarian regime may be quite stable even if it faces a loss to its legitimacy—that is, as long as there is no viable alternative (Przeworski, 1991).

**Contributions**

I advanced a series of arguments in this dissertation about the way rulers in hybrid regimes have learned to deal with multiparty elections in the context of non-democracy, with a particular focus on the state mobilization strategies adopted by rulers in illiberal hybrid regimes and the effects of these strategies on trends of political competition. The central arguments presented in the dissertation make a number of contributions to diverse literatures such as

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273 According to sociological research conducted by the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow: “Putin’s ‘fans’ vanished from focus groups some time ago (in about 2005). Thereafter, his ratings grew due to the lack of choice but motivation continued to decline, as did the ratings of United Russia, which were derived from ratings of Putin”(Belanovsky, Dmitriev, Misikhina, & Omelchuk, November 7, 2011). Additional anecdotal evidence reveals that people back Putin in the absence of other alternatives. For example, political scientist Pavel Danilin cites an internet poll pitting Putin against various individuals and notes that “Ksenia Sobchak, one of the representatives of the so called new opposition, opted for Putin when asked to choose between him and Navalny. She said, ‘I respect Navalny all right, but suppose he is elected the president... what then? Where is he going to get people for the state machinery? Knowledgeable and adequate people, I mean... By and large, I cannot say that there is someone among leaders of the so called non-parliamentary opposition who I will be ready to follow’” (Danilin, January 26, 2012).
Russian politics, regime classification, and hybrid regimes. These arguments contribute to wider policy debates outside of academia regarding the impact of democracy promotion.

With respect to Russian politics, my research contributes to the on-going conversation about the causes of Russia’s growing authoritarianism. While scholars have offered a broad array of explanations for the increased levels of authoritarianism evidenced in Russia, one of the most compelling explanations is Lucan Way’s (Levitsky & Way, 2010; 2005, 2009) analysis of the change to incumbent strength in Russia from Yeltsin to Putin and the consequences that this has had on Russian politics. Way argues that Russia’s growing authoritarianism is rooted in increased levels of coercive capacity and party cohesion under Vladimir Putin. I agree with this assessment, but go beyond this to detail how rulers in certain hybrid regimes have further enhanced their structural and institutional strengths with state mobilization strategies that preemptively eliminate potential challenges to their rule. State mobilization strategies help rulers fend off potential challengers by depriving them of the key legitimacy and grass roots popularity they could otherwise receive from social organizations. And it is in this way that my argument contributes to work on Russian public opinion. I argue that Vladimir Putin enjoys great popularity among Russians not only because he is seen to have brought relative prosperity to Russia (Treisman, 2011) or is an effective ruler (Hale, 2011), but also because his administration has pursued policies which ensure that a popular alternative cannot arise from society to challenge him.

Examples of these arguments include: institutional design (especially a powerful president and weak parliament, see Fish (2005), Aslund (2007)); an oil based economy (Fish 2005); leadership at critical junctures (Aslund, 2007; McFaul, 2001); and limited economic reform (Fish 2005).

In a similar vein, Vasili Silitiski brilliantly shows how Belarusian President Alexander Lukashchenko employed various preemptive tactics to buttress his already significant structural and institutional strengths to limit democratic diffusion (2010: 278).
In addition to providing insights on Russian politics, the comparative analysis I adopted makes meaningful contributions to the broader field of regime studies. My contributions to this field are fourfold. First, defining and conceptualizing post-cold war regimes that are not thoroughly democratic or authoritarian has become a veritable cottage industry and has led to a proliferation of terms and concepts. I address this state of affairs by conducting a comparative analysis and presenting visual diagrams of key hybrid regime concepts. The visualization of theoretical concepts plays an important role not only in providing greater understanding of the literature on regime concepts, but also in establishing a common ground from which scholars can constructively engage in debate and discussion. My second contribution to regime classification is my theoretically informed use of a configurative approach to help standardize the meaning of a hybrid regime and alleviate some of the conceptual confusion in the literature. I did so by introducing an innovative method of classifying countries that hold multiparty elections based on competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties. Third, the emphasis on the importance of multiple dimensions of regime types allows previously unnoticed similarities and differences between countries to be highlighted, opening the door for new comparisons, possibilities, and puzzles for research.

The final contribution to regime studies is the way I attempted in the dissertation to reintegrate mobilization into the field. The rise of hybrid regimes, and the potential importance of state mobilization to their dynamic, required further analysis and study. I addressed this lacuna by providing a conceptually and methodologically nuanced method for analyzing state mobilization strategies across hybrid regimes. By building on the findings of disparate literatures and sources, I created a framework to categorize and understand the multiple pressures
that states place on social organizations other than political parties. I further created practical indicators of these pressures to assess cross-national trends over time. The resultant dataset provides rich comparative data about the state’s relationship with society and will allow scholars to assess the effect of state mobilization strategies on a wide variety of factors other than those analyzed here.

The dissertation makes several contributions to the emerging literature on the dynamics of hybrid regimes. Recent research has shown that competitive authoritarian regimes, which are very similar to my conceptualization of illiberal hybrid regimes (see especially Chapter 2, A Multi-Dimensional Map of Regimes), are unstable (Brownlee, 2009b; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011) and are the most likely type of regime to experience a transition (Roessler & Howard, 2009). Scholars have simultaneously been calling for a better understanding of the dynamics of this volatile regime type (Epstein, et al., 2006). My research reacts to this circumstance by contributing to the study of hybrid regimes where oppositions have the chance to win elections. However, rather than focusing on the conditions that may cause such countries to transition to democracy (Brownlee, 2009b; Howard & Roessler, 2006), I centered my attention on examining how these regimes may become less competitive over time and the specific state mobilization strategies that contribute to this process. In other words, my research sheds light on the way that rulers seek to transform their precarious electoral dominance in relatively competitive systems into electoral hegemony (Schedler, 2009a).

My research on the conditions under which competitive hybrid regimes become less so over time complements and enhances the findings of previous scholarship in a number of ways. One, my findings reflect the importance of rulers’ policies and actions to explain decreased
political competition. As such, it lends further support to Way (2005), (2009), and Levitsky and Way (2010), who explain regime outcomes by emphasizing the significance of the incumbent’s organizational power over the strength and actions of the opposition (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Schedler, 2009b). Two, my research contributes to the wider study of the conditions under which elections fail to serve a democratizing role (Lindberg, 2009).

Indeed, my research suggests that elections, when combined with the centralized strategy, can serve an authoritarian enhancing role. In many ways, my findings echo those of Bunce and Wolchik (2009) and Silitski (2010), who argue that electoral processes may lead to backsliding if incumbents are able to successfully employ savvy and proactive strategies to curtail the political opposition.

Finally, my research on state mobilization strategies contributes to discussions on democracy promotion that exist outside of academia. In particular, my research offers a systematic, cross-national framework for policy analysts to examine the pressures that states place on social organizations over time. Equipped with this knowledge, NGOs, interest groups, and policy makers may be able to better utilize their scarce resources to develop effective and potentially transnational strategies to combat these pressures. For example, my trend analysis shows that the legal regulatory environment is one of the most common ways illiberal hybrid regimes inhibit independent organizational activity, suggesting that attention to this area is not only warranted by policy makers and activists, but also that devising effective tools to pressure

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276 The simplest version of the democratization by elections hypothesis is: “the more elections, the more democratic the regime and society in general” (Lindberg, 2009: 9).

277 As further noted by Bunce and Wolchik (2011), and despite my findings, there are certainly limits to the “savvy ruler” hypothesis, as these rulers are not omnipotent and scholars must take care not to overestimate their ability to “control” reforms.
governments to improve their legal environment should be a key priority for any advocacy group interested in democracy promotion.

**Opportunities for Future Research**

In addition to making contributions to comparative politics, my dissertation suggests several potential avenues for future inquiry. The first opportunity is further analyzing the dataset I created of state mobilization strategies across 25 illiberal hybrid regimes. In Chapter 3, I examined multi-year trends across the three overarching state mobilization strategy types as well as by individual indicators. My preliminary trend analysis suggests several patterns worthy of more rigorous analysis. For example, one of the most common demobilization tactics utilized by states is to alter and inhibit the legal regulatory environment for social organizations. A detailed, multi-region examination of the connections between this type of regulation and key elections could provide a better understanding of the conditions under which states choose to employ this particular tactic.

Similarly, while I have created a framework that will enable scholars to analyze state mobilization strategies cross-nationally, additional research could help uncover and assess potentially relevant regional patterns within the data. For example, various scholars have argued that there was a diffusion of strategies implemented by regimes in the Eurasian region to prevent political change in the wake of that region’s color revolutions (Beissinger, 2007; Hale, 2006; Polese & O Beachain, 2011; Silitski, 2010). My dataset helps to evaluate the validity of these claims, while simultaneously placing the Eurasian region and individual Eurasian states in a wider comparative framework. My research of state mobilization strategies demonstrates that
most of the countries that pursued a centralized strategy for at least one year are located in the post-communist world. This suggests that combining further analysis of the dataset with structured focused comparisons within regions or across regions may yield relevant insights. Hybrid regimes are located in multiple world regions and it is essential to understand the regional commonalities and differences in how ruling elites seek to manage aspects of both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule.

A final, and perhaps most important, area of future research is to understand why and how rulers decide to pursue a particular mobilization strategy. Due to the importance of this question, I will outline several potential hypotheses that should be considered in the future study of this topic. In short, it is my belief that rulers’ decision to adopt a centralized, decentralized, or diffuse strategy likely depends on a mixture of structural, institutional, and strategic conditions.

State capacity, understood as the extent to which the state can employ its agencies and resources to realize a policy goal, is a major structural factor constraining elite decision making (Migdal, 1988: xiii). I therefore expect that rulers will pursue mobilization strategies that complement their capacity levels and that the rulers reasonably expect they will be able to successfully implement. A second factor is the organizational strength and support base of the domestic political opposition. A well organized opposition that has financial capital, organizational reach throughout the country, skillful political leadership, or strong ties to a coalition of voters and/or connections to traditional organized social groups presents a strong threat to rulers, especially during elections (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006). I therefore expect that rulers in countries with a well organized opposition are more likely to
adopt a centralized or decentralized strategy, rather than a diffuse strategy. Although often related to the strength of the domestic opposition, a third factor is the overall strength of a country’s civil society.\textsuperscript{278} If a dense and vibrant associational life exists in the country, the regime may view these organizations as potential rivals for political mobilization and legitimacy, and would accordingly factor this into its choice of a particular mobilization strategy. The fourth condition is elite perception of the threat of popular citizen mobilization against the regime. Diverse studies have shown that elite perception of the likelihood and character of anti-regime mobilization is critical to explaining regime actions (Beissinger, 2007; Hale, 2006; Slater, 2010). A fifth and final condition incorporates insights from the literature on authoritarian learning: the choice of a particular mobilization strategy likely depends on the subjective beliefs elites develop from either their own experience, the experience of similar countries, or from large and influential states in their respective regions (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce, McFaul, & Stoner-Weiss, 2010; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Carothers, 2006; Hale, 2006; Heydemann, 2007; Silitski, 2010).

**Speculation**

While conjectures about how the future will unfold are inherently uncertain, my research to date offers insight into the likely future development of state mobilization strategies and regime trajectories in general, and Russia in particular. With respect to state mobilization strategies, in Chapter 3 my trend analysis examined changes over time in mobilization and demobilization tactics and found a significant increase in illiberal hybrid regimes’ adoption of centralized and decentralized strategies beginning in 2000. Specifically, since 2000 the

\textsuperscript{278} A strong civil society can and often does exist independent of a strong political opposition (see for example Migdal, 1988).
percentage of country years that these regimes pursued a centralized strategy increased from 4% to 24%, while these regimes’ implementation of a decentralized strategy simultaneously increased from 13% to 21%. I expect this trend to continue, with the result that there will be fewer illiberal hybrid regimes willing to employ a diffuse mobilization strategy in the future. A diffuse strategy will simply be considered too risky given the increased levels of threat rulers likely perceive from a mobilized society as a result of the color revolutions and Arab Spring, combined with authoritarian learning about tools to “preempt” (Silitski, 2010) electoral turnovers.279

My research is also relevant to understanding the likelihood for future “democratization by elections” in illiberal hybrid regimes.280 As detailed below, the increasing number of illiberal hybrid regimes adopting either a centralized or decentralized strategy will likely have an uneven effect on those countries’ prospects for democratization by elections, as countries employing the centralized strategy are less likely to see democratization by elections, while countries that adopt the decentralized strategy are more likely to so democratize.

The state mobilization strategies and regime trajectories of the 25 illiberal hybrid regimes in my study are summarized in Table 6.1. This table shows that three countries have pursued a centralized strategy for four or more years: Cambodia, Armenia, and Russia. These countries are consequently the least likely to experience a democratic electoral breakthrough in the near future.

279 The findings from multiple scholars in the Democratization by Elections project suggest that authoritarian learning after the turn of the new century diminishes the applicability of the hypothesis in the future (Diamond, 2009).

280 Again the simplest version of this hypothesis is “the more elections, the more democratic the regime and society” (Lindberg, 2009: 9).
Again, this is because the centralized strategy has proven to be very effective at helping prevent the development of viable alternatives to the entrenched regime.

In contrast, countries that pursue a decentralized strategy, such as Venezuela and Sri Lanka, offer the strongest hope for democratization by elections, as my research shows that the decentralized strategy produces the smallest margins of victory in presidential elections. In addition, while the decentralized strategy’s emphasis on pro-regime mobilization may be effective in keeping ruling groups in power in the short term, it is likely more difficult for the regime to control the mobilization resulting from this strategy in the long term because the mobilized organizations are less connected to or dependent on the regime. Moreover, if a democratic breakthrough occurs, countries employing the decentralized strategy often hold the greatest hope for maintaining democracy, as they contain the strongest organizational building blocks within society.\footnote{This includes a fairly organized political as well as civil society.}

Finally, it is possible that there will be future electoral breakthroughs in countries implementing a diffuse strategy. The diffuse strategy is \textit{ad hoc} in nature and has the potential to leave ruling groups vulnerable to mobilization by even weak opposition groups. Countries employing a diffuse strategy therefore have the greatest potential for volatility and change.\footnote{Indeed the table shows that countries that democratized before 2009 from illiberal hybrid rule all pursued a diffuse strategy for the majority of the four years before their transition.} In this regard, it is not surprising that all of the countries that experienced a color revolution had rulers that pursued a diffuse strategy.
Regime trajectory is defined by the classification of the regime in 2009 or its classification right after its transition from an illiberal hybrid regime. To be classified as a democracy, a country displays competitiveness (turnover in at least 4 electoral cycles for either the executive or legislature), high protection of civil liberties (3 or lower on Freedom House’s scale), and little to no tutelary interference. To be classified as authoritarian, a country does not display competitiveness, has low protection of civil liberties, and may or may not experience tutelary interference.

An authoritarian situation indicates when a hybrid regime has not experienced turnover in 3 electoral cycles.

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**Table 6.1 State Mobilization Strategy and Regime Trajectory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Years)</th>
<th>Majority Strategy Four Years Before Regime Change (If Any) or 2009</th>
<th>Trajectory as of 2009 or After Hybrid Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (1991-2006)</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Coup/Ambiguous Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (1990-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (1995-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (1997-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (1991-1997)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (2005-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (2002-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (1991-2009)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (1990-1993)</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (1990-2009)</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (1999-2009)</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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283 Regime trajectory is defined by the classification of the regime in 2009 or its classification right after its transition from an illiberal hybrid regime. To be classified as a democracy, a country displays competitiveness (turnover in at least 4 electoral cycles for either the executive or legislature), high protection of civil liberties (3 or lower on Freedom House’s scale), and little to no tutelary interference. To be classified as authoritarian, a country does not display competitiveness, has low protection of civil liberties, and may or may not experience tutelary interference.

284 An authoritarian situation indicates when a hybrid regime has not experienced turnover in 3 electoral cycles.
As suggested above, my analysis is fairly pessimistic about the near future possibility for democratization by elections in Russia, assuming that the centralized strategy remains in place without significant modification. From 2001 through the present, the centralized strategy has helped deliver consistent electoral victories to the ruling regime, and this has remained the case even in the face of large-scale protests. In addition to this history, considerable comparative research has found that hegemonic regimes that continue to hold multiparty elections tend to be among the most stable authoritarian regimes (Brownlee, 2007, 2009b; Lust-Okar, 2009; Roessler & Howard, 2009).

Despite this, there are a few encouraging signs suggesting that a gradual change in Russian politics is possible. The first of these is a direct result of the 2011-2012 protests, as even though these protests have not yet resulted in electoral change, they did succeed in changing the status quo by bringing alternative voices into a more prominent position within Russian public discourse. The protests have also galvanized some participants to become more engaged in their local communities and demonstrated that the internet can be a powerful organizational tool for independent activists.

A final reason Russia may still see electoral change comes from within and is best viewed by examining the two types of effects that participation in social organizations can have. The first of these, external effects, refers to the institutional role that social organizations can play; for example, these organizations can serve as a check on government.\(^\text{285}\) Currently, the external effects of social organizations in Russia are largely stymied by the state’s centralized

\(^{285}\text{For more on the differences between the internal and external effects of participation in social organizations see Howard (2003); Howard and Gilbert (2008).}\)
strategy. Neutral and loyal organizations are unlikely to provide a strong institutional check on the government, while critical and independent organizations that challenge the government are not very powerful and/or marginalized. However, citizen participation in any form of social organization (even loyal organizations) can bring many important internal effects, such as providing citizens with a set of civic skills. These civic skills and participation tools, once obtained, can later be used against the state if it fails to deliver on its promises.

No matter the electoral outcome in any particular country, for the foreseeable future state mobilization strategies will continue to play an important role in the dynamics of hybrid regimes.
APPENDIX A

Detailed State Mobilization Strategy Coding Rules

**Controlled Mobilization**

1. Establish high-profile, state-funded voluntary organizations or movements

   **Measurement**
   
   *High* = Report(s) list or note that government sponsored organizations exist in multiple organizational spheres: youth, human rights, environment, or labor.
   
   *Medium* = Government sponsored organizations exist in some organizational spheres. To be coded as medium, there must be at least one government sponsored organization mentioned in reports.
   
   *Low* = Report(s) do not mention government sponsored organizations.

2. Create civil society oversight bodies or councils

   **Measurement**
   
   *Yes* = Organizations such as a Public Chamber or other councils of civil society are created by the government in the country. The government has a significant say in the groups that are allowed to participate.
   
   I also coded this indicator as “Yes” if in a particular calendar year there was an attempt to set up such a body or council and/or that this body actually operated. If such a body exists, but reports mention that it did not conduct operations, I coded this indicator as a 0.

**Semi-Autonomous Mobilization**

3. Initiate the creation of local voluntary organizations throughout the country

   **Measurement**
   
   *High* = Report(s) mention pro-regime inclusive organizations (meaning not just a particular social group) that penetrates most of the country.
   
   *Medium* = Report(s) mention of government funded community organizations throughout the country, but mainly for general defense purposes and are not discussed as specifically pro-regime.
   
   *Low* = Report(s) do not mention such groups.

4. Draw upon or forge alliances with the leadership of existing organized social groupings

   **Measurement**
   
   *High* = Report(s) note affiliation between the government and unions, student groups, or religious organizations. Report(s) also note that these groups participate in demonstrations or that these groups play an important role in the political process.
   
   *Medium* = Affiliation and connections are noted, but these groups are not mentioned to take part in demonstrations.
   
   *Low* = No affiliation and connections noted.

**Demobilization**

5. Enact burdensome legal regulations on voluntary organizations

   **Measurement**
   
   *High* = Report(s) note:
A. 1) Registration regulations are burdensome AND  
   2) Laws enable intrusive means for officials to monitor associations.  
OR  
B. 1) The government refuses to register multiple high profile groups and/or the registration process appears to be highly politicized. 

Medium = Report(s) note:  
A. There are some legal regulations that impede organizations (mainly registration delays).  
OR  
B. Registration is easy, but there is significant government oversight.  
OR  
C. There are very ambiguous regulations or the legal environment is in complete flux.  
OR  
D. There is a high-profile politicized case of the rejection of registration or failure to register a particular NGO.  
OR  
E. Although the general law may not invite much supervisory oversight, the government proposes a law that would significantly tighten supervisory oversight.  
OR  
F. The laws generally do not include much supervisory oversight, but in a given year the government sets up a special commission or a special task force to look into NGO activities.  

*Combinations of A-F are also possible in the medium category.  

Low = Report(s) do not mention that legal regulations impede the registration or operation of NGOs.  

6. Manipulate media resources against independent groups  
Measurement:  
High = Government officials publicly disparage NGOs (or a particular NGO) more than once. For example they state publicly that NGOs are suspicious organizations and funded by foreign governments.  
Medium = Report(s) note that some officials publicly (report references one official only) disparage NGOs.  
Low = It is not reported that government officials publicly disparage NGOs.  

7. Employ state agencies to investigate, harass, or imprison members of independent groups  
Measurement:  
High = Report(s) note that state agencies are frequently (more than 5 cases) employed to investigate, interrogate, or imprison members of human rights groups; OR reports use the general language that the authorities frequently harass human right groups.  
Medium = Report(s) detail only a handful of particular cases of security service harassment of human rights groups/and or members OR report(s) use the general language that general harassment occurs.  
Low = Report(s) do not mention harassment of human rights groups or that harassment is rare or uncommon. The government may warn human rights groups to stay away from certain subjects.  

*Considered here are threats to human rights monitors and/or harassment through the use of various police (security services, tax police, fire inspections, criminal prosecution, libel, etc). Not included here
is registration or investigation of activities by the body that is tasked with the function of registering or monitoring NGO activities.

8. Restrict political rallies, strikes, and public meetings of independent groups

**Measurement**

*High* = Report(s) note:
A. The government does not allow freedom of assembly in law (state of emergency, curfews, etc.) in general or during crisis moments.
OR
B. The government does not frequently allow any demonstrations (if general language only used).
OR
C. At least two of the following conditions are met:
   1) Officials frequently (if number noted, more than 5-6 smaller rallies or one big rally plus at least 3 other smaller rallies) do not allow (i.e. do not give permission/declare illegal) demonstrations by the opposition.
   2) The opposition is frequently not allowed to hold meetings in central locations.
   3) The legal requirements to hold a public rally are very difficult to fulfill.
   4) Multiple rallies are broken up by the police and people are detained. Included here is whether pro-government supporters disrupt multiple rallies.

*Medium* = Report(s) note:
A. There is some restriction of rallies (at least two large rallies were not allowed, were dispersed with arrests, or were forced to move locations outside of the city).
OR
B. Both pro-government and opposition groups disrupt each other’s rallies.
OR
D. The conditions for high or low are not met.

*Low* = Report(s) note:
A. No denials of registration or other ways the authorities attempted to block a demonstration from happening. There may be laws that restrict freedom of assembly, but they are not used.
OR
B. Only a small number of meetings are blocked (less than two large rallies).

9. Use systematic violence against opposition groups/leaders

**Measurement:**

*High* = Multiple rallies are broken up violently by the police resulting in over 150 injuries or 20 deaths. Also included is whether human rights activists are frequently murdered or are physically threatened (more than 4).

*Medium* = Rallies are broken up violently by the police resulting in a range of 50 to 150 injuries or 6 to 20 deaths. Or in the medium category it is noted that human rights defenders are occasionally murdered (2-4) or one human rights defender is murdered, but there are multiple assaults of human rights workers.

*Low* = Rallies rarely end in violence resulting in 0 to 49 injuries or 0 to 5 deaths. In addition, human rights defenders are infrequently physically threatened or murdered (one or less).
In Cases of Conflicting Reports

If reports heavily conflict, I determined the coding based on what two out of the three sources say. If there are only two reports that provide information on a given indicator, I report the mean of the two reports. If it is impossible to calculate a mean, I coded the indicator in line with the coding of the indicator a year before and after that particular year.

When reports discuss an indicator in a general fashion and use only general language, I make a coding decision based on this general language. If there is general language plus a few examples, I continue to code based on the general language. If there is general language, but then the paucity of the details in the reporting contradict the general language, I make a coding determination based on the detailed description of events.

Coding Rule 9 Violence Figures

![Injuries at Demonstrations 1990-2009](image-url)
APPENDIX B

In order to mitigate any potential ramifications for participating in my study, I list all interview respondents as anonymous.

Interview List

Moscow
1. Women’s Organization
2. Women’s Organization
3. Two respondents, Women’s Organization
4. Women’s Organization
5. Women’s Organization
6. Women’s Organization
7. Women’s Organization
8. Women’s Organization
9. Women’s Organization
10. Women’s Organization
11. Women’s Organization
12. Human Rights Organization
13. Two respondents, Human Rights Organization
14. Human Rights Organization
15. Human Rights Organization
16. Human Rights Organization
17. Human Rights Organization
18. Human Rights Organization
19. Human Rights Organization
20. Human Rights Organization
21. Human Rights Organization
22. Youth Organization
23. Youth Organization
24. Youth Organization
25. Youth Organization
26. Youth Organization
27. Youth Organization
28. Youth Organization
29. Youth Organization
30. Expert Interview
31. Expert Interview
32. Expert Interview
33. Expert Interview
34. Expert Interview
35. Expert Interview
36. Expert Interview
Ekaterinburg
37. Women’s Organization
38. Women’s Organization
39. Women’s Organization
40. Women’s Organization
41. Two respondents, Women’s Organization
42. Women’s Organization
43. Human Rights Organization
44. Human Rights Organization
45. Human Rights Organization
46. Human Rights Organization
47. Human Rights Organization
48. Youth Organization
49. Youth Organization
50. Youth Organization
51. Youth Organization
52. Youth Organization

Volgograd
53. Women’s Organization
54. Women’s Organization
55. Women’s Organization
56. Human Rights Organization
57. Human Rights Organization
58. Human Rights Organization
59. Human Rights Organization
60. Human Rights Organization
61. Human Rights Organization
62. Youth Organization
63. Youth Organization
64. Youth Organization
65. Two respondents, Youth Organization
66. Expert Interview
67. Expert Interview
68. Expert Interview
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