MILITARY SOFT POWER IS NOT AN OXYMORON: USING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO EXAMINE GOALS AND EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

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MILITARY SOFT POWER IS NOT AN OXYMORON: USING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO EXAMINE GOALS AND EFFECTS OF US MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

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ABSTRACT

Current, less traditional threats to global security and stability call for changes in how we address national security goals. A number of studies have highlighted the importance of soft power in this new international environment. While such programs have long been a useful tool of the Department of State, little attention has been paid to a long-standing Defense soft power program with strong parallels to State’s educational exchanges – the attendance by foreign military officers at U.S. staff and war colleges.

This thesis contends that military educational exchange programs are highly relevant examples of public diplomacy by using close analysis of their history and evaluation of their program objectives and outcomes, such as support for the international order and development of mutual relationships, as well as the values that these exchanges promote. After establishing the relevance of public diplomacy for analyzing the military’s educational exchanges, this paper uses elements of the emerging interdisciplinary academic field of public diplomacy theory to craft a multi-part theoretical framework. Analysis of the program objectives using this public diplomacy-based framework provides new insights into the effectiveness of military educational exchanges by identifying parallel causalities in the more-examined civilian programs. Finally, a review of the current state of effectiveness assessment approaches
will identify those showing the most promise of establishing a causal link between programs and outcomes, not merely identifying correlation.

Overall, this study reveals that military educational exchanges, by functioning as public diplomacy programs with all of public diplomacy’s potential effects on values-related attitudes and behaviors, directly and indirectly educate and build relationships with foreign officers in ways that support our national goals of global stability and international order. While currently effective, these programs should move towards relying more on networks of relationships and less on messaging. One way to do that is for military education institutions to further emphasize their dialogic seminar focus, rather than their values-advocacy monologic field studies programs, to support Congressional values-related intentions. Another is to incentivize American students to further engage with International Fellows by creating more opportunities for collective interaction in and out of the classroom.

Our ultimate goal for military educational exchanges should be a more collaborative approach, as opposed to a dialogic one. This, plus a robust American/International Alumni connectivity network, can create an epistemic community of professional military thinkers who share a common perspective learned in the U.S. These networks can help make up for the shortcomings of traditional government hierarchies in responding to complex global instability, by improving governments’ scope, speed and range. Future use of public diplomacy approaches to analyze military educational exchanges will further increase our understanding of how to enhance and expand their impacts.
My particular area of interest focused on the United States’ use of ideas and values to shape the international environment, particularly what the Clinton Administration called “engagement” programs. These programs use the military to help build international relationships in peacetime with a dual goal of helping to prevent conflicts and providing us with stronger allies if a conflict can’t be avoided. The specific activities include everything from large organizations holding joint exercises to individuals in educational exchange programs. (Most of these exchanges involve foreign students attending U.S. courses.) A major focus of these projects is the idea of building democracy, and some of the most robust programs have been those in Eastern and Central European nations working to develop healthier civil-military relationships after the fall of the Iron Curtain. So far there has been little attention paid to the effectiveness of these activities, and those who work on them continue based on the gut feeling that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

I developed my interest in this subject gradually over a military career. In the early 1990’s, I was appointed at short notice to manage the International Fellows program at the Joint Forces Staff College, a twelve-week professional military education course. During the six months it took to find a permanent manager, I learned a good deal about how the programs were run, including the strong emphasis on what was then called the “information program,” which involved sessions about American values for all of our foreign students. Then in the late 1990’s I worked in Europe with some of the people who were developing the Partnership for Peace to instruct the militaries and
defense departments of the Warsaw Pact on how a military organization functions in support of a democratic government. The impact of these programs would be very hard to assess, but the potential benefits of the project seemed obvious to us all.

A few years later I had an opportunity to teach at National Defense University, where the framework for the curriculum is something called “DIME.” These are the instruments of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic tools, all of which are best used by national leaders in combination, in order to shape the world we live in. Of these four categories, the one we as a nation understand least is Information. A significant part of successfully wielding Information is based on the idea that global influence can come from ideas and values, not just the use of force or aid or treaties. Engagement is an excellent example of a comprehensive use of all of these instruments together. While it is still not the subject of much analysis, it might be a good place to start an examination of the effects of our efforts to use ideas to shape the globe.

Then I took John Brown’s course on propaganda and foreign policy, and realized that many of these Department of Defense programs are similar to the State Department’s education and cultural exchange programs, in that they also seek to influence others through exposure to U.S. ideas and values, as well as by building relationships for long-term understanding. That raised all sorts of questions: How many parallels do these programs really have? Are their goals the same? Does State have ways to measure the outcomes of their exchange programs? Might there be a way to improve both Defense and State programs with more coordination across government
agencies? Or even coordination with those outside the government? What disciplines might be the best for examination of educational impacts? That any analysis would have to be interdisciplinary was obvious. These programs used elements not only from international relations and foreign policy, but also communications, sociology, history, political science, organizational theory, and values studies.

Then conversations with Dr. Phyllis O’Callaghan, the founding Dean of this new interdisciplinary liberal studies doctoral program, make the idea of such an interdisciplinary approach to this subject feasible, exciting and possible. Imagine a program where you choose courses from across departments, tailored to your topic. Her guidance ensured that the process remained academically rigorous, a particular but not insurmountable challenge in such endeavors. That combination of support and rigor has been the hallmark of everyone else involved in the Doctor of Liberal Studies program, who all deserve much thanks for their ability to balance structure and experimentation. Professor Frank Ambrosio, our current Director, has brought his own philosophical perspective to the study of human values in all walks of life, with an infectious enthusiasm.

One of the further innovations of this DLS program has been the “directed study,” a tutorial for the study of subjects not covered by any available courses, modeled after the U.K. approach. This allowed me to read in depth on the truly interdisciplinary subject of public diplomacy, under the patient guidance of Dr. Juliet Antunes Sablosky. She has become a true mentor in this work, and has kept me focused on the argument when I was inclined to keep dredging up really interesting but tangential issues more
times than I can enumerate. The perspectives and insights shared by my readers, Father Eric Zimmer and Dr. Dan Kuehl, have kept this study both well-rounded and well-grounded in their disciplines of communications and history. All of these patient people are responsible for whatever success I have had in forming a thesis and making an argument in favor of viewing these military educational exchange programs as a form of public diplomacy. Without that focus, I would never have been able to develop this diplomatic theory framework and apply it to create new insights into a complex ongoing government program. All remaining errors in this thesis paper are solely my own.

No one can successfully complete the journey of a doctoral thesis without many other kinds of support as well. Anne Ridder, the DLS Assistant Dean, helps keep all of us informed about all the elements of this work, from Turabian format challenges to relevant lectures. Our “All But Dissertation” study group was invaluable in sharing everything from good sources to emotional ups and downs. Thanks to Liz, Susan, Vera (in absentia), and especially to Karen for having the idea to get us together. In a broader sense, my friends and family have been enormously supportive as well, and I will always appreciate their understanding my need to take “time off” from normal life to become a keyboarding hermit. When James Joyce said that writing requires “solitude, exile and cunning,” he must have meant graduate school!

Mike, you in particular have tolerated cancelled plans, crazy meal times, the wrangling of giant kittens, and that particular form of “schizophrenia” that comes when an extreme extrovert has to do such a major writing project in solitude. I can never thank you enough.
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CHAPTER 1

NO OXYMORON: MILITARY SOFT POWER: AN INTRODUCTION

The military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that is generated by its hard power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime.

-- Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

Current, less traditional threats to global security and stability call for changes in how we address national security goals. A number of studies have highlighted the importance of soft power in this new international environment. According to Joseph Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” Nye makes a case for more investment in and emphasis on soft power in American foreign policy, because it is more effective than coercion and can save some of the money we usually spend on carrots and sticks. One of the tools of soft power is public diplomacy, a form of diplomacy that uses culture and values to promote positive images of one’s country in foreign publics through information and exchange programs, but also goes further by seeking to build long-term relationships to “create an enabling environment for government policies.”

While such soft power approaches have long been considered a useful tool of the Department of State (State), there has been much concern about the appropriateness of

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the Department of Defense’s (Defense) role in this area, when it is considered at all. Throughout this debate, little attention has been paid to a long-standing Defense soft power program with strong parallels to State’s educational exchanges – the attendance by foreign military officers at U.S. staff and war colleges. These schools are also referred to as professional military education (PME) institutions, and the inclusion of foreign exchange officers in the student bodies of these military schools is part of Defense’s International Military Education and Training (international military education and training) program, arguably its primary and longest-standing soft power effort.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

This thesis will support the contention that military educational exchange programs are highly relevant - though overlooked - examples of the particular form of soft power called public diplomacy. A close analysis and evaluation of their program objectives and outcomes, such as support for the international order and development of mutual relationships, as well as the values that these exchanges promote, reveal strong parallels. Such a study will establish that these carefully defined and targeted Defense programs are both effective and appropriate and already play a significant role in furthering broad national security and foreign policy goals. If they were more carefully coordinated with the Department of State and other agencies’ educational exchange endeavors, not only in planning but all the way through the outcome analysis step, such programs could contribute even more significantly to national public diplomacy efforts, and therefore to increased long-term global stability.

Broadly speaking, while military educational exchanges are occasionally
acknowledged to be instruments of foreign and security policy, little has been done by those outside of their implementing organizations to include them in a grand-strategic discussion of reshaping national power for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Yet as this century unfolds, and global instability becomes one of our top security challenges, exchange programs of all sorts have the potential to address some of these very same new challenges. So this oversight could have grave consequences. In fact, these military educational exchange programs have existed in something of an analytic vacuum for decades, and it is beyond time that they were recognized as elements of public diplomacy with many similarities to other educational exchange programs – similarities in goals and potential effects in particular, irrespective of their “non-traditional” implementing organization (Defense).

The military exchange programs make their impact via three primary channels: through their information elements, which include overt values discussions on human rights and other Western democratic ideals; their classroom elements, which result in relationship-building; and the global alumni networks these programs can potentially create. Both Congressional guidance and the limited analysis of outcomes of these programs have focused almost exclusively on the impacts of the values-focused information and advocacy program, leaving many potentially effective relationship-based approaches unexplored and analytic approaches for identifying their impacts untapped. The biggest challenge in these studies is linking cause-and-effect, tying changes in attitudes and behaviors to specific program events. While it is indeed challenging to measure changes in attitudes and behaviors, there are several diverse areas where values-related attitudes and behaviors have been examined with validity and rigor. Some of the
communication, political science and sociological approaches used in those studies are worth examining for their applicability to military educational exchanges.

There are multiple likely reasons for the current analytic vacuum. First, there is a strong trend in the literature to focus on communication as information and messaging, not as relationship building. Thus, there is less work being done on the relationship-focused exchange programs. Communication scholar R.S. Zaharna notes that: “The first challenge is to start thinking outside of the ‘communication = information’ box and put relational thinking on the public diplomacy radar screen.”

A second reason might be the general lack of interactions between the civilian academic community that focuses on public diplomacy and the military personnel who develop and implement these exchange programs. Increased understanding of the role of these military programs in meeting soft power global stability goals might encourage their inclusion in public diplomacy analytical improvement efforts. Public diplomacy scholars could then bring their insights to the table and improve not only military educational exchange assessment but also address the conceptual links between objectives and outcomes.

A third characteristic that makes military educational exchange programs different from their more traditional civilian equivalents is of course their target population – foreign military personnel. Americans who received Fulbright grants to study overseas, or scholars in institutions hosting foreign Fulbright grantees, do much of the writing about State Department-run exchanges. Foreign military officers who attend our

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education programs are normally not scholars, and eschew writing about themselves and their experiences (at least in English). This is no doubt also due to their demanding work schedules upon their return to their home countries. There is a parallel program for sending American military personnel to spend time in foreign education programs, but it is miniscule. So there is very little published discussion or analysis of military educational exchange programs by their graduates.

A further challenge in studying military educational exchanges is the complexity of the programs, funding and organizations involved in these exchanges. In addition to the various budget and oversight issues already mentioned, there are also the even more complicated implementation processes carried out by both State and Defense Departments and multiple subordinate organizations in both agencies. These implementation processes are not the only complexity, of course. We must also consider the complexity of having multiple Congressional committees involved in the legislative and funding processes. The task of sorting this out becomes even more challenging when a researcher wants to examine program objectives, which are ephemeral at most levels.

Finally, in addition to crossing many organizational, funding and epistemic-community (dialogical) lines, this particular issue clearly crosses many subject area boundaries as well, addressing as it does political science, foreign policy, international


6 Ibid., 26.

7 Giles Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory,” in “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” eds. Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas Cull, special issue, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March 2008): 187. According to Scott-Smith, an epistemic community is one which represents “a concrete collection of individuals who share the same worldview (or episteme)”
relations, national security, governance, organizational management, history, communication and values issues. So the limited attention to the role of military exchange programs might also be a reflection of the limits of single-subject analytical approaches.

**EXISTING LITERATURE**

Soft Power, an element of international relations studies, provides the overarching conceptual framework for this thesis, and the international relations literature provides several theoretical rationales for widespread use of soft power as a tool of national policy. Joseph Nye’s 2004 book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, is a comprehensive introduction to Nye’s theory of “soft power” - a nation’s ability to attract and persuade others, in contrast to the coercion inherent in the use of military and economic “hard power.” Nye continued to refine and expand his soft power concept in a 2008 *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* article titled “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Here he provides some useful conceptual links between soft power and public diplomacy. More significantly for this topic, it is in this article that Nye mentions the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power, noting that: “. . . the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime.” While being one of very few foreign policy scholars to recognize the military’s role in soft power, Nye questioned whether it is appropriate or

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effective. But his question was something of a passing comment, and he immediately moved on to other subjects. Little research has been done into either issue by anyone writing since Nye’s comment, either.

Understanding the soft power rationales and the objectives guidance laid out by Congress is also important to a clear understanding of the role of military educational exchange programs in our country’s relations with the rest of the world. Broad foreign policy objectives are laid out in Congressional Acts, with the *United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* currently defining the purposes of U.S.-funded Security Assistance.\(^\text{10}\) Those broad purposes are listed as: furtherance of goals of international peace and security; improving the contributions of foreign countries to their own defense; and increasing awareness of participants in internationally recognized human rights.\(^\text{11}\) Perhaps because of its broad scope, the legislation begs more questions than it answers with respect to its objectives.

A more detailed and specific understanding of program history, particularly its objectives, would provide useful insight to the current program, but this is another area where research has been limited. The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, in responding to a request from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, has written the most historically oriented work on military assistance. Their report *U.S. Security Assistance and Arms Transfer*

\(^\text{10}\) *United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended*, Public Law 87-195, September 4, 1961, Chapter 5 in Congressional Research Service Report of Foreign Policy, vol IA. This law is sometimes referred to as the “FAA” in government reports and documents.

\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 266.
*Policies for the 1980s*\(^{12}\) considers security assistance program history from WWII to 1980, but contains nothing specific on military educational exchanges or even the larger international military education and training program. The focus is primarily on arms sales as a tool of both security and economic policy. However, the report’s goal – to make Security Assistance programs better conform to broad national foreign policy objectives – is strongly relevant to the focus of this thesis.

American University’s Duncan Clark wrote the book *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy* in 1997.\(^{13}\) He provides substantial discussion of what Security Assistance is, how the policy was implemented by State and Defense in the 1990s, and the role Security Assistance plays in broader foreign policy. That latter issue is particularly significant to my thesis, as my thesis is based on the position that military educational exchanges play a significant role in foreign policy beyond “just” national security. As with much other academic Security Assistance work, however, both military educational exchanges and other international military education and training programs are given short shrift here.

A clear grasp of the military’s specific role in soft power is another essential element of my conceptual framework. While national security studies concepts might seem relevant, it’s the history of the U.S. military’s soft power that is really more important to understanding the role played by military educational exchanges. It’s hard

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to find books that specifically address elements of military soft power and their relationship to broader foreign policy, but there are a few. A good example is one edited by Derek Reveron, a professor at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. His book, *America’s Viceroy: The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy* does address some broader military soft power issues, though with an almost exclusive focus on the role of the regional U.S. Combatant Commanders and their justifications for these roles. Even someone who teaches military education has not included it in his discussion of military soft power.

Much of the soft power literature contains a broad multidisciplinary range of theories at the intersection of foreign policy and communications, often called public diplomacy. The most relevant field is the sub-section relating to educational exchanges run by the State Department as part of their public diplomacy efforts. Two highly pertinent theoretical works in this area are Giles Scott-Smith’s article, “Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within International Relations Theory” and the 2005 book *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, as edited by Jan Melissen. While these studies focus on State Department exchange programs, there are sufficient parallels to be usefully compared to similar elements in our military exchange programs.

Many discussions of soft power and public diplomacy include values issues such as:

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15 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 173-197.

defining “American values,” and whether we should make them an explicit part of our exchange programs, or allow visitors to absorb understanding of our values simply through exposure. Nye emphasizes that national values are intrinsic elements of soft power, though not always an explicit part of State-sponsored educational exchange program objectives. (They may be most evident in visitor programs for civic leaders from emerging democracies.) The U.S. Congress has mandated explicit incorporation of American values in curricula for military educational exchanges, however, making this at least a difference in degree between the two sets of programs. Exploration of what exactly these values elements are based on could include many diverse sources, because “American values” means many things to many people, starting with Alexis De Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in America and Neil Baldwin’s much more recent The American Revelation: Ten Ideals that Shaped Our Country from the Puritans to the Cold War.

For a more specific exploration of the values that are part of the professional military education curricula, one of the very few books on the subject is a thoughtful work by Judith Stiehm on the U.S. Army’s War College, where this civilian professor spent a year, enabling her to examine the distinct values and culture of a “war” college.

17 Nye, Soft Power, 55 - 60.
As for the goals of education for military officers, there is no better guide than David Petraeus, a four-star general with a civilian PhD. His article “To Ph.D. or Not to Ph.D. . . .,” is a thoughtful exploration of the philosophy of education in the military.\footnote{Petraeus, David H., “To Ph.D. or Not to Ph.D. . . .,” \textit{The American Interest} 2, iss. 6 (July/August 2007): 16-20.}

The potential conflicts between values reflected in soft power programs and what values Americans hold with respect to the use of military forces is often the basis for criticism of Defense soft power programs. Primary among the critics is Washington Post journalist Dana Priest; whose book, \textit{The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military},\footnote{Dana Priest, \textit{The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003).} was a 2003 Pulitzer Prize winner. In it she argues that the use of the military for more diplomatic-type missions is inappropriate because it has the potential to short-circuit civilian control of foreign policy, one of our most closely held national values. Another recent book, Jerry M. Laurienti’s 2007 work \textit{The U.S. Military and Human Rights Promotion: Lessons from Latin America},\footnote{Jerry M. Laurienti, \textit{The U.S. Military and Human Rights Promotion: Lessons from Latin America} (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 4.} examines whether these military soft power programs have in fact contributed to violations of human rights. That graduates of international military education and training programs have engaged in such violations after returning to their countries is an oft-repeated criticism, and it could apply to graduates of our specific sub-category of international military education and training too. This criticism calls into question both appropriateness and effectiveness of international military education and training programs, and warrants examination.

Finally, no examination of effectiveness can ignore prior efforts to measure program
outcomes, an effort still in its infancy. Jarol B. Manheim’s *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence*, published in 1994, looks specifically at strategic influence campaigns waged by foreign entities in the U.S. to achieve precise objectives. He is among the first public diplomacy scholars to wield a social science lens to examine how one might use “sophisticated knowledge” of social sciences and other areas to target messages in a new “applied transnational science of human behavior.”

This quest for theories of influence provides some of the basis of what little quantitative and qualitative social science work has been done on measuring effectiveness of soft power programs.

More recently, the Government Accountability Office’s April 2007 report titled *Strategic Planning Efforts in Public Diplomacy* offered guidelines for tying public diplomacy outcomes to objectives. It is targeted at State programs, but perhaps is also relevant for Defense and worth some comparative analysis. Another analytic effort that is more focused on military educational exchange programs is John A. Cope’s monograph *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, which is somewhat dated at 15 years old. There is also a very well researched Foreign Policy Analysis article “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange

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She uses quantitative political science methods to establish correlation of military educational exchange programs to increases in democracy overseas, but neglects to explore other social science theories that might establish causation, a recurring challenge in evaluating soft power. While quantitative methods are both appealing and appropriate, they should be accompanied by qualitative methods, which tend to offer more opportunities to analyze causal links between program efforts and their outcomes. Because we are dealing with influence, ideas, and values, only a truly inter-disciplinary approach can do justice to all of the facets of this issue. Therefore, this thesis will seek to identify such an interdisciplinary approach.

After an examination of these various fields and the pertinent existing works, the lack of attention to the history or the potential future role of military educational exchange programs is quite apparent. This thesis will fill that hole in the literature by developing a conceptual framework which will show that Defense soft power programs, specifically military educational exchanges, are both appropriate and effective elements of U.S. national foreign policy, with benefits extending beyond defense realms.

EXPLORING THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

It does matter whether military educational exchange programs are more closely examined, because if we do not seek a new conceptual framework for analyzing this


aspect of our foreign policy, we risk being less effective and less efficient in achieving our foreign policy goals. If we do not use all relevant analytical approaches we cannot be sure that we are using the right tools in the optimum ways. While that is always an important consideration, it has become even more critical in this era of budget challenges.

Numerous practitioners in defense and foreign policy have generally agreed that more effective use of soft power should lead to a decreased need to use hard power, which is more expensive in so many ways. Certainly one of this idea’s most prestigious advocates these days is recent Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who has tied soft power to victory: “... military success is not sufficient ... These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.”30 His perception was echoed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Defense and diplomacy are simply no longer discrete choices, one to be applied when the other one fails, but must, in fact, complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations.”31 Showing that soft power programs can indeed be “an ounce of prevention which will save a pound of cure” should shore up support for this approach, perhaps even increase it.

Ignoring these programs is tantamount to ignoring the “target audience” involved, in this case a highly influential elite population, one that is arguably not reachable through other public diplomacy approaches. Spreading both relevant values and concepts through

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31 Mike Mullen, Admiral, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Landon Lecture Series remarks, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Wednesday, March 03, 2010.
education of this unique audience could potentially establish a globally networked epistemic community better-equipped, both conceptually and organizationally, to prevent instability or address it in early stages through local and regional government projects, rather than allowing pockets of unstable spaces to develop which require large-scale hard power interventions.

Civil academic public diplomacy experts can potentially enhance the outcomes of these military programs by applying their own analytic approaches, provided they are aware of the significant parallels and broad potential impacts of military educational exchange programs. This study will advance that analysis by providing a preliminary conceptual framework for the further study of military educational exchanges.

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE CHARACTERISTICS

Military Educational Exchanges are a small part of the International Military Education and Training effort. International military education and training is in reality a funding stream, though practitioners tend to use the term international military education and training to refer to all training and education programs that include any students funded through these channels.32 International military education and training incorporates several branches and multitudes of sub-sectors of the federal government in its inception and its implementation. Congress is involved through several committees in each legislative branch: House, Senate, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Defense, Appropriations, Authorizations – these and others are all involved in an elaborate dance

32 The Defense Department’s Dictionary of Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, defines international military education and training as: “Military training authorized by the FAA [Foreign Assistance Act] on a grant basis to foreign military and related civilian personnel for training both in the U.S. and in overseas facilities.”
of balancing various priorities and philosophies. The legislation and budget authorizations produced by these Congressional Committees then direct both State and Defense Departments to plan and execute programs that achieve nebulous goals such as “Fostering favorable attitudes.”\(^{33}\) In an effort to provide some central direction, Congress implemented Title V legislation in 2000 requiring the Secretary of State to provide an annual plan setting forth a Security Assistance multi-year strategy coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^{34}\) But for the programs that are officially Defense programs, this puts the strategy into a separate channel from the funding and the implementation, making the process highly complex to say the least.

The two broader legislative program umbrellas for international military education and training are Security Cooperation (SC), which refers to all Defense Department interactions with foreign defense organizations, and Security Assistance (SA), which is the funding element that enables the U.S. government to pay for programs it considers to be in our national security interest. This in turn is a specialized niche inside the even broader category of Foreign Assistance.\(^{35}\) For example, in fiscal year 2010, the authorized $32,800,000,000 for Foreign Assistance represented approximately two-thirds


\(^{35}\) U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training Report and Defense Engagement Activities of Interest*, January, 2008, Section II: Description of Programs. This section lists the components of Security Assistance as: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (international military education and training), the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Regional Centers for Security Studies, and transfers of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).
of the international affairs budget (or slightly less than 1% of our federal budget), and Security Assistance was 45% of that.\textsuperscript{36} The vast majority of Congressional time and attention to Security Assistance focuses on weapons sales and related work, with international military education and training’s 2010 budget of $108,000,000 representing only 0.7% of the Security Assistance total of $14,648,500,000.\textsuperscript{37} Weapons sales and international military education and training programs are linked based on their broadly shared security objectives,\textsuperscript{38} and the fact that many of the international military education and training programs involve training the personnel of a purchasing country on the use and maintenance of their U.S.-built weapons systems.\textsuperscript{39}

Often overlooked is that international military education and training funding also includes education programs, not solely training. While the program provided $82.6 million for approximately 7,000 foreign officers from 135 countries to attend international military education and training in fiscal year 2009, which averages close to $12,000 per student, the cost per student for the ten-month professional military education programs amounted to between $50,000 and $100,000 or more, depending on


which professional military education school, and source country subsidies.\textsuperscript{40}

These military education programs, particularly the historic Service War Colleges, pre-date international military education and training, but were rolled into it as it evolved after World War II. This is a case of creating strange bedfellows, because training and education by definition focus on different goals. Training is normally short-term, and functionally focused, whereas education is more long-term (professional military education programs are generally a full year for foreign officers) and focused on how to think about war-related issues, not which wrench to use on which widget. This is important when Congress makes priority choices, potentially limiting attendance by those very nations we most need to engage in educational endeavors. The difference between training and education is also an important distinction for those countries and times when Congress takes punitive action by cutting off all Security Assistance to a country to prevent our shoring up the capabilities of a nation which has used its military to violate its own citizens’ human rights, for example. Perhaps if educational exchange programs were treated and assessed separately from training, we could use the expansion of perspectives that comes from education to continue engaging personnel from these nations while still cutting off their more tactically oriented and potentially threatening training.

A further complication is that not all of the foreign attendees at professional military education schools are financed by U.S. international military education and training

funding streams. This means the costs of these programs tend to be composed of both apples and oranges, so to speak, making it difficult for outsiders to discern what percent of the military educational exchange is paid for with U.S. taxpayer money and which part is considered important enough by other nations for them to pay for their own students. After all, the effects of education are harder to assess, and yet these nations continue to spend large sums for it. One could conclude based on that evidence that they believe the benefits derived from sending their officers to American military schools are worth the cost. There are no studies to confirm that.

Taken together, all of these factors mean that military educational exchange programs are different in several ways from other international military education and training and Security Assistance programs, and would benefit from being viewed as such when discussing both goals and evaluation of outcomes.

**APPROACH TO THE STUDY**

To begin an examination of these programs, Chapter 2 will start with an examination of where military educational exchanges fit in the overall structure of U.S. soft power. That will be followed by an overview of the myriad sources of program guidelines to identify all military educational exchange program objectives, providing a list of objectives for further analysis and thus filling a current hole in the literature. Showing how these military educational exchange objectives are linked to our foreign policy and national security strategies, not just our defense strategies, will support the contention that these military educational exchange programs fit into a larger foreign policy role than is currently recognized. Furthermore, if they have unique effects or
elements that cannot be leveraged by other non-military programs, then the use of military assets in a soft power role is also appropriate.

When further considering the broader role of military exchanges, they would certainly benefit from being viewed as public diplomacy programs, not simply as an unusual aspect of defense work. Once the military educational exchange objectives are identified, they can also be compared to public diplomacy program objectives, to emphasize the relevance of public diplomacy analysis to military educational exchanges. Given that relevance, Chapter 4 will introduce and examine public diplomacy concepts and theoretical frameworks, crafting those concepts into a new public diplomacy conceptual framework for further military exchange program analysis. Then Chapter 5 will use this conceptual framework to analyze similarities and differences between State and Defense programs, seeking to discover what current public diplomacy analysis would truly be most relevant for and most productively applied to military exchanges. The State Department programs in this case will be the Fulbright Scholarship program in general and the Humphrey Fellowships for mid-career civic managers.41

Chapter 5 will also demonstrate the common values-based foundation of Defense and State soft power objectives. Yet of course there are also some differences, such as the fact that military programs are required to explicitly advocate for “American values,” and the idea that the participants in military programs already share specific “military values” such as duty, service, etc. These similarities and differences, when viewed as constants and dependent/independent variables, are worth exploring for what they might

41 The most current description of the Humphrey Fellowship program can be found at their website: www.humphreyfellowship.org (accessed July 1, 2009).
tell us about the effectiveness of these programs, especially over the long term. Furthermore, it is possible that the imposition of these advocacy-type field studies programs could actually conflict with the achievement of either the defense or foreign policy objectives, or both. This duality of explicit and implicit values-based approaches in one program has the potential to provide mutual reinforcement, but it could also weaken the longer-term outcomes - curriculum/learning, mutual understanding, and relationship building - for many military educational exchange students. The new analytic framework presented in this thesis will help to identify a theoretical basis for identifying the distinctions between the two approaches.

Education is about teaching people to think in new ways, so measuring the broader impacts and effects of education is extremely challenging. While rudimentary exchange program assessment efforts go back well before the timeframe when international military education and training was being established, it should be possible through recent advances in social science analytic capabilities to use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to scientifically support Senator Fulbright’s gut-level intuition that we could “... assist the development of peaceful relations through the exchange of some of our best scholars, teachers, students and lecturers with those of other countries.”

Chapter 6 will review the current state of measures of effectiveness (MOE) analytical approaches, seeking to identify those showing the most promise of establishing a causal

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link between programs and outcomes, not merely identifying correlation. But it must also expand on Fulbright’s statement, putting “military officers” in his list of exchangees, because in this context those military officers are also students – students of warfare and of American values.

The final conclusions and recommendations of this thesis will reveal that military educational exchanges, by functioning as public diplomacy programs with all of public diplomacy’s potential effects on values-related attitudes and behaviors, directly and indirectly educate and build relationships with foreign officers in ways that support our national goals of global stability and international order. Future use of public diplomacy approaches to analyze military educational exchanges will further increase our understanding of how to enhance and expand their impacts.
Chapter 2

The Military’s Role in Soft Power

Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes. . . . Successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance. Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.

--2010 National Security Strategy

This chapter will expand on the introduction to military educational exchanges in Chapter One, including a more thorough discussion of the two different components of Military Educational Exchanges. This discussion of both the information element and the educational exchange aspect will make the point that military educational exchanges are a form of public diplomacy, and thus an instrument of America’s soft power. These programs incorporate key concepts such as influencing values and building relationships, thus increasing mutual understanding. The interdisciplinary approach of public diplomacy can give us insights into the roles and long-term effects of these military educational exchange programs.

After setting this foundational debate, this chapter will address arguments regarding both the appropriateness and effectiveness of military educational exchange programs. For the purposes of this work, appropriate programs are defined as those that use

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government resources to support national-level strategic objectives. By showing that the objectives of military soft power programs can be linked to national policy (not solely defense policy goals), and that they have unique ways and means that cannot be leveraged by other non-military programs that support those same goals, then by definition the use of military assets in a soft power role is appropriate. Therefore, after a discussion of the pertinent elements of military educational exchange programs, the chapter will discuss national strategic objectives in classic terms of ends, ways and means.

An overview of national strategy development and its links to military educational exchanges will also show that in supporting diverse foreign policy goals military educational exchanges are an appropriate use of military means for non-violent ends – in other words: soft power. The concluding theoretical foci of this chapter will be two of seven broad goals associated with military educational exchange efforts: Education and Support for International Order.

Inherent in this discussion is the eternal Hegelian dualistic debate in foreign policy circles regarding the ideal balance between engagement and isolation, a struggle addressed in the leading quote from the current National Security Strategy: “Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes.”\(^2\) This thesis contends that military educational exchanges are an integral part of that engagement approach, and help shape outcomes.

\(^2\) Ibid.
This tension is reflected in Dana Priest’s depiction of the disagreement between the Combatant Commanders and civilian authorities on certain occasions, such as when Admiral Dennis Blair of Pacific Command vehemently debated National Security Advisor Sandy Berger over cutting off military-to-military programs in Indonesia after their Army’s involvement in violence in East Timor.\(^3\) In Priest’s examples it is often the case that the military representative consistently falls on the pro-engagement side of the debate. She argues that this somehow reflects the military’s lack of support for civilian primacy in foreign policy, and that the military’s involvement in such programs is inappropriate. The counter-argument is that this friction and debate reflects those senior officers’ support for national goals broader than Defense objectives. These combatant commanders are not only willing but also eager to use military assets of all types, lethal or not, to advance the cause of strengthening relationships and shaping outcomes. In other words, they are eager to bolster our soft power.

Priest actually includes a reference that reflects how important the small program of military educational exchanges is to our engagement philosophy. She notes that: “Berger and Blair argued over cutting off military programs altogether. Capitol Hill wouldn’t allow it to continue, Berger argued. Blair tried to save military education courses for senior officers.”\(^4\) I happen to know firsthand that the Admiral lost that discussion. I was a student at National Defense University when we sent home, in what could only be viewed as “in disgrace,” our Indonesian student. This was probably a loss of face that he


\(^4\) Ibid.
would never get over. The larger implication is that one cannot have any influence at all if one has cut off all connections with another nation. That leaves us with few options when there is instability or worse: when you have no soft power options, your only choices are hard power or doing nothing.

**MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES: ROLES AND ORGANIZATION(S)**

As discussed in Chapter One, these military education programs have been overlooked by the majority of Public Diplomacy analysts and practitioners. Publications considered compendia of public diplomacy ideas and research such as the ANNALS “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World” issue and the Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy do contain single token articles about military issues, but those tend to focus on psychological operations and propaganda issues, not what could legitimately be called “military public diplomacy,” and certainly not the exchange programs. Why might this oversight exist? Because they are a small niche program run by the Defense Department, and thus outside of the normal channels of diplomacy and of civil academe. Even those articles written for public diplomacy journals regarding military issues, written by people with military experience, appear to be by authors who exist in the strategic communication/information practitioner sphere, with no ties to or awareness of military exchanges. No doubt it is easier to get access to information and the students themselves if one is an “insider” in the military community. Hopefully an enhanced understanding of professional military education (PME) and its information and foreign exchange elements will bring more insight from these scholars to bear on these long-standing programs, enhancing their effectiveness.
This will of necessity include discussion of two different categories of Public Diplomacy program provided to foreign officers at professional military education schools. First is the Congressionally-driven “Field Studies Program (FSP),” part of the professional military education experience for foreign officers, not required for the Americans. Sometimes the field studies program is also referred to in (older) military literature as the “Information Program,” and it clearly is an information program. The second component is the more specifically relationship-focused Defense Department educational exchange program as carried out in the professional military education classroom.  

As it stands today, professional military education, as a sub-set of international military education and training, is not overtly integrated with State goals beyond its funding and initial-stage planning. Development of implementation processes, the choosing of students, management of targeted information programs and curriculum, and any program outcome assessments are all handled within Defense, and then a report is submitted by Defense to be included in State’s end of year report. This report is required by Congress, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-161). The report is published in three volumes, although only the first one is unclassified and available through open sources. It is available back through 1999.

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5 The most current primary guidance for these programs is in the Defense International Security Assistance Management (DISAM)/Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSCA) Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training Instruction, dated 3 January 2011.

The summary of a single fiscal year’s international military education and training activities in this report is quite overwhelming when presented as simple numbers. Of the nearly 33,400 individual events reported, for fiscal year 2009: “approximately 69,500 students from 159 countries participated in training, the total value of which is approximately $536.5M.”

Professional military education is part of Security Cooperation, a subset of Security Assistance. While Security Assistance is run by the State Department, Security Cooperation is the defense-specific component. Interestingly, the Security Cooperation definition is not so much descriptive as it is a list of objectives, all of which are relationship-oriented. Security Cooperation is defined by the Defense Department as “All Defense [Defense] interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that:

• Promote specific U.S. security interests

• Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and

• Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”

International military education and training is just one of the sub-components of Security Cooperation, representing U.S. fiscal year 2009 funding of $82.6 million in training for students from 135 allied and partner nations. Students totaled close to 7,000, and attended approximately 4,000 different technical training and education courses.

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7 Ibid., ii.

taught at over 150 different military sites.\textsuperscript{9}

The overall objectives of the international military education and training program take the Security Cooperation objectives and step them down to a more specific focus which is again couched in the relationship- and values-oriented language of public diplomacy and soft power:

- Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries;
- Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and
- Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military.\textsuperscript{10}

It is here in this formal description of the international military education and training objectives that we first see a mixing of educational exchange forms of objectives and those one would expect to be addressed in an “information/advocacy” public diplomacy program:

Training provided under the international military education and training program is professional and non-political, exposing foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control. . . . IMET [International Military Education and Training] facilitates the development of valuable professional and personal relationships that have provided U.S. access to and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments. The international military education and training program introduces military and civilian participants to elements of U.S. democracy such as the U.S. judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality issues, and U.S.


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
commitment to human rights.\textsuperscript{11}

**PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AS A COMPONENT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

Finally, foreign officer attendance at Professional Military Education (PME) is a subset of international military education and training, accounting for approximately half of the yearly international military education and training funding.\textsuperscript{12} As the name suggests, professional military education is an education program, focused on teaching American officers how to think, not what to think or what to do. A 2010 House of Representatives Committee Report describes the difference between education and training well enough if somewhat broadly: “Generally, training programs are highly utilitarian while the education system, particularly at the senior level, is intended to develop habits of mind and modes of analysis. As many military leaders have said, ‘we train for certainty and we educate for uncertainty.’”\textsuperscript{13} As our global security environment becomes ever more fraught with such uncertainty, education becomes all the more important in creating effective military leaders who understand not only how to successfully employ forces in a battle but also how such issues as culture, values, economics, and population perceptions contribute to the conflict environment. Added to that of course is the ability to consider how to shape the environment to prevent or avoid force-on-force conflict to begin with. That ability to steer a conflict into non-violent directions is what Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese writer on strategy, called the “acme of

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., II-2.
That sounds very much like “soft power.”

Of course, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) definition of professional military education is more specific:

Professional military education (PME) is progressive levels of military education that prepares military officers for leadership. It includes various basic level courses for the new and junior officers, command and staff colleges for the mid-level officers, and war colleges for the senior officers. International students may attend most of these courses through the normal Security Assistance Training quota process; however, the command colleges as well as the war colleges are by-invitation-only, with each U.S. Military Service deciding the invitation list.15

We do not teach professional military education for the sake of the International Fellows – most of the schools pre-date international military education and training, and International Fellows are a small part of their student bodies. The schools’ origins can be traced to the late 19th century Prussian approach to military education and professionalization, adapted in the very earliest years of this century (November 27, 1901) to the American Army by Elihu Root, William McKinley’s Secretary of War from 1899 to 1903 (and afterwards Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of War and then State). Interestingly, Root was later the first president and chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, serving from 1910 to 1925. In this capacity, he persuaded Andrew Carnegie to focus the endowment on “scientific and thorough study of the causes of war and the remedy which can be applied to the causes, rather than merely the treatment of symptoms.”16 So this founder of America’s war college system strongly

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16 Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. foreign policy and cultural relations, 1938-1950*
believed that we could prevent wars by informed engagement.

There are six of these schools now: one for each of the military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) and two at National Defense University (National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces). While each of these institutions has a specialized focus area, all of the schools exist to teach senior military leaders, some of them our future generals and admirals, how to be strategic thinkers, how the military fits in a broader national security realm, and how to provide military advice to senior civilian leaders. This education is intended to prepare our senior leaders for the sorts of situations that Priest covers in *The Mission*, where military leaders are involved in discussions about difficult foreign policy choices with civilian leaders. The rationale for this time spent on military education in Western nations can be traced back at least to Plato, who believed that education of a Republic’s guardians was so critical that he devoted most of *The Republic* to the issue. Who shall guard the guardians? In democracies they must be self-regulated by their (hopefully) deep understanding of their role in society.

A similar theme in many public diplomacy authors’ references to education is that of the “real” goal of Western-type education: exposing recipients to alternate ways of thinking. Richard Arndt, a public diplomacy practitioner and professor of languages and diplomacy, puts this into exchange diplomacy perspective: “It can remind participants that slogans or ideologies always short-change realities, that so-called realities may look different from another viewpoint, and that most realities can and do change. Education, 

in the cultural diplomat’s sense, is neither brainwashing, reeducating, nor reprogramming . . .but only a means of . . .showing them how to handle alternate truths.”\textsuperscript{17} This goal is applicable to all professional military education students, American and otherwise. As they continue their military careers, these officers will be encountering some of those “other viewpoints” firsthand, whether in the form of their civilian leadership or other societies.

In keeping with that goal of broadening minds, the War Colleges appreciate the presence of the International Fellows for the different perspective they bring to class discussions each and every day – a real benefit for the Americans, many of whom have had little exposure to other cultures. This is how the mutual relationship building takes place, of course – daily two-sided discourse on issues ranging from battlefield ethics to global weapons and energy trade.

The key from a public diplomacy perspective is that the foreign officers who do attend are spending ten to twelve months in a graduate school program whose primary objective is educating American officers. That is the relevant parallel to Fulbright’s Humphrey and other exchange programs – they are immersed in the same course of study as and with the U.S. students. The two most significant public diplomacy concepts in this military educational exchange program for the purposes of my study can be categorized as: Relationship-building, generally the same as civilian educational exchanges; and “Values-related” issues, which are part of both the curriculum and the unique-to-international military education and training information-based Field Studies Program.

The third key concept is education itself, not a public diplomacy concept per se, though education is bound up with values in many ways. Let’s look at how values are embedded in the program.

**Education and Values Goals in the War Colleges**

The overall goal of a War College is to develop officers who “... demonstrate intellectual agility, think critically, communicate well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and often dangerous situations.”\(^{18}\)

What we see in that description is the basis for much of the curriculum: Western ideas of creative thinking, flexibility, and individual analysis of evidence. War college curricula encompass lessons in civics, military ethics, the laws of war, leadership, and team building, among other topics. Even the study of the American approach to warfare covers ethical and societal-specific choices such as technology versus human lives sacrificed, and the Hegelian philosophic basis for Clausewitz’s approach to military strategy, which is focused on tensions between various key issues of warfare, such as offense and defense. This is all very typical of Western approaches to education.

What is unique to the military is the idea of teaching “professionalism.” This idea of the military as a profession with specific ethics and values was most famously explored in Samuel P. Huntington’s military sociological treatise *The Soldier and the State*. In it he defines the professional soldier as one who accepts civilian control over policy, is conservative in the application of military force, and has a policymaking role

that is largely advisory. Huntington’s analysis leads to the conclusion that professionalization of the military should be equated with inculcating ‘democratic’ values in the officer corps.\footnote{Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations} (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 229–230.} So we can conclude that with or without consideration of foreign officers in the student body, the curriculum content of U.S. War College programs is already strongly oriented to democratic and Western values.

Two specific professional military education schools, both “war colleges” at National Defense University, can serve as examples of some of the nuts and bolts of military educational exchanges. These are the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). Why these two? They are representative to some extent of all of the other four Service-specific schools while having the added advantages of focusing on strategic education (as opposed to more operational application of specific forms of warfare), they are particularly sensitive to broader foreign policy objectives due to their high percentage of State Department students and staff, and their location and prestige tend to lead to attendance by particularly influential International Fellows (IFs). Their foreign officer graduates, for example, tend to stay on in Washington, DC for follow-on jobs at their national embassies as defense attaches or as national liaison officers at the Pentagon or Combatant Command headquarters. It is these schools which tend to get the most attention from both civilian leadership and the media (recent articles about Egypt’s military are typical), and finally they are the schools with which this author is most familiar, having been both a student and faculty member at the Industrial College for four and a half years.
National Defense University itself is larger than the two war colleges, as it includes many research centers, other smaller schools, and entities such as the National Defense University Press. That said, many believe the two war colleges are the core of its mission. The two programs both emphasize the interrelationship of domestic, foreign, and defense policies, as well as the need for coordinated action among different military services, government agencies and branches, often the private sector, and international partners as well. Further, both schools address the political, economic, social and historical context of warfare. National War College has a stronger focus on strategy and international relations, whereas the Industrial College spends more time on economics and military-industrial issues. They both have access to National Defense University assets such as the Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership, and to electives offered at any component, thus allowing for more subject areas and a more diverse set of other students to interact with in seminars.

National Defense University came a bit late to the inclusion of foreign officers – they were only fully integrated into National Defense University schools in 1988. Since then, they have become an important element of the colleges, with two in each War College seminar group and at least one in each Industrial College seminar group. In the 221-person class of 2010, there were 31 International Fellows at National War College, all military officers. That same year the Industrial College hosted 23 foreign officers and 4 international civilians in their class of 320.\(^\text{20}\) (Industrial College civilians may be from

\(^{20}\text{National Defense University 2010 Annual Report. Not yet available online. The report shows three foreign civilians at ICAF, from Australia, Djibouti and Estonia. There was also a German Industry Fellow/Army Reservists in that class. The 2009 Report is available at: http://www.ndu.edu/info/2009%20NDU%20ANNUAL%20REPORT_FINAL%20(Rev%20March%202010).}\)
government or industry.) International Fellows at both schools are part of the same National Defense University International Fellows program, and thus most of their orientation, Field Studies Program and other foreign student programs are integrated and carried out for a group of over 50 people. The International Fellows arrive at National Defense University eight weeks prior to the start of their courses so that they can get their families settled and participate in an orientation program. So they begin to bond as a group well before their American classmates arrive, and then continue to attend functions and take multi-day trips together throughout the school year. It should be noted that international fellows are not officially required to participate in the Field Studies program, though it is strongly encouraged. The International Student Management Office website notes that the Field Studies Program is “considered to be of equal importance to the Academic Program.” When you say that to a member of most militaries, they consider it a requirement – it’s part of the ethos.

FIELD STUDIES PROGRAM GUIDANCE

The more detailed direction for international military education and training information programs is issued in several Department of Defense Instructions. Primary among them is Department of Defense Instruction 5410.17 for “United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors.” This directive contains a distillation of guidance from Defense and

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0)%20-%20for%20Web.pdf (accessed May 9, 2011).

legislative sources, such as title 22, USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, sections 2271, 2295, 2347, 2347b and 2751 – 2799aa. It states the goal of the Field Studies Program as: “The Field Studies Program shall provide international students and visitors the opportunity to obtain a balanced understanding of the United States and to increase their awareness of the basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.”

This legislatively-based policy is the foundation for the unidirectional information program that we call the Field Studies Program. The Defense Instruction goes on to outline eleven elements of mandatory content for all Defense exchanges to include in their Field Studies Program programs: Human Rights; Law of War; International Peace and Security; U.S. Government Institutions; Political Processes; Judicial Systems; Free Market System; Media; Education; Health and Human Services; and Diversity & American Life.

Further instruction is provided to all program managers in a combined directive for all three military departments titled “Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training” and dated January 3, 2011. This document takes the Defense Instruction guidance and expands on it in a twenty-page chapter. National Defense University’s funding channels go through the Army as its executive agent, so Army administrative guidance

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22 United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors, Department of Defense Instruction 5410.17 (Washington, DC, September 15, 2006), 1. This policy is currently revised as of September 15, 2006 but there were also versions produced in March 1985 and January 1965. For the full guidance, see Appendix I.

23 Ibid., 2.

24 Ibid.

also applies to National Defense University programs.

Congress is understandably concerned about the impact of U.S. arms sales to non-Western, non-democratic governments. Though this explicit values advocacy program seeks to ameliorate some of the potential damage those proliferated arms might do in the wrong hands, it is a heavy-handed approach. These Field Studies Programs apply to all international military education and training courses, of which professional military education represents only a small fraction. But perhaps due to the values inevitably contained in the curricula of military educational exchange programs, and other effects of educational exchanges long familiar to public diplomacy practitioners, the Field Studies Programs are an unnecessary addition for professional military education. Having identified such a dichotomy, this thesis will examine the possibility of overlap and potential interference between the two different approaches to public diplomacy contained in the programs we provide to International Fellows in professional military education.

Finally, there is the question of whether non-U.S. professional military education programs also have many foreign officers attending their programs. Gibler and Ruby did research this question for their recent journal article on professional military education effects and concluded that there is not sufficient international attendance at non-U.S. schools to merit analysis:

. . . the U.S. system represents the de facto choice of programs that teach best practices for the professional soldier. In other words, there are few alternatives with which to compare U.S. PME training, at least since World War II. While many countries offer PME, none has the number of foreign military officer attendees that the U.S. program does. Canadian, Japanese, and French programs are some of the larger PME programs but still train only a fraction of the number of foreign officers.
that the U.S. trains.\textsuperscript{26}

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES: THE CASE OF EGYPT

Finally, while the Arab Spring is still ongoing, and Egypt’s final resolution of their uprising remains to be seen, the influence of professional military education on the officers of the Egyptian Army and their choice not to attack their own population in the uprisings of January 2011 may be a case for examination of these theories and their application in a real-world scenario. While there is no room to carry out a full-fledged case study analysis here, this thesis does provide an overview of military-to-military educational exchanges the U.S. carries out with Egypt as an example of a strong military educational exchange relationship.

The protests of late January 2011 in several Arab countries grabbed international media attention, none capturing the imagination more than Egypt’s, where this uprising succeeded in ousting Hosne Mubarak without the Egyptian Army firing on the protesters. A number of pundits have opined that this was due to the influence of American international military education and training programs, going so far as to specify our Professional Military Education courses as the most influential. Ernesto Londono quoted American political leadership in a February 11\textsuperscript{th} Washington Post article that noted:

Many within Egypt's senior officers corps have completed training programs at the National Defense University in Washington. The Obama administration and congressional leaders hope that fact may help keep lines of communication open between the Egyptian and U.S. militaries and give the Egyptian officers a democratic grounding to draw on during the transition. One senior administration official described National Defense University as "a revolving door" for the

Egyptian military leadership.\textsuperscript{27}

This piece, perhaps not consciously, contains references to two of our primary military educational exchange objectives: providing a grounding in democratic values and developing relationships, which become communication channels between the militaries of our two countries.

None expressed it as well as when Daniel Byman, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, noted in his Brookings blog that: “When the story of the Egyptian military and the 25 January revolution is told, however, we’re likely to see that the leverage the United States had on Egypt stemmed in large part from this military relationship, and that it weighed heavily on Egyptian generals as they moved to usher Mubarak out.”\textsuperscript{28} Other academic commentators ventured opinions that the effects of Egyptian military attendance at American professional military education institutions was a likely component of their actions, but that some research will be required to bear this out.

The first record of international military education and training funding for Egyptian personnel is in 1978. It shows that international military education and training trained 12 students for $183,000, or 1\% of the total international military education and training financing for that year.\textsuperscript{29} This links into the timeline of our peacemaking efforts in the


Middle East. Egypt’s international military education and training program funding and student numbers reached 395 by 1983, averaging over 200 students per year throughout the 1980s, and then peaking again in 1993 at a total of 302 students. Then the numbers fell sharply to 52 in 1994, and remained in the mid-double digits, falling to 33 students in 2009.30

This data is only part of the story, however. According to the State/Defense Joint Report to Congress on Foreign Military Training, if one considers international military education and training, Foreign Military Financing, and other funding sources, the numbers grow considerably. Fiscal Year 2009 saw total support for Egypt of $12,439,009, supporting a total of 658 Egyptian students in programs ranging from weapons training to counter-terrorism to professional military education.31

American military educational exchange objectives regarding Egypt would be no different than already stated generally: influencing the military officers from Egypt by developing military-to-military and personal relationships; enhancing their development as what we consider a professional military with skills and ethos which would focus on defending the nation against outside threats, not using their military force to retain their political and economic power. In this way we would be developing both individual and institutional relationships. A further set of objectives apply as well – those associated with the Field Studies program focused on engaging all International Fellows in discussions regarding democratic values and human rights, particularly as they are

30 Ibid.
viewed in the United States.

It remains to be seen whether either or both of these sets of objectives were achieved in Egypt. It also remains for researchers to determine whether the curricular-embedded professional military ethics were instrumental in this influence, or whether it was the exposure to information programs on democratic values and human rights that made the most difference in the outcomes. This thesis will develop and suggest a framework to enable examination of these objectives, programs, processes and outcomes/effects from a public diplomacy viewpoint. The relevant assessment efforts to date will be addressed more specifically in the chapter on measuring effects. Before any of these discussions, though, it is necessary to outline the larger picture of national goals and where soft power, international military education and training and military educational exchanges fit.

**CRAFTING NATIONAL STRATEGY FROM THE TOP DOWN**

During his domestic polling work for the Pew Research Center in 2004 Andrew Kohut “discovered” that the nation’s top foreign policy priority is security.\(^\text{32}\) John Lewis Gaddis went so far as to develop a book to mine the idea that all American Grand Strategy is based on reactions to surprises and threats.\(^\text{33}\) Both authors stress that our history of security behind large oceans and beside unthreatening neighbors has made us perhaps “oversensitive” to threats.

One of the underlying assumptions of both soft power and public diplomacy is that

\(^{32}\) Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 80.

we can reduce such surprises and threats by creating mutual understanding. While this is true at the general societal level with which traditional public diplomacy concerns itself, it is even more applicable when we are talking about the members of those foreign militaries that might one day constitute a threat. Again, we see a link to the “inherent duality” of engagement approaches versus isolationist ones in basic philosophical perspectives on international relations. Any successes in Security Assistance, and more specifically the Military Educational Exchanges that are part of Security Assistance, bolster the argument that the engagement option is effective. To support that goal, our government must make the series of conceptual links from the grand strategic goals of “security and stability” to effective implementation of engagement programs.

The Ends, Ways and Means Approach to Grand Strategy

America’s broad approach to security is spelled out in a White House document called the National Security Strategy. This unclassified document is required by Congress and spells out an Administration’s view of the global security situation, and the ends, ways and means they intend to use to shape that environment in our best interests. The current version is the first from the Obama administration, having been released on May 27th, 2010. It states national goals as:

• The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;

• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;

• Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and

• An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security,
and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.  

These interests are not new nor are they linked to a partisan political philosophy – they can be traced directly back to Washington’s vision for the U.S. military. On May 2, 1783, the Commander-in-Chief responded to a request from Continental Congressman Alexander Hamilton for his advice regarding creation of a peacetime military establishment. Washington’s letter reflected deep thought regarding the pressures to entirely disband the Army. He spelled out three reasons for keeping some small standing forces - three elements that can still be linked to current National Security Strategy objectives: “defend the new country’s territory and citizens, protect commerce and trade, and promote the opening of the West.”

It is no great leap to interpret “promote the opening of the West” as reflecting George Washington’s support for the American idea of Manifest Destiny, which also includes the concept that America’s unique approach to democracy and respect for individual rights should be spread beyond the North American East Coast. The links from Washington’s letter to contemporary statements of “universal values,” “opportunity,” and “prosperity” are no coincidence – they have deep roots as American values.

The taciturn George Washington had significant influence not only on our strategy over the centuries but also our ethics, laying the foundations for our balanced approach to


freedom and civic responsibility in both civil and military realms, which will be addressed below. This influence was based more on his actions than words, as when he voluntarily stepped down after two terms as President, astonishing the world by voluntarily relinquishing power. His actions make him an ideal example of the American values our civil and military exchange programs work to promote.

The classic approach to achieving these lofty goals involves developing an ends-ways-means strategy framework.\textsuperscript{37} It is best described as:

- **Ends** = objectives
- **Ways** = courses of action which will achieve desired outcomes – such as public diplomacy theory/educational exchanges. This is the step that requires underlying (social science) theory to make the conceptual linkage between one’s own actions and the expected effects of those actions on other actors or an environment.
- **Means** = resources or instruments used to implement ways. In our case this might include State, Defense, civilian universities, personnel, funds, and other assets.

Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis writes as good a description of the contemporary American approach to ends-ways-means planning as any: “As a practical matter, strategy is about making insightful choices of courses of action likely to achieve one’s ultimate goals despite resource constraints, political considerations, bureaucratic resistance, the adversary’s opposing efforts, and the intractable uncertainties as to how a chosen strategy may ultimately work out. Competent strategy focuses on how one’s ends may be achieved.”\textsuperscript{38}

The balance of resourcing is part of that last step in the strategy process –

\textsuperscript{37} Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, \textit{Regaining Strategic Competence} (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), 47.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., viii.
determining the most effective or most efficient means. At the national level that includes balancing the roles of various agencies as part of the strategy, because those agencies are the implementers and the owners of assets, especially in the short run. (In the long run, theoretically, the leadership can re-balance assets.) Yet doing this right requires the flexibility to realize that there might not be a single optimal solution but a set of “good enough with what we have on hand” choices.

This difficulty is often complicated by confusion about the distinctions between ways and means. For example, in the case of military educational exchanges, some analysts have mistaken the means or instrument used, which is the military in our example, for the ways. When analysts or leaders view uses of the military instrument as appropriate only when the course of action is violent conflict, they are overlooking possible niche uses that are more efficient and effective than the use of more traditional soft power instruments. In the case of Military Educational Exchanges the major difference is merely the means, because we are pursuing the objectives of international order and relationship-building via the “ways” of educational exchanges using the atypical but not inappropriate means of professional military education, a form of military resource.

One example of this inclination to view the military as solely for coercive application of force in grand strategy theories is found in Eytan Gilboa’s article “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy.” He points out that: “Communication, education and persuasion have become major techniques of foreign relations at the
expense of military force.”°°

Certainly all three of those soft power techniques are included in the military educational exchange programs. Yet a look at his Power Table shows only that “Public Diplomacy is presented as an official policy translating soft power resources into action.”°°

**Table 1: Eytan Gilboa HARD POWER VERSUS SOFT POWER Table**°°

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hard Power</th>
<th>Soft Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviors</strong></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Inducement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Policies</strong></td>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy</td>
<td>Aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Bribes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
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</table>

While clearly linking soft power to public diplomacy, Gilboa neglects to mention the possibility that elements of other resource categories might support this approach as well. Perhaps this is unintentional, but the niche cross-application of military means to his listed soft power ways (behaviors) is just as appropriate and effective an approach to

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°° Ibid., 61.

°° Ibid.
supporting grand strategic ends as the use of more traditional means. Military
educational exchange programs indeed use attraction, agenda setting, values, culture,
policies and institutions to achieve strategic goals.

Nye, on the other hand, understands quite clearly that military resources can be used
in both hard and soft power roles:

Similarly, military force – while it is quintessentially important as a resource for
hard power – can also produce soft power. An example of this is . . . the tsunami in
Indonesia in 2004. In terms of public opinion of the U.S. in Indonesia in 2000,
about 75% of people had a positive view of the U.S. As soon as we invaded Iraq,
that went down to 15%. After we produced tsunami relief, that went back to 45%.
It was the military – the Navy, essentially – that provided the relief. The military
can be used as a resource to produce hard power behaviour or soft power
behaviour.42

Organizing and Funding Soft Power

Some soft power theorists also further confuse the ends and means issue by lumping
in budget policy, which is a planning function, as in this recent comment:

Many official instruments of soft power - public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange
programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts - are
scattered across the U.S. government. There is no overarching policy that even tries
to integrate them with hard power into a comprehensive national security strategy.
The United States spends about 500 times as much on the military as it does on
broadcasting and exchange programs. Is this the right proportion?43

The approaches listed are scattered across the government for good reason – they
are courses of action traditionally related to different means. What we need is a strategic
approach that integrates the instruments “across stovepipes” and uses them for all
possible courses of action (ways). Many would argue that we are well on our way to that


approach now that State has been given responsibility for all Security Assistance strategic objectives, regardless of which Agency runs a Security Assistance program’s day to day operations. This centralized responsibility for strategy is reflected in the Joint Report for Training.

As for funding issues, Nye has raised a valid point. Because there are multiple systemic reasons why Defense has a much larger budget, it has become a fact of life in the national security strategy realm. So strategies are now crafted to take this into account. This is certainly not optimal. Yet Congress does seem compelled to give Defense money and not State. Derek Reveron, a professor at the Naval War College, points out that defense issues are more politically compelling than more complex foreign policy issues, and that most politicians feel they can explain defense spending to their constituents in a way that they can’t “sell” foreign development projects. In fact most Defense spending ends up tied to jobs for constituents, whereas the State Department’s spending is for the most part much less directly tied to the constituency of any American politician. Hence there is little political motivation to support State budgets.

Donna Marie Oglesby notes the possible broad-scale implications of these imbalances by noting that current budget allocations are often locked in by previous political choices that create our government’s balance of instruments. If past choices have led to a large Defense Department, then when we must take action we often must turn to that Defense Department. Changing that balance takes many years of planning and effort. Oglesby finishes elegantly by noting that: “When the civilian capacity is

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simply not there, the military of necessity moves beyond its core security function to fill
the vacuum, performing functions for which it was not trained, thus militarizing
American foreign policy.45

But many Defense soft power programs do not focus exclusively on force of arms,
nor are they new. Gordon Adams, while also critiquing this imbalance, acknowledges
that Defense has in fact taken on non-force missions. He happens to believe this is
wrong, for the key reason that it is overburdening the military:

Yet, the military tool in the U.S. toolkit has become, in many ways, the “leading
dge” of American statecraft. Be it an overreliance on the military or an effort by
the Pentagon to expand their mission set, DOD has taken on an ever growing
number of missions that are not combat-related, including foreign aid, global health,
and even foreign police training. This imbalance erodes the civilian foreign policy
agencies and adds missions to an overburdened military.46

Both these and other critics have valid points, and there is no question that our
budgets are out of balance, but righting the structural imbalance must take into account
the ends, not just means, of programs. While overall there is an imbalance in budgets,
there are still specific circumstances when it is appropriate for Defense to engage in soft
power and public diplomacy, because there are some soft power/public diplomacy
programs that only Defense can do! Military educational exchange programs are not
duplicative – they are one small type of program, with one specific audience, and
Defense is the only practitioner in this arena with the credibility required to carry out

45 Donna Marie Oglesby, “Statecraft at the Crossroads,” SAIS Review 29, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2009),
102.

46 B Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams, “Budget is Policy: Integrating National Security
Spending,” Stimson Center Blog September 30, 2010,
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/budget-is-policy-integ…tional-security-
spending/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter (accessed October 4, 2010).
these programs.

As for the critiques regarding those multiple goals imposed by lack of “appropriate organizational structure” or a lack of ability to define objectives, that is because there are “too many cooks” who cannot or will not make definitive commitments to a set of objectives or a way of organizing. We continue to chase the chimera of a “perfect” organizational structure, instead of working to make a good-enough structure function.

The frustration of many experts on how the “soft” elements of national power are organized, or not, reaches back into at least the mid-20th century. Consider, for example, this comment from a 1975 advisory group on creation of an Information and Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA). Note that in 1975 there was already concern regarding too many agencies and too many Defense programs:

The ICA might also absorb some of the work now carried on by other government departments in areas related to the exchange of persons and the portrayal of American society overseas. Moreover, ICA ought to assume a Presidentially-directed coordination responsibility for all overseas information and cultural programs, since the large operations now run by the Department of Defense, Agriculture, National Science Foundation and others—whatever the various particular goals they may serve—have in common an impact on U.S. foreign policy.47

Actually, considering this letter to President Eisenhower, we can trace the roots of these “who’s in charge” concerns to at least 1953: “In reaching this conclusion, the Committee has been guided by its conviction that information activities conducted by a free society are necessarily based upon foreign policy and have no life apart from it. The

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Department of State is primarily responsible for the development of such policies.”

While obviously relevant, at some point the amount of discussion regarding organization and re-organization could be a distraction from establishing goals. These two quoted committee studies from 1953 and 1975 were just two among many. In 1984, after studying the constant lack of consensus on objectives (and organization) – Lois W. Roth, a long-time Deputy Director of Cultural Centers and Resources in the U.S. Information Agency, had this insightful and exasperated comment to share with a Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs:

Reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies of the federal government, a continuing topic of study and debate, has by conservative estimate produced some 65 major studies in the last three decades. Of these, an astonishing number, at least 31, have dealt in large measure with U.S. government propaganda, information, and cultural programs. The relationship of these activities to U.S. foreign policy has been examined in exhaustive detail again and again. Looking at these studies is a revealing experience, for they add up to a 30-year attempt to understand the proper role of official “information” and “cultural” programs in a democratic society, where their multifaceted activities are constantly open to scrutiny. They make clear that consensus as to the objectives and value of these programs has never been achieved.

More recently, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided a review of twenty-nine articles and studies on Public Diplomacy that had been produced in the six-year period between 1999 and 2005. They were seeking to determine whether changes to public diplomacy strategies or organizations would improve our effects in the “war on terror.” Congressional Research Service chose these particular studies based on State

48 Jackson Committee interim letter to President Dwight Eisenhower, May 2, 1953. Quoted in International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future, 71.

Department recommendations of credibility and utility. Ten of these twenty-nine studies recommended re-defining the overall public diplomacy strategy, and fifteen of them recommended one or multiple forms of reorganization. \(^{50}\) Actually, Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have contributed their own small flurry of studies to this pile in recent years: five for CRS and twenty-six for the Government Accountability Office since 2000.\(^{51}\)

CONCLUSION: MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES SEEK SOFT POWER OBJECTIVES

While the next chapter will focus on legislative and agency goals, this analysis of soft power issues has already identified some military educational exchange objectives:

Education is an intrinsic and primary goal of any 10-month master’s degree program, and the same holds true for the War Colleges. While they do teach a somewhat specialized curriculum in national security studies, it is really the student body and not the curriculum that makes them unique. It is also true that this education has strong implicit and explicit elements of values within it, most of which are geared to the American students but of course are taught to the foreign students as well. So, International Fellows at War Colleges are receiving implied and explicit exposure to values from multiple programs and possibly with different outcomes.

A second objective threading through the tapestry of national strategy could be called “Support for the International Order.” Phrased less broadly, the 2010 National


\(^{51}\) Government Accountability Office reports, http://www.gao.gov/search (accessed on March 10, 2011). CRS does not make their reports available on their website. I have copies of five CRS reports on the subject of public diplomacy that I have gathered during this research. There might easily be more.
Security Strategy supports the goal of higher levels of international cooperation, both for the practical outcomes and the mutual understanding: “Finally, our efforts to shape an international order that promotes a just peace must facilitate cooperation capable of addressing the problems of our time. This international order will support our interests, but it is also an end that we seek in its own right.”\textsuperscript{52} Mutual understanding is a thematic link from the National Security Strategy to soft power and public diplomacy programs, specifically exchange-based public diplomacy.

The definition of Security Cooperation also provides some objectives that can be supported by military educational exchange programs, including providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nation facilities and developing partner capabilities.\textsuperscript{53} While normally viewed as a hardware and operations issue, the strategic communication goal of interoperability includes mutual understanding to facilitate cooperation, certainly something that is enhanced by both the relationship-building and educational aspects of a War College assignment.

Given those objectives, the military educational exchange program is a prime example of Defense’s work to achieve security and foreign policy goals through “soft” approaches to power. That the military itself is normally a blunt instrument does not detract from the potential of military resources for application in new and non-lethal approaches. Nor is this acceptance of “strategic” relationship-building a new perspective for military thinkers. Ninkovich relays this telling anecdote while discussing post WWII


UNESCO staffing: “[Assistant Secretary of State, William] Benton was especially irritated to discover that men of military background, such as Walter Bedell Smith and Dwight D. Eisenhower, seemed to show a greater appreciation of the importance of cultural relations than did many of the “trained” political officers.”

When viewed through the lens of ends/ways/means planning, the military is just one of many national resources or means that can be applied to a variety of ends. That is not to say that in the case of national strategy the ends justify the means - it is the ways in which resources are used that matter. And sometimes those ways are soft power-oriented, as in educational exchange.

In sum, if one considers issues of American military culture, values and policies, this program certainly meets Nye’s own criteria for elements of soft power: “The major elements of a country's soft power include its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen as inclusive and legitimate).” While Nye was discussing national culture and values, a strong parallel can be drawn between U.S. military culture and values and the attraction they hold for members of foreign militaries. This is an “audience” who will not respond in a similar fashion to any State-run programs. Thus, in this case military soft power is not only appropriate, it is very likely the only soft power option to achieve the type of cooperation we seek – one based on shared values and long-term relationships.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

This chapter will assess how multiple sets of directives from throughout the U.S. government have defined program objectives for Military Educational Exchanges (MEEs). The objectives that drive military educational exchange programs have numerous sources, with Congress and Defense being primary, and State Department documents figuring prominently as well.

An analysis of these multiple objectives will show that military educational exchange programs display certain themes: they contain most or all characteristics of public diplomacy, and can therefore be examined through social science methodologies; as public diplomacy programs they are appropriate for supporting larger foreign policy goals, contributing in ways that no other element of the U.S. government can; evince a strong values component; and reflect a strong focus on building relationships, though mostly one-to-one relationships. (This raises a question, which also needs to be addressed: whether the relationship element should be more focused on crafting an institutional relationship, rather than individual relationship, with foreign officers.)

The final key theme requiring a definition for this thesis is effectiveness. Effective programs are those whose outcomes meet their objectives. Further analysis of this essential concept to determine whether military educational exchanges and their two public diplomacy approaches (information and exchange) are effective will be based on whether they meet the objectives identified in this chapter.

As mentioned in Chapter One, however, there is a challenge in taking this approach.
An extensive search found no scholarly works or government reports providing an overview, summary or history of these programs and all of their various objectives. Obviously, therefore, a key requirement for this work has been to research and identify the multiple overlapping sets of program objectives for military educational exchanges and international military education and training, with some consideration for their roots in Public Diplomacy, and provide the list of relevant strategies, laws and regulations here.

**CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVES AS REFLECTED IN LEGISLATION AND STUDIES**

In addition to authorization of funding, Congress generally provides objectives for those authorized programs. Thomas Bruneau’s 2007 international military education and training study for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency quotes an interview with a Congressional Staffer who was not too sure about the existence of international military education and training objectives: “When asked about a document stating the goals of international military education and training, he stated that there are neither legislatively mandated goals nor assessment measures . . . In sum, he, and others, are philosophically in favor of international military education and training, but have never seen any data nor heard anything but anecdotes on its value or importance. He keenly welcomes the effort to assess some part of it.”\(^1\) Of course, the staffer was right that it is impossible to do an assessment without objectives to measure against, but in fact Congress has provided some goals, albeit extremely broad ones. So this thesis will examine those Congressional goals and what the implementing agencies have done to make them more specific and thus measureable. In this case the relevant objectives are not just those specific to

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military educational exchanges or international military education and training, but can be found in other public diplomacy legislation, particularly those limited laws governing educational exchanges. Public diplomacy legislation is included in this analysis partly to show the link between Defense and State educational exchanges, but also because State is ultimately responsible for the strategic objectives of all Security Assistance programs.

The Congressional Guidance for international military education and training programs is contained in the current version of the Foreign Assistance Act, but it will help to understand those guidelines better if we briefly review some legislative history to see how we got here with respect to foreign exchange philosophy and ends/ways/means authorization. Covered in this discussion in chronological order will be the landmark legislation for public diplomacy and international military education and training: the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act; the 1961 Fulbright Hays and Foreign Assistance Acts; and the addition of human rights requirements and expanded international military education and training in more recent laws.

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and Its Predecessors

Senator William Fulbright’s first educational exchange legislation was Senate bill S. 1440, dated September 1945. This was a short thirty-line amendment to the 1944 Surplus Property Act, authorizing otherwise inaccessible foreign currency from the sales of war surplus to foreign governments be used “for the promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture, and science.”² The synergy of an otherwise unused funding source, legislation which could be initiated via

amendment to a “boring” financial bill in a “near-empty Senate chamber,” and a demand for such a program among scholars, enabled the Senator to get this first, “foot-in-the-door” legislation, passed.3

Then Senator Fulbright proposed bill S. 1636, a broader amendment to the same Surplus Property Act, just a few months later in November of 1945. This time Fulbright had done significant homework, and included recommendations from the State and Treasury Departments, as well as the White House, to achieve their support. The bill passed easily with six coordinated revisions made in the Senate, including provisions to ensure priority for veterans, limits on spending in any one country, and emphasis on spreading the program through every region of the U.S. The single amendment in the House involved establishing the Board of Foreign Scholarships to act as a check on the State Department. This included a requirement for the Board to submit annual reports – a boon to people studying the Fulbright Program because it gives scholars consistent historical data to work with, though it is “input data” in nature.

Step three, achieved during the next legislative session of 1947-48, was a larger, more formal bill known as House of Representatives (H.R.) 3342. This first piece of “landmark” public diplomacy legislation was titled the Smith-Mundt Act, officially called the “U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.” While the bill made provisions for educational exchange, including some funding, it was primarily focused on our national Information Strategy in an era when many were suspicious of any government “propaganda.” In 241 pages of House Hearing transcripts, for example,

3 Ibid., 130-131.
education is specifically covered only on the final five pages. In some sense it was legislative housekeeping to roll the Fulbright and other education programs into this bill. Yet the implications and impacts of this inclusion are still being felt, because of the way the Act combined education and information programs.

The stated intent of all three bills was generally the same – “to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the U.S. in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the people of other countries.” This was certainly the goal of our Information programs as well, so in that respect there was some synergy in their being tied together. Yet while this inclusion fulfilled Fulbright’s intent to expand and solidify the program’s funding so it would continue for the long term, it also caused education programs, generally believed to be most effective when steady and continuous, to be more subject to the inevitable ups and downs of the political process than they would otherwise have been. Certainly a graph of the history of Congressional funding levels for the first fifty years of the program resembles a roller coaster. More recent issues of the Foreign Board of Scholarships’ Annual Report show similar variation.

It should also be noted that the Act itself addressed the idea of interagency
involvement with exchange programs: “Having noted the experience this Government has had in the Western Hemisphere with programs of scientific and cultural cooperation, the committee endorses the intentions of the [State] Department and H.R. 3342 to draw upon participation by other Government agencies of the United States, especially in the interchange of persons, knowledge and skills.”

The Smith-Mundt Act has not been not the last word on Public Diplomacy and its goals. One of the continuing challenges is the objective statement itself. In a 1984 critique of the original Congressional language, a practitioner points out that the lack of clarity led to some of the aforementioned conflicts over objectives and organizations: “The goal of ‘mutual understanding’ was just as unclear. The Fulbright amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 described this objective so broadly that it was subject to widely divergent interpretations.” Perhaps later legislation would provide more clarity.

**Fulbright-Hays 1961**

The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, passed on September 21, 1961, as amended, also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act, is considered the second piece of “landmark” Public Diplomacy legislation. This bill focused more exclusively on educational programs, in an effort to consolidate them for both policy and funding harmonization. The Congressional statement of purpose phrases the goal of this Act similarly to the previous ones: “...to enable the government of the United States to

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increase mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchanges. . . and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the U.S. and the other countries of the world.”

This again contains echoes of the idea of helping to build a culture of freedom and democracy around the globe, through the mechanism of education. That goal would be equally subject to Roth’s critique of the lack of clarity in the Smith-Mundt Act objectives, however, Fulbright-Hays contains more precise objectives language as well, in the section authorizing U.S. exchange programs as a public diplomacy tool. Section 101 of the Act states Fulbright-Hays’ four-fold purpose:

- To increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchanges;
- To strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world;
- To promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and
- To assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

Frankly, this speaks to the idea of overcoming the division of the world into “us and them,” by getting to know “the other” as fellow human beings. Basic conflict studies research supports this view in more recent scholarship than they had access to in 1948. The idea of understanding an opponent’s humanity has strong links to the engagement

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10 United States Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 as amended, Public Law 87-256, September 21, 1961. This legislation is also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act, and can also be found as current 22 USC Sec 2451.

11 Ibid., section 101.
approach to international relations and foreign policy. It also has deep roots in Western Values tradition, especially American views of the equal value of every individual.


Another major piece of legislation with great significance to military educational exchange programs was also passed in 1961: the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Act or FAA. This law established the basis for all requirements for U.S. foreign assistance, and its current guidelines, after much amending, include everything from health, microfinance loans and agriculture programs to foreign military sales. Its objective as spelled out in the title is: “An Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes.”

Congress developed a keen sensitivity to the human rights challenges in working with foreign militaries as the U.S. became heavily involved in teaching what were called Internal Defense and Development (now termed counterinsurgency) courses in the Vietnam era, often but in no way exclusively to Latin American militaries. Thus, language in support of human rights was added to the front of the Military Assistance section in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (PL 93-559, sec 46). It has since been amended in limited ways to now stipulate as follows:

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13 Ibid.
The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.\(^\text{14}\)

However, this still doesn’t directly address international military education and training. In fact, while the FAA is the primary source for legal authorization of international military education and training programs, Chapter 5 of Part II of this legislation, “Defense and Military Assistance,” which is the sole chapter concerned with international military education and training, was added in its entirety fifteen years after the law’s initial passage, by the International Security Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, PL 94-329, 90 Stat. 732.\(^\text{15}\) It constitutes a total of 9 sections on 5 pages in a 426-page Statute, covering funding authorizations, purposes, one-for-one exchanges, training in maritime skills, prohibition of grants to high-income countries, records and databases of participants, and requirements for an annual Human Rights report. Interestingly, despite Congress’s long-term concerns about human rights violations by international military education and training participants, this actual HR report requirement was only added in the Security Assistance Act of 2002.\(^\text{16}\)

Because this is a discussion of objectives reflected in legislation, our primary interest is Section 543: Purposes. “Education and training activities conducted under this

\(^{14}\) United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 502B.

\(^{15}\) International Security Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Public Law 94-329, June 30, 1976. This legislation can also be found as current 22 USC Sec 2770a.

chapter shall be designed as follows:

- To encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security;

- To improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and

- To increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights. [this last was added by the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (PL 95-384; 92 Stat 736)]

So these three brief paragraphs are the current legislative guidance on objectives for international military education and training programs. They are indeed fairly broad statements, with such goals as “encourage effective relations,” and “increase awareness” perhaps not concrete enough to be directly amenable to measurement. Over time the implementers of military educational exchanges programs have drawn on these objectives, and those from our national and defense strategies, to craft more precisely tailored objectives for international military education and training. These will be addressed in the upcoming section about military objectives, after first touching on the State Department’s relevant program objectives.

Most recently, Congress added authorization for foreign civilian attendance at international military education and training in FAA Section 541 with four caveats, all originally added in the early 1990s. The civilians now authorized to attend include civil employees of foreign defense and other ministries, legislators, and even “individuals who

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17 United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 543.
18 Ibid.
are not members of the government.”19 These caveats can be viewed as authorization of specific goals for this “Expanded international military education and training” education:

- Contribute to responsible defense resource management,
- Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military,
- Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, or
- Improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.20

Finally, we return to the issue of engaging non-allies and “misbehaving” states versus cutting them off from any form of aid but also from possible influence. Congress has clearly come down on the side of isolation. An example of current restrictive language can be found in the fiscal year 2010 international military education and training funding authorization: “. . . assistance for Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka may only be provided through regular notification procedures of the appropriations committees to include a detailed description of proposed activities.”21

This tension between engaging and isolating is not a new one. In a 1993 RAND study on international military student programs, Jennifer Taw quotes a study on long-

19 Ibid., section 541.
20 Ibid., section 543.
term strategy that emphasized to Congress the need to keep engaging. Based on Congressional actions since then, it seems to have had no impact on legislative restrictions:

The irony of such sanctions on international military education and training, is that they often cut off communication with precisely those countries and those categories of individuals we wish most to influence. . . .It seems arguable that instead of cutting international military education and training in such instances, Congress might usefully increase it, since most U.S. Ambassadors and CINCs [Commanders in Chief, now referred to as Combatant Commanders] agree that they would prefer to deal on such issues with officials who have been advantaged by education in the United States. The sanctions against international military education and training isolate the officer corps of countries who clearly need enlightened leadership, and thus achieve the opposite of what Congress intends.22

Yet not all members of Congress would take this sanctions-oriented approach. Senator Fulbright had a rather different perspective on this issue of engagement versus isolation as reported by the New York Times in 1986: “He says he regrets that the exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are so limited: 'In the long course of history, having people who understand your thought is a much greater security than another submarine.'”23 The debate continues, a debate, which the public diplomacy academic community has the ability and opportunity to influence by analyzing Military Educational Exchange programs and perhaps providing sound evidence of the value of engagement.

So when we reflect back on Bruneau’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency international military education and training Assessment interviews, what should we


make of the Congressional Staffer who was so very frustrated over lack of any assessment of international military education and training programs whatsoever, or of his statement that there are not really any legislatively mandated goals nor assessment measures? Not surprising, given the most recent legislative guidance, he, like Congress in general, seemed mostly focused on conveyance of values – specifically human rights and civilian control of military issues. Perhaps he did not view the current goals as sufficiently specific or measurable? Because there are objectives, at the legislative and subordinate levels. But they are not easily quantifiable, especially if one is trying to measure the effects of the information-based Field Studies program that has such high levels of interest from Congress.

It is a complex but not impossible task to assess outcomes of programs with such values and relationship-oriented objectives, particularly when there are two separate public diplomacy programs addressing the same audience at the same time – an information one and an educational exchange? This latter aspect will be new territory for public diplomacy analysis because there is normally a strong separation between these two types of programs in State, so they have only been studied separately. The social science answer is to use a tailored combination of quantitative and qualitative efforts, examine case studies to identify the pertinent variables, and then make sure that they are linked by sound theoretical frameworks. The final step is to analyze outcomes based on the theories of cause and effect embedded in the frameworks.

Even given the previous conclusion that military educational exchange programs are a valid form of soft power, soft power theory is necessary but not sufficient to analyze military exchanges. Because of their many parallels to the more-examined State Department exchange programs, an important part of applying public diplomacy analytical tools to military educational exchanges is to first understand what we can we learn from State’s objectives and strategies.

The legislatively mandated objectives for public diplomacy certainly drive program funding and implementation, but they are not the only goals that do so. It remains the responsibility of the State Department to develop these objectives further, including linking them to the National Security Strategy objectives, since State is part of the Administration that authored the Strategy. Whether or how well that has happened is the subject of much commentary.

For example, the General Accounting Office reported in 2003 as follows:

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities. . . . The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State’s ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy strategy has not been completed that would help State and other federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually reinforcing benefits overseas.25

A few years later, Bruneau’s research for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency included significant interview work with Agency staffers to ascertain the link between

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goals and programs. Some of his State interviewees viewed their Agency’s allocations of international military education and training funds and programs as multiple versions of “... broad coverage and no specific focus.” That seems to reinforce the Government Accountability Office’s conclusions that State lacked a public diplomacy strategy. Have things improved in the past few years?

Public Diplomacy Objectives Research Challenges

Certainly in researching these public diplomacy objectives, one encounters many challenges, not least being that historically the State culture has not been given to extensive plans development, in contrast to Defense. So yes, in looking for relevant State objectives and strategies the search must be a bit less direct, but it is not so dire as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Government Accountability Office studies imply. This section spells out the relevant information, but only after a short discussion of three of the challenges involved in finding this information.

The most significant challenge for research is the fact that there are few references to educational exchange programs in the vast sea of discussion about information or propaganda work. The attention, or lack thereof, paid to exchange programs as compared to information ones is worth some analysis. In doing work on public diplomacy history one notices that many or most of the mission statements for public diplomacy were specifically for the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which means they focused on information to the near-exclusion of exchanges. The public diplomacy scholar and historian Nicholas Cull, writing about the Cold War, commented specifically regarding

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why the available evidence for a history of the U.S. Information Agency seems focused on mass media/information/propaganda issues: “I have written most about the parts of the story that generated the most controversy, created the most documentation at the top, and loomed largest in the minds of my interviewees. . . . By the same token, I have written least about the parts of the U.S. Information Agency that functioned best: the exchange of persons program seldom figures here, though the agency had a mandate from the State Department to administer that work. . . .”

Apparently exchanges are relatively uncontroversial, at least so long as they are the more traditional State-run exchanges. Yet for some reason Defense exchanges are viewed differently. Understanding what makes them somewhat more controversial is a must for answering those criticisms. The primary differences are their audience, their methods, and the more general fact that it is military resources that are used to implement them. Most of the criticisms from authors like Dana Priest tend to focus on the latter. There are also critics who believe that we undermine the military’s ability to carry out its core function when we ask it to do any soft power work: the military is for fighting wars.

The second public diplomacy research challenge was the lack of longer-term focus - a result of the patterns of wars and international events across the 20th Century. These conflicts caused U.S. public diplomacy to become a pattern of reaction, interaction and no action. There is no reason to think this will change in the 21st century. Wars often cause several predictable bureaucratic reactions, one of which is a focus on short-term issues. This is based on a sound rationale: effective national security requires speedy

responses to threats! But it tends to contrast with the nature of public diplomacy as a long-term process, and can undermine years of work spent building relationships. This is of course particularly true of educational exchange programs and their emphasis on relationship building.

The inherent contrast in timeframes is one of the compelling reasons for maintaining separation between information and exchange programs, even though that presents the third public diplomacy objectives research challenge. It was certainly the short- vs. long-term dichotomy that led the International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future Panel (CSIS and Georgetown) to include the following rationale for separation in their 1975 Recommendations:

Exchange of Persons—These programs, both cultural and educational, support the ultimate goals of U.S. policy by promoting the exposure of Americans and people of other nationalities and cultures to each other. Their objectives are thus to build mutual understanding in areas most important to preserving friendly and peaceful U.S. relations worldwide and to help develop a reservoir of people who can exchange ideas easily, can identify common objectives, and can work together in achieving these objectives. Their operations should, therefore, be directed with careful attention to long-range policy interests. Close connection with the day-to-day policy process is not required.

There may be other reasons for the separation beyond short versus long-term thinking. Roth tells us in *Public Diplomacy and the Past* that in the earliest programs in the 1930s, heading into WWII, the onset of the war caused a “clearly articulated policy [that] kept information and cultural or educational exchange programs separate, if only because information programs were aimed at enemy and occupied territories, while the

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cultural or educational programs were directed towards neutral areas.” While Roth
couched her observation in geographic terms, the distinction is really based on the
relationship we had with the intended audiences. That changed with the onset of the Cold
War, which blurred the differences between peace and war, between enemy and neutral.
When Truman directed the Undersecretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs in
1946 to focus more on providing a fair picture of American life across all aspects of
public diplomacy, we saw more linkage between information and cultural affairs
programs. The separation of programs was also reduced by the Smith-Mundt Act,
which was the first legislation to address funding and goals for both information and
exchanges, though there were still organizational barriers between the two maintained by
concerned public diplomacy practitioners.

That ability to keep our various public diplomacy programs entirely separate may be
even more difficult today. In addition to our inability to control who receives our public
communications, we now have two-way websites and blogs for “mass relationship”
messaging, and we encourage exchange participants to become information providers and
broadcast their experiences. Perhaps a perception of inevitably interwoven programs is
one of the rationales for having two public diplomacy programs for international
professional military education students – both Field Studies and the Educational
Exchange.

31 Ibid.
Public Diplomacy Objectives and Strategy

Lois Roth’s lecture in 1981 did strongly criticize the lack of strategy in public diplomacy programs, using language just as strong and condemning as Bruneau’s: “. . . the innumerable studies and reports stand as sad road signs to a consensus that never took place. Despite the human effort they consumed and the wisdom they represent, the U.S. government was, in the period under review, unable to decide what it wanted from these programs and how they might best serve U.S. foreign policy aims.”32 While the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright-Hays Acts continued to provide broad guidance, we have certainly made progress in the publication of public diplomacy strategy since Roth’s critique.

The first official and authoritative source for post 9/11 State public diplomacy objectives is the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC), published by the White House and State on December 14, 2006. It is considered to be primarily the work of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes, who left DOS after 2 years of occasional controversy and general success in at least raising the profile of public diplomacy in the U.S. Analysis of this document reveals that it is neither well-organized nor prioritized in presenting its three Strategic Objectives, which are:

- America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our most basic values.
- With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.
- America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans

32 Ibid., 359.
and peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world.\textsuperscript{33}

Unfortunately all three, but particularly the second objective, are apparent reactions to current global contexts or circumstances, and are not necessarily true long-term strategies. It is a real challenge to ferret out the ends, ways or means in this document, which reads rather more like a public affairs document. One would expect that because the current widespread terrorism threat is going to be a long-term security challenge, possibly with many strategic parallels to the Cold War, objectives and programs would have an equally long-term focus; but further reading reveals an almost exclusive focus on information programs. That is a short-term and arguably shortsighted approach. One also must notice that “values” are mentioned several times, based on an assumption that there are common global values. Many would argue that we are projecting our own Western or even American values which are not always universal. This is fundamentally different from seeking mutual understanding in the sense that Senator Fulbright meant it.

On the plus side, it is a major first step in the right direction to have a strategy document that spells out communication objectives for the entire government, and presumably for private organizations involved in government programs, such as the Fulbright scholarships. The strategy document goes on to identify audiences, refusing to choose between addressing “key opinion leaders” or mass audiences by targeting both, and adding specific “vulnerable populations” such as youth, women and girls, and minorities to the mix as well. This reflects the more general challenge of broad goals

requiring massive resources, resources that are not in evidence. A whole-of-government communication strategy should include resources (means) beyond that of the lead agency – yet here there is no mention of the roles of other agencies. And State has few resources of its own. The President of National Defense University used to say: “A strategy without resources is just a wish.” That appears to be the status of this first National Public Diplomacy Strategy.

The targeting strategy refers not to audiences but to targeting appropriate media to carry the message, a clear sign that America’s public diplomacy priorities are, or at least recently were, more about information than cultural and educational exchanges. This no doubt reflects current reactive security priorities but is also the issue that garners the most criticism about shallow, short-term, marketing efforts where people had hoped for a more long-term program that included education and cultural programs from the foundation on up. This criticism is levied not only by cultural relations practitioners such as Richard Arndt, but by more broadly focused international relations authors as well – Joseph Nye and Frank Ninkovich in particular. However, the fact that Ninkovich addressed these issues over thirty years ago, asking whether we should be leaving the long-term programs to the private sector and the “marketplace of ideas,” indicates these challenges are more systemic than Administration-based.34

This National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication is now four years and one Administration old. But we have not seen a new formal document. The current Secretary of State has strongly emphasized the intertwining role of

34 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 167.
Diplomacy and Development in making progress on global stabilization, and has focused instead on crafting the much-needed “First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR),” which was released in December 2010. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is a soft power document, with goals directly tied to the National Security Strategy: “Civilian power is the combined force of women and men across the U.S. government who are practicing diplomacy, implementing development projects, strengthening alliances and partnerships, preventing and responding to crises and conflict, and advancing America’s core interests: security, prosperity, universal values—especially democracy and human rights—and a just international order.”

That is not to say that there has not been any new thinking going on about public diplomacy strategy – the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review does contain one public diplomacy implementation statement (the ways in ends/ways/means) out of fourteen for State: “Make public diplomacy a core diplomatic mission by building regional media hubs staffed by skilled communicators to ensure that we can participate in public debates anywhere and anytime; pioneering community diplomacy to build networks that share our interests; and expanding people-to-people relationships.”


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36 Ibid., 8.
This successor to the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication is a strategic plan “intended as a roadmap for ensuring public diplomacy’s alignment with foreign policy objectives and for bringing a strategic focus to how public diplomacy programs, resources, and structures support those objectives. The framework was developed in close consultation with the QDDR [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review] and its recommendations are being integrated into QDDR implementation.”

It is worth pointing out the extremely high level of coordination between the two documents, a rare and welcome sign. Certainly this Framework does much more work linking resources to goals compared to the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. The five “strategic imperatives” spelled out in the Framework are:

- Shape the Narrative
- Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships
- Counter violent extremism
- Better inform policymaking
- Deploy resources in line with current priorities

These imperatives are the ways of achieving foreign policy objectives, though something more specific than “security, prosperity, and universal values” would be an excellent inclusion next time. This plan then steps from ways to “Achieving our Objectives: Tactics,” a section which tries to roll ways and means together. For example,

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38 Ibid., 8.
to support “Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships” the approaches include not only the way of “develop desired skills that provide opportunity and alternatives to extremism” but also the means of “Expand public diplomacy platforms and venues.”

Ends, Ways and Means Parallels to Military Exchange Programs

Three of these “tactics” are most relevant to military educational exchanges:

- Expand and Strengthen people-to-people relationships: “Broaden the demographic base of people with whom we engage, and create comprehensive strategies for critical groups.”

  Certainly foreign military leaders are a critical group deserving of comprehensive public diplomacy strategies. In order to broaden this, we would want to expand international military education and training-type programs, whether U.S.-funded or simply open more spaces on a tuition basis.

- Sustain enduring relationships and ensure that USG fully leverages investments in relationships and skills.

  This could be tailor-made for military educational exchanges. Most of the work being done in sustaining these relationships at the moment falls on the Regional Centers and the Combatant Commanders, though professional military education schools are developing more robust alumni programs. The communications revolution has really added to sustainment options. I will address some of the specific programs in the measures of effectiveness chapter.

- Enhancing local leaders’ relevant skills.

  This certainly also applies to military exchange programs, at least so far as the professional military education curriculum content goes. The Field Studies Program sessions’ contributions to this goal would be questionable. Perhaps there is a way to analyze this, and if the Field Studies Program has no effects in this area we can add that fact to the list of Field Studies Program cons or drawbacks.

“Expand and Strengthen” is not the only Imperative with applicability to military educational exchange programs, though. When public diplomacy practitioners mention

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39 Ibid., 13-14.
40 Ibid., 13.
41 Ibid., 14.
42 Ibid., 16.
“Better Inform Policy” they are no doubt hearkening back to Edward R. Murrow’s famous statement as head of the U.S. Information Agency – “If you want me in on the crash landings I had better be in on the takeoffs.”\textsuperscript{43} Defense addresses this challenge through multiple layers of strategic guidance, policy directives and plans, many of which are iterative and contain feedback loops both down and up the organization. This is a deeply rooted element of military culture. For regional coordination, for example, there are Combatant Commands and regional centers that determine how to use regional resources to meet goals spelled out in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans, which project out seven years of engagement programs for each country. The U.S. Information Agency had similar country plans, but apparently the re-organization that deemed the U.S. Information Agency a Cold War relic also eliminated these plans when the programs were moved to State.

The public diplomacy Strategy also lists “Leverage research and analysis” as a key tactic for supporting policy.\textsuperscript{44} While we all still have much progress to make in this arena, State is ahead of Defense in understanding the social science theories that underpin such public diplomacy goals as understanding and relationship building, as subsequent chapters will show.

Across all of these approaches, of course, coordination with other U.S. government departments and agencies is critical. This will bring a wider variety of resources to bear, something the limited budget of the State Department requires. Hopefully it will also

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
bring together a wider variety of perspectives and ideas for how to apply diverse means to public diplomacy ends.\textsuperscript{45}

Finally, there is also a National Security Council Report to Congress regarding the National Framework for Strategic Communication. This report was produced in response to a Congressional requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 outlining a comprehensive Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.\textsuperscript{46} This document mentions the same State framework, and no doubt there were high levels of coordination with State as it was drafted, but it identifies three priorities for Strategic Communication that are somewhat different from the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and from the Framework’s:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Foreign audiences recognize areas of mutual interest with the United States;
  \item Foreign audiences believe the United States plays a constructive role in global affairs; and
  \item Foreign audiences see the United States as a respectful partner in efforts to meet complex global challenges.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{itemize}

Frankly, these statements look the most like traditional objectives. These are broad and long-term goals that call for both information approaches and more relationship-focused exchanges. They are also general enough to accommodate a great variety of ways and means, whether State or other agency’s programs and resources.

In sum, one must note that within the multitude of studies and reports on Public

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 19.


Diplomacy, little to no mention is ever made of military-to-military programs of any type, educational or otherwise. Yet despite that gap, there are obvious similarities in goals, as well as many conceptual links that can be drawn between public diplomacy and military educational exchanges.

**MILITARY PROGRAM OBJECTIVES: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTERS**

The discussions of national security strategy development, Congressional directives and related State program objectives all give insight into the roots of international military education and training and its military program objectives. But those higher-level objectives are also refined and tailored by Defense and its components into lower-level goals as they plan and implement these programs.

There is a long history of military diplomacy and soft power, and it is not always “gunboat diplomacy.” One historic example familiar to all Americans is the military’s administration and governance of Japan after WWII. But the use of this approach was not always a long-term strategy; sometimes it was a response to a sudden requirement. There were certainly many instances of non-violent use of military assets during the Cold War too, such as the Berlin Airlift. That history of military soft power during the Cold War would make an excellent topic for another book.

For purposes of this thesis, the American military’s long-term soft power activities of the post-Cold War era have their roots in President Bill Clinton's 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The three-pronged focus of that approach was to shape the international security environment by building partnerships, to be ready to respond to threats and crises when needed, and to prepare for conflict.
Having sizeable forces overseas had significant benefits even in the age of a single superpower, and the U.S. leadership realized that access and cordial relationships were significant aids to maintaining the stability of sea, air and land trade routes – the “global commons.” Phrased in soft power terms: “A major goal of engagement or shaping, then, is to reduce the engines of conflict.”

Much of the responsibility for these activities rested on the American Regional Combatant Commanders, in areas that encompassed the Pacific, South America, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. As at least one author has observed: “The combatant commanders not only implement policy, but they are also often critical actors in the foreign policy formulation process itself.” For example, during the mid-20th Century, Southern Command had developed relationships and military-to-military programs to further the goals of democratization in a region better known for rule by military juntas. These programs emphasized the appropriate role of a military - subordinate to civil authority - in a democracy. While these were not the only democratization efforts in the region, Defense was pleased enough with the impacts of their programs to credit them with shifting the governance structures of many South American countries to democracies. This led to the movement of several Southern Command commanders into leadership of European Command in the 1990s (General George Joulwan, General Wesley Clark) so they could develop similar efforts in the newly free nations of Central and Eastern Europe, based on their experiences in South America.

One of the ways that Defense develops its lower-echelon objectives is by tying Security Cooperation goals to engagement strategy. While the engagement strategy’s details are spelled out in Defense’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans, which are classified, they are linked through the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This document is a Congressional requirement intended to force Defense to tie its strategies to its resources at least every four years. The QDR strategies are based on the higher-level National Security Strategy, which contains statements about the criticality of the system of international alliances and institutions that have been keys to our foreign policy since the end of World War II. In explaining this Security Cooperation link, the current Foreign Military Training Joint Report refers to the Quadrennial Defense Review:

. . . the QDR concludes the United States must be prepared to support the broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good. U.S. security cooperation is an important instrument in executing this strategy. Security cooperation advances U.S. security interests by building defense partnerships for the future. Security cooperation also prepares the United States, allies, and partner nations for unforeseen circumstances.  

The Quadrennial Defense Review itself then goes on to state that one of the five main elements of our Defense strategy is “Strengthening key relationships abroad:”

America’s power and influence are enhanced by sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions such as the United Nations. Recognizing the importance of fostering and improving military and defense relations with allies and partners, the Department continues to emphasize tailored approaches that build on shared interests and common approaches.  


Certainly one begins to see a pattern of concern with relationships here, from grand strategic levels down to implementation. Following the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Chairman of the Joint Staff publishes a more specific National Military Strategy. The most current one was issued on February 8th, 2011. Its four overall goals include several that discuss relationships, and are relevant to international military education and training:

- Counter Violent Extremism
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Strengthen International and Regional Security
- Shape the Future Force

The document goes on to comment about relationship-building in the regional security section: “... while gaining trust, understanding, and cooperation from our partners in an ever-more complex and dynamic environment.” This wording has some parallels with State public diplomacy statements and goals, such as “Expand and Strengthen People-to-People Relationships” in the most recent public diplomacy strategic framework.

This current National Military Strategy contains multiple references to relationships. It introduces the theme in the first page: “This strategy advances three broad themes. . . .

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53 Ibid., 16.

Second, the changing security environment requires the Joint Force to deepen security relationships with our allies and create opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors. Several more specific examples include a discussion on China, one on international leadership, and yet another on interagency cooperation and values (italics added for emphasis):

- . . . the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation.

- Military power and our Nation’s other instruments of statecraft are more effective when applied in concert. Trends in the strategic environment do not suggest this will change. In this multi-nodal world, the military’s contribution to American leadership must be about more than power – it must be about our approach to exercising power. And regardless of our leadership approach, we must always demonstrate our core values through the persuasive power of example.

- Leveraging our capabilities and forward presence, we must play a supporting role in facilitating U.S. government agencies and other organizations’ efforts to advance our Nation’s interests. In some cases, we will serve in an enabling capacity to help other nations achieve security goals that can advance common interests. As a convener, our relationships, values, and military capabilities provide us, often uniquely, with the ability to bring others together to help deepen security ties between them and cooperatively address common security challenges. Lastly, we will be prepared to act as security guarantor – preferably with partners and allies, but alone if necessary – to deter and defeat acts of aggression. For all of these leadership approaches, we will pursue wider and more constructive partnerships.

Still, these are not relationship goals for the sake of relationships. There is a necessary element of “what’s in it for us?” After interviewing representatives of the Defense Department, U.S. Army and the U.S. European Command, Rand Analyst

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56 Ibid., 14.
57 Ibid., 5.
58 Ibid., 1.
William McCoy arrived at the following perhaps over-simplified conclusion: "Military officers," asserts McCoy, "believe that the primary reason the United States trains foreign military personnel is to establish military-to-military relationships that may be useful in times of crises [and] gives the United States a certain freedom of action in other countries, whether through over-flight rights or basing agreements." As we have seen, these two aspects are part of our goals, but certainly not the only ones.

For goal statements specifically focused on operational benefits for our forces, we must return to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, as distilled and tied to engagement strategy by the State Department’s *Foreign Military Training Joint Report to Congress* for FY2009 and 2010:

1. Building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
2. Developing allied and partner military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation.
3. Improving information exchange and intelligence sharing to harmonize views on security challenges.
4. Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.
5. Influencing the development of foreign military institutions and their roles in democratic societies.  

Interestingly, nowhere in this list is there any mention of individual relationships formed during professional military education or other courses. The relationships

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mentioned here are institutional, focused on mutual understanding of information, not the ability to reach out to a specific individual during a crisis.

The final layer of goals comes from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is charged with oversight of international military education and training. Unlike the trio of objectives published in the State-led *Foreign Military Training Joint Report* (as discussed in the Military Educational Exchanges: Their Roles and Organization(s) section of this chapter), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency lists just two broad objectives for international military education and training – relationships and information. There are specific and differentiated goals for the information-oriented Field Studies Programs that are part of international military education and training, and then the goals for all professional military education attendees also apply to the International Fellows. This conforms in broad terms to two elements of Public Diplomacy: information programs and educational exchange programs. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency objectives are:

- To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and

- To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights.\(^6^1\)

We see here in the first statement a focus on the practical ends desired: regional stability and defense cooperation. The “ways” of achieving those are through

relationship building – the focus of educational exchanges of all sorts, though of course here it has a more specific audience and curricular content. The second statement provides the basis for the Field Studies Program, the information element of all international military education and training courses, including professional military education.

APPROPRIATE SOFT POWER IN TWO FORMS

This chapter’s lengthy discussion of various legislative and agency objectives for military educational exchange programs has emphasized the diversity of influences, yet in some sense after gathering the goals together one is struck by the consistency of several threads throughout. Bruneau, in his study of international military education and training assessment processes for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, summarized these various threads into four statements on the Contemporary Goals of international military education and training. This list is quite suitable for purposes of summarizing key issues:

1. Encouraging effective, positive defense relationships
2. Promoting interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces
3. Exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, positive civil-military relations, military professionalism, and international norms of human rights
4. Building partner institutional capacity

After exploring the broader objectives in multiple relevant strategies, as well as the embedded objectives in the definitions examined in Chapter 2, one can identify three

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other objectives that would round out and complete this list:

5. Education (an intrinsic goal of a 10-month master’s degree program)

6. Support of the International Order

7. Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nation facilities (a specific element of the definition of Security Cooperation)

This chapter began with a number of key points to support via an examination of the various directives and objectives to which the military educational exchange program is subject. Reviewing these objectives leads to the conclusion that when taken as a whole, the information and the educational elements of the U.S.’s Military Educational Exchange approach: meet the definition of soft power; contain most or all characteristics of public diplomacy (and can therefore be examined through social science methodologies); are appropriate for supporting larger foreign policy goals; are effective in achieving those objectives; evince a strong values component; and consistently aim to build strong relationships, though often of a one-to-one nature.

In examining these military educational exchange program objectives, it becomes apparent that they reflect strong parallels to State public diplomacy program goals - both information and exchange public diplomacy programs. The values component of the Field Studies (information) Program has strong similarities to other information programs that seek to expose foreign citizens to American values and culture, while the interaction-based relationship-building aspects of military educational exchanges are clearly similar to those elements of other educational exchange programs.

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A recent House of Representatives Armed Services Committee National Defense Annual Authorization report from fiscal year 2010 acknowledges Defense’s soft power role and the parallels of some Defense programs to Public Diplomacy. In fact, it specifically refers to Defense public diplomacy activities and professional military education’s parallel to the Fulbright program:

[T]he Department of Defense helped to fund . . . a number of activities to promote exchanges between scientific institutions as well as military personnel exchanges with professional military educational establishments. These activities represent an analogy to the kinds of Fulbright scholarships, American Corners, and book translation programs offered by the Department of State's public diplomacy program. Other activities, such as the deployment of hospital ships, or the use of military medical personnel to carry out medical, dental, and veterinary operations, have no analogue elsewhere within the government.64 [italics added]

This quote illustrates the fact that Congress does see the parallels between military educational exchanges and Fulbrights, but still levies information program requirements on military educational exchanges that have no parallel in the Fulbright exchanges. That raises the question: are the two sets of military educational exchange program objectives harmonious and reinforcing or could they conflict? State public diplomacy practitioners work hard to keep a separation between traditional information programs and exchanges, while considering their outcomes successful. This implies that the military educational exchange programs could still meet those Congressional international military education and training objectives without the Field Studies Program.

The use of military educational exchange programs as a form of public diplomacy

64 House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, National Defense Annual Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, H.R. 2647, 381. The Committee’s report also requires Defense to provide a list of all “Military Public Diplomacy” programs, and a description of their management and performance measurements. I would consider that further confirmation that military PD exists.
as well as soft power is appropriate, because their objectives have historically supported foreign policy goals, which are broader than purely security goals. Chapter 2 discussed the role that military educational exchanges and other forms of military soft power play to support the goals of the National Security Strategy, but not these relevant Congressional, State and Defense goals. The high level of overlap between State and Defense objectives in this discussion revealed that military educational exchange objectives are broader than Security Assistance and/or international military education and training goals, both because of their values/information component and particularly their focus on long-term relationship building. Because military educational exchanges can achieve some foreign policy objectives through addressing an influential, niche foreign audience, they are an appropriate use of military resources.

The military exchange’s dual set of objectives and timelines, both a link to specific foreign policy goals and also to the more long-term mutual-relationship orientations of public diplomacy programs, is not new, of course. The duality is equally relevant to any public diplomacy program, regardless of which Agency is in charge. Georgetown University’s International Information, Education and Cultural Relations panel eloquently expressed this duality in 1975:

Public support for the general information and exchange of persons dimensions of U.S. international relations has been justified over the years on two basic levels. First, and most important in the view of the executing agencies themselves, has been the support these programs provide for U.S. foreign policy. However, alongside this objective there has always been a second one, less often articulated but originally cited by Congress as the primary reason for establishing both programs. This goal is the promotion of mutual and reciprocal understanding of the United States abroad and of other countries here, both as an end in itself and as an essential basis for a peaceful world order. . . . The second objective, admittedly, is far more difficult to justify. . . . While understanding alone will not guarantee either peace or
cooperation, without understanding, nations are less likely to define areas where they can cooperate and to pursue this cooperation to mutual advantage.  

Nancy Snow, an expert on public diplomacy who focuses on exchange programs, points out that the link between security and public diplomacy is more complex because the duality works in both directions: “U.S. Government-sponsored international educational and cultural exchanges are considered a pillar in U.S. public diplomacy efforts to inform, influence, and engage overseas publics in pursuit of national interest objectives. The U.S. Government’s war on terror that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001 raised the profile of public diplomacy, including the value of exchanges, in the overt promotion of national security objectives.”  

Her point is that State programs can and do support security objectives. It buttresses the idea that programs from any government agency, using that particular organization’s means, can in fact be used to support objectives traditionally associated with other agencies.

Joseph Nye, among others, is concerned about a Defense role in public diplomacy: “The dangers of a military role in public diplomacy arise when it tries to apply wartime tactics in ambiguous situations. This is particularly tempting in the current ill-defined war on terrorism that blurs the distinction between normal civilian activities and traditional war. The net result of such efforts is to undercut rather than create soft power.”  

There are areas for which this criticism may be valid, but it is not relevant to military educational exchange programs. Military Education Institutions view their international

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military education and training role as long-term relationship building, not as an information or propaganda program. Of course that would have more credibility if we did not run the Field Studies Programs.

The next step is to ascertain whether these military educational exchange programs are effective. The preceding objectives research shows that the impact of public diplomacy programs used to be accepted as a given. For example, Nancy Snow writes that we are seeing a shift from an exchange paradigm that “viewed exchanges as an autonomous value unto themselves” in the age of Fulbright, to a more proof-oriented paradigm.68 As Congress and its various committees take a close look at every item in the budget, they put more emphasis on data-driven “proof” of program impacts. That means showing causal links between program activities and their outcomes that achieve specific objectives. Basic communications campaign theory stipulates that to measure outcomes you must design measurable objectives into your project. Yet Congress itself has established requirements for a Field Studies program, which are not directly measurable. There is a worthwhile debate in the field right now regarding the merits of seeking attitude changes versus the preferred behavioral ones. “Exposing” personnel to values “discussions” does not even assure changes in attitudes, never-mind behaviors.

This chapter has developed the list of seven objectives against which any effectiveness assessment of military educational exchange should take place. The next step in analysis would be to determine whether those outcomes are happening, and if there is correlation with these military educational exchange efforts. For example, it

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would be important to assess whether the Egyptian military is adhering to democratic and professional military values and whether other militaries that did not participate in these forms of training and exchanges have or have not supported democratic values. There are other potential control groups in that region such as the militaries of Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon. The comparison could help to identify the other variables that might have influenced their choices.

The final step - establishing causality - is going to be a challenge for years to come. One of the things that make it so difficult is that we are trying to tease out the impacts of two different public diplomacy approaches in a single audience – the information-based Field Studies Programs and the relationship-oriented exchange and curriculum. Additionally, these issues – values and relationships - are hard to quantify or to show causality of behaviors or policies. However, a solid conceptual framework based on public diplomacy theories will provide some general guidelines for where further work would prove productive.

Nearly all the diverse sets of objectives for public diplomacy and military exchanges share an emphasis on a key concept: values. Generally speaking those values are the same: democracy and human rights, then expansion into discussions of “American values.” Both the National Security Strategy and Congress agree that certain values are universal – a point reflected in numerous high-level strategy documents, as well as public diplomacy and international military education and training objectives. The National Security Strategy phrases the issue as a key to global security: “These efforts to advance security and prosperity are enhanced by our support for certain values that are universal.
Nations that respect human rights and democratic values are more successful and stronger partners, and individuals who enjoy such respect are more able to achieve their full potential. The United States rejects the false choice between the narrow pursuit of our interests and an endless campaign to impose our values.  

Congressional examples of this values link abound, but perhaps the most telling is the requirement for the field studies program and its contents: democracy, human rights, justice, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc. Here, too, the objective is to expose foreign students to American values not just in order to be understood and develop mutual relationships but also to influence their values. Most of these programs are based on one-way communication, an aspect of many of State’s public diplomacy information programs that is commonly criticized; yet copied in the Field Studies Program effort anyway.

In addition to this duplication, the values issues contained in military educational exchange programs go beyond the “normal” public diplomacy values list. In seeking to develop “capabilities” in foreign militaries, one of the implied goals is to achieve a “professional” approach to armed force. Bruneau reflects that in his four-part objectives summary. That idea of a “professional military” encompasses an entire additional realm of values, everything from subordination to civil authority, to rule of law and use of force. It is a separate field of academic study: military sociology. Many of these values are already shared by military officers around the world, particularly those from countries

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who choose to pay their own money for attendance at U.S. war colleges, which tend to be
Western-style Democracies. They are also values already embedded in all professional
military education curricula, thus duplicated by the Field Studies Program information
programs, perhaps un-necessarily.

Finally, it is evident that a large part of any educational exchange is development of
relationships. But there are several forms of relationship. If one of our military
educational exchange primary goals is developing and sustaining relationships, we should
be clear about what type. We can nurture haphazard and tenuous one-on-one
relationships between individuals or work to create an epistemic community where the
relationship is more institutional. If we seek to improve partner capacity and
interoperability, relationships between individual students are less relevant than creating
networked links among groups of people, such as a partner nation’s command staff
having multiple links with the applicable U.S. regional combatant command staff, to take
one example. These institutional relationships have more potential longevity than
individual links where the people involved change jobs every few years.

One public diplomacy researcher has examined this idea of exchange programs and
epistemic community building: Giles-Scott Smith. He defines an epistemic community
as “a concrete collection of individuals who share the same worldview (or episteme)”\textsuperscript{71} I
think that our military educational exchange goal should therefore be to create an
international epistemic community, where the American approach to values and to the
use of armed force would form the core view. In relation to public diplomacy exchanges,

\textsuperscript{71} Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable” 187.
military-to-military education has a head start on the building blocks compared to other possible epistemic communities because the idea of a “professional military” in a democracy is already an episteme, and a broadly recognized one at that. In many ways an epistemic community is the people-oriented version of our normally weapons-based definition of interoperability. Our 2011 National Military Strategy discussion of a new approach to U.S. leadership of a global defense community takes this approach already: “As a convener, our relationships, values, and military capabilities provide us, often uniquely, with the ability to bring others together to help deepen security ties between them and cooperatively address common security challenges.”

This “American approach” or even “Western approach” to a global professional military epistemic community might not be acceptable to the international population. However, surveys tell us that “Majorities in 13 out of 15 publics polled by World Public Opinion say the United States is ‘playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.’ . . . [but] In the same survey, publics around the world say they don't want the United States to withdraw from international affairs. Rather, they want the United States to participate in a more multilateral fashion.” Engaging in an epistemic community is a multi-lateral approach.

Ideally, the U.S. could wield enough soft power to achieve the same high levels of influence we enjoyed in prior decades. If we ever hope to achieve and maintain that level of global impact again, presuming that is our strategic end, it will require us to use all of

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our many diverse means in multiple and imaginative ways. In order to make that happen, we need to better understand the cause and effect relationships within soft power approaches. The next chapter will examine a number of the multi-disciplinary Public Diplomacy concepts and frameworks that underpin both State information and educational exchange programs. Once they have been identified, the most relevant of those variables can be used to build a conceptual framework for analyzing the effectiveness of military educational exchanges.
CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS

In international relations problems at the present stage of development, the genius of behavioral scientists is not necessarily found in the answers they have produced or in the sophistication of their research methodology. It is in their more effective way of looking at problems which have a psychological or cross-cultural component, their way of using concepts to provide order and meaning to observations, and often, their way of simply asking the right questions.

-- Glen H. Fisher

So far this paper has contended that Military Educational Exchange (MEE) programs support public diplomacy (PD) goals, and have strong values and relationship-building concepts. The idea that military educational exchanges provide unique support to these foreign policy objectives can be shown more directly if military educational exchange goals are examined in a way comparable to America’s other public diplomacy programs, as opposed to being considered solely as part of our defense strategy. This chapter will provide an overview of public diplomacy conceptual frameworks and theories in order to develop a similar, related framework of significant characteristics for both Field Studies and professional military education curricular elements of military educational exchange programs. This work will make clear that military educational exchanges are part of the government-wide public diplomacy effort.

As this chapter’s opening quote from social scientist and former Foreign Service officer Glen Fisher emphasizes, public diplomacy involves a multi-disciplinary juncture of international relations and social (or behavioral) sciences, including communications.

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An examination of the various theories and approaches it encompasses is needed because of the strongly interdisciplinary nature of public diplomacy – it requires exploration of many diverse concepts to determine which of public diplomacy’s multiple components are most likely to form a useful framework in this particular case. This framework will then inform a response to Fisher’s challenge to “use concepts to provide order and meaning to observations,” and then use these ordered concepts to “ask the right questions.”

**WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?**

Public Diplomacy encompasses multiple contexts, functions and processes, so there are nearly as many definitions as there are practitioners. The differences can be instructive with respect to the perspectives of the defining source.

Eytan Gilboa tells us that it is a new field of practice and scholarship, attracting attention in the 20th century “. . .when diplomacy fell under the scrutiny of media and public opinion.”

Bruce Gregory of George Washington University states that “The term public diplomacy was adopted by practitioners in the United States in the 1970s as an alternative to propaganda, which had negative connotations, and as an umbrella label for the U.S. government’s international information, cultural relations, and broadcasting activities.”

One of the briefest definitions is found in National Security Decision Document (NSDD)-77, written by the Reagan National Security Council Staff in 1983 – “Public

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Diplomacy is comprised of those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives.”

Frankly, this seems rather broad, and yet it excludes many important issues. Does it include generating domestic support? Does nothing outside of government efforts qualify? Is foreign policy about nothing except national security? A Congressional Research Service 2005 report is equally brief, stating: “PD [public diplomacy] is the promotion of America’s interests, culture, and politics by informing and influencing foreign populations.”

At the other end of the spectrum would be Jarol Manheim’s definition of strategic public diplomacy (emphasis in original) in his book *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy* as something that “encompasses the creation, distribution, control, use, processing, and effects of information as a political resource, whether by governments, organizations, groups or individuals . . . incorporates the use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of human behavior as attitude and preference structures, cultural tendencies, and media-use patterns . . . to shape and target messages so as to maximize their desired impact while minimizing undesired collateral effects.”

Joseph Nye defines public diplomacy partly by comparing it to what it is not – propaganda. The difference, according to Nye, is credibility. That is the necessary foundation for “conveying information and selling a positive image. . . . but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling

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environment for government policies.”7 Where other authors raise the specter of propaganda, it is normally to insist that while propaganda merely means a systematic dissemination of information in order to promote a cause or point of view, it had become so mired in negative connotations that it is no longer appropriate for polite company. It is apparent that most practitioners believe public diplomacy encompasses more than just the information programs that might be compared to propaganda, and so in fact the term propaganda is not just pejorative, it is not appropriate.

One of the original definitions of public diplomacy is still one of the best, in my opinion. Various sources credit Edmund P. Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, with the first use of the term public diplomacy in 1965. Fletcher’s Murrow School of Public Diplomacy website carries the following definition credited to Gullion:

PD [public diplomacy] deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policy. It encompasses dimensions of foreign relations beyond traditional diplomacy: the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another [part of what drives globalization]; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications. Central to PD is the transnational flow of information and ideas.8

Even this broad statement, however frequently quoted, is not satisfactory to all players. Richard Arndt, in his book The First Resort of Kings, sniffs that Gullion “...
somehow managed to overlook culture and education.”9 It also lacks specific reference to values and to relationships or mutual understanding.

**Why Are They Different?**

It is apparent that scholars and practitioners cannot agree on a definition. The primary reason for these differences is of course the varying perspectives, academic fields and experiences of the authors. Gullion was a diplomat with broad experiences at critical times in such places as Viet Nam and Congo, as well as a close relationship with Edward R. Murrow when Murrow was the head of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA).10 Arndt, on the other hand, was a cultural affairs officer for over two decades and has also taught university cultural affairs courses. William Rugh, a career officer with the U.S. Information Agency, focuses on the differences between public and traditional diplomacy. Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) deal with people other than the diplomats of foreign countries. Coming from government, he is emphatic that “by definition public diplomacy is a government function.”11 Akira Iriye, in contrast, in his examination of the 20th century history of cultural internationalism, emphasizes the many times when it was private organizations who provided concepts and frameworks later used by the government.12 He makes a good case for the idea of public diplomacy as an integrated process involving practitioners in both government and non-government

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organizations. Wilson Dizard, in his history of the U.S. Information Agency, points out examples of such programs, noting that it is often “Hollywood and Harvard” which carry America’s message to the world.\textsuperscript{13}

In the current globalized environment, with private entities also involved in official public diplomacy programs such as the Fulbright Program, public diplomacy work does include more than just the government. However, it is and should be the function of government to provide whatever strategic concepts and policies are required to guide the various programs towards a single goal or set of goals, whether they are actually government programs or otherwise. Cull addresses this governmental involvement issue this way:

It is also worth stressing that public diplomacy is not necessarily the same thing as international communication or intercultural relations. Although international communications and intercultural relations contribute to the terrain on which public diplomacy must operate, they are not public diplomacy until they become the subject of an international actor’s policy.\textsuperscript{14}

Most of this discussion so far has been about the senders of public diplomacy messages. Jan Melissen, a Dutch academic, on the other hand, focuses primarily on the audience or receivers of public diplomacy – the public -- when he states that: “The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is clear: the former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-


\textsuperscript{14} Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, xvi.
official groups, organizations and individuals.”¹⁵ (As with most fields, in practice, the distinction is not so neat.) Manheim adds to this an expanded focus on the message, using Tuch’s 1990 definition that public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”¹⁶ But this still does not address those programs that use public diplomacy tools such as educational exchange for reaching out to a group such as foreign military officers. They are certainly representatives of their states, yet one would hardly characterize officers as diplomats or military educational exchanges as traditional diplomacy. The definition needs to be broad enough to encompass these niche applications, while still being specific enough to differentiate it from more traditional diplomacy or public affairs.

**A More Relevant Definition**

After considering all of the various definitions and perspectives in these and other documents, it appears that a truly ideal, comprehensive definition needs to include the functions, practitioners and “audiences” of public diplomacy, in addition to the objectives. Succinctness is always a virtue in a definition, too. That is a tall order, but here goes: **Public diplomacy includes short- and long-term informational, cultural and educational activities carried out by government and private organizations with the**

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objective of shaping the values and attitudes of and forming relationships with members of other societies in order to support a nation’s foreign policy goals. To put a bit of spin on Nye – public diplomacy addresses a context in which intangible forms of power apply.\textsuperscript{17} The mention of relationship-building addresses the other important issue often neglected in public diplomacy frameworks: listening to our audiences. Finally, practitioners must keep in mind that we are pursuing these goals in an environment where all other nations are pursuing theirs as well.\textsuperscript{18}

Indeed, many people both in and out of government mistakenly view public diplomacy as being solely a (broadcast) information program whose only function is to explain America to the world so that we can win the hearts and minds of the globe’s population. Cull rightly points out that “. . . despite addressing publics, public diplomacy does not necessarily engage a mass audience. Public diplomats have always spent some – or sometimes most – of their energy focusing on significant individuals in the knowledge that they can, in their turn, either communicate to the wider public (and do so more effectively because of local credibility) or become the government insiders in time.”\textsuperscript{19} This description is certainly most applicable to the various forms of exchange programs, which are sometimes forgotten in the overwhelming focus on media-based information dissemination programs. Snow writes that: “Despite the major role exchanges played during the American Century and Cold War period, exchanges remain sidelined today as slow-media efforts while fast media government broadcasting, targeted

\textsuperscript{17} Nye, \textit{Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics}, 122.
\textsuperscript{19} Nicholas Cull, \textit{The Cold War and the United States Information Agency}, xv.
public relations and Rapid Response Units proliferate.”

But public diplomacy is so much more than any of these brief descriptions of what it is, or what it is not. While many practitioners and scholars have wrestled with what it can or cannot accomplish, what fields are or are not relevant, or what functions it contains or does not contain, there are others who still question whether it is in fact a specific field of scholarly endeavor. This would not be the first time that an area of policy interest and diplomatic function became an academic field. Bruce Gregory, in his *Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field* article argues that it already is. He makes the point that there are two issues to argue when addressing this question: the “analytical boundaries,” which have not been fully defined; and the dearth of academic research and scholarly publications, which he believes is starting to change. Gregory has taken on the task of cataloging the diverse publications relevant to public diplomacy, a project he has been doing for at least nine years, so he has strong credibility when he says there is an increase in research.

The International Studies Association now recognizes public diplomacy to the extent that they are setting up a working group on this issue, a group whose primary objective “... is to establish a productive community of scholars from across the disciplines and divisions of ISA in order to advance the scholarship and teaching on public diplomacy. Public diplomacy represents an increasingly important convergence of

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multiple research trajectories.”

Still, if Bruce Gregory feels that he must argue that public diplomacy fits the criteria for an academic field, then at least some people must not think so. One who does not is Gilboa. While noting that public diplomacy is “probably one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship,” Gilboa concludes that it has yet to fully meet the minimal requirements for an academic field: “It must be clearly distinguished from other fields; it should define several subfields sharing theories, models and methodologies; and it must win both internal and external recognition.”

Perhaps part of the answer lies in the following: a distinct academic field would be capable of analyzing more than just the antecedent policy or programs from which it developed. Then if public diplomacy has become an academic field it should be able to provide new insights when applied to a less traditionally recognized program. The Military Educational Exchange programs are a perfect test case for application of these conceptual frameworks/theories. This thesis will address some of these concerns by identifying a new subfield, providing an analytic approach based on existing public diplomacy theories, and by adding to the breadth of research in this area.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE DEPARTMENT EXCHANGES AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Before identifying specific concepts and frameworks within the study of public diplomacy, a brief overview of State public diplomacy history will help to set the context.

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25 Ibid., 75.
While the term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1965, the history of American public diplomacy programs is generally traced to the beginning of the 20th Century, where it is associated with WWI propaganda campaigns. Arndt makes the point that in fact this engaging of foreign publics has always been an element of statecraft, and he outlines some examples of American missionary, philanthropic and educational programs that go back to the late 19th century.26 Iriye also points out that non-governmental (cultural) internationalism in the form of organizations and efforts at treaties, exhibitions and agreements (such as the Red Cross, the Columbian Exposition, etc) were quite robust in the decades before WWI.27 Ninkovich more specifically identifies the 1910 institutionalization of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as a benchmark of private activity in foreign (cultural) affairs.28

Interestingly, the earliest identifiable government-initiated, long-term, relationship-oriented U.S. programs were both bi-lateral China programs. And they were both education-oriented. The earliest was a 1904 Congressional move to use the Boxer Indemnities to pay for hosting Chinese students in the U.S., and the second was a Rockefeller Foundation 1935 China “rural reconstruction” program, with a technological, practical focus on rural development. This reconstruction program actually had the dual values- and stability-oriented goals of modernization and democratization, not unlike many current public diplomacy programs in both State and Defense. It even included

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28 Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 34.
literacy education programs.\textsuperscript{29} It is certainly worth noting that this first “comprehensive” public diplomacy project was run by a private foundation, often the case in the early years of public diplomacy.

WWII saw more government involvement, and a split into information/propaganda and cultural programs. While the former was focused on short-term war winning, the cultural programs always held out hope for long-term relationships and effects. There was also a difference in audiences in these early years – propaganda was for enemy populations, information for neutrals and allies, and cultural programs were also targeted more towards allies. Writer Nicholas Spykman characterized the objectives of the cultural programs as being based on a belief that: “cultural relations can ‘erase’ ideology and misconception problems, leaving ‘only the hard sub-stratum of interests’ to deal with.”\textsuperscript{30} This philosophy is certainly still with us today, as exemplified in the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, for example, which posited that some values are universal.

With the end of WWII, many in America hoped to end many of our public diplomacy programs, information ones in particular. Congress took sometimes-hasty action to dismantle our “propaganda” organizations in part through fear of their potential for being used in domestic arenas. However, when the Cold War divided the world into two camps, we developed a national grand strategy of containment, based on using

\textsuperscript{29} Arndt, \textit{The First Resort of Kings}, 22; Ninkovich, \textit{Diplomacy of Ideas}, 55. Currently \textbf{international military education and training} contains a small percentage of English classes in its funded programs.

\textsuperscript{30} Ninkovich, \textit{Diplomacy of Ideas}, 62.
military and economic power to contain the enemy and buy time while using information and cultural strategies to show the world the superiority of (our) democratic values and allow the Soviet empire to crumble from within, due to its inherent economic and political contradictions and lack of “human values.”

These public diplomacy programs were focused both on keeping allies in the fold and attracting new countries to the community of liberal, capitalist democracies. While originally reactive in nature, the duration of the Cold War gave rise to some long-term perspectives and projects. For example, the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, also called the “Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act,” consolidated existing programs and expanded the scope of activity and resources for both the U.S. Information Agency and State Cultural Affairs. In this way Congress provided for increased exchanges and solidified the status of educational exchanges in the public diplomacy repertoire.

The end of the Cold War brought a clamor for a “peace dividend” and drastic cuts in public diplomacy programs. This culminated in 1999 with the elimination of the United States Information Agency and incorporation of its functions into DOS, where the traditional diplomats throughout the 1990s treated it as a redheaded stepchild. This is the same period during which public diplomacy became a major effort within DOD, with numerous “military-to-military engagement programs” supported by a budget DOS could only dream of, focused on introducing the militaries of former Iron Curtain countries to concepts of civilian control and the rule of law.

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31 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 11.

Finally, with the Al Qaeda strikes on September 11, 2001 came renewed recognition of the key role of public diplomacy in our foreign policy, and eventually the first published public diplomacy strategy document, which was released in June of 2007.\textsuperscript{33} Unfortunately, the majority of the government’s post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts too often seemed to be focused only on short-term information programs instead of the entire range of public diplomacy approaches. This is borne out by the dozens of public diplomacy studies done since 2001, most of which made similar recommendations for an assortment of approaches, few of which seem to have gained any traction with Congress or State. Chief among those orphan recommendations is the expansion of U.S. exchange programs, which the Congressional Research Service’s 2005 review of studies concluded was the most frequent recommendation by expert panels.\textsuperscript{34} Even with that input, the Government Accountability Office’s recommendations in 2007 and 2009 barely made passing reference to public diplomacy programs other than information ones.\textsuperscript{35} Within all of these multitudes of studies, however, not one makes mention of international military education and training or military exchanges, an unfortunate oversight to say the least. It emphasizes that this is not a Defense or State challenge alone; it’s a challenge to our entire government – strategists, implementers and analysts alike.


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

Over the course of this history, some public diplomacy theory did emerge. The rest of this chapter will address the goal of reviewing some existing public diplomacy frameworks to identify what is potentially most relevant for understanding and analyzing military educational exchange programs. This is an effort to categorize theories in order to produce some useful comparative analyses. Such comparisons require valid and meaningful generalizations, which can be categorized into concepts and then integrated into a framework. Thus, while not using full case study analytic approaches, this thesis will occasionally cite examples of particular cases to clarify a point.  

Additionally, most of the sources used to illustrate elements of this framework are written by scholars focused on developing and proposing concepts based on case studies and their own experiences in the field.

Given the multitude of different roles and uses of public diplomacy, this is by no means a comprehensive overview. It will certainly address some “classic” concepts contained in writings by scholars and practitioners from Walter Lippmann to Richard Arndt. Perhaps more directly relevant, though, are frameworks proposed by current scholars in the public diplomacy field, including Joseph Nye, Nicholas Cull, Nancy Snow, Brian Scott-Smith, and Eytan Gilboa. Many of these frameworks are multi-disciplinary approaches, combining elements of public opinion research, communication studies, cultural anthropology, political science/international relations, strategic studies and even organizational studies.

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There are many practitioners of various forms of public diplomacy who have written valuable and insightful treatises on the practice of various types of diplomacy based on their own experiences, or on that of their colleagues. Some of them also have academic roles and credentials, and have written not just memoirs but analytic treatises on the various components and outcomes of broadcasting, cultural and educational exchange efforts.

One of these historians, Akira Iriye, looks at the history of cultural exchange in 20th Century in his book *Cultural Internationalism*. His work looks beyond government programs to outline the efforts and impacts of some private people and organizations which were “out ahead” of the government on the idea of internationalism. While not his central idea, he makes a good case for the idea that small, non-governmental programs did provide frameworks of ideas and networks of people that would then be available for the government to use. Now many of our public diplomacy exchanges tend to reflect public-private partnerships. So while he does not mention military programs specifically, Iriye’s ideas are certainly relevant to understanding the role of government in public diplomacy. One particularly significant set of questions about frameworks comes out of his discussion: How much central direction or conceptualization or encouragement might be necessary from the government to be effective? What is “effective” in this context? How have we incorporated the dialectic between power and culture into current public diplomacy work, particularly our military exchange programs?37

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Walter Lippmann was not a diplomat, but he was a well-known journalist and media critic who also worked in government on occasion, so he did bring experience and scholarship to his analytic works. His classic book *Public Opinion* contains some analyses that are relevant to this thesis. While not directly about public diplomacy or even “public opinion” as we conceive it today with its emphasis on communication, spin or propaganda, it does address the role of information and influence in a democracy. Lippmann had a great concern about establishing an educated public who are able to rely on “unbiased facts” to counter the deleterious effects of increasingly skilled propagandists, lobbyists and marketers. Lippmann, writing in 1922, felt that the increasing media deluge was a threat to democracy. This classic book on democracy does raise questions about the merits of democratization efforts in (less developed) countries where propagandists are benefiting from great revolutions in media and content-shaping while most of the population has little hope of much education, thus little hope of being able to analyze and counter propaganda. But perhaps even more relevant is Lippmann’s emphasis on the value of education over “spun” information programs. His insights and logic make the case for the merits of educational exchange programs for foreign officers, while undermining some of the rationale of the Field Studies Programs.

As a multi-grant Fulbright Senior Lecturer and six-time Visiting Professor, Richard Pells is a different sort of practitioner from the diplomats who often write public diplomacy-related memoirs. But he is definitely a practitioner. In his book *Not Like Us*, Pells argues that despite their being the most like us in terms of culture and values, Europeans have not become so “Americanized” that they have forsaken their own
cultures or somewhat different values. Pells is a champion of the average person’s ability to filter out and resist cultural and media influences.

Pells’ message is that the more values-based a message is, the more likely the audience will be to filter it out, ignore it altogether, or adapt it to suit their own perspective. This has significant implications for our military field studies program programs – and perhaps for our military educational exchange program in general. At least for foreign officers from countries where being in the military conveys great power, our field studies program efforts to democratize their civil-military relationship seeks to reduce or eliminate that power and make military officers a special type of public servant. This could be the very sort of program about whose impact Pells felt such well-argued skepticism, which indicates a need for more analysis of Military Educational Exchanges.

At first glance, diplomat and scholar Richard Arndt’s book First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century is not relevant to military educational exchanges. But Arndt’s vision of “Cultural Diplomacy” encompasses both culture and education. By parsing the field this way, Arndt emphasizes the primary theme of his book – that there is a constant Hegelian tension between the information function of foreign policy and the cultural/educational functions. This tug-of-war is paralleled by another – the tension between long-range and short-range approaches to foreign policy. Arndt strongly emphasizes his solution to these tensions – these programs should play their own roles through different channels and organizations, repeating the program-separation theme of several other authors.

He develops a sender-receiver-based public diplomacy taxonomy of senders and
receivers:

- Government to Government: traditional diplomacy
- Government to (foreign) People: public diplomacy
  - Information: Government addresses the broad population
  - Cultural Diplomacy: Where the practitioner addresses “intellectuals, artists, scientists, university and secondary educators, deans . . .”
- People to (foreign) Government: a nebulous form, yet increasingly influential.

While government-to-government seems the most relevant category for Military Educational Exchanges, in fact what traditional diplomacy usually involves is diplomats communicating with other diplomats – not exactly the same function as our military-to-military programs. Alan Heil actually differentiates between these two sub-categories in his taxonomy:

- Government to Government
- Diplomat to diplomat
- People to people
- Government to people

Military educational exchanges use the two forms of Arndt’s government-to-people (public diplomacy) category, both information and his version of cultural (education) diplomacy, but are certainly applying them to a different category of persons than the audience he identifies in his Cultural Diplomacy list. Perhaps it’s best to consider the military educational exchange programs a hybrid form using Arndt’s public diplomacy

38 Arndt, First Resort of Kings, 547.
approaches to influence an atypical group of what would best fit Heil’s model of non-diplomat government representatives.

Americans value education for its own sake. The fact that the U.S. military embraces multiple levels of professional military education reflects our national appreciation for life-long learning. Arndt is not alone in pointing out that we go beyond mere schooling, with a: “conviction that learning must be continuous throughout a lifetime . . .” 40 Flowing from that assertion, he concludes that a truly educated person is able to reach beyond slogans and understand that ideologies “short-change reality.” 41 Again, this would argue for reconsideration of the effectiveness of the field studies program, particularly since it is run concurrent with an education program geared to expose students to varied ideas and give them analytic tools to question ideologies. It is at the very least counterintuitive to combine such a broad-based education with a program that is essentially espousing an ideology.

Finally, Arndt declares that the benefits of democracy are best related by example, not by lectures. American officers engaging in debates about ethics, theories and policies in an American seminar room is an ideal example to foreign visitors of our values in action.

His experiences in both the U.S. Information Agency and State Department led Wilson Dizard, Jr. to write Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency with a focus on the tension between those in the field and

40 Arndt, First Resort of Kings, 548.
41 Ibid., 549.
headquarters. In this case Dizard shows that most of the time programs were more “full and fair” when left to the authority of those in the field, at Embassies and U.S. Information Services sites. 42 For much of the time he covers, Cultural Affairs Officers were not trained and were left to develop their own approaches to their job, at least until their work caught the attention of those “inside the Beltway” for some reason. In the inevitable tug-of-war between short- and long-term perspectives, Dizard makes the case that the field operators had the normally more effective long-term perspective while those in strategic leadership roles, who should be thinking long-term, often opt for short-term approaches due to pressures of current events. This understanding, applied to the field studies program, would require that guidance be reduced to more general philosophical guidance as opposed to a laundry list of specific topics and allowed approaches.

Dizard makes a useful observation/insight about broadcast information programs that also has some relevance to military educational exchange programs. He points out that in areas where the U.S. had troops overseas, their Armed Forces Network [AFN] radio broadcasts were perceived as an even more credible source of information than Voice of America, because the network’s intended audience was American Service personnel, not foreigners. 43 This sort of credibility applies to the educational exchange element of military educational exchanges, though not the International Fellow-only field studies programs.

Ambassador William Rugh, another career Foreign Service Officer with the U.S.

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42 Dizard, (Re)Inventing Public Diplomacy, 178.
43 Ibid., 134.
Information Agency, focuses his historical public diplomacy analysis on a specific region of the world and America’s relationship with that region over ten presidential administrations. *American Encounters with Arabs* emphasizes the importance of relationship building, which is of particular significance in the Middle East because of the cultural emphasis that Arabs put on personal contact. But of course that would apply not only to diplomatic contacts but also to military-to-military ones, where relationship-building is a valid and appropriate goal for our international military education and training programs.

His case analyses also emphasize the need for a long-term perspective in developing and maintaining these relationships. One of our significant challenges is that latter element of the relationship goal – maintaining them. While some Arab or other regional specialists in the State Department might be able to spend most of a career in an area, and thus retain contact with their networks, for a military where officers seldom spend more than two or three years in a region, the work to maintain a relationship must extend beyond the personal to the institutional. The goal should be making the military-to-military programs into a foundation for more long-term relationships. Perhaps we can find “historical” templates in the forms of alumni programs, clubs, etc. by using Rugh’s approach to historical research.

Rugh mentions that these networks are particularly adept at helping Public Affairs Officers brainstorm with their trusted contacts for ideas of how to deal with national-level problems and obstacles from a less American-centric perspective, enhancing their likely effectiveness. That is also a challenge in the military’s efforts to work with friends and
Allies. It could be yet another good reason to seek establishment of a global military epistemic community, a network based on mutual relationships, developed over time with two-way communications, which might work on international problems.

**Public Diplomacy Theories, Frameworks and Key Concepts**

Pulling together all of the various threads in these histories and case studies is a challenging job, and public diplomacy scholars are still struggling with defining and crafting valid conceptual frameworks for public diplomacy. The efforts being made so far are somewhat diverse, and like the difference in definitions these theoretical works vary based on the perspectives, experiences and academic fields of the authors. Yet just as we can pick through the plethora of program objectives to identify seven oft-repeated and consistent goals, we can find repeated themes that make valid key concepts for a conceptual framework for analyzing military educational exchanges.

Joseph Nye’s *Soft Power* includes much theoretical discussion of Public diplomacy, including a definition based on what he terms Public diplomacy’s functions of: conveying information, selling a positive image, and building long-term relationships “that create an enabling environment for government policies.”

In fact, Nye’s three dimensions of public diplomacy - daily communications, strategic communications and exchanges - represent several military educational exchange-relevant themes tied together, including the development of relationships with an audience, control versus credibility, and long-term versus short-term impacts. Another oft-repeated theme is that of the dialectic between the informational side of public diplomacy and the cultural/educational

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exchange side. Similarly to Arndt, his “three dimensions” framework offers a viable approach to balancing these tensions through multiple programs with different goals, a far more appropriate approach than a singular focus on only one function (information).

Nye also crafted another framework, this one focused on differentiating among types of power. He breaks these down further for us, by identifying some of the components of that tug-of-war within soft power. Of primary relevance to this thesis is his Soft Power “Primary Currencies:”

**Table 2: Nye, Three Types of Power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Behaviors</th>
<th>Primary Currencies</th>
<th>Government Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Power</strong></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Coercive diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Power</strong></td>
<td>Inducement</td>
<td>Payments</td>
<td>Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Power</strong></td>
<td>Attraction</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Public diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Bilateral and multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first, culture, he views as providing some soft power, but indirectly. It is the middle two, values and policies, which “often set limits on soft power” – domestic policies and values in particular, but foreign policies as well. While it is more common

for diplomats and other representatives of our government to spend time explaining our foreign policy to foreign audiences, Nye makes the insightful point that it is often our domestic policy decisions that impact foreign views of the U.S. and which also must be put into context for the foreign media.\(^{46}\) As a world power, with both domestic and foreign media coverage of our internal activities and policy statements broadcast to global audiences, we must pay more attention to how what we do at home appears to those overseas. This mindfulness would be even more critical for those hosting foreign exchange visitors such as the professional military education International Fellows, reaching beyond media directly to influential audiences.

In a recent lecture to the British Council Nye discussed a two-step model of the mechanisms whereby soft power uses public diplomacy to influence a government: directly and indirectly. “In the direct form, it is a relationship among elites . . . One elite person is attracted to the other and does them a favour, and so on. More commonly, however, we think of soft power as working as a two-step model. You try to influence another society’s public opinion in order to influence its government. It is an indirect way.”\(^{47}\) How would this apply to the military educational exchange audience? In other words, would they fit the direct or indirect model? Since they are an effort to use public diplomacy approaches to address a particular type of government employee, that seems to fit the direct model a bit better, where the focus is on personal, mutual relationships.

Nye builds on his *Soft Power* ideas in a 2008 *ANNALS of the American Academy of*[^46]

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[^46]: Ibid., 55.
Political and Social Science article. In “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” he brings more elements of communication theory to bear in supporting his frameworks. He makes the point that to be effective, public diplomacy needs to be supported by a deep understanding of the relevance of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society.\textsuperscript{48} Of course a key element in achieving credibility is that our words and actions align with each other: “Preaching at foreigners is not the best way to convert them.”\textsuperscript{49} Certainly poll after poll in the past decade has made a point that we lost credibility and support whenever our values rhetoric is not seen to align with our policies. This is a particularly critical issue for our information-oriented Field Studies Program, which involves mostly words.

While discussing the importance of listening in the two-way interaction of effective public diplomacy, Nye makes two key observations about the reasons listening is important: first, it enables public diplomacy practitioners to understand how their messages are being heard and understood; and second, listening is the best way to determine what values we share with our audience/conversational partners.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, listening is a major contributor to achieving the mutual understanding that is one of the goals of both public diplomacy in general and military educational exchanges in particular.

Chapter 2 addressed public diplomacy scholar Eytan Gilboa’s ends/ways/means framework in Chapter two, but his “Framework for Analysis” from the same ANNALS article deserves mention here as well. This densely written piece notes Gilboa’s

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 103.
conclusion that most public diplomacy studies are historical, and have contributed little to the development of theory and methodology. He also points out that while there is much discussion of the interdisciplinarity of public diplomacy, most of the theory work has been done in just a few relevant areas, mostly international relations and communication studies. That leaves much opportunity for contributions from strategic studies, politics, and other fields, which he sets out to do.

Table 3: Eytan Gilboa, A Framework for Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Immediate</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Hours/days</td>
<td>Weeks/months</td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Proactive</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/public opinion</td>
<td>News management</td>
<td>Strategic communication</td>
<td>Building favorable conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Closely linked</td>
<td>Partially linked</td>
<td>Remotely linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public diplomacy (PD) instrument</td>
<td>Advocacy; International broadcasting; Cyber PD</td>
<td>International public relations; Corporate diplomacy; Diaspora PD</td>
<td>Cultural diplomacy; Exchanges; Branding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gilboa chooses to use timeframes as his primary point of comparison for public diplomacy. But he approaches them rather differently than Nye. Gilboa points out that “Traditional public diplomacy was aimed at long-term results, but the information age required a major adjustment in the time framework.”

While one could make the case that Cold War advocacy and broadcasting was aimed at short-term results despite taking

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52 Ibid., 73 Table 2.
53 Ibid., 72.
place before the information revolution, certainly he makes a valid case for the need to respond rapidly to events today, thus his framework’s association of this “immediate” timeframe with advocacy, broadcasting and other media-centric instruments. At the intermediate timeframe, Gilboa believes that planning takes a larger role in government and non-government activities. Finally, he views long-term activities as being the most like traditional public diplomacy. Here we see the goals of building mutual trust and friendly relationships. His conclusion is that Non-Governmental Organizations are the best way to carry out these “instruments:” cultural diplomacy, exchanges and branding. But there is a strong role for the government in these long-term programs as well, depending on the specific goal, the context and the audience. Perhaps this gap is because Gilboa, despite his background in communications theory, seems to have left audiences out of this framework. Still, he has tried to include the entire gamut of potential public diplomacy instruments and practitioners – government and otherwise.

Gilboa also presents an overview of media and public relations theories and models. He references several concepts for comparative analysis not reflected in his framework: three spheres (political/military; economic; social/cultural), and two types of public diplomacy (cooperation and competition).

While these sets of concepts might inform public diplomacy practitioners, they really seem to apply only in the realm of information programs, not exchanges.

Nicholas Cull teaches public diplomacy in the program at University of Southern California where Gilboa is currently a visiting professor, and thus there are some not
unexpected similarities in their approaches to creating public diplomacy frameworks. Cull has three different taxonomy tables in his 2008 “Public Diplomacy in a Changing World,” article on taxonomies and history, whose relevant concepts have been combined into a single table for this thesis. He has five types of public diplomacy instead of the usual three, in this case splitting information into three separate categories – advocacy, international broadcasting and listening. This latter is an unusual element for a public diplomacy theory, and while Cull uses it mostly as an illustration for seeking feedback in order to evaluate outcomes, it is also a key component of the more mutual relationship-oriented cultural and educational exchanges that are his last two types. In reality, listening should be part of every diplomatic interaction, public or not. His other two types of information program are Advocacy and International broadcasting – both programs where information only flows outward and again, normally treated as a single effort.
### Table 4: Nicholas Cull Taxonomy of Public Diplomacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of PD</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Flow of Info</th>
<th>Source of Credibility</th>
<th>Helped by Perceived Connection to Gov’t?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Listening</td>
<td>Short and long term</td>
<td>Inward to analysts and policy process</td>
<td>Validity of methods used</td>
<td>Yes, if it implies actor is listening to world opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Advocacy</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>Outward</td>
<td>Proximity to gov’t</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cultural diplomacy</td>
<td>Long term</td>
<td>Outward</td>
<td>Proximity to cultural authorities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes, yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Exchange diplomacy</td>
<td>Very long term</td>
<td>Inward and Outward</td>
<td>Perception of mutuality</td>
<td>Yes, if it implies the actor is listening to world opinion **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. International broadcasting</td>
<td>Medium term</td>
<td>Outward but from a news bureau</td>
<td>Evidence of good journalistic practice</td>
<td>Usually no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cull’s fourth and fifth categories also reflect some similarities to other frameworks and some thoughtful and creative idiosyncrasies. The idea of which direction information flows – inward or outward – is an interesting issue that others seem to have missed. What significant conclusions we can draw based on this category is still open to debate. If we use the idea of listening as a concept instead of a type of public diplomacy, then we can address the same basic idea by identifying whether a program involves listening (inward flow of info), or not (outward only).

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55 Nicholas Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” 35-6. (Combination of tables 1,2 and 3)
As Nye and others point out, credibility is another key factor for success in communication efforts. Cull makes the assumption that all of these types of public diplomacy (can) have credibility, and then uses his discussion of this issue to explicate insights about where such credibility comes from. He allows for proximity to government to sometimes be a benefit, unlike the impression left by Gilboa that distance from government is nearly always desirable. But within this discussion there is at least one element of Cull’s framework that is not relevant to military educational exchanges. That is his assertion that a perceived connection to the government can only be positive “if it implies the actor is listening to world opinion,” or conversely, that exchange programs can be helped by perceived distance from government “if it implies the exchange is not self-interested.”

In the case of military educational exchanges there is no way to remove government from its central role, so that becomes an irrelevant variable, though perhaps a point whose implications are worth considering in the context of government-to-government exchanges.

That said, how the government administers its exchange programs can make a significant difference in outcomes. Cull’s extensive study of the U.S. bureaucratic model in Cold War leads him to conclude that “... tensions between advocacy and mutuality-based exchange ... proved wasteful and often crippling.” He is a strong advocate for organizational separation of advocacy and exchange programs. This reiterates the call for separate management, and has obvious relevance for our dual-approach to military

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56 Ibid., 36.
57 Ibid.
educational exchanges.

For exchanges, Cull believes that perceived mutuality is key. He also points out that credibility in cultural exchanges derives from “proximity to authority.” In the case of both cultural exchange practitioners and educators, “authority” means expertise in their (teaching) field. In this case his cultural credibility criterion also applies to education, including military education.

While public diplomacy is emphatically an inter-disciplinary field, communication theory is often central, so there are many useful lessons to be learned from consideration of even basic communication theory. While many are familiar with the simple three-part model of communication: sender, message, and receiver, communication theory has advanced to more refined and complex models. Among those models is William McGuire’s framework for persuasive communications outlining five classes of input concepts: source, message, channel, audience and destination.\(^58\) Taking the analysis one level further, we learn that there are three “obvious” source characteristics: credibility, attractiveness, and power.\(^59\) Many public diplomacy scholars have mentioned credibility, but few address attractiveness or power in the context meant here. To McGuire, “attractive” encompasses familiarity and similarity, while “power” means control over rewards and punishments, as well as the ability to monitor compliance.

Most discussions of attraction in soft power relate to the attractiveness of American values and culture. That is also applicable in military educational exchange, but it is not


\(^59\) Ibid., 24.
the whole story. There is a commonality to membership in the military that could potentially ameliorate the foreignness of American culture writ large and perhaps make practitioners more attractive than is the norm with State public diplomacy programs, whether information or exchanges. There has been more-detailed work on such issues as the difference in outcomes when the source of a message is more ideologically or more demographically similar.\textsuperscript{60} This work has potential to enhance our understanding of military educational exchanges.

McGuire defines power as having control over rewards and punishments, which has an obvious relevance for the classroom with its focus on grades and performance. But the issue of power may be a larger one for military educational exchanges. It is relevant to the fact that America draws the largest number of foreign officers to its military educational exchange programs, and implies that the idea of learning from the world’s most powerful military is a major attraction factor. Whether we can use that attraction to make the argument that it is our values and professional ethics that make the U.S. military the world’s most powerful is a worthwhile subject for further study.

R.S. Zaharna focuses her framework on understanding the spectrum of programs. Her discussion of “communication assumptions and dynamics underlying how political entities try to communicate with international publics” found two perspectives or underlying assumptions about communication. These two perspectives, when boiled down to their essences, are the familiar dialectic pair of information/persuasion and relationship building. In an effort to develop a useful theoretical framework of public

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 25.
diplomacy initiatives, Zaharna lists the programs within each of these two approaches to communication: Information includes propaganda, nation branding, media relations, international broadcasts and information campaigns. Relational approaches include cultural and educational exchange programs, leadership visits, Development Aid, “twinning” arrangements, etc.  

So far this is not much different from other theorists’ categorizations, though it is broader and more inclusive, even if it does not specifically mention military programs. But then Zaharna adds a third category she calls “Third-Tier Relationship Building Initiatives: Policy Networking Strategy and Coalition Building.” This third category involves an international coalition effort, which requires the most advanced levels of diplomacy as nations cooperate to share resources and goals. Zaharna notes that this level of public diplomacy requires advocacy, negotiation and mediation skills, and echoes Scott-Smith’s call for epistemic community. The approach has much to offer when considering potential outcomes of military educational exchange efforts.

Given that most of the focus of public diplomacy is on information programs, including advocacy, it is also a given that the majority of communication in this realm has traditionally been uni-directional. Cull calls this “outward flow,” Nye bluntly uses the term “preaching.” Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault of the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School of Communication call the same one-way

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62 Ibid., 96.
communications “monologues.” They developed a typology based on forms of communication: monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. These different approaches are each well-suited to certain conditions and goals, though the ultimate determinant of applicability is “building credibility among foreign audiences.” The two researchers stipulate that it is dialogues that best build mutual understanding, with discussions between individuals needed first, as required stepping stones to a larger cultural or national-level dialogue.

In this, the Internet age, we try to incorporate more “feedback” mechanisms into our traditional information public diplomacy programs, such as call-in radio talk shows and comment spaces on State websites. Cowan and Arsenault go far beyond these basic approaches to make several interesting points based on communication research. First is the idea that there is a difference between “technical dialogue” which focuses on ideas and information, and “true dialogue” which is deeper, more mutual and minimizes elements of control of the interaction by one side. Second, they cite six democratization research projects, all of which concluded that discussion and debate among people with different viewpoints consistently led to acceptance of outcomes as fair, regardless of which viewpoint won. In fact, these authors cite a multitude of studies from various disciplines showing the importance of dialogue to fostering good will across groups.

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64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 18.

66 Ibid., 19.
That is certainly one of the goals of public diplomacy generally, though good will is normally not a challenge in professional military education classrooms in the sense that it would be among at least some broader foreign populations.

Finally, Cowan and Arsenault propose a third step in deepening communication – collaboration. This is defined as working on a project together, with mutual goals and concrete outcomes.67 Certainly this approach has taken hold in business team building programs. The American military prides itself on its teamwork and team building, using such tools as group exercises and projects in the classroom and the field. In theory, this approach can be combined with the classroom presence of International Fellows to produce stronger mutual understanding and deeper relationships than mere dialogue. Working on collaborative projects such as decision-making exercises is one of the elements that distinguish exchange programs from information ones, so this affirms the potential for deeper relationships inherent in exchanges. Furthermore, this suggestion parallels Zaharna’s “Third-Tier Relationship Building Initiatives” and the call in our National Military Strategy for American leadership to be more collaborative. The NMS uses the term “convener” to convey an international facilitator role: “As a convener, our relationships, values, and military capabilities provide us, often uniquely, with the ability to bring others together to help deepen security ties between them and cooperatively address common security challenges.”68

67 Ibid., 21.
Some Few Conceptual Frameworks Do Focus on Exchange Programs

Nancy Snow is one of the very few scholars studying exchange programs. While her focus is on Fulbright exchange, there are sufficient parallels with military educational exchanges to be instructive. She identifies three issues that reveal instructive differences between Fulbrights and military educational exchanges: Fulbright exchanges are never used for short-term policy advocacy; their organization keeps the selection of fellows mostly outside of government control; and the Fulbright program has scholars coming to the U.S. as well as those going overseas. (While not exactly even, a full one-third of program participants are Americans studying abroad). Given these distinctions, there are still sufficient parallels to contain lessons for military educational exchanges.

A key similarity is that in both civil and military programs most exchangees are at least as interested in their own development and professional advancement than in promoting goodwill or long-term relationships. There is a Fulbright Association, but only a small percentage of the 300,000 or so alumni belong. Snow did a study of Fulbright Fellows and concludes that most are willing to give back, in theory, if only someone would direct and organize an opportunity to do so.\(^69\) So their attitudes appear to be in the right place, but they need further encouragement on the behavioral front. That leads to Snow’s key recommendation: that we develop a more robust community of alumni to encourage greater post-program involvement, allowing graduates to act as “cultural mediators” and make the Fulbright “a separate global identity that transcends

\(^69\) Ibid.
national boundaries.” Here again we see support for creation of an epistemic community among graduates of a specific exchange program. In demonstrating other academics’ support for this idea, Snow quotes Ted Lowi, Professor of Political Science at Cornell, speaking at an American Political Science Association panel in Fall of 1993: “. . . would like to see the Fulbright program become the moral equivalent of empire . . .. We need a routine way to create a corps of people whose life is international.”

In further confirmation of what are shaping up to be military educational exchange significant concepts, Snow refers to media effects theory in relation to exchange programs. She notes that exposure to a message is not enough, that programs must also account for source credibility and audience bias. “Today there is general agreement among researchers that personal communication has a stronger influence on people’s attitudes than mass communication.”

Giles Scott-Smith is a senior researcher in International Relations who has written several articles and a book on various educational exchange programs, making him one of the more prolific writers on the issue. His journal articles tend to focus on developing useful theoretical frameworks for public diplomacy exchanges, particularly in terms of how they fit into the IR context. For example, his piece in the Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy begins with the point that exchanges always operate in the context of international politics, having either political intent in their creation or hope for future political outcomes. This means that even civilian exchanges are in fact “a political tool

71 Ibid., 245.
72 Ibid., 240.
within foreign policy,”73 and that “Following WWII, a whole swathe of social scientific and behavioralist research, mainly in the fields of communications and psychology, laid the basis for understanding the political implications of public diplomacy and exchanges.”74 Based on this perspective, Scott-Smith argues that there are two goals in exchange programs: “mutual understanding” and political influence. And herein lies a real challenge for evaluation of outcomes – to evaluate meeting the political goal one must “expose the level of political intent to an unacceptable level.”75 Perhaps this is yet another reason why finding a definitive list of military educational exchange program goals is so challenging.

While attitude changes as an outcome of an exchange program are hard to measure, Scott-Smith has identified three variables that might help guide such measurement:

1. The stated purpose and duration of the exchange
2. The extent of cultural difference between and expectations of grantee and host
3. The context of diplomatic relations between the respective countries (Mishler 1965; Sola Pool 1965)76

He notes that U.S. ambassadors consistently point to the International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP) as their most valued public diplomacy tool, because of the informal networks these programs establish.77 That long-term linking of policy and relationships is relevant for military educational exchanges, because as Scott-Smith

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73 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable, 173.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 178.
76 Ibid., 180.
points out in *Networks of Empire*: “To manage empire, particularly the American version of informal empire, it is crucial to maintain alliances and nurture friends.”

He concludes that exchanges are ideal tools for sustaining the status quo, rather than changing it. That certainly makes them an excellent tool for the world’s current sole superpower, or major power, in its efforts to “support the international order.”

There is one final issue raised by Scott-Smith with potential relevance for military educational exchanges: the importance of context. He notes: “Generally speaking, exchanges tend to have the biggest impact in those [professional] sectors that trade in information, such as education and the media. Individuals from sectors where results are judged in terms of policy decisions or political leadership are entirely dependent on the structure of political power and the freedom they have to apply their views within the political culture of their home country.”

How can this perspective enhance our insights into military educational exchanges? First we would need to determine where the military profession fits on this range from information to policy. That is another example of Glen Fisher’s meaning in the opening quote to this chapter - a good question derived from social science, one that requires more work to determine an answer.

**CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter has used experience-based practitioner analysis and existing work on public diplomacy conceptual frameworks to identify relevant concepts to use in crafting an analytic framework for military educational exchanges. That began with crafting a

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78 Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950-70* (Brussels and New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 23.

79 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 189.
relevant definition: Public diplomacy includes short- and long-term informational, cultural and educational activities carried out by government and private organizations with the objective of shaping the values and attitudes of and forming relationships with members of other societies in order to support a nation’s foreign policy goals. The ensuing discussion confirms that military educational exchange programs meet this definition. The fact that discussion of military educational exchanges is absent from nearly all studies and reviews of public diplomacy emphasizes the fact that it should be approached as a new subfield of public diplomacy, with great potential to benefit from public diplomacy analytical tools.

Regarding the interdisciplinary tools used by public diplomacy practitioners, this analysis concludes that public diplomacy’s emerging “analytical boundaries” are capable of encompassing these military educational exchange programs, and their application to military educational exchanges can in fact help to fully define those boundaries. Certainly application of public diplomacy theories and frameworks to military educational exchanges can address some of the concerns expressed by Bruce Gregory and others by providing an analytic approach to this new subfield based on existing public diplomacy theories, and by adding to the breadth of research in this area.

Finally, the thirteen relevant elements distilled from this survey of public diplomacy literature to form the analytic framework for military educational exchanges are based on their relevance to program objectives and their ability to help distinguish effects of either information or exchange approaches, or both. Many of these concepts are rooted in the basic communication process, such as: the role of practitioners - their credibility and their
ability to listen; three aspects of the audience - scale/size, influence, and bias; issues related to the message itself such as whether it is relayed as words or deeds, and what relationship goals or values goals are driving the message; organizational issues including what timeframes the approach takes – short or long, whether there is centralized control or a network approach, and the domestic policy context of these programs. The last element in this search for cause-and-effect theories is the measurable character of outcomes, which does vary based on whether the program is seeking attitude or behavior changes.

This framework will be used in Chapter 5 to compare and contrast the two different types of Public diplomacy approaches embedded in the military educational exchange program – the information-based Field Studies Program and the educational exchange approach reflected in the rest of the time that International Fellows spend in and out of the Professional Military Education classroom.
CHAPTER 5

APPLYING A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FRAMEWORK TO MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

The Department of Defense, no longer able to rely on USIA to handle its public affairs, has moved forcefully to develop its own PD outreach; it shows openness, with the U.S. military’s traditional respect for education, to understanding that more is needed than press releases, spin-control and free chewing-gum.

--Richard Arndt

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT FROM A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERSPECTIVE

The next step on this analysis is to examine how the relevant public diplomacy concepts relate to military educational exchange (MEE) programs. Public diplomacy is an excellent context for a structured analytic approach to military educational exchanges for many reasons, primary among them being that if military educational exchange programs seek to achieve public diplomacy-related objectives, then public diplomacy conceptual frameworks can provide relevant and valid analyses and insights. We have seen that both Defense and State seek to support similar national security goals, including: supporting the international order, building mutual relationships, and introducing foreign exchangees to American values. This section of the thesis will identify the significant parallels and contrasts between public diplomacy and military educational exchanges for each of the thirteen public diplomacy concepts noted in the previous chapter. Because of the strong distinction between information and exchange programs within public diplomacy, it will be necessary to note how these come into play

for each facet of military engagement programs: the informational Field Studies Program (FSP) and the classroom-based Professional Military Educational Exchange (PME).

The analysis in this chapter will provide the foundation for understanding how these public diplomacy concepts enable military educational exchanges to achieve their seven objectives, and which concepts are the most beneficial analytic tools to use in future military educational exchange programs. This public diplomacy-based comparison reveals that there are strong parallels between these military exchange programs and those run by State. Both civilian and military educational exchange programs are run by the government to influence foreign peoples through two mechanisms - communications media and actions; both involve government personnel addressing a foreign audience other than diplomats; and both involve the goals of informing, influencing, and building long-term relationships in addition to educating their audiences. Of course, there are also some differences, primarily in approaches, practitioners and audiences. Once they are outlined, patterns should emerge that can inform an analysis of their relevance to the program objectives.

**Frameworks and their Relevance to Military Educational Exchange Programs**

It is often said that: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”² It would indeed be useful to have a model to help analyze which public diplomacy concepts and theories are most useful or relevant for military educational exchange programs. This model should be applicable to both field studies program and professional military education

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² George E. P. Box, *Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces* (New York: Wiley, 1987), 424. This has become an oft-repeated statement, but it is generally attributed to George Box, a Professor Emeritus of Statistics.
separately, in order to help identify their causal links, their most relevant analytical
variables, and how they provide different support to the many goals of military
educational exchanges.

Department of State public diplomacy frameworks generally address three
dimensions of diplomacy: information, educational exchanges and cultural exchanges.
This gives a good frame for analyzing the thirteen concepts identified in the last chapter.
Thus, a purely State-program-based public diplomacy framework might look something
like the next table, with each of the concept’s characteristics spelled out for each of the
three dimensions of public diplomacy. While I will not address cultural exchange further
in this paper, it is included in this table to show that these concepts also apply to cultural
exchanges. The descriptive characteristics noted in each case are based on the analysis in
Chapter 4, derived from scholars and practitioners with decades of experience in public
diplomacy.
Table 5. Analysis Framework: State Public Diplomacy Concepts Applied to Three Dimensions/Types of Public Diplomacy³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PD Type: PD Concept</th>
<th>Information Program</th>
<th>Educational Exchange</th>
<th>Cultural Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeframe</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience Size</td>
<td>Mass/Broad</td>
<td>Specific/Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience Influence</td>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Influential elites</td>
<td>Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience Bias</td>
<td>Unknown to skeptical</td>
<td>Likely open-minded</td>
<td>Attending = open mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practitioners</td>
<td>Communicators</td>
<td>Lecturers/Researchers</td>
<td>Subject Experts Artists/Writers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words vs. Deeds</td>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Mostly deeds</td>
<td>Deeds, words implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Variable – dependent</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mostly one direction Some return visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Relationships</td>
<td>Shallow, 1-way</td>
<td>Deep is possible</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values approach</td>
<td>Explicit – HR, Democracy, Bill of R</td>
<td>Implicit; sometimes Explicit, eg. Support of democracy in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized vs. Network</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Policy Context</td>
<td>Policy focus</td>
<td>Broad Context</td>
<td>Broader Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td>Mutual Understanding</td>
<td>Mutual Understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step in building this analytical framework is to replace the three types of public diplomacy with the Defense military educational exchange program, keeping in mind that while this is a single program, with a single small audience, it incorporates two

³ Anne McGee, summary of Chapter 4 concepts.
of the three dimensions of public diplomacy: field studies program is an information program embedded in professional military education, which is an educational exchange. That of course necessitates analysis of both dimensions, and so this chapter will focus on identifying the relevance and varying characteristics of these public diplomacy concepts when applied to both Field Studies and Professional Military Educational exchange programs. Note that while each concept will be analyzed in turn, the discussion will also reveal the many overlaps and links among them. Then, once the analysis has been done, this framework will enable a visual comparison of the two programs by fitting the appropriate descriptions in the boxes.

**Timeframes**

The consensus of public diplomacy scholars and practitioners is that building relationships requires long-term, consistent commitment. Gass and Seiter, persuasion scholars, tell us that in successful persuasion and relationship building, credibility is dynamic and thus requires ongoing effort. In other words, it requires long-term effort.\(^4\) There is also broad agreement that information programs are focused on the short-term while exchanges are long-term programs with more long-term impacts. Combining these insights leads to the conclusion that if the goal is relationship building, then exchanges are a better tool to get us there.

However, while the value of long-term perspectives argues in favor of exchanges, these programs are also more of a challenge to implement and maintain. It is harder to properly manage long-term programs in the context of a government with rotating

leadership and multiple decision-makers. Cull makes a good case for more long-term vision with respect to strategies and goals when he notes: “Cultural and exchange work would benefit especially from leadership across a longer cycle than that afforded by the four-year rhythm of Washington’s political calendar.” But in many respects, given that our government is funded on an annual basis, it’s really a one-year rhythm, making long-term planning even more challenging.

Ninkovich also addressed the short-term myopia of the government: “The government seems focused primarily on short-term programs and outcomes, particularly in times when national security is threatened. Is that the proper focus, while leaving the long-term programs to the private sector and the “marketplace of ideas?” Ninkovich made that comment in 1980, during the seemingly interminable Cold War. Our current global instability is likely to last even longer. That calls for an even longer-term perspective in our programs.

Public diplomacy scholars are not the only ones making this point – the House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff has also recommended more focus on long-term outcomes: “When security assistance programs are implemented with regard to long- as well as short-term considerations, they ultimately prove to be more effective.” This should have had more credibility with Congress than inputs from academia or the Administration, but the lack of change indicates that even their own staff did not seem to

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have carried much weight.

The need to emphasize the long-term illuminates some distinctions of Military Educational Exchanges. Military educational exchanges do have an advantage in that as a tiny item in the huge Defense budget they are often shielded from many of the fiscal and political perturbations impacting State programs. On the other hand, the military exchanges are fully governmental, and unable to rely on the stable, long-term perspectives of private sector organizations. In contrast, universities and organizations such as the Institute of International Education (IIE) that administer State-related fellowships and scholarships - the Fulbrights and many others - counter-balance the short-term inclinations of government, by providing continuity in program management and a deeper understanding of the goals that comes from working with a program for more than the usual three year assignment. In addition to continuity, they also provide increased credibility and reassurance of academic integrity through their review panels.

Bruneau’s study of international military education and training graduate school exchange programs concluded that: “For a number of reasons, the benefits of international military education and training are not realized immediately upon the completion of any course but rather are realized over time.”8 Those reasons include the hoped-for future policy and interoperability outcomes, further adoption by students’ home-country military forces of democratic civil-military relations, and enhanced international cooperation. As all of these are future-oriented goals, it makes sense that the benefits are realized over time. The question then becomes: if we have such future-

8 Bruneau, International Military Education And Training Assessment Project, preface 4.
oriented goals, do we have suitably future-oriented programs? And do we persistently treat them as long-term? Certainly when Congress or an Administration chooses to use these programs as a means to punish or isolate the national government of an attendee, this undermines the potential long-term benefits.

Within military educational exchanges, field studies program and professional military education elements do differ with respect to timeframes. Field Studies are a classic information program, run as a monologue intended to change an audience’s attitudes. Yet compared to most single-issue-focused information programs, often created as a response to disinformation, field studies program does have some unique aspects. It addresses single-idea thematic sessions, true, but these sessions are woven into a series of events over time, linked by the specific small audience and normally also by the practitioners who manage the events, if not the speakers themselves.  

**Audiences** are an essential element of all communication, and in-depth analysis requires that these audience-based issues be further broken down into several more-precise aspects. These concepts are: the size or scale of the targeted population, the amount of influence that audience wields, and the inherent bias of that same audience.

**Audience Scale/Size**

The 21st century has presented a new milieu for State programs, which public diplomacy scholars acknowledge in discussions of the need to expand target audiences to include all of the new actors on the global stage, far beyond the Cold War’s focus on nation-states. Dizard notes that since the end of WWII the democracies have encouraged

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the growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including professional organizations, transnational businesses, academic institutions, and a plethora of advocacy groups. One good example would be the international network of non-governmental organizations formed to push for a ban on land mines. As one of the few nations reluctant to sign the treaty, we had to inform and advocate for our policy to these organizations and their members. Gregory summarized it this way: “States are not what they used to be. Governance is provided increasingly by political actors above, below, and around the state. Thick globalism, non-state actors, a mix of secular and religious “big ideas,” digital technologies, and new forms of communication have transformed the old world order. Network societies challenge organizational hierarchies. Attention – not information – is today’s scarce resource.”

This challenge is mostly relevant to information programs, with their normally broad audiences.

Traditional information programs are generally addressed to a broad swath of foreign publics, often the broader the better. In contrast, educational exchange audiences are usually quite small and narrowly targeted. This is partly driven by economics – exchanges cost far more per audience member. But it is also driven by the objectives, so the question of scale becomes one of effectiveness: “...quality programs for fewer individuals are going to achieve a greater success rate than attempts to simply obtain a

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10 Dizard, (Re)Inventing Public Diplomacy, 227.

large quantity of participants.”¹² While exchange participants may be drawn from the “elite,” they are people who we hope will affect policy making at some point in their careers and will be influencing a much broader sector of society.

Military educational exchange audiences are even smaller, more narrowly targeted, and more expensive than State programs such as the Fulbrights. But there is another difference – the military educational exchange audience is composed of official representatives of the nation-state, albeit not their diplomats, while most educational exchanges involve a broader section of society. So while State talks about “getting past states” when using public diplomacy tools, Defense military educational exchanges are seeking to use public diplomacy theories and frames to address a small niche of state-to-state communications. The military programs are impacted by these afore-mentioned global changes, however, because all militaries now “. . . confront insurgents and terrorists in a new paradigm of armed conflict fought within civilian populations by contestants with local and global reach.”¹³ So while globalization has made the State communication challenge broader, it has given the military educational exchange audience more in common than they had before the world got so small.

Given this common imperative, the educational exchange element of military educational exchanges can support many of their objectives, including relationship building, support to international order, interoperability, and building the institutional capacity of foreign militaries, by providing an educational forum for how to best confront

¹² Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 190.
these new global threats.

Normally information programs are targeted to mass audiences. The field studies program, as a classic information program, is a blunt instrument for the small military educational exchange audience. One of the most significant benefits of a small audience is the opportunity to have two-way dialogue, which public diplomacy theory tells us is more likely to lead to mutual understanding and mutuality of relationships. With relationship-building being one of military educational exchange’s primary goals, this approach to the small audience seems counter-productive for achieving the stated goals. Therefore Congress and Defense should re-consider the requirement for advocating American values in the ten-month educational exchange programs that are currently included in the overall international military education and training guidance.

**Audience - Influential Elites**

Public diplomacy practitioners often discuss the merits of targeting elite, influential audiences versus the population as a whole. Scott-Smith summarizes the majority conclusion when he writes about the resilience of the opinion leader, and the added value of targeting influential elites. He acknowledges that information technology has democratized access to information. “Nevertheless, the human factor remains a decisive element of the exchange experience, and the continuing influence of firsthand experience and personal contact must not be underestimated.”\(^\text{14}\) Communication theorists also make the relevant point that while such an educated audience is likely to be better informed and thus more critical, they are also better at message comprehension, which also tends to

\(^{14}\text{Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 191.}\)
“make educated audiences more persuadable.”\textsuperscript{15}

By definition the fairly senior officers in our military educational exchange audience are educated, “elite” and influential. That level of influence varies depending not only on the rank or job held by the individual, but also to some extent on the relationship between the military and the civil leadership of a nation. A Western European Colonel is likely to have less direct influence on a nation’s policies than a General from a national openly or functionally governed by the military. Still, the expectation is that they all have some degree of influence and are likely to do so for years into the future. Public diplomacy literature emphasizes that educational exchanges are normally focused on influential elites, as opposed to the mass audiences of info programs; so professional military education fits the profile in that regard, whereas the field studies program approach does not.

**Audience Bias**

All audiences have multiple biases, because all human beings have generalizations they make to understand our complex world. Communications scholar Kathleen Hall Jamieson, in a discussion on mediated politics, notes that: “...communication theorists hold as a basic premise the notion that meaning does not exist in messages but rather in the intersection of a message and an audience. From the time of Aristotle, scholars of communication have known that audiences draw on their cultural and biographical experiences as well as their knowledge of the conventions through which a society

\textsuperscript{15} McGuire, “Input and Output Variables Currently Promising for Constructing Persuasive Communications,” 33.
communicates in order to interpret messages.”

This conclusion is also based on linguistic scholarship: “Linguists make the same assumption when they note that all utterances are subject to semantic collaboration to establish their effective meaning.”

Many public diplomacy authors argue that context is critical. Key to the context of communication is a fairly thorough understanding of the audience’s background and preconceptions, to find out what ideas and values we share with them. Here we find a significant difference between military educational exchanges and other public diplomacy programs, because our analysis framework notes that for State information programs the audience bias is normally unknown to skeptical, and for educational exchanges it’s likely to be open-minded. American and foreign officer attendees at U.S. war colleges already share many experiences and some of the same values, making the exchange students more inclined to be open to U.S. messages. That should apply to both the explicit messages of the field studies program and the implicit ones in the professional military education classroom.

Another aspect of audience bias relates to the ability of the program to meet participants’ goals. Whether it’s education on the military practices of the world’s only superpower, closer relationships with officers from a wide array of nations, or a diploma to enhance one’s chances of promotion, professional military education meets this criteria more clearly than the field studies program, which generally speaking meets U.S. goals, not participant goals.

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17 Ibid.
Practitioners

The issue of who actually runs our public diplomacy programs and interacts with the audience is only occasionally raised in public diplomacy analysis, though it is often implied in discussions of credibility and mutual relationships. The experienced public diplomacy practitioner William Rugh has written insightfully about the frequent contrast between those who operate in the field, such as embassy staff, versus headquarters personnel. Rugh makes a strong case that practitioners in the field have a more effective, long-term perspective and are thus more effective at public diplomacy.18

But there are other dichotomies that are probably even more relevant to any discussion about practitioners. For example, State information programs are generally run by persons trained in communications or international relations, whereas the field studies program information aspect of military educational exchanges are normally run by generalists who happen to be assigned to an international fellows management job. That was how I ended up managing a field studies program for six months in 1995 when a colleague unexpectedly quit the position. Most of the job required administrative skills, while the persuasion elements of the field studies program were a very small part. Because Congress and the Defense Department drive the field studies program content requirements, this becomes a challenge when program managers do not have the educational background required to fully examine the subjects they are assigned to cover in the sessions. One can use guest speakers to address this gap, but that assumes the right speaker will always be available. All of this makes meeting our information program

18 Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs, 195.
persuasion objectives far more challenging.

The contrast between practitioners in Defense and State is not so pronounced in educational exchanges. In traditional State educational (and cultural) exchanges, there are two different groups doing these two different functions – program managers are separate from the faculty and American students who are interacting with international students in the classroom. That separation also exists in professional military education, with administrators also separate from faculty. In both State and Defense cases, it is this separation of personnel that gives the classroom interactions more distance from any hint of propaganda and thus more credibility. Add to that the expertise of faculty in their subject areas and the credibility is further reinforced.

In his discussion of persuasive communications, McGuire notes that elements such as attractiveness and power of the source also play a factor. Attractiveness in this discussion includes familiarity and similarity, characteristics strongly reflected in the professional military education classroom full of military officers. Power may play less of a role, as the tangible rewards and punishments of academia such as grades are of limited value to most of the students, compared to the less tangible outcome of learning and relationship building.\(^{19}\) In fact, the primary teaching approach in professional military education is seminar discussion, where the faculty member guides discussion and all students are expected to contribute and to learn from each other. This approach is akin to Cowan and Arsenault’s discussion in their ANNALS article on dialogue, where they make a distinction between “technical dialogue” about ideas and information, and

\(^{19}\) McGuire, “Input and Output Variables,” 24.
“true dialogue” of deeper mutuality that can transpire in an environment where “feelings of control and dominance are minimized.”

This clearly ties the professional military education classroom to our objective of building relationships, as given time, the technical dialogue often leads to the true dialogue.

**Words versus Deeds**

While arguably a sub-set of credibility, the words-versus-deeds dichotomy deserves its own line in my framework because of the different ways this duality manifests itself. It plays out differently for State and Defense, as well for information and exchange programs. While there are a plethora of references to this issue on the public diplomacy reference shelf, a few examples will illustrate their tone. First, Andrew Kohut informs us through his in-depth analysis of international opinion polls that most of the increase in Anti-Americanism among the world’s public is based on reactions to our foreign policies as they are enacted, which drive significant skepticism about our motives, even among our traditional allies (despite our public diplomacy efforts). Reflecting what the professional diplomats think, Oglesby writes harshly about the contrast between our words and deeds: “Moreover, the ‘halo of moral sanctity’ that marks America’s self-image as liberator of the world’s oppressed is tarnished by the facts of our actions.”

Finally, Cull asserts that our most potent voice is not what we say but what we do, noting that: “. . . history is full of examples of international actors who found the best public

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diplomacy to be no substitute for a bad policy."\(^{23}\)

In a recent issue of the *Joint Force Quarterly*, Admiral Mullen eloquently stated not only a political truth, but also an axiom of any effective communication: “[W]e need to worry less about how to communicate our actions and more about what our actions communicate. People have a general sensitivity to things inauthentic.”\(^{24}\) The same emphasis on deeds is a major part of the philosophy that underlies the *National Military Strategy* written by Mullen’s staff: “In this multi-nodal world, the military’s contribution to American leadership must be about more than power – it must be about our approach to exercising power. And regardless of our leadership approach, we must always demonstrate our core values through the persuasive power of example.”\(^{25}\) Clearly, America’s military leaders recognize the necessity of keeping words aligned with deeds, but it is harder to parse out whether that awareness go beyond Information Operations and Public Affairs communicators to inform the actions of our soft power engagement programs.

This is where the dichotomy becomes apparent. The field studies program, by its very nature, is about words and not deeds. The public diplomacy literature is emphatic that this approach is bound to elicit limited, short-term effects. On the other hand, professional military education is a way to demonstrate those values at the organizational and individual level. Classroom discussions, exercises and social interactions involve

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both words and deeds, as well as providing the American staff and students amply opportunities to demonstrate our core values. We can present a lecture on diversity in American society, or embed international students in a seminar with a diverse group of Americans and let the interactions speak for themselves. We are doing both right now, but have yet to ask the question as to whether that sort of repetition is reinforcing, redundant, or even worse, undermining our message.

Credibility

Our national image suffers from a credibility problem, which poses significant challenges to our ability to achieve goals through the use of soft power. A typical comment on this issue comes from Zaharna: “What U.S. officials don’t seem to register is that no amount of information pumped out by U.S. public diplomacy will be enough to improve the U.S. image. The problem, ultimately, is not lack of information but lack of credibility . . . Without credibility, no amount of information holds persuasive weight, and U.S. soft power can’t attract and influence.”26

While Zaharna, Nye and other international relations scholars mention credibility in discussions of public diplomacy, it is in communication theory where we find deeper analysis and a definition – credibility “derives from the source’s perceived expertise and trustworthiness.”27 That calls for an examination into whether military educational exchange practitioners and programs trustworthy and expert.

The previous section addressing the public diplomacy concept of practitioners has

already addressed many of the expertise factors for the programs under discussion, but there are others. The issues of practitioners’ education levels, and their experience with the subjects under discussion are generally on sounder footing when applied to professional military education faculty, who are all either holders of terminal degrees, colonels or the equivalent, or sometimes both. Actually, because professional military education relies heavily on seminar discussions, one could argue that both faculty and American students have credibility in the subject matter. Also as previously discussed, expertise on the subject at hand is highly variable at best among field studies program managers. Thus, they often must rely on the sort of secondary knowledge contained in the official field studies program course content guidance documents, or find expert guest speakers.

Second, McGuire describes trustworthiness as: “not standing to profit personally from convincing the audience.”28 In public diplomacy programs, this issue relates to Nicholas Cull’s ideas about the interface between credibility and proximity to government, where he stipulates that for exchange diplomacy, credibility is enhanced by an actor’s perceived distance from government when it implies the exchange is not self-interested.29 While all of military educational exchange is obviously a government program, this proximity to government and the government’s influence goals are much stronger in the field studies program than in the professional military education classroom. Ironically, of course, that means the field studies program is likely to have

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28 Ibid.
less influence. Scott-Smith puts this much more eloquently when he writes: “The more a program functions as if it is non-political in intent, the more it can achieve a political effect.”

Gass and Seiter add a third primary dimension for credibility: goodwill. This involves “. . . convey[ing] respect for others and a genuine interest in their well-being.” That is much easier to accomplish in an interactive seminar over ten months than in a series of lectures, particularly if a different individual presents each lecture.

There are other credibility-related issues in public diplomacy programs. Dizard writes that during the Cold War, the Armed Forces Network, which broadcast news and entertainment to U.S. troops overseas, had more credibility with its secondary audience of foreign listeners because the audience was U.S. troops, and we were unlikely to be lying to our own forces. This illustrates a key difference between field studies program and professional military education programs. The field studies program information program is designed and presented solely to our foreign officer students, whereas what happens in the classroom is designed for the American students, with no effort to alter content for the sake of the foreign students. They are seeing the “real deal.” Thus, just as in State programs, exchange program credibility tends to be consistently high, whereas the credibility of information programs varies across the spectrum from low to high.

Another credibility issue relates to the openness to criticize government, which is often thought to be an approach open to civilian but not to military programs. But State

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30 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 190.
32 Dizard, (Re)Inventing Public Diplomacy, 134.
communicators are also sometimes reluctant to criticize. Nye writes that: “Part of America’s soft power grows out of the openness of its society and polity and the fact that a free press, Congress and courts can criticize and correct policies. When the government instruments avoid such criticism, they not only diminish their own credibility but also fail to capitalize on an important source of attraction for foreign elites.”

While self-criticism might present a challenge in uni-directional messaging types of information programs, it is an issue addressed directly in the professional military education curriculum – it’s discussed in political science, leadership, ethics, and other courses. Questions raised in seminar include: Should we be critical of government policies? Where are the limits on free speech for members of the military? Should retired officers be able to criticize the President and Secretary of Defense in the media, or are we bound to support them even after we return to civilian life? International Fellows are exposed to lots of discussion and lots of criticism of government during seminar discussions.

Nye points out a second credibility issue: the success of public diplomacy requires the ability to craft the narrative before those with an opposing perspective can frame discussion. Our government must be proactive if we want to frame the issues. That means we have two choices: we can get our message out fastest, or we can rely on long-term relationships to provide a “standing frame” of goodwill and understanding as we take a bit of time to get our message right. While the first is less expensive and requires


34 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 54.
less strategic thought, we are not very good at it. These exchange programs are one of our best options for crafting that long-term goodwill for times when we will not be fast enough with our message.

Finally, a recent communication-theory-based study of public diplomacy concluded that we are using an outdated messaging model that assumes the message we are sending is received as we intended. Thus, we fall back on repetition to reinforce that message. But when it’s the wrong message or badly communicated, Corman, Tretheway and Goodall find that “the repetition of a seemingly clear and straightforward message can instead amplify meaning-making problems and damage the sender’s credibility.” In order to avoid that, we need to listen to the audience.

**Listening**

The most basic reason listening is important in public diplomacy is that listening gives us a better understanding of how to reach our foreign audiences, so that we can best convey our values and objectives in a way that will be couched in their own culture and narratives. Rugh, for example, mentions several times that Arab publics have such over-estimations of our abilities that they are often sure that if we do not take a particular action, such as fully restoring power to Iraq, it is because we choose not to, not because we are not able to. An understanding of this cultural narrative would help us to more accurately frame our messages about why we do or don’t do something.

Communication scholars have described this approach as: “asymmetrical dialogue

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which uses two-way communication and interactions to persuade others to a particular point of view for the self-interest of the persuader.” 37 In other words, feedback is used to adjust messages and strategies to make communication more effective in accomplishing specific outcomes. Habermas called this process “strategic action,” which is measured by “the efficiency of influencing the decisions of rational opponents.” 38 In distinguishing strategic action from communicative action, Habermas contended that most organizations engage in strategic action, which is aimed at the achievement of predetermined ends, rather than shared understanding.

This is not the sort of dialogue most scholars are encouraging us to engage in. Even with the White House’s stated intention to listen more in our diplomatic communications, Kristin Lord and Marc Lynch write, the administration’s efforts are “perceived by much of the world as too much lecturing and moralizing rhetoric, focused on message control and influencing target audiences, and too little consultation, listening and dialogue.” 39 The student audience could easily perceive the field studies program sessions as too much lecturing, particularly when they are aware of the goal of “sharing” our values.

There is a proven better approach. Cowan and Arsenault note a lack of “ . . . experimentation research on the impact of dialogue in relation to public diplomacy,” [yet]


a century of communication research demonstrates that the need to be heard represents an almost universal human characteristic.” In both State and Defense exchanges, classroom dialogue answers this need. Cull believes so strongly that listening is the foundation for all successful public diplomacy that he makes it a separate element of public diplomacy, in the same sense as advocacy, broadcasting, cultural and exchange forms of diplomacy. Despite its seeming importance, he sees little of whatever listening is done actually being fed back into State or higher levels of policy shaping. In order to accomplish that, most public diplomacy experts recommend a more networked approach to communication. For example, Riordan encourages dialogue, while raising collaboration as a goal, when he writes that we can collaborate without abandoning our values: “The aim remains to convince other publics of these values. But the effort to convince is set in a context of listening. Just as no individual will long suffer, or be convinced by, an interlocutor who endlessly asserts his views while never listening to those of others, so other governments and societies will not engage in collaboration if they feel that their ideas and values are not taken seriously.” Cowan and Arsenault echo this analysis when they recommend moving from dialogue to collaboration if we want to be truly effective. Again, that is much more likely to happen in a seminar room than a lecture hall.

**Mutual Relationships**

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40 Cowan and Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration,” 19.


In his discussion of exchange diplomacy, Cull points to reciprocity as the foundation for mutuality, where both parties benefit. But he notes that exchanges “... are also used for specific policy and/or advocacy purposes as when targeted for development or to promote military interoperability with an ally.”\(^{43}\) While interoperability is one of our goals, it is not the only one. Building mutual relationships is an equally important goal. But in order to do that, our military educational exchange programs must be sufficiently reciprocal to achieve the desired level of mutuality. They are not mutual in terms of numbers. After gathering data on fifty years’ worth of military exchangees, Gibler and Ruby conclude that U.S. professional military education is in high demand, and represents “the top level of professional education worldwide.”\(^{44}\) We are hosting more foreign officers than any other nation, yet we send few overseas in return. So if we are to achieve the objective of mutuality, we must find other ways to build it into our programs.

Scholars are in broad agreement that for a mutual relationship to occur, there must be the opportunity for speaking and listening, and for both sides to change somewhat based on their dialogue. Cull notes again that: “Individuals would not long tolerate interaction with someone who entered an interaction convinced that they had nothing to learn and closed to any possibility that they might themselves be changed by the encounter.”\(^{45}\) Thus, even when the information-based field studies program allows for question and answer sessions, or debates, it’s apparent to all participants that the


\(^{45}\) Cull, \textit{The Cold War and USIA}, 503-4.
American program practitioners are not open to changing their minds. The objective is to expose the foreign officers to our values, after all, which is hardly reciprocal or mutual.

Even in professional military education seminars, reciprocity is limited by many factors, some unavoidable. Many international fellows are the sole non-American in a room of fifteen to twenty people, and are often hesitant to engage in too strong a debate. Despite the requirement for visitors to be fluent in English, there are also highly varied language skills among each year’s group of foreign officers. Some are not computer-literate. Some come from cultures where debate is frowned upon as impolite. Most of the programs are focused on teaching about the U.S. way to do things, not the range of possible alternatives, so they often lack the opportunity to make comments about their approach or perspective unless specifically asked.

There are also ways in which we ourselves undermine the collaborative potential of the professional military education curriculum. It is hard to have a team when these foreign officers are continuously removed from the classroom for field studies program activities, for security classification concerns, or are given peripheral roles in war games and other exercises because they lack experience in the U.S. planning process or other requirements. While I have witnessed these challenges myself, they are also among the findings of a 2003 study conducted for the Army by Charles Moskos, a senior military sociologist at Northwestern University. His study findings, based on in-depth interviews with twenty percent of all foreign officers in professional military education that year, specifically note that while international officers (IOs) were generally positive about
military educational exchange programs, they:

- Critiqued a “too American-centric” curriculum
- Viewed seminars as more informative than lectures
- Complained strongly about classes being closed to them due to classification of content
- Wanted to be treated as full participants in class exercises, and sometimes were not

Moskos also noted that most foreign officers developed the strongest friendships among themselves, and not with their American counterparts. He attributed this to the long orientation period when they are the only students at the school, language issues, and the shared experience of being in a new country. This separation is exacerbated by the continual removal of international fellows from the classroom for separate field studies program activities.

In summary, while professional military education can be shown to be more mutual than field studies program information programs, they both have substantial room for improvement. This is particularly significant for the overall program because mutuality is not just a theoretical public diplomacy concept; it is one of the goals of military educational exchanges.

Values

The international military education and training program exposes students to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including amongst other things, U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights and belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which our military functions under civilian

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47 Ibid.
One of the most repeated discussions in public diplomacy literature is the question of the proper role of American values in our public diplomacy programs. The National Strategy for public diplomacy begins with a statement about our “fundamental” and “universal” values, which it lists as freedom, human rights, the dignity and equality of every human being, and democracy.\textsuperscript{49} Perhaps a bit less loftily, Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center identifies democracy and capitalism as “the twin pillars of the American way of life.”\textsuperscript{50}

The embedding of values messages in public diplomacy was central to our Cold War strategy. Szondi, writing about public diplomacy in central and eastern Europe, notes a significant change since then, one which requires some adjustment in our approach: the Cold War’s message context was ideology and interests, whereas today’s context is ideas and values.\textsuperscript{51} He concludes that ideas and values are more conducive to dialogue, because ideas and values are more likely to be “in common” and mutual, or at least mutually understandable, than ideologies. While one can appreciate Szondi’s optimism, and perhaps this is true when considering the U.S. and Europe, the real

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{48} U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency international military education and training website, \url{http://www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm} (accessed 6aug10).}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{49} U. S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, \textit{U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic}, 2.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{50} Kohut, \textit{America Against the World}, 121.}

\end{footnotes}
question is whether we can change values when they are not in common. Ideology is considered a scheme of ideas, whereas values are moral principles likely to be more deep-seated parts of someone’s identity. Yet a review of the various guidance documents for these programs would seem to at least imply a goal of values changes. This is another remnant of the Cold War approach, where persuasion took precedence over relationships in our public diplomacy.

There are also societal values issues driving our choice of communication approaches in public diplomacy programs. Zaharna’s exploration of communication frameworks touched on several of these values issues embedded in different cultures. For example, Western societies tend to place so much emphasis on individualism and the autonomy of individuals that they fail to comprehend the social, collective nature of communication in as much as 70% of the world. Thus, we tend to transmit information to control a situation, while others might use communication as a ritual to acknowledge shared beliefs. This dichotomy closely parallels the distinctions between information and exchange programs.

Zaharna also cites intercultural communication studies on the distinction between “low-context” and “high-context” approaches to communication. While low-context cultures focus nearly exclusively on the cognitive content of a message, high-context ones pay much more attention to issues of physical surroundings, body language, and

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52 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “ideology” is “A systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct.” and “values” are “The principles or moral standards held by a person or social group; the generally accepted or personally held judgment of what is valuable and important in life.”

who the messenger is.\textsuperscript{54} Certainly the Western approach is strongly low-context, as
exemplified in this quote from a retired public diplomacy practitioner and scholar:
“Public diplomacy professionals . . . know that it is the message, and not the messenger,
that is the key.”\textsuperscript{55} It takes a longer-term exchange program to help level the
communication playing field and enable relationship building in an environment where
both low- and high-context approaches can be used.

Of course, values are not only relevant because of the way they shape how we
communicate. Just like State public diplomacy programs, the hosting of foreign officers
in American war colleges is intended to expose them to content about American values.
These include the afore-mentioned values of capitalism, democracy, and education;
cultural values such as informality, directness, ethnocentrism, assurance;\textsuperscript{56} and other
liberal Western ideas such as rule of law. Additionally, military educational exchanges
address more military-specific values – duty, loyalty, subordination to civil authority,
responsibility, and our professional codes of ethics.

When considering the difference between information and exchange programs in the
public diplomacy framework, the distinction is often drawn between explicit and implicit
values messages. The Field studies program, like most information programs, is an
explicit approach to broadcasting our values. In professional military education, like
most exchanges, the focus on education and the longer duration provide an implicit

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{55} William P. Kiehl, “The Case for Localized Public Diplomacy,” in \textit{Routledge Handbook of Public
\item \textsuperscript{56} Stiehm, \textit{The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy}, 51.
\end{itemize}
exposure to values. But unlike many civilian academic programs, these classroom sessions also involve explicit discussions of values. Classes on military ethics, on the law of war, and on the relationship between military and civil leadership, are just some instances that require direct discussion of values, in addition to the myriad ways that values are implied by actions and discussions. For example, we can have a lecture in the field studies program about the role of diversity in America, or we can spend time in a relatively diverse group of military students (where diversity might be less expected) and absorb the idea implicitly.

A second example ties us back to the dialogue and mutuality discussion. Since participatory communication is part of democracy, it is also a fundamental American value. That value is much more credibly demonstrated than lectured about.

**Centralized versus Networked Approaches**

Most structural discussions of public diplomacy eventually must tackle the issue of how to organize for effective communications. Dizard’s discussion of the bureaucratic struggles for control of the U.S. message after 9/11, which involved various new entities created and dropped within the White House, State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and many others, is just one good example among many of the tension between centralized and decentralized (or networked) approaches.\(^{57}\) Tellingly, these tensions are most evident in efforts to organize for information programs, as opposed to exchange programs. Though perhaps that is because information seems to garner much more attention in general.

Despite our inability to heed them, there is basic consensus among scholars and former practitioners on the need to avoid heavy centralization and control of public diplomacy programs, even the information-focused ones. For example, Kiehl argues that local management is more credible, due to the deeper understanding of the audience developed by those who live among them while on embassy duty. Thus, he argues, reduced control is often, though not always, more effective.\(^{58}\) In “Mapping public diplomacy Networks,” Fisher takes a more structural approach, using computer modeling to examine the actual flow of communication. He also finds that there are strong contrasts between the effectiveness of centralized versus (genuinely) non-centralized communication networks, and that centralization implies lack of trust in network members.\(^{59}\) So again, this research points to the need for less central control in order to develop the dialogic and trusting communication needed for building relationships.

Certainly the world has changed dramatically since the Cold War, and many of these new challenges are global and based on multiple, systemic causes. Currently we face combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, climate change, international piracy, epidemics, and cyber security, while also trying to achieve balanced growth and the spread of human rights.\(^{60}\) Cull notes that none of these major changes in the international environment are: “as challenging as the reorientation of public diplomacy away from the top-down communication patterns of the Cold War era


\(^{60}\) The White House, National Security Strategy 2010, 42.
to an even greater emphasis on people-to-people contact . . . human relationships remain paramount.”\textsuperscript{61}

Finally, UK scholar Brian Hocking notes both domestic and international drawbacks to centralized control of public diplomacy. On the domestic side, “overcentralisation” can limit staff creativity and strategy development, and on the foreign side it will tend to create the perception that a government lacks true commitment to policy dialogue.\textsuperscript{62}

The best option for how a government should organize to deal with such a range of challenges is to borrow from business and organizational studies that stipulate it takes a network to best respond to a network. In keeping with that idea, Riordan in \textit{The New Public Diplomacy} offers the suggestion that rather than continue to be hierarchical and reactionary to the new global environment, governments should learn to form their own networks and collaborate with other governments, non-state actors, and the private sector.\textsuperscript{63} We do not even need to start from scratch, since it was the United States who led the development of a number of international organizations after World War II, we could build on this base. Collaboration within the U.S. government and with the private sector is also necessary. Paralleling the organizational literature, communication scholars also recommend that we abandon the old centralized message influence model, de-emphasize control and embrace complexity.\textsuperscript{64}


\textsuperscript{64} Corman, Trethewey and Goodall, \textit{New Model for Strategic Communication}, 12.
What this means for our field studies program and professional military education programs is that, like most information programs, field studies program\(^6\) is centrally controlled messaging. That is a stark contrast to the interaction possible in the professional military education classroom over the course of ten months of education, where student networks are common and encouraged via small group assignments, sports and social activities, and the mixing of students into multiple seminar groups over the course of the year. So organizational theory leads to the conclusion that professional military education is more credible, as well as offering the possibility of providing the basis for a long-term network that might help address global challenges.

**Domestic Policy Context**

Public diplomacy theory breaks this category into two ends of a spectrum, with (current) heavy policy focus at one end and “broad context” with little reference to American domestic policy at the other. The heavy policy focus is found in most information programs as they strive to respond to current events and counter other narratives and disinformation. This is not the case for military educational exchange information programs, as they are normally much broader in focus. Nor is it the case for the professional military education curriculum, though in this case domestic policy’s impact on foreign policy and the military is often covered (broadly) in classroom discussions.

Meanwhile, the “flip” side – the international fellows’ own domestic context - is

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\(^6\) United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors, Department of Defense Instruction 5410.17 (Washington, DC, September 15, 2006). For the full guidance, see Appendix I.
often overlooked. This factor is actually quite significant to the effectiveness of the military educational exchange. Scott-Smith tells us that: “the behavioralist studies conducted during the 1950s admitted that the sociopolitical context (or, better, “habitus”) to which the grantees returned after their exchange experience was a crucial determining factor for whether the experience could produce any significant results.”66

In relating this to professional military education, knowing whether the military “habitus” is more amenable to those who return with new ideas when they are related to their profession would be useful. While no research has been done to study this particular question, Gibler and Ruby’s work on the relationship between foreign officer professional military education attendance and military coups does make a good argument that U.S. professional military education-derived ideas are indeed spread throughout foreign militaries. They note that many participants in American military educational exchanges go home and become involved in both high-level staff work and, more significantly, creation of their own national professional military education institutions, built on the U.S. model.67

Effects: Attitudes or Behaviors?

The final public diplomacy concept in this framework is that of effects. In a traditional information milieu, the primary, and often the only possible, effect is to change the attitudes of the audience about an action or policy or our nation as a whole. These attitude changes can be ephemeral, and tracing ties from attitude changes to

67 Countries specifically mentioned in this article as creating or revising their PME programs to reflect their U.S. PME experiences include Argentina, Greece, Taiwan, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Gibler and Ruby, “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad,” 17-18.
behavioral ones are nebulous at best. This is one of public diplomacy’s most needed research areas. Meanwhile, only in exchanges, with their long-term and mutual communication, can we hope to achieve mutual understanding, which has the greater potential to leverage behavioral changes. There is no evidence to show that military educational exchanges are any different from State programs in this regard. Effects and outcomes will be explored more fully in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

Having analyzed all of these aspects of public diplomacy, and having broken out their implications for both the information and educational elements of military educational exchange programs, it would be useful to craft a table to summarize these key elements and show their parallels to the three dimensions of the State programs. The results are easier to compare and contrast both for each concept and within each approach when viewed in Table 7, below. While abbreviating issues to fit into a table risks oversimplification, it is useful for providing a “big picture” of any trends and patterns that might emerge. It is clear that while there are some distinctions between the characteristics of military programs when compared to their diplomatic counterparts, there are many similarities. In other words, the field studies program does indeed function much like an information program, while professional military education parallels other educational exchanges.

Given these parallels between State and Defense programs, it seems useful to analyze the effects of these programs in a way that parallels State programs. Effectiveness assessments of these parallel State programs can provide us insight into
what types of programs are likely to achieve military educational exchange’s seven objectives. The next chapter delves into State program assessment, as well as other approaches to measuring public diplomacy effectiveness.
Table 6. Public Diplomacy Concepts as Variables Applied to Defense Professional Military Educational Exchanges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PD Type: PD Function/Element</th>
<th>Information Program</th>
<th>Educational Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong></td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – series of short</td>
<td>PME – long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audience Size</strong></td>
<td>Mass/Broad</td>
<td>Specific/Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – tiny/targeted</td>
<td>PME – tiny/targeted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audience Influence</strong></td>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Influential elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – Elites</td>
<td>PME – Mil elites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audience Bias</strong></td>
<td>Unknown to skeptical</td>
<td>Open-minded?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – diverse cultural</td>
<td>PME – shared military experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>backgrounds but common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practitioners</strong></td>
<td>Communicators</td>
<td>Lecturers/Researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP - Staff</td>
<td>PME – Subject Experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(students also practitioners)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Words vs. Deeds</strong></td>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Mostly deeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP - Words</td>
<td>PME – words+ deeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credibility</strong></td>
<td>Variable – low to high</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – variable</td>
<td>PME – US + Foreign Mil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Listening</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – No</td>
<td>PME – Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual Relationships</strong></td>
<td>Shallow, 1-way</td>
<td>Deep is possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – variable, 1-way</td>
<td>PME – Deep is possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values approach</strong></td>
<td>Explicit – Human Rights, Democracy, Bill of Rights</td>
<td>Implicit, sometimes Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP - Explicit</td>
<td>PME – implicit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 types – US + military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralized vs. Network</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – High/Defense</td>
<td>PME - Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Policy Context</strong></td>
<td>Policy focus</td>
<td>Broad Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – Policy + Context</td>
<td>PME – Policy + Context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effects</strong></td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td>Mutual Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP – awareness/change in values</td>
<td>PME – Mutual Understanding, Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CHAPTER 6

USING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOOLS TO MEASURE MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE’S ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed not dollars spent.\(^1\)

-- Joseph Nye

While efforts to analyze the effectiveness of Defense and State soft power programs are in their infancy, there are major impulsions to address effectiveness: requirements from resource distributors, the desire to determine which programs have impacts and what those impacts are, and recent advances in social science analytic capabilities which make such an effort feasible. This thesis will wrap up with an analysis of current measurement efforts and methodologies within the U.S. government as well as efforts in academia and overseas. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that military educational exchange programs include many of the same elements and objectives as comparable civil ones, particularly the Fulbright and Hubert H. Humphrey exchange programs. Through their parallel approaches, the Defense programs achieve some of those same broad national objectives in ways that no other element of the U.S. government is able to.

But they can also be improved upon, by identifying and focusing on those approaches showing promise of establishing a correlation between program activities and outcomes, and any that go the extra step to identify causal links via application of tailored, multidisciplinary social science research. The combination of effectiveness

\(^1\) Nye, “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy,” 122.
measurement and public diplomacy theory points to several suggestions for the way ahead for Military Educational Exchanges. Primary among those are the separation of information and education programs (which State practitioners emphasize as important) and the potential increase in our ability to meet soft power goals through expansion of dialogic approaches into collaborative ones. As for the way ahead for assessments of military educational exchanges, and perhaps other exchange programs, this thesis identifies several of the most effective approaches to date, as well as additional approaches and resources that could greatly enhance our evaluations and therefore our effectiveness.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) ANALYSIS**

Scholarly efforts to measure effects of educational exchange programs go back as far as the programs themselves, based on the evidence in such journal articles as the 1955 “Evaluation of Exchange of Persons,”2 and the similarly-titled “Evaluating Exchange of Persons Programs.”3 The UNESCO study conclusions that are relevant today include: the need to avoid being “propagandistic;” the criticality of meeting visitors’ objectives (not just our own); and that evaluations of effects on attendees are easier than measuring how they impact their home societies.4 Wilson and Bonilla’s work for State led them to conclude that it is fairly easy to link material progress overseas to U.S. training programs, but a real challenge to identify why some influence-oriented programs are successful and

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others are not, and what the exact processes are that do bring about attitude changes. The evaluation community is still struggling to respond to these challenges.

Of course what makes public diplomacy program evaluation challenging is that even if an audience member does have shifts in attitudes, it might be due to other efforts or events. And what makes educational exchange assessment so challenging is that education is about teaching people to think in new ways, and its impact is therefore much more difficult to measure than simply administering a multiple-choice survey instrument. We can certainly identify at least the correlation of attendance at an exchange program with changes in attitudes or behaviors, as well as broader shifts in the attitudes or behaviors of groups. Yet review of the public diplomacy literature has arguably produced little causation-linked “proof” of effectiveness, in a way that garners the support of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), or various think tanks or scholars.

**Identifying Measures of Effectiveness**

The field of program assessment has its own terminology and range of possible approaches, including the sub-category of government programs. This reflects the diversity in items that should be analyzed for a thorough understanding of all aspects of a program. There are generally four categories of items to measure: inputs, throughputs (processes), outputs, and outcomes. While the first three are all associated with what the

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organization brings to the task, and studies of them will often provide greater efficiency, only through study of the fourth element can we improve our understanding of the effectiveness of the project. Put another way, outcome measurement is performance measurement.

It is common to mistake outputs for outcomes. A classic public diplomacy example, the number of people who hear or tune-in to a broadcast, is an output, not an outcome. When applying this approach to influence-and-education-focused public diplomacy efforts, we must be careful to consider not only outputs of soft power programs (such as number of students graduating from a program) but also outcomes (changes in attitudes and behaviors), the most important but also most difficult step in measuring effectiveness.

The Government Accountability Office has developed a structured approach to help program administrators focus on outcomes, and the model they favor is based on one from the University of Wisconsin’s Cooperative Extension Logic Model.\(^7\) In a 2002 study, the Government Accountability Office modified this model to address communication campaign evaluation issues for a number of federal government agencies, though not specifically State. In fact, this highly relevant model was proposed for domestic campaigns, such as a “National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign Evaluation,”\(^8\) with no mention of other possible uses in the initial study. This logic

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\(^8\) Ibid., 23. This example was sourced and adapted from Robert Hornik et al, *Evaluation of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Historical Trends in Drug Use and Design of the Phase III*
model is the classic “input, throughput, output and outcome” model, with “throughput” now called “activities,” and the addition of a bottom block acknowledging “external factors” such as demographics, family and peer influences, etc. The other alteration of the model is the sub-division of “outcomes” into three different time frames, something particularly relevant for exchange programs with their long-term focus. This model should be examined for other points of relevance.

Another frequent rationale for lack of assessment is lack of funding. Communicators consider it the norm to do measures of effectiveness analysis for all campaigns, and setting aside between four and seven percent of the total budget is part of that approach, as well as using whatever data has been gathered for other requirements. This feedback loop provides information on both effectiveness and efficiency in order to improve both during the next cycle. Without this aspect of strategic planning, there is no strategy. But this approach hasn’t carried over to public diplomacy programs in State or Defense.

**State Department Program Evaluations**

State does have a history of doing evaluation work, despite the many criticisms from the Government Accountability Office and think tanks in the 1990s and 2000s that they lacked any true evaluation process. Perhaps many of the critics are referring to State’s much larger and more advertised information programs, and not exchanges. Certainly

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*Evaluation*, prepared for the National Institute on Drug Abuse (Rockville, MD: Westat, July 2000). It was designed to support the Office for National Drug Control Policy’s goals.

information has garnered most of the attention, being criticized in everything from RAND dissertations: “Nor do these metrics consider the role of local opinion leaders, or the link between opinion metrics and ultimate foreign policy objectives (whether broad or specific) of the U.S. government,”\textsuperscript{10} to the Government Accountability Office in 2009: “However, U.S. agencies have not fully demonstrated the effect of their strategic communication efforts on the national communication goals, such as countering ideological support for violent extremism..”\textsuperscript{11} Because military educational exchanges include both information and exchange elements, ideally both information and exchange assessments should inform this analysis.

In his July, 2010 remarks to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Mr. Duncan MacInnes, the representative of the Bureau of International Information Programs, acknowledged the greater difficulty of measuring impacts of information work. He made the point that while exchanges have specific and limited numbers of people who come to the U.S., information programs have a global audience of nearly seven billion, which makes it necessary for their staff to do the huge work of identifying who their audiences are before they can assess impacts. The Bureau does not have the same funding levels (because information programs are much less expensive per audience member) for evaluations as the office of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA - the office in charge of exchanges). So the Evaluation Measurement Unit of the Undersecretary of Policy, Planning and Resources (PPR or “Ripper,”) has worked with

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{10} Michael Egner, \textit{Between Slogans and Solutions: A Frame-Based Assessment for Public Diplomacy}, RAND, RGSD255 (Santa Monica: PARDEE RAND Graduate School, December, 2009), 5. \\
\end{flushright}
them to develop a more elemental three-part set of information program metrics with categories of: reach, engagement and credibility.\textsuperscript{12}

The Office of Management and Budget assessment of State evaluation programs in 2006 was one of the few works to acknowledge the separation between information and exchange programs, awarding Education and Cultural Affairs their highest rating of “effective,” while noting that informational programs were “not effective” in terms of measuring their impact.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{A Short Look at Social Science Analysis Efforts in Public Diplomacy}

Wilson and Bonilla noted in 1955 that their company, International Research Associates, had carried out a number of evaluation studies of Department of State exchange programs “in different countries, among students, specialists, and groups of civic and opinion leaders from abroad.”\textsuperscript{14} While intent upon applying the most modern social science techniques in their work, they also acknowledged that there was “substantial evidence of the successes achieved by exchange programs . . . even before scientific methods were applied.”\textsuperscript{15} Certainly they address the same issues we wrestle with today, particularly the challenge of defining objectives (learning, opinion change and attitude formation).\textsuperscript{16} They actually point to two “fundamental questions” for


\textsuperscript{13} Johnson, “How Does Public Diplomacy Measure Up?,” 46.

\textsuperscript{14} Wilson and Bonilla, “Evaluating Exchange of Persons Programs,” 20.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 22.
evaluation of any exchange program, questions which sound familiar over 55 years later:
“(1) Has the exchange experience succeeded in implanting, broadening or reinforcing the skills, information, or attitudes which the program is designed to promote among exchangees? (2) Are returned exchangees effective in influencing people and events in their home countries in accordance with the objectives of the exchange program?”

Much of the focus of these 1955 articles is the design of social science studies - the how, not the what. These historical discussions of exchange evaluation approaches, with their focus on foundational social science and causality, contain a number of insights about determining key effectiveness measures:

• Having a solid grasp of objectives is critical. Smith puts it best:

  “Compromise is least admissible in regard to the specification of programme objectives and sub-goals, and the close scrutiny of operations in terms of these objectives. Much useful evaluation, in fact, is essentially limited to these two steps. While such staff studies have little in common with more ambitious research, they may point immediately to such clearly indicated needs for improvement that more expensive approaches would be hard to justify.”

• Furthermore, if you have more than one objective, be sure to identify the top priority and then subordinate goals.

• Have a control group. This is a basic from 1950s social science work that many current efforts seem to have missed. This team did not just do before-and-after of exchangees, they also identified a group of similar individuals who would not participate in the exchange (due to lack of ability to travel, applicants who did not make the cut off, etc), and did the same before-and-after surveys.

• Find a way to measure attitudes of associates. Both Wilson and Smith point out that this part of their work showed the importance of having more than one exchangee from a social group, in order to make any significant attitude impacts.

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18 Ibid., 389.
• Have a baseline for comparison; otherwise you are driven to focus on outputs rather than a true analysis of outcome effectiveness. In most cases this involves attitude surveys of the program participants before they leave their home country.20 Having a baseline is a recommended approach in communication campaign planning, which ideally employs “preproduction research” and pretesting during the program design phase.21

• While not ideal, even evaluations without a baseline can “... be quite helpful in pointing to the relatively more successful and less successful segments of a programme, or in indicating the categories of exchangees that present more serious problems to the administrator.”22 The challenge for assessing military educational exchanges is that the programs have been on-going for years, and evaluation is taking place after the program has been designed and implemented. So we cannot follow the ideal design plan. Instead we need to take an iterative approach to identifying key variables and theories to show cause-and-effect, and then use the results to refine the program form and content.

In addition to the Office of Management and Budget’s assessment in 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also spent much time and effort producing studies of State evaluation work. While there was resistance to this early on, the organizational culture changes required to truly embrace a measurement mentality are taking hold. The Government Accountability Office has written at least twenty-six reports on public diplomacy since their 2002 exploration of domestic communication campaigns,23 some critiquing State work and some providing suggested approaches to measures of effectiveness work in a more cooperative way. State has embraced the Government Accountability Office's recommendations, and has created a working partnership with GAO [the Government Accountability Office] consulting on the

20 Ibid., 26-7.


assessment efforts.” The most relevant reports in chronological order include:

September 2003 – General Accounting Office [former organization name] report 03-951 “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges” begins to compare public diplomacy to Public Relations (PR) models and suggesting the use of PR strategies. The General Accounting Office suggests development of a comprehensive strategy for public diplomacy, including an emphasis on measuring outcomes, not merely outputs. The report provides an example of a Public Relations strategy, as well as reference to the 2002 report’s “University of Wisconsin” logic model.

May 2006 – Government Accountability Office report 06-535 “U.S. Public diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges” – In this report the Government Accountability Office refers to the impending implementation of their proposed logic model for public diplomacy applications, which had been adopted by State in 2005 but was not yet in use by field staff. The depiction of that logic model now shows the addition of a fifth category of “impact.”

July 2007 – Government Accountability Office report 07-904 – “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research.” Acknowledges that State is changing, and adopting the campaign model approach. So in

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this report the Government Accountability Office takes the next step, recommending more targeted social science research as well as more sharing of data and research throughout the government, from State and USAID to Defense and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

After these guidance documents, there have been at least two performance audits. Government Accountability Office 09-0679SP “Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight” notes the shortcomings of the Karen Hughes NSPDSC, as well as lack of supporting plans and insufficient interagency coordination. The goal of this audit is to encourage the new Administration to adhere to the Government Accountability Office suggestions in their own national communication strategy. Then in July 2010 – the Government Accountability Office published their audit (10-767) titled: “Engaging Foreign Audiences: Assessment of Public Diplomacy Platforms Could Help Improve State Department Plans to Expand Engagement,” which really only applies to information programs.

The Congressional Research Service has also produced at least five public diplomacy studies in the same period. However, these reports have been less focused on guiding State through development of an organizational culture change, and are referred to elsewhere when relevant.

As a result of this guidance, State states that: “program evaluations in the Evaluation Division now:

- Consist of outcome evaluations
- Are retrospective and encompass cross-cutting themes
• Incorporate case studies to highlight findings
• Provide data for program planning and goal setting”

Rick Ruth of the Education and Cultural Affairs provided a more personal “insider’s perspective” on the state of their evaluation efforts to an Advisory Commission in 2010:

There have always been, of course, reports back from our ambassadors, from our missions in the field. Whenever ECA gives a grant to any organization to conduct an exchange, the language of that grant requires that they undertake various kinds of surveying and measurement of the impact of the program. [but they were mostly qualitative] . . . The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs bit the bullet about 10 or so years ago now, and created the State Department's first full-time office of evaluation staffed by professional evaluators, which I am not, by the way. This has paid enormous dividends for the bureau, because in congress, OMB, the senior leadership of the State Department and elsewhere, there has been a steady recognition that ECA has adopted the culture of measurement, that we have committed ourselves to steady, constant performance measurement of the impact of our exchanges, and this has been recognized.

The Education and Cultural Affairs bureau has over fifty separate exchange programs to monitor, some for Americans, some for foreigners, each with a unique set of requirements and often its own organization (such as the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board) and even information technology systems. The two with the closest parallels to military educational exchanges are the Fulbright program, specifically their foreign scholar and student exchanges, and the Hubert Humphrey program, which is

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exclusively for foreign mid-career professionals. An overview of evaluation efforts for these two programs should provide the most relevant and useful approaches for evaluating military educational exchanges.

**Fulbright Program**

There is at least one discoverable “historic” survey, an evaluation of sorts, of the Fulbright Scholarship program. This effort took place in 1979. It’s quite telling that this survey was not created by the State Department, nor the Board of Foreign Scholarships, but was carried out under the purview of the newly organized Alumni Association, which had its first conference in 1976 and was still in the throes of tracking down many alumni, both U.S. and foreign, in the late 1970s. The rationale and funding for this study were more reflective of the complex mosaic of public-private support that has always characterized the Fulbrights. The survey’s goals were to “study their perceptions of the professional and personal value of Fulbright awards and to present the findings anonymously to the President’s Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies.”

But there was more to it than that, as the available background report makes clear. A familiar-sounding further motivation: “for over a decade the Fulbright Program has suffered from declining financial support by the federal government, close to 60 percent in constant dollars, and has therefore shrunk in its scope and impact . . . It was thought that such a survey might help to strengthen the case for more support . . .”

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30 Barbara Burn, “Background on the Fulbright Grantee Survey Conducted by the Fulbright Alumni Association,” in *President’s Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies: Background Papers and Studies*, November, 1979, 221.
The Alumni Association deemed the survey a great success, because it “achieved a 69 percent response rate.” That of course only measures the success of the surveyors, not the effectiveness of the Fulbright awards in achieving the program goals. It also relied entirely on self-reporting by volunteer respondents, presumably members of the Alumni Association who were likely to be more positive about their experiences already.

The next Fulbright assessment surveys (plus focus groups) were carried out in 2001-2004, a few years before the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Management and Budget called for more effectiveness studies of public diplomacy programs. There were actually four surveys covering all major Fulbright categories: American students and scholars going overseas, and foreign students and scholars visiting the U.S. In contrast to the secretiveness of the 1979 surveyors, the executive summaries of all pieces of the survey are available on the State Department’s website. When I contacted the evaluation office that “owns” the surveys, they were thrilled to share copies of the full survey results. This is partly a legal issue – the current survey was carried out for the State Department by a contractor (SRI), and is therefore public property. So there is a stark contrast in the approach to the two surveys – in this case the government organization responsible for oversight and funding of the program initiated and paid for the survey.

The statement of goals is similar to the 1979 survey, though, and shares the earlier study’s dual purpose of analyzing the impact on individual fellows and on international relations: “The objective of the Outcome Assessment Survey of the U.S. Fulbright

Programs is to document the contribution of the “Fulbright experience” to the professional and personal lives of Program alumni and to demonstrate – in quantitative and qualitative terms – the Programs’ effectiveness in achieving its legislative goal of fostering mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”

This more current study assessed satisfaction and learning, but also effects on behavior and post-program networking, the latter two areas somewhat more focused on that second, larger objective, possibly due to the policy-oriented nature of the sponsors.

The consensus is firm among surveyed American and Visiting Fulbrighters that their personal horizons were expanded, and that they did influence their hosts. For example, in a sample of nearly half of all student grantees from 14 countries who came to the U.S. between 1980 and 2000, with a 70% response rate, over 80% reported gaining new insights into America and engendering increased interest in their home countries on the part of their American contacts. Furthermore, “almost 95% said it gave them greater insight into their professional fields,” with over 60% participating in some form of international activity since their Fulbright experience.

It is much more difficult to measure whether this personal-level influence impacts international relations. Part of solving the puzzle would have to include addressing the

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33 Ibid. 2.

34 Ibid., 4-5.
dilemma of whether normally objective academicians lose their perspective when analyzing their own experiences and perhaps naturally exaggerate their influence on those with whom they come in contact.

Overall, this becomes a good example of measuring outputs and processes, but not necessarily providing a strong focus on outcomes or much objectivity. The Government Accountability Office noted after reviewing these programs in 2006 that there was some effort made to evaluate educational programs, but questions the use of participant evaluations as the sole measure of success. “While it is useful to know that participants’ experiences were favorable, this information does not demonstrate progress toward the more fundamental objective of achieving changes in understanding and attitudes about the United States.”

**Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program**

The closest State program to military educational exchanges is the Humphrey Program, in which mid-level professionals in primarily civil-society fields such as city management and health care, come to spend an academic year in the U.S. The program’s goals as spelled out in the 2010 Guidelines document are also similar to military educational exchanges, particularly with regard to relationship-building, exposure to American values and ideas, and the concomitant learning by their American classmates:

- Establish and enhance long-lasting productive partnerships and relationships between U.S. citizens and individuals from other parts of the world

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• Develop leaders whose knowledge and skills have been informed by exposure to American values, models and ideas – leaders who will have a multiplier effect on their societies

• Expand and improve the range of international exchange and training programs

• Increase U.S. citizens’ knowledge and understanding of international issues and of other cultures and societies.

There is a “Humphrey Seminar” requirement for all fellows, which is intended to provide orientation to American culture, as well as networking opportunities with the other Humphrey fellows at the individual’s university (normally seven to fifteen per host school). This is the closest thing in State exchanges to the field studies program in the military exchanges. Yet the agenda of these seminars does not include any advocacy-type presentations on human rights, democracy, or “American values.” It is truly an information program designed to aid the fellows in fitting into the new culture they find themselves in. All other exposure to values takes place in dialogues in the classroom and in “real life.”

Due to the large number of State exchanges and the extensive nature of their normally eighteen-month studies, most exchange programs are evaluated about once per decade. The previous, most recently completed Humphrey survey was reported out in January of 2000. The Humphrey exchangees were even more positive about their learning regarding American practices, culture, and government than Fulbrighters. And they were also even more likely than Fulbright student visitors to report maintaining

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37 Program Guidelines for Humphrey Fellows, 2010-2011, 33.
friendships (93%) and networking/professional development (67%).\textsuperscript{39} One relevant inference is that program participants, who share a profession are more likely to stay connected – a good sign for military exchanges. But just as in the Fulbright surveys, this one based the assessment on self-reporting surveys of program alumni, so it is not fully definitive.

The Humphrey program is currently undergoing a newly detailed “groundbreaking, sectoral approach” evaluation from The Evaluation Division, working with Social Solutions International (SSi), whose purpose is: ”. . . to examine the effectiveness of the Humphrey Program in fostering change or institutional and organizational capacity building in three critical fields: environment, law and human rights, and public health. The evaluation will endeavor to collect information from fellows from all years, stretching back to the late 1970s, thus offering in-depth analysis of how the Humphrey Program is a catalyst for change.”\textsuperscript{40} Whether they achieve groundbreaking analytical outcomes or not won’t be known until 2012.

Overall, despite the definite evolution of measure of effectiveness frameworks and approaches in the past decade, these Fulbright and Humphrey program survey approaches are not applying social-science basic approaches suggested in 1955: establish a control group, find a way to measure attitudes of associates, have a baseline, find some objective ways to measure behaviors, prioritize your objectives, and most important: the study’s


\textsuperscript{40} \url{https://exchanges.state.gov/programevaluations/inprogress.html} (accessed 11aug11)
primary focus needs to be on a full, research-supported, causation/theory-based understanding of program objectives.

**Information Program Issues**

There are some lessons for exchange assessment in the information realm. While State has been carrying out evaluations for over ten years now, the information practitioners are only getting started, thanks in part to the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Management and Budget studies.

In order to bring measurement and evaluation for the rest of public diplomacy up to the ECA bureau’s high standard, State recently established an Evaluation and Measurement Unit within State’s Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The unit is charged with developing performance measurement instruments and conducting independent evaluations of the effectiveness of all State public diplomacy programs. This unit has established a core set of public diplomacy performance indicators and launched a global public diplomacy tracking system as well as a pilot study to attempt to quantify the aggregate effect of public diplomacy programs and products.\(^{41}\)

There is a recent academic study that also contains relevant lessons – the LBJ School of Public Affairs at University of Texas at Austin’s project to develop a public diplomacy assessment model, published in 2010. They critique the Office of Management and Budget/Government Accountability Office logic model: “The OMB currently has 21 public diplomacy performance measures, the majority of which are outputs, not outcomes.”\(^{42}\) Their suggested model has strong parallels with the earlier Government Accountability Office logic model, but goes several layers further by

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identifying sample behavioral outcomes to track.\textsuperscript{43} They identified a performance metric approach, with goal categories of: increased understanding, increased favorability and increased influence of the U.S. as the basis for measurement. Then they sub-divided this into target audiences: general population, elites, and government officials. Then for example the public diplomacy officer can use as a comprehension measurement for elites the sample measurement: “Relative change in the number of editorials correctly delineating U.S. policy compared to the previous quarter.”\textsuperscript{44} This is an improvement in that they are adding the element of tracking trends in data to identify changes, providing the opportunity to identify causes for any change in outcomes. State is incorporating this approach to measurement, but because it is (appropriately) tailored to each effort by the practitioners, it will be slow to come online. Whether this approach could work for exchanges is still open to analysis, and most benefits would likely be a reflection of adopting the process, not necessarily copying the “measurements” themselves.

Interestingly, one of the less duplicative study recommendations is to establish coordination of evaluation efforts between public diplomacy and Public Affairs, which is normally anathema to practitioners for several reasons, not least the legal barrier between the two organizations raised by the Smith-Mundt Act.\textsuperscript{45} Perhaps this would not run afoul of Congress if the coordination efforts were limited to evaluations, but the suggestion will no doubt encounter some resistance because of that legislation.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, Report Appendix A, 73.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{45} Smith-Mundt prohibits State Department communications intended for foreign audiences from being broadcast to Americans. Thus, public diplomacy is targeted to foreigners, and public affairs to U.S. citizens. The challenges in maintaining this separation have greatly increased in the internet age.
There has also been work on a suggestion made by former public diplomacy practitioner Joe Johnson: “Some elements of a solution for public diplomacy are already there. The most important token of success is also the simplest and cheapest: the anecdotes identifying significant changes in the host government or society made possible or abetted by public diplomacy. The department already records thousands of such small victories in a database called RESULTS.” While such records have some promise as aggregate data, they can only show correlation, not cause-and-effect, without the much more difficult work of identifying research-based social science theory to show those links from program activity to these anecdotes. Still, the Government Accountability Office reports that the consensus of private sector practitioners was that in the absence of ability to establish “direct causal links” to results, establishing convincing correlations is a reasonable expectation. The continued iterative application of the logic model should provide enough of the correlative feedback that it will hopefully identify the best areas for social science research to establish causality. This approach is certainly also likely to yield insights for exchange programs too.

**State Department Assessment Relevance for Military Exchanges**

Elements of these State program public diplomacy studies are relevant and evaluations to military exchanges. The conceptual basis of the logic model should be relevant, because it was designed for both information and exchange programs.

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46 Johnson, “How Does PD Measure Up?,” 50.

Furthermore, most of these program goals are similar to those of military educational exchanges: soft power, relationships, networking, values. But State’s information program metrics of reach, engagement and credibility are only tangentially relevant. We know whom we are reaching in the small military exchange program, and we have insights into their engagement through daily interactions over nearly a year. The issue of credibility, however, is certainly applicable, though as discussed elsewhere, it takes different forms in information/advocacy programs and educational exchanges.

For the most part, State exchange programs involve huge numbers compared to the several hundred foreign officers who attend professional military education schools each year. (The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs reports a total of 111,069 foreign exchangees came to the U.S. in 2009.)\textsuperscript{48} The Fulbright studies involve many American students and scholars who went abroad, which is not a good parallel for our foreign officers.

The Humphrey program is a closer match in terms of students, professional educational goals, and potential for international relationships and networking over time. Perhaps the currently underway study’s stronger focus on outcomes as opposed to outputs will provide more grist for military educational exchange program evaluators. However, even the Humphrey program keeps education separate from the advocacy element of information, so this may be of marginal relevance to military educational exchanges with their combination of info and exchange approaches.

\textsuperscript{48} U.S. State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, “About the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA),” \url{http://exchanges.state.gov/about.html} (accessed October 4, 2011).
A Foreign Approach to Public Diplomacy Evaluation

A number of scholars and practitioners have highlighted the difference between the U.S. and U.K. approaches to public diplomacy evaluation, often asserting that we can learn a few things. According to the Government Accountability Office:

“Comparing the four key principles endorsed by the British government’s Public Diplomacy Board with State Department practices reveals some similarities and certain key differences.

• First, unlike the United Kingdom, the State Department follows a dual set of objectives, which encourages the use of public diplomacy as both a tool designed to change public attitudes towards the United States and to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives.

• Second, while various attempts have been made to develop and coordinate U.S. agency strategic planning, evaluation, and research activities, these efforts remain largely separated.

• Third, State focuses on attitude-based program outputs and outcome measures and does not set explicit behavior change objectives.

• Fourth, State has not launched an effort comparable to the British government’s Public Diplomacy Laboratory to identify new public diplomacy tools.”

The implication is that a single set of objectives, with unified planning and research that is focused on behavior changes, would make the U.S. approach far more effective. This is not in conflict with other advice on social science approaches to measuring public diplomacy effectiveness, and reveals that yes, the U.K. keeps information and education programs separate.

The U.K.’s British Council, focused solely on cultural relations, not information, began their process of formal evaluations in the early 1990s, with the impetus of a review

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by the British equivalent of the Government Accountability Office concluding that the Council needed to improve their effectiveness assessments. British Council veteran Sharon Memis emphasizes that it takes time to mainstream an evaluation “culture” into any organization. They developed scorecards and storyboards, things that State is now implementing. In learning to “measure what matters” organizations must first often go through a stage of measuring everything, then letting that analysis identify what matters. That is cumbersome at first, but will eventually lead to streamlined evaluations focused on the key issues. It will also lead to better design of new programs, with audiences, outputs and desired outcomes identified before implementation. All of this costs money, of course, and in keeping with private communication campaign organizations, the British Council sets aside about five percent of all budgets to fund evaluations.

Though routine use of this approach, the U.K. team has confirmed that there are normally two types of change – personal learning, and shifts in individual or institutional behaviors. Knowing which category your goal fits into will help steer the choice of evaluation method, making the assessment more efficient. (Of course, that only applies if you are targeting one type of change.) The tools used by the British Council include familiar approaches like surveys and in-depth interviewing, but also evaluation methods network analysis and storyboarding. These latter two might be of particular interest for

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51 Ibid., 4.

52 Ibid.
tracking how attitude or behavioral changes spread out through an audience member’s associates, or for identifying the most effective “meme” for a planned communication campaign.\(^{53}\)

**Military Program Evaluations**

In addition to some parallel State evaluation efforts, there are a few efforts going on within Defense and academic circles that specifically address understanding the outcomes of military exchange programs. Most, though not all, of this work has been produced by those who have had some role in the military exchanges, as faculty or administrators. Some of the studies examine the military educational exchange programs I address here, and others examine related programs that might provide some insights useful to military educational exchange studies.

One of the older and lengthier military educational exchange evaluation efforts is a seventy-page monograph written by John A. Cope for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at National Defense University (NDU) in October 1995, a McNair Paper titled *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*.\(^{54}\) The INSS staff developed a framework for analysis, much of which is still in use today, that is highly relevant to my list of seven military educational exchange program goals. This framework include such potential influence and access measures as the promotion rates of foreign officer graduates of international military education and training programs,

\(^{53}\)“Meme” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as: “A cultural element or behavioural trait whose transmission and consequent persistence in a population . . . is considered as analogous to the inheritance of a gene.” Richard Dawkins, who is attributed with coining the word, describes the traits transmitted as “words, ideas, faiths, mannerisms and fashions,” in Susan Blackmore, *The Meme Machine*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1999, viii.

access to senior ranks of the host country military establishment, the political influence of military officers in many foreign governments, and existence of unofficial channels of communication between senior officers in a crisis. More practical outcomes tracked include increased sales of U.S. weapons systems, better interoperability of forces in coalition operations, spread of U.S. military education and management standards to other militaries and ministries of defense, the value for their U.S. classmates of exposure to foreign methods and perspectives, and the spread of better bilateral understanding among peers of the graduates.

Having watched National Defense University track its own foreign graduates and their promotions, I have often wondered whether that effort is measuring the right things. While it is possible that higher rank for those who have attended American programs can lead to increased American influence, there is no research-based support for this yet. This framework of “convincing correlations” was a good start, recognizing the need to measure attitudes of associates, have a baseline, find some objective ways to measure behaviors, and most important: it does make iterative progress on achieving a full, research-supported, causation/theory-based understanding of program objectives. But unless it has been expanded to develop a fuller discussion and understanding of underlying causal links to correlated objectives, as described by Joe Johnson and the British Council, it is still measuring outputs and not outcomes. Establishing a true analytic framework and using a control group for future assessments would help to fix this.

Carol Atkinson, a retired Air Force officer who is now a professor of Political
Science at Vanderbilt University, has published several journal articles using quantitative analysis to prove correlation between foreign officer attendance at professional military education and democratization. She was also a practitioner of military exchanges, having taught at the Air Command and Staff College program. Her proposal’s theoretical foundations are based on constructivist ideas, which hold that “the state socialization process” involves development of states’ identities and interests through international social interaction. Just as with individuals, international norms and rules can become “shared ideas of what is appropriate, rather than constraints on behavior.”

Her systematic empirical examination shows that military educational exchanges are positively correlated with liberalizing trends in both “coherent authoritarian” and “middle ground” states, but had no impact on already-democratic states. Furthermore, educational exchanges were the only one of five variables to show this correlation, the others being alliance with the U.S., U.S. troop presence, U.S. weapons sales and U.S. military assistance. Atkinson notes that:

... those that incorporated a greater amount of social interaction on a person-to-person level were significant in aiding liberal transition. For authoritarian states as well as for middle-ground states, participation in U.S. military educational exchange programs increased the probability of transition to a more liberal political identity. There was no discernible effect on transition or consolidation of any political identity for those mechanisms where social interaction was less pronounced but incorporated a greater element of instrumental rationalism (military assistance and military sales deliveries).

This is strong quantitative support, with an underlying political science theory, for

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56 Ibid., 531.
57 Ibid., 532.
the idea that it is the mutual interactions taking place in the seminar room that make the most impact on international fellows in military exchanges, not the information elements of these programs.

In a more recent article on the same issue, Atkinson expands her thesis to include the influence of civil exchange programs, asking: “Does Soft Power Matter?” While this is another highly quantitative study, it does prove a very strong correlation between exchanges and democratization. Atkinson’s contention is that this data shows that most influence is linked to: “(i) the depth and extent of social interactions between the exchange student and local populations, (ii) the extent to which the exchange student shares a sense of community or common identity with the local people with whom the social interactions occur, and (iii) whether the exchange student returns to the home country and attains a politically influential position.”58 While this is not an interdisciplinary public diplomacy analysis, but relies on primarily political science sources and analysis, Atkinson arrives at a conclusion very relevant for those working in many disciplines: “transnational communities of professionals who share similar life experiences and knowledge are more likely to serve as an effective socialization channel than unstructured exchanges of diverse persons.”59 It is another strong supporting argument for the critical role of dialogic person-to-person interaction in influencing the spread of democratic governing approaches, and the deeper understanding of democracy’s basis in the equality of every individual, to other nations.

59 Ibid., 20.
In a recent study, Gibler and Ruby (the latter, like Atkinson, a former instructor at the Air Command and Staff College) set out to disprove the conventional wisdom that the U.S. international military education and training programs, professional military education in particular, have trained some of the world’s worst human rights abusers, particularly officers from Argentina, Panama, and other Latin American countries.60 Using both quantitative analysis for correlation and case studies for causation, the authors make an excellent case for the opposite conclusion – officers who have attended U.S. professional military education are normally a stabilizing force during democratization, and often form the core of their countries’ own professional military education schools as they seek to further develop their own military’s professionalism.61 While in fact much of the “school for dictators” criticism revolved around the training programs under international military education and training, not necessarily the professional military education programs, the conclusions that professional military education attendance is stabilizing and creates a desire to spread professionalization within one’s home country still hold. Gibler and Ruby do not separate out effects of field studies program versus professional military education, however, making it no easier to identify the effects of information versus education.

The Moskos sociology study of international fellows at the U.S. and U.K. War Colleges relates that the foreign students form networks of their own as they are


separated from U.S. students for orientation and other programs.\textsuperscript{62} If we are serious about their developing relationships with American students, we should leave them in the classroom more, and develop other activities with the idea of encouraging more interaction. While professional military education provides an environment more conducive to building relationships and developing networks, we can do much more to encourage the long-term life of these networks into the years long beyond graduation.

The Moskos study included interviews with and field observations of NATO and several multinational peacekeeping staffs. This look at multinational staff cooperation highlights the common identity issue mentioned by Atkinson, finding that “military officers often find themselves more comfortable with fellow military officers from other countries than they do with civilian staff of the same nationality.”\textsuperscript{63} This would certainly support the likely success of a stronger multinational military network, or epistemic community.

Ron Reynolds, an military educational exchange practitioner as the Commandant of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, conducted a study of the Extended international military education and training (E-international military education and training) program. This addition to international military education and training was set up in 1991 to focus on human rights, defense resource management and civilian control of the military in courses stressing Ministry of Defense and other government civilian attendance. While noting the rigor of his study, and given the less than 10\%


\textsuperscript{63} Moskos, vii.
response rate he received for his survey, he concludes: “In fact, the real finding of the study was that amid positive indicators, the international military education and training/E-international military education and training was so small a portion of the overall U.S. aid package that its impact could not be successfully split out from that overall aid package to determine its role in the successes.”64 But perhaps this extended program’s population is sufficient to serve as a control group for other international military education and training and professional military education studies. That would merit further study.

A Government Accountability Office study of international military education and training programs concluded in 1999 that there were no instances of duplication of foreign assistance activities among U.S. agencies.65 This would assist in indicating that international military education and training/E-international military education and training at least touches an audience not necessarily participating in other programs. While this indicates some level of utility in filling an otherwise empty niche, it is still not the quantifiable type of data that would be most beneficial in substantiating program effectiveness. Just as in the Reynolds conclusion, perhaps this lack of overlap can provide an opportunity to identify the differences between programs and then study the difference in outcomes in an effort to identify links and causes.

Finally, a team of Naval Postgraduate School researchers led by Professor Tom

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Bruneau conducted a study of international military education and training graduate school exchangees in 2007. To be clear, this is not a study of war college attendees, but of foreign military officers who attended non-professional military education graduate schools in the U.S., including the Naval Postgraduate School. Because they are sponsored by international military education and training, they are also recipients of a Field Studies information Program (FSP) with activities similar to professional military education field studies program sessions.

The researchers used quantitative approaches such as Likert-scaled surveys, as well as gathering much qualitative data in surveys and focus groups. Of all the studies I found, this one adhered most closely to the guidance discussed in the foundational 1955 articles – have a control group, do in-depth interviews with not only students/graduates but also associates (in this case host country program managers and senior level Defense and military staff), having a baseline, measuring behaviors and first and foremost: have a clear understanding of program objectives.  

Bruneau’s six recommendations may echo others, but with more currency and credibility. These suggestions include institutionalization of interactions between foreign and U.S. students, outside of the current emphasis on their learning from the Americans in class, recognizing the same need for more interaction with American students observed by Moskos. Bruneau notes that this recommendation came from focus groups in Morocco, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Perhaps the next iteration of this work, if there were

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67 Bruneau, *International Military Education And Training Assessment Project*, 57. It is the foreign students themselves who pointed out this potential improvement.
to be another, would include American students in the survey to enhance understanding of this dynamic.

Bruneau also notes the difficulty of identifying direct links between program participation and particular outcomes, because of the high number of variables involved, as well as the long-term nature of the impacts these mid-level foreign officers were likely to make.\(^{68}\) Another suggestion is that we should make more efforts to maintain contact with graduates after they finish their programs, which would enhance the development of an international network of professional military officers. While some of the various international military education and training “providers” do this, others do not and there is certainly no systemic approach to keeping in touch. Finally, Bruneau calls for a combined State/Defense program of evaluation for international military education and training programs.\(^{69}\) While this study was conducted during the period of the Government Accountability Office’s encouragement of a logic frame for State evaluations, so it does no specifically address it, that frame would certainly be worth consideration for Defense international military education and training program evaluation.

**SEPARATION BETWEEN INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS**

A number of scholars and practitioners have made a strong case for why the State Department maintains an organizational separation between their information and exchange programs. Much has even been written about the history of this bifurcated

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 57.
organization of public diplomacy programs. Roth notes in “Public Diplomacy and the Past” that this separation goes back to a series of Congressional hearings between 1946 and 1948 focused on public diplomacy issues.\(^{70}\) These hearings were full of intense debates about the differences between information and exchange programs, as The Fulbright Amendment and then the Smith-Mundt Act were crafted. Because information programs were viewed as short-term, while others had “more general, longer-range objectives,” the State Office of Information and Cultural Affairs was split into an Office of International Information and a separate Office of Educational Exchange.\(^{71}\) Shortly afterwards, the movement of information programs out of the State Department and into the United States Information Agency in 1953 further strengthened the separation, though the U.S. Information Agency also got cultural centers, English teaching, speakers programs, exhibitions and its Foreign Service staff administered the exchange programs overseas. Then in a reversal of the separation trend, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was merged with the U.S. Information Agency in 1978. The U.S. Information Agency’s functions were rolled back into State in 1999. Now the distance is clearly not as pronounced, though the approaches are still run by separate offices.

**Current Public Diplomacy Organizational Structure**

There are three primary public diplomacy-related offices, or “bureaus,” working under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs: the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the Bureau of International

\(^{70}\) Roth, “Public Diplomacy and the Past,” 355.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 356.
Information Programs (IIP) and the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources. Then there is also the Bureau of Public Affairs. This is an interesting organizational construct, to say the least, since public affairs is primarily directed at communicating with the domestic audience and the International Information Bureau is forbidden from addressing Americans by the Smith-Mundt Act.

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs operates State's educational and cultural exchange programs, as well as the International Visitor program. In total, the Education and Cultural Affairs bureau oversees 83 exchange programs. These exchanges cover the cultural, sports, academic and professional fields and sponsor citizens from 160 countries. The purpose of these programs is to foster "mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries to promote friendly, and peaceful relations, as mandated by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961."\(^72\)

The role of the Bureau of International Information Programs is to convey information about U.S. "policy, society, and values" to foreign audiences through a speaker program and various publications, which it translates into local languages to best reach its target audience. \(^73\)

The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources, which includes the Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU), works to evaluate State's public diplomacy efforts and advises

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\(^72\) U.S. State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, “About the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA),” [http://exchanges.state.gov/about.html](http://exchanges.state.gov/about.html) (accessed April 7, 2010).

State on how best to allocate its resources to meet its objectives. While the Education and Cultural Affairs bureau contracts out for much of its evaluation, EMU is the primary evaluator for IIP programs.

**Rationale**

Given that this separation between information and exchange programs is so significant and long-standing, the specific rationales for that distinction should be readily discernable. Cull argues that the constituent parts of public diplomacy are often simply not compatible, and that they call for separate management and separate leaders who understand each particular type’s essential elements. He offers the example of the different timeframes involved in different programs – the rapid response to events required in an information bureau is entirely different from the deliberative approach that works best for cultural and educational programs. Cull actually calls for organizational “firewalls” between programs, because: “Each strand of activity has to be insulated from the time scales of the others.”

Then there is the issue of credibility of the practitioner. Each type of public diplomacy program achieves credibility differently: information broadcasters need to show they follow journalistic ethics and are not subject to political influence. Voice of America actually instituted a firewall in the form of their charter in order to stay insulated from political “spin.” Other information practitioners, who engage in more listening and advocacy, need to be perceived as having links to decision-makers so that they can honestly claim to be giving feedback to those policy leaders. Yet so far we have not

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identified their work as separate from other information practitioners. 75

As for exchange practitioners, the work of cultural and exchange diplomats is harmed by any signs of political influence, just as broadcasts are. But they are also distinct from the needs of policy advocates: “The credibility required to develop trust and genuine exchange in turn requires an operational space distinct from that of policy advocacy.” 76 Finally, exchange practitioners also need to run truly reciprocal programs in order to be credible with their audiences. 77

Returning to Nye’s three public diplomacy dimensions of daily communications, strategic communication, and lasting relationships, he clearly offers this framework as a viable approach to balancing public diplomacy’s inherent tensions through establishing multiple programs, each with different goals. 78 This separation does raise one quandary: if the various goals of public diplomacy require different organizations as well as approaches, how does a strategic planner choose between allocating multiple actions against a single goal to achieve cumulative effects (sometimes called “multiple causality”) and the firewall approach of one program for one goal?

Charles Frankel, an assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs, also saw the duality inherent in exchange program goals: “the hard choice often has to be made between promoting goodwill towards the United States and promoting objective

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understanding of the country and its policies.” This again argues for separation of programs with such diverse objectives. State accomplishes this not only through organizational differentiation, but also by working through the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the Institute of International Education, thus placing them at a greater distance from the government.

“The judgment of success or failure with an exchange program therefore has to be clarified as to whether it leads to simply a more favorable image of the United States abroad [arguably a goal of field studies program] or whether it leads to an expanding group of participants who see their interests (and their nation’s interests) as being in alignment with those of the United States (with identifiable policy outcomes being the result).”

Arndt calls for separation because of the intrinsic differences between information and cultural diplomacy, an “instrument of engagement.” Education “can remind participants that slogans or ideologies always short-change realities, that so-called realities may look different from another viewpoint, and that most realities can and do change.” It requires specialist practitioners, not generalists.

Audiences are another reason why it might be better to keep exchange programs isolated (organizationally) from information programs. The 1975 Center for Strategic and International Studies Education and Cultural Relations Panel noted that although

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80 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 189.

cultural exchanges were run from within State, the Bureau of International Cultural
Relations (CU) had a less-than direct connection with foreign policy. They considered
this a good thing. But perhaps the most significant difference CSIS observed was that the
Cultural Relations office exchanged people, whereas the U.S. Information Agency dealt
in media. “CU’s programs have thus been considered, not as a one-way effort to get a
particular message across overseas, but as providing the opportunity for mutual contact
between the United States and other nations on a personal level. As a result, CU has been
expected to make an impact in the United States, to build understanding here as well as
abroad, whereas the U.S. Information Agency was specifically enjoined by law from
“propagandizing” the American people."82 This insight is a particularly significant
parallel for professional military education, where American officers are in the program
learning from and about our foreign students.

While the U.S. State Department does maintain some separation between
information and exchange programs, there are sound arguments for even greater distances
among these organizational elements. The British provide an example of a slightly
different approach:

The incompatibility of the various elements of public diplomacy has led to intense
difficulties in devising effective structures to manage the work. The history of
public diplomacy agencies around the world often seems like an endless tussle
between centrifugal impulses towards independence of action and the centripetal
pull of policy coordination. This is especially obvious in the history of the Voice of
America and its struggle to operate under a charter equivalent to that which protects
the editorial independence of the BBC. The structure of public diplomacy adopted
within the UK, with a clear division of labour by function – Foreign and
Commonwealth Office for listening and advocacy, British Council for culture and

82 Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations, International Information,
Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future, 15.
exchange, BBC for international broadcasting – with its agreed firewalls and a sensible system of strategic cooperation at the executive level, seems like an excellent model which others would do well to consider. 83

Implications Of State Separation For Field Studies Program And Professional Military Education

The previous exploration of State programs provides multiple reasons for keeping information and exchange programs separate. The repeated themes include: different timeframes; protecting the program and practitioners’ credibility; different goals (effects); the program audiences are different and sometimes include Americans; and the natural alignment of the mutual relationship goal with engagement approaches. All of these themes apply to military educational exchange programs as well, and have been discussed in previous sections of this thesis.

One example of how these issues play out is Bruneau’s observation that in asking for more interactions with American classmates, the international students are seeking more “Exchanges of culture, history, practices, knowledge, national and individual accomplishments and technical abilities [that] would lead to even more increased mutual understanding . . .” 84 This is much more appropriate for educational exchanges versus the field studies program. This is a reminder that the very significant mutual understanding goal is an element of only one form of public diplomacy - exchanges.

Another example is that guidance for field studies program practitioners has shifted slightly to be less directive in nature – rather than give what almost amounted to lecture

84 Bruneau, International Military Education And Training Assessment Project, 57.
notes, program managers are encouraged to find experts and host lectures. This could be interpreted as acknowledging the importance of credibility, the identity of the practitioner, and listening, to the communication process.

A further parallel is that as with State, what little attention is paid to Defense public diplomacy is all about the information programs. For example, the Congressional Research Service 2008 Public Diplomacy Background and Current Issues report discusses Defense programs but only makes passing mention of military educational exchanges or International Fellows. It is possible that this type of program is better off behind a ‘firewall of obscurity’ as a way to provide the necessary separation, but not likely, because in that case exchange programs would be unlikely to garner the support they need to do good measure of effectiveness analysis and get increased funding where warranted. So the better solution is to keep the practitioners in separate organizations, and let the funders know that the program is contributing to their goals.

This military educational exchange obscurity might be because of the program’s small size among the rest of international military education and training/Defense programs. Certainly the 2009 Report on Defense Programs does not pull professional military education International Fellows out of international military education and

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85 United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors, Department of Defense Instruction 5410.17 (Washington, DC, September 15, 2006), and U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training, 3 Jan 2011, AR 12-15, SECNAVINST 4950.4B/AFI 16-105, Chapter 11, 209-214. For the full guidance, see Appendices I and II.

Kristin Lord makes one of the most cogent arguments for the view that military involvement in public diplomacy programs is inappropriate – but it’s important to note that this argument is all about information programs, not exchanges. “In most circumstances, the Department of Defense (Defense) should not serve as the most visible face of the United States overseas. This is particularly true in areas where the public feels threatened by American power.” Frankly, she is right, in such contexts the military are just the wrong practitioners, particularly in areas with high-context cultures.

However, Lord’s point is also valid when applied to a different context. We are generally familiar with the idea that the U.S. military should not be the face of a political message. This is part of our own definition of a professional military, one that holds itself to be above politics. But the issue is also relevant to military educational exchange audiences because we are teaching the importance of the separation of the political and military realms for professional militaries in our professional military education curriculum. This is a strong argument for elimination of military officers advocating for specific political philosophies in the field studies program, or at least some form of separation that puts someone other than military personnel, or even probably Defense personnel, in charge. Else we risk accusations of hypocrisy and loss of our credibility in both field studies program and professional military education programs.

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THE CASE FOR CREATING AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY

The critics are right to question the effectiveness of the military educational exchange programs. They are sometimes depicted as relying on fuzzy ideas about relationship-building and continuing relationships that are often random and beyond our control (based on personalities, chance, who among one’s acquaintances stays in the military long-term and who retires, etc). We obviously cannot completely control relationships that develop from exchanges, but we can use public diplomacy theory to steer the programs we do have into channels which we know are much more likely to have the desired outcomes. A deep look at other public diplomacy programs shows more of a focus on an institutional relationship with exchangees, as opposed to individual ones. This is the foundation of an epistemic community!

Even the few social science theory-based studies that have been done of military exchange programs, primarily Moskos and Bruneau, show that we are, at best, not as good as we could be at developing (individual) relationships with foreign officers. But neither study notes that there are really two forms of relationship building, or two levels – institutional and individual. It is possible that we can analyze and affect one more easily than the other, but analyzing them separately would require far more precision in our definition of relationship objectives. Even with all of these unexamined possibilities, there is support for the conclusion that our goal should in the long run be to develop broader institutional relationships, not just individual ones, which are random and of variable duration. Those institutional relationships have the potential to grow into a network of influence, based on a frame of American concepts and values.
On a practical level, take our Egypt example. The United States spent large sums of money over many years to facilitate the attendance of Egyptian military personnel at many exchange programs, and in the critical moment, they took action (or avoided action) commensurate with the values we expressed in those programs. Issues that have yet to be examined include: Did we influence that choice, or would it have happened that way anyway? Was there some other influence outside of the American one? Was their choice influenced more by Smith’s “propagandistic” advocacy sessions or because most Egyptian officers made multiple “visits” to the U.S. and thus developed more of a broad network of relationships, rather than a few one-on-one relationships? This group of officers could be said to have developed a relationship with the institutions of the U.S. military, as they experienced multiple opportunities to use their growing understanding of U.S. military ethics and knowledge to interact with different elements of Defense, such as the staff at the combatant command responsible for U.S. military forces in their region. They are not quite an epistemic community, but they are well past the stage of only a few mutual relationships with American officers.

On the theoretical level, Cowan and Arsenault’s three layers of public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue, collaboration,\(^9\) have military educational exchange equivalents. The field studies program is a monologue, while professional military education involves dialogue. Developing an Epistemic Community would be the next step, creating a real collaborative relationship. Allport’s 1954 “contact hypothesis” is described by Cowan and Arsenault as the basis for their ideal vision of a collaborative organization:

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Participants have equal status or ability to participate

They have common goals such as a sports team or the improvement of a neighborhood association

The contact is free from competition between their respective groups

The contact is supported by social norms and/or community authority\textsuperscript{90}

There is one element missing from this list, though – shared conceptual frames. “If, in a networked world, the issue is no longer relative power but centrality in an increasingly dense global web\textsuperscript{91} then our educational exchange provides us some of that centrality. In order to form and inform such a network one must view public diplomacy not as a mechanism for making one-way communications to a target audience, but for “introducing a reproducible idea into a matrix so that it can be passed among a target group.”\textsuperscript{92}

Another of our framework concepts is the timeframe of a program. Information has a short shelf life – so while it requires speed to run an effective information program, it also requires persistence and repetition to have any extended influence.\textsuperscript{93} While there is some small potential to achieve that through something like the field studies program effort, we would have more potential for persistence and repetition of ideas and values in an exchange program where we have good follow-through with alumni and where we incorporate them into a network/epistemic community that is also useful to them.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 20.


\textsuperscript{93} Heil, \textit{Voice of America, a History}, 450.
There are many calls for public diplomacy in State to use new media for dissemination of messages and expanding information programs to encompass two-way communications. But new media are also very useful for follow-up with program participants in educational exchanges, whether Fulbright/Humphrey or military. These online networks are great for sharing information and collaboration, though there is still no substitute for face-to-face contact. A good example of the growing movement to host reunions on the military side is the National Defense University co-sponsored symposium in Dubai, where the International Fellows program hosted a regional event which attracted alumni from over ten countries, including Poland and Nigeria! These reunions certainly have great potential to become the basis for epistemic community building.

Our national leadership recognizes the potential of networks. The current National Security Strategy emphasizes the role of networks in supporting the international order: “Many of today’s challenges cannot be solved by one nation or even a group of nations. The test of our international order, therefore, will be its ability to facilitate the broad and effective global cooperation necessary to meet 21st century challenges.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made news not only by calling for greater investment in soft power, but by questioning the need to recreate institutions of the past. He urged new thinking about “Hybrid institutions that connect government and civil society [and] can strengthen public diplomacy, and they sit more easily with the logic of networks,

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95 The White House, National Security Strategy 2010, 47.
global governance, and new forms of armed conflict.”

This is not solely an American concept. UK diplomats are writing about the potential of a new image of diplomacy, which eschews the traditional hierarchies and embraces “an environment in which international policy is increasingly conducted through complex policy networks.”

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This review of public diplomacy assessment studies reveals the diversity of ongoing approaches, all of which have contributions to make to our understanding of the causal mechanisms in exchange program outcomes. Before we make any final conclusions about how to measure effects in military educational exchange programs, we should step back and look at what these various effectiveness studies, combined with public diplomacy theory/analytic approaches from Chapter 4, can tell us about both the link between cause and effect and what such programs can and cannot accomplish. To build upon these and more decisively achieve those seven objectives, there are other things we can do:

(1) Get back to social science basics! Most of the suggestions culled from articles written about exchange evaluations in 1955 bear repeating and application today: work hard to know and prioritize your objectives; establish a control group to help identify your independent variable; measure the attitudes and behaviors of participants’ associates; establish a baseline for comparison; and finally use your data to identify

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categories for further research and to track trends.

(2) Focus on behaviors, not attitudes. This is one of the major distinctions between exchange and information programs, and impacts their assessments. There is a certain symmetry and continuity that flows from the private Fulbright assessment study in 1976 to the current ten years’ worth of exchange evaluation studies. What they have in common is that exchanges are about forming relationships, not just changing attitudes, and exchange program assessments therefore include some specific relationship-related behavioral questions. For example, even in the 1976 survey there were questions about whether exchangees were keeping in touch with the people they met during their fellowships, and whether they were involved or engaged in professional activities and/or international organizations. The more recent surveys reflect similar behavioral queries.

(3) The best analyses of the impacts of military exchanges also get back to basics and focus on behaviors, though they use different methodologies to determine causality links to broader, often collective, forms of behavior. For example, Atkinson examines democratization, an enormous, society-wide behavior change. Gibler and Ruby look at behavior on several levels. First, they actually go back and count the individual officers who graduated from U.S. professional military education and then were alleged to have violated human rights of their nations’ citizens, as well as looking at the emulation of U.S. professional military education institutions by other military organizations.

(4) The Government Accountability Office/State logic model assessment framework for public diplomacy is likely also applicable to military educational exchanges. It gives a structured way to gather and sort data about outcomes and outputs, identify the
difference, assist in tracking trends, and other benefits that are relevant for public diplomacy. If Defense used this model, there could be sharing of data across organizations, leading to new insights about effectiveness, or lack thereof. For example, the State database might contain information about a group that could be used as a comparison or control group for the military educational exchanges. It must be applied with caution, however, because it was created for information and not exchange programs.

(5) Defense has its own social science communities that can and should be brought to bear on analyzing our military public diplomacy, and soft power in general. There are: the Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program, an Office of the Secretary of Defense-led consortium; the basic social science research support program called MINERVA; the social science academic departments at the military academies; a small but hopefully increasing number of social scientists on the faculty of the professional military education institutions themselves; and social science research departments at the service laboratories, to name a few. While concern for improving our approaches to counterinsurgency have driven Congress to encourage Defense to improve its organic social science capabilities, many of these efforts contain aspects that could advance our understanding of the influence effects of various exchange programs.

Congress is also concerned that we lack sufficient in-house social scientists:

The committee is encouraged by the amount of effort that the Department of Defense has focused on cultivating social science expertise to support defense missions. In the committee report (H. Rept. 110-652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee noted concerns about the dearth of social science expertise within the Department. As new human, cultural, and social behavior related research and operational
initiatives are started or expanded, such as the Minerva Initiative and the Human Terrain System, the lack of organic expertise is becoming more acute.

The committee supports the greater development of in-house capacity to take advantage of increasing social science methods in order to reduce dependencies on contractors or academics on the battlefield. The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to utilize the full range of tools at the Department's disposal to increase that capacity . . . 98

(6) There are other assessment approaches and tools available, too, if Defense is willing to embrace outside experts. As the public diplomacy scholar community continues to solidify and expand, assessing impacts of military public diplomacy programs such as the educational exchanges should be part of their agenda. The recent International Studies Association Public Diplomacy Working Group Charter sets out goals that indicate they want to grasp this new opportunity:

The Working Group aims to build an inclusive and interdisciplinary forum that will address the pressing research, pedagogical, and practical issues pertaining to public diplomacy studies . . . . An important aspect of this effort is to move the debate forward on what is increasingly a global phenomenon that has theoretical and practical linkages to the broader community of scholars in ISA. The Working Group will address three primary areas of concern related to public diplomacy scholarship: (1) the trajectory for interdisciplinary theoretical development and research methods, (2) the increased demand from international actors for measures of effectiveness and evaluation, (3) the need to share resources for academic program development in public diplomacy. [italics added] 99

(7) Finally, there is also a small but growing group of social scientists who belong to the Military Operations Research Society, known as the “MORS Social Science


Community of Practice,” whose goal is to improve awareness and application of the social sciences in Defense.

Overall, assessment of military educational exchange programs is an area ripe for more focused attention, particularly from the public diplomacy community. The work reviewed in this chapter shows that there are pockets of work being done in seeming isolation - work with real potential. That’s a heartening sign. But there is great potential for significant benefits from cooperation among these and other groups, from sharing both data and conceptual approaches. A thorough and serious analysis of these programs from multiple practitioners and across multiple disciplines would ensure a broader understanding of the role of military educational exchanges in our national strategy, as well as contributing to our understanding of exchange programs in general.
CHAPTER 7

LESSONS, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

. . . the United States possesses an ample array of soft power tools. They have not, however, been put to work in a coordinated way that takes full advantage of their value. Soft power does not take effect spontaneously; it requires strategic planning and tactical deployment, just as hard power does. . . . So far, that has not occurred.

--Philip Seib

. . . we will build new and deeper partnerships in every region, and strengthen international standards and institutions. This engagement is no end in itself. The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times—countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a changing climate and sustaining global growth; helping countries feed themselves and care for their sick; resolving and preventing conflict, while also healing its wounds.

--National Security Strategy 2010

Governments need all forms of power, hard and soft, and harmonious efforts by all of their various agencies and departments, to tackle the systemic challenges represented by 21st Century global instability. This thesis reveals that military educational exchanges, by functioning as public diplomacy programs with all of public diplomacy’s potential effects on values-related attitudes and behaviors, directly and indirectly educate and build relationships with foreign officers in ways that support our national goals of global stability and international order.

In conclusion, the seven military educational exchange (MEE) objectives identified in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and the public diplomacy theoretical framework from Chapters 4 and 5 for both field studies program and professional military education programs, can

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be used to make some observations about theory-based links between these efforts and their goals, or the lack thereof. Taking quantitative-study based correlation and public diplomacy theory together should reveal which approaches are both effective and most likely to achieve multiple objectives. Those analytic efforts that show both whether these programs achieve their objectives and how they do so should be the ones we focus on to inform policy and resource allocation decisions in the future.

The National Security Strategy delineates the links between soft power and national/international security: “Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes.” Military educational exchange programs are a form of military soft power intended to build relationships and shape international events without bringing our weapons to bear. This examination of relevant public diplomacy theory and assessments, as well as existing evaluations of military educational exchanges, suggests that we can show that these programs and the relationships they establish do effectively and appropriately help us to shape international outcomes. Some do so in ways that are obvious and even quantifiable, others in ways that are hidden and not easily discernable.

**UNDERSTANDING MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES AS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

Military educational exchanges programs are effective to the extent that they achieve their objectives. After all, programs which achieve their objectives should be the ones we focus on to advance national objectives and efficiently use our resources,

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regardless of which Department implements them. Military educational exchanges programs have seven major soft power objectives:

1. Professional Military Education (not training)
2. Supporting the International Order
3. Access to Foreign Facilities
4. Building Mutual Relationships
5. Interoperability
6. Exposing Officials to Democratic Values
7. Enhancing the Institutional Capacity of Foreign Militaries

Of these seven objectives, five: education, support for international order, building mutual relationships, values, and enhancing institutional capacities of the exchangees home organizations, have direct links to public diplomacy. Thus, using a public diplomacy “theoretical prism” to analyze military educational exchanges is a relevant way to provide a better understanding of what these programs can accomplish. That theory-based foundational thinking can enhance our understanding of what goals we should be concentrating on, by identifying causal links between program goals and possible outcomes. These are necessary preliminary steps to building on current work measuring our effectiveness at achieving those goals.

Educational exchanges are an appropriate use of military resources. By using military assets to address a small but influential niche audience of foreign military officers, Defense can apply public diplomacy approaches to support national goals in ways that State does with a larger, more diverse audience.

While public diplomacy aspects of military educational exchanges have been largely ignored, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee recently required
Defense to provide a list of all “Military Public Diplomacy” programs, and a description of their management and performance measurements, an acknowledgment that military public diplomacy exists.

Yet the majority of public diplomacy analysts and practitioners continue to overlook these programs. Only a very small percentage of public diplomacy writing even mentions military programs, and most of those references are to the information programs run by Defense. The few exceptions that do recognize a military role in educational exchanges are primarily written by practitioners. Public diplomacy scholar Bruce Gregory, for example, told an audience that he had foreign officers in his classes when he taught at the National War College and the Naval War College, and “if that’s not public diplomacy I don’t know what is.” The one other author who mentions that there is a military role in public diplomacy efforts is Nye, and of course he was also a practitioner when he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, among other high-level government posts:

Generally speaking, all of the issues inherent in PD [public diplomacy] apply to military engagement programs too. That includes the criticality of credibility, importance of listening, the benefits for both sides, and general motives for implementing these programs. Granted, these programs only address a small niche in terms of target population, but they demonstrate a significant link between hard and soft power as well as walking the talk for an often-influential audience. Sometimes they can become the only link we have with a foreign government.

Nye is exactly right. So while public diplomacy scholars have not written much

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about military educational exchanges, their theories can form a relevant conceptual framework to use for military educational exchange analysis.

The final step in this analysis of military educational exchange effects is to examine the program objectives in light of the public diplomacy elements discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. That process involves much interdisciplinarity, because public diplomacy is an inherently interdisciplinary amalgam of communications, sociology, history, political science, and international relations, as well as values issues. The military programs contain extensive emphasis on such “American values” as democracy, human rights, and the value of the individual, as well as a professional military ethic emphasizing the role of a military in a democracy. Those ethics flow directly from the foundation of those values, so the professionalization of other militaries is also a reflection of democratic values. In a different sense, values also play a major role in the development of mutual relationships, a key objective in both military educational exchange and public diplomacy programs.

Of course, all of this effort is intended to show that military educational exchange programs are effective, and how public diplomacy analogies can enhance achievement of policy objectives. As public diplomacy scholar Cull notes, “The most important link in any public diplomacy structure is that which connects research to policy making (and ensures that the impact of an actor’s decisions on foreign opinion is weighed in the foreign policy process.)”7 In other words, social science theory connects research to policy! And indeed, this public diplomacy-derived conceptual framework gives

sufficient guidance for where to pursue more detailed research, of both quantitative and qualitative types, leading to several policy recommendations.

ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

These analyses play out differently in examining each of the seven military educational exchange objectives. There is one caveat, however. These seven objectives identified in Chapters 2 and 3 are for all international military education and training programs, while this thesis focused exclusively on foreign officer attendance at ten-month professional military education courses. Analysis of these exchanges does reveal that some of the international military education and training objectives are more appropriate and effective in an education context than others. This will be the point of the final table, aligning the seven military educational exchange objectives and public diplomacy concept-derived conclusions.

(1) Education – The educational exchange aspect of professional military education is obviously most effective at providing education to students, and education is likely to be at the top of their priority list. These students undergo a rigorous nomination and screening process to come to the U.S. and learn from the world’s strongest military force. So while achievement of visitors’ goals is not on our official list of objectives, we do need to consider them when developing our programs. The field studies program is of low relevance in terms of achieving education objectives, though it only interferes when it takes foreign students out of the classroom or otherwise away from their studies, which should be their primary focus.

(2) Support International Order – There is no direct link between the field studies
program and this objective, though it does not likely do any harm. The key to supporting international order is developing mutual relationships, which public diplomacy theory strongly indicates is not accomplished by monologic advocacy programs. Actually, there is no more than an anecdotal link between the professional military education program’s influence on individuals and the advancement of international order. However, there is great potential for development of networks and institutions that can directly support the international order, given more emphasis on institutional relationships and less on random one-on-one friendships. So even for professional military education, achievement of this objective relies on mutual relationship building.

(3) Access to Foreign Facilities – This should really be a subordinate objective, and relies on the development of mutual relationships to achieve. As with supporting the international order, the field studies program is not likely to advance us in this direction, and the professional military education exchanges only do so indirectly.

(4) Relationships – Building mutual relationships is the key distinction between what can be accomplished with information and exchange programs. The professional military education exchanges are much better equipped to achieve this, because they encourage interaction and dialogue. Given that mutual relationships are the key enabling and essential step to achieving a number of these other objectives, this goal should be given high priority. And that leads to the inevitable conclusion that the U.S. should spend more effort on ensuring foreign officers get as much time as possible in interaction with their American hosts, both in the classroom and out.

(5) Interoperability - The objective of interoperability is often most strongly
associated with having common equipment and support systems. The field studies program/information program for international officers does not directly support this goal, while the educational exchange program does provide some direct support for this goal in terms of common frames of reference for potential partners, an oft-overlooked element of interoperability. This form of “conceptual interoperability” is most strongly enhanced by development of institutional relationships and networks, which again places the objective of mutual relationships in an enabling position vis-à-vis an objective.

(6) Exposing Officials to Values – This is the overt objective of the field studies program, and it does achieve this objective at least at the moderate level, depending on the various levels of expertise and credibility people can bring to the presentations. The assumption behind this objective - that exposure to American values will lead to attitude changes - is both unsupported by research and of questionable relevance. Attitudes can be easily misrepresented in surveys, or they can change and then change back, or they can be impossible to share with one’s associates after returning home. The significant change is behavioral, and this is only somewhat likely to result from an advocacy and information program.

The professional military education exchange, on the other hand, is much better suited to presenting values in a way that encourages open-mindedness, because it is dialogic and involves both talking and doing, which always carries more credibility. Even here, in an indirect approach to values discussions, or in direct debates about relevant issues such as military professional ethics, the impacts of professional military education on visitors’ attitudes is an open question. This process is at least more likely to
make an impact, though that impact will be based yet again on the development of mutual relationships of trust and sharing.

(7) Institutional Capacity of Foreign Militaries – In this case, there is a limited likelihood that the explicit exposure to values enhances the institutional capacity of other militaries. However, just as with Education and Interoperability, the learning and relationship building that go on in the classroom do enhance the capacity of many militaries. The possibilities for increased professionalism, which cannot be directly proven to enhance the performance of other militaries in battle, are certainly anecdotally linked to increased capacity. As Gibler and Ruby point out, there have been many nations who have valued the American professional military education experience enough that they have worked to create their own versions:

U.S. officers and U.S. PME [professional military education] represent the top level of professional education worldwide, and foreign militaries often vie for the opportunity to learn at these schools. For countries without military education or even those with limited programs, the U.S. PME program provides an opportunity for educating top officers, for instilling professionalism in the military, and for exposing the officers to the concepts of civilian control. . . . Some of these officers even begin the task of building domestic PME programs based on the U.S. model.  

In summary, the most obvious conclusion to draw here is that these military educational exchanges are more effective at achieving some objectives than others, some objectives need to be re-addressed, and some aspects of the dual advocacy/exchange approach actually interfere with each other. Continued analysis of which ones are stronger than others, and why, would make for more efficient and effective programs.

We can also see that while the program objectives for military educational

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exchanges are intended to support larger foreign policy goals, they should be better focused. They currently lack any prioritization, due no doubt to the variety of the sources and oversight organizations involved in their direction. The two most significant objectives in terms of meeting most of these goals are Mutual Relationships and Education, both of which are strongly linked to the educational exchange aspects of professional military education, and neither of which benefit at all from explicit advocacy of values.

So truly prioritizing that overarching goal of supporting global stability and security would mean elevating relationships and education to the top of the military educational exchange objectives list. Then, by taking an interdisciplinary approach to the planning, programming, analyzing, planning loop, we can make what is good now even better, and more suited to countering current global instability.
Table 7: Military Educational Exchange Programs Meeting Identified Objectives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Field Studies Program</th>
<th>Professional Military Educational Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Education</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support International Order</td>
<td>Not directly</td>
<td>Low – individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High - institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Access to Foreign Facilities</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relationships</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual vs. Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interoperability</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low – individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High - institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low – attitude changes</td>
<td>Open question – attitude changes/behavior changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Institutional Capacity of Foreign Militaries</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Goals 1-3 derived from Chap 2, 4-7 from Chap 3.

RECOMMENDATIONS

If there is one concept that seems to elude the political masters of the Washington bureaucracy it is that in PD it is all about context and relationships.  

It is clear that the two public diplomacy components of military educational exchange programs – field studies program and professional military education – are not reinforcing but potentially contrary. The exchange aspects of professional military education provide much more support to each of the seven military educational exchange

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9 Anne McGee, Program Objective Summary

objectives, and thus more support to our security and foreign policy goals. The State Department keeps information advocacy and educational exchange programs separate - so should Defense. Information has a short shelf life, so it requires persistence and repetition to have any extended influence. Something like the field studies program effort is unlikely to really encompass sufficient persistence to impact attitudes and behaviors. We would have more potential for persistence and repetition in an exchange program where there is good follow-through with alumni and where they are incorporated into a network/epistemic community that is also useful to them.

We should consider reducing or eliminating the monologic, advocacy-oriented elements of the field studies program programs – they do not contribute to building relationships, their approach is not the optimal way to achieve education goals, and they conflict with our ability to evaluate the effects of the educational exchange aspects of the program. This does not mean elimination of orientation sessions, or discussions of American culture. It does mean ceasing the “American values” advocacy aspects of the field studies program, giving up efforts to centrally control the messages our international officers receive.

In addition to learning to rely on relationships instead of messages, we need to acknowledge our lack of control in the “new” international “order” (or call it disorder). In similar fashion, this recognition of reality calls for us to shift to approaches meant to best position us to deal with that lack of control: that being the Epistemic Community approach. Thomas Kuhn was describing such a network when he defined the term “paradigm,” as “not a subject matter but a group of practitioners,” who share “an entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on.”11 As has been discussed and established in other fields such as the food aid community, economists and bankers, environmentalists, and nuclear arms control, such a community can influence their nations’ decision-makers, which then influences behaviors of other states, “. . . thereby increasing the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international policy coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic community.”12

Our ultimate goal for military educational exchanges should be to start shifting professional military education to a more collaborative approach as opposed to a dialogic one. This, plus a robust Alumni connectivity network, can create an epistemic community of professional military thinkers who share a common perspective learned in the U.S. These networks can help make up for the shortcomings of traditional hierarchies in government, such as improving their scope, speed and range. They can achieve this because networks have no assumption of control, which is impossible in soft power and public diplomacy scenarios anyway.

This approach could thus leverage the benefits of a collaborative network to counter the networked challenges we face, such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, etc. Finally, a community of practice with a common understanding based to some degree on U.S. values and approaches will be far more likely to reflect changes in behaviors, as opposed to just attitudes. That would be the ideal result, leveraging a small, overlooked military


program to meet such high-level goals.

Further recommendations include:

The public diplomacy academic community, in conjunction with Defense’s social science programs, can and should apply social science evaluation tools to military educational exchanges to provide further insights into the differences between information and exchange effects. This would include further studies to delineate the differences between individual and institutional relationships, and how best to establish them. Such an enhanced understanding could conceivably improve program effectiveness and efficiency.

Professional military education institutions should further emphasize their curricular focus on ethics, values and the role of a professional military to support Congressional values-related intentions, thus reducing the need for the field studies program. Part of that would be achieved by sound social science research into the effects of exchanges on attendee attitudes and behaviors, to include a control group and trends.

While it does not fit in with the framework of this thesis, eventually the quality of the professional military education curriculum will itself need to be assessed as part of a true impact analysis. These programs are already reviewed by both the applicable educational association organization, such as the Middle States Schools Association for National Defense University, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s Process for Accreditation of Joint Education team. However, their specific values and relationship-building content are not part of either review. A true evaluation of this aspect of the program would provide data to support more-precise attribution of attitude
and behavior changes on the part of the International Fellows.

Incentivize American students to engage with International Fellows, by adding elements to the curriculum that require American/International cooperation, and by creating more opportunities for interaction in and out of the classroom. This also means reconsideration of activities that remove international officers from the classroom, because as Moskos points out, that detracts from opportunities to develop relationships with American officers. We certainly want the exchangees to bond with each other, but not at the expense of bonding with Americans. Tracking this hoped-for increase in relationships would require surveying the American graduates about their continued interactions with international fellows, not just the fellows themselves.

Focus on developing networking relationships with faculty as well as students, because faculty tends to remain at their schools longer than American students will be at their post-school assignments, and so faculty can become a more long-term point of contact for graduates. Part of this could involve such activities as leading alumni reading groups, something National Defense University (NDU) is doing, or other forms of communication. Because it is the communication that is most important here, the reading groups might consider shorter publications such as articles or chapters of books, instead of trying to get busy senior officers to commit to reading entire books for these discussions. There are always new articles assigned to current students that could be used to bring alumni up to date, helping them to meet their own or their institution’s objective of professional development.

Until recently, Alumni associations were difficult to make work for international
programs. They still require good facilitators, but this is much easier to accomplish now with communication technology, which can be used for keeping in general touch, as well as arranging for follow-up sessions, both in person and web-based. Professional military education schools are making good progress on this, though doubtless there are lessons to be learned from the Fulbright Alumni, who got their start in 1976. One area for exploration should be the establishment of a unified program for all intermediate and senior level professional military education graduates, which would provide broader networking opportunities. It might also provide a way to gather data on larger groups of military educational exchange alumni, enhancing the reliability and statistical significance of research.

Many or most of these conclusions could also apply to other educational components of military soft power, specifically the regional centers. While they are not part of professional military education, the Defense Department’s Regional Study Centers do share some of the same goals while employing different programs. In short, the five Regional Centers are characterized by similar military-to-military relationship-oriented engagement goals, albeit with shorter, more functionally or regionally focused programs. These centers also lead the rest of Defense in terms of programs to retain contact with graduates. They include shorter, follow-up symposia, regional newsletters and alumni organizations. These courses and programs have strong parallels with other forms of State exchanges, such as the International Visitor Leadership Program, American Council of Young Political Leaders, and exchanges for various professionals including education administrators, journalists, civil servants, and lawyers.
On the other hand, we should consider organizational separation of military education programs from international military education and training, because their goals and approaches are different. Because they are shorter, technical, and hands-on, lacking in explicit or implicit values and ethics immersion, the training courses might merit continued field studies program values advocacy sessions.

There are other elements of Defense soft power that would benefit from focused social science research. For example, ship visits and medical team deployments leverage implicit values as part of their goals, and we do make efforts to track attitudinal changes after such events as the tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia. The key is to develop ways to better measure behavioral outcomes from those programs.

Consideration should be given to expanding military educational exchanges to encompass more civil service and perhaps relevant private organization international fellows, as part of a 21st century effort to reflect and influence the complex, unstable international environment. National Defense University schools are doing a little of this already, but it is quite minimal, due no doubt to the limited and valued resource that a seat in a professional military education program represents to the nominating governments.

Professional military education exchanges are an appropriate use of military personnel for their administration and faculty functions, with the exception of using military officers to advocate U.S. government positions on information/political/propaganda issues in field studies program. These discussions can veer all too easily into the political realm, an inappropriate field for any officer in an
official duty.

**FINAL CONCLUSIONS**

Military educational exchange programs are an appropriate use of military assets – they achieve foreign policy and National Security Strategy goals, sometimes in ways that State Department programs cannot because Defense programs have access to unique and influential audiences that State does not. This small cadre of foreign military officers can be links to an entire category of personnel likely to have strong influence on international order. With respect to democracy-building and stabilization goals, for example, the military educational exchange audience is more directly involved in stabilization projects than the audience of many State exchange programs. The importance of this finding cannot be overemphasized – the U.S. needs to use every means available to support our national strategic ends. So yes, these programs address similar ends to State programs, but by using different means they reinforce each other, they are not redundant.

In sum, Military Educational Exchanges are an effective form of soft power, supporting broad, long-term foreign policy goals. Programs which achieve their objectives should be the ones we focus on to advance national objectives and efficiently use our resources, regardless of which Department implements them. However, they could be made far more effective through use of an appropriately tailored, multi-disciplinary conceptual framework to shape empirical studies and analysis, such as the one presented in this thesis.
APPENDIX I:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5410.17: UNITED STATES FIELD STUDIES PROGRAM (FSP) FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STUDENTS AND MILITARY-SPONSORED VISITORS

SEPTEMBER 15, 2006
SUBJECT: United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors

(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "DoD Directives Review – Phase II," July 13, 2005
(c) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8, 1999
(d) Sections 2271, 2295, 2347, 2347b, and 2751 – 2799aa-2 of title 22, United States Code, Foreign Relations and Intercourse
(e) through (j), see Enclosure I

1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Instruction reissues Reference (a) as a DoD Instruction according to the guidance in References (b) and (c) to update DoD policy and assign responsibilities within the Department of Defense for a U.S. Field Studies Program (FSP). The policy is reissued to enhance the formal training courses and orientation of international military and civilian students and military-sponsored visitors (hereafter referred to collectively as "international students and visitors") to the United States under the Security Assistance Training Program and other programs administered through security assistance channels.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, the DoD Security Assistance Organizations, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
3. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

3.1. The achievement of democracy, respect for human rights, peace, and equitable economic growth depends primarily on the cooperation of people and governments. The United States can make a significant contribution to promulgating peaceful and democratic principles by exposing international students and visitors to American society, institutions, and ideals.

3.2. The FSP shall provide international students and visitors the opportunity to obtain a balanced understanding of the United States and to increase their awareness of the basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

3.3. The FSP shall be developed and implemented pursuant to Sections 2271, 2295, 2347 2347b, and 2751 – 2799aa of title 22, United States Code (Reference (d)), with the objective of providing participants in the FSP with an awareness and understanding of the facets of the American democratic way of life set forth in Section 5.

3.4. Costs associated with the implementation of the FSP shall be included in course tuition rates. These costs shall include transportation, meals, lodging, admission, programs, and incidental expenses thereof, in accordance with DoD 5105.38-M (Reference (e)) and DoD 7000.14-R (Reference (f)).

3.5. Funds supporting the FSP shall not be expended to pay for alcoholic beverages or entertainment expenses for activities that are substantially of a recreational character, including but not limited to entrance fees at sporting events, theatrical and musical productions, and amusement parks, in compliance with relevant appropriations provisions of Section 548 of Public Law 109-102 (Reference (g)).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under the authority and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall:

4.1.1. Direct and supervise the FSP.

4.1.2. Publish instructions to implement the FSP, in accordance with Reference (e).

4.1.3. Provide guidance to the Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, as appropriate in the formulation and preparation of material for the orientation and training of U.S. personnel involved in executing the program.

4.2. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall establish pricing policy for the FSP according to Reference (f).
4.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

4.3.1. Establish, operate, and monitor the FSP at their respective installations and military schools in accordance with the guidance herein and Reference (e).

4.3.2. Provide adequate staffing at installations and military schools to support the FSP.

4.4. The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Security Assistance Organizations in each country, shall:

4.4.1. Provide information on the FSP to all international students and visitors prior to their departure from their respective countries of residence for training at U.S. installations or military schools.

4.4.2. Review regional FSP activities to ensure that the program meets regional security cooperation objectives in accordance with the guidance of the Secretary of Defense.

4.5. The President of the National Defense University (NDU), under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall ensure that NDU institutions involved in educating international students:

4.5.1. Establish, administer, operate, and review the FSP based on guidance in this Instruction and in compliance with relevant appropriations provisions of Reference (g).

4.5.2. Review staffing to ensure that personnel support for the FSP is adequate.

5. PROCEDURES

The FSP shall be developed and implemented to provide participants with an awareness and understanding of the following facets of the American democratic way of life.

5.1. Human Rights. U.S. commitment to basic principles of internationally recognized human rights as reflected in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," (Reference (h)) and The Constitution of the United States of America (Reference (i)). This aspect of American life shall be emphasized in conjunction with all FSP topics below.

5.2. Law of War. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, often called the "law of armed conflict" (Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (j)). For the purposes of this Instruction, the law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and

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1 Copies may be obtained via the Internet at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
2 Copies may be obtained via the Internet at http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution.html
international agreements to which the United States is a part, and applicable customary international law.

5.3. **International Peace and Security.** How the United States accomplishes effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding with foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

5.4. **U.S. Government Institutions.** U.S. institutions of democratic governance, including electoral and legislative processes and civilian control of the military, and the institution and improvement of public administration at the national, intergovernmental, State, and local levels.

5.5. **Political Processes.** American democracy and political reform, including opening the political process to all members of society, the practice of free elections, freedom of association, and the influence of various governmental and non-governmental organizations that promote democracy, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the political process.

5.6. **Judicial System.** The U.S. establishment of the rule of law and an effective judicial system, the role of the military justice system and its procedures, and the laws and institutions for addressing extremist violence and taking effective action to prosecute those who are alleged to have committed crimes.

5.7. **Free Market System.** The success of the U.S. economy due to land reform, reform in tax systems, encouragement of private enterprise and individual initiative, creation of favorable investment climates, curbing corruption where it exists, and spurring balanced trade; the independent roles of labor and management in negotiating pay, working hours and conditions, and other benefits associated with employment; the factors underlying industrial and agricultural production, and how environmental protection has altered each; and the role of environmental protection.

5.8. **Media.** The role of a free press and other communications media in American life; how diversity of media ensures people of all races, creeds, and political persuasions can be heard (e.g., editorials, letters to the editor) and ensures diverse, pluralistic culture.

5.9. **Education.** The purpose and range of educational institutions, the value of an educated and responsible citizenry, and the educational opportunities available to all citizens.

5.10. **Health and Human Services.** The U.S. institutions that provide quality health care and voluntary family planning services, housing, and other services, and the policies that are components of a social safety net, particularly for infants, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities.

5.11. **Diversity and American Life.** How the United States fosters political, economic, and social pluralism; the geographic, religious, and social diversity of American life; progress in applying American ideals to ethnic minorities and women, including how they address gender-based violence. How American families live and work in cities, towns, and rural areas; how
Americans function in communities, worship, work together in organizations, and participate in and support cultural and historical events; the role of volunteerism in American life.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Instruction is effective immediately.

Enclosure
E1. References, continued
E1. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(g) Section 548 of Public Law 109-102, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006," November 14, 2005
(i) The Constitution of the United States of America, September 17, 1787, as amended
(j) Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," as amended through April 14, 2006
APPENDIX II:

ARMY REGULATION 12-15/SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION 4950.4B/AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 16-105: JOINT SECURITY COOPERATION EDUCATION AND TRAINING

FEBRUARY 3, 2011

CHAPTER 11: U.S. FIELD STUDIES PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STUDENTS AND MILITARY SPONSORED VISITORS, SECTIONS I THROUGH IV
Security Assistance and International Logistics

Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training

Headquarters
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
Washington, DC
3 January 2011

UNCLASSIFIED
check the T-MASL for the required security clearance and will ensure that the appropriate statement and security level for classified training is checked on the IMS ITO.

b. Implementing command guidance.

1. The IC will ensure (through the MAJCOM FDO) that the training to be provided to IMS has been determined to be releasable by the appropriate disclosure authority. Classified training will not be programmed nor will dates be provided before determination of releasability.

2. The IC FDO may authorize disclosure if delegated by SAF/IAPD. To reflect current policy, unclassified courses should be staffed at the MAJCOM level. If not within the MAJCOM delegated authority, a disclosure request will be staffed with and determined by SAF/IAPD. When staffing disclosure requests to SAF/IAPD, the request for disclosure will have a suspense date of not later than 70 days before the course start date and will allow an additional 60 days for SAF/IAPD processing. It will also include the following:

(a) Course title, number, and T-MASL if applicable.

(b) Country or countries for which a determination of releasability is required.

(c) Course syllabus, outline, and other documents that outline subject areas, classification levels in each area, training aids and equipment used during the instruction, and locations at which training will be conducted or visited as part of the instruction. Additional information will be requested if required by SAF/IAPD.

3. The IC will advise Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron if training is not releasable.

4. The IC will ensure that courses developed for international students are developed according to the guidance below. (Courses, for this purpose, include qualification and observer training and training provided by security assistance training teams.)

(a) Courses will include only the instruction required to meet the objective of the training. Instruction, student handouts, and visits to other U.S. Air Force installations that are valuable in broadening the students knowledge but not necessary to meet the course objective will not be provided.

(b) Non-releasable instructional materials authorized to be shipped to the students will be kept to a minimum and, as much as possible, will be devoid of references to other U.S. Air Force publications.

(c) Equipment used in the course will be of a common nature and not part of a sophisticated weapon system, unless the course is specifically weapon-system related. The course curriculum developers will advise the IC if, during the course update, modification, or development, the guidelines in paragraph (4), above, cannot be adhered to.

5. The IC will advise Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron and IMSO of the required U.S. equivalent security clearance. Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron will advise the Security Cooperation Organization of the required U.S. equivalent security clearance when authority to publish the ITO is provided.

6. The IC will ensure that RIM is cleared as part of the course releasability determination.

C. IMS or international military student guidance.

1. The IMSO will review the IMS ITO to ensure that the ITO reflects the security clearance required for classified courses. Proper accomplishment of the ITO and/or required amendments remains the primary responsibility of the Security Cooperation Organization.

2. The IMSO will ensure that the guidance in paragraph b(4), above, is provided to instructors of IMS. Further, the IMSO will inform the instructors that additional training will not be recommended directly to the IMS but, rather, to the IMSO, who will then forward the recommendation to the IC.

Chapter 11
U.S. Field Studies Program for International Military and Civilian Students and Military Sponsored Visitors

This chapter describes the policy, goal, objective, responsibilities, planning and development, implementation strategies and methods, funding and constraints of the Field Studies Program, formerly known as the International Program.

Section I
Policies, Goal, and Objective

11-1. Field studies program policy

a. Each IMS attending military and selected contractor training in the United States, or participating in an orientation tour arranged under SCETP sponsorship will be given the opportunity to participate in the Field Studies Program according to DODI 5410.17. The Field Studies Program is an integral part of the total training program, and is second in importance only to the military objectives for which the IMS is in training. Participation in Field Studies Program activities other than those that are integral parts of the course program of instruction is voluntary but highly encouraged.

1. The provisions of this chapter also apply to IMS undergoing training at U.S. training installations overseas as appropriate to the surrounding environment.
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not apply to foreign personnel visiting at the personal invitation of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; self-invited visits; or other programs not managed in accordance with the security assistance training process.

b. The specific Field Studies Program objective to provide IMS with an awareness and understanding of the American democratic way of life has been derived from the laws authorizing the programs that make up the Security Assistance Training Program: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

c. The Field Studies Program implementation funds will be included in course tuition rates. Funds will cover transportation, meals, lodging, admissions, tours and associated fees and service charges in accordance with current versions of DOD 5105.28-M and DOD 7000.14-R Volume 15.

d. Public Law 108-7, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, imposes constraints on the Field Studies Program. Funds supporting the Field Studies Program shall not be expended to pay for alcoholic beverages or for activities that are substantially recreational, including but not limited to entrance fees at sporting events, theatrical and musical productions and amusement/park parks.

11-2. Field Studies Program Goal and Specific Objective

The goal of the Field Studies Program is to ensure that international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the responsibilities of governments, militaries, and citizens to protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every individual. The Field Studies Program will be developed and implemented with the specific objective of promoting an understanding of U.S. society, institutions, and ideals and the way in which these elements reflect U.S. commitment to basic principles of internationally recognized human rights. To achieve this objective, the Field Studies Program will provide students and visitors with an understanding of the following facets of American life, within the limits of time and availability:


b. Diversity & American Life. How the United States fosters political, economic, and social pluralism; the geographic, religious, and social diversity of American life; progress in applying American ideals to ethnic minorities and women, including how they address gender-based violence. How American Families live and work in cities, towns, and rural areas; how Americans function in communities, worship, work together in organizations, participate in cultural and historical events; the role of volunteerism in American life.

c. U.S. Government Institutions. U.S. institutions of democratic governance, including electoral and legislative processes and civilian control of the military, and the institution and improvement of public administration at the national, intergovernmental, state and local levels.

d. Political processes. American democracy and political reform, including opening the political process to all members of society, the practice of free elections, freedom of association, and the influence of various governmental and non-governmental organizations that promote democracy, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the political process.

e. The Judicial System. The U.S. establishment of the rule of law and an effective judicial system, the role of the military justice system and its procedures, and the laws and institutions for addressing extremist violence and taking effective action to prosecute those who are alleged to have committed crimes.

f. The Free Market System. The success of the U.S. economy due to land and tax system reform, encouragement of private enterprise and individual initiative, creation of favorable investment climates, curbing corruption where it exists, and spurring balanced trade; the independent roles of labor and management in negotiating pay, working hours and conditions, and other benefits associated with employment; the factors underlying industry and agricultural production, and how environmental protection has altered each; and the role of environmental protection.

g. Education. The purpose and range of educational institutions, the value of an educated and responsible citizenry, and the educational opportunities available to all citizens.

h. Health and Human Services. The U.S. institutions that provide quality healthcare and voluntary Family planning services, housing, and other services, and the policies that are components of a social safety net, particularly for infants, children, and people with disabilities.

i. Media. The role of a free press and other communications media in American life; how diversity of media ensures people of all races, creeds and political persuasions can be heard (for example, editorials, letters to the editor) and ensures diverse, pluralistic culture.

j. International Peace & Security. How the United States accomplishes effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding with foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

k. Law of War. The part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, often called the "law of armed conflict." For the purposes of this facet, the law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of
hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to
which the United States is a part, and applicable customary international law.

Section II

Field Studies Program Responsibilities

   a. The DSCA directs and supervises the Field Studies Program, including program funding.
   b. The DSCA publishes Field Studies Program implementing instructions in DOD 5105.38–M.

11–4. Under Secretary of Defense

11–5. Military services
   a. The Military Services will establish, administer, operate, and review the Field Studies Program at their respective installations based upon guidance in DOD 5410.17 and DOD 5105.38–M.
   b. Each Military Service will designate an Field Studies Program manager/Field Studies Program point of contact.
   c. The Military Service will ensure that each installation commander or school commandant involved in training international students implements the Field Studies Program in accordance with the references cited in paragraph 11–1, above. Military Service will also ensure adequate personnel support for the Field Studies Program, generally through an IMSO.

11–6. Combatant commanders
   Combatant Command staff will ensure that Security Cooperation Organization are educated on the Field Studies Program objective and goal and that all IMS are briefed on the Field Studies Program prior to their departure for training.

Section III

Field Studies Program Planning Considerations

11–7. Place of field studies program in the Security Cooperation Education and Training Program
   One of the objectives of the SCETP is to promote better understanding of the United States, its people, political systems, institutions, values, and way of life. Consequently, it is critical that IMS be exposed to non-military aspects of life in the United States in addition to their military training.

11–8. Types of field studies program events
   The Field Studies Program activities and events must be both interesting and educational in order to meet the objective of the program and to get maximum participation from IMS. The Field Studies Program Handbook provides many examples of possible Field Studies Program events along with information packets, sample student information and evaluation forms for both escorts and students. Local conditions will have a major impact on planning an Field Studies Program.
   a. Local events can be conducted at the military installation or in the surrounding civilian community. These could include—
      (1) A guest speaker, film and discussion, or a roundtable discussion on a topic in the news. These events should generally prepare students for an upcoming trip.
      (2) A day trip to a local city council meeting, court, business, school, or other public institution.
      (3) A social event such as a picnic planned in conjunction with a local civic group, providing IMS the opportunity to get to know people in the local civilian community.
      b. Overnight events can be conducted within in the surrounding area. These trips could include:
         (1) A trip to the state capitol, including meetings with and or briefings by elected or appointed officials.
         (2) A trip to a university, farm, business or historical site including tours, meetings, and/or speakers.
      c. A Washington, DC field trip is authorized for IMS in selected courses designated by the Military Service. A maximum of 4 days plus travel time is authorized for the trip.
         (1) The purpose of this trip is to provide opportunities for IMS to achieve a deeper understanding and appreciation of the U.S. Federal Government and how governmental institutions affect U.S. citizens and people and nations throughout the world. It is important that, before arrival in Washington, DC, IMS be familiar with local and state government in the area of the military installation where they are undergoing training.
         (2) Training installations are responsible for arranging roundtrip transportation to meet the approved trip schedule and for preparing IMS for their experience in Washington, DC.
(3) U.S. personnel designated as escorts will be knowledgeable about the SCETP in general and the Field Studies Program in particular. They will also have a general knowledge about how the U.S. government functions and be prepared to make maximum use of the Washington, DC field trip to attain the Field Studies Program objective. Escorts will brief IMS on each day’s itinerary, describing the significance of the places to be visited. Escorts will emphasize that IMS will follow the full planned itinerary, with exceptions only in case of illness or other emergency.

d. Sponsorship programs are important in assisting IMS in getting to know American people and how they live. Sponsorship programs, both military and civilian, are voluntary and labor-intensive, but their value cannot be overestimated. IMSO will exercise care in selecting sponsors who have a genuine interest in helping international students and their families to understand the American people. Sponsors will not use their positions to enhance their personal or commercial businesses, enterprises or interests.

1. Military sponsors are normally U.S. classmates of IMS who volunteer to assist the IMS in understanding unfamiliar terms, and so forth. Often sponsors and IMS become good friends and associate both inside and outside the classroom.

2. Civilian sponsors generally come from the local community. They invite the IMS into their homes and may take them on family trips, to sporting events, and so forth. Chambers of Commerce and other civic groups may welcome IMS to civilian communities, and members may become sponsors. Civilian organizations established for welcoming foreign visitors to the United States exist near most training installations, and can play an important role in the sponsor program.

e. Events such as receptions, luncheons, and so forth, will encourage the mingling of IMS and U.S. personnel, military, civilian or both. These special events, like the other events in the program, should support the goals and objectives of the Field Studies Program.

11–9. Travel and transportation

a. The USG or USG-contracted transportation will be used to the fullest extent possible for economy. IMSO are authorized to arrange for transportation and other support required for the Field Studies Program through installation support activities.

b. Commercial transportation is authorized if USG transportation is unavailable or inadequate.

c. The Field Studies Program funds are authorized for use as a gratuity for the driver of a USG-contracted or commercial means of transportation. Gratuity amount shall not exceed normal percentage rate for such.

d. The Field Studies Program trips will be limited to a MILDEP-determined radius in miles from the training installation. See paragraph 11–24 for Army, paragraph 11–35(a)(b) for Navy, paragraph 11–50g for Marine Corps, and paragraph 11–49 for Air Force for MILDEP limitations. Exceptions are the Washington, DC field trip for selected students and Field Studies Program trips planned in conjunction with academic trips. In the latter situation the MILDEP-determined radius begins at the temporary duty location. Additional limited exceptions must be authorized by the appropriate Military Service Field Studies Program Manager.

e. Excess baggage is not authorized on Field Studies Program trips.

11–10. Family members in the field studies program

When considered appropriate, Family members may accompany their sponsors on Field Studies Program trips at no additional cost to the USG. An exception is for minor costs, when individual collection from Family members for their share is impracticable; for example, parking fees or tolls.

Section IV

Developing the Field Studies Program Plan

11–11. Developing the annual field studies program plan

a. Annual Field Studies Program plan requirements. Each training installation/activity IMSO or designated POC will prepare an annual Field Studies Program plan which will be sent to the responsible Military Service Field Studies Program Manager for approval in advance of implementation. Planning details including suspense dates are provided in the Service specific sections of this chapter.

b. Identifying conditions. In order to plan effectively, IMSO must first determine the conditions that prevail at their installations, including funds required. The following should be considered in developing an annual Field Studies Program plan:

(1) The target audiences for the Field Studies Program events: grade/rank, countries/regions of origin, type of military training, and so forth. Some events that are appropriate for senior officers are not appropriate for junior enlisted personnel.

(2) The length of time students will be at the installation, along with periods of maximum student load to facilitate timing of significant Field Studies Program events.

(3) When the training schedule can accommodate Field Studies Program events (during duty hours, only on weekends or after duty hours, and so on). In courses consisting only of IMS, Field Studies Program events can
sometimes be made part of the course of instruction. Maximum use should be made of time that becomes available when IMS are excluded from classified portions of courses.

(4) Installations whose education/training programs are primarily academic in nature may find it appropriate to include lectures and seminars on Field Studies Program topics in their courses of study. In all instances where seminars, lectures, or film showings are scheduled, the atmosphere should be informal. Questions and open discussion periods should be encouraged.

c. Identifying available resources. The IMSO should become familiar with elected and appointed officials in the local city or county government(s) in the local civilian community. Local civic groups, organizations, agencies, businesses, and historical attractions should be contacted for potential program support and as possible sponsor sources. Local primary and secondary schools as well as colleges and universities can be very helpful in planning Field Studies Program events. Local events in which IMS mix with U.S. citizens should make up the foundation of the Field Studies Program. It is important for IMS to become familiar with state as well as local governments, and so the IMSO should also be familiar with elected and appointed officials at the state level. In addition, attractions in the general vicinity that focus on Field Studies Program topics should be investigated (for example, civil rights museums/tours, presidential libraries, Revolutionary and Civil War battlefields, Native American reservations).

d. Using the building block approach. The IMSO is responsible for preparing IMS for Field Studies Program events in order to achieve the maximum benefit. IMS should always be briefed in advance of an event so that they understand the purpose of the event and have sufficient information to profit from the event. For example, a trip to a local elementary school should be preceded by a guest speaker, film, or the IMSO describing the American educational system. Events should be followed by a discussion period with a frank and open exchange of ideas. Both escorts and students should complete event evaluation sheets, which can be used to determine the value of the event for future students.

e. Establishing priorities. All Field Studies Program events should include human rights aspects, and these should be discussed with IMS prior to the event. The words "human rights" do not have to be used with IMS, but the right itself, such as the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, should be identified prior to the event, such as observing a political rally, a march endorsing or opposing a government action. Field Studies Program events should provide IMS with out-of-the-classroom, practical experiences that reinforce the Field Studies Program goal. Top priority events are those that have clear human rights aspects, demonstrate American values and diversity in a democratic society, and focus on such topics as the Constitution and Bill of Rights; local, State and Federal Government institutions; judicial systems; civilian and military relationships and the U.S. political process. The IMSO, with the assistance of the Military Service Field Studies Program Manager, should develop an Field Studies Program plan that ensures that every IMS has the opportunity to participate in the Field Studies Program.

f. Scheduling events. Scheduling requires careful coordination with training departments and tracking of students to determine IMS availability. The IMSO should determine the desirability of conducting Field Studies Program events for students in selected classes as opposed to opening every event to every IMS. Planning quality events is of the utmost importance.

11–12. Field studies program event escorts

a. In most cases the IMSO will serve as the primary DOD escort for IMS participating in a Field Studies Program event. The IMSO is responsible for carefully preparing any additional escorts for their duties.

(1) DOD escorts must be knowledgeable about the SCETP in general and the Field Studies Program in particular. In addition, escorts should clearly understand and be able to articulate the objective(s) of the event in which they are participating.

(2) DOD escorts should have sufficient information to be able to answer some IMS questions, and to be able to carry on a conversation on the topic at hand. They should have a basic knowledge of U.S. Government and history, particularly the Constitution, and of internationally recognized human rights.

(3) DOD escorts should be accustomed to working with IMS.

b. The recommended number of DOD escorts for Field Studies Program trips will be one escort for every ten IMS. If for any reason an IMS becomes incapacitated during an extended Field Studies Program trip, a DOD escort will be designated to stay with the IMS and make the necessary change in travel arrangements for both of them to return to home station. IMSO will immediately notify the appropriate MILDEP should this occur.

11–13. Planning and conducting individual field studies program events

Individual events must be carefully planned. The IMSO is the key figure in the planning, and is assisted as appropriate by additional personnel both within the IMSO and outside the office. The Field Studies Program Handbook contains information packets with sample event information sheets along with sample student and escort evaluation sheets. In general, the "learning by seeing and experiencing" process should be followed. Local trips and other events at which knowledgeable military and civilian experts receive IMS and make presentations or conduct discussions in their particular areas can be valuable. Those who address IMS should be familiar with the goal of the Field Studies Program,
the specific purpose of the visit, and the English language comprehension level of the IMS. This requires advance coordination by IMSO personnel.

a. The IMSO or escort will be knowledgeable, although not necessarily expert, about all aspects of the planned event. Logistical requirements must be arranged in advance so that the event will proceed smoothly.

b. The IMSO or escort will brief IMS on the event, to include the learning objective(s), in advance. Any written material provided to IMS should be carefully prepared and reviewed to ensure it is clear, concise, and designed to enhance IMS experience.

c. Escorts will engage IMS in conversation as appropriate during the event to ensure IMS questions are answered and that objectives of the event are met.

d. Escorts will conduct an after action review with students following the event in order to summarize the event and to reemphasize the objectives, then provide students with Field Studies Program event evaluation sheets.

e. Escorts will complete an escort assessment sheet.

f. The IMSO will review event evaluation and escort assessment sheets and use the resulting information to determine events that should be retained, revised, or eliminated from the annual Field Studies Program.

Section V
Field Studies Program Funding

11–14. Source of funding
Funds for the Field Studies Program are derived from course tuition costs.

11–15. Funding field studies program activities
The following are general funding-related guidelines for Field Studies Program activities:

a. The IMS participating in Field Studies Program field trip are considered to be in a duty status. Therefore, appropriate orders will be published for IMS participating in Field Studies Program activities in excess of 10 hours.

b. The IMET and other IMS authorized living allowances paid by the USG will continue to receive the living allowance during Field Studies Program activities, regardless of length.

c. The Field Studies Program funds generally are used for field trip, admissions, and other activities that accomplish one or more Field Studies Program facets. However, Field Studies Program funds may also be used to support certain activities on the training installation that accomplish specific Field Studies Program objectives provided the activities are approved by the appropriate Military Service Field Studies Program Manager.

d. The Field Studies Program overnight trips must be approved by the appropriate Military Service Field Studies Program Manager.

e. The Field Studies Program field trips, including the Washington, DC field trip, will be conducted on an all-expense-paid basis.

(1) An escort may be appointed as a class A paying agent/cashier to permit advance withdrawal of Field Studies Program funds to defray trip costs.

(2) Authorized expenses include transportation, lodging, meals, gratuities for meals and transportation, admissions and related fees, and brochures, pamphlets, and maps used as handouts. Personal expenses of the IMS, such as laundry, phone calls, and room service, are the responsibility of the IMS.

f. Funding is authorized for guests at Field Studies Program functions such as luncheons, dinners, and receptions that are planned to facilitate IMS and U.S. personnel meeting and engaging in conversation. The ratio for guests to students is 3 to 1. Exceptions must be authorized by the appropriate Military Service Field Studies Program Manager in advance.

11–16. Funding constraints

a. Funds supporting the Field Studies Program will not be expended to pay for alcoholic beverages or for activities that are substantially recreational, including but not limited to entrance fees at sporting events, theatrical and musical productions and amusement/theme parks.

b. The Field Studies Program funds will not be used to support purely academic objectives, such as trips that are an integral part of the course curriculum for U.S. students. IMS expenses for such trips will be included in the course tuition apart from Field Studies Program.

c. The Field Studies Program funds will not be used to defray transportation expenses for trips with academic and entertainment rather than Field Studies Program objectives. However, Field Studies Program funds may be used for Field Studies Program events conducted in conjunction with academic trips.

11–17. Use of field studies program funds
Funds are authorized by respective Military Service for implementation of the Field Studies Program. Control of expenditures under this category is the responsibility of the Military Service and is addressed in the MILDEP sections.

a. The IMSO may be authorized to be reimbursed for legitimate out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a direct result of
POST-SCRIPT: A RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S REPORT TITLED “INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING: AGENCIES SHOULD EMPHASIZE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING AND IMPROVE EVALUATIONS.”

After the completion of this thesis in mid-October 2011, the Government Accountability Office published GAO-12-123, a study titled “International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations.” This report was released on October 27th, 2011. As spelled out in the title, this report focuses on two issues of concern to the Congress. The first is the concern that human rights and related concepts were not sufficiently addressed by program planning documents, nor were they considered a high enough priority by the training managers for countries that received low rankings for civil freedoms by Freedom House. Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office’s researchers concluded that neither State nor Defense are adequately assessing International Military Education and Training effectiveness.

I fully agree with this study that there is a lot of work to be done to develop a robust and useful assessment system for these programs. However, I would argue that when such an effort comes to fruition, it will produce results that argue against the human rights advocacy approach this report recommends. While the Congressional goals of improving human rights standards is a very worthy one, there are better ways to achieve this impact than the suggested approaches.


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Fulbright Alumni Association.” President’s Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies: Background Papers and Studies (November 1979): 221-223.


*Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program, A Fulbright Program, Program Guidelines for Humphrey Fellows, 2010-2011*. Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program Division, Department of Scholar and Professional Program of the Institute of International Education. April 2010.


*Outcome Assessment of the Visiting Fulbright Student Program,* SRI International Center for Science, Technology and Economic Development, for Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Washington, DC: June 2005,

Petraeus, David H. “To Ph.D. or Not to Ph.D. . . .” *The American Interest* 2, issue 6 (Vacation (July/August) 2007), 16-20.


