

COMMONALITY OF CONTEMPORARY EXTREMIST GROUPS:
WHY SOME FALL AND OTHERS FLOURISH

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary extremist groups pose a significant threat to stability and their actions influence US foreign policy. An analysis of why some contemporary extremist groups fall while others flourish reveal common attributes that inform an enhanced US government policy and response strategy. The identification and characterization of extremist groups reveals two major types – those based on political ideology and those based on religion.

Analysis of case studies and data bases on how extremist groups end indicates that those based on political ideology flourish when the single political issue is well defined and the group exploits the media and international organizations effectively. Extremist groups based on political ideology fail most often through direct law enforcement actions that capture or kill the leadership. Political ideology based extremist groups that flourish often transform into political parties and cease terrorist activities.

Analysis of case studies and data bases on how extremist groups based on religion focused on the three Abrahamic faiths – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These religious extremist groups share five common attributes: a search for meaning, a sense of religious duty, a quest for purity, inspirational leadership, and scripture as justification. Religious

extremist groups that flourish are highly effective in each of these common attributes. Some Zionist, Christian and Islamic extremist groups have achieved their goals and transformed into political parties. Characterization and comparative case studies of currently active Islamic extremist groups reveal a common perceived threat of modernity and globalization. Islamic extremist groups are engaged in the definition of an Islamic identity, cultural and worldview.

US government foreign policy and response strategy will be more successful in ending extremist groups by understanding why some fall and others flourish. An enhanced diplomatic response that fully integrates the proper balance of soft and hard power is essential for success. Diplomatic engagement, de-radicalization and political inclusion augmented by civilian, intelligence and military actions appears to be the most effective response to prevail in the struggle with religious extremist groups.

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INTRODUCTION

Extremist groups of the late 20th Century have influenced United States (US) foreign policy choices for more than 50 years. The US and its allies took a multifaceted approach to responding to the threats extremist posed to the stability of the West. This thesis analyzes the commonality and attributes of contemporary extremist groups in an effort to understand why some groups have failed while others have survived and others have transformed into non-extremist groups. It is necessary to define extremist and terrorist. The term extremist is used to describe the actions or ideologies of individuals or groups outside the perceived political, cultural, or religious center of a society. The main focus is on extremist groups which take violent action to further their ideology or worldview. Because of the emphasis on violent action when referring to extremist groups, the term *terrorist groups* is interchangeable with extremist groups.

Since September 11th 2001, much of the academic, political and policy work has focused on understanding the origins of extremist groups. A causal relationship can be found between terrorists groups and political ideology (e.g. the Irish Republican Army (IRA)), terrorist groups and religion (e.g. Hamas) and the confluence of all both factors in entities such as Hezbollah when discussing the origins or the formation of extremist groups. The influence of these factors on the origins and the formation of extremist groups has been widely studied, including extensive case studies on hundreds of terrorist groups including the three (IRA, Hamas, Hezbollah) mentioned above.

There has been scant research, however, on the organizational, ideological, tactical, and behavioral tendencies that explain why certain extremist groups have failed while others have survived and others have transformed into non-extremist groups (often political parties). Individual studies have sought to explain certain groups in isolation. This thesis seeks to identify and discuss characteristics, trends and commonalities which led to groups' failure, survival, or transformation. It will build upon the work of two studies which are concerned with how terrorists groups end.

In *Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda*, Audrey Cronin provides the first examination of the strategies of terrorism in an historical context with specific details on the potential consequences for Al Qaeda. Included in this study is the determination of the durability of terrorist groups. Cronin identifies six pathways in which terrorist groups end or are deemed durable. These endings are usually precipitated by a defining moment or event. This insight was developed by examining the commonalities amongst different groups in the last months of their existence. This Cronin study provides useful baseline information on how and why terrorists groups end for the analysis in this thesis. It is especially important and insightful to consider how terrorist groups end because for the past 20 years the overwhelming preponderance of research has focused on the causes of terrorism. An understanding of how terrorist groups end will inform the international community and US national security policy.

How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida by Seth Jones at the RAND Corporation is the first systematic examination, the most comprehensive and

far reaching study on the end of terrorists groups. Jones analyzed a broad spectrum of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006 and examines how some groups ended. Most groups that ended did so because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they negotiated a settlement with their governments. Military force was rarely (7%) the primary reason a terrorist group ended, and a few terrorist groups succeeded. Are there characteristics, trends and commonalities among groups with the same outcome (fail, flourish or transform)? This is the central theme important to the research and analysis conducted here. Jones evaluated five factors that influence how long terrorist groups last and how they end: ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, the size of groups, and the breadth of terrorist goals. This thesis will build upon Jones' research in the regime type and ideological motivation areas to ascertain what level of influence religion plays in the longevity of extremist groups.

The primary methodological approach for this thesis is a qualitative assessment of the organizational, ideological, tactical, and behavioral constructs of extremist organizations and a primary focus on those groups in which religion is a fundamental tenet of the movement. This emphasis on extremist groups which have religion as a fundamental tenet of the movement is essential because of the dramatic increase in their number, size and global impact on society and international security.

Faith and religion are perhaps the single most unifying force in the world today. According to the *World Christian Encyclopedia* by David Barrett and the *World*

Christian Database, of the more than 6 billion people alive today, 86% consider themselves as having a faith, whereas 14% consider themselves non-religious or of pre-modern religious faith. The largest group consists of the Abrahamic faiths – Jews, Christians, and Muslims - which represent about 53% of the world’s population. The next group, representing approximately 19%, is the Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Indian subcontinent religions based on reincarnation. Representing about 10%, are a group of people ranging from non-religious or ‘don’t know’ to agnostic and atheists. According to Barrett, there is a group of pre-modern or folk religion people who together represent the remaining 14%.¹ The vast majority (86%) of the humans on the planet are religious; despite all the discussion of secular society, modernization and globalization, religion clearly matters.

Because the overwhelming majority of people in the world today use religion or faith to define who they are, they also use religion or faith to define others. It is the connection between religion, identity and in the definition of others where the seeds of extremism and violence are often sown. The continuing focus by Al Qaeda, for example, on the strategic framing of injustice and grievances, their causes, motivations and associated templates for action has served to emphasize the central importance of Islam and its enduring conflict with other Abrahamic religions and by association with the West in general terms. In 1998, the declaration of the World Islamic Front, by Osama bin Laden is replete with religious associations used as templates for overarching action against the West, Christians and Jews by aligning the West with the Crusades and with

the State of Israel in a cosmic struggle “...despite the great devastation inflicted upon the Iraqi people by the hands of the Judeo-Crusader alliance....”² The unflattering religious characterization of others is not limited to extremist individuals or groups, but is frequently associated with the fundamental tenet of religion itself and is often broadly accepted and widely believed to be a fundamental precept of the religion. For example, in describing Islam as the only real civilization, Sayyid Qutb simplifies the world into two parts; Islam and the rest “Islam knows only two kinds of societies, the Islamic and the *jahili*³... the *jahili* society is that which does not follow Islam....”⁴ Through the association of all other civilizations as *jahili*, Qutb justifies his widely promulgated definition of jihad, an important component of which is for “abolishing the organizations and authorities of the *Jahili* system....”⁵ Because of the way in which Qutb used his concept of *jahili* in describing others, his message resonated through association with the historical references of the traditional uses of the term which are familiar with every Muslim. As such, Islamic extremist groups today justify violence against secular or Western-leaning governments which are deemed *jahili*. This is an example of the connection between religion, identity and the characterization of others where the seeds of extremism and violence are often sown.

However, extremist groups such as Qutb or terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are not alone in this characterization. Bernard Lewis tried to explain it this way, “For a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against the Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness. The Muslims have

suffered successive stages of defeat.”⁶ The civilization win/loss prism by which Islam is characterized has taken on populist dimensions. It is difficult to open a major broadsheet newspaper or mainstream magazine and not find another commentary on the Muslim or Islamic threat. Routinely, this type of commentary is often replete with inaccuracies that coincide with oversimplification. But oversimplification is not limited to journalism as demonstrated by Samuel Huntington’s simplification of the militancy of Islam when he stated, “the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc, from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia, has bloody borders.”⁷ Such oversimplification is not limited to recent times. Prominent Western writers such as Marlowe, Fletcher, Shakespeare, Milton and others used the term Arab or Arabian, as related to the medieval heritage of Islamic civilization, to connote wealthy, exotic and violent behavior.⁸ In general, Muslims find the Western media’s lack of sensitivity and blatant ignorance to be offensive. “Muslims have gone through a terrible trauma during the last two hundred years -- the tribulation of God’s people who unaccountably found themselves at the bottom of the heap.”⁹ Other players abound when it comes to the sport of demonizing Muslims, many of which come from the Christian Right in the US, e.g. the Reverend Jerry Falwell, or from US allies, e.g. politicians in Israel. This has had serious implications for dialogue and has fostered a view where Muslims “almost become untouchables, and given the worldwide influence of this evangelicalism, it has a significant negative impact on Muslim-Christian relations”.¹⁰

There is a cultural bias against extremist groups which have a different religion as a fundamental tenet of the movement. Faith-based extremism is religion independent.

Virtually all religions have a history of extremism and most religiously-based extremist groups have justified violence in the name of their faith. Despite religion's emphasis on unerring truth, all religions are pluralist movements which have examples of extremism. This not only applies to the Abrahamic faiths but also to the belief systems without gods such as Buddhism (e.g. Aum Shinrinkyo and Falung Gong) as well as multiple-gods-belief-systems such as Hinduism (e.g. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh).¹¹ This makes extremist groups which have religion as a fundamental tenet unique amongst extremist groups "writ large". For example, religious extremist groups are among the most durable and long lasting when compared to all other categories of terrorist groups.¹² It is within the uniqueness of extremist groups where the commonality among groups can be found. The relationship between these commonalities is critical in understanding why some extremist groups have failed while others have survived and others have transformed into non-extremist groups.

In Chapters 1 and 2, the intent is to begin by characterizing significant extremist groups of the late 20th Century to identify natural groupings of extremist movements. This will provide the first insight into the basic patterns of extremist groups. On one level, methods include a comparative history of terrorist groups since the 1960s. This will assist in the identification of the patterns of violence, organizational structures and tendencies common within contemporary terrorist groups. The information and data for this analysis is obtained through primary sources identified above augmented with statistical information assessing the rising or falling popularity of the groups over time.

An important aspect of this analysis is a discovery and definition of common attributes of the extremists groups identified and characterized in the Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 summarizes and discusses the five common attributes of religious extremist groups. While many studies have shown common attributes with respect to the formation of extremist groups, particularly those with religious ideology at their core, this thesis is one of the few examinations of common attributes with respect to success and durability. In *When Religion Becomes Evil*, Kimball provides a unique perspective of the factor influencing the human corruption of religion. Focusing on the Christian and Islamic faiths, which make up almost half of the world's population, Kimball provides detailed analysis on the five major warning signs of the corruption of religion. The five warning signs are: absolute truth claims, blind obedience, establishing the "ideal" time, a philosophy of the "end justifies the means" and finally, declaring holy war. These five warning signs are often precursors in the development of religious extremist groups.¹³ This thesis will build on Kimball's work by mapping those warning signs to the common attributes of religious extremist groups. One component of this analysis of common attributes is an assessment of their role in determining success, failure or transformation of religious extremist groups.

The natural progression for this thesis is the characterization of current Islamic extremist groups. This is the focus of Chapter 4. A more detailed examination of the five common attributes in Islamic extremist groups provides insight into the components of a potentially successful approach to countering such groups. Within the context of the

similarities of Islamic extremist groups, an examination of the social identity and cultural framings provides further insight. One revealing aspect is the multiplicity and complexity of views on how Islam is dealing with modernity and globalization. This is the dominant commonality that essentially all Islamic extremist groups share. Hence, an assessment of how Islamic groups deal with modernity is discussed in greater detail. The focus here is on explaining the survivability of Islamic extremist groups and what makes those different from the Zionist and Christian religious extremist groups.

The other significant methodological approach for this thesis are comparative case studies to understand why specific terrorist groups rise and persist while many others disappear relatively quickly. The case studies offer a useful approach to help understand how and why groups fall while others flourish. What are the key factors for their duration, decline, success, popularity and transformation? Are there apparent natural stages of development and progression? This type of examination requires specific case studies. The case studies presented here serve to better understand the commonality extremist groups that fail. As such, the examples used are selective rather than exhaustive.

It is virtually impossible to gain a better understanding of how and why extremist groups fail while others survive or flourish without examining the impact of government policy and responses to terrorism by those groups. This is necessary because all extremist groups, particularly religiously-based groups, have a political agenda. There are several potential responses to the political aim of an extremist group. These

responses include: diplomatic disengagement; civilian police, intelligence and military responses; diplomatic engagement; and de-radicalization and political inclusion. The potential policy responses and their impact on Islamic extremist groups is the focus of Chapter 5. Since the traditional tactical and counterterrorism responses to contemporary Islamic extremist groups appear to be ineffective, it seems prudent to describe elements of an effective policy and response strategy to limit the expansion and to expedite the end of Islamic extremist groups.

CHAPTER 1 – EXTREMIST GROUPS OF THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

A brief history of extremist groups in the late 20th Century demonstrates how World War II changed everything and facilitated the rapid emergence of a constantly increasing number of violent extremist group engaged in global terrorism.

1.1 Brief History of Extremist Groups

Extremist groups committing acts of terror are a part of human history. During the 20th Century, extremist groups throughout the world took violent actions to terrorize society in hopes of achieving their political or religious goals. The point of terrorism is to terrorize; to force society to acquiesce to the extremist group. From antiquity to the present, the use of terrorism by extremist groups is well documented.¹ World War II transformed terrorism into an instrument of resistance that became common in the subsequent wars of national liberation (1940s to 1960s). Many extremist groups engaged in guerrilla warfare including terrorism to further a political agenda.² In 1968, extremist groups in Latin America and Palestine initiated the tactic of terrorism as a “publicity stunt”.³ In 1979, the success of Shiite Islamism in the Iranian revolution facilitated the rise of suicide bombings by the traditional glorification of martyrdom and inspired Hamas and al Qaeda.⁴ Also beginning in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a global jihad with Sunni-inspired Radical Islamists traveling from Muslim regions to Pakistan for training and weapons to join the fight. In 1983, the suicide bombing in Lebanon that killed 241 American Marines and the retreat of ‘the enemy’ was perhaps the

most important triumph of international extremist groups. Many contemporary extremist groups assert that God is engaged on their side (the forces of good) in a battle against the forces of evil.⁵ Violent extremist groups active today are better understood in the context of the failure, success or transformation of similar groups in the late 20th Century.

1.1.1 The Rise of Democracies

In Postwar Palestine, the Jewish extremist group the Irgun (commanded by future Prime Minister Menachem Begin) implemented a terrorist campaign against the British Army that included the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The Irgun's dramatic terrorist attacks attracted worldwide attention to the Zionist grievances against Britain and their claims for statehood. The Irgun was successful and transformed into a political entity in the new State of Israel.⁶ In Cyprus and Algeria, anti-colonial extremist groups with a political goal of independence conducted terrorist campaigns based on the Irgun template and adapted to the local situation. The EOKA appealed to "Dipolmats of the World" to end foreign rule of Cyprus and attracted international attention through terrorist actions.⁷ The EOKA leader Grivas coordinated his activities with the Church Council of Cypress and its leader Makarios. The Independent republic of Cypress was created in 1959 and Makarios was elected as the first President. The FLN waged a terrorist bombing campaign against the symbols of French rule (and innocent civilians) in Algeria. A brutal response by the French military defeated the FLN in the "Battle of Algiers", but the FLN's subsequent triumph was based on international response to that brutality. The examples of Israel, Cypress and Algeria, demonstrated that terror is

effective as an instrument of political change.⁸ The evolution and development of contemporary extremist groups captured the successful elements of the anti-colonial terrorism campaigns: the publicity value inherent in terrorism, a coordinated appeal to an international audience, and capability to mobilize sympathy and support.

1.1.2 Social Movements Based on Political Structure

The leftist politically motivated extremist groups active in Europe, Japan, and Latin America, during the late 20th Century, were essentially armed insurgencies. As the terrorist actors were unable to garner popular national or international support, they failed and were often consumed by internal violent purges. The leftist student / worker social movement often devolved into highly fragmented anarchist cells.⁹ Terrorist social movements arise from new opportunities and signify the vulnerability of the state to collective violent action.¹⁰ An extensive review of case studies from Italy, Spain, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Japan and Northern Ireland highlights the fluid boundary between terrorist organizations and legitimate political parties.¹¹ Some political parties have turned to terrorism and some terrorist groups have turned to party politics.¹² The pathway from terrorism to peaceful political party competition is best exemplified by Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. For all of these internal conflicts, transformation of terrorist groups required a mechanism to accommodate the disaffected minorities often mediated by another nation.

1.1.3 International Terrorism

The extremist group, the PLO, was the first truly international terrorist organization. Its leader, Yassir Arafat acknowledged implementing the successful tactics from the Irgun, EOKA and the FLN. The PLO was the first extremist group to: 1) forge alliances with other terrorist groups and sell them training; and 2) pursue accumulation of capital and wealth as a priority. The PLO's success sent a powerful message to emerging extremist groups. However, its success has also transformed the extremist organization to focus on establishing relationships with as many governments as possible. The PLO has restrained its international terror campaign and limited acts of terrorism against Israeli targets to facilitate better government relations with the West. The PLO (al-Fatah) has transformed to the bureaucratic and corrupt elected government of the West Bank and Gaza.¹³

1.1.4 Religious Fundamentalism

The success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 signaled the emergence of modern terrorist organizations. From 1968 to 1980, the ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated extremist terrorist groups increased in number from eleven identifiable international terrorist groups to sixty-four groups. Only two of these groups active in 1980 could be classified as religious in character and motivation (Shi'a and al-Dawa); by 1992 there were eleven and today there are hundreds. As religious extremist groups grew in number and recognition, the number and stature of ethno-nationalist

groups declined. The core characteristics of religious terrorism are: violence is a divine duty, blessing of terrorist operations by a religious figure, and definition of the enemy as everyone outside the organization.¹⁴ While only a minority of fundamentalists resort to terrorism, religious extremist groups share a common aspect of fundamentalism – an emotional and intellectual way of looking at the world and acting in that world. Fundamentalism is also a protest against rapid change and against elimination of religion from a prominent role in popular culture.¹⁵ Religious fundamentalism is a global phenomenon because it is a reaction against and also part of the globalizing modern world.¹⁶

1.2 Emergence of the Modern Extremist Group

The emergence of the modern extremist group is a unique mix of nationalism, religion, and globalization. Not all three characteristics are necessarily present nor are any consistently dominant when examining large numbers of extremist groups. However, the preponderance of the literature of the modern extremist groups rarely omits one or more of these three characteristics. It is therefore important to examine these three characteristics in the context of the modern extremist group to gain a better understanding of their impact and any causal relationship to the modern extremist group formation or lack thereof and on the durability, survivability and resilience.

1.2.1 Nationalism, Religion and Globalization

Many of the nationalist extremist movements of the past were rooted in message of anti-colonial themes which resonated with the global population. Perhaps the best example of the power of the anti-colonial nationalist appeal to the masses comes from the Algerian War of Independence from 1954-1962. During this period in Algeria's history a group emerged called the Front de Libération Nationale or FLN which called for the restoration of the Algerian state defined as sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam. Despite the message of independence shrouded in the religion of Islam, the fundamental tenets of the FLN were political and nationalistic in their implementation rather than religious. Religion was the road by which nationalism traveled since Algeria's population was overwhelmingly Muslim rather than the other way around. This was evident in the Evian Accords¹⁷ whereby the key demands revolved around property rights, equal protection, and government participation all of which were nationalist rather than religious in nature. Similar examples can be seen in different parts of the world with different religions such as "the overwhelmingly Catholic IRA, its Protestant counterparts arrayed in various loyalist paramilitary groups like the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Commandos; and the predominantly Muslim PLO."¹⁸ In each case the strategic imperative for these extremist groups were steeped in a political ideology with politically motivated desired outcomes rather than religiously based ones.

The opposite end of the spectrum to nationalism is religion when considering the modern extremist group. However, the religious tenets of the modern extremist group are anything but new. Muhammad Iqbal, one of the most influential Islamic writers, believed that there is an “absolute equality of all members of the community.....no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. Islam is the unity in which there is no distinction.”¹⁹ Syed Abul A'ala Maududi, went even further to separate nationalism from religion by fostering the concept that “the principle Unity of God altogether negates the concept of the legal and political sovereignty of human being, individually or collectively.”²⁰ For Maududi, “God alone is the sovereign and His commandments are the Law of Islam.”²¹ The concept of religion and nationalist tendencies are often at opposite ends of the continuum. This is particularly true when thinking about the religion- and nationalism-based contemporary extremist groups in the Arab world but also in Indonesia and Malaysia. It was true in the time of Iqbal’s and Maududi’s India and it is true to this day but not only in the Islamic world. Although Maududi and Iqbal are considered Islamic philosophers rather than extremists in the mold of Said Qutb, their writings are often used as justification for modern extremist groups. The religious component of the modern extremist group is not always as closely related as is in the example above. In the case of Northern Ireland, religion served as a beacon of social and cultural identity rather than as a guiding principle or strategic imperative contrasting Catholic and Protestant theological positions. That is not to say that there is no religious justification to the modern extremist groups and how they justify their extremism which

are not Islamic in their faith. The Reconstruction Theology and Christian Identity movements have produced extremist groups every bit as violent and as intolerant of those of other religious faiths.²² These two groups will be examined in much greater detail later but the important point here is that religion plays a significant role in the emergence of the modern extremist group. Religion alone, however, is not the end in and of itself when characterizing the modern extremist group.

Globalization has many definitions, but at its core it means the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas across borders. Globalization has been sped up by technology and it makes traditional notions of sovereign nation-state powers more and more irrelevant. Although many tend to associate globalization to the present circumstances of technological advancements which are breaking down traditional impediments to the movement people, ideas goods, and capital, globalization has impacted societies throughout history and is not new. Nineteenth century globalization, which encompassed every continent, was no less impactful than the contemporary globalization currently experienced. There were differences to be sure since the laws governing trade and investment were not as refined as they are today and the concept of time has been reduced substantially in most transactions. However, the impact of the breakdown of barriers to the flow of ideas, people, and goods across borders is no less today than it was a century ago. Using globalization as the foundation of describing the Other, resisting social and political rule of the Other is also not new.

One of the significant differences in contemporary globalization is its impact on the nation-state. In 19th Century globalization, the political elite could react and temper the social, cultural and political impacts of mass dislocations from changes in economic activity and the resulting social and cultural changes which threatened their rule. Contemporary globalization is characterized by the proliferation of decentralized, unregulated networks for raising and transferring large sums of money, mobilizing people, and changing perceptions more rapidly than ever before in human history.²³ Contemporary globalization is “one of the great transformations in history, comparable to the shift from the hunter-gatherer age to the era of agriculture, or from feudalism to industrialism.”²⁴ Because of these unique characteristics of contemporary globalization modern extremist group treats globalization as more than simply an economic, political or ideological model to rebel against but rather an opportunity to exploit the weaknesses in the traditional nation-state and the international system of institutions which support it. The modern extremist group *uses* globalization for its own ends not merely as a means to define themselves and the Other.

The basic attributes of the modern extremist group which emerged in the last quarter century within the context of nationalism, religion and globalization can be simplified into a few meaningful yet important observations. The modern extremist group is not monolithic in its ideology, strategy, methods, tactics or desired outcomes. Indeed, there is an increasing tendency for extremist groups to become hybrid groups or splinter groups. In the hybrid group there is a mixing or coalescing of extremism with

criminal activity. The criminal activity can be a variety of traditional elements ranging from insurrectionists to transnational organized criminal groups.²⁵ In the splinter group there can be many offshoots (usually more violent) while still loosely affiliating with the parent group through a thread of commonality based on religious or nationalist congruency. Both groups also share one unique attribute commonly associated with globalization – speed. They splinter or become hybrid at a surprisingly fast pace due to the technology leveraged and the breakdown of barriers or holes in the international system as a result of contemporary globalization.²⁶ The hybrid-splintering potential of the modern extremist groups is unique in history and contributes to their longevity. On the one hand, the lifespan of durable terrorist groups is relatively short (5 to 10 years).²⁷ However, those groups which have at their core nationalist or religious goals last the longest.²⁸ And the increase in contemporary religious-based extremism is not limited to Islam, although it tends to get the most exposure in the media and in academia. The increase in contemporary religious-based extremism involves not only all Abrahamic faiths, but also Sikhs and Hindus.²⁹ Depending on when one rejects the linkage to the original group, through splintering or hybrid effects, these groups may be quite durable and resilient. For example, if one accepts that the Muslim Brotherhood was established in the early 20th century and that the splinter group Hamas is linked to the original group then the Muslim Brotherhood exceeds all notions of durability according to Cronin, Jones, or Libecki. However, if Hamas is counted separately as an extremist group which was formed in 1987 as an outbreak to the Intifada, then the arguments set forth by Cronin

about the myth of durability hold true.³⁰ This same argument can be applied for Black September which was formed in 1971 and dissolved 1974 and briefly reconstituted in 1981.³¹ As an isolated, distinct, and separate extremist group, Black September came and went only serves to skew quantitative analysis about durability and longevity. The important concept here is not about durability for its own sake but rather what contributes to longevity of the modern extremist group. All evidence suggests that extremist groups with a coherent and simple message appealing to nationalist or religious tendencies of their audience have the potential to last longer primarily through the hybrid-splintering effect. This is an important element of the modern extremist group and when combined with contemporary globalization, the concepts of durability based on the historical context are likely to be less meaningful as we look at the present situation and peer into the future.

1.2.2 Extremist Groups go Global

The quest for broad support for extremist groups irrespective of place and time is well documented. In the last half century, the situation has changed dramatically from a *quest* to a *necessity* for broad support. Any modern extremist group requires support from the broader population outside of the group and its members in order to survive let alone to thrive. There are two mechanisms, described by Clifford Bob, by which this support is achieved-through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational advocacy networks (TANs).³² Outside assistance through NGOs, TANs or supporters by another name can create the appearance of legitimacy.

In acute cases extremist groups solicit the assistance of outside supporters on the ideological basis of religious or ethnic duty. This was certainly the situation during the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s within the broader Muslim *ulema*. Despite the fact that the actual number of Arab fighters in Afghanistan numbered only a few hundred at any given time, the marketing value within the Arab world was a tremendous windfall in terms of al-Qaeda going global.³³ With the help of the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia resources were brought to bear to train and arm the local extremists under a Cold War mentality of containment. However, al-Qaeda used the external support to “gradually widen from the Afghan conflict to operations in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and even the United States.”³⁴ This “mutuality of interests creates a market for transnational support”.³⁵ However, as was experienced in the Soviet-Afghan case involving al-Qaeda, the supporters’ ability to control the situation is often limited. In addition, the unintended consequences associated with the necessity of broad support can take extremist movements or groups into new strategic directions. Using the case of al-Qaeda during the immediate aftermath of the victory in the Soviet-Afghan War, bin Laden and his followers “were leading the jihadi movement into a new strategic direction of breaking off its engagement with the with the ‘near enemy’, secular Muslim states such as Egypt, to concentrate on the real power that supports them.”³⁶ Without transnational support, it is far from certain that the progression of al-Qaeda could have gained the support it has based solely on nationalistic, ideological, or religious precepts

alone. As a result of this single example, the globalization of extremist groups is no longer option, for their very survival it is essential.

Cronin's analysis indicates the average lifespan of an extremist group that uses terrorists' attacks or violence is relatively short – 10 years or less. Jones and Limbicki point out that since 1968, only 32% of religious terrorist groups have ended. The substantial majority of current terrorist groups are religious extremist groups. This clearly demonstrates that religious extremist groups are more durable, than indicated by Cronin. The evidence suggests that religious extremist groups are not only durable with longevity of more than ten years (the PLO is forty years old); they are resilient. Through the process of hybrid-splintering the ability of the religious extremist group to adapt is evident. This is facilitated by the ability of contemporary religious extremist group to leverage trends in globalization. Instead of simply using anti-globalization as a rallying point for their cause, they are embracing the technological advancements resulting from globalization to mobilize resources, ideas, and messages quickly in response to adversarial attacks.

The number of modern extremist groups continues to increase and several organizations (RAND and others) maintain a comprehensive database. A comprehensive listing of contemporary extremist groups is available. While the actual number varies depending on definition and world events, currently there are more than 600 active extremist groups engaged in terrorism. The numerical analysis is enlightening. Of the 648 groups active between 1968 and 2006: 268 ended, 136 splintered and 244 remained

active. Most of the 268 end for one of two reasons: penetration and eliminated by police or intelligence agencies (40%) or peaceful political accommodation with their government (43%). The narrower the political goal the more likely a political accommodation was realized. In 10% of the cases, the terrorist group ended by achieving victory. Ending does not always equate to failure! Military force ended only 7% of the terrorist groups.³⁷ The first step in understanding why some of these contemporary extremist groups fall and others flourish is a thorough characterization.

CHAPTER 2 – CHARACTERIZATION OF EXTREMIST GROUPS

A characterization of extremist groups facilitates an analysis and initial description of emergent trends in groups that fail and those that flourish. The approach is to consider two major types of extremist groups – those based on political ideology and those based on religion – and a few specific terrorist groups within each type. Within each type, the examples presented represent groups that failed and groups that flourished. The emergent trends in groups that flourish appear to be common to both major types.

2.1 Extremist Groups Based on Political Ideology

Political ideology is the basis for conventional political parties and many terrorist groups. In Chapter 1, we identified several examples of successful extremist groups that used terrorism and then transformed into political parties. Western scholars are challenged by this concept because of their perception of political parties as the essence of peaceful democracies.¹ There are several examples of extremist groups based on political ideology. A characterization of two extremist groups based on political ideology (the Red Army Faction and the Zapatista) facilitates an understanding of why some groups fall and others flourish.

The Baader-Meinhof Group and its successor the Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorized Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. It was created in 1968 by a few young, Vietnam War protesters who decided to become terrorists² and launched a “campaign of liberation” that included murder, kidnapping, bank robbery, and bombings.³ The German

criminal police arrested Baader and Meinhof and other leaders of the group after a series of murders and bombings. An organization called the RAF was formed to dramatize and win public support for the Baader-Meinhof prisoners and helped them escape from prison in 1970. Baader then led the RAF and it was the most violent terrorist group in Europe.⁴ About 20 members of the group received terrorist training by the PLO in Jordan.⁵ After Baader and other RAF members were arrested in 1972 and imprisoned again, the RAF relocated from Germany to Baghdad and conducted murder, kidnappings, bombings, and high jacked an airliner demanding the release of Baader and other RAF members. In 1977, Baader and the RAF prisoners were killed (suicide?) in the prison in Germany. The RAF continued terrorist actions in Germany until 1993. In 1998 the RAF sent a letter to Reuters news agency indicating “the urban guerrilla in the form of the raf is now history, the end of this project shows we cannot be succeed that way.”⁶ The fall of the RAF demonstrates that a single issue organization that could not gather popular support globally cannot succeed. The Weather Underground Organization in the USA⁷ and the Red Brigades in Italy⁸ also failed for the same reasons. It also demonstrates that dedicated criminal police actions targeting the extremist group leadership can be successful.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was founded in 1983 to advocate for peasant land reform in Mexico.⁹ EZLN trained and armed local indigenous peasants and by 1990 had 8,000 troops under arms. EZLN opened hostilities in 1994 by seizing a town in Chiapas, destroying land records and releasing prisoners from the jails.

The Mexican military responded with an attack that resulted in 160 Mexican military deaths and more than 1,000 EZLN members killed or captured. The Chiapas rebellion shook the Mexican government and they opened negotiations with EZLN a month later. Activist NGOs from the USA and Canada and Europe swarmed into Mexico in support of the EZLN.¹⁰ A series of negotiations and government failures to honor commitments for land reform continued for the next 15 years (and continues today). The EZLN is armed and engaged in terrorism, but the acts of violence are against property records and military personnel. EZLN is supported by the majority of the Mexican population and by public opinion throughout the Americas. The EZLN receives international recognition, sympathy and financial support. The international community exerts pressure and influence on the Mexican federal government to implement land reform and negotiate with the EZLN. While the Mexican federal government fails to act, local communities in the region began to set-up municipal governments independent of the Mexican state. The EZLN used surprise, drama and force to immediately shot to prominence in the international media. EZLN established personal relationships with NGO employees who returned to their home countries and advocated for the EZLN land reform goals.¹¹ The EZLN is flourishing and continues to garner significant international support.

2.2 Extremist Groups Based on Religion

The characterization of extremist groups based on religion offers an extensive array of possibilities for study. The current climate in the world today regarding extremist groups focuses on those groups whose religious imperative is their defining

characteristic.¹² While that focus tends to concentrate on extremist groups whose religious imperative is Islam, there are broader implications which apply to other religions. In this section, those broader implications will be limited to an examination of the three Abrahamic faiths. The examination is limited to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in order to determine if there is a close tie between the attributes of the extremist groups which emerge with these faiths as their religious imperative and if so, how those similarities or differences contribute to the success or failure of the extremist group(s).

2.2.1 Zionist Extremism

The traditional image of the Jewish state and the Jewish people in the modern era has been that of the victim of extremism. Images over the last quarter century have repeatedly involved suicide bombings in major Israeli cities, aircraft hijackings with the express intent of obtaining Israeli hostages, and the broader targeting of Israeli citizens in the Middle East and Europe.¹³ These activities have strengthened the “role of Jews as victims of the terrorist attacks (which) fits into a wider conception of Jewish identity over the centuries: Jews as the quintessential victims.”¹⁴ Although the Jewish state and Jewish people have been the victims of violent extremist groups, this is only part of the Jewish tradition. Even before the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, there were Jewish militant sects who rebelled against Roman rule using techniques similar in their brutality as the most violent extremist groups in history.¹⁵

Within the Jewish religious and social tradition several examples of extremist religious groups will be examined here with the purpose of determining similar

characteristics or attributes. There are interesting tendencies in pre-1948 Jewish extremist groups which frame the context of examining post-1948 groups examined later in this chapter.

The first tendency was that pre-1948 Jewish extremist groups were primarily concerned with the effective defense of the Jewish collective. Their primary concern was to provide safety to Jewish people in situations where the country rulers in which they resided were unwilling or incapable of ensuring their safety. This was predominantly in at the end of the 19th century and involved two groups *Shomer* and *Hagana*.¹⁶ *Shomer* while not a purely religious extremist group had the main goals of the movement to not only protect Jewish diaspora in Europe but to enhance the development of Jewish settlements in Palestine. *Shomer* did not last long and what was established in 1909 never survived the First World War. The decline of *Shomer* was due primarily to splintering whereby rivals and opposition within the group undermined solidarity and the leadership.¹⁷ *Hagana* was formed after the First World War and was closely aligned with the political party United Labor Party and essentially served as the military arm of the ULP. *Hagana* as an extremist group transformed into a legitimate organization which eventually formed the basis of the Israeli Army in 1948.

The second tendency was a far more radical one. This involved the emergence of two extremist groups called *Etzel* and *Lehi* which at their core were offensive-based extremist groups actively ensuring a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish diaspora in Europe. At their core, these two extremist groups shared several attributes including an

anti-colonial, nationalistic goal of creating the conditions necessary for the establishment of the State of Israel during the British Mandate combined with a unique mixture of an extremist-messianic vision that the Jewish people were the chosen people and had a divine right to Palestine. Both of these groups fell because their extremist brand was unmarketable to the Jewish population writ large and were unable to raise the funds necessary to survive.

What all four of these groups shared and the legacy they left behind for other groups to follow is important. They all shared an ideology that they were the chosen one, the good acting against evil in a divine mission. They considered themselves to a lesser or greater extent, followers of other historical extremist religious groups such as the Zealots.¹⁸ Lastly, they all fell, albeit differently, with the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The ideology they left behind for other extremist religious groups in Israel include the historical tradition of their ideology, the divine nature of their cause, and the justification of their extremist positions and violent actions.

If *Shomer*, *Hagana*, *Etzel* and *Lehi* served as the foundation for the emergence of the contemporary extremist religious group in Israel, then contemporary among contemporaries is Rabbi Meir Kahane and his right wing Kach (“Thus”) Party. Meir David Kahane was born in Brooklyn, New York on August 1, 1932. The son of a Revisionist Zionist, Rabbi Charles Kahane, in his early years he was active in the Betar.¹⁹ In 1947, at the age of 15, Meir Kahane’s first activist action was to physically attack the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, who was visiting New York.²⁰ Kahane received

ordination from Mir Yeshiva in Brooklyn and went on to receive a masters degree in International Law from New York University, although he failed to pass the bar. He served as a pulpit rabbi and teacher in New York until the mid-1960s and was the editor of the *Jewish Press*. Following on in the spirit of the Shomer and Hagana, in 1968 he founded the Jewish Defense League (JDL). Although there is no reference in any literature examined which could be documented to prove the JDL followed on in the tradition of the *Shomer* or *Hagana*, the stated purpose of the JDL is strikingly similar building on the theme of protecting the Jewish collective which has resonated throughout Jewish tradition and social identity since the Zealots-Sicarii of the Jewish Revolt of 66CE.²¹

The JDL soon transformed from an organization providing effective defense of the Jewish population in NY, to an offensive-based extremist group targeting perceived enemies of the Jewish people with violence. These enemies included Palestinians and the Soviet Union. His hatred for the Soviet Union was based in large part on the Soviet treatment of Jews. As such, he focused on the plight of Soviet Jewry, and coined the phrases "Never again," and "every Jew a .22" to emphasize that Jews would no longer passively ignore the plight of their foreign brethren. These activities soon landed Kahane in jail and in 1971, upon release he emigrated to Israel. It is in Israel, where Kahane became even a more radical Zionist. Once in Israel, he was initially welcomed by the right wing political parties but his ideology and messianic vision of Jewish politics soon found him out of favor forcing him to establish his own party – the Kach (“Thus”) Party.

Following on from his more violent activity and “take action” message which served him well in the US where Jews were the minority, this tactic in Israel proved politically fatal.²² He was characterized as a racist and a bigot by the media. However, his messianic vision resonated with some Zionists in several critical ways.

First, was his interpretation of the term *kiddush ha-Shem*, meaning the sanctification of God, which meant that “anything that humiliated the Jews was not only an embarrassment but a retrograde motion in the world’s progress towards salvation.”²³ Second, he believed and espoused to the notion that the secular Jewish state was the forerunner to the biblical, religious Israel. The one in which Jews were the chosen one, their enemies humiliated, God is glorified in their struggle and the Messiahs coming assured.²⁴ This apocalyptic belief that there is a way to “speed up” the coming of the Messiah is something that is seen repeatedly within the ideology of Zionist extremist groups. Third, Kahane and many Zionist extremists believe that they live in a secular Jewish world and that in some way that the secularist movement is part of the underlying problem. Although Kahane does not explicitly call for violent action against secular Jews in Israel, his ideology can be interpreted as being sympathetic to such action should it happen. Lastly, Kahane had his own interpretation of just war theory which he persistently claimed was allowed by Jewish law in a *Halakchic* state (Jewish theocracy). These messianic visions and Jewish justifications for violence resonated with extremist groups long after Kahane’s assassination in 1990 and serve as the foundational and inspirational foundations of other followers.

Dr. Baruch Goldstein shared many of the ideals of Meir Kahane, the JDL and the Kach Party. Not only was he a follower of Kahane extremist Zionist ideology but he was also from New York and a member of the JDL. Like Kahane, Goldstein emigrated to Israel following his studies, which included medical school. He joined the Israeli Defense Forces on active duty and following his enlistment, served in the reserves as a physician. He lived in a small West Bank settlement near the city of Hebron where he worked in emergency medicine. The town was Kiryat Arba and was created for religiously active Jews who wanted to live near Hebron. From here, Goldstein was known to have traveled around Israel with Kahane to assist in gaining support for the Kach Party and the two became close personal friend. Kahane actually presided over the marriage ceremony of Goldstein and his bride, a Sephardic Jew. Perhaps most striking about this relationship between Goldstein and Kahane is that Goldstein shared all of the most extremist views of Kahane. What makes Goldstein so interesting is that most of what he believed was acted upon in what is considered to be one of the most violent terrorist acts portrayed by a Jewish settler *against* Muslims. On February 24, 1994 the night before that year's celebration of Purim²⁵, Goldstein went to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron which is the second holiest site in the Jewish religion. The shrine contains the site where Abraham, his wife Sarah, Isaac and other biblical figures are said to have been buried. As such, the shrine is considered holy by all of the Abrahamic faiths not just Judaism. There are two sides to the shrine, a Jewish side and a Muslim side. Goldstein went to the Jewish side that evening participating in the reading from the Scroll

of Esther as is tradition on Purim. During his prayers, he was interrupted by a gang of Arab youths yelling *itbah al-yahud* - slaughter the Jews.²⁶ This disturbed Goldstein since it is a considerable insult and humiliation to Jews, ever the more so on Purim and in a holy site. What bothered him even more is that the Israeli guards entrusted to provide security at the site did nothing to stop them. The next morning he returned to the shrine but this time entered on the Muslim side, took a rifle out from under his coat and let off more than 100 rounds, killing more than thirty, and wounding scores more. The crowd overtook Goldstein and subsequently beat him to death.²⁷ It was Meir Kahanes interpretation of *kiddush ha-Shem*, referred to earlier, which disturbed Goldstein and led him to commit the massacre at the mosque of the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Goldstein felt that “he – with all Jews – had been deeply humiliated by the taunts of Arab youths to ‘slaughter the Jews’, insults that were neither countered nor halted by the Israeli guards at the site.”²⁸ The act was officially condemned by the Israeli government, which set up a series of investigations and established the Shagmar Commission which proved Goldstein acted alone.²⁹ However, the impact can still be seen in the West Bank. He is considered to be a great martyr and holy man for this violent act.

The ideology and the interpretation of Goldstein’s act as justified according to Kahanes version of *kiddush ha-Shem* was a factor in Goldstein’s justification for the slaughter at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. The appeal for Kahanes interpretation of just war theory which he persistently claimed was allowed by Jewish law in a *Halakchic* state and his insistence that a *Halakchic* state is the only true destination for Israel and the Jewish

people continues to influence many. The perpetuation of this extremist view was the basis for Yigal Amir's assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1995 and can be seen in the writings and actions of Yoel Lerner, a young MIT-trained mathematician and linguist who follows the same form of messianic Zionism as Kahane. He believes that by destroying the Dome of the Rock and rebuilding the temple, the messiah will return to earth.³⁰ Following on in Kahane's ideology Lerner believes "the redemption of the whole world depends upon the actions of Jews in creating the conditions necessary for messianic salvation."³¹ The appeal of Kahane's version of Zionist extremism is perhaps one of the best examples of how an extremist group can flourish. If we assume this "Kahanism" to be a brand of religious extremism, to which it certainly could be accurately characterized, this extremist movement has been active for more than 40 years with no evidence to conclude that this brand of religious extremism is in decline despite the best efforts of the Israeli government.

2.2.2 Christian Extremism

The same religious extremism composed of a belief that the secularist movement is part of the underlying problem within Christian extremism. Christian extremists groups share many of the ideological precepts as their other Abrahamic brethren. However, Christian extremists groups are engaged in the constant process of defining and redefining themselves as a coherent whole with their vision and cause as unified, even if they are not. That whole has often been described as the "invisible Army", "the moral majority", and the "silent majority" in its most mainstream adaptations of the New

Christian Right in the early 1980s.³² In its more extremists forms they are known as the “Christian Identity”, “Army of God”³³, “Christian Patriot”, and “Concerned Christians”. Several domestic US religious extremist groups will be examined which provides unique insight into how contemporary religious extremists groups fall.

The first contemporary Christian extremist groups are a loose collection of single issue extremists who focus on abortion in the US. When the Supreme Court decided *Roe v. Wade* in 1973, the issue of abortion in the US was deemed settled by most Americans. Soon after, many anti-abortion groups, many of them church or community based, sprang up in opposition.³⁴ The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) is perhaps the best known group and is generally considered more activists than extremist. At the other end of the spectrum one finds groups like Operation Rescue (a.k.a. Operation Save America) or Advocates for Life Ministries. For single issue extremist groups like violent anti-abortion ones, the pattern from the research and literature appears to confirm that the more moderate the group the longer they tend to last. For example, the moderate NRLC founded in the late 1970’s is still going strong with affiliates in most states. In the case of Advocates for Life Ministries which was founded in 1985 was disbanded by 1999.³⁵

Unfortunately, this only scratches the surface of Christian extremists groups which are multiple issue groups and use the anti-abortion cause as one of many justifications for violence. The first violent attack against an abortion clinic occurred in 1977. There were 3,600 acts of violence against abortion providers between 1977 and 2002.³⁶ The theological justifications for these acts in the US are varied but follow two

general ideologies – one based on Reconstruction Theology and the other based upon the Christian Identity Movement.³⁷ The best known of the Christian extremists groups in the Christian Identity Movement regularly tied to violence against abortion clinics is the Army of God. The Christian Identity/Army of God ideology is a mixture of racism, white supremacy, and biblical law and is used in various forms by other groups such as Aryan Nations, the Freemen Group, and the,

The most famous member of the Christian Identity/Army of God is the Reverend Michael Bray who is listed as a terrorist in the RAND MIPT database. Rev. Bray was convicted in 1985 on charges of conspiracy in the bombing of 10 abortion clinics in Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland and served nearly 4 years in prison. Since his release, he has served as the spokesperson for other Army of God extremist including the Rev. Paul Hill who killed abortion physician Dr John Britton and James Barrett his bodyguard in Florida in 1994. The Rev Hill was convicted, sentenced to death, and was executed in 2003. Rev. Bray was also the spokesperson for Rachelle Shannon who was convicted of attempted murder for shooting Dr. George Tiller.³⁸ In his book, *A Time to Kill*, the Rev Bray explains using violence not only to resist what is morally wrong such as abortion, but also to bring about God's Kingdom on Earth through Christian political order in the spirit of Reconstruction theology. The Rev. Bray makes the link to Reconstruction the legitimizing factor for the justification of violence not just for murdering abortion doctors but his world view of fulfilling God's law.

This brand of Reconstructionist theology has been used by other Christian extremists including Eric Rudolph. Although known for the bombing of the Centennial Olympic Park in 1996, he is also an anti-abortion activist, a white supremacist, and active in the anti-homosexual conservative movement. Although there has been much written about Rudolph's association with Christian Identity/Army of God, he denies any association despite his letters from prison being posted to the Army of God website where a homepage dedicated to him and his writings can be found³⁹. If not a member of the Christian Identity/Army of God, he is certainly very sympathetic to their cause and his writings are congruent with their ideology. This mix of ideology, Reconstructions theology, and religious justification is also associated with other extremists in the Christian Identity/Army of God movement such as William Pierce, author of *The Turner Diaries*, Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, Randy Weaver of Ruby Ridge fame and his supporters, and many others.

All of the Christian extremist movements examined here share several common attributes and, depending on the extent to which they are emphasized, help explain their durability. Most are reacting to what they view is a pluralism of Western secular society which places humankind as the creator and maintainer of social mores and the institutions which sustain them. They believe God rules the world and that the Bible is the only authoritative source for belief, practice and implementation on earth. Most importantly, they are usually millennialists working towards God's Kingdom on Earth either through evangelizing to convert enough people to change the world or seek to gain control of

other religious or secular institutions. The first part of this is purely religious because they believe original sin is at the individual level while the second part is a more political approach which seeks to expand and hasten God's rule more directly.⁴⁰ There are legitimate theological justifications which have been argued by the Christian Church for centuries that are also tightly woven into Christian extremists group thought. The most important one is a concept involving just war theory. First stated by Cicero and developed by Ambrose and Augustine, the idea that the use of force or violence under certain conditions is permissible if the violence saved more lives by the use of force than would be lost in a concept called proportionality.⁴¹ By using the proportionality rule in just war theory, Christian extremist groups find moral justification for the use of violence.⁴²

2.2.3 Islamic Extremism

The roots of current Islamic extremist groups trace their origins to the modern Islamic philosophers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Of the most prominent of which include Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Rashid Rida, all of whom will be discussed in greater detail later. These three men all searched for a way to reform Islam in a way that would deal with modernity of the West. These reformers, although intellectual giants of Islamic modernism, provide no practical direction for implementing their reforms in a way that would reach the community in which they were so concerned. Each in their own way was elitist which virtually guaranteed their reforming message would remain largely an intellectual exercise. They were unable to

help the *ummah* which was in a desperate state following societal corruption brought on by colonialism (first France and later Britain) and doctrinal corruption brought upon by Christian missions and more seriously Islamic secularists.^{43 44 45 46}

In Egypt, these political events, and the failure of Abduh, al-Afghani and Rida to provide practical implementation of the reforms in which they wrote and espoused, set the stage for Hasan al-Banna to create a movement, indeed a mass-movement, which would truly seek to purify the *ummah* both socially and religiously. Al-Banna thought that the only way this could be accomplished is to return to the principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and to rebuild society from those principles. His vision became the Society of Muslim Brothers (Muslim Brotherhood), one of the most well known Islamic extremist groups in the world. The forum for such discussions and flow of ideas was naturally the mosque network. This method of organizing the message provided two important and valuable offshoots. First, the mosque network provided a ready-made network of communicating the message. Secondly, the mosque network provided a safe-haven for a reformist message unlikely to be appreciated by the government since the government could not attack the message by closing the mosques. This was actually an effective tactic of the Muslim Brotherhood which is still used as effectively today as it was in the 1930's when it was formed.

Al-Banna also devoted significant effort to organizing and structuring the *ummah* into manageable units called 'families'. His method of organizing was essential in (re)educating the society. By using these tactics the Muslim Brotherhood was often

accused of creating a ‘society within a society’. Detractors also accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being anti-intellectual because of the grass roots nature of the movement, its organization, and its worldview. Ideological dissenters or challengers were not tolerated. The Muslim Brotherhood did develop a militant wing called the Secret Apparatus (*al jihaz al sirri*) in the mid 1940’s in response to very turbulent times coinciding with the end of World War II. However, the watershed moment in history was the defeat of Muslim armies of Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The *al-Nakhbah* or ‘disaster’ as it is known by Muslims was a defining moment in political Islam in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. This marked the beginning of the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood and after the death of al-Banna, the crackdown by the Nasser government on the movement, many thought the movement was dead.

However, the message of the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the urgency in defending Islam from the West. The West was greedy, corrupt, devoid of spirituality, and bent on destroying Islam. The message also stressed the inability of Western values to secure harmony and happiness for Muslims. Back in al-Banna’s day, the West assaulted Islam through colonialism whereas today the West assaults Islam through the exportation of modern culture in the media and the internet.^{47 48 49}

The ways in which religion (beliefs, practices, personalities, symbols, discourse, and institutions) has been a source of conflict and violence is well known. The section will attempt illustrate the resurgence of religion in public life while at the same time

demonstrate, in their extreme positions and solutions to public issues, that there are deeply private worldviews upon which they are predicated by focusing here on the case of Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi and the Islamic extremist group *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia*’ or HAMAS, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement. As we begin to examine the private world views of HAMAS, similarities with other religious extremist groups, most ironically Rabbi Meir Kahane’s Kach (“Thus”) Party discussed in previously in this chapter abound despite the fact that the two groups are at odds with each other ideologically. For example, both groups are led by well educated, inspirational leaders. In the case of Rantisi, he enrolled in the College of Medicine at the University of Alexandria in Egypt where he received a degree in medicine in 1972. A few years later, he obtained a Masters' degree in pediatrics from the same university. Both were highly educated men who began their careers in seemingly innocuous professions but in both cases they slowly became disillusioned in their worldview. This ultimately led them to develop their own brand of extremism which led them to religious violence.

For example, his teaching job at the Islamic University allowed Rantisi, an extemporaneous and eloquent speaker, to influence many of his students who came later to form the nucleus of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Deeply influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists of the time like Al-Mahallawi (in particular) while in college, Rantisi went beyond the societal worldview in which he was living and felt the need to establish a new movement based upon a new worldview – a worldview which

would become the basis of a powerful force in Palestinian politics and society. However, to those who share the worldview of HAMAS, they are not all extremist and suicide bombers as they are described in the media. In fact, the whole concept of suicide bombers is quite acceptable, even expected, because of the way in which the concept of suicide bombing has been steeped in the Islamic religious tradition and mythology.⁵⁰ For example, according to extreme Islamic interpretations of the Qur'an, Hadith, Sunnah, all Muslims seek to become martyrs. In the case of HAMAS what we in the West describe as a suicide bomber, HAMAS would consider a 'self-chosen martyr'.⁵¹ It is not simply a matter of perspective but it is one of belief. Members of HAMAS find the concept of self-chosen martyr steeped in religious tradition and belief which has a complicated explanation rather than a simplified name describing the action itself (suicide bomber).⁵²

Extremism and violence in the name of religious beliefs is not unique to Rantisi's HAMAS but can be seen in the Kach Party as well. According to Kahane, the expulsion of Arabs from the biblical lands of Israel under the notion of *kiddush ha-Shem* as discussed previously. The tenet of Kahane's interpretation of *kiddush ha-Shem* are almost identical to the belief of Rantisi and HAMAS in which they are the victims of Jewish Messianic Zionism (ironically exactly the sort of Kahane's Kach Party represents). Within the victimization of HAMAS are justifications for violence especially the sort which are deemed righteous by religious tradition and belief often through *fatwas*, issued by muftis, which provide religious legitimacy for acts of self martyrdom. Despite religious beliefs and religious practices what makes most Islamic

extremist movements continue to prosper goes beyond the simplification all too easily accepted a good message, delivered well. The 'ideal' rather than the current reality is what provides for the longevity of these two movements, particularly HAMAS.

The beliefs and ideologies which form the foundation of HAMAS would not have been possible if there were not underlying institutions and symbols which represent the 'ideal'. I prefer to call these 'enablers of the ideal'. Without one or more 'enablers' HAMAS would likely not last much longer than the personalities which created it. Using these enablers, the ideal is formalized and codified while at the same time the extremism and religious violence is often rationalized. Both Rantisi and Kahane created institutions that embody the ideal of the system of beliefs and practices to which both men espoused and could not find in mainstream movements within their societies or religious traditions.

HAMAS, as a Sunni Islamic organization which was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was a quiescent force whose main goal was a reorientation of Palestinian society to religion. HAMAS's outgrowth from the Muslim Brotherhood is similar in progression to the Kach Party outgrowth from the JDL as previously discussed. Like the Kach Party, HAMAS also has its own militant group within the group – the *Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades* – among other organizations for intelligence (*al-Majd*) and politics (the main wing of HAMAS). Military actions, though originally declared incompatible with religion, were seen as part of the Muslim Brotherhood's increasing reconciliation with nationalism and drew wide popular support from refugees in the occupied territories as well as white collar workers

and professionals. Unlike the Kach Party, HAMAS has taken a different path to influence the plight of the people whom they represent. Instead of direct political activity like the Kach Party, HAMAS operates mosques, schools, clinics, and social programs although this has changed in recent years.

There are several explanations as to why these groups are a source of violence and conflict. All extremist religious groups share basic attributes, some of which have been discussed previously. However, the most significant are the militancy of the groups which are also responsible for attracting the most attention. Justifying the violence as a means to achieve political and religious goals (both groups claim of possessing the same land), is one such explanation. Mixing religious belief and symbology with politically motivated violence is somehow 'holy' is another powerful explanation. Both Judaism and Islam have justifications in their scriptures to violence and it is no coincidence that the extremists in each religion gravitate towards those justifications. This is often borne out of being a minority in their own faiths and political associations.

The Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in India by Syed Ab'ul Ala Maududi in 1941 before India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Its original purpose was to promote Islamic values and practices in the face of British colonization of India and originally objected to the Pakistan movement on the grounds that Islam was a universal religion not a nationalist one. Maududi and Jamaat-e-Islami changed that initial position once the partition of India commenced along religious geography. Just as the Islamists in Egypt were influenced by Islamic modernists such as Abduh, Al-Afghani, and Rida, Maududi

was influenced by the Muhammad Iqbal - perhaps the most influential Islamic modernist ever to hail from Asia. Together they established an academic center named Darul-Islam whose mission was to train scholars in the political philosophy of Islam. Like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami was a direct response to the Western-influenced nationalism, secularism, and other imperialist ideas meant to undermine Islamic societies and enforce Western domination over the lives of Muslims. Islam in Pakistan needed to be cleansed of the West and the *ummah* had to be refashioned in a fundamentally Islamic way. This worldview is not unlike other Islamist movements. However, the manner in which Jamaat-e-Islami sought to achieving that worldview can be seen in the way in which they chose to proceed with its practical implementation.

Maududi's goal was to make his form of Islam the ultimate organizing principle for the social and political life of the *ummah*. The primary concept of Maududi's plan was predicated upon the principle of *iqamat-i-deen* or 'the establishment of religion'. According to *iqamat-i-deen*, society and the state are totally subordinate to the authority of *Shari'a* as revealed in the Qur'an and practiced by Muhammad.

The organization of Jamaat-e-Islami was, from its inception, geared to eventually ruling as a political party in a sense that most in the West can appreciate. There was initially only an office of the president or *Ameer*. This was later expanded to include the Deputy Ameer, Secretary-General, and the *Shura* or 'consultation' at the provincial, city, and village levels. Its structure is based on a series of concentric circles beginning with the smallest unit, the *maqam*, consisting of two or more members, ever expanding

outward to the organization's national structure. Today, Jamaat-e-Islami is the largest religious party in Pakistan and has close relations with the Islamic movements and missions working in different continents and countries around the world. By operating and organizing as a political party, Jamaat have been more influential in Pakistani politics without having to resort to radical militant behavior.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami, and to a lesser extent HAMAS were different responses to the same problem – modernism brought on by Western colonialism. In both cases, the onslaught of socially and religiously altering policies made in the name of modernity was deemed to be a threat to the *ummah* and the very survival of Islam. The responses to this onslaught of Western-inspired modernity were slightly different however. The Muslim Brotherhood was a movement that sought to seek change from outside the political arena by focusing on the *ummah*. The Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS have also been more militant in the ways it seeks to influence change – sometime by force. This emphasis has slightly changed over the last few decades where the Muslim Brotherhood is in search of higher political aspirations seeking change from within the political system in Jordan, and most recently in the Gaza Strip. The Jamaat-e-Islami was always more politically activist seeking to take control of the 'system' while simultaneously re-educating society on the fundamentals of Islam. Along with the quest for political legitimacy, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami are proving to be very durable extremist groups. Despite its more militant excesses, HAMAS is also making itself into a more durable, if less violent, Islamic

extremist group in proportion to their political aspirations and gains across the broader Middle East.^{53 54 55}

2.3 Analysis and Emergent Trends

For extremist groups based on political ideology, the analysis indicates some emergent trends. The RAF killed fewer people than the EZLN (less than 40 compare to more than 160). However, the RAF is perceived as one of the most violent terrorist groups; while the EZLN is perceived as a non-violent, just and noble organization struggling for the rights of peasants. The RAF had support from international terrorist groups and a brief period of sympathy from the media and a few celebrities, but never captured sympathy and support from international public opinion for their campaign of liberation. German law enforcement was able to capture and imprison the RAF leadership, but the Mexican government was not able to capture or kill the EZLN leadership. The German government was able to characterize the RAF as criminals and thugs. The Mexican government was not able to re-characterize the EZLN as a criminal group (or terrorist group). The EZLN membership was very large (more than 8,000), while the RAF was very small (~20). The EZLN used well established networks with the international NGO community and international media attention (CNN) to create sympathy and support in global popular opinion. The RAF leadership was captured, imprisoned or fled the country, while the EZLN leadership eluded capture and negotiated with the Mexican federal government. The RAF failed and the EZLN flourished and may be in the process of transformation to a political party. The emergent trends for success

and longevity are single well-defined political issue (land reform), large membership, media strategy to build international support, and sustaining the leadership.

For extremist groups based on religion, the analysis indicates some emergent trends. Most religious traditions, and certainly all Abrahamic faiths, justify violence as a legitimate tool in achieving purity. In the case of the first book of the Hebrew Bible, Exodus 15:3 states “The Lord is a warrior”. The Talmud states in Abodah Zara 26b: “Even the best of the Gentiles should be killed”. In the Qu’ran, Sura 2.191 is even more explicit in the justification of violence: “And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, and persecution is worse than slaughter. And fight not with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it; so if they fight you (in it), slay them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.” This particular verse from the Qu’ran is often re-interpreted by extremist groups to provide a justification for Holy War or jihad. In all cases, the sacred texts are interpreted by extremist groups to justify their own blend of violence and scripture. The emergent trends for success and longevity are justification of the actions by sacred texts, large membership, media strategy to build international support, and sustaining the leadership.

CHAPTER 3 – COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMIST GROUPS

Religion is the most powerful and pervasive force on earth; it is a central feature of human life. Sadly, religion today is at the heart of violence around the world.¹ Kimball asserts that religion is not the problem; human corruption of religion to do evil is the problem. He focused on Christianity and Islam, the two largest religious communities on earth, and provided an analysis of the primary warning signs of the corruption of religion by extremist groups.² The identification and characterization of religious extremist groups in Chapters 1 and 2 indicates that these ‘warning signs’ are components of five common attributes of religious extremist groups: A Search for Meaning, A Sense of Religious Duty, A Quest for Purity, Inspirational Leadership, and Scripture as Justification. These five common attributes are completely interwoven. In many cases frightened people searching for meaning coalesce around an inspirational leader who offers religious meaning and a soothing sense of religious duty, assigns terrorist actions as a Quest for purity, and justifies the terror with Scripture. A discussion of these common attributes provides further understanding of why some extremist groups have failed while others have flourished and others have transformed into non-terrorist political groups.

3.1 A Search for Meaning

A search for meaning is a common attribute of the members of all religious extremist groups. Meaning derived from religious beliefs allows members to persevere in

an inhospitable culture. Disaffected religious seekers unhappy with mainstream religious organizations are searching for meaning. Secularism and the globalization of modernity are often frightening realities; they create rapid change and cultural instability. Every religious extremist (fundamentalist) group Armstrong studied was convinced that the secular establishment is determined to wipe out religion.³ “Fundamentalism provides a source of meaning for its adherents. Religious fundamentalism demands complete allegiance to a totally authoritative text (Torah, Bible, Quran) that provides a unifying philosophy of life.”⁴ “Radical Islamic movements [Islamic extremists] are collective endeavors to establish networks of shared meaning and religious interpretation.”⁵ The three Abrahamic faiths – Judaism, Christianity and Islam—teach that the human being is a special creation. The Bible: “God created man in His own image”⁶ and the Quran: “I [Allah] have breathed into man of My spirit.”⁷ In Islam: “There is no God but God. God is the Creator and Sustainer of life. God is intimately connected with human lives from moment to moment.”⁸ These three religions affirm that all human beings will be held accountable to God on the Last Day. Hence, the search for meaning is: What does God require of me? The description (in Chapter 2) of Zionist, Christian and Islamic extremists clearly indicates that the founders, leaders and recruits were searching for meaning and felt threatened by the culture and world around them. The search for meaning and finding it in radical extremist groups transforms individuals into soldiers sanctioned by God in a cosmic war for the future of civilization. For religious extremist groups there are no moral or ethical concerns because they are aligned with God’s will and the cosmic war is

won only through the power of faith. It is not a Holy War between religions; it is a cosmic war between the forces of good and the forces of evil.⁹

3.2 A Sense of Religious Duty

A Sense of Religious Duty is a common attribute of the members of all religious extremist groups. Zionist extremists believe it is a religious duty to strive to rebuild the Temple. It was the House of God.¹⁰ Christian extremists have a sense of religious duty to bring about the Messiah and the end of days.¹¹ Islamic extremists including Al-Qaeda assert that it is a religious duty to expel crusaders and Jews from the House of Islam and establish the caliphate.¹² Violence and suicide terrorism are a religious duty for many Islamic extremists.¹³ The motto of Hamas (zeal in Arabic) is: “Allah is its goal, the prophet its ideal, the Quran its constitution, jihad its way, and death in the service of Allah its aspiration.”¹⁴ For many Islamic extremists martyrdom is an inherent religious duty. Families of Palestinian suicide bombers routinely received calls and gifts from Jordan’s King Abdullah and other Islamic political leaders affirming the sense of religious duty and encouraging more martyrs.¹⁵ Zionist, Christian, and Islamic extremists have a common sense of religious duty to create a state governed by religious law, not secular law.

There are too many examples of terrorist acts committed by extremist groups out of a sense of religious duty. Yigal Amir believed it was his religious duty (he acted with guidance from God) to kill Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.¹⁶ The assassins led by Khalid Islambouli killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat because Omar Abdel-Rahman

obtained a fatwa approving the assassination (in the name of God). In Uganda, Joseph Kony, proclaimed himself a Christian Holy Spirit and the spokesperson of God and leads the Lord's Resistance Army; his soldiers wear rosary beads and recite passages from the Bible while committing murder and crimes against humanity. Usama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa: "To kill Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual [religious] duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries..."¹⁷

Religious extremist groups also receive support and sympathy from some segments of the global population that feel a common sense of religious duty and perhaps humiliation for their lack of engagement. "Abandoning Jihad is the cause of the humiliation and division in which Muslims live today."¹⁸

3.3 A Quest for Purity

A Quest for Purity is a common attribute of the members of all religious extremist groups. A quest for purity is driven by complex psychological and social factors often derived from traditional religious practices. Ritual purification is a feature of many religions. Judaism, Christianity and Islam have requirements for a ritual state of purity. The aim of these rituals is to remove specifically defined uncleanness prior to a particular type of activity, and especially prior to the worship. Several Biblical regulations specify that full immersion in water is required to regain ritual purity after impure incidents have occurred. In Islam the second pillar, the five daily prayers, must be carried out in a ritual state of purity. Mere awareness of modernity may instigate a quest for purity among religious extremists. Religious extremists seem to have a compelling

need to achieve purity; so that they may be with God. Purification always requires a ritual action that removes what is deemed unclean. Many religious traditions, and certainly all Abrahamic faiths, justify violence as a legitimate tool in achieving purity. For religious extremists, the required or only acceptable ritual may be a terrorist act. “The ideas of personal cleanliness, ritual purity and obedience to the [religious] law are closely interconnected.”¹⁹ Al-Qaeda instructed the 9/11 hijackers: “Purify your soul from all unclean things ... this is a battle for the sake of God”.²⁰ The 9/11 terrorists were carrying out a liturgical act in a quest for purity.

3.4 Inspirational Leadership

Inspirational Leadership is a common attribute of all religious extremist groups. Leaders must inspire members of the extremist group and potential new members. It seems prudent to emphasize that finding meaning in a religious extremist group often creates a sense of duty to perform terrorism in a quest for purity. Creating meaning, offering an opportunity to fulfill a sense of religious duty described as a quest for purity requires an inspirational leader. Inspirational Leaders have credibility and sacred authority based upon religious knowledge, reputation and personal character. For example, in 1994 Mullah Omar removed the cloak of Muhammad from the shrine and wore the coat while he stood atop a building, above a crowd of his followers in Kandahar. This single act re-established his sacred authority and ended a crisis within the Taliban. He led the “infamous Wahhabization process throughout Afghanistan in which all religious sites were destroyed, tobacco and coffee outlawed, men compelled to grow

beards, women forced to into seclusion, and the substantial Shi'ite and Sufi populations massacred".²¹

The Sufis (Islamic mystics) use the term Ilham (inspiration) to refer to the transformation of the human soul by the power of the universal Spirit. The leader of a Sufi order is the only person empowered to provide inspiration to other members.²²

Islamic extremist group leaders exploit this tradition to command and grow the organization. Zionist extremist group leaders also claim divine or prophetic authority. Christian extremist group leaders claim to be possessed by the Holy Spirit or to be chosen by God for this purpose.

Inspirational leaders must also manage a public persona exploiting the media to enhance a personal and group image.²³ Some component of the leadership must sustain expertise in internet and conventional media. Islamic terrorists are on the cutting edge of organizational networking and derive benefit from the information revolution. This leadership capability enhances offensive operational capability in the war of ideas and the war of violent acts.²⁴

3.5 Scripture as Justification

Scripture as Justification for terrorism is a common attribute of all religious extremist groups. Many writers on religious extremists and terrorism include this quote from Pascal: "Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction."²⁵ Many religious traditions, and certainly all Abrahamic faiths, justify violence as a legitimate tool. The most prevalent Islamic extremist groups -- the

Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, the PLO and its affiliates (Fatah and others), the Muslim Brotherhood and the PKK – justify murder, mass killings and terrorism with scripture from the Quran. For example, the Surah 2.191 is explicit in the justification of violence: “And kill them wherever you find them....” This particular verse from the Quran is often re-interpreted by extremist groups to provide a justification for murder.

Baruch Goldstein was an American born Israeli physician who perpetrated the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in the city of Hebron, killing 29 Muslims at prayer in the Ibrahimi Mosque and wounding another 150 in a shooting attack. Goldstein was a long-time devotee of Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of the Israeli far-right political party Kach, a group classified by the United States and Israeli governments as a terrorist organization. By killing Arabs he believed wanted to kill Jews, Goldstein was reenacting part of the Purim story.²⁶ Purim is a festival that commemorates the deliverance of the Jewish people of the ancient Persian Empire from Haman's plot to annihilate them, as recorded in the Biblical Book of Esther. Zionist extremist groups use scripture to justify terrorism.

Some Christian extremist groups justify bombing abortion clinics and murdering physicians and nurses with quotes from scripture: Genesis 9:6 “Who sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made the man”.

Al-Qaeda ideology derives from radical Salafism and offers a religious justification for terrorist attacks against the West (the far enemy) with scripture: God

Almighty said “we shall inflict upon them painful punishment”.²⁷ Bin Laden writes that for 200 years the umma (Islamic global community or supernational) has been under attack by the Christian West. Al-Qaeda attacks on the West are retaliation in defense of the umma.

Religious imagery is replete with examples that extremist groups use to evoke a sense of revenge or justification for violence against the ‘other’. For the Christian, it is the crucifixion of Jesus, for the Sh’ia Muslim it is the martyrdom of Hussain at the Battle of Karbala, and Hebrew Bible contains many examples of bloody conquests of Jewish holy lands.

CHAPTER 4 – CHARACTERIZATION OF CURRENT ISLAMIC EXTREMIST GROUPS

The characterization of current Islamic extremist groups within the context of the similarities of Islamic extremist groups, and an examination of the social identity and cultural framings provides further insight. One revealing aspect is the multiplicity and complexity of views on how Islam is dealing with secularism, modernity and globalization. This is the dominant commonality that essentially all Islamic extremist groups share in one way or another.

4.1 Islamic Radicalization

Islamic radicalization has followed the pattern of nearly every other form of religious radicalization. As was demonstrated in Chapter 2 with an examination of the Zealots-Sicirri impact on Zionism, the religious struggles begin within a society rather than between societies.¹ In the case of Islam, there have been multiple periods of internal struggle. A few will be discussed here to illustrate the broad context of radicalization as it applies to Islamic tradition. The first was during the establishment of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad beginning with his life and following on for several hundred years. Within the Arab world during this period most tribes, particularly along the Byzantine frontier, were actually Christians. As such, it is important to point out that this was more than mere religious history but it also entailed a “cultural affinity and a marker of political allegiance, so that in a sense the spread of Christianity sometimes served as an extension of Byzantine foreign policy”.² This is important because as Islam spread into

Christian lands there was not only a religious component that was being swept away but also cultural, social, and political elements which were being supplanted, which fits well into the holistic Islamic tradition. This continued for centuries as Christianity was replaced by Islam throughout the Middle East. Another significant period of struggle within Islam was in the 19th and 20th centuries as a result of globalization, colonialism, and modernity. What is important to discuss here is that in each of the periods mentioned so far, and many others throughout history, is that a significant contributor to radicalization and extremists movements within a society revolved around the fight between secularists and fundamentalists within a society. This is true of all the Abrahamic faiths, but significant and most important when discussing Islam because that struggle can still be seen today despite the fact that governments and the media tend to focus on the external struggles associated with Islamic terrorism.³

In the case of all of the struggles mention above, it is important to note that the use of the word struggle is deliberate because of the link between struggle and *jihad*. The concept of *jihad* is one that virtually all Islamic extremist groups share in their lexicon. There are many explanations for this commonality but the simplest is that *jihad* is rooted in the Qur'an's command to *struggle in the path of God*. This is the most widely accepted literal translation of the word jihad. With such a simple translation with no context, this word and the entire concept of *jihad* has been corrupted and abused throughout history.⁴ However, the unique interpretation of *jihad* in the 19th and 20th centuries has been used almost ubiquitously used to justify the *struggle* against host

governments which have become too secular as was the case in Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood) and Jamaat e-Islami (Pakistan) which were discussed previously. The single most important concept about *jihad* is not how it is currently used to justify terrorism by Islamic extremist groups, although that is extremely important, but how it is part of the social fabric of Islam. It is part of the social identity of what is meant to be Muslim and is inseparable from the Qur'an because all pious Muslims must struggle in the path of God in the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Jihad is a fundamental tenet of the Qur'an because it helps define and understand piety and the difficulty of living a good life – the struggle within ones self to make a serious effort to do good things and help reform society. This is called the spiritual jihad or *jihad bin-nafs* and is viewed by most Muslims as the greater jihad.⁵ However, depending on one's circumstances this could mean many things and this is where the problem lies. If one lives under a corrupt regime the struggle can be interpreted to legitimize the assassination of corrupt leaders as has been the case for centuries of Islamic history.⁶ In this simple example it is not *jihad bin-nafs* but rather the lesser jihad called the *jihad bil-sayf* or "jihad by the sword".⁷ This is perhaps one of the best examples of the misuse of the interpretation of jihad by Islamic extremists and is commonly referred to as the Sixth Pillar of Islam.⁸ The philosophic underpinning of Islamic extremism using the example of jihad is one of many examples which can be discussed. Perhaps more important are the intellectual and philosophical forefathers who have had the most significant imprint on Islamic extremist over the last century. Understanding the underlying ideas and concepts of the Islamic

extremist movement through the writings of those who inspired the extremism we see today is important to better understand how the disheartened Muslim community has “organized itself and adopted a radical interpretation of its religious beliefs to legitimize the systematic use of violence” which is so prevalent today⁹.

4.2 Islamic Modernization and Modernity

The majority of this section will be devoted to Islamic modernism and associated Islamic philosophical foundations and their impacts to Islamic extremists groups and the future of political Islam more generally. Hence, an assessment of how Islamic groups deal with modernity is discussed in greater detail. The focus here is on explaining the survivability of Islamic extremist groups. A significant methodological approach for this thesis is comparative case examinations of selected Islamic philosophers who have impacted Muslim thought in an effort to understand why certain Islamic extremist groups rise and persist while most others disappear relatively quickly. The approach used here will be to examine selected Islamic philosophical schools of thought and group them into three distinct categories; the Traditional View, The Radical View, and the Contemporary View. In each case, one or more Islamic philosophers or thought leaders will be compared and contrasted in terms of their world view on secularism, modernity and globalization in the context of western (and Islamic) civilization today.

4.2.1 The Traditional View

In examining the traditional view of Islam deals with secularism, modernity and globalization the section attempts to answer two questions. Firstly, could any (or all) of the late 19th century Islamic modernists make a compelling argument that Islam and modernity are compatible? Secondly, can an Islam which is authentically modern exist? The Islamic modernists which will be used to answer these questions are primarily Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). In trying to answer the questions it is important to look first at their views in specific areas contrasted against current views on law or civilization for which there is much disagreement. Using commonality in the different author's views in this way is more constructive than taking a more polemic approach and will be the approach used here.

Al-Afghani brought a new concept of Islam as a civilization rather than simply a religion. However, his definition of civilization appears far different than those used today. Al-Afghani thought that there are two forces driving his definition of civilization; societal development and individual development. These two forces characterize a civilization and both are rooted in the moral principles of man gained through reason. Al-Afgani believed the moral principles of man were driven by faith and religion was the key to determine civilizational lines. However, according to al-Afgani these civilizational lines can shift with the spread (or decline) of Islam and it is Muslim unity which ultimately defines the civilization and those lines. When al-Afghani talks of Muslim unity he meant not only cooperation among political and religious leaders but of

the solidarity (*ta'assub*) of a limited community (*umma*).¹⁰ These ideas were driven by the overarching concern al-Afghani had about the colonization of North Africa by the French and English in 1881-1882, rather than a purist effort to be modern. The basis of civilizations is cultural rather than political and defined by 'common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people'.¹¹ It is in this last part – the subjective self identification of people – to which al-Afghani referred when discussing *ta'assub* and *umma*. This is a compelling example of almost congruency on a fundamental question regarding the compatibility of Islam and modernity. To al-Afghani the issue is not 'is Islam modern?' but rather that Islam is inherently modern because all civilizations are dynamic in a way that similar to that of Islam. The nature of the identity of al-Afghani's *umma*, which has political elements to it, is inherently tied to the broadest level of identification with which (a person) strongly identifies which he argued is the same with Islam. Therefore, the *umma* of al-Afghani must be modern because they are eventually associated with Islam in the broadest sense. When reading al-Afghani and many other Islamic philosophers of his time, it is important to remember that he "sought to bridge the gap between Islamic traditionalists and secular reformers."¹² He and others of his time sought to incorporate internal *ummah* concerns of revivalism with the need to respond to European colonialism and the challenges of modernity which went with it.¹³

The modernity which came into place during the last century emphasized the separation of church and state. Indeed Abdu's and several of his disciples, such as Taha

Husayn who became leaders in politics and Middle Eastern thought, believed that the *ummah* and society as a whole would be better served by the separation of religion and politics.¹⁴ Because of this separation, an emphasis on law emerged and it is this development of law which has been an important fact in influencing modernity. While this may indeed be true of the west at the time, Muhammad Abduh would certainly argue that it is not exclusively western or even unique. Abduh's discourse on moral law and his view that laws within a Muslim community should change in accordance to the community with which they serve is exactly the kind of modernity under which current Islamic extremist groups rebel. When Abduh states, 'it is not permissible to apply the law of one group of people to another group of people who differ from and surpass the first in the level of understanding, because the law will not suit their state of thinking', one can assume that he is talking of western law rather than Islamic law.¹⁵

The answer to the first question, could any (or all) of the late 19th century Islamic modernists make a compelling argument that Islam and modernity are compatible, is an unequivocal no. There are selected topics discussed within Islamic modernist discourse to which some may agree are, or at some time were, viewed as modern but to make the jump to claim that Islam and modernity are thus compatible would be virtually impossible. Even after one strips away the context of history in which the authors may be motivated in making certain statements (like the Egyptian Crisis of 1880-1882 for Abduh or the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1888 for al-Afghani), it is highly unlikely that one could derive a position by either Abduh, al-Afghani, or anyone else at the time. Several

shared themes from the writers above emerge. All of the authors and certainly many others at the time try to identify a set of common goals for the *ummah* through their discourse on law, society, and modernity. They also share a belief that the changes required for the sake of the *ummah*, must come from within the Islamic world. This is certainly a partial response to colonialism but falls short of something to which the Islamic extremist today could cling to ideologically. However, the Islamic leaders which followed like Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, using even earlier Islamic philosophers as a reference point than Abdu or Al-Afghani would develop a more radical view of the future of Islam.

4.2.2 The Contemporary View

This section will define the Contemporary View of the future of Islam within the context of two Islamic modernists - Mohammad Khatami's and Tariq Ramadan. As one examines the lives of both Khatami (b. 1943) and Ramadan (b. 1962), two very diverse realities emerge. First, and most obvious is that Khatami is a traditionally educated Shi'a Muslim having reached *Hujjatul Islam* (Proof of Islam), one level below an Ayatollah in Shi'a hierarchy, and is formally trained in *ijtihad* (reasoned deduction). Second, Khatami is an activist politician having participated in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.¹⁶ Tariq Ramadan on the other hand was born, raised, and educated in Switzerland – one of the only true democracies in the world. Ramadan has far more ability to be critical of the way Islam is being practiced and has more opportunity to engage in dialogue because he is a scholar rather than a politician. He is similar in Khatami in that he is certainly an

ijtihadi (although not formally trained as is the case of Khatami). It is also important to point out the obvious but sometimes overlooked differences - unlike Khatami who lives as part of the majority; Ramadan is a minority being a Muslim living in a Western dominated society. This reality has a profound impact on their views of practically everything – from identity, to tradition, and modernity – but most importantly their views of the future of Islam.

One of the areas, based on the differences outlined above, where it is easiest to begin discussing the future of Islam, is by briefly examining the question of identity. For both Khatami and Ramadan identity begins and ends with religion of Islam. Both also agree in concept that Muslims once had a dominant civilization based on the religion of Islam. To a certain extent, identity for Muslims in that time was far simpler – it was defined almost exclusively by religion. That time has passed. For Khatami the religion of that time has certainly not passed ‘If the sun has set on Islamic civilization despite its many monumental achievements, a certain view of religion – which was appropriate for that period – has ended, not the age of religion itself.’¹⁷ The struggle for Khatami, with respect to identity, is influenced more by Western modernity as an outside force manipulating the *umma* as an Islamic republic than of the identity of the *umma* as a part of the republic. This is based, to some degree, upon the fact that national identity plays little or no part in the identity of the Muslim in Iran or any other *dar al-Islam* (territory under Muslim control). Ramadan, on the other hand is far more concerned with the identity of the individual and the *umma* concerning the impact of Western modernity but

this is all based upon an entirely different perspective ‘are they (*Muslims*) members of the *umma* whose orders they are completely bound by or rather true citizens of the state in which they live, bound, as all other citizens, by its constitution and laws.’¹⁸ To Ramadan, identity is entirely relative because it is determined by the situation upon which an issue is ultimately rooted. Using Ramadan as an example, if the issue is of a philosophical nature, then he responds as a *Muslim of Swiss nationality*. If the discussion turns to issues of a political nature, he then responds as a *Swiss citizen of Muslim faith*.¹⁹ In the case of Khatami, identity is not relative but absolute because Iran is a far more monolithic society than almost all other Muslim societies (and by inference all non-Muslim societies). For Khatami, there is little consideration given to the issue of Muslims living in the West and he only addresses the situation relative to *dar al-Islam*, and Iran specifically whereas for Ramadan there is only the issue of Muslims living in the West. The issue for examination now becomes, do people from such divergent backgrounds, education, and professions holding such diametrically opposed ideas of where Muslims are and the issues they face, also disagree on the future of Islam? To examine that question more deeply, we look at specific issues involving modernity, tradition, and Islam.

The influence of culture and tradition on the future of Islam is one area where Khatami and Ramadan have very different principles. To Khatami, tradition and culture are similar and tradition can be viewed in some instances as a symbol of culture. Because of this relationship there have been many misinterpretations of traditions and

culture in the past which must be undone for the future of Islam. There are two rather simplistic views that Khatami points out as examples – the traditionalist and the modernist. The traditionalists view is to resist anything that attempts to alter culture because it is something to be revered and in extreme cases in the past, has been treated as divine. For the modernist, there is no resistance and all that is modern is accepted and viewed as the highest form of human achievement, including, detrimentally, modern values.²⁰ Khatami's own views lie somewhere between these two views but it is the nature of the culture (and tradition) which is most revealing and most in contrast with Ramadan.

For Khatami, culture is more long lasting than most attributes of a society, even longer lasting than the great Islamic civilization he attributes to the past. Because this culture is bound by, and almost inseparable from, Islam the true problem with Islam is that it is at odds with Western culture.²¹ This is where Ramadan would certainly disagree because of a fundamental concept to which he so strongly believes and can be seen in several of his books and articles– that there is a non-culture bound truth to Islam. He would disagree on a point of fact with Khatami in that 'Islam is not a culture.....To speak of Islam is first of all to speak of faith, spirituality, and ethics, which together make up a conception of humankind and to life.'²² This is not to suggest that Khatami would disagree with the second part of that quote but to Khatami any future Islam must necessarily involve several factors based on his view of the 'oneness of Islam and culture'.²³ First, a dismantling of the modernist and traditionalist corruption that has

taken place. This dismantling must be based on entirely indigenous models with no outside (Western) interference. Second, the dismantling, and more importantly the reconstruction, must be done with the express knowledge that modernity, as we know it today, is entirely Western.²⁴ In these ideas, Khatami is far more pessimistic than Ramadan.

The future of Islam, according to Ramadan, is an entirely positive proposition. As he looks at the trends taking place within Islam in his lifetime he takes comfort in observing a revival of sorts ‘Muslim communities are witnessing renewed passion and enthusiasm. The passion is for study: adolescents, students, parents, of all backgrounds and all ages, all together, are following regular courses in religion, Arabic, even history and culture.’²⁵ Indeed, from Ramadan’s perspective, Muslims living in the West have an opportunity to become more devout than Muslims living in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For him it is an opportunity, even an obligation, specifically afforded to Muslims living in the West because it represents *dar al dawa* (a place which signifies inviting people to God).²⁶ This is due to many factors including being a minority and in most cases a diverse minority comprised of Sunni’s and Shi’as from Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and even Iran. In this diversity one finds more than simply a shared religion but an awareness of identity leading to the truth of Islam.

Both men agree that the future of Islam requires the West (term used by Ramadan) or Western civilization (term used by Khatami). In order to avoid disagreement between terms, for purposes here these two terms – ‘the West’ and

‘Western civilization’ have the same meaning. For Khatami and Ramadan it is the role of the West in the future of Islam which is very different. There are two roles or uses for Western civilization, according to Khatami. The first is to take the best from the Western civilization and jettison the rest. This is actually considered a necessary rather than a voluntary action. For him a fundamental premise is that Islamic civilization (of today) is declining and one must look to other civilizations for innovation ‘but when the collective consciousness and soul of a people outgrows the limitation of the existing civilization, the search for new ideas begins in earnest, often taking the form of turning to other civilizations for clues.’²⁷ This leads to a period of reflection on the part of the gaining civilization, in this case the Islamic civilization. In developing his case that this too is not entirely voluntary, he uses the following example from Western civilization: ‘what Marxists proposed forced the West to become introspective and to search for ways of adjusting capitalism’s methods to the demands of the time, and to modify its social, economic, and political order from within.’²⁸ Once this reflection and identification of the ‘good’ has taken place, the only role for Western civilization is for contrasting purposes ‘it is thus natural that we confront the West, and the upshot of this confrontation will determine our future.’²⁹

For Ramadan, the role of the West is intertwined and part of the future of Islam. In fact, the two are inseparable. Ramadan contrasts sharply to Khatami’s concept when he suggest in his discussion of *dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam* ‘ the old binary graphical representation, with two juxtaposed universes that could stand face to face in relative

stability, no longer bears any resemblance to the reality of hegemony and spheres of influence in civilization, culture, economics, and subsequently, of course, politics.³⁰

Ramadan does agree with Khatami that introspective examination is necessary. Ramadan proposes that the first step involves returning to the Islamic teaching on spirituality.

Because the Muslim in the West is surrounded by assaults on the principles of Islam—however inadvertent – it is essential to look inwardly at one's faith and spirituality as a first priority and let the truth of Islam radiate in all dimensions of life.³¹ Perhaps the most important outgrowth of this concept is also Ramadan's most glaring contrast with Khatami. For Ramadan, the future of Islam begins within Western civilization rather than separate from it. Where Khatami sees confrontation, Ramadan sees engagement “the future dialogue between civilizations will not take place at the geopolitical frontiers between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ but rather, paradoxically, within European and American societies.”³²

Commonality in the Contemporary View: There are many commonalities in the Contemporary View but two stand out above all others and both are not dealt with in any meaningful way. The first is the lack of intellectual Islam. Today there is no Islamic intellectual along the lines of Iqbal, Abduh, or Al-Afghani. Throughout Islamic history there have been intellectual giants in the Muslim world. It is difficult to think of one Islamic scholar today who is true to the “methodology of Qur’anic interpretation that would be sound in scholarship, rationally reliable, and faithful to the Qur’an itself”.³³

The second problematic commonality in the Contemporary View is the acknowledgement that the issue of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries must be addressed although there are differing ideas on how to deal with it. However, the significance of Muslims living in countries which are not Islamic is a growing trend with staggering statistics - 6 million Muslims live in Europe and 8 million in the United States. Although the rates of immigration to the West from Muslim countries are significant, what is more interesting is that “about half of Muslims in the West have been born there to parents who immigrated in the 1950s and 1960s”.³⁴ The other interesting point about Muslims in the West is that they are significantly better educated and are middle class. Living in minority status, which accounts for more than 40 percent of Muslims worldwide, is not easy.³⁵ This is further complicated by the fact that in Western countries, Muslims are heterogeneous with divisions along ethnic, cultural, or language differences. If the Contemporary View has any hope of succeeding, these issues must be addressed in order to redefine Muslim culture because “the common factor of this (minority) population as Muslim is the mere reference to Islam, with no common cultural or linguistic heritage”.³⁶

Impact on Islamic Extremist Groups: The significance of ignoring these two problems in the Contemporary View is profound because these conditions could lead to further justifications for Islamic extremists to gain further sympathy. As we have seen, Islamic extremists follow the general pattern of fundamentalist movements in other religious extremists groups. These include but are not limited to “rebellions against the

secularist exclusion of the divine from the public life, and a desperate attempt to make spiritual values prevail in the modern world.”³⁷ These conditions provide the opportunity for extremists to leverage fear and uncertainty to distort Islam closer to their particular worldview which is commonly intolerant of others and more violent than those who practice and espouse moderation and reconciliation. However, this is not an irreversible trend but there is a need for a modern civilizational Islam created by Muslims. This means creating an overall worldview which embraces modern realities and making it truly Islamic. Fazlur Rahman has some interesting suggestions which are worthy of noting. He observes there has not been much study or thought devoted to “Islamic metaphysics of the modern times”³⁸. He calls for the need of a ‘Qur’anic weltanschauung’ which he defines as a systematic and coherent body of thought fully informed by the Qur’an.³⁹ This requires the Islamization of all fields of study so that the intellectual capacity of the Muslim world can be brought to bear and make it their own. Additionally, unless this happens, when Muslim students reach higher education, all the fields of study will continue to be secular. This is an important concept which the Muslim world should embrace. Imagine a world in which a The Law Center at Georgetown University actually had classes in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. With Islamic education, the ‘corrupt’ Muslim governments and Islamic Parties which foster some of the most resilient Islamic extremists groups will eventually come to pass eliminating a strong justification for extremist movement. The subjugation of politics to Islamic values through education

could be the key to unlocking the extremist movements hold on the Muslim citizenry in many Middle Eastern countries.

4.3 Islamic Identity, Cultural Framings and the Future

The future of Islam and the role of Islam in the nation-state is the subject of considerable debate throughout the Muslim world. As the debate has progressed, little attention has been given to the issue of identity and the impact identity has and will have on framing the different worldviews on the future of Islam. For this section, the term identity is defined as the set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of a group. The defining characteristics of any group therefore lie at the very heart of what it is to belong. It is within that ideological belonging, one finds a common view of the past and a shared view of the future.

Within each common view there are slight variations and not all variations will have the same result. The common view in Islam is “further complicated by the decentralization of sacred authority in the Muslim world” making variations or “universally accepted interpretation of Islam” virtually impossible.⁴⁰ As an example, one needs to look no further than Turkey where economic liberalization has provided the opportunity for a Muslim identity independent of state control over religion. The intent was to make society better through economic liberalization but one of the results is a making a ‘public’ Muslim identity disseminated in ways the state cannot easily control. What was thought to be a unifying force – economic liberalization – has instead led to the development and dissemination of competing ideas on the Muslim identity in Turkey.⁴¹

In this case, relativist modernism, created the potential for competing versions of Turkish identity and what it means to be Muslim. Some variations may bind a group closer together or drive them further apart. Two attributes of these variations include significance and time. Variations, if remarkable or given enough time, will spawn new groups and therefore redefine identity. These dynamics result primarily from the questions or the subjects being examined by a group which were previously undefined. Events within the group may also have profound redefining effects on identity. For example, the death of the Prophet Muhammad was an event which split the Muslim community over the issue of leadership. Within the Muslim community, two views emerged over an initial period during which debate and significant confusion raged. There were those who followed Abu Bakr, Muhammad's father in law, as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad. While still others who believed that the Prophet had appointed his son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor years earlier during an announcement at Ghadir Khom. A characteristic of the identity of these two groups was their leader. In this case, the leader became a defining characteristic of the group and their identity. Reconciliation between two views on the future of the group proved unattainable so the group split and Islam has had two identities ever since – Sunni and Sh'ia.

One of the most significant aspects of identity lies in its dynamicism. Identity is ever changing and a group or individual may have infinite identities simultaneously depending on the issue being examined. Language, culture, faith, history, ethnicity, and

citizenship can all be the basis for identity when faced with a particular situation. An examination of some of the more common sources of identity is worth mentioning.

Ethnicity as defining behavioral characteristics centers upon the notion of a collective consciousness of common ancestry. Any ethnic group may have differing ideas about the ancestral characteristics that make up its identity. Language, for example, may be the dominant ancestral characteristic which creates 'separateness'. Language within a monolithic or stable group is identified as defining ethnic characteristic of the group. However, sometimes a unique language is not regarded as essential for a separate ethnic identity because other identity determinants such as physical appearance, common cultural traditions, geography or any combination or derivations of same take precedence. A good example of a non-language ethnic identity determinant is geography – an ethnic identity linked to a specific territory. There is no better example of this phenomena than the regional tendencies of identity in Germany's *Länder* or counties. Take *Bayern* (Bavaria) in southern Germany. Here one will find an identity with a combination of ethnic determinants that are tied directly to the land. Leather belt, leather shorts, feathered hat, tuft of chamois hair and woolen jacket are the basic garb of a Bavarian and all of these symbols have their roots in farming the Upper Alpine region of Bavaria. Other Bavarian traditions tied to the land can also be seen today. One such custom is more than 500 years old, called the *Schaffler Tanz* or 'Coopers Dance'. A *schaffler*, or cooper, is a person who makes a living building beer barrels or kegs. This dance is still performed by coopers only and is characterized by the stomping of the feet and slapping

knees, thighs and boots to the rhythm of the music. King Ludwig I famously stated upon the creation of the German state: '*We want to be Germans and to remain Bavarians*' which characterizes the Bavarian first, German second priority of identity that can be seen even today in the slogan 'Freistaat Bayern' meaning the Free State of Bavaria – all of which are ultimately tied to land. In this case culture and identity are tightly intertwined because aspects of culture – in this case the *Schaffler Tanz* – become internalized as part of the social identity.⁴²

The nation-state as defining behavioral characteristics is perhaps one of the most common forms of identity. Philosophers from Locke to Kant have written extensively on self-realization as a source of personal identity which ultimately manifests itself into civic identity when discussing a group. But nation-state identity is not simply the result of a single determinant. Identity determinants, when examining the nation-state as a source of identity, are multi-faceted and include many combinations.

As one examines the United States as a nation-state containing defining behavioral characteristics, the determinants are many. They often include democratic institutions like Congress, an independent judiciary, the executive branch, and how they interact with one another as well as critical documents such as the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights, etc. In other countries like those in Europe, the nation-state identity determinants include such diverse concepts such as a common currency. This may seem trivial, but ask any royalist in Britain about the idea of eliminating the Queen Elizabeth or the royal crest from the pound in favor of the euro and you begin to realize how

important seemingly innocuous symbols of the nation-state can be when examining the identity. In a recent article entitled *The Irony of Islah (Reform)*, Gwenn Okruhlik briefly discusses the identity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and what it means to reform in that country 'beneath the surface in Saudi Arabia, people are asking: who or what constitutes the nation? Competing narratives exist inside Saudi Arabia on what it means to belong – what it means if anything to 'be Saudi' and how it relates to the larger Arab and Muslim World.'⁴³ The issues involving the identity determinants of the nation-state are continuously being examined and are a source of unity as well as controversy.

Religion as defining behavioral characteristic of identity is one of the oldest and perhaps most controversial identity determinant in the modern world. Few issues involving religious identity are easy to reconcile. There is no better place this can be seen than the recent upheavals in France leading some to believe that 'Western European countries must place on the agenda certain values ingrained in Islam that cannot be reconciled with liberal democracy, religious tolerance, or gender equality.'⁴⁴ Religion in general, and Islam in particular, is at the heart of the identity debate taking place in many countries and most often focuses on differences with Christianity or Judaism (which are also Abrahamic faiths). It is in the 'tradition of the faith' which the roots of most differences rather than faith itself are found. All faiths assume that followers are ethical, have the potential to create saints and fanatics, and are holistic in their approach.⁴⁵ The role religion as the pivotal determinant of identity is currently experiencing a resurgence. From militant Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle Eastern and Central Asia to the rise

of the evangelical religious conservatives in the US, religion is now one of the key determinants of identity. But what is the source of the resurgence of this determinant factor of identity?

The answer can be found by looking to many sources but perhaps the most universal of explanations to emerge recently comes from globalization. This is one of the more prominent explanations as one looks to the example of Islam as a resurgent determinant in religious identity in certain parts of the world. Anti-globalizationalist arguments maintain that the resulting fragmentation of religious identity is taking place at all levels of society around the Muslim world. They contend that the fundamental relationship of Islamic values to a sense of community (*umma*), notion of belonging, and concept of homeland is becoming diluted through globalization. Conversely, it can also be argued that religious identity has never been a stable and homogenized determinant in the first place. All religious faiths have often gone through transformations and redefinitions, reinterpretations when faced with modernity. Religion has historically been at the very heart of societal fragmentation and conflict often forming and reforming new religious identities in the process. Globalization has simply reduced the spatial impediments that led to past societal fragmentations based upon religion through expanding the word and receiving feedback by embracing advances in technology and communications. For all of these very same reasons, globalization is also as one of the most significant threats to religious identity.

Identity can be further expanded to include an infinite number of defining characteristic of a group depending on how much or little one 'peels back the onion'. These defining characteristics can include identity based on what people do - professions, political affiliation, etc. Indeed, one only needs to look at organized labor unions to find numerous examples of professional-based identities when examining particular questions related to crises in various industries. It is thus important to keep in mind 'the peculiar nature of modern identities is that, although they are always the result of creative redefinition, they are also linked to a given, be it language or tradition, but also to soil, and sometime religion, as a historical marker.'⁴⁶ The significance depends not only on the issue being examined but also the point of view of those making the association.

Identity can also be associated to a particular group by others. The most striking example of this can be the view of Americans by many in the Muslim world as a result of the continuing scandals involving US policy and its effects on Muslims. One needs only consider US policy with respect to Iraq: collateral damage in the conduct of the invasion; the failure to find weapons of mass destruction; the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse; and the treatment Guantanamo Bay detainees. All of these events have served to create a definition of American identity by those in the Muslim world. The antonym to that image of Americans is the growing anti-Muslim sentiment in the US as a result of Septemer 11th, 2001, that all followers of the Islamic faith are terrorists.

Identity can also be defined even under much more subtle ways without active participation of those involved. Civil conflict and war are ready examples of how this

can happen. As one looks at the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was no side that was not part of the conflict. Individuals no matter how secular were associated with one side or another almost overnight. The concept of 'the other' was taken to horrific new heights based upon one's own identity. A close friend of mine by the name of Nedim Avdagic who was later a military commander in Sarajevo, described the notion of identity this way 'I have always considered myself as from Sarajevo, not Bosnian, not Yugoslavian. I remember walking home from work one day during the start of the war when a tank appeared in the middle of the street and began shelling the airport. At that point, I realized that despite not having been in a mosque for decades, I was a Muslim.'

The question becomes what vision of the future of Islam is likely? Will it be that which descends from the Traditionalist, Radical or Contemporary Views, previously discussed? Will it be neither or is there another way? The answer is most likely that Contemporary View of the future of Islam is likely to take place but the degree to which one will dominate is another issue altogether. This author believes that the future of Islam is directly tied to the West, in a manner suggested by Ramadan. There are two circumstances currently taking place in the Muslim world and the West that justify this view which have nothing to do with faith but with demographics.

First let's examine the West. As the West ages, immigration will need to be increased because current fertility rates will not support the benefits of those retired or retiring. The process of ageing is, at 1.3 births per woman, particularly acute in Germany and other countries of the European Union (EU). International migration can mitigate,

but not solve the demographic problem in the receiving countries of the EU. According to a recent United Nations study, an average annual net immigration of 1.4 million people will be needed to keep the proportion of the working-age population in the European Union stable until 2050. This corresponds to an increase in the net annual inflow from 0.8 persons per thousand in Western Europe between 1950 and 2000 to 3.7 per thousand over the next five decades. Although it is hardly realistic that immigration will accelerate to this level, migration can nevertheless contribute to mitigating the ageing process significantly.⁴⁷

The economic impacts of the demographic problem in Europe are already being felt. For example, Britain's National Health Service, which is one of the European Union's largest employers, would collapse were it not for the large numbers of immigrant doctors, nurses and ancillary staff that keep it going.⁴⁸ The economic impacts will force changes in immigration policy in the EU since politicians are unlikely to make the alternative decisions – raise taxes, cut retirement benefits, raising the retirement age or a combination of all three. Where will those immigrants come from?

The answer to that question leads to the second point confirming Ramadan's version of the future of Islam. The answer is from the Muslim world. The desperate economic, political and social conditions in countries from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia as a result of globalization are certainly contributing factors to immigration to the West, and to Europe in particular. There are 4.2 million Muslims in France making up one in 12 of the population—and its Arabs one in 20. In Germany, there are some 3.2 million

Muslims in its population of 82 million. Among Britain's 2 million Muslims (perhaps half of them under 18, in a population of nearly 60 million), there are some recently-settled refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere although the two of the largest and most established Muslim communities, the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. In Brussels, the capital of the European Union, Muhammad has been the most popular name for new-born boys for the past four years.⁴⁹ Most experts paint a grim picture in the Islamic world, particularly the Middle East suggesting that the trend of increasing Muslim immigration to the West will continue into the foreseeable future. In a recent report on Arab human development the U.N. is uncharacteristically blunt in characterizing the situation of Arab emigration to the West stating: “Arguably, emigration of highly qualified Arabs to the West has been one of the most serious factors undermining the knowledge acquisition in Arab countries. It is no exaggeration to characterize this outflow as a hemorrhage. The trend is large scale and steadily accelerating.”⁵⁰ All of this evidence appears to further support Ramadan’s claim that the future of Islam will take place within European (and American) societies.

CHAPTER 5 – GOVERNMENT POLICY AND RESPONSE STRATEGY

An effective government policy and response strategy to limit the expansion and to expedite the end of Islamic extremist groups would reduce violence and make more resources available to improve the quality of life for people everywhere. President Obama launched a new era of engagement with the world, including committing the U.S. to a new partnership with Muslims around the world, a partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect.¹ Recently (August 2009) President Obama approved several new initiatives to counter al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. “He has encouraged the NSC to be even more aggressive, even more proactive and even more innovative, to seek out new ways and new opportunities for taking down these terrorists before they can kill more innocent men, women and children.”² The U.S. is devoting new resources, investing in new capabilities, taking new actions and adapting policies across the board.

Four categories of potential responses including three (soft power) diplomatic policy programs; and one (hard power) civilian, intelligence, and military actions are considered. An analysis of some successful and some failed responses provide a framework to enhance and tailor a more proactive policy and new responses to Islamic extremist groups. There is widespread consensus that hard power (military action) alone cannot end Islamic extremist group terrorist actions. A clear, more precise definition of the challenge and a broader, more accurate understanding of the causes and conditions that help fuel violent extremism are essential. The challenge of confronting violent

Islamic extremism requires greater awareness, diplomatic engagement and a sense of justice (not vengeance).³ Extremist violence and terrorist attacks are the final manifestations of a long process rooted in helplessness, humiliation and hatred. A comprehensive approach to end Islamic extremist groups must address the conditions that help fuel violent extremism.

5.1 Diplomatic Disengagement

Diplomatic disengagement with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas clearly demonstrates the failure of this response. The strategy of seeking to give Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah the diplomatic equivalent of the silent treatment has not caused them to cower. Indeed, each has enjoyed a steady rise in power and influence in the face of U.S. opposition. The U.S. strategy of pursuing a mixture of diplomatic disengagement and sanctions has enabled these countries and groups to skirt hard choices rather than force them to make them. They determine the pace and direction of their relationship with the United States, and they have been satisfied to settle into a position in the twilight between peace and war. To be meaningful, engagement has to be directed to some purpose other than engagement itself. At the same time, however, disengagement has a way of sustaining itself, diminishing U.S. influence over its targets because no assets of value are at risk. Some in the United States seem to feel that this country has ‘taught these other countries a lesson,’ but if there is a lesson to be gleaned in all of this, it is that these countries have learned that they can defy the United States with relative impunity.”⁴

Diplomatic disengagement with Islamic extremists and terrorists (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah

and Hamas) left the US weaker, less persuasive and facing stronger foes. “Our experience in Iraq has not only drained our blood and our pockets, but it has led to deep questions about the credibility, commitment and capacity of the USG. We are also less central to regional diplomacy, and countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia are stepping in to fill the vacuum.”⁵

The strategy to contain Iran by diplomatic disengagement and rallying support of Sunni Arab states was “unsound and impractical, and probably further destabilized an already volatile region”.⁶ This strategy was based on the containment of Iran as the primary objective of the US government’s Middle East policy because it held Tehran responsible for “rising violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lebanon's tribulations, and Hamas' intransigence”.⁷ However, a successful containment effort required diplomatic engagement that simply did not exist. In addition, US policy inaccurately assumed that Iran's problems would go away when President Ahmadinejad does. The real decision-maker in Iran is Supreme Leader Khamenei not President Ahmadinejad.⁸ The clerical regime's tampering with the June 2009 election was nothing less than an attempt to completely take over all aspects of the Iranian state.⁹ Diplomatic disengagement has failed.

5.2 Diplomatic De-radicalization

Diplomatic de-radicalization is a practical program aimed at countering the appeal of militancy, changing attitudes and getting repentant terrorists back into society.¹⁰ What are the factors which prompt individual and collective withdrawal from violent extremist

groups? Disengagement is a behavioral change. It does not necessitate a change in values or ideals, but requires relinquishing the objective of achieving change through violence. Disengagement from terrorism does not guarantee de-radicalization.¹¹ De-radicalization implies a cognitive shift.¹² Social networks, financial and psychological assistance, and the willingness of the receiving community to accept former perpetrators of violence are common factors in successful programs.¹³ Some of the key elements of de-radicalization and rehabilitation in Europe and the Middle East include collective disengagement, removing the motivator, and creating an alternative narrative. There are four types of de-radicalization methods:

1. Re-education and rehabilitation based on providing a different truth
2. Creation of space and opportunity to vent frustration
3. Programs that provide an alternative lifestyle
4. Amnesty programs

The key to any successful rehabilitation initiative appears to be engagement with the individual, addressing both his way of thinking and his circumstances. Three examples demonstrate the path to successful de-radicalization programs. The Afghan program known as Takhim-e-Solh is a product of the unique history and political composition of the country.¹⁴ The Yemen Committee for Dialogue process involves two steps: first dialogue between the clerics and the militants, and then the reinsertion/reintegration of the former militants into society.¹⁵ The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has one of the most successful rehabilitation programs that rebuts the al-Qaeda

ideology through educational programs in the mass media, through university curricula, and through repentant terrorists and extremists who negotiate and argue with potential recruits on relevant websites and in other media.¹⁶

5.3 Diplomatic Engagement and Political Inclusion

Diplomatic engagement and political inclusion does work, but history shows that political participation co-opts terrorists only under very specific conditions. Diplomatic engagement with Hamas, the largest Islamic extremist group in the Palestinian community is challenging. While it boycotted the 1996 elections, it campaigned in the second, and with a stunning victory, began to take a role in Palestinian governance. “Hamas' involvement in the democratic process may strike many as a profound irony. After all, the group fields a private army, embraces violence as a political tool, regularly orchestrates terrorist attacks, and is dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamist state ruling the territory of Israel and the PA. Granting Hamas legitimate political status and access to the prerogatives of state power seems to be asking for trouble.”¹⁷ Optimists argued that Hamas' participation in mainstream Palestinian politics would force it to moderate its radical goals and terrorist tactics. They were wrong. In June 2007, the collapse of the Palestinian unity government and the subsequent coup d'etat in Gaza effectively established Hamas as the governing authority there. Hamas' ruthless ousting of Fatah forces put it in an unprecedented position. Hamas adapted to existing institutions, established a strong monopoly on institutional power, and ruthlessly suppressed opposing Fatah activists, religious rivals from the Islamic Jihad

movement, and criminal gangs.”¹⁸ The optimists continue to insist that the January war in Gaza overshadowed the fact that Hamas is in the midst of an unprecedented ideological transformation.

The rise of Islamic extremism in Europe created panic among some political leaders and aroused fears within the non-Muslim population. Terrorist bombings of the public transport systems in Madrid and London, riots in the French *banlieues*, and protests over disparaging cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad contributed to the need for an effective response. In France, diplomatic engagement and political inclusion appear to be working to limit the spread of Islamic extremism.¹⁹

Diplomatic engagement with autocracies (Russia and China) have demonstrated significant progress and produced stability. Diplomatic engagement of Islamic extremist governments (e.g. Iran and Syria) is essential to achieve stability and sustain peace. A successful foreign policy should integrate, rather than exclude. The US should integrate Islamic states into “existing international institutions by increasing their stakeholder roles within them. US foreign policy should be based on the broad assumption that there is ultimately one path to modernity -- and that it is essentially liberal in character.”²⁰

5.4 Civilian, Intelligence and Military Responses

Civilian, intelligence and military responses are essential components of a new strategy to end Islamic extremist groups. Civilian law enforcement actions have been the single most successful response in ending extremist groups. However, the current Islamic extremist groups appear to be highly resilient and their longevity indicates that the

effectiveness of civilian responses may be diminishing. Intelligence responses support both civilian and military responses and inform diplomatic responses. Military responses have very limited success (7%) in ending extremist groups. The US led military response in Iraq clearly created new Islamic extremist groups, increase recruitment for established groups, and significantly increased popular and financial support in the Islamic world. The US and NATO military response in Afghanistan has failed to achieve the goal of ending al Qaeda.

5.4.1 Civilian Responses

Civilian responses include law enforcement and financial actions. Law enforcement actions ended the majority (40%) of extremist groups in the RAND study. Law enforcement actions are an essential component of the response to Islamic extremist groups. Traditional and emergent integrated international law enforcement responses have successfully penetrated and ended Islamic extremist groups. Many actions of Islamic extremist groups are criminal activities. Popular public support for law enforcement responses to criminal actions is essential for success in ending extremist groups. Characterization of an extremist group as a criminal enterprise is helpful in obtaining information, limiting new recruits, and isolating the leadership. Expanded efforts to thwart global financing for violent extremism required working with the international banking community to deny resources and funding to the al-Qaeda network and the businesses that support them. While some terrorist financiers have adapted over the years to international measures aimed at isolating and freezing their assets. “Tracking

al-Qaeda financing has proven a very effective way to locate terrorist operatives and supporters and to disrupt terrorist plots."²¹

5.4.2 Intelligence Responses

Intelligence responses are essential for the success of any civilian, military or diplomatic action to end Islamic extremist groups. There are intelligence failures including the dramatic failure regarding the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda. "During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration disregarded the intelligence community's expertise, politicized the intelligence process, and selected unrepresentative raw intelligence to make its public case."²² "In the war on terrorism, intelligence is playing its greatest role yet, but even today, espionage and intelligence analysis will not be the decisive factors."²³ Intelligence informs and enhances policy and strategy in response to Islamic extremist groups. It is a component of the fully integrated response. A globally networked intelligence enterprise integrates foreign, military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through policy, personnel and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policy makers, warfighters, homeland security officials and law enforcement personnel.²⁴

5.4.3 Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism and Military Action

Experience from the British counterinsurgency in response to the IRA clearly demonstrates that criminalization and normalization are essential for success.²⁵ Counterinsurgency for Islamist extremists groups is most effective when coupled with

actions to inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group, produce dissension within the group, facilitate exit from the group, and reduce support for the group.²⁶ The U.S. Field Manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations indicates that a successful campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force lead by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.²⁷ Counterinsurgency operations to deny Islamic extremist groups access to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology are the centerpiece of US global strategy.²⁸ No single approach makes an effective counterinsurgency policy.²⁹

An effective counterterrorism action requires an understanding of Islamic extremists' vulnerabilities and appropriate use of national security resources.³⁰ US military counterterrorism global activities are tightly coupled with intelligence and diplomatic actions.³¹ One of the tactics Israel uses in responding to terrorism is to seek out and kill individual enemies. The US also engages in "targeted killings of terrorists".³² Although Israel's experience suggests that targeted killings can help manage terrorism, the policy cannot by itself resolve the problem. Hence, any targeted killings must be embedded in a broader counterterrorism program with better defenses and improved intelligence. Counterterrorism also includes

Military action is the most expensive and least effective response to end extremist groups. The military response to Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan has not achieved the objectives of stability, security and peace. The war has pushed parts of the US military close to the breaking point. "Frequent and extended combat tours of soldiers and repeated deployments of civilian reservists have disgracefully made a small number

of volunteers pay a high price for the politicians' miscalculations.”³³ The key to success is to fight the right war. “Victory will come only when the US succeeds in discrediting the terrorists' ideology and undermining their support. These achievements, in turn, will require accepting that the terrorist threat can never be eradicated completely and that acting as though it can, will only make it worse.”³⁴

5.4.4 Integrated Responses using the Media and the Internet

Integrated responses are a new strategic approach – a new way of seeing the extremist challenge and a new way of confronting it in a more comprehensive manner. Integrating every element of soft and hard power can discourage rather than encourage violent Islamic extremism. Using the media and internet it is possible to popularize a political, economic and social campaign that meets the basic needs and legitimate grievances of ordinary people – security for their communities, education for their children, a job and income for parents and a sense of dignity and worth. Seemingly intractable problems and legitimate grievances can be resolved through diplomacy, dialogue and the democratic process. Hard power responses to the fanatical Islamic extremist for whom no amount of outreach or engagement will ever dissuade from violence and murder is essential and must be fully integrated within the overall strategy.

Islamic extremists use the media and internet (virtual world) for operational control, radicalization, recruitment and fund raising. The vulnerability of the young and their access to new media via the internet allows recruitment into Islamic extremist groups.³⁵ The need to change the image of the US and other governments is well

documented.³⁶ Mutual exploitation of the media by governments and Islamic extremists poses unique challenges that must be considered by policy makers.³⁷ This dynamic tension is the driving force for the absence of a clear understanding in the general public of the threat to society. For example, the images of Muslim women in the global media have generated significant anti-Islamic public opinion in the west and have outraged conservative Muslims.³⁸

An examination of social movements indicates that the most successful type is a segmentary, polycentric, and integrated network (SPIN).³⁹ Islamic extremists groups survive overwhelming opposition because they are SPIN groups. SPINs may be the organizational form of the global future. Transnational marketing of Islamic extremists' ideology is facilitated with extensive internet access and the capability to access cable news media from remote, isolated regions. Islamic extremists also recognize and exploit relationships with global NGOs to market their ideology, recruit members, and raise funds.⁴⁰ The global Islamist terrorist network has evolved to self-organized groups in a hostile habitat but linked through the internet.⁴¹ Islamic extremists frame social problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audience access through public media and the internet. In many cases the media is the target for specific activities.⁴²

CONCLUSION

Contemporary extremist groups pose a significant threat to stability and their actions influence US foreign policy. An analysis of why some contemporary extremist groups fall while others flourish reveal common attributes that inform and enhanced US government policy and response strategy. While each group when examined individually has a separate and distinct set of reasons and attributes leading to its success or failure, there are common threads which the successful extremist groups possess and vice versa. The identification and characterization of extremist groups reveals two major types – those based on political ideology and those based on religion. However, the boundaries between the modern extremist group and the contemporary political party is often fluid.

The modern extremist group is not monolithic in its ideology, strategy, methods, tactics or desired outcomes. That is not to say that each modern extremist group is unique. Most follow two general patterns of evolution. Those two patters include what has been characterized here as the hybrid group and the splinter group. In the hybrid group there is a mixing or coalescing of extremism with criminal activity. Examples of such groups include the IRA, FARC, ETA, the GIA in Algeria, the Dawood Ibrahim gang in Pakistan, and several Islamist groups close to Al Qaeda such as Jaish-i-Muhammad and the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen. In the splinter group there are many offshoots while still maintaining a loose affiliation with the parent group through a thread of commonality based upon religious or nationalist congruency. The most well known groups which have experienced splintering include Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS and the Baader-

Meinhof Group and the Red Army Faction. The Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS have experienced hundreds of offshoots while Baader-Meinhof has experienced relatively few. The most interesting characteristic which the hybrid and splinter group share is speed. They splinter or become a hybrid at a surprisingly fast pace due to their ability to leverage and exploit the breakdown of barriers in the international systems.

Additionally, modern extremist groups with a coherent and simple message appealing to nationalist or religious tendencies have the potential to last longest through the hybrid-splintering effect. Analysis of case studies and data bases on how extremist groups end indicates that those based on political ideology flourish when the single political issue is well defined and the group exploits the media and international organizations effectively. Extremist groups based on political ideology fail most often through direct law enforcement actions that capture or kill the leadership. Political ideology-based extremist groups that flourish often transform into political parties and cease terrorist activities.

Analysis of case studies and databases on how extremist groups, based on religion, survive or thrive reveals common attributes usually associated with their formation. Religious extremist groups share five common attributes: a search for meaning, a sense of religious duty, a quest for purity, inspirational leadership, and scripture as justification. Religious extremist groups that flourish are highly effective in each of these common attributes. Some Zionist, Christian and Islamic extremist groups have achieved their goals and transformed into political parties while others have simply

disintegrated. Characterization and comparative case studies of religious-based extremist groups reveal a common perceived threat of modernity and globalization. The two best examples used here involved Zionist extremism and Islamic extremism. There are similarities between the two brands of extremism and within them which contribute to their longevity (Islamic) and their demise (Zionist). Their similarities included anti-colonial, nationalistic tendencies which formed a fundamental component of the group's initial identity. In the case of the Zionists it was Etzel and Lehi, for the Islamic groups it was HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas, Etzel and Lehi splintered and fell, HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood flourished.

Islamic extremist groups are engaged in the definition of an Islamic identity, cultural and worldview often used to justify their extremism. It is also the foundation of what makes these particular extremist movements among the most durable over time. The characterization of contemporary Islamic extremist groups within the context of these similarities involves an examination of the social identity and cultural framings which provides further insight. One revealing aspect is the multiplicity and complexity of views on how Islam is dealing with secularism, modernity and globalization. Islamic radicalization began as struggles within the Muslim society and follows the pattern of other forms of religious radicalization. During the establishment of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad, Islam spread into Christian lands and swept away cultural, social, and political elements. This continued for centuries as Christianity was replaced by Islam throughout the Middle East. During the 19th and 20th Centuries as a result of colonialism,

modernization, and globalization, Islamic extremist movements were created by the struggle (*jihad*) between secularists and fundamentalists within a particular country. The concept of *jihad* is shared by nearly all Islamic extremist groups in part because *jihad* is rooted in the Qur'an's command to *struggle in the path of God*. However, the unique interpretation of *jihad* in the 19th and 20th Centuries was used to justify the *struggle* against host governments which became too secular (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat e-Islami in Pakistan). Jihad is part of the social fabric of Islam. It is part of the social identity of what it means to be Muslim and is inseparable from the Qur'an because all pious Muslims must struggle in the path of God in the example of the Prophet Muhammad. The underlying philosophical foundations of Islam have continually addressed modernity and modernization.

The philosophical foundations of Islamic modernism can be grouped into two distinct categories: the Traditional View and the Contemporary View. The Traditional View as described by Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh indicates that Islam and modernity are not compatible. The Contemporary View as described by Mohammad Khatami's and Tariq Ramadan is not unitary – one asserts national identity and Islamic identity, while the other affirms only an Islamic identity. These two divergent contemporary views reflect the political realities and challenges of Muslims living in nations as a minority in contracts with those living as the majority in Islamic republics. The role of Islam in the nation-state is the subject of considerable debate throughout the Muslim world, but there appears to be an absence of contemporary

intellectual leadership within Islam. Contemporary Islamic extremists contend that the fundamental relationship of Islamic values with a sense of community (*umma*), the notion of belonging, and the concept of homeland is diluted through globalization. Modernity is perceived as a threat to the religious and political leadership within the Muslim world. Nearly all of the Islamic extremist groups examined have some form of anti-modernity or anti-globalization rhetoric as part of their message if not their ideology. In every case examined the perceived threat of modernity was related, in part, to their longevity.

Government policy and response strategy will be more successful in ending extremist groups by understanding why some fall and others flourish. In the cases of successful responses to extremist groups, law enforcement actions were the most successful. Military action proved to be the most expensive and least effective response governments have taken to end extremist groups. An enhanced diplomatic response that fully integrates the proper balance of soft and hard power is essential for success. Diplomatic engagement, de-radicalization and political inclusion augmented by civilian, intelligence and military actions appears to be the most effective response to prevail in the struggle with extremist groups. A more accurate understanding of the causes and conditions that fuel extremism are essential in any effort at neutralizing violent tendencies. This study sought to further characterize the commonalities amongst and between different groups in an effort to further understand why some groups flourish while other survive and even thrive.

Endnotes - Introduction

¹ World Christian Database. <<http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org>>, (accessed April 26, 2005). See also Weigle, George. *World Religions by the Numbers*. <<http://www.the-tidings.com/2002/0308/difference.htm>>, (accessed April 26, 2005); and D. Bartlett, George Thomas Kurian, Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Encyclopedia* (2nd Edition). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2 vols.

² Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, (London: Verso, 2005), 60.

³ John Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 154. Jahiliyyah refers to the pre-Islamic period, or “ignorance” of monotheism and divine law. Qutb interpreted *jahili* as the domination of humans over humans, rather than the submission of humans to God. The term denotes any government systems, ideology, or institution based on values other than those referring to God. In order to correct this situation, Qutb proposed the implementation of Islamic laws, values and principles.

⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Cedar Rapids: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 2003): 93.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁶ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” *The Atlantic* 266, no. 3 (September 1990): 49.

⁷ Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3. (Summer 1993): 34.

⁸ Nabil Matar, *Islam in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 155.

⁹ Daniel Pipes, “The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!” *National Review*, (November 19, 1990): 4.

¹⁰ Hugh Goddard, *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations* (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2000): 190.

¹¹ Mary Ann Tétreault and Robert A. Denemark, eds., *Guns, God, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism and the International Political Economy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004): 1-2.

¹² Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons of Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), 34-36. Of the 648 terrorist groups contained in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, 62 percent have ended. However, only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended indicating that religious terrorist groups are difficult to eliminate.

¹³ Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2002): 1-14.

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¹ Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007): 1-11.

² Ibid., 208.

³ Ibid., 221-254.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Reza Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War* (New York: Random House, 2009): 1-169.

⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 52.

⁷ Ibid., 54.

⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁹ Ibid., 97.

¹⁰ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 61.

¹¹ Leonard Weinberg, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 141-146.

¹² Michael Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, trans. David Gordon White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004): 289-298.

¹³ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 78-79.

¹⁴ Ibid., 88-89.

¹⁵ Richard T. Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008): 164.

¹⁶ Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 279-295.

¹⁷ The Evian Accords refer to a series of negotiations ending the Algerian War of Independence. The negotiations took place in the French town of Evian-les-Bains.

¹⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 82.

¹⁹ Charles Kurzman, *Modernist Islam 1840-1940: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 312.

²⁰ Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning* (Oxford: University Press, 2005): 132.

- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Mark Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): 20-21.
- ²³ Mary Ann Tétreault and Robert A. Denemark, *Gods, Guns, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism and International Political Economy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004): 1-31.
- ²⁴ Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference* (London: Continuum, 2002): 26.
- ²⁵ Robert W. Orttung and Andray Makarychev, eds., *National Counter-terrorism Strategies* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006): 1-20.
- ²⁶ Audrey Cronin, *Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda* (Oxford: Routledge, 2008): 19.
- ²⁷ Cronin, *Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda*, 24. The concept of durability or resiliency over time poses difficult challenges particularly with the splintering effect of extremist groups. Cronin argues that it is a myth that extremism is essentially endless, despite evidence to the contrary such as those ideas offered by Jones and Libecker at RAND. The median lifespan according to Cronin is 5-9 years and is based on the Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database.
- ²⁸ Seth G. Jones, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008): 15.
- ²⁹ Mark Jurgensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (London: Frank Cass, 1994): 1-8.
- ³⁰ Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004): 214-215.
- ³¹ Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (London: Harper Press, 2008): 152-188.
- ³² Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 1-5.
- ³³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (London: J.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000): 135.
- ³⁴ Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006): 108.
- ³⁵ Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*, 15.
- ³⁶ Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism and Social Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2007): 119-120.
- ³⁷ Jones, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*, 1-10.

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- ¹ Leonard Weinberg, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 1.
- ² Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremis Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004): 37-38.
- ³ Stephan Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: Inside the Story of the RAF*, trans. Anthea Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 65-80.
- ⁴ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremis Groups*, 266-267.
- ⁵ Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (London: HarperPress, 2008): 238.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 437.
- ⁷ Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004): 290-311.
- ⁸ Michael Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, trans. David Gordon White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004): 83-120.
- ⁹ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremis Groups*, 345-347.
- ¹⁰ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Emergence and Influence of the Zapatista Social Netwar,” in *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001): 171-195.
- ¹¹ Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion : Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 179-181.
- ¹² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 81-83.
- ¹³ Most prominent examples of these types of activities are from the 1960s, 1970s and even the 1980s. Although there have been relatively few examples recently of attacks on Israeli citizens through bombings and hijackings, the number of violent or terrorist acts concentrated against the Israel and the Israeli people is still a powerful and lingering element of the social identity of many Israelis.
- ¹⁴ Leonard Weinberg, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* (New York: Routledge, 2003): 91.
- ¹⁵ The group referred to here are called the Zealots. See David Rapport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1985): 660-72 and Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 88.
- ¹⁶ Although Shomer and Hagana were political and nationalistic in their goals, their reference to Talmidic references were part of their repertoire and, hence, why they are included in this section. Examples include the selection of the names of these groups. “Shomer” can be found in Jewish religious law (Halakha) and is defined as a legal guardian. “Hagana” is Hebrew for defense. See <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/haganah.html> (last accessed November 6, 2009) and <http://www.zionism-israel.com/Haganah.htm> (last accessed November 6, 2009).

¹⁷ Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004): 91-118.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Betar is a Revisionist Zionist youth movement founded by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who among other things, was a close friend of Rabbi Charles Kahane, Rabbi Meir Kahane's father. *Source*: Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004): 165.

²⁰ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 165.

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²³ Ibid., 54.

²⁴ Weinberg and Pedahzur, *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, 64.

²⁵ Purim is a holiday celebrated a month before Passover, commemorating the victory of the Jews over the evil Haman who sought to slay the Jews of ancient Persia. The main ritual of Purim is the recitation in synagogue of the Scroll of Esther, which tells the story of Haman's attack on the Jews.

²⁶ Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 50.

²⁷ Richard T. Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008): 101-103.

²⁸ Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 54.

²⁹ Ehud Spinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: Free Press, 1999): 241-259.

³⁰ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003): 86.

³¹ Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 46.

³² Mary Ann Tétreault and Robert A. Denemark, *Gods, Guns, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism and International Political Economy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 31, and Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements*, 105.

³³ The Army of God is identified as a terrorist group, separate and distinct from the Christian Identity Movement by some sources. For the purposes of this study, they are considered to be part of the Christian Identity Movement.

³⁴ Patricia Baird-Windle and Eleanor J. Bader, *Targets of Hatred: Anti-Abortion Terrorism* (New York: Palgrave, 2003): 5.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Frank Shanty and Raymond Picquet, eds, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism: 1996-2002* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2003): 291.

³⁷ Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 19-20.

³⁸ On May 31, 2009, Dr George Tiller was shot and killed by anti-abortion activist Scott Roeder as he served as an usher during the Sunday morning service at his church in Wichita, KS. Roeder is a member of the Freemen group, which engaged in a three-month standoff with the FBI from a remote Montana farmhouse in 1996. *Source: Time Magazine*, June 2, 2009.

³⁹ See www.armyofgod.com; see also the web page dedicated to Eric Rudolph's writing, <<http://www.armyofgod.com/EricRudolphHomepage.html>> (last accessed November 6, 2009).

⁴⁰ Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 79-81.

⁴¹ Thomas Hurka, "Proportionality in the Morality of War," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2005): 34-65; see also Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 119-120; and Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 24.

⁴² Some Christian theologians believe that two disciples of Jesus were members of the Jewish extremist group the Zealots-Sicarii (discussed in the section on Zionist Extremist Groups) and try to tie religious activism including justification of violence back to the very origins of Christianity. *Sources: Rapport*, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," 660-72; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 88; and Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 30-32.

⁴³ Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* (New York: Guilford Press, 2005): 155.

⁴⁴ Santosh C. Saha and Thomas K. Carr, eds., *Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries* (Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004): 1.

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⁴⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, "The Rationality of Radical Islam," *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 295.

⁴⁷ Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004): 112

⁴⁸ Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004): 214.

⁴⁹ John Esposito, Darrell J. Fasching, and Todd Lewis, *World Religions Today* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 239.

⁵⁰ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008): 35-40.

⁵¹ Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, *The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat* (New York: New York University Press, 2006): 139-141.

⁵² In recent decades, HAMAS has embraced suicide bombings to lethal effect. Its 1987 charter shows its intellectual and theological justifications and cites the Qur'an 3:109 to promote the idea of Muslim exclusivity and *hadith* from Bukhari and the *Sahih Muslim* calling for the murder of Jews to hasten the Day of Judgment. More recent exegesis also influenced HAMAS. The charter cites Hasan al-Banna's call for Islam to obliterate Israel and is explicit about the violent nature of jihad: Article 13 argues that there is no solution to the Palestinian question but through jihad, and Article 15 declares the necessity to instill jihad in the heart of the Muslim nation. *Source:* <http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html> (last accessed November 6, 2009).

⁵³ Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism A Social Movement Theory Approach*, 112.

⁵⁴ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 214.

⁵⁵ Esposito, Fasching and Lewis, *World Religions Today*, 239.

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¹ James L. Heft, ed, *Beyond Violence: Religious Sources of Social Transformation in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004): ix.

² Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2002): 1-14.

³ Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Random House Inc., 2002): 165.

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⁵ Wiktorowicz, Quintain, *Radical Islam Rising* (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005): 3.

⁶ Gen. 1:27 (NASB)

⁷ Qur'an 15 (Surah): 29

⁸ Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil*, 19.

⁹ Reza Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2009): 5.

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¹¹ Ibid., 9.

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¹³ Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Hutsebaut, Sara Mels, Walter Nonneman and Walter Van Herck, eds., *Faith-based Radicalism: Christianity, Islam and Judaism Between Constructive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007): 53-69.

¹⁴ Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): xxi.

¹⁵ Joyce M. Davis, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 133.

¹⁶ Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror*, 81.

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¹⁹ Günther Schlee, *How Enemies Are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflict*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 84.

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²⁵ It appears in more than half of the books listed in the bibliography.

²⁶ Michael Burleigh, *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (London: Harper Press, 2008): 389.

²⁷ Bruce Lawrence, ed., James Howarth, trans., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005): 264.

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¹ Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism and Social Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2007): 7.

² Hugh Goddard, *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations* (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2000): 15.

³ In the view of the author, Islamic terrorism—or any form of terrorism, for that matter—is merely a tactic. The current debate raging in the world on terrorism, the Global War on Terror, etc. ignores many of the points in this thesis and in fact was a major determinant in the selection of the topic.

⁴ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in The Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 27.

⁵ Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009): 18.

⁶ This is important because the word “assassin” comes from a splinter group of Shi’a sect followers of Islam in Sryia who used assassination as their primary tool against their enemies. They were known as the Assassins. The Assassins were active in Persia and Syria from about 1090 to 1272, and were known for assassinating Crusaders. It is important to note that despite their involvement in assassinating Crusaders, they actually hated the Sunnis even more. *Source*: Georges Tate, *The Crusaders: Warriors of God*, trans. Lory Frankel (New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc., 1996): 20.

⁷ Springer, Regens and Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, 18.

⁸ John Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002):117.

⁹ Springer, Regens and Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, 27.

¹⁰ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 113-115.

¹¹ S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996): 40-43; *see also* S.P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3, (Summer, 1993): 22-49.

¹² John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 55.

¹³ Maxime Roderson, *The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974): 9.

¹⁴ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 60.

¹⁵ Charles Kurzman, ed., *Modernist Islam 1840-1940: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 51.

¹⁶ This also has its drawbacks because in *Islam, Liberty and Development*, it is clear that in some of his public addresses, he cannot be entirely open and critical of observations with respect to the future of Islam taking place in Iran. This is most likely due to the fact that most of the contents of the book were written before Khatami became President of Iran.

¹⁷ Mohammad Khatami, *Islam, Liberty, and Development* (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 1998): 58.

¹⁸ Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999): 162.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 153-208.

²⁰ Khatami, *Islam, Liberty, and Development*, 18-36.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 21-24.

²² Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 214.

²³ Although Khatami never explicitly states that Islam is a culture, there is enough evidence in his book, particularly on pages 21-24 where he discusses the conflicts between Islam and the West, that one can infer that he views Islam as a culture. It may be the case that this may be a lack of clarity or laziness in the translation in using Islam and culture interchangeable without considering the implications. Since clarification about this ambiguity with either the author or the translator is not possible, it is interpreted as inferring that Khatami believes that Islam is a culture, in addition to being a faith.

²⁴ Khatami, *Islam, Liberty, and Development*, 36.

²⁵ Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, 104.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 75. It is important to point out that Ramadan appears to agree, in principle, with Faysal al-Mawlawi. From this one can deduce that to Ramadan the entire non-Muslim world is *dar al-dawa*.

²⁷ Khatami, *Islam, Liberty, and Development*, 51.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

³⁰ Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, 75-76.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 114 and 122.

³² *Ibid.*, 226.

- ³³ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982): 142-143.
- ³⁴ Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Random House Inc., 2002): 176.
- ³⁵ Peter Mandeville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004): 115.
- ³⁶ Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for the New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004): 18.
- ³⁷ Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History*, 167.
- ³⁸ Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*, 132.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Quintain Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising* (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005): 136.
- ⁴¹ Quintain Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004): 285.
- ⁴² Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Local and Personal* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 109.
- ⁴³ Gwenn Okruhlik, "The Irony of Islah (Reform)," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 153.
- ⁴⁴ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, "Islam and the EU's Identity Deficit", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. XII, issue 1, (Summer/Fall 2005): 51-52.
- ⁴⁵ Susan Hitchcock and John Esposito, *Geography of Religion: Where God Lives, Where Pilgrims Walk* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2004): 12-13, 44-45.
- ⁴⁶ James L. Heft, ed., *Beyond Violence: Religious Sources of Social Transformation in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004): 29.
- ⁴⁷ Herbert Brueker, Joachim Frick and Gert Wagner, "Economic Consequences of Immigration in Europe". Proceedings from the Conference: *Immigration in a Cross-National Context: What Are the Implications for Europe?*, Bourglinster, Luxembourg, June 14, 2004; and "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?" *Population Studies*, no. 206 (United Nations Publications, Sales No. 01.XIII.19), Geneva, 2000.
- ⁴⁸ "World on the Move", *The Economist*, June 11, 2003
- ⁴⁹ "Multicultural Troubles", *The Economist*, May 25, 2004.
- ⁵⁰ "Arab Human Development Report 2003" (United Nations Development Programme, 2003): 144.

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¹ Barack Obama, “The President’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning,” Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/> (last accessed November 6, 2009).

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³ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004): 229.

⁴ Jon Alterman, “Beyond November: Terrorists, Rogue States, and Democracy,” Address for the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., October 21, 2008.

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⁶ Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, “The Costs of Containing Iran,” *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 2008).

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⁸ Akbar Ganji, “The Latter-Day Sultan,” *Foreign Affairs*. (Nov/Dec 2008).

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¹⁰ Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari. “Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes Targeting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., (New York: Routledge, 2009): 170-180.

¹¹ John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 4. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=33> (accessed March 20, 2009).

¹² Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism* (New York: International Peace Institute Publications, 2008): 1.

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¹⁴ Barret and Bokhari, “Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programmes Targeting Religious Terrorists and Extremists in the Muslim World,” in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., (New York: Routledge, 2009): 176.

¹⁵ Ibid., 177.

¹⁶ Ibid., 179.

¹⁷ Michael Herzog, “Can Hamas Be Tamed?” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2006): 83.

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- ²⁶ Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Hutsebaut, Sara Mels, Walter Nonneman and Walter Van Herck eds., *Faith-based Radicalism: Christianity, Islam and Judaism Between Constructive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism*, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007): 191-207.
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- ³⁰ Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009): 227-237.
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- ³² Daniel Byman. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs*. (Mar/Apr 2006); 95.
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