SUDAN BREAKS APART: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUDAN’S PROSPECT FOR PEACE THROUGH DEMOCRACY

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By

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ABSTRACT

Has the call for Southern Sudan’s independence referendum (conducted during January 9-15, 2011, resulting in the creation of the newly autonomous nation of Southern Sudan on July 9, 2011) been successful in promoting both domestic and regional peace in the war-torn country? If so, will the institutionalized form of democracy be a governing mechanism that maintains peace between the newly separated nations?

The empirical claim that democracies are generally more peaceful internally and seldom go to war with one another has revolutionized the international relations community. The claim may also provide the newly divided Sudan an opportunity for peace. However, democracy does not happen immediately. This study is based on the democratic transition process in Africa and will show that the election process that causes countries like Sudan to remain in the transitional zone between an autocratic regime and a fully consolidated democratic government does
not initially facilitate the development of peaceful domestic and international relations.

By evaluating the history of Sudan and comparing its democratic transition process with those instituted in similar post conflict countries, Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, this interdisciplinary study reveals that the sequence in which the institution of liberal rights and elections takes place depends on the issues inherent to the democratizing country. Serving as a warning to Africa’s newly separated nation, this study looks to the citizens of Sudan and the international community to focus more on setting legally binding constraints on the government to maintain the will of the people while recognizing that elections, with time, can promote the democratic principles necessary for peace.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the people of Sudan and across Africa who continue to fight for freedom, justice and equality. Their strength and perseverance continue to inspire me. I would also like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, Zeremariam Debesai Gebreziger and Hosanna Gebreziger. Their dream of providing a better life for their family forced them to leave their war-stricken homeland of Eritrea and seek refuge in Khartoum, Sudan, where I was born.

Although I came to the United States when I was extremely young, my parents never let me forget where I came from. Their unbelievable journey and sacrifice have afforded me the opportunity to write this thesis and hopefully give back in some small way. To my mother, thank you for your never-ending love and support. To my father, although you are no longer here physically, your spirit remains forever within me, thank you.

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INTRODUCTION

Has the call for Southern Sudan’s independence referendum (conducted during January 9-15, 2011, resulting in the creation of the newly autonomous nation of Southern Sudan on July 9, 2011) been successful in promoting both domestic and regional peace? If so, will the institutionalized form of democracy be a governing mechanism that maintains peace between the newly separated nations?

Throughout Sudan’s history, discontent and violence have contributed to a lack of political legitimacy and inequality between the country’s different ethnic groups. The lack of natural resources added to the tensions within the country, and the inability of Sudan’s government to maintain security has engendered and exacerbated multiple conflicts that have claimed or wrecked the lives of millions of innocent Sudanese citizens. This study proposes that over time, the consolidated form of democracy that maintains the will of the people can bring an end to such violence and provide a radical break in Sudan’s history.

The notion that violence may arise as Southern Sudan begins to embark on its independent journey from its questionable autocratic Northern counterpart has made the
issue of providing a governing system that empirically claims to provide longstanding peace a priority. By initially breaking down the theory of democratic peace, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach to understand what it will take for the new divided nation of Sudan to maintain peace.

Chapter one of this study provides a sociological and historical analysis of Sudan’s multiple historical problems of national identity, political voice, and economic inequality to understand the roots of the conflict. In this context, how did the referendum calling for Southern Sudan’s independence affect the prospects for peace and stability in the conflict-ridden country? It seems the referendum improved the prospect for peace and stability by granting the South autonomy and giving voice to the large and marginalized population. This action eliminated one of the largest impetuses to war.

Chapter two focuses on the particular role of elections and seeks to evaluate the principles and process of democratization in relation to conflict resolution and the preservation of peace in the newly separated regions of Northern and Southern Sudan. In this context, will elections promote the acceptance and consolidation of democratic leadership selection, political legitimacy, and
peace, or will they produce yet further crises, instability, and human catastrophes between Northern and Southern Sudan? Yes, electoral democracy can meet the better expectations of the people. However, the realization of this outcome in the new Sudan is dependent on avoiding the historical tendency to subvert the will of the people.

Does the sequence in the process of instituting electoral or liberal (also known as constitutional) democracy make a difference in the success of democratic peace? No. Instead of sequencing, this study proposes the gradual approach offered by Thomas Carothers to suit the democratic challenges faced by Sudan and other African countries. Time to develop and to overcome the history of colonial consequences are crucial to understanding how democratic peace can be achieved in Africa.

Chapter three and four provide case studies of similar post conflict societies, Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, to illustrate successes and failures in achieving democratic peace through the electoral system. The case studies uncover that although aspects of liberal democracy such as civil society building, comprehensive constitutions, and the building of national identity are critical in facilitating democratic peace, the only
precondition to democracy is a strong political voice and time to institute the power of that voice in government.

In order to improve Sudan’s chances at democratic peace, the final chapter breaks down how both Northern and Southern Sudan must overcome the challenges of democratic sequencing, strengthening civil society, writing a new constitution, forming a national identity, and creating a government that is transparent and accountable to its electorate. By holding the government accountable to the will of the people and tempering expectations for instant democratic peace, the final chapter calls into action the people of both Northern and Southern Sudan and the international community to bring an end to the decades of violence.

Ultimately the propose of this study is to contribute not only to understanding and assessing the prospects for democracy and peace in the newly divided nations of Sudan, but also to a more realistic appraisal of the contested role of elections in post conflict societies generally. The devastation of war in Sudan and across Africa must be brought to end by the people and for the people.

**Democratic Peace Theory**

The empirical claim that democracies are generally more peaceful internally and seldom go to war with one
another has revolutionized the international relations community. Though there is a vocal dissenting minority, the consensus view by international relations theorists is summarized by the statement that the “absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy 1989, 270). Since the idea’s introduction by Immanuel Kant’s writings in the 18th century, the democratic peace theory has provided a variety of explanations as to why democratic states tend to be more peaceful (Levy 1989, 270-71).

The debated explanations for the democratic peace theory rest on three notions: democratic institutions place constraints on the ability of leaders to go to war, the norms shared by democratic states cause the perceptions between them to be unthreatening, and the tendency of democracies to foster economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of war (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999, 792-794). Essentially, the general theory contends that an institutionalized democracy legally holds the governing party accountable to the will of the people.

A number of contemporary scholars disagree with the notion that the values instituted in democracy hold
interstate cooperation together. Instead, markets are seen as the deciding factor for maintaining peaceful relations with other democracies, with the nation’s economic self-interest as the major priority (Mousseau 2003, Cohen 1998). It is important to note that in the case of Sudan, both notions of economic self-interest and democratic principles can play a part in maintaining peace.

The future success of both the Northern and Southern regions will rely heavily on their ability to maintain peaceful negotiations of shared resource between the nations. Essentially if one part of Sudan fails economically so will the other. Thus, the economic self-interest of both nations will provide an incentive to maintain peace. Yet, it is also true that the instituted democratic rule of law provides a mechanism restraining leaders in both the North and South to resolve economic disputes through negotiation as opposed to war.

Another side of democratic peace theory is that democracies are internally more peaceful than other kinds of polities. The influential findings of Rudolph Rummel reveal that, between 1900 and 1987, democracies killed about 160,000 of their own citizens, whereas non-democratic regimes killed almost 130,000,000 of their own people (Rummel 1995, 3-26). Rummel’s essential theoretical explanation for these findings
is that “Power kills; absolute Power kills absolutely” (Rummel 1994, 8).

The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the more power is diffused, checked, and balanced, the less it will aggress on others and commit democide. (Rummel 1994, 1-2)

Rummel uses the term democide to describe any instance in which the state kills its own citizens, ranging from large scale genocide to a single political execution. However, Rummel notes that time is needed to build a “well established” constitutional framework of laws constraining the government to guarantee equal rights and prevent mass atrocities while building a recognized democratic culture (Rummel 2002, 6-7).

Thus, for all its influence, the theory of the democratic peace carries a crucial caveat. Democratizing countries, particularly in Africa, face pressures on the state to enforce the rule of law, promote economic growth, ensure voluntary compliance from their population, and shape the allocation of societal resources (Grugel 2002, 83). Therefore, the leaders in most non-consolidated democracies are left pursuing nationalizing state policies aimed at cultural homogeneity which are not necessarily in
line with democratic policies that ensure broad inclusive citizenship and equal rights (Grugel 2002, 78).

In this context, this study analyzes the prospect for peace through the institutionalization of democracy in the newly autonomous nations of Northern and Southern Sudan. Recognizing the unique challenges faced by newly democratic nations in Africa to develop and sustain themselves in a globalized world, this study supports the claim that although democracy indeed decreases the likelihood of armed conflict, the initial process of democratization has the opposite effect (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5-6).
CHAPTER 1
HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN SUDAN

The idea of lasting peace in Sudan seems to continuously elude the country as it is engulfed in multiple conflicts. The irony, however, is the promise of peace fuels the constant discord within the country. There have been just as many wars fought within Sudan as there have been peace agreements. Pure frustration caused by broken promises of equal treatment and citizenship have taken its toll on the Northeast African nation that has endured two civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) and claimed the lives of over 2 million people. In addition, the civil conflict has displaced nearly 4 million people (Iyob and Khadiadala 2006, 13), not to mention the internationally-recognized genocide that took place during the Darfur conflict (2003-2009).

This chapter will examine the history of Sudan prior to the referendum in order to understand how the lack of national identity, political voice, and economic equality created a divided population in a constant state of civil war. In doing so, this chapter exposes the root cause for continual conflict in Sudan, stemming from the failures of historical governing mechanisms to adhere to the will of the people.
The loss of national identity: Questions of race, religion, and citizenship

Sudan can trace its roots of conflict to the historical divides of race, religion and culture, leaving the nation without a sense of national identity by creating an inferior and superior complex. According to the current 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit country report, Sudan is geographically the largest country in Africa, with the population estimated at 43 million people. Within Sudan’s vast population, there are nearly 597 ethnicities speaking over 400 different languages and dialects, identifying themselves as either Arab or African in ancestry (Economist Intelligence Unit, (online) 2011).

A broad breakdown of ethnic and religious backgrounds in Sudan consists of the majority of the population falling in these two groups; Christian Africans and Muslim Arabs. The Christian African population typically farms the land in the grasslands of the South. In contrast, the Muslim Arab population tends to be more nomadic and resides in the desert North. The sociological oversimplification of Muslim Arab and Christian African ancestry is explored further as the history of Sudan reveals how the divide among ethnic and religious backgrounds spawned an assertion from the developed North
to proclaim itself as the ruling party, leaving the South in a constant state of self-defense (Jok 2007, 51-52).

Turco-Egyptian Sudan, as it was known during the Ottoman Empire (1821-1881), was a country in name only, in which the Southern region, occupying one-third of the country, was considered "merely a field in which slaves were harvested" (Jok 2007, 52). The Southern Sudanese population was perceived by colonial leaders to be dramatically inferior to the North. In addition, the South was not effectively controlled by the colonial government in the North, nor did it benefit from state services, a problem that continues today. The history of colonial slavery exacerbated the notable ethnic divide between the North and South regions by creating structural hierarchical cleavage founded on assumptions of superior and inferior race (Jok 2007, 52-53).

Slavery also called into question Southern Sudan’s idea of citizenship. For the Christian African majority in Southern Sudan, the psychological effect of being outcaste and looked down upon as nothing more than slaves challenged the concept of “belonging” to the nation of Sudan as a whole. Southern Sudanese, whose African Christian ancestors had long occupied the region, felt isolated and harbored understandable frustrations towards
the forced union by colonial mapmakers to Northern Arab-Islamic elites (Deng 2005, 262). With the Southern population repressed, and the absence of national citizenship, Sudan was on the verge of civil conflict, leaving the question: how did the North justify the continual dominance over the Southern population?

In their book *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala maintained that Islam provided the theological and economic justification for the suppression of the non-Arabized Sudanic people of the South, as they were known during the Ottoman Empire. Iyob and Khadiagala suggested that due to slavery, the Arabized North correlated African features with inferiority and labeled them demeaning, while the perceived superiority of the Arab-Islamic features became a source of pride. In turn, the authors referred to the ideology of ethno-cultural superiority, known as Arabism. The authors illustrated how Arabism was utilized by Northern Sudan to mold a subordinate division that was composed of non-Arabized people such as the Beja, Nuba, Ingessana, Fur, and Nilotes from the Southern region (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 20-22).

Yet slavery was not the only factor that contributed to the subordination of Southern Sudan. Amir Ideris,
The need for political voice: The divide and conquer method

Examining Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, as it was known under British colonial rule from 1898-1956, reveals a desire for
a viable Southern political voice was at the heart of the Sudan conflict. The installation of colonial policies to govern the country as a single polity, while ruling Southern Sudan as a separate entity, has continued to haunt the nation. Northern Sudan was able to advance both politically and economically, while the South stayed underdeveloped. With no voice in government, the South’s continued frustrations of being tied to the North began to boil over (Deng 2006, 156).

1955, a year prior to Sudan’s independence, marked the beginning of Sudan’s first civil conflict. Rebellion was ignited when rumors surfaced of a post-colonial arrangement to replace the British and Egyptian officers with Arab soldiers in the South and Southern soldiers being transferred to the North. In the hope of finally establishing Southern autonomy, the soldiers in the South objected to the rumored arrangement. Southern soldiers stated the South’s desire to have the British set up two separate schedules for the independence of two countries. Yet, it was at that moment in Sudan’s history that the South’s fears of the British reversing their initial policy of a separate administration was confirmed and conflict erupted (Deng 2006, 157).
As the conflict began, the British administration withdrew from Sudan and transferred its political power to the Arabized North. Continuing the colonial policies of domination, Northern Sudan began “Arabising and Islamising” all of Sudan (Deng 2005 263). The notable Presidential adviser and author Dr. Luka Biong Deng argues, “the more this imposed Arab-Islamic nationalistic perception [was] challenged or even questioned by the non-Arab majority, the more it [was] coercively asserted in the country by the state with moral and material backing from the Arab Muslim world” (Deng 2005, 263). Essentially for the South, the end of British colonial rule was only the beginning of the Northern Arab-Islamic domination.

The weak parliamentary system run by the Arab-leaning Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Mahdist Umma Party marked the post-colonial period. It was in this moment that Sudan was given the opportunity to rectify historic Southern grievance by granting Southern autonomy. However, history shows that the coalition government continued to ignore the South’s demands for autonomy. Worse yet, the centralized government in the North instituted Islam throughout the nation by closing missionary schools and expelling missionaries from the South completely. Culturally, Arabic became the national language and the
installation of Islamic or sharia law was enforced throughout Sudan. By 1958, the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the civilian government and reinforced the Islamization of the South. General Abboud claimed that, “the missionaries threatened the integrity and the unity of Sudan by encouraging the South to resist the process Arabization and Islamization” (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 83).

Meanwhile, the Southern population, in response to the repressive governments of the North, rallied for Southern leadership. The two groups that ended up framing the Southern movement took opposing views on the military and political strategies necessary in achieving the overarching goal of self-determination. In 1961, William Deng founded the Sudan African National Union (SANU). The movement was put in place to advance politically the Southern objective of self-determination and was recognized by the central government. However, the opposing Anyanya Southern rebel group, instituted the same time as SANU, planned military attacks targeted against the central government. By 1964, the collation government utilized nearly 18,000 soldiers to combat the rebel groups of the South (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 81).
The history of Southern leadership continued to be challenged by the promise of autonomy. By 1965, the civilian-run governments in Sudan’s capital of Khartoum dangled the promise of peace to apply the colonial method of divide and conquer in order to keep the Southern movement from gaining cohesion. The consolidated government in Khartoum utilized the March 1965 Round Table Conference as a gesture of peace. The conference was called to discuss ways to bring the Sudan conflict to an end (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 81-82).

However, Northern political parties were not willing to grant the South regional autonomy. Maintaining Arab-Islam superiority, the Northern political party held fast to the notion of unity between Northern and Southern Sudan. Thus, with the Southern movement’s demand of autonomy ignored, the conference proved to be unsuccessful at brokering peace (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 81-82).

Nevertheless, the promise of peace promoted by the conference did succeed in causing a division in the SANU. The Southern Front and the People’s Progressive Party split from the SANU in response to the prospect of an autonomous South. Southern leaders were unable to determine what the majority of the Southern population desired. Northern leaders would antagonize the South by
continually asking what it is they sought. In turn, there was an evident divide between moderates and hardliners in the Southern movement (Khalid 2003, 94-95).

With the South’s leadership divided, the unified Northern party had more of reason to advocate the maintaining of a consolidated Sudan. By the end of the conference a constitution was drafted calling for the decentralization of government by splitting Sudan into nine regions. The Southern regional assembly was given limited legislative powers that were “subject to national legislative approval” (Khalid 2003, 94). In effect, the South was given a limited version of autonomy that still maintained the heart of control in the North. The constitution marked Sudan’s first attempt at establishing a form of democracy.

As instability within Southern leadership persisted on through the late 1960’s, the Anyanya rebels ramped up their attacks on the North, demanding the South gain its full independence. To add to the conflict, in 1967 SANU’s founder Deng was killed by the national army after joining forces with the Khartoum government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. The political alliance forged between Deng and al-Mahdi focused on the mock election for the South to fill a seat in the Constituent Assembly. Al-Mahdi had no intentions in
addressing the South’s concerns and utilized the alliance to gain support against the Northern opposition party (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 83).

Deng’s death deepened tensions between the North and South. Shortly after, the Southern Front and SANU tried, unsuccessfully, to utilize their seats in the assembly in order to push for Southern autonomy. In 1969, Southern representatives grew frustrated with the lack of political voice and walked out of the constituent assembly. In the same year a military coup, headed by Jaafar Nimeiri, once again led to an accord that promised peace by granting a mock form of Southern autonomy (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 83).

The Nimeiri era from 1969-1985 proved to be another missed opportunity in Sudan’s history to provide a lasting form of democratic peace. Nimeiri’s regime ended Sudan’s first civil war in 1972 with an accord for Southern Sudan’s provisional autonomy signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, Nimeiri’s personality and ruling methods were erratic and contradictory, often not realizing the ramifications of his actions. Nimeiri’s brazen form of governance was seen in the modifications made to the accord. By retracting the rights guaranteed to
the South in the accord, Nimeiri unraveled the short period of peace in Sudan (Khalid 2003, 143).

During the initial adoption of the Addis Ababa agreement Sudan was able to maintain relative peace. It was the first time in Sudan’s history that a constitution was founded to address the historical issue of separation. In turn, the accord fostered social, political, and economic gains. With mobility restored between the North and South, capital was able to flow and improve the post conflict nation. The accord also gave the South a taste for political leadership. By creating three independent administrative units, each with its own governor, government and parliament, the accord transformed the South’s political structure (Khalid 2003, 160).

However as the South began to grow, Nimeiri began repealing unilaterally the constitutional rights granted by the accord to the South. In doing so, Nimeiri riddled the accord with clauses to reestablish Northern supremacy. One example of Nimeiri’s retraction was the redesigning of the North-South boundaries. Refineries were strategically placed in the North in order to exploit the Southern oil resources. He also declared the imposition of sharia law and further diluted the concept of Southern autonomy. By 1983 the continued pacification of the autonomous South
combined with the cultural imposition of the Northern Arab elites, sparked the second uprising in Sudan (Jok 2007, 85-86).

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was established during the second civil war. The aggravation of continual broken promises hastened the South’s establishment of a united front. In response to the growing Southern movement, the radical Islamic faction incited a military takeover headed by the current President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. Ending Nimeiri’s reign in 1989, al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF) fought to regain control of the South (Jok 2007, 89-92). As Sudan’s second civil war waged on, the western region of Sudan, Darfur, took on another dimension of the North-South conflict.

The loss of economic equality: The Darfur conflict

The highly publicized Darfur conflict, which began in 2003 and continued through to 2009, epitomized the genocidal effect of deeply-rooted economic disparities in Sudan. However, the monstrous conflict could have been avoided. Tensions between the Northern and Southern population rapidly developed with Khartoum instigating and facilitating the conflict’s underlying issues of economic inequalities.
Despite the international media’s narrow depiction of the Darfur conflict as stemming from ethnic and religious differences, the heart of the conflict remained largely economic. Prior to the 1980s, tribal councils were utilized to ensure that both the Northern and Southern populations in Darfur were able to have access to land and water resources. The council was able to reassure the African population whose voice was not represented in government that their needs would be addressed and were even recognized in Khartoum. However, as seen in the North v. South war, the Arab majority government structure that was put in place after the 1980’s left the Southern African population without equal representation (Power 2004, 3).

To add to the problem in Darfur, a regional drought had limited the amount of resources available to both groups. The lack of water and food heightened the tensions between both sides. Yet, without a voice in government, the Southern African population became marginalized and took up arms to protect the small amount of land used to provide for their families (Power 2004, 3).

As the pressure continued to intensify, some of the Northern Arab tribes began to incite violence by trampling the small farm lands of the African population. Abhorrence
and frustration between the populations grew as both groups took actions to defend their livelihood. In Khartoum, little was done to mitigate the growing tensions in Darfur. Without any real representation in government and limited resources throughout Sudan due to the drought, fights began to erupt between the Arab and African populations (Power 2004, 3-4).

Prior to the height of the conflict in 2003, smaller scale violence in Darfur previewed the genocidal consequences of Khartoum not effectively addressing the economic and environmental concerns of the people. From 1987-1989 over 2,500 Southern Africans were killed, hundreds of village and nomadic tents burned, and over five hundred Northern Arabs died. Finally by 1989 an inter-tribal conference was held to end the conflict. However, nothing came of the conference and neither punishment nor compensation was restored in the area. The lack of government intervention festered as one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters began to take shape (Power 2004, 3-4).

The conflict exploded when the SPLA began to target government-run organizations in February 2003. The SPLA had grown tired of the pro-Arab mantra that had been adopted throughout the country and decided to fight back.
SPLA bombed airports, police stations, and army posts, killing nearly 100 soldiers. The SPLA began to make public their manifesto that demanded that all citizens of Sudan be treated equally. In retaliation against the SPLA’s attacks, president al-Bashir utilized the infamous Janjaweed militia (Anderson 2004, 2-3).

“Devils on horseback” is the English translation for Janjaweed, an apt description of an armed group that killed thousands of people for profit (Anderson 2004, 4). The Janjaweed was not a government-led army and instead of subduing the rebel groups, it incited more violence by killing thousands of people and burning villages throughout Southern Darfur. One of the Sudanese generals, Ibrahim Suleiman, admitted that, “When the problems with the rebels started in Darfur we in the government of Sudan had a number of options. We chose the wrong one. We chose the very worst one” (Anderson 2004, 2-3).

The government of Sudan supported the militia by providing arms to eradicate the rebels. In turn, the Janjaweed continued on without sanction, killing and dehumanizing not just rebel groups but anyone who stood in their way. This included some of the Arab population who were also victims of the Janjaweed violence. The Janjaweed was an unstoppable force that raped women and children,
burned villages and food sources, and escalated the conflict to a full-scale war as the SPLA struggled to fight back (Anderson 2004, 3-4).

The conflict claimed the lives of nearly 400,000 people and left millions more without homes before the government of Sudan and rebel forces signed a ceasefire agreement in 2004 that would slowly de-escalate the conflict by 2009 (Anderson 2004, 3-4). The crisis of Darfur internationalized the failures of the Sudanese government to create conditions for an equitable coexistence between the North and South. The government’s lack of resolve to address the historic social, political, and economic issues left a nation constantly at war with itself.

However, there is hope for the future of Sudan. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has given Sudan another opportunity to rectify the past mistakes of broken promises. The CPA not only put an end to the civil conflict in Sudan, but has also laid the constitutional groundwork to address issues of “citizenship, national identity, fundamental rights and freedom and good governance” (Deng 2005, 264-65). Signed by both the SPLM and the government of Sudan, the CPA made way for the January 2011 referendum for Southern independence.
On February 7, 2011 the Southern Sudan’s Referendum Commission announced that 98.83% of voters had backed the independence of the South, giving birth to Africa’s newest nation (Martell 2011). Still, after enduring both civil wars and the Darfur conflict, political legitimacy will need to be established throughout Sudan. In order to avoid making the same mistakes of the previous administrations, the newly separated Northern and Southern governments of Sudan cannot neglect the will of the people. The following chapters will show that with time, the institutionalization of democratic principles promised by the CPA’s transitional government can bring about peace within and between the newly-divided nations.
CHAPTER 2
ELECTIONS, PEACE, AND DEMOCRACY

Sudan’s missed opportunities for building a peaceful form of governance in the past leaves reasonable inclination to write off Sudan’s attempts at constructing a new democratic constitution that adheres to the will of the people as nothing more than another broken promise. So what is it about democracy and elections that offers the prospect of peace in Sudan and Africa in general? Simply put, it is democracy’s potential to provide a legally-binding voice through the election process to people who have suffered decades of repression and authoritative rule to ultimately establish peaceful civil societies. The challenge with democracy and elections in general is to understand how it works and how best to implement such a radical new concept. With postcolonial Africa already facing social and economic strife, the transition to democracy is particularly challenging, but not impossible.

The general definition of democracy is “…a system of rules by which leaders, groups, and parties compete for power, and in which free and equal people elect representatives to make binding decisions” (Mattes, and Bratton 2007, 192). However, for elections to be free and equal, they must include freedom of expression for
candidates and voters, access to alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and suffrage based on inclusive citizenship (Dahl 1989).

In turn, the two key characteristics of meaningful and sustainable democracy are electoral and liberal. The election process ultimately establishes a connection between the people’s interests and the governing body, while the liberal aspect provides protection through the rule of law and state building (Dahl 1989). Scholars continue to debate whether accountability or representation in elections actually makes the connection between the people and their government. Also questioned by scholars is the sequence (electoral or liberal) that comes first in the consolidation of democracy.

This chapter is organized into two parts. First, the components of the electoral system are broken down to understand how the people’s voice is established in a democratic system. Ultimately a theoretical tradeoff between the accountability and representation models utilized in establishing the people’s voice in a democratic system is uncovered. Second, it engages the debate about the sequence in which elections and democratic institutions are established. This important debate helps to frame the following case studies by
revealing the unique challenges that African countries face in forming a consolidated democracy. While the following case studies demonstrate that the initial transition to democracy is often violent, democratic peace can be achieved over time in Sudan and across Africa.

**Accountability vs. Representation**

Electoral systems are conventionally divided into two categories, majoritarian and proportional representation (Lijphart 1999). Majoritarian systems usually employ exclusive single-seat districts with plurality rule and tend to give greater representation to the two parties that receive the most votes. Proportional representation systems must employ multi-seat districts, usually with party lists, and typically produce parliamentary representation that largely reflects the vote shares of multiple parties (Lijphart 1999).

Proportional representation systems are more representative than majoritarian because they facilitate the inclusion of all relevant societal and ethnic groups. On the other hand, majoritarian systems encourage legislative mandates that implement the majority’s will and focus on accountability (Power 2000). Thus, the electoral system choice has important implications for citizen expectations of representation and accountability,
as different electoral systems tend to perform better in achieving one or the other.

Widespread support is critical to democratic legitimacy and stability in emerging democracies (Norris 1999, 3). The evaluations made by citizens on new political regimes are usually based on performance concerns. People are likely to build their own assessments of the legislature’s performance based on whether or not it provides what the people desire and whether it offers a reasonably fair chance for every individual and group in society to influence government decision-making processes. When people are both politically and economically alienated, there tends to be a lower level of trust in the legislature. As seen in Sudan and the following case studies, low levels of popular trust undermine the democratic legitimacy of the legislature and weaken the government decision-making process (Norris 1999, 3-4).

Elections are tools of democracy because they give the people influence over policy making (Powell 2000, 4). One of the fundamental roles of elections is the appraisal of the incumbent government. Citizens use elections to reward or punish the incumbents. Citizens who have more positive attitudes about their ability to control directly by choosing between potential members of government are
more likely to show positive attitudes toward the legislature. On the other hand, when elections are used as an instrument of citizen’s influence it is more often associated with a vision of dispersed policy-making power. The dispersed influence highlights the representation of all points of view brought into an arena of unstable policy coalitions. In this vision elections play a more indirect role in policy making (Powell 2000, 13-15).

Essentially, with regards to citizen influence in proportional representation, elections bring representatives of all the divisions in the society into the policy-making arena. These representatives then bargain with each other in a flexible and accommodative fashion. The disseminated influence emphasizes the representation of all points of view brought into an arena of shifting policy coalitions. In turn, citizens’ perceptions of the representation of the governing body have a significant impact on their attitudes toward the legislature (Powell 2000, 13-15). Overall there is a theoretical tradeoff that is expected between the accountability and representation models of democracy.

The sequencing debate

These tradeoffs are contextualized in the process of promoting the consolidation of democracy in transitioning
governments, particularly in Africa. Theoretical debates amongst scholars as to the sequence needed to establish a consolidated democracy center on the question: does the successful establishment of elections then lead to liberal democracy? Some scholars argue in defense of democracy promotion, suggesting that “Western democracy promoters” should take steps to safeguard fragile democracies, recommending that they “develop international institutions that enhance mutually beneficial cooperation” and “draft a code of conduct for democratic interventions” in order to consolidate the right to free and fair elections (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007, 43-44).

Taking that argument one step further, some scholars contend that not all societies are suited for democracy and that without clear laws and institutions, people cannot be trusted to make good decisions. First, infrastructure and liberal institutions must be built up to educate voters and create a certain level of wealth in the society in order to guarantee that when elections occur, the electorate will chose the leaders that will ensure that liberal democracy will be promoted and protected (Chaua 2004). As a result, proponents of sequencing fear that without first putting in place
democratic institutions, elected leaders cannot be trusted to ensure larger democratic outcomes for the society.

Yet, other international scholars disagree with this viewpoint and contend that elections can be the triggering event to initiate larger democratic changes in society. According to the opponents of sequencing, elections by democratic means naturally produce larger democratic ends; even if the elections are somewhat flawed, they are the necessary starting point for democratic transitions (Lindberg 2006). The key word is that elections are starting points. A successful election alone does not produce fundamental political change. Those in favor of sequencing pose elections as a means to an end, when in actuality elections in transitioning democracies give people their first real taste of self-empowerment.

Thomas Carothers states that proponents of sequencing “[attempt] to rationalize and defang democratic change by putting the potentially volatile, unpredictable actions of newly empowered masses and emergent leaders into a sturdy cage” (Carothers 2007, 13). Carothers’s statement brings to light the reality of transitioning democracies in Africa. Waiting to establish the preconditions, proposed by those in favor of sequencing,
confines the growth of democracy that originates from the will of the people.

Carothers admits that electoral democracy is not always the best option for countries. He concedes that electoral democracy tried in countries poorly prepared for it can and often does result in bad outcomes with illiberal leaders or extremists in power, strong nationalism, ethnic and civil conflict, and interstate wars. However, he makes the point that autocratic regimes are in direct conflict with the rule of law because the latter limits the autocrat’s power. Also, autocratic regimes are rarely able to maintain a well-functioning state due their erratic leadership (Carothers 2007, 17-18). Consequently, waiting for these preconditions to be established before democratization can occur only adds to the people’s frustration, which leads to violent outbreaks. Ultimately, democratization provides the voice needed to enforce the preconditions imposed by those in favor of sequencing. Thus, as opposed to sequencing, Carothers suggests a gradual approach to democracy (Carothers 2007, 17-18).

Instead of preconditions Carothers’s identifies five factors which he claims are “facilitators or nonfacilitators” of democratization. These factors include
level of economic development, concentration of sources of national wealth, identity based divisions, historical experience with political pluralism, and nondemocratic neighborhoods (Carothers 2007, 24). These factors are not prior requirements that must be met in order for democratization to advance. Instead, Carothers’s states that these five factors gauge the level of difficulty that a transitioning democracy may face. As the following case studies show, the problem in Sudan and Africa in general is that they face a majority (if not all) of the factors that challenge democracies growth and ultimately lead to violent outbreaks during the transition period.

**What democracy looks like in Africa?**

The sociological perspective on the political change that occurred in Africa in the 1990’s reveals how all five of Carothers’s non-facilitating factors continue to challenge the formation of any type of peaceful governing system in Africa. Transitioning from decolonization to democratization has proven to be a long and hard road for many African nations.

However, there is nothing novel about the struggle that comes with radical change. France, one of the European countries which subsequently emerged as a major colonial power in Africa, took between 300 and 500 years
of aggressive rebellion for its modern frontiers to be established. Forging over time, by way of conflict and revolution, a centralized state in France illustrates the relationship between war and nation building (Abubakar 2007, 2). Sudan’s journey in creating a similar progressive form of government may be seen in the same historical perspective.

To help understand the journey of the democratic transition process taking place in Sudan and throughout Africa it is important to look at the theory of political culture. The theory states as follows:

... cross-national differences in collective individual attitudes result from long-standing differences in norms and values, orientations that are embedded in national or ethnic cultures and conveyed across generations through socialization. (Bratton and Mattes 2007, 195)

Thus, when looking to the future of democracy as a process of promoting peace, it is important to assess the norms and values held on the continent by asking: what does democracy look like in Africa?

The comparative assessment of electoral democracies in Africa adapts to the distinct economic and social problems intrinsically linked to the continent. The combination of poverty, instability, and corruption has progressively left African countries facing more
challenges in creating peaceful forms of government. These challenges stem from the lasting effects of postcolonial rule felt throughout the continent (Joseph 1999, 34).

As seen in the history of Sudan and the following case studies, colonialists ruled the continent with pure self-interest, exploiting African resources and having little regard for the consequences of their actions. So, it comes as no surprise that after colonial rule ended in Africa, the continent retained the same repressive methods of governing. With more African countries demanding basic democratic rights, the continent is slowly beginning to break free from the cycle of repression. Yet, trying to instill democratic principles while nations are resolving postcolonial issues of economic dependence, underdevelopment, and civil strife defines the way in which democracy is taking shape in Africa today (Salih 2001, 1).

Another example of colonial consequences is the ethnic cleavages created by the arbitrary drawing of country boundaries throughout Africa. Democratic principles adopt the notion that a prior agreement is made on the identity of the political community that is to be governed. Nevertheless, as seen in Sudan and the following case studies, colonial mapmakers carelessly separated and
recombined homogenous local communities and turn them into heterogeneous national societies. Consequently, besides creating continuous ethnic and religious clashes, the negligence of colonial mapmakers has made it difficult to institute democracy without some form of national identity (Mattes and Bratton 2007, 196).

While carrying the weight of transition, African democracies are unreasonably expected by the international community to accept Western-style democratic principles. The expectation is then translated by the international community, and in turn the domestic population, as a failure if it is not capable of hosting a free and fair election process. In this context, the international community would point to the inability of a country to host free and fair elections and the accompanying structures of government as a normative failure. Yet, this interpretation of failure in the election process does not take into account the history of non-democratic regimes that African countries continue to struggle against (Salih 2001, 3).

Ultimately the process of democratization exerts pressures on states to enforce the rule of law, promote economic growth, ensure voluntary compliance from their population, and shape the allocation of societal resources
(Jean 2002, 83). Often, in non-consolidated democracies, leaders make public their state policies aimed at cultural homogeneity which are not necessarily in line with democratic policies that ensure broad inclusive citizenship and equal rights (Jean 2002, 78).

Additionally, if institutions of democracy are established, but the government remains essentially autocratic behind a democratic facade, “competitive authoritarianism” results (Levitsky 2005, 26). This is a source of instability because these governments must choose between allowing serious opposition challenges to continue, at the cost of possible defeat, and violating democratic rules to maintain power, at the cost of potential international isolation (Levitsky 2005, 26). Unfortunately, as seen in Sudan and the following case studies, the latter is often chosen in African democracies.

To further complicate the democratic transition process, due to Africa’s economic vulnerability, the continent typically turns to the international community to fund elections. In turn, African states are held accountable by the international community. However, the expectation of instant democracy through the election process cannot be the standard by which a country is
labeled democratic. It will take time and political upheavals to truly institute democracy in Africa and meet the conditions necessary for the democratic peace theory to hold true throughout the continent. While the superstructure of international accountability can help facilitate peace, international observers must evaluate the will of the people rather than focus purely on the process of elections in transitioning African democracies (Salih 2001, 3).

What is important to understand in the promotion of democracy and the sequencing debate is that overcoming a long history of autocratic regimes does not happen overnight and initially does not foster peace (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5-6). Therefore, as stated in the introduction, this study looks at the prospect of democracy providing sustainable long-term peace once democratic institutions are established in the new divided Sudan. Aspects of liberal democracy promotion favored by proponents of sequencing such as civil society building, creating a comprehensive constitution, and building a national identity prove to be extremely important in the success of a democratic system.

Still, in order to make these liberal democratic institutions work, the people need to voice their needs to
a governing body that will act on the greater good of the community. Since the election process is the initial connection of the people to its government, it carries the brunt end of tension and conflict, especially when liberal democratic principles are not fulfilled. This is precisely the reason the election process is examined further in this study.

Using Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire as case studies, the following two chapters compare the democratic election process employed in both post conflict societies to assess, on balance, how accountability and representation have shaped popular trust in legislation and the building of civil society. The case studies then go on to evaluate which factors have helped or hurt the consolidation of democracy and ultimately the promotion of peace. The purpose of the case studies is to understand what constitutes success and failures in similar transitioning democratic elections in order to guide Sudan’s new path towards democratic peace.

As in Sudan, the governments in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire have taken bold constitutional steps to reduce tension. Yet, with continued ethnic and economic conflict in both countries surrounding patronage and citizenship, questions about the effectiveness of these mechanisms
remain. However, the reoccurrence of conflict does not necessarily represent failure in the democratization process in these cases. On the contrary, the recognition of public outcry by these African institutions supports the notion that democracy comes “‘in parts and fragments’” (Whitaker and Giersch 2009, 2). It is also consistent with the argument that holding elections in Africa, regardless of their outcome, deepens democratic values (Whitaker and Giersch 2009, 2). Thus, the case studies show that, ultimately, the factors that differentiate between success and failures in obtaining democratic peace are twofold: a strong political voice and time to institute the power of that voice in government.

Fighting to ensure accountability and representation through the election process to secure the political voice of the people in both Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire has proven to be a challenge. However, as Kenya begins to show signs of democratic peace, Cote d’Ivoire struggles with the “non-facilitating” factors of democracy. In turn, each case provides guidance to the new Sudan’s formation of a peaceful consolidated democracy. As the newly separated nation of Sudan begins it democratic journey, these two African countries have already gone on to face the initial
phase of democratization and can provide insight on ways to overcome the challenges of transition.
CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF KENYA: STRUGGLE FOR PEACE THROUGH POLITICAL AWARENESS

The case of Kenya’s democratic transition shows that forming a consolidated democracy can be a lengthy and violent process, and that successful implementation is dependent on public participation. The November 2005 national referendum for Kenya’s proposed constitution broke ground for the democratic transition process in Africa. It was the first time in Kenyan history that the people were asked how they wanted their country to be governed. After decades of authoritarian rule, the division of power came under great scrutiny in the drafting of the constitution. However, with nearly 58% of voters rejecting the final document, the constitution’s integrity to provide a sound democratic structure was jeopardized from its inception (Giersch, Whitaker 2009, 1-2).

Without constitutional reform, the following 2007 presidential election process was riddled with irregularities sparking violence throughout Kenya. The voices of Kenyan citizens were ignored, and there was no accountability in political leadership causing the population to take to the streets. Violence became the
only option to gain the attention of not only the local government in Kenya, which betrayed the trust of the people, but also to the international community. However, there are signs that Kenya is rebuilding government accountability and peace through the internationally observed democratic election process. The constitution reform that was subjected to a referendum on August 4, 2010 has provided a fresh start at producing greater equality and democratic governance in Kenya (Palmer 2011, 32).

In evaluating the history of governance in Kenya, key problems of political patronage, tribalism, and the corruption of elite dictatorship are revealed as sources of rebellious violent outbreaks. However, these challenges have also become the driving force for the people of Kenya to demand equal representation and accountability through the democratic system. Withstanding the challenges to democracy, Kenya’s case proves that the only precondition to democracy is the people’s willingness to fight for their voice in government. The new two-state Sudan can learn from the challenges Kenya continues to face in establishing legitimacy and forming a consolidated democracy that adheres to the will of the people to bring peace.
Kenya’s challenges to consolidating democracy

The initial influx of foreign settlers in Kenya offered little in the way of hospitality for the native residents. According to the article entitled, “Race and Politics in Kenya” by Tom Mboya, the purpose of colonial rule in Kenya was to promote European supremacy and exploit the country’s goods and services. Similar to Sudan, British colonial powers produced a system of dividing the Kenyan population so that a unified public would not pose a threat of uprising against the colony. Mboya explains that in order to ensure that colonial interests were maintained, European settlers imposed indirect rule (Mboya 1965, 86-89).

The process of indirect rule provided an administration composed of select indigenous ethnic groups in order to divide land units. This distribution of land varied, with the majority of the best land going to the European settlers and the remainder distributed unequally amongst different ethnic groups. The inequitable treatment by colonial leaders was one of the main factors that led to the MAU MAU rebellion of 1952-1956. The MAU MAU was an anticolonial group, mostly composed of the Kikuyu ethnic faction whose armed rebellion against the British resulted in a terror campaign that killed thousands of people from
both sides. Although MAU MAU was defeated by the British military due to its lack of public support, it arguably set the stage for Kenyan independence (Nyukuri 1994, 8).

Kenyan citizens began to realize how critical public support is in obtaining their needs. Unfortunately, just as in Sudan, the colonial legacy of divide and conquer left a nation that was unable to form a national union. What happened during the MAU MAU revolution is that instead of national unity, the formation of distinct ethnic unions began their own individual struggles to end colonial rule. In turn, after Kenya gained independence there was a lack of political organization to rebuild and redistribute goods and services fairly. Worse yet, due to clear ethnic divisions there was no common political voice. The lack of infrastructure and common political voice left Kenya to produce its own form of political governance by way of patronage (Mboya 1965, 86-89).

Patronage is a vertical network of individual patron-client relations by electoral means. The system institutes a “big man” who is able to relate the needs of the community and effectively produce a structure to meet those needs. One person, voted by the people, is taking in the requests of an entire community and then allocating the resources, at will, throughout their network. The
problem is that the motives of one person can be easily altered in regards to personal gain. In Kenya, motives behind the patronage system were questioned due to the exploitative nature left in the wake of colonial rule. So it came as no surprise that the ambition for power through corrupt means remained a central part of Kenya’s patronage system (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 421-424).

In the early 1960s, Kenyan leaders met in London to draft a post independence constitution. Similar to Sudan, a split transpired between the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) over the separation of powers. The KANU gathered much of its political support from two of the largest ethnic groups, Kikuya and Luo, while KADU was a coalition of smaller groups. Concern over domination by the larger groups caused KADU to call for “majimboism” or regionalism. Prior to becoming Kenya’s first president in 1964, Jomo Kenyatta led the KANU party against the idea of majimboism. In turn, 1963 constitution included a scaled-down version of majimboism that decentralized power to the regions (Giersch, Whitaker 2009, 3).

After independence, however, President Kenyatta used KANU’s overwhelming strength in parliament to weaken regional governments, change the constitution, and
eventually swallow up KADU. The majimboism debate faded away, but came back full force in the 1990s, supported by none other than President Daniel arap Moi. At its worst, the renewed call for majimboism fuelled ethnic clashes and stalled political reforms. At its best, it represented a legitimate clash of visions over how to protect minority interests and divide power in a multiethnic democracy (Anderson 2005, 548).

Majimboism was Kenya’s first real attempt at trying to provide a democratic system that suited the needs of all its citizens. Introducing a new system to a society is already a difficult task without adding the complication of long stemming ethnic tensions. What is important to emphasize in the case of majimboism was its attempt to bring different ethnic backgrounds together.

The question of executive power has been a focus of constitutional debates in Kenya. In the decades following independence, under Kenyatta and then Moi, power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the president. In Gabrielle Lynch’s article entitled, “The Fruits of Perception: Ethnic Politics and the Case of Kenya’s Constitutional Referendum,” observations of Moi’s administration reveal the desire of power negating the purpose of overall Kenyan development.
Lynch states that although Moi presented the people of Kenya with such incentives as weekly cash hand-outs, the lure of power caused Moi continually to distort elections with his reign in office from 1978-2002. The time-span of the Moi regime illustrates that even with the end of colonial rule the impacts of colonial powers persist (Lynch 2006, 238-240).

Prospects for democracy in Kenya were enhanced by the resounding defeat of Moi and the KANU party by the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), itself an alliance of Mwai Kibaki’s National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and ex-KANU rebels in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Raila Odinga, NARC’s presidential candidate. Mwai Kibaki won 62% of the votes in the 27 December 2002 presidential election against 31% for Moi’s handpicked candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, setting the stage for the 30 December 2002 swearing of Kibaki as Kenya’s third president. For the first time since independence, the ruling party was defeated and conceded power. Yet, just as popular enthusiasm began to grow over the election of Kibaki, the 2007 election wreak havoc in Kenya (Kagwanja 2009, 371).

The desire for power along with the division and subsequent land discrimination laid the groundwork for
ethnic conflict and political turmoil in the election of 2007. International scholars underscored Kenya’s 2007 postelection violence as pushing the country to the brink of state failure, pointing to ethnic cleavages as the main source for political upheaval (Frederiksen 2010, Kagawanja and Southall 2009). Indubitably, ethnicity played a major role in the pattern of voting along ethnic lines during the 2005 referendum which set the stage for ethnic violence in 2007. Backing for the constitution stemmed from the larger Kikuyu, Meru, and the Embu ethnic communities, while opposition came from the smaller coalition groups Luo, Kamba, and Kalenjin. Yet, narrowly focusing on the role of ethnic difference in the 2007 elections masks the larger problems of corruption in Kenya’s democratic transition process (Giersch and Whitaker 2009, 2).

The argument is presented by Giersch and Whitaker that the “constitutional review process raised political awareness among Kenyans and the referendum gave the people opportunity to demand accountability from their leaders” (Giersch and Whitaker 2009, 2). The authors suggest that the process of democracy formation requires political upheaval. Showing how a strong political voice that is
able to hold its government accountable will promote the institutionalization of democracy.

Kenya’s steps towards consolidating democracy

Throughout the guest lecture presented on Kenya’s election violence in 2008, transparency and accountability were regarded as the cornerstone to establishing democracy. Leah Kiguatha, a member of the Georgetown University Law program and a Kenya native, presented different ideas on steps to rebuild Kenya that would later prove to be instituted in the 2010 constitutional reform. Kiguatha’s views ran parallel to the notion that due to large disparities in land distribution and strong ties to a continuous power struggle, Kenya’s government had begun to lose sight of the common good of the people. Some solutions to this problem of leadership that Kiguatha presented were to provide a bridge in economic disparity. She explained how the disenfranchised majority that was left with minimal land, due to lack of governmental intervention, were left fighting neighbors in similar situations.

Kiguatha also stated that providing an outlet for the people of Kenya to vent their frustrations on their daily struggles would facilitate a better network of communication between the government and the people. She
noted that the interaction would prove beneficial in bringing an end to the violent outbreaks taking place throughout Kenya. This open form process would ensure that the people’s concerns would be heard, and that steps to overcoming their circumstances would eventually be worked on. Kiguatha relates this form of communication to the slums of Kenya, where she felt the impact would promote an understanding for heterogeneous society.

Kiguatha’s recommendations as to what adjustment was needed to take place in Kenyan governance to restore peace soon became a reality. In April 2010, the Kenyan government passed a new constitution, which was later approved by 67% of Kenyans in a yes-or-no referendum in August the same year. The new constitution curtailed the powers of an imperial-style presidency, paved the way for much-needed land reform and gave Kenyans a bill of rights. The combination of reforms put forward in Kenya’s new constitution could bring an end to one of the most corrupt institutions in African history (Gettelman 2010).

The remarkably peaceful way in which the referendum was conducted proved to be a much-needed boost of self-confidence for the country. It showed that Kenya could run a clean election without a violent aftermath, that the losers could graciously accept defeat, that their
supporters could move on peacefully and that the police
and security forces could be deployed to maintain
stability throughout the country (Gettelman 2010).

Sudan can learn from Kenya’s continued frustration
caused by the restraint of a corrupt governing system and
take away the methods by which Kenya has begun to
institute democracy. The need for transparency provided
through an open form that will provide the people hope for
a more democratic system where their voices can be heard.
In the case of Sudan, one of the pertinent issues that
should be tackled is that of government accountability.
Without a viable source of justification, leaders are left
making decisions at will. Both Northern and Southern Sudan
will need to be able legally to hold their governments
accountable.
CHAPTER 4

THE CASE OF COTE D’IVOIRE:
BATTLE FOR CITIZENSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The case of Cote d’Ivoire is an example of a transitioning democracy attempting to address the political conflicts that emanate when elections are seen as the sole indicator for democratic consolidation. Cote d'Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability, accompanied by significant political violence, following a contested presidential election designed to put an end to a forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement aimed at reunifying Cote d'Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled Southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the North since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002 (Zounmenou 2011, 48-49).

On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara based his victory claim on the U.N.-
certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The Commission results show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community endorsed the IEC-announced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which reviewed and annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo consequently claimed to have been duly elected and refused to hand power over to Ouattara (Zonumenou 2011, 48-50).

The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in political tension and violence, deaths and human rights abuses, and spurred attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. The international community is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. However, as of October of 2011, regional mediation had produced few results (Zonumenou 2011, 52-53).

By examining the history of political governance in Cote d’Ivoire significant problems of authoritarian rule,
ambiguous citizenship policies, and an infusion of ethnicity in a multiparty democracy are uncovered to be the primary issues surrounding the postelection conflict. These issues were not sufficiently addressed prior to the vote and in turn incited violence.

Highlighting the importance of liberal democracy, Cote d’Ivoire illustrates what happens when years of authoritarian rule fail to establish the basic set of institutions ensuring liberal democracy (rule of law and the protection of civil liberties) before holding elections. Public participation is clearly evident throughout Cote d’Ivoire with people taking to the streets to demand equal representation. However, the case of Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic journey has not shown signs of progression because elections have become the main focus of the democratic process. Citizenship and accountability are the forefront of the people concerns, yet their concerns go unheeded while political elites fight for hegemony. In this aspect, Cote d’Ivoire’s current outbreaks of political violence serve as a precaution to the newly divided nations of Sudan to focus on the full picture of democracy.
Cote d’Ivoire’s challenges to consolidating democracy

After independence from France in 1960, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), led by Houphouët-Boigny, became the sole party until 1990. During the 1990 multiparty elections, PDCI defeated the opposition Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), led by Laurent Gbagbo. Houphouët-Boigny is commonly regarded as a skillful politician who outmaneuvered opponents, opened the country to foreign investment and labor, and nurtured strong ties with France. He built a relatively successful economy and held the country together, but failed to institutionalize a transparent and democratic government (Nandjui 1994, 151-164). His ambiguous citizenship policies tacitly allowed immigrants to participate in Ivorian politics and distorted the line between Ivorian and non-Ivorian. This became a fatal trap for the country as less savvy politicians exploited ethnic and nationalist sentiments (Bah 2010, 601).

In Cote d’Ivoire there are over 60 ethnic groups classified into five cultural clusters (Akan, Krou, Northern Mandé, Southern Mandé, and Gur) tangled in a strong regional divide between the Muslim-dominated North and Christian-dominated South. The regional divide is sharpened by economic disparities between the relatively
successful South and the impoverished North. There are huge immigrant populations, especially from neighboring Northern countries, who share similar cultures with Northern Ivorians (Chirot 2006, 68).

The fight to succeed Houphouët-Boigny advanced when an internal split occurred within the PDCI and a struggle between the PDCI and the opposition FPI took place (Banegas 2006, 537). Henri Bédié became President, but failed to rally support from the PDCI behind him. In 1994, a disintegrated group of the PDCI led by Djéni Kobina formed the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), which invited former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara to be its presidential candidate. The FPI also organized a vigorous campaign against the PDCI. Bédié made desperate efforts to consolidate power and gain support ahead of the 1995 elections. He restricted opposition parties and instigated the doctrine of Ivoirité, which infused a divisive form of ethnicity into Ivorian politics and unintentionally laid the groundwork for war (Marshall-Frantani 2006, 16-18).

These antidemocratic tactics prompted the RDR and FPI to boycott the 1995 presidential election. The doctrine of Ivoirité had a far-reaching, frightening effect on Ivorians, especially Northerners. Ivoirité could be traced to Southern intellectuals and politicians who wanted to
define Ivorian identity. Unfortunately, Ivoirité was introduced into politics as a nationalist-qua-ethnic political trick disguised as patriotism (Marshall-Frantani 2006, 16-18).

It rests on a controversial distinction between “indigenous Ivorians” and “Ivorians of immigrant ancestry” which brings together anti-foreigner and anti-Northerner sentiments. The unspoken goal of this divisive ethnic politics was to marginalize Northerners, lumping them together with the immigrants from Burkina Faso, implying that they too are foreigners or at best Ivorians of immigrant ancestry. Ivoirité was institutionalized through electoral reforms and national identification policies that tacitly disqualified many Ivorians from the North from seeking the presidency and denied them citizenship rights (Marshall-Frantani 2006, 16-18).

In 1994, Bédié pushed through the PDCI-dominated National Assembly a law requiring candidates for the presidency and legislature to prove that they and their parents were Ivorians by origin. This law was then woven into the 2000 Constitution. Under Article 35, a candidate for the presidency is described as follows:

... must be Ivorian by birth, born of a father and of a mother themselves Ivorians by birth. He must never have renounced the Ivorian nationality. He must
never have had another nationality. He must have resided in Côte d’Ivoire continuously during the five years preceding the date of the elections and have totaled ten years of effective presence. (Constitution of Cote d’Ivoire, 2000)

The laws were custom-made to disqualify the Northern political leader Ouattara, whose father is allegedly from Burkina Faso.

Ivoirité also landed into other areas of Ivorian society, such as national identification, land tenure, and public sector employment policies. The government refused to issue certificates of nationality to many people from the North on grounds that they were not Ivorians because they did not have proper documents to prove that their parents were Ivorian. Under the identification policies adopted by the FPI government in 2001, for example, “Anyone requesting an identity document was required to prove their nationality by obtaining a statement of origin issued by a committee from their village of origin” (Banegas 2006, 542). Essentially, Ivorian nationality was based on the ability to prove one’s status as an indigenous person from an Ivorian village.

The controversial nationality policies were adopted even though it was clear that the gaps in birth records would make it difficult to provide documentary evidence of ancestry. In essence, the legacies of French colonial
citizenship policies and Houphouët-Boigny’s loose definition of citizenship, cultural fluidity of the border regions, the long history of internal migration and urbanization, and the huge number of entrenched immigrants from neighboring countries made the policies unrealistic. As a result of the Ivoirité, Northerners not only felt politically marginalized, but also saw themselves as victims of state-sponsored discrimination in the application of citizenship laws. This sense of wrongful denial of citizenship became the base of the political protests and the civil war. Right from its inception, Ivoirité became the central political problem in Côte d’Ivoire (Bah 2010, 602-603).

The crisis fueled by Bédié was exacerbated by December 1999 with a coup which brought General Robert Guéï to power. Popular resistance to military rule merged with the three-way power struggle and a heated RDR-led campaign to end Ivoirité. In a bid to rig the October 2000 presidential election, Guéï suppressed political freedom and used the doctrine of Ivoirité to disqualify Ouattara. In protest, the PDCI and RDR boycotted the presidential election. Guéï halted ballot counting, dissolved the electoral commission, and arbitrarily declared himself winner. Massive street protests by FPI supporters forced
Guéï to flee, paving the way for Gbagbo to be installed as President (Bah 2010, 603).

New conflict exploded with the RDR demanding a new election based on inclusive citizenship policies that would not disenfranchise Northerners. Gbagbo insisted on his electoral mandate, while the RDR and disgruntled Northerners dismissed his government as illegitimate. Gbagbo also continued to support Ivoirité, while insinuating that Ouattara was not an indigenous Ivorian and as such not qualified to be President (Bah 2010, 603).

The political catastrophe collapsed into a civil war after the September 2002 coup, sparked by reports of a looming involuntary army demobilization program believed to be part of the Ivoirité purge against Northerners. Rebel forces of the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) attacked Abidjan and cities in the North. The rebels retreated to their bases in the North after loyalist forces repelled the Abidjan attack. The stated goals of the MPCI were to overthrow the government of Gbagbo, hold inclusive elections, and reinstate all disbanded soldiers (Mustapha and Whitefield 2009, 43).

By late 2002, two smaller rebel groups had emerged. Both the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO)
expressed similar intentions to overthrow Gbagbo. The rebels regrouped into a new movement called Forces Nouvelles (FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro. By the end of 2002, Côte d’Ivoire’s political crisis had disintegrated into a civil war. The government had lost control of the North, while hostility continued to grow between Northerners and Southerners. The country was also marred by communal fighting and violent political demonstrations, which pitted the pro-FPI Young Patriots (YP) against opposition supporters. By the end of 2003, over 700,000 people had been displaced and an untold number of people killed (International Crisis Group 2003).

Amidst the violence, the 2005 election was approaching. An opportunity to douse the continued violence arose when current leader Gbagbo promised to allow Ouattara, representing the North, to run for president. However, he insisted on remaining in power after realizing the Northerners had gained more support and his South had become somewhat the minority. Due to a growing militia among the rebels, the U.N. decided on October 14, 2005, to side with Gbagbo as president for 1 more year during which a coalition government would be appointed and elections planned.
Cote d’Ivoire’s steps towards consolidating democracy

The notion of democracy was discussed throughout the meditation process that contributed to ending the war in Cote d’Ivoire and rebel disarmament. Both the rebels and the government in Cote d’Ivoire voiced their own definition of rights inherent in a democratic system. The rebels view reflected the concerns of Northerners, demanding justice, equal treatment in the army, a common citizenship and identity card, and respect for their rights to land (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 44).

The ideas of nation and citizenship promotion by the rebellion are rooted in nostalgia for the “vivre-ensemble” notion created by Houphouët-Boigny. “Vivre ensemble” loosely translates as “social pact,” meaning people living together according to an agreed set of principles and norms. This desire for a more inclusive “vivre-ensemble” is behind the rebels’ attempt to impose justice and equal rights by force of arms. Reflecting the importance of violence in democratizing Cote d’Ivoire, the rebels justified taking up arms as the only means of forcing the government to create a political order that is more ethnically inclusive (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 45).

The rebels concerns centered on the democratization process being placed as the priority, while the root
problems of regionalism, nationality, and citizenship continued to be ignored. The Leopard Company, an armed branch of the MPCI stated:

...If tomorrow all Ivorians have identity documents, this uprising will not be in vain - this step, even more than elections, will bring peace...The ensemble of players in this crisis prefers to neglect this aspect, preferring to focus on the date of elections. The root of the problem is much deeper...how can elections help a country when the problems are so deeply-rooted? Identity documents define a nation—national citizens define a nation. What good is organizing elections if the basis of the nation is itself imprecise? That the state grants citizens the right to exist, this a struggle that, in the context of Cote d'Ivoire, justifies war. (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 45)

The rebels keenly voiced their grievances and explained their plan of action if their voices continued to be ignored.

Elections in the case of Cote d’Ivoire failed to make the connection between the people and the government because they were not what the people were looking to obtain. The people wanted to be recognized as citizens before talks of holding an election could even take place. Additionally, feelings of apathy and violence came from rebel groups when all accountability in the election process was lost due to the continued manipulation of citizenships rights by the government in Cote d’Ivoire.
As the previous chapter highlighted, the tendency to retain autocratic principles during the transition process must be broken by enforcing basic rule of law principles before an election can prove to be successful in adhering to the will of the people. Sudan can learn from Cote d’Ivoire’s violent struggle with citizenship issues as it separates and deals with the national identity crisis between the North and South.
CHAPTER 5
THE FUTURE OF A TWO-STATE SUDAN:
THE CHALLENGE TO INSTITUTE DEMOCRACY

With Southern Sudan celebrating its independence day on July 9, 2011 the challenges to the democratic transition process is now being put to the test. The ability of an undemocratic, multiethnic, conflict-ridden, and impoverished nation, marred by decades of civil war and corrupt governance, to transform into a viable democracy will be tested. Yet, it will not be a blind transition.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the 22 year long North v. South conflict has laid the groundwork for a democratic transition, at least in the eyes of the Western nations that helped draft the impressive 250-page document, along with the Interim National Constitution (INC) set up by it. Additionally, various U.S. and international organizations and agencies have begun democracy promotion programs in both the North and South in accordance with the CPA and in preparation for the division of two new countries (Goultry 2011).

Establishing a strong democratic government for the new country of Southern Sudan and the historically autocratic Islamic North will require a collective effort.
The international community, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the Government of National Unity (GoNU) in the North need to consider how sequencing, strengthening civil society, writing new constitutions, forming new national identities, and creating governments that are accountable to their respective electorates will play a role in the transition to democracy.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in Kenya after negotiations led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy, included agreements for power sharing, the distribution of oil revenues, and a ceasefire. Most importantly, the impressive 250-page document created an interim government and constitution, to be tested for a six-year period after which a referendum was to be held in the South for self-determination, laying the framework for transition to democracy for both regions (Sharqien 2011).

The interim government created under the CPA was a complex, asymmetrical federalist system of power sharing under which the North was governed by a three-level system (national, state, local) under the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the South by a four-tiered structure (national, Southern Sudanese, state, and local) under the
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). According to the CPA, each state in the federalist system would have its own elected assembly and executive, and the South would have representation in the GoNU. In each region, elections were to be held soon after the agreement was signed to fill the positions in each of the tiers. However, in the North, authoritarianism continued as the al-Bashir government allegedly manipulated elections and intimidated voters, and in the South, elections were delayed until April 2010 (Sharqien 2011).

The Bashir government in the North, under a provision of the CPA, was allowed to base legislation in the North on Islamic principles, while in the South, sources of legislation would include popular consensus, values and customs, including the traditions and religions of the majority of its people. The South was granted the right to repeal laws established in the North that were contrary to the wishes of the Southern Sudanese. The CPA stated that after a six-year trial period, the South and the contested border region of Abyei where to be given the opportunity to vote for either unity with the North or independence (Temin 2011).

In the referendum, held in January 2011, international observers confirmed that in a free and fair
election, 98% of the eligible voters in Southern Sudan opted for secession and independence. In addition to interstate conflicts that must be resolved between the North and the South, such as border disputes, oil-revenue sharing, and the citizenship of herding tribes that frequently cross the border, the interim GoSS is preparing for governing a fully independent state. In the interim before independence, the GoSS, foreign partners, and international organizations have begun addressing the forces and considerations necessary for developing a new democracy (Temin 2011).

Partners from the United States include the National Endowment for Democracy and its subcomponents, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, along with various civil society organizations. In particular, international and Sudanese organizations have focused on sequencing, strengthening civil society, writing a new constitution, forming a new national identity, and creating a government that is accountable to its electorate are critical considerations for the creation of a democratic government (Temin 2011).

The sequencing debate

The votes held to elect interim governments in April 2010 and to decide on a referendum for independence in
January 2011 revealed the legitimacy of popular vote as opposed to sequencing as the key to initiating Sudan’s democratic transition. Those who were skeptical that the elections set up under the CPA (which took place in April 2010) could be both free and fair argued that without institutions and an educated electorate, elections were doomed to fail. Proponents of sequencing theory could point to the extreme poverty in regions such as Darfur and in the South where much of the population was illiterate (and remains so), living in perpetual states of conflict and intimidation, and accustomed to undemocratic strongman rulers, as indicators that elections would produce undemocratic outcomes (Carothers 2007).

In fact, their predictions were accurate. Similar to Kenya’s distorted election process under the Moi administration, the April 2010 elections for the interim GoNU fell far short of international electoral standards according to the Carter Center and observation groups from the European Union. The results showed that 68% of the population re-elected President Bashir, who is viewed as corrupt and is currently facing charges from the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Observers reported that the election was marred by fraud and voter intimidation by the Bashir
government. Yet despite these facts, in the end the flawed elections did as those opposed to sequencing predicted—they created a starting point that eventually resulted in democratic ends (Kron 2011).

The April 2010 election in Sudan was the starting point for democratic transition and self-determination for Southern Sudan. The election empowered pro-democracy activists in the South, created a new sense of appreciation for democratic processes among the electorate, and raised awareness about the right to have a say in how and by whom a person is governed. This awareness confirmed the desire of the Southern Sudanese for independence. Prior to the election, a member of the Sudanese Mission to the United States warned that the election was the last opportunity for the Bashir government to make unity attractive to the entire population. The corruption of the elections failed to do so, and the end result was a vote for independence in the referendum just months after the election (Bixler 2011).

In the referendum vote that occurred in January 2011, a staggering 98% of the electorate in the South voted in favor of independence. In most elections, such a high vote would likely signal a manipulated election, but international observers confirmed that the election was
both free and fair. The legitimacy of this election made it very different from the previous election and forced the GoNU to accept the vote (Bixler 2011). Sequencing was not necessary for the largely uneducated and illiterate population to cast such a critical vote that will forever change their future.

The lesson to be learned from both Kenya’s and Sudan referendum vote as it relates to sequencing, then, is a true transition to democracy is an election that is recognized by the people as legitimate. The building of infrastructure and the development of society are crucial in maintaining legitimacy. Yet, as the future of Kenya and Sudan will show, the discovery of a political voice by the people can foster the legitimacy necessary to consolidate democracy. It is important to note, the election itself does not ensure that democracy will exist or thrive, but it is the critical first step toward creating a political culture where democracy and democratic institutions can develop. To be fair, a degree of civil societal development did occur prior to the vote, but not to the degree as sequencers deemed necessary according to their theories for democratic transitions.
**The role of civil society**

In addition to assisting with negotiating the CPA and the INC, democratic transition assistance by foreign entities largely focused on strengthening civil society groups in order to promote voter mobilization and education. In some theoretical debates over democracy promotion, whether or not a strong civil society is required for the effective functioning of democracy is a contentious issue. Some international relations scholars contend that active civil society groups are Western traditions that are not necessary for the viability of democracy (Kelsall 2011, 223-224).

In the case of Sudan, it appears that civil society groups have been effective in voter registration drives, voter education, and the electoral process. In an impoverished nation that is new to democracy, civil society groups have played a critical role in overcoming obstacles such as lack of infrastructure and institutions, illiteracy, and the originality of a new process for governance that has been essential in the transition to democracy. Various international and U.S.-based organizations assisting with the transition to both independence and democracy in Southern Sudan have made civil society strengthening their primary goal.
The National Endowment for Democracy and its sub-components the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, the United States Agency for International Development, the Carter Center, the United Nations, and various international NGOs have promoted the development and growth of civil society organizations such as Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections and others. This is not to say that a strong civil society is necessary, but in Southern Sudan, national civil society and international NGOs greatly assisted in the electoral process.

**Drafting a new constitution**

Like any strong civil society, the need for a written constitution is a contentious issue among some members of the democracy-promoting community and is an idea that stems largely from the Western democracy experience. The majority of modern Western democracies were created by a process that was centered upon the drafting of a written constitution that stipulated the structure and function of the government system. Great Britain is a major exception as it does not have a written constitution per se (instead it says that its laws are found in various pieces of legislation and decrees that have been collected over the centuries). In drafting the
Interim National Constitution, a member of the Sudanese Parliament pointed out the various contentious issues that needed to be addressed in addition to the power-sharing agreement between the North and South, such as: “plurality/diversity of the legal systems; meaning, common law, which is English-based; civil code, which is Egyptian, Turkish and continental law; traditional indigenous customary law; and religious law” (El-Turabi 2008, 7).

Consideration of the plurality/diversity of legal systems was complicated by local-level politics dominated by tribal leaders and sultans with diverse practices, types of legislation (including “decrees, acts, statutes, ordinance, rules, and directives and militant and self-protective societies”), and the fact that tribal leaders often commanded their own forces. These factors show that drafting a constitution to fit this complex society transitioning into democracy is not as simple as Western democracy-promoting individuals and organization may have anticipated and raise questions over the necessity of having a constitution prior to election (El-Turabi 2008, 7).
The problem of national identity

Although the national constitution attempts to redefine identity based upon citizenship rather than religious, ethnic, tribal, or cultural identities, it is important this transition occur not only on paper, but in the minds of the citizens. In the new state of Southern Sudan, the creation of a national identity will be one of the greatest challenges to creating a lasting democracy. Attempts by the current Bashir government in the North to “overcome cultural and ethnic diversity by adopting an Arab-Islamic paradigm” backfired and ended up marginalizing and excluding rural populations leading to violence and civil strife (Deng 2005, 158).

In the South, national identity was based upon common opposition to the government in Khartoum in the North, but with independence, the basis for this unity will be weakened, if not eliminated completely. The goal of the CPA was to end that conflict and create a new basis for “defining national identity, citizenship, recognition of cultural and religious diversity as a virtue and a basis for constitution-making, peace-building, citizenship and legal pluralism” (Goulty 2011).

In a state that has been divided since its independence from colonial rule by ethnic, tribal,
religious, and cultural divisions, it will be important for the citizens of the new South Sudan to recognize their ties to the new government. It is important for the South to create a sense of national identity based upon the state that can supersede ethnic divisions in order to prevent a relapse into ethnic violence. Likewise, the new GoSS must overcome the history and tendencies of patronism, discrimination, and clientelism based upon religion, tribal affiliation, or ethnicity that has long characterized the politics of Northern Sudan (El-Turabi 2008, 7).

Indeed, Deng states:

The challenge for sustaining peace in the Sudan will rest on how the new government of the Sudan recognizes cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity as a foundation for national cohesion and strength and a new nation-building based on citizenship and the free will of the people. (Deng 2005, 267-268)

The idea of citizenship is also a novel concept for much of the Sudan, and will need to be seen as the basis of equal rights and duties for all citizens enjoying all rights, including equality before the law (Deng 2005, 266). The new leaders in the South must heed the lessons of violent outcomes of citizenship manipulation that continues to tear Cote d’Ivoire apart. Rather than tension and conflict for political influence, the new nation will
need to embrace its multicultural and multiethnic foundations as part of the new national identity and recognize the strengths such a makeup can provide for a country.

In the North, not only has the separation of the South inflicted a psychological shock, but it will also trigger economic upheaval in the short-to-medium term. Inflation is rising and the central bank is anxiously trying to stabilize the currency, as Khartoum faces the loss of 75% of Sudan's known oil reserves. Even if the long-term outlook for growth is more positive in the North than in the South, the government budget will be hit severely. With expenditures being cut, even the presidential patronage networks do not escape the setbacks of the current economy. To make matters worse there are rumors on the streets of Khartoum that reveal a possible popular uprising, such as the ones that overthrew the dictatorships of generals Abboud and Nimeiri (Verhoeven 2011).

Yet, as demands for more political liberalization and possible regime change are increasing, so are calls for bringing back Islamist supremacy. Key constituencies in the security services and the ruling National Congress party (NCP) are signaling discontent, lobbying for a
further centralization of power and the full-scale implementation of sharia law now that the costly Southern population is no longer united (Verhoeven 2011).

**Transparency and accountability to the people**

In addition to the challenges described above, the ability of both the North and South to provide a transparent and accountable government is crucial to adhering to the conditions under which democratic peace may flourish. By providing the basic needs and services to the people, the long-term success of the government and the creation of a new national identity can be established. Here, two issues come into play: transparency and accountability. First, the government must avoid the plagues of the “resource curse” typical of many African and Middle Eastern nations with a valuable resource, such as the oil in Southern Sudan (Andrews 2011). Oil revenues must be adequately and fairly used to develop the society as a whole, and the government must be transparent in how revenues are used in order to avoid government corruption.

To some degree, the complex relationship with North Sudan may help achieve this goal in the South. Although the oil reserves are located primarily in the South (and also in contested border regions), the pipelines and access to ports are located in the North, making the two
new countries dependent upon each other. It is hoped that this dependency and complex relationship will remain peaceful and an agreement can be reached, or the provision in the CPA continued, in order to overcome the potential resource curse or conflict with the North.

In addition to transparency, government accountability to the people will determine the long-term viability of democracy and national unity to prevent a relapse into ethnic violence and tribal allegiances over the state. Following the referendum, a panel discussion sponsored by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting at George Washington University discussed challenges to the new Sudan. The panel highlighted that immediately following the referendum, the people in both the North and South had high expectations that a vote for independence and democracy would ensure that basic services, including infrastructure development and education, would be provided in a timely fashion. To the people of Sudan democracy is a new concept.

Over the years of broken promises for Southern autonomy and equal representation, the people of Sudan will need to be warned that instant democracy is not possible through one election process. High expectations for the democratic transition process to produce
development and peace in the short term must be tempered in order to prevent similar outbreaks of violence that were seen in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. The current peace and unity in the South is fragile and dependent upon the viability of the new government. A clear understanding that time for development and legal institutions constraining the rights of both Northern and Southern leaders to adhere to the peoples will is essential to maintain peace in Sudan during the transition.

**Conclusions: The hope for new beginnings and kept promises**

Many obstacles and challenges remain for both Northern and Southern Sudan. In addition to internal issues to be overcome in the transition to democracy, the two new states to be created out of the current Sudan have many unresolved conflicts including border disputes, an oil revenue-sharing arrangement, and the citizenship of herding populations that move between the two regions. In the South, civil society groups have been developed to assist with elections, but this does not mean they will continue to play a role in the new society. Infrastructure, education, healthcare, and the economy are all still suffering.

An interim constitution was written for the GoSS under the CPA, but it is not clear whether this
constitution will continue to be utilized or another constitutional convention will be called to draft a new document. Perhaps most importantly, the new state of South Sudan must still develop a new sense of national identity and put faith in the new government, which in turn, must prove its responsiveness to the people and provide for the basic needs of the people there.

Electoral democracy is able to accommodate to multicultural societies by allowing all groups an equal say in how they are to be governed, but it will take time and citizen participation to break the cycle of corruption that has become a destructive part of Africa’s political heritage. Still, in midst of the turmoil and upheavals occurring throughout the region and in contrast to its questioned autocratic neighbor to the North, Southern Sudan will provide an interesting and informative study of the democratic transition process in the upcoming years.

In the North, the democratic transition process will need to be monitored closely by the international community in order to prevent a regression back to radical Islamic superiority. A critical choice must be made by the Khartoum government to either revert back to radical Islamic superiority policies of 1990s in order to appease the radical wings of the security services, or be destined
to a situation of constant confrontation with the outside world and with its own population. The Sudanese people have historically rejected hardline Islamism, and returning to centralization and sharia law is likely to hasten the demise of the Bashir regime through a violent breakdown of Northern Sudan, as neither the people in the peripheries (Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile) nor those in Khartoum would accept a monocultural, monoreligious "Arab" state. It would also make it more difficult to attract the outside investment and aid money that Northern Sudan desperately needs to cope with the loss of oil revenue and the growing impact of climate change on its agriculture (Vorhoeven 2011).

President Bashir and future Northern leaders can no longer hide behind the front of democracy while maintaining authoritative style rule. The process of gradually opening up and allowing opposition parties limited space does not need to be costly, but could ultimately benefit Bashir given the advantages of patronage, incumbency and political ability that he holds over potential rivals (Vorheven 2011). In doing so, the initial process of democratic transition can begin to open up and normalize a regime battered by years of isolation.
Consequently, the international community has a significant role in influencing the power struggle for both the North and the South. By continuing to reach out and signal its willingness to support reformist elements, the international community, along with strong public participation in Sudan, can begin to shape democratic peace. It is imperative, however, for the international community not to focus solely on the election process as the end to the democratic transition process.

This interdisciplinary study evaluating the different historical, sociological, political, and economic challenges to consolidating democracy has uncovered that meeting the criteria for democratic peace in Sudan and across Africa may be a long sometimes violent journey, but it is not an impossible one. Breaking political habits to subvert common interests will need to be continually evaluated in order for the principles of the democratic peace theory to hold true in Sudan as well as across Africa.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it best when she addressed the U.N. Security Council in November 2010:

\[\ldots\] the will of the people must be respected by all parties in Sudan and around the world, because we have already seen the alternative. The alternative, the unacceptable alternative, is Sudan’s past \ldots \] simmering tensions that stall development and
perpetuate poverty, then erupt again to darken the lives of another generation of Sudanese children. (McConnell 2011, 26)
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