NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE:
FRENCH AND AMERICAN CULTURAL OCCUPATION POLICIES
AND GERMAN EXPECTATIONS, 1945-1949

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation explores the local implementation of French and American cultural occupation policies in Germany from 1945-1949. It focuses on events in French-occupied Freiburg and American-occupied Stuttgart and relies on materials gathered in local and state German archives as well as the French and American national archives. The dissertation argues that postwar German culture developed not through the unilateral implementation of Allied policies, but rather through negotiations between Allied and German visions. In Freiburg and Stuttgart negotiations over the purpose and character of postwar cultural activities reflected a broader debate over what 1945 meant for the future of German society. To varying degrees, French and American officials viewed the Reich’s collapse as an invitation to rebuild Germany along the lines of their own “superior” political and cultural traditions. By contrast, German officials looked to rebuild along native lines and, in the wake of what they described as unwelcome Nazi political and cultural “experiments,” greeted Allied reeducation efforts with a combination of frustration and suspicion. Thus, while the Allies shared with their Germans general democratic, capitalist, and Christian values, they struggled to win support for their specific reforms. Combined with conflicts between civilian and military officials and continued personnel reductions, the lingering physical and psychological trauma of war frustrated reeducation efforts and rendered the transfer of Allied culture more difficult than occupation planners had anticipated. Although historical, geographic, and cultural ties between Baden and France helped the French to achieve a greater cultural presence in Freiburg, the situation most owed to the willingness of French officials to
impose their agenda on local Germans. In Stuttgart, American concerns over the antidemocratic
nature of occupation and an historical American aversion to imperialism stiffened the challenge
that broader discrepancies between German and American cultural expectations posed to
occupation officials. Thus, after four years of occupation, the most important Allied contribution
to the denazification and democratization of both cities came not through the promotion of Allied
customs, but rather the victory of Allied armies over the Reich and the cessation of Nazi rule.
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To my wife, Sarah
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“…the ravaged faces of the three men who signed before us the acknowledgement of the total defeat of the Reich has given us a picture of the German people’s ruin. But these ruins will rise again one day and, to prevent the development of a new tragedy that would stain the world with blood, there will always be a need for France.” – General de Lattre de Tassigny, French First Army, victory speech to Allied officials following the German capitulation, 8 May 1945.

“The American people have a huge stake in peace. Twice within the century […] we have given of our lives and our resources to prevent the domination of Europe by force. We recognize that a threat to freedom anywhere is a threat to our own freedom. […] Solving the German problem will be a major constructive step toward peace. It is a complex task. A new political and economic life [has] to be reconstructed from the chaos of defeat.” – General Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor U.S. Zone, retrospective discussion of the occupation in his memoir, Decision in Germany.
Introduction

In March 2003 American-led Coalition forces invaded Iraq and toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. In the wake of the invasion, the victors sought both to demilitarize and democratize the defeated country. For historians of post-1945 Germany, the occupiers’ mission was familiar. The same appeared to be true for American officials and commentators, who insisted on the similarities between the postwar occupation of Germany and the Coalition’s presence in Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice thus compared the Iraqi anti-occupation insurgency to the Nazi “Werewolves,” who confronted Allied forces in the wake of the Reich’s collapse. In the meantime, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld justified the Coalition’s mission by arguing that any decision to leave a defeated Iraq in the hands of Saddam’s ruling Baath party would have been tantamount to leaving a devastated Germany under Nazi control.¹

Comparisons of the occupations also influenced American policies. Calls for the “de-Baathification” of Iraqi society drew on the example of denazification, while plans for Iraq’s democratization drew on postwar strategies for German reeducation. More than policy guidelines, however, American officials perceived in the occupation of Germany a model for the successful export of American democracy. (West) Germany had become democratic, they argued, because of the Allied, and especially American, commitment to democratize and reeducate German society. Yet, in their rush to achieve similar results in Iraq, American officials inadvertently raised questions about the realities of the post-1945 mission. How exactly had the occupation democratized Germany? What had the introduction of Allied political and cultural ideals meant for Germans in their daily lives? How had relations between the occupier and occupied influenced the implementation of Allied initiatives?

These questions lie at the heart of the present study, which explores the local implementation of Allied cultural occupation policies in French-occupied Freiburg and American-occupied Stuttgart. Like the Allies, the study defines “cultural policy” as an effort to alter German ideas, customs, and institutions in the fields of film, theater, print media, and public education. If the Second World War had constituted a battle for territory, the implementation of cultural policy comprised a battle for hearts and minds. It served to reinforce, in the daily lives of postwar Germans, those ideas and ideals that underlay broader Allied visions for a denazified, demilitarized, and democratic German state. Yet, in their campaign to reshape German society, the Allies were not alone. Germans held their own visions for the future and engaged their occupiers in a series of negotiations about the cultural foundations of postwar Germany.

At the heart of such negotiations lay a question that has continued to spark debate since the occupation of Germany began. At issue was the notion of a Stunde Null and a dispute over the political and cultural continuity of German society across the 1945 “divide.” To varying degrees, the Allies saw in the German defeat not only the collapse of Nazism but also the demise of an historical German penchant for authoritarianism and militaristic chauvinism. To prevent any future wave of German aggression, Allied planners argued, the reconstruction of German society had to proceed along more peaceful Allied models. German officials held a different view of their defeat and looked to rebuild their nation along pre-Nazi, German lines. As the occupation endured, the debate over what 1945 meant for Germany and Germans informed local relations between the occupier and the occupied.

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To examine these relations, the study proceeds in two sections and treats cultural activities in Freiburg and Stuttgart as the product of negotiations between Allied and German cultural expectations. Thus, the first section, which comprises two chapters, details the experiences, ideals, and assumptions that underlay the various parties’ visions for postwar Germany. Chapter 1 treats the Germans. It outlines how the two cities experienced Nazism and explores local reactions to defeat and occupation. It also examines Nazism’s influence in the cities’ cultural arenas and identifies those pre-Nazi ideals and customs that residents and officials hoped to reassert in the wake of the Reich’s collapse. Chapter 2 treats the Allies. It contrasts the views of National Socialism that underlay French and American denazification policies and compares the Allies’ reeducation agendas. The chapter also examines how the Allies’ experiences during the war influenced their approaches to peace and occupation. The second section, which comprises four chapters, tackles the local implementation of high cultural policies and probes the intersection of Allied and German understandings of Nazism, war, and reconstruction. Chapters 3-6 treat the reestablishment of film, theater, print media, and education activities and illustrate how distinct Allied and German visions informed the experience of each.

The dissertation argues that postwar German culture developed not through the unilateral implementation of Allied policies, but rather through negotiations between Allied and German visions. Negotiations were less contentious between the French and the Germans, who shared political and cultural ideals and held similar views of what Germany’s recent past meant for its postwar future. In Freiburg, historical ties between the city and France further eased relations between the occupier and the occupied. The situation was different in Stuttgart, where few prewar ties connected residents to their postwar occupier and differences between German and
American expectations frustrated negotiations over the shape of local cultural activities. Although each Ally’s policies laid the foundation for the restoration of such activities, neither French nor American officials were satisfied with their accomplishments. In addition to the physical consequences of defeat and personnel cuts within the occupation governments, a German aversion to cultural experimentation in the wake of the Nazi experience challenged the Allies’ efforts to reshape German culture. If French officials realized more of their agenda than their American colleagues, the situation owed less to similarities between French and German expectations than to the willingness of French occupation officials to ignore their commitment to democratization and impose their agenda on the Germans. In any case, residents and German officials in both cities approached the German defeat not as an obligation to adopt new, foreign customs and practices, but rather an opportunity to reassert those native traditions, which they believed Nazism had suspended or destroyed. Amid contentious Allied-German negotiations, then, the occupiers’ most important contribution to the denazification and democratization of local cultural activities came not through the promotion of Allied customs but rather the cessation of Nazi cultural policies.

The study of the local experience of occupation requires two analytical boundaries. The first is geographic. No single study can account for the diversity of events that unfolded in each of the four occupation zones. At best, one can make generalizations from a series of representative case studies. Pursuit of such generalizations, however, detracts attention from those local circumstances that distinguished occupation experiences within and across zonal borders. Thus, while the present study alludes to similarities among local and regional and national developments, it makes no claims about the typicality of either city’s experiences and, in fact, emphasizes developments that were unique to each community.
The selection of the two cities for this study owed to a combination of analytical and practical considerations. For the former, the cities’ positions within their respective regions and occupation zones were central. Both were the seats of regional military government units and hosted large contingents of Allied personnel who worked to influence local cultural activities. As state capitals, the cities also housed state cultural ministries, which alongside the municipal governments challenged the Allies’ control of cultural affairs. For a study of Allied-German relations, then, Freiburg and Stuttgart offered a wealth of interactions to observe. Practical considerations also justified a study of the two cities. Most important here was their proximity to one another. A short train ride connects them and eases the burden that research deadlines and limited funding present. In addition, the cities boast a wealth of archives. Both have municipal archives and branches of the Baden-Württemberg state archives. Stuttgart is also home to the Baden-Württemberg state library, while Freiburg offers the local university library. Freiburg is also close to archives of the French military government in nearby Colmar, France.

A second necessary analytical boundary concerns the timeline of the narrative. The present study examines the period 1945-1949. To be sure, the first section outlines developments prior to 1945, and the second section emphasizes the period 1945-1946, when the Allies’ position was strongest and the foundation of subsequent occupier-occupied relations was laid. Nevertheless, the analysis most concerns the period between the German capitulation on May 8, 1945 and the enactment of the Allied Occupation Statute in September 1949. The latter marked the official end of the occupation and the replacement of military governors with Allied high commissioners, who functioned less as directors than advisers. Combined with the reduction of the Allies' power, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the

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restoration of German sovereignty over cultural affairs signaled a new chapter in Allied-German relations, which lies beyond the scope of the present analysis.

By way of introduction, two final analytical observations merit attention. The first concerns the biography of those German officials with whom the occupiers most negotiated Germany’s postwar future. In general, these were older Germans, who had been born around the turn of the century. Most were also anti- or non-Nazis for whom Nazism had constituted an unwelcome political, cultural, or professional interruption. Tired of what they viewed as Nazi political and cultural “experiments,” they greeted the promotion of foreign Allied models with a mixture of frustration and suspicion. Of course, some of the native political and cultural ideals that German officials looked to reassert in the wake of the Reich’s collapse resembled Allied traditions. Nevertheless, a desire to restore Germany’s cultural reputation and refute Allied notions of a flawed German character rendered the response of early postwar German officials to Allied tutelage defensive.

A second observation concerns the treatment of anti-Communism in the narrative. Much of the occupation literature emphasizes the onset of the Cold War and the subsequent shift from anti-fascism to anti-Communism as determining factors in the evolution of Allied occupation strategies. To be sure, the increase in East-West tensions was crucial for the development of initiatives like the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the currency reform of 1948, all of which cast a shadow over local occupation experiences. In the cultural arena, however, the local influence of the Cold War was more ambiguous. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, at least, French and American cultural policy officials made little mention of a broader anti-Communist agenda and

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drew little distinction between anti-fascist and anti-Communist initiatives. If their silence reflected the lack of Communist sympathies in the two cities, it also betrayed similarities between the Allies’ denazification and anti-Communist agendas. Both carried the same objective: to make the Germans more like the Allies. Indeed, French and American authorities viewed their respective countries as model democratic societies and understood the adoption of their respective values and traditions as essential to the defense against either National Socialism or Communism.

To illustrate the conduct of these authorities, and their interactions with their Germans, the dissertation draws on a variety of sources. The Archives of the French Occupation of Germany and Austria and the records of the Office of Military Government United States (OMGUS) reveal the general outlines of French and American policies, as well as the views of local occupation officials in Freiburg and Stuttgart. By contrast, the municipal archives of Freiburg and Stuttgart, as well as the local Baden-Württemberg state archives, offer insight into German expectations and reactions to Allied policies. In addition, a variety of local newspapers, memoirs, and contemporary accounts reveal the occupation experiences of local German residents and officials.

As a comparative study of the local implementation of French and American cultural policies, the dissertation responds to the shortcomings of two separate bodies of literature. In general, the historiography of Germany’s postwar occupation has remained divided along zonal lines and has featured few comparative works. While historians have contrasted the policies of the Western Allies with those of the Soviets, policy differences among the western Allies have received little attention. With few exceptions scholars have treated the individual zones either in

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the context of specific national, i.e. French or American, questions or in reference to the broader history of the origins of the Cold War. The former is most common to studies of the French occupation, while the latter is typical of the literature on the American occupation.

Within the historiography of the western zones, studies of the American occupation comprise the largest and oldest body of literature. The earliest accounts of American policies appeared in the 1950s and were the work of former occupation officials. These titles featured more description than analysis and ventured only modest criticism of Allied policies. In the 1960s and 1970s, historians and political scientists brought a more critical approach to the field. Yet, their interest in the relationship between the occupation and the subsequent division of Germany established a narrative that has endured for decades in the work of both German and American scholars.

According to this narrative, the occupation was the prelude to the Cold War. The struggle to reconstruct the collapsed Nazi state exacerbated tensions between the Soviets and their Western Allies, and the division of Germany gave physical expression to the ideological divide between the East and the West. While this account is not inaccurate, it is misleading in two important ways. First, in anticipation of the Cold War and the integration of West Germany into the western Alliance, it accepts the western Allies’ own argument that their tutelage was responsible for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic Germany. It ignores differences between Allied and German cultural and political expectations and downplays the role that

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6 On the general historiography of the American occupation, see: Boehling, 9.
Germans played in shaping their own postwar society and culture. Second, the narrative substitutes “America” for the “West.” Britain receives some attention as America’s loyal ally, while France receives little or none. The narrative reflects America’s postwar diplomatic and economic superiority, which the extension of Marshall Aid to all western zones and the merger of the French and British zones with the American zone affirmed. Nevertheless, real policy differences, which, as chapter 2 demonstrates, were most pronounced between the French and American agendas, diversified the experience of western Germans throughout the occupation period. To understand the occupation in its entirety, such diversity merits greater attention.

Studies of the French zone also lack a comparative focus. More than the Cold War, however, scholars of the French occupation have focused on the nature and purpose of French occupation strategies as a function of broader French foreign policies. Debates on the matter colored much of the initial occupation historiography, which also suffered from the inaccessibility of French records until the mid-1980s. At the heart of the literature was the question of how French denazification and reeducation strategies related to postwar French security concerns. In the early 1980s a variety of French and German scholars cast the occupation in a negative light, with arguments that cultural policies and talk of FrancoGerman reconciliation served only to soften a broader campaign to make Germany more like France and thus less threatening. After the archives of the French occupation opened in 1986, another

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10 For an example, see: Wolfgang Benz, Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945-49/55 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).
group of historians challenged the negative view of the occupation. With the help of newly released documents, they contested the notion of the French zone as a “colony of exploitation,” and argued that French cultural policies betrayed a genuine desire for reconciliation.\textsuperscript{13} By the mid-1990s, a third group of scholars proposed a compromise and held that French cultural policy had served both French security and Franco-German reconciliation. Among the more prominent of these scholars was Corine Defrance, whose study of the French presence in Rhineland-Palatinate remains the most extensive general account of French cultural policy to date.\textsuperscript{14} Since the 1990s, historians of the French zone have focused less on the broader national relevance of French occupation strategies and turned more toward the local implementation of specific policies. However, comparisons of French and Allied initiatives have remained rare.

In addition to their lack of comparative studies, the historiographies of both the French and American zones have featured little analysis of the German (cultural) experience of occupation. Among the few case studies that have tackled the issue, a variety of shortcomings persists. For the American zone, John Gimbel’s study of Marburg comprises one of the earliest explorations of German experiences and Allied-German interactions. Although his work made a welcome contribution to a field dominated by macro-level policy studies, it focused less on German visions for the postwar future than German reactions to Allied mandates. In the meantime, Gimbel’s work pays only minimal attention to cultural policy. Studies of Nuremberg

\textsuperscript{13} A central proponent of this view was Jérôme Vaillant. For example, see: Jérôme Vaillant. “Aspects de la politique culturelle de la France en Allemagne 1945-1949,” in L’Allemagne occupée, 1945-1949, ed. Henri Ménudier (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1990) 201-220.

\textsuperscript{14} Corine Defrance, La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin, 1945-1955 (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994).
and Coburg have proven no more insightful.\textsuperscript{15} The situation is similar for the French zone. Frank Becker’s study of film, theater, and art policy in Württemberg-Hohenzollern treats cultural policy at the state level, although its emphasis on events in Tübingen offers a more localized portrait of the occupation experience.\textsuperscript{16} Dorothea Führe’s study of the French occupation of Berlin also treats cultural policy despite its broader focus on denazification.\textsuperscript{17} In both works, however, the discussion centers less on German expectations for the postwar future than reactions to Allied policies.

As responses to the historiographical neglect of the German occupation experience, two works deserve mention. For the American zone, Rebecca Boehling’s study of Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart examines German and Allied expectations for the shape of local postwar political parties and municipal and state governance.\textsuperscript{18} She reveals the prewar origins of the postwar German agenda and evaluates negotiations between the occupier and the occupied. Yet, her study is slight on matters of cultural policy and makes only brief references to the other western Allies. By contrast, Franz-Josef Heyen and Anton M. Keim’s collection of essays on the French-occupied region of Rhineland-Pfalz does treat cultural issues. It outlines cultural activities in the region from 1945-1955 and, in addition to the implementation of Allied policies, treats German cultural preferences. Yet, like Boehling’s work, the volume offers no insight into experiences in the other occupation zones. With both its comparative, cultural focus and its


\textsuperscript{18} Boehling, 1-14.
attention to both Allied and German experiences, then, this dissertation builds on these works and fills two important gaps in the occupation historiography.
Chapter 1: German Paths to 1945 - Freiburg and Stuttgart Before the Allies’ Arrival

On April 21, 1945 a woman in Freiburg huddled with her neighbors in the basement of a local church. In the distance gunfire announced the arrival of French soldiers. For most in the church the sound came as no surprise. For more than a year, reports of German military setbacks and the advance of Allied armies had presaged Germany’s defeat and occupation. While Germans assessed the present with certainty, they approached the future with great anxiety. In her diary the woman captured the conflicting emotions of the day. As she recounted, “Jeder wusste alles und keiner etwas Genaues. [...] Was mag jetzt kommen?”¹⁹ As the war ended and the occupation began, this question confronted Allied and German officials alike. In the months that followed, a host of solutions emerged from both sides, and negotiations among the various visions of postwar Germany provided the substance of Allied-German relations. Beneath debates over Germany’s future, however, lay a dispute over the nation’s past.

The chapter examines the communities’ development prior to the Allies’ arrival and considers the local experience of national and international developments. It begins with a review of the cities’ general political, economic, and cultural character from the nineteenth century through the 1920s. The focus then shifts to the rise of National Socialism and the transition from democracy to dictatorship. The chapter explores the cities’ experiences of both the Machtergreifung and Gleichschaltung and examines the local realities and consequences of the Second World War. A final section highlights the cities’ reactions to defeat and occupation and considers the postwar implications of the communities’ prewar ties to their respective occupiers.

At the heart of the chapter lies the notion of a *Stunde Null* and the debate over what the defeat of 1945 *meant* for Germany’s postwar future. At issue were the historical foundations of National Socialism and their implications for the political and cultural continuity of German society across the 1945 “divide.” In both cities German interpretations of the issues differed from those of their Allied counterparts. Although German officials did not deny the far-reaching consequences of the Nazi experience, they failed to see National Socialism as the sum of all Germany’s historical parts. Instead, they concluded that Nazism had echoed, accommodated, and suppressed, but not extirpated, the more established political and cultural traditions, such as Social Democracy, Communism, Liberalism, and Christianity, which had informed German society prior to 1933.\(^{20}\) As non- and anti-Nazis who had come of age before the Third Reich, local postwar leaders in Freiburg and Stuttgart found in these older customs and ideas a familiar, German, foundation for the future.\(^{21}\) As the occupation endured, the resonance or friction between such traditions and the Allies’ own political and cultural expectations determined the nature of Allied-German interactions.

The chapter makes no claims about the typicality of the pre-1945 histories of either Freiburg or Stuttgart. In fact, the analysis reveals how the cities’ distinct political and economic development during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries informed the local experience of the turbulent interwar years and rendered the communities less sympathetic to National Socialist appeals. Throughout the Weimar period the Nazis’ electoral strength in both cities remained below the national average. Yet, if local residents later recalled the *Machtergreifung* as an unwelcome imposition from Berlin, few contested the legitimacy of the new regime after 1933.


\(^{21}\) Herf, 25.
Whether for fear, hope, the desire for normalcy, or the discovery of common ground between its own expectations and the promises of the Führer, a majority in both cities found cause to accept the Nazi state. At the same time, however, non-Nazi political and cultural preferences persisted in both communities throughout the 1930s. After 1939, the onset of war, the continued radicalization of the regime, and the experience of defeat confirmed the bankruptcy of National Socialism for all but the most devout followers. In the wake of the Reich’s collapse, local officials endeavored to (re)assert their own visions of a democratic postwar German society and saw in their pre-1933 political and cultural preferences an acceptable, non-Nazi foundation for the future. In their endeavor, officials in Freiburg, where local cultural and historic ties to France promised greater resonance between German and French expectations, had greater cause for optimism than officials in Stuttgart, where the city’s minimal pre-1933 ties to America presaged greater friction between German and American visions.

**Nineteenth-Century Legacies**

As German and Allied officials assessed the historical significance of Nazism, they focused on different chapters in the German past. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, German assessments began with the early nineteenth century and emphasized the liberal and democratic traditions, that had distinguished the region since the French Revolution. As subsequent chapters show, the reassertion of such traditions later inspired the cities’ postwar leaders to question the need for postwar Allied democratic tutelage. Although officials exaggerated the strength and importance of their regions’ liberal and democratic traditions as a bulwark against National Socialism, their arguments recalled important trends that shaped their cities’ development prior to the 1930s.

At the end of the eighteenth century, as demands for the end of absolutism emerged throughout the German territories, they found particular resonance in the Southwest, the region
that later comprised Baden and Württemberg, for two reasons. The first was the region’s historic territorial diversity, which had discouraged absolutism. Prior to its consolidation in 1806, the German Southwest had constituted one of the most disjointed areas of the Holy Roman Empire, a diversity of small duchies, provinces, ecclesiastical holdings, and imperial cities. The situation deprived local leaders of the territorial and financial strength necessary for absolutist regimes and rendered more important the support of the local Untertanen. In their quest to maintain the latter’s loyalty, rulers discovered inclusive, liberal administrative styles to be more effective than the exclusive assertion of sovereign will.  

A second condition that facilitated the spread of liberal and democratic thought in the region was geography. As details of political and philosophical debates in revolutionary France crossed the Rhine in the eighteenth century, they found sympathy in the work of academics and publishers throughout the German Southwest.

In the decades after the French Revolution such sympathies encouraged liberal and democratic reform movements in the region. The Napoleonic conquests precipitated a wave of territorial consolidations, which disrupted the established lines of aristocratic and ecclesiastical power, and opened the door to more liberal forms of rule. In the meantime, the remaining sovereigns relied on liberal concessions to consolidate their legitimacy and win the support of their new subjects. In 1818 and 1819, respectively, Baden and Württemberg adopted two of the most progressive constitutions within the German Confederation. Both admittedly

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23 Fenkse, 11-17; Wassner, 101.


strengthened the supremacy of the sovereigns. Yet, in Baden, where officials drew on the example of the French constitutional charter of 1814, the grand duke agreed to guarantee the freedoms of movement, creed, and the press. In addition, he created a parliament, which provided all adult male taxpayers a representative voice in the government. Unlike its Badenese counterpart, Württemberg’s constitution emerged not from a decree by the monarch but rather from lengthy negotiations between the king and the estates. The constitution also offered additional freedoms beyond those granted in Baden. Most striking was the unprecedented right to contest unlawful actions by government officials of any rank.26

Neither state’s constitution escaped unscathed the waves of reaction that followed the Carlsbad Decrees in 1819. Yet, the measure of their significance lay most in their expression of political ideals, which in the following decades continued to move the pens of local liberal and democratic activists, whose work inspired reform movements throughout the German territories.27 Some of the more influential voices hailed from Freiburg and Stuttgart. Karl von Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker were both professors at the University of Freiburg and together edited one of Germany’s first non-censored newspapers, entitled Der Freisinnige, in the wake of the Revolution of 1830. They also were responsible for the Staatslexikon, which functioned as a kind of handbook for liberal politicians for decades.28 Stuttgart boasted its own liberal heroes, among whom was the young Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Although subsequent generations twisted Hegel’s words to fit a variety of political views on both the left and the right, the influence of his Philosophy of Right (1821) on the thinking of liberal activists

27 Fenske, 11.
throughout the nineteenth century was central. Stuttgart was also home to Friedrich Schiller, whose exploration of moral and spiritual rebellion in *Kabale und Liebe* (1784) and *Die Räuber* (1781) enjoyed widespread popularity among subsequent generations of liberal thinkers. Schiller later was a central figure in Stuttgart’s post-1945 cultural identity.

In addition to many liberal and democratic activists, the Southwest provided a stage for intense political agitation. During the *Vormärz*, calls for reform in Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, and Mannheim helped to inspire similar demands in other German territories. As news of Louis Philippe’s fall in Paris sparked a flurry of activity across Germany in 1848, developments in the southwestern states proved most intense. Baden, in fact, was home to Germany’s only revolutionary republic. Neither Freiburg nor Stuttgart escaped the excitement of the Revolution. In Freiburg, revolutionaries paraded through the streets and erected barricades in the city center. Liberal reformers also forced the replacement of the conservative mayor with the liberal nephew of Karl von Rotteck. Stuttgart saw its share of demonstrations as well, and later provided refuge to delegates of the Frankfurt Parliament, who faced military arrest in the wake of their failed constitutional campaign. The city appealed to delegates both because of Württemberg’s liberal constitutional past and because its king, William I, had been the only German monarch to endorse, albeit reluctantly, the Frankfurt Parliament’s proposed constitution. The cities’ also experienced the revolution’s collapse. Residents of Freiburg endured occupation by Prussian troops, whose help Baden’s grand duke requested in order to

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29 Fenske, 68-71; Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 33-34.
30 Fenske, 25; Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 200-201.
31 Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 659; Fenske, 12.
32 Fenkse, 12.
topple the revolutionary government. Although Stuttgart escaped occupation, the threat of Prussian invasion prompted the local government to use its own military forces to disperse the so-called Rumpfparlament.35

In the following decades, the strength of early liberal and democratic movements in the Southwest continued to influence the region’s development in at least three ways. First, the region remained a source of progressive legislation, as the reintroduction of free press laws in Baden and Württemberg in 1864 demonstrated. Both states’ laws remained in force until their supersession by the national Reich Press Law of 1874.36 Second, the attention that early constitutional and political experiments in the Southwest had garnered throughout Germany during the early nineteenth century informed the region’s approach to German unification.37 Images of Baden and Württemberg as liberal and democratic strongholds had fostered popular, albeit exaggerated, distinctions between the “liberal” Southwest and the “conservative” North.38 The distinction strengthened Southwestern opposition to Prussian hegemony and a “small German” solution to the German question. This was true both in Freiburg, where the city’s Catholic majority already preferred the leadership of Catholic Austria to Protestant Prussia, and in Stuttgart, where William I had long sought to maintain his kingdom’s independence from both great German powers.39 In spite of the bitter prosecution of the Kulturkampf in Badenese cities like Freiburg, which saw the imprisonment of priests and the house arrest of an archbishop, and

37 Fenske, 11; Sheehan, German Liberalism, 8; Wehling and Weber, Geschichte Baden-Württembergs, 66.
the subsequent implementation of anti-Socialist legislation across the region, views of the Southwest as a bastion of liberal, democratic, and “anti-Prussian” ideals endured after 1871 and resurfaced during the Weimar, Nazi, and post-1945 eras.\textsuperscript{40} Finally, the Southwest’s early liberal political biases had important consequences for the development of local politics. These prevented a strong conservative movement in the two states and created a milder political environment, which featured tentative cooperation between liberal leaders and their colleagues in the Catholic Center and Social Democratic parties.\textsuperscript{41} Such cooperation endured throughout the imperial era and later provided the region with calm amid the political storms of the 1920s and 1930s.

\textbf{Stability and Continuity in the Weimar Period}

Despite moments of hope and prosperity, the Weimar era remained for most Germans a time of tremendous uncertainty. Along with the defeat of 1918, the transition from monarchy to democracy challenged political, socio-economic, and cultural norms that had informed German society since the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{42} In Freiburg and Stuttgart, however, the transition was less dramatic. While neither city escaped the consequences of the Great War or the Kaiser’s abdication, much about political, economic, and cultural life remained unchanged from the pre-1914 period.

Both cities experienced continued demographic expansion. From 24,603 in 1871 and 89,120 in 1914, Freiburg’s population grew to 90,400 in 1925 and 100,000 in 1932. In the


meantime, the city maintained its confessional character. With historic ties to Catholic Austria and its role as the seat of an archdiocese, which was responsible for most of Baden, Freiburg had been predominantly Catholic for centuries. From the late nineteenth century through the Weimar era, approximately two thirds of residents identified themselves as Catholics. In addition, approximately 30% claimed to be Protestants, while less than 2% were Jewish.\footnote{On general German demographic trends, see: Peukert, 7; On local growth rates, see: Manfred Lallinger, “Wandel der Einwohnerstruktur,” \emph{Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg}, eds. Heiko Haumann and Hans Schadek, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss, 2001) 180; Kalchthaler 129.; Thomas Schnabel, “Krise und Untergang der Weimarer Republik,” \emph{Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg}, eds. Heiko Haumann and Hans Schadek, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss, 2001) 298; Chickering, 33.} Stuttgart was larger and more Protestant. From 91,623 in 1871 and 300,000 in 1914, the city’s population grew to 341,967 in 1925 and 415,028 in 1933. The city’s Protestant character dated from the sixteenth century, when Stuttgart became the seat of the Württemberg Evangelical Church. In 1925 approximately three quarters of its residents identified themselves as Protestant, while 19% claimed to be Catholic, and less than 2% were Jewish.\footnote{Paul Sauer, \emph{Kleine Geschichte Stuttgarts: Von der Reichsgründung bis heute} (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1991) 19 and 60; Rolland Müller, \emph{Stuttgart zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus} (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss, 1988) 12.}

The cities’ interwar economies demonstrated the continued influence of prewar developments as well. Since the 1880s Freiburg had boasted a service-based economy. During his twenty-five-year tenure in office, which ended in 1913, Lord Mayor Otto Winterer had transformed the city into both a retirement community and a tourist destination.\footnote{Renate Liessem-Breinlinger, “Schlaglicht: Oberbürgermeister Dr. Otto Winterer (1846-1915),” \emph{Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg}, eds. Heiko Haumann and Hans Schadek, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss, 2001) 239; Chickering, 22; Kalchthaler, 124.} Combined with expanded transportation facilities, new housing construction, and an architectural facelift of the city center, Freiburg’s location at the edge of the Black Forest and its moderate climate drew both long- and short-term visitors. In the wake of First World War the city remained a “\emph{Pensionopolis}” and attracted an increasing number of tourists. From the late nineteenth century through the 1920s, the transportation and commercial sectors, which served Freiburg’s visitors
and included many small businesses and artisanal shops, employed approximately a third of local workers. 46 In addition, the university drew an increasing number of students, professors, and administrators to the city. Ecclesiastical as well as state and municipal bureaucracies provided another important source of employment. Finally, approximately forty percent of the population found work in the industrial sector, which comprised housing construction, infrastructure repair, and factory work. Yet, Freiburg was far from a major industrial center, as local manufacturing rates lagged behind the national average until the late 1920s. 47

By contrast, Stuttgart was an important manufacturing hub. The local economy had assumed its industrial character during the late nineteenth century, when a series of manufacturing plants began to replace the small workshops, farms, and vineyards of the Residenzstadt as the top source of employment. 48 From its humble beginnings in the production of musical instruments, sugar products, furniture, and chemicals, the city’s manufacturing sector emerged as a leader in automobile production and precision engineering, after Gottlieb Daimler and Robert Bosch opened their local factories in 1886 and 1890. 49 As the twentieth century began, the local industrial sector remained focused on finished goods, and most comprised small- and medium-sized firms. 50 In addition to factories, residents found work in the city’s publishing industry and robust public sector. 51

Like their economies, the cities’ Weimar-era school systems demonstrated continuity across the 1918 divide. Administration of the education system, which still comprised separate primary and secondary schooling tracks and oriented students at a young age toward specific

47 Schnabel, “Von der Splittergruppe,” 95; Chickering, 23.
48 Sauer, 9.
49 Sauer, 9.
51 Sauer, 44.
career paths, remained decentralized. Primary schools, which offered basic instruction in literature and religion, remained under the financial control of the cities, while secondary schools, which prepared select students for careers in academia or the higher civil service, were the responsibility of the regional (state) governments. In Freiburg the late nineteenth-century Badenese tradition of mixed-faith primary schools, or Simultanschulen, persisted. Stuttgart’s primary students attended separate Catholic and Protestant institutions. Although pre-1914 efforts to create a national, single-track school system continued, reforms established only a common four-year elementary school and an intermediary Aufbauschule. The new elementary school delayed the “orientation” of students toward a specific profession by four years and, along with the Aufbauschule, increased mobility between the primary and secondary tracks. In neither city, however, did the reforms have the desired effect. Throughout the 1920s primary schools provided the majority of the cities’ students with their only educational experience, while attendance at secondary schools, which included the humanities-focused Gymnasien and the more science-focused Realschulen, remained the privilege of a small, middle- and upper-class minority.

Outside work and school, the cities’ Weimar-era residents enjoyed familiar pastimes. Increased film production and improved distribution networks helped cinemas to emerge as the most popular entertainment venue. In both cities cinema construction increased after the introduction of “talking films” in the late 1920s. Freiburg had already made its own unique

contribution to the evolution of German cinema as the birthplace of the popular “Kino-Orgel,” which provided musical accompaniment to silent films in Germany’s early movie houses.\textsuperscript{53}

After the passage of the \textit{Reichslichtspielgesetz} in 1920, local film programs required approval from one of two national film boards prior to screening. The boards, which comprised educators, representatives of the film industry, and state officials with experience in artistic or pedagogical matters, prevented the release of films that threatened either the public order or Germany’s relations with foreign powers. The boards’ charters did not, however, call for the suspension of films for specific political, religious, or philosophical reasons.\textsuperscript{54}

Specific Weimar-era programs from the two cities are unavailable. Yet, no evidence suggests that local cinematic offerings diverged from national trends, which under the watch of the censorship boards shifted their focus from foreign to domestic titles throughout the 1920s. In the absence of a strong domestic film industry, foreign films had dominated the German screen during the first decade of the twentieth century. French films led with 30\% of the market, while American and Italian works followed with 25\% and 20\%, respectively.\textsuperscript{55} If the dominance of German screens by foreign films was a matter of little debate before the First World War, the reverse was true after 1918. Combined with the lingering effects of wartime restrictions on film imports, as well as the isolation of German markets behind Allied blockades and a push by the imperial government to increase German film production, postwar quotas also encouraged an expansion of the domestic film industry after 1918.\textsuperscript{56} Throughout the 1920s German filmmakers developed a unique national film style, whose fantastic storylines, gothic characters and unique

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Thill} Bernhard Thill, “Eine kleine Freiburger Kino-Geschichte,” \textit{Freiburger Almanach} (Freiburg: Poppen und Ortmann, 1997) 41.
\bibitem{Fehrenbach2} Fehrenbach, 24.
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aesthetics distinguished it from foreign, and especially American, models.57 With increased exports, the help of domestic and international stars, including Greta Garbo, Marlene Dietrich, and Peter Lorre, and the work of acclaimed directors, including Fritz Lang and G.W. Pabst, German cinema established a clear presence on both domestic and international screens. In fact, setbacks in the French and Italian film industries left Germany as the only legitimate European rival to an expanding American film empire.58

Amid the expansion of the domestic film industry, reception of foreign works varied according to the country of origin and between the German film industry and the public. Most consistent was the reception of French films, which in light of their smaller presence on postwar screens posed little threat to German filmmakers and continued to win favor among Weimar audiences with their familiar storylines and production aesthetics. In fact, given the similarities between French and German films, and a shared desire to counter America’s growing cinematic empire, German producer Erich Pommer pondered in 1924 the development of a “European-style” cinema, which would appeal to French, English, Italian, and German audiences.59 American films drew more mixed reactions and struck German viewers as alluring, but foreign. While Hollywood maintained its prewar popularity among German audiences, critics and industry representatives came to view its share of domestic film screenings, which totaled 60% in 1925, as a threat to German filmmaking.60 Their concern echoed a broader debate that consumed Germans, and Europeans, throughout the 1920s. At issue was the notion of America as an economic and cultural rival of Europe. As the Dawes Plan and other American loans precipitated a flood of American cultural exports to Germany during the mid-1920s, American

57 Fehrenbach, 28-30; Peukert, 171.
58 Fehrenbach, 26-30; Saunders, 4.
59 Fehrenbach, 39; Saunders, 6.
60 Fehrenbach, 38; Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung, 1933-1945 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997) 60.
films, more than any other cultural export, drew criticism as the face of a young, materialistic, self-confident American “way of life,” which at once captivated and troubled European observers.\(^{61}\) As they did after 1945, American films in the 1920s filled the role of the “other,” against which German filmmakers and audiences evaluated and developed Germany’s own cinematic repertoire.\(^{62}\)

While cinemas most entertained Freiburg and Stuttgart’s working classes, theaters remained the preferred entertainment for the local elite. In both cities, spectators adhered to established aesthetic preferences and rejected much of the “experimental” works that had made Weimar-era theater famous. In Freiburg, critics and audiences dismissed works by Brecht, Werfel, and Wedekind as “expressionistic” and “atonal.”\(^{63}\) The situation was similar in Stuttgart, where despite the success of contemporary productions, the city’s theater manager, Albert Kehm, struggled to balance his own modern tastes with demand for the classical works of Schiller, Goethe, Kleist, and Lessing.\(^{64}\) In both cities, audiences comprised members of the Bildungsbürgertum, who maintained their nineteenth-century disdain for attempts to merge Politik and Kultur. Like most audiences throughout the so-called Provinz, the cities’ theater-goers resented the overt use of the stage as a weapon of political warfare and disliked the creative experiments and pro-democratic messages, which earned greater praise from audiences in the Metropole. This backlash against Weimar’s “political” theater later inspired local theater patrons to find hope in the Nazis’ promise to eliminate the Republican repertoire from the

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\(^{61}\) Saunders, 127 and 243.


\(^{64}\) Sauer, 58; Borst, 383.
stage.\textsuperscript{65} In addition to their preference for classical over contemporary works, the cities’ audiences favored domestic over foreign plays. Yet, the latter still appeared on local stages. In fact, the works of Shakespeare and of French playwrights Jacques Deval, Marcel Pagnol, and Molière were among the most popular in Freiburg.\textsuperscript{66} By contrast, America’s presence on Stuttgart’s stages was smaller.

At the intersection of cities’ cultural and political arenas lay the press. Residents of both communities enjoyed a range of publications, most of which pre-dated the Weimar era. In Freiburg the Social Democratic \textit{Volkswacht}, the liberal \textit{Freiburger Zeitung}, the right-liberal \textit{Breisgauer Zeitung}, which sympathized with the German National People’s Party after 1918, and the Center-leaning \textit{Freiburger Tagespost} offered a familiar forum to the city’s post-1918 readers.\textsuperscript{67} Readers in Stuttgart encountered similar variety. Among the city’s oldest and most popular newspapers were the liberal-leaning \textit{Stuttgarter Neue Tagblatt} and the \textit{Württembergische Landeszeitung}, as well as the Social-Democratic \textit{Schwäbische Tagwacht}, and the Center-leaning \textit{Deutsche Volksblatt}. Also popular after 1918 were the Communist \textit{Arbeiter-Tribüne} and the conservative \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}.

Throughout the 1920s, three qualities informed the character of the cities’ print media, as they did the Weimar press in general. First, the press was decentralized. In both cities local titles dominated the market, while national newspapers, which came from a variety of metropolitan centers, including Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich, enjoyed a smaller local

\textsuperscript{65} Gerwin Strobl, \textit{The Swastika and the Stage: German Theater and Society, 1933-1945} (Cambridge: Cambridge, UP, 2007) 35.
\textsuperscript{66} Thomas Salb, “Trutzburg deutschen Geistes?” \textit{Das Stadttheater Freiburg in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus}, (Freiburg: Rombach, 1993) 293.
\textsuperscript{68} Müller, 112.
circulations. Second, the character of the local print media was at once political and diverse. Like the publications in Freiburg and Stuttgart, more than half of the country’s 4,000 Weimar-era papers exhibited a clear political bias but had no official ties to a political party or government agency. Unlike the Nazi-era press, local interwar newspapers served as a forum for political exchange. According to one editor in Stuttgart, the Weimar press was as the site of enjoyable “Geistesgefecht.” A final defining quality of the cities’ post-1918 newspapers was their role as a cultural forum. For decades art and theater reviews had combined with cultural and philosophical essays as regular features of German newspapers, and the press continued to function as a Kulturträger throughout the 1920s.

Beyond the cities’ cultural arenas, stability extended to the local political arenas as well. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, the municipal leadership remained intact after 1918. The local situation was not unique, as most municipal governments escaped the more radical changes that remade Germany’s post-1918 national and regional bureaucracies. In Freiburg, a minor uprising by local workers’ and soldiers’ councils was the only “unrest” that accompanied the monarchy’s collapse. The day after the uprising, representatives of the councils met with municipal officials and agreed on a plan for the city’s postwar administration. The agreement retained Emil Thoma as lord mayor. Thoma had replaced Otto Winterer in 1913 and remained in

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70 Hale, 1.
72 Eckstein, 73.
his position until Karl Bender succeeded him in 1922. Stuttgart saw only peaceful demonstrations as well. King William II’s departure from the city and his throne constituted a solemn affair that reflected his continued personal appeal among his subjects. The king’s abdication precipitated a host of changes in the state offices but had little effect on city hall, where lord mayor Karl Lautenschlager remained in the office to which he was elected in 1911. It was, in fact, because of the stable local political environment and the pro-Republican position of local officials that the besieged national government took refuge in Stuttgart after the Kapp Putsch in 1920.

Stability in the cities’ leadership reflected the stability of local political allegiances. The cooperative political environment of the late nineteenth century endured into the early 1920s and secured the local dominance of the so-called “Weimar Coalition,” the Liberal, Center, and Social Democratic parties. After the Reichstag elections of 1890, the Catholic Center party surpassed the National Liberal party as Freiburg’s dominant political group. The former owed its strength to the city’s Catholic majority, even if not all Catholics in Freiburg supported it. The party most represented the city’s lower and middle-class residents, but produced local and national elites after 1918 as well. These included Lord Mayor Karl Bender, as well as two of the Weimar Republic’s chancellors, Joseph Wirth and Konstantin Fehrenbach. Together with the Center, the Social Democrats, who most represented the city’s small working class, and the Liberals, who most represented the upper-class Protestant and Jewish minorities, secured a majority of the local

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76 Borst, 361.
77 On the city’s Catholic milieu, see: Chickering, 33-39; On the local Center party, see: Hug, “‘Ultramontane’ gegen ‘Liberale,’ 135-141.
votes in national and municipal elections throughout the 1920s.\textsuperscript{78} In the meantime, local support for both the Communist party and the conservative German National Peoples’ Party (DNVP) remained below 10\% after 1924. Support for the latter was strongest among Protestant, northern German retirees, who populated the Pensionopolis, and among the Protestant faculty of the university, whose post-1918 disillusionment with the Weimar Republic reflected their prewar support for nationalist causes such as the expansion of the German navy and the acquisition of colonial territories.\textsuperscript{79}

In Stuttgart political allegiances reflected the dominance of the Social Democrats, whose support had eclipsed that of the National Liberals in the late nineteenth century. The strength of local Social Democratic loyalties reflected not only the city’s continued industrialization during the early twentieth century, but also the lenient application of the anti-Socialist laws in Württemberg during the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{80} The latter had, in fact, transformed Stuttgart into a refuge for Socialist activists from across Germany and Europe. In addition to the temporary home of Karl Kautsky and Vladimir Lenin, the city served in 1907 as the site of the first meeting of the International Socialist Congress on German soil.\textsuperscript{81} After 1918, the Social Democrats enjoyed increased support from Stuttgart’s working-class voters, and in the city council they favored cooperation with the liberal parties, which found their greatest support among the local Protestant middle and upper classes. Although the lord mayor was a Social Democrat, he embraced the city’s cooperative political tradition and acted as a non-partisan arbiter.\textsuperscript{82} In the meantime, local support for the conservative Bürgerpartei, which represented


\textsuperscript{79} Chickering, 48.

\textsuperscript{80} On the lenient pursuit of anti-Socialist legislation in Württemberg, see: Fenske, 167; Sauer, 15.

\textsuperscript{81} Sauer, 17.

\textsuperscript{82} Boehling, 141; Sauer, 42; Müller, 5.
supporters and former officials of the toppled Württemberg court, declined throughout the 1920s. At the same time, the communist and Center parties played smaller roles on the city’s political stage.\(^{83}\)

**The Rise of National-Socialism and the *Machtergreifung***

Amid the cities’ stable Weimar political climate, National Socialism struggled to find support. In Stuttgart, which gained a Nazi chapter before Freiburg, the local party emerged with help from the city’s *völkisch*, anti-Semitic *Schutz- und Trutzbund*. The latter counted approximately 1600 members, most of whom were businessmen, artisans, or low-ranking government officials. In April 1920, a small group left the *Bund* and established a local Nazi chapter in the hope of winning support among workers and beyond the city’s conservative circles. Stuttgart’s nascent party helped to organize other chapters in cities throughout Württemberg and Baden, including Freiburg.\(^{84}\) However, the chapters proved short-lived, as both states were among those to ban the party in the wake of Walther Rathenau’s assassination. In 1925 small Nazi party chapters reemerged in the two cities after the relaxation of local restrictions.\(^{85}\)

Despite the local increase in Nazism’s appeal throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, a variety of factors limited the movement’s strength. Most important were the internal weaknesses of the local party chapters. In Freiburg, the party remained without a newspaper

\(^{83}\) On the conservative Bürgerpartei, see: Sauer, 42; Müller, 5. On the Catholic and Communist parties, see: Borst, 367-368.

\(^{84}\) Müller, 18.

until 1931, when *Der Alemann* began circulation. In addition, the stringency of Badenese police, who remained intolerant of violent political activity, limited the size and intensity of party rallies. Restrictions were particularly harsh in Freiburg, where city officials worried about the effect of street violence on the lucrative flow of tourists. In contrast to those of Hamburg and Munich, the streets of Freiburg enjoyed relative calm, and the city registered no deaths from street clashes from 1930-1933.

Without the help of street rallies or a party press, the party’s best hope to increase its local support lay with rallies hosted by party dignitaries. Yet, the far-southwestern, Catholic city failed to register as a priority for the Nazi leadership. When Adolf Hitler finally visited the city in July 1932, his performance disappointed local Nazi leaders. He appeared tired, spoke for less than ten minutes, and departed without meeting the members of the local SA.

In Stuttgart, the party faced a different set of challenges. Most detrimental was the continued infighting that distracted the party’s leadership and prevented it from taking advantage of the less stringent supervision of the Württemberg police. Stuttgart saw fewer street conflicts than Germany’s larger cities. In addition, the party’s internal dysfunction stunted the growth of the local press organ, the *NS-Kurier*, which also did not premiere until 1931.

However, internal weaknesses were not the only obstacles to the growth of the local parties. The cities’ religious and geographic characters detracted from Nazism’s appeal as well. In general, Nazi candidates performed best in small and rural Protestant towns. Freiburg and Stuttgart were neither small nor rural towns. In Freiburg, where Catholicism remained the faith of a majority of residents, confession also worked against the Nazis. If the reverse was true in

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86 Bräunche, 17.
89 Schnabel, “Die NSDAP in Württemberg,” 61; Müller, 24.
Protestant Stuttgart, the city’s urban and industrial qualities, which continued to favor the Social Democrats, detracted from the party’s success there.\textsuperscript{90} In the meantime, geography inhibited the spread of Nazism. Freiburg had escaped the post-1918 Allied occupation that fueled nationalist resentment in the conquered territories. The city did suffer from the loss of markets in Alsace and Lorraine, but the anti-Western, nationalist rhetoric that resonated in occupied towns brought the Nazis little support in Freiburg. The same was true in Stuttgart, which found itself even more removed from the direct territorial and military consequences of Versailles.\textsuperscript{91}

Another deterrent to the local rise of National Socialism was the cities’ economic conditions. In general, Nazi electoral successes depended on the economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s, which increased voter dissatisfaction with the Weimar regime and led to a search for alternative leadership outside the traditional party system. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, however, the unique structure of the cities’ economies mitigated the local consequences of the nation’s economic collapse. Freiburg’s role as a university town and a retirement community meant that unemployment was a less pressing concern for a sizeable share of the city’s residents. Although the crisis was difficult for those who did want jobs, the local unemployment numbers, which stood at 3.6\% in 1925 and 18.1\% in 1933, remained below the national average.\textsuperscript{92} The situation owed most to the continued strength of the city’s tourist industry, which benefited the sizeable local transportation and commercial sectors. In fact, in spite of the economic crisis, the number of tourists who visited the city continued to grow.\textsuperscript{93} In Stuttgart, conditions were even better. Contemporaries described the city as an “\textit{Oase in der Krise},” for the local unemployment

\textsuperscript{90} Müller, 12.
\textsuperscript{92} Schnabel, “Von der Splittergruppe,” 98; Peukert, \textit{The Weimar Republic}, 252.
\textsuperscript{93} Schnabel, “Von der Splittergruppe,” 95.
rate, approximately 10% in 1933, remained among the lowest of Germany’s industrial centers. The origins of the “oasis” lay in Stuttgart’s diversified economy and its focus on the manufacturing of finished-products, which performed better on the export market than raw materials.\textsuperscript{94}

In both cities, voting patterns confirmed the consequences of internal party weaknesses and local political and economic conditions for Nazism’s rise. In the four national Reichstag elections from 1928 through 1932, the Nazis’ local vote share remained below the national average. The party earned 2.6% of the national vote in 1928 but received only 1.6% in Freiburg and 2.5% in Stuttgart. Four years later, when the Nazis achieved a pre-1933 best of 37.3% of the national vote, they secured only 29.7% of Freiburg’s and 27.2% of Stuttgart’s votes. In the meantime, as Table 1 demonstrates, support for the Nazis’ strongest local rivals remained stable. In Freiburg the Center party garnered the highest vote share in each Reichstag election, and in Stuttgart the Social Democrats maintained their dominance until November 1932, when their support dipped below that of the Nazis by less than 1%.

If National Socialist candidates failed to capture a majority of either city’s votes, they nevertheless enjoyed the support of over a fifth of the communities’ voters by the fall 1932. This support derived from two main sources. The first was a small core of devout followers, which comprised Protestant businessmen, salesmen, engineers, lower government officials, and artisans.\textsuperscript{95} In general, concern for socio-economic survival amid the chaos of the late 1920s or disgust with the politics and culture of the Weimar era had opened these voters to the search for


\textsuperscript{95} Schnabel, “Von der Splitterpartei,” 108; Müller, 17.
alternative political solutions and to Nazi theories of Jewish capitalist conspiracies. ⁹⁶ In Freiburg, an additional core of Nazi support appeared at the university, where anti-republican faculty found in Nazism a promise to end the “decadent” political and cultural trends of the Weimar era. For a generation of students, who had greeted war with enthusiasm in 1914 and had confronted defeat with disillusionment in 1918, Nazism also appeared to offer a promising path toward national renewal. Anti-Semitism was strong within the student body as well. ⁹⁷

A second, larger source of Nazi support came later and owed to the mobilization of new voters and the defection of established voters from other parties amid the political and economic turmoil of the late Weimar period. In both cities defections from the liberal and conservative parties most benefited the Nazis.⁹⁸ A similar trend informed national voting patterns. Yet, comparison between the national and local experiences reveals an important cause of the Nazis’ local struggles. The collapse of the liberal and conservative parties was less severe in Freiburg and Stuttgart. In each of the four parliamentary elections from 1928-1932, the liberal parties (DDP and DVP) held a larger vote share in the two cities than on the national stage. Over the same period, the conservative party (DNVP) expanded its local vote share by 1.5% in Freiburg and 0.2% in Stuttgart, while its national share shrank by 5.9%. The local appeal of the DNVP was not surprising, as both cities’ housed sizeable communities of retired and disgruntled imperial officials, who agreed with the party’s call for the restoration of the imperial order.⁹⁹

Although voter defections were less common in Freiburg and Stuttgart, their importance to the rise of Nazism justifies a brief examination of their general motivations. Explanations of

⁹⁸ Schnabel, “Krise und Untergang,” 301; Müller, 14.
⁹⁹ Schnabel, “Von der Splittergruppe,” 106; On the strength of the DNVP in the cities relative to the Reich, see: Berghahn, 301; Werner Köhler, Freiburg i. Br. 1945-1949: Politisches Leben und Erfahrungen in der Nachkriegszeit (Freiburg: Stadtarchiv, 1987) 284; Müller, 14.
Nazism’s appeal to defecting voters comprise a literature too complex for review here.\textsuperscript{100} However, two familiar observations merit reiteration with an eye toward life in Freiburg and Stuttgart after 1933. First, Nazism comprised less an organic philosophy than a diverse conglomeration of ideas and ideals, for which support increased and declined in direct relation to the course of political and economic crises in the late Weimar period. The rapid increase in the party’s support from 1928-1932 therefore reflected less the conversion of the German masses to a specific \textit{Weltanschauung} than the broad appeal of Nazism’s vague promises to a disillusioned electorate.\textsuperscript{101} Second, the views that Nazi votes represented were as diverse and ambivalent as the Nazi platform itself. Voter defections included both temporary departures in protest against a specific party and more permanent defections, which betrayed the abandonment of the Weimar system.\textsuperscript{102} Votes against the Weimar Republic did not always constitute a rejection of democracy. Nor did sympathy with the Nazis’ specific brand of \textit{völkisch}-nationalism always constitute a vote for Hitler’s fantasies of eternal social struggle, war, and racial purification, as Allied officials later suspected.\textsuperscript{103} In any case, voters with a wide-range of expectations assumed that Nazism would serve their diverse personal interests.\textsuperscript{104} The experience of dictatorship and war later revealed the fallacy of their assumptions. Thus, while German voters bore responsibility for the collapse of democracy and the rise of Hitler, their electoral behavior did not indicate a wholesale nazification of German hearts and minds.


\textsuperscript{102} On Peukert, \textit{The Weimar Republic}, 232.


\textsuperscript{104} Kershaw, 29.
This truth was particularly evident in Freiburg and Stuttgart, where the Nazis’
embarrassing electoral performance from 1928-1933 made clear that the impetus for the local
Machtergreifung would have to come from without. The necessary external push arrived on
January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler assumed the chancellorship. Local Nazi supporters took to
the streets in celebration, as the non-Nazi majorities received the news with a combination of
shock and concern. In light of improving economic conditions, critics in Freiburg wondered why
Hindenburg, whom a majority of the city’s voters had supported over Hitler in 1932, had felt
compelled to elevate the Nazi leader.105 Similar disbelief emerged in Stuttgart. Disgust with
Hitler’s rise combined here with frustration over aggressive Nazi campaign tactics in advance of
the March 1933 parliamentary elections to force the resignation of city council members from
the Center, Social Democratic, and Communist parties.106 At the same time, historic
antagonisms between the Southwest and Prussia resurfaced when, in anticipation of the coming
elections, Reinhold-Maier, a local politician in Stuttgart and the future postwar president of
Württemberg-Baden, cautioned voters about the Nazi threat and the potential for Württemberg to
become a “Filiale” of Berlin.107

Amid a wave of violence and repression, voters went to the polls for a final time on
March 5, 1933. Prior to the vote, the cities’ Nazi parties relied on the support of their new
chancellor, the local police, and the SA to silence their opponents. In both cities Nazi supporters
clash ed with Communist and Socialist activists in the streets. In Freiburg, left-wing voters
endured house searches and limitations on their right to campaign. In Stuttgart members of the
liberal and Center parties appealed in vain to President Hindenburg to curtail restrictions on the

106 Müller, 41; Schnabel, “Vortwort” 8.
Nazis’ political opponents. The Württemberg State President, Eugen Bolz, echoed the appeal and cautioned local voters to resist the new regime and the authoritarian “Geist von Potsdam” that it embodied.  In the meantime, a majority of the cities’ politicians recognized the futility of such appeals and resigned themselves to the prospect of an unfair election. In spite of the Nazis’ efforts to silence their opposition, they failed to capture a majority of the cities’ votes. The party increased its local vote shares to 35.8% in Freiburg and 33.8% in Stuttgart, both of which lagged behind the national share of 43.9%. As the Nazis had failed to seize control of either city’s lord mayorship and lacked the seats and political allies needed to control the city councils, the stage was set for the imposition of a coup from without.

**Gleichschaltung**

In Freiburg the transition to Nazi rule began on March 6, when the local SA unit raised the party’s flag over city hall without the approval of Bender. Local and regional party officials then launched a campaign to replace the city’s leadership. Bender was their first target. Controversy had erupted after he failed to support the police in the wake of the murder of two officers by a Socialist state parliamentarian. Although he had the endorsement of the Archbishop, Konrad Gröber, the university rector, Josef Sauer, and the city council, Bender recognized the futility of any campaign to save his position and conceded defeat after less than a month. In the wake of his resignation, state and local party officials named and then “elected” Kreisleiter Franz Kerber as Bender’s replacement. Kerber was representative of the city’s devout core of Nazi followers. He was a native of the nearby town of Endingen, an alumnus of the University of Freiburg, and a veteran of the Freikorps. He had joined the Nazi party in 1930 and became editor-in-chief for the city’s Der Alemanne a year later. Once in office, Kerber
forced the “retirement” of the Social-Democratic deputy mayor, Josef Hölzl, as well as local
councilor Wolfgang Hoffmann, a member of the Center party, and city council member Franz
Geiler, a Socialist.\footnote{Dr. Hoffmann, OB von Freiburg,” Freiburger Nachrichten 13 Nov 1945 : 5; Bernd Serger, et al., ed., Südbaden unter Hakenkreuz und Trikolore: Zeitzeugen berichten über das Kriegsende und die französische Besetzung 1945 (Freiburg: Rombach, 2006) 74; Schnabel, “Krise und Untergang,” 305.} The latter two officials retired from politics until the end of the war, when they reemerged as the city’s lord mayor and deputy mayor, respectively. In Stuttgart a similar
narrative unfolded, as Nazi officials raised their flag over the city on March 7 and forced the
city’s beloved Lord Mayor Lautenschlager into retirement. The transition began at the state level
when Württemberg’s state president, Wilhelm Murr, selected Staatskommissar Karl Strölin as
Lautenschlager’s replacement. Born in Berlin in 1890, Strölin was also representative of the
local devout core of Nazi followers. He was the son of a distinguished military family and a
veteran of both the First World War and the struggle against the “Räterepublik” in Munich. He
had joined the Nazi party in 1923 and, to distinguish himself from those residents who joined
only after the onset of the economic crisis, described himself as a “gläubiger
Nationalsozialist.”\footnote{Müller, 43; Borst, 405.}

In both cities the transition to dictatorship effected more sweeping changes at the highest
levels of the municipal administration than the transition to democracy had in 1918. At the
lower levels of the bureaucracies, however, the purge was less thorough and allowed
considerable continuity of personnel. Not unlike the nascent Weimar Republic, and the postwar
administrations twelve years later, the Nazi regime needed a pool of experienced bureaucrats to
keep the wheels of government in motion. After the removal of vocal opponents, Nazi officials
“retrained” the remaining staff. In Stuttgart, city officials received instructions on how to give
the Nazi salute, when to say “Heil Hitler,” and how to boycott Jewish businesses. In light of such cosmetic changes, the head of the municipal press office in Freiburg conceded that the “German revolution of 1933” had had no “destructive effect.”

Still, the continuity of local political, economic, and cultural officials was not only the result of tempered purge efforts. Those officials not dismissed by the new regime confronted a choice between retirement, as Hoffmann and Geiler chose in Freiburg, or continued service. A host of incentives underlay decisions in favor of the latter. Ideological commitments to National Socialism were the least powerful. Local voting patterns confirmed as much, for they revealed the party’s struggle to convince a majority of residents of Nazism’s merits. To be sure, most found something about the Nazi platform with which to agree or even sympathize. While Christians found hope in the Nazis’ anti-Bolshevism and their promise to restore morality in the wake of the decadent Weimar years, veterans, unemployed workers, and discontents clung to the hope of national renewal and found comfort in the Nazis’ identification of a non-German scapegoat on whom to pin a multitude of frustrations. At the same time, social and legal pressures discouraged officials and residents from debating those aspects of Nazism with which they did not agree. By associating itself with the notion of the Volksgemeinschaft the regime rendered all opposition anti-German and treasonous. Yet, for other residents, the decision to accommodate or serve the new regime was less complicated. To continue to support themselves and their families, Germans needed to maintain their incomes. In the calculus of everyday life, a hand salute or “Heil Hitler!” seemed a small price to pay for continued financial stability in the wake of the country’s economic collapse.

113 Müller, 57.
115 On incentives for cooperation with the Nazi regime, see: Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, 191; Peterson, 442-451; Kershaw, 183-217.
In the years that followed the *Machtergreifung*, the superficiality of Nazism’s reach became obvious. For thousands of local residents Communism, Social Democracy, Liberalism, Conservatism, and political Catholicism remained preferable political platforms, if only in the realm of private thought.\(^{117}\) This was especially true for the cities’ future postwar leaders who, like most members of the (left-)liberal, Social Democratic and Center parties, reacted to Nazism’s rise with a mixture of public retreat, internal emigration, and wishful anticipation of the regime’s collapse. In Freiburg the leader of the city’s postwar Badenese Christian Socialist People’s Party (BCSV), Leo Wohleb, remained in his position in the state ministry of culture in Karlsruhe until 1934, after which he retreated to the classroom. Franz Geiler bided his time as a shoemaker until he reemerged as the leader of the local postwar Social Democratic party.\(^{118}\) The situation was similar in Stuttgart, where two of the cities’ postwar liberal leaders, Reinhold Maier and Wolfgang Haussmann, also opted against serving the Nazi state. Maier had served in the Reichstag until 1933, when he returned to Stuttgart to practice law and support his Jewish wife in emigration. Haussmann retired from politics to practice law as well, and along with the future lord mayor, Arnulf Klett, headed a movement to spare the city a final wave of destruction in 1945. Erwin Schoettle, who led the city’s Social-Democratic party before 1933, fled to England until the war’s end, when he returned as an editor of the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*.\(^{119}\) In both cities, such acts of internal emigration confirmed Nazism’s failure to eliminate alternative political views and laid the foundation for the restorationist agendas of postwar officials.

\(^{117}\) Herf, 24.


In contrast to their political and electoral weaknesses, however, the Nazis garnered greater support in the economic arena. The cities’ economic recoveries pre-dated the Nazis rise to power, but post-1933 public works projects were nevertheless central to the decline in unemployment. The Four Year Plan proved more advantageous in Stuttgart, where local industrial giants Klemm, Hirth, and Daimler Benz received large armaments contracts. In Freiburg, proximity to the French border and a lack of an armaments industry discouraged heavy investment. Other economic concerns proved more challenging for the regime. Most troubling for residents of both cities was a lack of housing. In Freiburg new-home construction increased by only 10% from 1926-1937, after which the war economy began to divert resources and manpower away from the housing industry. The situation was similar in Stuttgart, where a growing industrial workforce placed excess demand on an already short supply of homes. High rent and prices also challenged residents. In Stuttgart consumer goods prices increased by 6.1% from February 1933 through July 1935 and surpassed the average national increase of 5.6%. By the late 1930s, then, Nazi economic policies had facilitated enough economic growth to avoid public unrest but had failed to produce the economic miracle for which many residents had hoped.

Nazism met greater difficulty in the cultural arena, where its greatest influences owed more to policy decrees and the use of force than popular support. In general, Nazi cultural policy comprised a collection of vague objectives that suppressed, accommodated, and echoed, but failed to eradicate, ideas, customs, and preferences that had informed the cities’ cultural life prior

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122 Müller, 310.
123 Schnabel, “Freiburg im Dritten Reich,” 317-318; Müller 233; Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, 70.
to 1933. Most welcome were policies that eliminated unpopular cultural practices from the Weimar era. By contrast, efforts to politicize culture or to infuse it with ideological or propagandistic tones drew mixed reactions. In fact, the regime’s cultural policies drew their most vehement opposition when they forced a departure from pre-1933 preferences and practices.

The experience of German moviegoers after 1933 offered a classic example of the challenges that confronted efforts to nazify German culture. Local details from Freiburg and Stuttgart are unavailable, but no evidence suggests that the cities’ experiences diverged from the national trends that saw the regime’s biggest “successes” occur off-screen and on the administrative level. Under the direction of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Film Chamber brought more rigid censorship to Germany. In addition to its stringency, the chamber also departed from Weimar-era practices with its overt political and racist agenda. The purge of Jewish actors and directors from the nation’s film industry deprived German cinema of some of its most popular Weimar-era stars and benefited studios elsewhere in Europe and Hollywood. Nevertheless, the regime waged an impressive campaign to grow the German film industry. In addition to quotas, which reduced the number of foreign releases and allayed fears of an American cinematic invasion, increased domestic production guaranteed a majority of screen time for domestic films after 1933.

Beyond the control and expansion of the German film industry, however, the Nazi regime struggled both to develop a distinct film aesthetic and to alter the preferences of domestic audiences. Of the kind of overt propagandistic and anti-Semitic films that later most worried

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125 Steinweis, 132-133.
Allied officials, the regime produced few. Examples included Leni Riefenstahl’s *The Triumph of the Will* (1934), Veit Harlan’s *Jud Süß* (1940), and Wolfgang Liebeneiner’s *Ich klage an* (1941). More common to Nazi-era film programs were works that carried less overt political messages, featured familiar Weimar-era stars, music, and special effects, and drew on pre-1933 German and American models. As Goebbels himself understood, the most successful films were those which confirmed existing political and cultural ideals not in an aggressive, dogmatic fashion, but rather through creative and entertaining storytelling. One of the regime’s most successful, and costly, productions, entitled *Baron Münchhausen*, illustrated the point. The film, which featured a screen-play by the popular Jewish novelist, Erich Kästner, and carried only a vague nationalist theme, offered a fantastical viewing experience that drew on the best special effects of Hollywood. In fact, the film offered a German answer to the success of the American films *Gone with the Wind* (1939) and *Thief of Baghdad* (1940). In spite of, or perhaps because of, Germany’s deteriorating position on the battlefield at the time of the film’s premier in 1943, the film enjoyed tremendous success.

Still, the popularity of such domestic *Unterhaltungsfilme* did little to eliminate Weimar-era demand for foreign films, including French and American titles. German exposure to French cinema had declined after the advent of the talking film, but German audiences continued throughout the early 1940s to enjoy French films. Although America’s influence on German movie programs shrank after the *Machtergreifung* from 64 titles in 1933, to 28 in 1936, to 5 in

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128 Rentschler, 64; Feherbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany*, 41-42.
129 Feherbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany*, 44; De Grazia, 331-332.
1940, American films remained popular with German audiences. In fact, Hollywood exports continued to outsell German imitations throughout the 1930s. Demand for American films grew even stronger after the regime banned them in 1940. Thereafter, Hollywood constituted a kind of forbidden fruit, which Germans, including residents of Freiburg and Stuttgart, craved as a source of fantasy and escapism from an ever-more regimented and propagandized daily life. In any case, the popularity of foreign films and the influence of American film aesthetics on Nazi filmmaking promised a difficult task for postwar Allied officials who were charged with “denazifying” the German screen and thus defining and eliminating “Nazi” cinema.

On the German stage, evidence of Nazi influences was less ambiguous. Again the regime’s most obvious influence was institutional in nature. Under the aegis of the Propaganda Ministry, the government nationalized theater administration. As responsibility for licensing and censorship matters shifted to Berlin, decades of municipal and regional theater control came to an end. In addition, the regime ordered the expulsion of non-Aryan playwrights and performers and mandated membership in the Reich Theater Chamber for all remaining actors and directors. While some of the remaining actors and directors sympathized with Nazi ideology, most contributed to Nazi productions only to sustain employment. In the meantime, the regime purged non-Nazi theater managers. In Freiburg local Nazi officials replaced the city’s pre-1933 manager, Max Krüger, with a devout National Socialist named Wolfgang Nufer. In Stuttgart, Nazi party members Otto Krauss and, later, Gustav Dehardé assumed

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131 Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 167.
132 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, 46.
133 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, 50; Gassert, 171.
134 Steinweis, 135.
control of the state theater. In contrast to the reorganization of theater administration and personnel, the campaign to nazify theater programs struggled. Beyond the removal of works by non-Aryan playwrights from the cities’ repertoires and the presentation of obvious propagandistic works, such as Hanns Johst’s anti-French Schlageter, Dietrich Eckart’s nationalist adaptation of Peer Gynt and Eberhard Möller’s anti-Weimar Kalifornische Tragödie, no unique Nazi theatrical aesthetic emerged. Even the regime’s most original, and short-lived, Thingspiel productions, which consisted of grand open-air depictions of völkisch political themes, had their roots in ancient German tribal culture and the Erlebnistheater of the nineteenth century. The same was true of the Nazis’ efforts to employ the stage as an instrument of national (re)definition. These betrayed the influences of the French Revolution in Germany and the historic connection between national identity and drama, which had informed theatrical productions on both sides of the Rhine for more than a century.

In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, the regime struggled to leave its mark on the cities’ stages. To begin, overt propagandistic productions resonated with audiences in neither city. In the wake of the Machtergreifung the regime’s initial “coalition” with the traditionalist-minded members of the Bildungsbürgertum, who had perceived in National Socialism a promise to end the Weimar-era politicization of German culture, disintegrated. The removal of Jewish influences from the stage was also unpopular. In Freiburg the production of A Mid-Summer Night’s Dream without the conventional musical score by Mendelssohn offended the traditionalist tastes of local

137 Müller, 122-125.
139 Strobl, 51.
140 Strobl, 226.
In addition, the regime’s campaign to shield the German stage from foreign influences founderered. Shakespeare, whose work Nazi censors actually praised as a symbol of Nordic cultural supremacy, remained popular, as did French drama. In fact, a translation of Jaques Deval’s Towaris constituted the most-performed work in Freiburg from 1933-44. If the play’s anti-Bolshevist theme contributed to its appeal, it was nevertheless striking that audiences most preferred a foreign rather than a German title.

Throughout the 1930s resistance to the regime’s theater policies persisted. In Freiburg audience frustration and the need for profits forced Nufer to produce a combination of modified German classics and lucrative operettas. The latter were, in fact, often the work of popular blacklisted playwrights. In Stuttgart theater officials pursued a more rigid ideological agenda and drew more criticism from spectators. Audience numbers declined throughout the Nazi era, and critics dismissed the local program as “untragbar.” The local effect of Nazi theater policy, then, was less to captivate the cities’ audiences than to alienate them.

On the cities’ print media Nazism left a more discernable, albeit no more popular, mark. In the wake of the Machtergreifung, government officials transformed the cities’ media landscape. They abolished all opposition newspapers, coordinated the remaining publications under a new, state-controlled publishing firm, and mandated membership in the Reich Press Chamber for all editors. Under the leadership of Max Amann, the Chamber dictated the treatment of stories across Germany and coordinated local and national reporting. By mid-1933, neither city’s Socialist or Communist leaning publications remained in print. Beyond the National Socialist Alemannen, readers in Freiburg found only the Freiburger Tagespost and the

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142 Salb, 262.
143 Salb, 290.
144 Schadek, “Kulturelles Leben,” 661.
145 Müller, 125.
Freiburger Zeitung, whose respective Center and liberal sympathies dissipated under the control of their new Nazi publishers. In Stuttgart, the NS Kurier dominated the local market while Nazi-controlled versions of the liberal Stuttgarter Neue Tagblatt and the Württembergische Landeszeitung and the Center-leaning Deutsche Volksblatt endured reduced circulation. As conformity replaced diversity, the local press devolved into a mouthpiece of the regime.

Readers’ reaction to Nazi press policies was difficult to gauge. On the one hand, both cities’ National Socialist papers increased in circulation throughout the 1930s. Despite disappointment over the disappearance of long-established local publications, a combination of apathy and Nazi sympathies led many readers to accept the new press. On the other hand, the increased circulation of Nazi publications also owed to the acquisition of printing equipment from discontinued rival publications, as well as mandatory subscription orders for local government offices. In any case, residents were not unaware of the biases of the Nazi press. In the summer 1933 the Freiburger Zeitung attacked the Nazi Alemannen as unreliable and unfair.  

The city government was also displeased with the local Nazi daily and argued as late as 1939 that the editors’ preoccupation with ideological matters detracted from the city governments’ ability to inform the public about policy matters. In Stuttgart proponents of the region’s pre-1933 print media raised objections to the new “coordinated” press. Most vocal was the editor of the Sonntagszeitung, Erich Schairer, who detested the regime’s censorship policies and continued to publish his views under various pseudonyms throughout the 1930s.

147 Schnabel, “Freiburg im Dritten Reich,” 315.
148 Müller, 117.
In schools Nazism’s reach was more varied. The creation of the nation’s first national education ministry suspended the historic tradition of regional education administration. Under the leadership of Bernhard Rust, the new ministry sought to transform classrooms into bastions of National-Socialist thought and tackled curricular reform. It ordered the revision of textbooks to reflect National Socialist ideology. History texts were to emphasize German military accomplishments, while literature texts stressed German cultural superiority and biology texts included racial studies. Reich officials also relied on teachers to indoctrinate the nation’s youth. The regime purged non-Aryans and political dissidents from the ranks of primary and secondary teaching staffs, and, to ensure the ideological loyalty of the remaining personnel, implemented teacher-training programs and mandated membership in party-based professional associations. Yet, in spite of pressure from state officials, colleagues, and students with Nazi sympathies, some instructors refused to cooperate. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, students encountered teachers with non- and even anti-Nazi views. In Freiburg, for example, one student recalled that, “Ja, da hat man morgens, wenn jemand gekommen ist, hat man müssen, ‘Heil Hitler’ sagen statt, ‘Grüss Gott,’ aber sonst – nein.” In addition, the rector of the city’s Rotteck-Oberrealschule, Albert Kuntzemüller, prohibited students from hanging pictures of Adolf Hitler in the hallways in the wake of the Machtergreifung. In Stuttgart a student noted that his teachers provided only “eine relativ geringe politische Indoktrination.” He had also

150 On student denunciations of teachers, see: Müller, 135; Schnabel, “Freiburg im Dritten Reich,” 310.
151 Cited in Hug 593.
remained unsure of his teachers’ Nazi sympathies and commented that, “Mein Eindruck war und ist, dass sich die Lehrer […] angepasst haben […] Ich kann auch die Frage, die ich mir in späteren Jahren öfters gestellt habe, ob die Lehrer oder einzelne unter ihnen ihre Zweifel […] ausgetragen haben, nicht beantworten.” While the extent of teachers’ opposition to the regime remained unclear, the establishment of private Napola academies by the Nazi party and the gradual monopolization of the school day by the Hitler Jugend suggested that Reich officials had concluded the need for alternative, more reliable, venues for the indoctrination of the nation’s youth.154

Nazi orders for the structural reorganization of German schools came only later. They targeted the multi-track school system and with a push to unify and rationalize primary and, especially, secondary schools brought an abrupt, and unpopular, end to contentious and complex Weimar-era education reform debates. An order for the suspension of confessional schools most affected Stuttgart, where separate Catholic and Protestant schools had continued to function throughout the 1920s. In vain, local religious leaders protested the change. After 1936, the so-called Deutsche Volksschulen, which resembled the Simultanschulen in Freiburg, provided a common elementary education to the city’s youth.155 In the meantime, Nazi policies also facilitated the consolidation of both cities’ secondary institutions into a single Oberschule and, to facilitate the draft of youth for compulsory and military service, reduced the length of studies from nine to eight years.156 In spite of the consolidation, select Gymnasien survived with their classical, humanities-based curriculum intact.157

153 Müller, 134.
154 Hug, “Zwischen ‘Trivialschule’,” 594; Müller, 140-146.
155 Müller, 138-140.
156 Müller, 139.
A final target of local nazification efforts was the cities’ Christian communities. If many of the cities’ Catholics and Protestants had maintained non-Nazi political allegiances prior to 1933, most sympathized with either the Nazis’ anti-Marxist or anti-Semitic views or their opposition to the decadence of Weimar culture. Christians also found hope in the regime’s promise to honor and protect Christian traditions and communities after 1933. For Catholics, especially, the Concordat between the Reich and the Vatican assuaged concerns that the new regime might interfere with church life. As the regime radicalized, the fragility of the relationship between Nazism and Christianity emerged. Among the main sources of Christian opposition to the regime were the assault on religious instruction in local schools and the brutal treatment of Nazi opponents. Knowledge of the latter made it difficult for many Catholics and Protestants to reconcile support of the regime with the underlying principles of their faith. In response to the radicalization of the regime, Freiburg’s Archbishop Gröber began to distance himself from the local government. Evidence of the rift appeared when, after 1936, lord mayor Kerber ended the city hall’s historic participation in the annual Feast of Corpus Christi. A similar situation unfolded in Stuttgart, where the congregation of pro-Hitler “Deutsche Christen” had withered into an insignificant splinter group by the mid-1930s. In addition, the city’s Protestant State Bishop, Theophil Wurm, and the local Catholic Bishop, Joannes Baptista Sproll, later emerged as outspoken critics of the regime. To be sure, the actions of the cities’ religious leaders did not inspire wider resistance movements. Whether for fear of or sympathy with the regime, most local residents found reason to remain silent. Nevertheless, tensions between the regime and the churches made clear the disconnect between Nazism and

159 Schnabel, “Freiburg im Dritten Reich,” 311.
Christianity. After the war, such tensions led many Germans to view the latter as an important foundation upon which to build a denazified German society.

Six years after the *Machtergreifung* nazification remained a work in progress. In none of the political, economic, and cultural arenas in which daily German life unfolded had a complete National Socialist revolution occurred. In Freiburg and Stuttgart the vagaries of Nazi policy had combined with Nazism’s initial lack of resonance to foster an odd mixture of institutional ruptures and philosophical and psychological continuities. In the meantime police terror and the general hope for prosperity and national renewal inspired a working coalition between supporters and opponents of the regime.\(^\text{162}\) In its obsessive drive to war, however, Nazism threatened the very promise on which its tenuous foundation within German society rested. In the years that followed the start of combat, evidence of the regime’s shortcomings and incapacities became inescapable. Under the strains of total war and the hail of Allied bombs, the conflict that was supposed to cement Germany’s eternal endearment to National Socialism instead brought the beginning of the nation’s denazification.

**Freiburg and Stuttgart in Wartime**

The start of the Second World War met with a range of emotions, from cautious optimism to dread. Absent was the enthusiasm that had accompanied the start of the Great War. In Freiburg a school girl recalled how the start of fighting dampened excitement over the extension of the summer break. She noted, “*Ferienverlängerung wegen Frontnähe. Es kommt keine Freude über die verlängerten Ferien auf.*”\(^\text{163}\) An older woman expressed similar dread and observed how “*All die düsteren Erzählungen vom Ersten Weltkrieg, der für mich so unendlich*
The public’s unease concerned local officials. Although the fighting had begun far in the east, Lord Mayor Kerber cited Freiburg’s position on the German border to justify the implementation of air defense measures and reassure residents of their security. A similar scenario unfolded in Stuttgart, where news of Germany’s initial success in Poland inspired relief rather than elation.

In light of the public’s distaste for the war, the government’s earliest and least demanding calls for civilian sacrifice met with disapproval. In Freiburg public outcry erupted when state officials closed the university in September 1939 in preparation for a breach of the nearby western front. City officials were no less happy when, after the reconquest of Alsace, state policy required most of the city’s top educators to relocate to schools west of the Rhine. In the teachers’ absence, officials complained of “Diziplinlosigkeit” in the schools. In Stuttgart residents also struggled to adjust to the demands of wartime. Because of the distance between the city and the frontline and the rarity of air raids during the early years of the conflict, the community was slow to comply with civilian defense measures and rationing. To increase compliance the regime made an example of disobedient citizens. The excesses of the strategy culminated in the much-publicized imprisonment of a 70-year old man who had failed to take cover during an air-raid warning.

In spite of the regime’s efforts to “win” public support for the war, dissatisfaction continued to grow as the economic demands of the conflict increased and conditions on the home front worsened. Among the most pressing concerns were the cities’ housing shortages. In Freiburg, where Lord Mayor Kerber conceded in 1940 that conditions were worse than in 1933,

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164 Bechtold, 51.
166 Müller, 327.
168 Müller, 328.

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officials concluded that at least 3000 new homes were necessary to accommodate local residents. The situation grew more desperate, as wounded soldiers and evacuees arrived in search of shelter, and college students sought refuge in the seemingly safe university town.\textsuperscript{169} When they refused to share their spacious residences with the homeless, municipal and party officials drew the ire of local residents. In Stuttgart the persistence of prewar housing shortages inspired similar tensions.\textsuperscript{170} A lack of hunger, however, provided a rare bright spot for the two cities. In light of the memory of the “hunger years” of the First World War and the fear of another “Dolchstoss,” regime officials were careful to avoid dramatic reductions in food supplies.\textsuperscript{171} Still, neither community escaped black markets or rationing. In Freiburg the introduction of ration cards brought the municipal government embarrassment after the lord mayor’s wife was found guilty of hoarding supplies beyond her allotment.\textsuperscript{172}

The war brought even greater impositions on the cities’ cultural arenas. In fact, it brought an end to most cultural activities. After 1940 cinema audiences met with a more narrow selection of films, which excluded most foreign works and included an increasing number of propagandistic newsreels. On stage, theaters maintained the uncomfortable balance between audience and government demands until 1944, when the regime ordered the suspension of all productions and enlisted thousands of actors and directors in the war effort. Schools faced increased interruptions as well, as teachers and students left for the battlefield and routine air raid alarms eliminated classroom routines. Finally, the propagandistic slant of the media grew more extreme, while paper shortages provided officials with a convenient excuse to eliminate even the most sympathetic non-Nazi publications. As the war entered its final year, residents encountered

\textsuperscript{169} Schnabel, “Die Stadtverwaltung,” 352.
\textsuperscript{170} Müller, 474.
\textsuperscript{171} Müller, 331.
\textsuperscript{172} Müller, 336.; Schnabel, “Die Stadtverwaltung,” 356.
only the local party publications. In the meantime, fatigue with government propaganda led readers to turn from the press to rumor mills in search of reliable information about the war’s development.\(^\text{173}\)

For a minority of residents the radicalization of the regime and the pursuit of war at all costs demanded active resistance. For the majority, however, a combination of incentives prevented more than grumbling. Most important was terror. Like most cities, Freiburg and Stuttgart received regular reminders of the fate that awaited those who resisted the regime or detracted from the war effort. In November 1940 a man convicted of plundering a vacant home became the first victim of wartime justice in Freiburg. To deter future dissent, local officials made quick publicity of his execution.\(^\text{174}\) In Stuttgart residents received frequent reminders of the elimination of dissent with reports on the activity of the local guillotine.\(^\text{175}\) Also central to the cities’ silence were the desire to win the war and to avoid defeat and occupation and the hope that success on the battlefield would render meaningful the nation’s wartime sacrifices. In any case, neither the public’s hope for victory nor the regime’s efforts to quash resistance slowed the deterioration of public opinion.

Most detrimental for the regime’s image were Allied air raids. Freiburg experienced its first raid, albeit under friendly fire, in May 1940. Allied attacks came later. In October 1943 a British assault disappointed local hopes that Allied commanders would spare the idyllic university and vacation city.\(^\text{176}\) The worst raid occurred on November 11, 1944 when “operation Tigerfisch” killed almost 3,000 citizens, injured another 9,600, and left a third of the city’s

\(^{173}\) Thomas Schnabel, “Freiburg im Dritten Reich,” 314; Sauer, Kleine Geschichte Stuttgarts, 79.


\(^{175}\) Sauer, Kleine Geschichte Stuttgarts, 80.

homes unusable. Allied strategists, who besieged the city with more frequent air raids. Between 1940 and 1944 the city suffered 18 attacks, which took the lives of 1400 residents, left 71,500 homeless, and destroyed over 7000 homes.

Allied bombs all but severed the German people from the Nazi regime and its deranged pursuit of victory. Without shelter, water, electricity, or food millions of Germans endured the final phase of the war in terror. A Freiburg resident captured the scene well, when he recalled “Nie mehr, so lange ich lebe, werden diese Bilder, die Eindrücke, aus meinem Gedächtnis gelöscht werden können. Es war grauenhaft! Flammen, Inferno, unbeschreibliche Hitze, Brandgeruch […] Schreiende Menschen irrten umher[…] Wir waren verstört.” As they grappled with such experiences, Germans found solace not in the regime’s continued promises of a glorious Endsieg but in their faith and families. As a Freiburg woman recounted, “Gemeinsam fanden wir im Gebet Trost und dankten Gott für die Rettung unseres Lebens und baten um Kraft für alles, was uns draussen in der Trümmerstadt erwartete.”

A central cause of Germany’s defeat, Allied bombing raids were also the earliest agent of denazification. The horrors of life under the bombs cemented the regime’s association with the dreaded war in the minds of all but the most devout National Socialists. In the wake of the raids, officials in both cities noted an increase in public discontent with the regime. In Freiburg Kerber conceded that the people no longer trusted the local government and that only a new

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178 Müller, 439.
179 Irmi Martin, Diary Entry, Cited in: Serger 78.
administration could win the public’s support.\textsuperscript{181} The situation was the same in Stuttgart, where local security officials conceded the public’s disgust with the war. In the words of one official:

Die Sorgen und Missstände des Alltags werden mit Verdrossenheit erörtert und manche innenpolitischen Vorgänge scharf, zum Teil mit Verbitterung kritisiert. Aus Gesprächen und Äusserungen aller Volksschichten gewinnt man den Eindruck, dass nicht unbeträchtliche Bevölkerungskreise den Krieg nur mehr als eine persönliche ärgerliche Last empfinden, die man so schnell wie möglich loswerden möchte.\textsuperscript{182}

During the final months of fighting, civilian preoccupation with survival combined with fear of Allied reprisals and the regime’s brutal elimination of dissenters to prevent an open revolt against the Nazi state. However, as the regime made clear its intention to continue the war at all costs, bands of citizens throughout Germany rose to prevent a final wave of senseless destruction. In Freiburg a local woman, Philomene Steiger, led a campaign to defend the city’s infrastructure from sabotage by the \textit{Wehrmacht}. In Stuttgart Arnulf Klett led a similar effort. Although such resistance was belated and, perhaps trivial, it nonetheless offered final confirmation of Nazism’s failure to win the hearts and minds of Germans. As the regime’s hardened ideologues elected to pursue their insanity to its logical conclusion, the German people revealed that they were not willing to follow.

\textbf{Postwar Assessments: Defeat, Nazism, and Occupation}

Unlike the upheavals of 1918 and 1933, which had allowed stability in daily lives, the defeat of 1945 was disruptive. The war claimed approximately 5½ million lives, more than double the number of casualties from the First World War. At the same time, the conflict brought unprecedented destruction to the home front and left not only physical wounds but social

\textsuperscript{181} Schnabel, “Die Stadtverwaltung,” 357.
\textsuperscript{182} Müller, 489.
and psychological trauma as well.\textsuperscript{183} Amid the destruction survival remained the top concern for most Germans. Residents of Freiburg and Stuttgart offered no exception. As one Freiburg man described “\textit{Unsere Lage war schrecklich, wir hatten einfach nichts zu essen.}”\textsuperscript{184} A woman in Stuttgart noted how “\textit{Das ganze Fühlen und Trachten war darauf ausgerichtet, etwas zu essen, etwas zum Anziehen und die Wohnung dicht zu kriegen.}”\textsuperscript{185} In the years that followed, food supplies remained insufficient, as the country’s infrastructure lay in disrepair. Housing shortages worsened.\textsuperscript{186} As they grappled with the challenges of daily life, residents were struck by the totality of their nation’s collapse. A Stuttgart man best captured the scene in a letter to his wife: “\textit{Die Verhältnisse hier sind Dir schwerlich klar zu machen. ‘Chaos’ ist das falsche Wort. Alles ruht: die Schulen, die Fabriken, die Eisenbahn, die Post. Das ganze Volk ist gelähmt.}”\textsuperscript{187}

Amid the rubble, the cities’ residents responded to defeat with a variety of emotions. In general, relief accompanied the end of fighting and the cessation of Allied air raids. A woman in Stuttgart exclaimed “\textit{Ich vergesse gar nicht das Gefühl, als ich wüsste, heute nacht gibt es keine Sirenen. Heute nacht darf ich schlafen.}”\textsuperscript{188} In Freiburg a man recalled how, “\textit{Wir atmeten erleichtert auf, weil wir endlich die lähmende Todesangst vor dauernden Fliegerangriffen los waren und wieder aus dem Kellerleben herauskamen.}”\textsuperscript{189} Residents also rejoiced in the regime’s collapse and felt “liberated” from Nazi leaders, whom a majority in neither city had endorsed. Freiburg’s municipal archivist captured the sentiment with the observation that,

\begin{itemize}
  \item Hans Bieser, Diary Entry, Cited in: Serger, 370.
  \item Cited in: Hosseinzadeh, 23.
  \item Cited in: Serger, 412.
\end{itemize}
Trotz der drückenden Sorgen in der eigenen Familie und trotz der ganzen Schwere der deutschen Niederlage, über die wir uns keine Illusionen machen, hatten wir doch […] das Gefühl, […] frei zu sein nicht nur von den Schrecken des Krieges, […] sondern vor allem seelisch von einem Alpdruck erlöst zu sein, wieder frei zu sein von dem höllischen Spuk, der uns bisher dauernd umgeben und bedrückt hatte.190

A woman in Stuttgart experienced the same and recalled how, “Als wir die Panzerwagen der Sieger […] herabrollen sahen, tranken wir in dem Bretterschild, der von unserer Wohnung übrig geblieben war, die wohlgehütete Flasche Sekt […] auf unser erhalten gebliebenes Leben, auf unsere Befreiung von der Diktatur der Verbrecher.”191 In light of Nazism’s electoral struggles in both cities and residents’ wartime frustrations, such sentiments carried greater truth than cynical Allied observers later allowed. Nevertheless, the cities were also sad. Although few mourned Hitler, the Reich, or Nazism, most residents struggled with the anger and shame that accompanied the defeat of their country. While the woman in Stuttgart rejoiced over the prospect of a good night’s sleep, she also confided that “Aber auf der anderen Seite war da doch auch, wenn man ganz ehrlich ist, eine gewisse Niederlage.”192 In the same spirit a man in Freiburg lamented the suffering of his fellow countrymen and wondered “ob dies [befreit, zu sein] ein allgemeines Gefühl gewesen sein kann. Viele deutsche Soldaten kamen durch das Kriegsende in Gefangenschaft, viele Zivilisten wurden vertrieben, verschleppt oder kamen in das Gefängnis.”193 In short, residents of both cities confronted defeat with a mixture of elation and sadness and recalled their experiences with Nazism as a tragic nightmare.

The defeat of 1945 marked a Stunde Null for officials and residents in neither community. As questions about the future demanded reflections on the past, local assessments

190 StadtAF, Chronik Dr. Hefele, 5 May 1945, 10.
192 Cited in: Hosseinzadeh, 23.
193 Cited in: Serger, 413.
of the cities’ nazification confirmed the endurance of pre- and non-Nazi ideals and traditions. In both cities, commentators across political and confessional lines recalled, and exaggerated, the local unpopularity of Nazism and reasserted the historic liberal and anti-Prussian identity of the German Southwest. In Freiburg, Baden’s future minister president and Christian Democrat, Leo Wohleb, noted that “Nicht aus unserem Land ist der gefährlich Wirrwarr gekommen, welcher gesunde demokratische Entwicklung von 1918/19 verfälscht hat.” Wohleb’s colleague, Karl Färber, shared the sentiment and bemoaned the imposition of national (i.e. Prussian) policy on Baden from Berlin: “Da drückte irgendwo in Berlin einer auf einer Reichsstelle auf den Knopf; und hier draussen im letzten süddeutsche Winkel sprang der Befehl heraus.” In the same spirit, Anton Fendrich, a Social Democrat in Freiburg, declared that before 1933 “wir [Badener] waren eines von besonderen Prägung in Deutschland bis 1933.” One of Fendrich’s colleagues in Stuttgart added that, “Das altwürttembergische Verhältnis von Herr und Untertan […] war weit über zeitbedingte Regierungsformen hinaus von einer demokratischen Grundgesinnung getragen und beseelt.”

Other observers drew sharper distinctions between the authoritarian north and the democratic southwest. In Freiburg, Rupert Giessler, a Catholic and the editor of the postwar Freiburger Nachrichten, commented that “Wenn man an die Bewegung von 1848 denkt, so weiss man, dass auch politisch ein demokratisches Denken in ganz Baden, vom Hotzenwald bis Mannheim, gleicherweise lebt, und es von der norddeutschen Art unterscheidet.” In Stuttgart, a prominent Lutheran leader, Paul Schempp, blamed Germany’s authoritarian past on, “Dieser

195 Köhler, 118.
The most poignant reassertion of anti-Prussian sentiment came from the city’s left-leaning editor, Karl Ackermann, who described Nazism as the final expression of a long tradition of Prussian conservatism and argued, “Warum wollen wir also die Dinge nicht beim Namen nennen und zugeben, dass nicht das Jahr 1933, sondern das Jahr 1871 oder 1849 vor Gericht steht.” If such statements served, in part, to evade accountability for the Reich’s atrocities, they were not wholly inaccurate characterizations of the cities’ relationship to Nazism and the communities’ historical identity within the German Reich. Still, the significance of local reactions to defeat and Nazism lay less in their historical accuracy than in their reassertion of familiar pre-Nazi *German* values and identities and in their implicit rejection of the need for Allied tutelage.

That Allied observers interpreted local responses to defeat as indifferent, defiant, and unrepentant was understandable, as no German rushed to accept personal responsibility for Nazism and its crimes. However, neither community failed to address the question of guilt. In Freiburg, the city’s postwar deputy mayor, Franz Geiler, conceded that “Scham und Entsetzen müssen alle vom Nazismus nicht verseuchte deutsche Menschen packen, angesicht der politisch und sittlich abgrundtiefen Verbrechen Hitlers und seiner Gefolgschaft, die zu der furchtbaren Katastrophen führten.” A city councilman added:

So wie die Dinge heute liegen, haben wir kein Recht, uns zu beschweren, sondern müssen uns immer wieder an die Brust schlagen und bedenken, dass wir alle mehr oder weniger dazu beigetragen haben, dass die Hitler und Konsorten in unserem Namen mordend, brennend, raubend und plündernd friedliche Länder überfallen konnten.

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In Stuttgart, Ackermann wrote that, “Vor Gericht stehen auch wir selbst, als Volk und Untertanen, nicht weil wir das Kriegsverbrechen angezettelt und befohlen hätten, sondern weil wir, schwach gutgläubig und kritiklos genug gewesen sind, uns ihm nicht rechtzeitig entgegenzustehen.”

Yet residents were less open to accusations of guilt. In both cities Allied campaigns to confront Germans with photos and footage of the Reich’s crimes drew a mix of reluctant interest and outright anger. In Freiburg the city archivist reacted to a French collection of photos of the concentration camps, entitled “Eure Schuld,” as follows:

die These von der Schuld aller an den Gruellen in den Konzentrationslagern entspricht nicht der Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit. Für einen alten Pazifisten, der bis zum Jahre 1933 Mitglied der deutschen Freidensgesellschaft war, und bei den Wahlen im Dritten Reich gegen Hitler gestimmt hat, ist es betrübend zu sehen, dass von den Siegern immer wieder dieselben Fehler gemacht werden, dass immer wieder eine Saat für neuen Hass und neue Kriege ausgestreut wird, so dass die Menschheit nie zur Ruhe und Friede gelangt.

A more candid rejection of Allied accusations appeared in Stuttgart in a letter to the editor of the local paper. The author argued that,

Wir wissen, dass wir eine grosse Schuld zu übernehmen haben […] aber) alle Nationen unterhielten politische, wirtschaftliche, kulturelle Beziehungen mit [Hitler.] Die Olympiade wurde in seinem Beisein abgehalten! Und dagegen wirft man aber selbst den kleinen und kleinsten Parteigenossen und schliesslich jedem Deutschen vor, sich nicht gegen Hitler gestellt und dann sich von ihm befreit zu haben.

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205 For example, see: Hans-Georg Merz and Herbert Uhl, Hitlers Verbrechen – Crimes Hitleriens (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2008) 102.
206 StadtAF, Chronik Dr. Hefele, 9 Jul 1945, 45.
Such statements betrayed the widespread view that because the Allies also bore responsibility for the recent war, their right to lecture and judge Germans was murky at best.

In both cities officials questioned the purpose of Allied reeducation projects and asserted the need for domestic leadership of reconstruction. A Freiburg city councilman asserted that “Um aber Taten zu vollbringen, die den furchtbaren Hass der anderen Völker gegen uns beseitigen können, müssen wir uns selber erziehen.” Another observer noted that, “Die Hauptlast der wichtigen Aufgabe der geistigen Neuerziehung wird bei der Familie liegen.” In Stuttgart the editor Josef Eberle added that, “Es liegt an uns allen, und nur an uns, ob wir Besiegte von heute uns morgen zu den Siegern zählen dürfen, zu den Siegern des Geistes über Barbarismus, Rechtlosigkeit und Gewalt.” While some observers conceded the value of Allied examples, they clung to pre- and non-Nazi German ideas and customs that had survived the Reich.

The initial months of occupation did little to improve German receptivity to the Allies’ presence. Although both the French and the Americans demonstrated greater civility than the Russians, their conduct was far from noble. Conditions were worst under the French, whose ill-equipped military units overcame their material poverty with massive requisitions of German goods. In June and July 1945 three rounds of housing requisitions in Freiburg forced hundreds of devastated families from their homes and shelters. One particular source of resentment was the requirement that each family provide a complete man’s suit for needy French citizens and returning French prisoners of war. Complaints inundated city hall, as residents argued that they

211 For example, see: StadtAF C 5/18, Memo, 17 Jul. 1945.
either could not afford to sacrifice or simply did not have the requested clothing. In the meantime, physical violence against civilians detracted from the occupiers’ image. During the final two weeks of October 1945 Freiburg recorded four cases of rape by French personnel, including the brutal assault of one woman by 10 occupation soldiers.

In Stuttgart conditions were better. The affluence of the American military meant that its soldiers were not dependent on requisitions. In fact, affluence helped to endear millions of American GIs to German civilians. In stereotypical fashion, a Stuttgart woman associated her first encounter with the Americans with the gifts that they distributed. She had received an orange and recalled how, “We had not seen oranges in years. […] We all gathered around and held and smelled the lovely fruit. […] We ate the whole orange, and it tasted heavenly.” In spite of their charity, the Americans failed to ease the fears of all residents. A higher number of consensual sexual relations between Germans and Americans reduced the level of rape in the American zone, but assaults still occurred. American non-fraternization laws also led to housing requisitions that rendered entire neighborhoods off-limits to German civilians. By contrast, French soldiers tended to live in the same houses as Germans. Isolated and distant, American officials remained agents of a foreign occupation, which few Germans liked. A 1951 poll by the German Institut für Demoskopie confirmed as much, when it revealed that while 65% of Germans held a negative view of the French, 49% disliked the Americans. Similar polls revealed dislike for Americans was highest where the American presence was greatest.

213 StadtAF D.Aö. 1. 82 - Police report submitted by local Polizeipräsident to French General Schwarz, 31.10.1945.
215 See: Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation (New York: Basic Books, 2007); Hosseinizadeh, 95; On the example of the Sonnenberg neighborhood in Stuttgart, see: StadtAS, HA 0, Nr. 105.
In spite of their general dislike of the occupation, officials in both cities realized that any effort to assert their own visions for the future of postwar Germany would require cooperation with the Allies. Conditions in Freiburg pointed to greater Allied-German understanding than conditions in Stuttgart. Freiburg enjoyed a multitude of historic connections to its occupier. From the rise of local liberal political traditions in the early nineteenth century to the content of local theatrical and cinematic programs in the early twentieth century, evidence of France’s local influence abounded. Even the anti-French propaganda of the Third Reich had failed to weaken the community’s fondness for French culture. In fact, Lord Mayor Kerber, himself a fan of French art and drama, declared in 1937 that “Die Grenzen und die Strassen, die nach Osten und Westen quer darüberführen, sollen Organe werden für das Zusammenleben zweier Völker, die beide nach ihrer ruhmvollen Geschichte, ihrer hohen Kultur und ihren inneren Werten berufen sein müssten, sich gemeinsam zu Wahren des Freidens zu machen.” Kerber’s successor had a personal connection to France. Postwar Lord Mayor Wolfgang Hoffmann, as well as city council members Paul Fleig and Franz Geiler, had all lived in Strasbourg before 1933.

A more general cause for optimism among officials in Freiburg stemmed from France and Germany’s geographic bond. The countries’ physical proximity discouraged the sense of “foreignness,” which separated Germans from the more “distant” British, Russians, and Americans. Throughout the French zone, frequent references to the French as Germany’s “Nachbar” reflected a unique and historic sense of community and encouraged notions of a shared Franco-German future. In Freiburg a local church pamphlet on youth work and France spoke of the, “Nachbarvolk, mit dem wir nun auf weiteste Sicht verknüpft sind.” In the same spirit a local cultural organization hoped as early as 1945 to foster exchange between the two

countries and establish, “ein breiteres Verständnis für den westlichen Nachbar als Vorstufe zu spätere wechselseitiger Verständigung auf der Basis westlich orientierter [...] Kulturgemeinschaft hinzuwirken.” On both sides of the Rhine the experience of three major wars in less than a century had convinced postwar officials of the need for greater cooperation and understanding. In the French zone, then, the occupation gained added significance as the first step in a broader push for Franco-German reconciliation. The larger sense of purpose did not eliminate conflicts between the expectations of postwar French and German officials, but it eased their negotiation of differences.

Stuttgart enjoyed less familiarity with its American occupiers. Beyond America’s role as a distant beacon for discouraged liberals in the nineteenth century and Hollywood’s presence on local screens in the early twentieth century, America had few historical ties to the city. No evidence suggests that any of the city’s postwar leaders had lived in America. In Stuttgart, then, the Americans remained a more foreign, albeit alluring, presence. Instead of a “Nachbar” the Americans were just “Die Amerikaner.” To be sure, the countries’ general western, capitalist, and Christian character provided a wider foundation for cooperation than that which existed in the Soviet zone. Anti-Communism also encouraged cooperation during the latter years of the occupation; but it was a product of the Cold War and a more contemporary mission than the drive for Franco-German reconciliation, which expanded on precedents set by Aristide Briand.

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and Gustav Stresemann in the 1920s. Yet much about the expectations of postwar American and German officials seemed foreign in the eyes of the other. After 1945, especially, the realities of occupation highlighted the “differences” between German and American political, cultural, and social models. American cultural exports had appealed to Germans throughout the early twentieth-century, but postwar reeducation forced German officials to consider whether they should embrace as their own the values and traditions that lay behind American culture. The question demanded that Germans look beyond the material comforts of American occupation policies and consider the longer-term implications of American influences. These implications led Reinhold Maier to observe the American flag in Stuttgart and wonder, “Ist es ein Banner der Hoffnung?” As Maier and his colleagues undertook to assert their own visions for postwar German politics and culture in the years that followed, their actions provided an answer to his poignant question.

**Conclusion**

As postwar officials in Freiburg and Stuttgart confronted the Nazi past, they stressed their communities’ incomplete nazification. If their arguments downplayed the extent of local Nazi sympathies, they also reflected the genuine struggles that Nazi officials had encountered in their quest to win the cities’ hearts and minds. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the cities had developed unique political and economic traditions, which later mitigated the local consequences of Germany’s interwar crises and detracted from Nazism’s rise at the polls. Though a majority of the cities’ residents supported the Nazi regime after 1933, their motivations reflected less a fanatical commitment to National Socialism or a desire for war and genocide than a combination of fear and the hope for personal and national renewal. The survival of non-Nazi

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222 Schirmann, 75.
223 Maier, 283.
political and cultural preferences in the face of rigid nazification campaigns confirmed as much and revealed the regime’s failure to convert the masses to its twisted ideological faith. In the wake of Nazism’s collapse, local officials drew on Nazism’s beleaguered appeal and looked to (re)assert pre-Nazi ideals and traditions as the foundation for postwar German politics, culture, and society. In their quest officials in Freiburg had greater cause for optimism than their colleagues in Stuttgart, where a lack of familiarity between the city and its American occupier presaged greater dissonance than did Freiburg’s historic ties to France. Nevertheless, the course of postwar cultural negotiations in both cities depended on the extent to which the occupiers shared their Germans’ assessments of the Nazi past and the local prospects for Allied-German cooperation.
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\textsuperscript{i} Wirtschaftspartei
\textsuperscript{iii} For election results in Freiburg, see: Werner Köhler, *Freiburg i. Br. 1945-1949: Politisches Leben und Erfahrungen in der Nachkriegszeit* (Freiburg: Verlag Stadtarchiv, 1987) 284.
\textsuperscript{iv} For election results in Stuttgart, see: Roland Müller, *Stuttgart zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss Verlag, 1988) 13f.
Chapter 2: Allied Paths to 1945 – Wartime Experiences and Postwar Expectations

Like the Germans, Allied officials greeted the end of the war with a variety of emotions. In general, news of the German surrender inspired feelings of relief, elation, and vindication. After almost six years, the conflict had claimed tens of millions of lives, demanded unprecedented economic sacrifices, and dislocated countless families and communities. As the Nazi war machine ground to halt, Allied populations, civilian and military, welcomed the prospect of peace and a return to normalcy. Amid their relief the victors also found cause for celebration. In contrast to that of 1918, the most recent German defeat was total and undeniable. In addition to the battlefield, Allied forces had conquered the German home front. In light of German civilians’ refusal to defend the Nazi regime from collapse, the Allied victory appeared to be both military and psychological. In addition, wartime propaganda, which had portrayed the conflict as an apocalyptic battle between good and evil, added a moral quality to the victory. For Allied observers, then, the capitulation ceremonies at Reims and Berlin signaled more than the war’s conclusion. The defeat affirmed the righteousness of the victors’ cause and vindicated those who had died in pursuit of it.

In spite of their triumphant joy, however, Allied officials remained unsatisfied. While they celebrated their victory as thorough, they worried that it was insufficient. If the outbreak of war in 1939 had confirmed the failure of efforts to resolve the “German Question” in the wake of the First World War, it had also seemed to validate historical Allied concerns over the militaristic nature of the German people. Evidence of Nazi war crimes and the Holocaust deepened such concerns and suggested that the German threat to European and world peace was more complicated and sinister than imagined. Convinced of the shortcomings of the Versailles Treaty, the Allies emerged from the most recent conflict committed to a different, more comprehensive
postwar settlement. Lest the rise of a Fourth Reich squander the promise of the present victory and render the sacrifices of the past six years meaningless, the Allies believed that they had to transform not only the structures of the German state but also the mentality of the German people. In an unprecedented campaign to alter the political, economic, social, and cultural foundation of a modern, industrialized nation, the postwar occupiers aimed to instill in German society values and customs that approximated their own. While a shared hope for peace inspired the Allies’ efforts, differences among the Allies’ own political and cultural traditions combined with unique understandings of the German past to produce a diversity of approaches to the German future.

The chapter outlines the Allies’ strategies for the occupation of Germany and considers their interpretations of what the defeat of 1945 meant for postwar German society. It focuses on the experiences and views of individuals and communities that were most responsible for the formation of occupation policy but provides an exhaustive review of neither French nor American views of Germany’s prewar past. The chapter begins with a discussion of how each Ally’s unique wartime experiences influenced its postwar agenda. It then examines the evolution and organization of the Allies’ respective occupation missions and introduces the central figures who were charged with the implementation of postwar policies. A final section introduces these policies. It compares approaches to “denazification,” which reflected specific understandings of nazification, and “reeducation,” which reflected both the influence of the Allies’ paths to victory and the historical foundations of their cultural foreign policies.

Through its examination of the occupiers’ missions the chapter reveals two divergent approaches to a shared postwar task. Among the Allied powers, France was least certain of its rank in the postwar world. French uncertainty contributed a sense of urgency to the occupation
and gave French officials the dual task of reeducating the German people and reestablishing French prestige. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, the latter often trumped the former as the driving force behind specific French initiatives. Beyond concerns over grandeur, the French agenda also reflected an understanding of Nazism that approximated German interpretations of the recent past in Freiburg. The result was a less stringent approach to denazification and reeducation, which because of similarities between French and German cultural and political expectations and the familiarity of French officials with their Germans, promised greater cooperation between the occupier and the occupied. A different set of priorities informed the American agenda. On the one hand, the United States entered the postwar period with little concern over matters of prestige. On the other hand, American policies called for a more stringent approach to denazification. If few American officials viewed all Germans as devout Nazis, most lacked their French colleagues’ familiarity with pre-war German politics and culture; they were therefore more suspicious of postwar German arguments about Nazism’s incomplete reach. In their suspicion, the Americans turned to their own customs and traditions as models for postwar Germans to emulate. Although greater differences between German and American political and cultural expectations set the stage for more contentious interactions between the occupier and the occupied, concerns over the undemocratic nature of occupation rendered the Americans more reluctant “re-educators” than their French colleagues, who drew on the rich history of French cultural imperialism to justify their mission.

**Different Paths Toward a Common Victory**

As the Allies celebrated victory in the spring 1945, they marked a common end to a variety of wartime experiences. In spite of their shared mission to defeat a common enemy, each
power had pursued a different path to victory. Most striking, perhaps, was the French path. Among the postwar victors France was the first to experience war on its own soil and the only power to suffer defeat by the Germans. The chronology of the French experience is well known. After months of inaction during the so-called “phony war,” the German invasion of May 1940 forced the conflict onto French soil and precipitated the collapse of the French state. Overwhelmed and undersupplied, French defenses disintegrated in the presence of the German invaders, who overtook French units in full retreat. As hundreds of thousands of civilians fled their homes to escape the invasion, the French government followed suit and abandoned Paris for Bordeaux. Within days the government conceded defeat, requested an armistice, and handed power to the national hero of the First World War, Marshal Pétain. On June 22 representatives of the new administration signed the French capitulation in the famous railway car near Compiègne forest. Under the terms of the agreement, German forces assumed direct control of the northern two-thirds of France, while Pétain’s administration, which later established itself in the spa-town of Vichy, retained nominal control of the unoccupied south. The arrangement endured until November 1942, when German forces assumed control of the whole of France. In the meantime, the financial and psychological strains of life under military occupation combined with the battle between proponents of resistance and collaboration and debates over the causes of the French defeat to antagonize French society throughout the war.

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With an eye toward the timing of France’s arrival at the postwar victors’ table and the nature of French occupation strategy, three particular consequences of the nation’s tumultuous wartime experience were important. First, the German occupation of France informed the conduct of French officials in postwar Germany. On the one hand, the costs and consequences of the German invasion provided postwar officials a convenient justification for the pillage of German towns and cities after 1945. The demands of the German occupiers, which included the requisition of housing, food, and clothing, and the transfer of more than 650,000 French civilians for work in Germany, had devastated the French economy and left postwar French occupation forces ill-equipped and with few alternatives to the requisition of German supplies and labor.227 When confronted with a complaint by the Archbishop in Freiburg about French requisitions in the area, the head of French occupation forces, General de Lattre, thus responded in comparative terms. He noted that while his forces “viennent de frémir d’horreur en pénétrant sur votre sol, devant le spectacle du martyre infligé à nos compatriotes déportés,” they would at least remain faithful to the ideals of the Allied mission and exercise restraint.228 German crimes against French civilians provided another standard by which French officials judged the conduct of their own forces. In Stuttgart, which fell under French control until the summer of 1945, the French commander of the city apologized for the rape of local women by his soldiers by noting that in contrast to the systematic rape of towns under German rule, “hier [Stuttgart] wenigstens von den


The postwar significance of the German occupation extended, however, beyond the justification of French transgressions. In spite of its obvious imposition of physical and psychological trauma on French civilians, the German tenure in France had facilitated a variety of ties between the occupier and occupied and had encouraged a host of social and cultural exchanges. The latter contributed to a more nuanced postwar French understanding of Germans and their relationship to Nazism. In fact, German cultural initiatives in France later reminded French officials of a more “human” Germany and provided a standard against which to judge the quality of their own cultural programs.

A second aspect of France’s wartime experience with postwar ramifications was the political divisions that plagued the country after 1940. In the wake of the defeat, new fault lines appeared in French society, which at once reflected and exacerbated the political tensions of the interwar period. While support for the leadership of Marshal Pétain was widespread, support for his authoritarian regime had not been unanimous. Most controversial was the regime’s collaboration with the German Reich. Even for Vichy’s most fervent supporters, the decision to allow France to serve as a pawn in Hitler’s empire was difficult to swallow. Similar divisions appeared among Frenchmen who aligned with neither the advocates of collaboration nor the supporters of Pétain but instead joined one of the numerous resistance organizations. In spite of General Charles de Gaulle’s efforts to unify these organizations, his leadership remained contested until 1943.

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230 Willis, 94; Gildea, 45; Burrin, 203-204.
the nation’s wartime divisions were troubling. Debates over collaboration, which suffered from a clear definition of the term and its morality, intensified throughout the war and threatened to ignite a civil war at precisely the time when the post-Liberation French Provisional Government confronted the challenges of preparing for the occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{233}

Like the French, the Allies struggled during the war to decide “which” France to support. Within the future western camp, a clear division developed. The British government, which had supported De Gaulle during his self-imposed exile in London, emerged as one of the earliest and strongest international advocates of his Free French movement. On a visit to France before the armistice, Churchill described the general as “L’homme du destin.”\textsuperscript{234} In the years that followed, the British leader remained an ally of De Gaulle and within the Allied community championed the general’s push for a French zone of occupation. In fact, the French only received their zone at Churchill’s insistence. Afraid of another rapid postwar American withdrawal from Europe, the prime minister viewed a strong French ally as essential to Britain’s security on the continent and demanded for France a place at the victors’ table. The United States, however, adopted a different approach. It sided first with Pétain and the Vichy government.\textsuperscript{235} Among the multitude of motivations that underlay the American decision were the argument that Pétain’s regime was the legitimate successor to the Third Republic, the hope for a military ally in the heart of Hitler’s Europe, and, not least, the personal animosity between President Roosevelt and De Gaulle. In fact, the delayed American recognition of De Gaulle’s Provisional Government owed in large

\textsuperscript{234} Willis, 9.
part to the President’s dislike of the French leader. The same was true of Roosevelt’s eventual
decision to grant the French an occupation zone, which owed less to any change in his views of
De Gaulle’s leadership than to his sympathy for British security concerns.236

A final component of France’s wartime journey with lasting consequences was the
tremendous embarrassment that accompanied the French collapse. Across the political spectrum,
Frenchmen reacted to defeat with a mixture of incredulity and shame.237 In light of their nation’s
historical role as a political and cultural leader on the world stage, they struggled to come to
terms with the almost instant loss of French prestige and bemoaned their inability to remedy the
situation. The contemporary historian Marc Bloch captured the mood with the concession that
“We find ourselves today in this appalling situation – that the fate of France no longer depends
upon the French […] the future of our country and of our civilization has become the stake in a
struggle of which we, for the most part, are only rather humiliated spectators.”238 Bloch and
millions of other Frenchmen worried for good reason about the future of their nation’s
international reputation. Observers in both Britain and the United States had observed the
French collapse with surprise and disappointment.239 The Soviets were no less critical. Stalin
concluded that France had “simply left the door open to the enemy.”240 For the French and the
Allies alike, concern over French weakness endured beyond the war’s end. Such concern forced
the restoration of France’s image onto the French occupation agenda and led General De Lattre

238 Bloch, 174.
240 Cited in: Notin, 21.
to conclude in March 1945 that a French presence in postwar Germany was, “une nécessité historique [...] pour relever notre prestige.”

The United States traveled a different path to victory. The country benefited from its geography, which shielded it from the war’s initial stages and provided policymakers greater control over the timing and nature of America’s entry into the conflict. Separated from the diplomatic turmoil of interwar Europe, Americans had observed the outbreak of renewed hostilities on the continent with cautious concern. Isolationist sentiment, which had inspired the passage of a series of neutrality acts by Congress during the 1930s and had grown stronger because of a dispute over Europe’s lingering war-debts to America, was widespread in the fall of 1939. Officials, including President Roosevelt, believed that some form of American intervention was necessary, yet public opposition discouraged any action. Preoccupied with the nation’s ongoing economic recovery and the domestic political battles over the New Deal, America thus greeted the war as a matter for the Old World to resolve without the direct involvement of the United States. In spite of American resistance to direct participation in the war, however, the collapse of France and the German siege of Great Britain did inspire indirect aid to the Allied war effort. In contrast to the 64% of Americans who felt that their country’s main duty was to stay out of the war in May 1940, 60% had concluded by December that the provision of aid to Great Britain was necessary. In the year that followed, American isolationism began to weaken, and the country began a slow, albeit reluctant, push to war, which followed from the Lend-Lease Act of March, through the occupation of Iceland in July, to the

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242 See: Dallek, 103-121; Grosser, 12; Duroselle, 122-130.
244 Duroselle, 149.
Atlantic Conference of August and the triumph of pro-war sentiment in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December.245

For America’s position at the postwar victors’ table the influence of the country’s wartime experience was two-fold. First, America experienced little of the political uncertainty that antagonized France both at home and within the Allied community. Throughout the war the United States remained under the leadership of a single government and, for most of it, a single president. As the French argued over the identity of their nation’s true leader, the Americans reelected their President to unprecedented third and fourth terms.246 American wartime politics was not free of tension. Lingering debates over the consequences of the New Deal, the merits of isolationist and interventionist platforms, and the timing and costs of America’s war effort persisted.247 Nevertheless, the war had not cost the Americans their prewar political system, and wartime debates had respected the conventions of the established political framework. The experience contrasted with both that of France and Germany, where the crises of the interwar period and the war had precipitated political collapse. The endurance of American political institutions later proved a source of pride for occupation officials. It also helped reinforce America’s leadership role within the Allied community prior to the war’s end. In contrast to those of France, Washington’s allegiances were never challenged by a “Vichy” rival. Although Americans debated if and when to enter the war, their support of the Allied cause was never in doubt. In November 1939, a Gallup poll found that only 0.1% of respondents favored the German cause. If formal alliances remained politically unpopular throughout the conflict,

American diplomacy and military planning favored the Allies.\textsuperscript{248} Undivided at home, America’s allegiances remained unquestioned abroad and fostered a certainty that the United States was, in fact, aligned on the “right side of history.”\textsuperscript{249}

A second aspect of America’s path to victory that informed the nation’s postwar policies was the distant and delayed nature of the American combat experience. The United States did not begin combat operations until December 1941. On the western European front American involvement did not begin until the fall of 1942. When the American campaigns did begin, they did so in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The American home front therefore escaped the horrors of total war that terrorized, and in some cases anesthetized, populations in France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Germany. A lack of American civilian casualties was essential to the maintenance of morale and support for the war. The same was true of the lower casualty rates among American forces abroad. By 1945, American military losses in both Europe and the Pacific totaled approximately 292,000. They ranked just ahead of British and French losses, which each totaled approximately 250,000, but well behind Soviet and German losses, which reached 8 million and 4.2 million, respectively.\textsuperscript{250} In addition to the effects on morale, America’s fortunate escape from the demands of total war further helped establish the nation as an economic leader among the postwar Allies. The growth and efficiency of an undamaged American war economy resulted in surpluses of military goods, which benefited America’s allies, including France, and gave the United States considerable leverage in postwar Allied

\textsuperscript{248} Dallek, 317-320.
\textsuperscript{249} Richard Overy, \textit{Why the Allies Won} (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) 298.
The richesse of American military units also reduced the need of American troops to requisition German goods.

In spite of its material benefits, America’s sheltered experience of the war’s early stages rendered the conflict’s final and most gruesome chapter all the more foreign and shocking. With little exposure to the realities of war and occupation from their offices in Washington, American planners struggled to empathize with the experiences of Europeans, including Germans alike. As a result, American responses to the war and Nazism were less nuanced than those of their western Allied counterparts. In fact, French officials later described the American assessment of Europe’s wartime experience as naive. De Gaulle voiced this view in a meeting with President Truman in the summer 1945. He argued: “Vous autres, Américains...avez pris part aux deux guerres mondiales avec une efficacité et un courage devant lesquels on doit s’incliner. Cependant, les invasions, les dévastations, les révolutions, sont pour vous des épreuves inconnues.”

In light of their respective paths to victory, France and America made for strange bedfellows. As France prepared to assume control of its zone of occupation, it confronted a variety of weaknesses at home and abroad. In the wake of the German occupation, French industrial output stood at 40% of prewar levels, while the French transportation system lay paralyzed and the black market functioned alongside traditional economic channels. In the meantime, domestic political tensions threatened to derail the reconstruction efforts of the Provisional Government and diverted attention and resources from the French occupation mission. On the ground in Germany, France commanded only a hodge-podge of colonial

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251 Davies, 35.
253 Willis, 83ff; Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, 5th Ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) 399-400.
soldiers and resistance fighters, who were armed with American and German weapons.\textsuperscript{254} Humiliated by collaboration and defeat and dependent on the United States for its financial and military survival, France in 1945 appeared unprepared for the mission that lay ahead. The reverse was true for the United States, which in spite of its initial reluctance to enter the war appeared as the dominant power in the world.\textsuperscript{255} With the support of a booming economy at home, America had mustered an impressive show of military force abroad. As the war ended, western Europe was host to 3.5 million American soldiers, whose superior equipment and supplies drew the awe of Allied and German observers alike. In the face of America’s financial and military might, Winston Churchill declared that the United States stood at the “summit of the world.”\textsuperscript{256} Yet, as the Allies shifted their attention to the challenges of the postwar period, the inequalities among their military, economic, and international standing at war’s end grew less important. Occupation was a different endeavor than war. Success at the former required resources and experiences that success at the latter did not. As the demands of the victors’ postwar occupation missions began to crystallize, wartime imbalances between French weaknesses and American strengths began to shift.

**Different Approaches to a Shared Postwar Task**

In Washington, where deliberations over Germany’s postwar fate had begun as early as 1940, the decision to occupy Germany emerged from a series of decisions by wartime leaders. Among the earliest to consider the idea of occupation were American military commanders who, like President Roosevelt, assumed during the early stages of the conflict that America’s


participation in the war was inevitable and would require the liberation and administration of civilian populations. The course of the war confirmed their assumptions, as most of Europe lay under German control by the end of 1940. Eight months later, the prospect of a postwar occupation grew stronger, when President Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter and committed the United States to pursue the “final destruction” of Nazi tyranny. Although the Charter offered no specifics on the administration of a defeated Reich, it hinted at a longer-term American campaign in postwar Germany. The same was true of Roosevelt’s decision at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to pursue Germany’s unconditional surrender. The decision, which the President had discussed among his advisors for almost a year, reflected the Allied desire to avoid a repetition of the disastrous post-1918 settlement and to achieve the kind of total victory that would allow the Allies to oversee the establishment of a new, peaceful government in Germany.

Convinced of the inevitability of some kind of postwar occupation, America’s wartime leaders ordered the recruitment and training of potential personnel three years before the war ended. Their zeal owed, in part, to the well-known Hunt Report, which had reviewed the American occupation of Germany from 1918-1920 and recommended more advanced planning for any future occupation mission. The first significant training operations began with the opening of a School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in 1942. Additional Civil Affairs Training Schools later opened at Harvard, Yale, Michigan, Chicago, Northwestern,
and Stanford.\textsuperscript{261} The programs, which recruited students from within the military, offered generalized instruction in matters of military law, correspondence, courtesy, and supply management. Language courses were also available. As the war continued and Allied victory seemed certain, responsibility for the training of American personnel shifted to institutions in the United Kingdom. Here recruits received additional information on the conditions in countries to which they might travel. After the spring 1944, when the military released preliminary detachment assignments, the army’s German Country Unit began to offer recruits general advice to personnel on the challenges in Germany, such as food distribution and economic reconstruction.\textsuperscript{262}

If American wartime preparations for the occupation were ambitious, they were also ineffective for a variety of reasons. In Charlottesville, continued criticism from the White House over the faculty’s anti-New Deal political views threatened the school’s closure and detracted from the focus of instructors and administrators.\textsuperscript{263} At the same time, the faculty bemoaned the quality of the student body. As one lecturer noted, the school “was an assemblage of people who did not seem particularly impressive from the standpoint of being highly selected as greatly sophisticated about affairs, German, Italian, or anything else.”\textsuperscript{264} Students were not, however, the only group accused of mediocrity. In classrooms in Charlottesville and elsewhere, recruits bemoaned the poor pedagogical skills of the officers, lawyers, and corporate executives who, in spite of their professional success, struggled to communicate their ideas to students.\textsuperscript{265} Problems also emerged with the curriculum of the training programs. Though the military intended for students to gain a firm understanding of European and German history, politics,

\textsuperscript{261} On the training of American occupation personnel, see: Zink, 10-25; Ziemke, 3-22; Boehling, 30-40. 
\textsuperscript{262} Boehling, 34; Zink, 20. 
\textsuperscript{263} Merritt, 50. 
\textsuperscript{264} Cited in: Boehling, 32. 
\textsuperscript{265} Zink, 21.
economics, and society, government reports later concluded that few recruits graduated with more than a rudimentary knowledge of the people, institutions, and regions for which they were to be responsible. In addition, few of the eventual military government officials attended language training. For those who did attend, the benefits were minimal. Only 5% of the American personnel in postwar Germany could communicate without an interpreter. Finally, military training programs failed during the final year of the war to provide recruits with information on key developments in Germany, including the increase in anti-Nazi resistance and the formation of anti-fascist committees. The failure owed to a combination of Nazi censorship and the unreliability of American news sources in wartime Europe. Nevertheless, it left American officials ill-prepared to identify potential non- and anti-Nazi German leaders after the war.

German affairs were not the only subject about which American occupation officials were ill-informed. Training programs also provided little information on the conduct of non-combat operations. On this point, American preparations for the occupation fell victim to their own zealous timing. Most American courses had predated the delineation of specific postwar occupation objectives, which only began to crystallize after the Allied meetings at Yalta and Potsdam in February and July 1945. Instructors therefore focused on the technical administration of liberated civilian communities and the satisfaction of basic human needs. Absent from the classrooms were discussions of broader political, cultural, and social initiatives that the Allies later undertook. When instructors requested more detailed directives on postwar policies from Washington, they received little help, as officials there remained preoccupied with the prosecution of the war. Although the release of preliminary regional assignments in the

266 Zink, 13.
267 Boehling, 35.
268 Boehling, 35.
spring 1944 for personnel in Germany allowed recruits to focus on the management of specific German reconstruction challenges, guidelines for postwar political and cultural policies remained elusive. At the same time, the military struggled to maintain the commitment of recruits who had already begun training but had grown weary of waiting for the occupation to begin. Contrary to the promises of foreign adventures and “exciting crusading” work that had informed the recruitment of military government trainees, recruits had begun their tenure with months of inaction and boredom. As civilian recruits sought permission to return home, military recruits, who were anxious to reunite with their families after the war, decided against continued postwar service.269 After the occupation began, American personnel continued to fluctuate and, ironically, entered Germany with no greater preparation than their French colleagues, who had only begun training six months earlier.

When the French Provisional Government initiated preparations for a postwar occupation mission in the winter of 1944, they did so with a different priorities and concerns. The French debate began not with the question of whether to occupy Germany but rather if France would be among the occupying powers. Officials in the Provisional Government, which under the leadership of De Gaulle and his Free French movement had assumed control of France in August 1944, shared both the Allies’ commitment to Germany’s unconditional surrender and their belief in the need for a new kind of peace. More than the Americans, the French appreciated the consequences of the failed 1918 settlement and were anxious to prevent the fourth German invasion of French soil since the late nineteenth century.270 Nevertheless, France’s unclear standing among the wartime Allies cast a shadow of uncertainty over the country’s postwar role. The Allies had invited France in November 1944 to join the European Advisory Commission

270 Defrance, La politique culturelle, 21.
(EAC), which was responsible for planning the occupation, but waited until February 1945 to grant France an occupation zone. In any case, anxiety over France’s international standing inspired preemptive preparations for a seat at the victors’ table. In fact, concerns over France’s role on the postwar stage led the French to push harder for their occupation zone. De Gaulle best summarized the connection that he and his colleagues drew between participation in the occupation and the restoration of France’s international standing when he recalled: “Je voulais, évidemment, que notre armée entrât en territoire ennemi, qu’elle y eût son secteur d’opérations[…] qu’elle y reçut, avec ses alliés, la reddition des vaincus[…]. Dès lors que nous aurions en main une zone du sol germanique, ce qu’il adviendrait de l’Allemagne ne pourrait être décidé sans nous.”

Convinced of the importance of French participation in a postwar occupation, French officials organized programs for the recruitment and training of military government units. In December 1944 a school of military government opened in Paris under the direction of the nascent French Military Administration in Germany (AMFA). Students attended four-week sessions and received training in general military-government operations, as well as specialized instruction in matters of nutrition, industry, law, and health. For assistance with such subjects, French instructors relied on translations of the handbook from the Anglo-American German Country Unit. The text provided a welcome starting point for French instructors, who faced a tremendous planning deficit.

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271 De Gaulle, 184.
French recruits completed courses in German language, culture, and history. From December 1944 until June 1945 approximately 1500 students attended classes in Paris. At the end of their studies, civilian students received specific assignments in Germany and a grade d’assimilation, which provided a civilian equivalent of the military rank to which their position in the military government corresponded.  

The results of the French training program were mixed. On the one hand, the program lacked preparation. Unlike the Americans, who had years to develop their courses, the French hurried to do so months before the occupation began. A further consequence of the program’s belated development was the shortened time-line of instruction. In fact, the most frequent critique of the French courses was their short four-week schedule. On the other hand, the quality of French instructors was superior to that of the Americans. To teach courses on Germany and German affairs, the AMFA recruited accomplished French Germanists, including André Siegfried and Edmond Vermeil. The result was a training faculty, that possessed a greater knowledge of German affairs than most American instructors, and students who graduated with a better understanding of the people, culture, and problems that awaited them in Germany.

Differences in the focus of French and American training programs reflected broader differences in the Allies’ pasts. The United States brought to Germany little experience with colonialism or cultural diplomacy. With the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century and the rise of Wilsonianism in the twentieth century, American foreign policy had long extolled the virtues of extending democracy and the right to self-determination around the world. Yet, American political traditions had fostered a distrust of imperialism and an aversion to direct

274 Frank Becker, Kultur im Schatten der Trikolore: Theater, Kunstaustellungen, Kino und Film im französisch besetzten Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 1945-1949 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007) 69; Klöckler, 34.
275 Becker, 69; Klöckler, 34.
276 Becker, 68.
government involvement in the dissemination of culture and information. Beyond a minimalist agenda in Cuba and the Philippines and George Creel’s short-lived Committee of Public Information (1917-1919), the American government had practiced little cultural diplomacy prior to 1945.\textsuperscript{277} Not even the American participation in the post-1918 Rhineland occupation had established a clear standard of American cultural foreign policy.\textsuperscript{278} In fact, the first official agency for the promotion of American culture abroad was the Division of Cultural Relations, which opened its doors in 1938 as part of the effort to combat Nazi influence in Latin America. While private organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation and the YMCA had preceded such government offices in the export of American culture, their efforts dated only from the late nineteenth century and provided only a modest template for the scale of cultural diplomacy that the post-1945 occupation involved.\textsuperscript{279}

The French brought to their occupation planning a richer colonial past and a greater appreciation for the demands of cultural diplomacy. From the patronage of Francis I in the sixteenth century to the reformist campaigns of the revolutionary armies in the eighteenth century and the expansion of the French empire in the nineteenth century, the French state had long participated in the export of French culture. In the wake of the French defeat of 1871, the adoption of the so-called \textit{mission civilisatrice} intensified French cultural diplomacy throughout French colonies.\textsuperscript{280} The Third Republic also witnessed the creation of a number of institutions


\textsuperscript{278} See: Nelson, x-xi.

\textsuperscript{279} On the role of the private sector in American cultural foreign policy, see: Ninkovich, 8-34; Emily S. Rosenberg, \textit{Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945} (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) 229-231; Pells, 33.

that worked to enlarge France’s cultural presence outside the empire. In 1883 the French government created the Alliance Française to promote the study of French language and literature and to encourage sympathy with French political and economic policies through familiarity with French cultural traditions. Further state coordination of cultural policy followed in the early twentieth-century and produced a growing bureaucracy of cultural diplomats, from which the post-1945 occupation government later benefited. After 1911, when the Bureau des Oeuvres began to facilitate French language instruction around the world, the Service des Oeuvres opened its doors in 1920 and inspired the larger Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles (DGRC) in 1945. The latter offices had expanded responsibilities, which included the promotion of French media and art and the coordination of faculty and student exchanges between foreign and French universities. The DGRC also worked with the military government to coordinate cultural policies in postwar Germany.

In light of their varied experiences with imperialism and cultural diplomacy, French and American officials adopted different criteria for the recruitment of military government officials. American policies, which called for recruits with a solid work ethic and managerial experience, revealed a pragmatic, technical approach to the occupation and an assumption that hard work and administrative skill were essential for a successful mission in Germany. This assumption suggested a lack of concern with the more “human” side of the occupation, which involved communication between the Americans and their Germans. The oversight did not escape German officials, such as the Minister President of Württemberg-Baden, Reinhold Maier, who worried about the implications of the American technocratic style. After a meeting with the head

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281 Pells, 31.
283 For examples, see: Zink, 68; Boehling, 140; Michael Bayer, “Das Kriegsende und die Franzosenzeit,” in *Stuttgart in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren*, Eds. Edgar Lersch, et al. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995) 39.
of American forces, General Lucius D. Clay, Maier recalled in amazement how, “Man erzählte uns, er [Clay] habe den ganzen Nachschub des amerikanischen Heeres nach Europa organisiert, also ist er gewohnt, mit Waffen, Tanks, Autos, Geräten, Material umzugehen. Die Aufgabe in Deutschland ist eine andersartige. Werden die Deutschen in seiner Hand auch nur Sachen, Material sein?”

French recruiters drew on the lessons of French cultural diplomacy and sought officials with experience in military and colonial operations or knowledge of German affairs. In fact, the AMFA favored applicants with solid Deutschkenntnisse and professional expertise in finance, economics, law, public service, health, or nutrition. More than the skills to administer postwar German society, then, French recruiters valued an ability to communicate with and understand Germans.

The influence of the Allies’ priorities and their respective cultural diplomatic traditions reflected in the background of French and American personnel. With few exceptions, American officials lacked knowledge of German affairs and experience with military government operations. The top official in the American military government, General Clay, was a graduate of West Point who had worked as an engineer prior to the war. Before 1945, his only foreign service posting had been a brief stint as an assistant to General MacArthur in the Philippines in 1937. Clay spent the war in Washington, where he coordinated military supply lines for the War Mobilization Board. In this capacity, he caught the attention of his superiors, who considered his pragmatism, determination, and work-ethic valuable assets for work in postwar Germany. Clay was reluctant to join the military government, however, for fear that the move might jeopardize his military career. As he recalled: “They just sent me over there. I did not want the

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285 Becker, 68.
286 Zink, 68; Boehling, 44.
job. After all we were still fighting a war, and to be the [...] military governor in a defeated area while the war was still going on in the Pacific was about as dead-looking an end for a soldier as you could find.” 287 Although Clay was not alone in his concerns, he accepted the position and surrounded himself with a staff of advisors whose qualifications were similar to his own. William Draper served as his economic advisor. The former investment-banker-turned-general had also spent the war in Washington and brought to Germany little knowledge of the country or military government. A rare exception on Clay’s staff was his political advisor, Robert Murphy, who possessed a solid understanding of German politics and foreign relations. He had worked as an American consul in Munich prior to the war and later as a diplomatic official in occupied Paris. Murphy was also the only member of Clay’s senior staff who spoke German. Yet, Murphy’s Office of the Political Advisor, which operated under the jurisdiction of the State Department, struggled to find a voice within the military government. Officials in the War Department, which oversaw the military government and hoped for a short and inexpensive occupation, were less open to input from the State Department, whose officials favored a longer occupation in order to stabilize German and European societies and prevent the spread of Communism. 288

Other officials who later oversaw the implementation of cultural policy arrived at their postwar positions with little knowledge of Germany as well. General Robert A. McClure, who later headed the Information Control Division (ICD), hailed from Illinois, the son of a railroad manager. During the war, he served as a military attaché to the American embassy in England, taught at a military school, and worked in the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) for

288 On disagreements between the War and State Departments, see: Moore, 281ff; Boehling, 44.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Although his experiences with the PWD exposed him to the kinds of public information work that he later undertook in Germany, little in his prewar professional background qualified him for his eventual position as the senior administrator of film, theater, and press policy. In addition, he, like Clay, had been loathe to accept the position for fear that it might detract from his plan to climb the ranks of the military.\textsuperscript{289} John W. Taylor, who oversaw American education policy as head of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch (ERA), possessed a better understanding of German affairs. Still, Taylor, who had served on the staff of the Teachers College at Columbia University and was an expert in the American education system, knew little of Germany’s prewar experiences or the demands of work in an occupation.\textsuperscript{290}

In the French zone officials possessed greater knowledge of both military government operations and German affairs. General Pierre Koenig, who served as head of the French administration, was a career officer from Normandy and one of De Gaulle’s earliest wartime allies. He was also a veteran of the First World War as well as the French occupations of the Rhineland and Morocco.\textsuperscript{291} Unlike Clay, he had first-hand knowledge of war and occupation. His staff was no less qualified. In charge of French occupation troops, General Goisard de Monsabert, was a product of the prestigious Saint-Cyr military academy and a veteran of the First World War and the French missions in Morocco and Tunisia.\textsuperscript{292} The head of civilian affairs, General Émile Laffon, had directed the administrative preparations for the liberation of France and had also worked in the Ministry of the Interior to design and coordinate the purge of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{290} Zink, 196.
  \item \textsuperscript{291} Willis, 77.
  \item \textsuperscript{292} Willis, 79.
\end{itemize}
wartime collaborators from the French public sector.\textsuperscript{293} No less qualified were the head of the French \textit{Direction de l’Information} (DI), Jean Arnaud, and the director of the \textit{Direction de l’Education Publique} (DEP), Raymond Schmittlein. Arnaud, who oversaw French film, theater and press policy, had held a position as a reader at the University of Cologne from 1935-1938 and worked as the deputy director of the \textit{Maison Académique Française} in Berlin in 1939. He thus had personal experience with both life in interwar Germany and the promotion of French culture abroad.\textsuperscript{294} Schmittlein, who oversaw French education policy, was a trained Germanist with a German wife and had worked before the war as \textit{Inspecteur de l’enseignement français à l’étranger} in Riga.\textsuperscript{295}

National differences between the professional qualifications of occupation personnel extended to the local level. In Stuttgart, responsibility for the municipal military government detachment fell to Charles W. Jackson. Jackson was a young (32), energetic graduate of West Point. He had served as a unit commander during the war but had no experience with and little training in military-government matters. His work ethic had convinced occupation planners of his suitability for work in the demanding environment of postwar Germany.\textsuperscript{296} His deputy, Edwin Norton, found himself no better prepared for his assignment. By 1945 he had only served in uniform for 37 months, most of which he had spent working in civilian-affairs training school. Prior to his enlistment he had served as the vice president of the Manchester Ice and Coal Company in New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{297} He therefore had little experience with either the war or German affairs. William Dawson, who served as head of the state military government for

\textsuperscript{294} Klöckler, 50.
\textsuperscript{295} Becker, 62.
\textsuperscript{296} Boehling, 140; Bayer, 39.
\textsuperscript{297} Bayer, 40.
Württemberg-Baden and had his headquarters in Stuttgart, had a better understanding of German history and affairs than his colleagues, but he had had little experience with occupations or civilian administration. Prior to his tenure in the military he had worked as a lawyer and a professor of law at Western Reserve University in Cleveland.298

In Freiburg, the situation was different. The head of the French detachment for Baden, which had its headquarters in Freiburg, was a career general from Alsace. As a literal neighbor to the city, Schwartz had benefited from greater exposure to developments in prewar Germany than his American counterpart had in Cleveland.299 The same was true of Schwartz’s successor, Pierre Pène, who had served in the French Resistance throughout the war and witnessed the horrors of Nazi rule after his own capture and torture by the Gestapo. Pène’s assistant, René Bargeton, enjoyed a solid understanding of German culture as a trained Germanist.300 Alongside French state officials in Freiburg were the city’s municipal military-government leaders. As the war ended, the city found itself under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montel. In July 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel Marcellin replaced him and governed the city with his deputy, Colonel Monteux.301

Archival records reveal little of the biographies of French municipal leaders. Still, the officials’ conduct during the initial phase of the occupation suggested a firm appreciation of Freiburg’s local history and culture. Two examples highlighted the point. First, Monteux impressed the city’s lord mayor, Wolfgang Hoffmann, with his knowledge of the historic cultural ties between Baden and France. As Hoffmann recalled in a farewell speech for Monteux, he had countless conversations with the French commander in which they reflected on how, “nirgends

\[\text{298 Bayer, 36.}\]
\[\text{299 Klöckler, 41.}\]
\[\text{300 Klöckler, 41.}\]
\[\text{301 Köhler, 10.}\]
auf der Welt die Geistesverwandtschaft so deutlich ist, wie zwischen Alemannen – Frankenland und Frankreich!"  

Second, Freiburg’s commanders indicated their local historical sensibilities in their approach to the city’s Siegesdenkmal, which commemorated Badenese soldiers who had fallen in the Franco-Prussia War of 1870-1871. In spite of Allied directives to remove all militaristic monuments and the site’s connection to a painful French defeat, the French commanders elected not to destroy it. More concerned with the removal of Nazi symbols from the city, French officials recognized the monument’s ties to an earlier historical period.  

French officials also brought to Germany a better understanding of the German language and etiquette. They therefore struggled less to communicate with their Germans. It is difficult to generalize about the nature of interactions between the Germans and their occupiers, yet three anecdotes from Freiburg and Stuttgart capture the varying degrees of comfort that colored German-Allied interactions in the two cities. The first two concern Freiburg, where the city’s proximity to France afforded local elites a working knowledge of the French language. For some officials, this knowledge included idiomatic expressions. This was the case for Lord Mayor Hoffmann, who in a farewell speech for Colonel Monteux stated that, “Da fiel mir das französische Sprichwort ein, das wohl ungefähr lautet: partir, c’est un peu mourir!” Freiburg’s residents also benefited from the French occupiers’ similar standards of conversational etiquette.  

A second anecdote, which involves the interaction between a Freiburg family and a French soldier during the final days of the war, captures this fact. In her diary, the daughter of the family recalled how her father, a lieutenant in the German army, had returned home in April 1945 to find a French soldier in his home. When the soldier saw the

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305 Max Bruecher, Freiburg im Breisgau 1945: Eine Dokumentation (Freiburg: Rombach, 1980) 17.
father’s uniform, his reaction was surprising. Despite the long-established enmity between the two countries’ armies and French ambitions to demilitarize the conquered Germans, the French commander asked the father to pardon his trespass and said, “Excusez-moi, mon Lieutenant.”

That a French soldier afforded the German father the courtesy of his proper title demonstrated the sense of formality and propriety that connected the French and German languages.

A third anecdote reveals an antithetical experience in Stuttgart. An early meeting between Reinhold Maier and local American commanders revealed the disconnect between German and American conversational customs. Maier found the American greetings informal and awkward. He was dismayed by the Americans’ “ausgesuchte Höflichkeit, Shakehands und How do you do’s.” In addition, he struggled to understand American humor. As the meeting continued, the topic of the city’s future government arose. An American official told him that the administration was to be “a real one, and not a cat’s tail.” The idiom was a reference to the constant movement and changing position of a cat’s tail, and a call for a stable democratic administration. In spite of the interpreter’s best efforts, Maier failed to grasp its meaning in English or German. As he later recalled, “Nach diesem Scherz des Obersten lachten auch dieses Mal alle Amerikaner. Wir deutschen verstehen einen solchen Witz natürlich in den seltensten Fällen. Man lacht aber mit, man lacht der Spur nach, wie man im Schwäbischen sagt.”

The disconnect between Maier and the American officials highlighted the kind of unfamiliarity with which Germans and Americans greeted each other at war’s end.

**Allied Zones and Missions Take Shape**

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307 Maier, 285.
308 Maier, 291.
The final determination of the Allies’ occupation zones and their specific policy objectives did not occur until after the end of the war. With the former, the delay owed, in part, to Franco-American territorial disputes. When the Allies agreed to grant France a zone of occupation at Yalta, they assigned Germany’s Southwestern corner to French control. The French zone, which the Allies’ had carved out of the original American zone, was to include all towns and cities to the South of the Autobahn that connected Karlsruhe with Stuttgart and Ulm. The three cities themselves, as well as the Autobahn, were to fall under American jurisdiction. However, during the Allied invasion of Germany De Gaulle, who had not attended the Yalta conference and did not recognize its resolutions, ordered French forces to capture Stuttgart in order to increase French clout in future Allied negotiations over Germany’s postwar shape.\footnote{Boehling, 91-92.}

Despite objections from the Americans, who had seized control of the regional Autobahn and threatened to restrict the flow of supplies into the city, French forces refused to leave after their arrival on April 22.\footnote{On the French tenure in Stuttgart, see: Hermann Vietzen, 

titel{Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart 1945-1948} (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1972) 33-50; Willis, 17-20; Boehling, 90-93.}

In the weeks that followed, the French established a local military government detachment and appointed the city’s postwar Lord Mayor, Arnulf Klett. They also held a Joan-of-Arc festival, which De Gaulle attended, circulated newsletters, and oversaw the initial purge of Nazi officials and party members from public office. Perhaps most memorable for the city’s residents were French requisitions. Like Freiburgers, Stuttgarters received orders for the surrender of cars, household goods, and clothing.\footnote{Vietzen, 42.}

Yet if locals resented the immediate burdens of the French presence, they later developed a more positive memory of their initial occupiers, who eventually yielded to American pressure and evacuated the city on July 8, 1945. Within weeks of the French departure, residents reached a conclusion that was common in the
French zone. It held that unlike the Americans and the other Allies “mit den Franzosen lässt man sich reden.”

With the resolution of the territorial dispute, the boundaries and organization of the zones took final shape. Responsibility for the French zone, which comprised the provinces of South Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saarland, began with the French government in Paris and rested with the National Assembly, the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, and the Commissariat aux affaires allemandes et autrichiennes, which helped plan and draft occupation policies and cultural initiatives. In Germany, the French central command established its headquarters in the undamaged spa-town of Baden-Baden. The selection of a spa-town was not uncontroversial in France, as it evoked memories of Vichy and fueled criticism that the military government was employing low-level Vichy officials. In addition to the general administrative offices of Koenig and Laffon, which battled to secure the needs of military and civilian officials, two divisions charged with cultural policy also worked from Baden-Baden: the Direction de l’Information (DI) and the Direction de l’Education (DEP). In addition to the French headquarters, five state-level administrations (délégations supérieures) oversaw the local implementation of policies with the help of county and municipal delegations. As the seat of the French délégation supérieure for South Baden, Freiburg hosted a

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313 See map, p. 123.
314 Willis, 72.
larger than normal contingent of occupation officials. Most municipal French delegations had three to four officers. Freiburg had fourteen.\textsuperscript{316}

In the American zone the administration adopted a similar organizational pattern with minor exceptions. Control of the zone, which comprised the provinces of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Hesse, began in the War Department in Washington. Within the Department, responsibility for the occupation troops fell to the Army, while responsibility for the military government and the administration of cultural policy fell to the Civil Affairs Division (CAD). As in the French zone, conflicts between American military and civilian officials were not uncommon. Although the War Department had hoped to avoid the costs of a lengthy occupation and looked to transfer responsibility for the zone to the State Department immediately after the war’s end, the latter remained focused on stemming the spread of Communism and was unable to assume control until May 1949. In the meantime, the War Department’s aversion to long-term, civilian administration projects frustrated cultural-policy officials within the military government. In any case, command of daily American operations in Germany fell to the Office of Military Government United States (OMGUS), which established its zonal headquarters in Frankfurt. From here General Clay coordinated with the American representative to the Allied Control Council in Berlin and oversaw the work of American administrators at the state and municipal levels of the military government. The French also had a representative on the Control Council, but kept him in Baden-Baden in order to demonstrate French independence. In fact, American officials lamented the powerlessness of French personnel in Berlin and concluded that negotiations with them were of little use.\textsuperscript{317} In Stuttgart, which had become the seat of the


\textsuperscript{317}Henke, “Politik,” 61.
American headquarters for Württemberg-Baden after the French evacuation, a host of state and municipal officials had their offices. The municipal detachment comprised 28 officers in addition to local representatives of the Information Control Division and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch.318

Like the boundaries of the occupation zones, the objectives of the occupation powers were slow to develop. The delay owed to uncertainty and disagreements both within and among the Allied governments. Wartime conferences between the Allied powers had yielded little more than general policy prescriptions.319 Most important was the declaration that emerged from the meeting at Yalta. It stated: “The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.”320 Five months later the Allies clarified their mission at Potsdam, where they agreed to pursue the so-called “3 D’s” of “demilitarization, denazification, and decartelization.”321 In the meantime, the individual Allied governments published initial directives for their missions.

After months of debate and 8 new drafts, President Truman approved a general policy outline, JCS 1067, for use by American commanders in Germany in April 1945.322 Distribution of the directive to officials in Germany did not begin, however, until July. A similar situation unfolded in the French zone, where policy debates in Paris and between Paris and Baden-Baden delayed

318 Bayer, 40.
321 On Potsdam Agreement, see: Merritt, 63-67; Boehling, 29-30.
322 On development of JCS 1067, see: Ziemke, 98-106; Boehling, 28-30; Merritt, 59-63.
the development of specific directives. In early July the Provisional Government approved an 
order, titled “Directives pour notre action en Allemagne.” Neither the French nor the American 
orders provided more than general guidelines for cultural policies, which developed instead 
under the supervision of local occupation authorities and in response to conditions on the ground. 
Still, the early directives revealed the Allies’ respective approaches to two important tasks that 
informed cultural occupation policies: denazification and reeducation. 

**Denazification**

For the Allies, “denazification” referred to the removal of Nazi sympathizers from 
positions of public power and the elimination of Nazi influences from German society and 
culture. Strategies for denazification reflected different understandings of the historical 
significance of National Socialism. Common to both Allies’ approach to the latter were 
metaphors of physical and psychological illness. French observers described Nazism as a 
“delusion” and an “intoxication.” One occupation official referred to it as “a terrible disease, a 
leprosy, that had infected the world.”

References to a Nazi “illness” were no less common among American officials. Most responsible for such references, perhaps, was Richard 
Brickener, a professor of neurology at Columbia University, whose 1943 work, entitled *Is 
Germany Incurable?*, enjoyed widespread circulation within American policymaking circles. 
Brickener argued that “that national group we call Germany behaves and has long behaved 
startlingly like an individual involved in a dangerous mental trend.”

Evidence of Brickener’s influence appeared in the words of President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace, who spoke

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often of the a Nazi “disease.” Secretary of State Cordell Hull shared their views and worried that the Nazi infection of Germany was “deep.”

In both Paris and Washington, the general association of National Socialism with disease concealed intense disagreements among policymakers over the exact nature of Nazism’s historical significance. Was the disease congenital or infectious? Debates about this question produced a variety of perceptions and cast distinct shadows on postwar denazification policies. In France, deliberations were too complex for review here. The most critical voices asserted that Nazism constituted only the most recent incarnation of France’s hereditary German enemy. They drew a straight line between the Nazis and the German enemy of 1870 and adhered to the notion that Germany had developed along a deviant “special path.” According to this notion, the violent unification of Germany under the guidance of an illiberal Prussia, and the subsequent rise of militaristic leaders from Bismarck to William II and Hitler, both reflected and cemented an intrinsic German penchant for war and authoritarianism. As some occupation planners later concluded, Nazism had affirmed that “every manifestation of strength is agreeable to him [the German] in his deepest character.”

Other officials held more nuanced views. They saw Nazism less as evidence of a flawed German character than as a response to the political and economic crises of the interwar period.

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325 Cited in: Moore, 285.
326 On the role of disease metaphors in concealing differences among Allied views of Nazism, see: Moore, 217.
329 Cited in: Willis, 148.
As one French politician and Resistance fighter argued, “Versailles was responsible for Nazism. One only has to turn to the period 1920-1930 and the demoralized and confused youth of a starving nation, which was deprived of its integrity by a gang of cynical leaders.”

Similar arguments emerged from French Germanists, who helped shape occupation policies and who distinguished between a “good” Germany of liberalism, Goethe, and Schiller and a “bad” Germany, in which Nazism marked the most recent consequence of Prussia’s unfortunate historical influence. As Edmond Vermeil argued in his 1931 study of German culture, entitled L’Allemagne: essai d’explication, “Ou bien l’Allemagne demeure morcelée quand, s’adonnant à la culture, elle opère une merveilleuse et riche synthèse entre les multiples apports qui lui viennent de la périphérie européenne; ou bien elle s’unifie en y renonçant, en s’appauvrissant sur le plan de la psychologie et de l’art.”

Although French debates over the origins of National Socialism continued after the war’s end, French denazification directives betrayed an understanding of Nazism that most approximated the views of officials like Vermeil. If French policies insisted on the need for a thorough denazification process, they recognized the limits of Nazism’s reach and tied Hitler’s rise less to an intrinsic German proclivity to militarism than to the historical influence of an illiberal Prussia and the desperation of an all-too-obedient interwar German society. In fact, more than their Allies, French officials spoke of “denazification” and “deprussification” interchangeably. The military government’s directive of July 1945 confirmed the association, with the declaration that “Nous devons chercher aussi bien la destruction de l’édifice prussien que celle de l’édifice hitlérien. Nous devons rester sur la réserve vis-à-vis des tendances

330 Cited in: Ziebura, 42.
‘fédéralistes’ en n’oubliant pas que c’est en s’abritant sous un masque fédéral que la Prusse a commencé son regroupement de l’Allemagne.”

The approach of French policy to the German past accommodated the views of German officials, such as those in Freiburg and Stuttgart, who also distinguished between Nazis and Germans. The result of such accommodation was a less contentious purge process in the French zone. In addition to their individualistic approach to the purge of Nazi sympathizers, French officials allowed Germans to participate in the evaluation of denazification cases earlier than the other Allies did. Both practices drew praise from German officials. When Reinhold Maier compared Stuttgart’s experiences with French and American purge efforts, he concluded that “Die Franzosen sind milder. Bei ihnen ist zu entfernen der alte Kämpfer und das Parteimitglied, das nachweisbar ‘actif et ardent’ war.” To the delight of Maier and other German officials, the French maintained their distinction between a “good” Germany and a “bad” Prussia as they began the implementation of specific cultural policies. Raymond Schmittlein confirmed the distinction when in response to anti-German critics in France he argued that “Die Vorurteile der Franzosen gegenüber den Deutschen, eine kriegerische und beutegierige Nation und von Untertanengeist durchdrungen zu sein [...] gründeten sich auf der Unkenntnis über die Geschichte Deutschlands und der Grösse des humanistischen Wirkens in und aus Deutschland.”

335 Maier, 250.
336 Becker, 63.
The distinct nature of French purge policies owed not only to their more nuanced view of Nazism’s origins. Also important were French officials’ firsthand knowledge of both pre-Nazi Germany and the challenges of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary supporters of an authoritarian regime. Based on their experiences with the purge of collaborators in France, officials like Émile Laffon, who helped organize French denazification policies, concluded that denazification demanded careful attention to the unique circumstances of an individual’s past.\textsuperscript{337}

The French experience had also made clear the importance of transparency and public involvement, as well as the need to avoid the wholesale alienation of communities with overly broad definitions of guilt and collaboration. As Laffon observed, “Wenn die französische Besatzungsmacht nur eine Sorte von Deutschen kennt, läuft sie Gefahr, sie eines Tages alle gegen sich aufzubringen; wenn sie jene zu erkennen vermag, von denen sie eine ernsthafte Zusammenarbeit erwarten kann, und wenn sie rückhaltlos die Stützten des alten Regimes bekämpft, erhöht sie ihre Erfolgschancen.”\textsuperscript{338}

In the United States, American denazification strategies also emerged from debates over the origins and causes of National Socialism.\textsuperscript{339} Most critical were those observers who, like French hardliners, viewed the Nazis as the latest incarnation of the “barbarians” of 1914. Despite the subsequent exaggeration of his views by contemporaries, Treasury Secretary Henry

\textsuperscript{337} Hudemann, 464.
\textsuperscript{338} Grohnert, 167.
Morgenthau, Jr. provided a prominent voice for such observers, when in his 1945 treatise on the so-called “German problem” he argued that the “Desire for war has been as firmly planted in the German as desire for freedom in the American. The process has been going on in both for about the same length of time.”\textsuperscript{340} Secretary Hull held a similar view. He contended that Germans “through the generations [have] been accustomed to militaristic ways,” and he concluded that Nazism represented “their natural gait.”\textsuperscript{341} Other officials were less critical. The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy blamed the rise of Nazism on the Versailles Treaty and the bitterness and economic hardship that it created in Germany. The Committee cautioned against attacks on the German national character and notions of collective guilt. In a memo to the President in August 1944, its members warned that “to avoid raising an issue similar to that which after 1919 was exploited by the nationalists to discredit and destroy all attempts to promote liberalism […] this Government should oppose […] a verdict of moral guilt against the German people as a whole.”\textsuperscript{342}

In spite of the clarity of some officials’ views of Nazism, a general uncertainty colored American debates on the subject. Few American occupation planners believed that all Germans were ardent Nazis. Unlike their French colleagues, however, most struggled to identify a “good,” non-Nazi Germany to trust. Two examples illustrate their uncertainty. The first emerged with President Roosevelt’s statements on Nazism near the end of the war. While his understandings of National Socialism had long vacillated between a rejection of World War I-era stereotypes of German barbarism to the more hard-line approach of Morgenthau, he spoke after 1943 of the need for a period of “trial and error” during which to develop the appropriate

\textsuperscript{340} Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is Our Problem (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945) 114. On the controversy surrounding Morgenthau’s views, see: Wilfried Mausbach, Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: Das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandkonzept der USA, 1944-47 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1997); Moore, 293ff.
\textsuperscript{341} Cited in: Moore, 285.
\textsuperscript{342} Cited in: Moore, 284.
occupation strategies.\textsuperscript{343} Then, as the war continued, he qualified his expectations for the
discovery of a “good,” anti-Nazi Germany. In October 1944 he noted that “I should be false to
the very foundations of my religious and political convictions if I should ever relinquish the hope
[… ] that in all peoples, without exception, there live some instinct for truth, some attraction
toward justice, some passion for peace – buried as they may be in the German case under a brutal
regime.”\textsuperscript{344} A month later, the President appeared even more concerned about the extent of
Nazism’s reach when, at a cabinet meeting, he conceded that his own firsthand experiences with
pre-1933 Germany, about which he had boasted for years, were no longer “a basis of reliable
judgment as to what Germany will be like after the termination of hostilities.” In light of
mounting evidence of German atrocities and the realities of two German wars of aggression in
less than thirty years, Roosevelt concluded that “we have no way of knowing what we shall find
in Germany.”\textsuperscript{345}

A second example of American uncertainty regarding Nazism’s reach appeared in a
military government training film, entitled \textit{Your Job in Germany} (1944). In general, the film
advanced the notion of a German \textit{Sonderweg} with an overview of German history that traced a
direct line from Bismarck to Hitler. While the film also acknowledged a more benign aspect of
German culture, it cautioned that militarism and chauvinism were, in fact, Germany’s defining
qualities. In response to footage of beer gardens, cuckoo clocks, and churches, which suggested
a more peaceful side of German culture, the narrator cautioned that “Germany appears today to
be beaten. […] Don’t let it fool you.” As the film continued, it described Germans as two-faced
and warned of potential acts of revenge against the Allies. Yet, the final scene best captured
American uncertainty about the Germans and their past. When a voice asked, “But there are

\textsuperscript{343} Cited in: Moore, 276.
\textsuperscript{344} Cited in: Moore, 318.
\textsuperscript{345} Cited in: Moore, 319.
millions of Germans. Some of those guys must be ok?,” the narrator responded “Perhaps, but which ones?” The film and others that followed it were important, for they reinforced doubts about a “good” Germany within months of the liberation of concentration camps, which for many American officials and soldiers seemed to confirm the wholehearted embrace of Nazism’s militaristic and racist ideology by the entire German nation.  

Reflecting the outcome of the debates from which their policies emerged, American denazification strategies were more stringent than their French counterparts. Indicative of American uncertainty over the extent of Nazism’s reach, American policies erred on the side of caution and most reflected the views of hardliners. JCS 1067 set the tone for the American purge effort and, as General Clay described it, “contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of the occupation.” The directive stated that “Persons are to be treated as more than nominal participants in Party activities and as active supporters of Nazism or militarism when they have […] held office or otherwise been active at any level from local to national in the party and its subordinate organizations, or in organizations which further militaristic doctrines.” Under the guidance of 1067, American officials were less willing to consider the circumstances of individuals’ professional and political biographies. Instead they favored the classification of all Germans into one of five broad categories of guilt, which ranged from devout Nazi sympathizer to ardent anti-Nazis. Unlike its French counterpart, the American denazification strategy left little room for the arguments of German officials in Stuttgart, who cast Nazism as an imposition on the liberal Southwest by the militaristic, Prussian north.

346 Your Job in Germany, Dir. Frank Capra, 1944; On the film, see: Moore, 259-260.
347 Moore, 325.
Reeducation

If metaphors of disease helped conceal differences in Allied understandings of Nazism, they fostered a common approach to reeducation. Both Allies concluded that, if left untreated, German militarism and Nazism could inspire a third world war. Thus to their “negative” purge policies, the Allies added a more “constructive” agenda.\(^{350}\) Having won the fight for territory and power, they began an unprecedented battle to win and transform German hearts and minds.\(^{351}\) To describe this battle, they borrowed the term “reeducation” from the lexicon of American psychotherapists during the 1930s and 1940s. In a preview of the French postwar administrative style, French planners borrowed the term from the Americans and adapted its meaning to fit their particular goals. In its clinical sense the term described a process through which therapists helped patients recover some lost capacity.\(^{352}\) For occupation officials the term held a similar meaning and revealed that in spite of their varied understandings of Nazism, both Allies believed it possible for Germany to (re)establish itself as a peaceful member of the western world. As one French official described it, the project aimed to see Germany again, “comme à l’époque de Goethe et de Beethoven, jouer un rôle dans la civilisation Européenne.”\(^{353}\)

To rejoin the civilized world, the Allies argued, Germany needed guidance. A central component of this guidance was cultural policy. Targeting the values and practices of daily life


in Germany, cultural policy constituted an effort to transform the ideas and institutions that governed German media, religion, education, and social relations. The Allies sought to change how Germans read newspapers, watched films and plays, and attended schools. According to Jean Arnaud, cultural policy entailed “une transformation radicale de la mentalité germanique grâce à ces armes modernes que sont l’école, la presse, la radio, le cinéma et le livre.”

American officials understood cultural policy in a similar manner. As General Clay later reflected, “Only the truth constantly repeated could overcome the cynicism of a Goebbels audience. This we determined to do by every available means: informational and educational, the magazines, the press, the radio, books, moving pictures, the theater [...] and town meetings.”

In practice, cultural policy targeted the restoration of German cultural life along the lines of the Allies’ own “superior,” peaceful, and democratic models. Unlike their British counterparts, who for a variety of reasons were less inclined to impose a British template on their zone, and the Soviets, whose cultural policies sought not the westernization but the Sovietization of postwar Germany and targeted the socio-economic structure as well as the ideational foundations of German culture, French and American officials insisted that their own political and cultural traditions offered the best models with which postwar German society might reenter the ranks of the civilized world. To the respective occupation staffs, France and America

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355 Clay, 281.
represented ideal democracies, whose credentials as carriers of universalist values, particularly liberty and equality, could be traced back to their respective revolutions during the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{357} For American officials, the contrast between their country’s interwar stability and Europe’s fascist decline had left little doubt over America’s role as the world’s model democracy. That same confidence had inspired Henry Luce in 1941 to declare an “American century” in \textit{Life} magazine and to praise the country “as the Good Samaritan and […] the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice.”\textsuperscript{358} Combined with American uncertainty over the depth of Nazism’s historical roots, faith in American cultural and political traditions led American officials to envision a more transformative reeducation process than their French colleagues, who were more confident in their assessments of “good” and “bad” German traditions. If French policies looked most to redress the isolation of German minds during the Nazi period, French officials suffered no lack of confidence in the value of their own culture as a model for postwar Germany.\textsuperscript{359} A publication by the French Direction de l’Information, which extolled the virtues of France’s historic commitment to peace and democracy, described the French spiritual tradition as “la lutte pour la pensée claire et irréfutable, la lutte pour l’éducation de l’homme, le grand combat pour ses libertés, les attaques contre la dictature et la guerre et la défense tenace d’une terre qui est à la fois celle de nos pères et celle de nos idées.”\textsuperscript{360} Jean Arnaud echoed the work. He declared France the “pays de la mesure, du bon sens, du goût, de la

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\textsuperscript{357} Cogan, 13.
\textsuperscript{359} Willis, 247.
\textsuperscript{360} Cited in: Mombert, 13.
\end{flushright}
finesse, pays aussi de la Révolution et des droits de l’homme, pays exportateur des valeurs humanistes.”

In its nationalist ardor, however, French rhetoric adopted a competitive tone, as French officials asserted that among the western Allies France was best suited to reeducate the Germans. Edmond Vermeil argued in August 1945 that, “La France a beaucoup a dire sur ce point [la rééducation] vis-à-vis des Anglo-Saxons. J’ose dire que nous connaissons l’Allemagne mieux qu’eux et sommes en mesure de poser les problèmes avec l’ampleur voulue.” Jean Arnaud saw the French position in the same way. He argued that, “Dans ce concert des nations alliées occupant l’Allemagne, elle [France] a sa spécialité […] Ce qu’elle ne fera pas, personne ne le fera à sa place.” In a speech in Baden-Baden in October 1945, De Gaulle also stressed France’s superior role in the establishment of a peaceful, democratic Germany. He called for Germans to abandon “l’idée d’une Allemagne groupée autour de la Prusse maintenant écroulée pour se retourner vers l’horizon qui leur apportera le plus d’espoir, vers l’Europe occidentale et avant tout vers la France.”

Claims about the exceptionality of France’s role in postwar Germany reflected concerns over France’s postwar international standing. Evidence of a French postwar inferiority complex abounded. One contemporary French author captured the defiant mood of French officials with the argument that “Les Français, beaucoup moins nombreux et beaucoup moins prolifiques, sont et resteront destinés à être les gardiens de leur propre civilisation et, tout à la fois, de la

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364 Arnaud, 61.
365 Cited in: Becker, 38.
civilisation humaine.”

The head of French theater policy, René Thimonnier, agreed. He insisted that “Dans l’ordre des valeurs culturelles, la France reste encore une très grande nation et peut-être la plus grande de toutes.”

French officials understood the occupation as an opportunity to reestablish their country’s international influence. In De Gaulle’s words the Allied victory had given France “des chances d’action exceptionnelles.”

Nowhere did French officials perceive their opportunity to be greater than with the implementation of cultural policy and the showcasing of French culture to both the Germans and the Allies. For centuries, cultural prestige had provided a complement to military strength as the foundation of French grandeur.

After 1945, French cultural policy officials looked to strengthen that foundation in Germany and were loathe to share the spotlight with the other Allies.

In spite of French insecurity, however, French officials were better prepared for the Allies’ reeducation mission. As officials on the ground later discovered, the implementation of Allied cultural policies facilitated a series of negotiations in which the Allies and their Germans struggled to determine which German customs and traditions were compatible with plans for a peaceful, democratic postwar German society. Agreement was elusive in both zones. Yet greater similarities between French and German cultural and political expectations bred fewer difficulties. Comparison of German and French and American understandings of two general concepts preview the more specific clashes that informed the implementation of cultural policies in Freiburg and Stuttgart.

367 Cited in: Becker, 165.
368 De Gaulle, 215.
369 On the “mission civilisatrice,” see: Conklin, 1-10; On French efforts to impress both the Allies and the Germans, see Defrance, La politique culturelle, 312.
First, German and Allied officials held different understandings of the term “culture.” In their mission to reeducate Germans through exposure to superior French models, the French drew on the idea of “civilisation” with its specific historical foundations. Civilisation was Christian and western European. According to Edmond Vermeil it was the result of four historical phenomena, which included “le culte de l’Antiquité gréco-latine et des ‘Humanités’, le christianisme sous toutes ses formes, le libéralisme rationaliste du XVIIIe siècle et le socialisme des diverses Internationales.”\footnote{Cited in: Mombert, 13.} In addition, civilisation meant high culture rather than mass culture. In both its origins and meaning, then, it approximated the notions of culture shared by the German elites with whom French officials most interacted. Although German notions of Kultur differed in significant ways from civilisation, they too implied a focus on high culture and drew on a similar foundation of Western European cultural achievements.\footnote{On “civilisation v. Kultur,” see: Becker, 27-28; Heinz L. Kretzenbacher, “Der ‘erweiterte Kulturbegriff’ in der ausussenpolitischen Diskussion der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein Vergleich mit der öffentlichen/innenkulturpolitischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsentwicklung von den sechziger bis zu den achtziger Jahren,” in Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache 18 (1992) : 170-196.} In spite of debates over a German political Sonderweg, it was difficult to deny that Goethe, Schiller, and Bach were representative of the same high European culture as Molière, Rousseau, and Saint-Saëns. If negotiations in the French zone over Germany’s return to the ranks of the western civilized world benefited from a shared understanding of western cultural foundations, the reverse was true in the American zone, where the American notion of “culture” marked a more dramatic departure from German Kultur. American “culture” encompassed both high and mass culture and referred to a shared set of beliefs and customs open to anyone without ethnic or geographic restrictions.\footnote{Gienow-Hecht, 10.} Less elitist, American culture was also less “European” than its French counterpart. The former was the product of the “New World,” the result of a revolution that had challenged the very traditions and customs that underlay the “Old World.” Though American
high culture bore similarities to its European counterparts, American mass culture appeared at once intriguing, materialistic, violent, and crude.\textsuperscript{373} As they had before the war, the popular-foundations of American culture again troubled German cultural officials after 1945 and frustrated negotiations between the occupier and the occupied.\textsuperscript{374}

A second concept over which Allied and German officials disagreed was the relationship between the state and the individual. Differences were again greatest in the American zone, where calls for the democratization of Germany implied the export of American political traditions. Central to these traditions were a belief in limited government and a commitment to the protection of individuals’ rights.\textsuperscript{375} Although many occupation officials were former New Dealers whose views on social policies departed from the more conservative, traditional anti-government strain of American democratic traditions, they nevertheless advocated a limited role for government in German cultural affairs. At the same time, they adhered to the view that social equality was a defining characteristic of American democracy.\textsuperscript{376} Their views stood in marked contrast to those of officials in Germany, where even in the “liberal” Southwest, democratic traditions had never implied the elimination of class distinctions or privileges. At the same time, Germans were more open to the role of the state in society and advocated a greater balance between the protection of individual rights and the maintenance of the general welfare. On these points Germans, especially those in Freiburg and Stuttgart, embraced values that more approximated those of the French \textit{volonté générale}.\textsuperscript{377}

Beyond similar political and cultural expectations, the French shared their Germans’ sense of a common postwar Franco-German purpose. Combined with the long history of

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\item\textsuperscript{373} Pells, 4.
\item\textsuperscript{374} On German objections to American mass culture, see: Dan Diner, \textit{America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism} (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996).
\item\textsuperscript{375} Smith, 17.
\item\textsuperscript{376} Smith, 18.
\item\textsuperscript{377} Ernst Fraenkel, \textit{Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien}, 2nd Ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991) 58-59.
\end{itemize}
Franco-German conflicts, the most recent war had convinced observers in both countries of the need for reconciliation and partnership. To be sure, lingering wartime resentments and the challenges of immediate postwar reconstruction discouraged mass movement in favor of bilateral friendships. This was particularly true for officials in Paris, who catered to the views of a constituency still scarred by the German occupation.\textsuperscript{378} Within the French military government, however, support for reconciliation was more widespread and reflected the desire for improved Franco-German relations among members of the Resistance. Among the most prominent proponents of such ideals was Emile Laffon.\textsuperscript{379} Yet even officials, including De Gaulle, who adopted a more cautious approach to Germany, understood reconciliation as a beneficial path to the improvement of French security.\textsuperscript{380} In his advocacy of the decentralization of Germany, De Gaulle thus called for an improvement of the historic ties that linked France and the German Southwest. In a meeting in the fall 1945 with German government and ecclesiastical officials in Freiburg, he spoke of “les liens qui, jadis, rapprochaient les Français et les Allemands du Sud et qui doivent, maintenant, reparaître, pour servir à bâtir ‘notre’ Europe et ‘notre’ Occident.”\textsuperscript{381} He further expressed the desire for improved bilateral relations in a speech to the city’s residents. The speech, which met with warm applause, called for Franco-German cooperation and described Europe’s postwar reconstruction as a job not for a single country but for “us.”\textsuperscript{382}

In Freiburg local officials shared their superiors’ interest in reconciliation. During the initial months of the occupation, the municipal French information officer, Lt. Maurice Jordy,

\textsuperscript{379} Lattard, 11; Willis, 89.
\textsuperscript{380} On the more self-serving approach to reconciliation, see: Hudemann, “Kulturpolitik,” 20.
\textsuperscript{381} De Gaulle, 263.
worked with wartime resistance fighter, Josef Ruby, to establish a Franco-German cultural exchange organization. The Vereinigung Abendland hosted several cultural events intended for the city’s university audience in late 1945. In a letter to the lord mayor, Ruby described the organization as a group committed to building cultural relations with “our neighbor” and open to members from the local churches, bureaucracy, university, and media.\footnote{StadtAF C5/1857 – Letter from Josef Ruby to mayor of Freiburg, 16.11.1945.} Jordy’s insistence on running the meetings alone deterred more residents from joining, for they feared that the club was a tool of French propaganda. In the meantime, Jordy’s superiors disbanded the organization after they became suspicious that talk of the Abendland might serve to disguise renewed German expansionism as a push for Western European integration.\footnote{Klöckler, 90.} In spite of its collapse, the Vereinigung Abendland provided a template for continued local reconciliation efforts throughout the occupation. They culminated in the establishment of a new organization in the fall 1949. The product of collaboration between Lord Mayor Hoffmann and the head of the Military Government for Freiburg, Lt-Colonel Monteux, the cercle franco-allemand comprised 250 German and 250 French members, who through regular meetings, lectures, and exchange programs, undertook to improve relations between professionals from both countries in all fields of interest.\footnote{StadtAF C5/1857 – Statutes of the cercle franco-allemand.}

In addition to their unique underlying political and cultural expectations, French and American reeducation efforts betrayed different levels of comfort with cultural diplomacy. Here the Allies’ distinct histories were important. In the French zone officials drew inspiration and guidance from their country’s imperial past. Of particular value for them was the long history of French cultural policy in Germany. French efforts to export their universalist, humanist values
across the Rhine dated back to the late eighteenth century and had continued throughout the interwar period. Émile Laffon viewed France’s most recent democratization mission as a continuation of the work begun by French soldiers in the 1790s. Of more practical value were the policies of the post-1918 occupation of the Rhineland, which included the publication of magazines about French culture, the performance of French plays by traveling theater troupes, and the staging of French art exhibitions.

More than a template for future cultural initiatives, however, the rich history of French cultural diplomacy provided post-1945 French officials with a well-established sense of purpose. Knowledge of France’s historic mission civilisatrice reinforced a sense of obligation to export French culture. De Gaulle captured that sense in a 1943 speech in which he argued “La France a pu, de siècle en siècle et jusqu’au drame présent, maintenir à l’extérieur la présence de son génie [...] Nous avons, une fois pour toutes, tiré cette conclusion que c’est par de libres rapports intellectuels et moraux, établis entre nous-mêmes et les autres, que notre influence culturelle peut s’étendre à l’avantage de tous.” Confident in the historical foundations and success of their work, French officials struggled little with the obvious contradiction between the efforts to democratize Germany and to alter German culture under the tutelage of a military government. Further justification for French tutelage came with the conclusion that the collapse of National Socialism had left Germans desperate for guidance. As Laffon noted “Le national-socialisme a ruiné la culture allemande, il laisse derrière lui [...] le vide politique et moral. [...]”

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388 Cited in: Becker, 35.
La République Française doit aussi leur apparaître comme un exemple, comme une démocratie moderne organisée, forte, généreuse." Combined with the belief that France’s future grandeur depended on its cultural foreign policy, the sense of obligation to France’s historic civilizing mission promised an assertive French approach to reeducation.

The reverse was true in the American zone, where America’s historical aversion to cultural diplomacy rendered officials uncomfortable with the reeducation mission. While Americans had few reservations about removing Nazi sympathizers from positions of influence, they were much less ready to impose their own political and cultural models on a denazified German society. Before the war, the American shift from private to public cultural diplomacy, which the establishment of the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938 initiated, had been controversial.

While wartime officials eventually assuaged their concerns by comparing their “promotion of freedom” with the Nazi promotion of evil, occupation officials nevertheless remained uncomfortable with their postwar mission. As Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hildring later explained the American position: “The redemption of Germany, the establishment of decency and democracy in Germany, are tasks that must be done by Germans; they can never be done by our proconsuls, American or otherwise.” Reluctant to impose “the American way” on their Germans, American officials hoped that defeat itself would discredit German cultural and political traditions and foster a desire to become “more American.” The American mission was therefore not to provide “direct propaganda,” but, as General Clay saw it, “to

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391 Rosenberg, 205-206.
392 Cited in: Moore, 340.
penetrate the German consciousness […] with hard, convincing facts.”

Conclusion:

In light of their different paths to victory, France and the United States constituted unlikely partners in postwar Germany. In spite of its wartime weaknesses, France entered Germany more prepared to implement the Allies’ denazification and reeducation agendas. In addition to their experiences with occupation and collaboration, French officials’ understandings of Nazism combined with their specific political and cultural expectations to presage smoother relations between them and their Germans. At the same time, concerns over France’s postwar international standing and a long history of French foreign cultural policy encouraged a more determined and aggressive French administrative style. The reverse was true in the American zone, where differences between German and American political and cultural traditions combined with a less forgiving American view of Nazism to breed greater tensions between occupier and occupied. Although visions of the Americanization of postwar German culture and society demanded more dramatic changes to pre-1933 German customs and traditions, a more indirect American administrative style promised to mitigate such changes.

However, one common assumption underlay the French and American approaches to the occupation. In their evaluation of National Socialism’s origins and consequences and in their decision to reeducate the German people, the Allies assumed a need for their tutelage. In the German defeat they perceived both an opportunity and an obligation to introduce their superior cultural and political models as the foundation for a peaceful, democratic German society. Yet, as the Allies initiated the kind of cultural negotiations that reeducation demanded, they discovered the fallacy of their assumptions. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, efforts by local

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394 Clay, 281.
German officials and residents to restore pre-1933 customs and traditions and to rebuild Germany along German, rather than Allied, lines frustrated the occupiers’ mission.
Map 1: German States and Occupation Zones

Map Source: Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*. 
Chapter 3: Moviegoers and Occupiers – German and Allied Expectations for the Screen

As Allied officials considered venues for the realization of their cultural mission, cinemas seemed the most obvious choice. Like Hitler and Goebbels, occupation officials appreciated the capacity of film to capture an audience and deliver a message with lasting effect. They also understood that the screen offered access to a broader socio-economic and age demographic than the stage, newspapers, or the classroom. Convinced of the power of cinemas, Allied officials hoped to harness it to their advantage. If film had contributed to the spread of Nazi ideology, it could also contribute to the spread of Allied cultural and political ideals. While the Allies agreed on the value of the cinema, they differed in their views of how best to reintroduce it in postwar Germany. Throughout the occupation, differences between French and American film policies, which reflected differences between the Allies’ broader occupation strategies, provided distinct experiences for moviegoers in Freiburg and Stuttgart.

The chapter contrasts the Allies’ visions for postwar German cinema and considers the local implementation of film policy. It begins with an outline of general Allied objectives and introduces the institutions and officials most responsible for the local administration of film initiatives. The chapter then examines the denazification of local cinema personnel and programs and explores the challenges of reopening the cities’ postwar movie houses. It also considers Allied plans to use the screen as a tool of reeducation and traces the general features of early French and American film programs. A final section treats the transfer of responsibility for the postwar screen from Allied to German authorities and considers the implications of changing German film expectations for French and American policies.

There was a disconnect between Allied and German visions for the postwar screen. During the first year of the occupation, audiences most turned to the cinema to escape the
physical and psychological hardships of life amid the rubble. Although twelve years of Nazi
propaganda had left viewers less open to Allied documentaries about German war crimes or
democracy, Nazi censorship practices had encouraged demand for Allied feature films as a kind
of forbidden fruit. To varying degrees, however, the quality of French and American offerings
disappointed postwar audiences. In the meantime, German expectations for the screen evolved.
As material conditions improved, audiences sought an escapist experience less than a forum in
which to address broader moral and philosophical questions. In short, they looked to explore
their nation’s recent past and its uncertain future. Both issues informed the focus of a renewed
German film industry, whose popularity weakened the Allies’ cinematic influence during the
later portion of the occupation. In response, French officials looked beyond the cinema and in
film clubs found an alternative venue for the promotion of French cinematic and cultural
grandeur. Less concerned with the promotion of American prestige and more uncomfortable
with their role as cultural diplomats, the Americans opted against such a move. In any case, the
local experiences of both Allies challenged their wartime assumption that postwar Germans
needed and desired Allied cultural tutelage.

High Policy – General Allied Approaches to the Screen

In light of differences among the Allies’ broader postwar objectives, differences among
specific Allied cultural initiatives were not surprising. In most areas of cultural policy, Allied
agreement was rare and fleeting. Film policy was no exception. Beyond general guidelines for
the initial control of postwar German film activities, directives from central Allied agencies only
provided the appearance of Allied unity and offered little support to film officers on the ground.
Examples included Law 191, which the Allied Expeditionary Forces issued in November 1944.
The law banned all production, distribution, advertisement, sale, and commercial leasing of films
effective upon the occupation of German territory. A modification of the law in May 1945 allowed these activities to resume with the written consent of military government officials. In the meantime, a separate Allied law required the surrender of all German film collections to Allied authorities for inspection.\(^{395}\) Beyond these initial orders, film policy remained within the purview of zonal leaders. By the time the postwar Allied Control Commission first convened in June 1945, these leaders had already outlined their specific film initiatives.\(^{396}\) In the years that followed, cultural-policy officials interpreted directives from the Commission not as orders but as suggestions, which they could adapt to the specific conditions in their respective zones.

Despite differences in their implementation, the policies that French and American officials outlined for their zones shared two general objectives. The first was denazification, which entailed the purge of both cinema programs and personnel. To encourage the growth of a peaceful, democratic German culture, the Allies believed it necessary to remove the influences that had transformed German screens into showcases for films such as Leni Riefenstahl’s *Triumph of the Will* (1935), Veit Harlan’s *Jud Süß* (1940), and Wolfgang Liebeneiner’s *Ich klage an* (1941). In an internal review of film policy, French officials gave top priority to efforts to “épurer le cinéma de la zone des Allemands nazis.”\(^{397}\) American directives asserted the same. An outline of the American film agenda listed first the removal of “all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda” from German cinemas.\(^{398}\)

The second shared objective was reeducation. French and American officials hoped to use their zone’s screens to teach their Germans about “superior” Allied political and cultural models. As one French official described it, control of German movie houses promised to “*doter*
le Gouvernement Militaire d’un puissant instrument de propagande.” Through a combination of documentary and feature films French officials looked to illustrate for Germans both the evil of Nazism and the benefits of western civilization à la française. Their plan was evidence of the dual French agenda of reeducating the Germans and promoting French cultural excellence. Although the Americans were less concerned with self-promotion, they shared the French view that through the depiction of Allied cultures, Allied films could help convince the Germans of the flaws in their own prewar society. Hopeful that the experience of defeat had rendered Germans open to foreign tutelage, American film officers believed that by watching American movies, Germans would learn to emulate democratic Americans. As one official concluded, cinemas offered a forum to “prepare for the reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for the eventual peaceful cooperation of Germany in international life.”

In any case, the expectations of film officers in both zones affirmed wartime views of Allied cultures as a “cure” for Nazi “illness.” In fact, in a discussion of French cultural objectives, which included film policy, the director of French information services in Germany, Jean Arnaud, reasserted that French culture was “l’antidote tout indiqué pour l’âme allemand.”

Two final objectives distinguished French and American film policies. The first concerned the exploitation of the German film market by Allied filmmakers. Comfortable in their role as cultural masters and civilisateurs and determined to restore their nation’s prewar international film reputation, French film officers were candid about their intention to secure for French films a dominant position on postwar German screens. From the creation of joint

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399 AOC, AC 29/1, Memo from Colin-Reval, 7 Oct 1947.
401 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, Organizational History of ICD, July 1946.
Franco-German distribution firms, in which French interests held a majority stake, to the selection of French films to be circulated in Germany, French policy aimed to “créer des bases permettant à l’industrie cinématographique française de s’installer en Allemagne.”

For American officials securing for Hollywood a niche in the postwar German market was never a specific objective. The situation angered the American film industry, which attempted in vain to force a policy change by waging a campaign of criticism against the State and War Departments. The United States government affirmed its historical aversion to colonial endeavors and maintained that Germany’s postwar film industry had to be a German enterprise rather than an American subsidiary.

A second distinction between French and American film policies betrayed differences between Allied and German film preferences. It concerned the formation of German film clubs. During the latter years of the occupation, German demands for the clubs, which met to discuss specific films and film aesthetics, revealed an interest in film not only as a source of entertainment but also as a critical form of art. French film officers held similar interests and drew on the long tradition of French ciné-clubs, as well as a desire to find additional venues for the promotion of French cinema, to guide the establishment of German clubs. Aware of the shared Franco-German interest in film aesthetics, one German observer recalled how in French film policies “the artistic and cultural were stressed, while the political and topical remained very much in the background.”

The reverse was true of American policies, which paid little attention to film clubs. The situation owed, in part, to the lack of a film-club tradition in the

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404 AOC, AC 29/1, Memo from Colin-Reval, 7 Oct 1947.
United States. It also reflected the influence of officials, like General Clay, who understood the Allies’ primary responsibility as the presentation of “hard, convincing facts” to Germans. Film officers thus focused on conventional German cinema programs and the promotion of American documentary and feature films, which, they believed, best illustrated the “facts” of American life for Germans. Less interested in establishing avenues of American-German cultural exchange or in the discussion of film as art, American officials struggled to appreciate the German interest in film clubs.  

Within the occupation zones specific institutions were responsible for the implementation and adaptation of film policies. Most important in the French zone was the Section Cinéma of the Direction de l’Information (DI). At the head of the Section Cinéma was Marcel Colin-Reval, who supervised film activities through the spring of 1947 and thus directed French film policy at the time when personnel levels and expectations were highest. An experienced figure in the French film industry, Colin-Reval had been the chief editor of the trade journal La Cinématographie française from 1925-1940 and the editor of Excelsior from 1937-1940. In addition to his knowledge of French cinema, he brought to his postwar position a solid understanding of German cinema, which he had acquired during his frequent interwar travels to Berlin. Under Reval’s command, the Section Cinéma established a series of sub-departments that were responsible for denazification, the reconstruction of German cinemas, filming and distribution of newsreels, and the subtitling and distribution of French films. To ensure the implementation of French policies at the local level, film officers stationed throughout the

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407 Fehrenbach, 175.
French zone worked with local German cinema owners and distribution officials. Archival records do not reveal the names of the film officers who worked in Freiburg.

In the American zone, film policy fell to a similar, albeit larger, bureaucracy. In the fall of 1945, there were 350 cinemas in the French zone but 800 in the American zone. The Americans also controlled two major German film studios in Berlin and Munich, while the French zone housed no significant production facilities. The size of the American zone mandated a more complex administration. While the Section Cinéma administered policy for the entire French zone, the American administration did so with separate offices in each of its zone’s three Länder. Within the Office of Military Government (OMGUS), film policy was the responsibility of the Information Control Division (ICD). In January 1946, the Offices of Military Government for the various US-zone Länder became independent units and reported only to OMGUS central command. In Stuttgart, the ICD of the Office of Military Government Württemberg-Baden (OMGWB) controlled local film activities. Under the command of John H. Boxer, about whom archival records reveal little, the ICD branch of OMGWB comprised 8 subdivisions, which oversaw activities in intelligence and research, press, radio, publications, exhibitions and information centers, theater and music, and film. The department had branch offices in Heilbronn, Ulm, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, and Heidelberg. At the head of the Film Control Branch in Stuttgart was a civilian, John A. Scott. Like Colin-Reval in the French zone, Scott oversaw the most meaningful phase of American film policy in Württemberg-Baden.

‘Nazis raus’ – Denazification and the Reopening of Local Cinemas, 1945-1946

French and American film policies began with denazification. In Freiburg and Stuttgart film officers relied on the mayors to gather local film collections for inspection by occupation

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409 Thaisy, 61.
French authorities stored all confiscated films for future use. The reappearance of Nazi-era films on postwar German screens was not uncommon in the French zone, and officials remained concerned about their safe storage through 1948. While American officials did not share the French concern for the safekeeping of Nazi-era films, their approach to the confiscation and sorting of German film collections reflected the American commitment to a thorough denazification process. Unlike the French, who acted later and with less uniformity, the Americans issued a single order for the collection of films throughout their zone at the end of the war. By contrast, French officers began confiscating Nazi films in the north of their zone in the fall 1945, but no official collection order appeared in Freiburg until February 1946. The delay was evidence of both the hurried establishment of the French military government and the more casual French approach to denazification.

German films were not the only targets of the early French collection drives. In the wake of the German occupation of France, French authorities were concerned with the recovery of stolen French property, and film officers undertook to retrieve all requisitioned French cinema equipment. In fact, the equipment inventories of cinemas in both Freiburg and Stuttgart underwent review. Records reveal little about the search in Stuttgart. In Freiburg, an order to register all property with origins in former German territories came in July 1945. It included machinery, furniture, clothing, raw materials, and production equipment. A second order requiring the registration of all cinema equipment, German or foreign, appeared in February 1946. In August the municipal government submitted to French officials a list of persons in

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410 On the role of German municipal leaders in the collection of films, see: StadtAF, C 5/19, Verordnung Nr. 35 vom 2 Oct 1946 über den Besitz von Filmen; Fehrenbach, 54.
411 AOC, AC 29/2, Note from CCFA to head of DI, 7 Mar 1948.
412 AOC, AC 29/2, Note from DI to General Pierre Koenig, 6 Oct 1948.
413 Fehrenbach, 54.
414 StadtAF, C 5/19, Verordnung Nr. 35 vom 2.10.46 über den Besitz von Filmen; Thaisy, 67.
possession of non-German goods and equipment. No local cinema owners appeared on this list.

As the review of film collections and equipment inventories continued, Allied officials turned their attention to the purge of local cinema personnel. In accordance with Allied Law 191, movie houses in both cities remained closed throughout the initial weeks of the occupation. To reopen their businesses, cinema owners had to pass denazification proceedings and obtain an exhibition license. In late July the French high command ordered local film officers to undertake background investigations of all cinema owners and their staffs. To distribute and collect the requisite questionnaires in Freiburg, film officers again enlisted the help of German city officials. In Stuttgart events followed a similar timeline. There, local exhibitors had to complete three “Fragebogen:” a personal survey, a business survey, and an application for a film exhibition license. The surveys, which mirrored those used in other areas of cultural policy, were thorough. To prove that they had not profited from the Nazi regime, applicants had to state their incomes in 1932, 1935, 1939, and 1944. They also had to list three references: “one of whom is familiar with your business experience, one with your political opinions, and one with your personal life.” As the occupation continued, the surveys became a hated symbol of American stringency. French surveys drew less criticism. Throughout the French zone, film exhibitors had to complete only 2 questionnaires: one personal and one business survey. Neither was as extensive as its American counterparts.

In both cities the results of denazification proceedings seemed to support the claims of municipal officials about the limits of Nazism’s local reach. Allied investigations uncovered

416 StadtAF, C 5/19, Oberbürgermeisteramt – Wirtschaftsamt an Militärregierung, 6 Aug 1945.
417 StadtAF, C 5/2247, Letter from mayor’s office to local cinema owners, 6 Aug 1945.
418 NARA, RG 260, Box 269, OMGUS, Records of the ICD, Records of the Motion Picture Branch – copies of Fragebogen.
419 NARA, RG 260, Box 269, Copies of Fragebogen distributed in the American zone.
420 StadtAF, C 5/2247, Letter from Bürgermeisteramt to Freiburg Cinema Owners, 6 Aug 45.
only minor Nazi sympathies among local cinema owners. Of Stuttgart’s 9 inner-city and 5 suburban cinemas, four managers were found to have objectionable ties to the Nazi party.\textsuperscript{421} In Freiburg only 1 of the city’s 5 cinema owners was implicated.\textsuperscript{422} According to Allied laws, cinemas belonging to owners of objectionable backgrounds could be placed under the control of temporary owners appointed by the military governments. In Stuttgart, the cinemas in question were placed under the trusteeship of the mayor on behalf of the American administration.\textsuperscript{423} In Freiburg, however, French officials allowed the daughter of the incriminated cinema owner to serve as temporary director of her father’s business.\textsuperscript{424}

Throughout the occupation, the records of film officers in both cities reflected the Allies’ distinct denazification strategies. In Freiburg, reports on the convicted local cinema owner made no reference to broader denazification objectives or ambitions. When Colin-Reval later worried that the French purge of German cinema was insufficient, he was in the minority.\textsuperscript{425} None of the French denazification records from Freiburg reflected his concern. The American commitment to denazification was stronger, and film officers in Stuttgart demonstrated an unwavering sense of purpose. In a review of investigations of cinema personnel in the Stuttgart area, John A. Scott spoke in July 1946 of an obligation to “investigate the political, professional and moral history of all applicants [and] to search out and remove silent partners with money… [and] dark political backgrounds”\textsuperscript{426}

Beyond the purge of personnel, a final issue informed early denazification proceedings in the two cities. It involved the implementation of an Allied ban on government ownership and

\textsuperscript{421} StadtAS, HA 0 (14), Nr. 2, Activity Report from the Mayor to the Military Government, 1 Oct - 6 Oct 1945.
\textsuperscript{422} StadtAF, C 5/2247, Letter from municipal government to French military government, 13 Aug 1945.
\textsuperscript{423} StadtAS, HA Gr. 0 (14), Nr. 2, Activity Report from the Mayor to the Military Government, 1 Oct - 6 Oct 1945.
\textsuperscript{424} StadtAF, C 5/2247, Letter from municipal government to French military government, 13 Aug 1945.
\textsuperscript{425} AOC, AC 29/1, Report on the organization of French cinema in Germany by Colin-Reval, 7 Oct 1947.
\textsuperscript{426} NARA, RG 260, Box 309, History of Film Branch written by John A. Scott, 9 Jul 1946.
operation of cinemas and film studios. While the Allied Control Commission agreed to the ban in February 1946, enforcement of the policy was not uniform. In Freiburg and Stuttgart campaigns by municipal officials to gain control of cinema operations drew different responses from the occupation authorities. In Freiburg, French officials granted control of a major cinema to the city government in September 1945. This was the same cinema whose owner was suspected of Nazi sympathies. Local officials had requested control of the screen not for propaganda purposes but rather as a replacement venue for the municipal theater, which had been destroyed during the war. French officials understood the distinction and were sympathetic. With their typical disdain for quadripartite decrees, the local French administration ignored the Allied Control Commission ban and allowed the municipal government to use the building for film and theater presentations. In the meantime, the French relieved the cinema owner’s daughter of her function as interim cinema director, and ordered that revenue from municipal film presentations go into municipal coffers.

In Stuttgart American officials were more suspicious of the municipal government’s motives and were determined to keep local government from influencing film activities. Their suspicion revealed the American belief that any state involvement in cultural affairs was tantamount to a return to Nazi-era practices. Thus Scott lamented that “as soon as local German officials realize theater or distribution branches are open, they scheme to seize control.” He added that “against this US film officers will for some time to come have to be alert.” Throughout the American zone, film officers bemoaned attempts by German mayors to operate cinemas in order to replenish city coffers or provide their friends with jobs. In Stuttgart, the Americans disproved of the deputy mayor’s attempts to gain control of local movie houses and

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427 StadtAF, C 5/2248, Letter from Military Government to owner of Casino Lichtspiele, 21 Sep 45.
428 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, History of Film Branch written by John A. Scott, 9 Jul 1946.
to transfer their titles without notifying the occupation administration. No less troubling for the occupiers, was the municipal government’s campaign to establish a local film production company. The largest studios in the American zone were located near Munich, so Stuttgart’s large Protestant community feared that Catholic propaganda would fill local screens. Nevertheless, American officials opposed the project, which they believed exemplified a dangerous historical German affinity for state censorship.

In both the French and the American zones, the process of investigating exhibitors and granting operator licenses was incomplete when cinemas reopened their doors in the summer and fall of 1945. Less thorough in their purge efforts, the French permitted movie houses to open sooner than the Americans did. In September 1945, 250 cinemas operated in the French zone, while 50 operated in the American zone. The official order to reopen cinemas reached local French detachments in early August 1945, yet some commanders began film presentations in July. In Freiburg, regular screenings began in mid-August. In the American zone most cinemas reopened later, save those in communities first held by French forces. Thus, in Stuttgart screenings had begun in June. The slowness with which cinemas regained life under American supervision was not lost on American commanders. In a weekly detachment report for the US forces in Stuttgart, Lt.-Col. Charles D. Winning acknowledged that the American zone trailed its Allied neighbors in “the number of newspapers published, cinemas and theaters opened and public gatherings permitted.”

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429 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from Director ICD - OMGWB on Requirements for Free German Information Services, 27 Nov 1946.
430 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from Director ICD - OMGWB on Requirements for Free German Information Services, 27 Nov 1946.
431 Thaisy, 54.
432 Thaisy, 66.
With the reopening of cinemas, occupation officials had to choose which films Germans would see. In both zones, local film programs comprised three elements. The first were feature films of both German and Allied origin. In their selection of the former, French and American officials adopted distinct procedures. During the summer 1945 the French Section Cinéma ordered that a French officer with a solid understanding of the German language screen all German films prior to their presentation to the public. An order to film officers in Freiburg mandated that their reviews look for “des allusions politiques même minimes.”\(^{434}\) The vague guideline afforded individual officials great leeway in their decisions and reflected the more liberal French approach to denazification. In Stuttgart American officials adopted more stringent criteria, which were similar to those that the Allied Control Commission outlined in September 1945. They included a ban on films that “glorify ideology of Fascism, Nazism, and racial distinction, glorify or idealize war or militarism, politically subvert or pervert German history […] [or] deal with German revenge.”\(^{435}\) A final criterion that informed both French and American review efforts was the decision to ban all German films that challenged the Allies’ integrity. In light of French postwar image concerns, the ban on such films perhaps mattered most to French film officers.

No less important for Allied officials was the review of their own national cinemas and the identification of works suited for the reeducation of postwar Germans. Like most American preparations for the occupation, the selection of American films preceded its French counterpart. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Office of War Information had established committees in New York, Washington, and London. Comprised of German and Austrian exiles and American and British educators, the three committees compiled a list of 40 US titles deemed

\(^{434}\) Cited in: Thaisy, 67.
\(^{435}\) NARA, RG 260, Box 270, “Memo: Censoring of German Motion Picture Films,” 7 Dec 1945.
suitable for show in postwar Germany. Criteria for film selection included the prediction that on VE-Day the US would still be at war with Japan, the belief that Germans would be stubborn and need a reminder of American strength, and the desire to convey Allied unity to the German public. Among the selected titles, for which officials provided no specific explanation, were *Action in the North Atlantic* (1943), *Gone with the Wind* (1939), and *The Maltese Falcon* (1941). The French employed similar criteria in their selection of films, but did not begin the process until the spring 1945. They sought titles that would aid the denazification and democratization of Germany and promote French cultural prestige. As one French official recalled, the selection of French films for distribution in Germany entailed:

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\text{d'une part à choisir soigneusement dans le trésor français les bandes susceptibles de passer utilement sur les écrans allemands, et d'autre part à interdire tout spectacle qui ne soit pas nettement conforme aux grandes lignes de notre politique en Allemagne, propagande artistique française, dénazification, rééducation politique. Il s'agit de passer les bons films et de ne pas tolérer la moindre faiblesse.}
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Among the early French selections were *L’Eternel Retour* (1943), *Les Visiteurs du soir* (1942), and *La Marseillaise* (1938).

A second component of early postwar film programs were Allied newsreels. Prior to the establishment of a postwar German print media, the newsreels offered Germans a rare glimpse of the outside world and afforded the Allies an additional means of information control. Yet, a lack of financial resources in the French zone limited French investment in the films. Known in German as the *Französische Wochenschau*, early French newsreels comprised little more than news

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436 Joseph, 124.
437 Thaisy, 141.
footage shown in France and contained few stories relating to Germany.  

American newsreels were more elaborate and contributed to the broader reeducation effort. Beyond the presentation of news, the American-British newsreel *Welt in Film* attempted to dissuade Germans from militarism and Nazism through footage of the concentration camps and the war-torn European landscape. The direct communication that newsreels encouraged appealed to the Americans more than the indirect, or allegorical function of feature film presentations. In fact, as one American film officer later confessed, the ICD did not present feature films to entertain the Germans, but rather to attract audiences for newsreels and documentaries.

A final element of early postwar German film programs were Allied documentaries. These films exposed Germans to a variety of Allied political and cultural traditions and addressed Germany’s recent past and future. While French officials focused more on the use of their own feature films for reeducation, they released a variety of films on France’s regional cultures, national folklore, and French art. Most notable of the French documentaries was the film *Ein Jahr später*, which comprised a retrospective of the first year of the occupation and asserted the benefits of the French presence to postwar Germans. To educate the Germans about the horrors of the Nazi Reich, the French also released an exposé on the concentration camps, entitled *Les camps de mort*. Produced for distribution in France, French film officers later dubbed the work in German.

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440 Fehrenbach, 56.
441 Joseph, 124; Fehrenbach, 56.
442 AOC, AC 29/2, Letter from the head of the French cultural mission in Germany to Cpt. Lombard, 11.6.48.
443 *La Revue de la Zone Française* 15 Nov 1945 : 24.
More excited about documentaries, American officials invested greater energy in them. Initial American documentaries betrayed the American intention to confront the Germans with their past and advanced a kind of collective guilt thesis that reflected the thinking of hard-line American planners, like Morgenthau. The most well-known of the early American documentaries was the film *Todesmühlen*, which debuted in March 1946 and left audiences speechless with its horrific footage of the concentration camps. Beyond denazification, however, documentaries also served American reeducation objectives. In light of American reluctance to impose their traditions on the Germans, the films provided an important medium in which, as occupation officials hoped, disillusioned Germans could “discover” American customs and adopt them as their own. A summary of potential documentaries, to which John Scott contributed, illustrated the point and revealed the depth of American concerns over German political and cultural deficiencies. One film, entitled *The Civil Servant – Servant of the people* proposed to rid Germans of their unhealthy respect for *Beamten* and demonstrate “the American idea of friendly ‘service to the customer’.” To illustrate the latter, the film was to use footage of American traffic policemen who help rather than “bully” the people. Another film, entitled *The Modern Woman*, proposed to disabuse Germans of sexist Nazi ideals. As the summary described it, “Pictures of women in important industrial and professional jobs, and the general attitude of comradeship and respect between American men and women should highlight the equality accorded women in America.” Most notable was a film, entitled *Germans in America*, which proposed to highlight not the historical democratic accomplishments of Germans

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in Germany but rather those of Germans in America. As the film description noted “This film should show outstanding Americans of German decent who are staunch pillars of freedom and tolerance. It should show […] something of German societies in America with cultural and fraternal shots of average Americans with the narrator asking […] ‘Of what racial decent is this man?’ and then explaining that the man is German, English, Scotch, or German-French, etc.”

To present their film programs to their Germans, the Allies first had to establish distribution networks in their zones. The war had laid waste to the German infrastructure, and in the French zone a shortage of vehicles and gasoline made matters worse. To alleviate the situation, French officials established a distribution company known as Rhein-Donau. The company was the only body authorized to supply German cinemas under French control. Each week it delivered to movie houses a certified film program comprising a newsreel, a documentary, and a feature film. Following the final presentation of each program, cinema managers transferred to Rhein-Donau a portion of the profits. French film officers oversaw this process and were impatient with late transfers. In Freiburg a clerical error delayed payment for the early film programs at the city’s Casino theater. In a letter to the mayor’s office, the local French administration warned that future late payments would result in the closing of the municipal cinema.  

American officials also monopolized film distribution in their zone. In Stuttgart, a special division of the ICD in Württemberg-Baden oversaw the process.

As audiences in Freiburg and Stuttgart returned to their local cinemas, they met with a variety of films. In both cities pre-1945 German titles dominated the screen. In Freiburg audiences saw Johannes Hesters Glück bei Frauen (1944) and Gezá von Bolváry’s Rosen in Tirol (1940). In January 1946 the Nazi-era blockbuster Baron Münchhausen also reappeared.

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448 StadtAF, C 5/2248, Letter from military government to mayor’s office, 3 Jan 1946.
Stuttgart Willi Forst's *Operette* (1940) was among the earliest works to return to the screen.\(^{449}\) American officials also approved the rerelease of Adolf Schlyssleder’s *Der Hochtourist* (1942), Theo Lingen’s *Liebeskomödie* (1943), and Géza von Cziffra’s *Der weisse Traum* (1943).\(^{450}\) While most of the films that the Allies’ approved for rerelease comprised apolitical works of escapist fantasy or comedy, distinctions emerged between the French and American selections. In general, American film officers selected works from non-Nazi directors. Yet, the French approved the rerelease of *Opfergang* (1944), whose director, Veit Harlan, had produced the infamous Nazi propaganda film, *Jud Süss* (1940).\(^{451}\) The decision demonstrated the liberal French approach to denazification and the willingness of French film officers to approve the release of individual films from a given directors’ repertoire.

In both cities, Allied feature films debuted only after the rerelease of older German works. Most French films appeared first with subtitles. Dubbed films appeared later, as the French administration found the time and resources to produce them.\(^{452}\) Among the first French films to premier in Freiburg was the wartime comedy *Premier rendez-vous* (1941). In addition, Marcel Carné’s *Les Visiteurs du soir* (1942) premiered in November 1945. For French officials the film’s treatment of man’s struggle with the devil offered an allegory for France’s wartime struggle with occupation and collaboration. At the same time, the original release of the film in 1942 offered evidence of French cultural resilience during the occupation and the war. In fact, to highlight the latter to their Germans, film officers in Freiburg organized a private screening for members of the local military government and 400 invited German guests, including members of

\(^{449}\) For a sample of early film listings in Freiburg, see: *Freiburger Nachrichten* 5 Sep 1945 : 2; *Freiburger Nachrichten* 22 Jan 1946 : 6.
\(^{451}\) For film listing, see: *Freiburger Nachrichten* 5 Sep 1945 : 2.
the municipal government and the university community. The event demonstrated not only the
desire to impress upon Germans the postwar integrity of French culture but also the French view
of film as more than a medium for the masses. Unlike the Americans, whose film activities
mostly targeted the lower and uneducated classes of German society, French officials viewed
film a means to reach German elites as well. 453 Confident that these elites were open to foreign
influences in the wake of the Nazi experience, one French film officer described the private
screening as an important event for “une partie cultivée de la population, peu habitué a de
pareilles oeuvres.” 454

In Stuttgart, where the Americans held no special screenings of their films, early postwar
audiences encountered dubbed versions of films such as Young Tom Edison (1940), I Married a
Witch (1942), and The Maltese Falcon (1941). 455 Justifications for the screening of the first two
films remained unclear in the records of film officers. The Maltese Falcon, however, proved
controversial among American officials, who debated whether the film offered an illustration of
American justice or a nation of gangsters. The latter view was alarming in light of the military
government’s efforts to dispel similar Nazi-era stereotypes of the United States. 456 In any case,
the city’s initial exposure to American cinema was limited because of the broader conflict
between the American military government and Hollywood. To foster a vibrant postwar German
film industry, occupation officials restricted both the removal of cinema profits from Germany
and the investment of foreign firms in German cinematic operations. 457

453 Fehrenbach, 57.
454 AOC, H1102-1103/1, Memo, 7 Nov 1945.
457 On the battle between Hollywood and OMGUS, see: Heide Fehrenbach, “Persistent Myths of Americanization:
German Reconstruction and the Remilitarization of Postwar Cinema, 1945-1956,” in Transactions, Transgressions,
studios withheld their more popular, and more expensive, productions from German screens. Instead they sent fewer older and less expensive films to Germany.\textsuperscript{458} To the dismay of American film officers, the shortage of American films shifted the balance of early postwar cinema programs in favor of German titles.

German reactions to early postwar film programs varied. Least popular were Allied newsreels and documentaries, as Germans perceived in them a return to Nazi-era propaganda practices. In the immediate wake of defeat, Germans flocked to the cinema not for cultural and political tutelage but rather for a reprieve from the challenges of life amid the rubble. Thus, when French newsreels ignored German sporting and provided only footage of victorious French teams, audiences grew irritated. In Freiburg, in fact, local film officers observed audiences whistling and screaming during presentations of French newsreels.\textsuperscript{459} French documentaries were no more popular. Most contentious was the retrospective \textit{Ein Jahr später}, which debuted at a time when frustration over French housing requisitions and a lack of food and supplies were widespread. In fact, film officers in Freiburg shared the frustration of local audiences and later conceded the puerility of a film that contained footage of shoe production in the French zone at a time when most residents could not acquire shoes.\textsuperscript{460} American newsreels and documentaries fared no better in Stuttgart, where with a limited selection of B-grade American feature films John Scott struggled to create interest in the productions.\textsuperscript{461} Scott’s commanders in Frankfurt further restricted his efforts when they reminded all film officers to avoid coercion as a means to fill local cinema seats. The order came after overzealous film officers in Bavaria had made

\textsuperscript{458} Fehrenbach, \textit{Cinema in Democratizing}, 54.
\textsuperscript{459} StadtAF, C 5/2247, Announcement from Comm. Monteux circulated by mayor’s office, 18 Oct 1945.
\textsuperscript{460} AOC, Bade 39, Minutes of a meeting in Freiburg between French and Baden state officials, 3 Dec 1947.
\textsuperscript{461} Bausch, “Good bye,” 431.
attendance at a screening of Todesmühlen a prerequisite for the distribution of weekly ration cards.  

Reactions to German and Allied feature films were more varied. In general, old German films elicited little or no response. In Freiburg, however, a review of Baron Münchhausen confirmed the demand for escapist entertainment with the comment that “Wieder liess man sich gern von dieser Folge bunter Bilderbogen fesseln.” French films elicited more negative reactions, as the quality of most French wartime productions fell short of that which German viewers had valued in prewar French cinema. At the same time, the once forbidden fruit now appeared as the imposition of an unwelcome occupier. Nevertheless, a few films did earn praise from local audiences. To the delight of film officers, spectators welcomed Carné’s Les Visiteurs du soir. A local review echoed French sentiment about the piece and declared it a “Sieg der französischen Filmkunst.” Yet, the value of the film for local audiences lay less in its illustration of French cultural prestige than in its treatment of broader historical and social struggles to which they could relate. German viewers found in the film an allegorical representation of their own recent past and most appreciated the work for its applicability to their personal struggles. As the local review described it “Das Gewand ist historisch. Das Exempel aber für alle Zeiten gültig […] Die Personen des Films sind also Vertreter der Menschheit.”

Praise for American films was less forthcoming in Stuttgart, where audiences also struggled to dissociate American films from the occupation and tried in vain to identify in postwar film programs the quality that they had expected from Hollywood before the war. A

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462 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, “Memo: Compulsory Showing of Atrocity Film,” 18 Feb 1946.
464 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing, 61.
466 Stiefvater, 4.
local review of *I Married a Witch* confirmed as much and complained how “Nach jahrelanger Überfütterung mit sogenannten kulturpolitisch- und staatspolitisch-wertvollen Propaganda-Filmen hätten wir aber gern als ersten amerikanischen Film etwas anderes gesehen als die Hexe Veronica Lake.”

Norman Taurog’s *Young Tom Edison* (1940), met with similar reviews. Critics called the film entertaining but concluded that its fight scenes were unwelcome among viewers who sought to escape the violence of their recent past. As one reviewer wrote: “Über die etwas reichlich eingestreuten Prügeleien könnte man sagen: weniger wäre mehr.” In addition to the quality of American film selections, insufficient dubbing and subtitling left Germans unable to grasp the humor and meaning of specific lines. Just as Reinhold Maier had struggled to understand the jokes of local American commanders, German audiences discovered that “Der eigentümliche amerikanische Humor wird nicht verstanden. Die Untertitel können den gesprochenen Humor nicht wirkungsvoll übersetzen.” Under the circumstances, recycled German films began to outperform American films at the box office. Thus, *The Maltese Falcon* filled 20% of the available seats in Stuttgart, while the German *Die Operette* filled 60% of its potential capacity.

Although local film officers conceded the deficiencies of their initial offerings, they had few options in light of the conflict between Hollywood and the military government.

As the occupation entered its second year, the disconnect between Allied and German expectations for the postwar screen had become clear. While the Allies had hoped to use film as a tool for the denazification and reeducation of German society, Germans had turned to the

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468 „About the numerous beatings [in the film] one could say: less would be more,“ Anna Haag, “Unser Filmbericht: Der junge Edison,” *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 22 Sept. 1945 : 5.
471 On American recognition of the weakness in their early film program, see: NARA, RG 260, Box 310, “History of ICD to 1 July 1947,” Jul 1947.
cinema for entertainment and relief from the harsh realities of postwar life. French films earned more praise in Freiburg than American films earned in Stuttgart, yet neither Ally’s film programs inspired the level of interest that occupation planners had envisioned. In the years that followed, German expectations combined with inter-allied conflicts and Allied personnel constraints to alter the dynamics of negotiations between Allied and German visions for the postwar screen.

‘Alliierten raus’ – Allied Adjustments and German Demands, 1947-1949

For both Allies, 1946 marked the start of a series of personnel reductions and administrative reorganization campaigns that loosened their control of German screens. In the French zone, Rhein-Donau ceded control of film distribution in December 1946 to private Franco-German firms, which had emerged throughout the zone. In the spring of 1947 Colin-Reval resigned as director of the Section Cinéma to assume control of one of the firms. Raymond Cossevin, about whom archival records reveal little, succeeded him and oversaw the department at a time when its portfolio and personnel continued to dwindle. In 1948 a major restructuring of the French occupation administration downgraded the Section Cinéma to a Liaison Cinéma and restricted the department’s duties to personnel management, the execution of inter-Allied film transfers, and the selection of French films for presentation to the German public.

A similar phenomenon occurred, albeit with greater intensity, in the American zone, where personnel reductions even forced a loosening of stringent American denazification standards. By October 1945, 94,000 Germans were in American custody on charges of affiliating or sympathizing with the Nazi party. As troop redeployments reduced the size of

472 Thaisy, 86.
the occupation staff, the ambition of American denazification policy overwhelmed available resources. In January 1947 John Scott conceded that “because the US personnel of the branch was reduced […] it was necessary to revamp the operating procedure and responsibilities.” Under the circumstances American officials transferred responsibility for denazification to German courts and allowed the return of sequestered cinemas to their original owners. In Stuttgart, the local film branch justified their actions with the argument that “since it was no longer possible for this division to apply higher standards for theater managers and since their property […] could no longer be retained on the basis of ‘Military Government necessity’ it was obligatory to turn over the functions of selectivity and processing to the [German] Prüfungsausschuss.” Like the Americans, local cinema operators were also disappointed in the policy shift. Those who had undergone denazification proceedings during the early postwar months were angry that those still awaiting investigation would face less discriminating standards. However, American officials saw no alternative to the transfer of denazification duties to German officials. In May 1948 Scott himself transferred out of Germany. A civilian, Harry D. Brockman, succeeded him as head of the weakened Film Branch and oversaw the continued American withdrawal from postwar German cinema.

Personnel reductions were not the only challenge to the Allies’ film control. As the initial shock of defeat faded and material conditions improved, broader moral and philosophical questions replaced concerns over survival as the focus of German audiences and officials. With the formation of political parties, the scheduling of municipal and state elections, and the reopening of schools and businesses, matters of the recent German past and concerns about the

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474 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Quarterly History – Film Branch, 1 Jan 31 - Mar 1947.
476 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Quarterly History – Film Branch, 1 Jan – 31 Mar 1947.
future gained attention. To explore these issues Germans turned to the screen. No longer content with the escapist film programs of the initial postwar months, audiences revealed their own expectations for the postwar cinema and challenged the Allies’ assumption that their own cinematic programs and guidance were needed and desired. The shift in German expectations escaped neither French nor American officials. In Freiburg, a film officer concluded in May 1947 that “Le public allemand […] dont l’esprit critique s’est développé, ne goût plus que les œuvres parfaites et n’apprécie que les idées portant à de longues réflexions.”\textsuperscript{477} In Stuttgart, John Scott had reached a similar conclusion in the summer 1946. He conceded that “it soon became apparent that the Hollywood film was not held in high regard by most Germans…[as] certain types of film, liked in the United States, were not at all liked in Germany.”\textsuperscript{478}

Nevertheless, Allied recognition of changing German expectations did not mean the end of efforts to influence German film programs. Conflicts between Allied and German visions for the screen continued. Evidence of increased German challenges to Allied film controls appeared in two areas. The first concerned the selection and censorship of films. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart Allied selection criteria drew criticism from a variety of observers, the loudest of which were the cities’ church leaders. As the only German political, social, and cultural institution to survive the war intact, the churches enjoyed the respect of both German and Allied officials, and in film matters they often assumed the role of Germany’s moral guardians. Aware of the cinema’s extensive reach, church officials were not content to ignore what they viewed as objectionable Allied film policies. In Freiburg Catholic leaders expressed concern that German officials could not ban objectionable French films from local cinemas once occupation censors

\textsuperscript{477} AOC, H 1.104/2a, Rapport Mensuel – April 1947, May 1947.
had approved them for distribution in Germany.\footnote{479} The city’s archbishop also cautioned that the French failure to enforce age restrictions at local cinemas endangered German youth.\footnote{480} Pressure from church leaders resulted in a French decision in the summer of 1948 to allow German police to enforce admissions rules on behalf of French officers.\footnote{481} In Stuttgart American policies also faced opposition from church leaders. Most complaints concerned films that the church “did not consider suitable for children.”\footnote{482} More than anything, church officials worried that the violence in American films would have a negative influence on German youth. While American officials responded to such complaints with the creation of youth film programs, which included American documentaries and German cartoons, they greeted the German complaints with frustration. As John Scott concluded, “Few of the [German] objections were constructive.”\footnote{483}

Amid German criticism of Allied policies and continued personnel reduction, French and American film officers found themselves in a difficult situation. Their own weakness and the increasing strength of German officials and institutions, which Allied democratization policies facilitated, meant that the Allies could no longer dictate cinema programs. Although ignoring public opinion was no longer an option, neither power wanted to relinquish control of film activities to the Germans. For French officials control of German screens and film programs was essential to the promotion of French cinematic and cultural grandeur. Thus, the French refused to allow German participation in the selection of French films for distribution in Germany. Responsibility for this shifted between zonal officials and Paris throughout the occupation, but it

\footnote{479} StaatsAF, C 5/1, Nr. 2372, Memo by the Badische Staatskanzlei, 3 Apr 1948.  
\footnote{480} StaatsAF, F 110/9, Nr. 459, Letter from Erzbischöfliches Kapitelsvikariat to Badisches Innenministerium, 28 Feb 1948.  
\footnote{481} StaatsAF, F 110/9, Nr. 459, Letter from Badenese Ministry of Interior to Directors of state and municipal police in Freiburg, 15 Jul 1948.  
\footnote{482} NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Quarterly History – Film Branch, ICD-OMGWB, by John Scott, 13 Feb 1947.  
\footnote{483} NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Quarterly History – Film Branch, ICD-OMGWB, by John Scott, 13 Feb 1947.
never involved direct German input.\textsuperscript{484} However, the French did allow German involvement in the selection of German films, which in early 1948 fell to a central censorship commission in Baden-Baden. The commission comprised a representative of the French occupation administration and a member of each of the main German political parties.\textsuperscript{485} In response to pressure from state officials throughout the zone, French officials granted each German state administration a representative on the commission in August 1948.\textsuperscript{486}

More weary of the state than the French, American officials adopted an alternative method to increase German involvement in film selection: industry self-censorship. Eager to prevent a return to Nazi-era abuses of the screen by state officials, American authorities turned to their own tradition of industry censorship and established the German Film Producer’s Association in early 1947. The association granted political, religious, and education leaders the right to participate in deliberations but limited them to an advisory role. While German producers welcomed the Association, local and state governments sought more control of it.\textsuperscript{487}

At the same time, Hollywood objected to the selection of American films by German censors. Film officers sympathized little with American filmmakers, yet did respond to the demands of German officials. In cooperation with German and British authorities in the joint British-American Bizone, which formed in January 1947, the Americans agreed to a compromise over the role of government officials in censorship matters. They established the \textit{Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft} (FSK) in May 1948. With 8 seats reserved for German film industry leaders and 7 seats reserved for state ministers of culture and church officials, FSK afforded politicians a voice but ensured that German filmmakers would have the final say in film

\textsuperscript{484} Thaisy, 143.
\textsuperscript{485} StaatsAF, C 5/1, Nr. 2372, Letter from Gov. Pène to Lantagspräsident Baden, 9 Mar 48.
\textsuperscript{486} StaatsAF, C 5/1, Nr. 2372, Memo by Badische Staatskanzlei, 23 Aug 48.
\textsuperscript{487} Fehrenbach, \textit{Cinema in Democratizing}, 76.
selection. With the addition of the French zone to the Bizone in the April 1949, the FSK gained control of film selection in the three Western zones.

A second challenge to the Allies’ film policies came with the renewal of German film production. In both the French and American zones production resumed in 1947. In the French zone, 14 production firms began work between February 1947 and November 1948. Four were located in Freiburg and included the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Film (AGF), which produced Boleslaw Barlog’s Wohin die Züge fahren (1949). The American zone, which included the important film centers of Munich and Frankfurt, had more studios. The first film produced in the American zone, Josef von Báky’s Und über uns der Himmel (1947), debuted in December 1947.

The content of early postwar German films confirmed the shift of audience preferences from escapism to more serious issues. Many of the so-called “rubble films,” as the initial postwar German productions were known, treated Germany’s recent past, its defeat, and its future. The first German production, Wolfgang Staudte’s Die Mörder sind unter uns (1946), which was filmed in the Soviet zone, depicted the struggles of a German soldier to come to terms with his involvement in the execution of civilians during the war. Josef von Báky’s Und über uns der Himmel also treated the recent German past and with humor tackled the chaos that had followed Germany’s total defeat. Through a series of flashbacks, the film illustrated the protagonist’s longing for the familial stability of his prewar days and his struggles to confront the

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488 Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing*, 84.
489 Thaisy, 96.
490 Thaisy, 100.
491 Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing*, 63.
devastation and loneliness of the postwar period. A different aspect of Germany’s postwar struggles provided the theme for Helmut Käutner’s Der Apfel ist ab (1948), which treated questions of guilt and individual responsibility for the Reich’s crimes through a parody of the Biblical tale of Adam and Eve. Taken together, German rubble films were evidence of a particular German expectation for the postwar screen. They confirmed a desire to use films as a forum in which to explore the challenges that confronted postwar German society. In doing so, they introduced a purpose for postwar cinemas which Allied officials struggled to fulfill with their unpopular documentaries and feature films. An American officials summarized the situation well, when he noted that Germans “want backgrounds and themes as well as […] actors, which are familiar to them and somehow indigenous, rather than foreign backgrounds with which they have no associations.” In short, rubble films confirmed a German desire to fill postwar screens with German, rather than Allied works.

Evidence of the growing disconnect between Allied and German film expectations appeared in both Freiburg and Stuttgart. As the occupation continued, audience preferences confirmed the rejection of French films as sources of more serious reflection. During the later years of the occupation, Jean Dréville’s musical comedy La Cage aux Rossignols was among the most popular French films. The film enjoyed particular praise among the city’s youth. In the meantime, few French films earned praise for their relevance to postwar German experiences or struggles. Prior to the premier of Die Mörder sind unter uns in June 1947 a French official

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493 Shandley, 160ff.
494 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing, 84-88.
495 Cited in: Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing, 62.
496 On reactions to the film, see: AOC, H 1.104/2a, Rapport Mensuel – April 1947, May 1947; Köhler, 76.
acknowledged the situation and conceded the Allies’ challenge of “reeducating” a population disinterested in propaganda after twelve years of Nazi rule.\textsuperscript{497}

In Stuttgart differences between local reactions to the American documentary, \textit{Nüremberg}, and Staudte’s film revealed a similar disconnect between German and American expectations for the screen. The documentary, which detailed the trial of Nazi war criminals and included extensive footage of the proceedings, met with a lukewarm response from the cities’ audiences. American officials reported that residents watched the film with interest, yet appeared unmoved by its exploration of German guilt. As a local film official described it, “In very few cases […] was the acceptance of the picture’s genuineness coupled with approval.”\textsuperscript{498} The official was correct, for despite the film’s claim to depart from the early collective guilt thesis of early occupation policies, it still drew criticism from viewers who perceived in it a sweeping American condemnation of the German nation.\textsuperscript{499} In vain, film officers suggested that brief introductory lectures before each showing could improve the film’s success.\textsuperscript{500} Yet, local opposition to the American documentary was not evidence of a more general rejection of cinematic treatments of the recent past. Although critics described as too direct Harald Braun’s \textit{Zwischen Gestern und Morgen}, which followed a variety of characters in their struggles to come to terms with the war and defeat, the film made a welcome German contribution to the local screen and drew praise from local critics.\textsuperscript{501}

As the occupation neared its end, Allied officials in both cities confronted the reality that audiences preferred to tackle questions about their society’s past and future in German rather

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{AOC, H 1.104/2a, Rapport Mensuel – April 1947, May 1947.}
\footnote{NARA, RG 260, Box 310, “Memo: Reactions to the ‘Nürnberg’ Film,” 26 Nov 1946.}
\footnote{Bausch, \textit{Die Kulturpolitik}, 111.}
\footnote{NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Letter from William Sailer to ICD, 23 Jun 1948.}
\footnote{Vietzen, 541; Shandley, 64ff.}
\end{footnotes}
than Allied films. However, Allied responses to this reality differed. French film officers elected to find alternative avenues for the promotion of their domestic repertoire and took an active role in the development of German film clubs. In Freiburg French officials had begun to consider the establishment of such clubs as early as January 1947.\textsuperscript{502} They drew inspiration from the French tradition of \textit{ciné-clubs}, which had emerged in Paris after the First World War and facilitated discussions among filmmakers, intellectuals, and film critics about the aesthetics of avant-garde productions.\textsuperscript{503} While French film officers appreciated the value of such clubs as a forum for postwar Franco-German cultural exchange, they acknowledged their role as tool of cultural diplomacy. In a memo to local French administrators in January 1947, General Laffon reflected on how the clubs could “orienter un certain public déjà animé de préoccupations culturelles (composé non-seulement d’étudiants et d’intellectuels, mais d’éléments éclairés des milieux populaires) […] vers la compréhension des meilleurs films du cinéma mondial.”\textsuperscript{504}

When officials like Laffon spoke of exposure to “cinema mondial” they meant above all, exposure to French films.\textsuperscript{505} The circulation of a French list of films for future German clubs confirmed as much. Of the 74 titles on the list, 5 were British, 18 were American, 4 were Russian, and 41 were French.\textsuperscript{506}

In Freiburg French interests and local demand combined to produce the city’s first “Film-Club” in the spring 1949. The club appeared with the support of the military government and

\textsuperscript{502} AOC, Bade 4.141, “Note de Service,” 14 Jan 1946.
\textsuperscript{503} Fehrenbach, \textit{Cinema in Democratizing}, 172.
\textsuperscript{504} AOC, Bade 4.141, Memo from General Laffon to Délégués Superieurs, 2 Jan 1947.
\textsuperscript{505} Thaisy, 45.
undertook to study a variety of Allied and German films.\footnote{StadtAF, C 5/2251, “Memo to Bürgermeister from Film-Club Freiburg,” 28 Apr 1949.} The club’s formation occurred at a time when the restoration of German governance and the decline of Allied power made it easier to view non-German and Allied films as works of art rather than as the mark of enemies or occupiers. The easing of Allied-German tensions had also fostered increased interest in Franco-German cultural exchange, which culminated several months later in the establishment of the local cercle franco-allemand. In any case, the city’s film club spoke not only to residents’ interest in improved Franco-German relations but also to their interest in the aesthetics of film. In an invitation to new members, the club’s president, one Klaus Hosemann, described the club’s mission: “Unseren Mitgliedern wollen wir interessante Filme vorführen, die Anregung zu Diskussion und Kritik geben; denn vom Publikum soll die Forderung nach einem guten Film ausgehen.”\footnote{StadtAF, C 5/2251, “Einladung,” spring 1949.} A local review of the club was more candid. It stated that, “Jeder, der vom Film mehr als für zwei Stunden unterhaltende Ablenkung erwartet, wird im Film-Club Anregung empfangen oder auch geben können.”\footnote{Br., “Ein Film-Club in Freiburg,” Badische Zeitung 14 May 1949 : 4.} The first film that club screened was La Cage aux rossignols, which had already entertained local audiences earlier in the occupation.\footnote{Br., “Ein Film-Club in Freiburg,” Badische Zeitung 14 May 1949 : 4.} It was not clear if the selection of a French film owed to French insistence or German choice.

French initiatives during the latter stage of the occupation provided Freiburg’s film enthusiasts with another opportunity to explore cinema beyond the movie house. In January 1949, the French film officer Albert Tanguy established an annual Filmtreffen, which gathered together members of German film clubs as well as French and German film critics, directors, and
The first gathering took place near Freiburg at the Titisee in the Black Forest. The event was a success with local film enthusiasts. As one German participant recalled “We sat on hard benches in front of an improvised screen and watched the works of the French avant-garde, the great films of Carné, Renoir, and Feyder, representatives of the English documentary school, American realism, and Italian neorealism…Direct contact with the works of art and the artists occupied the limelight, and subsequently discussions were passionate and spontaneous.”

In Stuttgart film enthusiasts enjoyed a smaller forum for exchange and little support from American officials. A local film club began meeting in December 1948 and shared the objectives of its Freiburg counterpart. According to its statute, the club sought “die Einführung seiner Mitglieder in die künstlerischen, technischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme des Filmwesens durch Vorträge, Filmvorführungen und Besichtigungen von Produktionsstätten, sowie Diskussionen und Arbeitsgemeinschaften.” The club, which continued to grow after the occupation ended, sent members to the Filmtreffen near Freiburg in 1949. Yet, the clubs received little input from local American film officers, whose belated response to the club was unenthusiastic. As an afterthought, American officials outlined their approach to the club with the statement that “An increased interest in film was noticeable with the formation of film clubs in Heidelberg and Stuttgart […] The film branch therefore asked for approval [from OMGWB] to register 16mm exhibitors in order to partly control this trade.”

In light of broader American occupation objectives, the response of the local film officers was understandable. American officials had invested most in the presentation of “direct facts” about American political and cultural traditions through newsreels and documentaries. To the

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511 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing, 173.
extent that American documentaries and feature films facilitated this effort, their presentation was welcome. However, American film officers had little interest in exploring film aesthetics with their Germans. This, they believed, was a task for filmmakers and audiences and required no government involvement. In their eyes, film presentations provided a means to reeducation. At the same time, film officers had no domestic tradition of film clubs from which they could draw inspiration. Thus it was not surprising when in response to their dwindling influence on local screens they did not encourage the establishment of film clubs.

**Conclusion**

In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, negotiations between Allied and German expectations for the postwar screen informed the restoration of local film activities. As the occupation began, the cities’ residents turned to their local cinemas in search of entertainment and a reprieve from the realities of defeat. Their interests contrasted with those of their occupiers, who looked to use the screen as a tool for the denazification and reeducation of German society. Allied control of film matters was strongest during the initial months of the occupation, yet both powers struggled to realize their objectives. Allied newsreels and documentaries struck audiences in both cities as unwelcome propaganda. While French feature films drew mild enthusiasm in Freiburg, American feature films fared worse in Stuttgart, after conflicts between the American administration and Hollywood had deprived the military government of access to America’s most popular films. As the occupation continued, Germans began to tackle political and cultural questions that had underlain the initial Allied reeducation mission. Still, they preferred to explore such questions through domestic rather than foreign films. Aware of their declining position on the German screen, French officials turned to the creation of film clubs to secure France’s continued cinematic influence in Germany. Less concerned with such matters, the

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515 Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing*, 175.
Americans gave less attention to film clubs. In both cities, then, negotiations over the content and purpose of postwar screens called into question the occupiers’ wartime assumption that postwar Germans would need and solicit Allied tutelage. Similar questions emerged as the Allies turned to other German venues in pursuit of their cultural mission.
Chapter 4: On Stage – German and Allied Visions for the Theater

The German dramatist Friedrich Schiller described the theater as the “moral academy” of a nation. In May 1945 Germany’s moral academy lay devastated and disgraced. Twelve years of Nazi rule had deprived the German stage of its pre-1933 creative license and transformed theaters into an unpopular mouthpiece of the state. Silenced by the regime after 1944, the German stage had then literally collapsed under the Allied bombs. The fiery deluge loosed upon Germany by Allied planes damaged or destroyed over half of the nation’s state and municipal theaters. During the final months of the war, stage props, wardrobes, and scripts disappeared in flames, while the nation’s unemployed acting ensembles disbanded or perished.

In spite of the devastation, Allied and German theater personnel looked to the postwar stage with hope. Allied officials saw in theaters a powerful tool for the denazification and reeducation of German society. Eager to reach postwar audiences, French and American authorities adopted different strategies for the rapid restoration of theaters in their zones. At the same time, however, the German theater community emerged from the war with a sense of purpose and vigor not seen since the 1920s. Like postwar politicians, who called for the restoration of non-Nazi, German political traditions, audiences and theater personnel viewed the collapse of the Reich as an opportunity to reconnect with the nation’s rich pre-Nazi theatrical past. Across the country, directors and performers looked to restore Germany’s reputation as the land of Goethe and Schiller. As the occupation endured, then, continued negotiations between German and Allied expectations informed the character of local theater activities.

This chapter examines theater activities in Freiburg and Stuttgart and focuses on the productions and programs of the cities’ state and municipal stages. It begins with an outline of French and American theater policies and introduces the institutions charged with their
implementation. The chapter then examines German visions for the postwar stage and considers their influence on local programs. A final section examines how changes in audience preferences and increased demand for new German plays influenced the Allies’ stage presence during the latter years of the occupation.

The chapter reveals that both French and American theater policies targeted local elites. In Freiburg, French officials were more equipped to do so, because they shared similar theatrical preferences with their Germans. Eager to profit from the familiarity of German elites with French drama, and to promote French cultural prestige, the French allocated more resources for theater activities in their zone. In Stuttgart, the American aversion to cultural diplomacy combined with a recognition of differences between German and American theatrical expectations to produce a less assertive theater policy. Nevertheless, both Allies promoted their respective theatrical canons as illustrations of their superior political and cultural traditions. To be sure, the French stage presence in Freiburg was larger and more welcome than the American counterpart in Stuttgart. Yet, audiences and critics in neither city embraced the occupier’s repertoires to the extent desired by Allied planners. German classics provided the core of local programs throughout the occupation. Allied plays thus served not to revolutionize German theatrical preferences or to facilitate the adoption of foreign political and cultural models, but rather to assist Germans in their reflections on the recent past and to rekindle exchanges about the purpose and aesthetics of the stage, which Nazi censorship had suspended. As the occupation continued, however, the reception of new German works, such as Carl Zuckmayer’s *Des Teufels General*, which treated questions of responsibility for Nazism’s rise, suggested that audiences preferred to explore matters of the recent past and the postwar future through native productions. Elated with the end of Nazi theater policies, the postwar German theater
community looked to restore and develop the nation’s moral academy along German rather than Allied lines. As the cases of Freiburg and Stuttgart thus suggest, the Allies exerted their greatest influence on postwar German theater not through scripts or Fragebogen but bombs. In other words, the destruction of the Reich did more to revive the German stage than any Allied theater initiative.

**High Policy – General Allied Approaches to the Stage**

In their approach to the postwar stage, French and American theater policies shared three general objectives. First, Allied initiatives targeted the German elite. American policy planners correctly assessed the German theater as an upper-class cinema. Theater had long been the preferred entertainment venue of Germany’s ruling political, economic, and social circles. Unlike American film policy, which targeted, “farmers, youth, housewives, shopkeepers and workers,” American theater policy aimed at government officials, business executives, and intellectuals. French officials had a similar understanding of German audiences. One official asserted that theater policy should “toucher les générations déjà établies dans la vie et qui tiennent en mains les leviers de commande.” Indeed no other aspect of the Allies’ cultural policy placed more emphasis on a single social class than did theater policy.

Yet, if both Allies recognized the stage as an “elite” venue, they differed in their familiarity with the cities’ cultural elites. In Stuttgart, American theater officers displayed little knowledge of the city’s theater community or its expectations for the stage. In Freiburg, however, French officials applauded the city’s academic reputation and noted the sophistication of local theater audiences. About the latter one French official observed that “Dans cette ville intellectuelle, qui possédait jusqu’en 1942 un théâtre magnifique […] le plus modeste artisan a

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In the meantime, French officials also recognized in the city’s theater community a familiarity with French culture and hinted that a majority of the city’s theater-goers spoke or understood French. A local theater officer suggested that because audiences best recognized the French titles of French plays, advertisements for productions should appear in both French and German. Theater officers also acknowledged Freiburg’s historic role as a “centre culturel français et badois” and perceived among local elites an interest in maintaining the city’s cultural prestige. Lord Mayor Hoffmann affirmed their perceptions, when he later boasted that “Es gehört zu den unvergessenen und weithin bekannt gewordenen Kulturleistungen Freiburgs, dass die Stadt [...], obwohl sie arm war [...] als eine der ersten deutschen Städte ihr Theater wieder spielfähig gemacht hat.”

While differences between the Allies’ familiarity with local elites reflected the occupiers’ varied prewar ties to their cities, they also betrayed differences between French and American understandings of “culture.” Aware of the shared emphasis on high culture that connected French civilisation and German Kultur, French officials identified Freiburg’s educated elite as a group of Germans who, they hoped, shared their own basic theatrical and cultural expectations. To emphasize the notion of “shared” theatrical traditions, the French acknowledged the value of Germany’s historical contributions to the canon of Western European drama and noted the influence of German dramatists across the Rhine. In fact, such recognition later inspired a traveling French exhibit entitled “Goethe et la France.” A French report on the exhibit noted how “Werther est traduit et admiré dès 1776. L’œuvre maîtresse de Goethe – Faust – n’a cessé

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The Americans, however, brought to Germany a broader view of “culture” that differed from Kultur and lacked a connection to shared icons, like Goethe. American officials understood their own native theatrical repertoire as contemporary and popular, and distinguished it from the more historical, and elitist canon of Shakespeare, Schiller, and Molière. Theater officers therefore felt no particular connection to German cultural elites and made no special effort to become acquainted with them.

A second objective that informed Allied theater policies was denazification. The American purge of the German stage was no less ambitious than that of the screen. A “complete and thorough” review of German personnel was the top priority of all theater officers. Although French officials also called for denazification proceedings, they were less zealous. They undertook to remove only the most devout Nazis from the stage and favored expediency over thoroughness. Concerned most with the presentation of French drama to German audiences, French theater officers required support from German personnel. Thus, to ensure the availability of German actors and stagehands, occupation officials discouraged lengthy investigations.

A third objective of the Allies’ theater policies was reeducation. With their own theatrical repertoires, the Allies hoped to expose Germany’s ruling elite to the values and customs of western democratic countries. In the French zone traces of the mission civilisatrice emerged. One official described the stage as an essential tool with which to “reanimer la vie allemande.”

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522 “Goethe et la France,” Realités allemandes Nov-Dec (1949) 79.
523 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, Organizational History of ICD, 1 Jul 1946.
that France was “la patrie de la culture, une terre d’humanisme et le lieu d’éclosion de la philosophie des Lumières.” As the embodiment of western civilization, the French theatrical repertoire was best suited to reacquaint Germany’s postwar elites with the values of a peaceful, democratic society. In spite of their acknowledgement of differences between American and European theatrical traditions, the Americans also recognized the stage as an important and influential venue. They viewed American plays as the work of the world’s model democracy and, in Stuttgart, described the “propagation of American ideas and culture” on stage as critical to the success of German reeducation. Nevertheless, the Americans lacked the zeal of their French counterparts, and in the months that followed, the importation of American scripts paled in comparison to the deployment of French theatrical troupes, which overwhelmed the French zone.

Within the French and American occupation administrations specific departments were responsible for the execution of theater policy. The Service des Spectacles et de la Musique (SSM) administered theater policy for the entire French zone. At the head of the SSM was a civilian named René Thimonnier, about whom occupation records revealed little. Below him was a staff of theater officers in each of the zone’s counties. In Freiburg, the head of the local French administration, Lieutenant-Colonel Marcellin, and his successor, Colonel Monteux, also aided the recovery of the municipal stage.

The larger American zone required a more complex administration. Darmstadt, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Munich, Mannheim, and Stuttgart were all major theater cities. Hundreds of smaller cities in the zone had local stages. By contrast, the only theater city of national repute

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525 Defrance, La politique culturelle, 126.
in the French zone was Baden-Baden. In spite of its rich theatrical tradition, Freiburg’s stage had remained a local treasure. Not unlike film policy, American officials administered theater policy on a Land-wide basis. Independent theater offices oversaw affairs in each of the zone’s three Länder. In Stuttgart control of early theater initiatives shifted among several officials. The first theater officer to work in the city was a civilian employee of the Information Control Division (ICD), Frank Rosenthal. Another ICD official, William Sailer, also administered operations during the first months of the occupation. Sailer was a German émigré and a Stuttgart native with close ties to local performers. However, neither Sailer nor Rosenthal maintained their authority over Stuttgart’s stages. On January 1, 1946 the ICD shifted control of theater activities in Württemberg-Baden from Wiesbaden to Stuttgart and made Newell Jenkins head of the Land’s Theater and Music Control Branch. Among American cultural policy officers, Jenkins possessed a rare familiarity with German culture and, thus, the differences between it and its American counterpart. He was a civilian who had studied music in the 1930s in Freiburg with Carl Orff. He oversaw the most ambitious phase of American theater policy until his departure in 1947.

Throughout the occupation Allied theater officers worked with the directors of the cities’ municipal and state theaters. In both cities, control of the local stages fell to Germans who had experienced the Nazi period as an unwelcome interruption in their careers. In Freiburg the municipal theater came under the control of Martin Hellberg, who had been an actor with the state theater in Dresden and a director in the Dresden Kollektiv für sozialistisches Zeittheater

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528 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, History of ICD through July 1947, 1 Jul 1947.
530 Bausch, 436.
before Nazi officials dismissed him in 1933. In Stuttgart Albert Kehm became *Intendant* of the city’s main stage, the Württemberg state theater. With the approval of the French-appointed state minister of culture, Carlo Schmid, and French officials, he regained the position that he had lost twelve years earlier to Nazi party officials Otto Krauss and Gustav Dehardé. In any case, his nomination proved controversial among municipal and, later, American officials who had their own visions for the theater’s leadership. In vain, lord mayor Klett campaigned to replace Kehm with Heinz Hilpert, while Newell Jenkins pushed for his old friend, Carl Orff, to assume control of the city’s main stage. In the end Kehm retained his post until the spring of 1946, when the new Minister of Culture for Württemberg-Baden, Theodor Heuss, named Bertil Wetzelsberger to replace him. Wetzelsberger’s notoriety as a former director of the Munich opera appealed to Klett and other German officials who were committed to the development of Stuttgart’s postwar theatrical reputation. Unwilling to impose a particular candidate on the Germans, American officials accepted the nomination. In the meantime, Kehm’s attaché from the state ministry of culture, Fritz Kauffmann, continued to play an important role in the selection of personnel and scripts. Kauffmann was all the more influential because he acted on behalf of Heuss, whose background in print media left him unprepared to handle theater issues.

The Germans and Allies Enter the Stage, 1945-1946

For the Germans and the Allies alike the 1945-1946 theater season was unique. Allied personnel levels were at their highest point, and ambitions were high. Fresh from training schools, theater officers were anxious to leave a mark on the German stage. Within the German*

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531 Schadek, “Kulturelles Leben in Freiburg,” 662.
533 Mack, 483.
534 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, OMGWB, Memo to Brigadier General Robert Mac Clure, 28 Nov 1946.
theater community expectations also were high, as audiences and personnel awaited the first theatrical productions since September 1944.

In both zones the revival of local theater life began with denazification. In Freiburg, French theater officials required performers, directors, and playwrights to complete personal and professional background surveys for review by occupation officials. Theater personnel answered questions about their affiliations with the Nazi party, employment history, military service, and political beliefs. A list of their recent performances was also required. Yet, as French officials determined the future employment status of actors and directors, their interpretation of the questionnaires proved lenient. In Freiburg officials recognized the consequences of Nazi personnel purges and in response to performance applications from pre-1933 German actors sympathized that “Plusieurs d’entre eux ont vu leur activité arrêtée par les Nazis dès 1933, et ont menée depuis cette date une vie assez tourmentée.” American officials were more stringent. With vague calls for the retention of “politically-clean” or “politically-reliable” Germans, American denazification orders afforded local theater officers great autonomy in determining the intensity of denazification efforts. While the American high command suggested that membership in the Reich Theater Chamber, which Nazi law required of all actors and directors, was not itself grounds for exclusion, officials in Stuttgart disagreed. Jenkins believed that while “licensees [were] responsible for the people performing under their license…all performers must be examined personally by this division.” Under Jenkins none

538 Lange, 150.
539 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, Memo von Newell Jenkins an Chief ICD, 9 Jul 1946.
of Stuttgart’s actors, directors, or stage hands returned to work without a thorough review of their completed *Fragebogen*.

Within months the American staff, like American film officers, was overwhelmed by its own zeal. During the first year of the occupation theater officials across the American zone received over 10,000 cases for review. In search of a quick solution, they issued temporary “special permits,” which allowed theater operators and performers to return to work before the completion of background investigations. As the permits provided only limited relief, officials conceded that, “theater and music activities had taken on such proportions that the…officers in the outposts were unable to deal with them.” Theater officers then enlisted the help of the German theater community and the established German examination boards. These boards assumed responsibility for the processing of *Fragebogen* and made recommendations to American officials for the approval or rejection of specific applications. The first board convened in Stuttgart in January 1946 and made theater the first (semi-) autonomous cultural arena in postwar Germany. Together, the special permits and German examination boards also allowed American officials to delay a loosening of denazification standards.

In both cities the impact of denazification proceedings was minimal. Investigations revealed ardent Nazis among neither of the cities’ remaining theater personnel. In Freiburg, the most prominent dismissals were of the city’s lead director and scene editor, whose positions as

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540 Lange, 213.
541 Lange, 181.
542 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, Memo von Newell Jenkins an Chief ICD, 9 Jul 1946.
high municipal officials during the Nazi era disqualified them from postwar work. In the meantime, the more lenient French denazification strategy allowed five German soldiers, who had served until the end of the war, to obtain performance permits. In Stuttgart theater officers were more reluctant to approve such permits for the career Wehrmacht, yet the outcome of purge proceedings was likewise meager.

The results of denazification efforts challenged Allied, and especially American, assumptions about the extent of Nazism’s reach. They suggested that the denazification of the stage was unneeded, because the nazification of German theater had been incomplete. In both cities, the effect of Gleichschaltung had been more to silence than convert the local theater communities. While local cultural elites had supported the Nazis’ in their quest to rid the stage of unpopular political and modern Weimar-era productions, Nazi theater policies had disappointed them. Instead of the restoration of classic German theater, they had replaced one unpopular repertoire with another, more political and propagandistic one.

In the wake of the Reich’s collapse, then, officials like Kehm and Hellberg celebrated the Reich’s collapse and, in their push to resume their pre-1933 careers, needed little incentive to remove Nazi influences from the stage. In Stuttgart the German defeat had spelled the end of Gustav Dehardé’s career, and the return of ardent Nazis like him to the state theater was inconceivable in the eyes of local officials. In fact, in a speech about the city’s postwar theater activities, Minister of Culture Heuss invoked Schiller’s “moral academy” and called for a renewal of the German stage. Lord mayor Klett made a similar plea. His call for the theater to provide, “Aufmunterung der Bevölkerung,” left no room for a return to the Nazi repertoire.

Postwar theater was to be a source of hope and encouragement for a city buried in rubble. Officials in Freiburg agreed.

Nevertheless, Allied reviews of theater personnel continued. In the meantime, theater officers turned their attention to the purge of local repertoires. In the French zone officials composed “black” and “white” lists of German scripts. The white list comprised scripts approved by the occupation and included most works banned under Nazi law. More difficult was identification of plays for the black list. Obvious choices were ideological works such as Dietrich Eckart’s version of Peer Gynt and Eberhard Möller’s anti-Weimar Kalifornische Tragödie. Beyond plays that drew obvious connections to national socialism, Nazi drama was harder to define. The works of Goethe, Schiller, and Shakespeare had appeared on Nazi stages, and French and American officials allowed such classics to return. In any case, local theater officers in both zones reviewed all theater programs prior to production and canceled objectionable performances. In Stuttgart pre-production censorship was rare. In Freiburg French officials reported no instances of censorship.

To the list of approved German plays the Allies added their own repertoires. Occupation officials provided translated scripts of French and American plays to local directors. More ambitious, the French forced their repertoire onto the German stage. They exported 98 scripts to Germany and sponsored dozens of traveling French theater troupes. The latter marked a continuation of French theater policies from the post-1918 occupation of the Rhineland. After

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546 Schadek, 662.
547 Defrance, La politique culturelle, 126.
549 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, OMGWB, Memo von Col Hills to Major Schinske, Commanding Officer ICD 6871st Dist, 9 Dec 1945.
1945, however, the traveling stages targeted both the Germans and the Allies. In the words of one French theater officer, French productions aimed to convince both groups that “la France, malgré les dégâts considérables qu’elle [avait] subis, malgré les pertes en hommes, [avait] su trouver en elle assez de ressources pour se refaire et reprendre sa place dans le concert des grandes nations.” Less concerned with matters of prestige, the Americans were less ambitious in their distribution of American drama. Officials circulated 60 translations of American plays, 45 of which German directors selected for production. The distribution of American scripts also began later, because of the Military Government’s refusal to allow the transfer of profits from productions in Germany to the United States. Like the American film industry, then, the American theater community was reluctant to export its work.

In spite of the Allies’ convictions that their repertoires would comprise an essential component of postwar German programs, a curious tone of humility tempered their expectations for the reception of their theatrical imports. Most surprising were the reactions of French officers, who in spite of their recognition of shared Franco-German cultural expectations, agonized over the quality of French performances in Germany. They knew that German theatrical traditions were well established and German audiences demanding. They even worried about comparisons between Nazi and French productions. One officer demanded that all French guest performances “soutenir avantageusement toute comparaison qu’un spectateur allemand de bonne foi ne manquera pas d’établir avec des manifestations similaires auxquelles il aura assisté sous le régime nazi.” For a country so confident in its identity as the “lieu d’éclosion de la philosophie des Lumières,” concern over comparisons between French and Nazi theatrical

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551 Cited in: Defrance, La politique culturelle, 126.
552 Glaser, Deutsche Kultur, 117.
aesthetics was striking. Even more curious was the suggestion that German productions in occupied Paris had provided a measuring stick against which to judge the quality of French productions in postwar Germany. In Freiburg an official urged all theater officers to remember the “luxe et...perfection avec lesquels les allemands avaient monté, à l’Opéra de Paris, les représentations de propagande de l’Operette ‘La Chauve-Souris.’” He argued that even the most fervent French anti-Nazis had conceded the perfection of the German sets, orchestra, and actors. However striking, such sensitivity to German expectations was understandable in light of French intentions to use local stages for the promotion of French cultural prestige.

Less curious was the anxiety of American officials, who were confident of their country’s dominance on screen, but unsure of the appeal of American drama to sophisticated German spectators. In Stuttgart theater officers spoke of the need to prove America’s theatrical worth to the Germans, if the stage were to contribute to reeducation efforts. One official thus described a 1946 American theater festival as an opportunity, “to show the Germans that the Americans had really something to offer.” Another official acknowledged the differences between American and German audiences when he noted that the success of a play in America did not guarantee a positive reception in Europe.

In any case, Allied concerns mattered little to Germans as preparations for the inaugural postwar season began. More than the quality or aesthetics of Allied plays, the Allies’ physical presence most weighed on the minds of German theater managers. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart German officials competed with their occupiers for control of local stages. In Freiburg, where the municipal theater lay in ruins, staff clamored to find alternative venues. The best

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555 Lange, 290.
557 OMGUS, Amerikanische Theaterstücke (Berlin: OMGUS, Amerikanische Nachrichtenkontrolle, 1948) 3.
available stage was that of the Casino auditorium, which also hosted French and German film
events. French officials reserved the Casino stage for visiting French theatrical groups, so
German officials had to coordinate the local program with the schedule of French performances,
which claimed the Casino during the evening. 558 French officials thus relegated German
performances to the less lucrative morning and early afternoon hours.

In Stuttgart, a similar battle for control of local facilities developed. The Americans
requisitioned the Württemberg state theater, which was one of the few large buildings to survive
the Allied bombs. Here American officials put offices, a shoe-shine parlor, vending stands, and
a radio broadcast center, as well as an officers’ club. 559 Theater officers objected to this use of
the theater and, like many civilian occupation officials, battled in vain to win support for their
agenda from their military counterparts. One official confessed that the presence of troops inside
the theater did little to encourage the image of America as a cultured nation. 560 The situation
worsened when the American vending stands inside the building became a supply source for the
black market. In a report to the American military government in November 1945 city officials
expressed concern that the park in front of the theater had become an illegal marketplace, in
which American soldiers were the main merchants. 561 Their objections brought no relief, so
state theater officials employed alternative venues during the 1945-1946 season.

Amid on-going battles for the use of local stages, German theater managers shifted their
attention to the 1945-1946 theater season. The managers correctly assessed that, unlike early
cinema audiences, which most sought escapist entertainment from initial postwar film
screenings, the theater community would look to the stage for immediate guidance, as they

558 AOC, H 1.106/2, Report – Education Publique-Beaux-Arts, 11.15.45; C 5/1875, Letter from Lt-Col. Monteux to
Oberbürgermeister Hoffmann, 9 Aug 1946.
559 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from Major Steiner to Colonel Dawson, 1 Mar 1946.
560 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from Major Steiner to Colonel Dawson, 1 Mar 1946.
561 StadtAS, HA (0) 14, Nr. 2, Activity Report from the Municipal Government to the Military Government, 5-10
Nov 1945.
grappled with the recent experiences of dictatorship, war, and defeat. The distinction was understandable, as theater audiences most comprised those political and cultural elites involved in the daily administration and negotiation of denazification, democratization, and reconstruction policies. Confident in their assessment of audience demands, managers favored four general themes in their selections. First, existential works, which treated questions of purpose and direction in the lives of their protagonists, were popular among spectators who confronted similar questions in their lives amid the rubble. Examples of “existential” works included Goethe’s *Iphigenia in Tauris* (1779), Jean-Paul Sartre’s *Les Mouches* (1943), and Thornton Wilder’s *Our Town* (1937). Second, indirect treatments of the nation’s past helped audiences to explore questions about Nazism’s rise and appeal. Although audiences were unafraid to confront recent history, candid analyses of the Nazi period were discouraged during the initial postwar period. Among the plays that drew indirect attention to the past were Lessing’s *Nathan der Weise* (1779) and Schiller’s *Maria Stuart*. Both encouraged the exploration of questions of about the Nazi period through stories with more distant geographic and historical settings. A third common theme was religion, which appeared to offer the best path toward the regeneration of German theater and culture. Plays that animated the Scriptures or dramatized religious events appealed to spectators whose experience during the war had inspired them to reevaluate their faith. Like the overcrowded postwar churches, theaters offered spiritual and emotional guidance. Examples of plays that Germans believed offered such guidance included Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s *Jedermann* (1911), Paul Claudel’s *L’annonce faite à Marie* (1911), and

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562 The first 3 of the 4 themes are outlined by Hermann Glaser in *The Rubble Years*. The fourth emerged with analysis of postwar theater programs in Freiburg and Stuttgart.
565 Hortmann, 180.
566 Hortmann, 179.
Gerhart Hauptmann’s *Hanneles Himmelfahrt* (1893). Finally, explorations of morality were common to early stage programs and featured in works such as Romain Rolland’s *Le jeu de l’amour et de la mort* (1925) and Heinrich von Kleist’s *Der zerbrochene Krug* (1806).

As theater managers looked for scripts that treated the preferred themes, they favored German over Allied works. In the wake of the Nazi experience, demand for classic German plays was great and betrayed a broader demand among intellectuals, especially those with right-wing political, Catholic and/or Protestant convictions, for the reassertion of Germany’s “Christian and humanistic cultural heritage.” For these intellectuals, interest in pre- and non-Nazi high culture offered a welcome sign of affluence amid the material poverty of the immediate postwar period. At the same time, the reassertion of German cultural greatness provided some with an escape from the shame of the recent past and others with a means to contribute to the denazification and democratization of postwar German society. Regardless of their personal motivations, however, German elites hoped to resurrect an “other,” non-Nazi German cultural tradition that drew on the historic achievements of Goethe, Schiller, and Bach. Their efforts, which mirrored those of postwar politicians who emphasized pre-1933 German democratic traditions, reflected in the establishment of cultural organizations and “Goethe Societies,” which the historian Friedrich Meinecke encouraged in his 1946 work, *Die deutsche Katastrophe*. With celebrations of famous German playwrights and authors, the groups aimed to restore Germany’s cultural reputation and, later, to restrict the spread of mass culture that Allied, i.e. American, influences facilitated. One such group appeared in Stuttgart in December

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568 Hermand, 68.
Of course, the organization also revived the historic competition between Berlin and the so-called Provinz with its intention to establish Stuttgart as new cultural hub for postwar Germany. In any case, the spread of such organizations and the commitment to the restoration of an “other” cultural Germany that later led Theodor Adorno to praise what he viewed as an “humanistic intellectuality” in postwar German society.570

On stage, the reassertion of pre-Nazi German cultural achievements appeared in a plethora of classical productions. As evidence of the “other” non-Nazi Germany, theater managers selected Goethe’s Iphigenie, Bach’s Matthäuspassion, and Mozart’s Zauberflöte. Also included in the “classical” German canon was Lessing’s Nathan der Weise. Freiburg’s municipal theater opened its inaugural postwar season with the play in October 1945. Lessing’s Jewish protagonist and the play’s theme of religious toleration made the piece a favorite among postwar directors, who found in the work evidence of a more compassionate Germany.571 Audiences also welcomed the return of this pre-1933 favorite, which the Nazi regime had banned. The local paper praised the production and noted the postwar relevance of Lessing’s work: “Das Schicksal des Juden Nathan, dessen Weib und sieben Söhne verbrannt worden waren...und seine menschlich edle Tat beschäm[en] uns Heutige.”572 Stuttgart’s state theater opened with another “classic”, Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Jedermann, which premiered in August to favorable reviews from local critics. Performances of the play, which had been a success during the Weimar era, recalled Germany’s Christian heritage with its religious themes. In addition, its story of a man’s struggle to make peace with God before his death gained renewed relevance for postwar spectators who had confronted a similar challenge during the war.

569 Mack, 481-482.
570 On Adorno’s views, see: Theodor A. Adorno, “Auferstehung der Kultur in Deutschland?,” Frankfurter Hefte 5 (1950) : 469-477; Hermand, 68.
Amid strong demand for German plays, Allied works struggled to find their place on the cities’ stages. In Freiburg, a proposal by the leftist Intendant Hellberg to “Europeanize” the municipal repertoire encountered stiff resistance from the city council, which representatives of the right-of-center Badische Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei (BCSV) dominated. At the same time, Hellberg drew criticism from both sides of the political spectrum for his political approach to the stage. In spite of the local theater community’s rejection of similar theatrical approaches during the Weimar and Nazi periods, Hellberg insisted that the stage was an ideal forum for political discussions. Throughout the fall of 1945 he held a series of lectures on the matter and in November overwhelmed audiences with a candid exploration of German responsibility for the Nazi past in his own play, entitled Der neue Weg. The play sought to explain the rise and effect of Nazism through a selection of scenes set in the period 1918-1945.

In the wake of his controversial work Hellberg yielded to critics and granted a less political and “more German” program. From the scripts distributed by French officials he selected only two for production. François Adrien Boieldieu’s musical La dame blanche (1825) premiered in March 1946 to mixed reviews. Contrary to the expectation of French theater officers, critics did not receive the play as an example of French theatrical prestige or as a source of political or cultural tutelage. In fact, one review quipped that Boiledieu’s simple “Handlung mit ihrem durchsichtigen Intrigenspiel” held little value for German spectators who sought from the stage insight into their own postwar challenges. If the comment disappointed French officials, it nevertheless betrayed the rekindling of German discussions about the stage,

573 Schadek, 662.
574 See Köhler, 76; and „Rupert Giessler, Der neue Weg’ – Uraufführung im Freiburger Theater,“ Freiburger Nachrichten 6 Nov. 1945 : 4.
575 Schadek, 662.
which Nazi policies had prohibited. More popular was the municipal theater’s second French production. Molière’s *L’Avare* (1668), which debuted in May 1946. Molière’s works were an obvious favorite of French theater officers for the promotion of French drama in Germany, and in Freiburg they met with a warm reception. Just as French officers understood the contributions of Goethe to the classic Western European repertoire, so too did Germans in Freiburg appreciate Molière’s position on the European stage. In fact, local critics described the inclusion of Molière on the postwar program as key to the regeneration of the German theater. As one review stated, “Da wir wieder den Anschluss an die Weltliteratur finden müssen, gehört Molière wie je auch in den Spielplan des deutschen Theaters.”  

Traveling theater troupes increased the city’s exposure to French theater throughout the 1945-1946 season. If the frequency of the troupes’ performances proved a source of increasing frustration to local residents, reactions to specific guest performances were more positive. Yet, like that of German productions of French plays, the appeal of guest performances for French and German officials diverged. German audiences mined the plays less for confirmation of French *grandeur* than for their relevance to Germany’s postwar experience. Thus when a group from Paris performed Aeschylus’s *The Persians* in December 1945, local spectators interpreted the story of a nation destroyed by its own hubris as an allegory of the Nazi past. One critic wrote, “Es gibt kein Bühnenwerk, das besser in unsere Tage passt, als *die Perser.*” An equal success was the guest performance of Molière’s *Le dépit amoureux*. Evidence of local elites’ knowledge of French appeared in the preference of critics and spectators for French performances of the work. German translations, they complained, denied the audience the poetry

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of the author’s native tongue. Local spectators also applauded a guest performance of Paul Claudel’s *Violaine* (1901). Because Claudel had been a staunch opponent of the Vichy government and Nazism, his work appealed to occupation officials as evidence of the integrity of French drama. Yet, Germans most appreciated the story of a girl blinded by her jealous sister for its treatment of questions of faith and forgiveness.

In Stuttgart few American plays were staged. Three factors contributed to the situation. First, the initial reluctance of American playwrights to release their work limited the number of scripts available for translation and distribution during the first year of the occupation. Second, German theaters were reluctant to include American titles on their programs. In addition to audience demands for German rather than foreign works, high reconstruction costs and dwindling government subsidies encouraged managers to feature plays with a record of success. In Freiburg, French drama had a more established reputation and posed less risk to the municipal stage. American theater had a shorter history in Stuttgart and offered little financial promise. While theater officers acknowledged America’s status as a newcomer to the German stage, they bemoaned the German aversion to risk and experimentation. One theater officer complained that “initiative is one of the most difficult things to teach the German people.”

A final factor that contributed to America’s delayed theatrical debut was the indirect approach of the administration to the promotion of American drama. Because of their modest expectations for the reception of American plays, the Americans did not bother to invest in expensive traveling theater groups. Instead, theater officers relied on newspaper advertisements of upcoming performances, radio discussions, and public readings of scripts at local cultural centers.

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583 Lange, 272.
584 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, History of ICD – Theater and Music Branch, 10 Jul 1946.
to promote the American repertoire.\textsuperscript{585} Limited newspaper and radio activity during the early months of the occupation brought little attention to American scripts. Still, officials continued to hope that in their defeat Germans would embrace the Americans’ cultural tutelage. In fact, the Americans expected that the suspension of theater activities during the war and a lack of new German scripts during the early postwar years would create a niche for American plays. The top American theater official in Berlin, Benno D. Frank, explained that it was not “necessary to force the theaters to produce American plays because…there is an acute crisis in the repertory of the German theaters.”\textsuperscript{586} But the American assessment was wrong. While script shortages and aesthetic debates made difficult the design of early postwar programs, managers were clear in their intentions to establish a German rather than an American theater.

Stuttgart’s audiences were, however, interested in French drama. In January 1946 Paul Raynal’s \textit{Le Tombeau sous l’Arc de Triomphe} (1924) returned to the stage. The play had been a success in interwar Stuttgart, and audiences in 1945 found new interest in the author’s dramatic comparison of battlefield and home front experiences during the First World War, which in the wake of Allied bombing raids now spoke more directly to them.\textsuperscript{587} In March the state theater produced another French play with equal success: Romain Rolland’s \textit{Le jeu de l’amour et de la mort} (1925). Like Claudel, Rolland was an ideal figure for the promotion of French culture. He had won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1915, and his work enjoyed great success in interwar Europe. Rolland continued to write until his death in 1944. Under Nazi occupation his life embodied French cultural prosperity in the face of tyranny. German audiences, by contrast,
applauded his treatment of the Reign of Terror as a reflection of the Nazi terror in Germany. In vain, American officials protested against the performance. Convinced of spectators’ militaristic and Nazi sympathies, they worried about the “ambiguous effect” of the play on “politically immature audiences.” Nevertheless, French drama remained prominent on Stuttgart’s initial postwar program with productions of Molière’s *Tartuffe* (1664), which spoke to spectators’ interest in classic Western European plays, and Louis Verneuil’s *Monsieur Lamberthier* (1927). Both shows earned favorable reviews.

American plays debuted only in the late spring of 1946. An American culture festival in May occasioned the city’s first American productions. Increasingly concerned over the absence of American plays on local stages, theater officers adopted a rare assertive approach and “persuaded” city officials to sponsor the event. The festival presented samples of American poetry, chamber music, and theater. The poetry readings and concerts were failures, but the stage productions were not. The first was Robert Ardrey’s *Thunder Rock* (1939), which German actors performed. The play depicted the struggles of an exhausted soldier who confronted the horrors of his past and rejoined the world with renewed optimism. German critics praised Ardrey’s message and his, “Frage nach dem Sinn des Daseins.” A day after Ardrey’s play, Thornton Wilder’s *Our Town* debuted. *Our Town* was one of the most successful American theatrical imports and a favorite of American theater officials. Unlike most American dramatists, Wilder was not unknown to German audiences. He had attracted attention in the late 1920s during a walking tour of Europe with boxing champion Gene Turney, and the translation...
of his novel *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* (1927) had been a favorite. Wilder’s wholesome portrait of small-town life matched the image of America that occupation officials encouraged. At the same time his frequent references to American history made the play an ideal teaching instrument. Yet German critics paid little attention to the play’s illustration of “American life.” Instead, they focused on its aesthetics and noted the contrast between Wilder’s unconventional style and the rigid conventions of the European stage. In spite of strong demand for German plays, twelve years of Nazi isolation had fostered interest in foreign theatrical styles. In response to *Our Town* one critic thus concluded that “Die wesenhafte Bedeutung des amerikanischen Schauspiels liegt für uns darin, dass es neue bisher unentdeckte Möglichkeiten der Szene, des Dialogs...wart”.597

In spite of minor successes, neither the French nor the Americans achieved the stage presence that they had envisioned for the inaugural postwar season. In both cities, audiences approached Allied plays less as a source of political or cultural tutelage than as a tool with which to reflect on their own personal challenges. In Freiburg the municipal theater earned positive reviews for its French performances but produced few of them. Traveling theater troupes provided an unwelcome substitute. In Stuttgart the American presence was even smaller amid delays in the distribution of American scripts, German unwillingness to produce unfamiliar works, and the ineffective advertisement of American drama. Yet, in their ambition to inspire lasting political and cultural change in German society, theater officers failed to recognize their real accomplishment. While Allied productions had not encouraged the Germans to remake their dramatic canon, they had helped to rekindle discussions, which Nazi censorship had prohibited.

595 Konkle, 277.
596 „Das amerikanische Theater der Gegenwart“ *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 27 Apr 1946 : 1.
about expectations for the stage. Of course, after the inaugural postwar season, such debates
combined with shifting German expectations and changes within the occupation administrations
to alter Allied policies.

**Continued Negotiations – German Demands and the Reform of Allied Policies, 1946-1949**

By the summer of 1946 budget cuts and policy shifts began to alter the size and
administrative capacity of local French and American theater offices. In Freiburg French
officials relinquished control of licensing and denazification to the municipal government. With
French approval German officials established a cultural-affairs committee to handle the new
responsibilities. On the committee were Josef Brandel from the mayor’s office, Paul Fleig
from the city council, Wilhelm Schleuning from the municipal orchestra, and the local music
critic Hanns Reich. The committee, which began work in January 1947, was also responsible for
the coordination of French and German theatrical schedules. Approval of the committee
signaled an important shift in French policy, adoption of, “*le principe de l’administration
indirecte*.” The new tactic, which still gave French authorities final say over personnel
matters and the content of German programs, was little surprise in light of the broader French
denazification and reeducation strategies. To encourage the spread of French theater and
promote Franco-German reconciliation, French officials had avoided intense denazification
proceedings. By 1947 the French deemed the purge of theatrical personnel and the licensing of
theater managers complete. With theatrical troupes to ensure a continued French presence on the
German stage, officials accepted that the direct administration of theater activities was no longer
necessary.

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American officials faced similar personnel cuts, which unfolded from 1946 to 1949. In June 1946 budget constraints and troop redeployment reduced by one quarter the staff of the Württemberg-Baden ICD.\textsuperscript{600} In light of the cuts theater officers in Stuttgart recognized the need for a policy change. American officials turned their attention from the search for Nazis among theater personnel to the counseling of current licensees.\textsuperscript{601} Yet, the American commitment to denazification did not fade. By the end of 1946 American officials settled into an advisory role with the same ambitions of the first months of the occupation. In January 1947 theater officers were told to continue to scrutinize the German stage for Nazi and militaristic influences and to promote the belief that the German media and arts were “a force in the democratic reorientation of Germany so that Germany may again be accepted in the family of nations.”\textsuperscript{602} However, continued scrutiny became impossible during the summer 1947, after a second round of personnel cuts. Occupation officials now gave control of all licensing procedures to the Länder governments and restricted the duties of individual American officers.\textsuperscript{603}

American offices henceforth relied on German employees to aide communication between American and German officials, ensure compliance with Military Government regulations within the theater community, and oversee daily office activities. At the end of 1946 the Stuttgart Theater and Music Branch employed 18 Germans.\textsuperscript{604} But budget cuts threatened even them. Jenkins wrote in October 1946 that “it stands to reason that, due to the cut in American personnel, this section would be unable to perform...with a reduced number of German personnel.”\textsuperscript{605} The American high command ignored Jenkins’s warning, and Germans

\textsuperscript{600} NARA, RG 260, Box 311, OMGWB, Operations Plan ICD-WB, 16 Feb 1946.
\textsuperscript{601} NARA, RG 260, Box 311, OMGWB, Operations Plan ICD-WB, 16 Feb 1946.
\textsuperscript{602} NARA, RG 260, Box 309, OMGWB, History of ICD – OMGWB thru July 1946, 1 Jul 1946.
\textsuperscript{603} NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from ICD WB Theater Music Division - Newell Jenkins, 19 Dec 1946.
\textsuperscript{604} NARA, RG 260, Box 311, Memo from Cpt. McPoland to Director of Personnel Div, OMGWB, 28 Oct 1946; NARA, RG 260, Box 311, OMGWB, Internal Memo.
\textsuperscript{605} NARA, RG 260, Box 311, Interoffice Communiqué by Newell Jenkins, 24 Oct 46.
became the victims of additional cuts. By the summer of 1948 the Stuttgart theater staff had only three American and twelve German employees. One Stuttgart officer declared that continued staff reductions had “made it impossible for the Theater and Music Officers to personally superintend the proper carrying out of ICD regulations pertinent to Theater and Music activities…in Wuerttemberg-Baden.”

As the Allies’ capacity to control the stage dwindled, their physical presence continued to obstruct local theater activities. In Freiburg the battle over the Casino stage grew more intense after the 1945-1946 season, as the schedule of French theater troupes continued to dictate the availability of the stage for German productions. In March 1947 a change in the French schedule led to the cancellation of a German musical event and cost the city 3500 RM. Two months later the French administration decided to host a film presentation in the Casino auditorium and requested that the city delay a scheduled theater production. While the military government paid for the use of the Casino stage and provided compensation for canceled events, the sharing of facilities made it difficult for the city to resume its rich theatrical traditions. The situation worsened in 1948, when occupation officials reserved both Saturday and Sunday evenings at the Casino for French performances. The weekends were the most lucrative time for the theater and became even more important amid the harsh financial consequences of the 1948 currency reform. The new currency had made wages more attractive and decreased the number of persons willing to attend theater productions during working hours. Freiburg’s mayor pleaded with

606 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, OMGWB, Memo from Theater and Music Branch – Stuttgart, “Theater and Music Functions eliminated as a result of personnel cuts.”
608 Vietzen, 527.
occupation officials to share the weekend stage but achieved few concessions.609 The battle over local facilities continued until 1949, when the municipal theater reopened.

French theater troupes also proved a source of concern for French theater officers. While officials with Thimonnier’s office in Baden-Baden initiated and supervised the traveling theater program, local authorities were responsible for facilitating the troupes’ performances on municipal and state stages. As theater officers in Freiburg implemented orders from Baden-Baden, they acknowledged and regretted German frustration with the troupes. In October 1946 one report argued that “Il y a trop des spectacles français à Fribourg […] Le nombre trop élevé de spectacles provoque une désaffection grandissante de la population pour les représentations françaises.”610 Six months later officials observed that the situation had not improved.611 As the occupation entered its final months, local theater officers continued, in vain, to report the frustration of local audiences to officials in Baden-Baden. In January 1949 an official noted that “Dans le domaine culturelle, il y a lieu de noter une vive désaffection du public allemand pour les spectacles français.”612 In any case, the frequency of complaints by local theater officers confirmed the futility of their arguments. Thimonnier’s office remained committed to the promotion of French drama and cultural prestige in Germany and viewed traveling theater troupes as essential to their success. To the dismay of local French and German officials, the troupes remained a permanent fixture on postwar stages in the French zone.

In Stuttgart, theater officers shared the frustrations of their French colleagues. They worried about the continued occupation of the Württemberg state theater by American troops after the 1945-1946 season. As the occupation continued, the soldiers became a regular

distraction at local events. In September 1946 noise from the officers’ lounge in the upper balcony interrupted a memorial for German anti-fascist fighters. This incident made, as one theater officer complained, “an extremely bad impression on exactly the people who had been fighting with us and for our cause long before we entered the war.” 613 On the same day soldiers held a concert and interrupted the opening performance of the 1946-1947 theater season. Two months later noise from the officers’ club disrupted a performance of Schiller’s Don Carlos. American officers reported that, “conduct by troops…unbecoming either to the Army or in a theater brought out open criticism not only of the Army but also of a Military Government that could permit such conduct and lax discipline.” 614 To concerns about the impression of America as a “barbaric land without culture” the military high command had little response. 615 The local Red Cross representative provided at least a candid response to complaints about the requisition of the theater. She argued that, “the Germans should be grateful that they have theater at all…were the positions reversed, the Germans would grant us nothing [so] why should we grant them anything?” 616 Her response revealed the lingering influence of some American planners’ punitive approach to Germany, yet did little to calm the frustrations of American theater officers or German spectators.

For theater managers and audiences in both cities, frustration with the occupation extended beyond the Allies’ stage presence to Allied film policies. Local theater communities had emerged from the war committed to the establishment of a vibrant German stage. The success of postwar German cinemas led theaters to worry about their place in a postwar world of mass entertainment. Their concern resurrected Weimar-era complaints by theater managers.

613 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from JH Hills to Gen Harold, 16 Nov 1946.
614 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from JH Hills to Gen Harold, 16 Nov 1946.
615 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from JH Hills to Gen Harold, 16 Nov 1946.
616 NARA, RG 260, Box 310, Memo from Colonel Jenkins to Commanding Officer OMGWB, 28 Feb 1946.
about the increased appeal of cinemas following the advent of talking films. While the decline of postwar stage audiences owed, in part, to the costs of reconstruction, which had reduced state and local government theater subsidies and shrunk theater programs, it also reflected the appeal of postwar cinemas. In their assessments of the situation, theater managers focused on the influence of screen. In Stuttgart one journalist wrote, “die Ursache des Verfalls [des Theaters] liege allein in der Hinwendung der breiten Massen zu Kino, Sport und Amüsierbetrieb.”

To the extent that Allied film policies facilitated the growth of German cinemas, they also drew the ire of theater officials. In Stuttgart critics described the American encouragement of the cinema as the “Marshallplanisierung” of high German culture. In Freiburg the sentiment was similar. The municipal theater committee complained, albeit incorrectly, that when, “Film und Theater treten...m iteinander in Konkurrenz,” French officials placed more value on film events. Amid the financial difficulties of the initial postwar period, then, Allied interference with local theater facilities and involvement in the promotion of cinema were more than a simple inconvenience for the German theater community. They hindered the staging of profitable performances on which the postwar survival of the stage depended.

In spite of their awareness of German frustrations with the Allies’ stage presence, theater officers in both cities continued to encourage the production of their native repertoires. To their delight, frustration with Allied policies did not preclude the success of Allied plays. In Freiburg, critics lauded the municipal theater’s production of Jean Anouilh’s Le Voyageur sans bagage (1937) in October 1946. A local review noted boisterous applause from the audience and

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620 StadtAF, C 5/2017, Minutes of the municipal theater committee, 18 Jan 1946.
commented that, “Mit Interesse und Spannung verfolgt man den Gang dieses Theaterstückes.”

While occupation records did not discuss the appeal of the play to French officials, German spectators appreciated Anouilh’s exploration of a soldier’s struggle to come to terms with his actions before and during the First World War. In the words of one critic, the moral of the play was the notion that, “Du musst endlich sein wollen, der du wirklich bist.”

In light of Freiburg’s proximity to the fighting during both World Wars, local audiences carried to the performance a myriad of personal wartime experiences. As they struggled to come to terms with their own responses to war, Anouilh’s work provided a welcome allegorical tool. Also popular was a performance of Paul Claudel’s *Le Soulier de satin* (1924) in September 1948. However, French and German assessments of the work differed. For French officials the play offered another example of the resilient anti-fascist character of French culture. Their view owed to the fact that during the war Vichy officials had dismissed the play as a pro-Resistance piece. By contrast, German audiences most appreciated the aesthetics and themes of Claudel’s play. In Freiburg the local paper described the work as, “*grossartige dramatische Dichtung*” and praised its focus on forgiveness and the Christian faith.

Although they remained a source of frustration for municipal officials, French theater troupes also maintained the favor of Freiburg audiences. In October 1946 the production of Claudel’s *L’annonce faite à Marie* was a success. The religious-themed work built on Claudel’s earlier *Violaine*. One review praised the, “*Schönheit und Tiefe dieser Dichtung vom christlichen*

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Another successful traveling guest performance was a production of Jean-Paul Sartre’s *Les Mouches* (1943) in June 1947. German spectators found in the interaction of Argos’s dead and living citizens relevant themes of morality and responsibility for Nazism’s rise. Less popular than Sartre’s work was a guest performance of Paul Raynal’s *Napoleon privat* (1937) in December 1947. The play inspired little serious reflection on Germany’s postwar challenges, and drew praise only for its comedic treatment of Napoleon’s personal struggles at the height of his power.

In Stuttgart reactions to Allied plays after the inaugural postwar season were similar. Of the French plays that dominated the city’s international repertoire, the production of Jean Giraudoux’s antiwar *La Guerre de Troie n’aura pas lieu* (1935) in December 1946 was a favorite. A local review described the play as, “reich an Anregungen und in seiner Mischung von geistvoller Ironie, Satire und Ernst...so herausfordernd für Menschen mit geläufigen Gedankengängen.” The review welcomed the exploration of, “den uns alle lebhaft bewegenden Gedanken...Sind Kriege vermeidbar oder können wir ihnen nicht entgehen?”. Critics awarded similar praise to the production in January 1947 of Maurice Rostand’s *L’homme que j’ai tué* (1925), the story of a French soldier’s search for forgiveness for the killing of a German combatant during the First World War. One critic located the moral of the play in the protagonist’s realization that “nicht sein Tod...kann die Sühne bringen, sondern sein Leben, das er als Ersatz für das des Toten darbietet.”

The few American productions in Stuttgart received positive reviews as well. In October 1946 the state theater produced Patrick Hamilton’s *Gas Light* (1938), a crime-thriller that was a

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628 „Stgt Neues Theater (Kammerspiele): ‚Der Mann, den sein Gewissen trieb’,“ *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 1 Apr. 1947 : 2.
success throughout western Germany.\textsuperscript{629} Also popular was John van Druten’s *The Voice of the Turtle* (1943), a love story of an American soldier and his girlfriend. Local audiences obliged the cast to make multiple curtain calls.\textsuperscript{630} In light of German demands for more serious theatrical productions, the success of the two plays was surprising and perhaps reflected the general interest in foreign drama in the wake of the Nazi censorship. Still, the most anticipated American production was Thornton Wilder’s *The Skin of Our Teeth* (1942), which promised to be more relevant to on-going discussions about Germany’s recent past and postwar future. After the success of *Our Town*, audiences were anxious to see Wilder’s other works. Yet, when *The Skin of Our Teeth* premiered in Stuttgart in the summer of 1947, the reviews were mixed. Reviewers enjoyed this story of human ingenuity in the face of adversity, and critics praised his affirmation of human progress.\textsuperscript{631} Less popular among German spectators were the audio-visual aspects of Wilder’s new production. His use of motion pictures, loud speakers, and radio were foreign to German audiences, who were accustomed to more “traditional” and less-technological theatrical presentations.\textsuperscript{632} Such reactions betrayed the differences between German and American expectations for the stage and affirmed the aversion of local cultural elites to experimental “modern” theatrical productions.

In any case, the success of French and American productions belied the Allies’ limited influence on German programs after the 1945-1946 season. In both Freiburg and Stuttgart the performance of Allied plays remained uncommon. After the municipal stage ventured two French productions during the 1945/1946 season, the 1946/47 season saw only three, the

\textsuperscript{629} Lange, 402.
\textsuperscript{631} Konkle, 280.
Despite continued complaints about their intrusion on local stages, the number of traveling theater troupes that reached Freiburg remained modest amid continued budget cuts. After seven theater troupes visited Freiburg during the 1945/46 season and six performed during the 1946/47 season, only four did so during the 1947/48 season. At the same time, German attendance of the guest performances declined throughout the occupation. The Americans attained even less exposure on Stuttgart’s stages. While the number of French titles declined, the number of American productions remained small. After three American plays appeared on the program of the state theater during the 1945/46 season, the following seasons featured five and two American works respectively.

As the Allies struggled to maintain their position on the postwar stage, Germans began to reevaluate theirs. During the latter half of the occupation, continued concerns over the function of theater in postwar society inspired a debate over the content of postwar programs. While demand for classic German drama remained high, calls for new German plays emerged. Amid concerns over competition between the screen and the stage and in light of the initial release of contemporary postwar German films, some in the theater community worried that the preponderance of classic German plays might render theaters out-of-touch with current affairs and less appealing to the broader public. In Stuttgart one critic argued that “Das einzige Ziel müsse sein, das künstlerische Gesicht des deutschen Theaters zu bilden.” Similar demands appeared in Freiburg. As one observer bemoaned “Hier liebt man die vergangene Jahrhunderte [...] [aber] das zwanzigste Jahrhundert [blieb] im Spielplan dieses Jahres bisher völlig

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633 Numbers gathered from local Freiburg and Stuttgart papers: Freiburger Nachrichten, Badische Zeitung, Stuttgarter Zeitung.
übersehen.“ Such concerns were evidence of the broader debate over the position of the stage in postwar society.

Calls for more contemporary works also revealed a shift in audience preferences. As living conditions improved and the trauma of dictatorship, war, and defeat faded, demand for more direct theatrical treatments of contemporary issues increased. Rather than the allegorical explorations of Nazism that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century works provided, audiences sought a more direct reflection of their recent experiences on stage. Thus in Freiburg came the warning that „Es kann jedenfalls nicht länger angehen, dass das Freiburger Theater unter der Glassglocke altbewährter Tradition dahinlebt, während […] erregende, klärende, und reinigende Stürme geistiger Auseinandersetzungen vor sich gehen.“\textsuperscript{636} Similar arguments emerged in Stuttgart. As one local critic suggested, the time for indirect treatments of the Nazi experience had passed: „Die Zugstücke von heute müssen auf einen [...] realistischeren Ton gestimmt sein. [...] Das augenblickliche Theaterpublikum will [...] vom Relativismus zurück zum Realismus.“\textsuperscript{637} For the promotion of Allied plays, most of which provided allegorical explorations of the past, the shift in German preferences was critical.

Amid German debates over the future of the stage, the first works of exiled German playwrights debuted. With their direct treatment of the recent war and the Nazi experience, they added a more contemporary, and welcome, flavor to theater programs. One of the first and most acclaimed exile productions was Carl Zuckmayer’s \textit{Des Teufels General} (1945). Written in Vermont, Zuckmayer’s play explored the responsibility of ordinary Germans for Nazism. The work appeared in Freiburg and Stuttgart in 1948 and received strong reviews. At the premiere in Freiburg, the audience delayed the start of the second act with a deafening ovation. The applause

was evidence of the play’s resonance. In the words of one local critic, “*im Beifall löste sich die innere Anteilnahme an einem Drama, in dem es um die eigene Sache geht.*”<sup>638</sup> Compared to the rejection of Hellberg’s *Der neue Weg*, which had tackled similar issues, the warm reception of Zuckmayer’s work was evidence of an increased openness to more direct explorations of the past. As the above reviewer commented “*Zuckmayers Drama ist gerecht, es urteilt nicht und verurteilt nicht. Aber wer durch das Stück nicht zur Selbstbesinnung und Selbsterkenntnis geführt wird, hat seinen Sinn nicht verstanden.*”<sup>639</sup> The review revealed the preference of audiences for German explorations of the past and confirmed the fallacy of the Allies’ assumption that their guidance in such matters was expected.

Allied reactions to Zuckmayer’s play also confirmed the shortcomings of wartime expectations. In Freiburg French officials had delayed the premiere of the play with a restriction on German treatments of contemporary issues. The restriction, which officials had applied throughout the French zone until 1948, reflected the expectation that Allied, and especially French, plays were to guide Germans in their reflections on matters of the recent past and postwar future.<sup>640</sup> It also aided the French exploitation of the stage by shielding established French dramas from the competition of new, more topical German works. Yet, as the comments of local leaders at the start of the occupation indicated, Allied attempts to enlighten the Germans about their past only appeared to audiences as accusatory and unfair. German openness to plays like Zuckmayer’s confirmed as much.

American officials misinterpreted the significance of Zuckmayer’s work as well. Still suspicious of Nazism’s lingering reach, theater officers reacted with cynicism to the play’s

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<sup>638</sup> Rupert Giessler, „*Des Teufels General,*“ *Badische Zeitung* 19 May 1948 : 3.
<sup>639</sup> Ibid.
success. One official ascribed the public’s response to the enthusiasm with which, “certain German circles greet the sight of a uniform…and the slight degree to which they understand…General Harras and the fact that he and others of his type might have altered the course of Germany’s destiny had they desired.” Yet, German audiences had not responded to the play’s military themes but rather its exploration of relevant questions of responsibility for the war and Nazism. As the Americans continued to view Germans as chauvinistic warmongers, they also failed to recognize the contrast between the reception of their own propagandistic and documentary treatments of the past, which cinema audiences had panned, and Zuckmayer’s work.

A 1947 report by Zuckmayer, who worked as a correspondent for the Civil Affairs Division of the American Military Government from 1946-1947, addressed the Allies’ struggle to coopt the stage as an instrument of reeducation. About Nazi theater policies he noted how “Der Plan, die Theater als Plattform für politische Propaganda zu gebrauchen, scheiterte völlig, und er wird in Deutschland immer scheitern, egal von welcher Seite derartige direkte Propaganda versucht wird. Diese Tatsache ist für das Verstehen von Theaterproblemen unter der Besatzung der Vereinigten Staaten [...] äusserst wichtig.” Like officials in Freiburg and Stuttgart, Zuckmayer invoked the notion of the theater as Germany’s moral academy. As such, he argued, the stage was the guardian of universal values and did not lend itself well to political manipulations, Nazi or Allied. He thus cautioned that “Theater, das einer Partei linientreu war, war in Deutschland immer von kurzer Dauer, selbst wenn es mit sensationellen Methoden gemacht war. Dieser Geist lebt immer noch in Deutschland – auf der Bühnen genauso wie beim

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641 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Quarterly History, Theater and Music Branch, First Quarter 1948.
In short, the playwright’s report confirmed what American and French officials had failed to understand. If the theater were to regain its status as the nation’s moral academy, the stage had to serve not Allied objectives but rather German interests and the defense of Germany’s pre-Nazi cultural heritage.

**Conclusion:**

In neither Freiburg nor Stuttgart did the implementation of theater policies meet the expectations of Allied planners. Both occupiers understood the theater as a venue for local cultural elites, whom they hoped to influence through exposure to Allied repertoires. In Freiburg, French officials were better suited for the task, because they shared basic cultural and theatrical expectations with their Germans. Still, German works dominated programs in both cities. While audiences found relevance in the Allied plays that they encountered, they failed to see them as a source of political or cultural tutelage. Preoccupied with the challenges of life among the rubble, they looked to plays, Allied and German, more for a reassuring reflection of their past and present struggles than a prescription for future action. If exposure to Allied plays had inspired Germans to discuss their expectations for the stage, local elites remained committed to the restoration of Germany’s theatrical reputation and preferred German over Allied works. Their preference solidified as demand for new German plays, which offered direct treatments of the recent past, increased amid the continued decline of the Allies’ stage presence. As the Allies exited German theaters in 1949, their liberation of the stage from Nazi control four years earlier remained their most popular and important theater initiative.

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643 Zuckmayer, 159.
Chapter 5: Read All About It! – Germans, Allies, and the Postwar Press

Of all the Allies’ cultural initiatives, the restoration of regular print media was perhaps the most pressing for Germans. In the spring 1945, residents of the collapsed Reich found themselves in a kind of information darkness. For months, state controlled newspapers had offered little more than propagandistic rants and fantastic accounts of the war. When Freiburg’s *Der Alemanne* appeared for the last time on April 21, 1945, it carried an exaggerated account of defense efforts in Berlin and chided the Allied invasion for disrupting Europe’s economy and transportation. The same was true of Stuttgart’s *NS Kurier*, which in spite of the city’s devastation exhorted readers in its final issue to “*In Unglück nicht feige, sondern trotzig werden.*”\(^{644}\) Although readers welcomed the end of the Nazi press monopoly, they remained in the dark as the occupation began. As the cities’ Nazi printing presses ground to a halt in the presence of Allied troops, an Allied publication ban prevented the circulation of any new periodicals. Amid the resulting media blackout, questions about the present and future abounded. Most common were concerns over basic survival, as Germans struggled to learn where they could find food and shelter. No less troubling were questions about Allied intentions and the fate of loved ones who found themselves scattered across the map. Amid the shifting of zonal boundaries and diverse Allied travel restrictions, the lack of news media rendered information about developments and people in other zones even more difficult to attain. As German uncertainties increased, the flow of reliable information remained a mere trickle. Pulling Germans out of the “dark,” then, constituted the main objective of Allied press officers during initial postwar period.

\(^{644}\) Cited in: Müller, 533; On the final edition of Freiburg’s paper, see: *Der Alemanne* 21-22 Apr 1945 : 1.
Beyond the basic need for information, however, Allied and German observers sensed in the breakdown of German print media an opportunity to shape the character of postwar German society. Allied planners had looked forward to reshaping a German press, which, to varying degrees, they blamed for the weaknesses of Weimar democracy and the rise of National Socialism. They also viewed newspapers as another important medium through which to promote the spread of their own democratic and cultural ideals. In the meantime, German editors and journalists, whom the Nazis had suspended, emerged from the war anxious to resume their careers and leave their own mark on the postwar press.

This chapter examines negotiations between Allied and German press visions. It compares the broad contours of French and American policies and traces the local implementation of specific initiatives. In the format and content of the cities’ newspapers, the chapter looks for evidence of cooperation and conflict between Allied and German designs. Independent daily publications and party newspapers, which were the main targets of Allied initiatives, are the focus of the analysis.

Like the preceding chapters, this chapter reveals the Allies’ struggles to impose their own political and cultural traditions on German society. Although the Allies’ initial press monopoly laid the foundation for Germany’s post-1945 print media, German expectations rivaled their Allied counterparts as a template for newspapers throughout the occupation. As German media personnel pursued their own press designs, they solicited little guidance from Allied officials. These Germans viewed Nazism not as the culmination of but rather a diversion from past political and cultural traditions, and they confronted 1945 not as a “Stunde null” but rather as an opportunity to reassert pre-Nazi press traditions. More than the Americans, the French accommodated German efforts to seize this opportunity. French officials recognized similarities
between their own press and that of pre-1933 Germany, and they sought less to transform
German newspapers than to control coverage of France and the occupation itself. Relations
between American and German press officials were more contentious and reflected significant
discrepancies between the two countries’ press traditions. Committed to an idealized version of
their own press, the Americans viewed the Americanization of German newspapers as the only
path to a denazified, demilitarized, and democratic German media. In doing so, they demanded a
more radical transformation of German newspapers than their French colleagues. Nevertheless,
both Allies’ positions weakened with time, and newspapers in their zones came to reflect
German initiative more than Allied influence. In the end, the horrific realities of dictatorship and
defeat and the desire to restore traditions and practices that the Nazis had suspended contributed
more to the denazification of the German press than Allied policy.

High Policy – General Allied Visions for Postwar Newspapers

French and American approaches to the German press betrayed the influence of the
Allies’ different wartime experiences. In the French zone, the character and development of
press initiatives reflected France’s late arrival to the victors’ table. Unlike the British and the
Americans, the French had only begun to develop specific press policies by the end of the
war.645 The French agenda thus constituted not a set of well-defined objectives but rather a
response to immediate postwar concerns. It aimed less to transform German newspapers than to
control them. Like their western Allies, the French sought to replace the state-controlled,
demagogic Nazi press with the kind of free print media that they believed was essential to the

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645 Stephan Schlözel, “Pressepolitik in der französischen Zone,” in Frankreichs Kulturpolitik in Deutschland, 1945-
maintenance of a critical public sphere and a democratic political culture. Unlike the Americans, however, the French did not believe that a free and democratic press was one void of political debates and provocative editorials. As German newspapers later revived the blend of information and opinion that had characterized German print media since the nineteenth century, they worried French officials less, because as western European neighbors, France and Germany shared journalistic styles. Papers on both sides of the Rhine had similar editorial, reporting, and formatting practices. In addition, newspapers in both countries had long served as a source not only of information but, more importantly, social and political commentary. Because of their familiarity with German press styles, French occupation authorities distinguished between the state-controlled sensationalist press of the Nazi era and its independent, yet partisan, Weimar predecessor.

More worrisome for the French was the content of the postwar German press. Amid concerns over France’s postwar image, French press officers approached German newspapers as a forum in which to restore and defend France’s position on the Allied stage. The influence of French insecurity on press officers in Germany was clear from the beginning. Among the early reasons that officials gave for the creation of German newspapers was the desire to combat the lingering effects of wartime propaganda. In Freiburg, an officer encouraged the authorization of censored newspapers to “effectively combat the ‘whisper campaigns’ of the Nazis.” While Nazi stereotypes of French impotence threatened France’s postwar image, so too did Allied

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648 Archives de l’Occupation Française en Allemagne et en Autriche, Colmar, France (AOC), Bade H 1.103/1, Compte-rendu, 13-18 Jun 1945.
French officials were sensitive to Allied news reports of “better conditions” in other occupation zones and were anxious to divert the attention of their zone’s residents away from non-French news sources. Early American newsletters, for example, troubled French officials because they carried reports of more liberal American policies, such as the lack of travel visa requirements within the American zone. Because residents of the French zone faced more stringent travel restrictions, French officials wanted to limit awareness of American travel policies. Through the establishment and censorship of a postwar German press, the French thus hoped to control, and improve, their nation’s image in the eyes of both the Germans and the Allies.

To American officials the content of the German press mattered less. America suffered none of the insecurities that plagued its French ally, and officials did not view German periodicals as a record of America’s occupation performance. The self-proclaimed harbingers of democracy were also loath to engage in censorship and adhered to the maxim, “the less control the better.” Yet, if American press officers were reluctant to control the content of German newspapers, they were eager to influence their form. More than the other Allies, American officials sought to eliminate what they saw as the “German press tradition.” As General Clay later described it, Germans lacked “a true consciousness […] of the importance of a free press.” American press officers had had little exposure to the Weimar press and American policy made little distinction between pre- and post-1933 German print media. Although

649 AOC, Bade H 1.103/1, Compte-rendu 1-6 Jul 1945.
650 AOC, Bade H 1.103/1, Compte-rendu 21-28 Jun 1945.
651 Hauptstaatsarchiv des Landes Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart (HStaatsAS), EA 2/301, Bü 21, Minutes of meeting between Länderrat, OMGUS Stuttgart, OMGUS Berlin, 29 Jan 1946.
sensationalism had informed the content of many Weimar-era newspapers, the privately-controlled Weimar press had also featured an incredible diversity of viewpoints.\footnote{Hurwitz, 37.} By contrast, the state-controlled Nazi media had featured no diversity and practiced a more vitriolic brand of sensationalism. The distinction nevertheless evaded American observers, who also believed, incorrectly, that the entire German press had been eager to submit to Nazi rule. In the end, American officials concluded that the partisanship and nationalism of newspapers in the 1930s were, in fact, hallmarks of German journalism, and they undertook to give Germany a more objective and “democratic” postwar media. “Democratic” was policy-speak for “American” and referred to an objective, non-party press, which was free of state-control. Press officers called for clear delineations between information and opinion pieces and, most importantly, ordered that the latter not appear on a paper’s front page.\footnote{See: Gienow-Hecht, \textit{Transmission}, 86; and Hurwitz, 41-43.} They also ordered the reorganization of German newspaper staffs “along lines traditional in Anglo-Saxon journalism,” in order to “attain…better news coverage.”\footnote{National Archives and Records Administration, United States, College Park, MD (NARA) Record Group (RG) 260, Box 311, 12/97-1 (16), Objectives of ICD, 3rd Quarter 1947, 11 Jul 1947.}

The journalistic model that American press officers brought to Germany constituted a misrepresentation of America’s own press traditions. In their rush to condemn all German media as partisan and sensationalist, occupation officials ignored the sizeable “yellow press” that had dominated the American newspaper market for decades. American publishers, such as William Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, were responsible for an entire industry of sensationalist journalism that blurred the lines between fact and fiction. In the aftermath of the Second World War the yellow newspapers continued to thrive in the United States and helped to foster anti-Communist
Such newspapers were not unique to America. France, in fact, also had its share of mass-circulation, sensationalist publications. Unlike their French colleagues, however, American officials refused to acknowledge the sensationalist side of their domestic press. In their intransigence American press officers adhered to a journalistic ideal that did not reflect the realities of American journalism. More importantly, the ideal fostered a misunderstanding of pre-Nazi German media practices and invited conflict with postwar German editors who wished to reconnect with the non-sensationalist aspects of past German press traditions.

In spite of their different long-term objectives, French and American policies shared two short-term goals. The first was the denazification of German newspapers. Like their American colleagues, French officials sought to, “reacquaint intoxicated minds with ‘the truth,’” and stressed that a purged German press was essential to the construction of a peaceful, democratic Germany. American policy extended the definition of “denazification” to include not only the purge of Nazi-era personnel but also a dramatic reform of German reporting and editing practices. The second shared objective was the spread of Allied culture. Both powers hoped that, like the screen and the stage, the postwar press would showcase their respective cultures as a model for Germans to embrace. One French official described newspapers as the ideal forum in which to highlight “the social and human character of the occupation.” American planners agreed and called for “a definite campaign in the German press” to provide readers with articles that, “will reflect American life.”

In addition to their short-term goals, French and American press officers adopted a similar strategy for the (re-)establishment of German newspapers in their zones. Because the

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658 Cited in: Schölzel, 197.
660 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Memo from F.J. Pearson to the Director of Military Government, 5 Mar 1946.
French had no concrete plan of their own, they borrowed the Anglo-American plan, which called for the creation of a licensed German press in three phases. The first step comprised the initial Allied publication ban. Next, local military governments circulated posters and newsletters to fill the information void. In the meantime, press officers interviewed German editors and journalists and surveyed local printing facilities. Finally, Allied officials granted licenses for the publication of politically independent German newspapers.

Within the occupation governments specific departments oversaw press policy. In both the French and American administrations, newspapers fell under the purview of the same institutions that administered film and theater initiatives. In the French zone, the Section Presse of the Division de l’Information operated from its headquarters in Baden-Baden. Camille Loutre was head of the section. Like most French cultural policy officials, he carried to the occupation a solid understanding of Germans and their culture. Prior to the war he had worked in Berlin as a correspondent for a Parisian newspaper. He thus had first-hand knowledge of Nazi press policy and was better prepared than most of his American colleagues to distinguish between pre- and post-1933 press practices. Throughout the zone Loutre employed a staff of press officers, who adapted initiatives to local conditions. Most of the staff were educated French Germanists or Alsatians and, like Loutre, had a good knowledge of the German language, press, and culture. Captain Gutmann directed press activities in Freiburg. Archival records revealed only that he was from southern France and that he had been a member of the Resistance.

In the American zone the administration of press policy fell to the Press Control Branch (PCB) of the Information Control Division (ICD). Regional offices of the PCB administered

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661 Defrance, La politique culturelle, 135.
662 Defrance, La politique culturelle, 135; Schlözel, 135.
664 Max Bruecher, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1945: Eine Dokumentation (Freiburg: Rombach, 1980) 123.
policy in the various states of the American zone. In Württemberg-Baden, Colonel John B. Stanley was first in charge of press policy. He managed Press Control Branch offices in Frankfurt, Marburg, Kassel, Bremen, Heidelberg, and Stuttgart. Hermann J. Gauerke oversaw operations in the Stuttgart office. Like most of his colleagues, Gauerke had spent the war not in Europe but in Washington, at the Pentagon. While archival records reveal nothing more of his prewar background, it seems unlikely that his work in Washington provided him with more than a general overview of pre-1933 German or Nazi press traditions.665

Posters and Newsletters – Early Allied Press Initiatives

With the ban on German publications in place, press officers turned their attention to the German demand for news and information. Their first response comprised a series of posters or “bulletins.” In both Freiburg and Stuttgart French posters wallpapered local town squares as the occupation began. In Freiburg the scene was colorful, as city officials adopted a system to avoid confusion between German and Allied proclamations. French announcements were white and municipal government announcements were yellow.666 Most posters in Freiburg appeared in both French and German. In Stuttgart only a few appeared in German. In vain the city’s mayor complained to French officials about the lack of translations.667 Why the French administration in Stuttgart did not provide more bilingual texts was unclear but perhaps owed to personnel shortages. In light of American demands for control of Stuttgart, French officials might also have anticipated a rapid departure from the city and declined to invest in costly translation operations there.

666 Stadtarchiv Freiburg (StadtAF), C 5/3, Memo from mayor’s office, 5 Jun 1945.
667 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart (StadtAS), Hauptaktei (HA) 01, Letter from mayor’s office to Military Government, 12 Jun 1945.
Allied posters constituted a public information channel that allowed occupation officials to control both the distribution and the consumption of news. Because the publications were only available at specific locations, readers were subject to observation by Allied authorities. Thus during the poster-phase of the press campaign, press officers had more opportunities to observe and police reaction to specific news stories than at any time thereafter. For French officials, who obsessed over the public image of the occupation, such opportunities were invaluable. Although French press policy ultimately aimed to reestablish traditional, privately-consumed German newspapers, French adherence to strict censorship initiatives throughout the initial postwar years marked an attempt to maintain such early levels of control.

In their content Allied posters presented Germans with two kinds of material. News and military government orders filled most of the pages. One of the first postings in Freiburg mandated the registration of all local vehicles.668 Another poster announced the German capitulation. To emphasize Allied authority, French officials printed the words of General Alfred Jodl, who signed the surrender at Reims and declared: “Ich überlasse das deutsche Volk den siegreichen alliierten Mächten, mögen die Folgen sein, wie sie wollen.”669 Residents in Stuttgart encountered similar posters. News of Allied negotiations accompanied announcements about the suspension of mail deliveries and the closing of bars.670 A second, smaller feature of the early posters was what Germans viewed as “propaganda.” Under headings such as “France during the War,” and “These Atrocities: Your Responsibility,” officials in Freiburg documented the French experience under German occupation and detailed German war crimes.671

668 StadtAF, C 5/3, Announcement for the city and county of Freiburg/Breisgau, 1 May 1945.
669 StadtAF, C 5/3, Announcement, 8 May 1945.
671 StadtAF, C 5/3, Memo from municipal transportation office to mayor’s office, 27 June 1945.
As Allied posters blanketed German cities, officials prepared for the second phase of press policy. In Freiburg French authorities revealed plans for a military-government newsletter in late May. To publish the newsletter officials turned to the local firm Poppen and Ortmann, which had published the nationalist *Freiburger Zeitung* until 1943. In the absence of alternative publishing houses, French officials overlooked the National Socialist sympathies of the firm’s earlier publication. Poppen and Ortmann shared the printing costs with the city government and had permission to print only the texts that the military government provided. French officials made similar arrangements in Stuttgart, where they enlisted the help of the Stuttgarter Zeitungsverlag, which had published the liberal *Stuttgarter Neue Tagblatt* until 1935. In both cities, distribution of newsletters began in June. The *Mitteilungen für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart* debuted on June 1 and the *Gazette officielle du Gouvernement Militaire de Fribourg* followed on June 6. The newsletters were available to residents for purchase at specific locations throughout the two cities and thus, unlike the earlier posters, could be read in private. This shift toward the unsupervised consumption and discussion of information signaled a significant decrease in the Allies’ control of the press.

Like the earlier posters, Allied newsletters offered only limited news reports. Instead officials filled the pages with policy decrees. In both cities the inaugural issues featured the full text of a speech by General Eisenhower, who reassured Germans that the Allies were “victors not oppressors.” Yet, the content of subsequent pages appeared to contradict the general. Readers encountered regulations that touched every aspect of postwar life. In Freiburg the French published laws for the registration of all male residents, the establishment of military tribunals,

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672 See: StadtAF C 5/4, Note from Dr. Brandel, 24.5.45; and Angela Kronenberg, *Die Tagespresse in Südbaden nach 1945 – Dargestellt am Beispiel der Badischen Zeitung* (Freiburg: Badischer Verlag, 1986) 58.
673 StadtAF C 5/4, Letter from Poppen and Ortmann to mayor, 22 Jun 1945.
674 Müller, 115.
and the operation of postwar businesses. In Stuttgart readers discovered new travel restrictions as well as guidelines for street cleaning, fruit picking, and the registration of homes.

As the French administration struggled to establish itself and administer the occupied populations in both cities, the newsletters afforded it a clear and assertive voice. At the same time, however, the lists of proclamations failed to satisfy the German desire for news. French newsletters provided little information about events outside of the local communities and did little to assuage concerns about missing loved ones, food supplies, or housing needs. In short, the publications responded to French rather than German needs and therefore failed to divert the attention of French zone residents away from other (Allied) news sources.

To the delight of Stuttgarters their local newsletter offered more news coverage after American forces assumed control of the city. In an early effort to Americanize Germany’s postwar press, American officials redesigned the publication as a model for future licensed newspapers. Like the American-sponsored Neue Zeitung, which through the pens of German émigré’s also served to model American journalistic practices for Germans, American newsletters betrayed the American preference for indirect cultural diplomacy and the hope that Germans would be open to foreign tutelage. Readers of the new American newsletter encountered news and articles, which demonstrated the “objective” style that officials claimed to be the hallmark of American journalism. During the summer 1945, the newsletter began to cover reconstruction efforts, preparations for school openings, and the rebuilding of the local

678 Albert Norman, Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture (New York: Vantage, 1951) 32.
679 On the history of the Neue Zeitung, see: Hecht, 1.
In an attempt to make the occupation more personal, the occupiers also made themselves the subject of several issues. Seven of the first ten issues featured either the text of officials’ speeches or explanations of American objectives. Two issues carried pictures of local military government leaders. In the end, the American publication struck a better balance between the needs of the occupier and the occupied than its French predecessor.

Nevertheless, Allied newsletters remained an ineffective and unpopular information source throughout the initial postwar months. Paper shortages and distribution challenges restricted the reach of the publications, while the limited news coverage continued to disappoint readers. Questions about Germany’s future and the nature and duration of the occupation remained unanswered. At the same time, Allied officials struggled to earn the trust of readers, as years of Nazi propaganda and the example of the Nazi press had fostered suspicion of the Allies and a mistrust of official media.

Across Germany a continued flood of rumors confirmed the shortcomings of the Allies’ early press initiatives. In Freiburg rumors circulated about Franco-American fighting around Stuttgart. There were also reports that in pursuit of vengeance, French soldiers planned to bomb the historic cathedral in nearby Breisach. Other rumors included those of a three-year marriage ban and a five-year alcohol ban. High schools and universities faced an alleged twenty-year suspension. In Stuttgart officials reported fears of American plans to grant amnesty to

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683 Wrobel, 63.
685 StadtAF C 5/4, Letter from Rudolf Schwannke to mayor, 15 Jun 1945.
Nazi officials and discontinue denazification proceedings by October 1945. Fears of a war between the Western and Soviet Allies also emerged. Residents heard stories about a pending conflict in which former Wehrmacht soldiers planned to fight alongside Soviet troops against British and American forces.

The spread of rumors alarmed press officers in both cities. In Freiburg a French officer observed that in July, “Les rumeurs de toute nature ont circulé […] avec plus d’acuité et de persistance que jamais.” In light of French image concerns, rumors about French policies or vengeance campaigns were unacceptable. American officials were no less worried. An officer in Stuttgart lamented that “the early absence of local newspapers and other information services […] definitely left a vacuum which could only create negative results and provide fertile ground for rumors of all kinds.” The popularity of the rumor mills threatened the legitimacy of the occupiers and their mission. As long as Germans relied on gossip more than Allied information channels, broader initiatives such as democratization and reeducation had little chance for success. In both zones, then, the spread of rumors encouraged the Allies to begin the third phase of their press policies, the licensing of a German press.

‘Wieder eine deutsche Presse’ – The Early Licensed Press

From the beginning of the occupation the Allies’ timeline for the establishment of German newspapers encountered resistance. In spite of the publication ban, German editors and officials pursued their own press agenda. In Freiburg city officials pushed to create a local newspaper as early as May 1945. During the same month local Catholic leaders and members

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686 StadtAS, HA 0, Nr. 0612, Gerüchte und Meinungen, Report 7, September 6, 1945; Report 2, 30 Aug 1945; Report 9, 11 Sep 1945.
687 Bausch, 58.
689 Cited in: Bausch, 55.
690 StadtAF, C 5/4, Note from city official, 24 May 1945.
of the former Center Party announced similar plans. In Stuttgart city and state officials also submitted proposals for news bulletins.\textsuperscript{691} A local anti-fascist group even printed 10,000 copies of a local newsletter, entitled the \textit{Stuttgarter Aufbau}. French officials confiscated the publication before its scheduled release in early May 1945.\textsuperscript{692}

In both cities the Allies rejected early German press initiatives and pushed forward with their own plans for the licensing of independent, non-party, newspapers. Although the notion of an independent German press originated with the Americans, French officials also adopted the concept. They wanted to ensure an end to the party press of the Nazi era and in the absence of their own policy directives accepted the American plan as a much-needed guide.\textsuperscript{693}

Yet, as editors in both cities later noted, independent journalism was not a new concept for Germans in 1945. Some of the country’s most well-known interwar newspapers had prided themselves on their lack of affiliation with a specific party and their rejection of demagoguery and sensationalist reporting.\textsuperscript{694} The same had been true of most pre-1933 newspapers in Freiburg and Stuttgart. Nevertheless, German newspapers remained too partisan in the eyes of Allied, and especially American, observers whose blanket condemnation of the German media precluded a nuanced analysis of individual periodicals.\textsuperscript{695} At the same time, the size of the Weimar independent press also hurt its reputation with the Allies, as truly “neutral” newspapers had comprised less than half of Germany’s interwar periodicals.\textsuperscript{696} Therein lay the novelty of the Allies’ plan. It reversed the interwar imbalance between independent and partisan

\textsuperscript{692} Vietzen, 512.
\textsuperscript{693} Schlozel, 195.
\textsuperscript{695} Hale, 6; Hurwitz, 41.
\textsuperscript{696} Hurwitz, 37.
publications. In fact, the initial French and American plans envisioned a German press scene in which politically independent newspapers were the only news source.

As the Allies began to assemble the licensed press, a key difference emerged between the French and American approaches. American officials elected to license editorial panels. The idea was to prevent political bias through a diversity of viewpoints. To assemble the panels, officials conducted thorough background investigations of all potential licensees and focused most on candidates’ political histories. French officials took a different approach. In a departure from the American independent press model, they sought to develop a licensed press that appealed to the political mainstream. While they too feared a return to the radicalized press of the 1930s, they felt that the selection of editors with “mainstream” political views provided sufficient guarantees against the development of an extremist press. Thus, the French licensed individuals rather than panels. To identify licensees, French officials relied on their knowledge of the pre-Nazi press and their impressions from informal interviews. Unlike the Americans, they cared more about a candidate’s professional résumé than his political background. In fact, it was not uncommon for editors and journalists who were politically ineligible for employment in the American zone to find work in the French zone. Such leniency underlay the French decision to employ Poppen and Ortmann as the publisher of French newsletters. Given the importance of the German press as a tool for the promotion of France’s postwar image, the French focus on professional qualifications and avoidance of lengthy denazification proceedings was understandable.

French officials began their licensing process in June 1945. In Freiburg they interviewed twenty-three editors and journalists, all but four of whom were right-leaning or Catholic, like the

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697 Bausch, 58.
698 Schlözel, 196.
699 Defrance, *La politique culturelle*, 136; Schlözel, 196.
majority of Freiburgers. In the end Rupert Giessler emerged as the favorite candidate. The 49 year-old offered an attractive combination of anti-Nazi credentials and journalistic experience. He had edited the local Catholic *Tagespost* until Reich officials suspended the paper in 1940. After his dismissal he had fled to Colmar, France, where he worked as a reader for a local printing house. As the publisher of Giessler’s paper French officials selected Heinrich Rombach. Rombach had served as the director of Freiburg’s prewar Catholic Pressverein and published the *Tagespost* through 1940. He was most attractive to French officials because his printing house was one of the few that escaped the war intact. On September 2, 1945 he became the city’s first licensed postwar publisher.

The Americans also began the search for licensees in June. After months of investigation, press officers in Stuttgart settled on a panel that fit their ideal model. Members of the panel had solid anti-Nazi credentials and as a group offered a political diversity that surpassed that of any of the city’s prewar editorial boards. Of course, the editors also had considerable professional experience and saw little need for American tutelage. At 37 years of age, Karl Ackermann was the youngest panelist. Before the war, he had belonged to a radical student group known as the Revolutionary Socialists. He later spent time at Dachau for his opposition to the Nazi regime. After his release he fled to Switzerland, where he edited an anti-Nazi newspaper, entitled *Echo*. Henry Bernhard was a 49 year-old journalist who had served as private secretary to Gustav Stresemann from 1923 until 1929. His ties to the former chancellor and foreign minister rendered him unemployable during the Nazi era and thus increased his appeal as a postwar licensee. The final panelist, Josef Eberle, was 44 years old and had an impressive journalistic résumé, which included positions with the liberal *Sonntagszeitung* and

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700 StadtAF C 5/4, Memo from mayor, 28 Jun 1945; See also, Köhler, 72.
701 Köhler, 274.
Berlin’s *Welt am Montag*. He had also worked for the independent *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Eberle was an ardent anti-Nazi, whom Nazi officials had banned from the Reich Press Chamber.

As licensees began their work across the various zones they encountered different levels of Allied supervision. In Stuttgart, the local editorial panel faced less stringent content controls than their colleagues in Freiburg. American press officers scanned the German press only for militaristic or pro-Nazi material. In general, the policy was to “bring nothing derogatory to Military Government, nothing that is pro-Nazi propaganda, and nothing against the security of the occupation forces.”

American officials also preferred post-publication scrutiny, and after a year they no longer examined the German press before printing. In contrast, French officers adhered to a more stringent censorship policy, which compensated for their more lenient review of personnel. Officials in Freiburg reviewed each issue of the local paper before its release and ordered that all necessary changes be made before printing. Unfortunately, the details of interventions by French censors remained secret.

American officials preferred to influence German press personnel through more indirect means, such as training programs. Here, again, was evidence of their hope that defeated Germans would embrace Allied tutelage. Press officers organized frequent seminars and held meetings with licensees to discuss American journalistic practices. In the fall of 1945 the military government held a training course for all the zone’s editors. In Aachen the Americans opened a school of journalism. A second school followed in Munich, as press

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703 NARA, RG 260, Box 309, 12-97/1 (1), Memo History of ICD, 10 Jul 1946.
705 Bruecher, 123.
706 Kronenberg, 69.
officers continued to nominate journalists for the programs. In October 1945 the military government for Württemberg-Baden sponsored a seminar for the zone’s licensees in Marburg. The opening address revealed the propagandistic purpose of the meeting, as the keynote speaker encouraged attendees to see American journalism as a template for the postwar German press. Yet, as the character of the local German newspapers later revealed, the influence of such conferences remained minimal.

In addition to training and censorship practices, the control of postwar news agencies provided another indirect means of Allied supervision. French zone papers relied most on French news sources. The situation was similar in Stuttgart, where local editors relied on the Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichtenagentur (DANA). Despite the name, the agency operated under American control. DANA relied on American correspondents for reports on news within Germany and received international news from the United States Press Service in Luxembourg.

After months of preparation the third phase of French and American press policy became reality, as licensed newspapers debuted across the western zones in the late summer 1945. Freiburg’s paper, entitled the Freiburger Nachrichten, premiered on September 5. It was the fourth paper to appear in the French zone and by December boasted the region’s third largest circulation with 140,000 copies per issue. Like most early publications, the Freiburg paper appeared on a biweekly basis and, as paper supplies improved, increased in length. Stuttgart’s paper debuted almost two weeks later on September 18. The Stuttgarter Zeitung was the second of sixteen licensed papers in Württemberg-Baden and had an initial circulation of 400,000 copies.

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708 Gruener, 96.
710 Norman, 42.
711 Schlözel, 197.

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per issue.\textsuperscript{712} It was also a biweekly publication and during its first year grew from four to six pages in length.

From the beginning, the influence of the Nazi experience on both editors and readers of the licensed press was obvious and revealed that Germans shared the Allies’ desire for an independent press. The intensity of Nazi-era politics had discouraged Germans from political engagement, and at a time when basic survival was the priority of most Germans, little demand for political journalism emerged. Editors acknowledged the political apathy of their readers and, to the delight of Allied officials, promised a clean break from the polemical press of the 1930s. Thus in Freiburg Giessler assured readers that the city’s nascent periodical “was not a continuation of any earlier newspapers.”\textsuperscript{713} Stuttgart’s editors echoed him. They promised readers that the \textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung} “\textit{keine der früher vorhandenen Zeitungen fortsetzt}.”\textsuperscript{714} In addition to a less political style, the cities’ newspapers also promised to be more inclusive. The \textit{Freiburger Nachrichten} billed itself as a publication for readers of all confessions and political persuasions. It “\textit{wendete sich nicht an eine begrenzte, einseitig bestimmte Schicht von Lesern},” and, “\textit{[wollte] vielmehr dem ganzen Volk dienen und das Sprachrohr aller Kräfte sein}.”\textsuperscript{715} Stuttgart’s paper committed to the same ideal. In his first editorial Ackermann praised the diverse editorial staff and claimed that “\textit{Unsere Stärke besteht in der Zusammenarbeit der verschiedenartigsten weltanschaulichen Strömungen, die sich einig sind in dem einen Ziel, den deutschen Geist in der Richtung auf wirkliche Demokratie zu reformieren}.”\textsuperscript{716}

In addition to the newer features of the press, German editors pledged a return to the region’s pre-1933 free-press traditions. In order to regain the public’s trust in the press, Giessler

\textsuperscript{712} See: NARA, RG 260, Box 309, Report on Activities of Press Control Branch, 12 Jul 1946; Bausch, 64.  
undertook to restore “Freiheit der Gesinnung und des Wortes, [...] Wahrhaftigkeit und Redlichkeit.” In Stuttgart Karl Ackermann made an even more direct appeal to history. He wrote that “mehr als ein Jahrhundert haben unsere hervorragendsten Geister um die Freiheit von Meinung, Presse und Partei gestritten. [...] Wir ehren das Andenken dieser Männer.”

His statement was a reference to the press traditions that had developed in Württemberg and Baden in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. In both cities, then, editors cast Nazi-era press practices as a diversion from an otherwise democratic (Southern) German press heritage. More than Allied influences, which marked only another unwelcome diversion, that heritage was to provide the template for postwar print media.

As local editors embraced a mixture of new and old traditions, they focused on three general themes. The first of these was the Nazi past and issues of guilt and responsibility. It was evidence of the kind of introspection in which Germans engaged not because of Allied prodding, which had only begun a few months earlier, but rather in response to the Reich’s collapse. The licensed press became, in part, a forum for readers and editors, whose opposition to Nazism made them eager to expose the evils of the fallen regime. Eight of the first twenty-five editorials in the Freiburger Nachrichten treated the Nazi past. In September 1945, Giessler drew parallels between the political apathy of postwar Germans and the indifference of the 1930s, which, he argued, had eased the Nazis’ rise to power. Another editorial tackled the question of responsibility for the Nazis’ crimes. Under the heading, “Das Schuldbeckenntnis,” an author criticized efforts to scapegoat Hitler and his inner circle. He warned readers that, “Ihr Teil Schuld tragen auch die 10 Millionen Deutschen, die 1933 bei freier Wahlen für Hitler

719 Hodenberg, 379.
Stuttgart’s editors were no less tenacious in their approach to the past. At least five of the first twenty-five editorials addressed the Nazi experience. Most notable was a column that treated Nazi medical experiments and posed the difficult question: “Wie kann man sich erklären, dass so ungeheuerliche Verbrechen an Tausenden von Unschuldigen nicht nur unter Terrordruck geduldet, sondern schliesslich sogar mit schweigender Zustimmung hingenommen wurden?”

In both papers analysis of the Nazi past extended beyond the editorial columns. Early issues of the Freiburger Nachrichten provided detailed coverage of the fate of concentration camp officials. Proceedings against the “Kommandant of Belsen,” which began a week after the paper’s debut, received thorough coverage. The same kind of reports filled the pages of the Stuttgarter Zeitung. Readers encountered a regular column, entitled “Dokumente aus dem Dritten Reich.” The column comprised copies of records from local Nazi officials that drew the attention of readers to the cynicism of the regime’s policies. One issue featured a Gestapo memo that ordered the suppression of public unrest after a popular local pastor died in a concentration camp. Another document called for the registration of childless couples for government-sponsored fertility counseling.

A second general theme was Germany’s future. In both cities editors devoted a majority of their columns to matters of political, economic, and social reconstruction. An early issue of the Freiburger Nachrichten included an essay on the importance of family in the postwar period. The column suggested that while the material consequences of the war weighed most on the community, the war’s “moral consequences” were “viel folgenschwerer [...] besonders in Bezug

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auf Ehe, Familie und allgemeine Sittlichkeit.” Two weeks later the paper addressed the nation’s political future. An editorial suggested that democratization did not mean a return to the flawed Weimar system, which so many Germans dreaded. At the same time, the author called on readers to heed the lessons of the interwar experience: “Die Vergangenheit hat uns gezeigt, nicht dass Politik den Charakter verdirbt, sondern dass schlechte Charaktere nur schlechte Politik machen können. Die Zukunft fordert starke Charaktere.” In Stuttgart, an editorial, entitled “Mut in der Finsternis,” issued the same challenge. The author suggested that readers approach reconstruction as a break with past political and social institutions, because “es gibt keinen geschichtlichen Vorgang, der irgendwie hierfür tragte, und so müssen wir denn auf die Tröstungen verzichten, um derentwillen wir so gerne den Pfad der Analogie zu betreten pflegen.” The paper also stressed the need to involve Germany’s youth in the rebuilding process. In November an editorial worried, “Ob es unsere Jugend nicht verlockt, an diesem ehrlichen Kampf teilzunehmen, statt müde abseits zu stehen.” Despite their various subjects, then, each of these columns cast reconstruction as a German challenge. They encouraged readers to learn the lessons of the German past rather than adopt Allied visions for the future.

A third popular feature was reader-involvement. In its inaugural issue, the Freiburger Nachrichten called for “rege Mitarbeit unserer Leser,” and pledged to, “den Lesern selbst gern das Wort zu freier, verantwortungsbewusster Aussprache geben.” Stuttgart’s readers received the same encouragement. Ackermann invited, “reger Austausch zwischen Leserschaft und Redaktion,” and told readers that the paper was, “die Zeitung des Lesers.” To facilitate reader involvement both papers included regular “letters-to-the-editor” columns. Readers seized the

opportunity and tackled a variety of subjects, from food and the role of women in postwar society to collective guilt for Nazi crimes. Some readers were slow to trust the new press and continued to make anonymous submissions. In December 1945 the Freiburger Nachrichten issued a reminder that secrecy was no longer a feature of the German media. An editorial noted that, “zumal heutzutage, wo es nicht mehr als Staatsverbrechen gewertet wird, eine eigene Meinung zu haben, und wo der, der es unternimmt, diese seine Meinung zu äußern, weder Gestapo noch KZ zu fürchten hat.”

One subject on which editors did not dwell was the Allies. Coverage of the occupiers rarely extended beyond reports about inter-Allied diplomacy, official policy announcements, and accounts of visiting dignitaries. And the reports were sterile. An example appeared in Freiburg with a story about the Allies’ decision to make Germans fund the boarding of occupation troops. The influence of the censors was palpable when, without editorial interjection, the article announced that “Nach der Zusammenkunft der alliierten Kontrollkommission [...] wurde eine Proklamation veröffentlicht, in der den Deutschen bekanntgegeben wird, dass sie die Unterhaltskosten der Alliierten Besatzungstruppen werden bezahlen müssen.” If, however, censors succeeded in restricting negative coverage of the occupation, press officers also failed to achieve more positive coverage of the occupiers themselves. In both cities editors appeared unwilling to promote the Allies and their cultures. The cultural section of the Freiburger Nachrichten only addressed French themes on rare occasions. American culture fared no better in Stuttgart. In September the local paper there ran excerpts from Reader's Digest, which

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offered anecdotes about a restaurant in North Carolina and a Washington, DC taxi ride.\textsuperscript{734} The paper’s cultural section did not explore America again until November, when it provided an excerpt of Christian Schubart’s travel diary, which on a visit to America in 1776 predicted that, “bald werden einige ihres Volkes wie Riesen aufwachen und den Briten zeigen, was die gereizte Menschheit zu tun imstande ist.”\textsuperscript{735} In the end, French and American culture achieved little more exposure in the pages of Freiburg and Stuttgart newspapers than it did on the cities’ screens and stages. The local press provided a forum in which to explore not the traditions and values of Allied societies but rather the recent German past and the uncertain German future.

Because of its German focus, the early licensed press drew mixed reactions from the occupiers. On the one hand, French officials in Freiburg were satisfied that they had achieved their main goal of restricting negative coverage of the occupation. Press officers were also content with the independent tone of the \textit{Freiburger Nachrichten} and described the paper as a tremendous improvement over the “\textit{pauvreté des articles du temps nazi.”}\textsuperscript{736} In addition, they were pleased with the decline in rumors that accompanied the paper’s debut.\textsuperscript{737} On the other hand, the occupiers were disappointed that the paper had not provided a better showcase for French culture. Press officers continued to push for more French features and suggested a regular French literature column.\textsuperscript{738} Of even greater concern, however, was the imbalance between local and international stories. French reports described the \textit{Freiburger Nachrichten} as too narrow and noted that some readers found the paper to be provincial.\textsuperscript{739} The local bias threatened French plans to distribute the paper beyond the zone’s borders as a source of pro-
French propaganda. To succeed in competition with other papers, and thus provide an effective medium for the rehabilitation of France’s image, the paper needed to broaden its focus. On this point, French and German views complemented each other. In addition to readers’ demands for a more comprehensive periodical, the local newspaper staff also welcomed the increased profits that came with an expanded circulation.

In November 1945 a press officer from Freiburg toured the American zone and was impressed with the broader, more international scope of the press in Frankfurt and Stuttgart. When he returned, he enlisted a Freiburg publishing firm, which had ties to the prewar mass-circulation Frankfurter Zeitung, to establish a zone-wide newspaper similar to those that he observed on his trip. The result was the Badische Zeitung, which debuted on February 1, 1946. The differences between the new paper’s scope and that of its predecessor were obvious. The new paper was more international. Almost 75% of the front page stories in the first twenty issues concerned international developments. By contrast, the first twenty front pages of the Freiburger Nachrichten had comprised less than 50% international stories. At the same time, local news, which had accounted for 10% of the front page stories in the first twenty issues of the Freiburger Nachrichten, was absent from the early front pages of the Badische Zeitung. Under the new title, editorials expanded their focus as well. While only 3 of the first 25 editorials in the Freiburger Nachrichten treated international affairs, 8 of the initial 25 editorials in the Badische Zeitung addressed the topic.

In Stuttgart American reactions to early German newspapers were also mixed. On the one hand, officials were pleased with the reporting in the Stuttgarter Zeitung and concluded that the paper “presents considerable news coverage and in that respect is one of the best in the
American zone.” They also praised the paper’s contribution to the reduction of rumors. On the other hand, the paper did not adhere to American stylistic guidelines. It ran its editorials on the front page and featured a cultural section, which press officers felt was more suited for magazines. In addition, smaller violations of American directives irritated the occupiers. Press officers bemoaned the use of Gothic script and the printing of military titles in the personals section.

American officials encountered greater resistance to their efforts to alter the licensed press. In vain press officers attempted to change the style of the Stuttgarter Zeitung and focused most on the placement of editorials. After the editors resisted orders in the fall of 1945 to shift opinion pieces to the interior of the paper, press officers revisited the issue in March 1946. They ordered a month-long trial-period, in which editorials were not to appear on the front page. Again the editors refused. Because American officials were unwilling to engage in strict content-control they had little recourse. After five days press officers conceded defeat and reduced their order to a “suggestion.” In their adherence to tradition, Stuttgart’s editors had thus rejected a major feature of the American press model.

As American officials struggled with the format of the licensed press, they also grew frustrated with one of their licensees. Henry Bernhard had emerged as a vocal critic of American press policies and ruffled feathers in late 1945, when he criticized the American-controlled news agency, DANA, from which his paper received most of its material. Bernhard disliked American reporting and disagreed with orders for the relocation of editorials. As one press officer

740 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Memo to Arthur Eggleston, 3 Apr 1946.
741 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Note – Scotching a Rumor, 14 Aug 1946.
742 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Memo from F.J. Pearson to Director Military Government, 5 Mar 1946.
744 See Stuttgarter Zeitung, 23 Mar – 2 Apr 1946; Lersch, 460.
745 Lersch, 461.
reported, the editor had “little sympathy with American style and objectivity.”

In February 1946 the editor caused more sparks with a discussion of the, “verständliche Hasspsychose,” with which American troops treated German prisoners of war. The director of the ICD, Colonel J.H. Hills, observed that “Bernhard is either writing with his tongue in his cheek or seeking to give pleasure to former Nazis while at the same time placating us […] He shows ‘understanding’ in relation to us, but at the same time definitely pins a ‘psychosis’ label on us.” Although American officials began to question Bernhard’s qualifications, they stopped short of removing him from his position. Their reluctance owed to the American adherence to “democratic” governance and aversion to direct intervention in the internal affairs of individual newspapers. In any case, Bernhard’s critique illustrated not only the differences between German and American press ideals, but also the disdain with which some German personnel confronted American efforts to refashion local newspapers. In the wake of the Nazis’ dramatic transformation of the German press, postwar editors were in no mood for further deviations from pre-1933 traditions. The accommodation of such sentiment most distinguished French from American policy.

To be sure, the initial license was the product of the Allies’ early press monopoly. It was the result of Allied personnel selections, censorship, and oversight. Yet, at the same time, the transition from Allied newsletters to German newspapers marked a key shift from public to private means of gathering information and signaled the beginning of the end of Allied press controls. Although licensed newspapers continued to reflect Allied calls for a politically independent media, they catered more to German interests. While such interests clashed more
with American policy than its less transformative French counterpart, editors and journalists in both zones began to take more responsibility for the postwar press. In the meantime, German readers were also empowered and influenced newspapers not only with their wallets but also through their submissions to specific publications. After less than a year, then, control of the German press had begun to shift to the Germans. As the occupation continued, the trend endured thanks to mounting challenges to Allied press initiatives.

A Year of Change: Allied Policy and the Licensed Press, 1946

In 1946 three major developments altered the shape of the German press. First, German political parties challenged the Allies’ independent press model. Second, personnel reductions weakened the Allies’ capacity to influence German newspapers. Third, inter-Allied squabbles emboldened German editors to resist further the Allies’ guidance.

Political challenges to the independent press emerged as the first postwar elections drew closer. In Freiburg elections for the municipal and state governments occurred in September 1946 and May 1947, respectively. In Stuttgart, similar elections were held in May and November. As they began to campaign, German politicians were no longer content with the infrequent columns that Allied officials afforded them in the licensed press. Party leaders began to demand more regular media access, in order to present their platforms to voters and promote their views of postwar developments. Ironically, Allied democratization efforts, which called for the establishment of political parties, had created additional problems for press officers, who now faced increased pressure to grant these parties a voice.

Challenges to the independent press model elicited different responses from Allied officials. French press officers elected to allow a limited party press. The French had adopted

the independent press model for pragmatic reasons and did not share the American ideological opposition to party newspapers. In fact, they would have allowed a party press sooner if paper supplies had been greater. Nonetheless, officials in Freiburg were partial to the *Badische Zeitung*. They had invested considerable energy in the paper and had high expectations for its future as a medium of French propaganda. To protect the publication, local press officers thus allotted smaller paper rations to the various political titles.

By the summer of 1946 party newspapers began to appear throughout the French zone. In Freiburg, the papers’ circulation numbers corresponded roughly to the city’s political alignment. The Social Democratic *Das Volk* debuted first in July and within a year expanded its circulation to 60,000 copies per issue. The Communist *Der neue Tag* soon followed and grew its circulation to 70,000 copies per issue. A month later, the Christian Democratic, *Südwestdeutsche Volkszeitung* appeared. As the voice of the city’s majority party, the paper achieved the largest circulation with 100,000 copies per issue. The local Democratic Party did not begin circulation of its *Das Neue Baden* until the following spring.

American press officers were less sympathetic to the demands of German political parties. In fact, America was the only Ally that did not license party newspapers. Yet, to appease German political leaders and thus soften opposition to American policies, press officers approved the distribution of political newsletters. In Stuttgart the Communist *Volksstimme* and the Social Democratic *Volkswille* premiered in April 1946. A month later the Democratic, *Das andere Deutschland*, and the Christian Democratic, *CDU-Nachrichten*, followed. Still,

751 AOC, Bade 716, Minutes of Comité de Direction de la Presse, 5 Jan 1946.
752 AOC, Bade 716, Memo from Direction des Affaires Administratives, 23 Jan 1948.
753 Kronenberg, 25.
754 Kronenberg, 25.
755 Kronenberg, 25.
756 Hurwitz, 153.
757 Vietzen, 516.
American officials limited the content of the newsletters to intraparty business and ordered that the circulation not extend beyond party members. While the demand for a political press remained low throughout the occupation, party newspapers constituted a vital component of the press tradition that postwar Germans undertook to revive. In their refusal to allow a political press to develop, the Americans thus ran afoul of German press expectations.

In addition to the issue of political newspapers, political conflicts among licensed editors created headaches for American officials. In fact, differences between the members of Stuttgart’s editorial panel threatened to cripple the city’s newspaper after only six months. In February 1946 the mayor advised American officials that “The three licensees of the present Stuttgarter Zeitung are not well chosen and serious frictions among them had already arisen.” Tensions were greatest between the liberal Bernhard and the leftist Ackermann, whose work had begun to carry a Communist tone. In May nine of the paper’s ten section editors threatened to resign if Ackermann remained with the paper. They argued that his political views did not mesh well with those of the other editors. In addition to his colleagues, Ackermann also frustrated American officials when, in an attack on the independent press ideal, he described the paper as being “inter-party” rather than “above parties.” Tensions peaked when the editorial board dissolved in October. Ackermann left Stuttgart for a position as editor of the Mannheimer Morgen, while Bernhard resigned after officials gave him the choice between resignation and “wholehearted” collaboration with his co-editors. In Stuttgart, at least, the American attempt to establish an independent newspaper above partisan squabbles had failed.

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758 Vietzen, 516.
759 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/241-1 (3), Memo from ICD Stuttgart to Chief ICD-OMGWB, 4 Feb 1946.
760 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Memo from Peter H. Olden to Chief, Press Branch, ICD-OMGWB, 18 May 1946.
761 Lersch, 464.
762 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Memo from Peter H. Olden to Chief, Press Branch, ICD-OMGWB, 18 May 1946.
The situation worried American officials. In fact, they delayed preparations for a second independent paper in Stuttgart in order to focus on repairing the first. To replace the departed editors, the Americans selected Erich Schairer and Franz Karl Maier. Schairer was a 59 year-old Socialist and, like the majority of Stuttgarters, a Protestant. In 1920 he had founded the Socialist *Sonntags-Zeitung*, to which Eberle had made periodic contributions. Maier was a 36-year old Catholic lawyer. To the relief of American officials, the new editorial team proved more cohesive.

Nevertheless, the collapse of the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* weighed on the minds of press officers as they resumed preparations for a second licensed paper in the fall of 1946. The experience had shown them that while a politically diverse editorial panel could broaden the scope of reporting, it could also threaten a paper’s stability. Press officers now saw that the cohesiveness of an editorial staff was as important as the diversity of a panel’s political views. Officials found that cohesiveness in their new panel, which included Bernhard. Given Bernhard’s opposition to the American press model, the decision to re-license him was odd. However, he was a competent journalist and one of the few available editors who possessed the requisite anti-Nazi qualifications. A lack of available German personnel often forced occupation officials to reevaluate their qualification standards and personnel selections. Erwin Schoettle and Otto Färber joined Bernhard on the new panel, which comprised no Communists. In fact, no Communist held an editorial position with the licensed independent press in Stuttgart after Ackermann’s departure. This was not surprising given the lack of electoral success for Communists in the city and the increasingly anti-Communist tone of American policy in the wake of the famous Stuttgart speech by Secretary of State Byrnes in September 1946.
With the new editorial panel in place Stuttgart’s second licensed newspaper, entitled the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, debuted on November 12, 1946 with an initial run of 140,000. The editors promised readers “*eine deutsche Zeitung [...] die eintritt für Recht, Freiheit und Kultur.*” The new paper focused on international news and gave less attention to the Nazi past. Only two of the first twenty editorials treated the matter. The more forward-looking orientation of the paper owed as much to editorial preference as to the timing of the premiere some sixteen months after the end of the war, when reconstruction, elections, and the implications of world politics for Germany’s future concerned readers and editors more than recent history.

Despite the differences between the two papers, American reactions to the new publication were as mixed as their reactions to the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*. On the one hand, press officers praised the paper’s news coverage, and they felt that the editors did a good job of recounting both domestic and international developments. Officials also commended the paper for its efforts to identify and quash rumors. On the other hand, they were disappointed with the lack of articles about America and American culture. One press officer lamented that, “people in the French and Russian zones are far-better informed about conditions in France and Russia.” The lack of features on France and French culture in Freiburg’s *Badische Zeitung* casts doubt on this conclusion. Nevertheless, the American officers proposed a “series of articles describing everyday life, politics and cultural life in the US.” To his chagrin, Stuttgart’s editors ignored the suggestion.

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764 See *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, Nº 1-20, 1945.
765 See: NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/241-1 (3), Note: Germany, December 4, 1946; NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/241-1 (3), Note: Press, 23 Dec 1946.
767 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/241-1 (3), Memo from Mr. Olden to Mr. Eggleston, 15 Sep 1947.
A second development in 1946 that reshaped the German press scene was the start of a series of Allied personnel reductions. As French and American officials continued to pursue their different policies, they had to do so with smaller staffs. In June 1946 the staff of the Stuttgart Information Control Division shrunk from 50 officials and 84 enlisted men to 38 officials and 12 enlisted men. The remaining American personnel focused on post-production censorship and the organization of training seminars. Similar reductions occurred in Freiburg. With fewer press officers the Direction de l’Information initiated a shift from pre- to post-publication censorship. To protect France’s postwar image as long as possible, officials called for a gradual transition. If anti-French sentiment crept into the press, officers were to return to the, “‘a priori’ censorship regime.” In the meantime, repeated personnel cuts forced occupation officials across Germany to rely on the help of German civilian employees in local press offices. Like the shift from Allied newsletters to German newspapers, however, reliance on Germans for the execution of occupation policies signaled a further weakening of the Allies’ position.

A final key development of 1946 that influenced the German press was a series of squabbles within the Allied Control Council. Throughout the summer Soviet and American officials argued over the content of licensed newspapers in their respective zones. In August Soviet officials in East Berlin confiscated American-zone papers, which had complained about the preferential treatment of the German Socialist Unity Party by the Soviets. American officials were loath to retaliate with the confiscation of Soviet-zone newspapers, because they feared a division of the German media along Allied lines. Of course, the pursuit of separate

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769 AOC, Bade 716, Minutes of Comité de Direction de la Presse, 22 Oct 1946.
770 NARA, RG 260, Box 311, Memo from ICD, 28 Oct 1946.
771 Hurwitz, 327.
press policies in the different occupation zones had, in part, already done just that. The Control Council proposed a solution in October. A new directive declared “es deutschen demokratischen Parteien ebenso wie der deutschen Presse gestattet sein, deutsche politische Probleme frei zu besprechen. Kommentare über die Politik der Besatzungsmächte in Deutschland sind erlaubt.” Still, the ban on militaristic, nationalistic, and anti-democratic content remained in force as a door to the re-imposition of censorship.

While members of the Allied Control Council agreed to this solution in principle, press officers in the various occupation zones differed in their enforcement of it. American officials redesigned their press-control policies around the more liberal guidelines. French officials dismissed them. In fact, the Direction de l’Information reasserted its ban on criticism of the occupation. A policy memo announced that “Les libertés qui semblent être accordées par cette loi aux rédacteurs allemands sont compensées par la réaffirmation des interdictions énoncées déjà par SHAEF et ne changent pratiquement rien aux directives déjà données à la zone française.” For French press officers, then, the protection of France’s image remained the top priority.

The Licensed Press After 1946

The response of the German press to the developments of 1946 was mixed. Despite the French shift from pre- to post-publication censorship and the new freedoms afforded to editors by the Control Council, Freiburg’s Badische Zeitung remained neutral toward the occupation. While it did not criticize French actions, it also refrained, as noted above, from more positive coverage of French culture and society. Like its predecessor, the paper remained first and foremost a forum for the discussion of Germans and Germany. The timing and content of the

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772 Cited in: Hurwitz, 328.
773 AOC, Bade 716, Minutes of Comité de Direction de la Presse, 22 Oct 1946.
news cycle continued to determine the depth of the paper’s occupation coverage. The Freiburg party press was less neutral and did exercise the new freedoms that the Control Council had promised. Most troublesome for the French was the Communist *Unser Tag*. In August 1947 the paper ruffled feathers when it called on local construction workers to strike in protest against the western occupation. In January 1948 French frustration peaked after the paper criticized the use of French textbooks in German schools. The military government responded with a temporary suspension of the publication.

The contrast between the critical tone of the party press and the sustained neutrality of the *Badische Zeitung* was curious. French records were silent on the matter. To be sure, it is not clear if the editors of the *Badische Zeitung* were even interested in filling their pages with polemical rants against the occupation. Still, it is plausible that in the wake of personnel reductions French censors focused their energies on the *Badische Zeitung*, which had a wider circulation and played a larger role in the campaign to promote France’s image. With French eyes directed at the independent press, the party press thus faced less pre-publication scrutiny and was able to issue more critical editorials than the *Badische Zeitung*. At the same time, the need to advance a set of political arguments gave the party press an incentive to criticize the occupation that the independent press did not have. It was not, in fact, uncommon for German political leaders to use criticism of the occupation as a means to appeal to voters.

In Stuttgart reaction to the Allies’ weakened position was more pronounced. The two main papers continued to favor German press practices and subjects over American ones and, now, grew more critical of the occupation. In November 1946 the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* praised the US decision to treat Austria as a liberated country and suggested that Germany deserved

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similar treatment. Three weeks later the paper bemoaned the denazification law in the American zone. An editorial argued that the law, which called for the examination of an individual’s political background before May 1, 1937, gave an unfair advantage to those who joined the Nazi party later. The paper also voiced frustration over increasing inter-Allied tensions and suggested that the Allies themselves posed the biggest threat to the postwar peace. In May 1949 the paper ran a cartoon that pictured “the Peace Dove seated at the feet of military figures with hands on sword-hilts, representing the US, France, Britain and Russia.” The caption read, “If none of them rattles the saber now perhaps she’ll stay put.”

The Stuttgarter Nachrichten was no less critical of the Allies. In April 1947 the paper called the sentencing of Nazi Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, too harsh. It also reprinted a critique of American literature that first appeared in Margret Boveri’s controversial 1946 study of Americans and American society, entitled Amerika Fibel. The article described America as a land where “there is as yet only one similarly all-embracing idea: That of business and profit, wherefore the majority of American writers, like overworked machines are prematurely used.”

A Fight to the Bitter End – The Allies’ Retreat from Press Control

As the end of the occupation neared and the Allies’ numbers continued to shrink, officials displayed remarkable tenacity in pursuit of their core press objectives. In Freiburg press officers remained committed to censorship and the protection of France’s image. However, they now relied more on indirect methods of control, such as paper rationing. While the Americans relinquished control of the paper market in their zone in July 1948, the French continued to

776 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Note, “Austria,” 6 Nov 1946.
777 NARA, RG 260, Box 221, 5/240-3 (11), Note, “Denazification,” 26 Nov 1946.
administer it in theirs until May 1949.\textsuperscript{781} French press officers also continued to censor the local media through the confiscation of objectionable newspapers. Periodicals from the other occupation zones, which now appeared in Freiburg through interzonal exchange agreements, were the most common targets. In January 1948 press officers seized copies of the American-licensed \textit{Rhein-Neckar Zeitung}. They provided no justification for the move and inspired no little frustration among American officials.\textsuperscript{782} A month later the French seized copies of the Soviet-zone \textit{Tägliche Rundschau}, \textit{Berliner Zeitung}, and \textit{Neues Deutschland}.\textsuperscript{783} Officials again provided no justification for their actions.

Although less effective, the Americans were no less determined. Even as the licensed press continued to rebuff efforts to Americanize it, officials continued their attempts to influence German editors and journalists. In January 1948 press officers in Stuttgart issued plans “to obtain various American books on journalism and newspaper ethics for distribution to all newspapers in Württemberg-Baden, with strong suggestions that they be read by all editors and reporters.”\textsuperscript{784} Plans were also underway for an American journalism school in Stuttgart. In addition, the military government sent German media personnel to America for training. To facilitate the latter, American officials again turned to the private sector for help. With funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, which had administered cultural diplomacy for the American government before 1945, Eberle attended the American Press Institute Training Program at

\textsuperscript{781} AOC, Bade 716, Minutes of the Comité de Direction de la Presse, 16 May 1949; NARA, RG 260, Box 313, Monthly ICD Report, 6 Aug 1948.
\textsuperscript{782} NARA, RG 260, Box 309, 12/96-2 (21), Memo from Nicholas Canaday, 9 Jan 1948.
\textsuperscript{783} AOC, Bade 741, Memo from R. Bareton to Délégués de cercle, 17 Feb 1948.
\textsuperscript{784} NARA, RG 260, Box 311, Quarterly Objectives ICD – First Quarter 1948, 9 Jan 1948.
Columbia University in September 1948.\textsuperscript{785} While such training efforts produced no tangible shifts in the character of local newspapers, they affirmed both the hope that Germans would embrace “superior” American practices and the refusal of American press officers to acknowledge the clear German preference for native rather than foreign press models. General Clay demonstrated similar intransigence when upon his departure from Germany he insisted that American papers, like the \textit{Neue Zeitung} “should continue as long as possible not only to be the voice of America but also to serve as examples of the part to be played by press and radio in maintaining the integrity of public institutions.”\textsuperscript{786}

Still, one Allied priority, the dominant position of the non-party press, required little defense from press officers. In 1949 independent newspapers remained the most popular German news medium. Party newspapers were still in print but had fewer readers after the currency reform of June 1948 brought higher prices and reduced circulation. More important for the future of the party press than the currency reform was the continued political apathy of readers.\textsuperscript{787} This apathy and the desire to avoid future political turmoil later found expression in Konrad Adenauer’s campaign slogan, “\textit{Keine Experimente!”} Allied officials continued to observe such sentiment throughout the occupation. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, a majority of readers viewed the independent press as a sufficient source of information and an adequate forum for the discussion of contemporary political, social, and cultural issues. Their satisfaction became more apparent as demand for party newspapers continued to shrink even after the end of Allied press controls.\textsuperscript{788} Certainly, the experience of 1930s politics and the trauma of the Second World War had had a lasting effect on German readers and were at least as responsible for the

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\textsuperscript{786} Clay, 289.
\textsuperscript{787} Kronenberg, 29.
\textsuperscript{788} Hurwitz, 288.
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popularity of the independent press as any Allied attempt to refashion German media preferences.

In the spring of 1949 Allied officials initiated the end of their press policies. On May 1 American authorities issued three general licenses that allowed the publication of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books without Allied preapproval. Officials made clear that materials published under the general license must not incite resistance to the Allies or contain militaristic, fascist, racist, or National Socialist material. French officials issued a similar license in their zone four months later. Because they viewed their authority as central to the defense of France’s image, they had postponed the end of licensing as long as possible. Nevertheless, as the occupation statute entered into force on September 21, 1949, the era of the licensed press came to an official end throughout the western zones.

Conclusion:

French and American officials approached the establishment of the postwar German press in different ways. French press officers were most concerned with the defense and promotion of France’s image and through strict censorship policies largely achieved their goals. At the same time, however, the French recognized similarities between their own press traditions and those of pre-Nazi Germany and did little to frustrate German efforts to restore the latter in the wake of the Reich’s collapse. By contrast, American press policy did challenge German efforts with plans to Americanize postwar newspapers. Although the Americans struggled to realize their objectives with an indirect administrative style, relations between American and German press officials proved more contentious because of greater discrepancies between German and American ideals. Nevertheless, both Allies’ positions weakened with time and

789 Henry Pilgert, Press, Radio and Film in West Germany. 1945-1953 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 1953) 27.
allowed Germans increased responsibility for the content as well as the format of local newspapers. In both cities, then, the printed page reflected German more than Allied visions.
Chapter 6: Back to School – Debating the Future of Germany’s Youth

Among the Western Allies’ cultural initiatives, efforts to reform the German education system were unique. Film, theater, and press policies all targeted adults and sought immediate results. As Germans labored to rebuild their country, American films offered them an illustration of “democratic living,” while French plays modeled the values of *la civilisation* and licensed newspapers provided an experiment in the freedoms of speech and press. In short, the policies targeted the practices and thinking of those Germans on whom the immediate rebuilding process depended. By contrast, Allied education initiatives targeted Germany’s youth and called for longer-term results. In the classroom Allied officials worked not only to counter twelve years of Nazi pedagogy, but also to instill in Germany’s future generations a commitment to peace and democracy. In other words, school reform offered a means to guarantee German adherence to the values that informed the Allies’ message on the postwar screen, stage, and printed page. In addition to its unique mission, however, the contentious nature of education policy distinguished it from other Allied cultural initiatives. More than film, theater, or the press, education lay at the intersection of German politics, religion, and culture and had long been the subject of intense debate among the Germans themselves. Attempts to reform German schools thus forced Allied officials to engage a wider variety of German actors and mediate a greater diversity of German viewpoints.

As Allied education officers surveyed German schools in the spring 1945, they encountered the disastrous results of Nazi education policy. Through the reform of textbooks, the purge of teaching staffs, and the reorganization of schools, Nazi officials had transformed the various Weimar-era regional school systems into a national system for the indoctrination of Germany’s youth. They had also established private political schools and extracurricular youth
organizations, which later detracted from students’ basic education. The so-called *Napola* academies drew students away from the public school system, while groups like the *Hitler Jugend* encouraged absenteeism by requiring members to attend functions during school hours. The situation only worsened after 1939, as teachers, and, later, students, began to leave the classroom for the battlefield, and air raids and food shortages created regular disruptions. As the war drew to a close, Allied bombs brought an end to most school operations and reduced thousands of classrooms to rubble. Amid the destruction Allied education officers began their work.

During the initial months of the occupation, a variety of Allied and German visions for the postwar education system emerged. French and American officials understood education reform as essential to the democratization of postwar Germany and viewed their own domestic education systems as templates for the reconstruction of German schools. Similarities between the French and German school traditions, however, rendered French reforms less radical than American reforms, which proposed to remodel the German school system along American lines. Germans also differed in their approach to the schools. In fact, the collapse of the Reich had inspired the restoration of long-standing debates over the structure and purpose of the education system. “Traditionalists” argued in defense of the pre-1933 multi-track school system, while “reformers” favored the creation of a more equitable, single-track model. Despite such divisions, Germans united in their opposition to Allied interference. Amid the cacophony of the German debate, French and American officials struggled to make their voices heard.

This chapter examines their struggles and explores the construction of the postwar German school system as a negotiation between competing Allied and German education philosophies. It contrasts Allied and German assessments of German education traditions and
considers what changes, if any, the various parties proposed. The chapter also discusses differences between French and American education policies and asks how those policies informed each Ally’s position within the German school debate. The analysis focuses on the primary and secondary public education system and is most concerned with structural reform initiatives as a reflection of German and Allied education philosophies. Although Allied officials also undertook to reform German universities and adult-education programs, they concentrated on public schools, which served a much wider segment of the German population. While Freiburg and Stuttgart remain the focus of the chapter, the postwar restoration of regional education administration requires consideration of state actors and policies in Southern Baden and Württemberg-Baden as well.

The chapter reveals that proponents of the status quo ante dominated the postwar school debate in both cities. Traditionalist sentiment most challenged American officials, who sought to eliminate the differentiated German school structure and streamline, to “Americanize,” the postwar education system. While their motivations, which included a commitment to providing equal educational opportunities to all German students, differed from those of Nazi education officials, American plans for a unified, undifferentiated school system resembled the Nazi reforms that “traditionalists” had despised prior to 1945. By contrast, French proposals, which reflected similarities between French and German education practices, threatened the traditionalist agenda less and outlined only a modest reform program. Thus, negotiations between Allied and German education officials were less contentious in Freiburg than in Stuttgart. However, after four years of occupation, the structural and philosophical underpinnings of both cities’ school systems reflected less the influence of Allied models than

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adherence to pre-1933 German traditions. In Freiburg, French influence owed more to the willingness of French officials to impose their objectives on local education officials than a German desire to adopt even the most similar, foreign models. In the wake of what they viewed as disastrous Nazi education policies, German officials in both cities were eager not to pursue new, Allied reform experiments, but rather to restore and demonstrate the integrity of their own pre-Nazi educational philosophies.

**Philosophical Underpinnings: Allied and German Education Traditions and Personnel**

In their approach to the design of postwar schools Allied and German officials favored their own school traditions. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, German officials emphasized the unique purpose and structure that had informed the nation’s various regional school systems prior to 1933. From the earliest *Ritterakademien* and Latin training schools to the more developed public schools of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, German schools had served less to provide students with a general education than to orient them toward specific professional, and social, positions at a young age. By the early nineteenth century the organization of public schools reflected their “directional” purpose and comprised separate primary and secondary tracks. Primary schools, or *Volksschulen*, constituted the only educational experience for a vast majority of German children. In states like Württemberg, the schools functioned as separate Catholic and Protestant institutions, while in Baden they operated after 1876 as *Simultanschulen* and provided common instruction in all subjects except religion. In both states, a minority of primary school students attended *Realschulen* or comprehensive middle schools alongside the *Hauptschulen*.

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graduates attended higher primary institutions, where they pursued some kind of technical training or prepared for a career as a primary instructor. Yet, only in rare cases could primary students enter the secondary school system, which served as the gateway to university studies and careers in the higher civil service.

Across Germany, secondary schools had emerged in the early nineteenth century in response to the government’s need for highly trained officials. The schools, which often operated their own “elementary” classes and charged high tuition fees, catered to wealthier families. For most students the secondary curriculum concluded with a rigorous examination, or Abitur, which provided entrance to the university. The most prestigious of the secondary schools was the Gymnasium, whose curriculum emphasized the study of classical languages. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, an increased demand for skilled white-collar labor had encouraged the establishment of more modern secondary schools, such as the Realgymnasium and the Oberrealschule, which placed greater emphasis on the study of modern languages, science, and math. In any event, the expansion of the secondary system did little to bridge the gap between the separate school tracks.

After 1918 an increased awareness of class distinctions and a desire to minimize discrepancies in the educational opportunities of the different social classes inspired an education-reform movement. Primary teachers, who were sensitive to the plight of lower-class students, and Socialist politicians led the charge. They called for a single-track system that comprised a common school, or Einheitsschule, and provided equal educational opportunities to students of all social backgrounds. Yet, the enthusiasm of the initial postwar period proved short lived, and the reform movement collapsed amid the economic crises and political gridlock of the 1920s. The only significant changes that emerged from the campaign was the nation-wide
termination of separate elementary classes and the creation of both a common 4-year Grundschule for all children from ages 6-10 and an intermediary Aufbauschule.\textsuperscript{792} While the new elementary school delayed the “orientation” of students toward a specific career by four years, and the intermediary school promised to help more primary students enter secondary schools, they did little to alter the fundamental structure and purpose of the school system.\textsuperscript{793} At the time of the Machtergreifung primary schools continued to provide the majority of German students, including those in Freiburg and Stuttgart, with their only educational experience, while attendance at secondary schools remained the privilege of a small, middle class minority.

As French education officers entered Germany, they encountered a school tradition that was not unlike their own. In fact, they recognized the influence of German practices on their own throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As one French education report concluded “

\textit{la comparaison entre le système scolaire français et le système allemand: reconnaissons que sur plusieurs points celui-ci est supérieur [...] à celui-là. [...] Après sa défaite de 1871 qu’on a attribuée à la valeur [...] de l’instituteur allemand, la France désemparée avait tourné ses yeux vers l’Allemagne victorieuse.”}\textsuperscript{794} The French public school system also had a multi-track structure and directed students toward occupations along class lines.\textsuperscript{795} Primary schools, or \textit{école primaires}, served the majority of students, while a select, wealthier minority attended secondary lycées and collèges. In addition, French secondary students completed a rigorous leaving examination, or \textit{baccalauréat}, in order to gain access to


the university. Until the early twentieth century, transfers between the primary and secondary school tracks were no more common in France than Germany.

Despite the common organization and function of French and German public schools, three key differences had emerged between the systems by the late nineteenth century. First, most primary French schools operated as secular institutions after the 1880s. While the confessional nature of primary education had been the subject of great debate between state and church officials since the Revolution, *laïcité* had become a symbol of republican allegiance in public schools by the dawn of the Third Republic. For post-1945 French occupation officials, freedom from religious discrimination, more than class discrimination, was the hallmark of a democratic education system. Yet, if French schools viewed *laïcité* as a defense against the excesses of the Church, some Germans, especially Catholics, viewed confessional schools as a defense against the excesses of the state. Second, the response of French secondary schools to the demands of industrialization differed from that of their German counterparts. Unlike the Germans, the French created no new institutions to teach more modern curricula. Instead, they incorporated the study of science, math, and modern languages into the existing *lycées* alongside the traditional classical curriculum. Finally, interwar reform movements had progressed further during the 1930s and 1940s in France than in Germany. Among the most significant French reforms were the removal of tuition fees for public primary and secondary education and the expansion of the secondary student body to include students of select higher primary

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schools. If the reforms increased mobility between the two school tracks, a strict centralized baccalauréat continued to restrict the number of entrants to the university. Thus the result was less the elimination of exclusivity than a shift from class-based to meritocratic discrimination. In short, the reforms affirmed the exclusionary approach to higher education that had informed the French, and German, school systems for more than a century.

American officials found little about German education traditions familiar. The American public education system comprised a single track that provided secular, common primary and secondary instruction to all students. In fact, the American system most approximated the “common school” for which French and German reformers had pushed during the interwar period. In addition to structural contrasts, however, philosophical differences distinguished American schools from their German, and French, counterparts. For more than a century Americans had viewed their system as “inclusive” and democratic. Unlike French and German schools, which catered to the “highest common denominator” and favored the most talented, and wealthiest students, American schools claimed to provide equal opportunities to all students.

Like American press policy, American education policy reflected a “selective” reading of customs and practices in the United States. In the eyes of American education officials, the inclusiveness of American schools owed to the nation’s unique public-education tradition. American officials concluded that while the French and German systems had developed in response to the needs of an expanding nineteenth century bureaucracy, American schools had emerged in response to the needs of the people. Because America lacked a strong central government, the nation’s commitment to education had had to come from below. The situation

799 Ringer, Education and Society, 127-130.
800 Jutta-B. Lange-Quassowski, Neuordnung oder Restauration (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1979) 59.
fostered a distinct connection between the establishment of schools and the common defense and inspired Thomas Jefferson to argue that if ignorance was the enemy of the free, education offered the best protection against tyranny. As waves of immigrants later flooded into the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, reformers such as Horace Mann strengthened the nation’s belief in the unifying power of education with the argument that common schooling would help integrate America’s increasingly diverse society.\footnote{Tent, Mission, 3.} To provide all Americans with a common set of values, American schools began to emphasize civics and morality, in addition to the traditional subjects of reading, writing, math, and science. By the early twentieth century schools offered a more general education than their European counterparts and served not to funnel students into narrow professional categories but to unify them through an informative experience. Although such readings of the history of American education belied the realities of racial and socio-economic segregation in American society, the view of American schools as institutions of equality nevertheless endured in the minds of occupation officials.

Countless voices had helped to perpetuate such idealized views. One in particular influenced the thinking of postwar education officers. Throughout his career as psychologist, author, and philosopher, John Dewey championed the American tradition of “democratic” education. He was, in fact, a harsh critic of the German school system for both its service to the state and what he viewed as its dogmatic underpinnings.\footnote{Otto Schlander, “Der Einfluss von John Dewey und Hans Morgenthau auf die Formulierung der Re-educationspolitik,” Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau: Die Bildungspolitik der Besatzungsmächte in Deutschland und Österreich, ed. Manfred Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 49.} He challenged the narrow German concept of Erziehung, which stressed the memorization of facts, and called for more expansive learning that coupled classroom lessons with practical experiences. For postwar education officers, Dewey’s understanding of “democratic education” was most important. He envisioned
a school system that minimized social divisions, encouraged tolerance, and fostered innovation by mixing students of all social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds in a common school at a young age. In his 1929 treatise, entitled Democracy and Education, he argued that, “Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought. The more activity is restricted to a few definite lines – as it is when there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences – the more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a disadvantage.” He added that, “Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct.” In their approach to German schools, American education officers shared Dewey’s objection to a stratified education system and his fear of the acquiescence that structural divisions could foster. To American observers precisely such passivity and obedience had allowed the Nazis to rise to power. Yet, as education officers distributed copies of Dewey’s writings to their German counterparts, and proposed a radical departure from pre-1933 German education traditions, they failed to grasp that their proposal for a unified, rationalized school system resembled its unpopular Nazi counterpart.

Within each occupation zone negotiations over education reforms fell to specific departments and officials. In the French zone education policy was the purview of the Direction de l’Education Publique (DEP) and its director Raymond Schmittlein, who issued policy decrees on a zone-wide basis. Schmittlein, a French Germanist with a German wife, brought to his work a deep understanding of and appreciation for German education practices that few of his American colleagues possessed. Throughout the zone he employed a staff of younger French Germanists who shared his understanding of German pedagogical traditions. In spite of the

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803 Tent, Mission, 5.
French preference for centralized school administration, Schmittlein afforded his regional staffs authority to adapt policies to local conditions.\textsuperscript{806} This flexibility, as well as the French familiarity with German schools, helped to foster cordial relations between French and German education officials.

Relations between German and American education officials were more strained. The situation most owed to a combination of American ignorance and hubris. While most American education officers insisted on the transferability of their own “superior” native school system, few carried to their work more than a basic knowledge of German school traditions. Most assumed that Nazism’s rise confirmed the undemocratic nature of German schools, which, they accused of paving the way for Hitler by fostering a German penchant for authoritarianism and militarism.\textsuperscript{807} Two rare exceptions among American education personnel were John W. Taylor, who was a professor of education and oversaw developments in the Land-level offices of the military government’s Education and Religious Affairs (ERA) branch, and Richard Thomas Alexander, Taylor’s former mentor and postwar deputy. Both men had a solid understanding of pre-1933 German education practices. Yet, understanding was not synonymous with approval, and both men were, in fact, vocal critics of the German school system.\textsuperscript{808} The same was true for John P. Steiner, who headed the Land ERA office for Württemberg-Baden in Stuttgart, and, like most of his colleagues, had made a career in American education. Unlike Taylor and Alexander, he had little knowledge of German schools and had served as a local school superintendent in New Mexico before the war. His deputy, Richard G. Banks, also a career educator, was a strong advocate of American education traditions.\textsuperscript{809}

\textsuperscript{806} AOC, Bade 4.141, Letter from Laffon to Délégués Supérieurs, 24 Aug 1945; Cheval, 193.
\textsuperscript{807} Puaca, 15f.
\textsuperscript{808} Tent, “American Influences,” 395.
\textsuperscript{809} Tent, Mission, 230.
In their push to reopen and then to reorganize German schools, Allied education officers in both Freiburg and Stuttgart worked closely with local German officials. With the collapse of the Reich Ministry of Education, control of schools reverted to municipal and state governments, which gained increased authority from the Allies throughout the occupation. Municipal leaders regained control of the financing of local primary schools, while the state education ministers and, later, legislatures established the general organization of primary and secondary schools. The latter were also responsible for the funding of secondary education. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, two particular state officials helped to shape the cities’ secondary schools. In Freiburg, Leo Wohleb served both as the first postwar president of Baden and, after December 1946, as the minister of culture and education. As a member of the Badenese Christian-Socialist People’s Party (BCSV), he favored the restoration of pre-1933 education practices and was open to only minor reform proposals. Wohleb’s initial counterpart in Stuttgart was Carlo Schmid, whom French officials named as Württemberg’s state Minister of Culture, Education, and Art in June 1945. As a professor at the University of Tübingen, Schmid had a long career in education and oversaw a ministry that employed a host of educators, including Theodor Bäuerle. Before the war Bäuerle had been a primary school teacher. In fact, both Schmid and he were attractive to French officials because of their professional experience in education.\footnote{Markus Wurster, “Schule und Bildung in Stuttgart in den ersten Jahren nach 1945,” Stuttgart in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren, ed. Edgar Lersch et al (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995) 509.} When the French left Stuttgart, Schmid followed. Bäuerle, however, remained in his position as deputy until he became minister of culture in 1947. He was attractive to American authorities, in part, because he was an acquaintance of Richard Alexander.\footnote{Tent, Mission, 221.} Like Newell Jenkins’s failed campaign to promote his friend Carl Orff as Intendant of Stuttgart’s state theater, Bäuerle’s retention by
American officials affirmed the American practice of hiring personnel not on the basis of their professional expertise but rather their familiarity or work ethic.

**Summer 1945: Restoration Over Reform**

As the war ended, French and American education officers began their work with similar orders to close all German schools. The temporary measure aimed to provide officials time to purge teaching staffs and denazify libraries. While neither power set an immediate date for the reopening of schools, observation of the German youth during the initial postwar weeks convinced Allied officials of the need to restore school operations sooner than later. In the wake of the Reich’s collapse, thousands of parentless children roamed the streets in search of loved ones, shelter, and food. In the absence of parental supervision, crime appealed as a means to secure basic material needs. In Freiburg juvenile convictions totaled 232 during the first postwar year as compared to 114 in 1939. Included in the higher crime statistics were acts of sabotage against phone lines used by the military government. The situation was no better in Stuttgart, where in light of juvenile delinquency municipal officials insisted on the need to reopen local schools. The Americans concurred. One education officer later conceded that “The growing amount of juvenile crimes can be laid to one major item – the children are on the streets.” Concerned for Germany’s youth, then, occupation officials elected to reopen German schools by the fall 1945.

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813 Köhler, 249.
816 NARA, RG 260, Box 888, Folder 12/87-3 (8), OMGWB Ed/Rel Affairs Div – Schools, Weekly Mil Govt Report, Stuttgart Detachment, 8 Sep 1945.
However, before students could return to the classroom, Allied officials had to decide how to structure the German school system. Two possibilities emerged. Education officers could either restore the pre-1933 German system or reorganize schools according to Allied models. During the initial postwar weeks two factors settled the issue in favor of the former. First, French and American education officers arrived in Germany without clear orders for the long-term reform of German education. While they were anxious to import their own ideals and traditions to Germany, they lacked the direction to do so. In the French zone, the lack of policies and the hurried approach to the administration of German affairs was not surprising. As in other cultural policy fields, French education officers had begun preparations late. At the same time, insecurity over France’s position within the Allied community pushed French education officers toward a policy of hurried improvisation. One French official thus declared that, “Afin de n’être pas devancés par nos Alliés, afin de sauvegarder le prestige de la France et de contribuer à sa sécurité, quelles que soient les difficultés que nous rencontrerons [...], nous ouvrirons les écoles à la rentrée.” The unpreparedness of American education officials was more surprising in light of the advanced preparation that underlay the American occupation mission. Yet, as a longer-term reform project, education policy had received less attention from planners at the War Department, who had sought a quick end to the occupation and in response to immediate postwar concerns of reconstruction and denazification, focused on shorter-term information-control strategies for the screen, stage, and printed page. In fact, contrary to the recommendations of the State Department, military planners had assigned the reconstruction of German schools to the underfunded and understaffed ERA branch of the OMGUS administration. During the final weeks of the war, the branch had struggled to determine its objectives amid the on-going dispute

818 Cited in: Defrance, La politique culturelle, 106.
between officials at the Treasury and State Departments. In the end, American education officers entered Germany guided only by the punitive Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067). The document ordered simply that “a coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative program of reorientation will be established, designed completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the development of democratic ideas.” In the absence of a more detailed reform agenda, American officials, like their French colleagues, favored a rapid reopening of German schools along pre-1933 lines.

A second factor that led Allied officials to favor restoration over reform was the desperate material condition of German schools. In Freiburg none of the main primary schools had survived the war without serious damage. During the summer of 1945 city officials worked to find replacements for 117 unusable classrooms. The city’s secondary schools were in worse shape and faced a shortage of 134 classrooms. Stuttgart’s schools fared no better. Only 3 of the 24 primary schools in the city center survived the war intact, while each of the 5 main secondary schools suffered significant damage. The requisition of classrooms as office space by Allied and German municipal officials made the situation worse. Like their colleagues who were charged with theater policy, French and American education officers struggled in vain with their commanders to secure the release of school facilities. Their pleas fell on deaf ears. As the battle for space continued, schools also struggled to obtain supplies and textbooks. The

819 Tent, Mission, 10.
820 Tent, Mission, 9.
material reconstruction of German schools proved so challenging that Allied officials had little
time to implement structural reform during the initial postwar months.\textsuperscript{825}  

French officials insisted on one minor exception. They mandated one hour of French
language instruction per day in German secondary schools. The measure eased exposure to
French film, theater, and art expositions and built on historical efforts to export the French
language as the key to \textit{civilisation}.\textsuperscript{826} To implement their mandate, education officers drew on
another established French practice and posted French “\textit{assistants}” in German classrooms.\textsuperscript{827}
The assistants not only supervised the teaching of French but also provided the military
government with a first-hand account of conditions in the classroom throughout the zone. Most
assistants were young French Germanists, but to the chagrin of German officials, they received
their pay not from French but rather German municipal and state coffers. Three assistants began
work in Freiburg during the initial postwar school year and had permission to work a maximum
of fourteen hours per week.\textsuperscript{828} While German officials were annoyed with the cost of the
assistants, overburdened German teachers appreciated the help in the classroom. In fact,
throughout the occupation French officials had to remind instructors of the limited workload that
assistants were to assume.\textsuperscript{829} Students also appreciated the assistants, whose youth and
knowledge of Germany facilitated welcome Franco-German exchange. As one Badenese student

\textsuperscript{825} Birgit Braun, \textit{Umerziehung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Schul- und Bildungspolitik in
\textsuperscript{826} Angelika Ruge-Schatz, \textit{Umerziehung und Schulpolitik in der französischen Besatzungszone, 1945-1949}
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1977) 76; On the historical export of French language, see: Suzanne Balous, \textit{L’Action
usages de l’Allemagne. Politique culturelle française en Allemagne et rapprochement franco-allemand, 1945-1963,”
\textsuperscript{827} Ruge-Schatz, 76; On the history of the “\textit{assistants},” see: Balous, 51f.
\textsuperscript{828} StaatsAF, C 25/4, Nr. 265, Memo from Ministerium des Kultus und Unterrichts, 15 Dec 1945.
\textsuperscript{829} StaatsAF, C 25/4, Nr. 265, Memo from Ministerium des Kultus und Unterrichts, 29 Jan 1947.
later recalled, "wir [lernten] sehr viel, da unsere ‘Lehrkräfte’ nur wenig älter als wir waren [...] Wir verstanden uns gut mit ihnen, und dies beruhte auf Gegenseitigkeit."830

Across the western zones schools reopened in September and October 1945. While Germans were pleased to restore even the slightest degree of normalcy to their daily lives, the return to school was for most students and teachers an unpleasant experience. To begin, not all students could attend. In Freiburg a lack of classrooms restricted enrollment to 2400 of the city’s 5400 primary students. Even with a reduced student body the available facilities remained filled to over 200% of capacity.831 At the same time the municipal government needed an additional 200 primary school teachers, while state officials confronted similar personnel shortages in the city’s secondary schools.832 Conditions were no better in Stuttgart, where local schools had only 418 teachers for the city’s 26,000 students.833 To accommodate students, schools in both cities met in shifts of 2 to 3 hours and convened in guest houses, factories, churches, and other makeshift facilities.834

For children who were able to enroll, the school day proved challenging. To arrive at school, students often had to walk several miles without proper outerwear and shoes. One Freiburg student recalled the flimsy makeshift footwear that she wore each day. She, "hatte aber nur Stoffschuhe mit einer geflochtenen Sohle aus Papierschnüren. Wenn es regnete, zog ich sie aus, sonst hätten sie sich aufgelöst."835 Such frustrations only intensified once students arrived at school, where they lacked the most basic school supplies and, in winter, struggled to keep warm. To combat the cold, teachers in Stuttgart required each student to bring a piece of wood

832 AOC, H 1.106/2, Rapport Mensuel - Novembre 1945, 10 Nov 1945.
833 Wurster, 499.
834 Puaca, 27.
for the class woodstove. Worse than the cold and the lack of supplies, however, was the constant struggle with hunger. While French officials had allotted Freiburg residents a daily ration of 1500 calories, most people received an average of 590 calories at the time that schools reopened their doors in September 1945. The figure marked an all-time low for the postwar period. In Stuttgart occupation officials described a similar situation and blamed malnutrition for the high levels of absenteeism during the initial postwar school year. Not only their hunger kept them from school, but also that of their families. Parents often withheld their children from classes to help forage for food and supplies. The initial poverty of German schools was slow to diminish, and while Allied officials shifted their attention toward broader reform, immediate material conditions continued to inform the perspectives of German officials and, more importantly, parents and students. The experience of the initial postwar school year thus fostered an important disconnect between the occupier and occupied which later informed debates over the future of German education.

1945-1946: Taking Stock and Looking to the Future

With schools reopened, Allied officials began to divide their attention between the more immediate concerns of denazification and physical reconstruction and the longer-term structural and philosophical reshaping of the German school system. Although the Allies made clear their preference for their own education models, both maintained that any lasting education reform had to be the product of cooperation between the occupier and the occupied. Thus, in August 1945 French General Émile Laffon reminded French education officers that, “Il importe donc au

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836 Wurster, 500.
plus haut point de prouver à tous les membres de corps enseignant que nous respectons les fonctions dont ils ont été investis et que nous ne songeons pas à les diminuer aux yeux de leur concitoyens. [...] si nous les froissions, nous en ferions facilement des saboteurs."

Officials in Stuttgart received similar orders. A directive in May 1945 reminded American personnel that, “permanent cultural changes can be affected only as they are developed and maintained by the Germans themselves.” The directive added that while changes in postwar education practices were “subject to the supervision and approval of the […] Military Government,” the “reform of German education was to be left to the Germans themselves.”

Behind the Allies’ calls for cooperation with the Germans lay two different administrative styles. While they preferred to have the support of German officials, French authorities were not afraid to impose their agenda, which targeted not only the reeducation of German society but also the promotion of French prestige. Thus, just as French theater troops had forced French drama onto the German stage, French education officers had already forced German secondary schools to offer daily French language instruction. General Laffon condoned the heavy-handed pursuit of reforms and urged education officers not to shy away from, “la fermeté.” He added that while cooperation with the Germans was preferred, officials should be ready to, “leur imposer des idées et des programmes qui ne sont pas, ou qu’il sont assez peu les leurs.”

American officials were less willing to impose cultural changes on their Germans. Although their reluctance seemed odd in light of their convictions about the superiority of American education traditions, it owed to the American aversion to imperialism and concerns about democratization. Like their colleagues in other cultural policy fields, American education

840 AOC, Bade 4.141, Memo from Laffon to Délégués Supérieurs, 24 Aug 1945.
841 NARA, RG 260, Box 83, Folder 5 307-1 (16), History of US Military Government in Germany, 30 Jun 1946.
842 NARA, RG 260, Box 83, Folder 5 307-1 (16), History of US Military Government in Germany, 30 Jun 1946.
843 AOC, Bade 4.141, Memo from Laffon to Délégués Supérieurs, 24 Aug 1945.
officers did not feel that they could foster German democracy by authoritarian means. While they urged Germans to pursue specific reforms, they adhered to a more indirect style of administration than their French colleagues.

With the initial reopening of schools underway, Allied officials in both cities identified weaknesses in the schools. In Freiburg, education officers compared students and teachers to their French counterparts, and the results were not flattering. A local French assistant described German secondary teachers as, “inférieurs aux professeurs français” and added that “Ils ne possèdent aucune culture générale et n’ont pas de personnalité.” The comment entailed a broader observation about the underlying philosophies of classical French and German secondary training. To be sure, the traditional concepts of French culture générale and German Bildung both referred to a general education in classical subjects such as Latin, Greek, grammar, and rhetoric, which were distinct from the more modern science- and math-based courses of study. They further described an elitist approach to education that, by the late nineteenth century, served to defend Western Europe’s humanist cultural heritage from the homogenizing influences of industrialization and the rise of popular, mass culture. However, a variety of more subtle characteristics, too numerous for review here, also distinguished the French and German traditions. While both concepts referred to a nonspecific, non-professional classical education, the French tradition focused less on methodology and hermeneutics than its German counterpart. At the same time, French secondary training focused on the “Latinity” of French civilization and presented France as the “heir” to Rome. Convinced that ancient Latin texts espoused the same, “universal” values and ideals of modern French civilization, French secondary instructors held that students would grasp the texts’ familiar themes and messages.

844 AOC, H 0.001/2, Report from French Assistant Angelloz to Military Government, 17 Jul 1946.
845 Ringer, Education and Society, 7 and 116.
without abstract hermeneutic tools.\textsuperscript{846} By contrast, German \textit{Bildung} stressed the ties between German culture and its Greek, not Latin, predecessor. While German classicists revered the Greeks, they did not identify with them as the French did with the Romans. They thus encouraged a more reflexive learning process that entailed more theoretical and hermeneutic analysis.\textsuperscript{847} In fact, the Freiburg assistant bemoaned such analysis when she commented that German instructors prefer, \textit{“des sujets abstraits, obscurs, où parfois ils se perdent.”}\textsuperscript{848} The sensitivity of French officials to minor differences between the French and German education traditions anticipated the difficulty inherent in the attempt to refashion one country’s school system along the lines of even the most similar foreign model.

Additional reports from Freiburg emphasized the importance of French tutelage to denazification and democratization of the German student population. Thus with great enthusiasm one French observer applauded that \textit{“on note parmi les étudiants allemands de Fribourg une grande curiosité envers tout ce qui est français. Les jeunes allemands sont vivement attirés par la vie intellectuelle et culturelle française.”}\textsuperscript{849} Another official observed a similar interest in French culture among German teachers. In fact, he recorded that German instructors \textit{“préfèrent la zone française à toute autre car les échanges intellectuels y sont possibles, tandis qu’avec les Américains surtout ils estiment toute intellectualité impossible.”}\textsuperscript{850} The sense of cultural superiority that infused French reports corresponded to the tone of other French cultural-policy officials. On the one hand, claims of German interest in French culture seemed plausible in Freiburg given the historic connections between Baden and France. On the

\textsuperscript{848} AOC, H 0.001/2, Report from French Assistant Angelloz to Military Government, 17 Jul 1946.
\textsuperscript{849} AOC, H 0.001/2, Note d’information, 16 Jul 1946.
\textsuperscript{850} AOC, H. 0.001/2, Synthèse des trois rapports des Assistants de Français, Jul 1946.
other hand, as the experience of French film and theater officers had demonstrated, German interest in French culture was not synonymous with a desire to remold Germany à la française.

In Stuttgart American officials were no less critical of the local school system. Yet, their critiques targeted broader philosophical and organizational questions and betrayed the greater differences between the American and German education systems. One education officer summarized the contrast as follows: “Fundamentally the German idea was the development of the child for the Government and the Government was an entity to which the child belongs. This contrasts with the American idea that Government belongs to the people and is operated for the people by the people.”\(^\text{851}\) Another report expanded on the differences between the “democratic” single-track American education system and its “undemocratic” multi-track German counterpart. It attributed the organization of the German system to, “aristocratic-military traditions that anachronistically survived other modern changes;” it further cited the traditions as the reason that, “the German mind was not open to the ways of democracy as we know it.”\(^\text{852}\) Not unlike the French, American officials saw their own education model as a panacea for such weaknesses. In a nod to future reform policies, one education officer in Stuttgart suggested the development of a school system “which in essence resembles the perpendicular structure of the US educational system.”\(^\text{853}\) In short, the reports of both American and French officials during the initial school year revealed a commitment to refashion German schools according to the Allies’ respective domestic education models.

If German officials remained most concerned with the immediate material needs of schools, they too made clear their visions for the future of their education system during the

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\(^\text{851}\) NARA, RG 260, Box 888, Folder 12/87 -3 (8), Weekly Report – Education and Religious Affairs, 1 Dec 1945.  
initial postwar school year. In both cities discussions among municipal and state officials developed along political lines reminiscent of those of the interwar reform debate. In general right-leaning leaders, Christian Democrats and members of the BCSV, favored the restoration of the traditional multi-track school system with clear divides between the primary and secondary branches. A conservative member of Freiburg’s school council typified the “traditionalist” argument with the statement that, “Es ist durchaus nicht nötig, die äussere Struktur des Erziehungssystems wesentlich zu ändern; dass dieses nicht einmal der Nationalsozialismus tat, beweist die Güte der Tradition.” \(^{854}\) His argument referred to the Nazis’ focus on curricular changes and the Reich’s decision to allow local Gymnasien to remain open alongside the consolidated secondary Oberschulen. In the meantime, he argued that during the initial postwar period the most important task was the improvement of teacher training and the removal of Nazi instructors. Stuttgart’s “traditionalists” made similar arguments. One lamented the reforms of both the Weimar and Nazi periods and argued that, “Unsere Schule leidet seit bald dreissig Jahren an der Sucht zu reformieren und an der Lust zu experimentieren.” \(^{855}\) He too viewed improved teacher-training and performance, rather than the development of a new school system, as the best strategy for the denazification of public education.

On the other side of the German school debate were the proponents of reform. They most often aligned on the political left and revived interwar calls to bridge the gap between the primary and secondary tracks. In Freiburg the local Communist Party called for an end to the traditional German Volksschule. A party official argued that, “Die deutsche Volksschule war anfangs des 19. Jahrhunderts von den damals herrschenden Schichten geschaffen worden, nicht um dem Bedürfnis des Volkes nach Bildung zu genügen, sondern um ein Volk unterwürfiger

Untertanen heranzuzüchten.” To replace the Volksschule, which had still allowed for some differentiation even after the interwar establishment of the common 4-year Grundschule, the party called for the extension of common instruction to all primary grades. Stuttgart’s Communists had similar ideas and demanded an end to the multi-track school system. One leftist commentator suggested, “allen jungen Menschen, geben wir ungehinderte Aufstiegsmöglichkeit ohne Rücksicht auf Stand und Geldbeutel der Eltern.”

While officials in both cities were divided over the future structure of their education systems, they united in their rejection of the Nazis’ attempt to create a single-track, national school system and expressed a desire to restore regional pre-1933 school structures. From Freiburg came the call of a prominent Socialist, who attacked the imposition of secondary reforms from Berlin during both the Weimar and Nazi periods. He argued: “Besinnen wir uns auch zurück auf unseren alten gut-badischen Namen! [...] Kehren wir zu unsern zu unseren alten Knaben- und Mädchenschulen zurück, Oberrealschule und Gymnasium, und überlassen wir den Preussen die Jungenschulen samt den Jungen in Aufbauform!” Theodor Bäuerle took a similar tone as he pleaded to, “bei der Neugestaltung der Schule aus den Tiefen der schwäbischen Volksseele [zu] schöpfen. Mit ihrer abwägenden und ausgleichenden Art war und ist sie im Grunde demokratisch und nicht nationalistisch und militaristisch eingestellt.”

To be sure, his statement reflected historical local distinctions between the democratic Southwest and the militaristic and authoritarian Prussian and Nazi North. More important for the Allies was the distinction drawn between prewar regional education systems and the Nazi-era national system. Germans did not see the latter as an outgrowth of the former. In fact, they understood Nazi

860 Cited in: Wurster, 510.
school reforms as an assault on democratic Weimar-era traditions. Thus, unlike Allied, and especially American, officials, they did not view a return to the pre-1933 school system as incompatible with postwar democratization efforts.

At the same time, German officials in Freiburg and Stuttgart were opposed to adopting “foreign” education models. In the wake of the Nazi school “experiment,” they sought the comfort of familiar, pre-Nazi traditions. During the first postwar year they anticipated Allied intervention with dread. One commentator in Stuttgart asked “wollen wir auf eine Höhere Schule, die in der europäischen Tradition bleibt, verzichten?” He continued that, “Anleihen zu machen bei anderen Völkern, deren Bildungswesen von anderen Traditionen herkommt [...] geschähe, wenig gesagt, zu früh.” Opposition to Allied reform also emerged in Freiburg when the university senate criticized the French secondary curriculum and defended the traditional German humanistisches Gymnasium. In addition, Leo Wohleb called for a postwar school system that was “heimatverbunden.” His words expressed opposition to both the prewar imposition of “foreign” education models from Berlin and the postwar promotion of reforms by Allied officials.

As the initial postwar school year drew to a close, the battle to reshape German schools took shape. While the Allies’ decision to delay school reforms had afforded education officers time to finalize their reform agendas, it had also allowed Germans to revive familiar school debates and consolidate their opposition to foreign intervention. More importantly, the restoration of schools along pre-1933 lines had placed the postwar education system on a path

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that favored German traditionalists over Allied or German reformers. As education officers announced their agendas in the late summer 1946, they faced an uphill struggle.

1946-1948: From Restoration to Reform

The French reform agenda undertook less to revolutionize German practices than to modify them. After the summer of 1946 French officials focused on two particular “modifications.” First, they sought to increase access to German secondary education and began with a call for an end to all tuition fees. The measure aimed not for the kind of democratization that American officials embraced, but rather for the replacement of the German class-based model of elitist education with the meritocratic French model. A French report on the accessibility of secondary schools in France thus argued that “toute homme quelle que soient ses origines sociales ou religieuses, a le droit de se cultiver.”

Convinced of the superior democratic character of their own school system, then, French officials ordered the transformation of the classical Gymnasium into a multi-curricular institution that resembled a French lycée. Within the new school, instructors were to delay the introduction of Latin until the fourth year. The idea was to allow primary students, who had not studied Latin, to transfer into the Gymnasium later in their academic careers. The tradition of forcing students to select a secondary school at the age of 10 was especially difficult for rural parents, whose children often had to move away from home to attend school. To make the system more democratic, French officials hoped to allow rural students to stay at home longer without forgoing their chance for higher education.

In order to accommodate both the delay in Latin instruction and the merger of modern and classical studies, French education officers ordered a reorganization of the

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secondary curriculum. Students were to choose between a classical or modern track in their first year and after their second year select one of four courses of study, all of which featured French. The plan was similar to the one that French educators had adopted in 1902 to raise the status of modern studies within the lycée and eliminate the classical bias of secondary education. The proposal had an additional appeal for education officers, because it ensured a dominant position for French language instruction in Germany’s secondary classrooms. Yet, while French officials mandated the implementation of secondary school reforms, they did allow a few select Gymnasien to retain their classical form and curriculum.

The second modification that French officials proposed concerned the German Abitur. Prior to 1945 each German Gymnasium had administered its own version of the exam and relied on its own faculty to assign marks. By contrast, French schools used a standardized test that faculty members from other institutions graded. To encourage a more anonymous, and “democratic,” exam system, French officials thus ordered the standardization of the Abitur along the lines of the baccalauréat.

More than the democratization of exams, the centralization initiative aimed to restrict access to higher education and assuage French fears of overcrowding at the zone’s universities. On a practical level, occupation officials worried that German universities would not be able to cope with the flood of returning students. On a more philosophical level, education officers also hoped to lessen the effect of an expanded secondary student body on the quality of higher education. Here was evidence of the French preference for a meritocracy. Thus, Schmittlein described the goal of French secondary reform as the transformation of “le recrutement ancien,

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866 Ruge Schatz, 83.
867 Talbott, 16.
868 StaatsAF, C 25/4, Nr. 147, Letter from Le Commissaire de la République, Délégué Supérieur pour le G.M. de Bade to M. le Secrétaire de l’Education et des Cultes, Université de Fribourg, 11 Dec 1946.
869 Willis, 170; Tent, Mission, 235.
qui était strictement un recrutement de classe, en un recrutement d’élite.”

Schmittlein’s comments were indicative of the well-established aversion of both the French and the German academic communities to the expansion of higher education and the creation of an academic proletariat, whose broader range of talents would require the dilution of academic standards. In fact, this elitist approach to education, which neither French nor right-leaning German education officials saw as undemocratic, most distinguished the French from their American colleagues. Schmittlein, himself a member of the French academic community, quipped that the Allies need not open the doors of German universities to every worker and farmer.

While French officials began to announce reform initiatives in July 1946, American officials waited until the fall. In October the so-called Zook Commission provided the basis for the American reform agenda. The commission, which had toured the American zone at the request of General Clay, comprised twelve American educators whose experience with German education traditions was no greater than that of American occupation officials. The commission confirmed the assessments of American planners and described the multi-track German education system as one that, “cultivates attitudes of superiority in one small group and inferiority in the majority of the members of German society, making possible the submission and lack of self-determination upon which authoritarian leadership had thrived.” To replace the German system, the Commission called for the adoption of an American-style school model and urged occupation officials to be more forceful in their pursuit of reform.

In Stuttgart officials distributed 15,000 translated copies of the Zook Report to German officials and educators and incorporated most of the Commission’s proposals into its reform

870 Cited in: Defrance, La politique culturelle, 115.
872 Ruge-Schatz, 87.

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They urged an end to tuition fees and called for the consolidation of primary and secondary school tracks. From common elementary schools, all German students were to advance to common secondary schools, where in addition to a unified basic curriculum, they could pursue elective courses toward specific vocational goals. At the heart of the American proposals lay the belief that equality of educational opportunities was essential to a democratic society. Thus the Zook report argued that the most important task for American education officers was the “development of the concept that the school is a primary agency for the democratization of Germany.”

While officials in Stuttgart adopted the proposals of the Zook Commission, they did not heed its calls for a more forceful implementation of policy. Instead they planned a series of information campaigns to convince Germans of the merits of school reform and to “achieve the acceptance by German authorities of American education ideas.” The campaigns comprised lectures by visiting American education experts and meetings between German educators and American education officers. Finally, American officials asked each of the zone’s state legislatures, which after their establishment in 1947 gained control of secondary education matters with Allied supervision, to produce reform packages that reflected the American agenda by April of the following year.

Before 1947 the Allies pursued their reforms with little guidance form the Allied Control Council. In June, however, it cobbled together a statement on education reform, known simply as “Directive 54.” This document highlighted the differences between French and American reeducation strategies. It reflected American superiority at the Allied table and called for a

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common school system not unlike that imagined by the Zook Commission.\textsuperscript{878} While French officials had been present to draft the order, its content clashed with the initiatives that the DEP had introduced within the French zone. Schmittlein thus rejected the directive and the idea that the implementation of education policy required Allied cooperation and joint administration. He quipped that “\textit{Umerziehung sei eine Aufgabe und kein Verwaltungsproblem}.”\textsuperscript{879} Schmittlein’s reaction confirmed that French officials, unlike their American colleagues, did not see major structural reforms as the key to Germany’s democratization. Rather, the French believed that through cultural exchange and personal contacts democratization could occur within existing German cultural institutions, which resembled their French counterparts.

If French and American reform agendas differed in most areas, they shared a common hope for the secularization of postwar German schools. For both powers laïcité and the separation of church and state constituted defining elements of a democratic society. Still, the Allies were reluctant to impose their own secular models on the occupied populations. Churches were the only domestic civil institutions that had survived the war intact, and they enjoyed the respect and allegiance of millions of Germans. To avoid angering church leaders, and to avoid the continuation of Nazi-era restrictions on church power, French and American education officers contented themselves with an indirect push for the secularization of schools. To be sure, French officials waded into German debates over confessional schooling more than their American colleagues. They allowed the reopening of parochial schools that had closed their doors before 1933, but prohibited the establishment of new institutions.\textsuperscript{880} The American position was more reserved. Officials adhered to the vague dictates of JCS 1067, which declared that “It is not intended that the military government will intervene in questions concerning

\textsuperscript{878} NARA, RG 260, Box 15, Folder 5 302-1 (6), Allied Control Council Directive Nr. 54, 3 Jul 1947.
\textsuperscript{879} Ruge-Schatz, 87.
\textsuperscript{880} Defrance, \textit{La politique culturelle}, 109.
denominational control of German schools, or in religious instruction in German schools, except
[…] to insure that religious instruction […] conform to such Allied regulations as are or may be
established.”

In their cautious approach to the issue of parochial schooling, American and French officials thus limited their role in resolving one of the most important questions of postwar German schools.

1946-1948: German Reactions and Initiatives

As the Allies forced their way into German reform-debates, they struggled to find support among the Germans. Because of local politics, school traditions, and material concerns, Allied reform proposals gained little ground in either city. Their preference for secular public education was no exception. Debate over the confessional character of schools proved least contentious in Freiburg, where support for the local simultan tradition remained strong. Local Protestant and Catholic leaders had grown accustomed to the system and objected little to its postwar restoration. For French officials the Simultanschulen were a welcome compromise. In other states, such as Württemberg-Hohenzollern, the zone’s Catholic majority defended separate parochial institutions.

In fact, Freiburg’s Archbishop Conrad Gröber was alone among Catholic officials in defending the simultan tradition. He had also ignored the Allied Control Council’s initial, yet temporary recognition of the Reichskonkordat, which allowed the establishment of Catholic schools. He knew that the lack of available school houses prohibited separate parochial institutions and realized that because of the overwhelming Catholic majority in South Baden, most of the state’s primary schools were de facto Catholic institutions anyway. In a letter to the Vatican Gröber declared that, “wir mit dem Religionsunterricht in der

882 Braun, 92.
883 Witz, 398.
Simultanschule wettäus die meisten Kinder religiös erfassen konnten, ob ihre Eltern nun dieser oder jener Partei angehörten.” With the support of the local Christian-Democratic majority, Gröber’s campaign to preserve the traditional place of religious instruction in Baden’s schools was successful. In March 1947 the newly ratified state constitution declared that: “Die öffentlichen Schulen sind Simultanschulen mit christlichem Charakter in überlieferten badischen Sinn.”

Stuttgart witnessed a more heated debate over parochial education. Württemberg-Baden, the product of Franco-American territorial disputes, comprised portions of the prewar states of Baden and Württemberg. State officials in Stuttgart struggled to negotiate between Baden’s simultan tradition and the parochial school tradition of Württemberg. However, space and personnel shortages, as well as a desire to foster unity within the new state, led Schmid and his successor Bäuerle to favor the former. Protestants proved most amenable to the idea. Baden’s Protestants were already accustomed to the system, and after a series of internal debates during the summer of 1945, the Württemberg state church accepted the idea as well. Catholics offered more resistance. Unlike Gröber in Freiburg, Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg insisted on separate Catholic schools. Yet, after a year of negotiations between the state and the church, Württemberg’s Catholics, who comprised a minority in the state, agreed to the simultan model. The state constitution of October 1946 ended the confessional debate and declared that, “Die öffentlichen Volksschulen sind christliche Gemeinschaftsschulen.” Like the French, the Americans were pleased with the outcome. Although not secular, Simultanschulen restricted the involvement of church officials to religious instruction.

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884 Cited in: Braun, 86.
887 Braun, 87.
888 Braun, 91.
In both Freiburg and Stuttgart German support for religious instruction in the public schools reflected less the rejection of Allied secular models than the importance of religion in postwar society. In both cities the mostly Christian populations found in religion a source of strength and direction with which to navigate the devastation of the postwar period. Leaders of the local Christian Democratic majorities further stressed the importance of religion as a tool to rebuild the nation’s moral foundation. A conservative (BCSV) member of Freiburg’s municipal school council declared that “Religion muss wieder in die Herzen der Jugend gepflanzt werden, damit sich jeder im innersten Gewissen vor Gott verantwortlich fühlt.”\(^\text{889}\)

In Stuttgart, a Christian-Democratic legislator made a similar plea and concluded that “Der Totalitätsanspruch, für den wir eintreten, ist der Totalitätsanspruch der Lehre Christi, der Totalitätsanspruch dessen, der in der Vergangenheit im deutschen Volk vergessen worden ist, und [...] den an die Spitze unseres Denkens und Lebens zu stellen, die Aufgabe [...] sein sollte.”\(^\text{890}\) His use of the term “totalitarian” seemed to respond to American suspicions of a German penchant for authoritarian governance. Nevertheless, conservatives were not alone in their appeal to religion. Despite their historic opposition to the power of the churches, Social Democrats recognized the stabilizing influence of faith. Thus a Social Democratic legislator in Stuttgart called for a, “Gemeinschaftsschule, die [...] nicht areligiös oder anti-religiös [...] ist.”\(^\text{891}\) Germans across the political spectrum blamed the anti-church policies of the Nazi era for the country’s moral degeneration. Religion thus offered not only a source of postwar strength but also the key to the country’s moral regeneration. Under such circumstances Allied preferences for the removal of religious instruction from schools found little sympathy.


\(^{890}\) Theopil Kaufmann, cited in: Braun, 90.

\(^{891}\) “Der Kampf um die Schule- und Erziehungsfragen,” *Stuttgarter Zeitung* 21 Sep 1946 : 2.
The Allies’ structural-reform agendas inspired a greater range of responses. In Freiburg reactions to French initiatives emerged along familiar party lines. Most contentious were efforts to increase access to German secondary schools. The local Christian Democratic majority viewed the move as a threat to the quality of German secondary education. Wohleb expressed his hope that “dass über das Schicksal der weiteren vier humanistischen Gymnasien alten und bewährten Stils noch nicht das letzte Wort gesprochen ist.”\textsuperscript{892} German secondary teachers, who feared the loss of positions and prestige, echoed Wohleb’s concerns.\textsuperscript{893} In addition, the University of Freiburg voiced its opposition to the “gesamtschulähnliche Richtung” of French policy.\textsuperscript{894} Plans for refashioning secondary education did, however, find modest support among the traditional German proponents of school reform. The local Social Democratic newspaper \textit{Das Volk} published a positive review of French policy and praised a, “Schulgebilde, das durch den gemeinsamen Unterbau zum sozialen Gemeinschaftserlebnis führen will und das innerhalb des einheitlichen Rahmens die naturgemässe und von der Gesellschaft her gewünschte Besonderung hinausschiebt in Altersstufen, wo der Schüler selbst schon zur Mitentscheidung fähig wird.”\textsuperscript{895} Local Communist officials also advocated the reform of secondary education. They sought less a bridge between the primary and secondary branches than the creation of a single-track school system, “vom Kindergarten bis zur Universität.”\textsuperscript{896}

Although French officials welcomed all support of their reform agenda, they found Socialists and Communists to be unreliable allies. To begin, the two groups comprised only a weak minority among officials in Freiburg and Baden. In addition to their control of the


\textsuperscript{893} AOC, H 1.103/3, Rapport Mensuel November 1946, 1 Dec 1946.


\textsuperscript{895} Herbert Vincent, “Die Schulreform in der französischen Zone,” \textit{Das Volk} 23 Aug 1947.

Freiburg municipal school council and the state ministry of culture and education, Christian Democrats held 34 seats in the state legislature, which gained increasing control from French authorities after its establishment in May 1947. The Socialists and Communists held only 13 and 4 seats respectively. They also lacked a solid education program. Unlike Christian Democrats, who had begun to develop an education vision as early as June 1945, the postwar left struggled to adapt its prewar positions to the postwar context. For Social Democrats, especially, the hope of expanding the party beyond the ranks of the working class required a rethinking of pre-1933 anti-parochial, pro-common school policies. At the same time, Social Democratic leaders were afraid to endorse an agenda that resembled that of the occupiers. Evidence of their reticence appeared when Freiburg’s Socialist party tempered its support of French policy with the disclaimer that, “Im übrigen lässt sich wohl ein Schulsystem sinnvollerweise nicht ein für allemal von aussen dekretieren. Wir betrachten den neuen Plan, dem weithin die Erfahrungen unserer Nachbarvölker zugunde liegen, als ein Modell, mit dem nun in Deutschland Erfahrungen gesammelt werden müssen.”

In contrast to the consolidation of secondary schools, French plans for the reform of the German Abitur met with more widespread opposition. Secondary teachers led the charge. As one education officer noted, “Le corps enseignant ne voudrait pas que l’Abitur soit remplacé par un examen semblable à notre baccalauréat pour les raisons suivantes: au baccalauréat les professeurs ne peuvent juger qu’un aspect de la personnalité de l’élève.” A Christian Democrat in the state assembly echoed the concern of teachers and argued that a centralized exam and anonymous grading practices would reduce education to the memorization of

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898 Lange-Quassowski, 187.
900 AOC, H 1.104/2a, Rapport Mensuel Mars 1947, 1 Apr 1947.
knowledge. Education, the assemblyman argued, “*habe die doppelte Aufgabe, Kenntnisse zu
vermitteln und die persönliche Bildung der Schüler zu fördern.*” Wohleb insisted that the new
exam was “*aucunement le point de vue allemand mais [...] imposé par l’occupant.*” Surprisingly, the exam reform angered Germans on the political left as well. Social Democrats worried that the instantaneous nature of the reform would deny schools the opportunity to adjust their curriculum and thus create a disadvantage for students who had trained for the older exam. German opposition seemed less motivated by an aversion to the new exam itself than by a dislike for Allied meddling. While a similar elite notion of higher education underlay both the French *baccalauréat* and the German *Abitur*, regional and national practices informed the two traditions. Like the subtle differences that separated the notions of *culture générale* and *Bildung*, the contrast between the two exams reminded officials of the difficulty inherent in the effort to reform one nation’s education system according to even the most similar foreign models.

German resistance to the French reform agenda drew mixed reactions from French officials. An official in Freiburg complained how “*il est étonnant de voir combien les Allemands, capables de temps à autre de bouleverser le monde, sont attachés à certaines de leurs traditions dont le changement leur apparaît comme un sacrilège.*” In spite of such frustration, French officials held their ground and honored Laffon’s call for “*la fermeté.*” While the decision to allow select traditional *Gymnasien* to remain open had created an odd mixture of secondary schools throughout the state, the French granted no further concessions and insisted on

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901 “*Gegen das Zentralabitur,*” *Badische Zeitung* 23 Jul 1948 : 5.
903 Willis, 171.
904 AOC, H 1.104/2a, Rapport Mensuel Mars 1947, 1 Apr 1947.

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the continued implementation of secondary reforms. At the same time they offered no compromise on the centralization of the *Abitur* and forced all schools to adopt the new exam.  

American officials too encountered great resistance. To be sure, Württemberg’s ministry of culture did submit a reform program by the April 1947 deadline. It contained most of the Zook Commission’s recommendations and called for compulsory schooling for ages 6 through 15. It also increased the current common elementary school from 4 to 6 years and proposed a common 3-year middle school, from which students would proceed to a 3-4 year common high school. While American officials were pleased to receive the proposal, they recognized that any reform efforts were still in the “paper” stage. One education officer in Stuttgart noted that while “the Military Government had expected a ‘blue-print’ of school reform [it] had received only general statements.”

Americans interpreted the ministry’s proposals as insincere. Their feelings were not unjustified. Like the French, the Americans struggled to find a German voice for their policies. Their most important ally was Bäuerle, who had drafted the April 1947 reform proposal and was himself a veteran of the prewar German reform movement. In fact, he later commented that the American agenda reflected of his own ideas. Bäuerle’s views contrasted with those of other, more obstructionist cultural ministers, such as Bavaria’s Alois Hundhammer and Wohleb in Freiburg. The latter maintained that, “Es wäre in Zweifel zu ziehen, ob die siegreichen ausländischen Mächte in der Lage sind, das deutsche Wesen zu verstehen, und ob sie die Befugnis besitzen, uns Schulreformen vorzuschlagen und deren Durchführungen anzuregen, die

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908 Braun, 127.
vielleicht in ihren Ländern sich eingebürgert haben, aber bei uns kaum beim Elend unserer Zeit durchgeführt werden können.”

Bäuerle’s goodwill was not enough in any case to advance a reform agenda in the local legislature, where his lack of political affiliation rendered him an ineffective leader.

Despite Bäuerle’s best efforts, the American request for a more detailed reform proposal disintegrated amid the familiar lines of the German school debate. While elementary school teachers, Social Democrats, and Communists, favored a common school, secondary teachers, university faculty, and Christian Democrats opposed it. In Stuttgart, as in Freiburg, opponents of the common school proved loudest. Secondary teachers saw (American) proposals for a longer common elementary school phase as a threat to their own positions and prestige.

A member of Stuttgart’s teachers’ union thus argued that “Wir können von fremder Art lernen. Zu entscheiden aber, was vom fremden Wesen sich dem eigenen organisch verbinden lässt, so das dieses gefördert und nicht geschädigt wird, die richtige Mitte zwischen Beharren und Fortschritt zu finden, bedarf der Zeit.”

A local Christian Democrat added that “Jede Besatzungsmacht suchte ihrer Zone das Bildungsideal aufzuzwingen, das in ihrem Heimatsstaat massgebend war. Glücklicherweise haben wir erkannt, dass der Wiederaufbau unseres Erziehungswesens nicht nach den Vorstellungen und Befehlen der Siegermächte durfte.”

In addition, opposition to the common-school program recalled the rejection of Nazi efforts to create a similar program. As one Stuttgart observer noted “in der HJ und im BdM nicht bloss bis zum 12., sondern bis zum 18 Jahr ohne Unterschied der gesellschaftlichen Stellung der Eltern verbunden. Sind dadurch das

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910 Vietzen, 207; (The CDU held 34 seats, the SPD 32, the DVP 17, the KPD 10.)
913 Cited in: Braun, 127.
sozial-ethischen Anlagen’ der deutschen Jugend in besonders erfreulicherweise zur Entfaltung gekommen?”

Stuttgart’s political left proved no more supportive of Allied policies than its counterpart in Freiburg. Despite their pre-1933 championing of the common school model, the city’s Social Democrats lowered their expectations in light of more immediate postwar financial concerns. As one party member argued, the desire for a common school “gestattet uns aber die Nachahmung des amerikanischen Schulwesens nicht. Das reiche Amerika kann sich viel Zeit lassen bei der Ausbildung der Jugend.” In addition, American officials also encountered the indecisiveness that informed the initial school programs of the postwar left generally. Evidence of such uncertainty appeared in the words of the same Social Democrat, who worried that “Die Verlängerung der Grundschulzeit, als Gegenmassnahme gegen Standesschulen gedacht, würde gerade zur Entstehung solcher Schulen führen; denn bemittelte Kreise können sich immer ins Privatschulwesen flüchten.” In a departure from the prewar reform agenda he called for a school system that provided all students with a solid education but, that “die theoretisch Hochbegabten so bald als möglich von den mehr praktisch Begabten trennen.”

In the face of similar resistance to their agenda, American officials were more reserved than the French. They adhered to their indirect administrative style and even accepted partial responsibility for the lack of progress. An official in Stuttgart lamented the shortcomings of the initial American “information sessions” and conceded that the first visits by American education experts had been disorganized and short. He further cited personnel shortages and the frequent

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916 Ibid.
917 Ibid.
rotation of education officers for the ERA’s lack of accomplishment.\textsuperscript{918} American officials also lamented the depth to which prewar German school traditions remained rooted in postwar society. As the debate over the April 1947 reform proposal began in the state legislature, an education officer in Stuttgart concluded that “the achievement of a true school reform would require years of effort and guidance if it were to become part and parcel of the German system of education.”\textsuperscript{919} American officials had begun to appreciate the tremendous differences that separated their education vision from German traditions.

The dominance of traditionalists and resistance to foreign intervention were not the only factors that discouraged the pursuit of reform in the French and American zones. Two more practical concerns contributed to the situation. First, the poor material conditions that confronted German schools at the end of the war endured throughout the occupation and monopolized the attention of German officials. In Stuttgart an American education officer conceded that, “It is freely admitted that certain changes are needed, but at the same time it is contended that these changes are at present inappropriate.”\textsuperscript{920} A major concern for German officials in both cities remained the persistent shortage of classrooms. Although Freiburg city officials had evacuated school buildings by 1949, French officials had not. In fact, as the occupation ended, French officials still occupied over 100 classrooms throughout the city.\textsuperscript{921} In Stuttgart Allied and municipal government requisitions and a lack of building materials also perpetuated the shortage of space.\textsuperscript{922} While classrooms remained scarce, class sizes continued to expand as more students returned to school and refugees continued arrive from across Germany. In Freiburg, the city

\textsuperscript{918} NARA, RG 260, Box 887, Folder 12/87-2 (7), Quarterly History – Education and Religious Affairs Division, 30 Jun 1947.
\textsuperscript{919} NARA, RG 260, Box 887, Folder 12/87-2 (7), Quarterly History – Education and Religious Affairs Division, 30 Jun 1947.
\textsuperscript{920} NARA, RG 260, Box 888, Folder 12/87-3 (8), OMGWB Education and Religious Affairs Division, 3 Apr 1947.
\textsuperscript{921} StadtAF, C 5/1535, Memo from Wiederaufbaubüro to Bürgermeisteramt Abt I, 29 Dec 1949.
\textsuperscript{922} StadtAS, HA 0, Nr. 0622-1, Verwaltungsbericht 1946, 17 Jan 1947; Vietzen, 492.
center had 6,600 students and 9 school houses with 195 classrooms before the war. In December 1948 the city had 5,470 students and 5 school houses with 52 classrooms.\textsuperscript{923} As the student bodies in both cities grew, they remained malnourished. Poor harvests prevented the increase of postwar ration levels and left children ill-prepared for success in school. In the meantime students continued to struggle with a lack of shoes, clothing, and heating materials.\textsuperscript{924} Stuttgart’s schools faced an additional obstacle. While the Americans had relinquished control of the purge of teaching staffs to German purge committees, they continued to reverse the more “lenient” German decisions and created tremendous instability among the local teaching ranks. In fact, in June 1947 local education officers drew a direct correlation between an increased number of suicide attempts among teachers and the uncertainty of the denazification process.\textsuperscript{925} Although unintended, such consequences of Allied policies inspired many Germans to compare the Allied occupation with the Nazi regime and to hope for a rapid end to the Allies’ presence.

A second practical reason for the delayed implementation of Allied reforms was German anxiety about the country’s political future. Across Germany officials worried about the adoption of divergent Allied proposals and the consequences that such diverse measures could have if in the future the country unified and pursued a national education system. A Freiburg editorial captured the sentiment with the observation that, “Es ist für die Eltern sicher ein ernstes Anliegen, dass die Reformen in den einzelnen Ländern und Zonen nicht so weit auseinandergehen, dass Umschulungen bei einem Ortswechsel zu ernsten Rückschritten für die Kinder führen oder gar unmöglich werden.”\textsuperscript{926} For residents of Freiburg and Stuttgart, anxieties over future political boundaries were more acute in light of the awkward postwar divisions of

\textsuperscript{923} Hug, “Zwischen ‘Trivialschule’,” 595.
\textsuperscript{924} StadtAS, HA 0 (14), Nr. 69, Weekly report from city government to Military Government, 2 Feb 1947; Held, 29.
\textsuperscript{925} NARA, RG 260, Box 887, Folder 12/87-2 (7), Quarterly History – Education and Religious Affairs Division, 30 Jun 1947.
\textsuperscript{926} “Grundschule-Oberschule,” Badische Zeitung 21 May 1948 : 3.
Baden and Württemberg. Throughout the German southwest, officials were loathe to adapt significant reforms so long as the map remained shrouded in uncertainty.  

**1948-1949: Entrenched Positions**

In spite of the gradual transfer of education administration from Allied to German municipal and state authorities, French and American officials remained committed to their reform agendas until the end of the occupation. In the French zone Schmittlein continued to insist on the benefits of secondary education reform and centralization of the *Abitur*. He also stressed French language instruction and pressured the zone’s state legislatures to abolish secondary tuition fees. American officials proved more willing to acknowledge the challenge that lay before them. Evidence of their realism appeared when in October 1948 they hosted a meeting of their zone’s education ministers to assuage concern about different education policies across the *Länder*. When the conference produced no significant reform proposals, General Clay reevaluated his expectations. He assured his staff that they “do not need to despair that so little has been done in writing it in terms of free textbooks, of so many years of this type of school and so many years of that type of school.” He added that “any reform is good and that it takes many years to build a democracy.”  

Alonzo Grace, who had succeeded John Taylor as the head of the American education mission, admitted that, “no army of occupation has or possibly ever will successfully superimpose an educational and cultural pattern on a conquered people.” His concession reflected the experience of four years of troubled negotiations between German and Allied cultural expectations and the gradual realization, which many Allied officials reached, that the horrors of the Nazi experience and defeat had inspired Germans not to seek new, foreign

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927 NARA, RG 260, Box 904, Folder 12/87-2 (25), Letter from Ministry of Culture to OMGWB, 18 Jul 1947.  
929 NARA, RG 260, Box 15, Folder 5/302-1 (6), Address by General Lucius D. Clay, October 1948.  
political and cultural models, but rather to reassert native pre-1933 models that they viewed as essential to the restoration of their nation’s reputation.

Nevertheless, American officials, like their French colleagues, continued to lobby for Germans to embrace reforms. A touring exhibit of American school practices arrived in Stuttgart in the fall 1948. Bäuerle held a series of talks about his recent trip to the United States. He argued that while Germans could not simply copy the American school system, they could learn from it. Most impressive for him was the high level of cooperation between American parents and teachers and the equality of educational opportunities available to American students.  

Copious handouts from the military government also publicized American education policies. In March 1949 the Stuttgart ERA office produced a pamphlet titled, “Fragen der Schulreform in Württemberg-Baden,” which comprised two essays by the top education officers in the state. The first addressed opponents of school reform and argued that “Die menschliche Gesellschaft hat eingesehen, dass sie für ihren eigenen Fortbestand ihren Kindern bessere Schulen einrichten muss – obwohl einzelne das noch nicht begreifen, obwohl Diktatoren es verneinen, obwohl Privilegierte Widerstand leisten, und obwohl finanzielle Opfer gebracht werden müssen.” The second explained the American interest in German school reform. It conceded that not all in the history of German education was bad, and argued that “Selbst wenn Sie alle Vorschläge, die hier vorgetragen wurde, übernehmen würden, so wäre Ihr deutsches Schulsystem in keiner Weise ein amerikanisches […] Es wäre ein neues deutsches Schulsystem,  

in dem sich die beste deutsche Traditionen verbinden mit den neuesten pädagogischen Erkenntnissen anderer Teile der Welt.”

In spite of the Allies’ campaigns, little had changed by the final year of the occupation. While traditionalist majorities remained in municipal and state assemblies in both Freiburg and Stuttgart, material and geographic concerns continued to discourage structural and philosophical changes within the local school systems.

The situation was less discouraging for French officials, who had implemented their main initiatives through direct orders. In December 1948 Baden’s ministry of culture issued a much-anticipated policy statement that accepted both the centralized Abitur and the curricular and structural changes in secondary schools. However, the ministry defended the remaining classical Gymnasien and reasserted the value of traditional “humanistische Bildung” In addition, state officials confirmed minor adjustments to the Abitur, which included a series of make-up exams to provide students with opportunities to improve their initial grades. If a commitment to stringent university entrance standards and the benefit of time had led officials to accept the new exam, the providing of “make-up” tests revealed a desire to make postwar education practices reflect German needs rather than Allied orders.

In contrast to the exam reform, the push to eliminate tuition fees collapsed under German resistance. In addition to the costs of reconstruction, finance ministries across the western zones faced increasing budget shortfalls in the wake of the June 1948 currency reform. Under such circumstances the ministries were unwilling to waive tuition fees or to assume sole responsibility for the financing of secondary schools. At the same time, resistance reemerged from

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traditionalists who feared that the removal of tuition barriers would overcrowd the secondary system. Tuition fees remained in effect for 6 years after the occupation ended.

In Stuttgart American officials faced a more discouraging end to their campaign. The reluctance of officials to mandate reforms had placed the fate of the reform movement in the hands of traditionalists in the state legislature and the supportive, but ineffective, minister of culture. In April 1949 Bäuerle presented a series of reforms to legislators. They treated a variety of issues, from the extension of the mandatory schooling period to the reorganization of the school system and the provision of free public education and textbooks. All but one of the initiatives collapsed in the legislature in the face of conservative opposition. Only the proposal to end fees for tuition and textbooks enjoyed partial success, as Bäuerle secured limited financing for subsidies to help lower-class secondary students. The rejection of Bäuerle’s other proposals confirmed the resilience of German education traditions and the reluctance of Germans to adopt foreign education models.

Conclusion

In both Freiburg and Stuttgart, Allied officials struggled to find a German voice for their reforms. Local politics, economic uncertainties, and a widespread aversion to foreign intervention forced the Allies into awkward negotiations with the traditionalist majorities that dominated the cities’ postwar school debates. The situation was less daunting for French officials, who because of similarities between French and German traditions, pursued only minor reforms. American officials led a more dramatic campaign that sought to replace the conventional multi-track German school system with an Americanized, single-track model. While French officials realized more of their objectives than the Americans, their success owed less to similarities between the French and German education traditions than to the willingness of

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education officers to impose reforms by direct order. Indeed even in Freiburg, Germans on both sides of the postwar school debate remained convinced that German, rather than Allied, education models best fit the needs of postwar society.
Conclusion

In Freiburg and Stuttgart, Germans encountered distinct approaches to a shared Allied mission. In Freiburg, French officials adopted a more lenient denazification strategy that owed both to the familiarity of French policy planners with prewar German politics and culture and to the empathy of occupation officials who understood the challenges of France’s own postwar purge process. In contrast to denazification policies, French reeducation efforts were more forceful. As French authorities attempted to refashion German cultural activities according to French values and customs, concern over the postwar restoration of French prestige combined with the established traditions of French imperialism and cultural diplomacy to produce a less lenient administrative style. Although geographic, historical, and cultural ties between France and Baden promised to ease the promotion of French culture in Freiburg, French officials were also willing to ignore their commitment to democratization and impose their influence and agenda on the Germans. In Stuttgart, residents experienced a different approach to occupation. Less familiar with the contours of prewar German politics and society and thus less willing than their French colleagues to distinguish between “good Germans” and “bad Nazis,” the Americans adopted a more punitive approach to denazification. In cities like Stuttgart, the stringency of the American purge campaign alienated German officials and residents. The same was true of reeducation policies that aimed to refashion German culture along more foreign, American lines. As fewer prewar ties connected them to their Germans, American officials encountered greater resistance to the promotion of American ideas and practices as a foundation for postwar German cultural activity. In spite of such resistance, however, an historical American aversion to cultural diplomacy and a commitment to democratic governance in Germany combined with uncertainty about German views of American culture to discourage forceful reform policies. American
officials thus adopted a more reluctant reeducation strategy and hoped that through the experience of defeat the Germans would themselves embrace foreign, and especially American, cultural models.

Through its comparison of the local implementation of French and American cultural occupation policies this study has raised questions about the effect of the Allies’ distinct occupation strategies. Which strategy most facilitated the implementation of Allied policies and exposure to Allied culture? What was the effect of French aggressiveness? Of American reluctance? How did the Allies’ strategies fare in the face of German resistance?

To judge from the experiences of Freiburg and Stuttgart, the French strategy was, in the short-term at least, most effective in the promotion of Allied culture and objectives. From 1945 until 1949, French reeducation policies secured a larger cultural influence in Freiburg than the indirect American administrative style achieved in Stuttgart. From the promotion of French theater troupes to the pre-publication censorship of local newspapers and the centralization of the Abitur, the willingness of French officials to achieve their objectives by direct order ensured a strong French influence in German cultural life. The situation differed in Stuttgart, where the reluctance of American officials to order the adoption of American cultural practices limited America’s local cultural presence. In the absence of direct American orders, local stages were slow to select American plays for production, while proposals for the reform of local newspapers along American lines fell on deaf ears. At the same time, local school officials dismissed American education practices as incompatible with the values and traditions of the German school system.

If, however, the French administrative style ensured a greater French cultural presence in Freiburg, French officials, like their American colleagues in Stuttgart, still grappled with
widespread German resistance to Allied tutelage. In both cities, German officials and residents looked to restore local cultural activities along native lines and, in the wake of what they described as unwelcome Nazi political and cultural “experiments,” greeted Allied reeducation efforts with a combination of frustration and suspicion. In the face of such suspicion, French and American cultural reform efforts struggled. Evidence of the struggle appeared as occupation officials in Freiburg and Stuttgart bemoaned the reluctance of local cinemas and theaters to feature more Allied works. Similar complaints emerged from press officers who confronted not only the adherence of German editors to pre-1933 German press practices but also the refusal of local newspapers to provide more coverage of French and American news and culture. Thus, while the French reeducation strategy was more effective in the promotion of Allied culture, neither it nor the American counterpart did much to inspire interest in Allied values and practices as the foundation for postwar German cultural life. After four years of occupation, then, the most important Allied contribution to the denazification and democratization of both cities remained the defeat of National Socialism and the victory of Allied armies over the Reich.

Nevertheless, questions about the effect of Allied cultural policies invite the exploration of developments beyond the end of the occupation. In its analysis of the debate over the meaning of 1945, the present study points to a future research question about the significance of 1949. What did the end of military occupation mean for Allied-German cultural negotiations? Here, it seems, 1949 marked both a point of rupture and continuity. To be sure, the year signaled a clear shift in the dynamics of Allied-German relations. After the establishment of a federal German government in May, the election of Konrad Adenauer as German chancellor and the replacement of Allied military governors with high commissioners in September completed the transition from Allied to German governance in most matters, save foreign policy. At the same
time, however, the end of military governance did not entail the cessation of those cultural negotiations that the occupation had inspired. Although their objective shifted from policing to defending German towns and cities, Allied troops remained present throughout West Germany and continued to act as agents of cultural transfer. In Freiburg, French troops maintained a garrison until the mid-1990s and French schools, community centers, and even grocery stores left a mark on local social and cultural activities. A similar situation unfolded in Stuttgart, where the presence of American military personnel persists to this day. In the meantime, Allied high commissioners, whose staffs maintained offices in both cities until the mid-1950s, facilitated further Allied-German cultural exchange. Deprived of the immediate postwar tools of occupation mandates, licensing, and requisitions, they relied instead on the promotion of student and professional exchanges, the operation of Allied libraries, and the notion of a shared Communist enemy to strengthen Allied-German relations and secure the democratic character of (western) German society. Thus, while 1949 marked the end of the Allied occupation, it also marked a new chapter in a long-term exchange between the Germans and their occupiers-turned-allies.

Future occupation studies should focus on this new chapter and probe the long-term legacies of Allied cultural policies. While the general democratic character of the West German state is clear, the post-occupation dynamics of German social and cultural democratization are not. Here, again, local studies will be useful, for they can reveal details about post-1949 German approaches to democracy and answer a variety of questions about the local, post-occupation influence of Allied reforms. These questions concern the role that Allied cultural imports played in Germans’ lives during the 1950s and 1960s. Did, for example, Allied-German cultural exchange organizations or student exchanges thrive more in Freiburg or Stuttgart after 1949?
Did local schools or newspapers later embrace additional Allied practices? Also important are questions about generational differences in the post-occupation response to Allied influences.

Occupation scholars have only begun to assess the longer-term consequences of the Allies’ postwar mission. Two recent monographs, however, have set the stage for an important historiographical shift. The first is Christina von Hodenberg’s study of German print media during the first three postwar decades, entitled *Konsens und Krise: Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit, 1945-1973*. It recasts questions about the German response to Allied journalistic models as a generational issue and distinguishes the negative response of older journalists, whose professionalization was complete before 1933, with their younger colleagues, whose careers blossomed only after 1945. Hodenberg’s generational perspective is insightful. Yet, her macro-level focus does little to illustrate how postwar negotiations over the adoption of Allied journalistic practices unfolded on the ground after 1949. A second study has provided a more localized portrait. Brian Puaca’s account of German education reforms from 1945-1965 traces developments in West Berlin and Hesse. The study asks if and how those “seeds of reform,” which the Allies planted, sprouted after the occupation ended. It focuses on textbook reform and examines how a younger generation of postwar teachers later helped to realize some of the Allies’ reform initiatives. Together, these authors have paved the way for future studies to consider the (local) legacies of Allied cultural policies, including film, theater, and art. An expansion of the present study to include developments in the 1950s and 1960s would fit well with the current historiographical trend.

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In the meantime, the immediate postwar experiences of Freiburg and Stuttgart should inspire caution in the face of popular notions of the “success” of Allied cultural occupation policies. If the establishment of a (West) German democratic state corresponded to what occupation planners had targeted, it had not resulted from the unilateral implementation of Allied reforms. Instead, the political and cultural character of West German society developed through a series of complex deliberations between postwar Germans and their occupiers. While Allied policies influenced Germany’s postwar development, they were neither the only nor the central force behind the nation’s denazification and democratization. In Freiburg and Stuttgart, at least, these were the result of negotiations between different understandings of the past and distinct expectations for the future.
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