THE INFLUENCE OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURE ON
AMERICAN MILITARY INNOVATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

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Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
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in Government

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation critically explores military innovation in counterinsurgency in the American experience. It examines innovations in the operational strategy of the U.S. military in the Philippines War from 1898-1902, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to present. The U.S., like most advanced militaries, has defined military professionalism in terms of the specialized knowledge and skills needed to wage major combat operations (MCO) in conventional war, against similarly armed and organized opponents. When faced with the problems of fighting insurgent groups that are neither similarly armed nor organized, the American military establishment has struggled to innovate quickly and effectively. I argue that American military culture is the primary explanation for why innovation in counterinsurgency has been so difficult. An institutional environment that defines the profession via a technology-driven framework of major combat has hampered the adoption of innovative approaches to counterinsurgency that lie outside the dominant institutional culture.

In the American example, military innovation in counterinsurgency has largely been a contest of competing military cultures, defined by changing standards of what it means to be a professional soldier. Relatively weak identification by the officer corps
with conventional military knowledge, and a high degree of specialization in civilian professions produced highly innovative counterinsurgency approaches in the Philippines. Almost a century later a tightly defined theory of doctrine, developed after the Vietnam War, created a re-professionalized military that largely eschewed the study of unconventional war. This contributed to the loss of important institutional knowledge about COIN. Reinforced by the characteristics of the all-volunteer military, the force that went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq was organized, trained, and indoctrinated in the culture of major combat. It would take the publication of Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006 to begin the necessary shift in the broader institutional culture that allowed for effective operational innovation to occur.
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Finally, I could not have finished without the patient faith and sage guidance of my committee, but especially my advisor and friend, Dr. Charles King.

With Deepest Gratitude,

Matthew J. Schmidt
TO CHARLOTTE AND JASPER, WITH ALL MY LOVE.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIMA</td>
<td>Biometrics Identity Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTF</td>
<td>Biometrics Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director Central Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>Enemy Prisoners of War</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Foreign Security Force Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GF</td>
<td>General Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
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<td>HIDE</td>
<td>Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJC</td>
<td>ISAF Joint Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIEDDO</td>
<td>Joint IED Defeat Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIF</td>
<td>Joint Interrogation Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Major Combat Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine-resistant Ambush Protected vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Operational Detachment Team - Alpha</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision-guided Munition</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL-MIL</td>
<td>Political-Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSWG</td>
<td>Technical Support Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Un-manned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIF</td>
<td>United Islamic Front - Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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Chapter 1

Military Innovation in a ‘Special Kind of War’

Re-Framing the Question of Military Innovation

Counterinsurgency warfare has dominated the last century of American military experience. Since 1898 the U.S. military has spent nine years fighting conventional\textsuperscript{a} wars but some 35 years engaged in major overseas counterinsurgencies.\textsuperscript{b} Further, counterinsurgency will remain the most likely type of conflict facing the U.S. in coming decades. Consensus among experts in the field is that “insurgency will continue to be prominent because there are no signs that the problems of national cohesion, economic development, and political legitimacy” that give rise to such conflicts will soon abate.\textsuperscript{c} Such causes, broad as they are, hint at the problems involved in disentangling how innovation happens in counterinsurgency. The very question of how a military organization understands issues like national cohesion and political legitimacy gets conflated with how that same institution makes sense of such conflicts. This project

\textsuperscript{a} See definition below.


\textsuperscript{c} O’Neil 12. See especially Antulio J. Echevarria, "Principles of War or Principles of Battle?," in Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 2005). Echevarria is a particulary consistent critic of he calls the American “way of war” as not being a strategy of war, but a method of battle (p.58). Also, Micheal R. Melilo, "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities," Parameters, 2006.
explores how the American military sought to understand the central characteristics of each counterinsurgency and innovate in response.

Despite the continued significance of counterinsurgency conflicts, however, little is known about how the American military innovated during its engagements in this type of warfare. Past studies on military innovation focused on the technological innovations adopted by advanced militaries fighting *conventional* wars. Comparatively few have addressed the twin issues of innovation in counterinsurgency and innovation other than as the adoption of advanced warfighting technology.

Yet innovation, however much the common meaning has fixated around the idea of technology, is not just new inventions. At a minimum innovation requires that the invention, procedure, or concept be routinized throughout an organization or industry. As early as Joseph Schumpeter’s 1934 study, *A Theory of Economic Development*, innovation has been the beginning of a *process*, the end of which involves the adoption of the new idea throughout a broad collective like a business, an industry (to include the military), or a society.\(^d\) As later students of innovation have put it,

All innovation begins with creative ideas . . . [but] We define innovation as the successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization. In this view, creativity by individuals and teams is a starting point for innovation; the first is necessary but not sufficient condition for the second.\(^e\)


This study investigates the process of military innovation in the American experience during the Philippines Insurrection, the Vietnam War, and the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The study that follows adopts a process tracing and congruence testing approach to identify the significant causal mechanisms driving innovation under counterinsurgency conditions. It uses primary source documents and interviews to trace the chain of decisions leading to significant innovations in weapons technology or the operational or strategic approach to a given case. Congruence tests (see below for further explanation) then identify the weaknesses or strengths of an identified mechanism relative to its ability to explain other potential innovations not taken.

How militaries innovate in wartime is a question of primary significance both for academics and the professional military. Victory and defeat have historically rested on whether and how such innovation occurred.\(^\text{f}\) But as Harvey Sapolsky and Barry Posen note in the syllabus to their course on the subject, “Both the theoretical literature on innovation [in general] and the case literature on military innovation are of an uneven quality.”\(^\text{g}\) One reason for the general unevenness of research into this topic is its focus on military innovation in conventional war. There is little research into military innovation in unconventional war\(^\text{h}\), and specifically,

\(^{h}\) Non- or unconventional wars could also include the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict, e.g. nuclear war. Although terminology in the U.S. changes regularly, the idea that insurgent war is “low intensity” and nuclear war is “high intensity” provides a good sense of the normal usage of the term. It is important to remember that intensity in common usage refers to the broadest level of consequence for the state. Thus, low intensity war does not mean that the experience for a soldier is somehow less intense than in more conventional war, but that the existential intensity for the national body politic is. A “low intensity” war as generally understood in American political discourse means the existence of the nation is not at immediate risk. A nuclear war would conversely pose the immediate risk of total national destruction. Hence the idea of intensity is a combination of concepts about the consequences of each military action taken and the total risk the war poses to the population. Of course, it is important that the
insurgent war. There is even less literature on the topic of this study, how an advanced military innovates fighting as a counterinsurgent in an unconventional war.

Of the major assigned readings for Sapolsky’s and Posen’s course on innovation in military organizations, three of the four books required are management-school texts on innovation in the private sector. Only the last, *Lifting the Fog of War* (2000), deals with the military at all. However, even *Lifting*, by a former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (William Owens), takes on the question of innovation from the perspective of Owens’ post-military career in as Chief Executive Officer of an information technology company. That the two most versed academic writers on the subject would lean so heavily on management theory texts is telling. It raises the first sub-question of the study: whether military organizations like the U.S. Army innovate in significantly different ways than private sector institutions.

As Sapolsky and Posen’s course syllabus illustrates, the question of how organizations innovate has largely been peripheral to political science (though they argue that it should not be). Thus, the question of any difference between military innovation and innovation in a non-military organization is mostly uncharted territory. A further sub-question is whether advanced military confronting the problem of how to innovate in an insurgent war reacts differently than it would under conventional war conditions. As argued above, the literature on military innovation is tilted heavily toward conventional war cases. Hence the goal of this study is to outline the basic arguments for how and why military innovation in counterinsurgency is a distinct problem from innovation in conventional war conditions. Although the study offers a rough theory of

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American experience of insurgency has taken place in a context where the U.S. is not the incumbent government, but a third-party intervening power. As will be seen, this is an important part of the argument of this study.

military innovation in counterinsurgency, its primary interest is to identify the major causal factors affecting innovation in order to create space for further study into this under-researched question.

A few notes on the structure of the study are necessary. First, because of the dominance of land forces in these conflicts, the study primarily focuses on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, although significant aspects of the Vietnam case deal with air power and an interesting aspect of the Philippines case involves innovative uses of naval power in combination with ground forces. Further, the bulk of the theoretical literature on innovation as a general phenomenon has been cross-applied into political science from economics and organizational science. Within the literature that specifically addresses military innovation, however, two main arguments have analogous variants in political science – historical institutionalism and path dependency. So theoretical discussions of historical institutionalism and path dependency will be buttressed throughout the project with insights from economics and organizational science. Also, both historical institutionalism and path dependency rely in the main on arguments about the impact of an organization’s culture on the way it innovates. In this case ‘culture’ more specifically refers to the military service culture of the main branches (Army, Marine Corps, etc.) fighting the conflicts addressed in each case study.

This study examines three main explanations of how and why military innovation occurs: realist and neorealist arguments, institutional cultural claims, and organizational theory claims. As will be explored in the next chapter, organizational theory claims share basic aspects of institutional cultural claims. Though organizational theory introduces important nuances left out from standard institutional cultural claims. The introduction of the concepts of sensemaking and
metrics from organizational theory provide a deeper process-oriented understanding of the factors affecting military innovation. These concepts are addressed in separate sections below.

The major theorists of military innovation, to include Sapolsky and Posen, have generally tested realist/neorealist explanations of military behavior (innovation behavior) against the claims of organizational theory. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, most authors (again including Posen) have argued that organizational claims have been weaker explanatory fits than realist explanations for how and why military innovation happens. One key additional sub-question this study poses, then, is whether the claims supporting realist explanations hold when looking at military innovation in the very different context of counterinsurgency. Of course, this first supposes that counterinsurgency and insurgency represent significantly different environments for the military. It further supposes that because of differences in the context of the conflicts, the military organization in question acts differently.

What is Innovation?

Stephen Rosen offers one of the most widely held definitions of military innovation. To Rosen military innovation is:

[A] Change in one of the primary combat arms of service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm . . . [It] involves a change in the concepts of operation . . . that is, the ideas governing the ways it used its forces to win a campaign . . . [and] a change in the relation of that combat arm to other combat
arms and a down-grading or abandoning of older concepts of operation and possibly of a formerly dominant weapon.

Note that Rosen requires at least three things to qualify a shift as an innovation: (1) a change in the concept of how to fight the war, (2) a subsequent shift in the relationship among combat arms, and (3) a shift in weapons-system dominance. The first two make sense because the second necessarily follows, but the last (the down-grading or abandoning of “older concepts”) seems redundant of his first criterion. The down-grading or abandonment of a formerly dominant weapon seems a non-necessary condition. An old weapon can often be adapted to new uses that are reflective of his other two criteria (e.g. for which a case could be argued about the reprinting of classic horse cavalry techniques through the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual in preparation for counterinsurgent operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere). What seems clear is that Rosen emphasizes that military innovation shares the same relationship to creativity as innovation in the private sector. Military innovation is not just a single creative occurrence, but a fuller, organization-wide adoption of a fighting concept, weapons-system, or change in force structure.

The largest study of military innovation to date, a 1999 RAND study, however, reduces innovation down to “new means of integrating technology [which] might include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.”\(^k\) Importantly, however, the authors go on to note that innovation is not synonymous with technology, pointing out that “by coupling low-technology

\(^{\text{j}}\text{Rosen, cited in Michael Mcnerney, "Military Innovation During War: Paradox or Paradigm?,” Defense and Security Analysis 21, no. 2 (June 2005): 202.}\)

\(^{\text{k}}\text{Jeffrey Isaacson, Christopher Layne and John Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation, RAND (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999). 8.}\)
expedients with creative operational or tactical concepts, such states [those with low-tech means] can attain a high degree of military effectiveness; indeed, such states may be able to prevail against military opponents employing superior technology.” Nonetheless, as a question for advanced militaries, innovation is nearly synonymous with changes in technology. What Antoine Bousquet calls the “scientific way of war” includes both the “increasing reliance on the development and integration of technology” in the Western approach to war, but also the way this mode of understanding has been “systematically recruited to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organization best suited to prevail in it.” If Bousquet is correct, one test for each case in this study is to ask to what extent this systematized view of war is present in each case.

Finally, Peter Senge, comes closest to bridging the gap between the general literature on innovation and the military-specific when he notes that an “ensemble of technologies” – from the machines to make airplane production reliable and repeatable, to a system of avionics, and a network of airports – were necessary before military and commercial aviation became more than a novelty. Rosen makes implies similar concepts in his discussion of warfighting concepts, and the RAND study offers the idea that innovation involves the “integration of technology”. But neither makes explicit the difference between invention and innovation.

**Why Study Innovation?**

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Innovation is important because it wins wars. Innovation wins wars because it is through innovation that one side gains an advantage over the other. Most often the advantage conferred is understood to be a “lifting [of] the fog of war” as Vice-Chairman Owen made a case for in his book of the same title. “The fog of war”, of course, is a reference to Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher of war whose work is the touchstone of the Western military profession. But to fully comprehend the idea of a fog of war, one first needs to remember that Clausewitz centered his masterwork on the idea that the first principle of warfare is to understand the unique character of war as “an act of human intercourse.”\(^o\) It is the complexity of human intercourse that fogs the conduct of warfare. War, he contends, is fundamentally an act of relationship. Cause and effect are uniquely shiftable in the “realm of uncertainty”, “fog”, and the “province of chance” that defined the relational nature of war for him.\(^p\) Indeed, this fundamental uncertainty was greater in war than any other human endeavor. The “province of chance” meant both crisis and opportunity to Clausewitz, and constituted the space in which innovation could determine the outcome of war. Because crisis or opportunity could unfold anywhere on the battlefield or around the diplomatic tables, the ability to adapt or innovate was the essential attribute of the individual soldier, commander, and statesman. Ultimately, innovation was the heart of the military as an institution because it was the military, beyond the other appendages of state, that most had the ability to creatively adapt under the pressures of war.


\(^p\) *On War*, 101.
In the U.S. the military has been consistently viewed more favorably than most other parts of government precisely because it is believed capable of providing almost any service under any condition. If that capability did not actually exist, it was believed that the military could *innovate* to provide it. The unspoken touchstone behind the idea of the American military’s famed “can do” attitude is innovation. Indeed, the idea of an “attitude” is arguably colloquial use of the idea of organizational culture. The military’s service culture is one of “can do” innovation in the face of problems other organizations are assumed incapable of responding to effectively.

Most studies of military innovation have approached the question in a way similar to Clausewitz’s antagonists. They have taken specific historical cases of technological innovations (with a few exceptions) and attempted to provide linear causal explanations. That is, the cause leading to a given innovatory path has been argued to be clear, direct, and testable. Prior studies have framed the question in ways that have neglected the complicated reality of war reflected in Clausewitz’s conception. First, most of the significant work on innovation frames the discussion using the inter-war period in Europe. As discussed already, this has meant that a conventional-war take dominates the study of military innovation. Second, a preoccupation with the technology of weaponry has placed too much emphasis on defining innovation in scientific terms to the exclusion of the conceptual and organizational.

The “fog” of war, inside and outside the command tent is intense. Understanding the enemy is hard enough, understanding one’s own institutional processes is arguably harder. As

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Williamson Murray points out, military institutions, “must spend long periods of time not engaged in their fundamental purpose – war.” As a consequence the institutional ethos and attributes defining the profession, most importantly its Weltanschauung about the fundamental use of force develops largely outside the experience of actual war.

If this worldview behind the institution’s fundamental concept of its purpose also limits its definition of war to the “conventional” then the military’s capacity to adapt its paradigm to meet the actual, but unexpected, conditions of fighting as a third-party counterinsurgent is severely affected. And as Murray again argues, “There is a consistent pattern of military organizations’ attempting to impose their prewar concepts of future combat on the actual conditions of war, instead of adapting to those conditions.”

Taken together, these constraints in the framing military innovation question have excluded a potentially important side of the question: the problem of understanding how innovation may occur in unconventional contexts, in non-technological ways, as affected by the institutional preconceptions of the military.

**Conventional and Insurgent War**

This study looks at military innovation in a subset of what is known as unconventional war. Because the main arguments of the study rest on a presumption of the uniqueness of insurgent and counterinsurgent war, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the terms.

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u For one study in how consumed U.S. military thinkers were by the idea of technological innovation to the exclusion of other concepts see, Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
‘Conventional’ war is defined by a basic structure that is common among the combatants on all sides of the conflict." That is, combatants are similarly armed and organized. It is this similarity, or symmetry, of structure that reflects a fundamental agreement among sides on the conventions of the war. The basic shared convention emerging from this symmetry of structure is a commonality in the grand strategy employed by both sides: the decisive application of massed force in space and time against the other side. The winning side wins because their force effectively destroys the other side’s ability to continue the struggle. In the argot of the profession, the losing side can no longer mass force effectively. Either its will to arms is weakened, its actual force has been physically diminished or because what force it does have is blocked access to the battlefield.

Conventional war is defined by characteristics that do not hold for insurgent warfare. Among the most basic is that in conventional war combatants are identified by uniform. This is not just a function of historical happenstance but an enshrined element of international law. Indeed, it is from the seemingly small convention of uniformed combatants that much of the concept of this type of conflict stems. That is, the designation of combatants as such through the

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"One definition is: “armed conflict between two or more states that employ recently developed, non-nuclear weaponry for direct combat between organized military forces. Nuclear weapons may be deployed, and their use may be threatened, but they are not actually fired,” from Alex Roland, Technology and War, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_4/roland2.html#roland (accessed May 2010). For more on the definition see the Department of Defense Dictionary of Terms, “conventional forces”, at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/3410.html; also, see John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994).

visual cue of the uniform establishes the most important tenant of such war: the distinction of combatant from civilian. As frequently as this distinction may have been violated throughout history, its development as an ideal and as a standard of a nascent international legal framework is effectively what demarcates how conflict is categorized. Even the distinction between civil-war and insurgent war largely turns on the separation of civilian from combatant. Civil wars tend to pit uniformed or at least identifiable forces against each other for control of the state or for secession from a constituted government. The combatants on each side are in theory a subset of a larger civilian population they claim to be acting on the behalf of. Combatants and civilians are not intended to be coterminous groups.

The visual distinction between combatants and non-combatants is compounded by the difference between the organizational structure of civilian society and that of the armed forces in conflict. In conventional war competing forces tend toward symmetrical organizing structures that are hierarchical in design. More or less strict lines of command are created among conventional forces in order to facilitate control of force elements in battle. Smaller force elements (e.g. squads or companies) are joined together to make larger fighting units (battalions, divisions, armies). Clearly defined command chains are intended to allow for cooperative action among units and levels of units. Clashes among enemy sides may occur at the level of small units or whole armies. The conventional model of war also encompasses a similar hierarchy of supporting structures like control over weapons production and food and other resource rationing.

Note that this also impacts the military’s process for lifting the fog, or making sense of the total context of the war. For most military’s this means making sense of, through
measurement, of enemy strength. Simply because of the symmetry among forces, opposing sides share a largely common system of meaning-making. Indeed, they largely share the same symbolic systems for noting types of units, strengths, and movement. This is in turn allows for a largely shared language whereby intent can be signaled or discerned in the case where one side intentionally attempts to deceive the other through a mis-signal of intent, means or timing of attack, for instance. Again, however, the very possibility of effective deception requires that one side understand the sensemaking process of the other (see below for further discussion of the term). In modern war, this is almost always because the sides share enough of a common system of metrics (see below) and sensemaking to make deceit possible.

This similarity extends to the command structure of conventional opponents, too. The hierarchical structure of conventional forces is generally mirrored by the larger political body they represent. Conventional war, while not exclusively an inter-state affair, is, because of its structure, at least generally a reflection of the Westphalian state structure. Even in a civil war, it is arguable that competing sides fighting conventionally are already organized as proto-Westphalian states. For example, a successful conventional combatant is unlikely to produce a loose tribal-confederation (that is, non-Westphalian structure) in the aftermath of the war. Rather, the strict command chain of the conventional force is almost certain to result in a state with a strong, internationally recognized monopoly on the use of force over a well-defined territory.

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The German military in WWII provides a basic example of the nature of conventional, non-nuclear war. Adolf Hitler’s *Wehrmacht* found itself split between vast eastern and western lines of battle, for example. The necessary choices about the movement of forces is always squeezed between the basic pressures of time and space in war. Go west, and the eastern front may collapse. Go east, and the Allies may land a successful invasion in the west. Of course the intricacies are far greater, but the basic nature of the problem at the grand strategic level is remarkably stable. The *Wehrmacht*, literally, is a *war machine*. And the nature of its parts—Army, Navy, Air Force—determine the tools it has available for the marshalling of force in time and space. Each type of force allows for military power to be projected at different points in different time constraints.

The type of force and its position relative to the enemy determine the grim physics of war. If some combination of enough force of can be applied at the right place and time, the enemy’s capacity to project force may be critically wounded and the war won. Both sides play essentially the same game of live chess. Air forces cover space and time quickly, but cannot reliably hold ground. Ground forces cover space slowly, but can hold territory and effectively shrink the size of the gameboard. The key questions in conventional war are the soundness of the strategy in moving the pieces of the machine around and the added dimension of performance capability. Unlike the boardgame, where each piece’s capability to perform as a rook or knight is unquestioned, in the stark light of war the great unknown is performance. So innovation in the ability of parts of the war machine to mass greater force faster, farther, or with greater probability of performance, are of the utmost importance.
Therefore, as will be discussed in the American example, the pattern of innovation for forces like Germany and the U.S. fighting conventional wars has been to marshal technology to gain a decisive advantage. Indeed, the idea of “innovation” is a short-hand for “technological innovation”. That there could be other types of innovation, such as organizational, that are not driven by new technologies is barely acknowledged in the general imagination, much less the military mind.

The characteristics of insurgent war are in many ways the opposite of conventional war. For the insurgent, the opportunity to achieve defeat of the enemy through force of arms is rare. The primary element of effect, then, is not military but political. Bard O’Neil defines insurgency as follows:

Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{y}}\)

Central to the distinction is that insurgents rely on violence to support the primary sphere of activity, which is political organization. But is the use of both in combination that distinguishes an insurgency from a non-insurgent political movement like Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement, or Mahatma Ghandi’s independence movement.\(^\text{\textsuperscript{z}}\) This aspect of insurgency places organizational innovation in front of technological innovation as the main type of innovation on


the insurgent side. Modern insurgents have been creatively inventive in turning limited resources into weapons, but it is the organizational genius of the larger insurgent movement that has made such limited tactical inventions into dire strategic threats. It is not, in other words, the improvised explosive device (IED) that is strategically dangerous, but the ability of the insurgent group to organize its production and use in ways that attack the counterinsurgent’s weaknesses. Without the organizational strength of the insurgent structure there would only be ‘lone wolf’ bombers, and not a recognizable campaign of terror and intimidation towards a political end.

There are several additional distinctions between conventional and insurgent war that are relevant to determining what drives the counterinsurgent’s innovation process. Because insurgencies are distinctly political in nature they are population-centered, not military-centered. The relationship between the insurgents’ and their own population’s will to sustain armed conflict and the will of the counterinsurgent’s population to do the same are of the utmost importance. The centrality of organizational innovation for the insurgent rests on the need to gain, sustain, or increase the will of its side’s target population to support the continuation of the struggle for power. The insurgent side must draw heavily on the civilian population for military materials, intelligence, hiding, and political legitimacy. In addition, the insurgent looks to primarily use a strategy of continual bloodletting, not the decisiveness of major battle, to turn the will of the counterinsurgent’s population. The former is based mostly on manipulating public psychology in an incremental manner, the latter, on the physics of force projection. Particularly in the case of the American experience fighting as a third-party in overseas insurgencies, the strength of U.S. domestic support for each insurgent war has been a decisive factor in the conflict’s outcome.
Emerging from this primary distinction of population-centered war, is the idea that in insurgent war the distinction between combatant and civilian is purposefully blurred by the insurgent. Hence the problem of measurement or *metrics*, and *sensemaking*, that flows from the effort of measurement. This attempted erasure of the carefully constructed ideal of western conventional war has multiple effects. First, it offers one of the few direct military advantages the insurgent can hope for: stealth. By not donning uniforms and consciously blending with the larger portion of the population, insurgents conceal themselves from attack by the usually superior counterinsurgent force. This erases much of the counterinsurgent’s advantage in mass and technology – a fact against which the counterinsurgent must react, and whose form of reaction is the basis for the hypothesis proposed in this study. As David Galulla stated of the Algerian insurgency,

> Subversive warfare . . . is a special kind of war . . . that require[s] operations of a particular type that differ from conventional warfare.\(^{aa}\)

Second, the ability of the insurgent to merge into the general population exposes a moral quandary to a counterinsurgent force steeped in the western code of martial conduct that relies on the probable distinction between combatant and civilian. The ‘collateral damage’ that is inevitable in war means that more civilians are often killed or wounded by counterinsurgent (and insurgent) actions than by known combatants. This factor plays heavily into whether or not the counterinsurgent’s domestic population will sustain support for the war.

The Significance of Insurgent Wars

This study re-orientates the question of military innovation. Nearly all the extant writing on the subject examines innovation in the context of conventional, maneuver warfare. Insurgent warfare raises most of the basic research questions in political science. This category of conflict presupposes the fundamental problem of legitimate political authority, state formation, regime transitions, and social mobilization. Insurgency is not inter-state war. And as will be emphasized throughout, its occurrence heralds a fundamental breakdown in political legitimacy in a way conventional inter-state war does not.

The insurgent landscape looks much like Joel Migdal’s famous description of “strong societies and weak states,” where “a growing state apparatus and ability to get rid of strongmen” does not result in effective state authority. So besides the importance of transferring the question of military innovation out of its usual the “big war” context, doing so offers insights into many of the basic problems faced by academics and policymakers alike. The most basic problem, of course, is the one Samuel Huntington posed forty years ago; in insurgent conflicts “governments simply do not govern.” This type of warfare is perhaps the quintessential situation where, to borrow from the title of Huntington’s book, a society undergoing violent change is confronted in full with the problem of establishing legitimate political order.

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It is also fair to ask how relevant insurgent wars have been in the broad sweep of American history. Despite the spasmodic and often secondary treatment of the subject of counterinsurgency until recently, by certain measures insurgent war has dominated the U.S. military experience during the last century. This fact is usually overshadowed by the intensity of the two world wars. As discussed above, from 1898-2010 American forces have spent approximately 35 years engaged in insurgent conflicts, nine in conventional ones. Though combat casualties have been few compared to conventional wars (roughly 250,000 American casualties over the same 32 combat years, versus some 1.5 million for the 9 years of conventional war), the financial and political costs of insurgent war is clearly rising. For example, from an estimated $549 billion, in constant dollars, for the roughly seven plus years of the Vietnam War, the cost of the ongoing counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has risen to over $800 billion in the last five years alone.\textsuperscript{cc} This represents a per-year cost increase of over one-hundred percent.

Insurgent war has tapped into methods that are allowing it to draw in a greater percentage of U.S. military effort while not producing proportional success. The reasons for this have been widely discussed in the popular and academic literature. Insurgency is a strategic choice. Counterinsurgency is too. For the insurgent, the basic strategic paradigm is the acknowledgment that their side is dramatically out-gunned on the conventional battlefield. The result has been over time the elimination of the very idea of a battlefield. What exists now is the idea of a broader battlespace.\textsuperscript{ff} To say that a war is waged over a battlespace is to eliminate the major

\textsuperscript{ff} Officially the U.S. Army has stopped using the term “battlespace” in doctrine. Other services have retained its use, however. The term has been replaced with the phrase “operational environment”, “area of responsibility”, “area of
conceptual frames of western military thinking in the last 300 years. By now this idea of the
dimensional transformation of conflict from its industrial-age conceptual frames has become
something of a threadbare idea – especially eight-plus years into the Afghan/Iraq
counterinsurgencies. But its origins in the literature on military innovation go back perhaps only
to the late 1980s in so far as it was reflected in the debates over the “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA). But the full assimilation into the marrow of the fighting force of the idea of
innovation as organizational rather than technological, is by and large a result of the on-going
Afghan/Iraq experiences. The lack of a more developed theoretical literature on the American
experience is unusually striking given the number of years the U.S. has spent fighting in overseas
insurgencies and the likelihood it will continue to do so.

**Approach of the Study**

This study adopts a process tracing and congruence method approach to analyze
American military innovation in the cases addressed. Process tracing uses the knowledge of the
case outcomes to reconstruct a narrative of the events leading up to the outcome. The goal of
process tracing is not the construction of a causal theory that links independent variables to
dependent effects. Rather, the process tracing method’s best advantage is its capacity to take
new or under-studied causal theories and “by making observations at a different level of
operations”, or “area of influence”. The use of “operational environment” is intended to buttress the move toward
systemic operational design approaches to the planning process and signals a move to embrace much of the logic of
Complex Adaptive Systems and “design” thinking. See for example, Field Manual 2-03.1 *Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield*, or the forthcoming *Design Student Text* from the Combined Arms Command, School of Advanced
Military Studies.

**Jonathan E. Gumz, “Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military
Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past,”* Journal of Strategic Studies, July 2009.*
analysis” show new implications of the theory or simply indentify new causal mechanisms.\textsuperscript{hh} Thus, this study looks at known outcomes (e.g., the decision to employ a fortified town concept in the Philippines Insurrection) to determine the causal chain for the employment of a given operational approach. In doing so the study uses primary source and original research to reconstruct the institutional debate over “counterinsurgency” approaches within the military at that time. This, in turn, exposes the fundamental norms at play in the institution and allows for a re-examination of the main influences on operational strategy based on critical interpretation of the source evidence.

Further, a key aspect of this study rests on the claim that organizational belief-systems (e.g. military service culture) is a key causal factor in how the military innovates in counterinsurgency. As Andrew Bennett and Alexander George warn,

\begin{quote}
\ldots important methodological issues arise in attempting to assess the role that such beliefs play in two different phases of the process of decision making: the processing of information and analysis that precedes the decision taken, and the actual choice of policy.\textsuperscript{ii}
\end{quote}

Congruence methodology, in conjunction with process tracing, allows for the study to assess how congruent its theory of causality is with the known outcome. The congruence approach fits especially well with cases like the ones in this study because it looks at the propensity of an organization to “extend or restrict the scope and direction” of information gathering and analysis to as a way to shape decisions about innovating strategic, operational, or tactical approaches to

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the conflict. This approach also addresses the “choice propensities” of the organization and key decision-makers as they may already be constrained prior to the development of any information and analysis (e.g. *a priori* institutional cultural constraints). The approach compares innovation A with causal factor XX (as discovered by process tracing) but asks further whether causal factor XX might also be congruent with alternative innovations B, C, D, or G, H, I. Alternatives B, C, and D are innovatory choices within institutional propensities; G, H, and I are outside such propensities. If the causal factor is observed producing innovations A and B, C, D, but not G, H, or I then the explanatory strength of factor XX is seen as being congruent with innovation A, but also with B, C, D. However, the link to B, C, and D would indicate that institutional propensities were having an important effect on innovation. This would indicate that the causal factor proposed as an explanation for why innovation A happened is a likely fit for a rough theory of innovation, but not a strictly predictive one because outcomes B, C, and D would also fit, meaning other causal factors are also likely present. A case that showed factor XX correlated with innovations G, H, or I but not the others would argue against institutional propensities as causal mechanisms. In this fashion congruence and process tracing methods can help move toward a better theory of military innovation, even if they cannot produce a fully predictive one.

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Specifically the method used in this study focuses the process tracing especially closely on what information the military gathered and how it framed the analysis of it into “metrics”. To do this the study asks the following questions of each case:

How did the military organization collectively define the situation they faced? (Did they use past experience as analogy?)

What was the implicit prescription for the situation?

What innovations were discussed or adopted?

What information was gathered to assess the situation?
How was this analyzed? (What doctrine did the military produce?)

These questions outline the process chain and form the framework for determining the operational concept of counterinsurgency employed by the key decision-makers.

**Main Argument – Culture of Techno-Optimism**

An understanding of innovation as primarily *technological* is so ingrained in the narrative of the American military that it goes mostly unquestioned. Common ideas of military innovation evoke visions of new weapons platforms and whiz-bang technology like precision guided bombs, Predator drones, x-band radar, and sub-orbital hypersonic strike weapons that can reach anywhere on the planet within a few hours. All of which are real, or likely to be real soon.\(^{mm}\)

The current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has called this vision American “techno-optimism”\(^{nn}\).

But there is another form of innovation - of a different, non-technologically driven kind – that occurs less noticeably. In the private sector this type of organizational innovation is about transforming an organization’s culture and restructuring the institution to better compete in a radically shifting marketplace. It is also about reshaping the entire competitive environment in which a corporate organization exists in order to create a market where none existed before. The

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\(^{nn}\) Address to Command and General Staff College, Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence, Ft. Leavenworth, May 7, 2010.
analog in the military occurs when the strategic understanding of a conflict is re-framed by commanders to reflect a radical change in the competitive environment of war. In the military such organizational innovation might mean adjusting unit sizes and structures to enable easier command and control or logistical supply.

There are profound differences between fighting a conventional enemy and fighting an insurgent enemy. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in 2003, LTG. William Wallace candidly admitted, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against." Those planning the Iraq War did not adequately factor in the risk of an insurgency. As the one-sided conventional invasion quickly gave way to a multi-sided insurgency, the U.S. was faced with the problem of how to respond. As the existing narrative of the anticipated war collapsed, the military’s war fighting doctrine continued to be organized around the concept of the war-gamed enemy.

The type of innovation the military pursued depended heavily on the standards of measurement it used to make sense of the changed battlefield it found itself on. But standards of measurement are frequently misleading. For the military these standards, were intended to help clarify the picture it saw on the battlefield. Metrics about insurgents killed, numbers of foreign

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Fred Kaplan, “War-Gamed,” March 28, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2080814 (accessed January 17, 2010). In fact, the possibility of an insurgency was broached several times during the simulation but was dismissed as being outside the rules of the simulation.

The military gives no clear definition of metrics. Today the term in use is usually “Measures of Effectiveness” or MOEs. The term, “MOE”, has been transferred to the military directly from business practices. See, unpublished handbook, United States Institute of Peace, The MPICE Handbook, “There has been a longstanding need for “Measures of Effectiveness,” as they are often called in the private sector, focused on diplomatic, military and development efforts in places prone to conflict.” The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework is the most influential metrics project relating to conflict currently conducted by the U.S government. Because of differences in chronology varying terms were used in the cases addressed. The best definition, and one referred to implicitly in an increasing number of U.S. military and civil-military organizations comes from the United Nations, Monitoring Peace Consolidation: UN Practitioner’s Guide to Benchmarking, p. 19. “A benchmark
fighters in country, hours of electricity, etc., were used to shape decisions about whether to apply innovative technology or to adopt organizational innovations to respond to the insurgency. The process of measurement broke down, however, when the military used metrics to confirm the narrative that most conformed to the existing view of war held by the military as an institution and buttressed by the American public. U.S. metrics in the early years of the Iraq war reflected more about the institutional culture of the American military than about the reality of the war. The breakdown in measurement meant that the military was three years into the Iraq War before300

In May 2010 more than 50,000 U.S. troops still remained in Iraq. The world’s most technologically advanced military spent years hobbled by an organizational culture that prevented it from effectively responding to enemies who used a marriage of technological and organizational innovation to mount an effective campaign of terror, sabotage, and ambush. The U.S. response was often to bring technology to bear until it became apparent that whatever the metrics said about the effectiveness of the wizardry, the truth on the ground told something different.

**Main Argument – Metrics**

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can be defined more specifically as a concrete point of reference (in the form of a value, a state, or a characteristic) that has been verified by practice (in the form of empirical evidence, experience, or observation) to lead to fulfillment of more overall objectives or visions (in isolation or together with the fulfillment of other benchmarks)”.

The development of metrics, and their root in the institutional culture of the military, determines how the organization makes sense (sensemaking) of the counterinsurgency and directs decisions about innovation. Like the trinity of key elements in *On War*, the elements of metrics, institutional culture and sensemaking form the framework for understanding military innovation in counterinsurgency. In the American case a clear institutional culture based on a techno-scientific understanding of war emerges in cases after WWII. This culture has largely shaped the nature of military innovation, even in circumstances of counterinsurgency where the efficacy of technologically focused innovation is highly questionable.

Much of what is presented about the history of the American experience in counterinsurgency can be found in countless secondary works. What is lacking is an analytical framework that offers a probable hypothesis for why the institutional response to the experience of counterinsurgency continued to support a techno-scientific approach to innovation that failed to recognize the radically different counterinsurgency. As Col. Bobby Clain, director of the Afghan Assessment Group noted of the current process, “our metrics suck.” This study presents a new way of looking at American military innovation. The thesis of this project is that the U.S. pattern of military innovation in counterinsurgency is determined by the metrics used to frame the institutional sensemaking process of the military. Establishing the relationship between the development and use of metrics to the institutional sensemaking process that drives the innovation process is a key goal of this study.

When one looks into how metrics have come to be developed and used, it is clear that a pattern develops wherein A.) quantitative measures are preferred over qualitative as a matter of

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institutional culture; B.) the character of insurgent war causes a high degree of dissonance within the American military about the fundamental nature of combat; and C.) as a result, quantitative metrics lead to an initial pattern of innovation that gives primacy to the development of new weapons-systems over attempts at organizational innovation.

Understanding the persistence of this approach to innovation requires an understanding of sensemaking and other organizational phenomena that have only come under serious study in the last few years. An in-depth discussion of these factors as observed in the three major case-studies of the project follow in subsequent chapters. In all three the process of setting metrics in order to confirm or challenge the existing institutional sensemaking culture was key to the pattern of innovation that developed.

**Main Argument - Sensemaking**

At its plainest, ‘sensemaking’ is “to make sense of” a situation. This is the first issue a commander faces – making sense of the battlefield situation and its place in the operational and strategic levels of war.\(^{58}\) This is especially difficult in irregular warfare, perhaps most so in counterinsurgency. The conceptual problem in counterinsurgency is delineating the operational

\(^{58}\) The three levels of war as thought of in the U.S. military are: **strategic**, “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives”; **operational**, “the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives”; **tactical**, “The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives”. See, U.S. Government, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, JP 1-02*, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (accessed May 28, 2010).
level of war. Because engagements with the enemy are generally not the result of planned campaigns on the enemy’s part as is generally understood, developing a unified operational approach that links tactical engagements into a broader operational campaign capable of achieving national strategic goals is extremely difficult. Indeed, the national strategic goal is usually too ambiguous, “stop terrorism”, “create legitimate governance” for example, to be a useful guide to field commanders. Hence sensemaking becomes a problem for the military at the command-level, since the national-strategic level struggles to articulate an operationalizable endstate for the military to pursue. Because of the complexity of this type of conflict, it is important that the colloquial idea of “making sense of” be understood as a specific organizational process. The institutional or organizational process of sensemaking is a process of “collective meaning-making that distinguishes one member of a group from a member of another group or category of people. Different groups develop different systems of meaning and the expression of that meaning.”

Sensemaking is used to emphasize the institutionalized and patterned process faced by military leaders in counterinsurgencies. Because sensemaking is a collective act, it is a cultural process. As the institutional pattern of the sensemaking process emerges in subsequent chapters it becomes clear that military innovation is not ad hoc. Rather, it is an emergent process evolving out of a set of collective suppositions about warfare that are inherent to the American military. These are, as per the definition, a “system of meaning and expression” that allow the institution to establish shared understanding of a specific conflict and its relationship to more general ideas about conflict and war. From inside the cultural system of the organization the

―Throughout this study ‘institutional’ and ‘organizational’ are used synonymously to distinguish the process of collective meaning-making from individual meaning-making. Individual meaning-making is understood to be a cognitive process, organizational meaning-making a cultural process. See subsequent citation.

“ Definition is my own, but follows closely the definition provided in, Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, Revised 2nd (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2005). 400.
characteristics of a given war seem like external facts of general agreement rather than opinions. But other militaries will have different understandings based on the peculiarities of their institutional culture. Metrics are a specific system for establishing the sensemaking pattern of the military in question. In short, the questions for which metric data are intended to provide answers expose the military’s existing system of meaning and expression at that time.

The multiplicity of actors in a counterinsurgency, the multitude of ways they interact with each other, and the lack of transparency about allegiances, and hence the direction of interaction among actors, means that understanding how the sensemaking process takes place is the foundation for exploring military innovation in these contexts. How sensemaking occurs among key institutional decision-makers, and what a given understanding of the conflict-scape is, shapes the choices made about innovation. As posited in the introduction, a sensemaking process centered on quantitative measures seems to push military innovation in a techno-scientific direction. The type of innovation supported and resourced by the military and other decision-makers supposes breakthroughs or adaptations in scientific and technological fields will solve the basic problems identified by American commanders in the field. These presumptions reflect the military’s institutional culture, as observed through its sensemaking process. Rather than look solely at situational assessments that define the established military culture, placing those assessments in the context of a larger procedural pattern gives a better explanation of how military innovation occurs. By looking at the actual metrics and the sensemaking process involved in their development and subsequent use, aspects of military innovation not explored by other approaches become evident.
In the social sciences this is the idea of “path dependency”. An institution like the military develops a history of behavior that creates dominant patterns of organizational action, as each new generation of members is taught the fundamental sensemaking frame of the institution. These patterns, once formed, set the initial responses of the organization to challenges in its field of operation. In the case of the U.S., the dependence on a techno-scientific sensemaking process determined its innovatory approach to the unfamiliar context of fighting as a foreign counterinsurgent.

In Vietnam, for example, this path dependency was borne-out in the development of the “McNamara Line” of sensors along the De-militarized Zone (DMZ). This line of sensors was intended to allow the tracking of movement down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and/or small-unit movement into South Vietnam through the DMZ. In addition, the rationale behind the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that went on throughout the war was premised on the belief that the technological superiority in the firepower of U.S. forces could force an end to the war. This dependence on technological dominance was only reinforced with the post-war reorganization of the military, in particular the Army.

In the Philippines, by contrast, the major innovation on Luzon, the largest of the provinces, was the development of a ‘pacification’ strategy by General J.F. Bell that was largely successful because of how it reorganized available resources, not its introduction of new technologies. As will be discussed in more depth later, Bell established an approach that

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Path dependency argues that, “the same initial state may give rise to different outcomes by different routes. [And] any good choice procedure ought to be path-independent.” The argument here is that the military’s choice procedure concerning innovation is largely not path-independent. See, Ian McLean and Alistair McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 399.

Prados, 183.
recognized the organizational structure of the insurgency and its relation to the general population. As a result, Bell sought a way to sever relations in such a way as to isolate the hard-core insurgents and in so doing also shift public opinion in favor of the American protectorate government.\textsuperscript{xx}

These two examples illustrate the difficulty of sensemaking for the counterinsurgent force. Not only must the counterinsurgent side make sense of the conflict in all its complexity, but it must devise a meaningful sense of what victory would look like. Given the complexity of insurgencies, defining the endstate and the metrics to reach it are not just a supporting part of war strategy in counterinsurgency. Rather, \textit{defining the endstate and the metrics to recognize progress toward it are the whole of counterinsurgency strategy}. The main causal factors affecting military innovation are inextricably woven into this process.

\textbf{The Way Ahead}

War is a phenomenon of the whole human experience. It cannot be isolated from the sociology of the management of violence.\textsuperscript{yy} Understanding how that sociology played out in the experience of military organizations as collectives of men and women trying to make sense of, and react to, the most extreme conditions of life, is the only way to understand military innovation for what it is. Military innovation is a survival response, a reaction to the unexpected.


Military innovation, especially in counterinsurgency, is about the framing of questions of measurement in the proper way. It is less about output than outcome, and the interpretation of the outcomes of prior wars on the collective expectations for current or future wars.

Chapter 2 reviews of the major arguments about the drivers of military innovation, and explains their basis in two major schools of international relations theory, structural-realism and constructivism. It continues with a critique of structural-realism’s ability to explain military innovation outside a conventional war context. Finally, I expand on the advances in organization theory over the last quarter century, especially on the institutional sensemaking process and its utility as an explanatory framework for understanding military innovation.

Chapter 3 examines the American experience during the Philippines Insurrection. The pre-professional nature of the U.S. military at this time offers a counter-example to later case studies. The establishment of a mostly organizationally directed innovation is explored. Finally, the first document that could be said to offer a doctrine or theory of counterinsurgency warfare is examined.

Chapter 4 looks at the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter separates early innovation attempts from those after 2006. It draws connections between the creation of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) after Vietnam and the military’s institutional learning process about counterinsurgency. Finally, it examines the record of change in the military’s doctrine as shown in the publication of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006 and its subsequent impact on the larger institutional culture of the military.

Chapter 5 is an examination of FM 3-24. Using an original survey, this chapter argues that Counterinsurgency represented a major break with the existing institutional culture of the
military that had been dominant since after Vietnam. It shows that this break with past professional norms was essential for the development of operational innovation. The alternative sensemaking framework outlined in the manual signaled an important change in the professional skill-sets valued by the military, and allowed for a shift to a population-centric operational approach.

Chapter 6 synthesizes the preceding chapters into a framework for understanding military innovation in counterinsurgency that centers on institutional culture. It argues that in each case examined, and in the example of FM 3-24, the determining factor driving military innovation was a shift in the institutional standard of what counted as professional military knowledge.
Chapter 2

Theorizing Military Innovation

This study attempts to understand the military innovation process as it occurred in the context of the U.S. experience in counterinsurgency. By asking, “How did the U.S. military innovate in counterinsurgency?” the project is addressing a question of institutional process. As this study addresses this question of institutional process wades into a number of literatures. Of these, the most directly related is the literature on military innovation. And although there is a strong tradition of writing on military innovation in general, a significant gap exists where innovation in counterinsurgency is concerned. First, most military innovation literature only looks at innovation in conventional war contexts. Almost none examines how innovation occurs from the standpoint of a militarily advanced organization engaged in counterinsurgency. Second, the literature focused on conventional war has left unexamined many assumptions of how well realist theories can account for innovation in insurgent conflict. Third, where writers on military innovation have examined alternative explanations of innovation, they have done so using only at the same cases of conventional war as have realist authors. Given the importance of military innovation as a general question in war, and the importance of insurgent war in the present and past experience of the U.S., this study fills a significant break in literature.
Theorizing Military Innovation

As discussed in Chapter 1, innovation in the private sector is invention followed by the widespread adoption (commercialization) of that invention. The successful commercialization of an invention depends on its ability to enhance a firm’s position in its industry, or to generate an entirely new market from which the firm profits. “The process of innovation cannot be separated from a firm’s strategic and competitive context,” argues M.E. Porter in *The Competitive Advantage of Nations.* Similarly, innovation in the military context cannot be separated from the state’s own understanding of its strategic and competitive context in the international system. As such, the basis for claims about the nature of the military innovation process invariably rest upon claims about the fundamental nature of the system of states.

Theories on military innovation have traditionally split along two broad conceptual divides. One side argues that innovation happens because of external factors. These factors, discussed in-depth below, revolve around Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power theory and the realist or neorealist school of thought. The key components of this line of argument rest on the idea that states and their militaries can effectively signal and read the increase or decrease of threat. As a state and its military “reads” that a potential enemy is increasing the nature of its military threat innovates to balance and counter the threat, thus maintaining the international homeostasis. Evident in this process is an assumption made the realist school: that militaries are

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structured symmetrically, such that they speak and understand a common language of threat and power. In short, innovation in the realist model emerges as a response to threats from other states in order to rebalance power among states.

The internal explanation school argues for the primacy of internal forces as the determinants of military innovation. This school adopts constructivist theories focused on institutional culture, and organization theory as it existed in the mid-20th century. Proponents of this argument hold that innovation is a product of institutional culture. An organization’s culture is reflected in its corporate structure. Norms that define what it means to excel as a professional within the organization are established by the standards of specialized knowledge that higher rank, pay, and other markers of status privilege. These markers of status are in turn reinforced by the creation of organizational units that privilege methodologies based on the specialized knowledge defining the profession. These ways of measuring and analyzing the competitive environment of the external world set the framework for how threat signals are understood by the military in question.

Decisions affecting the direction of military innovation are inextricably linked to the state’s larger understanding of its place in the international system. But that understanding is part of a system of feedback loops where present institutional frameworks shape how past experiences are interpreted and extrapolated onto present and future threat scenarios. In short, threat perception is learned. Understanding why the processes of innovation emerges as it does means confronting the inherent problem of how states and their military organizations come to model their learning about the international system. As W. Brian Arthur noted,

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as I read into the literature I realized that where learning took place, beliefs could become self-reinforcing [and]. . . . I began to see a strong connection between learning problems and increasing returns.\textsuperscript{ccc}

The idea of “self-reinforcing” beliefs in organizations is what political science calls “path dependence”, and what economics calls “increasing returns”.\textsuperscript{ddd} Both terms refer to the idea of a feedback loop, where the organization’s internalized model of learning determines the how and what type of information it provides itself about its position in the international system. Further, the idea of “historical institutionalism” in political science (see below) contains essentially the same idea. In short, the internal approach whether articulated through the language of self-reinforcing beliefs, path dependence, internal returns, or historical institutionalism recognizes what Bennett and George see as the same essential point: organizational problems are subject to a multitude of causal variables that interact to produce a phenomenon like innovation.\textsuperscript{eee}

Within both camps another debate arises about who drives military innovation. The external approach assumes that the bureaucratic locus of innovation rests with civilian national security elites.\textsuperscript{fff} As Deborah Avant and James Lebovic note, this approach frames the question


as one where civilians act as principals and the military as agent. In this model civilian preferences drive military innovation. But in order to predict the direction of that innovation, civilian preferences (and the sources affecting those preferences) must be known. This again, however, brings up Bennett and George’s contention that questions of this type have multi-causal answers.

In both schools of the thought the question of innovation can be constructed one of two ways: either as a question of what organizational incentive structures and category of people drive the process, or what and who obstruct it. For the internal school the question of who drives innovation tends to become a question of who (as a group) inside the military subverts change rather than promotes it. Steven Rosen describes the two major premises of this school: that it is the professionalization (defined as the high degree of technical specialization) of the military that gives the soldier sway over the civilian (who lacks the specialized knowledge to effectively challenge his military counterpart). Second, the military’s inherent conservatism tends to slow innovation to a pace determined by, “the rate at which young officers” replace older ones. In sum, an institution’s cultural reticence to embrace change that requires a generational turn-over to produce innovation. In this case, shifts in culture produce shifts in the category of skill and knowledge essential for promotion through the organization. Rapid shifts of culture in highly professionalized organizations represent a threat to established officers. Hence, the corporate logic of the organization is to avoid rapid cultural change. Under this theory only extreme events

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are likely to produce rapid, widespread changes in institutional culture and organizational structure.

This study will not systematically consider whether innovatory change is driven by the civilian or military side, for several reasons. First, the author agrees with Bennett and George that the presence of “maverick” civilians or “reformist military leaders is a necessary condition for innovation.” Key civilian posts are often filled with such recently retired military personnel that categorizing them as one or the other is hopelessly problematic. Senior generals often employ civilian contractors who hold significant sway over decisions of technological innovation, and key civilian posts like Secretary of Defense or the President’s National Security Advisor are frequently held by retired high-ranking military personnel. Second, the study is interested in looking at military innovation in counterinsurgency: a conflict-type that has historically involved the presence of many civilians in partnership with the military, a fact that again complicates the analytical landscape. Despite this, by focusing primarily on the military, the effect of civilian influence on military innovation becomes broadly apparent against the backdrop of the dominant institutional culture of the force and the significant political aspects involved in fighting counterinsurgencies. In periods where the range of civilian expertise in military leadership is particularly weak, the independent affect of civilian professionals is high. But the affect is often delayed by the bureaucratic obstacles manifested by the military’s conventional war oriented culture.

The question of how military innovation occurred in the U.S. experience as a counterinsurgent will examine three schools of explanatory claims. The first is the relevance of

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iii Bennett and George, 163.
realist arguments to assumptions about innovation in counterinsurgency. Second are the claims of cultural institutionalist arguments to explain military innovation. And third are the claims of organization theory, particularly claims about institutional “defensive routines” that impede innovation or direct it down path dependent directions.

**Realism**

Balance of power theory is perhaps the oldest theory purporting to explain state action. Under the logic of power balancing states in the international system are assumed to exist in a context of anarchy, defined as the absence of any higher unit of political authority. As a result, each state is compelled to view itself as existing in a “self-help” world. Weaker states, lacking the power to successfully defend their integrity alone may join with other weak states to balance against stronger ones, thus assuring no one state dominates the system.\(^\text{iij}\) Some states may also engage in *bandwagoning*, wherein states join a stronger power in order to gain security through alliance. Stephen Walt argued that under most circumstances balancing behavior is the most likely act for a state, while *bandwagoning* tends to occur only in cases where groups of states are especially weak.\(^\text{kkk}\)

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\(^{iij}\) The classic work is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). See chapters 1, 4, and 6 specifically.

Walt argued that balance of threat theory “subsumed” balance of power theory because it had better explanatory power.iii Though the difference between threat and power balancing might seem subtle, it was significant because of how power was measured versus threat. Power, though in Walt’s mind still subjective, was seen as an objectively measurable quantity among similar states. Military equipment, natural resources, and population could in theory be calculated to produce a kind of index of power. Waltz and his students assumed this calculation of an index of power was generalizable across the system of states. In the context of international anarchy, power was defined by the components of force. And most or all states (having been founded through force mmm) calculated and balanced themselves accordingly.nnn

To Walt, the difference between balancing based on power versus threat was also significant because unlike power-based balancing, a system of states balanced against threats was a system where the interpretation of threat by each state was subjective. Walt argued that at the level of weak states there was a kind of universal logic driving state behavior, but there was a significant measure of difference in how threat was viewed by superpowers and weaker states.ooo

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iii Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*. 21-26, 263-65. The chief critique leveled against Waltz’s formulation of balance of threat was that it could not accurately account for the bi-polar structure of the international system under the Cold War. For Walt, the system’s bi-polarity was evidence that state’s balanced threat, not power. For Walt’s discussion of balance threat subsuming balance of power see 264.


ooo Walt, 161-63. Walt argued that weak states did not often shift alliances even in the case of major superpower readjustment of power because 1.) they were too weak to shift power at the global level and would be influenced by classic collective action problems, 2.) neither major power presented a threat greater than nearer regional powers, so weak-state behavior would already be shaped by regional and not global power dynamics, and 3.) because each superpower was expected to oppose expansion by the other weak-states had little to fear in terms of encroachment on their spheres of influence – because the other superpower would block any major alteration in alliances.
Thus the logic of threat balancing introduced a level of critical analysis into the question of state behavior that Waltz’s original formulation did not.

Literature specific to the question of innovation in military organizations was arguably propelled first by Barry Posen’s pathbreaking work *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Posen defined doctrine as a conceptual innovation in a military’s approach to warfighting. In looking at the sources of doctrine among France, Britain, and Germany in the inter-war period, Posen sought to understand how each state “cause[d] security for itself”. In looking at military doctrine, Posen sought to further explain the “priorities” state’s set concerning how they spend resources to “cause” security. These priorities included decisions about weapons systems, types of training to specialize in, and the overall structure of the military.

For example, at the most general level military doctrine set either a defensive or offensive posture for the state. This posture represented in turn a theory of war, and in turn again, the basis on which to attempt to direct military innovation. Finally, Posen saw military doctrine itself as something that could itself count as an innovation. Indeed, it does not go too far to say that the terms innovation and doctrine were frequently used interchangeably. (This is also in agreement with Rosen’s first attribute of military innovation as a change in the way a military conceptualizes war.)

To Posen two possible explanatory “perspective[s]” emerged that might point toward the sources of military doctrine. One perspective is Posen’s take on Waltzian balance of power


\[qqq\] Posen, *Sources*. See footnote 55.


\[sss\] See pages 29-33 of previous for Posen’s discussion of innovation.
“theory.” The other is what Posen calls “organization theory.” Both of these “perspectives” are structural-functional explanatory frameworks. They place the majority of the causal logic in the explication of “what makes a system a system, what holds it together and causes it to behave in characteristic ways.” Importantly, however, Posen’s understanding of systems theory comes at a time when its parent field, organizational theory, is in its relative infancy. Though the questions he asks are the right ones, his answers predate important developments that radically alter his conclusions.

Posen concludes that the balance of power perspective offers better explanations for both the aggressive behavior of Germany and the “tardy” “deterrent” tendencies of France and Britain. In line with the realist position Posen concludes that it is relatively objective knowledge among the powers concerning military strength and geography that has the greater effect on how whether each state’s military doctrine innovates in a toward a generally defensive or offensive posture. A state’s ability to innovate militarily is thus a function of its security environment, which in turn is a generally universally understood condition. Civilian attempts to innovate how the military is organized fall short because in the end the domestic political drivers determining civilian action are outweighed by the state’s security situation as seen from the realist position. Even though Posen allows that “organization” theory is only slightly less powerful than balance of power explanations there are two important arguments from Sources that illustrate the need to re-examine these perspectives outside a “big war” context.

iii Posen, Sources, 34-35
iviii Posen, Sources, 35.
iii Posen, Sources, 35.
www Posen, Sources, 228-239.
First, is Posen’s acknowledgement that,

Numerous propositions relevant to the study of military organizations are scattered through the organization theory literature. [But] regretfully, organization theory itself is a rather incoherent field. While propositions proliferate wildly, connections among them are vague. Although these propositions are by no means always clear about what causes what, and why, a number of propositions do bear on the central questions of this study.xxx

He then goes on to note that what follows is not a literature review, but a discussion three elements from the literature Posen sees as bearing on his topic. This clearly indicates the need for an updated examination of organization theory’s success in explaining the innovation process.

Second, Posen comes to the finding that most of his evidence suggests that, “when threats become sufficiently grave, soldiers themselves begin to reconsider organizationally self-serving doctrinal preferences, if those preferences do not adequately respond to the state’s immediate security problem.”yyy This is key because it points to the centrality of the context of the war and the perceived nature of the threat. But it also acknowledges that “soldiers themselves” (and presumably the military organization they comprise) hold strong, a priori preferences against doctrinal innovations until the moment of maximum danger to the state is undeniable.

xxx Posen, Sources. 42.
yyy Posen, Sources. 240. Emphasis mine.
Figure 2-1 summarizes the broad realist position and points to its basic assumptions as well as how evidence of metric use might support or falsify its utility as an explanation of innovation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Innovation</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Application to Insurgent War</th>
<th>Metrics as Falsifiable Measures of Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realist/Balance of Threat</td>
<td>Assumes universality of how threat is perceived. Ignores question of origins of metrics.</td>
<td>Ignores possibility of constructed threat perception frames.</td>
<td>Weak applicability of structuralist theory to COIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metric used shows either static universal frame, or constructed frame over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongest explanation when aim of war is political revision.</td>
<td>Insurgency/COIN are at least as explicitly revisionist in aim.</td>
<td>Operational and strategic level metrics reflect revisionist political aims. Supports Structural school.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires clear signal of threat and counter-balancing</td>
<td>Insurgent threat is not often clear at first, emerges slowly – means of counter-balancing by insurgents not what theory assumed. Theory assumed nation-state counter-balancing.</td>
<td>Use of metrics reflects search for clear signal by counterinsurgents. Supports Structural school.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational balancing would show different process at work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-1. Realist argument for military innovation.
To reiterate, the realist school argues that incentives in favor of innovation are greatest when military leaders perceive the greatest external threats. To borrow from above, this school places its emphasis on the reactions of military and civilian policy makers to the uncertainty of the inter-state system of relations – to perceived threat. The more competitively threatening the external environment is perceived as being, the more intensely focused a military establishment is on securing its own safety in the “self-help” milieu of the Waltzian international system espoused by Posen. Further, realists argue that innovation increases when the state’s political-military aim is revisionist – that is, when it seeks to find some path breaking way to use force to re-align its position in the international system. Such states will pursue adaptations or innovations that emulate its neighbors in part as a signaling system to potential enemies.

In this line of thinking, the central condition providing a propensity toward military innovation is the international system itself and the presumed universality of states to signal and read other states’ signals about their relative military power. The self-help nature of the international system creates a survival-of-the-fittest environment for states and militaries. But this offers no explanation for the type of innovation a state and its military might pursue. And this position cannot explain innovation in a foreign military interjecting itself into foreign insurgencies. The fitness pressure assumed in the realist perspective is simply not strong enough for a foreign counterinsurgent unless there is a subjective understanding of the threat that makes it appear so.

The second condition, the state’s aim in going to war (its level of revisionist goals), further increases the probability of innovation according to the realist perspective. But this again, says little about the type of military innovation. If a state is intent on using force to revise
the political and military structure of a region it can still choose to do so by either reorganizing its own forces to best match its adversary’s or by adding to its own technological capability to counter its enemy.

The problem with this line of thinking, as subsequent authors show, is that it ignores strong claims that the threat of insurgency from the point of view of a power like the U.S. is the duration of the war, not the outright victory of the “wrong” side. If insurgent warfare represents a kind of pathological breakdown of governing legitimacy, it is unclear how technical superiority on the battlefield addresses that problem. As retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria cautioned already in 2001:

[The new threat environment] has the additional disadvantage—as reflected in today’s strategic dilemma—of placing defense planners in the position of having to make difficult resource choices in the absence of the underlying rationale that a clear threat would provide. In short, the logic of threat-based planning can lead to strategic paralysis, or—worse—a defense establishment organized for the wrong kind of threat.

Fighting in the counterinsurgent role places the military fundamentally outside the realist worldview the institution is accustomed to operating in. The threat posed by an insurgency, and additionally one not on U.S. soil, cannot be easily explained by the universalizing claims of the realist school. Rather, the unconventional threat is subjective; it is determined by the institutional perspective of the defense establishment. And what is more, given the analytical and planning processes of the U.S. military, the biggest risk comes in misconstruing the threat

zzz Metz, v-vi.

entirely. In short, the problem of insurgency and counterinsurgency is problem of signaling. Threat-based planning assumes a kind of universal grammar of power and threat common to all potential adversaries that allows for accurate decoding and war-preparation based on that decoding. Further, the syntax of that grammar is embedded in the system of states and all the assumptions of conventional war, especially is basic symmetry. But insurgency and counterinsurgency expose frameworks of signaling that fall outside the assumptions of the war as it happens inside the system of states. A counterinsurgent whose military institutional culture is fixed on decoding the threat signals within the system of similar states will have a hard time even recognizing potential threat signals coming from outside that system.

Two under-examined processes may be at work in counterinsurgency that the existing realist school cannot account for. First, is the previous question of how the development of a system of signals (metrics) may drive threat assessment. Second, is the question of when a counterinsurgent war becomes existentially threatening enough through its waging that it forces military innovation. Both processes introduce an intersubjective element that undermines much of the rational-choice basis of the theory. To clarify, the one argument is that a threat must be a priori determined as significant enough to warrant innovatory changes. (If true this begs the underlying question of where the a priori metrics used to gauge the threat come from.) But even if a threat is not seen as existentially significant enough to push innovation prior to war, the nature of overseas insurgencies, at least as experienced by the U.S., have turned into significant national threats by virtue of their duration, unique combat environments, and a host of political feedback loops associated with them. The framing and re-framing of each war during conflict has arguably been the most significant aspect affecting public support for the war. In turn, the
time-pressure perceived by the nation’s security establishment to “win” the war has increased the pressure to innovate.

Figure 2-1 summarizes the core issues in question when the realist school is used to explain military innovation in counterinsurgency. First, as argued above, the realist arguments assume the basic objectivity of threat assessment. The underlying ideas of power and threat balancing also assume that any given side in a potential conflict will provide a clear signal of threat to any other side. Given the clouded universe of insurgent wars where sides and signals are far less clear, the utility of the framework is questionable.

There is also strong evidence that the metrics developed by the counterinsurgent may be intended as signaling devices from the counterinsurgent to the insurgent. For example, bombing tonnage metrics were used by the Johnson administration to gauge the intensity of its ROLLING THUNDER campaign over North Vietnam. Internally the Military Advisory Command – Vietnam (MACV) and the White House tended to assume that the bombing output metric was correlated with a kind of misery or pressure metric in the North. By increasing, decreasing or pausing bombing it was expected that Hanoi could be moved to negotiate when not at the table, or to adjust its term of negotiation when peace talks were active. In short, the bombing tonnage metric was used as a proxy for an implicit metric of input against the North. It was, in the logic of the realist school, a signaling device to convey the idea of increased or decreased threat to the North’s regime. The insurgent side, however, did not read the signal as intended, largely because the assumed correlations made by the U.S. were misperceptions of the North’s tolerance
and long-range war strategy. Hanoi did not act like a symmetrically structured enemy within the system of states. Rather, the North sought to wage war of a different sort than that being fought by the U.S. The metrics that mattered to the U.S. were not those that mattered to Hanoi. Hanoi understood this, for a long time the U.S. did not.

Realism’s strongest explanatory claims come when the goals of the warring sides are explicitly revisionist. In this sense, the political goals of either the insurgent or counterinsurgent may fit well into its schema. But in reality the realist schema does not work well when applied to insurgent war because it is predicated on a theory of innovation that is mimicry-based. Thus, if an insurgent balances a more advanced counterinsurgent through asymmetric, adoptions of simple-technology coupled with advanced organizational means, structural-realism is a poor explanatory device of the causes of innovation. Waltz explains the logic of mimicry in the realist view.

Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same the world over.

The innovatory path is one of mimicry wherein by developing similar weapons similar strategies follow, because in this model most advanced militaries derive warfighting strategy from force capability. The problem in applying the logic of mimicry to understanding military innovation

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Prados. 162. Prados emphasizes that national security advisor Walt Rostow and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, argued from the start that the bombing campaign would assist in getting Hanoi to negotiate. Prados’s emphasis is meant to show the author’s view that this belief on the part of the Johnson team represented an extremely mistaken reading of the North’s strategy.

Military Innovation, 127.
from a counterinsurgent viewpoint is that the counterinsurgent is faced with conflict conditions not taken into account by the realist school. This points to the intense power of institutional norms to drive military innovation. What it also exposes is a definition of “major contender” that seems to exclude the experience of insurgent war.

Nonetheless, if the realist logic were to hold true for military innovation by counterinsurgent forces, the expectation would be very much at odds with observations. As will be discussed in-depth later, the path of innovation adopted by the U.S. as the “country of greatest ability and ingenuity” will instead focus on creating quantum leaps in weaponry first, and organizational mimicry (or at least adjustment) only second. Realist explanations of military innovation aim to explain military innovation in conventional war but they are useful as comparative tests of how well the same arguments hold up when applied to the question of innovation in insurgent warfare.

Structural-realism’s inapplicability to counterinsurgency rests in its lack of a theory for how advanced militaries perceive insurgent threats. Without an accounting of the threat perception aspect of the foreign counterinsurgent side’s sensemaking (e.g. the development of novel metrics and interpretive frames) process, the theory is highly limited.

The weakness in this approach when applied to innovation by an advanced counterinsurgent force like the U.S. is that realist accounts confuse conditions and mechanisms of innovation. Many of the conditional variables making military innovation likely presuppose theories about the mechanism of innovation. The conditions of waging a counterinsurgency in a complex conflict environment make innovation all but assured. The question then turns away

Prados. 162.
from conditions and toward the question of the mechanism by which the counterinsurgent side engages in sensemaking. Indeed, the realist school provides a mechanism—threat perception—and a condition (the place of the state in the international system). But it muddles the relationship between the two. Rather than see the condition of the state in the international system as a product of the state’s and its military’s own institutional perception of threat, realism assumes external threat is a reflection of an objective language of military power and military balance.

**Institutional Culture**

The second major school of thought concerning innovation places the weight of explanation on an institution’s organizational culture. Institutional culturalists argue that whether the mechanism of innovation is organizational or techno-scientific depends less on the conditions of the conflict seen objectively, and more on the metrics used to frame the conflict. This is a significant break from previous studies of military innovation that have heavily discounted institutionalist or “cultural” explanations of innovation likelihood. The argument here is not about the probability of innovation occurring under given conditions, but rather which direction that innovation will take as determined by the system of metrics used for sensemaking during the conflict. As the RAND report noted in its study of general military innovation, “the framework cannot predict the likelihood of achieving innovative success independent of defining

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the particulars of what innovation entails.” Here the authors meant they needed to look at the military institution’s strategy in order to connect “objective indicators” to predicting successful innovation. Of course, in arguing for “objective indicators” the reports authors have clearly adopted a realist approach. But divining a set of objective signals is too hard under insurgent warfare conditions, so the RAND report simply folds with the escape clause that “military strategy is hard to quantify.”

The context of the Sources study was conventional war, where, at least among the active participants, the relative balance of military power could be understood as being essentially synonymous with the threat posed to the state. And, owing to similar culture backgrounds, geographic proximity, and a relative lack of language barrier, the calculation of military power/threat was read in a similar way among the participants. Further, Posen found that technological innovation among the warring parties was heavily filtered through organizational biases anyway, even if his theory of organizations was limited. In a non-conventional war context where there is a high degree of technological, cultural and linguistic dissimilarity between sides, and a large geographic distance, the explanatory power of the balance of power perspective becomes highly suspect.

Contrasting voices like Elizabeth Kier or Ian Johnston offered counter-explanations to the same question of innovation in conventional war contexts. Again, few if any theorists have sought to examine military innovation in the insurgent war environment. Kier and Johnston in

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Isaacson. Predicting Military Innovation. 53.
Isaacson. Predicting Military Innovation. 54.
Isaacson. Predicting Military Innovation. 236.
fact examine the same inter-war period, but re-assess Posen’s underlying structural-realism.

Arguing that nations and their militaries possess strategic cultures, both Kier and Johnston reject Posen’s thesis on the grounds that its basic realist assumption is deeply flawed. Kier takes up Posen’s and Jack Snyder’s case studies of WWI, but rejects the notion that the international system offers “accurate cues” to civilian or military doctrine writers. Kier also takes issue directly with Posen’s interpretation of Waltz, arguing that balance of power theory cannot be used to “explain states’ military doctrines.” Her argument is that although realists like Posen or Snyder may see a correlation between the signals of denoting the shifting balance of power between France and Germany (Germany has a weak army in the 1920s, France’s doctrine is therefore offensive; Germany has a strong army in the 1930s, France’s doctrine shifts to the defensive) the assertion is unsupported by the evidence. France, she offers, adopted a clearly defensive doctrine by 1929 – five before Hitler took power and eight before significant remilitarization in the Rhineland.

Instead Kier offers an explanation for innovation of military doctrine that recognizes how military institutions are “constrained by their own culture.” Accurate explanations, she further argues, “require an understanding of the often conflicting perspectives held by military organizations.” Such conflicting perspectives open the door to examinations of how military doctrine may be designed to capture greater shares of the state’s domestic resources or, drawing directly from organizational theory, “organizations’ perceptions of their world frame” affect

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\(^{\text{iii}}\) See note 26.

\(^{\text{kkkk}}\) Kier, in *The Culture of National Security*, 188-89. Specifically, see footnote on 189.


what they see as threats and how they respond adaptively. Significantly, the very language Kier concludes with anticipates the institutional perspective that will underlay this study.

Not all militaries share the same collection of ideas about armed force, and these beliefs shape how the organization responds to changes in the environment.

Johnston’s study of what he calls “cultural realism” in China adopts a purely constructivist stance along the lines of Alexander Wendt’s framework. Johnston maintains that realist claims rest on three faulty premises: 1.) only state behavior that is deviant of realist expectations might be explained by institutional culture (therefore realist arguments still explain standard state behavior); 2.) realist claims do not implicitly assume a sensemaking mechanism for determining the power balance among states; and 3.) that realpolitik is not, thus, epiphenomenal of a state’s or military’s institutional culture. Further, Johnston establishes a workable definition of the “strategic culture” of a state or military as,

. . . an integrated system of symbols (i.e. causal axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and

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by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. ssss

The most salient points in Johnston’s definition are his recognition that the system of symbols
works to create explicitly “causal axioms” that because of their “aura of factuality” produce
institutionally pervasive and time-durable world-frames – what he calls “strategic cultures”.

So while in a sense saying Posen’s contention is right, Kier and Johnston argue that
Posen does not go deep enough. He assumes a universal and objective metric of threat
perception among competitors that both argue is not an accurate representation of institutional
behavior. Yes, a state’s security environment determines the course of its military innovation,
but the security environment one state sees may be, and often is, vastly different between even
closely related, geographically contiguous states. Instead, internally formed causal axioms about
force, threat, and the military’s identity color mean that state’s and their military’s make much of
world they see.

Further work by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch continued the focus on conventional
warfare contexts. tttt *Military Misfortunes* focuses on what could be summarized as the structural
causes of failed innovation in military institutions. Cohen and Gooch draw a picture of failures
in attempted innovation (or failure to attempt to innovate) that treats such events as routine.
Importantly, like Bousquet, they also point to the extreme institutional proclivity of the U.S.
military to see innovation almost solely in technological terms. Pointing the development of

*ssss* Johnston, in *The Culture of National Security*. 222. Johnston builds his definition from Clifford Geertz’s

operations research as a key innovation in America’s WWII military structure, they nonetheless recognize that the, “origins of operations research lie in the physical sciences, [and] its practitioners have tended to look at material and procedural problems rather than managerial and organizational ones.” Extending on this argument they conclude that militaries should develop learning organizations not predetermined toward the solving of a limited class of problems.

Thus, explicit knowledge inside the military of how to build and sustain and a learning organization is the key to avoiding many of the misfortunes identified. Cohen and Gooch openly discuss the affects of the operations research program in the U.S. Such approaches are great when applied to the right set of problems (the technical, specifically anti-submarine warfare in their examples). But the use of such comfortably technical approaches becomes deeply problematic when the military fails to identify the right problem in the first place. Identifying the right problem becomes even more difficult outside conventional “big war” contexts, especially for the U.S. The greater complexity of counterinsurgent operations makes learning to learn all the more important. In this context effective innovation or lack thereof becomes a question of organizational learning. And organizational learning itself becomes a problem of developing the means to innovate effective ways to make sense of complex, rapidly evolving systems of conflict. As alluded to at the start of the chapter, organizational learning is also intimately linked to the problem of path dependency.

From the beginning the literature on military innovation has flirted with the implications of organizational theory. Posen picks up from the most basic domestic-resource claims, Kier and

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Unnum Cohen, Military Misfortunes. 234.
VvVv Cohen, Military Misfortunes. 59-94.
Johnston make bolder claims in line with the constructivist school of thought, and finally Cohen and Gooch bring the very specific processes of operations research into the debate. What all these discussions share is a sense that dynamics internal to military organizations play an important role in how doctrine and other innovatory practices are developed.

What they lack in common is a robust framework that might explain how any such internal process operates. For instance, although Kier suggests fights for increased access to state resources plays a role in the innovation of doctrine, she falls short of explaining the more micro-level processes that, when aggregated, produce a discernable institutional path towards a either an offensive or defensive stance. Johnston likewise makes a compelling case for the causal nature of strategic cultures. But both engage more in the excavation of an artifact than in the explanation of how institutional processes produce the culture they identify. Their work, especially their identification of the powerful internal mechanisms driving doctrinal innovation, is the jumping-off point for the next section.

**Organization Theory**

Johnston and Kier argue that some form of institutional culture, whether at the level of the state or the military, drove the innovation of doctrine in each of the cases they studied. In the broadest sense they named as ‘culture’ the source of path dependence that favored particular doctrinal stances. Path dependence has long played a role in political science explanations. Phenomena as diverse as the differences in democratic functioning in Italy (Putnam, 1993) to tax policy in Brazil, Chile and Cuba (Kimball, 2008) have all been explained through the path
dependence argument. In 1984, with the publication of “The New Institutionalism” by James March and Johan Olsen, the role of “organizational factors” began to re-emerge as a central methodological focus in political science. The institutionalist approach developed in response to the limitations of the field’s other two main methods: behavioralism and rational-choice theory. In distinction to both these approaches the new institutionalism differed first through its focus on the collective nature of choice as mediated through institutions. Second, as a result of its focus on the intermediary role of institutions, it broke with the rational-choice model’s assumption that individual preferences were stable, and instead sought to ask how those preferences were affected by various formal and informal institutional structures. Third, it abandoned the implicit idea of rationality and efficiency embedded in the behavioralist and choice models.

Instead historical institutionalists argued for a process of “path dependency” that was usually inefficient and non-rational if one assumed a set of stable preferences for decision-makers individually and institutions collectively. Finally, the new institutionalists adopted research questions devoted to large-scale, complex social phenomena like the outbreak of war, transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, or the connection between domestic and international politics. By the early twenty-first century observers had noted that the historical institutionalist school had produced an extensive body of empirical studies and become firmly established within political science as one of the three key research methods.

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Pierson, Skocpol, 2002; 718-21.
Yet even as this approach gained in use, within political science it remained largely unable to explain why it was that its models, and in particular its key explanatory framework—path dependency—seemed to fit its observations of the political world. As an approach to political science it existed in an uneasy limbo within the broader discipline. Historical institutionalism seemed to have a correct grasp of the variables and their scale, but no satisfactory explanation for why that was the case. To many, saying a large-scale event like a war or a structure like a political regime type was ‘path dependent’ was the equivalent of saying, ‘history matters’. Without a more general theory for why history mattered in all large-scale, complex phenomena, the path dependency answer was seen as a vapid way of escaping ‘real’ and/or ‘realist’ explanation. Specifically, the institutionalist school could not offer what the rational-choice or behavioralist schools claimed: predictability. At best it could offer groping explanations suggesting that the answer to these questions lie somewhere in the mediating role of institutions. As Margaret Levi explained:

Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.\textsuperscript{8555}

Hence the existing system tends toward the inertia of whatever the \textit{status quo} and \textit{status quo ante} learning system consists of. For critics of the realist and behaviorist schools the problem is the

application of a reductionist approach to the wrong problem-type. Most issues like the question of military innovation are questions that involve the issue of human contingency. The recognition that a set of decision incentives has created a path of action that is more likely to be followed than another is a sign that the real problem to be addressed is the full ecology of cognitive, cultural and organizational factors involved in determining the probable arc of action. The approach cannot be to reduce each step to a series of “independent” variables leading to a “dependent” outcome because in an ecological approach there are no independent variables. Fully accepted scientific fields like astronomy, anthropology, ecology, and meteorology, for example, take this systemic approach.

Military innovation, too, because it occurs in the context of the ecology of a conflict, to include the environment of an organization, must be understood as a systemic process. Hence, the modified historical research method of process tracing and congruence testing. There are no truly independent variables because the definition of a system is that every variable within it affects another. Thus, this is a radically different approach because it rejects the paradigmatic method of most social science fields. Rather than dissect complex phenomena like innovation or war into separable and discreet units for study, these approaches accept the basic holistic nature of the problem. Institutions (whether man-made organizations or biological ecosystems) are systems of systems (complex) that are interdependent, and whose structure of interdependency within itself and in relation to its external environment changes (adapts, evolves, innovates) in reaction to stimuli. In the natural world this process of co-evolution between populations of flora and fauna and their environment has exposed a multitude of disciplinary fields to novel,
verifiable phenomena that affect our understanding of systems. In the human world the added dimension of psychology has meant that understanding how group (organizational or institutional) perceptions form becomes the foundational question underlying the more specific question of innovation.

To summarize before moving onto to the last section of this chapter, the question of how military innovation happens has been approached in the past from an analytically deductive position. Starting from the premises of structural-realism, military innovation has largely been seen as a test of the viability of balance of power or balance of threat theories about state behavior. The balancing theories of the realist school require that military innovation be understood as a response to power or threat signals among potentially competing states. As one state “reads” the power signal from another it would be expected to react by innovating its doctrine, organization, and weapons to mimic the power of the opposing state.

But the assumption of realism, that similarly organized states have similarly organized militaries and hence can signal relative military power or threat to each other in a common language, is challenged by an alternate framework focused on the institutional culture of the military and its state system. This alternate explanatory approach has called into question realists explanations of military innovation in conventional war. Taken out of the context of conventional war, the utility of the realist framework to explain military innovation becomes weaker as the symmetry of the insurgent and counterinsurgent sides erodes the possibility of

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clear threat signaling required under the balance-of-power/threat framework. Because institutional ability to “objectively” identify and respond to threat signals is in question even under conventional war conditions, and all the more so under insurgent war contexts, military culture looms as a larger explanatory factor in answering the question of how military innovation happens in counterinsurgency.

The importance of internal organizational processes in explaining innovation from the counterinsurgent’s perspective is greater still as the asymmetry between opponents expands. In turn, the asymmetry of insurgent war, especially in the cases involving U.S. intervention, produce situations of complex adaptation among the warring sides that is the military innovation this study is interested in understanding. Finally, because the context of the conflicts in which this innovation takes place is complex in character, it reinforces institutional cultural norms as the military organization seeks orientation on how to direct decisions about innovating in doctrine, organization, weapons, etc.

**Innovation as a Complex Organizational Process**

Approaches like Kier’s or Johnston’s that emphasize the subjectivity of military organizations and cultures are especially useful for addressing the real-world questions about change and transformation that historical-institutionalism claimed were its special purview. Organization science is the study of institutions and institutional change. Military innovation is a

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aaaaa For a review of the history of this approach see, Sven Steinmo’s chapter, “What is Historical Institutionalism?” in *Approaches in the Social Sciences*, Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
process of institutional change in the rarefied context of violent conflict and international relations. But it is fundamentally a question whose type calls for the cross-application of tools from organization science. As an organizational process the question of military innovation is similar to much of the work done on private-sector innovation in organization science.

Modern organization science examines the group decision-making dynamics of institutions like the military to expose and understand the, “intricate patterns that make organizations understandable.” Contemporary organization science is the flowering of historical-institutionalism into its own disciplinary field. But where political science is generally content to acknowledge the imprint of historical institutionalist processes in explicating political phenomena, organization science seeks to understand the process of institutionalization at a higher level of fidelity.

The “deceptively simple” cycle of “variation→interaction→feedback→selection” that management theorists argue generates innovation in the private sector is the basis for the approach adopted in this study. Though this process is “an all-purpose formula for innovation,” understanding how it happens inside organizations has only recently begun to be explained with a higher level of fidelity. Posen, Cohen, Gooch, Kier, et al., have in essence identified the innovation process as “historical-
institutionalist”. What this means is that they approached their questions assuming that institutional structure shaped the innovatory behavior they were interested in.

The following chapter will explore the U.S. military’s experience in the Philippine Insurrection. The purpose of the chapter is to introduce the reader to a period of U.S. military innovation at a point where the professionalization of the military was just beginning. Importantly, this professionalism would come to be defined synonymously with technological and scientific prowess. The professional soldier became defined as either a creator of science, as with the atomic bomb or advanced aeronautics and space programs of the early Cold War, or a technician who maintained and deployed the highly specialized tools of militarized science, according to Bousquet. But in the period of the Philippine counterinsurgency, the U.S. military, and chiefly its army, were just on the cusp of this technologically driven vision of military professionalism. In the context of this pre-professional era, the sensemaking frame used to design and chart a counterinsurgency strategy was very different from later eras. Understanding this period provides a baseline from which to judge the relative effect the move to a technologically self-defined, professionalized military culture would have on later approaches to counterinsurgency.
Chapter 3

Insurgency and Innovation in the Philippines

A Pre-professional Army

The Philippine Insurrection, as it was then called, bridged two distinct eras in American military history. Though contemporary strategists expected the Philippines to play no more than a supporting role in the larger Spanish-American War, the revolutionary movement in the Pacific island chain would quickly develop into a much larger war than the original. It was during the war in the Pacific that the U.S. military would fully emerge from its long post-Civil War ‘hibernation’. Officers that had begun their careers in the Civil War and had spent decades as Captains, would finally rise to General Officer rank. The long experience of these men as frontier military-statesmen in the American West would serve them well as they confronted the complex political side of the Insurrection. Education and practice in civilian professions like public administration, engineering and law would turn out to be the essential skills that turned battlefield success into political victory. The top field officers in the Philippines would quickly develop a style of politically astute warfare that the U.S. military would not again be able to execute effectively for another century.

In the long term, the more important event was not the success of the U.S. in the Philippines, but the writing down of the theory and application of its operational approach. Tellingly, for this study, the making and losing of this rich source of institutional knowledge
about counterinsurgency is a central part of the story of American engagement in this type of warfare. The institutional culture of the military was not yet as set as it would become later in the century. Though formal military education still stressed the conventional combat of the day, the frontier experience putting down local Indian revolts and securing and governing white settlement of the West would prove of greater effect in the end. Military officers of this period lived in constant contact with the civilian population. The wives and families that traveled with many of them formed the first settlements that grew into the first towns outside the borders of military forts. Their educational backgrounds made them essential civilian professionals in their communities. They taught, governed, practiced medicine and public health and judged in those same communities. So when the conventional war in the Philippines wound down, this extraordinary cadre of officers understood the power of good governance and the limited utility of force.

Opening Shots

The capture of Manila Bay by Commodore George Dewey’s fleet on May 1, 1898 was a victory that brought with it uneasy implications. With victory came a set of choices about the American presence in the islands that President McKinley and his cabinet were ill-prepared to answer. Spanish forces had been backed into the city’s outlying limits by an insurgent force estimated at the time to be as large as 30,000. Dewey, now promoted to the rank of Admiral,

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**Footnotes:**

said he could take the city. But it would require a ground force of some 5,000 men. The President immediately ordered the commander of U.S. east coast forces, Major General Wesley Merritt, to San Francisco to organize and outfit an expeditionary force. But after meeting McKinley on May 12 Merritt would depart for his new command no more clear about the President’s intended policy than before.

Dewey’s action at Manila had been part of the first deliberate war plan developed by the United States in anticipation of a conflict. Developed based on a paper written at the newly created Naval War College, the plan for “War with Spain, 1896” was largely the product of Lieutenant William Warren Kimball. Although several ad hoc planning boards would offer variations and extensions on Kimball’s original paper, by 1897 the adopted plan retained enough of the key aspects of Kimball’s original paper that it became known by his name. The Kimball Plan centered around a naval blockade of Cuba, but included the dispatch of the Asiatic Squadron to take Manila Bay and the Spanish fleet “so that the release of our hold on them” could be used a bartering chip to force a peace settlement after Cuba was liberated. Dewey had been sent in accordance with that idea. But after destroying the Spanish fleet, holding Manila as ransom against Cuba became only one of three strategic options. Merritt, assuming his mission might extend beyond taking and holding the city itself, prepared 8,500 men, under the lead of his subordinate Major-General Elwell S. Otis, to go to the Philippines instead of the lower number Dewey claimed would be sufficient.

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**jjjj** Trask, *The War with Spain*. 75.
Yet what that mission would be was still in question as the first transports arrived in Manila at the end of June 1898. Though the original war plan had not envisioned using major ground forces in either Cuba or the Philippines. Despite the original assumption, the U.S. was now committing thousands of troops to a theater of operation nearly 7,000 miles away from the mainland – for the first time in its history. In deciding what to do with those troops, McKinley and his commanders in turn, had three options.

The first was the option assumed in the Kimball plan. After defeating Spanish naval power in the archipelago a limited number of ground forces could be used to take and hold Manila city and its harbor captive. The concept behind this limited option was to use the attack on Manila as a way to hold Spanish naval power in the Pacific from joining the Caribbean theater. As discussed above, it was also believed that Manila would be enough of an economic prize that it would push Spain to the peace table quickly.

The second option open to the U.S. was to keep Manila and the main island of Luzon, but leave the rest of the Philippines alone. But two actors, the leader of the insurgency, Emilio Aguinaldo, and Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany eventually pushed the McKinley administration away from this option. Aguinaldo, whose forces had been fighting the Spanish since 1896, had already successfully put a choke-hold on Manila and controlled most of Luzon when Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet. Aguinaldo wanted independence and was at first expectant of support

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llll Kimball had assumed that in Cuba the insurgent fighters would bear the bulk of the fighting protected and supported by U.S. naval operations.
mmmmm The question of U.S. imperialism or “commercialism” as Democrats labeled it, was at the core of the national debate over the fate of the Philippines. McKinley’s administration would in the end defend American colonialism as a pragmatic economic expansion of U.S. overseas markets as well as a civilizing mission. For an example see, *New York Times*, “Campaign in Ohio Opens,” September 9, 1900. 1.
for his movement since it was the U.S. who had brought him back to the islands from exile in China. But as the U.S. wavered, Aguinaldo became unsure of American intent regarding the disposition of the islands’ political future. In addition, Germany’s expansion into the Far East under a policy of Weltpolitik meant that if the Americans left the Philippines under a weak indigenous government they were likely to become prey to a German squadron patrolling in the area.

Finally, the third option was a full annexation of the archipelago by the United States. Besides the reasons discussed above, McKinley was finally persuaded toward a policy of annexation by his own sense of divine mission,

There was nothing left to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.

Confirmed in this by both Dewey who declared that the “natives” were unable to govern themselves and foreign “experts” from Britain who predicted that the islands “would not one

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Literally, “world policy”. Strategy of statecraft adopted by Germany in the late 1800s. Weltpolitik replaced the idea of Realpolitik “political realism”. The latter emphasized that policy should be made based on qualitative assessments of actual power among states. The former emphasized an ideological approach to policy that sought to use policy to force systemic change in furtherance of the state’s ideological or normative vision. In essence Realpolitik was reactive to conditions of power, whereas Weltpolitik sought to be proactive in the creation of ideal conditions. See Hojo Holborn, *History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

Grenville, 27. For an example of contemporary thinking on the question of Germany’s intentions, see Senator Marcus A. Hanna’s (R-Ohio) remark, “if we . . . turned the islands over to the natives . . . Why, Germany would take them in a month! Spain is selling all her other islands to Germany as it is,” in Thomas Beer, *Hanna* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1929). 213.

year” remain stable under indigenous government. But this decision was still to come when official hostilities ended between the U.S. and Spain in August 1898. Over the course of the fall U.S. and insurgent troops would anxiously face each other across the trench lines only meters apart. McKinley’s first orders would be to set up a military government for Manila. As to settlement with Spain, McKinley at first asked only for the transfer of Luzon, but finally, in late October, for the whole of the islands. The final peace treaty with Spain, with its transfer of full governance rights to the U.S., passed the Senate 57-27 in February 1899. Two days before the treaty was ratified the first shots were fired between Aquinaldo’s troops and Merritt’s expeditionary force. America’s first overseas counterinsurgency war had begun.

The Stakes in 1898

Heading into the fall of 1898 U.S. leaders held a range of opinions about the situation in the Philippines. On the one hand military officials in Manila, including Gen. Merritt, warned president McKinley that though Aguinaldo’s forces were “anxious to be friendly,” they were also not to be underestimated as a military force. Merritt, replaced by Major-General Elwell S. Otis so that he could represent the U.S. at the peace talks in Paris, seemed to change his assessment. In his report to Congress, Merritt submitted that there were fissures in Aguinaldo’s movement that meant it was likely to disintegrate, and that hard-line elements in the movement did not have the support of much of the population. He concluded that though there was “not a

Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 23-24
McDougall, 113.
Merritt to AG, Aug., 27, 1898, Correspondence II, 765.
particle of doubt” that Aguinaldo would resist any attempt at reconstituting a colonial
government, the rebel leader himself nonetheless knew better than anyone that what was best
(and what Aguinaldo really desired) was a Filipino republic “with an American
protectorate.” Of course, though Merritt, Otis, and other key military men like Brigadier-
General John Franklin Bell all agreed that Aguinaldo and a number of key leaders did have the
capacity for self-rule, on the whole the nation was as yet “unfit” for rule. Adding to this
were reports from prominent businessmen who assured the American consul in Hong Kong (and
through him president McKinley) that the insurgents were “fighting for annexation to the United
States first, and for independence secondly.” This sentiment was only bolstered by other
reports claiming that 4,000 Viscayan soldiers “representing southern [Filipino] business
interests” as well as several insurgent leaders arrived at the U.S. consulate in Manila to pledge
loyalty to annexation. Consul Williams concluded his report with the august statement, “Spain
can not control; if we evacuate, anarchy rules.”

By this time McKinley had largely formed his opinion about the situation.
Internationally, he believed the islands would be contested by Germany or other European
powers if the U.S. left. In this, he was almost surely right. Of the internal situation on the
islands he believed that he was called to carry out a civilizing, Christenizing mission, and that
Aguinaldo and a majority of the population wanted American protection. Further, he believed,
in accordance with the views of his generals that the population was not yet ready for self-

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\begin{itemize}
\item[^{v\\v\\v\\v}]{Deposition of Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, August 29, 1898, \textit{A Treaty of Peace}, SD 62, 55\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 3d sess., 380.}
\item[^{w\\w\\w\\w}]{Deposition of Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt. 380.}
\item[^{x\\x\\x\\x}]{Wildman to John Bassett More, July 18, 1898, \textit{Correspondence II}, 336.}
\item[^{y\\y\\y\\y}]{Oscar F. Williams, U.S. Consul, Manila, to William R. Day, U.S.S. Baltimore, \textit{Correspondence II}. 333.}
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}
government and that, as his consul reported, anarchy would ensue should the U.S. leave the Filipinos to their own devices. But in a final recognition of uncertainty, McKinley acknowledged that the first leader of initial expedition must, “be governed by events and circumstances of which we can have no knowledge.” The man who would lead the first troops ashore later interpreted McKinley’s orders as, “do the best you can.”

The military leadership in theater recognized that Aguinaldo’s troops around Manila were determined fighters and that Aguinaldo and at least some of his officers were capable leaders. But they also thought the rebels were showing signs of leadership splits over whether to accept U.S. protection or to fight on for full independence. In this they were accurate. But the intelligence on the rebels also led the military to believe that they would face only extremely limited opposition should some rebel groups decide to go on fighting after the treaty settlement.

Already during the “First Battle of Manila” on August 13 tensions between the rebels and American troops almost led to direct confrontation. Merritt had instructed Aguinaldo to keep his troops out of the suburbs, but in the confusion of the “battle” with the Spanish troops, large numbers of rebel troops move into position anyway. The American capture of the city was widely considered to have been a “sham battle”. U.S. policy was not clear about the final purpose of putting troops on the ground, but clear enough to know that it needed to gain Manila city to keep its options open. As a result, with Aquinaldo’s troops arrayed outside the city against the Spanish, the U.S. problem was to take the city from Spain, while keeping

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aaaaaa Because Merritt was tied up in Washington with administrative responsibilities, most of the work of organizing volunteer troops in San Francisco fell to Otis, which in turn left Brigadier-General Thomas A. Anderson as the actual expeditionary commander for the first embarkation to Manila.

bbbbbb Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags. 25.

cccccc Linn, Philippine War, 25.
Aguinaldo’s troops out of the battle. Dewey had negotiated with the Spanish Governor to conduct a kind of feigned battle with just enough bloodshed to allow the Spaniards to preserve their honor. But key elements on both sides were not informed of their roles and Spanish resistance was tougher than expected. In the confusion Filipino and American troops rushed to take the same suburbs. In at least one instance a U.S. outpost, manned by the 1st Colorado, was fired on by several hundred insurgents. Fixing bayonets and preparing to assault in response, the Colorado’s Colonel managed to avoid further bloodshed by confiscating the insurgents weapons instead.

By the evening of the 13th Merritt and Dewey were sufficiently concerned to send a telegram reporting the occupation of some suburbs by the insurgents asking directly, “Is Government willing to use all means to make the natives submit to the authority of the United States?” The Government was unsure. Although McKinley and the War Department replied on August 17th that there would be no joint occupation and that the insurgents must acknowledge the sovereignty of the U.S., they did not authorize Merritt to use military force except to “preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces.” As insurgent troops more or less openly operated inside Manila city limits and its suburbs in early September, Otis telegraphed Washington to report that the majority of the population feared a return to Spanish rule, most “natives” wanted U.S. protection, and Aguinaldo and the insurgent leadership “desire peaceful relations, I think.” But a hint of doubt seemed implicit in this last remark. Yet the telegram concluded on a tone of

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Merritt and Dewey to AG, August 13, 1898, *Correspondence II*, 754.
Henry C. Corbin to Wesley Merritt, August 17, 1898, *Correspondence II*, 754.
confidence that what was needed was a clear declaration from Washington that Manila would not be returned to Spain. Such a proclamation would “greatly relieve” the situation.

Less than a week later, now signing his report as the “U.S. Military Governor in the Philippines”, Otis would report that the insurgents had captured all the remaining Spanish forts in the islands and effectively controlled the country outside Manila. As a result, Otis and Dewey had unilaterally demanded that Aguinaldo remove his troops beyond the city limits of Manila or face “forcible action.” American military leadership was “divided as to whether insurgents” would comply with the demand. On the day of the deadline for withdrawal of the insurgent forces, Otis would cable that the situation was satisfactory, with only a small group of insurgents refusing to withdraw, but with Aguinaldo promising to convince them shortly.

And so it drag on throughout the fall and early winter as the Paris negotiations commenced. The military, unsure of McKinley’s intentions maintained a strained and wary truce with the insurgents. The insurgency’s inner circle remained split about what to do, but largely followed Aguinaldo’s lead and kept an uneasy peace along the trench lines outside Manila. Finally, in late December, McKinley announced his policy of “benevolent assimilation.” To his military commander, McKinley made “benevolent assimilation” a mission to be carried out by winning the “confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines.” At the same time the military government was given the mandate to use the “strong arm of authority

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Otis to AG, September, 3 1898, *Correspondence II*, 786.
Otis to AG, September, 7 1898, *Correspondence II*, 788-89.
Otis to AG, September, 15 1898, *Correspondence II*, 790.
to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government” on the islands.iii

In drafting his proclamation McKinley had committed his military commanders to a policy of conciliation. kkkk As the second week of the new year began, Otis telegraphed Washington that war throughout the islands was a hair’s trigger away. iiiii Though concerned enough to reply personally, McKinley nevertheless held to a belief that

[the insurgents] will come to see our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can give their people good government our sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential just now. Am sure you both [Otis and Dewey] having full knowledge of situation can be trusted to accomplish purposes of this Government with least discord and friction. mmmm

But Otis, Dewey and their commanders did not share the President’s optimism that tact and kindness could overcome what they saw as rapidly deteriorating situation. “The men on both sides seem to have become weary of the tension, and all wish for a collision. It is coming, and no one can forecast the day ahead,” noted Gen. Robert Hughes who was part of the military delegation in discussions with the insurgent leadership on February, 4 1899. nnnnn Fighting would break out that same day.

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iii McKinley to Secretary of War, December 21, 1898, in Henry C. Corbin to Elwell S. Otis, December 21, 1898, Correspondence II, 858-59.
kkkk Secretary of State J.B. Moore to Secretary of War Russell Alger, September, 6 1898, Correspondence II, 788.

See also Linn, Philippine War, 31.
liii Otis to AG, January, 8 1898, Correspondence II, 872.

nnnnn McKinley to Otis and Dewey, January 8, 1899, Correspondence II, 873.

nnnn Linn, Philippine War, 36.
As America’s first counterinsurgency war began, the military was hardening in its belief that McKinley’s conciliatory approach would not be enough. In the days ahead, though, both McKinley and Otis would repeatedly hold to the hope that the “natives” – the peasant majority of the population – would be won over by the success of American good governance policy. At stake was America’s place among the world’s Great Powers, a widely-held belief in the racial and religious duty of the mission, and a pragmatic acknowledgment of the economic benefits to the U.S. Already in early January, Hughes was concerned that as many as 50,000 Filipinos had left Manila to join the insurgents. The move to war would come fitfully and it would be two years until anything like a clear prescription for the unique political-military conflict would emerge.

**Initial Operational Approach**

By February 1899 the U.S. had a force of some 800 officers commanding 20,000 men. The entire U.S Army a decade earlier had only numbered around 39,000. This was the smallest land force of any major power in the world. In 1898 the Army totaled only 27,000 regular troops until the declaration of war, when Congress increased regular Army strength to 58,000. McKinley would call for an additional 125,000 volunteers in April, and

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ppppppp Linn, *Philippine War*, 42.

another 75,000 after Dewey’s victory in Manila. Most of those who would fight in the Philippines, however, were “were inexperienced and untrained recruits,” raised from state militia.

The regular army was well experienced with counterinsurgency, having fought engagements across Mexico and the American southwest for most of the 18th century. Drawing especially in the latter-half of the century on Lincoln’s General Orders 100, the Army had established a mix of conciliatory and repressive approaches to combating insurgents. In essence, the American Army had grafted “European style discipline, organization, and firepower,” onto small units experienced in the tactics of “Indian-style” warfare. But the majority of regular army troops had been sent to Cuba.

Merritt was deeply concerned about operating so far away from the mainland. On May 13, 1898, as he was leaving to set up the deployment center in San Francisco he telegraphed McKinley with a long letter arguing for the use of Volunteers in the Cuban and Puerto Rican theaters where they could be trained in nearby Florida. The Philippine expedition, he urged, needed Regular troops because it had only itself to depend on and would not have time or provisions to adequately train large numbers of Volunteers. But in late June, Merritt was informed by his direct superior, MG Nelson A. Miles, that he would be getting a force mix of

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Merritt to McKinley, May 13, 1898, Correspondence II, 643.
four Volunteer units to every one Regular. The now re-christened the VIII Corps would be some 75 percent Volunteer.

The force mix Merritt and later Otis would inherit meant that the Regular Army’s experience in Indian warfare would not be easily passed on to the untested militia forces. Although a body of informal organizational knowledge existed, it was passed down through the traditions of the Regular Army. Eighth Corps would end up rediscovering these lessons through hard-won lessons across the rugged landscapes of the islands.

In any case, the general confusion of McKinley and his aides concerning the nature of the mission they assigned Merritt and subsequent commanders would hamper campaign planning from the beginning. Before departing San Francisco for Manila Merritt had once more cabled McKinley for a clear statement of mission, asking if the mission was to “subdue and hold all Spanish territory in the islands, or merely to seize and hold the capital.” But McKinley’s repeated “failure to define political objectives created complex difficulties for the generals in command in Manila.”

The Spanish had responded to the insurgents by dispersing their forces to outlying strongholds. This allowed Aguinaldo to concentrate his forces and besiege Manila. With the Spanish gone, the Americans now faced essentially the same question. After beating the Spanish in the “First Battle of Manilla” Merritt departed for Paris and the peace talks. In his stead he left Otis, who found himself free of the Spanish but still enveloped by the insurgents. Throughout the fall of 1898 Otis concentrated on establishing a functioning government in Manila. High on

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Coats, Gathering at the Golden Gate. 11
Merritt to McKinley, May 15, 1898, Correspondence II, 644-45.
his list was battling the public health problems, especially providing clean water and trash removal, that were a scourge to Manila citizens and the cause of increasing casualties among his troops. After a month and a half of siege the city’s population had exploded to seven-times its norm and insurgent forces had cut the main water supply.

When, on the evening of February 4, 1899, Private William Grayson, D Company, 1st Nebraska, opened fire on small Filipino patrol, no one in Otis’s command expected a long war. Rather, Otis and his subordinates maintained the theory (buttressed by isolated requests for American protection) that the insurgents were mainly comprised of the local majority ethnic group, the Tagalogs. As a result, Otis maintained a cautious approach that bolstered his position around Manila and continued his benevolent governance policies in the hopes of winning over the rest of the population to American control. Militarily, Otis’s subordinate, Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur (father to Douglas MacArthur) routed Aguinaldo’s forces outside the city and regained control over the water supply.

Otis’s command believed that they could quickly end the war by defeating the insurgent army, which was arrayed mostly north of Manila now; capturing Aguinaldo directly; or taking the revolutionary capital city of Malolos, 25 miles northeast of Manila. Most likely any one of these three options would suffice. Otis’s greatest concern was not strategy, but holding onto enough forces to enact it. At the time of Private Grayson’s opening shot VIII Corps rounded out to some 5,000 Regulars and 15,000 Volunteers. But all of the Volunteer troops were eligible for release after the ratification of the peace treaty on February 14. Though Otis managed to convince a sizable force to re-enlist, and while there were new Volunteers steaming from the

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Otis to AG, March 16, 1899, *Correspondence II*, 935. Also, Gates, *Schoolbooks*, 80.
states, his strategy was clearly made more cautious by the need to take into account troop loss and new troop training time.

Otis committed himself to a conventional approach aimed at defeating Aguinaldo’s force. Because he lacked enough troops to operate throughout the islands, and because of his belief in the local, Tagalog, character of the insurgency, he focused the majority of his efforts on Luzon. Generally speaking, Otis was able to move and fight effectively throughout Luzon, repeatedly winning battles and taking towns. But the revolutionary troops continued to hold more territory and a greater share of the population than did Otis. Aguinaldo’s government had foreign recognition from the revolutionary government in China and Japan, and was convinced it was a matter of time before support would be forthcoming. In addition, Aguinaldo was betting on the 1900 presidential election in the U.S. The revolutionary government urged Filipinos to continue resistance until William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, was elected and even went so far as to print a pamphlet proclaiming “the triumph of Bryan is a triumph of the cause of the Filipinos.”

The April after fighting broke out, Aguinaldo nonetheless asked Otis for truce. The revolutionaries were hoping to gain time to convince the Japanese to send arms and ammunitions and to re-organize. Otis, seeing the offer for what it was declined and insisted on unconditional surrender, but with full amnesty given to the insurgents. Unfortunately for Otis, he did not recognize that his own forces could also have used the truce to their own

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Untitled document, November 14, 1899, PIR 1159, quoted in Gates, 100.

In the end only a few officers arrived, mostly in the following year. Although the Japanese did authorize two shipments of arms, the first sank in a typhoon and the second turned back because of the U.S. naval blockade.

advantage. By rejecting Aguinaldo’s offer he committed the U.S. to an expanded conventional campaign to hunt down and destroy the insurgent force.

But Otis did not have a force sufficient to accomplish the task. By August of 1899 he recognized the problem:

Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country. A column of 3,000 men could march through and successfully contend with any force which the insurgents could place in its route, but they would be close in behind it and again prey upon the inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops.

Though his forces could effectively “win” battles, they were proving ineffective at the larger mission of establishing the writ of McKinley’s benevolent assimilation.

In Washington McKinley’s administration was split on the question of the war. The problem was to balance the goal of benevolent governance with the reality of a shooting war. Before hostilities had started McKinley had established a civilian commission under the leadership of Cornell University president, Jacob G. Schurman. The administration wanted a quick end to the war before the election heated up in the fall. But when the Schurman Commission arrived in Manila in the summer of 1899 Otis was too deeply committed to his conventional strategy to shift emphasis towards Schurman’s recommendation to negotiate

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*War Department, 1900, HD 2, 56th Congress, 1st. sess., V, 162. Quoted in Gates, 102.*
conditional surrender with the insurgents. Otis went so far was to call such an approach, “fatal.”

Innovations in the Operational Approach

Otis continued to press a conventional campaign against the insurgents until his departure from the Philippines in May, 1900. But after a major defeat in November 1899 Aguinaldo had already recognized the need to shift to guerrilla operations. This shift, however, had been urged on him for months by other insurgent leaders who understood that they were likely to lose in conventional set-piece battles. That winter Aguinaldo ordered the re-organization of his Army of Liberation into smaller, more mobile units. In the following six-months after Aguinaldo ordered the shift to guerrilla operations American casualties shot up some 40%. Otis’s replacement, Arthur MacArthur, however, sustained the same strategy until December 1900 when he finally shifted approaches and issued orders to conduct a counterinsurgent campaign.

MacArthur’s change of policy reflected in part the resurgence of violence inflicted by the insurgents earlier that fall. Hoping to get Bryan elected in the November presidential contest Aguinaldo had moved on the offensive. In September his troops mounted two politically successful ambushes on U.S. patrols. Although only the first was an unambiguous military win for Aguinaldo, together the uptick in violence they represented shocked the U.S. public and re-

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energized the controversy over the war. MacArthur had predicted a surge in attacks prior to the election, but his prescience did little to satisfy critics both in and out of his command. Officers argued that MacArthur’s approach of simultaneously pursuing civil-governance building and fighting was impossible. “General killing” was needed first. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young would sum up the criticism of the benevolent assimilation policy when he argued that the mistake was assuming the Filipinos were civilized in the first place. What was needed before assimilation were the, “remedial measures that proved successful with the Apaches.”

Young, who would later become famous for the cruelty with which he applied such measures, showed just how much the experience of the “Indian” campaigns were to eventually affect the policy decisions in the Philippines. The other major factor that would shape the war’s biggest operational innovations was General Orders 100. General Orders 100, issued in 1863 by President Lincoln, established the rules of war for Union troops operating in southern territory. Its intent was to establish the guidelines for the use of violence in the midst of the civilian population Lincoln knew it would be necessary to bring back into the fold after the war. G.O. 100 stipulated the standards of conduct expected of Union soldiers in the field, but it also laid out the provisions for civil administration of non-combatants by the Army. In the decades following its implementation G.O. 100 had emerged as most comprehensive code of land warfare in the world. Among its central tenets was the expectation of a reciprocal relationship between the population and the Army. A population that respected the Army’s authority would be treated

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Linn, *Philippine War*, 210-211.
Linn, *Philippine War*, 210-211.
Linn, *Philippine War*, 210-211.
Linn, *Philippine War*, 211.
well, but a population that supported the enemy, directly or indirectly, faced the threat of property destruction, forced re-location, imprisonment as hostages, or execution if caught in certain defined acts.

It was the interpretation of what was meant by a reciprocal relationship between the Army and population that constituted the biggest operational innovations of the war. In retrospect McKinley’s idea of benevolent assimilation seems to draw implicitly on the expectation that good governance by the military would elicit good citizenship from the population. Otis’s belief in the power of school, road, and water projects to win over the population was similar. His use of the Army reflected this conviction. And the composition of the officer corps in turn encouraged the progressive idea underneath this approach. As one foreign observer noted during Otis’s command:

Perhaps no military force is better situated for meeting such a demand than is an army composed of the material which fills the ranks of the American Expeditionary Force. . . .men drawn from every rank of society, lawyers, merchants, postal clerks, tradesmen, office hands of all descriptions, university men; and, indeed, it be would be difficult to say what trade or calling is not represented.

Prior to MacArthur’s recognition of the shift in the nature of the war, individual commanders had already begun to experiment with their own approaches. The key innovations adopted were organizational and doctrinal. Technological innovations aided these shifts, but by themselves

were not sufficient to transform the nature of the U.S. approach to the war. The most significant innovation came with the imposition of General Orders 100 in December 1900. The tenets of this civil-war era order laid the foundation for the operational innovations adopted by individual commanders.

General Orders 100 had been issued by President Lincoln in 1863. It, more than anything, was the factor pushing the change in approach to the war adopted by the U.S. in December 1900. Select provisions of the Orders had been used to justify a variety of civil and military measures since the beginning of the occupation, but with MacArthur’s full-adoption of the Orders in December it became the guiding logic for the next phase of the war.

Again, the key component to the Orders was the concept of the reciprocal relationship between the military occupation and the population. In general, as in evidence from Otis’s focus on civil administration, the military used the logic to G.O. 100 to support its policy of benevolent attraction. But as the insurgency began to intensify under MacArthur’s command, G.O. 100 was increasingly used to justify harsher tactics in accordance with the same reciprocity concept used earlier. The choice between benevolent attraction and forced compliance was bedeviled by a characteristic intrinsic to the war: the difficulty in identifying an enemy.

The senior military leadership in the islands all had extensive experience in the Army during either reconstruction in the U.S. South or in the frontier campaigns protecting settlers on the American frontier. In both cases commanders learned to manage matters more civil than military:
horse stealing, moonshining, rioting, civil court proceedings, regulating commercial law, public education, fraud, removing public officials, registering voters. . . . This occupation duty absorbed somewhat more than one-third of the Army’s strength in 1867.

Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, had all served the bulk of their careers in the post-Civil War Army. In addition to grappling with the problem of using the military organization to conduct public administration, the frontier Army was faced with the problem of fighting an enemy who would, “change with bewildering rapidity from friend to foe to neutral, and rarely could one be confidently distinguished from the other.” Benevolent assimilation was intended to deal with this problem by convincing the population that it wanted to remain in the ‘friend’ category. G.O. 100 was intended to provide the enforcement mechanism by which the Army could forcefully shunt the population into one of these categories if benevolent administration failed to elicit a suitable thorough self-sorting.

Two innovations in operational approach presented themselves. The first was the original policy of benevolent assimilation and conventional war waged against insurgents that were believed to be a small sub-set of the population. This was the approach adopted by Merritt and Otis from 1898 through the spring of 1900. By summer, the increases in attacks by the

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888888 Coats, Gathering at the Golden Gate. 1-42.

insurgents and the rise in American casualties heading into the fall election period pushed MacArthur to focus his energy on trying to take the offensive. But by election day it was becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. would not succeed with this approach. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, Commander of the 1st District, Northern Luzon, would write to Theodore Roosevelt that the strategy of taking several hundred soldiers into the jungle in pursuit of insurgents, having to slash through the canopy all the way, only, “to emerge and find nothing but peasants . . . apparently innocent and knowing nothing whatever of any insurgents – is discouraging.”

By the end of 1900 MacArthur finally announced what would be the second operational innovation. Basing his approach on the concepts of G.O. 100 MacArthur declared that the leniency of earlier years would end. And, in accordance with the codes of conduct expected under the Orders, the civilian population would be treated as “war rebels, or war traitors” and punished by the Army for any support given the insurgents. Importantly, he upped the pressure on civilian leaders by adding that pleas of “intimidation” by insurgents as justification for acts against the Americans would “rarely be accepted.” This second approach, which abandoned the idea of achieving victory through conventional means, instead focused its efforts not on the insurgent army, but on the civilian population that supported it.

But this unconventional approach had two major variants. Both had the same central concept: to separate the insurgents from their support base in the population. The most infamous is the “howling wilderness” campaign led by BG Jacob H. Smith after the Balangiga “massacre” in September 1901. Balangiga and Smith’s campaign of destruction throughout the island of

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Young to Theodore Roosevelt, November 26, 1900, Young Papers, Box 12.
Samar ended in a torrent of bloodshed and eventually, a series of high-level courts martial. Smith himself had come to the Philippines with a record of insubordination, graft, and brutality. While some in command condoned Smith’s wanton destruction as an actual operational strategy, it is more accurately understood as the reaction of an enraged military and singularly poor commander.

The best example of a fully thought out operational strategy was BG James Franlin Bell’s campaign on Batangas. As Andrew Birtle argued, though both Smith and Bell pursued brutal operational strategies, “Bell’s was better organized and quickly won acclaim throughout the Army as a model counterinsurgency operation.” In contrast to Smith’s indiscriminate violence, Bell’s operational concept depended on applying violence in a way that would isolate the insurgents while still maintaining, if not support, at least acquiescence from the civilian population. What was unique about Bell was his ability to understand the political nature of the war. By fall 1901, and especially after the events on Samar, opinion among the rank and file had turned decidedly hostile to the citizenry. Many began to question Otis’s earlier policies emphasizing good governance over direct military force and in essence blamed those policies for the death of their comrades and the deteriorating situation of the war. Bell, however, took it upon himself to forcefully address the “frequently heard opinion . . . that no good has been accomplished,” by the softer policies. He continued,

Had we been building for a day only or solely in order to put an end to hostilities, a different policy might have been indicated . . .

Birtle, 134.
but we have got to continue to live among these people. We have got to govern them. Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a Government be established in time which is based upon the will of the governed. This can be accomplished satisfactorily only by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people . . . Our policy heretofore was calculated to prevent the birth of undying resentment and hatred. 

What is striking is his sense that the rising tide of anger among the troops and officer corps had to be quelled, as a matter of successfully completing the mission. Further, in doing this Bell appealed directly to the principles of the American founding, and the concept of concept of the governed.

Bell’s operational approach, then, sought to create the conditions for increasing pressure against the insurgents and their supporters. The central operational problem, however, was to identify the “irreconcilables” from the part of the population that may be swayed toward American control. To do accomplish this Bell borrowed a page from the frontier campaigns, and probably more directly, from what the British were doing in South Africa in Second Boer War. Bell set up garrisoned towns, “concentration camps”, where some 300,000 civilians were housed inside fortified enclosures manned by U.S. units of about 50 men. But Bell was careful to establish innovative provisions hardly envisioned by the British in Africa. The detail with which Bell translated his general operational concept into specific planning orders for his subordinates is a testament to his understanding of the nature of counterinsurgency.

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Among his prescriptions were that each garrison include enough room for citizens to 
graze livestock. He demanded “considerate and courteous” behavior from is men. He 
chastised poor record keeping on prisoners and demanded a careful accounting of release dates 
and narratives on the prisoner’s political activities. He recognized the importance of 
paying the poor who assisted the American’s in provisioning their camps, but also understood 
the risk that much of that money had ended up in the hands of the insurgents because of 
intimidation. To counter this he demanded his subordinates understand the central 
importance of making special efforts to protect the Americanistas not only against assassination 
or other violence but against “misrepresentation by revengeful sympathizers”. Further, he 
implemented an open door policy of amnesty for an insurgent who surrendered and turned in a 
weapon. In addition, he made it clear that this was, in effect, an information operation intended 
to “encourage others to do likewise.”

Yet while the bulk of his force would be busy carrying out his garrison program, the rest 
would be busy scouring the countryside, not so much for insurgents, as for their food supplies. 
Yet even here, Bell was supremely sensitive to the public perception aspect of his approach. 
What food was found that could be brought back to the towns was, only that which was too far 
out or in excess of what could be carried was destroyed. And in all of this, Bell expected the 
 utmost restraint from his soldiers, admonishing them that they were professionals and that anger

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bbbbbbb Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, "Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders Regulating the Campaign 
Against Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstructions after Close of War in the 
Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippines Islands. Issued 1 December, 1902.,” in A Masterpiece of 
Counterguerilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-02 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 
ccccccc Bell, Circulars. 38.
ddddddd Bell, Circulars. 40.
eeeeee Bell, Circulars. 41.
fffff Bell, Circulars. 41.
was an emotion inimical to the mission. “But whenever one becomes angered and excited,” he told his assembled commanders, “it is better to postpone action, to sleep on the matter and act next day. If absolutely essential to act more promptly let anger be controlled and action moderate but firm.”

Aside from the explicit nature of his command there remained the implicit fact that by first calling his senior officers together to outline his approach he understood the vital importance of having everyone under his command understand the concept of the operational strategy. “We have only one purpose,” he told them when they assembled in December 1901, “. . . to force the insurgents and those in active sympathy with them to want peace.”

Throughout the remainder of his campaign on Batangas Bell would maintain a level of control over his district unmatched by his peers. But it was a control predicated on making his subordinates understand the logic of the full operation and its myriad details. He did not issue blind orders. He issued explanatory statements that were often more guidelines to inform the initiative of subordinates than explicit commands. When local station commanders broke rank with his careful balance of force and respect, Bell brought them to heel by first acknowledging the difficulty of their situation. In one instance commanders accepting the surrender of insurgents left them to starve as punishment. Bell notes both that such persons are clearly classified as enemies under G.O. 100, and even notes that the Orders would seemingly justify such measures. But, after acknowledging the frustration of his commanders, he firmly explains that despite what is legal, is not necessarily moral or helpful to the mission at hand:

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Bell, *Circulars.* 41.

Bell, *Circulars.* 39.
. . . it is too difficult to discriminate between the hostile and those who really desire peace to inaugurate or permit any policy of starvation under such circumstances. Every proper effort will be made at all times to deprive those in arms in the mountains of food supplies, but in order that those who have assembled in the towns may not be reduced to want it is absolutely essential to confiscate, transport to garrisoned towns and save for future contingencies, whenever possible every particle of food supply . . . .

Bell’s insistence on finding and communicating a properly understood balance between force and a policy of enlightened government was absolute. The end of the insurgency would turn not on a contest of arms, but on understanding this balance and finding a way to translate it into an operational plan that could be acted on. In later years a former soldier in his command would remark that Bell had an “. . . uncanny ability . . . to value correctly the powers and limitations of the enemy . . . .” What is equally striking when reading through his Telegraphic Circulars is the extent to which he correctly understood the strengths and weakness of U.S. forces, as well.

**Innovation in Weapons – Combined Arms**

One of the more the notable aspects of the Philippines War was the use of combined arms. Although combined arms operations had taken place during the Civil War, most notably during the Battle of Vicksburg, they were not an integrated aspect of the war throughout its duration. Admiral Dewey never showed a great interest in the land campaign for the

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Bell, *Circulars*. 55.

Ramsey, *A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare*. 3

For a discussion of the how similar Army-Navy combined arms operations occurred in the Civil War see, Christopher Gabel, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign December 1862-July 1863* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2002).
islands. He was reported to have disliked Otis and to have contributed little to the operational strategy meetings of the military command and the civilian Commission. After paying half-a-million dollars to raise three of the Spanish ships he had sunk in Manila harbor, he turned his attentions towards building up the U.S. blue-water fleet. When Otis began outfitting a “mosquito navy” to enforce an inter-island blockade, Dewy threatened to attack them. But in June 1899 he was promoted up and out of the Philippines. His replacement, Rear Admiral John C. Watson, arrived with the Secretary of the Navy’s orders to, “cooperate with the Army,” in conjunction with the general plan of the war as laid out by Otis.

The operational plan was to use the brown-water fleet to cut off the insurgents’ means of inter-island communication that afforded them both the advantage of rapid escape, and, in cases where they controlled ports, a lucrative source of funding. In addition, as the war progressed the Army quickly found that the shallow-draft fleet provided excellent artillery coverage and quick movement for its own troops. The innovation was thus, two-fold. First, there was the development of what was essentially a “new” weapons system – the riverine gunboat. Second, the capabilities this system provided led to an important doctrinal change that relegated the deep-water naval presence to a second-class component of the American effort.

Intelligence and Analysis

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*New York Times*, "SPANISH SHIPS FOR DEWEY; Three Gunboats Sunk in Manila Battle to be Raised. COST WILL BE ABOUT $500,000 The Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and Don Juan De Austria Will Be Saved," November 18, 1898: 4.
The military started the war with a weak focus on intelligence. As Merritt and Otis pursued a campaign against what they thought was a limited resistance, they often failed to recognize that the local officials they appointed were actually sympathetic to, or outright members of, the insurgency. As one local American commander noted later, “many of their officials [were] the same as those put in by us.” It would take until March of 1900 for Lt. William T. Johnston to produce the first comprehensive intelligence study of the insurgency’s methods and structure. Its conclusions would be the driving force behind the shift in the American understanding and approach to the war.

Johnston’s “Investigation” was a detailed unveiling of the of the insurgent system of political and military control over a majority of the population. It laid out in vivid accounts the relationships between local presidentes (mayor) or other principales and the insurgency. The insurgents had a well-developed system of support and intelligence and by the time of Johnston’s report MacArthur recognized that the war had shifted into a new phase. This new phase would require a new approach, and as Johnston’s “Investigation” showed, conventional reconnaissance about enemy strength was wildly misleading. Johnston’s “Investigation” showed the fault in relying on standard measures to gauge the progress of the war. The standard measures were wrong. The U.S. was losing, and its approach would have to change if it hoped to win against such an enemy.

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*Annual Report of the War Department, 1900.* 264.
The field officer who best understood this was Bell. Early during his stint in the Philippines Bell had been the VIII Corps’ intelligence officer. During that time and his time as Provost Marshall in Manila he developed the same keen understanding of the importance of intelligence in waging this odd kind of war. When Bell was assigned command of the 3rd Separate Brigade after the Balangiga attack he recognized the difficult position he was being put in.

Given the heightened atmosphere of revenge running through the American side after the “massacre” he knew he would be faced with the ugly situation of possibly having to bring the “peace of desolation” to the Batangas region. But as discussed above, he was determined to avoid such an outcome as much as he could control. To this end he began his command by interviewing, “every prominent Filipino within my reach.” The conclusion he came to, detailed above, was that there was only one successful operational approach to his mission:

"the only way that I could possibly succeed in putting an end to insurrection within the territorial limits of the brigade would by cutting off the income and food of the insurgents, and by crowding them so persistently with operations as to wear them out"

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In short, Bell, more than any other commander in the islands, most fully integrated the conceptual and technological innovations at hand. The thoroughness of his approach, the carefulness of his consideration of the political aspects of the mission, and his use of both Navy and Army assets to pressure the insurgents won him praise in producing a “masterpiece of counter-guerilla warfare” and a “model counterinsurgency operation.”

Assessing the Sources of Innovation

In assessing the sources of innovation in Philippines three factors emerge. The first is the background of the military command itself. In particular the common experience of conducting operations during the Reconstruction period and throughout the frontier wars later in the 1800s should have shaped the senior command’s understanding of warfare. The expectation is that given such experience, the military in the Philippine’s would have quickly recognized the war as a something other than a conventional, force-on-force affair.

To a great degree commanders did come to this recognition. Otis recognized early on the importance of conducting civil affairs and using American military expertise to clean up sanitation and water problems in Manila. He also understood the need to combat administrative corruption in the ranks of the Manila civil service. But as far as the shooting war was concerned, Otis remained convinced of its conventional nature. This may have been a more or less accurate description of the war through the signing of the Peace Treaty in December 1898. But by the time he left command in the spring of 1899 there was plenty of evidence to suggest the

Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags. 263.
insurgency had shifted its approach. In fact, only a month after fighting started one of Aguinaldo’s top generals, Gen. Luna, argued forcefully for adopting a guerilla approach to the war. Aguinaldo continued to push a mostly conventional war. But many of his commanders, who often operated independently of Aguinaldo, did shift to an insurgent approach even at this stage of the conflict. MacArthur continued prosecuting the war along the same line as Otis until the fall. A formal change in policy would come only with the official enactment of G.O. 100 throughout the archipelago.

Much of the explanation for the delay in recognizing the shift from conventional to counterinsurgent war can be explained by the approach of the U.S. towards intelligence. Aguinaldo and other key insurgent leaders did attempt to prosecute a conventional war at first, so standard reconnaissance concerning enemy disposition was a warranted exercise. It was also something the military was good at. But even from day one of the capture of Manila, insurgents were actively establishing intelligence and support networks in the city. By the end of the first month after the capture of Manila, Aguinaldo had proclaimed himself head of a revolutionary government. He began issuing instructions for municipal elections in June. As American troops replaced the Spanish in their trenches, the city was already highly infiltrated. In the tense months between the take-over from Spain, the signing of the Peace Treaty, and the outbreak of hostilities in 1899, the American intelligence effort was focused on watching across the trenches. As fighting between the U.S. and the insurgents began in earnest, Otis realized he only had enough troops with the requisite skills to accomplish only part of McKinley’s ill-formed mission. Otis could win battles, and he could hold territory once taken, but he could not

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Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags. 97.
Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags. 16.
do it throughout the extent of the islands. He simply lacked the troops. Yet McKinley seemed to want both. As one historian noted, the President’s, “failure to define political objectives created complex difficulties,” for the military command in the islands.

Any explanation of the major innovations during the war through 1902 must question the effect of past experience on how the Army’s senior commanders saw the conflict. To a man, all had extensive experience in similar unconventional operations. But their appreciation that the war in the Philippines was also unconventional took years to emerge. Of course, from 1898 to the summer of 1899 both sides fought a largely conventional war. But from then on the insurgents switched to an operational approach that applied guerrilla methods, not conventional force-on-force battles. As the discussion above illustrates, American commanders were continually frustrated by the difficulties of identifying the enemy and taking the fight to him. U.S. commanders would spend a year pursuing a futile conventional fight in the field, while simultaneously pursuing a “good governance” policy of civil affairs in Manila and in whatever cities and towns they controlled.

This policy of dual efforts should not be conflated with the counterinsurgency approach adopted in at the beginning of 1901. The initial benevolent assimilation approach assumed that the bulk of the Filipino population was neutral and therefore amenable to assimilation via the attractiveness of American good governance. This operational theory was hinged on the idea that American governance policy would be overwhelmingly attractive compared to what Filipinos had experienced under Spanish rule. It was also ignorant of the deep roots the insurgency had already developed throughout the population. The war had been going on nearly

*Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 113.*
continuously in some regions since 1896, and its roots went back much farther. McKinley, Dewey, Merritt, and Otis never really grasped the complexity of the situation. Because of this, early American policy was split into two distinct approaches aimed at what were thought to be two distinct populations. There was the benevolent governance approach and the conventional military campaign aimed at a direct defeat of the revolutionary army.

The operational approach that emerged in 1901 eliminated this distinction. Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901 and several other senior leaders of the insurgency surrendered, but others like Gen. Miguel Malvar continued – evidence that the insurgency did not depend on any one figure to survive. MacArthur’s application of G.O. 100 showed that the American military command had, as a matter of policy, recognized that the war would not be won through conventional means. In turn, Bell’s development of the heart of G.O. 100 into a fully detailed operational plan for ending the insurgency clearly showed the complete shift in understanding of the war that had taken place within the American military. District commanders were coming to the realization that their enemy was not, “the ignorant Tagalo,” but the *principales* in the towns and cities who supported the insurgent fight. Units of Native Scouts were created in 1901 and as Bell’s and Johnston’s efforts show commanders had learned to establish their own intelligence networks and analytical units. After Johnston report provided a model for other commanders, Col. William Duvall, for example, set up an intelligence unit of former insurgents. Through the efforts of the former *Guardia de Honor* Duvall was soon able to “pick up insurrectos like chickens off a roost.” It was capture of a member of this group, Crispulo

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*Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency.* 43.
Patajo, and his cooperation with Lt. Johnston that led Col. Duvall to order Johnston and Patajo to undertake the “Investigation” report that would so influential in shifting the American approach. What had been an isolated approach had been developed into an integrated civil-military operation that also made use of combined arms through Watson’s brown-water navy.

The Innovatory Shift

What is clear from the first hand accounts and later historical studies is that a dramatic shift in understanding took place among the military command from 1900-01. A military institution originally prepared to conduct conventional operations relatively quickly transformed into what was essentially a wide-spread police force backed by a coast-guard navy and small unit shock troops. This was nothing short of the kind of cultural shift that allows for rapid adaptability Cohen and Gooch argue is the key element of military innovation and others, for success in military operations.

In the most general sense, the key innovation of the war was the shift from an approach that used benevolent government and conventional warfare to end the insurgency. As the insurgency gained strength or simply failed to dissipate after two years of this approach key individuals in the military chain of command argued and won the case for a change in approach. Mainly this shift was incremental, but certain events did mark larger, force-wide innovations. Figure 3-1 distills the major innovations in approach, force structure, technology (weapons), and the key personnel associated with them.

This visualization of the war exposes the link between the central operational approach and the structure of the force and/or weapons systems connected with how the force is structured. At the start of the occupation in 1898 the military’s operational approach under Merritt and later Otis was to use the forces at their disposal to pursue a benevolent government policy first in
Manila and later throughout other areas of American control. Forces were engaged mostly in administrative or civil affairs activities as the peace treaty and final American policy toward the islands were being decided upon. Externally, the navy under Dewey was structured to operate in the open seas as a deterrent to outside interference. When fighting broke out the following year the only significant innovation came with the departure of Dewey and the development of a brown-water gunboat navy. A dual-pronged approach emerged that continued the benevolent government effort and expected a quick win over the revolutionaries through conventional means. The gunboat navy was innovative in the sense that it turned a major geographical impediment to the ground troops – the broken, difficult terrain that made hauling artillery overland nearly impossible and allowed the revolutionaries to escape across waterways. The “mosquito navy” turned the intra-island rivers and shallow salt-water crossings into a means to effectively deploy America’s massive technological advantage in firepower.

But as the war continued and the fight dissolved away from the battlefield and into the political and social landscape, the advantages of a navy of floating artillery barges lost much of their value. With Johnston’s “Investigation” completed by May 1900, the stage was set for MacArthur to formally shift to what today would be called a counterinsurgency approach based on the concepts of G.O. 100 in December. By 1901 Bell had developed a detailed and well-thought-out theory of counterinsurgency. Bell’s concept emphasized the role of intelligence operations at the same time it demanded open communication among U.S. commanders and between the military and the civilian population.

The importance of good intelligence is obvious, but Bell’s insistence on publishing his commands and the concept behind them was the real innovatory turn. This aspect of his
approach helped ensure against the kinds of atrocities other U.S. troops had committed in their
anger and frustration with this different style of war. Bell specifically addressed the root of such
actions as the lack of control over emotions required of a professional soldier. His Circulars
were printed and distributed throughout his command to leave no doubt as to his orders. And
more importantly, in cases where his soldiers had to make decisions absent specific orders, the
Circulars offered his soldiers a logic of counterinsurgent war that they could use to reason
through their actions. And so as 1901 dawned, Bell’s exemplary campaign on Batangas ended
the worst of the insurgency in the islands. By May 1901 no further engagements with the
insurgents were reported in Bell’s district.

Bell’s campaign was by his own words calculated to “escalate the war to a level that the
revolutionary leaders found intolerable.” But contemporary and historical judgments
largely support the view that his approach avoided both the “racist brutality” and “squeamish
hesitation” characteristics of other campaigns. Bell himself understood that the ultimate
end would be not the destruction of the enemy but the reconciliation of the population and the
active insurgents to American rule. The record of his command shows the effectiveness of
his operational concept: from December 1, 1901 through April 30, 1902 only 349 guerillas were
ekilled or wounded. But 413 officers and 2,560 men surrendered, bringing with them 2,264
rifles. Without weapons or men the insurgency was fatally crippled. Gen. Malvar turned

Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgence, 60.


Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 5.

Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgence, 159.
himself into Bell on April 16, 1902. The war was effectively over. A proclamation of peace was officially announced on July 4, 1902. Crucially, wide-spread amnesty was granted to anyone who took part in the insurgency except for those convicted of murder, rape, arson, or robbery. Bell was a vocal proponent of the need for amnesty. By 1903 a mere 15,000 U.S. troops were left in the islands.

Conclusions

U.S. military innovation during the Philippines War had three distinct phases. The first was the period from the capture of Manila until the outbreak of hostilities with the Filipino insurgents. During this phase U.S. activity in the Philippines was framed by senior commanders and civilian political leaders by Weltpolitik. The decision to attack in the Philippines was itself an innovative way to exert pressure on Spain in the wider war. The fact that this decision came through a process of pre-war planning represented a key innovation in the American approach to warfare. Pre-war planning evolved directly out of American observation of the German general staff structure and its own system of pre-war planning. The other major innovation of this period is the policy of benevolent assimilation, or governance, applied during Otis’s tenure as commander of U.S. forces. The origins of this approach reach back in part to the collective experience of the U.S. military as a small garrison force on the American frontier. Further, the historian John Gates has pointed to the influence of the Progressive political movement and is unease with the European model of colonization as a major factor in the implementation of this

Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency, 159.
Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 263, 270.
policy. But Gates distinguishes the normal range of civil affairs activity the Army routinely conducted from the expansive social programs it instituted in Manila. He argues that “there is no evidence that tradition or past military experience” to explain these reforms. Rather, he points to the similarity in ethnic, religious, and educational levels between urban Progressives in the States and the officer corps of the Philippines. The sweeping nature of the public health, educational, and political reforms pursued by the Army in the Philippines seems to support this proposition.

The second phase of innovation in the war covers the period from the outbreak of the insurgency through Johnston’s “Investigation” report. This period saw the construction of a new naval system designed especially to operate in the environment of the Philippines. The system was both technologically and organizationally innovatory. Its technical specifications meant that combined arms operations were integrated into the overall operational plan of the U.S. at a level never before seen in American military history. But that same operational plan remained compromised by a fundamental misunderstanding of the structure of the insurgency and its shift to unconventional approaches.

The third phase extends from Johnston’s report through the end of the war. It is during this period that the most important innovation in the war occurs. The shift from a conventional approach to a counterinsurgency concept is the central military innovation of the war for the U.S. This conceptual shift causes all the consequent changes in force structure and approach. Direct engagement with the insurgents becomes a supporting rather than defining action of the military. Intelligence and policing the civilian population move to the fore. The concept of a battle

Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 54-70.
victory against the insurgents gives way to an understanding of the need to shape a political environment conducive to support long-term American rule. Military violence had its place, but as Bell’s operations showed, intelligence, the threat of force, and the use of indirect force became the main activities for troops.

While realist explanations could explain the innovations during the first phase of the war, they fail completely to explain subsequent innovation. The conventional and world-system scale of the first phase fit well the threat assessment assumptions of realist models. The fact that the U.S. faced a conflict with a country whose military system was similar to its own meant that signaling about relative strength between the U.S. and Spain, or later Germany, took place in the a mutually decodable language of Napoleonic warfare. Once Spain capitulated and Germany was determined not to be a threat to the U.S. occupation the language of threat changed.

Although Aguinaldo attempted to win by conventional means at the start of hostilities, this approach was short-lived. As early as March 1899 senior revolutionary commanders could see that they could not sustain a conventional war against the better-trained and equipped U.S. force. As the revolutionaries’ strategy shifted toward insurgent methods the American side was slow to recognize and adapt to the shift in their enemy’s method. But both the latency of the innovation and its eventual form had their roots in the same explanation. The Army’s institutional culture, despite its frontier experience, was Napoleonic. The training, structure, and values of the officer corps assumed that war would be fought in the manner described in the manuals published from the proto-staff college at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. These manuals focused on teaching “extended order” tactics for infantry and cavalry. They emphasized marching and fireline discipline. Interestingly, they proposed a loose-ordered structure of small squads
operating in a spread out manner across fire lines so as to, “minimize the targets they would present to the destructive firepower of breech-loading repeaters, Gatling guns, and improved artillery.”

Once adept at this type of fighting it would have made the thousands of volunteers assembled at San Francisco a formidable force fighting against a similarly-armed opponent. But the revolutionaries, even fighting conventionally, never presented the kind of challenge U.S. Army institutional culture assumed. Fighting as an insurgency the challenge was all the more outside formal institutional expectations.

What did appear to drive innovation for the military command in the islands was the simple fact that the metric of battles won was not producing the expected diminishment of the insurgency. As Otis noted by mid-1899, taking towns was not the problem, holding them was. With the passage of time, it became clearer and clearer that continuing to pursue the same operational approach would not work. As Gates notes, even in 1899 Aguinaldo controlled more of the population than did the Americans. The key difference was that many of the revolutionary commanders understood that the right measure of the war was the sentiment of the population. Although the U.S. military establishment understood that, too, the policy of benevolent assimilation that represented this understanding was only one-half of the Army’s approach to the war. The importance placed on this policy of attraction was confused by the senior leadership’s misreading of the broader war. U.S. leadership persisted in believing the insurgency was smaller than it was, and insisted on fighting in a conventional, Napoleonic, manner for a nearly two years.

Coats, Gathering at the Golden Gate., 103. For an extended discussion of drill see 96-108.
The revelation of the Johnston report made it clear to the U.S. leadership that its policies of attraction had allowed the insurgency near complete infiltration of the local government structure. The documentation of this allowed what had been improvised efforts at “counterinsurgency” to be formalized through MacArthur’s application of G.O. 100 throughout the islands and by the efforts of commanders like Bell. The source of Bell’s own innovatory approach seems to have been centered on his own personal experience. His Batangas operation was, in his own estimation, the result of what he had learned from his earlier time in the islands. But this begs the question of why he was able to come to so clear and understanding of the problem he faced and formulate such a detailed and effective operational approach to it.

The answer seems to lie in the uniqueness of the post-bellum experience of the Army.

Officers in this period were often able to actively serve while at the same time maintaining professional careers outside the Army. Bell himself had spent large amounts of time in Central and South America, thus gaining both linguistic and cultural knowledge of Spanish-influenced societies. Otis, who went so above and beyond standard practice in setting up a government in Manila had graduated from Harvard Law prior to joining the Army. Other notable figures in the Philippines at the time included a Colonel who simultaneously ran a private law practice, while teaching both military science and law at the University of Missouri in the years before the war. In other words, the professional affiliation of many of the leading figures in the war were private, more so, or as much as, to the profession of arms. In one

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Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare. 32-34.


sense the Army’s culture supported a bias toward thinking in conventional war terms. But at the same time, especially in comparison to later periods in the twentieth-century, the sense of professionalism was much weaker. 

As discussed above, the vast majority of enlisted men who served in the Philippines were volunteers called up from civilian careers. And for many in the officer corps service in uniform was often an *avocation* until they were called up for wartime duty. “The peaceful period of the 1880s and 1890s,” Gates notes, provided “a favorable environment for the development of contact between soldiers and civilians,” and the pursuit of civilian careers. Coupled with the presence of a weak professional culture this explains much of the relative speed and success with which the U.S. military in the Philippines innovated to the demands of this special kind of war.

Institutional culture was both the factor most responsible for the shift to the complex, indirect-style of warfare adopted in late 1900, and the reason it took until then to change policy. Nowhere in does the historical record reflect a concern about the relative power or threat posed by the insurgents. From the beginning the threat was, if anything, underestimated. And even when it was recognized that the other side was stronger than originally thought, the military was confident in its ability to win a contest of arms. What gave the senior command and their counterparts in Washington pause were the political and moral implications of having to win through brute force. Indeed, Gen. Smith’s indiscriminate campaign on Samar lead to a series of Congressional hearings and courts-martial, and so tainted everyone involved in the war that Bell’s *Circulars* were later suppressed.

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The military that emerged from the war was much more professionalized in its character than the military that began it. Indeed, Bell went on to become the first full-term serving Chief of the Army and was instrumental in establishing the professional schools at Ft. Leavenworth that became the Command and General Staff College. This was a critical juncture in the formation of the modern Army’s institutional culture. The closeting of Bell’s own *Circulars* from the war and the general public unwillingness to acknowledge the American experience there made it a “lost” war even as later generations of military leaders would suffer to re-learn its lessons. As Linn sadly notes, even at contemporary academic conferences there are a, “surprising number of academics who assume that anyone,” studying the war is, at best, an, “unreconstructed imperialist.”

This speaks not only to the path dependent culture that developed within the U.S. military and relegated the study of counterinsurgency to second-class status, but also to the larger national culture’s unease in even addressing the topic. As the next chapter explores the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the cost of this institutional blindness has meant much longer delays in successfully innovating technology and operational concepts to the counterinsurgent fight.

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*Raines, 1-43; see especially the section, “The Modernization Process.”
Linn, *The Philippine War*, xi
Chapter 4

Military Innovation in Modern Insurgencies – Afghanistan and Iraq

The Modern Military

The U.S. experiences in Iraq from 2005 to 2007 and in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2010, together represent a single period of innovation for the U.S. military. The fundamental finding of this chapter is that the military began shifting its pattern of innovation away from its traditional focus on major combat operations (MCO) and towards counterinsurgency. The driving force behind this shift in innovation came from a change in the broader institutional culture of the military. The most important aspect of the institutional culture was its professionalization as a conventional fighting force. Whereas the military’s existing culture was oriented toward maintaining a high degree of skill in fighting MCO in conventional contexts, effective counterinsurgency required developing skills in areas outside major combat operations.

The counterinsurgency skills needed in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2005 to 2010 were similar to those brought to bear by the senior military leadership fighting the Philippines War. The difference was that in the era of the Philippines War, a mostly part-time, amateur military allowed its senior officers and its enlisted men to develop professional-level skills in civilian pursuits that were put to great effect in the war. The force fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other hand, faced a “different kind of war” that its professional training (acquired in the military, not in civilian pursuits) had left it largely unprepared for. The U.S. force fighting in

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these recent wars was hampered in its ability to innovate precisely because it was a professionalized *military* force, as opposed to a force consisting of professional civilians (lawyers, public administrators, etc.) fighting as volunteers in the military.

The focus of its professional training in major combat operations simply did not match the conditions it found itself in by 2005. Modern counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, like in the Philippines, required an approach more akin to good policing and enlightened public administration. The recognition by the military that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had turned into insurgencies, and its ability to innovate in a way that reflected this recognition, was slowed because its professional culture was oriented toward major combat. Further, the military’s existing professional culture overly privileged formal doctrine. These aspects of its culture left open a loophole wherein localized and isolated instances of innovation could occur in the absence of official counterinsurgency doctrine. But it delayed a systemic shift in the conceptual and operational approach to the wars until official doctrine could be socialized throughout the force. These were barriers that the Philippine leadership of a century earlier did not face, in large part because they did not have to grapple with the cultural predispositions that attended the modern professionalized military.

This chapter attempts to answer three questions: first, how did American units innovate in Afghanistan and Iraq during the period from 2005-2010? Second, what were the key drivers of that innovation? And third, how did the culture and structure of the military affect the process of innovating across the force as a whole? Answering these questions sketches a picture of the change in institutional culture and organizational structure of the U.S. military over this period that has not been drawn as yet.
The remainder of this chapter begins with a discussion of the professionalization of the American military through its transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF). Next, the study looks at the main element of the force’s institutional culture as a profession – its highly specialized knowledge in conducting MCOs during conventional war. From there the chapter looks at two examples where the legacy of this particular aspect of institutional culture impeded widespread innovation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Next, the chapter examines localized instances of innovation in both theaters of war. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the effect of post-Vietnam professionalization on the pattern of innovation seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Evidence from both theaters supports the conclusion of the prior chapter that the military’s organizational culture at the time best explains the type of innovation and the method of its spread through the force. Professionalized, bureaucratic organizations are uniquely dependent on officially sanctioned, standardized operating procedures (SOPs). As will be argued in this chapter, the institutional culture of the modern American force is that of a highly professionalized and, thus, doctrine-dependent organization. Therefore, the lack of official doctrine did two things simultaneously. It left the institution in a state of “schizoid incoherence” allowing for “rule-breaking” or innovation with low risk of penalty (at certain levels of the organization) because there is no SOP against which to penalize violators. Thus, the

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modern U.S. experience highlights the centrality of institutional doctrine, in both its absence and presence, in shaping innovation.

Military innovation against the unfamiliar threat posed by insurgents in both countries was most directly influenced by the lack of a sanctioned doctrinal approach until the publication of FM 3-24 in 2006. In this way the most important element affecting military innovation in the modern American experience with counterinsurgency was the extreme professionalization of the force in MCO compared to the largely pre-professional army deployed to the Philippines a century prior.

The Paradox of the Professional Force

The modern U.S. military that fought in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001 had evolved significantly since the end of the Philippines War. The most significant internal development was that by the early 2000’s the military was a fully professionalized force. The force trained in 1898 in San Francisco for departure to Manila was composed of raw recruits, quickly put through rudimentary drill, and shipped out when they were only slightly more adept at the profession of arms than when they arrived. In contrast the force sent to Afghanistan and Iraq represented the most rigorously trained, best equipped, most tactically advanced military in the world, probably in history. By 2003, the year the Iraq War began, the American military had been a completely volunteer force for three decades.

The change to an all-volunteer force began in 1973. The 1973 transformation to an all-volunteer force took place for a number of reasons specific to the era. First, the existing draft-based system in place during the Vietnam War was seen as an increasingly unequal system of selection. A youth bulge meant that the number of military-age males greatly exceeded the need of the military. As a result those selected represented a very small subset of the population. Further, the unpopularity of the war and the range of exemptions allowed led to both the reality and perception of a corrupted system. Second, by making service voluntary, the country acknowledged the moral argument supporting claims to conscientious objection to service. Again, this helped answer some of the most strident anti-military sentiment that had developed during the war. Third, the military leaders pushing for change foresaw a much more potent force precisely because it would now be self-selected. As noted above, the ability to recruit their own personnel meant the military could push more rigorous training, experiment with tactics, and in effect trade size for high skill and absolute dedication to the institution and its missions.

Recall that one of the two major standards in defining professionalism is the development of a high degree of specialized knowledge. Huntington supports this in Soldier and the State when he acknowledges that the complexity of modern war requires a “high order of expertise,” which


could only be developed through self-selection and “professional education” that set standards of advancement and established the norms of accepted ‘professional’ responsibility.

Sociology further supports the central role played any profession’s body of “lore,” that is:

Professions are knowledge-based occupations. But every occupation has its lore – a body of knowledge that its members master. What distinguishes the professions is the type of knowledge they master.

In the case of the U.S., as it entered Afghanistan and Iraq the body of lore that it had mastered was the conducting of major combat operations. Huntington discusses two phases in the development of professional expertise. The first is a broad-based, liberal education. The second is the “imparting of the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession.” For the moment, it is the second type of knowledge we are interested in.

The U.S. military had in effect professionalized twice: once after the world wars, and again, more effectively after Vietnam. In both cases the second phases of professional knowledge development could be said to be broadly the same. The forces that emerged from both periods sought to maintain the highest degree of specialization they could in the conduct of major conventional war. Although after WWII there was a period of focus on fighting

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Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 12, 15, 47. See also his extended selection from Lord Biddulph Cardwell, Chapter 2, note 23.


unconventional atomic war, for instance with the attempt to develop the Pentomic Army, this was still a variation on MCO. It was only as the Vietnam War dragged on that the ground forces of the military began to seriously reorient training and professional education toward a different type of specialized knowledge.

Given the extended experience of Vietnam and the beginnings of a reorientation of the military’s professional education programs, why did the U.S. military end up with a professional culture so defined by major combat operations instead? The answer lies in the development of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC was created in response to a belief held among key Army leaders that a major contributing factor to the apparent failure of the war in Vietnam was the lack of unified training and doctrine for the force. The rate of drug use, crime and absenteeism among the general, drafted force was seen as another major contributing factor to the loss of the war. In short, the breakdown in the discipline of the force was understood as a central factor in a larger breakdown of combat effectiveness.

TRADOC was established for the purpose of correcting these issues by producing a centralized and coordinated doctrine on how to prepare and fight the nation’s next war. But the question remained as to what type of conflict TRADOC-produced doctrine would focus on. In setting up the command, Generals William Depuy and Donn Starry, the first two leaders of the command, were not only deeply concerned about the discipline of the force, but also about what they perceived as the proper orientation of force’s basic framework toward future war.

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Both have auditoriums named after at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and its Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Ft. Leavenworth is considered the center of Army doctrine development and is known as the, “intellectual center of the Army.”
Depuy and Starry believed Vietnam was an aberration. Both saw counterinsurgency conflicts like Vietnam as a distraction from the real threat facing the nation, which was the Soviet bloc in Europe.

And if major combat in Europe was the right geographic orientation for TRADOC, the deepest lessons of doctrine were to be found in the Middle East, not Southeast Asia. The model for future war that would drive Depuy and Starry, and the development of TRADOC, was the Yom Kippur War of 1973. DePuy’s early study of the war concluded:

The three major lessons in the war [Yom Kippur] are:

First, that modern weapons are vastly more lethal than any weapons we have encountered on the battlefield before. Second, in order to cope with these weapons it is essential we have a highly trained and highly skilled combined arms team of armor, infantry, artillery and air defense backed by the support required to sustain combat operations. Third, the training of the individual as well as the team will make the difference between success and failure on the battlefield. Well trained Israeli tank crews made the difference in 1973. Their performance in battle has helped us to understand the requirements of battle, the concepts of operations, if you will.


The fast pace at which Arab and Israeli forces were able to produce massive destruction focused TRADOC on preparing for a similar, but larger battle in Europe. DePuy continued, quoting an uncited internal TRADOC report:

. . . . if the rate of loss which occurred in the Arab-Israeli war during the short period of 18 to 20 days were extrapolated to the battlefields of Europe over a period of 60 to 90 days, the resulting losses would reach levels for which the United States Army is not prepared in any way.

The specter of this kind of war drove the development of the Army’s capstone doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations, in 1976. FM 100-5 stressed the development of the kind of combined arms teams DePuy and Starry saw as the heart of the Israeli model, and the key to success in Europe. Gradually, this became a codified sub-doctrine known as AirLandBattle and was expanded to the entire force through the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. With the publication of Operations Army doctrine was locked into a view of future war that directed its training toward major combat operations in Europe. Further, the lessons of the Yom Kippur War kept the larger military concerned with overcoming the problems it assumed would be the hallmark of a highly networked battlespace, which would require in response a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). This focus might be fine if it were likely that the concepts and

DePuy, "Presentation: Implications of the Middle East War”, bottom of unnumbered page 3.
The best known article on the RMA within the military itself is probably U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Proceedings, January 1998. Cebrowski and Garstka review the full-scope of the theoretical debate surrounding RMA. Further, their definitions
tools of the RMA could be effectively deployed in counterinsurgency contexts. But this was already being questioned in a 1994 study by Steven Metz from the Army’s own Strategic Studies Institute.

As it was, the central concept of integrated, multi-dimensional, fast-paced warfare at the heart of *FM 100-5* established a unique commitment to doctrine as an essential tool, because the speed and destructive potential of the kind envisioned by TRADOC’s expectation of the future meant that there was increasingly little room for deliberation, confusion about the chain of command, or debates about inter-service responsibilities. *AirLandBattle* and Goldwater-Nichols institutionalized this view and continued to solidify the MCO culture of the general force. The Vietnam experience left a deep mark on how the institution came to re-professionalize itself, in essence, in contra-distinction to the war. The specific lien toward MCO at the heart of the military’s post-Vietnam professionalization laid the foundation for an institutional culture that privileged not just major combat, but the role of doctrine in general because of the unique speed and lethality presupposed in its founding narrative.

*FM 100-5* reflected this concept of the role of doctrine in modern war:

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Depuy’s concern about what the Arab-Israel war forecasts for the Army in Europe cannot be understated. Again from Depuy’s “Presentation”: “During the very intense 18 day battle, in fact, during the first 12 days, the losses in comparison with anything we have experienced were phenomenal, enormous. Egypt and Syria lost approximately 1,500 to 2,000 tanks. That would equate to all the tanks we have in Europe. Five hundred artillery tubes were lost; almost equal the amount of artillery the American Army has in Europe,” top of unnumbered page 5. Depuy explains his focus on the need for exceptionally specialized skill training with a discourse on the changes in tank technology, “In Korea that distance had increased to 1,000 meters. Now it has increased to 3,000 meters and you can see what’s happening to the Lieutenant, the Captain, and the Sergeant in our tank units. They must worry about a lot more hills tops out there from which enemy weapons can fire at
An army’s translation of ideas into published doctrine is a relatively modern phenomena that is more important in recent times because it is more complex, more difficult and of more immediate consequence to the society that army serves. This has much to do with the rapidly intensifying technological and bureaucratic complexity of warfare that began in the late 19th century.

The official institutional response after the war was to view insurgent war as an exception (like it had “Indian Wars”), and to focus the preparation of its newly all-volunteer, professionalized force toward anything but involvement in counterinsurgent-like operations. The military establishment TRADOC influenced did not see the war it had just fought as a template for its future.

Additionally, counterinsurgency experts like Bruce Hoffman have repeatedly noted the military’s insistence on making MCO its central focus despite the accumulated evidence of U.S. combat experience to the contrary (in the Philippines, Vietnam, and now Afghanistan and Iraq). Likening the institution’s persistent obtuseness to Bill Murray’s character in the film Ground Hog Day, Hoffman says, “But, whereas Murray eventually attains enlightenment, similarly decisive epiphany has yet to occur with respect to America’s historical ambivalence towards counterinsurgency.”

The current ant-tank guided missiles, the SAGGER, the SNAPPER, and our TOW reach to 3,000 meters and are extremely effective given a hit. You can then see, the enormously more difficult problem for the battlefield commander. It’s a much more dangerous environment in which to fight. He must worry about a much greater area. A mistake on this bigger battlefield will penalize the commander by greater casualties,” middle of unnumbered page 7.


By the time of the current wars, TRADOC was even seen by some respected observers of the military as being in steep decline because of its failure to adequately address the problem of non-MCO war:

There was a time a couple of decades ago when the Army's Training and Doctrine Command was an intellectual powerhouse, leading the way in rebuilding the post-Vietnam Army. But in recent years, it hasn't been clear to me what it is doing down there on Ft. Monroe. I mean, in interviews I did for The Gamble about how the counterinsurgency manual was written, TRADOC didn't come up much -- and when it did, it was portrayed as a minor obstacle.

Further, the shift to the AVF meant a marked improvement in the ability of the military to professionalize its force around the specialized knowledge of MCO, not counterinsurgency. Self-selected entrants meant not only a better-educated force at a basic level, but a force more committed to the years of training a full-time military career would entail. By contrast, a conscript can only be expected to one tour of duty in combat – in a kind of combat [counterinsurgency] that rewards professional competence and experience. While the price to be paid for tactical misjudgments wouldn’t be as high as in World War II, it’s hard to imagine there wouldn’t be some cost measured in terms of


American casualties and itchy-fingers leading to other casualties.

This kind of individual soldier, and a small team composed of such soldiers, was exactly what DePuy and Starry understood as having made the essential “difference between success and failure on the battlefield,” in the 1973. The result was that the modern U.S. military that fought in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001 had an institutional culture defined by its mastery of MCO, not COIN. The force sent to Afghanistan and Iraq represented the most rigorously trained, best equipped, most tactically advanced military in the world - probably in history. But with the advantages of full professionalization came a highly bureaucratized culture and the problem of skilled-incompetence in non-MCO environments.

Skilled in MCO, Unprepared for COIN

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM – Planning for MCO

Military planners entered deliberations on the invasion of Iraq with only the dimmest sense that the military might face conditions other than major combat. Planners had full

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See above.


See chapter 1.

confidence in the institution’s competence in MCO and gave relatively little thought to the possibility that their skill in major combat operations might not be sufficient for victory. In a discussion during the planning exercise VICTORY SCRIMMAGE held in Germany in January 2003, COL. Thomas Torrance, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division’s Artillery Division remembers:

. . . . asking the question during our war gaming and the development of our plan, ‘Okay, we are now in Baghdad, what next?’ No real good answers came forth. I remember being at a V Corps exercise in Germany in late January and early February of 2003, I forget the gentleman’s position but I know he was a colonel who was a member of the V Corps staff, and he essentially asked the questions, ‘Who is responsible for economic development? Who is responsible for a judicial system? Who is responsible for a monetary system? Who is responsible for health care?’ I was, in my own mind, always sort of personally questioning, ‘What next? What now? Now that we are here, what now?’

After VICTORY SCRIMMAGE, LTG William S. Wallace, V Corps commander, set up an informal conference on the question of “Phase IV”, or post-MCO, operations. But this was the exception, not the norm. When training did happen it was the result of ad hoc adjustments to the regular training schedule made by individual commanders. LTC Troy Perry, operations officer for the 1st Battallion, 68th Armor Regiment, noted that despite weeks spent training at the

National Training Center (NTC) in addition to training conducted at their home base, “None of the training included stability operations.”

After the invasion General Wallace explained it simply, “We had the wrong assumptions and therefore we had the wrong plan. . . .” He added:

I believe the things that we assumed would be in place on the ground that make Phase IV operations extraordinarily easy if they are there or extraordinarily hard if they are not had most to do with Iraqi institutions and infrastructure. We made the assumption that some of those institutions and some of that infrastructure would be in place upon our arrival, regardless of the presence of the regime or not. The criticality of those assumptions was such that when the regime ceased to exist or ceased to dominate the areas in which we were operating, then all of those institutions and all of that infrastructure ceased to operate at the same time.

What is of note for this study is the role of the assumptions made by the senior planners. The Army assumed it would be operating under certain conditions, and these assumptions dictated its planning and training. These assumptions reflected the Army’s institutional culture as a major combat operations force. The authors of the Army’s official history of OIF have argued that the explanation for this failure in planning and execution of Phase IV operations resulted from a structural problem in how the planners were organized across all the government agencies involved. Wright and Reese argued that:

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it is clear that during their preparation for operations in Iraq, CENTCOM and CFLCC staff officers did not plan in an environment that allowed them to coordinate and nest their work in the larger context of a shared strategic and integrated vision of the end state of the campaign.

While it is likely true that the planning environment was not conducive to coordination, this seems like a result of the military’s institutional culture, not a root explanatory cause.

Four-star General John (Jack) Keane, former Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, assessed the failure to plan and train for counterinsurgency operations this way:

The essential problem with Phase IV was we never ever seriously considered that leaders of the regime would not surrender. If we occupied the capital and took down his military capability, essentially having physical and material control, we did not consider it a realistic option that they would continue to attack us indirectly. And shame on us for that.

GEN. Keane’s assessment would suggest that the reason senior leaders across all levels of the military failed to address the possibility of an insurgency was because of the cultural predisposition of the institution toward MCO. The culture of the military and its senior civilian leadership seem, in Kean’s words, to be conditioned to expect the enemy to react to the loss of his capital and control over his army, as would any other MCO oriented military organization. Once the structures of classic (Westphalian) political and military control were taken, in other words, whatever civil and military authority remained would cease the fight and sue for peace.


This, of course, is the assumption at the core of a realist world-view. But as Keane wryly notes, the reality of OIF I did not match the textbook assumptions of the planners.

GEN. Keane’s forthrightness about what was and was not seriously considered by the principal planners of the Iraqi invasion is echoed by COL. Kevin C.M. Benson. “We were extraordinarily focused on Phase III [MCO]. There should have been more than just one Army colonel, me, really worrying about the details of Phase IV,” said Benson.\footnote{Wright, 	extit{The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005}, 76.} In a later workshop on Phase IV planning for the war, Benson is brutally clear about the focus of planning, “. . . our focus was on who do we have to kill to be successful. . . . That was the thrust of it for us.”\footnote{Brian M. De Toy, ed., 	extit{Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign}, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009). 196. See also, the entire section from Day 2, Session 2, “Planning for Success” beginning on p. 169.}

Wright and Reese even note that this focus on MCO over stability operations extends back at least as far \textit{Operation Just Cause} and the invasion of Panama in 1989. In addition \textit{On Point II} states explicitly that:

\ldots the emphasis within the major US commands, as well as within the DOD, was on planning the first three phases of the campaign. \ldots the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) focused CENTCOM and CFLCC staffs on these plans. The CENTCOM staff spent a greater amount of time on the preparation for the staging of forces in Kuwait and initial offensive operations than it did on what might happen after the toppling of the Saddam regime.\footnote{Wright, 	extit{The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005}, 76.}
Whatever the fact of inter-agency coordination during planning, it seems clear from all the above that the driving assumption of pre-war planning reflected the larger institutional focus on MCO at the expense of alternative types of conflict. Whatever concerns were present about the possibility of an insurgency, the dominant institutional culture kept them mostly muzzled. And as will be shown in the case of Afghanistan, a similar dynamic was at play. The culture of the American military simply did not allow for meaningful consideration of the possibility of non-MCO type combat. Its doctrine was built on the assumptions of a major conventional war in Europe, and even as that threat had largely faded, the secondary impact of the post-Vietnam re-professionalization lingered. Doctrine, in and of itself, had become a constraint on the force.

What was arguably a necessary centralization of theory in the face of high-tech, high-speed, high-destruction war, proved a liability under the conditions of this “different kind of war.”

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – Mistaking the “Afghan Model”

The same institutional orientation toward MCO over counterinsurgency operations drove the initial period of innovation in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. In fact, the invasion of Afghanistan with a small force of special operators, liaising with the Northern Alliance, a group made up of mostly ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras, was at the time considered a major innovation in the use of U.S. forces.

The Northern Alliance, known locally as the Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan or simply the United Front (UIF), was a group created to counter the rise of the Taliban government. For more information on the group, its history, and its role in the war see: Peter Greste, ”Who Are the Northern Alliance?,” Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm (London: BBC, November 13, 2001). Also, Ludwig Adewec, Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press,
In the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks President Bush convened his National Security Council (NSC) to discuss options for response. Bush asked Secretary Rumsfeld for a range of military options but was told that the Pentagon could do relatively little without several months lead-time. This view represented the position of U.S. Central Command. GEN. Tommy Franks, head of CENTCOM, was a long-time conventional warrior. The military would require months to get basing rights to support the massive logistical movement Franks thought necessary to any effective attack. The President was not satisfied. At a September 12th NSC meeting Bush made clear his goal was punitive. A counterpunch was needed to return to al Qaeda the pain and destruction wrought on New York and D.C. This was not military strategy.

Franks was thinking in terms of months and in terms of the forces and logistics needed to support a full attrition-style war across Afghanistan. Rumsfeld and the President wanted thinking focused on what could be done in days, weeks at the most. The next day, George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), presented Bush a plan developed by his counterterrorism head, Cofer Black. Black presented a plan that would insert a team of combined CIA and SOF forces into Afghanistan to support a locally-led attack on the Taliban and the members of al Qaeda their regime protected. The local faction Black intended was the Northern Alliance. They had just seen their leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, assassinated by the same Taliban/al

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 Qaeda partnership that had executed the New York attacks. They were willing, able, and ready for war. With the CIA’s help with air support and operations, they were confident of victory. Outside Washington at Camp David the President was listening to GEN. Henry H. Shelton offer three tepid military options: strike al Qaeda sites with cruise missiles (this had the advantage of being quick and low-risk, if likely ineffective); strike with missiles and bombers (this would require basing rights for the staging of search and rescue teams for the bombers and would take more time), or; do all of the above, plus add special forces into the mix. The President’s terse comment to his Vice-President and Deputy Secretary of Defense was that the options presented by the Pentagon were, “unimaginative.” One could as easily say, “not innovative.”

The Camp David presentation showed the Pentagon’s basic problem with institutional innovation in the face of an unconventional enemy. But the options presented by Shelton also showed a disconnect between what the President understood was at stake in Afghanistan and what the military took be at stake. For the military, Afghanistan offered an opportunity for a full-scale mobilization of assets. But to what end was unclear. The military means did not seem to match the stature of the threat. If the CIA was correct, the threat posed by al Qaeda and their Taliban sponsors could effectively be dealt with through very limited means. In fact, the first CIA-SOF team inserted into Afghanistan consisted of 10 men. The CIA plan offered a strategy for how to wage a war in Afghanistan. It clearly stated the goals, means, and risks. And its means were undoubtedly innovative by the standards of U.S. paramilitary history. Cofer Black’s plan to leverage the CIA’s long-standing relationship with the Northern Alliance went

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counter to anything in U.S. military doctrine. But then, the CIA did not produce statements of doctrine.

The Pentagon plan, in contrast, was as Secretary of State Colin Powell worried, akin to the American “bomb and hope” “strategy” in Vietnam. Powell understood the need for a fast American response, but was wary of getting trapped into an escalation of forces situation, something he felt very likely to happen without a clearly defined military endstate. This was consistent with what had come to be called the “Powell Doctrine”, in fact. So while Powell advocated a large, deliberate build-up of forces in-line with the larger Pentagon if the military was going to get in on the action, he was at the same time critical of a Pentagon plan he felt was dangerously incomplete. To Powell, the stakes in Afghanistan were relatively small on the surface. The pressure to act quickly was not a function of military necessity, but rather domestic anxiety and political necessity.

There was likely no immediate security threat to the country in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commission Report argued forcibly that policymakers needed to understand that the threat posed by “islamist” terror organizations would “go on long after Usama bin Laden and his cohorts are killed or captured.” Fears about follow-on attacks were linked to concerns that “sleeper” agents were already inside the U.S., or else already forward-staged outside of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a redoubt for bin Laden and al Qaeda’s senior command, and it still offered a place for the training of would-be terrorists. But any proximate threat to the U.S. would likely come from groups already in the U.S., Europe or elsewhere, as the initial

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investigation into the 9/11 cell quickly established. The frantic movement to get cockpit doors in airliners bolted, put air-marshals on flights going into our out of sensitive cities, and set up security-screening at major transportation hubs all pointed toward a threat situated on domestic or friendly soil, pre-positioned by a leadership overseas. What was becoming increasingly clear was that once cut loose from their training grounds in Afghanistan, the actual attackers operated mostly autonomously.

Attacking Afghanistan was about the long-term pre-emption of future attacks by destroying al Qaeda’s command and training structure there. But a large-scale involvement in Afghanistan, entered into without an adequately thought-out exit-strategy, could quickly become its own self-fulfilling threat. As military planners quickly discovered, the list of targets to be hit in Afghanistan was small, and all but zeroed-out a month into the war.

The capture of Kabul in November 2001 by U.S. special forces designated Operational Detachement Alpha (ODA) teams, in concert with members of the Northern Alliance, was the traditional marker of victory. Almost immediately, U.S. and international representatives headed to the city to begin establishing a replacement government under Hamid Karzai. The decision to ally with the Northern Alliance tribes was also seen as a vindication of the operational theory that success could be achieved with a light on-the-ground footprint that leveraged local

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manpower and U.S. air technology. This approach was seen by many as a revolutionary operational innovation. Many regarded it as amounting to a new, "American Way of War."  

Stephen Biddle of the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, however, argued that the proponents of the initial American approach mistook the actual nature of the combat. That is, proponents confused the endstate of the *initial* phase of the war with the means of fighting. While the centrality of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and special forces to the fight was innovative in its way, the larger operation remained a classic example of a combined arms, conventional ground campaign – albeit with an exceptionally small and lethal force footprint. What was chiefly different about the initial phase, however, was the fact that supporting fire for the infantry came not from artillery, but almost exclusively from air-launched PGMs. Further, the effective spotters and controllers of this fire were the U.S. ODA teams, not members of the regular U.S. ground infantry the coalition infantry force provided by the Northern Alliance. Thus, the innovatory aspects of the campaign were not in its operational theory. Effective supporting fires and ground maneuver remained the key to victory. And victory itself was the conventional defeat of the Taliban’s ability to wage effective war. The “Afghan Model” as it came to be known, was a scaled-down version of standard, U.S. conventional war doctrine. There was little, if anything, that was conceptually new about the approach.  

What was innovatory, however, was the organizational relationship of the foreign SOFs and air force to the Alliance. In addition, the extensive role played by special operators and air platforms compared to the standard model of ground-based fires-support controlled by

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*Stephen J. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 2-4. See footnote 2 for discussion of proponents of this innovation as a new way of war.*

*See footnote 11, Chapter 1.*
conventional forces added to the innovatory nature of this phase of the war. But as Biddle makes clear, this was also not an innovative counterinsurgency campaign. At best it could be argued this was an innovation in the scale at which the U.S. thought it could fight a conventional war. But what is clear is that at this stage, the fight was a conventional one.

In 2008 even a Human Rights Watch report confirmed the “Afghan Model’s” dominance in coalition war planning, by concluding that a, “combination of light ground forces and overwhelming airpower has become the dominant doctrine of war.” The reasons for this approach rested on the hope that by doing so the face of the war could be more “Afghanized.” It also represented a response to rising U.S and ISAF casualties. But what the report and others failed to note was that the “military” reasons for adopting this operational approach were mostly inward facing.

The problem of the “Afghan Model” was that by relying on air power to such a degree it inevitably increased the prevalence of civilian casualties. In 2006 116 Afghan civilians were killed by 13 errant ISAF airstrikes, in 2007 the number tripled to 321 dead, with hundreds more injured. And by 2008, the latest year for reporting, a minimum of 119 civilians had been killed in the first half of the year alone. The harm these strikes were causing the broader mission was increasingly evident as the Karzai government dramatically stepped up its public criticism of ISAF to include calling on ISAF to stop arresting suspected Taliban members.

In September of 2008 the U.N. Secretary General reported that, “that ‘insurgent influence has

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See footnote 11, Chapter 1.


Adam Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan,” Survival (Routledge) 51, no. 1 (February-March 2009), 41.

Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan”. 42.
intensified in areas that were previously relatively calm, including in the provinces closest to Kabul.” The traditional metric of success, the fall of the enemy’s capital, which had once indicated success, now seemed an irrelevant marker to a war heading in reverse.

Other metrics seemed to correlate with this message. Even Gen. David McKieran, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan at the time of the U.N. report echoed its findings, calling the situation in the country a “downward spiral.” Yet as Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N. Special Representative to Afghanistan, noted, despite its sketchy record, there remained no convincing alternative to the “Afghan Model” being applied.

In 2001 the goal was relatively clear – defeat the Taliban militarily and drive them from political control in Kabul. What had emerged at the time of the Human Rights Watch report in 2008, was very different, complex political-military situation where the metric of military success was only weakly, if at all, correlated with overall mission success. Indeed, much of the problem facing the Obama administration and the Pentagon was to articulate a clear vision of what “victory” might look like. Without a clear idea of an acceptable political endstate, the military had little chance of devising a campaign plan that might link military success to overall political success in Afghanistan. Indeed, in many ways, this was the central question of any counterinsurgency war: how to convert conventional means of exerting violence on an enemy army to the wholly different arena of using limited violence against something less than an army, for the purpose of changing political perceptions in the general populace? It was a question that would vex military strategy for most of the decade.


In the specific case of Afghanistan, it has been argued that the institutional culture of the individual service branches has resulted in a failure to adapt to an unconventional warfare approach. As Hy Rothstein argued about the use of Special Forces, “the deep-seated influences of structure and education are so pervasive” in the services that the military command in Afghanistan failed to recognize the war’s shift from a conventional to unconventional, insurgent, nature. Rothstein cites Russell Wiegley’s key work on *The American Way of War* to argue that the American orientation toward war in the current era has remained an “attrition-model” orientation. This makes sense, he says, for a wealthy state because it minimizes risk in exchange for a high-material cost, which such a state can afford. But when the opponent adopts an insurgent strategy, “the relevance of attrition declines as the targets become less defined and more dispersed. Simply put, even the best precision guided munitions are inefficient against an insignificantly disposed and untargetable enemy.” An attrition approach, besides being inefficient, actually works against its proponent’s goals in a counterinsurgency because the collateral damage it causes actively pushes the population toward stronger opposition of the counterinsurgent side. Finally, Rothstein adds to the large body of work that criticizes the U.S. military’s focus on technology acquisition as an impediment to innovation in the context of insurgent war.

Rothstein’s basis for the argument is that organizational theory, specifically, a subset of the institutional culture argument from Chapter 2 called dependency theory, explains why the U.S. and its allies in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pursued an attrition-

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focused strategy after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. By 2002 the war in Afghanistan was taking on all the characteristics of an insurgency, but the model for its prosecution remained wedded to an inappropriate strategy. Rothstein’s case-study is an examination of how U.S Special Forces were essentially misused as “shock-troops” in support of the attrition strategy.

The military’s basic orienting framework remained centered on conventional, big war doctrine, despite its decade-long experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. The persistent hold conventional war doctrine has on the U.S. military is buttressed by the organizational incentives at its highest echelons. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are:

. . . . products of organizational cultures and the prevailing assumptions, ideas, and norms that guide actions within their services. These men come from their organization’s center and represent that center. Unconventional warfare is not a part of mainstream warfare. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs do not, and cannot, represent an unconventional warfare approach.

Even at the highest levels, the organizational culture of the military, largely because of the internal incentive structure of the personnel and budget systems, will be paralyzed into a path of “innovation” that focuses on the internal demands of the institution and not the external exigencies of the war. Classic organizational theory on the role internal reward structures play in sensemaking and the decision-making that is its result means that, “Military leaders will respond in ways that have been rewarded in the past.”

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Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future. 89.
Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future. xv.
The U.S. command in Afghanistan was able to focus internally because the standardized procedures of the American system would almost always offer a quick victory through the use of its overwhelming power, which its standardized procedures are designed to support. But the enemy chose to avoid a conventional fight. The U.S., as a result, faced a paradox:

. . . . maintain control over complex terrain using conventional tactics and accepting heavy casualties (with CNN recording daily tactical defeats), or wage counterinsurgency that requires a keen awareness and the ability to manage the external setting – unfamiliar ground for conventional forces.

The 82nd and 101st Airborne Division’s efforts in OPERATION MOUNTAIN SWEEP in August 2002, represented the military’s larger conceptual problem in Afghanistan. Put simply, the military was a well-managed but internally-focused institution that ended up “significantly less adapted to the external environment” it was fighting in, because it was hampered by its legacy MCO culture. Pressure from Secretary Rumsfeld meant commanders were pressured to produce results consistent with the metrics of an MCO – to show the number or kills or captures of high-value targets. But no one effectively raised the question of whether such a conventional strategy was the right one for the “different kind of war” everyone seemed to be talking about.

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Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future. 142.
Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future. 141.
Halting Transitional Innovation: The Counter-IED Fight

Iraq

An example of what might be called a “transitional innovation” was the military’s (again, largely the Army and Marine Corps’) response to the problem of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. In Iraq, IEDs emerged as the enemy’s weapon of choice within three months of the invasion. By June 2003 U.S. CENTCOM commander GEN. John Abizaid, declared IEDs his “No. 1 threat.” By December the percentage of fatalities caused by IEDs rose to just over half of all U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. Between July 2005 and June 2008 IEDs accounted for 50 to 80 percent of U.S. fatalities. They would only begin to drop by mid-2007, with the majority of the drop-off in deaths happening 2008.

The example of the IED problem in Iraq illustrates both the capacity for innovation at the lowest, tactical level of the military, and the larger institutional culture that hampered a quicker, more effective response to the problem. As the IED problem grew and better protection in the

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form of up- armored vehicles was not immediately fielded, innovative U.S. troops began adding improvised armor to their light Humvees. Soldiers and Marines used scrap metal, plywood, and sandbags in an attempt to add extra blast protection to their vehicles. But the Pentagon remained institutionally inert until December 2004 when a soldier in Kuwait complained in a public forum to Secretary Rumsfeld that:

Our vehicles are not armored. We’re digging pieces of rusted scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass that’s already been shot up, dropped, and busted, [and we’re] picking the best out of this scrap to put on our vehicles to take into combat.

Rumsfeld responded by saying that the lack of armor was a “problem of physics,” – meaning a larger problem raw materials and industrial capacity – and that one simply had to go to war “with the Army you have.” The seemingly cavalier dismissal of the soldier’s concern by the SecDef set off a series of Congressional inquiries and caused key defense contactors to protest that the problem was not about “physics” but about mismanagement at the Pentagon.

Six months earlier the GEN. John Abizaid had set up an Army Rapid Equipping Task Force to push up-armored vehicles into the field. But the first direct of the Task Force, COL. Bruce D. Jette quit in frustration over the lack of movement in the larger bureaucracy. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) would later chastise DOD for not making sufficient

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Hess, "Troops Ask Rumsfeld”.


Interview with Bob Simons and John Wason, House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Washington, DC (February 17, 2009).
use of its rapid acquisition authority. The Army program would eventually get merged into a Joint IED Task Force in 2005, and the Task Force would become the permanent Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006. But two years had passed in the interim. Large numbers of Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAPs) vehicles and good jammers against radio detonated IEDs began flowing into theater only in 2006. By then it was difficult to tell if the drop off in IED effectiveness was due to counter-IED efforts in particular, or the deeper shift in the conceptual approach to the war reflected by the implementation of the “surge” under GEN. Petraeus.

What is known is that JIEDDO lacked implementation authority. It could only recommend courses of actions. This organizational weakness spilled onto the floor of the House of Representatives when GEN. Richard Cody responded to a question about the slow pace of MRAP deployment by noting that the Army “did not have a valid requirement except for 335 MRAP vehicles when the 2008 Title IV supplemental was being built.” This caused Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) to express his frustration with the DOD’s efforts:

But we are getting back to that word requirement. And I have pointed out three instances where somebody tried to fight this war on the cheap. . . . I guarantee you kids died needlessly and kids are lying up in Walter Reed needlessly because of body armor, because of Humvees and because of jammers. So the question is: Why do we go through this again? . . . We are finally admitting things that we should have been asking for last year and the year before that and the year before that. If this vehicle is going to save lives, if Humvees, as we now know, are vulnerable to mines and a hugely disproportionate number of casualties are occurring in Humvees because of mines and we have a way to address that, why don’t we address it now?\[...\]

Taylor went on to say the Army “seems to be dragging their feet” and suggested that the country adapt auto plants to build MRAPs if necessary. He finished his remarks by saying, “I think the Army is making a tragic—and I can’t emphasize the word tragic enough—mistake in not asking for more of these vehicles.” What had started with a

In the end what stands out about the counter-IED/MRAP issue in Iraq is the magnitude of the organizational problem it illustrated. The relevant question as it relates to the military’s difficulty in innovating its acquisition structure what factors seemed to most impede an earlier response?

One answer is that armored vehicles for defensive use was not consistent with the conventional war culture that drove the day-to-day organization. Dr. Vernon Joynt, chief

scientist for Force Protection noted that “a vehicle designed with mine-and-blast protection as its

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priority focus is not part of conventional thinking. Conventionally armored vehicles are aggressive vehicles: Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Strykers. Those vehicles are designed to be fighting vehicles. Andrew Birtle, in his history of U.S. counterinsurgency also notes a similar reticence existed in Vietnam and in broader U.S. doctrine:

Army doctrine had always stated that tanks and armored personnel carriers would be of limited utility in counterguerrilla warfare. Westmoreland initially shared this philosophy . . . [But] the heavy vehicles demonstrated their worth as convoy escorts, raiders, rapid reaction forces, and as integral parts of many sweep, search-and-destroy, and assault operations. They were especially useful in minimizing casualties from mines, booby traps, and bunkers.

These views support the contention that the existing MCO-defined culture, contributed to a significant delay in fielding resources that did not fit within its conceptual framework. In addition, it also important to note that bulk of the counter-IED effort was directed toward developing responses that were also consistent with the technological focus of the MCO culture. This is a theme that will be explored further in the next section on counter-IED efforts in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

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The U.S., like in Iraq, was “throwing” technology at the IED problem. JIEDDO continued its focus on developing weapons systems to detect and counter IEDs. By 2010 JIEDDO alone spent some $14 Billion on counter-IED technology. And although technology was a necessary part of any counter-IED program, when asked about the proportionality of the approach COL. Wayne Grigsby argued that commanders “were too dependent on it” and not sufficiently grounded in the human side of the problem. Grigsby was director for Future Operations for ISAF, and was one of a small coterie of officers under LTG David M. Rodriguez who set up the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in 2009. This position, especially as a close advisor to Rodriguez through the IJC, gave him a unique vantage point from which to view the overall counter-IED effort. Grigsby contended that “Last time I checked, whether it’s Desert Storm or comprehensive COIN, [war] is still a human endeavor. And you’ve got to be with human beings in order to [know the situation],” contended. This dependence on U.S. technological superiority was further acknowledged in the Army’s own history of OEF. Through 2005, the two primary means of intelligence collection about the enemy in Afghanistan was signals intelligence (SIGNINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The over reliance on these intelligence platforms was a legacy of the Cold War. Again, as the Army’s own history makes clear, despite a relative increase in resources devoted to human intelligence (HUMINT) during the 1990s, by 2001 only some 30 percent of the Army’s intelligence resources were

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focused on HUMINT. Further, most of the military intelligence specialists were trained in Russian, Serbo-Croat, or a language other than Dari or Pashto, the dominant languages spoken in Afghanistan.

Two additional organizational problems added to the general institutional problem the Army faced in adapting its intelligence gathering and analysis procedures to the realities of the Afghan conflict. First, doctrine called for all prisoners to be put under the formal control of military police (MP) units, not military intelligence (MI) units. But by December 2001 the number of detainees had ballooned to some 4,000. This prompted CENTCOM to form Task Force 202 (TF-202). TF-202 moved to the airfield at Kandahar from their base in Karshi-Khanabad (K2) in Uzbekistan. The task force was composed of members of the 202d MI Battalion, augmented by reserve and guard components, and quickly grew to include elements of the SOF community and other U.S. government agencies. TF-202 set up a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) at Kandahar and, in a break with doctrine, used the U.S. Marines already at the airfield as prison guards. All the while the number of prisoners grew.

The second major problem was the burgeoning population of prisoners. As Major David Carstens, the operations officer for TF-202 over this period, noted, the guidance as for detaining and interrogating prisoners was simply too vague, too broad. The population of detainees who, “may pose a threat to U.S. interests, held intelligence value, or may be of interest for U.S. prosecution,” continued to expand far beyond what TF-202 could reasonably handle. In the

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Wright, *A Different Kind of War*. 220.
absence of clarifying guidance TF-202 developed a more finely calibrated method for determining the necessity of holding prisoners.

The problems of vague interrogation guidance, a bursting prisoner population, and the adaptation of non-MP Marines into a prison-guard force all contributed to the spate of prisoner abuse incidents that erupted in the following year. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s January 2002 memorandum to the troops that al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not considered to be fully protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing prisoners of war added to the confusion on the ground. Instead of being officially classified as “enemy prisoners of war” (EPWs) the new policy simply classified captured suspected enemies as “persons under control” (PUCs). The deaths of two detainees at Bagram airfield at the hands of Marine MPs and MI interrogators lead later to the 2005 investigation by Vice Admiral A.T. Church. The Church Report, as it became known, brought to light the problems and excesses in the MI community in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In the maelstrom of the legal and organizational adjustments surrounding the handling of HUMINT, the counter-IED fight continued to be driven by technology. UAVs, robots, and reconnaissance patrols constituted the vast majority of counter-IED methods. The HUMINT process was focused on ferreting out persons of interest to the U.S. who may have had knowledge of further attacks on the U.S. It was not geared toward the in-theater, conduct of the war yet. The fight in Afghanistan at this time was to find bin Laden and other high-ranking members of al-Qaeda. The issue of IEDs or other techniques of ambush were not seen as

\[\text{Wright, A Different Kind of War}. 219-220\]
\[\text{Wright, A Different Kind of War}. 221.\]
\[\text{Wright, A Different Kind of War}. 221.\]
\[\text{Wright, A Different Kind of War}. 222.\]
problems in the context of a counterinsurgency fight. The general insecurity, both for coalition forces and the population, that IEDs created, was not yet considered a problem standing in the way of “mission success” in Afghanistan. The mission was not yet perceived as a political-military (POL-MIL) mission. Hence, IED and ambush attacks served to impede the search for high-value targets, but their general effect on the host-nation’s current and future political environment was scarcely considered.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a congressionally-funded think-tank, dispatched LTC Michael Stout in September 2002 to conduct a study for the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). Stout discussed the lack of a strong political development plan with the CJCMOTF’s director. It was out of this initial meeting that the idea of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) would emerge. In addition, the POL-MIL plan that evolved began the shift toward a full counterinsurgency concept of operations in Afghanistan, to include the training of Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. But like so much else, the resources and political focus for this innovatory shift in the operational concept would be stymied by the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

The most significant innovations in OEF would have to be improvised. The recognition of the importance of HUMINT, the change in the character HUMINT seen as most valuable, the development of the PRTs, the overall shift in the conceptual understanding of the war, and the re-organization of the coalition command structure after 2008 would sit mostly idle until the drawdown of forces in Iraq allowed for a return of attention to the issue of Afghanistan and the problems unique to the kind of war being fought there.

************ Wright, A Different Kind of War. 226-228.
The shift from a military-dominated operational approach to, at least in name, one that placed the political aspects ahead of the military, should not be underestimated. In counterinsurgency, this has emerged as the key category of innovation, and its pattern – overconfidence in technology, followed by a recognition of technology’s limit, followed by a reconsideration of the nature of the conflict, and finally, a rising to the top of improvised techniques to form a more general POL-MIL strategy, is the basic story of innovation in counterinsurgency.

The war in Afghanistan became fragmented across different command structures with the NATO/ISAF mission and across other U.S. government and international agencies assisting there. To Grigsby the approach to the IED threat exemplified how different aspects of ISAF’s institutional culture and the culture of the U.S. command resulted in poor counter-IED programs. When he deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 to set up the IJC as a response to the fragmentation of the overall effort, Grigsby saw his job as in part forcing ISAF forces to leave their protected FOBs and engage more directly with the population. The NATO/ISAF reluctance to go “outside the wire” of their protected bases both reflected the dominant institutional belief that remotely operated technology could effectively counter the threat and reaffirmed it by effectively incentivizing the stand-off approach over alternative approaches that relied on building personal relationships and intelligence networks among local populations. What stands out is the delay in transposing many similar lessons that were seemingly already “learned” about organizational structure and overall operational approach in Iraq. This is a subject that will be

Grigsby.
further explored in the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter will take up the cases of two units in Iraq that began to independently experiment with new innovations between 2005-2006.

**True Transitional Innovation: Census and Policing Approaches**

*1-7 in al-Qaim, Iraq*

By mid-2005 Western Anbar province had become the center of the Iraqi insurgency. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni insurgent groups had gained de facto control over major towns in the region like Al-Qaim. AQI’s control over the area had become so strong that they were able to post a sign in September 2005 welcoming visitors to “the Islamic Republic of Qaim.” In the middle of this stood First Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1-7). The 1-7, commanded by LTC Nick Marano, sought to continue the ‘hold’ phase of Operation ‘Steel Curtain’ that had been handed over to him by Third Battalion, 6th Marines. Like in the Philippines a century earlier, Marano began by developing a network of local informants. This effort initially succeeded so well that 80% of the unit’s intelligence was generated by joint Marine-Iraqi Security Force patrols. However, the unit’s capacity to analyze the intelligence was overwhelmed. Its initial component of four to six intelligence officers would grow to over thirty by the end of the unit’s deployment. This ability to restructure itself represented one of the most significant operational innovations for the unit. It was a lesson learned by many units across Iraq over that same period.

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Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War". 599
In addition to growing the size of the intelligence staff, the 1-7 slowly learned to improve its analytical ability by utilizing shared database programs that linked it to other units and analytical groups in the United States. The initial key information for the unit’s database program came from a census and vehicle registration initiative imposed on all the towns under its control. The program required all vehicles to be registered with the local police and to maintain a color-coded sticker identifying the vehicle’s town of registration. The advantage of this system was that it allowed joint patrols to clearly identify registered and unregistered vehicles. Previous experience had shown that these types of jointly manned checkpoints were subject to frequent miscommunication about potential threats from vehicles approaching checkpoints. The registration and census system divided each city into discrete neighborhoods, streets, and addresses and crucially, offered a “common frame of reference” for Coalition forces to operate under. Marano put the system in place despite objections from his headquarters. Again this points to a disconnect in situational awareness and operational approach between different unit levels.

Another critical point of innovation to note was that the database used by Marano’s unit came from the Phoenix, AZ Police Department. The database, called COPLINK, synthesized multiple categories of information from the census and registration programs as well as other shared databases. The use of this law enforcement database evolved out of a series of workshops put on by the Pentagon’s Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) throughout the

Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War‖. 599.
Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War‖. 599.

COPLINK and affiliated analytics software is a product of i2 Corporation. The software was developed out of the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Lab. It first came to prominence in 2002 D.C. area sniper attacks. See, Larry Copenhaver, "Tucson Cops, Local Software to Help in D.C. Sniper Probe," Tucson Citizen, October 23, 2002.
The workshops were directed at informing domestic law enforcement about the conflict environment U.S. forces faced in Iraq in order to determine if domestic policing models could be applied to the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. The 1-7 had worked extensively with the Los Angeles and Phoenix police departments prior to deployment. After working with Los Angeles Police Detective Ralph Morton, Marano believed a gang-warfare model best fit the situation his unit faced in Al-Qaim. Through the information generated by the COPLINK database and a series of sensor and surveillance equipment modeled on surveillance cameras and gunshot acoustic microphones used in major U.S. cities, the 1-7 and its affiliated Iraqi units began to operate more like law enforcement beat patrols than conventional massed fire units. The result was that units:

. . . develop[ed] the ‘cop on the beat’ mentality, knowing their terrain, and more importantly, knowing the people of the area. The level of familiarity gained with the area and its inhabitants allowed for easier detection of suspicious activity/items/personnel. More importantly, these tactics greatly facilitated the relationship with the local population, providing them with a much greater sense of security and willingness to provide information.

The direction of innovation was similar Afghanistan. In March 2010 the DOD made the Biometrics Task Force (BTF) a permanent agency of the Department. The renamed Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA) was the DOD’s attempt to institutionalize the kind of population/COIN management strategy COPLINK represented in 2006. The major innovatory piece of technology the BTF/BIMA deployed other than the database technology itself, was the

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See Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War”. Footnotes, p. 600.
Handheld Interagency Identity Detection unit (HIDE). The Detection Unit itself was developed around the specifications of the type of handheld units used by police departments like Los Angeles and Phoenix that track large populations without official identity papers.iiiii

The full package of sensors, the COPLINK database, and the 1-7’s emerging tactical innovations eventually formed a larger initiative called, “Project METRO.” METRO stood for Mobile Embedded Target and Reconnaissance Operation and was viewed by the 1-7 as their chief success. Project METRO was reported to have, “vastly [reduced] the time necessary to create a target package from several hours to several minutes,” in addition to greatly helping with counter-IED missions.iiiiii

But Marano’s approach extended beyond the development and exploitation of data-mining to counter the insurgency. In March 2006 the 1-7 increased their recruitment of local Iraqis for the Iraqi Security Force (ISF). On one day in late March they had some 400 men apply to join the ISF. These efforts were in addition to the ongoing development of the local police that had been begun by the 3-6 prior to the 1-7’s arrival. The effort eventually produced a series of new police ISF stations around the unit’s own outposts in the region. By late spring the local police force alone had mushroomed to 1,400 personnel.kkkkkkkkkkk

At the same time the buildup of local police and security forces was happening, the 1-7 was also engaged in series of infrastructure development projects. The unit built or rebuilt schools, water treatment plants, clinics, and even playing fields. Among the most important of these projects was the rebuilding of two bridges over the Euphrates river that had been destroyed


Quoted in Russell, 601.

Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War”. 602.

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in 2005. Their reconstruction allowed a vital economic link to the western part of Iraq to be re-established. All the while the unit, utilizing the more in-depth and rapid analysis provided through the COPLINK/METRO system, was continuing “direct action” operations against suspected insurgents. These included both arrests and killings.

The noteworthy aspect of the 1-7’s work is that its shift toward a policing model backed by a robust census system reflected a fundamental shift in the basic understanding of the nature of the conflict among the unit. In making this shift, the unit was in many ways abetted by the military’s institutional predilection for technology. The shift in understanding, and the means to develop that shift into a coherent approach that could be acted on, were a co-evolutionary process. The theoretical shift away from an attrition model of the war and toward a population-focused insurgent model was confirmed by the ability of the COPLINK/METRO system to provide data that military units could act on. It also provided, accurately or not, a tool for developing metrics. In a culture where nearly every action is reviewed and analyzed, the input of census and registration data into the system could be used to measure the unit’s output of effort.

Frequently, large organization’s tend to confuse output with intended outcome, but the mere ability to put an “objective” measure on an otherwise subjective-sounding counterinsurgency approach offered important organizational “cover” for the unit’s experimentation. It allowed the unit to act within the normative limits of the military. Even as more effort went toward “soft” approaches, the data in the COPLINK/METRO system could
always be correlated to the traditional military tasks of capturing and killing enemies. The system’s initial selling point was that it could be used “in order to detain suspects.”

Finally, the technology itself played an essential role in re-allocating sufficient bureaucratic resources to lock-in the military’s institutional commitment to this operational shift. The sensor technology developed for COPLINK/METRO came from Lockheed Martin at an initial cost of $2.5 million. Subsequent expenditures are classified. But in a revealing statement, CAPT. Todd Pillo, the Battalion’s intelligence officer offered:

Last deployment, I was 90 percent reliant on human intel — stuff that individuals out in town or detainees would give us. If I wanted to go collect intel on a certain area, I would have to send Marines to watch that area or have to ask locals about the area. With this technology I can put technology in place of that and watch those areas without having to put Marine or Iraqi lives in danger.

Pillo’s remarks on the COPLINK/METRO system reflect both the shift how the unit approached their mission, but also and the hard-to-break military reliance on technology.

The “Ready First” in Ramadi

To the south and east of the 1-7, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, the “Ready First” or RFCT 1, began its deployment to Ramadi in July 2006. Lead by COL. V.J.

Tedesco, RFCT 1 faced a hard fight if it was going to establish control in the city. Coming off the heels of the well-publicized “clear, hold, build” approach of COL. H.R. McMaster in Tall Afar, Tedesco set three similar goals for his unit. First, he wanted to gain control physical terrain of the city. Second, he wanted to expand and consolidate his physical control by clearing areas of insurgents through aggressive attacks on insurgents. Third, he wanted to “build” and “hold” his gains by developing the ISF in his area.

The Ready First went about the first objective by establishing a constant presence in the contested neighborhoods of the city. Unlike many other units in the counterinsurgency fight, the 1-37 deployed as an armored regiment and was equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Rather than find this equipment irrelevant to the COIN battlefield, the 1-37 used it to good effect. The Bradley’s were especially useful in helping units maneuver troops and direct fire against insurgents. Once they had gained control of the city the unit instituted a series of “census operations” designed to develop a better picture of the local insurgent and civilian human “terrain.” And like the 1-7, the first element involved re-mapping the city with a common vocabulary and system of street names and addresses.

These census operations became an “invaluable” tool for the 1-37. Remarkably, the unit developed a bi-lingual, standardized questionnaire that was used by units out on “census patrols”. These patrols were conducted by 15-30 soldiers, and were designed to allow for a period of 10-30 minutes for completion of the questionnaire per residence. It was expected that each patrol could conduct eight to ten interviews a patrol. The survey instrument

Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War". 604.
Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War". 604.
Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War". 607.
provided the unit with the patrol sector, address, date, full name with tribal affiliation, date of birth, occupation and location of job for each military-age male in the household. In addition, the survey listed the number of women and children in the household, the family’s religion, and whether the dwelling was owned, rented, or being squatted in. Each also questionnaire listed the serial number of any guns in the house, and, like the 1-7, collected vehicle ownership information and assigned a registration number to each vehicle. Finally, each military-age male was photographed, mug-shot style, holding their identification cards and a placard with their name and address.

As this data was collected it was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet developed off an initial system developed in Powerpoint by CPT. Greg Pavlichko. Pavlichko created a process linking photos of residents from his patrol neighborhood to overhead shots of residencies on each block. From this, Pavlichko’s battalion was able to identify and locate an insurgent cell that had committed an IED attack in July 2006. The initial success of this crude “database” system became the driving force behind the development of the much more sophisticated Excel repository. As the Excel repository grew, Tedesco realized that he was, in effect, reversing Army doctrine. At the start the Ready First saw the census database system primarily as a way to support their kinetic operations against insurgents. But it quickly became apparent that the brigade’s chief success was coming from the civil-military effects of its interactions with the population, not its arrests or killings of insurgents. The large cordon-and-search operations the 1-37 had been trained to conduct began to take a backseat to the smaller information gathering census patrols. The census patrols evolved into “meet and greets” with the community.

Russell, “Innovation in the Crucible of War”. 608.
allowing the brigade to develop a better rapport with the population. By the close of their tour the unit had surveyed 80% of the buildings in their sector of Ramadi. In the end, the census approach became the 1-37’s "main instrument of fighting the counterinsurgency."

Conclusion

In Afghanistan and Iraq the military initially approached innovation through a technological lens. The organizational military, reflecting its institutional bias toward technologically-driven warfare, tried to fit one element of the broader conflict into its existing framework. So that even while evidence of the low-tech nature of the conflict grew, institution-wide change was hampered by the existing organizational culture.

In addition, in this kind of highly professionalized, highly doctrine-dependent force the manner of innovation differs significantly from less professionalized military organizations. In both cases in Iraq, the tactical unit level drove the main effort of innovation. The creation of the census program and correlated analytical innovations did not come from the command headquarters associated with campaign-level planning. Rather, innovation “bubbled its way to the top of the organization and then back down again in the form of routinized procedures.” This is markedly different from the pre-professional, less-routinized Army in the Philippines where the key innovations emerged from the highest command levels. But one striking similarity is the role of non-military, public administration, especially policing, knowledge. In both the Iraq cases the major innovation is the development of an approach to the

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Russell, "Innovation in the Crucible of War". 610.
war that replicates major-city anti-gang programs, than major combat operations. But whereas in
the Philippines the vector for this knowledge came from the professional experience and
identification of commanding officers with their private-sector careers, in the professional,
career-officer corps, the knowledge (which is the much the same) comes from outside subject
matter experts acting as consultants. In Afghanistan it was the outside review done under the
auspices of USIP that finally resulted in the development of PRTs and pushed the overall
strategy there toward a more politically oriented approach.

In both theaters, however, the direct effect of having a professional officer corps steeped
in an MCO culture was the dominant shaping force on U.S. military innovation. The
professional dependency on codified doctrine meant that higher-level commands, those at the
division, corps and combatant command level were slow to adopt innovations outside the MCO
framework. At the same time innovations that were adopted were helped if they could draw on
the technical expertise at the heart of the professional MCO framework. This is consistent with
the “innovation enablers” that opened the organizational space for the 1-7 and 1-37 to adapt in
Iraq:

Command Atmosphere: Organizational leadership delegated and
apportioned authority and responsibility to different sectors of the
organization, with particular emphasis on empowering tactical-
level leadership.

[slide deck presented at Center for Contemporary Conflict by James Russell, via correspondence
with author.]
Command Atmosphere drives innovation through the delegation of authority to different parts of the military organization. In this way, adaptation at the tactical level is empowered. But this was a limited phenomenon empowered in places where the command atmosphere not just allowed, but nurtured, key attributes. If one looks at these attributes another way, however, what emerges is the larger truth that COIN innovation was highly uneven throughout the force:

Information flow: The circumstances of war caused the units studies here to abandon peacetime [sic] practice of information control. In war, the flow of information passed quickly up and down the organizational hierarchy and, in certain cases, flowed seamlessly into the units from organizations operating outside the unit.

Ad Hoc Org Structures: The units studies here showed immense flexibility in creating sub-organizational structures that were either completely new, or which enhanced the capabilities of existing, doctrinally accepted organizational structures.

Role of informal doctrine: Units sought diverse sources of information that resided outside their formal institutional structures. Both the Army and Marine Corps [sic] digitally-based lessons learned websites served as important source [sic] of information outside formal, institutionally ‘blessed’ doctrinal products.

Russell notes in a sub-bullett: Various units displayed a marked willingness to work through ad hoc organizational structures to support the flow of information and materiel to the war-fighter JIATFs (Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces). His emphasis on “marked” indicates the relative uniqueness of this willingness among units in the general force.

Russell slide deck. Emphasis mine.
All three of these enablers stress a break with existing doctrine. “Information flow” stresses the abandonment of peacetime operating practices, “Ad hoc structures” stresses the tension between the creation of wholly new organizational sub-structures and finding ways to tweak existing, doctrinaire, structures to local requirements. Finally, “Role of informal doctrine” brings to the fore the fundamental lack of institutional knowledge about COIN. (A broader survey detailing the extra-doctrinal sources used will be discussed in the next chapter.)

Both the lack of institutional knowledge about counterinsurgency, and the over-reliance on doctrine point to the controlling effect of the post-Vietnam professionalization of the force. Despite the extensive experiences of similar conflicts in the Philippines and Vietnam the U.S. force that occupied Iraq and Afghanistan was controlled by an MCO-defined culture. The primacy of doctrine in general, and its specific content, are rooted in the vision Depuy and Starry shared when TRADOC was created. The definition of the military professional reflected in FM 100-5 was someone who was a skilled specialist with the technologies and operational approaches of major combat operations. Further, U.S. military structure, especially the organizational structure of its land forces, reflected the belief that Vietnam-like conflicts were inappropriate uses of its professional skills. Grand-strategic ideas like the “Weinberger” or “Powell” “doctrines” that limit the use of American military force to situations where its full professional MCO ability is unleashed only reinforced the techno-war, anti-COIN culture of the pre-9/11 force.

For the modern force in Iraq and Afghanistan this meant that the most important driver of innovation was the institutional culture of various organizational units within the military. At the level of the whole force it meant that the existing culture and the organizational structure built up around it acted as a major impediment to counterinsurgency innovation. The persistence of the belief in the “Afghan Model” as an effective innovation is the major demonstration of this pattern. At lower levels where a culture of experimentation was nurtured innovation did occur. But even at these levels, the pull of the larger techno-war culture meant that connecting innovative conceptual changes to technological capacity helped secure the innovation’s acceptance within the broader military.

As expected with a professional organization defined in large part by its technological superiority, the first half-steps toward innovation came in areas like the counter-IED fight where there would seem to be a natural technological fix to the problem. But again, over time the efficacy of the twin pillars of the U.S. force’s professional identity – its command over high technology, and its ability to deploy technology in MCO – had to be circumvented. Tactical-level units were forced to improvise in the face of an institutional culture too slow to shift its conceptual understanding of the wars, and too lacking in guiding doctrine. The following chapter will look at the impact of the key document, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, on the mid-level officers directly engaged in the fighting.
Chapter 5

Doctrine – Assessing Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The Doctrine Gap

In assessing the creation of American counterinsurgency doctrine post 9/11 there is no single event more important than the publication of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, in December 2006. The joint Army/Marine manual was the first attempt to fully articulate a conceptual approach to fighting a counterinsurgent war by the U.S. since the mid-1980s. The military’s latent focus on this type of conflict, and the resulting gap in knowledge within the larger institution was candidly (and unprecedentedly) admitted in the FM’s foreword. The implications of this gap were even more explicitly acknowledged in the commercially-published version of the manual. “Although there are many reasons why the U.S. Army was unprepared for the insurgency in Iraq,” noted LTC. John Nagl, one of the key contributors to the manual, “among the most important was the lack of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the war began.”

This assessment is borne out by the results of a survey conducted among students at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) program in Ft. Leavenworth,


The vast majority of respondents, 86%, noted the lack of doctrine in their responses. Further, the list of sources consulted in the absence of official doctrine constitute a review of the major works on guerrilla war or insurgency in the 20th century. Among the most cited were: David Galulla’s *Guerilla Warfare*, David Kilcullen’s *The Accidental Guerrilla*, the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual, C.E. Calwell’s *Small Wars*, T.E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Frank Kitson’s *Low Intensity Conflict*, John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Bard O’Neil’s *Insurgency and Terrorism*, to Mao Zedong’s classic *On Guerilla Warfare*. In addition, respondents cited a wide ranging set of articles in U.S. and foreign military and civilian journals, simply said that they had not found any useful sources, or cited what they had learned from sister units.

See Appendix A. The survey was conducted between Nov. 30 and Dec. 17, 2010. The questionnaire was hosted at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/KH2BPY6 and administered through class “scribes” who control access to group listserves. One-hundred and one (101) out of a possible 166 responses were returned. SAMS educates the top 1% of Majors in the U.S. Army. There are approximately 1800 currently active Majors in the U.S. Army. (See Total Army Personnel Database at: [https://itapdb.hoffman.army.mil/Default.asp](https://itapdb.hoffman.army.mil/Default.asp) [limited access])


Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice*, 3rd, Original printing in 1899 (London, 1906). Note that an early version of the work added a subtitle, “A Handbook for Imperial Soldiers”, that clearly expresses the author’s sense that its discussion is intended to occur in the context of imperial military strategy.


John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Note that the title’s allusion to eating soup with a knife is an explicit reference to how difficult it was for the U.S. to learn to adapt to the lessons of the COIN.


The two dominant views are best summed up by one respondent’s remark that he read “Whatever I could get my hands on. Old SF [special forces] manuals, Galula, the old counter-guerilla manual [FM 90-8],” and another respondent’s comment that there were no good sources except “best practices” passed along from sister units.” This respondent added, also, that “In 2001, this information was virtually impossible to get . . . .” It is clear in the responses that the field-grade officers directing the wars at the tactical level were forced to operate without doctrine. Further, the reading choices used to substitute for this gap in theory show a wide level of confusion about the nature of the wars the American officers were engaged in.

The range of outside readings illustrate two important sub-points: first, despite the fact that doctrine from the 1980s and related works from the 1990s did exist, the majority of officers did not cite them as references. One presumes this is either because they were unaware of the previous documents, or else did not see them as relevant. In either case, this supports the claim that the military as a whole had consistently failed to effectively address the issue of counterinsurgency. What publications did exist were either not widely known, or else rejected on substance. This indicates that the broader institutional culture, even if it did produce a select number of quality publications on counterinsurgency, nonetheless failed to communicate the existence of the manuals at the time it most needed. Second, the general sense of understanding in evidence in the survey depicts a class of officers that is deeply unclear about how to think about and respond to the battles they find themselves charged with fighting. The full range of substitute reading being done by most officers covers the anti-communist, anti-colonial, and

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See Appendix A for survey responses. Because the survey was conducted anonymously, all unattributed quotations come from survey responses. Responses can be read in full in Appendix A.
ancient Chinese periods. It includes tomes basing their analysis on Cold-War assumptions or nineteenth-century tactics, both American and other. In related interviews with students at SAMS the “environment” of the military’s MCO-focus, its training and educational practices, and its promotion and other personnel-related standards was repeatedly cited. One Major, a Captain at the time the FM was published explained that the manual’s COIN focus was controversial (as it still is) and “require[d] a much deeper understanding than I think they [senior leadership] had time for when they wrote the manual.” He went on to say that the FM challenged the military’s most basic ideas “of strategy and operational art” and crucially, “who does it,” the organizational structure that was built to fight major combat, not COIN.

**FM 3-24 and the Prevailing Institutional Culture**

Nagl, in his foreword to the commercial edition of the manual wrote that, “. . . no manual has been so well received” as FM 3-24. The survey conducted for this study suggests that the manual’s reception among combat officers was more complicated. An overwhelming majority of responses collected indicated that the manual did fill a significant gap in doctrine. Further, the responses strongly support the contention that the manual’s biggest effect was on the overall culture of the military. Some 70% of direct responses can be categorized as noting the

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Email correspondence with MAJ Drew Conover, Nov. 30, 2010


effect of the manual on military culture. Of that, the vast majority cite the cultural shift from an MCO-focus to a population-centric COIN mindset as generally positive. But a number of responses were highly critical of the manual’s substance, despite also generally supporting the idea that the manual had a widespread effect on Army and Marine Corps culture.

The most common response argued in some way that with the manual’s publication, the military’s broader “way of thinking,” was changed, “leading to a change in operations.” Among the most frequent comments about the FM were those that referred to a change in “framework,” “concept”, “understanding”, and “discourse.” Below is a representative sample of the majority responses.

I believe it was important to shift a mindset away from a kinetic focus.

It changed the way of thinking of the problems in Afghanistan. It shifted focus from kinetic to population centric warefare [sic], where the battle needs to be during counterinsurgency.

It is important as it gives an understanding of what counterinsurgency is. To the average Soldier [sic] the idea of hunting down the insurgent is key to counterinsurgency rather than addressing the Lines of Efforts\textsuperscript{FM 3-0, Operations,} defines a Line of Effort as, “A line that links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.”
These comments illustrate the close-mindedness of the broader institution to the kind of approach fully outlined in the manual.

[The FM] provided a common, coherent, [sic] and authoritative expression of how the Army intended to organize and fight for counterinsurgency—something that helped to change leaders' and subordinates' mindsets on the war.

What most clearly emerges from the survey is the necessity that this shift in cultural mindset occur first in order to allow for effective innovation to happen. In insurgent war, the intense interconnectedness of military, political, and socio-economic factors argue for nothing short of a holistic change in culture. That is, cultural change is the *sine qua non* of victory for all sides in an insurgency. Hence in the FM when the U.S. speaks of “winning hearts and minds” it is a short-hand to mean changing the major aspects of the political culture of the society in which it is acting.

Long-term success in COIN depends on . . . .the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.

As the Army and Marine Corps FM bluntly explained:

FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-1.
The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. In applying any of the tools of national power discussed above, the commander in a COIN operation is reminded that the guiding idea for action is to, “reduce support for insurgents and gain support for the HN [host nation] government.” The opposite can be said to be the operational concept for the insurgents. In both cases the conventional activity war, killing the other side’s personnel and equipment in order to end its war-making capacity, is at best a lucky shot. The most likely end game is political settlement that leaves both sides’ capacity for organized violence in place. Bullets and bombs are used for what the U.S. military calls, “shaping” operations. Killing insurgents “whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling” with the host nation is only one aspect of successful COIN, and according to the FM, not the main aspect. But because advanced forces like the U.S. resort to their institutionally dominant culture to kill by “employ[ing] massive firepower”, such action is “counterproductive” against the socio-cultural environment of insurgent war.

The field manual focuses on the problem of “culture” in three ways. First, is the problem of shift internal U.S. military culture away from its MCO framework. This focus is also substantially supported by the survey responses. Second, is the necessity of understand the socio-political culture of the theater of operations. Here the manual draws on the classic texts of sociology and political science – from Max Weber’s discussion of legitimacy to Clifford Gertz’s definition of culture. Its categorization of the six key sociocultural factors to be addressed,
Society, Social Structure, Culture, Language, Power and Authority, and Interests, reads like a list of subjects for a comprehensive examination in political science. In 209 pages of text, the term culture is used some 179 times.

The implication of the sociocultural nature of insurgent war means that innovation, to be effective, must be a cultural innovation first, technological or procedural, second. Isolated instances of innovation in technique or technology are not effective until connected by an institution-wide understanding of the conflict and consequent unity of approach. Because despite last chapter’s examples of localized innovation towards population-centric counterinsurgency, in the absence of a “common, coherent and authoritative” approach organization-wide innovation would continue to be severely obstructed. In the assessment of many of the officers surveyed, the manual offered both a baseline of knowledge that had been lacking, and also, crucially, a means to “pass on the knowledge to incoming units in order to keep up the fight” as several respondents noted. Recall also that Grigsby’s assessment of that the central problem with allied efforts in Afghanistan was precisely this type of lack of unity – in understanding of the nature of the war and in applying a coherent approach across different areas of operation. Further, that the lesson to be taken from the examples of the two units profiled in Iraq support the claim that innovation by one unit did not get efficiently passed on to the next, or even on to other units serving short distances away. Indeed, one respondent recalled a situation from Iraq that illustrates just how ad hoc COIN approaches remain at present:

\footnote{FM 3-24. 3-19.}

\footnote{Text search of electronic version of FM 3-24, including appendices. This count excluded similar terms and phrases. In one or another of the three ways the manual addresses the topic, “culture” is probably the most discussed topic in the text.}
I got tagged as being [sic] the BDE’s [Brigade’s] lead for IP [intelligence/police] training, even though [sic] I was a [Battalion] staff officer and we had a [Military Police] provost marshall officer [sic]. With that said, I was tasked to develop the [Brigade’s] IP training plan, which at the time was part of the BDE’s main effort...I had no idea what I was doing. I remember getting a draft order kicked back by the BDE XO [executive officer] with the remarks, "...think like a cop..." on it. How the hell would I know how a cop thinks? I've never been a cop and my only experience with cops were the few times I was pulled over...that's why we're 9 years into OEF and 7 years into OIF. Think like a cop, really? I'm an Armor officer.

The deployment described by this officer occurred in Iraq, in 2009. As discussed previously, the professional COPLINK database used by the Marine 1-7 in al Qaim and and the amateur database started in nearby Ramadi three years earlier should have been readily available to this armor officer. That such resources (the COPLINK program especially, since it was a big-budget DOD program not specific to the Marines) were not available or were unknown again supports the contention that structural problems stemming from the military’s general MCO-culture continued to be significant impediments to innovation. (In addition, the officer’s exasperated retort about being an Armor Officer reflects a professional identity centered on major combat related knowledge and a consequent unease with the unconventional warfare nature of his assignment.

**Effect on Different Levels of Command**
The first-order importance of institutional cultural change is further supported when one looks at the level of command which the majority of respondents said the counterinsurgency manual had its most important effect on. Sixty-four percent of respondents indicated that the manual had its most significant effect at the Division and above level. Only 36% indicated the manual was most effective at the tactical level. Further, the most common complaint against the manual was that precisely that it “isn’t very useful for tactical units. It’s useful for higher level commands to set larger goals and tie together resources and efforts of tactical units toward those goals.” A more in-depth analysis shows of 49 respondents who chose to elaborate more specifically on the question, “At what levels of operations do you think FM 3-24 was most useful?” supports this conclusion. There were only12 mentions the platoon or squad levels out 99 total levels of command listed. Corps, Division, “operational level” and “higher” commands were listed 41 times. Counting mentions of the Brigade and Battalion levels as falling under the general category of “operational level” (noted 14 and 12 times, respectively) the overwhelming consensus (just over two-thirds) was that the counterinsurgency manual had its greatest effect on the levels of command where institutional cultural is set.
MAJ. Conover explained a sentiment common among his peers:

3-24 is a very useful "operational" manual. By this I mean it is most helpful to Commanders at Brigade level and above as well as staffs at any levels. Specifically, I think most helpful are the discussions on (1) Nature of the Insurgency (2) Complexity of the

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Operational Unit Diagrams - U.S. Army,
environment and (3) The use of design in campaign planning. I believe the aim of this manual was to refocus Brigade, Division, Corps, and Theatre Commanders on our COIN operational approach at a time when we were losing (2005). Without a doubt, I believe it helped to accomplished [sic] this.

Again, as received in the field FM 3-24 was understood as having been written to change or “refocus” the levels of command that effectively set the institutional culture of the Army. As Conover articulates the manual was seen as an instrument that acted on the “operational” level of command. The “operational” level of war is doctrinally understood as the level of planning that connects the lowest level of action (tactical) to the highest (strategic) in order to arrive at the desired military endstate (which, in turn is assumed to effectively accomplish the political-strategic goal of the war if reached.) The problem implicitly identified by Conover and the survey, then, is that the most fundamental prerequisites for effectively connecting the tactical to the strategic were lost in the prevailing military culture. The nature of the local and regional insurgency, the wider complexity of the war, and the unique set of tools (design) needed to guide the institution into a the new paradigm of COIN were largely absent until the manual forced them on the key levels of command. Conover continued:

As simple as those concepts sound in the manual, many commanders at Brigade and above lacked a true understanding of the environment and the insurgency prior to taking command because they did not ever experience it first hand. Rather, most of

*FM 3-0, Operations.*
their experience prior to the war was with high intensity conflict, so this was very foreign to them.

Further, survey responses reiterate this sentiment in a variety of ways. The simple fact of publication of a manual dedicated to COIN was a first-order act of conceptual innovation itself. The “culture of command” had to change before significant innovation throughout the larger military could happen.

The TTPs [tactics, techniques, procedures] were less important than the institutional message sent by 3-24's publication, which, in my estimation helped to effect a change in the culture of command.

In line with the primacy of place the professional military gave doctrine, this was a necessary pre-condition because it:

. . . . officially sanctioned the Army to take direct responsibility for the Iraqi population's security and thereby to [sic] regain the operational initiative . . . .

This necessity for official sanction is exactly what one would expect from a “culturalist” model of innovation. The shift in responsibility toward population security was a shift in the most basic type of specialized knowledge defining the profession. In fact, further evidence of this shift can be seen in the critically negative responses to the counterinsurgency manual.

xxxxxxxxxxxx Email correspondence with MAJ Drew Conover.
Some 16% of respondents were strongly negative in their view of the FM. However, of these, roughly half couched their critiques in ways that confirm the general thesis that the FM did have a wide-reaching effect on U.S. military culture. The nearly uniform complaint was not that the manual did not effect the general U.S. approach to the wars, but that the population-centric concept espoused by the FM was wrong.

I think the central drive of 3-24 in concept of ‘securing the population’ and rebuilding detracted from our security efforts in-country, with far-reaching consequences. I have first-hand experience [OEF, 2009-10] that highlights the futility in trying to win hearts and minds over there, but we tried regardless [sic] to the detriment of our security line of operation.

This respondent directly calls the population-centric approach “futile”. But the soldier goes on to specify that the futility of the approach rests in the inability of such an operational concept to articulate a “feasible end-state”. Without such a measurable standard to gauge war termination by, the operational problem of connecting tactical actions to strategic ends is insurmountable – because the strategic end remains undefined. Other responses attack the capacity of old-generation commanders (the embodiments of institutional culture) to properly interpret the manual:

I'm convinced now that the FM is doing more damage than good, because I have seen too many commanders who are myopically focused the population, who ignored the enemy and gave them considerable freedom of movement, which of course undermined their efforts to influence the populace. It isn't the text, it is the interpretation of the text.
This kind of response is a complex assessment of the kind of hard-to-get-at data that has always confronted cultural explanations of innovation. But the same sense that what was needed was this kind of shift in interpretive frame, mostly at higher levels, but not always, is pervasive in the survey responses:

3-24 is not a recipe book for success. What it does is get soldiers to understand that COIN is different to [sic] warfighting. A lighter touch is required. COIN is subtle but should be intuitive. Understanding the environment is the most important part of dealing with COIN problems and I rate understanding the environment as more important than mission analysis.

To this soldier understanding the environment properly is the necessary shift. And the reference to “mission analysis” is telling. Mission Analysis is taught as the focal point of the military decision making process (MDMP), and the MDMP in turn has been the cornerstone of the military’s doctrine on planning operations. By arguing for a shift to environmental understanding, the soldier is calling for a major change in the cultural landscape of how the military trains and acts.

The language used, “environmental understanding”, and “environmental frame”, that is seen throughout the survey is a reference to a new change in the Army’s operational doctrine that officially debuted in March 2010. The conceptual shift toward this new “organizational learning methodology” was intended to help commanders “lead adaptive, innovative efforts” that
leveraged small group collaboration. It should be emphasized, however, that the kind of leadership model tentatively proposed in the March 2010 FM was often interpreted as going against the “traditional” leadership model focused on the individual. What the military literature talks about as collaborative leadership in groups, organizational and management theory terminology often calls “X-teams.” What is important to note is that the increasing inclusion of organizational theory into doctrinal writing is illuminating what appears to be a generational divide in the force. As the same respondent continues:

My view is that COIN is no more complex than warfighting - just different. Many of the (COIN) challenges are of our own making and although the enemy is adaptive and difficult to recognize [sic], he will always be beaten tactically. The challenge is in turning tactical success into operational and strategic success. In COIN sometimes it is best to avoid the fight in order to achieve overall success. COIN requires 'command' patience - there are no quick wins.

The implication of this view is that (1) the military’s struggle with adapting to COIN, e.g. with shifting its framework of understand as discussed above, are the result of internal institutional problems; (2) a way to understand the challenge is a lack of “command patience”, e.g. an inclination among the older generation to seek the kind of “quick” victories characteristic of MCO, but not COIN; and (3) that the analytical illustration of this is the inability to link tactical success to strategic ends. Again, note that this is nearly the same analysis as seen in earlier responses.

Other responses specifically referred to the Army’s general jettisoning of “low-intensity” or COIN studies after Vietnam:

US Army had lost its doctrinal way [with regard to] COIN & other low intensity operations since the Vietnam War. . . . [in the] post-Vietnam era the Army as an institution abandoned its low intensity or COIN capability. The curriculum at West Point and the Command and General Staff College reflect this where the study of COIN and low intensity conflicts not only decreased but was often done surreptitiously if at all.

The last sentence, of course, points to the presence of a dominant MCO culture. If LIC or COIN concepts were discussed, it was done by a sub-culture. As another respondent explained:

Those of us fighting on the ground figured out pretty quickly the best way to do it - mostly by emulating the [special forces] guys. Our doctrinaire leadership did not understand this, and refused to do the COIN things that worked until we had doctrine to use as top cover.

The sub-culture keeping alive LIC traditions was mostly to be found in the Special Forces, whose mission had always included a key element of COIN: foreign security force assistance (FSA).

The FSA mission has emerged in both Iraq and Afghanistan as the key missions for determining success. And the primacy of this mission has made the metric of how well HN forces can operate with little to no U.S. assistance the single most important factor determining
the length of the U.S. commitment in each theater. In effect, the FSA specialty of the SOF community was grown into a critical skill for the general force given the requirements of population-centric COIN:

If we do not continue to resource the training mission in Afghanistan, we will definitely delay transition. Tactical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring without a self-sustaining Afghan Security Force. To create this force, we must professionalize the police, army, and air forces; create viable logistics and medical systems; and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train and educate them...above all, we MUST have the trainers to develop them. We cannot meet our goals without the resources to achieve them. As our Secretary General said recently, —no trainers, no transition.

As LTG William Caldwell emphasizes above, a lack of skilled trainers will have a direct and definite effect on the war in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this study, however, what is striking is the sea-change in priorities this speech by one of the top generals in the American establishment represents. The priority resource question is not on materiel, but personnel. As more than one respondent has noted, tactical success in small arms combat is not the challenge. As the people at the head of the cultural shift argue again and again, the issue is how to change the military’s institutional priorities: to effectively teach commanders to conceptually marry

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aaaaa---- Conversations with MAJs Jonathan Roginski and Mike Parsons, and LTC Kettie Davison, 10th Mountain Division, Ft. Drum, NY, July 2010. Roginski is an operations research specialist brought in expressly to help the Division establish metrics for their mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Parsons was the lead planner helping to prepare the Division for their deployment in Fall 2010. Davison was the chief of intelligence for the Division. bbb---- Address to NATO Military Committee, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, September 27, 2010. Emphasis in the original.
tactical success to strategic ends and to make key elements of COIN, like foreign security force training, a respected and wide-spread professional specialization.

Conclusion

The reception of *FM 3-24* by the group of officers which will form the next generation of senior commanders (Colonels and General Officers) provides essential insight into how U.S. military culture is changing. When the officers surveyed were first deployed in conjunction with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq American military culture was still dominated by the culture of major combat operations. As the survey responses show, the dominance of this institutional framework was so complete that no current official literature on counterinsurgency warfare was available. The officers surveyed, mostly charged with leading Company and below units, struggled to find a coherent theory of war that could help guide their actions. A specific example of this is explained below:

Company commanders face tactical problems when operating as part of a larger operation. For example, when executing a battalion or brigade clearing operation (clearing Sadr City for example), companies are merely a supporting or main effort operating as part of a larger whole to accomplish a mission with a definitive end. Upon completion, they pick up and move back to their permanently assigned AO.
However, in the absence of a larger operation conducting by the higher headquarters, companies are simply trying to provide stability in their assigned area of operation (AO).

Many respondents were critical of the late publication, e.g. “Wish I had FM 3-24 prior to deployment to assist with our police transition mission”. Many were critical of sections of the manual they felt were “commonsensical” or a “regurgitation” from the works of Galula, Kilcullen, and others. But most also recognized that despite these limitations the manual was an important help in training and advising foreign police and military, conducting police-type intelligence, understanding the populace, and restructuring their own systems to get closer “unity of effort.” Perhaps most important, and most noted, was the manual’s focus on integrating civil and military operations. At a practical level, the meshing of these two spheres of effort defined the difference between COIN and MCO more than anything.

The recognition by so many mid-level officers that they could not achieve the vaguely worded missions they were given by military force alone meant that they would need to reach out to others outside the military. But this tended to go against the insular, “can do” attitude of the armed forces. The kind of “armed social work” approach advocated in the manual was considered “soft” and antithetical to many senior commanders.

I used the whole thing as a club to beat on my doctrinaire superiors - without it, I had absolutely no justification to do things the COIN way.
The above was a common theme in the survey and related interviews. Though in some areas commanders did allow experimentation with the population-centric COIN approach advocated in the manual (see chapter 4) it remained true that there was no official justification of the approach until the publication of *FM 3-24*:

[FM 3-24] endorsed the general notion that large-scale uniform approaches were insufficient. Novel, neighborhood based approaches would require "bottom up" initiatives (mission command), a fact that seems to have facilitated experimentation and adaptation (and that endorsed risk taking and underwriting.)

Whatever internal divides existed inside the military about the right way to fight an insurgency, the manual’s publication finally gave the “COINdinista’s” equal rights in the debate. Further, the localized experiments in population-based COIN like those conducted in Ramadi and al Qaim could now be offered openly as models for commanders in other areas. The sharing of lessons learned with the adaptations of these approaches was also now available through formal information sharing systems, not just the informal networks of contacts among officers. This kind of “top cover” even extended beyond the military:

FM 3-24, and 'pop' COINdinistas like Nagl and Kilcullen have been great at getting the word out and providing material for our political decision makers as well, so they and the manual have been essbntial [sic] in helping persuade [politicians] on how best to prosecute the wars.
Having brought together the best literature on counterinsurgency theory and placed on it the imprimatur of professional military judgment, the manual was able to effect the debate on the wars in two directions at once. Inside the military it established at minimum a safe-haven for those espousing and experimenting with “softer” approaches to the wars. Outside the military it gave senior political decision-makers the chance to tell their constituents that they were following best military judgment. Though Nagl, Kilcullen and others largely already addressed the issues in the manual in their dissertations and subsequent books, it was not fully vetted professional military judgment until it had been distilled into doctrine.

The manual was used in an unprecedented variety of ways to shift not just military culture, but the larger national political debate as well. Its publication and best-seller ranking as a commercial imprint meant that, like the 9/11 commission report, large numbers of the public were getting a serious education in the most important political topic of the times. This changed the debate. First, it meant a good portion of the public no longer accepted simple tropes about how to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, it meant political leaders were freed to argue in favor of longer commitments because of the complexity of counterinsurgent wars. And the manual gave military and political leaders a place they could point to for support and explanation. Third, the field manual, because of the unprecedentedly open way it was put together, effectively put direct pressure on senior military leaders.

Traditionally, when we write Army doctrine, it’s done in-house. The Army has a very deliberate set procedure, as many of you might imagine, as we can only do in the United States military, but we really broke the mold in doing this one. If you look back and you look at how we wrote the counterinsurgency manual, it really
was the first deviation from the way army manuals are written, done in 2006 in a much more open and collaborative manner, many [in] academia and others being brought into the process.

By bringing so many experts from outside the military, an unusually diverse alliance of academics, military and political leaders were seen as having given their stamp of approval to the approach of manual. Smart commanders could read the writing on the wall. As one of the principal architects of the manual noted:

This review process raised the stakes for a manual that would ordinarily have attracted no attention outside the Army and little inside it. Rightly or wrongly, FM 3–24 became more than a routine doctrinal publication; it became a symbol of something more expansive.

The unprecedented process used in writing *FM 3-24* signaled in the broadest possible way that a major shift in culture was afoot. The entire framework that had been used to view the problems presented by the conflicts would be reviewed and recast. Further, the process of writing *FM 3-24* would be reapplied to subsequent doctrinal manuals.

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We took the lessons learned from [FM 3-24], applied them to this [FM 3-07 Stability Operations], and expanded even further going into the international community, reaching out across many, many different nations in addition to all the normal folks we talked about at the very beginning.

As one respondent to the survey put it: “In other words, the specific techniques espoused by 3-24 were far less important, in my mind, than the social fact that was 3-24’s publication.”

The “social fact” of Counterinsurgency was its central effect on U.S. military culture. It reoriented the basic institutional culture of the military away from its post-Vietnam MCO legacy, and toward a population-centric, civic affairs approach. Whether or not this “armed social work” approach would be successful was a secondary point, what was clear was that the prevailing culture based on massing overwhelming fire against the enemy was clearly not successful in the COIN environment.

The manual was “aimed” at upending comfortable assumptions about war inherently held in the MCO culture and protected by the structure of the military as an organizational entity. The first was to establish that counterinsurgency required a focus on protecting the population more than killing the enemy. Even when the latter was a necessary function of population protection, the means of force had to be more discriminate than the prevailing culture of major combat generally allowed. More risk to individual soldiers would have to be accepted as massive firepower operations were reduced. In addition, the key to population protection would often require the kind of community policing/intelligence models discussed earlier. These kinds of

Caldwell, “FM 3-07 Stability Operations,”.
force structures were again anathema to the general force. Finally, the other major lesson the manual tried to impart was the importance of innovation itself. The force that adapted most quickly would win. Therefore the type of internal reflection and restructuring called for by the manual was not just an academic exercise, but a vital strategic imperative. If the U.S. could not sufficiently impart a new culture of professional knowledge and identity built around the precepts of COIN, it would lose.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The modern American experience clearly supports the conclusion that the main driver of military innovation has been organizational culture. In the cases studied, realist and neorealist explanations of military innovation only become relevant subsequent to major shifts in institutional culture. Further, a deeper explanation of this outcome reveals the inappropriateness of “realism” as a category of explanation for military innovation. In fact, the realist school’s assumption of comparable systems of threat signaling among combatant sides only highlights the first-order importance of institutional culture as the main variable in explaining U.S. innovation in counterinsurgent wars. It is not that the signaling calculus presupposed in realist explanations is wrong, per se. The problem is in the misapplication of this method in the sequence of how innovation is understood. A full model of military innovation must take into account the question of institutional professionalization. The result is that at finer levels of explanation, the body of specialized knowledge defining what it means to be a professional soldier is the most important concrete fact to grasp in order to understand how military innovation occurs. This is true for military innovation in general, but is especially important to a nuanced understanding of what drives innovation in conditions of counterinsurgency. The reason is simple, but its implications complex. The most significant innovation made by the U.S. military in the course of fighting its major counterinsurgent wars has been to adapt its organizational culture to support the widespread adoption of unconventional operational approaches. In each case, the U.S. had to
create a theory of counterinsurgency that could then be developed into a practical program of military operations.

Military and civilian leaders facing the unique circumstances of the wars in the Philippines, Iraq, and Afghanistan eventually recognized that existing theories about how to use military force to reach a desired political end were not sufficient to the circumstances. This process followed a clear pattern of starting with an understanding of the war that saw it as a conventional battle. This allowed the prevailing model of warfare inherent in the “strategic culture” of the military to set how it saw the enemy threat and by what means it could best counter that threat. As the wars in question evolved away from conventional battles, institutional barriers predicted by organization theory slowed the innovation process. Existing centers of power within the military, as seen the cases examined, systematically controlled information flows to other parts of military thus limiting innovation to ad hoc, tactical-level units in most cases. Such centers of power, reflecting the organizational structure of a military culture built around the specialized knowledge of MCO, could define issues and exclude other issues from discussion. This meant organizational sensemaking and decision-making was controlled by standards of analysis for threat and risk assessment controlled by an MCO, not COIN, understanding of the cases. Senior leaders could thus effect how long vs. short term risk was viewed; choose the criteria of assessment in order to favor existing capabilities and institutional bureaucratic needs; and promote personnel who shared these views.

In the Philippines case such organizational impediments to recognizing the war had turned into a counterinsurgency were markedly less. In this case senior military leaders like

Merritt, Otis, and Bell all had extensive experience in “Indian Wars” army which mostly meant acting as military governors. The bulk of their practical experience was generally more political than military. They were skilled at governance and used military force largely to enforce population security, not destroy enemy armies. Further, the period of service for this cadre of officers meant that most held simultaneous posts as working lawyers, businessmen, engineers, and academics. This identification with non-military professions gave them access to specialized knowledge that they would use as the centerpiece of the counterinsurgency approach that emerged in the war. After abandoning a conventional war approach, the most successful approaches focused on using military capacity to provide security and political, legal, and social reform under the broad concept of “benevolent assimilation.” This approach worked because it attracted support from the Filipino population away from the insurgents at the same time it weakened the ability of the insurgents to fight and to offer a credible political alternative. As much as national sentiment disliked the prospect of exchanging one foreign governor for another, the American side offered both a qualitatively better government and a more effective one given the increasing recognition that the insurgent could not win. U.S. policies on political rights, public health, and the economy represented a progressive improvement to enough of the population that it secured enough neutrality among the general population and active support among elites to turn the tide of the war. The sophisticated political approach the military pursued in tandem with its military operations represented the peak power of a unique breed of American officer. Subsequent generations of military officers in the U.S. would become increasingly identified with a highly constrained subset of professional knowledge that did not
include the kind of political and civil-professional knowledge that defined the officer corps of the Philippine War.

By the time the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq had started U.S. military culture had embraced a techno-scientific approach to war that placed the ability to fight major combat operations at the center of what it meant to be a “professional” soldier. Unlike the group of officers whose dual careers in civilian and military pursuits made them more capable of crafting innovative approaches to fighting counterinsurgencies, the modern officer corps reflected a highly circumscribed sphere of professional knowledge. The proximate explanation for this pattern of professionalization in the modern U.S. force goes back to the Vietnam War and the development of an institutional doctrine-writing organization.

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, under the early influence of Gens. DePuy and Starry, set the cultural conditions for how the major branch engaged in COIN would come to understand the purpose and practice of doctrine. DePuy, because of his interpretation of the Yom Kippur War, essentially wanted to reduce the art of command to following basic rules and set principles Because in DePuy’s understanding the speed and lethality of likely future war would be so high:

. . . . the first battle of our next war could be its last battle…This circumstance is unprecedented: We are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to
bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the US Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war.

As a consequence of the extremes of future war, officer training, in DePuy’s words, should be like “buying a lawn mower,” where the owner “get[s] a little booklet that tells you how to put it together to operate the whole thing.” The compression of time and space in TRADOC’s vision of future war necessitated that doctrine act less a guide to the military decision-making process and more as a manual for rapid implementation of emergency procedures. Where even past major combat might have allowed the build-up of materiel and men over time, present and future war would not. The first battle would for all intents be the decisive battle. The revolution in military affairs of the next decades that sought to leverage advances in electronics and information processing technology in order to gain maneuver space inside the tightly compressed context of modern war. But the type of technological and pure science advances pursued were focused on the context of major combat in a first-is-last-battle environment.

Professional military knowledge was largely defined around the problem of this kind of combat. Further, as the U.S. moved to an all-volunteer force, it was able to more exactingly refine the parameters of specialization that defined the profession. As the cases studies of Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, this MCO-defined meaning of the military profession in the U.S. was still firmly in place in 2001 and beyond. Two elements of the DePuy-Starry-TRADOC MCO culture stand out in the case studies. The first was the inability of the military to offer the

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President and Secretary of Defense credible response options in Afghanistan that did require the kind of Cold War level mobilization anticipated in mainstream planning. The failure of the Joint Chiefs to provide a response option that stepped outside the big-war senemaking frame of the larger culture shows how cross-service MCO-cultural dominance was. It would take a smaller, outside agency like the CIA to offer up an innovative twist on standard U.S. invasion planning. Further, when the CIA did partner with elements of the military, it worked with Special Forces, the only subset of the general force whose institutional culture could be said to embrace a non-MCO mindset.

Second, the planning for the Iraq War again explicitly rejected scenarios that predicted the outbreak of insurgent war. The time-frame projections for the invasion, to the institution of a transitional government, reproduced the 90-day start-to-culmination cycle of Cold War planners. This symmetry in planning across two wildly different conflict environments reflected the organizational structure of the military. A three-month start-to-finish time was the default support time the military could sustain major operations under “normal” conditions. The stresses of fighting a counterinsurgent war strained the ability of the existing organizational structure to maintain “dwell” to “deployment” time. This meant that training time was drastically shortened, and time-in-combat lengthened for most of the force. Soldiers and Marines began facing turn-around tours within 12 months of their prior deployment. Indeed, the Army does not expect to reach their preferred “dwell” time of 36 months between deployments until 2014, even with the wind-down of engagement in Iraq.\footnote{GEN. George Casey Chief of Staff of the Army, "Presentation on Army Future Force Generation" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, January 2010).}
Further, as the examination of the Army/Marine Corps joint counterinsurgency manual showed, as late as 2006 field officers were relying on a hodgepodge of outside material about insurgent war. It was only with the publication of FM 3-24 that the military establishment signaled the acceptance of population-centered, non-enemy focused approaches to counterinsurgency. The evidence of the military’s neglect of COIN in general force education is overwhelming. In addition, the vast majority of survey responses reflected a command culture that had to be overcome in order to implement population-centric COIN approaches. The integration of technology and techniques into a broadly innovative approach to counterinsurgency required that the institutional culture shift away from its MCO-framework.

Until a wider shift in institutional culture was signaled by the publication of Counterinsurgency innovation occurred only in isolated pockets throughout the force. The publication of the field manual offered bureaucratic support to innovators at all levels - tactical, operational, strategic, and political. With this official support, communities of practitioners within the military were able to openly share their experiences and engage in discussion about approaches to COIN more effectively. The generation of LT’s, CAPTs. and MAJs. that had spent their formative years in the military repeatedly deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq were gradually changing the parameters of what counted professional military knowledge. The specialized knowledge of how to disperse Commander’s Emergency Response funds, set up census and vehicle registration systems, and administer health care systems gradually came to be seen as at least as relevant to the profession as MCO skills.

This conclusion is consistent with the arguments laid out in the first two chapters. The most successful approaches finally adopted in the case studies were all predicated on the
presence of an institutional culture that framed the war outside the conventional threat construct of its day. Further, there is no convincing evidence that a structural/realist framework would have led to the innovations in operational strategy described without first adjusting the basic culture of how threat was perceived among military and civilian decision makers. In having to pass through this period of institutional re-conceptualization of the threat faced in each war, the cases demonstrate the primary nature of the cultural narrative as the driver of innovation in counterinsurgency. Even more so, the striking similarity in the innovations adopted and the process by which they were learned or re-learned make it clear that professional culture drove adaptation.

As long as the culture of the military profession in America privileged skills at odds with the kind of specialized knowledge about political transition, governance, economics, and law that characterized the operational sphere of counterinsurgency, innovation remained stymied. In the period of the Philippines Insurrection the professional culture of the military was sufficiently connected to civilian political and legal professions to allow rapid innovation from conventional operational approaches to occur. Over the course of the rest of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, American professional military culture largely lost that connection. As a result, before significant innovation in the current counterinsurgencies could happen, the professional culture of the military had to change. This meant a reconstruction of the institutional sensemaking framework that had been the basis of the MCO culture. FM 3-24 established the basis for this new framework. It allowed localized innovation to be adopted across operational areas and signaled to the officer corps that a new type of skill-set would be promoted within the institution. Despite opposition, the emergence of a “full-spectrum” approach to military strategy
suggests that counterinsurgency operational skills will now share equal footing with major combat operational skills as defining characteristics of military professionalism in the U.S.
APPENDIX A

Survey Instrument

The following pages show the blank survey as seen by respondents.

THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
1. Consent to participate in survey

By submitting this survey you give consent to use any data provided. Any identifying information will be edited for anonymity before any publication. You have the right to request information on how your data is used. To inquire about its use please contact the author of this survey, Matthew Schmidt, at matthew.j.schmidt@us.army.mil with any questions or concerns.
2. FM 3-24 Field Usage

1. For each year, please answer whether you were deployed in any part of OIF or OEF. In the second column please provide rank for the years in which you were deployed.

(If non-US military please note country of service in comment box, years of deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, and equivalent rank in the U.S. system if known.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Rank for each year of deployment. If rank changes during year, note highest rank.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other (please specify) 

2. At any time during or after your deployment did you make use of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency"?

- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

If YES, in what year did you start using the manual?

3. Before the publication of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" in December 2006, what, if any, sources of information on counterinsurgency were you using? Please list titles or authors to the best of your ability.
4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections, chapters, or themes you found most useful while on deployment. For example: "chapter 3, on intelligence", "the parts on the population," or "the sections on how to plan COIN ops", or "I found little useful info in the FM".

5. On a scale from "Not useful" to "Extremely Useful", please rate how useful you felt FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" was to you during your deployments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not useful</th>
<th>A little useful</th>
<th>Somewhat useful</th>
<th>Mostly useful</th>
<th>Extremely useful</th>
<th>Did not use FM 3-24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Please check the box next to the phrase that best describes how FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency", was used during your tour. (Please check all that apply.)

- [ ] Informed my own understanding of the conflict
- [ ] Changed planning and operations of my unit
- [ ] Had no effect on my unit
- [ ] Changed planning and operations of my command
- [ ] Informed my subordinates about counterinsurgency

7. How useful was FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency", in informing your subordinates about the reasoning behind plans and operations informed by the discussion of insurgent war in the manual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not useful</th>
<th>A little useful</th>
<th>Somewhat useful</th>
<th>Very useful</th>
<th>Extremely useful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In your opinion, how important was an official statement of doctrine on counterinsurgency, like FM 3-24, to the success of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all related to the military's success</th>
<th>A little important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Essential to the military's success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 3
9. At what levels of operations do you think FM 3-24 was most useful? (Please check all that apply.)

- [ ] Tactical unit level
- [ ] Division/Corps level
- [ ] Combatant Command level
- [ ] Political Decision Maker level

Please list the level at which you think FM 3-24 was most useful.

10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" was or was not important to the military's success in Iraq and Afghanistan.
## APPENDIX B

### Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) - Iraq</th>
<th>Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10.0% (1)</td>
<td>00.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>92.4% (27)</td>
<td>15.6% (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>86.2% (33)</td>
<td>10.8% (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88.2% (30)</td>
<td>11.3% (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>76.4% (20)</td>
<td>21.6% (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>66.0% (20)</td>
<td>31.0% (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>77.5% (31)</td>
<td>22.5% (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>65.5% (10)</td>
<td>31.5% (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>27.3% (6)</td>
<td>72.7% (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note for each year of deployment: If rank changes during year note highest rank.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2LT</th>
<th>1LT</th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>COL</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (41)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>14.3% (1)</td>
<td>85.7% (8)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.8% (1)</td>
<td>3.8% (1)</td>
<td>70.9% (20)</td>
<td>11.5% (3)</td>
<td>3.8% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.3% (1)</td>
<td>19.0% (2)</td>
<td>73.8% (22)</td>
<td>10.0% (0)</td>
<td>3.3% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
<td>No (%)</td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>Yes Count</td>
<td>No Count</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7.1% (2)</td>
<td>3.6% (1)</td>
<td>75.0% (21)</td>
<td>3.6% (1)</td>
<td>7.1% (2)</td>
<td>3.6% (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.8% (3)</td>
<td>6.0% (3)</td>
<td>41.2% (14)</td>
<td>23.5% (6)</td>
<td>11.6% (4)</td>
<td>5.9% (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.3% (2)</td>
<td>18.4% (7)</td>
<td>18.4% (7)</td>
<td>55.3% (21)</td>
<td>2.6% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>57.6% (19)</td>
<td>3.0% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>12.5% (3)</td>
<td>25.0% (6)</td>
<td>54.2% (13)</td>
<td>4.2% (1)</td>
<td>4.2% (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>36.6% (7)</td>
<td>47.4% (9)</td>
<td>5.3% (1)</td>
<td>10.5% (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other (please specify)

answered question
skipped question

2. At any time during or after your deployment did you make use of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency"?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If YES, in what year did you start using the manual? 71

answered question 98
skipped question 1
3. Before the publication of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" in December 2006, what, if any, sources of information on counterinsurgency were you using? Please list titles or authors to the best of your ability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answered question</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skipped question</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections, chapters, or themes you found most useful while on deployment. For example: "chapter 3, on intelligence", "the parts on the population," or "the sections on how to plan COIN ops", or "I found little useful info in the FM".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answered question</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skipped question</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. On a scale from "Not useful" to "Extremely Useful", please rate how useful you felt FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" was to you during your deployments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not useful</td>
<td>7.4% (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A little useful</td>
<td>9.8% (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat useful</td>
<td>22.3% (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mostly useful</td>
<td>23.4% (22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Extremely useful</td>
<td>11.7% (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not use FM 3-24</td>
<td>25.5% (24)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rating Average</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Count</td>
<td>94</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answered question</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answered question</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skipped question</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Please check the box next to the phrase that best describes how FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency", was used during your tour. (Please check all that apply.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informed my own understanding of the conflict</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed planning and operations of my unit</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had no effect on my unit</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed planning and operations of my command</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed my subordinates about counterinsurgency</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 92
skipped question 7

7. How useful was FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency", in informing your subordinates about the reasoning behind plans and operations informed by the discussion of insurgent war in the manual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Not useful</th>
<th>A little useful</th>
<th>Somewhat useful</th>
<th>Very useful</th>
<th>Extremely useful</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.4% (13)</td>
<td>21.1% (19)</td>
<td>28.9% (26)</td>
<td>22.2% (20)</td>
<td>4.4% (4)</td>
<td>5.9% (8)</td>
<td>2.79 (90)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 90
skipped question 9
8. In your opinion, how important was an official statement of doctrine on counterinsurgency, like FM 3-24, to the success of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all related to the military’s success</th>
<th>A little important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Essential to the military’s success</th>
<th>Rating Average</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>18.9% (17)</td>
<td>28.9% (26)</td>
<td>22.2% (20)</td>
<td>17.8% (16)</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>90</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

answered question 90

skipped question 9

9. At what levels of operations do you think FM 3-24 was most useful? (Please check at all that apply.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical unit level</td>
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<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division/Corps level</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Command level</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Decision Maker level</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please list the level at which you think FM 3-24 was most useful.

answered question 88

skipped question 11
10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" was or was not important to the military's success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Count</th>
<th>64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>answered question</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skipped question</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. For each year, please answer whether you were deployed in any part of OIF or OEF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2006 OEF-P (Also 2004-2008 in SOCPAC working GWOT across PACOM AOR)</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 12:58 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bright Star</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 7:55 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Canadian Army, ISAF (vice OEF) Jan-Sep 07 Kandahar Province</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:17 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Foreign Service Officer equivalent of ranks shown are FS-04</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Deployed 2009-2010 as a Rifle Platoon Commander with the Canadian Army to ISAF.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:24 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Numerous short engagements in the Philippines in support of OEF-P, and was a primary planner/coordinator for JTF-Liberia.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SPC</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 4:06 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. OEF-HOA 2003-CPT</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:41 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Civilian Operational Analyst (Government employee) equivalent rank listed</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:42 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. POLAD</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:52 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Served 15 months in Iraq in military. Remainder as a civilian intelligence analyst and COIN / tribal warfare adviser. One year of this working as a tribal adviser to II Marine Expeditionary Force, Anbar Province.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 11:21 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. I was a staffsergeant in 2003-2004</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 1:48 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. GS14, CIW, Human Terrain System</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 3:45 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Hey guys - officers deployed in-theater aren't the only ones to find value in FM 3-24. Military and civilian of all ranks and in all locations read it too, AND USED IT</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 4:22 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. 2006-2009, Kosovo, MAJ</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 8:47 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. I was an E-5 in 2001-2002</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:10 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 2002 - OEF Philippines</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 12:53 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Foreign Service 1 (Equivalent to COL)</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 4:37 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. El Salvador, JUST CAUSE, ODS, Bcsnia</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 5:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Was a UN military observer in the Western Sahara in 2000/2001, matched up with the Frente De Polisario separatist movement.</td>
<td>Dec 8, 2010 6:54 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. For each year, please answer whether you were deployed in any part of OIF or OEF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Government Employee -- three deployments</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 3:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>'01-'02: OEF-Colombia</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 7:58 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>We still have OPS in the Phillipines and Central/South America as well as</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 8:35 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen, HOA etc...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>LCpl, Cpl, Sgr.</td>
<td>Dec 12, 2010 6:45 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. At any time during or after your deployment did you make use of FM 3-24,

   If YES, in what year did you start using the manual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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2. At any time during or after your deployment did you make use of FM 3-24, 

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<td>2005 (Draft)</td>
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3. Before the publication of FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency” in

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<td>1. David Galula, Trinquier</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 4:27 PM</td>
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<td>2. None or “best practices” passed along from sister units. In 2001, this information was virtually impossible to get…</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 6:21 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. none</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 10:27 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Nagl Soup w/A Knife Krepinich Army in Vietnam Kilcullen 26 Articles</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:46 AM</td>
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<td>7. 2005: FM 3-0, 3-90 as applicable (not much) 2005: COIN Academy traveling team in Baghdad</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:31 PM</td>
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<td>8. David Galula, Counterinsurgency warfare USMC Counterinsurgency FM @1930s</td>
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<td>9. Best practices of last unit, Phoenix academy docs, Lawrence 7 Pillars, CALL docs.</td>
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<td>11. Galula</td>
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<td>12. Unknown authors…material from CALL</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:40 PM</td>
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<td>13. galula</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:49 PM</td>
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<td>14. None.</td>
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<td>16. None</td>
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<td>17. Whatever I could get my hands on. Old SF manuals, Galula, the old counter-guerrilla manual.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:39 PM</td>
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<td>18. Did not use - assigned outside operational Army</td>
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<td>19. None</td>
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<td>20. FM 7-8</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:01 PM</td>
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<td>21. Canadian Army Draft COIN Publication, never published Canadian Army 355-01, Civ-Mil Coop UK Army Stability Operations US Army Fires Bn Publication (it had a section on fire support in COIN ops based on Vietnam LL which proved particularly useful).</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:17 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. We read Galula in prep for Afghanistan, and used alot of lessons learned.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Attended PRT lectures and meetings wherein the tenets of FM 3-24 were reinforced. Read PRT Handbook equivalent.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Galula; some from Counterinsurgency: T&amp;P. but his Pacification in Algeria was much more useful for developing a campaign plan. C.E. Callwell, Taber, Small Wars Journal. As an intelligence officer, I found War Comes to Long An and Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience Napoleon Valeriano particularly useful</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 11:58 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Mostly academic articles (Military Review) Some books on Rhodesian Experience</td>
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3. Before the publication of FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency” in

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<td>27 I can't recall all the titles, but I have a large library for COIN, UW and terrorism related textbooks, PDF formatted RAND studies, etc.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:52 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 none</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:59 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Galula's pacification in alg Kilcullen's 28 articles</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:24 AM</td>
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<td>30 Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam others required in advanced course reading list</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:37 AM</td>
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<td>32 Galula, Nagel, Kilcullen</td>
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<td>33 Small Wars Manual Taliban Guerrilla and Jungle Warfare Professional Articles</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:52 PM</td>
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<td>34 David Galula Trinquier Nagel Vietnam, Malaysia case studies Rand Studies</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:01 PM</td>
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<td>35 Galula, Thompson, Trinquier</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 6:22 PM</td>
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<td>36 None</td>
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<td>37 none</td>
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<td>38 C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice; David Galula, Countermilitary Warfare, Robert Taber, War of the Flea; Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare Thomas Hamme, The Sting and the Stone USMC 1940 Small Wars Manual</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:41 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>39 Small Wars Journal postings and discussions were extremely helpful and informative</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:42 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 I have been in LIC conflicts in Lebanon and Rwanda</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:52 PM</td>
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<td>41 I read books on how the english dealt with the irish problem, and Indochina</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:02 PM</td>
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<td>42 David Kilculler's 29 articles. CALL manuals from earlier OIF/OEF tours. Naghi's eating soup with a knife.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:06 PM</td>
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<td>43 Hackworth's Vietnam Primer Galula Something else but cant remember</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:48 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>44 Materials from Phoenix Academy Taji Iraq December 2005</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
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3. Before the publication of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" in

| 45 | Thompson - Defeating Communist Insurgency  
|    | Fall Street Without Joy and Hell in a Very Small Place  
|    | Kitson - Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping and  
|    | Bunch of Five  
|    | Trinquier - Modern Warfare  
|    | Mao Guerilla Warfare and Modern Warfare  
|  | Dec 2, 2010 10:03 PM |
| 46 | Studied history and social systems of the region.  
|  | Dec 2, 2010 11:21 PM |
| 47 | Sepp, Kicullen, Nagi  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 1:48 AM |
| 48 | My Company Commander was plugged in to COIN philosophy back in 2005 - he  
|    | read T.E. Lawrence and brought back a lot of what he was taught during the  
|    | Army's COIN Academy and integrated that into Company level operations.  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 1:56 AM |
| 49 | None  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 2:18 AM |
| 50 | RECONDO  
|    | Seal Teams during Vietnam  
|    | D-DAY, Stephen Ambrose: Chapters on French Insurgency and OSS  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 2:43 AM |
| 51 | Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare  
|    | Hammers, The Sling and the Stone  
|    | Galula, Counterinsurgent Warfare, Theory and Practice  
|    | Kitson, Low Intensity Warfare  
|    | Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 3:45 AM |
| 52 | Australian Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD publication) but I had very little idea on  
|    | what was in it or what 'COIN' was about.  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 4:39 AM |
| 53 | Writings by Galula and Kicullen  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 6:18 AM |
| 54 | Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife  
|    | Kicullen's 28 Articles  
|    | Seven Pillars of Wisdom  
|    | Mao Little Red Book  
|    | Small Wars Journal  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 6:36 AM |
|  | Dec 3, 2010 7:25 AM |
| 56 | Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Dr Marks of NDU  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 9:03 AM |
| 57 | Marine Corps Small Wars Manual  
|    | The Last 100 Yds by John Poole in addition to some of his other publications on  
|    | small units and the eastern way of warfare.  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 9:39 AM |
| 58 | Galula  
|    | Small Wars Journal - 1940  
|    | TE Lawrence  
|    | Others  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 10:39 AM |
| 59 | Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 12:19 PM |
| 60 | "The Village" by Bing West, "Eating Soup with a Knife" by LTC John Nagl  
|  | Dec 3, 2010 1:22 PM |
| 61 | Andy Kreplinevich, Colin Gray, John Nagl, Jeff Record, Ray Millen and Steve  
|    | Metz, Roger Trinquier, David Galula, T.X. Hammes, Asprey, Anthony James  
|    | Joens, Small Wars Journal, various stuff on Soviets in Afghanistan. I am probably  
|    | an anomaly in your survey in that I started the disciplined study of this topic as a  
|    | 2nd Class Cadet at USMA in '90-91 with the course then titled "Low Intensity  
|    | Conflict."  
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<td>63 SF Q course</td>
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<td>64 I found little help in the FM</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 9:51 PM</td>
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<td>66 Word of mouth from SF guys</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 6:10 AM</td>
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<td>67 To many to list...here is a few - Bard O’Neil, TE Lawrence, Galula, Bing West, John Nagl, Bruce Hoffman (terrorism).</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:58 AM</td>
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<td>69 N/A</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 4:20 PM</td>
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<td>70 SF COIN Manual</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 5:05 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>71 Vietnam Primer - SLA Marshal &amp; Hackworth</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:53 PM</td>
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<td>72 “28 articles” -David Galula, &quot;Coin Warfare&quot; -john Poole -Alexis Detoucheville, helped understand civil society</td>
<td>Dec 5, 2010 10:05 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>73 Before the publication I was a junior Marine, and there was no concept of counterinsurgency.</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 12:29 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>74 None. We made it up as we went along.</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 1:48 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 The few COIN articles being published in mainstream and military publications at the time. I do not recall specific titles. Also, “The Pentagon's New Map” opened the door for the validation of strategies other than conventional.</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 10:48 PM</td>
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<td>76 Galula, Kilcullen, Thompson, Kitson</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 4:17 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>77 Galula, Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie, von der Heydtle, and more</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 5:39 PM</td>
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<td>78 Read whole or parts of: Galula - Counterinsurgency (Maoist, Algeria, Indochina) Nagle - Eating Soup with a Knife (Malaysia) Linn - The Phillpine War Home – A Savage War of Peace (Algeria) Also attended the Indian Counterinsurgency School in Vairengte, Mizorum, India in 2005 – learned extensively about the Naga and Mizo insurgencies, and general theory and practice</td>
<td>Dec 8, 2010 6:54 PM</td>
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<td>79 N/A/ U.S. forces are not counter-insurgents in OIF or OEF</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 3:52 AM</td>
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<td>80 Marine Small Wars manual Special Forces COIN manual, FM 31-20-3</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 7:58 AM</td>
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<td>81 Low Intensity Operations Frank Kitson Bunch of Five Frank Kitson Big Boys Rules Mark Urban Works of Kilcullen Op Banner Lessons Learned Seven Pillars of Wisdom TE Lawrence</td>
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<td>83 USMC Small Wars Manual</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 1:26 PM</td>
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<td>Sun Tzu Art of War</td>
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<td>Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare</td>
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<td>Giap, How We Won the War</td>
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<td>The Bear Went over the Mountain</td>
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<td>On the Other Side of the Mountain</td>
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<td>84 UW Manual</td>
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<td>85 Galula, SF Manuals, Kitson</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 8:35 PM</td>
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<td>86 William Lind, Col T.X. Hammes</td>
<td>Dec 12, 2010 6:45 PM</td>
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<td>87 Savage wars of peace</td>
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4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections,

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<tr>
<td>1 Population-focus; importance of HUMINT, uncertainty, difficult to measure progress</td>
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<td>2 The chapter on developing lines of effort.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Did not use it at the BN level and below</td>
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<td>4 n/a</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 10:27 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Did not read until after deployment. As former ops officer @ COIN center found CH 1.2.5, and APP A most useless/relevant to audiences. CH 3.4.6 exceeded by more recent doctrinal FMes</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:46 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 I find this FM to be what I call &quot;zombie COIN&quot; as it lacks soul. That missing soul is an understanding of insurgency itself. This is a collection of historic COIN insights, overly colored by the US experience in Iraq.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 12:56 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Did not use FM 3-24</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:31 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Useful, were Effects of the Operational Environment</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:56 PM</td>
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<td>Unuseful, minimal discussion on the importance of NON-Military counterinsurgency partners</td>
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<td>9 Chapters 4 and 5. But to me the FM seemed to be a little &quot;all over the place&quot; trying to put in everything whether it was connected or not.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 4:51 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 I have not read 3-24</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 4:53 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 COIN campaign design</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:22 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 The chapter on sustainment provided a good start point for assisting Iraqi Army logistics units, but it really just pointed out stuff we already knew. It lacked imperatives that we could point to and say, &quot;We must do this or risk mission failure.&quot;</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:40 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 I do not remember</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:49 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 My deployment was prior to FM 3-24 being released.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 6:41 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 By the time it came out I had already completed one OIF deployment and learned many of the lessons the hard way. However, the section LOO's what something that I hadn't seen before and was useful to me on my second deployment.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Ch 1 - Definitions of Counterinsurgency, Paradoxes; Ch 5 - Figure 5.1 and explaining paragraphs</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:54 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17  Chapter 1. Aspects of Counterinsurgency  
Chapter 5. Counterinsurgency Approaches                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Dec 1, 2010 8:59 PM |
| 18  I found little useful info in the FM                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Dec 1, 2010 9:01 PM |
| 19  The section on Targeting in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 particularly use of police, Appendix A and to a lesser extent E                                                                                                                                                               | Dec 1, 2010 9:17 PM |
| 20  No part stands out in particular                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Dec 1, 2010 9:55 PM |
| 21  The parts on dealing with the population were spoken about regularly amongst PRT members. There were tensions between the military and foreign service officers on implementation of COIN with respect to population and government.                                     | Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM |
| 22  Everything pertaining to the importance of securing the populace and preventing the enemy from using (said) populace as a safe-haven, or kinetic offensive launching pad.                                                                                                     | Dec 1, 2010 11:39 PM |
| 23  I utilized the intelligence chapter to some effect particularly in training the other officers in my unit in COIN intelligence. It was useful to have doctrine to back up my insistence that they needed to take an active role in collecting and disseminating information and intelligence. | Dec 1, 2010 11:58 PM |
| 24  Parts on "White SA", figuring out who is living in communities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Dec 2, 2010 12:24 AM |
| 25  I quoted FM3-24 a few times in the handbook I wrote (Controlling the Population, who owns the block), the campaign planning section I found very useful.                                                                                                                               | Dec 2, 2010 12:52 AM |
| 26  The paradoxes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Dec 2, 2010 1:57 AM |
| 27  Protracted war they don't have to win just survive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Dec 2, 2010 1:59 AM |
| 28  FM 3-24 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Dec 2, 2010 2:24 AM |
| 29  N/A                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Dec 2, 2010 2:37 AM |
| 30  The better parts of FM 3-24 revolve about intelligence. But much of that is commonsensical.  
Overall, FM 3-24 emerges as a Maoist cartoon that doesn't capture either the nature of the irregular wars we find ourselves in or provide a handy guide for the typical military officer.  
Although I had been sent brief snippets of FM 3-24's rough drafts during the Leavenworth vetting of it, I obviously absorbed it fully after my deployment.  
It has not aged well.                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Dec 2, 2010 4:08 AM |
| 31  Population,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Dec 2, 2010 1:24 PM |
| 32  ch5 executing COIN Operations (especially IO)  
parts on the population planning COIN  
integrating Host Nation Forces                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Dec 2, 2010 1:52 PM |
| 33  IPB in the Counterinsurgency-Chapter 3  
Tenets of Counterinsurgency                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Dec 2, 2010 2:01 PM |
| 34  I did not use FM 3-24.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Dec 2, 2010 7:33 PM |
| 35  The most useful section provided an example of an operational approach for COIN, including lines of effort and associated decisive points. The discussion of insurgency also was helpful.                                                                  | Dec 2, 2010 8:41 PM |
| 36  Planning and Assessment of COIN operations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Dec 2, 2010 8:42 PM |
| 37  N/A                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Dec 2, 2010 9:02 PM |
| 38  "Think small—small victories grow over time", "The more force pro you have, the less secure you may be", "All security is local"                                                                                                                                                     | Dec 2, 2010 9:06 PM |
4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections, and your thoughts on them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 39 | Ch 1  
| Ch 2  
| Chap 4  
| Chap 6                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Dec 2, 2010 10:03 PM |
| 40 | I found little useful info in the FM that could not be found and is better expressed in the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual and 1961 FM 31-21 *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations. | Dec 2, 2010 11:21 PM |
| 41 | The chapter on Insurgency I didn't know anything.                                                                                                                                                             | Dec 3, 2010 1:48 AM  |
| 42 | I found little use in the FM... I've found reading info on Small Wars Journal, as well as David Kilcullen far more beneficial. The only somewhat useful stuff pulled from the FM when used it were ideas for tracking data / information. I think it was good that the Army put out a FM on COIN, but it didn't help much. | Dec 3, 2010 1:56 AM  |
| 43 | Reading the entire manual is critical to understanding each element. In addition, additional reading is a must, as there are many elements of counterinsurgency and insurgency evolving and being discovered. | Dec 3, 2010 2:18 AM  |
| 44 | Good at describing the tactical environment but there is no strategic integration.                                                                                                                             | Dec 3, 2010 2:43 AM  |
| 45 | I think many parts of the book contain useful, practical suggestions but I think the manual provides an insufficient portrait of how insurgency has evolved from the original Galula-esque and Thompson-esque portrait - particularly in the areas of media/propaganda of the deed. In this sense, it was more a rehashing of the literature rather than a step forward. And it fails to incorporate practical and useful suggestions on how to deal with the subversive network of an insurgency which is involved primarily in facilitation, shadow governance, and intimidation. This may be the most important part to counter - certainly more so than the trigger pullers - and it is key to prying the insurgency away from the population. | Dec 3, 2010 3:45 AM  |
| 46 | The separate volume 3-24.2 was the most helpful.                                                                                                                                                             | Dec 3, 2010 4:39 AM  |
| 47 | Most chapters provided useful information, but although hinted at in the manual it is exceedingly vague and could be confusing regarding the importance and use of influence operations like what American forces characterize under the rubric of Information Operations. | Dec 3, 2010 6:18 AM  |
| 48 | Unity of Command  
Chapter 2  
social network analysis                                                                                                                                                                                      | Dec 3, 2010 6:36 AM  |
| 49 | It was all useful in a way, but it was nothing new. Probably the sections on Unity of Effort and Executing COIN.                                                                                             | Dec 3, 2010 7:25 AM  |
| 50 | Nothing in particular. The FM was just introduced to us to let us know it was out there.                                                                                                                      | Dec 3, 2010 9:03 AM  |
| 51 | Chapters 1 for a good background. Chap 2 had the most relevance to some of our operations with civilian engineers and contractors.                                                                           | Dec 3, 2010 9:39 AM  |
| 52 | None - simply a rehash of existing material                                                                                                                                                                    | Dec 3, 2010 10:39 AM |
| 53 | I found most useful probably the chapter concerning working and partnering with indigenous military forces as it pretty well captured the largest part of my work.                                                  | Dec 3, 2010 12:19 PM |
4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections, and contents of this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The FM provided a framework to build on in a very general sense. But the books</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Village&quot; and &quot;Eating Soup with A Knife&quot; both provided specific example of</td>
<td>1:22 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soldiers &amp; leaders operating in a COIN environment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From LTC Nag's book, I recall the discussion about the UK perspective of US</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reaction to the British COIN recommendations (the US ignored them). &quot;The</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village&quot; had numerous examples of Marines operating &amp; living with Vietnamese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>villagers and &quot;security forces&quot; and sharing their dangers, hardships, &amp;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives...leading by example.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I found something useful in all of it, but I had a broad and deep background</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:16 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to its publication. I would offer that the role of punitive operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are diminished and frankly the notion propagated by the manual that the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population is ALWAYS the center of gravity reduces COIN to a very formulaic,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complicated problem, i.e. the solution is this but you must use multi-variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calculus to get to it versus really figuring out what the true problem is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the ends), then what the solution is (ways and means) and then the way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ahead to bring a suitable end.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not use it on deployment, as came out after my deployments.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:24 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing that wasn't already known from study of UW.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:46 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I used the whole thing as a club to beat on my doctrinaire superiors - without</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 6:10 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it, I had absolutely no justification to do things the COIN way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 (whole of government). 4 (Design) and 6 (HN SECFOR)</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:56 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3, Intelligence served as the foundation for generating our PIFIs and</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 12:53 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a template for post-patrol after action reports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Paradoxes of COIN (1-148 thru 1-157)</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 4:20 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Example Lines of Operations for COIN (Fig 5-1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Goals &amp; Objs Along Lines of Ops (Fig 5-2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Evaluate the Threat (B-26 thru B-56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pattern Analysis (B-59 thru B-62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Good/Bad Practices for Speakers (Tbl C-2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Vignettes throughout the FM are helpful understanding and teaching/training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I did not use the manual until after deployments. I referred to it while an O/</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:53 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C at JRTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction and Appendix A... made it required reading for SLs</td>
<td>Dec 5, 2010 10:05 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a Marine officer who served as the OIC for a Police Mentor Team in</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 12:29 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, I was most interested in the application of the chapter pertaining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to training/advising foreign forces. However, I enjoyed the section on non-kin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etic targeting as well.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Unity of Effort, Integrating CIL MIL Activities</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 10:48 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, host-nation security forces, engaging the population</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 4:17 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 5:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. forces are not counter-insurgents in OIF or OEF</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 3:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV (Civil-mil integration) and X (limited support)</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 7:58 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much of the rest was written with a heavy American-centric influence and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perception of how people act/the world works-to include a white-washed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>version/vision of how to conduct COIN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot remember chapters but reqt for intelligence, indigenous forces and</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 9:11 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding the environment were key takeaways.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Given the best you can remember, please briefly describe the parts, sections,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Date and Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72 I found little useful in the FM. I think it is mostly a poor and narrowly interpreted regurgitation of other works.</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 1:26 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 Kluckhun's parts from &quot;Articles of COIN&quot;</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 4:10 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 Appendices were good for CO/BN echelon, and the Paradoxes and Best Practices were great for a commander.</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 8:35 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Chapter 3</td>
<td>Dec 12, 2010 6:25 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. At what levels of operations do you think FM 3-24 was most useful? (Please list the level at which you think FM 3-24 was most useful.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level Description</th>
<th>Date and Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 political</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 4:27 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Division &amp; Above</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 8:27 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Corps and higher</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 10:27 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BCT and higher</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:46 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Combatant Command</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:31 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Political Decision Maker level</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 2:56 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Operational</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 4:51 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Division/Corps</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 5:22 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Brigade</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 7:40 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Battalion</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 7:49 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 At the tactical level</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 BCT-to-Corps (Tactical/ Operational)</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:54 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Operational (not based on size of unit but its function)</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:17 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Tactical</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Company down to platoon to squad level.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 11:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Guide focuses mostly on issues that the Military shouldn't get too mixed up in</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:24 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Ground Pounder to BDE level</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Understanding framing the enemy</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:59 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Operational</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:24 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Political Decision Maker</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 4:06 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Battalion and below</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:52 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Tactical Unit or Below</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:01 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Brigade and below</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:41 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 brigade</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:52 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tactical (BN and below, although the BCT level needs to be on the same page as well)</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:06 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Tactical</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:09 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Tactical but it should have had greater impact/understanding at op level</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 10:03 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Battalion / Brigade</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 6:16 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 At the company and battalion operations level</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 9:39 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Battalion staff as the bottom level---useful for framing the campaign at the BCT and higher level.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:16 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. At what levels of operations do you think FM 3-24 was most useful? (Please list the level at which you think FM 3-24 was most useful.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Operation Level</th>
<th>Date and Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Did lead to the development of the US COIN Manual signed by DoD, DoS, USAID.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:24 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Division and Corp</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:46 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 8:47 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Brigade - Corps</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 6:10 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Division, corps - because that is where I was. Every answer you receive will be from that person's worldview, thus inherently biased.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:56 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 12:53 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Political Decision Maker Level</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 4:20 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>BCT/BNCO</td>
<td>Dec 5, 2010 10:05 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Operational level</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 12:29 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Division and below</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 10:48 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>operational level (Bn, Bde, and Div)</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 4:17 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Not useful</td>
<td>Dec 7, 2010 5:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Division / Corps</td>
<td>Dec 8, 2010 6:54 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Dec 9, 2010 8:05 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>N/A/ U.S. forces were not counter-insurgents in OIF or OEF</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 3:52 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 7:58 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Company/BN</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 4:10 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 8:35 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency";

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Date and Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>It changed the way that people and senior leaders thought about success in such efforts. Before I went to Iraq, my brigade commander said we were going to be decisive. It seemed wrong, but no one could articulate exactly why he was wrong. In Ramadi, in 2004-2005 we paid the price for trying to be decisive. Most leaders do not think like that anymore and when they do, others have some intellectual basis for disagreeing. From a more strategic perspective, when everyone realized that these things were going to take time and progress was difficult to measure, it relieved some of the angst that Americans typically feel when they do not get immediate results.</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 4:27 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FM 3-24's biggest achievement was that it helped achieve buy-in for the war effort from the inter-agency community.</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 6:21 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>You had to have ‘buy in’ at the BDE commander level. If they did not tell the BN that it was the way to go...it did not go.</td>
<td>Nov 30, 2010 7:43 PM</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, <strong>&quot;Counterinsurgency&quot;</strong>;</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Response Text</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I do not think it adequately addresses the challenges and types of planning necessary for units permanently owning battle space. Its central focus is addressing the basic aspects of an insurgency, the complexity of the environment, and use of design in campaign planning. These are extremely helpful to staffs and certainly senior officers who do not get to experience the environment first hand on a regular basis. However, it does not address the unique way a CPT needs to look at the environment, the unending problem he is facing (stability), and how each unique area contributes equally to the idea of national stability. It must explore the idea that strategies might need to be developed below theatre because the local problem mirrors the national problem. Commanders charged with stabilizing the environment must think long term &amp; strategically. They must then translate that approach into tactical action on a daily basis. This idea is not discussed probably because it is so controversial and requires significant analysis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nov 30, 2010 8:27 PM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Came too late. Most units did not read/internaize. As late as 2009 less than 10% of military audiences polled had actually read the manual. Joke used to be &quot;best manual no one read&quot; or &quot;more people outside the army have read it than in the army&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 2:46 AM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The reasons cited to FM3-24 for success in Iraq are quite likely not the actual cause of the effects achieved. As to Afghanistan, the insurgency grows stronger every day (or every summer) as we apply 3-24 too literally without understanding Insurgency and addressing the true causation.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 12:58 PM</strong></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>It doesn't describe anything that units aren't already doing, so it isn't very useful for tactical units. It is useful for higher level commanders to set larger goals and tie together resources and efforts of the tactical units toward those goals. The FM can provide a common framework for rotating higher headquarters to give more continuity between incoming and outgoing HQs.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 2:31 PM</strong></td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>It was useful in a brough view, limited on understanding the personnel nature of good COIN operations in relation to the population.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 2:56 PM</strong></td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>It did little to explain the HOW but more focused on the WHY and the WHAT. I'd venture that persistance had more to do with success (define success, right?) than FM 3-24. Anecdotal comments don't help commanders, specifically tactical ones to see how these thoughts apply to where the rubber meets the road. There is a lot of room for interpretation which, given the great reviews, allowed commanders to reference 3-24 without understanding WHY it proposed an action. There is little depth in the manual and, just like many business management books, it was propogated mostly on high reviews and buy-in by influential people not the substance. It made everyone think they were Trinquier.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 4:51 PM</strong></td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>I have not read 3-24.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 4:53 PM</strong></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>It forms the doctrinal basis for our operations. Without it, many in the Army would say that activities outside of offense and defense are not our job.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 5:22 PM</strong></td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>It confirmed what we already knew, but this was a good thing. In a way, it codified what we were doing -- and this we needed more than anything.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 5:40 PM</strong></td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Provided a common lexicon and got the force to start studying/thinking about COIN holistically</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 7:02 PM</strong></td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Was not developed in Iraq, was used by the Brigade in Afghanistan. Certainly gained importance in the eyes of the commander and was a useful reference.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 7:40 PM</strong></td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>It recognized the importance of COIN within the Army Culture.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 7:55 PM</strong></td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>I think it was important because it formally &quot;enshrined&quot; COIN as something that the Army did. In my opinion, this helped to shift the thinking of units, soldiers, and leaders to look more holistically at their AOs.</td>
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<td><strong>Dec 1, 2010 8:39 PM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The publishing of FM 3-24 and the pervading emphasis placed on the force in Iraq to know it (links on every portal page, highlights in briefings, etc) finally place a common operational approach into the heads of all leaders in Iraq. It provided the missing 'common language' to the force for the mission MNC-I was engaged in. In short - right doctrine, right emphasis, right time (or maybe 4 years too late...).</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:54 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>FM 3-24, &quot;Counterinsurgency&quot; was important because it gave the coalition forces a guide to use in fighting this type of war.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 8:59 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>For my deployment it came out too late to have a significant impact.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:17 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>FM 3-24 was useful because it put everyone on the same sheet of music for how to conduct operations, instead of each commander doing his own thing. I think that many people understood it as GEN Petraeus' commander's guidance.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:55 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>At the tactical level it was where COIN was most successful – the issue is that in lieu of a Top-Down approach, the strategic CDR would provide overall guidance and direction, COIN was often implemented Bottom-Up – so that the field tactical CDR almost seemed to be creating U.S. national strategy as he implemented offensive, defensive, and/or ops missions and activities. Policy goals were therefore being applied at the tactical level – no one knew what what going on operationally and strategically. What the PRT members knew (military and foreign service) was that the tactical CDR was the one who disallowed the elements of COIN to be implemented. So while it was important to have some guidance, and there is no doubt that COIN was needed in that particular environment (given the development goals for both Iraq and Afghanistan), there was much confusion how to do so. Foreign Service Officers prefer a Top-Down approach, not Bottom-Up. Otherwise, it appears that national strategy and policy are being implemented from the ground up and not from policy makers. This causes many problems in the short and long term.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 9:56 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The manual gave combat leaders a baseline of knowledge of how to assess and tackle the threat we faced. Although much of FM 3-24 is rooted from lessons learned in past conflicts (Galuga - Algeria per se), it allowed leaders to adapt their lessons learned, apply FM 3-24 and pass on the knowledge to incoming units in order to keep up the fight. Securing and working with the local populace, again, is vital.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 11:39 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>The manual's publication and its associated fanfare was more useful than its content. Post publication, the operational framework of counterinsurgency, regardless of the tactics utilized therein, had a much higher profile and acceptance across the operational army.</td>
<td>Dec 1, 2010 11:58 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Not very important. I believe Iraq settled down due to forces outside of the military's control - COIN fans took the claim for it. Afghanistan is far from successful and I saw no utility in pop-centric COIN during my 7 months.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:24 AM</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Quite frankly we have not been successful in Afghanistan, and while we achieved a temporary success in Iraq by simultaneously focusing on the populace and enemy, it is far from certain that what we obtained will hold for more than a couple of years before it unravels. I'm convinced now that the FM is doing more damage than good, because I have seen too many commanders who are myopically focused the population, who ignored the enemy and gave them considerable freedom of movement, which of course undermined their efforts to influence the populace. It isn't the text, it is the interpretation of the text.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 12:52 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>As an infantry company commander conducting distributed security operations I used FM 3-24 as a tool to teach my NCOis/Soldiers on the basics of population centric COIN by reading/discussing portions of the FM.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:57 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>It created a framework of understanding for the conflict and broke the army out of the rut some were stuck in.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:59 AM</td>
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10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency;"

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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>The FM tries to articulate conceptual and abstract information at a time when we were focused and consumed with execution and reaction</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:24 AM</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>It is a good starting point for those who cannot read to any great depth on counterinsurgency.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:37 AM</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>FM 3-24 mostly was useful as an IO effort. It provided a means to sell the upspring of endemic civil conflict by suggesting a seamless how-to manual that was short on kinetics and long on pensive &quot;pentathlete&quot; leaders who nimbly adapted in the most humanitarian fashion to end the bloodletting. This, of course, is a myth, and one that was dishonestly constructed. I suppose in a few decades a future Douglas Porch will emerge to describe how it became a tool used to sway fence sitters amongst America's elite, especially ham-headed journalists and think tank wonks, to the efficacy of a strategy that actually wasn't used. Gallieni would be impressed.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 4:08 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>I think it did help. Although imperfect it did codify some very important factors that a leader needed to take into account while conducting COIN.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:24 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>The section in ch 6 on IO is especially critical to developing a campaign strategy and framework. 96% of what we did in OEF is based on an integrated IO campaign which we did not have during the cold war. This chapter rolls things together from the rest of the manual. FM 3-24 is great but needs updates, specifics and changes from recent US combat experiences and lessons learned.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 1:52 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>The Army was not focused on the population prior to FM 3-24; we were an Army of occupation only prior to that.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 2:01 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Indirectly, FM3-24 was useful in Iraq only in that roughly the same people who wrote it were responsible for the change in tactics that brought success. I would argue that we have not yet achieved military success in Afghanistan because the FM assumes a concomitant improvement (or at least a desire for improvement) in governance.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 6:22 PM</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Not related to my specialty.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 7:33 PM</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>In my opinion, common doctrine significantly contributed to success in Afghanistan and Iraq. FM 3-24 informed the field about the subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency. It also defined common terminology useful in those conditions. Without these, the Army had no common basis for operation or experimentation.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:41 PM</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Caters to a wide audience in terms of supporting multiple approaches to the conduct of COIN. I felt the distillation of COIN doctrine to Operational Tasks to support the justification of anything one wishes to undertake by linking it to a set of, or buffet of principles. Any one action or task was therefore justified on its own merit BUT the collective effect of these dispersed, well-meaning and intentioned tasks failed to deliver the desired effects and sometimes produced tactical success with attendant strategic defeats.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:42 PM</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Because it provided a common framework that had been lacking</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 8:52 PM</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>It was important because it caused leaders the think about COIN. For too long they had ignored it. Your survey is flawed focusing on OIF adn OEF.</td>
<td>Dec 2, 2010 9:02 PM</td>
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10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency";

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<th>Response Text</th>
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<td>It was important for Iraq, can't speak on AF as I haven't been, by shifting the mindset of the small unit leaders so that we were all working off the same sheet of music. I don't believe, however, that this FM somehow was the driving factor for the drop in violence in Iraq, there were plenty of other factors that occurred and may have led to the so-called tipping point even if this FM was never produced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>It changed the way of thinking of the problems in Afghanistan. It shifted focus from kinetic to population centric warfare, where the battle needs to be during counterinsurgency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-24 speaks in too many generalities with little discussion of tactical considerations. Looking through the lens of a CO CDR, it doesn't advise me in the tactical terms or decisions. As a MAJ and strategist, I see the utility of the 3 and 4-star level, but it wasn't decisive. 90% of the manual is codified common sense. There is definitely a place for that so we don't lose the lessons, but there is clearly a need for something that discusses irregular warfare at the brigade and below.</td>
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<td>Changed the way of thinking leading to a change in operations.</td>
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<th>Response Text</th>
<th>Dec 2, 2010 10:03 PM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provides a common, useful framework upon which to base understanding of what needs to be done, provides a broader understanding for scope of course of action and methods.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 3-24, &quot;Counterinsurgency&quot; is plain wrong as to what motivates tribal and solidarity groups, tribal politics and diplomacy. The manual focuses too much on social work approaches to irregular warfare and stresses the introduction of welfare programs (hearts and minds) as an answer to rebellion and revolt. A hearts and minds approach does not resonate with members of a shame and honor culture.</td>
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<td>I don't think it was. I would wager 80% of the Army MFE who conduct COIN OPS still haven't read the manual 3-24 or 3-24-2. So all of the BS shoved down people whout JRTC etc makes little to no sense if people dont understand the principles behind it... And a caveat if you automatically assumed not a single enlisted soldier read the manual that is an epic fail... i.e from question number 1.</td>
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<td>I think the FM would be more beneficial if it were reduced in size and made more user friendly. Additionally, I think more current &amp; theater / enemy specific type trackers would be beneficial. I think most people at this point in OEF and OIF understand the basics of COIN, but everyone gets all spun around what defines success and how to track success - the FM needs to provide examples of that, examples on campaign planning at the BDE and below (down to the company level), etc. so that it provides junior level leaders on what they actually need while deployed. not all RIWs go as they should, not all info is shared, not all tracking mechanisms are passed. The FM needs to give a brief overview of COIN fundamentals and then talk about ways to defeat insurgencies. I also feel that the FM is not the problem with winning. First, we need to define success and then figure out how to get there...in my experience, that does not happen. Nor do we prepare ourselves prior to deployment on what the deployment will entail. My previous deployment I was the A/S-3 (Plans) for my BN. I got tagged as being the BDE's lead for IP training, eventhough I was a BN staff officer and we had a MP provost marshall officer. With that said, I was tasked to develop the BDE's IP training plan, which at the time was part of the BDE's main effort. I had no idea what I was doing. I remember getting a draft order kicked back by the BDE XO with the remarks, &quot;...think like a cop. &quot; on it. How the hell would I know how a cop thinks? I've never been a cop and my only experience with cops were the few times I was pulled over...that's why we're 9 years into OEF and 7 years into OIF. Think like a cop, really? I'm an Armor officer.</td>
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<td>It is important as it gives an understanding of what counterinsurgency is. To the average Soldier the idea of hunting down the insurgent is key to counterinsurgency rather than addressing the Lines of Efforts. I do believe that FM 3-24:2 Tactical Counterinsurgency is an important addition, giving further insight into the concept.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:18 AM</td>
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<td>It was the first big step in reminding the Army about fighting insurgents. It is best used at the BDE level for analyzing the big picture. Most commands say they are adopting the manual yet do not change their methods as the manual recommends.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:43 AM</td>
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<td>I think the central drive of 3-24 in concept of 'securing the population' and rebuilding detracted from our security efforts in-country, with far-reaching consequences. I have first-hand experience that highlights the futility in trying to win hearts and minds over there, but we tried regardless to the detriment of our security line of operation. In my opinion 3-24 led the campaign down that path without proper policy or campaign design. In other words 3-24 templated the tactics and policy for us, but the tactics and policy were never linked into a realistic or feasible end-state.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 3:46 AM</td>
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<td>This manual's holistic approach and the emphasis put behind its development and &quot;fielding&quot; drew interest to the subject which gave Soldiers at several levels greater understanding of what they face(d) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like any Western military manual, FM 3-24 is not prescriptive and can only provide models/ideas which Soldiers in the field can manipulate and (most importantly) innovate based on current conditions. War is inherently uncertain but the more models and background Soldiers have in the subject, the better able they are to react to this uncertainty in comparison to the illiterate and uninformed.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 4:39 AM</td>
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<td>The ideals presented are great. The publication of the manual itself brought the topic and techniques to the public mind. I question how effectively the tenets are utilized in practice at the operational and tactical level. I currently work for NTD-A and I can tell you there is little unity of effort. We have so many DCOMs that there is little actual work happening in Kabul other than a bunch of rice bowl fights.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 6:38 AM</td>
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<td>It was not important because it did little more than repackage what diligent professionals already knew in a single source. Furthermore, while it informed the tactical level, those who followed the FM would have done so anyway based on their own readings/education, and those who didn't buy COIN to begin with ignored the FM. Most critically, while tactical level actions largely followed the FM and operational level commanders mouthed allegiance to the FM, commanders failed to properly aggregate tactical actions in a coherent operational and strategic design, ESPECIALLY in Afghanistan. One three-star briefing key leaders in Afghanistan in 2010 went on about the successes we were seeing at the tactical level. Then he said (paraphrase), &quot;At the operational level, I'm a little less optimistic. I don't really see how we're going to combine these tactical successes at the operational level.&quot; Well, isn't that your job? We are failing at the operational and strategic level because our leadership is not operationally or strategically proficient, but rather are bred as bureaucratic administrative managers of programs and mitigators of risk.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 7:25 AM</td>
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<td>The Joint Unit I was assigned to could have had some great successes in Afghanistan had we even used 3-24 a little. The problems was the Army guys on the team didn't believe we should be involved in COIN ops and they had most of the command positions we never used 3-24 during our deployment.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 9:03 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>I believe it was important to shift a mindset away from a kinetic focus.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 9:39 AM</td>
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### 10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency;"

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<td>57. Not useful because very few have read it. Senior officers in particular don't seem interested for reasons unknown though it may have to do with ego. Senior NCOs are, IMHO, too lazy to be bothered with it.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 1:22 PM</td>
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<td>58. Before 3-24 I don't think we knew what the operational level of war meant in a COIN/SASDIMOOTW/LIC environment. I remember discussing with guys in 2003, &quot;what role did a Corps have in COIN?&quot; Especially since we tended to tie the operational art to the corps and army-level formations—3-24 has helped us think about campaigning at lower levels, although I think we are getting a bit too deep with companies, batteries, troops now developing rudimentary campaign plans.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:16 PM</td>
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<td>59. 3-24 focused on Iraq, and believe it did assist in the success in Iraq.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:24 PM</td>
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<td>60. It was an educational tool for all the COLs and GENs who grew up in the Cold War, no so much for the LTs and CPTs who grew up post 9-11.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 2:48 PM</td>
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<td>61. It was too theoretical for the conditions as a stand alone product</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 9:51 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>62. I think that FM 3-24 has only been partially embraced by the military. Some units did great, others not at all.</td>
<td>Dec 3, 2010 10:56 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>63. Those of us fighting on the ground figured out pretty quickly the best way to do it - mostly by emulating the SF guys. Our doctrinaire leadership did not understand this, and refused to do the COIN things that worked until we had doctrine to use as top cover.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 6:10 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>64. Absolutely. It helped inform the discourse.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:56 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. FM 3-24 served best as a doctrine to teach to our host nation partner units. The FM is not drafted for the United States to serve as a temporary foreign force inside a sovereign nation. Furthermore, the FM does not account for the revolutionary nature of the new democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq best described as phase III insurgencies. Instead, the FM is written for a nation with an established government that is now facing an insurgency as opposed to a new government that failed to garner popular support. As far as Iraq is concerned, the FM should not be given credit for AQNs strategic blunder, the T-walling of Baghdad, or Muqtada al Sadr's stand down of JAM.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 12:53 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>66. First steps in changing the culture of the U.S. Military, and embracing a change from traditional, conventional operations and embracing COIN.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 2:10 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. The FM served as an academic discussion of the strategy the US/Coalition Forces would pursue. This thorough explanation (at the policy maker level) helped convince the US/Coalition governments that the war could be won, thus granting the funding, troops, equipment, and materiel needed to continue the campaign and win. Without this manual, I believe that government support for the war would have faltered, and the military would not have been granted continued fiscal support from Congress/Parliament, etc.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 4:20 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. Two different areas, cultures and dynamics. Two entirely different insurgencies that can't be cookie cut and planted somewhere else. A regurgitation of SF manuals that were used when insurgencies were really at the pinnacle of war</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 5:05 PM</td>
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<td>69. It does not discuss the reality of selective and purposeful violence in moving from control to collaboration in reference to the native population. (Kalyves). This is the tool that is cannot be exercised by the U.S. military today. All other TTPs are efforts to compensate (poorly) for the lack of this tool.</td>
<td>Dec 4, 2010 8:53 PM</td>
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<td>70. Changed the cultural mindset. It codified what many veterans of the insurgency already knew/feet. Now we had doctrine to stand on.</td>
<td>Dec 5, 2010 10:05 AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>71. Counterinsurgency is another aspect in our range of military operations. Now at least we have some doctrine in that department.</td>
<td>Dec 6, 2010 12:29 AM</td>
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10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency;"

| Response Text                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Dec 6, 2010 10:48 PM |
|---                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 72 Hugely important. The publication of the manual helped the Army reframe its approach to operations in Iraq -- from kinetic dominance to population centric. Emphasis shifted to civil mil and influence ops. Also, reset the priorities for professional military studies from conventional war to COIN. However controversial, COIN and FM 3-24 expanded permanently how the US Army conducts itself during armed conflict.                                                                                          | Dec 7, 2010 4:17 AM |
| 73 It provided a common, coherent, and authoritative expression of how the Army intended to organize and fight for counterinsurgency--something that helped to change leaders' and subordinates' mindsets on the war. Close-mindedness has the greatest potential to inhibit our operations, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere (HOA, Philippines, etc.). | Dec 7, 2010 5:39 PM |
| 74 am neither a believer in "lessons learned" nor "best practices" -- our best hope is to have a range of heuristics in our officers that they can call upon (essentially as insightful metaphors). In that regard, I am not a fan of doctrine -- it is way too Doctrine is reductive and always presents a monistic paradigm that is counterproductive to "design" acting and thinking. If we are to have a doctrine, make it an annotated bibliography of "essential" readings. Move to a design philosophy ("the anti-doctrine") and away from doctrine unless it is about the science of war (physical war).  | Dec 6, 2010 6:54 PM |
| 75 The TTPs were less important than the institutional message sent by 3-24's publication, which, in my estimation helped to effect a change in the culture of command. First, it officially sanctioned the Army to take direct responsibility for the Iraq population's security and thereby to regain the operational initiative (which had been lost in the "Iraqis in the lead" strategy) and second, it endorsed the general notion that large scale uniform approaches were insufficient. Novel, neighborhood based approaches would require "bottom up" initiatives (mission command), a fact that seems to have facilitated experimentation and adaptation (and that endorsed risk taking and underwriting.) Thirdly -- and this is a paradox -- 3-24's publication signified that US forces had found an honorable logic for our operations, which was previously only describable in terms of conditions setting for withdrawal. In other words, the specific techniques espoused by 3-24 were far less important, in my mind, than the social fact that was 3-24's publication. | Dec 9, 2010 9:05 PM |
| 76 1. We have not succeed. FM 3-24 is a method to an end, but we have not defined the end we are hoping to achieve. I also believe that 3-24 has had the (perhaps unintended) effect of making us less willing to see force as a viable option to shape the environment. In my view this is flat wrong. Force is the critical component that the Army can use in a COIN campaign, yet we fail to emphasize it. Again, this may be an unintended result, but I believe 3-24 is similar to Clausewitz in that it was heavily quoted but rarely read. Additionally my view is that 3-24 is being applied haphazardly at the Tactical and Operational level and NOT AT ALL at the Strategic level. The issues of government legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan must be dealt with at the STRATEGIC level if the pop centric COIN method has any hope of working. ROE and rhetoric about protecting the population will not prevent defeat if we accept the truly criminal nature of the HN governments. |
10. Please describe why you think FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency;"

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<th>Dec 11, 2010 3:52 AM</th>
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| 77  OIF or OEF were not examples of COIN. They were examples of an occupying force conducting foreign internal defense. We are not the counter-insurgent in these conflicts.  

In Iraq, as an invader and occupier, we enabled a Shia revolution. The Shia in charge (PM Maliki's Dawa Party for example) have long been Iranian supported guerrilla organizations that violently opposed the previous regime. Our forces enabled this revolution to occur, whereas prior to our invasion the revolution was held in check by Saddam's security forces.  

The violence we have witnessed in Iraq has been a mixture of resistance to the occupation, counter-revolutionary violence aimed at the Shia guerrillas that the occupier installed into power, counter-revolutionary violence directed at the enabling force (occupier), terrorist -- tied to the notion of a global jihad to make Iraq part of a global caliphate, and criminal violence.  

Applying the FM to this problem is akin to forcing a round peg into a square hole. And it is incredibly intellectually dishonest for senior leadership to not only ignore this fact, but then try to sell this FM as being successful and useful in Afghanistan.  

The FM simply does not apply to Iraq, or Afghanistan and the authors and supporters of the FM's failure to recognize this problem has lead us to the point where we are today -- and is directly related to the massive loss of treasure we have dumped into both countries.  

Besides the problems outlined above, a major fundamental flaw in the FM is that it was written from the basis of colonial powers fighting insurrection within the borders of their far reaching empire. It simply not applicable to scenarios we face today (Western forces occupying Muslim lands and attempting to install, protect, and enable new governments).  

It is time to scrap the FM altogether and write a new FM that is applicable to not only the actual conflicts we may face, but specifically the role we will play in those conflicts. | Dec 11, 2010 7:58 AM |
<p>| I tend to think that success in Iraq came from the emergence of several factors and that the application of 3-24 played little, if any, part in that. In Afghanistan, the military has not had success, but if there is any future success I would think it would come from either non-3-24 concepts or the fact that the military doesn't follow 3-24 now. | Dec 11, 2010 9:11 AM |
| 79  3-24 is not a recipe book for success. What it does is get soldiers to understand that COIN is different to warfighting. A lighter touch is required. COIN is subtle but should be intuitive. Understanding the environment is the most important part of dealing with COIN problems and I rate understanding the environment as more important than mission analysis. My view is that COIN is no more complex than warfighting - just different. Many of the (COIN) challenges are of our own making and although the enemy is adaptive and difficult to recognise, he will always be beaten tactically. The challenge is in turning tactical success into operational and strategic success. In COIN sometimes it is best to avoid the fight in order to achieve overall success. COIN requires 'command' patience - there are no quick wins. | Dec 11, 2010 1:26 PM |
| First, we've had no success in either country to date. To state that we've had success is to overlook the obvious... no government in Iraq. That is effectively out of our hands and positing it as a success also denies the errors made by the enemy during the campaign. As for Afghanistan, classic example of not understanding the country and a misinformed policy. | Dec 11, 2010 1:26 PM |</p>
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<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Doctrine provides direction and guidance, and CF were lacking this since UW doctrine likely wasn't their emphasis.</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 4:10 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>US Army had lost its doctrinal way WRT COIN &amp; other low intensity operations since the Vietnam War. As an institution the Army brought into Colonel Summers argument and the force was not afforded a full spectrum education to prepare it for full spectrum operations (Apologies for using current concepts, but the tasks had been there just not the nature.) Dr. David Whighelestein writes that in the closing years of the war, and into the post-Vietnam era the Army as an institution abandoned its low intensity or COIN capability. The curriculum at West Point and the Command and General Staff College reflect this where the study of COIN and low intensity conflicts not only decreased but was often done surreptitiously if at all. FM 3-24, and ‘pop’ COIN (dinistias like Nagi and Kilcullen have been great at getting the word out and providing material for our political decision makers as well, so they and the manual have been essential in helping persuade politicians on how best to prosecute the wars. However, 3-24, is dated in that its approach is very Iraq and many will complain (rightly) that there is no cookie cutter approach to COIN, and blame 3-24 instead of reading it and seeking their own solutions.</td>
<td>Dec 11, 2010 8:35 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>First of all, no one’s gonna read it. It’s the driest, most painful hundreds of pages I’ve read it pales anything I’m reading now at an Ivy League university. When most commanders speak about “counterinsurgency,” they are using buzzwords in place of actual understanding just as they do with everything else. Second, the Anbaris got tired of Al Qaeda in Iraq and everyone outside of the military’s echo chamber can see that. If they hadn’t facilitated the love fest visited upon them by the US military, we would’ve kept shooting up civilians and fighting the entire population just the same. Most members of the US GCE don’t take most training seriously most of the time, so I find it pretty hard to believe that a couple Mojave Vipers suddenly turned every redneck with an M-4 into T.E. Lawrence.</td>
<td>Dec 12, 2010 6:45 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>It at least got us to start thinking about counterinsurgency from an operational and intellectual standpoint.</td>
<td>Dec 12, 2010 8:25 PM</td>
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</table>
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