MASLOW’S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS: A FAILED STATE AND SOMALI PIRACY THREAT ASSESSMENT: CRIMINAL DEVIANCE OR MARITIME TERRORISM

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Current anti and counter-piracy strategies and operations by both the United
States and the international community at large in the Gulf of Aden are fundamentally
flawed. These strategies and resulting operations address the maritime symptoms of
Somali piracy rather than the on the ground root causes at the motivational heart of
problem. Such strategies are based on woefully inadequate understanding of the thematic
motivations of pirates throughout the world, across history, and within the current
Somali-specific crisis. At the same time, such strategies fail to account for the complex
and unique experiences endured by the Somali people over the course of the last century
and are therefore disconnected from reality. Left unaltered, these strategies cannot and
will not provide a strategic security solution to the Somali piracy crisis and therein by
default perpetuate an unacceptably perilous environment on both land and sea throughout
East Africa. In order to develop an effective anti and counter-piracy strategy, the United
States and its international partners must step back and reassess the assumptions that
underlie their current efforts to secure the maritime domain in the Gulf of Aden.

In such a recalibration, application of Dr. Abraham Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*
framework demonstrates that Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden is driven by the inability
of Somalis to meet their physiological and psychological needs on land. Application of
Maslow’s framework also sheds light on the risks, and potential likelihood, of Somali
Islamists, including al Qaeda, leveraging the physiological and psychological depravation of Somali pirates to develop an ideological alliance with Somali pirates in which they could self-actualize and advance maritime militant Islam. Such a situation could lead to a transition from criminal maritime deviance to ideologically driven maritime terrorism and pose grave security threats. Today, the anarchy that has long scarred Somalia is now a regional crisis with global implications. Nearly two decades after the Black Hawk Down debacle the United States must make tough decisions about security in East Africa and the Gulf of Aden. Application of Maslow’s framework to such an effort ultimately yields a holistic alternative.
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CHAPTER 1

THESIS STATEMENT AND INTRODUCTION

While the United States and the international community at large are actively engaged in a number of anti and counter-piracy operations to secure the Gulf of Aden from the criminal activities of Somali-based maritime pirates, these actions are unlikely to result in a strategic security solution. The current anti and counter-piracy strategy of both the United States and its international partners is focused almost explicitly on the maritime domain. This strategy fails to directly address the fact that Somali piracy at sea is fueled by conditions on the ground within the failed state. In order to grasp the full spectrum of threats posed by Somali piracy it is necessary to first understand the historical origins and the thematic motivations that have transcended piracy throughout the ages irrespective of time or place. All pirates – past, present, and future – share common motivations. They have universally sought to meet basic human physiological needs. At times, they have also attempted to fulfill more complex psychological desires. Application of this finding to understand the shared motivations of Somali pirates and the proximate causes of Somali piracy at large is necessary to develop a well informed more comprehensive strategy that can, must, and will holistically address the Somali crisis.

At the same time, a broad review of the complex intersection of geography, history, people, and culture throughout the lands that constitute Somalia today is equally necessary. Such an exploratory analysis sheds light on the dynamic set of successive historical events and themes that, many decades ago, collectively placed Somalia on a path towards failed statehood. Somalia’s tragic trajectory towards failed statehood,
coupled with unique geo-political challenges that have long plagued the Horn of Africa, cultivated an ideal breeding ground for both the emergence and exponential expansion of piracy. Any examination into why Somali piracy first emerged, how it has since changed, and what can be done to thwart a transition from criminal piracy to maritime terrorism, all while an Islamist presence in Somalia has grown ever-stronger, would be incomplete without an exploration of piracy throughout the ages and an evaluation of the unique and telling history of Somalia itself.

Though the failed state has been in a civil war for nearly two decades, the origins of the chaos that marks the current situation can be traced back to a saga in Somalia that began in the late nineteenth century scramble for Africa by European powers with resurgent ambitions for colonial conquest.\(^1\) Over a period of slightly more than one hundred years, Somalis experienced colonial conquest and foreign occupation, insurgency, war, decolonization, liberation, national unification, democratic capitalism, dictatorial communism, welfare statehood, human rights atrocities, descent into chaos, humanitarian crises, civil war, failed statehood and, most recently, the rise of piracy amidst anarchy and increasingly powerful Islamist forces, such as al Shabaab and al Qaeda.\(^2\) Left unaddressed, the on the ground conditions at present will likely result in the continued rise of Somali maritime piracy. Amidst the increasingly prevalent presence of Islamist influence throughout Somalia, it is readily apparent that if the United States and its international partners are serious about protecting the shared national security interests

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of the Western world and ensuring the stability of maritime trade throughout the Gulf of Aden, then the Somali situation must be addressed on both the high seas and on the ground.³

Application of Dr. Abraham Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* provides a valuable, established psychological framework to examine the general motivating force(s) driving specific human behavior(s) within a society or a societal subgroup.⁴ This thesis is the first work to specifically utilize Maslow’s framework to better understand various motivational factors that drive individuals to participate and engage in piracy and how the motivations of individuals within a failed state context can result in the emergence and expansion of piracy from its shores. Through this analysis it becomes possible to identify shortfalls within the current anti and counter-piracy strategy employed by the United States and its international partners and to provide holistic recommendations to close identified gaps. This work will provide recommendations that can result in the development, adoption, and execution of a more holistic and effective anti and counter-piracy strategy. The proposed way ahead recognizes and addresses the comprehensive nature of the security situation at hand and the driving motivational forces behind the behaviors that fuel the crisis on land and at sea within Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.

These recommendations will ultimately prove politically challenging and inconvenient given current levels of American military engagement across the world and throughout the last decade. However, it is critical that the United States and its

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international partners do not let the situation in Somalia take a back seat simply because of recent events in American foreign policy.\(^5\) It is in the national security interest of the United States and in the collective security interests of the Western world to prevent the rise of maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden, even if to do so requires covert or overt on-the-ground operations.\(^6\) The Islamist radicals who threaten to drive an ideological transition among those who violate the sanctity of the high seas from criminal-minded maritime pirates to religiously motivated, politically disenfranchised, Islamist-linked maritime terrorists is a security risk that must be directly addressed.\(^7\) Should the United States and its international partners fail to develop an overt or covert method by which to directly confront and combat the Somali crisis at large, it will “commit the same egregious mistake in Somalia that it did in Afghanistan.”\(^8\)


\(^6\) Iyassu Menelik and Girma Yohannes, *The Emergence and Impacts of Islamic Radicalists* (Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN Verlag, 2009), 92.

\(^7\) Yee-Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh, *Risk, Global Governance, and Security: The Other War on Terror* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 94.

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

To fully leverage the benefits of applying Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* framework to an analytical assessment of Somali piracy and the holistic threats its existence poses, as both a form of maritime crime and, potentially, maritime terrorism, this thesis addresses the following issues in the sequential order outlined below.

1. Thesis Statement and Introduction

2. Organizational Structure of the Argument

3. Leveraging Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* Framework
   3-1. Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*: Defining the Framework
   3-2. Maslow’s Framework and Development Across the World
   3-3. Maslow’s Framework and the Post-Cold War Environment
   3-4. Application of Maslow’s Framework to Somalia
   3-5. Application of Maslow’s Framework to Piracy
   3-6. Maslow’s Framework and the Somali Piracy Crisis

4. Definition Analysis: Maritime Piracy and Terrorism
   4-1. The Definition of Piracy
   4-2. The Definition of Terrorism
   4-3. The Definition of Maritime Terrorism

5. Piracy Throughout the Ages: A Historical Review
   5-1. Ancient Greece and the Maniots
   5-2. The Middle Ages and the Vikings
   5-3. Pre-Colonial Europe and the Baltic Slavs
   5-4. The Rise of the British Empire and British Anti-Piracy
   5-5. North Africa, the Barbary Pirates, and the United States
   5-6. Connecting the Dots: Historical Themes and Somali Piracy

6. Somalia: Historical Review and Analysis
   6-1. Topography, Geography, and Environment
   6-2. Ancient Civilizations and the Importance of the Seas
   6-3. The Middle Ages to the Eighteenth Century
   6-4. European Colonization and the Dervish State
   6-5. Expanded European Colonization: Italian Somaliland
   6-6. World War II in East Africa
The analysis that follows within the body of the thesis supports the determination that current American and multinational anti and counter-piracy strategies in the Gulf of Aden are inadequate. There is a widespread failure to account for the full spectrum of security threats posed by Somali piracy. Continuing to address the symptoms of Somali piracy rather than its root causes merely perpetuates a policy that cannot strategically advance American national security interests in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

The most recently published and formally adopted American anti and counter-piracy strategy policy document is the United States National Security Council’s (NSC) *Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan*. Released in
December of 2008, it does not meet the mark. The NSC’s plan is focused on addressing the maritime symptoms of piracy rather than its on the ground root causes.\(^1\) While the NSC’s plan provides tactical methods by which to provide and protect a secure maritime domain in the Gulf of Aden, it lacks a holistic vision and a comprehensive understanding of the actions necessary to fundamentally improve the security situation at large. For example, “the establishment and maintenance of a convoy system over the long term, in the absence of broader efforts to address the root causes of the piracy problem, could pose unacceptable costs for international navies.”\(^2\) Continued dependence upon the NSC’s flawed guiding document is particularly concerning amidst intelligence concerns and media reports that radical Islamists in Somalia are developing strategic alliances and ideological affiliations with some Somali pirates. Should they succeed in converting Somali pirates from rogue fortune-hunting criminals into ideologically driven Islamist maritime terrorists intent on attacking American and Western vessels in the Gulf of Aden, the security situation in the region would only further deteriorate.\(^3\)

If the assumptions, intent, and execution of current American and multinational anti and counter-piracy strategies are not revamped, the United States and its Western allies will be incapable of preventing a widespread regional shift in maritime deviance –

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from criminal piracy to maritime terrorism. The time to recalibrate America’s anti and counter-piracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden, and how the United States both views and addresses the conditions inside Somalia, is now. As Vice Admiral (VADM) William Gortney, Commander of the United States Naval Forces Central Command (CENTCOM), testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in March of 2009, “Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts ashore and requires an international solution ashore.”\(^4\) VADM Gortney went on to state that, “We cannot guarantee safety in this region,” at this time given current force levels and resourcing.\(^5\)

While the Obama Administration has publicly stated that it will continue to step up the pressure on Somali pirates, and while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated in April 2009 that a “more robust anti-piracy policy is now being developed” and that the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) will be “pressed to take action against pirates operating from bases within their territories,” the United States has yet to formally ramp up, better resource, and more comprehensively commit to more directly addressing the crisis.\(^6\) Even while the Obama Administration is “seeking authorization to transfer up to $50 million in funding for equipment and logistical support for training of Somali troops by forces in Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda,” there remains little if any indication that the United States is willing to holistically recalibrate its anti and counter piracy


\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.
policy and the way in which it approaches the situation on the ground within Somalia.\textsuperscript{7} Recognizing the risks of both action and inaction, the thorough analytical review provided by this thesis ultimately yields a proposed strategy to close the gaps within the current policy and to more fully address the Somali piracy crisis.

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CHAPTER 3

LEVERAGING MASLOW’S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS FRAMEWORK

Application of Dr. Abraham Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* framework as a means by which to understand both piracy at large and Somali history provides important insight into the phenomenon of Somali piracy and how to more effectively combat the threats posed by a potential transition in maritime deviance, from criminal piracy to maritime terrorism, within the Gulf of Aden. To fully utilize Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* as a framework by which to understand and address the Somali piracy crisis, it is first necessary to define and explain the theory and its applicability to such an analysis.

3-1: MASLOW’S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS: DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK

Maslow’s framework “is a valuable assessment tool that is used in many different professions.”¹ It is particularly applicable to a social science-based examination of how societies, subgroups, and individuals within them “resolve the most basic needs for survival before moving on to more complex needs.”² In 1943, Dr. Abraham Maslow published “A Theory of Human Motivation.” In this twenty-five page article he explored human needs and desires and the “classifications of motivations” that drive individuals towards hierarchical fulfillment.³ Eleven years later, in 1954, Maslow expanded upon his

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² Ibid.

ideas and published *Motivation and Personality* in which he provided a more detailed explanation of his *Hierarchy of Needs* framework. In *Motivation and Personality*, Maslow argued that the way in which people fulfill needs and wants can be classified and depicted within a hierarchical, tiered structure. “The basic human needs are organized in a hierarchy of relative prepotency.” Within that hierarchy, the most basic needs, physiological needs, must be satisfied before more advanced and complex needs, such as psychological needs, can be fulfilled.

Basic needs are comprised of physiological and safety needs. Physiological needs include breathing, food, water, sex, sleep, homeostasis, and excretion. Safety needs, often viewed as a higher level of physiological needs but still a part of basic needs, include security of body, of employment, of resources, of morality, of the family, of health, and of property. “Once the individual has attained this level, he seeks esteem, including the impulse for the esteem of others.” Psychological needs are comprised of belongingness, love, and esteem needs. Psychological needs of love and belonging include friendship, family, and intimate relationships. Esteem needs include self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others, and respect by others – the feeling of prestige and accomplishment. Once physiological needs are fulfilled, it is natural to work towards

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meeting psychological needs. Ultimately, Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* placed at its apex what has been termed as self-fulfillment or self-actualization needs, needs that can only be fulfilled when an individual has satisfied both basic needs and psychological needs. When defining self actualization, Maslow wrote, “What a man can be, he must be.” Individuals who self actualize “realize their full human potential” and experience the height of human motivational fulfillment.⁹

However, self-actualization can only occur if the psychological needs of love, belonging, and esteem have been met. Likewise, such psychological needs can only be met if physiological needs, including safety, have been met. If physiological needs remain unmet over any sustained period of time, the vast majority of individuals will engage in abnormal and desperate behavior to meet those needs.

Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most potent of all needs. What this means specifically is, that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others. A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food more strongly than for anything else. … All capacities are put into the service of hunger-satisfaction, and the organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one purpose of satisfying hunger.¹⁰

The proximate factors that first drove the emergence of Somali piracy, as will be discussed in Section 7-1: Physiological Necessity and Somali Piracy, are but one example that serves to illustrate the point that a population or people pushed to the physiological

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brink is often willing to take actions they otherwise would not in order to ensure their physiological survival.

Self actualization is generally linked to such concepts as morality, creativity, problem solving, religion, and ideology and an individual’s capability to understand, belong to, and commit to pursue actions for the perceived betterment of a group, whether that group be political, religious, or otherwise based. Self actualization represents the apex of Maslow’s hierarchy and rests upon the concepts of morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts. Self actualization “refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.”

That said, however, self-actualization by individuals dedicated to the pursuit and advancement of a platform or ideology intent on threatening or harming another individual or group of people committed, or self-actualized, to a different political, religious, or otherwise-based group poses a significant problem. While self-actualization demonstrates fulfillment of all the core tiers of Maslow’s hierarchical framework, this does not necessarily mean that self-actualization is always good.

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pirates self-actualize, and therein should their motives transition from basic physiological and/or psychological in origin to religious, ideological, and/or Islamist in nature, American security interests in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden would face an ever-more complex threat set.

3-2: MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT ACROSS THE WORLD

Much of the majority of the Western world’s societies, the more technologically advanced nations, witness their populations generally living lives focused on meeting psychological needs such as love, belonging, and esteem or on living lives in which they focus on engaging in activities that enable them to fulfill self-actualization needs.¹³ This is common among Western societies because their national governments tend to provide sufficient order, through a combination of capitalist enterprise and government aid programs, as to ensure that the vast majority of their population’s physiological needs are met through one means or another.¹⁴ Ensuring physiological needs are met, either through individual action or the collective actions of the society is critical to establishing a secure environment in which the general population will not engage in dangerous, violent, and/or criminal behaviors in an effort to meet their basic physiological needs.¹⁵


In no Western nation does the majority of the population go to sleep hungry or experiencing an insufficient sense of security.\(^{16}\)

It is no surprise, then, that the Western nations tend to be the most stable, internally and externally, because the “evolutionary path” upon which they have embarked as “nation-states” has, consciously or unconsciously, accounted for the fact that “national security is the apparent physiological, mental, and emotional well-being of the people of a nation, defined accordingly as a measurable state.”\(^{17}\) National security is therefore a measure of “the well-being of a human system that, in the form of a nation-state, is today the largest formal group.”\(^{18}\) Western nations have long linked national security and international power to the stability of their own domestic populations and the strength of their people who, with physiological needs met, could develop industry, technology, and commerce to strengthen the nation-state’s position relative to other nations and international actors. “Winning hearts and minds” is not merely a concept to be applied to international interventionism, but one that nation-states have long employed to ensure the loyalty of their own populations; ensuring physiological needs are met is important for the stability of any nation.\(^{19}\)

In much of the non-Western world, corrupt, underfunded, or, in the case of Somalia, nonexistent governments are incapable of cultivating and sustaining a civil


\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Emily Spencer, *Solving the People Puzzle: Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 80-81.
society with the financial resources, material capacity, and moral fortitude to ensure the population can legitimately meet its basic physiological and safety needs. Unlike the Western world, rampant instability, chaos, and violence of undeveloped, underdeveloped, and failed states contribute to a situation that forces the population to focus the overwhelming majority of its energies on meeting basic physiological and safety needs.²⁰

Across the world, many of the challenges associated with undeveloped, underdeveloped, and/or failed states can be attributed, in part, to the fact that for five decades Soviet influence in many of these countries served to mask their woefully underdeveloped economies and to, through sheer force, subdue longstanding internal conflicts.²¹ Nonetheless, as virtual welfare states living off a steady supply of Soviet aid, these countries continued to experience and support population growth. For example, “according to estimates by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United States Census Bureau … Somalia’s population grew in 1978 and 1979 by 11.2% and 19.5%, respectively.”²² With the rapid and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Western nations were unprepared to fill the void left when Moscow’s “development aid flow substantially declined” to countries formerly within the Soviet sphere of influence.²³


²³ Ibid.
By the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, the severity of the brewing crisis within Somalia became increasingly evident as exemplified by the following depiction of the increasingly degraded overall economic situation, developmental climate, and agricultural capacity, which had long been subsidized via foreign aid programs.

Agriculture provided the livelihood for about 80% of the population, accounting for more than 95% of export earnings and 65% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Given the limited pastoral and arable land, meager and irregular amount of rainfall, and poor physical and social infrastructure, agricultural output fluctuated widely, thereby dramatically affecting the GDP.24

While agricultural output fluctuated and then waned in the wake of post Cold War foreign aid reductions, the macro level impact of radically reduced foreign aid to Somalia in the post-Cold War years held ramifications beyond statistical measurements of economic output. The real impact of this “dramatically affected GDP” was that the vast majority of Somalis would, within less than a year from the Soviet collapse, find themselves on the brink of starvation and unable to meet their most basic physiological needs.25

It is important to note that not only were many Western nations, including the United States, unprepared for this void left behind by the Soviet collapse, but they, at least at first, also felt no subsequent need to step in and fill this void because there was no longer a bi-polar world. The United States saw no reason to compete with any other nation via foreign aid programs as a means by which to advance its interests or to secure


25 Ibid.
its sphere of influence. In 1991, the United States was the world’s sole superpower. While it provided foreign aid throughout the world, it consciously reduced levels of foreign aid and knowingly did not provide sufficient aid as to fill the void left behind by the evaporation of Soviet assistance to the world’s hungry hordes. The American decision to do so was partially based on the fact that it could not meet the demand for all nations in need throughout the world, but also because it was believed that there was no immediate national security interest that would be advanced in the short term by such a tremendous, and expensive, global humanitarian mission. Nobody in a position of authority was quick to recognize the extent to which “the end of the Cold War unleashed tremendous energies for internal conflict.” Famine and humanitarian crises could impact both nation-states and non-state entities and contribute to a complicated transnational security issue that today impacts many American foreign policy decisions.

However, by the close of George H.W. Bush’s presidency, it became clear that something had to be done to assist Somalia as the situation in the Horn of Africa continued to rapidly worsen. In August of 1991, while campaigning for a second term in office, and as more than one thousand Somalis died each day due to starvation, President George H.W. Bush announced a “U.S. military airlift of food to Somalia… and declared

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that ‘starvation in Somalia is a major human tragedy’ and that the United States would provide food for ‘those who desperately need it.’”  

Nonetheless, “President Bush exhibited a lack of common sense in his assumption that forces could be inserted in Somalia in December 1992 and withdrawn by January 20, 1993.”

The express purpose of Operation Restore Hope was to support the United Nations in providing a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies to vulnerable populations … and though the U.S. military escorted relief convoys carrying 100,000 metric tons of food, repaired and improved over 1,000 miles of roads, dug wells and repaired airfields, opened the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu, and assisted humanitarian Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with technical assistance and supplies, … the failure to act early on as the Somalia situation developed proved to be a critical blunder.

At a macro level, President Bush’s limited foray into Somalia would prove to be an under-resourced and ineffective attempt to take back ground against the full scale humanitarian disaster plaguing the nation. “The failed analysis of early warning signals and the absence of preventative diplomatic strategies meant … that intervention came too late” and that the level of intervention subsequently provided was insufficient “to prevent the escalation of violence in Somalia” and to provide an opportunity “to implement long-term peace-building.”


And yet, all was not lost with the George H.W. Bush Administration’s policy towards Somalia. In fact, the actions undertaken have been widely recognized as the “only true case of humanitarian intervention.”34 According to George Ward, the former United States Ambassador to Nigeria, 1996-1999, and the coordinator for humanitarian assistance in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, appointed in 2003, the actions of George H.W. Bush’s Administration in Somalia hold significant implications for the history of humanitarian intervention and the role of the United States within the post-Cold War new world order.35 “Somalia made people realize that when human rights reached a certain level, some kind of intervention was inevitable. There was an outcry among informed elites – people who knew what was going on – to do something.”36 Whether the United States could and/or would step up to meet the full scope of that illusive, ubiquitous, and multifaceted “something” needed to right the course in Somalia remained to be seen.

3-3: MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK AND THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

Soon after the collapse of the Kremlin, internal religious and ethnic tensions rapidly emerged throughout the sphere of influence formally dominated by the Soviets. Similar tensions emerged throughout nations that the United States had supported, and provided foreign and humanitarian aid to purely as a means of advancing anti-Soviet


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.
influence. When the Cold War ended, civil strife emerged not only in nations formerly and directly controlled by the Soviets, but also in nations that the United States had once supported but then largely abandoned at the end of the Cold War. “Economic assistance to Africa was regularly undercut … thereby retarding sustainable development” and enabling forces intent on destabilization and revamping local power structures to take shape. Though “new violence emerged,” it lacked the “clarity” of standard, almost predictable Cold War Soviet-American power struggles. “The end of the Cold War meant the end of competition for influence with the Soviets and hence any real direction for American policy.”

Providing foreign aid to nations was no longer considered to be of critical importance to the advancement of American national security interests and seemed unnecessary given the widely believed assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union would spawn widespread peace and unparalleled stability in the international system in which democracies would inevitably emerge from the rubble of Soviet domination.

Somalia, a nation that had experienced significant power plays and political maneuvering by both the Americans and Soviets during the Cold War, was one of the


40 Ibid.

41 Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After the Cold War (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992), 1.
countries most affected by the collapse of the two-superpower status quo.\textsuperscript{42} Somalia had long played American and Soviet interests off against one another to its benefit, but when that equation changed – Somalia was left hanging on her own, and she did not last long. “Sentiments previously buried under the mantel of communism” became “regional conflicts” overnight – and the impact of such Somali infighting was a direct contributing factor to the nation’s descent into failed statehood.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{3-4: APPLICATION OF MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK TO SOMALIA}

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, the Somali population has been focused almost explicitly on meeting its basic physiological and safety needs for more than two decades. Almost twenty years after chaos first emerged, Somalia is still without an effective central government and its civil society is in ruins. Such instability, amidst a seemingly endless civil war and an abysmal internal security situation that often prevents the delivery of desperately needed foreign aid and humanitarian relief, makes it clear that the application of Maslow’s \textit{Hierarchy of Needs} theory provides a much needed and valuable framework by which to assess the current situation in Somalia. Application of the framework provides an established paradigm by which to understand the holistic contributing factors that led to this crisis, and to determine what the future likely holds as


radical Islamist ideologues preach anti-Western hate throughout much of the country in an effort gain an increasing base of support.44

3-5: APPLICATION OF MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK TO PIRACY

In addition to providing a means by which to assess the proximate human conditions, motivations, and behaviors within Somalia and how they contribute to Somali piracy, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs yields important insight into the motivating forces of piracy at large across the world and throughout the historical record. Application of Maslow’s framework to understand both Somali history and piracy at large provides an opportunity to identify and assess the overarching motivational forces and themes that transcend piracy across time and space. Application of the framework also sheds light on the unique historical experiences endured by the Somali people over the past century. From that baseline, Maslow’s framework can be further applied to analyze the proximate driving factors that led to the emergence of Somali piracy and its subsequent mutation and expansion. Finally, when this baseline understanding is holistically analyzed in the context of the emergence of Islamists in Somalia who are intent on radicalizing the population with anti-Western political and religious rhetoric, it becomes clear that Maslow’s framework is again valuable and provides a means by which to both identify and to determine ways to thwart, intercept, block and/or address the threats that are likely to emerge from the current trends within the chaos – both in Somalia and throughout the Gulf of Aden. Application of Maslow’s theory may well shed important insight

necessary to recalibrating the current, and largely ineffective, American anti and counter piracy strategy.

3-6: MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK AND THE SOMALI PIRACY CRISIS

The comprehensive application of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* framework to this analytical review leads one to conclude that the Somali piracy crisis at present is the result of a dramatic saga that has taken place throughout the Horn of Africa and spans almost countless major players over the last one hundred and fifty years. The most notable cast members have included British and Italian colonial powers, the Allied and Axis forces of the Second World War, the United Nations, the sovereign state of Somalia itself, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the United States, and innumerable warlords and clans. All of these actors – entities led by individuals – sought to ascend along the stepladder of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*. However, attempts to advance competing interests through the manipulation, abuse, and/or domination of Somalia and the Somali people eventually created a house of cards that, by the end of the Cold War, was destined to collapse.

Ultimately, analysis through this framework reveals that piracy in Somalia originated primarily as a means by which to fulfill basic physiological needs. It has since evolved and expanded throughout the Gulf of Aden as it is now primarily a means by which Somali pirates fulfill more complex psychological needs such as belonging and esteem as they find fulfillment in the thrill of seeking their fortune within the fraternal order of the piracy groups. Though the United States and its international partners have increased their efforts to combat Somali piracy, they are woefully uncoordinated and
insufficient to combat the deviant maritime activity of Somalis engaged in criminal piracy. At the same time, however, given the arrival and, to a significant degree, the success of Islamist radicals, such as al Shabaab and al Qaeda, in infiltrating and influencing the Somali population over the last five years, the inadequacy of America’s anti and counter-piracy strategy has become that much more of a national and international security issue.45 America’s anti and counter-piracy strategy requires substantial recalibration and the application of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs framework is a valuable analytical tool to apply in order to obtain a better understanding of Somali history and piracy, past and present, in order to develop, implement, and execute an effective anti and counter-piracy strategy that directly addresses the situation on both land and at sea.

CHAPTER 4

DEFINITION ANALYSIS: MARITIME PIRACY AND TERRORISM

To evaluate the threats posed by the current Somali security crisis, it is first necessary to examine the definitions of maritime piracy and maritime terrorism. In the post 9/11 global security environment, there is a common, presumptive, and often dangerous tendency to preemptively classify individuals or organizations employing violence to advance their beliefs as terrorists simply because their beliefs are contrary to one’s own. For both legalistic and policy reasons, it is important to delineate between those activities that constitute crime and those activities that constitute terrorism.\footnote{James E. White, \textit{Contemporary Moral Problems: War, Terrorism, and Torture}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (New York: Thomson Wadsworth, 2009), 7.} Within the Somalia case study, such delineation between criminal piracy and maritime terrorism is particularly important. An understanding of both, and the differences between them, is necessary to understand the potential ramifications of Islamists, such as al Shabaab and/or al Qaeda, developing an alliance of convenience with Somali pirates.\footnote{Benjamin Clarke, Robert Imre, and Brian Mooney, \textit{Responding to Terrorism: Political, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives} (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 203.}

In the event of such an alliance of convenience, the emergence of maritime terrorists advancing an ideologically driven platform of anti-Western political and Islamist religious rhetoric would fundamentally differ from the economically motivated criminal piracy that predominantly marks the Gulf of Aden today. Nonetheless, an understanding of the definitions of criminal piracy and maritime terrorism provides

clarification and a means by which to distinguish two terms that have often been erroneously confused and muddied over the past several years. This clarification makes its evident that Somali maritime deviance, at the moment, is indeed the crime of piracy and not maritime terrorism. However, the on the ground conditions in Somalia at present suggest that maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden may take root in the near future.

4-1: THE DEFINITION OF PIRACY

More than one hundred and fifty-five nations met in 1981 at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to “address the problems of ocean space” and to “establish … a legal order for the seas, … facilitate international communication, and peaceful uses of the seas…to strengthen peace, security, cooperation, and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice.” Previous UNCLOS meetings were held in 1958 and 1960, but the 1981 UNCLOS was the largest and most comprehensive yet.

Although acts of piracy are generally aggressive, violent, and highly threatening to both people and material assets, the 1981 UNCLOS maintained the historical precedent of nations to classify maritime piracy as a crime rather than as terrorism. As

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such, Part VII, Article 101 of the 1981 UNCLOS, which still applies and guides international maritime law today, defines “piracy” as follows:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft;
   a. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
   b. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).\(^8\)

While the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS and is therefore not a party to it, the United States formally adopted this definition of piracy when it was used to define piracy in then-President George W. Bush’s 14 June 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea.\(^9\) The United States is also party to the 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Seas, which identically defines piracy.\(^10\)


The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) was established in the 1980s as a non-profit organization to provide an international focal point for gathering and disseminating maritime security information.\(^{11}\) The IMB defines “piracy” as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.”\(^{12}\) Piracy has long been viewed as a crime rather than a means of advancing ideological agendas.\(^{13}\)

Piracy is … an economically driven phenomenon. This is true both with respect to those who engage in the practice – profit being the main objective – and those against whom attacks are directed, ship owners – where the desire to keep operating costs as low as possible has frequently outweighed imperatives for more concerted on-board security. This economic dimension is important in understanding the manifestation and evolving dynamic of piracy as well as for setting it apart from maritime terrorism, which is primarily aimed at leveraging or otherwise undermining the oceanic environment to secure political, ideological, or religious imperatives.\(^{14}\)

Maritime terrorism, indeed terrorism itself, takes on a purpose and an aura significantly different than that of the crime of maritime piracy.\(^{15}\) Distinguishing the crime of maritime piracy from the deed of maritime terrorism is important in determining how to address the threat.


4-2: THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

To define maritime terrorism first requires a definition of terrorism at large. Various federal agencies within the United States have different, competing, and sometimes contradictory definitions of terrorism.\textsuperscript{16} The United States Government does not have a single, commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism.\textsuperscript{17} The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, all have different definitions of terrorism uniquely tailored to their individual mission statements.\textsuperscript{18} At the same time, countries around the world and international bodies such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the European Union (E.U.) have yet to agree on a common and shared definition of terrorism.\textsuperscript{19} Both within the United States and the broader international community, the lack of a single, commonly agreed upon, and universally applicable definition of terrorism poses both bureaucratic and tangible issues that ultimately translate into strategic, operational, and tactical challenges in addressing some of the most critical national and international security threats of the modern era. In many ways, such a commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism remains an enigma and that in and of itself presents additional challenges.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
Quite simply, there is no internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), institutions representing the international community, have been unsuccessful in crafting a definition of terrorism acceptable to all. No doubt the view that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ is partly responsible for this impasse. Even the United States has not adopted a single definition of terrorism. While it is defined in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the Departments of State and Defense both have separate definitions. Some countries have attempted to side step this semantic problem by drafting laws defining terrorist acts. Other countries view these so-called ‘terrorist acts’ as criminal offences. This inability of the international community to define terrorism has resulted in giving carte blanche to international terrorism experts and regional security specialists to pick and choose which groups to include in their analysis.\(^\text{20}\)

Amidst such ambiguity, it is nonetheless necessary to understand terrorism through a well-informed definition.\(^\text{21}\) The internationally renowned security studies scholar and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman provides a definition of terrorism that leverages input from more than one hundred definitions from around the world. It is one of the best definitions of terrorism yet available and, should the United States or the international community adopt this specific definition of terrorism, or agree upon another such definition, such clarity could greatly benefit the organization, resourcing, and effectiveness of both America’s and world’s anti and counterterrorism efforts. Such definitional analysis is not trivial for it forms the basis from which to better coordinate and align efforts across both domestic agencies and among international partners. A shared perspective and common understanding of the core identifying characteristics of


terrorism is necessary for such coordinated collaboration. After an exhaustive analytical, Hoffman concludes that terrorism can be defined by the following five components.

1. Ineluctably political in aims and motives;
2. Violent – or, equally important, threatens violence;
3. Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
4. Conducted by either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and
5. Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.  

The role and the advancement of a belief or ideology is critically important because it is one of the central defining characteristics of terrorism that delineates and differentiates terrorism from piracy. Pirates are intent on advancing their own self-interests and obtaining financial and material resources to advance their own economic standing. For pirates, there is nothing more important than the advancement of their own self-interest. They are not intent on pursuing a political, religious, or ideological agenda through the use of force or violence, even though their acts of piracy often employ force, violence, and/or the threat of violence.

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Application of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* framework to understanding the definitions of piracy and terrorism at large, and the differences between the two, demonstrates that the motivations of pirates are rooted in a quest to meet their basic physiological and/or psychological needs while the motivations of terrorists are driven by ideological zeal and commitment to a cause greater than their own independent, individual, self interest. Terrorists fall into the category of individuals who experience self-actualization, who realize fulfillment of Maslow’s highest need, but who, in doing so, because of their commitment to advancing an ideological position through violence, force, and fear, pose a grave danger to society at large. When writing about terrorism in general Hoffman notes the following:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear and violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.\(^{25}\)

Stepping back from Hoffman’s commentary it becomes apparent that ironically, since Somali piracy first emerged in the mid 1990s as an attempt to instill sufficient fear among the crews and investors of foreign commercial fishing vessels plundering Somalia’s territorial waters, its contiguous zone, and its exclusive economic zone – and

in an effort to fill the void left by the collapse of the central government and the disbanded Somali Coast Guard – one could argue that when Somali piracy first emerged it was an attempt to “use violence and the threat of violence to have far reaching impact beyond the immediate victim(s)” in the hope that foreign commercial fishing vessels would not return. Though such an argument is a stretch given the fact that Somalis were desperate to protect their one reliable source of food, the sea, from anyone else and they viewed the sea as the only stable means by which to provide for their families and to meet their basic physiological needs, such an argument that Somali piracy – when it first emerged – would in fact qualify as a form of maritime terrorism is riddled with holes. However, though such an argument is indeed hollow, it does provide valuable analytical exercise in attempting to apply Hoffman’s definition of terrorism to attempt to determine and to define what exactly does, could, and/or would constitute maritime terrorism.

4-3: THE DEFINITION OF MARITIME TERRORISM

Though the United States Government has not defined maritime terrorism, maritime security analysts have dedicated significant effort to the development of such a definition. While the United States Government has not formally adopted this definition, it minimally provides a basis from which to refine the nation’s and international community’s understanding of maritime terrorism, and therein the associated implications of such maritime activity. Maritime security analysts proposed the definition that follows:

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Terrorism is distinct from piracy in a straightforward manner. Piracy is a crime motivated by greed, and thus predicated on financial gain. Maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking or hijacking a maritime target. The motivating factor for terrorists is generally a political or religious ideology stemming from perceived injustices, both historical and contemporary.27

Another means of distinguishing piracy from maritime terrorism is that “pirates want to avoid attention and will inflict only as much harm and damage as is necessary to accomplish their mission while terrorists want to call attention to their cause and inflict as much harm and damage as possible.”28 Indeed, “pirates want to sustain their trade; an act of maritime terrorism is often pyrrhic.”29

Other attempts to delineate piracy from maritime terrorism have been based upon a definition of maritime piracy by the IMB and based upon a definition of maritime terrorism by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Working Group on Maritime Terrorism.30 The IMB defines piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of the act.”31 The IMB’s definition of piracy is broader than that of the 1981 UNCLOS definition of piracy.32


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.

“high seas” while “the IMB definition recognizes this is problematic because the majority of piratical incidents occur in territorial or coastal waters.”

The definition of maritime terrorism put forth by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Working Group on Maritime Terrorism notes that, “Maritime terrorism refers to the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, and (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities.” However, this definition of maritime terrorism presupposes an agreement on what exactly constitutes, or defines, terrorism and/or terroristic activities.

Though the United States Government, the United Nations, and the European Union have yet to gain consensus for an agreed upon definition of maritime terrorism, both independently and collectively, the fact remains that the threat of Somali piracy mutating into a form of maritime terrorism, intent on advancing a politically or religiously motivated ideological platform linked to radical Islamists, such as al Shabaab or al Qaeda, is very real and must be recognized as such by the United States and its international partners. However, before one can begin to determine the best means by which to counter Somali piracy and to prevent such a mutation from criminal piracy to

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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
maritime terrorism, it is first necessary to understand piracy more broadly. To do so requires a review of piracy throughout the ages and across the world to understand the common motivations and behaviors that have transcended all pirates irrespective of time and space. Application of the trends identified within this analysis to the Somali case study provides important comparative insight and diagnostic assistance in determining the likely future of Somali piracy and whether it will or will not transition from criminal piracy to maritime terrorism.
CHAPTER 5

PIRACY THROUGHOUT THE AGES: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

A review and assessment of piracy throughout the ages, through an application of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* framework, offers insight into how, why, and under what specific conditions piracy has repeatedly emerged within the Western historical record. Application of Maslow’s framework also provides a means by which to assess and evaluate the sophistication of piracy at various times and by various groups and how their engagement in such maritime crime has provided a means by which to fulfill basic physiological and psychological needs that, in such circumstances, could not otherwise be met.

Pirates have been a security threat to mariners, maritime commerce, and the freedom of the seas ever since people first took to the rivers and oceans to conduct trade.¹ Ancient scholars such as Thucydides noted that “the motives which inspired piracy were private gain” and when, throughout the ages, decentralized populations have been located along the sea with “men … organized on a tribal basis,” trouble at sea often ensued.² Thucydides argued that tribal organization along the coast almost inevitably resulted in “two things: war and piracy.”³ A broad review of piracy throughout the ages, focused on ancient Greece and the Maniots, the Middle Ages and the Vikings, pre-colonial Europe and the Baltic Slavs, the age of European colonial conquest and piracy’s impact on the

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² Ibid., 71.

³ Ibid.
British Empire, and the hostilities between a young United States and the Barbary Pirates along the North African coast, provides insight into the driving forces that led to piracy, and its expansion, across the world and throughout history.

5-1: ANCIENT GREECE AND THE MANIOTS

The Maniots, a tribal people on the western shores of the southernmost tip of the Greek Peninsula were the first well-documented culture to engage in piracy in the Western world.\(^4\) The Maniots lived along a barren, mountainous shoreline marked by rough terrain and limited natural resources. Small villages carved into the cliffs with stone enclaves were perched high above the sea with a steep, treacherous, and largely impassable mountain range not far beyond.\(^5\) Long dependent on the bounty of the sea and left without sufficient availability of land-based natural resources needed to sustain the Maniots’ population growth, they began to capitalize on the uncertainty and lack of order that marked the power vacuum in the Mediterranean world in the years immediately preceding the rise of the Byzantine Empire.\(^6\) As they took predominantly to piracy rather than fishing and began to pillage and plunder the cargos of merchant ships along the coastal waters of the Greek islands and mainland, Maniot pirates rapidly


\(^6\) Ibid., 24.
acquired a reputation for being brutally aggressive and hostile.\textsuperscript{7} They were fiercely determined to acquire whatever they needed by whatever means they found necessary.\textsuperscript{8}

Maniot pirates viewed their engagement in piracy as a legitimate means of obtaining the resources they needed to sustain their villages and their culture.\textsuperscript{9} Lacking the benefits of even a moderately well-resourced homeland, Maniot pirates targeted virtually any vulnerable commercial vessel whenever the opportunity presented itself, regardless of the merchantman’s nationality or allegiance.\textsuperscript{10} “Lacking any other source of income apart from fishing,” Maniot piracy was, at least at first, purely about seizing opportunistic moments to acquire the materials, and/or capital necessary to barter for and/or to purchase those resources, essential to ensuring the stability and sustainability of their people and culture.\textsuperscript{11} However, the Maniot pirates were so successful in obtaining the resources essential to their survival that they soon began to view piracy as a means by which not only to ensure their basic sustenance but also as a means of acquiring financial wealth and material grandeur well beyond what had once been only their wildest ambitions. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Maniots had been relatively “persistent, small-time pirates, whose activities enjoyed a boost following the collapse of

\textsuperscript{7} Kassis Kyriakos, \textit{Mani’s History} (Athens: Presoft, 1979), 16.


\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{10} Kassis Kyriakos, \textit{Mani’s History} (Athens: Presoft, 1979), 16.

Byzantine authority in the region.”12 With this expanded operating envelope and a reduced military presence in the maritime domain, the Maniots acquired great wealth.13

It is crucial to note that Maniot piracy originated, as have most groups of pirates throughout history, as a survival mechanism. The Maniots, a tough-willed people, saw themselves as a society and a culture on the brink. With an increasing population and decreasing natural resources available to them within their immediate proximity, they believed their people and culture had reached a critical juncture and something had to be done.14 Very rarely do a people who see themselves as having their backs pushed up against a wall go quietly into the night. More often than not, they respond and fight with whatever means they have available, and if necessary, they will develop innovative methods by which to ensure their survival. This is exactly what occurred with the Maniots and it explains how and why piracy emerged within their society.

This line of reasoning further substantiates that Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs paradigm is an effective framework by which to examine piracy at large. Maniot piracy, much the same as piracy throughout the ages and in the Gulf of Aden today, originated as a way by which to obtain and sustain a population’s physiological needs. Physiological needs correlate to the actions associated with ensuring sufficient means of sustenance are available to support survival of the population to which one belongs. For such elemental and base needs, people will engage, as the Maniots did and Somalis do today, in actions


13 Ibid.

that under normal circumstances would appear to be clearly illegal and/or immoral. But, those actions, when taken within the situational context of a people pushed to the brink, become more easily understood. Therefore, while piracy is illegal and has long been a universal crime, it is evident that piracy emerged in the Maniot mindset because it provided an opportunistic, relatively indiscriminate, and virtually consequence free means of securing the physiological needs of the population. Maniot piracy’s emergence, then, is something that, given the contextual situation, was rationalized in the Maniot mindset as legitimate and justified.\(^\text{15}\)

As will be explained in significantly more detail at a later point, a similar situation, and in many ways a more troubling and difficult situation than that experienced by the Maniots, has emerged in Somalia over the last two decades. In short, however, the Somalis pursued a similar path and first ventured into piracy as a means by which to secure physiological and safety needs. However, like the Maniot pirates of yesterday, the Somali pirates of today have shifted from engaging in piracy as a means by which to merely meet basic physiological and survival needs to engaging in piracy as a means by which to also meet psychological needs and to financially and materially thrive.

In both the Maniot and Somali case studies, and more largely throughout the history of piracy itself, the importance of this tipping point is clear. When piracy no longer merely offers a means by which to fulfill physiological needs and can, in addition to that, offer a means by which to fulfill psychological needs such as belonging and esteem, piracy becomes a far more dangerous threat because it then represents a means

by which to obtain fulfillment of higher level needs. As such, the maritime crime of piracy becomes psychologically institutionalized within the fraternal brotherhood and cultural framework of those engaged in it. In these situations, piracy is, at least in part, furthered and continued as a result of wanting to engage in it rather than merely needing to engage in it.

Somali pirates, much as the Maniot pirates more than a thousand years ago, see piracy as a fraternal order that, in addition to ensuring survival, is a means by which to achieve a sense of self-worth in a depraved and destitute land consumed by poverty, lack of opportunity, and utter instability with no hope for a better, alternative, legitimate future.\textsuperscript{16} Beyond the fraternal brotherhood concept, note for example, that the operating expenses of Somali piracy today are believed to run approximately $79 million per year with profits totaling more than $120 million per year.\textsuperscript{17} The average per capita income in Somalia is only $600 per year.\textsuperscript{18} The monetary incentive, which at its most basic level represents the opportunity to achieve physiological stability, when coupled with the fraternal order provided by Somali piracy, makes engaging in it an enticing option that few Somalis are willing to pass up should they be offered a chance to join one of the local piracy operations.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
This standard thematic shift, when piracy becomes a means by which to not only meet basic physiological needs but as a means by which to fulfill more advanced psychological needs, occurs time and again throughout the history of piracy. Every time a group of pirates has experienced this transformational shift in thinking, from viewing piracy as a means to survive to a means to thrive, they have become more dangerous and more difficult to suppress.\textsuperscript{20} Without fear of suppression, repression, or repercussion, the Maniots, and virtually every similar group of pirates, continued to engage in piracy for many generations until the benefits offered by doing so were no longer viewed as worth the risks by the pirate population. Indeed, “between organized states and pirates there is perpetual war.”\textsuperscript{21} This story has repeated itself time and again throughout history whenever there was a “lack of central control” on both land and within the maritime domain, and for these reasons it is again reemerging in full force – this time throughout the Gulf of Aden.\textsuperscript{22}

Throughout the times of the ancients, every major civilization was faced with the issue of piracy and the security and economic threats therein associated.\textsuperscript{23} Interception and interdiction was often difficult due to limited intelligence gathering capabilities, communications challenges, and logistical hurdles. Collectively, this set of circumstances made it difficult to proactively engage in effective anti and counter-piracy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Philip Goose, \textit{The History of Piracy} (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{21} William L. Kingsley, \textit{The Right of Search: The New Englander}, Vol. 16 (New Haven, CT: T. J. Stafford Printing, 1858), 597.
\end{itemize}
operations at sea. The leaders of empires of old preferred to apply their maritime forces to expand the empire rather than to confront brigands on the high seas.\textsuperscript{24} The Romans, for example, were often hesitant to allocate naval resources to pursuing pirates rather than expanding their territorial control throughout the Mediterranean and Europe.\textsuperscript{25} Though “Rome had been involved in a protracted struggle against pirates” for centuries, the breadth of the empire and the limited technology of the era made effective maritime anti and counter-piracy efforts incredibly difficult.\textsuperscript{26} Ultimately, the Romans changed course and even went so far as sometimes adopting a “pay the attacker not to attack” approach.\textsuperscript{27} As such, anti and counter-piracy operations were often only undertaken if the threat of piracy posed a significant risk of destabilizing or undermining the economic or security status quo in an area or region controlled by an empire.\textsuperscript{28}

The struggle between piracy and anti/counter piracy at the time was representative of early asymmetrical warfare. The conventional forces that had fueled the expansion of empires were not adept at strategic and tactical shifts to best leverage their naval resources in such unconventional operations.\textsuperscript{29} It is therefore not surprising that though anti and counter-piracy operations were often viewed by ancient empires as conflicts of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{24} Klaus Bringmann, \textit{A History of the Roman Republic} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 214.

\bibitem{25} Ibid.

\bibitem{26} Ibid.


\bibitem{29} Oded Lowenheim, \textit{Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 53.

\end{thebibliography}
necessity, they were just as often believed to be petty nuisances. Nonetheless, pirates posed such a nuisance to the Romans, or, more accurately, a threat the empire preferred to view as a nagging nuisance, that Cicero once stated, “Pirates are the most hated enemies of Rome, and not just of Rome, but of all mankind.”

Indeed, a similar view of, and response to, piracy generally holds true today in the current geo-political environment. Anti and counter-piracy operations are often only endeavored upon when the existence and prevalence of pirates in a particular region is sufficiently significant as to pose a legitimate security and economic concern to the interests of the nations with naval forces capable of pursuing, interdicting, and directly confronting such pirates. For example, piracy in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and the Philippines through the Straits of Malacca, has been a centuries old challenge that has long impeded the free flow of maritime commerce in the region. It was not until the last ten years that the Malaysian and Philippine navies, along with assistance from India, Pakistan, and the navies of the Western powers, most notably the United States, were able to allocate sufficient resources to significantly reduce piracy in the region through collective political and military actions. A lack of capability,

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32 Donald B. Freeman, *The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet* (Quebec City, Canada: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 174.

capacity, and/or willingness to address piracy, over the long haul, ensures that sooner or later, piratical activity will become a sufficiently significant economic and security threat as to warrant diplomatic and/or military engagement.\textsuperscript{34} Inaction and an unwillingness to confront pirates makes it inevitable that, over time, they will continue to feel empowered and take ever bolder action until maritime forces strong enough to counter their criminal activity arrive on station and take decisive action.

For example, the Romans’ dispensation to avoid confronting piracy when possible resulted in a significant piracy threat that expanded from relatively small, localized pockets to encompass a sizable portion of the empire’s maritime domain.\textsuperscript{35} Numerous merchantmen and coastal villages throughout the Mediterranean fell victim to piracy during the Roman Empire and “all too often,” when the call for assistance went out, “no one helped at all or the help came too late.”\textsuperscript{36} It was clear that only the power of the Roman Empire could suppress piracy in the Mediterranean, but that suppression could only occur if the empire would apply its naval resources in a concerted, focused, and long-haul anti and counter-piracy campaign.\textsuperscript{37}

The situation at present has many parallels. The United States is the one nation that has the naval capability and capacity to route Somali piracy from the Gulf of Aden. Nonetheless, the United States is hesitant to withdraw its naval forces from other

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Philip de Souza, \textit{Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 213.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
operations and support their reassignment and redeployment to the Gulf of Aden to embark upon a more concerted and well-resourced anti/counter-piracy operation. Like the Roman navy, the United States Navy is built, equipped, and skilled in waging conventional warfare within the maritime domain. In addition, the overwhelming majority of American naval forces conduct operations related to monitoring conventional threats and providing “conventional strategic deterrence.” Just a handful of the vessels currently active within the United States Navy were specifically designed, or specifically modified, to be agile and adaptable in confronting piracy.

However, unlike the piracy situation during the age of the Romans, the United States has the opportunity to effectively partner with the modern navies of many Western nations in an effort to cooperatively confront the piracy threat. Though that effort is underway, there remains much to do. Both the United States and its international partners could substantially improve the security situation in the Gulf of Aden should they allocate increased resources and several more ships. Doing so could result in the provision of a sufficiently resourced anti and counter-piracy force and lead to a significant reduction of the maritime threats posed within the Gulf of Aden, altering the status quo and creating an environment in which the risks associated with Somali piracy could, in time, come to outweigh the potential gains.

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 Nonetheless, such partnering was unlikely during the Roman era as the empire was preoccupied with expansionist priorities and territorial acquisition and there was a tremendous technological gap between the sophistication and supremacy of the Roman Navy as compared to all others throughout the Mediterranean world.⁴¹ Centuries later, when the Roman Empire collapsed and Europe subsequently descended into the Middle Ages, “the Mediterranean was wide open to pirates, but trade was so diminished that pirates had little prey and seas were free of marauders until the time of the Vikings.”⁴² Yet, this would again demonstrate that instability is prerequisite for the emergence of an ideal breeding ground for piracy.

5-2: THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE VIKINGS

“Between the fall of Rome and the beginning of the Crusades, the Mediterranean was free of piracy,” but between the 8th and the 11th centuries the Vikings emerged as the preeminent piracy threat across northern Europe.⁴³ As they swept along the coast of Western Europe, entered the Mediterranean, and raided Southeastern Europe, they eventually penetrated as far as the Black Sea and the western shores of Persia.⁴⁴ The tremendous geographical extent of Viking piracy demonstrated a lesson critical to

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understanding how and why piracy has thrived throughout the ages: lawlessness is a key enabler.\textsuperscript{45}

During the Middle Ages, the vast majority of Europe lacked any semblance of widespread centralized power.\textsuperscript{46} Authority and control was often limited to very small geographical areas, and more often fiefdoms were the norm.\textsuperscript{47} The age of the empires had, for the time being, come to a close and with the lack of central order lawlessness prevailed not just on land, but also at sea. Though at first this did not immediately result in a spike in piracy because Europe’s economy was in shambles following the collapse of Rome, once economic activity began to increase and traders again took to the seas, it was not long before piracy reemerged.\textsuperscript{48}

And yet, resurgent economic activity was not the result of reconstituted central authority and effective governance systems. Rather, it was largely piecemeal and demonstrative of the fiefdom structure throughout Europe. While trade increased, there was no dominant or collective military power(s) to protect traders’ interests and secure the trade routes.\textsuperscript{49} Traders on both land and sea were vulnerable and attacking merchantmen at sea was virtually consequence free. A lack of central authority on land

\textsuperscript{45} Daniel Sekulich, \textit{Terror on the Seas: True Tales of Modern-Day Pirates} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 149.


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} Gareth Williams, ed., \textit{Kingship, Christianity and Coinage: Monetary and Political Perspectives on Silver Economy in the Viking Age} (San Francisco: Left Coast Press, 2007), 177-207.

ensures that the security of the seas is questionable at best, and that the maritime domain will remain vulnerable until the powers that be take independent or collective action to secure the environment. While Europe sat in political chaos without organized central governance and order became localized, the Vikings emerged as the most powerful, successful, and geographically ambitious piratical force in human history.  

Applying this lesson to the present maritime security environment, it should not be shocking that Somali piracy did not emerge until the collapse of the nation’s central government in the early 1990s. Furthermore, exponential growth of Somali piracy did not occur until Somalia descended into a second, full-scale civil war in the mid 2000s. Decentralized and/or non-existent governmental authority is a pre-requisite to the emergence of significant acts of piracy along a nation-state’s territorial waters and beyond. In addition, the existence of decentralized and/or non-existent governmental authority within such nation-states and/or regions necessitates that if anti and counter-piracy operations are to be conducted, the cost and burden of those missions will fall directly on at least one or more other nation-states. Therefore, this further supports the idea that only when piracy poses a sufficiently significant threat to a powerful nation-state’s or nation-states’ economic and/or security interests will such external anti and counter piracy naval forces arrive on station to pursue and eliminate the threats posed by piracy.

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52 Ibid.
5-3: PRE-COLONIAL EUROPE AND THE BALTIC SLAVS

As the Vikings swept through the Mediterranean along the southern coast of Western Europe, descended upon Southeastern Europe, and pressed onward towards Persia, Slavic tribes swept across the Balkans and soon took to the high seas engaging in piracy throughout the Aegean Sea along the western coast of what is today Turkey, the eastern coast of Greece, and raiding as far into the Mediterranean as southern Italy. The Slavic tribes, like the Maniots and Vikings before them, needed a means by which to meet the physiological needs of their families and they could not do so with the resources available on land. They were not well skilled in agriculture which made it difficult to raise cattle and grains in the environment of the Balkans. On the seas, Slavic pirates were known for their brutality and grew so feared and powerful that it became common practice for merchantmen to avoid the Aegean altogether if at all possible – something modern nations generally refuse to do as it symbolizes recognition that pirates control a specific maritime domain.

As the Slavic pirates pressed further and more routinely towards southern Italy, they more regularly attempted to target Venetian mariners, the wealthiest merchants throughout the entire Mediterranean at the time. The Venetian fleet alone was


54 Ibid.


insufficient to route the threat posed by Slavic piracy and it was not until the mid-fourteenth century that the Danish fleet arrived in the Mediterranean from northern Europe with sufficient force to alter the status quo and effectively suppress Slavic piracy.\(^{57}\) It is important to note that the Danes only sent a sufficiently powerful naval force to route Slavic piracy when the risks posed to their regional economic interests and securing their trade relationships in the Mediterranean had made doing so a worthwhile, cost-effective venture.\(^{58}\)

Around this time, the nation-states of northern and western Europe, including the Dutch, were centralizing power and pursued significant naval buildups that eventually fueled a sea power race and would ultimately result in the European pursuit of colonial empires centuries later. Two major players emerged early on: England and France.\(^{59}\) Both leveraged their emerging naval forces to, independently, confront piracy that threatened their individual interests in both the North and Baltic Seas well into the late eighteenth century.\(^{60}\)


5-4: THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND BRITISH ANTI-PIRACY

As early as the thirteenth century, the British were the first to include formal, specific punishments for pirates within their legal system. In 1241, the British conviction of William Maurice for piracy resulted in the ordering of his execution:

That you be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution where you shall be hanged by the neck and being alive cut down, your privy members shall be cut off and your bowels taken out and burned before you, your head severed from your body and your body divided into four quarters to be disposed of at the King’s pleasure.

By the time of Maurice’s hanging, almost every sea-faring nation with commercial maritime interests in the North, Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas recognized that, to one extent or another, piracy posed a significant threat to the free flow of capital on the high seas. Though they did not cooperate in a collective anti and/or counter-piracy effort, the nations that could afford to do so continued to invest in ever-stronger naval forces to advance their economic and security interests. One nation in particular, Britain, would take the lead in anti and counter-piracy operations and embark upon securing the world’s seas.

In the centuries that followed, the British Empire would emerge and, with it, the largest and most and powerful naval force in history. In an effort to protect her colonial

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62 Stephen Talty, Empire of Blue Water: Captain Morgan’s Great Pirate Army, the Epic Battle for the Americas, and the Catastrophe that Ended the Outlaw’s Bloody Reign (New York: Random House, 2007), 16.


64 Ibid.
holdings and economic interests, the British Crown developed the naval forces necessary to engage in the largest global anti and counter-piracy mission ever undertaken, all while continuing to expand the empire’s reach. Though piracy continued to pose a significant threat to British economic interests, British naval supremacy would ultimately prove effective and it significantly reduced piracy along the empire’s most critical shipping routes. Indeed, piracy often proved to be most challenging along shorelines of lands not directly held or controlled by the British. When piracy did emerge in areas actually controlled by the British, the Crown worked to “bring the colonies into line with London which took several decades, but ultimately … cooperation between London and British North America proved crucial in suppressing Caribbean and Indian Ocean piracy.”

However, one piracy threat in particular would not go quietly into the night. Within the Mediterranean Sea, along the North African coast, the threat of piracy endured. It would prove to be one of the most powerful pirate strongholds in the colonial age and throughout the history of piracy. Though the British found limited success securing the empire’s interests in the face of these pirates, their anti and counter-piracy


efforts did not result in a holistically secure maritime domain along the North African coast – and this would pose major challenges to American merchantmen throughout the Mediterranean during the first several decades of the United States’ existence. 69

5-5: NORTH AFRICA, THE BARBARY PIRATES, AND THE UNITED STATES

Attempts to first work within and later to directly confront piracy in the Mediterranean and along the coast of North Africa played a significant role in early American foreign policy and military affairs. 70 Less than ten years after achieving independence, the United States was intimately embroiled in the geographically distant but politically pressing piracy crisis that would endure for several more decades. 71 Though, in 1777, following the American Declaration of Independence, Morocco had been the first state to formally recognize the United States as a sovereign nation, just seven years later, in 1784, the Barbary Pirates would launch an operation from Moroccan shores specifically targeting an American merchant vessel. 72 While Morocco did not directly support the Barbary Pirates, the state’s inability to extend and enforce the

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effective rule of law throughout its lands resulted in the pirates often using Moroccan coastal villages as rogue homeports from which to base their operations.\textsuperscript{73}

Lawlessness that plagued Moroccan lands distant from her capital caused concern for American commercial shipping interests.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, Morocco, the first nation to befriend the United States, became America’s first de-facto foreign enemy when the Barbary Pirates began attacking American merchantmen in the Mediterranean having launched from lawless and ungoverned coastal villages along the Moroccan shores. However, it is important to note that “although Morocco was one of the Barbary States and it sometimes sent pirates into the Mediterranean, Moroccan pirates never attacked U.S. ships. The Barbary Wars did not involve Morocco” formally, per say, because the Moroccan government did not outwardly and actively support the Barbary Pirates.\textsuperscript{75} The same cannot be said of Tunisia, Algiers, and Tripoli.\textsuperscript{76} And so, in response, America would take her first step in what has become an unending, ever-more challenging, journey to secure the seas and ensure the safe transit of American commercial enterprise in the maritime domain.\textsuperscript{77}

To understand the extent of the maritime threat faced by the United States at the time, and its eventual response, it is first necessary to examine why the Barbary Pirates

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\item \textsuperscript{74} Robert Kagan, \textit{Dangerous Nation: America’s Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century} (New York: Random House, 2006), 97-98.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Brendan January, \textit{The Aftermath of the Wars Against the Barbary Pirates} (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publishing Group, 2009), 39.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 40.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Cecil Scott Forester, \textit{The Barbary Pirates} (New York: Random House, 2007).
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emerged in the first place, and how the piracy in which they engaged fundamentally differed from, and was more dangerous than, any previous form of piracy then-known. By the late eighteenth century, the Barbary Pirates had long posed a threat to maritime commerce throughout the Mediterranean ever since they had first appeared in the sixteenth century.\(^78\) Originally chartered as privateers by the emerging Ottoman Empire, within a generation or two, they transitioned from privateers who collected payment from the empire for their services to autonomous pirates who demanded safe-passage tributes, seized the ships and cargos of merchantmen associated with nation-state(s) that refused to pay such tributes, and enslaved able-bodied crewmen and passengers alike – ultimately selling them into the servitude of Muslim slave owners all along the North African coast and throughout the Muslim world.\(^79\) The Barbary Pirates also conducted kidnap for ransom operations.\(^80\) Collectively, these actions resulted in the Barbary Pirates amassing great wealth, further enabling, funding, and expanding the geographic reach and geopolitical impact of their acts of piracy.\(^81\)

This transition from privateers to pirates occurred because, living along the North African coast of the Mediterranean, those who became Ottoman privateers in the first place did so because it provided a reliable means by which to obtain the financial and otherwise necessary resources to meet their physiological and safety needs and those of


\(^79\) Ibid., 37.


their families. The life of a privateer offered a relatively stable and dependable means by which to provide for one’s family when compared to the alternative – working the arid and unforgiving lands of North Africa. The Barbary Coast lacks significant natural resources and meeting basic needs via dependable food and water sources often proved to be a daily challenge and an incredibly time consuming endeavor.\textsuperscript{82}

The Barbary States sat on the edge of the Sahara Desert, and their sparsely populated hinterland of small African settlements produced the barest essentials required to support the coastal cities. Under Roman civilization, agriculture had spread deep into the Sahara in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, but centuries of neglect had allowed the desert to encroach almost to the coast in many places. Any wealth, therefore, had to come from the sea, so during the late 15\textsuperscript{th} and early 16\textsuperscript{th} centuries the local beys encouraged corsairs to use their ports as pirate havens. In return, they received a portion of the profits – and piracy proved to be lucrative.\textsuperscript{83}

Once at sea as hired Ottoman privateers, the Barbary Pirates instantly recognized their future was bright as they could use their earnings to purchase resources key to meeting physiological needs.

However, within a generation, the Ottoman privateers also came to the conclusion that their lives could be even better and their futures could be even brighter. Unknowingly, they realized that, psychological needs, in addition to physiological needs, could best be met through lives as autonomous pirates rather than as Ottoman privateers in servitude to an empire and a distant sultanate in Constantinople.

While a Barbary corsair \textit{rais} (captain) owned his ship and had considerable autonomy over his operations, he enjoyed less freedom than a European pirate captain. The Barbary corsairs were all organized by a ruling captain’s council, the \textit{taife raisi}. This body supervised the running


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
of the pirate havens and acted as a link between the corsairs, local potentates, and the Ottoman sultanate. At sea, the rais was assisted by an aga, who commanded the boarding party, and a scribe appointed by the taife raisi who ensured that booty was shared between the rais and the local bey at the end of the cruise. Typically, the local ruler claimed ten percent, plus a fee for the use of his harbor.\textsuperscript{84}

As autonomous pirates, they could acquire great wealth, control their destinies, and, in an almost completely lawless environment on both land and sea, face virtually no risk of negative repercussions for engaging in such criminal activity.\textsuperscript{85} Every incentive existed to lure the Ottoman privateers to autonomous piracy.\textsuperscript{86}

More importantly, within the application of Maslow’s \textit{Hierarchy of Needs} framework to the issue of piracy throughout the ages and in discerning implications as such for addressing contemporary Somali piracy, it is critical to note that the Barbary Pirates engaged in piracy not merely as a form of maritime crime but as a form of maritime terrorism. “The general policy of \textit{taife raisi} was to confine attacks to non-Muslim shipping.”\textsuperscript{87} Whereas all known piratical groups before them were solely engaged in maritime criminal enterprise with the single intent of meeting sustenance needs, acquiring financial wealth, or fulfilling what Maslow defined as psychological needs, the Barbary Pirates were heavily engaged in maritime terrorism because they were not merely motivated by a need to fulfill physiological or psychological needs – nor


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.

merely by a quest for material wealth – though each was, at one point, an independently powerful and primary motivation. The added motivation for Barbary Pirates was their religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{88} The Barbary Pirates were fiercely religious Muslims who truly viewed Christians as infidels.\textsuperscript{89} For this reason, they specifically targeted Christian commercial shipping vessels from Europe in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{90}

Indeed, the Barbary Pirates were not merely opportunistic pirates that would attack any vulnerable vessel believed to have significant cargo aboard. Rather, the Barbary Pirates rarely, if ever, attacked Muslim merchantmen on the high seas.\textsuperscript{91} This religiously based ideological motivation fundamentally distinguishes the Barbary Pirates from all those piratical groups that came before them – including the Maniots, Vikings, and Slavs – and provides evidence to substantiate the argument that the Barbary Pirates were indeed the first maritime terrorists. “One Yankee envoy suggested that ‘there is but one language which can be held to these people, and this is terror.’”\textsuperscript{92} Indeed, in combating the Barbary Pirates, “America’s war aim was simple: to break a system of state-sponsored maritime terrorism, to end the Islamic North African practice of enslaving Americans or forcing the United States to pay tribute to meanly buy peace.”\textsuperscript{93}

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\textsuperscript{88} Frederick C. Leiner, \textit{The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.

\textsuperscript{89} Cecil Scott Forester, \textit{The Barbary Pirates} (New York: Random House, 2007), 2.


\textsuperscript{92} Frank Everson Vandiver, \textit{How America Goes to War} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 8.
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While it is highly unlikely that the Barbary Pirates cared to distinguish piracy as either maritime crime or maritime terrorism, they engaged in a number of behaviors that clearly delineated their activity from standard maritime piracy and crime on the high seas. The Barbary Pirates’ religious convictions and adhesion to Islam provided both ideological motivation and self-rationalized justification to seize Christian vessels, merchants, and crews and to enslave them.\textsuperscript{94} Christian cargos and Christian slaves were sold to Muslim buyers throughout North Africa and routed back through the trade routes on land all throughout the Ottoman Empire – land controlled by Muslims.\textsuperscript{95}

Further, the Ottoman Empire did not find it necessary to leverage its naval forces against the Barbary Pirates. While the Ottoman sultanates were undoubtedly frustrated that the Barbary Pirates were no longer at their disposal as privateers, they were surely content with the fact that the pirates had allocated their energies to targeting Christian vessels, commerce, and maritime interests at large. After all, the Ottoman Empire was very much a Muslim empire and the very purpose for which it had chartered the privateers in the first place was to create a maritime security threat to European Christian commercial interests in the Mediterranean.

The capture of Algiers in 1516 gave the Barbary Pirates (Corsairs) a secure base, and despite their political and military alliance with the Turks, the Barbary Corsairs continued to wage their own private war against the Christian states of the western Mediterranean. In effect,

\textsuperscript{93} Frederick C. Leiner, \textit{The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51.

\textsuperscript{94} Brendan January, \textit{The Aftermath of the Wars Against the Barbary Pirates} (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publishing Group, 2009), 39.

following the defeat of Christian galley fleets at Prevesa (1538) and Djerba (1560), the Ottoman Turks maintained control of the eastern and central Mediterranean while their Barbary allies vied for control of the western regions of the sea.\textsuperscript{96}

Whether as chartered privateers or as autonomous pirates, the existence of piracy along the Barbary Coast meant that the original intent of the Ottomans’ effort was achieved.\textsuperscript{97} Though the empire failed to directly gain the material wealth of the seized cargos, the fact remained that the Barbary Pirates advanced Ottoman economic interests by threatening and attacking European commercial ventures at sea, destabilizing trade routes, and creating significant security concerns that drove up the cost of Christian commerce.\textsuperscript{98}

Aside from the monetary value of cargos and vessels lost to piracy, more than 1.25 million Christians were taken as slaves by the Barbary Pirates and sold throughout the Muslim lands of North Africa.\textsuperscript{99} In the three stronghold Barbary ports of Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli, the pirates often had no fewer than 35,000 Christian slaves awaiting sale at anytime between the mid sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{100} Religion clearly impacted the targets selected by the Barbary Pirates. Vessels bearing flags from


\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.


predominantly Christian nations often felt the full weight of the Barbary threat. In fact, one first hand account from 1634 states the following:

As to the slaves of both sexes that are in Barbary today, there are a quantity of them from all the Christian nations, such as France, Italy, Spain, England, Germany, Flanders, Holland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovania, Russia, and so forth. The number of these captives reaches about thirty-six thousand, according to the enumeration that I have carried out on the spot and to the records that have been furnished and sent to me by the Christian Consuls who live in Corsair Cities.\footnote{Robert C. Davis, Rab Houston, and Edward Muir, eds., \textit{Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy 1500-1800} (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 15.}

In addition, the Barbary Pirates often conducted brutal and violent shore raids throughout Christian coastal villages all across Europe.\footnote{Oded Lowenheim, \textit{Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 81.} “The coasts of Spain, France, and Italy suffered the most, but from the late sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth century the shores of countries such as England, Ireland, and even Iceland and Sweden were visited by the Barbary corsairs.”\footnote{Ibid.} As the Barbary Pirates harnessed their ability to dominate the maritime domain and to terrorize the Mediterranean world, the net macro level impact resulted in the destabilization of the economies of European nation-states. Collectively, the economy of Christian Europe suffered greatly as security concerns decreased levels of maritime trade throughout the continent. Christian nation-states throughout the continent found it difficult to conduct maritime commerce with any regularity and dependability due to the threat posed by the Barbary Pirates. “Their extensive reach and intensive sea predations caused Charles Molloy, a renowned

\footnote{Ibid.}
seventeenth-century English jurist, to refer to them as ‘hostis humani generis,’ or ‘the enemies of all mankind.’”

And yet, an economically destabilized Europe found itself unwilling to unite naval forces in an effort to confront the challenges Barbary Piracy presented to all European Christian nation-states, even as it was widely recognized that no single nation-state possessed a naval force capable of independently and effectively countering the pirates. Consumed by rivalries, Christian Europe facilitated the continuation of the maritime security crisis. In fact, France leveraged the Barbary Pirates against Spain, and later, the British and the Dutch leveraged the Barbary Pirates against the French.

The Barbary corsairs were tolerated and at times even encouraged because of the rivalries among the Europeans. … Accordingly, although European powers sent many expeditions against the bases of the corsairs, they were usually not aimed at stamping out piracy altogether, but more often than not had ulterior and sinister designs against European rivals.

Meanwhile, the Barbary Pirates continued to conduct piracy operations throughout the Mediterranean and beyond.

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105 Ibid.


Throughout the years, generations upon generations of Barbary Pirates engaged in crime on the high seas as maritime pirates who, in effect, were maritime terrorists. What began as an effort to fulfill basic physiological and safety needs, led to piracy becoming a means by which to fulfill mid-tier psychological needs such as belonging and esteem. Barbary Piracy, as was true with many piratical groups that endured, came to represent a fraternal order and provide structure and a sense of belonging for pirates.\textsuperscript{109} The Barbary Pirates were so successful that, leveraging their belief in, and adhesion to, Islam and a disdain for Christians, they actually experienced self-actualization through their participation in piracy. The most notable examples include the Barbossa Brothers and their crews who went so far as to “capture two galleys belonging to Pope Julius II.”\textsuperscript{110}

This self-actualization, and the occurrence of piracy as both maritime crime and as maritime terrorism, along with the fact that European Christian nation-states did not cooperate to harness their combined naval forces to combat the Barbary Pirates, resulted in a seemingly endless continuation of the piracy problem.\textsuperscript{111} Petty intra-continental, longstanding feuds, and seemingly endless religious wars consumed Europe’s attention and energy. A largely locally-focused worldview prevented Europeans from recognizing the Barbary Pirates could only be directly confronted through the strength of the great powers of the era. It was not until the mid-1600s that the Barbary Pirates began to face a

\textsuperscript{109} Heidi Edsall, Paula Hardy, and Mara Vorhees, \textit{Morocco} (New York: Lonely Plant, 2002), 32.


\textsuperscript{111} Oded Lowenheim, \textit{Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 80.
European Christian naval force, the British, in sufficient numerical force and strength that the balance of power began to alter.  

Families and merchant companies formed successful groups in England in the 1640s and forced King Charles I and Parliament into action. This resulted in ‘An Act for the Relief of Captives Taken by Turkish Moorish and Other Pirates and to Prevent Taking of Others in Time to Come’ (1641). The Crown officially accepted the responsibility of raising money to ransom captives of the Barbary privateers and to fight them. The official declaration did not solve the problem of the corsairs; however, the scope of the problem was so great that the Crown established an official mechanism in England to address the problem of attacks on English seamen, merchants, and shipping.

Still, however, European naval powers refused to unite in an effort to combat the Barbary Pirates and anti and counter-piracy operations remained largely fragmented. “The larger European nations in their own self interests, now as in earlier times, connived at these depredations on the commerce of a rival.” Unified anti and counter-piracy campaigns common across European powers were not endeavored upon because each of them “brought their own immunity by winking at piracy against others. Indeed, this century-old extortion by bandits was largely fostered by the mutual jealousies and lack of cooperation of the Christian powers.” When European nation-state(s) did engage in

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113 Ibid.


115 Ibid.
operations against the Barbary Pirates, they did so only to secure their own national and economic interests.116

There was a continued failure by European nation-states to both recognize and act in accordance with the fact that the interests of Christian Europe at large were negatively impacted by the existence of the Barbary Pirates. Though the British, if but for a only a brief while in the late 1600s, successfully dealt a significant single-handed blow to the Barbary Pirates by forcing concessions in the strongholds of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, the peace did not last.117 Within a handful of years, the Barbary Pirates returned in full force.118 A hundred years later, as the United States emerged as the world’s first fledgling modern democracy, the Barbary Pirates were as strong as ever and they would soon pull the young nation into its first foreign war.119

Throughout the colonial experience, American merchant shipping vessels had enjoyed some sense of protection in the Mediterranean due to the ability of British naval forces to actively engage in anti and counter-piracy operations.120 Up until American independence, treaties concluded between the Barbary Pirates and the British Empire


ensured that any protections afforded to British merchant ships were legally bound to be extended to all merchant vessels sailing from all British colonial holdings.\textsuperscript{121} Throughout the American Revolution, American merchant shipping had been protected by the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France, by which French naval forces were required to “protect American vessels and effects against all violence, insults, attacks, or depredations, on the part of said Princes and States of Barbary or their subjects.”\textsuperscript{122} However, with American independence emerged the very real and immediate need to develop a naval force capable of protecting and defending American maritime interests and commercial shipping.\textsuperscript{123}

By 1794, the threat posed to American maritime commerce by the Barbary Pirates was one of the principle reasons for establishing the United States Navy.\textsuperscript{124} Though the United States attempted to engage in diplomacy with the Barbary Pirates and tried to secure treaties guaranteeing safe passage in exchange for tributary payments, piracy continued to pose a significant threat to American maritime commerce in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{125} Further, the payment of such tributes for safe passage took a tremendous financial toll on the young nation. By 1800, tributary and ransom payments


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

combined to account for more than twenty percent of all expenditures by the United States Government.\textsuperscript{126} The payment of monetary tributes for the guarantee of safe passage as American policy was ultimately a flawed and unsustainable approach.\textsuperscript{127} Inevitably, the Barbary Pirates continued to demand ever increasing payments and the cost of this policy well surpassed the cost of funding an ambitious American naval development plan.\textsuperscript{128}

It became clear to American leadership, particularly President Thomas Jefferson, that acquiescing to the demands of pirates was not in the long-term economic or security interests of the United States and to do so would perpetuate an unsustainable policy to the detriment of nation.\textsuperscript{129} Continuing on the same path was simply no longer an option in Jefferson’s mind. In 1785, Jefferson, along with John Adams, represented the United States in negotiations with Tripoli’s diplomats stationed in London, an experience that provided Jefferson with invaluable insight into the mindset of the North African pirates and the statesmen representing their interests.\textsuperscript{130} Upon making an inquiry “concerning the ground of the pretensions to make war upon nations who had done them no injury,”

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\item \textsuperscript{127} Edward S. Mihalkanin, \textit{American Statesmen: Secretaries of State from John Jay to Colin Powell} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 289.

\item \textsuperscript{128} Patricia L. Dooley, \textit{The Early Republic: Primary Documents on Events from 1799 to 1820} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 125.

\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

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Jefferson captured the response of Tripoli’s Ambassador, Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja, in his diary:

It was written in their Koran, that all nations which had not acknowledged the Prophet were sinners, whom it was the right and duty of the faithful to plunder and enslave; and that every Muslim who was slain in this warfare was sure to go to paradise. He said, also, that the man who was the first to board a vessel had one slave over and above his share, and that when they sprang to the deck of an enemy’s ship, every sailor held a dagger in each hand and a third in his mouth; which usually struck such terror into the foe that they cried out for quarter at once.131

Jefferson recognized the Barbary Pirates as a legitimate threat to American interests abroad and as a security concern that undermined, and would continue to undermine, American maritime commerce if left unchecked. Therefore, long before his presidency, Jefferson engaged the Congress and the highest levels of the federal government – political, diplomatic, and military – in an effort to make the case that tributary payments would only encourage the pirates.132 Ultimately, though Jefferson successfully convinced George Washington that tributary payments were not in the long term advancement of American interests, it proved a bridge too far for the young nation to take a stand in the Mediterranean during Washington’s presidency.

Though Jefferson was unsuccessful in stirring Washington to take military action against the Barbary Pirates, he vehemently believed that acquiescence to such tributary and ransom demands could only further complicate the piracy problem. Long before becoming president, “Jefferson suggested an international alliance to wage war on the


Barbary Pirates, but the United States lacked the money and resource to fight a naval war, and the other nations that Jefferson wanted to take part did not believe that the alliance would work.”\textsuperscript{133} Jefferson argued that “the payment of tribute or ransom would only lead to further demands” and in time, the “now-famous statement of Charles Cotesworth Pickney called for ‘Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute’ continued to gain traction and the cause of raising a navy gained ground.”\textsuperscript{134} Current American and international policies to employ naval forces to confront Somali pirates suggest that a refusal to abandon critical maritime domains has endured the test of time and that abandonment of the Gulf of Aden by both commercial shipping and naval forces alike is neither a desirable nor likely outcome – similar to the refusal of European and American merchants and naval forces to abandon the Mediterranean two centuries ago.\textsuperscript{135}

Years later, when the Barbary Pirates demanded a tributary payment of $225,000 be paid on the day of Jefferson’s inauguration as President, Jefferson “determined to act on his long-standing desire to take a tough line against the Barbary States.”\textsuperscript{136} He made it his mission to directly confront piracy and to secure American maritime interests in the Mediterranean. “‘I know,’ he wrote, ‘that nothing will stop the eternal increase of demands from these pirates but the presence of an armed force, and it will be more


\textsuperscript{134} Patricia L. Dooley, \textit{The Early Republic: Primary Documents on Events from 1799 to 1820} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 126.


economical and more honorable to use the same means at once for suppressing their insolencies.”

In 1801, America went to war with piracy and sent its best frigates to intercept, seize, and destroy the Barbary Pirates. Well before Jefferson became president, he had written a letter in December of 1786 to the president of Yale College in which he noted that “taxing Americans to wage a war against the Barbary States would be more popular politically than taxing them to pay tributes.” Though “other Christian empires continued to pay tributes” the United States, Jefferson believed, had to take a moral, principled, and realist stand against the Barbary Pirates. As President, Jefferson finally possessed the executive authority to alter American policy towards the Barbary Pirates.

Unlike the situation today in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia, the United States was willing to both recognize and act upon the fact that piracy can only endure so long as there are land-based safe havens from which pirates are enabled to operate. As president, Jefferson was willing to exert the political and military capital necessary to firmly and directly confront the Barbary Pirates in a strategic manner in the Mediterranean waters and along the coast of North Africa because he understood the environment and the threat posed by the Barbary Pirates.

The same year he took office, Jefferson launched America’s first anti and counter-piracy campaign, deploying naval forces to the Mediterranean. The First Barbary War

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139 Ibid.
lasted until 1805. Led by Commodore Edward Preble, American naval forces effectively blockaded the Barbary Pirates, confining them to land and cutting them off from the payments, ransoms, and cargos that provided their lifeblood.\footnote{Christopher McKee, \textit{Edward Preble: A Naval Biography: 1761-1807} (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1996), 181.} American naval forces also bombarded key pirate installations on land from the sea and conducted a series of land-based raids to force the pirates into submission. This resulted in several hundred American prisoners being returned for a final payment of $60,000 from the United States Government per a treaty reached on June 10, 1805.\footnote{Daniel Panzac, \textit{Barbary Corsairs: The End of A Legend: 1800-1820}. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2005), 79.} With this treaty, the requirement for payment of American tributes for safe passage was terminated.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, by 1807 the Barbary Pirates recognized that American maritime concerns were more heavily focused on how to deal with British impressments of American sailors.\footnote{Frank Lambert, \textit{The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World} (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), 188.} Leveraging this shift in focus, the Barbary Pirates capitalized on America’s preoccupation with the crisis that would erupt in the War of 1812.\footnote{Ibid.} The Barbary Pirates returned to attacking American merchant vessels in 1807 and continued to do so until, subsequent to the conclusion of the War of 1812, the United States launched a second and final assault on the Barbary Pirates.\footnote{Tom Lansford and Thomas E. Woods, \textit{Exploring American History: From Colonial Times to 1877} (Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2008), 134.} It lasted only one year and
finally, with uncoordinated yet highly effective support from British naval forces engaged in similar efforts, resulted in a major defeat of the Barbary Pirates.  

At the same time that the Second Barbary War concluded, the Congress of Vienna met in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and resulted in the recognition by European nations that they had a common interest in working towards, even if in a limited manner, a degree of shared security. Following the Napoleonic Wars and the Second Barbary War, Europe was not engaged in a significant conflict for some time, which enabled European nations to strengthen their naval forces and military assets and to exert their strength throughout the Mediterranean. This relative peace, coupled with the previous Barbary defeats in 1805 and early 1815, along with two final bombardments in late 1815, one French and one British, ensured the Barbary Pirates faded into history.

5-6: CONNECTING THE DOTS: HISTORICAL THEMES AND SOMALI PIRACY

While it is undoubtedly certain that over the course of the nearly two centuries that have passed since the demise of the Barbary Pirates and that geopolitical considerations have shifted innumerable times over, it is clear that the lawlessness of the Barbary Coast was a critical key enabler to the Barbary Piracy crisis. Today, lawlessness within Somalia remains the cornerstone, key enabler of piracy in the Gulf of


Until the fact that Somalia provides a land-based safe haven from which the pirates in the Gulf of Aden operate is comprehensively addressed, much the same as the United States addressed the North African coast and the Barbary Pirates – diplomatically, economically, and militarily – Somali piracy will only continue to grow more prevalent, violent, and dangerous.

A failure to address the on the ground conditions that fuel Somali piracy would yield equally ineffective results as those witnessed when the early American government acquiesced to the tributary payment demands of the Barbary Pirates. Piracy, both the symptoms and the root causes, must be directly confronted. It is critical that the United States take action against Somali piracy now to prevent a transition towards self-actualization among Somali pirates much the same as that experienced by the Barbary Pirates. Should Somali pirates take on an ideological cause and transition from maritime criminals to maritime terrorists advancing a radical Islamist platform, the security implications would be staggering. The lessons of American policy towards the Barbary Pirates should not be overlooked in determining an improved way forward in the Gulf of Aden.

To determine the extent to which such a threat of radical Islamist self-actualization is or is not real among the Somali pirate population first requires an examination of Somalia itself. It is essential to understand how the current state of affairs emerged in Somalia in order to more fully understand the contemporary piracy crisis and

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to identify alternative and/or more holistic approaches to combating Somali piracy both at sea and on the ground. Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* again provides an applicable framework through which to conduct such a Somalia-focused analytical review and to subsequently leverage the thematic lessons of both the Somali historical experience and the themes common across pirates throughout the world and across time.
CHAPTER 6
SOMALIA: HISTORICAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Within the last one hundred years, the people who inhabited and continue to inhabit the lands that collectively make up modern day Somalia have experienced all phases of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*. However, the overwhelming majority of the events of the past century have resulted in the overwhelming majority of the Somali population focusing its energies on meeting physiological needs, less frequently on meeting psychological needs such as belonging and esteem, and only rarely on meeting self-actualization needs. To understand Somalia and the Somali people, both historically and today, it is also necessary to understand the geography, climate, and geo-strategic value of these lands.

Located along the coast of East Africa, Somalia rests at the center of one of the world’s most critical geo-strategic maritime chokepoints.\(^1\) Neighbored by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the west, and Kenya to the southwest, Somalia’s location holds significant regional and global security implications. With more than 1,500 miles of coastline, Somalia’s is the longest of any African nation.\(^2\) Somalia’s eastern coast meets the northwestern Indian Ocean while the northern coast abuts the Gulf of Aden.

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The Gulf of Aden is the key southern access route to the Bab-el-Mandeb, or the Mandab Strait, the mouth to the Red Sea.\(^3\) The Gulf of Aden has always been an important route in maritime commerce throughout the time of the ancients as well as in modernity.\(^4\) When the Suez Canal was completed in 1869, the Gulf of Aden became a geo-strategic maritime passage of even more value to European nations intent on expanding their colonial holdings and ensuring the free flow of their maritime commercial interests on a global scale.\(^5\) With the Suez Canal providing a strategic shortcut between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, it became clear that whoever controlled the Suez, and the access routes to it, held significant power.\(^6\)

Only a few decades later, after the Berlin Conference, European colonization of Africa took true form and Britain and Italy set their eyes on seizing the lands of modern day Somalia.\(^7\) Seizure of those lands was sought first and foremost by the British to, with colonial holdings already in hand along the northern coast of the Gulf of Aden, secure the maritime entry way to the Bab-el-Mandeb.\(^8\) Indeed, European ambitions in Somalia were long linked to securing influence and/or control over the maritime domain as the


\(^4\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Mia Carter and Barbara Harlow, eds., *Archives of Empire: The Scramble for Africa* (Raleigh Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 1.

topography and climate of Somalia were viewed as largely unsuitable for agricultural
development and exploitation.\(^9\) The real value of colonizing Somalia was that whoever
did so, provided they could control Yemen to the north and seize the Suez Canal, could
then extend that influence and power over the horizon and control the maritime domain
both toward the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

6-1: TOPOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY, AND ENVIRONMENT

Throughout time, Somalia has long been known as a rough, rugged, and
predominantly arid landscape. On an annual basis, Somalia receives less than twenty
inches of precipitation and it is no surprise that, though not for a lack of effort, agriculture
and the development of sustainable irrigation infrastructure to support it has long been a
challenge for the indigenous peoples of this region.\(^{10}\) Most of the terrain is flat and
scattered with plateaus.\(^{11}\) In northern Somalia, the terrain, at times, becomes slightly
hilly, but is still relatively dry most of the year. The vast majority of these lands are
classified as desert. A monsoon season threatens both the northeast portion of the
country from December to February and the southwest portion of the country from May
to October.\(^{12}\) Outside of the monsoon season, rainfall is minimal, temperatures are hot,
and the physiological challenges of a stark, barren land make themselves self-evident.

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\(^9\) Daoud Aboubaker Alwan and Yohanis Mibrathu, *Historical Dictionary of Djibouti* (Lanham,

\(^{10}\) George Thomas Kurian, *Geo-Data: The World Geographical Encyclopedia*. (Farmington Hills,

\(^{11}\) Susan M. Hassig and Zawiah Abdul Latif, *Cultures of the World: Somalia*, 2\(^{nd}\) ed. (Tarrytown,

\(^{12}\) Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
2001), 4.
Recurring droughts and dust storms have become a part of life in this area while disastrous floods mark the rainy season and pose other perils.\textsuperscript{13}

The environment’s two extremes often result in famine.\textsuperscript{14} The relatively limited natural resources readily accessible, such as forests, have been decimated over the millennia.\textsuperscript{15} In turn, deforestation has resulted in further desertification, and soil erosion coupled with inadequate drainage has long posed challenges to obtaining reliably clean drinking water in many areas.\textsuperscript{16} Given such difficult challenges on land, it is no surprise that Somalis have long been people of the sea and that they are adept mariners who have routinely passed down lessons learned of the sea to their children.\textsuperscript{17} Harnessing the renewable resources of the maritime domain and passing such knowledge from generation to generation led Somalis to become adept at adapting to a challenging environment. In turn, the ancient ancestors of the Somali people developed highly advanced societies in which they fulfilled physiological, psychological, and even self-actualization needs. As masters of the maritime domain, Somalis extracted the bountiful resources of the seas to fuel their advancement.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, \textit{Culture and Customs of Somalia} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 4.
\item \textsuperscript{14} York W. Bradshaw, Joseph F. Healey, and Rebecca Smith, \textit{Sociology for a New Century} (London: Pine Forge Press, 2001), 475.
\end{itemize}
ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEAS

Ancient societies throughout the lands and along the coastlines of what is now Somalia were highly effective at harnessing the resources of the sea to meet their physiological needs. Throughout time, the people of these lands developed into masterful mariners with exceptional seafaring skills. At the same time, these individuals also recognized very early on in history, more than four thousand years ago and long before the colonial powers of Europe in the nineteenth century, that while their homeland lacked many of the natural resources found in other lands, they themselves lived along one of the most crucial maritime transit routes in the world.  

Leveraging an understanding of their geo-strategically and commercially valuable location, they soon developed centers of global commerce at the crossroads of many tertiary and maritime trade routes. Harnessing this opportunity, and over time as these trade routes and central markets continued to acquire increased value to merchantmen from throughout the region, the ancient ancestors of modern day Somalis transitioned from a people focused on meeting physiological needs on a day to day, hand to mouth basis into a people who developed thriving societies, advanced cultures, and adopted Islam as a monotheistic mainstream religion.  

Through this transition, and the developments associated with attaining such sophisticated norms, it is clear that ancient

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societies in this region not only advanced to meet belonging and esteem needs, but that they also experienced self-actualization with their common adoption and acceptance of Islam.

Still, long before the advent of Islam, robust regional powers emerged along the shores of the Horn of Africa. They were representative of a societal advancement from meeting physiological needs to focusing on psychological needs through their advancements in political rule and commercial ventures. Each of these regional powers was, first and foremost, a direct result of continuing to engage in maritime commerce and leveraging their geo-strategic location as a means by which to engage in trade as middlemen with the more powerful empires of the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa.

Ancient Somalis traded with the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Mycenaeans, and Babylonians and were recognized as commercial leaders in the trades of frankincense, myrrh, and spices. As wealth poured in from such maritime commercial intercourse, the financial resources became available by which to purchase material resources that remained unavailable on Somali lands but would prove critical to developing and advancing a highly complex society of their own, one that would, like the grand empires


with which they traded, represent a cultural climb and ascendance from merely meeting physiological needs.

The inextricable role of ancient Somalis as partners in a highly intricate, legitimate, and legal maritime commercial venture directly fueled the rise of the Kingdom of Punt along the southern shores of the Gulf of Aden in what is now northern Somalia.24 Established around 2500BC, the Kingdom of Punt thrived for more than a thousand years at the crossroads of trade routes from North Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.25 In time, the people of the Kingdom of Punt developed one of the most advanced ancient civilizations in ancient East African history.26 Though much archeological research remains to be conducted and few specific details of the Kingdom of Punt are known, it is reasonable to conclude that within such an advanced society many within the population achieved some sense of belonging, esteem, and self-actualization.

6-3: THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Later, while the Vikings and Slavs plundered the Mediterranean as lawless bandits and rogue criminals who first engaged in piracy out of a need to meet physiological needs, the ancestors of modern day Somalis were again applying their skills as mariners in legitimate maritime commercial ventures, and again they achieved great


25 Shelley Wachsmann, *Seagoing Ships and Seamanship in the Bronze Age Levant* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 238.

wealth and societal advancement.\textsuperscript{27} Regional powers along the Horn of Africa emerged with the rise of the Warsangali Sultanate in the thirteenth century, the Adal Sultanate in the fourteenth century, the Ajuuran Empire in the fifteenth century, and the Gobroon Dynasty in the seventeenth century – which lasted nearly two hundred years.\textsuperscript{28}

This analytical digression into ancient Somali seafarers and the societies they developed demonstrates that merely because Somalia is located on a largely resource limited peninsula does not necessitate that piracy has always existed, or must exist, as a regional norm. In fact, this historical analysis demonstrates that piracy has not been a staple in the Somali record. It is not part of an ancient cultural, behavioral norm continuing on into modernity. In fact, this historical assessment of maritime activity along the Horn of Africa suggests that when the people of this region are enabled, through the sustained existence of a politically secure and stable homeland, to engage in legitimate maritime commercial enterprise, not only has piracy not emerged during such times, but the people at large throughout the region have thrived. Without a primary and overwhelming concern for meeting physiological needs, energies were focused on further advancements – economic, social, and cultural – with the result of a greater portion of the population experiencing fulfillment of higher level needs, psychological needs, such as belonging and esteem, with some even experiencing self-actualization.


6-4: EUROPEAN COLONIZATION AND THE DERVISH STATE

With the advent of European colonial ambitions in East Africa in the eighteenth century, and the increasing dominance of maritime commerce by European merchantmen throughout the region, Somali maritime commerce, and the society and order such economic activity fueled, soon began to bend under the weight of these changing conditions.  
By late 1869, the construction of the Suez Canal was complete, linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and, in turn, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The European powers had long recognized that should such a canal be built, controlling access points to the canal would provide significant military and economic advantage. To that end, when the French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps first presented the idea to local Egyptian leaders in the 1830s, Britain moved quickly to obtain a territorial interest along the entrance to the Red Sea. By colonizing Yemen in 1838 the British secured their regional interests should such a canal materialize. Three decades later, when the canal was completed, the British sought to expand their control over the Gulf of Aden beyond its northern shores in Yemen to include its southern shores along what is now northern Somalia.

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Controlling the northern and southern territorial boundaries of the Gulf of Aden, and that key maritime domain in between, effectively provided the British with a means by which to protect and control access through the Bab-al-Mandeb, a narrow twenty mile stretch of water by which all ships passing through the Red Sea must transit.\textsuperscript{34} When the French first moved to present the idea of the Suez Canal to indigenous Egyptian leaders, the British sought to counter the potential of a French strategic advantage by controlling the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-al-Mandeb, therein limiting the strategic advantage the French could hold by controlling the Suez Canal.

As European interests took shape on both land and sea throughout East Africa, much of the order and stability that had been provided by the Gobroon Dynasty within what is now modern day Somalia began to wane. Uncertainty spread throughout the countryside and fears of foreign infiltration and domination took hold of the local psyche.\textsuperscript{35} Soon, the Somalis of the Gobroon Dynasty began a hierarchical descent and transitioned from a people focused on fulfilling psychological needs such as belonging and esteem to a people focused on how to best meet their physiological and safety needs in light of foreign intrusion and fundamental changes to the norms and assumptions that underlay their society. The majority of the Somali populace gradually transitioned from engaging in maritime commerce as either merchantmen or sailors aboard such vessels to

\textsuperscript{34} Edward Ingram, \textit{The British Empire as a World Power} (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 180.

lives as local fishermen.\textsuperscript{36} Essentially, they withdrew from participation in large-scale maritime commercial enterprise as European merchantmen and European crews could now transit from the Mediterranean through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and directly into the Indian Ocean. With the advent of the Suez Canal, the demand for Somali merchantmen and crews to man the ships of middlemen significantly decreased.\textsuperscript{37} The role of the middleman in the Horn of Africa was no longer needed.

With this decrease in demand and infusion of foreign influence, at first indirect and then direct, the Somali economy suffered and stagnated.\textsuperscript{38} This shift further drove the Somali population to focus on meeting physiological and safety needs, which in part explains why a return to the sea as local fishermen was a logical decision for many Somalis. The abundant fishing grounds off the Somali coast provided a renewable and dependable food source that individual fishermen could utilize to meet the physiological needs of their families.

Nonetheless, in time, the uncertainty that emerged as a result of threats posed by foreign forces ultimately drove Somalia’s descent into instability, fueled a fervent anti-European insurgency, and the area’s fall to European colonial ambitions. Over the next century, the pendulum would swing back and forth. More often than not, however, the on the ground situation in Somalia would be marked by instability, clan warfare, chaos and, often, anarchy. Only rarely would there emerge fleeting moments of societal and/or

\textsuperscript{36} Abdi Ismail Samatar, \textit{The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia} (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 29 & 42.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 109.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 80.
national unity and less often than that would Somalis be able to focus their energies on fulfilling needs beyond those of physiological and safety importance.

All the while, the harsh realities of Somalia’s climatically challenging natural environment posed persistent difficulties. As the Somali population increased throughout the years, non-renewable indigenous land-based resources continued to dwindle.\(^{39}\) Forests were logged without reseeding and fields were farmed without effective agricultural management plans resulting in rapidly degraded soil quality.\(^{40}\) In turn, this led to significant desertification in an already largely arid and parched landscape therein serving to further limit the area’s agricultural capacity and its ability to feed its own population.\(^{41}\) Clearly, much of the Somali experience in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries can be appropriately interpreted as a daily struggle to meet what Maslow would term physiological needs – and to do so on a daily basis. Over time, the struggle to fulfill such basic needs would wear on the population and strain both the society and the culture to their very core.

Though David D. Latin argues that “Somalia was never really colonized,” the fact remains that whether such colonization was formal or informal, the net impact of European domination of Somalia, first by Britain and then also by Italy, left a lasting imprint on the Somali consciousness that has endured long since the Italians and British


ultimately withdrew. Understanding the impact of British and Italian colonization upon the Somali people, within the framework of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*, sheds much needed light into how the Somali people of have historically responded to external threats and forced submission to foreign powers. This analysis provides insight into the extent to which such events contributed to hierarchical shifts in individual and societal behavior and fulfillment, or lack thereof, of human needs.

With the 1884 Berlin Conference serving as the catalyst, European powers began a full scale scramble for colonial holdings in Africa that, in many ways, paralleled European colonial ambitions two centuries prior in the Americas. Late nineteenth century European powers sought to recreate the colonial empires of old and assert their power across Africa. In effect, they saw colonization as a demonstration of power and grandeur – and one could argue that, whether they realized it or not, such power seemed to be perceived by the world’s most powerful nations as an indicator that they believed their own societies had in fact self-actualized. In reality, such colonial acquisitions resulted in a degradation of the indigenous populations as they were forced into humiliating subservience and reduced to focusing their energies on meeting the most basic physiological needs.

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In this new colonial power play, the Scramble for Africa, the British took a leading role. Keen on advancing their interests abroad and leveraging their powerful naval force to do so, the British moved to expand their colonial presence in what is now northern Somalia. In so doing, they secured a strong colonial foothold in East Africa, holding both the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Aden given previous British colonization of Yemen. By the mid 1880s, the British were intent on obtaining colonies that would secure their military and commercial domination of the maritime domains critical to the Crown’s power. Guaranteeing safe passage of both military and commercial assets from the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden provided a dependable, efficient, and critical lifeline linking the Crown with her colonial holdings throughout both East Africa and the Indian subcontinent.

While the British colonized northern Somalia with the primary goal of securing regional maritime interests, some Somalis were keenly aware of Britain’s intent to educate, enlighten, and lift up the people of Somalia, or as Rudyard Kipling so infamously termed it, to carry out “The White Man’s Burden.” In response to Britain’s colonization and attempted subservience of the Somali people, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan emerged as the leader of a vehement anti-colonial insurgency intent on routing

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British colonial presence from Somalia.\textsuperscript{48} Though Hassan had grand ambitions and was successful for a while in leading an anti-British insurgency, the vast majority of Somalis were consumed by a daily struggle to meet basic physiological needs. That focus on physiological needs ultimately limited Hassan’s long-term effectiveness. Even against such odds, however, Hassan’s insurgency was formidable for nearly three decades.\textsuperscript{49}

Whether he would have explained it as such is unlikely, but Hassan clearly believed that colonial domination would destine Somalis to a perpetual state of living in uncertainty and an unending preoccupation with basic physiological needs. He refused to allow Somalia to serve as a means to an end for British interests.\textsuperscript{50} Hassan’s anti-colonial platform was widely received throughout northern Somalia and he led one of the most effective and enduring anti-colonial insurgencies in Africa.

Hassan was offended by the attitudes and demeanor of the European community living there, in particular by the way they sought to undermine Somali cultural and religious traditions. It all came to a head one day when he was asked by a British customs official in the port to pay customs duty. Mullah Hassan responded by asking the officer if he had paid customs duty when he and the British occupation authorities had landed in Berbera: ‘Who gave you permission to enter our country?’ Subsequently, Hassan left for the Ogaden, declared a jihad against the British, and quickly raised an army of 3,000 tribesmen.\textsuperscript{51}

Hassan believed British colonization was intent on dismantling Somalia’s cultural integrity, norms, and values. At the beginning of his uprising he wrote, “‘Do you not see

\begin{itemize}
\item[51] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
that the infidels have destroyed our religion and made our children their children.”

He saw himself as “a champion of his country’s political and religious freedom, defending it all against Christian invaders.” Rallying support from other Arabic and Muslim nations, Hassan acquired weapons and munitions from the Ottoman Empire and others, developed a military and pseudo-governmental hierarchy, and called for clear, definitive, and final guarantees of Somali independence from the British. Meanwhile, as the British rebuked, Hassan continued to prepare his forces for what seemed to be an imminent direct confrontation. His forces were ready and willing to fight the British because they internalized the threat of full-blown colonization as a direct threat to their ability to fulfill their psychological and physiological needs.

By 1896, Hassan had formally established the Dervish State and was effectively an all-in-one military, governmental, and religious leader of the Somali anti-colonial movement. In addition to ousting the British as colonial domineers, Hassan’s Dervish forces sought to unite the fragmented lands of ancient Somalia and consolidate power to establish a unified and strong Somali nation. Militarily, the Dervish force stood at between 20,000 and 40,000 men, including cavalry and foot soldiers possessing modern weapons and munitions. At heart, Hassan was a military leader. He successfully


54 Michael Dumper and Bruce E. Stanley, eds., *Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia,* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 92.

repulsed four British counter-insurgency invasion attempts and developed formal relations with both the Germans and the Ottomans of the Central Powers and his forces proved adaptable as they “changed their military tactics and resorted to guerilla warfare.”

Hassan’s forces were quite able and effective. They cut trade to Berbera to such an extent that the port ground to a halt, drove the British into defensive positions in the port cities, evade or defeat four expeditionary forces, attack Ethiopia, and force the British to consider abandoning the protectorate. In 1913, his forces even raided Berbera itself. In one communication to the British in Berbera, he wrote ‘If you wish peace, go away from my country to your own. If you wish war, stay where you are.’ From 1908 to 1914, the British virtually abandoned the interior of the country to Mullah Hassan. They did supply friendly tribes with weapons, which were used against other tribes in internecine warfare. One estimate is that as many as one third of the male population of the interior died during this period of the conflict. With the advent of World War I, Berbera’s significance as a geo-strategic site reconfirmed the British in their occupation of the northern Somali coast, and so, after 1918, they took the offensive and moved against the mullah’s forces.

Hassan’s forces were finally brought to their knees by the British in 1921 when they conducted aerial bombardments and finally forced Somali submission to British domination.

Though ultimately defeated, Hassan’s Dervish forces, and the Dervish state at large, had effectively held the British back and thwarted direct, formal colonization for almost three decades. Nonetheless, the insurgency had taken a terrible toll on the Somali economy and the society at large. With the Somali spirits broken, Britain established

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57 Michael Dumper and Bruce E. Stanely, Jr., eds., *Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 92.
British Somaliland as a British protectorate along what is now the northern tier of Somalia and finally took formal territorial control in the late 1920s.

Ironically, Hassan’s resistance movement, in an effort to ensure the ability of Somalis to independently fulfill their physiological and safety needs, had also provided a means by which an entire generation of Somalis had achieved fulfillment of psychological needs such as belonging and esteem. Hassan’s supporters were part of a significant, organized, formal resistance movement with a hierarchical structure of its own. However, with his defeat, the Somali society at large formally descended into what would become, and remain, a focus on meeting the most basic physiological needs for many years to come.

6-5: EXPANDED EUROPEAN COLONIZATION: ITALIAN SOMALILAND

Meanwhile, however, the British were not the only Europeans with an interest in securing part of modern day Somalia as a colonial holding. As early as 1889, Italian colonial ambitions became evident to the world as nominal treaties with local sultanates in the Horn of Africa were established. Soon, the Italian lust for colonies, power, and expansion grew more intense. With the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, Benito Mussolini sought to seize this national momentum and leverage the opportunity to

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expand Italian interests in East Africa.\textsuperscript{60} In 1923, Mussolini pressed forward and dispatched representatives of his government and military with orders to obtain concessions and begin consolidating power in southern Somalia as a means of advancing Italian interests along the shores of the Western Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{61} Mussolini was also intent on establishing an Italian Somaliland, as Italy’s counter to Britain’s holdings in the north.\textsuperscript{62}

By 1935, with extensive military modernization and mobilization programs underway, Mussolini sought a decisive military expedition and confidence building colonial war in East Africa as a means by which to assert and demonstrate Italy’s strength.\textsuperscript{63} That year, Mussolini ordered an invasion of Ethiopia. Though condemned by the international community, no retributive or punitive actions were taken against Italy.\textsuperscript{64} Mussolini successfully secured the confidence of his forces and the Italian public’s support as it was believed throughout Italy that this earned the country “‘a place in the sun’ alongside other colonial powers.”\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{60} Elizabeth Jane Errington and Ion Hamish, \textit{Great Powers and Little Wars} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 177.


Leveraging a foothold in Ethiopia, Mussolini then launched an invasion into what is now central and southern Somalia with the intent of acquiring these lands in full force, not merely to advance Italian economic interests in East Africa, but to secure an expanded foothold for Italian ground forces and to support a naval presence based in the Horn of Africa and along the shores of the Western Indian Ocean. By mid-1940, Italy held the central and southern lands of Somalia and by the end of August Italian forces surged northward and seized British Somaliland – lands once vehemently defended from foreign intrusion by Hassan’s Dervish forces.

While it is clear that colonial expansion provided a means by which the Italians, and many other Europeans, consciously or unconsciously, found fulfillment in increasingly higher strata of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*, it is equally evident that the Somali people were forced to bear the awful burden of colonial domination. These scars, in turn, resulted in a decreased level of Somali fulfillment and a return to a focus on Maslow’s physiological and safety needs. It seems readily apparent that the exploitation, colonization, and domination of one people by another people inevitably results in a disequilibrium. That imbalance is reflected in the different needs focused on by colonizers and those colonized. In the case of Britain, Italy, and Somalia in the Horn of Africa between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is clear that Somalia fell victim to European colonial powers and suffered long-lasting scars that can be, at least in part, understood through the application of Maslow’s framework.

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67 Ibid.
6-6: WORLD WAR II IN EAST AFRICA

By 1941, however, Italian forces were routed from Somalia as British forces returned, operating out of bases in Kenya, and retook British Somaliland. They then drove the Italians from the south as well.68 Forced westward, over the border, and back into Ethiopia, the Italians fled Somalia. Determined to secure a decisive victory in East Africa, the British pursued the Italians and liberated Ethiopia a few months later.69

Though the Italians operated a limited insurgency in East Africa throughout the remainder of the Second World War, they were essentially defeated in full by mid 1943.70 Throughout World War II, and ever since the mid 1800s, the Somali people were caught up in a brutal geo-political power-struggle, first colonialism and second a brutal, global, geo-political and ideological struggle. And, while European colonial ambitions and expansionism ensured the Somali people would be relegated to focusing their daily energies on meeting basic sustenance, physiological, and safety needs, many Somalis saw great hypocrisy as they were again under European’s eye.71 A war the Allies had fought to liberate and secure the world from oppression had not resulted in Somali freedom.72

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69 Ibid.


With the defeat of the Axis Powers, the British did not cease control over Somalia. Rather, they maintained authority over what had been both pre-war British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south. With approximately 10,000 Italians remaining in what was pre-war Italian Somaliland, the post-war Italian government appealed to the United Nations in effort to regain nominal and interim trusteeship of the territory in an effort to coordinate the withdrawal of remaining Italian civilians and to terminate any continued overt Italian influence in central and southern Somalia. Under a 1949 United Nations Mandate, Italy was authorized to reengage in the region but only under close international observation and scrutiny. And, the United Nations only granted Italy such an opportunity with the provision that, within ten years, it would assist the people of what was formerly Italian Somaliland in developing, implementing, and transitioning into a society based upon indigenous and local democratic governance.

This stipulation was first proposed by a number of grassroots organizations throughout Somalia that began to press for independence and autonomy in the post-war

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years. With the stability and opportunity presented by a relatively secure post-war environment in Somalia, and the promise of independence that would alleviate many of the surface level challenges posed by decades of colonial rule and foreign domination, the Somali people were able to advance their daily activities and mature their motivations beyond the parameters of merely meeting physiological needs. They had an opportunity to move towards fulfilling psychological needs; they had an opportunity to build a functioning civil society in what was to be a Somali democracy.

The Somalis of what was formerly Italian Somaliland recognized that this ten year transitional window provided them with an opportunity during which the most educated members of society sought to dedicate themselves to the study of self-governance, democracy, legislative and parliamentary processes, and the general legal frameworks that were long established in the West and provided the foundational mechanisms by which to secure and guarantee certain freedoms to societies at large. In sum, these Somalis educated themselves in how to develop a stable, independent society capable of self-rule. However, there was little written, and even less known, about how difficult it would be to facilitate such a tremendous societal transition across a population that for generations had lived under the crushing weight of colonial domination and foreign occupation. Little was known about how to enable, let alone expedite, an effective and

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enduring ascendancy towards a democratic transition and simultaneous achievement of the higher levels of fulfillment within Maslow’s framework.

Recognizing the United Nations’ ten-year transitional mandate would require significant changes in Somali society, the Italian government, along with assistance from other Western nations, and the United Nations at large, provided funding and assistance to help facilitate a basic educational understanding of democratic rule and how a democratic society is designed to operate in an effort to assist in the transition.\textsuperscript{79} It is important to understand the historical perspective of the generation of Somalis that were about to experience independence. With an average life expectancy of roughly forty years at the time, it is evident that the eldest members of Somali society would have been born between 1900 and 1910 and would have been able to remember their parents’ participation, if not their own, in supporting Hassan’s campaigns to defend the Dervish state from European colonial domination.\textsuperscript{80} Having succumbed to foreign occupation and colonial rule, and then been caught in the middle of a worldwide conflict ignited by a megalomaniac from another power-hungry European country, it is difficult to fathom just how radical a transition for which Somalia was in store even though the overwhelming majority of the population fully desired Somali independence.

And yet, while the eldest Somalis remembered life under the Dervish state, the vast majority had never lived under an autonomous Somali state. Those young enough to actively participate in and lead a newly independent and free Somalia had spent virtually


their entire lives struggling to meet their physiological needs. Somali independence would provide their first opportunity by which to, in mass, focus on fulfilling psychological needs such as belonging and esteem. Though much had been done to assist Somalis in preparing for this transition, and to prepare the society to ascend Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*, Somalis at large were woefully unprepared to successfully apply the theory of democratic governance to create an actual democratic government capable of developing, funding, and executing national policies.\(^\text{81}\)

Through the majority of the 1950s, the population of what had been Italian Somaliland remained largely uneducated with illiteracy rates in excess of ninety percent.\(^\text{82}\) While the small percentage of highly educated intellectuals sought to understand and implement democratic governance structures, the overwhelming majority of the population lacked any education, formal or informal.\(^\text{83}\) As history has demonstrated time and time again, an illiterate population is highly vulnerable to manipulation. Worse, the discrepancy between those Somalis who were literate and those who were illiterate resulted in a significant gap in fulfillment of needs along Maslow’s hierarchical spectrum. The most educated Somalis would, in turn, often be the most affluent and influential Somalis, and it would be these individuals who would achieve power and prestige in a new democratic government while the uneducated would find it difficult to participate within the system. While the educated would reach higher

\[^{81}\text{Tozon Bahcheli, Barry Bartman, and Henry Felix Srebrnik, *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty* (London: Routledge, 2004), 212.}\]

\[^{82}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{83}\text{Mark DeLancey, *Somalia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1988), xviii.}\]
levels of fulfillment, even perhaps self-actualizing, the uneducated would likely be relegated to focusing their energies to fulfill lower-level needs as the new democratic system would not necessarily mean new and/or improved opportunities for them. Ultimately, by the late 1960s, this discrepancy materialized and was leveraged by power hungry Somali military leaders as motivation for the execution of a coup d’état that effectively eradicated democratic governance throughout Somalia and established a military dictatorship.\(^{84}\)

Returning to post-war Somalia momentarily, however, the British-ruled lands of the north were not placed on a long term path towards eventual liberation and democratic self-governance.\(^{85}\) Though Britain faced intense international scrutiny in the post-war years for attempting to maintain colonial holdings in both Africa and Asia, and though the British did cede the Ogaden territories, traditional Somali pastoral grazing grounds to a free and independent Ethiopia, Britain vehemently opposed decolonization of northern Somalia.\(^{86}\)

To save face with the international community and to ease calls for withdrawal, the British did engage in nominal support of grassroots educational programs to convey democratic processes and establish self-government at the local level.\(^{87}\) But, in the end,

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\(^{86}\) Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, eds., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 364.

these were insufficiently funded, poorly managed programs that lacked the motivational urgency of a fully backed policy.\textsuperscript{88} While the intellectual elites of southern Somalia acclimated and familiarized themselves with democratic ideals and processes, even amidst an abysmal literacy rate across the broader population, the Somalis living under British oversight in the north found themselves in a far worse situation.

Ironically, however, by the late 1950s, Britain began to turn the page and it recognized that its colonial holdings were unsustainable in the post-war geo-political environment as international norms and associated pressures began to shift.\textsuperscript{89} With this emerging mind shift, the British seized the opportunity presented by the scheduled transition of power in what had formerly been Italian Somaliland and arranged for a nearly simultaneous divestment of the Crown’s holdings in Somalia.\textsuperscript{90} Under the politically convenient auspices of supporting Somali independence and full unification, the British ceded control of northern Somalia to the Somali people on June 26, 1960.\textsuperscript{91} Five days later, southern Somali was declared free of Italian influence by the United

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Nations.⁹² That same day, July 1, 1960, northern and southern Somalia were unified as one nation and the Somali Republic was established.⁹³

While unification was supposedly to bring reconciliation, the fact remains that linking north and south in Somalia proved very challenging. The south was comparatively far better prepared to develop a functioning civil society and ascend Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs* whereas the north was thrust, all of the sudden, onto the stage of national democratic governance and the political challenges therein associated. With the north long focused on meeting physiological needs in the post war years, northern Somalis were far less prepared to engage in such a transition. Significant divisions remain today between northern and southern local governance structures even amidst the chaos of civil war and anarchy that mark the current security situation in Somalia.⁹⁴

And yet, to the surprise and pleasure of many, following Somali unification on July 1, 1960, a transition of democratic governance did ensue. Referendums were held, national elections took place to elect a president and vice president, and parliament even established a new Somali constitution.⁹⁵ It appeared as though Somalia was rising to the occasion and was on a course to establish itself as one of the first post war decolonized

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⁹³ Ibid.


nations to achieve political stability, economic growth, and a developing democratic civil society.\textsuperscript{96} In this environment of self-determination, Somalis returned to the sea, not merely as fishermen, but as mariners engaged in regional commerce on the high seas. They returned to the roots of their ancient ancestors, with the modification of modernity, and reasserted themselves as capable mariners engaged in commercial maritime trade while also taking strides to concentrate on agricultural development.\textsuperscript{97} In so doing, they strengthened the Somali economy and state. However, peace, democracy, and stability did not last a decade in the Republic of Somalia.

6-8: COLD WAR POLITICS AND RIVALRIES: DESCENT INTO DICTATORSHIP

Though Western democracies heralded Somalia as a model of rural democracy in Africa and as an artifact that demonstrated decolonization was to be the wave of the future in global politics, the West failed to anticipate the extent to which clan allegiances and conflicts would endure and challenge stability in the Republic of Somalia.\textsuperscript{98} Uncertainty about what exactly this transition to democratic government would mean for the people of Somali led to widespread fear and distrust. Out of that fear, the majority of the Somali population, north and south, was more confident in the clans it had long known and trusted, and turned to for assistance in meeting their physiological and safety

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  \item \textsuperscript{96} Peter Woodward, \textit{The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations} (New York: I. B. Tauris and Co., 2003), 158.
  \item \textsuperscript{97} Abdullah A. Mohamoud, \textit{State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia 1960-2001} (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006), 85.
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needs, than any central Somali democracy.⁹⁹ “Somalis attach primary importance to clan affiliation, rather than embracing a national concept.”¹⁰⁰ Somalia’s leaders failed to convince the populace, and demonstrate through their actions, that democracy could provide the Somali people and their children with opportunities far greater than any other central governance system or any system of clan leadership. The government’s inability to directly confront and eliminate the historical reliance on local clan allegiances was a major contributing factor to its collapse. In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre led a coup d’état and overthrew the democratic Somali government.¹⁰¹ When the dust settled, Barre claimed the presidency and began a decades-long dictatorship.

General Barre established a socialist government and enacted Soviet-style political, social, and economic reforms, many of which he had witnessed first hand while spending time in the Soviet Union conducting joint Soviet-Somali military training exercises in the 1960s.¹⁰² He implemented large-scale public works programs, literacy campaigns, nationalized industry, agriculture, banking, and all forms of commerce.¹⁰³ Despite his reforms, domestic industry virtually collapsed and within ten years Somalia

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¹⁰⁰ Ibid.


¹⁰² Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 676.

manufactured virtually no exportable goods. At the same time, Soviet support, monetary and moral, began to wane.

All the while, however, General Barre believed that socialism and his government would offer the Somali people a better future, or a means by which to achieve fulfillment at a higher level along the spectrum of Maslow’s *Hierarchy of Needs*. Barre seems to have believed socialism and socialist policies were critical enabling forces for self-actualization of his citizens and the society at large, though he may not have ever stated it in such Maslow-like terminology. Throughout his rule Barre held firm to his platform, as he so fervently espoused during an October 20, 1979 speech in which he said the following:

> In our Revolution we believe that we have broken the chain of a consumer economy based on imports, and we are free to decide our destiny. And in order to realize the interests of the Somali people, their achievement of a better life, the full development of their potentialities and the fulfillment of their aspirations, we solemnly declare Somalia to be a Socialist State.

And yet, Barre and his regime simultaneously committed some of the worst human rights atrocities ever documented in Africa, conducting mass-murders of both urban and nomadic populations, indefinitely detaining and killing Somalis for disagreeing with his policies, indiscriminately raping and torturing, and establishing a political climate based upon psychological intimidation.

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Recognizing strained relations with the Soviets, Barre attempted to build unity with the Arab and Muslim world to obtain their support for his cause.\(^\text{107}\) Barre sought to exploit the fact that eighty-five percent of Somalis were Muslims as a political means by which to develop religious and political allegiances with Middle Eastern nations.\(^\text{108}\) Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974, and that same year Barre served as the Chairman of the African Union.\(^\text{109}\)

By 1976, Barre was concerned that Soviet support continued to wane and he sought an opportunity to demonstrate to the world the extent of Somalia’s allegiance to the plight of Muslims. He directed his socialist military regime to further build up forces in preparation for what has come to be known as the Ogaden War. Ordering Somali forces to cross Somalia’s western border and seize the Ogaden territories of eastern Ethiopia carried both real and symbolic meaning. Barre sought to demonstrate that Somalia, a predominantly Muslim nation, was advancing the Muslim cause in East Africa.\(^\text{110}\) After all, Ethiopia’s population is predominantly comprised of Christians. Several decades prior, the Ogaden had been Somali territory and it was historically important because it provided some of the best grazing grounds for livestock in the


region.\textsuperscript{111} After World War II, the British ceded the Ogaden to Ethiopia and General Barre exploited that rift to create a conflict through which he sought to demonstrate the solidarity of Somalia with the Muslim world, reclaiming grounds that were once Somalia’s – grounds that were once held by Muslims.\textsuperscript{112}

Claiming these lands as Somali territory, and in an effort to demonstrate Somali solidarity and power, Barre’s forces seized ninety percent of the Ogaden.\textsuperscript{113} Nonetheless Somali support for Barre’s regime had waned.\textsuperscript{114} Additionally, the General had not cleared his invasion of the Ogaden with Moscow and the Soviets were hesitant to support his cause and aggression.\textsuperscript{115} At the time, the Soviets were actively cultivating socialist grassroots movements in Ethiopia and they viewed Barre’s aggression as a threat to gaining a stronger socialist foothold in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{116} When the Soviets attempted to negotiate a truce and Barre refused, Moscow cut all military and humanitarian aid to Somalia and terminated Soviet support of Barre’s regime.\textsuperscript{117} The Soviets then began to provide massive economic and military aid to Ethiopia, including more than one billion

\textsuperscript{111} Michael P. Colaresi, \textit{Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 60.

\textsuperscript{112} Anthony Vinci, \textit{Armed Groups and the Balance of Power} (New York: Routledge, 2009), 69.


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Robert G. Patman, \textit{The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 220.
dollars worth of weapons, in an effort to strengthen Ethiopia’s armed forces.\textsuperscript{118} Recognizing how difficult it was to work with Barre, Moscow seized the moment to gain Ethiopian allegiance to the Kremlin and broke free from Barre.

At the same time, concerned with the Cold War balance of power in East Africa, the United States, which had long provided foreign aid to Ethiopia, at the direction of President Jimmy Carter, rerouted its military and economic aid to Somalia in an effort to counter increasing Soviet support of Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{119} The United States and the Soviet Union leveraged their foreign aid capacities as a means by which to either obtain influence and or incentivize support of various regimes throughout the Cold War. Somalia and Ethiopia were no different.

The Somali President appealed to ‘other world powers’ for help and, in an attempt to rally Western support, raised the spectre of a Soviet-inspired Cuban-Ethiopian invasion of his country...amidst the presence of 7,000 to 15,000 Cuban combat troops fighting on Ethiopia’s side. ‘We are sure that Ethiopia with their friends are planning to attack Somalia. We are expecting it and are prepared. But will they stop at Somalia? I don’t think so.’\textsuperscript{120}

The Ogaden War lasted two years.\textsuperscript{121} What originated as a rogue act by General Barre became a full-blown proxy war between the two Cold War superpowers. Three thousand Soviet military advisors and twenty thousand Cuban soldiers were sent to Ethiopia, along


\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120} Robert G. Patman, \textit{The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 220.

with more than a billion dollars in military aid. Meanwhile, the United States provided
millions of dollars in military aid, armaments, and munitions shipments to Barre’s forces,
but refused to provide military advisors or soldiers in an effort to limit the scale of the
conflict and prevent escalation.

The Soviets were free of General Barre, but now the United States had to at least
nominally work with the dictator to secure American regional security interests within the
macro-level balance of power struggle that drove Cold War policies at large. Though
the General thought he had come out on top and believed that so long as the Cold War
endured, he could leverage Soviet-American power politics to advance his agenda and
fund his military dictatorship, he had one major problem. The funding to perpetuate
General Barre’s grasp on power in his self-proclaimed socialist state was to be provided
by the strongest capitalist power in the world. Though he amassed one of the most
powerful militaries in Africa, the General’s forces were virtually useless by 1978 because
he had lost the support of the Somali people. The moral authority of the regime
collapsed as Somalis saw blatant hypocrisies throughout his government.

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Barre lose the Ogaden War, he also placed Somalia at large on a path towards accelerated self-destruction.

6-9: MOSCOW’S COLLAPSE AND SOMALIA: WELFARE STATE ON THE BRINK

Ever since General Barre’s regime rose to power in 1969, he had asserted that Somalia had “broken the chain of a consumer economy based on imports” and that the Somali people were “free to decide their destiny.”

However, Barre and the Somali people at large were in a bind. Somalia did not, and does not, possess sufficient natural resources nor does it have an adequate technological, mechanical, and/or industrial capacity to extract its limited natural resources to support an indigenously and/or self-sustained economy and populace. Therefore, General Barre’s allegiance to the Soviets was not merely an allegiance born from shared political ideologies and a belief in Marxist principles. That allegiance was also more practically speaking central to the survival of the Somali state and its people because it resulted in critical foreign aid provisions. Somalia was virtually a welfare state and it had long depended on vast shipments of the most basic kind – food, water, and the most elementary of staple resources – all key to meeting the most basic physiological needs of the population.

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Throughout the 1960s, during Somalia’s brief dance with democracy, the Western powers had provided significant foreign aid of like kind. However, with the General’s rise to power and the establishment of a socialist regime, Western foreign aid dried up. In that vacuum, the Soviets realized that if they were to obtain and sustain a sphere of influence in East Africa via this relationship with Somalia, they could help their cause by providing massive foreign aid shipments that the Somalis would then in turn use to meet basic physiological needs. As the General and Somalia began to take these foreign aid shipments for granted, it became increasingly possible for Barre to espouse the socialist ideological principles in which he deeply believed. With physiological and safety needs fulfilled for the Somalis thanks to Soviet aid, they had no reason in the short term to support any other system. After all, Somalis believed that they were “deciding their own destiny” as a liberated people free of “the chain of a consumer economy based on imports.” The fact of the matter, however, was that Somalia’s entire economy under Barre’s regime was a consumer based economy, but it lacked the financial and material capability and capacity to actually purchase the goods necessary to meet the population’s

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132 Ibid.


physiological needs. As such, Somalia was fully dependent on “consuming imports,” or living off the imported hand-outs of Soviet foreign aid. 135

When the General went to war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden territories and the Soviets withdrew their moral support and terminated foreign aid shipments, Barre’s regime and his hold on power were on the brink. 136 Though the United States filled the void for the welfare state and began to infuse massive foreign aid shipments to meet Somali physiological needs, in addition to military aid to wage the war in the Ogaden, the fact remains that the Somali people began to recognize rather quickly that their entire system and Barre’s entire platform were unsustainable without foreign aid shipments. The Somali society could not meet its most basic physiological needs. By the late 1970s, “foreign aid comprised seventy percent of the Somali national budget.” 137 An end to foreign aid would surely spell disaster in Somalia.

6-10: IMPLICATIONS OF BEING A COLD WAR WELFARE STATE

While the United States continued to provide foreign aid shipments to Somalia, though in diminished quantities subsequent to the Ogaden War and throughout the 1980s, when the Cold War ended and Soviet-American power politics ceased, so too did American foreign aid shipments to Somalia. 138 Though perhaps against its better moral

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138 Ibid., 84.
judgment, and likely out of Cold War strategic necessity, the United States had in fact supported Barre’s socialist regime and military dictatorship with foreign aid shipments.¹³⁹ With the collapse of the Kremlin, the United States saw no strategic need, and certainly felt no moral imperative, to continue providing Barre’s Somalia with foreign aid shipments.¹⁴⁰ In fact, Barre’s regime was facing increasingly open and hostile indigenous forces throughout the mid and late 1980s.¹⁴¹ Post-Cold War American policymakers were hopeful that these forces might unite and seize the momentum of the Soviet collapse in an effort to topple one of Africa’s worst violators of human rights, eliminate socialism from the Horn of Africa, and lead a return of democracy to Somalia.¹⁴²

As foreign aid dried up, the extent to which Somalia was a true “welfare state” became fully self-evident to the general population as they were now faced with the very real threat of starvation due to the extent to which food supplies dwindled.¹⁴³ In response, rather than ease policies and develop relations with regional nations with which to trade, Barre’s government hunted down political dissidents throughout both urban and rural areas and sought to instill total control through a culture of fear.¹⁴⁴


¹⁴³ Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 170.
held power by a thread and only his military’s backing kept him in power.\textsuperscript{145} He lacked any real support from the general Somali populace and for all intents and purposes, it became a matter of when, not if, he and his regime would crumble under the weight of a starving population and rampant uncertainty that drove further instability.

By 1990, the General’s grasp on power had all but vanished. Instability was on the verge of transitioning to all out anarchy as clan leaders and warlords began to engage in open hostilities in both urban and rural areas.\textsuperscript{146} Barre’s refusal to allow public gatherings, coupled with paralyzing fuel and food shortages and rampant inflation resulted in the emergence of a highly complex black market economy, one in which the most commonly sold item was weapons.\textsuperscript{147} Somalis were a people on the physiological brink, and now, they were arming themselves for what appeared to be an inevitable civil war. With no food, empty coffers, and no hope of foreign aid shipments to relieve the situation, Somalis took to the streets in open and armed revolt. Though largely fragmented and uncoordinated, the cumulative impact of multiple revolting groups resulted in the end of the General’s regime.\textsuperscript{148} Unable to fulfill their most basic

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\textsuperscript{146} Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, \textit{Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making} (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 127.


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physiological needs, the Somali people rose up and ousted one of Africa’s most brutal dictators – but democracy did not follow.

6-11: THE OUSTING OF GENERAL BARRE’S DICTATORSHIP

In the end, Barre’s Somali Revolutionary Sociality Party had ruled Somalia for more than twenty years until it fell between December 1990 and January 1991.\(^\text{149}\) It was overthrown by the combined armed revolt of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) along with non-violent political opposition from the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG).\(^\text{150}\) Though free of the General, Somalia now faced a major problem: it needed a central government. Somalia was in need of major agricultural reform, but in the short term, the country desperately needed the resumption of foreign aid shipments in order to meet the immediate physiological needs of its people amidst a looming humanitarian catastrophe.\(^\text{151}\) The true extent to which the Somali people had depended upon foreign aid and the assistance of the outside world for so long was now clear – and it was fully evident that the majority of Somalis could not meet their most basic physiological needs without such intervention.\(^\text{152}\)


For more than thirty years, foreign aid shipments had virtually eliminated concerns about how to domestically develop agriculture, infrastructure, and industry in order to meet the physiological needs of the Somali people. As Somalia experimented with both capitalist democracy in the 1960s and socialism in the 1970s and 1980s, both the West and the Soviets has provided foreign aid in such quantities that Somalis rarely, with but one exception in the mid 1970s, ever had to worry about meeting their physiological needs. With those basic needs met, Somalis had been enabled to artificially focus on meeting belonging and esteem needs. Many had done so by participating in Barre’s government or the military.

Yet, when the Cold War ended and the General was ousted in late 1990, there was a cumulative crisis as complete disorder descended upon Somalia and no major power stepped up to the plate to pre-empt the impending humanitarian crisis. As the extent of the humanitarian crisis that followed would demonstrate, and as lawlessness continues today, and as Islamist radicals readily seek to influence a vulnerable Muslim population throughout Somalia with aggressive anti-Western ideologies, the benefit of hindsight suggests that the United States and the Western powers may have been substantially better off today had they more quickly sought to assist Somalis and not waited until the United Nations established a mission to Somalia in 1992.


6-12: CIVIL WAR ERUPTS: 1991

Though General Barre was a brutal dictator who regularly abused power and committed numerous human rights violations, he had, if for but only a while in the long Somali saga, provided some sense of order throughout the country. With his ousting and the end of his socialist military dictatorship, Somalia descended into anarchy that erupted in a brutal civil war that began in 1991 and endures today. Inaugurated by uprisings in protest to Barre’s repression, the civil war took hold in January of 1991 when, after anti Barre forces successfully ousted him from power, pro-Barre forces attempted to regain control of the country.155 Violent clashes erupted throughout urban centers and the countryside alike.156 In an effort to withdraw from the violence, the northern areas of Somalia, formerly held within British Somaliland, declared themselves free and independent as Somaliland.157 Meanwhile, anti and pro-Barre forces continued their violent clashes which then escalated into full scale, nationwide civil war by late 1991.158

In response, the United Nations (U.N.) passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 746, resulting in the creation of United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), the U.N.’s first mission to provide international humanitarian relief and to help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution

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of its central government. Executing authority derived within Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the U.N. established a “general and complete” arms embargo on Somalia to limit the continued influx of weapons that would only serve to further escalate violence and internal conflict. With U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 came the provision of international humanitarian aid from both the U.N. and member nations, along with a host of international non profit and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 directed the U.N. Secretary General to contact all members of the African Union and Arab League in an effort to engage them to help prevent a continued escalation of violence across Somalia. U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 also took measures to ensure such humanitarian aid would reach the victim population rather than be intercepted and hoarded by the warlords. In addition, it aimed to obtain assurances and guarantee the safe passage of humanitarian relief personnel throughout the Somalia.

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It is important to note that U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 did not call for the establishment of any international peacekeeping force within Somalia. At the time, many nations were hesitant to commit the financial and military resources necessary to support such a peacekeeping force while the United States noted that it would not intervene in the domestic conflict without invitation/request to do so directly from the Somali government – an issue that only complicated the situation since the Somali government was by then virtually a non-entity.

Recognizing the shortfalls of U.N. Security Council Resolution 733, the U.N. moved to take further action and on March 17, 1992, passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 746. U.N. Security Council Resolution 746 urged the Somali factions and warlords to uphold the ceasefire agreement reached earlier that month on March 3, 1992, and sought their pledges to cooperate with the U.N. and international relief organizations to enable continued and sustainable delivery of humanitarian aid to the starving population.

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166 Ibid.


Somali pledges to not interfere with the technical team.\textsuperscript{169} In addition, U.N. Security Council Resolution 746 sought cooperation among the African Union, Arab League, and Organization of the Islamic Conference to assist the U.N. in convening a conference to lay out a plan for Somali national reconciliation and reunification of the country.\textsuperscript{170}

When the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolution 746 failed to materialize, U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 was passed on December 3, 1992, resulting in the approval of deploying U.N. peacekeepers, led by the United States, to establish the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), tasked with ensuring humanitarian aid be distributed and peace be established in Somalia.\textsuperscript{171} UNITAF was to create a “secure environment” on the ground to ensure the starving population received critically needed humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{172} U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 determined that “the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance” constituted a threat to international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{173}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{171} Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., \textit{Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 118-119.
\end{itemize}
The U.N. Security Council again condemned violations of international humanitarian law and demanded the cessation of all hostilities from all parties involved. It urged them to cooperate with the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General and to avoid confrontation with U.N. peacekeepers, military personnel, and humanitarian organizations deployed to assist the devastated civilian population caught in the midst of the conflict. At its heart, the U.N. effort recognized how the physiological challenges in Somalia were at the root of the entire conflict.

6-13: MOUNTING CHAOS: THE U.N. PUTS BOOTS ON THE GROUND

The U.N. humanitarian troops, largely led by the United States, put boots on the ground on December 8, 1992, and continued to surge well into 1993. They began a two-year humanitarian and peace-building/peacekeeping mission primarily focused on Southern Somalia. U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 had led to the passage of an addendum motion that authorized a further deployment of 3,500 personnel in support of UNOSOM II in an effort to develop a better security environment and to better distribute humanitarian aid via the UNITAF effort. By early 1993, UNITAF forces peaked at 38,300, including 24,000 United States Marines and by February 19, 1993, more than “70,000 tons of food and medical supplies were delivered to Somalia.”

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goal was to address the famine which left more than half of the Somali population of 4.5 million in severe danger of starvation. In the first few months of 1992 alone, more than 300,000 Somalis died due to starvation while one million Somali refugees fled.

At its height of its effort, the U.N. coordinated and administered humanitarian aid from across the following six main U.N. organizations:

1. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
4. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
5. World Food Programme (WFP)
6. World Health Organization (WHO)

Another thirty NGOs were working in Somalia as “implementing partners” of the U.N., but it was ultimately all to no avail as the situation continued to deteriorate. By late December of 1992, the situation in Somalia reached a boiling point.

Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions, some torn by internal divisions, were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general lawlessness

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compounded the situation. … Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened, and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were put in danger. The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed.\textsuperscript{181}

U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 ultimately led to the U.N.’s fourth major military engagement since the start of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{182} It was also the first U.N. Security Council Resolution to authorize the use of force, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to deliver humanitarian aid that was being obstructed by warlords.\textsuperscript{183} To counter the warlords and to attempt to establish a reasonable security environment in Somalia required the deployment of military forces to directly address the chaos and instability. As such, U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 authorized the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{184} It also led to the establishment of a “unified command and control”


\textsuperscript{182} Richard Connaughton, \textit{A Brief History of Modern Warfare} (London: Running Press, 2008).


arrangement to support military operations as directed and authorized by the United Nations Secretary General.\textsuperscript{185}

Escalation in violence both internally among warlords and externally between warlords and U.N. military personnel continued as the U.N. did not intend to leave Somalia until peace, stability, law, and order had been restored.\textsuperscript{186} The economy had to be completely rebuilt, social and political life needed order, the country’s institutions and infrastructure – political and material – needed to be reengineered, and a civilian police force was needed. Holistic rehabilitation of the nation was necessary and the U.N. seemed to be fully committed to this humanitarian cause – and it had the backing of the strongest superpower the world had ever seen as the United States was without question the most powerful nation in the wake of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{187}

6-14: THE BLACK HAWK DOWN DEBACLE AND BEYOND

Then, between June and October of 1993, a series of clashes took place throughout Mogadishu between local warlords and U.N. peacekeepers. Hostilities intensified in August when the United States launched a largely independent push called \textit{Operation Gothic Serpent} tasking American Special Operations Forces (SOF) to capture


\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Operation Gothic Serpent was a sub-operation to Operation Restore Hope, established late during the George H. W. Bush presidency and carried on by the Clinton Administration in an effort to support U.N. Security Council efforts to stabilize the security environment and provide humanitarian aid.

Mohammad Farrah Aidid was one of the most powerful Somali warlords and the United States believed that his capture could alleviate much of the violence in Somalia and play a significant role in restoring order and peace. The United States believed Aidid was such an important figure because although all fifteen Somali factions had agreed to terms for a ceasefire, restoration of peace, and the establishment of democracy at a March 15, 1993, meeting at the Conference of National Reconciliation of Somalia, it was clear by May that Aidid would not honor the terms to which he was a signatory and that his faction would not cooperate in stabilizing and reunifying the country. According to the terms of the agreement reached at the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, the U.N. was to begin the disarmament of the Somali factions and warlords on June 5, 1993. With Aidid holding out and holding on to his weapons,

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and with his faction maintaining militant power, the other Somali factions and warlords were increasingly hesitant to turn over their arms and to leave themselves and their families unprotected should Aidid seek to expand his power.\textsuperscript{193} Aidid was the major roadblock standing in the way of Somalia moving forward from darkness into light.

By July, as Aidid dug his heels in, and as the other warlords continued to argue that they would not give up their arms until Aidid was toppled, the United States coordinated a raid on a safe house believed to be an Aidid headquarters in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{194} A very brief combat operation ensued wherein American Cobra attack helicopters were employed to fire sixteen Tube-Launched Optically-Tracker Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles and thousands of twenty millimeter cannon rounds at the compound.\textsuperscript{195} Fifty Somalis, including women and children, were killed in the operation and it was later concluded that Aidid was not there at the time of the attack.\textsuperscript{196} Somalis were outraged. When four Western journalists arrived to report the story and capture the event for world media outlets, the Somalis at the scene erupted into violent mobs and killed the


\textsuperscript{194} Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas George Weiss, \emph{The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 55.


\textsuperscript{196} Michael Maren, \emph{The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity} (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1997), 286.
journalists.\textsuperscript{197} The overwhelming firepower and airborne nature of the operation against the safe house, along with the resultant deaths of innocent women and children rather than Aidid, is believed to have strengthened anti-American sentiment in Somalia.\textsuperscript{198} Some analysts also argued that this attack turned Somali moderates against not just the United States, but also the U.N. and its efforts at large in Somalia.\textsuperscript{199}

Nonetheless, the United States remained resolved to capture Aidid, to eliminate the threat his continued power as a warlord posed to the reunification and stabilization of Somalia, and to finally establish a secure environment within the country.\textsuperscript{200} On October 3, 1993, American SOFs assaulted downtown Mogadishu in a highly orchestrated tactical operation to capture Aidid’s foreign minister, Omar Salad Emli, and his top political advisor, Mohamed Hassan Awale, in an effort obtain intelligence and turn up the heat on Aidid.\textsuperscript{201} Using a combination of air and ground forces, the operation was not coordinated with the U.N. and advanced contingency planning was not conducted.

Upon preparing to for extraction and with the Somali prisoners in position, U.S. forces were almost immediately bogged down and the plan began to fall apart.\textsuperscript{202} As

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{198}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{199}{Scott Peterson, \textit{Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda} (New York: Routledge, 2002), 121.}
\footnotetext{202}{Fred J. Pushies, \textit{Weapons of Delta Force} (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2002), 20.}
\end{footnotes}
Somali civilians created roadblocks, the militia, fresh off its daily afternoon binge of khat, opened fire on the convoy and targeted helicopter support with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). When an American Black Hawk helicopter was shot down and attempts to rescue the crew members ensued, a scene of carnage unfolded across the city. In the combat that followed, as many as one thousand Somali militiamen and civilians were killed by American forces in brutal urban combat. Eighteen American soldiers lost their lives and another thirty two were wounded.

By early morning on October 4, 1993, the fight was over. The senior American officer in charge, General William F. Garrison, was recalled to Washington by President Clinton, who, just three days later, on October 7th, announced that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. Les Aspin, the Secretary of Defense, resigned and assumed the blame for what was then viewed as a failed American policy in Somalia. President Clinton appointed Ambassador Robert B. Oakley as special envoy

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to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement, but with the withdrawal of all American forces and a minimalist African Union peacekeeping force remaining in Somalia, the prospects of a renewed peace in Somalia rapidly faded.  

Though the U.N. Security Council, via Resolution 837, condemned the Somali militia, the withdrawal of American forces symbolized that the United States was unwilling to fight in locations, and over issues, it did not see as directly related, at least in the short term, to its immediate national security interests. It became convenient and politically expedient to view the situation in Somalia as a distant issue that could not possibly pose any real, direct, near term threat to American interests. The initiative of the humanitarian mission in Somalia was largely lost. And so, Somalia remained just as lawless as when U.N. peacekeepers had first arrived. Worse, the warlords were emboldened by the withdrawal of both American and U.N. forces signaling an unwillingness to fight and stomach casualties to secure the situation on the ground in Somalia. Somalia, and emerging Islamists both within and abroad, took that perception of the United States and the West to heart.

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Ironically, with the benefit of hindsight, it is important to understand the ramification of allowing American foreign policy decisions to be made within a politically expedient mindset and one that failed to understand how inaction, rather than action, in specific circumstances, exposes a nation to far greater risk over the long haul. To that end, given the situation in Somalia today, it is necessary to note the findings by one of the most well-respected anti and counter-terrorism scholars in the world, Peter Bergen, from an interview he conducted with Osama bin Laden while writing his book, *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, which was then published in 2001. According to Bergen, during the interview bin Laden repeatedly claimed that al Qaeda was involved in training, funding, and equipping Aidid’s militiamen and that without al Qaeda’s assistance, Aidid’s forces could not have had such an impact on the American mission.\(^{215}\) Bin Laden had made this same claim earlier to the Arabic newspaper *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*.\(^{216}\) Bin Laden is known to have even claimed that al Qaeda’s top military strategist, Muhammad Atef, was involved in the Battle of Mogadishu and directly assisted Aidid’s forces.\(^{217}\) Separately, in a 1998 interview, bin Laden noted that he lamented the 1994 withdrawal of American forces from Somalia because he had hoped for a sustained engagement by which to bog them down in an


\(^{216}\) Ibid., 137.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 86.

The timing of bin Laden’s statements coincide with the 1998 al Qaeda bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In addition, his comments appear to have been made at a time when al Qaeda was gearing up for further attacks against the United States and the West at large. In October of 2000, the \textit{USS Cole}, docked in Yemen, was attacked and a year later, the infamous 9/11 attacks occurred in the United States itself. In fact, the timing of bin Laden’s comments to both Peter Bergen and \textit{Al-Quds Al-Arabi} suggests that al Qaeda’s influence in Somalia began much earlier than was initially believed. It now appears that al Qaeda first gained a foothold in Africa by taking advantage of the chaos and anarchy within Somalia in the early 1990s and that Somalia did not merely become an Islamist safe haven after 9/11.\footnote{Rohan Gunaratna, \textit{Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 156.} In addition, neither the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, nor the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were the first attempts by al Qaeda to target Americans or American interests. Rather, influencing the most powerful Somali warlords in the early 1990s was an attempt by al Qaeda to drag the United States into sustained combat operations in East Africa.\footnote{Kishore Mahbubani, \textit{Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World} (New York: Perseus, 2005), 83.}
On another level, this course of events had a significant impact on the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy.\(^\text{221}\) For the remainder of his presidency, Clinton refused to engage American forces in ground operations in low intensity, third-world conflicts, even those embarked upon for humanitarian reasons.\(^\text{222}\) Such reluctance to deploy ground forces resulted in virtual inaction in response to the Rwandan Genocide and Clinton only authorized air operations in the Bosnia/Kosovo conflict.\(^\text{223}\) Bin Laden and al Qaeda surely took note and exploited that knowledge in preparing their attacks in the years to follow. Nonetheless, in Somalia itself, chaos and violence continued without interruption for the next decade as the Clinton non-interventionist policy in Somalia endured into the first years of the George W. Bush Administration.\(^\text{224}\)

6-15: THE ISLAMIC COURTS UNION (ICU) AND ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION

In 2004, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was founded in Nairobi, Kenya as the security situation inside Somalia was too unstable to locate and convene the central government within Mogadishu.\(^\text{225}\) In early 2006, the TFG attempted

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\(^{223}\) Cameron Fraser, *United States Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* 2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22.


to establish the government out of Baidoa within Somalia.\textsuperscript{226} This move was supported by an alliance of predominantly secular Somalia warlords “surrealistically called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).”\textsuperscript{227} Nonetheless, this was a “notoriously ill-judged policy” and the United States misjudged the potential effectiveness of the ARPCT as “a bulwark against terrorist elements within the ICU.”\textsuperscript{228} After the ICU defeated the ARPCT in June 2006, it reigned in Mogadishu” while the United States stepped back to determine a new way forward.\textsuperscript{229}

The ICU had been sweeping through the Somali countryside and cities preaching radical Islamist doctrine and consolidating power as they moved towards both Mogadishu and Baidoa.\textsuperscript{230} Given the post 9/11 security environment and American efforts underway to combat radical Islamist organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) extended millions in support to the ARPCT in the hope that these predominantly secular Somali warlords could provide an indigenous counterweight to the Islamists throughout the countryside.\textsuperscript{231} However, this inevitably fueled further conflict.


\textsuperscript{227} Stephen Ellis and Ineke van Kessel, eds., \textit{Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa} (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke, Brill, 2009), 101.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 257.

Despite CIA backing, the ARPCT was unable to prevent the ICU from seizing Mogadishu and they moved very close to Baidoa.\(^{232}\) In addition, the ICU gained the support of a number of other warlords and expanded its powerbase throughout the country to the borders of Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south.\(^{233}\) As the ICU continued to gain control of Somalia, their increasing power base also led to an increasing tendency to take aggressive military action against segments of the society not necessarily opposed to ICU control, but not necessarily supportive of the ICU or loyal to its cause. Violence continued to spread and ultimately the ICU attacked the Galmudug, a TFG-leaning zone, and the TFG itself.\(^{234}\) Galmudug proclaimed itself an autonomous state within Somalia in an effort to unify and rally resistance against the ICU.\(^{235}\)

In response, Ethiopian forces were mobilized and swept across the border in December 2006 in an effort to turn the tide against the ICU.\(^{236}\)

Ethiopian military forces, acting at the invitation of the internationally recognized but wholly ineffectual Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), intervened in Somalia against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was a coalition of shari’a (Islamic law) courts that had taken control of Mogadishu in June 2006 after ousting the various warlords who controlled most of the city. At the time the ICU had begun what might have been a dramatic rise to power across much of south-central


\(^{235}\) Ibid.

Somalia. But Ethiopia viewed that development with great alarm; leading figures associated with the ICU had openly threatened war on Ethiopia and talked of annexing the whole of Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region.237

Ethiopia, the United States, and the Somalia TFG, along with the United Nations, were concerned that Somalia’s civil war not only provided a convenient, lawless safe haven for al Qaeda and other Islamists seeking refuge from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but that any further destabilization or Islamist push to consolidate power could only spell rapidly escalating security concerns across the board.238

The final straw occurred on July 20, 2006, when multiple Western intelligence services learned and verified that “an Airbus A310-300 departed Eritrea (well-known for providing tacit support to al Qaeda and Islamists in Africa) for Somalia…with a variety of arms” including B-10 antitank guns; heavy machine guns, PKM machine guns, with magazines and telescopic sighting devices; AK-47 assault rifles, G3A3 assault rifles, Browning .30-calibre machine guns, 120mm mortars, and rifle-fired grenades. A second shipment arrived shortly thereafter, clearly violating the United Nations arms embargo.239

It became clear to the United States that al Qaeda, through the ICU, was intent on firmly seizing power and extending formal control throughout Somalia. This was something that the United States could not accept. However, the United States lacked the resources


238 Ibid., 17.

239 Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 49.
to directly address the situation in Somalia in full force due to the extent of its resources already committed to sustained combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  

There is widespread speculation, and reason to believe, that the United States offered significant incentives and assistance to Ethiopia in order to obtain its commitment to conduct such a military intervention. While ICU control of Mogadishu did result in “a useful measure of stability in the Horn of Africa, which is home to more than ninety million Muslims, Washington backed the December 24, 2006, invasion of Somalia by the Ethiopian military.” Amidst growing concerns, “U.S. officials argued that … action was based on ‘genuine security concerns.’” Given this belief, the United States expanded covert intelligence operations in Somalia and provided highly classified advisory assistance on the ground support to Ethiopian forces. “U.S. advisers were on the ground in Somalia and working with Ethiopian troops and U.S. special operations provided intelligence and support to Ethiopian and Somali fighting forces.”

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243 Ibid.

244 Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 49.

245 Ibid.
conflict soon took on the aura of a Cold-War-era proxy war while al Qaeda sought to portray the conflict as a pseudo-civilizational conflict between Islam and the West. 246

Though the ICU sought to repel Ethiopian forces from Somali soil and “called on Muslim jihadis to join them in their drive to take over the entire country,” the Ethiopian incursion was highly effective. 247

On December 29, 2006, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu following the evacuation of the TFG one day earlier. On January 12, 2007, the Ethiopian army-backed TFG forces captured Ras Kamboni, the last remaining stronghold of the ICU in southern Somalia, after five days of heavy fighting. Thus, it completed the conventional defeat of the ICU. 248

The ICU was forced to blend into the general population. 249 Though it did prove adaptable and developed into an insurgency, similar to those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the presence of Ethiopian forces brought a sense of stability. 250 In January 2007, Prime Minister Ali Mohammad Ghedi called for the Somali nation, and all warlord factions, to begin disarming and moving towards a peace and reconciliation process. 251

Yet, it quickly became evident that Ghedi’s call would not be answered and that additional, more overt, American assistance would be necessary in order to keep the pressure on the ICU, al Qaeda, and other Islamists in Somalia. The same month as


249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

Ghedi’s call for peace, the Islamists and their warlords again refused to put down their arms. In response, the United States conducted its first publicly acknowledged military intervention in Somalia since its withdrawal in the wake of the Black Hawk Down debacle.²⁵² American military forces launched air strikes using AC-130 gunships against Islamists in Ras Kamboni in an effort to kill al Qaeda operatives thought to be embedded within ICU forces.²⁵³ The United States also launched bombardments against “the Somali village of Bargara, where al Qaeda targets were thought to be hiding.”²⁵⁴

By 2009 six U.S. helicopter gunships struck a suspected al Qaeda convoy in southern Somalia that carried Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, … who was wanted for a host of attacks including … the November 2002 bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, … the attempted downing of an Israeli jetliner with surface-to-air missiles at the Mombasa airport, … and the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam that killed 229.²⁵⁵

Through covert means, the United States was determined to support the Ethiopian forces in Somalia and to surgically insert SOFs, when necessary, to act on solid intelligence and bring the fight to the ICU, al Qaeda, and al Shabaab.


²⁵⁵ Ibid.
Then, in December of 2008, Ethiopian forces formally began withdrawing from Somalia, and by early 2009 the drawdown was complete.\textsuperscript{256} Though it has yet to be confirmed, one may speculate that the agreement reached between the United States and Ethiopia leading to Ethiopia’s mobilization of forces in Somalia was only arranged to last through the end of the George W. Bush presidency. The timing of Ethiopia’s drawdown leads one to wonder whether the Obama Administration seriously entertained the idea of possibly extending the agreement given the relative success of Ethiopian forces in Somalia.

Nonetheless, upon its withdrawal, Ethiopia left behind a small detachment of several thousand soldiers to assist the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).\textsuperscript{257} However, as soon as Ethiopian forces withdrew, the stability their presence had provided eroded overnight.\textsuperscript{258} Islamist radicals and their rebel forces emerged in full force from the urban environments in which they had blended and sought cover while waging a low-level insurgency.\textsuperscript{259} In response, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was established to assist in providing basic security throughout Somalia and included a force


\textsuperscript{258} Neyire Akpinarli, \textit{The Fragility of the ‘Failed State’ Paradigm: A Different International Law.} (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2010), 49.

\textsuperscript{259} Barry Rubin, ed., \textit{Guide to Islamist Movements} (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 34.
of as many as 8,000 peacekeepers stationed within the Somalia.260 A number of Islamist groups are involved in an active insurgency against the TFG, Ethiopian forces, and AMISOM peacekeepers, including the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of Two Migrations (PRM) which is thought to be one of the major insurgent groups.261

The presence of AMISOM peacekeepers did little to dissuade the Islamist rebels. In addition to the eruption of tribal and clan violence again in 2009, Islamist insurgents quickly regained control of the southern half of Somalia and reasserted their dominance.262 In several southern provinces, the ICU and Islamist forces institutionalized sharia. The ICU is ideologically influencing a highly vulnerable and malleable population.263 On May 7, 2009, Islamist rebels attacked Mogadishu in an attempt to seize the capital. They took most of the city but failed to overthrown the government which today retains control over but a few square kilometers of the city and is surrounded by Islamist rebels.264

Throughout the last two decades, Somalis have suffered through a brutal and uninterrupted humanitarian crisis. Estimates suggest that it has resulted in between five hundred thousand and one million Somali deaths and that it has created millions of


refugees that have sought shelter and security throughout Africa and around world.\textsuperscript{265} During this time, anarchy was omnipresent, and warlords engaged in an endless civil war. Famine plagued the population at large leading to mass starvation while violence reached such levels as to preclude the regular provision of international relief shipments. Today, the situation on the ground within Somali borders remains much unchanged from what it was almost two decades ago – with the notable exception that radical Islamist forces are obtaining an increasingly powerful grip on the psyche of Somalis at large. Islamists are capitalizing on Somali fears and the challenges they face in meeting their most basic physiological needs.

CHAPTER 7

THE EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION OF SOMALI PIRACY

Today, at their core, Somalis are a vulnerable and angry population. They are angry at the West for both intrusion and neglect. Their most recent point of contention with the West, in addition to the American backed Ethiopian invasion, has to do with intrusion of Somali waters by commercial fishing ventures. Unregulated and unmonitored Western commercial fishing in Somali waters has posed additional hardships to Somalis merely looking to meet their physiological needs through the bounty of the sea.¹

7-1: PHYSIOLOGICAL NECESSITY AND SOMALI PIRACY

Amidst a rapid degradation of on the ground conditions and Somalia’s descent into failed statehood over the last two decades, innumerable Somalis turned to the sea in the hope that the historically bountiful territorial fishing grounds along the coast would provide much needed food and a means by which to fulfill their most basic physiological needs. Caught in all encompassing humanitarian crisis, Somalis were desperate for food and the rich territorial fishing grounds were seen as a way to ensure their survival.²

Yet, there was a major problem. The collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991 also resulted in the end of Somalia’s Coast Guard.³ It had long patrolled the

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nation’s territorial waters and provided protection against foreign commercial fishing vessels which would, at any opportunity, overfish the waters. The Somali Coast had prevented devastation of Somalia’s territorial maritime zone. But, when it evaporated, local Somali fishermen simply could not compete with large scale commercial fishing operations of foreign trawlers. With no legitimate governmental authority or execution agent to protect Somalia’s territorial waters and the sovereignty of the nation’s fishing grounds, foreign commercial fishing vessels arrived in great numbers. According to the United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), up to seven hundred foreign commercial fishing vessels arrived off Somalia’s coast and began to plunder the last Somali refuge capable of providing a source of dependable sustenance in sufficient capacity and reliability as to meet the basic physiological needs of the population. Somalis were outraged. They saw this development as exploitation of a tragic humanitarian crisis amidst a brutal civil war. In response, Somalis sought to protect the sovereignty – the physiological security – of their territorial fishing grounds.

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5 Ibid.


With the fall of the central government and the resultant end of the Somali Coast Guard, piracy emerged as Somalis were forced to watch helplessly as the country’s “2,000 mile coastline, the longest in Africa, was pillaged by foreign vessels.”

Without a maritime patrol service, foreign commercial fishing companies sent wave upon wave of vessels to the Gulf of Aden in what was to become an uncontrolled commercial fishing binge off the coast of Somalia. Local Somali fisherman, the vast majority of whom did not have access to commercial fishing vessels, and therefore engaged in sustenance fishing to support themselves and their families, simply could not compete with the foreign competition.

Foreign commercial fishing operations soon had a marked impact on the fishing grounds off the Somali coast as there became a “‘a free for all,’ with fishing fleets from around the world illegally plundering Somali stocks and freezing out the country’s own rudimentarily-equipped fishermen.” Sustenance fishing became increasingly difficult for Somali fishermen.

Somalis viewed the foreign commercial fishing vessels as a threat not merely to their ability to operate their own fishing business, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
as a threat to their ability to meet physiological needs via fishing.\textsuperscript{14} The bounty of the sea was integral to physiological survival in a time of increasing chaos and widespread famine. Further complicating the situation were foreign commercial fishing vessels violating international treaties that specifically protected countries’ territorial waters.\textsuperscript{15}

Since the collapse of Somalia’s government, the United Nations has estimated that more than $300 million worth of seafood is stolen from Somali waters each year.\textsuperscript{16}

The massive increase in commercial fishing, illegal, and foreign fishing threatens fishing grounds and subsistence fishing communities specifically in cases where maritime policing is lacking. The large numbers of commercial fish species around the Horn attracts a growing number of poachers. In 2006, the ‘Somaliland Coast Guard’ captured nine Yemeni fishing boats (they were released shortly afterwards) as they claimed that up to 200 Yemeni boats were illegally fishing in their waters. Despite the high risk, Taiwanese and South Korean fishermen often poach lucrative yellow-fin tuna. Some vessels were captured by Somali ‘coastal patrols,’ such as the South Korean Dongwon-ho, which was released after paying US$800,000 (a ‘fine’ according to the Somalis and a ‘ransom’ according to the South Koreans). Such incidents might be seen as piracy, but Somali sources claim they are just protecting their fishing resources. … Links exist between conflict and the environment as populations make increasing demands on the environment in their efforts to provide for themselves and their families.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Reiner Pommerin, \textit{Maritime Security in Southern African Waters} (Stellenbosh, South Africa: Sun Media, 2009), 12.


\textsuperscript{16} Tatat Mentan, \textit{The New World Order: Ideology and Africa – Understanding and Appreciating Ambiguity, Deceit, and Recapture of Decolonized Spaces in 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Historical Argument and Presentation} (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group, 2010), 110.

\textsuperscript{17} Reiner Pommerin, \textit{Maritime Security in Southern African Waters} (Stellenbosh, South Africa: Sun Media, 2009), 12.
Somalis clearly see themselves in a fight for survival. Foreign commercial fishing and intrusion within territorial waters has had a significant impact on the Somali population, both physiologically and psychologically. Amidst such poor agricultural conditions, Somalis rightly view the sea as a critical lifeline.¹⁸

Given such extensive foreign exploitation of Somalia’s territorial waters and such blatant disregard for the sovereignty of this territorially protected maritime zone, along with the importance of its bounty to the survival of the Somali people, many Somalis felt pushed to the physiological brink. Once again, a physiologically desperate people refused to go quietly into the night. Somalis took action and sought to defend their territorial waters and the bounty within them to ensure they could continue to rely on the sea as a means by which to meet the physiological needs of their families and themselves. Out of that motivational necessity and sense of urgency, Somali fishermen lashed back at foreign commercial fishing ventures. They used both force and scare tactics in an attempt to drive away the foreigners.¹⁹

The ports of Eyl, Harardhere, and Kismayo became staging points from which Somali fishermen commenced launching basic, low level, and minimally resourced maritime operations intent on countering the foreign commercial fishing vessels’ impact on their capability to meet physiological needs.²⁰ The foreign commercial fishing

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vessels, in turn, regularly shot at the Somalis with both water cannons and firearms on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{21} By the mid 1990s, these alienated Somali fishermen banded together into small groups and emerged as pirate gangs targeting foreign commercial fishing vessels and trawlers.\textsuperscript{22} The very name of these first Somali pirate gangs – the National Volunteer Coastguard of Somalia and the Somali Marines – provide irrefutable proof that the state of mind and the psychological motive behind these first Somali pirate groups, the first to emerge in more than 5,000 years of Somali seafaring, was born out of physiological needs.\textsuperscript{23}

Their actions were spawned from the manifestation of decades of frustration with the West on land and now that frustration spilled over into the maritime domain. Somalis lashed out against those intruders who threatened their ability to meet their basic physiological needs. Foreign commercial fishing vessels arrived in Somali waters from as far away as Asia (Korea and Japan) and Western Europe (Spain).\textsuperscript{24} All the while, the foreign commercial fishing vessels continued to intentionally play the system, violating international agreements that protected Somali territorial waters, and flew flags of nations

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that lacked stringent security and compliance with international maritime standards.\textsuperscript{25} There is no doubt that “illegal trawling has fed the piracy problem.”\textsuperscript{26}

In addition to illegally plundering Somali territorial waters, foreign vessels have been accused by Somali fishermen of dumping massive loads of toxic waste, including nuclear material, into the Gulf of Aden and even within Somali’s territorial waters\textsuperscript{27}. Obviously, such dumping has had an extensive impact on the health of the local maritime environment and fishing stocks, as well as the Somalis who depend upon that bounty to meet their physiological needs.\textsuperscript{28} In 2005, a United Nations Environmental Programme Report cited radioactive uranium and other abnormally high readings of hazardous deposits in Somali territorial waters and the Gulf of Aden, noting that there is at least a corollary, if not causal, connection to the abnormally high prevalence of respiratory ailments and skin diseases throughout the villages along the Somali coast.\textsuperscript{29} Given a comparison of the financial expenses associated with safe and compliant disposal of toxic waste in Europe and the cost of transporting and dumping such waste in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, it appears that the latter option is far cheaper.\textsuperscript{30} In all likelihood, such

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ishann Tharoor, \textit{How Somalia’s Fishermen Became Pirates}. New York: TIME, April 18, 2009, 3. \url{http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html} (accessed September 22, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
illegal dumping will continue and fuel further health related issues for both the local maritime environment and the Somali people which will inevitably continue to fan the fire of anti-Western sentiment and provide further motivation for Somalis to engage in piracy.

It is clear that when the first Somali pirates emerged in the 1990s they merely sought to pose sufficient risk and to instill sufficient fear in foreign commercial fishing operations and illegal toxic dumping as to de-incentivize such actions and to preclude their owners from ordering them to return to Somali territorial waters and the Gulf of Aden. At its inception, Somali piracy was a response to foreign intrusion into its territorial sanctity and the last bastion of the country’s natural resources that could provide a means by which the local population could meet its physiological needs amidst an atrocious humanitarian crisis with no end in sight. Somali piracy emerged first and foremost as a survival mechanism.

7-2: PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS AND SOMALI PIRACY

Since its emergence in the early 1990s, the primary motivations that originally drove Somali piracy have mutated. At present, a relatively small minority of Somalis engage in piracy purely to protect territorial fishing grounds from foreign intrusion and to


ensure the maritime zone can support their physiological needs. Rather, the vast majority of Somali pirates today are engaged in such maritime crime because the potential wealth offered through successful hijackings, kidnappings, and ransoms of larger cargo ships is far greater than that which could be acquired via any other station in life throughout Somalia, legal or illegal.\(^{34}\)

Ever adaptable, it did not take long for Somalis to realize that piracy targeting foreign commercial carriers and cargo ships would prove significantly more lucrative than targeting foreign commercial fishing vessels.\(^{35}\) Further, it became evident that if and/or when Somali pirates were caught, it was excruciatingly difficult to effectively prosecute them. The need for more refined and clear piracy prosecution processes and additional international, multinational, and bi-lateral treaties among a number of nations was routinely made evident whenever capture of pirates did occur.\(^{36}\) Yet for many years interception and capture was so irregular that little was done to mature the international mechanisms by which to prosecute Somali pirates. Therefore, they often went free and negative repercussions were virtually non-existent.\(^{37}\)

The difficulty associated capturing and prosecuting Somali pirates resulted in Somalis recognizing that piracy in the Gulf of Aden was a low risk venture that offered

\(^{34}\) Peter Eichstaedt, *Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 158.


the possibility of incomparably high returns. As more and more Somalis began to engage in piracy, the activity itself – regardless of whether or not the pirates in fact succeeded in hijacking cargo vessels and securing ransom payments – began to provide a mechanism by which Somali pirates obtained fulfillment of psychological needs such as belonging, esteem, and prestige. Participation in piracy by Somalis provided a means by which, in their own eyes, they believed they could accomplish something. The psychological element of Somali piracy, and the shared sense of belonging and brotherhood they experience, coupled with the lack of stability within Somalia itself, has helped to make piracy a highly enticing option for Somalis. Somali pirates – these fighters who now target foreign cargo ships – now view piracy, consciously or unconsciously, as a means by which to not only meet their basic physiological needs, but also as a means by which to fulfill their psychological needs such as belonging, esteem, and prestige. As Alan Cole, the United Nations coordinators of counter-piracy programs, stated, “There are fewer fishermen and more fighters.”

Thus, the first Somali pirates recognized rather quickly that by banding together they could successfully target foreign commercial fishing vessels, and later foreign cargo ships, they could obtain significant ransom payments in exchange for the release of the vessels and their crews. Western corporations and investment firms that funded the foreign commercial fishing vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden and within Somali territorial waters did not want to draw attention to their violation of international

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agreements and their exploitation of the country’s humanitarian crisis in order to expand their business and seek greater profits.\textsuperscript{39} As Somali pirates began to target foreign cargo ships more often than they targeted foreign commercial fishing vessels, Western corporations and investment firms, through their insurers, continued to make ransom payments.\textsuperscript{40} In turn, and again demonstrating their savvy, Somali pirates learned how to obtain ever increasing ransom payments.\textsuperscript{41} Somali pirates also improved the organization of both their operations and tactics, developing pseudo-hierarchical structures of their own.\textsuperscript{42}

It became evident that the ransom payments received by Somali pirates, and paid by Western corporations, investment firms, and insurers, provided a new means by which Somalis could meet their physiological needs. With access to the money from such ransom payments, they possessed the purchasing power to ensure their physiological needs were met. Somalis who successfully engaged in piracy and obtained ransom payments no longer had to view the sea as a critical lifeline essential to ensuring the physiological survival of their families or themselves. They now, consciously or unconsciously, viewed the sea – and piracy on it – as a means by which they could fulfill higher level psychological needs.


\textsuperscript{41} Daniel Sekulich, \textit{Terror on the Seas: True Tales of Modern-Day Pirates} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 149.

\textsuperscript{42} Peter Eichstaedt, \textit{Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea} (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 176.
Nonetheless, while Somali piracy transitioned from being a desperate response to physiological depravation to providing a means by which to fulfill higher level psychological needs, the significance of foreign intrusion into Somali waters by Western commercial fishing vessels has not been lost on Somali pirates. Today, they continue to predominantly target Western cargo ships and only very rarely do they attempt to seize a vessel of non-Western origin, flag, or ownership.\(^{43}\)

As Somali pirates took action against foreign intrusions into their maritime domain, first commercial fishing and then the dumping of toxic waste, they found piracy to be a highly profitable and low risk endeavor. It offered a means by which to meet their physiological needs, provided psychological fulfillment in esteem and belongingness, and dangled the possibility of great wealth amidst a virtually consequence free lawless environment. Inevitably, with their success and wealth came the expanded capability to better plot, organize, and execute additional attacks. As Somali pirates acquired increasingly dangerous weapons and gained more experience conducting both successful and unsuccessful hijackings, they soon broadened their operating envelope and began conducting attacks further and further from shore and soon thereafter, well over the horizon.

While there is widespread agreement that, at present, Somali piracy on the high seas has been overwhelmingly criminal in nature and represents a criminal violation of international law, there is equally widespread agreement and growing concern that Somali piracy may again undergo a mutation, much the same as it did when it

transitioned from a physiological response to providing psychological fulfillment. The current mutation of Somali piracy appears to be underway and must be thwarted. This time, mutation of Somali piracy could pose a significantly more dangerous threat set to American and Western security interests. Should Somali pirates experience self-actualization, driven by a new found ideological identification and affiliation with Islamist extremists such as al Qaeda and al Shabaab, American and Western interests in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, and the broader region would face a major security threat. The United States and the West must recalibrate their anti and counter-piracy strategies in order to more effectively thwart such an evolution, particularly as Somali piracy has expanded at an exponential rate in recent years.

7-3: EXPANSION OF SOMALI PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN

While Somali piracy emerged in the mid 1990s and piracy rates held relatively steady for several years, there has been a surge in the annual incidents of piracy every year since the early 2000s. The most recent aggregate trend analysis and statistics available on piracy in the Gulf of Aden are focused on the years 2003 through 2008. Over this five year period, there has been a 511% percent increase in annual incidents of maritime piracy off the Somali coastline and throughout the Gulf of Aden.


In 2003, there were eighteen piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden. By 2008, that number had climbed to ninety-two.\textsuperscript{48} Though piracy levels held relatively steady between 2003 and 2007, demonstrating only incremental increases, Somali piracy spiked exponentially between 2007 and 2008.\textsuperscript{49} The timing of such a spike in maritime piracy correlates with the on the ground situation at the time in Somalia. As Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia to provide a stabilizing force against the ICU and took ground to provide a sense of order and authority throughout the country, Somalis who traditionally engaged in black market crime on land found their environment altered by the presence of Ethiopian forces. In response, it appeared these savvy and adaptable individuals moved from both their urban and rural locations towards the Somali coast in search of a new and more lawless base of operations.\textsuperscript{50} The Somali coast provided an ideal new staging ground for these rogue, savvy, and adaptable individuals to conduct their criminal enterprise throughout the Ethiopian incursion and occupation.\textsuperscript{51}

Ironically, though the United States worked backchannel diplomatic negotiations to incentivize the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia in late 2006 and provided covert SOF support on the ground within Somalia, the fact remains that the American motive and Ethiopian mission was to route the expanding Islamist presence and to remove the threat of Islamists such as the ICU, al Qaeda, or al Shabaab formally seizing power and

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  \item \textsuperscript{47} U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. \textit{International Piracy on the High Seas}. 111\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., February 4, 2009, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 3-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Angel Rabasa, \textit{Radicalism in East Africa} (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2009), 21 and 63-64.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 20-21.
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establishing a functional government within Somalia. At the time, and throughout the remainder of the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia until 2009, the United States did not arrange for Ethiopian forces to engage in significant operations along the Somali coastline. As Somali piracy expanded rapidly in late 2007 and continued to exponentially increase throughout the remainder of the Ethiopian occupation, the United States missed an opportunity to more broadly leverage Ethiopian forces already within Somalia to directly confront the coastal villages from which Somali pirates predominantly operated in addition to the security and stabilization operations that were already underway.

While the presence of Ethiopian forces in many of the nation’s urban areas, and at times throughout the countryside, provided value in so far as they brought much needed stability and a relative de-escalation of Islamist violence, as soon as the Ethiopians withdrew the majority of their forces in 2009, Islamists returned to power virtually overnight. The radicalists emerged from hiding among the general population and rapidly began to re-cultivate and to expand their support base. Islamist “re-warlordization” began and the extremists began incrementally retaking the political center of gravity within Somalia.

Paralleling this rise in Somali piracy at large throughout the Gulf of Aden between 2007 and 2008 was the rise in the specific incidents of maritime hostage taking,

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kidnapping, and ransoming of personnel and vessels in those same years.\textsuperscript{54} According to the International Maritime Bureau, the spike in Somali piracy between 2007 and 2008 drove an increase in hostages, kidnapping, and ransoms at sea by 255\%, from 355 in 2007 to 931 in 2008.\textsuperscript{55} Meanwhile, overall incidents of violence to crewmembers through pirate incidents rose by 156\% percent between 2007 and 2008.\textsuperscript{56} This was directly attributable to the increase in Somali piracy as other acts of piracy throughout the world remained stable and/or decreased.\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, incidents of maritime violence by pirates – including hostages taken, kidnappings, ransoms, threatened crews, assaulted crews, injured crews, killed crews, and missing crews – increased from 433 in 2007 to 1,011 in 2008.\textsuperscript{58} Meanwhile, further accentuating the aforementioned point regarding the physiological to psychological transition of Somali piracy, it is important to note that only nine commercial fishing vessels were attacked by pirates worldwide in 2008.\textsuperscript{59} Though the majority of attacks on commercial fishing vessels did in fact occur within the

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\textsuperscript{54} U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. \textit{International Piracy on the High Seas.} 111\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., February 4, 2009, 4.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 5.
\end{谢引用}
Gulf of Aden and the vast majority of them were off Somalia, more than 220 major cargo vessels were attacked by pirates that same year.60

Given that piracy at large, and Somali piracy specifically, is today targeting numerous large scale vessels, it is clear that there are significant implications for maritime commerce throughout the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, and even the markets of the world’s most powerful nations.61 The NSC’s December 2008 *Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan* states the following:

Most of the attacks conducted by Somali pirates are aimed at ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, which is the shortest route between Asia and Europe. It is estimated that between 16,000 and 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden on an annual basis, including tanker ships moving approximately 12% of world petroleum shipments.62

Several of the world’s largest maritime shipping lines and cargo carriers are considering whether or not to reroute their transits to fully avoid the Gulf of Aden and the threats posed by Somali pirates.63 Should they decide to do so, they would then have to transit around the Cape of Good Hope and travel around all of Africa rather than taking the much shorter route through the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, and then on to the Eastern

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Atlantic. Should major commercial shipping companies ultimately decide to terminate transits through the Gulf of Aden, it is inevitable that the added cost of longer transit routes would be passed on to consumers across the world, impacting prices, price points, and purchasing power.
CHAPTER 8
THE RISE OF SOMALI ISLAMISTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PIRACY

Amidst such a recent rise in the prevalence of Somali piracy, both American and partner intelligence agencies have raised concerns that radical Islamists, including al Qaeda in Somalia, could further complicate security challenges posed by Somali piracy by facilitating a transition from piracy to maritime terrorism.¹

8-1: INTERACTION AND AFFILIATION: SOMALI ISLAMISTS AND PIRATES

The risk associated with a potential future marked by maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden is of serious concern to both the United States and the broader world.²

Al Shabaab, which has been designated by the United States as a terrorist group, has proceeded from taxing Somali pirates’ ransom revenue to dispatching its own fighters to attack ships – American vessels in particular – according to pirates, al Shabaab officials, residents of seaside towns, and the Somali government. At the same time, the Islamists militants-turned-pirates have been instructed to avoid ships from Muslim countries, in contrast to established pirates, who are known for an impious lifestyle and chiefly seek targets that are easier to board from their small skiffs. Even more concerning is that, in a recent sermon in the southern port city of Kismayo, Sheikh Mahad, a senior al Shabaab official, branded the group’s piracy as ‘sea jihad’ and called on young militants about to head to sea to target American ships stating that, ‘America is our enemy and we have to retaliate against them by sea or land.’³

Application of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs framework sheds light on such evolutions and provides insight into the conclusions reached by the intelligence agencies


² Ibid.

of the United States and the West. Somali piracy began as a means by which to meet basic human physiological needs. It then transitioned to its present form, or mutated, and became a means by which to fulfill general human psychological wants. Should Somali pirates at large be convinced by radical Islamists to transition from committing acts of criminal piracy to instead commit acts of maritime terrorism, such ideological self-actualization, as Maslow would term it, would carry significant regional and international security implications, threaten the sanctity of the global commons, and inevitably increase the cost of global commerce.

8-2: SOMALI ISLAMISTS: CAN THEY EXPLOIT SOMALIA’S SUNNI BASE?

It is important to note that Somalia’s population is overwhelmingly comprised of Sunni Muslims, the same major sect of Islam as Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network. In light of the widespread support of al Shabaab, another radical Islamist group, the fact that al Qaeda has gained an ever-stronger foothold within Somalia over the past five years is not all that surprising. Nonetheless, it is clear and concerning that the Somali population is minimally sympathetic to, if not outwardly supportive of, al Qaeda’s ideological platform and acts of terrorism. In fact this sentiment can be traced back to the early 1990s. Much of the Somali population’s support for Islamist

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6 Dan G. Cox, John Falconer, and Brian Stackhouse, *Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2009), 177.
organizations such as al Shabaab and al Qaeda can be attributed to the vehement anti-Americanism that solidified itself in the wake of the now infamous Black Hawk Down debacle of 1993.\textsuperscript{7}

Anti-American sentiment and detest of the West remains fervent in Somalia today.\textsuperscript{8} Al Shabaab’s strength, particularly in southern Somalia, taken together with the influx of al Qaeda, in a lawless nation brimming with uneducated, malleable, and depraved young men looking for a purpose and belonging poses is a major concern – particularly given the importance of the Gulf of Aden as a critical maritime domain and its significance to global commerce.\textsuperscript{9} Should the security of the region, on land or at sea, grow worse, there will be significant economic ramifications.\textsuperscript{10}

As stated by the former head of the United Nations panel of experts monitoring the situation in Somalia on land and at sea, Mr. Bruno Schiemsky, “turning a blind eye to piracy in Somalia is to invite disasters of horrific proportions.”\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, there is clear evidence of synergy between Somali pirates and Somali Islamists. Ignoring these trends exposes the United States and the underlying norms of freedom of the seas to grave


\textsuperscript{9} Ophir Falk and Henry Morgenstern, eds., \textit{Suicide Terror: Understanding and Confronting the Threat} (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2009), 320.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} Peter Eichstaedt, \textit{Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea} (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 5.
security concerns that threaten to destabilize the security that rests at the cornerstone of facilitating global economic trade.

There are … links between the pirates and elements of the extremist al-Shabaab militia that controls southern Somalia. The tentacles of such terrorist groups extend across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the freewheeling port of Dubai, ultimately reaching Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Africa, those tentacles stretch throughout Somalia and across the porous borders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and to Sudan, Egypt, and Libya. The pirates…are at the edges of an underground network determined to make Somalia not only a haven for madness but a platform for global jihad.¹²

As one of the most lawless and chaotic failed states, Somalia is an ideal breeding ground for the spread of Islamist extremism.¹³ With Islamist extremists already known to be operating within the country, they appear to be poised to facilitate and drive a transition from criminal piracy to maritime terrorism throughout the Gulf of Aden, and therein Somali pirates may become the first maritime terrorists since the days of the Barbary Pirates nearly two hundred years ago.¹⁴ Taken in whole, the situation does not bode well for the security interests of the United States and the West.

¹² Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 4-5.


CHAPTER 9
CURRENT ANTI-PIRACY STRATEGIES AND AN ALTERNATIVE

The examination of the emergence and expansion of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden in Section 7, along with the rise of Islamists in Somalia in Section 8, clearly demonstrates that any effective anti and counter-piracy strategy targeting the Somali piracy crisis must focus on both the maritime domain and the actual situation on the ground. The on the ground conditions have created an environment that is so unstable that instability has spilled over the coastline, over the horizon, and well out to sea in the Gulf of Aden. In fact, Somali pirates now operate hundreds of kilometers from the coast.\(^1\) Unfortunately, the current anti and counter-piracy strategies of both the United States and the European Union are shortsighted in that while they recognize that the on the ground conditions in Somalia have led to, and fueled a rise in, Somali piracy, they both fail to require both a land and sea based approach to dealing with the crisis.

Well intentioned though these strategies may be, there are many gaps within them. Continuing to address Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden through this misguided lens only further exposes the United States and the West to an increased likelihood that Somali piracy may transition from a form of maritime crime to maritime terrorism. Given the current trends in Somali piracy and the rise of Islamist power and influence throughout Somalia, and more broadly across the Horn of Africa, it is irrefutable that analysis of the current anti and counter-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden demonstrates that it cannot result in a long-term

\(^1\) Peter Eichstaedt, *Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 64.
strategic security solution to the holistic geo-political, ideological, and economic security threat set.

9-1: CURRENT STRATEGY: “THREE LINES OF ACTION”

The December 2008 United States NSC’s *Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan* articulates the current American anti and counter-piracy strategy. It clearly states that “Piracy off the Somali coast is only one manifestation of the tragic events Somalia has experienced for almost 20 years,” and that “long-term actions to establish governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia are necessary to repress piracy fully in the region.”

And yet, not one of the plan’s three goals, or as the plan terms them “lines of action,” directly addresses these long-term, on-the-ground, strategic imperatives.

The three lines of action proposed in the plan are as follows:

1) Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy;

2) Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag States; and

3) Ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim and coastal States, and … the United States.

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3 Ibid.

The NSC’s anti and counter-piracy plan is insufficiently proactive and is predominantly focuses on addressing the symptoms and implications of piracy rather than the root causes and systemic drivers of the crisis.

The first line of action is explicitly focused on preventing piracy in the maritime domain but only seeks to do so by better securing the seas through enhanced and expanded anti and counter piracy operations within the maritime domain itself – without expanding those operations to address land-based piracy drivers. The second line of action is explicitly focused on leveraging existing international law to reduce piracy along the Horn of Africa, but does nothing to address the internal humanitarian crisis within Somalia that further fuels piracy throughout the region. The third line of action is explicitly focused on prosecuting pirates caught in the act of piracy and apprehended at sea. But this effort, while important, is a response to the existence of, and the threat posed by, expanded piratical activity in the region. It minimally appears to presume piracy in the Gulf of Aden will remain a substantial threat for many years to come and, one could argue, appears to recognize that the piracy threat in all likelihood will continue to grow. The third line of action does not take sufficient action so as to likely drive a reduction of the rate of piracy incidents and will not likely reduce the number of Somalis engaged in piracy. Analysis of each of the three lines of action – the core goals of the NSC’s anti and counter-piracy plan – demonstrates that more comprehensive action is necessary to reduce Somali piracy and to address the holistic threat set it poses – including the Islamist ideological element that appears ever more likely to take root and expand.
9-2: THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT STRATEGY

Addressing Somali piracy through an anti and counter piracy strategy focused exclusively on deterrence and interception within the maritime domain, even when the NSC plan’s background section clearly states that piracy on the high seas, both at present in the Gulf of Aden and across the world throughout history has been a land-driven problem, ensures that current anti and counter-operations by the United States and the West cannot succeed. The current anti and counter-piracy strategy states that the intent of the plan is, “to reduce the incidents of piracy, thereby decreasing the impact on global commerce, and preventing the lack of security in Somalia from reaching out beyond its shores.”

That intent is now overcome by events (OBE) and needs modification. In fact, that intent was OBE when the plan was first published in December 2008. By then, Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden had increased more than 250% in just one year, and attacks were taking place well beyond the horizon.

In addition, the three lines of action in the NSC’s plan are inadequate because they are based upon an incomplete understanding of both contemporary and local drivers of Somali piracy and piracy throughout the ages. Somali pirates will continue to reach out beyond Somalia’s shores as long as the instability, violence, chaos, and full-scale humanitarian crisis is allowed to continue within the country. Piracy offers Somalis the

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greatest chance of a better life – and they have very little to lose by engaging in such crime on the high seas when those who have been caught to date have only rarely been prosecuted and held accountable for their misdeeds.⁷

Furthermore, indefinite anti and counter-piracy patrols, regardless of their multinational character, and even with British assistance via operation ATALANTA, are ultimately unsupportable over the long haul as nations will inevitably come to recognize that they cannot continue to avail multi-billion dollar naval platforms to conduct such operations against criminal foes utilizing basic outboard motors on twenty foot skiffs.⁸ In time, their willingness to support such an allocation of resources is likely wane given a whole host of other budgetary considerations, security requirements, and operations for which naval forces will inevitably be needed.⁹

With multinational momentum in place to combat piracy on the high seas, particularly among America’s partners in the European Union, it is now time to harness that energy and develop a revamped, comprehensive anti and counter-piracy strategy. While the European Union’s support for such an effort is likely should it result in a recalibrated and expanded maritime “solution” to Somali piracy, it is unlikely that the nations of Western Europe would support a broader land and sea based anti and counter-

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piracy strategy. Nonetheless, that is exactly what is needed to directly confront Somali piracy and secure the Gulf of Aden.

Given that Somalia lacks an effective central government and has yet to earn the respect of its people, it is clear that the challenges associated with combating the situation on the ground that drives Somalis to piracy on the seas will be incredibly difficult and fall almost explicitly to the United States and/or any international partners willing to join such an expanded anti and counter-piracy operation. Nonetheless, failing to make the tough decisions necessary to secure the maritime domain in the Gulf of Aden and to directly and decisively address the on the ground conditions within Somalia that drive the regional piracy crisis will inevitably result in further destabilization of the security situation and escalation of the Somali piracy problem.

9-3: POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES: RE-SCOPING THE SOMALI PIRACY THREAT

It is particularly troubling that while it is widely understood among policymakers that “piracy off the coast of Somalia is…a symptom of a much greater problem,” the extent to which they have examined the history of both piracy at large and the long course of events that culminated in Somalia’s descent into failed statehood is severely lacking.\textsuperscript{10} Policymakers addressing the maritime security issue in the Gulf of Aden have made anti and counter-piracy strategy decisions to date based on an analytical scope and a course of action spectrum that has been artificially limited due to paralyzing political sensitivities in the wake of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the scars of

the Black Hawk Down debacle. These political sensitivities have resulted in a reluctance to apply American and Western military force to confront the root causes of the crisis on land while actions taken to date in the maritime domain continue to merely address symptoms of the crisis. Actions at present related to Somalia and Somali piracy are driven by policymakers’ limited understanding of the holistic security threat represented by the failed state and increasingly powerful Islamist presence within it.

The handful of policymakers who truly understand the complex intricacies of Somali history, not merely since the collapse of the central government in 1991 but since the days of European colonial conquest of Africa, are of often buried within bureaucratic red tape deep within government agencies or are academics with virtually no near term policymaking influence. Twenty years ago, the Clinton Administration had to search the retired ranks of the State Department to appoint Ambassador Robert B. Oakley as America’s Special Envoy to Somalia.11 Today, the Obama Administration could find itself running a fools’ errand if it were in search of a similar individual since the United States has not had a diplomatic presence in the country since the collapse of its central government.12

All too often, and particularly in the case of Somalia and Somali piracy, American policymakers make policy decisions that are driven by short-term political sensitivities. They generally opt for courses of action that offer limited risk over alternative options


that, though potentially more risky, offer a much greater chance of reducing both the level and impact of a threat – including that of Somali criminal piracy and potentially Somali maritime terrorism. Ultimately, as demonstrated by the 2008 NSC’s *Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan*, policymakers often opt for well-intended but inadequate strategies that perpetuate the security threat they are meant to counter because they do not holistically understand the problem the policy must address. Given the geo-strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden to the security and economic interests of the United States and the West at large, it is in America’s national security interest to revamp its anti and counter-piracy strategy in the Horn of Africa, with an understanding of piracy throughout the ages, the long and unique history of Somalia, and by applying Maslow’s framework to understand the physiological, psychological, and self-actualization needs of the Somali people. In doing so, it becomes evident that decisive action on both land and sea, via either covert or overt operations, is necessary if the United States and the West seriously intend to stabilize this critical maritime domain. Maritime security in the Gulf of Aden cannot be achieved purely by addressing Somali piracy within the maritime domain.

9-4: A TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY TO PREVENT MARITIME TERRORISM

The United States cannot allow the free and peaceful flow of commerce on the high seas to be held hostage by Somali pirates, regardless of whether they are maritime criminals or maritime terrorists. The question that remains is whether such bold action requires overt American military operations in order to yield the desired impact. One alternative that has proven effective in the past seems far more appealing. Rather than
overt, large scale American military action in Somalia, a more realistic option exists and would be based upon a combination of covert, highly classified, American SOF missions in support of a publicly downplayed but fully renewed re-alliance with Ethiopia.

The 2006-2009 American supported Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia was highly effective, but the gains were quickly lost upon Ethiopia’s withdrawal in early 2009. While Ethiopian forces provided a sense of stability in Somalia and decreased the power of Islamists in the urban areas, the occupation did contribute to a substantial increase in Somali piracy. However, that increase in piracy was enabled due to the fact that the American and multinational anti and counter-piracy forces currently in place in the Gulf of Aden had not yet arrived in full on station off the Somali coast. With those naval assets in place today, coupled with effective coordination and communication from Ethiopian ground forces, American intelligence operatives, and covert military advisors, a renewed American-Ethiopian alliance could offer a realistic means by which to holistically address the crisis both within Somalia and off its shores. Through this approach, the United States could work to stabilize the situation on the ground and to prevent an Islamist driven transition from maritime crime to maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden.

Should the United States fail to make the tough decisions necessary to take politically unpopular – but desperately needed – action to address this crisis, the nation must be fully informed of the risks associated with such inaction. Such inaction would inevitably pose increasingly poignant threats to American commercial and economic interests throughout the maritime domain along the Horn of East Africa.
The West is about to commit the same egregious mistake in Somalia that it did in Afghanistan. … Somalia duplicates Afghanistan. The country has been wracked with war since 1991 due in part to the United States’ hands-off policy that followed the Black Hawk Down debacle and made the country ripe for an extremist takeover by militant Islamists. Doing nothing to bring stability and sanity to Somalia is inviting another 9/11, only the next one could be much worse. Doing nothing will also allow Somali piracy to flourish … They are increasingly linked with global financiers and religious fanatics prepared to kill themselves and countless others on the promise of paradise in the afterlife. These links to a disturbing and growing network may ultimately affect people around the world in ways they can’t imagine.\(^{13}\)

Though the cost of pursuing the joint land and sea actions proposed, in coordination with Ethiopian forces, are likely to be significant in manpower, resources, and political capital, the cost of inaction is destined to catch up with the United States should it fail to act – and that cost, both in lives and dollars, would surely be greater. Given the stakes at hand, such a policy shift is necessary even though it is controversial and politically unpopular.

Seventeen years after the Black Hawk Down debacle, nine years after the 9/11 attacks, and seven years after launching a still hotly debated preventative war in Iraq, the United States and the international community must work together to take coordinated assertive actions to address the on-the-ground situation in Somalia and the worsening crisis in the Gulf of Aden before it is too late. Years of inaction and inadequate action now mean that there is but a small window of opportunity left, perhaps eighteen to twenty-four months, before the situation in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden becomes so bad that it may well become unsalvageable. The United States and the American people

\(^{13}\) Peter Eichstaedt, *Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 5.
may not want it, but this is a much needed reality check. At this point, the United States can only blame itself for what will undoubtedly follow in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden should it fail to act now.
CHAPTER 10

WHY AMERICA MUST THWART SOMALI MARITIME TERRORISM

Somali piracy is, in large part, the result of abysmal – and sustained – on the ground conditions that pose daily challenges to the population’s ability to meet its most basic needs. Somalia is a country that has lacked a functioning central government for almost two decades and ranks among the world’s most chaotic, dangerous, and volatile failed states.¹ A cursory historical review demonstrates that, in the near term, the Somali piracy crisis has evolved in response to rampant poverty and uninterrupted anarchy that has spanned the last twenty years. Within the last four years, Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden has exploded. Annual documented incidents of Somali piracy have increased exponentially between 2007 and 2008 and attacks continue to rise.² The level of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is particularly concerning given the fact that “the actual number of attacks could well be higher; not all incidents have been reported as there is much illegal activity in Somali waters.”³ At the same time, a more holistic assessment of the historical conditions within Somalia suggests that an unfortunate course of events over the last


Over the last century, colonization and international opportunism have resulted in foreign domination and rampant interference in the lands that comprise modern Somalia. Though the country briefly experienced democratic rule in the wake of the World War II, foreign interference soon reemerged. Cold War power plays and attempts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to acquire a sphere of influence over Somalia, coupled with the central government’s blatant abuses of power, eroded the integrity of the nation’s institutions and the populace’s faith in them. In time, it became a matter of when, not if, the welfare state would collapse under its own weight. Within eighteen months of the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign interest in – and aid to – Somalia vanished and the central government imploded. Two decades of anarchy has followed as rival clans struggle for power, Islamist radicals, including Al Qaeda, establish and expand operations within this lawless safe haven, and as pirates destabilize the maritime realm.\(^4\)

It is clear that though Somali piracy emerged in the last ten years, the host of contributing factors is not merely the direct result of two decades of civil war. It is critical to understand the last one hundred years of the collective Somali experience to grasp the extent to which Somalis have been pushed to the brink and have struggled to meet even the most basic physiological needs, both on land and at sea. Understanding that collective Somali experience, from nineteenth century foreign domination by

European colonial powers through the anarchy of today, is critical to ascertaining why – for the first time in recorded history – Somalis took to the seas in mass not as merchants or fishermen, but as pirates.

Though piracy is often viewed as merely a maritime crisis and significant resources are expended to combat the threat on the high seas, the fact remains that maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is driven by conditions on the ground in Somalia – and those conditions today are worse than ever before. The United States and the international community must come to terms with the fact that Somali piracy, and the threats its existence poses, cannot be reduced merely by maritime anti and counter piracy operations. Somali piracy stems from, among other contributing factors, that Somalia is itself a failed state.

There are increasing concerns that an ideological allegiance could emerge between Somali pirates and Islamists within the country, a course of events that could pose significant threats to both American and Western security interests in the region and at large. Indeed, “the international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks” – either directly as maritime terrorists or as pawns in a larger game.⁵ In fact, “already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the U.S. terror-listed al-Shabaab.”⁶ Left unchecked, such a scenario can only become increasingly likely.

It is now clear that, “Piracy is not a problem that can be solved by maritime force alone.”\textsuperscript{7} If the United States and the international community are serious about securing Somalia from Islamists and the Gulf of Aden from pirates, success can only be achieved via a two-pronged anti and counter piracy strategy both on land and at sea. Looking forward, America should once again pause and look back at its own history as it determines whether it will finally – and holistically – address the situation in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Two hundred years ago, President Thomas Jefferson recognized that piracy was a problem driven by on the ground conditions of lawlessness and an environment without consequences. He recognized piracy was born out of physiological deprivation, but that, in the case of the Barbary Pirates, it had also ascended the ladder of human needs. Though Maslow’s \textit{Hierarchy of Needs} would not be published for another one hundred and fifty years, Jefferson recognized that the motivations of the Barbary Pirates were different than those of any other piratical group in human history. The key distinguishing feature, above all others, was the fact that the Barbary Pirates were the only pirates to self-actualize based on, and in support of advancing, a radicalist interpretation of Islam advanced by the local beys. Should Somali pirates self-actualize based on, and in support of advancing, a radicalist interpretation of Islam advanced by Islamists such as al Qaeda, al Shabaab, and the ICU in Somalia today, it is likely they would transition from maritime criminals to maritime terrorists and open a Pandora’s Box\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{7}U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. \textit{International Piracy on the High Seas}. 111\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., February 4, 2009, 8.
of regional maritime security threats unlike any before seen in modernity and with instantaneously global implications. The United States must lead the world in carefully, yet assertively, taking action on the ground and at sea to address the Somali piracy crisis, much the same as it did two centuries ago along the North African coast.
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